For the Common Good: State Power and Urban Revolts in the Reign of Mary of Burgundy (1477-1482) 2503529860, 9782503529868

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For the Common Good

SEUH 17 Studies in European Urban History (1100–1800)

Series Editor

Marc Boone Ghent University

For the Common Good State Power and Urban Revolts in the Reign of Mary of Burgundy (1477–1482)

Jelle Haemers

H F

For Sofie

This book was rewarded by the Flemish Royal Academy of Belgium with the Frans Van Cauwelaertprijs 2008. Cover illustration: Willem Moreel, Protected by his Patron Saint, on a Triptych He Ordered for his Funeral Chapel in the Church of St. Jacob in Bruges After Receiving Death Threats in 1485 (1485, ‘Moreel triptych’; Groeningemuseum, Bruges) © 2009, Brepols Publishers n.v., Turnhout, Belgium All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. D/2009/0095/4 ISBN 978-2-503-52986-8 Printed in the E.U. on acid-free paper

Table of Contents List of Graphs, Tables, and Illustrations

VII

Acknowledgments

XI

Map of Flanders

XII

Introduction The Central State and Urban Revolts in Medieval Flanders

1

Chapter 1 The State

11

1.1

The Privileges of 1477

11

1.2

Repairing the Damage

18

1.2.1

The Marriage of Mary and Maximilian

18

1.2.2

The War against France

21

1.2.3

State Finances

26

1.2.3.1 The Empty Treasury

26

1.2.3.2 The Institutional Structure

33

1.2.3.3 The Search for Money

39

(a) Taxation

39

(b) Domain and Offices

44

(c)

52

Gifts and Loans

(d) Conclusion: Maximilian’s Financial Policy 1.2.4

1.2.5 1.3

1.4

59

Habsburg Politics

62

1.2.4.1 The Expenses of the Receiver-General

62

1.2.4.2 The Violation of the Privileges of 1477

67

Maximilian’s State Officials

78

Resistance against Maximilian

85

1.3.1

The Imprisonment of Willem Moreel

85

1.3.2

Criticizing the Regime

93

Conclusion

100

Chapter 2 The Nobility 2.1

103

The Crisis of 1477

103

2.1.1

103

Reaction after the Death of Charles the Bold

V

2.1.2 2.2

2.3

Adolf of Cleves and Louis of Bruges

106

The Thorny Position of the Nobility at the Court of Mary and Maximilian

113

2.2.1

The Victory of Anton van der Vichte

113

2.2.2

Noble Dissatisfaction

118

2.2.2.1 Austrians and Wars

118

2.2.2.2 Archducal Favouritism

121

2.2.2.3 The Court Ordinance of 1481 and the ‘Parvenus’ at Court

126

2.2.3

The Chapter Meeting of the Golden Fleece of 1481

129

2.2.4

Forming a League

131

Conclusion

135

Chapter 3 The Cities 3.1

137

Bruges

137

3.1.1

The Faction of Willem Moreel

137

3.1.2

Politics and Finances during the Reign of Charles the Bold

146

3.1.3

The Bruges Revolt of 1477

153

3.1.3.1 Bruges Support for the Privileges of 1477

153

3.1.3.2 The Craft Guilds Return to Power

157

3.1.3.3 The Bruges Privilege of 30 March 1477

162

3.1.3.4 The April Revolt

168

3.1.3.5 The City Boards of April 1477 and Second Privilege of Bruges

173

3.1.3.6 The Politics of Radical Craftsmen in May 1477

180

3.1.4

Politics in Bruges

185

3.1.4.1 The New Regime

185

3.1.4.2 Financial and Fiscal Policy of Bruges

187

(a) Expenses for the Court and the War

187

(b) Spending for Public Debt and City Administration

193

3.1.4.3 Fiscal Policy in Bruges

3.1.5

VI

195

(a) Voluntary Tax Systems

195

(b) Consumer Taxes

198

(c)

203

Building a Belfry ‘For the Common Good’

The Faltering Economy of Bruges

206

3.1.5.1 A General Economic Decline and the Bruges Response

206

3.1.5.2 The Bruges Tolls

210

3.1.6

The Food Crisis of 1481–82

216

3.1.7

Political Tensions in Bruges Before the Death of Mary of Burgundy

221

3.1.8

Conclusion: ‘For the Common Good’?

226

3.2

3.3

Ghent

228

3.2.1

The Revolt of 1477 and its Previous History

228

3.2.2

Eliminating Political Adversaries

232

3.2.3

The Social Background of the New Regime

236

3.2.4

Protest against the Regime

242

3.2.5

Conclusion: Comparing Ghent and Bruges

247

Ypres

248

3.3.1

A Sleepy Oligarchic City

248

3.3.2

The Revolt of 1477

251

3.3.3

The Repression of the Revolt of 1477

256

3.3.4

Conclusion: Comparison with Ghent and Bruges

261

Conclusion

263

List of Abbreviations

271

Bibliography

273

Index

311

VII

List of Graphs, Tables, and Illustrations

Graphs 1

The Revenues of the Receiver-General for all Finances in the Reigns of Charles the Bold and Mary of Burgundy (1467–1482).

28

2

The Revenues of the Receiver-General for all Finances, Pieter Lanchals (1475)

30

3

The Revenues of the Receiver of Flanders for the Quarter of Bruges and the Franc of Bruges (1471–1479).

31

Detailed Analysis of the Revenues of the Receiver of Flanders for the Quarter of Bruges and the Franc of Bruges (1476–1477).

31

5

Income from Aides in the County of Flanders (1471–1482).

40

6

Analysis of the Origins of the Revenues of the Receiver-general for all Finances during the Reign of Mary of Burgundy (1477–1482).

45

7

The Expenses of the Receiver-General For all Finances during the Reign of Mary of Burgundy, by Category (1477–1482).

63

8

Analysis of the Personal Expenses of Mary of Burgundy and Maximilian of Austria (Category 1).

63

Analysis of the Administrative Costs of the Burgundian-Habsburg Court (Category 2).

64

10

Analysis of the War Expenses of the Burgundian Court (Category 3).

65

11

Analysis, in Percentage Terms, of the Expenses of the City of Bruges (Fiscal Year 1475–1476).

148

12

The Nominal (Face Value) Profits from Bruges Indirect Taxes (1468–1476).

152

13

Payments by the City of Bruges for the Court and the War, in Groats (1467–1482)

188

14

Annual Percentage of the Total Expenses for the Court and the War (1467–1482)

189

15

Bruges Expenditures by Category (1476–1482).

193

16

Detailed Analysis of the Average Expenses of the City of Bruges (1476–1482).

194

17

Detailed Analysis of the Revenues of the City of Bruges (1476–82).

196

18

The Profits From the Indirect taxes of the City of Bruges Compared to the City Expenditures for the Court and the War (1467–1482).

199

19

Gross Revenues from the Bruges Indirect Taxes (1468–1482).

203

20

Revenues of the Bruges Toll and Expenses for the Lord of the Toll and Collection of the Toll (from 1481 until the End of the Flemish Revolt).

214

Revenues and Expenses of the Bruges ‘Grute’ Toll, under City Collection (1481–1492).

215

The Prices of Wheat in Groats per Hoet (172 liter), from the Accounts of the Hospital of St. Julian and the Chapter of St. Donatian in Bruges (1400–1500).

217

4

9

21 22

VIII

Tables 1

The Expenses of the Receiver-General in 1445 and 1477–1482.

2

Bruges Payments to the Duke during the Reign of Charles the Bold (1467–1476)

147

3

Profits from the Bruges Indirect taxes during the Reign of Charles the Bold (1468–1476).

151

Number of Previous Mandates Held by Members of the City Boards of Bruges (1475–1477).

174

5

Percentage of Bruges Expenses for the Court and the War (1476–1482).

190

6

The Rates of Bruges Indirect taxes, in Groats (1468–1482).

202

7

Index-linked Wheat Prices of the Chapter of St. Donatian and the Hospital of St. Julian (1476–1484).

218

The Number of Terms of Office Held by Members of the City Boards of Ypres After 1470 and Before Appointment in 1475–1478.

252

4

8

66

Illustrations 1

Execution in the Great Market Square of a Flemish City (perhaps the Friday Market square in Ghent?) in the Presence of a Noble Lady (Mary of Burgundy?) (ca. 1477; illustration from the ‘Chroniques de Flandre’, Wells-Next-the-Sea, Holkham Hall, Ms. 659, 78v).

7

2

Mary of Burgundy (Michael Pacher, ca. 1477; Collection Heinz Kisters).

13

3

Maximilian of Austria, 1459–1519 (Ambrogio de’ Predis, ‘Emperor Maximilian I’, ca. 1508; Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna).

20

4

Maximilian of Austria, Mary of Burgundy, and their Descendants: Philip the Fair, Margaret of Austria, Emperor Charles V, Ferdinand and Louis of Habsburg (Bernhard Strigel, ‘Emperor Maximilian I with his Family’, 1516; Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna).

61

5

Willem Moreel (Hans Memling, ca. 1475; Royal Museum of Fine Arts, Brussels).

80

6

Maarten Lem (Sixteenth-Century Copy of a Painting possibly from the 1480s; Potterie Museum; Bruges).

84

7

Adolf of Cleves (ca. 1485; Staatlichen Museen zu Berlin-Preußischer Kulturbesitz)

107

8

Louis of Bruges (ca. 1485; Gruuthuze Museum; Bruges).

110

9

Adolph of Cleves Serves the Dukes of Burgundy at a Banquet in his Castle (ca. 1485, ‘The Marriage at Cana’; National Gallery of Victoria, Melbourne).

134

10

Willem Moreel, Protected by his Patron Saint, on a Triptych He Ordered for his Funeral Chapel in the Church of St. Jacob in Bruges After Receiving Death Threats in 1485 (1485, ‘Moreel triptych’; Groeninge Museum, Bruges).

140

11

The Bruges Privilege of 30 March 1477 (City Archives of Bruges, Political Charters nr. 1152).

166

The Belfry of Bruges with its Octagonal Tower Erected during the Reign of Mary of Burgundy.

205

The Toll House in Bruges, With the Coat of Arms of the Lord of the Toll, Peter of Luxembourg, 1477.

212

12 13

IX

14

X

The City Hall of Ghent, the Façade Constructed during the Reign of Mary of Burgundy.

236

15

The Cloth Hall of Ypres before its Destruction in 1914 (Vandenpeereboom, Ypriana, I, xiv).

253

16

Tombs of Charles the Bold and Mary of Burgundy in the Church of Our Lady in Bruges (Bruges Museum).

264

Acknowledgments Writing a Ph.D. dissertation is a lonely work, but fortunately I did not write it alone. With the completion of this book, a concise revision of the dissertation, time has come to thank those persons who advised me in scholarly matters and those who tolerated my distraction and solitude. First, I would like to express my gratitude to Marc Boone, who gave me the chance to take part in the IAP-project (V, 10) ‘Urban Society in the Low Countries’ (2002–2006), and its successor (VI, 32) ‘City and Society in the Low Countries’ (2007–2011), both funded by the ‘Federal Science Policy’ of Belgium. Without this tremendous opportunity, his continuous advice, and his erudite comments, I would never have been able to complete my dissertation. And in the roguish acts of my life outside academia, Marc was a much-appreciated companion in fighting battles, in Gavere and elsewhere. The members of the jury for my Ph.D. (Wim Blockmans, Peter Stabel, Jean-Marie Cauchies, and Maarten Prak) and my close friend and colleague Jan Dumolyn were very helpful at moments when I needed them. Their extensive knowledge, internationallyrecognized contributions to scholarship, and influential writings in numerous areas of medieval history were a vital inspiration for me. Together with other historians, and colleagues and friends from the Department of Medieval History at Ghent University, they encouraged me at crucial moments during the writing process for the dissertation and this book, even more than they realise. I especially want to thank Liesbet Van Nieuwenhuyse, Pieter-Jan Lachaert, Nele Vanslembrouck, Alexander Lehouck, Bram Vannieuwenhuyze, Linde Vandevelde, Cyriel Vleeschouwers, Monique Van Melkebeek, Tim Soens, Frederik Buylaert, Bart Lambert, Jonas Braekevelt, Vanessa Gelorini, Hannes Lowagie, Thérèse de Hemptinne, Jeroen Deploige, Claudine Colyn, Anne-Laure Van Bruaene, Susie Sutch, Elodie Desjardin, Hilde Symoens, Christophe Verbruggen, Guy Dupont, Céline Van Hoorebeeck, Hanno Wijsman, Louis Sicking, Claire Billen, and Walter Prevenier. Like the revolts I discuss in this book, historical research is a collective action. The contribution of these people and many others supported the preparation of this book in different, but crucial, ways. Several friends deserve a mention in this preface because they repeatedly contributed to the present result of the endless process we call writing, and because they helped me maintain my balance by standing by me. Joris, Lars, Delphine, and Ilse know why I name them here. Moreover, Lars was mad enough to provide skilful assistance in text revision during the final days of dissertation writing. The professional help of my overseas friend Shennan Hutton was essential in the last phase of the English redaction of this book, and without her this book would not be readable. Without the permanent support of my parents it would not have been written. Together with Lien and Mauk, they were a warm refuge in both dark and more joyful moments. I owe them a lot. Sofie, last but not least, made me deliriously happy, simply because of the mere fact she is always here. Therefore I dedicate this book to her. Ghent, 8 August 2008. XI

The county of Flanders in the fifteenth century (© ERIK THOEN, TIM SOENS EN REBECCA BEECKMAN).

XII

Introduction

The Central State and Urban Revolts in Medieval Flanders On 27 March 1482 history changed. In the beginning of March (the precise location and the exact moment are unknown), Duchess Mary of Burgundy was fatally injured after she fell off her horse during a hunt in the park of Wijnendale castle near Bruges. The dying woman, probably expecting her fourth child, was carried to the Burgundian palace in Bruges, where she was attended by her ‘first knight of honour’, Louis of Bruges. Adolf of Cleves, the lord of Wijnendale and the Burgundian dynasty’s guardian angel, travelled to Brussels to take charge of her children, Philip, heir-apparent to the duchy, and his younger sister Margaret. Meanwhile, Mary’s husband, the Habsburg Archduke Maximilian of Austria, son of the Holy Roman Emperor, tried to plan for the future. On 24 March Mary made her will and appointed Maximilian as regent of their young son Philip. Then the duchess’ health improved temporarily, but on Wednesday the 27th, surrounded by the inner circle of the court, she died. On 2 April, Mary of Burgundy was buried ‘with full distinction, honours and pomp’, as a chronicler noted.1 The sumptuous tomb in the Bruges Church of Our Lady gives silent witness to the elaborate funeral. Control of the regency for her son, Philip the Fair (1478–1506), was the focus of the Flemish Revolt from 1482 until 1492. The delicate question of whether Maximilian should be regent of the count came into dispute immediately after Mary’s death. On the authority of the late duchess’ will, Maximilian claimed guardianship over their son, but the marriage contract he had signed on 18 August 1477 specified that he had no right to inherit from Mary if they had children. In spite of a ducal amendment dated 17 September 1477 annulling this clause of the marriage contract, the city of Ghent refused to accept Maximilian as regent in 1482. Instead, the cities of Ghent, Bruges and Ypres administered the regency through a ‘guardianship council’, set up in January 1483, and then through the regency council, established in the following June. Maximilian was completely excluded. In spring 1485, Maximilian’s army conquered Flanders, and he took over the regency until November 1487 when the city of Ghent rebelled. Bruges rebels captured Maximilian in January 1488 when he tried to take over power in the city. After the Treaty of Bruges was signed on 16 May 1488, the rebels released Maximilian and set up a second regency council. Once he was free, Maximilian gathered troops to attack the county. In spite of an offensive in Brabant by Philip of Cleves (a nobleman who had joined the opposition), Maximilian defeated and disbanded the regency council in October 1489. Maximilian again took over the regency for his son, only to face renewed rebellion by Ghent and Bruges. In December 1490 Maximilian managed to conquer Bruges, and in July 1492 Ghent surrendered unconditionally. On 12 October 1492 Philip of Cleves, who had built 1 ‘In allerhande hoocheit, ceremonieusheit ende pompeusheit’ (Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 216). About the injury and death of Mary of Burgundy: Hommel, Marie de Bourgogne, 353–60. 1

For the Common Good

Sluis into an impregnable fortress, surrendered in exchange for the favourable terms he was offered in the Treaty of Sluis. Philip of Cleves accepted Maximilian’s control of the regency over Philip. From that point onwards, Maximilian ruled the lands that had belonged to Mary of Burgundy. On 12 October 1492, the Flemish Revolt came to an end on the same day that Christopher Columbus first landed on ‘American’ soil.2 During the decade of the Flemish Revolt two political visions of the ideal organisation and operation of the Burgundian state were at issue. The regency council supported a federal state structure, whereas Maximilian and his entourage promoted a highly centralized state organisation. Both parties supported the existence of the central state, but they differed over how much authority the central state should have. This book is an analysis of the motivations people had to support one of those two political visions. It addresses the following central questions: What was the social background of federalism in the Flemish cities? Who supported the formation of a highly centralised state in Flanders, and why? The short reign of Mary of Burgundy, just before the Flemish Revolt, provides the temporal frame. Following a definition of terminology, I will discuss why the political arena during Mary’s reign offers an ideal microcosm for investigating these questions. One conceptual tool of this study is the Weberian paradigm of the state. According to Max Weber, an ‘ideal’ central state successfully claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical and symbolic violence in a defined territory and over the entire population living within the territory’s borders.3 The central state has a differentiated set of institutions, monopolises authoritative and binding rule-making, and embodies centrality, in the sense that its connections radiate outwards from the centre to cover the entire territory it claims. The Weberian definition describes an ideal state which has never existed, and there are many varieties of historical states. The fifteenth-century Burgundian Netherlands was governed as a ‘composite state’, which means that the component states were united in the person of one ruler.4 Each state which the Burgundian dynasty ruled had its own privileges, representative institutions, traditions, and law. The umbrella state had its own institutions and claimed to have ultimate authority over the individual states, but the Burgundian state was far from the Weberian ‘ideal’. Maximilian governed a medieval state which did not have a total monopoly on coercion, or a monopoly on the governmental use of physical violence, state ideology and the levy of taxes. He had no administrative system that could efficiently skim the profits from his subjects’ economic activities, and the state’s ineffective and underdeveloped central institutions often hindered decisive political and military action. Nevertheless, just as the previous Burgundian dukes had, Maximilian tried to increase the power of the court and central state institutions. He believed that decision-making had to be centrally organised, and that the autonomy of subordinate levels of authority 2 About the Flemish Revolt: Blockmans, Autocratie ou polyarchie, 262–307; Haemers & Sicking, De Vlaamse Opstand, passim; Haemers, Philippe de Clèves, 34–80. 3 Weber, Economy and society, I, 64; Bruhns, Ville et état, 4; Kalberg, Max Weber, 9–15; Mann, The autonomous power, 112; Ertman, State formation, 369–70. About the Burgundian state: Blockmans & Prevenier, The promised lands, passim; Blockmans, Voracious states, 237–240; Isaacs & Prak, Cities, bourgeoisies, 207–22. 4 Koenigsberger, Composite states, 134–5; Elliott, A Europe of composite states, 50–1. About the Burgundian ‘composite’ state: Cools, Mannen met macht, 22–3; Schnerb, L’Etat bourguignon, 8–10 and Pirenne, The formation and constitution, 495. 2

Introduction

should be systematically diminished in favour of the court, central institutions and the state bureaucracy. Maximilian’s power over the state was not absolute, but he intended to be the only central authority in the Burgundian territories. The regency council rejected this centralistic view on the organisation of state structure. The cities did not dismiss the central state, but reinterpreted it as a federation, a political union of partially self-governing cities united by a central (‘federal’) government, the regency council. In a federation, there were constitutional guarantees for the self-governing status of the member cities, which retained significant autonomy. Some responsibilities of the regency council, such as monetary and military affairs, were managed at the centre, but others, like economic and fiscal policies, were decided by the individual cities. The composition of the regency council demonstrated its federal structure. In addition to several important nobles, representatives from the three main cities of the county had permanent seats on the council and participated in all decision-making. The regency council resided in Ghent, along with the young count. Political participation of city representatives on the regency council was designed to make arbitrary action by a sovereign impossible. The federal model of the state was based on the corporate organisation of city politics. The policy model of the cities, the social system of ‘corporatism’, consisted of several relatively autonomous organisations (like the medieval guilds), called corporations, who had a certain monopoly on coercion over their members.5 The autonomy of the urban corporations was based on privileges and the right of self-government. Neither the corporations nor the cities wanted to give up their autonomy to the central state, but they would cooperate with the central government because their representatives had a permanent role in managing that government. Although the federal model of state power was adopted by the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic and some modern states, the Flemish regency council lost its battle against the centralistic model of political organisation. Another useful model for analyzing these issues is the city-state, as defined by Peter Burke. City-states are a particular form of a state, aptly defined by Peter Burke as a self-governing political entity, free from control by any prince.6 A city council not only independently governed the city, but also exercised absolute sovereignty over the surrounding countryside, which was crucial for the economic supply of the city. Often, as in northern Italy, city states were in competition with their neighbours, or with other central states. Although Bruges, Ghent and Ypres governed their city and their hinterland ‘quarters’ (‘kwartieren’) in an autonomous manner, as they did in 1477 when they regained political power, they were never fully independent from the Flemish count. However, the fifteenthcentury Flemish cities show some of the features of city-states, which are listed by Burke. As Burke says, taxes were a socially divisive issue in city-states, as in Bruges in 1477–82, where the rich preferred indirect taxes while others wanted some form of property tax. Politically, the cities were divided into three levels: a governing body, generally recruited from wealthy families; a larger group of citizens, who could at least occasionally cast votes; and those without political rights. City-state institutions followed the principles of corporatism. 5 Corporatism formed the basis of the structural organisation of the urban guilds (Boone, Les metiers, 20–1; Stabel, Guilds in medieval Flanders, 187–98) and many medieval and early modern cities (Prak, Corporate politics, 74–82; idem, Republikeinse veelheid, 318–9). 6 Burke, City states, 140–2. See also Weber, Economy and society, 1212–26; Nippel, Introductory remarks, 28–9; Chittolini, Cities, “City states”, 30–1; Martines, Power and imagination, 130–61 and (about Flanders) Prevenier & Boone, De ‘stadstaat’-droom, 80–1. 3

For the Common Good

Guilds were responsible for their own economic production, quarters were ruled by councils, and guilds and/or quarters participated in urban politics, usually by representation. Principles such as ‘Quod omnes tangit’ (that which affects all [should be decided by all]) and ‘no taxation without representation’ underpinned the city-state. As the research of Jan Dumolyn pointed out, the Flemish cities even had a corporatist ideology. This concept can be defined as a principle to order the urban community with norms and values including peace, the common weal (‘le bien public’), and ‘freedoms’ (privileges) as central features.7 Key elements in the ideology of the Flemish cities were the terms unity, brotherhood, and the common utility of politics. According to their own discourse, the political motivation of urban politicians in Flanders was the ‘common good’ of the country. But in practice, the Flemish cities, as the Italian city-states, were ruled according to maxims such as ‘panem et circenses’ (bread and circuses) and ‘divide et impera’ (divide and rule). Corporate politics and ideas could not prevent socio-political conflicts in the north-central Italian city-states or in Flanders. Conflict between factions and parties often divided the cities and weakened their political position vis-à-vis other states. Chapter 3 explores this comparison further in an indepth examination of the Flemish ‘imitation’ city-state as applied to the city of Bruges. Many historians and social scientists have offered explanations for the pattern that centralized states tend to survive more often than city-states. Centrality in a state seems to be an advantage in the ‘survival of the fittest’ environment of competition among states. The monopoly on coercion gives a central state more ability to acquire money and the means of physical violence which can be used to conquer or demolish rival state structures. Moreover, waging war, extraction, and capital accumulation interacted to shape European state-building.8 To wage wars, monarchs needed sufficient financial means, which meant that state revenues had to increase. To increase state revenues, the state often had to use coercive means to extract the fiscal resources. Thus the concentration of coercion depended in part on the concentration of capital, and vice versa. The more specialised taxation structures of the state became, the more the state evolved from the medieval archetype of the ‘domain state’, into a ‘tax state’, and then into a ‘fiscal state’, as elaborated by Richard Bonney. The Burgundian state was a tax state, which is characterized by an increased government reliance on borrowing without a sophisticated financial structure sufficient to support it.9 A state’s chances for survival depended on its ability to collect enough taxes to wage effective war against political and military rivals. In this battle between the states, a centralised state structure was a crucial advantage. However, states needed more than just financial resources to eliminate their rivals. The example of the Flemish Revolt shows that states also needed social, economic and symbolic capital to survive. These forms of ‘capital’ are taken from the conceptual framework of Pierre Bourdieu. According to the French sociologist, the state is the culmination of a process of concentration of different types of capital. For Bourdieu, capital is an individual quality of a person, a form of labour he has absorbed. The capital of a person or a group serves as their social credentials. Concentration of capital at the state level makes the state 7 Dumolyn, Privileges and novelties, 21–2. See also Lecuppre-Desjardin, La ville des cérémonies, 329–30 and Blickle, Kommunalismus, II, passim. 8 Tilly, War making and state making, 172; idem, Entanglements of European cities, 9–10; Genet, L’Etat moderne, 262; Gunn, Grummitt & Cools, War, state, and society, 329; Ertman, State formation, 375–8. 9 Bonney, The rise of the fiscal state, 13; Krüger, Public finance and modernisation, 52; Ormrod, The West European monarchies, 123–7. 4

Introduction

the holder of meta-capital, giving it power over other types of capital and its holders. Concentration of the different types of capital leads to the emergence of a specific ‘state capital’ (‘capital étatique’) which enables the state to exercise power over different social fields.10 Financial resources, like taxes, are a form of economic capital, which can be used to finance military operations, or distributed to servants, state officials, loyal nobles, and others. This redistribution of capital is an essential mechanism of the social and political system of ‘state feudalism’. 11 Economic capital extracted by the centre can be transformed into social, cultural, and symbolic types of capital. In the ‘struggle for existence’ between states, economic capital is an indispensable resource, but it is not sufficient in itself. A state must also gather symbolic capital of recognized authority. Symbolic capital gives the state the legitimacy to use force, collect taxes, appoint officials and perform all other acts of authority. The symbolic capital of a monarch gives him a creative, semi-divine power, which makes him capable of governing the state, ruling subjects and fighting rivals.12 A state also possesses social capital, in the form of social networks and the system of norms and sanctions that facilitate co-operative action among individuals and communities.13 The Burgundian dukes and their court built up social networks in local institutions and among urban elites, and the court accumulated social capital from those networks. The court could use the networks to infiltrate local politics and support the state-formation process. The duke encouraged Burgundian nobles to create social bonds, such as marriages, with state officials and urban patricians. In this manner, a new statewide or supra-regional nobility was created, which combined traditional noble values and patrilineal family structures with practical bourgeois ability in law and finances. The dukes, court, and the state-wide nobility spread a state ideology (a form of symbolic capital) in which the defence of justice and the common good were the key elements. Objectively-shared interests in maintaining the structure of the state were thus subjectively reproduced.14 In the end, social capital created and maintained trust among the supraregional elite, which was crucial for its survival. However, social capital is also not enough to govern a state. Without other forms of state capital, a state can not be reproduced. An analysis of the state capital accumulated by the Burgundian dynasty by the time of Mary of Burgundy’s reign is an important component of Chapter 1. Because of the unusual circumstances of Mary’s reign (1477–1482), the Burgundian state acquired a very particular structure. After Duke Charles the Bold died in battle on 5 January 1477, the Estates-General of the Burgundian lands wrung additional privileges from the distraught court. The young duchess and her trusted advisors, Louis of Bruges and Adolf of Cleves, granted these privileges to the Estates-General and to several cities, in order to get their support for the war against the French king. With the privileges the Estates were modifying the state structure, introducing federalism and giving themselves 10 Bourdieu, Rethinking the state, 4–8. See also Dumolyn, The political and symbolic economy, 124–6. 11 Dumolyn, The political and symbolic economy, 118–20; Genet, La genèse de l’Etat moderne, passim. 12 Bourdieu, Sur le pouvoir symbolique, 410; Genet, Which state rises, 122–3. 13 Social capital as a term came into wider and more consistent usage following the work of James Coleman and Robert Putnam (see Halpern, Social capital, 38–9; Coleman, Social capital, 98; Putnam, Making democracy work, 167). In this book I follow the original definition of Pierre Bourdieu (see his Le capital social) because the interpretation of Coleman, Putnam and others raise serious problems for the historian (see the critique of Gaggio, Do social historians, 507–11, and Haemers, Protagonist of antiheld?, 53–4). 14 Dumolyn, Nobles, patricians, and officers, 446. See also Prevenier, De netwerken in actie, 295–6 and Boone, Elites urbaines, passim. 5

For the Common Good

substantial control over state policy. As a consequence, the reign of Mary of Burgundy is an unique period in the fifteenth-century history of the county of Flanders because supporters of a federal state structure came to power. It offers an excellent opportunity to uncover the social background of medieval federalism. However, the Estates did not successfully force the state to observe these privileges, and, moreover, the husband of the duchess, Maximilian of Austria – who married Mary of Burgundy in August 1477 – tried to undo some of the restrictions in the privileges of 1477. Throughout Mary’s reign, the Estates were able to check his efforts to increase the power of the central state and obstruct his policy, especially in Flanders. The subject of this book, the political resistance of the Flemish cities during the reign of Mary of Burgundy, addresses the prelude to the Flemish Revolt. The records of the cities’ resistance against the state reveal the reasons why people opposed the centralising policy of the state and its officials. Equally interesting were the motivations of the state servants who supported Maximilian, another subject of this investigation. While state structure and the ‘top-down’ formation of the state are crucial movements in this period, ‘bottom-up’ movements by subjects to restrict or to obstruct central state power were also significant. The medieval county of Flanders had a strong tradition of political involvement of subjects and representative institutions. By the eleventh century the most important cities of the county (Ghent, Bruges, and Ypres) had already set up a representative body charged with deciding economic policy (the ‘scabini Flandriae’).15 As the county had no natural boundaries, the cities also had to work out a common military defence structure. From the twelfth century, as the power of the Flemish count started to increase, the meetings of the representatives of the three cities became an institutional forum whose main function was to manage regional trade routes and negotiate with the count. The count supported the growing power of the cities, because they were powerful counterweights to diminish the power of the rural nobility. According to the ‘Königsmechanismus’, developed by Norbert Elias, two relatively weak powers (the cities and the count) joined forces to tackle the most powerful political group, the nobility.16 The count supported the cities as they set up an institutional structure to dominate the surrounding countryside, which in Flanders was known as the ‘kwartier’. As a result, the nobility who wanted to stay in power had to become dependent on the count, or move into one of the cities and join the city government. In the fourteenth century another phase of the state-formation process in Flanders began, as the count sought support from the relatively weak nobility to counter the power of the cities in their ‘kwartieren’. In a second application of the principles of the ‘Königsmechanismus’, an alliance between the count and those nobles who supported him was aimed at reducing the power of the cities. Rising tensions in the county often resulted in urban revolts, with the cities on the one side and the count and the nobles on the other.

15 Boone, The Dutch Revolt, passim. See also Dhondt, Estates or powers, 57–104; Blickle, Kommunalismus, Parlementarismus, 535–46; Blockmans, A typology of representative institutions, passim. 16 Elias, Uber den Prozess, II, 226–37. For Flanders, see: Blockmans, Princes conquérants, 168; Van Uytven, Vorst, adel en steden, 120–2; Thoen, Landbouwekonomie en bevolking, 637–43; Dumolyn, The political and symbolic economy, 114–7 and Stabel, Dwarfs among giants, 81–113 (about the ‘kwartieren’). 6

Introduction

Illustration 1: Execution in the Great Market Square of a Flemish City (perhaps the Friday Market square in Ghent?) in the Presence of a Noble Lady (Mary of Burgundy?) (ca. 1477; illustration from the ‘Chroniques de Flandre’, Wells-Next-the-Sea, Holkham Hall, Ms. 659, 78v).

But the urban revolts also had internal causes. As the economy began to decline at the end of the thirteenth century, social tensions in the cities grew. The urban craft guilds campaigned openly against the patrician oligarchs who controlled the city’s institutions. Whenever a city government fundamentally violated the political or economic privileges of the guilds, a revolt was the consequence. Moreover, the guilds fought successfully for participation in city government at the beginning of the fourteenth century, but struggles for power between different guilds eventually weakened the power of the Flemish cities. At 7

For the Common Good

the end of the fourteenth century, which was called the Age of the Arteveldes (named after the famous Ghent rebel leader Jacob van Artevelde who took up arms against the count in 1339–45, and after his son Filips who led a rebellion in 1379–82), the urban guilds had acquired permanent political participation in city governments.17 But in the fifteenth century, when the dukes of Burgundy took over as counts of Flanders, participation in city government was increasingly restricted. Small elite groups ruled the cities, and the dukes and their influential court attracted and recruited these elites to enhance their own status by furthering the state’s progress. In most cities this process worked smoothly, and fifteenthcentury political elites were much more docile than their forefathers had been. Unlike the middle class and the common craftsmen, these city oligarchs were less dependent on the urban privileges to ensure their economic wealth and political power. They thus undermined the corporate solidarity of the city which they were supposed to represent.18 Even the leaders of the guilds took the opportunity to gain personal profits from their positions as the privileged suppliers of materials or services to the city. Frustrated members of the urban elites who had not been approached by the duke could forge an alliance with the powerless craftsmen to contest their declining representation in city government. But because of rivalries within the city, a lack of support from other challengers to the state and the overwhelming strength of the duke’s forces, rebel alliances did not succeed in bringing back the good old days when guilds and local potentates had independently determined policies. With the repression of the Bruges revolt of 1436–38 and the defeat of Ghent troops at the Battle of Gavere in 1453, the Burgundian dynasty became the mightiest political power in the county of Flanders. But the dynasty was not invincible. In 1467 and in 1477, during difficult moments of ducal succession, urban revolts broke out against the centralizing efforts of the dukes. In 1467 Ghent rebels failed to reverse the trend towards central authority, but in 1477 an united force of people from almost every social group in the three Flemish cities succeeded in temporarily imposing a federal structure on the central state.19 This book investigates the reasons for the alliance between the urban elites and the craft guilds in 1477, and for their success in imposing their will on the dynasty. The case study of Flanders from 1477 to 1482 offers an almost ideal laboratory to answer these questions. I will examine the groups which were the driving force behind the revolt and elucidate their reasons for rebellion. Why did they want to institute a federal state structure? This book is about the motives people have to rebel when their shared interests are threatened, and how people and groups move from one position to another as circumstances change, or, in response to changes by their opponents, form alliances and factions. The central problem is how people’s motivations and preferences work together with historical traditions, local conditions, and personal rivalries, to complicate or nuance larger processes like state formation, economic change, and the ‘decline and fall’ of urban autonomy. Analyzing urban revolts entails uncovering the interests of actors which led them to resist their rulers or, on a larger scale, battle state structures. In our study of the pattern 17 About fourteenth-century rebellions, see Nicholas, The Van Arteveldes, passim and a detailed analysis in Verbruggen, Geweld in Vlaanderen, passim. The rebels did not have a lust for social liberty (as Cohn, Lust for liberty, stated), but wanted instead to restore violated privileges (see Dumolyn & Haemers, Patterns of urban rebellion, 378–82). 18 Blockmans, The impact of cities, 270. 19 Blockmans, Alternatives to monarchical centralisation, 151–4; Boone & Prak, Rulers, patricians and burghers, 99–111; Boone, Armes, coursses et assemblees, 14–20; Dumolyn & Haemers, Patterns of urban rebellion, 378–82. 8

Introduction

of urban rebellion in medieval Flanders, Jan Dumolyn and I defined rebellion as a form of collective action, in reference to Charles Tilly’s framework.20 A rebellion occurs when a group of people is pursuing shared interests, confronting the existing order and trying to gain political power by violence. Dynamics of economic crisis or growth, specific issues and demands, or socio-political tensions can motivate a significant number of people to aspire to political power in order to achieve specific aims. In the past, rebels have sometimes sought fairer governmental policies. They have demanded the abolition of repressive measures. They have always striven for the fulfilment of socio-political or economic desires. Rebellions and revolts are not revolutions, and this distinction remains the most widely used classification tool in studies of political violence. Rebellions or revolts, in contrast to revolutions, do not result in a basic structural change in society.21 Instead, they are attempts to obtain concessions from rulers, rather than attempts to overthrow existing social, political, or economic systems.22 Whatever social tensions the Flemish rebellions reflected, rebels never attacked the institution of the central state. Instead, they only wanted to improve the management of the central state or gain the right to participate in decision-making.23 This study seeks to reveal the rebels’ motives and goals, components of the element of ‘shared interests’ in the above definition, in their efforts and struggles to improve state structures and gain a voice in politics. A medievalist who wants to find out who rebelled and why is always confronted with a lack of sources. He or she can not uncover the motivations of each rebel nor can he or she even ascertain the exact number of rebels. Only wealthy people, usually the leaders of revolts, left behind files and documents. They could afford to register their acts with the urban government (in which they often held office) by paying to have their documents recorded in the aldermen’s registers. Their prominent socio-economic status gave them the ability to produce archival documents. In the course of repressing rebels, governments sometimes assembled and stored information about the individual rebels’ roles in the revolt. This information is obviously very biased, and requires a strong dose of historical criticism. My methodology was prosopographical research, collecting into a database all the surviving data from archival sources concerning the main actors of the revolts. If we accept that an individual’s behaviour during a rebellion was directed by his economic situation, social background and cultural setting, I need to reconstruct all of these facets of the lives of those under investigation in order to be complete. However, the sources are far from complete, and, unfortunately, a significant number of individuals and groups have left behind no data and will thus be absent from this book. Most often, my conclusions are based on a small number of (wealthy) persons, but whenever possible I widen the scope to consider the motivations of urban craftsmen, the middle class and more marginal social groups. It is even more risky to consider what these men might have been thinking, but it is my scholarly challenge to retrieve the ideological background and ideas of these rebels from the grudging sources.

20 As Tilly explains, ‘a collective action consists of people’s acting together in pursuit of common interests’ (Tilly, From mobilization, 7). See Dumolyn & Haemers, Patterns of urban rebellion, 372. 21 Skocpol, States and social revolutions, 4; Zagorin, Rebels and rulers, I, 22; Johnson, Revolutionary change, 142–9. 22 Brustein & Levi, The geography of rebellion, 471; Rotz, Social struggles, 69–70. 23 Rotz, Investigating urban uprisings, 232. 9

For the Common Good

This book consists of three chapters. In the first chapter, I describe the major events of the revolt of 1477. How did the Estates-General manage to install a federal state structure in the Burgundian Netherlands and what were the principles, organisation and capabilities of this structure? The first chapter also concretely delineates the amount and forms of the state capital held by the Burgundian dynastic state. My analysis discloses that the state was too weak at the beginning of 1477 to react decisively against the rebellious Estates, but after the marriage of Mary of Burgundy and Maximilian, the new Habsburg monarch tried to reverse the privileges granted in 1477. Maximilian, his court and administration targeted tax income which had been reduced by the privileges, employing a number of methods to get around the privileges and increase that income, such as bypassing the Estates-General, and inventing new taxes. There is a special focus on Maximilian’s borrowing strategies, which painfully expose the financial and political problems of the state and its officials. An analysis of the social background of Maximilian’s officials gives insight into the social capital the state had assembled and the fragile basis of its power. Chapter 2 deals with the nobility during Mary of Burgundy’s reign. The defeat of Charles the Bold at the Battle of Nancy upset many nobles. Many whose major properties lay in the regions that King Louis XI had conquered defected to the French court. Others chose to remain in Ghent to advise the young duchess or fight against the French. My analysis explores why some nobles chose to save the Burgundian dynasty, and why Adolf of Cleves and Louis of Bruges became the principal ducal advisors and noble figures in the Burgundian Low Countries after 1477. After Maximilian became the head of the Burgundian state, noble dissatisfaction with his policy and his entourage grew. Rising tensions at the court spawned rivalry between nobles, and between nobles and civil servants. The Burgundian nobility was as badly divided at the end of Mary’s reign as it was united at the beginning. Chapter 2 concludes with a discussion of the dissatisfied nobles’ backgrounds and the reasons for their increasing disillusionment. Chapter 3 examines the ‘Members of Flanders’, the cities of Bruges, Ghent and Ypres. They were the driving force behind the revolt of 1477. I begin with an analysis of the initial resistance and the composition of the privileges of 1477. I explore the changing power dynamics as internal revolts in these cities continued to change the composition of the urban governments, even after the grant of the new privileges. The policy of the oligarchs who ruled during the reign of Charles the Bold is compared with the policy of the new rulers who took power in 1477. The focus of this book will be on Bruges, not only because of its generous sources, but also because political tensions in this city reveal the most about individual and group motivations, preferences and coalitions. But Ghent and Ypres will not be ignored, because their distinct degrees of rebelliousness shed light on the causes of political resistance in Flanders. While Ypres obediently followed the instructions from the court, Ghent took the lead in a new escalating confrontation. For the struggles in each of these cities, I examine the reasons for the overt resistance to Maximilian of Austria and the dissatisfaction about state policy which would be the central issue in the Flemish Revolt which followed. At the end of 1481, before Mary of Burgundy died, and thus even before the Flemish Revolt, the ruling elites of Bruges and Ghent were at loggerheads with Maximilian. History may have changed on 27 March 1482, but the outcome of the change was highly predictable.

10

CHAPTER 1

The State

1.1

The Privileges of 1477

On a foggy morning, following a soldier who remembered the place where he had fallen, living men staggered among the frozen corpses. Wolves had already torn at the almost unrecognizable body. The envoys took up the corpse and escorted it to Nancy, where the Duke of Lorraine heaved a sigh of relief. Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy, was dead!1 He had been killed during a brief battle near Nancy on 5 January 1477. The jubilant scene at the ducal palace in Nancy in the days after the battle contrasted sharply with the uncertainty and ignorance at the Burgundian court in Ghent. Ten days after the death of Charles the Bold, his widow Margaret of York and daughter Mary of Burgundy asked state officials to continue the smooth operation of the administration, despite rumours of the duke’s death. In their appeal, the women expressed the hope that ‘thanks to God, he [Charles the Bold] is alive and healthy […], in a safe location and not in the hands of his enemies’. 2 A few days later the news was certain. ‘Flanders, cry! Your Charles has been slain!’, noted one chronicler.3 At the court uncertainty and grief was rapidly replaced by fear of war and rebellion. On 9 January, the French King Louis XI ordered his troops to invade the duchy of Burgundy.4 On the twelfth of January, expecting trouble, the Ghent bailiff issued additional weapons to his guards, and a week later, he had already pacified ‘commotion’ (‘comocie ’) in town.5 Increasing political pressure forced Mary of Burgundy to call for an assembly of the Estates-General to meet in Ghent, where she was then residing. In the following chapters I will analyze the commotion in the cities, the composition and the background of the decision-makers in the court and the estates, while this chapter focuses on the ‘legal revolution’ Maurice Arnould saw happening in the first months of 1477.6 Arnould has used the term ‘legal revolution’ to identify the privileges Duchess Mary of Burgundy granted to her subjects in 1477. However, as I explained in the introduction, the term ‘revolution’ is not useful because the new rights had no impact on the structure of late medieval Burgundian society. In an authoritative article, Wim Blockmans more accurately characterises the crisis of 1477 as a legal ‘opposition’. 7 The Burgundian dynasty did not collapse, but it had to make significant legal concessions to its subjects in order to survive. The combination of a problematic succession, the imminent threat of foreign 1 The report of the discovery of the body of duke Charles (7 January 1477) is edited by Lenglet du Fresnoy, Mémoires de messire Philippe, III, 493–6. See also Vaughan, Charles the Bold, 432; Blockmans, Les “Pays de par-deça ”, 39–47. 2 ‘Et esperons que, graces a Dieu, il est en vie et sancté, et […] qu’il est hors des mains de ses ennemis en lieu seur que autrement ’ (GSAB: GR, Correspondentie, 12, 11bis). 3 ‘O, Vlaendre, screyt! Dijn Karel is doot ghesleghen ’ (Dits die Excellente Cronicke, 177r). 4 Molinet, Chroniques, I, 173. By doing this, he violated the treaty of Soleuvre (of September 13, 1475) in which Charles the Bold and he had agreed to a truce (Cauchies, Louis XI et Charles le Hardi, 116). 5 CAG: 400, 25, 56r–57v. 6 Arnould, Les lendemains de Nancy, 1. 7 Blockmans, La signification “constitutionnelle ”, 496. 11

For the Common Good

invasion, contained but widespread internal resistance, and depletion of the treasury and military forces dramatically weakened the dynasty’s position. In exchange for badly needed financial and military support, the dynasty granted the demands of its well-organised subjects in a set of written privileges. The grievances of the Estates General were manifold. Seeking to increase the power of the court and its centralised institutions, Charles the Bold had been tactless and paternalistic towards his subjects throughout the last decade, and this had created much resentment. Even more than his predecessors, Charles had erected a centralized state structure. He had even wished to become a king.8 He believed that sovereign and specialised institutions in one geographic centre, a rational, hierarchical system of law, and, last but not least, a reliable flow of money into the Burgundian treasury would insure his complete sovereignty over the united principalities. Particularly in searching for military and financial means to wage his wars, the duke had broken with tradition. Favouritism, nepotism, the sale of offices, and other methods of collecting revenue had trampled on the rights of secular and ecclesiastical authorities. Forcing vassals into almost continuous military service, claiming clerical revenues, violating urban privileges, and levying taxes on commerce threatened the privileged status of the cities, the Church and the nobility. By the end of Charles’s reign taxes had tripled, hitting a record-breaking high in 1475. In May 1476, the assembly of the Estates-General accused the duke of buying only military defeats with these revenues, and refused to grant him a new levy.9 In the last months of his reign the duke and his entourage were completely alienated from the Estates. Charles’ desires for sovereignty and state-power did not correspond to reality. The dream fell apart on the battlefield of Nancy. Mary inherited the anger. Intense political pressure forced the desperate court to submit to the demands of the Estates. Mary granted a privilege to Ghent on January 30, and she signed the ‘Great’ Flemish Privilege on February 11. The privileges of the county of Holland and the city of Bruges followed in March, and those of Namur and Brabant in May 1477. The Great Privilege reversed the policies of Charles the Bold, and the regional privileges (of Flanders, Holland, Brabant, and Namur) dealt with regional sensitive issues. The short span between the beginning of the assembly of the Estates General and the formulation of the privileges show how deeply rooted the dissatisfaction was with the policy of Charles the Bold.10 The profound disagreement between the Estates-General and the ducal court in May 1476, stemming from the duke’s new demand for financial and military support after he had lost the Battle of Grandson, certainly gave rise to demands that the Estates forced the court to grant six months later.11 8 A detailed analysis of the policy of Charles the Bold in Blockmans & Prevenier, The promised lands, 174–95; Jongkees, Etat et Eglise, 238–9; Mollat, Une enquête à poursuivre, 184–5; Opsommer, Omme dat leengoet, 726–34 and Blockmans, De volksvertegenwoordiging, 614–5; about his wishes to be king: Müller, Um 1473, 262–3; Ehm, Burgund und das Reich, 118–129; Debris, “Tu, felix Austria, nube ”, 190–4. 9 Wellens, Les Etats Généraux, 150–2. 10 The death of the duke was known in Flanders on January 12, and official confirmation followed on the 24th. Six days later the Ghent privilege was confirmed, and on February 4, the Estates-General presented their grievances to Mary, who incorporated this list in the Great Privilege on February 9. On February 11, the Flemish and the Great Privilege were sealed (Arnould, Les lendemains de Nancy, 18–21). 11 About the Estates-General of May 1476, see Wellens, Les Etats-Généraux, 143–51. In the autumn of 1476 the Flemish Estates already gathered to address the ‘heavy business’ of the county (the ‘zware materien ’). Maybe some political grievenances were uttered at this meeting (Blockmans, Handelingen (1467–1477), 305). 12

Chapter 1 The State

Illustration 2: Mary of Burgundy (Michael Pacher, ca. 1477; Collection Heinz Kisters).

The grievances were numerous, serious, and desperate. The Estates complained about the forceful nature of Charles’ efforts to centralise state policy and the excesses of 13

For the Common Good

ducal officials. The Estates charged that attacks on local jurisdiction and widespread abuse of power by officials in ducal service had become outrageous. The privileges took steps to protect free trade, the integrity of regional territories, jurisdiction (in first instance) by the proper judges, and respect for regional and local achievements, and enacted drastic measures against corruption and the sale of offices. The Great Privilege stipulated that ‘all political deeds that violate the privileges and the rights of the regions will be nullified’. 12 Mary concluded the Privilege with a warning for her successors, that in the event a duke or his officials undertook anything not in accordance with the Privilege, his subjects would no longer be under the slightest obligation to render him any service whatsoever.13 Thus, in theory, this clause made any ducal violation of an existing right a legitimate reason for his subjects to refuse him allegiance and service. With the privileges the Estates legitimated the existence of the Burgundian state and even improved its operation. Control of corruption and the demand for competent state officials made the state function more reliably for its subjects and even for the executors of governmental policy.14 Some measures optimized the actions of central institutions; the council of Flanders became a full court of appeals. Moreover, the Great Privilege made opposition to the state by the Estates illegal as long as the government followed the stipulations of the Privilege. The Estates remained cohesive and loyal to the dynasty, but it was clear that the will of the sovereign had been bound by regulations. These terms clipped the wings of the state and its rulers, and reduced the authority of some central institutions, but they also produced harmony and stabilized state structure. What were the consequences of the privileges of 1477 on the finances, political power, juridical competency, and social capital of the Burgundian state? First, the Burgundian court lost its control over state financial policy. The privileges abolished three central institutions (the central ‘chambre des comptes ’, the ‘chambre des aides ’ and the general treasury in Mechelen) and returned authority to their decentralised predecessors. The Chamber of Accounts of Mechelen was again split up into the three chambers of Lille, The Hague and Brussels.15 The government lost some control over ducal finances, and the Estates assumed supervision of a portion of state revenues. The Estates of each region received the power to ratify or veto aides (these are voluntary fiscal subsidies of the subjects), and every member of the Estates had to consent in order for an aide to pass. In Flanders, the privilege reinstated the old repartition system of aides of 1408 (the ‘Transport of Oudenburg’), after throwing out the new system of aides of 1474, which had insured a payment schedule more favourable to the ducal treasury.16 Furthermore, the Privilege abolished the lucrative practice of leasing offices and all taxes which had been imposed without their consent. The Four Members of Flanders eliminated the toll on imports of 12 ‘Item, dat al tguent, dat in de vorseiden landen boven ende in contrarien van den voorghenomden previlegen, rechten, costumen ende usagen inghebroken es of namaels inbreken mochte, zal alsnu ende alsdan of ende te nieuten wesen, crachteloos ende van onweerden zijn ’ (Blockmans, Privilegie voor alle landen, 91). 13 Mary wrote: ‘Ende waert dat wij, onse hoirs oft naercommers hierjeghen ghinghen […], zo consenteren wij ende willekueren onsen vorseiden landen ende den ondersaten […], dat zij ons ende onse naercommers nemmermeer gheenranden dienst doen en zullen noch onderhoorich zijn in gheenrande zaken die ons van noode zullen zijn […], toter tijt toe dat wij hemlieden alsulc ghebrec als daerinne ghedaen ware, weder daden beteren ende uprechten ’ (Blockmans, Privilegie voor alle landen, 94). The Flemish Privilege ends in the same way (idem, Privilegie voor het graafschap Vlaanderen, 143–4). 14 Blockmans, La signification “constitutionnelle ”, 515–6; Van Rompaey, De Grote Raad, 130–1. 15 Dumolyn, De Raad van Vlaanderen, 144–5; Van Rompaey, De Grote Raad, 124. 16 Blockmans, The Low Countries, 287. 14

Chapter 1 The State

English wool at Gravelines, a tariff on alum, and other levies at the port of Sluis (the ‘quade placke ’, ‘bodemgheld ’, ‘leenknechtgeld ’, and ‘sheerengeld ’).17 Finally, the privileges forbade excessive manipulation of the minting process and devaluation of currency by the dukes. To reverse Charles the Bold’s policies on mint manipulation, the privilege now required that the court would obtain the consent of the Estates General to make any change in the circulation of currency. The judicial power of central authority in the Low Countries was diminished as well. The Great Privilege revised the Thionville ordinances of 1473, which Charles had used to replace the Great Council with the Parlement of Mechelen. The privilege instituted a new Great Council with permanent representation for all regions.18 The Council could not use an ‘omisso medio ’ to extend its juridical power over regional or local courts, as the ducal Mechelen Parlement had. In the same manner, the Flemish Privilege restricted the authority of its council and changed its composition. Appeal and reform still fell under its jurisdiction, but the feudal rights, cases of first instance, evocation, and total reversal of cases were now almost impossible.19 Both the Council and the sovereign-bailiff had to respect the integrity of the urban quarters (‘kwartieren ’). The state lost the power to direct the judicial system and appoint judges. The government was forced to respect local and regional privileges, now adjudicated by magistrates who could no longer be easily influenced by the state. But the privileges did not intend to abolish all central institutions. The Council of Flanders became a full court of appeal, the only authority that could decide juridical conflicts between Flemish courts. The privileges really only meant to reduce the council’s authority and minimize the interference from the central court in lawsuits. Abolition of the notoriously corruptible position of councillor-commissar, the restriction that only Flemings could be appointed to the Council, and the insistence on competence were all framed by the vision of enhancing the council’s reliability. The stipulation that subjects had to be addressed in their own language would make the administration of justice more accessible, but it was also a symbolical statement that those subjects had regained political influence over governmental policy. Politically, the privileges of 1477 did massive damage to the centralized state. The Great Privilege reduced state power drastically. The Estates General not only obtained decisive control over state finances and monetary policy, but also a certain political and military autonomy. The Estates acquired the right to meet freely, and the state had to win their consent before war could be declared.20 Other restrictions constricted the political authority of the Burgundian dukes, by limiting the feudal service of vassals, and guaranteeing free trade between Burgundian subjects and others within the Low Countries and in other countries, even enemies of the dynasty. The privileges prohibited ducal involvement in the appointment of ecclesiastical officials, and the increased authority given to customary law diminished the duke’s political influence. With these 17 Blockmans, Privilegie voor het graafschap Vlaanderen, 137–8. 18 The ‘new’ Council consisted of 26 councillors, namely one chancellor, four members each from Burgundy, Flanders, Brabant, and Holland, two members each from Artois, Hainault, Luxembourg, and Limburg, and one from Namur (Blockmans, Privilegie voor alle landen, 90; see also Van Rompaey, De Grote Raad, 131–5). 19 Dumolyn, De Raad van Vlaanderen, 52–4, and Blockmans, Breuk of continuïteit, 104. 20 Blockmans, Privilegie voor alle landen, 92–3; Wellens, Les Etats-Généraux, 163–5; Koenigsberger, Fürst und Generalstaaten, 561; Cuvelier, Actes des Etats-Généraux, 303–4. 15

For the Common Good

measures the Estates exacted revenge on the ‘bold’ policies of Duke Charles. However, vague language and lack of enforcement provisions in the privileges made it clear to discerning contemporaries that the Estates did not wish to become an alternative to the ducal power, but desired only to be a consultative body that could not be ignored.21 Such an interpretation reduces the closing statement of the Great Privilege, which gave subjects the right to resist ducal actions which violated regional privileges, to a mere hint, but in that hint was a very forceful political warning. Regional and urban privileges restricted ducal power even more. After the abolition of the humiliating peace treaties of Arras (1438) and Gavere (1453), which Duke Philip the Good had imposed after failed revolts in Bruges and Ghent, and the abolition of the Franc of Bruges as Fourth Member of Flanders,22 the cities of Bruges and Ghent governed their quarters again with extensive autonomy. Progress in diminishing the power of the Flemish cities over their hinterland, a ducal project for many years, vanished into thin air. The power of the cities now reached far beyond the city walls. The return to the old customary rules, such as the traditional election procedures for city aldermen and the guild administrators, prohibitions against the leasing of urban offices, and restoration of urban privileges made it impossible for the duke to influence politics within the cities. Even if the duke was able to appoint his candidates to serve as city aldermen, their sphere of action was severely diminished because power of urban institutions had diminished while the clout of the urban corporations, such as guilds, had increased. The count retained his authority to appoint local and regional officers, such as bailiffs, dune supervisors, and the ‘sheerenknapen ’ at Sluis, but the privileges eliminated the duke’s ability to exercise arbitrary choice or abuse his power. The city of Bruges even gained a decisive say in the appointment of the bailiff of Sijsele, chatelains of the ducal forts at Sluis, and the Sluis water-bailiff. The power of the cities again reached far beyond the city walls, to the detriment of central authority. The privileges even reduced ducal means to build up social capital. For many years the dukes of Burgundy had expanded the social capital of the court by bribery, patronage, brokerage, networking, and similar strategies. In fact, the court’s social capital was one of the main pillars of state power in the Low Countries. In order to break down the local power monopolies, the state had painstakingly built up an influential local clientele in every city.23 However, the privileges of 1477 restricted the methods the dukes had previously used to extend these loyal networks. For example, regional privileges regulated the wages of the officials and restricted the amount of special rewards the duke could give them, which had previously been an important ducal strategy to build the loyalty of officials. In return, those officials had extended loans to the dukes in times of emergency. Twice during the reign of Philip the Good, for example, these loans were crucial to Philip’s efforts to put down the urban revolts in Flanders (in 1436 and in 1453). Without this ‘financial loyalty’ of his officials, the duke would not have been able to pay his troops. The privileges attacked the financial foundation of this system with precision, and then went even further. 21 See Pirenne, Le rôle constitutionnel, 268. 22 On the 20th and the 30th of March and the ninth of April, Mary confirmed the abolition of the Fourth Member of Flanders (Prevenier, Réalité et histoire, 6–8; Blockmans, De volksvertegenwoordiging, 132). 23 See, among others: Blockmans, Corruptie, makelaardij en patronage, 233–4; Boone, Dons et pots-de-vin, 486–7; Prevenier, De netwerken in actie, 305–9; Dumolyn, Investeren in sociaal kapitaal, 436–8. 16

Chapter 1 The State

Any type of reward that might buy the duke influence was prohibited; the duke could not replace the commissioners who had appointed city aldermen, or give fiefs as gifts. The privileges stipulated that the ducal seal could only be used properly, and prohibited all ‘gifts, corruption, and equal behaviour’. 24 Although the privileges did rectify misfeasance and corruption for a brief period, they also fundamentally undermined the political gift culture of the Burgundian state. The privileges broke with the recent past, returning the county of Flanders to the ‘golden age ’ of urban autonomy. Both Brabant’s Joyous Entry privilege and the urban privileges of Flanders made explicit references to a ‘golden age’ situated before the succession of Philip the Good. The Bruges privileges cited the reign of ‘Philips le Hardy ’ (Philip the Bold), Ghent took the 1385 Peace of Tournai as its political anchor, and the Ypres guilds expressed the desire to return to the age of ‘count Louis,’ Louis of Male, the father-in-law of Philip the Bold.25 In sum, the privileges of 1477 intended to ‘federalize’ the Burgundian state. They expressed for the first time a federal political vision for the state, a point of view widely favoured in the cities.26 In this sense, the Great Privilege can be considered the first ‘constitution’ for the whole of the Low Countries, and it would later be used to legitimatize the Flemish Revolt against Maximilian, as well as the Dutch Revolt against Spain in the sixteenth century. In the privileges of 1477, the Burgundian state was not abolished, but kept as an essential part of political state structure in the Low Countries. It retained a central level of decision-making, in consultation with and under the control of the EstatesGeneral. The sovereign remained the keystone of the political and feudal order, and he or she unified the territories under Burgundian rule. Many central institutions, such as the Chambers of Accounts and the regional Councils, kept their governing functions, now approved as an integral part of the federal state structure. But the individual territories regained significant political autonomy. They could counter the duke’s arbitrary exercise of power through their representatives, in accordance with the medieval principles of ‘parlementarism’. 27 The state had to transfer some of its monopoly on coercion and tax levies, built up by Philip the Good and his son, to the regions and the Estates-General. From now on, the fiscal and monetary policy of the state would be controlled by the Estates, while the power of the court was defined negatively through prohibitions against usurping existing privileges and traditions. The duke’s opportunities to widen his influence by enhancing social capital were severely reduced. Corruption, patronage, and brokerage were restricted and replaced by rules reflecting politics from the ‘bottom up.’ According to the privileges the rules of this new federal state would enhance the ‘common good’, the ‘res publica ’ of the Estates-General. The Burgundian state was far from being a republic, but some republican values had crept into the state structure. How long would they last? Two dangers threatened the implementation of the privileges of 1477. First, internal disagreement undermined the position of the EstatesGeneral. In spite of the reforms promised in the Great Privileges, riots and revolts broke 24 ‘Ghiften, corruptien of andersseins ’ (Blockmans, Privilegie voor het graafschap Vlaanderen, 130). 25 See Gilliodts-Van Severen, Coutume de la ville de Bruges, II, 74 (Bruges); Vander Haeghen, La charte donnée, 277 (Ghent), and Diegerick, Episode de l ’histoire, 443 (the Ypres’ guilds wanted to return to ‘sgraven Lodewycx tyden ’). Concerning Brabant: Van Uytven, 1477 in Brabant, 269. 26 Blockmans, La signification “constitutionnelle ” , 516. 27 About parlementarism in the Low Countries, see Blockmans, Du contrat féodal, passim; Boone, In den beginne, passim; idem, The Dutch Revolt, 373–5; Dumolyn, Privileges and novelties, 20–3. 17

For the Common Good

out in numerous towns during the spring of 1477, as the populace expressed rage at the oppressive fiscal measures and curbs on urban and guild rights. This weakened the position of the representatives who had formulated the Great Privilege, and they no longer possessed the power to control the urban population nor the direction of state government, as I will discuss in chapter 3. Second, the court, particularly Maximilian of Austria, the new husband of the duchess, would try to undo the privileges of 1477. In order to rebuilt its monopoly on coercion, the state sought to regain the political power that it had lost in 1477. This project will be the subject of the following section. 1.2

Repairing the Damage

1.2.1

The Marriage of Mary and Maximilian

The privileges of 1477 were based on the desire of the Estates-General to reform the Burgundian state apparatus into a stable, but decentralized form of government. The only function of the sovereign was to protect the new state structure and guarantee justice and the strict observance of the privileges. Consequently, the future husband of Mary of Burgundy had to be a level-headed, but not domineering individual, who could ensure the succession. ‘Pour la reparation du throne de Bourgoigne ’, Mary had to marry.28 But the choices for the future husband of the duchess differed widely. The court, Margaret of York, and several nobles favoured a marriage with the Habsburg prince Maximilian, archduke of Austria, the son of the Emperor Frederick III of the Holy Roman Empire. They inherited this matrimonial alliance project from Charles the Bold, who on three occasions had promised his daughter to the Habsburg emperor in exchange for a title of king for himself. In May 1476 the duke had agreed to a marriage ceremony to take place in November that year in Cologne, but Charles’ military defeats determined otherwise.29 On 24 January 1477, three weeks after Charles was killed at battle, Emperor Frederick III, who did not yet know of the duke’s death, sent a letter to Charles reminding him of his promise.30 But the French king Louis XI had other plans, and he was supported by many of Mary’s subjects. In a letter to their home city, for example, the Bruges deputies to the Estates-General of March 1477 in Ghent severely criticized the possible marriage of their duchess to Maximilian of Austria. They argued that there was no legal obligation that forced her to marry Maximilian, and that a matrimonial alliance with the French king was probably the best way to end the war.31 In his desire to acquire the Burgundian patrimony, Louis XI proposed his son Charles as a candidate for Mary’s hand.32 The Bruges deputies were certainly persuaded to prefer a French spouse over a German one by the argument that the French king would cease hostilities if his marriage proposal turned into reality. But the age (and infertility) of the six-year-old Charles, and the 28 Molinet, Chroniques, I, 226. 29 Hommel, Marie de Bourgogne, 201. 30 Arnould, Les lendemains de Nancy, 13; Ehm, Burgund und das Reich, 202–14. 31 The Bruges deputies tried to convince the city that Maximilian was not able to stop the French invader, for he was ‘zeer onghereedt omme huer ende hueren lande bistant te doene ’. There was a better alliance (‘meerder noch beter aliance ’) possible (SAB: FD, 181, edited by Priem, Documents extraits, second series, VI, 285 and by Cuvelier, Actes des Etats-Généraux, 306). See also Blockmans, Handelingen, 16–7. 32 See, for example, Molinet, Chroniques, I, 194. 18

Chapter 1 The State

great intensity of the French attacks on the border undermined the chances of a French marriage. Moreover, the French king had a very dominant personality, and he was all for a centralised state structure.33 The Estates-General had no desire to grant him any power over the Burgundian state. They believed that the young German prince would be more easily convinced to leave the new federal state structure intact. Much of the Low Countries nobility also feared that the political influence of the French king would be increased in their homeland if the French dynasty absorbed the Burgundian, a fear which I will discuss further in chapter 2. At the end of March, following the advice of her court, Mary wrote to Frederick III that Maximilian must come help her drive away the French invaders.34 The Habsburg court in Vienna certainly received this letter with great rejoicing, for the marriage fit with the traditional Habsburg practice of extending the power of the dynasty (the ‘Hausmacht ’). With the conquest of territories and lucrative marriage alliances, the Habsburgs had build up a huge family patrimony, even including the title of emperor. However, this title had little real power behind it, as the Holy Roman Empire was a crumbling structure, and internal rivalries and different interests divided its many sovereign princes. This discord within the Empire prevented the emperor from establishing firm and consistent rule. The emperor did not have the power to levy taxes throughout the whole Empire, and so he could not, for example, mobilize a big ‘German army’. Only the personal domains of the Habsburg dynasty (Austria, Carinthia, Stiermarken, and others) provided the emperor with the means to support his own personal, and even imperial political gambits.35 He ruled these patrimonial territories autocratically in order to enhance the dynastic ‘Hausmacht ’, but if Frederick III wanted to extend his authority over the Empire, he had to expand his personal possessions. In this way, the marriage of his son and only heir, Maximilian, with Mary of Burgundy offered Frederick an unique opportunity, not only to inherit the rich ‘promised’ lands at the border of the empire, but also to strengthen his power within the empire itself. Expanding the dynasty’s personal lands and ruling them autocratically had always been a characteristic strategy of the Habsburgs, and thus also of its youngest heir apparent, Maximilian of Austria.

33 34 35

Favier, Louis XI, 919–40. Hugenholtz, The 1477 crisis, 35 (letter of March 26, 1477). Debris, Tu “ felix Austria ”, nube, 8–12 and 470; Rapp, Maximilien d ’Autriche, 63–83. 19

For the Common Good

Illustration 3: Maximilian of Austria, 1459–1519 (Ambrogio de’ Predis, ‘Emperor Maximilian I’, ca. 1508; Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna).

Burgundian subjects were probably not aware of this Habsburg defining characteristic, or, if they were, those who supported marriage did not think it was an 20

Chapter 1 The State

obstacle. The seemingly unstoppable advance of French troops and impending loss of Burgundian territory silenced internal opposition to the marriage of Mary and Maximilian. At its April 1477 meeting in Louvain, the Estates-General, who had the right to decide this matter according to the privileges of 1477, agreed to the marriage. A Habsburg delegation, lead by George of Baden, Bishop of Metz, convinced the Estates that the emperor’s competent son would stop the French invaders.36 On April 21st, Mary of Burgundy was pledged in marriage to Maximilian, with the Duke Louis of Bavaria standing in as proxy. Maximilian was still in Vienna, waiting for his father who was trying to gather funds for his son’s journey to the Low Countries. These attempts were in vain, because the other German princes did not want to invest in a project that only enriched the Habsburg dynasty.37 In Louvain the imperial embassy had secured the wealth of the ‘totally [and] loyally willing people’, as they described Mary’s subjects.38 With the promise that the new duke would save them from the French army, and in the (vain) hope that Maximilian would bring many German troops with him, the Estates agreed to the marriage. The final marriage ceremony took place on 19 August in Ghent, accompanied by the locals’ cries for peace. Maximilian entered the city through St. Bavo’s gate, where he and all others could read a sign proclaiming, ‘You are our duke, our military strength for battle; all that you tell us, we will do’ (‘Tu es dux noster, pugna praelium nostrum, omnia quae dixeris nobis, faciemus ’).39 The marriage contract, concluded on 18 August, barred Maximilian from inheriting Mary’s lands if she died childless.40 In this way, the Estates-General intended to create an independent dynasty whose rule they could control and which could not be absorbed into the realm of the German Emperor. However, as an Austrian prince, Maximilian was dedicated to an opposing mission, to increase the ‘Hausmacht ’ of the Habsburg dynasty. These different points of view at the outset of the marriage were signs that the alliance between the Habsburg prince and the Burgundian court would not be a happy one. 1.2.2

The War against France

After its demands to extract the privileges, the main concern of the Estates-General in 1477 was to halt the invasion of the French army. The war was having disastrous effects on the economic situation of the cities, especially those in the southern provinces of Flanders, Hainault, and Brabant. This motivated the Estates-General to pledge sufficient revenues to mobilize troops. In accordance with the privileges of 1477, and in close communication with the court, in March 1477 the Estates had ordered the mobilization of 100,000 soldiers (this was later reduced to 34,000).41 But in the following months the Estates lost power, and campaigns against the French resulted in disaster, obliging the Estates to turn over 36 Wellens, Les Etats-Généraux, 177; Cuvelier, Actes des Etats-Généraux, 346; Schneider, Un conseiller des ducs, 328–9; Wiesflecker, Kaiser Maximilian I, 122–35. 37 Debris, Tu “ felix Austria ”, nube, 196. 38 ‘Ein gans getrewes willigs volck ’ (Hommel, Marie de Bourgogne, 316). 39 This meant that the Gentenars would support their prince if he would end the war. Molinet wrote about the Joyous Entrance of Maximilian into Ghent: ‘The people who were walking in the shadows saw a great light’ (populus qui ambulabat in tenebris vidit lucem magnam) (Molinet, Chroniques, I, 224). 40 Edited by Dumont, Corps universel diplomatique, III (2), 10 and in the Chronique des faits, 446–9. 41 The county of Flanders (together with the casselries of Lille-Douai-Orchies) would pay for 12,000 soldiers, Brabant for 8000, Holland for 6000, and so on (Cuvelier, Actes des Etats-Généraux, 278 and 303–4). 21

For the Common Good

coordination of the war effort to the court, which could centralize the defence.42 By June, after the defeat of Flemish troops at Tournai and the death of their captain, the Duke of Ghelders, the court requested new tax levies from the Estates to continue resistance against the French.43 More will be said later about the financial means used to pay for the war. The next paragraph presents a brief chronological summary of the war, as well as an analysis of Maximilian’s military strategy, command structure, and logistics. The beginning of the war went disastrously for the Burgundian state. In January 1477 French troops invaded the duchy of Burgundy, which they rapidly conquered. The French king also annexed the county of Boulogne and the Burgundian territories in Picardy. The Duke of Lorraine invaded the duchy of Luxembourg and territory in Lorraine that had recently been acquired by Charles the Bold. French military success was greatly facilitated by the collaboration of Burgundian nobles who had defected to the French court. As the defection of Philip of Crèvecoeur exemplifies, desertion of nobles in 1477 also entailed territorial losses for the Burgundian court. Even before 1477, the location of his fiefs on the French-Burgundian border had forced Philip of Crévecoeur to choose sides between the French king and the Burgundian duke. After the defeat at Nancy, Burgundian LieutenantGeneral Adolf of Cleves had appointed Philip, a knight of the Golden Fleece, captain of the city of Arras, but ‘in the end he chose the other side’. 44 On 4 March, convinced by the tireless efforts of Louis XI (see chapter 2), Philip opened the gates of the city of Arras to the French king. The county of Artois was added to the French crown, and Philip himself became ‘maréchal de France ’. 45 As the General of the French troops on the Flemish border, he launched punishing attacks into the county until a brief armistice was concluded on 18 September 1477.46 After this armistice Maximilian planned a counteroffensive on two fronts, military and judicial, but his legal assault failed to produce results. He had ordered Jean d’Auffay, the personal ‘advisor of juridical affaires’ (‘maître des requestes ’) of Duchess Mary from 1473 to 1477 and legal advisor to the ducal couple during Mary’s reign,47 to compose a pamphlet which attacked the legal foundation for the French annexation of Artois and Burgundy. A printed version of this pamphlet was dispersed in order to gather international support for the Burgundian cause. King Louis, not impressed with the pamphlet, bought a charge of lèse majesté against Charles the Bold before the Parlement of Paris in May 1478, with the intention of legitimizing the conquest of his lands.48 The legal cases were accompanied by much propaganda attempting to convince others of the ‘right point of view’. 49 However, because neither party would compromise in court, the dispute was decided on the battlefield. 42 As in 1557, when towns tried to use the Estates-General of the Low Countries to take overall charge of key aspects of war policy in the same way, the Estates did not succeed in doing so for long in 1477 (Gunn, Grummitt & Cools, War, state, and society, 123). 43 Blockmans, De volksvertegenwoordiging, 447–9; idem, Handelingen van de leden, 28; Verbruggen, Bewapening en krijgskunst, 15–7; idem, De slag bij Guinegatte, 36. 44 ‘Finablement il se tourna de son parti’ (Molinet, Chroniques, I, 185). See also Harsgor, Recherches sur le personnel, II, 1088–9; d’Amat, Esquerdes, 37; Collet, Philippe de Crèvecoeur, passim; Potter, War and government, passim; Cools, Mannen met macht, 190–1. Philip the Crèvecoeur became the ‘bête noir’ of Maximilian (Dubois, Autour du traité, 139). 45 In a royal ordinance of November 1477, Louis XI added Artois to the French royal domain (Ordonnances de rois, XVIII, 304–5). 46 The text of this ceasefire is edited by Dumont, Corps universel diplomatique, III (2), 9–10. 47 Hennebert, Auffay, 543; Molinet, Chroniques, I, 378; ADN: B 2118, 233r. 48 Blockmans, La position du comté, 73; Lettres de Louis XI, VII, 36–44; Ordonnances des rois, XVIII, 396. 49 In this propaganda Louis XI claimed: ‘il n ’y a de duc de Bourgogne que moy ’ (Lettres de Louis XI, VIII, 200). 22

Chapter 1 The State

The war between the French king and the Burgundian court consisted of two phases. In the first phase, from 1477 until the Battle of Enguinegatte in the summer of 1479, the Burgundian troops were on the defensive. In the second phase, from August 1479 until the peace treaty of Arras in December 1482, fighting was at a standstill because of an international balance of power. The following paragraphs summarize the highlights of each phase.50 In spite of the efforts of the Estates-General in 1477, French troops penetrated deeply into the Burgundian territories, advancing as far as Ronse, where they fought Flemish troops in March 1478.51 However, during the summer of 1478 the French advance halted when Philip of Crèvecoeur failed to take the city of Cambrai. In that year, Maximilian began his military counteroffensive under the command of the Prince of Orange, Jean de Châlon. With a fresh army Châlon took off from the imperial county of Burgundy in an attempt to recapture the duchy of Burgundy, but the military expedition was a major failure.52 On 11 July 1478, Louis XI and Maximilian proclaimed a ceasefire for one year, and the French king promised to leave the territory he had conquered in Flanders and Hainault.53 The birth of a Burgundian heir, Philip, on June 22 in Bruges improved Maximilian’s political standing. Although he was very young, the new prince was an inviting prospective husband for royal daughters of other kings, especially Edward IV of England, whom both Maximilian and Louis XI had been wooing as an ally. Edward IV, however, decided to wait for the outcome of the war.54 Beyond minor clashes and an abortive French attempt to take Saint Omer, both parties observed the armistice, but no treaty was concluded, despite fresh negotiations. In July 1479 the conflict resumed, with both sides manoeuvring towards a decisive battle. They engaged at Enguinegatte (near Thérouanne) on 7 August 1479, and the victory went to Maximilian. Since Maximilian wanted to recapture the territories of Artois and Picardy lost in 1477, he did not immediately make peace with Louis XI, and the war continued. The second phase of the war began after the Battle of Enguinegatte. Sabre-rattling gave way to increased diplomatic activity by both sovereigns. Hoping to avoid another direct military confrontation with Maximilian, Louis XI adopted a new, ‘broad’ strategy. While making truce agreements to avoid military conflict, he encouraged internal opponents of the Burgundian-Habsburg court, supporting the opposition in the Duchy of Ghelders and a rebellion of nobles in Luxembourg.55 As a result, Maximilian was forced to split his forces in several directions, abandon his plans to recapture the territories taken by Louis XI, and seek additional allies. His efforts and those of Margaret of York bore fruit when Edward IV broke off diplomatic relations with Louis XI. On 1 August 1480, the English monarch renewed the peace treaty he had concluded in 1474 with Maximilian’s father-in-

50 More details about the war can be found in: Verbruggen, De slag bij Enguinegatte, 51–135; Wiesflecker, Kaiser Maximilian I., 136–60; Van Gent, ‘Perijelike saken ’, passim; Blockmans, La position du comté, 73–80; Favier, Louis XI, 729–773; Verbist, Van Nancy tot Cadzand, 8–66; Molinet, Chroniques, I, 172–377. 51 Verbruggen, De slag bij Guinegatte, 59. 52 ADN: B 2118, 90r. 53 Dumont, Corps universel diplomatique, III (2), 26–7; Molinet, Chroniques, I, 277; Lenglet du Fresnoy, Mémoires de messire, III, 540–6. 54 On July 12, 1478, Maximilian concluded a trade treaty with Edward IV, and in February 1479, Louis XI promised him not to attack English possessions for the next century (Lenglet du Fresnoy, Mémoires de messire, III, 560). 55 In 1480 three armistices were promulgated: on 3 April (BNF: MC, 358, 248), on 21 August (ADN: B 343, 17739; B 18823, 23694; 23708; BNF: MC 358, 249) and on 22 September (ADN: B 343, 17740). 23

For the Common Good

law, Charles the Bold.56 An instruction of Maximilian to his representatives in London in March 1480 reflects the overweening ambitions of both Maximilian and Edward IV. The Habsburg prince encouraged the English king to join in the French war, because this would not only prevent French dominance on the continent, but also lead to English invasion of France. The Burgundian court would recapture its lost territories, and the English king might win ‘the crown of France’. 57 More concretely, the negotiations between Burgundy and England led to Edward’s dispatch of English troops to Flanders, and to a marriage contract between his daughter Anne and the young Philip the Fair.58 When he heard about the proposed marriage, Louis XI reacted in fury and encouraged the Scottish king to take up arms against the English royal house.59 An international balance of power was the result. The alliance of Louis XI, the powerful but physically declining king of France, with the Scottish king and Maximilian’s enemies in the Low Countries faced an alliance of the English king, Maximilian, and the German emperor. They were joined in May 1481 by the Duke of Brittany, after Edward IV concluded a marriage alliance between his son Edward and Anne, the daughter of Francis of Montfort, Duke of Brittany, although eventually the murder of the British royal heirs in 1483 prevented this marriage. Because Brittany did not yet belong to the French kingdom, Francis and Maximilian shared a common interest in opposing French pressure to annex their duchies.60 As a consequence they made a political alliance against their common enemy. The two dukes initiated contacts in 1478, and these intensified in 1481. On 16 April of that year, Maximilian and Francis promised military support to each other, and troops were sent from Nantes to Flanders.61 Maximilian also had tried to court Anne of Brittany by offering to her father Francis that she marry Maximilian’s newborn son Francis of Austria. Born in Brussels on 2 September 1481, the prince was named after the Breton duke, who even became the boy’s godfather.62 However, the untimely death of Francis just four months later prevented a Burgundian marriage for Anne of Brittany. Like all princely children, the young girl became a pawn on the political chessboard. In December 1490 a marriage agreement was concluded between Anne and Maximilian himself, but this alliance was broken when King Charles VIII, son of Louis XI, married her in 1491. After his death in 1498, Queen Anne married his royal successor, Louis XII.63 The international balance of power did not end the Burgundian-French war. In 1481 French troops invaded Namur and Luxembourg,64 and in the northern Netherlands 56 SAG: OV, 826. See also Scofield, Life and Reign, II, 271–301. 57 Maximilian wrote: ‘La dite descente sera prouffitable aux deux princes ’. Edward could recapture ‘la couronne de France ’ (ADN: B 18823, 23691–2; on the negotiations, see also B 2121, 327v and B 431, 17728, and -31). 58 By May 1480 the parties reached an agreement on the marriage (ADN: B 431, 17738), and again in August 1480 (ADN: B 431, 17730 en -37). The marriage treaty of 5 August 1480 is edited by Dumont, Corps universel diplomatique, III (2), 73–4. See also Cauchies, Philippe le Beau, 6–7. 59 Thomson, The Transformation of Medieval England, 218; Scofield, Life and Reign, II, 302–23. 60 Minois, Anne de Bretagne, 77–8; Scofield, The life and reign, II, 313; Ross, Edward IV, 245–56 and 278–87. 61 Negotiations of 1478 in ADN: B 2121, 367v; of 1480 in ADN: B 18823, 23683–4 and 23728; BNF: NAF, 6525, 8 and SAG: OV, 830 (see also Bischoff, Maximilien Ier, roi des Romains, 460). The treaty of April 1481 in ADN: B 18823, 23685–7 (edited by Lenglet du Fresnoy, Mémoires de messire, IV, 35–7). The Duke of Brittany reconfirmed this treaty in August 1481 (ADN: B 18824, 23737–8). 62 Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 208; Commynes, Mémoires, 387 and Molinet, Chroniques, I, 367–8. 63 Debris, “Tu, felix Austria, nube ”, 202; Minois, Anne de Bretagne, 273–307 and 376–414. 64 Wiesflecker, Kaiser Maximilian I., 154–5. ‘Nonobstant que les trèves fussent criiées et données sur esperance de inventer paix finale, toutevoyes, et Francois et Bourgongnons pillotoyent et couroyent les ungz sur les autres ’ Molinet concluded (Chroniques, I, 366). 24

Chapter 1 The State

the conflict between the two factions of the Hooks (Hoeken) and the Cods (Kabeljauwen) reignited. When the Hooks in several cities rejected the rule of Maximilian’s partisans, who were mainly Cods, rebellions spread across the county of Holland and beyond. In the summer and autumn of 1481, Maximilian responded to these rebellions by sending military expeditions against Ghelders and Utrecht.65 In short, balance in the second phase of the war against France did not bring peace to the Low Countries. The military and diplomatic strategy of Maximilian and his advisors actually increased economic uncertainty and internal political conflicts within the Low Countries. Neither the war with France nor internal conflicts ended with the death of Duchess Mary. On the battlefield Maximilian of Austria acted like a true ‘impresario of war ’. James Tracy anointed emperor Charles V with this title, which means a ‘director’ of war.66 An impresario, such as Maximilian, sets the objectives for the military campaign, establishes numerical quotas and guidelines for the recruitment of the troops, coordinates battles, which he also attends in person, and adjusts troop movements as necessary. Of course, when exercising his impresarial mastery, the duke received help from his advisors, especially concerning financial matters. Lack of sufficient funds could destroy any military dream. To win a military campaign, the ‘impresario ’ needed reliable troops, which required enough money to pay them adequately. Sometimes the course of war depended on a bidding match between two rulers with huge pots of money. The French king and Maximilian could obtain funds fairly easily from their territories, by levying additional taxes, or, in most cases, by borrowing it from wealthy merchants, but in practice there was a limit to how much money was available for these loans. During the reign of Mary of Burgundy, of the many battles fought between Maximilian and Louis XI, some battles ended in a victory for one when the other had spent all his revenues. Both sovereigns were very aware of the adage: ‘money is the sinew of war’. Since funds to wage war were collected irregularly, a permanent standing army (which would remain armed in times of peace) required additional finances. Just as Charles the Bold had, Maximilian maintained a permanent guard67 and also had German troops at his disposal (the so-called ‘German chamber’, to be discussed later). The levy of troops by the Estates-General in 1477 provided men, but when Maximilian deployed them in the field, he was bound by the conditions made by the Estates. In accordance with the privileges of 1477, the troops of the Estates-General only could be deployed for purposes determined by the Estates. In order to bypass the Estates’ restrictions and wage war freely, Charles the Bold had built up a permanent army, modelled on the French army, in 1471.68 This army included artillery units, garrisons at strategic border sites, and the so-called ‘ordinance troops’ (‘bandes d ’ordonnance ’). These troops, established by the duke’s order and largely filled by men recruited in the Low Countries, were organized into ‘lances’, each containing one heavily armed mounted man-at-arms, three archers, and three foot soldiers. Ideally, each troop contained one hundred soldiers, lead by a captain who gave his name to

65 Van Gent, ‘Pertijelike Saken ’, 315–40, Ter Braake, Met recht en rekenschap, 260–309 and Wiesflecker, Kaiser Maximilian I., 158–60. 66 A military campaign was called an ‘emprise ’; the leader of the troops was a real ‘enterpriser’ of war, an ‘impresario’ (Tracy, Emperor Charles V, 8 and 314). 67 Cools, The Burgundian-Habsburg court, 161–3. 68 Contamine, La guerre au Moyen Age, 299–301; Vaughan, Charles the Bold, 197–229. 25

For the Common Good

the troop.69 In 1476 Charles the Bold streamlined his army once again. He subdivided the army into ‘batailles ’ and turned it over to the command of a field marshal, his stepbrother Anton of Burgundy.70 But the highly sophisticated army of the duke was not immune to military defeat, and it did not survive the Battle of Nancy. In addition to men and artillery lost in this battle, the sophisticated organisation of the Burgundian army collapsed because it was too expensive to maintain. The Estates had replaced Charles’s army with their own troops, because they could not control Charles’ ‘ordinance troops’. Maximilian tried to reinstate them, but he did not have the financial means to pay more than a small group on a permanent basis.71 In times of war the well-trained, professional nucleus of the Burgundian army (the personal guard, the ‘German chamber’, and two or three ‘troops’) was extended by hiring mercenaries. Maximilian purchased both light and heavy artillery (see below) and, when he had the money, a navy as well. When his financial resources permitted it, Maximilian had an impressive army, superior to those of cities and smaller regions, but not one that could outclass the French army. The Burgundians could not improve their military situation, not only because the opposing army was militarily resilient, but also because the Archduke had to pay the high costs of fighting on several different fronts. To overcome that, ‘Impresario ’ Maximilian really needed more money. 1.2.3

State Finances

1.2.3.1 The Empty Treasury In his elegy about the death of Mary of Burgundy in March 1482, Jean Molinet poetically wrote that when the young Habsburg archduke came to the Low Countries, he was very humane, courteous, and careful, but only ‘moderately rich’. 72 Maximilian was already bankrupt when he arrived in the Low Countries in August 1477, and lack of finances had been the reason he took so long to journey from Vienna to his new homeland. The immediate problems of war with Hungary and other internal difficulties, along with the general lack of reliable permanent finance methods and weak state structure of the Holy Empire, prevented the German Emperor from giving his son enough money, troops, and material to journey to his future wife, not to mention mount a defence of the Low Countries.73 Although some chroniclers wrote that Mary of Burgundy gave Archduke Maximilian 100,000 florins to pay for his journey from Vienna to the Low Countries, they are probably misinterpreting the 100,000 florins of her family’s jewellery Maximilian melted down later in November 1477 to support the war effort.74 Despite these measures, Maximilian was not able to fill the empty treasure chest of the Burgundian state. The 69 Guillaume, Histoire des bandes, 1–22. On the artillery: Smith & Devries, The artillery of the dukes, 137–202. 70 Guillaume, Histoire des bandes, 45–8. 71 In 1477 for example he provided Philip of Cleves and Philip of Burgundy-Beveren with a ‘bande d ’ordonnance ’ (ADN: B 2115, 117r and Gachard, Les archives royales, 303). In 1478 Maximilian again gave birth to fifteen ‘bandes ’ (Guillaume, Histoire des bandes, 54). 72 Maximilian was ‘moyennement riche ’, in ‘Complainte sur la mort de madame d ’Ostrisse ’ (edited by Dupiré, Les faictz et dictz, I, 168). In his chronicles Molinet wrote about Maximilian: ‘Brief, il est doé de tant de precieux dons, sciences et bonnes meurs acquises et natureles que le peuple des pays se dira estre bieneuré d ’avoir ung tel prince à seigneur ’ (Molinet, Chroniques, I, 227). 73 Fichtenau, Der junge Maximilian, 32–4; and Wiesflecker, Kaiser Maximilian I., 129–39. 74 See Wiesflecker, Kaiser Maximilian I., 130. Philip de Commynes wrote that Maximilian was badly in need of money (‘mal fourny d ’argent ’, ‘car, en lieu d ’apporter argent, il leur en failloit ’; Commynes, Mémoires, 385). About the melting of the jewellery, see below. 26

Chapter 1 The State

Bruges deputies had been correct when they judged that the long distance between Vienna and Brussels would be an impediment to the marriage of Mary and Maximilian.75 Due to lack of time, the Estates-General had not sent a delegation to Vienna in the first months of 1477, and because of this, the Burgundian court and the Estates had overestimated the financial strength of the Habsburg dynasty. In hindsight, this was a crucial failure. How much revenue had the Burgundian state lost in the reorganization of 1477? The particular features of Burgundian administration and surviving sources make it nearly impossible to measure the true depth of the financial drain of 1477. Research on Burgundian financial administration has shown that the central treasury (‘recette générale de toutes les finances ’) was not a union of subordinate treasuries (the ‘recettes particulières ’ of the regions), so much as it was the administrative tool of one person, the receiver-general (‘receveur général de toutes les finances ’).76 The central treasury did not include all of the lower treasuries, and, moreover, there were several central treasuries, with, for example, some revenue going to the ‘chambre aux deniers ’, the ducal couple’s personal treasury, whose records have not survived. Besides fragmented records, several administrative practices obscured the actual condition of state finances. Low-level receivers only transferred part of the revenues they collected to the central treasury and held the rest in bonds. Regional and local officials spent some of the revenue as they received it, only transferring the surplus to the higher level. The court and the central receivers also spent the surpluses of regional or local officials before those officials got the chance to transfer the funds officially. Finally, medieval finance did not include the idea of a “budget,” which complicates research on the fiscal revenues of the Burgundian state.77 Research into both Philip the Bold’s finances and the financial statement drawn up by Philip the Good in 1445 shows that only half of state revenues reached the account of the receiver-general.78 The dukes and the receiversgeneral themselves did not know how much money they had. It is no wonder that medieval sovereigns could not make long-term policy. Only at specific moments, when they ordered a special review of their revenues, did the dukes (and researchers) gain temporary insight into state finance.79 A historian is imprisoned by his sources, and the sources of the period from 1477 through 1482 are particularly fragmentary. Because there was no receiver-general between the beginning of March and the end of August 1477, there are no records for the central treasury for the first half of the troubled year of 1477. The receiver-general of Charles the Bold, Pieter Lanchals, closed his account on 28 February, and on 28 August a new receiver-general, Nicolas le Prévost, was appointed.80 With this appointment, Maximilian and his advisors merged the responsibilities of two central financial officials of Charles the Bold’s administration, the ‘receveur general ’ of the state revenues, and the ‘argentier’, who kept accounts of ducal spending. On 1 January 1480, receiver-general office took over the

75 Priem, Documents extraits, second series, VI, 285; Cuvelier, Actes des Etats-Généraux, 306. 76 Van Nieuwenhuysen, Les finances du duc de Bourgogne (1990), 174; Cockshaw, Comptes généraux de l ’Etat, 485. 77 Mollat, Recherches sur les finances, 285–90; Prevenier, Financiën en boekhouding, 471–4; Van Nieuwenhuysen, Les finances du duc de Bourgogne (1990), 156–60. 78 The receiver-general of Philip the Bold had control of 55 % of all state revenues (Van Nieuwenhuysen, Les finances du duc de Bourgogne (1990), 168) and Philip the Good of 54 % (Blockmans, The Low Countries, 283). 79 Mollat, Recherches sur les finances, 296; Arnould, Le premier budget, 226–31. 80 ADN: B 2115, 39v and B 2114, 12v. The account of Pieter lanchals survives (ADN: B 2108); Mary had reconfirmed him in office on the 27th of January 1477 (ULG: Ms. 1642, I). 27

For the Common Good

responsibilities of the war treasurer, the ‘tresorier des guerres ’. 81 The former war treasurer, Louis Quarré, took over the position of receiver-general, and held it until 10 January 1492. Using what is available, the following overview estimates how much state revenue was lost as a result of the privileges of 1477. I will first examine the accounts of the receiver-general in order to measure the financial consequences at the centre of power, and then the accounts of a regional receiver, the receiver for the Bruges quarter and the Franc of Bruges. These carefully preserved accounts give insight into the financial losses of the state at a lower level. Graph 1: The Revenues of the Receiver-General of all Finances in the Reigns of Charles the Bold and Mary of Burgundy (1467–1482).82

As I have discussed, this graph shows only the flow of money to the receiver-general of all finances rather than the total revenues of the Burgundian state. At first glance, the fiscal year 1477 shows a dramatic loss of revenue, but this is misleading. The figure for 1477 only includes the last quarter of the year, because the months of January and February of 1477 had been included in the fiscal year 1476. Then, in the period from March until August 1477, there was no receiver-general, and the office received no money. Presumably, from March to August the state revenues went into another treasury, probably the personal cashbox of the duchess (the ‘chambre aux deniers ’). During those months the duchess must have lived off the revenues of her domain, that is, Brabant, Flanders, Holland, Hainault, Namur, and other regions which still remained under Burgundian rule (the ‘recette ordinaire ’). In this case, she followed the adage ‘the sovereign has to live off of his [her] own property’,83 which meant that she should not levy any taxes beyond those assigned to her by feudal law. The state could only levy special taxes in extraordinary circumstances, such as defence of the 81 ‘Comme pour raison des grans et pesans affaires que nous avons a supporter et qui de jour en jour acroissent et multiplient tant a cause de la guerre comme autrement en pluiseurs et diverses manieres, nous soit besoing et neccessaire de restraindre et admoindrir notre despence tant ordinaire que extraordinaire et meismement de diminuer le nombre de noz officiers…, [nous] avons les dits deux offices de recepte generale et tresorier de noz guerres readioincts et reuniz en ung meisme office, nommé la recepte generale ’ (ADN: B 2121, 1r). 82 Sources: ADN: B 2065, 2067, 2072, 2077–8, 2084, 2090, 2094, 2099, 2104, 2108, 2115, 2118, 2121, 2124, 2127. The fiscal year 1471 extended until 31 March; 1472 started on the first of April. Fiscal year 1476 ran until 28 February 1477. 1477 ran from 1 September until 31 December 1477. The account of 1478 is missing. 83 See also: Scordia, “Le roi doit vivre du sien ”, 411–21; Arnould, Une estimation des revenus, 163. 28

Chapter 1 The State

country-as the Estates-General did in March 1477. The brief financial hiatus of 1477 seems to be primarily a break in surviving records. But the political implications were clear: the state was to rely on its ordinary income, and only on special occasions would the EstatesGeneral award additional revenues, along with its instructions for the use of that money. The shifts in the financial administration of the Burgundian state in 1477 can be seen in a deeper analysis of the sources of state revenues. I have divided the accounts of Pieter Lanchals, receiver-general in 1475, into six categories (graph 2).84 First, Charles imposed a sixth-penny tax to compensate his vassals for their military service (category 1). Second, two extraordinary aides were levied in 1476 (category 2).85 Third, the duke borrowed money from his officials in 1475 (category 3). The fourth and fifth categories were revenues from the regions. The revenues of the territories that remained under Burgundian rule after 1477 (Flanders, Holland-Zeeland, Brabant, Hainault, Namur, and a part of Luxembourg) are added together in category 4. The fifth category consists of the revenues from the territories the Burgundian state lost in 1477 (Liège, Ghelders-Zutphen, the lands of the count of Saint-Pol, Artois, a part of Luxembourg, the county of Boulogne, Ponthieu, Péronne, the duchy of Burgundy, Amiens, and Mortaigne). Charles the Bold also collected extraordinary revenues, specifically loans from merchants, outstanding debts of regions (mostly unpaid aides), taxes on monetary exchange, and similar funds (category 6). The territorial loss of 1477 cost the dynasty considerably. The receiver-general lost 22.5 percent of the 1475 revenues because of war and internal strife. The state lost these lands with the French conquest of Artois, Picardy, and the duchy of Burgundy, and the succession crisis in Luxembourg, whose ruler did not accept Maximilian as heir to the Burgundian throne until October 1480.86 Also, Mary returned Ghelders and Zutphen to Duke Adolf, who had been imprisoned by Charles the Bold for five years.87 The princebishop of Liège, Louis de Bourbon, pressured the Burgundian court to lift its punitive fines on the city of Liège, which amounted to ten percent of the revenues of the receiver-general in 1475.88 In addition, the revenues from the territories of the count of Saint-Pol were lost. Louis XI and Charles the Bold had confiscated these lands from Louis of Luxembourg, constable of the French king, and count of Saint-Pol, for treason in 1471. After the French king executed Louis in 1475, Mary awarded the revenues to his son Pieter, who became a member of her court in 1477.89 The dynasty’s weak political and military position forced Mary to make these concessions, which were responsible for almost a quarter of the lost revenues of the receiver-general.

84 I chose 1475 because the fiscal year 1476 included 14 months. 85 Namely an aide of 100,000 riders on all Burgundian territories and one of 30,000 riders on the county of Flanders (Blockmans, De volksvertegenwoordiging, 615). 86 Petit, Le Luxembourg et le recul du pouvoir, 384–400. 87 Immediately after the death of Duke Charles, the court decided to release the duke of Ghelders, if he agreed to become a captain of the ducal army. He was killed in battle in June 1477, but his duchy remained independent of the Burgundian throne (Rotthoff-Kraus, Geldern und Habsburg, 139). 88 Demoulin & Kupper, Histoire de la principauté, 73–4; Harsin, La principauté de Liège, 37–41. 89 Paravacini, Peur, pratiques et intelligences, 344; Soumillion, Le procès de Louis, 176–241. 29

For the Common Good

Graph 2: The Revenues of the Receiver-General for all Finances, Pieter Lanchals, 1475.90

Half of the revenues received from the territories in 1475 disappeared in 1477. Leaders of those lands that remained realized all too well who would have to make up the shortfall; the court would have to fall back on revenues from their territories to enact its policies. The Estates-General immediately closed the purse, in hopes of warding off the state’s rapacious financial levies. The privileges of 1477 prohibited a sixth-penny tax similar to that of 1475, and the levy on military service, two methods Charles the Bold had used to finance his war against Lorraine. The Estates also limited the extension of the so-called ‘extraordinary’ revenues, for which the receiver-general collected the profits on city annuity transactions, donations from clergy, elevations to fiefs, city loans, property confiscated from political opponents, devaluation of the coinage, and other sources. Some of these revenues (such as the enormous profits from devaluations) were rigorously prohibited by the privileges of 1477; others (such as city annuity sales) were strictly controlled by the subjects. The receiver-general still had some elbow room, but when he tried to increase revenue, he would come into conflict with the Estates-General, which even had control over aides, the largest source of revenue to the state. This shows again what extensive control the Estates had won over the state in 1477, reflected this time in state revenues. The financial rupture in the receiver-general’s account book thus reflects a deep political rupture in the state. The second series of state revenues, from the regional level, belong to the receiver for the Bruges quarter and the Franc of Bruges from 1471 until 1479. After 1 January 1480 these accounts cease, because the receiver’s position was combined with those of his counterparts for the Ghent quarter and the Ypres quarter.91 A new receiver, Jan van der Scaghe, was appointed in early 1477, but the account series was not interrupted (graph 3).92 90 Source: ADN: B 2104. 91 On 20 November, 1479, Roland le Fevre became receiver of Flanders (of the three quarters), and of Artois (ADN: B 33, 49r and B 4123). He also assumed the responsibilities of the ‘receveur des aides de Flandres ’, a post which had been held by Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Michiel (ADN: B 2123, 68597). 92 In March 1477 Jan van der Scaghe was appointed receiver (ADN: B 4120, 1r–3r and B 33, 35r). He replaced Christoffel Buridaen, who died in office. This position collected revenues from the city and the quarter of Bruges, the castellanies and the cities of the Franc of Bruges, Veurne, Bergues-Saint-Winnoc, Nieuwpoort, Sluis, Oostburg, Ursel, Eeklo, Kaprijke, Dunkerke, Bourbourg, and Gravelines. 30

Chapter 1 The State

Graph 3: The Revenues of the Receiver of Flanders for the Quarter of Bruges and the Franc of Bruges (1471–1479).93

In 1477, the ducal receiver of the county of Flanders for the Bruges quarter and the Franc of Bruges had 39.5 percent less revenue than in 1475. The average revenue of the period between 1477 and 1479 is 41.5 percent of the average revenue between 1471 and 1476.94 Comparing the figures from before and after 1477 shows that after 1477 the receiver lost nearly three-fifths of his income. There was a clear, decisive break in the revenues of the receiver of the Bruges quarter and the Franc of Bruges. A detailed analysis of the fiscal sources of the Bruges quarter receiver’s revenue helps explain this considerable loss. Graph 4 compares the accounts of 1476 and 1477 broken down by fiscal source. Graph 4: Detailed Analysis of the Revenues of the Receiver of Flanders for the Quarter of Bruges and the Franc of Bruges (1476–1477).95

93 94 95

Sources: ADN: B 4113–21 and GSAB: Rk., 2707 (fiscal year 1473) and 2709 (fiscal year 1478). The average profits of the period 1471–76 are 2,584,698 groat, of the period 1477–79, 1,511,795 groat. Source: ADN: B 4119 and 4120. 31

For the Common Good

More vital was the drop in revenue from the Flemish bailiffs in 1477. Each year the Flemish bailiffs had to send their surplus (the difference between monies they collected and the expenses they incurred) to the receiver of Flanders. The exceptional circumstances of 1477 caused these surpluses to shrink. Part of the Bruges receiver’s revenue came from the bailiffs in the southern part of the county of Flanders, where the French invasion prevented many bailiffs from collecting any revenue at all. Many bailiffs also spent their surplus directly on the military defence of the county.96 The Privileges of 1477 caused part of the shortfall, because they prohibited sale of offices. Before 1477 vacant bailiff ’s offices had been leased to the highest bidder, who then sent the entire lease amount to the receiver for the Bruges quarter. After 1477 bailiffs only sent him the account surpluses. Moreover, as I will later discuss, after 1477 when a new bailiff was appointed, the ducal court directly borrowed money from his office. The bailiffs paid this sum directly to the court, which reduced the revenue of the receiver of the quarter. The worst losses in the accounts of the receiver of Bruges and the Franc of Bruges were in the ‘other rents’ (rentes muables) category, which declined by 56.7 percent.97 The prohibition in the privileges of 1477 against the sale or lease of offices and tax-farming hit these revenues very hard. Some farmed taxes, such as the tax on ‘grute ’ (an ingredient of beer) in Bruges, were not leased in 1477. But this loss was only temporary, because the tax was leased out again in 1478.98 Other taxes, particularly those initiated by Charles the Bold, did not survive 1477. The Flemish Privilege of 1477 abolished the toll on English wool in Gravelines, the Sluis toll of 30 groat on every load of herring (the ‘sheerenghelt ’), and the toll on beer from Holland of two groats per ton (the ‘quade placke ’).99 These tolls made up the lion’s share of the receipts in the 1476 accounts. For example, the Gravelines toll brought in 25,920 lb. par., almost one quarter (23.7 percent) of the revenue total. This toll was leased out to the Florentine merchant and banker, Tommaso Portinari, who was compensated by the court for the losses he incurred when the tax was abolished in 1477.100 In short, the abolition of tolls in the privileges of 1477 cut the deepest swath in the revenues of the receiver of Flanders for the Bruges quarter and the Franc of Bruges. This brief analysis of the accounts of the receiver-general for all finances and the accounts of the regional receiver of Flanders in the quarter of Bruges quarter and the Franc of Bruges has revealed a financial and political rupture in Burgundian administration during the turbulent year of 1477. The privileges of 1477 made serious inroads into financial and political power which the state had systematically accumulated. On the one hand the considerable territorial losses meant decreases in fiscal revenues. On the other, even in those lands which remained, revenues declined sharply because the privileges abolished several taxes that had previously yielded substantial sums to the state.101 The consequences were 96 The receiver of Flanders in the quarter of Ypres also had to cope with this problem. In May 1479 for example he let know to the Chambre of Accounts of Lille that his revenues are decreasing dramatically because the war had ravaged the quarter: ‘tout [est] brulé, comme [vous] povez avoir oy, et ainsi comme [vous] assez savez, tout mon quartier [est] destruit et desolé ’ (ADN: B 17729, ‘Comptables générales’). 97 On these rents, see Van Nieuwenhuysen, Les finances du duc (1990), 147–52. 98 ‘Le dit droit n ’a point esté rebaillié à ferme obstant les empeschements qui par la guerre et la commocion du peuple estoient en Flandres ’ reported the receiver (ADN: B 4120, 31r). 99 Blockmans, Privilegie voor het graafschap Vlaanderen, 138; idem, De volksvertegenwoordiging, 406–10. 100 Boone, Apologie d ’un banquier, 48. 101 Also the Privilege of Holland of 1477 abolished important taxes (Boone & Brand, De ondermijning van het privilege, 4–5). 32

Chapter 1 The State

manifold. Lack of funding prevented the state from mobilizing troops, rewarding its own personnel with gifts, and bribing enemies. But more profoundly, decreased revenues from consumer taxes in the state budget made the court dependent on other forms of revenue, particularly the aides. As a consequence, the court could no longer pursue an independent policy, because it had to accept the conditions placed on the aides by the Estates. Since that assembly had gained significant control over the most important fiscal source of the ducal treasury, the fiscal provisions of the privileges of 1477 empowered it significantly. In the Estates’ view, the sovereign was henceforth to live off of the revenues of his domain, which would be sufficient because his only duty was to act as a guarantor for the new federal state. If he or she wanted to make any political move which would require additional money, he or she had to ask permission from the Estates. The (idle) hope of the court to marry Mary to a wealthy prince, who would consequently be a more independent sovereign, died when it became clear that Maximilian did not have any money. The vital quest for fresh sources of money was about to begin. 1.2.3.2 The Institutional Structure Immediately after his marriage with Mary of Burgundy, Archduke Maximilian embarked on his quest for money, the guiding purpose for his reorganization of the Burgundian state’s financial institutions. The state needed new financial structures because the privileges of 1477 had abolished the central Chamber of Accounts, the ‘chambre des aides’, and the general treasury in Mechelen, thereby creating an institutional vacuum. The ordinances of Thionville of 1473, the basis of the ‘old’ institutional structure, were no longer in force and needed replacement. At Bruges on 10 October 1477, Maximilian promulgated the ‘New Ordinances for Financial Administration’ (ordonnances nouvelles sur la conduite des finances), which established a framework for the new institutional structure for Burgundian state financial administration.102 A detailed description follows of the each of the new institutions: the superintendent, the financial commission, the chambers, and other functionaries, just as the function of the receiver-general has been reviewed above. As Maximilian expressed in his ordinance, ‘in order to administer our finances in better way, and to increase our revenues, we order a noble person to have the principal supervision of our finances’, the newly created office of the ‘superintendent des finances ’ would henceforth guide financial policy for the Burgundian state.103 The superintendent, who was entirely dependent on the duke, would not only control, but also administer state finances. Together with the financial commission, the superintendent was responsible for monitoring all receipts and payments of the receiver-general and the treasurer of war, whose offices were combined in 1480. The receiver could only authorize expenditures of less than eighty groats without consulting the financial commission, who could approve 102 Maximilian restructured the financial institutions of the state because of ‘guerre que a tort et sans cause nous a fait et encoires fait journellement le roy, notre dit demaine ensemble nos dites finances sont tellement diminuez […] et aussi par le desordre qui y a esté, plusieurs de noz deniers ont esté distribuez autrement que deuement et inutillement dissippez a notre grant dommaige et prejudice. A laquelle cause et affin de deffendre notre dit demaine et mettre ordre en la distribucion de nos dits deniers et que de cy en avant ilz puissent estre conduiz et riglez au bien honneur, utilité et prouffit de nous ’ (ADN: B 867, 16300; a copy in ADN: B 1610, 186v–188r). Analyzed by Van Rompaey, De Grote Raad, 124–6. 103 ‘[Nous] savoir faisons que nous, et que dit est consideré, desirans pourveoir a la conduicte de nos dits demaine et finances et a l ’accroissement d ’iceulx, voulons et ordonnons que doresenavant pour la conduicte d ’iceuls noz demaine et finance aura une notable personne, que a ce commettrons par autres noz lettres patentes, qui aura la principale superintendence de toute la conduicte d ’icelles noz finances ’. 33

For the Common Good

amounts between eighty and 1,200 groats (60 lb. par.). For expenditures of more than 1,200 groats, the consent and all receipts needed to be signed by the superintendent, the receiver-general, and the secretary of finances. Policy, management, and control of the state finances were now in the hands of one man, a central ‘financial minister’. Although Maximilian’s plans were a continuation of the centralising efforts of his father-in-law, never before in the history of the Burgundian state had one official held so much control over state finance. With the creation of the position of superintendent, concentration of control and management of state finances reached a peak.104 The Institutional Organisation of Financial Administration in the Burgundian State during the Reign of Mary of Burgundy (1477–82).

A brief look at the career of the man who was appointed superintendent on the day following the promulgation of the New Ordinances demonstrates that Maximilian wanted to control state finances very strictly.105 George of Baden was the bishop of Metz, 104 Van Rompaey, De Grote Raad, 127. 105 On October 11, 1477, he put George of Baden in charge of ‘la principale charge et superintendence de nos dits finances ’ with the duty to ‘icelles conduire au bien honneur, utillité et prouffit de nous ’ (ADN: B 1610, 188r–189r). 34

Chapter 1 The State

and a former advisor to Charles the Bold.106 The late duke had included George of Baden in his court in hopes of increasing his political influence in the Duchy of Lorraine. The bishop, a member of a powerful family from the southwest Holy Roman Empire, supported Charles the Bold against the duke of Lorraine, partially in his own self-interest. From this angle he also argued in favour of a marriage between Mary and Maximilian during the final years of Charles’ reign. A few months before the duke’s death, George of Baden travelled to the Habsburg court at Vienna together with George Hesler, who was later chancellor to the German emperor, in an attempt to persuade the emperor of the wealth and the political and military strength of the Burgundian court. The two men also tried to convince the Estates-General of the Low Countries, meeting at Louvain in April 1477, that a marriage between Mary and Maximilian would be valuable. The two marriage brokers had also accompanied Maximilian on his journey from Vienna to the Low Countries. Soon after the marriage George of Baden sped to the Lorraine court to convince the duke to make peace with Burgundy, more to extend his own influence in that region than to end the threat of war, because the duke himself had already initiated peace efforts.107 When he arrived in the Low Countries, Maximilian rewarded the ambitious bishop with the highest post in his newly acquired lands, the office of superintendent, making George of Baden responsible for Mary’s wealth, the main attraction of the Burgundian heiress in Maximilian’s eyes. With the appointment of George of Baden Maximilian made clear, once again, that the treasury would be controlled by his closest and most loyal confident. However, George of Baden was more a diplomat than a financial specialist, and his numerous diplomatic missions abroad interfered with his execution of the office of superintendent.108 Sometimes Maximilian took over his duties, but more often the lower-level institution, the financial commission, ran financial matters. Ducal control over state finances increased on 23 May 1479 when Maximilian appointed Willem Moreel and Maarten Lem as new superintendents.109 As he explained in a letter to the Chamber of Accounts in Lille in June 1479, Maximilian appointed the two men from Bruges to supervise finances and increase the flow of money into the treasury, the same reasons he had expressed in October 1477.110 The timing of this appointment is not coincidental. The war against France demanded renewed effort; a few months later the Battle of Enguinegatte was fought. But, again, it was difficult to keep the office of superintendent filled. In August 1480 Maarten Lem became burgomaster of Bruges (ut infra), and from then on, he no longer acted as a superintendent. Until the end of 1480 Willem Moreel held the office alone, but after that time he was paid as ‘commis sur le fait des demaine et finances ’ and no longer as superintendent.111 The office 106 Schneider, Un conseiller des ducs, 314; Wiesflecker, Kaiser Maximilian I., 125. 107 George of Baden received some fiefs and an annual pension from duke René when the treaty was concluded on the 30th of August 1477 (Schneider, Un conseiller des ducs, 331–2). 108 Ibidem, 333–5. 109 ADN: B 2121, 94r. 110 ‘Pour commencer a mettre ordre et regle au fait de noz demaine et finances, dont [nous] avons nagaires commis superintendens noz amez et feaulx conseilliers Martin Lem et Guillaume Moreel, nous escripvons presentement a notre amé et feal aussi conseillier et commis sur le fait de nos dits finances Nicolas de Gondeval pour soy transporter en notre ville d ’Anvers, où ilz sont presentement, pour par ensemble et a main commune veoir l ’estat de nos dits demaine et finances, aussi les charges estans sur iceulx, pour surtout aviser coment et en quele maniere nous pourrons aller avant et fournir aux fraiz et despens que avons journelement a supporter ’ (ADN: B 17729, ‘Administration Générale’). 111 ADN: B 2124, 77r. 35

For the Common Good

of superintendent had been abolished in practice rather than by ducal order, probably because it was unnecessary after Maximilian had gathered enough authority to control state financial policy. In the first years of Maximilian’s reign, he had needed the superintendant to control finances, but when the duke himself wanted to control operations, he found the office of superintendent an interference. Moreover, as time passed, the power of the financial commission increased, making the superintendent redundant. Maximilian and the financial commission increasingly worked together to establish financial policies, and the superfluous level of the superintendent quietly disappeared. Maximilian did not appoint another superintendent until 1493, when he left the Low Countries to his son, because once again, he needed an official as a watchdog over court finances. In June 1495 Philip the Fair confirmed Philip of Burgundy-Beveren in this office, where he remained until 1497112, when Philip the Fair himself took over control of finances.113 In short, a superintendent only was needed when the sovereign wanted to increase his political influence on state finances, but once a high degree of control had been attained, the superintendent was no longer necessary. The second level of the financial administration was the financial commission. The ordinance of November 1478 which organised the commission is only partially preserved.114 The financial commission included two or three commissioners, a secretary of finances, an inspector-controller of finances, an auditor, and one or two clerks. Composition of the commission had automatically reverted the structure created by Charles the Bold in 1468, after the privileges of 1477 had abolished the intervening Thionville ordinances of 1473.115 In November 1477, for example, the city of Ypres negotiated with the ‘Lords of the Finances’ (a reference to the financial specialists of the commission) about the costs of the country’s defence.116 In 1478 Maximilian froze this institutional structure, and placed the commission under the control of the superintendent. This commission would become the basis of the new ‘Council of Finances’, established in 1487, as well as its successors, and, ultimately, the Council of Finances which Emperor Charles V instituted in 1531.117 The responsibilities of the financial commission also corresponded to those of its predecessor of 1468. The quittances of the receiver-general had to be signed by one of the commissioners and the secretary of finances. The commissioners had total control over the receiver-general who had to submit a monthly statement to the commission. The receivergeneral did not have an official seat on the financial commission, but in practice he was present at most meetings. The secretary, the auditor, and the controller of finances had closely similar functions – controlling, signing, and sealing the acts of the commission. Not surprisingly, these offices were consolidated into one post after few years, just as it had been during the reign of Charles the Bold. Theoretically the commission was supposed to travel with the duke, but it had a permanent office in Bruges.118 This was not an official residency, such as the one in Mechelen during the period between 1473 and 1477, but

112 Cauchies, De la “régenterie ”, 58–9. 113 Coppens, Raad van financiën, 498; Baelde, De collaterale raden, 9. 114 ‘Ordonnance par mon tres redoubté seigneur monseigneur le duc d ’Ostrice, de Bourgogne, et de Brabant etc., par laquelle il a voulu et ordonné que ses demaine et finances soient conduictes et de cy en avant en la maniere qu ’il s ’ensuit ’ (ADN: B 17727, ‘Comptabilité Générale’). The document is highly damaged. 115 Van Rompaey, De Grote Raad, 116–20; Albrecht, Eine reformierte Zentralfinanz, 220–3. 116 ‘De heeren van der financen’ (Blockmans, Handelingen van de leden, 43). 117 Walther, Die burgundischen Zentralbehörden, 53; Coppens, Raad van financiën, 498. 118 The ‘bureau des finances a Bruges ’ is mentioned in ADN: B 2119, 68432 (1479); B 3495, 123689 (1479) and B 20144, 155889 (1487). 36

Chapter 1 The State

more likely a very practical move. Most of the commissioners were from Bruges, and the city was the financial centre of the Low Countries. An overview of the men who served on the financial commission during the reign of Mary of Burgundy reveals its functions and radius of action.119 In autumn 1477 the financial commission consisted of three financial commissioners, Pieter Bogaert (the dean of the church of Saint-Donatian in Bruges, and councillor of Philip the Good and Charles the Bold),120 Pieter Lanchals (the former receiver-general of Charles the Bold),121 Nicolas de Gondeval (former ‘argentier ’ of Charles the Bold),122 controller Jean Gros (secretary and controller of finances of Charles the Bold),123 auditor Antoon van Halewyn (secretary of Charles the Bold),124 secretary Nicolas de Rutere (the former clerk of the Parlement of Mechelen),125 and clerk Gillis Collin (who was new in the administration). In March 1478 Nicolas de Rutere replaced Jean Gros as controller of finances.126 In 1480 Pieter Bogaert left the commission, a new clerk was appointed (Gilles le Viseulx), and Nicolas de Rutere also took over the jobs of auditor and keeper of the seal.127 Willem Moreel exchanged his office as superintendent for a place on the financial commission, where he replaced Nicolas de Gondeval in 1481. The following year Nicolas de Gondeval replaced Willem Moreel who had fallen into disgrace. By the end of Mary of Burgundy’s reign the commission therefore included Nicolas de Gondeval, Pieter Lanchals, Nicolas de Rutere, and the clerks Gillis Colin and Gilles le Viseulx. This short overview shows two evolutions. First, the number of members of the commission diminished from six persons and one clerk in 1477 to three persons and two clerks in 1482. Since the office of superintendent also disappeared in 1481, the importance of the financial commission, and especially of those three officials in charge in 1482, increased sharply. Financial control became increasingly centralised in the hands of a very few loyal officials of the duke. The second evolution concerned the political background of the members. Officials who were in charge during the reign of Charles the Bold returned in Maximilian’s administration. Those officials who survived until 1482, commissioners Pieter Lanchals and Nicolas de Gondeval, and the auditor, secretary, and controller Nicolas de Rutere, had all held high positions in Charles the Bold’s administration. They were also a loyal sub-group of highly skilled financial specialists, who tightened their control over financial affairs during Mary of Burgundy’s reign. In concentrating power in the hands of a few loyal confidants, Maximilian was emulating the centralising state organisation of Charles the Bold. A few years after the death of the controversial duke, his vision of a 119 The overview is based on the annual payment of the loans of the commission: ADN: B 2115, 40r-v; B 2121, 103r–105r; B 2124, 77r-v; B 2127, 84r. 120 Walsh, Charles the Bold, 101–3. 121 Boone, Lanchals (Pieter), 474. 122 Bartier, Légistes et gens de finances, 89; Albrecht, Eine reformierte Zentralfinanz, 231. 123 Cockshaw, Prosopographie des secrétaires, 47–8. 124 Ibidem, 48–9. 125 Cockshaw, Le personnel des ducs, 86, 162, and 208. 126 ADN: B 2116, 1r. Jean Gros became treasurer of the Ordre of the Golden Fleece – in 1483 he would desert to the French king (Cockshaw, Prosopographie des secrétaires, 47). 127 On the 15th of July 1480 Maximilian appointed Nicolas de Rutere to replace Gerard Numan, who had replaced Antoon van Halewyn, who died in the battle of Enguinegatte (RAG: RV, 7512, 159v; Molinet, Chroniques, I, 313). Actually, Mary had appointed Nicolas de Rutere as auditor before she married, but Antoon van Halewyn held the same office simultaneously. Nicolas accepted his dismissal, but in 1480 he returned as auditor (ARA: Rk. 20371, 1r; edited by Gachard, Inventaire des archives, III, 344; see also Arnould, Les lendemains de Nancy, 27–9 and Hénin, La charge d ’audiencier, 29). 37

For the Common Good

centrally administered state was still very much alive. Even the same financial advisors were still in charge, in spite of the rebellion against their policies in 1477. Beneath the financial commission there was an entire network of financial institutions. The receiver-general absorbed the tasks of the ‘argentier ’, which had been created by Charles the Bold in 1473. In 1480 Maximilian combined this office with the office of treasurer of war, and in the same way, combined the regional receivers for the domain with the regional receivers of the aides. Maximilian also had a treasurer of the artillery, two receivers of confiscated property, receivers of the mint, and a receiver of extraordinary revenues.128 Several chambers at the court administered the personal finances of the duke and the duchess; Maximilian had his own ‘chambre aux deniers ’, Mary had one for her finances and those of her children. The ‘German chamber’ (to be discussed later) was responsible for paying the German troops Maximilian had brought to the Low Countries. There were three regional Chambers of Accounts, at The Hague, Brussels, and Lille. Despite the wishes of Burgundian subjects, the Chamber of Lille remained in Mechelen until 1479.129 Mary had issued the order on 17 March 1477 that the Chamber must return to its former residence, but the actual move did not take place until July 1479.130 In August 1477 Mary had also arranged for a work force at the Chamber of Accounts in Lille, thereby returning to the conditions in the reign of Philip the Good.131 Shortly after his arrival in the Low Countries, Archduke Maximilian put his mark on the institutional framework of the financial administration of the Burgundian state. The new organisation he built bore witness to his vision of the political role he wanted to play in the Low Countries. The Habsburg archduke was a perfect substitute for Charles the Bold, and, like a real ‘impresario ’, he took personal control of state finances. Mary of Burgundy probably had some political influence on the events during the first months of 1477, but after her marriage with Maximilian she no longer played a role in the decision-making process.132 Her presence was only necessary to legitimize Maximilian’s claim to power. The vision of the new sovereign of the Burgundian state was one of strong centralism. Along with his like-minded and loyal confidents, he wished to supervise state finances strictly. The centralisation of the financial administration was not direct (see for example the multiple changes in the office of the superintendent), but instead Maximilian and his officials cleverly manipulated the power balances of the moment, creating and abolishing offices as necessary. This strong control from the top down clashed dramatically with the role the privileges of 1477 had imposed on the duke. Political disunity within the Estates and the need for central coordination of the war and its finances made the federal state structure very weak. The Estates did not have the means to defend their federal model of state structure against an institutional framework which fell back into the familiar centralising model. The officials who had dictated policy during the reign of Charles the Bold returned to the political arena and state office. They were supported by a sovereign 128 The ‘receveur de l ’extraordinaire ’ only existed in Flanders. Jan van der Scaghe was appointed to exert this function from January 1480 on (Haemers & Campbell, ‘Scaghe (Jan van der)’, 786; ADN: B 33, 51v; and B 17733, ‘Recette de l’extraordinaire de Flandre’). 129 The personnel signed their documents as follows: ‘les president et gens des comptes a monseigneur le duc d ’Osterice, de Bourgoigne, comte de Flandre etc., ordonnez a Lille et de present residens a Mechelen ’ (ADN: B 17727, ‘Nécessités’), or ‘les president et gens des comptes a Lille, residens a Mechelen ’ (ADN: B 17729, ‘Auditions des comptables’, 1479). 130 ADN: B 1610, 177r-v; B 33, 46r. 131 Dumolyn, De Raad van Vlaanderen, 145; Aerts, Geschiedenis en archief, 102; GSAB: OV, II, 49 (charter of 8 August 1477). 132 Devaux, Le rôle politique, 405; Smagghe, L ’exécution du chancelier, 181. 38

Chapter 1 The State

who did everything possible to keep himself independent of the Estates. Not surprisingly, the policy of Maximilian reflected largely the policy of Charles the Bold. 1.2.3.3 The Search for Money After the mobilisation of the troops by the Estates General, and the defeat of the Flemish troops near Tournai, the Estates realized that central coordination of the war was necessary. When Archduke Maximilian arrived in the Low Countries, the Estates allocated him an aide of 127,000 ‘golden riders ’ to be used for the defence of the country.133 But because the payment of aides took time, the court had to seek an immediate financial alternative. On 16 September, just one month after his marriage, Maximilian began to search for additional funds. In a letter to the Chamber of Accounts of Lille, he complained that the turbulent succession of Charles the Bold had damaged state finances. The young sovereign wanted to remedy this situation by ordering that his Flemish domain be increased ‘to its maximal value.’134 Because the traditional feudal taxes Maximilian collected on the domain allowed little room for manoeuvre (they were stipulated to increase only when grain was expensive), he had to use more manipulative tax methods.135 In the following years Maximilian and his advisors sought money from three main areas: (1) taxation, (2) profits from domain land and offices, and (3) gifts and loans. Limiting the investigation to the county of Flanders during Mary of Burgundy’s reign, I will first examine whether the tax burden on the county increased, and if so, the specific ways in which it increased. (a) Taxation In the county of Flanders, taxes were divided into two main categories, direct taxes (such as the ‘sixth penny’ and the aides) and indirect taxes (such as taxes on consumable goods and tolls on trade). General discontent with Charles the Bold’s direct taxes and the furious reaction of his subjects in 1477 made Maximilian unwilling to levy a new ‘sixth penny’. Although his administration proposed such a tax, his political foundation was too weak to impose it successfully.136 The aides were thus the only method of levying direct taxes on the subjects, but the privileges of 1477 demanded that all the Members of Flanders had to agree before an aide could be levied. Although not every aide proposed in the period between 1477 and 1482 met with approval, many did pass. The tax burden created by these aides appears in graph 5. The figures, provided by Blockmans, do not include aides and gifts Maximilian received from the clergy, who twice awarded the state aides, in May 1479 for 38,400 lb. par., and in fall 1481, for 14,400 lb. par.137 These ‘aides ’ could be considered gifts, because Maximilian did not have to negotiate for them. It is most likely that a cleric attached to Maximilian’s court arranged this financial transfer.138 The discussion which follows concentrates on aides paid by the cities in the county of Flanders. 133 Blockmans, De volksvertegenwoordiging, 614–5. 134 ‘Et pour ce que [nous] desirons le bien et augmentacion du demaine, des seigneuries de nous et de notre dite compaigne estre entretenu et conduit en la plus grant valeur, augmentacion et melioracion que faire se pourra ’ (ADN: B 17726, ‘Administration Générale’). 135 See Van Cauwenberghe, Het vorstelijk domein, 251–2 and Soens, Evolution et gestion, 52–3. 136 In August 1479 a veto by the assembly of the Flemish Members prevented a levy of the sixth penny (Blockmans, De volksvertegenwoordiging, 457; idem, Handelingen van de leden, 111). 137 ADN: B 2118, 53v and 54v (1479); and ADN: B 2124, 29r-v. 138 In 1479, for example, the dean of Saint-Donaas, Pieter Bogaert, member of the financial commission, and the abbot of SaintBertin (in Saint-Omer), Jean de Lannoy, chancellor of the Golden Fleece, were mentioned as creditors (see also ADN: B 2120, 5v). 39

For the Common Good

Graph 5: Income from Aides in the County of Flanders (1471–1482).139

In graph 5, the decline in 1477 again shows the financial loss the state suffered in that year, but the crisis only lasted for a short time. During his reign Charles the Bold had requested a total of twenty-two aides from the Members of Flanders, who had only refused three of them. In the shorter reign of Mary of Burgundy, the Members approved seventeen of the nineteen ducal requests.140 Comparatively, Maximilian asked much more financially from his subjects than his father-in-law had. Regarding the aides, the financial ‘crisis’ in 1477 was only a small one, if it can even be called a crisis at all. The tax burden from the aides was higher than in Charles the Bold’s reign, as proceeds from these levies increased by 4.53 percent during his daughter’s reign.141 The type of aides granted by the Members of Flanders shifted in 1479. Before the Battle of Enguinegatte, the Members supported Maximilian’s war against France, but afterwards political tensions between the archduke and the Members increased. Beginning in autumn 1477, the Members of Flanders agreed to all the new aides requested by Maximilian in order to stop the French invasion. But negotiations about how the aides would be paid continually turned on the issue of control. The Members could either give the sum directly to the archduke, which he could then use to hire mercenaries, or they could pay the troops themselves and send them to Maximilian’s generals.142 In the first case, the Members would have little control over how the money was spent, while the archduke was free to spend the money and deploy the troops as he wished. In the second case, the archduke was limited by the conditions the Members set when they mobilized the troops, and if the Flemish captains commanding the urban militias decided they did not want to fight in a specific engagement, Maximilian’s generals had to withdraw. In the first phase of the war (up until the Battle of Enguinegatte), the Members of Flanders levied 139 Blockmans, Autocratie ou polyarchie, 259. 140 Blockmans, De volksvertegenwoordiging, 612–7. I did not count the aide of April 1477 in this total, because it was not requested by the duke, but was instead an initiative of the Estates-General. About the precise amount and form of the aides that were granted, see Blockmans. 141 The average of the period 1471–76: 452,833 lb. par. to 473,333 lb. par. in 1477–1482. 142 The discussion of prolonging the payment of the aide of 500,000 riders the Members had awarded to Charles the Bold in 1473, for example, focused on this point: ‘maer aldoen en was men noch niet vaste of de penninghe van den 500.000 commen souden in de handen van minen gheduchte heere, of dat men volc leveren soude ende daermede betalen elc int zijne ’ (Blockmans, Handelingen van de leden, 40). 40

Chapter 1 The State

aides themselves, while in the second phase (after 1479), the archduke stipulated what conditions would be placed on the aides. In 1478, for example, the Members of Flanders took the initiative of mobilizing troops to defend the county boundaries. In May a Flemish delegation went to the ducal court in the Hague to inform the duke that they had levied a new aide for 9000 soldiers. The delegation was also charged with convincing the Estates of Holland to match this initiative.143 In the first years of Mary’s reign, other aides, such as one in April 1479, were granted under the condition that the soldiers would only be used to defend the county.144 Until the Battle of Enguinegatte, the Flemish Members had relative military autonomy, because they alone determined how many troops would be mobilized. They assumed responsibility for the financial costs of this mobilisation, and even established goals for the troops on the battlefield. Even though aides awarded by the Members were a very important part of the fiscal revenues of the state, the state could not spend that money freely. In the first years of Mary’s reign, the Members of Flanders made a huge impact on military policy in the Burgundian state.145 However, after the Battle of Enguinegatte, Maximilian’s war against France was no longer a defense of the county, but had instead become an offensive drive to recapture territory lost in 1477. Now Maximilian and his advisors initiated requests for new aides. The Members of Flanders reacted negatively to this ‘new [!] armament’, but continued to award new aides for one more year.146 In autumn 1480 the city of Ghent unsuccessfully requested more control over the spending of the aides, which had now become lump sums of money rather than provision of troops paid by the cities. The city argued that Maximilian had not stuck to the agreement, that the troops and aides they had granted were not being spent on defence of the country. The city of Ghent charged that the troops had not been able to end the war, because the archduke had broken his promises. As a consequence the city broke off relations with Maximilian, and refused to approve any aides for him. In 1481, they even stopped attending assemblees of the Members of Flanders held for fiscal purposes. Until the death of the duchess, the cities of Bruges and Ypres agreed to ducal requests for money and troops, but they also imposed conditions. In 1481, Bruges granted troops or money to the duke only if the aide was spent on coastal defence, and Ypres sided with the Bruges.147 The intent of the privileges of 1477 remained effective even though Ghent stubbornly refused to pay aides. Technically, by imposing aides without Ghent’s participation Mary and Maximilian were violating the privileges, which stipulated that aides were illegal if they were not harmoniously agreed upon by the three Members.148 After autumn 1480, the city of Ghent no longer paid direct taxes, and Maximilian had no power to force the city to pay. If the state was to increase revenues, it had to seek them 143 Blockmans, Handelingen van de leden, 57–60. 144 For example in April 1479 the Members awarded 7000 soldiers to Maximilian, but ‘alleenlic in de voorseide betalinghe van den .vii. duust volcks voornoemt anghezien dat dezelve subvencie gheconsenteert gheweest es omme de diffencie van den lande daermede te doene ’ (CAG: 93, 7, 18r). 145 On the political significance of the aides, see Zoete, De beden in het graafschap, 232–3; Blockmans, Finances publiques, 82 and idem, De volksvertegenwoordiging, 448–9. 146 The ‘nieuwer wapenynghe ’ (Blockmans, Handelingen van de leden, 112). 147 Blockmans, Handelingen van de leden, 139; idem, De volksvertegenwoordiging, 616–7. 148 However, Ghent and Bruges had not followed this rule themselves in June 1477 and February 1478. Ypres did not want to participate in those aides, probably as revenge for the reintroduction of the repartition of Oudenburg, that was unfavourable to the city (Blockmans, Breuk of continuïteit, 105). 41

For the Common Good

elsewhere. It is no wonder, then, that the archduke’s financial administration tried several times to reintroduce the indirect taxes that had been abolished by the Flemish Privilege of 1477. However, the privileges of 1477 forbade the archduke to impose new indirect taxes on trade or consumable goods. Maximilian was limited to issuing guidelines for the efficient collection of tolls to his receivers.149 The state’s financial administration even ran into problems with the privileges or the increased power of the cities when it tried to collect existing taxes.150 The duke was bound by the power of the local elites, because he could not levy new taxes without their help. For example, after a revolt in Sluis (Bruges’ seaport) in April 1477, several smaller ducal taxes on trade were no longer collected in the town. The duchess pardoned the revolt on 20 April, but, despite this, in autumn Sluis residents were still obstructing ducal officials who were trying to collect these taxes.151 Moreover, the new local leaders, who had come to power after the revolt in April, did not want to set the former magistrates free. The court ordered the receiver of Flanders for the Bruges quarter, Jan van der Scaghe, to take a troop of soldiers to Sluis to restore state authority. The ducal Great Council condemned the September rebellion by the city of Sluis.152 When the city of Bruges intervened, the Sluis rebels were convinced to liberate the old magistrates. However, the rebels still refused to accept the old taxes, and Mary forgave the rebellion.153 Bruges then sent a commission to the port, and the state finally began to make headway on the tax issue. After two Bruges commissions had investigated and negotiated with foreign merchants in May and November 1478, the city of Bruges decided in February 1479 to abolish the old smaller taxes and replace them with an annual rent of 720 lb. par. payable to the receiver of Flanders.154 This case shows that Maximilian’s options for increasing taxes were very limited. But, slowly, things changed. After intensive negotiations with the Bruges elite, the Burgundian financial administration obtained the revival of other taxes that had been abolished in 1477. The tax on ‘grute ’ was leased out again after December 1477, probably at the urging of Louis of Bruges, who held this tax in fief from the Flemish count.155 In September 1478 the tax of two groats on herrings arriving in Flemish ports (the ‘sherengeld ’) 149 See the letters of 16 September and 22 November 1477 (ADN: B 17726, ‘Administration Générale’). On the indirect taxes that were levied by the Flemish count: Soens, De rentmeesters van de graaf, 51–3. 150 For example, in 1477 the Chamber of Accounts and the Council of Flanders insisted on the correct levy of the toll on the Scheldt in Rupelmonde, but, significantly, the problem was only solved when the city of Ghent interfered (See ADN: B 17726, ‘Flamand’ and 17727, ‘Flamand’, and also CAG: 94, 710). 151 About the revolt in Sluis: Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 136–7 and Vorsterman, Dits die Excellente Cronike, 184r. According to the Chamber of Accounts, the abolishing of the tolls caused ‘grant interest, prejudice et dommage de mon dit seigneur ’ (ADN: B 17725, ‘Histoire Générale’). See also ADN: B 17726, ‘l’Ecluse, fermes de tonlieu’: ‘vous avez trouvé que ceuls de la loy d ’illec par eulx [aucuns rebelles et commocionneurs de peuple] creé avoient de leur auctorité privee mis au neant par cry publicque les drois de passageghelt, wasseghelt, orlofghelt et autres droix appartenant a mon dit seigneur le duc en la dite ville ’. Probably four Brugians (Donaas de Moor, Geraard de Groote, Sander du Bosquiel, and Nicolas Pierins), who leased the tolls until the revolt of Sluis, had urged the court to reimpose the taxes (ADN: B 17726, ‘Recette Générale, emprunts’). 152 ADN: B 17726, ‘Recette Générale Flandres’ and GSAB: GR, 796, 10r–13r. 153 ADN: B 1699, 39v–40v. Some privileges of the city of Sluis were confirmed (ADN: B 1699, 48r). 154 About the Brugian commission of investigation: ADN: B 2117, 68338–9; the negotiations with foreign merchants: CAB: SR, 1477–78, 65r–66v and CA, 14, 300v–302r. The abolition of the tolls in Gilliodts-Van Severen, Inventaire de la ville, VI, 183–5 and SAB: PO 1165 sum up the abolished tolls: ‘den cleenen oorlof, wasegelt, passaigegelt, spellegelt, leenknechtgelt, trecht van der ballaste, den inghelschen gestelt up tvoorseide ballast ende tzettegelt ’. About these tolls: Soens, De rentmeesters van de graaf, 317–20. The ‘leenknechtgelt ’ was already abolished by the Flemish Privilege of 1477. 155 On the First of December 1477 Jan Caneel started to collect this tax (ADN: B 4121, 29v). Chapter 2 deals with Louis of Bruges. 42

Chapter 1 The State

was reinstated.156 In 1479, Maximilian sent several letters to increase the pressure. He asked the Chamber of Accounts and the receiver-general to plead for the reintroduction of the ‘quade placke ’ and the seventh penny in the city of Bruges.157 And he met with success. In June 1479 the ‘quade placke ’, an indirect tax of two groat on imports of English and Holland beer (‘keyte ’) in Sluis was leased out for three years.158 In the course of 1479 the city of Bruges resumed payment of the seventh-penny tax on their revenues to the receivergeneral of Flanders. The city of Bruges had abolished this humiliating tax in 1477, because it was a reminder of the duke’s repression after the Bruges revolt of 1438. Duke John the Fearless first imposed the seventh-penny tax in 1407, it was abolished in 1411, and then imposed again by Duke Philip the Good after the 1438 revolt.159 In 1477 a new Bruges rebellion replaced this lucrative state revenue and another annual tax (the ‘tort le conte ’), with an annual rent of 7200 lb. par.160 During 1479 the city promised to resume payment of the ‘tort le conte ’ and the seventh penny retroactively from March 1477.161 Thus, only two years after their abolition, most of the indirect taxes, which we have seen were so crucial in the accountbooks of the receiver of Flanders for the quarter of Bruges, were again collected in Flanders. The only exception was the toll at Gravelines. There is a clear explanation for this change in 1479. In May of that year, Maximilian appointed Willem Moreel and Maarten Lem as co-superintendents of his financial administration. The archduke appointed these two citizens of Bruges (!) with the mandate to increase state revenue, and just a few months after their appointment, the Burgundian state and the city of Bruges reached an agreement on the payment of the seventh penny and on the levy of taxes in Sluis. Maximilian knew all too well that he only could increase state revenue with the support of urban elites, which is why he had appointed two important Bruges merchants to his administration. Willem Moreel and Maarten Lem had their own reasons for accepting Maximilian’s offer, because entry into the state structure gave the two politicians a certain influence over state politics. In this way, the appointment of Willem Moreel and Maarten Lem as superintendents was a marriage of convenience between the state, which wanted to increase its influence on the urban elite, and the urban elite, who wanted to increase their influence on state. However, as we will see, it would end in a painful divorce. Willem Moreel and Maarten Lem hoped to prevent the reintroduction of the Gravelines toll, which was a severe and hated tariff on imports of English wool into the Low Countries. Chapter 3 will explore how the local partisans of both Bruges superintendents fought to obstruct the reintroduction of this toll. The Chamber of Accounts of Lille drew up a plan in 1480 for its reintroduction, and prepared to present it at an assembly of the Members of Flanders.162 However, the plan was never discussed at the Members meeting. 156 Jan van Zuuenkerke leased this tax for an annual rent of 5500 lb. par. (ADN: B 4121, 31v; the lease-contract in SAG: RV, 6831, 1, 2). 157 ADN: B 17731, ‘Flandre, tonlieu’. 158 For an annual rent of 4600 lb. par. to Jan, bastard, de Baenst (ADN: B 4122, 24r; SAG: RV, 6831, 1, 1). 159 Lambert, The city, the duke, 133–4. 160 CAB: SR, 1476–77, 114r and CA, 14, 307v–308r. The ‘tort le conte ’ was a tax on all goods that were sold at the Bruges annual fair to non-Brugians (see Soens, De rentmeesters van de graaf, 261). 161 CAB: SR, 1478–79, 44v and 152r-v. The payment of the ‘tort le conte ’ was long in coming (ADN: B 17729, ‘Recette Générale, quartier de Bruges’ and CAB: SR, 1481–2, 145v). 162 The pamphlet was entitled: ‘s ’ensuist a correction et […] a remonstrer aux estats ou membres de Flandres pour la remise sus du tonlieu de Gravelinghes ’ (ADN: B 17731, ‘Tonlieu Gravelines ’). 43

For the Common Good

As we have seen, abolition of this toll was one of the major financial losses for the state from the Flemish Privilege of 1477, and reintroduction of this toll would have been a strong symbolic reversal of those privileges. It is likely that Ghent also protested against this planned reintroduction, just as the city refused to pay other tolls to the county’s receivergeneral.163 Maximilian was forced to put his plan for the toll of Gravelines on hold, where it would remain until 1485, when he had recaptured the county after the government of the first regency council.164 In conclusion, Maximilian was able to increase state revenues systematically, but the central government did not have anything like a fiscal monopoly, which was a necessary condition for further growth of state power.165 Maximilian and his weak state administration did not have the power to impose taxes autonomously, nor the means to force the cities to agree to aides. The Habsburg prince was able to overcome these limitations by courting local elites, as he did by appointing Willem Moreel and Maarten Lem as superintendents in 1479. As a consequence he found it easier to plead for the reintroduction of some indirect taxes that had been abolished by the privileges of 1477. But the appointment of the men from Bruges could not solve all the problems. The reintroduction of the toll of Gravelines was completely out of the question, and Ghent refused to participate in the aides negotiations with the Members of Flanders. The city of Ghent blamed Maximilian for using the aides inefficiently, and this disapproval legitimized their refusal to pay direct taxes to the state. In this way the city was trying to influence the archduke’s foreign policy, but their stubborn refusal had the opposite effect. Because Ghent would not finance state policy, Maximilian’s financial administration had to find revenue elsewhere. Part of the solution was to reintroduce several indirect taxes, and the remainder came from the comital domain and its offices. (b) Domain and Offices The largest portion of the revenues of the receiver-general for all finances came from the Burgundian territories (Flanders, Brabant, Holland, Zeeland, Namur, and Luxembourg). From 1477 on Mary and Maximilian also charged ‘extraordinary’ revenues to the receiver-general (the ‘recette extraordinaire ’). In 1477 extraordinary revenues made up more than the half of all taxes he collected, but in the following years, the income from extraordinary revenues decreased (graph 6). The difference between ordinary revenues from the territories and extraordinary revenues of the dukes did not correspond to the traditional division of the count of Flanders’ revenues. Normally, ‘ordinary’ revenues meant the traditional revenues from the domain, and ‘extraordinary’ revenues meant the income from aides and new tolls. In Mary’s reign, aides and tolls were placed under ‘ordinary’ revenues, and ‘extraordinary revenues’ was a collective term including all the ‘fiscal windfalls’ discovered by Maximilian and his administration. The ‘windfall’ measures evoke the image of a ruler who was looking 163 In August 1480 Ghent refused to pay the so-called toll ‘tgheleede ’ to the receiver; but his accounts are not saved. Nevertheless a letter of the receiver, Roland le Fevre, to the Chamber of Accounts informs us that Ghent did not wanted to pay ‘le droit de tonlieu es ville et chastellenie de Gand, nommé tgheleede, que monseigneur le duc a droit d ’ancienne temps de prendre sur toutes manieres de marchandise ’ (ADN: B 17734, ‘Gand, tonlieu dit ’t gheleede’). Also in the revolt of 1449–53 Ghent refused to pay this toll (Boone, Het vorstelijk domein, 73). 164 ADN: B 4123, 69r; B 2135, 69521 and B 17748, ‘L’Ecluse. Ferme des droits sur les rentes’. See also Boone, Apologie d ’un banquier, 40. 165 Boone, Overheidsfinanciën, 114. 44

Chapter 1 The State

for money wherever he could get it. Maximilian employed the same expedients as his Burgundian predecessors had, but in a more intensive way.166 His fiscal creativity is here grouped into eight categories: the melting down of ducal jewellery, profits on minting, devaluation of the currency, sale of fiefs, confiscations, sales of rents, reduction of wages and offices, and leases of offices. Graph 6: Analysis of the Origins of the Revenues of the Receiver-general for all Finances during the Reign of Mary of Burgundy (1477–1482).167

To wage the war against France in 1477, Maximilian not only requested a new aide at the assembly of the Members of Flanders, but on 17 September he also ordered Wouter van Houtheusden, steward of the Flemish count’s jewellery in Bruges, to melt down pieces of gold and silver from the Brussels treasury of the dukes of Brabant, ‘to use for ducal affairs’. 168 Although it was seldom done, melting down jewellery was an accepted method of augmenting ducal finances.169 In 1477, the procedure brought in 39,305 lb. 8 s. 8 d. par., almost four percent of the total revenue of the receiver-general.170 Maximilian only used this method twice, and only to pay for emergency needs. In April 1482 the jewellery steward melted down 10,016 lb. par. to pay the funeral of Mary of Burgundy.171 Maximilian did not shy away from any opportunity to increase state revenues, as his monetary policy demonstrates. On 8 November 1477, the ducal couple expressed their concern about the glut of foreign coins circulating in the Flemish market, ‘to the detriment of the economy’. 172 A list of acceptable coins was published to drive out those that were overvalued. Although the ordinance prohibited the use of several coins, it was apparently ineffective, because the court had to repeat the prohibition only a few months later.173 The

166 Boone, Stratégies fiscales et financières, 244; Blockmans, Finances publiques et inégalité sociale, 88. 167 Source: ADN: B 2115, 2118, 2121, 2124, and 2127. 168 ‘Pour subvenir a leurs affaires ’ (ADN: B 17727, ‘Hôtel, joyaux’; Mémoires de Jean de Dadizeele, 56). 169 Augustyn, Juwelenbewaarders, 173. 170 He paid troops with this money (ADN: B 2115, 20v). 171 On the eleventh of April 1482 Wouter van Houtheusden paid this sum to the receiver general, ‘des deniers venant de la fondu de certaines parties de vaisselles que icellui seigneur avoit fait prendre de ses dits joyaulx et icelles fait monnoyer en sa monnoye de Bruges, en deniers payez pour convertir ou fait de l ’obseque de feue madame la duchesse ’ (ADN: B 2127, 54r). 172 ‘Ten groten quetse ende hindere van den coopmanscepe ’ (SAG: RV, 692, 4). 173 SAG: RV, 692, 5 (First of April 1478). 45

For the Common Good

ambivalent character of Maximilian’s financial policy is revealed by his order of December 1477 to retain the high seigniorial tax on the Flemish mint (the so-called ‘seignoriage ’ or the ‘sleischat ’), which had been introduced by Charles the Bold, charging six groats for each mark of silver and seventeen groats for each mark of gold.174 As a consequence it was very expensive for foreign merchants to melt down their precious metals in Flemish workshops, which caused a drain of precious metal out of the country. The Flemish Members took two steps to remedy this intolerable situation and make domestic mint workshops more attractive for those possessing foreign precious metals. Their first step was an effort to end the English ‘bullionist’ policy, which since 1429 had forced buyers at Calais to pay cash for English wool. In 1473 Charles the Bold had secured its abolition, but in July 1477 the Members of Flanders were still negotiating with the English king to escape the negative effects of the ‘Calais bullion laws’. 175 Finally, on 12 July 1478, the Burgundian negotiators reached the accord they desired. In exchange for the promise that the subjects of the Burgundian duke would only buy wool in Calais, Edward IV definitively abolished the bullion laws.176 With this agreement, Maximilian of Austria and the English king were attempting to create a permanent alliance, with the French king as the common enemy. Flemish merchants appreciated the monetary advantages of this alliance, but probably not to the extent that they ceased their wool purchases from Spain.177 The second measure taken by the Members to prevent the loss of precious metals was devaluation of the coinage. As the Great Privilege stipulated, every devaluation in the Low Countries had to be discussed first by the Estates-General. In the summer of 1478 negotiations about a possible general devaluation in all territories governed by the Burgundian duke started between the Flemish Members and the Estates of Brabant, and in September, the Estates-General reached agreement on this issue.178 The archduke issued an ordinance on 12 October which reflected the results of the negotiations; a three-percent reduction in the percentage of precious metals in all coins, the introduction of a new groat, prohibitions against exporting bullion, and additional minor measures.179 With this small devaluation the Estates were not only trying to attract foreign bullion, but also to correct the overvaluing of silver coins which had peaked during the reign of Charles the Bold.180 The Estates may also have intended to encourage the export-oriented economy by making domestic products cheaper on the foreign market. Since many merchants served in the Estates-General, as Chapter 3 will show, such an intention was logical. The devaluation had an additional psychological benefit, because, as its defenders argued, it stimulated trade which had suffered greatly from the war.181 Maximilian of course agreed to the devaluation, because this type of monetary trick delivered rapid but short-lived profits to the treasury.182

174 Munro, Deflation and petty coinage, 401; idem, Wool, cloth and gold, 202–4. 175 Blockmans, Handelingen van de leden, 31–2. See also Munro, English “backwardness ” and financial innovations, 116–20 and idem, Wool, cloth and gold, 84–92. 176 Ibidem, 177–8; Ross, Edward IV, 252 and 368–9; SAG: OV, 822; BNF: MC, 380, 538; ADN: B 579, 17726. 177 Stabel, Dwarfs among giants, 147–50. 178 Blockmans, Handelingen van de leden, 68–79; idem, De volksvertegenwoordiging, 505; Wellens, Les Etats-Généraux, 181 and 441. 179 Deschamps de Pas, Essai sur l ’histoire monétaire, 123–4; Enno van Gelder & Hoc, Les monnaies des Pays-Bas, 24. The ordnance in SAG: RV, 692, 6. Also a new mandament on the jurisdiction of masters of mintateliers was promulgated (CAB: PO 1160).

180 Van Uytven, Sociaal-economische evoluties, 65. 181 Blockmans, La participation des sujets, 133. 182 Blockmans, Devaluation, coinage, and Seignorage, 79; Munro, Gold, guild and government, 154–7. 46

Chapter 1 The State

Whatever positive effects this devaluation might have had for the Flemish economy were ruled out by a new ducal ordinance of 4 December 1480. The archduke unilaterally raised the seigniorial tax on minted silver by twenty-one percent (to seven groats and six mites) and on gold, which circulated less, by thirty-five percent (to twenty-three groats).183 Since there is no archival record that the Members of Flanders were consulted on this decision, I argue that Maximilian’s act mirrored Charles the Bold’s autocratic mint policy. In comparison to negotiating with the obstinate Members for an aide, contracting expensive loans, or selling annuities secured by domain land, and considering the rudimentary banking tools of the period, increasing the ‘seigniorage ’ was one of easiest ways to augment state revenues.184 Yet this lucrative measure, which yielded substantial profits and solved the acute need for money, caused much economic damage. Flemish mint workshops lost their attractiveness to foreign merchants and their very limited supply of bullion, another application of Gresham’s law. Because this measure only increased the ‘seignoriage ’ on the Flemish mint market, it is possible that Maximilian also wanted to favour the Brabant mint market, but that can only be determined by further study.185 The archduke issued this ordinance because fraud had been uncovered in the Bruges mint workshop. After a long judicial battle, even involving the Great Council, the Bruges mintmaster, Marc le Bingueteur, was convicted and ordered to pay a fine.186 After his dismissal, his son Nicolas leased the office of mintmaster because he had submitted the highest bid. Nicolas had probably asked the court to raise the ‘seignioriage ’ so that he could recoup the sum of the lease.187 Nevertheless, the archduke’s unilateral action stands out prominently against the careful negotiations by the Estates that preceded the devaluation of 1478. The Members of Flanders had lost their dominant influence on the monetary policy of the court, and Maximilian’s autocratic methods became a major issue in the Flemish Revolt. In July 1482, even before the inauguration of the regency council, the Members dramatically decreased the ‘seigniorage ’ on silver to three groats and six mites. Maximilian’s ‘seigniorage ’ on the mint, described as ‘excessive’, was reduced significantly below its level during the reign of Charles the Bold.188 By appropriating this political prerogative of the count, the Members of Flanders tried to turn the economic tide and halt the extensive loss of precious metals provoked by the court’s single-minded policy. This monetary policy evokes the image of a ruler who repeatedly tried to undo the privileges of 1477, at least while he had the sufficient power. He rejected the joint political process of 1478 with its stress on consultations between all interested parties, and then denied the political and economic consequences of his unilateral decisions. After squeezing precious metals, the ducal couple broke into their domain lands to increase state revenues. When the opportunity arose, selling and confiscating lands gave the ruler a one-time profit. In May 1477, for example, Wolfert of Borssele capitalized on 183 The ordinance (ADN: B 33, 64v–66r) was edited by Deschamps de Pas, Essai sur l ’histoire monétaire, 125–30. Spufford (Dans l ’espace bourguignon, 197) is wrong when he writes that Maximilian only asked a higher seigniorage in 1485. 184 Munro, An aspect of medieval public finance, 148. 185 See Van Uytven, Sociaal-economische evoluties, 62. 186 ADN: B 2124, 42v; CAB: PO 1171; ADN: B 17731, ‘Bruges. Monnaie’; B 17732, ‘Le Bingueteur’; B 17734, ‘Bruges. Monnaie’; AGR: GR 795, 27v. 187 This happened in the fourteenth century (see for example: Cockshaw, Le fonctionnement des ateliers, 24–7 and Munro, Wool, cloth and gold, 21–2). 188 ‘Ainsi excessif ’ (ADN: B 17741, ‘Minorité de Philippe le Beau’, ordinance of 10 July, 1482); see also GSAB: Rk. 18197, 2r and Blockmans, La participation des sujets, 128–9. 47

For the Common Good

the dynasty’s political weakness and financial need to enlarge his own holdings with the purchase of four fiefs for 29,744 lb. 4 s. par.189 The new governor of Holland, also an admiral in the Burgundian navy, bought several important ports, thereby increasing his political influence on the isle of Walcheren, and his naval authority in the Scheldt river delta.190 The decapitated Guy de Brumeu’s widow, Antoinette de Rambures, also contributed to the treasury in this way. In 1480 she bought fiefs in the part of Artois which had not been conquered by the French king. Antoinette purchased these fiefs, which the state had bought from Philip de Croÿ, for 27,000 lb. par.191 With these sales the Burgundian dynasty gained new income, but also social capital from situating their supporters in wealthy fiefs. As long as these noblemen remained loyal to the court, the dynasty benefited twice from these sales. In 1482 Olivier de la Marche bought the fiefs of Rieux and Vieuxcondé for 4000 lb. par. Maximilian had confiscated them from William of Arenbergh, who had lead the rebellion by the principality of Liège against the dynasty.192 Confiscating the lands of political opponents was a common means of increasing state revenues and rewarding the dynasty’s loyal supporters. In April 1478 Maximilian ordered the confiscation of all properties belonging to ‘those who take sides against the duke’. 193 The receiver-general collected an annual average of 2.5 percent of his total revenue from confiscations.194 However, the value of the confiscations was likely much higher, because most of the confiscated lands were given away directly to the archduke’s generals or supporters. In his account of 1480, the receiver-general for all finances introduced a new category, for the ‘sale of annuities (‘rentes ’)’. 195 On 1 August 1480, the Chamber of Accounts informed the receiver-general that the Flemish receiver, Roland le Fevre, had sold annuities in the amount of 2400 lb. par. on the ‘spijker ’ (the ‘espier ’, a seigniorial tax on corn on the Flemish count’s domain) of Bruges to pay for the French war.196 On 26 December, Maximilian wrote a note in his own hand authorizing the sale of annuities, which were, in his opinion, one of the best ways to increase state revenues.197 The sale brought in a considerable sum of money quickly and cheaply, and the costs of the annuities would be paid back with the revenues from the Bruges ‘spijker ’. The proven technique of annuity sales would tap into the savings of wealthy citizens, and the sovereign did not have to impose new taxes to pay them back. Maximilian skilfully avoided the political danger of taxes and the high interest rates of loans by selling annuities, but, as we will see, some officials of his own administration criticized this fiscal manoeuvre. 189 These fiefs were Vlissingen, Westkappelle, and Domburg (ADN: B 2115, 18r and 20r). 190 Sicking, Zeemacht en onmacht, 38; Henderikx, Het cartularium van de heren, 164–70. 191 Duke Philip the Good had confiscated these fiefs from the father of Philip de Croÿ. In December 1477 Maximilian returned them to the noblemen, but in 1480 Philip sold them to the dynasty for 21,011 lb. 18 s. par. (ADN: B 1610, 202v; B 17725, ‘Croy’; B 2121, 555v). The court sold the fiefs to Antoinette de Rambures for 48,000 lb. par. (ADN: B 2121, 50v; B 1610, 284v and 291v). 192 ADN: B 2127, 60r. 193 ‘Tenans party contraire a mon dit seigneur ’ (ADN: B 2121, 56r). 194 The accounts of Jean de Wailly, Bertelemy Trotin, and Jan de Witte were saved (GSAB: Rk., 19719–23). 195 ADN: B 2121, 62v–65v. 196 The Chamber of Accounts reported ‘que notre tres redoubté seigneur monseigneur le duc, pour aydier a subvenir a ses presens grans afaires, nous a ordonné [à] vendre certaines rentes heritables, a rachat et a vie, sur son demaine de Flandre et entre autres parties de son dit demaine sur son espier de Bruges ’ (ADN: B 17733, ‘Bruges, espier’). Two annuity contracts are preserved (CAB: PO 1173–4). 197 ‘Aussi que [nous] avons beaucoup moindre perte et dommaige de la dite rente que de prendre argent a frait, qui cousteroit a present .xxv. ou .xxx. pour cent. Et a vendre la dite rente, nous n ’avons perte que de .vi. ou .vii. pour cent par an ! ’ (ADN: B 17733, ‘Bruges, espier’). 48

Chapter 1 The State

Annuities from the cities yielded comparable advantages. Just as the previous dukes of Burgundy had done, Maximilian frequently gave his subordinate cities permission to sell annuities secured by their revenues.198 In 1480 sale of annuities amounted to 9.3 percent of the total revenue of the receiver-general for all finances.199 With this authorization, the city government could collect money from its wealthy citizens and give it to the duke as a preceding payment of a future aide. The city would then compensate the wealthy citizens who had bought the annuities with yearly instalments on the principal and interest. By convincing members of his loyal urban networks to buy these lucrative annuities, the sovereign avoided difficult negotiations with urban representatives about new taxes or other methods of increasing state revenue. He also received political profits, because the annuity buyers became indirect shareholders in the state.200 Moreover, by involving them in the financial policy of the city, the duke gave annuity buyers a vested interest in the political stability of the city and strict control by the central government over urban accounts. The self-perpetuating nature of annuity sales –the city actually had to sell new annuities to pay the interest on older ones – created an opening for the state to exert control over urban finances. These considerations explain why the city of Ghent chose not to sell public annuities during Mary of Burgundy’s reign. The city no longer wanted to support itself by a continuous cycle of annuities, because similar policies during the reign of Charles the Bold had increased Ghent’s debt to catastrophic levels. The new city government was well aware of the protests that had arisen against the financial policies of the previous city government which had supported Charles, and did not want to make the same mistakes again.201 In contrast, the Bruges government sold seven series of public annuities in the period between 1477 and 1482. Four series were sold to finance the payment of aides to the duke, which seems at first glance mainly to benefit Maximilian and his financial advisors (most of whom were citizens of Bruges). However, the city never sold annuities without first insuring that it would reap financial rewards as well. In November 1477 the city of Bruges sold a series of annuities designated for the state’s benefit, but in return, Maximilian’s government assumed the interest payments due on three previous annuities.202 In April 1478 and June 1479 the city sold annuities worth 4800 lb. par. (at an interest rate of 6.67 %). For the last of these annuities, the state pledged as security some of its own seigniorial revenues, namely a mortgage on the receipts of the tax on the so-called ‘grute ’, the seventh-penny tax which the city owed to the duke, and another annuity which had been issued to compensate for the “small tolls” tax at Sluis.203 When a fourth public annuity was sold in December 1480, the seventh-penny tax was again put up as security.204 In most cases the city of Bruges therefore received financial compensation for selling public annuities. 198 See Mollat, Recherches sur les finances, 317–8. 199 77,800 lb. par. (ADN: B 2121, 65v). 200 Boone, “Plus deuil que joie ”, 7; idem, Geld en macht, 60–7; Derycke, The public annuity market, 180. 201 In 1477 one third of the revenues of the city of Ghent was diverted to pay off the debt of the annuities the city had sold in the past years (See Ryckbosch, Tussen Gavere en Cadzand, 275–80; Boone, Stratégies fiscales et financières, 250–1 and idem, “Plus deuil que joie ”, 19). 202 Namely two annuities that were accorded by Philip the Good, and one by his son (CAB: PO, 1158). In 1478 these debts run up to 727 lb. 4 s. 3 d. gr. (CAB: SR, 1478–79, 41v). The rent of November amounted to 250 lb. 14 s. 3 d. gr. at an interest rate of 6.25 % (CAB: SR, 1477–78, 121r–125r and GSAB: OV, I, 2601). The profits went to the receiver general of all finances (ADN: B 2115, 20v). 203 CAB: SR, 1477–78, 125v–129r; SR, 1478–79, 144r–151v; PO, 1159 and 1166; ADN: B 2118, 53r. 204 CAB: PO 1177; SR, 1480–81, 37r and 151r–153r. 49

For the Common Good

Undoubtedly the most lucrative financial ‘invention’ during the reign of Mary of Burgundy was profit-taking from state offices. Initially the court had ordered a decrease in the number of state offices, and the positions of treasurer of war, receiver of the aides, and receiver for the Flemish quarters were dissolved in 1480. In 1479 Maximilian asked the receiver of Flanders to decrease the wages of some of his subordinates, a measure which saved 2400 lb. par. and gave rise to protests from the victims.205 The preceding dukes of Burgundy had also reorganized state financial administration by decreasing the number of offices and lowering wages. These measures yielded a brief, one-time profit.206 An even more lucrative strategy of the Burgundian state financial administration was its efforts to make money by ‘borrowing from offices’. On 29 March 1477, Mary and her court ordered the Chamber of Accounts to borrow money from receivers and other court officials who were willing to loan money voluntarily based on the future revenues of their positions.207 The duchess promoted her request by emphasizing that this was not an aide, but a necessary step to maintain her domain, and thus guarantee justice and order in the county. As there are no surviving state accounts from this period, it is hard to determine if this initiative worked. When the receiver-general resumed his position in the autumn of 1477, borrowing from offices appeared as a new category of revenue. It was still possible for officials to loan money to the state, because 47 officials, mainly from Flanders, lent a total of 24,250 lb. par. to the receiver-general.208 Obviously the loans were no longer used to ‘maintain the domain’, but instead to cover the costs of the war, for the receiver-general spent most of his revenue on payment to the troops. These (voluntary) loans made up almost 10 percent of the revenues of the receiver-general in 1477, and an average of 6.12 percent in the period from 1477 to 1481. In 1482 the category disappeared from the accounts. Because they were voluntary, those loans can not be regarded as the leasing of offices. In 1479, however, Maximilian forced all his officials to loan money to the state. In order to finance the war, on 19 April 1479, he ordered the Chamber of Accounts to lease all judicial positions and receiverships. Maximilian ordered the regional receivers to declare all offices vacant and award each post to the highest bidder.209 One month later, the receivers of the Ghent and Ypres quarters informed the Chamber that they had obediently leased the majority of the offices under their control ‘for the profit of our lord’. 210 On 3 August (just four days before the Battle of Enguinegatte) the newly-appointed superintendents, writing about the difficulties with the appointment of a bailiff in Damme, informed the Chamber of Accounts that Maximilian had ordered that all state judicial offices had to ‘make a profit’. 211 The superintendents applied gentle coercion on the Chamber to follow 205 ADN: B 2118, 56v. The captain of the big castle of Sluis, Josse de Lalaing, complained to Maximilian, who decided that the wage of the chatelaine of Sluis fall outside this measure (ADN: B 17728, ‘Lalaing’). 206 Arnould, Une estimation des revenus, 136; Vaughan, Philip the Good, 265. 207 ‘Pour l ’entretenement de notre demaine ’, Mary asked ‘pour nous faire comptant aucuns gracieulx prestz ’, which would be ‘rembourssez de leurs dits prestz sur leurs offices en quatre annees a venir par egale porcion ’ (ADN: B 17726, ‘Emprunte sur les offices de justice’). 208 ‘Recepte des prestz faiz a mes dits seigneur et dame par plusieurs officiers tant de justice comme de recepte a en estre remboursez en quatre annees et autrement ’ (ADN: B 2115, 23r–28v). 209 ADN: B 17728, ‘Administration Générale’. 210 ‘Au prouffit de mon dit seigneur ’ (ADN: B 17729, ‘Recette de Flandres, quartier de Gand’ ( Jacob van Duermeer on the 26th of April 1479) and ADN: B 17728, ‘Affermage des offices de justice’ (Ypres)). 211 ‘Nous nous recommandons a vous pour subvenir aux grans affaires que notre tres redoubté seigneur monseigneur le duc a presentement a supporter et conduire, comme vous povez assez congnoistre, il a deliberé et conclu de faire son prouffit de tous ses officiers de justice et nous en a baillé la charge’, signed by Willem Moreel, Maarten Lem and Nicolas de Gondeval (ADN: B 17728, ‘Lobel’). 50

Chapter 1 The State

orders and cease obstructing the leasing of offices.212 In this warning the superintendents were undoubtedly alluding to the Great Privilege of 1477, in which the young duchess had promised ‘not to lease judicial offices in our county of Flanders’. 213 The Flemish Privilege even specified offices, such as supervisor of the dunes, which should never leased, because previous leaseholders had neglected their duties.214 Nevertheless, this office was the first to be leased under the new directive, when the future superintendent Maarten Lem leased the office of ‘supervisor of the eastern dunes’ for a single sum of 7200 lb. par. on 25 February 1479. Maximilian sought the leasing of this office because he urgently needed money.215 Leasing offices was indeed a lucrative method of raising money for the state. Leasing the bailiff positions to the highest bidder increased the income from those offices by 300 to 400 percent.216 There are insufficient sources surviving to indicate exactly how much the state administration gained from office-leasing, but in one account, from the receiver of Flanders in the Bruges quarter, revenues from the bailiffs doubled in 1479.217 The practice carried adverse consequences for the state, because it undermined the ruler’s right of appointment. Charles the Bold had retained his right to appoint the most important bailiffs, those for Ghent and Bruges, but Maximilian leased all offices, which, as chapter 2 discusses, caused much difficulty in Bruges. Another harmful consequence was dispersal of revenues, for the lease payments from offices were paid to the regional receivers, and not to the receiver-general. Of course, the public also suffered from the lease of judicial offices. The financial administration, which became responsible for the appointment of new officers, did not require conscientious public servants, appointing instead wealthy persons who ‘cooked the books’ in order to defray the costs of the lease. Discontent stemming from the lease of offices was as old as the practice itself, and the Estates saw a chance to eliminate it in 1477 while the state was weak. But Maximilian, like his predecessors, could not resist the monetary lure, and the example of Maarten Lem makes it clear that a group of wealthy citizens was willing to invest in those offices. Leasing offices symbolised the political vision of Maximilian and his financial advisors for his domain. In the perennial concern to ‘make a profit’ from offices, functions, annuities, the minting of coins, jewellery of the counts, and other government assets, the financial administration violated many of the restrictions from the privileges of 1477. If Maximilian was to pursue victory in war, he had no other way to increase state revenues. The government had no means to force the cities to pay higher aides, or to impose new indirect taxes, and as a consequence, Maximilian had to make quick and lucrative profits from his own domain – just as his predecessors had done. But such a financial policy could not be pursued indefinitely, because many measures could only enacted once, and all bore serious political consequences. Charles the Bold had already experienced those consequences. When his subjects withheld financial resources, the overconfident duke 212 ‘Et vous requerrons bien a certes que le plustost que pourrez, vous le recevez a serment sans y vouloir faire difficulté pour la consequence des autres, car aultrement se difficulté y estoit par vous faicte, ce seroit rompture de la charge a nous baillee par notre dit seigneur qui tourneroit a grant consequence ’. 213 ‘Gheene officien van justicien van onsen vorseiden landen verpachten ’ (Blockmans, Privilegie voor alle landen, 93). 214 Blockmans, Privilegie voor Vlaanderen, 138–40. 215 Because of the ‘grant besoing et urgente neccessité que [nous] avons de recouvrer argent ’ (ADN: B 1610, 244v–245r; see also B 2118, 49v). 216 Van Rompaey, Het grafelijk baljuwsambt, 367–79. 217 Compare ADN: B 4121 to B 4122: the revenues from bailiffs increased from 3509 lb. 7 s. 3 d. par. in 1478 to 8894 lb. 16 s. 3 d. par. in 1479 (an increase of 153 %). 51

For the Common Good

had lost his final battle because he did not have the means to win it. The anger of those subjects, which his daughter inherited, damaged the state severely. But even when Ghent refused to pay aides, Maximilian and his financial administration did not fully appreciate the ominous threat of increasing discontent. They had their hands full with the demands of other financial backers. (c)

Gifts and Loans

Maximilian had a lot of creditors, from his foreign loans, first to be analyzed below, and those from native creditors and foreign merchants residing in the Low Countries. Maximilian received Breton and English money as part of the political alliances he concluded. The friendship between the English king, the Breton duke, and Maximilian went further than mere intensification of diplomatic and political contacts among the sovereigns. To concretise their plans to resist French domination on the continent, the English king first sent troops to the Low Countries, and money followed in a second phase. In 1478 English troops were sent to the continent, to help Maximilian’s forces fighting on the French border. Maximilian had to pay the troops from his own revenues, and he sent crown jewels to London as security.218 As part of the marriage contract between Philip the Fair and Anne of York negotiated in August 1480, Maximilian was promised a new contingent of archers, a dowry of 100,000 crowns, and a loan of 2000 English pounds to pay the troops.219 In April 1481 the Breton Duke Francis promised to take over the payment of these troops, and the receiver-general of Brittany handed over the (rather modest) sum of 3600 lb. par.220 Maximilian received the lion’s share of the financial support promised from Brittany in June 1482, when the Italian merchant Tommaso Portinari, acting as an intermediary, transferred a new Breton loan of 49,200 lb. par., again secured by the crown jewels.221 The financial bond between Maximilian and the foreign sovereigns not only created a strong political alliance, but also made Maximilian financially dependent on them. The political consequences were legion. These funds did not help to end the war, but, on the contrary, increased international rivalry between France and its enemies. In this way, Maximilian became dependent on a political alliance which showed no sympathy with the desires of his subjects, who yearned for peace. Maximilian not only borrowed from foreign creditors, but also drew on the thriving money market in the Low Countries. However, while it has been possible up until now to give a rough sketch of the origins of ducal finances, Maximilian’s local borrowing is far more difficult to reconstruct, because the accounts of the receiver-general only give the amounts of loans in two cases. Other records only mention the payment of a debt.222 However, I have collected information on 25 loans from the accounts of the receivergeneral and traces in the correspondence of the Chamber of Accounts, but this is not a 218 In October 1479 the jewels were sent to London (ADN: B 3495, 123689–90); they were worth 36,000lb. par. (GSAB: MD, 3279). About the difficulties of paying the troops: Delepierre, Chronique des faits, 462–3. 219 ‘Laquelle somme a esté convertie et employé au paiement des dits gens de guerre ’ (ADN: B 431, 17738, 15 August 1480). The marriage contract in SAG: OV, 827; see also Scofield, The life and reign, II, 290–1; Ross, Edward IV, 278–83; Van Gent, ‘Pertijelike saken ’, 268; Sablon du Corail, Les étrangers au service, 393–8 and ADN: B 17731, ‘Histoire Générale’; B 18823, 23693 and 23703. About the dowry: BnF: MC, 380, 539–40. 220 ADN: B 17736, ‘Histoire Générale, Bretagne’. 221 ADN: B 2127, 56v; Boone, Apologie d ’un banquier, 50; ADN: B 3495, 123691. 222 Only the loans from Folco Portinari and Giovanni Canini of September 1477 and the loan from the Breton duke of June 1482 are recorded in the revenues of the receiver-general (ADN: B 2115, 17v and 2127, 56). 52

Chapter 1 The State

complete list. Because these records probably only include a few of all the loans Maximilian received, the following conclusions must be viewed with caution. It was normal for the Burgundian dukes to appeal to the financial reserves of wealthy subjects and merchants. To fulfil short-term needs, incurred mainly by military expeditions, the dukes turned to credit.223 The count of Flanders and the Burgundian dukes normally ‘shopped’ in the Bruges money market, the nucleus of the Western European economic and financial trade network.224 In Bruges there were innumerable foreign merchants with extensive holdings, and also native bankers, salesmen, and moneychangers with cash in their treasuries, cash that was far more scarce in the Middle Ages than now. Maximilian’s financial advisors had to negotiate the terms and interest rates of loans, and more than once the crown jewels were listed as security. Once obtained, the money was usually sent directly to a military captain, or used to pay off another debtor. Maximilian often borrowed money from important nobles in his personal entourage, state officials, clerical institutions, and cities. Loans from cities were usually small sums which the cities gave to the archduke when he visited, in order to meet direct needs. In return the archduke promised to pay off the loan from the next aide granted to him by the city. The state paid off his debts, probably hoping to hasten consent to a new aide. In December 1479, for example, Bruges paid Maximilian 9600 lb. par. and Ypres 1200 lb. par., sums that would be subtracted from the next aide.225 Maximilian also borrowed money from abbeys. In August 1479, he received 370 lb. 10 s. par from the abbeys in southern Flanders, probably to pay troops in the Battle of Enguinegatte.226 As an expected aspect of loyalty to their lord, state officials and noblemen also lent money to Maximilian. Paul de Baenst gave 400 lb. par., and the first ‘maître d ’hôtel ’ Olivier de la Marche gave him 1200 lb. par. in 1478; Guillaume de la Baulme contributed 1200 lb. par. in December 1479, and Adolf of Cleves lent 1680 lb. par. to Maximilian in September 1479 ‘to help him in personal affairs’. 227 With loans of that sort, the sovereign strengthened his political ties to confidents. By lending money to their sovereign, members of the court could also count on receiving political and financial advantages.228 These ‘socio-political’ loans from loyal confidents differ greatly from the huge loans extended by native bankers and international merchants. For merchants and bankers could provide in huge amounts of cash, but they were subject to economic laws and market forces, and they had to be repaid in cash. Considering that it was so difficult for the state to increase its revenues by imposing new taxes, it is not surprising that Maximilian frequently accessed the capital of private bankers and merchants to meet pressing financial needs. For example, in the autumn of 1477, when the Burgundian treasury was empty, and a military expedition against French invader was urgently necessary, Maximilian borrowed a total 223 Bigwood, Le régime juridique, 11–95; Mollat, Recherches sur les finances, 316–8; Van Nieuwenhuysen, Les finances du duc (1984), 333–72; Schnerb, Jean sans Peur, 290; Arnould, Une estimation des revenus, 153–5; Gunn, Grummitt & Cools, War, state, and society, 33; Stabel & Haemers, From Bruges to Antwerp, passim. 224 Boone, Brugge en de Bourgondische hertogen, 124–6; see also Murray, Cradle of capitalism; De Roover, Money, banking and credit; and Lambert, The city, the duke. 225 ADN: B 2118, 68r and 72v. 226 ADN: B 18844, 29540. In 1478 the archduke borrowed 7800 lb. par. from the abbeys of Brabant (ADN: B 2127, 287v). The abbot of ‘Ter Duinen’ lent 1200 lb. par. to the state in May 1482 (ADN: B 2127, 54r). 227 ‘Pour lui aucunement aidier a subvenir a ses affaires et aultrement ’ (ADN, B 2118, 60r and B 2120, 68514). The other loans in ADN: B 2121, 546r and 557r. 228 Boone & Dumolyn, Les officiers-créditeurs, 75–7. 53

For the Common Good

of 78,000 lb. par. from a group of foreign merchants and moneychangers in Bruges, along with a remarkable loan from the city’s inhabitants. Analysis of this particular loan sheds light on Maximilian’s borrowing policy.229 On 4 November 1477 thirty Bruges citizens and resident merchants lent 40,000 lb. par. to the state, secured by the crown jewels.230 The Florentine merchant Pierantonio di Guasparre Bandini-Baroncelli loaned 8400 lb. par., the Bruges broker Jan de Laubeel loaned 19,221 lb. 10 s. par., the moneychanger Nicolas de May extended 6452 lb., and the remainder of 5926 lb. 10 s. par. was paid by 26 other Bruges citizens. The loans were negotiated at an interest rate of ten percent, but Jan de Laubeel made one loan at eight percent and another at nine. The Italian merchant Folco Portinari collected the money from the Bruges citizens Jan de Laubeel and Nicolas de May, and transferred the sum to Pierantonio Baldini, who then took it to the Free County of Burgundy. In April 1478 Jean de Châlon, prince of Orange and the governor of the territories of the Free County which were still under Burgundian rule, received the money and immediately launched a full-scale military attack against the French invader, unfortunately, without success.231 The Bruges Dean of Saint-Donatian Pieter Bogaert, and Guy de Baenst, the rent master of the Western Scheldt, were ordered to hand crown jewels over to each of the moneylenders on 6 December 1477.232 Who were these Bruges moneylenders? Fifteen percent of the giant loan came from city inhabitants belonging to the socio-political and economic cream of Bruges society.233 It is not clear if these Bruges citizens wanted to further Maximilian’s goal to recapture the Free County and the duchy of Burgundy. It is more likely that they hoped to further their own personal careers by investing in state finance. Maybe the loan was for reasons of prestige, and perhaps some hoped to get state offices. Maarten Lem and Willem Moreel lent the largest sums, which may be connected to their entries into ducal service some years later. Other moneylenders may have only had an economic motive in loaning to Maximilian, as their investment would yield an interest rate of ten percent. Maximilian and his advisors may have wanted to win the loyalty of the Bruges elite by borrowing money from them, but the main motivation in contracting the loan was the desire to continue fighting the war. Among the Bruges creditors were two moneychangers, Willem Roelands and Colard d’Ault, and the latter lent 9600 lb. par. to Maximilian in March 1479.234 But the Bruges moneychanger could not fulfil every financial demand of Maximilian; in chapter 3 I will return to the bankruptcy of many money-lenders in these years. 229 The other loans of the Autumn of 1477 are a loan from Folco Portinari and Giovanni Canini of 14,400 lb. par. on the 21st of September on crown jewels (ADN: B 2115, 17v). In the same month Gaspard de Bonsami lent 12,000 lb. par., moneychanger Nicolas de May 4800 lb. par., and the Spaniard Alonso de Lerme, who staid in Bruges, 6800 lb. par. (ADN: B 2115, 79r). 230 ADN: B 3495, 123686. 231 ADN: B 1610, 212r–213r. About Jean de Châlon, see Cools, Mannen met macht, 186–9. 232 Probably with this purpose Thomas Malet, Nicolas de Gondeval, and Jean Gros had made in October 1477 an inventory of the ‘parties de vaisselles d ’argent doré et blanc ’ of the crown jewels that were saved in Bruges (ADN: B 3495, 123685). 233 Namely Jan van den Rijne, Jan Nutin, Lieven de Clerc, Klaas van den Steene, Willem and Reinier Houtmarct, Jan and Antoon Losschaert, Mathias de Buc, Willem Moreel, Sander Haec, Alexander Hotin, Pieter Lotin, Jan Moeschroen, Jan and Willem Roelands, Donaas de Moor, Jan de Blasere, Pieter de Copeleere, Nicasius Pierins, Thomas Perot, Colard de Labye, Klaas van Nieuwenhove, Jan en Cornelis de Boot, Jan de Keyt and Maarten Lem. They lent a sum from 120 lb. par (Lieven de Clerc) to 1200 lb. par. (Maarten Lem). Most of their careers are examined in chapter 3. 234 ADN: B 2121, 553r. Colard d’Ault was a Brugian moneychanger (SAB: BB, 64, 19r). 54

Chapter 1 The State

Pierantonio Bandini provided one of the biggest chunks of the loan of November 1477, 8400 lb. par. He was the governor of Bruges branch of the company of Florentine Pazzi family. His brother would murder Guiliano de’ Medici in the Florentine plot against the Medici in April 1478.235 But Bandini was also related to Tommaso Portinari, who was the head of the Bruges branch of the Medici company, which complicated their political position. In Bruges both bankers were important moneylenders to the Burgundian dynasty. Other foreign lenders, mostly of northern Italian origin, were powerful merchants who dealt in the Bruges market to further the interests of their companies and also their own private investments.236 Maximilian frequently called on the financial holdings of these eminent tradesmen in the following years. In 1478 or 1479 the Florentine merchant Giovanni Cambi lent 72,000 lb. par. to Maximilian, again with the crown jewels as security.237 In 1480 the Florentine Girolamo Frescobaldi and two Genoese merchants, Anselmo de Lomellini and Dimitro della Costa, lent a total of 27,070 lb. par. to the Habsburg archduke.238 In 1480 or 1481 state financial advisors Pieter Lanchals and Willem Moreel borrowed 14,000 lb. par. from the Luccese merchant Pietro Carincioni.239 In a final, exceptional case from 1478, Maximilian had confiscated, for an unknown reason, a freighter containing alum belonging to Augustino Doria, which Maximilian then used to pay the troops of the English general John Fax.240 After Doria protested, the confiscation was turned into a (forced) loan of 77,280 lb. par., which was paid off in 1482. This last loan clearly shows that Maximilian’s financial advisors followed a quite arbitrary policy. They collected the money wherever they found it, and in the case of Augustino Doria, even with force. This last loan is of course an exception. A sovereign who did not abide by the rules of money-lending committed financial suicide. To remain a worthy risk, Maximilian had to stick to the conditions set by the merchants, but very little information remains about the conditions Maximilian’s creditors imposed. Short-term loans were expensive of course, but the interest rate depended on the term of the loan and the amount borrowed.241 Interest rates were normally around ten percent in the late medieval city, but, depending on the market, some sovereigns had to borrow at hundred percent interest.242 In November 1477 Maximilian paid an interest rate of ten percent, but in 1479 he had to pay twenty percent on the loan from Giovanni Cambi.243 As discussed above, Maximilian had decided to sell annuities on the ‘spijker ’ of Bruges, because, according to the archduke, borrowing 235 De Roover, The rise and decline, 355; Martines, April blood, 169. 236 A description of this milieu in Stabel, Entre commerce international, 83–95. 237 Namely a ‘riche fleur de lys ’ (ADN: B 2127, 290r). Probably this man was the same as Giovanni di Bernardo Cambi who was decapitated in Florence in 1497 when he supported the Medici in an unsuccessful attempt to regain power (De Roover, The rise and decline, 277). 238 Namely 13.870 lb., 6000 lb. (ADN: B 2121, 559v–560r) and 7200 lb. (ADN: B 2122, 68529; B 20159, 155973). Frescobaldi paid superintendent George of Baden 1740 lb. par. when he stayed in London (ADN: B 2124, 300v). In April 1483 Frescobali demanded repayment of his loan of 7200 lb. par., and 2200 lb. par. interest. Maximilian did not have the money, but he borrowed it from Pierantonio Baldini, who received the security (a Burgundian suit of armour; see ADN: B 2129, 69085 and B 2141, 69856). The Frescobaldi also were active as moneylenders to emperor Charles V (Stabel, Entre commerce international, 84–6; Goris, Etude sur les colonies, 393). Dimitro da Costa and Anselmo de Lomellini probably were members of the Genoese families of the same name who traded with Bruges (Petti Balbi, Mercanti e nationes, 92–4). 239 ADN: B 3495, 123687. Pietro Carincioni was, together with Real de Reali, among the Luccese merchants who made up new statutes for the Luccese nation in Bruges in 1478 (Lazzareschi, Gli statuti dei Lucchesi, 87). 240 ADN: B 2121, 557r–559r; B 2127, 293r. See also Boone, Apologie d ’un banquier, 45–6. 241 An overview in Körner, Public credit, 514–5 and Van der Wee, The growth of the Antwerp market, I, 110. 242 Homer, A history of interest rates, 106–10. Emperor Charles V paid interest rates of 10 to 15 percent (Goris, Etude sur les colonies, 400 and Stabel & Haemers, From Bruges to Antwerp, 31–4). 243 ADN: B 2127, 304r. 55

For the Common Good

at that time would cost him 25 to 30 percent.244 The interest rates Maximilian encountered did not dramatically increase, but by the end of Mary of Burgundy’s reign, his debts to creditors had piled up steeply. In 1482 the receiver-general paid 21,598 lb. 11 s. par. for loan interest only – without paying off the debts.245 We do not know exactly if or how Maximilian repaid the loans he contracted, but De Roover stated that Maximilian was the ‘worst debtor among all the princes of Europe’. 246 Because Maximilian contracted many loans after the death of Mary of Burgundy, this statement probably is exaggerated for the time period of Mary’s reign, but there is no question that the debt of the Burgundian state increased dramatically during her reign. The difficulty Maximilian experienced trying to repay the loan of 40,000 lb. par. from November 1477 shows the financial struggles of the archduke, who could only pay off his debts when he acquired the financial means. After a month some of Bruges creditors were paid off with the income from a portion of an aide awarded by Ghent, while the others were paid off on the stipulated day in May.247 Repayment of the moneychangers had to wait, and Maximilian’s financial administration found it necessary to extend the loan by six months.248 Remarkably Pierantonio Baldini and Nicolas de May were able to sell their loans to other bankers, to the company of Pietro Carincioni and to the Genoese Real de Reali.249 In September 1478, when the loan fell due, Maximilian himself frantically informed his financial commissioners that he could not repay the loan. He asked them to ‘find money’ because he did not want to lose the crown jewels.250 The search for money lasted until 1481, when the receiver-general paid off the debt to Pietro Carincioni, with a final loss of 53 percent.251 Three significant examples demonstrate that the many loans Maximilian contracted not only made him financially, but also politically, dependent on other people. The first example concerns Thibaut Barradot. During the reign of Mary of Burgundy this former secretary of Charles the Bold was responsible for the personal finances of the duchess.252 After her death the Members of Flanders accused him of financial misdeeds. In April 1483 an investigating commission from the three Members interrogated Barradot about a missing 3600 lb. par., which the official had borrowed from the duchess in August 1478 and February 1479, without ever repaying it, according to the three Members. Barradot 244 ADN: B 17733, ‘Bruges, espier ’. 245 ADN: B 2127, 301r–304r. 246 De Roover, The rise and decline, 355–6. 247 23.959 lb. 6 s. par (ADN: B 2115, 79r-v). 248 The released administration informed the archduke that: ‘ilz [the moneylenders] vueillent surcerir leur dit remboursement jusques a six mois apres ensuivans ’ (ADN: B 3495, 123688; B 18844, 29536). 249 Luccese Pietro Carincioni bought the loan ‘pour soy, comme pour Henry Arnulphin et autres de sa compaignie ’ – the crown jewels were transferred (ADN: B 18844, 29534–5). 250 ‘Toutesvoyes nous n ’avons encore eu de vous quelques nouvelles dont nous donnons merveilles, et pour ce qu ’il est besoing, comme bien savez, de trouver argent […] et que [vous] faictes tousiours le meilleur devoir que pourrez de trouver la plus grande somme que faire se pourra afin que par fault d ’argent aucun inconvenient ne nous avienne. Au surplus, Folque Portinari et Pietre Antoine Bandin nous ont fait requerir que les vueillons faire contenter des deniers qu ’ilz ont prestez et pour lesquelz leur avons baillié notre vaisselle, qui nous seroit ung dommaige irreparable. Pourquoy nous vous requerons que incontinent vous advisez comment l ’on pourra contenter les dits Folque et Pietre Anthoine afin que [nous] ne perdons notre dit vaisselle ’ (ADN: B 3495, 123688; a letter of 19th September 1478). Maximilian refers to the share of the loan of November 1477 Folco Portinari had collected. 251 The repayment of the loan of 8400 lb. par. cost 12.843 lb. 2 s. par. (ADN: B 2124, 301r). 252 ADN: B 2115, 35r-v. To show his sympathy to his masters he had named his son after the archduke, who rewarded him on that occasion with a silver piece (ADN: B 2118, 297v). On his career: Cockshaw, Prosopographie des secrétaires, 20–1. After the death of the duchess Maximilian made him responsible of the finances of their children (ADN: B 2128, 68999). 56

Chapter 1 The State

justified his actions by claiming that Mary’s first knight of honour, Louis of Bruges, had ordered him to repay a loan of 1000 ecu to Pierantonio Baldini, and to subtract that from the amount he had borrowed from Mary. The Flemish Members did not dispute this claim, but demanded the remainder, 1000 lb. par., from Barradot. The archduke’s financial advisor responded that Mary had forgiven him the rest; even on her deathbed she had not requested that he repay the remainder.253 Barradot’s borrowed money dissolved in a complicated web of political promises, murky transactions, and disputable agreements, once more demonstrating the complexities of the ducal financial system and the weighty political influence of officials over state finances. A second example supports the same conclusion, at least in part. In May 1478 when Tommaso Portinari was in Florence reporting to Lorenzo de’ Medici about financial losses, Folco Portinari, his nephew and substitute company head, loaned 7200 lb. par. to the court, with one of the crown jewels as security.254 When the term of the loan expired, Maximilian did not have the money. He then contracted a new loan in November 1479 from Giovanni Cambi, with another crown jewel as security.255 The first crown jewel which had been given to Portinari returned to the ducal treasury, but only after another loan had been secured. On the due date of this second loan Maximilian’s financial administration realized that the revenues from the aides from Holland, originally assigned to repay this loan, had already been spent to pay the troops. Deputies of Maximilian made an offer to Cambi, which he accepted, to continue the loan at an interest rate of 20 percent. In March 1482 Cambi received interest payments for the previous period, but the outcome of the story is unknown due to the gaps in the sources.256 But the result is clear. By borrowing and extending loans Maximilian and his administration made a complete mess of the treasury. This policy contrasts heavily with the loan policy of Philip the Bold, whose administration maintained order by repaying what it had borrowed.257 As Maximilian failed to stick to the contracts he had made with merchants, he became imprisoned by their financial games. It became very difficult to set out an independent policy; he always had to take the demands of the moneylenders into account. Sometimes the political influence of the moneylender went very far, as the third example shows. The privileges of 1477 had abolished the Gravelines toll on English wool. Tommaso Portinari, who had leased this toll, received a reimbursment for the loss he had suffered when the toll was abolished. The state also owed the Florentine merchant for a loan Charles the Bold had contracted. How much money the Burgundian state owe to Portinari is unclear, but in 1482 the receiver-general paid Portinari 90,858 lb. 10 s. par.258 Moreover, on an unknown date, Maximilian had contracted a new loan from Portinari, secured with a crown jewel (a ‘riche fleur de lys ’),259 and Portinari also served as the intermediary for the loan 253 Thibaut Barradot told that he stood at the deathbed of duchess Mary: ‘Elle ne parla a moy, ne je a elle ung seul mot. Et quant elle m ’eust demandé les dits deniers, je ne luy en eusse sceu gaires bailler, pour lors, car a son dit trespas je n ’eusse sceu finer du sien ne du mien cent florins ’ (CAG: 93bis, 15, 7). About the investigation of the three Members: ADN: B 33, 83r. 254 ADN: B 17727, ‘Hôtel, joyaux’ and B 17729, ‘Flamand’. 255 ADN: B 2121, 553v–554r. 256 Namely 13.200 lb. par. (ADN: B 2127, 317r). In spite of these lucrative loans, the company of Cambi bankrupted in 1483 (Grunzweig, Correspondance de la filiale, xxxi). 257 Van Nieuwenhuysen, Les finances du duc (1984), 371–2 and 499. 258 ADN: B 2127, 287v–288r. About the reimbursement and the loans of Portinari to Charles the Bold, see: Boone, Apologie d ’un banquier, 48–51 and Walsh, Charles the Bold, 129–33. 259 De Roover, The rise and decline, 355–6. 57

For the Common Good

of 49,200 lb. par. Maximilian had received from the duke of Brittany. Portinari’s juggling of those high sums of money demonstrates how immersed this merchant was in state finances. Of course, Portinari took advantage of the political weakness of the Burgundian state to claim reimbursements, but also to invest in the rebuilding of state power, by providing funds to wage war. As Portinari’s influence on state finances grew, his position at court highly resembled the influential status Dino Rapondi had acquired at the court of Philip the Bold.260 Like Rapondi, Portinari was immersed in court financial matters, and he also had significant political influence. Portinari had already been a counsellor of Charles the Bold, and now he acquired an important political office in Maximilian’s court.261 When the Habsburg prince reintroduced the toll on Gravelines in 1485, Portinari again served as financial advisor to the archduke.262 Maximilian and Portinari had the same financial interest in reintroducing the toll, and it diverged sharply from the interest of Maximilian’s subjects. Those subjects tried to protect the privileges of 1477, but because those privileges abolished the Gravelines toll, the main revenue source of Flanders, as well as other sources of ducal revenues, Maximilian and his financial advisors had to find some way around the privileges. The reintroduction of the toll was necessary to bring in money to repay loans and make the Burgundian state less dependent on the approval of aides. But Maximilian had admitted the Trojan horse, as slowly but surely, he became the puppet of his debtors. This had three severe political consequences. First, the high debts increasingly drove state policy. Obtaining more money more quickly seemed to be a tactical advantage in war, but since the enemy used the same financial means, credit only multiplied and postponed the costs of the war.263 Maximilian hoped to use international tensions to his own advantage, but by borrowing money from foreign rulers, he only became dependent on their political projects. In addition, the merchants, principally Italians, that loaned money to Maximilian, had different political priorities from those of the sovereign and his subjects. The city of Ghent’s demand to end the war immediately differed sharply from the complaints of ‘external’ financers, who only wanted a profitable return on their loans. They did not want the war to end; on the contrary, a long and costly war would increase their profits.264 When officials loaned to the state, the state faced many restrictions. First, officials would not receive the same amount of cash back, but they could demand political services in return, or acquire control over state expenses. Maximilian was able to avoid this type of control, but as a consequence he faced another political agenda, imposed by creditors.265 Secondly, the growth of state debts made it very risky for moneylenders to extend new loans to the Habsburg prince. Crown jewels as security, or prepayment of a portion of an aide was no longer sufficient as the loan amounts increased. Now creditors demanded personal security from a ducal representative, preferably a state official with financial authority. For example, in 1480 or 1481 Pietro Carincioni loaned 14,000 lb. par. to Willem Moreel and Pieter Lanchals, rather than to the receiver-general or Maximilian. The two

260 261 262 263 264 265 58

Lambert, The city, the duke, 165–8. Boone, Apologie d ’un banquier, 41; Walsh, Charles the Bold, 122–6. Boone, Apologie d ’un banquier, 38–41. Blockmans, Keizer Karel V, 219. ‘La guerre est une bonne affaire pour les créanciers de l ’Etat ’ (Chevalier, Le financement de la première guerre, 59). See also Stabel & Haemers, From Bruges to Antwerp, 26–31.

Chapter 1 The State

financial commissioners also negotiated other loan contracts, but few have survived.266 Rather than Maximilian himself, other functionaries began borrowing money for the state. In June 1481 the chancellor of the Golden Fleece and abbot of Saint-Bertin, Jean de Lannoy, borrowed 1200 lb. par. from an unknown merchant to pay troops in SaintOmer (where his abbey was located).267 The heavy responsibility laid on the abbot and the financial commissioners demonstrates that merchants only wanted to loan to the top officials of the state administrative apparatus of the state, to those with political weight. As a consequence those officials were able to strengthen their personal authority over state finances and over the sovereign, making him dependent on his financial advisors, as well as on his creditors. The financial policy of the state was increasingly controlled by an ever-shrinking group of financial specialists. This aroused the envy of other state officials, such as nobles, jurists, and more conventional office-holders. These men would not hesitate to undo the political power of the new, talented financial advisors whenever they had the chance. Thirdly, the need to repay loans heavily influenced the policy of the archduke. Just as Charles the Bold had in the last years of his reign268, Maximilian and his financial advisors chose to use new loans to pay off old loans, because the privileges of 1477 and the dissatisfaction with the policy of the regime made it impossible to raise taxes or request aides to pay off state debts. But while repayments of loans are recorded in the account books of the receiver-general, incoming funds from new loans very rarely appear.269 The largest part of the borrowed money was spent on the troops, and it was given directly to captains and lieutenants (see, for example, the forced loan from Augustino Doria). The receivergeneral did not get to add this money to his account, but he was required to repay the interest and the principal of the loan. Thus, the public resources of the state, the ordinary and extraordinary revenues, increasingly ended up in the hands of state creditors, mostly merchants and bankers. The sovereign and his administration contracted loans because they could not raise taxes, but the costs of their policy were ultimately paid with tax money. This policy transferred the costs of borrowing onto Maximilian’s subjects, and it would soon become unacceptable for the Members of Flanders. (d) Conclusion: Maximilian’s Financial Policy Medieval state finances were fragile and unstable. Whatever delicate structure was in place collapsed quickly whenever rising expenses encountered tight limits placed by subjects on income for the central government. Maximilian of Austria, his adversaries, his allies, and his descendants all experienced severe financial problems whenever war increased

266 The loan of Pietro Carincioni in ADN: B 3495, 123687. The presence of both officers is attested in B 2122, 68529 and B 20159, 155973 (loan from Girolamo Frescobaldi), in B 3495, 123689 (loan from the English king), and in B 17739, ‘Emprunts’ (loan from the personnel of the Chamber of Accounts of Lille, to be discussed later). 267 Maximilian had given orders to the financial commission in Antwerp to search salary of the solders. The commission concluded: ‘finablement fut conclu de sur l ’obligacion de mon dit seigneur de Saint-Bertin emprunter la dicte somme a frait d ’aucuns marchans lors estans au dit Anvers ausquelz mon dit seigneur de Wierre [ Jean de la Bouverie] et les dits Nicolas de Gondeval et Guillaume Moreel baillerent leurs lettres obligatoires pour le remboursement des dits marchans ’. The loan would be repayed from the money ‘que mon dit seigneur entendoit estre levez sur les prelatz de son pays de Flandres ’ (ADN: B 2124, 165v–166v). 268 Mollat, Recherches sur les finances, 320–1. 269 Only the loans from Folco Portinari and Giovanni Canini of September 1477 and the loan from the Breton duke of June 1482 were received by the receiver-general. 59

For the Common Good

expenses, or the Estates-General increased its political control.270 The warrior Maximilian and his financial advisors tried to solve these problems by finding new money, or stripping off the political corset put on them by the Estates. The financial officials of Flanders did not receive official instructions from Maximilian explaining how they were to maneuver around the disadvantageous provisions of the 1477 privileges, but Maximilian issued such instructions to his ministers in Holland.271 In these instructions, dated December 1477, Maximilian and his commissioners expressed the hope that wealthy citizens would support the war financially. The sale of annuities, reintroduction of abolished tolls, and leasing of offices would help fill the treasury. Using the same methods, but without a ducal ordinance and more slowly, Maximilian succeeded in raising more revenues in Flanders as well. This Habsburg policy utilized Charles the Bold’s methods – re-imposing tolls, leasing offices, selling annuities secured by the domain, gifts, and enormous loans – to fill state coffers. This is not surprising because Charles the Bold’s most important financial advisors were still in power during Mary of Burgundy’s reign. Initially, Maximilian was tormented by the numerous restrictions of the privileges of 1477. If he wanted to raise taxes, he could not act without consulting the Estates. But gradually the financial administration of the archduke manoeuvred around several of those restrictions, such as the prohibition on the leasing of offices, the abolition of tolls on trade, and the obligatory participation of the Estates in monetary measures. Because Maximilian and his administration wanted to ignore the Estates, and from necessity when Ghent refused to negotiate or pay aides, costing the state its main source of revenue, the state sought more and more of its funding in borrowing from foreign merchants, bankers, and other moneylenders. Just as happened in the reign of Charles V, the other ‘impresario of war ’, financing the war with private capital made the burdens of war more arduous.272 Consequently, Maximilian had to cope with the same problems which all medieval monarchs faced. The Burgundian state structure was still organized in a medieval way, that of the so-called ‘domain state’. Although Maximilian had access to substantial income, state fiscal revenues were inconsistent and unable to sustain large projects such as a longterm war against an opponent with similar means. The system of fiscal extraction was not yet centralised enough to build up a reliable fiscal policy.273 Like every other ruler supervising the transition from a ‘domain state’ to a ‘fiscal state’, Maximilian lacked a solid basis from which to repay loans and interest consistently and ensure a healthy financial policy in general.274

270 See Kerhervé, L ’Etat breton, 947; Lassalmonie, La boîte à l ’enchanteur, 707–8 for case studies on state finances of Louis XI and the duke of Brittany. Charles V also tried to raise profits from his domain to pay debts and salaries (Vandenbulcke, Fonction publique et crédit, 114–5; Blockmans, Keizer Karel V, 216–7). 271 Boone & Brand, De ondermijning van het Groot Privilege, 17. On the fiscal consequences of this ordnance: Marsilje, Les modes d ’imposition, 104–9. 272 Tracy, Emperor Charles V, 108. 273 Blockmans, The Low Countries, 304. 274 Ormrod, The West European monarchies, 158–9 and Bonney, The rise of the fiscal state, 13. 60

Chapter 1 The State

Illustration 4: Maximilian of Austria, Mary of Burgundy, and their Descendants: Philip the Fair, Margaret of Austria, Emperor Charles V, Ferdinand and Louis of Habsburg (Bernhard Strigel, ‘Emperor Maximilian I with his Family’, 1516; Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna).

During the reign of Mary of Burgundy, Maximilian was gradually released from the strong political control the Estates had obtained in 1477, but the alternative did not give him the chance to make autonomous policy. Maximilian was caught in a complicated web of political and financial dependence on foreign sovereigns, merchants, and bankers, and on state officials bent on increasing their own power. In their quest for financing, the archduke and his administration valued state financial interests more highly than maintenance of the privileges of 1477. The Burgundian state did not become the model 61

For the Common Good

of fair government that the Estates-General had envisioned in 1477. Urban craftsmen and peasants in the countryside probably had no knowledge of the policy set by Maximilian and his advisors, but they did notice the consequences. The massive leasing of judicial offices imperilled fair justice, the tax burden was even higher than in the reign of Charles the Bold, and the government did not provide for basic needs, such as an improvement of the economic situation or an end to the war. Maximilian’s performance on the Burgundian throne did not match the role the privileges of 1477 had imposed on him. Maximilian’s financial policy planted the seeds of future protest. 1.2.4

Habsburg Politics

1.2.4.1 The Expenses of the Receiver-General What policies were carried out with state revenues? Because we do not have the necessary source material to answer this question fully, I only can give a rough sketch of Habsburg spending. Research into Burgundian state finances in other periods has shown that the revenues flowing to the receiver-general amounted to only half of the total revenue of the state.275 If this is true for state finances in the period 1477–1482, the following survey based on the receiver-general’s expenses can only offer a provisional analysis of Maximilian of Austria’s spending. It does not include the missing figures from subordinate levels nor from other central treasuries. Nevertheless, this partial survey confirms the image cast by the preceding analysis of Maximilian’s financial policy. Graph 7 divides state expenses into three categories. Category 1 covers the personal spending of duke and duchess; category 2 contains expenses for court administration and state personnel; and category 3 deals with the costs of the war. The first category (‘personal use ’) can be divided in four parts, namely (1) the Chamber (‘hostel’ ) of the archduke, (2) the Chamber of the duchess and her children, (3) jewels, silverware, linens, and dishes, and (4) the ‘personal expenses ’ of the ducal couple (see graph 8). Except for the third part, the precise expenses in this first category were not detailed. The receiver-general only informs us that secret affairs of the ducal couple were not to be exposed.276 The archduke ’s personal entourage controlled his household and personal expenses. The receiver split these expenses into the ‘hand-money ’ of the archduke, and ‘money for archduke to do as he pleases ’, but in the sources the distinction between these is never clear.277 Maarten von Polheim, Veit von Volkenstein, and several other Austrians who had accompanied Maximilian to the Low Countries controlled these funds, and they did not leave any evidence of how this money was spent.278 Money provided for the household (‘hôtel’ ) and the ‘duke ’s pleasure ’ was most likely used to maintain the proverbial splendour of the Burgundian court.279

275 Concerning the reigns of Philip the Bold and Philip the Good (Vannieuwenhuysen, Les finances du duc (1990), 174 and Blockmans, The Low Countries, 283). 276 In 1480 the money for the Chamber of the archduke was given to Maximilian ‘pour convertir et employer en certaines ses usaiges et affaires secretz, dont il ne veult autre ne plus ample declaracion ’ (ADN: B 2121, 570r). 277 The ‘deniers a monsieur pour faire son plaisir ’ (ADN: B 2115, 136v). 278 In 1479 the category of personal finances was introduced as follows: ‘Despensse pour deniers delivrez es mains de messire Martin, seigneur de Polham, chambelier, de Vith de Volkestain, escuier, chambellan, et de messire George Konterer, aussi chambelier, maistre de la cuisine de mon dit seigneur le duc, par leurs lettres de recepte et par mandaments particuliers d ’icellui seigneur ’ (ADN: B 2118, 385r). 279 See for example: Paravicini, The court of the dukes, 509–10. 62

Chapter 1 The State

Graph 7: The Expenses of the Receiver-General for all Finances during the Reign of Mary of Burgundy, by Category (1477–1482).280

Graph 8: Analysis of the Personal Expenses of Mary of Burgundy and Maximilian of Austria (Category 1).

The second category concerns the expenses for court staff and state personnel (graph 9). The receiver-general divided this category into three parts: (1) salaries of personnel and members of the court; (2) gifts given by the ducal couple, and (3) expenses for embassies and messengers sent by the archduke. It is difficult to distinguish between ‘gifts’ and ‘personal expenses’ of the archduke, because the receiver-general sometimes entered repayment of loans into the ‘gifts’ account. This creative bookkeeping explains why the gifts category increased so dramatically in 1482, when the receiver-general repaid the giant loans made to the state by Tommaso Portinari and Giovanni Cambi and recorded 280 Sources: ADN: B 2115, 2118, 2121, 2124, 2127. 63

For the Common Good

part of these repayments as ‘gifts’. 281 In a similar fashion, the receiver recorded as ‘gifts’ part of the reimbursements paid to captains and noblemen for the salaries of their ordinance companies and similar battlefield expenses.282 In a way that is typical of primitive medieval bookkeeping practices, the receiver-general did not maintain a tight discipline in his accounts, but instead varied his recording of expenses according to whatever formula the archduke had used to pay the salaries, compensation, or interest. Graph 9: Analysis of the Administrative Costs of the Burgundian-Habsburg Court (Category 2).

In addition, the contents of the third category, payments for war, troops, and artillery, changed during Mary of Burgundy’s reign. Initially, as Graph 10 shows, this category consisted of the payments to the treasurer of war and the master of artillery. The treasurer of war paid the salaries and armament costs of troops, the costs of fortress surveillance, salaries of ordinance companies, and similar military expenses. But in 1480 the receiver-general introduced a new subcategory, the ‘German chamber’, into military expenses. The ‘German chamber’ was controlled by Andries Andries (appointed to supervise the ‘chambre aux deniers de mon dit seigneur subsequent qui est aussi commis au payement des Almans’).283 Because the archduke did not have the money to pay the salaries of the troops he had led to the Low Countries in 1477, nor the salaries of the retinue that had accompanied him, he made the treasurer of war responsible for paying these salaries.284 From 1480 on, this new chamber absorbed almost 14 percent of all state expenses, or 42 percent of the entire cost of war. With the money he received, Andries Andries paid a troop of ‘German soldiers’ commanded by Adolf of Nassau. In addition, the German Chamber included German-speaking advisors led by Maarten von Polheim.285 This German Chamber, 281 ADN: B 2127, 301r–305r. 282 In 1482, for example, Philip of Burgundy-Beveren received 1000 lb. par. for his personal expenditures on the defense of Saint-Omer (ADN: B 2127, 254v; about his military role in the Burgundian army: Salamagne, La défense des villes, 298). 283 ADN: B 2124, 61v. 284 In 1479, for example, a payment of 2600 lb. par. was made for the ‘paiement de certains pensionnaires de la haulte ligne d ’Almaigne, amis de mon dit seigneur ou pays des Zwices, ou mon dit seigneur l ’envoya lors avec autres pour certaines matieres et affaires qui grandement touchoient mon dit seigneur et dont il ne veult autre declaracion ’ (ADN: B 2118, 101v). 285 Sums were paid to ‘gens de guere ’ and their captains, and on ‘tant fait des gaiges comme de la despence ordinaire de l ’ostel de mon dit seigneur ’ (ADN: B 2118, 61v–65r). The military activities of the German troops in the ducal army are described in Sablon du Corail, Les étrangers au service, 398–410. 64

Chapter 1 The State

and its non-institutionalized predecessor, provided Maximilian with military support, and the German soldiers also served as the archduke’s personal bodyguards.286 Graph 10: Analysis of the War Expenses of the Burgundian court (Category 3).

Although the finances of the German Chamber were classified as military, Andries paid both soldiers and councillors, which forces the historian to be cautious in interpreting the receiver-general’s outlays. But one conclusion is beyond question: expenditures for war consumed much of the receiver-general’s accounts. During Mary’s reign he spent an average of 31.15 percent of his revenues (and 31.01 percent of his expenses) on war costs (category 3).287 On average, one-third of total expenses came from personnel, one-third from personal spending of the duke and duchess, and one-third from military costs (see graph 7). It is no wonder that the receiver-general assumed the duties of treasurer of war in 1480. In Mary of Burgundy’s short reign, more was spent on the military than during the reigns of any of the preceding dukes of Burgundy. For example, in 1445, the only year for which we have reliable accounts of the entire scope of state finances, the army only absorbed 1.7 percent of revenue. However, 1445 was an exceptionally ‘peaceful’ year, and during times of war, military costs were naturally higher. During the height of John the Fearless’ wars, his receivergeneral spent almost one quarter of his revenues on the military.288 John the Fearless’ father, Philip the Bold, kept military expenses under tighter control, but both dukes received considerable sums from the French treasury to finance their military expeditions.289 Philip the Good and Charles the Bold waged many wars, but they did not experience financial trouble throughout their entire period of their reigns, although Charles the Bold was in financial difficulty at the end of his reign.290

286 Cools’ claim that the ducal court was demilitarized after Charles the Bold’s reign is incorrect (Cools, The BurgundianHabsburg court, 164). 287 That is an annual average of 224,322 lb. par. (1478 is not included, because the account is not extant). 288 Schnerb, Un aspect de la politique financière, 14 and 26. 289 Van Nieuwenhuysen, Les finances du duc (1984), 499. 290 Vaughan, Philip the Good, 259–67. 65

For the Common Good

Table 1: The Expenses of the Receiver-General in 1445 and 1477–1482.291

Categories

1445

1477–1482

Chamber of the archduke

32

8.2

Chamber of the duchess and children

6.8

10.5

Personal expenses

21.9

14.7

Gifts

10.9

14.1

6.5

4.3

14.5

11.8

Embassies and messengers

4.1

3.5

Army

1.7

31

Rest

1.6

1.9

Total

100

100

Cloth and silverware Salaries

The heavy weight of military spending in the receiver-general’s accounts during Mary’s reign came at the expense of the ‘Chamber of the archduke’ and the ‘personal expenses’ of the ducal couple (see table 1). However, this does not necessarily mean that Maximilian’s personal expenses were lower than those of Philip the Good. Surviving records of Archduke Maximilian’s personal spending are certainly not complete, because the amount of loans are unknown, and the accounts of the receiver of the archduke’s ‘chambre aux deniers’ are not extant. In addition, table 1 actually understates military costs, because some of the loans contracted by the administration, such as the November 1477 loan of 40,000 lb. par. from citizens of Bruges, were not recorded in the receiver-general’s accounts. Moreover, regional receivers also spent significant amounts on military expeditions and defense of the county.292 And, of course, the expenses for troops and fortifications paid by the Flemish cities do not appear in these accounts. The military spending of the Burgundian dynasty was spread out over several accounts, and was certainly higher than the sum recorded by the receiver-general. The 31 percent he spent on the war was only a partial figure. By raising more money, Maximilian of Austria hoped to influence the course of military affairs, but he failed to do so. French troops kept attacking, while Maximilian also had to suppress revolts in the northern Low Countries. Throughout Mary’s entire reign, the military costs plagued the accounts of the receiver-general, who spent almost one third of his revenues on an apparently insolvable political conflict. There were many serious political consequences. The permanent need for additional money and the constant pressure of the war on state finances forced the financial administration to search for money from every conceivable source. But Maximilian’s strategy to win the war by increasing revenues turned 291 This is the percentage of each category of expenses out of the total. The figures for the period 1477–1482 are an annual average (1478 excluded). The figures for 1445 are from Arnould, Une estimation des revenus, 215 and Blockmans & Prevenier, De Bourgondiërs, 169. 292 See for example Salamagne, La défense des villes, 301–3. 66

Chapter 1 The State

into a money-devouring policy that put the administration in an awkward position. The financial officers of the archduke had a choice. They could either pass on the cost of the war to the subjects, thus violating their political rights (to be discussed next), or they could call a halt to the war policy (the subject of chapter 1.2.6). 1.2.4.2 The Violation of the Privileges of 1477 Three examples, which show the ways in which state officials handled the 1477 privileges, reveal how the attitude of the ducal administration towards the privileges changed in the course of Mary’s reign. The first, a 1478 dispute between the regional receiver of Flanders for the Bruges quarter, Jan van der Scaghe, and the nobleman Jacques Galliot, shows that in the beginning of the Habsburg reign the privileges of 1477 served as a guideline for legal action, at least in this case. The second, the 1480 ‘Willem van der Scaghe’ affair, was a clash between the city of Ghent, which was trying to protect its political autonomy, and the archduke’s administration, which was trying vainly to increase ducal political influence in the city. The conflict ended in a return to the political ‘status quo’. The third example is the murder of the Ghent bailiff Jan van Dadizeele in 1481. Maximilian and his court protected those suspected of the murder, thus seriously violating the privileges of Ghent. By this act, Maximilian’s administration clearly signalled that the privileges of 1477 no longer served as a guideline for government actions, causing tensions in the county to mount in the months leading up to Mary of Burgundy’s death. The dispute between Jan van der Scaghe and Jacques Galliot provided an early opportunity for the court to demonstrate its adherence to the 1477 privileges. The Members of Flanders had erected a line of defensive fortifications along the county’s southern border in the summer of 1477 in an effort to counter French forces. The EstatesGeneral also contributed to this fortification, especially after the cities of Hainault appealed to them for assistance against the French.293 Garrisons in the cities of Douai and Saint-Omer were placed under the supervision of the military strategist Jacques Galliot, lord of Chanteraine (in Brabant).294 When the Burgundian government did not give him sufficient funds to pay the salaries of these garrisons, Galliot provided the remainder out of his own pocket. In September 1477, Maximilian promised goods that had washed up on the beaches of Ostend and Blankenberge as reimbursement to the nobleman. These goods belonged to the count of Flanders as his beach rights. But the cheated owners, English merchants who had seen their merchandise swept overboard, claimed their property from the regional receiver of the Bruges quarter, who was responsible for collecting items falling under the count’s beach rights. The English merchants appealed to an old trade agreement between the count of Flanders and the English king which stipulated that Englishmen had the right to reclaim goods that washed up onshore if they could prove their ownership. Jan van der Scaghe declared that the Englishmen were right and returned their goods, but then Jacques Galliot confronted the regional receiver with the archduke’s order promising Galliot the English merchandise. To counter, Van der Scaghe showed the nobleman another recent ducal ordinance confirming the 293 Ibidem, 299 and 305. 294 Jacques Galliot participated in the wars of Charles the Bold and in July 1477 he fought against the French (Molinet, Chroniques, I, 218). Maximilian appointed him in the ducal court in November 1477 (Gachard, Analectes historiques, 5e série, 117; see also Cools, Mannen met macht, 209–10). 67

For the Common Good

Englishmen’s right of ownership, but it was less specific than Maximilian’s order to hand over the salvaged goods to Jacques Galliot. After the receiver’s refusal, the Brabantine nobleman appealed to the Great Council, which supported the receiver’s action. On 30 January 1478, the council found that the English merchants should take possession of their property.295 To wage war against the French in 1477, the Burgundian state relied heavily on the financial efforts of loyal noblemen, as this example shows. As he was attempting to reimburse one of them for this loyalty, Maximilian had violated the privileges of English tradesmen. An official, the Flemish receiver, and the Great Council had corrected Maximilian’s error, and the archduke had to reimburse Jacques Galliot in another way. On 1 March 1478 Maximilian gave Galliot an annual income of 1600 lb. par., paid from the account of the receiver-general.296 In this case the Great Council served as a watchdog over the privileges, exactly the role the privileges of 1477 had envisioned for this institution. The Council also created order from the chaotic political decisions made by the administration. Perhaps without the archduke’s knowledge, his administration had issued an improper order to Jacques Galliot, but the Great Council resolved the problem. In a similar manner, the receiver of Flanders for the Bruges quarter, Jan van der Scaghe, proved himself dedicated to preserving the rights and privileges of merchants. Although the city of Bruges, always a protector of merchant rights, may have mediated for the English merchants, Jan van der Scaghe was clearly motivated by the desire to abide by the privileges and preserve public order. During his watch, the Burgundian state’s hunt for money would not pursued at the expense of the privileges of cheated tradesmen. Not every state official behaved so properly, especially in the following years. Maximilian himself gave orders to his financial officials in the county of Holland to find ways to manoeuvre around the Holland Privilege of 1477.297 Similarly, in November 1477 Maximilian ordered his administration in Brabant to identify those stipulations of the Brabantine Privilege of 1477 which were detrimental to the state.298 The Estates of Brabant vigorously opposed Maximilian’s efforts to undo the privileges of 1477, but the balance of power in this duchy also favoured the Burgundian administration. The changing policies of the Great Council, for example, are revealing. Whereas the Great Council guarded the privileges of 1477 in the case of the English merchants, Maximilian tried to bypass the judicial limitations placed on the Council’s jurisdiction. The Estates-General had prohibited the Great Council from exercising evocation (taking over cases from the local courts), but the ducal couple used ‘lettres patentes ’ to remove lawsuits from local courts in order to settle them before the Great Council. The duke was taking back the concessions made by the duchess in 1477.299 The background of the officials appointed to the Great Council also shows this change in approach to the privileges of 1477. The Great Privilege of 11 February 1477 required that the Great Council be balanced, with half of its 26 members noble and half jurists. There are two documents which list the members of the Council in 1477, but they 295 296 297 298 299 68

GSAB: GR, 796, 16v–17v (sentence of the Great Council). ADN: B 2118, 96v. Boone & Brand, De ondermijning van het Groot Privilege, 20–1; Jongkees, Het Groot Privilege, 188. Van Uytven, 1477 in Brabant, 275 and 357–71. Stengers, Composition, procédure et activité judiciaire, 32–3; Van Rompaey, De Grote Raad, 138–9.

Chapter 1 The State

are not completely identical.300 Both agree that of the representatives from the county of Flanders. Louis of Bruges and Jan van Halewyn were of noble origin, and Philip Wielant and Paul de Baenst were ‘law clerks’, just as the Privilege dictated.301 The ‘audiencier ’ Antoon van Halewyn, and two Flemish secretaries, Jacob Heyman and Jan de Beere, were also assigned to the Council. There is the same distinct continuity in Council personnel from the reign of Charles the Bold to Maximilian’s reign as the review of personnel from Maximilian’s financial administration revealed. Philip Wielant was a councillor of the Parlement of Mechelen.302 From 1474, his father-in-law, Jan van Halewyn, lord of Zwevezele, was president of the Council of Holland when the Holland governor, Louis of Bruges, was absent.303 The city of Bruges successfully opposed his appointment as president of the Council of Flanders in 1477. The city had sent him into exile for an unknown reason in 1475, but Charles the Bold had countermanded the banishment. Now, Bruges got its revenge.304 Jan de Beere, Antoon van Halewyn, and Jacob Heyman had already served Charles the Bold as secretaries; the remaining councillors seated on the Great Council had also served the late duke.305 The only new official was Paul de Baenst, but this jurist, educated in Padua, came from an important family that was very loyal to the dukes. His nephew Guy de Baenst, for example, sat on the Council of Flanders from 1472 until 1477, and the Members of Flanders had removed him from office after the death of Charles the Bold.306 Continuity in personnel meant continuity of policy in the Great Council, just as it did for Maximilian’s financial administration. Moreover, close examination of the Great Council’s decisions during Mary of Burgundy’s reign shows that the noble appointees rarely participated in the Great Council sessions.307 After the fall of 1477, the Great Council was once again a supreme court filled with jurists. Its activities had been limited by the privileges of 1477, but it now began a slow but certain recovery. Because Maximilian had the autonomous right to appoint new Council members, he had influence over its jurisdiction. In this way, he was able to prevent the Council from zealously guarding the privileges of 1477. The appointment of Jean Carondelet as president of the Council on 26 March 1480, is telling.308 In 1477 the Estates-General had refused to allow this Burgundian nobleman and jurist to assume the presidency of the Council because he could not speak Dutch. Carondelet was the former president of the Parlement of Mechelen, a hated institution abolished by the privileges of 1477. It is rather ironic that Jean Carondelet became president 300 Namely a seventeenth-century copy of the court ordinance of 22 March 1477 (SAG: RV, 34323), and a fifteenthcentury copy from an undated document with the title ‘s ’ensuilt les personnes que ma tres redoubté damoisielle a prins pour estre de son conseil ’ (GSAB: MD, 104, 31v–32r). Maybe the last mentioned document was a draft of the first, because it is incomplete. The list counts thirteen names, which does not correspond to the number of members prescribed in the Great Privilege. 301 ‘Clerken van rechte ’ (Blockmans, Privilegie voor alle landen, 90). 302 Buntinx, Wielant (Filips), 1010. 303 Damen, De staat van dienst, 464–5. 304 In March 1477 Bruges sent a deputy to the Estates-General in Ghent to prevent his nomination (‘te wederstane dat meester Jan van Halewin gheen president van der camere van den Rade in Vlaendren wesen zoude ’; CAB: SR, 1476–77, 51r). Jan van Halewyn was banished in 1475 (Gilliodts-Van Severen, Une lettre de Charles, 58–9). 305 About the secretaries: Paravicini & Paravicini, L ’arsenal intellectuel, 148 and Cockshaw, Le personnel de la chancellerie, 67. The other servitors were Jean d’Auffay, Guillaume Hautain, Louis de la Vallee, Rijkaard Utenhove, Jean de la Bouverie, Thomas de Plaine, Thomas de la Papoire, and Karel de Groote. Their careers are examined in Dumolyn, Staatvorming en vorstelijke ambtenaren, passim en Cools, Mannen met macht, passim. 306 Buylaert, Baenst (Paul de), 49–50. 307 Van Rompaey, De Grote Raad, 137; Stengers, Composition, procédure et activité judiciaire, 7–10. 308 Mémoires de Jean de Dadizeele, 107; Cools, Mannen met macht, 184; ADN: B 17732, ‘Carondelet’. 69

For the Common Good

of its successor, the Great Council, in 1480, and he would, of course, have no interest in preserving the privileges. Political relations between the sovereign and the city of Ghent also became strained during Mary’s reign. In 1477 Ghent was one of the most rebellious cities in the Low Countries, and not surprisingly defended the privileges it had regained resolutely. Tensions mounted after a series of small incidents during the reign of Mary of Burgundy. Ghent deputies in Bruges were arrested in August 1479 because the city had not yet paid part of an aide to the receiver. To pay off the debt, the receiver confiscated merchandise belonging to the Ghent representatives.309 More serious confrontations, the case of Willem van der Scaghe and the murder of the Ghent bailiff, Jan van Dadizeele, built on the continuing struggle between the centralizing state and the autonomous cities. However, during the period of Mary’s reign with its special difficulties, violations of privilege were even more delicate. In the case of ‘Willem van der Scaghe’, Maximilian was forced to grant political concessions, but after the murder of Jan van Dadizeele, the archduke decided that the time had come to confront the city of Ghent directly. One of the most sensitive issues between Ghent and its sovereign was their differing interpretations of the Charter of Senlis, granted to the city by the French King Philip the Fair in 1301. Any move by the archduke to contradict Ghent’s interpretation of this charter would provoke a huge reaction from the city. The Charter of Senlis governed the annual election of city aldermen by the following formula: the sovereign chose four comital electors (‘herekiezers ’), and the city designated four city electors (‘stedekiezers’), and the eight electors jointly chose the new aldermen. However, by city tradition, Ghent patricians chose the four ‘herekiezers ’ and the craft guilds named the four ‘stedekiezers ’. 310 The craft guilds regarded this ‘Ghent interpretation’ of the Senlis Charter as confirmation of their political power in the city, and any lord who tried to violate this privilege could expect a severe political reaction. In truth, much was at stake. The city aldermen governed the political, economic, financial, and cultural life in the city, and holding the office of alderman opened up opportunities for gaining lucrative social, symbolic, and economic capital.311 Unless the archduke had the power to name the electors, he had no way to influence the leading social networks in town. He and his loyal followers had no hold on the Ghent political scene – and no access to city finances. Although Maximilian had confirmed the Ghent privileges after his Joyous Entries into the city in July and September 1478, the Habsburg prince was not happy with the situation, and he attempted to use the case of Willem van der Scaghe to enhance his political influence in town.312 On 15 August 1479, the annual election date of the Ghent aldermen, a crisis broke out in the city.313 Ghentenars Willem van der Scaghe, Jaspar van den Hole, and Lieven 309 Only after a personal loan of the bailiff of Ghent at the receiver, Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Michiel, the Ghentenars were released (Ryckbosch, Tussen Gavere en Cadzand, 37). The receiver wrote at the Chamber of Accounts in Lille in August 1479: ‘sans ce que les dits de Gand ayent vollu ne veullent payer ja, soit il que depuis dix jours encha je les aye fait prendre et constituer prisonniers en ceste ville de Bruges ensemble certains leurs biens et marchandise ’ (ADN: B 17731, ‘Aides. Recette générale de Flandres’). This practice was not new. In 1478 the receiver of the aides kept the aldermen of Bruges almost one month in the town hall of the city because the city had to pay off a debt to the former city receiver (CAB: SR, 1477–78, 146r). 310 Boone, Gent en de Bourgondische hertogen, 33–48; idem, Het charter van Senlis, 10–21. 311 Haemers, De Gentse opstand, 53–101. 312 In July 1478 Maximilian confirmed the ‘previlegien alzoe wel oude als nyeuwe ’ which ‘wij zindert ende terstont naer die confirmacie van den huelijke tusschen ons ende haer hebben oic geconfermeert ’ (SAG: OV, 823 – 14 juli 1478). ‘Ende dat dese zaken goet, vast ende ghestadich bliven moghen eeuwelic ende tallen daghen ’ (SAG: OV, 825 – 24 September 1478). 313 The following story is based on CAG: 212, 1, 35r; 93, 7, 22r-v; 93bis, 2, 179–180 and Van Leeuwen, Didactiek in een middeleeuws stadhuis, passim. 70

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Utermeere, three ‘herekiezers’ appointed by the urban patricians, rejected the choice of the aldermen made by the five other electors. This was a serious breach of the Senlis Charter, which had stipulated that the minority had to obey the majority of the electors. It is not clear if Maximilian had urged the three electors to reject the majority’s choice, or if the three used the move to protest the growing power of the faction led by Willem Rijm and Jan van Coppenhole, a possibility which I will explore in chapter 3. However, Maximilian and his entourage did support the three Ghentenars in the juridical battle which followed the events of 15 August. After the final election of the city aldermen (by the majority of the electors), the new urban power structure banished the three minority electors from the county for fifty years. A few months later, one of the exiles, Willem van der Scaghe, was recognized in Bruges, a violation of his banishment and the Ghent privilege. Moreover, the sovereign bailiff of the county of Flanders, Josse de Lalaing, had given Willem permission to go about freely in the city of Bruges. De Lalaing was a loyal supporter of Maximilian and became sovereign bailiff after his predecessor John of Burgundy was killed in the battle of Enguinegatte. Maximilian also had appointed de Lalaing castellan of Sluis, and in May 1480 governorgeneral of Holland.314 Behind this stratagem of protecting the Ghent exile was a campaign to undermine the Ghent’s power within the county and the legitimacy of the new bench of Ghent aldermen seated in August 1479. There is no indication that Maximilian ever issued an order to Josse de Lalaing, but in the past the ducal administration had often used the sovereign bailiff to undermine urban autonomy.315 De Lalaing’s symbolical gesture ensured that Ghent could not overlook the violation of the privilege concerning exile, dating from 1297, which stipulated that people who were exiled by the city of Ghent did not have the right to return to the county without the consent of the Ghent aldermen. If Ghent did not react, the city would be undermining its own authority. The city of Bruges supported Ghent in its struggle to defend the privileges. At Ghent’s request, the Bruges aldermen arrested Willem van der Scaghe.316 But, in a creative move, Willem sought juridical immunity by filing a lawsuit in the ecclesiastical court at Tournai. Which aspect of the case was presented to the court is unclear, but any appeal to ecclesiastical courts to judge suits between laymen was a violation of Ghent’s and Bruges’ privileges and the provisions of the privileges of 1477. Consequently, Ghent and Bruges brought the case before the Great Council.317 In addition, the Three Members of Flanders, in a remarkable united effort, enacted a new edict on 1 July 1480, in which the cities of Bruges, Ghent and Ypres forbade their citizens to bring civil cases before the ecclesiastical courts. With this edict the Three Members concluded a lengthy dispute about the clerical 314 Josse de Lalaing had been sovereign bailiff of Flanders since March 1474. He was captured in the battle of Nancy, and after his return to the county in April 1477, he was replaced by the illegitimate son of Philip the Good, John of Burgundy. Josse de Lalaing would die in battle in August 1483 while he was trying to suppress a rebellion in Utrecht (Cools, Mannen met macht, 246; Van Gent, Een middeleeuwse crisismanager, 256; Van Rompaey, Het grafelijk baljuwsambt, 615; Molinet, Chroniques, I, 313; Mémoires de Jean de Dadizeele, 42). 315 Boone, De souverein baljuw, 71–2. 316 CAB: SR, 1479–80, 73r. 317 A Ghent deputy went to the Great Council ‘angaende Willem van der Scaghe die daer in haerlieder handen bij mandamente van den gheestelijken hoven commen was ’ (CAG: 400, 27, 89r). The city of Bruges also sent a deputy to Brussels in March 1480 ‘omme dien van Ghend assistencie ende bijstand te doene int vercrighen van Willem van der Schave [sic], daer ghebannen, de welke ten vervolghe van die van Ghend hier ghevanghen was ende daer naer bij mandemente uter vanghenesse ghelicht ’ (CAB: SR, 1479–80, 73r). 71

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interference in civil affairs.318 This joint action by the Three Members was a clever move, because the Burgundian state had itself protested for years against the interference of ecclesiastical courts in secular cases. In fact, the Great Council followed the example of the Three Members in spring 1481 when it dismissed a protest lodged by bishops against the edict of July 1480.319 But the Council would not decide the Willem van der Scaghe case, probably because it was too delicate a matter. Ghent sent letters to Maximilian himself, but they accomplished nothing.320 The Flemish cities had one powerful weapon: money. When Maximilian travelled from Holland to Flanders in July 1480 in order to collect funds to fight the rebels in Holland and launch a new offensive against the French in Luxembourg, the Three Members called a new meeting to obtain political concessions in return for the new aide.321 In Ghent the Members presented Maximilian with a list of grievances arising from the Willem van der Scaghe case. They not only protested against the role of the administration and the ecclesiastical courts in this case, but also against other governmental practices such as the leasing of state offices. As in 1477, the cities, united in their opposition, profited from the temporary weakness of the state and won their concessions. It appears that Maximilian agreed to the punishment of Willem van der Scaghe in exchange for a new aide – it would be the last one the united Three Members would grant to the archduke.322 A ducal order commanded that Willem van der Scaghe be handed over to the Bruges bailiff, who brought him to Ghent. The city commuted the normal sentence for a returned exile (death) to a symbolical punishment. Willem had to pay for three metal busts which were hung on the town hall walls, along with a clarifying notice. In the attic of the town hall (the so-called ‘Collatiezolder ’, the room where the city council of Ghent held its meetings) the wall was painted with a poem which described how the Charter of Senlis was to be followed.323 The onlookers had been warned; the Ghent power holders had won the battle against their opponents in the city and informed the archduke’s administration that violations of the privileges would not be tolerated. Maximilian was probably cognizant of the fact that Ghent was still too powerful for him to launch an attack on its autonomy, but he did not hesitate when he was given another opportunity to diminish the city’s power. On 7 October 1481 the Ghent bailiff, Jan van Dadizeele, was attacked in Antwerp, according to contemporary chroniclers, by hired assassins paid by ‘the bastard of Gaasbeke’, Brabantine nobleman Philip of Heurne.324 The bailiff survived the attack itself, but died in Antwerp on 20 October. A Ghent delegation brought him back to the city and afterwards to 318 Van Rompaey, De Grote Raad, 134–5; Vleeschouwers-Van Melkebeek, L ’officialité de Tournai, 247, who edits the ordinance of the three Members of Flanders. Possibly Ypres got involved because the city had a quarrel with the bishop of Thérouanne over jurisdiction in 1480 (Diegerick, Inventaire analytique, IV, 50). 319 Vleeschouwers-Van Melkebeek, L ’officialité de Tournai, 248. However, this was not the end of the battle about juridical competencies. In the summer of 1481 the Franc of Bruges brought a suit over jurisdiction against the officiality of Tournai before the Great Council (idem, Jurisdictie over criminele clerici, 103–14). 320 Van Leeuwen, Didactiek in een middeleeuws stadhuis, 340. 321 On the 13th of July, 1480, Maximilian arrived in Ghent (Vander Linden, Itinéraires de Marie de Bourgogne, 80) where a meeting of the Members was held (Blockmans, Handelingen van de leden, 150–1). 322 Namely 200 fighting unites which costed 48,000 lb. par. (Blockmans, De volksvertegenwoordiging, 614–5). 323 Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 203; Dits die Excellente Cronicke, 219v; Van Leeuwen, Didactiek in een middeleeuws stadhuis, 337 (who edited the poem). About this poem, see also Van Bruaene, De Gentse memorieboeken, 207 and Haemers, De Gentse opstand, 149. 324 Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 209. See also Arickx, Vele van dat ghesciet es, 25 and Poullet, Dadizeele, 618–20. 72

Chapter 1 The State

Dadizeele where he was buried.325 Since I have examined the murder extensively elsewhere, the focus here will be on the crime’s political consequences and the definitive break between the city of Ghent and Maximilian, resulting from the search for the murderer.326 Jan van Dadizeele was a Flemish nobleman, who grew up in the household of the noble de Lalaing family. He took over the office of castellan of Wijnendale from Simon de Lalaing, a confidant and military captain of Philip the Good. As castellan of Wijnendale he served Adolf of Cleves, the lord of Wijnendale, and in February 1477, Mary of Burgundy, with Adolf of Cleves at her right side, appointed Jan van Dadizeele bailiff of Ghent. Jan van Dadizeele had much experience in governmental service, as he already had replaced Josse de Lalaing, Simon’s son, as sovereign bailiff when Josse was away at battle from 1474 through 1477 during Charles the Bold’s wars. Maximilian noticed the bailiff ’s military expertise on the battlefield and appointed Jan van Dadizeele commander of the Flemish troops in April 1479 together with Jacob of Savoye, and after the victory at Enguinegatte, the archduke knighted the commander in his castle in Dadizeele. Moreover, as will be discussed in chapter 2, Maximilian promised him the office of steward (‘maistre d ’ostel ’) when the court would be restructured in March 1481. Jan van Dadizeele not only maintained good relations at court, but was also popular in the Flemish towns. As Ghent had much influence over court policy in 1477, the city had certainly given its assent to the appointment of Jan van Dadizeele as the city bailiff. In the following years, the commander planned military strategy for Flemish armies on the battlefield in close consultation with the cities who were paying the troops. Jan van Dadizeele was the emblematic leader for the war the Flemish cities wanted to wage, namely one which took the interests of those paying for the war into account. The success of the Flemish army in Enguinegatte undoubtedly contributed to the popularity of the noble commander, and bolstered the opinion of the Flemish cities that their way of waging war was correct. If Jan van Dadizeele was so popular, why then was he murdered? There were two possible motives. In the first scenario, as discontent among the nobles in the ducal court grew, Philip of Heurne may have killed Jan van Dadizeele because of a personal feud. The second possibility is that Jan van Dadizeele became a victim of the political tensions between Ghent and Maximilian. Certainly, Jan van Dadizeele had enemies at the court of Maximilian of Austria. In 1477, Philip of Heurne, a courtier of Charles the Bold, had been appointed by Mary of Burgundy to the Great Council and to the ducal commission responsible for renewing the urban magistrates in the county of Flanders.327 Jan van Dadizeele also was a member of this commission, but only as a replacement for Josse de Lalaing when he was away at battle. After another member of the commission, Louis of Schoorisse, was killed in the battle of Enguinegatte, Maximilian appointed Jan van Dadizeele as Louis’ replacement.328 In August 1481, the commission was divided by a severe dispute over the annual election of Ghent aldermen, which was just as a serious political problem in 1481 as in 1479. As a member of the ducal commission to renew the city bench on 15 August, Jan van Dadizeele was one of the electors (‘herekiezer ’) who had agreed with 325 His tomb still exists (De Valkeneer, Inventaire des tombeaux, 134–5). 326 Haemers, Le meurtre sur Jean de Dadizeele, passim. The personal documents of Jan van Dadizeele are edited by J. Kervyn de Lettenhove (Mémoires de Jean de Dadizeele, passim). 327 Cools, Mannen met macht, 234; Mémoires de Jean de Dadizeele, 10; GSAB: MD, 174, 31v; ADN: B 17726, ‘Flandre’. 328 Mémoires de Jean de Dadizeele, 107, 113–4 and 121–4. 73

For the Common Good

the aldermanic appointments of members of the city’s leading faction. Normally, Philip of Heurne would have been a comital elector as well, but, unexpectedly, he was replaced by Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas, a relative of Jan van Dadizeele.329 Maybe, Philip of Heurne bore a grudge against Jan van Dadizeele because of this replacement. Chronicler Nicolas Despars mentions that Josse de Lalaing and other nobles also sought revenge against Jan van Dadizeele because the former aide was appointed as a ‘maitre d ’ostel ’ for Maximilian’s court. Therefore, according to Despars, Josse de Lalaing wanted him dead.330 As will be discussed in chapter 2, in 1481 tensions grew between the nobles at the court of Maximilian. Adolf of Cleves, Louis of Bruges, Philip of Burgundy, and others were dissatisfied with Maximilian’s policies, and it is possible that Jan van Dadizeele belonged to this faction. Remember that van Dadizeele had once served Adolf of Cleves, and Philip of Burgundy and Jacob of Romont were his fellow commanders of the Flemish army in 1479.331 Moreover, all of the nobles mentioned above chose to participate in the regency council in 1483, and it is very likely Jan van Dadizeele would have done the same. He not only circulated within the noble faction that would oppose Maximilian, but many of his relatives belonged to the urban groups that also joined the regency council. Jan van Dadizeele was married to Katrien Breydel, the sister-in-law of Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas.332 Jan van Nieuwenhove, and his brother-in-law, Maarten Lem, belonged to the most prominent Bruges network supporting the regency council in 1483–1485.333 Jan van Dadizeele was both a relative and a political ally of the networks which would lead the opposition against Maximilian a few years after the death of Mary of Burgundy. It is possible that a group of nobles at court saw van Dadizeele as an enemy and a personal and political rival. By all accounts Jan van Dadizeele had become increasingly involved with the Ghent resistance to Maximilian’s policy, for a number of reasons. The first is that Jan van Dadizeele symbolised the style of warfare desired by Ghent. In contrast to the desires of Maximilian and his close entourage, Ghent wanted to control the army, as the city had done before the battle of Enguinegatte. Jan van Dadizeele had been commander of the Flemish troops during the period in which the Members had tightly controlled Maximilian’s military policy. Another reason was Jan van Dadizeele’s drift towards the most Ghent prominent networks as relations between Maximilian and the rebellious city began to worsen. When, as we have seen, the 1481 election of the Ghent aldermen erupted into a serious power contest, the political opposition criticized the leading faction of the Ghent elite for its domination of urban politics. The insulted aldermen reacted by bringing members of the opposition before a special commission, on which Jan van Dadizeele served, among others.334 As this commission publicly punished the opponents of the new aldermen, the 329 In the years 1478–80 Philip van Heurne represented the count in the Ghent election (CAG: 94, 723; 400, 27, 47r and 177r). In 1481 he was replaced by Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas (CAG: 400, 27, 310r). 330 Despars (Cronycke van den lande, IV, 209) wrote about Josse de Lalaing: ‘die welcke hem [ Jan van Dadizeele] tsonderlinghe groote faveur van den prince ter weerelt aldermeest mesjoonde ende benijdede ’. Similar rumours in Dits die Excellente Cronike, 221v. 331 Jan van Dadizeele corresponded frequently with Louis of Bruges, Adolf of Cleves, and Philip of Burgundy-Beveren (Mémoires de Jean de Dadizeele, 79–80 and 91). The aldermen of Aire, for example, wrote in August 1480 to Jan van Dadizeele: ‘et de tant que monseigneur de Bevres nous dist que [nous] adreschissions a vous comme a son bon amy et que de tout vous estes offers a luy…’ (ibidem, 118). 332 Gailliard, Bruges et le Franc, III, 18 and IV, 87; Mémoires de Jean de Dadizeele, 2 and 145; CAB: PR, 1485–86, 44r and 98r. 333 Janssens, Macht en onmacht, 40–1. 334 CAG: 93, 3, 77v. This case will be discussed at length in chapter 3. 74

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presence of this nobleman reveals his political sympathy for Ghent’s leading faction, which increasingly opposed Maximilian’s actions. Jan van Dadizeele openly sympathized with archduke’s opposition in Ghent, and he might have become the victim of these growing political tensions between Ghent and the archduke. But why, then, did Maximilian promise to appoint Jan van Dadizeele as ‘maître d ’hôtel ’ in March 1481? It is true that Maximilian made a very provisional promise; Jan van Dadizeele would only join the court if another ‘maître d ’hôtel ’ died.335 Jan van Dadizeele was murdered before he got this opportunity. The ‘realpolitiker ’ Maximilian might have promised the appointment to Jan van Dadizeele in a desperate attempt to appease the predominant faction in Ghent, or perhaps the archduke hoped that Jan van Dadizeele would remain loyal to the state if he was appointed to court. If that was the case, Maximilian’s hope expired during the dispute over the renewal of the Ghent board of magistrates in August 1481. A week after the election, Maximilian ordered the bailiff to report to Antwerp as soon as possible.336 Did Maximilian want to reprimand Jan van Dadizeele? In any event, the bailiff initially refused to go to Antwerp, but he did not ignore a second ducal order dated 3 September 1481.337 Shortly after, the bailiff travelled to Antwerp and never returned. It is impossible now to prove conclusively who was responsible for the murder. However, it is clear that Ghent’s search for the murderer and Maximilian’s refusal to help in the investigation increased an already tense political situation in Flanders. The Ghentenars used a number of judicial methods to investigate the murder, but they yielded no concrete results. Maximilian and his officials did try to smooth over the rising dispute between the city and Philip of Heurne, but beyond a shadow of a doubt, this noble suspect received unshakeable ducal protection. At the end of October, for example, Maximilian warned Philip of Heurne not to surround himself with troops when he was in the vicinity of Bruges, but the court also forestalled judicial action against the Brabantine nobleman.338 Ghent would not back down, and after public quarrelling between the lord of Gaasbeek and the city, the latter banished Philip from Flanders on 11 December 1481. Cities could not legally exile nobles, but Ghent justified this unique banishment by listing Philip’s offences. Philip of Heurne had called the Ghent citizens ‘quarrelers’ and ‘dogs’. He had soured relations between the court and the city, and sowed discord between Bruges and Ghent. As a consequence, Ghent argued, Philip of Heurne was better out of the county than within its bounds.339

335 Mémoires de Jean de Dadizeele, 125. See Haemers, Le meurtre de Jean, 234–8. 336 Maximilian wrote: ‘ende voort es onse gheliefte ende bevelen u, dat ghy ter stont dese onse brieven ghezien, by ons comt waer wy werden ’ (Mémoires de Jean de Dadizeele, 131). 337 Ibidem, 132. 338 On the 31st of October, the court sent a letter to Thomas de Plaine in Bruges to ask him to speak with Philip of Heurne ‘affin qu ’il cessast d ’aler avant Bruges, accompaignié de gens armez par la maniere qu ’il faisoit ’ (ADN: B 2124, 152r). 339 Ghent exiled him ‘ommedat hij hem te meer stonden met ziner openbare onghelijcke quader causen, uut sijner aerghen wille ende worsten herten, vervordert heeft te segghene dat die van Ghend waren ende sijn alle meyutmakers ende honden, zijn vermoghene doende omme hemlieden te bringhene in de gramscip ende hatye van onsen arden gheduchten heere ende prince, ende heeft voort sijn beste ghedaen ende ghepoocht met de neersscher middelen ende sine maniere van doene omme onghenoughte, ghescil ende divisie te makene tusschen der voorseide stede van Ghend ende die van Brugghe ende hemlieden te doen sceedene ende separerne deen van den andere, omme al welke zaken, die niet ghedooghelic en sijn, hij beter ende orbuerlijker es uutter lande dan daer in ’ (CAG: 212, 1, 57v). See also Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 211 and SAG: OF, 143. 75

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Ghent brought the dispute to a head when Maximilian requested a new aide from the Members of Flanders on 26 December 1481. The city of Ghent hoped to use the dispute to win concessions in negotiations over the aide.340 In his request, Maximilian argued that French troops had launched a renewed attack on the county, and the court had no alternative but to ask for money because it had already borrowed too much on its domain and the crown jewels.341 He asked for three aides, totalling 215,000 lb. par. The Ghent aldermen refused to attend the meeting of the Members held at Bruges, and set up its own meeting with representatives from the subordinate communities in the Ghent quarter to prevent those representatives from going to the Bruges meeting. Asking the representatives from its quarter not to sign on to an aide for the archduke, Ghent officials turned the archduke’s argument over military necessity into a debate about privileges. The Ghent quarter, they argued, enjoyed a ‘nice privilege’ granted by the count of Flanders himself, and it forbade lesser communities from approving a new aide if the city of Ghent, as head of the quarter, refused.342 The Ghent strategy worked, as the representatives from its quarter voted ‘in harmony’ to refuse the aide. Even the city of Ypres was affected and hesitated to join with Bruges to approve the new aide (Bruges’ docility in this case will be taken up later).343 Ypres finally fell in line, but Maximilian could not convince the subordinate castellanies and cities in the Ghent quarter to attend a separate meeting in Bruges.344 Ghent and its quarter did not pay any of the new aide, winning another battle over the privileges by once again frustrating the ducal administration. The other Members of Flanders did pay the aide to the court, but only with conditions attached.345 Even though Ghent provocation had successfully challenged the archduke’s authority, and lack of a new aide hurt the court, they would not stop defending the murder suspect. Philip of Heurne did not leave the county and even stayed at the ducal court in Bruges.346 At some point Maximilian pardoned him, which cancelled his exile.347 Philip of Huerne himself composed a judicial pamphlet challenging the legality of his banishment. The text was copied by Steven Doblet in Alost so that it could be widely distributed. The nobleman also filed a lawsuit in the Council of Flanders, but the precise charges are now unknown. The lord of Gaasbeek brought the case also before the Great Council, which immediately took action against the city of Ghent. Philip’s exile was nullified, and the Ghentenars were summoned to justify their actions before the archduke on 23 March 1482.348

340 Blockmans, Handelingen van de leden, 189–90. Or, as Molinet saw it (Chroniques, I, 368): Jan van Dadizeele was murdered ‘au très grand desplaisir des Ganthois qui lors voloyent gouverner la court ’. 341 ‘Overmidts dat hij [the archduke] ter causen van der oorloghe, die langhe gheduert heift, meest alle zine domeynen beleent ende verset hadde ende ooc alle zine baghen ende juweelen ’ (CAB: CA, 14, 315r). 342 According to Ghent, this was a ‘scoen previlege ’; or as was said in January: ‘bij eenen privilege dat ghegheven was over 150 jaer dat men niet gheven noch consenteren en soude yemende te belastene, het en ware bij consente van scepenen van Ghend ’ (Blockmans, Handelingen van de leden, 194 and 198). 343 The reunion in Ghent concluded ‘eendrachtelic ghesloten [...] eendrachtelic te blivene, deen met den andren, ende minen voorseiden gheduchten heere te andwordene so men alder hoefschelicx mochte ’ (ibidem, 198 and 200, about the position of Ypres). 344 Ibidem, 206. 345 Ypres and Bruges accorded the aide on the 23rd of February 1482, but ‘niet als leden, noch leidsschewijse, maer alleenlicke over hemlieden, bij manieren van provisien ’ (SAG: V3, 243, 34). 346 Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 211; Dits die Excellente Cronike, 223v; Memorieboek der stad Ghendt, I, 322. 347 CAG: 93, 3, 80r. 348 CAG: 94, 727. 76

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The city of Ghent did not capitulate. Before the Council of Flanders city representatives disputed the legality of the judicial pamphlet Philip of Heurne had circulated.349 The city itself distributed a notarial letter containing its view of the dispute, as it had done in 1451 to protest the violation of its privileges by Philip the Good.350 In the notarial letter, dated 7 March 1482, representatives of the Ghent aldermen denounced Philip of Heurne’s behaviour and proclaimed the Great Council’s decision illegitimate. The letter warned that the city would no longer tolerate any violation of its privileges.351 The archduke countered with an offer to negotiate the issue in a meeting at Alost, but the city ignored the offer.352 As the accidental fall of Duchess Mary from her horse occurred during this time, the city leaders might have been emboldened and hopeful that grief at the court would help them achieve their goals. The city took further steps, exiling Philip of Heurne for a second time on 15 March, along with Steven Doblet, who had circulated the nobleman’s pamphlet. The city also exiled Nicolas de Rutere, the archduke’s seal-bearer and financial secretary, for violating the city’s privileges during the Bruges meeting of the Members of Flanders in early 1482.353 The court was in serious trouble. One week before the tragic death of Mary of Burgundy, the political stalemate between Ghent and archduke Maximilian was complete. The conflict lessened somewhat when Philip of Heurne left for the county of Zeeland on 19 March, but this move did nothing to solve the real problem.354 In late 1481 and early 1482, the court had seriously violated the privileges of the city of Ghent. The court was no longer following the privileges of 1477 which had protected Mary of Burgundy’s subjects from these types of edicts. The Great Privilege had stipulated that subjects did not have to obey government orders that went against existing privileges.355 The city of Ghent considered this privilege to have full legal force and had acted on that interpretation. The city had also convinced its quarter to take a similar stance, and as a result, Maximilian once again saw his state policy inhibited by a disobedient city. Both parties clung to different political standards, and both felt strong. Maximilian did not want to give in, as he had in the ‘Willem van der Scaghe’ case. Whereas the archduke had at first merely turned a blind eye to violations of the Ghent privileges, after the murder of Jan van Dadizeele, Maximilian explicitly accepted violations of the privileges by his members of his court and administration. The three examples above also show that Maximilian did not stand alone. At the court, there was a loyal faction who thought that the privileges obstructed state policy and agreed with these violations. But in the court and administration, there was also another faction, who did not agree with the state’s treatment of the privileges. However, before investigating criticism within the regime of the Habsburg prince, I will first examine those state officials who were most important to Maximilian. 349 CAG: 93, 3, 80r. 350 CAG: 94, 727. About 1451: Haemers, De Gentse opstand, 179–80. 351 ‘Protesterende voort van allen den coninuacien, deffauten, condempnacien ende sentencien die ghedaen mochten werden dat zij die nemen zullen als overghedaen bij dengonen die daerof niet en behoorden te kennene mids den ghiften ende previlegien van den voornoemden coninc, graven ende graefneden van Vlaendren ghegheven ’. See also SAG: OF, 148 (councillor Richard Utenhove brought the letter to the archduke in Bruges). 352 Dits die Excellente Cronike, 223r. 353 Nicolas de Rutere was exiled ‘ommedat hij daghelicx zijn beste doet ende poogt te vermindere de rechten ende previlegien van den lande ende deser stede, an de gheneghen zijnde die te willen helpen houdene te persuaderne ter contrarien ende omme diverssche andere messusen in woorde ende andersins bij hem ghedaen, bij den welken hij beter es uten lande dan daer in ’ (CAG: 212, 1, 59r). 354 CAG: 400, 27, 344v; Dits die Excellente Cronike, 224v. 355 Governmental acts that were against privileges were ‘van onweerden […] ende niet astringieren noch verbinden denghonen die daerbi ghequetst zoude moghen zijn ’ (Blockmans, Privilegie voor alle landen, 93). 77

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1.2.5

Maximilian’s State Officials

State officials and civil servants constituted a crucial pillar supporting every state structure in late medieval Europe. These ‘agents of state power’ supported and inspired the policy of the lord. State officers were also powerbrokers. They used the various forms of economic, symbolic and cultural capital acquired from their offices to benefit relatives, friends, and their clients at the local level. The official thereby increased his own social capital and invested in his own social status. Local elites used state office to enhance their prestige and influence with those lower on the social scale in local urban or rural settings, and the central state also benefited, because these activities reinforced its political position. The investment of state officials in social capital was an efficient antidote against local elites who might resist centralization, and proved to be centrally important to the genesis of the ‘modern state’. The sovereign remained the keystone of the state structure, but his officials were indispensable to the state’s daily operation and acquisition of power.356 Mary of Burgundy inherited a state apparatus that relied heavily on officials who represented the absent duke. In the last years of his reign, Charles the Bold spent most of his time abroad, and his administration and court council maintained the government. Duchess Margaret of York, Chancellor Guillaume Hugonet, Guy de Brumeu, Bishop Ferry de Clugny and Governor-General Adolf of Cleves ran the state from 1475 through 1477.357 A small group of experts assisted the politicians, and most of them remained in service after the unexpected death of the duke in 1477. Few new officials were added, and Maximilian did not bring officials with him to the Low Countries. Three state officials were key players during Mary’s reign: Pieter Lanchals, who had originally served Charles the Bold, and Maximilian’s two superintendents, Willem Moreel and Maarten Lem. The following account of their careers shows that Maximilian’s financial policy was seriously dependent on the loyalty of these three officials, but for several reasons, that loyalty was very fragile. Pieter Lanchals was born in Bruges in 1441 or 1442.358 His ancestors belonged to the middling urban group who had migrated from the countryside to the city. His father Simon was a carpenter who used violence to intimidate his family. His mother, Isabella Joncman, came from a family of brokers, from whom young Pieter probably learned accounting and financial techniques.359 In his twenties, the talented financial specialist eagerly took advantage of the opportunities offered by the Burgundian state. In March 1465 the accounts of Guilbert de Ruple, the receiver-general for all finances, first mention Lanchals as a clerk, and he succeeded his master in several government posts. Charles the Bold also noticed Lanchals’ political insight and financial prowess, because, like Maximilian, Charles sought independent servitors who could invent clever strategies to extract money needed to support ducal political ambitions. In these circumstances, Lanchals rose quickly through the administrative ranks. In January 1471 the duke appointed him registrar of 356 Dumolyn, Staatsvorming en vorstelijke ambtenaren, 233–5; idem, Investeren in sociaal kapitaal, 435–8; Boone, Elites urbaines, 78; Soens, Bâtir la fortune, 170; Haemers, De Gentse opstand, 107–9; Prevenier, Ambtenaren in stad, 48; Tilly, Cities and states, 571; Blockmans, Voracious states, 746. 357 Vaughan, Charles the Bold, 235. 358 ULG: Hs 1259, 65v and 78v. Unless noted, the biographal information of Lanchals is based on Boone, Lanchals, 472–5 and idem, Biografie en prosopografie, 9–10. 359 Beernaert & Schotte, Op zoek naar zwaanridder, 67. Despars writes that Lanchals was of humble origin and made a very quick career in ducal sevice; he was‘zeer haestelick van nieten upghecommen’ (Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 233). 78

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finances, and when Guilbert de Ruple was appointed ‘argentier ’ on 1 April 1472, Lanchals moved up to the key position as receiver-general of all finances’. 360 Lanchals’ marriage to Katrien van Nieuwenhove bears witness to the social promotion of Lanchals in his home town. She was the daughter of Katrien van Belle and Michiel van Nieuwenhove, a member of a powerful Bruges political family. As a symbol of his new social position, Lanchals was made a member of the prestigious guild, Our Lady of the Snow, and the elite social club called the Guild of the Holy Blood (of which he became dean in 1481). Lanchals purchased a luxurious residence in the ‘Oudburg ’ of Bruges from his in-laws. At his death, his estate contained immeasurable wealth, extensive property and movables.361 One specific indicator of his wealth was the number of city annuities Lanchals possessed. By 1482, the Bruges native had bought ten (known) annuity contracts which provided him and his family with an annual income of 1048 lb. par., the equivalent of eight years’ salary for a Bruges guild master.362 The salary Lanchals received from the state partly explains this wealth.363 As for the rest, like all state officers, Lanchals also received gifts from the duke and bribes from cities and individuals who wanted him to use his position as a powerbroker to grant them favours.364 Despite this bribery and corruption, Lanchals survived the crisis of 1477. When Charles the Bold was killed, Lanchals was in Luxembourg. The ducal council did not contest Lanchals’ position, because the court hoped to retrieve the duke’s money Lanchals held at Luxembourg castle.365 Mary confirmed his office on 27 January and again on 1 March 1477.366 When the political climate in the Low Countries improved, Lanchals returned to Flanders. On the first of September he was appointed as financial commissioner (‘commis sur le fait des demaine et finances ’), an office he would hold until his violent death in 1488.367 Lanchals climbed to an even higher rank in January 1481 when Maximilian appointed him as chamberlain (‘maître d ’hôtel ’) in his new court ordinance and also as castellan of the comital fortress at Male.368 As financial commissioner, Lanchals never forgot his family. His brother-in-law, Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Michiel, was appointed ducal receiver of the aides in the fall of 1477, after Lanchals vouched for him.369 At the ducal court and in Bruges Pieter Lanchals built an impressive social network of local politicians and wealthy parvenus who helped him gain power and influence in both the state structure and his native city. 360 Papin, Guilbert de Ruple, 112–3. 361 See Beernaert & Schotte, Op zoek naar het huis, passim and Janssens, Mer Pieter Lanchals, 125–9. 362 A Bruges bricklayer earned 11 gr. a day, 240 days a year (Scholliers, Lonen te Brugge, 92; Sosson, Les travaux publics, 301). The letters are to be found in CAB: SR, 1476–77, 109r; SR, 1477–78, 124r; ULG: Hs 1259, 56r–62r; ADN: B 5392, 29v; CAG: FLL, 1428. 363 His annual salary as receiver-general amounted to twelve times the annual earnings of a Bruges guildmaster. As ‘commis de finances ’ he received a daily income of 96 gr. (ADN: B 2115, 39v). In 1479 this was increased to a total sum of 1752 lb. par. (ADN: B 2118, 101v). Lanchals also had income from fiefs (see Boone, Lanchals, 475 and CAG: FLL, 1428). 364 Boone, Lanchals, 474–5. Investigations by the Chamber of Accounts of Lille suspected Lanchals of corruption. ‘Que desirons bien savoir quel chose en a esté fait ’, asked the Chamber in January 1480, when it wanted to retrieve 4000 ecu that he received from the Bruges Lombards in 1477 as payment for the confirmation of their privileges (ADN: B 17732, ‘Hallewin ’). 365 On 10 April 1477 the Chamber asked him to send funds from his 1476 account (ADN: B 33, 25r). About the money in Luxembourg: Petit, Le Luxembourg et le recul du pouvoir, 412. 366 ULG: Hs 1642, I; Boone, Lanchals, 473. 367 ADN: B 2115, 39v. 368 CAG: FLL, 1429 and 1430. 369 ADN: B 2116, 2r and B 33, 35v. After the post of the receiver of the aides was discontinued in 1480, Jan van Nieuwenhove became ‘watergraaf en moermeester van Vlaanderen ’ (ADN: B 5346–7 and B 33, 66v). 79

For the Common Good

Illustration 5: Willem Moreel (Hans Memling, ca. 1475; Royal Museum of Fine Arts, Brussels).

It is possible that Lanchals also had a hand in the appointment of Willem Moreel and Maarten Lem as superintendents for all finances in May 1479. Both Bruges natives were wealthy merchants, so both came from a higher social stratum than Lanchals. Willem Moreel was born in Bruges in 1427 or 1428, the eldest son of Willem Moreel (senior) and 80

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Johanna Luuckx.370 After his father’s death, Willem inherited the fief of ‘Oostcleyhem ’ with the farm ‘de Bonte Poort ’ in Zuienkerke, a small village near Bruges.371 He also possessed land around Blankenberge and several houses in Bruges and Antwerp. He lived in a house near the cemetery of St. Jacobs (in the Sint-Jacobsstraat in Bruges), where he was later buried. Like Lanchals, Willem Moreel held many annuities from cities; in 1482 seventeen annuities provided his family with an annual income of 971 lb. 13 s. 4 d. par. As a guardian for several orphaned minor relatives, he shared control with two other guardians over additional annuities yielding an income of 1600 lb. par.372 Willem’s wealth enabled him to invest in the latest cultural trends. He commissioned a beautiful double portrait of his wife and himself from Hans Memling, and in 1479 he bought an illustrated book of hours.373 In 1485, after a threatened assassination during his service on the regency council of Flanders, he had his burial chapel embellished with a splendid triptych, which depicts him protected by his patron saint.374 Of course, Willem circulated in Bruges high society. In 1446 or 1447, he became a member of the Archers Guild of St. George, and in 1474 he was admitted in the guild of Our Lady of the Snow, to which Pieter Lanchals also belonged.375 However, in contrast to Lanchals, Willem Moreel made his fortune in commerce. He was a typical wealthy Bruges merchant and banker who traded with local, regional and international merchants. Willem was a member of the Bruges coopers guild, and he rented a little grocer’s stall in the Bruges market hall.376 Willem’s fortune was based on the spice trade, a family business. Typically for merchants in fifteenth-century Bruges, the partners in his company were relatives. His wife, Barbara van Hertsvelde, alias van Vlaenderenberch, was the daughter of Jan, the head of an important company which traded with Venetian merchants and the Roman See.377 A short note from 1488 tells us that Willem’s brother Lieven and Lieven’s brother-in-law, Jan de Keyt, Willem’s son-in-law, Boudewijn van Heldinghe, and his brother-in-law, Denijs van Hertsvelde, were business partners of the recently deceased Jan van Hertsvelde.378 The socio-economic network of Willem Moreel was an outgrowth of the ‘trade endogamy’ common in the Low Countries, for late medieval Bruges merchants and tradesmen married within their social class, and even within their own trade. As Martha Howell described for late medieval Douai, this nucleus of relatives ensured trust between trade partners, protected the company from the risks of international commerce, and as a consequence, lowered the cost of transactions in trade.379 In the Flemish Revolt, as we will see, this social network would also protect Willem Moreel in times of political crisis. Some historians call this company the ‘Banco di Roma ’, but little is known about its dealings because Willem left no surviving personal accounts. Certainly, as a Bruges merchant, he had many international contacts.380 Many of Moreel’s international 370 Janssens, Willem Moreel, 75 (see also the outdated article of Weale, Généalogie de la famille Moreel, 181–3). 371 SAB: BB, 64, 142v; CAB: WR, Sint-Jacobs, 7, 5v and GSAB: Rk. 17416, 4v; about the fief: Boterberghe, Zuienkerke. Geschiedenis, 269. About his other possessions: Janssens, Willem Moreel, 68–70. 372 ADN: B 5392, 29r; CAB: SR, 1476–77, 99v and 110v; SR, 1477–78, 118v; SR 1478–79, 126v–128r; SR, 1478–79, 151r-v. 373 Borchert, De portretten van Memling, 168–9 and Boeren, Een getijdenboek van Willem Moreel, 138–9. 374 Haemers, Moreel (Willem), 683. 375 Vanhoutryve, De Brugse kruisboogsgilde, 205; Janssens, Willem Moreel, 93; idem, Daar komen de Brugse, 63. 376 Janssens, Willem Moreel, 69; CAB: SR, 1483–84, 22v and CAB: Kuipers, ledenlijst 1494. 377 Schulte, Die Fugger in Rom, I, 8; Vaes, Les fondations hospitalières, 195. 378 Doehaerd, Etudes anversoises, II, 102; Mus, De compagnie Despars, 96. 379 Howell, The social logic, 194; idem, From land to love, 233–4. 380 Such as Wouter Ameyde (Stabel, Entre commerce international, 98; Mus, De compagnie Despars, 106–7). 81

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trading partners – Giovanni Cambi, Alberto Contarini, Lazarro de Lomellini, and Pietro Carincioni – also lent money to Maximilian.381 The loans these merchants contracted with superintendent Moreel as a state official may therefore be interpreted as friendly favours from trading partners. He might have taken personal profits from the deals, but it is more likely that the deals were a natural outgrowth of the money-lenders’ reliance on Moreel. Moreel’s reputation and financial know-how explains why Maximilian appointed him superintendent in a period when the state needed money; Maximilian already borrowed 658 lb. par. secured by an ‘ymaige de Saint-Pierre ’ from his future superintendent in November 1477.382 Surrounded by a solid economic network with familial roots, Willem Moreel was a wealthy Bruges merchant who made the most of the international Bruges market and his state service. However, Moreel also had local political ambitions, and, this points out another significant difference between Moreel’s political roots and those of Lanchals. When Lanchals was hiding in Luxembourg, Moreel fought on the barricades for the privileges of 1477. In the first months of 1477, Moreel was the spokesman for the Bruges merchants who wanted to obtain the privileges. For example, he journeyed to Mechelen in February 1477 to discuss the political situation with Margaret of York.383 When the Bruges revolt of 1477 broke out in March, he was chosen as one of the nine representatives of the Bruges rebels dispatched to the young duchess ‘to obtain new privileges’. 384 When the new city council was named in April 1477, Moreel was appointed ‘principal commissioner of the urban treasury’. 385 The Bruges rebels must have had great confidence in him, as one of the principal targets of the revolt of 1477 focused on the financial policy of the previous council which had been appointed by Charles the Bold. Maybe the rebels hoped Moreel’s financial know-how and his personal wealth would help the city bear the expense of the war against France, and in fact he did loan money to the city in March and April 1477, just as he did to the state.386 Willem Moreel also received political support for his urban fiscal policy from many Bruges merchants. His appointment as burgomaster of the aldermen on 2 September 1478, testifies to his political success in the city.387 Willem Moreel and his social networks filled the political vacuum in Bruges after the revolt of 1477; it is fair to say that the revolts of 1477 made Willem the rising star of the Bruges political scene. The same can be said of Maarten Lem. Although this powerful merchant had already held the office of burgomaster in 1467 and 1472 (in the same year Willem Moreel was an alderman), his political career became much more stellar after 1477. In September 1477 he was again appointed as burgomaster and became dean of the parish of Saint John the following year. In April 1479 he was appointed superintendent, and, just as Moreel had done, he had in November 1477 made a loan to Maximilian (1200 lb. par. on ‘une douzaine de tasses dorees ’).388 But, unlike Moreel, Maarten Lem retained his urban offices. He became

381 GSAB: GR, 793bis, 17r and 230r-233v. See also CAB: MC, 1478, 20r. 382 ADN: B 3495, 123686. 383 CAB: SR, 1477–78, 49r. 384 To ‘vercrighene zekere nieuwe pointen ende artikelen van previlegen ’ (CAB: SR, 1476–77, 128v). 385 He was ‘principael bouchoudere ’ of the city (CAB: SR, 1478–1479, 44v). 386 For a total sum of 126 lb. 17 s. gr. (CAB: SR, 1476–77, 128r and 131v–132r). Also in 1480 he lent money to the city, 6 lb. 15 s. gr. (CAB: SR, 1480–81, 197r). 387 CAB: RW, 1468–1501, 94v (until his appointment he held the office of urban treasurer). 388 ADN: B 3495, 123686. On his career: CAB: RW, 1468–1501, 33v, 85v, 94v and 109r. 82

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burgomaster again in September 1480, and it seems that, shortly afterwards, he was no longer superintendent. However this came about, an important motive for Maximilian to draft Lem and Moreel into ducal service was the local power these two held. Maximilian used these two companions to increase his political influence in Bruges and, especially, his control over the Bruges treasury. Trade connections bound Maarten Lem’s network together. Maarten imported sugar from the Portuguese island of Madeira and sold it on the international market in Bruges, making him a kind of ‘sugar baron’. 389 He practiced trade endogamy by marrying Adriana van Nieuwenhove, the daughter of Klaas van Nieuwenhove. This was a lucrative marriage for both parties, as Maarten had a considerable fortune, and Adriana came from a wealthy family of Bruges merchants and politicians. With this marriage his social integration in the city of Bruges was complete, as his membership in a Bruges elite club shows. He was admitted to the exclusive guild of the archers of St. George, of which Willem Moreel also was a member.390 International trade provided Maarten with a considerable fortune. During Mary of Burgundy’s reign he bought fifteen annuities from the city of Bruges, which gave him a total annual profit of 2710 lb. par.391 With his accumulated wealth Maarten could afford a luxurious residence, the ‘Rijckenburch ’ (next to the Koningsbrug ) in Bruges, and lavish examples of conspicuous consumption, including tapestries from the Hugonet estate and a famous portrait.392 Maarten also built up an impressive social network. One son-in-law, for example, was the son of chancellor Guillaume Hugonet.393 Other children married sons and daughters of Bruges merchants and politicians.394 Briefly, Maarten Lem was a successful merchant, and integrated himself into the most important socio-economic and political circles.395 Willem Moreel and Maarten Lem were enmeshed in a complicated triangle of interests. Just as Dino Rapondi in the late fourteenth century, and other foreign merchants who had combined local and ducal offices, the superintendents had to cope with interests on three different levels: their own interests, urban politics, and the needs of the state.396 Of these, their own interests probably had the most influence over their actions. Both merchants operated in the risky arena of international business, and their city and ducal offices made it possible for them to influence urban and ducal politics to enhance their own economic opportunities. These merchant-politicans made economic policy on the city and state level that might lower the transaction costs of their trading ventures; their political activities were a type of ‘risk-management’. Rewards from the archduke, an annual state income, and the prestige of high office were pleasant additional facets of their political careers, which made it possible for them to enjoy even more luxurious lifestyles. But international trade remained the basis of their wealth, and it is logical to assume that economic considerations directed their political actions. 389 Everaert, Les Lem, alias Leme, 830; Paviot, Les Flamands au Portugal, 28–32. 390 Janssens, Daar komen de Brugse, 63. 391 CAB: SR, 1476–77, 103v–104r and 112r; SR, 1477–78, 118r–119v, 123r–124v and 128r; SR, 1478–79, 147v. 392 Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 213; Vorsterman, Dits die Excellente Cronike, 223r; Flammang, Compte de tutelle, 86–7; Pinchart, La fabrication de la tapisserie, 394 and 398. 393 Paravicini, Zur Biographie, 131. 394 See Gailliard, Bruges et le Franc, I, 321; de Herckenrode, Nobiliaire des Pays-Bas, II, 1197. 395 Comparable examples are the families Adornes, Spinola, de Najero etc. (Stabel, De gewenste vreemdeling, passim; Geirnaert, Het archief van de familie, I, 5–12). 396 Lambert, The city, the duke, 165–8. 83

For the Common Good

Illustration 6: Maarten Lem (Sixteenth-Century Copy of a Painting possibly from the 1480s; Potterie Museum; Bruges).

A second influence on the decisions Moreel and Lem made at the city and state levels was loyalty to their urban social networks. When they made decisions in their state offices, the superintendents had to look after the interests of their associates and relatives. 84

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Then, as Bruges burgomasters, Lem and Moreel had to protect urban finances, which was not an easy task in time of war. Both state and local politicians wanted to finance the defence of the county with city funds, and the superintendents had to know how to give and take in financial matters. Because the Bruges guilds had gained more influence in city politics in 1477, the superintendents had to steer a middle course between the interests of the wealthy merchants and the urban middle class, a situation that chapter 3 will discuss in greater detail. Whenever they raised taxes, the city aldermen could expect internal opposition. Lem’s position was often contested; in 1480 people in Bruges called him ‘the little count of Flanders’ or the ‘count without a county’ and he had to be protected by a bodyguard.397 When Lem leased the office of ‘chief ’ of the Oostdunes, he violated the privileges of 1477 which prohibited the leasing of public offices. But as Maarten Lem and Willem Moreel did not significantly violate the privileges and nor threaten the autonomy Bruges had acquired in 1477, they enjoyed the support of guild leaders and the most powerful networks in the city. The third point of the triangle of influences on Maarten Lem and Willem Moreel was, of course, the state. Maximilian had appointed the two Bruges men superintendents not only because they were financial specialists and had sufficient economic resources to lend money to the state, but also because they had local power. In contrast to Ghent, the city of Bruges still followed the state’s financial directives after the Battle of Enguinegatte. Relations between the Bruges elite and the court were only troubled in 1481, a turbulent period which we discuss in the next paragraph. By appointing Willem Moreel and Maarten Lem as superintendents, Maximilian hoped to gain access to the Bruges treasury, and in return both merchants gained influence over state decisions. But several years later, when Maximilian sought to increase the court’s political influence over financial policy, he encountered resistance from Moreel and Lem, because, unlike Pieter Lanchals, the two merchants had to consider the other points of their political triangle. Lanchals only had to defend the interests of the state, the source of his wealth, while Moreel and Lem also had their own economic interests and those of their networks to defend. They had sufficient resources and power of their own to survive, while Lanchals lacked personal resources. This explains Lanchals’ unconditional loyalty to Maximilian, and the largely independent political position of Moreel and Lem vis-à-vis Maximilian. When Maximilian tried to decrease the political participation of his subjects in financial and military affairs, he faced resistance from Bruges merchant networks. Moreover, his aggressive war policy damaged international trade and did not defend the county adequately. Differences between the priorities of the court and the superintendents increasingly weakened the financial pillar of ducal policy. The clash followed in December 1481. 1.3

Resistance against Maximilian

1.3.1

The Imprisonment of Willem Moreel

The sound of hoofbeats in the night. A horseman speeds to Bruges. At Oudenaarde, Maximilian himself had ordered a messenger to convey his directive to the Bruges bailiff

397 ‘Cleen graefkin van Vlaenderen ’ or ‘den grave Maertin zonder landt ’ (Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 179 and 202). About the bodyguard (‘scadebeletter ’): CAB: SR, 1480–81, 59v. 85

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during the night of 9–10 December 1481.398 Bailiff Roeland van Halewyn took a prompt action. In the early morning he arrested the unsuspecting Willem Moreel as he was leaving city hall.399 The bailiff led the outraged Moreel to the Bruges prison on the Burg (the socalled ‘Ghyselhuys ’). Later that afternoon, men stormed into the court of the provost of St. Donatian to surprise Jan van Riebeke as he was about to take the floor in the hearing of a lawsuit. They conducted him to the Bruges ‘Steen ’ on the Burg where Willem Moreel was also imprisoned. Friends and relatives of the two prisoners fled or went into hiding, as the imprisonment of Willem Moreel and Jan van Riebeke shocked the entire Bruges elite.400 Maximilian entered the city three days later and was greeted by an eerie silence. He transferred Willem Moreel to the ducal castle of Sluis and put Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas, Maarten Lem’s brother-in-law, under house arrest. After the men had been imprisoned for almost four weeks, the court finally produced an explanation. On 4 January 1482, Maximilian’s procurator-general presented the following charges against the three Bruges men.401 He charged that Willem Moreel, Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas, and Jan van Riebeke had disobeyed the archduke to pursue their own self-interest. The complaint went back to 1475, the procurer stated, when the three men had tried to hinder the passage of a new aide for Charles the Bold. When that did not succeed, Willem Moreel and his companions tried to extract new privileges from the duke in exchange for the new aide. The procurer insinuated that the military defeats of Charles the Bold were caused by the delaying tactics of the three defendants.402 The procurer continued. After the death of the duke on the battlefield of Nancy, Willem Moreel had been one of the most important instigators of the revolt of 1477. The complaint blamed Willem Moreel for the composition of the Bruges privilege of 1477.403 And if that was not enough, according to Maximilian’s procurer, the three Bruges men had done everything in their power to secure the execution of Jan Barbesaen, the only victim of the Bruges revolt of 1477. This execution was part of a complex plot, in which Barbesaen’s elimination cleared the way for the three to take over the city. ‘To the detriment of their lord and for self-interest’, Willem Moreel, Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas and Jan van Riebeke had administered Bruges in the years after 1477.404 The complaint accused the three men of diverting public funds for their own use and extending their demands throughout the county.405 And, last but not least, the three defendants had aided and abetted the city of Ghent in its resistance 398 ‘A Adrien Kinx, messaigier, la somme de dixhuit solz dicte monnoie pour le xe jour du dit mois [de decembre] et de la ville d ’Audenarde porter toute la nuyt lettres closes de mon dit seigneur au bailly de Bruges par lesquelles icellui seigneur mandoit aucunes choses dont il ne veult aucune declaracion icy estre faicte ’ (ADN: B 2124, 161v). Maximilian travelled from Brussels to Bruges on 8 December. On 9 and 10 December he spent the night at Oudenaarde (Vander Linden, Itinéraires de Marie, 113). 399 Anthonis de Roovere and Nicolas Despars report that the bailiff acted ‘bi virtute van mandemente twelc hy hadde van boven ’ and ‘by expresser ordonnantie van den hove ’ (Dits die Excellente Cronike, 222r and Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 211). The story of the arrest is based on both chronicles. 400 ‘Inne twelcke hemlieden [...] meer andere oude burchmeesters ende wethouders zo afgriselicke zeere beroerden ’ (Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 211). 401 This document and the defence of the Bruges citizens was copied by a Bruges clerk (CAB: CA, 2, 322r–323r). 402 ‘Par quoy l ’intencion de mon dit seigneur fut tellement retardee que les inconveniens telz que chacun scet et dont encoires endurent les traches se n ’estoient ensuys ’ (CAB: CA, 2, 322r). 403 ‘Apres le trespas de feu mon dit seigneur le duc Charles le dit Guillaume Moreel fut l ’un des principaulx que induisy le peuple a eulx assambler et mectre en armes, visiter les vielz et anchiens previleges, demander des nouveaulx et avoir les lettres de la paix faicte apres le voiaige de Calaix ’. 404 ‘Au prejudice de la personne de mon dit seigneur ses drois, haulteur et seignourie pour eulx exauchier et avanchier leur prouffit ’. 405 ‘Pour multiplier et augmenter icellui gouvernement ’ they had ‘tenu mes dits seigneur et dame et les nobles en leurs subiections ’. 86

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to Maximilian’s financial and military policies, ‘in order to destroy the authority of the lord and to stay in office’. 406 The procurer demanded repayment of the embezzled money, plus a fine of 40,000 golden lions. If the Great Council found them guilty, the three politicians were to be barred from every public office in the county, and banished from Flanders for the rest of their lives. The three defendants and their supporters sprang immediately into action. Possibly because their relatives had lobbied by the court, the prisoners were released on 18 January 1482, upon payment of a surety of 1000 lb. gr. each. The procurer invited the three Bruges men to defend themselves before the Great Council on 28 January. Those who stood as sureties for the three prisoners belonged to the Bruges elite. Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas was supported by his cousin Denijs Metteneye, his brother Antoon, and his sonsin-law Maarten Lem and Cornelis Breydel.407 Jan van Riebeke’s father and uncle, Jacob van Riebeke en Pieter Bultinc, and two other relatives, Jacob Sey and Jan van Raveschoot, were his sureties.408 Willem Moreel’s sureties were Maarten Lem, his brother-in-law Denijs van Hertsvelde, and his relatives Boudewijn and Hendrik Heindrickx.409 The three defendants chose their sureties carefully because all were powerful politicians and wealthy merchants, whose careers are discussed in chapter 3. It is true that the amount of the surety was so much that the sureties had to be wealthy men, but the presence of Maarten Lem and other powerful men shows that the three prisoners had the support of the most important Bruges social networks. Maximilian also mobilised his supporters. The social networks who had supported the archduke’s efforts to increase his political influence in the city took up their stations behind the Habsburg prince. Sovereign-bailiff Jacob van Gistel, the Bruges bailiff Roeland van Halewyn, sheriff Anton van der Vichte, the bailiff of the waterways around Sluis and former burgomaster Joost van Varsenare, and the future urban treasurer Adriaan Drabbe represented the sovereign when the three Bruges men defended themselves before the Great Council.410 The socio-political breach which would divide the Bruges elite for the next ten years first emerged at this trial. Just as they had done during the Willem van der Scaghe case, Maximilian and his advisors took advantage of internal rivalries in Bruges to increase court influence on local politics, a typical Burgundian tactical move. In similar case from 1447, Duke Philip the Good had supported locals loyal to him in Ghent to stop a take-over bid by the duke’s political opponents, a coalition of Daneel Sersanders and members of the middle class.411 But just as Philip the Good had, in 1481–82 Maximilian sorely underestimated the social and political support his opponents possessed. The city’s inhabitants did not approve of the audacious imprisonment of three leading Bruges citizens. 406 ‘Pour tousiours aneantir la haulteur, auctorité et seigneurie de mon dit seigneur et demourer en leur dit gouvernement ’. 407 CAB: CA, 2, 323v. About the genealogy: Gailliard, Bruges et le Franc, IV, 87–90. 408 Jacob Sey was the guardian of the children of Jan van Riebeke at the death of his wife in 1485 (CAB: WR, SintJacobs, 6, 28r) and of the children of Jan van Raveschoot when Jan died (CAB: PR, 1485, 62r). Consequently, they all were related to each other. Jacob van Riebeke’s sister Katrien was married to Pieter Bultinc (Martens, De opdrachtgevers van Hans Memling, 18 and CAB: SR, 1480–81, 152v). 409 Boudewijn Heindrickx was the son of Boudewijn and Suzanna Offhuus, who was related to Katrien Offhuus, the mother-in-law of Willem Moreel (De Doppere, Chronique, 38; Vermeersch, Grafmonumenten te Brugge, II, 277; Gailliard, Bruges et le Franc, I, 475; SAB: BN, 11740). Hendrik Heindrickx was his brother ( Janssens, Nog over de familie, 133–4). In 1494 the children of Boudewijn Heindrickx possessed the house ‘De Rosenhoet ’ in the Brasseriestraat in Antwerp, next to the house of the wife of Willem Moreel (CAB: PR, 1494–95, 99r). 410 CAB: CA, 2, 321r. See also Dits die Excellente Cronike, 223r and Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 212. 411 Haemers, De Gentse opstand, 138–47. 87

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Chronicler Anthonis de Roovere, for example, wrote that Maximilian’s accusations were ‘founded on bad information and biased’. 412 In the ducal residence in Bruges (the Prinsenhof ) the three defendants, Willem Moreel, Jan van Riebeke, and Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas, planned to combat the complaint of Maximilian’s procurer. In the Prinsenhof they were assisted by Maarten Lem, Jan de Boot, and Jan de Keyt. These three former burgomasters of Bruges belonged to Willem Moreel’s social network, which, as chapter 3 will show, was the force behind the Bruges privileges of 1477. Consequently, before the Great Council, the three defendants did not deny the important political role they had played in spring 1477, but they protested vehemently against the ducal accusation which had named them instigators of the Bruges revolt in the same year. On the contrary, Willem Moreel and Jan van Riebeke claimed that they had damped the anger and calmed the outbursts of the violent crowd in 1477. Instead of stirring up the people against the government, the three Bruges men claimed that they had kept the city under control. Even facing mortal danger they behaved ‘as honourable men’. 413 Willem Moreel confirmed that he had been present at several political meetings in 1477, but if he had talked to the crowds assembled in the market square, he had done so intending to calm them. How could a lord condemn loyal subjects who had acted in the interest of the town, the county, and even of the dynasty, ‘for the common good’, he wondered?414 The defence reiterated that the three accused had always acted as much as possible in a way that was the best for everyone. This explanation contrasted sharply with the procurer’s accusations, which charged the defendants with acting out of self-interest. In this way, the three Bruges defendants sought not only to prove their innocence, but also to increase citizens’ support for their cause by claiming that they were protectors of urban public interests. After demonstrating their innocence, the defendants went on the offensive. According to Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas, his imprisonment during the Bruges revolt of 1477 proved how treacherous the accusation was.415 How could a prisoner of the rebels be the instigator of their actions? The Bruges politician posed a second question designed to undermine Maximilian’s strategy of imprisoning the three. Why had the ducal couple not accused the three defendants in the past? Moreover, why had Maximilian knighted Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas in 1479, after the battle of Enguinegatte in which he, despite the danger to himself, defended the county’s interests?416 Willem Moreel also demonstrated the hypocrisy of the accusation. The sovereign had made use of his loyal services until quite recently; Maximilian had even appointed him superintendent. In office, Willem had always served the dynasty and its subjects, ‘en gardant les haulteur, souveraineté et auctorité de mon dit seigneur et le bien, utilité et prouffit de ses pays et subgectz ’. He had never disobeyed orders from Maximilian. If Willem had made any mistakes in

412 They were ‘inghestelt bi quade informacie ende dat partyelicke was ’ (Dits die Excellente Cronike, 222v). 413 Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas and Jan van Riebeke described themselves as ‘gens de bien d ’honneur, de bonne fame renommee et preudommie ’ (CAB: CA, 2, 321r). 414 ‘Le bien de mon dit seigneur et de la chose publique ’; ‘et s ’il avoit dit aucuns motz aus dits populaires dont l ’on lui peusist imputer aucune chose ce que non, ce auroit esté pour appaysier et reduire icelui populaire ’ (CAB: CA, 2, 323v and 324v). 415 Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas was imprisoned in April 1477 (Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 126–7); he had to pay a fine of 200 lb. gr. to the city (CAB: SR, 1476–77, 35r). 416 He had defended the county ‘en demonstrant la grande affection qu ’il avoit a la deffence du pays et utilité de la chose publique ’. After the battle he was knighted by Maximilian (Verbruggen, De slag bij Guinegatte, 78). 88

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the last few years, it was not his intention to do so.417 Willem Moreel argued that his imprisonment and the accusation were completely unjust. There was no proof of guilt and the imprisonment happened ‘en usant de voulenté plus que de raison’. 418 Arbitrariness had won out over reason. Probably, Willem Moreel, Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas, and Jan van Riebeke were quite relieved as they left the Prinsenhof, because it had become clear during the hearing that Maximilian had no proof to back up charges of disobedience or rebellion. The three defendants were free and aware that they had been supported by the most important networks in the city. Their appearance as arbiters in a law suit between merchants in February 1482 is further proof that they were still held in high regard in the merchant community.419 Surrounded by their social networks, Willem Moreel, Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas, and Jan van Riebeke had nothing to fear. The situation had devolved into a political stalemate. Strikingly, the Great Council clearly did not know how to deal with the case and adjourned the proceedings until 1 April.420 Although they were free men, it is logical to assume that the three Bruges men were very worried about the course of events. They knew why they had been imprisoned. In the preceding chapter, I argued that Willem Moreel’s policy as superintendent did not correspond to the privileges of 1477 which he had helped to create. Although Willem Moreel and Maarten Lem did not compose the privileges themselves, the two men were still supporters of their spirit. The privileges were supposed to be a guarantee against arbitrary financial, economic, monetary, and military policies of the government. The chance to take part in the financial decision-making of the state was one of the main reasons why Willem Moreel had accepted the post of superintendent. But Moreel and his supporters had enemies in the city and in the state bureaucracy. Maximilian and his closest advisors wanted to make financial policy without interference from the Members of Flanders, and accordingly, they tried to restrict the political input from their subjects. The fact that Willem Moreel and his network now tried to influence that policy weakened the bond between Maximilian and his superintendent. But what had cracked this fragile pillar of Maximilian’s administration? A detailed reconstruction of the life of Willem Moreel in the last months before his detention shows a sharp increase in the political pressure placed on Maximilian’s financial administrator. As he had during the entire reign of Mary of Burgundy, in the summer of 1481 Maximilian was searching for money to pay for his wars. This time he planned a military incursion into Utrecht to restore the authority of Bishop David of Burgundy.421 On a visit to The Hague in the middle of September, Maximilian learned that the city of 417 Il n ’avoit jamais esté rebelle ne desobeissant a feu mon dit seigneur, empeschié l ’ayde par luy requiz, mais au contraire s ’estoit tousiours monstré bon, loyal et obeissant subget et s ’estoit a son possible employé de tenir la main affin qu ’ icelui seigneur peust parvenir a tout ce qu ’il avoit demandé et requiz ’ (CAB: CA, 2, 323r). 418 CAB: CA, 2, 324r. 419 On 13 February 1482 Maarten Lem, Willem Moreel, Jan van Riebeke and Jan van Nieuwenhove fs Klaas acted as arbiters in a trade conflict between the Bruges moneychanger Jan Nutin and the Portuguese merchant Antonio Fernandez (represented by Vicente Gil) over the sale of oil in 1475. Lodewijk Greffin, Guy de Houdecoutre and Jan de Keyt (in whose house the witnesses were heared) were the clerks in this lawsuit. The arbiters pronounced their sentence on 26 March 1482 (SAG: RV, 6832). 420 Dits die Excellente Cronike, 223r. 421 Van Gent, ‘Pertijelike saken ’, 329–30; Wiesflecker, Kaiser Maximilian I., 158–60. 89

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Delft planned to sell annuities, secured by its revenue, totalling 19,200 lb. par.422 When he arrived in Antwerp, Maximilian ordered Willem Moreel, then in Bruges, and the Bruges aldermen to spread the word about annuity sale in the city.423 On 5 October, Denijs van Hertsvelde, Willem’s brother-in-law and business partner, transferred profits from the sale of annuities (totalling 6000 lb. par.) from Bruges to Antwerp.424 Shortly afterwards Willem Moreel himself travelled to Antwerp, where he witnessed the murder of Ghent bailiff Jan van Dadizeele (but left no record of his reaction). In the beginning of November he was back in Bruges when the ducal administration sent him letters about the Delft annuities.425 Maximilian’s correspondence from the fall of 1481 shows that he was short of money – a dangerous situation in times of war. Personnel at the Chambers of Accounts in Lille and loyalists in Zeeland, Holland, and Brabant were ordered to find money wherever they could. On 7 November 1481 the archduke, who was still in Antwerp, sent a letter to Willem Moreel telling him to initiate a new search for funds, not only for the war in Holland, but also for the defence of the Luxembourg frontiers. Willem received permission to borrow 20,000 lb. par. immediately, wherever he could find it.426 The letter of 7 November 1481 was the last Maximilian sent to Willem while the latter was in ducal service – the last quittance Willem signed as financial commissioner also comes from this date.427 Did Willem, after reading this letter, wonder how long this kind of arbitrary policy would continue? Every money chest Willem sent to Maximilian was followed by a new request for money. Those who paid had no say in ducal policy, and the war never ended. On the contrary, the Burgundian state faced new wars, and there was nothing left to defend the country. Did the members of Willem’s networks perhaps convince the financial commissioner to raise his voice in protest against this warlike and very costly policy? A hint in this direction comes from the meetings of the Members of Flanders in 1481, at which even the Bruges elite, who up until this point had loyally paid aides to the sovereign, began to criticize the military policy of the government. As we will see in chapter 3, Bruges itself wanted to administer the spending of aides that were paid by the city. Moreover, on 18 November, shortly after Maximilian had ordered Willem to find money for the defence of Luxembourg, the archduke and his entourage ordered all members of the court, noble and clerical, to go to Bruges for a new meeting of the Members of Flanders.428 Mary of Burgundy, who recently had given birth to her son Francis, received a similar request on 23 November.429 Two weeks later, in Oudenaarde and on his way to Bruges, Maximilian ordered a messenger to travel to Bruges with the order for the bailiff to imprison Willem Moreel. Had the superintendent 422 On 19 September 1481 Maximilian sent a letter from The Hague to Pieter Lanchals in Delft because he wanted to know ‘combien ilz [the magistracy of Delft] avoient vendu de rente sur la dicte ville et quelz deniers comtans ilz en avoient ’ (ADN: B 2124, 145v). On 23 September Maximilian left the Hague for Antwerp (Vander Linden, Itinéraires de Marie, 109). 423 ADN: B 2124, 146v. 424 ADN: B 2124, 153v–154r. 425 ADN: B 2124, 149v and 155r. Possibly Pieter Lanchals also bought an annuity (SAG: FPR, 218). 426 Maximilian sent him a letter ‘par lesquelles lui estoit mandé incontinement trouver a frait et finance la somme de dix mil livres du dit pris [pounds of 40 groat]’ (ADN: B 2124, 155r). 427 This quittance was incorrectly put in the box of the receiver-general for all finances of 1468 (ADN: B 2067). 428 ‘Pour certaines matieres grandement touchant le bien honneur et utilité de sa personne et de la chose publicque de ses pays lesquelles il leur desiroit declairer et communicquier ’ received the court a request to travel to Bruges (ADN: B 2124, 157v). 429 ADN: B 2124, 158r. On 29 November Mary, already in Bruges, received a message (with a present) that informed her of the arrival of her husband ‘par lesquelles il luy mandoit entretenir les seigneurs de son sang, prelatz, nobles et autres grans seigneurs de ses pays, lesquelz il avoit mandé estre en sa ville de Bruges devers lui le dit jour jusques qu ’il seroit par de la qui seroit en la sepmaine lors prouchaine venante. Et aussi que lui envoyoit par le dit Huchon [the messenger] la hure de la venoison d ’un grant sangler qu ’il print le xxviiie jour du dit mois a la chasse ’ (159r). 90

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perhaps sent Maximilian a letter saying that he was not able (or not willing) to finance the loan of 20,000 lb. par. for the defence of Luxembourg? It seems probable that the request to raise new funds was the immediate cause of Willem Moreel’s imprisonment. One week later Maximilian sent some pieces of royal silver from the treasury of Bruges to Brussels, to serve as collateral for a loan contracted to pay the troops at the border of Luxembourg and Hainault.430 Six days later, the court invited all the cities and castellanies of Flanders to a meeting in Bruges at which the court would request a new aide.431 For the specific context of the meeting of the Members of Flanders, the imprisonment of Willem Moreel and members of his networks was also a clever strategic move. Maximilian’s correspondence shows that the court would find money, even at great financial and political expense. The ducal administration was well aware that the city of Ghent would not give its approval to the levy of a new aide without receiving political compensation. As we have seen, relations between Ghent and the ducal court were extremely tense in December 1481 because the court protected the man suspected of murdering Jan van Dadizeele, therefore blatantly violating Ghent privileges. At the meeting Ghent even prevented its subordinate castellanies from paying their parts of the requested aide, a particularly large one totalling 127,000 golden riders. To ensure that the other cities of Flanders would approve the levy of a new aide, the archduke had to silence any possible resistance. Since the Bruges representatives had already criticized government policy in spring 1481, they were very likely to be critical again. In this context, the detention of Willem Moreel, Jan van Riebeke, and the house arrest of Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas can be seen as a last-ditch attempt by the court to prevent Willem Moreel and his political sympathizers from hindering approval of the new aide. The duke’s supporters had pushed members of Moreel’s network out of the city’s aldermen benches in August 1481. These ducal loyalists were the same people who backed the procurer-general during Willem’s trial before the Great Council in February 1482. Joost van Varsenare was now burgomaster of Bruges, and in that capacity he represented the city of Bruges at the meeting of the Members of Flanders. On 23 February 1482 the cities of Ypres and Bruges agreed to the new aide. Maximilian’s cronies in the Bruges government had done their job. After the new aide was approved, Willem Moreel, Jan van Riebeke, and Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas were released from prison. Their imprisonment was no longer necessary. Although the three prisoners were now free men, the remarkable events of the last few months had certainly upset the citizens of Bruges. The prisoners were doubtless well aware of Maximilian’s strategy to prevent political resistance to approval of a new aide, and their imprisonment demonstrated that Maximilian would no longer tolerate obstruction of his will. Moreover, Maximilian had made it clear that he would no longer be bound by agreements to allow subjects representation in decision-making, nor by urban and regional privileges. When he imprisoned Willem Moreel and Jan van Riebeke, Maximilian went even further in violating urban privileges than he had when he protected the Brabantine noble Philip of Heurne from banishment by the city of Ghent. For the first time in his reign, Maximilian had accused powerful local elites of responsibility for the privileges of 430 ‘Sur laquelle [vaiselle d ’argent] l ’en devoit emprunter la somme de huit mil livres du dit pris [pounds of 40 groat] pour le perfurnissement de l ’estat par luy fait a son partement du dit lieu de Bruxelles, meismement pour en payer ses garnisons des frontieres de Haynnau et Luxembourg ’ (ADN: B 2124, 162r). 431 ADN: B 2124, 163r. 91

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1477, and threatened these defendants with banishments and fines. Maximilian was too weak to force the Ghent elite to fall in line with his policies, but in December 1481 he felt mighty enough to eliminate possible resistance in Bruges. After the trial and approval of the aide, his opponents were released, but the conflict between the court and the former superintendent was not resolved. A few weeks before the death of Mary of Burgundy, Maximilian was not only estranged from the Ghent elite, but his relationship with one of the most powerful networks of Bruges was seriously strained. However, both parties tried to move back from the brink. In his chronicle, Nicolas Despars noted that Maarten Lem invited the duke and duchess to dinner at his house on 18 February 1482.432 It is likely that this dinner party lowered tensions, because two weeks later Willem Moreel was again acting as Maximilian’s financial commissioner. On 2 March 1482 Willem Moreel, with two other members of the financial commission, Pieter Lanchals and Nicolas de Gondeval, paid back a loan of 3000 lb. par. that the ducal administration had borrowed from Anselmo de Lomellini.433 The loan was repaid with the proceeds of the aide that Bruges had awarded to the duke in January. Just as before his imprisonment, Willem Moreel was involved in collecting the Bruges aides, but it is not possible to determine the degree to which Willem was reinvested with his former responsibility, as just a few days after the payment of the debt, Mary of Burgundy fell from her horse in Wijnendale. Her death decisively altered power relations in the county, and a note in the Bruges cartulary tells us that the case against Willem Moreel and his companions was dismissed two days after the death of the duchess.434 The chroniclers also recorded that Maximilian had forgiven the Bruges defendants, who clearly profited from the political vacuum at court.435 Soon afterwards Willem Moreel, Maarten Lem, and Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas would take over power in Bruges, to the detriment of Maximilian’s supporters.436 Development of a conflict between the Flemish urban elites and the archduke in 1482 demonstrates that the dispute between Willem Moreel and his friends on the one side and the archduke and his Bruges networks on the other was not settled during the dinner at Maarten Lem’s house. While Willem Moreel was reinstated in the ducal administration, the reconciliation seems to have been opportunistic. Maximilian hoped to calm political tensions in Bruges by dismissing the case against Willem Moreel, and facilitate ducal access to the Bruges treasury and the international money-market. Willem Moreel probably returned to ducal service after his imprisonment because he realized that the only way to influence state politics was from inside the administration. Willem Moreel (and his social network) were certainly aware that the archduke would no longer respect Bruges’ relative political autonomy (nor the privileges), but he may have thought that it was better to be inside the power structure rather than outside it. However, by rejoining the financial commission, the realist Willem Moreel did not drop his critical stance on Maximilian’s policy. In 1482, Mary of Burgundy’s death gave him and his political sympathizers a new opportunity to influence state politics. 432 Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 213. 433 CAB: OR, 1, 5v. 434 The cartulary mentions that the archduke ‘a absolz et absolt les dits messieurs de leur petition et demande de son dit procureur general ’. Maximilian wanted a ‘silence perpetuel ’ about this case (CAB: CA, 2, 326v). 435 Dits die Excellente Cronike, 224v. 436 Blockmans, Autocratie ou polyarchie, 268–9; Van Leeuwen, De Vlaamse wetsvernieuwing, 170–1. On 19 April 1482 Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas was appointed burgomaster of the aldermen of the city. 92

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1.3.2

Criticizing the Regime

The death of the duchess on 27 March 1482 provided an ideal opportunity to criticize Maximilian’s policies, but even before her death some administration officials had raised objections. The following analysis will show that their complaints were the same as the objections of the Estates-General and the Members of Flanders, as well as conveying much of the motivation and context leading to Moreel’s imprisonment in December 1481. The archives of the Chambers of Accounts of Lille preserve many letters written by its personnel to the archduke and the financial commission. These letters contain objections to several state measures, and show the application of a doctrine held by most late medieval civil servants, who felt that the task of administrators was to protect the ducal domain. An example is the advice the Chamber of Accounts offered to the archduke and the financial commission in September 1480: not to sell annuities on the Bruges ‘spijker’. As we have seen, this sale was one of the archduke’s moves to acquire quick money to pay for the war against France. The Chamber of Accounts warned Maximilian that selling annuities secured by the domain could result in its loss.437 The civil service doctrine held that the sovereign’s domain should be inalienable and the ruler could not put it at risk.438 The sovereign was seen as a sort of administrator who controlled the domain and used the profits from it, but the property itself was not a private, but a public, domain. Each sovereign had to hand over the domain intact to his successors without the alienation of any part, because one consequence of alienation would be the loss of the administration’s ability to carry out public policy and pay for the routine work of civil servants. Then, in order to maintain the state, the sovereign would have to increase taxes which his subjects would then have to bear. This was improper behaviour, because the sovereign was supposed to live off of the proceeds of his own domain.439 Maximilian and his close advisors thought that the income from the domain could be used for personal expenses, and the Habsburg prince constantly transferred the revenues from the domain into his personal accounts – just as his predecessors had done. However, the Chamber of Accounts protested against the invisible flow of public monies into the personal treasury of Maximilian. In a letter of 1480, for example, an anonymous member of the Chamber expressed his concern about the amounts of money that were being transferred to the archduke. These giant transfers, which were ‘new’ in the history of the Burgundian state, according to the writer, had not been sufficiently justified by Maximilian and his entourage. The letter condemns this practice as ‘harmful and dangerous’ for the ducal domain.440 The letter writer may be referring specifically to the large sum awarded 437 ‘Car l ’ouverture de telz ventes est la voye de l ’alienacion totale du demaine [...], a quoy tous serviteurs et officiers du prince doivent resister a leur povoir ’ (ADN: B 17733, ‘Bruges, espier’). 438 Leyte, Domaine et domanialité, 386–91 and 436. See also Dumolyn, De Raad van Vlaanderen, 157–60. 439 Scordia, “Le roi doit vivre du sien ”, 414–5. 440 The letter says about the tranfers: ‘tant pour ceste partie comme pour autres cy apres et meismes pour celles prinses ou compte prochain par ce dit de ce dit recette [of the receiver general of all finances] de assez semblable nature, montant a bien grans sommes de ainsi delivrees es mains de mon dit seigneur le duc dont de la distribucion ne se font aucun enseignements, qui est nouvelle introduction et que james ne s ’est fait par messieurs les predecesseurs de mon dit seigneur ou temps desquelz la recette et distribucion de toutes les finances s ’est faicte par le receveur general d ’icelle et par declaracion particuliere, meismement des parties que le prince pouroit ordinairement pour son espargne, compte et renseignement particulier s ’en est tousiours rendu. Et comme a continuer, a ainsi recouvrer acquis en deniers payez es mains de mon dit seigneur dont il ne veult aultre declairacion est faictes, comme l ’en a commencé depuis que mon dit seigneur est venu a seignourie. Ce soit chose tres dommageuse et de dangereuse consequence ’ (ADN: B 17733, ‘Administration générale’). 93

For the Common Good

to the newly-created ‘German Chamber’ in 1480, which absorbed one-eight of the total revenue of the receiver-general, and was not explained by the receiver, Andries Andries (see above). The court disregarded these objections, as it did when a few candidates for public office protested the leasing of offices. In 1479, some officials objected strenuously to the decision of Maximilian and the financial commission to lease all juridical and financial posts in the county of Flanders. In a letter to the Chamber of Accounts at Lille, for example, the bailiff of Ypres, Joost van Cortewille, lord of Reningelst, argued that he had already spent much of his own money waging the war in the southern part of the county. Moreover, he already had extended a loan to the court from his future revenues, when the government had asked ducal officials to do so in 1477. After Gillis Ghiselin, who submitted the highest bid for the office, promised to assume the former bailiff ’s debts, Joost van Cortewille agreed to resign from the position.441 There were probably additional officials frustrated because they now had to lease their offices, especially those who did not have the means to pay. Some of the ‘dismissed’ officials joined the city contingents of the duke’s army, as did Joost van Cortewille who fought in the service of Ypres. After the battle of Enguinegatte he was knighted by Maximilian.442 Maximilian was able to ‘convince’ many officials to support his policy by giving them gifts or positions in ducal service, but remarkably most of the Flemish officers, such as Joost van Cortewille, ended up choosing the side of the Flemish regency council in the Flemish Revolt. Joost van Cortewille was appointed burgomaster of the Franc of Bruges when Ghent and Bruges appointed their candidates to the benches of the Franc after they took over the government of Philip the Fair in April 1482.443 The smouldering dissatisfaction caused by the leasing of offices drove many officials to side with the Members of Flanders in the Flemish Revolt. Alienation of the ducal domain, transfers of money, and leasing of offices were not the only practices questioned by state administrators. They also criticized the policy of relying on loans and the choice of civil servants. In January 1481, for example, Maximilian ordered each official of the Chamber of Accounts at Lille to make a personal loan of 2,000 lb. par. to the receiver-general. The Chamber reacted furiously, sending an indignant letter to the archduke attacking this initiative. They also sent their objections to the financial commission against this ‘new’ and ‘unknown’ method of increasing state revenues. The Chamber asked the financial commission to advise Maximilian properly, because the Habsburg prince was apparently not aware of political traditions in the Low Countries.444 But the archduke did not give in – a vehement and curious discussion between the archduke and his personnel followed. To be sure, the financial commission (or the archduke himself ?) lowered the loans from 2,000 to 1,000 lb. par each, and they informed the members of the Chamber that all justice officials in the county of Flanders 441 In May 1479 the Chamber informed the financial commission that Joost van Cortewille had resigned: ‘qu ’il n ’est point d ’advis de le prendre par admodiacion ferme ne appoinctement, mais s ’en rapporte au bon et noble plaisir de mon dit seigneur et le votre ’ (ADN: B 17729, ‘Affermages des offices de justice’; see also GSAB: Rk., 14550 and RLB: M 104, I). 442 Mémoires de Jean de Dadizeele, 19. 443 Priem, Documents extraits (deuxième série), VII, 166. 444 ‘Que ceste matiere nous est bien nouvelle et de grant poix veuz noz affaires et les pertes que [nous] avons a soustenir par deca a cause des guerres et divisions presentes et qu ’il y chiet bien de penser ung petit ’; and ‘lesquelles lettres ainsi par nous veues nous ont semblé de termes assez estranges en leur substance et n ’a aucun james veues de telles. Et apres advis eu sur icelles, il nous a bien semblé que notre dit seigneur n ’est point assez adverti comment ne en quelle maniere il se doit faire servir en sa dite chambre ’ (ADN: B 17739, ‘Emprunts’). 94

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had leased their offices. If the Chamber did not, their offices would be vacant. The sovereign guaranteed that the loans would be repaid, in two terms, by the receiver of Flanders. In a letter dated 28 February, Maximilian warned the Chamber that he would no longer tolerate any contradiction, because his will had to be obeyed.445 In this letter Maximilian appears as an autocratic archduke, who, just like his father-in-law Charles the Bold, tried to cash in on every source of revenue in the state, despite the objections of his own bureaucrats. His civil servants had only two courses of action: either they obeyed his lordship, or they objected to his policy. Politically speaking, there was no third choice.446 In 1480–81 the Chamber still obeyed Maximilian’s orders, but clearly their obedience was reluctant. Another collision between the Chamber and the archduke, over the appointment of the receiver of Flanders, Roland le Fevre, in fall 1479, demonstrates how Maximilian overcame opposition from within his administration, but not without criticism. In November 1479 the archduke announced to the Chamber of Accounts that he had appointed Roland le Fevre as receiver-general of the county of Flanders. His candidacy was controversial. The Chamber thought he was neither old or wealthy enough for the position, and although his sureties were rich, payment by those sureties, if needed, was not guaranteed. The Chamber warned the archduke that the current disastrous financial situation required a very reliable and wealthy man, and Roland le Fevre did not fulfil these conditions.447 Maximilian and his financial commission argued that these objections were not valid, and at the end of November 1479 Roland was appointed as receiver of Flanders (for the three quarters) and Flemish receiver of the aides.448 Roland’s origins were obscure, as they still are for this historian. New to ducal service, he was the son of a Mathieu le Fevre and Jehanne Frescot. In 1479 he was only 21 years old. He came from Béthune and before his appointment to ducal service, he had been the clerk for the Ghent abbey of St. Peters in the domain of Temse – a fief he would buy in the 1490s – and afterwards, clerk for Thomas Perrot. And just like the Chamber of Accounts, the Bruges chronicler Rombout de Doppere did not have a good word to say about him.449 By appointing Roland le Fevre in an important position in the ducal domain, Maximilian added to his administration another ‘parvenu’, a young and very ambitious technician, jurist or financial specialist dependent on the duke for progress in his career. Parvenus, such as Roland le Fevre and Pieter Lanchals, were mainly from humble origins and made the most of the chances they were given to climb the social and political ladder. Parvenus’ careers have a very similar pattern. The increasing bond of trust between the sovereign and his experienced servant gave each advantages. In exchange for efficient 445 ‘Et n ’y faictes faulte comment qu ’il soit, car tel est notre plaisir ’ (ADN: B 17739, ‘Emprunts’). 446 Blockmans, De volksvertegenwoordiging, 565–6. 447 ‘Il nous a semblé et semble, notre tres redoubté seigneur, tousiours a votre tres noble correction, que le dit Roland est homme bien jeune, petitement nourry en fait de finances pour avoir si grand charge comme de la dite recepte generale des demaine et aydes de Flandres qui est office de grant poix et a la verité le plus grant pour recette de tous vos pais et seignouries. Et ouquel, consideré le temps present, devront bien homme de plus grant granté afin de tant mieulx garder votre haulteur, seignourie et demaine qui, comme il est assez notoire, est presentement fort diminué. Et d ’autrepart ja soit que les caucionnaires bailliez par le dit Rouland soient gens et marchans a present reputez riches et puissans, toutesvoyes ilz ne sont pas fort herités en votre dit pays de Flandres, ne ailleurs, soubz vous qui cy apres vous pourroit retourner a interest se aucune faulte avoit au dit Rolland ’ (ADN: B 17729, ‘Recette générale de Flandres’). 448 On 20 November 1479 Roland swore his oath (ADN: B 33, 49r). 449 ‘Hic quaestor erat avarissimus, nemo casum ejus dolvit. Semper recipit, sed nemini solvit’ (de Doppere, Chroniques, 30). He was born ca. 1458 (SAG: RV, 34315, 87v). The other information is in de Herckenrode, Nobiliaire des Pays-Bas, I, 745 and CAB: SR, 1480–81, 152v. 95

For the Common Good

management of revenues and administration, the sovereign provided the parvenu with money, prestige, and political influence. The parvenu used these gifts to enlarge his economic capital. He could afford a luxurious lifestyle; parvenus often built fashionable castles which resembled those of nobles, usually in an area that also offered economic opportunities. Roland le Fevre built his castle in Temse, Andries Andries (the young but talented governor of Maximilian’s German Chamber) in Assenede, and Jeronimus Lauwerein (a clerk who served Maximilian in 1480, but Roland le Fevre’s successor in 1493) in Watervliet.450 Pieter Bladelin, receiver-general for Philip the Good, was probably the ultimate example of a parvenu. His castle in Middelburg, which was bought by Guillaume Hugonet in 1476, was the ideal residence desired by every public servant who wanted to ‘vivre noblement ’. 451 The parvenus also built up much social capital, mainly by marrying a woman from a wealthy family. Roland le Fevre, for example, married Hedwige van Hemstede, daughter of the Dutch knight Jan van Hemstede.452 The end of the fifteenth century was ‘a golden age’ for ‘parvenus’. The state administration had a growing need for financial specialists who served no other interest than that of the state. These ambitious youngsters did not come from families who had traditionally served the state, nor from noble lineages. If a sovereign recruited officials from noble or patrician groups, he always risked the chance that these servitors would act to protect the interests of their own families. In contrast, the political and social position of a parvenu depended completely on their direct relationship with the sovereign, who used their personal loyalty not only to enlarge the technical skills of his staff, but also to break the power of influential old families. Of course, the trust the sovereign placed in parvenus frustrated those in traditional nuclei of power. It is possible that the objections against Roland le Fevre’s appointment can be read as standard criticism from traditional official families. Moreover, it is possible the Flemish cities had also protested against the appointment of Roland le Fevre. In the case of Jacques Galliot against Jan van der Scaghe before the Great Council in January 1478, Jan van der Scaghe had protected the privileges of English tradesmen against the financial claims of a captain from Maximilian’s army. Jan van der Scaghe was a member of a powerful patrician family in Ghent, and he had been appointed receiver-general of Flanders for the Bruges quarter in spring 1477; Roland le Fevre was his successor in 1479.453 In the cooperative context of early 1477, the Flemish cities had at least approved the appointment of the Ghentenar Jan van der Scaghe, and perhaps even recommended him to the court. It was exactly this man, who had defended trade privileges, who was replaced in 1479 by the young ambitious parvenu, responsible only to Maximilian and his confidents. As a consequence the Flemish cities supported the Chamber of Accounts officials against Roland le Fevre, whom they judged was too young, too poor, and too independent of the traditional bureaucracy and of the Flemish cities. 450 Andries Andries was born ca. 1455 (SAG: RV, 955, 39v and 34315, 136v). His career in the service of Maximilian, his son, and emperor Charles V gave him the opportunity to build up a luxurious residence in Assenede (Baete, De Decker & De Vleesschauwer, Het Prinsenhof te Assenede, 38–46). Jeronimus Lauweryn refounded the village of Watervliet and he was an important dike-builder in the coastal plain (Haemers & Soens, Lauweryn (Jeronimus), 584–5). 451 De Clercq, Dumolyn & Haemers, Vivre noblement, passim. 452 Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 273; Geerts & Raemdonck, De burcht, 296; de Herckenrode, Nobiliaire des PaysBas, I, 745; Wellens, Fèvre (Roland le), 260). 453 Haemers & Campbell, Scaghe (Jan van der), 787. 96

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Moreover, the parvenu filled four offices in the financial administration of the county at the same time. As a consequence, Roland le Fevre would henceforth be the key figure in Flemish fiscal policy. Jan van der Scaghe was not dismissed, but appointed to the post of ‘receiver of extraordinary revenues for the county of Flanders’. 454 This was a minor office, from which Jan could not influence policy as he did in his former position. It is possible that Jan protested this demotion, because he resisted handing over his accounts. Only after admonition from the Chamber of Accounts did he deliver the accounts to his successor.455 Jan van der Scaghe had previously been in trouble with the Great Council, when its president, with Maximilian’s permission, sent a commission to investigate Jan’s receipts (‘recette ’) in January 1479.456 This dispute with the council may have been the immediate cause of his dismissal, but the more fundamental cause was certainly the court’s move to centralise fiscal policy in Flanders and put it in the hands of an ambitious confident, who owed no loyalty to the urban opponents of Maximilian. It is not surprising the Flemish cities dismissed Roland le Fevre when they took over the government of the county in 1482. He was imprisoned and replaced by … Jan van der Scaghe.457 The Chamber of Accounts at Lille was not alone in its protest against the government’s policy. The Estates-General and the Members of Flanders constantly raised objections against financial strategies and political decisions of the Habsburg court. A short overview of these objections starts with the protest by the Estates-General in 1480. At their meeting in Mechelen, and later in Antwerp during the spring of 1480, the members of the Estates-General expressed their concerns about the poor returns for their large investment in the war.458 In spite of numerous aides and loans to the government and the military victory at Enguinegatte, French troops were still fighting in the border regions of Flanders and Hainault, to detriment of the economy in the Low Countries. Representatives of the different regions were well aware of the kind of war Maximilian was waging. Instead of a defensive war for the protection of the borders, the Low Countries now faced an offensive war pursued by the dynasty to retake the territories lost in 1477. Maximilian had ignored the ‘concept of war’ the Estates had presented to him in February 1479, and replaced it with a never-ending vicious circle of costly military campaigns.459 It was like paying into a bottomless pit, as representatives of the duchy of Brabant sighed in 1481, as Maximilian kept asking for money without respecting the privileges of 1477.460 The Estates-General, and especially the Members of Flanders, could not overlook the violation of their privileges. In July 1480 the cities of Ghent, Bruges and Ypres, in a remarkable joint action reminiscent of the united front of 1477, tried to exact more respect for the privileges from the ducal administration.461 For the first time since the arrival of 454 On 28 February 1480 he swore the oath as ‘ontfanghere van den extraordinarien van Vlaendren ’ (ADN: B 33, 51v and B 17733, ‘Recette de l’extraordinaire de Flandre’). He already held this office in January 1480 (ADN: B 2121, 57r). 455 In April 1480 the Chamber asked the former receiver of Flanders ‘de vous deporter de la dite charge en delaissant au dit receveur [Roland le Fevre] la joissance selon et ainsi que mon dit seigneur le veult ’ (ADN: B 17732, ‘Le Scaghe’). 456 He answered he had administered the funds properly: ‘de mon avis [j’] ay continuellement fait toute diligence a moy possible comme se ce feust pour gaigner paradis ’ (ADN: B 17729, ‘Recette de Flandres, quartier de Bruges’). 457 Wellens, Fèvre (Roland le), 261; Haemers & Campbell, Scaghe (Jan van der), 790. 458 Wellens, Les Etats-Généraux, 184–5 and 445–8. 459 The ‘concept van den orloghe ’ (Blockmans, De handelingen van de leden, 92). 460 ‘Het was den moor gewassen ’ (Van Uytven, 1477 in Brabant, 277). 461 Blockmans, Handelingen van de leden, 150–3; Van Rompaey, Het grafelijk baljuwsambt, 390–1. 97

For the Common Good

Maximilian in the Low Countries the duke was advised, albeit indirectly, to follow the oath he had sworn. On 20 July 1480 Ghent, Bruges and Ypres wrote an official letter of protest to the Chamber requesting that the violation of all privileges and rights of the three Members cease. They objected particularly to the lease of judicial and financial offices in the county.462 At their meetings during the summer of 1480, the Members threatened to cut off funds if the government did not adjust its policy.463 Maximilian was not impressed by the protest. He had just yielded to Ghent’s desire to banish Willem van der Scaghe, but he did not plan to leave the protest of the Three Members unanswered. A veteran member of the Chamber of Accounts at Lille, Thomas Malet, secretly sent Maximilian a note informing him of the investigation started by the Three Members.464 According to Malet, the Three Members planned to banish all bailiffs who had leased their offices. Moreover, because the Flemish Privilege of 1477 stipulated that only natives of the county could be appointed to judicial and financial posts,465 Malet thought that officials who were foreigners would also be threatened. This loyal ‘spy’ advised Maximilian to take immediate action. Shortly afterwards, the new receiver of Flanders, Roland le Fevre, travelled to Ghent to negotiate this matter.466 From Namur on 26 August 1480, Maximilian himself wrote to the Chamber of Accounts personnel a letter, in which he prohibited them from paying attention to the protest from the Three Members. He argued that there was a long tradition of leasing county offices, so his policy should not be questioned.467 In the end the Three Members did not banish the officials under investigation, probably because they knew what a provocation that would be. Bruges and Ypres still complied with governmental policy because Maximilian’s tentacles had penetrated deeply into the leading circles in both cities. That was not the case in Ghent. Protests against the continual violations of the privileges mounted, culminating in a statement (‘staet ’) composed by Ghentenars in February 1481. The city may have presented the ‘staet ’ at the meeting of the Three Members in Ghent in Spring 1481.468 I did not find this document in the archives, but it is mentioned by the chroniclers. According to Nicolas Despars, in the ‘staet ’ the city of Ghent listed guidelines for the financial policy they wanted their lord to follow.469 These guidelines limited Maximilian’s personal expenses and personnel costs and put both under strict supervision. The Ghentenars also discussed the financial malaise brought on by Maximilian’s policy and probably connected it with the 462 ‘Waeromme, eerbare wijse ende voorseineghe heeren, wij jeghewoordelicx an u scriven, biddende zeere hertelic ende met neerendsten dat ulieder gheliefte zij int helpen onderhouden ende vulcommen van ons voorseides harde gheduchtes heeren ende princessen eede ende ten fijne dat tvoornoemde haerlieder land paysivelic ghebruuc hebben moghe van tghuend dat den insetenen van dien ten grooten orboore van den lande in previlegien, rechten ende vryheden bij ghiften verleendt es ’. Signed by Ghent ‘over ons allen ’ (ADN: B 17730, ‘Histoire générale, flamand ’). In an attached note the Members clarified their protest: ‘dat men voortan niet en verpacht noch en vercoope eenighe officien van onsen voorseiden lande van Vlaendren ’ (ADN: B 17733, ‘Flamand’). 463 Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 200. 464 ADN: B 17733, ‘Flandre, offices de justice’. About Thomas Malet: Jean, La chambre des comptes, 325–6 and Dumolyn, Staatsvorming en vorstelijke ambtenaren, fiche Thomas Malet. 465 Blockmans, Privilegie voor Vlaanderen, 133–4. 466 ADN: B 17733, ‘Recette générale de Flandre’. 467 They were leased ‘de toute ancienneté ’ (ADN: B 17733, ‘Flandre, bail à ferme de tous les offices de justice’). 468 Blockmans, Handelingen van de leden, 163. 469 Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 204: ‘naer den welcken zy vastelick mainteneerden dat hy [Maximiliaan] hem voortan, mids der grooter verachtertheit van den lande, noodtsakelick te voughene ende te reghelene hadde ’. See also Blockmans, Autocratie ou polyarchie, 260 and Fris, Histoire de Gand, 150. 98

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inadequate defence of the county. Ghent would no longer approve aides that were proposed by the government, and by July the city had convinced its subordinated castellanies not to approve any measure of the government that was ‘against the well-being of our county’. 470 They slowly formed a front against the archduke, with well-known consequences. Ghent proposed to organize the county’s defence itself during the summer of 1481. The murder of one of Ghent’s political leaders, the bailiff Jan van Dadizeele, the archduke’s protection of the accused murderer, and continuing violations of the city’s privileges finally caused an explosion at the meeting of the Members in December 1481, the meeting Willem Moreel was not able to attend because he was in prison. In his February 1482 complaint against Willem Moreel, Jan van Riebeke, and Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas, Maximilian’s prosecutor accused the three Bruges men of helping the city of Ghent compose the ‘staet ’. 471 Willem Moreel probably steadfastly denied that he had cooperated in any way with the Ghent protest, because he remained in office for more than ten months after the Ghent statement was issued. But it is also likely that the city of Ghent successfully convinced Willem Moreel and his companions that the policy of Maximilian and his administration was disastrous. The ducal administration, and perhaps even his close colleague, Pieter Lanchals, suspected that Willem Moreel was planning to obstruct the petition for the new aide at the Estates meeting in December 1481. Was this suspicion correct? The intensity with which Willem would fight the autocratic policy of Maximilian and his entourage in the Flemish Revolt472, shows that he no longer supported ducal policy. If the duke’s advisors thought that Moreel would publicly criticize the archduke’s financial policy, they may have imprisoned him just to silence him. Willem Moreel might have criticized the regime in the same way the members of the Chambers of Accounts had in previous years. Important financial administrators commonly objected against their lords’ policy in the late Middle Ages, because their professional training made them much more knowledgeable in financial matters than their lords.473 Based on his specialised knowledge in financial and political affairs, a civil servant could assume a critical position towards his lord, who was stuck in a more feudal way of thinking. The most important and noble occupation of a prince might be waging war, but the civil servant had different interests and views on state affairs. If circumstances allowed, an official could even could take over financial policy from the lord entirely. There are several examples from the history of late medieval Flanders in which a financial specialist assumed the complex administration of his sovereign’s policy, and after determining that his lord was incompetent, opposed his lord. Simon de Mirabello, for example, had a career similar to that of Willem Moreel. This native Italian was a very powerful moneylender and wealthy merchant who joined the administration of the Flemish Count Louis de Nevers in 1323. However, the count damaged the state and its administration, and chose the French king’s side in his conflict with the English king, known as the Hundred Years War. Since this policy hurt their economic interests, the merchants, among them Simon de Mirabello, joined the rebellion, led by Jacob van Artevelde, of the Flemish cities against the count. In 1340 the Members of Flanders appointed the naturalized Italian, who was backed by a 470 471 472 473

‘Contrarie der welvaert van den ghemeenen lande ’ (Blockmans, Handelingen van de leden, 182). CAB: CA, 2, 322v and 324v. Janssens, Willem Moreel, passim; Haemers, Moreel (Willem), 683–4. Prevenier, Ambtenaren in stad, 53. 99

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large economic network, ‘ruwaard ’ of Flanders. Henceforth Simon de Mirabello governed as the count of Flanders’ regent.474 One hundred fifty years later, Willem Moreel followed a similar path. The rich merchant saw that trade in Low Countries had suffered from Maximilian’s financial and military policies. His social network, economic partners, and political friends, among them presumably Maarten Lem, probably convinced him to withdraw his support for the warlike policies of his employer. Since Willem had already stated in February 1482 defence that he preferred to make decisions with ‘raison ’ rather than ‘voulenté ’, he probably tried initially to gain allies at court. Willem also made his political intentions known in this statement. Willem Moreel, Maarten Lem and others did not plead for the complete preservation of the privileges of 1477, because they had violated them more than once. Instead, they wanted a transparent decision-making process that would produce responsible choices and a well-considered policy which took the interests of tax-payers and tradesmen into account. Perhaps Willem Moreel thought the time had come in December 1481 to stand up to the duke. If so, it seems logical that he would have made contact with the Ghent opposition and members of the ducal administration who had already criticized the regime. Maximilian’s supporters in Bruges could have learned of Willem’s opinions or his plan to raise objections against Habsburg policy. In reaction, Maximilian then ordered his subordinates to imprison Willem on the night of 9–10 December. 1.4

Conclusion

With the privileges of 1477 the Estates-General had created a decentralised and federalised state structure. The Burgundian state became a political union of cooperative regions, which did not give up their governmental autonomy. The spirit of the privileges of 1477 envisioned a sovereign who safeguarded public order in his lands and the economic prosperity of his subjects. The sovereign had to guard against the violation of their rights and privileges. The Estates-General hoped to create an efficient state structure that would let interests of the Estates guide its actions, but this organisation did not have the power to made this form of government a reality. Internal division, political competition among the representatives in the Estates, the tradition of a strong corps of officials used to governing the state in a centralising manner, and the arrival of a new, ambitious ‘impresario of war ’ as the head of state undermined the privileges of 1477. The Estates had agreed to the marriage of Mary of Burgundy to Maximilian of Austria because they hoped the new sovereign would stop the French invasion. Despite their hopes, Maximilian did not possess the means to defend the Low Countries. Nevertheless, by giving the state money to build up its military power, the Estates, and especially the county of Flanders, were able to stop the French invasion. But the political role the 1477 privileges forced Maximilian to play clashed with the young archduke’s ambitions. His father had sent him to the Netherlands to bolster the Habsburg position in the Holy Roman Empire, so the young duke wanted to strengthen 474 After the murder of Jacob van Artevelde the political support of Simon melted, and in 1346 he was murdered (Rogghé, Mirabello (Simon de), 709–10). Simon’s father, Jan, also fell into disgrace, albeit in the duchy of Brabant (Kusman, Jean de Mirabello, 872–95). 100

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the financial, political, and military power of the Burgundian dynasty. The privileges of 1477 were, of course, a serious obstacle to the exercise of the Habsburg prince’s autocratic rule. Maximilian had to navigate around the numerous restrictions placed on him by the Estates-General, and especially by the Flemish cities, if he wanted to coerce his subjects as his predecessors had. In 1477, Maximilian lacked the financial means to build up a powerful state, a situation that did not improve as the years passed. Although the EstatesGeneral were too weak to guard the privileges, the state was not able to collect the same amount of money as Charles the Bold had amassed during his reign. Maximilian and Charles’ former officials tried to use the same financial and fiscal strategies as Charles the Bold had, but they encountered immediate resistance in Flanders. In particular, the city of Ghent strenuously fought Maximilian’s initiatives when they began to resemble the moves of Charles the Bold. The privileges of 1477 were enacted during a period when the state was fundamentally weak, and they met the same fate as other ‘constitutional texts’ created in the Middle Ages. Once the authority of the sovereign had been restored, he tried to tip the balance of power back in his favour.475 Only a few months after his arrival in the Low Countries, the archduke’s policy had already begun to adopt some of Charles the Bold’s measures, which were supported by his court and the officials who had served the late duke. The large tax levies that the Estates imposed were insufficient to wage Maximilian’s wars. Because the ‘impresario ’ wanted to take back territory lost in 1477, he did not have enough resources to defend the county’s heartland, and the war caused economic problems in the Low Countries. Moreover, Maximilian’s top officials displayed an undisguised contempt for the political and social privileges of the realm’s subjects, and their search for money was unscrupulous. The state’s public debts weighed down the policy of the court, which had become dependent on moneylenders and a small clique of officials. Last but not least, the international situation forced Maximilian to wage war against France and to suppress rebellion in the northern regions which Maximilian either governed or wanted to govern. Growing discontent from several centres of power in the county of Flanders blossomed into open protest in 1480. In the summer of 1480 the city of Ghent refused to finance Maximilian’s militant policies. The ever-increasing contrast between the role of the sovereign imagined in the privileges and the archduke’s actual conduct fuelled the Ghent protest. More than once Ghent leaders called violations of the privileges to the attention of the court and the other Members of Flanders, and in its ‘statement’ of 1481, the city presented its vision of good administration. Maximilian lost considerable authority in this time period. The head of state’s symbolic capital shrank, and at the end of Mary of Burgundy’s reign, his subjects no longer saw Maximilian as the person who could solve the county’s political problems. The political deadlock between the court and Ghent was complete before the death of the duchess. In Bruges, frustration with the Burgundian state’s policy was also simmering. Maximilian and his entourage tried to eliminate urban protest permanently. They had removed a weak link in the ducal administration at the end of 1481, when the former superintendent for all finances, the Bruges citizen Willem Moreel, was imprisoned in a bold attempt to head off Bruges’ objections against the state’s financial policy. But 475 Van Uytven & Blockmans, Consitutions and their application, 423. 101

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several economic and social networks supported Willem Moreel. Bruges’ criticism of the regime was not as far-reaching as that of Ghent, because elite networks of the city had complied with Maximilian’s policies and even helped to create them. But the city would not tolerate the growing autocratic style of the state which paid no attention to the city’s interests. The frustration of bureaucrats and ducal officials over the leasing of offices and the domineering policy of some central administrators added to this dissatisfaction. In both the state administration and the Flemish cities, the opponents and supporters of Maximilian of Austria and his entourage stood squarely against each other. As a result Maximilian had already lost crucial political and social support in the principal cities of the county of Flanders even before his wife fell to her death. The next chapter will investigate if the social capital Maximilian had among the nobility, the traditional political ally of the Burgundian dukes in fifteenth-century Flanders, could compensate for the loss of political support in the cities.

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2.1

The Crises of 1477

2.1.1

Reaction after the Death of Charles the Bold

Confused. Anxious. Relieved. The nobility of the Low Countries reacted in very different ways to the news of Duke Charles the Bold’s death. The uncertain future of the decapitated dynasty, the French king’s brutal imprisonment of some of the ducal council, and the relentless invasion of the French army confused many nobles. Sudden and intense anxiety drove nobles to different corners of the political landscape. Some accepted the lucrative offer of Louis XI to switch allegiance to his court. Others fled to their estates to wait out the crisis. Some took up their posts on the storm front as they rallied around Mary in her first days as duchess. However, other nobles were probably relieved. Certain of Charles the Bold’s measures, such as his summonses for feudal military service, had met with protest from the nobility. Moreover, the death of the authoritarian duke made it possible for some nobles to enhance their standing at court. Some saw a window of opportunity to get even with rivals. Nevertheless, all nobles at court had the same goals in the tumultuous crisis. The nobility primarily wanted to secure their own position and the safety of their entourage, and protect their patrimony from military or political threats so that it would pass intact from father to son. In short, the power and the standing of the lineage took priority.1 In this chapter2 I will examine how the nobility tried to secure its political position. First, a close analysis of the careers of Adolf of Cleves and Louis of Bruges will reveal why these nobles had so much influence in Mary of Burgundy’s court, and how the arrival of the new duke changed the balance of power in the court. In the second part, I investigate Maximilian’s rationale for attempting to diminish the power of these noble courtiers, as well as the reasons for the growing dissatisfaction at court during Mary of Burgundy’s reign. This dissatisfaction ultimately led Adolf of Cleves and Louis of Bruges to side with the regency council in 1483. Why did those two nobles, who had been the most influential noble courtiers in 1477, oppose ducal policy in 1483? Along with his army, the French king Louis XI sent his envoy Philip de Commynes to the Low Countries ‘in order to attract people to his court’. 3 In the conquered duchy of Burgundy the French invaders won over most local nobles, including nobles of the Golden Fleece, Philip Pot and Jean Damas, and their followers.4 After several forays, the French diplomat was also able to convince some nobles from the Low Countries to side with the French king. Philip de Crèvecoeur (governor of Artois), Anton of Burgundy (illegitimate 1 Cools, Mannen met macht, 102. Buylaert, Gevaarlijke tijden, 327. The ‘lineage’ or ‘ extended family’ refers to the persons descending from a common ancestor and assuming a collective identity (ibidem, 323). 2 This chapter is a more detailed study on this topic than Haemers, Adellijke onvrede. 3 ‘Pour faire venir gens devers luy ’ (Commynes, Mémoires, I, 366). See also Blanchard, Philippe de Commynes, 131–5. 4 Cools, Noblemen on the borderline, 377–9. 103

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son of Duke Philip the Good), Jacob of Luxembourg and Lodewijk van Halewyn (both generals in the Burgundian army) accepted the royal offer, defections which greatly facilitated the advance of French troops. As a consequence, ‘1477’ was a year of drastic political loss for the Burgundian dynasty. The Burgundian dukes’ programs to influence nobles in the Low Countries, such as creation of the Order of the Golden Fleece in 1430, seemed to have failed when six nobles of the Golden Fleece deserted to the enemy in 1477.5 In the short term, some counties and duchies were lost to the French crown. In the long term, the ‘Flemish faction’ at court of Louis XI continually urged the king (and his successor, Charles VIII) to pursue aggressive attempts to conquer the southern Low Countries.6 The French king’s strategy of attracting nobles to his court permanently destabilised Burgundian authority up until the Treaty of Senlis in 1493. When the Burgundian dynasty suffered this period of weakness, some nobles chose to join the French king, but this ‘desertion’ did not affect their social and political position. Louis XI was not interested in attracting every noble, only those who had an important political or military position at the Burgundian court, those who could really help enlarge the power and territorial holdings of the Valois crown. Political heavyweights Anton of Burgundy and Jacob of Luxembourg, for example, were generals in the duke’s army and principal advisors to Charles the Bold.7 The French king could use their political and military talents. Moreover, by winning over these nobles, he weakened his Burgundian rival. In return Louis XI promised the nobles that he would protect their patrimonies and compensate them for the losses they had suffered by switching their allegiance. In March 1477, Louis XI gave Anton of Burgundy financial compensation for the damage his lands had suffered during the war, as well as several fiefs in Artois.8 The king appointed Philip de Crèvecoeur governor and lieutenant-general of Artois, Picardy, and La Rochelle. He became a member of the royal Order of Saint-Michel, just as Jacob of Luxembourg had. Henceforth, Crèvecoeur’s annual income was greater than the income he had formerly received from the Burgundian duke.9 The other nobles received similar favours.10 The ‘deserters’ enjoyed high social positions at the French court, comparable to their positions at the Burgundian court. The nobles who chose to remain in service to the Burgundian court were similarly concerned with their personal power and social position. Philip de Commynes did not beat about the bush when he was explaining the presence of nobles at Mary’s court. According to the chronicler, they helped the young duchess through the difficult crisis, but they did this ‘out of self-interest’. 11 As a consequence, in Spring 1477 Mary of Burgundy was not only 5 In June 1479 Jean de Neuchâtel joined his companions Anton of Burgundy, Philip de Crèvecoeur, Jean Damas, Jacob of Luxembourg and Philip Pot in their flight to the French court (Cools, Quelques considérations, 176). 6 See Blockmans, La position du comté, 77–88 and Haemers, Philippe de Clèves, 23–4. 7 Vaughan, Charles the Bold, 235–8 and 252–3. 8 Cools, Mannen met macht, 105–6; Ordonnances des rois de France, XVIII, 259; Lettres de Louis XI, VII, 116; Clément, Antoine de Bourgogne, 179. 9 Paravicini, Acquérir sa grâce, 381; Blockmans, La position du comté, 74; Harsgor, Recherches sur le personnel, II, 1090; Cools, Mannen met macht, 104–5. 10 Jean de Neuchâtel received the county of Corbeil, Philip Pot became marshal of Burgundy, Jean de Damas lieutenantgeneral of the Mâconnais (Cools, Mannen met macht, 276; de Smedt, Les chevaliers, 147 and 156). Jacob of Luxembourg, who was imprisoned by the French king after the execution of his brother Louis in 1475, would serve in the royal army until his death in 1487 (Paviot, Jacques de Luxembourg, 337). All knights of the Golden Fleece received an annual income and sat on the royal council of the king. 11 ‘Pour leurs affaires particuliers ’ (Commynes, Mémoires, I, 390). 104

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the puppet of the Estates-General and the rebellious cities, but also of her courtiers.12 The political vacuum at court gave nobles the opportunity to reverse unfavourable directives promulgated by Charles the Bold. For example, the bishop of Liège, Louis de Bourbon, withdrew the bishopric of Liège from the control of the ducal crown. The duke of Ghelders won his release and regained his duchy. Pieter of Luxembourg, the son of the executed Louis, retrieved some of his father’s holdings. And the duke of Cleves tried to marry his son to Mary of Burgundy – but failed. The duchy of Luxembourg and the county of Namur became prey to local nobles vying for authority. The privilege of Namur re-established the authority of local power-holders, and it was not until 1480 that the Luxembourg nobility accepted Mary of Burgundy as duchess.13 Around the periphery of the Low Countries, the Burgundian state faced a severe loss of authority. But the dynasty did not bleed to death. On the contrary, several nobles from the core of the Low Countries (Flanders, Holland-Zeeland, Brabant, and Hainault) set themselves up as the guardian angels of the Burgundian dynasty after the defeat at Nancy. Adolf of Cleves, Philip of Burgundy (son of Anton), Josse de Lalaing, William of Egmond, Wolfert of Borssele, Engelbert of Nassau, and Olivier de la Marche protected the young duchess in the first months of her reign. These nobles did not intend to let the dynasty be swallowed up by the French crown. Feelings of internal solidarity and sympathy for the dynasty (to which they owed their positions) steeled them to remain loyal to the duchess. In exchange for the protection of their prominent positions, those nobles worked to stabilise the wobbling throne of Burgundy. On 26 March 1477 the upper nobility issued a new order for the duchess’ court.14 Her personal court, the ‘Chamber of the duchess’, became the ducal council (the ‘hofraad ’). During her reign, this institution was divided into four sections: the ‘Chamber’, the political council, the ‘Great Council’ (for judicial matters), and the ‘financial commission’ (a board of financial experts). The composition of the political council was not permanent, but instead varied according to the place and time of the meetings and the nature of the issues before it. The other sections of the ducal council had a fixed body of officials, but it is often difficult to make a distinction between the sections, because some officials sat on the Great Council, as well as on the Chamber or the political council. Moreover, the political and military turbulence of 1477 severely impacted the composition of the ducal council. In 1477, many nobles just took over a source of income or a ducal title in order to legitimize and secure their position at court. Louis of Bruges, for example, took a permanent seat in the Great Council, but also became Mary’s ‘chevalier d ’honneur et premier chambellan ’, meaning that he was a knight of honour who managed the duchess’ Chamber. In addition, he sometimes appeared on Mary’s political council, for example, when the Holland privilege of 1477 was granted.15 Louis of Bruges belonged to all three institutions, and probably did 12 Mary’s personal impact on politics was small (Devaux, Le rôle politique, 405). 13 Douxchamps-Lefevre, Le privilege de Marie de Bourgogne, 235–44; Petit, Le Luxembourg et le recul du pouvoir, 382–400. 14 John of Cleves (the duke of Cleves) and his brother Adolf, Louis de Bourbon and Jean de la Bouverie are mentioned in the document as members of the council that composed the ordinance. We only have a copy from the seventeenth century (SAG: RV, 34323 and ADN: B 19445, 240r–303r), studied by Cools, Mannen met macht, 109–10. It is quite possible that Olivier de la Marche drew up the ordnance as he did before (ibidem, 111 and Paravicini, La cour de Bourgogne, 92–3). 15 SAG: RV, 34323 ( Johanna of Commynes, lady of Halewyn, remained the first ‘lady of honour’ of Mary). Because he was the former governor of Holland, Louis appeared in the political council when the county obtained its privilege ( Jongkees, Het Groot Privilege, 234). 105

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not distinguish among them. He was a nobleman of high status who advised the young duchess in whatever capacity she was governing. He had political, judicial, and financial responsibilities which did not all fit neatly into one institution. The Great Privilege of 1477 was responsible for this blurring of the boundaries between the council institutions. The Privilege abolished the central institutions of Mechelen, and consequently, the government was returned to the structure it held before 1473, when the Thionville ordinances of Charles the Bold created the Mechelen institutions. The jobs of several of those institutions were folded back into the ducal council, but some specialised commissions and councils also remained active. Fragmentation of ducal institutions forced nobles to make a choice. In Autumn 1477 Louis of Bruges quit the Great Council, and afterwards appeared only on the political council and in the ‘Chamber’. The main concern of those who wrote the court ordinance of March 1477 was not to create order out of the institutional mess created by the Great Privilege. Their concern was to halt the exodus from court and to ensure the loyalty of those noble courtiers who remained.16 As a peace-keeping measure, Adolf of Cleves issued a directive on 26 March prohibiting all noblemen from entering Mary’s bedchamber without her permission. Pushy noblemen could no longer use this method to try to gain concessions from the duchess. Moreover, no order could carry Mary’s signature without the permission of her first knight of honour, Louis of Bruges.17 With these directives Adolf of Cleves and Louis of Bruges tried to control the chaotic decision-making process at court, and re-establish a coherent state policy. But who were these nobles who stood at the centre of the court? 2.1.2

Adolf of Cleves and Louis of Bruges: Guardian Angels of the Dynasty

Adolf of Cleves (1425–1492) set himself up as the father-figure, or ‘patron ’ of the Burgundian dynasty in 1477. Duchess Mary called Adolf one of ‘our closest relatives’, because Adolf and she had the same ancestor, Duke John the Fearless.18 John’s illegitimate daughter, also called Mary of Burgundy, had married Adolf, duke of Cleves. He was succeeded by his eldest son, John, while his younger brother Adolf was brought up at the court of the Burgundian Duchess Isabel of Portugal to help maintain good diplomatic relations between the courts of Cleves and Burgundy.19 Philip the Good’s duchess arranged the (first) marriage of her pupil, Adolf, to her niece, Beatrice of Portugal, in 1453. After Beatrice’s death, Adolf married Anne of Burgundy, the illegitimate daughter of his nephew Philip the Good. She was the widow of Adriaan of Borssele, a nobleman from Zeeland. This marriage remained childless, but from Adolf ’s first marriage he had a son, Philip, born in 1456. The political role Adolf played in 1477 corresponded to his close personal relationship with the Burgundian heiress. In 1491 Adolf would declare that Mary was the ‘creature on earth he liked the most’. 20

16 ‘Et veult ma dite damoiselle que quel qu ’il soit de ses gens et officiers ne servent en absence d ’autre, ne que nul ne soit compté pour quelconcque cause que ce soit, il n ’est en personne devers elle ’ (SAG: RV, 34323). 17 A copy of these documents in RAG: 34323 and ADN: B 19945, 303r–304v. 18 ‘Naeste maghen van onsen bloede ’ (CAB: PO, 1145). 19 A biography of Adolf in Haemers, Kleef (Adolf van); Cools, Mannen met macht, 238–40 and de Smedt, Les chevaliers, 131–4. 20 ‘C ’estoit la creature du monde que plus il aimoit ’ (cited by Sterchi, Uber den Umgang, 642; the context of this citation is in Haemers, Opstand adelt?). 106

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Illustration 7: Adolf of Cleves (ca. 1485; Staatlichen Museen zu Berlin - Preußischer Kulturbesitz).

When Adolf of Cleves became the most prominent noble at the Burgundian court in 1477, his position was a logical extension of his previous political career. In 1454 the 107

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young noble was already serving on the regency council of Charles the Bold when Philip the Good was absent from the Low Countries. Two years before, on the eve of the Battle of Overmeere during the Ghent War, the Burgundian duke had himself knighted Adolf. In 1456, the duke inducted Adolf into the Order of the Golden Fleece. In 1471 Charles the Bold appointed Adolf as one of four generals of the Burgundian army, together with Louis of Bruges, Jacob of Luxembourg, and Anton of Burgundy. Immediately after her father’s death, Mary appointed Adolf lieutenant-general and governor-general of the Low Countries on 28 January 1477, and followed by appointing his son Philip as lieutenantgeneral next to his father in April 1477. 21 In August father and son were also appointed governor and lieutenant of Hainault.22 Given Adolf ’s experience in political and military affairs, it is not surprising that he advised the duchess in policy matters. He represented the duchess at meetings of the Estates-General, acted as the most important court advisor when she signed the privileges of 1477, personally welcomed Maximilian to the Low Countries, knighted the Habsburg prince in the Order of the Golden Fleece and, together with Pieter of Luxembourg, held the young Philip the Fair above the baptismal font in 1478. In short, Adolf patronised the Burgundians, the dynasty with which he identified. In return the dynasty rewarded Adolf with a large fortune. At the time of his first marriage, he received several ducal favours, such as the fief of Dreischor in Zeeland and an annuity of 2,000 lb. par. from the city of Cassel. He inherited the fief of Wijnendale (in the county of Flanders) and an annuity of 4,800 lb. par. from the Flemish county revenues, because his mother had received both favours from Duke John the Fearless. Adolf ’s father, the duke of Cleves, endowed his son with the strategic fiefs of Ravenstein, Herpen and Uden on the Maas in Brabant. His second wife, Anne of Burgundy, also possessed important fiefs on the isle of Walcheren (Zeeland), from her late husband’s estate, and a residence in Bruges. She also possessed a room in the ducal Coudenberg Palace in Brussels, conveniently close to Adolf ’s Brussels residence, the ‘Hôtel Ravenstein ’. As Adolf also owned a Ghent residence, he could sojourn in all the duchy’s most important cities. His possessions were spread out across the Low Countries, which made him a member of the ‘supra-regional’ nobility. This level of the upper nobility had been nurtured by the Burgundian dynasty to help govern the regions under its rule.23 The dynasty rewarded these ‘supra-regional’ nobles with numerous gifts to provide for their economic support. Adolf had a large income from his own domains and fiefs, but the ducal rewards were a welcome addition. In 1486, the income from Wijnendale was approximately 5,000 lb. par., while Ravenstein yielded almost 11,000 lb. par.24 From 1454 the Burgundian treasury paid Adolf an annual income which sporadically increased. He received 19,200 lb. par. in 1477 from the ‘recette générale de toutes les finances ’, in addition to other annuities from Kassel and the county of Flanders.25 The financial commission made 21 Gachard, Les archives royales, 300. In case Mary was absent from the ducal court, Adolf was the ‘stedehouder generael ende gouverneur van allen onzen landen ’ (SAG: RV, 175, 67). Since 1470 Philip of Cleves was in service of the dukes of Burgundy (Bessey, Flammang & Lebailly, Comptes de l’argentier, 38; Haemers, Philippe de Clèves, 29). 22 Gachard, Les archives royales, 301. 23 Cools, Mannen met macht, 26–7; Boone, Elites urbaines, 80–1; Van Uytven, Vorst, stad en adel, 121; Dumolyn & Van Tricht, Adel en nobiliteringsprocessen, 208–9. 24 In 1486 (the only year for which the accounts of the fief of Wijnendale survives) Wijnendale yielded 4,999 lb. 7 s. 7 d. 1 ob. par. to Adolf (SAB: FW, 22v). Ravenstein yielded 3,928 florins of the Rhine (Hermans, Charters en geschiedkundige bescheiden, I, 714), that is 10,999 lb. 2 s. par. (one florin was 56 gr. in 1486; Spufford, Handbook of medieval exchange, 255). 25 ADN: B 2115, 38r. 108

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an accord with Adolf in October 1477 to reduce this sum to 12,800 lb. par., in view of the financial crisis in the Burgundian state.26 His wife, Anne, and their son Philip also received annual rent payments of 3,200 and 6,400 lb. par. respectively.27 The financial relationship between the dynasty and the Cleves was reciprocal, because they also lent money to the duchess on certain occasions. For example, Anne of Burgundy lent Maximilian 1,680 lb. par. in 1477 ‘to help him provide for his affairs’. 28 Moreover, in the late Middle Ages noblemen were, to some extent, expected to finance their military service from their own resources.29 The wealth and the prestige Adolf and his relatives possessed therefore was a reflection of the military and political power they held on the eve of Mary of Burgundy’s reign. The Burgundian state rewarded Adolf with an annual income for his loyal services, and his financial relationship with the duke demonstrated his close political, familial, and cultural connection with the dynasty. Louis of Bruges, lord of Gruuthuze (1427–1492), was also a member of the supraregional nobility, but he had urban roots.30 First Louis was lord of Gruuthuze, which meant that he collected the so-called ‘grutegeld ’ in Bruges and the Franc of Bruges. The collection of this tax on beer was a fief he held from the count of Flanders. When Louis concluded a lease contract with Bruges in 1481, the city paid him 1774 lb. par. to lease the ‘grutegeld ’. 31 Louis held many fiefs in Flanders and other regions, a clear expression of the political power he had accumulated during his lifetime. Initially Louis inherited or bought fiefs around Bruges, in areas such as Oostkamp, Beveren (near Courtrai), Beernem, Spiere, Sijsele, Steenhuize, Pamele, Bevere, Berchem, Voorde, Avelgem and Tielt.32 These fiefs gave him considerable wealth.33 With his fortune Louis could afford luxurious urban palaces in Bruges and Ghent, a large collection of artwork, and a renowned library.34 Louis took part in many tournaments in the city of Bruges and from 1479 on was the dean of the archers of Saint-George.35 These achievements symbolised the prestige Louis enjoyed in town.

26 Gachard, Les archives royales, 302–3 and ADN: B 2124, 68v. 27 ADN: B 2115, 37r-v. 28 ‘Pour lui aucunement aidier a subvenir a ses affaires et aultrement ’ (ADN: B 2118, 60r and B 2120, 68514). 29 Gunn, Grummitt & Cools, War, state, and society, 177–9. 30 Biographical data in Haemers, Gruuthuze (Lodewijk van); Martens, De biografie van Lodewijk, 13–36 and Cools, Mannen met macht, 180–2. 31 CAB: PO, 1178 and SR, 1482–83, 85r. The ‘grutegeld ’ was a tax of two groat on every imported or locally brewed ton of beer (except from English beer and beer from Bremen), of which the half was collected by the lord of Gruuthuze and the other half by the count of Flanders (Soens, De rentmeesters van de graaf, 251; Van Nieuwenhuysen, Les finances du duc (1984), 283). 32 SAB: BB, 64, 235v–236r and 256v–257r; Opsommer, Omme dat leengoed, 420; CAB: Adornes, 39, 4r–5v; GSAB: Rk., 17381, 3v and 13789, 4r; SAG: RV, 7512, 82r; Greve & Lebailly, Comptes de l ’argentier, 218; Martens, De biografie van Lodewijk, 13. 33 The revenues of the fiefs Avelgem, Bevere, Tielt, Berchem, Steenhuize, Voorde and Spiere amounted to 5,247 lb. 7 s. 2 d. par. in 1481 (Thoen, Landbouwekonomie en bevolking, 606–7). 34 Wijsman, Louis de Bruges, 228–52. 35 Janssens, Daar komen de Brugse, 54. 109

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Illustration 8: Louis of Bruges (ca. 1485; Gruuthuze Museum; Bruges).

In their efforts to rule the county and especially the city of Bruges, the counts of Flanders could not ignore the local power of the lords of Gruuthuze, who were often 110

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appointed to the Burgundian court. Duke Philip the Good had introduced the young Louis to his court as a page in 1445. Louis became a captain in the duke’s army in 1452 and was knighted before a battle in the Ghent war, just as Adolf of Cleves was. In 1456 Louis appeared for the first time in a court ordinance of Philip the Good, and thereafter he was paid for every day that he was in the duke’s service.36 He was inducted into the Order of the Golden Fleece in 1461. One year later Louis was appointed governor of the county of Holland-Zeeland, perhaps because in 1455 he had married Margaret of Borssele, daughter of the admiral Henry of Borssele, the most important nobleman in Zeeland. Louis began amassing landholdings in Holland. He either bought or received as a marriage portion Haamstede, Heemstede and Westenschouwen, making him one of the most important fief-holders in Holland.37 Just as his father-in-law had, Louis maintained good contacts with the English king. In 1471 Louis provided shelter at his Bruges palace for the exiled Edward IV, who rewarded his Bruges ally with trade privileges for fiefs in Holland, the title of ‘Earl of Winchester’, and a yearly pension of 200 English pounds.38 In short, Louis of Bruges, lord of Gruuthuze, had the political power, the social networks, the prestige, and the wealth to make him an honourable member of the supra-regional nobility and a powerful pillar of the Burgundian state in the Low Countries. Louis proved this in 1477. After he learned about the death of Duke Charles the Bold, he travelled from The Hague to Ghent. He had to resign his position as governor of Holland, because the new Holland Privilege of 1477 demanded that the post be held by a native. His brother-in-law Wolfert of Borssele took over as governor. In February and March Louis commuted between Bruges and Ghent, assisting Mary and defending the interests of Bruges at the meetings of the Estates-General. Louis’ double role was made visible in a remarkable ceremony in the Bruges market square on 7 March 1477, in which the lord of Gruuthuze himself destroyed the Treaty of Arras from 1438.39 This treaty had been imposed on the city after its revolt against Philip the Good, and the Bruges rebels now demanded its annulment. By cutting it into pieces Louis hoped to prevent the city from demanding a new urban privilege, as Ghent had done. Chapter 3 will show that he failed, but the city of Bruges did not lose confidence in him, and appointed him as captain. Together with Adolf of Cleves he was able to calm the guildsmen massed on the marketsquare on more than one occasion, and in the end it was he who presented to the guilds the new urban privilege of Bruges granted by Mary on 30 March.40 By yielding to the rebels’ demands, Louis was able to avert a further escalation of the Bruges revolt, and to assure the court of the city’s help in the war against France. Meanwhile, the court had appointed Louis as ‘first chamberlain’ of the duchess. The political service he performed for the court closely resembled the efforts of Adolf of Cleves. Louis assisted Mary in policy-making, escorted the duchess to her marriage, and became the chamberlain of the young Philip the Fair in 1478. The nobleman also introduced his son John at court, and the young man was appointed to the household of 36 37 38 39 40

Kruse & Paravicini, Die Hofordnungen der Herzöge, 266. Janse, De Hollandse ridderschap, 192–3. Visser-Fuchs, Edward IV ’s grants, 152–5; Vale, An Anglo-Burgundian nobleman, 118–20. Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 124. CAB: PO, 1148. 111

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Mary and Maximilian in November 1477.41 John received the fief of Spiere from his father. Just like Philip of Cleves, John of Bruges fought in the field during the French war. He replaced his father at the end of the year as captain, and led Bruges troops on the battlefield during 1478.42 Shortly before the battle of Enguinegatte Maximilian knighted John, but the young noble was captured by French troops during that battle.43 Back in Flanders, as applied to Adolf, the political and military service of the Gruuthuzes was also matched by their financial practices. On several occasions they lent money to the archduke, who rewarded them in turn.44 Sometimes Louis quarrelled with other courtiers, but he remained a loyal servant of the duchess until her death.45 In their respective posts as governor-general and first chamberlain of Mary of Burgundy, Adolf of Cleves and Louis of Bruges did not, of course, reign supreme over the Burgundian state. State political policy was an uneven conglomeration of the desires, interests, and motives of the representatives to the Estates-General, their leaders back at home, noble factions at court, administrators of the central bureaucracy, and members of the dynasty. The context of politics changed rapidly, causing a faction to become more important, only to lose that influence when circumstances changed. Adolf of Cleves and Louis of Bruges could not make up for the loss of a central coordinator at the top of the state administrative structure. Nevertheless, they tried to put the Burgundian state on the right track, and also, of course, secure their own positions. The actions of Adolf and Louis also had a darker side. After the execution of Guillaume Hugonet and Guy de Brumeu, rumours circulated that Adolf and other influential nobles at court had done nothing to save the former officials of Charles the Bold from the scaffold.46 There are three sources from different origins. The chronicles of Philip de Commynes (at the French court), Philip Wielant (a jurist from the Great Council), and Nicolas Despars (who based his story on a Bruges chronicle), give evidence about the envy that the careers of Hugonet and Brumeu, both ‘rising stars’, had aroused.47 These men, as chancellor and governor of Liège, governed the Low Countries with unlimited authority during the last few years of Charles the Bold’s reign, when the duke was continually away at the battlefield. They had made enemies at court, enemies such as the bishop of Liège, Louis de Bourbon, who had lost authority over Liège to Guy de Brumeu. Pieter of Luxembourg considered both ‘parvenus’ the driving force behind his father’s execution. In addition, the duke of Ghelders had never accepted the conquest of his duchy by Guy de Brumeu. Moreover, according to Philip de Commynes, Hugonet and Brumeu strongly supported the possibility of marriage between Mary of Burgundy 41 SAG: RV, 34323; Gachard, Analectes historiques, 5e série, 117. 42 CAB: SR, 1477–78, 156v. 43 Molinet, Chroniques, I, 313. 44 On 24 June 1478 he lent 2,000 lb. par. to Maximilian (GSAB: OV, I, 619). At the same time he persuaded the city of Bruges to present the newly-born prince Philip jewellery worth 6,000 lb. par. (CAB: MC, 1478, 9v–10r). Mary rewarded Louis with a salary of 64 s. par. per day spent in her service, and on several occasions he received gifts. In June 1480 for example he received together with Olivier de la Marche some confiscated goods of French enemies in Tournai (ADN: B 2121, 416v). 45 At the meeting of the Golden Fleece in Bruges in May 1478 Louis clashed with Josse de Lalaing (Sterchi, Uber den Umgang, 425–6). In May 1477 Jean de Houdempnil seized part of Louis’ castle in Haamstede, but the Great Council confirmed Louis’ right to possession in November 1478 (GSAB: GR, 796, 90r–92v). 46 Paravicini, Guy de Brimeu, 479–85; Boone, La justice politique, 53–4; Haemers, Philippe de Clèves, 24. 47 Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 124; Commynes, Mémoires, I, 392–3; Wielant, Recueil des antiquités, 327. 112

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and the French crown prince. According to the chronicler, both nobles had offered their service to the French king because they realised they would lose power after the death of Charles, their personal mentor.48 If these rumours were correct, the opponents of the French marriage were also political opponents of Hugonet and Brumeu. When the court decided to marry Mary to Maximilian, both of these confidents of Charles lost their last bid for power. Rivals of Hugonet and Brumeu, such as Adolf of Cleves and Louis of Bruges, then allowed their rival parvenus to be executed, as they moved in to fill the power vacuum. It even seems that Adolf and Louis had political supporters in the leading urban networks in the county of Flanders. The records of Ghent trial of Hugonet and Brumeu states that both officials were executed for treason because they had negotiated with the French king in February 1477 without the consent of the Estates. However, Adolf of Cleves, Louis of Bruges, and Wolfert of Borssele had also negotiated with the French king, but the Estates ignored their actions.49 The proceedings show that the rebellious Estates-General of 1477 did not oppose the central position these nobles had assumed at the Burgundian court. In the tumultuous spring of 1477, the rebels thought that Adolf of Cleves and Louis of Bruges would be favourable negotiating partners because of their charisma and their close relationships with Bruges and Ghent. Louis of Bruges was close to the Bruges elite, and the Ghent elite was not hostile to Adolf of Cleves, as the appointment of Adolf ’s governor of the castle of Wijnendale, Jan van Dadizeele, as high bailiff of Ghent in February 1477 shows.50 The tie between the two nobles on one side and the Estates and the new powerholders in the Flemish cities on the other was a marriage of convenience, but it created a solid power base for Adolf of Cleves and Louis of Bruges at the highest level of the state. They did not control the state completely, but the duchess could not avoid involving them in political decision-making. 2.2 The Thorny Position of the Nobility at the Court of Mary and Maximilian 2.2.1 The Victory of Anton van der Vichte, or the Position of the Nobility in the Cities ‘Please accept Willem de Wintere as schout (sheriff ) of Bruges by next Sunday’, Louis of Bruges demanded in a hasty note to the Chamber of Accounts in Lille on 18 April 1479. He was warning its members not to delay any longer in administering the oath of schout of Bruges to Willem de Wintere. In accordance with Maximilian’s new directives about leasing county offices, Willem de Wintere had paid Louis a sum of 1,200 lb. par., the highest bid for the office of schout. In this office, he would be the sheriff of the city of Bruges; the bailiff of Bruges only had judicial power over the surrounding countryside, called the Franc of Bruges. The new schout would restore the office, which had not been producing much income for the state because of the war. Louis was willing to reward the

48 49 50

Commynes, Mémoires, I, 380–1. Wellens, Les Etats-Généraux, 170–2; Commynes, Mémoires, I, 380. See Chapter 1. 113

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members of the Chamber of Accounts if they complied with his request.51 And they did. Shortly afterwards, Willem de Wintere took the oath, and on 28 April 1479 he assumed the office of the schout of Bruges.52 The little note provides witness to the dominant and powerful position Louis of Bruges held during the first years of Mary of Burgundy’s reign. Louis had become a powerbroker. In a typical medieval strategy for building up one’s social networks, he could use his appointment power to reward a client or extend his patronage over whatever candidate he chose to back for the office.53 In return for his appointment, Willem had probably promised to reimburse Louis for the loan that the powerbroker and his son had advanced to Maximilian in 1478. Maximilian had already promised that the two noblemen could request reimbursement from the revenues collected by the Bruges schout.54 However, as the former schout, Anton van der Vichte, had not yet repaid the loan, Louis certainly hoped Willem would do so. In fact, Willem may have already paid Louis. Willem also profited from his appointment, and not only because the office was very lucrative. Some months before Maximilian had forced Willem to resign from his position as bailiff of the ‘Vier Ambachten ’ (the countryside north of Ghent) because Willem had lost a case before the Great Council against his squire Jacob Dheere.55 Since Willem was looking for another office, he had probably consulted Louis of Bruges, who then used his power to help Willem. The alliance had reached its goal, as both patron and client profited from the transaction. However, the former schout, Anton van der Vichte, did not quietly accept his loss of the office. On 6 May 1479 he brought a lawsuit against Willem before the Great Council.56 The development and the outcome of this trial give insight into the thorny position Louis of Bruges found himself in during the middle of Mary of Burgundy’s reign, as power relations at court shifted. Before the Great Council, Anton made two arguments to challenge his dismissal: there was no reason for it, and besides, the appointment of Willem de Wintere had broken the rules. Anton argued that Louis of Bruges had appointed him schout during the turbulent month of February 1477, after the death of Charles the Bold made the position vacant. The former schout, Joost van Varsenare, was a symbol of Charles the Bold’s unpopular rule, and the appointment of a new schout was intended to appease the Bruges rebels. Anton was a descendant of an old noble family from the Franc of Bruges.57 Louis of Bruges had appointed Anton, the former schout argued, because he was a strong military leader and 51 ‘Mes tres honnourez seigneurs, je me recommande a vous tant comme je puis. Pierre de Spierres, mon serviteur porteur de cestes, m ’a presentement rescript que vous faictes difficulté de recevoir le serment de Guillaume de Wintre de l ’office d ’escoutete de Bruges, a cause que [vous] n ’avez veu la descharge des xiiC livres, et afin que soyez bien contens de moy. [...] Et lors je me trouveray par devers vous, je vous adverteray d ’aucunes choses par moyen desquelles monseigneur le duc pourra recouvrer son droit et haulteur ou dit office que nagaires il a perdu en icelle. Et au surplus, je vous prie que au dit Guillaume de Wintre, veuilliez faire expedicion telle que dimence prouchain, il puist estre en sa possession, car, se lors il n ’y est, ce lui portera tres grand prejudice. Et en ce faisant, [vous] me ferez tres singulier plaiser, lequel je recongnoistray voulentiers se vous voulez aucunes choses que pour vous faire, [je] puisse. Escript en haste, le dimence xviiie jour d ’avril, apres disner. Le tout votre, Gruthuse ’ (ADN: B 17728, ‘Wintre’). 52 GSAB: Rk., 13781, 11r. 53 Prevenier, De netwerken in actie, 296; Dumolyn, Investeren in sociaal kapitaal, 437; Blockmans, Corruptie, patronage, makelaardij, 245; Boone, Netwerken in de steden, 257; Damen, Corrupt of hoofs gedrag, 93. 54 GSAB: OV, I, 619. 55 On 27 March 1479 Maximilian informed the Chamber of Accounts that Willem de Wintere had lost a trial before the Great Council against Jacob Dheere (ADN: B 17728, ‘Heere’; Van Rompaey, Het grafelijk baljuwsambt, 629; GSAB: Rk., 14256). It is noteworthy that relatives of Jacob Dheere were at court in those years. His uncle was married to Margriete van Nieuwenhove (Gailliard, Bruges et le Franc, V, 144), the aunt of the receiver of the extraordinary revenues ( Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Michiel) and of the wife of Pieter Lanchals. It seems Jacob Dheere won the lawsuit because he had influential relatives. 56 Two copies of the judgment of this trial have survived (GSAB: GR, 795, 50r and CAB: CA, 2, 285r). 57 He was the son of Olivier and Isabella van Gavere (Gailliard, Bruges et le Franc, II, 154). 114

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could effectively command Bruges troops in the war against France. Anton said that he had declined the post because it was ‘too dangerous and adventurous to serve while the people were in such an uproar in the city’. 58 Moreover, he had told Louis that he did not have enough wealth to take on the office, but Louis had promised him complete protection. Anton had been convinced and accepted the offer. Now, before the court, Anton publicly expressed his puzzlement about Louis’ motivation. Why did Louis want someone else to serve as schout for Bruges, after he had so persistently urged Anton to accept the office in 1477? In his reply, Louis did not deny that he had asked Anton to take on the office of schout. Louis of Bruges was, in fact, acting consistently, because in both appointments (Anton van der Vichte in 1477, and Willem de Wintere in 1479), he was using the same strategy, appointing one of his clients to a key position. Adolf of Cleves used the same strategy when he appointed Jan van Dadizeele, a loyal follower, as Ghent bailiff. Both statesmen were placing their ‘clients’ in the most important cities of the county of Flanders, in order to secure for themselves a means to control events in these cities. This influence could only strengthen their position at court. But why did Louis want to remove Anton from office two years later? Through his son John, Louis responded before court that Anton had only been his second choice. Louis had wanted to appoint his own son as schout in February 1477, but he was forced to chose Anton because the Bruges privileges did not allow a native to serve as schout. In addition, Anton had fallen short of his expectations. Louis accused Anton of corruption, arguing that the former schout had lined his pockets with the proceeds from public office. This had not only severely harmed the course of justice in Bruges, but also damaged the sovereign. By being corrupt, Anton had harmed the authority of the lord. And, moreover, the schout had not repaid the loans made by Louis and John of Bruges. It was better to get rid of Anton, concluded Louis.59 Anton countered with a second argument. By appointing Willem de Wintere as schout of Bruges, Louis had violated proper procedures. Anton did not know about the letter Louis had sent to the Chamber of Accounts, but he was aware that Louis had lobbied the Council of Flanders. Anton did not know precisely how the lord of Gruuthuuze had convinced the Council, but Louis had obtained letters conveying the duchess’ appointment of Willem de Wintere as schout of Bruges from that body. Anton maintained that Louis and his son John had convinced Inghelram Hauweel, the process-server of the Council of Flanders,60 to get the Council to impose a sanction on Anton if he did not hand over the schout accounts. The two nobles had manipulated judicial process in the county, Anton charged. How could the Great Council could tolerate this kind of behaviour? Anton demanded that the situation be rectified, and he promised to lease the office of schout for the same sum that Willem de Wintere had bid. Anton was skating on thin ice. In accusing one of the most powerful nobles in the county of corruption, he risked losing all favour at court. Louis of Bruges himself had sat on the Great Council, and he was then the head of Mary of Burgundy’s personal household. 58 Because it was ‘zeere dangereux ende adventuerlic was te bedienene omme de beroerte van den volke doe wesende in de voorseide stede van Brugghe ’ (GSAB: GR, 795, 50v). Before his appointment as schout, Anton had been captain at the comital residence of Petegem. 59 John of Bruges said ‘dat wel mochte wesen dat vorseide appelant int bedienen ende excercicie van den vorseiden officie hem hadde zeere soberlic ende min dan souffisantelic ghedreghen ende en hadde niet bewaert onse [of Maximilian and Mary] hoocheyt ende heerlicheyt als dat een goet scouteet van Brugghe sculdich es te doene ’ (GSAB: GR, 795, 54v). 60 CAB: SR, 1477–78, 143r. 115

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It is not surprising that the Great Council followed the nobleman’s line of reasoning. The Council rebuked Anton for corruption and misuse of power, and praised Louis because he had tried to restore the authority of the lord in Bruges. The Council concluded that since Anton did not have a leg to stand on, the case would be dismissed.61 But the council did not dismiss the case. Suddenly the trial took an unexpected turn, as Anton was given a chance to reply to the charges made by Louis and John of Bruges. Once more, the former schout denied that he had abused his authority and loudly informed the court that Louis of Bruges had never asked for his resignation. After contradicting all the arguments put forward by his noble opponents, Anton repeated that he still wanted to lease the office of schout. In the February 1477 appointment act, Mary had stipulated that Anton would remain in that office ‘as long as she wanted’ (‘alst ons belieft ’), a clause that Anton interpreted in his own favour. He claimed that ‘the prince can not deprive an official of his office without a cause, because the will of the prince should be governed by justice, honour and virtue, for it is not absolute’. 62 After Anton’s reply, the Great Council decided to consider the case once again. Pronouncing its judgment on 14 December 1479, the Council removed Willem de Wintere, who had already served as schout for seven months, and returned the post to Anton.63 For the second time in a year, Willem was dismissed from a county office and ordered to hand over his accounts immediately. Anton had to pay the same sum for leasing the office, as he had already promised to do, and to repay the loans made by Louis and John of Bruges. Neither noble was punished, but the sentence itself was a serious defeat for Louis. Why had the Great Council reversed its judgment? The document in which the sentence is copied reveals everything. The duke and duchess themselves had intervened in the case. Just before the document pronounces the will of the Great Council, it reads that Mary and Maximilian dictated the sentence.64 The court manipulated the judicial process, but this was not forbidden by the Great Privilege, and, of course, appointment of the schout was a prerogative of the count. Nevertheless, the court intervention is unusual, because it went directly against the sentence that the Great Council wanted to pronounce and was highly unfavourable for both Gruuthuzes. Had Maximilian dangled another favour in front of both noblemen? Or was he trying to diminish the power Louis held in Bruges? As we have seen in the first chapter, Maximilian had adopted a new élan during 1479. He was tightening his grip on the state bureaucracy, and building up military and political power. He appointed two superintendents, tried to undo several stipulations of the privileges of 1477, won the battle of Enguinegatte, and launched a new offensive war against France. Authoritarian interference in the decisions of the Great Council was an act along the same political lines. Maximilian’s primary goal was to extend his political power in Bruges, and Louis and John of Bruges became victims in a series of ducal acts which aimed towards that larger goal in 1479. Maximilian appointed two Bruges citizens as superintendents in April 1479

61 The Council concluded: ‘concluderende mits dese redenen […] dat de voorseide appellant gheseyt ende verclaert zoude wesen qualic gheappelleert te hebbene ’ (CAB: CA, 2, 288v). 62 ‘De prince niet en mochte, onder tdexel van dien, eeneghe van zijnen officieren destituteren van zijnre officie zonder cause, want den wille van den prince behoorde ende was sculdich te zijne ghemodereert in rechte, in eerbaercheden ende in duechden, ende niet absolutelic ’ (CAB: CA, 2, 289r). 63 CAB: CA, 2, 289v. 64 ‘De welke bij ons [Mary and Maximilian] ghesien ende volghende den advise also overghesonden hebben denselven van onsen Grooten Raede voornoemt, wederomme expresselic bevolen bij onsen beslotenen brieven up tzelve proces te pronuncieren onse sentencie ende vonnesse zulc ende in der manieren als hier verlaert staet ’ (CAB: CA, 2, 289r). 116

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not only to appeal to the Bruges financiers but also to gain loyal followers in the leading urban networks. He appointed Anton, who proved to be very loyal, to the office of schout on 14 December 1479. Two weeks later, Maximilian also appointed a new bailiff for Bruges, despite anonymous objections.65 The post had fallen vacant when the old bailiff, Jacob van Halewyn, was killed in the battle of Enguinegatte in August 1479.66 Records do not preserve who else might have been appointed to the office, nor the name of the person or persons who opposed Maximilian’s choice of Roeland van Halewyn, who was appointed bailiff for the city and the Franc of Bruges on 24 December 1479. Roeland was the halfbrother of the late bailiff and of Antoon van Halewyn, formerly Mary of Burgundy’s councillor (who was also killed at Enguinegatte).67 Like Anton van der Vichte, Roeland belonged to a powerful noble family from the Franc of Bruges. He would later become the father-in-law of Pieter Lanchals, who married his daughter in 1486.68 However, Roeland was illegitimate, and the Bruges privileges did not allow a bastard to hold the office of bailiff. Maximilian had to issue a non-prejudice order to the Chamber of Accounts at Lille in order to appoint Roeland to the office.69 Over the course of two short weeks in December 1479, the Habsburg prince had appointed two controversial candidates as the most important representatives of the state in the city of Bruges, over protests in both cases. In this way, Maximilian hoped to increase his political influence in Bruges, and it came at the expense of the influence of the lord of Gruuthuze. Another unforeseen development may have also weakened Louis of Bruges’ position at court. The French king had taken Louis’s son John prisoner at the battle of Enguinegatte in August 1479. After releasing the young man, the king made him a lucrative offer, similar to those the king had offered captured nobles after the battle of Nancy. Louis XI, the ‘roimarieur ’,70 famous for connecting nobles to his court by marrying them to daughters of other supporters, proposed that John should marry Renée du Beuil, a granddaughter of the former king Charles VII and his mistress Agnes Sorel. Louis XI gave John an annual income, the title of seneschal of Anjou, and command of an ordinance troop charged with protecting the kingdom’s borders.71 It is not clear whether John’s adoption of a French career was the cause of the dissension between Maximilian and Louis of Bruges, or the effect of their discord. The French king might have merely wished to weaken his enemy by driving a wedge between Louis of Bruges and his lord. In any case, Louis’ political position was severely weakened during the course of 1479. In February 1477, he had chosen the Bruges schout, but by the end of 1479, he no longer had this power. 65 Maximiliaan wrote on 27 December 1479 to the Chamber of Accounts: ‘obstant que autre, soy disant avoir don de nous du dit office, a desia fait le serement en voz mains ’. The archduke wanted Roeland as bailiff : ‘[Nous] desirons le dit messire Rolant joyr et user du dit office ’ and he hoped ‘que incontinent cestes veues, vous recevez le dit messire Rolant a serement du dit office de bailli, ensuivant nos dites lettres patentes ’ (ADN: B 17728, ‘Halewin’). 66 Molinet, Chroniques, I, 313. After his death, his mother, Jacoba de Vis, took on the office of bailiff (GSAB: Rk., 13709). 67 Maximilian had legitimated Roeland, son of Wouter, in August 1479 (ADN: B 4122, 38r and B 1610, 267r-v). Antoon van Halewyn also was a bastard of Wouter and he was legitimated on 24 January 1477 (ADN: B 1610, 185r). 68 Boone, Lanchals, 472. In September 1477 Roeland joined the court of Maximilian (Gachard, Analectes historiques, 5e série, 119). He received an annual rent of 400 lb. par. from the revenues of the count of Flanders in Bruges (ADN: B 4120, 54v and 4121, 51r). He was bailiff of Bergue-Saint-Winnoc in 1465–7 and of Biervliet in 1468–72 (Van Rompaey, Het grafelijk baljuwsambt, 618 and 644). 69 CAB: CA, 14, 309v. 70 Contamine, Un aspect de la « tyrannie », 433–4. 71 Martens, Lodewijk van Gruuthuse, 117; Van Praet, Recherches sur Louis, 65–7. On 18 March 1480 John married Reneé du Bueil, who was the niece of Louis XI (Cools, Mannen met macht, 179). Or as Philip de Commynes wrote: ‘lequel le dit seigneur maria et feit son chambelan et seneschal d ’Anjou, et luy bailla cent lances ’ (Commynes, Mémoires, I, 494). 117

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Although Louis of Bruges remained the first knight of honour to Mary of Burgundy until her death, his political position at court was seriously damaged after the 1479 trial before the Great Council. It was probably inevitable that those nobles who were most important in Mary’s court of 1477, such as Louis of Bruges and Adolf of Cleves, would come into collision with the new archduke. Since Maximilian had been dispatched to the Low Countries in order to enlarge the ‘Hausmacht ’ of the Habsburg dynasty, it is predictable that he would try to reduce the power of noble rivals at court. By weakening the position of Louis of Bruges, Maximilian not only strengthened his own control over state policy, but extended his influence in Bruges, Louis’ hometown. Maximilian’s supporters, Anton van der Vichte and Roeland van Halewyn, now held the key offices in Bruges and did everything they could to strengthen the archduke’s power over the city. These two noblemen imprisoned Willem Moreel in December 1481, for example. Meanwhile, Louis of Bruges and his supporters, such as Willem de Wintere, slowly lost power in Bruges. The lord of Gruuthuze had protected the dynasty in 1477, and became one of the leading figures of the court, only to be slowly pushed aside by his opponents. Who were these men who opposed him, and why were they favoured by Maximilian? 2.2.2

Noble Dissatisfaction

The disgrace Louis of Bruges suffered in 1479 symbolised the struggle for power between certain nobles from Mary of Burgundy’s court and Maximilian of Austria. There were four reasons why a noble might become dissatisfied at Maximilian’s court, and analysis of these explains the ensuing power struggle between noble factions. First, Maximilian had brought a number of nobles from the Holy Roman Empire with him to the Low Countries. After 1477 they comprised the inner circle of power holders at court, to the detriment of others. Second, the dynasty’s wars alienated some nobles, and the French king did not hestitate to exploit that dissatisfaction. Third, Maximilian’s favouritism towards certain nobles made others envious. Fourth, nobles who were used to exercising power were disgusted at the growing power of so-called ‘parvenus’ at court, particularly when Maximilian used those parvenus to break the power of nobles who had dominated the court after Charles the Bold’s death. Any one of these reasons, or a combination of all four, could provide motive for a nobleman to be dissatisfied with Maximilian’s regime. Although each noble had distinct and specific grievances, some of which will be examined below, in general, nobles were unhappy because Maximilian did not offer them an effective guarantee of protection for their family property and patrimony, their avenues to power, and their social networks. In consequence, whenever an alternative focus of power appeared, those nobles might choose to join the archduke’s opponents, as would happen after the death of Mary of Burgundy. First, I will examine the four causes of discontent, to be followed by the case of Adolf of Cleves and his reasons for choosing the political alternative. 2.2.2.1 Austrian Nobles and Wars Several Austrian-born, German-speaking councillors, advisors, and noblemen came to the Low Countries in Maximilian’s wake. The German emperor had provided a sizeable

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retinue to give his son advice in decision-making.72 Just as the arrival of Philip the Bold in Flanders in 1386 was coupled with the introduction of new (Burgundian) nobles at court,73 the marriage of Mary and Maximilian introduced new faces to the Low Countries. Although the precise degree of influence those councillors had on the young prince is unclear, they presumably advised Maximilian whenever he had to make a difficult decision. The most important German-speaking advisors of Maximilian were George of Baden (a nephew of Frederic III and introduced above), his nephew Christoph (count of Baden), the cousins Maarten and Wolfgang von Polheim, and Veit von Volkenstein. The last named were old friends of Maximilian who spent their entire lives in his service.74 Maarten von Polheim, for example, assumed administration of Maximilian’s personal chamber and finances.75 He also carried out several diplomatic and political tasks, as well as advising the archduke in battle.76 Of course, Maximilian rewarded his personal advisors with gifts, honours and money – just as he rewarded the other ‘Burgundian’ nobles at court. Maarten von Polheim received an annual income from the receiver-general for all finances, and in August 1480 he was awarded the fief of Lumpinen which had been confiscated from William of Arenberg.77 Wolfgang von Polheim, Vijt von Volkenstein, and George of Baden were also given salaries, in Wolfgang’s case because he had served Maximilian ‘since his childhood’. 78 The German Emperor did not have sufficient funds to pay his son’s advisors, so, as we have seen, the Burgundian receiver-general had to finance their expenses. By 1480 this support led to the establishment of a ‘German Chamber’ at court, which on average absorbed 8.13 percent of the total disbursements of the receiver-general. How this money was spent is unclear, and there were protests against this method of financing in 1480.79 Maximilian also gave his loyal councillors honours. Maarten von Polheim, for example, was knighted in the Order of the Golden Fleece in May 1481, an honour which legitimated the power he now held in his new homeland.80 Since reward for loyal service was a normal aspect of relationships between a prince and his loyal entourage, the rewards themselves probably did not offend the older Burgundian nobility. However, the nobility of the Low Countries may have taken offence at the political and personal influence the German-speaking entourage had on the young Habsburg. Maximilian had only been in the Low Countries for one month when he appointed George of Baden superintendent, or supreme controller of the treasury, the most important office in the state at that time. The chronicler Philip de Commynes (who did not like Maximilian) recounts rumours about the pernicious influence Maarten 72 Wiesflecker, Kaiser Maximilian I., 130. 73 Vaughan, Philip the Bold, 212–25. 74 Noflätscher, Räte und Herrscher, 54. 75 ADN: B 2115, 136r–138r. 76 Cools, Quelques hommes de cour, 168–9; idem, Mannen met macht, 280. See also ADN: B 4122, 100r; B 2124, 173v/183v and SAG: V3, 243, ‘1478’). His nephew Wolfgang pursued a career in the ducal army; he was captain of a ‘bande d ’ordonnance ’ (ADN: B 2112, 68064 and B 2129, 69157). 77 ADN: B 2121, 88v–89r and 350r. In 1479 this income was increased to 2,880 lb. par. 78 ‘Pour consideracion des bons loyaulx et coutumelz services qui lui a faiz parcedevant des son enfance, fait journelement en pluiseurs et diverses manieres, et espere que faire luy devra ou temps advenir de bien en mieulx; meismement qu ’il est estraingier et loings arriere des siens et qu ’il n ’a aucune chose pour soy entretenir en son service ’ (ADN: B 2121, 89v). Superintendent George of Baden received an annual income of 8,800 lb. par. (ADN: B 2118, 91v), Veit von Volkenstein 2,880 lb. par. (ADN: B 2124, 73v). Other gifts were confiscated goods, or compensations for harm during the war (ADN: B 2112, 68063; B 2118, 298v, 303r; and B 2121, 443r). 79 ADN: B 17733, ‘Administration Générale’ (see chapter 1). 80 De Smedt, Les chevaliers, 220. 119

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von Polheim and others had on the archduke, who did not know the local habits nor the political traditions of the Low Countries.81 Moreover, Maximilian’s own correspondence to his father bears witness to the debauchery of the young prince and his entourage.82 Whether or not Maximilian’s German-speaking advisors influenced the archduke’s decision-making, powerful nobles at court undoubtedly had a deep distrust of them. Because the exact extent of the political influence of these ‘new’ nobles in the Low Countries is unclear, it is also difficult to determine how significant this cause for discontent became. However, it could only heighten existing tensions. Maximilian’s aggressive military policy also alienated some nobles. Nobles who had supported and counselled Mary in 1477 left the court because they opposed Maximilian’s wars. The prince-bishop of Liège, Louis de Bourbon, found it difficult to digest Mary’s and Maximilian’s assumption of rule in Ghelders, which passed over his sister-in-law, Catherina of Egmond. While Louis was Mary’s relative and a member of her council in 1477, he later switched his support to the rebels in Ghelders and backed the French king against Maximilian.83 The Ghelders conflict also caused John II, duke of Cleves, and brother of Adolf, to join the opposition to Maximilian in that duchy. Unlike his father, John I of Cleves, John II did not support the Burgundian dynasty, even though he had collected an annual salary from the Burgundian court in 1477.84 In the 1480s, John II of Cleves joined forces with John of Montfort, a nobleman who had been banished from Holland for supporting the Hoek faction. In the following years the duke of Cleves and exiled Hollander nobles fought against Burgundian rule in Ghelders and Utrecht.85 War and rebellion in Holland created more enemies, such as the governor of Holland, Wolfert of Borssele, for the archduke. After Wolfert replaced Louis of Bruges, his brother-in-law, as governor of Holland in 1477, he slowly but surely drifted towards the Hoek opposition against Maximilian. William of Egmond, leader of the opposing Kabeljauw party, convinced Maximilian to dismiss Wolfert, and in May 1480 he was replaced by Josse de Lalaing, the former sovereign-bailiff of Flanders.86 Wolfert ended up in the faction which opposed Maximilian and joined the regency council during the Flemish Revolt. As a short-term measure, dismissing Wolfert weakened the Hoek party, but for Maximilian it was in the long run a strategic failure. Maximilian had alienated the most important noble in Zeeland, who also, as admiral, controlled considerable naval power. Moreover, Wolfert had powerful contacts with the French court, because he was married to Charlotte de Bourbon, the niece of Pierre de Bourbon. Pierre, lord of Beaujeu, was the son-in-law of the French king, and after the death of Louis XI, he and his wife (Anne of France) became regents for the minor Charles VIII.87 In his efforts to court the Kabeljauw party, Maximilian had estranged a noble who had the power and connections to make life very difficult for the Burgundian state. But Maximilian did not have many options 81 Commynes did not like foreign policy advisors: ‘tant pour l ’adversité des meurs et conditions que pour les violances, et qu ’ilz n ’ont l ’amour au pays que ont ceulx qui en sont nez, et surtout quant ilz veulent avoir les offices et beneffices et les grans manymens du pays. [...] Le dit duc Maximilian n ’avoit congnoissance de rien, tant pour sa jeunesse que pour estre en pays estrange, et aussi avoir esté assés mal nourry, autmoins pour avoir congnoissance de grant chose ’ (Commynes, Mémoires, I, 442). 82 Wiesflecker, Kaiser Maximilian I., 139–41. 83 Harsin, La principauté de Liège, 66–9. 84 ADN: B 2115, 36r. 85 Van Gent, ‘Pertijelike Saken ’, 338. About Monfort: Damen, The nerve centre, 174–7. 86 Cools, Mannen met macht, 161; Sicking, Zeemacht en onmacht, 38; Van Gent, ‘Pertijelike Saken ’, 256. 87 Labande-Mailfert, Charles VIII, passim. 120

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in Holland. He was facing war on two fronts, in the south against the French, and in the north against rebellion in Ghelders and Holland. He only had enough military power to win one of those struggles. To secure his political position in Holland, his only option was to support one of the two warring factions, and whatever party he chose, the other would concentrate opposition against the court. As a consequence, factional conflict in Holland produced enemies for Maximilian in the northern provinces until the submission of John of Monfort in August 1490. 2.2.2.2 Archducal Favouritism In 1477 many Burgundian noblemen fled to the French court, but Mary and Maximilian made several attempts to keep the remaining nobles at their court by advantageous court ordinances and gifts of annual incomes. Mary’s court ordnance of 26 March 1477, for example, was composed to stop the noble exodus. In November 1477 Archduke Maximilian composed an ordinance for his personal ‘Chamber’, appointing 116 councillors and servants to serve him as the new ‘duke of Burgundy’. 88 This ordinance did not affect the March order, which remained in effect for Mary’s chamber. In addition to the two chambers of the ducal couple, other noblemen, including Adolf of Cleves, received an annual income from the Burgundian treasury.89 And, of course, Maximilian’s German-speaking entourage (which would become the ‘German chamber’ in 1480) also received incomes. The only explanation for the huge number of councillors and servants paid by the court is the desire to favour and to retain noblemen who had stood by the court in the crisis of 1477. The career of Philip of Burgundy (ca. 1450–1498) demonstrates how certain nobles profited from the favours of a court desperate not to lose nobles to its French rival. In order to keep Philip at the Burgundian court, Maximilian gave him exceptional awards. In exchange for his loyalty, Philip of Burgundy was given the opportunity to rise quickly through the political ranks. He was the son of the illegitimate Anton of Burgundy, lord of Beveren, who had switched his allegiance to the French king after the battle of Nancy. In 1464 Anton had granted the fief of Beveren, which he had received from Philip the Good, to his son. Charles the Bold granted the young Philip an annual pension from the treasury in 1467.90 Like his contemporaries, Philip of Cleves and John of Bruges, Philip of Burgundy followed in his father’s footsteps and began a career in the Burgundian army. But when Anton, often called ‘Great Bastard’, was taken prisoner on the battlefield of Nancy, his son was in the Low Countries, fighting against the French as the captain of Saint Omer. Louis XI threatened to behead his father if Philip did not surrender Saint Omer, but Philip remained loyal to the Burgundian dynasty.91 Louis XI continued to dangle favours in front of Philip in order to convince him to switch sides. In July 1478 Louis XI created a new county (Sainte-Menehould) for Anton of Burgundy, which Philip could only inherit if he joined 88 Edited by Gachard, Analectes historiques, 5e série, 117–27. See also Cools, Mannen met macht, 31. 89 Namely John of Cleves (the son of the duke of Cleves), Adolf of Cleves, his son Philip, Jacob van Savoye, Pernot de Sailly, George of Baden, Jacob of Luxembourg (lord of Fiennes), bastard Philip of Burgundy (lord of Blaton), Philip de Croÿ (lord of Chimay) and Denis of Portugal. The president of the Great Council ( Jean de la Bouverie), the members of the financial commission and the presidents of the different Chambers of Account also received an annual payment from the ‘recette générale de toutes les finances’ (ADN: B 2115, 36r–42v). 90 Greve & Lebailly, Comptes de l ’argentier, 80 and 173. A short biography in Cauchies, Bourgogne (Philippe de), 275 and Cools, Mannen met macht, 168. 91 Molinet, Chroniques, I, 195. 121

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the French court.92 In the end Maximilian won the competition, as the favours he offered were apparently more attractive. He appointed the young nobleman governor of the county of Namur and castellan of the comital fortress in the city of Namur in March 1478.93 Philip was knighted into the Order of the Golden Fleece in May 1478, and in 1480 Maximilian appointed him captain of Picardy and Artois.94 The French king had occupied these regions, but Maximilian hoped the appointment would stimulate Philip to recapture them for the Burgundian court. The amount of money Philip received from court is incalculable. From the central treasury (‘recette générale ’) he collected 9,040 lb. par. in 1477, as well as a stipend of 56 groats for each day in service.95 Maximilian’s new court ordinance of November 1477 granted Philip 48 groats a day instead of the stipend.96 Over the next few years, the archduke gave Philip property confiscated from French enemies, and compensation for war damages. In 1480 his annual income was tripled.97 With all these gifts, Philip became a very important nobleman at court, and he did not switch his allegiance to the French king. The successful, but expensive, strategy of Maximilian had achieved its goal. Using this policy Maximilian built up a very wealthy and powerful noble entourage, but there were two negative consequences. Maximilian intensified the tendency of the Burgundian dukes to give a small group of confidants the most important court offices in order to diminish the influence of the cities on state politics.98 He helped to strengthen the growth of a supra-regional nobility, but he also became dangerously dependent on these noblemen, who sometimes dominated policy-making in several areas. Maximilian could not make decisions which contradicted the interests of those noblemen, because he needed them to govern his lands. A second consequence was the rivalry at court which favouring certain nobles over others produced. At the 1481 gathering of the Order of the Golden Fleece in ‘s Hertogenbosch, Maximilian gave favours to certain nobles which were clearly to the detriment of other nobles. Another example happened in August 1480 when Adolf of Cleves protested a favour granted to Philip de Croÿ, lord of Aarschot. Maximilian had given Philip the command of the Burgundian troops in Hainault, but Adolf, as governor of the county of Hainault, argued strenuously against Philip’s appointment. ‘It would be to the detriment of the office’, he claimed.99 The archduke’s favouritism could thus increase tensions at court. Maximilian also made extensive use of this noble-favouring strategy in the county of Flanders, where he was trying to decrease the power of the urban elite. The archduke found this strategy was the only way to counter the dominating networks in Bruges and Ghent. In contrast to the other regions within the Burgundian empire, the Flemish nobility was tightly interwoven with the urban elite, especially in Ghent.100 Maximilian was forced to content with the effects of past policies. During the High Middle Ages, the counts of Flanders had

92 Ordonnances des rois, XVIII, 468. 93 Gachard, Les archives royales, 304–5; Baurin, Les gouverneurs du comté, 94–5. 94 ADN: B 2121, 447v, 588v; B 2124, 69v and B 2128, 68960. 95 ADN: B 17725, ‘Bevres’; B 2115, 39r and 117r. 96 Gachard, Analectes historiques, 5e série, 117. 97 See ADN: B 2118, 96r; B 2121, 447v and 483r-v (he received 10,000 lb. par. for losses in the battle of Vieuxville); B 2121, 87r and B 2124, 69v (raising his annual income); B 2124, 243v; B 2127, 75r and B 2127, 254v (other gifts). 98 Van Uytven, Vorst, adel en steden, 110–1. See also Cools, Aristocraten in de polder, 177–80. 99 ‘Ce seroit a la diminucion totale de son dit etat de lieutenant ’ (ADN: B 2121, 350v). 100 Dumolyn & Van Tricht, Adel en nobiliteringsprocessen, 209–10; Buylaert, Edelen in de Vlaamse stedelijke samenleving, 53–4. 122

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given more power to the cities to weaken the rural nobility.101 Consequently, many noble families moved from the countryside into the cities of Ypres, Bruges and Ghent.102 They intermarried with the urban patrician families, but kept their noble status. This process created a kind of ‘urban nobility’. This urban nobility made political choices based on the interests, discourses, and ideas of their social networks instead of depending on favours from the lord, as the following two cases will show. Maximilian thus lacked sufficient social leverage to break the power of his urban opponents, especially in Ghent. He was more successful in Bruges, because the nobles of the Franc of Bruges were willing to be his political partners. In exchange for favours from the duke, the nobility of the Franc of Bruges supported Maximilian in his attempts to diminish the power of the urban elites, as the case of the De Baenst family shows.103 Maximilian granted several family members gifts, titles and offices in the Burgundian administration. Guy de Baenst, the receiver of the aides in the Westerschelde, became councillor to the archduke, while his nephew Paul was appointed president of the Council of Flanders. The De Baenst family were originally based in the Franc of Bruges, the large rural district around the city of Bruges. Most of the Flemish nobles who received appointments to county administration and supported Maximilian in his slow recovery of state power were from the Franc of Bruges. Sovereignbailiff Jacob van Gistel, for example, was lord of Dudzele, and also held fiefs in Knokke, Sint-Andries, Jabbeke and Varsenare.104 Karel van Halewyn, councillor to Maximilian, was lord of Uitkerke and held other fiefs in the countryside around Bruges.105 Other members of his family who have already appeared in this study – Roeland, Jacob and Antoon van Halewyn – also came from the Franc of Bruges. Joost van Varsenare, the water-bailiff of the Sluis area, held fiefs in Sint-Kruis, Moerkerke, Varsenare, Woumen, Cadzand, Aardenburg, Oostburg, Oostkerke and Maldegem.106 The urban privilege of Bruges granted in spring 1477 removed the Franc of Bruges from its former position as the fourth ‘Member of Flanders’, thus depriving the nobles of the Franc of any influence at meetings of the Members. To regain power, they had to support the archduke and curry political favours. In exchange for their support, Maximilian granted nobles from the Franc offices in county administration, as well as using them to compete with urban powerholders, such as Louis of Bruges, or the Willem Moreel faction. When Maximilian appointed Anton van der Vichte as schout of Bruges and Roeland van Halewyn as bailiff, he intended them to temper the power of Louis of Bruges in his home city and to control the expanding influence of Willem Moreel’s relatives. In September 1480, Maximilian appointed as burgomaster of Bruges Joost van Varsenare, who had lost his position as schout when the rebels threw him out in 1477. The Members of Flanders protested against his 1480 appointment, but in Joost van Varsenare Maximilian gained a loyal supporter, who stuck by his side during the Flemish Revolt.107 When Maximilian assumed power in the city of Bruges 101 Thoen, Landbouwekonomie en bevolking, 447–8; Dumolyn & Van Tricht, De sociaal-economische positie, 10–20. 102 Prevenier, La bourgeoisie en Flandre, 409–10; Boone, Cette frivole, dampnable, 33–44. 103 Buylaert, Sociale mobiliteit, 222–4. 104 GSAB: Rk., 17405, 4v–5r; SAB: BB, 64, 125r, 134r and 222r. 105 SAB: BB, 64, 140r. Other fiefs were in Cadzand, Diksmuide, Sint-Kateline, Sint-Pieters, Sint-Salvators outside Bruges, Wervik, Dendermonde and Veurne-ambacht (CAB: PR, 1492, 104v; SAB: BB, 64, 38v, 40r and 274r; ADN: B 17732, ‘Hallewin’ and B 17735, ‘Halewin’; ULG: Hs 1259, 2v; GSAB: Rk., 17412, 5r; 13710, 30r and 17414, 1r). 106 Haemers, Middelburg na Pieter Bladelin, 223–5. 107 Because the Bruges privilege of 1477 forbade ducal servants from holding political offices in Bruges (ADN: B 2122, 68523). 123

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in September 1481, the nobles of the Franc of Bruges were his willing partners. Sovereignbailiff Jacob van Gistel and Karel van Halewyn, lord of Uutkerke, became burgomasters, and Joost van Varsenare was appointed dean of the parish of Our Lady.108 Roeland van Halewyn, Jacob van Gistel, Anton van der Vichte and Joost van Varsenare arrested Willem Moreel and defended his imprisonment before the Great Council. After this, these noble supporters from the Franc of Bruges formed a political faction. They carried out Maximilian’s plans, and during the Flemish Revolt, joined the archduke’s side. Maximilian was again making use of a tactic often employed by preceding dukes of Burgundy, and nobles from the Franc of Bruges took advantage of the excellent opportunity offered by the state-building project of the Burgundian dukes to gain personal profit, increased power, or a larger patrimony.109 As these nobles joined the Burgundian court and married the daughters of other influential families at court, the nobility became a homogeneous supraregional group. For these reasons, Maximilian’s new faction was already socially interwoven with the court. Roeland van Halewyn, for example, married the daughter of the former chancellor of Burgundy, Pierre de Goux, and Roeland’s daughter married Pieter Lanchals.110 Karel van Halewyn married Adriana de Baenst, a relative of Guy and Paul de Baenst.111 Another relative, Jan de Baenst, was heir to Pieter Bladelin, and Joost van Varsenare was related to Philip the Good’s receiver-general.112 Through these marriages a sort of ‘team spirit’ was born among the supporters of the archduke, who in turn relied upon the faction to increase his own power. Moreover, as the faction or members of its various social networks gained power and influence, the court’s influence also increased automatically. The Burgundian state had been built on this kind of gentle state formation and, just as his predecessors had, Maximilian used his noble faction of supporters to counter the obstructionist cities.113 Maximilian was much less successful with the Ghent nobility. There was no nobility in the countryside around Ghent comparable to the nobility of the Franc of Bruges. Because most Ghent noble families were tightly connected to urban patrician families, there was no political division between the nobility and the urban political elite. Some Ghent nobles were loyal to the Burgundian dukes, and had served Charles the Bold during his reign. However, the rebels of 1477 had beheaded some of these supporters of the deceased duke, and exiled others (see chapter 3). Maximilian did retain a few trusted noble supporters, such as Jacob Donche, Jan van Formelis, Roeland van Wedergrate, Jan van der Gracht and Lieven Utenhove, in the city. Most of them were related to nobles who had supported Philip the Good or Charles the Bold.114 Maximilian gave some of them offices in the state administration, but 108 See chapter 3. 109 See the case of Roeland van Uutkerke (Boone, Une famille au service, 254) and, in general: Buylaert, Edelen in de Vlaamse stedelijke samenleving, 47–8. 110 Lambin, Esquisses historiques, 22–3. 111 Buylaert, Sociale mobiliteit, 221. 112 Haemers, Middelburg na Pieter Bladelin, 223–7. 113 See Prevenier, De netwerken in actie, 317; Blockmans, Beheersen en overtuigen, 28–9; Boone, De la ville à l ’état, 349; Dumolyn, Investeren in sociaal kapitaal, 435–8; Buylaert, Sociale mobiliteit, 231. 114 Jan van Formelis was the son of Simon, councillor of Philip the Good (Boone, Formelis (Simon van), 286 and Haemers, De Gentse opstand, 81–2). The father of Roeland van Wedergrate was executed in 1477 (ibidem, 417). His brother-in-law Lieven Utenhove was councillor in the Council of Flanders (Dumolyn, Staatsvorming en vorstelijke ambtenaren, Lieven Utenhove). Jan van der Gracht was clerk of the city in 1472–76 (Hancké, Conflict en confiscatie, II, 78). Jacob Donche was councillor in the Council of Flanders from 1460 until 1474 and ‘watergraaf ’ of Flanders from 24 June 1468 until 24 June 1480, when he was succeeded by Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Michiel. He was receiver of Flanders for the quarter of Ghent from 1468 until 1471 and bookkeeper for Margaret of York from 1468 until 1482 (Dumolyn, Staatsvorming en vorstelijke ambtenaren, Jacob Donche; Donche, Geschiedenis en genealogie, I, 223–83). 124

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their political influence in Ghent was negligible.115 Of the entire noble faction which had supported Charles the Bold’s policies, only Roeland de Baenst, of the family from the Franc of Bruges, remained a political player in the city after the revolt of 1477. He also disappeared from city politics as tensions increased during Mary of Burgundy’s reign.116 In 1481, when the conflict between Ghent and Maximilian reached a climax, the Ghent city council exiled several more of the archduke’s supporters, such as Jacob Donche, Jan van Formelis and Jan van der Gracht.117 Maximilian’s weak political position and the broad support Ghent’s decisionmakers enjoyed during Mary of Burgundy’s reign explain why a noble faction supporting Maximilian did not grow more powerful in Ghent, as it did in Bruges. In fact, several Ghent nobles went over to the opposition. The most important of these were two cousins both named Adrian Vilain, whose socio-political background sheds light on their reasons for joining the opposition against Maximilian’s policy. Both Vilains had the same grandfather, Adrian Vilain the elder. He had two sons, Martin and Colard. After his death Martin received the fiefs of Rassegem and Temse; Colard received Liedekerke and Gavere. Both named their eldest sons after their grandfather, Adrian (Vilain) of Rassegem and Adrian (Vilain) of Liedekerke. The brothers Martin and Colard Vilain clashed with Duke Philip the Good during the Ghent revolt of 1449–53. After Martin Vilain billeted Ghent troops in his castle in Temse, Philip the Good confiscated that fief and and gave it to his illegitimate son, Anton of Burgundy. But after a long trial before the Parlement of Paris, the duke was forced to back down and return the property. Philip the Good was not able to undermine local support for the Vilain family. Martin had accumulated huge debts, however, and had to sell the fief to the St. Peter’s Abbey in Ghent.118 Adrian of Liedekerke, son of Colard Vilain, also ran into trouble with the Burgundian dynasty, when he abducted Antoinette de Rambures, widow of Guy de Brumeu, on 13 December 1477.119 Adrian’s hope was that this conquest would help him climb the social ladder and acquire the estate of the former governor of Liège, Guy de Brumeu, who had been beheaded at Ghent in April 1477. Guy de Brumeu’s social network, refusing to capitulate, convinced Maximilian to arrest Adrian. Soon after the abduction, Adrian was captured and imprisoned in the castle of Rupelmonde, to the great dissatisfaction of the city of Ghent.120 The Vilain cousins were highly trusted in Ghent and among certain nobles in the county. In February 1477 the rebels appointed Adrian Vilain of Liedekerke to the city’s most important political position, head aldermen of the Keure, the bench of thirteen aldermen who made ordinances, adjudicated disputes, and governed the city of Ghent. He had been the commander of the Ghent troops on the battlefield until his imprisonment in December 115 Jacob Donche was bailiff of Dendermonde from 18 September 1477 until 18 September 1479 (Van Acker, Jacob Donche, 99–100). Lieven Utenhove was councillor in the Council of Flanders until the death of Mary of Burgundy (Dumolyn, Staatsvorming en vorstelijke ambtenaren, Lieven Utenhove). Roeland van Wedergrate was bailiff of Ninove from December 1477 until December 1485 (SAG: RV, 34323 and GSAB: Rk., 14293). Jan van Formelis was bailiff of the ‘Oudburg ’ from March 1479 until June 1481 (GSAB: Rk. 14159, 53r). 116 Buylaert, Sociale mobiliteit, 222. 117 Jacob Donche was exiled on 15 June 1481 because he had insulted the city and aroused anger against the duke, ‘omme hemlieden te bringhene in gramscip van onsen harde gheduchten heere ’ (CAG: 212, 1, 53r). The others were banished because they had violated the privileges of the city (CAG: 212, 1, 50r and 52v). 118 Geerts & Raemdonck, De burcht en de heerlijkheid, 142–45, 187–201 and 333. The abbey received no bargain, as it promised to pay a rent to Vilain. In 1493 the fief of Temse was sold to Roland le Fevre, the receiver-general of Flanders. He built himself a prestigious palace on the fief, a common practice for all of Maximilian’s parvenus. 119 Prevenier, Geforceerde huwelijken, 300; Paravicini, Guy de Brimeu, 503. 120 CAG: 400, 26, 87v. 125

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1477.121 After he escaped from prison in September 1478, he was protected by another noble, Jacob of Savoye, the admiral of Flanders.122 His friends at court pleaded successfully for his pardon in 1479, and in August of that year, he was again elected head alderman, this time for the aldermen of the Gedele, the city’s second highest bench of aldermen who supervised inheritance and guardianship of orphans. At the same time, his cousin Adrian was head aldermen of the Keure. Adrian of Rassegem had made his career in the Ghent army, and Maximilian knighted him for his prowess in the battle of Enguinegatte, and perhaps also to win over the nobleman.123 In August 1481, Adrian of Rassegem was elected head alderman of the ‘Keure ’, leading the Ghent protest against the court’s protection of the murderer of bailiff Jan van Dadizeele. Adrian of Rassegem had also supported the leading Ghent networks in the Willem van der Scaghe affair. All of these conflicts in the county of Flanders widened the gulf between the Vilain cousins and the court. The touchy relationship between Maximilian and the Ghent city government made a reconciliation between the Vilain family and the Burgundian dynasty very difficult. The sovereign was not able to cut through the close ties between the Vilains and the leading Ghent networks, their political partners. The cousins had no desire to sacrifice their strong positions in Ghent and, consequently, the court found it difficult to lure them away. Jan van Dadizeele’s murder only increased the opposition of the Vilains to Maximilian. By protecting a suspected murderer, the archduke revealed his attitude towards Ghent officials. Because the Ghent nobility had solid social connections with the urban elite, and Maximilian had no social lever like the one he employed in Bruges, the governmental policy of archducal favouritism did not reap rewards in Ghent. 2.2.2.3 The Court Ordinance of 1481 and the ‘Parvenus’ at Court. In a desperate attempt to gain influence in Ghent politics, Maximilian had inducted the Ghent bailiff Jan van Dadizeele into the personal archducal household in Spring 1481. Maximilian had already reorganized the court once (in November 1477), but he was now replacing that order with a new ordinance, published on 13 March 1481. Mary’s household remained untouched again. Little is known about this ordinance, the text of which has not survived, and its existence has been overlooked until now.124 It may or may not have spelled out in words the changing power relations at court. Even its author is unknown, although it may well have been Olivier de la Marche, who had written a similar ordinance for Charles the Bold and still served as court steward. However, we can trace some of the consequences this ordinance had for the position of nobles at the archduke’s court. Surviving documents of the appointments of Jan van Dadizeele and Pieter Lanchals as ‘maîtres d ’hôtel ’ give insight into the new structure of the archduke’s court.125 On 1 121 CAG: 400, 25, 106r and 146r (he represented the city in August 1477 when a delegation of the Estates-General welcomed Maximilian into the Low Countries). 122 Prevenier, Geforceerde huwelijken, 300. Jacob of Savoye (count of Romont) was married to Marie of Luxembourg, the daughter of Pieter who was in the council of Mary of Burgundy. His support for the dynasty was rewarded in 1478 with a membership in the Golden Fleece (Cools, Mannen met macht, 290–1; Degryse, De admiraals en de eigen marine, 177; Vaughan, Charles the Bold, 243–5). 123 Fris, Rasseghem, 748; Molinet, Chroniques, I, 323; Mémoires de Jean de Dadizeele, 19 and 86. 124 The anonymous chronicler who recorded the life of Jan van Dadizeele says about March 1481: ‘de hertoghe Maximiliaen dede publyeren zynen nieuwen staet van zynen huuse ’ (Mémoires de Jean de Dadizeele, 23). Paravicini does not mention the ordinance, Ordonnances de l ’Hôtel, 244–5. See also Haemers, Le meurtre de Jean de Dadizeele, 234–8. 125 Mémoires de Jean de Dadizeele, 125–30 and ULG: Vliegende bladen, IV, L7, ‘Lanchals’. 126

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February 1481, one month before the ordinance was issued, Maximilian appointed Pieter Lanchals ‘maistre d ’ostel ’. The appointment specified that the financial commissioner would serve as ‘maistre d ’ostel ’ to Maximilian for four months of each year, from September to December. However, the new court ordinance specified that there would be four ‘maîtres ’; two men would direct the court for a period of six months, and a second pair for the next six months.126 In addition to Pieter Lanchals, Nicolas d’Aveluys, Jean de Lannoy (lord of Mignoval), and Olivier de la Marche were likely the other ‘maistres d ’ostel ’. Olivier was the first ‘maître ’ of Maximilian’s court in November 1477, and remained in the post after 1481.127 Jean de Lannoy was identified as ‘maistre d ’ostel ’ in 1485, and ‘grand maistre d ’ostel ’ in 1486.128 Nicolas d’Aveluys was second ‘maître ’ in November 1477 and was identified in December 1481 as ‘maistre d ’ostel ’. 129 John van Dadizeele received the honour on 5 April 1481 of serving as the ‘substitute’ ‘maistre d ’ostel ’ if one of the four others was unable to serve. The honour allowed him to use the title of ‘maistre d ’ostel ’, but his death in October 1481 prevented him from ever filling the office. There were also four ‘knights and chamberlains’, John van Dadizeele, Jacques Galliot, Jan of Glymes-Bergen, and Charles de Chalon, appointed on 13 March 1481.130 Maximilian had thus confered two offices on Jan van Dadizeele shortly before his death, but these extraordinary favours did not alter John’s plans to support the opposition against Maximilian. Again, the court had failed to manipulate the resistance in Ghent. Another beneficiary of the new court ordinance was Pieter Lanchals, who was also appointed ‘maistre d ’ostel ’. This nomination is an excellent example of the increasing power of ‘parvenus’ at the Habsburg court. Parvenus rose in state administration through their skills in finance, justice, or politics, because in the absence of a developed state structure, there was a need for administrative specialists to carry out policy. Sometimes parvenus even made policy because they knew more than their masters did about certain state functions. Parvenus came from low origins, but the personal gifts and rewards given to them by the sovereign gave them chances to climb the social ladder. They received economic capital which they could use to lead a luxurious, almost noble lifestyle. They could ‘vivre noblement ’. 131 The parvenu even collected social capital, because he often married a noblewoman, or the ambitious daughter of another parvenu or official of the inner circle of the court. A parvenu’s lifestyle, titles and advantageous marriage gave him entrance into the upper class and high society of the town in which he was born. He used the power he held at the state level to favour his relatives in local urban (or rural) politics. Because he was not affiliated with traditional noble or administrative families, the parvenu was loyal only to his master. In short, the parvenu profited from the birth of the modern state as he exchanged his specialized knowledge for upward social mobility. 126 Maximilian let it be known that ‘al hoe wy onlancx int vernieuwen van der ordonnantien van onsen huuse ghestelt ende gheordonneirt hebben vier hoofmeesters die dienen zullen by halve jaeren, twee tsamen ’ (Mémoires de Jean de Dadizeele, 129). 127 Gachard, Analectes historiques, 5e série, 117; Stein, Etude biographique, 188. 128 Cools, Mannen met macht, 251 (1485); SAG: FPR, 216 (1486). 129 Gachard, Analectes historiques, 5e série, 119; Derode, Rôles des dépenses, 396. In 1484 when he was beheaded in Bruges, he was identified as ‘hofmeester ’ (Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 238). 130 Mémoires de Jean de Dadizeele, 24 and 129. All four had belonged to the court since November 1477. Jacques Galliot appears in chapter 1. John of Glymes-Bergen was knighted in the Order of the Golden Fleece in 1478. He belonged to a powerful Brabantine family that would support Maximilian in the Flemish Revolt (Cools, Les frères Henri, 129–30). Charles de Chalon came from the free county of Burgundy; he was the prince of Orange and he was active in the ducal army (Cools, Mannen met macht, 189). 131 De Clercq, Dumolyn & Haemers, ‘Vivre noblement ’, 31. 127

For the Common Good

The appointment of Pieter Lanchals as ‘maistre d ’ostel ’ was the highest recognition a parvenu could attain. The Bruges financial commissioner was the first ‘maître d ’ostel ’ in the Low Countries who was not of noble origin. Lanchals was knighted in 1483, but his appointment as ‘maistre d ’ostel ’ preceded this favour.132 Ten days before his exceptional appointment to the ducal court, Lanchals was appointed as castellan and captain of the castle of Male for the Flemish count.133 As a castellan, Lanchals certainly rose in status and could begin to live nobly, but he did not have enough status to be a ‘maistre d ’ostel ’. In the late medieval Low Countries a ‘new nobility’ of administrators, patricians and burghers had been created to join the ‘old nobility’ of fief-holders, who had been favoured by the Flemish count since the fourteenth century.134 But Lanchals did not belong to either category, but instead came from urban middle class. His abrupt social ascent must have raised some eyebrows at court. If protest against his rise was muted, however, nobles probably found a more important reason for their dissatisfaction in the loss of their own influence at court. The appointment of Pieter Lanchals symbolized the increasing power of the parvenu in state administration and government. Pieter Lanchals was the embodiment of the changed relationship between the sovereign and his officials caused by the increasing technocratic nature of the state.135 In the chapter about the state officials, we have seen that in making policy Maximilian increasingly had to rely on the technical skills and the specialist knowledge of his officials, such as Pieter Lanchals, Willem Moreel and others. As was the case with Roland Le Fevre, another parvenu, Lanchals’ nomination and growing power at court came at the cost of others’ careers. Those who had lost power were very likely to envy or even try to obstruct the parvenu’s career. But it is wrong to characterize the differences between parvenus and nobles as a struggle between groups who were trying to eliminate each other. But nobles did not want to allow parvenus into policy-making positions or prestigious court offices, for they were clearly threatened by the extension of parvenus into areas they felt were their exclusive domains. The parvenu had no interest in ‘fighting’ nobles, and the nobility recognized that the state needed technically-skilled people to carry out policy.136 During the Flemish Revolt, for example, nobles used technocrats to implement the decisions of the regency council. But the council would never turn over policy-making to the parvenus. Maximilian, on the other hand, granted more and more power to his loyal state officials, letting them make financial and probably even fiscal policy in Flanders. When he appointed Pieter Lanchals to the court, Maximilian was even letting a parvenu hold a prestigious position in the court. Louis of Bruges, still first knight of honour to Mary of Burgundy in 1481, now had to tolerate a powerful and ambitious competitor at court. The influence of Pieter Lanchals might be seen as inversely proportional to the power of Louis of Bruges at court. It is very likely that the nobleman wanted to strike out against this change that was so abominable for him and presumably for other nobles at court.

132 Boone, Lanchals, 474. In the fifteenth century the household ‘hôtel ’ of the Burgundian dukes was the playground of the nobility (Paravicini, Structure et fonctionnement, 72–3). The highest offices, such as ‘maître d ’hôtel ’, belonged to the highest nobles (idem, Soziale Schichtung, 128). 133 Boone, Lanchals, 474; idem, Biografie of prosopografie, 10; see also CAG: FLL, 1429 and 1430; ADN: B 4123, 119r. 134 Dumolyn, Nobles, patricians and officers, passim; Dumolyn & Van Tricht, Adel en nobiliteringsprocessen, 221; Thoen, Landbouwekonomie en bevolking, 415. 135 Prevenier, Ambtenaren in stad, 52. 136 ‘La bourgoisie des offices ne demandait pas à détruire sa rivale, mais tout au contraire à être absorbée par elle ’, wrote Bartier about the supposed battle between the nobility and bourgeois state officials (Bartier, Légistes et gens de finances, 290). 128

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Noblemen who had made policy at court in 1477 never intended this type of evolution, and in May 1481 the nobles had an opportunity to voice their grievances. 2.2.3 The Chapter Meeting of the Golden Fleece in ‘s Hertogenbosch, or the Position of the Nobility at Court At the chapter meeting of the Order of the Golden Fleece in ‘s Hertogenbosch in May 1481, the nobility confronted Maximilian with their objections to some of his policies. The reports of this meeting tell us about the protests of the Order against Maximilian, but they do not name the opposition, nor do they indicate whether the new court ordinance was an issue. However, they clearly show that the Order reproached the archduke for the way in which he governed the Low Countries. The Order blamed Maximilian for ignoring the advice of the nobility when he determined policy. He had made decisions without consulting the member nobles, a practice that violated the Order’s statutes.137 The knights supported their complaints with witnesses, who testified that in the battle of Enguinegatte the archduke had not consulted his nobles, and by ignoring the restriction on knights charging the enemy without a direct order, he had seriously and needlessly endangered the dynasty. Moreover, Maximilian, the Order’s head, had violated its statutes by declaring war on the duchy of Ghelders without consulting its member knights.138 Maximilian had also made mistakes in the dynasty’s heartlands, the Order argued, when he repressed the Ghent revolt of 1479 too severely. This was not an ‘honourable policy’ in the knights’ opinion.139 The Order also criticised Maximilian for his favouritism. The sovereign was too quick to accede to the desires of noblemen and had indeed promised the same favours to several different noblemen, which caused many disputes between rival nobles.140 In their multiple complaints, the Order judged Maximilian’s rule quite negatively. In the past, the Order of the Golden Fleece had also sharply criticised the policies of his father-in-law, Charles the Bold. The knights had focused on the duke’s wars, which they claimed had harmed the dynasty, the country, and the duke’s subordinates.141 However, their criticisms of Maximilian were more intense. The young Austrian defended himself by trying to disprove the arguments of the Order, and argued that his policies steered a middle course between several negative alternatives which had undermined the dynasty in the past.142 Maximilian promised to repent, but it is clear the criticism tarnished his reputation and weakened princely authority. The knights rebuked Maximilian for his authoritarian 137 Sterchi, Uber den Umgang, 435–6. Sterchi edited a part of the report, which is cited in the following notes. 138 ‘Aussi a esté parlé du vie article des status de l ’ordre, selon lequel le souverain du dit ordre pour le temps ne doit entreprendre guerres ou autres grandes et pesantes besoingnes, que paravant il ne les ait fait savoir a la greingneur partie des chevaliers freres d ’icellui ordre pour en avoir leur bon advis et conseil, saulf en entreprinses secretes et hastives etc. Lequel article, sauve la reverence de mon dit seigneur le souverain, n ’avoit pas esté bien ensuy de son costé ’. 139 ‘Il se soit fort mis en la subjection de ceulx de Gand, ce qui ne samble pas bien honneste, selon l ’opinion de ceulx qui en parlent ’. 140 ‘D ’aultrepart a esté touchié comment mon dit seigneur donne et accorde souvent une mesme chose a pluseurs, par fois contraires, qui a cause de leur contrarieté ne peuent bonnement sortir leur effect, mais en sourdent debas, questions et proces pluseurs. Ce que messeigneurs du chappitre ne imputent point a mon dit seigneur, ne a sa faulte, mais a l ’importunité des requerans et poursuivans ’. 141 Sterchi, Uber den Umgang, 434. 142 ‘Quant au fait de ceulx de Gand, a respondu et dit mon dit seigneur que ce qui en estoit, il n ’avoit pas fait sans conseil. Bien cognoissoit il que tout n ’estoit pas bien fait, et n ’avoit homme qui onques le lui ouyst priser ou dire que ce fust bon, ne bien fait, mais pour ce qu ’il veoit le peuple de Gand soit enclin a usurper et entreprenre sur lui et sur sa jurisdiction et seignourie, sentant en soy mesmes grande perplexité pour choisir de deux maulx le moins grevable ’ (ibidem, 436). 129

For the Common Good

policy. They clearly wanted to be involved in the state decision-making process, and hoped not to be excluded in the future. Although they did not threaten the rule of the young Habsburg prince, the knights of the Order of the Golden Fleece were clearly reminding him in April 1481 of the conditions on their loyalty to the dynasty. At the chapter meeting of the Golden Fleece in ‘s Hertogenbosch, the knights also attended to two other matters. First, they ejected from the Order the knights who had deserted to the French court and issued a public condemnation. The Order’s verdict charged Philip de Crèvecoeur, Jean de Damas, Jean de Neufchâtel, Philip Pot and Jacques de Luxembourg with ‘treason and disloyalty’. 143 They were deprived of their membership in the Order and ordered to return their necklaces adorned with the Golden Fleece emblems. The chapter decided to paint over the deserters’ coats of arms, which hung in the choir of the church of Saint John of ‘s Hertogenbosch, with the text of the verdict.144 The public humiliation of the condemned nobles was supposed to conjure up a vision of the loyalty the Burgundian nobility owed to the dynasty. However, the knights might have been less intimidated because one deserter, Anton of Burgundy, was not included in the punishment. His son Philip, a member of the Order, perhaps pleaded for mercy towards his father, and Anton’s high birth as the illegitimate son of Philip the Good probably impressed the Order. But, more importantly, Maximilian and his supporters in the Order were doubtless concerned that if they punished Anton, his son might also desert to the French king. Punishing Anton might also have offended other relatives, such as Adolf of Cleves. The Order was in fact quite divided. Adolf of Cleves attended the meeting, but other members were deliberately absent.145 In addition to the six knights who had deserted to the French court, two other Order members stayed away from ‘s Hertogenbosch. They were Wolfert of Borssele, who had been dismissed from his office as governor of Holland one year before, and his brother-in-law, Louis of Bruges. Their pointed absence suggests that both noblemen were lodging a protest against Maximilian as leader of the Order. Louis of Bruges had designated Josse de Lalaing as his representative at the chapter meeting, but this did not prevent the members from ordering Louis to pay a fine and provide a dinner for the entire Order as punishment for his absence. The punishment was light enough to show that the Order did not want to inflame existing differences of opinion into outright conflict, but it did highlight Louis’ political isolation. The Bruges nobleman immediately hurried to ‘s Hertogenbosch, but nothing else is known about his efforts to defend himself at the chapter meeting.146 The Order was very harsh on Wolfert of Borssele, who received a severe denunciation for his contacts with the rebels in Ghelders and the possibility that he had revealed secrets to the French king.147 In contrast to the light treatment given to Louis, the noble from Zeeland was severely condemned and ostracized completely. In its previous chapter meetings, the Order had sometimes reprimanded its members; members urged Adolf of Cleves in 1478, for example, to moderate his lust.148 But the political implications of the 143 ‘Faulse trahison et desleauté ’ as Olivier de la Marche expressed it in his Mémoires (IV, 149). 144 Sterchi, Uber den Umgang, 444–8; de Reiffenberg, Histoire de l ’ordre, 109–11; Wymans, Un témoignage inédit, 73–6; Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 206. 145 De la Marche, Mémoires, IV, 150. 146 De Reiffenberg, Histoire de l ’ordre, 110. 147 Ibidem, 110–1. 148 Sterchi, Uber den Umgang, 427. 130

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1481 condemnations at the chapter meeting in ‘s Hertogenbosch were far more profound. The Order was politically divided, and its sovereign was not able to resolve the tensions. Maximilian received harsh criticism at the chapter meeting of the Golden Fleece in May 1481, but some members obviously supported him, and he continued his autocratic policies, as the murder of Jan van Dadizeele shows. The death of Maximilian’s ‘maistre d ’ostel ’ not only polarised political tensions between the court and Ghent, but it probably also affected knights of the Golden Fleece. Apparently, even an appointment as ‘maistre d ’ostel ’ did not guarantee the ducal protection that it had previously enjoyed. The court protected the principal suspect in the murder, and never issued an order to investigate the case, which must have shocked Adolf of Cleves and others. Since Jan van Dadizeele had been Adolf ’s castellan, he may also have mourned the death. Jan van Dadizeele’s murder affected Adolf in the same way that Anton van der Vichte’s appointment as schout of Bruges in December 1479 had affected Louis of Bruges. Sometimes gradually, sometimes abruptly, the autocratic archduke was turning against the nobles who had protected the dynasty in 1477. The Habsburg prince supported the opponents of the former guardian angels of the dynasty and made decisions that diminished their power at court and/or in their hometowns. Maximilian, his officials, and those nobles that sympathized with him made it clear that they would not longer put up with the dominant position of the high nobility in state decision-making. At the end of 1481 some of the disaffected nobles joined forces. 2.2.4

Forming a League: The Marriage of Anne of Borssele (1481)

On 4 November 1481 Adolf of Cleves and Wolfert of Borssele concluded a marriage contract uniting their heirs, Philip of Cleves and Anne of Borssele. For both noble fathers, the primary reason for the marriage contract was to secure and enlarge their family patrimony. In addition, I argue that Adolf and Wolfert had political motives for joining their heirs in marriage. The families had been involved in a dispute which both men now wished to settle. Adolf was married to Anne of Burgundy, an illegitimate daughter of Philip the Good and the widow of Frank of Borssele, lord of Brigdamme and a relative of Wolfert. After Frank’s death in 1468, his heirs instituted legal proceedings against Anne because she was still controlling Frank’s fiefs of Brigdamme, Zoutelande, and Sint-Laureins. The heirs, including Wolfert, filed suit against her in the Parliament of Mechelen, and when that court was abolished in 1477, the case was transferred to the Great Council.149 Now Adolf and Wolfert wished to settle the lawsuit amicably, ‘in a friendly way’, by a marriage between their heirs.150 Since the marriage would combine the estates of Anne of Burgundy, Adolf of Cleves and Wolfert of Borssele, the court proceedings could be dropped. The families celebrated the betrothal (‘ondertrouw ’) in November at Vere with a glorious presentation of their entrance into a friendly alliance.151 The marriage was well worth a grand party. The two nobles had concluded a farreaching economic and social alliance. Both were at an advanced age (Wolfert was 51, 149 GSAB: GR, ‘Aanzienlijke geslachten’, B, 155 and ‘Processen in eerste aanleg’, 2678. 150 The marriage was contracted ‘verleken ende vriendelicke ’. It is edited by Haemers, Philippe de Clèves, 84–7. See also idem, Adellijke onvrede, 203–6 and Henderikx, Cartularium van de heren, 13. 151 Van Gent, ‘Pertijelike Saken ’, 374–5; Sicking, Zeemacht en onmacht, 39 and 254. An ‘ondertrouw ’ sealed an engagement between two possible partners. A valid marriage contract had to be made before the engagement (Vleeschouwers-Van Melkebeek, A la recherche, 37–8 and Monballyu, Costumen van de stad, 152). 131

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Adolf 56) and the marriage between their heirs would secure their estates. The heirs, Philip, Anne, and their future children, would govern a gigantic patrimony which would make them the most important nobles in the Low Countries. The patrimony included the strategic fiefs of Ravenstein on the Maas and Vere, located where the Scheldt estuary meets the North Sea.152 Other holdings were spread across the core of the Low Countries, in Flanders, Holland, Zeeland, and Brabant. The marriage union brought together several important fiefs on the isles in the Scheldt estuary, namely Dreischor, Duiveland, Brigdamme, Vlissingen, Domburg, Zandenburg, Brouwershaven, Westkapelle and Vere. These lands gave the future couple both strategic and economic advantages, as the isle of Walcheren had several ports, and the fiefs produced much revenue and even more rights and privileges. The marriage also conveyed considerable ‘social capital’. The combined social networks of the lords of Vere and Ravenstein launched Philip and Anne into the highest noble and even royal circles. The lords of Vere had political connections with the English king, in addition to the social connections with the French king outlined above. And of course, as with all noble marriages in the late medieval Low Countries, the matrimonial alliance between the families of Cleves and Borssele also had political consequences. Adolf of Cleves and Wolfert of Borssele held many honourable titles and political offices. Adolf was governor and lieutenant-general of Hainault, and councillor and chamberlain to Maximilian and Mary. Some of his offices, such as the governorship of Hainault, were hereditary, passing from father to son. Wolfert was the admiral of Zeeland and lieutenant-general of the Burgundian navy. Traditionally, these were hereditary titles, meaning that Philip would likely inherit them as well. Philip of Cleves himself had already built up a military career in the ducal army and with the marriage his political future was assured. Using the isles in Zeeland as their base, the couple came to possess political and military power that no ruler in the Low Countries could ignore. Philip of Cleves became one of the most important nobles in the region, and in the future, the reigning (arch) duke of Burgundy-Habsburg had to secure Philip’s support to govern the Scheldt area effectively. Adolf of Cleves and Wolfert of Borssele had followed the traditional noble strategy of marrying into other noble families to secure the family’s future. The Burgundian dukes also favoured intermarriages between noble families from different regions because the unions created a supra-regional nobility which in turn strengthened ducal power in the Low Countries.153 But Maximilian played no role in the marriage between Philip and Anne, which shows that the Burgundian dynasty often was not the initiator of noble marriages. The nobility in the Low Countries had a sense of common loyalty and belonging, the same spirit that had prevented many of them from deserting to the French king in 1477. Marriages sealed the cooperation between nobles who owned land all over the Low Countries, and the high nobility did possess a certain kind of Burgundian identity. In this sense, the Burgundian dukes had been successful. On the other hand, the absence of court influence in the marriage contract between Philip of Cleves and Anne of Borssele reveals that major nobles were bypassing the court and forming opposition alliances. The solidarity between Adolf of Cleves and Wolfert of Borssele was clearly stimulated by the political situation 152 Van der Ree & Scholtens, De grensgebieden in het noordoosten, 55–7; Sicking, Zeemacht en onmacht, 33–40. 153 Blockmans & Prevenier, De Bourgondiërs, 144; Paravicini, Invitations au mariage, 33–7; Buylaert, Gevaarlijke tijden, 326–7. 132

Chapter 2 The Nobility

in the Low Countries. Wolfert of Borssele had been replaced as governor of Holland, and Adolf of Cleves no longer had the same political influence as he had held in 1477. Louis of Bruges also played a role in Philip’s and Anne’s marriage contract, a signal that he had also joined the new alliance. He was Wolfert’s brother-in-law and witnessed the contract as one of the noblemen from Zeeland. By strengthening his ties to Adolf and Wolfert, Louis was probably trying to recoup his political prestige, as the new alliance accumulated economic, social and political power. The alliance established each nobleman back in the most powerful noble circle, as well as brightening the future of each family. Maximilian could not ignore the alliance which the three noblemen created in 1481, because of its considerable power. The archduke had to ply the three noblemen with favours, or he would lose control over many strategically important, wealthy fiefs. Moreover, the alliance was closely connected to the French court. Wolfert was married to a relative of the French king, and both Louis’ son and Adolf ’s half-brother belonged to Louis XI’s royal council. Although the three allied noblemen did not intend to desert to the French court, the political connection with France seriously threatened Maximilian’s political position. In the past the Flemish cities had used their feudal bond with the French king to counter his vassal, the Flemish count. These occasions allowed the French king to use his feudal power to interfere in Flemish politics.154 This new noble alliance might use the same political and social connections to the French court to form a united front against Maximilian. The three noblemen were hesitant to contact Louis XI, because the interference of the French king in Burgundian politics would strengthen his power in the Low Countries. But we can assume that Louis XI, and members of his royal council, closely followed events in the Low Countries. The ‘French connection’ of Adolf, Wolfert, and Louis was a mighty political weapon to use against Maximilian, if needed. But the intention of the marriage of Philip of Cleves and Anne of Borssele in 1481 was not to form an alternative to Burgundian rule, like the noble ‘leagues’ of the sixteenth century. In the French ‘Fronde’ and the Dutch Revolt, noble alliances existed in order to challenge royal (French or Spanish, respectively) power.155 The alliance of Adolf of Cleves, Wolfert of Borssele, and Louis of Bruges became a ‘league’ after Maximilian was rejected as regent for his minor son during the Flemish Revolt, but in 1481, it was not designed as such. The noblemen wanted to secure the future of their family in a period in which their power was decreasing. The marriage was also motivated by dissatisfaction with archduke’s decisions, but the nobles certainly hoped to reconcile with the court. The political gap between Maximilian and these nobles was not nearly as deep as the gulf between Ghent and the court. Louis of Bruges even proposed negotiating an agreement between Ghent and Maximilian in the beginning of 1482.156 But the Order meeting at ‘s Hertogenbosch in May 1481 made it clear that some nobles at court would no longer support the autocratic methods Maximilian employed to rule the Low Countries. The marriage between Philip and Anne united the forces opposed to Maximilian. This political alliance wanted to correct governmental policy, and it would seize the opportunity to take power during the Flemish Revolt.

154 Blockmans, La position du comté, passim; Boone, Diplomatie et violence d ’Etat, 7–16; Dauchy, De processen in beroep, 307–8. 155 Jouanna, Le devoir de révolte, 368–77; Van Nierop, The Nobles and the Revolt, passim. 156 Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 215. 133

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Illustration 9: Adolph of Cleves Serves the Dukes of Burgundy at a Banquet in his Castle (ca. 1485, ‘The Marriage at Cana’; National Gallery of Victoria, Melbourne). 134

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2.3

Conclusion

During the reign of Mary of Burgundy the nobility behaved as it did in other political crises. In the first place, the Burgundian nobles wanted to protect their family patrimonies and maintain their privileged positions in society. As long as the central government maintained conditions conducive to guaranteeing these noble desires, it could count on the support of the nobility. In spite of their grievances against the policy of Duke Charles the Bold in 1477, most of the nobles remained loyal to the Burgundian dynasty when the duke died. The dynasty had over the past decades built up a strong relationship with the nobility in the Low Countries. The landed holdings of nobles such as Louis of Bruges and Adolf of Cleves were too sizable and widespread to do without the protection of a central power. The nobility would only choose another defender for its interests if that defender could offer a comparable guarantee. The French king offered such a guarantee to some nobles in 1477 when he gave deserters even better positions at his court. The city of Ghent provided another alternative for the Flemish nobility, and some Ghent nobles, who were thoroughly integrated into the Ghent elite networks, chose to join those networks and oppose the central state. Because the city could guarantee protection and power to these nobles, it could count on their support. After 1477, the Burgundian state was too weak to use force against those who abandoned or resisted the court. Nevertheless, it still possessed the means, prestige and authority to position itself as the principal protector of the noble interests in the Low Countries. But dissatisfaction grew among the nobility during Mary of Burgundy’s reign. Because the nobility had profited from the vacuum of power at court in 1477, the new duke, Maximilian of Austria, ran up against a powerful noble presence within the court. Since the archduke wanted to strengthen his own ‘Hausmacht ’, he had to weaken the position of the most important nobles at court – which probably also gained him the support of many other sympathizers. Maximilian tried to constrain the power of the two guardian angels of the dynasty, Adolf of Cleves and Louis of Bruges, by increasing favouritism to other nobles during Mary of Burgundy’s reign. Maximilian appealed to loyal servants, parvenus, and nobles who were prepared to accept centralised government, in order to break the power of the mighty nobility at court. In the central power’s quest to extend the state monopoly of force and increase state income, it had to eliminate competing power centres.157 But as a consequence, Maximilian lost the support of an important segment of the nobility, which had traditionally supported the centralizing efforts of the Burgundian dukes throughout the fifteenth century, as allies in the attempt to diminish the power of the Flemish cities. But, for the first time in this century, the Burgundian nobility was now divided, and an important group of nobles had become alienated from the court. Maximilian could not cover his loss of social capital among the nobility by increasing his support in the cities. On the contrary, the amount of social capital held by the Burgundian state steadily decreased. The Flemish Revolt would prove the ‘social bankruptcy’ of Maximilian’s court quite thoroughly. The nobles who lost power during the reign of Mary of Burgundy obviously wanted to regain it. Maximilian’s wars and his policy of favouring Austrians and lesser nobles, such 157 Blockmans, Voracious states, 750–2; Boone, Elites urbaines, 83–5. 135

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as those from the Franc of Bruges in Flanders, made more enemies. The nobles who opposed the policy of Maximilian believed in a different sort of government, one in which nobles were involved in the decision-making process.158 During Mary’s reign there was not yet a ‘national reflex’ of the nobility against their diminished influence in state decision-making, in the sense that Pirenne categorized noble opposition in the sixteenth century.159 But the noble dissatisfaction with autocracy was clearly manifest during this period. The alliance which Adolf of Cleves, Wolfert of Borssele, and Louis of Bruges formed at the end of 1481 was primarily intended for social reproduction of noble family power. However, this alliance would acquire a second function when it took advantage of a moment of weakness for the dynasty to launch itself to power.

158 See also Haemers, Adellijke onvrede and idem, Opstand adelt? 159 Van Uytven, Crisis als cesuur, 433–4. 136

CHAPTER 3

The Cities

3.1

Bruges

3.1.1

The Faction of Willem Moreel

On 11 December 1481, on the order of Maximilian of Austria, the Bruges bailiff imprisoned Willem Moreel and Jan van Riebeke. Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas was confined under house arrest. At the trial, Maarten Lem, Jan de Boot, and Jan de Keyt defended the three accused. In this situation, the three defendants and their three defenders were behaving like a ‘faction’. A medieval faction was an informal institution with no apparent statutes. It was a more or less spontaneous society, comparable to modern influence or pressure groups. Jacques Heers, Wim Blockmans, Jeremy Boissevain and others describe factions as not having clear-cut recruitment rules, nor demarcated boundaries, but that the mutual affection between members was general in factions.1 Factions by their very nature are dynamic, for they are built up out of personal relations and informal ties, which are highly fluid. In short, an amorphous cluster of social capital united the members of the faction, which created mutual trust among themselves. This social trust facilitated the transaction of economic goods in a faction. Social capital channelled information, it was crucial to keep political secrets in the faction, it excluded non-members, and it generated social connections, such as marriages, between the members. A faction defends specific political ideas, but lacks a defined political program and a stable organisation. Power relationships in a medieval town shaped a faction, which had only one goal, to struggle for power within the city. When a faction, such as the one formed around Willem Moreel in 1477, seized control of public offices in a city, it would always try to monopolize power and hold on to it as long as possible. However, in December 1481 Maximilian abruptly removed the faction of Willem Moreel from political power. In what follows I will investigate how the Moreel faction was formed during Mary of Burgundy’s reign, and who belonged to it. In addition to the urban background of Willem Moreel and other faction members, urban protest against state policy forms the context in which this faction grew. I use the term ‘faction of Willem Moreel’, but the faction was not his property, and he was not its leader. There was no strict social hierarchy in Moreel’s faction. Willem Moreel was certainly one of the leading figures of the faction, but he did not rule over it like Lorenzo and Cosimo de’ Medici ruled over their faction in Italy at the same time.2 The Medici faction in Florence had at its core the members of a single family and the ‘godfather’ of the faction, the ‘pater familias ’, decided matters of life and death for all family members. Willem Moreel could not. The faction of Willem Moreel was not a centralised network, like the one of Cosimo de’ Medici, in which the patron directly linked 1 Heers, Parties and political life, 10–1; Blockmans, Vete, partijstrijd en staatsmacht, 21–9; Boissevain, Friends of friends, 192–205. See also Haemers, Factionalism and state power. 2 Martines, April Blood, passim. See also Padgett & Ansell, Robust action, 1278. 137

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the clients of the network to his person. Members of Moreel’s faction were tied together more by mutual social contacts, and all were on the same rung of the social ladder. Several social ties between the members of the faction already existed before the revolt, but the political events during the revolt and Mary of Burgundy’s reign really shaped the faction. The social nucleus of the faction of Willem Moreel consisted of a limited number of relatives, i.e. the six persons mentioned above (Willem Moreel, Maarten Lem, Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas, Jan de Boot, and Jan van Riebeke), and several distinct social networks. Multiple social ties bound the members of the faction together. As already mentioned, Jan de Keyt was the brother-in-law of Willem Moreel, and Maarten Lem was the brother-in-law of Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas. The nucleus of the faction was a group of ‘friends and relatives’ (the so-called ‘vrienden ende maghen ’ in medieval Dutch). This medieval terminology identifies the inner circle of relatives and close friends who protected a person at the most difficult moments of his life.3 This group of ‘friends and relatives’ gave a person social, judicial and/or financial support in times of need – and also in times of political uncertainty, as the events of Willem Moreel’s imprisonment prove. The precise composition of the group differed from person to person, but an analysis of the Ghent social networks in the middle of the fifteenth century demonstrated that members of the urban elite surrounded themselves with their richest and most powerful relatives as their group of ‘friends and relatives’. 4 During their imprisonment, Willem Moreel and Jan van Riebeke also sought support from their relatives and friends at the top of the Bruges political and economic elite because these people had the necessary financial means to pay the bail as well as large groups of followers in the city. The following analysis of social networks, economic status, and cultural background of the nucleus of Moreel’s faction shows that these six persons belonged to the rich merchant groups that governed Bruges during Mary’s reign. Gaps in sources and lack of genealogical information precludes the recovery of all the social connections among faction members, but what remains shows much about the social composition and background of one of the most powerful factions of this period in Bruges. The urban elite of the city of Bruges were bound together by ‘trade endogamy’, in a similar fashion to the elites of late medieval Douai and Ghent, because merchants and tradesmen married within their social class and even within their trades. Dealing with relatives generated trust between trade partners, protected companies from the risks of international commerce, and consequently lowered transaction costs for trade.5 Merchants created economic ‘clusters’ around a nucleus of relatives, as the example of Willem Moreel’s own trade company shows. Moreel’s company included his brother Lieven, his brother-in-law, Jan de Keyt, his son-in-law, Boudewijn van Heldinghe, and his brother-in-law Denijs van Hertsvelde. Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas, who was confined under house arrest in December 1481, also belonged to a social network bound together by trade endogamy. Jan came from a wealthy family of merchant brokers, one of the most influential professions in Bruges’ international trade. From their positions as innkeepers (the meeting places of merchants) in most cases, brokers mediated and arbitrated between local and international merchants in the city markets of Bruges – and sometimes joined 3 4 5 138

Carlier, Solidariteit of sociale controle, 72–5; Danneel, Vrienden en magen, 35–8; idem, Weduwen en wezen, 131–40. Haemers, De Gentse opstand, 94–8. Howell, The social logic, 194; Haemers, De Gentse opstand, 85–6.

Chapter 3 The Cities

trading companies.6 On several occasions Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas defended foreign merchants in local courts and made payments to merchants on the orders of other merchants.7 Jan’s father Klaas and his aunt Apoline had married into another family of merchant brokers, the Metteneyes. Apoline’s sons, Jacob and Denis Metteneye, were active in the Bruges international trade.8 Jacob Metteneye was married to Adriana Heghels, who was probably related to Maria Heghels, the wife of Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas.9 Klaas van Nieuwenhove had built up a huge socio-economic network by marrying his children to wealthy merchants and influential brokers. Jan’s three sisters were wed to wealthy merchants, Maarten Lem, Arnoud Adornes and Cornelis Breydel. As we have already seen, Maarten Lem headed a successful company which sold Portuguese sugar in Bruges. Cornelis Breydel, married to Klaas’ daughter Margaret, came from a rich family of butchers.10 Arnoud Adornes, son of Anselmus Adornes, belonged to a wealthy Genoese merchant family that had integrated itself into Bruges high society.11 In addition to the extensive network of Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas, two other defenders of Willem Moreel, Jan van Riebeke and Jan de Boot, belonged to wealthy merchant families. Jan van Riebeke was a broker who had twice been dean of the brokers guild.12 There were also brokers in Jan de Boot’s family. His brother Cornelis was dean of the brokers at the time when Moreel was arrested, and it is likely that a relative of his married the uncle of Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas.13 As this brief review of connections shows, the men in the nucleus of the Moreel faction belonged to powerful economic and social networks, in which relatives traded and acted together. Because the faction nucleus included several social networks, rather than one family, there was no ‘pater familias’ ruling over it. But its composite character did not preclude a high degree of solidarity between the members of the faction.

6 A general overview of the tasks and duties of the Bruges brokers: Van Houtte, Makelaars en waarden, 19–31. 7 See, for example, the trial of Nicolas Bertram (Paviot, Les Portugais, 114–6), and of Thomas Picanul and Lazaro de Lommellini (CAB: MC, 1474–75, 32v). In March 1475 Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas acted as a broker in the sales contract for oil and sugar between Antonio Fernandez and Jan Nutin (SAG: RV, 6832). His relatives Jacob Metteneye and Cornelis Breydel were his sureties in 1475 (CAB: MC, 1475–76, 4r). 8 See Paviot, Les Portugais, 113, and CAB: SR, 1479–80, 167v. About the genealogy: Gailliard, Bruges et le Franc, IV, 87–90. 9 CAB: KV, 828bis, 253. Gailliard, Bruges et le Franc, IV, 90 and 171. 10 He was chief of the butchers in 1479 and 1483 (CAB: RW, 1468–1501, 103r and 136r). About the Breydel family: Lambert, Over carrière, promotie, 214–6. 11 Gailliard, Bruges et le franc, I, 319. However, after the death of his wife Agnete van Nieuwenhove in 1479, he chose to become a priest (Geirnaert, De Adornes, 33). About the economic activities of the Adornes: Paviot, Les Portugais, 98 and Geirnaert, De Adornes, 31. 12 From September 1476 until April 1477 and from September 1480 until September 1481 (Van den Abeele & Catry, Makelaars en handelaars, 138–9). About his economic activities: CAB: WR, SJ, 6, 28r; CAB: Fonds makelaars, cartularium 1, 60v–62v). 13 Jan de Boot traded in cloth (CAB: SR, 1476–77, 143v and 147r). About his brother: Van den Abeele & Catry, Makelaars en handelaars, 139. Barbara de Boot fa. Jan was married to Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Jan, the brother of Klaas (Gailliard, Bruges et le Franc, IV, 87). 139

For the Common Good

Illustration 10: Willem Moreel, Protected by his Patron Saint, on a Triptych He Ordered for his Funeral Chapel in the Church of St. Jacob in Bruges After Receiving Death Threats in 1485 (1485, ‘Moreel triptych’; Groeninge Museum, Bruges). 140

Chapter 3 The Cities

The faction of Willem Moreel controlled a significant amount of social and economic capital in late medieval Bruges. These merchants invested their profits from trade in land, movable property, and luxury items. Jan de Keyt, for example, possessed several fiefs and rents in Bruges and the countryside.14 His son ( Jan de Keyt fs. Jan) owned 60.2 hectacres of farmland in the former watering of Blankenberge, the largest ‘watering’ (a complex of drainage canals and dikes) around Bruges in 1513.15 Jan van Riebeke owned a farm called ‘Ten Poele ’ in Westkapelle.16 In 1484 or 1485 he bought a fief in Leffinge from Jan Breydel and acquired another in Sint-Laureins in 1488 or 1489.17 Both Maarten Lem and Willem Moreel owned luxurious residences, described above. The latter also possessed land around Bruges, and his wife had ownership rights in a number of houses in Antwerp, which would soon become the central trade market for the Low Countries.18 Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas lived in the magnificent house named the ‘Casselberg ’ on the Hoogstraat near the city hall of Bruges.19 He owned houses and land in Maldegem, Adegem, and Eeklo, and the fiefs of ‘Nieuwenhove ’ and ‘Nieuburch ’ in Oostkamp.20 In 1467 Philip the Good had given his father, his brother-in-law Guillaume Hautain, Christoffel Buridaen and Ghijsbrecht Hysson the right to dike land in Boekhoute.21 Jan owned annuities on the Bruges toll revenues, and on fiefs in Woumen paid by Joost van Varsenare.22 Jan purchased the fief of ‘Moerseke ’ at Sint-Pieters near Bruges in 1483 and in March 1500 he acquired the castle of Koekelare.23 Like the Ghent elite, the Bruges elite owned extensive tracts of land both inside and outside the city, for reasons of prestige and economic security.24 And, of course, all these people acquired luxurious objects, as the portraits of Willem Moreel painted by Hans Memling so graphally prove. The faction members were deeply immersed in the religious and cultural life of Bruges.25 The ‘friends and relatives’ of the three men whom Maximilian attacked in 1481 were wealthy people who had considerable prestige and important positions in the city. What social capital did the faction leaders command? At their trial before the Great Council in February 1482, Willem Moreel, Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas, and Jan van Riebeke each designated four sureties, who, as we have seen, had multiple social connections to the defendants.26 Further exploration of the sureties’ social backgrounds 14 As a rent on the Brugian ‘spijker’, the ‘dienstmanscepe ’ of Moerkerke, Oostkerke and Dudzele and smaller rents on the so-called letters of Jacob Rinvisch (SAB: BB, 64, 14v; ADN: B 17732, ‘Keyt’). 15 SAB: Blankenbergse watering, nr. 183. 16 SAB: BB, 64, 112v; GSAB: Rk., 13793, 4v. 17 SAB: BB, 64, 172v; GSAB: Rk., 17398, 2r and 17406, 3r. His father owned a house in Antwerp (Asaert, Gasten uit Brugge, 35). 18 Namely the houses ‘Galissien ’ and ‘Den Keghelaere ’ in the Brasseriestraat (CAB: PR, 1494–5, 99r). 19 CAB: KV, 828bis, 253. 20 CAB: PR, 1485–86, 49r; Dewitte, Jehan Adourne, 158; SAB: BB, 64, 264r; GSAB: Rk., 13709, 46r and 13795, 3r. 21 Gottschalk, Historische Geografie, I, 84. 22 Totaling 200 lb. par. (SAB: BB, 64, 21r-v; GSAB: Rk., 13709, 81r and Rk., AL, 44, E, document from 3 November 1477). 23 SAG: RV, 7512, 89r; GSAB: Rk., 13710, 83r–84r; 17398, 1v; 17414, 3r and SAB: BB, 64, 205r. 24 Boone, La terre, les hommes, 160–6. 25 Jan de Boot was warden (kerkmeester) of the church of Saint Salvator in 1482 (CAB: PO, 1185) and a member of the guild of the Holy Blood in 1488 (CAB: CSK, 1487–88, 135r). Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas was a member of the confraternity of the White Bear and guardian of the hospital of Saint Julian (Van den Abeele, De Witte Beer, 144). In 1484 he was the guardian of the guild of the Dry Tree (CAB: KV, 828bis, 102), and in 1488 he was a member of the confraternity of the Holy Blood (CAB: CSK, 1487–88, 135r). In 1494 en 1496 he sold land from the church of Saint Anne in Sint-Kruis to erect a new church (SAB: Archief van de Sint-Annakerk, 35–6). 26 Namely Denijs Metteneye, Antoon van Nieuwenhove, Maarten Lem and Cornelis Breydel (sureties of Jan van Nieuwenhove); Jacob van Riebeke, Pieter Bultinc, Jacob Sey and Jan van Raveschoot (sureties of Jan van Riebeke); Denijs van Hertsvelde, Maarten Lem, Boudewijn and Hendrik Heindrickx (sureties of Willem Moreel). 141

For the Common Good

reveals much about the social capital of the three defendants. All sureties belonged to Bruges elite families, and all were wealthy, because they had to come up with the bail money before Moreel and his companions were released in February 1482. Background information exists for all of the sureties except Jacob van Riebeke, for whom we only know that he might have been a broker, as his son was. Jan van Raveschoot and Jacob Sey belonged to the brokers’ guild, and held several positions in guild administration.27 Pieter Bultinc worked as a tanner and merchant.28 Antoon van Nieuwenhove, brother of Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas, was a member of the soapmakers’ guild, and served as their dean in 1479–80.29 Boudewijn Heindricx was the bookkeeper for a trade company (‘coopmanscepe ’) that also included Alexander Moeschroen, Colard Mesdach and Robert le Gaigneur.30 After Boudewijn’s death, his son Hendrik, Jan de Keyt and Cornelis de Boot ( Jan’s brother) settled his outstanding affairs.31 Creating the trust that was needed to conduct business, the social capital of the Willem Moreel faction was spread out widely through the Bruges merchant milieu. The faction formed an ‘economic cluster’ which resembled that of Wouter Ameyde, a Bruges merchant who lived at the turn of the century.32 Both Ameyde and the members of the Moreel faction bought imported goods from international merchants and resold them in regional and local markets, as well as buying regional goods to resell to their international trading partners. The Moreel faction’s cluster was not the only economic cluster that supported the Bruges economy, but it was certainly one of the major economic powers in the city. The economic power of the Moreel faction converted directly into financial weight and political might. Funds gathered by the faction members could be used to support relatives in times of need, such as providing the bail for Willem Moreel and Jan van Riebeke in February 1482. But the money also could be used politically. In November 1477, for example, several members of the faction contributed to the loan for 40,000 lb. par. Maximilian contracted with forty Bruges citizens and merchants and guaranteed with the crown jewels. Willem Moreel lent 658 lb. par., Maarten Lem extended 1,200 lb. par., Klaas van Nieuwenhove, Jan de Keyt, and the brothers Jan and Cornelis de Boot advanced a total sum of 750 lb. par.33 The faction also provided money to the Bruges treasury when necessary. The city of Bruges took out several loans from its citizen during Mary’s reign. These loans earned no interest, so the primary motivation of the lenders was political rather than financial. In the spring of 1477, June 1478 and May 1480, Willem Moreel, Maarten Lem, and Cornelis and Jan de Boot contributed large amounts of money to the city, as voluntary contributions by wealthy citizens to an urban government in cases of acute financial shortage, a common medieval practice.34 Citizens could also invest in the 27 Jan van Raveschoot in 1474 and 1478, Jacob Sey in 1472, 1477 and 1482 (Van den Abeele & Catry, Makelaars en handelaars, 138–9). 28 Martens, De opdrachtgevers van Hans Memling, 17. 29 CAB: SR, 1479–80, 167v. 30 CAB: PR, 1485–86, 93r. 31 CAB: PR, 1492–93, 33r. A niece of Boudewijn Heindrickx would marry the son of Cornelis de Boot (Focke, De familie Offhuis, 144) and inherit his residence in Sint-Kruis, the so-called ‘Ter Spyckere ’ (De Clerck, Kasteel De Spycker, 232–3). 32 Stabel, Entre commerce international, 98–9; Van Houtte, Makelaars en waarden, 23–5. 33 ADN: B 3495, 123686 (see chapter 1.2.3.3). 34 Willem Moreel lent 108 lb. par. in May 1480, Klaas van Nieuwenhove lent 1,200 lb. par. in 1477 and 144 lb. par. in 1480, his son Jan lent 144 lb. par. in 1480, Jan van Riebeke lent 60 lb. par. in 1478 and 72 lb. par. in 1480, the brothers de Boot lent 240 lb. par. in 1477 and 120 lb. par. in 1478, and Maarten Lem lent 204 lb. par. in 1480 (CAB: SR, 1476–77, 27v and 31v; SR, 1480–81, 48r–49r, 188v, 189r, 190v and 197r). 142

Chapter 3 The Cities

city’s public debt by buying annuities, and thereby help the city carry out its plans, while still making a tidy personal profit. The financial and economic elite of Bruges were the principal buyers of urban annuities, a method by which they provided money to the city.35 The purchase of an annuity was primarily a personal financial investment, but investors could also be motivated by political considerations. As Laurence Derycke has pointed out, the small group of urban annuity buyers in Bruges was a select company of members of high society and important urban officials, just like the members of the Moreel faction. Since this select group of leading figures dominated the public annuity market at politically crucial moments, their contributions to financing the public debt have to be understood within a broader context of consolidating political and financial power structures in the city. Another strategy for controlling urban finances and policies without sacrificing personal profit was to purchase the farm of an urban tax. In 1476 and 1478, for example, Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas farmed the taxes levied in the Bruges ‘Hallen’ (Markethall).36 The financial power of the faction of Willem Moreel gave it dominating influence in city politics, and with Moreel’s state office, the faction was represented by a ‘power broker’ at court, a role held by other Bruges financiers in the past.37 Conversely, Maximilian could access the faction’s authority in Bruges to influence city politics. Throughout Mary of Burgundy’s reign, Moreel’s faction ruled the city in a coalition with representatives from the urban guilds. Several members of the faction served on the city boards each year. Willem Moreel, Maarten Lem, Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas, Jan de Boot, Jan van Riebeke, and Jan de Keyt were elected to a total of seventeen seats on five city boards from April 1477 until September 1481, when Maximilian’s faction banned the Moreel faction from participation in Bruges politics.38 Before that fall, Moreel’s faction held a strong grip on political power in city government, not only by sheer number of seats, but also in the types of offices that faction members controlled. In April 1477 Jan de Keyt became burgomaster of the aldermen, and Willem Moreel the principal receiver of the city treasury. He continued to hold this key financial position when Maarten Lem was elected as burgomaster of the ‘commune ’ in September 1477.39 One year later, Willem Moreel was elected as burgomaster of the aldermen, and Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas became burgomaster of the ‘commune ’. Jan van Riebeke took over as principal receiver in 1478, and in 1479 became burgomaster of the aldermen, while his colleague, Jan de Boot, became the burgomaster of the ‘commune ’. In 1480 Maarten Lem again assumed this position, while Jan de Keyt became head aldermen of the city bench. From 1477 through 1480, the six men who were the nucleus of the Moreel 35 Derycke, The public annuity market, 172. See also Boone, Davids & Janssens, Urban public debts, 10–1. In the period between January 1477 and March 1482 the brothers Cornelis and Jan de Boot bought annuities worth 288 lb. par., Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas 293 lb. par., Jan de Keyt 108 lb. par. and Jan van Riebeke 852 lb. par. (CAB: SR, 1477–78, 115v–126r; SR, 1478–79, 146r–150r and SR, 1481–82, 144r). This is the sum the person received after March 1482 (when the annuities had already been purchased). 36 CAB: SR, 1476–77, 20r and SR, 1478–79, 31v. About the practice of farming taxes by urban elites: Boone, Triomferend privé-initiatief, passim. 37 See the example of Dino Rapondi: Lambert, The duke, the city, 92. 38 CAB: RW, 1468–1501, 78r–123r. The Bruges city boards were elected on 2 September of every year. Only in 1477 were two sets appointed, namely in April and September 1477. In what follows I will speak of ‘the city boards of April 1477’ and ‘the city boards of September 1477’. References to ‘the city boards of 1480’, for example, mean only the city boards that governed from 2 September 1480 until 1 September 1481. 39 Bruges had two burgomasters, namely the burgomaster of the aldermen, and the burgomaster of the ‘commune ’. The ‘commune ’ of councillors had a more administrative function, the city bench of aldermen had more political duties to fulfil. About the election and the tasks of the city boards, see: Mertens, Bestuursinstellingen van de stad Brugge, 323–5 and Van Leeuwen, De Vlaamse wetsvernieuwing, 125–37. 143

For the Common Good

faction dominated the most powerful city offices, a clear sign of their political control. During the entire period, Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas, Jan de Boot, and Maarten Lem were also deans of the administrative quarters (‘zestendelen ’) in which they resided.40 In addition to these powerful positions, members of the faction of Willem Moreel held lesser offices in town, as well as carrying out a number of special tasks under the authority of the city boards. In recognition of their financial acumen and economic resources, faction members were particularly employed in financial and economic administration. Jan van Riebeke collected the tax on grain from September 1475 until April 1477, when the tax was abolished.41 Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas, Jan van Riebeke, and Jan de Boot collected the ducal ‘aides ’ in Bruges and the Franc of Bruges from 1479 until 1481.42 Jan de Keyt represented the city of Bruges in the ‘watering ’ of Blankenberge, an area in which he was a large landowner.43 In the same way that investing in annuities served both personal financial interests and public political goals, members of the Moreel faction took on public responsibilities that coincided with their private holdings. Since Jan de Keyt served as a master of the locks (sluismeester) in the Blankenberg area, he could protect his own property interests there. However, he was also defending the interests of the Bruges merchant elite, because management of floodplains and waterways around the city played a crucial role in the Bruges economy. He served the public interest by properly managing waterways and dikes around Bruges to protect the city against damage by flood, which the county faced in the fall of 1477.44 When a special commission after the flood was created to strengthen the dikes around the city, Jan de Keyt was appointed as its president.45 Management of water around the city also necessitated keeping the port of Bruges accessible. In June 1481, for example, Jan de Keyt and Jan van Riebeke visited Sluis and the islands in the Swin estuary to determine if the new measures to halt the silting-up of the Swin had been effective.46 The city’s control of the surrounding countryside was maintained through other significant positions as well. Maarten Lem was chief overseer of the dunes in the county of Flanders. The burgomaster of the ‘commune ’, a post held several times by members of the Moreel faction, sat on the annual commission that after April 1477 elected aldermen to the city benches of the Franc of Bruges, a position which gave the Bruges government control over the leaders of the Franc of Bruges. The Bruges burgomaster’s power over the Franc aldermen is likely the reason that Cornelis Metteneye, a nephew of Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas, was elected alderman during this period.47 The numerous public offices and governing responsibilities that members of the Moreel faction held in city and regional administration gave them influence over politics in the city, the surrounding countryside, and, through Willem Moreel, in ducal administration. 40 Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas was dean of the ‘Sint-Janszestendeel ’ in September 1477 and in 1479, his brothers-inlaw Maarten Lem and Denijs Metteneye held this office in, respectively, 1478 and 1480. Jan de Boot was dean of the ‘SintNiklaaszestendeel ’ in September 1477 and in 1480. About the office and the boundaries of the Bruges quarters: Ryckaert, Brugge, 89–91. 41 CAB: SR, 1476–77, 27r. 42 CAB: SR, 1479–80, 171v and SR, 1480–81, 185r. 43 He was ‘sluismeester ’ of this ‘watering ’ from 1477 until 1485 (databank Tim Soens). 44 Gottschalk, Historische geografie, I, 92–5. 45 CAB: SR, 1480–81, 89v–90r and 181r. 46 ‘Omme te vernemene de beteringhe van den Zwene ’ (CAB: SR, 1480–81, 83v). 47 He was already burgomaster of the Franc in 1476 and served as alderman in 1477 and from 1479 until 1481. He was captain of the city of Middelburg during the reign of Mary of Burgundy, and he became one of the leading figures in the Franc of Bruges during the Flemish Revolt (Haemers, Middelburg na Pieter Bladelin, 235–6). 144

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The faction also played a role in the county decision-making process because several members of the Moreel faction held representative and military offices. Jan de Keyt and Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas were in charge of fortifying the duke’s castles in Sluis in spring 1479.48 Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas was captain of the Bruges troops in northern France up until the battle of Enguinegatte, after which he was knighted by Maximilian for his honourable conduct.49 In addition, as city officials, faction members represented the city at the meetings of the Members of Flanders. At the end of January and the beginning of February 1478, for example, Burgomaster Maarten Lem, Alderman Jan van Riebeke, Receiver Willem Moreel, Lockmaster Jan de Keyt, and Captain Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas gathered with the representatives from Ypres and Ghent to discuss the military strategy and methods of financing the war.50 The presence of Willem Moreel was not a coincidence, because monetary policy (‘materye van der munte ’) was also on the agenda. The faction of Willem Moreel had a voice in decision-making at the county level, and, given the power possessed by the Flemish cities after the Revolt of 1477, the faction had influence in state politics as well. However, it was the local power of the Moreel faction which explains why the archduke chose these Bruges merchants to join his administration in 1479. If Maximilian and his entourage wanted to influence Bruges politics, especially in financial matters, they had to win over the Moreel faction. With the appointment of Moreel and Maarten Lem, two leading figures of the faction, as superintendents for all finances in spring 1479, and the appointment of Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas as councillor of the archduke a few months later,51 Maximilian planned not only to increase state revenue, but also augment his political influence in Bruges. Without the faction’s political support the archduke would find it difficult to control the city. Moreover, through the faction’s trade contacts, Maximilian could easily locate foreign merchants who wanted to lend money to the state. The marriage of convenience between the faction and the court also strengthened the faction’s political power. When its members were appointed to ducal offices, the faction gained more prestige and authority to govern the city and quarter, or hinterland, around Bruges. As the count’s councillor, Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas sat on the commission which renewed (that is, chose new aldermen for) the boards in the Flemish cities.52 The political bond with the court permitted the Moreel faction to maintain and strengthen its political power. The marriage would last until the autumn of 1481. A characteristic of the history of medieval parties and factions is their interaction with political events. Moreover, political conflicts can even shape political factions. The imprisonment of Willem Moreel by Maximilian’s councillors in December 1481 clearly strengthened the faction’s solidarity. It is also clear that the faction gained political power by cooperating with Maximilian in the years before 1481. However, the preceding analysis shows that the faction was not created by Maximilian’s support or his threatening tactics. Many social connections between the members of the faction existed prior to 1477. Some 48 CAB: SR, 1478–79, 71r. 49 Mémoires de Jean de Dadizeele, 19; CAB: SR, 1476–77, 58v–59r; SR, 1477–78, 53r-v and 160v. 50 Blockmans, Handelingen van de leden, 49–52. 51 When Jan van Nieuwenhove was knighted, he became councillor and chamberlain of Maximilian (CAB: SR, 1479–80, 172r and CA, 2, 321v.). 52 In 1480 Maximilian appointed Jan to this commission – an office he would held until July 1485; see CAB: SR, 1480–81, 158r (renewal in Bruges); KB: M 103, II (Ypres) and CAG: 400, 27, 310r (Ghent). 145

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members even had political power before the Revolt of 1477.53 Nevertheless, the group of ‘friends and relatives’ which formed this faction in Bruges during Mary of Burgundy’s reign was not yet a faction before 1477. In what follows, I will argue the Revolt of 1477 created a faction from the group of ‘friends and relatives’ around Willem Moreel and the others. This social group used the profound political reversal in the county in 1477 to launch itself as a faction. Through the events of the Revolt of 1477 the faction found its form and used this sudden opportunity to set out a policy for Bruges and the county, a policy which was inspired by its specific political ideas. 3.1.2

Politics and Finances during the Reign of Charles the Bold (1467–1476)

Bruges politics were aristocratic throughout the fifteenth century. During the Burgundian era, revolts of craftsmen only temporarily interrupted the political domination of wealthy merchants and moneyed landowners.54 Regimes of craftsmen never lasted long, even though the urban guilds in Bruges acquired a permanent representation on the city boards in 1302. But, afterwards the Flemish counts and the Burgundian dukes reduced the influence of the urban craftsmen in Bruges politics. The repression of the Bruges Revolt in 1436–38 gave Duke Philip the Good a chance to suppress Bruges autonomy and the power of the urban guilds.55 He reversed the custom of dividing seats on the city boards proportionally, a custom which had been instituted in 1302. In May 1452 the Bruges craftsmen tried to take over city government while Ghent troops were besieging the city, but ducal representatives prevented the return of political rights to the guilds.56 In a marked contrast to protests in Ghent, Bruges remained quiet during the inauguration of Charles the Bold in 1467, showing that the domination of the Bruges oligarchy which was supported by Charles the Bold had a stronger base than their counterparts in Ghent. Consequently, the dukes of Burgundy found in the Bruges elite mighty political partners and wealthy supporters of their policies. The following reconstruction of the policy guiding the Bruges government during Charles the Bold’s reign will show why the city government was so docile. It will also uncover the seeds of unrest in the reactions of the craft guilds to this policy and examine the internal causes of the revolt of 1477 in the city of Bruges. Just as other cities in Flanders, Bruges endured ever-increasing financial demands from Duke Charles the Bold during his reign. According to the ‘Transport van Oudenburg ’ (a distribution schedule for aides payments created in 1408), Bruges had to pay 15.71 percent of each aide given to the duke by the Three Members of Flanders.57 Table 2 shows the percentage of the total outlay of the Bruges treasury which was paid to the duke in each year. 53 Willem Moreel was alderman in 1472 and 1475, Maarten Lem was burgomaster in 1467 and 1472, Jan de Boot was receiver in 1476, alderman in 1474 and councillor in 1466, 1470 and 1472, Jan van Riebeke was receiver in 1474 and councillor in 1465 and 1470, Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas was councillor in 1472 and receiver in 1474, Jan de Keyt was a new face in urban administration in April 1477. 54 De Meyer, De sociale strukturen, 78; Blockmans, Nieuwe gegevens, 154; Van Houtte, De geschiedenis van Brugge, 297–9; Vanhaverbeke, De reële machtsstructuren, 53–4; Dumolyn, De Brugse opstand, 105–15; Verbruggen, Geweld in Vlaanderen, 35–40. 55 Blockmans, La répression de révoltes, 8–9; Dumolyn, De Brugse opstand, 267–95. 56 Haemers, De Gentse opstand, 301–3. 57 Ghent paid 13.78 %, the Franc of Bruges 11.90 % and Ypres 8.58 % (Zoete, De beden in het graafschap, 93–5 and Prevenier, De beden in het graafschap, annex I). In 1474 the contribution of Ypres decreased, and in 1476 the duke approved a new plan of division, but due to his death, it was never introduced (see Blockmans, De volksvertegenwoordiging, 418–20 and Priem, Précis analytique des documents, III, 209–18). 146

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Table 2: Bruges Payments to the Duke during the Reign of Charles the Bold (1467–1476).58

Year

Percentage of Total Expenses

1467–1468

10.72

1468–1469

31.45

1469–1470

32.75

1470–1471

33.22

1471–1472

17.85

1472–1473

24.15

1473–1474

25.74

1474–1475

29.53

1475–1476

41.82

Average

27.47

An average of 27.47 percent of all city expenditures were paid to the duke’s receivers (that is an average 29.06 percent of the entire revenues of the city). Especially at the beginning and end of Charles the Bold’s reign, Bruges spent close to one-third of its expenses to the duke, and sometimes more. This rate was 8.4 percent higher than during the reign of Philip the Good.59 In addition to these ‘direct’ payments, the city also paid indirectly for ducal policies. In order to pay a portion of the approved aide in cash, Bruges borrowed money from individuals or sold city annuities which accumulated more debt for the city. These loans and annuities were repaid by the city – only the name of the creditor changed.60 If we take the payments on these debts into account, annual payments to the duke were even higher. Merlevede calculated that an average of 43.80 percent of total Bruges expenditures were transferred to Charles the Bold, almost double the percentage of payments to John the Fearless and a third more than those to Philip the Good.61 The fiscal pressure of the lord on the city undoubtedly increased during Charles the Bold’s reign. Traditional annual revenues collected by the city of Bruges were not sufficient to provide for this higher expense, and different financial makeshift measures were taken to make the payments. Annuities, leasing of city offices, cost-saving measures, borrowing, and increasing taxes were necessary to balance the Bruges accounts. Some of these measures, such as the sale of annuities, only postponed the cost of payments to another year. Debts from eight annuities sold during Charles the Bold’s reign amounted to 3,156 lb. 10 s. 3 d. gr.

58 The fiscal year started on 2 September (the Bruges accounts, annual expenses to ‘onsen gheduchten heere ’). 59 Zoete, De beden in het graafschap, Tabel Brugge. 60 Merlevede, Stad, vorst en schatkist, 568. The following figures are found there. 61 These amounted respectively to 23.50 % and 35.10 % of the urban expenses (ibidem, 573). Another difference is the equal spreading of the expenses. During the period 1405–19 the amount of the payments fluctuated heavily. In some years under John the Fearless and Philip the Good almost two-thirds was paid to the duke, in others nothing (Prevenier, De beden in het graafschap, 359). 147

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in 1476, against 1,714 lb. 6 s. 4 d. gr. in 1467 – an increase of 54 percent within ten years.62 The sale of annuities burdened the city with serious indebtedness, which also heightened the impact of other payments to the duke. With the sale of annuities a permanent system of payments to the duke was introduced into the city accounts. In the last complete booking year before the death of the duke, from 2 September 1475 until 1 September 1476, the city paid 82.56 percent of its expenses in direct and indirect payments to the duke. Graph 11: Analysis, in Percentage Terms, of the Expenses of the City of Bruges (Fiscal Year 1475–1476).63

Forty-two percent of the expenses went directly to ducal receivers (including the payment of the ‘seventh penny’, portions of aides, and other rents).64 One-quarter of the expenses were paid out to annuity buyers. Sixteen percent of the expenses compensated creditors that had extended loans to the city – mainly to pay portions of aides. Only 17 percent was left to pay the costs of ceremonies, personnel, messengers, public works, and so on. The duke had pilfered an extensive amount of the city’s revenues, as he did also in Ghent. In the same period Ghent had been hit with severe fiscal penalities after losing the Revolts of 1449–53 and 1467.65 Charles the Bold had not punished the city of Bruges as harshly, but he took away as much of the Bruges revenues as if he had imposed the same penalties on that city as well. How did the Bruges government handle this heavy financial pressure? The Bruges oligarchy principally chose to contract long-term debts, while trying to pass on the costs of this policy to the other segments of the urban population. There were two landmarks in this policy: the ‘restriction’ of 1475, and increased indirect taxes. Since the document from 62 CAB: SR, 1467–68 and SR, 1475–76. In November 1470, May, June, October 1472, November 1473, November 1474, August 1475 and March 1476 annuities were sold (CAB: SR, 1476–77, 97r–112v and Derycke, The public annuity market, 178). On 2 January 1477 the financial administration of Charles the Bold approved a new sale of annuities on urban revenues (of 200 lb. gr., penny sixteen), but, due to the political circumstances, it did not take place (CAB: PO, 1141). 63 Source: CAB: SR, 1475–76. 64 These were a rent of 800 lb. gr. for the seventh penny, the ‘tort le conte ’, a portion of an aide of 1474, the aide for Margaret of York, a rent of 1470, an aide of 2500 and one of 30,000 golden riders for the wars of the duke, an aide of 500 riders for the living costs of his daughter Mary and one of 500 riders for Anton of Burgundy (CAB: SR, 1475–76, 123v–125r). 65 Boone, Geld en macht, 64; Ryckbosch, Tussen Gavere en Cadzand, 32–7. 148

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1475 resembles comparable ducal ordinances which aimed to save money on city personnel (especially the ‘Ghent restriction’ of 1468), I have labeled it ‘the Bruges restriction’. 66 The duke signed this ordinance on 26 August 1475, in order to decrease costs by leasing all administrative offices in the city for the following six years. Another provision aimed to reduce corruption, outlawing presents to ducal secretaries and other officials for the purpose of influencing state politics.67 While the primary intention of other measures was to cut costs, they also tended to benefit the urban elite. The city would only pay salaries to the two burgomasters and five clerks, and not to magistrates or aldermen, who now would only receive special attire for the annual procession of Saint-Donatian. Because only wealthy citizens would now be able to serve in city office, these measures favoured a more restricted oligarchy. In fact, the restriction confirmed the political domination of the Bruges oligarchy, as the duke installed another institutional structure which limited the participation of craftsmen in government, as he had also done in Ghent in 1468. With this ordinance the duke hoped to favour the government of docile rich people in Bruges. It is important to note that Charles the Bold merely ratified a document which had been drawn up by the Bruges city government.68 A discussion between the Maximilian’s prosecutor and the defendants Willem Moreel, Jan van Riebeke, and Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas at their trial before the Great Council in February 1482 reveals how the restriction was developed. At the trial, Maximilian accused the three Bruges men of obstructing the approval of the aide of 100,000 golden riders Charles the Bold had requested in August 1475 in order to besiege Neuss. The Bruges burgomaster Jan Barbesaen had finally approved the aide but during the negotiations a political clash seems to have taken place. Maximilian’s prosecutor charged that Willem Moreel and a coalition of craftsmen had tried to ‘buy’ the restriction, which the prosecutor characterised as a new privilege from the duke, in exchange for approving the aide. According to the accusation, then city treasurer Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas was sent to Namur to get this new privilege signed by the duke.69 At the trial, Willem Moreel denied that he had any personal role in getting the restriction approved, and presented his own version of events. It was only after the Members of Flanders met with the duke’s representatives at Valenciennes to discuss the aide, he said, that the Bruges magistrates had selected 48 men to form a special committee to draw up a more restrictive policy for the city. According to Willem Moreel, Jan van 66 In 1468 Charles the Bold ordered a comparable document for Ghent (Boone, Législation communale, 146, edited by Fris, La restriction de Gand, 76–88). In 1407 his grandfather John the Fearless had already imposed a ‘restriction’, the socalled ‘Calfvel ’, on Bruges (see Fris, Het Brugsche Calfvel, 58–63 and Dumolyn, De Brugse opstand, 129–43). The text of the restriction of 1475 is edited by Gilliodts-Van Severen, Inventaire des archives, VI, 97–9. 67 Duke Philip the Good had promulgated several prohibitions in 1446 (Espinas, Verlinden & Buntinx, Privilèges et chartes, I, 30). 68 Charles starts the restriction with ‘Nous, avoir receu l ’umble supplication de noz bien amez les hooftmans, doyens et jurez de nostre ville de Bruges, tant en leurs noms que pour et ou nom du corps et de toutte la communaulté de nostre dicte ville de Bruges ’ (Gilliodts-Van Severen, Inventaire des archives, VI, 97). 69 According to the prosecutor: ‘Il apparissoit aussy estoit vray que sur ce que icelui feu seigneur [Charles the Bold] fist requerir aux membres de son pays de Flandres certain aide pour subvenir a ses affaires, les dits Guillaume Morel, messieur Jehan de Nieuwehove et autres leurs adherens, eulx demonstrans rebelles et desobeissans, et pour empeschier et retarder le dit ayde, firent et construisierent certains billetz contenans pluiseurs poins et articles tendans affin de obtenir nouveaulx previleges exhorbitans et desraisonnables, pour par le moyen diceulx avoir le total gouvernement de la dicte ville de Bruges. Lesquelz billetz le dit Guillaume baillia et fist baillier aux neuf doyens qui lors estoient en la ville de Bruges, les aucuns des dits billetz furent aussy par le dit Guillaume et ses consors baillez au dit messieur Jehan qui prend la charge d ’aller vers feu mon dit seigneur pour obtenir le contenu d ’icelui par fourme de previlege. Et se delibererent iceulx Morel, Nieuwenhove et leurs complices non consenter en ce que feu mon dit seigneur, lors vivant, requeroit jusques ad ce qu ’ilz auroient obtenu les dits previleges telz qu ’ilz desiroient ’ (CAB: CA, 2, 322r). Charles the Bold was at Namur at the end of August 1475 (Vander Linden, Itinéraires de Charles, 69), in which city the restriction was signed (Gilliodts-Van Severen, Inventaire des archives, VI, 99). 149

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Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas admitted that he had given the Bruges restriction to the duke at Namur. The other treasurer of the city at that time, Jan van Riebeke, was also accused by the archduke of complicity in the affair. Although Willem Moreel probably did not play a role in developing the restriction, certainly the two treasurers, Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas and Jan van Riebeke, later members of the Moreel faction, were directly involved in its design. The involvement of these relatives of Moreel in securing the restriction is not surprising, given their wealth and political careers. They belonged to the Bruges economic elite and the restriction increased the grip of this elite on city politics. Moreel’s comment that some of the 48 committee members were representatives of the urban guilds at first seems more puzzling. However, many of these guild leaders also belonged to the same wealthy group of merchants and entrepreneurs, and shared an interest in ‘monopolising’ urban power in the hands of a wealthy oligarchy. Approval of the restriction by the group of 48, even though their names are unknown, shows the deep political support the Bruges oligarchy enjoyed. The guilds were controlled by a wealthy elite, who supported the political oligarchy of Bruges. The restriction of 1475 froze the political structure of Bruges, ensuring the oligarchy and the duke of a compliant regime which defended the interests of a small but powerful merchant elite. The Bruges regime’s fiscal policies also disadvantaged those who did not have a voice or power in urban politics. In a similar manner to every other Western European city in the Late Middle Ages, the Bruges elite financed its government by a system of indirect taxes (‘assizen ’ or ‘maletôte ’).70 Barely a year after his inauguration as a count, Charles the Bold agreed to an increase of indirect taxes in Bruges. The tax on sales of Bruges beer (the ‘keyte ’) was raised from 6 Flemish groats to 14 groats per barrel, the tax on foreign beer from 16 to 32 groats, and the tax on small beer (thinner beer) from 2 to 3 groats.71 The levy on French wine doubled from one-half groat to a full groat, while other levies remained at the levels imposed after the Bruges Revolt of 1438 was repressed.72 The duke stipulated that taxes would be levied at the increased rate for the following sixteen years for everyone except certain members of the ducal household. The duke and his entourage (including Adolf of Cleves and Louis of Bruges) and the Bruges burgomasters Maarten Lem and Philip Metteneye received a specified number of untaxed barrels for their personal use each year.73 Like all indirect taxes, these levies were socially discriminatory. Indirect taxes on vital consumer goods affect everyone, but they have a disproportionately heavy impact on the budgets of the poorer sectors of the urban population.74 The rich Bruges elite were passing on the costs of the policy they had adopted (paying for ever-increasing payments to the duke with long-term debt) to the lower classes of society. The elite also levied taxes on consumer goods used by the rich, such as wine, but the city’s tax policy principally hit 70 Zoete, De beden in het graafschap, 174–7; Boone, Triomferend privé-initiatief, 113. 71 CAB: CA, 13, 240r (18 March 1468). Increasing a indirect tax required the approval of the count (Merlevede, Stad, vorst en schatkist, 213–4). 72 A half groat per ‘stoop ’ (ca. 2.2 liters) for wine from the Rhineland, one groat for ‘corte ’ wine and a fourth on ‘hete ’ wine (ibidem, 214–5 and 231–2). 73 Gilliodts-Van Severen, Inventaire des archives, VI, 92–3. It was a usual practice of the duke to exempt his loyal servants from urban indirect tax (Boone, Geld en macht, 128–9). 74 Boone, Stedelijke fiscaliteit, 127; Stabel, Stedelijke instellingen, 17. 150

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those groups who had no voice in politics. The city council and the urban craft guilds were governed by wealthy citizens, who did not defend the interests of common craftsmen. The tax rate remained untouched until the end of Charles the Bold’s reign. On average, 71.94 percent of the annual revenues of the city of Bruges came from indirect taxes – more or less the same as in Ghent.75 Table 3 reveals the difficulties the city of Bruges ran into after a few years. Table 3: Profits from the Bruges Indirect taxes during the Reign of Charles the Bold (1468–1476).76

Accounting Year

Percentage of Indirect taxes as a Portion of Total Urban Revenue

Profits From Indirect taxes (1468–1469 = 100)

1468–1469

80.72

100

1469–1470

79.73

96.22

1470–1471

81.29

96.54

1471–1472

79.27

90.72

1472–1473

69.37

84.74

1473–1474

61.99

84.59

1474–1475

56.79

78.14

1475–1476

66.38

99.45

Average

71.94

–

Two patterns, which can be seen in Table 3, led the Bruges government to revise its tax policy in 1475. As the middle column shows, profits from indirect taxes decreased throughout Charles the Bold’s reign. The highpoint of profits, in accounting year 1467–68, was never reached again, mainly because the profits from the assize on wine fell (see Graph 12). This downward tendency might have been due to changes in demand for wine, inaccurate accounting, or perhaps fraud. Whatever the reasons, income from the wine assize steadily decreased. The second pattern, which can be seen in the third column of Table 3, is that the Bruges power holders sought additional sources of revenue. In 1474–75 the indirect taxes only yielded 56.79 percent of total revenues (compared to 80.72 percent six years before). Since the nominal figures do not decrease as dramatically as this percentage decreased, the city government had located other sources of funding. The increasing costs of debt settlements and payments to the duke forced the ruling elite to find other funding sources.77 Since the proceeds from the urban domain were very difficult to increase, and the urban leaders did not want to sell a new series of annuities, the only option was to raise 75 Boone, Geld en macht, 134. 76 In 1468–69 the Bruges indirect taxes amounted 1,851,702 groats (source: the Bruges city accounts). A table of the total revenues of the city can be find in Sosson, Les travaux publics, 297. 77 In 1475–76 the city spent 82.56% of its total expenditures on ducal payments and the payment of debts (graph 11), while only 66.38 % of the revenues came from the indirect tax. The city spent 2,547,061 groats on debts and ducal payments, while receiving 1,841,606 groats from ‘assizen ’ (a shortfall of 38.31 %). 151

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the indirect taxes. New direct taxes were not considered, because the cost of reforming the administrative system would be prohibitive, and because a direct tax would run counter to the interests of the wealthy elite. Although a direct tax on their incomes might yield substantial revenue, this option was not considered. Graph 12: The Nominal (Face Value) Profits from Bruges Indirect Taxes (1468–1476).78

In the fall of 1475 the urban government decided to levy a sales tax of four groats on corn, and three groats on rye, for the next three years. The ducal administration ratified this decision on 13 November 1475.79 Profits from the indirect taxes consequently rose by one-third in 1474–75 (see Table 3). Jan van Riebeke leased the farm of the indirect taxes in that year.80 The portion of total city revenue from indirect taxes rose by ten percent, while the total profits of the indirect taxes finally reached the level set in 1467–68. The city’s fiscal strategy was a success, and the urban government could now afford to pay for its policies. However, the poorer sectors of the urban population became the victims of this policy. Not only were they excluded from political decision-making, but they were also the principal targets of the indirect tax increase. They were certainly aware of the fact that Charles the Bold’s war policy and the compliance of the Bruges regime were the main causes for the increase. The tax strategies of Charles the Bold and the Bruges government also bore a heavy resemblance to taxes imposed by the dukes after failed urban revolts. Burgundian dukes used taxes on corn to punish rebellious cities, such as Ghent in 1453, and again in 1468, and Bruges in 1438, when the Burgundian dukes had imposed taxes called ‘cueillotes ’ after they had suppressed revolts in those cities.81 To the average citizens of Bruges, their government’s policy must have seemed like punishment of their own city. 78 Source: the Bruges city accounts. 79 CAB: PO, 1135–6 (partly edited by Gilliodts-Van Severen, Inventaire des archives, VI, 85–6). 80 CAB: SR, 1476–77, 27r. Profits increased from 1,446,981 groats in 1474–75 to 1,841,606 groats in 1475–76. The tax on corn yielded 217,244 groats, 7.83% of the total revenues of the city. 81 Boone, Geld en macht, 132–52; Haemers, De Gentse opstand, 392–3; Dumolyn, De Brugse opstand, 290. 152

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In its financial and fiscal policies a regime demonstrates its fundamental social views.82 Bruges during Charles the Bold’s reign provides a good example of this. Once more a ruling elite passed on the costs of its policy decisions to the powerless, as was also a common tendency in the formation of a centralised state.83 In addition to the detrimental economic effects (which are very difficult to measure), the fiscal policy of the Bruges government during Charles’ reign also had severe social and political consequences. The middle class, ordinary craftspeople, and the very poor were the main victims of the increased indirect taxes levied by the Bruges regime. The sale of annuities also had a socially discriminatory character, because only wealthy people could afford to buy an urban annuity. The wealthy profited from the proceeds of the annuities, while the whole urban community paid for those proceeds through indirect taxes.84 Revenue from the increased assizes was not invested in public works, the urban economy, or other public sectors, but instead paid for the settlement of debts and the duke’s war policy. Political participation in the decision-making process was not a requirement for raising taxes, and the Bruges government remained an oligarchy of merchants and landowners. The development of the centralised Burgundian state was directly connected to the growing power of the Bruges oligarchy. The members of the future faction of Willem Moreel belonged to this oligarchy. Although they were not the only creators of these policies, they seem nevertheless to have agreed with them. The common craftsmen probably did not, and in the beginning of 1477 they got the opportunity to even the score. 3.1.3

The Bruges Revolt of 1477

3.1.3.1 Bruges Support for the Privileges of 1477: The Formation of a Faction The social composition of the Bruges government changed very little in the Revolt of 1477, as the wealthy merchants and financiers remained firmly in control, but a serious rift opened up within that elite group. In contrast to the situation in Ghent, the same aldermen who had been elected in early 1477 remained in power in Bruges after Charles the Bold’s death. These men bore the political responsibility for formulating the privileges of 1477. They orchestrated the ordination of the Great Privilege and the Flemish Privilege in a completely legal and orderly way, without mobilisation of the masses or exertion of force.85 These privileges enshrined the political aspirations of those elite men who had been ruling the city since the reign of Charles the Bold. At the same time, other elite men were disregarded, and their marginalisation created a political division within the Bruges elite, which lasted until the end of the Flemish Revolt in 1492. This opposition group within the Bruges elite became the party I have identified as the faction of Willem Moreel. This faction supported a federal state model. I argue that the context around the enactment of the privileges in 1477 shaped the faction Willem Moreel joined. The city boards in office in the first months of 1477 had been elected in September 1476. Some members were merchants, and some belonged to the duke’s network. The majority of the aldermen were wealthy politicians who had made their fortunes in trade, 82 83 84 85

Boone, Triomferend privé-initiatief, 114. Blockmans, Finances publiques, 90; Boone, Gestion urbaine, 859–60; idem, Stratégies fiscales, 247. As in Ghent during the reign of Charles the Bold (Boone, Plus deuil que joie, 22). Blockmans, Breuk of continuïteit, 99. 153

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such as Reinier Houtmaerct, Denijs Metteneye, Jeronimus van Viven, and the receiver Jan de Boot.86 Jacob Coolbrant, Jan Breydel and Ghyslain van Theimseke were chosen as negotiators to represent the city of Bruges at the Estates-General meeting in January–February 1477.87 Although we do not know who composed the instructions for these negotiators, the negotiators themselves were members of the Bruges elite. They were all respected politicians who had held multiple city offices, and they belonged to the highest economic and political layer of Bruges society. Their backgrounds suggest that they were chosen to represent the views of the Bruges elite, which was likely the content of their instructions. Despite its three representatives on the city boards, one social network was not represented at the meeting of the Estates. This was the social network formed around the receiver-general for all finances, Pieter Lanchals. Its members did not derive their fortunes from commerce, but instead loyalty to the duke formed the basis of their political and social power. The burgomaster of the ‘commune ’, Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Michiel, Lanchals’ brother-in-law, the alderman Wouter Merghaert and the alderman Michiel van Theimseke belonged to this network.88 Pieter Lanchals was a loyal servant of Charles the Bold, who had protected his loyal supporter and endowed him with money, titles and prestige. The probability that Pieter Lanchals shared this wealth and prestige with his relatives, some of whom sat on the Bruges city boards, might help explain why the boards had been so loyal to Charles. This social network was marginalised after the duke’s death. None of the representatives to the Estates-General meeting came from its ranks, and Pieter Lanchals, the spider at the centre of the network’s web, remained in Luxembourg throughout the tumultuous spring of 1477.89 However, despite the differences in social background between the majority of the Bruges aldermen and the Lanchals social network, there were no serious political divisions during Charles the Bold’s reign. Instead, the Bruges oligarchy was a powerful and solid political union, which only burst under the pressure of the extraordinary situation during early 1477. Bruges loyalty to the duke was not unlimited. The duke’s subjects, including some members of the Bruges merchant elite, opposed certain political measures of the duke and his financial administration (of which Pieter Lanchals was an important official). The EstatesGeneral meeting at Ghent in April–May 1476, convened by Charles in order to approve another aide for reinforcements after the defeat in Grandson, focused the discontent. Delegations from every region, no longer intimidated by Chancellor Guillaume Hugonet, refused to pour money down the drain any longer.90 The Estates-General did not intend to 86 Jan de Boot was a broker (see the first paragraph, in which Denijs Metteneye is mentioned too), Reinier Houtmaerct belonged to the company of Jan van Herstvelde, along with Willem Moreel (Mus, De compagnie Despars, 96). Jeronimus van Viven was a powerful butcher (CAB: MC, 1474–75, 30v and 35r). 87 Blockmans, Handelingen van de leden, 5–6. Jacob Coolbrant was councillor of Bruges in 1454 and 1471, and alderman in 1467, 1469, 1473 and 1476. He was in the government of the brokers’ guild in 1479 and 1482 (Van den Abeele & Catry, Handelaars en makelaars, 138–9). Butcher Jan Breydel was alderman in 1461, councillor in 1445, 1447, 1457 and 1476 and burgomaster of the ‘commune ’ in 1468 and 1471. Ghyslain van Theimseke was dean of the butchers in 1475, councillor in 1468 and 1472 and alderman in 1474 and 1476 (CAB: RW, 1468–1501, passim). Joost van Halewyn was sovereign-bailiff of Flanders from 1454 until 1472 and bailiff of Sluis from 1468 until 1474 (Van Rompaey, Het grafelijk baljuwsambt, 615). 88 Wouter Merghaert was married to the niece of Pieter Lanchals (Beernaert & Schotte, Op zoek naar zwaanridder, 95). He was councillor of Bruges in 1473 (CAB: RW, 1468–1501, 43r). As Michiel van Theimseke, he was a brother-in-law of Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Michiel (Gailliard, Bruges et le Franc, I, 352). Michiel was councillor in 1469 and 1471. Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Michiel was dean of the ‘zestendeel ’ of Saint-Donatian in 1475 (CAB: RW, 1468–1501, 60v). 89 Boone, Lanchals (Pieter), 473. 90 Wellens, Les Etats-Généraux, 144–51; Cuvelier, Dhondt & Doehaerd, Actes des Etats-Généraux, 225–32. 154

Chapter 3 The Cities

invest any more money in a war which was damaging the economy of the Low Countries. The Bruges delegation joined in resistance to the duke. A brief notation in the account books from 1475–76 recounts that Bruges ‘notables’ and former burgomasters (who unfortunately were not identified by name) criticised ducal policy and promised to ‘resist’ future attempts by the duke to violate urban privileges.91 The protest came to nothing, however, because shortly after this meeting of the Bruges ‘notables’, the city government decided to pay 200 lb. gr. to the duke for his wars. The outcome of this quiet protest is characteristic of the difficult political position of the Bruges elite. They supported the duke because he ensured their political dominance over the city, but his wars undermined profits from commerce, which hurt them economically. When it became clear that the duke and his court could not win the war but were obstinately unwilling to stop fighting, protest began to gain the upper hand among the Bruges elite. The presence of Bruges representatives at the meeting of the Estates-General in May 1476,92 and Bruges opposition to ducal policy in the fall of that year indicates that a part of the ruling elite were now refusing to follow the duke’s policy unconditionally. The financial and military weakness of Charles the Bold in the autumn of 1476 offered them an excellent opportunity to criticise ducal policy. After the duke lost the battle of Morat in June 1476, the Members of Flanders refused to grant an aide of 22,000 golden riders the duke had requested for the siege of Nancy.93 They also protested against the new apportionment system for aides.94 Lack of the aide caused severe problems for the duke, but he persisted with his plan to besiege Nancy, with the most unfortunate personal results. Back in Flanders, an allied opposition was born. On 17 October 1476 representatives from Ghent, Bruges and Ypres celebrated their ‘brotherly love’ with a ‘delicious meal’. 95 Their intention was not to question the duke’s authority, but rather to send a powerful signal to the ruler and his administration. If the duke wanted to have money for his wars, he had to listen to the concerns of the Members. State administrators got the message. When the Bruges aldermen decided to freeze payments to the duke on the evening after the banquet, the receiver of Flanders, Christoffel Buridaen, arrested them.96 This brutal action undoubtedly caused the relationship between the court and the Bruges elite to deteriorate. A few days later the Flemish Members received a letter from the duke in which he requested a ‘certain quantity of carts’ to carry out his campaign.97 When Bruges aldermen refused to acquiesce, the warden of the Council of Flanders arrested them for a second time.98 Consequently, there was no contingent from Bruges at the Members meeting in Ghent, which discussed yet another new aide for the duke.99 The political standoff between the Members of Flanders and Duke Charles the 91 The meeting of the ‘notabelen ’ intended to ‘wederstane ’ the violations of privileges (CAB: SR, 1475–76, 127v; edited by Gilliodts-Van Severen, Inventaire des archives, VI, 102). 92 Blockmans, Handelingen van de leden (1467–1477), 276. 93 Ibidem, 306–7. 94 The Members registered a complaint before the Parliament of Mechelen (ibidem, 303). 95 A ‘heerlike maeltyd ’ was served to ‘broederlike minne met mallicanderen thebbene ende te behoudene ’ (CAB: SR, 1476–77, 118v). 96 ‘Item betaelt van costen ghedaen bij buerchmeesters, scepenen ende tresoriers bin der tijd dat zij eerst ghevanghen laghen in den Buerch ten vervolghe van den ontfanghere van Vlaendren omme betalinghe thebbene van den laetsten paymente ’ of the aide of 1475 (CAB: SR, 1476–77, 118v). 97 CAB: SR, 1476–77, 46v. 98 CAB: SR, 1476–77, 121r. 99 Blockmans, Handelingen van de leden (1467–1476), 306. 155

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Bold and his administration was thus already building when the duke was suddenly killed. His death and the dynastic vacuum complicated an already difficult political situation in the county of Flanders, as it would again in 1482. The Great Privilege and Flemish Privilege of 1477, written in the immediate aftermath of the duke’s death, show the influence of the Bruges merchant elite on the Estates-General. Both privileges aimed to improve the political, financial and economic conditions for trade and commerce in the Low Countries. Although they preached a partial decentralisation of Burgundian institutions, they advocated above all fair justice and limited interference of the state in trade. They eliminated arbitrary decision-making by the central government, and hoped to prevent duke from adopting any policies that might harm the economy. They abolished recently-adopted tolls, forbade corruption by state officials, and prohibited the duke from waging any war without the approval of the Estates-General. In times of peace, the Privileges stipulated that merchants should have complete freedom of movement, and their ships should not be hindered for any reason.100 If war became necessary, the Privileges ordered that foreign merchants be allowed to leave the Low Countries with their merchandise intact.101 State officials should no longer tolerate postponements on debt payments, and the duke should no longer manipulate the currency.102 The Estates-General, composed of the representatives of the cities, and thus the merchant elite, should have a voice in any decisions about monetary affairs, and their approval was necessary to levy any new tolls. In addition, the Estates-General could take the initiative to convene itself and intervene in financial and economic policy, ‘in order to improve the prosperity of our land’. 103 The Great and the Flemish Privileges emphasized respect for free and fair trade and the desire that the central government no longer obstruct commerce. The discourse embodied in the Privileges drew on familiar themes from the long struggle between the cities and the counts, particularly the desire for the respect for privileges and urban autonomy. This discourse characterized the current relationship between the central government and its subjects as distorted, unnatural, and untraditional, while the solution was a return to an earlier more-balanced relationship. But the accent on free trade demonstrates that the merchant elite were taking advantage of the political weakness of the dynasty to advance its own political goals and convert critics in the regime to its views. There is no doubt that the Bruges merchant elite supported the imposition of these ‘constitutional’ texts, which might have led to a fracture within the city’s ruling elite between the merchant group and the social network of Pieter Lanchals. The merchants, including the group connected to Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas, Maarten Lem, and Willem Moreel, came from a completely different social background from those in the Lanchals network. Lanchals’ political, social, and economic position did not depend on trade, but on his loyalty to the duke. This fundamental difference between Lanchals 100 ‘Item, dat men gheenre coopmanscepen binnen onsen vornoemden landen loop hebbende, hueren loop benemen en zal ’ (Blockmans, Privilegie voor alle landen, 93). In the Flemish Privilege: ‘Maer dat alle coopmanscepe zo vorseit es vrij commen mach, also die van ouden tiden gheploghen heeft ’ (Blockmans, Privilegie voor het graafschap, 137). 101 Blockmans, Privilegie voor alle landen, 92. 102 The Great Council might no longer give similar postponements ‘omme de sculdenaers te bescuddene van hueren sculden te moeten betalen jeghen die insettene van den vorseiden lande ende den cooplieden tselve land frequenterende ’ (Blockmans, Privilegie voor het graafschap, 141). 103 ‘Ter welvaert, orbore ende proffite van onsen vorseiden lande ’ (Ibidem, 141). 156

Chapter 3 The Cities

network and the merchant networks is the most likely cause of the split within the urban elite. While there is no direct evidence confirming this hypothesis, it is safe to presume that Pieter Lanchals and his relatives remained loyal to the duke and his administration, and that the Bruges merchants resisted threats to their economic and political freedom. At the very least, the active role Willem Moreel and other merchants played in the enactment of the privileges of 1477 confirms that discontent with the regime of Charles the Bold was widespread among prominent Bruges merchants. In these circumstances, the faction of Willem Moreel was born. The social network of Pieter Lanchals and the merchant networks in town had governed Bruges together for the past decade, but events now drove them apart. The contents of the privileges of 1477 and the prominent role of Willem Moreel and his network in their composition indicate that the Bruges merchant networks preferred to assume control of the administration of the city of Bruges rather than turn it over to administrators who would merely act as extensions of the central state. During the Revolt of 1477, the people who believed in this vision for city government appear to have united slowly into a faction, which, by definition, does not have a definitive political program or a permanent structure. However, for these people, defending commercial interests was one of the most important motiviations for rejecting Charles the Bold’s policies. This motivation drove Willem Moreel, his relatives and his friends to involve themselves in urban politics after the Revolt of 1477, and state politics after 1479. The faction did not seek strong central power or extensive urban autonomy as a goal in itself, but only as a method to create a favourable economic and political climate for trade, the basis of their wealth and social position. 3.1.3.2 The Craft Guilds Return to the Political Stage The Bruges merchants were not the only social group that wanted a voice in Bruges politics. A new player entered onto the political stage after the passage of the Great and Flemish Privileges. In the chaotic beginning of 1477 the urban craft guilds in Bruges, and their counterparts in Ghent and Ypres, saw the chance to undo the repressive political structure which had excluded them. The balance of power within the city began to shift, but the change did not lead to violence in Bruges, as it did in Ghent. Instead, the Moreel faction and representatives of the urban craft guilds negotiated a new balance of power. In exchange for their approval of payments from the city to the court and the Estates, guild representatives insisted upon restoration of their political and social rights. These demands led to the creation of a new urban privilege for Bruges, awarded on 30 March 1477. The change in the city’s balance of power was a crucial concern to state power holders, including the duchess, nobles at court, and representatives to the Estates-General. They closely watched events in Bruges, for the city was one of the most important creditors of the central state. Because the Great and the Flemish Privileges of 1477 redressed the grievances of the Bruges merchant elite, the city government did not consider it necessary to obtain a new urban privilege. However, Ghent did enact a new urban privilege, abolishing the repressive Treaty of Gavere (imposed on 28 July 1453) on 30 January 1477. The new Ghent privilege restored the political rights and economic privileges of the craft guilds and gave them representation on the city boards of aldermen. But in Bruges, the Treaty of Arras 157

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remained in force. Philip the Good had imposed this treaty on the city on 4 March 1438 after he had repressed the Bruges Revolt. The treaty strengthened state control over the city and removed the Bruges craft guilds from the political process.104 On 15 February 1477, when the millers’ guild in Ghent demanded the removal of those city politicians who had carried out Charles the Bold’s policies, smouldering popular rage exploded in Bruges and elsewhere in Flanders and Brabant.105 The Bruges guilds knew that the court was too weak to support the city elite. The craft guilds demanded political power by applying strong political pressure, but without resorting to violence. The reaction of the Bruges government was quite conservative. These rich merchants probably were very reluctant to grant the craft guilds power, because that would undermine the position they just had gained. To head off demands for complete restoration of the guilds’ political rights, the merchant-dominated city government granted a limited role to guild representatives on 13 February 1477. On the same day the city council sent a messenger to Ghent, seeking Mary of Burgundy’s approval for the decision of the ‘common belly of the city’ to appoint a captain, namely Jan Breydel.106 The expression ‘common belly’ denotes the so-called ‘Grote Raad ’, the Great Council, of the city of Bruges. It derives from the medieval comparison of society to the human body.107 In Bruges, the twelve aldermen, the twelve councillors, the two burgomasters, and the receivers of the urban revenues were the ‘head’ of the city. The deans of the six quarters of Bruges (who were the deans for the patricians or ‘poorterij ’), the deans of the craft guilds, and the guilds themselves were the ‘(common) belly’ of the city. The rest of the urban population were the ‘legs or limbs’, who were to be represented and governed by the head and the belly.108 The ‘belly’ of the city assembled in the ‘Great Council’ and it united representatives of the nine ‘Members of Bruges’. These Members were the ‘poorterij ’ (patricians, or wealthy citizens not belonging to any guild), the four craft guilds related to textile production, the butchers, the fishsellers, the 17 ‘small guilds’ (most of them related to woodworking), the guilds ‘van den hamere ’ (metal-work), the guilds ‘van den ledere ’ (leather-work), the guilds ‘van den naelde ’ (clothing and needlework), the bakers (including a few subordinate guilds, like the millers), and the brokers guild. Except for the ‘poorterij ’, each of these guilds had a head dean or a ‘zware dekin ’. 109 The eight Members of Bruges (without the ‘poorterij ’) thus consisted of 54 guilds organized hierarchically.110 On 13 February 1477, the ‘common belly’ convened in the Great Council, a kind of board meeting of the city. The Great Council did not frequently assemble, but in moments of political crisis it could wield considerable power, especially in financial and

104 Dumolyn, De Brugse opstand, 284–8. 105 An overview in Arnould, Les lendemains de Nancy, 23–7. 106 The decision was made ‘bij den ghemeenen buke van deser stede ’ (CAB: SR, 1476–77, 50r; edited by Gilliodts-Van Severen, La mort de Charles, 24–5). 107 Head, belly, and feet each symbolised a certain social or political organisation, which all together formed a closed society. All limbs had a specific function, and they all acted for the ‘common good’ of the body. This ‘organology’ goes back to Aristotle and was continued by John of Salisbury (Struve, The importance of the organism, 309–10). 108 Or as the Privilege of 30 March stated: ‘De burchmeesters, scepenen, raden, hooftmans van der poorterie, dekens van den ambachten ende neeringhen, over ende in de name van den gheheelen lechame ende ghemeente van onser goeder stede van Brugghe ’ (Gilliodts-Van Severen, Coutumes de la ville, II, 72). 109 An overview of the Bruges craft guilds in Dumolyn, De Brugse opstand, 106; Mertens, De verdeling van de Brugse schepenzetels, 460; idem, Bestuursinstellingen van de stad Brugge, 325. 110 A new list of this hierachy was composed in 1477 (edited by Vandewalle, De Brugse stadsmagistraat, 39–40). 158

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military affairs.111 This was the case in 1477, when the city faced a common danger, the war against France. In order to unite the city against the enemy and to give the nine Members a modicum of representation, the urban government convened the Great Council. Later, when the guilds regained power in April 1477, the Great Council became a permanent institution comprised of representatives of the craft guilds with considerable governing power. But in February, guild representatives merely approved a decision, already made by the city government, to select Jan Breydel as a leader of the city militia. However, after the Ghent craft guilds presented demands that they be included in the Ghent city government, the Bruges guilds also began taking political action. The first few weeks of the Bruges Revolt of 1477 followed the same pattern as the beginning of the 1436 Revolt. The craft guilds went on strike on 18 February, bringing the city’s economy to a standstill by unleasing their most powerful political weapon.112 The urban government did not have enough authority to break the strike, and could not even keep the guilds out of the Belfry, where the urban privileges were stored. Shouting ‘after the example of Ghent’, the representatives of the craft guilds forced their way into the Belfry and began to examine the documents looking for evidence of their former political rights in order to ‘considerably improve’ their present condition.113 On 23 February guildsmen carrying their weapons assembled in each of the city’s guild houses, an overt violation of the Treaty of Arras which prohibited any armed gatherings in the city without the consent of the city boards.114 This action, which was not suppressed by the city government, was a sure warning that the guilds had returned to power. Shortly afterwards, guild representatives presented their demands. They did this in a typical form of urban protest, the so-called request, ‘requête ’ or ‘rekwest ’, a pamphlet listing and justifying complaints about government actions. It was a political medium that was quite widespread in the Low Countries.115 The demands in a ‘request’ often were written so that they could be incorporated directly into a law, but their acceptance depended on the outcome of negotiations, which had variable outcomes depending on the political strength or weakness of the government. In most cases, presentation of the request was the last phase before an armed occupation of the Market square by the guilds. If the requests were not granted, the guilds’ only further option to gain power was violence. While we do not know who wrote the request or who led the revolt, as each craft guild chose its leaders or representatives for the meeting of the Great Council, it is likely that they chose new, more radical deans to replace the deans appointed by urban government at the annual renewal of the city boards in September 1476. As their approval of the Bruges restriction shows, the previous deans had mostly belonged to the ruling elite, but their identities are unknown. Names of guild leaders were only recorded after April 1477, when the guilds gained seats on the city boards.

111 Dumolyn, Population et structures, 50; Blockmans, De volksvertegenwoordiging, 86. In 1436, another moment of severe political crisis, the nine Members had drawn up a regulation for the meetings of the Great Council, see Dumolyn, “Rebelheden ende vergaderinghen ”, 320–3. 112 Dits de Excellente Cronike, 179r. 113 ‘Naer texemple van die van Ghendt ’, for a ‘behoorlicke beteringhe ’ (Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 123). 114 The craft guilds were ‘in die wapene, elc in sijn ambochtshuys ’ (Dits de Excellente Cronike, 179r). About the ban on armed meetings: Dumolyn, De Brugse opstand, 287. 115 Prak, Gouden Eeuw, 206–7; Van Nierop, Popular participation, 280–90. 159

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In the request, which no longer exists, the craft guilds demanded the repeal of the high indirect taxes, a ‘renewal’ (a complete change of officials) of the city boards, and the abolition of the Treaty of Arras.116 The urban government did not immediately give in, but slowly lost control over events. The guilds began a public reading of their privileges in the market square before an (unarmed) crowd. Soon after, burgomaster Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Michiel fled to Ghent, probably because he feared that he would be the primary scapegoat for the craft guilds. As burgomaster, he was the head of the city government, supported by Charles the Bold, which had implemented so many ordinances against the guilds. Furthermore, he was the brother-in-law of Pieter Lanchals, the Bruges citizen who was responsible for the duke’s financial policy. After his flight, the urban government, in trying to deal with the situation, did not appoint a new burgomaster, but instead, asked Louis of Bruges, lord of Gruuthuze, to come to Bruges. The future knight of honour of Mary of Burgundy enjoyed great prestige in Bruges, while also representing the central state. City officials hoped that the charisma and the political contacts of the important noblemen would calm the agitated guilds. Louis could also serve as a ‘neutral’ intermediary between their representatives, the urban government and the state. Louis of Bruges was also asked to convey guild demands to the duchess in Ghent, but the results of this are unknown. On 25 February 1477 the Great Council of the city decided to send a messenger to Mary of Burgundy with the request to destroy the Treaty of Arras. The urban government had given in, but the guilds promised to wait for the opinion of the court before adding the deed to the word. On 28 February the city government made new concessions, without surrendering its own or the state’s interests entirely. In order to ‘avoid further commotion’, the city boards decided to abolish the indirect tax on corn and lower the levy on other commodities.117 This measure brought an end to the fiscal policy which had been characteristic of the reign of Charles the Bold. The financial consequences of this measure were not drastic, because the Flemish Members had recently decided to suspend payments of all aides awarded to the late duke, except for an aide for Margaret of York (which only cost the city 33 lb. gr. per year).118 The Bruges treasury could easily afford to lower taxes. However, the city government knew that suspending payments to the central state would lead to trouble. The state did not have sufficient funds to fight the war against France. Neither could it pay for the organisation and operation of the new state structure or the living costs of the duchess. Together with Louis of Bruges, the future head of Mary of Burgundy’s personal court, the city council agreed to pay an annuity of 800 lb. gr. – a financial obligation dictated by the Treaty of Arras – and the so-called ‘seventh penny’ tax on the total city income to the court.119 On the following day, the city council agreed to the request of the Estates-General for a new aide intended to halt the French invasion. The Estates decided to turn over command of 100,000 soldiers to Adolf of Cleves, the 116 Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 123. 117 ‘Omme meerdere beroerte te schuwene ’ (ibidem, 124), the ‘assize ’ on wine (the ‘dobbele assijze ’) was cut in half on 28 February 1477, ‘ter inkele ’. The indirect tax on beer was lowered from 14 groats (the level of 1468) to 6 groats (CAB: SR, 1476–77, 17v–19v). Also in Ghent the indirect tax on corn was discontinued (Ryckbosch, Tussen Gavere en Cadzand, 198). About the meeting of 25 February: SAB: FD, 182. 118 CAB: SR, 1476–77, 113r. 119 CAB: SR, 1476–77, 125v. 160

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military commander for the Low Countries. The Estates-General paid for the soldiers, and divided up the costs proportionally, giving Flanders responsibility for paying 34,000 soldiers.120 However, these payments were not made efficiently, because challenges to the Estates representatives in their own hometowns were on the rise. The city of Bruges only decided in April that its portion of the troop payments would be raised by borrowing from its citizens. To avoid further problems and convince the guilds to support their policies, the city government decided to inform guild leaders of all its decisions. On 1 March, Louis of Bruges reported the decisions of the Estates and the city council to the representatives of the guilds, and asked them for their support for those decisions, as a report of this meeting recounts.121 The Bruges nobleman first asked the Great Council if the city wanted to pay the seventh penny and the rent of 800 lb. gr. to the court. In exchange for this ‘friendly act’, the duchess would grant the city the right to collect a tax on the property of illegitimate persons.122 The lord of Gruuthuze warned the guilds that he would not tolerate an act of ‘lèse majesté’, such as the imprisonment of the duchess. Louis was probably referring to an incident in September 1436, when Duchess Isabel of Portugal and the young Charles the Bold were threatened with imprisonment in the city, or a similar event in May 1437, when Philip the Good had run into the same difficulty.123 The court was planning an official entry of Mary of Burgundy into Bruges, in which the city would recognize her as count of Flanders, but the court wanted to assure that the entry would be ‘Joyous’ rather than troublesome. The lord insisted that the craft guilds were not to use the occasion to demand political rights.124 Finally, the lord of Gruuthuze asked the guilds to give up their strike, because it was damaging the whole city. This document demonstrates that the balance of power had now turned in favour of the craft guilds. The court was forced to beg for its very existence from a segment of the population which had been kept out of power for years. On 1 March the craft guilds had not yet gained official standing, but the meeting made clear that the ‘belly’ of the city was a dominant influence on city politics. The craft guilds had profited from the vacuum of power, and now firmly refused to end their strike.125 They were finally experiencing the chance to get even with an urban government which had made decisions unfavourable to their interests, and a central government which had been repressive. Louis of Bruges went to Ghent to consult with the count, and on 6 March he returned to Bruges.126 In presence of the city council he announced the conclusion everyone had already realized: the Treaty of Arras would have to go. The next day the city council erected a baldachin, adorned with golden cloth, on the Burg of Bruges and Louis of Bruges himself cut up the Treaty of Arras 120 Wellens, Les Etats-Généraux, 163. 121 CAB: PO, 1148. 122 The Treaty of Arras had deprived the city of this right (Carlier, La politique des autorités, 208–12). But the ‘vriendscape ’ only brought the city a small sum. In accounting year 1477–78 this levy (on the property of illegitimate people who died in the city, and who had no family) only yielded 39 lb. 8 s. gr. to the city (CAB: SR, 1477–78, 22r-v). 123 Dumolyn, De Brugse opstand, 170 and 226. 124 ‘Item, angaende tpoint dat in den brief van verbande [the treaty of Arras] staet nopende dat waert dat yement hand sloughe bij faite of quaden wille om den prince, princesse ende huere kinderen, ghelijc leeraers zegghen ende wel weten, es cryme de lese maiesté, welke men wel weet dat tghemeene van deser stede in gheender manieren doen en zouden willen, noch laten doen, maer dat beschermen naer hare moghenthede met live ende met goede. Zo es hare begheerte dat dat point zine stede houde ’ (CAB: PO, 1148). 125 Dits die Excellente Cronike, 179v. 126 CAB: SR, 1476–77, 126r. 161

For the Common Good

with a knife, before an enthusiastic crowd. The nobleman asked the spectators if the duchess was welcome in the city, and the crowd answered: ‘Yes, of course. With pleasure’…127 The ceremony in which one of the most important noblemen from the court destroyed a ducal document which had punished the city, demonstrated that an era had come to the end. The Treaty of Arras only survived Charles the Bold by two months. For almost forty years the document had provided the legal foundation for Burgundian duke’s extensive influence on city decision-making, as well as political oppression of the craft guilds. Because the Burgundian court allied itself to the Bruges ruling elite, the urban government had not wanted to destroy the Treaty of Arras. But the craft guilds had discovered that the political weakness of the dynasty had undermined the status of the Bruges elite. The threat of a strike was enough to force these opponents of the urban guilds to capitulate. For all participants in this struggle, a peaceful resolution was of primary importance. The city boards remained in power, but many political actors felt the need for a new treaty that would establish a new relationship among the powerful groups within the city, and between Bruges and the Burgundian dynasty. As in Ghent, a new urban privilege was in the making for Bruges. 3.1.3.3 The Bruges Privilege of 30 March 1477 Now that they had won access to power, what were the political demands of the craft guilds? Both the genesis and the contents of the urban privilege of Bruges reveal the political program of those who had been excluded from power for decades. Negotiations over the new privileges started shortly after the abolition of the Treaty of Arras. The city government appointed six people to the commission charged with drawing up the privilege. Willem Moreel was probably one of them, as he confirmed at his trial in February 1482. The commission presented its results to the Nine Members, the deans of the craft guilds and the six deans of the ‘poorterij ’. At the negotiation table, the craft guilds were represented by two people for each of the Nine Members. The Nine Members added six points to the commission’s draft of the urban privilege, which was signed by Mary of Burgundy on 30 March 1477. The surviving ‘request’ for the amendment (of the six points) provides exceptional insight into the complaints of the Nine Members.128 In addition to the six points that were to be added to the privilege, in their amendment the Nine Members also requested that several new laws be passed. Apparently, the craft guilds used the power they had gained to resolve some practical conflicts. They requested that the production of beer be controlled, and also that the production of caps be controlled by the capmakers’ guild. The Bruges Markethall should be cleaned regularly, prostitutes should be confined to one quarter of the city, and the night clock of the city should be maintained. Since the records of the urban laws of Bruges (the so-called ‘hallegeboden ’) only survive for the period after 1490, we do not know if these demands ever became law. A very noteworthy demand of the Nine Members is their wish to maintain ‘brotherly love’ between Ghent and Bruges.129 This suggests that the craft guilds of Ghent and Bruges 127 ‘Daer up dat al tghemeene volc riep: ja wy, ja wi! Gheerne! Met blijden sinne! ’; ‘Sevene in maerte, corts onghetruert, doe bleef te Brugghe tcalfsvel gheschuert ’ (Dits die Excellente Cronike, 180r). 128 ‘Dese naervolghende articlen waren bij hooftmannen ende dekens boven den articlen gheadviseert ende gheraempt bi den .xviii.en ende .vi.e persoonen inneghebrocht ende begheert vercreghen te werdene, daerof onder correxcie eeneghe bij previlege vercreghen zullen moeten zijn ende andre gheremediert ende voorsien worden bi der wet van Brugghe ’ (CAB: PO, 1144). 129 ‘Broederlike minne ’ (CAB: PO, 1144). 162

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carried on a correspondence, or perhaps disputes had arisen between them. Nevertheless, the Bruges craft guilds were well aware that a united front of craft guilds in Ghent and Bruges was a powerful force with which to pressure the ruling elite of both towns. This remarkable feeling of solidarity would be taxed severely by events in the following weeks. The six articles the Nine Members wanted to add to the urban privilege radically changed the political landscape in Bruges and even in the surrounding countryside (the ‘Brugse kwartier ’). First, the representatives of the Nine Members established a new process for the annual election of the city boards of Bruges. Henceforth the city board of aldermen would include nine representatives from the Nine Members, and four from the ‘poorterij ’. The latter would be chosen by four representatives from the court, and from this group a burgomaster would be elected by the thirteen aldermen. The aldermen would choose twelve councillors and one burgomaster of the councillors. They were elected by the same distribution principle. Each of the Nine Members would have a councillor, and the remaining four would come from the ‘poorterij ’. The urban privilege thus institutionalised the power regained by the urban craft guilds – 16 of the 26 aldermen and councillors had to be guild members.130 This distribution formula was faithfully copied into the privilege of 30 March. In their second demand, the urban craft guilds desired that Mary of Burgundy would order the election of new city boards, under the new rules and as soon as possible. The guilds wanted to cash in on their political power immediately before it disappeared by an unfortunate turn of events. Thirdly, the Nine Members requested the restoration of the socio-economic and political rights of the craft guilds. Amendments to the draft of the urban privilege should include ratification of all old rights and privileges of each craft guild. The guilds expressed the desire that the new urban government would no longer violate any of these rights and privileges. The Nine Members also demanded fair justice from the water bailiff of Sluis. The craft guilds, as well as the merchant elite, thought that state officials should not obstruct commerce with partisan justice. The craft guilds were using the influence they had gained to clear away burdens imposed by the faulty decisions of both the urban elite and the duke’s officials. This demand was also copied verbatim into the urban privilege of 30 March 1477. Two other demands in the amendment were more problematic. The Nine Members wanted to remove the Franc of Bruges from its position as the Fourth Member of Flanders, and desired that the recently-founded city of Middelburg would come under the authority of Bruges. The political tensions between the city of Bruges and the surrounding castellany of the Franc of Bruges (which extended from Ostend to Eeklo) already had a long history. In the beginning of the fourteenth century Bruges dominated the castellany of the Franc of Bruges, but sporadically after 1310 and permanently after 1386, representatives of the Franc participated in the meetings of the Members of Flanders. In 1437 Duke Philip the Good had given the Franc permission to become the Fourth Member of Flanders, alongside Ghent, Bruges, and Ypres, in order to act as a political counterbalance to the city of Bruges which was then governed by the craft guilds.131 As the previous chapter has shown, the dukes found in the castellany a largely noble, loyal elite which would carry out ducal policy in exchange for political power and personal wealth. Abolition of the 130 Van Leeuwen, De Vlaamse wetsvernieuwing, 161–7; Mertens, Brugge en Gent, 388. 131 Blockmans, De volksvertegenwoordiging, 130–1; Prevenier, Het Brugse Vrije, 6–18; Dumolyn, De Brugse opstand, 213. 163

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Fourth Member thus deprived the duke of an ally at the meetings of the Members of Flanders. This had important political and financial consequences, because the Members determined what aides would be awarded to the duke. Bruges and the Franc of Bruges together paid two-fifths of each aide.132 When the craft guilds took over the city of Bruges, and Bruges took over the Franc, the Bruges craft guilds decided the fate of two-fifths of the ducal aides. This part of the amendment ran completely counter to the painstakinglyconstructed apparatus the Burgundian dynasty had built up to diminish the political role of groups they were not easily able to influence and to remove them from the process of approving aides in the county. The autonomy of the Franc of Bruges was not only an obstacle to the political and financial domination of the city of Bruges, but also to its economic hegemony over the surrounding countryside. As they had done in past revolts, the Bruges craft guilds sought to improve their economic situation by tightening controls on the hinterland, and strengthening the city’s monopoly on production.133 As in 1436, the Bruges craft guilds now demanded that manual work be prohibited within a one-mile radius around the city. The surrounding cities and ports, such as Damme, Sluis, and Middelburg, were to be placed under the urban government of Bruges, so that it could insure that the city’s staple privileges were observed.134 The craft guilds were particularly interested in controlling Middelburg (in Flanders) because of the economic privileges Duke Philip the Good had given the city. Pieter Bladelin had built the city a few decades before, and it was bought in 1476 by chancellor Guillaume Hugonet (who was still alive when the amendment was published).135 The craft guilds intended that the city’s domination of the hinterland would eliminate economic competition prohibited by the Bruges privileges. Rather than attempting to eliminate all economic production in the countryside, the guilds were really trying to create favourable conditions for economic production within the city. They wanted to protect the urban economy because it was the basis of their social position. They were not so much interested in using their political voice and restored privileges to monopolise economic policy as they were in shaping the economic decisionmaking process. They sought control over decisions about the key elements of commercial traffic, especially provisioning of the city, price structures and the organisation of markets and economic space.136 The political activity of the craft guilds did result in some economic ‘protectionism’, but it was principally directed towards creating a favourable climate for business in Bruges. The craft guilds viewed the new urban privilege as an instrument for eliminating unfavourable economic competition and adjusting the economic policies of the city government when necessary. The elite from the Franc of Bruges did their best to counter the loss of authority that the guild amendment proposed. Mary of Burgundy confirmed the board of the Franc on 1 132 The Franc of Bruges paid 20.43 % of the Flemish aides, the city of Bruges 22.85 % (Blockmans, De volksvertegenwoordiging, 439; Prevenier, Het Brugse Vrije, 55). 133 Prevenier, Het Brugse Vrije, 35; Blockmans, De volksvertegenwoordiging, 130; Dumolyn, De Brugse opstand, 104. See also Stabel, Guilds in late medieval Flanders, 210. 134 As would be stipulated by the privilege (Gilliodts-Van Severen, Coutumes de la ville, II, 84, 88, 91 and 93). A comparison with 1436 in Dumolyn, “Rebelheden ende vergaderinghen ”, 314–6. 135 It had several economic privileges, for example, the right to have a metal industry (Haemers, Middelburg na Pieter Bladelin, 218–21; Declercq, Dumolyn, & Haemers, Vivre noblement, 11–2). 136 See the example of the urban space in Stabel, From the market to the shop, 104. More general, about guild politics: Lis & Soly, Craft guilds, 14 and Prak, Corporate politics, passim. 164

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February 1477, and the Franc was admitted to the meeting of the Members of Flanders.137 The Franc board, aware of its impending abolition as a Member and changing colors like a chameleon to adjust to the spirit of the privileges of 1477, drew up new regulations for the election of the board. The new regulation required that aldermen of the Franc speak Dutch and live in the Franc. There would be an annual election of fifteen aldermen, and one of these would be burgomaster of the ‘commune ’ or community. Three other burgomasters would represent each quarter of the Franc.138 But these efforts were in vain. On 20 March 1477 Mary of Burgundy removed the Franc of Bruges from its place as the Fourth Member of Flanders and placed the castellany under the jurisdiction of Bruges. The duchess also confirmed the new election procedures for the governing board of the Franc.139 The desire to eliminate the Franc as a Member of Flanders was not only supported by the craft guilds, but also by some of the Franc’s inhabitants. On 22 March, a group identified as ‘the community of the Franc’, led by Jacob Joris from Jabbeke (a village near Ostend that belonged to the jurisdiction of the Franc) forced its way into the Franc aldermen’s hall in the Burg of Bruges.140 The intruders tore up the letters and the registers they found in the building, and shouted their desire to be ‘under the law and the justice of Bruges’. 141 Apparently there was some dissatisfaction with justice in the Franc of Bruges, but nothing is known about the social background of the resistance. The incident had no political effect because the group’s demand had already been realised, but it did mark the first outbreak of violence in the city. In Ghent, however, violent events had begun the week before, when the craft guilds demonstrated to demand justice. On 14 March the EstatesGeneral imprisoned chancellor Hugonet and others held responsible for Charles the Bold’s policies. The execution of several Ghent officials followed. The group who invaded the Franc building in Bruges were likely inspired by these cries for justice in Ghent. The incident also shows that the Bruges elite was not able to prevent violent outbursts in the city. The power vacuum in the city was rapidly being filled by the craft guilds who took it upon themselves to rebuke the former regime. In response, the Bruges bailiff arrested 16 former Bruges burgomasters and aldermen and imprisoned them in the Burg jail on 26 March.142 These arrests were largely symbolic acts which never resulted in formal charges, nor were penalties awarded. Instead, the bailiff was acting on Mary of Burgundy’s orders, according to the chronicles, because the court was opening an investigation of possible corruption – as it had done in Ghent. Mary and the court were likely advised by Louis of Bruges, who knew the political climate of Bruges quite well, to take action to prevent the outbreak of violent demonstrations in Bruges resembling those which had recently occurred in Ghent. The court may have secured the cooperation of the city government, or even the 16 prisoners themselves, to put on this highly visible symbolic display of its committment to justice in the city. Furthermore, the imprisonment actually protected the accused from mob violence. With this move, the court and the urban elite hoped to gain control over events and regain the political initiative in the city. 137 Gilliodts-Van Severen, Coutume du Franc, II, 393–9. 138 Blockmans, De volksvertegenwoordiging, 89. 139 Ibidem, 132; idem, Handelingen van de leden, 9. 140 According to the chronicler he lead the ‘commuyn van den Vryen ’ (Dits die Excellente Cronike, 180v). See also Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 126. 141 ‘Te wette ende rechte staen onder die van Brugghe ’ (Dits die Excellente Cronike, 180v). 142 Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 127; Dits die Excellente Cronike, 180v. 165

For the Common Good

Illustration 11: The Bruges Privilege of 30 March 1477 (City Archives of Bruges, Political Charters nr. 1152).

The strategy was successful. Chronicler Nicolas Despars noted the prisoners were not punished, because friends and relatives worked to prevent a thorough investigation.143 The only concrete action was the issuing of an arrest warrant for the burgomaster Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Michiel, then in Ghent. On 27 March, guild leaders proposed to the crowd assembled in the Great Market square that the prisoners be allowed to move freely throughout the city. In their speech, partially preserved in the archives, the leaders explained that the urban privileges prohibited imprisonment of people who had not been legally convicted. They added that an embassy from the Scottish king had arrived in Bruges for trade negotiations, and one of the prisoners, Anselmus Adornes, was the Bruges specialist in the Scottish trade.144 Guild leaders warned the crowd that the imprisonment of the city’s most important politicians put the plans for a Joyous Entry for Mary of Burgundy, and her approval of the new urban privilege, into jeopardy. Thus, the leaders concluded, the economic and political life in the city was endangered because of this ‘unjust’ imprisonment. The common people (‘ghemeenen volke ’) in the market square allowed themselves to be convinced by the arguments of the guild leaders, and accepted the release of the 143 Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 127. 144 A part of the speech was recorded, but the document has a wrong date (22 March), because the imprisonment happened on 26 March 1477. Probably the copyist forgot the ‘v ’ of ‘xxvii ’ ? (CAB: KO, 54). 166

Chapter 3 The Cities

prisoners. Along with other revolts in Ghent and Bruges, this incident shows that the common craftsmen could access a limited degree of political participation by attending meetings in the central market square, but they did not have real political power.145 Common craftsmen approved decisions, and by doing so, legitimised the policies of the guild leaders. Both leaders and followers realized in this case that they had to restrain violent actions by the crowd because these would endanger approval of the new privilege. The common craftsmen agreed with the arguments and public policy of their leaders, and with their decision to release the prisoners, the ordinary craftsmen removed obstacles to the approval of the new privilege. Mary of Burgundy signed the Bruges privilege in Ghent on 30 March 1477, because Ghent was in too much turmoil for her to leave the city. The new urban privilege contained six provisions.146 It restored the political autonomy of the city of Bruges. It removed obstacles, such as tolls and market restrictions, which the former duke had imposed on commerce. The craft guilds regained political power, and their rights were restored. The privilege copied the new election procedure imposed on the urban elite verbatim from the guild amendment, the most significant evidence of the guilds’ return to power. The privilege ratified all the old privileges of the city, such as the exemption from tolls for all citizens of Bruges.147 It also featured a number of measures against corruption within the urban government, to which we will return later. Finally, the ways in which the dynasty might influence urban politics were diminished; Bruges became the head of its quarter, and ducal officials could no longer sit on the city boards. The contents of the privilege were very similar to those of the Great and the Flemish privileges of February 1477. But unlike those documents, the new urban privileges, the Bruges privilege and the Ghent privilege of January 1477, provided a legal basis for the inclusion of the craft guilds in urban government. The charter also regulated a revised relationship with the court. Mary of Burgundy swore not to violate the charter, and, the Bruges privilege, like all the other privileges of 1477, contained the duchess’ promise that if the dynasty violated the privilege, the city was not bound to fulfil its obligations under the agreement.148 Another institutional change demonstrates the power the Nine Members had gained in the city. The privilege directed the city boards to govern political, military and judicial affairs, but put the city’s finances into the hands of ‘financial commissioners’ (‘ghecommitteerden ’), instead of a pair of city treasurers. The six commissioners were empowered to oversee the ‘government of the city’s property’. 149 They were not allowed to make independent decisions, but were to carry out the decisions made by the ‘ghemeenen buucke ’, or the Great Council, who also selected the commissioners. This permanent meeting 145 Dumolyn & Haemers, Patterns of urban rebellion, 390–1; Haemers, De Gentse opstand, 239–65. 146 The edition of Gilliodts-Van Severen incorrectly dated the privilege 13 March 1477. The document was signed the ‘dertichsten dach van maerte ’ by the duchess and her court (including Duke John I of Cleves, the Bishop of Liege, Louis de Bourbon, Louis of Bruges, the presidents of the Great Council and the Chamber of Accounts of Lille ( Jean de la Bouverie and Jean le Doubz) and unnamed others (Gilliodts-Van Severen, Coutume de la ville, II, 72–100 and CAB: PO, 1152)). A clerk knocked over a pot of ink in 1478, ruining the document; the surviving text is a copy redacted in August 1478 (CAB: SR, 1477–78, 150v and CA, 14, 295r). 147 Mary of Burgundy had already ratified this privilege some weeks before (CAB: PO 1147). 148 If Mary of Burgundy or her successors violated the privilege, Bruges had the right to ‘nemmermeer gheenranden dienst doen en sullen noch bystandichede in gheenrehanden zaken die ons van nooden zullen zijn of die wij van hem begheeren of versoucken mochten ’ (Gilliodts-Van Severen, Coutume de la ville, II, 99). 149 ‘Tbewint ende gouvernement van der stede goedinghen ’ (Ibidem, II, 79). 167

For the Common Good

of the representatives of the Nine Members thus took over control of finances from the city boards. The six commissioners were appointed at the same time that the city boards were chosen every year in September, and every four months they had to report and justify their expenditures to the Great Council. This stipulation of the privilege was not actually new. In September 1461 the Bruges government had created a comparable financial commission of six persons when the city was trying to deal with growing expenses.150 They needed the participation of the Great Council at that time, because important fiscal decisions had be made in order to raise more revenue. But with the succession of Charles the Bold in 1467, the commission was abolished, excluding the Great Council again from political participation.151 The privilege of 1477 was really bringing back an institutional structure which had governed the city during the last decade of Philip the Good’s reign, just as the indirect tax rates were being rolled back to the levels of that decade. The reestablishment of the ‘financial commission’ in Bruges was a much better guarantee that the Nine Members would have influence in urban politics, especially in financial matters. The Great Council had the power to approve or disapprove all financial and fiscal decisions, which gave the craft guilds a strong, permanent voice in decision-making, particularly over the type and amount of city funds sent to the central government. For the next fifteen years the Great Council participated in politics, but, as might be expected, when Maximilian of Austria took back control of the city in October 1492 after the failure of the Flemish Revolt and the Treaty of Sluis, he abolished the commission.152 The financial commission provided a means for the Great Council to oversee the city’s finances, a policy that was structured by the privilege of 30 March. Without the consent of the Great Council, the government could not levy new indirect taxes or increase existing taxes. The privilege also abolished the Bruges Restriction of 1475, with the result that Bruges aldermen again received salaries from the city, and administrative offices were no longer to be leased. The six commissioners were permitted to distribute gifts once again, but only if the city profited – if not, the commissioners had to pay for the gifts out of their own pockets. In addition to abolishing the Restriction, the Great Council took aim at corruption. The urban aldermen and councillors could no longer assume more than one administrative office, and they could not lease a farm of indirect taxes. No one was exempt from taxes, and the misuse of staple privileges and craft guild rights were to be severely punished. These guidelines that the Bruges privilege of 1477 established for city finances clearly demonstrate that the craft guilds now held the power. 3.1.3.4 The April Revolt On 17 April 1477 the Bruges government ordered the destruction of the Flemish Privilege of 11 February 1477, to be accompanied by a splendid ceremony in the Great Market square.153 The charter had only survived for ten weeks, because serious problems 150 CAB: HS, 7. In 1463 the number of commissioners was cut back to four (CAB: PO, 1090; edited by Gilliodts-Van Severen, Inventaire de la ville de Bruges, V, 439–41). 151 CAB: RW, 1468–1501, 1v. 152 As a consequence, the financial commission elected in September 1492 was the last which held this office (until September 1493; CAB: RW, 1468–1501, 209v). 153 ‘Twelke op de maerct openbaerlike ten aenziene van den ghemeenen buke van deser stede te nieuten ghedaen was ’ (CAB: SR, 1476–77, 131r – edited by Gilliodts-Van Severen, La mort de Charles, 45). For what follows, see: Blockmans, Breuk of continuïteit, 118–9 and idem, De volksvertegenwoordiging, 132. 168

Chapter 3 The Cities

had arisen with its contents during the busy spring of 1477. The privilege repeatedly spoke of the ‘Four Members of Flanders’, and once explicitly named ‘tland van den Vrijen ’ as the fourth Member of Flanders.154 Mary of Burgundy’s decision on 21 March and the Bruges privilege of 30 March had removed the Franc from its position as the fourth Member of Flanders, and Mary repeated the decision in a charter dated 9 April.155 To confirm the exclusion, representatives of the Nine Members of Bruges called for a new privilege which named only three Members of Flanders. They also ordered the board of the Franc to hand over its copy of the Flemish Privilege and a ducal charter of 1 February in which Mary had recognized the Franc as the Fourth Member. Since the Great Privilege of 11 February 1477 did not mention the Franc, it did not have to be revised to meet the new political circumstances. The board of the Franc had to hand it over to the Bruges city boards, in whose archives it still rests.156 The theatrical destruction of the Flemish Privilege did not cause as much commotion in the city of Bruges during the first weeks of April as did the failure of the government to elect new city boards as ordered in the Bruges Privilege. Mary of Burgundy entered the city on 5 April 1477 with the usual pomp, and was inaugurated as countess of Flanders. In a highly symbolic performance of the new political order, the deans of the craft guilds stood on a small stage in the Great Market square on 9 April while Mary, standing on the balcony of the Belfry, swore to uphold the privileges of the town. She again confirmed the demotion of the Franc to the crowd.157 But the guildsmen in the market square must have been surprised that Mary did not give the signal to elect new city boards. Was there perhaps division between the former city boards and the representatives of the Nine Members in the negotiations over the selection of the new aldermen? Or did the former urban government want to delay until the craft guilds had lost political strength? The delay is not explained, but that afternoon the leaders of the urban guilds held a meeting to deliberate strategy.158 Late in the day they gave the craftsmen the order to occupy the Great Market square. For the first time since the Revolt of 1437 the political tension between the urban elite and the craft guilds overflowed into action. The craftsmen went on strike and assembled in arms in their guild houses. In the evening they occupied the Market square. Bruges had risen in revolt! The ‘wapeninghe ’, the occupation of the Market square by the armed members of the craft guilds, was a controlled outburst of anger. Etymologically ‘wapeninghe ’ means ‘an armed meeting’, and in the medieval Flemish cities, it denoted a demonstration in which members of the craft guilds armed themselves and occupied a central place in the city. Observing a strict hierarchy the guilds marched in ranks under their guild banners and pitched their tents in the market square, preventing commerce and economic activities. In the late medieval county of Flanders the ‘wapeninghe ’ was the most important manifestation of political discontent by urban craft guilds. It signaled the political dissatisfaction of the guilds, in this case with the failure of the city government to elect new city boards. The ‘wapeninghe ’ also expressed political unity and social cohesion among the craft guilds. The 154 Blockmans, Privilegie voor Vlaanderen, 134. 155 CAB: PO, 1153 and CAG: 94, 708. 156 CAB: PO, 1146 (nr. 1145 is the copy of Bruges). 157 CAB: SR, 1476–77, 129r–130r (partially edited by Gilliodts-Van Severen, La mort de Charles, 40–3); Vander Linden, Itinéraires de Marie, 8. 158 Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 130; Dits die Excellente Cronike, 182v. 169

For the Common Good

anger of the craftsmen was channeled into a ritualized ceremony which kept them from protesting in more violent and individual ways. The leaders of the guilds could more easily control their ‘troops’ if they were assembled together in one place, and the ceremonial rituals had a calming effect on the craftsmen.159 The ceremony also served as the final warning to the city government to fix the problem before the guilds resorted to genuine violence. If the urban government did not begin negotiations with the guilds, their leaders could give their assembled troops the order to attack those responsible for the unpopular policy. The threat of the ‘wapeninghe ’ was not to be ignored. The craft guilds reinforced their demands by imprisoning city representatives who had returned from the meeting of the Estates-General in Ghent. Their leader, a city attorney (pensionaris ), the canon Jan Coolbrant, was hauled before the crowds in the market square and forced to explain the Estates’ decision publicly. He was pointedly asked why the Franc of Bruges had been retained as a Member of Flanders in the original copy of the Flemish privilege.160 Under orders, armed craftsmen broke into the house of burgomaster Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Michiel, who had fled to Ghent. They smashed several barrels of wine to pieces and stole valuables.161 Guild leaders were sending a strong signal to the urban government, which reacted predictably by sending out negotiators, Adolf of Cleves and Louis of Bruges. The two noblemen promised to grant the guilds’ requests but did not make concrete concessions, instead arguing that the court was busy with other, more urgent tasks. French troops were advancing on Ypres, and a delegation from the German Emperor was due to arrive the next day. The city government of Bruges had decided to wait, probably in hope that the unity among the craft guilds would fall apart. Guild leaders shifted the protest into a higher gear, realizing that their own position would be untenable if they could not force the election of new city boards. They ordered the erection of a stage (called a ‘parc ’) in the Great Market square, and invited the city administrators to meet with them on the stage for political discussions.162 The construction of a kind of ‘city board’ in the open Market square transferred the city’s political nerve centre out of the city hall into the open space. This highly symbolic act was intended to give the craftsmen the impression they could influence policy in town, while their leaders knew that they did not have any real access to power. The same day a group of armed men from the Franc of Bruges asked to join the ‘wapeninghe ’. They submitted to the craft guilds, saying that the Franc troops now belonged to the Bruges army. Guild leaders also read out publicly the contents of letters to the Ghent aldermen asking the latter to send their old copy of the Flemish privilege in order that it might be replaced with the revised text. Despite these public displays, the assembled craftsmen realised that guild leaders had not achieved their goal. There were no new city boards. After five days of assembly in the Market square, the first signs of protest appeared against the leadership of the revolt. 159 Verbruggen, Geweld in Vlaanderen, 112–44; Haemers, A moody community, 65–80; idem, De Gentse opstand, 195–205; Boone, Armes, coursses, assemblees, 14–20. 160 Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 133. Jan Coolbrant was a canon of the St. Donatian church in Bruges and a civil servant of the city (CAB: SR, 1476–77, 42v). 161 Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 130–1. 162 ‘Item, doe wasser up die marct een parc ghemaect om scepenen, hoofdmannen ende dekens daer binnen onghedroomt te sijn, ende bancken omme up te sittene om dagelicx tsamen te sprekene, raet ende advijs met malcanderen te nemene ’ (Dits die Excellente Cronike, 182v). 170

Chapter 3 The Cities

In the Market square arose ‘a curious shout’, a claim that the leaders of the guilds had been bribed by the city government.163 This was not a wild rumour, but rather a political message from the craftsmen who were asking their guild leaders to take decisive action. The term ‘roup ’, as a synonym for agitation, expressed a protest from the lowest urban social groups who did not want to compromise.164 Cries of ‘Kill! Kill!’ (‘slaet doot, slaet doot ’) resounded through the square. The chronicler Despars records that the radicals were a small group, and the moderates were more numerous, but the moderates may have been less numerous but more powerful, and ultimately successful in convincing their more radical, but less renowned, members to fall into line with the guild leaders. They shouted out that they wanted other, more radical leaders, who would force the urban government to make concessions, with violence if necessary. But a significant number of craftsmen (the majority, or a more powerful section?) shuddered at the thought of violence and feared a take-over by radicals. Recognising the danger to their authority, guild leaders scrambled to regain control over the assembled craftsmen. The dean of the smiths took the lead and called the craftsmen to order, shouting: ‘Everyone under his banner!’ Shouting ‘Unity!’, the craftsmen obeyed.165 After the guild leaders had averted the immediate crisis, they informed the captain of the city, Louis of Bruges, that political concessions were needed to calm the craftsmen (and to maintain their own leadership positions). The guild leaders had chosen a favourable moment, because an embassy of the German Emperor was on its way to the city. Louis of Bruges probably made some promises to the guild leaders, but there is no record of their meeting. The central government was again forced to give in to the craft guilds, but the commotion in the city was over. The craftsmen did not resume shouting for radical action. The day after this skirmish in the market square, Ghent representatives turned over their copy of the Flemish privilege to the Bruges craft guilds. The city government of Ghent had refused, but after Bruges repeated its demand the leaders of Ghent had a revised copy drawn up of the Flemish Privilege in which there was no mention of the Franc of Bruges as the Fourth Member of Flanders. Their copy of the original charter was destroyed along with the Bruges copy in the Bruges Market square on 17 April.166 The offending charter from the duchess which named the Franc as fourth Member was sliced up with a knife before the assembled craft guilds in the Market square. The ducal ‘audiencier ’ Antoon van Halewyn made a new document in which ‘four members’ (‘Vier Leden ’) were systematically replaced by ‘three members (‘Drie Leden ’), but he retained the original place and date in the revised text. Properly speaking, the two exemplars of the Flemish Privilege preserved in the archives to this day are material forgeries. This is accentuated by the fact that one of the original witnesses, the bishop of Liege, Louis de Bourbon, had left the county. His name on the charter was replaced by that of Duke John I of Cleves, who had joined the duchess at her court in Ghent.167 The Ghent representatives promised to ‘help and support’ the Bruges guilds in their attempt to force a change in the city boards. In return the Bruges guild 163 ‘Eenen wonderlicken roup ’ (for what follows, see Dits die Excellente Cronike, 183r and Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 132–3). 164 Dumolyn, ‘Criers and shouters’, 112–5. 165 The ‘Alleman onder sijnen standaert ’ was followed by ‘eendrachticheyt ’ (Dits die Excellente Cronike, 183r). 166 They brought their copy to Bruges ‘twelke op de maerct openbaerlike ten aenziene van den ghemeenen buke van deser stede te nieuten ghedaen was ’ (Gilliodts-Van Severen, La mort de Charles, 45). 167 Blockmans, Privilegie voor het graafschap, 126–7 and 144. 171

For the Common Good

leaders promised to be ‘good neighbours, to maintain the friendship and the brotherly love between the two cities’. 168 In a charter they also vowed not to misuse the removal of the Franc of Bruges as Fourth Member of Flanders to the detriment of the city of Ghent.169 After appearing in the Market square, the Ghent representatives proceeded to the Bruges Prinsenhof (Princely Court). There, the Austrian delegation was promised the hand of Mary of Burgundy for Maximilian, and in the afternoon court representatives met with guild leaders and decided to rewrite the Flemish privilege. The ducal administration also issued a letter of remission in which Duchess Mary forgave the guilds for imprisoning the representatives to the Estates-General. The letter justified the ‘wapeninghe ’ of the craft guilds by describing the armed demonstration as a search for justice and punishment for officials who had abused power during the reign of Charles the Bold.170 Court officials were adopting the discourse of the craft guilds in this letter, which also gave the guilds the authority to initiate corruption investigations. The duchess promised to begin the process of selecting new aldermen and councillors for the city boards within two days, which satisfied the guildsmen and forestalled the investigations. Accompanied by ‘very melodious bell ringing’, the craft guilds left the market square.171 On the following day, the duchess swore to uphold all the privileges of the city, some of which were proclaimed from the balcony of the Belfry. Word of this passed throughout the city, confirming the resolution of the city-wide conflict. On 19 April the new city boards were installed, and two days later another new privilege was granted to the city. On the same day marriage was contracted between Mary of Burgundy and Maximilian of Austria. In the court and the city, peace and serenity were reborn. The Bruges political scene was based on a delicate balance of power, which had been disturbed during the April revolt but never completely undone. The city was partially controlled by the craft guilds and their leaders who had loudly proclaimed their demands from the market square, while city officials operated behind the scenes but never lost control of events. As the third player in the political arena, the court only intervened when forced to by necessity, but its sympathy was clearly with the Bruges urban elite. Court officials certainly discussed with urban elites the concessions given to the craft guilds, for example. During the April revolt the balance of power shifted in favor of the craft guilds, which won a revised privilege and an overhaul of city administration through renewal of the city boards, without resorting to widespread violence. The conflict-management model which had been so successful in Ghent now came into use in Bruges.172 The craft guilds were hierarchically structured and internally stable, and all major urban groups enjoyed a certain degree of political representation through the structure of the Nine Members. Fear of losing 168 The Ghent representatives promised to lend ‘hulpe ende bystandicheit ’, and the Bruges craftsmen responded with ‘duecht, vriendscepe, broederlike mine ende ghebuersamichede ’ (Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 133). 169 Bruges promised ‘niet meer an ons te treckene noch te moghen treckene ter causen van der voorseiden abolicie ende dies daer an cleven mach, in prejudicien ende verminderthede van onsen voorseiden medebroeders van Ghendt, maer zullen daer of ghebruucken ende useren alleenlike ende in zulkerwijs alzo men daerof ghebruucte ghemeenlicke elc int zijne onder de leden hier voortijds als er maer Drie Leden en waren ’. Two copies of this document are preserved, one in Ghent, and one in Bruges: CAG: 94, 709 and CAB: CA, 17, 46r-v). 170 According to the letter, the craft guilds had occupied the market square in order to ‘vercrighene in handen van justicie deghone die onse voorseide stede langhen tijt qualic, onduechdelic ende ghebreckelic gheregiert hebben ’ (CAB: PO, 1154). 171 ‘Tzeer melodieux gheluyt ’ of bells (Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 134). This ringing accentuated the importance of the event and the unity of the craft guilds (see Van Uytven, Flämische Belfriede, passim and Lecuppre-Desjardin, La ville des cérémonies, 167–70). 172 Boone, Gent en de Bourgondische hertogen, 52–3 and 158–60. 172

Chapter 3 The Cities

their privileged positions in the city pacified the craft guilds. The ritual character of the ‘wapeninghe ’ and the armed occupation of the central market square channeled the political discontent of the ordinary craftsmen who realized that united action was best way to force concessions from the city government and the court. Guild leaders only risked losing control over their constituents at one moment, when calls for more radical leadership threatened to sway the collective membership. The leaders regained control because a large proportion of craftsmen did not want to lose power to their more radical compatriots. In the end, the strategy of the craft guilds worked once again, as they won their demands for a new privilege, and their representatives would soon be seated on the city boards. This occasion offers us an excellent opportunity to investigate the social background of these guild leaders. 3.1.3.5 The City Boards of April 1477 and the Second Privilege of Bruges In February and March 1477 the craft guilds came back into power, as the urban privilege(s) guaranteed them a political role in Bruges and the surrounding countryside. Just as in other towns in 1477,173 Bruges guild leaders owed their election to the city boards to the fact that they were not seen as members of the elite that had governed the city in the recent past. Through the mobilisation of the guilds and the political discontent of the common craftsmen, guild leaders got the opportunity to regain the power they had lost in the past decade. This section first recreates the social background of these new power holders, both the ruling elite of the guilds and other civil servants. An analysis follows of the new Bruges privilege granted on 21 April 1477 by Mary. Because this new charter incorporated the first political decisions of the new city government, it reveals much about the background, concerns, and interests of the new power holders. On 19 April 1477 Mary of Burgundy appointed four commissioners to ‘renew’ the Bruges city boards. They were Karel van Halewyn, Philip of Heurne, Wouter van der Gracht, and Jan van Dadizeele, the bailiff of Ghent. According to the customary renewal procedure of Bruges, these comissioners did not elect new aldermen and councillors themselves, but merely approved a list of candidates given to them. Although the composers of this list are not named, the list of those ‘elected’ was surely the result of negotiations among the Nine Members. In the normal fashion, the names of the new aldermen and councillors were announced from the Belfry balcony on the same day. There were, however, two immediate problems.174 One of the new aldermen, Jan Haeuwe, was out of town, and three of the elected aldermen had sat on the 1475 city boards (Cornelis de Boot, Ambrosius Ruebs, and Jan Tsoenin). This was a violation of the Bruges privilege, which prohibited aldermen from serving two consecutive yearly terms. Because the city boards of 1475 had served until 1 September 1476, only six months before the renewal of the boards in April 1477, the aldermen of 1475 were not allowed to serve on the new city boards. The problem was not unusual, and three substitutes were quickly named, while Jan Haeuwe also returned to the city.175 The list was complete on 20 April, with Jan de Keyt as burgomaster of the aldermen, and Jan Losschaert as burgomaster of the councillors. Performing the traditional rituals, the new city boards swore their oaths to uphold and preserve the urban privileges.176 173 174 175 176

Blockmans, La signification constitutionnelle, 501–2. Janssens, Macht en onmacht, 14–5; Van Leeuwen, De Vlaamse wetsvernieuwing, 166–7. Van Leeuwen, Ritueel en publiek, 333. Van Leeuwen, Municipal oaths, 199–200. 173

For the Common Good

Table 4: Number of Previous Mandates Held by Members of the City Boards of Bruges (1475–1477).177

City Boards

Mandates

September 1475

128

September 1476

126

April 1477

45

Although the break from the previous regime was not as total as Blockmans claimed, it was nevertheless quite radical.178 Table 4 shows the number of political mandates (yearlong terms as city officials) the new power holders had held before they were appointed as alderman, councillor, dean of a city quarter or ‘zestendeel ’, or financial commissioner in April 1477. Officials appointed in April 1477 had held only one-third of the mandates held by their predecessors, indicating that the political change in 1477 was radical, but not total. The remarkable difference in the degree of collective political experience between the city boards of 1475 and 1476 on one hand and those of April 1477 on the other does demonstrate that the oligarchy which had ruled Bruges during the reign of Charles the Bold lost its exclusive hold on power. Eighteen of the twenty-six aldermen (69 percent) had never held an office in city administration before.179 If the financial commissioners and the deans of the ‘zestendeel ’ are included, 58 percent were first-time officeholders. The change is even more profound if we take the importance of the office into account. The new burgomaster of the aldermen, Jan de Keyt, had never held a political office before – and neither had the first seat, the second seat, or five of the remaining seats on the board of aldermen. Holders of thirteen councillor posts and the six financial commissioners were more experienced, probably because their offices required more technical expertise than the purely political and juridical office of alderman.180 What was the social status of the new power holders? According to the Bruges privilege of 30 March, 18 of the 26 aldermen and councillors had to be members of the craft guilds. The sources do not give the guild affiliation of all of these aldermen and councillors, but we can safely assume that this stipulation of the privilege was scrupulously fulfilled. Most of those whose guild affiliations are known had previously held top posts in their craft guilds. Jan Michiels had been dean of the carpenters in 1474, Gregorius Heyns was dean of the cap makers in 1475, and Frans van Bassevelde had served as dean of the butchers in 1474. Others became deans of their guilds after completing their terms as

177 Source: CAB: RW, 1468–1501, passim. 178 Blockmans, Mutaties van het politiek personeel, 98. 179 The 18 were Jan de Keyt, Rijkaard Macharis, Mark van den Velde, Jan Michiels, Gregorius Heyns, Pieter Bultinc, Jan Marant, Klaas Veranneman, Willem de Ghelder, Boudewijn Petyt, Steven van den Gheinste, Jacob van Schooren, Jan Dhamere, Hubrecht de Jaghere, Maarten den Brune, Alard de Ladesoubs, Jan van Muenekereede and Leon Spinghele. Colard Lauwerein, Zeger van Rooden and Cornelis van Doorne had already held one public office, Willem Houtmaerct and Jan Haeuwe two, Colard de Labye three, Jan Losschaert six and Lieven van Assenede eight (CAB: RW, 1468–1501, 78r-v). 180 The burgomaster of the councillors, Jan Losschaert, had held six offices, councillor Lieven van Assenede the most (eight offices). Collectively, the commissioners had served fourteen office terms, namely Willem Moreel two, Pieter van Muelenbeke three, Jan de Blasere four, Frans van Bassevelde five, Jan de Plaet and Nicasius Pierins none. 174

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aldermen or councillors.181 The Bruges craft guilds were not closed oligarchies, but studies of the social composition of their leadership have concluded that they were governed by an economic upper class which had accumulated political power.182 Most of those elected to city office in 1477 from the guilds belonged to this wealthy circle which had governed the craft guilds in the past. The aldermen and councillors who represented the craft guilds may have belonged to a group which had been excluded from city policy-making, but in general they occupied a relatively strong social position. The career of Boudin Petyt demonstrates this point. Since he was related to Adornes family, whose archive has survived, much is known about his social background. He was married to Kateline Losschaert, the sister of the burgomaster of the councillors, Jan Losschaert. Jan was a wealthy man who was connected to the Bruges merchant elite.183 When Boudin Petyt married Kateline in December 1476, the Losschaerts gave her money and fiefs in Oostduinkerke, Kaaskerke, Diksmuide and Cadzand. From his mother, Boudin had inherited annuities, houses in Bruges, and money from ‘diverse trading ships’ that belonged to his father.184 He owned annuities on properties in Nieuwpoort and Bruges, where he held property as well.185 Two powerful merchants, Jan de Boot and Donaas de Moor, were witnesses at Boudin’s wedding.186 In short, Boudin came from a wealthy family, he possessed social capital among the urban elite, and he had expanded his property-holdings with a lucrative marriage. When he assumed city office for the first time in April 1477, Boudin represented the cap makers’ guild, who also appointed him dean in the following year. Boudin was not a ‘common’ craftsman, but neither did he belong to the higher circles of the socioeconomic elite of Bruges. He had social ties to the merchant elite, but he was not a member of the group that had governed the city during the reign of Charles the Bold. He might have aspired to political office, and in that case the Revolt of 1477 launched his career. But not all aldermen and councillors from the craft guilds were as powerful and wealthy. The lack of archival information about Klaas Veranneman, Jan Marant, Jan Haeuwe, Maarten den Brune and others may result from the fact that they did not possess the wealth needed to buy annuities from the city or central government, to acquire the administration of a fief, or to engage in merchant contracts. They did not leave behind the records that the aldermen and councillors of the age before 1477 had amassed. This ‘argumentum ex silentio ’ might indicate that these persons belonged to less fortunate social groups. This group of guild masters and small producers apparently had enough capital to 181 Jan Michiels would be dean again in 1480. Hubrecht de Jaghere was dean of the smiths in 1477, 1487, 1490, 1492 and 1494, as was Gregorius Heyns in 1479 and 1481. Joris Bave was dean of the cap makers in 1477, as was Boudewijn Petyt in 1478. Frans van Bassevelde was dean of the butchers in 1477, as was Lieven van Assenede in 1488, 1494 and 1496. Jan van Muenekereede was dean of the bakers in 1482 and 1486. 182 Mertens, De Brugse ambachtsbesturen, 191–2 and Sosson, La structure sociale, 475–6. 183 CAB: Adornes, 361; GSAB: Rk. 17412, 1v–2r and Opsommer, Omme dat leengoed, 348. The father of Jan, Antonis, possessed many fiefs, namely in Koolkerke, Westkapelle, Reigersvliet, Cadzand, Sint-Anna-ter-Muiden, Oostkerke, Wenduine, Zuienkerke, Leffinge, Loppem and Oostkamp (GSAB: Rk. 17404, 1v–2v and SAB: BB, 64, 17v, 107r, 115r, 227v and 237v). Jan Losschaert was married to Adriana Despars, the daughter of merchant Mark Despars and Margriete Metteneye (Weale, Généalogie des familles, 375). 184 The marriage contract gave Boudin Petyt annuities worth 23 lb. gr., 414 lb. gr. in cash (129 lb. from ‘diversche coopmanscepen ’), four houses in the Rechtestraat and land in the Sint-Jansdijk (CAB: Adornes, 361). 185 He owned annuities from Nieuwpoort (ADN: B 5392, 27v), and several parts of houses in the Zouterstraat and Vlamingstraat in Bruges (CAB: Adornes, 360). 186 CAB: Adornes, 361. The social background of these people is discussed above. 175

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claim a seat on the new city boards, but they did not belong to the city’s economic elite. While there is no evidence specifying the guild leadership’s motivation for appointing an individual to the post of alderman or councillor, experience, prestige, trust, and wealth were likely factors influencing the decision. The election of Jan Haeuwe shows that some craft guilds elected representatives without their knowledge, because he was not in Bruges at the time of his appointment. His guild affiliation and the circumstances of his appointment are unclear, but he might have been appointed because he had already held city office (in 1465 and 1467). Because he had political experience, but did not belong to the group of power holders who had governed the town during Charles the Bold’s reign, the government of his guild thought he was the right man to defend the guild’s interests on one of the new city boards. Studies of urban middle groups point out that they were the most important defenders of urban autonomy in times of political crisis.187 Urban autonomy was essential for the corporate political system which the craft guilds had established, and in those guilds the middle class (guild masters, shop owners, prosperous but not elite guild members) were the dominant social group. This means that they were in the ‘middle’ between the urban elite and the common craftsmen. The aldermen and councillors elected by the craft guilds clearly had a certain amount of wealth and were not on the lowest rungs of the social ladder. In general, they were powerful within their own guilds, and connected with the guild elite, or they would not have been elected to be an alderman or a councillor. Their election probably was not democratic, because the Flemish urban guilds in Flanders did not have a democratic tradition.188 The guild hierarchy and the election procedures for guild leaders prevented extensive participation by common craftsmen. The ‘middle group’ of society was too heterogeneous to be definitively labeled, but in Bruges and other cities, the guild leaders (belonging to the middle class or not) were solid defenders of urban autonomy. Guild representatives did not completely monopolize power in April 1477. Willem Moreel’s faction was also represented on the new city boards. Willem Moreel became the first financial commissioner, and his brother-in-law Jan de Keyt was the new burgomaster of the aldermen. Willem’s relatives held additional public offices; Denijs Metteneye was dean of one quarter, the ‘Sint-Janszestendeel ’, his brother Jacob Metteneye was dean of another, the ‘Carmerszestendeel ’, and Pieter Bultinc and Colard Lauwerein were aldermen in April 1477.189 Jan de Keyt, as burgomaster, and Willem Moreel, as commissioner, were now the most important officials in the city. Although they were connected by social ties to members of the city government under Charles the Bold, they had not held office in the previous regime. The Bruges merchant elite did not dare to appoint officials from the detested former government to the new city boards, for fear of provoking the opposition. The power vacuum created a sudden opportunity which Willem Moreel and his friends seized, the beginning of their successful careers in urban and state politics. The faction of Willem Moreel steadily coalesced during the first months of 1477, and the election of new city boards in April sealed the faction’s rise to political power. In the 187 Dambruyne, Corporatieve middengroepen, 726–7; idem, De middenstand in opstand, 117–9; Prak, Corporate politics, 81–3; Haemers, De Gentse opstand, 425–6; Dumolyn, De Brugse opstand, 340–1; Boone, Les métiers dans les villes, 18–9. 188 Stabel, Guilds in medieval Flanders, 190–1; Boone, Les métiers, passim. 189 See the first paragraph for the genealogical information about these persons. Colard Lauwerein was married to Klara Moreel, a daughter of Willem (CAB: SR, 1477–78, 128r). After her death Colard Lauwerein remarried the daughter of Pieter van Muelenbeke, another commissioner of April 1477 (ADN: B 4122, 76v and CAB: PR, 1485–86, 97r). 176

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following months Willem Moreel, Jan de Keyt, their relatives and trade partners became the spokesmen of the Bruges merchant elite, as their governmental policy promoted the interests of the merchant elite. In the process, several social networks became connected to the future nucleus of the Moreel faction. One connection was by marriage; certain aldermen and councillors on the 1477 city boards were related by marriage to the Moreel faction, but whether this relationship by marriage occurred before or after April 1477 is not clear.190 These men may have acquired political office because they were related to members of the Moreel faction, or they may have married into (and thus joined) the Moreel faction after they had already been appointed to public office in April 1477. As it quickly grew, the faction formed a coalition with the representatives of the urban guilds, and, as we will see, events in May strengthened the alliance between the two coalition partners. The Revolt of 1477 clearly launched the relatives and business partners of Willem Moreel into power, as it made them the leading faction in the city. One social network, that of Pieter Lanchals, was not represented on the city boards of April 1477. In sharp contrast to the composition of the 1476 city boards, no relatives of Pieter Lanchals sat on the boards elected in April 1477. Neither Pieter Lanchals, nor his brother-in-law, Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Michiel, whose house suffered intrusion during the revolt, returned to the city. Since many Bruges citizens held Lanchals’ network responsible for the unpopular policies of the previous regime, its members were trying to limit the personal damage they might suffer. Another contrast from the previous government was that no noblemen from the Franc of Bruges were elected to the city boards.191 Because the privilege of 30 March forbade officials of the central state from sitting on the city boards, there were no ducal representatives among the aldermen and councillors of April 1477.192 The new city boards had no social or political connections with the court, an independence which strengthened its authority vis-à-vis the craft guilds. However, tensions between members of the Moreel faction and those who would back Maximilian in the future probably began to form during the Revolt of 1477, and especially during the election process. Some of the future adversaries of Moreel’s faction must have been envious, but most of Charles the Bold’s supporters seem to have chosen to remain on the sidelines of Bruges politics in 1477 for fear of retaliation from the guilds. These former power holders would become eager partners of Maximilian of Austria when he moved to restrict the political participation of the guilds in the future. But for the present, the Burgundian dynasty had lost all power to influence the selection of the Bruges city boards, another loss of control for the centralised state that Charles the Bold had extended. Henceforth, the opposition directed policy in Bruges.

190 The first alderman, Marc van de Velde, was the son of Jacob and Katrien de Keyt, the daugher or the sister of Jan de Keyt. His sister Maria van de Velde married Colard de Labye, the alderman that replaced Cornelis de Boot in April 1477. His brother Jan van de Velde was married to the daugher of councillor Steven van den Gheinste (Gailliard, Bruges et le Franc, III, 373–4). A niece of Marc van de Velde was the wife of Jan Losschaert, but this Jan may not have been the same Jan who was the burgomaster of the councillors in April 1477 (GSA: Rk. 13795, 1r). 191 Some important families, like the van Halewyns and the de Baensts, no longer had relatives on the city boards. Bernard van Halewyn was burgomaster in 1468, Joost van Halewyn in 1476, Jan (III) de Baenst in 1470 and 1473, and Zegher de Baenst in 1471 (CAB: RW, 1468–1501, 1v, 17v, 26r, 43r and 68v). 192 Paul van Overtvelt, secretary of the dukes, was burgomaster of Bruges in 1475 (Dumolyn, Staatsvorming en vorstelijke ambtenaren, Pauwels van Overtvelt). 177

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The first political act of the new city boards was to present Mary of Burgundy with a new privilege, which she and her advisors granted in its entirety on 21 April 1477.193 After some years, the privilege sank into oblivion, but nevertheless it had the same statute as the other privileges that were obtained by the subjects of the Burgundian dynasty in 1477.194 The rapid appearance of this document suggests that a rough draft of the privilege had been composed earlier, most likely shortly before the inauguration of the new city boards. The draft contained a request for remission, or pardon, for the revolt, which was granted on 17 April 1477.195 The privilege also contained 34 concrete regulations which were to be observed by every citizen of Bruges. Probably these measures could have been promulgated by ordinances (‘voorgeboden ’), as the craft guilds had requested during the negotiations over the first urban privilege. However, the guilds judged that compliance with the regulations would be more likely if the duchess had endorsed the regulations in the text of an official privilege. The privilege of 21 April 1477 was designed to rectify the governmental failures of the past decade. Unlike the other privileges of 1477, it did not restrict ducal power. Instead the craft guilds used their newly acquired power to change practices in order to ‘have a better policy and justice in the city’, just as they had done in 1436.196 The number of measures designed to restrict the autonomy of the Franc of Bruges and subordinate towns show that the craft guilds were the driving force behind the privilege. The document contained a provision that the burgomaster of the ‘commune ’ of Bruges would always be one of the count’s commissioners in charge of renewing the Franc board. The purpose of this measure was to increase the influence of the Bruges politicians (including the guild representatives) over the composition of the government of the Franc of Bruges. When the Franc board was renewed on 2 May 1477, this regulation put the traditional nobility who had governed the Franc of Bruges on the sidelines.197 The majority of the aldermen of the board put in place by Charles the Bold in 1475 were replaced by new officeholders.198 The jurisdiction of the aldermen of the Franc was also restricted. They were no longer allowed to apply the death penalty without the permission of the Bruges bailiff, nor were they authorized to levy new taxes. The burgomaster of the Franc would preside over a commission of five aldermen who would visit all the subordinate cities of the Franc of Bruges each year to search for violations of the Bruges privileges. He could call out a police force of hundred ‘red caps’ (‘rode kaproenen ’). These paramilitary forces, used by the city to control the surrounding countryside, had been abolished by the peace treaty of Arras in 1438, but were now reinstated. On the day after the second privilege of Bruges was signed, the city of Sluis was to present to the Bruges city boards a charter admitting it 193 CAB: PO, 1143 (the draught), PO, 1155 (the privilege). Gilliodts-Van Severen incorrectly stated that nr. 1143 was the draft of the first privilege. Neither are there differences between the draft and the final text (Gilliodts-Van Severen, Inventaire des archives, VI, 130). 194 The only edition dates from 1787 (Recueil des chartes, 114). 195 ‘Item, dat onse ghenadeghe joncvrauwe ende princesse ghelievene te nieuten te doene ende ooc te verghevene de verghaderijnghe van den ambochten in haerlieder huusen ende ooc ter maerct voor de date van desen gheschiet ende tote dien de worden die bij particulieren persoonen jeghen elcanderen gheresen ende gheschiet zouden moghen wezen hoe ende in zo wat manieren dat het gheweist zoude moghen hebben toten voorseiden daghe van heden, ende dat bij speciale gracien ’ (CAB: PO 1143). 196 ‘Omme altijds te meersene ende breedene de goede pollicie ende justicie van derselver onser stede ’ (CAB: PO, 1155). In 1436 the craft guilds had composed a similar document, but, due to the different circumstances, it was not signed by Duke Philip the Good (Dumolyn, “Rebelheden ende vergaderinghen ”, 313–7). 197 The list of the aldermen of the Franc says that ‘persoonen van cleene conditie ’ came into office (Priem, Documents extraits du dépot, 2ème série, VII, 160 – the list of aldermen is not completely transcribed in this edition). 198 Blockmans, De volksvertegenwoordiging, 89; Haemers, Middelburg na Pieter Bladelin, 235, 248–9, 253–5. 178

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was ‘under Bruges’.199 This charter and other stipulations of the second privilege provided the necessary machinery to ensure that Bruges would once again be the dominant city in the surrounding quarter (‘kwartier ’). The craft guilds did not transform Bruges into an independent city-state, but they gave the city a very extensive autonomous authority. Other articles of the privilege of 21 April 1477 regulated administration and judicial procedures in the city. In a symbolic affirmation of the new political role of the guilds, keys to the Belfry chamber which housed the urban privileges were to be given over to the deans of each of the Nine Members. Possession of keys guaranteed the Members access to the political memory of the city, with all the attendant symbolical importance. The deans of the Members had the power to convene a meeting of the Great Council and demand explanations from the city boards. They were also empowered to check the correspondence of the Bruges city boards. Clergy were no longer to serve as aldermen or councillors, a measure probably designed by the Nine Members to prevent the canon Jan Coolbrant from reappointment as employee of town, after he had recently been publicly interrogated in the market square. The privilege also codified several legal and political traditions, such as regulation of the ‘heerlicke dinghedaghen ’, the payment of legal costs, and the guarantee that judgements had to be pronounced swiftly after the commission of a crime. The privilege attacked corruption, demanding fair justice and severe punishment for corrupt acts. No one could temporarily substitute for the bailiff or the sheriff of the city. The privilege required that the Bruges Tollmaster (Pieter of Luxembourg in 1477) clearly post rates for all Bruges tariffs and tolls, and, in regard to the war, that the admiral of Flanders ( Josse de Lalaing in 1477) had to maintain an effective defence of the coast. In a similar fashion, the second privilege aimed at guaranteeing fair and equitable trade in the city. It forbade exchange brokers from charging exorbitant rates of interest by limiting them to one groat per pound. In an attempt to bolster creditworthiness, the privilege forbade debtors from fleeing to the ‘Proosse ’, a juridical enclave within the city administered by the chapter of Saint Donatian church. The most remarkable stipulation of the privilege obliged exchange brokers and bankers to give two sureties for each economic transaction. On the same day that she signed the city-wide privilege, Mary of Burgundy confirmed the brokers’ privilege (a collection of old regulations for brokerage in Bruges), another measure designed to protect merchants.200 The privilege of 21 April 1477 aimed to create a safe climate for commerce, in which transaction costs and risks for merchants were reduced to the minimum – a constant imperative in Bruges.201 It is, however, somewhat contradictory that the Bruges city boards, which included representatives of the city’s rich merchants, prohibited exchange brokers from investing in

199 This charter includes the copied text of a charter from 1290, which stated that Sluis ‘wesen zal onder de voirseide stede van Brugghe ’ (CAB: PO, 1156). 200 Van Houtte states that this privilege was one of the ‘last death spasms’ and a ‘hazardous undertaking’ of the Bruges brokers as a consequence of the economic decline of Bruges (Van Houtte, Makelaars en waarden, 9). In contrast, however, we think that the confirmation of the privilege was not a conservative reaction, but a measure taken by the city boards (which contained several brokers) to offer legal security in time of war (edition of the privilege: Visart de Bocarmé, Les jetons de la chambre, 40–50). Older historiography too often interpreted efforts to preserve privileges as creating obstacles to economic prosperity. It is now clear that craft guilds adapted to changing economic circumstances, and, even if they maintained customary laws, their economic initiatives often contained remarkable innovations (Stabel, Guilds in late medieval Flanders, 211). 201 Stabel, Kooplieden in de stad, 96; Murray, Bruges, cradle of capitalism, passim. 179

For the Common Good

trade companies.202 Their aim may have been to prevent bankruptcy of exchange brokers and bankers, but the measure conflicted with economic reality in Bruges. Bankers and exchange brokers regularly invested in commerce and continued to do so after 21 April. This reminds us that the privilege of 21 April 1477 is only a momentary snapshot. Just as with every important ‘contract’ between sovereign and subjects, the enactment of this privilege depended on the political situation at a particular moment in time.203 The craft guilds intended that the second Bruges privilege would correct abuses of power which had occurred during the past decade, because in their view these abuses had violated justice and damaged commerce. Whether the craft guilds could enforce observance of the privilege depended on how much power they could deploy in the following months. However, the power of the guilds decreased, as we will see, while the power of the Moreel faction increased. Unlike the widespread support of Bruges citizens for the first privilege, support for the second privilege was very fragile. The second privilege, with its stringent restrictions, slipped into oblivion in the next few years, as the Bruges political scene returned to its former habits. 3.1.3.6 The Politics of Radical Craftsmen in May 1477 The events of May 1477, the last phase of the Bruges Revolt, were shaped by the war against France. At first the radical faction of the craft guilds held the upper hand, but the sway of these radical elements did not survive the defeat of Bruges troops on the battlefield. In May, French troops were posed to invade Flanders. At the urgent request of the Estates-General, the Flemish cities authorized a counteroffensive under the leadership of Adolf, Duke of Ghelders, to drive back the French from Tournai, a French enclave within the county of Flanders.204 In Bruges, as in Ghent, the aldermen decided to finance the military campaign in a corporate fashion, by dividing responsibility for the troops among the constituent groups.205 The captain of Bruges would command forces from the Franc of Bruges.206 Each of the Nine Members, the ‘poorterij ’ (patricians) and the craft guilds, was to furnish and pay for the ‘seventh man’, one soldier for every seven men in their individual groups.207 The ‘poorterij ’, which included the most important politicians and the merchant elite, paid for their portion by extending a loan of 3,062 lb. 17 s. 6 d. gr. to the urban treasury. This voluntary loan would be paid back, but without any interest.208 Another financial measure taken by the Great Council was an increased levy on wine. The assizes which had been lowered at the end of February were now raised to their former level, with the consent of the Nine Members.209 This measure predominantly affected more 202 ‘Item dat de wisselaers ende banchouders in onser voorseide stede van Brugghe borchtucht stellen zullen van huere wisselen ter bewaernesse van elken ende dat zij gheene coopmanscepen doen noch ghesellen in coopmanscepen wesen en zullen moghen bin den lande, over zee noch over land ’ (CAB: PO 1155). 203 Van Uytven & Blockmans, Constitutions and their application, 423. 204 Blockmans, Handelingen van de leden, 21–4; Wellens, Les Etats Généraux, 175–6. 205 In Ghent the Three Members of the city paid the costs of mobilisation (Blockmans, Peilingen naar de sociale strukturen, 217–8). 206 On 12 May 1477 representatives of the city of Bruges travelled to Aardenburg and Cadzand ‘omme aldaer midsgaders der wet van den Vryen ende meer andere ghedeputeerde van der stede thelpen kiesene volc twelke uter name van die van den Vryen metten volke van deser stede uut trecken ten frontieren van den lande ’ (CAB: SR, 1476–77, 55r and 62r). 207 The city government decided ‘dat men uter poortrye ende uut al den ambochten ende neeringhen van deser stede zenden zoude den viien man ten frontieren van den lande ’ (CAB: SR, 1476–77, 151r). 208 CAB: SR, 1476–77, 27v–33v. Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas lent 100 lb. gr., Jan Losschaert 40 lb. gr., and Lodewijk Greffin 200 lb. gr., etc. Also in 1488 the ‘poorterij ’ would lend money to the treasury in order to pay city troops (Blockmans, Nieuwe gegevens, 139). 209 CAB: SR, 1476–77, 17v. 180

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wealthy citizens, because wine was a luxury good. The ‘poorterij ’ were thus agreeing to pay a higher proportion of the war costs, because the other taxes remained at the reduced level set on 28 February 1477. The political influence which the craft guilds had gained in the preceding months now manifested itself in military power. The guilds decided to provide the necessary soldiers from their own membership, but in the middle of the fifteenth century, Bruges craftsmen, like their counterparts in Ghent, were no longer experienced militiamen.210 Because Charles the Bold had hired mercenaries to fight his wars, the Bruges craft guilds had lost their experience in mobilising troops and fighting battles. The Bruges guild militia had been disbanded in 1382 and only temporarily mobilised again in 1411 and 1436.211 The sources do not reveal much about the mobilisation of 1477, but a brief note in the city accounts of Bruges tells us that the craft guilds appealed to their own armed members, called ‘sergeanten ’, to serve in the city-wide militia alongside soldiers paid for by the ‘poorterij ’ loan. However, the craft guilds did not have enough money to pay for their companies, and the city treasury had to make up the shortfall.212 Since the ‘poorterij ’ were thus financing the military effort of the craft guilds, the guilds lost their military autonomy even before the first battle in the field. It is doubtful that the guild militias were a capable military force. In 1411 and 1436 city militias serving in the Burgundian duke’s army fled as soon as they reached the battlefield.213 In any case, the Flemish city militias did not stop the French invasion, because they suffered heavy losses in the Battle of Tournai. Their commander, the Duke of Ghelders, was killed in battle on 27 June 1477.214 In the future the Flemish cities would send funds rather than soldiers to the lieutenant-general of the Burgundian army (Adolf of Cleves), to pay troops and hire mercenaries. The Flemish craft guilds had forgotten how to fight. The threat of war and the mobilisation of the militias gave more radical craftsmen the opportunity to act collectively. Radicals had made a bid for power in April during the demonstration over the renewal of the city boards, but the guild leaders had held on to the support of the majority of craftsmen. In May, as the threat of war grew, radicals gained support from many common craftsmen who wanted to punish the corrupt politicians who had ruled Bruges during Charles the Bold’s reign, as the city of Ghent had done some months before. Although it is logical to assume that the radicals wanted a voice in guild and city government, little is known about their specific goals. It was common for guild leaders to write out lists of demands, called ‘requests’, and present these documents to the city government, but these Bruges radicals did not commit their demands to paper. They operated within an oral culture, and we now know little about their history or their goals. Their actions and occasionally their shouted slogans, recorded by those who suppressed the revolt, are our only evidence of their political demands. 210 Haemers, De Gentse opstand, 286–7. 211 Dumolyn, “Rebelheden ende vergaderinghen ”, 299–300. 212 The accounts mention ‘dat de voorseyde ambochten ende neeringhen ten besten niet voorsien en waren van ghereeden pennijnghen omme die haestelike te zendene den voorseide haerlieder serganten ende volke van wapene elc in tzine, dat men van den pennijnghen commende ter causen van der leenijnghe ghedaen bij den poorters van deser stede ende anderssins gheven zoude elken deken van den voorseide ambochten ende neeringhen also vele pennijnghen als elc in tzine te costen ghehadt hadde van der eerster maend, alleenlic ter causen van der saudee van haerlieder serganten ende anders niet ’. The city paid a total sum of 1244 lb. 17 s. 10 d. gr. (CAB: SR, 1476–77, 150r). 213 Fris, Documents gantois, 245–7; idem, Het Brugsche Calfvel, 74. 214 Verbruggen, De slag te Guinegatte, 51–4. 181

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One of these records is the letter of remission from Mary of Burgundy, dated 2 June 1477 (the second Mary had granted the city in that year) forgiving the city for the events of 16 and 17 May. This pardon describes how the urban militias assembled on the Great Market square of the city on 16 May, in preparation for marching out to the battlefield under the command of Louis of Bruges and Jacob van Gistel. But suddenly ‘another large armed crowd’ entered the market square.215 Members of the guild militias took advantage of the situation to demand the judgement of the oligarchy which ruled the city under Charles the Bold. Faced with the military clout of the craftsmen, the aldermen were forced to arrest sixteen former aldermen and councillors, just as had happened in other revolts of the Bruges craft guilds.216 Taking advantage of the armed assembly and their support among the common craftsmen, radicals in the militias and perhaps even some in the new government forced the arrest of important politicians. The urgency of the military threat also pressured city officials to placate their own militias. If the French invasion was to be stopped, direct action on the battlefield was needed, which meant that the power holders had to listen the radical craftsmen. The city boards also sent a letter to the city of Ghent, apologizing for the delay in mobilising the troops.217 To calm the radicalised crowd, the city government quickly produced a scapegoat, the former burgomaster Jan Barbesaen, who confessed the next day under torture that he had governed the city in a corrupt manner. He confessed to receiving gifts to favour certain parties, whom he did not name, over others in civil suits, and to appointing deans to craft guilds without input from the guild membership.218 The aldermen pronounced the death penalty. Then Louis of Bruges, two clergymen, and two ‘sweet virgins’ ( Jan Barbesaen’s two young daughters) begged the masses in the market square to forgive the former burgomaster.219 Their intention, likely at the behest of Jan’s friends and relatives, was to diffuse the crowd’s anger and prevent the execution, but they were not successful. At eight o’clock in the evening, Jan Barbesaen was beheaded.220 The choice to execute Jan Barbesaen was an apt move, for the old burgomaster was an incarnation of the former urban government. After serving six terms of offices in the city, he had been burgomaster of the aldermen from September 1474 until September 1475. In this office, he was responsible for the development of the Bruges Restriction of August 1475, although others, including members of the Moreel party, were equally responsible for its composition. However, as burgomaster, he symbolised the repressive policies of the former regime. The Moreel faction was represented among the aldermen, but they could not, or perhaps would not, prevent the execution. Jan Barbesaen may have been a political rival, and he had no social connections with the Moreel faction. Instead, his social network included Philip Metteneye (another former burgomaster) and the ducal functionary Jan

215 ‘Ooc andere in grooter menichte ghewapender hand ’ (CAB: PO, 1157; edited by Gilliodts-Van Severen, Inventaire des archives, VI, 151–3). 216 Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 138–9. In 1411 and 1436 armed troops within the city walls forced the duke and the city government to give in to their demands (Dumolyn, “Rebelheden ende vergaderinghen ”, 303). 217 CAB: SR, 1476–77, 55r. 218 The Bruges sheriff Anton van der Vichte noted down his confessions. He had said ‘que lui, derrière estant bourgmaistre du dit Bruges, a prins pluiseurs dons corrupcions de ceulx qui avoient affaire devant luy en justice et aussi de ceulx qu ’il avoit mis en gouvernement et serment de la ville comme doyens des mestiers ’ (GSAB: Rk., 13781, 7v). 219 Two ‘soete maechdekins ’ appeared on stage (Dits die Excellente Cronike, 185v). 220 Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 139. 182

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Quévin.221 Jan may also have obstructed the renewal of the city boards in April 1477, because he had contacts with the ducal administration. For whatever reason, Barbesaen was selected as the scapegoat by the new regime, with the hope was that his swift execution would calm the crowd and allow the rapid deployment of the city troops to the battlefield. But the crowd did not calm down. After the execution of Jan Barbesaen, ‘the very furious crowd’ dragged three former burgomasters from the prison to the Bruges Markethall.222 This action was highly symbolic, because the mob had taken the former officials out of a space under the control of the city government into a space controlled by the craft guilds. The Markethall was the building in which guild privileges were stored and daily guild commerce took place, so bringing the former rulers to the space of the Markethall subjected them to the power of the guilds. The radicals selected their victims carefully. The ducal secretary Paul van Overtvelt symbolised the policy of Charles the Bold, because, as a ducal official and Bruges burgomaster in 1475, he had facilitated the duke’s extensive influence in Bruges politics.223 The second ‘victim’, Jan (III) de Baenst, lord of Lembeke, had also held several city offices. He was a nobleman from the Franc of Bruges who had made a place for himself in Bruges politics. As such, he symbolised the increased power of the Franc of Bruges, which the craft guilds had opposed in April 1477.224 The third unfortunate prisoner was Anselmus Adornes, who came from a wealthy Genoese family which had integrated into Bruges society. This wealthy merchant was a symbol of the oligarchy of Bruges, because he had leased tax farms and held several offices during Charles the Bold’s reign. He probably had helped to establish the previous fiscal policy.225 As symbols of the former regime, the three prisoners were put to torture, which continued until late at night. On the following day, the city government and leaders of the radicals negotiated the future of the three prisoners and their compatriots who were still confined in the city’s prison. They agreed that all prisoners could buy their freedom, with funds that would be applied to the city’s military expenses. In additions to these fines, the prisoners promised never to hold political office in the city.226 Radicals from the craft guilds had attained their stated goals, punishing those who were held responsible for the former government of the city and ensuring that the former rulers would not return to power again. In exchange, the radicals 221 Jan Barbesaen was councillor of the city in 1457 and burgomaster of the ‘commune ’ in 1469, burgomaster of the aldermen in 1475, and dean of the ‘Sint-Jacobszestendeel ’ in 1467, 1473 and 1475. He was married to Katrien Metteneye, the daughter of Philip Metteneye (Gailliard, Bruges et le Franc, I, 431). Jan’s son-in-law Jan Quévin was an official in the Council of Flanders and ducal receiver of the ‘Bewesterschelde ’ (Paravicini, Invitations au mariage, 77–8; Dumolyn, Staatsvorming en vorstelijke ambtenaren, Jean Quévin). 222 ‘Tzeer furieux ghemeente ’ (Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 139–40). 223 Dumolyn, Staatsvorming en vorstelijke ambtenaren, Pauwels van Overtvelt. 224 Buylaert, Baenst (Jan III de). 225 Anselmus Adornes was a rich merchant, related to Jan III de Baenst (Boone, Danneel & Geirnaert, Pieter IV Adornes, 123–4; Buylaert, Sociale mobiliteit, 207). In 1466 he had founded a trade company together with Zegher de Baenst, Colard d’Ault and Jacob de Witte (‘ghezelscip van coopmanscepen om in te coopene ende te vercoopene al tfrueyt van Algerben ende van Valencien ’; CAB: SV, 85r). The Genoese descendant had held seventeen political offices in Bruges between 1444 and 1475. He was member of the financial commission in 1463–67 and he leased the assizes on beer during the first months of 1477 (CAB: SR, 1476–77, 18v–19v). He also had contacts at court. In February 1477 he joined the court of the tollmaster (‘tolheer ’) of Bruges, the nobleman Pieter of Luxembourg (CAB: Adornes, 33). 226 The prisoners had to pay four times the value of everything they had received from the treasury during the reign of Charles the Bold. Karel van Halewyn, Zegher de Baenst, Jan Breydel, Donaas de Moor, Maarten Lem, Jan de Witte, Jan de Hond, Cornelis Breydel, Jan de Baenst, Jacob de Voocht, Jeronimus van Viven, Pieter Metteneye, Jan van Riebeke, Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas, Paul van Overtvelt and Anselmus Adornes paid a total sum of 1162 lb. gr. to the city (CAB: SR, 1476–77, 34v–35r; Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 140–1). 183

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agreed to release the former officials from prison and suspend further judgement against them. A public punishment ceremony sealed this compromise, serving as an example to others and symbolically erasing the detested former regime. Dressed only in their underwear, Anselmus Adornes, Paul van Overtvelt, and the nobleman (!) Jan de Baenst begged forgiveness from the craft guilds assembled in the market square, the political theatre of the craft guilds. The craft guilds forgave their humiliated former rulers, and gave them leave to move freely about the city. The former oligarchs fled the city, never to return to Bruges politics.227 These events suggest that the Bruges system of conflict management failed in May 1477, as guild leaders were not able to bring the radicals within their own guilds into line. The radical craftsmen came from a different political and social background from that of the craft guild leaders who had demanded political participation one month before. The radicals had less self-control and were less ‘civilized’ than the guild leaders. The radicals worked within a more violent and largely oral political culture, probably because they were inexperienced in politics. They were not well integrated into the power structures of the craft guilds and not used to the (written) method of presenting demand requests to superiors. They were only familiar with gaining power by shouting in the market square or acting violently.228 Nevertheless, their violent actions were not uncontrolled outbursts, but highly selective, wellconceived, sometimes impulsive but always symbolically important deeds. They were not driven by a specific ideology except for a type of urban chauvinism. When they had seized power, the radical craftsmen did not demand a permanent role in policy-making, but sought only to rectify policies they judged to be unfair. This ‘political economy’ (in the sense of the ‘moral economy’ posited by Thompson) was an expression of what Scott identifies as the local hidden transcript, as these craftsmen who did not leave sources behind because they had no written culture, or their records were destroyed after they had disappeared from the political scene.229 The violent deeds of the radical craftsmen threatened some in the establishment, but the city government was able to keep a measure of control over them. The Bruges system of conflict management did not fail completely. The city government countered radicals’ demand by giving in on some points, such as sacrificing a scapegoat, punishing former leaders with fines and promising to keep the condemned out of power in the future. Fulfilment of these promises was contingent on future power relations, and as a consequence they soon fell into abeyance. Apart from the three symbolic scapegoats, all the politicians arrested in May returned to political life. The fines they paid were reimbursed soon after, as we will see below. The government employed promises and a kind of ‘summary justice’ ( Jan Barbesaen was executed just after a few hours of torture, without getting a chance to defend himself ), 227 Their profitable careers came to an end. It seems Paul van Overtvelt later found support at court (see CAB: SR, 1478–79, 65r and SR, 1480–81, 82r). In February 1480 Maximilian demanded that the city reimburse the fine Paul had paid in 1477 (CAB: CA, 14, 313r). In 1481 the urban government extended him mercy, but in October 1483 he was banished again (CAB: SR, 1480–81, 163r and Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 236). He fled to Brussels, where he died a month later (Vermeersch, Grafmonumenten te Brugge, II, 284). Jan de Baenst was kept in prison until the fall of 1477 (CAB: CA, 14, 293r). Afterwards he did not return to politics, but his son Jan did pursue a political career. The elder Jan died in March 1486 (Buylaert, Sociale mobiliteit, 208; Haemers, Middelburg na Pieter Bladelin, 225–7). Anselmus Adornes fled to Scotland in 1480 and became a councillor to the Scottish king (CAB: SR, 1480–81, 188v). He was killed on duty in March 1483 (Geirnaert, De Adornes, 21–9 and CAB: Adornes, 35). 228 Therefore they were often called ‘shouters’, ‘roupers ’ or ‘creesers ’ (Dumolyn, ‘Criers and Shouters’, 118). 229 See Thompson, The moral economy, 76–9; Van Honacker, Résistance locale et émeutes, 39–47; Huard, Existe-t-il, 63; Vovelle, La découverte de la politique, 23; Dupuy, La politique du peuple, 95–122 and Scott, Domination and the arts, 4–5. 184

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to regain its authority without harming the present power holders. It is also possible that some aldermen or guild leaders silently agreed with the radicals and used the violence to get rid of political rivals. They could pass on the responsibility for events (and the execution) to the radicals, while their rivals were banished from the political scene. The city government even obtained an official letter of remission from the duchess, so that no one could be punished for the execution.230 In the end, after the punishment of the former politicians, the government was again firmly in charge. City officials sent the militia to the battlefield on 20 May 1477 under the command of Jacob van Gistel and Pieter Metteneye. Several weeks later, the troops met a serious defeat in which the radicals of the craft guilds probably were eliminated as an effective force. There were no future outbreaks like that of May 1477. The coalition between the wealthy merchants and the guild leaders ruled undisturbed, and they could finally institute the policies they had fought for in the first months of 1477. 3.1.4

Politics in Bruges (1477–1481)

3.1.4.1 The New Regime After the Revolt of 1477 and the installation of a new regime in Bruges, the city enjoyed a quiet, stable political climate for the remainder of Mary’s reign.231 Although it was very diverse the new political coalition ruling the city did not fall apart until 1481. Some of the city board members of April 1477 were new to city office, but held office frequently in later years. Members of the Moreel faction (such as Jan de Keyt and Pieter Bultinc), as well as representatives of the urban guilds (such as Jan Dhamere and Hubrecht de Jaghere) belonged to this group.232 Some men who had held office during the previous regime under Charles the Bold now returned to office as well. They were wealthy merchants (such as Donaas de Moor and Geraard de Groote), as well as elite men from the Franc of Bruges (such as Karel van Halewyn and Joost van Varsenare), who were compensating for their lost position in the Franc by taking seats on the Bruges boards.233 As we have seen, Maximilian supported their position in the Bruges city government in order to strengthen his personal influence in the city’s political scene. Some members of the merchant elite held positions on the city boards, because of their experience, their wealth or their social connections with members of the Moreel faction. The city boards were filled with strong supporters of the privileges facing off against past supporters of Charles the Bold’s centralisation efforts. The difference in the political interests among the power holders of the new regime which governed Bruges during the reign of Mary of Burgundy would lead to political dissension in 1481. The most important difference between the reign of Charles the Bold and the reign of Mary of Burgundy was the increased political role of the Nine Members of Bruges. Eight 230 CAB: PO 1157 (at supra). 231 Blockmans, Mutaties van het politiek personeel, 98–9. 232 Pieter Bultinc was alderman in 1478 and 1480. Jan de Keyt was burgomaster of the aldermen in April 1477 and 1480. During this period he was also clerk of the city’s financial commission and ‘clerk of the orphans’, responsible for the ‘wezenregisters ’ (CAB: SR, 1477–78, 41v; SR, 1478–79, 58r; SR, 1479–80, 57v). The smith Hubrecht de Jaghere was aldermen in 1479 and 1481; and Jan Dhamere, member of the coopers’ guild, was councillor in 1478 and 1480. 233 Geraard de Groote held eleven offices before his office in 1477. He was councillor in 1479 and alderman in 1481. Donaas de Moor held nine offices before returning. He was alderman in 1477 and 1481. Both had lent money to Charles the Bold in the past (ADN: B 17726, ‘Recette Générale, Empruntes’). After serving as waterbailiff, Joost van Varsenare became burgomaster of the aldermen in 1480 and dean of the quarter of Our Lady in 1481. Karel van Halewyn was burgomaster of councillors in 1477 and in 1481. 185

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of the Nine Members were urban craft guilds, each with its own interests and background. Most of the craft guild representatives were wealthy and powerful within their guilds, but none had previously held power or influence in the larger urban political scene. Eight of the craft guild representatives elected to the city boards in September 1479, for example, had never held city-wide office. They had all held or would hold leadership position in their guilds, but now held the lowest seats on the city boards.234 As all were inexperienced as politicians, they probably had little influence on policy-making. For this reason, the institution that deployed guild power was not one of the city boards, but the Bruges Great Council, which was composed of representatives of the Nine Members. Along with the aldermen and councillors of Bruges, the Great Council made the most important political decisions for the city. The Great Council’s most significant responsibility was control of city finances. Their decisions on financial and fiscal matters bound the rest of the city government, just as the financial decisions of Ghent’s ‘Collatie ’, a comparable institution, bound the aldermen of Ghent.235 The Bruges privilege of 30 March 1477 stipulated that the Great Council would inspect the city receivers’ accounts once every four months.236 With their very active participation in the Great Council, guild representatives obtained an important voice in the levying and spending of city taxes. This political influence stemmed from the procedures for assembling and voting in the Great Council, which are recorded in meeting records from the period of Mary’s reign. The Great Council had to approve all aides and new city taxes. When the city boards requested a new indirect tax to pay for military expenses in October 1478, for example, the Great Council agreed, but added conditions.237 In January 1479, a group of court messengers requested an additional gratuity from the city receivers. They forwarded the request to the Great Council, who denied it.238 The Great Council delegated some matters to smaller commissions, which included one representative from each of the Nine Members. In October 1479 the Great Council established this type of commission to regulate the production and quality of beer.239 At other times, the entire Great Council met, as in August 1478 when a huge group of 150 gathered to discuss solutions for the city’s great debt burden.240 In most cases, however, the input of the guilds was obtained through a multi-stage process. After the aldermen submitted a proposal to the Great Council, each of the Nine Members could choose to retire and consider the proposal with their own 234 Pieter Minne, Joost van der Leyen, Antoon Roelens, and Marc Croes were aldermen, and Daneel Danneels, Jan Cockaert, Maarten van Eede, and Jan van Raveschoote were councillors (CAB: RW, 1468–1501, 102r-v). Pieter Minne was dean of the carpenters in 1470, 1475 and 1478, Antoon Roelens belonged to the administration of the mattress and coverlet makers (the ‘kulkstikkers ’) in 1475, Jan van Raveschoote was in the administration of the brokers (Van den Abeele & Catry, Makelaars en handelaars, 99), Joost van der Leyen was dean of the tanners in 1470, 1474 and 1477, and Danneel Danneels was dean of the glove makers in April 1477 (and again in 1481). The others held leadership positions in guild administration after they served as alderman or councillor (Marc Croes was dean of the bakers in 1480, Maarten van Eede was dean of the smiths in 1480, and Jan Cockaert was dean of the carpenters in 1481). 235 Boone, Gent en de Bourgondische hertogen, 28. 236 Gilliodts-Van Severen, Coutume de la ville, II, 78–9. 237 CAB: CA, 14, 298v. 238 ‘Welcke begheerten ende hebbinghe [of the messengers] de zes ghecommitteirde niet doen en wilden, ten ware bij consente ende overeendraghene van denzelven hooftmannen ende dekenen, die naer tvoorseide te kennen gheven, zeyden bij ghemeenen accoorde dat men den voorseiden dienaers zegghen wilde dat zij pacientie hebben wilden ’ (CAB: CA, 14, 303v). 239 Because beer was one of the most important commodities for the city (‘een groot ende van den principaelsten voetselen [...] van derzelver stede ’) a commission of ‘neghen persoonen ghedeputeird ute de neghen leden ’ was assigned to insure quality control (CAB: CA, 14, 309r). 240 ‘Doe was gheconsenteirt bij den hooftmannen ende dekenen van deser stede uuter name van den ghemeenen lichame van dien, up de begheerte bij mijnen heeren van der wet ende van den ghecommitteerden te meer stonden an hemlieden begheert omme de steden thelpen ontcommen van haren lasten ’ (CAB: CA, 14, 298v). 186

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constituents, or discuss the proposal in the larger group. If the Members met alone, each group would decide to approve, deny or amend the proposal, and their representative would carry that decision back to the Great Council.241 In most cases, decisions of the Great Council were unanimous, but some decisions were voted in by the majority, as in December 1478 when the ‘larger part’ of the Council granted the request of the aldermen of the Franc of Bruges to transport the charter of their privileges from the Belfry back to the Franc’s own meeting hall in the Burg.242 With these procedures, the Great Council gave the craft guilds a consistent voice in political decision-making, and because of the Great Council’s power over finances, the guilds’ influence on urban politics was assured. Which policies did the new regime promote? The most important concern of the Bruges Great Council during Mary’s reign was to maintain urban autonomy, a standard imperative of governing coalitions of merchants and urban guilds.243 City power holders thought that political domination of the surrounding countryside was a critical component of Bruges’ autonomy. The new regime pursued an economic policy which sought to favour urban industries without altogether hampering rural interests. Securing advantages for urban production and other economic measures of the regime are the topics of sections 3.1.4.3 and 4. Section 3.1.4.2 takes up the primary question of financial and fiscal policy. In order to end the war against France, the Great Council approved aides for the ducal court, but always tried to keep oversight of the disbursement of the awarded funds. The regime was concerned that during the levying of aides its autonomy and the participation of the Nine Members was respected. But the fiscal pressure of the court and the internal dissensions in the city made the continual observance of these principles very difficult. 3.1.4.2 The Financial and Fiscal Policy of Bruges (a) Expenses for the Court and the War The war against France required a huge financial outlay from the Flemish cities. After 1477, the city of Bruges spent much more money on the costs of war than it had before (Graph 13). Some of these sums were paid to state officials or directly to court (‘Court’ in Graph 13), while other amounts were spent on troops which were dispatched to the ducal army (‘War’ in Graph 13). The absolute costs for the court and the war rose from Charles the Bold’s reign to Mary’s reign. On average, the city spent 94.14 percent more per year for court and war expenses in the period from September 1476 to September 1482.244 If, as Van der Wee argued, Charles the Bold ‘squeezed the people to the very limit’, Mary and Maximilian surpassed that limit.245 However, if we consider the proportion of court and war expenses to the city’s total spending in this period, war and court expenses only increased by 5.42 percent (Graph 14). During Mary’s reign, an average of one-third of city expenditures (33.02 percent) went to the court or the war, while during the reign of Charles the Bold, 241 The advice was ‘bij denzelven hooftmannen ende dekenen bij laste van hueren volcke ter voorseide plecke zij te diere cause vergadert ’ reported to the Council ( January 1480). Or: ‘naer welcx te kennen gheven de voorseide hooftmannen ende dekenen spraken hilden met malicandren. Dat ghedaen, zeyden by ghemeenen accoorde ende consenteirden ’ (August 1478; see respectively: CAB: CA, 14, 311r and 302v). 242 The Council agreed ‘bij de meeste menichte van den hooftmannen ende deeckenen ’ (CAB: CA, 14, 299v). 243 Compare with Prak, Corporate politics, 105–6. 244 The annual average from 1467–1476 was 697,517 groats, compared to 1,354,143 groats in 1476–1482. 245 Van der Wee, The growth of the Antwerp market, II, 109. 187

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27.6 percent was devoted to these purposes. Both graphs 13 and 14 suggest that the fiscal pressure of the court on the city treasury rose during the reign of Mary of Burgundy. Graph 13: Payments by the City of Bruges for the Court and the War, in Groats (1467–1482).246

However, a closer examination of the expenses nuances these conclusions. First, the high average percentage rate for the period 1476–1482 (33.06 percent) stems from the figures for the year 1476–1477. To counter the imminent military threat of the French king, the city spent more than half of its revenue on the direct and indirect costs of the war, as Ghent did also.247 If this exceptional year is excluded, average expenses for the court and the war are almost the same as in the reign of Charles the Bold.248 A second point is that the graph shows gross expenses, and does not show offsetting revenues that the city received from the court, such as the payments Maximilian had promised for the costs of four annuities secured on Bruges revenues in 1479. The city spent 5.20 percent per year on these annuities, but those costs were reimbursed by the court. If this percentage is deducted from the total payments of the city to the court, the percent drops to only 28.52 percent, compared to 29.06 percent during the reign of Charles the Bold. The fiscal pressure of the court and war expenses on the Bruges city accounts thus remained more or less the same during both reigns. The absolute amount of money paid for the court and the war increased, but the city did not pay a larger share of its revenues to the court than it had in the preceding years.

246 Source: city accounts of Bruges. 247 Ryckbosch, Tussen Gavere en Cadzand, 33, 43–4, 50. 248 From September 1477 until September 1482 the city spent 28.06 % of its revenues on payments for the court and the war. 188

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Graph 14: Annual Percentage of the Total Expenses for the Court and the War (1467–1482).249

Moreover, the method of payments for the court and the war had changed totally. As graph 13 and 14 show, the composition of the payments differed widely between the two reigns. During Charles the Bold’s reign, the Flemish cities deposited hard cash into the ducal treasury when they paid an aide. But the political changes of 1477 meant that the Estates and city representatives held much more control over payments to the central government.250 While Charles received cash, Mary and Maximilian generally received troops when they asked for an aide to pay for the war. Table 5 shows that in the first and the last years of Mary’s reign, expenses for the war surpassed those for the court. From the total court and war expenses, an average of 56.35 percent went to the war and 43.65 percent went to the court. The expenses for the war were payments the city made for the recruitment of troops, who were sent to serve the generals in the duke’s army. In 1477 the Flemish cities had acquired considerable power which they deployed readily at the meetings of the Members of Flanders. The Flemish cities more than once gave troops to the archduke when he asked an aide. Charles the Bold had the power to demand money from the Members, money he could spend as he liked. Maximilian did not. The archduke might received more financial aid from the cities than his father-in-law had, but he had much less control over those funds. During Mary’s reign, the city of Bruges retained much more control over the funds it supplied to the court. In exchange for its financial generosity, the city acquired a role in determining how the money was spent. The contrast with the reign of Charles the Bold is striking. The fiscal pressure of duke’s military policy was the same, but in Mary’s reign, the Members of Flanders had extensive control over the court’s spending. The Members naturally tried to keep this political power, while the court sought to rid itself of these restrictions. 249 Source: city accounts of Bruges. 250 And the Members had also gained greater control over payments from the surrounding quarters ‘kwartieren ’. In 1477 for example the Franc of Bruges paid its portions of the aide for troops to the city of Bruges (CAB: SR, 1477–78, 27v). Later the Franc paid its own forces, but the soldiers, of course, were under the command of the captain of Bruges (Haemers, Middelburg na Pieter Bladelin, 247–9). 189

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Tabel 5: Percentage of Bruges Expenses for the Court and the War (1476–1482).251

Year

Court

War

1476–77

26.05

73.95

1477–78

79.73

20.27

1478–79

78.02

21.98

1479–80

19.81

80.19

1480–81

34.91

65.09

1481–82

23.36

76.64

Average

43.65

56.35

This political tension led to several confrontations between the city of Bruges and the court during Mary’s reign, as well as political dissension within the city. The struggle surrounding approval of an aide in spring 1479 reveals both the tensions created by this internal and external dissension and the solutions devised by the city’s new regime. After the severe defeat of the Duke of Ghelders in the Battle of Tournai in June 1477, the Flemish cities decided to send troops to the ducal army under the command of Adolf of Cleves. Several battles between French and Burgundian troops did bring the French invasion to a halt, but war on the county borders continued. In 1478, despite all the money spent by the Members of Flanders, the war continued to disrupt trade and make commercial traffic unsafe on land and sea. At the end of February 1479 Maximilian asked the EstatesGeneral to award him a new aide to wage a new campaign, but the Members of Flanders refused. Also in Bruges the urban craft guilds had protested strongly in the Great Council. After individual meetings of the constituents of each of the Members of the city, the Nine Members requested the Bruges aldermen to ask Maximilian if he could try to make a ‘real truce’ with the French king instead of fighting useless battles.252 Although some craft guilds (such as the smiths and the weapon-makers) probably profited from spending for Maximilian’s wars, they also preferred a peaceful solution to the conflict. Awarding troops rather than money to the Archduke probably also reflects a compromise between the craft guilds and the merchant elite of Bruges. The merchant elite were placed in an awkward position when the craft guilds in the Great Council refused to approve a new aide. Merchants also suffered economically as Maximilian continued to fight France, but many also wanted to maintain good relations with the archduke. The compromise in which the city paid for military forces and dispatched them to the army gave the city some control on its spending, and also restricted Maximilian’s actions. The craft guilds agreed with this political compromise as long as the troops would be used

251 Source: the city acounts of Bruges. 252 After a meeting of each Member (‘elc int zine ’), the Nine Members requested ‘dat men bidden zoude mer ghenadegher vrauwe dat haer ghelievene bij huerer duecht als noch pacientie te hebbene van tguendt dat zoe begheert heift tote anderstond toe dat eenen warachteghen paeys of bestand ghemaect werde tusschen den coninc van Vranckerijke an deen zijde ende mijnen ghenadeghen heere, zine landen ende ondersaten an dander zijde ’ (CAB: CA, 14, 303r). The meeting of the Estates took place at Dendermonde and Antwerp (Blockmans, Handelingen van de leden, 96; Wellens, Les Etats généraux, 443). 190

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to fight for the defense of the county and city.253 On 4 April the archduke agreed to this solution. In a solemn act he promised that the 7,000 soldiers the Members provided to the ducal army would only be used to defend the county of Flanders.254 This successful compromise became a guideline for the city government in the next few years. In exchange for financially supporting the archduke’s wars, the Great Council kept some control over ducal military policy. In fall 1479, for example, the archduke asked for 500 ‘glavien ’ (contingents of soldiers who would form an artillery corps and thus operate independently from the city militias) from the Members of Flanders, but, together with Ghent and Ypres, the city of Bruges instead approved an aide for 2,000 soldiers mobilised by the Members themselves.255 This reduced cash payments from the city of Bruges significantly during 1479.256 Sending troops to the archduke preserved good relations between the city and the court and insured internal peace in Bruges. This atmosphere of restriction and compromise also helps to explain why Maximilian of Austria took two members of the Bruges merchant elite into his administration. Maximilian appointed Willem Moreel and Maarten Lem as co-superintendents for all finances even before the battle of Enguinegatte, in the hope that court would acquire more influence over financial decision-making in Bruges. In return, these two Bruges leaders hoped to influence state policy-making by joining the ducal administration, but, with the memory of the 1477 Revolt fresh in their minds, they could not sacrifice the political coalition with the guilds in their hometown. Their concerns likely led to difficulties with the archduke and his administration in the years following the battle of Enguinegatte. Certainly when Ghent refused to pay or send troops to the court, pressure increased on the merchant elite of Bruges. In January 1480, when the archduke requested a new aide to pay for defence of the county, the Nine Members once more asked the Bruges city government to give the archduke an aide ‘with people’, and only if other regions and cities joined in as well.257 The city handed over payments to Maximilian’s two treasurers, with the express command that the money be spent for troop recruitment.258 The city of Ghent was initially convinced that the aide was necessary, but when Ghent officials learned that Maximilian had not spent the money as agreed, they refused to pay any more to the archduke. In 1480 and 1481 new disputes about payments for the court and the war arose between the court and Bruges, showing that the position of the Moreel faction had become critical. In early 1480 pirates ravaged the coasts of Flanders, threatening Bruges commerce.259 253 The troops received orders to ‘omme metten andere menichte die zij ter zelver plaetse vinden zullen, te helpen weeren de vianden ende beschermen dit voorseide landt ende stede ’ (CAB: CA, 14, 306r). 254 The money served ‘alleenlic in de voorseide betalinghe van den .vii. duust volcks voornoemt anghezien dat dezelve subvencie gheconsenteert gheweest es omme de diffencie van den lande daermede te doene ’ (CAG: 93, 7, 18r; see also Wellens, Les Etats-Généraux, 182–3 and Blockmans, De volksvertegenwoordiging, 615). 255 Blockmans, Handelingen van de leden, 123. 256 See table 5. If we take the payments of the court to the city into account, Bruges even gained cash money. Maximilian paid 280,051 groats to the city in 1479 for the payments on annuities, while the city only paid 236,260 groats to the court for aides that had been approved in the past. This is a difference of 43,791 groats (CAB: SR, 1479–80, 41r-v and 146r-v). 257 ‘Ende dat die van Brabant ende Ypre van der wille worde de begheerte te consenteirne met penninghen, ende die van Ghend met hueren casselrien ende smalle steden niet dan met volcke, dan dat dezelve ghedeputeirde volghen zullen dezelve van Ghendt, casselrien ende smalle steden ende afghaen Brabant ende Ypre ’ (CAB: CA, 14, 313v). 258 Pierre de Binche and Jean de Wailly collected the money (CAB: SR, 1479–80, 171v). Jean de Wailly was married to the sister of Jan de Witte, a former councillor on the Council of Flanders, who was responsible, along with his brother-inlaw, for confiscating the Flemish property of French sympathizers (GSAB: Rk. 19719, 1r; ADN: B 2118, 76v; Dumolyn, Staatsvorming en vorstelijke ambtenaren, Jan de Witte). 259 Blockmans, De volksvertegenwoordiging, 454; Degryse, De omvang van Vlaanderens, 37. 191

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The city planned a military intervention against the pirates, and asked for financial assistance from the other cities in the county. At their meeting in March 1480, the EstatesGeneral voted to finance troops for Maximilian to fight the pirates, but Ghent declined to participate. Bruges and Ypres sent troops to Maximilian, but when it became clear that defense efforts on the coast had failed, the city asked for additional financial support from the Members of Flanders in April 1480 in order to ‘defend the sea borders’ itself.260 Ghent was convinced to pay its portion in this ‘aide ’, which was not an aide to the archduke. The Three Members of Flanders decided to administer the collection and spending of an aide for 6,000 soldiers and three warships by themselves, without interference from the court.261 However, their efforts were not successful, and the pirates continued to ravage the coast. In summer 1480 Maximilian was able to convince the Members of Flanders to supply a new aide for the French war, but after this, Ghent completely refused to pay for any military ventures of the archduke. Willem Moreel and Pieter Lanchals probably prevailed upon the Bruges Great Council not to join Ghent in its resistance, because in the fall Bruges did pay one small aide, in cash, to the receiver for all finances.262 But it would be the last cash payment to the court. The defense of the county was failing, and the Moreel party had to make a choice; either they continued to help Maximilian fight his wars, or they took over organising the defense themselves. The Moreel faction decided to cut off financial support for Maximilian’s wars during the spring of 1481. Bruges initiated a plan for defending the southern border in February, and convinced the city of Ypres to support the initiative. Together they approved an aide of 50,000 lb. par.263 Ghent refused to participate, even after alderman Jan de Keyt negotiated with representatives of that city. Jan de Keyt was a relative of Willem Moreel, and his presence at this negotiation suggests that the leading party in Bruges was trying to mend fences with the Ghent resistance. But the gap between Bruges and Ghent remained deep. Jan de Keyt tried to inspire the Ghent representatives with confidence by proposing that Philip of Burgundy, lord of Beveren, would administer the finances instead of the central administration. The captain of Artois would stop the French troops right there, and halt damage to trade.264 Ghent refused, dooming the Bruges initiative. When Ghent finally asked the Members of Flanders for a new joint military initiative for county defence during a meeting in that city in the summer of 1481, Bruges reacted eagerly. More about this turbulent meeting and its effects on the growth of political discontent with Maximilian’s policies appears later in this chapter. During 1481 the Moreel faction clearly had political problems. Because their power in the city of Bruges depended on a coalition with the urban craft guilds, the Moreel faction had to take guild interests seriously. The craft guilds preferred a peaceful end to the conflict with France, but by 1481 this goal had not been achieved. In expectation of this peace, the guilds were willing to support the war against the French, but only if they had some control over Maximilian’s spending for defence of the county. Both the guilds and the wealthy merchants of the Moreel faction wanted to limit the damage war did to 260 261 262 263 264 192

For ‘tbescudden van den frontieren van der zee ’ (Blockmans, Handelingen van de leden, 139). Ibidem, 141. A sum of 62 lb. gr. was paid to receiver-general and war treasurer Louis Quarré (CAB: SR, 1480–81, 154v). Blockmans, Handelingen van de Leden, 170; CAB: SR, 1480–81, 185r. Blockmans, Handelingen van de Leden, 171.

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commerce. But Moreel’s party was caught in the middle, because Willem Moreel served on Maximilian’s financial commission. The archduke wanted money for his wars but he was no longer willing to accept the compromise of troops instead of money, which had been worked out by the Bruges craft guilds and the Moreel faction. The coalition between the Moreel faction and guild representatives came under extreme pressure in the course of 1481. As a result, the Moreel faction slowly but surely moved towards the position of the Bruges guilds and the city of Ghent. In 1481, the political position of the Moreel party became very ambivalent. (b) Spending for Public Debt and City Administration The war was not the only expense of the Bruges government during the reign of Mary of Burgundy. While an average of one-third of expenditures went to finance the war and a second third to reimburse creditors, the final third went to pay for administration of the city (Graph 15). Graph 15: Bruges Expenditures by Category (1476–1482).265

During Charles the Bold’s reign, the city of Bruges had burdened the urban treasury with debts from borrowing and selling annuities. As a result of the exceptionally high spending during 1477 to deal with the crises of war and political turmoil, Bruges faced bankruptcy at the end of the 1476–77 accounting year. The city accounts showed a deficit of 8,372 lb. 6 s. 2 d. gr., equivalent to 63.52 percent of its annual revenue.266 The city’s financial obligations included debts contracted in previous years, new loans borrowed to finance the war effort, and overdue payments on aides, annuities, and salaries for city officials. The financial commissioners of the city nevertheless succeeded in ending each the accounting years from 1478 to 1482 with a credit balance.267 The commissioners made 265 Source: the Bruges city accounts. 266 CAB: SR, 1476–77, 165v. 267 While in 1476–77 the losses were 10.32 % of the revenues (CAB: SR, 1476–77, 153v), in 1478–79 the city had a credit balance of 11.29 % (CAB: SR, 1478–79, 182v). 193

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a concerted and successful effort to keep the city budget balanced, in order to keep the city credit-worthy. This concern for solvency not only arose from the need to attract new lenders and annuity buyers, but also to keep up with payments to old annuity buyers. Many aldermen had invested in city annuities, and some had also extended loans to the city in 1477 during the war emergency. While their financial support paid for the implementation of city policy, they also become creditors of the city. A healthy, balanced city budget guaranteed their reimbursement. Payment of annuities was a major expense of the city during the reign of Mary of Burgundy, amounting to 19 percent of total expenditures, as Graph 16 shows. Annuity payments cost the city more than payments to the court, which absorbed only 14 percent of city expenditures (minus the 5.2 percent that the court paid back to the city). The commission also paid out 12 percent to other creditors, including the ducal court and other lenders. During Mary’s reign, the city refunded the fines imposed on the aldermen who had been imprisoned and convicted in May 1477.268 The city repaid voluntary loans made by Bruges citizens in June 1478 and May 1480. In 1479 the regime decided to pay the salaries of past officials retroactively, as part of the abolition of the Bruges Restriction of 1475.269 Most of creditors of the city of Bruges lived inside the city walls, adding an extra incentive for the regime to keep up with payments on its debts. Graph 16: Detailed Analysis of the Average Expenses of the City of Bruges (1476–1482).270

The final third of Bruges city expenses from 1476 until 1482 went to construction, fortifications, administration and ordinary expenses of the city. These included officials’ salaries, gifts, messengers, ceremonies, firemen, (re)construction of urban infrastructure, building and maintaining the dikes around the city, and other costs.271 Two percent of 268 Maarten Lem,for example, received the repayment of his fine of 250 lb. gr. in 1478 ‘uter name ende over den ghemeenen buuc ende lechame van derzelver stede ’ (CAB: SR, 1477–78, 152v). 269 The Bruges privilege of 30 March 1477 abolished the Bruges restriction, but in 1478 the urban government decided to pay wages retroactively to the politicians who had held office since April 1477 (CAB: SR, 1479–80, 50r-v). On 22 September 1478 the amounts of these salaries were designated (Gilliodts-Van Severen, Inventaire des archives, VI, 175). 270 Source: the Bruges city accounts. 271 An overview of several of these expenses appears in Merlevede, Stad, vorst en schatkist, 539–46. 194

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the expenses went to build up city fortifications, and in some years the city invested in ambitious building projects. The largest of these projects, a complete remodelling of the Market hall, was carried out between 1478 and 1481. Part of the city officials’ motivation was to restore public infrastructure, but they were primarily interested in enhancing the city’s prestige, as the Market hall was a symbol of Bruges wealth. In July 1481 the city started the building of a new octagonal tower on top of the existing rectangular tower of the Belfry, another visual representation of city prestige.272 Restoration of Bruges autonomy in 1477 had clearly inspired the city government to embellish the Belfry, the paramount symbol of urban identity, with a prestigious building project. In 1478–81 the city spent one-tenth of its budget on the construction of the new tower. In 1481–82 construction cost absorbed 16.88 percent of all city expenditures, and the project was complete by 1484. During the same time period, the city of Ghent invested large sums in a comparable project, the construction of a new town hall beginning in 1482.273 In this period of political autonomy, both city governments made the same decision to promote their urban identities. Investing in public infrastructure while simultaneously paying for a war meant that the cities had to impose a strict fiscal regime. The same groups who had fought so ardently against the fiscal policy of Charles the Bold imposed an even heavier tax burden when they were in power, a striking pattern. More will follow about the identity and motivation of the groups and individuals who promoted these construction projects, and the financial measures needed to pay for them. 3.1.4.3 Fiscal Policy in Bruges (a) Voluntary Tax Systems The revenues of the city of Bruges in this period can be divided into three categories. The first category included traditional annual revenues, from taxes on land and government fees (‘exue ’ rights, citizenship registration, confiscation of the property of bastards, fines, leases and sales of urban domain property), payments by the court (especially for annuities), and miscellaneous revenues (confiscations, credit balances from the past year, and so on). As Graph 17 shows, traditional revenues (court, land and government, and others) only yielded one-fifth of the total income of the city. The second category, indirect taxes, provided the largest share of the city’s income (an average of 57.06 percent). When the proceeds of indirect taxes fell below this average, the third category, ‘extra-ordinary’ revenues, made up the shortfall. Extra-ordinary revenues were funds from loans by citizens and sales of annuities. Unique sources of income, such as the fines collected from former city officials in 1476–77, or the new contract of the Bruges toll in 1481–82, also fell into this category.

272 Janssens, Het Brugse belfort, 72–5. 273 Ryckbosch, Tussen Gavere en Cadzand, 94–5; Van Tyghem, Het stadhuis van Gent, 138–9. 195

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Graph 17: Detailed Analysis of the Revenues of the City of Bruges (1476–82).274

However, most of the revenue (and expense) accounts categorized above were creations of the city account books. They were umbrella accounts, which hid small subaccounts. The records of some sub-accounts are extant (such as gifts of wine and public works), but most have not survived. Any overall analysis can only be tentative because sometimes the clerks did not record or add the revenues from a sub-account into the umbrella account. The income from the voluntary loans of June 1478 and May 1480, for example, were never entered into the city accounts, but the reimbursements were.275 The financial commissioners of the city, or perhaps someone else, must have kept separate accounts of revenues and expenses, as they did in Bruges and Ghent in 1483–85 and 1488–90.276 For some reason, the loans of June 1478 and May 1480 were not reimbursed from these separate accounts, and consequently the city had to repay the creditors out of the umbrella account. The possibility that several of these separate accounts may have existed mandates a cautious approach to the analysis of the (umbrella) city accounts. The loans of June 1478 and May 1480 were products of the voluntary tax system of the city of Bruges. The city of Bruges did not force its citizens to make loans, as other medieval cities did. For Bruges, loans from citizens were voluntary, while indirect and direct taxes were the obligatory, or forced, tax system.277 James Tracy has argued that there is a close relationship between a city’s political regime and the way in which that regime handles its debts. Republican cities chose forced loans, while cities under dynastic rule financed their rule with voluntary loans and annuities.278 As Bruges was semi-autonomous but still under dynastic rule in this period, it is not surprising that its methods of handling 274 Source: the city accounts. 275 In June 1478 citizens loaned 685 lb. gr. and in May 1480 2,481 lb. 10 s. gr., but only the repayments were noted down into the city accounts (CAB: SR, 1480–81, 46v–49v and 49v–55r). 276 See for example the ‘war-accounts’ of Bruges and Ghent: CAB: OR, 2–6 and CAG: 20, 2–12. 277 An example of a forced loan is the Ghent loan of 1492 (Boone, De Gentse verplichte lening, 253–4). 278 Tracy, On the dual origins, 24. 196

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debts were mixed as well. The city chose to contract voluntary loans because it did not have the administrative structure necessary to force its citizens to lend money, as the Italian citystates did (cf. the ‘catasto ’). Loans from citizens remained voluntary. In May 1477, June 1478, and May 1480, the city government asked citizens to support city policy with voluntary loans, to be repaid without interest.279 The biggest moneylenders were the politicians themselves, not surprising in view of their role in establishing that city policy. Most of the voluntary creditors were urban officials, political sympathizers, members of wealthy middle groups, and rich merchants, who responded not only because they had cash reserves, but also because they belonged to the same social networks as did the policy-makers. Power holders were easily able to convince their social networks to invest in the city. The trust embedded in those social networks assured the lenders that the loans would be repaid, so elites in these networks lent generously to the city in 1477–80 and again in 1488 and 1490.280 Their reasons for loaning money to the city must have been social or political rather than economic, because the loans were repaid without interest. The city government might have pressured some of the lenders, particularly those who were disenfranchised power holders from the Charles the Bold era.281 But in general, the loans were voluntary, which shows that the regime had gained a degree of credibility and trust. While neither the separate accounts of the loans nor their express purpose survives, it is likely that the voluntary funds went to pay troops, as was the case in May 1477 when the ‘poorterij ’ voluntarily contributed funds for mobilising soldiers. A second pillar of the voluntary tax system in Bruges was the sale of annuities. The city offered annuities six times during Mary’s reign (in September and November 1477, April 1478, June 1479, December 1480, and February 1482). The sale of an annuity meant that the city acquired a large lump sum of cash in exchange for making smaller annual payments for many years. In June 1479, for example, the city sold annuities amounting to 400 lb. gr., at an interest rate of 6.67 percent.282 Whereas a loan at this interest rate would be repaid after 15 years under stable monetary conditions, the annual payments due for an annuity were still paid out long after the principal and interest had been met. For the city, the sale of an annuity accumulated long-term debt, while for the annuity buyer it was a long-term investment. Only the wealthy were able to afford this investment, and powerful politicians and wealthy merchants bought annuities in addition to making voluntary loans.283 Of course, leaders of the Moreel faction also bought annuities from the city in order to finance their policies. During the reign of Mary of Burgundy, Willem Moreel bought sixteen annuities for 1,629 lb. 15 s. gr., Maarten Lem seven annuities for 995 lb. gr., Jan van Riebeke five annuities for 1,090 lb. gr., Jan de Boot eight annuities for 220 lb. gr., Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas four annuities for 371 lb. 15 s. gr., and Jan de 279 CAB: SR, 1476–77, 27v–33v; SR, 1480–81, 46v–49v; SR, 1480–81, 188v–206r. 280 Blockmans, Nieuwe gegevens, 146–53. In May 1480 the highest sums were lent by important politicians during the reign of Mary of Burgundy (with the exception of the persons mentioned in the following footnote). 17 lb. gr. was lent by Maarten Lem. Jan Losschaert and Klaas van den Steene lent 16 lb. gr. Cornelis Helle, Boudewijn Heindricx, Antonis Losschaert, Donaas de Moor, Klaas and his son Jan van Nieuwenhove, Joost van der Straten, Jan de Vleeschauwere and Cornelis de Boot lent 12 lb. gr. 281 Anselmus Adornes lent 17 lb. gr. and the father and son both named Jan de Baenst lent 20 lb. gr. on two occasions in May 1480. 20 lb. gr. was the highest sum from the loan. 282 CAB: PO, nr. 1166. 283 Derycke, The public annuity market, 181. But in contrast to earlier periods, foreign merchants no longer invested in these annuities. See also Van der Heijden, State formation, 445–6 and idem, Stedelijke bestuursstructuur, 141. 197

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Keyt four annuities for 140 lb. gr. Although buyers were clearly motivated by the profit potential of annuities, other investments, such as trade and short-term loans were more profitable, albeit more risky.284 Buyers often gave the annuities to relatives or orphans to provide them the support of an annual income, rather than taking the profits themselves.285 Although some buyers bought annuities purely for economic reasons, most of them also had a political purpose. When the city needed money in order to fight a war, as was the case in Mary of Burgundy’s reign, wealthy citizens were probably motivated primarily by their desire to support the city government. The profit potential of the annuity added to its attractiveness. The sale of annuities saddled the city with a long-term debt burden, but the city government deliberately chose to finance its shortfalls by this method. In the period from 1477 to 1482, Bruges did not borrow from foreign merchants or bankers. The Great Council clearly thought that short-term loans were not an option, because the city did not have the means to repay the principal and high interest in the short time span of these loans. There may also have been a political motivation for choosing long-term debt, as the urban domain and city revenues guaranteed repayment of annuities. As a consequence, each inhabitant who paid taxes helped repay the long-term debt. Annuities were sold ‘on the whole body of the city’ as the Great Council once stated.286 According to this logic, all citizens of Bruges contributed to the sale of annuities which was in the public interest of the city. Tracy’s point that a city with considerable political autonomy (an ‘urban republic’) could promote annuity sales with the slogan ‘for the common good’, applies well here.287 Although Bruges was not an urban republic, the city government behaved as if it were, particularly in its use of the ideological tools and discourse of a city-state to promote its policies. (b) Indirect Taxes Graph 17 shows that indirect taxes provided the bulk of the income of the city of Bruges during Mary’s reign. These indirect taxes (‘assizen ’) were taxes on the production and consumption of different commodities, such as beer and wine. A direct tax was never introduced in Bruges during the reign of Mary of Burgundy because the city did not want to build up the administrative infrastructure that was needed for this kind of tax. On one occasion, in October 1477, the Great Council had discussed a proposal for a direct tax on the ‘one-hundredth penny’ (‘honderste penninc ’), i.e. a levy of one percent on the income of each citizen. This was a equitable tax because every citizen had to contribute the same percentage of his or her revenues. The Nine Members agreed that the ‘one-hundredth penny’ tax was based on a fair principle, but they were concerned that establishing the bureaucracy to administer it would be very expensive. The Members called for a study of the feasibility and profit potential of this tax.288 While it is possible that they did introduce 284 In the countryside long-term loans yielded 10 to 15 % (Thoen, Landbouwekonomie en bevolking, 913 and Thoen & Soens, Appauvrissement et endettement, 705–6). Loans in the city are not as well studied. 285 In April 1478, for example, Willem Moreel bought an annuity for each of his eight children (CAB: SR, 1477–78, 126v–127r). 286 ‘Over tghemeene lichame van der stede ’ (CAB: CA, 14, 305r, June 1479). 287 Tracy, On the dual origins, 23–4. 288 On 13 October 1477 the Nine Members decided ‘dat elc poortere ende poortersse van der stede van Brugghe gheven zoude eenswechdraghens den hondertsten penninc van zinen goede ’, but ‘zo was bij ommevraghen eendrachtelick gheconsenteirt dat de cueillote noch gaen zoude eene maend tijdts tot dat men voorweten zoude wat den honderste penninc bestrecken zoude connen ’ (CAB: CA, 14, 293r). 198

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the tax later and kept track of it in a separate account, there is no surviving indication that the proposal was ever enacted. Otherwise, indirect taxes were the only obligatory levies in Bruges during Mary’s reign. Indirect taxes were less fair than direct taxes. They weighed more heavily on the budgets of the poor, who did not have the same financial reserves as the wealthy. Nevertheless, even when the Flemish cities were governed by political coalitions which included guild representatives, these coalition governments made extensive use of indirect taxes to finance their regimes.289 One reason was practicality. Because all economic traffic passed through the city gates, tax collectors stationed there could easily count, calculate and collect the tax. An indirect tax produced ready cash to the city on a monthly basis, and could be paid out rapidly for expenses. It was also very easy to raise the tax rate, after discussion in the Great Council, of course. However, the most important reason why indirect taxes were the main source of city revenue in this period derives from the system of political participation in the Great Council, for reasons discussed below. Graph 18 shows that the city’s spending for the war and the court influenced the introduction of new indirect taxes, and increased rates for existing indirect taxes. Graph 18: The Profits From the Indirect taxes of the City of Bruges Compared to the City

Expenditures for the Court and the War (1467–1482).290

During Charles the Bold’s reign, Bruges’ payments for the war and the court slowly increased. When in 1474–75 the amount of these payments threatened to equal the profits of the indirect taxes, the city government decided to introduce a new indirect tax on the sale of corn (see Chapter 3.1.2). The strategy worked, because in the following year, although the expenses for the court and the war continued to increase, they did not exceed the profits from the indirect taxes. In 1476–77, by contrast, the war against France threw city finances into disorder. The city had to find new sources of revenue, because 289 Boone, Stratégies fiscales, 240–1; idem, Stedelijke fiscaliteit, 127. 290 Source: the city accounts (see also Graph 13 and Graph 19). 199

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the traditional sources (such as land and government fees) could not support the costs of the war. The city chose a structural approach – raising the indirect taxes – to solve the problem. Increasing the indirect taxes expanded the financial reserves of the city. So, even though expenses for the war and the court did not exceed the profits of the indirect taxes in the following year, the city raised the tax rates again (in 1478–79). After these rate hikes, Bruges had no more financial difficulties until 1481–82 when the lines on Graph 18 again threaten to converge, due to the political crisis after the death of Mary of Burgundy in March 1482. The two crucial phases of fiscal policy development in Bruges during the duchess’ reign were the periods in 1477 and 1478 when the indirect taxes were increased. The following analysis of fiscal policy in these periods will explain why the urban guilds, after they had seized power in 1477, continued to use indirect taxes to garner revenue for the city. On 1 August 1477, the Great Council of Bruges reintroduced the indirect taxes which had been levied on the city during the final years of Charles the Bold. The favorable tax system that the guilds had won in February lasted only five months, before the government dominated by those same guilds replaced it with the tax system they had opposed so vigorously. On 1 May 1477, the city raised the tax rate on wine to its 1476 level, followed by a return to the higher rates on Bruges beer, foreign beer, and even the hated ‘cueillote ’ on corn, in August.291 The financial pressure of the war was too great for the city to maintain the favourable tax rates of February 1477. Moreover, as Graph 18 shows, the money was needed quickly. The Bruges financial commission had no other option except reintroducing the old tax rates from November 1475. Both Bruges and Ghent paid the troops with profits from increased indirect taxes.292 The altered political conditions in August 1477 explain why the craft guilds agreed to increase the tax rate. The war against France which Bruges faced in 1477 had a totally different character from the wars of Charles the Bold. The new war was about defending the county, rather than serving the interests of a belligerent duke. Moreover, the craft guilds had now obtained a voice and role in deciding how the money from the indirect taxes would be spent. Whereas in the past the indirect taxes had been leased out in tax farms to the highest bidder, now the city government itself organised tax collection.293 In this case, Bruges did not follow the same policy as Ghent, which continued to lease tax farms, perhaps because the Bruges government thought that wartime disruptions might reduce profits from a tax farm.294 No one in Bruges made personal profits from indirect taxes during Mary’s reign.295 The financial commission and the Great Council strictly supervised the institution, rates and collection of indirect taxes. The craft guilds probably 291 CAB: SR, 1476–77, 18v–19r. 292 Ryckbosch, Tussen Gavere en Cadzand, 200–4. 293 Financial commissioner Jan de Blasere, for example, had to collect the indirect tax on wine ‘als een der zes ghecommitteerden daertoe ghestelt ’ (CAB: SR, 1477–78, 19r). 294 Ryckbosch, Tussen Gavere en Cadzand, 132–6. 295 In most cases the financial commissioners of Bruges collected the indirect taxes; only once was another person put in charge, namely Colard le Thiry. He collected the indirect tax on Bruges beer from 1 September 1478 until 1 October 1481 (CAB: SR, 1478–79, 30v; SR, 1479–80, 29v; SR, 1480–81, 28r; SR, 1481–82, 27v). He was a political sympathizer of the new regime of Bruges. Colard was member of a international trade company (a ‘gheselscip […] in coopmanscepe te ghemeene staldom ende verliese ’; see CAB: KV, 828bis, 202 and Mus, De compagnie Despars, 88). His son Cornelis would be beheaded by Maximilian’s party in 1486 because of his sympathy for the opposition to the duke. Colard himself was condemned to pay a fine of 600 lb. gr. because he had supported the political resistance against the regency of the Habsburg prince (Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 272–3, 276; CAB: SR, 1485–86, 167v). 200

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accepted the increase in indirect taxes because of these exceptional conditions and their voice in decisions about fiscal policy. Difficulties which arose during the Great Council meetings in late August 1478 confirm this conclusion. In the accounting year 1477–78, the amount spent to repay city debts soared to almost 40 percent of the total expenses of the city (see Graph 15). In the face of financial catastrophe, the city magistrates asked the Great Council to find a solution. The Great Council created a commission of 150 people, representatives from the craft guilds and the ‘poorterij ’. The commission concluded that another increase of the sales taxes on corn, Bruges beer, and foreign beer, plus the institution of new sales taxes on meat and fish, were the only solution for the city’s financial problems. The commission’s report stated that these taxes would harm everyone in the same way because every citizen had to pay them.296 This statement suggests that most of representatives of the Nine Members appointed to the commission were wealthy, as they neglected to mention that indirect taxes damaged the poor much more than the rich. It may also explain why certain craft guilds did not want to approve the new taxes. When the Great Council took up discussion of the commission’s proposal on 22 August 1478, some craft guilds were reluctant.297 After separate meetings of each of the constituent Members, the collective Nine Members refused to approve the new fiscal measures. The financial commissioners (among them Willem Moreel) pointed out the commission of 150 had agreed to institute the new rates, and argued that new taxes were the only way to pay for the city’s public debt.298 The commissioners did not want to reconsider the decision of the commission of 150, which caused conflict with the representatives of the Nine Members. The meeting report states that the Nine Members stuck to their guns and the financial commissioners were not able to force them to agree.299 The stalemate was not resolved until October 1478. After the election of new city boards on 2 September 1478, when Willem Moreel became burgomaster, the debt payment issue again divided the Great Council. The financial commissioners (probably supported by the burgomaster) demanded a solution from the Great Council on 22 September, followed by an ultimatum. If an arrangement was not made, the financial commissioners would resign. This political move must have impressed the Great Council, because on 2 October the representatives of the nine Members accepted the increase to the existing indirect taxes.300 They did, however, amend the original proposal; taxes on beer and corn were increased, but no new taxes were levied on meat and fish. In addition, the Great Council promised that the new tax system would only be valid for one year. The Nine Members had demanded this measure because they wanted to reassure their rank and file that the measure would be temporary.301 The new tax rates began on 1 October.302 The result of this compromise by the Great Council was that the rates of the indirect taxes in Bruges were even higher in the next few years than during the reign of Charles the Bold (Table 6). 296 CAB: CA, 14, 295r-v (partially edited by Gilliodts-Van Severen, Inventaire de la ville, VI, 172–3). 297 CAB: CA, 14, 297r. 298 CAB: CA, 14, 297r-v. 299 They ‘bliven bi den hueren, schieden van daer ’ (CAB: CA, 14, 297v). Maybe the quarrel Willem Moreel had with Willem Houtmaerct (the representative of the ‘poorterij ’) two days before (see below) should be situated in this context. 300 CAB: CA, 14, 298r. 301 The nine Members had required ‘dat zij elcken van den voorseiden neghen leden wilden doen hebben een copie dat de voorseide consenteringhe maer een jaer lanc ghedueren en zoude omme die huerlieder volcke te tooghene ten hende dat zij te bet tevreden ende gherust zijn mochten ’ (CAB: CA, 14, 299r). 302 CAB: SR, 1478–79, 29v–31r. 201

For the Common Good

Table 6: The Rates of Bruges Indirect taxes, in Groats (1468–1482).303304305306307

Date of change

Wine304 (per stope)

Bruges beer305 (per barrel)

Foreign beer (per barrel)

Corn306 (per ‘hoet ’)

1 March 1468

24

14 – 3

32

–

13 November 1475

24

14 – 3

32

4–2

1 March 1477

12

6 – 1.5

16

–

1 August 1477

24307

14 – 3

32

4–2

1 October 1478

24

20 – 3

48

8–4

1 October 1479

24

20 – 3

48

4–2

1 October 1481

24

14 – 3

48

–

1 October 1482

24

20 – 3

48

4–2

Although taxes had increased, the nine Members did hold on to their political participation in fiscal decision-making, and this participation also partially explains the success of the indirect tax system in Bruges. An indirect tax system is much easier to manipulate, while a direct tax system depends on a more technical and administrative structure. In addition to these practical considerations, the bargaining potential of indirect taxes seems to be the reason why the Nine Members maintained an indirect tax system in Bruges after they had seized power in 1477. But negotiating means that one must approve compromises, as became clear in autumn 1478, and a compromise always has advantages and disadvantages for both parties. The Bruges elite had a great interest in a proper debt repayment structure because they were some of the main investors in the public debt of Bruges, but the elite had to agree with a compromise that did not raise taxes dramatically. This was the price they paid for their political coalition with the craft guilds. The Nine Members also had to compromise if they wanted to maintain their role in decision-making, and many probably also wanted to keep their city creditworthy. Higher tax rates were the only solution. The Great Council did refuse to exempt certain citizens and ducal officials (such as Pieter Lanchals, Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Michiel, and Jan van der Scaghe) from paying the taxes when Maximilian requested this in December 1478.308 A few months later the Nine Members also refused to give a new aide to the court, as we have seen. Although the Nine Members remained faithful to their principle of ‘no taxation without representation’, they had to compromise with the Bruges elite, because they did not want to give up the existing political coalition which ruled the city.

303 Source: the city accounts. 304 These are the rates for the so-called ‘corte ’ wine. Every type of wine had its own rate (an overview in Merlevede, Vorst, stad en schatkist, 214-7). A stope is ca. 2.2 liters. 305 The first figure is for the ‘large’ beer (‘groot bier ’), the second for the ‘small’ (‘klein ’) beer. 306 The first figure is for wheat and peas, the second for other types of corn. 307 The rates on wine had already been doubled on 1 May 1477 (‘te dobbelre assijze ’, i.e. 24 groats; CAB: SR, 1476-77, 17v-18r). 308 CAB: CA, 14, 300r-v. 202

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Graph 19: Gross Revenues from the Bruges Indirect Taxes (1468–1482).309

The financial consequences of the higher tax rates are evident in Graph 19. The revenues from the indirect taxes in 1478–79 yielded half again as much as the year before. They once again provided two-thirds of the total revenues of the city (Graph 17). With the higher indirect taxes, the city of Bruges obtained financial breathing space at the end of 1478. In the next two years the city only had to sell annuities to relieve urgent financial needs on two occasions (in June 1479 and December 1480). Financial solvency was also attained because the costs for the court and the war decreased in 1480, when they sank to the level of 1472–73.310 This led to a budget surplus of 11.49 percent at the end of 1478–79.311 As a consequence the Great Council lowered the indirect tax rate on corn by half (Table 6). However, the Great Council kept the other tax rates at the high levels, in order to finance an extensive city building program. (c)

Building a Belfry ‘For the Common Good’

During the reign of Mary of Burgundy Bruges was ruled by political compromise. The craft guilds maintained their privileges and rights, but they did not oppose the financial policies of the merchant elite. The guilds only protested against tax increases when their representatives did not have a voice in how the increased taxes would be spent. Shared control over the spending of tax revenues helped to maintain internal peace between the political partners. This was also true in Ghent, where joint control of the ruling partners over use of the profits from the indirect taxes helped to stabilize their coalition.312 Because the craft guilds and the merchant elite had the same economic interests, this compromise was not so difficult to achieve. Both wanted to maintain a favourable climate for regional and international trade, the fount of the city’s wealth. Neither party wished to support dynastic wars which only damaged the county. The craft guilds were willing to pay higher 309 Source: the city accounts. 310 The city paid 579,402 groats in 1472–73 and 735,806 groats in 1480–81. The portion of total expenses that went to the costs for the court and the war fell even to the level of 1468–69 (see Graph 10 and 15). 311 CAB: SR, 1478–79, 182v. 312 Also in Ghent a coalition between craft guilds and merchant elite ruled the city (see chapter 3.2 and Boone, Geld en macht, 207–11). 203

For the Common Good

taxes, but the profits had to be spent on defensive wars which protected trade routes, or on projects which served the interests of both the merchant elite and the craft guilds. The building of a new tower on the Belfry exemplified this type of project. It is a symbolic representation in stone of the coalition which ruled Bruges during Mary’s reign, a symbol of identity and an ideological weapon for political propaganda. The coalition of urban guilds and the merchant elite ordered the building of a new octagonal tower on the Belfry in 1478. Like their counterparts in Ghent, the coalition government of Bruges invested heavily in the remodelling, decoration and extension of a public building that had important social functions. In Ghent the embellishment of the town hall was meant to show that a new political era had commenced, one in which the city had political autonomy. In Bruges the political implications of the construction project were even clearer. The Belfry was not only the symbol of urban autonomy because it was the site where the urban privileges were stored, but also the centrepiece of the craft guilds, because the tower stood atop the Market hall, where the craft guilds performed their economic functions. When the guilds invested in economic and political power symbols, their intention was always to increase the guilds’ prestige.313 But the investment in the Belfry was not only their idea but one that was shared with the merchant elite, who had already been financing attractive and useful economic infrastructure projects in the past few decades.314 The Belfry was a symbol of the new political identity of Bruges and a means to stimulate the Bruges economy. The construction project was designed to show that Bruges faced the future with confidence. Moreover, the new octagonal tower on the Belfry was an ideological weapon of the new regime. In his analysis of symbolic power, Pierre Bourdieu notes that ideology is a tool deployed to convince a society that the interests of a small group are really common interests.315 The new octagonal tower was such an ideological project. The tower might stimulate economic growth in the city, but the Bruges merchant and guild elites would reap the largest profits from a booming economy. The tower symbolized the political participation of the craft guilds in policy-making, but only the powerful and wealthy elite of the craft guilds could actually have a role in politics. The tower thus served the interests of the (new) political elite, but the ideology promoting it proclaimed that the interests of the elite were the interests of the whole city. The idea behind remodelling the Belfry was that a booming economy and political participation by the guilds was for the good of everyone in the city. According to this argument, the Belfry was remodelled for the common good of Bruges, just as the construction of public buildings in other cities in this period were represented as projects for the ‘common good’. 316 Although we have no texts which describe the Belfry project, the craft guild elites probably used this argument to promote the project and defend the continuance of high tax rates even though the expenses for the court and the war were low in 1480–81. The profits of the indirect taxes were used for an ambitious building program that enhanced the status of the new power holders. The Belfry was an ideological tool, made of stone, intended to convince citizens that the ruling coalition of merchant elite and craft guilds governed the city for the ‘common good’. 313 Dambruyne, Corporative capital, 221; Van Uytven, Flämische Belfriede, 142–3. 314 Stabel, From the market to the shop, 85–92. In this context mention can be made of the amendment to the privilege of 30 March 1477 which the craft guilds had made shortly before its promulgation (p. 162). In this document they requested the good maintenance of the belfry by the urban government. This shows that the craft guilds had a certain interest in repairing the prestigious building. 315 Bourdieu, Sur le pouvoir symbolique, 409. 316 Lecuppre-Desjardin, Des pouvoirs inscrits, 29. 204

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Illustration 12: The Belfry of Bruges with its Octagonal Tower Erected during the Reign of Mary of Burgundy.

The pattern of expenditure by the Bruges coalition also explains why there was political peace in the city after the Revolt of 1477. Apart from a minor upset in November 1477 (see above), the craft guilds did not rebel against the heavy fiscal measures imposed by the city government during Mary’s reign. The political role of the urban guilds and the 205

For the Common Good

way in which the elite justified its rule seem to have stimulated a certain degree of trust in the new regime’s policies. An exemplar of the trust and confidence that dominated in Bruges in the period between 1477 and 1482 was an allegorical ballad composed by Bruges poet Anthonis de Roovere. The rhetorician understood conditions in Bruges well, as his chronicle about the reign of Mary of Burgundy witnesses.317 The city government may have ordered Anthonis to write the ballad, because the rhetorician was connected to the elite circles of Bruges society.318 In the poem, written in 1480 or 1481, he extolled the Bruges financial commissioners for their numerous investments in public works. Along with their efforts to pay off the public debt of the city, Anthonis hoped that these public works would get the sick city of Bruges back on its feet.319 But Anthonis also warned the power holders that Bruges had an almost incurable disease, the miserable economic situation. ‘Fortune wil my te nieten bringhen ’, (‘Fortune will destroy me’), sang the ailing city of Bruges in his poem.320 Was this true? And if so, what did the city government do to try to improve the economy? Or was the poem merely a tool of propaganda? 3.1.5

The Faltering Economy of Bruges

3.1.5.1 A General Economic Decline and the Bruges Response Historians of the late medieval economy regularly express unfavourable evaluations of the second half of the fifteenth century. Population saturation slowed demographic growth, agricultural production stagnated, feudal taxes increased, and the prices of basic goods rose, an unmistakably negative pattern.321 An industrial and commercial recession followed the agricultural decline. Global trade in industrial and commercial goods increased during the period between 1440 and 1470, but afterwards growing inflation, higher taxes and numerous international conflicts reversed this trend.322 The traditional wool cloth industry had largely disappeared, replaced by smaller, specialised luxury-cloth industries.323 Urban producers had to compete increasingly with rural manufacturers, albeit only for products with a lower value.324 A detailed analysis of the Ghent economy has shown that the negative economic trend had serious consequences for the economies of the Flemish cities, and that the economic recession which started around 1475 lasted until the end of the century. The wars of the city against Maximilian in the years 1488–92 obviously slowed the economy even more.325 Bruges did not escape the depression. Three factors hurt the Bruges economy - the war against France, the monetary and financial crisis of the 1480s, and, last but not least, the growth of the Antwerp market. The war certainly had disadvantageous effects on the 317 Oosterman, De Excellente cronike, 30–1. 318 One indication of this is the annual salary of 6 lb. gr. Anthonis received from the city (Viaene, Anthonis de Roovere, 361–2; CAB: SR, 1476–77, 126r). 319 ‘De ses raeyen die hem ghehelpich bieden / Sijnder toe ghebeden uut charitaten / Sy moghen die ses ghecomitteerde bedieden / Die poorten, mueren voorsien en straten / Brugghen, caeyen, commende ter baten / Daer menich mensche aen wint zijn broodt / oock schulden betalende diverssche staten / Godt stae hem by in alder noodt ’ (Mak, De gedichten van Anthonis, 364). 320 Ibidem, 361. 321 Thoen, Landbouwekonomie en bevolking, 1031–2. 322 Van Uytven, La conjoncture commerciale, 448; Stabel, De kleine stad, 287. 323 Van der Wee, Industrial dynamics, 330–1; Boone, L ’industrie textile, 44–50; Stabel, Economic development, 194–5; Dumolyn, Population et structures, 48–58. 324 Stabel, Décadence ou survie?, 75. 325 Ryckbosch, Tussen Gavere en Cadzand, 261–2. 206

Chapter 3 The Cities

Bruges economy.326 Economic traffic from, into and through the city was obstructed by hostile troops on land (and probably by ‘friendly’ but hungry forces as well) and pirates at sea. It is not clear how much these predators actually discouraged trade, however, because the nation (or merchant organisation) of Lucca actually increased their presence in Bruges in 1478.327 The city levied high indirect taxes which had to stave off these predators and wage the war after 1477, but these taxes possibly could harm economic traffic even more. This has to be balanced against the fact that some of the funds spent by the city, and even the court, to fight the war returned to the Bruges economy. Spending on fortification of the city and equipment for soldiers, for example, were investments in the economic activity of the craft guilds. The construction projects of the city government certainly had positive effects on the building industry. War was bad for business on general, but good for some trades and industries.328 But the negative effects of the war probably surpassed political efforts to make the Bruges economy flourish. Lack of adequate sources to reconstruct the Bruges economy prevents more systematic research into the precise effects of war on the economic activity of Bruges citizens. Although we cannot precisely gauge the effect of ducal policy on the Bruges economy, it is likely that Maximilian’s borrowing hurt the city’s moneylenders. A striking number of Bruges moneychangers went bankrupt during Mary’s reign, including Willem Roelands and Colard de May in 1481.329 Their personal accounts have not survived, but both had lent money to Maximilian.330 The Three Members of Flanders thought that Maximilian’s monetary policies had clear detrimental effects on the county’s economy. As I discussed in chapter 1, the court had increased mint profits, which may have caused bullion suppliers to take their metal elsewhere. One of the first political decisions the Three Members made after Mary’s death was to abolish Maximilian’s monetary ordinances, one indication that these ordinances had damaged the economy which, unfortunately, cannot be confirmed by other sources. The growing importance of other ports in the Low Countries, particularly Antwerp, is usually considered the most important factor hurting the Bruges economy. The Brabantine economy did begin to flourish in the second half of the fifteenth century, but growth of Antwerp did not damage the Bruges economy at first as much as it would in the long term.331 During the fifteenth century Bruges remained the main commercial centre connecting southern and northern Europe for trade in high-quality goods, but the Bruges ‘gateway’ steadily lost control over large parts of its economic hinterland.332 326 Van Uytven, Politiek en economie, 1149; idem, Stages of economic decline, 267–8. 327 Lazzareschi, Gli statuti dei Lucchesi, 87. 328 Gunn, Grummitt & Cools, War, state, and society, 89; Van der Wee, The growth of the Antwerp market, II, 399. 329 ‘Ende binnen dier middelen tijt speelden te Brugghe diversche cooplieden banckeroutte ’ (Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 198). See also Van der Wee, The growth of the Antwerp market, II, 108. 330 After the bankruptcy of Willem Roelands, the city of Bruges had to repay his creditors. According to the city accounts, however, Donaas de Moor had taken money for personal profit during this operation. He was appointed by the city ‘omme te overziene ende te visenteirne alle de boucken van Willem Roelands, banchoudere ende wisselare in dese stede, ten hende dat zine crediteurs betaelt hadden moghen wesen […]. Ende duer mids dien dat de voorseide Donaes zekere somme van penninghen hief ende lichte uter voorseide wissele ende die themwaerts betrac ’, he had to repay these sums (CAB: SR, 1482–83, 40v–41r; see also De Roover, Money, banking and credit, 337; Mus, De compagnie Despars, 35; CAB: SR, 1482–83, 76r, 176v; SR, 1483–84, 54r and SR, 1484–85, 183v). Colard de May went bankrupt in 1482 after he was fled from the county (CAB: SR, 1481–82, 40r; SR, 1482–83, 40r; SAG: RV, 7512, 84r and 219v). 331 Van Uytven, Stages of economic decline, 269; Stabel, Décadence ou survie?, 75–6; Van Werveke, Bruges et Anvers, 51–5; Van der Wee, The growth of the Antwerp market, II, 430–1; Bolton & Bruscoli, When did Antwerp, 376–8. 332 Stabel, De kleine stad, 107–8. 207

For the Common Good

Antwerp surpassed Bruges around 1500 as the most important commercial port in the Low Countries, but Bruges remained the financial centre for another century.333 At the beginning of Mary’s reign, the Bruges economy was not in crisis, but it was faltering. Van Uytven argues that there was a fundamental recession beginning in the middle of the fifteenth century, stimulated by keen competition from other ports and the general decline in trade, industry and agricultural production.334 The slow pace of the decline in the number of immigrants moving into Bruges beginning in the 1460s confirms that there was no deep crisis, but the decline had begun.335 Older historiography held that the silting-up of the Swin estuary (the waterway which connected Bruges to the sea) was one of the main reasons for the decline of the Bruges market.336 However, the probability that Bruges lacked the means to prevent or circumvent the silting-up of the estuary is a more solid explanation for the city’s decline. Bruges did not have the huge amounts of money needed to invest in the construction of a new seaport, or a new waterway in the Swin estuary. During Mary’s reign the city did undertake some projects to keep the city accessible to shipping. In February 1478, for example, the city prohibited the building of dikes near Damme and Sluis in order to ‘improve the Swin’. 337 In 1481 the city decided to fill in the so-called ‘Black Gap’ to combat the build-up of silt in the estuary. In 1473 the city had already tried to wash away the growing sandbar which was making it risky for ships to enter the port of Sluis by flooding the polder between Cadzand and Wulpen. Those efforts were in vain and in fact caused more silt to build up in the Black Gap. In 1481 the city planned to reverse this process and build dikes in the Black Gap again, as well as to dig a new canal from the Swin to Bruges, but these works were never started.338 Instead the Flemish Revolt and the ensuing war against Maximilian delayed the project until 1484.339 Efforts to fix the Black Gap continued in 1486–87, but were again unsuccessful. The city did not have sufficient funds to dig a new canal to the sea or to construct a new port on the sea. The city government gave priority to the remodelling of the Belfry during Mary’s reign and to the struggle against Maximilian afterwards. The reorientation of economic traffic in the Low Countries, accelerated by the policy of Antwerp supporters during the Flemish Revolt, made Antwerp the new economic centre. The silting-up of the Swin was only a symptom of this reorientation. Besides trying to halt the silting-up of the Swin estuary, the city made other attempts to improve its economic situation. These measures show that the Bruges elite was well aware of the economic difficulties and still had enough vitality to address economic issues. First, the city tried to stop the exodus of foreign merchants. In the winter of 1480–81 333 Stabel, Dwarfs among giants, 71. 334 Van Uytven, Stages of economic decline, 267; Stabel, Economic development, 202–3. 335 Thoen, Verhuizen naar Brugge, 333. The registration of new members into the coopers’ guilds decreased slowly in the 1470s, but this fall was not dramatic (Sosson, La structure sociale, 478; Stabel, Guilds in late medieval Flanders, 202–3). 336 Van Houtte, The rise and decline, 43–4; Gottschalk, Het verval van Brugge, 25. 337 ‘Omme de beteringhe van den Zwene ’ (CAB: SR, 1477–78, 48v). This measures were somewhat successful, because the city remarked some months later that ‘tZwin ter Sluus bij dien zeere ghediept ende ghebetert [is] ende van daghe te daghe zo lanc zo meer diept ende betert ’ (138v). 338 The city decided ‘omme te makene een nieu ghedelf commende in de Bruchsche vaert ten hende dat die beteren zoude ende ooc omme de beteringhe van den Zwene ’ and a messenger was sent to the Great Council of Maximilian to obtain permission from the court ‘omme weder moghen te bedijkene tzwarte gat ’ (CAB: SR, 1480–81, 176r, 181r). 339 CAB: SR, 1484–85, 154r (1484). In April 1486 the city sold an annuity to pay a new project to dike in the Black Gap (CAB: SR, 1485–86, 186r–203v), but, again, the project failed (Gottschalk, Historische geografie, II, 100–2; idem, Het verval van Brugge, 12–3; Ryckaert & Vandewalle, De strijd voor het behoud, 58–9). 208

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the city negotiated with merchants from Newcastle to keep them for moving their staple to Bergen-op-Zoom. The court supported these efforts by stipulating that Bruges was to remain the most important staple location for foreign merchants in the Low Countries.340 The war increased risks for foreign merchants traveling to Bruges, but the presence of a highly sophisticated trade network in the city was still a huge attraction.341 The city even tried to improve conditions for foreign merchants. In February 1479, the city persuaded the court to give up charging the smaller toll levied on foreign merchants at the port of Sluis. Since the city agreed to pay an annual rent of 720 lb. par. to the court in exchange, Bruges was in effect partially subsidising foreign trade.342 With the urban privilege of 30 March 1477 the city had strengthened its political control over Sluis, and, suppressed any trouble there which might interfere with trade. The government also took measures to improve trade conditions within the city, but because the city government ordinances, the ‘Hallegeboden ’, do not survive for this period, most remain unknown. A rare surviving ordinance from 19 May 1481 gives evidence of the government’s desire to make the judicial system fair for merchants, in this case, by facilitating methods for suing debtors.343 The city government declared that Bruges citizens could bring their lawsuits concerning debt and commercial disagreements before the board of aldermen. In the past a citizen had to wait to bring lawsuits until one of the special sessions, or ‘vierschaar ’, which could cause long delays. Some merchants carried large unpaid debts, which made them afraid to do business.344 Foreign merchants already had the right to bring lawsuits to the aldermen, and now Bruges citizens enjoyed the same privilege. As usual the city of Bruges was trying to create a safe judicial climate for trade, in order to lower transaction costs and risk.345 Another ordinance of May 1481 had same purpose. The government appointed a guard to patrol the city’s annual market fair and prevent the theft of merchandise, in response to incidences when foodstuffs had been stolen in this year of grain shortages.346 These ordinances offer glimpses of the regime’s effort to support commerce, but the majority of the juridical and political measures the city took to protect the merchants are unknown, due to the lack of sources. Other efforts of the city were not successful. In 1479 the government lent a total of 64 lb. gr. to eight woolworkers who had fled from Arras to encourage them to settle in Bruges. The city government hoped that the Arras woolworkers, who were specialists in the making of ‘says’, a type of woolcloth, would inject a stimulus into the city’s cloth industry, and perhaps to make the city more competitive with rural say cloth production.347 The craftsmen were to repay the city at the rate of four groats for every say cloth they produced, but the project was in vain, because the loan was never repaid. The city’s efforts to combat 340 CAB: SR, SR, 1480–81, 73r, 80v, 163v. 341 Murray, Of nodes and networks, 14; Stabel, Kooplieden in de stad, 85. 342 CAB: PO, nr. 1165. 343 CAB: CA, 2, 303r-v (edited by Gilliodts-Van Severen, Coutume de la ville, II, 114–6). 344 They ‘schuwen ende laten met mallicanderen coopmanschepe te doene ’. 345 Stabel, Stedelijke instellingen en stedelijke economie, 20–1. 346 CAB: SR, 1480–81, 174r. 347 The city lent the money ‘hopende dat bij dien dese stede te bet multiplijeren ende vermeersen zal van volke ende dat groote neeringhe daer of onderlinghe binder stede zoude moghen commen grootelike in voordernesse van den ghemeenen oorboire van derzelver stede ende van den inwuenende van diere ’ (CAB: SR, 1479–80, 163v). The French king Louis had ordered the citizens of Arras in 1479 to leave the town after he had renamed the city ‘Franchise ’ (Boone, La destruction des villes, 108; Potter, War and government, 54–5). 209

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competition from rural cloth production were also fruitless. As the urban privilege of 30 March 1477 shows, the Bruges craft guilds had tried to take control over the countryside by forcing towns along the Swin estuary to submit to Bruges. In November 1477 the Great Council decided to supervise the observance of the privileges by all craftsmen who lived in the circle of one mile around the city borders.348 This was a typical attempt by urban craftsmen to prevent ‘unfair’ competition from the countryside, but this measure and most of those like it were ineffective.349 3.1.5.2 The Bruges Tolls The city’s most important initiatives to improve the economy were the new contracts concluded with the two noblemen who possessed the feudal right to levy tolls in Bruges. Pieter of Luxembourg held the right to levy a tax called the ‘great’ or ‘Bruges’ toll on all economic traffic into the city, and Louis of Bruges held the right to levy a tax on ‘grute’, used to make beer. As part of its mission to supervise and improve the city’s economy, the Great Council of Bruges tried to take control over these tolls during Mary’s reign. The following analysis of these efforts and their consequences for the Bruges market shows that the city government was not resigned to economic decline. On the contrary, the political coalition of merchants and craft guilds did everything they could to try to improve the economy. The possessor of the old feudal right to levy the ‘Bruges toll’ had the power to influence trade in the city. The toll applied to the goods on every foreign ship arriving in Bruges. The right was originally held by the count of Flanders, who in the thirteenth century awarded it to the lords of Gistel, in exchange for an annual rent payment.350 When Johanna of Bar, the heiress of the lords of Gistel, married Louis of Luxembourg in the fifteenth century, the Bruges toll right passed to the counts of St. Pol.351 When the French king executed Louis of Luxembourg, count of St. Pol, in 1475, his eldest son John inherited the Bruges toll, but he died in the battle of Morat in June 1476. Louis’ second son, Pieter, then became the new ‘lord of the toll’ of Bruges.352 After Pieter had returned to the Burgundian fold in spring 1477 (see chapter 2), he became a very important nobleman in the city, and his possession of the Bruges toll undoubtedly also strengthened his position throughout the Low Countries. The Bruges toll was immensely lucrative. On 24 February 1480, the city officially estimated that the annual revenue from the toll was between 12,000 and 14,000 lb. par.353 In addition to the impressive profits, the lord of the toll also possessed considerable political and economic power through his indirect control over commercial traffic into the city of Bruges, and thus into the whole county of Flanders.

348 ‘Dat elc van den ambochten zal moghen bezoucken, up eene mile ghehendt der stede van Brugghe, ceuren, naer den uutwijsene van den previlegen ’ (CAB: CA, 14, 294v). 349 Stabel, Stedelijke instellingen en stedelijke economie, 17; Dambruyne, Corporatieve middengroepen, 726. 350 Soens, De rentmeesters van de graaf, 260. The ‘lord of the toll’ of Bruges also had rents on other tolls in Bruges and Damme (SAB: BB, 64, 1r–2v, 21v, 23v and 276r – see also Gilliodts-Van Severen, Cartulaire de l ’ancien grand tonlieu, II, 160–1). 351 Johanna of Bar (viscountess of Meaux, countes of Marle and Soissons) was the only heiress of John III of Luxembourg (count of Guise and Ligny) and Johanna de Béthune, the only heiress of Isabel van Gistel and Robert de Béthune (de Limburg-Stirum, La cour des comtes, 180–1). 352 De Smedt, Les chevaliers, 29–31, 176–7 and 200–1 353 CAB: CA, 14, 314r. 210

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Conflict between the lord of the Bruges toll and the city of Bruges, both inevitable and frequent, broke out again in the summer of 1479. Citizens of Bruges were exempt from the toll, after Duke John the Fearless had granted this exemption in 1411 when he was engaged in war against France and needed the city’s military support. In March 1477 Mary of Burgundy had confirmed this right in the (first) urban privilege of Bruges for a similar reason.354 In 1479, two French merchants, Corneille Daussut and Jean Garnier, who had purchased Bruges citizenship, refused to pay the toll to Filips van Waterleet and Jan van Sassegem, who had leased the toll from the count of St. Pol.355 In response, Filips van Waterleet and Jan van Sassegem confiscated three bales of alum from the two French merchants. A commission of the city government, lead by burgomaster Willem Moreel, civil clerk Jan de Taye, sheriff Willem de Wintere and several aldermen, went to the Bruges tollhouse, a small building on the Kraanlei, where Willem Moreel ordered the toll collectors to return the confiscated goods. Jan van Sassegem and Filips van Waterleet were not amused, and brought a suit against the city before the ducal Great Council. Despite negotiations between the city and the lord of the toll in February 1480, the Great Council heard the case in December 1480. It was a strange trial in terms of the parties, the verdict, and the results. On the one side Willem Moreel, Maximilian’s superintendent for all finances, and Willem de Wintere, the former Bruges sheriff of Bruges who had been dismissed by the same Great Council a few months before (see chapter 2), defended the city of Bruges. On the other side, Filips van Waterleet and Jan van Sassegem defended the rights of a knight of the Golden Fleece, Pieter of Luxembourg. The tax collectors condemned the seizure of the bales of alum by the former burgomaster, claiming that those who had purchased Bruges citizenship (‘ghecochte poorters ’) had no exemption and had to pay the toll.356 The Bruges defendants claimed the opposite, arguing that the privilege of 1411 was unclear on this matter, and that in the past few decades a custom had developed that citizens by purchase were exempt from the toll. After a short debate, the Great Council ordered the city to return the three bales of alum to the French merchants, without ruling on the fundamental issue raised by the case. The Great Council fined the former Bruges burgomaster and his fellow invaders of the tollhouse 3,000 golden lions (4,050 lb. par.), with one-third going to the lord of the toll and two-thirds to the count. The former city officials also had to beg public forgiveness from the count of St. Pol, a symbolic punishment. The Great Council did not, however, pronounce any decision on whether citizens by purchase had to pay the Bruges toll.

354 See Gilliodts-Van Severen, Inventaire des archives, IV, 87–8 and Cauchies, Ordonnances de Jean sans Peur, 248–9 for 1411; Gilliodts-Van Severen, Coutume de la ville de Bruges, II, 80–1 for 1477. 355 This is based on GSAB: GR, 796, 210v–212v (sentence of the Great Council of Maximilian, a copy in CAB: CA, 13, 202r–206r – see also Gilliodts-Van Severen, Cartulaire de l ’ancien grand tonlieu, I, 100–1 for a summary of the events) and on CAB: CA, 14, 306r–307v (a report of a meeting of the Great Council of Bruges). 356 GSAB: GR, 796, 211r. 211

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Illustration 13: The Toll House in Bruges, With the Coat of Arms of the Lord of the Toll, Peter of Luxembourg, 1477.

This mild, limited sentence is a clue that the conflict had already been resolved before the trial began. During the preceding negotiations the city had asked the lord

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of the toll if it could buy the toll right.357 The city had concluded a purchase agreement with him, but waited on the sentence of the Great Council, perhaps because the court and Pieter of Luxembourg wanted to emphasize that citizens were not allowed to impinge upon the feudal rights of the count. Therefore a symbolic punishment of the former Bruges power holders would discourage future violations of the toll privileges. The ducal Great Council had ordered Willem Moreel and the other offenders to beg the count of Saint-Pol for mercy publicly and to hang a tablet inscribed with a warning to future offenders on the façade of the tollhouse.358 Some days later, Maximilian let off the superintendent and his companions easily.359 No one was condemned in this case, because it had already been resolved before it began. The contract for purchase of the Bruges toll was signed on 16 April 1481, but it was the same agreement concluded by the Great Council of Bruges in February 1480. The city of Bruges and the lord of the toll agreed that for the following eighteen years the city would levy the toll in exchange for an annual rent of 12,000 lb. par. for the count of SaintPol, to be paid twice a year (in May and November).360 Pieter of Luxembourg guaranteed that he would fulfil the feudal duties incumbent on the toll right, such as possible feudal services, the payment of the annual rent to the count of Flanders, and protection of the coast.361 The city of Bruges was responsible for collecting the toll, paying the salaries of the tax collectors and maintenance of the tollhouse on the Kraanlei. The city was allowed to proclaim toll-free days exempt people from the toll, which it probably did for citizens by purchase. Finally, the city was allowed to spend the profits of the toll, but it had to cover the losses as well. It seems that the city of Bruges had welcomed the Trojan horse inside its walls, because the new arrangement caused serious losses (Graph 20). The contract with the lord of the toll cost Bruges 634 lb. 11 s. 3 d. gr. in the accounting year 1481–82. In addition to the annual rent of 1000 lb. gr., Bruges had to pay collection expenses (140 lb. 3 s. 7 d. gr. in 1481–82). Losses increased in the following years until 1484–85. On 8 January 1484 the city signed a new contract with the lord of the toll, Jacob of Savoy, the son-inlaw of Pieter of Luxemburg, who agreed to reduce the annual rent the city had to pay to 400 lb. gr. However, this agreement also cost the city because Jacob of Savoy, who served on the regency council of Flanders, collected a one-time payment of 2,300 lb. gr. from the city.362 The city decided to finance this with long-term public debt, selling an annuity on its revenues. Due to the war, the annual rent was not paid in 1491–92, but otherwise the agreement lasted until 1499, as the original contract made with Pieter of Luxembourg in 357 CAB: CA, 14, 314r. 358 The Great Counsil had sentenced that ‘in den voorseiden tolhuuse te doen makene een glasen veinstere werdich zijnde twintich ponden groten ende daertoe een tafelkin, in de welke veynstere ende tafelkin ghescreven zoude wesen tfait voorscreven ’ (GSAB: GR, 796, 212r). 359 ‘Laquelle somme mon dit seigneur leur a quitté par ses lettres patentes de quittance ’ is noted down in the records of the Great Council. The fine was listed in the revenues, but also in the ‘deniers non receuz ’ (GSAB: Rk., 21442, 2v and 10v). 360 CAB: PO, 1179; partially edited by Gilliodts-Van Severen, Inventaire des archives, VI, 205–10 and idem, Cartulaire de l ’ancien grand tonlieu, II, 160–1. 361 The (second) Bruges privilege of 21 April 1477 stipulated that the lord of the toll had to equip a warfleet of six ships in order to protect the Flemish coast if necessary (Degryse, De admiraals, 173–4). 362 See CAB: PO, 1198 (the new contract) and CAB: PO, 1198; SR, 1483–84, 47v, 50v and 121r–122r (for the sale of the annuities). Pieter of Luxembourg died on 25 February 1482 (Cools, Mannen met macht, 260). His daughter Mary had married Jacob of Savoy, count of Romont and the captain of the urban troops of the county during the reign of the first regency council (Fris, Romont (Jacques de), 931). 213

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1481 had stipulated.363 Bruges never made a profit from the deal. Before the annual rent was reduced in 1484, the city lost an average of 162,690 groats per year, a loss of 55.25 percent. Graph 20: Revenues of the Bruges Toll and Expenses for the Lord of the Toll and Collection of the Toll (until the End of the Flemish Revolt).364

Seeking an explanation for this financially disadvantageous arrangement with the lord of the toll in 1481 entails looking at the other toll contract concluded by Bruges in the same year. The city bought a second lucrative toll on trade, also collected by a nobleman, Louis of Bruges. At some point in December 1480, the lord of Gruuthuze leased the tax on the import of ‘grute’, to the city. The contract itself has not survived, but the city accounts note that the contract would begin from 1 March 1481 and extend for three years.365 The tax on ‘grute’, a herb used to flavour beer, was a tax of two groats on every barrel of beer that was brewed or tapped in the city. One groat went to the count, and the other to the lord of the grute, as a fief.366 On 1 December 1477 the toll had been leased to Jan Caneel for three years, and when that contract ended, the city regime probably saw the opportunity to lease the toll from Louis of Bruges.367 In the three-year agreement, the city leased the right to 363 After the death of Jacob of Savoy Mary remarried François de Bourbon, Count of Vendôme. Because he was a French captain who had joined the second regency council of Flanders (led by its brother-in-law, Philip of Cleves) in its war against Maximilian the city would not try to undo the contract in the year 1488–89, in contrast to the years immediately before and after (see CAB: SR, 1485–86, 41r and SR, 1491–92, 44v; about the count: Haemers, Philippe de Clèves, passim). In 1499, when the contract expired, Mary of Luxembourg forgave the unpaid balance of 1491–92 (CAB: CA, 12, 109v–112v). Exactly fifty years later, emperor Charles V would buy the toll from the Luxembourg family in favour of the city (GilliodtsVan Severen, Cartulaire de l ’ancien grand tonlieu, I, 145–9). 364 The figures are edited by Gilliodts-Van Severen, Cartulaire de l ’ancien grand tonlieu, II, 164–7. 365 CAB: SR, 1481–82, 42v. A regulation on the collection of the tax survives (CAB: PO, 1178). 366 ‘Dies moeten betaelen de brauwers diet aldus bij consente brauwen of dit tappen over elcke ton twee groten vlaemsche als over de voorseide gruute ende dat heet men gruuteghelt. Daer of dat onsen gheduchten heere den eenen groten ontfanct ende den leenhoudere den anderen grooten, uutegheleit tgruuteghelt van den amborghen biere ofte van den maerschen biere, daerof heeft den voorseiden leenhoudere eenen groten ende onsen gheduchten heere niet. Ende moeten dezelve brauwers telken als zij brauwen zullen dat gheven te kennen of teeken bringhen den leenhoudere of zijne ghecomitteerde omme te wetene ende bij te ziene hoe vele tonnen dat zij vullen telcker braute ’. Offenses bore a fine of 6 lb. par. ‘Boven desen heeft noch de voorseide leenhoudere bij den rechte van zijnder gruute van elcker braute cleenbiers, gheheeten vlaemsch bier, twee groten vlaemschen munten dat ghebrauwen wort binder stede ’ (BNF: MN, 15, 1r–2r). 367 ADN: B 4121, 29v. 214

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collect both groats, in exchange for paying annual rents to the receiver-general of Flanders and Louis of Bruges. The rents were not fixed, and the amount paid to the count’s receiver was not the same as the amount paid to the lord of the ‘grute’. 368 Probably the amount of the rents depended on the toll revenues in a formula laid out in the missing contract. The contract was extended every three years until Louis of Bruges died in November 1492, and for eleven years the city tried to balance the expenses with the revenues of the ‘grute’. 369 The city only made serious profits from the new contract in the first year, but its losses on the grute toll were not as serious as those on the Bruges toll, perhaps because the city leased the tax of the ‘grute’ to private tax farmers. As a consequence the city’s financial commission did not collect the tax itself, as it did for the Bruges toll (Graph 21). Graph 21: Revenues and Expenses of the Bruges ‘Grute’ Toll, under City Collection (1481–1492).370

The fact that in March and April 1481 the city bought off the two main tolls that were levied by nobles within the city was no coincidence. The city government wanted to control administration and regulation of the tolls. Despite the financial losses of one of these leases, the city gained political and economic freedom from the contracts. The losses from the Bruges toll may reflect the weak position of city in its negotiations with Pieter of Luxembourg in 1480. But the city itself determined the amount of those losses, because it could manipulate the tariffs of the toll. Administration of the two most important tolls in the city put the Bruges magistrates in charge of the principal tax burdens on Bruges commerce, which they could administer in such a way as to maximize commercial growth. In 1477 the craft guilds had already begun to refuse to pay the tax on ‘grute’. 371 These guilds had powerful influence 368 In accounting year 1482–83, for example, the city paid Louis of Bruges 3,548 lb. par. and 4,100 lb. par. to the count (CAB: SR, 1482–83, 85r). 369 Only from March 1487 until March 1490 the rent to the lord and the count was fixed, respectively 3800 lb. par. and 4100 lb. par. (CAB: SR, 1488–89, 144v). After the death of Louis of Bruges the tax on the ‘grute’ was leased to Jeronimus Lauwerein, who sufered serious losses (GSAB: Rk. 23117 and Haemers & Soens, Lauwerein (Jeronimus), 591). 370 Source: the city accounts. 371 ADN: B 4120, 31r. 215

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in the Great Council of Bruges, which after 1481 had the means to control the toll rates and regulations. Even though exact reconstruction of the tariff policy of the Great Council is impossible because no list of tariffs survives, the Great Council probably exempted citizens by purchase from the Bruges toll and lowered the rate of the ‘grute’ toll. Both the craft guilds and the merchant elite were interested in lower tax rates, as a stimulus to commerce, but the city suffered serious financial losses as a consequence. City officials delibrately decided to trade money for control, a decision also made by the competitor, Antwerp. In 1479 the Antwerp city board bought the rights of the toll on shipping on the Honte in exchange for an annual rent payment to the Duke of Brabant, Maximilian of Austria.372 The Bruges contracts made in 1481 may even have been a response to Antwerp’s new policy. In any case, Bruges gained more control over commercial traffic in the city. The financial losses of both contracts were nothing compared to the economic and political freedom the city had gained. The city’s financial losses were covered by the high profits of the indirect taxes during the last years of the reign of Mary Burgundy. As the city’s main source of revenue, the income from the indirect taxes made it possible for the city government to conclude a lossmaking contract with Pieter of Luxembourg. But this was a double-edged sword. Bruges had gained a certain freedom to determine the amount of tolls, but the high indirect taxes had negative effects on city commerce. The Great Council’s position was clear. They had decided to spread the costs of the toll contract among all the consumers in Bruges instead of charging higher taxes on navigation (the Bruges toll) or on the production of beer (the ‘grute’). Regardless of whether or not this was a good decision, it did not turn the economic tide. The competitiveness of Bruges deteriorated in favour of the booming ports of Antwerp, Middelburg (in Zeeland), Bergen-op-Zoom, and others. Bruges did not have a serious economic crisis during Mary’s reign, but the unfavourable economic situation weakened the financial and economic resilience of the city. Bruges had become a giant with mud feet, awaiting the fall. The giant definitely staggered when Flanders was hit by a severe food shortage in 1481–82. 3.1.6

The Food Crisis of 1481–82

Throughout Mary’s reign, scarcity of food, particularly grain, was a tremendous problem. Crop failures, war, and economic blockades caused food prices to rise from 1477 until 1483. Shortages and rising prices exacerbated the effects of Bruges’ economic decline, especially for those who could no longer afford to purchase basic necessities. The food crisis also caused problems, albeit political, for the elite, as the following chapter will show. Graph 22 shows the gravity of the food crisis of 1477–1483. It shows the prices two Bruges institutions paid for one ‘hoet’ (172 liters) of wheat, one of the principal types of grain. Although the figures from the Saint Donatian chapter have been widely used in scholarly literature, they do not reflect the real prices of wheat in the Low Countries. The editor of these accounts, Adriaan Verhulst, cautioned that real prices were ten percent higher than the chapter’s figures, because the chapter possessed a large reserve stock of grain cultivated on its own lands, which meant that its costs were lower in crisis years.373 The hospital of St. Julian, however, bought its wheat in the Bruges market, at higher prices, as is confirmed 372 Asaert, De Antwerpse scheepvaart, 119. 373 Verhulst, Prijzen van granen, 10–1. See also Vandenborre, Prijzen, lonen en levensstandaard, I, 237–8. 216

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by Graph 22. Throughout the fifteenth century the wheat bought by the hospital cost an average of 12.87 percent more than the prices paid by St. Donatian, a close match to the margin of ten percent predicted by Verhulst. The prices from the hospital of St. Julian are probably closer to the prices an average person paid in the Bruges market, and consequently give a more trustworthy image of the economic reality of fifteenth-century Bruges. Graph 22: The Prices of Wheat in Groats per Hoet (172 liter), From the Accounts of the Hospital of St. Julian and the Chapter of St. Donatian in Bruges (1400–1500).374

Table 7 shows the index-linked prices for the period between 1476 and 1484. The average price between 1450 and 1475 forms the base at 100. Table 7 shows that wheat was very expensive during Mary’s reign. Prices actually tripled in 1481–82. In the Late Middle Ages, the grain harvests, economic speculation and the supply of foreign grain were the main variables affecting grain prices.375 The war with France after 1477 raised wheat prices by one-half in comparison to the prices of the preceding 25 years, and that higher level persisted for some time. Fighting destroyed crops, depleted money and energy, and cut the supply lines from Artois to Flanders.376 The cost of living had already increased in Bruges because of the new indirect tax on corn. But the tax of 4 or 8 groats per hoet of wheat paled in comparison to the high prices of 70 or 80 groats per hoet during the period between 1477 and 1480, followed by even higher prices later. The worst had yet to come. In 1480, the city of Gdansk outlawed the export of corn from the Baltic area to western Europe, a ban which lasted until the middle of 1483. At same time, crops

374 Source: Nyffels, Tussen ascese en exuberantie, II, 4–5 (St. Julian) and Verhulst, Prijzen van granen, 35–6 (St. Donatian). 375 Tits-Dieuaide, La formation des prix, 259. 376 The trade on the Ghent Lieve canal increased after 1477, which could be a sign of the inverting trade lines (Boes, De Lieve, 45; Boone, Openbare diensten, 92). 217

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failed in Western Europe, and prices soared.377 In 1481 the chapter of St. Donatian paid 140 groats and the hospital of St. Julian 196 groats for a hoet of grain. In 1482, the former paid 156 groats and the latter 190. In February 1482, after the French king had prohibited all corn exports from France in the wake of another crop failure, prices hit a new record of 288 groats per hoet.378 This was a very difficult period throughout the southern Low Countries and especially in the city of Bruges. Unlike Ghent, Bruges did not have a corn staple which could mitigate the sharp fluctuations in grain prices.379 Table 7: Index-linked Wheat Prices of the Chapter of St. Donatian and the Hospital of St. Julian (1476–1484); Average of 1450–1475 = 100.380

Year

Saint-Donatian

Saint-Julian

100

100

1476

88

85

1477

155

144

1478

150

–

1479

138

–

1480

161

146

1481

269

336

1482

299

325

1483

113

127

1484

96

99

Average 1450–1475

Bruges had only experienced such high corn prices once before, during the revolt of 1436–38 (see Graph 22).381 In 1481–82 prices were three times as high as those of 1477. Prices for other commodities, other varieties of corn, meat and dairy products, also increased, while wages remained constant. Comparing the ratio of grain prices to the salaries of construction workers, from Sosson’s study, shows that in 1481–82, workers paid the highest adjusted prices for corn of the entire fifteenth century.382 In similar crises in the past the urban population had resorted to eating cheaper types of corn, such as barley and oats, but those prices also increased during Mary’s reign, causing a general food crisis.383 The dire consequence was a widespread impoverishment of the population of Bruges.384 Beginning in 1477, the Bruges government took measures to reduce the negative effects of the food crisis, but with only limited results. The city banned the export of grain 377 Tits-Dieuaide, La formation des prix, 229–34. 378 CAB: SR, 1481–82, 173r. About the French policy: Gandilhon, La politique économique, 156–7. 379 Boone, Gent en de Bourgondische hertogen, 22; Blockmans, Die Niederlande vor und nach 1400, 130. 380 The average is 52.1 groats for St. Donation and 58.4 groats for St. Julian per ‘hoet’. There is a gap in the figures for St. Julian in 1478–79. 381 In 1438 a hoet cost 200 groats for St. Julian and 140 for St. Donatian (see also Thoen, Landbouwekonomie en bevolking, 239–53). 382 Sosson, Les travaux publics, 301, 308–9. 383 Thoen, Landbouwekonomie en bevolking, 242, 250–2, 290, 297. 384 Sosson, Corporation et paupérisme, 561–3. 218

Chapter 3 The Cities

from Flanders in 1477, and again in April 1479, this time with the court’s support.385 In May 1481 the city government sent messages to each parish in the rural hinterland, asking inhabitants to pray for good weather, but also prohibiting them from exporting grain and dairy products from the county.386 In December 1481 the Bruges aldermen began an investigation to root out individuals who had sold corn to foreign merchants. The city sent envoys to persuade merchants in the northern Low Countries to ship grain to Bruges. Since many cities in Holland had also banned corn exports, these efforts were in vain.387 In 1482 the city even paid a bounty to merchants who brought their corn to the Bruges market, a measure which was somewhat successful.388 In 1482 the city tried to establish a permanent provision of corn, which was bought and sold in the port of Sluis. The effort was ended when the city of Ghent refused to participate because this kind of ‘corn aid’ ran counter to its staple right.389 Bruges was not able, of course, to find a permanent solution for the inadequate food supply of the city. A second measure was fixing grain prices, a ‘social’ policy which conflicted with the economic laws of supply and demand. The city government of Bruges, and of Ghent, put ceilings on the price of corn, which led to protests from suppliers.390 When in June 1481 the Bruges government fixed the price of wheat at 132 groats per hoet, Burgomaster Maarten Lem had to put down protests by peasants in the Bruges market square.391 To avoid these kinds of protest, the city organised a subsidized food program which sold grain at cheaper prices. For each year between 1477 and 1482 (except for 1479–80), the city purchased corn to re-sell it for a ‘reasonable’ price to ‘poor inhabitants of the city’. 392 The city purchased huge quantities of wheat in order to sell it to the poor at a financial loss.393 From 1480–81 the city also confiscated corn from victims who remain anonymous. The confiscations yielded large amounts of corn, which partially supported the city’s grain subsidy policy.394 The confiscated corn was sold to bakers and poor people. Through the indirect taxes, every citizen supported the remaining losses from these sales, designed as a social policy to help the poor, who were most affected by the food crisis. The final measure taken by the city government to deal with the food crisis shows that the power holders were not only motivated by social conscience but also sought to gain the public’s trust with their ‘social policy’. In October 1481 the city abolished the tax of four groats on wheat and two groats on rye which had been in force for four years (Table 6). 385 CAB: SR, 1476–77, 139v (1477); SR, 1478–79, 72v (1479; see also Tits-Dieuaide, La formation des prix, 188–9 en 349). 386 CAB: SR, 1480–81, 82v and 83r. 387 CAB: SR, 1481–82, 64v–65r; Tits-Dieuaide, La formation des prix, 189. 388 The supplier received 5 lb. gr. for 100 hoeten of wheat and 2–1/2 lb. gr. for 100 hoeten of rye. 18,771 hoeten of wheat and 910 hoeten of rye cost the city 581 lb. 2 s. gr. (CAB: SR, 1481–82, 174v). 389 Tits-Dieuaide, La formation des prix, 335–6; Blockmans, De volksvertegenwoordiging, 470. The profits of this sale went to the war treasurer of the city of Bruges (CAB: SR, 1482–83, 42r). 390 Blockmans, De volksvertegenwoordiging, 469–70. 391 Despars, Cronycke van de lande, IV, 207. 392 ‘Ten redenliken prijse ’ (CAB: SR, 1477–78, 177v). The city sold corn because ‘zeere groote dierste was int coorne zodat tbeste galt .xxiiii. s. gr. thoet ende der boven ende dat scamele ende ghemeene lieden qualike ende nauwe coorne consten ghecrighen, het en hadde gheweist thuerlieder gheheeler destructie ende verdervenesse bij also dat het langhere gheduert zoude hebben ten ware dat God bij zijnder goedertiere ende ghenadeghe gracie daerin voorsien hadde van remedien ’ (CAB: SR, 1481–82, 173r). 393 In 1476–77 the city sold 393 lb. 7 s. gr. of wheat for 70 lb. gr. (CAB: SR, 1476–77, 139r), in 1477–78 it sold 363 hoet of rye for 90 lb. 15 s. gr. (SR, 1477–78, 152v). In 1478–79 the city lost 302 lb. 7 s. gr. (SR, 1478–79, 177v), in 1480–81 the loss was 104 lb. 10 s. gr. and in 1481–82, 476 lb. 12 s. 1 d. gr. (SR, 1480–81, 183v and SR, 1481–82, 173v, 176v). 394 In 1480–81 the confiscation yielded 356 lb. 1 s. 9 d. gr. (CAB: SR, 1480–81, 41r) and in 1481–82 554 lb. 6 s. gr. (SR, 1481–82, 38v). See also Tits-Dieuaide, La formation des prix, 344. 219

For the Common Good

They also reduced the tax on beer by six groats, from twenty groats per barrel to fourteen. Historians have shown that in Ghent manipulations of indirect taxes during periods of food crisis were primarily intended to appease social turmoil.395 Moreover, during some Ghent revolts, city leaders had used the distribution of cheap grain to win popular support.396 Cities often took similar measures to mitigate food crises and meet the needs of citizens, who seem to have expected their governments to practice this type of moral policy.397 In the case of Bruges, abolishing the grain tax was a highly symbolic measure, which would remind citizens of the abolition of the hated grain tax after the revolt of 1477 when the craft guilds came to power. The indirect tax on corn only produced 7.4 percent of the annual revenues, so the city could afford to abolish it. Producing a psychological effect on the masses seems to have also been a political motivation for discontinuing the corn tax. The Burgundian court may not have always been in accord with the cities on this social policy. A strange remark in the Ghent records suggests that in early 1482 the court tried to remove the ban on grain exports. In late February 1482, the aldermen of Ghent requested that officials from the Council of Flanders nullify a ducal ordinance which gave foreign merchants the right to buy and sell grain freely within Flanders and might give them permission to ship grain out of the county.398 If Maximilian of Austria, or a court official acting in his name, had really granted such permission to foreign merchants, he was directly countering the interests of the Flemish cities. In addition to countering Bruges’ efforts to keep local grain in the county, such permission violated Ghent staple rights. The reaction of the Bruges aldermen to this ducal ordinance is nowhere recorded, possibly because Maximilian’s supporters had taken over the Bruges government in the wake of Moreel’s imprisonment in December 1481. Ghent’s reaction was predictable. It furiously promulgated an urban ordinance which prohibited the export of corn out of the county.399 The ordinance aimed at more than retaining food supplies, however. In view of the growing hostility between the court and the city of Ghent in early 1482, the ordinance undoubtedly also had a social and political goal, to arouse mass support for the Ghent resistance against Maximilian of Austria. In Bruges, the Moreel party, which had put into place a grain policy different from that of Maximilian, may have also gained support from poorer groups. Even if the Moreel faction were inspired to offer this social policy of grain subsidies to appease the city’s poor and win popularity, there were probably many people in Bruges who preferred that policy over the one suggested by Maximilian’s sympathisers. The food crisis was again (mis)used for political purposes, to stimulate protest against Maximilian’s policies. The following section shows how the political opposition to Maximilian exploited the corn crisis as fodder for propaganda to further its cause. It also analyses the division of the Bruges elite over the issue of support for Maximilian. 395 Boone, Geld en macht, 208; Ryckbosch, Tussen Gavere en Cadzand, 288–9. 396 Haemers, De Gentse opstand, 251–2. 397 Thompson, The moral economy, 76–9. See also Van Honacker, Résistance locale et émeutes, 39–47. 398 ‘Int jaer xiiiie ende lxxxi omtrent den vastenavond [26 February 1482] was bij eenighe quaetwillende deser stede gheimpetreert van der hertoghe een mandement dat in eenighe plaetsen ghepublijert was […], inhoudende dat elc, van wat lande hij ware, coopmanscepe doen zoude moghen van den grane binnen Vlaendren ghewassen, ende dat voeren daert elken gheliefde. Twelke commende ter kennesse van scepenen van der kuere, ghinghen terstond bij der heeren van den Rade int casteel van Ghend, segghende dat zij zo vele doen zouden bij den hertoghe dat men van den publicacie cesseren zoude, als zeere bejeghenende den previlegien van deser stede. Volghende welken scepenen wederghekeert zijnde, leyden voorgheboden ter contrarien binnen Ghend ende den Ghendschen, bevelende dat niement cooren, broot of meel daer uut voeren zoude, up den ban van vijftich jaren ’ (CAG: 93, 3, 78r). 399 CAG: 400, 27, 383r. 220

Chapter 3 The Cities

3.1.7

Political Tensions in Bruges Before the Death of Mary of Burgundy

In Bruges during 1481, concerns about the high grain prices added to discontent about the inadequate military defence of the county. Some Bruges politicians may have been trying to capitalize on the food crisis. Those who thought that the French war was the cause of the city’s economic malaise could easily point to the higher grain prices as an argument for a more effective war strategy. After the battle of Enguinegatte in 1479 the Bruges government limited its approval of aides to the court to defence of the county and its trade routes. When the court and Burgundian army commanders failed to meet these expectations, the city had organised coastal defences itself. Although Bruges did not want to go as far as Ghent, which advocated taking over the spending of funds awarded to the court, Bruges officials made overtures to Ghent in May 1481 to organise a concerted defence of the county and find a solution for the high corn prices. The leading politicians of both cities agreed ‘by common accord to alleviate the high price of corn’ and ‘to find a consensus on defence of the county’. 400 In July political cooperation between Bruges and Ghent led to joint financial action, payments for the mobilisation of troops to defend the southern borders of the county.401 In August 1481 Ghent invited a representative of the French king to the meeting of the Members, presumably to negotiate peace.402 The cities had thus reached a compromise. Bruges did not join Ghent in its opposition to the court, because Ghent would not retreat from its radical position. Nevertheless, both cities were establishing a clear political distance from the Burgundian court. There was no court delegation present at the meeting in June 1481, and the exclusion of the court was a clear message that the Members thought the duke’s policies had failed to stop the war. The Members had decided they would take charge of making certain political arrangements themselves. This new position produced serious tensions between Bruges’ two political factions, which had different priorities. The Moreel faction and the guild representatives supported the political initiative of the Three Members. Action taken by the Bruges representatives at the meeting of the Members clearly defended one of the craft guilds’ priorities, defence of the county. The Moreel faction was not only in agreement, but probably initiated the city’s overture to Ghent. At the May-June meeting of the Members, Bruges was represented by relatives of Willem Moreel and other leading figures of the faction, Jan van Riebeke, Jan de Keyt, and Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas.403 Willem Moreel, who was still superintendent for all finances, was not present at the meeting. His faction did not renounce Maximilian, but clearly voiced its desire for a different policy. On the other side of the political spectrum, supporters of Maximilian and opponents of the ruling coalition of Moreel party and the guilds now joined forces. This united opposition included nobles from the Franc of Bruges, politicians who had been removed by the revolt of 1477, and court officials. Together those people formed a group which I will call the Maximilian’s party or faction. Although some faction members may not have wholeheartedly supported Maximilian’s autocratic rule, they joined Maximilian’s party because it offered the only way to overthrow 400 They tried to ‘bij ghemeenen acoorde te belettene den dierste van den coorne ’, and ‘eene ghemeene conclusie te nemene ter beschermenesse van den lande ’ (Blockmans, Handelingen van de leden, 174 and 177). 401 Ibidem, 180. 402 Ibidem, 185. 403 Ibidem, 174, 179, and 180. 221

For the Common Good

the rule of the coalition between the Moreel faction and the guilds. Maximilian and his supporters naturally welcomed them with open arms. The events of 1481 had polarised existing political groups into two opposing parties. The political discord reached its climax in December 1481, with the imprisonment of the Moreel faction’s leaders. In addition to ideological and political differences, personal feuds also played a part in polarising the Bruges elite. The most striking (and best documented) feud in Bruges during Mary’s reign was a dispute between Willem Moreel and the Houtmaerct brothers. In August 1478, during the intense negotiations over increasing the indirect taxes, Reinier Houtmaerct called Willem Moreel a ‘son of a bitch’ (‘hoerezeune ’), for reasons unknown. The quarrel was patched up on 20 August 1478, when Willem Houtmaerct and Willem Moreel promised before the city magistrates that they would be ‘good friends’, and Reinier was sent on a pilgrimage to Rome as punishment for the insult.404 The violent argument seemed to have been appeased, because in the following city government (of September 1478) Willem Moreel became burgomaster and Willem Houtmaerct financial commissioner. But from late 1481 through the Flemish Revolt, Willem Moreel and the Houtmaerct brothers belonged to opposite parties on the political spectrum. While Moreel joined the regency council, Willem Houtmaerct defended Maximilian’s regency. Willem Houtmaerct’s property was confiscated during the rule of the regency council, but after Maximilian re-conquered the county in June 1485, Houtmaerct became financial commissioner and then burgomaster in 1487. After the imprisonment of Maximilian in February 1488, Houtmaerct was imprisoned and his property was confiscated again.405 In the intense political climate of 1481 and the ensuing revolt, the personal quarrel between Willem Moreel and Willem Houtmaerct became an outright rivalry. However, the violent argument over an insult in 1478 was already a sign of political dissension within the Bruges elite. There was an even more profound dissension within the Bruges elite between those politicians who had lost power in 1477 and those who now served in the city government. After the revolt, some politicians were no longer welcome on the city boards because they had sympathized with the late duke, or because they had supported policies disliked by the craft guilds during Charles the Bold’s reign. Others eventually returned to power, but a few quarrelled frequently with the new regime of Bruges. Geraard de Groote, a successful politician before the revolt of 1477, returned to the city boards in September 1477 and 1479, but in 1480 he clashed with city leaders. He had asked for the repayment of a loan he had made to the city near the end of Philip the Good’s reign, and although Geraard had the support of the Council of Flanders, the city refused to pay him.406 Jan Dhondt had 404 ‘Willem Moreel an deen zide ende Willem Oudmaert an dandere zide submitterende hemlieden in tzegghen ende ordonneren van der wet van al zulke veel rudere worden als zij jeghens malicanderen ghehad hadden, belovende toudene tghuent dat bij scepenen ghezeit zoude worden. Achtervolghenden was gheordonnert dat Willem Odmairt zegghen zoude tot Willem Morel dat de worden die hij jeghens hem ghezeit heeft uut hitte van bloede ende bidden dat hij hem niet belghen en wille (twelke hij dede) ende insghelics de voorseide Moreel Willem Odmairt (twelke hij ooc dede), ende hiermede goede vrienden ’ (CAB: MC, 1478, 19r). 405 CAB: SR, 1484–85, 138r (confiscation in 1485), CAB: RW, 1468–1501, 165v (burgomaster in 1487), Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 348 and CAB: SR, February-September 1488, 138r (imprisonment and confiscation in 1488). Willem’s brother Marc was keeper of the mint of Flanders during Maximilian’s regency (ADN: B 33, 126r). Reinier was alderman of Bruges in 1486 (CAB: RW, 1468–1501, 157r). His brother-in-law, Jan de Witte, was a member of the Council of Flanders, but he was dismissed during the reign of the regency council (Dumolyn, Staatsvorming en vorstelijke ambtenaren, Jan de Witte; Gailliard, Bruges et le Franc, V, 66–9). 406 CAB: SR, 1480–81, 165v–166r. 222

Chapter 3 The Cities

the same problem. In 1478 he brought a suit against the city to the ducal Great Council, charging that the city would not repay him for a loan he had made to Charles the Bold’s receiver. In 1475–76, as city treasurer, Jan Dhondt had made the loan probably as an advance on an aide. Since the city had suspended payment of Charles the Bold’s aides in the wake of the Revolt of 1477, the city did not want to refund the loan. Although the Bruges regime finally agreed in 1478 to repay Jan in several instalments, relations between Jan and the Moreel party remained difficult.407 It is not surprising that both Jan Dhondt and Geraard de Groote were on Maximilian’s side during his conflict with the Moreel faction in late 1481. Another fundamental political clash occurred between the Moreel party and nobles of the Franc of Bruges. Maximilian lavished favours – wealth, prestige and public offices – on many Franc nobles in order to extend his power within the city of Bruges. This strategy diminished the power of Louis of Bruges, and drove a wedge between the court and this wealthy nobleman by 1479 (see chapter 2). But the nobles of the Franc of Bruges also gave Maximilian a powerful lever against the Moreel faction. When Moreel was imprisoned in December 1481, the Franc nobles were the archduke’s main supporters. Members of the party of Willem Moreel, as well as the Three Members of Flanders, often clashed with Franc nobles, as the case of Joost van Varsenare shows. This nobleman held much land in the countryside around Bruges, and also sought power within the city during Mary’s reign. In 1478 Maximilian appointed Joost as waterbailiff of Sluis.408 In September 1480 he became burgomaster of Bruges in a process which remains a mystery. Earlier, the Three Members of Flanders had insisted on Joost’s dismissal from the post of waterbailiff, on the grounds that he had leased the office.409 This was a violation of the privileges of 1477, but the office was quite crucial for Joost because he had lent money to Maximilian with the agreement that the revenues from the office would repay the loan.410 For this reason, Joost fought the discharge until 1480. It is possible that his acceptance of the discharge in 1480 and his appointment as burgomaster of Bruges were both provisions of a compromise worked out between the noble and city. The case of Joost van Varsenare shows the divergent interests of the Three Members and the nobles of the Franc of Bruges, and the way Maximilian manipulated the conflicts that often arose between both parties. The mutual accord between the archduke and the Franc nobles, who owed their political power and economic wealth to the court, was strong in 1481. The nobles chose Maximilian’s side while the Moreel party negotiated with the city of Ghent. The two Bruges parties clashed over the election of new city boards in September 1481, but there are no sources which explain how this crucial shift in power happened. For the first time since the Revolt of 1477, no member of the Moreel faction sat on the new city boards, which were filled instead with their opponents. Politicians who had clashed with the Moreel party or who had been out of power since 1477 and nobles from the Franc sat on the city boards of September 1481.411 Among the new officials were Jacob de Vos, his son-in-law Donaas de Moor, Jacob de Witte, his son-in-law Jacob Dheere fs. 407 The city repaid Jan 938 lb. 3 s. 2 d. gr. in 1477–78 (CAB: SR, 1477–78, 164r) and 50 lb. 3 s. 2 d. gr. the year after (CAB: SR, 1478–79, 51r). 408 ADN: B 33, 32v. About his career: Haemers, Middelburg na Pieter Bladelin, 224–5. 409 ADN: B 2122, 68523. 410 ADN: B 17742, ‘Hautain’. 411 CAB: RW, 1468–1501, 116r–v. 223

For the Common Good

Antonis, Geraard de Groote, and Jan Dhondt. Willem Houtmaerct, the personal rival of Willem Moreel, became financial commissioner.412 Many of these men had served in city government from 1477 to 1481, but there was a extremely high concentration of officials from the Charles the Bold era on the new board of aldermen. Franc nobles were also wellrepresented in the new city government. Joost van Varsenare became dean of the quarter of Our Lady. Karel van Halewyn, lord of Uutkerke and a relative of the bailiff of Bruges, became burgomaster of councillors, and Jacob van Gistel, lord of Dudzele, became burgomaster of the aldermen. All were loyal supporters of Maximilian, and all had been appointed to the archduke’s personal household in March 1481.413 Jacob van Gistel was even the sovereignbailiff of the county of Flanders.414 In September 1481, allies of Maximilian of Austria and opponents of the Moreel party overthrew the Moreel faction and took over the city government of Bruges. Maximilian’s reason for building up his power in Bruges during the fall of 1481 is clear. After the radicals become dominant in Ghent during August 1481 (see the case of Jacob van Wymeersch below), the archduke needed to head off united action by the Members of Flanders which might lead to open resistance against ducal policy. In September he orchestrated the banishment of the Moreel faction from power, because they were making overtures to and compromises with Ghent. The Archduke and his supporters went even further in the next few months, with the murder of the Ghent bailiff Jan van Dadizeele in October, and the imprisonment of Moreel and those who had negotiated with the city of Ghent in December. Maximilian of Austria and his court hoped for political support from Flanders because they faced a serious war in the northern provinces. Because the court needed money, it tried to silence the political opposition in Flanders. After Moreel was imprisoned, Maximilian asked the Members of Flanders for a new aide in late December 1481.415 Predictably, the city of Bruges, governed by Maximilian’s supporters, agreed to the new aide.416 The ‘coup’ by Maximilian’s partisans in Bruges had been successful. What was the reaction of the guild representatives, partners of the Moreel faction in the governing coalition, to this coup? When the Moreel party was ousted in September 1481, the guilds did not lose the right to elect representatives to the city boards. Maximilian and his Bruges allies could not prevent the election of guild representatives because that would entail abolishing the Bruges privilege of 30 March 1477. Maximilian could not go that far. As a result, 18 representatives of the craft guilds were elected to the city boards of September 1481, and among them were many representatives who had held public offices in the preceding years.417 It seems that they remained loyal to Moreel party, even after the faction had been eliminated from Bruges politics. Willem Moreel and his allies did not lose the political support they enjoyed in the city after they were released at the beginning of 1482. Guild representatives probably chose to support the party of the former superintendent because they feared the policies of Maximilian’s party. Since 412 CAB: SR, 1481–82, 1r. 413 CAB: PO, 1180 ( Joost van Varsenare); SAB: BVR, 217, 182r (Karel van Halewyn); Cools, Mannen met macht, 213 ( Jacob van Gistel). 414 Proost, Recherches historiques, 296. 415 Blockmans, Handelingen van de leden, 189 (see also chapter 1). 416 Ibidem, 202–3. 417 As, for example, Jacob van Schooren, Lieven van Viven, Adriaan de Muer, Hubrecht de Jaghere, Jan Tsoenin, Jan Dhamere, Jacob de Conync, and Frans Ridsaert. 224

Chapter 3 The Cities

most of the Maximilian’s faction had sat on the city boards appointed by Charles the Bold, chances were good that they would adopt the same policy as they had in the years before the revolt of 1477, a policy the craft guilds had resisted fiercely. The approval of the aide in February 1482 confirmed their fears. The new regime had approved the aide, but, according to political tradition, the Great Council had to agree to this approval. The guild representatives chose to place restrictions on the use of the aide rather than to try to overturn the boards’ approval. The Nine Members stipulated that the aide should only be spent on the defence of the county and that payment of the aide should be apportioned according to the Transport of Flanders. If the Transport was observed, Bruges would not have to cover the part of an aide which Ghent refused to pay.418 As a result, when Ghent did refuse, Maximilian would be forced to settle for less money from the aides than he had been awarded. He had requested an aide of 128,000 riders for the war, 48,000 lb. par. for his personal court, and 40,000 lb. par. for the court of the Duchess and her children. In February 1482, the cities of Bruges and Ypres approved one aide of 24,000 lb. par. for the living expenses of the Archduke and his wife together, plus an unknown sum for the defence of the county.419 In an promulgation which resembled a contract, dated 23 February 1482, the Archduke promised the Bruges Great Council and the city of Ypres (which had also been reluctant to approve a new aide) that the aide was not approved ‘leidsschewijse ’, which means it had not been approved by the Three Members of Flanders, but only by Bruges and Ypres.420 The text assured Bruges and Ypres that payments of the aide would cease when the war was over. The archduke also had to promise that his troops would not harm inhabitants of the county of Flanders. The cities were permitted to deduct payments to their own troops for defence of their own cities from their aide payments.421 The ‘contract’ was perhaps intended to convince the city of Ghent of the court’s good intentions for use of the money, but it was necessary first to assure the Great Council of Bruges on that same point. Representatives of the Nine Members may have also requested that the new aide not be financed by an increase in the indirect taxes, because the city government decided instead to sell a new annuity series on the city for 300 lb. gr. (at 6.67 percent) to pay for the aide. The city collected 4,500 lb. gr., almost one-quarter of the total revenues for 1481–82, from the sale.422 In contrast to the previous city administrations which had received compensation or securities from the court to support paying for the annuities, the new administration placed the entire burden of repaying the annuities on the city treasury.423 The new Bruges regime was returning to the financial policy that the city had followed under Charles the Bold, because most of the power holders in early 1482 had dominated city government during that reign as well. The craft guilds had not lost their political role, but the court had clearly strengthened its grip on Bruges politics and finances.

418 The Nine Members agreed to the aide on 16 January 1482 ‘omme die gheemployeirt te werdene ter deffensie ende bewaernesse van den lande daertoe dat die tanderen tijden gheconsenteirt hadde gheweist, ende niet anders ’ (CAB: CA, 14, 315v). 419 Blockmans, De volksvertegenwoordiging, 616–7. 420 SAG: V3, 243, 34. 421 Diegerick, Inventaire analytique, IV, 54–5. 422 CAB: SR, 1481–82, 42r (see Graph 17, extraordinary revenues). Because the political situation in the county totally changed after the death of Duchess Mary one month later, the profits from the sale of the annuity would be used for a different purpose than the power holders of Bruges had intended when they sold the annuity. 423 CAB: PO, 1184 (see also chapter 1). 225

For the Common Good

However, Maximilian’s political gain in 1482 was only a temporary victory. One month after the definitive approval of the aide of February 1482, Duchess Mary of Burgundy died at the ducal palace in Bruges. A delegation from Ghent had awaited the death of the Duchess, and asked for an audience with her husband the next day. The Ghent representatives promised to be ‘good and loyal subjects’ in accordance with all the privileges they had obtained in the past from the dynasty.424 This meant that they would only follow Maximilian if he kept to the limits of the privileges of 1477. Two days later, on 30 March 1482, the three former prisoners, Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas, Jan van Riebeke, and Willem Moreel, came to court with their sureties, Jan de Boot, Jan de Keyt, and Maarten Lem. The widower had to absolve the three defendants from the charges made by his Great Council in February 1482.425 The political successes of Maximilian and his supporters in Bruges during September 1481, at the meeting of the Estates in January 1482, and at the trial before the Great Council in February 1482, were all nullified within a few days of Mary’s death. In the next few weeks Maximilian and his faction lost their hold on the Bruges city government. On 19 April 1482 new city boards were elected and Jan van Nieuwenhove fs. Klaas became burgomaster.426 The Moreel faction regained power in the city of Bruges, as Maximilian of Austria’s opponents came to power all over Flanders during the next few months. 3.1.8

Conclusion: ‘For the Common Good’?

Each social group in Bruges chose to support or oppose the centralising policy of Maximilian of Austria for its own reasons. The Bruges elite of merchants, bankers, and salesmen became sharply divided during Mary’s short reign. As Ghent had experienced in the middle of the fifteenth century, political pressure by the court triggered a struggle between different political factions in Bruges.427 These factions became the principal political divisions after the duchess’ death. The same two factions which had split in 1481 fought each other in the Flemish Revolt. One faction of the Bruges elite, which I have called Maximilian’s party, was prepared to support ducal policy. This party gave up some of its own political power when it ruled the city under Maximilian’s supervision. Because the party had promised to allow the central government more access to city finances, Maximilian’s party could not make independent policy decisions for Bruges. Urban autonomy was not a priority of Maximilian’s faction, which also attracted the support of nobles from the Franc of Bruges. These nobles wanted to rule the Franc without urban interference, but they could not be politically independent either, because they had to accept strong central authority. In exchange for acceptance of a strong monopoly on violence and taxes at the central level, the court gave its urban and noble supporters wealth, local power, and prestige. But the central court remained the nucleus which made all the important decisions.

424 Dits die Excellente Cronike, 224v. 425 Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 216. ‘Ende aldaer waren sy ontsleghen van den prinche ende van sijnen rade ende ooc huerlieder borghen ende waren gheabsolveirt van alle voorleden saken die hemlieden aengheleyt waren van den procureur generael van sprinchensweghe ende van sijnen rade ’ (Dits die Excellente Cronike, 224v). 426 CAB: RW, 1468–1501, 123v–124r; Despars, Cronycke van den lande, IV, 216; Van Leeuwen, De Vlaamse wetsvernieuwing, 170–1. 427 Haemers, De Gentse opstand, 424–8. 226

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This was not acceptable for the members of the Bruges urban elite who joined the party of Willem Moreel. This group of merchants primarily wanted a stable economic and monetary climate based on an effective defence of the country and its trade routes. Reliable justice, limits to the arbitrary exercise of ducal authority, prevention of corruption, territorial integrity, observance of privileges, and political participation through representation were the main priorities of the Moreel party and its supporters. We can read these priorities in the privileges of 1477. In exchange for recognition of their political and social rights, the craft guilds, represented by the Nine Members, supported the rule of the Moreel faction. The guilds also supported a favourable economic climate and effective defence of the county in the war against France, but their main priority was the political autonomy of Bruges. This autonomy would insure the political and economic dominance of the guilds within the city and outside the city walls as well. Through permanent representation in the city boards the urban guilds were assured of a decision-making role in the city and the surrounding countryside. In accordance with the principles of corporatism, the city of Bruges was autonomous if the craft guilds themselves had political autonomy. During Mary’s reign in Bruges, as in other cities of the Low Countries, a strategic coalition between the merchant elite and the urban guilds formed the base of public support for corporate politics.428 The Bruges coalition of the Moreel faction and the craft guilds promoted its policies by claiming it governed Bruges ‘for the common good’, the ‘bien commun ’ as Willem Moreel stated at his trial before Maximilian’s Great Council in February 1482. Was this true? Those measures taken to improve the city’s economy which were carried out by the Moreel party in cooperation with guild representatives were, of course, in the common interests of all Bruges inhabitants, because the basis of Bruges wealth was trade and commerce. The Moreel faction also supported political principles which were not its main priorities, particularly urban autonomy. The Moreel faction only began to support urban autonomy when the guilds gained power in 1477. Even then, when the most important members of Moreel faction gained access to the central state administration in 1479, they violated Bruges autonomy. They supported ducal policy by facilitating access to the city’s treasury, while Ghent had decided that the court was harming its urban autonomy with its warlike policy. As long as the court did not damage Bruges economy, the city’s political autonomy was not a priority for the Moreel faction. Of course, the faction required that the city had a voice in making central policy, and wanted to control the finances it had transferred to the court. When in 1481 Maximilian’s policy began to resemble that of Charles the Bold, the Moreel party strengthened its connection with the craft guilds. Political circumstances made the Moreel faction change to support the autonomy of Bruges, in contrast to their position in 1477. Fighting against the court’s autocracy and defending Bruges autonomy had become a ‘common’ political priority of Maximilian’s opponents in Bruges during Mary’s reign. The coalition of craft guilds and the Moreel faction thought they were defending this ‘common’ priority ‘for the common good of the whole city’. On the contrary, at the Great Council trial Maximilian of Austria accused Moreel and his companions of ruling the city purely in their own interest. Was this true? The Moreel faction were not corrupt in their rule of the city, but naturally they ruled in the ‘personal’ interest of the coalition. To wage war and pay for the expensive building program, 428 See, for example, Dambruyne, Corporatieve middengroepen, 724–5 and Prak, Republikeinse veelheid, 322. 227

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the regime had raise indirect taxes to gain revenue. This fiscal policy shows that the Moreel party and the guild representatives belonged either to the elite or the wealthy middle class, because indirect taxes unjustly targeted the ‘have-nots’ of the city. If the Bruges city boards dropped the indirect taxes, the coalition’s policy would have become impossibly expensive. Moreover, the representatives of the craft guilds were afraid that they might lose their political role if the indirect tax system were abolished. The measures of the coalition to counteract the food crisis in 1481 were aimed more at the maintaining the coalition’s power than at improving the lot of the poor. Suppression of the radical elements of the craft guilds in spring 1477 also demonstrates the coalition’s desire for self-preservation. For the members of the Moreel party, the purpose of the revolt of 1477 was to change Charles the Bold’s policies, while the craft guilds strived for recognition of their social and political rights. When the realisation of these political aspirations were threatened by radical demands from less-controllable groups, the guild leaders rapidly suppressed the protests. From this point of view, the party of Willem Moreel and the urban craft guilds ruled the city for the maintenance of their own socio-political position. Since this study is based on the analysis of political and socio-economic sources, it does not adequately explore the conceptual world and the opinions, feelings, and thoughts of the historical actors. While I can suggest several socio-economic and political motives for Willem Moreel and his friends to fight the court’s autocratic policy during Mary’s reign, his personal vision of events remains opaque. I presume that Willem Moreel personally hated to be brutally deprived of his freedom and to see his party forced out of power in late 1481. The Moreel party could probably have defended its own socio-economic interests by following a more autocratic policy, but in 1477, and again in 1482, the Moreel faction chose to form and maintain a coalition with the craft guilds. This coalition defended urban autonomy and the inclusion of all privileged groups in city government, and fought against political autocracy. Unpredictable events (such as the death of a duke or a duchess) led a remarkable political coalition in Bruges which defended the city’s political autonomy through cooperation between merchants and craft guilds. The Moreel faction members who defended these political priorities in this period were perhaps not only reacting to unexpected events in accordance with socio-economic and political motives, but also acting from personal choice. 3.2.

Ghent

3.2.1

The Revolt of 1477 and its Previous History

‘Because of the mobilisation and the commotion of the Ghent people’, the Treaty of Gavere of 1453 and the Ghent restriction of 1468 were cut into shreds on 15 February 1477.429 As in Bruges, the acknowledgement of the new privilege was accompanied by the destruction of a previously imposed treaty which had regulated relations between the Duke of Burgundy and the city. The duchess granted a new privilege to the city of Ghent on 30 January 1477.430 In the charter, Mary of Burgundy also reinstated the Treaty 429 ‘Ter causen van den loope ende commocie by die van Ghendt ’ (Dagboek van Gent, II, 250). 430 Edited by Vander Haeghen, La charte donnée, 277. An analysis of the privilege in Blockmans, Breuk of continuïteit, 110, 122–3. 228

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of Tournai, which Duke Philip the Bold had granted to Ghent in order to be accepted as count of Flanders in 1385. This treaty confirmed all of the city’s privileges and its power over the surrounding countryside. The privilege issued by Mary of Burgundy thus restored the urban autonomy of Ghent and its privileges over the countryside in all the essential forms for the exercise of the public power: the election of aldermen, their areas of authority, rights of citizenship, and the statute of the craft guilds. Just as Bruges had, Ghent again became the governing capital of the quarter which surrounded it. The craft guilds regained participation in urban politics, and the charter re-established the political traditions which had been abolished by Charles the Bold. The Ghent privilege of 1477 thus expressed the radical counter current to the consolidation of power by the central state which had been trying to reduce the city’s power for years. In 1477, Ghent was again on the move. Contemporaries could have predicted that Ghent would rebel after the death of Charles the Bold. The city was already in turmoil in the fall of 1476, when the city government informed the Burgundian chancellor that it had prevented ‘commotion’ in the city by imprisoning and executing some agitators.431 After the duke’s death, the Ghent Bailiff Louis of Schoorisse had immediately ordered the hiring of extra city guards to prevent violent outbreaks.432 But this effort was in vain. Even though the city had obtained a new privilege, the craft guilds went on strike and occupied the Friday Market square on 15 February. The Treaty of Gavere (27 July 1453), the Ghent Restriction of 13 July 1468, and the so-called Abolition of 8 January 1469 were destroyed publicly. That afternoon the duchess left the city for Zwijnaarde, and later entered again with the usual pomp of a Joyous Entry of the count of Flanders. On 18 February the new power holders replaced the old city boards of aldermen using the election procedure that had been forbidden by the Treaty of Gavere. This election procedure was based on Ghent’s interpretation of the 1301 Charter of Senlis, awarded to the city by the French king. According to Ghent’s interpretation of the charter, the three Members of the city, which were the patricians, the weavers, and the small guilds (a collection of 53 craft guilds), divided the seats on the two city boards proportionally. As a result, 20 of the 26 new aldermen belonged to the craft guilds.433 The new government of Ghent formulated complaints about the late duke, a traditional practice for the city whenever the count or countess died. Because the Dukes of Burgundy had suppressed two revolts by the city in the past 25 years, many Ghent inhabitants had serious complaints about ducal policy in 1477. There was a remarkable continuity in the group which led the two earlier revolts and the Revolt of 1477. The list of new aldermen included several men who had already held city office during the revolts in 1449–53 and in 1467–68. In both revolts the same group had attacked the policy of the dukes of Burgundy. In 1453, after the rebels had ruled for four years, Philip the Good had put down the revolt of the craft guilds and the allies of Daneel Sersanders, the duke’s personal enemy. In 1468 Duke Charles the Bold had severely suppressed a new uprising of those who had been punished for revolting in 1453.434 In February 1477 some of these rebels against the Burgundian dynasty 431 In the Autumn the head of the aldermen informed the chancellor of ‘den gheexecuteerden persoonen ende andren noch ghevanghen zijnde ter causen van zekeren roupene bij nachte gheschiet binnen dezer stede omme bij dien te makene comocie ’ (CAG: 400, 25, 37v). 432 ‘Omme te wederstane deghone die eenighe onghenouchte zouden willen maken binnen derzelver stede ’ (CAG: 400, 25, 57v). Later Mary of Burgundy replaced Louis with Jan van Dadizeele (ut supra). 433 Boone, Gent en de Bourgondische hertogen, 33–53; idem, Het ‘charter van Senlis ’, 10–21; Van Leeuwen, De Vlaamse wetsvernieuwing, 86–93. 434 Haemers, De Gentse opstand, 416–20. 229

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regained power. Lieven de Pottere, a member of Daneel Sersanders’ social network and dean of the small guilds in 1449–51, became first aldermen of the Keure. He had already clashed with the local allies of the duke in 1457, when they had insulted him during a meeting of the Collatie, the city’s great council, and in 1467, when he took one of the principal seats on the new city boards seated during the revolt.435 Several of his former colleagues also regained power in February 1477. Simon Clocman, who was probably Daneel Sersanders’ father-inlaw, became an alderman of the Gedele. Other allies of Daneel Sersanders, who had died in the 1460s,436 were electors of the city boards, such as Simon Borluut (burgomaster in 1452), Diederik van Schoonbroek (military captain in 1452–53), Lieven Zoetamijs, Jan van Loo, and Simon Damman (all aldermen during the revolt of 1449–53). Two of the most powerful positions in the city government were the offices of head dean of the weavers and head dean of the small guilds. In addition to their role in representing all the Ghent craftsmen, these officials were especially powerful because of the role they played in electing new boards of aldermen. After the old head dean from Charles the Bold’s reign was deposed, Jacob van Wymeersch was appointed head dean of the small guilds. He had served on one of the city boards appointed by Daneel Sersanders in August 1448. Less is known about Jacob de Steenwerpere, the new head dean of the weavers, but he clearly did not stand in the way of the duke’ opponents who had regained power in 1477. The Treaty of Gavere had severely punished the city of Ghent, and when Duke Philip the Good died in 1467, his opponents in the city used the power vacuum to try to undo some of the treaty’s punitive measures. When the new duke, Charles the Bold, entered the city on 28–29 June 1467, the craft guilds, probably joined by members of those social networks that had been suppressed in 1453, assembled in the Friday Market square to shout demands for political concessions.437 They condemned the treaty’s punitive fiscal and political measures, in hopes of gaining power and gathering support from the city’s inhabitants. Charles the Bold was forced onto the defensive, just as Mary was a decade later. He complied with the request of the craft guilds. He abolished the ‘cueilliotes ’, high indirect taxes which had been imposed by the treaty. The craft guilds regained their banners, along with a role in the election of the city boards. In exchange for this ducal clemency, city representatives submitted to a ritualised punishment ceremony in Brussels in August 1467, but the duke had to endure the fact that his opponents now sat on the Ghent boards of aldermen. As seats on the two city boards were divided between the Three Members, ducal opponents, such as Lieven De Pottere, Simon Borluut, and Lieven Zoetamijs, received seats. Eleven politicians from the Ghent revolt of 1449–53 sat on the new city boards of 1467.438 Six of those aldermen returned to public office in February 1477, as well.439 Thus, the same individuals, complemented by younger members from the same social networks, seem to have held power in 1449–53, 1467–68, and 1477.

435 CAG: 94, 635; Ryckbosch, Tussen Gavere en Cadzand, 143–4; Boone, Triomferend privé-initiatief, 120–1. 436 Haemers, Sersanders (Daneel), 568–9. 437 Arnade, Secular charisma, 69–75; Vaughan, Charles the Bold, 1–40; Fris, La restriction de Gand, 59–76; Haemers, De Gentse opstand, 415–6. 438 Namely Lieven de Pottere, Simon Borluut, Lieven Zoetamijs, Jan de Bels, Jan de Coninc, Jan Everwijn, Geraard Goetghebuer, Pieter van den Haute, Jan van Zeveren, Thomas van der Stichelen, and Jan van der Stoct. 439 Namely Jacob de Steenwerpere, Pieter Goetghebuer, Lodewijk van Maerke, Hendrik Pappal, Joost van Wychuus, and Jan van Zeveren. See also Hancké, Confiscaties als politiek wapen, 208. 230

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However, one year after his humiliating Entry into Ghent, Duke Charles the Bold struck back. Unlike his daughter in 1477, the duke had enough military power, financial strength and personal authority to organise a repression of the rebellious city. After his marriage to Margaret of York and the war with Liège, Charles the Bold pronounced the Ghent ‘Restriction’. This document, which was the exemplar for the Bruges Restriction of 1475, restricted city expenditures for the next six years. This was intended to narrow the recruitment base of Ghent politicians and strengthen the power of the central state in the city.440 Charles sent Ghent a stern warning in November 1468, when he punished the city of Liège for rebellion by burning it down.441 The Ghent leadership got the message, and the old city boards dominated by the duke’s rivals were replaced by a more docile regime. Ducal councillors Roeland of Wedergrate and Filip Sersanders (who was not an ally of Daneel Sersanders) became burgomasters and composed a ducal punishment for the city. The so-called ‘Abolition’ of Ghent was approved by the Ghent Collatie (or great council) on 2 January 1469, and six days later it was confirmed by the duke. The craft guilds did not dare to protest against this penalty, because of Charles the Bold’s severe reprisals in Liège. Charles the Bold repeated his ratification of this humiliating document on 15 July 1469. Repressions of urban revolts had traditionally been rather lucrative operations for the dukes who were determined to create a centralised Burgundian state which incorporated the county of Flanders.442 The Abolition of 1469 was no exception to this rule, and it was in many ways the antithesis of the Ghent privilege of 30 January 1477. The Abolition stipulated that the banners of the guilds were to be handed over to the duke immediately. The Hospital Gate in the city walls, closed in 1453, and reopened by the rebels in 1467, was closed again. Henceforth, the duke would decide who sat on the Collatie, which meant that his supporters would make fiscal and political decisions for the city. The Abolition thus legitimised ducal sympathizers as the new power holders, and prohibited all protest against their policies. According to the Abolition, any member of a craft guild who entered the Friday Market square armed with weapons or carrying a banner without the permission of the city government or the bailiff, would be punished severely. Not only the individual who violated this measure, but also the guild to which he belonged, could be condemned, and would then lose all its privileges. Finally, the Abolition undid the Charter of Senlis, which had been the constitutional basis for Ghent’s government institutions. Henceforth, the city boards would be elected by a ducal commission, instead of city electors. The Charter of Senlis was destroyed in a symbolic ceremony before a delegation of Ghent aldermen on 8 January 1469 in Brussels.443 The jurist George Chastelain described this pompous ceremony, with a snide reference to the legends of Heracles, as one of the twelve magnificent labors of Charles the Bold.444 Despite Charles’ best efforts, the Abolition would not survive his death. Following the example of the ritualised destruction of the Charter of Senlis in January 1469, the Ghent rebels destroyed the Abolition, the Restriction and the Treaty of Gavere in January 1477. Rebel actions removed not only the political humiliation of 440 441 442 443 444

A detailed analysis by Boone, Législation communale, 146–9 and Fris, La restriction de Gand, 115–9. Boone, La destruction des villes, 106–9. Blockmans, La répression de révoltes urbaines, 7–9; Dumolyn, The legal repression, 512–20. Boone, Het ‘Charter van Senlis ’, 24–7. Paravicini, Die zwölf ‘Magnificences ’, 323–7. 231

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the city, but also the power base of Charles the Bold’s local supporters, which faded away in the spring of 1477. The coalition of the members of the middle class, the craft guilds, and sympathizers from the urban elite which had governed the city during 1449–53 and 1467–68 again monopolised power.445 By placing Charles the Bold’s victims on the city boards in February 1477, the new city power holders made it clear that the Three Members again ruled the city and that all political, social and economic rights of the craft guilds had been restored. The charisma and symbolic presence of these veterans of rebellion were as important as their political views. Lieven de Pottere, Diederik van Schoonbroek, Simon Borluut, Jacob van Wymeersch and the others personified the power regained by the craft guilds in 1477. A powerful coalition of wealthy craftsmen and members of the urban elite ruled Ghent, and neither Mary of Burgundy nor Maximilian had the means to overthrow it. 3.2.2

Eliminating Political Adversaries

The first political and financial decisions of the new power holders reveal much about their social and political background and the ways in which they intended to cement their power. Because there are no surviving reports of the Ghent Collatie meetings, as there are for Bruges, the reconstruction of Collatie policies must be based on urban accounts, chronicles and charters. All the chronicles mention the first measure of the new Collatie, which shows that it had a serious impact on contemporaries. Their first action was to abolish the high tariffs of the indirect taxes on 25 January.446 As in Bruges, the primary objective of the revolt of 1477 was to get rid off the highly symbolic and repressive fiscal policy of the late Duke. In 1453 Philip the Good had imposed a ‘cueilliote ’, a levy of indirect taxes, which was abolished in 1467, but reinstated by Charles the Bold in 1469.447 In 1477 the new power holders decided that the city no longer had to pay the high indirect taxes on beer, corn and wine. With this popular move, the new power holders clearly wanted to gather general support for their regime. They abolished other symbolic punitive measures of the Burgundian dukes for the same reason. The Collatie reopened the city gates that had been closed by Philip the Good in 1453.448 The new city leaders ordered the return of the banners confiscated from the craft guilds.449 In addition to symbolising the craft guilds’ return to power, return of the banners allowed the guild leaders to use these ritual tools to control the mobilisation, or ‘wapeningen ’, of the craftsmen.450 The Collatie reversed every political or fiscal punishment imposed by the dukes, in order to negate the repressive policy of Burgundian dynasty and gain the support of the craftsmen for its own rule. When the new power holders took control of the city, they fixed those policies which dissatisfied 445 Haemers, De Gentse opstand, 420–1. 446 Memorieboek der stad Ghendt, 297. 447 Boone, Geld en macht, 146–52; Ryckbosch, Tussen Gavere en Cadzand, 202–4. 448 Namely the Spitaal-, the Percelle- and the Sint-Lievenspoort through which the Ghent rebels of 1452 had left the city to fight the ducal army at Oudenaarde. In 1467 the rebels had reopened the Spitaalpoort. On 8 January 1469 Charles the Bold forced the city to close this gate again (Memorieboek der stadt Ghendt, 297; Arnade, Realms of Ritual, 120–1; Fris, La restriction de Gand, 74). 449 The banners which had been confiscated in 1453 and taken to Brussels arrived in the city on 30 April 1477 (CAG: 400, 25, 162v). In the revolt of 1467 the craft guilds had made copies of the banners, but these were also confiscated by the Duke of Burgundy (Arnade, Realms of ritual, 152). 450 Haemers, A moody community, 73–5; Boone, Armes, coursses et commocions, 19–20. 232

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the craft guilds and tried to channel the anger of the craftsmen into the struggle against Charles the Bold’s regime. The Collatie also executed their enemies to help convince the citizens of Ghent to support the new regime. After the former power holders were removed politically, the Collatie decided to eliminate them physically. The Revolt of 1477 was thus far more violent in Ghent than in Bruges, partly because the previous history of revolt was more violent, but also because the court, including the supporters of Charles the Bold, was resident in Ghent when the duke died. After the election of new city boards on 18 February 1477, the former power holders who were not executed were vilified and banished. The former ‘watergraven ’ Jacob Donche and Jan Utenhove were banished.451 The chancellor of Burgundy, Charles the Bold’s audiencier, or head jurist, the Bishop of Tournai, and the governor of Liège were all imprisoned, and those who were held responsible for abuses of power in the city under the previous regime were punished severely. The new regime sacrificed several scapegoats in March 1477. Former burgomasters and aldermen, such as Pieter Hueribloc, Pieter Boudins, Roeland van Wedergrate, Filips Sersanders, Jan van Poucke, and Olivier de Grave were led to the scaffold. ‘Because of the poor policies they had carried out in Ghent for many years’, they were beheaded one by one between 13 and 17 March. The execution of the knight Jan van Melle took place along the punishment of chancellor Guillaume Hugonet on Holy Thursday, 3 April 1477.452 While these executions did serve as symbolic condemnations of past ducal policy, the new city government primarily intended them as strategic political moves. The executions targeted those who were directly responsible for the detested policies. The executed politicians had served a total of 43 terms as burgomaster, alderman, or city receiver during the reign of Charles the Bold. Olivier de Grave, Filips Sersanders, and Roeland van Wedergrate had composed and signed the Ghent Restriction.453 Roeland van Wedergrate was burgomaster of the Keure in 1468 and 1476, just as Filips Sersanders was burgomaster of the Gedele in 1470 and 1474. Charles the Bold’s regime had appointed Jan van Poucke, Pieter Hueribloc and Olivier de Grave successively as deans for the Member of the 53 small guilds in the years before the revolt. They not only symbolized Charles the Bold’s project to reduce guild rights, but were directly responsible for carrying it out. Jan van Poucke, Jan van Melle, and Olivier de Grave were city receivers in those years, and were held responsible for the city’s financial policy. As a buyer of several city annuities before 1477 who then became rich at the city’s expense, Jan van Melle even personified the despised ducal policy. As Marc Boone has pointed out, the Ghent allies of Charles the Bold sold many annuities secured by the city during his reign. To pay off this long-term debt, the city government had to raise indirect taxes, just as happened in Bruges. The craft guilds were the principal victims of this fiscal policy, and in 1477 they got even with those who were responsible for it, as well as with those who become wealthy by investing in the city’s fiscal policies.454 451 CAG: 212, 1, 12v. 452 Dagboek van Gent, II, 251; Boone, La justice en spectacle, 32. Jan van Melle was executed later than the others because he was in Dendermonde in March 1477. He was detained by Hector van Massemen on behalf of Ghent on 1 April 1477. The duchess forgave the city for this detention (ADN: B 1699, 21r–22v). Jan was brought to Ghent and immediately executed (CAG: 400, 25, 162r). 453 Fris, Histoire de Gand, 147. 454 Boone, Plus deuil que joie, 19–21. The wealth of Jan van Melle is well documented, because his property was confiscated in 1477, as a kind of ‘reimbursement’ to the city (Blockmans, Peilingen naar de sociale strukturen, 240–1). 233

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A second factor was that the executed politicians had all served the duke. Pieter Boudins was personal secretary to Philip the Good and Charles the Bold. Pieter Hueribloc, Jan van Melle, and the brother of Filips Sersanders ( Jan) were councillors in the Council of Flanders during Charles the Bold’s reign.455 Roeland van Wedergrate was ‘watergraaf ’ from 1464 until 1467, and Jan van Melle was appointed bailiff of the Oudburg (a comital enclave within the city) after the repression of the Revolt of 1467.456 As burgomasters or city representatives, most of the executed politicians had given their support to Charles the Bold at meetings of the Estates-Generals or the Members of Flanders.457 Charles the Bold knighted Jan van Melle in 1475 after the duke had granted him a pardon for the abduction of Elisabeth van Massemen in 1466.458 Some of the executed politicians had even helped the Burgundian dynasty suppress previous revolts in Ghent. On Philip the Good’s orders, Pieter Boudins and Pieter Hueribloc attempted to prevent Daneel Sersanders’ takeover in 1449, and Duke Philip had appointed Pieter Hueribloc head dean of the small guilds after the defeat of the Ghent troops at the Battle of Gavere.459 Both had been banished during the revolt of 1449–53. Their political opponents swiftly eliminated these politicians as soon as they saw the opportunity. In 1467 the rebels had forced the imprisonment of Pieter Hueribloc, Pieter Beys and Jan van Poucke, and in 1477 the same rebels finally got the chance to finish off these officials who had carried out the autocratic policy of Charles the Bold.460 A third factor was that the rebels could easily eliminate support for dynasty in Ghent, because all that support was focused in only one social network. There were multiple social and political connections between the executed men, often cemented by marriage alliances. The mother of Filips Sersanders, for example, was the sister of the water bailiff (‘watergraaf ’) Jan Utenhove. Filips’ brother-in-law was Joris de Bul, secretary to the duke, who was also Pieter Boudins’ cousin. Pieter Boudins’ sister married Jacob Donche. After the death of his first wife, Jacob married the daughter of Jan Utenhove. Another of Jan’s daughters married Roeland van Wedergrate.461 Due to these marriages and daily contacts the ‘ducal party’ in Ghent had become one social network. Consequently, the local supporters of Charles the Bold behaved like a consolidated bloc that identified its interests with those of the dynasty. The young men from this network were a reliable recruitment pool for ducal administrators.462 They were dependent on the duke’s favour for their upward social mobility and the political power of their network. In return, the network anchored the duke’s position within the local elite, but dependence on one network made Charles the Bold’s power base in Ghent very limited. With the elimination of the main members of the social network, the court lost all its support in the city. In the same manner, the duke’s Ghent allies did not have enough power to fight their 455 Dumolyn, Staatsvorming en vorstelijke ambtenaren, passim. 456 Van Rompaey, Het grafelijk baljuwsambt, 639. 457 Filips Sersanders, for example, argued for the aide of 100,000 rijders granted to the duke in 1475 (Blockmans, Handelingen van de leden (1467–1477), 253, 256, 258–9, 261). 458 Haemers, De Gentse opstand, 93–4; Dumolyn, Staatsvorming en vorstelijke ambtenaren, 164. 459 Haemers, De Gentse opstand, 138–57; Fris, Een strijd om het dekenschap, 85–8. 460 Fris, La restriction de Gand, 65. 461 Dumolyn, Les réseaux politiques, 317–8; Haemers, De Gentse opstand, 105–7. 462 The sons of Roeland van Wedergate, Pieter Hueribloc and Jan van Melle became important politicians in the Maximilian of Austria’s state administration or in the Ghent city government appointed by the Archduke (Van Peteghem, De Raad van Vlaanderen, 340; Dumolyn, Staatsvorming en vorstelijke ambtenaren, 178). 234

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opponents once their protector was gone. With the executions of March and April 1477, the rebels rid themselves of the duke’s tools for interfering in Ghent politics and their own local adversaries at the same time. The new power holders also used the executions to gain support among those who opposed the former administration. They even used the executions to legitimate their own rule. The reaction of court strengthened the position of the new power holders in Ghent to an even greater extent. Because Mary of Burgundy and those in the inner circle of her court were in such a weak position in early 1477, they had to agree to Ghent’s requirements. Maybe fearing that they might become the next victims, ducal officials let the Ghent rebels do as they pleased. Even the duchess did not want to interfere in Ghent politics. She made only one public appearance, to beg for mercy for her chancellor,463 but otherwise made no attempt to stop the Ghent executions. Just one day after the beheadings, on 18 March, she granted the city forgiveness for the revolt of the craft guilds, and legitimized the executions of the former power holders in the letter of remission by claiming that the executions were the result of a search for ‘right and justice’ against bad government in the past.464 She repeated these words in a second remission for the city issued on Good Friday (4 April), when she symbolically pardoned the city for the execution of the chancellor of Burgundy, the lord of Brimeu, and Jan van Melle.465 These letters of remission or pardon were very similar to the remissions Philip the Good had granted to the city in 1432 and 1437, although very different from his remission of 1440. In 1432 and 1437 Philip the Good used these words to approve the peaceful resolution by the Three Members of internal conflicts between Ghent’s craft guilds and its urban elite. In 1440, however, the Duke used quite different language in the letter of remission which also included punishments for offenders. In addition to the threat that the 1440 revolt made to him personally, Philip the Good was powerful enough to exact punishment on the city instead of putting a seal on an internal peace settlement.466 The 1453 revolt was pardoned, but with severe repression, and Charles the Bold followed the example of his father in 1468. In 1477, however, the Burgundian dynasty no longer had the means to punish Ghent for its rebellious deeds. The power relationship between the dynasty and its largest city flashed back to the period before 1440. A combination of the overextension of Charles’ wars and the political repression which was responsible for alienating the cities, had weakened ducal power. The advent of a new ‘count’, Archduke Maximilian of Austria, would not change the power relationship between Ghent and its lord. The new Ghent regime had already put in writing in their new local ‘constitution’ of 30 January 1477 that they would not tolerate autocratic rule by the new count or his local supporters.

463 Smagghe, 3 Avril 1477, 170–91. 464 The former power holders were beheaded ‘omme recht ende justicie te hebbene ende vercrighene up deghone die onse voorseide stede langhen tijt qualic, onduechdelic ende ghebreckelic gheregiert hebben ’ (CAG: 94, 711). 465 CAG: 94, 708bis (edited, but wrongly dated by Gachard, Note sur le jugement, 355–8). 466 Boone, Armes, coursses et assemblees, 25–31. 235

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Illustration 14: The City Hall of Ghent, the Façade Constructed during the Reign of Mary of Burgundy.

3.2.3

The Social Background of the New Regime

Who were the new power holders in Ghent in 1477? Wim Blockmans concluded that there was a thorough turnover in the government of Ghent in 1477. From the city boards elected on 18 February 1477, only Willem Rijm, who had served as alderman in 1474, had held public office in the past five years.467 In Bruges, the change was less radical as some of the aldermen and councillors had served in the previous regime, but in Ghent the political change was quite complete. Although it might be possible to call this a political revolution, the work of Wouter Ryckbosch shows that it was not a social one, because nearly the same socio-economic group retained leadership roles in the city before and after the revolt. More than the half of the men who leased tax farms before 1477 continued to lease tax farms afterwards.468 Another political group, rather than another socio-economic group, took power in 1477, which supports the argument that the Revolt of 1477 was a struggle between social networks rather than social groups. An argument for the centrality of social networks to the struggle must incorporate the participation of the craft guilds into those networks, or the obedience of guild members to ruling members of social networks. The following section analyzes the social backgrounds of the elite networks that took power in 1477, the main leaders of the craft guilds, and the opponents of the new regime.

467 Blockmans, Mutaties van het politiek personeel, 98. 468 Ryckbosch, Tussen Gavere en Cadzand, 136–46. 236

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In Ghent, as in Bruges, a coalition between elite networks and representatives of the craft guilds ruled the city during Mary’s reign. In contrast to Bruges, this coalition was based on an institutionalised form, the Three Members, which had existed before 1454, but was then suspended by the dukes from 1454 until 1477. As Boone’s exhaustive study has shown, from about 1360 until 1454 the Three Members of Ghent (the patricians, the weavers, and the small guilds) governed the city.469 The Three Members shared all city public offices in a proportional division. The city boards of aldermen, for example, included 6 patricians and 18 representatives from the craft guilds. During the fifteenth century, the dukes of Burgundy had fought to eliminate this regime because of the entrenched power of the craft guilds, which were far less controllable than elite groups. In 1454, one year after the Treaty of Gavere, Philip the Good suspended the Three Members regime.470 In 1467 challengers to Charles the Bold reintroduced the system, but in 1468 the duke again banned it. The Revolt of 1477 brought the craft guilds back into power, and they reintroduced the proportional system of dividing offices among the Three Members. Thorough analyses of the Three Members regimes during the Ghent revolt of 1449–53 and the Revolt of 1539–40 have shown that these government were led by the wealthy middle class in coalition with some of the city’s elite social networks.471 The same pattern fits the leaders of the regime which ruled Ghent between 1477 and 1482, as I will show below. However, more elite networks than ever before supported the Three Members regime during Mary’s reign, including some nobles who were among the new power holders after 1477. As Chapter 2 has shown, the Adrian Vilain cousins held prominent positions in Ghent during this period, as the weakness of the Burgundian dynasty gave its noble enemies an excellent opportunity to realise their desires for power. In 1477 the Vilain cousins also were welcomed by the Ghent rebels and quickly co-opted by the new regime. A Ghent tradition was to give noblemen principal positions on the city boards in times of political crisis. The ruling regime used the prestige of nobility to inspire trust. This trust helped to legitimate the city regime and generate respect for the government both inside and outside the city walls.472 The nobles Roeland de Baenst and Joost van Gistel served as burgomasters during Mary’s reign.473 But after a few years, as Ghent took a more radical position in Flemish politics, Roeland de Baenst and his son disappeared from the Ghent political scene. The city regime probably denied these noblemen offices because they were related to Guy de Baenst, a loyal confident of Maximilian.474 Joost van Gistel remained in Ghent service, probably because he was related to Adrian Vilain of Rassegem.475 The prestigious social position of the noblemen made them attractive allies for the city regime in the beginning, but the nobles’ political convictions and personal relationships with the new power holders seem to have determined how long a nobleman would last in public office. 469 Boone, Gent en de Bourgondische hertogen, 27–160. 470 Haemers, De Gentse opstand, 396–401. 471 Ibidem, 423–36; Dambruyne, Corporatieve middengroepen, 616–32. 472 Blockmans, Het wisselingsproces, 93. 473 Roeland de Baenst was burgomaster of Gedele in February 1477 and alderman of the Keure in 1478. Joost van Gistel was burgomaster of the Keure in 1477 and 1480. Adrian Vilain van Liedekerke was burgomaster of the Keure in February 1477 and in 1479. His cousin was burgomaster of Gedele in 1479 and burgomaster of the Keure in 1481. 474 Buylaert, Sociale mobiliteit bij stedelijke elites, 221–2. Olivier de Baenst became city receiver in February 1477, but he did not return to service after the end of this term in office. 475 Joost van Gistel was married to Jooszine Vilain, a cousin of Adrian (AND: B 4122, 98r; Stecher, Ghistele (Josse van), 738). 237

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Some elite families which had no social or political ties with the social network which backed Charles the Bold, also came into prominence after the revolt of 1477. Most of these were patrician families, such as the Borluuts and Rijms, who had very old roots in Ghent. The Borluut ancestors had belonged to the patrician ‘hereditary men’ (‘viri heriditarii ’) who had governed Ghent in the thirteenth century.476 These historical roots make it remarkable that descendants of this family were rebel leaders in the revolts of 1449–1453, 1467, 1477–1485, 1488–1492, and 1539–1540 in Ghent. Often the Borluut rebel scion was named Simon, an oft-repeated family personal name.477 The political position of the Borluut family was inspired, or maybe even led, by an amazing rebellious tradition, and they must have had socio-economic interests in urban autonomy. An analysis of the surviving personal accounts of one of the many Simon Borluuts did not reveal any specific social or economic reasons for this focus, but it did show that the family exhibited certain characteristics. The Borluuts always tried to maintain or to enlarge their patrimony and reputation through elite consumption and a public display of religiosity.478 The tradition of defending urban autonomy seems to have been the main characteristic of the family’s political behaviour. Willem Rijm also belonged to a wealthy old patrician family. He was the son of Lodewijk Rijm and Clara van der Eeken.479 As was common among the Ghent patricians, he possessed considerable landed property in small towns around the city, such as Zaffelare, Waregem, Gijzenzele, Scheldewindeke, Assele, Beveren, Gavere, and Evergem.480 He held fiefs in Deinze, Vurste, Zingem, Nevele, Sint-Denijs-Boekel, Zaffelare, Galmaarden, Munte, and other locations. Multiple annuities on other tracts of land and houses in Ghent made him a wealthy man. He lived in a big house on the ‘Ringhesse’ in Ghent. ‘Master’ Willem Rijm had studied law at the University of Louvain.481 Like Simon Borluut, he came from a family whose members often joined in Ghent revolts. Willem’s relative, Boudewijn, led the Ghent revolt of 1449–53.482 Willem had married into a family with the same political persuasion, as his wife Elisabeth Damman was the daughter of Simon and Elisabeth van Vaernewijc.483 Simon Damman and many of his relatives had made common cause with the Ghent rebels in 1449–53. Other members of Willem’s social network, such as Simon Clocman, Denijs Heyman, and Simon Borluut, would also hold leading positions in the revolt against Maximilian of Austria.484 Willem Rijm belonged to a social network of the Ghent elite which had a tradition of defending the city’s autonomy. Willem was not left out, as he held several city offices during Mary’s reign. In February 1477 and in September 476 Milis, De middeleeuwse grootstad, 66; Boone, Élites urbaines, 65–8. 477 Simon Borluut fs. Gheerom or Simon Borluut fs. Simon (the elder) was burgomaster of the Keure in 1452 (Haemers, De Gentse opstand, 335–6), Simon Borluut fs. Gheerom was city receiver in 1467 and in February 1477, his son Simon (the younger) was burgomaster of the Keure in 1483 and 1488. A Simon Borluut was decapitated in 1540 by Emperor Charles V because he had led the revolt of 1540 (Dambruyne, Corporatieve middengroepen, 628). 478 Boone, De discrete charmes, 113. 479 CAG: 301, 53, 17v. 480 Boone, La terre, les hommes, 172–3. About Willem’s possessions: CAG: 301, 55 (2), 27v, 144v; 330, 37 (2), 124r-v (property statement dated April 1486). 481 On 28 January 1467 he began to study at Louvain (Wils, Matricule de l ’université, 182). 482 He was ‘head alderman’ (‘voorschepen ’) and military captain of Ghent at the Battle of Gavere (Fris, Rym (Baudouin), 676; Haemers, De Gentse opstand, 337, 396–7). 483 Fris, Rym (Guillaume), 686; SAG: FB, 296; Haemers, De Gentse opstand, 76, 86, 94, 207. 484 Friends and relatives of Willem are listed in his property statement (staat van goed) (CAG: 330, 37 (2), 124r-v). About the historical value of this source for the reconstruction of social networks: Haemers, De Gentse opstand, 94–101. 238

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1479 he was appointed as an alderman of the Keure, and in September 1477 he was a city receiver. From September 1480 until June 1485 he was employed by the city as a jurist.485 In this position he was one of the principal administrators of the regency council during the Flemish Revolt. Willem Rijm and Daneel Onredene were both executed on 14 June 1485 for leading the Flemish opposition against the regency of Maximilian of Austria.486 Daneel Onredene did not belong to the city’s wealthy elite, but, like Willem, he came from a family that had rebels in its ranks. Daneel’s father, Raas, led the Ghent revolt of 1437.487 No other information survives about Daneel, except that he purchased wood in June 1478.488 Daneel Onredene does not seem to have had enough wealth to be appointed as an alderman in the normal course of events. Most members of the Ghent elite, such as Simon Borluut and Willem Rijm, could afford to have their civil contracts recorded in the registers of the aldermen of the Keure and the Gedele. Registration of the documents cost more money, and consequently mainly rich people appear in these sources.489 Daneel Onredene does not, which probably means that he did not belong to the urban elite. Nevertheless he was an important Ghent politician during this period, and served as alderman of the Keure in 1478 and 1481. In July 1482 the Three Members of Flanders appointed him ‘guardian of the Flemish mint’. 490 Daneel probably took advantage of the political vacuum created by the revolt of 1477 to gain a city office, a position from which his family had been excluded in the past. The twin brothers Jan and Frans van Coppenhole were also new actors on the political stage in 1477, but neither the twins nor their ancestors had a ‘rebellious history’. The city registers show they had sufficient wealth to afford houses and annuities.491 Both seem to have been talented bookkeepers and jurists, although neither had studied at an university. They were very often called in by patricians, abbeys, or civil institutions to defend their clients’ rights in trials before the Ghent aldermen during the 1470s.492 Neither Jan nor Frans held city office during the Revolt of 1477, but they were hired in that year by the city boards to administer the city’s judicial and financial affairs. On 2 June Jan was appointed city prosecutor with a mandate to confiscate the property of ‘enemies of the city’. 493 As prosecutor, Jan brought charges against many members of the elite who had held power during Charles the Bold’s reign. With a certain fanaticism he doggedly prosecuted families who sought to evade confiscation by bringing them up on charges several times. The victims’ efforts to escape were in vain, because Jan had the support of the city boards and won every trial.494 Frans held a similar city office after 1480. By the order of the city of Ghent and the count of Flanders he confiscated the property held by French partisans in

485 Fris, Rym (Guillaume), 686–7. 486 CAG: 400, 28, 449v. 487 Raas was captain of the Ghent troops in the campaign against the English in 1437. After leaving the siege of Calais they obtained political concessions of the Ghent patricians (Fris, Onredene (Daneel), 192; idem, Onredene (Race), 195). 488 CAG: 301, 55, 191v. 489 Historians thus can only reconstruct the living conditions of the rich (Haemers, De Gentse opstand, 27–8). 490 GSAB: Rk. 18197, 8r. 491 See for example CAG: 301, 51, 31r, 37v; 52 (2), 81v, 105v; 54 (3), 43r; 55, 54v; 56, 11v, and 92r. 492 CAG: 301, 51, 66v; 53, 107v; 54 (3), 158v. 493 CAG: 301, 54 (2), 21r; 212, 1, 12v; Fris, Jan van Coppenhole, 95–6. 494 CAG: 301, 54 (2), 21r, 35v, 118r-v; 56 (2), 100v. 239

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the Ghent quarter.495 After several years in government service, the power of both brothers increased. Jan was appointed secretary of the city boards in September 1479, and he kept this office for years.496 He was an element of continuity in the Ghent administration until June 1492, when both brothers died on the scaffold during a radical phase of the Flemish Revolt.497 Their deaths prepared the city to surrender to Maximilian a few weeks later, as it marked the beginning of the later reconciliation with the court. In addition to Ghent patricians and noblemen, representatives of the craft guilds also took up city office in 1477. The governments of the Ghent craft guilds had oligarchic tendencies.498 After the Battle of Gavere, the city boards appointed the duke’s supporters to be deans of the most important craft guilds, such as the shippers, bakers and butchers.499 The extent of these men’s political influence is unknown, but it may not have reached far, because the craft guilds took to the barricades in 1467 and 1477. The craft guilds gained a permanent voice in politics in 1477, but little information about the guild representatives on the city boards survives. There was a high degree of turnover among the aldermen from the craft guilds during Mary’s reign.500 Ghent aldermen of the Keure had to wait two years before they could be re-elected, and the aldermen of the Gedele had to wait for only one year. The rotation of seats on the city boards within the weavers guild and among the constituent guilds of the Member of the 53 small guilds contributed to the high turnover, as did the limited political experience of the guild representatives. Of all the representatives who held seats on the city boards during Mary’s reign, Jan van den Buendere, Jacob van Wymeersch and Joost van Wychuus served the most terms, four each during the period between 1477 and 1482.501 Three men, Arend de Clerc, Gillis de Bels and Jan Dullaert, sat three times on the boards each in the same period.502 These six persons probably carried political weight in the government of their guilds because they were re-elected several times. These six guild representatives formed an element of continuity and concentration of power on the Ghent city boards during Mary’s reign. The importance of the offices they held also accentuates their influence. Most of them served as head deans for the Member of the weavers or the small guilds, two of the most important political offices in fifteenth-century Ghent.503 The head dean of the weavers or the small guilds had the final say over the selection of aldermen from that Member. He governed the Member guild(s) and pronounced legal decisions for one of the two overarching organisations of the craft guilds. Head deans took part in the decision-making process of the city, represented the 495 GSAB: Rk. 19724, 1r; ADN: B 33, 128r; CAG: 301, 56, 22v. 496 Hancké, Confiscaties als politiek wapen, 208–9. 497 As they were born together, so they would be executed together (on 16 June 1492, as ‘grans patriarches des meutins ’; Molinet, Chroniques, II, 253–5; see also Dagboek van Gent, II, 270 and Fris, Jan van Coppenhole, 112–4). 498 Boone, Gent en de Bourgondische hertogen, 84; idem, Les métiers dans les villes, 11; Dambruyne, Guilds, social mobility, 58–9. 499 Haemers, De Gentse opstand, 393. 500 Blockmans, Mutatie van het politiek personeel, 95; idem, Het wisselingsproces van de Gentse schepenen, 89. 501 Jan van den Buendere was alderman of Gedele in February 1477, alderman of the Keure in 1478, and head dean of the small guilds in 1478–80 and again in 1480–82. Jacob van Wymeersch was head dean of the small guilds from February 1477 until 15 August 1478, alderman of the Keure in 1479 and urban receiver in 1480. Joost van Wychuus was head dean of the weavers in 1479–81, alderman of Gedele in February 1477 and alderman of the Keure in 1478. 502 Arend de Clerc was head dean of the weavers in 1481–83, urban receiver in 1477 and alderman of the Keure in 1478. Jan Dullaert was alderman of Gedele in 1477, 1479 and 1481. Gillis de Bels was alderman of Gedele in February 1477 and in 1480. He was mentioned as head dean of the weavers together with Gillis de Clerc in 1477 and with Joost van Wychuus in 1479. Perhaps he was acting as a permanent substitute for the head dean (CAG: 400, 26, 102r; 27, 96r). 503 Boone, Les gens de métiers, 26–7. 240

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city at meetings of the Members of Flanders, and sometimes led troops on the battlefield. The career of the mattress-cover weaver Jan van den Buendere is especially striking. After he had completed his two-year term as head dean on 15 August 1480, he was re-elected to the same post, a highly unusual procedure which was actually prohibited by law. After this term ended, Jan van den Buendere was re-elected again (on 15 August 1482), but he died suddenly at the beginning of March 1483.504 Jan van den Buendere had held the office of head dean for almost five years. His political clout, charisma and/or persuasive powers must have been quite high, because his double re-election departed sharply from Ghent tradition. The Burgundian chronicler Jean Molinet attributed great personal qualitites to Jan van den Buendere, which could explain his great popularity.505 The property statement (staat van goed) written after his death listed the contents of his estate and so informs us about his economic background.506 He possessed lands in Gavere, several small houses near St. Peter’s Abbey, several annuities, and a house in the street called the Nederkouter. Jan clearly did not possess wealth comparable to that of Simon Borluut or Willem Rijm. However, as head dean of the small guilds, he had certainly profited from economic activities and then invested the profits in land and other immovable property. Although he did not belong to the city’s elite, Jan was a wealthy man compared to his fellow craftsmen. For this reason, I categorize him among the middle class, which in Ghent included guild masters, producers of small goods, and deans of the less powerful guilds. They were in the ‘middle’ between the common craftsmen and the elite.507 Members of this middle class gained power as guild representatives during this revolt, as they did in revolts both before and after 1477.508 Jan van den Buendere was thus a typical Ghent ‘rebel’, who defended the interests of the craft guilds in the city whenever he received the opportunity. Along with Willem Rijm and Jan van Coppenhole, Jan van den Buendere was a constant power holder in the city government during Mary’s reign. In contrast to other politicians in contemporary Ghent, these three individuals, who all held some city office continuously from August 1479 until March 1483, formed a political ‘cluster’. Because the power of the Ghent aldermen extended beyond the city walls, these men also influenced the surrounding countryside and the meetings of the Members of Flanders.509 The prominence of Willem Rijm, Jan van den Buendere, and Jan van Coppenhole in the city politics coincided with the growing conflict between the city of Ghent and the archduke’s court. Willem Rijm was to play an especially pivotal role in the protest of Ghent against Maximilian of Austria’s policies. Because Willem Rijm was renowned as an orator and jurist, the city ordered him to defend Ghent’s point of view on state issues. In November 504 CAG: 400, 26, 107r; 27, 96r, 234r, 366r; 28, 121r. He died on the First day of the Ghent auweet in 1483 before the church of the Dominicans (Molinet, Chroniques, I, 414). According to the Dagboek van Gent (II, 258) he died on 10 March – he was burried on 12 March (CAG: 400, 28, 137v). His successor, Jan van den Abeele, was elected on 20 March 1483 (CAG: 400, 28, 130r). 505 Molinet claims that Jan van den Buendere was a ‘tres juste homme, fort amé du peuple et vertueux, comme il sambloit ’, small in stature, but with a great mind (he spoke two or three languages). Moreover, he refused to accept gifts when he was head dean (Molinet, Chroniques, I, 414). Molinet condemns the revolts against the Burgundian dynasty in his chronicle, but his information mainly corresponds to other sources (Devaux, Jean Molinet, 432–462; Haemers, Un miroir à double face). 506 CAG: 330, 36 (2), 131r-v. 507 Haemers, De Gentse opstand, 109–16; Dambruyne, Corporatieve middengroepen, 328–42. 508 Dambruyne, De middenstand in opstand, 117–22; Dumolyn & Haemers, Patterns of urban revolts, passim. 509 In the last years of Mary’s reign, one of the three was present at almost every meeting of the Members (see, for example, Blockmans, Handelingen van de leden, 154, 159, 160–2). 241

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1481, for example, when he was dispatched to convince the cities of Ghent’s quarter to join the Ghent opposition, he beguiled them ‘with beautiful speeches’ and his ‘very dignified’ manner.510 Willem Rijm, Jan (and Frans) van Coppenhole, Jan van den Buendere, and later, Daneel Onredene, were the main advocates of the Ghent opposition against Maximilian of Austria as political tensions grew. Since they were representatives of the craft guilds and members of the elite or middle classes, they personified the political coalition which ruled Ghent. They maintained their political position in the city after Mary’s death, but as the main initiators of the Flemish Revolt, they did not survive the turbulent years that followed Maximilian’s victory. 3.2.4

Protest against the Regime

The broad coalition which governed Ghent during Mary’s reign was never able to prevent protest against its regime, which came from three sources. Criticism arose from the court, from below, and even from within the coalition, over the methods it employed to govern the city. As Chapter 1 explains, discord between the court and the Ghent city government arose after the Battle of Enguinegatte, and their relationship continued to deteroriate over the next few years. Maximilian did not have many local supporters in Ghent, as he did in Bruges, to help him circumvent the restrictions of the privileges of 1477. Moreover, the Ghent ruling coalition had enough power to remove its opponents from the city. During Mary’s reign, the coalition banished Jacob Donche, Filips van Heurne, Jan Utenhove, Joost Arends, Jean de Houplines, and Omer Claeissone for obstructing city politics.511 Court officials and opponents of the new Ghent regime did try to seek out allies in the city, but the regime reacted swiftly to counter resistance. In April 1480, for example, Omer Claeissone, a councillor on the Council of Flanders, tried to undermine the authority of the city boards (according to city authorities). Two locals, Olivier van Royen and Jacob Goetghebeur, were punished because they had joined forces with Omer.512 Olivier and Jacob, both from wealthy families, had served on the city boards of 1475–76, and their property was confiscated in the revolt of 1477 as a result.513 The new regime banished anyone who supported or was suspected of supporting ducal policy rather than the authority of the new regime. The regime banished Pieter Ghiselin, for example, 510 ‘Met velen scoenen vertoeghe ’ and ‘zeere notabelic ’ as the deputees of Oudenaarde reported (Blockmans, Handelingen van de leden, 189). Olivier de la Marche described Willem as ‘l ’idolle et le dieu des Gantois ’ and ‘Guillaume Rin avoit plus grant voix à Gand et plus grant credit que n ’avoit le prince du pays ne les plus grans de Flandres ’ (de la Marche, Mémoires, III, 275). Filips Wielant called him ‘le principal conduicteur de touttes les rébellions ’ (see Fris, Rym (Guillaume), 686). 511 The banishment of Jacob Donche, Jan Utenhove and Filips van Heurne is discussed elsewhere. Ducal secretary Jean de Houplines was banished from the county on 20 November 1479 when the city accused him of the creating ordinances against city justice, ‘daerup diversche ordonnancien, statuten ende onbehoerlicke justitucien makende ten zwaren verdriete, onghenouchte ende laste van den ghemeenen inzetenen van den voorseiden lande ’ (CAG: 212, 1, 34v). The aldermen banished Joost Arends, secretary of the Franc of Bruges, on 23 July 1479 because he had claimed that the Franc was abolished as Fourth Member of Flanders ‘more by force than by right ’ (‘meer met forchen dan bij rechte ’, ‘ende van meer andere rude woorde bij hem aldaer ghesproken al met zijnen openbaren onghelijcken ende in vermindertheden ende versmaetheden van deser stede ende den anderen Leden slants van Vlaenderen ’; CAG: 212, 1, 30r). 512 They were punished because they ‘in diverssche vergaderinghen bij hemlieden ghehouden groote cleenicheden, quade ende versmadelijcke woorden gheseyt ende ghesproken hebben ter vermindertheden van deser stede contrarie den rechten, previlegien ende vryheden van diere ende grootelicx ten laste ende confusien van heere ende wette, welke manieren van vergaderinghen ende woorden niet en behooren te ludene zonder punicie ’ (CAG: 212, 1, 37r). Omer Claeissone probably was married to the sister of Pieter Boudins, who was executed in March 1477 (Dumolyn, Staatsvorming en vorstelijke ambtenaren, Omaer Claiszone). 513 Hancké, Conflict en confiscatie, II, 73. 242

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in October 1481 because he had said in public: ‘I hope to live in a time when the city of Ghent will only have rights inside the city walls’. 514 The most significant protest against the new regime arose in February 1479 from the urban craftsmen who violently protested certain policies of the new regime. The Ghent coalition between guild representatives and elites, like the Bruges coalition, had considerable difficulty trying to control protest ‘from below’. The cause for protest was identical to that in Bruges: to pay for increased military costs, the regime had to raise indirect taxes. In November 1477 Ghent craftsmen had protested an initial increase in indirect taxes, a protest which the regime had easily suppressed, but in February 1479 craftsmen protested again and more forcefully.515 After a meeting of the Estates-General in Dendermonde in February 1479, the Members of Flanders decided to approve a new aide for the war against France.516 However, funds from the confiscated property of opponents, confiscations of enemies, restitution of pensions of former power holders, and the war surtax levied on patricians had been exhausted by 1478.517 Moreover, the city had amassed a great burden of debt from numerous sales of annuities on the city during Charles the Bold’s reign.518 To finance the court’s new military campaign, the city government proposed raising the indirect tax on beer, to two mites per stoop of beer produced or sold in the city.519 The middle class and the poor would become the main victims of these increased indirect taxes, just as in Bruges. As soon as the news of the city boards’ plan circulated, some craftsmen went on strike. Resistance against the Ghent regime’s fiscal policies was violent, and so was the regime’s response. Fifteen of the fifty-three small guilds mobilized their members in their guild houses on 26 February 1479.520 The city government tried to pacify the conflict by organizing a collective assembly, a ‘wapeninghe ’, of the armed guilds in the Friday market square, a ritual which had tempered and directed the emotional reactions of ordinary craftsmen into support for peaceful negotiations between the craft guilds and the city government during every revolt in Ghent.521 However, since some guilds refused to participate in the collective action, the ‘wapeninghe ’ did not achieve its goal. The city government had to remove the guilds of the shoemakers, millers, smiths, carpet weavers, and oil producers ‘by force’ out of their guild houses.522 They joined the ‘wapeninghe ’ in the Friday Market square, but the next day, the guilds of the millers, smiths and shoemakers again gathered their members in their guild houses and refused to leave. Bailiff Jan van Dadizeele had to lay siege to the guild houses before the guildsmen surrendered. Some 514 ‘Ic hope den tijt te ghebidene dat die van Ghend niet meer vrijhede hebben en zullen dan tooten poorte ’ (CAG: 212, 1, 56v). 515 The city received a ducal pardon for this revolt. As in March 1477, the remission blamed the former power holders for the turmoil in the city. Because their fiscal management and government had been so poor, the current regime had to raise taxes in November 1477 to service the public debt (the city was ‘in grooten commere ende laste van renten ende anderssins bij den soberen regemente van denghonen die ze gheregiert ende de administracie van den goede van diere ghehadt hebben, waerof diverssche ongenouchten ghespruut ende gheresen zijn ende daghelijcx vernieuwen, welc zeere te claghene es ’ – see CAG: 94, 719 and 93, 7, 28r). 516 Wellens, Les Etats-Généraux, 183; Blockmans, Handelingen van de leden, 92. 517 About these fiscal measures, see Hancké, Conflict en confiscatie, 202; Blockmans, Peilingen naar de sociale strukturen, 239–41; Ryckbosch, Tussen Gavere en Cadzand, 108–11, 207–11; Boone, Dumon & Reussens, Immobiliënmarkt, fiscaliteit en sociale ongelijkheid, 98 and Boone, Openbare diensten, 103. 518 In 1478 the total public debt of the city amounted to 54 % of its annual revenues (Ryckbosch, Tussen Gavere en Cadzand, 275–7). 519 Mémoires de Jean de Dadizeele, 14. 520 Dagboek van Gent, I, 253–4; Memorieboek der stad Ghendt, 310–1; Mémoires de Jean de Dadizeele, 14–5. An analysis of the facts in Fris, L ’émeute de Gand, 189–95 and Ryckbosch, Tussen Gavere en Cadzand, 12–3. 521 Haemers, A moody community, 71–5; Verbruggen, Geweld in Vlaanderen, 133–44. 522 ‘By fortsen ’ (Dagboek van Gent, I, 253). 243

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craftsmen afterwards occupied the Saint Veerle square, but they were overpowered and forced to hand over their weapons. The city boards immediately banished 27 of the rebels from Flanders for 50 years because ‘they had mobilized in order to kill the power holders and all good men in town’. 523 A small armed troop guarded Veerle square for the next few days until the Collatie had reached agreement over the new tax. On 1 March the city board banished 25 people for stirring up trouble.524 The bailiff publicly executed five people on the following day.525 The city banished more people at the end of the month because they had criticised the executions.526 The city regime was only able to introduce the new tax on beer by force. Just as the Bruges government had found in April 1477, the government formed by the Ghent rebels had to deal with the radicals who did not agree with the regime’s policies. The radical craftsmen were not easy to control. They did not ask for institutional reforms or a change of regime. They only wanted to improve their daily living conditions and for that purpose, they demanded a more equitable tax system. The city board did not give in because then its policy of supporting the war would become prohibitively expensive. As in previous Ghent revolts the mob was not able to influence the decisions of the rebellious regime.527 Even the governments of most guilds would not support the radical demands. Guild leaders may have agreed with the common craftsmen’s position, but they not want to jeopardize their alliance with the urban elite. Most guild leaders chose to maintain their favourable position in the city, because they feared that they would lose the political participation if they pushed the elite too far. In addition, the majority of the ordinary craftsmen realised that they might secure a compromise by working with the Collatie, but they would lose everything if they fought the regime, especially violently. Fighting the regime meant fighting their own allies. The massive repression of March 1479 signaled that the ruling coalition would not give in to radical demands, and the regime would not tolerate opposition. The coalition between craft guilds and urban elite ruled by compromise when possible, and by force if necessary. The regime legitimised the repression of the revolt of February 1479 by arguing that the revolt did not serve the ‘common good’ of the city. The exemplary punishment of banishment for 50 years emphasized the ideology of the city’s ruling elites. The urban government described the rebels’ demand as an ‘evil opinion’ held ‘against the Three Members and good citizens’. 528 The exiled rebels had acted out of self-interest when they had ignored the orders of the city boards and the Collatie. The Collatie represented the complete community of the city, and individuals could not be allowed to fight the decision of the ‘body politic’. Commotion was unhealthy for the city’s unity. Those who spread discord in the city were a threat to the urban community and had to leave it. After the revolt of February the regime banished more people for causing trouble in the city.529 The discourse about the ‘common good’ masked the primary motive, a strong desire for political self-preservation, of this regime which had come to power to fulfil the demands 523 They had made ‘upstel van wapenninghen […] omme heere ende wet ende alle goede mannen doot te slane ’ (CAG: 212, 1, 27r). 524 They had spoken ‘quade beroerlicke woorden ’ (CAG: 212, 1, 27r-v). 525 GSAB: Rk., 14177, 196v. 526 CAG: 212, 1, 28r; Fris, L ’émeute de Gand, 193–5. 527 Haemers, De Gentse opstand, 239–64. 528 ‘Quade meeninghe ’ and ‘contrarie den drien leden ende den goeden inzetene van deser stede ’ (CAG: 212, 1, 27r). 529 In December 1479 the bailiff executed two people ‘a cause de commotion par eulx faicte en la ville de Gand ’ (GSAB: Rk., 14117, 178r). The city followed this example in March 1480 (CAG: 400, 27, 110r). 244

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of the elites and middle class. The ideological defence of policy was as necessary for the regime as the repression it tried to justify. Repression and ideology might ‘convince’ the common craftsman to support the coalition regime, but he had social and political reasons to support the regime as well. Taxes had been raised since 1477, but the repressive politics of Charles the Bold’s regime were past history. The guild leadership had a voice in the levying and spending of the taxes their members paid. The craft guilds had the rights of self-determination within their own corporations, and the ruling coalition did not tolerate abuses of guild privileges. The city magistrates’ decisions show that they upheld the old privileges of the guilds, such as the regulations on the registration of new members, during Mary’s reign.530 Although the guild archives which would prove this contention no longer exist, presumably the Ghent regime also protected the craft guilds economically, as was the case in Bruges. In October 1483 the head dean of the small guilds condemned residents of Evergem for doing work reserved for the Ghent craft guilds within the one-mile radius of the city walls. This labour was prohibited and condemned as ‘to the detriment of this city and its inhabitants’, because the urban craftsmen had to pay taxes and those outside the city walls did not.531 The economic interests of the guild members were threatened by labourers who were not registered in a guild, but often worked in the city and competed with the guild’s monopoly. Unity between the craft guilds was based on the systematic exclusion of these economic competitors. The regime of the Three Members and the urban autonomy of Ghent protected the common craftsmen against this economic threat.532 Although there are insufficient documents to prove this, economic protectionism by the city board was likely one of the main reasons why ordinary craftsmen supported the coalition between its representatives and the elites. In addition, when opposition against the regime arose, the guild leaders had the means to stop it. The hierarchical structure of each craft guild and the election procedure for its government prevented dissidents from gathering much support. Elections for new deans happened in multiple stages and usually in public, which made guild governments inherently stable and resistant to change.533 Repression, ideology, hierarchical structures, political motives and economic interests were responsible for the craft guild’s support for the coalition which included the twin brothers Jan and Frans van Coppenhole, Willem Rijm, Jan van den Buendere, and Daneel Onredene. Their regime was infinitely preferable to a regime that was dominated by the sovereign or his local allies. During Mary’s reign political divisions also occurred within the ruling coalition in Ghent. In 1477 the coalition agreed unanimously about its policies towards the court. But in the next few years, when it became clear that Maxilimian of Austria was trying to 530 On 3 August 1478 the dean of the barbers condemned one of the guild members, Jacob van Steenvoorde, for an orphan in the guild, as was the custom after the Treaty of Gavere (‘ghelijc andre kindren van zulker oudden naer den paeys van Gavere ontfaen ende ghewijdt ’). The dean ignored the motivation, because the political situation in Ghent had gone back to the period before the treaty. The aldermen confirmed the dean’s sentence and ordered Jacob to follow the guild privileges (CAG: 156, 1, 147). A privilege of 1433, confirmed by Mary of Burgundy in 1477, gave the right to deans to sentence members of their guilds (Boone, Les gens de métiers, 24). 531 Some inhabitants of Evergem had done ‘neeringe ’. They were condemned to pay a fine ‘anghesien dat bij zulke manieren de goede lieden van den neeringhen (die binnen dezer stede dooghen ende sustineren moesten alle lasten van assijzen, subventien, wakene ende anderssins) te nieuten gaen ende neeringhloes zitten zouden, niet alleenlic ten grieve ende achterdeele van hemlieden nemaer van deser goeder stede ende den ondersaten ’ (CAG: 156, 3, 4). 532 Boone, Gent en de Bourgondische hertogen, 85–9; Haemers, De Gentse opstand, 41–6. 533 Boone, Gent en de Bourgondische hertogen, 85–9. 245

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remove some of the restrictions of the privileges of 1477, coalition members disagreed about how to deal with the archduke’s actions. These disagreements fostered the rise of opposition to the coalition in the city, as the increase of tensions in the city around the Willem van der Scaghe case in the summer of 1479 has shown. Criticisms of the regime by political outsiders combined with Maximilian’s efforts to undermine the power of the ruling coalition in this case. In the summer of 1481, however, a more serious disagreement arose within the Ghent coalition. The influence of the political cluster around Willem Rijm, Daneel Onredene, Jan van den Buendere and the Coppenhole brothers had grown, as Ghent politics had radicalised vis-à-vis the court. But one member of the coalition, Jacob van Wymeersch, criticized the city regime for dishonest practices. Jacob was an old warrior from the Revolt of 1477. He was elected then as head dean of the small guilds, stayed in power during the following years, and in August 1480 became a receiver for the city. In this capacity, he accused city clerk Willem Rijm, secretary Jan van Coppenhole and head dean Jan van den Buendere of favouritism and nepotism in their leadership of the small guilds. According to the verdict condemning him on 12 July 1481, Jacob tried to stop the Rijm cluster from nominating its cronies to the offices in the Member of the small guilds. He was said to have warned the three leaders that they would be the first to die if their favouritism led to a new revolt.534 Jacob did not protest alone, but was joined by Gillis van den Broucke, Zegher de Mey, and Jan de Vechtere, who were all fellow politicians who had held office after 1477.535 In clear contrast to the case of Willem van der Scaghe, this protest against the regime did not come from the outside, but from the inner circles of the craft guilds. The accused, Willem Rijm, Jan van Coppenhole, and Jan van den Buendere, reacted severely. Their four adversaries were severely punished by an extraordinary court. The sentence and the political background of the court suggest that these radical politicians used the opportunity to settle scores with political moderates. Burgomaster Adrian Vilain van Rassegem, bailiff Jan van Dadizeele and the head dean of the weavers Joost van Wychuus condemned Jacob and his companions because they had very ‘lightly’ spoken words of ‘revolt’ (‘wapeninghen ’). If Jacob and his allies repeated these actions, they would be punished by death.536 The court forbade Jacob to hold any public office again and the four accused were never to meet with sympathizers (‘convocatie of gheselscip ’). The punishment was also designed to serve as a discouraging example. The four condemned politicians had to beg forgiveness publicly and before all the deans of the small guilds confess that their words had come ‘from heated blood’ and were ‘badly considered’. 537 With this sentence the regime clearly intended to smother any protest firmly and decisively.

534 Jacob van Wymeersch supposedly said: ‘Want up datter moeyte ende beroerte ghebuerde, zij zouden daeromme eerst dootghesleghen wesen ’ (CAG: 93, 3, 77v; see also Dagboek van Gent, II, 256–7). 535 Zegher de Mey was an elector of the aldermen and dean of the fullers in 1477, and elector and city receiver in 1479. Gillis van den Broucke was also an elector in 1479. Jan de Vechtere was ‘cnape van den neerynghe ’ (journeyman of the guilds) from February 1477 until 1480 and an elector of the aldermen in 1477 and 1479. Zegher de Mey performed many administrative and financial tasks for the regime after 1477 (CAG: 400, 25, 105r, 184r, 426r; 26, 31r; 27, 43r). 536 ‘Omme dat de voornoemde Jacop zo lichte es gheweest twoordt van wapeninghen of vriende ende maghen te moeyene ’… ‘Item, dat hem elc van partien verdraeghe eenighe woorden van der principaler materie te stroyene of sayene onder tvolc, elc up dies livelic ghecorrigiert te zijne ’ (CAG: 93, 3, 78r). 537 ‘Uut hitten van den bloede ’ and ‘qualic bedacht ’. ‘Ende mids al desen zullen dezelve partien van nu voort bliven ende zijn goede vrienden alsof dit stic niet ghebuert en ware ’… (CAG: 93, 3, 78r). 246

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Jacob van Wymeersch and his allies may have belonged to a group who did not want provoke confrontation with the court in 1481. He had been a strong supporter of the Revolt of 1477 and of previous revolts against the centralizing dukes, but perhaps he feared too direct a confrontation of the city with Maximilian. Because of his political background, he would not join the Habsburg court, nor ally with Maximilian’s supporters in the city. However, he may have been trying to warn the regime of the dangers of its radical position by accusing prominent leaders of corruption. It is also possible that the charges were true, and Jan van den Buendere and his fellows had appointed friends and relatives to guild positions. The head dean was in his second term, and he was likely surrounded by allies in the administration. However, with the sentence against Jacob van Wymeersch, the regime had nipped political opposition within the city in the bud. Unlike Bruges, the Ghent government was not divided politically (anymore) at the end of 1481. After the murder of Jan van Dadizeele, the regime was one firm bloc against the centralizing efforts of Maximilian of Austria. Radicals looking for opportunities to confront the archduke replaced political moderates. These radicals led Ghent into the Flemish Revolt in 1482, and some of them died for it when Maximilian took over the city in 1485. This was a logical punishment considering how the radicals themselves had come to power in Ghent. 3.2.5

Conclusion: Comparing Ghent and Bruges

The Ghent revolt against Charles the Bold’s autocratic policy was far more violent than the Bruges revolt. The Ghent networks that had enjoyed a taste of power in 1451–53 and 1467, only to lose power after the ducal victory, used the opportunity created by the death of Charles the Bold to seize power again – in a strong coalition with the urban craft guilds. Aversion against the late duke’s regime had deeper roots in Ghent than in Bruges. Ghent had a long and remarkable ‘rebellious tradition’. Both Philip the Good and Charles the Bold had violently and severely put down numerous revolts in Ghent, and their punishments of the city were brutal and financially draining. The dukes’ local supporters had organised the repression of their fellow citizens and then used public office to amass large fortunes. All of these factors explain why the Ghent Revolt of 1477 was more violent than the revolt in Bruges. The rebels in both cities fought for recognition of their social rights and political privileges, and both condemned the excesses of the former regime. The Bruges resistance emphasized better management of public institutions and a safer climate for trade and commerce in the county, but the Ghent resistance concentrated on the political (and even physical) elimination of the former power holders. Furthermore, the Ghent rebels instituted a much more autonomous city government, which reassembled those of Italian city-states.538 While some members from the Bruges elite were willing to work for the ducal administration after the revolt, the Ghent regime stubbornly defended political autonomy. Both the Bruges and Ghent coalitions consisted of men from the city’s wealthy elite and representatives and leaders of the craft guilds. Those citizens who opposed the growing power of the guilds joined forces with Maximilian and his allies. However, once again, the gulf between supporters and adversaries of the privileges of 1477 was much

538 Prevenier & Boone, De Gentse ‘stadstaat ’-droom, 103–5. 247

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more profound in Ghent than in Bruges. A reconciliation between these parties would have been almost impossible in Ghent. In contrast to the light hand of Bruges regime, the Ghent power holders showed no mercy to those who had supported Charles the Bold. In Ghent new social networks monopolised the seats on the city boards after 1477, while in Bruges supporters of the ducal court continued to hold office and became somewhat integrated into the new power networks after 1477. In Ghent the court lost all its major supporters and its entire local power base after the new regime executed members of the ducal network in 1477. Maximilian could find no ally in Ghent to compare with his Bruges ally, the nobility of the Franc of Bruges. The Ghent nobility was firmly connected to the city power holders, and the nobility from the Ghent hinterland either lived in the city or had social connections with the leading networks. Political differences between the Willem Moreel party and court were minor in the beginning but grew steadily to a breaking point in 1481. In Ghent, the rebel elites stood sharply divided from the court already in 1477. In Bruges regime change was necessary after the death of Mary of Burgundy in March 1482, as the city leaders shifted away from the court. Regime change was unnecessary in Ghent because there was no ducal party in the city government. Both the Bruges and Ghent regimes experienced difficulties with their guild coalition partners. Although the leaders of the craft guilds participated in both regimes, they could not prevent revolts by common craftsmen. In May 1477 in Bruges and in November 1477 and February 1479 in Ghent, radical groups of craftsmen protested against decisions of the ruling coalitions. Both regimes had to use force to suppress this resistance against their policies, especially their fiscal measures to finance the war. The use of force demonstrates that the traditional methods of consultation and compromise had failed and that the radical craftsmen had a distinct and more violent political culture. Both regimes were only able to counter the resistance by means of repression, propaganda, and the politics of self-preservation. The hierarchical structure of each craft guild helped the guild leaders silence opposition by encouraging the majority of the craftsmen to follow their leaders. Common craftsmen were also politically motivated to support the coalition regime after 1477. The bad experiences under Charles the Bold had taught them that when the court achieved permanent control over the city’s government, the craft guilds and their members suffered losses to their social position. In both Ghent and Bruges, ordinary craftsmen wanted urban autonomy, city dominance over the surrounding countryside, and recognition of social and political rights of the craft guilds. Because city leaders fulfilled these desires, ordinary craftsmen had a powerful reason to support the city government. The threat that the court would certainly try to violate their rights finally silenced political protests within the craft guilds in both cities. 3.3

Ypres

3.3.1

A Sleepy Oligarchic City

The city of Ypres was an anomaly in Flemish politics. The city was one of the Three Members of Flanders, but its political power no longer reflected economic prosperity. With economic depression and changes in the textile market during the fourteenth century, the former giant in wool cloth production had shrunk to an administrative centre with a small 248

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textile industry and about 7,000 or 8,000 inhabitants.539 Efforts to replace the production of the ‘new’ expensive luxury cloth for the ‘old’ heavy cloth were not successful in Ypres.540 The Ypres craft guilds blamed the economic downturn in textile production on the competition from the surrounding countryside. They pinned their hopes for recovery on prohibition of rural production, but after an ordinance from Philip the Good imposed a ban on rural cloth production in March 1428, the economy did not improve. One problem was that the duke and the Ypres city government did not enforce the ordinance effectively, which caused the craft guilds to go on strike for several months in 1428–29.541 The other Members of Flanders, Ghent and Bruges, stepped in to negotiate between the craft guilds, the Ypres patricians, and the duke. The Ghent and Bruges governments approached the conflict with a strong measure of self-interest, which coloured their attempts to influence Ypres politics. Both Members feared that failure to prevent that turmoil in the small city could inspire similar protest in their own cities, as had happened in the past.542 The Ypres agitators were punished severely, and the craft guilds did not rebel again until 1477. The outcome of the revolt of 1428–29 shows that Ypres was ruled by a closed oligarchy in the fifteenth century. The oligarchy quickly suppressed the revolt, undoubtedly because it was afraid to lose power. However, the Ypres elites might have also been motivated to suppress the revolt quickly and continue to protect rural textile production by their personal investments. As the in-depth study of Pieter Lansaem has shown, this leading figure of the Ypres oligarchy had amassed considerable wealth by trading in textiles made in the countryside.543 Pieter Lansaem held thirty-one offices in his forty-year career in Ypres politics (between 1443 and 1482). His colleagues were either rich textile barons or large landowners, and all came from powerful families who had dominated the city for ages.544 Approximately thirty families governed Ypres in the fifteenth century, and the rare entry of new families had not affected the oligarchy. These families seem to have monopolised the exports of cloth from the (reduced) textile industry and were reaping the majority of the profits. The Ypres craft guilds no longer held onto the political power they had acquired sporadically in the fourteenth century. Like the guilds in Bruges and Ghent, the Ypres guilds were not permanently represented on the city boards on the eve of the revolt of 1477. The city boards included one board of thirteen aldermen and another of thirteen councillors, lead by a ‘Guardian’ (comparable to the Ghent city bench of the ‘Gedeele ’).545 The craft guilds did not have representatives in any of the other city institutions. The ‘Council of 27’, which oversaw judicial proceedings, was probably chosen by the city boards. Another council, the ‘Notable Citizens’, led by a head dean, governed the Member of the patricians. Head deans also led the other three Members of the city (the weavers, the fullers, and the common guilds). A fifth head dean, the ‘hoofdman van den Besante ’ lead the meetings

539 Pirenne, Les dénombrements des foyers, 467–8; Prevenier, La démographie des villes, 208–9; Stabel, Dwarfs among giants, 28–9; Demey, Proeve tot raming, 162–3. 540 Stabel, Dmeeste, oirboirlixste ende proffitelixste let, 121–3. 541 Blockmans, De volksvertegenwoordiging, 345; Diegerick, Les drapiers yprois, 289–91. 542 Verbruggen, Geweld in Vlaanderen, 40–5. 543 Mus, Pieter Lansaem, 62–5. 544 Viaene, De drang naar macht, 32–4; Mus, Mutaties in de samenstelling, 79–80; Boone, Social conflicts, 147–8; Dumolyn & Haemers, Patterns of urban rebellion, 374–5. 545 Trio, Bestuursinstellingen van de stad, 347–55; Blockmans, De volksvertegenwoordiging, 77–9. 249

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of the Council of 27, and was charged with maintaining order in the city. Ypres had a ‘Great Council’, like those in Bruges and Ghent, which included representatives of the craft guilds. The Great Council included thirty men, fifteen from the patricians and five each from the weavers, fullers, and common guilds.546 However, the Council only held political power after the Revolt of 1477. Since the Burgundian dynasty had taken over rule in the Low Countries, the court had supported the rule of the Ypres textile barons. Moreover, Philip the Bold’s fatherin-law, Louis of Male, count of Flanders, had in 1380 assumed the right to appoint the Ypres aldermen, which he probably did in close collaboration with the oligarchic families. Although Philip the Bold returned the old privileges to the city in 1384, the Burgundian dukes kept their right to appoint the Ypres aldermen.547 To prevent abuse of power by ducal commissioners who were assigned to appoint the aldermen, Duke Philip the Good had in 1430 given the city some autonomy in the yearly elections of aldermen, in exchange, of course, for an annual monetary gift from the city and strict ducal control.548 In 1475 Charles the Bold rescinded that autonomy and set up a ducal commission to appoint the aldermen, who would serve three-year terms.549 On 8 February 1475 the new ordinance went into effect for the first time, and in spring 1477 these city boards were still in power. In view of the rebellious atmosphere of 1477, the close relationship between the Ypres oligarchy and ducal court was clearly one of the main reasons why the authority of this city regime was contested in the revolt. A few months before the institution of the new election procedure, Charles the Bold and his chancellor Guillaume Hugonet had imposed a new proportional division of the aides in the Ypres quarter. As a result of the approval of an aide of 127,000 riders in 1474, the contribution owed by the city of Ypres was reduced by half (from 8.58 percent to 4.31 percent of the total amount of the aide). The surrounding castellanies guaranteed payment of the remainder.550 In past years Ypres had often needed to ask for postponements of its aide payments because it did not have sufficient funds to pay its contribution, due to the weak economy of the city. By revising the older division schedule, the ‘Transport of Oudenburg’ of 1408, the court probably hoped that the Ypres quarter’s aides allotments would be paid more regularly. Naturally, the Ypres power holders had agreed to the new proportional division, and they may even have asked for the duke’s intervention. In the 1470s the city was in serious trouble financially, after taxes due from the city treasury had doubled under Charles the Bold.551 Ypres joined Bruges and Ghent in increasing indirect taxes to finance the duke’s wars. In 1470 the Ypres city government levied ‘cueilliotes ’ on sales of meat, fish, wood, cloth, wax, and saddles. In 1474 the tax on cloth was raised again.552 Because the Ypres power holders were members of the oligarchy, the decision to raise indirect taxes is not surprising. The oligarchy passed on the court’s higher expenses

546 Diegerick, Episode de l ’histoire, 440. 547 Prevenier, De leden en de staten, 271; Trio, Bestuursinstellingen van de stad, 338. 548 Blockmans, De volksvertegenwoordiging, 77–8; Van Leeuwen, De Vlaamse wetsvernieuwing, 219–25. 549 Ibidem, 230–1; Trio, Bestuursinstellingen van de stad, 340. The edition of the ducal ordinance of 17 January 1475 in Diegerick, Episode de l ’histoire, 464–7. 550 Blockmans, De volksvertegenwoordiging, 417–8. 551 14 % of the expenses of the city went to the court under Philip the Good and 27 % under Charles the Bold (Merlevede, Stad, vorst en schatkist, 573). 552 Ibidem, 249–50; Diegerick, Inventaire analytique, IV, 22; Mus, Pieter Lansaem, 67–9. 250

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to all inhabitants of Ypres, but the indirect taxes sharply impacted the budgets of the less wealthy, those who were not represented on the city boards. 3.3.2

The Revolt of 1477

The Ypres revolt of 1477 followed the same pattern as revolts in Bruges and Ghent, albeit with a slower timetable. While Ghent won its urban privilege in January 1477, and Bruges in March 1477, the Ypres revolt had yet to break out. The principal questions arising from the Ypres revolt are why violence broke out in Ypres only when the revolts in Ghent and Bruges were almost over, and why the court chose to repress revolt in Ypres and not in Bruges or Ghent. The next section will address the revolt of March through May 1477, to be followed by an analysis of the repression. Because the Ypres archives were destroyed in the First World War, sources are very scarce. Fortunately Pieter van de Letuwe, a fifteenth-century Ypres chronicler, described the revolt in detail. Pieter was a member of the Ypres oligarchy and held 25 terms of public office between 1451 and 1479.553 In his ‘Memorie ’, a chronicle of the revolt, he describes the actions of the rebels with a certain contempt. His disapproval of the revolt probably reflects a common attitude of those in the city’s small group of power holders, as they were victims of the revolt. In contrast to the Bruges and Ghent revolts in which the guilds formed coalitions with the urban elite, the revolt of 1477 did not receive support from the Ypres establishment. The first demand of the Ypres craft guilds after the political shift of January 1477 was for abolition of the indirect taxes. The city boards appointed by Charles the Bold in 1475 intended to lower these taxes, because the remainder of the aides owed to the late duke had been abolished. However, the city government did not want to go as far as abolishing the taxes, because the new Flemish Privilege had restored the ‘Transport of Oudenburg’ of 1408. This meant that Ypres again had to pay 8.58 percent of any future aides (see chapter 1). On 15 February 1477, when the Treaty of Gavere was publicly destroyed in Ghent, the craft guilds occupied the Great Market square of Ypres.554 They were probably inspired by their colleagues in Ghent and Bruges, as they referred to the rights won by the guilds in those cities at several points during their own uprising.555 The Ypres craft guilds won their first success in that demonstration, as the city government decided to abolish all taxes that had been levied to finance aides for Charles the Bold. Peace returned to Ypres for more than a month. The city power holders decided to elect new city boards, probably to counter other demands of the craft guilds. In January 1477 the Ypres city boards had already asked Mary of Burgundy to appoint new aldermen and councillors on 8 February. The court refused this demand on 31 January, on the grounds that Duke Charles the Bold had appointed the city boards in 1475 for a term of three years, making a new election unnecessary.556 One month later, after revolts had broken out in Ghent and Bruges, the court agreed to change the Ypres government, and on 26 February, new city boards were appointed without any 553 Diegerick, Episode de l ’histoire, 424–5. 554 Ibidem, 429. 555 See ibidem, 442 and Justice, La répression à Ypres, 28. 556 Mary and her councillors, ‘ayent instamment requis et suplié leur vouloir pour la plus grande seurté des choses dessusdites de decerner et commetre aulcun commissaires pour, au dit .viiie. jour de fevrier prochain venant, renouveller la dite loy ’, had refused this demand (Diegerick, Episode de l ’histoire, 467–9). 251

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specific demand from the craft guilds.557 The Ypres oligarchy had apparently decided to undo the 1475 ordinance of Charles the Bold, because the new city government was not appointed by a ducal commission. Four ducal officers appeared when the new city boards were presented to the public, but this was a traditional practice in all Flemish cities.558 Due to intervening events, these city boards did not remain in office for three years, but it seems that was never the intention. In the future the city boards were replaced annually. The Ypres oligarchy probably rescinded the ducal ordinance of 1475 to prevent unrest in the city. The composition of the new city boards demonstrates that the same socioeconomic group of power holders remained in office after 26 February 1477 (Table 8). Table 8: The Number of Terms of Office Held by Members of the City Boards of Ypres After 1470 and Before Appointment in 1475–78.559

City Boards

Number of Terms of Office

08/02/1475–25/02/1477

61

26/02/1477–21/05/1477

61

22/05/1477–07/02/1478

23

The renewal of the city boards on 26 February 1477 did not bring a change in the political background of Ypres government. The members of the new city boards had already served 61 terms of office before they were appointed as aldermen and councillors of Ypres in February 1477. There was a very high degree of continuity. The city boards of February 1477 had collectively served the same number of terms of office as their predecessors on the 1475 boards. Both city boards came from the same political group, as well as containing many of the same people. Ten men who had been an alderman or councillor in 1475 were again in office in 1477.560 Some aldermen and councillors on the city boards of February 1477 had never had sat on one of the city boards before, but their names suggest that they were related to the previous power holders.561 The same powerful families maintained their political control in Ypres after the election of the new city boards in February 1477. Even the bailiff of Ypres, Luc Thoenin, remained in office, unlike the bailiffs of Ghent and Bruges.562 The oligarchy of Ypres was not broken in February 1477, at least for the moment. 557 Ibidem, 469–70. 558 Filips van Heurne, the abbot of Ter Duinen, Wouter van der Gracht and the bailiff of Menen ( Jan Cabelliau) were present (GSAB: Rk., 38701, 77r). The first three persons mentioned were on the commission for renewal of Flemish magistracies which Mary of Burgundy appointed in early 1477 (see chapter 2). 559 Source: RL: M, 103, II. I only counted the offices of guardian, alderman, and councillor. 560 RL: M, 103, II (the lists of the three city boards in Table 8 are edited by Diegerick, Episode de l ’histoire, 429–32). Jan van Lichtervelde fs. Victor, Joos de Brievere, Joris de Witte, Victor de Waele, Jan Minne, Hector van de Woestijne, Joos Gilloen, Frans van der Poorte, Jan de Wilde, and Joris de Wilde were on the city boards of 1475 and of 1477. Sebastiaan van Menen was city receiver for both terms. 561 Victor van Lichtervelde, Wulfaert van Lichtervelde, Jan van Lichtervelde and Andries de Waele belonged to the families that had been in power for decades in Ypres. Four aldermen and councillors were ‘new’ (namely Jan Veynoot, Jan de Cardenaghele, Joris Gommer and Jacob van Rammecourt), but no documents survive to reconstruct their social background. Presumably they could not vote against the other power holders, even if they wanted to do. 562 Mus, Pieter Lansaem, 86. The former bailiff, Hector van Hollebeke, had been appointed on 20 September 1472 (Van Rompaey, Het grafelijk baljuwsambt, 630). He died in office on 1 October 1476 and the heirs of Laureins Thoenin had taken over his office. From the beginning of 1477 until 6 June 1477 Luc Thoenin, member of the city boards of February 1475, held this office (GSAB: Rk., 14550, 50r). 252

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Illustration 15: The Cloth Hall of Ypres before its Destruction in 1914 (Vandenpeereboom, Ypriana, I, xiv).

On 29 March 1477 the Ypres city government ordered the arrest of Pieter Cockuut, a fuller who had recently criticized the regime by spreading rumours in town. On Holy Thursday he was punished publicly in the Great Market square. This repressive action reveals the utter docility of the Ypres regime in early 1477, especially in contrast to events in Ghent. On the same Holy Thursday the city government of Ghent publicly executed the chancellor of Burgundy, and the Ypres government punished a powerless artisan for insulting the dynasty. The hangman put a hot iron bar through his tongue as punishment for spreading lies.563 But peace did not return to the city, and turmoil continued until 25 April, when the unrest exploded. According to chronicler Pieter van de Letuwe, ‘a lot of unknown people’, or ‘scoundrels’, forced their way into the city hall and started to smash the furniture.564 The intruders may have been inspired by events in Bruges, where the craft guilds had recently won a new urban privilege. The next day the Ypres craft guilds took up their banners and assembled on the Great Market square. Pieter van de Letuwe wrote that the city boards no longer had ‘any say or authority’. 565 The assembled crowd in the market square seized the city boards’ correspondence and leaders read the city accounts out to the crowd. The craft guilds demanded the restoration of the privileges they had received from Count Louis of Male, and later called a general strike. Ypres was in revolt. The leaders of the resistance are difficult to identify with any certainty. Under interrogation in December 1477, some rebels pointed out Robert van den Steene, the head dean of the ‘Besant’, as the leader of the rebellious craft guilds. The rebels may have implicated the head dean because he had fled the city by that time. Pieter van de Letuwe also wrote in his 563 ‘Pour certains ses mesparlers ’ (GSAB: Rk., 14550, 54r). See also Haemers, A moody community, 65–6 and Diegerick, Episode de l ’histoire, 432–3. 564 ‘Vele onbekents volcx ’, ‘gheboufte ’ (Diegerick, Episode de l ’histoire, 434–5). 565 Ibidem, 439. See also Van Leeuwen, De Vlaamse wetsvernieuwing, 232–4. 253

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chronicle that Robert van den Steene was charged with leading the revolt, but Pieter may have been blaming Robert because the city government needed a scapegoat. The craft guilds probably forced the head dean of the ‘Besant’ to be their leader, because they regarded the ‘Besant’ as a sign of their identity. The ‘Besant’ is etymologically derived from ‘(a)paisant ’, which means ‘bringing peace’. 566 The head dean of the ‘Besant’ was the keeper of peace and justice in the city, and he was charged with punishing those who broke the peace. The guild rebels may have thought that the head dean was a logical choice for leadership, for he would be punishing the corrupt politicians from the previous regime. On 26 April the craft guilds demanded that the flag of the count and the city be hung from the front of the Besant headquarters on the Great Market square, because ‘the Besant belonged to the common people and not to the city boards’. 567 The guilds were using the symbolic power of the Besant, and the authority of its head dean, to galvanize the city into granting their demands. The city government gave in to guilds’ demand to move the flag, but it did not restore the old privileges of the craft guilds. The conflict between challengers and power holders had reached an impasse. The craft guilds made a strategic move to force the city government to yield, which succeeded because of the assistance of the Burgundian court. Guild rebels broke into the artillery depot within the city, a strategic manoeuvre in the first place because it gave the guilds weapons they could use to threaten the city government. Unlike their colleagues in Ghent and Bruges, the Ypres guildsmen apparently did not have their own weapons, which meant that they needed the firepower. The move also deprived the city boards of the weapons they needed to decisively counter violent rebellion. Another strategic benefit was that the move impressed the court, particularly since Ypres was a city near the county’s border with France. When Philip de Crèvecoeur deserted to the French in March 1477, the French army made a strong push into southern Flanders.568 The threat of war inspired the resistance of the city’s inhabitants, and for the Burgundian court, Ypres was a significant city for the defence of the county. The court could not afford to allow the Ypres craft guilds to revolt because they needed to keep the city under the tight control of the commander of the Burgundian army. Since the craft guilds had appointed the head deans of the guilds and the Besant as captains of the city forces, the court had to negotiate with them. Shortly after the artillery depot action, guild representatives sent Joost Arends, a ducal secretary, to request a general pardon from Mary for the rebels’ violent deeds. On 14 May 1477 the court accepted the request of the Ypres craft guilds by granting a remission which not only absolved the craft guilds from punishment, but also opened the way for elections of new city boards in Ypres. The ducal pardon letter justified the revolt as a search for ‘justice, correction, and punishment’, as similar letters had done for the revolts in Ghent and Bruges.569 The Ypres craft guilds now began to arrest the former city leaders. Ten members of the city boards, including the chronicler Pieter van de Letuwe, were arrested and charged with corruption.570

566 Vandenpeereboom, Ypriana, I, 214. 567 ‘De voorseiden Besant, zo zy zeiden, behoorde toe den ghemeene ende niet der wet ’ (Diegerick, Episode de l ’histoire, 441). The ‘Besant’ headquarters was on the south end of the Great Market (Vandenpeereboom, Ypriana, I, 215). 568 See in Chapter 1 the lament of the receiver of the quarter of Ypres who wrote to the Chamber of Accounts of Lille to say that the region around Ypres had been severely damaged by French troops since 1477 (ADN: B 17729, ‘Comtables générales’). 569 ‘Justicien, correctie ende pugnicie ’ (edited by Diegerick, Episode de l ’histoire, 471–4). 570 Frans van der Poorte, Joos and Joris de Brievere, Joris de Witte, Pieter van Heysackere and Jan Colaert belonged to the city boards of February 1475. Victor van Lichtervelde, Joris Paelding and Victor van Volmersbeke were member of the city boards of February 1477. Together the 10 prisoners had held 40 terms of public office in the city from 1470 until 1477. 254

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The guilds did their part to secure the election, satisfied that they would have some voice in the composition of the new city boards. On the day before the renewal was scheduled, the craft guilds left the market square accompanied by bell ringing, and returned to work.571 The court sent four commissioners to Ypres to assist in the election, and on 22 May, for the second time in 1477, new aldermen and councillors were appointed. The registers of the Ypres aldermen contains the complaint that they had no influence on the election of the city boards, which were later labelled ‘the wrong city boards’. 572 Reconstructing the elections is difficult because of the lack of sources, but the names of the new aldermen and councillors strongly suggest that the craft guilds had much influence in choosing them. With a collective total of only 23 previous terms of office, the new aldermen and councillors had much less political experience than their predecessors (see Table 8). At least sixteen had no previous experience in politics and do not appear elsewhere in the surviving archives, suggesting that they were representatives of the craft guilds.573 Other aldermen and councillors who had sat on the city boards of 1475 (Christoffel Fagheel) and February 1477 (Victor de Waele and Jan Minne), were probably representatives of the patricians. The patricians did not lose all influence on the ‘wrong city boards’ of May 1477, as the appointment of Pieter Lansaem as councillor confirms, but their role was very restricted. It is most likely that the four Members of town (the patricians, the fullers, the weavers, and the common craft guilds) shared seats on the new city boards of May 1477, as had happened in Ghent and Bruges some months before. Consequently, the oligarchy that had ruled Ypres for many decades was broken in May 1477. The gap with the past was radical, but not complete, because the representatives of the patricians came from the Ypres oligarchy. Ypres did not have a complete changeover of leadership as Ghent did. There were also no vendettas among the Ypres urban elite in 1477, in contrast to Ghent. The revolt in Ypres was organised by the craft guilds without any support by the urban elite, which explains why the revolt of Ypres had a different intensity and course of development than the revolts in Bruges and Ghent. The new regime punished the former power holders, but not as severely as in Ghent and Bruges. The politicians who were charged with corruption had to pay fines – money which the city boards used to finance the war against France and fortification of the city.574 Moreover, the city government levied a new tax on property to substitute for the profits of the abolished indirect taxes. This direct tax was ‘just’ because it levied a fixed (but unknown) percentage rate on the property of every citizen, which meant that the rich oligarchs paid more money.575 This could be another sign that there was no coalition of the new power holders with an elite network, as was the case in Ghent and Bruges. The city boards only punished a few people physically, such Roeland van Diksmuide who was interrogated with torture.576 But in contrast to Bruges and Ghent, there were no executions in Ypres. Instead,

571 Diegerick, Episode de l ’histoire, 451. 572 The ‘haefsche of verkeerde wet ’ (Ibidem, 451). 573 Namely Willem Bouderave, Hendrik Ritsaert, Frans de Storm, Hendrik Bateman, Jan Cabilliau fs. Jacob, Pieter de Wulf, Engelbert van Suyxgate, Pieter Buedin, Blasius Doemeniet, Paulus Debuysere, Jacob Bestkin, Frans de Hondt, Guy van den Kerchove, Willem Malfeyt, Hendrik van der Stichelen, and Malin de Vos. Because Andries Paelding and Jan de Wilde were common names shared by several contemporaries, their careers was impossible to reconstruct. 574 Diegerick, Episode de l ’histoire, 461–2. 575 Merlevede, Stad, vorst en schatkist, 173–4. 576 Diegerick, Episode de l ’histoire, 460; GSAB: Rk., 38701, 86r. 255

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the city boards punished the condemned politicians with unusual economic measures. Some were forbidden to produce cloth in great quantity in the future. Joris de Brievere, for example, was released on 4 August 1477 after he paid a fine and on the condition that he could only produce cloth from eight sacks of wool each year.577 This punishment supports the conclusion that some members of the Ypres oligarchy had grown wealthy from cloth production, as it certainly demonstrates the frustration of the craft guilds with the elites of the textile trade. The craft guilds doubtless hoped to increase their production by restricting the output of others. The success of these unique restrictions is unknown but very doubtful. In the next few years power relations in the city shifted again, and the economic punishment of major cloth producers probably hurt the Ypres economy. With so many wealthy cloth producers forced to limit their production drastically, the clothworkers and even the craft guilds likely felt the disastrous consequences of the economic isolation of those who had supported the Ypres economy in the preceding decades. Some of the craft guilds also had other economic demands. The Ypres ‘Memorie ’ chronicle describes a conflict between the weavers and their journeymen over wages, and a strike by the fullers on 8 June 1477.578 After fullers from Bruges and Courtrai had negotiated between the city government and the Member of the Ypres fullers, the strike was suspended. The chronicle does not explain the reasons for the strike, but some of the fullers’ demands may have originated in the economic climate of Ypres, because leading entrepreneurs in the cloth industry had to cut wages if they wanted to be competitive in the textile market.579 Wage reductions and similar measures also explain why the fullers in Ypres played a leading role in the revolt of 1477. Pieter Cockuut, the man whose arrest was the immediate cause for the revolt, was a fuller. While more research is needed on the economic background of the Ypres craft guilds, it seems that the craft guilds used the Revolt of 1477 to improve their economic conditions. The craft guilds were primarily driven to revolt because they did not have the political power to change economic and fiscal policy. After being excluded from power for decades, the Ypres craft guilds finally had the opportunity to change power relations in the city. They had gained political power and their representatives sat on the city boards. But for how long? 3.3.3

The Repression of the Revolt of 1477

The Ypres revolt was the only uprising of 1477 which was punished by the court. Once the Burgundian dynasty had restored its authority in the fall of 1477, the court was ready to target those who were responsible for the political turmoil in Ypres. Because Maximilian of Austria and his supporters clearly intended the city’s punishment to serve as an example for Bruges and Ghent, Ypres may have became the victim of the court’s frustration with the revolts of 1477. Although Mary of Burgundy had forgiven the rebellious deeds of the spring on 14 May 1477, on 20 November Maximilian of Austria ordered the Ypres city boards to punish those responsible for the revolt.580 It is also possible that the former power holders of the city had asked Maximilian to punish 577 578 579 580 256

Diegerick, Episode de l ’histoire, 462. Ibidem, 463. Brand & Stabel, De ontwikkeling van vollerslonen, 222. Diegerick, Inventaire analytique, IV, 37–8; Justice, La répression à Ypres, 14.

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their enemies when the court visited the town in October 1477.581 The current Ypres city boards protested heavily against the archduke’s order, even warning the court that the city planned to file suit before the Great Council. The regime argued that the ducal pardon of May 1477 had absolved the city of all crimes committed during the spring. Moreover, the privileges of the city prohibited the formation of a special commission to punish the city’s inhabitants.582 Despite these arguments, the main reason for the regime’s protest was more immediately political. On the city boards the craft guilds were the leading faction, and they were not about to punish those who had been responsible for their rise to power. The city boards likely included many friends and relatives of the rebels of 1477 as well as sympathizers, and some rebel leaders may have actually been appointed as alderman or councillor in May 1477. The ducal ordinance put the city boards in an awkward position. But the city government cleverly made a virtue of necessity by deciding to initiate an official investigation into the revolt of 1477, an investigation which would determine that no charges against citizens were warranted. The investigation commission of the Ypres city boards interrogated 27 witnesses and delivered their final report in December 1477 – and it has survived.583 Most of the witnesses had either played a visible role in the revolt, or had carried out orders from the rebel leaders, like carrying a flag, while the leaders of the revolt were clearly not interrogated. The majority of the witnesses were either noncommittal or denied any personal involvement in the revolt. When the commission asked who had initiated the violent actions of 25 April 1477, the witnesses avoided clear answers. Most of the witnesses said that they had seen the head dean of the Besant, Robert van den Steene, carrying the flag of the city of Ypres, but, as the secretary of the commission wrote concerning the testimony of Joris Gommer, ‘he does not know who had given the order to carry the flag’. 584 Every witness pointed at Robert van den Steene as the sole initiator of the revolt. As Hector van den Woestijne put it, Robert van den Steene was the ‘main cause and initiator of the turmoil’, for he had said ‘Who other than me has command over the people?’ while at a drunken revel during the revolt.585 Because the leaders of the revolt were both the targets and investigators, the commission of December 1477 did not charge any inhabitants of Ypres. Moreover, their report absolved all citizens from any kind of crime, except for the head dean of the Besant, Robert van den Steene, identified as the man who had started the revolt. Under interrogation, the witnesses argued that entire responsibility for the revolt was in his hands, and not in the hands of those who had carried out his bid for power. But because Robert van den Steene had fled from the city, no one could be punished. Moreover, the city boards of May 1477 argued that the revolt of 1477 had been a quest for justice. The head dean of the Besant had intended to punish the politicians who had governed the city incorrectly in the past. A search for justice did not merit punishment. Collective punishment of the city, or even individual punishments for rebels, would be unjust because the ‘evil’ leader 581 The court visited Ypres from 16 to 20 October (GSAB: Rk., 38701, 86r; Vander Linden, Itinéraires de Marie de Bourgogne, 21). 582 Diegerick, Inventaire analytique, IV, 38. 583 Edited by Justice, La répression à Ypres. 584 ‘Uut wiens mouvement dat hijt [Robert van den Steene] dede, en weet hij [ Joris Gommer] niet ’ (ibidem, 35). 585 He was the ‘principale cause ende upset van der beroerte ’. He reportedly said, ‘Qui a la charge du commun que moy? ’ (ibidem, 45–6). 257

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had already fled the city. Besides, the court had already forgiven all crimes that might have happened during this search for justice. With this justification, the investigation put a seal of approval on the current political arrangements in the city. It legitimized the power of the craft guilds, and freed them of any charges, so that they could continue to govern unhindered. From ducal point of view, the investigation of December 1477 was useless, and for the city boards it was an unanticipated victory. However, in the following year the political situation in Ypres changed drastically, as the lists of the aldermen from 1478 until the death of Mary of Burgundy show. The city boards were filled with the same people who had governed the city during Charles the Bold’s reign. When the city boards were renewed in February 1478, for example, many members of Ypres oligarchy returned to power. Although there are no accounts that can be used to reconstruct this shift, it seems clear that the craft guilds had lost the ability to appoint aldermen. They may have retained a voice in the election procedure, but this voice was not dominant, because only five people from the ‘wrong city boards’ of May 1477 sat on the new boards.586 Many patricians became aldermen or councillors, and among them were eight out of the nine politicians who had been imprisoned by the craft guilds in 1477.587 The city boards of 1478 included both supporters and opponents of the Ypres oligarchy, but in the next few years, the oligarchs increased their control. The prisoners of 1477 held lead positions on every set of city boards appointed during Mary’s reign. Collectively these former prisoners served 36 terms of city office from 1478 until 1482. Pieter van de Letuwe, for example, was councillor in 1478 and 1480, alderman in 1479 and 1481, and member of the Council of Notable Citizens (‘notabele poorters ’) in 1482. Pieter Lansaem was alderman in 1482, councillor in 1480, member of the Council of Notable Citizens in 1479, and member of the Council of 27 in 1481.588 The position of the head dean of the Besant was sold in 1478 to Jan de Wale (normally this was a life-long position, but Robert van den Steene was no longer welcome). Jan de Wale, a member of a wealthy Ypres family, would be in charge of the Besant until 1488.589 The political influence of the craft guilds faded away more and more each year. A new attempt to seek out and punish those responsible for the revolt of 1477, which met with more success than its predecessor, confirms this conclusion. On 12 October 1478 Maximilian of Austria sent a delegation of seven officials to the city, under the leadership of Philip de Croÿ, Count of Porcien, with orders to repeat the investigation of December 1477.590 In collaboration with Maximilian’s travelling Great Council, this commission was sent to punish the principal initiators of the revolt of 1477. The craft guilds were not able to prevent the commission from carrying out its mandate. In sharp contrast to their immediate predecessors, the aldermen of 1478 did not challenge the ducal commission or its conclusions. On 20 March 1479 the commission announced that 17 586 Jan Minne, Christoffel Fagheel, Olivier Belle, Lamsin Lanczwaert, and Jacob de Brouckere (RL: M, 103, II). 587 Joris de Witte, Joris en Joos de Brievere, Pieter van de Letuwe, Pieter van Heysackere, Jan Colaert, Frans van der Poorte, and Victor van Volmersbeke (RL: M, 103, II). 588 Mus, Pieter Lansaem, 62; RL: M 103, II. 589 ‘Son office [était] vendu en novembre 1478 parce qu ’il s ’est rendu coupable de rebellion ’ (KB, M, 103, II). A note from 1488 mentions that he resigned on 17 January 1488 (‘den .xviien. dach van laumaent anno .lxxxvii. so resignerde Jan de Wale tofficie van den hooftmansceipe ’). On 28 January 1488 Joos de Brievere bought the office (RL: M 107, I, 116–7). 590 The other members of the commission were Daneel van Praet, Jan van Halewyn (captain of Ypres), Joost van Cortewille (baillif of Ypres), Gillis van den Bossche (the receiver of the quarter of Ypres), Gillis Ghiselin and ducal secretary Jacob Heyman ( Justice, La répression à Ypres, 46). 258

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people should be banished, 16 punished symbolically, and one executed publicly. The city government carried out the punishments and even increased the assigned punishments for four of the victims in November 1479.591 In contrast to December 1477, the court succeeded in punishing the Ypres rebels, thanks to the thorough cooperation of the Ypres oligarchy. The ducal commission awarded punishments in a very tactical manner, in the style favoured by many medieval governments.592 It condemned those who had played a visible role in the revolt to exemplary punishments. Shoemaker Andries Boetin, for example, (‘a thoughtless fool’, according to the ‘Memorie ’) had jerked the flag of the city of Ypres out of the hands of the Guardian after the renewal of the city boards on 22 May 1477.593 The commission condemned Andries to eternal banishment from the city. Pieter Cockuut, whose shouting had started the revolt, was also banished.594 Michiel van der Meersh had spoken ‘bad words’ (‘mauvaises parolles ’) about the aldermen and, according to the commission’s report, he had been an agitator who stirred people to revolt. His symbolic punishment was to be conveyed in a cart through city during the annual procession for St. Martin. After that, he was to hold a candle and kneel before the altar in the St. Martin’s church and beg for forgiveness.595 This punishment was not only designed to demonstrate to every spectator that the revolt of 1477 was wrong, but also to condemn the revolt as a ‘sin’ which needed to be expiated by a religious penance. With these public humiliations the court and the Ypres power holders punished the rebels whose actions remained in the memories of the inhabitants of the city. Their punishment made clear to everyone that such actions would not be tolerated in the future. The semi-religious character of this kind of propaganda made the political message clear to every inhabitant, as it legitimated, once more, the power of a repressive urban government. A second purpose of the ducal commission was to locate the driving force behind the revolt of 1477. In its investigation, the commission identified several culprits, ‘principaulx mouveurs ’ or ‘mauvais conducteurs ’, who had led the opposition against the Ypres oligarchy in 1477. The commission had located a document which indicted Wouter van den Ackere as one of the main agitators of the revolt.596 The commission concluded that Wouter, a messenger for the city, had joined the craft guilds when the revolt started. Carrying weapons, he had entered and then occupied the city hall on 25 April, and on horseback, he had joined the assembled craft guilds on the Market square. The leaders of the revolt met in his house, and, the report continued, he threatened to punish the nine prisoners from the previous regime personally if the craft guilds did not do so.597 The commission also convicted Frans Rijckewaert and Pieter Ghiselin for organising meetings of the representatives of the craft guilds. The three were denounced as the driving force behind the occupation of the city hall, the assembly of the craft guilds on the Great Market

591 Ibidem, 66–8. 592 Compare with the repression of the Ypres revolt of 1428–9 (Diegerick, Les drapiers yprois, 293–300; Dumolyn, The legal repression, 497–520). 593 ‘Een onbedocht zot ’ (Diegerick, Episode de l ’histoire, 453). 594 Justice, La répression à Ypres, 50–1. 595 Ibidem, 58–9. 596 The commission concluded: ‘que par tout, il a esté des plus rigoreux ’ (Ibidem, 54). 597 ‘Les notables et constituez prisonniers par les communes ne feussent pugniz, Il seroit plustost lui mesme le bourreau ’ said Wouter van den Ackere (Ibidem, 55). 259

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square, and the accusations against leaders of the previous regime.598 Together with three other men who had slandered the city boards of February 1477, the three accused of leading the revolt were banished by the court, rather than the city. This banishment was more than a symbolic punishment. It was designed to refute the resistance to the Ypres oligarchy and remove both proven and ‘potential’ rebels from the city. But the repression of the rebels of 1477 was not thoroughly vindictive. Many of those condemned were given only symbolic punishments, and others were not punished at all. Lodewijk Bariseel, for example, had spoken seditious words during the revolt, but he was not punished because ‘of his poverty and age’. 599 By meting out ‘fair justice’, the Ypres oligarchy could preserve its authority, whereas strict repression might provoke new turmoil. The ducal commission clearly did not want to fuel political discord in the city which might set off a new spiral of violence. The only person executed was Lammekin de Mesmaeker who had threatened Bailiff Luc Thoenin during the revolt, an offense to ducal authority which the commission would not tolerate. Moreover, Lammekin had brought the artillery into the Great Market square, which had added to the potential danger of the situation, the report of the ducal commission charged.600 Last but not least, Lammekin had murdered two or three people in recent years, and he was unrepentant. Since that crime alone would have merited execution under any contemporary regime, the city government was promoting the idea that justice and peace would rule the city in the future. The repression of 1479 was aimed at punishing political resistance against the regime in a symbolic and ritualistic manner, but also at banishing the opposition from the city. The Ypres oligarchy tried to restore order and perhaps win general support for punishment of the rebels, some of whom were condemned as criminals. The oligarchs were quite successful, because their rule was not contested in the following years. The close collaboration between the Ypres oligarchy and the court lasted until the death of Mary of Burgundy. In contrast to Ghent and Bruges, Ypres approved every aide the archduke requested from the Members of Flanders during his wife’s lifetime. The city used its good relationship with the court to obtain reductions in its share of the aides payments.601 Ypres remained loyal to Maximilian, even when Bruges and Ghent protested against the archduke’s policy. Maximilian had to change the city boards of Bruges in September 1481 to get his gigantic aide request of December 1481 approved, while in Ypres such a move was unnecessary. When Bruges had finally approved the aide in January 1481, Ypres followed immediately.602 Ypres was also the exception in the Members in Flanders in 1482. When Mary of Burgundy died, no one in the city contested the regime. Two days after her death, the city government received a letter from Maximilian asking that Ypres not to change its city boards.603 The Ypres regime remained loyal and, in contrast to 598 About Pieter Ghiselin: ‘il fut l ’un de ceulx qui poursuirent l ’abolicion de la cueillote, [et qui] tousiours avoir esté l ’un des principaulx solliciteurs. Il porta la parolle a l ’assemblee qui se fit le jour de Pasques flories quant ils voldrent ravoir Pieter Cockuut. Item, l ’un de ceulx qui firent l ’assemblee pour aller à la salle où il fist rompre serures, huys et fenestres… ’. Frans Rijckewaert ‘est chargié d ’estre des pires du hoc, et en toutes communications du commun, avoir esté fort aigre ’ (ibidem, 56–7). 599 ‘Pour cause de sa poverté, qu ’il est ancien homme et que aucun fait n ’est enfreny a sa cause ’ (ibidem, 60). 600 Ibidem, 47. 601 See, for example, Blockmans, Handelingen van de leden, 53 and idem, De volksvertegenwoordiging, 625 (note 71)). To pay these aides the city again introduced indirect taxes on meat, fish and wood (Merlevede, Stad, vorst en schatkist, 250). 602 SAG: V3, 243, 34; Blockmans, Handelingen van de leden, 203. 603 Although ‘ulieden staten vacqueren ende machten gheexpireert zijn ’, Maximilian asked if ‘ghij ende elc van ulieden evvenverre [sic] dat hem angaet, continueere in de exercucie van uwen staten ende officien als ghij ghedaen hebt ’ (SAG: RV, 175, 40). 260

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Bruges, there was no protest from political opponents. The oligarchy ruled the city with an iron hand, proof that the repression of 1479 had been productive. 3.3.4

Conclusion: Comparison with Ghent and Bruges

Ypres was the only city of the Three Members of Flanders which did not receive an urban privilege in 1477. The city faced a revolt by the craft guilds in spring 1477, which followed the pattern of the revolts in the other Flemish cities. In all three Revolts of 1477, the rebels tried to reverse the policies of the urban elites who had ruled the cities in close collaboration with Charles the Bold. Leaders of the craft guilds gained political participation during the revolt and dominated the election of new city boards. But in contrast to Bruges and Ghent, the political effects of the Ypres revolt of 1477 were very limited in the long term. The craft guilds could not maintain the position they won in 1477. Their opponents, the Ypres oligarchs, were too resilient. Those who had ruled Ypres before 1477 returned to rule again in 1478. An even greater contrast was that the leaders of the Ypres revolt were later punished. Until the end of Mary’s reign the city remained a loyal supporter of the archduke’s policies. While the resistance against the autocratic policy of Maximilian of Austria increased in Bruges and Ghent, Ypres was characterized by a remarkable political peace. Why was there such a difference in ‘rebelliousness’ between Ypres and her sister cities? First, the economic background of Ypres was starkly different from that of Bruges and Ghent. The smallest of the Three Members had not adapted well to the new economic situation in the fifteenth century, especially the transformation of the textile industry. Although there are insufficient sources to reconstruct the financial and economic position of the Ypres craft guilds, it is clear that they were not as powerful as those in Ghent and Bruges. In Bruges and Ghent, the craft guilds had weapons and could finance the mobilization of troops. In Ypres the guilds had no weapons, and lacked the financial resources to rebel. The craft guilds had little political experience, and did not have the resources, either of economic or financial power, to fight the oligarchy. The Ypres oligarchy controlled the textile industry, while the guildsmen were wage labourers dependent on wealthy entrepreneurs. As a consequence the economic position of the craft guilds weakened during the fifteenth century. A second factor was that the social basis of the political resistance in Ypres was much narrower than in Ghent and Bruges, because there was no faction of the elite which joined the craft guilds in the revolt. In Ghent and Bruges a rebel elite faction fought other elite factions which had backed Charles the Bold because the duke’s war policies had made him enemies among the urban elite. In Ypres, however, no faction from the urban elite joined the revolt. Charles the Bold had strengthened the power of the city’s oligarchy in the decades preceding the revolt. The urban elite was not prepared to contest the authority of the dynasty which had favoured their political dominance. Charles the Bold had even created the legal framework for the oligarchy’s control over Ypres. The abolition in 1475 of annual elections for the aldermen confirmed the political domination of the textile barons and the landowners in Ypres. Maximilian and his court continued that policy of favouring the small city’s oligarchy. The archduke’s monetary and fiscal policies weakened the economic position of the urban elite in Bruges and Ghent because they damaged 261

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international trade. In Ypres the oligarchs never protested the Maximilian’s war policy. Apparently the Ypres power holders had more to gain than they had to lose in cooperating with the court. A third factor is that the socio-economic changes of the Late Middle Ages had extinguished the tradition of rebellion in the city of Ypres. In contrast to Bruges and Ghent, the Ypres craftsmen did not have the recent memory of a revolt against the Burgundian dynasty. After the revolts of 1449–53 and 1467, rival factions within the Ghent elite waited for the opportunity to fight the regime which had been installed by the Burgundian dynasty. In Bruges the revolt of 1477 was very similar to the revolt of 1436–38. The tradition of revolt in Ypres, however, had been seriously watered down by the long political calm in the city. The revolt of 1428–9 was very short, and it had not built up tensions as high as the tensions that built up in Bruges and Ghent. A successful repression in 1429 had extinguished the (small) seeds of rebellion. The revolt of 1477 was repressed in a similar way. The leaders of the revolt were banished, and a ritualised punishment was enacted to wipe out the mental traces of the revolt. In 1477, Ypres did not have a tradition of revolt as Ghent and Bruges did. Economic, social, political causes and even cultural factors explain why the Ypres craft guilds did not obtain an urban privilege in 1477.

262

Conclusion

Ung homme de bien de son office […] ne doit tant seullement aymer le bien de la chose publicque, mais de toute sa puissance la doibt acquerir.1 This study has examined the rise of political tensions during the reign of Mary of Burgundy in the county of Flanders. It was a turbulent reign because the court, the nobles, and citizens fought for political power in the county. All parties argued that they were defending ‘the common good’ of all inhabitants of the county (‘le bien de la chose publicque ’, as a Ghent clerk wrote in the above quotation). But all of them interpreted this notion differently. The court claimed that promoting the welfare of the dynasty was in the public interest. The nobility defended its privileges by evoking their service to the county in times of need. The cities thought their privileges were essential for the wealth of the county because they provided for the county’s economic welfare. In the cities the craft guilds thought they were the driving force behind urban trade, while the merchants probably thought the same. All these interpretations of the ‘common good’ idea show every political player tried to convince the others that his own interests were the common interests of everyone in the county. The ideological weapon of the ‘common good’ was deployed to persuade others to fulfil the interests of a single group in the society. When city aldermen governed the city ‘in the name of the common good’, they were primarily trying to meet the needs of the group they represented on the city boards. Sometimes these decisions were for the benefit of other groups as well, but sometimes they were not. It is not the task of the historian to evaluate the politics of power holders, but instead he or she looks at the motivations and reasons for their actions and evaluates the outcomes. In this study I have given explanations or ranges of possible explanations for the behaviour of the major politicians of Mary’s reign, at court, among the nobility, and in the cities. This research is not intended to offer value judgements, but rather to determine why people rebelled, why they repressed the rebellions of others, and why they did not fulfil the ‘common good’ of everyone when they ascended to power.

1 Annotation of a medieval hand on a folio of the registers of the Ghent alderman of the Gedeele, in the middle of the year 1485–86 (CAG: 330, register 37). 263

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Illustration 16: Tombs of Charles the Bold and Mary of Burgundy in the Church of Our Lady in Bruges (Bruges Museum).

On 5 January 1477 Charles the Bold was killed at the Battle of Nancy. The political reaction of his subjects in the county of Flanders was violent and rational at the same time. Nobles, merchants, and craftsmen were able to abolish the detested policies of the late duke and his cronies. Charles the Bold had used autocratic methods to increase the central state’s monopoly on violence and revenues. He hoped that a strong central state would strengthen his position in international politics, and especially on the battlefield. But he failed. Not only did he fall victim in one of his own wars, but he and his local sympathizers lost trustworthiness in the eyes of the county’s majority. The state structure did not adequately respect the rights and traditions of noble and urban groups in society. The severe repression of political opponents had created enemies in the county’s major cities, enemies who used the death of the duke to remove his supporters from power. Some did not survive the brief but violent revolts in the most important Flemish cities of Ghent, Bruges, and Ypres. However, the response to the duke’s death was more than just violent. A more rational reaction actually preceded the outburst of violence. In the cities and even at court previously invisible coalitions of craftsmen, merchants and nobles arose with the mission of changing court policies. The Great and the Flemish Privileges of 11 February 1477 established a new kind of government in the Low Countries. Based on the principles of political participation and corporatism, the privileges of 1477 converted the EstatesGeneral into an institution that would check and balance the monetary, economic, financial, and even foreign policies of the ruler. The privileges guaranteed freedom of commerce, fair justice, reliable government, and respect for the traditions and rights of subjects. The 264

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Burgundian dynasty had to grant these privileges in order to preserve itself and gain the military and financial support of the Estates in the war against its eternal rival, the king of France. The subjects of the dynasty rationally supported this war because it resisted a ruler who did not intend to respect the privileges the citizens had legally won. But the political dream of the Estates-General ended abruptly. Once the common goal of correcting governmental policy was achieved, the united front of the Estates-General disintegrated. Lack of a tradition of supra-regional decision-making, the great social differences among members of the resistance to Charles the Bold, and quarrels over local and regional interests paralysed the actions of the Estates-General. In this central institution, in every region, and even in the cities, political discontent arose. In Flanders, for example, the urban craft guilds obtained a political role in two of the major cities, Ghent and Bruges, but not in Ypres. In contrast to the other Members of Flanders, Ypres did not have a permanent coalition of craft guilds and urban elites during Mary’s reign. Ypres never contested the autocratic policy of the new count, Archduke Maximilian of Austria. The belligerent archduke found another political ally in the powerful nobility of the Franc of Bruges. Because the Bruges craft guilds had deprived the Franc of its political power over the countryside around Bruges, the nobles of the Franc supported Maximilian in his efforts to restrict Bruges dominance over the Franc. According to the ‘king mechanism’ of Norbert Elias, Maximilian used the support of these allies to counter the resistance of his principal adversaries, the urban elites of Bruges and Ghent. Consequently, two of the four Members of Flanders (namely the city of Ypres, and the Franc of Bruges), which had approved the Great and the Flemish Privileges in February 1477, afterwards chose the side of a sovereign who intended to negate the restrictions of those privileges. The internal disunity among the Members of Flanders made the political front against the autocratic politics of court collapse. As the new duke of Burgundy, Maximilian of Austria fell short of expectations in 1477. When he arrived in the Low Countries, he did not have the resources to win the war against the French invaders. For the Habsburg dynasty the strategic alliance with Mary of Burgundy was only intended to strengthen Habsburg ‘Hausmacht ’ in the Holy Roman Empire. The interests of the archduke’s subjects and their new ruler naturally conflicted sharply. Moreover, the fundamental political weakness of the Burgundian dynasty, inflicted by the restrictions of the 1477 privileges, made the central state vulnerable to the political aspirations of other powerful groups, such as the nobility at court or the officials in the central state institutions of the Low Countries. Some nobles chose the French alternative in 1477, because the French king was able to guarantee the preservation of those nobles’ patrimonies. But other nobles took advantage of dynastic weakness to move into powerful positions at court. The extensive power of Adolph of Cleves, Louis of Bruges, Wolfert of Borssele, and their supporters during the initial years of Mary of Burgundy’s reign angered other nobles and officials at court. By 1481 the court was deeply divided into several opposing factions. Maximilian had to support the interests of central officials and nobles who could and would assist the dynasty in its never-ending search for money, in exchange for ducal favours. Not surprisingly, Adolph of Cleves and his supporters chose to ally themselves with the political alternative offered by the Flemish cities after Mary’s death. During the period from 1477 to 1482, Maximilian lacked enough ‘state capital’ to govern the county of Flanders. In the first place, he did not possess enough social capi265

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tal in the cities. In 1477 Ghent had eliminated court sympathizers, both politically and physically. The court still had some supporters in Bruges and Ypres, but in none of the cities did the court have trusted social networks which were both deeply rooted in urban society and reliably committed to the court. Maximilian lacked economic capital as well. The privileges of 1477 had decreased the revenues of the court, and the aides awarded by the Members of Flanders were tied up in restrictions. Fortunately for Maximilian, he could rely on the revenues from other regions. But because Flanders was the wealthiest of the regions, any policy he pursued would become ephemeral if the county refused to pay aides. Maximilian did not have enough money to wage the war against France, and income from the domain would not begin to pay for the kind of state government Maximilian wanted to lead. Maximilian, like the Burgundian dukes before him, bought the loyalty of officials and nobles with money, presents, and titles, in what is called bastard feudalism. This was an effective but expensive strategy and dangerous to Maximilian, since he did not have the financial resources to pay for it. Nor did the court have the resources to pay for the Joyous Entries, the propaganda, the art, and other displays put on by the Burgundian theatre state, which meant that the dynasty lost symbolic capital as well. Moreover, Maximilian was not a Valois duke, but a Habsburg prince. He did not descend directly from either the dukes of Burgundy or the counts of Flanders. When Mary died unexpectedly, Maximilian lost the authority to govern the county. He lacked the symbolic capital to legitimize his continued rule. Consequently, political alternatives to his regime were able to gain significant support, especially because they also had a strong tradition of political resistance, resources to mount opposition to the court, and well-founded reasons to convince others to join them. Urban resistance to the rule of Maximilian of Austria did not come into being because of Mary’s death, but had already grown tremendously in the last years of her reign. In 1481 the Members of Flanders had already restricted the financial resources of the court. In 1477 the Members demanded an extensive role in deciding how the aides they awarded to the court would be spent. If Maximilian wanted to make decisions independently, he had to find the money elsewhere. To do this, he violated the privileges of 1477, extracted revenues from other regions, and took out huge loans from foreign merchants. As a result, the state ruled over the county in a more autocratic manner than the privileges of 1477 allowed. The monetary reforms, the archduke’s aggressive war policy, commercial losses due to the war, and infringements of local rights and privileges gave rise to protest among the leading factions in Ghent and Bruges. However, Maximilian and his court ignored the growing protests, even when the protests came from nobles and state administrators. Slowly but surely, the rule of Maximilian of Austria began to resemble the rule of Charles the Bold. Craftsmen, merchants, nobles, and officials who would no longer accept the archduke’s war policy joined forces during 1481. By the end of that year, Maximilian had to resort to murdering opponents, imprisoning officials, replacing aldermen, and violating urban privileges to preserve his authority. When Duchess Mary died, Maximilian of Austria lost his legitimacy to exercise power, but he had already lost the trust and confidence of numerous subjects in the preceding years. Maximilian was not alone when he tried to expand the power of the central state. There were those in the county of Flanders who allied themselves with the court. Maximilian preferred a centralised state apparatus, in which the ruler commanded a monopoly on violence and on levying taxes. In reality, this monopoly was never complete, because taxes 266

Conclusion

were collected locally, financial techniques to govern revenues and expenses were primitive, and medieval administration was rudimentary. Because the state structure was underdeveloped, the ruler had to parcel out central authority to trusted supporters and itinerant officials who exercised some of the state monopoly on violence and taxation at the local level. The ruler thus had to decentralise the monopoly on violence and taxation, in exchange for maintaining his own powerful position. However, the ruler would only tolerate power that descended directly from the centre. He would not accept political participation by representatives of the corporations in the county. Only his local confidants could influence state politics. Some of these confidants were ‘parvenus’, talented accountants or jurists from relatively humble origins. From their personal relationships of trust with Maximilian, they could afford a better and even luxurious standard of living. The social position of these parvenus did not depend on the privileges of 1477, making them an ideal lever for the archduke to use to break the power of the traditional elites in the county. The economic capital of the parvenus and other court officials depended on the revenues of the central treasury, which encouraged them to support the archduke’s desire to govern the county autocratically. The symbolic capital of the state legitimized the prominent social position of Maximilian’s loyal supporters. Their own social capital was concentrated at the court, because it was the centre of their social networks. Urban autonomy not only undermined the social position of the ruler, but also the status of his confidants. Those nobles and officials that allied with Maximilian supported his rule out of self-interest, an element of bastard feudalism. However, their interests had to be fulfilled within the imperfect central state structure governed by the Habsburg-Burgundian dynasty. Maximilian found political supporters at court, and also within the Flemish cities. Factions among the urban elites were prepared to recognize the political supremacy of the court in the decision-making process of the state. Some wealthy urban merchants detested the idea of political participation by the urban craft guilds. In Bruges the economic elite had collaborated with Charles the Bold in order to govern the city without a political role for the guilds. They must have believed that this type of urban government was best for their economic endeavours, because once Maximilian took over rule of the city in the fall of 1481, these merchants again supported his autocratic style of government. The Ypres oligarchs pursued a similar agenda because they prohibited the craft guilds from participating in politics after 1478. They became allies of Maximilian when he tried to limit the voice of the craft guilds in the expenditure of aides. Both in Bruges and Ypres, wealthy merchants preferred an oligarchic city government, supported by the court, and were willing to fund the dynasty’s wars in exchange. Adherents to this policy were attacking the major principle of corporatism, the right of civic corporations to political participation in city government. During Mary’s reign, Bruges merchants were divided on this point, because some of them chose to make a coalition with the craft guilds. There were also groups who supported the federal model of government, which dispersed the state monopoly on violence to lower power groups composed of permanent or temporary representatives of corporate groups. Gaining a political role for these corporations was the main reason why urban craft guilds, certain merchants, and factions of the urban elites defended the privileges of 1477 during Mary’s reign. For example, without the urban privileges of 1477 the craft guilds would have lost the political and economic rights they had gained in the revolt after Charles the Bold’s death. The privileges gave the guilds 267

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some control over the economic and fiscal policies of the city governments. The privileges even let the craft guilds control production in the city and the countryside. However, the privileges were not ‘democratic’, because they only confirmed the power of the existing hierarchy within the craft guilds. Almost all guilds were governed by members of the middle class or the urban elite, and only those guild leaders could participate in city or state politics. Suppression of the more radical demands of common craftsmen, political propaganda, and permanent fiscal pressure on less wealthy groups in society kept the coalition between the representatives of the craft guilds and the urban elite at the helm. Nevertheless, the majority of guild members supported the policies of the coalition, because it was preferable to the rule of the archduke’s supporters. A federal view of the state and corporatism went hand in hand with urban autonomy. The Bruges craft guilds and the Ghent urban elite both stubbornly defended the autonomy of their cities. In Ghent, some patrician families had a tradition of rebelling for the political autonomy of the city. Even nobles joined the Ghent opposition to the autocratic policy of Charles the Bold and Maximilian of Austria. The Ghent nobility was socially interwoven with the city’s patrician families, and they followed the allegiances of their relatives and friends. Ghent politics were very similar to city-state politics, but Ghent citizens always recognized the need to maintain central authority in the county. A central institution was needed to organize county defence and establish a common monetary policy for its subjects. But according to Ghent federalists, the state should not interfere in local politics, and it needed to be checked and balanced by local authorities. These beliefs deepened the seriousness of Ghent’s conflict with Maximilian when he tried to restrict the political power of Ghent. The urban elite, in a coalition with several social networks from the middle class, would form a solid basis for the resistance against Maximilian. The city would be the driving force behind the Flemish Revolt. In other cities, there were members of the urban elites who did not exhibit strong preferences for either urban autonomy or state centralisation. The turbulent political careers of Willem Moreel and Maarten Lem put the discussion of ‘centralism versus particularism’ into perspective. After April 1479 Willem Moreel and Maarten Lem held important offices in the archduke’s financial administration. Maximilian hoped their presence in administration would strengthen his control of Bruges’ many financial resources. Both of the new administrators from Bruges hoped to influence state policies from their offices in state administration. In December 1481, however, they became strong opponents of court policies because their networks (and maybe Willem and Maarten themselves) had criticized the autocratic fiscal policy of Maximilian. A complicated combination of opportunities, circumstances, and interests resulted in the switch of Willem Moreel and Maarten Lem to the opposition. Both merchants wanted to influence the economic and financial policies of the central government in order to protect the commercial interests of their social and economic networks. Maximilian’s hard-line search for money, his aggressively belligerent policy, and the misuse of power by state officials undermined trade in Flanders. Neither these merchant-officials, nor their social networks, would tolerate a central government which did not pursue a political policy that guaranteed commercial interests. When the archduke imprisoned his former officials in December 1481, the Moreel party cut its last ties with the court and wholeheartedly joined the opposition led by Ghent.

268

Conclusion

No single reason explains why an individual preferred one state model to another. His social background, his education, the political tradition and the ideas of his social networks, and specific circumstances all play a role in determining the political actions of an individual. No one contested the existence of a central state in Flanders, but only the concentration of power at the central level. While the Habsburg dynasty and its entourage tried to monopolize the right to levy taxes and use force, leading urban factions tried to disperse this monopoly among the corporate bodies of society. There was no question if a central state would govern the county, but its form was discussed widely during the reign of Mary of Burgundy (and afterwards). If a historian wants to know which type of state an individual preferred, he or she has to look at the bundle of factors which determine political choices for each person. It is possible to reconstruct the social and ideological background for some (wealthy) people, and so reconstruct his or her motivation to act. Although the sources do not allow us to derive a general pattern of action of the ‘rebels’, one common motivation can be derived from the study of their ‘rebellious’ behaviour. It seems that the maintenance and the improvement of their social position was the main reason why all these social groups wanted to participate in politics. This motivation was their ‘common good’.

269

List of abbreviations

ADN: AESC: BMGN: BMGOG: BN: BNF: BTFG: CAB: CAG: GSAB: HHSA: HKCG: HMGOG: HGGSEB KdL: MSH: NBW: PCEEB: RBNS: Rk.: RL: RN: SAB: SAG: SL: ULG: TG: TSG: TSEG: VKAB: VKVAB: VMGOG:

Archives Départementales du Nord Annales. Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden Bulletijn van de Maatschappij voor Geschied- en Oudheidkunde te Gent Biographie Nationale Bibliothèque Nationale de France (Paris) Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Filologie en Geschiedenis City Archives Bruges City Archives Ghent General State Archives, Brussels Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv (Vienna) Handelingen van de Koninklijke Commissie voor Geschiedenis Handelingen van de Maatschappij voor Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde te Gent Handelingen van het Genootschap voor Geschiedenis ‘Société d’Émulation’ te Brugge Klasse der Letteren Messager des Sciences Historiques Nationaal Biografisch Woordenboek Publications du Centre Européen d’Études Bourguignonnes (XIVe–XVIe s.) Revue Belge de Numismatique et de Sigillographie Fonds Rekenkamers Royal Library, Brussels Revue du Nord State Archives Bruges State Archives Ghent Standen en Landen University Library, Ghent Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis Tijdschrift voor Sociale Geschiedenis Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis Verhandelingen van de Koninklijke Academie voor Wetenschappen, Leteren en Schone Kunsten van België Verhandelingen van de Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van België voor Wetenschappen en Kunsten, nieuwe reeks Verhandelingen van de Maatschappij voor Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde te Gent

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Unedited sources ADN (Archives départementales du Nord) Série B (Chambre des Comptes): nrs. 33, 71, 341–63, 430–1, 457, 579–81, 644, 839, 867, 895, 975, 1285–7, 1334, 1341, 1351, 1355, 1421, 1610–3, 1699–1708, 2065, 2067, 2072, 2077–8, 2084, 2090, 2094,, 2099, 2104, 2108–47, 3377–8, 3495, 3521–4, 3540, 3664, 4113–23, 5342–58, 5392, 6771–3, 7554, 17724–64, 18823–4, 18844, 19962, 19969, 20004–5, 20010, 20159, 20135, 20144

BNF (Bibliothèque nationale de France) MC (Mélanges Colbert): nrs. 358–9, 380–1, 397, 399 MF (Manuscrits français): nrs. 1278, 2897, 2908, 11590, 11592, 15538, 15540–1, 17909, 17861, 18997, 20428, 20483, 22479 MN (Manuscrits néerlandais): nr. 15 NAF (Nouvelles Acquisitions françaises): nrs. 6525, 22330 PO (Pièces Originales): nrs. 787–8

CAB (City Archives Bruges; Stadsarchief Brugge) Adornes: BR: CA: CSK: FB: FV: HS: HG: KO: KV: MC: OA: OR: PO: PR: PrOr: PrRe: PW:

Archief Adornes Baljuwsrekeningen (1487–1497) Cartularia (nrs. 2, 4, 12, 13, 14, 17 and Cartularia Varia, nr. 1) Civiele sententiën Kamer (1487–1490) Fonds Bogardenschool (nr. 859) Fonds Veranneman Handschriften (nrs. 7, 8, 8bis, 14) Hallegeboden (1490–1493) Kopies van Oorkonden (1477–1495) Klerken van de vierschaar (1484–1488) Memoriaal van de Camere (1474–1475, 1478) Oorkonden van de ambachten (1477–1490) Oorlogsrekeningen (1482–1489) Politieke oorkonden (nrs. 1138–1252) Procuraties (1485–6 and 1492–3) Private oorkonden (1ste reeks: II, nrs. 7–52; 2de reeks: nrs. 33–35) Private rekeningen (nr. 10) Presentwijnen (1484–1493) 273

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RW: SR: SV: TR: WR:

Registers wetsvernieuwingen (1468–1501) Stadsrekeningen (1467–1495) Snaggaertsvonnissen Titels van renten (1477–1482) Wezenregisters (Sint-Jans-, Sint-Jacobs-, Carmers-, OLV-, Sint-Niklaas- en Sint Donaaszestendeel)

CAG (City Archives Ghent; Stadsarchief Gent) Familiearchief Lanchals-de Ladeuze (FLL): nrs. 1428–1450 Familiearchief Morel de Boucle (FM): nrs. 10–12, 174, 261–2, 483, 523, 621 Oud archief: Reeks 20, nrs. 1–18; Reeks 93, nrs. 3, 7, 26; Reeks 93bis, nrs. 4, 9, 12, 15; Reeks 94, nrs. 706–786; Reeks 110bis, nr. 1; Reeks 147bis, nr. 1; Reeks 212, nr. 1; Reeks 156, nrs. 1 en 3; Reeks 400, nrs. 26–32; Reeks 532, nr. 1

GSAB (General State Archives, Brussels; Algemeen Rijksarchief te Brussel) Fonds Rekenkamer: volumes en registers (Rk.): nrs. 103, 104, 997, 2707, 2709, 3156, 3185–7, 13522, 13554, 13709–10, 13781–2, 13927, 14117–8, 14159–61, 14550–1, 16103, 17381–17410, 18110–20, 18197–200, 18254, 19719–25, 20367–80, 20963–4, 21439–48, 21846–63, 28302, 38701, 38712, 45984, 48837, 48895, 49071 Fonds Rekenkamer: Acquits de Lille (Rk., AL): nrs. 44–45, 109, 114, 369, 426 Fonds Grote Raad (GR): Sententiën, nrs. 12, 793bis, 795–797, 799–804; Eerste aanleg (EA), nrs. 99 en 2678; Aanzienlijke Geslachten (AG), B, nr. 155; Procesbundels tot 1504, nrs. 78–9 Fonds Oorkonden van Vlaanderen (OV): reeks I: nrs. 615, 617, 618–20, 2234–39, 2601, 2608, 2610; II: 49–54 Fonds de Lalaing (FL): nrs. 275, 470–71, 547, 549 Manuscrits divers (MD): nrs. 9, 174, 175, 797, 882A, 3279, 3969

HHSA (Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv Wien) Niederländische Urkunden (NU): 1476; 1481; 1493 Belgica: PA (1), PC (1) Fridericiana: 7 (1488–1490) Maximiliana: 1, 32b

RL (Royal Library of Belgium; Koninklijke Bibliotheek van België) Fonds Merghelynck (M): nrs. 32, 103–4, 107 Manuscripten (Ms.): nrs. 1132, 13167–9, 20642–68

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SAB (State Archives Bruges; Rijksarchief Brugge) Aanwinsten (AW): nrs. 1431, 1478 Fonds Brugse Vrije (BV): BVR (registers): nrs. 4, 212–37; BVO (charters): nrs. 455–518 Oorkonden met Blauwe Nummers (BN): nrs. 1959–61, 2338, 2450, 3499, 3517, 3503, 3521, 3529, 3534, 3801, 4150, 5029, 5089, 6283, 11503, 11697 Fonds Burg van Brugge (BB): nr. 64 Fonds Wijnendale (FW): nr. 249 Fonds ‘Découvertes ’ (FD): nrs 181–4, 189–92

SAG (State Archives Ghent; Rijksarchief Gent) Fonds Oorkonden van Vlaanderen (OV): nrs. 822–63 Oostenrijks Fonds (OF): nrs. 143–48 Fonds Diverse Oorkonden (DO): nrs. 80, 90, 143 Fonds Varia: Varia 2 (V2): nr. 261; Varia 3 (V3): nrs. 243–44, 251 Fonds Raad van Vlaanderen (RV): nrs. 175, 692, 955, 2418, 6831–4, 7351–2, 7512–3, 8631–2, 8640–1, 34315, 34323 Fonds Gent (FG): nrs. 131, 158, 172, 436 Fonds Borluut (FB): nrs. 19, 32–3, 296, 448–9, 516 Fonds Piers de Raveschoot (FPR): nrs. 214–8, 1532 Fonds schenking Lippens (SL): nr. 79

ULG (University Library, UGent; Universiteitsbibliotheek Gent) Handschriften (Hs.): nrs. 785, 1259, 1642

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Blockmans W., ‘Privilegie voor alle landen van herwaarts over, verleend door Maria, hertogin van Bourgondië, ter bekrachtiging van de klachten die de Staten-Generaal haar hadden voorgelegd (Gent, 11 februari 1477)’, in W. Blockmans (ed.), 1477. Het algemene en de gewestelijke privilegiën van Maria van Bourgondië voor de Nederlanden. (SL, LXXX) Kortrijk, 1985, pp. 85–95. ‘t Boeck van al ‘t gene datter gheschiedt is binnen Brugghe sichten jaer 1477 tot 1491. (Maatschappij der Vlaamsche bibliophilen, derde reeks, 2) C. Carton (ed.), Ghent, 1859. Boone M., ‘De Gentse verplichte lening van 1492–1493’, HKCG, 147 (1981), pp. 247–305. Cauchies J.-M., Ordonnances de Jean sans Peur, 1405–1419. (Verzameling van de verordeningen van de Nederlanden, I, 3) Brussels, 2001. Cauchies J.-M., ‘De la “régenterie” à l’autonomie. Deux ordonnances de cour et de gouvernement de Maximilien et Philippe le Beau (1495)’, HKCG, 171 (2005), pp. 41–88. Chronijcke van Ghendt door Jan van den Vivere en eenige andere aanteekenaars der XVI e en XVII e eeuw. F. de Potter (ed.), Ghent, 1885. Chronique des faits et gestes admirables de Maximilien I durant son mariage avec Marie de Bourgogne. O. Delepierre (ed.), Brussels, 1839. Cuvelier J., Dhondt J. & Doehaerd R., Actes des états généraux des anciens Pays-Bas (actes de 1427 à 1477). Brussels, 1948. Dagboek van Gent van 1447 tot 1470, met een vervolg van 1477 tot 1515. (Maatschappij der Vlaamsche bibliophilen, vierde reeks, 12) V. Fris (ed.), Ghent, 1901–1904, 2 vols. De Commynes P., Mémoires. (Textes littéraires français, 585) J. Blanchard (ed.), Genève, 2007, 2 vols. De Doppere R., Chronique brugeoise de 1491 à 1498. H. Dussart (ed.), Bruges, 1892. De la Fons-Melicocq, ‘Documents inédits pour servir à l’histoire du nord de la France et de la Belgique sous Marie de Bourgogne et Maximilien d’Autriche (1477–1482)’, Revue d ’histoire et d ’archéologie, 4 (1864), pp. 410–422. De la Marche O., Mémoires. H. Beaune et J. d’Arbaumont (eds.), Paris, 1883–1888, 4 vols. Derode V., ‘Rôles des dépenses de la maison de Bourgogne’, Annales du Comité Flamand de France, 6 (1861–1862), pp. 283–302 and 7 (1863–1864), pp. 383–400. Despars N., Cronycke van den lande ende graefscepe van Vlaenderen. J. de Jonghe (ed.), Bruges, 1840, 4 vols. Diegerick I., Analectes yprois ou receuil de documents inédits concernant la ville d ’Ypres. Bruges, 1850. Diegerick I., ‘Episode de l’histoire d’Ypres sous le règne de Marie de Bourgogne, 1477’, HGGSEB, 10 (1848), pp. 423–476. Diegerick I., Inventaire analytique et chronologique des chartes et documents appartenant aux archives de la ville d ’Ypres. Bruges, 1853–1868, 7 vols. Dits die Excellente Cronike van Vlaenderen. W. Vorsterman (ed.), Antwerp, 1531. Douxchamps-Lefevre C., ‘Le privilège de Marie de Bourgogne pour le comté de Namur (mai 1477), in W. Blockmans (ed.), 1477. Het algemene en de gewestelijke privilegiën van Maria van Bourgondië voor de Nederlanden. (SL, LXXX) Kortrijk, 1985, pp. 235–252. Dumont J., Corps universel diplomatique. Amsterdam, 1726–1731, 8 vols.

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310

Index Bruges, Ghent, Flanders, Ypres, Charles the Bold, Mary of Burgundy, and Maximilian of Austria are not included in this index.

A Aardenburg 123, 180 Aarschot 122 Abeele, Jan van den 241 Ackere, Wouter van den 259 Adegem 141 Adornes, Anselmus 139, 166, 183–4, 197 Adornes, Arnoud 139 Alost 76–7 Ameyde, Wouter 81, 142 Amiens 29 Andries, Andries 64, 94, 96 Anjou 117 Antwerp 59, 72, 75, 81, 87, 90, 97, 141, 190, 206–8, 216 Arenberg, William of 48, 119 Arends, Joost 242, 254 Aristotle 158 Arras 16, 22–3, 111, 157, 159–62, 178, 209 Artevelde, Jacob van 8, 99–100 Artois 15, 22–3, 29–30, 48, 103–4, 122, 192, 217 Assele 238 Assenede 94, 96 Assenede, Lieven van 174–5 Auffay, Jean d’ 22, 69 Ault, Colard d’ 54, 183 Austria 19 Austria, Francis of 24 Austria, Margaret of 61 Avelgem 109 Aveluys, Nicolas d’ 127 B Baden, Christoph of Baden, George of Baenst, Adriana de Baenst, Guy de Baenst, Jan de (bastard) Baenst, Jan de (III) Baenst, Paul de Baenst, Roeland de

119 34–5, 55, 119, 121 124 54, 69, 123, 237 43 124, 183–4, 197 53, 69, 124 125, 237

Baenst, Zegher de 177, 183 Bandini–Baroncelli, Pierantonio 54–5 di Guaparre Bar, Johanna of 210 Barbesaen, Jan 86, 149, 182–4 Bariseel, Lodewijk 260 Barradot, Thibaut 56–7 Bassevelde, Frans van 174–5 Bateman, Hendrik 255 Baulme, Guillaume de la 53 Bavaria, Louis of 21 Bave, Joris 175 Beere, Jan de 69 Beernem 109 Belle, Katrien van 79 Belle, Olivier 258 Bels, Gillis de 240 Bels, Jan de 230 Berchem 109 Bergen–op–Zoom 209, 216 Bergues–Saint–Winnoc 30, 117 Bertram, Nicolas 139 Bestkin, Jacob 255 Béthune 95 Béthune, Johanna de 210 Béthune, Robert de 210 Beuil, Renée du 117 Bevere 109 Beveren 109 Beys, Pieter 234 Biervliet 117 Binche, Pierre de 191 Bingueteur, Marc le 47 Bingueteur, Nicolas le 47 Bladelin, Pieter 96, 124, 164 Blankenberge 67, 81, 141, 144 Blasere, Jan de 54, 174, 200 Boekhoute 141 Boetin, Andries 259 Bogaert, Pieter 37, 39, 54 Bonsami, Gaspard de 54 Boot, Barbara de 139 Boot, Cornelis de 54, 142, 173, 177, 197 Boot, Jan de 88, 137–9, 141–4, 146, 154, 175, 197, 226 Borluut, Simon 230, 232, 238–9, 241 Borssele, Adriaan of 106 Borssele, Anne of 131–3 Borssele, Frank of 131 Borssele, Henry of 111 Borssele, Margaret of 111 Borssele, Wolfert of 47, 105, 111, 113, 120, 130–3, 136, 265 311

Index

Bosquiel, Sander du Bouderave, Willem Boudins, Pieter Boulogne Bourbon, Charlotte de Bourbon, François de Bourbon, Louis de

42 255 233–4, 242 22, 29 120 214 29, 105, 112, 120, 167, 171 Bourbon, Pierre de 120 Bourbourg 30 Bouverie, Jean de la 59, 69, 105, 121, 167 Brabant 1, 12, 15, 17, 21, 28–9, 31, 44–7, 53, 67–8, 90, 97, 100, 105, 108, 132, 158, 191, 207 Breydel, Cornelis 87, 139, 141, 183 Breydel, Jan 141, 154, 158–9, 183 Breydel, Katrien 74 Brievere, Joos de 252, 258 Brievere, Joris de 254, 256 Brigdamme 131–2 Brittany 24, 52, 58, 60 Brittany, Anne of 24 Broucke, Gillis van den 246 Brouckere, Jacob de 258 Brouwershaven 132 Bruges, John of 112, 115, 121 Bruges, Louis of 1, 5, 10, 42, 57, 69, 74, 103, 105–18, 120, 123, 128, 130–3, 135–8, 150, 160–1, 165, 167, 170–1, 182, 210–5, 223, 265 Brumeu, Guy de 48, 78, 112, 125 Brune, Maarten den 174 Brussels 1, 14, 24, 27, 38, 45, 71, 86, 91, 108, 184, 230–2 Buc, Mathias de 54 Buedin, Pieter 255 Buendere, Jan van de 240–2, 245–7 Bul, Joris de 234 Bultinc, Pieter 87, 141–2, 174, 176, 185 Burgundy 15, 22–4, 35, 54, 103–4, 127 Burgundy, Anne of 106, 109 Burgundy, Anton of 26, 103–4, 121, 125, 130, 148 Burgundy, David of 89 Burgundy, John of 71 Burgundy, Philip of 36, 64, 74, 105, 121, 192 Burgundy, Philip of (bastard) 121 Buridaen, Christoffel 30, 141, 155

312

C Cabelliau, Jan Cabilliau, Jan Cadzand Calais Cambi, Giovanni Cambrai Caneel, Jan Canini, Giovanni Cardenaghele, Jan de Carincioni, Pietro Carinthia Carondelet, Jean Cassel Chalon, Charles de Chalon, Jean de Charles V (Emperor)

252 255 123, 175, 180, 208 46, 239 55, 57, 63, 82 23 42 214 252 55–6, 58–9, 82 19 69 108 127 23, 54 25, 36, 55, 60, 61, 96, 214, 238 Charles VII (King of France) 117 Charles VIII (King of France) 24, 104, 120 Chastelain, George 231 Claeissone, Omer 242 Clerc, Arend de 240 Clerc, Gillis de 240 Clerc, Lieven de 54 Cleves, Adolf of 1, 5, 10, 22, 53, 73–4, 78, 103, 105–9, 111–13, 115, 118, 121–2, 130–6, 150, 160, 170, 181, 190, 265 Cleves, John of 105, 120, 167, 171 Cleves, John of (II) 120–1 Cleves, Philip of 1, 2, 26, 108, 112, 121, 131–3, 214 Clocman, Simon 230, 238 Clugny, Ferry de 78 Cockaert, Jan 186 Cockuut, Pieter 253, 256, 259, 260 Colaert, Jan 254, 258 Collin, Gillis 37 Cologne 18 Columbus, Christopher 2 Commynes, Johanna of 105 Commynes, Philip de 26, 103–4, 112, 117, 119–20 Coninc, Jan de 230 Conync, Jacob de 224 Coolbrant, Jacob 154, 170, 179 Copeleere, Pieter de 54 Coppenhole, Frans van 239, 242, 245 Coppenhole, Jan van 71, 241–2, 246, 293 Corbeil 104

Index

Cortewille, Joost van 94, 258 Costa, Dimitro della 55 Crèvecoeur, Philip of 22–3, 103–4, 130, 254 Croes, Marc 186 Croÿ, Philip de 48, 121, 258

Enguinegatte

Evergem Everwijn, Jan

23, 35, 37, 40–1, 50, 53, 71, 73–4, 85, 88, 94, 97, 112, 116–7, 126, 129, 145, 191, 221 238, 245 230

D F Dadizeele, Jan van

67, 70, 72–7, 90–1, 99, 113, 115, 126–7, 131, 173, 224, 229, 243, 246–7 Damas, Jean 103–4, 130 Damman, Elisabeth 238 Damman, Simon 230, 238 Damme 50, 164, 208, 210 Danneels, Danneel 186 Daussut, Corneille 211 Debuysere, Paulus 255 Deinze 238 Delft 90 Dendermonde 123, 125, 190, 233, 243 Despars, Adriana 175 Despars, Mark 175 Dhamere, Jan 174, 185, 224 Dheere, Jacob 114, 223 Dhondt, Jan 222, 224 Diksmuide 123, 175 Diksmuide, Roeland van 255 Doblet, Steven 76–7 Doemeniet, Blasius 255 Domburg 48, 132 Donche, Jacob 124–5, 233–4, 242 Doorne, Cornelis van 174 Doppere, Rombout de 95 Doria, Augustino 55, 59 Douai 21, 67, 81, 138 Doubz, Jean le 167 Drabbe, Adriaan 87 Dreischor 108, 132 Dudzele 123, 141, 224 Duiveland 132 Dullaert, Jan 240 Dunkerke 30 E Edward IV (King of England) Eede, Maarten van Eeken, Clara van der Eeklo Egmond, Catherina of Egmond, William of

23–4, 46, 111 186 238 30, 141, 163 120 105, 120

Fagheel, Christoffel Fair, Philip the

255, 258 1, 24, 36, 52, 61, 70, 94, 108, 111 Fax, John 55 Fernandez, Antonio 89, 139 Fevre, Mathieu le 95 Fevre, Roland le 30, 44, 48, 95–8, 125, 128 Formelis, Jan van 124–5 Formelis, Simon van 124 Franc of Bruges 16, 28, 30–2, 72, 94, 109, 113–4, 117, 123–5, 136, 144, 146, 163–5, 170–72, 177–80, 183, 185, 187, 189, 221, 223, 226, 242, 248, 265 France 21, 24–5, 35, 40–1, 45, 52, 82, 93, 101, 111, 115–6, 133, 145, 159–60, 180, 187, 190, 192, 199–200, 206, 211, 217–8, 227, 243, 255, 265–6 France, Anne of 120 Frederick III (German emperor) 18–9 Frescobaldi, Girolamo 55, 59 Frescot, Jehanne 95 G Gaigneur, Robert le Galliot, Jacques Galmaarden Garnier, Jean Gavere

142 67–8, 96, 127 238 211 8, 16, 125, 157, 228–31, 234 Gavere, Isabella van 114 Gdansk 217 Gheinste, Steven van den 174, 177 Ghelder, Willem de 174 Ghelders 22–3, 25, 29, 105, 112, 120–1, 129–30, 180–1, 190 Ghelders, Adolf of 22–3, 29, 105, 112, 180–1, 190 Ghiselin, Gillis 94, 258 313

Index

Ghiselin, Pieter Gijzenzele Gil, Vicente Gilloen, Joos Gistel, Isabel van Gistel, Jacob van

242, 259–60 238 89 252 210 87, 123–4, 182, 185, 224, 237 Gistel, Joost van 237 Glymes–Bergen, Jan of 127 Goetghebeur, Jacob 242 Goetghebuer, Geraard 230 Goetghebuer, Pieter 230 Gommer, Joris 252, 257 Gondeval, Nicolas de 35, 37, 50, 54, 59, 92 Goux, Pierre de 124 Gracht, Jan van der 124–5 Gracht, Wouter van der 173, 252 Grandson 12, 154 Grave, Olivier de 233 Gravelines 14, 30, 32, 43–4, 57–8 Greffin, Lodewijk 89, 180 Groote, Geraard de 42, 185, 222–4 Groote, Karel de 69 Gros, Jean 37, 54 Guise 210 H Haamstede Haec, Sander Haeuwe, Jan Hainault

111–2 54 173–6 15, 21, 23, 28, 67, 91, 97, 105, 108, 122, 132 Halewyn, Antoon van 37, 69, 117, 123, 171 Halewyn, Bernard van 177 Halewyn, Jacob van 117 Halewyn, Jan van 69, 258 Halewyn, Joost van 154, 177 Halewyn, Karel van 123–4, 183, 185, 224 Halewyn, Lodewijk van 104 Halewyn, Roeland van 86–7, 117–8, 123–4 Hautain, Guillaume 69, 141 Haute, Pieter van den 230 Hauweel, Inghelram 115 Heemstede 111 Heghels, Adriana 139 Heghels, Maria 139 Heindrickx, Boudewijn 87, 142 Heindrickx, Hendrik 87, 141 Heldinghe, Boudewijn van 81, 138 Helle, Cornelis 197 Hemstede, Hedwige van 96 314

Hemstede, Jan van 96 Heracles 231 Herpen 108 ’s Hertogenbosch 122, 129–31, 133 Hertsvelde, Barbara van 81 Hertsvelde, Denijs van 81, 87, 90, 138 Hertsvelde, Jan van 81 Hesler, George 35 Heurne, Philip of 72–7, 91, 173, 242, 252 Heyman, Denijs 238 Heyman, Jacob 69, 258 Heyns, Gregorius 174–5 Heysackere, Pieter van 254, 258 Hole, Jaspar van den 70 Holland 12, 15, 21, 25, 28–9, 32, 41, 43–4, 48, 57, 60, 68–9, 71–2, 90, 105, 111, 120–1, 130, 132–3, 219 Hollebeke, Hector van 252 Hond, Jan de 183 Hondt, Frans de 255 Honte 216 Hotin, Alexander 54 Houdecoutre, Guy de 89 Houdempnil, Jean de 112 Houplines, Jean de 242 Houtheusden, Wouter van 45 Houtmaerct, Marc 222 Houtmaerct, Reinier 154, 222 Houtmaerct, Willem 147, 201, 222, 224 Hueribloc, Pieter 233–4 Hugonet, Guillaume 78, 83, 96, 112–3, 154, 164–5, 233, 250 Hysson, Ghijsbrecht 141 J Jabbeke Jaghere, Hubrecht de John the Fearless Joncman, Isabella Joris, Jacob

123, 165 174–5, 185, 224 43, 65, 106, 108, 147, 149, 211 78 165

K Kaaskerke 175 Kaprijke 30 Kerchove, Guy van den 255 Keyt, Jan de 54, 81, 88–9, 137–8, 141–6, 173–4, 176–7, 185, 192, 221, 226

Index

Keyt, Jan de (fs. Jan) Keyt, Katrien de Knokke Koekelare Koolkerke

141 177 123 141 175

L La Rochelle Labye, Colard de Ladesoubs, Alard de Lalaing, Josse de

104 54, 174, 177 174 50, 71, 73–4, 105, 112, 120, 130, 179 Lalaing, Simon de 73 Lanchals, Pieter 27, 29, 30, 37, 55, 58, 78–9, 81, 85, 90, 92, 95, 99, 114, 117, 124, 126–8, 154, 156–7, 160, 177, 192, 202 Lanchals, Simon 78 Lanczwaert, Lamsin 258 Lannoy, Jean de (Abot of Saint Bertin) 39, 59 Lannoy, Jean de (Lord of Mignoval) 127 Lansaem, Pieter 249, 255, 258 Laubeel, Jan de 54 Lauwerein, Colard 174, 176 Lauwerein, Jeronimus 96, 215 Leffi nge 175 Lem, Maarten 35, 43–4, 50–1, 54, 74, 78, 80, 82–9, 92, 100, 137–9, 141–6, 150, 156, 183, 191, 194, 197, 219, 226, 268 Lembeke 183 Lerme, Alonso de 54 Letuwe, Pieter van de 251, 253–4, 258 Leyen, Joost van der 186 Lichtervelde, Jan van 252 Lichtervelde, Victor van 252, 254 Lichtervelde, Wulfaert van 252 Liedekerke 125, 237 Liège 29, 48, 105, 112, 120, 125, 167, 171, 231, 233 Ligny 210 Lille 14, 21, 32, 35, 38–9, 43, 59, 70, 79, 90, 93–4, 97–8, 113, 117, 167, 254 Limburg 15 Lomellini, Anselmo de 55, 92 Lomellini, Lazaro de 82 Loo, Jan van 230

Loppem 175 Lorraine 11, 22, 30, 35 Losschaert, Antoon 54, 197 Losschaert, Jan 173–5, 177, 180, 197 Losschaert, Kateline 175 Lotin, Pieter 54 Louis XI (King of France) 10–1, 18, 22–5, 29, 60, 103–4, 117, 120–1, 133 Louis XII (King of France) 24 Louvain 21, 35, 238 Lumpinen 119 Luuckx, Johanna 81 Luxembourg 15, 22–4, 29, 44, 72, 79, 82, 90–1, 105, 154 Luxembourg, Jacob of 104, 108, 121 Luxembourg, John of 210 Luxembourg, Louis of 29, 210 Luxembourg, Marie of 126, 214 Luxembourg, Pieter of 105, 112, 179, 183, 210–3, 215–6 M Maas Macharis, Rijkaard Madeira Maerke, Lodewijk van Maldegem Male Male, Louis of Malet, Thomas Malfeyt, Willem Marant, Jan Marche, Olivier de la

108, 132 174 83 230 123, 141 79 17, 250, 253 54, 98 255 174–5 48, 53, 105, 112, 126–7, 130, 242 Marle 210 Massemen, Elisabeth van 234 Massemen, Hector van 233 May, Colard de 207 May, Nicolas de 54, 56 Meaux 210 Mechelen 14–5, 33, 36–8, 69, 82, 97, 106, 131, 155 Medici, Cosimo de’ 137 Medici, Giuliano de’ 55 Medici, Lorenzo de’ 57 Melle, Jan van 233–4 Memling, Hans 80–1, 141 Menen, Sebastiaan van 252 Merghaert, Wouter 154 315

Index

Mesdach, Colard 142 Mesmaeker, Lammekin de 260 Metteneye, Cornelis 144 Metteneye, Denijs 87, 139, 141, 144, 154, 176 Metteneye, Jacob 139, 176 Metteneye, Margriete 175 Metteneye, Philip 150, 182–3 Metteneye, Pieter 183, 185 Metz 21, 34 Mey, Zegher de 246 Michiels, Jan 174–5 Middelburg 96, 144, 163–4, 216 Mignoval 127 Minne, Jan 252, 255, 258 Minne, Pieter 186 Mirabello, Jan de 100 Mirabello, Simon de 99–100 Moerkerke 123, 141 Moeschroen, Alexander 142 Moeschroen, Jan 54 Molinet, Jean 21, 24, 26, 76, 241 Montfort, Francis of 24 Montfort, John of 120 Moor, Donaas de 42, 54, 175, 183, 185, 192, 207, 223 Morat 155, 210 Moreel, Klara 176 Moreel, Lieven 81 Moreel, Willem 35, 37, 43–4, 50, 54–5, 58–9, 78, 80–93, 99–102, 118, 123–4, 128, 137–46, 149–54, 156–7, 162, 174, 176–7, 180, 182, 185, 191–3, 197–8, 201, 211, 213, 220–8, 248, 268 Mortaigne 29 Muelenbeke, Pieter van 174 Muenekereede, Jan van 174–5 Muer, Adriaan de 224 Munte 238 N Namur Nancy Nantes Nassau, Adolf of 316

12, 15, 24, 28–9, 44, 98, 105, 122, 149–50 10–2, 22, 26, 71, 86, 105, 117, 121, 155, 158, 264 24 64

Nassau, Engelbert of 105 Neuchâtel, Jean de 104 Newcastle 209 Nieuwenhove, Adriana van 83 Nieuwenhove, Agnete van 139 Nieuwenhove, Antoon van 141–2 Nieuwenhove, Apoline van 139 Nieuwenhove, Jan (fs. Klaas) 74, 86–9, 91–2, 99, 137–9, 141–6, 149–50, 156, 180, 183, 197, 221, 226 Nieuwenhove, Jan (fs. Michiel) 30, 70, 79, 114, 124, 154, 160, 166, 170, 177, 202 Nieuwenhove, Katrien van 79 Nieuwenhove, Klaas van 54, 83, 139, 142 Nieuwenhove, Margriete van 114 Nieuwenhove, Michiel van 79 Nieuwpoort 30, 175 Ninove 125 Nutin, Jan 54, 89, 139 O Offhuus, Katrien Offhuus, Suzanne Onredene, Daneel Onredene, Raas Oostburg Oostduinkerke Oostkamp Oostkerke Orange Ostend Oudenaarde Oudenburg Overmeere Overtvelt, Paul van

87 87 239, 242, 245–6 239 30, 123 175 109, 141, 175 123, 141, 175 23, 54, 127 67, 163, 165 85–6, 90, 232, 242 14, 41, 146, 250–1 108 177, 183–4

P Padua Paelding, Andries Paelding, Joris Pamele Papoire, Thomas de la Pappal, Hendrik Paris Péronne Perrot, Thomas Petegem Petyt, Boudin

69 255 254 109 69 230 22, 125 29 95 115 174–5

Index

Philip the Bold

17, 27, 57–8, 62, 65, 119, 229, 250 Philip the Good 16–7, 27, 37–8, 43, 48–50, 62, 65–6, 71, 73, 77, 87, 96, 104, 106, 108, 111, 121, 124–5, 130, 141, 146–7, 149, 158, 161, 163–4, 168, 178, 222, 229–30, 232, 234–5, 237, 247, 249–50 Picanul, Thomas 139 Picardy 22–3, 29, 104, 122 Pierins, Nicasius 54, 174 Pierins, Nicolas 42 Plaet, Jan de 174 Plaine, Thomas de 69, 75 Polheim, Maarten von 62, 64, 119–20 Polheim, Wolfgang von 119 Ponthieu 29 Poorte, Frans van der 252, 254, 258 Portinari, Folco 52, 54, 56–7, 59 Portinari, Tommaso 32, 52, 55, 57–8, 63 Portugal, Beatrice of 106 Portugal, Denis of 121 Portugal, Isabel of 106, 161 Pot, Philip 103–4, 130 Pottere, Lieven de 230, 232 Poucke, Jan van 233–4 Praet, Daneel van 258 Prévost, Nicolas le 27 Q Quarré, Louis Quévin, Jan

28, 192 183

R Rambures, Antoinette de 48, 125 Rammecourt, Jacob van 252 Rapondi, Dino 58, 83, 143 Rassegem 125–6, 237, 246 Ravenstein 108, 132 Raveschoot, Jan van 87, 141–2, 186 Reali, Real de 55–6 Reigersvliet 175 Ridsaert, Frans 224 Riebeke, Jakob van 141–2 Riebeke, Jan van 86–9, 91, 99, 137–9, 141–6, 149–50, 152, 183, 197, 221, 226 Rieux 48

Rijckewaert, Frans Rijm, Boudewijn Rijm, Lodewijk Rijm, Willem Rijne, Jan van den Ritsaert, Hendrik Roelands, Jan Roelands, Willem Roelens, Antoon Romont Rooden, Zeger van Roovere, Anthonis de Royen, Olivier van Ruebs, Ambrosius Rupelmonde Ruple, Guilbert de Rutere, Nicolas de

259–60 238 238 71, 236–9, 241–2, 245–6 54 255 54 54, 207 186 74, 126, 213 174 86, 88, 206 242 173 42, 125 78–9 37, 77

S Sailly, Pernot de Saint Omer Sainte–Menehould Saint–Pol Salisbury, John of Sassegem, Jan van Savoye, Jacob of Scaghe, Jan van der

121 23, 39, 59, 64, 67, 121 121 29, 213 158 211 73, 121, 126 30, 38, 42, 67–8, 96–7, 202 Scaghe, Willem van der 67, 70–2, 77, 87, 98, 126, 246 Scheldewindeke 238 Scheldt 42, 48, 54, 132 Schoonbroek, Diederik van 230, 232 Schooren, Jacob van 174, 224 Schoorisse, Louis of 73, 229 Scotland 184 Senlis 70–2, 104, 229, 231 Sersanders, Daneel 87, 229–31, 234 Sersanders, Filips 231, 233–4 Sey, Jacob 87, 141–2 Sijsele 16, 109 Sint–Andries 123 Sint–Anna–ter–Muiden 175 Sint–Denijs–Boekel 238 Sint–Kateline 123 Sint–Kruis 123, 141–2 Sint–Laureins 131, 141 Sint–Pieters 123, 141 Sint–Salvators 123

317

Index

Sluis

2, 15–6, 30, 32, 42–3, 49–50, 71, 86–7, 123, 144–5, 154, 163–4, 168, 178–9, 208–9, 219, 223 Soissons 210 Soleuvre 11 Sorel, Agnes 117 Spain 17, 46 Spiere 109, 112 Spinghele, Leon 174 Steene, Klaas van den 54, 197 Steene, Robert van den 253–4, 257–8 Steenhuize 109 Steenvoorde, Jacob van 245 Steenwerpere, Jacob van 230 Stichelen, Hendrik van der 230 Stichelen, Thomas van der 255 Stiermarken 19 Stoct, Jan van der 230 Storm, Frans de 255 Straten, Joost van der 197 Suyxgate, Engelbert van 255 Swin 144, 208, 210 T Taye, Jan de 211 Temse 95–6, 125 The Hague 14, 38, 41, 89–90, 111 Theimseke, Ghyslain van 154 Theimseke, Michiel van 154 Thérouanne 23, 72 Thionville 15, 33, 36, 106 Thiry, Colard le 200 Thiry, Cornelis le 200 Thoenin, Laureins 252 Thoenin, Luc 252, 260 Tielt 109 Tournai 17, 22, 39, 72, 112, 180–1, 190, 229, 233 Trotin, Bertelemy 48 Tsoenin, Jan 173, 224 U Uden Uitkerke Ursel Utenhove, Jan Utenhove, Lieven Utenhove, Rijkaard Utermeere, Lieven 318

108 123 30 233–4, 242 124–5 69, 77 71

Utrecht Uutkerke, Roeland van

25, 71, 89, 120 124

V Vaernewijc, Elisabeth van 238 Valenciennes 149 Vallee, Louis de la 69 Varsenare 123 Varsenare, Joost van 87, 91, 114, 123–4, 141, 185, 223–4 Vechtere, Jan de 246 Velde, Jan van de 177 Velde, Maria van de 177 Velde, Marc van den 177 Vendôme 214 Veranneman, Klaas 174–5 Vere 131–2 Veurne 30, 123, 291 Veynoot, Jan 252 Vichte, Anton van der 87, 113–5, 117–8, 123–4, 131, 182 Vichte, Olivier van der 114 Vienna 19, 21, 26–7, 35 Vieuxcondé 48 Vieuxville 122 Vilain, Adrian (of Liedekerke) 125–6, 237 Vilain, Adrian (of Rassegem) 125–6, 237, 246 Vilain, Colard 125 Vilain, Jooszine 237 Vilain, Martin 125 Vis, Jacoba de 117 Viseulx, Gilles le 37 Viven, Jeronimus van 154, 183 Viven, Lieven van 224 Vleeschauwere, Jan de 197 Vlissingen 48, 132 Volkenstein, Veit von 62, 119 Volmersbeke, Victor van 254, 258 Voocht, Jacob de 183 Voorde 109 Vos, Jacob de 223 Vos, Malin de 255 Vurste 238 W Waele, Andries de Waele, Victor de Wailly, Jean de Walcheren

252 252, 255 48, 191 48, 108, 132

Index

Wale, Jan de 258 Waregem 238 Waterleet, Filips van 211 Watervliet 96 Wedergrate, Roeland van 124–5, 231, 233–4 Wenduine 175 Wervik 123 Westenschouwen 111 Westerschelde 123 Westkapelle 132, 141, 175 Wielant, Philip 69, 112, 242 Wijnendale 1, 73, 92, 108, 113 Wilde, Jan de 252, 255 Wilde, Joris de 252 Winchester 111 Wintere, Willem de 113–6, 118, 211 Witte, Jacob de 183, 223 Witte, Jan de 48, 183, 191, 222 Witte, Joris de 252, 254, 258 Woestijne, Hector van de 252, 257 Woumen 123, 141 Wulf, Pieter de 255 Wulpen 208 Wychuus, Joos van 230, 240, 246 Wymeersch, Jacob van 224, 230, 232, 240, 246–7

Y York, Anne of York, Margaret of

52 11, 18, 23, 78, 82, 124, 148, 160, 231

Z Zaffelare Zandenburg Zeeland

238 132 29, 44, 77, 90, 105–6, 108, 111, 120, 130, 132–3, 216 Zeveren, Jan van 230 Zingem 238 Zoetamijs, Lieven 230 Zoutelande 131 Zuienkerke 81, 175 Zutphen 29 Zuuenkerke, Jan van 43 Zwijnaarde 229

319