Florentine politics and society, 1343-1378 9780691051178

Table of contents :
Frontmatter
PREFACE (page vii)
ABBREVIATIONS FREQUENTLY CITED (page xiii)
I. THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND (page 3)
The Decade of Disaster, 1338-1348 (page 3)
Revival and Reorientation of the Economy after 1348 (page 9)
The Pattern of Social Change (page 27)
The Heightening of Social Tension (page 50)
II. THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND (page 57)
The Structure of Communal Government (page 57)
Political Ideology (page 72)
The Vital Political Issues (page 83)
THE FIRST DECADE, 1343-1353 (page 105)
The New Regime and its Enemies (page 105)
The Patrician Resurgence and the Origins of Partisan Conflict (page 116)
Two Divisive Issues: the Church and Foreign Policy (page 131)
IV. PRECARIOUS EQUILIBRIUM, 1354-1365 (page 148)
The Politics of Compromise (page 148)
The Ghibelline Question, 1354-1360 (page 159)
Florence and the Papal States, 1354-1360 (page 172)
Dissension, Conspiracy, and War, 1360-1365 (page 183)
V. DOMESTIC FERMENT AND FOREIGN PERILS, 1366-1370 (page 194)
Storm Signals (page 194)
The Popular Resurgence: the Reform of the Parte Guelfa, 1366-1367 (page 202)
External Dangers (page 221)
VI. THE BURGEONING CRISIS, 1371-1375 (page 244)
"...Fra le pessime sette che ci sono" (page 244)
The Disintegration of the Guelf Entente (page 265)
The Path to War (page 282)
VII. THE WAR OF THE "EIGHT SAINTS," 1375-1378 (page 297)
The War Within (page 297)
The Pattern of Conflict (page 308)
The Problem of Peace (page 319)
VIII. THE DEMISE OF THE REGIME, 1378 (page 336)
The Guelf Terror (page 336)
The Response to the Oligarchic Challenge (page 351)
June (page 363)
July (page 373)
Post-Mortem (page 387)
BIBLIOGRAPHY (page 397)
INDEX (page 413)

Citation preview

FLORENTINE POLITICS AND SOCIETY, 1343-1378

PRINCETON STUDIES IN HISTORY, 12.

Florentine Politics and Society 1343-1378 BY GENE A. BRUCKER

Copyright © 1962 by Princeton University Press ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

LC Card 62-7035

> Publication of this book has been aided by the Ford Foundation program to support publication through university presses, of work in the humanities and social sciences.

+

Printed in the United States of America . by Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.

To Patricia

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PREFACE This book is a study of Florentine politics in the third quarter of the fourteenth century, from 1343 to 1378. It is the first of a projected series of investigations into the political and social life of Florence during its transition from a “medieval” to a “Renais-

sance” city. |

Briefly sketched in two introductory chapters is the economic, social, and political milieu in which the communal government functioned in these years. The main body of the work traces the history of the communal regime which was established in 1343: its unstable beginnings, its mature period of uneasy equilibrium, and the years of crisis which culminated, in 1378, in its downfall. My objective has not been to write a political narrative, but to delineate and explore the most significant problems and issues con-

fronting the Florentine commune. These are treated in the context of the society which faced them, and of the age which experienced them. It is now thirty years since Robert Davidsohn published the last volume of his magisterial work, Geschichte von Florenz, terminating his study at the year 1330, when, in his opinion, medieval Flor-

ence reached its zenith. Davidsohn’s history was written in the orthodox manner of the nineteenth century; it is factual, solid, and

pragmatic. As Professor Sestan has noted in his introduction to the Italian edition, Davidsohn’s treatment of Florentine history was descriptive or “topographical,” not analytical. But the German scholar’s impressive achievement was to establish a solid foundation of historical evidence upon which future generations of students could build. No work of comparable scope and depth exists

for the years after 1330; our knowledge of late medieval and Renaissance Florence is, by contrast, sketchy and fragmentary. For the period treated in this study, the most satisfactory general

account remains that of the French historian, Perrens, whose work, now seventy years old, is essentially a chronicle of political events. Recently, much significant research has been done in specialized fields, most notably by Sapori, Renouard, Fiumi, and Rodolico in economic and social history, by Antal, Meiss, and Offner in the history of art. Yet, notwithstanding the extraordinary richness of

the source material, large segments of the city’s history in the vil

PREFACE

second half of the trecento have remained almost totally unexplored. On such important subjects as the social structure, the church, public finance, and communal administration, historical research has scarcely begun. Part of the explanation for this scholarly neglect is inherent in the period itself. The late zrecento is not an heroic epoch of Florentine history. The annals are filled with accounts of pestilence and famine, unresolved political crises, social upheavals, economic stagnation. In these years, Florence did not experience the prosperity, nor did it exhibit the dynamism and vitality, of its earlier history. The city’s cultural achievement is also inferior: there are no Florentine writers or artists in this age equal to Dante or Giotto.

Compared to the guattrocento, with its panoply of renowned artists, scholars, and statesmen, the period appears drab. In the general histories of Florence, the late trecento is characterized as

an age of decline and disintegration, or, at best, as a stagnant interval between two pinnacles of glorious achievement. Yet it is precisely this spectacle of a society in crisis which infuses the period with significance and drama. While the historical annals do not portray stirring progress and growth, they do depict

the reaction of a society to adversity of more than common intensity. The crisis which struck Florence was experienced, in varying degrees, by the whole of Latin Europe, and the city’s tribulation was thus part of a general phenomenon. That the Arno city weathered this crisis well is attested by its history in the fol-

lowing century, an age of creativity which has scarcely been equaled in European history. No small part of this achievement was due to the foundations—political, social, economic, intellectual—which were preserved or constructed during the troubled years encompassed by this study. Documentary sources are extensive and informative. The operation and function of no European state in the fourteenth century—

whether kingdom, feudal principality, or commune—is so well documented as that of the Florentine republic. The corpus of legislative enactments (Provvision) is practically complete, and this is supplemented by the statistics of council votes (Libri Fabarum), electoral records (Tratte), and the protocols of extraordinary commissions (Balie). Judicial administration is amply documented by

the court records. Information concerning the economic life of vill

PREFACE

the city and of individual citizens can be gleaned from guild documents, notarial protocols, tax lists, and private diaries. Of supreme importance is the survival, in fragmentary form, of the Consulte e

Pratiche records. These documents constitute one of the earliest extant sources of political debates in the history of European gov-

ernment, and their value can hardly be overestimated. These protocols contain clues to the divisions and discords within the electorate, and to the relationship between communal opinion and the implementation of policy. It is thus possible to study in some detail the formulation of communal policy on such important issues as officeholding, taxation, justice, economic regulations, foreign affairs, and the church. This work originated as a doctoral dissertation at Princeton University, where it was accepted by the Department of History in April 1954. It has since been thoroughly revised. To the director of the thesis, the late Professor Theodor E. Mommsen, I owe an incalculable debt. It was a great privilege to have known this man

and to have worked with him.

The research for this work was begun while I was a Porter Ogden Jacobus Fellow in the Princeton Graduate School, and completed while I held a Fulbright Scholarship in Florence. With-

out the financial support from these sources, there would have been no dissertation and no book. My thanks are due, also, to the archivists of the Archivio di Stato in Florence, for their cooperation and assistance, and to the Institute of Social Sciences at the University of California, for financial aid in preparing the final manuscript. To many scholars, who share my interest in Floren-

tine history, I am indebted for information, advice, encouragement, and criticism. I wish, in particular, to acknowledge my obligation to two of them: Professor Lauro Martines of Reed College, and Professor Robert Brentano of the University of California, Berkeley. Florence, Italy January 1961

1x

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CONTENTS

PREFACE vil ABBREVIATIONS FREQUENTLY CITED Xili I. THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC

BACKGROUND 3

The Decade of Disaster, 1338-1348 3

after 1348 9

Revival and Reorientation of the Economy

The Pattern of Social Change 27

The Heightening of Social Tension 50 Il. THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND 57 The Structure of Communal Government 57

Political Ideology 72 The Vital Political Issues 83

Il. THE FIRST DECADE, 1343-1353 105 The New Regime and its Enemies 105 The Patrician Resurgence and the Origins

of Partisan Conflict 116 Two Divisive Issues: the Church and

Foreign Policy 131

IV. PRECARIOUS EQUILIBRIUM, 1354-1365 148

The Politics of Compromise 148

The Ghibelline Question, 1354-1360 159 Florence and the Papal States, 1354-1360 172 Dissension, Conspiracy, and War, 1360-1365 183 V. DOMESTIC FERMENT AND FOREIGN

PERILS, 1366-1370 194

Storm Signals 194

The Popular Resurgence: the Reform of

the Parte Guelfa, 1366-1367 202

External Dangers 221 xt

CONTENTS

VI. THE BURGEONING CRISIS, 1371-1375 244

“.Frale pessime sette che ct sono” 244

The Path to War 282

The Disintegration of the Guelf Entente 265 VI. THE WAR OF THE “EIGHT

SAINTS,” 1375-1378 297 The War Within 297 The Pattern of Conflict 308 The Problem of Peace 319

VIII. THE DEMISE OF THE REGIME, 1378 336

June 363 July 373 Post-Mortem 387

The Guelf Terror 336 The Response to the Oligarchic Challenge 351

BIBLIOGRAPHY 397

INDEX 413

xt

ABBREVIATIONS FREQUENTLY CITED ARCHIVES

ACP Atti del Capitano del Popolo AEO] Atti del Esecutore degli Ordinamenti della Giustizta

AP Atti del Podesta

APG Archivio di Parte Guelfa ASF = Archivio di Stato, Firenze ASS = Archivio di Stato, Siena BNF Biblioteca Nazionale di Firenze

CP Consulte e Pratiche LF Libri Fabarum Pres. Prestanze Prov. Provvisioni PUBLISHED WORKS

ASI Archivio storico italiano Capitols I Capitol: del Comune di Firenze. Inventario e regesto. C. Guasti and A. Gherardi, eds. 2 vols. (Florence, 1866-1893).

Delizie Delizie degli eruditi toscani. Udetonso di San Luigi, ed. 24 vols. (Florence, 1770-1789). Diario d’anonimo Diario d’anonimo fiorentino dall’anno 1358 al 1389,

in Cronache dei secoli xii e xiv. A. Gherardi, ed. (Documenti di storia italiana, v1). (Florence, 1876)

RRUSS Rerum Italicarum Scriptores Stefani Cronaca fiorentina dt Marchionne di Coppo Stefant. N. Rodolico, ed. Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, new ed., xxx, Part 1 (Citta di Castello, 1903-1955).

Velluti La cronica domestica di Messer Donato Vellutz, scritta far il 1367 e 11 1370 con le addizioni di Paolo

Vellut. J. del Lungo and G. Volpi, eds. (Florence, I9I4).

G. Villani Cronica di Giovanni Villam. F. Dragomanni, ed. (Florence, 1844-1845).

M. Villani Cronica di Matteo Villani. F. Dragomanni, ed. (Florence, 1846). Norte: All dates cited are New Style.

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CHAPTER I Che Social and Economic Background The Decade of Disaster, 1338-1348 The eleventh book of Giovanni Villani’s chronicle contains a famous chapter entitled “On the Greatness and State and Magnificence of the Commune of Florence.”* It is a description of the city in the year 1338, in which the chronicler measures statistically the

physical and material manifestations of Florence’s grandeur: population, industrial production, food consumption, and the riches of its citizens. The data collected by Villani indicate that Florence then ranked among the five largest and wealthiest urban

centers in Europe. Her population of ninety thousand—astronomical compared to the size of the average medieval city—derived its livelihood in large part from the production and sale of woolen cloth, the value of which exceeded one and one-half million florins annually. For the larger part of his description, Villani is content to allow the figures to speak for themselves, confident that they will evoke only admiration and astonishment. At the end of the chapter, however, he abandons numbers for words, describing the beauty and magnificence of the city, with its galaxy of palaces, churches, and country villas, visible symbols of the great wealth of Florence and her citizens. Within the structure of Villani’s chronicle, the survey of the city in 1338 represents a climax, deliberately selected by the author, depicting the city at the height of its power. Giovanni had been both observer and participant in the steady progress of his native

city since 1300, when he first conceived the plan to write his chronicle, convinced that “Florence, the daughter and creature of Rome, was in the ascendancy and destined for great things.”” The events of this era seemed to justify fully his predictions; the city overcame every obstacle in its path, recovered quickly from every

disaster, natural or man-made, In describing the entry into the 1G. Villani, Cronica, ed. Dragomanni (Florence, 1844-45), x1, 94. An abridged

translation of the chapter, with notes and bibliography, is in R. Lopez and I. Raymond, Medieval Trade in the Mediterranean World (New York, 1955), pp. 69-74.

2G. Villani, vii, 36.

3

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

city of the Duke of Calabria in 1326, the chronicler wrote: “Consider the great enterprise of the Florentines, after having suftered so many afflictions and so much damage... in less than one year... [they] arranged for the coming of so great a lord .. . which was

considered a great achievement by all Italians. . . .”* Even the disastrous flood of 1333 did not reverse the trend of burgeoning

prosperity and power. Within a few months after the deluge,

measures were taken to rebuild the destroyed bridges and to repair the other damage. So inexhaustible, apparently, were the city’s resources that other building enterprises were inaugurated: the cathedral campanile in 1334 and the reconstruction of Or San Michele in 1337. When six young lions, symbols of Florence’s Guelf tradition, were born in 1337, Villani referred to an ancient

pagan belief that it augured greatness, and he added, “Truly in this time and immediately thereafter [Florence] was at the summit of her power.” The year 1338 was not only the climax, but also the turning point in Florentine fortunes; it marked the beginning of a decade of unrelieved disaster. Signs of the forthcoming difficulties were not absent from Villani’s account of the last years of Florentine prosperity. The vices of the citizens were of such magnitude, in the chronicler’s opinion, that they invited divine retribution. Villani interpreted the flood of 1333 as God’s warning to the Florentines to abandon their evil habits and practices, among which he included avarice, fraudulent business activities, and usury.” A more

tangible element of danger was the increasing difficulty of the great mercantile companies, the Bardi and the Peruzzi. Upon the prosperity of these companies depended the entire economic structure of Florence, and by 1338 the first tremors of the future collapse were already being felt in the business community.° It was an issue of foreign policy, not domestic difficulty, which constituted the gravest menace to the city in these years. In 1329 8 Tbid., x, 1. 4 Tbid., x1, 67. 5 Ibid., XI, 2. 8 Tbid., x1, 88. While this chapter sketched the economic conditions of the Bardi and the Peruzzi in the 1330’s, it was written or revised after 1342, when the companies had already suffered bankruptcy. Thus Villani’s description had the benefit of hindsight. For other evidence of the economic decline of the Bardi and the Peruzzi, see A. Sapori, La crist delle compagnie mercantili dei Bardi e dei Peruzzi (Florence, 1926), pp. 105-07; and his Studi di storia economica, 3rd ed. (Florence, 1955), pp. 681-86.

4

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

Florence was on the verge of acquiring Lucca, a city which had seriously threatened her security for a decade. According to Villani, internal factional strife disrupted the negotiations into which a group of Florentine citizens had entered with Lucca’s German rulers.” Infuriated by thus being balked of its prey, the business class which controlled the communal government determined to gain possession of Lucca at all costs. There followed a complicated

maze of diplomatic negotiations and military enterprises which culminated in a war with the powerful and dangerous lord of Verona, Mastino della Scala. Time and again, Lucca appeared about to fall into Florentine clutches, but the Arno city was never able to possess her rival on the Serchio. The campaign for the possession of Lucca was extremely costly. In 1338 Villani estimated that Florence had spent 600,000 florins for war purposes, that the communal debt stood at 450,000 florins, and that the gabelle revenues for the next six years were already

pledged to pay the debt. This financial burden weighed heavily upon the taxpayers, and the commune instituted special financial measures to assure an adequate revenue for war expenses.* Moreover, with the government’s failure to conquer Lucca, the temper of the citizenry became strained. Sensing that its control over the

city was weakening, the ruling group established a new police office, with broad authority to maintain order and suppress opposition. But the arbitrary acts of the police officials added fuel to an overheated political atmosphere.”

It is against this background of heavy economic burdens, recurring military disappointments, and mounting political unrest that the decade of catastrophe began. Viewing the events in retrospect, Villani recalled the warning signs of impending disaster. In the summer of 1339, a comet made its appearance in Tuscan skies,

followed shortly by unusually severe thunderstorms. A more tangible portent was a bad harvest, which sent the price of grain soaring.” Into a city whose population was weakened by famine conditions there came, in the spring of 1340, the first of a series of plagues which periodically ravaged Tuscany for the next halfcentury. Villani estimated that 15,000 Florentines were buried; he reported that no family escaped without at least one casualty.” 7G. Villani, x, 143. 8 Ibid., xt, 45. 9 Ibid., XI, 39, 100.

10 Thid., X1, 100. 11 Tid., XI, 114. , 5

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

The political ferment, which had been brewing during the height of Florentine prosperity, exploded in 1340 from a totally unforeseen quarter. Several members of the Bardi family, including one of the directors of the mercantile company, plotted to overthrow the regime, of which they were an influential part. The conspiracy was discovered in November 1340, and the communal authorities took prompt steps to crush it. In addition to the sixteen Bardi who were condemned zn” absentia, members of other magnate houses, the Frescobaldi, Nerli, and Rossi, were also involved in the plot. This abortive revolt was clearly designed to exploit political unrest and to attract a wide variety of malcontents within and without the city. In part, it was an expression of the perennial desire of the magnate class to regain full participation in the communal government, which it had lost in 1293. The specific motives which induced the Bardi to become involved in this perilous enterprise are complex, but one factor was certainly the impending financial crisis. Had the Bardi and their allies gained control of the government, they would have used their position to safeguard their eco-

nomic interests at home, and to protect themselves from the demands of foreign creditors abroad.” The eighteen months following the putative revolt were deceptively calm, as the ruling group endeavored to recover its equilibrium and restore confidence in the government. Its task was made more difficult by the depressed state of the city’s economy. The Italian market had been adversely affected by war, famine, and plague; Villani noted that by 1340 all business activity in the

| city, from banking to baking, was in a slump.”* The Anglo-French war had disrupted commercial ties with northern Europe, and in France the Florentine bankers and merchants were in disgrace because of the financial support given by the Bardi and Peruzzi companies to the English monarch. The insolvency of Edward III was common knowledge after the failure of the king’s invasion 12 On the Bardi plot, see ibid., x1, 118; Annali di Simone della Tosa, in Crontchette antiche di vari scrittort del buon secolo della lingua toscana, ed. D. Manni

(Florence, 1733), p. 168; and Istorte pistolest ovvero delle cose avvenute in Toscana dall’anno MCCC al MCCCXLVIII (Prato, 1835), pp. 345-48. Sapori’s revisionist interpretation is not entirely convincing; Crisz, pp. 117-27. His argument that the Bardi were secking to reverse Florence’s Guelf policy and to reorient it toward Ghibellinism is based upon very slim evidence. 18G, Villani, x1, 100.

6

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

of France in 1340. Indeed, the great companies were able to survive

after 1340 only because news of their deteriorating position had not yet circulated among their creditors, who did not immediately demand the return of those assets, which had been sunk irretrievably into the maw of the English war effort.“ Florentine wealth and power had masked the weaknesses in the city’s economic and political position. The facade crumbled in 1342. Neither appeals to the pope and Naples for financial and military assistance, nor threats to seek Ghibelline support, achieved

any positive results. Indeed, these diplomatic maneuvers only provoke the Neapolitans to demand the return of their deposits from the Florentine companies, thus dooming those organizations

to inevitable bankruptcy.’ Confronted with economic collapse and political upheaval, the ruling group, in a final effort to save itself, had recourse to the signore. Walter of Brienne, Duke of Athens, had been selected to command Florence’s troops in the Lucca war; but he was also given supreme judicial authority within the city for a one-year period. Supported by magnates eager

to regain political influence, by bankers hoping to salvage their fortunes, and by artisans impoverished by the business depression, the duke was proclaimed signore for life in September 1342. Although the Duke of Athens took certain measures to alleviate Florence’s desperate position, he was unable to reverse the tide of misfortune. The economic advantages gained by the termination

of the Lucca war and the moratorium granted to the banking companies were dissipated by the duke’s extravagance and his harsh tax policy." The business depression continued, and its 14 On the deteriorating economic situation, see Sapori, Crist, pp. 131-40. By 1342,

confidence in the companies had been thoroughly shaken, as the petition of Taddeo dell’Antella to the Duke of Athens indicates: “Quod propter adversitates et sinistros casus, qui multis societatibus mercatorum in civitate Florentie hiis temporibus evenerunt, .. . creditores dictorum Taddey et sociorum concurrerunt pro eorum creditis repetendis ab eis... .” The petition further stated that “modica fides hodie in civitate Florentie mercatoribus adhibetur.” Sapori, “Il quaderno dei creditori di Taddeo dell’Antella e compagni,” Rivista delle biblioteche e degh archivi, n.s., 11 (1925), 159-60. 15 Sapori, Crist, pp. 141-45.

16 Qn the ducal regime in Florence, see C. Paoli, Della Signoria di Gualtieri Duca d’Atene (Florence, 1862); M. Becker and G. Brucker, “The Arti Minori in Florentine Politics, 1342-1378,” Mediaeval Studies, xvit1 (1956), 94-96; M. Becker, “Gualtieri di Brienne e l’uso delle dispense giudiziarie,” Archivio storico ttaliano [ASI], cxm (1955), 245-51.

7

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

effects were made more acute by a poor harvest and food scarcity.’ Artisans and workers became disenchanted with the duke for his

failure to provide them with work, and the patriciate turned against him because he was determined to rule alone for his own advantage. Walter of Brienne’s expulsion in July 1343 represented a unified effort of all classes in Florence, but the spirit of harmony and cooperation was of short duration. In September, street fighting broke out between magnates and a popular front comprising merchants, artisans, and laborers. The grandi, led by the Bardi, Rossi, and Adimari families, were decisively defeated, and the city’s third regime in one year was established. Into this government—from which the magnates were again excluded—a significant number of artisans and shopkeepers from the fourteen lower guilds were admitted, for the first time in Florentine history. The new regime which emerged from the political disorders of 1343 inherited a bleak legacy. From her position as the leading Guelf power of Tuscany, Florence had sunk to a lowly state. The commune had lost a large portion of territory so painfully acquired over decades, including the cities of Arezzo, Pistoia, and Volterra. As a consequence, the city also suffered a loss of prestige, revenue, and control over local trade routes.” Not only were the coffers of the communal treasury empty, but a huge public debt remained

| to be paid.*® The new government was far from stable; during the first five years of its life, there were several attempts to overthrow it.” The economic slump continued. “Florence today is in a very

poor state for artisans and the lower classes, for we can earn nothing,” wrote two workers to a friend in Avignon in 1344.” The bankruptcy of the Bardi, Peruzzi, and Acciaiuoli companies caused the collapse of many smaller business firms. There was at least a kernel of truth in Villani’s lament: “Our republic has lost all of its power, and our citizens have nearly all been impover17 G,. Villani, x11, 13.

18 The events of this revolution are described in zbid., x11, 19-22. 19 G, Villani, x11, 24, lists the losses and comments upon them.

20 On the commune’s financial difficulties, see B. Barbadoro, Le finanze della Repubblica fiorentina (Florence, 1926), pp. 629-49.

pp. 107-11. ,

21 G. Villani, x1, 28, 34; M. Becker and G. Brucker, “Una lettera in difesa della dittatura nella Firenze del Trecento,” ASI, cxm (1955), 254-56. See below, 22 Becker and Brucker, “Lettera,” 258.

8

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

ished.””* In 1346 famine conditions again prevailed in the city and surrounding countryside, more severe, according to Villani, than

citizens." |

the previous shortages of 1329 and 1340. In the following year, Florence was struck by a plague which killed some four thousand This relatively mild epidemic was a prelude to the Black Death, which made its appearance in Italy in the spring of 1348. No other event of the century so impressed itself upon the minds of contemporaries as did this scourge. The chroniclers clearly sensed the

inadequacy of words in describing the immensity of the catastrophe. Some sought to compensate for this verbal deficiency by making exaggerated estimates of the plague’s toll. For Florence, these guesses ranged from a loss of one-third to four-fifths of the population.” According to the most accurate estimate based upon available sources, approximately fifty thousand Florentines died in 1348, of a total population of some eighty thousand. Between 1350 and 1380, the city’s population fluctuated between fifty thousand and sixty thousand, or three-fifths of the figure which was reached at the height of Florence’s prosperity in 1338.*°

Revival and Reortentation of the Economy after 1348 The economic situation in Florence after the Black Death can only be described as chaotic. Upon a business community shaken by the bankruptcies, there now fell the further misfortune of a population and a market reduced by one-third.** While it was still 28 G, Villani, xu, 55. 24 Tbid., x11, 73, 84. 25 The most detailed accounts of the plague in Florence are M. Villani, Cronica (Florence, 1846), 1, 1, 2; Cronaca fiorentina di Marchionne di Coppo Stefant, ed. N. Rodolico, Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, [RRIISS| new ed., xxx, Part 1 (Citta di Castello, 1903-55), rubrics 634, 635.

26, Fiumi, “La demografia fiorentina nelle pagine di Giovanni Villani,” AST, cvit (1950), 112-18. Fiumi corrects earlier estimates by Rodolico, Pardi, and Barbadoro. The effects of the plague were more severe in the city than in the contado; the Florentine urban proletariat was a prime target of the pestilence, as were the monastic houses. The Dominican monastery of S. Maria Novella lost 83 friars, of a total of 130; S. Orlandi, O. P., “Necrologio” di Santa Maria Novella (Florence, 1955), 1, 388-90. 27 The effects of the plague in southern Europe are summarized by R. Lopez in The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, 11 (Cambridge, 1952), 338-39.

Lopez estimates that the mortality rate of the urban population varied between 35 and 65 per cent.

9

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

struggling with the complex problem of liquidating the assets of the insolvent companies, the commune faced the additional task of supervising the affairs of those merchants who were killed by

the pestilence.” The situation confronting the survivors of the plague may be visualized by this description of Paolo Morelli’s experiences, after the pestilence of 1363 had claimed his three brothers: “Paolo, young, inexperienced and alone, ... frightened by the death of his [brothers] and in fear of his own life, found himself in great confusion as a result of the need to collect credits worth thousands of florins. Many of the creditors and the employees of the company, who had their affairs in their heads, had died. Paolo had to search for these credits in Florence and the contado, and beyond, in Arezzo, Borgo [S. Sepolcro], Siena, Pisa, and in other foreign parts. He also had to retrieve merchandise and sell it and take charge of everything. At the same time, he had to give five hundred florins to Calandro’s [his brother’s| wife, to arrange the household affairs, the funerals, the legacies, and all of the other details which are without number in such times.”” Compounding the domestic difficulties was the disruption of the

network of Florentine business interests abroad, following the collapse of the companies. Many employees of these organizations streamed back to Florence to seek employment, while their com-

patriots who remained abroad were harassed by the authorities. According to the chronicler, Marchionne Stefani, Florentine merchants were badly treated in France, Germany, and Lombardy.” King Philip of France was incensed with the city’s expulsion of the Duke of Athens, and in retaliation he evicted Florentines who were living and trading in France.** Even in the territories of the 28Qn the commune’s administration of the bankrupt companies, see Sapori, Crist, pp. 158-84. This problem still occupied the attention of the government in 1348 and 1349; Archivio di Stato di Firenze | ASF], Provvisioni, 35, ff. 86r88r, 122r-124v; 36, ff. 48r-48v, 78v-7ov, 108r-ro8v. In June 1349 the commune appointed officials to settle the affairs of some 30 deceased merchants; Prov., 36,

fl. 106r-107Vv. :

29 Giovanni di Pagolo Morelli, Ricordi, ed. V. Branca (Florence, 1956), pp.

153°54-

8° Stefani, 620, 6309.

81 Iiid., 608, 627; I Capitolt del Comune di Firenze. Inventario e regesto, ed.

C. Guasti and A. Gherardi, 2 vols. (Florence, 1866-93), 1, 490. |

10

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

city’s traditional Guelf allies, the merchants were in constant danger of losing their property through reprisals, to satisfy the creditors of the defunct companies.”

Despite these adverse economic conditions, the Florentine business community recovered from the decade of disaster with remarkable rapidity.** Rental income from shops, which had declined steadily since 1340, began to rise sharply after 1350, an indication of increased demand for business establishments.** A con-

temporary writer, describing the adverse effects on business of robber bands and marauding soldiers, noted that Florence’s wool industry was still flourishing, and that it provided a livelihood for large numbers of workers.* The measures taken by the Lana guild after the Black Death to prevent the payment of high wages and

ensure a fair distribution of the available labor supply indicate that both the demand for cloth and potential profits were substantial in these years.*° The matriculation figures of the guilds engaged in large-scale industry and commerce reveal a notable increase in the number of matricolats after 1348. Between 1349 and

1356, over one hundred new members were enrolled in the Lana guild of woolen cloth manufacturers, and 132 matricolati were inscribed in the records of the Calimala guild, which specialized in the refinement of quality cloth. In the same period, the bankers of the Cambio guild accepted 224 new entrants, and forty-one 82 Sapori, Crist, pp. 187-93.

88 The rapidity of this recovery is described by Lopez in The Cambridge Economic History, u, 343. 34 Sapori has collated statistics for the period 1314-1367 on the rental income from certain shops owned by members of the Del Bene family; Stzdi, pp. 320-23.

This income declined some 40 per cent between 1340 and 1352; it then rose until by 1367 it had nearly reached the 1340 figure. 85 ASF, Manoscritti, 222, f. 198: “In Talia si trovava in malle stato, per che la chorte non stava a Rroma; eran rotte le strade da malandrini ... ma per lo sussidio de panni che molto se ne lavorara in nostra citta, molte gente si sostenava.” Even in 1345, when business conditions were most depressed, some firms prospered. The company headed by Antonio di Lando degli Albizzi made a profit

of 33 per cent on its investment in that year; R. de Roover, “The Story of the Alberti Company of Florence, 1302-1348, as Revealed in its Account Books,” The Business History Review, xxxu (1958), 38, n. 77. This firm, however, was badly

disrupted in 1348 when Antonio and two of his partner sons succumbed to the Black Death. 86 A. Doren, Die Florentiner Wollentuchindustrie vom vierzehnten bis zum sechzehnten Jahrhundert (Stuttgart, 1901), pp. 229, 240.

Il

IHE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

silk manufacturers enrolled in the guild of Por San Maria.*" Although a certain proportion of this influx involved the replacement of deceased guildsmen, the trend indicates that opportunities for business activity and profit still existed in banking, commerce, and industry. Monetary evidence also supports the conclusion that the years immediately following the Black Death were characterized by rapid economic expansion and prosperity for the entrepreneurial classes. Between 1348 and 1354, the value of the gold florin, in terms of silver currency, rose very sharply, a condition

which both reflected and contributed to a favorable economic situation for businessmen.” Nor was the foreign network of Florentine commercial activity totally disrupted by the events of the 1340’s. Many merchants who remained abroad survived the difficulties, renewing and expanding their business operations after the Black Death. The extent of the Florentine diaspora cannot be determined with accuracy, but it involved many hundreds and perhaps thousands of merchants.” In the Romagna towns of Rimini, Fano, and Pescara, some fifty natives of the Arno city were engaged in business in 1345.*° Florentine merchants remained active in Perugia and other Umbrian cities throughout the 1340’s.* The city’s mercantile community in Naples apparently survived the displeasure of the royal court, for in 1353 the commune demanded that Queen Joanna’s government cease molesting and persecuting its citizens who resided there.” Southern France remained a focal point of Tuscan business activity; in 1350, thirteen Florentine banking firms were engaged in the transfer of papal funds from Avignon to Italy.“ Colonies of 87 The lists of matricolati in the respective guilds for this period are recorded in ASF, Lana, 19, 20; Cambio, 12; Por San Maria, 7; Manoscritti, 542 (Calimala).

88C. Cipolla, Stud: di storia della moneta, 1 (Padua, 1948), 59-60, 106. Although Florentine fiscal policy contributed to this phenomenon, it occurred

p. 161. |

throughout northern and central Italy; ibid., 26, 45, 47, 56, and especially, 187-200. 89 In 1375 the Florentine community in Avignon numbered 600; Sapori, Studz,

40 ASF, Atti del Esecutore degli Ordinamenti della Giustizia [AEO]], 38, f. av.

41G. degli Azzi Vitelleschi, Le relazioni tra la Repubblica di Firenze e l’'Umbria nel secolo xiv, secondo i documenti di R. Archivio di Stato di Firenze (Perugia, 1904), 1, docs. 107-09, 113, 131, 154, 162. 42 ASF, Missive, 11, f£. 22Yr.

43 'Y, Renouard, Les relations des Papes d’Avignon et des compagnies commerciales et bancaires de 1316 a 1378 (Paris, 1941), pp. 250ff.

12

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

Florentine merchants were established in Marseilles, Nimes, Mont-

pellier, and Toulouse.** Although Sicily and England were two areas where Florentine commerce declined after 1343, this loss was

partially balanced by increased activity in the lands to the north and east of Venice, particularly Hungary.* A notable example of a business organization which survived the economic pitfalls of the 1340’s was the Alberti company.” Established early in the fourteenth century, the Alberti firm experienced a period of adversity between 1310 and 1318. It survived these difficulties, however, and maintained its position as a pros-

perous company of middling rank. In the 1340’s the Alberti did suffer losses from insolvent debtors, particularly the Bardi,*’ but “4On Florentine business activity in France, see E. Labande, “De quelques Italiens établis en Languedoc sous Charles V,” Mélanges d’histoire du moyen age dediés 2 la mémoire de Louis Halphen (Paris, 1951), pp. 359-67; E. Baratier and F. Reynaud, Histoire du commerce de Marseille (Paris, 1951—), 11, 172-75. Donato Velluti described the career of his brother Piccio who engaged in trade in Marseilles between 1346 and his death in 1348; La cronica domestica di Messer Donato Velluti, ed. I. del Lungo and G. Volpi (Florence, 1914), pp. 146-47.

*5On Florentine commercial activity in Sicily, see C. Trasselli, “Nuovi documenti sui Peruzzi, Bardi e Acciaiuoli in Sicilia,’ Economia e storia, m1 (1956), 179-95. On declining trade with England, see A. Ruddock, Italian Merchants and Shipping in Southampton, 1270-1600 (Southampton, 1951), pp. 39-44; E. Carus Wilson, “Trends in the Export of English Woolens in the Fourteenth Century,” Economic History Review, ser. 2, 11 (1950), 162-76; E. Power,

The Wool Trade in English Medieval History (Oxford, 1941), pp. 54-62; A. Beardwood, Alien Merchants in England, 1350 to 1377 (Cambridge, Mass., 1931), p. 160.

On the important Florentine commercial expansion into the area north and

east of Venice, including Hungary, see G. Canestrini, “Discorso sopra alcune relazioni della Repubblica fiorentina col Re d’Ungheria,” ASI, ser. 1, 1v, Pt. 1 (1843), 188ff.; G. Wenzel, Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Acta extera (Budapest, 1874-76), mI, 131-32, 150-52; C. de Franceschi, “Esuli fiorentine della compagnia di Dante mercanti e prestatori a Trieste e in Istria,” Archivio veneto, ser. 5, xxut (1938), g2ff.; P. Neri, “I commercianti fiorentini in Alto Adige nei secoli xiii e xiv,” Archivio per l’Alto Adige, xuu1 (1948), 90-146; N. Rubinstein,

“The place of the Empire in 15th Century Florentine Political Opinion and Diplomacy,” Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, xxx (1957), 129-30.

#6 Sapori has recently edited the surviving account books of the Alberti; I libri degh Alberti del Giudice (Milan, 1952). For discussions of the material provided by this source, see Sapori, “Gli Alberti del Giudice di Firenze,” Stud: in onore dt Gino Luzzatto (Milan, 1950), 1, 254-73; R. de Roover, “Alberti,” Bus. Hist. Rev., xxxu, 14-59; G. Luzzatto, “Per la storia dell’economia rurale in Italia nel secolo xiv,” Eventail de l'histoire vivante. Hommage @ Lucien Febvre (Paris, 1953), UH, 105-13.

47 De Roover, “Alberti,” 20.

13

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

at mid-century they were the largest solvent business organization in Florence. In 1348 they employed nineteen factors in Florence, Avignon, Naples, and Barletta, and their annual payroll amounted

to 790 lire.’ Significant evidence of their economic strength is provided by the substantial purchases of real estate, exceeding eleven hundred florins in value, made by one of the partners, Bartolomeo di Caroccio Alberti, between 1349 and 1353.” However, the economic prosperity of the period immediately following the Black Death was not permanent, and Florence did not regain the level of productivity and wealth she had achieved before 1340. The general contraction of the European economy, reflecting a major decline in population, persisted throughout the fourteenth century.” There were periodic recurrences of plague and famine, and reinforcing the adverse effects of these natural calamities were the unsettled political conditions which prevailed

in many part of Europe: the war in France, civil strife in Spain and Germany, and, most serious of all, the devastations of the armed companies.” From Piedmont to the Abruzzi, the Italian peninsula was ravaged by marauding bands of discharged soldiers, the dregs of the armies of Europe. These endemic war conditions seriously restricted mercantile activity. For the cloth industry the halcyon days had definitely passed, and after 1348 the output of Florentine factories probably did not exceed thirty thousand pieces

annually.” This was less than one-half of the amount manufactured in 1338, although the rate of production, in terms of the city’s population and working force, had not greatly decreased.” 48 Tbhid., 26.

497 libri degli Alberti del Giudice, pp. 303-05. 5° On this problem, see Camb. Ec. Hist., 1, 343-45; C. Cipolla, “The Trends in Italian Economic History in the Later Middle Ages,” Journal of Economic History, 1x (1949), 181-84.

51 There is an excellent summary of perils and difficulties of mercantile activity in Renouard, Relations, pp. 199-200. For a vivid description of the depredations of the armed companies, see M. Villani, rx, 1. 52 Doren, Wollentuchindustrie, pp. 406-10; R. Davidsohn, “Bliite und Nieder-

gang der Florentiner Tuch-Industrie,” Zeitschrift fir die gesammte StaatsWissenschaft, uxxxv (1928), 241-46. In 1373 the poet Antonio Pucci stated that

the industry produced 30,000 pieces annually. Since this was in a period of economic depression, it is possible that the figure was higher during the years of prosperity after 1348.

58 Davidsohn has calculated the population, size of working force and production for 1338 and 1373 as follows:

14

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

A graph of Florentine business trends for the period 1348-1378 would reveal a series of short-term fluctuations, with alternating phases of prosperity and recession. If the incidence of bankruptcy is used as an index of business conditions, the most prosperous years were 1349-1357 and 1361-1365, while the years 1358-1360 and

1366-1378 were periods of depression.“ The 1360 crisis was the direct consequence of the exodus of Florentine merchants from Pisa, as part of the campaign to extract greater port privileges from that city. According to a Sienese chronicler, the Florentine cloth industry was seriously damaged by the abandonment of the Arno port.’ The end of the Pisa war in 1364 ushered in a brief era of prosperity before the onset of another grave economic crisis beginning in 1369.°° This depression resulted from a combination of unfortunate circumstances: famine, plague, and the spread of war, which blocked trade routes and ruined markets. In 1369 an anonymous chronicler lamented, “Profits have greatly diminished,” while

in that same year a decree of the Lana guild referred to “the depressed condition of the guild and of its members and of the other merchants in the city.”*’ This crisis was prolonged and intensified by the war with the papacy (1375-1378) and the upheavals of the

Ciompi revolution and its aftermath (1378-1382); it is probable that during this decade the Florentine economy reached its lowest point since 1348.°° In the midst of these difficulties, Florence was

Year Population Working Force Production

1338 1373 90,000 55,000 30,000 14,000 75,000 30,000

A controversy among scholars has developed over the extent of the decline of

the cloth industry in Florence in the late fourteenth century. The views of A. Sapori, in Studi, pp. 544-47, represent a balanced and judicious estimate of the problem. 54 These figures are derived from the provisions pertaining to the appointment of bankruptcy commissions: 1349-1357, seven bankruptcies; 1358-1360, twelve; 1361-1365, two; 1366-1370, thirty; 1371-1376, forty-three. 55 Cronaca senese dt Donato di Neri e di suo figlio Nert, in Cronache senest, ed. A. Lisini and F. Iacometti, RRIISS, new ed., xv, Part 6 (Bologna, 1931-39), 595. See also Cronica di Pisa, RRIISS (Milan, 1723-51), xv, col. 1035. 56 Doren, Wollentuchindustrie, p. 410.

57 Cronichetta d’incerto, in Cronichette antiche, p. 191; A. Doren, Le arti fiorentine, trans. G. Klein (Florence, 1940), 1, 255, n. 7. 58In 1381 woolen cloth production had declined to 20,000 pieces; one of the demands of the Ciompi in 1378 was that 24,000 pieces be produced annually; Doren, Wollentuchindustrie, pp. 467-68, 526.

15

IHE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

able to finance a war costing two million florins—additional proof of the sturdy and resilient character of her economy and the mas-

sive resources of her citizens.” oe

The revival of the Florentine economy after the Black Death indicates that neither the capital resources nor the productive capacity of the city were mortally damaged by the events of the 1340's. However, the economic structure did not emerge from the crisis unaltered and intact. Two significant and related developments had decisively changed the pattern of the economy: a substantial redistribution of wealth, and a major revolution in the personnel who controlled Florence’s large commercial, industrial, and banking enterprises.

Literary evidence and economic data both support the conclusion that many Florentines suffered economic loss during the 1340's. In the prologue to his Novelle, Franco Sacchetti made note of the many individuals and families in his time who had been reduced to poverty.” Paolo di Ser Pace da Certaldo, the moralizing collector of proverbs, observed: “I have seen great kings, great lords, great citizens, and great merchants fall from their position, and ... living in poverty and misery.” The “great merchants” to

whom Paolo referred doubtless included the soci of the great companies, although these men did not have a monopoly on business failure. Catalogued among the archival records of communal

elections is an incomplete list of 350 Florentines who suffered 5® Stefani, 795, estimated the cost of the war at 2,243,000 f. 89Tn the light of the evidence presented in the preceding pages, Renouard’s conclusion that the Florentine economy did not recover to an appreciable degree until 1360 must be revised; Recherches sur les compagnies commerciales et bancaires uttlisées par les Papes d’ Avignon avant le grand schisme (Paris, 1942), pp. 24-28. The amount of capital and the scope of operations of the companies between 1348 and 1360 was much greater than Renouard assumed; zid., p. 25, notes 2 and 3. In 1367 the company headed by Carlo degli Strozzi, which succeeded an earlier one, had a capitalization of 53,600 fl., a figure which compares favorably with the capital of the Bardi and Peruzzi organizations before 1340; ASF, Carte Strozziane, ser. 5, 1, f. 5v. The capitalization of the larger Alberti antiqgui company must have been considerably greater. On the business activities of the Uzzano company between 1360 and 1370, see V. Rutenberg, “La Compagnia Uzzano,” Studi in onore di Armando Sapori (Milan, 1957), 1,

689-706. ,

_ 81. Sacchetti, 1] libro delle trecentonovelle, ed. E. Li Gotti (Rome, 1946), proemio. 62 Libro di buoni costumi, ed. A. Schiaffini (Florence, 1945), pp. 173-74.

16

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

bankruptcy between 1333 and 1346.°° In addition to the prominent families—Bardi, Peruzzi, Acciaiuoli, Baroncelli, Antellesi—the list contains hundreds of unfamiliar names belonging to obscure, petty entrepreneurs, the minor casualties of the mid-century economic

disasters. More numerous than the bankrupts were the investors, who had deposited funds with the defunct companies and received back only a portion of their investment.“ The list of creditors of the Antellesi company reveals that individuals from all levels of Florentine society were directly involved in the fate of the companies: magnates, merchants, artisans, widows, and orphans.” Losses of the greatest magnitude were sustained by the mer-

chants who controlled the bankrupt companies, although few suffered imprisonment and total ruin. Adoardo Acciaiuoli and Giovanni Villani were among those imprisoned for debt. Matteo Villani returned to Florence a bankrupt after a prosperous career as an associate of the Buonaccorsi company in Naples and Avignon,

and he was forced to accept a petty clerical post in the communal administration to support himself.** Several company directors, however, were able to salvage a substantial part of their fortunes. Taddeo dell’Antella and his associates kept their assets out of the hands of the bankruptcy commissioners by making fictitious sales of their property, and by hiding the company’s books.*” None of the Bardi or Peruzzi became destitute; indeed, the Bardi remained 88 ASF, Tratte, 1155, no pagination. The list includes the bankrupts with given names A through S. It was probably compiled as a guide for election officials; bankrupts were excluded from communal office. 64 Creditors of the Bardi, Peruzzi and Acciaiuoli companies were authorized to receive 48 per cent, 37 per cent, and 50 per cent of their investments, respec-

tively; Sapori, Crist, pp. 174, 193. | 85 Sapori, “Quaderno,” Rivista delle biblioteche e degli archivi, n.s., w1, 168ff.

The creditors included Ciore and Neri Pitti (400 fl.). Francesco di Lapo Mangioni (540 f.), Messer Bindaccio Ricasoli (380 fl.), Lemmo di Ser Cambi, druggist (24 lire), and Monna Antonia, widow of Messer Talano degli Adimari

(380 f1.). | |

66 See the plea for mercy by the imprisoned and impoverished Acciaiuoli; Prov., 38, ff. 157v-158r. On the Villani, see Renouard, Recherches, p. 21, n. 4; Brucker, “The Ghibelline Trial of Matteo Villani,” Medievalia et Humanistica, x11 (1960), 48-55. Matteo’s tax levy in the 1352 sega was small, but still in the upper 50 per cent of his quarter; ASF, Estimo, 306, f. 84r. This tax assessment has been analyzed statistically by B. Barbadoro, “Finanza e demografia nei ruoli fiorentine d’imposta del 1352-1355,” Atti del Congresso internazionale per lo studio dei problemi della popolazione (Rome, 1933), 1X, 624-29. - 87 Sapori, “Quaderno,” 161.

17

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

one of the three or four wealthiest families in Florence after 1350. The tax assessments of Sandro di Bartolo, Bartolo di Giovanni, and Piero di Messer Ridolfo, all soci of the Bardi organization, ranked in the upper two percent of the quarter of S. Spirito.°° With few exceptions,’’ neither these merchants nor their direct descendants re-entered the business world in an active capacity after the 1340's. Either the stigma of the failures or their own loss of confidence restrained them. However, some of their relatives, who had not

been involved in the bankruptcies, continued to pursue active business careers. One notable example was Simone di Rinieri Peruzzi, who combined the management of an international trading company with an influential role in communal policies.” Not all Florentines, however, experienced economic adversity in the 1340’s. We may accept with reservations Matteo Villani’s assertion that the lower classes enjoyed great prosperity after the plague, although the labor shortage did improve temporarily their economic situation.” The money spent on medicines and burials in 1340 and 1348 promoted the economic interests of those doctors,

druggists, gravediggers, and manufacturers of shrouds who survived the pestilence. A more important factor in redistributing wealth was inheritance. If some part of the property of the plague’s victims enriched the treasuries of churches and religious confraternities,”* the major portion was willed to relatives. Donato Vel88 On the economic status of the Bardi, see Brucker, “Un documento fiorentino sulla guerra, sulla finanza e sulla amministrazione pubblica (1375),” ASI, cxv (1957), 166, n. 8. The socit (or their descendants) of the Peruzzi company were nearly all in the upper one-fourth bracket of tax assessments in 1352, and some were in the upper one-tenth; Estimo, 306, ff. 77r, 78v, 81r. On this point, see P. J. Jones, “Florentine families and Florentine diaries in the fourteenth century,” Studies in Italian Medieval History presented to Miss E. M. Jamison (Rome, 1956), p. 202, who describes the long and tedious nature of bankruptcy proceedings. 69 E'stimo, 306, ff. 1or-11Vv.

7° Two exceptions were the small Bardi companies formed after 1346; Sapori, Crisi, pp. 86-90; Renouard, Recherches, pp. 28-209. 71 Simone directed one of the companies which used the port of Pisa in 1369;

S. Peruzzi, Storia del commercio e dei banchieri di Firenze (Florence, 1868), pp. 219-21. For a fragment of his account books, see Sapori, J libri di commercio dei Peruzzi (Milan, 1934), pp. 515-25. He was one of the wealthiest men in Florence; see his tax assessments in 1352, 1364, and 1378; Estimo, 306, f. 78v; ASF, Prestanze, 117, f£. 83v; 333, £. 7ar.

72M. Villani, 1, 4. |

78 These bequests were in many cases utilized for religious building and

18

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

luti was one of many Florentines whose possessions were materially increased by bequests from those who died in 1348." The records of the monte, the communal public debt, constitute

an important source for documenting the redistribution of wealth in Florence. When, in 1345, the commune consolidated all of its outstanding obligations into a funded debt, paying five percent interest annually, it also authorized the transfer of credits between individuals, The release of this reservoir of hitherto unavailable capital stimulated a veritable orgy of buying and selling monte shares, whose market price fluctuated between one-fourth and one-

third of the original value.” That large numbers of investors were prepared to sacrifice their holdings clearly indicates a widespread and pressing need for liquid assets in Florence.”* Although a part of this money was doubtless used to invest in more lucrative enterprises, many of these sales, made to pay debts or to re-

place sources of income that had dried up, were symbols of economic decline. One striking example of this trend involved the widow of a magnate, Messer Tegghie Buondelmonti. She liquidated her monte credit of 866 florins, a large investment which

indicates that her husband was quite wealthy.” In 1352 her two sons, Benghi and Ruggiero, received a tax assessment which was lower than that of many artisans, suggesting that their fortune was of extremely modest proportions.” decoration, thus contributing indirectly to the welfare of painters, sculptors, and stonemasons. Thus Orcagna’s construction of the tabernacle in the Or San Michele was made possible by the 350,000 fl. received by the confraternity at the time of the plague; M. Meiss, Painting in Florence and Siena after the Black Death (Princeton, N.J., 1951), pp. 78-79. 74 Velluti, pp. 190-91. M. Villani, 1, 4, also comments on this transfer of wealth through inheritance. 75M. Villani, m1, 106. 78 On the liquidation by the Medici of their monte credits, see Brucker, “The Medici in the Fourteenth Century,” Speculum, xxx11 (1957), 5.

77 ASF, Monte of 1345, Santa Maria Novella [S.M.N.\, f. g21r. Most of the loans which were consolidated in the monte were forced loans, levied in the period 1328-1343 on the basis of wealth. A large monte credit therefore indicates a heavy prestanza assessment and substantial wealth during this period; Barbadoro, Finanze, Ch. 8. Jacopo and Amerigo del Bene paid 336 fl. in forced loans between November 1337 and April 1340; Sapori, Studi, pp. 217-19. 78 E'stimo, 306, f£. o5r. A large number of magnates liquidated their monte

credits after 1345; for example, in the quarter of S. Maria Novella, Messer Andrea Buondelmonti (148 f1.), Messer Biagio Tornaquinci (360 f1.), Messer

19

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

The plight of those who were forced to sell their monte credits was turned into substantial advantage for individuals with available capital. By purchasing these credits at bargain prices, speculators were able to ensure themselves of a guaranteed return of

fifteen or twenty percent on their investment. For Florence’s monied class, the monte was a welcome alternative to commercial

and real estate investment; it had the double advantage of being safe and lucrative.” Many of these speculators belonged to the old mercantile patriciate, which had participated in the business life of Florence for a century or more. Several members of the Strozzi family, for example, were heavy investors in monte shares

and were also partners in a flourishing mercantile company en-

, gaged in international trade. Their neighbours in the quarter of S. Maria Novella, the Rucellai, also possessed extensive monte investments and were active in the manufacture of woolen cloth.” A significant number of these large-scale speculators were men whose ancestors had not been prominent in business circles before 1340, and whose families did not belong to that select group which had controlled the economy and the politics of Florence since the beginning of the century. Their fortunes relatively unimpaired by the economic difficulties of the 1340's, these gente nuova were in a position to invest heavily in business, real estate, and government securities. Notable examples of these new elements in the Floren-

tine business world were two brothers, Francesco and Piero di Tani Pantaleoni. Both were heavy investors in the 1345 monte, their holdings exceeding four thousand florins. Francesco had died

before 1352, but his brother was matriculated into the Lana and Giovanni Gianfigliazzi (1463 f1.), Jacopo Cavalcanti (304 f1.), and Jacopo Giandonati (241 fl.); Monte of 1345, S.M.N., ff. 18v, Sor, 418r, 419r, 424©. 79On monte speculations after 1345, see M. Villani, m1, 106; A. Sapori, Studz, pp. 347-52; G. Brucker, “Documento,” 168-70; P. J. Jones, “Florentine families,” p. 199, n. 130. 80 Strozzi investments in the 1345 monte totalled nearly 25,000 f1.; Brucker,

“Medici,” 5, n. 22. Heavy investors included Benedetto and Leonardo di Messer Giovanni (2145 fi.), Carlo (2000 fl.), Palla di Messer Jacopo (3773 f1.), and Strozza di Rosso (3707 fl.); Monte of 1345, S.M.N., ff. 98v, 223r, 697v, 7031, '784r, 945r. Members of the family who were shareholders in Carlo degli Strozzi’s company are listed in Carte Strozziane, ser. 5, 1, £. 5v. Rucellai credits in the monte exceeded 7000 fl.; Monte of 1345, S.M.N., ff. 58r, 161r, 280v, 343Vv, 360r, 513Vv, 586v, 827r, 944r. Eleven members of the family were enrolled in the Lana guild between 1350 and 1378.

20

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

Por San Maria guilds, and in 1369 was the head of a mercantile company engaged in foreign trade. His tax assessments indicate that he had become one of the wealthiest residents of the quarter of S. Maria Novella.” The economic status of the gente nuova and the extent to which

they had achieved wealth are further documented by the communal tax records.’ After 1350, the greatest concentrations of wealth were still in the hands of certain old families, most notably, the Bardi, Alberti, Strozzi, and Albizzi.** The business disasters, political revolutions, and plagues of the 1340’s had not changed

this situation. However, the gente nuova, who can be roughly defined as those individuals whose families were not represented in the Signoria before 1343, constituted a very definite economic challenge to the old order. The records of the 1352 estzmo indicate that the “new men” comprise two-fifths of those households in the highest two percent of tax assessments.” 81 For the monte transactions of the Pantaleoni, see Monte of 1345, S.M.N., ff. g15r, g17r; on their tax assessments, Estimo, 306, f. 97v; Pres., 118, £. 19V3 334,

f. 21v. Other heavy speculators in monte credits from the quarter of S. Maria Novella included these gente nuova: Giunta Rosini, Giovanni di Guido Perini, Giovanni di Lapo Davizzi, Giovanni Guglielmi, setazuolo, Lippo Doni del Saggina, Lorenzo Bufache; Monte of 1345, S.M.N., ff. 335Vv, 417r, 420r, 4221, 423r, 513V, 576r, 9I7Vv.

82 The city’s first complete tax roll which has survived is the 1352 sega; for a discussion of this tax, see Barbadoro, “Finanza e demografia,” 615-23; Fiumi, “Demografia fiorentina,” ASI, cv, 106-10. The extant records of forced loans (prestanze) begin in 1359, and they continue without any appreciable gaps throughout the century. 88 See Brucker, “Medici,” 5-6. The Bardi were both the wealthiest and the largest family in Florence; in the prestanza of August 1364, 52 households were assessed a total of 2555 f.; Pres., 116, ff. 12-33. 84 This tax bracket included some 170 households. Of the ten richest Florentines in this period, only four were from families of the highest rank: Messer Niccolé. Alberti, Messer Pazzino degli Strozzi, Castrone di Sinibaldo de’ Bardi, and Bettino Ricasoli. The other six included Bartolomeo Panciatichi, a member of the Pistoian nobility who had emigrated to Florence; Tedaldo Tedaldi, who belonged to an ancient Florentine family which had never been represented in the Signoria; and four men who can legitimately be classified as gente nuova: Francesco Rinuccini, Messer Lapo Ruspi, Guido di Francesco Monaldi, and Francesco di Giovanni Davizzi. These names were collated from three tax lists: the 1352 sega, and the prestanze of August 1364 and April 1378. Although the methods of tax assessment in Florence were haphazard, inaccurate, and arbitrary (at least before the institution of the catasto), the results were fairly consistent. While it would be impossible to estimate the size of an individual’s fortune from his tax quota, it is possible to rank him economically in relation to his fellows.

21

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND ,

Survey of a single district brings this general pattern into sharper

focus. The district (gonfalone) of the White Lion, in the quarter of S. Maria Novella, was the second most populous of the four dis-

85 « e e

tricts in the quarter. Within its boundaries lived representatives of every stratum of Florentine society: magnates, wealthy merchants, artisans, shopkeepers, usurers, porters, servants, and market

women.” The most affluent residents of the district were Carlo degli Strozzi, head of one of the largest mercantile companies in

the city, and two cousins, Andrea di Segnino and Baldese di Torino Baldesi.** The Baldesi had first entered the Signoria in 1310

and were active in business and politics throughout the fourteenth century. In a more modest but still substantial economic category

were such mercantile families as the Dietsalvi, Sassetti, and Buere.”” The most striking fact revealed by the tax data is the number of old, established families in the district whose economic | fortunes had declined sharply. Most precipitous was the descent | of the Bordoni, formerly one of the most prominent families in Florence, whose members had been reduced to near-poverty in this period.** The Scali, Amieri, Mangioni, and Beccanugi families

had also experienced economic adversity, and after 1350 were living in the shadow of their former prosperity.” The greatest magnate house in the district was the Tornaquinci, and its members cannot be fitted into a single economic category. Those who engaged in banking and exchange activities were prosperous, but

the majority were in modest economic circumstances. Indeed, some of the Tornaquinci received tax assessments which were near the minimum.” In this district, as elsewhere in Florence, 85 The evidence on which this paragraph is based is from the tax assessment (sega) of 1352, and the prestanze of August 1364 and April 1378; Estimo, 306, ff. 18r-126r; Pres., 118, ff. 85r-108v; 334, ff. 93r-127F.

86In April 1378 Carlo degli Strozzi was assessed gt fl.; the Baldesi were assessed 76 and 42 fl.; Pres., 334, ff. 103r, 106v; 335, f£. 78r. 87 On the Sassetti, see P. J. Jones, “Florentine families,” pp. 184-85. 88 Cf. the Bordoni tax assessments; Estimo, 306, f. 121r; Pres., 334, ff. 104r, Io5r. 89 The Scali and the Amieri suffered bankruptcy in 1326; G. Villani, x, 4. On

the importance of the Bordoni and Beccanugi in the late thirteenth century, see N. Ottokar, 1] Comune di Firenze alla fine del dugento (Florence, 1926), pp. 92-96. Sacchetti described one of the Beccanugi, Salvino di Simone, as “poverissimo”; Novelle, no. 133. 8° On the tax assessments of the Tornaquinci, see Estimo, 306, ff. 120r, 1231; Pres., 118, ff. gtr-g2r, 96r-g6v, 108r; 334, ff. g9v, rorv, 121v. Several members

22

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

there were several prosperous artisans and shopkeepers who paid higher taxes than most magnate households.” With few exceptions, the “new men” who became rich were personally engaged in large-scale business activities—mercantile, industrial, financial. Constituting a large and influential element in the Florentine business elite, they competed strenuously with

the members of the old mercantile patriciate who still pursued active business careers.” That most aristocratic of guilds, the Calimala, whose matriculation list in the early fourteenth century could be equated with the city’s social register, contained a signifcant number of gente nuova in the second half of the century.” Equally noteworthy is the flood of unfamiliar names inscribed in the rosters of the other great guilds—Lana, Cambio, Por San Maria—where the “new men” overwhelmed the remnants of the old patriciate by sheer weight of numbers.” of the family became popolani after 1361, changing their names to Popoleschi and Cardinali. In April 1378 the highest tax assessments were levied against Gregorio and Niccoléd di Pagnozzo Cardinali (25 fl, 10 s.) and Simone di Tieri Tornaquinci (20 f1., 8 s.); Pres., 334, ff. 99v, toov. These men were active members of the Cambio guild; Cambio, 14, ff. 3r, 28v. The lowest assessments (1 fl., 5 d.) were levied against the households of Domenico di Manetto, Sandro di Simone, Tiero di Francesco, and Niccolo di Tegghie Tornaquinci; Pres., 334, ff. roor-to1v. Only a very few households in the district were assessed lower amounts: 10 s.,6s., and § s. 91 Cf. the April 1378 assessments of Jacopo di Riccio (7 fl., 13 s.) and Niccold di Tieri (19 fl., 14 s.), blacksmiths; Piero di Lippo (8 fi, 10 s.) and Chelluccio di Chele (7 f1., 3 s.), old-clothes dealers; and Bencivenni Gratini, tanner (10 f1, 17 s.)3 with the levies of Filippozzo di Messer Jacopo degli Amieri (1 f1., 5 s.), Leonardo di Niccolé Beccanugi (3 fl., 1 s.), Cipriano di Lippozzo Mangioni (3 fl, 1 s.), Niccold, Angelo, and Chele di Jacopo Bordoni (2 fl.), Carlo di Francesco Mangioni (1 fl.), and Simone di Bordone Bordoni (1 fl., 3 s.); Pres., 334, ff. 93v, o8r, r04r-105r, 106v, I09QV, II5r. 82 There had always been a small but steady influx of “new men” into the top rank of the Florentine business community; in 1300 the Cerchi were considered gente nuova “siccome genti venuti di piccolo tempo in grande stato e podere”; G. Villani, vit1, 39. What distinguishes the period after the 1340's

is the large number of parvenus who had broken into the select circle of business leadership.

®3 At the beginning of the fourteenth century, the Calimala guild was the exclusive preserve of the old mercantile families: Cerchi, Mozzi, Pulci, Canigiani,

Bardi, Pazzi, Spini, Peruzzi; G. Filippi, L’arte det mercanti di Calamala ed il suo pit antico statuto (Turin, 1889), pp. 46-50. After the Black Death, gente nuova infiltrate into the guild in increasing numbers: Tommaso di Lippo Amizzini, Niccolé di Piero del Bagniuolo, Lorenzo Bartoli, Niccolo Benedicti, Jacopo Betti, Giovanni Bianciardi; Manoscritti, 542, passim.

®4The names of the newly enrolled members of the great guilds after 1348

23

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

The infusion of new elements into international trade after 1350 can be seen clearly by comparison of two lists of Florentine companies who were authorized to use the facilities of the port

of Pisa.”” The earlier list, drawn up in 1329, has the names of twenty seven firms engaged in international commerce, nearly all of which were controlled by men from ancient families: Bardi,

Peruzzi, Acciaiuoli, Alberti, Buonaccorsi, Antellesi, Albizzi, Rucellai, Corsini, Biliotti. The much larger list, from 1369, comprises 106 firms. It also includes representatives from the families

who had been engaged in foreign trade for decades: Alberti, Castellani, Strozzi, Ricci, Covoni, Baldesi, Rucellai. However, nearly one-half of the companies (51 of 106) were headed by gente nuova, whose participation in international commerce began after 1350, and whose names—Tommaso di Piero Parigi, Valeriano Dolcibene, Zanobi Truffe, Francesco Vigorosi—made but a fleeting impression in the economic records of the city.*° That large numbers of gente nuova moved into the upper echeJons of the Florentine business class after 1350 is a trend which can be amply documented. However, the evidence supporting a corollary proposition, that there was a corresponding withdrawal

of the old mercantile patriciate from entrepreneurial activity, is less conclusive.*’ Clearly, there was no absolute or total retreat are recorded in Lana, 19, 20; Cambio, 12; Por San Maria, 7. The names of gente nuova also predominate in the lists of the consuls of the major guilds. In 1355 the consuls of the Cambio guild were Francesco Bonafati, Giovanni di Matteo Guidi, Jacopo di Piero Sacchetti, Cambio di Arrigo Fei, Simone di Neri dell’Antella, Piero di Bonaventura Ricoveri, Sandro Barucci, Giovanni Bianciardi, Amerigo di Bernardo da Sommaia, Jacopo Renzi, Ubaldino di Fastello Petriboni, and Albizzo di Lippo Bellandi; S. La Sorsa, L’organizzazione dei cambiatori fiorentini nel medio evo (Cerignola, 1903), p. 86. Only three of these cambiatori were members of old, established families (Sacchetti, Antellesi, Ricoveri)—a much lower ratio than before 1343; cf. ibid., pp. 83-85. ®5 The 1329 list is printed in P. Silva, “L’ultimo trattato commerciale tra Pisa e Firenze,” Studi storict diretti da F. Crivellucci, xvi1 (1908), 642-43. The 1369 list is printed in zbzd., xvu, 679-83, and in S. Peruzzi, Storia del commercio, pp. 220-22.

86 A similar ratio between old and new families is found in two other lists of merchant companies in 1357, one group engaged in trade with Naples, the other with Avignon; Prov., 45, Pt. 2, f. 108v; G. Milanesi, “Ordini della ‘Scarsella’ de’ mercanti fiorentini per la corrispondenza tra Firenze e Avignone,” Miscellanea fiorentina di erudizione e storia, ed. I. del Badia (Florence, 1902), I, 152-53.

®7 Entrepreneurial activity, as used in this paragraph, is defined as active participation in large-scale business activities in Florence or abroad; i.e. the

24

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

from large-scale business operation on the part of the old families;

their members still made up at least half of the entrepreneurial class in the second half of the century. Although there was no mass exodus from the counting house to the country villa,”* the evidence does suggest that after the Black Death a substantial portion of the old mercantile class did abandon active business careers in favor of safer and less adventurous pursuits. While the late trecento does not represent a sharp reorientation in the pat-

tern of Florentine society, with its perpetual rise and fall of families, it does constitute a distinct phase in that pattern. It was

a period of unusual instability and insecurity, when fortunes fluctuated more rapidly than usual, when the abrupt rise of new elements in the society was paralleled to some extent by the decline of a part of the old order. The retreat from business was most evident among the magnate families. Although some noble clans, notably the Ricasoli and Visdomini, had never participated in business, several magnate families—the Bardi, Cerchi, Frescobaldi, Pazzi, Pulci, Scali—

were very active in the Florentine business world in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries.” The guild records after 1348, however, tell a different story. Only seven of the 188

entrants into the Calimala guild between 1343 and 1378 were magnates, and the proportion of grandi in the Lana and Cambio guilds was also very small.*°° Among the prominent popolani direction and management of firms engaged in foreign commerce, banking, and cloth manufacture. It does not include investment of deposit capital in business divorced from any managerial function, investment or management of real estate, or business activities of local or limited scope. 88 The best discussion of this complex problem is P. J. Jones’s article, “Florentine families and Florentine diaries in the fourteenth century.” Using material gleaned from the ricordanze and private papers of Florentine families, the author emphasizes the continuity of the city’s social and economic history, particularly

with reference to the transformation of the merchant class into a landowning class.

88 The business activities of these families is documented by R. Davidsohn, Geschichte von Florenz (Berlin, 1896-1927), 1v, i (Gewerbe, Ziinfte, Welthandel,

und Bankwesen); and Forschungen zur Geschichte von Florenz (Berlin, 18961908), 111, 1-259.

100 Of 864 entrants into the Lana guild during this period, 25 were magnates, while 54 grandi were included among the 642 matricolati in the Cambio guild. Not a single magnate is included in the 965 entrants into the Por San Maria guild. Jones’s statement (“Florentine families,” p. 203) that a high proportion of Florentine magnate families traditionally engaged in business is true only for the period before 1340.

25

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

houses the trend was less pronounced, but still distinguishable. Guild records indicate that several families—the Acciaiuoli, Bordoni, Bucelli, Machiavelli, Magalotti, Mangioni, Quaratesi, Risaliti, Serragli—had withdrawn almost entirely from entrepreneurial activity." While certain other popolani houses—the Strozzi, Al-

bizzi, Capponi, Guasconi, Ricci, Rucellai, and Salviati—were heavily involved in business affairs, many mercantile families after 1350 were represented in commerce and industry by only one or two members. For example, the Medici counted several bankers

and merchants among their number in the early decades of the fourteenth century. Between 1340 and 1380, however, only the brothers Vieri and Giovanni di Cambio continued the businesss pursuits of their forebears, while their relatives were scsoperatz, living on the proceeds of real estate holdings, supplementing their rental income with stipends from offices and the interest on petty

loans to contadini’” This partial retreat from the world of business is but one manifestation of a general state of mind of the patriciate in these years. Its spirits dampened by the grim experiences of mid-century, this generation sought to achieve economic security by practicing caution and restraint."°* For these men, living in troubled times, the regular income from rentals and monte investments was more

attractive than the large fortune which could be made only through entrepreneurial activity."°* Instead of committing all of its resources to business, the typical patrician family followed a policy of diversification, investing in real estate and government securities as well as trade and industry. The same pattern emerged with respect to vocation. Rarely, after 1350, did all members of one family band together to operate a company. Instead, one brother might manage a cloth factory, another enter the church, a third study law, and a fourth live as 101JTn certain cases, this withdrawal was temporary; some families returned to business after a period of retirement. 102 Brucker, “Medici,” 6-10. Francesco and Giovanni di Bicci, who laid the foundations for the great Medici fortune of the fifteenth century, began their business careers in the 1380's; 1bid., 21-22. 103 On this point, see zbid., 7; Jones, pp. 204-05. 104 Great fortunes in Florence were invariably built up through business activity, rarely through real estate investment alone. On the comparative return from business and real estate, see Jones, p. 199, n. 130.

26

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

a rentier and devote much of his time to politics. The Corsini family provides an excellent illustration of this tendency. After the bankruptcy of the family business firm in 1346, the survivors

branched out into multifarious paths. Remaining in business were Stefano, who operated an international mercantile firm, Matteo di Niccol6, who manufactured woolen cloth, and Jacopo di Jacopo, who was engaged in business in Venice in the 1370's. Two of the Corsini, Filippo di Tommaso and Tommaso di Duccio, became prominent lawyers, while two others achieved eminence in the church: Andrea di Niccol6, an ascetic monk who was later canonized; and Piero di Tommaso, whose long ecclesiastical career was climaxed by his promotion to the cardinalate in 1369.""°

The Pattern of Social Change Historically, Florence’s social structure had always been flexible, characterized by a constant shifting in the composition of its various classes. The extraordinary disturbances of the 1340's

and the recurrence of plague, war, and economic crises after 1350 intensified the internal displacements and fluctuations, making generalizations about social groups extremely hazardous. To

construct a valid and useful picture of the social structure, one must employ several criteria for distinguishing between classes. These criteria may be listed as wealth, occupation, family antiquity,

marriage connections, behavior patterns, and attitudes. Applying these standards, Florentine society after 1350 may be divided into

four groups: 1) the patriciate; 2) the gente nuova, the newly enriched mercantile element; 3) the petty bourgeois artisan-shopkeeper class; and 4) the unorganized and propertyless laborers.*°° 105 Qn the bankruptcy of the Corsini, see Sapori, Crist, p. 177. Three Corsini are listed among the bankrupts in Tratte, 1155: Duccio di Niccolo, Corsino di Mozzo, and Gherardo di Duccio. For the careers of the men mentioned in this paragraph, see L. Passerini, Genealogia e storia della famiglia Corsini (Florence, 1858), pp. 37-90. In addition to the businessmen described, Amerigo di Tommaso di Duccio was enrolled in the Lana guild in 1354, and Andrea di Tommaso was enrolled in the Por San Maria guild in 1374. 106Jn formulating this classification, I owe much to the perceptive analysis of the Florentine social structure by G. Scaramella, Firenze allo scoppio del tumulto dei Ciompi (Pisa, 1914), pp. 20-47. My major criticism of Scaramella’s description of the class structure is that it is based almost entirely upon economic

criteria, to the exclusion of other important factors. For a Marxist analysis of

27

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

These social groups each possessed distinctive characteristics: their

members held certain common attitudes and beliefs and conformed to similar behavior patterns. Most important for the political history of the city, these classes maintained a sense of identity and common purpose which was often transformed into political programs.

It is legitimate to speak of a patriciate in ¢recento Florence, although its membership was not legally defined, as was that of the Venetian oligarchy. This patriciate was composed of individuals from families who had long been active and important participants in the city’s history, whose ancestors had fought at Montaperti and Altopascio, had held major offices in the commune, and had acquired wealth and status."°’ Membership in an old and eminent family was an essential qualification for high

, social standing. Florentines who compiled ricordanze invariably made reference to the antichita of their house, and the imposing role their ancestors had played in the life of the city.”°* These evocations of family pride indicate that the blood tie remained the strongest and most durable link in the social structure. Families were closely knit units, their members banding together to form solid nuclei of wealth, political power, and social prestige. Florentine society, which also relies upon economic distinctions between classes,

see F. Antal, Florentine Painting and its Social Background (London, 1947), Ch. 1. Attempts to divide Florentine society into legally defined categories—e.g. magnati and popolani, or upper guildsmen and lower guildsmen—are unsatis-

factory because these rigid definitions do not take into account the complex social pattern which was perpetually changing. For an analysis and critique of the various interpretations which see the basic political struggle between 1343 and 1378 as one between the arti minori and the arti maggiori, see Becker and Brucker, “Arti minori,” Med. Stud., xvi1, 93-104. 107 Chroniclers and other writers frequently compiled lists of the most emi-

nent Florentine families; e.g. G. Villani’s lists of ancient and noble families at the beginning of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries (iv, 10-13; v, 39); the poet Antonio Pucci’s list written about 1370, in Delizie degli eruditi toscant, ed. Ildefonso di San Luigi (Florence, 1770-89), v1, 180-82; and an anonymous compilation from the same period (Manoscritti, 222, f. 182). One of the most significant indications of high social status for popolani families was the incidence of membership in the Signoria. There are numerous copies in Florentine libraries and archives of elaborate prior lists or prioriste, describing the details of each family’s representation in the Signoria between 1282 and 1530. 108 P, J. Jones, p. 204. See, for example, the ricordi of Giovanni di Alessandro

Arrigucci, “per far memoria di tutti gli huomini delli Arrigucci,” Bzblioteca Nazionale di Firenze [BNF |, Magliabechiana, xxv, 44, ff. 36r-42Vv.

28

I'HE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

The visible evidence of their cohesiveness was the tendency of households belonging to a single family to cluster together in the same district, a vestigial practice from a past age when family vendettas were commonplace. Relationships formed by marriage alliances also served to bind together the families which constituted the aristocracy of Florence. United by blood, by community of interests, and by a shared tradition, this patrician class wielded

a powerful influence over the destinies of the Arno city.*” Within this group, and even within individual families, there were infinite gradations of wealth, status, and pre-eminence. The magnate families constituted roughly the upper stratum of this patrician class. Many of these houses were descended from the Tuscan feudal nobility, and several still possessed large estates in the contado. Through decades of intermarriage and close social, economic, and political contact, they had become so fused with

the old popolani houses as to be scarcely distinguishable from them. Originally, the distinction between magnati and popolani had been an empirical one. The decisive criteria for magnate status were not antiquity and nobility; more important was the behavior pattern of the family, its reputation for violence and disorder, and the extent to which it constituted a threat to communal peace and security.“° The Cerchi, though not of noble descent, were designated as magnates in 1293 because they were rich, numerous, and dangerous; the Castiglionchi, though noble in origin, remained popolani because they were not sufficiently powerful to constitute a threat to the government of the guilds.™ A scholar has recently observed that “the history of Florence, even at its most democratic, remains in large measure the history of its principal families.”"’ The identification of these families is thus an essential preliminary to any investigation of the city’s

social structure. In the quarter of S. Spirito, the Bardi had survived the bankruptcy of their company and the political reverses 109 This is the major theme of N. Ottokar’s work, I] Comune di Firenze alla fine del dugento. 110Tn his recent article, “Fioritura e decadenza dell’economia fiorentina,” ASI, cxv (1957), 385-439, E. Fiumi has clarified the definitions of noble and magnate, and has demonstrated convincingly that very few Florentine magnate families were actually descendants of the feudal nobility. 111. On the Cerchi and the Castiglionchi, see P. J. Jones, pp. 184-85, 191-93.

112 Ibid, p. 183.

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THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

suffered in 1340 and 1343 to remain the predominant magnate house in Florence.”* Of the other grandi families in the quarter, only the Rossi had preserved a comparable fund of wealth and manpower, although they too had been bruised by their encounter with the popolo in the summer of 1343.°°* Among the notable popolani families in S. Spirito were three small houses of ancient lineage and conservative political orientation: the Corsini, Soderini, and Canigiani. Each of these families furnished leaders of the Parte Guelfa who played prominent roles in Florentine public life: Messer Tommaso di Duccio Corsini and his son Filippo, Niccolé di Geri Soderini, and Piero di Dati Canigiani.“’ Their political rivals in the quarter were the Capponi and the Quaratesi, two families who were hostile to the conservative elements of the aristocracy.”° Two other houses of long standing, later made famous by illustrious sons, were the Machiavelli and the Guicciardini. The Machiavelli has suffered an economic eclipse through

their involvement in the Bardi debacle, but the Gutcciardini 118 See the tax assessments of the Bardi in 1352, 1364, and 1378; Estzmo, 306, ff. tor-14v; Pres., 116, ff. 3Vv, 5v, 121-23; 332, ff. r1r, 13v-20r, 29r-35r. For the

names of the Bardi who held those communal offices which were open to magnates, see Manoscritti, 534, no pag. In this volume, alphabetical lists of officeholders have been compiled for all magnate families. 114 For the list of magnate families which acquired popolano status, see G. Villani, x11, 23. For the tax assessments of the Rossi, see Estimo, 306, ff. 12Vv, 16r-17V, 29r-35r; Pres., 116, ff. 12r, 37r-55r, 69r-69v, '75r-78V, LIOV, 135V; 332, ff.

37r-50r, 73r-88v. On the rise and decline of the Frescobaldi, see Sapori’s article, “La compagnia dei Frescobaldi in Inghilterra,” Studi, pp. 859-926. Their tax assessments are in Estimo, 306, ff. 34r, 36r, 37v-40r; Pres., 116, ff. 59v-68r, 118v122V; 332, ff. 51v, 58r, 64r-75r, 128r.

115 Qn the importance of the Canigiani and the Soderini in the late thirteenth century, see Ottokar, Comune, pp. 69-70; on the Corsini, see above, p. 27, and Passerini, Corsini, pp. 37-90. These three families were quite small in size in the late trecento, each consisting of only five households in the city in 1378. For their tax assessments in that year, see Pres., 332, ff. 27v-28v, gov-gIr, 107r, 129V, 137V.

116 The Capponi were first represented in the Signoria in 1287, the Quaratesi

in 1317; Stefani, 170, 326. The Capponi were very active in business, their members enrolled in both the Lana and Cambio guilds; Lana, 109, f. 12v; 20, ff. 1r2v, 6r, 8r, ror; Cambio, 14, ff. tv, 21r. The Quaratesi were not active in business

in the second half of the fourteenth century. For their tax records, see Pres., 116, ff. 23v-30v, 6or-61r; 332, ff. 2r-7r, 36r-36v, 67v-69V, 128v-1209r. The wealthiest

and most prominent members of the two families were Vanni di Simone, Sandro

di Simone and Bernardo di Castello da Quarata, and Filippo and Mico di Recco Capponi. On the Capponi, see P. Litta, Famiglie celebri italiane (Milan and Turin, 1847-99), Cappont.

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THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

counted among their number one of the richest men in Florence,

the banker, Piero di Gino." In the quarter of S. Croce, with its numerous botteghe of lanaiuoli and dyers, were concentrated many of the leading business families of Florence. Pre-eminent were the Alberti, whose

great wealth and authority derived from their control of the city’s largest mercantile company and their position as papal bankers.* Two other prominent mercantile families were the Peruzzi and the Antellesi, whose fortunes had been sensibly diminished by the bankruptcy of their companies, but who continued to play an important role in communal politics. The Baroncelli, who had been closely associated with the defunct Peruzzi company, remained influential; Filippo di Giamori Baroncelli was a leading statesman and Parte Guelfa figure.” Two other representatives of political conservatism in the quarter were the canon lawyer, Lapo da Castiglionchio, and the wealthy merchant, Michele di Vanni Castellani.*”? S$. Croce also provided leadership for the more liberal elements in communal politics: the Covoni, Soldani, Salviati, and Rinuccini.”* The leading magnate houses 117 On the Machiavelli, see Ottokar, pp. 71-73; and Litta, Machiavelli. The eco-

nomic decline of the Machiavelli is proved by their tax assessments in 1378; Pres., 332, ff. 46v, 48v, 62v, 142r, 182v. On the Guicciardini, see Litta, Gucczardini. Their prestanza records are in Pres., 116, ff. 41r-4iv, 44V, 54r3 332, ff. 41rA4IV, 45r, I106v.

118 On the Alberti, see above, pp. 13-14. Scholars have credited the Alberti with noble origins, but Fiumi, “Fioritura,” 406-07, reveals that this claim is not based upon solid evidence. Their great wealth is attested by their tax assessments, consistently among the highest in the city; Estimo, 306, ff. 75v-7or; Pres., 117, ff. 65r-66r, 771-79V; 333, ff. 63v, 66v, 69v, 72v-73r, 84v.

119 The financial condition of the Peruzzi, Antellesi, and Baroncelli may be estimated from their tax records; Estimo, 306, ff. 58r-58v, 61r, 7ar-81v; Pres., 117, ff. 8v-or, 20v-24r, 74r-88v; 333, ff. 11r-12r, 16r, 22r-22v, 72r-77r. Tax data also provide evidence for the economic decline of a once prominent family, the Mancini; Ottokar, p. 81; Estimo, 306, £. 72v; Pres., 117, ff. 38r-38v; 333, ff. 33v, 62v. These records also reveal the poverty-stricken condition of the son of a famous father, Gabriello di Dante Alighieri, who in 1352 received the minimum tax assessment; Estimo, 306, f. 84v. 120 Both the Castiglionchi and the Castellani were small families, each comprising only three taxpaying households in the city. For Michele Castellani’s tax payments, see Pres., 117, f. 3r; 333, f. av.

121 The Covoni, Soldani, and Salviati were all heavily represented in the Lana guild; Lana, 19, ff. 33v, 36v, 38r-38v, gor, 81v; 20, £. 87v. For their substantial tax payments in 1378, see Pres., 333, ff. 78v-79v, 88v-93v. On the wealthy merchant, Francesco Rinuccini, see Brucker, “Medici,” 6; Ricordi storici di

31

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

of the quarter were the Cavalcanti, Gherardini, Cerchi, and Pulci, all living in the shadow of their former greatness.*” The Caval-

canti, by virtue of their numbers and wealth, still constituted a formidable family bloc, but their position was steadily weakened by defections of their members into the ranks of the popolanz.’”* The western quarter of Florence, which received its name from the Dominican monastery of S. Maria Novella, was dominated

by the Strozzi, the largest popolano house in the city. It contained within its ranks men of every political persuasion and every economic condition. The most prominent members of the family were Carlo and Pazzino, wealthy merchants and Parte Guelfa leaders, and Tommaso di Marco, a cloth manufacturer and opponent of the Parte.*** The Strozzi had supplanted the Acciaiuoli as the quarter’s major representative of the Florentine business world; the latter’s position had been very seriously damaged by the collapse of their company in 1343."° Two other prominent popolani families in S. Maria Novella were the Rucellai and Altoviti. Both houses were politically conservative, closely associated with the Parte Guelfa leadership.’** Indeed, S. Maria Filippo di Cino Rinuccini, ed. C. Aiazzi (Florence, 1840), pp. r1off; Fiumi, “Fioritura,” 413. 122 On the Cavalcanti and the Cerchi, see P. J. Jones, pp. 184-86; Fiumi, “Fioritura,” 411. The Cavalcanti were one of the few families living in more than one quarter; they were also located in S. Maria Novella and S. Giovanni. The comparative numerical strength of these families may be estimated from the number of taxable households: in 1378 the Cavalcanti numbered thirty households; Pres., 333, ff. 8v-12r, 57r, 96r; 334, ff. Lov-13Vv, 32v, 93r; 335, ff. 147v, 178r; the Gherardini, eighteen; Pres., 333, ff. 3v-7v, 54r, 76v; the Pulci, six; Pres., 333, ff. 4r, 6r, 17r, 55r; the Cerchi, three; Pres., 333, ff. 87r-87v, 92v. 123 The provision of August 1361, which established the procedure for individual magnates to achieve popolano status, stipulated that the magnate must change both his name and his residence, and sever all ties with his family; Prov., 49, ff. Ifr-2v.

124 On the Strozzi, see Fiumi, “Fioritura,” 414; Jones, pp. 186-90; Litta, Strozz.

The Strozzi were one of the largest families in Florence; in 1367, 54 of their number were nominated for the Signoria by the captains of the Parte Guelfa; Tratte, 136, no pag. In the 1378 prestanza records, 36 Strozzi households are listed; Pres., 334, ff. 20v-21v, 33r, 52v-56r, 97V, I05V, I14V; 335, ff. 7or, 78r.

125 Between 1282 and 1343, the Acciaiuoli were represented 42 times in the Signoria; between 1343 and 1378, they were represented twice; Stefani, 654, 750. See their modest tax assessments; Estimo, 306, ff. 921r-93r, 95v, 96r; Pres., 118, f. 7v; 334, ff. 5v, 8r, 13Vv.

126 See L. Passerini, Genealogia e storia della famiglia Rucellai (Florence, 1861); Ottokar, p. 87; Fiumi, “Fioritura,” 407-08. Both families were frequently repre-

32

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

Novella was a stronghold of political conservatism in Florence. The leadership of the liberal forces in the quarter did not come from any of the great families. It came from men of small and relatively weak houses: Gino di Bernardo Anselmi, Luigi and Piero di Lippo Aldobrandini, Francesco di Jacopo del Bene. The

Ricasoli were the leading magnate house in the quarter, and also one of the richest of the city, deriving their income mainly from their extensive possessions in the Chianti district of the

contado, which their descendants hold to this day. Both the Ricasoli and the Buondelmonti were descendants of the ancient feudal nobility; neither family had ever made any concessions to the mercantile way of life. They were equally at home in the contado and in the city, supplementing their estate revenues by accepting positions as military captains, castellans, and governors in Florence and elsewhere in Italy.*”’

Two of the most important families in Florentine politics after 1350, the Albizzi and the Ricci, were residents of the quarter of S. Giovanni. In addition to their political activities, these families were very prominent in the business world. The Albizzi, by far the larger and wealthier of the two houses, were cloth manufacturers, while the Ricci were engaged in banking and exchange

operations.’”* Piero di Filippo degli Albizzi, who shared with sented in the Signoria. Eleven Rucellai were matriculated in the Lana guild between 1343 and 1378; Lana, 19, ff. 59r-63r; 20, f. 84r. Most of the Altoviti were scioperati. Although four were matriculated in the Cambio guild, only one was an active banker; Cambio, 14, f. 34r. Both families paid substantial taxes; Pres., 334, ff. 2v-4v, 8v-Ior, 13r, IgVv-20r, 56v-5or, 62v, 66r, I13r, II5r.

127 The Ricasoli and the Buondelmonti both counted several wealthy men among their number; Pres., 334, ff. 4v, 11r, 13V, 33r, 51V, 74V-75v, 79Vv, 87v. The most prominent members of the two families were Messer Benghi Buondelmonti and Bettino di Messer Bindaccio Ricasoli, leaders of the ultra-conservative faction

of the Parte Guelfa; Stefani, 761, 775. On these two families, see also Fiumi, “Fioritura,” 410, 422, 427, 430-31; Passerini, Genealogia e storia della famiglha Ricasolit (Florence, 1870), pp. 173-76. 128 For the history of the Albizzi and the Ricci, see Litta, A/diz21; and Delizie,

xiv, 214ff. The relative size of the two houses may be seen by comparing the number from each family nominated for the Signoria in 1367: fourteen Ricci and 33 Albizzi; Tratte, 136, ff. ror-12v. In 1352, nineteen Albizzi were enrolled in the Lana guild; seven others matriculated later; Lana, 109, f. 37v; 20, ff. Ir, 14r, yor-8or, 84r-84v. Seven of the Ricci were active in banking companies; Cambio,

11, ff. 57v-58r; 14, ff. 2r, 3r, 66r. For their tax payments, see Estimo, 306, ff. 163V-165v, 1'77r-177V, 180v-181v; Pres., 119, ff. Q9Vv-Io4r, I19r, 142v, 167v-168v, I7AV-175V3 335, ff. 8r, 117V-122v, I5Iv, 164r, 181r, 185r-186r, gov.

33

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

Carlo degli Strozzi and Lapo da Castiglionchio the leadership of

the Parte Guelfa faction, was also a prominent businessman, the owner of a large cloth Jottega, and the head of an international trading company.” Piero’s chief political rivals in the quarter were the wealthy banker, Rosso di Riccardo, and his brother Uguccione, who devoted all of his life to politics and died in 1383 a poor man.*” Inferior in power and influence to the two major constellations

| of S. Giovanni were several popolano houses of lesser rank: the Medici, Guasconi, Rondinelli, and Del Palagio. The Medici had

achieved considerable distinction for their leadership of the struggle against the Duke of Athens and the magnates in 1343, but their political position was weakened by internal dissension, and their economic condition declined as a result of the family’s general withdrawal from business enterprise.“** Both the Rondinelli and the Guasconi were deeply involved in partisan politics: the Guasconi were adherents of the Parte Guelfa and the Rondinelli were vehement opponents of the Parte leadership. The Del Palagio brothers, Andrea and Tommaso di Neri, achieved prominence by avoiding partisan strife, serving regularly and competently in public office, and attending to their very lucrative industrial and mercantile enterprises.*°? Within the confines of S. Giovanni was a large cluster of magnate houses, some still wealthy and powerful, others experiencing decline. The Adimari were the largest grandi family, and also one of the few magnate houses that remained active in business.*** The turbulent Pazzi 129 Qn Piero, see Litta, Albizzi, tav. 12. Other prominent and wealthy Albizzi were Alessandro and Bartolomeo di Niccolé, Lando and Pepo di Antonio, and Francesco di Uberto. 180 Jones, p. 186. An indication of the power and influence of the Ricci is given

by Giovanni Morelli in his chronicle, referring to Gucciozzo de’ Ricci: “Era Gucciozzo grande cittadino, temuto e in istato grande d’ogni bene mondano”; Ricordt, p. 156. 181 For a general history of the Medici in the fourteenth century, see my article in Speculum, xxxu, 1-26.

182 The Rondinelli, Guasconi, and Del Palagio were small families of approximately five households each, but they were all very active in business and politics. Between 1343 and 1378, the Guasconi and Rondinelli were represented thirteen times in the Signoria, the Del Palagio on ten occasions. Members of each

1343-1378. a

family were frequently selected as consuls of the Lana guild; Lana, 32, anni 133Qn the Adimari, see Delizie, x1, 239-45; Fiumt, “Fioritura,”’ 402-03, 406.

34

|

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

and Donati had been subdued by the popolani in 1343, and several of their number were penalized by fines and exile. But they remained powerful and aggressive houses, bulwarks of the forces of extreme conservatism in the city.*”*

Although these patrician families had been living in an urban environment for more than a century, their behavior was more

characteristic of the feudal baron than of the merchant. The spirit of the vendetta still burned brightly in Florence, despite the strenuous efforts of the commune to force citizens to settle quarrels in the courts rather than by resorting to arms.’*” Among the magnates, indulgence in violence and disorder was part of an established tradition. In his rzcordanze Simone della Tosa mentioned seven cases of assault within a decade involving his magnate relatives.*** Belonging to an ancient and eminent family was no guarantee of respectability. Luca di Totto da Panzano, the scion of a noble house, was described as a “liar, robber, assassin, traitor, gambler, highwayman, arsonist, who associates with

outlaws and men of evil condition and who lives by extortion and from the sweat and labor of others.’”**’ The great popolano houses were equally guilty of violent and overbearing behavior, as the record of the Medici family illustrates. Five Medici were convicted of murder between 1343 and 1360, while several others

in this period were condemned for a variety of crimes of violence.***

A valuable source for illustrating the outlook of the Florentine aristocracy is the letter written by Lapo da Castiglionchio to his

son Bernardo. Answering what may have been a rhetorical Twelve of the Adimari were matriculated in the Cambio guild between 1343 and 1378; Cambio, 12, passim. A large family, the Adimari comprised 33 taxable households in 1378. The tax returns indicate that they were moderately prosperous; Pres., 335, ff. 72v, 83r, g2v, Iogr, 165r, 186r-192r. 184On the Pazzi, see Fiumi, “Fioritura,” 412; Litta, Pazzi. On the participation of the Pazzi and the Donati in the 1343 upheavals, see Stefani, 592, 599. 185 See Donato Velluti’s description of the antivendetta legislation; Cronica, p. 70. 186 Annali di Simone della Tosa, in Cronichette antiche, pp. 163-66. The largest fine imposed upon one of the Tosinghi was gooo fi. in 1329.

187 AFO], 512, f. 14r. In his ricordanze, Luca candidly admitted his participation in a vendetta; Jones, p. 183, n. 2. On the Panzano family, see zbid., pp. 19394; for Luca’s own remarkable career, see Passerini, Ricasoli, pp. 230ff. 188 Brucker, “Medici,” 12-14. For similar activities of the Strozzi, see Jones, p. 187.

35

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

question concerning his family’s past, Lapo discussed at wearisome length the nature of nobility, and then proceeded to establish his family’s claim to that title. He traced the origins of the Castiglionchi to the eleventh century, when his ancestors had held lands in the Valdisieve and “all possessed great status and were reputed to be the greatest and noblest men of the district.”** The earliest document in his possession which mentioned his family (1204) was a record of the transfer of lands and feudal jurisdictions between his forebears and the Ricasoli.’*° During the thirteenth century, the family had split into opposing Guelf and Ghibelline factions, and Lapo’s branch, the Castiglionchi, submitted to Florence, released its vassali and fedeli and established residence in the city. While Lapo conceded that the Castiglionchi had not played a prominent role in Florentine history, he explained that his ancestors preferred to live in the contado, “hunting and falconing on their estates,” instead of involving themselves in city politics, as did the Ricasoli. To substantiate his family’s claim to nobility, Lapo cited the statement of Andrea di Filippozzo de’ Bardi, who was in a company of prominent Florentines “discussing the deeds of the ancient and noble families of Florence,” apparently a common after-dinner topic. It was Andrea’s opinion that the Castiglionchi possessed as many attributes of antiquity and nobility as did any Florentine family. A final argument adduced by Lapo was the honorable marriage alliances which the Castiglionchi had contracted with some of the great magnate clans: Bardi, Cavalcanti, Foraboschi, Frescobaldi, Cerchi.***

Lapo was forced to admit that in this own day, his family escutcheon had lost much of its sheen. This awareness of decline explains his passionate attachment to the past glory of his house

and his rancor against the parvenus who had surpassed him in wealth. Most galling to him was the fact that certain dependent fedeli of the Castiglionchi had become rich merchants, even achieving membership in the Signoria, an honor that Lapo never attained. He described with relish an incident from his student days in Bologna, when one of the descendants of these fedelz 1389 Foistola o sia ragionamento di Messer Lapo da Castighonchio, ed. Mehus (Bologna, 1753), p. 31. See Jones, p. 101.

140 Epistola, pp. 30ff. 141 [bid., 50-57.

36

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

had taunted him with the claim that his own family was as ancient as the Castiglionchi, but then became contrite and respectful when he learned of his ancestors’ servile status.’*” Lapo’s son Bernardo provided the details of the economic decline of the Castiglionchi: the lands sold, jurisdictions abandoned, church patronage lost. Nevertheless, Bernardo pointed with pride

to the fact that none of his family had ever sunk so deeply into poverty that they were forced to pursue a base occcupation or trade. Admittedly, some Castiglionchi had been merchants, but Bernardo contended that they had engaged in “noble and honest not base merchandise, voyaging to France and England and trading in cloth and wool as do all the greater and better men of the

city....°** Lapo’s own economic situation had apparently been precarious; he abandoned a clerical sinecure to marry the daughter of a merchant, Margherita di Bernardo Folchi, who, by Lapo’s

own admission, brought with her a substantial dowry and a useful family connection.” Like so many of his noble contemporaries, Lapo was forced to marry beneath him, to ally with a family which had no claim to antiquity or nobility, and even to justify his marriage by praising his wife’s relatives as men of substance and status in the community.*”° Another member of the legal profession, Donato Velluti, compiled a record of his family’s past. Donato could not claim noble

ancestry, but his family enjoyed a comfortable antiquity, and it had never fallen into such straits as the Castiglionchi. Like so many families of the mercantile patriciate, the Velluti had emigrated from the contado in the first half of the thirteenth century, and were established in the S. Spirito area by 1244.**° An garly ancestor, Buonaccorso, had belonged to a mercantile com-

pany which operated in Italy, France, and England, and the Velluti remained active in business thenceforth.**’ The family had also engaged in the popular pastime of feuding with a noble 142 Tbid., 43-45.

143 Tdid., 147-48. The translation is by P. J. Jones, p. 191. 144 Thid., 57-58.

145 Donato Velluti considered the Folchi below the social status of his own family; Cronica, p. 42.

146 The authoritative work on this subject is J. Plesner, L’émigration de la campagne a la ville libre de Florence au xiti® siécle (Copenhagen, 1934). 147 Velluti, pp. 4-9.

3/7

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

family, the Mannelli.*** A Velluti had been chosen to the Signoria in 1283, and thereafter the family had been represented regularly

in communal office. Although they never achieved the power and influence of larger and wealthier houses, the Velluti maintained their median position in the patrician ranks, feeding merchants, clerics, lawyers, and an occasional black sheep into the mainstream of Florentine life. They consistently married well, allying with such noted houses as the Frescobaldi, Buondelmonti, Bardi, Rossi, Strozzi, and Soderini.’” In 1367, when Donato be-

gan his chronicle, he could look back upon a profitable and prominent career in law and public service, sitting four times in the Signoria, promoting the economic and political interests of his family and friends. Donato Velluti’s social outlook is so typical of his class that it

deserves a detailed examination. His writing reflects certain traits of mind and personality which were broadly characteristic of the Italian bourgeoisie of this era: shrewdness, acquisitiveness, loyalty to family, city and religion, and a profound appreciation of the realities and difficulties of life.*°° Donato’s ideal type was

the sensible down-to-earth individual who devotes himself to his vocation, while recognizing and accepting the responsibilities

and duties imposed by family, state, and church. He had only contempt for his relatives who failed to earn their livelihood and who squandered their inheritance. His own brother Filippo was stigmatized as a wastrel, although Donato admitted that he was

a competent merchant.’” Describing two of his cousins of the magnate Frescobaldi family, he noted that Giovanni was “a good trovatore, sonneteer and rhymester, and an excellent player of the guitar, lute and viola,” although less adept at making money;

the second, Berto, was only concerned with eating and drinking, having consumed his paternal inheritance. Donato predicted a bad end for his cousin, Gherardino di Piero Velluti, who dressed 148 Tbid., pp. 10-24.

149 See the Velluti genealogical table, zbzd., tav. 1.

150Qn this problem, see particularly Sapori, Le marchand italien au moyen dge (Paris, 1952), pp. xi-txx. Sapori has also compiled a comprehensive bibliography of primary and secondary sources; zbid., pp. 3-14. 151 Velluti, pp. 141-144. Cf. also Donato’s strictures on the spendthrift habits

of his distant relatives, Sandro di Zanobi and Gherarduccio di Lapo dello Scelto; zbid., pp. 52-57.

38

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

well and hunted with hounds and hawks, “wearing himself out playing the nobleman.”*’” He would have been horrified by the behavior of Paolo di Michele Rondinelli, who was so infatuated with a woman that, in the words of a judicial deposition of 13/5, “being an honest and serious man of forty-five years of age, [he] has wandered from ... every right path, abandoning his wife, his children, his business and all of his affairs.’”*** A striking feature of Donato’s chronicle is his constant use of the words onore and onorevole in describing individuals and their conduct. This intense preoccupation with status and honor reinforces the conclusion that the prominent bourgeois families of Florence were strongly influenced by a feudal code of ethics and behavior.*’* It was not enough to be diligent, serious, and hardworking; one must also conduct oneself according to the standards of one’s class. Donato was very critical of his relatives who married beneath their station. He expressed mild disapproval when his cousin Bernardo contracted a marriage with the daugh-

ter of one of the Folchi (the family from which Lapo da Castiglionchio chose a wife). “This marriage did not please me greatly . . . because they do not have status nor are they of our condition.”*’* A dubious matrimonial tie was contracted by his uncle Gherardo di Filippo Velluti, “who wed the daughter of a certain Rustico, a purse maker ... as a result of which my father and the other relatives were discontented with the lowly mar-

riage.’ The most notorious mesalliance which he describes is that of a distant relative, Piero di Ciore Pitti, who frittered away his father’s inheritance, became a foot soldier, and was then reduced to accepting employment as a day laborer in a cloth fac-

tory. “He was wounded by one of the Machiavelli and never engaged in a vendetta. He took for a wife Monna Bartolomea, the

granddaughter of Bongianni, a wine seller, who had been the 152 Velluti, pp. 96-99. 153 AFO], 751, £. 25v. Paolo’s relatives accounted for his strange behavior by

asserting that the woman was a witch who used occult powers to dominate her victim. She was condemned to be burned at the stake but avoided execution by flight.

154 On this point, see R. de Roover, “Alberti,” 18, who states that the Alberti rated honor higher than wealth, and comments: “Feudal tradition was far from moribund in 1300 and it was still alive in 1400.”

186 Ibid, 107. |

155 Velluti, p. 42.

39

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

whore of other men, and with whom he lived in a miserable state.” When Piero died in 1367 in a hovel near the church of S. Giorgio, none of his relatives were present at his death or burial.**”

Despite the gradations and fluctuations of wealth, rank, and status within the Florentine patriciate, it was an established social class. The gente nuova, on the other hand, did not constitute an homogenous group with similar backgrounds, ideals, and objectives. These “new men” did, however, possess certain common characteristics. First, nearly all of them came from obscure backgrounds; few were able to project their genealogy further back

than their grandfathers. Some had no family name, but were identified only by their fathers’ Christian names. Above all, they did not possess that most valuable of social commodities, a family. Theirs was an isolated and vulnerable position, which they sought to bolster by forging marriage alliances with ancient families, and by associating themselves—socially, politically, economically—with prominent citizens. What they all possessed in large

measure was ambition: the determination to achieve wealth, political influence and some degree of social status. It was this quality which made their role dynamic in this period of Florentine history.*”*

Although the origins of most of the gente nuova are shrouded in obscurity, the background of a few can be traced prior to 1343. Some received their business training as employees of the great mercantile companies, frequently serving abroad as factors or agents. Lodovico di Lippo Ceffini, a member of the Bardi firm from 1338 to 1342, later formed his own international trading company. Piero Bini, who had a long and successful career with 157 Thid., 138-39.

158 There are remarkable parallels, in origins and attitudes, between these gente nuova of Florence and the nowt homines of Pisa, two generations earlier. Cf. the description of the Pisans in D. Herlihy, Pisa in the Early Renaissance. A Study of Urban Growth (New Haven, 1958), p. 182: “The center of Pisa’s urbanization revolution was a petty merchant . . . who originated in the contado and lived by bringing to Pisa’s urban market the wool products of her countryside. This man knew the situation, problems, and opportunities of both city and contado. . . . His rural roots, his interest in wool, gave him a policy to pursue. His late arrival in the city, the social gap which separated him from the aristocracy gave him a kind of self-consciousness, a psychology, whose collective manifestation was the popolo and whose fruits were an unabashed ruthlessness and cruelty in the pursuit of ends which the Renaissance would see again.” 40)

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

the Bardi, became a partner of a banking firm in 1353, associated with two other parvenus, Roggerio Lippi and Jacopo Renzi.” Several prominent businessmen began their careers as lower guildsmen engaged in retail trade.“ A dealer in used clothing, Giovanni Goggio, built up a thriving commerce in grain and cloth between Florence and Naples and amassed a large fortune.” Included in the 1369 list of trading companies using the port of Pisa are the names of six lower guildsmen whose

business activities had spread far beyond the local limits to which the affairs of the arti minori were usually confined.” Many of the gente nuova were immigrants or the descendants

of immigrants who had moved into the city from the contado in the fourteenth century. Frequently, their names, as inscribed in guild matriculation records and prior lists, give clues to the location of their families’ origins: Mugnaio di Recco da Ghiaceto, Filippo di Spinello da Mosciano, Niccolo di Ser Bene da Varazzano.*® A collection of Ghibelline accusations in the judicial

archives provides information concerning the origin of several of these gente nuova. The Amadori, who were well represented 159 On Ceffini, see Sapori, Studi, p. 745; Peruzzi, Commercio, p. 220. On Bini, see Sapori, Studi, p. 749; Cambio, 14, f. 18r. Bini was an associate of the Alberti company in Avignon in 1359; Renouard, “Le compagnie commerciale fiorentine

del trecento,” ASI, xcvt (1938), 1, 55. He was a member of the Signoria four times: iN 1352, 1363, 1365, and 1375.

160In his article, “Piccoli e grandi mercanti nelle citta italiane del rinascimento,” /n onore e ricordo di Giuseppe Prato (Turin, 1931), pp. 27-49, G. Luzzatto perhaps overstresses the gulf between piccoli and grandi mercant. The transition

from one group to the other was frequently made in trecento Florence. For example, six lower guildsmen were matriculated into the Lana guild and seven into Por San Maria between 1350 and 1378. A prominent Florentine mercantile family of the guattrocento, the Martelli, was founded in the fourteenth century by an immigrant artisan from the Valdisieve, Roberto Martelli. A swordmaker by trade, Martelli sat in the Signoria seven times between 1343 and 1373; see Litta, Martelli; L. Martines, “La famiglia Martelli e un documento sulla vigilia del ritorno dall’esilio di Cosimo de’ Medici (1434),” ASI, cxvu (1959), 31-41. 161 Although thrice selected to the Signoria as a lower guildsman, Giovanni had also matriculated into the Calimala guild in 1360. For his ‘substantial tax assessment, see Pres., 119, f£. 1togv. For evidence of his large-scale trading activity, see Prov., 57, ff. 168v-169v. 162 Recker and Brucker, “Arti minori,” 102, n. 68.

163 These men were all merchants who were represented in the Signoria; Stefani, 640, 643, 693, 750. For a description of their places of origin, see E. Repetti, Dizionario geografico fisico storico della Toscana (Florence, 1833-43), 0, 6; 111, 616; v, 423, 611, 680.

4]

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

in the Calimala guild between 1350 and 1380, came from the town of Ancisa.** The ancestors of the Busini, five of whose members were enrolled in the Lana guild between 1360 and 1375,

were originally fedeli of the Caponsacchi, a Ghibelline noble family with lands near Montereggi.** Typical of the rise of these

“new men” from poverty and obscurity to wealth and status is the story of a certain Gennaio and his descendants. Emigrating from Montecarelli where he had been the fedelis of a feudal lord, Gennaio established himself as a baker in the parish of S. Maria Bertelde. His descendants prospered: a grandson, Benedetto di

Guccio di Gennaio, entered the Lana guild and was a member of the Signoria in 1332. Two of Benedetto’s sons, Francesco and

Alessandro, built a sizeable fortune from their profits in the Lana guild, and by 1378 had also become important political figures in the commune.*”

The Morelli, whose history was compiled in 1393 by Giovanni di Paolo, had resided in Florence for a century before they achieved a measure of distinction. Emulating his social superiors,

Giovanni laboriously constructed, without any documentary proof, a genealogy for the Morelli dating back to the twelfth century. He admitted that his distant ancestors “were not rich but needy folk” when they emigrated into Florence from the Mugello, but he insisted that they were “honorable people.”*™ The cloudy past of the Morelli became clearer by the end of the thirteenth century, when they had become established as dyers

of cloth and traders in dyestuffs. The family’s energies in the fourteenth century were devoted exclusively to making money, and the tax records indicate a spectacular increase in their wealth between 1352 and 1378. Outside of the economic sphere, how-

ever, the Morelli made no substantial mark in the city.** Not 164 4EO], 811, f. 193r. For the matriculation of the Amadori in the Calimala,

see Manoscritti, 542, passim. 165 AFO], 811, £. 224r. 166 For family details, see zizd., 811, ff. 163r, 166v. On their guild matriculation, see Lana, 20, ff. 7or-80r, 84r, 92r. Their tax assessments are in Pres., 119, f. 114V; 335, £. 200r. Francesco and Alessandro sat three times in the Signoria. 167 G. Morelli, Ricordi, pp. 105-22. The earliest ancestor whose relationship to Giovanni is definitely established was his great grandfather, Morello di Giraldo, whose approximate dates were 1250-1335. On the efforts of Giovanni and later genealogists to discover earlier ancestors for the Morelli, see Jones, p. 204. 168 The business activities of the Morelli are described in Ricordi, pp. 120, 136, 148. Giovanni’s uncle Calandro (d. 1363) utilized most of his capital in making

42

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

until 1387 was any member of the family selected to the Signoria,

a clear indication of its modest status.“ The marriage alliances which they contracted were not exceptional; they were linked to popolano houses of middling rank: Bagnesi, Tigliamochi, Ricci, and Quaratesi.*” The character of Giovanni Morelli which is reflected in the pages of his chronicle is as colorless as the story of his family. A successful merchant himself, his code of business ethics was extremely conservative. He deplored the practice of usury, advocated great caution in the management of commercial enterprises,

and advised his son to trust no one and to take no unnecessary risks."" The social virtues he praised were astuteness, circumspection, and moderation. His advice concerning marriage is typical of his attitude: “Be careful to arrange an alliance only with good

citizens who are merchants and not impoverished, who are not domineering, and who are ancient residents of the city, honored by the commune, and whose family has not been stained by any traitor, robber, murderer or bastard.”*’’ Giovanni’s own social behavior reflects not a trace of the grandigia that characterized so many of the great families of Florence. He suffered the humiljation of a broken marriage agreement, when his prospective father-in-law found a better match for his daughter.’ In political matters, he counseled his son to ingratiate himself with the men of power and influence, and thus reap the advantages of their usurious loans to contadini; ibid., p. 152; his father Paolo was matriculated in the

Lana guild “e trafficava parecchi migliaia di fiorini su cambi secche e gambi [cambi] per lettera, di lane francesche e di molte altre cose.” The Morelli tax assessments are in Estimo, 306, f. 75r; Pres., 117, ff. 76v, 78r; 333, £. 68r. Only four other households, all of the Alberti, paid higher prestanze in April 1378 in the Morelli’s district of S. Croce. 169 Giovanni’s cousin Bernardo di Giovanni was accepted in the scrutiny for the Signoria in 1382; he actually sat in November 1387; Delizie, xv1, 163; xvttt,

ror. Giovanni’s father had been selected in the scrutiny of 1367, but he died before he could hold office; Ricordi, pp. 158-59. 170 Ricordi, pp. 137, 139, 155, 156.

171 Ibid., pp. 225-29, 237-43, 249-52. Identical advice was given to his son by Paolo di Ser Pace da Certaldo, Libro di buoni costumi, pp. 78-79, 87-93, 149-51, 173-74, 185-87.

172 Ricordi, pp. 208-09. Giovanni apparently believed that his marriage to the

daughter of one of the Alberti, who were then regarded with disfavor by the , ruling group, had damaged his own position; izbid., p. 341. 178 Tbid., 341-43.

43

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

benevolence.** This obsequious, supine attitude was that of a man who did not dare to aspire to a position of authority, who preferred the position of client to that of leader. This outlook would have been scorned by the leading families of Florence, but it was typical of many men who felt dependent upon the patronage and support of their social superiors.

The best-known representative of the gente nuova in this period of Florentine history is Francesco di Marco Datini, whose fame rests upon the great mass of surviving source material pertaining to his career. Datini was born in Prato in 1335 and was left an orphan by the Black Death. His tiny patrimony consisted of forty seven florins, a house and a piece of land, which he later converted into cash to finance a trip to Avignon. There he built the foundations of his fortune. His choice of a location was excellent; Avignon, owing to the presence of the papal court, was one of the few cities in Europe that were enjoying a burgeoning prosperity. Datini established himself as a merchant specializing

in the trade of cloth and arms, the latter commodity in great demand in the 1360’s and 1370’s. After accumulating a substantial

fortune, he returned to Tuscany in 1383 and made Florence the headquarters of his business enterprises, which included a cloth factory in Prato and trading branches in Avignon, Pisa, Genoa, Majorca, Barcelona, and Valencia. When he died in 1410, he left behind him a large fortune of some seventy thousand florins, with which he endowed a charitable foundation for the poor in his native city of Prato.*”

Datini’s career is a classic illustration of the self-made man rising from rags to riches through his own initiative and industry. His behavior and outlook were completely typical of the parvenu. He did not marry until he had already achieved considerable wealth, selecting for his bride a girl from a good family that had suffered misfortune and was therefore unable to provide a dowry. Datini’s wife Margherita was descended through

her mother from an ancient and noble Florentine family, and 174 Tbid., 274-84. Giovanni’s emphasis upon political conformity was partly the

result of the increased power of the aristocracy in the last decades of the fourteenth century. 175 The best and most recent biography of Datini is I. Origo, The Merchant of

Prato (New York, 1957); see pp. 395-96 for a comprehensive bibliography of other works pertaining to Datini.

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THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

she frequently reminded her husband of the difference in their

social origins. In one letter she wrote, “I have a little of the Gherardini blood, though I prize it not overmuch, but what your blood is, I know not.”’”° The most striking aspect of Francesco’s character is his overwhelming feeling of insecurity. His angst was only in part the consequence of the general instability of the age; it was much more the expression of the parvenu’s rootlessness and isolation.**’ This insecurity was manifested in every aspect of Datini’s behavior: his avarice, his pathological distrust

of other men, his ostentation in clothing, house building, and almsgiving.””* It was reflected most poignantly in the terrible conflict raging within himself between his overweening desire for wealth and material possessions, and his profound fear of damnation. Like many of his contemporaries, he sought to assuage the guilt feelings engendered by his usurious practices and his preoccupation with the things of the flesh by making lavish contributions to ecclesiastical and charitable foundations.*” Francesco Datini’s father had been a tavern keeper, a member of one of the lower guilds of Prato, and it was from this milieu that many of the parvenu merchants and industrialists had come. It was the world of the petty bourgeoisie, the men who provided for the local needs of the city’s inhabitants: the bakers, butchers,

and winesellers; the druggists and painters, the carpenters and stonemasons, the notaries and schoolmasters. This class occupied an intermediate position in the social structure, between the aris176 Ibid., 164. Datini’s wife was the daughter of a cloth manufacturer who was executed in 1360 for his participation in a plot against the regime; zbid., 26.

177 Marchesa Origo has quite aptly used Angst as a modern synonym for Datini’s maninconia, tbid., p. xi. In his article, “Economia e morale alla fine del Trecento,” Studt, pp. 156-78, Sapori considers Datini as the typical representative of the business class of the late ¢trecento, and regards him as definitely inferior in character and personality to the heroic merchant types of the dugento and early trecento. While there may be some validity in this comparison, I believe that Sapori neglects an important point, namely, that many of the distasteful aspects of Datini’s character derive from his parvenu status, and would not be

found to the same degree among his contemporaries from old, established families, e.g. Giovanni di Bicci de’ Medici. On this point, see Origo, pp. 154-55,

and H. Baron, “Moot Problems of Renaissance Interpretation: An Answer to Wallace K. Ferguson,” Journal of the History of Ideas, x1x (1958), 31-32. +78 Origo, pp. 67, 119-20, 274-75.

179 Thid., pp. 347-48. On the restitution of usury by the Medici, see Brucker, “Medici,” 11-12.

45

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

tocracy of wealth and birth on the one hand, and the laboring masses on the other. But unlike Francesco Datini, these artisans and shopkeepers were securely anchored in the social hierarchy, fulfilling a role as ancient as the city itself. Although the majority of these artefict were matriculated in the fourteen lower guilds (the arti minori), their numbers also included many from the seven greater guilds. In economic status, in business activity, in mentality and outlook, there was little to distinguish the lower guildsmen from the druggists, notaries and retail merchants of the arti maggiori. Their economic interests were predominantly local, in contrast to the Europe-wide activities of the big business class.**° The guild system, with its protectionist and regulatory character, was an extremely vital element in the lives of these artefict. They could not escape from its controls as readily as the international merchants, many of whose activities were geographically beyond the control of their guild. Although guild membership signified rigid control of the economic activities of the artefici, it also conferred substantial benefits: the protection which derived from association and a

limited participation in the communal government.’* These guild members were distinguished from the unorganized laboring class not only by the possession of juridical privileges, but also

by the fact that the majority were men of property on a_ small scale. This modest stake in the economy made them a less revolutionary force in the society than the mass of the popolo minuto, whose subsistence depended upon the chance of day-to-day employment.

The artefici of Florence lived in a circumscribed world of the shop, the guild hall, and the parish church. Their outlook was conservative and conformist, and they tended to accept without question the traditional modes of life and thought. In their behavior patterns they were not strikingly different from the upper 180 The contrast in activity and mentality between the two business classes is well drawn by G. Luzzatto, “Piccoli e grandi mercanti.” 181 The fundamental work on the Florentine guild system is A. Doren, Le arti fiorentine, tr. G. Klein, 2 vols. (Florence, 1940). In recent years, the statutes of several of the Florentine lower guilds have appeared in the series Font sulle corporazioni medioevali, published by the Deputazione toscana di storia patria. They include the statutes of the arte dei rigattieri e linaioli (1940), the arti degli albergatori (1953), and the arti dei fornai e dei vinattieri (1956).

: 46

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

classes: sanctity and piety existed alongside violence, brutality, and licentiousness.**’ On rare occasions the even tenor of their lives was disturbed by a crisis or an exceptional event: the ravages of a pestilence; the outbreak of a riot or revolution; the preaching of an eloquent friar; the excitement and color of a civic spectacle, such as the reception of a cardinal or an ambassador; the punishment of a notorious crime, as that of the slave girl who poisoned

her master and was carted through the streets of the city, her flesh torn by red-hot pincers before her execution at the stake.**

The mentality of the artisan class is clearly reflected in the letters of Francesco Datini’s closest friend, the notary, Ser Lapo Mazzei.’** From origins as humble as those of Datini, Lapo had been educated in Bologna, received his notary’s diploma, and established himself in Florence. His professional conduct was

without blemish; unlike so many of his colleagues, Lapo was not avaricious and was quite content with a modest livelihood, sufficient to maintain himself and his large family. The most noteworthy traits of his character were a sense of moderation and a genuine religious piety. The contrast between Lapo and Francesco Datini, as revealed in their correspondence, is a profound one, for the gulf between them separated two worlds: “on the one hand, a small enclosed society of craftsmen and shopkeepers, still wholly preoccupied with local interests, and on the

other, a handful of men whose marketplace is the whole of Europe, and whose ambition and enterprise are as wide as their field of action.”**’ Datini’s total preoccupation with gaining wealth was incomprehensible to the notary, who urged his friend 182 The judicial records of the commune provide ample evidence of the predilection for violence among the lower classes in Florence. An example of piety is the carpenter Maso who was a disciple of the ascetic hermit, Giovanni delle Celle; F. Tocco, “I Fraticelli,” AS/, ser. 5, xxxv (1905), 344. 183 On the reception of Cardinal Albornoz in Florence, see M. Villani, 111, 84; of the grand seneschal of Naples, Niccolo Acciaiuoli, zbid., x, 22. For a description of famous preachers, see G. Villani, x1, 23; and M. Villani, vim, 2. The details of the execution of the slave girl are in ASF, Attt del Capitano del Popolo {ACP}, 1197, f. 71r. A vivid eyewitness account of the execution of a heretic in Florence

in 1389 is printed in Storta di Fra Michele Minorita, ed. F. Flora, 2nd ed. (Florence, 1946). 184 Some of this correspondence has been edited and published by C. Guasti, Lettere di un notato a un mercante del secolo xiv, 2 vols. (Florence, 1880). 185 Origo, p. xv.

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THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

to be content with less and to devote more time to religion. Ser

Lapo’s admonitory voice is that of the traditional, conservative, | hierarchic “medieval” world; Datini was a prototype of the intensely competitive and materialistic world of the future. Beyond the fact of guild membership, there was relatively little

difference in the status and condition of many of the poorer artefict and the laboring proletariat. This mass of unorganized, unenfranchised, poverty-stricken humanity was the true popolo minuto of Florence." The bulk of this group, perhaps one-fourth of the city’s population (including dependents) was made up of the sottoposti of the Lana guild, the wool carders, spinners, weavers, cutters, and fullers, upon whose labor the prosperity of Florence depended.**’ Sharing their lowly condition was a host

: of other minuti: servants, market women (trecce), fishermen, apprentices, and prostitutes, living for the most part in misery and want, in hopelessness and despair. - Source material on the Florentine lower classes is extremely scanty. Only on rare occasions, when they were shaken out of their torpor by some crisis—famine, political upheaval, a wave of religious fanaticism—do they leave any substantial imprint upon the records of their time. The most fruitful sources of information on their life and activity are the records of the guilds, the tax commissions, and the courts. The guild records reveal that the laborers in the cloth industries were very strictly controlled, and that their position vis-a-vis the employers was similar to that of the workers in the Lancashire cotton mills of the early nineteenth century before the introduction of labor legislation.*** The tax returns contain the names of hundreds of these workers who were forced to pay their share of the prestanze, and they also

identify the miserabili who were too poor to contribute even a pittance to the communal treasury." From this source, too, we can locate the slum areas where the lower classes were concen186 See N. Rodolico, I] Popolo minuto. Note di storia fiorentina (1343-1378) (Bologna, 1899); and I Ciompi, una pagina di storia del proletariato operaio

(Florence, 1945), Ch. 2. |

187 These occupations have been described in detail by Doren, Wollentuchindustrie, Ch. 5. There is also a list of these occupations and the various steps in the cloth manufacturing process in F. Edler, Glossary of Medieval Terms of Business, Italian Series 1200-1600 (Cambridge, Mass., 1934), pp. 324-30.

188 Doren, Wollentuchindustrie, pp. 219-48, 457-68. |

189 Fiumi, “Demografia,” 107-08. 48

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

trated—in the quarters of S. Spirito and S. Croce.*”* Through their depressing tales of violence and degradation, the judicial

records throw some light on the conditions of poverty and misery in which these people lived. Precise details of their lives, however, are lacking. The notarial records, the source of so much information on the social life of trecento Florence, are generally

silent concerning the laborers, whose rental agreements were usually too petty to be recorded by landlords, and whose possessions were too meager to necessitate the composition of a testa-

ment. Their infrequent appearances in the notarial registers usually pertain to those occasions when adversity forced them to resort to the moneylender. There are no well-known representatives of the popolo minuto

who can be utilized to portray the mores and attitudes of the entire class. However, fragmentary information about a few individuals does reveal certain general types within their ranks. The ugly figure of the racketeer who preyed upon the misery and

weakness of his fellows is depicted in an accusation against a certain Niccol6é Malefici, “a man of evil and base condition, who

operates a gambling house, who is a pederast and a blasphemer against God and the saints... and who leads our sons into every sin.”"** If the judicial records of the commune are worthy of credence, the Florentine underworld constituted a sizeable segment of the lowest stratum of the society, although examples of men of good character among the minut are not lacking. The judicial deposition of one worker evokes an impression of honesty and candor: “I, Neroccio di Bartolomeo, a poor man, recom-

mend myself to you. I do not know how to write properly.” Neroccio complained to the judge that his wife, a mender of fish nets, had been assaulted by a magnate, and he asked for justice. Frequently, workers referred with some pride to the fact that they engaged in manual labor. “I am a poor man, and I live

from the labor of my hands ...I must follow my trade to live and to feed my family of four children, all of them small,” was the simple but impressive statement of one individual, whose lowly condition had not destroyed his sense of human dignity and responsibility."”° 190 Barbadoro, “Finanza e demografia,” 622. 191 AFO], 675, f. 149Vv.

192 AFEO], 688, £. 2218. 198 4AEO], 716, £. 42r. 49

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

The Heightening of Social Tension The relations between these social classes constitute one of the most significant themes in Florentine history between 1343 and 1378. It is axiomatic to say that throughout its existence the city’s

internal history had been the account of the struggles and conflicts of its inhabitants: between bishops and laity, priests and monks, magnates and popolani, between industrialists and work-

ers. Conflict was omnipresent, although the forms, the issues, the contending parties, and the intensity of strife varied from age to age. In contrast to the preceding period, the second half of the fourteenth century witnessed both a different pattern and a marked intensification of conflict.

The gloomy and somber atmosphere of this period increased tensions between classes. The monotonous recurrence of crisis and misfortune darkened the hearts and minds of men, making them an easier prey to fears and terrors; it struck at the roots of reason and sanity, impelling individuals and groups to extremes of thought and behavior.*** The transformation in the city’s political and economic structure also intensified social antag-

onisms. Once wealthy and prominent families had become impoverished, sustained by memories of past glory and by rancor

against the nouveaux riches. Men whose ancestors had been leaders in communal politics were jostled from power, replaced by newcomers. Conversely, the parvenus were apprehensive, fearful of losing the social and economic advantages they had gained. The gravitation of wealth and political influence into the hands of the gente nuova was a most important factor in exacerbating relations between social groups.

The members of the patriciate reacted to adversity in two ways: by fighting each other, and by attacking their rivals among the gente nuova. Conflict between the city’s major families was

not, of course, a new phenomenon, but the persistence and intensity of discord did expend energy that might have been used more effectively in other pursuits.’ Even those families who 194 The best discussion of the problem is in Meiss, Painting in Florence and Siena, pp. 74-85. 195 Qn conflicts between the Medici and other prominent families, see Brucker, “Medici,” 12. There was a violent struggle between the Bordoni and the Beccanugi in 1354; M. Villani, rv, 20. There is a reference to a conflict between the Altoviti

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THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

were political allies had their moments of tension. In 1356 the Albizzi and the Strozzi became involved in an altercation outside the palace of the podesta. According to a judicial deposition, Uberto degli Albizzi had advised the Strozzi “to go somewhere else to commit your depredations,” in response to which Messer Pazzino degli Strozzi shouted: “You thought that you could prey on others, but you were not able to do so, so you have been injuring us, and we are not going to stand for it any longer.”’*® One striking aspect of the lack of cohesion within the patriciate

was the weakening of the family tie. The magnates who broke their connections with their clans to obtain political privileges and surcease from penalties attached to grandi status were not

the only Florentines to abandon their families. Among the popolani, it was not uncommon for individuals to petition the Signoria for a legal separation from blood relatives whose activities and station in life were different from their own.”*’ The most

notable example was the severance of their family tie by two wealthy and prominent cloth manufacturers, Bartolomeo and Alessandro degli Albizzi, in 1372."°°

The extent to which some important families were divided economically, socially, and politically is illustrated by the history of the Medici. Within the ranks of that family were men of substantial wealth and social prestige—Salvestro di Messer Alamanno, Vieri and Giovanni di Cambio, Giovanni and Foligno di Conte.

These men married women from prominent families, received large dowries, and were important in politics. Several of the Medici, however, were in a lower social and economic category,

which was reflected in their small tax payments, the meager dowries they received, and their exclusion from political office. Throughout the second half of the fourteenth century the family and the Acciaiuoli in 1355; Missive, 11, f. 124v. See also an account of an armed

battle between members of the Bardi and the Peruzzi in the contado in May, 1345; ACP, 17, f. 64r. This may have been connected with the economic difficulties of the two families. 196 4SF, Atti del Podesta [AP], 1017, ff. 98r-gor. 197 Tn 1356 several members of the Risaliti family petitioned for legal separation from two of their relatives, “homines non discrete condictionis . . . [qui] conversantur cum hominibus male condictionis vite et fame”; Prov., 43, f. 98r. A similar division of the Brancacci was also approved by the Signoria and the councils; Prov., 62, ff. 67r-68r. 198 Stefani, 733.

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THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

was deeply riven by internal feuds: quarrels over property, division over political issues, and even criminal acts committed by some of the Medici against their kin.*”° On one issue the Florentine aristocracy was firmly united—

its intense dislike of the gente nuova. It is true that there had always been “new men” in Florence, and that the older elements

of the society had always resented their intrusion.””° Dante’s reference to the stink of the contadini is but the most famous of many such deprecatory comments.” In no period of the city’s history, however, was this resentment so deep or its expression so general as in the second half of the fourteenth century. The judicial records contain several statements allegedly made by patricians denigrating their social inferiors, as, for example, Pagnozzo degli Strozzi’s outburst: “Canaille! Canaille! Canaille! May

you die of starvation!” or the reference of Ceffo degli Agli to “questi arteficiali de la merda\”*”’ Franco Sacchetti, commenting on the degradation of the title of cavalier, noted that it had been

bestowed upon “mechanics and artisans and even bakers, and still lower, upon wool carders, usurers and rubaldi barattiert.”’** In the same vein is Boccaccio’s oftquoted reference to “those who have come from Capalle, Cilicciavole, Sugame and Viminiccio, brought from the trowel and the plow and placed in our highest office [the Signoria ].””°*

It was the entrance of these men of lowly origin into the com-

munal government that most angered the patriciate. Donato 199 Brucker, “Medici,” 10-14, 17-19.

200 Jones, p. 203, perhaps underestimates the strength of this sentiment against the gente nuova at certain times. 201 Paradiso, XVI, 49-57:

Ma la cittadinanza, ch’é or mista

Di Campi, di Certaldo e di Figghine, Pura vedeasi nell’ultimo artista, O quanto fora meglio esser vicine Quelle genti ch’io dico, ed al Galluzzo Ed a Trespiano aver vostro confine, Che averle dentro, e sostener lo puzzo Del villan d’Aguglion, di quel da Signa, Che gia per barattar ha l’occhio aguzzo! 202 Rodolico, Popolo minuto, p. 145; AEOJ, 847, f. 22Vv. 203 Novelle, no. 153.

204 Te lettere edite e inedite di Messer Giovanni Boccaccio, ed. F. Corazzini (Florence, 1877), p. 74.

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T'HE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

Velluti complained that, owing to the influx of artisans and Ghibellines, his family had not received its due share of communal offices.’ “Every vile artisan in the community aspires to the status and position of the priorate . . . as do those other citizens of frivolous mien and recent citizenship,” lamented Matteo Villani.”° His son Filippo further embellished this theme: “The government of the city has come, in no small part, into

the hands of men recently arrived from the contado and the district of Florence and even beyond. These men, little experienced in civic affairs, had settled in the city and with the wealth accumu-

lated from trade and usury, in the course of time became very rich. They were able to conclude any marriage which they desired, and by means of gifts, banquets and persuasion, both open and hidden, they won such influence that they were chosen for office.””*”

An anonymous citizen, writing in 1377, noted that since the beginning of the century, “gente nuova, that is, merchants who had recently acquired wealth,” had entered the communal government in considerable numbers. However, added the writer, it was not until after 1343 that the moderate influx of these parvenus became a flood, when “there entered into office the entire community of middling folk (mezzana gente), merchants whose ancestors had never before held office. May God pardon those who have passed over the ancient and honorable citizens in favor of vile artisans and foreigners.”’”*

To these sentiments held by the aristocracy, the lower levels of Florentine society responded in kind. In the opinion of these groups, the patriciate was composed of domineering and overbearing bullies, who habitually maltreated and despoiled their social inferiors. The judicial records are filled with denunciations against grandi e potenti cittadini, whose arrogant demeanor was a constant tribulation.*” One appeal to the executor of the Ordi205 Cronica, p. 243. 206M. Villani, 1, 2. Matteo frequently elaborated on this theme in his chronicle;

see Brucker, “The Ghibelline Trial of Matteo Villani (1362),” Medievalia et Humanistica, x111 (1960), 52.

207 F, Villani, x1, 65. 208 Delizie, 1x, 276-78. 209 See, for example, the description of Roberto di Neri de’Bardi, “siccome huomo grande e possente ...e per sua grandigia, possanza e magioranza e come di case grande e possente della dicta citta”; AEOJ, 675, f. 96v. Similar language

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I'HE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

nances of Justice began with these words: “You are the champion and the support of the people, especially against the grandi, the wolves and rapacious men who wish to dominate the people.””™*

Although the majority of these complaints were registered on behalf of artisans, laborers, and contadini, some were made by men of higher social status. Filippo di Jacopo Marsili, a member of the Lana guild and twice chosen to the Signoria, accused one

of the Bardi of vilifying him without provocation or justification. “And Filippo, an impotent man, did not wish to reply to him, because he feared that he might have others in the house to do him harm... O, for God’s sake, Messer Executor, do not be afraid of the Bardi because they are a great family. ... Let reason and justice prevail!”’** Another victim of a magnate’s despoliation wrote that his aggressor “has done this to me because he is

powerful and I am a poor, weak popolano, forced to gain my livelihood with my hands, and I am not strong enough to resist

him.” The distinction between the arrogant and violent behavior of the grandi and the peaceloving ways of the meno potenti was sharply drawn in the minds of the citizenry, and it is reflected in this petition by a magnate seeking popolano status: “He [the petitioner] was and intends to be a quiet and peaceful merchant and guild member, doing injury to no one, but peacefully devoting himself to trade and business.”** These feelings of hostility and resentment against the aristocracy were very prevalent among the lower classes. For most men

at most times, however, it was a latent sentiment, manifesting itself in an occasional anonymous protest to the judicial authorities, Or, more commonly, in grumbling complaints to fellow workers and drinking companions in shops, taverns, and public squares. Yet, although the majority passively accepted the existing social order, there were small, isolated nuclei of individuals

holding extreme views. On a purely economic level were the activities of Ciuto Brandini, whose efforts to organize the laborers is used to describe Lodovico Giandonati, “homo superbo e arrogante de numero di grandi”; zbid., 892, f. 18r. Frequent references to the famigl or the fant: of powerful men indicate that the servants were often as arrogant and violent as their masters; zbid., 364, f. 39v; 802, f. 8v.

210 AEO], 647, f. 26r. 211 AEO], 364, f. 30v. 212 AEOJ, 499, f. 75r213 Prov., 68, f. 53r. See similar statements made by other magnates seeking popolano status; zbid., 67, ff. 48v-49r, 156v-1571.

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THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

in the cloth industry cost him his life in 1345.”** Born of hunger and poverty (and wine) were the rioting mobs that cried, “Down with the rich!”, and in 1344 sought to burn and pillage the houses

of the Rucellai.”° Another form of social protest was inspired by religious radicalism. Numerous and influential in Florence were

the heretic Fraticelli, who glorified poverty and condemned the materialist preocccupations of both the secular and ecclesiastical societies of their time.”*® Circulating through the city in 1368 was a prophecy of an imminent upheaval, “when the worms of the earth will most cruelly devour the lions, leopards, and wolves; and the blackbirds and small fowl swallow up the greedy vul-

tures. And at the same time the common and little folk will destroy all tyrants and false traitors... . And there will be great famine and pestilence, wherefrom some evil folk will die, and the churches will be despoiled of all their temporal goods.””""

Between 1343 and 1378 these sentiments did not crystallize into overt revolutionary movements. This was due, in some degree, to the vigilance of the communal officials, who were perpetually on guard against attempts to subvert the political and social order.”* Their task was made easier by the lack of unity and cohesion among the lower classes. The gulf between the artisans, men with a minimal stake in society, and the pariahs, the unorganized proletariat, was clearly visible in September 1378, when the majority of the lower guildsmen helped to suppress the Ciompi.”” This division was symbolized by the petition of one of the lower guilds, the innkeepers, requesting the Signoria to proclaim the anniversary of the Ciompi downfall as a holiday.”

Within the lower guilds there was discord between those who cast their lot with the ruling group, and who were rewarded

with offices and emoluments, and the rank and file of the 214 Rodolico, Popolo minuto, pp. 157-60. 215 1bid., 168-69.

216 On the influence of the Fraticelli in Florence during this ‘period, see the recent article by M. Becker, “Florentine Politics and the Diffusion of Heresy in the Trecento: a Socioeconomic Inquiry,” Speculum, xxxtv (1959), 60-75. 217 Origo, p. 66.

218 Becker, “Florentine Politics and Heresy,” 61-73, has suggested, however, that until 1382 the communal government indirectly promoted the spread of Fraticelli ideas by severely curtailing the authority of the inquisitor. 219 Rodolico, Ciompi, pp. 166-78. 220 Prov., 67, ff. I51r-152r.

55

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

petty bourgeoisie, who opposed many of the policies of the communal government.” Thus the lower classes of Florence emulated their social superiors in their disunity. They formed a mélange of diverse and conflicting groups, each with its own

orientation and motivation. Held together occasionally by a crisis, they were more frequently divided by interest, personality, and the tactics of those who controlled their destiny. 221 See Becker and Brucker, “Arti Minort,” 100-02, especially n. 55. On the disunity of the lower classes, see also Becker, “Florentine Politics and Heresy,” 66-67.

56

CHAPTER II Ghe Political Background The Structure of Communal Government The Florentine commune in the fourteenth century was a mosaic, whose parts had been created during critical moments of the city’s history. The product of two centuries of historical evolution, it retained many of the characteristic features of its origins: the usurpation and assimilation of ancient authorities and jurisdictions, and the exercise of new functions made necessary

by the conditions of growth and expansion.” Communal authority was always complex, never simple; always variable, never fixed; always limited, never total.

The commune was not a sovereign entity; it recognized in theory, and occasionally and reluctantly in fact, the supreme authority of a distant emperor.’ Furthermore, its power was limited by entities which were almost completely exempt from its control, such as the church, or which possessed varying degrees of independence, such as organizations with recognized

privileges and immunities: the Parte Guelfa, the guilds, the confraternities.” Geographically, too, its power was circumscribed. While its authority within the city walls and the adjacent contado

was extensive, the commune’s jurisdiction in the outlying areas of its territory (the district) was limited by the capiztolt, the agree-

ments which had been made with the dependent communities.* 1 The juridical foundations of Italian communes have been described in many works. Among the most important are: E. Mayer, Italientsche Verfassungsgeschichte von der Gothenzeit bis zur Zunftherrschaft (Leipzig, 1909), 11; F. Ercole, Dal comune al principato (Florence, 1929); and A. Marongiu, Storia del diritto

pubblico. Principi e istituti di governo in Italia dalla meta del IX alla meta del XIX secolo (Milan, 1956). 2The importance of the imperial problem for Florence in the fourteenth century can be seen from the material in Theodor E. Mommsen, Italienische Analekten zur Reichsgeschichte des 14. Jahrhunderts (1310-1378), Schriften der Monumenta Germaniae Historica, 11 (Stuttgart, 1952). See also N. Rubinstein, “The Place of the Empire in 15th Century Florentine Political Opinion and Diplomacy,” Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, xxx, 123-35.

3 See below, pp. 96-104. : 4 See E. Sestan, “Il comune nel Trecento,” I7 Trecento (Florence, 1953), pp. 23-24. Several of these agreements regulating relations between Florence and

7

THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

Although certain elements of the communal structure had their origins in the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, the basic fabric of the zrecento commune dated from 1282. In that year a regime of the popolo based upon the guilds was established in the city, and its major features survived until the final destruction of the republic in the sixteenth century.’ The fundamental organs and principles of government were set forth in three documents: the statutes of the podesta and the captain of the popolo, and the Ordinances of Justice.° While these statutes formed the constitution of the commune, they had no permanent or immutable character, and could be changed by the simple passage of a legislative enactment. In the fourteenth century, efforts were made to codify the statutes, but these redactions were quickly outdated by the passage of new legislation transforming the constitutional structure.’ Two significant characteristics of the communal organization

were its instability and its complexity. In The Divine Comedy, Dante had noted the Florentine propensity for change and novelty in political affairs, and this trait became even more pronounced after the poet’s death.* While new institutions were established at regular intervals, old ones were rarely abolished, but dependent communes are printed in J Capitol: del Comune di Firenze. Inventario e regesto, ed. Guasti and Gherardi. The most recent study of relations between city and contado concentrates on the economic sphere: E. Fiumi, “Sui rapporti economici tra citta e contado nell’eta comunale,” Archivio storico italiano, cx1v (1956), 18-68.

5 A fundamental source for the structure of the Florentine commune is R. Davidsohn’s chapter, “Verfassung und Verwaltung,” in his Geschichte von Florenz, iv, 1, 54-204. The earliest documents pertaining to the city’s constitutional structure have been collected by Rondini, J pia antichi frammenti del costituto fiorentino (Florence, 1882); and P. Santini, Documenti dell’antica costituzione del comune di Firenze (Florence, 1895). 6 The Ordinances of Justice are published in G. Salvemini, Magnati e popolani in Firenze dal 1280 al 1295 (Florence, 1899), pp. 384-432. The other statutes have been edited by R. Caggese, Statuti della Repubblica fiorentina, 2 vols. (Flor-

ence, Ig10-21). The earliest extant statutes date from 1322 and 1325; on the existence of earlier statutes, see Davidsohn, Forschungen zur dlteren Geschichte von Florence, 1, 137-41.

7 The statutes were codified in 1355 but never printed; the compilation of I415 is in print: Statuta popult et comunis Florentiae publica auctoritate collecta castigata et praeposita anno salutis mccccxv, 4 vols. (Freiburg, 1778-81). 8 See Giovanni Villani’s comment, Cronica di Giovanni Villani, xu, 19: “E 7]

nostro poeta Dante Allighieri sclamando contra il vizio della incostanza de’

58

THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

continued to exist alongside the innovations. The result was a cumbersome system, comprising a large number of offices with ill-defined and often conflicting jurisdictions. To compound the confusion, extraordinary commissions (balie) were periodically created to perform a specific function for a limited time: to enforce sumptuary regulations, to collect a special tax assessment, to conduct a war.”’ Although several balie were empowered to reform the government in the ¢recento, none ever succeeded in simplifying or rationalizing the communal structure. The supreme executive office of the commune was the Signoria, which included eight priors and the standard-bearer (gonfaloniere) of justice. Two colleges, the Sixteen gonfalomieri of the companies and the Twelve (dodici buon’ uomini), gave counsel and assistance to the Signoria on policy matters and participated in the elec-

tion of other communal officials. Members of the Signoria, the Twelve, and the Sixteen held office for two, three, and four months,

respectively. The principle of limited tenure also applied to the twenty-odd posts and commissions which constituted the lower echelon of the communal administration. Two commissions were responsible for the city’s grain supply; two others supervised the mercenary troops hired by the commune; another administered the city’s prison, the Stinche. Several offices had jurisdiction over

the fiscal administration: the collection of taxes, the review of communal accounts, the reception and disbursement of revenues.” Fiorentini nella sua Commedia...

..... Fai tanto sottili Provvedimenti, ch’a mezzo novembre Non giugne quel che tu d’ottobre fili.” [Purg., vi, 142-44] ®A typical example of the proliferation of offices was the establishment in

September 1378 of the Otto di Guardia, with authority to guard the regime against conspiracies, a task which had previously been (and remained) the responsibility of the judicial authorities and another commission, the Dieci della Liberta. Originally created as a temporary body, the Otto was made permanent in 1382 and became one of the most powerful offices in the commune; G. Antonelli, “La magistratura degli Otto di Guardia a Firenze,” ASI, cx11 (1954), 3-39. 10 Fifteen volumes of balie records for the period 1342-1378 have survived in the Florentine archives; the majority pertain to dalie granted to supervise the conduct of wars. 11]In Tratte, 219 and 220, are recorded the names of citizens selected for these minor administrative offices from 1375 to 1377. The number of these offices increased progressively in the second half of the fourteenth century, and there was no effort made to consolidate functions. The terms of office varied from two to six months.

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IHE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

Formulation of policy and supervision of communal administration were the responsibility of citizens who held office for very short periods and who combined public service with the direction of their private affairs. However, the daily routine of government was, to a considerable degree, in the hands of professional civil servants.** The activities of these men gave to the administration some degree of continuity and stability which compensated in part for the weaknesses inherent in a system of amateur, part-time government. These permanent officials were notaries who constituted a veritable city-hall clique, and who adopted the mores and mentality typical of professional bureaucrats. Apparently, they were an avaricious lot who collected lucrative posts as eagerly as did ecclesiastical 'pluralists, and who supplemented their salaries with the petty graft which inevitably exists in the loci of authority. While the names of most of these officials remain buried in the records they themselves copied, a few achieved some notoriety and political influence. Ser Piero di Ser Grifo, a permanent fixture in the palace of the Signoria, held a regular position as notary of the Reformation, in charge of drafting the most im-

portant communal documents. He was also the author of an ingenious device for attracting investments into the communal

moni.* Another influential civil servant was Ser Niccold di Ser Ventura Monachi, who was chancellor of the commune from 1348 to 1375, when he suffered the misfortune of being proscribed

as a Ghibelline.” The fame of his successor, Coluccio Salutati, 12 Tax records provide one source of evidence for the size of this professional bureaucracy. In 1352, 17 couriers, 18 tax collectors, 39 notaries and 55 numptii were listed in the sega records; B. Barbadoro, “Finanza e demografia nei ruoli fiorentine d’imposta del 1352-1355,” Arti del Congresso internazionale, 1x, 631-45.

18 The most detailed discussions of the bureaucracy are in D. Marzi, La Cancelleria della Repubblica fiorentina (Rocca San Casciano, 1910); and Davidsohn, Geschichte, 1v, 1, 151-79. Stefani commented upon the exorbitant fees charged by notarial officials of the commune; Cronaca fiorentina di Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, ed. N. Rodolico, Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, xxx, Pt. 1, 728. For the popular reputation of notaries, see I. Origo, The Merchant of Prato, pp. 218-21, who estimates that between 600 and 700 notaries were active in Florence in the late trecento. 14 On the character and career of Ser Piero, see Marzi, Cancelleria, pp. 88-91. 15 Monachi’s career and his difficulties with the Parte Guelfa are described in thid., pp. 92-105.

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THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

was derived equally from his career as a public official and his role as a humanist.**°

The two legislative bodies of the commune were the Council

of the Popolo and the Council of the Commune. The former comprised three hundred members, including the Signoria, the colleges, and other exofficio delegates; the latter totaled two

hundred citizens, of whom one-fifth were magnates.’ Both councils were elected by the Signoria and the colleges for sixmonth terms, which, in 1366, were reduced to four months. Neither assembly had authority to initiate legislation; the councils considered only those proposals which had previously been approved by the Signoria and the colleges. A majority of twothirds was required in each council for passage of a provision, and the tabulated votes on these measures are useful guides for ascertaining public opinion on important issues.*© That these assemblies played a vital, though passive, role in commual politics is proved by the large number of provisions which failed

to gain acceptance, even after being submitted two or three times.”

The single branch of government that was not entrusted to the citizens themselves was the administration of justice. In this sphere Florence followed the pattern of other Italian communes by calling in outsiders to fill the judicial posts of podesta, captain of the popolo, and executor of the Ordinances of Justice. The

judges were eminent nobles who made a career of serving as 16 On Salutati, see zbid., pp. 106-51. For a recent discussion of his thought, see H. Baron, The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance (Princeton, N.J., 1955), PP. 79-139.

17 Qn the historical development of the councils, see Davidsohn, Geschichte, Iv, 2, 57-70. The size of the councils varied. In 1343 they were set at 300 for the Council of the Popolo and 4oo for the Council of the Commune; G. Villani, xu, 19; I Capitoli del Comune di Firenze, 11, 599-603. After the Black Death, however, the size of the Council of the Commune was reduced to 200. See Provutsiont, 36, ff. tor-tov, 38r, 83v-84r; 39, f. r7r. The personnel records of only a few councils have survived; the lists of ten councils for the years 1373-1377 are recorded in Tratte, 218-20. 18 A provision of 1366 which described the procedure whereby provisions were submitted to the councils is printed in Marzi, pp. 573-77. 19 Occasionally attempts were made to force the councils to pass a provision by resubmitting it several times; this practice was specifically prohibited; Prov., 43, ff. 159v-160r; 63, f. 39r. There were also attempts to obstruct the passage of legislation by not submitting it to the councils; Prov., 59, ff. 133r-133v; 60, ff.

9or-gov. } 61

IHE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

judicial officials in Italian cities with Guelf traditions.” Since these men were not lawyers, they relied upon subordinates with legal training to advise them in rendering decisions. In addition to their judicial functions, these officials were also responsible for

policing the city and executing the laws of the commune, for which purpose they were assigned corps of armed men.” The administration of justice was of vital importance in frecento Florence. In this congenitally unruly society, still impregnated with feudal mores, the resort to violence was a conventional solution to a dispute or conflict. Citizens of all classes still considered justice a private prerogative rather than a public

| responsibility. These attitudes fostered chronic disorder, but, save for rare occasions, it was kept under control by the authorities. A more serious problem was the impartiality of justice, upon which,

| to an important degree, the survival of republican government depended. The crucial issue was the aggressive behavior of prom-

inent families and individuals in their relations with each other and with their social inferiors, and the extent to which these potenti were subject to the law. Boccaccio and Sacchetti were among the contemporary critics who asserted that the administration of justice was corrupt, and that the judges were lenient in their treatment of the powerful and unduly harsh on the poor and impotent.” In Florence as in every society, the rich and influential citizens certainly possessed

definite advantages over their poorer and weaker brethren in matters of justice. They could hire competent counsel; they could

intimidate witnesses; they could suborn officials. Members of notable Florentine families accused of crime were frequently 20 The method of selecting these judges was complex. First, the name of a Guelf

city was chosen from a Jorsa; then, the judge was selected from the list of eligible residents of the city. For this procedure, see ASF, Deliberazioni det Signori e Collegi (Speciale Autorita), 2. 21 For details concerning the entourage of the judges, see Miscellanea fiorentina di erudizione e storia, ed. I. del Badia (Florence, 1902), 1, 43-44. In 1371 the podesta and his 100 assistants received a total salary of 12,500 ire for a six-month period; the captain of the popolo and his 75 associates were paid 8,200 lire. 22 L.. Chiapelli, “L’amministrazione della giustizia in Firenze durante gli ultimi secoli del medioevo e il periodo del rinascimento secondo le testimonianze degli antichi scrittori,” ASI, 4th ser., xv (1885), 43-45. Chiapelli’s opinions on the administration of justice are vitiated by his total reliance on the observations of contemporaries, instead of on the judicial records.

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THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

released when witnesses refused to testify against them,” and the Consulte records contain occasional references to attempts by private citizens to subvert justice.** However, this did not result in the wholesale immunity of the potenti from the sanctions of the law. Penalties for tampering with the judicial process were severe, and the fact that justice was administered under the watchful eyes of the populace was undoubtedly a deterrent to potential givers and receivers of bribes. Large numbers of prominent citt-

zens received harsh sentences, supporting the conclusion that the majority of judges performed their duties conscientiously and equitably.”” That only a minority was guilty of improper conduct is suggested by this anonymous letter addressed to one judge:

“Messer Executor. The rumor is circulating . . . that you are here at the behest of the grand: of Florence and that you do not proceed against any magnate who comes before you. . . . Many

executors have come here . . . and they have punished both grandi and popolani, and there have been executors from Lombardy, very noble men, and they have punished the magnates who erred, and have always favored the popolani. It is believed ... that you have sought to favor the grandi and the gentlemen (gentili huomini) ... and that only popolani will be punished. ... Do your task well, Messer Executor, in order that you may carry away a good and honorable reputation.”” 23 The records of the criminal courts are filled with accusations which were quashed for lack of evidence. For example, in January 1368 Leonardo di Niccolo Frescobaldi, charged with assaulting Giovanni di Francesco Magalotti, was released when all of the witnesses called by the prosecution denied any knowledge (se nichil sctre) of the attack; Att del Esecutore degli Ordinamenti della Giusttgia, 512, £. roor. 24 Consulte e Pratiche, 2, f. 107r; 8, f. 1r. In one case, the Sixteen demanded: “Quod ponatur remedium expediens ne cives mutuent rettores.” 25 Members of patrician families sentenced to death by the podestd’s court included: Adoardo Portinari, Angelo di Paolo Bordoni, Bardo di Paolo Altoviti, Antonio di Forese Sacchetti, Alamanno Acciaiuoli, Jacopo Guicciardini, Stefano di Sanze degli Strozzi, Bernardo Giandonati, Alamanno Adimari, and Fecino di Biagio Ridolfi; Azz del Podesta, 482, £. 239V; 981, f£. 84r; 1035, f. 167r; 1102, f. 131r; 1486, f£. 79v; 1657, f. 47r; 1675, £. 77r; 1770, ff. 165r, 293r; 2562, f. 93r. 26 4EO], 530, ff. 68r-68v, 6 May 1367. There is also a reference in the Consulte e Pratiche records to a podesta who had failed to prosecute a case involving op-

pression by a powerful citizen, and who was reprimanded for his laxity. The comment of the spokesman for the Twelve was: “Quod domini procurent habere et se informare de inquisitionibus . . . et habitis illis, habeatur potestas, et sibi hostendatur error suus. .. . Et deinceps provideatur quod potentes non possint opprimere debiles”; CP, 8, f. 35v.

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THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

The most glaring flaw in Florentine justice was the facility with which criminals could flee the city and later arrange for a remission or reduction of their penalty. This avenue was usually

open only to individuals with money and influential friends. Frequently, a condemned man’s family procured the adoption of a provision cancelling his sentence.** The commune also enacted general amnesty legislation, which permitted outlaws to obtain

the annulment of their conviction upon payment of money.” Thus, while prominent citizens were regularly sentenced to death in the courts, their necks rarely graced the executioner’s block. Of the five members of the Medici family who received the death penalty between 1343 and 1360, not one was actually executed.” Even the most heinous crimes could be compounded by arrangement with the authorities. Messer Andrea degli Strozzi, sentenced to death in 1343 for leading an insurrection against the regime,

escaped to avoid execution, but fifteen years later he was still alive and free in the city.” The keystone of the communal edifice was the Signoria, whose nine members were primarily responsible for the formulation of policy and the administration of government. The statute of the captain of the popolo defined the broad authority of the office: “The priors and the standard-bearer of justice should work diligently for the safety, exaltation, conservation and growth of the

peaceful and tranquil state of the popolo and the commune of Florence.”™ In addition to its general powers of supervising and 27 An example was the cancellation of the death sentence against Andrea di Messer Alamanno de’ Medici; Brucker, “The Medici in the Fourteenth Century,” Speculum, xxxi1 (1957), 13. See also Cronica di Matteo Villani, 1, 71. On the judicial dispensations granted during the rule of the Duke of Athens, see M. Becker, “Gualtieri di Brienne e Puso delle dispense giudiziarie,’ ASI, cxm, 245-51.

28 Two amnesty laws were passed in 1363 and 1368; AP, 270, f. 7v; Prov., 56,

f. gor. One beneficiary of the 1363 amnesty was Lodovico di Naddo Covoni, who was fined 5000 Hire for wounding a magnate, Giovanni Tornaquinci, in April 1363. The sentence was cancelled in September 1364 as a result of the 1363 amnesty and after Lodovico had paid a certain portion of his fine to the commune. See also the cancellation of Ferrante Baroncelli’s sentence; AP, 279, f. 7v. 29 Brucker, “Medici,” 13. A close scrutiny of the judicial records would reveal

how many prominent citizens were actually executed for crimes. 80 On Andrea’s crime see below, p. 107. In 1359, he was convicted of robbery; AP, 1186, f. 23Vv.

81 Statuto del Capitano del Popolo, u, 3, in Statutt della Repubblica fiorentina, ed. Caggese, 1, 78.

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THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

controlling the communal administration, the Signoria possessed special authority and prerogatives. The priors participated in the selection of most communal officials. They were responsible for

initiating legislation, and were also charged with pushing the provisions through the councils. Frequently, the Signoria intervened in the administration of justice by sending notes to the judges ordering them to prosecute one case, or to desist from proceeding with another.” Foreign policy was largely in the hands of the priors, who entered into correspondence with other heads

of state, sent instructions to ambassadors, and bore the primary responsibility for the conduct of war and the negotiations for peace.** Also on the Signoria’s agenda, interspersed with momen-

tous affairs of state, were the petty details of government, the trivia which clogged the administrative machinery and distracted the attention of the priors from the truly important problems and issues confronting them.”

Although the authority of the Signoria was extensive, it was not limitless. One significant restriction was the short term of office. The opportunities for malfeasance were decisively restricted,

as Matteo Villani pointed out with satisfaction, by the fact that each Signoria had only sixty days in which to commit errors.” Moreover, the actions of the priors were closely scrutinized by a vigilant and suspicious citizenry. Rarely did one Signoria leave office without being charged with illegal acts and violations of communal statutes.*° To protect themselves from litigation of this kind, the priors frequently initiated legislation which granted them 82 For examples of this intervention, see CP, 2, f. 1771; 4, ff. 31r-31v; 10, f£. 28r;

Deliberazioni dei Signori e Collegi (Ordinaria Autorita), 20, f. 13v. 88 Examples of the diplomatic correspondence of the Signoria are printed in Mommsen, Italienische Analekten, docs. 376, 380, 383, 443, 444, 456.

84 The records of the Consulte e Pratiche reveal clearly this intermixture of the important and the inconsequential. For a schedule of the regular duties and functions, largely formal, of the Signoria, see Marzi, Cancelleria, pp. 58285. The records of the Deliberazioni det Signori e Collegi also contain the daily agenda of the Signoria. 85M. Villani, tv, 60. 86 The judicial records are filled with denunciations of the Signoria and other officials. A typical example is the accusation against the Signoria holding office in January and February 1350; AEOJ, 137, f. 5r. The priors were accused of extortion, failing to observe communal statutes, bribery, granting offices to unworthy persons, and not remaining in the palace of the Signoria. For an example of an accusation against a lesser official, see AP, 1186, £. 63r.

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THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

specific immunity from prosecution.’ Another factor which restrained the arbitrary and illegal exercise of authority was the wrath of the populace. To molest or injure a communal official was a serious offense, for which heavy punishment was prescribed. Yet, this did not prevent threats and attacks upon officials whose

acts had aroused opposition and resentment. In 1364, after the Signoria had concluded an unpopular peace with Pisa, Carlo degli Strozzi, a member of the body, was given a police guard to pro-

tect him from an angry mob that sought to attack him.* The system for selecting the Signoria was basically simple. An electoral body chose a list of eligible candidates, and every two

| months a new group of priors was drawn by lot from a bag containing the names of the eligibles. To prevent the fraudulent manipulation of the electoral process, the Florentines transformed

this system into a procedure of extreme complexity, in which each stage was surrounded by elaborate safeguards. The key feature was the “scrutiny,” the selection of those citizens eligible for the Signoria. Every three years, new lists of nominees were drawn up by three separate agencies, and these lists were then submitted to an electoral commission composed of the Signoria, the colleges, various exofficio groups, and eighty members co-opted by

the Signoria and the colleges.” Those citizens who received a favorable two-thirds vote by this body were declared eligible for

| the supreme executive, and their names were placed in leather bags from which, at two-month intervals, they were then drawn. Eligibility for the Signoria was limited to Guelf citizens over thirty who were enrolled in a guild and were neither bankrupts, magnates, nor tax delinquents.*° The number of nominees whose names were submitted to the scrutiny varied. According to Gio87 For examples of this legislation, see Prov., 42, ff. 116v-117r; 62, f. 230r. 88M. Villani, x1, 102; Sozomen Pistoriensis, Specimen Historiae, RRIISS, ed. Muratori (Milan, 1723-51), xvi, col. 1081. For other examples of assaults upon communal officials, see CP, 6, ff. 76v, 77v; AEO], 462, f. 112r; 575, f£. 44r; Atti del Capitano del Popolo, 165, f. 3r. 89 These preliminary lists were submitted to the electoral commission by the

Sixteen gonfalonieri, the captains of the Parte Guelfa and the consuls of the guilds. One list, or rechata, drawn up by the Parte captains in 1364, is in ASF, Archivio Bardi, 75. A description of the involved process is contained in a rubric of the statute of the captain of the popolo of 1355, printed in Marzi, Cancelleria, PP. 558-59.

40 On these limitations, see Marzi, Cancelleria, pp. 566-67.

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THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

vanni Villani, some three thousand citizens were nominated to the supreme executive in 1343, of whom approximately three hundred obtained approval.** The number of eligibles increased regularly with each scrutiny held after 1348, and by 1361 over

five hundred Florentines were certified as qualified for the Signoria.”

A cardinal feature of the selection process was the divieto, a device that limited the frequency with which an individual or family could be represented in the executive offices. A prior could not return to the supreme executive before three years had passed, nor could any member of his family succeed him within a year of the expiration of his term of office.“ The divieto restrictions made the selection process a protracted and tedious affair. Each name drawn from one of the bags was closely scrutinized

to determine whether the individual was eligible for the office at that specific time. It was not unusual for fifty names to be extracted before a single Signoria could be constituted. In September 1369 thirty-one names were drawn before two priors from the quarter of S. Croce were finally selected. Of this number, two citizens were absent from Florence, eight had previously died, eighteen were ineligible on account of dzveto restrictions, and one was disqualified as a Ghibelline.** The avowed purpose of the divieto, as stated in one provision, was to permit citizens to participate more equitably in the honors and burdens of office. The restrictions were designed primarily to prevent the monopoly of high office by the large, influential 41G. Villani, xu, 22. 42 The earliest extant list of eligibles for the Signoria is the 1382 scrutiny, printed in Delizie degli eruditi toscani, ed. Ildefonso di San Luigi (Florence, 1770-86), XVI, 125-260.

In that scrutiny, approximately 5000 nominees were considered, and 750 were declared eligible for the Signoria. A fairly complete record of earlier scrutiny lists can be compiled from the Tratte records; see M. Becker and G. Brucker, “The Artt Minori in Florentine Politics, 1342-1378,” Mediaeval Studies, XVIII, 97, notes 32 and 33.

43 A summary of the divieto restrictions extracted from the statue of the captain of the popolo (1355) is printed in Marzi, pp. 566-69. Examples of later divieto legislation are in Prov., 36, £. gor; 40, ff. r42v, 147r, 161r; 41, f. 55r; 42, ff. 8or-89v; 54, £. 138v; 60, ff. 76r-76v.

44The record of the extractions is in Tratte, 216. 45 “(Jt magis inter cives Florentinos equalitas servetur in honoribus et oneribus”;

Prov., 36, £. gor. For other statements of this principle, see zbid., 42, ff. 8or, 113V; 54, f. 138v.

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THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

popolano families: the Strozzi, Albizzi, Medici, Ricci, Rucellai.*° How effective these controls were in limiting the representation

in the Signoria of the great families may be seen from a study of the prior lists.’ The Strozzi constituted the largest family bloc of popolani in Florence; in 1364 forty six members of that house were designated as eligible for the Signoria by one of the nominating groups, the captains of the Parte Guelfa.* Yet, between 1343 and 1378 the Strozzi were represented in the Signoria

only twenty times, while three members of a minor family, the Corsi, were chosen on eleven occasions to the supreme executive.” Profiting most from the divieto were those individuals without family connections who participated in communal politics. Three lower guildsmen and one citizen from the greater guilds shared the record of being selected to the Signoria seven times between 1343 and 1378: Roberto Martelli, a swordmaker; Antonio Martini, a butcher; Matteo di Federigo Soldi, a wine merchant; and Niccolé Rimbaldesi, a banker. By contrast, such eminent political figures as Messer Pazzino degli Strozzi, Piero degli Albizzi, and Salvestro de’ Medici could expect to attain the commune’s highest office only once or twice during their political careers,

The selection of the Signoria which held office in May and June 1362 illustrates the complexity of the final stage of the electoral process.°° In the quarter of S. Spirito, all twelve names

remaining from the scrutiny of 1352 were extracted, but none were eligible. Divieto restrictions accounted for nine disqualifica-

tions, while the stigma of Ghibellinism eliminated two others. However, two candidates were quickly drawn from the bag con46M. Villani, vim, 24, described the divieto legislation and noted that it favored the gente nuova. 47 The prior lists are in M. Rastrelli, Priorista Fiorentino istorico (Florence, 1783) and in Stefani’s chronicle. 48 Tratte, 395, ff. 1-15. Other families with a substantial number of nominees in this list included the Albizzi (19), Medici (20), Rucellai (15), and Ricci (15). For other statistics on the representation of important families in the Signoria, see Brucker, “Medici,” 14. 49 Bardo Corsi, a silk manufacturer, was prior in 1354, 1360, 1368, and 1372.

Francesco di Lapo Corsi, a /anatuolo, sat in the Signoria in 1362 and 1366; one brother Simone, a baker, in 1357, 1364, and 1376; and another, Giovanni, in 1370 and 1375. 59 Tratte, 210.

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THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

taining the 1355 list of eligibles: Amerigo di Messer Tommaso Corsini and Niccolé6 Rimbaldesi. These priors represented opposite ends of the political spectrum. Amerigo Corsini was a partisan of the oligarchic faction, while Niccolé Rimbaldesi, the only member of his family in politics, was an outspoken opponent

of the Parte Guelfa and a leader of the liberal faction in the commune.” The quarter of S. Croce was represented by two cloth manufacturers, Orlando Orlandi and Buonaccorso di Lapo

Buonaccorsi. The latter was a prominent leader of the Parte Guelfa and an energetic participant in communal politics.” S. Maria Novella furnished two priors who, like Rimbaldesi, were

foes of the oligarchic faction: Gino di Bernardo Anselmi and Guccio di Dino Gucci. Two lower guildsmen and the standardbearer of justice, Zato Passavanti, came from the quarter of S. Giovanni. One of these artisans, Giovanni di Piero Parenti, was

a political figure of some importance. He sat in the Signoria six times, and his opposition to the oligarchic faction earned him the enmity of the leaders of the Parte Guelfa. Accused in 1371 of Ghibelline sympathies, he was declared innocent of the charge by the judge. Seven years later, however, he was proscribed by

the Parte Guelfa in the great purge of Ghibelline suspects during the war with the papacy.” The defects and flaws in this constitutional structure are easily discernible. Authority was divided and scattered among an ex-

cessive number of groups, and the lines of responsibility were blurred by the multiplicity of offices and the overlapping of jurisdictions. Short terms of office were not conducive to continuity of policy or effective administrative control, Another serious defect was the lack of stability. The Florentines never became deeply attached to their institutions, nor did they develop a respect for their political customs and traditions, because 51 Rimbaldesi was chosen to the Signoria seven times; in 1377 he was proscribed by the Parte Guelfa, but after the revolution of the following year, his Guelf status was restored; Stefani, 775; Diario d’anonimo fiorentino dall’anno 1356 al 1389, ed. A. Gherardi, in Cronache dei secoli xiii e xiv (Florence, 1876), . 361.

, i Stefani, 790. Buonaccorsi belonged to the mercantile family whose company had suffered bankruptcy in 1342; he was matriculated in the Lana guild. 58 The records of Parenti’s trial are in ACP, 371, ff. 118-1281; 372, ff. 21r-33v; 382, ff. or-ov. His proscription is noted in Stefani, 775.

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THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

these were changed so frequently, either by revolution or legisla-

tive fiat. The method of selecting officials by lot placed little premium upon political ability or statesmanship, but tended instead to exalt mediocrity. Finally, the regime was weakened by the exclusion of important segments of the society. It was a republic, resting upon a broader social base than any previous communal regime. Yet it prohibited some of its most eminent citizens, the magnates, from full participation in the government, and it excluded the lower classes, whose inclusion might have provided the massive popular support to ensure its survival.

Many of these structural weaknesses in the Florentine con- © stitution were deliberately instituted to compensate for certain features of the society which were incompatible with republican government. The complex system of selecting officeholders was designed to avert the very real danger of the commune’s domination by one or several of the city’s great families. Magnates were not granted full political rights, because they had demonstrated on several occasions that, as a group, they were incapable of conducting themselves as responsible participants in a republican regime. The most serious weakness was the exclusion of the lower classes from the communal government, a policy dictated more by economic than political considerations. Members of the greater guilds who controlled Florence’s large-scale industry and

commerce were not prepared to grant the proletariat even a token representation in the regime. Such participation, involving

the organization of the cloth workers into guilds, would have constituted a serious challenge to the total control of the cloth industry by the entrepreneurs. Certain weaknesses in the constitutional structure were alleviated by devices that minimized their adverse effects. Some continuity between the outgoing and incoming priors was provided

by the colleges, whose terms of office overlapped that of the Signoria.“ Moreover, in times of grave crisis, the commune usually resorted to a balia to provide permanent direction and control of policy. The war with the papacy (1375-1378) was supervised throughout its duration by the eight citizens who constituted the otto della guerra. The flexibility provided by the 54 The Signoria began its term of office on the 1st of January, and at two month intervals. The Twelve entered office on the 15th of March, June, September, and December. The term of the Sixteen began on the 8th of January, May and September.

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THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

balie compensated for much rigidity which was inherent in the system. The method of choosing officials had both positive and negative aspects. The results of the scrutiny were only as good as the judgment of the participating citizens. In a system of this kind, conformity was doubtless a political asset, and there was

probably discrimination against able individuals with sharp tongues or prickly personalities. On the other hand, the notorious

demagogue or scoundrel could rarely command the assent of two-thirds of his peers.” With its numerous offices and frequent changes of personnel, the system did contribute to the political education of a large and representative group of citizens. By holding a variety of posts

and coming into contact with their fellows in assemblies and commissions, these men gained a unique knowledge of the problems and techniques of government. And, despite the many democratic features of the regime, there did exist a leadership elite. A small corps of citizens, which included several magnates, was

repeatedly convoked as richiesti to advise the Signoria and the | colleges on important issues. The political influence of these men,

the most astute and experienced statesmen in Florence, was not seriously circumscribed by the limitations of officeholding.”®

An impartial judgment of the political and constitutional history of the commune during these years must take into account the achievements of the regime, as well as its defects and inadequacies. Some scholars have considered this period one of pro-

gressive deterioration of republican government; but this is only one side of the coin. It must be admitted that the regime was

unstable and insecure, that it did not command the total allegiance of important segments of the society, that social and political tensions appear to have increased. But these facts should be seen against the background of endemic crisis which confronted

not Florence or Italy alone, but the whole of western Europe. Very few states in Latin Christendom enjoyed stable government in these troubled times. 55 One exception was Luca di Totto da Panzano, whose political irresponsibility was matched by his reckless and arrogant social behavior; see below, p. 128. Luca was named eligible for the Signoria in every scrutiny from 1348 to 1363. 56 Brucker, “Medici,” 16. 57 Cf. R. Caggese, Firenze dalla decadenza di Roma al Risorgimento d'Italia (Florence, 1912-21), 11, Ch. 3. A just and balanced assessment is that of Sestan, Il Trecento, pp. 21-38.

/1

THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

Political Ideology Florentines in the fourteenth century rarely speculated about their political system. Between the composition of Dante’s De Monarchica in the second decade of the fourteenth century and the writings of Salutati, Bruni, and Rinuccini around 1400, there is literally nothing penned by a Florentine which can be considered a work of political thought. The approach of the ¢recento chroniclers was factual or didactic, never analytical. In his chronicle, Matteo Villani made a rather naive attempt to describe the

basic principles of Florentine republicanism and Guelfism, but it was not notably successful.°* The legal training of men like Lapo de Castiglionchio and Donato Velluti did not inspire them to investigate and analyze the structure of their communal government.” This abstention from theorizing reflects the essentially pragmatic outlook of the Florentine in the fourteenth century. The merchant or artisan took the same practical view of his government as he did of his business: he was interested in its efhciency and success, not in its theoretical basis.“°

Although the Florentines did not write formal treatises on politics, they did possess common convictions which underlay their political behavior. In contemporary writings there frequently occur expressions of devoted allegiance to the communal government,” an attitude which Paolo da Certaldo reflects in his 58 On this point, see H. Baron, The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance, pp. 141-42. The necessity of constructing the principles of Florentine political ideology from works which are not, strictly speaking, political theory, was pointed

out by N. Rubinstein, “The Beginnings of Political Thought in Florence,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, v (1942), 1098. 59 Lapo’s comments upon politics and history are as factual and descriptive as that of the chroniclers; see his Eptstola o sta ragionamento di Messer Lapo da Castiglionchio, pp. 61-130. 60 The average citizen had only a vague conception of the juridical founda-

tions of communal authority. On those occasions when legal problems con-

fronted the commune, jurisconsults were called in to give advice to the Signoria; e.g. CP, 12, f. 24v. 61Jn their expressions of patriotic sentiment, the Florentines were reserved and laconic, never florid or verbose. Only with the advent of humanist rhetoric in politics, toward the end of the century, does one encounter such statements

as this eulogy of Florence written in 1383 by Coluccio Salutati: “In Tuscia principem, in Italia maximam, in orbe clarissimam et .. . liberam et libertatis undique genitricem”; Epistolario di Coluccio Salutati, ed. F. Novati (Rome, 1893), 11, 85.

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THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

book of proverbs: “Never engage in any trade that your Com-

mune forbids. . . . Cherish the honor and the good and the welfare of your city . .. and to this devote your property and person, and never support any other party but that of your Com-

mune.” If not all Florentines followed these maxims to the letter, they were united in their determination to maintain the city’s independence. During the crisis resulting from Emperor Charles IV’s second visit to Italy in 1368, this sentiment was expressed forcefully in the minutes of one council meeting. “The commune should animose et viriliter maintain and fortify itself,” proclaimed Jacopo Gavacciani, “for to lose lrberty is to lose every-

thing.” In the same assembly, Uguccione de’ Ricci declared, “Everything should be done to maintain the liberty of the commune of Florence, so that we may leave to posterity that which was left to us by our predecessors.”** The survival of republican government was scarcely less im-

portant to the Florentines than independence. The Duke of Athens taught them a lesson that they learned well: the French prince was the last foreigner to be made a signore in the history of the commune. In the midst of the war with Pisa in October 1363, the captain general of the Florentine army, Pandolfo Malatesta, demanded extraordinary judicial powers within and without the city. According to the chronicler, Sozomen, Simone di Rinieri Peruzzi persuaded the people that he wished to kill liberty and raised the example of the Duke of Athens.® Thus suit-

ably warned, the Florentines decided to grant Pandolfo the authority regularly given to military captains, and no more. Fourteen years later, during the papal war, one disgruntled citizen named Domenico Donnini was dissatisfied with the conduct 62 Paolo di Ser Pace da Certaldo, Libro di buoni costumi (Florence, 1945), p. 226. The translation is in R. Lopez and I. Raymond, Medieval Trade in the Mediterranean World, p. 424. For a similar statement, see Giovanni Morelli, Ricordt, pp. 266, 274-76.

68 CP, 10, f. vr: “Quod animose et viriliter comune se teneatur et fortificet; quod perdere libertatem est perdere totum.” 84 CP, 10, f. 11r. Expressions of similar views recur frequently in the Consulte e Pratiche records; e.g. “Quod domini advertantur circa conservationem status et libertatis comunis Florentie”’; and “Quod domini . . . vigilent assidue circa

manutentionem libertatis et status comunis Florentie”’; CP, 2, f. 190v, 29 April 1360. 85 Sozomen, RRIISS, xv, col. 1074.

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THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

of the war, and in private conversation he suggested that the Duke of Anjou be made signore of Florence. When news of this

opinion reached the palace of the Signoria, the reaction was immediate and sharp. The spokesman for the Sixteen exclaimed:

“The statements concerning the Duke of Anjou are false and malicious. When Domenico di Sandro [Donnini] returns from San Gemignano, let him be called here and warned not to engage in any such discussions in future.”®° Florence was traditionally Guelf. Nearly a century had elapsed

since the Ghibellines had been expelled from the city in 1266; since then, the commune had followed, more or less consistently, a policy which coincided with papal interests in Italy. Florence had organized and directed the revival of Guelfism in the peninsula on the occasion of Emperor Henry VII’s invasion in 1311-

1312." Prior to 1343, the city’s foreign policy had been based upon her close ties with the two major Guelf powers in Italy, the papacy and the Angevin dynasty in Naples. The republic’s economic relations with these two powers served to strengthen the political and diplomatic bonds that had been forged under the aegis of the Guelf symbol. After 1343, changed political conditions, both internal and external, modified this state of affairs to some extent.”° Nevertheless, support of the papacy and friendship with other Guelf states in Italy remained basic tenets of the Florentine political credo.” Few, if any, residents of the Arno city would have been loath to identify themselves as fedel: e devoti di Santa Chiesa, e amatori del Popolo e del Comune e della liberta della citta di Firenze e di Parte Guelfa.” 66 CP, 15, f. 57Vv.

67 W. Bowsky, “Florence and Henry of Luxemburg, King of the Romans: the Rebirth of Guelfism,” Speculum, xxxiu1 (1958), 177-203. 68 N, Valeri, L’Italia nell’eta dei principati dal 1343 al 1516 (Storia d'Italia, v), Milan, 1949, pp. 3-17. 68 Y, Renouard, Les relations des Papes d’Avignon et des compagnies commerctales et bancaires de 1316 & 1378, pp. 121-96; G. Yver, Le commerce et les marchands dans Italie méridionale au xiti® et au xiv® stécle (Paris, 1903).

7° See below, pp. 140-47.

71 Typical expressions of these sentiments in the Consulte e Pratiche: “Conservetur comunitas Florentie in devotione Romane ecclesie. Conservetur etiam benevolentia et amor domini Hungarie Regis”; and “Quod domini pro comuni Florentie velint potius amplecti illos dominos et comunia cum quibus semper devotionem et amicitiam servavit”; CP, 9, £. 54v; 7, f£. 8or.

72C, Guasti, ed., Le carte Strozziane del R. Archivio di Stato di Firenze

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THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

Florentines transmitted their personal concept of onore to the larger entity of which they were members, the commune. In

their determination to maintain the city’s prestige, they were very sensitive about anything that cast a shadow upon the integrity and honor of their government. The Consulte e Pratiche records are replete with statements that reflect the delicate sensibilities of the citizenry on this issue. “The priors should concern themselves with the maintenance of the commune’s honor.” “Do

not make peace [with Pisa] for it would be shameful to the commune.” “Reply to the lord [of Padua] in those terms which

will redound to the honor of the commune of Florence.” In the conduct of foreign affairs, the concern for the commune’s onore was particularly important. Every decision relating to ex-

ternal affairs was carefully scrutinized to determine whether it was consistent with Florence’s treaty obligations and commitments. Any real or imagined infringement of the city’s rights,

as set forth in treaties, provoked an immediate ground swell of sentiment demanding that the iwra of the commune be observed.’ Conversely, the commune was expected to abide by the agreements with its own citizens. In discussing the necessity for the government to meet its financial obligations, Matteo Villani wrote, “Faith, more useful than anything else, is of great assistance

in supplying the needs of the republic.”

Deeply ingrained in the Florentine political mentality was a fundamental precept of republicanism: the formulation of pol-

icy through group consultation.” The right of free and un(Florence, 1884-91), 1, 98. The quotation is from the text of the constitution of a Guelf confraternity in trecento Florence. 73 CP, 3, ff. 4ar, 124r; 5, f. 41r; 12, £. 58v. 74The peace treaty made with the Visconti in 1353 was constantly invoked

as am excuse to avoid involvement in the papacy’s military and diplomatic projects in Italy; e.g. in 1358; CP, 2, ff. ror-14r. 75 One illustration of the heat engendered by a dispute over the commune’s tura involved a territorial conflict with Lucca in 1372; CP, 12, ff. 49v, 60r, 74v75v; R. Fumi, ed., R. Archivio di Stato di Lucca. Regesti, u, Pt. 2, Carteggio degli Anziani (1333-1400), Lucca, 1903, docs. 163, 164, 167. The preamble of a provision of October 1375 stated the Florentine viewpoint succinctly: “Volentes iura comunis Florentie efficaciter conservare et possibilius augere, nec alicui

alteri detrahere iura sua... .” Prov., 63, f. r4ov. 7M. Villani, 111, 106. See Brucker, “Un documento fiorentino sulla guerra, sulla finanza e sulla amministrazione pubblica (1375),” ASI, cxv, 169.

™ This principle was still accepted a century later in the last years of the

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THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

trammeled discussion was considered one of the bulwarks of

e @ é¢ e ®

independence, and it was thus stated in the preamble to one provision: “For the conservation of liberty and welfare and for the

direction of public affairs, nothing appears to be more advantageous than a free spirit (animus liber) in discussion.””* The policy debates in the Consulte e Pratiche protocols have a double value. Besides their substantive importance, they reveal clearly

how decisions were arrived at through the sieve of intensive public debate and consultation.” These deliberations were advisory only, and technically the Signoria could ignore the views of these councils. But rarely, if ever, did the priors flout the consensus of opinion expressed in these consultative assemblies. This procedure became part of the unwritten code of the city’s political life.*°

The Florentine commitment to the solution of problems and issues through the channel of group discussion is seen even more Florentine republic, ca. 1500; F. Gilbert, “Florentine Political Assumptions in the Period of Savonarola and Soderini,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, xx (1957), 180. 78 Prov., 63, £. 39r. Some citizens, however, sought to limit the right of free speech within and without the council halls; e.g. “Quod ad reprimandum varios oblocutores qui continue oblucuntur”; CP, 1, f. 135v, January 1355; “Quod cives non lJoquantur contra incepta comunis, obloquendo per plateas”; CP, 14, f. 127r, 5 March 1377. There is an interesting reference to an attempt to curtail free expression in a council. On 16 January 1371, Francesco di Ser Arrigo Rocchi,

spokesman for the Sixteen stated: “In concordia quod Bernardus Cini [da Quarata] reprehendatur de dictis heri in arengheria in consilia comunis, et imponatur sibi quod dicat in favorem proposite, et acriter moneatur, et teneatur in suspenso dictis sibi quod comune intendit eum punire”; CP, 11, f. 136v. 79On the value of Consulte e Pratiche records and their limitations, see Gilbert, “Political Assumptions,” 192-94. Gilbert’s discussion pertains to the early

sixteenth century, but his points are equally valid for these records in the trecento.

89In one council meeting this viewpoint was clearly stated; Niccolé Tornaquinci: “dixit quod faciendo fundamentum a voluntate civium, qui pro maiori parte videbantur aspirare ad ligam”; Simone dell’Antella: “Visis consiliis redditis

in primo quam secundo civium consilio convocatus, et comprehensa quod voluntas civium est in liga concludere. .. .” CP, 7, £. 95r. In May 1362, on the eve of the outbreak of the Pisa war, one counselor asserted, “Guerra scoperte non fiat sine conscientia civium, quos domini consulent super dictam materiam”; CP, 3, f. sor. The disadvantages of these lengthy deliberations were clearly realized. Matteo Villani, vim, 17, noted: “Il comune di Firenze, che di. natura e d’antica consuetudine é tardo alle cose, per avere a diliberare con molti consigli.”

THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

clearly in a nonpolitical context: the deliberations on reconstruction of the cathedral church of S. Reparata. The records of the

officials (operari) in charge of this project indicate that every aspect of this work was the subject of intense discussion. In December 1364 the operari decreed, “In order that the work of the church should proceed in future, every month a council will be convened with masters and other citizens.”* In accordance with this policy, the consuls of the druggists’ guild were invited to send “the best and most proficient sculptors, goldsmiths and painters in their guild to consult with them concerning the con-

struction of the church.”” Although the operari relied heavily upon the counsel of the artisans, with their special knowledge of building problems, they also summoned other citizens, both lay and cleric, to these meetings. A council of October 1367 included several merchants and industrialists, three magnates, a judge, a priest, an innkeeper, and a wine vendor.” The atmosphere of these meetings was remarkably egalitarian, as citizens from all classes expressed their candid opinions on the plans for the cathedral.

Another sentiment shared by citizens of all classes was the desire to attain high communal office. Only the most dedicated merchant shunned participation in communal affairs, as did Francesco Datini, on the grounds that it was detrimental to business.** Membership in the Signoria was not only a symbol of political influence; it was also a mark of social distinction.” An indication of the high prestige value of the Signoria was the popularity of the prioriste, the catalogues listing the dates of 81 C. Guasti, Santa Marta del Fiore (Florence, 1887), p. 160. 82 Ibid., p. 166. 83 Ibid., pp. 199-205. See also zbid., pp. 102-03, 168, 191-92. 84 Origo, Merchant of Prato, p. 70.

85 Fach prior was entitled to bear arms during his lifetime, and to exhibit his coat of arms over the doorway of his house; G. Villani, xm, 92. A typical expression of this pride in the attainment of high office is the statement in the ricordanze of Bartolomeo di Niccolé Valori, Biblioteca Nazionale di Firenze, Panciatichi, 134, n. 1, £. 1v: “Memoria che infind l’ano 1366 in kalendi gienaio

che Niccolo di Taldo mio padre fu gonfaloniere di giustizia. E avanti pit tempo era stato di cholegio, cioé, del uficio de dodici buoni uomini e anche gonfaloniere di compangnia. E finiti i detti due mesi del priorato, fu capitano di parte guelfa. Se fosse stato a Firenze fermo come gl’altri suoi vicini, era onorate di tutti gl’uffci.”

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THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

each family’s representation in the supreme executive.*° In the view of some observers, the thirst for office was so intense that it constituted a grave danger to the commune and was a principal cause of the government’s instability.*’ The fact that some citizens resorted to bribery to insure their inclusion among the

list of eligible candidates for the Signoria indicates that the passion for office occasionally passed legitimate bounds.” Minor posts in the communal administration were much less popular. The sense of civic responsibility was often submerged by the disadvantages of a lesser post. Donato Velluti admitted that he acquired considerable revenue from holding salaried offices, but he also complained that he had been forced to accept onerous ambassadorial positions which interfered with his professional career.’ The cloth manufacturer, Neri Pitti, regarded only the office of prior as worthwhile, even rejecting election to the advisory colleges.°? While some citizens derived much of

their income from the remunerations of officeholding,” the majority preferred to avoid the lesser burdens of government.” 88 Several of these prioriste from the fourteenth century survive in Florentine libraries and archives. See the copies in the Biblioteca Nazionale di Firenze, described in G. Mazzatinti, Inventari det manoscritti delle biblioteche d'Italia, vii-x1 (Forli, 1903), passim. 87 Stefani, 694, 923. 88 Several citizens were found guilty of bribery in connection with the scrutiny

of 1361; AEOJ, 347, ff. 3r-tov. The culprits included prominent citizens: Guerriante di Biligardo Bagnesi, Bartolo di Luce Banchelli, Giovanni di Tedici Manovelli, and Filippo di Vanni Bellandi. For other irregularities in the electoral procedure, see Stefani, 694; CP, 5, f. 21r. 89 La cronica domestica di Messer Donato Velluti, eds. I. del Lungo and G. Volpi (Florence, 1914), pp. 189-190, 194, 210. 89 Cronica di Buonaccorso Pitti (Florence, 1720), p. 6: “Aparve che egli [Neri] non curava degl’ ufici del Comune, perd che rifiutava tutti quelli, che si possono rifiutare, e anche lo rifiutare per li Consigli oportuni il Ghonfalone di Compagnia. Fu de’ Priori due volte.” ®t Velluti, p. 133, mentions the case of Piero di Tuccio Ferrucci, who “ebbe altri ufici di Comune, e podesterie e castellenerie; di che sostenea sua vita, perd che arte o mercatantia non facea.”

®2Qn this point, see Origo, p. 69. An interesting letter from the Datini archives, dated 8 July 1379, has been published in part by R. Piattoli, “L’origine dei fondaci datiani di Pisa e Genova,” Archivio storico pratese, vit (1927), 181-

82. Nozo and Orlandino Orlandini wrote to Matteo Orlandini and Niccold di Giovanni in Pisa, informing them that Matteo’s name had been extracted for a contado office. His brother went to the chancellor, Coluccio Salutati, with evidence that Matteo was in Pisa, and with some difficulty received permission

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THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

A contributor to this general reluctance was the commune’s unwillingness to pay adequately for services rendered. “It is not honest,” exclaimed one indignant counselor, “that the citizens should engage in the work of the commune with their own re-

sources,” and he demanded that the government should pay proper salaries to citizens holding communal office.” The least attractive offices were those in the contado and district

of Florence: the posts of vicar and castellan in outlying areas. Citizens drawn by lot for these posts frequently sought to excuse

themselves, although the regulations limited this prerogative. When a merchant, Andrea di Messer Ambrogio, learned that he had been selected as castellan of Serravale and Pescia, he wrote:

“Today I shall refuse both the one and the other; it is not for me, nor for those of my standing, to take on charges such as these.””* In time of war or emergency, however, the Florentine civic sense overcame the distaste for onerous public service. At the outbreak

of the papal war in 1375, Gherardino di Niccol6 Gherardini Giani informed a friend in Bruges that he had been selected vicar of Firenzuola, a district in the Apennines north of Florence. “I would have refused this office,” he wrote, “except that I would have incurred great dishonor. It is a grand and honorable ofhce for any eminent citizen, and no one would refuse it except merchants or others occupied with their own affairs.” Gherardino could not renounce the post, since he had no business occupation to serve as an excuse. He described the vicariate as a difhcult and dangerous one, close to the war frontier. He would be

entrusted with the task of governing mountain people with a reputation for evil and disloyalty. “God grant me,” he wrote, “that I may return home with honor. I cannot hope for gain, and I fear that I may be forced to spend my own money. ... May God protect me so that I will not be called upon to condemn

men to death.” for Matteo to refuse the post. However, Orlandino himself was then extracted for another minor office which he could not refuse. 83 CP, 8, f. 93r. 84 Origo, pp. 69-70. It became necessary to permit magnates and lower guildsmen to take contado posts which had previously been reserved for upper guilds-

men. See the provisions permitting magnates to hold all military and administrative posts in the contado; Prov., 41, f. 137v, 3 February 1355; 42, f. 33r, 10 April 1355. 85 Brucker, “Documento,” ASI, cxv, 171, 175.

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THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

Among the motives, altruistic and egoistic, which induced citizens to compete for office, none was more potent than selfinterest. Lorenzo de’ Medici’s dictum, a Firenze si pud mal vivere senza lo Stato,’° was not articulated in the ¢recento, but it was an accepted fact in Florentine life. Political power was an

essential prerequisite for securing private advantage. Half the legislative proposals submitted to the councils did not pertain to public affairs; they were petitions submitted by individuals requesting tax exemptions, judicial dispensations, or monetary reimbursement. Whether these petitions were accepted or rejected often depended less on the merits of the case than on the influence which the petitioner wielded among the council members. Men of all classes—magnate, merchant, artisan—engaged in this quest for special benefits and favors.’ The commune had at its disposal substantial economic resources; in the competition for these resources, citizens with political influence had a decisive advantage. One source of profit was tax farming. Most taxes in Florence were collected by public

officials, but a few gabelles were sold to tax farmers whose

. profit margin was substantial.°° The commune also awarded contracts for supplying troops, which, considering the city’s permanent defense problem, was a lucrative source of revenue for the recipients. Selling grain to the authorities was another profit86 Lorenzo de’ Medici, “Ricordi,” in W. Roscoe, The Life of Lorenzo de’ Medici, 7th ed. (London, 1846), p. 466. 87 A typical group of provisions was submitted to the councils on 22 and 23 June 1377; LF, 40, ff. 256r-257v. Of the eighteen legislative proposals, twelve

were private petitions. The petitioners represented all levels of Florentine society: Bartolomea and Selvaggia de Amiratis (rejected); Jacopo de’ Bardi (rejected); Andrea de’ Pazzi; Bernardo di Andrea, an armor maker; Gino de Goiano; Lorenzo Banchini; Francesco di Zanobi (rejected); and Francesco, a priest. Two weeks before, cight petitions by individual citizens were included in a group of twenty provisions; LF, 40, ff. 252r-253v. The petitions included members of three magnate families (Visdomini, Gherardini, and Rossi), and one patrician, Giovanni di Lorenzo Rucellai, whose petition was rejected. 88 This problem has not been studied, although the relevant material exists in the records of the camera del comune. A provision of October 1374 describes the sale of two gabelles to tax farmers; Prov., 61, ff. 161r-161v. On the sale of the pawnbrokers’ gabelle, see M. Becker, “Nota dei processi riguardanti prestatori di danaro nei tribunali fiorentini dal 1343 al 1379,” ASI, cxtv (1956), 742. Certain gabelles were not sold to tax farmers, but were administered by the commune. On one of these, the “gabella delle porte,” see A. Sapori, L’eta della rinascita (Milan, 1958), pp. 132-49.

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THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

able activity. In his ricordanze, Paolo Sassetti described the terms

of a contract which he and his partner, Geri Pigli, made with the commune, by which the two merchants agreed to furnish fifteen hundred moggia of grain to the city at a price of 3 s., 9 d. per bushel. “May God grant us a profit,” Sassetti commented, “with the salvation of our souls and the sustenance of ourselves and our families.”®? The monied class also reaped large financial benefits from the purchase or rent of communal property, much

of which had been confiscated from individuals convicted of major crimes. This property was frequently sold or leased on extremely favorable terms to politically influential citizens. By 1374 this practice had reached scandalous proportions, and a commission of auditors was appointed to recover property and revenue that had been expropriated. One member of this commission was Marchionne Stefani, who identified two citizens who

were forced to disgorge their illicit gains: the banker, Giovanni da Uzzano, and the magnate, Totto di Filippozzo de’ Bardi.*”* In his chronicle, Donato Velluti made no reference to obtaining personal advantage from his public service, but he did reveal how he used the authority of his office on behalf of relatives

and friends. In 1358 he arranged for his cousin Bernardo di Matteo Velluti to be declared eligible for the Signoria.*”* Another cousin, Matteo di Gherardino Velluti, had invested money in the monte and suffered loss as a result of the passage of a certain provision. “However, when I was standard-bearer of justice, I so arranged it that they [Matteo’s heirs] were compensated.”*** Donato was equally solicitous of the interests of friends.

Zanobi Mannelli was a member of a magnate family that had been feuding with the Velluti for decades. When Zanobi asked 89 ASF, Carte Strozziane, ser. 2, 4, f£. 5IVv. 100 Stefani, 740.

101 Velluti, p. 43. The papers of the Del Bene family illustrate very well the nature and the significance of personal bonds of friendship and obligation in communal politics. One example, among dozens which might be cited, is this letter from Rosso de’ Ricci to Francesco del Bene: “Fratello karissimo. O sentito

che tu se’ a fare lo squictino nuovamente, perché ti priego che l’onore mio e di Bernardo e di Salvestro, miei figliuoli, ti piaccia avere racommandato, il quale in ongni caso il puo riputar tuo e intorno accid, da quella operatione che vedi che bisongni. Apparecchiato sempre a piaceri tuoi. Data in Volterra a di xiii di Febbraio [1381?]. Rosso di Ricci tuo chiarissimo.” ASF, Carte Del Bene, 49, f. 174r. 102 Velluti, p. 38.

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THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

Donato, a member of one of the colleges, to intercede with the Signoria so that he might achieve popolano status, the chronicler was cool to the suggestion. However, after Zanobi had apologized for his past behavior, Donato relented: “I worked on his

behalf as though he were my brother, and he was made a popolano.”*”* On another occasion he demonstrated the practical value of friendship by arranging for the mitigation of a criminal sentence passed against one of the Mannelli who had been convicted of murder.*”*

In no sphere of politics did the conflict between public and private interest appear so sharp, nor its resolution so clear-cut, as in the area of taxation. As members of commissions empowered to collect revenues, individual citizens had the grave respon-sibility of levying taxes upon their fellows. But each sought by every conceivable method to minimize his own share of the tax

burden. A universally adopted stratagem was to present an appearance of poverty and to avoid any ostentation or flaunting of wealth. “Bring home only what is needful and a little each time

. . - lest the neighbours become envious and say you have a thousand farms .. . for thus you will be called a rich man and be hit by a great prestanza,” advised Giovanni Morelli.” Francesco Datini wrote his wife to spread the news that ships carrying his merchandise had been lost at sea, so that his taxes would be lowered.*** Even more devious subterfuges to avoid taxation were suggested by Gherardino di Niccolo Gherardini Giani to his close friend, Tommaso de’ Bardi. While himself a member of a tax commission, Gherardino advised Tommaso to inform the tax officials that he did not have sufficient cash to pay a tax, thus making it unlikely that any future assessment would be increased.”*’

This deliberate balancing of public and private obligations is an important key to understanding the Florentine political men103 Tbid., pp. 19-20.

104 Thid., p. 21: “Io aoperai tanto col Podesta che ’1 detto Amio fu condannato

in danari [instead of being condemned to death]; ed anche poi innanzi che io uscissi de’ Priori, pe’ fatti di Pistoia, avendo balia di potere ribandire banditi di bando, feci con poco costo che detti Amio ed Iacopo furono tratti di bando.” 105 Quoted in Origo, p. 272, n. 2. 106 Ihid., p. 140. 107 Brucker, “Documento,” 170.

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THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

tality. It was clearly to the individual’s advantage to participate in public life and protect the interests of self, family, and social class. To pay taxes or to serve in an office which did not promote one’s welfare, influence, or prestige was, if possible, to be avoided.

Yet it would be gross distortion to regard the Florentines as totally indifferent to the concept of the general welfare. Individually and collectively, these citizens paid their taxes, fought on the battlefield, and served in distant and incommodious posts for other reasons besides self-interest: they were proud of their city and were prepared to make sacrifices of time, money, and

life itself to live in freedom and remain the masters of their destiny.*°* Matteo Villani contrasted the strong devotion to communal interests which characterized past generations of citizens with the selfish preoccupations of his contemporaries.*”” However, a just evaluation of the course of Florentine history reveals a picture which at any point is neither black nor white, but gray.

The Vital Political Issues History, commented Matteo Villani in the opening chapter of his chronicle, is essentially a narration of the calamities and dis-

asters that befall the human race. The last two decades of his life (1343-1363) provided ample evidence for this pessimistic conclusion, and the men who governed Florence in these years would have echoed the chronicler’s sentiments. The commune was virtually in a state of permanent crisis. Even though intervals of comparative tranquillity did occur, a sense of peril, of impending danger, permeated the entire period. The official doc108Qn the patriotism of the medieval Italian merchant, see A. Sapori, Le marchand italien au moyen age, pp. xt-xv. 109 “Perocche gli antichi moderati e virtudiosi che soleano reggere e governare

lo stato della repubblica in grande liberta, e con maturl movimenti ¢ con diligente provvidenza governavano quella in tempo di pace e di guerra, e non perdonando i falli che si faceano contro la patria, né lasciando senza merito l’operazioni che si facevano virtudiose in accrescimento e onore del comune, onde al nostro tempo é da maravigliare come la cittadinanza si mantiene, essendo

strana da quelle virtu e dalla provisione di quel reggimento; e in luogo di quelli antichi amatori della patria, spregiatori de’ loro propri comodi per accrescere quelli del comune, si trovano usurpatori de’ reggimenti con indebiti e disonesti procacci e argomenti, uomini avveniticci, senza senno e senza virtu, e di niuna autorita nella maggior parte, i quali abbracciato il reggimento del comune intendono a’ loro propri vantaggi”; M. Villani, 1v, 60.

, 83

THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

uments reflect the tension and anxiety which gripped the communal officials in moments of extreme gravity. During a crisis of major proportions, such as that created by plague and war in the summer of 1363, the Pratiche records communicate a vivid

impression of the atmosphere in the council halls, the sense of urgency and desperation with which citizens sought to ward off the dangers that threatened to engulf them.’ A major concern of the communal authorities was the recurrence of pestilence and famine. After the Black Death, the city suffered two other visitations of the plague, in 1363 and 1374, each

claiming thousands of victims and severely dislocating the economic and social life of the city.** On three occasions during the lifetime of the regime, the commune was forced to cope with famine conditions: in 1352-1353, 1369-1370, and 1373-1375." To avert the possibility of revolution by a starving population in these

periods of crisis, the government purchased supplies of grain from other parts of Europe, selling bread and flour at reduced prices to enable its poor inhabitants to keep body and soul together. Thousands of florins were spent in these operations, whose objective was less humanitarian than political.** External dangers were frequent and serious. Between 1343 and

1378, Florence was engaged in four major wars: with Milan in 1351-1353 and 1369-1370; with Pisa between 1362 and 1364; and

with the papacy from 1375 to 1378. In addition, the city’s independence was twice menaced by the Italian expeditions of the Emperor Charles IV, in 1354-1355 and 1368-1369. 110 CP, 4, ff. 83r-94v. See also Manoscritti, 222, ff. 218-19. 111 On the 1363 plague, see M. Villani, x, 103; G. Morelli, Ricordi, pp. 153-54,

who estimated that one-fourth of the city’s population died. The heavy toll is reflected in the number of burials during that year in S. Maria Novella; Delizie, IX, 123-203. On the 1374 plague, see Stefani, 745, 746, who estimated a loss of one-third of the population—certainly exaggerated. During these plagues, the commune had difficulty in finding personnel to fill the administrative posts, since many inhabitants fled to healthier areas; CP, 4, f. 62v; Prov., 62, ff. 93r, 104r-I04V.

112Qn the famine of 1352-1353, see M. Villani, 11, 56, 76. The famines of 1369-1370 and 1373-1375 are described in detail in Cronaca di Donato di Neri, in Cronache Senesi, RRIISS, new ed., xv, Pt. 6 (Bologna, 1931-39), 633, 655. See also Stefani, 745, 746; CP, 10, ff. 7or, 89v; 12, ff. 94v, gor, ror, 174r; Prov., 57, f. 166r; 58, f. 108r. 118 Qn the commune’s grain policy, see E. Fiumi, “Sui rapporti economici tra citta. e contado,” ASI, cxrv, 56-61.

54

THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

The armed companies constituted another permanent threat to the commune’s security and a serious drain on its resources. These bands of freebooters battened upon the peninsula like para-

sites, extorting money from the cities and ravaging their territories.’* The Consulte e Pratiche records are filled with discussions pertaining to these companies; they represented a perennial problem that was never solved. In its policy toward this endemic

danger, the commune had two alternatives: to buy immunity from attack, or to attempt to destroy the companies by force of arms. Neither was more than a temporary solution. Bribes or military defeat might eliminate the threat from one band, but it was soon replaced by others, which sprouted hydra-like from the cauterized trunk of the immobilized company. The problem was complicated by the Italian states’ reliance upon these companies as a source for mercenary troops. The irony of this situation is reflected in Florence’s relations with Sir John Hawkwood. In 1394 the Signoria staged an impressive and costly funeral for the intrepid English condottiere in recognition of his services to the city. This gesture was made despite the fact that Hawkwood had often fought against Florence and had extorted thousands of florins, in booty and pensions, from the republic’s coffers." The dangers from without were equalled, possibly exceeded, by those from within. All Florentines realized that the survival

of republican government depended on the maintenance of a certain degree of internal peace and harmony and the existence of a healthy social and economic order. A theme reiterated in the legislative provisions was that the law was designed to promote “the good and peaceful state of the commune and people of Florence.”*** The achievement of intestine peace and security, elusive at any time in Florence’s history, became even more difficult in 114’The problem of the companies is a constant theme in Matteo Villani’s chronicle. See also G. Gerola, “Fra Moriale in Toscana,” ASI, ser. 6, 1 (1906), 261 ff.; G. Canestrini, “Documenti per servire a la storia della milizia italiana dal xiii secolo al xvi raccolti in gli archivi della Toscana,” ASI, ser. 1, xv (1851). For Siena, see A. Professione, Siena e le compagnie di ventura nella seconda meta del sec. xiv (Civitanova, 1898). 115 G, Temple Leader and G. Marcotti, Sir John Hawkwood (London, 1889), pp. 88-97, 264-66, 286-93. 116 An example is the provision with the avowed object of the “corroborationem

et augumentum libertatis, quietis et status populi et comunis Florentie”; Prov., 51, f. 33r, 13 October 1363.

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THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

this period of aggravated social tensions. The citizens who participated in the government represented a wide variety of social and economic interests, ranging all the way from the wealthy scions of ancient noble families to the artisans who gained their livelihood by manual labor. To reconcile these diverse interests was a major preoccupation of the regime, which was forced to

maintain a constant vigil against the formation of plots and conspiracies designed to overthrow it.

The most serious threat did not come from the groups excluded from political power, the magnates and the popolo minuto." It came from within the ruling group itself, in the form of divisive factions that competed for political supremacy. “These factions of evil-minded citizens who are wholly deter-

mined to rule over the others” were denounced by Giovanni Villani* in 1328 as the greatest threat to communal security, and nothing had changed since 1343 to alter that situation. In 1352 Matteo Villani made two derogatory references to the sette cittadinesche, which were then disturbing the city’s political life.” Exhortations to civic tranquillity and the establishment of bdalie to promote concord among the citizens were frequent devices of a government seeking to heal this festering sore.’ These endeavors to achieve harmony were predicated upon the illusory concept of a hierarchic society, in which each individual had a

secure and stationary niche. In the words of one citizen, “Let each be honored according to his station and rank.”*** Such pleas

were futile because they ignored the realities of the intensely competitive social milieu in which the Florentines of the trecento

lived.*” |

117 The magnates were only partially excluded from office. The major communal offices were closed to them, but they were represented in minor posts, in

the Council of the Commune, and above all, in Pratiche debates.

118 G, Villani, x, 111. 119M, Villani, m, 62; 11, 45. 120 The appeals for unity recur constantly in the Consulte e Pratiche records; e.g. CP, 1, f. 22r, 30 July 1351; 2, f. 125r, 5 December 1354. For an example of a balia to promote civic unity, see Libri Fabarum, 29, ff. 42r-43v, 19 May 1349; Prov., 36, £. 105v, 13 June 1340.

121 CP, 1, f. ggv. Cf. the statement of another counselor: “Provideant .. . circa alia que cedant ad contentationem civium, videlicet, secundum statum et conditionem quorumlibet”; CP, 8, f. 5ov. 122 This point was effectively made by Gilbert, “Florentine Political Assumptions,” 212, in discussing the problem confronting the Florentine government at the time of Savonarola a century and a half later. It is equally applicable to the Florentine trecento.

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THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

The most controversial issue in communal politics was the composition of the governing class. This problem created profound divisions of opinion within the electorate, and these divisions became deeper with the passage of time. It had several aspects: the size of the ruling group, the Ghibelline issue, the degree of magnate participation in the government, the question of small versus large consultative groups. On each of these issues, two opposing attitudes developed. The oligarchic position, which was generally adopted by the patriciate, favored a restricted officeholding class, the exclusion from the government of Ghibellines and recent immigrants, the formulation of policy by small groups, and the admission of magnates into the communal offices. This attitude, typical of exclusive, aristocratic groups in every society,

was based on the contention that only individuals from old, established families with a long record of public service could be trusted to direct the destinies of the republic. By overt and

oblique means, the oligarchs sought to prohibit or limit the political activity of anyone whose background was obscure and whose status was recently acquired. In opposition to this philosophy was the “democratic” or liberal position, whose adherents

included the bulk of the gente nuova and also a minority of patricians. This group advocated a relatively large governing class, the restriction of magnate participation in the commune, and the principle of numerically large policy-making councils. The liberals were generally hostile to the exclusion from office of

suspected Ghibellines and immigrants, or, if they approved of the policy in principle, they favored its application only under strict controls,

The Ghibelline problem became the most controversial issue in communal politics. At the root of the conflict lay a question of definition: who was a Guelf, or, conversely, a Ghibelline? By mid-century, Guelfism had become as fashionable as orthodox Christianity in Florence, and few dared to embrace openly either religious or political heresy. The situation was succinctly described in 1377 by one anonymous writer:

“Every man who was in business was eligible for office, if he was a good man, even though in the past his ancestors may have

been Ghibellines. Truly, everyone became Guelf in spirit, in action and in thought, so that one could say in Florence there 87

THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

were no longer any Ghibellines, except the ancient rebel nobles. The common people, the middling and lesser folk, have all voluntarily embraced Guelfism.’””*

Thus, through mass acceptance, Guelfism was being transformed into a vague and watery patriotism, devoid of any ideological content or significance. To reverse this trend, the conservative elements of the patriciate embarked upon a campaign to revive the Guelf symbol as a vital force in Florentine political life.

The leaders of the Parte Guelfa could not evoke a genuine Ghibelline menace to resuscitate their dying cause, for none existed in reality.’** It was necessary, therefore, to manufacture a threat.

The Parte leaders made an emotional appeal to tradition, demanding that all Ghibellines be excluded from office as potential traitors to the Guelf republic. They based their case on the contention that a leopard never changes its spots, that anyone whose ancestors had ever been tainted with Ghibellinism was zpso facto

a menace to communal liberty and totally unqualified for any position of public trust.”*° This specious argument can be interpreted as a cynical maneuver to eliminate political opposition,

but it would be a mistake to discount its emotional appeal to the Florentines. It was widely accepted by citizens of all classes who could project their family’s association with the city back to the heroic age of Guelfism a half-century earlier.“°* For obvious reasons, this argument did not win the support of those “new men” who did possess Ghibelline forebears, who had emigrated from those parts of Tuscany which supported Henry of Luxem123 Delizie, 1x, 278.

124'The natural leader of Ghibellinism was the Emperor Charles IV, but during his appearances in Tuscany, no effort was made in Florence to identify

him with the Ghibelline cause within or without the city. See Mommsen, Analekten, pp. 113-92; G. Pirchan, Katser Karl IV in der Zeit seiner zweiten Romfahrt (Prague, 1930), 1, 218-57. 125 In a collection of Ghibelline accusations made to the judicial officials in 1378, the charge was invariably based upon the ancestry of the accused, not his political convictions; AEOJ, 811, ff. roqr-284r.

126 See the commendatory statements concerning the first anti-Ghibelline legislation by moderates who were not associated with the Parte leadership: Velluti, p. 242; G. Villani, xm, 72, 92; M. Villani, x1, 51; Stefani, 674. On the support of this legislation by lower guildsmen, see Becker and Brucker, “Arti minori,” 100.

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THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

burg in 1311-1312."°’ But the most important factor in creating opposition to the anti-Ghibelline campaign was its utilization as an instrument of political warfare against citizens who were unquestionably Guelf in origin and sentiment.'** Whereas the issue had originally affected only a small minority of Florentines of dubious ancestry, it eventually involved the entire officeholding class and became perforce a major issue of partisan politics. Another aspect of this controversy concerned the selection of the consultative groups which debated communal policy.” The oligarchic faction maintained that these bodies should be small: in Piero degli Albizzi’s words, “The business of war is not well conducted in a large council.”**° Furthermore, these deliberative councils should be restricted to prominent men of ancient Guelf lineage. Lapo da Castiglionchio stated that men di piccolo affare should not be presumptuous and eager to speak in council meetings, but instead should sit quietly and listen to the opinions of the two or three most distinguished citizens.** In their discus-

sions pertaining to the qualifications which should apply to membership in these groups, the conservatives used such phrases as bont, sapientes, discret, antiqui, and habentium quod perdere.* The liberals did not develop, in the Pratiche protocols, a reasoned argument to support their contention that policy should be formulated by large and broadly representative groups. In opposing the concept of small, restricted councils,*** they advocated simply

the convocation of large numbers of citizens, of “every status and condition,” of “merchants and other citizens and guilds727 It was also opposed by those gente nuova who were ignorant of the identity and the political affiliation of their ancestors. 128 An extreme example of these tactics was the Ghibelline accusation against Matteo Villani; G. Brucker, “The Ghibelline Trial of Matteo Villani (1362),”

Medievalta et Humanistica, xu, 48-55.

129 The identical problem was the subject of intense debate in the 1492-1512 period; Gilbert, “Political Assumptions,” 189-92. 180 CP, 2, f. 142v, 3 Jan. 1360. For other statements favoring small councils, see CP, 3, f. o5r; 4, ff. 114r-114v; 5, £. 6ar. 131 Foistola, p. 116.

1382 CP, 1, f. 105r; 4, f. ror; 5, ff. 6ar, 125v. 183Cf. the opposing views of Jacopo Bencivenni, “Quod domini convocent cives in maiori numero quem habere potuerit”; and Simone Peruzzi, “Non videtur utile tamen quod magnus numerus civium haberetur, sed modicus”;

CP, 4, f. torr. For a similar expression of opposing views, see Mommsen, Analekten, doc. 434.

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THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

men.”*** The single hint of a justification for this position was

contained in one statement by a spokesman for the Sixteen, in discussing the Pisa war: “In order to pacify the citizens, a

council ...in large numbers should be convened." On this issue of the size of the officeholding group, the liberals

were victorious, statistically. In the 1343 scrutiny, some three hundred Florentines were declared eligible for the Signoria; by the eve of the Ciompi revolution, this figure had been doubled.***

This democratic trend was a most significant development in communal politics and a potent source of partisan controversy. However, it did not represent a total victory for mass participation of the guild membership in government, for the officeholders constituted only a small minority of guildsmen. Less than one-third of the matricolati in the Calimala guild were designated as eligible for the Signoria during the lifetime of the 1343 regime. In the fourteen lower guilds, the percentage of participation was much smaller. Of the five hundred citizens who were matriculated in the innkeepers’ guild between 1343 and 1378, only nine ever became priors.**’ Nor were all of these lower guildsmen who entered the Signoria genuinely representa-

tive of the rank and file in the art minori. Instead they constituted an elite of the petty bourgeoisie, whose economic and social

condition and interests were often closer to the membership of the greater guilds than to the artisan, craft, and retail groups in the city.***

Despite the divisions and factions within it, the officeholding class was remarkably united on several important issues con184 CP, 5, f. g5r; 10, f. 113v; 12, f. 134v; 15, f. 78r. CE. CP, 8, f. 53r: “Quod domini convocent consilium civium tam magnatum quam popolarium mercatorum et artificum in magno numero.” 185 CP, 5, f. g5r. Cf. also the argument advanced by Ser Jacopo di Ser Gherardo Gualberti during the debate over the commune’s treaty agreement with Charles IV in 1355: “Quod, quia, quod multorum est, non debet per modicos approbari, predicta in grandi civium consilio pertractentur”; Mommsen, Analekten, doc. 434.

186 See above, pp. 66-67. The last scrutiny for which nearly complete records are extant was held in 1361. Only fragmentary records for later scrutinies (1364, 1367, 1371, 1375) have survived, but they reveal a progressive increase in the number of eligibles. 187 The estimated number of matricolati is based on figures cited by Sapori, “L’arte degli albergatori in Firenze nel Trecento,” ASI, cx (1955), 312. 138 Becker and Brucker, “Arti minori,” to1-102.

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THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

nected with economic policy. Predominantly capitalist and entrepreneurial in its composition, it supported without reservation the interests of the industrialists, the international merchants, and the bankers and moneychangers.*” A basic axiom of communal policy was that whatever benefited Florentine businessmen was advantageous for the entire popula-

tion. This was stated bluntly and unequivocally in 1344, a year after the establishment of the regime: “Since, by means of the Lana guild, ... many persons in the city and district of Florence sustain themselves, it is proper that the commune of Florence should maintain this guild in honor and favor and conserve it in good condition.”**® The preamble to a 1356 provision asserted

that unless remedies were applied to certain obstacles to trade, there would be an exodus of merchants and merchandise from the city, “which would be contrary to the honor and status of the commune of Florence, and greatly detrimental to the citizens of Florence, and especially the merchants.”*** This legislative enactment, providing for communal protection for land and sea routes used by merchants, was passed in the councils by the over-

whelming majority of 252-5. Other provisions that authorized the utilization of communal authority and funds for the protection of mercantile and financial interests received equally impressive majorities in the councils.’ The vulnerability of Florentine merchants abroad was a major factor in the commune’s

,; Loe 1 449 -

external relations, and the need to protect the city’s businessmen in foreign parts from reprisals was often cited as an excuse for failure to assist her allies against their enemies.” 189 The extent to which entrepreneurial interests controlled the formulation of economic policy from 1343 to 1348 is described in ibid., 08. 140 Rodolico, Popolo minuto, doc. 12. This statement was part of a rubric added to the statute of the captain of the popolo in 1344. 141 Prov., 43, f. 114r. 142 See, for example, Prov., 36, ff. 1ogv-110r; 44, f. 123r; 48, f. 57r; 57, £. a5v.

Frequently recorded in the Consulte e Pratiche protocols are statements similar to this opinion voiced by a spokesman for the Sixteen: “Favorentur mercatores circa recuperationem suarum mercaturarum”; CP, 12, f. 147r. 143 7Tn 1368 the danger of reprisals against Florentine merchants in Naples

kept the commune out of the imbroglio between the queen of Naples and the king of Hungary; CP, 10, ff. 17v, 20v-21v, 23r-23v. In 1372-1373, the commune also refused to help the Hungarian monarch against Venice, citing the presence of the city’s merchant colony in Venice; CP, 12, ff. 75r, 89v.

9]

THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

The commune’s fiscal policy commanded the general but not unanimous support of the officeholding class. Fundamental elements of this policy had been formulated in the early decades of the fourteenth century, and they were continued, with little variation, after 1343. These were: 1) the direct taxation of the inhabitants of the contado and district;** 2) the reliance upon indirect taxation within the city itself, largely gabelles on food; 3) the raising of money for emergencies through voluntary or

forced loans which were repayable with interest; and 4) the establishment of a funded debt (moniz).** All these features benefited the rich and were decidedly disadvantageous to the poorer inhabitants. The latter were forced to pay heavy taxes upon the necessities of life, and in addition, their contributions to the forced loans were usually not repaid by the commune.’ The wealthy paid, proportionately, a small share of the gabelles, since a part of their food supply was consumed on their contado estates.*’ They were assessed no direct taxes, and their prestanze contributions were repaid with interest.*** Finally, they were able to invest surplus funds in the monti, on which they received a regular return. The control of the communal government by the monied class

is nowhere seen with more clarity than in the realm of fiscal policy. Whenever the source of new revenue was discussed in the councils, the consensus of opinion invariably favored an increase 144The standard interpretation of the massive economic exploitation of the contado by the city, particularly with respect to taxation and food supply, has been effectively criticized and qualified by E. Fiumi, “Rapporti economici,” 18-68.

145 Of these features, only the funded debt was initiated after 1343. A very comprehensive study of communal finance to the year 1345 is B. Barbadoro, Le finanze della Repubblica fiorentina. See, however, the criticisms of N. Ottokar, ASI, xctv (1936), it, 77-81. There is no comparable study for the period after 1345.

146Qn the substitution of indirect taxes for direct levies in Florence and Lucca, see Fiumi, “Rapporti economici,” 31. Most small prestanza obligations (under two florins) were cancelled by the payment of a portion of the assessment, which was not repaid by the commune. On this practice, see CP, 4, f. 64r; 10, f£. 46r, 8ov.

147 See Stefani, 882.

748 Another fiscal device which redounded to the advantage of the capitalist class was the practice of selling prestanze, for a fee, to a speculator who then paid the quota, received the interest and eventually the capital. On this practice, see M. Villani, 1v, 83, who noted that some citizens derived great profit from it; Stefani, 520; Brucker, “Documento fiorentino,” 168.

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in indirect taxes, the raising of direct taxes in the contado, or, as a last resort, the levy of a forced loan.**” The most equitable fiscal device that could have been applied was a direct tax on

e * * e 150 °

property or income within the city,’ but the Florentine bourgeoisie shied from this alternative as from the plague.*”* Speakers

in council discussions frequently qualified their proposals on raising revenue by excluding from consideration the imposition of any direct tax.’ This sentiment also found expression in the language of communal provisions, many of which specifically prohibited the levy of a direct impost by the commissions appointed to increase revenue.” A potential source of income that would have adversely affected the interests of the entrepreneurial class was a tax on merchandise,

particularly wool and cloth, which passed through the city gates in large quantities every year. During a moment of extreme financial crisis in the Pisa war (January 1364), this expedient was proposed in a Pratiche discussion. Filippo Capponi, the director of a large mercantile company, expressed his views strongly on the subject: “This is not useful, but rather detrimental, and therefore 149 For evidence of the impoverishment of parts of the contado, see Prov., 58, f. 3v. Giovanni Morelli asserted that excessive taxation was a principal fac-

tor in the depopulation of the Mugello, “pelle quai é suto forza a una gran gente il partirsi, per non avere a stentare in pregione”; Ricordi, p. 102. For suggestions and action to raise contado tax rates, see CP, 2, f. 2r; 12, f. 11Vv; Prov., 55, £. 134r. For discussions and enactments pertaining to the increase in gabelles, see CP, 1, f. 23v; 4, £. 44v; 8, ff. 93r-94v; Prov., 41, £. 109r; M. Villani, 11, 46.

150Qn this issue before 1343, see Barbadoro, Finanze, pp. ‘73-212, 377-448. Both the Duke of Calabria and the Duke of Athens reintroduced direct taxation within the city, but it was abolished after their regimes had ended. 151 Between 1343 and 1378, the sole imposition of a direct tax, with no repayment, occurred in 1352 with the levy of the gabella dei fumanti, called the sega. A tax commission drew up a schedule called an estimo, in which citizens were ranked roughly according to wealth; M. Villani, 11, 46; Barbadoro, “Finanza e demografia,” 616-19. I do not accept Fiumi’s contention (ASI, cvi1, 1950, 10612), that this levy was a prestanza. The estimo could be used as the basis for a forced loan; this occurred in 1355; M. Villani, rv, 83; Barbadoro, “Demografia,”

619. An estimo was authorized in 1363, probably for the apportionment of prestanze rather than direct taxes; Prov., 51, ff. 11r-14r, 7 September 1363. One fragment of the declarations pertaining to this estimo is extant; Estimo, 2.

152 CP, 2, ff. 21r, 23Vv. | | 153 A provision of November 1354 appointed a tax commission to increase

communal revenue; expressly prohibited was the levy of “aliquam prestantiam ... seu segam seu ghabellam fumantium;” Prov., 41, £. 109r. See also Prov., 39, ff. 58r-5or.

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THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

do not impose it.” This sentiment was echoed by Francesco degli Albizzi, Messer Niccolé Alberti, and Messer Giovanni de’ Ricci, all of whom were members of families involved in international trade.*”*

The entrepreneurial class was able to write the script for the commune’s tax program, but it was a prime target for criticism by those groups that suffered most from the inequities of the system. In times of crisis, this opposition was expressed by the mob: “Long live the popolo minuto, and down with the rich and

the gabelles!”" There was a running thread of complaint in the Consulte e Pratiche discussions against tax inequality and discrimination, and a few voices warned that this was a grave source of scandal and discontent.**° Most of the criticism was directed less against the basic features of the system than at its application

in individual cases. In this vein was the complaint by one anony- | mous citizen who denounced the tax assessors in his district as

Ghibellines who were attempting to drive the true Guelfs to |

financial ruin.**’ There are a few references to the fundamental defect of the commune’s tax policy, namely, that the burden fell most heavily on those least able to pay. During the Pisa war, one speaker commented, “The rich should be forced to pay, and it should be an established principle that the war will not be waged with the purses of the poor, but rather with those belonging to the powerful.”*** Strong protests against communal fiscal policy were also made in anonymous complaints to the Signoria, describ-

ing the plight of the Florentine poor. Even when allowance is made for the exaggeration which inevitably accompanies a request

for tax relief, these statements carry a ring of conviction: “Priors of Florence! You must do something about the taxes which the poor people of Florence must pay... . If you do not 154 CP, 5, f. 6r. For a previous discussion of the proposal, see CP, 4, f£. 135r. 155 G, Villani, x11, 20.

156 A typical statement is that of Messer Arnaldo Altoviti: “Quod videatur modis habende pecunia a civibus, ne inequalitas sit causa scandalorum”; CP, 1, £. 161r. For similar comments, see CP, 4, ff. gor, 93r, 94v, 116v; 11, ff. 85r, 88r; Prov., 57, £. r9gor.

157 4FO], 621, f. ar, 23 August 1370: “Questi iscritti di sotto sono tucti gybellini e non veri guelfi e . . . feciono congiura e conventichola isieme e possura a gravare e riporre questa prestanza a guelfi ...e a ghibelline porre pocho e niente.” 158 CP, 4, f. r16r.

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provide for this, you will find that no one will be able to earn a

living in Florence. . . . For there is great want, with poverty and the small wages and the famine which has now been with us for thirteen months or more. Consider the man who has three

or four or five children, who must pay a prestanza of two or three florins, and must live from the labor of his hands, and his wife, too. I tell you that you will drive out all of your citizens so that only the foreigners will remain!”*””

In the later years of the regime, this opposition to the tax system intensified, and one result was the limitation of some of the lucrative benefits that wealthy Florentines had enjoyed. This

trend is seen in the abandonment of the practice of voluntary loans, which usually carried interest rates of fifteen percent, and the adoption of a regular policy of forced loans, with a normal return of five percent.’ A second development was the progressive reduction of the funded debt and the consequent decrease in interest payments to investors.’ The pressure to reduce the commune’s financial obligations increased with each year, and commissions “for the reduction of the mon#” were regularly established."*’ Other proposals, even less to the taste of the monied class, were made after the termination of the expensive war with Pisa. One counselor suggested that interest-free forced loans be

| levied. Other bold spirits urged the commune to suspend interest payments on loans and mont shares, as one means of reducing the government’s obligations.*** These proposals provoked

strong opposition from the majority, who insisted that the commune should keep faith with its creditors.*** Although these 189 AEO], 575, f. 48v, 2 June 1369. Similar complaints are recorded in zbid., 580,

f. 107r; 621, f£. 37r. 16° On voluntary loans, see Barbadoro, Finanze, pp. 666-70. Provisions authorizing voluntary loans are frequent before 1360; Prov., 41, ff. 35r-36v, 72v; 42, ff. 103V-104V; 43, ff. 38r, 125r; 45, ii, ff. 37r-38v. On the imposition of the forced loan of 1359, see M. Villani, 1x, 3. During the Pisa war, forced loans became common; six were sometimes levied in one year. A typical authorization for a prestanza (for 30,000 fl. in June 1374) is in Prov., 62, f. Sor. 161Qn this development, see Brucker, “Documento,” 169, n. 20. By 1378 the original monte vecchio of 1345 had been reduced from nearly 600,000 fl. to 157,608 fl. The total funded debt of the commune in 1378 was 2,361,802 fl. 162 F.g. Prov., 59, £. 771, 14 August 1371. For views favoring the reduction of the funded debt, see CP, 7, £. 62v; 12, ff. 51v, 98r. 163 CP, 11, ff. 120r, 134v; 12, ff. 4r, 6r, IIVv. 164 See the pertinent discussion in CP, 11, ff. 20r, 24r, 88v.

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radical views were not put into effect immediately,** their enunciation clearly shows that the inequities of the fiscal system were

comprehended by those who suffered from them. The implementation of these ideas was postponed until after the Ciompi revolution, when a comprehensive fiscal and monetary program was enacted for the benefit of the meno possent.’® General agreement was also achieved concerning another vital

and complex problem: the supremacy of communal authority over the nuclei of special privileges and immunities in the city. Basically, this issue involved a struggle between public power, as vested in the institutions of communal government, and those organizations, many with long histories and venerable traditions,

which sought to preserve their liberties.’ The most important of these organizations was, of course, the church, whose position on this issue was ambivalent. On the one hand, it endeavored to defend itself against attacks on its collective rights and liberties by the temporal power. Internally, however, it was less a monolithic structure than a mélange of quasi-independent entities, each

of which sought to protect its own freedom from its superiors: pope, bishop, or monastic head.*** The guilds represented a second major bloc of privilege. On a lower level of importance and influence was a heterogeneous collection of organizations: religious confraternities, charitable societies, Jay associations, each with its special function and jurisdiction, each concerned with preserving its privileges. Toward these entities the commune’s attitude was essentially that of the modern sovereign state: to restrict the liberties of the

privileged groups, to break down their juridical immunities, to 165 An illustration is the statement of Andrea di Veri Rondinelli: “Procuretur

haberi pecunia per modum prestantie, que non restituatur, nec detur aliquid pro interesse: et diminuantur expense communis; et aliqua gabella imponatur, cuius redditus expendatur in diminutione debiti comunis”; CP, 7, f. 48r. 166 On this program, see Barbadoro, Finanze, pp. 670-73; Rodolico, Ciompz,

pp. 184-89. It included the institution of direct taxation within the city, the revision of the contado tax structure, the reduction and eventual abolition of the monti, and the revision of the ratio between gold and silver coinage. On the reaction of one citizen to these enactments, see the ricordanze of Valorino di Barna Valorini; ASF, Manoseritti, 77, £. 2aVv. 167 On this general problem, see G. de Lagarde, La natssance de l’esprit laique au declin du moyen dge (Paris, 1934-48), 1v.

168 For a general discussion of this development, see sd:d., 1v, Ch. 3.

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THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

limit their spheres of jurisdiction. This doctrine was never formulated explicitly, nor was it applied systematically. There was no conscious plan to wreck these corporate units, whose existence and function were in most cases fully accepted by commune and society. But this concept of state sovereignty was manifest in hundreds of specific communal decisions involving a conflict of inter-

est between public authority and private privilege. It was the

..;1

ad hoc policy of a majority of the governing group, whose political, social, and economic interests were best served by the force-

ful exercise of public power.’ In its complexity and orientation, the evolution of communal policy toward the guilds was typical of this entire problem. These institutions were firmly embedded in the governmental fabric, and they exercised broad authority in the economic sphere. They regulated the production and sale of most commodities in the Florentine market, from cloth and armor to spices and bread. The privileges of the four major guilds—Lana, Cambio, Calimala, and Por San Maria—were not significantly limited, since the members of these guilds exercised great power

in the communal government.” Indeed, public authority was often placed at the disposal of these organizations, to enforce their decisions and to strengthen their control over matters within

their jurisdiction.’ Yet, the commune insisted that these influential associations recognize its paramount authority. No guild 169 One example was the extension of communal control, including the selection of directors, over the religious society of Or San Michele, whose affairs had been mismanaged after the Black Death; M. Villani, 1, 7. 170 This phenomenon in Florence has never been adequately treated, but cf. the comments of M. Becker, “Florentine Politics and the Diffusion of Heresy in the Trecento: a Socioeconomic Inquiry,” Speculum, xxxtv, 63. On the issue in Pisa, see the excellent article by C. Violante, “Per la storia economica e sociale di Pisa nel Trecento,” Bullettino dell’Istituto Storico Italiano per il medio evo e Archivio Muratoriano, uxvi (1954), 120ff. 171 The basic work on the Florentine guild system is A. Doren, Le arti fioren-

tine. It is primarily a juridical analysis of the guild structure, and one of its major weaknesses is its failure to describe adequately the historical evolution of the guild system, and the relations between guilds, commune, and society. 172.Qn the cooperation between commune and Lana guild in the fourteenth century, see Doren, Die Florentiner Wollentuchindustrie vom wterzehnten bis zum sechzehnten Jahrhundert, pp. 138-53. 173 Rodolico, Popolo minuto, pp. 19-28, 152-55; Statuto del Podesta, 11, 84; in Statuti della Repubblica fiorentina, 1, 150-51.

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THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

was permitted to select its consuls without the express consent of the Signoria. The settlement of interguild disputes was the responsibility of the priors and the guild consuls, and it was enforceable by the judicial officers of the commune.*™* On the rare occasions when these major guilds were the subject of Pratiche discussions, the counselors exhibited a willingness to respect the privileges of

the guilds, while insisting upon the commune’s right to intervene in their internal affairs.*” Toward the lower guilds the commune asserted its supremacy with greater vigor. This was one manifestation of the conflict of interest between the merchants and industrialists, who dominated the government, and the artisan-shopkeeper class. The issue

dividing these groups was simple. While the entrepreneurial class desired a free market and open competition for the local

| goods and services provided by the lower guildsmen, the latter, intent upon their own protection, favored the regulation and control of prices, wages, and production. The statute of the captain of the popolo of 1322 expressly prohibited conspirationem aliquam seu convenctionem, posturam, pactum, monopoliam vel doghanam pertaining to the buying and selling of any products, “since each should be free to buy and sell and negotiate as he wishes.”*”* Judicial officials were frequently instructed to investigate the charge that the guilds were guilty of making illegal pacts

binding on their members to regulate the manufacture and sale of their products.*’ In the 1340’s, when the labor shortage in Florence was acute, immigrant stonemasons, winesellers, innkeepers, and butchers were permitted to practice their metier 11 Statuto del Capitano del Popolo, v, 5; and Statuto del Podesta, v, 99; in Statuti, 1, 221; 11, 426-27.

175 Concerning a problem, not clearly defined, pertaining to the Lana guild, the spokesman for the Sixteen stated: “Mictatur pro consulibus artis lane, et eis dicatur de condictionibus Ser Landucci, et operetur quod capsetur; et demum detur uni ex rectoribus quod sibi faciat ius.” The representative of the Twelve commented: “Fiat honor consulum artis lane de officio; si facitunt voluntatem

comunis, bene quidem; si non, domini poterint providere”; CP, 10, f. 171, t October 1368. 178 Statuto del Capitano del Popolo, 11, 4, Statuti, 1, 144-46. This prohibition was repeated in legislation passed in 1330 and 1349; G. Villani, x, 153; Becker and Brucker, “Arti Minori,” 98, n. 44. 177 For example, see AEOJ, 6, ff. 5r, 11v-12r, 37r; 17, ff. 25r, 35r; 79, ff. r1Vv, 23r, 25r, 33r. See also Rodolico, Popolo minuto, pp. 85-88.

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THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

without joining any guild. This provision increased competition and lowered prices and wages, which did not benefit those already matriculated in the lower guilds, but was certainly advan-

tageous to the rest of the population, including the rich.“ In their close regulation of the activities of the butchers, communal authorities frequently referred to such efforts as promoting the public welfare; they refrained from mentioning that this control benefited their own interests as consumers.*”

Of the corporate entities in the city, the most powerful and influential, in a political sense, was the Parte Guelfa. This organization arose sometime after 1250 as an association of Guelf nobles

contending with the Ghibellines for control of the city.** Throughout the troubled and uncertain years of the late thirteenth

century, when the Guelf cause finally emerged victorious, the Parte grew in stature, wealth, and power. In the early decades of the fourteenth century, its leadership was synonymous with

the ruling elite that governed Florence. This state of affairs changed in 1343 with the influx of new blood into the communal government, and henceforth the Parte assumed a more partisan character." Its power and influence remained great, not because of its wealth,’ but because of its role as the visible symbol of the Guelf tradition. Most Florentines had come to accept the Parte’s 178 The relevant documents are printed in Rodolico, Popolo minuto, docs. 12, 16, 17. See also Becker and Brucker, “Art: Minor,” 98. 178 Becker and Brucker, “Arti Minort,” 99-100. 180 UY, Dorini, Notizie storiche sul’ Universita di Parte Guelfa in Firenze (Florence, 1902), p. 3. The existence of the Parte in Florence was first mentioned by a chronicler in 1267. 181 For rather sketchy treatments of the Parte between 1343 and 1378, see

Dorini, pp. 19-33, and Rodolico, La democrazia fiorentina nel suo tramonto, 1378-1382 (Bologna, 1905), pp. 159-75.

182 It has been asserted that the Parte in the fourteenth century was tremendously wealthy; Barbadoro, Finanze, pp. 478-85; Rodolico, Ciompt, p. 68. The limited evidence from the financial records of the Parte does not support this conclusion. In 1324 the Parte’s real estate holdings comprised one palace, eleven houses, six shops, and 314 statore on land; ASF, Archivio di Parte Guelfa {APG}, rosso, 26, ff. 1r-4v. Between 1370 and 1377 the Parte spent 3360 fl. in acquiring real estate, which equalled the amount spent by two moderately prosperous citizens, Foligno and Giovanni di Conte de’ Medici, for a comparable period; ASF, Archivio Mediceo avant il Principato, 152, ff. 32r-93v. The Parte was the commune’s creditor for substantial sums of money (20,000 fl. in 1361), which it had difficulty in collecting; Prov., 48, ff. 125r-126v. See also zbid., 46, f. 66v; 54, f. 86r.

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THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

contention that it was the city’s most vital link with her past and also the guardian of her destiny.

The structure of the Parte Guelfa was similar to that of the commune. The captains, selected from a list of eligibles for a two-month period, were the executive officers; they were assisted

by advisory councils, legislative assemblies, and a number of lesser functionaries.*** Within the Parte organization, the captains had greater authority than their counterparts in the com-

munal administration, the priors. In addition to possessing broad executive powers, they were able to control, to a large de-

| gree, the selection of their successors to the Parte captaincy.*** In effect, the captains constituted a small, entrenched clique, with the constitutional right to perpetuate their supremacy within the organization. Membership in the Parte Guelfa was not as exclusive as has often been assumed; it included most of the families

of status and substance who had resided in Florence since the turn of the century.*** However, the rank and file were unable to exercise any effective control over the small group of Parte leaders, most of whom came from magnate and popolano families with ultra-conservative sympathies. In 1350 a petition was presented to the Parte’s chief executive requesting a new scrutiny

for the captaincy, on the grounds that “there are in the city of Florence many true Guelfs and adherents of the Parte who are never chosen to the office of captain.’”*° These protests, reinforced by pressure from the communal government, did force the leader-

ship to broaden participation in the supreme executive,’ which 183 The officials of the Parte and their duties are described in the 1335 statute, “Statuto della Parte Guelfa di Firenze compilato nel MCCCXXXV,” ed. F. Bonaini, in Giornale storico degli archivi toscani, 1 (1857), 5-19, 24-30. 184 Although the constitution stipulated that a scrutiny for the captaincy be held every two years, the nominations for the scrutiny were entrusted to the captains in office, assisted by members of the Parte’s advisory colleges and a group of members co-opted by the captains. Unlike the scrutiny for communal offices, no provisions existed for the participation of outside groups; zdid., 1, 6-7. 185 No Parte membership roll exists for this period, but it must be assumed that the great majority of citizens who held communal office were attached to the Parte. In 1364 the captains nominated some 1700 citizens for the Signoria, including 250 lower guildsmen; Tratte, 136. While not all of these nominees were necessarily Parte members, they were at least considered Guelfs by the Parte

leadership at the time. 186 APG, rosso, 1, ff. 33r-34r.

187 The changes in the composition of the Parte’s supreme executive may be seen by comparing the personnel holding the captaincy before and after the Parte

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THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

included some citizens of pronounced liberal views.’** While forming a dissident minority, these “new men” were not able to wrest control of the Parte from the oligarchs, or to modify its policy.

Embedded in the mythology of Florentine politics was a vision

of the Parte Guelfa as the faithful ally of the commune, with both institutions dedicated to identical objectives.**® The Parte’s constitution, which, significantly, had been composed in an age

when quasi-independent urban societies were commonplace,” required each new group of captains to call upon the Signoria and the judicial officials, admonishing them to do their duty, and offering them the authority of the Parte for that purpose.*” The statute also included the proviso that communal officials should not engage in any activity detrimental to the Parte; indeed, they were specifically charged with furthering its interests and goals."** This language implies that the autonomous status of the Guelf society was firmly established and recognized, its privileges extensive and unassailable. Indeed, many of the Parte’s

activities in the fourteenth century, relics from a glorious and robust past, do signify a virtual sovereign status. In addition to its responsibilities to promote Guelfism in Florence, it was the titular leader of the Guelf cause in Tuscany. The Parte mainreforms of 1366-1367: APG, rosso, 1, ff. 34v-35r (June 1350); M. Villani, vim, 24, 31 (January and April 1358); Tratte, 58, £. 136r (January 1361); Carte Strozziane, ser. 2, 2, f. 69r (October 1366); CP, 8, f. 65r (February 1367); APG, rosso, 5, f£. 4or (February 1372); Prov., 60, £. 48r (April 1372); BNF, Magliabechiana, uy, w, 384, f. rr (March 1375); APG, rosso, 26, f£. 75r (November 1375); Carte StrozRiane, ser. 2, 116, ff. 229V, 235v, 236r (March 1377; January and May 1378). 188 For example, Alamanno Salviati, Filippo di Recco Capponi, Andrea Ron-

dinelli, Messer Donato Barbadori, and Tommaso di Marco degli Strozzi; CP, 9, £. 16v; 10, ff. 130v, 143V; 12, ff. 58v, 88r.

188 See the language of the Statute of the Podesta (1324): “Pecunia Partis Guelfe sit quidam thesaurus Populi et Comunis Florentie; ac Pars, Populus et Comunis Florentie sit unum et idem”; Dorini, p. 8. 190 “The popolo has been called with reason a ‘state within a state.’ The term, however, could as well be applied to any number of urban societies, noble consorteries (which collected taxes), for example, or guilds (as the curia maris, which fought wars). More accurately, the popolo was that one of many ‘states within a state,’ which eventually reduced the others to subservience, seized the signoria, the sovereign power, and became the State.” D. Herlihy, Pisa in the Early Renatssance. A Study of Urban Growth, p. 55. 191 Giornale storico degli archivi toscant, 1, 35. 192 Tbhid., 1, 39-40.

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THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

tained diplomatic relations with other Guelf organizations and with the governments of Guelf cities.*°* It intervened as an in-

dependent agent in a conflict between the commune and the rebel city of San Miniato in 1368; it furnished a company of troops which, in 1373, took part in a war between Florence and the Ubaldini, a large clan in the Apennines with Ghibelline traditions.***

Despite the Parte’s favored status and its considerable involve-

ment in political affairs,’ it was forced to recognize the commune’s supremacy. In those tranquil periods when relations between the two organizations were harmonious, the illusion of the Guelf society’s autonomy could be maintained. But whenever a Crisis arose, public authority reacted quickly to assert itself, intervening directly in the Parte’s internal affairs. In 1358 and again in 1366 the commune reformed the Parte’s chief executive by increasing the number of captains and establishing the proportion between magnates, popolani, and lower guildsmen.*”® While permitting the Parte to designate individuals as Ghibellines, it drew up procedural rules to be followed for these declarations to be valid.**’ On certain occasions the commune even violated the society’s most sacrosanct privilege, its right to confer Guelf

status.” In 1349 members of the Davizzi family, merchants whose business activities had sent them abroad for some years, complained to the Signoria that “certain magnates of the city seek to harass us .. . by defaming us as Ghibellines.” Their petition that the Parte be forced to recognize them as Guelfs was 193 The Parte’s statute proved for the appointment and payment of ambassadors; thid., 1, 33. For examples of the Parte’s correspondence to the signore of Rimini and the commune of Bologna, see Marzi, pp. 656-57; O. Vancini, “Bologna nella chiesa, 1360-1376,” Azz della R. Deputazione di storia patria per Romagna, ser. 3, xxiv (1906), 56-57. 194 CP, 7, ff. 13v-24r; Diario d’anonimo, ed. Gherardi, pp. 299-302. 195 See this comment in a Pratiche discussion: “Placetur quod capitanei partis guelfe assumerentur onus concordandi guelfos Aretinos et alios de Tuscia. Et ubi nollent, alii cives deputentur”; CP, 7, f. 63r, November 1365.

196 For a discussion of these reforms, see below, pp. 170, 208-11. : 197 See below, pp. 208, 245-46. 198 A provision of July 1349 provided that the Parte could accept no new members without the prior approval of three-fourths of the Signoria and the colleges; Prov., 36, ff. 1371r-137Vv.

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THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

accepted with large majorities by the Signoria, the colleges, and the legislative councils.*”°

The Parte’s conflict with the commune, its struggle to defend its privileged status, was only a secondary issue in the political history of these years. Far more significant was its advocacy of certain principles that became highly controversial. The Parte

did not remain aloof from politics; instead, it became deeply committed to a program that pushed it directly into the vortex of partisan strife. Traditionally aristocratic in its composition and orientation, the Guelf organization became the fortress of conservatism in Florentine politics, the vehicle for organizing and

solidifying patrician sentiment. One important result of this involvement was that, for the first time in the century, the Parte became the target of sharp criticism. Against it was directed the resentment and hostility of those citizens who opposed its policies and practices. The Parte provided this opposition with a focus and gave it a sense of direction and purpose that it did not originally possess. Thus an important consequence of the Guelf society’s

political activity was to polarize partisan conflict, to infuse it with greater form and coherence, and, above all, to increase its intensity.

The Ghibelline question was one of three major issues on which the Parte leadership took a determined position; the others

were the relations between church and commune, and foreign policy. These problems were intimately related to the core of the Parte’s ideology, as expressed in the prologue of its 1335 statute: “To the honor and reverence of God and of his blessed Mother,

and of all the saints, and of the Holy Roman Church, and of the most holy father and lord, Pope Benedict XII, and of his successors and of his cardinals; to the exaltation and glory of the serene prince Robert, king of Jerusalem and Sicily; to the greatness and prosperity of the popolo and the commune of Florence

and its institutions; and to the maintenance and growth of the 199 Prov., 37, f. 22v. With the Davizzi were admitted two others to Guelf status, Nastagio Cambi and Stefano Stefani. For two other examples, see Prov., 45, ff. 38v, ro8r.

103

| THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND Parte Guelfa and of those devoted to the Holy Church, and to their friends, and to the confusion of all their enemies.’”” From this proclamation we can deduce the Parte’s support of the Florentine church in an age when tensions between the lay and ecclesiastical realms were increasing, when sources of con-

troversy lay everywhere at hand: clerical taxation, conflict between secular and church courts, the prickly issue of ecclesiastical privileges and immunities. Likewise, the basic tenets of the Guelf

position on foreign policy were spelled out clearly in the constitution: intimate association and cooperation with the papacy and the Guelf states in Italy. On these issues controversy arose and grew more intense, as major policy questions became inextricably linked with the partisan struggle for control of the commune and of Florence’s future. 200 Giornale storico degli archivi toscani, 1, 4.

104

CHAPTER III Ghe First Decade 1343-1353

The New Regime and its Enemies The final convulsion of the year of revolutions, 1343, occurred

in the last week of September, when the magnates were overwhelmed in street battles with the populace and excluded from the communal government. In this struggle for power the lower elements of the guild community—artisans, shopkeepers, dyers, furriers—had played an important role. Consequently, these arte-

fict were strongly represented in the scrutiny for the Signoria held early in October. Of those citizens who were designated as eligible for the priorate, the majority belonged to families who had not previously held communal office. Between 1343 and 1348

the patriciate obtained less than one-third of the seats in the Signoria.” In the first group of priors selected from the new scrutiny list, the lower guilds were represented by a butcher, a swordmaker, and a blacksmith. Only two members of this Signoria had filled this office in the past, while the gente nuova from the greater guilds included a druggist and three merchants, of whom one, Buonarrote di Simone Buonarroti, was an ancestor

of Michelangelo.* With substantial majorities in the priorate, the colleges, and the councils, the newcomers were in a strong position to dictate communal policy. Although statistics can furnish a rough guide to the balance of political forces, they are not completely reliable. Figures alone do not indicate the extent to which an individual prior or coun1Of the 261 members of the Signoria chosen between October 1343 and July 1348, 86 were members of families which had previously been represented in the supreme executive, while 175 come from new families. Approximately 80 of the latter group were lower guildsmen; 95 were gente nuova from the greater guilds. On the selection procedure during this period, see M. Becker and G. Brucker, “The Arti Minor in Florentine Politics, 1342-1378,” Medtaeval Studies, xviu1, 96. Due to the unique method of selecting replacements for citizens who were disqualified for the Signoria, the lower guildsmen frequently received more than the two seats in the priorate regularly allotted to them. 2 Cronaca fiorentina di Marchionne di Coppo Stefant, ed. N. Rodolico, RRIISS, xxx, Pt. 1, 602.

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cilor was guided in his voting by a rational calculation of his interests, or the degree to which he was influenced by personal antagonisms or the example of his social superiors. Nor do they reveal which citizens were able to command assent from their peers, or which voices could sway assemblies. These intangible factors help to explain why, in the early years of the regime, no single group or class controlled the communal government. Insofar as any pattern of political behavior can be detected, there was an unstable and shifting balance of forces, with the numerical

superiority of the gente nuova counterbalanced to some degree by the patrician monopoly of experience and leadership.* Although the aristocracy had been discredited by the mistakes and failures of its policy, it retained considerable influence after 1343.

Its members were well known and their opinions commanded respect and attention. The neophytes, inexperienced in public affairs, had no recognized leaders. Moreover, they did not constitute an homogeneous group: their number included wealthy bankers and industrialists, as well as unlettered artisans who carried the marks of their manual trades with them into the council halls. The old order was partly successful in resisting change and

innovation, in disciplining the new elements, and in blunting their numerical preponderance. This political equilibrium between the old and the new forces in the commune is reflected in the selection of officials to minor posts, many of which were filled by direct election instead of by lot.* In the balloting for these offices, the laurels were quite evenly

divided between patricians and gente nuova. There are several examples of artisans scoring victories over scions of prominent families: a baker, Berardo di Simone, and a mercer, Piero di Guccio, defeated Soldo degli Strozzi and Albertozzo di Lapo

Alberti in one election.” Frequently, however, the old order triumphed over the “new men” in the balloting. In one election held in 1346 to choose eight members of a judicial review commission, four posts were won by the patriciate (Paolo Vettori, 8 The thesis that the lower guilds dominated the communal government after 1343 is refuted in Becker and Brucker, “Artz Minori,” 93-104. The records of these elections are found in Libri Fabarum, 25-34, covering the period 1343-1355. After 1355 only a few direct elections are recorded, since most of the minor offices were filled by the scrutiny procedure. 5 LF, 27, ff. 45r, rorr.

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Niccolo Ridolfi, Giovanni Arnolfi, and Benedetto Gherardi), the others by gente nuova from the greater guilds.® In general, lower guildsmen did not fare well in these contests—additional proof of their limited influence in the commune. Diplomatic posts remained the exclusive preserve of the aristocracy, who also held

most of the important rectorships in the contado.' Fear was the most powerful cohesive force among the disparate

elements in the new regime. Men of such diverse backgrounds as Ruggiero da Castiglionchio, a descendant of feudal nobility, and the tanner, Lapo Buti, cooperated, perhaps reluctantly, to preserve Florence’s republican government, which was in grave peril.* Although the yoke of the foreign dictator had been thrown

off, the danger of tyranny did not pass with the exodus of the Duke of Athens. The major problem confronting the regime was a disturbed and discontented populace. Florentines had witnessed the complete breakdown of law and order twice in three months. This participation in violence and direct action was a powerful elixir, the taste for which did not disappear with the institution of a new political order. On the eve of the uprising against the magnates, on 23 September 1343, the threat of a proletarian revolution was raised by a renegade patrician, Andrea degli Strozzi, who led a mob of hungry men to the palace of the Signoria, demanding that the price of grain be lowered.’ In December another group of armed men assembled in the parish of S. Paolo, shouting “Viva

el popolo,” the traditional rallying cry of popular uprisings.” The state of tension is dramatically illustrated by an incident in March 1344. In a street brawl, a member of the powerful Rucellai family inflicted knife wounds on three men. This assault pro-

voked shouts from bystanders: “Long live the guilds and the popolo and down with the traitorous Rucellai! Al fero al foco ad SUF, 27, f. 81r. In the scrutinies for minor offices held in 1345 and 1346, the patricians obtained a decisive majority; Tratte, 138, ff. 30r-45v. 7 See Becker and Brucker, “Arti Minori,” 97, n. 36. 8 These two men were colleagues in the Signoria of September-October 1344; Stefani, 614.

® This incident was described by Stefani, 590; see also Cronica di Giovanni Villani, x11, 20. Strozzi’s condemnation is published in N. Rodolico, I] Popolo minuto, pp. 142-44. 10 Artz del Capitano del Popolo, 3, ff. 5r-6r.

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casa delli Oricellari\”* A year later, another tumult of serious proportions broke out near the monastery of S. Marco.’ The judicial records reveal that such outbreaks of disorder were more frequent between 1343 and 1348 than during the last three decades of the regime’s existence.”* The regime’s unpopularity, of which these mass demonstra-

tions are eloquent proof, was also shown by attacks upon the personnel of the administration.** On at least four occasions dur-

ing these years, communal officials were assaulted by mobs in the streets.” A certain Taddeo di Risalsi was convicted in 1344 of posting a placard describing one of the priors, Ser Gino da Calenzano, as a traitor.** In August 1346 a judge condemned a notary for asserting that the official orders of the Signoria were invalid and could be ignored." A contadino named Ser Lapo, described as a “sower of evil and discord,” was found guilty of posting inflammatory placards on the walls of public buildings— placards which, according to the accusation, were designed “to disturb the peace and tranquillity of the city of Florence and to create

scandal and tumult.”** In June 1347 an agitator named Monte di Lippo denounced the priors in office and urged his listeners to throw them from the windows of the palace of the Signoria.” A shoemaker, Cecco Bocchini, condemned officials in charge of the grain supply in these terms:

“They wish to destroy the manual laborers of this city: they have made and are making statutes and ordinances against these

laborers to their damage and prejudice. But I swear to you... that neither I nor the other artisans will submit to this treat11 Rodolico, Popolo minuto, pp. 167-69.

12 ACP, 19, f. 38r. One of the convicted rioters was Niccolo di Messer Giovanni de’ Medici. 18 For other examples, see ACP, 10, £. 251; Atti del Esecutore degli Ordina-

menti della Giustizia, 17, f. 11v. In one disturbance which broke out in August 1350, the standard of the quarter of S. Spirito was seized by a crowd which shouted: “Popolo! Popolo! Moriantur Gibelini!” AEOJ], 146, f. 1r. 14. A provision of May 1346 forbade the dissemination of derogatory statements against the commune or its officials, under penalty of a 1ooo /. fine; Provvisioni, 34, ff. 471r-47v. 15 ACP, 3, £. 29Vv; 30, f. ov; 75, f£. 5r; AEOJ, 137, £. 17¢.

16 ACP, 11, f. 5r. 17 ACP, 43, f. 1. 18 AEO], 17, f. r7r. 19 ACP, 48, f. 31r.

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ment. We shall not oppose it with words but with iron and fire which we shall use upon the houses of these officials.””* The forms which this protest assumed, the aimless and volatile mob or the isolated act of violence, suggest that opposition to the regime was extensive but totally lacking in cohesion and direction. Officials were understandably tense, however, fearful that

a minor incident might precipitate a major upheaval. In an atmosphere that verged at times upon hysteria, rumors became facts and a chance remark was proof of a diabolical conspiracy. An indiscreet comment or letter was as dangerous as an overt

act." For asserting that a revolution should take place in Flor- | ence, two citizens earned themselves a lengthy residence in the noisome environs of the Stinche, the city prison.” Even more drastic was the punishment meted out to Segna di Nigi and Lapo

di Cione, two stonemasons who were executed for writing a letter in which they expressed admiration for the Duke of Athens and his government: “You know our friendship with the duke; and as a consequence,

all the citizens here dislike us, and we earn nothing. .. . Truly, we tell you, Diedi, that the city of Florence is in a very bad state for the artisans and the gente minuta, and we are unable to earn a living. It was a mistake to expel the duke, for he wished to establish good government in Florence, and he saved us from the Bavarian [Emperor Louis the Bavarian], who would have been lord of Florence save for the duke. We have enemies on all sides and we cannot leave Florence for fear of being captured... . We were about to enjoy the best conditions that we had ever known, and few citizens know as well as ourselves the good state in which the duke planned to place Florence. For those who were

not content with that, may God pardon them.”” 20 AEO], 154, £. tr. 21 An indication of the extreme nervousness of the authorities was the con-

viction of two prominent citizens, Salvestro de’ Medici and Pazzino degli Strozzi; they were fined for staging marriage celebrations which violated an ordinance prohibiting gatherings in excess of fifty persons; AEOJ, 08, ff. ror, 2o0v.

22 Rodolico, Popolo minuto, p. 170. According to the accusation, the men “dixerunt verba pluribus . . . personis que poterant generare scandalum et turbacionem in popolo, videlicet, dicendo quod rumor tumultus et novitas debebat esse in dicta civitate et maxime quando casetta dominorum priorum debebat portari ad palacium pro extraendo priores de mensis Augusti.” 28M. Becker and G. Brucker, “Una lettera in difesa della dittatura nella

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Owing to the depressed state of the Florentine economy, thousands of workers in the cloth industry constituted a serious threat to internal peace, and the authorities were vigilant to detect any

signs of labor unrest. The workers had fought in the streets against Walter of Brienne and the magnates, but, unlike the other classes, they had received no tangible reward for their efforts.

This laboring mass served as a magnet to draw together the propertied class in Florence, from the wealthiest merchant to the lowliest shopkeeper. The proletariat won little support or sympathy

from the lower guildsmen, and their repression was generally popular. In October 1343 an itinerant Sienese laborer, Aldobran-

dino Ciecharini, was hanged for inciting laborers in two cloth factories to defy their employers, Salvi Salviati and Matteo degli

Albizzi.* Another cloth worker from the contado, Francesco di Lapo, suffered the same fate for arousing workers in the parish

of S. Lorenzo.” Acts of violence by groups of laborers were severely punished. In 1346 a judge condemned sixteen wool spinners for two crimes: forming an illicit assembly and then assaulting a house belonging to a Janaiuolo and ejecting two of his employees.”®

The most dramatic incident in this industrial crisis involved a

wool carder named Ciuto Brandini, whose career deserves a prominent place in proletarian martyrology. A merchant, Francesco Duranti, described the affair in his diary: “On 24 May 1345, the captain [of the popolo| of Florence... seized at night Ciuto Brandini, a carder, and his two sons, because Ciuto wished to organize a company at S. Croce and create a union with the other workers of Florence. On the same day, the Florentine workers, that is, the carders and wool combers, learned the news... and they stopped work and did not wish to continue until Ciuto was returned to them. These workers went to the priors and urged them to restore Ciuto safe and sound .. . Firenze del Trecento,” Archivio storico italiano, cxut, 258. G. Villani, xu, 34,

makes brief mention of this incident. :

24 Atti del Podesta, 23, £. 87r; Rodolico, Popolo minuto, pp. 56-57. 25 AP, 23, f. gir. 28 Rodolico, Popolo minuto, pp. 161-62. Those who participated in a brawl between a group of wool carders and a group of dyers were severely punished; ACP, 62, f. 6or, 26 December 1347.

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and they also wished to be better paid. And Ciuto was then hung by the neck.’”? The formal judicial language of Brandini’s condemnation translated with startling clarity the fears and apprehensions that his activities inspired in the Florentine bourgeoisie.”* Ciuto was described as “a man who was hated by all on account of his condition, his activities and his bad reputation; who was odious to the citizenry on account of the frequent assemblies arranged by him and the other dangerous novelties which he introduced.” Ac-

cording to the accusation, “Ciuto had deliberated, with others who had been seduced by his words, to form, with as large a number of adherents as possible, a brotherhood among the carders,

combers and the other workers of the Lana guild, and to name consuls and captains of the new organization. To such end, he had, on many times and occasions, assembled large numbers of men of evil reputation, and in these gatherings he had proposed that each contribute a certain sum of money in order that they might more strongly resist everyone.” The parallels between this episode and modern industrial conflict are striking: the economic motivation behind the drive for a laborer’s guild; the protest strike when the leader was seized; the equation of labor organization with political subversion; and the inevitable collapse of the movement through the use of public authority on behalf of industrial interests. The regime’s enemies on the left, among the lower classes, outnumbered its patrician opponents on the right, but the latter were probably more dangerous. In addition to possessing the economic resources to finance a revolution, the disgruntled aristocrats could use their contado estates as headquarters for conspiracy, secure in

the knowledge that they were largely immune from communal inspection and control. Moreover, their foreign contacts enabled them to negotiate for support with neighboring signori, who were eager for the opportunity to fish in troubled Florentine waters. Opponents of the regime could also expect assistance 27 Biblioteca Nazionale di Firenze, Magliabechiana, 11, 11, 280, f. 23v. This

fragment of Duranti’s ricordanze was published as an appendix to the 1731 edition of Velluti’s chronicle, but the author was not identified; cf. Rodolico, Popolo minuto, pp. 58-59. 28 The text of the condemnation is published in Rodolico, Popolo minuto, pp. 157-60.

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from the Ubaldini and Tarlati, feudal families with Ghibelline traditions, who nourished a virulent hatred for the Arno city and its inhabitants. The regime was only a few weeks old when reports circulated that some magnates were in league with the hostile Tarlati, on Florence’s southern frontier, while others were alleged to be active in sowing seeds of discord between the commune and the Pisan government.” Although the patriciate was united in its dislike of the new regime, the reactions of its members varied. The majority accepted the status quo reluctantly, aware that they still constituted an influ-

ential force in communal politics and that changes could be achieved by peaceful, constitutional means. The attitude of these moderates was summed up by Stefani: “If I have an artisan for a colleague, he will be subservient and reverent and will do as

I wish. I won’t give him a half share [of offices], so that if he doesn’t do as I wish, there won’t be so many of them that they would ruin everything.”*® However, within the ranks of the aristocracy was a small minority that thoroughly detested the regime and was prepared to take direct action to achieve its downfall. The boasts of two magnates, Angelo Cavicciuli and Angelo Cardinali, concerning their plans to defile the communal standard (gonfalone) could scarcely be regarded as a menace to the government’s security. However, these comments did reflect

a morbid hatred for the regime; in the opinion of the judicial authorities, this hatred merited severe punishment.” Pagnozzo degli Strozzi’s bitter outburst against the lower classes reflected the deep resentment of certain patricians against their social inferiors in the communal government, whom they had been accustomed to dominate and patronize.” The degree to which hostile words and sentiments were translated into plans for action is unclear. On several occasions, officials probed into alleged cases of subversion involving magnates. The

regime was scarcely two months old when Tommaso di Messer Riccardo de’ Bardi was fined for announcing that certain wealthy 29 Stefani, 590.

} $9 Stefani, 588.

31 ACP, 42, f. 16r; 75, f. 2v. Cavicciuli stated that he had torn the communal standard; Angelo Cardinali’s comment was: “Ia [gia] fo tempo che me misi el gonfalone di la iustitia intro en culo et forbilomece.”

112 |

82 Rodolico, Popolo minuto, p. 145.

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and prominent citizens were plotting to exclude artisans and gente

minuta from the government.** In the spring of 1344 a more substantial conspiracy was uncovered in its initial stages. Corso Donati, the chief of a powerful magnate clan, was condemned to death for writing letters to certain Lombard signori, including Luchino Visconti of Milan, requesting help to foment a revolution in Florence.** Two years later, in the summer of 1346, the city

was engulfed by rumors that an uprising was planned by rich merchants, magnates, and bankrupts.” Another wave of subversive activity broke out in 1350. Three members of the Pazzi family, Messer Geri, Francesco di Ghinozzo, and Bertramino di Bartolomeo, were implicated in a plot to discredit the podesta and the communal administration.** An act of violence with graver implications was the murder of Banchello di Ser Belcaro Serragli, a member of one of the colleges.

The judicial denunciation asserted that the assassins, who included members of the Machiavelli and Gherardini families, 88 Tbid., pp. 166-67. Bardi was condemned by the judge for making a false statement.

84G, Villani commented: “Ancora nel detto tempo fu condannato Corso di messer Amerigo di messer Corso Donati in avere e in persona per contumace, per certe lettere che furono trovate, che mandava e erano mandate a lui da certi tiranni di Lombardia, con cui teneva certi trattati contro il popolo di Firenze, o vero o non vero che fosse, che non l’approviamo, perocch’a lui era impossibile a fornire si grande impresa sanza maggior seguito; ma non compari dinanzi a scusarsi, o per temenza del popolo e de’ suoi nimici, o per non discoprire chi a cio teneva con lui al detto trattato”; x11, 32. Stefani, 605, asserted that Corso was negotiating with Luchino Visconti, who was then at war with Pisa in the Lunigiana area; see G. Villani, xm, 26, 29. Donati’s condemnation is in ACP, 11, f. rr; one of his accomplices, Alberto of Siena, was also condemned for his part in the conspiracy; ACP, 11, f. 73r. 35 There is no evidence to prove that these rumors had any basis in fact; three

citizens who circulated them were convicted of disseminating false informa- : tion. A notary was condemned in 1346 for falsely accusing Simone di Geri de’ Bardi of asking an acquaintance this question: “Vultis actendere et consentire ad mutationem presentis status civitatis Florentie; placet vobis dictum statum nec ne?” ACP, 42, f. 15r. At the same time Ser Brunaccio Sulli was fined for

making this statement: “Ante medietatem mensis tunii futuri, in civitate Florentie debet fieri rumor per magnates, populares grossos et per fallitos sub hoc colore et nomine, videlicet: ‘Moghano i Ghibellini e viva ’] popolo e l’arti’” ACP, 42, f. rir. 86 “Tractaverunt et ordinaverunt et conventiculam et conspirationem et tractatum fecerunt ... ut pacificus et tranquillus presens status comunis et populi et artificum civitatis Florentie turbaretur”; AP, 554, f. 287r; 10 June 1350.

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hoped that the crime would cause a disturbance in the quarter of S. Spirito that could be fanned into a general revolution.*” The plan miscarried, however, and the murderers were all forced to flee the city to avoid capture and execution. Communal policy toward the magnates during the first decade of the regime was harsh and inflexible, a consequence of the hostility these powerful families had aroused by their excesses and by their attempts, real or imagined, to overthrow the government. In October 1343 the traditional instrument for curbing the power of the grandi, the Ordinances of Justice, was revived.** These draconian statutes provided for very heavy penalties to be assessed

against any magnate who assaulted or maltreated a popolano. In 1344 the consuls of the lower guilds investigated the conduct of those contado officials who had been responsible for the loss of castles and lands during the 1343 upheavals. Several magnates were convicted of malfeasance, including some who, in Villani’s opinion, were innocent.” In October 1344 lower guildsmen secured passage of two additional pieces of antimagnate legislation. One provision increased the penalties for magnates convicted of arson, while the second law stipulated that grandi in the service of foreign governments must leave their employment and return to Florence, or be classified as rebels.*° Stefani described an incendiary speech made in April 1345 by an artisan who reminded his colleagues of the excesses of the magnates, “who had wished to crush the popolo and who had been the recipients of their possessions.” Thereupon, the commune confiscated the estates that had been given to certain magnate families—the Pazzi, Rossi, and Tosinghi—as a reward for illustrious military service by their forebears.

The magnate issue created a sharp division of opinion between the old order and the gente nuova. Patricians consistently sought 87 Nine men were condemned for the crime, including Carlo di Baldovinetto Gherardini and Giovanni di Chiovo Machiavelli; AEO], 137, f. or; AP, 554, ff. 249r, 2551-256r; Prov., 62, f. 755.

88 The provision reimposing the Ordinances of Justice, which had been revoked by the Duke of Athens, is in Delizte degli eruditi toscani, ed. I. di San Luigi, x111, 289-95. See also G. Villani, xm, 23; Stefani, 595.

89G. Villani, x11, 32; Stefani, 604. 40 G, Villani, x11, 34; Stefani, 607. The provisions are in Delizie, x111, 296-304.

41 Stefani, 617; G. Villani, x11, 44. , 114

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to limit the restrictions and penalties imposed on the grand; the “new men,” on the other hand, regarded the magnates with implacable enmity. This disagreement is clearly illustrated by a council debate of June 1349, concerning proposed revisions of the Ordinances of Justice.“ Messer Bindo Altoviti, spokesman for a special commission appointed to investigate the problem, stated that his group could not agree on a solution. The most controversial issue was the degree of blood relationship by which a magnate was held responsible for the misdemeanors of his relatives. Representatives of the patriciate—Altoviti, Rosso de’ Ricci,

Carlo degli Strozzi, and Luigi de’ Mozzi—wished to mitigate the severity of the Ordinances, and to fix magnate responsibility at the third degree.** Favoring harsher penalties were several gente nuova—Ser Jacopo di Ser Gherardo, Niccold di Ser Bene da Varazzano, Francesco Benini, Piero Pape—who proposed that

the Ordinances be imposed without qualification, and that the responsibility of the magnates for their kin be extended to the sixth degree.

The magnate problem remained a fertile source of controversy throughout the regime’s existence. The hostility with which the

gente nuova viewed the grandi was partly a reaction to the haughty and overbearing demeanor of certain members of this caste. To the “new men,” whose status was so recently and painfully acquired, the magnates were particularly repugnant because their position in society was so fixed and unassailable. Of greater significance was the belief nurtured by the parvenus that these ancient families were dedicated enemies of the government, that, by reason of their traditions, beliefs, and associations, they could never be incorporated into a republican regime. This conviction explains many of the harsh and vindictive measures against the magnates which the gente nuova sponsored. These laws were

designed to keep the grandi on a tight leash, to make life in Florence as unbearable for them as possible. Either they must sub-

mit completely to communal authority, or else sever their ties with the city and live in permanent exile.“ 42 The law which established this commission is in Prov., 36, f. 95v. 48 The debate is in Consulte e Pratiche, 1, ff. 5r-5v. 44 As a result of the antimagnate legislation and the condemnations against several grand in the autumn of 1343, a large number of magnates left the city

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The patrician popolani, linked to the magnates by blood ties and common interests, naturally opposed this policy. Giovanni Villani reflected aristocratic sentiment on this question: he regarded the magnates as an integral part of the city and its past. The chronicler was scarcely capable of envisaging a situation in which the magnates did not participate in Florentine public life. He denounced the confiscation of magnate property as gross ingratitude and “against reason,” because it ignored the positive contributions that the Florentine nobility had made to the city’s greatness.” The exclusion of magnates from the embassy sent to the king of Hungary in 1347 was, in Villani’s judgment, an unwarranted affront, a deliberate attempt to withhold from the grand: the honors and offices that had traditionally been their due.“ Fundamentally, this disagreement arose from opposing views of the relationship between the new regime and its anteced-

ents. The gente nuova were prepared to cut the links with the preceding age, to minimize or ignore tradition, while Villani and his fellow patricians wanted to preserve as much of the past as possible.

The Patrician Resurgence and the Origins of Partisan Conflict A significant political development in the first decade of the 1343 regime was the rapid recovery of the patriciate: its success in enacting legislation that furthered its interests and weakened the position of the gente nuova. The first milestone of this revival, in October 1346, was described by an anonymous chronicler:

“It seemed to the great popolani of Florence that the mediani and the artisans had too much authority in the government. They and resided in the contado; Stefani, 599. Many magnates then took employment

with foreign governments and the prohibition of this service was very detrimental to their interests; “donde gran danno fu loro”; Stefani, 607. 45 G, Villani, xu, 44: “Per gli detti reggenti e maestrati del popolo di Firenze fur tolti di subito, e contra ogni debito di ragione, a’ pit nobili de’ beni donati per lo comune per antico e per loro meriti e de’ loro anticessori. . . . Di questo torto fatto per li reggenti del popolo a’ sopraddetti gentili uomini, con lo inzigamento degli altri grandi per invidia, avemo fatta menzione per dare esempio a quegli che verranno, come riescono i servigi fatti allo ingrato popolo di Firenze.” 46 G. Villani, xm, 108.

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procured the passage of a law stating that no citizen who was not born in the city or in the contado, and whose father and grandfather were not natives, could accept any position in the government, under heavy penalty. Many were thus deprived of office, and the fourteen lower guilds were seriously weakened by

this law.”*’ According to Giovanni Villani, the provision was initiated by the captains of the Parte Guelfa, who sought thereby to eliminate Ghibellines from the government and to restrain the influence of the lower guilds.” A companion measure gained the approval of the legislative councils in January 1347. The purpose of the law, as stated in the preamble, was to bar from office “those rebels against the mother church and the popolo and commune of Florence who have insinuated themselves into the administration.” It specifically provided for the exclusion from office of anyone whose forebears had been involved in rebellion or conflict against the commune since 1301. In more general terms, the measure banned from gov-

ernment posts all Ghibellines and “anyone who is not a true Guelf or who is not faithful and devoted to the Holy Roman Church.” Those found guilty of violating the provisions of the law were to be fined 500 Jire. The sole proof required was the testimony of six men who were approved by the consuls of their guilds.

This law provoked strong opposition. With its loose terminology and the superficial nature of the proof required, it was an ideal instrument for personal revenge, and, more important, a powerful political weapon. Six priors who were in office during July and August 1347 proposed a revision of the law that would require all witnesses in Ghibelline cases to be approved by the Signoria. The Parte captains, however, secured the rejection of this proposal. They then submitted a provision which prescribed heavy penalties against anyone who sought to nullify or modify the anti-Ghibelline law passed in the previous January.” In the preamble to this measure, the captains stated that they proposed 47 Manoscritti, 222, f. 183. This account contains important information which is not found in the major chronicles. For the text of the law, see Prov., 34, ff. 93V-94V.

48 G. Villani, xu, 72. 49G. Villani, x1, 79. 50 The text of this provision is printed in Delizie, x11, 314-24.

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this legislation on account of “numerous complaints and lamentations which have been addressed to the Signoria by Ghibellines and those who, seeking to destroy the Parte Guelfa, endeavored to weaken this law with subtle and false words and iniquitous actions.” Both councils approved the petition by large majorities.™

These measures disqualified a substantial number of the gente nuova who had entered the communal government since 1343. Of the 165 priors selected between October 1343 and January 1347,

, only thirty one were again chosen to the Signoria.” The existence of this legislation on the statute books was sufficient warning for many of the “new men,” whose antecedents were obscure, to retire from public service.°* To demonstrate their intention of enforcing these provisions, the Parte captains took judicial action against several individuals. Among those successfully prosecuted for violating the anti-Ghibelline law were two prominent businessmen: Uberto Infanghati, a banker, and Andrea dell’Ischia,

a cloth manufacturer.* A draper named Lorenzo Buonaccorsi probably owed his condemnation as a Ghibelline to his opposition,

as a member of the Sixteen, to the law of October 1346, which barred foreigners from office.” To block any mass attempt by 51 Delizie, X11, 324-26.

52 Many of these were victims of the Black Death.

°8G. Villani, xu, 79: “Altri cittadini rifiutarono altri ufici per non esserne condannati né riceverne vergogna, e in loro luoghi ne furono chiamati altri.” 54 Infanghati’s condemnation is published in Delizie, xu, 327-28. According to the charge, he accepted membership in a bankruptcy commission, “sciens se esse Ghibellinum et non vere Guelfum . . . et sciens se dictum officium debere iurare vel acceptare non posse.” His family had been Ghibelline in the thirteenth century; Delizie, 1x, 78. For the judicial process against Andrea dell’Ischia, who defended himself against the charge, see ACP, 74, ff. 1o7r-t13r. Andrea was involved in the 1360 conspiracy and was condemned to death in absentia; Stefani, 685. Two other Ghibelline trials at this time, involving contadini, are in AP, 204, ff. 131v-132r. 55 Buonaccorsi’s conviction on 3 July 1347 is in AP, 204, f. 349r; it is printed

in Delizie, xu, 327-28. He was a member of the Sixteen in the autumn of 1346. The records of the Ghibelline trial (September 1349) of Cambio Nucci, a druggist, is printed in J. Kohler and G. degli Azzi, Das Florentiner Strafrecht des XIV. Jahrhunderts mit einem Anhang tiber den Strafprozess der italienischen Statuten (Mannheim and Leipzig, 1900), pp. 131-62. Nucci defended himself and was acquitted of the charge: “Vissis etiam intentione et capitulis coram

nobis . . . exibitis per ipsum Cambium accusatum ad sui deffensionem, et testibus super ea interrogatis receptis et examinatis probantibus dictum Cambium

fuisse et esse vera guelfum et fidellem et devotum S.e Romane Ecclesie et Parti Guelfe: visso etiam libro coram nobis . . . producto . .. in quo libro

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immigrants to gain Guelf status and the right to hold communal office, the Parte also tightened its admission requirements and doubled the fee to be assessed against any Ghibelline who was accepted into the Guelf fold.** There is no completely satisfactory explanation for the ability of the patrician minority to secure the passage of legislation so

patently detrimental to the interests of the gente nuova. One important factor was the overwhelming support these laws received from the aristocracy. Such moderates as Giovanni Villani and Donato Velluti were united with the ultra-conservative Parte

leadership in the view that the “new men” were, at best, lukewarm Guelfs, and that many were Ghibellines and traitors.*’ The Parte captains had carefully introduced this legislation at a time when the patriciate was well represented in the Signoria and the colleges; two-thirds of the colleges’ members had to approve all provisions submitted to the councils.” The unity of the patriciate on the Ghibelline question does not explain why a baker, Berardo di Simone, and a pork butcher, Giovanni di Jacopo, publicly supported these measures in the councils,” or why large numbers of gente nuova, in Perrens’ descripta sunt nomina Ghibellinorum civitatis Florentie et eius comitatus, in quo libro descripta sunt nomina Ghibellinorum civitatis Florentie et eius comitatus, in quo non apparet esse descriptum nomen ipsius Cambii accusati nec nomen ipsius patris vel avi, et audita relactione quorumdam fidedignorum et honorabilium popularium civitatis Florentie nobis refferentium ipsius Cambium fuisse et esse verum guelfum et ex progenie Guelforum; vissis et consideratis

que in predictis et circha predicta videnda et consideranda fuerunt; non reperto ipsum esse Ghibellinum, sed vere Guelfum et ex progenie et stirpe Guelforum natum, nec culpabilem de predictis in accusa contentis vel aliquo predictorum.” 58 Archivio di Parte Guelfa, 1, ff. 30v-31Vv. 57 G, Villani, x11, 72, 79, 92; La cronica domestica di Messer Donato Velluti,

pp. 242-43. See also the comments of the anonymous chronicler; Manoscrittt, 222, f. 198.

58 When the law against foreign officeholders was passed in October 1346, one-half of the Signoria and the colleges was composed of patricians—a very unusual situation. The proportion of patricians in the priorates of January and August 1347 was less, but still above the norm for these years. The prior lists are in Stefani, 632 51s; members of the colleges are listed in Manoscritti, 2609, no pag. 58 Others who publicly favored these provisions were Cecco Cenni, a broker (sensale), Tuccio Guicciardini, and a notary, Ser Guglielmo di Ser Francesco Pini; ASF, Provvisioni duplicati, 6, ff. 168r-169v.

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words, opted for their self-immolation.” The decisive factor was

apparently the emotional response that the Ghibelline issue evoked from all classes of society. This was heightened by external events. Charles of Bohemia, a grandson of Florence’s ancient

enemy, Henry of Luxemburg, was recognized as emperor-elect by Pope Clement VI in November 1346, and the German prince

immediately began operations in the territory around Trent, preparatory to his coronation journey to Rome.” The native elements among the gente nuova were apparently influenced by these

events and by the patriotic aura that enveloped the anti-Ghibelline legislation. In August 1347 the Guelf society honored two “new men,” Zanobi Camerini, a cloth manufacturer, and Francesco Fabrini, a wineseller from the lower guilds, lauding them as “benefactors of the Parte Guelfa.”® According to the Parte’s citation, Zanobi and Francesco, while members of the Signoria, had been instrumental in securing passage of the provision that fortified the anti-Ghibelline law of January 1347. Many of the gente nuova were probably induced to cast their

vote for these laws against their will, fearing that opposition would brand them as disloyal. Other motives may be inferred, although positive proof is lacking: the desire of the humble to curry favor with the powerful, and the patron-client relationship, an omnipresent factor in Florentine political life. The old order struck another serious blow at the gente nuova

in August 1348, at the height of the Black Death. While the plague’s survivors, particularly among the lower classes, were demoralized by the catastrophe,” a group of prominent citizens 60 F.-T. Perrens, Histoire de Florence (Paris, 1877-83), 1v, 370. The votes in the councils on the three provisions of October 1346 and January and August 1347 were 189-39 and 171-45; 187-62 and 193-45; 156-54 and 151-59.

61G, Villani, xu, 60, 78. Villani stated that this was one factor which contributed to the passage of the anti-Ghibelline law of January 1347; x11, 79.

62 Delizie, xl, 326.

88 Although the Black Death exacted its toll .of victims from all classes, it fell most heavily upon the popolo minuto, which did not have the means or the opportunity to leave the city for less pestilential areas. There is an element of reality in the setting of the Decameron: the wealthy young people divert themselves in their Fiesole villa in comparative safety, while thousands of their less fortunate brethren are dying in the city below. On the exodus of the upper classes during times of plague, see the ricordanze of Simone Peruzzi: I libri di com-

mercio det Peruzzi, ed. A. Sapori (Milan, 1934), p. 522; Giovanni di Paolo Morelli, Ricord:, p. 378.

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initiated action to revive the machinery of government, which had been literally inoperative since April.** The councils granted

to the Signoria and the colleges authority (alia) to reform the government and to provide for the selection of new officials who

would replace the victims of the pestilence.” To assist them in carrying out this mandate, the members of the dalia co-opted sixty nine citizens, the great majority of whom were patricians.” This commission promulgated two very significant reforms.® First, it revised the scrutiny procedure for selecting the priors and

the members of the colleges. The representation of the lower guilds in the Signoria was fixed at two, less than one-fourth of that office’s complement. Then, the dalia reduced the number of

lower guilds from fourteen to seven, cutting in half the quota of artisans who participated in the scrutiny for the Signoria.” 64 Although the Signoria and the colleges were chosen throughout the duration of the plague, no legislation was passed between April and August. The priors limited their activities to emergency measures. 85 The original provision establishing the dalia and the records of that body have not survived. An eighteenth century copy of the proceedings, from which the information in this paragraph is derived, is in Manoscritti, 269, no pag. The introductory statement of the dalia record is: “Nobiles et prudentes viri domini priores artium et vexillifer iustitie populi et comunis Florentie, duodecim

boni viri et gonfalonerii societatum .. . vigore balie auctoritatis et potestatis eis attribute et concesse per opportuna consilia civitatis predicte, et omni via iure et modo quibus melius potuerunt, volentes ad electionem insaccationem seu imborsulationem et reformationem officiorum et officialium populi et comunis Florentie intendere, diligenter providerunt ordinaverunt et decreverunt pro bono statu civitatis etusdem.” 66 Those co-opted included three citizens from each of the sixteen districts

and one from each of the twenty one guilds. Of the forty eight men chosen from the districts, only ten were gente nuova. 67 The major chroniclers make no mention of this dalia and its activities. In one anonymous account, the work of the dalia was described as follows: “In questo tempo, che era gonfalonere di giustizia Francesco Giovanni, si riform6é la

terra per Vordine dello squittino, e i grandi popolani chol braccio della parte Guelfa per la chasa e chapitani di detta parte, dando tremore agli artefici e mediani, in detta riferma vollono che nella detta imborsazione gli artefici none svesino se none il quarto, II priori per prioraticho, e fussino in uno quartiere ... el ghonfaloniere della giustizia delle VII arti maggiori. . . .” Manoscritti, 222, f. 18%,

68 The copy of the balia proceedings does not include the decree reducing the number of lower guilds, although it is quite certain that the reform was enacted _ by the commission. It is not recorded in the Provvisioni. When the balia’s proceedings began on 16 August, the 14 lower guilds were still intact, since each

furnished one member for the commission. In the record of the balia for 25 August, there is inserted a list of the seven newly constituted guilds.

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This radical measure was designed to cripple the political power of the gente nuova, which, as Giovanni Villani pointed out, was largely based upon these lower guild representatives (capitudini).”

After putting into effect these important reforms, the balia consolidated the patriciate’s triumph by holding a new scrutiny. Of 240 citizens from the greater guilds approved for the Signoria, sixty percent were from old families who had been represented in the priorate before 1343. Moreover, with its increased influence in the scrutinies, the patriciate was able to screen the “new

men,” to eliminate those whose political and economic views were too radical. Only thirty five lower guildsmen qualified for the Signoria in the 1348 scrutiny; more than one hundred had been approved in 1343."° This select group of muinori priors represented the wealthiest segments of the artisan-shopkeeper class. Several were engaged in large-scale business operations, and their interests were more closely identified with entrepreneurial elements than with the craft and retail guilds.” Even though lower guildsmen were guaranteed a fixed representation in the Signoria, their effective influence in the communal government was sharply curtailed. This realignment of political forces in Florence is reflected most clearly in the records of elections to minor offices, which are extant for the years 1349-1351.” The important rectorships and vicariates

in the contado were monopolized by the great families, magnate and popolano.”™ In those administrative commissions that supervised troop recruitment, tax collection, and grain supplies, the lower guilds usually had a single representative. For example, the eight officials in charge of confiscated property, elected on

8 January 1350, included two magnates, two members of the 69 E.g, G. Villani, x11, 32: “Nel detto anno 1344 del mese di giugno e di luglio signoreggiandosi il reggimento di Firenze per lo popolo ricciuto cioé minuto... cioé per le capitudini delle ventuna arti.” See also zbid., xu, 72, 79. 70 Becker and Brucker, “Arti minori,” 97. No scrutiny lists for these years have survived; for their reconstruction, see zid., 97, n. 32. 1 Tbid., 101-02. 72 Tratte, 205, no pag.; the election to offices is recorded chronologically.

73 Thus for the important vicariate of Valdinievole, the following citizens, all

patricians, were drawn by lot during the first four months of 1349: Paolo Altoviti, Niccold Rucellai, Castello da Quarata, Messer Francesco Brunelleschi, Filippo Machiavelli, Messer Paolo Vettori, Messer Leonardo degli Strozzi, Messer Gherardo Bordoni, and Jacopo di Caroccio Alberti. The latter accepted the post.

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Peruzzi and Albizzi families, a linen manufacturer from the arti

minori, and three “new men” from the greater guilds. Of the eight members of a commission responsible for contado fortifications, selected on 19 August 1351, all but one were from patrician

families. The changed complexion of the regime was also apparent in the stricter application of the statutes against guild monopolies, which adversely affected the interests of lower guildsmen.”*

The political resurgence of the old order did not precipitate a crisis; indeed, these developments coincided with a period of peace and stability. Judicial records for these years contain no references to conspiracies or demonstrations against the regime, or any signs of serious discontent.” The patriciate had reduced the threat of an aristocratic revolution, although the regime was still not accepted by the extreme conservatives. Another factor contributing to political stability was the Black Death, which had seriously damaged the morale and the spirit of the proletariat. More important, the pestilence had created a labor shortage that temporarily improved the economic conditions of the popolo

minuto. Whether from preoccupation with sin and salvation, or with material prosperity, the Florentine proletariat after 1348 ceased to be a revolutionary force in communal politics.” However, the patriciate did not succeed in stabilizing its control

over the commune. In 1350 the trend actually shifted in the op-

posite direction, toward a more popular regime. The crucial moment for this surprising development occurred in October 1350, with the repeal of the provision that had reduced the number of lower guilds to seven. The consuls of the blacksmiths’

and coppersmiths’ guild petitioned the Signoria to restore the number to the original fourteen; they argued that the new system

had brought discordant elements together within individual guilds. After the petition gained the approval of the Signoria 74M. Becker, “La esecuzione della legislazione contro le pratiche monopolistiche

delle arti fiorentine alla meta del secolo quattordicesimo,” ASI, cxvit (1959), 16-19.

eT is significant that Rodolico was unable to find any document reflecting lower class discontent between 1350 and 1368; Popolo minuto, passim. 78 In the Cronica di Matteo Villani, 1, 4, the chronicler asserted that the lower

acquired wealth. |

classes after the Black Death were totally absorbed in spending their newly

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and the colleges, it then passed the legislative councils by substantial majorities of 97-27 and 79-22." In the scrutiny for the Signoria held in 1351, the proportion of gente nuova among the eligibles sharply increased. In each successive scrutiny between 1351 and 1371, the number of citizens who qualified for high office was progressively enlarged, and a steady flow of “new men”

entered the Signoria, the colleges, and the legislative councils.” The revival of their political fortunes was not achieved by the gente nuova’s own efforts; it was a gift from the patriciate. Its confidence restored to some degree by economic prosperity and by its augmented influence in the commune, the old order again felt free to indulge in factional strife, in unrestrained competition for office, in bitter rivalries between parties, families, and individuals. Donato Velluti asserted that the Albizzi faction was re-

| sponsible for the passage of the October 1350 provision restoring the fourteen lower guilds. The proponents of the repeal in the Signoria, Filippo Bastari and Schiatta Ridolfi, rationalized their position with the argument that “they were restoring affairs to their pristine condition.” According to the chronicler, the Albizzi

party thereby sought to gain the favor of the artisans. Velluti noted that this stratagem was frequently used by the factions thereafter, “each seeking to attach Ghibellines and artisans to itself and to make them greater.””° In 1377 another observer asserted

that the political gains of the lower guildsmen were a result of partisan warfare, with rival cliques bidding for the support of the artisan class.” All chroniclers agree that factional strife increased in intensity after the Black Death, and that its crystallization around two families, the Albizzi and the Ricci, occurred about 1350.° The most detailed record of these developments is an anonymous account

of uncertain date.** After the Black Death, the author noted, control of the commune had been wrested from the gente nuova by a group of influential and wealthy popolano families, who had achieved their exalted position through the profits of their business "7 Prov., 38, ff. 1271r-127Vv.

78 Becker and Brucker, “Arti Minori,” 97, n. 33. 79 Velluti, p. 242. 80 Becker and Brucker, “Arti Minori,” 103. 81 See Stefani, 662; M. Villani, u, 4, 62; Velluti, pp. 241-42. 82 Manoscritti, 222, f. 182.

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activities and by means of material benefits received from the com-

mune. The chronicler listed the most prominent families in this governing elite: Strozzi, Albizzi, Altoviti, Ricci, Magalotti, Medici, Mozzi, Acciaiuoli, Bastari, Guadagni, Covoni, Guicciardini, Alberti, Ridolfi, Corsini, Machiavelli. “In the competition for supremacy and from envy, these houses became divided: in one group were the Alberti, Medici, Acciaiuoli, Ridolfi, Covoni® .. . and others were in the other faction.” The chronicler added that the Alberti (Ricci) group was favored by the artisans and the mediani, because their opponents, led by the Albizzi, had sought to debase them and to weaken their political position. Thus, from the inception of this partisan struggle, the Albizzi group was identified with an oligarchic policy, while the Ricci and their adherents were recognized as allies of the gente nuova. These factions were not political parties in the modern sense, with formal organizations and clearly defined policies. They were loosely knit, amorphous associations, whose members were united by a variety of ties for a variety of purposes. Their personnel was constantly changing, as adherents died, withdrew from political life, or transferred their allegiance to the opposing camp. Of the two parties, the oligarchic group headed by the Albizzi had more stability: family blocs constituted a large proportion of its mem-

bership and it was linked more closely to the Parte Guelfa. Its leaders included men from the city’s most illustrious houses: Altoviti, Corsini, Canigiani, Baroncelli, Brunelleschi, Pazzi, Strozzi, Soderini, Rucellai.“* The opposing clique, formed around the Ricci, was more heterogeneous. It was less a coalition of family blocs than an association of individuals who, for diverse reasons, opposed the personnel and the policies of the oligarchic faction.

Many of its adherents came from the ranks of the gente nuova. Its patrician leaders included Andrea Rondinelli, Niccolo Rimbald-

esi, Luigi di Lippo Aldobrandini, and Francesco di Jacopo del Bene. These men represented small family blocs that feared the concentrated power of the great clans in the Albizzi party.” Other 88 The chronicler was less than precise in his cataloguing of families which adhered to the Ricci. Only one part of the Medici were Ricci partisans, and at least some members of the Ridolfi and the Acciaiuoli were allies of the Albizzi; Stefani, 790. 84 The leaders of the Albizzi faction in 1378 are listed in Stefani, 775. 85In the prestanza of April 1378 there are recorded the names of three Aldo-

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houses that gravitated toward the Ricci faction—for example, the Quaratesi, Tolosini, and Soldani—had become prominent in recent times and thus were not as strongly entrenched, either socially or politically, as the older patrician houses.* In this partisan alignment, the political allegiance of the indi-

vidual citizen was usually determined by his social status, by the interests of his class and family. The wealthy patrician merchant, Niccolo Soderini, naturally associated with the party of the Guelf aristocracy, while the parvenu banker with political ambitions, Piero Petriboni, joined the Ricci faction.” Party affiliation was frequently dictated by family antagonisms. The hostility between the Albizzi and the Ricci did not originate from political or ideological disagreement; it sprang from the rivalry between two potent and aggressive families, residents of the same

quarter, who for years had competed for honors and status. It was habitual, almost automatic, for one family to join the political opponents of its enemies. Quarrels with families in the Albizzi camp probably explain why such prominent patrician houses as the Alberti, Salviati, Covoni, and Capponi associated with the Ricci faction and lent political support to the gente

nuova. |

Factional conflict in politics extended to the world of business.

The records of partnerships between members of the Cambio guild reveal that patricians and gente nuova usually associated with others of their social class who shared their political sympathies.”” A typical business society of “new men” organized in 1350 included Roggerio Lippi, Jacopo Renzi, Giovanni di Jacopo, and Filippo Tozzi.” In 1372 a company of patrician bankers was brandini (of the quarter of S. Maria Novella), six Del Bene, three Rimbaldesi, one Rinuccini, and six Rondinelli.

86 The Quaratesi first entered the Signoria in 1317; the Tolosini in 1318; the Soldani in 1344. 87 Stefani, 735, 790.

-88QOn the specific circumstances in which this rivalry intensified, see Stefani,

ar In September 1343, the Medici, Capponi, and Rondinelli families, which included many Ricci partisans, were extremely active in the struggle against the magnates, who were strongly represented in the Albizzi party. ®0 These partnerships records are in Cambio, 11, 14. 91 Cambio, 14, f£. 6v. The majority of these partnerships between moneychangers and bankers involved gente nuova.

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formed by Nofri di Giovanni Arnolfi, Niccolé di Michele Castellani, Neri di Filippo Malegonelle, Selvolo di Lippo di Cione del Cane, and Piero di Giovanni Siminetti.*’ Several members of this association were Albizzi partisans, which suggests that political attachments and beliefs had some importance in the formation of business societies.** The chronicler Stefani reported that Niccola di Lippo Alberti was considered an adherent of the Albizzi because he was a partner of Michele di Vanni Castellani,

one of the leaders of that faction.°” Among the gente nuova, too, business ties were forged between men who were hostile to the Parte Guelfa and the Albizzi clique.”

The career of Bartolo di Giovanni Siminetti illustrates this intimate relationship between business alliances and politics. For twenty years Bartolo had been a partner in a banking firm with two of the Ricci, Tedaldino di Roggerio and Gucciozzo di Ardingho.

He was also a political partisan of the Ricci, even though his family had been identified with the Parte hierachy.** In 1370 Bartolo was on the verge of bankruptcy. His economic fortunes were saved when two leaders of the Albizzi faction, Carlo degli Strozzi and Michele Castellani, loaned him money that enabled him to repay his creditors. In return for this favor, Bartolo became a fervent supporter of the Albizzi in communal politics,’ This transfer of political loyalties eventually cost him his life. °2 Cambio, 14, ff. 66r, 6or. There were exceptions. Between 1350 and 1358, three patricians, Pinuccio Bonciani, and Uberto and Amerigo di Messer Gianozzo Cavalcanti, were associated with Giovanni di Guido Perini, who was proscribed as a Ghibelline in 1358; Camdio, 14, f£. 27r; Stefani, 678. ®3 Niccolé Castellani was a son of Michele di Vanni di Ser Lotto Castellani,

a Parte leader; Stefani, 730. Selvolo del Cane and Piero Siminetti were also Parte leaders who were exiled in 1378; Stefani, 795. 94 Stefani, 789.

®5 Three men hostile to the Parte hierarchy, Piero and Stefano di Bindo Benini and Andrea di Betto Filippi, were business associates; P. Ginori Conti, Il libro segreto della ragione di Piero Benini e compagni (Florence, 1937); Stefani, 775, 779, 910. Two other business partners, excluded from office by

the Parte Guelfa, were Valeriano Dolcibene and Zanobi Truffe; Peruzzi, Storia del commercio e det banchtert di Firenze, p. 222; Stefani, 678, 775. ®6 For the first record of this business association, see Cambio, 14, f. 11Vv. The partnership was still intact in 1369; Peruzzi, Storia di commercio, p. 220.

Bartolo’s cousin, Simone di Ser Giovanni Siminetti, was one of the captains who introduced the Parte’s proscription of Ghibellines in 1358; M. Villani, VIII, 24. 97 Stefani, 730.

127

: THE FIRST DECADE, 1343-1353 Exiled from Florence in 1378, after the Ciompi revolution, he was executed two years later for participating in a conspiracy against the regime.” Some Florentines followed their own political course, without regard for family, class, or business connection. Migliore Guadagni broke with the Albizzi faction as a result of some litigation

with a member of that family over a piece of land.’ Giorgio , Scali, descended from an ancient Guelf magnate house, became a leader of the popular party when his cousin Vieri was declared ineligible for office by the Parte Guelfa.*°’ Another renee gade patrician was Luca di Totto da Panzano, descended from a

branch of the Ricasoli, who was a hero of the Ciompi during their brief tenure of power in 1378.*°* The Albizzi party also had

its supporters among the gente nuova. Three of their partisans among the “new men” were in one Signoria in 1378: Piero di Fronte, a cloth manufacturer; Francesco Spinelli, a furrier; and Francesco Casini, a merchant.*° That personal motives were sometimes stronger than blood ties or social bonds in determining political allegiance is demonstrated by the divisions within families. In 1351 the Medici were split so sharply between supporters of the Albizzi and the Ricci that the Signoria attempted, unsuccessfully, to heal the rift.*°* While most of the Strozzi were firmly committed to the oligarchic faction, one of their number, Tom-

maso di Marco, became a leader of the popular party."’* The Magalotti, an ancient house in the quarter of S. Croce, furnished a Parte leader, Bese di Guido, and also a chief of the opposition, Giovanni di Francesco.”

As an immediate consequence of this eruption of partisan strife, the authorities’ attention shifted from sedition to the problem of internal peace. In May 1349 an eight-man commission was given authority to force individuals and families to sign peace

8 Thid., 835. 9 Thid., 733. 100 Tbid., 748, 755. 101 For details of Luca’s career, see G. Salvemini, La dignita cavalleresca nel comune di Firenze (Florence, 1896), pp. 30-32; and L. Passerini, Genealogia e storia della famiglia Ricasoli (Florence, 1870), p. 239.

(1957), 17102 Stefani, 780.

108 Brucker, “The Medici in the Fourteenth Century,” Speculum, xxx

104 Tommaso was a leader of the 1378-1382 regime; Stefani, 814. 105 Qn Bese di Guido, see Carte Strozziane, ser. 2, 116, ff. 229v, 235v-236v. On Giovanni, see Manoscritti, 222, £. 265; Stefani, 731.

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agreements and to post bond as security for maintaining public order." In the Consulte e Pratiche records of July 1351 is the first notice a theme that appears with monotonous regularity in later protocols: unitas civium. “All citizens should be led back to unity,” intoned Ser Domenico da Certaldo, and his sentiments were echoed by his colleagues, none of whom publicly favored the pastime of quarreling with neighbors—a pastime in which nearly all of them engaged.*” A legislative enactment that reflected this preoccupation with public order was submitted as a petition to the Signoria in August 1352 by a group of citizens “seeking to live in peace.”°* The petitioners claimed that “several popolano citizens of Florence are so inflated by pride and arrogance that through their power

and audacity .. . they have inflicted injury and shame upon other Florentine popolani who are less powerful.” To correct this situation, the petition required the Signoria to take cognizance of any incident called to its attention involving one popolano maltreating another. By a two-thirds vote of the priors and the colleges, a citizen adjudged guilty of such offense was declared a magnate, subject to all of the penalties and restrictions pertaining to that status. The massive majorities that this petition received in both councils attested to its popularity among patricians and gente nuova alike.’ Men from the smaller and weaker families of the old order sensed the dangers, public and private,

inherent in the formidable concentrations of manpower and wealth represented by the great popolano houses—Albizzi, Strozzi, Medici, Rucellai.“° This was the first step taken by the 106 TF, 29, ff. 42r-43v; Prov., 36, £. ro5v. 107 CP, 1, f. 23r. Perhaps the most hypocritical statement was uttered by a magnate, Messer Berto Frescobaldi, whose family was perpetually occupied in creating disorder: “Commendando bonam constantiam et fortitudinem animi dominorum [priorum] secundo quod ad veram unionem civium solicite ... procedatur.” 108 The text of this provision is in Perrens, 1v, 523-25.

109 The council votes were 134-13 and 82-20. In August 1355 the measure was revised; a majority vote, rather than two-thirds, was sufficient to place a popolano malefactor in magnate ranks; Prov., 42, ff. ggr-toor. The vote on this revision was 142-12 and go-6. 110 Some thirty years later, Stefani, 912, described the passage of this law (and misdated it 1354 instead of 1352), and noted its significant political function: “La cagione fu questa che le famiglie possenti e grandi della citta di Firenze,

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regime to correct an anomaly that Giovanni Villani had noted in 1343, when he asserted that several popolano families were more deserving of the magnate appellation than the majority of houses in that rank.™ This law was a clear warning to the grandi e potenti of the commune’s determination to curb aristocratic excesses, and it was followed by an object lesson. After the Black Death it had become fashionable for young men of good birth to finance their drinking and gambling by stealing goods from shops. In 1353 the scions of two patrician houses, Bordone de’ Bordoni and Andrea de’ Medici, were accused of robbery. Andrea sensibly fled to escape capture,'** but Bordone, confident that his family’s prestige was sufficiently great to protect him, surrendered to the authorities and was sentenced to death. The Bordoni appealed to

the Signoria for help, and the priors requested the podesta to revoke his sentence. Upon the judge’s refusal, the Signoria discharged his troops so that he was powerless to enforce his decrees,

The podesta then obtained his release from office and left the city. Stefani described the effect of his departure on the populace: “Having learned of the podesta’s dismissal, some citizens, fearing for the good state of the city, and others, motivated by parti-

san feelings, began to complain that justice had not been done to the podesta. The city was in a disturbed state . . . and in the palace of the Signoria, the colleges and others began to com-

plain. The next morning, there were notices posted in many places: “Abundance, reason and justice are dead!” . . . Seeing this, the Signoria voted to recall the podesta, who returned, decapitated Bordoni and exercised his office well.”***

This incident reinforced the conviction held by many citizens e ricche d’uomini e di persone, oltraggiavano i meno possenti, e poi a palagio non potieno avere piena ragione i meno possenti.” The law was repealed in 1382. 111 G, Villani, x11, 23. 112 See Stefani, 659. In 1350 Michele di Messer Alamanno de’ Medici was condemned to death zn absentia for stealing from two shops. In sentencing the

culprit, the judge noted that such crimes were becoming more frequent in Florence, and that Michele’s punishment was to serve as an example to restrain other potential criminals; Brucker, “Medici,” 13.

118Qn Andrea’s conviction and the later cancellation of his sentence, see Brucker, “Medici,” 13, n. 84. 114 Stefani, 660.

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that the government was the instrument of the patriciate, whose

members closed ranks to protect their own, even those guilty of crime. Matteo Villani described a scene at the height of the crisis when a milling throng besieged the palace of the Signoria and voiced this complaint: “The powerful citizens who commit

the greatest wrongs are never punished, while the small and weak are hanged, broken in pieces, and decapitated for every petty misdemeanor.” The sequel to this event occurred a year later, in July 1354. The Bordoni, convinced that their relative was executed through

the machinations of their political enemies, placed the major responsibility at the door of two rival families in their quarter, the Mangioni and the Beccanugi. Suspicion was followed by action, and in the mélée which ensued, the wife of one of the Mangioni was killed.*** On the morrow of this incident, a chorus

of speakers in a council meeting demanded that the instigators

of the disturbance be punished.’ The Mangioni and the Beccanugi convinced the podestd of their innocence, but the Bordoni involved in the fracas were condemned to death and their property was confiscated.”* The patriciate derived some instruction from the severity of these penalties, and thereafter, vendettas between prominent families were waged with greater circumspection.

Two Divisive Issues: the Church and Foreign Policy When Matteo Villani and Donato Velluti deplored the rise of the sette cittadinesche, they emphasized that these factions were disruptive, that they added another dimension to the pattern of 115M, Villani, m1, 58.

116 Stefani, 663; M. Villani, rv, 20. 117 CP, 1, ff. 95r-97v. The outbreak of disorder occurred at a time when the

city was awaiting an attack from one of the armed companies led by Fra Moriale.

118 Charges against the Bordoni were placed before the podestd and the executor of the Ordinances of Justice. The podesta levied heavy fines against five of the Bordoni and eight of their servants; the amounts ranged from 6400 I, to 11,200 7.; AP, 921, ff. 161r-162r. The executor, however, condemned all five Bordoni to death in absentia, together with twelve of their associates, and confiscated their property; AEO], 221, ff. 1r-3r. The accusation brought by the Bordoni against the Mangioni was rejected by the executor; 4EOJ, 221, f. 6r.

See also AEOJ, 210, ff. 49r-5ov. | 131

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discord within Florence between individuals, families, and social classes. They postulated a visionary ideal that had never actually

existed in the Arno city: of citizens motivated solely by the desire to promote the public welfare, meeting together in harmony and concord to direct the affairs of state."® To a considerable degree, the factions reflected political reality in Florence, Their existence may have exacerbated tensions within the city, but it certainly did not create those tensions. The parties only mirrored the antagonisms that already existed within the society. Partisan conflict fixed the Albizzi bloc as the party of conservatism and tradition, the party of the church and the Parte Guelfa. It established the Ricci and their allies as the party of the gente nuova, the party of innovation and flexibility. The factions also served to link together men and issues. These

groups not only opposed each other on the question of broad versus narrow participation in the commune: they were also divided on such fundamental issues as the church and foreign affairs. The relationship between secular and ecclesiastical author-

ity was a vexing problem everywhere in Catholic Europe in the fourteenth century. In Florence the issue was complicated by the

unique relationship between the city and the papacy that had existed since the thirteenth century. The commune had been a member of the Guelf coalition which supported the papacy’s temporal power in the peninsula; thus her relations with the church at any point directly affected her foreign policy. To antagonize the pope by encroaching upon the powers of the Florentine church might involve not only the usual threat of an interdict, but also the rupture of ties with other Guelf states in Italy. Another complicating factor was the presence in Avignon of a large contingent of Florentine businessmen, many of whom were involved in papal finance. Whenever relations with the curia became strained, the position of these merchants grew insecure.

Between 1343 and 1348 a serious crisis threatened to disrupt

the traditional friendship between Florence and Avignon, a situation for which the papacy was primarily responsible.” Pope 119 See above, p. 83; Velluti, pp. 241-42.

120 The relations between the commune and the papacy during the 1340’s are discussed by A. Panella, “Politica ecclesiastica del comune fiorentino dopo

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Clement VI persisted in his support of Walter of Brienne, despite conclusive evidence that the duke’s expulsion had been genuinely popular with the Florentines.* The business community did not soon forget that the papacy’s precipitate abandon-

ment of the Florentine companies in 1341 and 1342 hastened the advent of the banking crisis and nullified any possibility that the companies might weather the storm.’” The curia also insisted that ecclesiastical creditors of the bankrupt societies be given

preference in the repayment of claims.” Particularly troublesome was the case of Cardinal Sabina, who had lent a large sum of money to the Acciainoli. Sabina’s agent in Florence was the inquisitor of Tuscany, Piero d’Aquila, who zealously pressed the cardinal’s claims against the Acciaiuoli.°* This Franciscan heaped fuel on the smoldering embers of anticlericalism by filling the ecclesiastical courts with citizens of every rank, charged with petty violations against canon law.’” The commune’s reply to these harassments was a provision, enacted in April 1345, which struck at the heart of ecclesiastical privileges in Florence.”* The stated objective of the twenty one capitudint of the guilds who presented the petition was to ensure that the citizens of Florence might live and be governed “in a prosperous and tranquil state,” a condition which could not be la cacciata del Duca d’Atene,” ASI, uxx1 (1913), i, 271-365. The problem of church-state relations in Florence has been investigated in a recent article by M. Becker, “Some Economic Implications of the Conflict Between Church and State in “‘Trecento’ Florence,” Mediaeval Studies, xx1 (1959), 1-16. The article was published after this chapter was written, and it contains much new material which corroborates the arguments which I have developed. 121 The Duke of Athens was a subject of Florentine-papal correspondence for

some years after 1343; see Leoni, “Breve di Clemente VI in favore di Gualtieri di Brienne, duca d’Atene,” ASI, ser. 3, xx11 (1875), 181-82. 122 Y, Renouard, Les relations des Papes d’Avignon et des compagnies commerciales et bancatres de 1316 @ 1378, pp. 198-99. 123 See, for example, the pope’s demand of 8 December 1344 that the Bardi

repay 745 fi. which the cardinal of S. Prisca had deposited with them; Documenti delle relazioni delle citta toscane coll’Oriente cristiano e cot turchi fino all’anno MDXXXI, ed. G. Miller (Florence, 1879), p. 113. 124 Panella, 278-81; M. Becker, “Florentine Politics and the Diffusion of Heresy in the Trecento: a Socio-Economic Inquiry,” Speculum, xxxtv, 64. 125 According to G. Villani, xm, 58, the inquisitor collected some 7ooo fl. in fines in two years. 126 The text of this law is in Panella, 327-39. It is summarized in zbid., 281-83.

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realized unless those who transgressed the law were properly punished. Anyone accused of injuring a Florentine citizen in his

person or property was subject to the jurisdiction of the communal courts, and could not claim immunity or demand trial before any other tribunal. Violators were subject to severe penal-

ties. Although the provision made no specific reference to the church or its judicial system, its intent was clear, as Giovanni Villani noted. It placed all clerics accused of crime against Florentine citizens under the exclusive jurisdiction of the secular courts, and it prohibited any appeals by either lay or cleric to an ecclesiastical tribunal.’ The crisis in church-state relations erupted one year later, in March 1346.” Piero d’Aquila had continued to press relentlessly for the execution of a papal judgment against the Acciaiuoli to satisfy Sabina’s claim; the commune refused to invoke its authority against the soci of the company. When the inquisitor arranged for the apprehension of a partner of the Acciaiuoli firm, Salvestro Baroncelli, the Signoria promptly released him. The infuriated

cleric then fled to Siena and placed the city under interdict. In reply, the priors sent an embassy to Avignon, requesting that Piero d’Aquila be replaced as inquisitor by a Florentine citizen, Fra Michele Arnolfi. Piero was accused of abusing the authority of his office by exacting fines illegally from innocent citizens. The commune also took the offensive in the legislative sphere. It passed a provision that prohibited the institution of a judicial process against any citizen in a court not under communal con-

trol (that is, a church court) without the express authorization of the Signoria, the colleges, and the capitudini of the guilds. This carried further the regime’s efforts to nullify judgments against the companies by ecclesiastical tribunals on behalf of creditors. The measure substantially curtailed the authority of the inquisitor, whose jurisdiction was restricted to serious cases of heresy.**° Another provision enacted in April forbade Flor127 G, Villani, xu, 43. 128 The events of this crisis are described by G. Villani, xm, 43, and Stefani, 628; see also Panella, 285-88.

129 The text is printed in Panella, 339-65. It was fortified by another provision, passed on 21 April, which created a commission of fourteen citizens with the obligation of enforcing the law of 4 April; zd:d., 366-70.

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entine citizens, lay or cleric, to obey the interdict; the commune assumed the expenses of the appeal for its revocation.**° This attack upon ecclesiastical privilege was the immediate consequence of the exacerbated tensions between church and

commune in the 1340’s. From these origins, the church issue became a persistent source of discord between the old and new elements within the regime. Even though some patricians voted for this legislation and obtained economic benefits from its passage, the old order generally opposed these restraints upon the clerical estate. The substantial number of votes in opposition to these measures reflected this patrician disapproval.*** On this issue, as on so many others, Giovanni Villani was the mouthpiece of the aristocracy. He described the 1345 provision as a “harsh and cruel

Jaw,” and he blamed the gente nuova for the deterioration of | relations between the city and the curia. Although the chronicler

conceded that Florence had the right to enact these laws and that it had justice on its side, nevertheless, he argued, “It was not

permitted to do such things against the liberty of the church, nor had it ever been done before in Florence.”*” The gente nuova, too, obtained some limited material advantages from these laws. As creditors of the defunct companies, they profited from the elimination of the advantage claimed by clerics in the scramble for the assets of the bankrupts. However, their hostility to the church, its personnel and policies, had deeper roots. They sought to force the church to relax its control over their economic and social activities, and, particularly, to curtail Its assessment of penalties against laymen for violations of canon law."** Two incidents illustrate the intensity of this resentment 120 Ibid, 206. 181 The votes on the measures were 202-50 and 153-69, and 206-36 and 242-43.

That some patricians voted for these laws is proven by the statistical breakdown

of the two councils which sat in April 1346, incomplete lists of which are printed in Delizie, x11, 305-313. In the Council of the Popolo there were 42 patricians listed among 130 councilors; in the Council of the Commune there were also 42 patricians among 151 members. To this number must be added the patricians in the ex-officio bodies which participated in the council votes, e.g. the 13 patricians among 37 members of the Signoria and the colleges. 182G, Villani, xm, 43. Cf. Stefani’s comments criticizing the legislation, 616. 188 Becker, “Politics and Heresy,” 63, noted that in 1293 and in 1328, when significant numbers of “new men” entered communal politics, the privileges of the church were also curtailed.

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against ecclesiastical justice. In the summer of 1344 the Florentine bishop, Angelo Acciaiuoli, was traveling along a Tuscan road when his cortege was attacked by an angry crowd of contadim: shouting: “Death to the bishop! In his court we receive only injury and injustice!”*** A year later, in July 1345, a mob invaded a parish church and seized Buonaccorso di Messer Giovanni de’ Boscoli, a magnate and a legal coadjutor of the bishop’s court. Upon the hapless Buonaccorso’s head was placed a mitre with the inscription: “False traitor! Simon Magus!’**° Usury was the one aspect of ecclesiastical interference in lay affairs which most antagonized the gente nuova. Citizens might be annoyed by petty fines levied against them for blasphemy or adultery, but the question of usury directly affected their liveli-

. hood.*** Giovanni Villani cited the church’s opposition to usurious contracts as a factor in arousing support for the anticlerical legislation of 1345-1346." This was not, of course, a new issue. The

church’s prohibition of usury had been violated by the Florentine business community for centuries. However, the mercantile aristocracy had accepted the economic doctrines of the church;

its members who transgressed canon law recognized their guilt and sought to expiate it. The new entrepreneurial class which came to the fore after 1343 was less compliant. Villani reported the circulation, in the 1340's, of the opinion that usury was not a mortal sin.*** Both Matteo and Filippo Villani claimed that the fortunes of the parvenus were tainted with usury; Matteo compared unfavorably the economic practices of this new business class with “the good and ancient customs of our ancestors.”** Despite the obvious prejudice reflected by these statements, there

was probably some truth in this argument. The gente nuova may well have been more ruthless and callous in their business 184 Rodolico, Popolo minuto, pp. 172-73. 185 ACP, 19, f. 43r, 16 July 1345. The scene of this attack was the church of S. Salvator, “in qua ecclesia jus reddi solet per vicarium domini episcopi Floren-

ar According to G. Villani, xm, 58, the inquisitor, “per attignere danari d’ogni piccola parola oziosa che alcuno dicesse per niquita contra Iddio, o dicesse che usura non fosse peccato mortale, o simili parole, condannava in grossa somma di danari secondo che l’uomo era ricco.” 187 G, Villani, x11, 43. 188 Tbid., xu, 58.

189M. Villani, vim, 71; XI, 65.

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activities, less fastidious in their methods, more determined to exploit every possible source of wealth, than the older, established mercantile class.**°

The commune systematically followed a policy designed to free business enterprise from ecclesiastical control.*** The legislation of 1346 prohibiting recourse to church tribunals applied equally to victims of usury as well as to creditors of bankrupts, and the court records reveal that few men sought to cancel usurious contracts by appealing to ecclesiastical justice. In 1360 Giorgio Venozzi demanded that a church court invalidate his loan contract as usurious; his appeal was rejected.’” Fifteen years later,

the commune directly assumed the responsibility for restoring the illicit gains of usurers, and specifically prohibited the intervention of any cleric. The regime also sanctioned the usurious activities of Christian pawnbrokers, permitting them to engage in business upon payment of a fee.*** Not until the fifteenth cen-

tury was this practice discontinued, when Jews were granted a monopoly to engage in activity which, according to canon law, damned the Christian soul to perdition.’“* Another questionable practice instituted by the commune in 1345 was the regular pay-

ment of interest to holders of shares in the public debt. This device aroused grave doubts among pious patricians; a century later, the legitimacy of monte speculations was still a subject of lively debate among Florentines.*” 140 Cf. Becker’s comment, “Politics and Heresy,” 64, n. 23: “It is possible that the gente nuova, in their quest for social and economic mobility, were not averse to usurious practices, and, therefore, antagonistic towards the inquisitor when he sought to oppose them.” 141Jn tbid., 61, Becker has shown that before 1343 the communal authorities cooperated with the inquisitor’s office in its efforts to curb heresy and usury. The new regime preferred the spread of heresy to the harassments of an inquisitor with extensive powers. In January 1365 the Signoria protested against the interference of a papal official, a collector named Messer Litius, who had instituted processes against Florentine citizens for usury, and had excommunicated some. The commune claimed that these cases were the exclusive prerogative of the bishop; Missive, 13, f. 25v, 10 January 1365. 142 Becker, “Nota dei processi riguardanti prestatori di danaro nei tribunali fiorentini dal 1343 al 1370,” ASI, cxiv, 744-45. 148 Ibid., 742-44; Becker, “Three Cases Concerning the Restitution of Usury

in Florence,” Journal of Economic History, xvi (1957), 447. 144 A. Sapori, Studi di storia economica (secoli xiti-xtv-xv), pp. 235-36. 145 On the doubts of Matteo Villani and his fellow-citizens, see M. Villani, m1, 106. On the problem in the fifteenth century, see Alessandra Macinghi Strozzi,

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In the eyes of the gente nuova, the clergy represented an obstacle to their economic pursuits and a menace to their political power. Piero d’Aquila was accused of arming several powerful citizens against the Signoria.*“* Giovanni Villani noted that certain clerics from prominent families had committed acts of violence against impotent laymen, using their ecclesiastical immunity

as a shield to avoid prosecution.**’ Thus by its own actions the clergy was drawn into the vortex of partisan politics. An attack on ecclesiastical privileges constituted one phase of the political battle waged by the gente nuova against their patrician opponents.

There was considerable justification for the belief that the Florentine church was the creature of the city’s aristocracy. Of the five bishops who held the see between 1343 and 1382, only one was not a Florentine patrician. The Acciaiuoli, Antellesi, Corsini, and Ricasoli furnished the other four occupants.“* A

majority of the canons attached to the cathedral church were also members of the city’s ancient houses.“ Not only was the patriciate entrenched in the local ecclesiastical establishment, but it was well represented throughout the Italian hierarchy. A substantial part of the correspondence between Florence and Avig-

non was devoted to communal petitions on behalf of native sons, almost all from prominent families, who were seeking ecclesiastical benefices at home and abroad.”** The large number Lettere di una gentildonna fiorentina del secolo xv, ed. C. Guasti, pp. 573-743 R. de Roover, “Il trattato di fra Santi Rucellai sul cambio, il monte comune e il monte delle doti,” ASI, cx (1953), 15-19. 146 Panella, 311-12.

147 G, Villani, x1, 43. Stefani’s comment, 616: “I cherici molto soperchi in molti modi, ed infra quali erano molti Grandi e popolani grassi, li quali batteano ed oltraggiavano li minut, e cognizione non era appo li secolari rettori.” 148 For biographies of these bishops, see F. Ughello, Italia sacra sive de episcopis Italiae (Venice, 1718), 11, cols. 148-57.

149 Catalogo cronologico det canonici della chiesa metropolitana fiorentina compilato l’anno 1751 da Salvino Salvini (Florence, 1782), no. 204ff. Of 28 ap-

pointments of canons made between 1343 and 1378, 17 were members of patrician families.

180 See the commune’s requests to the curia for benefices on behalf of Guglielmo Spini, Azzone dell’Antella, Gherardo Peruzzi, Gianozzo Angioleri, and Marco Ardinghelli in 1350 and 1351; Missive, 10, ff. 17r-17v, 58r, 74r, 83V. The search for benefices was also an important theme in private correspondence between Florence and the papal court. See the letters from Francesco Bruni, the papal secretary, to Jacopo del Bene, describing his efforts to obtain a benefice

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of these clerics seeking positions or promotions would seem to belie Giovanni Villani’s contention that few of his fellow citizens entered the clergy.*** To an important degree, the patriciate was bound by ties of material interest to the church and to the papacy. With such fertile sources of discord at hand, a reconciliation between the regime and the church appeared unlikely. Nevertheless, the rupture between Florence and Avignon was eventually repaired. Neither could afford to maintain an intransigent position indefinitely; each needed the support and cooperation of the other. Even while it was formulating its legislative bombs against the church, the commune initiated steps to satisfy the claims of Cardinal Sabina, thus removing one of the original causes of discord.*** Clement VI, for his part, exhibited a readiness to compromise with respect to the inquisitor’s office, and the

Florentine Arnolfi replaced the unpopular Piero d’Aquila. On 28 February 1347 the pope lifted the interdict, which apparently had not been observed in the city.** The curia again began to make use of the services of Florentine bankers for transmitting money between Avignon and Italy.***

After 1348, when the patriciate increased its influence in the

government, the city’s relations with Avignon became more cordial. Friction did not entirely disappear, however. The antifor Jacopo’s son, Bene; Carte Del Bene, 49, ff. 88r-88v, 89r, 6 October and 13 November 1364. To promote Bene’s cause, Francesco urged Jacopo to enlist the aid of the Parte captains and the directors of the Alberti company. 191 According to Villani, xu, 7, few Florentines received the cardinal’s hat “per lo poco studio che 1 Fiorentini fanno fare a’ loro figliuoli per essere cherici.”

Patrician families were well represented in the Dominican monastery of S. Maria Novella in these years: Rucellai, Villanuzzi (2), Ardinghelli (4), Albizzi

(2), Cavalcanti (3), Beccanugi, Bardi (4), Strozzi (3), Altoviti, Peruzzi; S. Orlandi, “Necrologio” di S. Maria Novella (Florence, 1954), 1, no. 322ff. 152 Many families controlled the patronage of churches or obtained revenue

from ecclesiastical property. The Medici were patrons of S. Tommaso in Flor-

ence and usually appointed members of their own family to the benefice; Archivio Mediceo avann il Principato, 152, £. tor. In the ricordanze of Giovanni

Arrigucci is the statement that the Arrigucci “sono padroni antichissimi del

Maglhiabechiana, xxv, 44, f. 37r. vescovado di Fiesole et hannone di censo ogn’anno un moggia di grano”; BNF,

153 The details of the rapprochement are in Panella, 288-89. For an official act of Fra Michele Arnolfi, dated 22 October 1351, see P. Cividali, “Il beato Giovanni dalle Celle,” Memorie della R. Accademia dei Lincet, Classe di sctenze morali, storiche e filologiche, ser. 5, x11 (1907), 423-26. 154 Renouard, Relations, pp. 201-02, 280-87.

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clerical legislation remained in force and was incorporated in the statute of the captain of the popolo compiled in 1355.’°° This was one of several controversial issues which caused the papacy’s attitude toward its “beloved sons” of Tuscany to oscillate between warm benevolence and uncontrolled fury.

In the Florentine debate over the status and authority of the church, a basic theme was tradition, the degree to which communal policy should be guided by the heritage of the past. This issue was also present in the disagreement over foreign policy. The problem can be formulated in these terms: should Florence maintain her traditional alliance with the papacy and the other Guelf powers—Naples, Ferrara, Padua, Hungary—or should she pursue instead a more independent course in foreign affairs? In general, the aristocracy sought to maintain the old alliances, based.

on the ancient rivalry of Guelf versus Ghibelline. The gente nuova and their patrician allies preferred a less rigid and more pragmatic policy. Wherever possible, they sought to disentangle

the commune from the obligations and commitments to other

Guelf states with which the preceding regime had formed leagues. They favored a foreign policy sufficiently flexible to permit the commune to contract alliances with any state, whatever its structure or ideology, whose existence and support were deemed vital to Florence’s own security.

Under the new regime, Florence’s external policy quickly veered from its traditional course. Embroiled with the papacy over internal questions, the commune was not inclined to follow

Avignon’s lead in diplomacy. But other factors dictated a different orientation in foreign policy. In the 1340’s Florence no longer aspired to be the leading Guelf power in central Italy, a role which required an extensive network of alliances. Its objectives limited by its physical weakness, the commune concentrated on defense and the recovery of its territory lost in 1343. It sought protection in leagues of limited scope with neighboring communes, Siena and Perugia.**° 155 Panella, 325.

156 See N. Rubinstein, “Florence and the Despots. Some Aspects of Florentine Diplomacy in the Fourteenth Century,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Soctety, 5th ser., 11 (1952), 38-46; H. Baron, “A Struggle for Liberty in the Renaissance: Florence, Venice and Milan in the Early Quattrocento,”

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Florence’s diplomatic alienation from the papacy in these years was illustrated by the Bologna crisis of 1349-1350. That city had

been ruled by the Pepoli family, but Clement VI ordered his lieutenant in Romagna, Astorre Durfort, to seize the city for the church. When Durfort requested aid from Florence for this enterprise, the commune summarily rejected his plea. Instead, the Signoria urged the pope to come to terms with the Pepolli, in order to avoid disorder in that area.“°’ Communal authorities were even willing to consider a Pepoli proposal that Florence take Bologna under its protection, a maneuver which, if successful, would have been a direct affront to the papacy.” This independent attitude changed overnight, however, when the Pepoli surrendered Bologna to the Visconti of Milan. The head of that family, Archbishop Giovanni Visconti, sent one of his relatives, Giovanni d’Oleggio, to take possession of the city, which controlled Florence’s main trade route to the north. Suddenly recovering all of her forgotten Guelf sentiments, the American Historical Review, tv1t (1953), 270-72. In its diplomatic correspondence, the commune consistently reafirmed its attachment to its traditional Guelf principles, but invariably refused invitations to play its former role as leader

and supporter of the Guelf cause in central Italy. Thus in October 1349 the Signoria replied to Malatesta de’ Malatesti’s plea for military aid against his Ghibelline enemies in these terms: “. . . Adomandate il nostro aiuto, mostrando in quello aver grande speranca per l’amore e per l’afectione che portate

e a Parte [Guelfa] e a noi. A la quala lectera . . . siamo constretti de cid rendervi copiosa gracie, e vorremmo potere fare quello che per voi se spera; ma, per molte cagioni e bisongni, li quagli da molte parti ci occorrono, non veggiamo che cosi largamente quanto l’animo nostro desidera vi possiamo

sovenir de gente d’arme. Di che forte ci grava, si per laffectione che vi portiamo, e si per l’ardore che abbiamo a stato di Parte Guelfa, della quale mantenere et essa acrescere ongni di acresce la volonta”; Marzi, La Cancelleria della Repubblica fiorentina, pp. 656-57.

157 See the letters of September and October 1349, from the Signoria to Clement VI, urging him to settle affairs peacefully in Romagna, instead of resorting to war; G. Canestrini, “Di alcuni documenti risguardanti le relazioni politiche dei papi d’Avignone coi comuni d'Italia,” ASI, ser. 1, Appendix, vm (1849), docs. 26, 27. See also A. Sorbelli, La Signoria di Giovanni Visconti a Bologna e le sue relazione con la Toscana (Bologna, 1901), p. 6; F. Baldasseroni,

“La guerra tra Firenze e Giovanni Visconti,” Studi storict diretti da A. Crivellucci, xt (1902), 395-96. Florence’s final negative reply to papal requests for aid was in May 1350; an earlier reply (March 1350) to an Avignon appeal was evasive; Missive, 10, f. 33r. 158 Canestrini, “Di alcuni documenti,” doc. 35; Sorbelli, La Signoria, pp. 19-21, 31-32; M. Villani, 1, 64-65.

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commune sent urgent messages to the pope, requesting assistance to combat this Ghibelline menace. When the Visconti launched an invasion of Florentine territory in July 1351, the Signoria sent

ambassadors to Guelf states throughout the peninsula, seeking to rouse traditional partisan sympathies in defense of the Arno

city."”° ,

Goaded by the threat of Visconti aggression to seek the revival of an Italian Guelf coalition, Florence was soon disillusioned in

her hopes. Neither the papacy nor any other state came to her assistance. Clement VI had decided to negotiate an agreement with the Visconti, to be free to pursue his plan for the reconquest

- of the papal states. Isolated and vulnerable, the commune then sent an embassy to the emperor-elect, Charles of Bohemia, urging

him to come to Italy and protect the free communes from Visconti aggression." This decision to seek the assistance of the

traditional leader of Ghibellinism was a victory for the proponents of a flexible foreign policy, but it was no easy triumph. Matteo Villani described how the suspicions of many citizens were aroused by this plan; certain members of the embassy were suspected of secretly harboring Ghibelline sympathies. Although the conservative Guelf faction could not prevent the dispatch of the mission, it did restrict its scope. In negotiating with Charles, the ambassadors were warned to follow strictly their letter of in-

structions. Furthermore, they were required, on pain of heavy penalty, to start their return trip to Florence within ten days of their arrival in Prague." These restrictions may have contributed to the embassy’s failure to conclude an agreement with Charles,

although the commune continued to negotiate with his representatives until the peace treaty with the Visconti was signed at Sarzana in March 1353. 159 Canestrini, docs. 36, 40-43; Sorbelli, pp. 58-62, 91-95, 101-03; and docs. 8-9, 12-14, 34-36; Baldasseroni, Studi storict, x1, 379-82, 387-90; x11, 41-50; G. degli Azzi Vitelleschi, Le relaziont tra la Repubblica di Firenze e ’'Umbria nel secolo

xiv, 1, doc. 191. For a survey of Florence’s struggle with the Visconti, see N. Valeri, L’Italia nell’eta dei princtpati, pp. 117-34; and Storta di Milano, published by Fondazione Treccani degli Alfieri per la Storia di Milano (Milan, 1955—), 1, 343-57.

160 Canestrini, docs. 47, 48; T. E. Mommsen, Jtalientsche Analekten zur Reichsgeschichte des 14. Jahrhunderts (1310-1378), docs. 358-68; Sorbelli, pp. 134-36, 147-49; Baldasseront, 53-72. 161M, Villani, m1, 13. 18? Baldasseroni, 59-61.

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THE FIRST DECADE, 1343-1353

The commune’s relations with the other major Guelf power in Italy, the kingdom of Naples, were also quite cool after 1343. The close ties that had been maintained between Florence and the

Angevin ruler of Naples, King Robert, throughout the early decades of the fourteenth century began to loosen as early as 1340, when the first repercussions of the banking crisis were felt

in Naples.“ The bad feeling engendered on both sides by this disaster was inherited by the new communal regime and the new ruler of Naples, Queen Joanna. When, in 1347, King Louis

of Hungary led an army into Italy to avenge the murder of his brother, Joanna’s consort, Florence ignored the desperate pleas of the queen for aid. The commune sought to maintain a neutral policy between the warring Angevin factions." Florence did send, somewhat ostentatiously, a large embassy to the Hungarian monarch when he arrived in central Italy. The spokesman for the commune’s delegation, Messer Tommaso Corsini,

delivered a speech to the king in which he stressed the ancient alliance that had always existed between Florence and the house

of Anjou.” The patrician Corsini may have been sincere in his reference to the venerable tradition of amity between Florence and the Angevins, but the priors who sent him to King Louis were think-

ing not of the past, but of the immediate likelihood that the Hungarian monarch would conquer the Neapolitan kingdom. Not all Angevins received such cordial treatment from the com-

mune. When King Louis’ defeated enemy, Louis of Taranto (Queen Joanna’s second husband), fled north to Avignon in search of aid, neither he nor his chancellor, the Florentine Niccold Acciaiuoli, were allowed to enter the Arno city, and citizens were

forbidden to have any contact with the prince or members of his entourage. Guelf patricians were incensed at this rebuff, for they remembered the services rendered to the commune by Louis’ 163 Valeri, pp. 7-8, 14-17; A. Sapori, La crisi delle compagnie mercantili det Bardi e det Peruzzi, pp. 122-30; E. Léonard, Histoire de Jeanne I"*, reine de Naples, comtesse de Provence (1343-1382) (Paris and Monaco, 1932-1936), 1, Tet Léonard, 1, 697-98; 1 Capitol: del Comune di Firenze, Inventarto e regesto, ed. C. Guasti and A. Gherardi, 11, 559-60. 165 Giovanni Villani recorded a copy of Corsini’s speech; x11, 109.

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father and brother.**° When, some months later, the Signoria warmly received the signore of Mantua, Filippino Gonzaga, Guelf

partisans commented bitterly, “Our officials welcome into the city Ghibelline tyrants who have fought with our enemies, and they refuse to receive Messer Louis of Taranto.”*” Florentine relations with Naples did not improve during the long and eventually successful attempt by Queen Joanna and

her husband to win back their kingdom from the Hungarian monarch. On his return journey to direct this campaign in the autumn of 1348, Niccold Acciaiuoli visited Florence to request aid for the enterprise, and even obtained a promise that help would

be forthcoming. This pledge was not honored, however, despite repeated pleas by the Neapolitan chancellor.“* The commune also rejected a papal request in February 1350 that assistance be given to an army, partially organized and financed by the curia, which

was being sent into southern Italy to support the Neapolitan cause.””

There is extant an interesting series of letters written by Acciaiuoli to friends in Florence between 1351 and 1354.°” The two predominant themes of these documents are the chancellor’s persistent demands for money and troops, and his irritation with the communal authorities for their obtuseness in rejecting Neapolitan overtures for an alliance. In February 1351 the chancellor complained bitterly that Neapolitan interests were “valued lightly”

by the commune. He hinted that economic sanctions against Florentine merchants might be taken unless the government adopted a more friendly attitude.“ Four months later, he again pointed out the grave risk that the city was incurring by treating the Angevin monarchs in such cavalier fashion. After mentioning a possible rapprochement between the Neapolitan court and Charles IV, Acciaiuoli concluded his letter with this sinister 166 Jbid., x11, 115. The chronicler approved of the Signoria’s action in this instance: “Per gli savi fu lodato per lo migliore del comune.” 167 Ihid., xt, 116. 168 J géonard, 11, 138, 152, 154-55. 169 Thid., 11, 254-55.

170 These letters form a principal source of Léonard’s work; several of the most important are printed in the appendices of vols. 11 and m1. 171 Letter to Angelo Acciaiuoli, Tommaso Corsini, Jacopo Acciaiuoli and Giovanni di Rucco Savini, printed in zbid., 11, 480-83.

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THE FIRST DECADE, 1343-1353

warning: “It does not appear to me that the Florentine regime is so well established internally, nor so loved by its neighbors, that it can afford to continue its policy of provoking the enmity of the rulers of this kingdom.’””*”

Such threats did not cause many knees to quake in Florence, and the commune continued to remain aloof from its onetime ally. In 1350, when the Visconti threatened to invade Tuscany, Florence seized control of nearby Prato as a defensive measure against an attack from the north, even though the city belonged

to the Neapolitan rulers. Confronted with this faz accompli, Joanna and her consort deeded the city to Acciaiuoli, who, after much haggling, arranged to sell Prato to Florence for the ridiculously low price of 17,500 florins. It was only with considerable

difficulty that the chancellor succeeded in obtaining this sum from the commune.” In December 1352 four Angevin princes, who had been released from prison by Louis of Hungary, passed near Florence on their way home to Naples. When these princes expressed the desire to visit the city, the Signoria sent an embassy

to meet them, forbidding them to enter Florence. In the letter of instruction given to their ambassadors, the priors justified their decision on the grounds that the commune did not wish to anger

King Louis of Hungary. They added that the safety of the princes could not be guaranteed in the city, since it was feared that the populace might demonstrate against them.’’* Matteo Villani was outraged by the government’s action, and attributed it to the influence of “certain powerful citizens who were parti-

sans of the setta cittadinesca.”* Not only were the princes themselves and the Neapolitan court angry at this rebuff, but the dedicated Guelfs in Florence became even more incensed at this deliberate affront to the city’s traditions. The most outspoken advocate of a pan-Guelf policy in Italy was Niccolé Acciaiuoli, who sought to popularize the concept

of a strong league of Guelf states, headed by the kingdom of Naples. In a letter to the Signoria early in 1351, the chancellor 172 Ibid. 11, 315.

178 Tbid., 11, 301-05. For Acciaiuoli’s demands that the money due to him be paid, see his letters to Florentine friends; zbid., 11, 480-81, 483, 488-89. 174 The instruction to the ambassadors is in Missive, 11, f. 14r; see Léonard, 111, 8-9.

175 M. Villani, 11, 45.

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outlined this project, by which he hoped to crush the Visconti power and safeguard the papal position of Italy.*"* Even though

the commune was then on the brink of war with Milan, and had been appealing to the papacy and other Guelf powers for aid, it did not exhibit great enthusiasm for this idea. After the conclusion of the Visconti war in 1353, Florence finally decided

to send a military contingent into the Regno; this was the commune’s first favorable response to a Neapolitan request for aid, after ten years of persistent demands. However, the object of this assistance was eminently practical from the Florentine viewpoint. The troops were to be used to clear the kingdom of robber bands and thus make the roads safe for the city’s merchants engaged in trade with Naples.’ In the eyes of the Angevin rulers, this Florentine gesture signified the re-establishment of the old alliance.*”* But this assumption was premature. During the crisis provoked by ‘Charles IV’s

appearance in Italy, Acciaiuoli again sought to win the commune’s support for an Italian Guelf league under Neapolitan leadership. To this proposal, repeatedly mentioned in letters to Florentines, the Signoria made no response, and did not even send an ambassador to the Angevin court to discuss the issue.*” Florentine enthusiasm for Naples as an ally was not appreciably greater in 1354 than it had been in the previous decade.

An important factor in the commune’s relations with the Regno was the presence in the Angevin court of a large contingent

of Florentines from old Guelf families. Led by the chancellor, Acciaiuoli, this group included members of the Soderini, Buondelmonti, Ricasoli, and Cavalcanti houses, These expatriates were

naturally interested in strengthening ties between Naples and their native city, and through their friends and relatives in Florence they exerted pressure on the commune to achieve this end. The chancellor’s circle of intimates in the Arno city included his

cousins, Angelo, Jacopo di Donato, and Francesco di Meo 176 This letter is printed in Léonard, u, 483-85, 20 February 1351. On the chancellor’s policy, see Léonard, Les Angevins de Naples (Paris, 1954), pp. 365-400.

177 Léonard, Jeanne, III, 52-53; Sapori, Studi, p. 135.

178 Léonard, Jeanne, III, 53. ,

179 Ibid., 11, 100-04, and letter in 1b:d., 111, 522-24, 25 September 1354. The

same argument is repeated in another letter of 15 November 1354; 2d7d., 1, 105-06.

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THE FIRST DECADE, 1343-1353

Acciaiuoli; and also Messer Tommaso Corsini, Giovanni di Rucco Savini, Messer Bindo Altoviti, Andrea Buondelmonti, and Niccold Soderini. Acciaiuoli constantly urged these men to work for closer ties between Florence and Naples.**? In the spring of

1353 he noted that Tommaso Corsini, Filippo Magalotti, and Tommaso Dietaiuti had been selected for the Signoria, and described them as “men of great authority, our intimate and proven friends,” who, he hoped, would strive to reconstitute the ancient friendship between the commune and the Regno.*™ This bond between the chancellor and the Florentine aristocracy strengthened the opposition to any rapprochement with Naples, particularly among the gente nuova and the leaders of the Ricci faction. Acciaiuoli himself was regarded with hostility and suspicion by these groups, who perhaps visualized the chancellor as a potential tyrant. Although he had been named eligible for the Signoria in the scrutinies of 1343 and 1348, he was specifically

excluded from that office by a provision enacted in 1360." He was also the victim of extremely heavy prestanza assessments.”**

In the spring of 1355 Acciaiuoli visited Florence with a large retinue of Neapolitan barons and other retainers, including a bevy

of dancing girls. He sought to dazzle his fellow citizens with a grand display of hospitality. Stefani reported that he was well received, but the dour Villani asserted that the opulence and loose morals of the chancellor’s court made a very bad impression.*™* According to the chronicler, it was this adverse reaction to Nea-

politan mores which explained the commune’s refusal to grant further military assistance to the Regno. Thus deeply involved in the city’s partisan quarrels, Acciaiuoli was himself a major obstacle to the renewal of an effective alliance between the commune and Naples. 180 For example, see tbid., 111, 480-81, 485-86, 486-87, 515-18. 181 Tbid., 111, 503-04.

182 The Tratte volumes, 205-08, reveal that the chancellor’s name was extracted

from the dJorse containing the 1343 and 1348 scrutinies from 1350 (when the extant records begin) until 1359; his name was always put back, on account of his absence. The law which excluded him from office is in Prov., 48, f. r11r, 16 December 1360. The provision barely obtained the necessary two-thirds majority in the councils; the votes were 107-49 and 82-38. 183 Sapori, “Lettera di Niccold Acciaiuoli,” Studi, pp. 134-37, 147-53. There is a discussion of the chancellor’s protest against his prestanza levy in CP, 5, ff. 46r, 6or. The opinions expressed are all favorable to his petition for relief. 184 Stefani, 670; M. Villani, 1v, or.

| 147 po

CHAPTER IV Precarious Equilibrium 13854-1365

The Politics of Compromise In the decade following the institution of the new regime in 1343, Florentine politics were characterized by disorder and turbulence, by intense partisan conflict, and by the emergence of controversial policy issues. In contrast, the next ten years of communal history were relatively stable. The political behavior of men, as individuals and groups, had become more regular and predictable, and the issues over which they quarreled had been clarified and stabilized by time and experience. A tenuous equilibrium prevailed. The political forces within the regime were so nicely balanced that no single group predominated, although there were temporary upheavals and dislocations. Practicing caution and restraint, politicians tended to avoid precipitate action which might recoil against them, or which could destroy the uneasy balance.

This equilibrium did not mean an end of tension and conflict within the commune. Pleas for unity and for a truce in partisan warfare were seldom absent from the minutes of council meetings. “Let the citizens submerge their antagonisms,” urged Simone

Peruzzi in 1355, when Charles of Bohemia threatened to attack the city. “Search for means whereby the citizens may be reconciled without rancor,” was Filippo Magalotti’s counsel five years later, in April 1360. “The priors should vigilantly seek to establish concord among the citizens and to remove the animosities which divide them,” commented Piero Canigiani in November 1363, during the city’s war with Pisa." Thesé suggestions for

promoting unity were usually couched in general terms; if a specific remedy was proposed, it was the establishment of a special commission to handle the problem. There is little evidence, however, that this device, frequently advocated and occa1 Consulte e Pratiche, 1, £. 107V; 2, £ 190v; 4, f. 122v. For other similar appeals, see CP, 1, f. 148r; 4, ff. 8ar, 85r, 113Vv.

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sionally instituted, made a positive contribution to the cause of civic peace.”

Nor did hostility toward the regime disappear. As a selfappointed critic of the communal government, Matteo Villani filled his chronicle with caustic barbs directed at the men who controlled the administration. He referred to one group of priors

(of May and June 1354) as “without any sentiment of virtue, gluttonous and . . . addicted to drink.” The rectors, he charged, “pursue their own advantage and that of their friends with such solicitude that they ignore the needs of our commune, and there is no one who concerns himself with its liberty, its aggrandize-

ment, or its honor.”* There were occasional references in the official documents to antigovernment sentiment. In the summer

of 1354 there was an outbreak of disorder within the city and also in the contado sufficiently serious to warrant demands for an investigation and castigation of the offenders.* During the tense months when the emperor-elect was menacing the city, speakers in the council meetings frequently denounced the critics (oblocutores) who were attacking the regime and its policies.’ In 1360 an antigovernment plot of quite serious dimensions was uncovered and crushed by the authorities.° While the symptoms of unrest and opposition were visible in

these years, discontent did not erupt into overt action. Restraints on the disruptive forces kept the political temperature below the boiling point. References to plots and conspiracies, or insults and aggressions against communal authorities, which filled

the judicial records of the 1340’s, are almost entirely absent in 2A balia for promoting concord in 1351 did succeed in arranging peace agreements between the Medici and the Guasconi, the Mannelli and the Gherardini families; Delizie degli eruditi toscani, ed. Ildefonso di San Luigi, XIII, 341. For suggestions that other peace balie be established, see CP, 1, ff. 125r, 148r.

8 Cronica di Matteo Villani, 1, 15, 69. Cf. the similar comments of Giovanni Boccaccio in letters to Zanobi da Strada and Messer Pino de’ Rossi; Le lettere edite e inedite di Messer Giovanni Boccaccio, pp. 31, 74. 4 This eruption occurred at a time when the city was preparing for an attack from the armed company led by Fra Moriale; CP, 1, ff. 94r-97v. 5 CP, 1, ff. 109r, 126v, 143r, 146r. Typical is the statement of Giovanni Raffacani, spokesman for the Twelve: “Quod ad reprimendum varios oblocutores qui continue et vane oblucuntur, quod unus uffcialis de novo assumetur qui habet baliam contra eos.” 8 See below, pp. 185-87.

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this period. For the lower classes the general prosperity result-

ing from the labor shortage kept revolutionary ferment at a minimum. The conditions deplored by Matteo Villani actually saved Florence from grave social unrest in these years: “The lower classes were enriched and debased after the mor-

tality [of 1348], and they no longer wished to work in their customary occupations. They demanded more expensive and delicate things for the necessities of life than did the ancient citizens, and this disrupted the entire city. The pages, servant girls, and stable boys demanded a minimum salary of twelve florins per year, and the more experienced asked for eighteen to twenty four florins. And in the same manner, the manual laborers insisted upon three times their normal wages, and the peasants wanted all of the oxen and the seed, and they would work only the best land and leave the rest uncultivated.”’ So acute was the labor shortage, particularly in the cloth in-

dustry, that workers were imported from Lombardy and Germany to operate the looms, the dye vats, and the cloth refining tables.* A depression in the woolen industry, the result of the commune’s embargo upon trade with Pisa, undoubtedly caused some distress among the laboring classes, but this apparently did not reach a critical stage.” The severe plague of 1363 also dampened proletarian unrest: a sizable segment of the population was killed off, to be replaced by new blood from outside. Unaccustomed to an urban environment, these newcomers were unprepared to launch an attack on the city’s institutions, External events also promoted some degree of accord and co-

operation, inducing citizens to bury their antipathies, at least temporarily, and to direct their energies toward common goals. The steady extension of communal authority into outlying areas 7M. Villani, 1, 57. Villani noted that the famine of 1352-1353 caused little distress or discontent among the lower classes because they were so liberally paid for their labor that they could afford higher food prices; 11, 56. 8 The names of numerous foreigners are listed in the prestanze records; on the German textile workers in Florence in the fourteenth century, see A. Doren, Deutsche Handwerker und Handwerkerbruderschaften im mittelalterlichen Italien (Berlin, 1903). ® A provision of November 1362, stated: “Quod status mercantie in civitate Florentie est adeo pessimus et obscurus, quod mercatores et artifices civitatis eiusdem dampnis non modicis pregravantur”; Provvtstont, 49, f. 57r.

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—for example, the cities of Pistoia and Volterra—was one devel-

opment that commanded general approbation.” The menace posed by Charles of Bohemia and his German knights in the early months of 1355 drew the Florentines together. Partisan warfare also subsided when the city was threatened by two major

incursions of armed companies: Fra Moriale in 1354, and the force led by Count Landau in 1358-1359. Although the war with

Pisa (1362-1364) was not universally popular in the city, and indeed bred dissension, it also stimulated patriotic sentiment, particularly among the lower classes. The foreign enemy became the

target of passions and hatred, which in times of peace were directed against the domestic opponent. Another source of political stability was the presence of mod-

erates in the council halls. The majority were from patrician families; they remained aloof from the factions, pursued an independent policy, and had a clear conception of the public weal above and beyond their personal and class interests. Donato Velluti is an example. With pride he described in his ricordanze how he had resisted the blandishments of both factions and sought instead to disband them. But he noted, too, the penalty paid for this neutralist position: the factions sought to ruin and discredit

the cari e antichi cittadini who refused to join them.” The Pratiche protocols corroborate Velluti’s claim, for his opinions were consistently moderate in tone and devoid of partisan bias.” Other influential independents were Filippo Bastari, Simone dell’Antella, and Filippo Magalotti. Bastari was a senior statesman whose public career coincided almost exactly with the lifetime of the regime. The sole representative in politics from his small family, he compiled a remarkable record of communal service. Six times he sat in the Signoria; he was a frequent member of ambassadorial missions, and his opinions are regularly 10On the expansion of communal territory, see F.-T. Perrens, Histoire de Florence, 1v, 394-95; V, 14-17. See the Pratica discussion in favor of besieging the city of Bibbiena in August 1359; CP, 2, ff. r12r-112v.

117, E. Mommsen, Italientsche Analekten zur Retchsgeschichte des 14. Jahrhunderts (1310-1378), docs. 374, 385, 396, 401, 407, 412, 424-39. 12 Ta cronica domestica di Messer Donato Vellutt, pp. 241-42.

18 See, for example, Velluti’s comments on internal peace; CP, 1, f. g9v; 4, f.

85r; 8, f. 57r. See also his account of his participation in the crisis of 1366;

Cronica, pp. 241-52. , 15]

PRECARIOUS EQUILIBRIUM, 1354-1365

recorded in Pratiche protocols.* Filippo Magalotti and Simone dell’Antella belonged to patrician families that generally supported the conservative Albizzi faction, but these two men were noted for their independent opinions in the council discussions and for their opposition to the sezte.” The tenuous and delicate balance of political forces within the commune was clearly reflected in the evolution of the regime’s policy toward the second-class citizens, those groups which did not enjoy, de cure or de facto, full participation in the government. To the totally disenfranchised proletariat, the ruling group made no concessions, although strenuous efforts were made to attend to their material needs during periods of famine. The government was more solicitous of the artisans and shopkeepers in the lower guilds, who had nominal representation in the regime but limited political influence. For example, the commune repealed the measures enacted in the 1340’s which had

thrown open certain trades and crafts to all who desired entrance. The lower guildsmen were again permitted to exercise

their traditional regulation of economic activity through restricted guild membership and price and wage controls,*® 14 On Bastari’s neutralist position in the 1372 crisis, see M. Stefani, Cronaca fiorentina, RRIISS, new ed., xxx, Part 1 (Citta di Castello, 1903-1955), 731. For his numerous ambassadorial posts in 1349 and 1350, see D. Marzi, La Cancelleria della Repubblica fiorentina, pp. 663 ff.

18 For Magalotti’s views, see CP, 2, ff. 159v, 190v; for those of Simone dell’Antella, see CP, 2, £. 160v; 8, f. rar. 18 Between 1343 and 1348 there was a concerted effort in the courts to force

the guilds to abandon their policy of price fixing. According to one accusation in March 1347, the guilds were guilty of organizing “monopoliam conspira-

tionem conventiculam et ligam seu doganam de rebus et super rebus aut negotiationibus ipsarum artium .. . pertinentibus certo modo et forma seu pretio vendendi vel emendi et non aliter vel alio modo contrahendi emendi vel donandi, ad hoc ut homines et persone non possent emere et vendere prout

voluerint de rebus et negotiis’; Att del Esecutore degli Ordinamenti della Giustizia, 79, f£. 23r. For similar accusations, see AEO], 6, ff. 5r, 11v, 37%; 17,

ff. 25r, 35r; 79, ff. r1v, 25r, 33r. All of these accusations were quashed, and after 1348 none appear in the judicial records, one indication that the commune had in effect acquiesced in the guild policy of controls. I agree with Professor de Roover that Italian cities officially sought to restrain guilds from fixing prices, but I would add that many communes, like Florence, made no serious effort to enforce the statutes against monopolies; R. de Roover, “The Concept of a Just Price: Theory and Economic Policy,” Journal of Economic History, xvirr (1958), 432-33. On this question, see the recent article by M. Becker, “La esecuzione della legislazione contro le pratiche monopolistiche

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The most unruly element of the arti minori were the butchers, who by tradition and temperament were prone to violence. Communal authorities engaged in a protracted controversy with these truculent guildsmen who sought to evade regulations pertain-

ing to the sale of meat. In this imbroglio the commune was eventually victorious, but in the council discussions on the problem, opinions were moderate and conciliatory. Speakers empha-

sized that it was desirable to negotiate with the butchers, to consider their viewpoint, and adopt a lenient policy toward those

who violated the regulations. While determined to protect its own interests and those of the consumers, the ruling group also wished to avoid any arbitrary action which would drive the minori into strenuous opposition to the regime.” The commune’s attitude toward the magnates also softened appreciably in the 1350’s—partly the result of increased patrician influence, and partly a response to the pressure of events. Since

there was scarcely a prominent popolano family that was not connected by marriage or business ties with several magnate houses,” most patricians supported measures to extend more political privileges to this group and to mitigate the Ordinances of Justice. The gente nuova, however, opposed any relaxation of

the rigid juridical cast in which magnates were placed, and it was the imperial crisis of 1354-1355 which finally broke down their intransigence. Even the most inveterate foes of the magnates realized how dangerous was the presence of discontented grandi in Florence, with a potential enemy approaching the city. When the issue was debated in council, Piero Canigiani, an oligarchic

leader, naturally supported the magnate cause, but even such friends of the gente nuova as Salvestro de’ Medici, Uguccione de’

Ricci, and Marco degli Strozzi favored their reintegration into | delle arti fiorentine alla meta del secolo quattordicesimo,” ASI, cxvir (1959), 8-28. According to Becker, the period of the most intense application of the antimonopoly regulations was 1348-1354; thereafter, they were rarely applied; tbid., 16, n. 42; 18-19.

17 A detailed discussion of this problem is in M. Becker and G. Brucker, “The Arti Minori in Florentine Politics, 1342-1378,” Mediaeval Studies, xvui (1956), 98-100.

18In the trecento the Frescobaldi contracted marriages with these popolano families, among others: Velluti, Vettori, Antellesi, Mancini, Arrigucci, Altoviti, Cocchi, Capponi, and Guadagni; Velluti, tav. m1.

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the communal structure. Salvestro de’ Medici’s argument was typical of the patrician viewpoint: “Let the magnates be honored with offices, and the Ordinances be relaxed, with deeds and not words.”*® Success finally crowned these efforts in February 1355, when a provision was enacted which allowed the magnates

to hold nearly all communal offices, with the exception of the Signoria and the colleges. An important restriction placed upon grandi officeholding was the proviso that their representation in any office be limited to one-fourth of the total.?? Two other measures favorable to the magnates were also approved in the early months of 1355. One provision abolished the box (tamburo) in which secret denunciations against them could be deposited.

The second law provided those grandi accused of crimes with greater opportunity to defend themselves, and also limited to

magnate.” | | the third degree the responsibility of relatives of a convicted | This relaxation of the commune’s policy against the grandi met strenuous opposition in the councils, where artisans and shopkeepers could use their vote to express convictions which

they feared to voice publicly. The provision which opened offices to magnates, first approved by the Signoria and the colleges in

November 1354, was rejected several times before it finally won | acceptance three months later by majorities of 133-40 and 87-19.”

The termination of the imperial crisis reduced somewhat the need to placate the magnates, and the emperor’s exodus was marked by the passage of another law (August 1355) designed

to harass the grandi. It provided that any magnate who committed a crime against a popolano was to be totally cut off from his family; he could not live in the same quarter, nor could he receive any assistance from his relatives.** The high mortality rate of magnate petitions in the councils was yet another sign of

the unwavering antagonism which this class inspired among the lower ranks of society.”* 19 The debates of 21 October and 3 November 1354 are in CP, 1, ff. 107v-111Fr. 20 Prov., 41, f. 137Vv. 21 Prov., 41, ff. 137v-138r; 42, f£. 34r. 22 CP, 1, ff. togv-t1ov, 148r-148v. 28 Prov., 42, ff. 113r-113V.

24'The incidence of these rejections increased in the 1370’s when the tempo of internal conflict grew more intense; see, for example, Libri Fabarum, go, fi. 20r, 22V, 33r- For a lively discussion concerning the petition of Tommaso di Buonaccorso Adimari, see CP, 2, f. 117Vv.

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The solution to the magnate problem which gained strongest support in the councils was the voluntary disassociation of individual grandi from their families. This policy was inaugurated in 1350, with the passage of a law that permitted certain magnates to renounce their families and assume new names and coats of arms.”* While those who took advantage of this measure did not gain popolano status, at least they were no longer held responsible for the misdeeds of their relatives.** During the 1350's a small number of magnates were made popolani by legislative decree, and this group swelled appreciably after 1361. In that year a law was passed requiring ex-magnates to change their names and cut their ties completely with their clan.”’ Scores of magnates seized the opportunity to abandon their status, thus gaining political and juridical advantages while sacrificing their family heritage.

Typical of the petitions which were presented to the Signoria was that of a cloth manufacturer, Ippolito Frescobaldi, who pre-

sented his case in these terms: “Although he belongs to the house of Frescobaldi, nevertheless he was and is considered, through the maternal line, to be weak and impotent, and has always tried to live in peace and tranquillity, abstaining from inflicting injury upon anyone, and embracing the life and customs of the popolani of this city.”"* In his exodus from the magnate ranks, Ippolito was joined by members of other ancient and illustrious houses: Tosinghi, Cavalcanti, Nerli, Bardi, Rossi, *° Prov., 36, ff. 103v-104v. At least one hundred magnates took advantage of this opportunity; Prov., 37, ff. 9or-1oov.

26 The importance of relief from this bond may be seen in the case of Simone di Messer Porcello de’ Rossi, condemned to death and the confiscation of his property for the murder of a contadino in November 1352. The podesta decreed that unless Simone appeared to receive his sentence, three of his rela-

tives, Jacopo di Messer Porcello and Messer Barna, and Roberto di Messer Barone de’ Rossi would each be required to pay a fine of three thousand J/ire; Atti del Podesta, 826, f. 26or. 27 The 1361 law is in Prov., 49, ff. 1r-2v. Magnates who received popolano status by legislative fiat before 1361 included Messer Luigi Gianfigliazzi, Tieri

de’ Agli, Gherardo di Gualtiero de’ Bardi, and the Vecchietti, Compiobesi, Aliotti, and Manieri families; Prov., 41, f. 33v; 42, ff. 6v, 140v-141r; 44, f. 86r.

Published in Delizie, x1v, 256-63, is the record of their appearance before communal authorities to announce their new names and coats of arms. 28 Prov., 60, ff. 128r-129r. Ippolito changed his surname to Rinieri; Delizie, XIV, 265.

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Agli, Adimari, Mannelli.” In February 1372 some fifteen members of the Visdomini, one of the most venerable of Florentine

noble families, became popolani, and assumed the name of Cortigiani.”°

Only a small minority of magnates actually made the transition to popolano status, but the number might have been much larger had the gente nuova not been reluctant to accord full civic rights

to this class. Doubtless many of the magnate petitions rejected in the councils were appeals for popolano status, for those which did gain approval were always strongly opposed.** What disturbed

the gente nuova, of course, was the fact that the magnates were the natural allies of the oligarchic faction. Some of the petitions in the 1350’s were accepted by the councils with the reservation that the ex-magnates could not enter the Signoria or the colleges for a specified number of years, usually five or ten.” After 1361 this restrictive clause was regularly incorporated into all petitions for popolano status, occasionally as a permanent prohibition.”

| An act was passed in 1371 which excluded all ex-magnates from the supreme executive offices for twenty years.** These precautions seem to have been quite unnecessary. Only two former magnates,

Amaretto Mannelli and Benghi Buondelmonti, qualified for the 7° See the list of declarations of ex-magnates in Delizie, x1v, 263-73. 5° Prov., 60, ff. 128r-129r. The entire Tosinghi family also acquired popolano status in 1370; Prov., 58, ff. 110v-111TF.

$1 The votes on the Tosinghi petition were barely sufficient for passage: 116-55 and 75-34. On the Gianfigliazzi petition of June 1369, the vote was 149-65 and 102-41. The bankers, Gregorio and Niccold di Pagnozzo Tornaquinci, were accepted as popolani by the slimmest of margins, 157-71 and 109-49; Prov., 59, f. 249v. An argument advanced for granting popolano status to Messer Manno

Donati (in 1370) and Leonardo di Messer Ranieri Adimari (1373) was the value of their military service to the commune; Prov., 58, ff. 371r-37v; 61, ff. 88v-8or. Still, the vote was close in both cases: 124-46 and 99-10; 149-59 and 98-40.

82 For examples of magnate petitions without any officeholding limitations, see Prov., 41, f. 33v; 42, ff. 6v, r4or; 61, ff. 88v-89r. A five-year prohibition was

applied to two members of the Bostichi and Giandonati families; Prov., 43, ff. 167r-167v; and one of ten years to Gherardo de’ Bardi; Prov., 44, f. 86r.

83 Permanently excluded from the Signoria were Messer Manno Donati, Tommaso di Piero Tornaquinci, Pazzino Donati, Simone della Tosa, and Tommaso and Nofri de’ Rossi; Prov., 58, ff. 37r-37v, 59V, 72r, I10v-111r; 63, ff. 215v-216r. Excluded for twenty years were Gregorio and Niccolo Tornaquinci and Carlo di Naddo Nerli; Prov., 59, £. 249v; 60, ff. 7v-8r. 84 Prov., 58, f. 164r.

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Signoria in the extant scrutiny lists, and neither actually became a prior.*°

There are close parallels between the commune’s magnate policy and its attitude toward the clergy in these years. In the 1340’s the ecclesiastical issue had been a sharp wedge dividing the patriciate and the gente nuova. An aristocrat, possessing the background and status of Filippo Baroncelli, whose brother was a cleric in need of benefices and promotions, and whose family had close connections with the Franciscans of S. Croce,** would naturally consider clerical privileges with more tolerance and favor than would the parvenu who could expect, not benefits, but fines and recriminations from ecclesiastical authorities. In the 1350’s, however, the church had ceased to be a burning political issue in Florence. Save for sporadic minor quarrels, relations

between the papacy and the commune were quite friendly in these years, and this reduced the opportunity for domestic strife over the clerical issue.

The two laws restricting ecclesiastical liberty, a legacy from the skirmishes of the previous decade, remained on the statute books, a gesture to anticlerical sentiment and a symbol of the commune’s determination to maintain, at least in theory, the supremacy of the secular power.*’ Although rarely if ever invoked, these provisions annoyed the curia, which persistently demanded their repeal.

In 1353 the commune ignited a minor crisis by hanging a robber named Bricciolo; Avignon immediately protested that the executed man was a priest. The colleges advised the Signoria to write to Pope Innocent VI, “justifying the conviction of the priest, Bricciolo.”** Since the commune’s letter to the curia has not 85 Tratte, 193. Both men were selected in the 1363 scrutiny. 86 See the commune’s petitions to Avignon, 11 December 1364 and 2 March 1365, requesting an additional benefice for Bartolo Baroncelli, a canon of the Florentine cathedral; Missive, 13, ff. 23v, 35r. On the Baroncelli connection with S. Croce, see W. and E. Paatz, Die Kirchen von Floreng (Frankfurt am Main, 1941-1955), 1, 556. 87 The Jaws were incorporated into the statute of the captain of the popolo in 1355; A. Panella, “Politica ecclesiastica del comune fiorentino dopo la cacciata del Duca d’Atene,” AS/, txxt (1913), é, 323. 88 Bricciolo’s conviction is in AP, 873, ff. 4gr-5ov, 1 April 1353. For the comments of the colleges, see CP, 1, f. 30r, 8 July 1353.

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survived, there is no record of the arguments deployed to justify this secular invasion of ecclesiastical justice. Two years later,

another erring priest named Giovanni precipitated a greater tempest when he was sent to the gallows by the podesta. This so angered the bishop, Angelo Acciaiuoli, that he placed the city under interdict and excommunicated the judicial officials who

had condemned the priest. In his statement announcing the censures, the bishop also attacked the communal statutes “against

ecclesiastical liberty which are prejudicial and harmful to the clergy of this city.”°’ In the debates over the interdict and the means to terminate it, the old rift between the anticlericals and the defenders of the clergy was opened anew. The colleges, with

substantial minorities dissenting, proposed that the commune seize and prosecute the episcopal officers who had published the interdict. They also suggested that a tax be levied upon the clergy to defray the expenses of the commune’s appeal to Avignon.“ By a very narrow margin, the latter proposal was enacted into law.” The commune then sent an envoy to Innocent VI, requesting that the interdict be lifted. To the new bishop, Francesco de Actis, who replaced Acciaiuoli in the spring of 1355, the Signoria wrote a conciliatory letter. The priors justified the priest’s execution with the rather lame argument that the judicial authorities were unaware of his clerical status. Apparently satisfied with this ex-

planation, the bishop then lifted the interdict.* But Avignon had been aroused by this incident. In May 1355 the Signoria received another letter from the pope, complaining about the exactions levied against the clergy and the offending statutes which violated ecclesiastical liberty. The commune’s re-

ply to this letter was silence; and in September the Signoria responded with no more alacrity to another papal demand for 89 F_ Baldasseroni, “Una controversia fra stato e chiesa,” ASI, ser. 6, 1v (1912), -AI.

Oe CP, 1, f. 164v. The members of the colleges who opposed the majority are not identified. A few days later, Filippo Bastari demanded that the clergy furnish part of the money which was owed to Charles IV: CP, 1, f. 167v, 10 March 1355. 41 The law which obliquely provided for clerical taxation is in Prov., 42, f. 41Vv.

In the margin alongside the provision is this summary statement: “Balia eligendo officiales contra clericos.” The vote on the measure: 100-47 and 71-33. 42 Baldasseroni, 45-46.

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the repeal of the controversial provisions.** But the pressure from the curia did not relax, and as a conciliatory gesture, the commune enacted a provision (July 1357) which suspended all laws “against the Catholic faith and ecclesiastical liberty” for two months. Three subsequent provisions extended the suspension until May 1358. The pope was not satisfied with these measures, and in December 1357 reiterated his demand for repeal.* When this was ignored, the curia again allowed the issue to subside.

Both parties in this controversy were guided by expediency. Neither curia nor commune wished to press the issue to a conclusion: the commune sought to avoid internal conflict and a rupture with its Guelf ally; the papacy was unwilling to compromise its campaign for the recovery of its Italian territory, which depended to an important degree upon Florentine assistance and approval. But this mutual forbearance did not signify a settlement of differences. The problems of clerical taxation and ecclesiastical versus secular justice remained sources of friction between the church and the regime.

The Ghibelline Question, 1354-1 360 Partisan rivalry in these years found its most immediate outlet

in the quarrel over the Ghibelline issue, which had remained dormant after the Black Death, but was rekindled afresh in 1354.

Patricians complained about the unabated influx of the gente nuova into communal offices, a movement that had been checked

but not stifled by the legislation of the 1340’s directed against foreigners and Ghibellines. Even the moderate Velluti grumbled

that the Guelfs were being supplanted in the scrutinies “by Ghibellines and pseudo-Guelfs,” and to substantiate his argument he cited the case of his own family, who had not been represented in the lists of eligibles for the Signoria drawn up in 1351 and 1354.° 487 Capitoli del Comune di Firenze. Inventario e regesto, U1, 499. 44 Baldasseroni, 46-47. The negative votes cast against this concession to the church were surprisingly few. In the provision extending the suspension from December 1357 to February 1358, the vote was 158-7 and 107-17; Prov., 45, i, ff. roor, toir; from March to May, 1358, 127-20 and 109-7; Prov., 45, 11, ff. 33v, 36r. 45 Missive, 13, £. 3r.

46 Velluti, p. 243: “De’ quali schiusi Guelfi siamo stati noi di casa; perd che

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The statistics prove that the infiltration by the “new men” into offices was, in fact, increasing. In the 1348 scrutiny, the gente nuova comprised slightly more than one-third (thirty six percent) of the eligibles from the greater guilds; three years later, their representation exceeded two-fifths.” In two scrutinies of 1351 and 1354, eighty two “new men” were named eligible to the Signoria for the first time, a clear indication that the barriers erected against them were quite porous. The degree to which the

legislation against the newcomers was flouted is illustrated by the case of the banker, Uberto Infanghati. Although convicted in 1347 of violating the provision barring Ghibellines from office, Infanghati nevertheless entered the Signoria in 1348, and was a

member of an advisory college in the following year.“ Conservatives could justify efforts to strengthen the legislative bastions against the “new men,” but the responsibility for reviving

the Ghibelline issue lay with the Ricci and their adherents. As-

siduously spreading the rumor that the Albizzi “were from Arezzo and Ghibellines,” they sent a petition to the Signoria, “on behalf of many Guelf citizens and partisans of the Holy Roman church,” which was designed to exclude Ghibellines from

office more effectively. Leaders of the Ricci faction reasoned that the Albizzi would automatically denounce any measure advanced by their antagonists, and thus could be charged with nello scruttino del 1351 non vi rimase niuno di casa, e simile in quello del 1354.” Donato himself was named eligible in the scrutinies of 1343, 1348, and 1357:

*7 From the nearly complete data of the Tratte records, the number of “old” and “new” citizens from the greater guilds, who were designated as eligible for the Signoria, is as follows: Percentage of

1343 223 217 49 1348 I5I 84 36 1351 158 139114 97 41 1354 42 1357 211 154 42 1360 239 162 Al 1363 234 189 45

Year of Scrutiny Patrictans Gente Nuova Gente Nuova

48 Infanghati was fined 500 7. as a Ghibelline officeholder in April 1347; Delizie, x11, 327-28. He was selected prior in November 1348 and became a member of the Twelve in September 1349. He was also a consul of the Cambio guild in 1351.

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opposing a patriotic measure. The Albizzi refused to accept the bait. Stefani described the secret meeting between Piero degli Albizzi and Messer Geri de’ Pazzi, where these two party leaders

agreed to mobilize their supporters in favor of the petition; it was then passed with large majorities.”

This was no revolutionary measure.” It repeated all of the prohibitions against Ghibellines’ holding office which had been

promulgated in 1347, and provided for the identical penalty against offenders, a fine of 500 lire. The one significant innovation pertained to the accreditation of witnesses in Ghibelline cases, In the past, six witnesses, whose testimony was required to estab-

lish the fact that an officeholder was a Ghibelline, had been approved by the consuls of their respective guilds. According to the new statute, they could be certified as reputable witnesses either by the Signoria and the colleges, or by the captains of the Parte Guelfa. Judicial authorities were required to investigate every alleged infraction of the law, even when the accusation was made by magnates. The impressive majorities (138-31 and go-4) obtained by this

measure in the councils suggests an unanimity of sentiment within the commune which, quite clearly, did not exist. The fortunate survival of a Pratica discussion of September 1354™ reveals how controversial the Ghibelline issue had become. Opening the debate was the wealthy industrialist, Marco degli Strozzi, who revealed himself as the lone member of his family to espouse liberal policies and eschew their ultra-conservative convictions.

Strozzi argued that the “iniquitous law” passed against the Ghibellines should be repealed, if it could be done honorably.” His views were seconded by another patrician with liberal proclivities, Giovanni del Bello, and by three “new men”: the physician, #9 The details of this partisan jockeying are in Stefani, 665. Stefani’s account is corroborated by Velluti, pp. 242-43, who, however, mistakenly dates the incident in 1357 instead of 1354. 50 Prov., 41, ff. 63r-64v. A fragment of the provision is printed in Delizte, XIV, 231-32. The law also stated that before any scrutiny, extraction, or election to communal office, the notary who recorded the proceedings was required to warn the participants to prevent the choice of any Ghibelline. The standard formula of this admonition is in LF, 34, f. 7v. 51 CP, 1, ff. ggr-1oor, 9 September 1354.

52 “Quod reformatio facta contra ghibellinos . . . tanquam iniqua tollatur, quantus fieri potest honestius.”

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Messer Tommaso del Garbo, Fruosino Unganelli, and Tellino Dini, the latter an ironmonger from the lower guilds.” Only one speaker, the linen manufacturer, Salvestro Brancacci, expressed himself in strong terms against revision: “Let the law passed against the Ghibellines be observed as it was enacted.” A more moderate view was advanced by Donato Velluti, who favored a limited revision of the measure, but who also expressed concern

“lest the Ghibellines should break through [into the offices] in greater numbers than before.” Velluti prescribed the sovereign remedy for controversial problems: the special commission to hammer out a compromise solution. The outcome of this discussion was a legislative proposal, “concerning the limitation of the Ghibelline provision,” which passed the Council of the Popolo by a large majority, but was defeated in the Council of the Commune, where the magnates held one-fourth of the seats.°* __

This debate is the first extant record of a discussion on the Ghibelline issue. It identifies some of the leading proponents and opponents of the anti-Ghibelline legislation, and thus provides clues to their partisan affiliation. Moreover, it gives some indication of the atmosphere in which this explosive problem was debated. Some citizens, as the council minutes reveal, had already assumed dogmatic positions on the issue. Salvestro Brancacci, the patrician lower guildsman,” voiced the hyperpatriotic sentiments of the Parte hierarchy. In diametric opposition was Marco degli Strozzi whose strong convictions on this issue are not hidden by the formal and rather pallid rhetoric of the recording notary. Most speakers, however, avoided a rigid stand on the issue and adopted instead a flexible, conciliatory position. Several 53 Messer Tommaso del Garbo’s career is described by Filippo Villani in his Vite degh uomini illustri fiorentini. He was also active in business. Giovanni del Bello was the sole member of his family in communal politics; his family first sat in the Signoria in 1302. He and Tellino Dini were frequently selected as priors. 540 F, 33, ff. 42r-42v. The affirmative vote in the Council of the Popolo was 119-48; the negative vote in the Council of the Commune was not recorded. 55 Brancacci was a linen cloth manufacturer (linatuolo) and thus a lower guildsman, although his family had been represented in the Signoria since 1317. He was named eligible for the Signoria in the scrutinies of 1348 and 1360; he was an outstanding example of a lower guildsman who did not represent the political views of his guild colleagues. His brother Tommaso was one of the Parte captains who introduced the ant-Ghibelline law of January 1358; M. Villani, viii, 24.

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patricians—Giovanni Lanfredini, Simone Peruzzi, Stefano del Forese—expressed willingness to consider the revision of the law.”

Two arguments were cited by those citizens who favored revision. Some argued that the law might be utilized contrary to the intention of those who had enacted it, for purposes other than the exclusion of bona fide Ghibellines.*’ This is the first veiled hint that the Ghibelline laws might be used as a partisan weapon. Other speakers noted that the measure had caused unrest in the city: they emphasized the need to avoid dissension and promote unity. This was not merely a pious genuflection before the goddess of civic peace, for these counselors also favored the relaxation of the divieto provisions restricting the patriciate’s share of offices.”* By propitiating both the old order and the new,

they hoped to restore the equilibrium that had been disrupted by the passage of the Ghibelline law.

In the autumn of 1354 there was a particular need to soothe ruffled spirits and to placate discontented groups—patrician, mag-

nate, gente nuova—for the emperor-elect was then traveling toward central Italy. The physical presence of the traditional leader of Ghibellinism increased the possibility of internal revolution in the Tuscan towns, as the upheavals in Lucca, Pisa, and Siena attest.” Florentine Guelfs were convinced that the throngs of recent immigrants included Ghibelline sympathizers who might foment a rebellion on behalf of the German monarch. When an envoy from Charles visited the city in November 1354 to conduct negotiations with the commune, one citizen urged that precautions be taken to prevent the ambassador from “contaminating the citizens.”** Lack of confidence in the loyalty of the populace

was probably the major reason for the commune’s adamant refusal to permit Charles to visit the city.” There were no overt manifestations of pro-imperial sentiment 586 Thus, Giovanni Lanfredini, CP, 1, f. romr: “Quod priores . . . provideant super reformationem factam contra ghibellinos . . . prout utilius et honorificentius ac salubrius viderint convenire, pro bono statu comunis Florentie.” 57 Speakers who referred to this danger were Donato Velluti, Stefano del Forese, and Giovanni del Bello. 58 The provision which strengthened the divteto provisions was passed on 21 August 1354; Prov., 41, f£. 55r.

58 These are described in M. Villani, v, 29-37. 60 CP, 1, f. 119v, 19 November 1354. 61 Mommsen, Italienische Analekten, docs. 399, 401, 412, 438.

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during these months when the emperor-elect tarried in Tuscany, but the vigilance of the authorities may explain the city’s calm. Paradoxically, the communal debates show that the Ricci partisans and the gente nuova invariably adopted a more hostile and intransigent position toward the German monarch than did the - conservative Guelfs. In the early stages of the crisis, when Charles was still in Lombardy, Uguccione de’ Ricci bravely proclaimed,

“The commune should not in any way enter into negotiations with the emperor, which would be pernicious, nor even reply to his request.”*’ During the course of the tortuous negotiations with the emperor-elect in March 1355, the ironmonger, Tellino

Dini, demanded that the commune instruct its ambassadors at Charles’ court to obtain a definite answer to the Florentine proposals, and, failing that, to terminate discussion and prepare for war.” Parte leaders, on the other hand, were less inclined to force the issue with the Luxemburger, preferring to continue negotiations and to make concessions in order that a peaceful settlement might be achieved.™

A series of incidents during these tense weeks might, despite their slightly comic aspect, be interpreted as an expression of latent anti-Guelf sentiment. In late November and early December, lions made of snow were erected in several city squares, and these Guelf symbols were systematically destroyed at night. This provoked a furor in the palace of the Signoria, and counselors demanded an investigation and punishment of the offenders.”

So inflamed was public opinion that a balia was granted to a judge of the merchant’s court “to investigate each and every one

who is said to be responsible for destroying the snow figures of statues of the lions made in the city of Florence in public places and in the view of the citizens.”** Unfortunately, the records do not reveal whether this vandalism was a mere prank 62 Mommsen, doc. 385. Ricci’s argument received no support from his colleagues.

88 Mommsen, doc. 432. Marco degli Strozzi approved Dini’s advice, but the majority of the counselors, including Jacopo Ridolfi, Sandro Biliotti and Berto Frescobaldi, urged a policy of caution; CP, 1, ff. 163r-163Vv.

64 See, for example, the statements of Arnaldo Altoviti, Filippo Magalotti, Giovanni Raffacani, Berto Frescobaldi, and Tommaso di Caroccio Alberti; Mommsen, docs. 407, 424, 439. 65 CP, 1, ff. 123r-123V, 124v, 126r; 29 November, 5 and 10 December 1354. 86 Prov., 41, £. 111K.

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or something more sinister. The reaction of the authorities does

seem disproportionate to the act, and it reflects the fear with which the communal leadership viewed any sign of incipient disloyalty. It helps to explain, too, why the red herring of Ghibellinism could be manipulated so effectively as a political issue. When Charles IV returned to Prague in the summer after his

Roman coronation, tensions eased in Florence and the other cities of central Italy. With the emperor’s exit, there vanished both the external threat to independence and the internal danger of a Ghibelline-inspired revolution. But that perennial problem in Florence, the composition of the officeholding group, had not been solved: the patrician thirst for a greater share of offices was

unslaked, and the resentment of the old families against the gente nuova had not diminished. The anti-Ghibelline measure of 1354 had been no more efficacious than its predecessors in weeding out of the government individuals with dubious antecedents and loyalties. After its passage only one Ghibelline officeholder, a contado notary named Ser Corso di Ser Vita, was con-

victed in the courts.” In Stefani’s opinion, the failure of this legislation was due to the unwillingness of individuals to testify

in Ghibelline cases.°° From motives of either fear or shame, Florentines were apparently reluctant to appear publicly as denouncers or informers. The task confronting the advocates of oligarchic government was thus twofold: to devise machinery for the efficient exclusion of the undesirables, and to make this policy palatable to the citizenry. The major protagonists in this revived campaign against the Ghibellines were the eight Parte captains who held office during the first four months of 1358. Identified by their bitter critic, Matteo Villani, they belonged to that substantial segment of the old order which advocated an aggressive and uncompromising posture against the gente nuova. Four were magnates: Messer Guelfo Gherardini, Messer Geri de’ Pazzi, Messer Simone de’ Bardi, Messer Uguccione Buondelmonti, scions of the most intransigent and reactionary clans in the city. The four popolano captains represented diverse elements within the patriciate. Tommaso Brancacci was a linen cloth manufacturer from the lower guilds, whose family was notorious for its blatant and _ shrill 87 AEO], 219, f. 2or. 88 Stefani, 674.

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avowals of Guelfism. Migliore Guadagni, a wealthy cloth manu-

facturer, was the single representative of big business in this octet. Simone Siminetti and Massaiozzo Raffacani came from patrician families of middling rank. Villani’s characterization of the captains, as men “of lowly and debased status... not one of whom had ever had any influence in the commune,” is less than just.’ All had served in communal offices and the four popolani were regularly chosen to the Signoria.” It is true, however, that these captains did not form part of that citizen elite which served as a perennial advisory body to the Signoria. And, with the exception of Guadagni, they were not men of wealth;” thus their hostility toward the prosperous gente nuova may have been intensified by their own modest economic status. In January 1358 the Parte captains presented their petition to the Signoria.” The prologue stated that Florence had flourished under the Guelf banner, and that members of the Parte had shed their blood pro libertate patrie. Then, asserting that all was not

well in this most Guelf of communes, the captains denounced those who, like wolves in sheep’s clothing, sought to enter the Guelf fold. The petition requested confirmation of all previous communal legislation favoring the Parte Guelfa, and, in particular, the provisions excluding Ghibellines from office. No Ghibelline or non-Guelf was to be allowed to hold any office for fifteen years after taking the oath of allegiance to the Parte Guelfa. Individuals who had been certified for admittance to the Parte by the Signoria would not be admitted unless they took the oath within a year, and with the consent of the captains. They were to be considered Ghibellines and ineligible for office, as were

those who petitioned the captains to take the oath and were refused. Those suspected of Ghibelline sympathies could be denounced secretly to the magistrates, even by magnates and members of the accused’s own family. The testimony of six witnesses, 89M. Villani, vit1, 24, 31: “di pessima e iniqua condizione . . . de quali non vera ma’ uno ch’avesse stato in comune.” 7° Brancacci and Siminetti were priors on six occasions between 1343 and 1378; Guadagni, five times, Raffacani, four. 71 Their sega assessments are recorded in Estimo, 306, ff. rov, 49v, 6or, 7or, Q4V, 95r, I62v. 72 Prov., 45, ff. 113r-114v. It is published in Delizie, x1v, 249-53.

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whose probity was certified by the Parte captains, was the sole proof required for conviction. The furor which this new salvo in the anti-Ghibelline campaign aroused was not due to any drastic innovations proposed by the Parte hierarchy: the petition added little to the legislation already

inscribed in the statute books. It did erect some important limitations upon the commune’s right to force the Parte to accept new members.’* By protecting the accuser with anonymity, it also

made denunciation safer. The petition’s significance lay not in its content, but in the objectives of its proponents, who were determined to revive partisan rancors and disturb the political equilibrium.” The Signoria and the colleges strongly opposed the petition, and the Parte captains used a variety of arguments to persuade them to accept it."° “Ghibellines are holding offices,” they claimed, “and if the Guelfs do not correct this situation, they can reconcile

themselves to the loss of their political influence and the commune’s independence, which maintains the liberty of Italy.” The

captains asserted, too, that the passage of the petition would facilitate the revision of the divieto laws, thus enabling the old families to obtain a greater share of offices. When these arguments failed to convince the priors and the colleges, the Parte leadership resorted to more direct methods of persuasion, which Matteo Villani described in detail. “The captains denounced them

as opponents of the Parte. They collected some two hundred citizens among their followers and with the avowed objective of defending the Parte Guelfa, to which no one was opposed, they went before the priors and the councils and said that they would not retire until the petition was debated.” By the sub73 A few weeks before the petition was submitted to the Signoria in Decem-

ber 1357, a provision admitting Ser Cialli di Ser Dino into the Parte was passed by narrow margins: 118-51 and go-40; Prov., 45, ff. 108r-110v. Five others were granted Guelf status by legislative fiat in August 1357; Prov., 45, ff. 8r-38v.

° 1 Villani emphasized that partisan strife had subsided on the eve of this petition: “Era la citta di Firenze in questi tempi in grande tranquillita e pace dentro . . . La cittadinanza era pid unita al comune bene, e le sette aveano meno luogo”; M. Villani, vu, 24. 7 Villani described the background of the submission and passage of the petition in detail; vim, 24.

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stantial margins of 164-34 and 102-22, the measure then received the sanction of the two councils. In March the captains put into motion the revitalized machinery to eliminate the Ghibelline threat.’* Their initial list of seventy suspects included members of prominent families, citizens of high rank. However, the captains put aside their bold plan to humiliate their powerful opponents, among whom were the leaders of the Ricci faction. Instead, they picked four men whose backgrounds were sufficiently obscure to lend credence to their accusations of

Ghibelline origin and sympathies: Neri Alamanni, Manetto Mazzetti, Giovanni Girolami, and Giovanni Bianciardi. All four were accused of violating the law prohibiting Ghibellines from holding office; each was convicted by the podesta and fined 500 live.’ The thoroughness with which the captains constructed their case against their victims and the determination to involve all levels of society in the purge were demonstrated by the trial

of Neri Alamanni. Thirty nine witnesses were called to give evidence against the hapless Neri: patricians, artisans, wealthy parvenus, some of whom were opposed to the entire procedure, but who had become personally involved in the proscriptions through the deft machinations of the Parte leaders.”

Altogether, twenty one Ghibelline cases were tried in the Florentine courts in the spring of 1358. All save one of the accused were convicted and fined 500 lire. An obscure contadino

named Lodovico di Matteo was the sole suspect who was absolved by the judges.*° Only three of the accused defended them-

selves in court; the rest were apparently convinced that their fate was sealed, and that a defense would merely add the court costs to the fine which they would be required to pay. 76 The details of the first Ghibelline trials are in Villani, vit, 31. 7 The condemnations of these four are in AP, 1103, ff. 23r-24r, 32r. 78 AP, 1064, ff. 123r-132v. Among those who testified were Piero Brancacci, Filippo Lanfredini, Leonardo Ferrucci, Filippo Giugni, and Andrea Baldovinetti,

all from patrician families; and Antonio Martini, butcher; Giovanni Ciari, retail merchant; Giovanni di Mone, graindealer; Ristoro di Cione, stonemason. 78 An incomplete list of those convicted is in Stefani, 675, 678, who mistakenly

stated that they were ammoniti instead of condemned in the courts. Their convictions are in AP, 1103, ff. 23r-24r, 32r, 67r-69v; AEOJ, 278, ff. 15r-15v, 23r-

a0 AEO], 278, £. 22v, 12 May 1358. The witnesses called to testify against the accused denied any knowledge of the case; AEO], 277, ff. 174r-18v.

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One case, involving a contadino named Ser Niccolo di Ser Ciuto

da Figline, deserves special attention, since the testimony of the witnesses and the arguments of the lawyers for both prosecution and defense are fully reported in the court records. Ser Niccold was charged with accepting communal posts in 1351 and 1354, even though he was a notorious Ghibelline. The accusation, which comprised thirteen counts, alleged that his father had been a supporter

of Emperor Henry VII during his Tuscan campaign of 1311. Sixteen witnesses were called by the prosecution, all of whom swore that the charges against the accused were true. In his reply, the defense lawyer maintained that his client was innocent. He con-

tended, too, that the trial was illegal because the prosecution witnesses had not been properly certified by the Parte captains. The prosecution insisted that the charges against the notary were true, and that the witnesses had been legally certified. Ser Niccold’s spirited defense was of no avail, and he was convicted of the Ghibelline charge. This first cluster of proscribed officeholders formed a remark-

ably homogeneous group. They were “new men” of middling rank and reputation, who had held such minor offices as commissioners in charge of hiring troops or repairing roads and bridges. Only four had ever been named eligible for the Signoria. The majority were active in business, some on a large scale. Of the first four men convicted, Manetto Mazzetti was a cloth manufacturer, Giovanni Bianciardi, a banker, and Giovanni Girolami,

a member of Por San Maria, the guild of retail merchants and silk manufacturers. As a group they represented that rising economic and social class which was challenging the mercantile oligarchy, but which was still on the fringes of political power. They had not yet formed friendships and alliances with patrician families, which would have given them greater status and secu-

rity. Relatively weak and isolated, they were, from the Parte’s point of view, ideal victims for sacrifice, since their proscription would not arouse great resentment.

Matteo Villani claimed that the implementation of the antiGhibelline program was deplored “by all good, respectable citizens,” a statement which, despite its exaggeration, emphasizes 81 The judicial record of Ser Niccold’s trial is in AEOJ, 277, ff. 19r-42v; 278, ff, 23Vv-24Vv.

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the apprehension which many Florentines, patrician and parvenu,

undoubtedly felt about the tactics of the Guelf extremists. The response of the opposition was immediate, but, like the machina-

tions of the Parte leadership, it was cautious, limited, oblique.

Neither side desired to risk open war, preferring instead to fence and spar. Those who favored placing restrictions upon the Parte’s campaign against Ghibelline suspects were hampered

by a general reluctance to support any measure that could be construed as hostile to the Parte. Moreover, Villani noted that those citizens whose backgrounds were most suspect exhibited the greatest zeal for the anti-Ghibelline law, until, as the chronicler commented wryly, “the stone should fall upon them.”*” The corrective measure that was finally enacted increased the number of Parte captains from four to six, by the addition of two popolani. Its restraining effect was limited, as Villani conceded, and its main function was to warn the oligarchic faction to keep its antiGhibelline campaign under some reasonable control.** In the jousting over the Ghibelline issue, however, the Parte hierarchy proved to be more fecund in ideas than its opponents.

Perhaps fearful that public sentiment might again become so hostile that convictions in the courts would be extremely difficult, the Guelf leaders devised a brilliant new technique: ammonizione. In its simplicity and efficacy, this device was a stroke of genius. There was no need for witnesses or judges or even formal accusations and investigations. Four of the six captains could declare any citizen to be ammoniti; those so designated were warned not

to accept office, on penalty of prosecution as violators of the anti-Ghibelline statutes. Thus, without trial or an opportunity to defend himself, any Florentine could be effectively excluded from politics by a simple decision of four captains. As Stefani pointed out, ammonizione was considered a more humane method of proscription, less likely to cause bad feelings. Those marked 82M. Villani, vit, 32. 88 Tbid. The law is recorded in Prov., 45, ff. 62r-63v; the votes were 137-25 and 107-9. Three sponsors of the measure were Francesco Vigorosi, a cloth manufacturer who was later proscribed by the Parte; Gucciozzo di Ardingho

Ricci; and Stefano di Piero Altoviti, a member of a conservative patrician family.

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for exclusion were not financially penalized, nor did they suffer the humiliation of being branded in the courts as a criminal.**

In possession of this new weapon, the Parte hierarchy had achieved, temporarily, a very strong position within the communal government. In 1359 the Guelf society pushed through an

acquiescent legislature two provisions that fortified the antiGhibelline statutes and made any move to repeal them virtually

impossible. Enacted in May was a measure which gave communal sanction to the ammonizione procedure; this provision also decreed that anyone convicted of voicing opposition to the anti-

Ghibelline laws forfeited his right to hold office.** In June another measure was submitted to the councils, which reafirmed the validity of the 1358 law and provided stiff penalties for anyone convicted of offending the Parte captains. Although this proposal failed in the Council of the Popolo, it was resubmitted in August and passed both councils with ease.** Two factors limited the scope of the Parte’s campaign against Ghibelline suspects. The leaders, fearing a violent reaction by an opposition goaded to desperation, wisely refrained from large-

scale and indiscriminate proscriptions. Some twenty men had been excluded from office in 1358; fifteen more were “warned” in the following year. The communal structure also served as 8¢ The circumstances of the introduction of ammonizione are obscure. Stefani stated mistakenly, 674, that the procedure was derived from the law of January 1358, an error that was copied by later scholars. For the most recent repetition of this misconception, see N. Valeri, L’Italia nell’ eta det princtpati dal 1343 al 1516, p. 196. The device was not mentioned in that statute and it was enacted after April 1358, when the Parte captaincy was increased to six. The first official reference to the procedure is in a provision passed in May 1359. It seems likely

that ammonizione was introduced, not in a communal provision, but via a Parte decree which is no longer extant. This conclusion finds corroboration in an anonymous chronicler of the late trecento: “Fu deliberato per li capitani e per li loro collegia e per loro consigli oportuni della detta parte che VI capitani

della parte guelfa fossono in choncordia ogni volta, o veramente li III de VI, uno fosse ghibellino, ogni volta eglino gli potessano notifichare e ammonirlo che non pigliare alcuno uficio, et ssi della notificatione o ammonizione innanzi ne pigliassono, pur alora s’intendessi fatta la pruova che fosse ghibellino et ciascuno lo potisse achusare et non gli bisognasse fare alcuna pruova;” BNF, Magliabechiana, 11, 1v, 34’7, £. tor. 85 Prov., 46, ff. 144v-146r.

86 TF, 35, £. 67r; Prov., 47, ff. 31v-32r. The votes on these measures were 116-46 and 86-15; 120-49 and 72-28.

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a brake to restrain impulsive captains from giving full vent to their purging instincts. The authorities did not question the Parte’s

right to persecute traitors and false patriots, but they could and did demand a measure of discretion in the interest of order and security. In November 1358 Filippo Magalotti and Gucciozzo de’ Ricci, spokesmen for the colleges, advised the Parte captains to suspend their campaign against Ghibellines, “having respect for the conditions of the commune.”* This was an oblique reference to internal discontent and unrest provoked by the Parte’s proscriptions. A year later, in November 1359, the colleges interfered directly in the Parte’s attack on two Ghibelline suspects: they advised the Signoria to order the judge to desist from prosecuting the case against them. The spokesman for the Sixteen, Ormanozzo Deti, also asked the priors to cooperate with the Parte captains “to eliminate discord of this kind in the contado and in the city.”** By such pointed hints was the Parte warned to keep its purges within bounds; the uneasy equilibrium between

proponents of oligarchic and popular government was maintained.

Florence and the Papal States, 1354-1360 The pattern of conflict over the Ghibelline issue is sharply limned in the chronicles and documents; the stratagems and maneuvers of the opposing factions and the personalities involved emerge clearly from the records. Less clear, however, is the controversy which developed over the commune’s relations with the

papacy in 1350’s. The chronicles contain little information on this subject, and there are few provisions, with their revealing voting statistics, which pertain to foreign policy. Diplomatic correspondence, only fragments of which are extant, reveals nothing

of the struggles waged over it, or of the manner in which policy was hammered out. Only in the Pratiche protocols do signs of discord appear intermittently. There was a noticeable increase in partisan bickering over foreign affairs in 1358 and 1359, which coincided with the intensified campaign against the Ghibellines. 87 CP, 2, f£. 5v: “Quod dicatur capitanei partis guelfe quod pro nunc supersedeant de accusando quemquam.” 88 CP, 2, f. 136r. The accusation against the suspects, two residents of Scarperia in the contado, is in AEO], 304, ff. 43r-45r.

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By 1360 the partisan alignment on this issue had become quite firmly established. The Parte hierarchy and the leaders of the Albizzi faction advocated full cooperation with the papacy and firm support for Avignon’s diplomatic objectives. Opponents of this policy, Ricci partisans and the bulk of the gente nuova, questioned the benefits to be derived from a papal alliance and favored a more independent foreign policy.

A factor of great significance for the future of Florentinepapal relations was the decision of Pope Clement VI to send Cardinal Egidio Albornoz into Italy, with the task of reconquering the papal states.* For the success of his mission, Albornoz

required the active assistance of the Guelfs in the peninsula, particularly Florence. To this revival of the papacy’s temporal power, the commune could not remain indifferent or neutral. Shortly after the announcement of Albornoz’ appointment as legate, the Signoria received a request to send a contingent of troops to participate in the campaign against Giovanni di Vico, the prefect of Rome, who was the first target in the papal campaign against the “tyrants.” Summoned on 8 July 1353 to discuss the papal request, the colleges were unwilling to commit themselves.°° Two months later, however, on the eve of Albornoz’

entrance into Florence on his way to assume his legatine office,

both collegiate groups advised the Signoria to furnish troops for the papal campaign. As spokesman for the Sixteen, the con-

servative Parte leader, Simone Peruzzi, announced that his group supported the commune’s active participation in the resto-

ration of Romagna to papal obedience.” A Florentine military force joined the papal army in the autumn of 1353, but in the following January the legate’s appeal for further aid was opposed by the colleges, whose members maintained that it was 89 The letter of Pope Innocent VI to Florence announcing the appointment of Albornoz is published in A. Theiner, Codex diplomaticus dominit temporalts Sanctae Sedis (Rome, 1861-1862), 11, doc. 249. A history of Albornoz’ career in Italy has been written by F. Filippini, 72 cardinale Egidio Albornoz (Bologna, 1933). A good summary of papal relations with Italy during this period is in G. Mollat, Les papes d’Avignon (1305-1378), gth ed. (Paris, 1949), pp. 204-95. On the reconquest, see also Valeri, L’Italia, pp. 143-81. °0 CP, 1, f£. 30r. .

81 CP, 1, ff. 4or-41r, 27 September and 3 October 1352. Matteo Villani also described Albornoz’ visit; 11, 84.

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beyond the commune’s capacity.”” The Signoria rebuffed a similar

plea a month later,** but in April 1354 a group of counselors, including men who were hostile to the Parte hierarchy, Marco degli Strozzi and Filippo Capponi, publicly announced their support for increased assistance to Albornoz.”*

In this early phase of the papal project to regain control over its central Italian territory, communal opinion generally favored the grant of military and financial aid to the legate, within the limits of the city’s resources. This change from the neutral posi-

tion of the previous decade can be attributed in part to the increased influence of the conservative patricians in the regime, and to the fear of the Visconti menace from the north. Another

important factor in this policy shift was the much greater role

| played by Florentine companies in papal finance during the 1350's. With the inauguration of Albornoz’ military campaigns IN 1353, it became necessary to transfer large sums of money from

Avignon to the papal armies in the field. Although the Alberti company gained the lion’s share of this papal business, other firms—the Strozzi, Soderini, Rinuccini, Castellani, Ricci, and Cocchi—also participated in the operations and the profits.” It is significant that the legate was a guest of the Alberti in their palace when he visited Florence in 1353 and in 1358.°°

Both Pratiche and Missive records are lacking for the period 1355-1358, but evidence from other sources indicates that Florence continued to furnish substantial assistance to the papal armies, which were then pressing the offensive against the companies and the petty despots of Romagna and the Marches.” °° CP, 1, f. 52r, 13 January 1354. 93 CP, 1, f. 56r, 3 February 1354. The same advice was given by the colleges on 17 March; CP, 1, f. 61r. °4 CP, 1, ff. 66r-66v, 12 April 1354. °° The participation of the Florentine companies in papal banking activities is described in Y. Renouard, Les relations des Papes d' Avignon et des compagnies commerciales et bancaires de 1316 ad 1378, pp. 112-16, 230-33. For charts show-

ing the names of the companies and the amounts involved in the transfer of funds from Avignon to Italy after 1353, see zbd., pp. 258ff. 86M. Villani, 111, 84; vi1I, 103.

97 Filippini, Albornoz, pp. 150-51, 173; M. Villani, vu, 85. A summary of Florence’s assistance to the papacy is recorded in a letter of instruction to the Florentine ambassador in Avignon, Missive, 13, ff. 52v-53r, 8 August 1365. Papal letters of commendation to the commune for this aid in 1357 and 1358

are printed in Capitol, 11, 499-500. , 174

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Matteo Villani reported that large sums of money were collected in the city by papal officials who granted indulgences to the contributors.°* But not every aspect of the Albornoz campaign won Florentine approbation. When, in 1354, the legate was planning

an attack upon Galeatto Malatesta, the lord of Rimini, the Signoria urged him to settle his differences peacefully with the Romagna despot.”” The commune’s defense of Malatesta was prompted by its ancient friendship for that Guelf family, many of whose members had served the city as military captains. Two

years later, in 1356, Florentine emissaries labored in vain to reconcile Albornoz and Francesco Ordelaffi, lord of Forli and Cesena. The commune feared that military action would attract unemployed soldiers from all parts of the peninsula, who would form into companies to menace the peace of Tuscany.*””

Five years after Albornoz launched his reconquest, a state under the direct control of the papacy had become an established fact, a major political entity in central Italy. Along the crest of the Apennines from Bologna to Bibbiena, Florence’s frontier touched papal territory. As the implications of this development became more apparent, the commune’s relationship with the papacy was subjected to closer scrutiny. The proponents of cooperation with Avignon emphasized the tangible and concrete advantages of a foreign policy based upon traditional ties. They viewed a strong papal state as a bulwark, protecting Florence from the Visconti menace and the armed

companies. Shielded by the church, the commune would no longer be at the mercy of every robber band attracted by the wealth of Tuscan cities. Not all Florentines, however, were convinced by these arguments. Many doubted whether an alliance with the papal states would provide adequate protection for the city. These critics also feared that the commune would become a satellite of the church, losing its initiative and freedom of action °8M. Villani, v1, 14; vu, 84.

®9In a letter to Florentine ambassadors in Perugia, printed in Vitelleschi, Le relazioni tra la Repubblica di Firenze e (Umbria nel secolo xiv, 1, doc. 243, the Signoria asserted that Malatesta’s cause was just. Speakers in Pratiche discussions urged the Signoria to mediate between Malatesta and Albornoz, and to give no military aid to either; CP, 1, ff. rogv-11or, 119r. On Albornoz’ peaceful settlement with the Malatesta, see Valeri, pp. 159-60. 100M. Villani, vi, 67. See Valeri, pp. 160-62.

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in diplomacy, expending its resources on papal objectives which did not coincide with Florentine interests. The positive benefits of a papal alliance were emphasized in council discussions during the summer of 1358, when the commune was menaced by troops commanded by the German knight,

Count Landau. In July a provision authorizing the Signoria to negotiate a pact with the legate was passed with little opposition.*™

The agreement with Albornoz was concluded in September. It provided for joint military action against the armed companies for two years. In November Albornoz visited Florence, where he was received with the honor and respect due to him as a prince of the church and a valued ally.*”’ The cardinal submitted to the com-

' mune a proposal to broaden the alliance to include Giovanni d’Oleggio, lord of Bologna and a recent convert to the papal cause, and the Guelf lords of Padua and Ferrara. His plan to bring Florence into an extensive Guelf confederation stretching from the Lombard plain to the Roman Campagna was the subject of intense debate throughout the winter of 1358-13509. When council discussions on this proposal began on 20 Novem-

ber, the conflicting views of the factions emerged clearly. Leaders of the oligarchic party—Piero degli Albizzi, Simone Peruzzi, Messer Bindo Frescobaldi—favored the commune’s prompt entrance into the league. The papal alliance was opposed

by the Sixteen. Their spokesman, Sandro da Quarata, was an inveterate foe of the Albizzi and the Parte hierarchy: “The priors should not assent . . . to the legate’s petition, lest they incur the

opprobrium of the citizens.” A frequently voiced criticism of

the projected league was that it might be a violation of the peace of Sarzana, signed with Milan in 1353, and thus could be regarded by the Visconti as a hostile act.*°* This sentiment reflected the suspicion that the legate’s prime objective in con-

structing the enlarged league was not the destruction of the companies, but the downfall of the Milanese despot, Bernabo 101 Prow,, 46, ff. 13r-13v. The vote on this provision: 113-23 and 94-11.

102M. Villani, viz, 103. For suggestions on the honors to be extended to Albornoz, see CP, 2, ff. 4v-5r. 108 CP, 2, ff. ror-rov.

104 This was stressed by Sandro da Quarata, Messer Tommaso del Garbo, Giorgio de’ Ricci, and Simone dell’Antella; CP, 2, ff. ror-rov.

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Visconti. Luigi de’ Mozzi argued that a condition to Florence’s entry into the league should be Milan’s participation.*”° Another reservation was expressed by the Ricci partisan, Niccold Rimbaldesi: “Although the league may be useful and beneficial, it should be determined whether or not it will actually be effec-

tive.”*°© This argument appealed to those realists who were skeptical of the value of alliances that appeared quite formidable

on paper but were pitifully weak in the field. After two weeks of intensive debate, communal opinion had swung decisively against the legate’s scheme. In the council meet-

ing of 4 December," the majority supported the view of a representative of the gente nuova, Cambio Signorini: “Under no circumstances should a league be concluded, but other remedies should be found.” On this occasion, only the arch-conservative, Piero Canigiani, spoke out unequivocally in favor of the Albornoz plan for a Guelf federation. The Signoria, however, continued to hold discussions with the legate concerning the possibility of joint action against Landau’s

company which menaced both Tuscany and Romagna in the winter of 1358-1359.°°° By the terms of its accord with Albornoz,

the commune had provided a detachment of troops which was serving in Romagna under the legate’s command. But the Florentines were not unanimously in favor of military action against the company. Some citizens favored the purchase of immunity from Landau; others advocated the resort to arms.*°? When, in mid-January, the threat from the company became more serious, the Signoria informed the legate of its willingness to unite with

him and other Guelf states to destroy the company and rid Italy of that perpetual menace.**” At this precise moment, when 105 CP, 2, ff. 13v-14r. Luigi de’ Mozzi was a member of an old mercantile family which was persistently hostile to the Guelf hierarchy; Luigi’s son, Giovanni, was ammoniti in 1378. 106 CP, 2, f. rov. This point was also made by Giorgio Baroni and Niccold di Cione Ridolf, f. 14r. 107 CP, 2, ff. 17r-18r. Those who opposed the league included Stefano del Forese, Giovanni del Bello, Messer Tommaso Altoviti, Tommaso Guidetti, Niccolé degli Ubaldini, and Simone dell’Antella. 108 Missive, 12, ff. 58v-5or, letter of instruction to Florence’s ambassador at the legate’s court, 9 January 13509. 109 CP, 2, ff. 20r, 24v, 25v-26r, 3or. 110 The Signoria informed ambassadors at the legate’s court that the commune

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the usually reluctant commune was prepared for joint action with the papal forces, Albornoz decided to come to terms with Landau. Preoccupied with the fate of Bologna, which was again threatened by the Visconti, the cardinal hoped that by making

peace with the marauders he would be free to defend that key city and continue the conquest of the papal states. Albornoz informed the Signoria in mid-February that he was negotiating an agreement with the company, whereby the church would pay 40,000 florins and the commune double that amount,

in exchange for Landau’s promise to stay out of Tuscany and Romagna for four years. According to Villani, the legate was convinced that the Florentines, out of reverence for himself and the church, would not shame him by rejecting the pact.’ When this news reached Florence, it provoked a torrent of bitter criticism against Albornoz. The spokesman for the Sixteen, Filippo Machiavelli, commented sharply: “Tell the cardinal to his face that his action is contrary to that which the commune

hoped from him, and that the commune of Florence does not intend that he or anyone else should interfere in any of its negotiations. And tell him that the commune is very displeased with him.”*”? While other counselors were less harsh in their criticism, they did urge the Signoria to induce Albornoz to break off negotiations with the company.”** Various methods of applying pres-

sure on the legate were suggested: some favored the offer of increased aid,’** while others demanded the recall of Florentine troops from Romagna.” But despite the pleas of the commune’s would provide a cavalry force of 1000 horse; Missive, 12, f. 6ov. In a Pratica discussion, speakers with one exception (Stefano del Forese, noted opponent of the Albizzi), approved this plan; CP, 2, ff. 32r-33v, 17 January 13509. 111M, Villani, rx, 6. 112 CP, 2, f. 43r, 20 February 1359. Other speakers voiced similar views. 113 Tellino Dini and Simone dell’Antella emphasized that the legate’s plan would not benefit the papacy; CP, 2, f. 4aqr. 114 Thus, the statements of Simone dell’Antella and Carlo degli Strozzi, the latter a dominant figure in the Albizzi faction; CP, 2, ff. 46r, 47v, 49Vv. 115 The colleges, who were particularly sharp in their criticism of the legate, favored the recall of troops from the papal army in Romagna. Thus Salvestro Isacchi, spokesman for the Twelve (and proscribed by the Parte in 1362): “Quod nullo modo gens mictatur ad d. legatum. Et quod similiter nulla oblatio fiat ei”; CP, 2, f. 5or. See also idid., f. 45r.

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ambassadors at the legate’s court in Cesena,“* Albornoz even-

tually signed a peace agreement with Landau on 21 March. When this information was publicized in Florence, it prompted one citizen to comment: “Let notice be taken of the incongruous actions recently made by the legate to the detriment of the Florentine commune.”*”’

Resentment of the cardinal and his activities, though widespread in the city, was not universal. A small nucleus of conservatives—Parte leaders and Albizzi partisans—favored his project of making peace with the company. Villani asserted that they were motivated by their loyalty to Albornoz, their fear of losing their contado possessions, and their “craven spirit.” The

chronicler contrasted the narrow and selfish attitude of these “great citizens” with the position of the “merchants and artisans of middling rank,” who were determined to resist the company by force of arms, being less concerned with their private interests than with the commune’s honor and welfare.** The issue was not as clear-cut as Villani depicted it, but the Pratiche records corroborate his description of a division within the ruling group on this question of peace or war with the com-

pany.” Most leaders of the Ricci faction opted for resistance, while several conservatives cautiously favored negotiations with

Landau. Typical of this viewpoint was the statement of Piero degli Albizzi, speaking for the Parte captains, who advised the 116 Missive, 12, ff. 68r-6or, 74Vv. 117 CP, 2, f. 61r.

118M. Villani, 1x, 26: “Molti grandi e potenti . . . cittadini, i quali o che conoscessono il pericolo, o che temessono di loro possessioni, o perché fossono d’animo vile, apertamente ne’ pubblichi e aperti consigli aoperavano e consighavano che si prendesse l’accordo; ma il desiderio di vivere in liberta vinse

Pappetito dei cittadini che consigliavano e voleano per maggioranza che il comune facesse a loro modo . . . Questo addivenne per l’unita de’ cittadini mercatanti e artefici e di mezzano stato, che tutti concorsono in uno volere all’onore e bene del comune.” See also zbid., vit, 103; 1x, 6. Villani’s judgment

represents a striking reversal of his earlier views, in which he customarily lauded the great citizens and strongly criticized the medzani. 119 Thus Rosso de’ Ricci’s statement on 8 March; CP, 2, f. 51v. In a Pratica session of 11 April, Marco degli Strozzi, Simone da Quarata, and Francesco Benini, all opponents of the Albizzi and the Parte hierarchy, urged resistance to the company, while Messer Arnaldo Altoviti and Filippo Magalotti favored negotiation; CP, 2, f. 68v. The division was not, however, along strictly factional lines. A Ricci adherent, Luigi de’ Mozzi, counseled peace, while many Albizzi partisans were in favor of military action against the company.

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Signoria to support the legate’s plan for buying peace with Landau, or to give him a subsidy if he was prepared to fight the

company. Such opinions found little overt support in the council meetings, and it required some courage for Piero to advocate further cooperation with the legate. Close ties were still maintained between Albornoz and his Florentine supporters,

for the cardinal was kept informed of what occurred in the council debates.’”

The legate’s decision to make peace with Count Landau had momentous and far-reaching consequences for the papacy’s temporal power in Italy, and also for Florentine politics, It signified, first, the end of the Arno city’s close cooperation with Avignon’s political projects in Italy; henceforth, the curia could not depend on Florence’s assistance in its efforts to build and defend a strong papal state. For the first time in decades, papal motives and objectives in the peninsula were publicly denounced in Guelf Flor-

ence. Villani’s comments are significant: “It appeared that the legate wished to direct the commune and take it under his tute-

lage, and to establish a hidden lordship, whence the people openly criticized him.””” Florentines were angered by Albornoz’

breach of faith, by his failure to protect the city against the company, by his refusal to repay the assistance which the com-

mune had furnished him, and by his assumption that the city would passively accept his decisions.** While a hard core of Guelf partisans persisted in their belief that Florence could not survive outside the papal orbit, the advocates of an independent foreign policy grew in number and influence. A leader of this faction, Giorgio de’ Ricci, suggested that a law be passed pro120 CP, 2, f. gor.

121 CP, 2, ff. 51v-52r, 53r. When this fact was publicized, it provoked demands that those who revealed communal secrets be punished. 122M. Villani, vii, 103.

128 Ibid., 1x, 7: “Sentendo il comune ... che il legato avea fermo per sé laccordo con la compagnia, e abbandonato nell’ impresa grande e pericolosa il nostro comune, forte si dolse, recandosi dinanzi agli occhi gli onori fatti a’ prelati ch’erano passati di qua . . . e i danari ch’avea speso per difendere la Chiesa: di Roma in aggrandire suo stato in Italia, nel cui servigio avea per pit anni quasi del continovo tenuti da quattrocento in cinquecento cavalieri, e da settecento in ottocento balestrieri, senza il grande aiuto de’ suoi singulari cittadini, e distrettuali e contadini, i quali . . . avea tratti altrui di borsa fiorini centomila.”

180

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hibiting the commune from joining any league or federation.** For Giorgio, and for those who agreed with him, the events of 1359 proved that alliances were of little value, and that the Arno city was now strong enough to protect itself without recourse to outside assistance.”” Florence, however, did not stand alone against Landau’s band.

In addition to enlisting (and receiving) aid from such Guelf states as Naples, Padua, and Ferrara, the government also cooperated closely with the archenemy of Italian Guelfism, Bernabé Visconti, lord of Milan. During the spring and summer of 1359,

Florence’s relations with this despot became quite cordial.** Although this development angered the intransigent Guelfs, they could not protest unduly, since the papacy had abandoned the fight against the enemy. The commune exchanged ambassadors with Milan, and Bernabo sent a detachment of troops into Tuscany to defend Florentine territory, a gesture which won praise in council meetings and in diplomatic missives.*” In August, after Landau’s band had withdrawn from Tuscany and moved into Lombardy, Florence sent troops north to join — the Visconti army.’”* These reciprocal acts of assistance were effected without an alliance; communal opinion was not yet ripe for the conclusion of a formal accord with the Ghibelline Visconti.” But this rapprochement with a traditional enemy signaled the growing influence of those citizens who favored a flexible and independent foreign policy, freed from any commitment to the Guelf banner. During the winter of 1359-1360, the commune was forced to 124 CP, 2, f. 51v, 8 March 1350. 125 Council discussions in the spring and summer of 1359 reflect this conviction

that the commune was capable of dealing with the company alone; CP, 2, ff. 82v-108r.

126 As early as February, Bernabo was proposing to send troops to the defense of Florence; CP, 2, f. 4or, 16 February 1359. The question of Visconti military assistance was discussed later in the spring and summer; CP, 2, ff. 5or, 74Vv, “5V-77r, 102K.

127 CP, 2, ff. 50r, 74v-76r; Missive, 12, f. 82r, letter to Bernabo, 10 April 1350.

128 There was general support for sending a force of one thousand horse to

Bernabd’s aid; CP, 2, f. ro6v, 15 July 1359. In a letter of 23 August, the Signoria informed Bernabé that troops had been sent to Lombardy to join his army; Missive, 12, f. gor. 129 CP, 2, f. r19v, 18 September 1359; Missive, 12, f. gor.

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reconsider her relationship with the Visconti and the legate. Bernabo launched a fresh campaign to seize Bologna, and the

Signoria was besieged by pleas for help from Albornoz and | Innocent VI.**° The fervent expressions of friendship for the lord of Milan, which had been proclaimed a few weeks earlier, were forgotten with this revived threat of a Visconti foothold on the Tuscan border, only fifty miles from the Arno city. In the council discussions, however, most citizens opposed the dispatch of any assistance, either military or financial, to Bologna." The strong neutralist position taken by such opponents of the Parte hierarchy as Sandro da Quarata and Simone dell’Antella is illustrated by the latter’s statement: “There should be no participation in the war, either open or hidden, but the commune’s affairs should be regulated and put in order.”**” Although Matteo

Villani stated that this issue “caused great controversy among our citizens in secret councils,” only two opinions recorded in the Pratiche protocols specifically advocated direct assistance to Albornoz.*** The tone of the discussions clearly indicate that the

sympathies of most Florentines lay with the papacy; several speakers admitted that they would be quite pleased to see Bologna under ecclesiastical control.*** When Albornoz did conclude nego-

tiations for the city’s occupation by papal forces in April 1360, the event was applauded in the councils.*” The Bologna crisis of 1360 reflected the stalemate within the ruling group on foreign policy issues. A strong aristocratic minority, with its headquarters in the palace of the Parte Guelfa, had consistently favored the establishment and cultivation of close ties with the papacy and other Italian Guelf states. The magnate 180 Letters requesting aid are printed in Capitolt, 1, 500. One communal reply to these requests is in Missive, 12, f. 115r. The recovery of Bologna by the papacy is described in O. Vancini, “Bologna nella Chiesa (1360-1376),” Atti della R. Deputazione di storia patria per Romagna, ser. 3, xxv (1906), 239-320. 181 CP, 2, ff. 142v, 147V-150r, 150V-152r, 159V-160V, 178r-179V, 18Ir, IQOV-IgIF.

182 CP, 2, ff. 190v-rorr. 188 The two speakers who publicly favored a league were Jacopo di Gherardo Buonaccorsi and Salvestro de’ Medici; CP, 2, ff. 150v-151r. There were probably several others who were loath to express openly an unpopular viewpoint. 134 For example, Messer Tommaso del Garbo, Matteo di Federigo Soldi, Sandro

da Quarata, Messer Arnaldo Altoviti, and Filippo Machiavelli; CP, 2, ff. r5rr, 152r, I5QV, 178r.

185 CP, 2, f. 189v, 25 April 1360.

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Lapo de’ Rossi expressed the sentiments of this group when he stated, “The priors, on behalf of the commune of Florence, should seek to exalt those lords and communes with whom it has always preserved friendship and devotion.”*”* Yet this traditionalist party,

which had guided foreign policy through the 1350's, had lost the initiative by 1360, largely through Albornoz’ blunder. The decline of its influence was clearly revealed in the Bologna crisis,

when it failed to persuade the communal authorities to aid the papacy for a cause which was certainly vital to Florentine interests.’ However, the commune’s refusal to defend Bologna against Bernabo’s invasion was essentially a negative gesture; it was no

substitute for a foreign policy. Opponents of Guelf diplomacy had not yet evolved a coherent plan to meet the serious threats to

Florentine security, from the Visconti behemoth to the armed companies. During the 1360’s this group was searching for an alternative foreign policy which avoided the disadvantages of excessive dependence upon the papacy, while providing the city with adequate protection.

Dissension, Conspiracy, and War, 1360-1365 The history of the Florentine commune in the 1350’s reveals that behind the facade of compromise and conciliation, no real progress had been made toward a permanent settlement of the major controversial issues. Although the rancors and antagonisms

within the ruling group did not explode into revolution or violence, neither did they subside. Those forces which kept discord within manageable bounds—economic prosperity, external crises, the efforts of peacemakers—did not have the character of permanent safety valves. By 1360 there were ominous signs that polit-

ical and social tensions were growing, and that after the short interlude of limited detente, the communal government was again under heavy and sustained attack. There is no simple explanation for the regime’s failure to achieve stability, although in this turbulent and tormented age, stable government would have seemed a miracle. Within the 186 CP, 7, f. 8or.

187 Villani stated that the main reason for the commune’s refusal to send aid to Bologna was the fear that Florence would bear the brunt of the struggle against the Visconti; M. Villani, x, 57.

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governing class there was no general acceptance of the status quo

and no sincere desire to achieve a permanent solution of unresolved issues. The postures of compromise which were adopted were based upon expediency, not conviction. None of the groups

and factions—patricians and parvenus, magnates and artisans, Albizzi and Ricci partisans—was prepared to make any significant

concessions to its opponents. The ultra-conservative patricians were never reconciled to sharing office with lower guildsmen, while the gente nuova could not accept the magnates as equal partners in the commune. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that each citizen was convinced that he was being deprived of

his proper and legitimate place in the regime, and that his neighbor was conniving to achieve political influence beyond his merit and due.*** Behind these attitudes lay the irreconciliable differences between social classes, the intensely competitive conditions of urban life, the penchant for violence which permeated the whole society. Early in 1360 the ubiquitous Ghibelline issue was again raised in a Pratiche discussion.**® Opening the debate was the independent patrician, Filippo Magalotti, who reiterated the criticisms of the Ghibelline proscriptions which he had voiced in the previous year. The practices of the captains, Magalotti insisted, were not

contributing to the aggrandizement of the Parte Guelfa, but to its destruction. His views were seconded by the /anaiuolo, Filippo

Capponi, who belonged to the Ricci faction and consistently opposed the Parte hierarchy. Answering these criticisms was a member of the Albizzi circle, Bindo degli Strozzi, who urged an even more vigorous campaign against the Ghibellines: “Those

inscribed in the Parte’s book of Ghibellines should either be condemned [in the courts] or ammoniti, lest they be chosen to office.” The moderate Guelf position, which probably reflected the views of most patricians, was enunciated by Luca da Panzano, spokesman for the Sixteen: 188 The leaders of the Albizzi faction, in particular, were suspected of seek-

ing immoderate power. See the comment of the virulent critic of the Parte hierarchy, Andrea Rondinelli: “Quod domini sciscitentur si aliqui cives sint qui velint esse maiores comuni, vel acceptare aliquid contra voluntate comunis. Si qui sint, puniantur”; CP, 3, f. gv, 26 January 1362. 189 These discussions are in CP, 2, ff. 159v-160v, 161v, 20 January and 3 February 1360.

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“The regulations made in favor of the Parte Guelfa are useful and good, and the priors should instruct the captains to use them

for the benefit of Parte members. ... They should offer to the captains their favor and assistance so that they will exercise their office forcefully. They should also urge the captains to proceed with deliberation and caution, so that they do not make Ghibellines of true Guelfs, observing at all times the Parte statutes, and

taking care that Ghibellines do not hold office.” A more ominous sign of the unresolved discords in the city was the exposure of a conspiracy against the regime in the late months of 1360. Both Villani and Stefani stated that the plot was inspired by antagonism toward the Parte hierarchy, which had sponsored the campaign against suspected Ghibellines.*” There is some evidence to support this analysis, since four of the conspirators had been proscribed as Ghibellines: Domenico Bandini, Niccold del Buono, Uberto Infanghati, and Andrea dell’Ischia.*” The details of the abortive plot, however, suggest that the participants indulged in subversive activity for a variety

of reasons, and that the sole bond uniting them was hostility toward the regime. In Villani’s judgment, they were all men of aggressive spirits and passions who could not bear to see their rivals surpass them. Among the convicted conspirators were six magnates, members of the Rossi, Pazzi, Frescobaldi, Adimari, Donati, and Gherardini families, whose grievances doubtless centered on the stubborn refusal of the government to allow them more political power.*** These scions of ancient and illustrious families would hardly have been sympathetic to the aspirations of such men as Luca Ugolini and Niccolé del Buono, parvenu merchants of mediocre rank.

Stefani and Villani both asserted that the number involved in the conspiracy was considerably greater than the dozen men 140 CP, 2, f. 161Vv.

141 Detailed accounts of this event are in Stefani, 685; M. Villani, x, 24, 25.

142 Uberto Infanghati and Andrea dell’Ischia had been convicted in the courts as Ghibelline officeholders in 1347; Delizie, x1, 327-28; Bandini and Niccolé del Buono were condemned in 1358; Stefani, 678.

143 Tn addition to those convicted, two other magnates were recorded in unofficial lists of participants: Attaviano Brunelleschi and Tommaso Adimari; Stefani, 685; Diario d’anonimo fiorentino dal 1358 al 1389, p. 298. Domenico

Bandini had married a woman from the Gherardini family; I. Origo, The Merchant of Prato, p. 47.

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who were eventually placed on trial. It was Stefani’s opinion that several leaders of the Ricci faction, dissatisfied with the impressive successes scored by their opponents in the Ghibelline

campaign, were implicated in the plot. However, he added, “Things always go badly for the small fry, while the big fish are able to break through the net.” Villani did not mention the Ricci by name, but he admitted that a substantial number of Florentines were involved. The Signoria was furnished with a long list of alleged conspirators, but it refused to prosecute or even investigate the activities of the accused. Villani attributed this reticence to a disinclination to hold a lengthy judicial process, but Stefani was probably correct in ascribing it to the Signoria’s

| fear of stirring up passions in the city.

Some details of the attempted coup were revealed by foreigners; additional information was extracted by torture from the two men, Domenico Bandini and Niccolé del Buono, who had fallen into the hands of the authorities. The conspirators first intended to seize control of the palace of the Signoria. One of their number, a friar, planned to spend the night in the palace with some other clerics, and after obtaining the keys, to open the gates for his comrades.*** Since the plan could not have suc-

ceeded without outside help, the plotters contacted Giovanni d’Oleggio, lord of Bologna, Matteo Visconti of Milan, and Cardi-

nal Albornoz. This indiscriminate appeal to Guelf and Ghibelline alike is additional proof that the conspiracy was not the work

of a specific political faction, but was conceived by a motley crew of malcontents. The Signoria learned of the plot’s existence from three sources: Cardinal Albornoz, Bartolomeo de’ Medici, one of the conspirators, and Bernarduolo Rosso, a liaison agent. When Bartolomeo informed his brother Salvestro of his part in

the scheme, the latter went to the Signoria, obtained a pardon for his brother, and then revealed the entire conspiracy. Salvestro

thus saved his brother from execution or exile, and his entire family from ignominy.” 144 The details given in the chronicles correspond exactly with the information contained in the judicial sentence; AP, 1525, ff. 57r-57Vv. 145 Brucker, “The Medici in the Fourteenth Century,” Speculum, xxx (1957), 17. Matteo Villani stated that Bartolomeo was the leader of the conspiracy; x,

24; Stefani, 685, mistakenly included him in the list of those who were con-

186

PRECARIOUS EQUILIBRIUM, 1354-1365 | The conspirators were accused in the podesta’s court of planning to overthrow the regime, “while disregarding the peaceful and serene state of the city which thrives in tranquillity, prosperity, and justice.’ They were also charged with advocating constitutional reforms: increasing the number of priors from eight to twelve, and abolishing the Ordinances of Justice. The latter proposal was obviously designed to win magnate support for the plot. All twelve of the accused were sentenced to death, and

their property was confiscated. However, only the two men actually in custody suffered the supreme penalty. The rest were declared rebels, to be summarily executed if they fell into the

hands of the authorities. As a warning to the populace, their portraits were painted on the walls of the podesta’s palace, with

captions describing their crimes and the penalties which they had incurred.***

One other factor which may have played some part in the conspiracy was suggested by a Sienese chronicler; he reported that the ringleaders were lJanaiuoli, whose business had been ruined by the commune’s prohibition against trade with Pisa.** Some credence is lent to this thesis by the fact that three men implicated in the plot—Andrea dell’Ischia, Niccolé del Buono, and Luca Ugolini—were cloth manufacturers.’ The embargo on trade with Pisa had first been imposed by the commune in 1357, when the Signoria refused to accept a tariff on Florentine merchandise passing through the Pisan port. Relations between the two cities deteriorated steadily, with borvicted. Ammirato, /storie fiorentine (Florence, 1647), 1, 602-04, described the

plot in detail; he included in his account a long, patriotic (and probably apocryphal) speech by Salvestro de’ Medici. 148 AP, 1525, f. 58r. One of the convicted conspirators, Messer Pino de’ Rossi,

was the recipient, while in exile, of a famous letter from Boccaccio, commiserating with him on his unjust condemnation; Lettere, pp. 67-97. Another

condemned plotter, Pelliccia Gherardini, was later declared innocent in a communal provision; Prov., 56, f. 16tr. 147 Cronaca senese dit Donato di Neri, in Cronache senest, ed. Lisini and Iacometti, RRIJSS, new ed., xv, Part 6 (Bologna, 1931-1939), 595: “In Firenze

si fe’ uno grande trattato . . . per certi caporali dell’arte de la lana, i quali erano tutti disfatti peroche l’arte de la lana non lavorava per non avere pit el porto di Pisa.” A similar comment is recorded in the Cronica di Pisa, RRIISS, ed Muratori (Milan, 1723-1751), xv, col. 1035.

148 Tana, 20, ff. 2v, 27r, 80r, 82r. , 187

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der disputes inflaming the crisis created by the litigation over transit duties.“ Actual fighting broke out in the spring of 1362 when Pisa occupied the town of Pietrabuona, which was claimed

by Florence. It was the last major war in which a substantial contingent of Florentine citizens participated in the fighting.” After a dreary and protracted struggle, marked by few battles but much ravaging of enemy vineyards and cornfields, peace was

finally negotiated in September 1364." Pisa paid a heavy indemnity of 100,000 florins, but commercial relations between the

two cities were not resumed until 1369.” The military aspect of the conflict, recounted in tiresome detail in the chronicles, possesses little interest, but the war did affect Florence’s internal politics. The lower classes, their patriotism

inflamed, demanded a relentless prosecution of the struggle against the Pisan enemy.’ The patriciate, on the other hand, was seriously divided by the war. While some men from the older families, stirred by memories of past military glories, saw the conflict as a necessary vindication of Florentine honor, others preferred negotiation and compromise. Merchants had originally 149 The details of the rupture are in M. Villani, v1, 19, 47, 48. Villani emphasized that Florentines were united in their determination to resist Pisan demands for the duty. 75° An anonymous chronicler recorded the names of some fifteen prominent citizens, including Ricci, Alberti, Albizzi, Bardi, and Capponi, who fought in the Pisan war; Manoscritti, 222, ff. 218-21. 151 The most detailed account of the conflict is in M. Villani’s chronicle; see also Velluti, pp. 227-41. Non-Florentine sources are valuable for their discussion of responsibility for beginning the war; cf. Cronica di Pisa, RRIISS, xv, cols. 1037

ff., Sozomen Pistoriensis, Specimen Historiae, RRIISS, xvi, cols. 1063 ff.; Cronache senest, 158, 596-597; Le croniche di Giovanni Sercambi Lucchese, ed. S. Bongi (Lucca, 1892), rub. 149-61. 1521). Catellacci, “La pace tra Firenze e Pisa nel 1364,” ASI, ser. 5, 11 (1888),

145-65. , Ln

153 This sentiment was reflected in a Pratica discussion of 23 March 1364. In this debate the patrician speakers, notably Pazzino degli Strozzi and Jacopo Alberti, favored peace negotiations with Pisa, while citizens of lesser rank demanded, “Quod nullo modo fiat pax, sed viva guerra.” The latter included Ser Manno Nigi and Ser Betto Guglielmi, notaries; Neri, a goldsmith, and Romolo Bianchi, a lower guildsman, who stated: “Quod pax non fiat, quia esset vituperabile pro comuni, sed potenter procedatur ad guerram”; CP, 5, f. 4ir. For a similar conflict of opinions, cf. the statements of Carlo degli Strozzi, “Quod sequatur pax, cum guerre processus sit discriminosus”; and Francesco Fabrini, wineseller, “Quod tractatus pacis supersedeat ad presens, et quod viva et debita guerra fiat ut honorabilis pax sequatur”; CP, 5, f. g6v.

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favored the embargo as a means of extracting commercial concessions from Pisa. As the struggle dragged on, however, the business class became concerned over mounting costs and business depression,** and longed for a cessation of hostilities. At no time did the war become a strictly partisan issue; it was supported and opposed throughout its course by adherents of both

factions.” By 1364 the Ricci had assumed the leadership of the war party, and it was an Albizzi partisan, Carlo degli Strozzi, who was instrumental in negotiating a peace settlement. Although Florence, as the recipient of a large indemnity, was the nominal victor, the peace was highly unpopular in the city. Carlo degli Strozzi was assaulted by a proletarian mob that de-

nounced the peace as shameful.” A stonemason named Feo Guidi attacked one of the Sixteen who had approved the Pisan settlement, which, in the mason’s opinion, “was neither good nor honorable.”** Internal peace was a prime necessity for the commune in this *°¢ According to one source, the cost of the war exceeded 1,700,000 fl; Cronichetta d’incerto, in Cronichette antiche di varit scrittori del buon secolo della lingua toscana, ed. Manni (Florence, 1733), p. 187. See Jacopo Alberti’s comment in September 1363: “Quod qui possint solvere [prestantias], solvant, aut fiat pax cum pisanis;” CP, 4, £. 94v. *5° An anonymous source described a secret council meeting held on the eve of the war to discuss the crisis; Manoscritti, 222, f. 213. Prominent among those favoring peace were Messer Giovanni de’ Ricci, Benedetto Alberti, Pazzino degli Strozzi, and Messer Giovanni de’ Medici. The war party included Gian-

nozzo Cavalcanti, a magnate, Simone Peruzzi, Piero degli Albizzi, Vanni Castellani and Messer Oddo Altoviti, all leaders of the conservative Guelf faction. Carlo degli Strozzi was steadfast in his opposition to the war; on 13 June 1362, he was the sole member of a council to favor peace, “Quod non fiat guerra”; CP, 3, f. 71v. Ammirato, Istorte, 1, 610-12, printed an account of a long and impassioned speech in favor of the war by the aged Zato Passavanti. Am-

mirato may have based his account on a Pratica report which is no longer extant.

156 Velluti’s comment, p. 240, is significant: “Carlo degli Strozzi, il quale con molti altri sollicitavano la pace, o che ’] facessono a bene di Comune... o che ’l facessono in dispetto d’Uguccione de’ Ricci, ch’era di que’ della guerra, perch’egli e que’ della sua setta non avessino compimento d’onore.” 157 ‘T)omenica a di primo Settembre usci Carlo degli Strozzi de’ Priori, e nel

tornare a casa fu per essere gran romore, e zuffa, perché il popolo minuto fu tutto commosso contro di lui, che avea fatto pace tra noi, e 1 Pisani”; Dzario del Monaldi, in appendix to Istorie pistolest ovvero delle cose avvenute in Tos-

| 189

cana dall’anno MCCC al MCCCXLVIII (Prato, 1835), p. 499. See also Sozomen, Specimen, col. 1081. 158 AFO], 438, f. 13r, 9 October 1364.

PRECARIOUS EQUILIBRIUM, 1354-1365

enervating struggle with its Tuscan adversary. The essentials for victory were succinctly stated by one citizen: unitas, ordo, gens, et pecunia.”’* Yet this did not prevent certain irresponsible

Parte captains from pressing their campaign against the gente nuova. The number of proscriptions in these years was not large; some thirty individuals were ammoniti between 1360 and 1365. Most of those who lost their political rights came from the new business class; some, like the merchants Jacopo Asini and Tommaso Davizzi, were rich men.*® The Parte hierarchy had also

begun to cast its net into the ranks of the patriciate; the proscribed citizens included Taddeo del Bene, a merchant from a worthy and respected family; Tommaso Adimari and Antonio Brunelleschi, representatives of distinguished magnate houses; and the chronicler, Matteo Villani. The latter had been accused in court by Simone da Castiglionchio of violating the statute prohibiting Ghibellines from accepting communal office. This charge was quashed by the judge. But the oligarchs got their revenge upon Matteo by proscribing him, a few months before he succumbed to the plague.*™

_A significant feature of these proscriptions was the prompt 1° CP, 4, £. 113v, October 1363. The pressure for unity was particularly great in the autumn of 1363, when Florence faced the gravest crisis of the war. See the appeals of Uguccione de’ Ricci, Donato Velluti, Lapo Rossi and Pazzino degli Strozzi in August; CP, 4, ff. 8ar, 85r-85v; and the discussion of 13 October, in which Uberto degli Albizzi, Zenobi dell’Antella, Messer Giovanni de’ Medici,

Filippo Corsini, Alamanno Salviati, Piero Canigiani and Tommaso Altoviti all urged the establishment of civic harmony; CP, 4, f. r1ov. 160 The lists of ammoniti are recorded in Stefani, 681, 686, 688, 692. The proscribed /anatuoli included: Uberto Benvenuti, Giovanni Mazzetti, Francesco Becchi, Ciore del Buono, Giachinotto Tanagli, and Stefano Stefani. Cambio

guild members were Francesco Bonamichi, Jacopo Asini, Sandro Barucci, Uberto Infanghati, and Giovanni Rinaldi. Also proscribed were Bardo Lapi, a retail merchant, Salvestro Isacchi from the guild of Por San Maria, and Tosco Ghinazzi, a druggist. The Tratte records show that a substantial number of ammoniti had been approved in scrutinies for the Signoria. Their names were removed from the Gorse upon extraction; e.g. Piero Ugolini, Francesco Bonamichi, Angelo Guidi, and Gamberello Pieri in May and June 1363; Tratte, 210, ff. 93r, 106r; Salvestro Isacchi and Jacopo Asini in September 1363; zdrd., 211, f. 25r; and Sandro Barucci in September 1364; zdid., 212, f. 21Vv. 161 Villani’s proscription was probably in revenge for his harsh comments against the Parte hierarchy in his chronicle, copies of which were apparently circulated in Florence at this time; G. Brucker, “The Ghibelline Trial of Matteo Villani (1362),” Medievalia et Humanistica, xu (1960), 51-54,

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reaction of the opposition. When Matteo Villani and four others were ammoniti in April 1363, the colleges asked the Signoria to investigate the matter, to determine whether injustice had been done. An acerbic critic of the oligarchic faction, Niccolé Rimbaldesi, urged the priors to summon the captains and demand from them an explanation for their actions,.*” In the following September the issue again arose in council debates, and several speakers expressed fear that the anti-Ghibelline campaign was corroding the bonds of the social order.*® The son of an old foe of the Parte hierarchy, Tommaso di Filippo

Magalotti, spoke bluntly: “The fear that many citizens have that they will be proscribed as Ghibellines ought to be eliminated.” Another critic of the Guelf faction, Giorgio Aldobrandini, advanced a similar view: “Some remedy must be found so that Guelfs will not be suspected of Ghibellinism; from this suspicion the commune may well suffer great damage.” The Signoria and the colleges were then deliberating on some revisions of the ammonizione procedure, but the reform project was stalled by the refusal of the Parte captains to sanction it.’ In January 1364 a prominent and respected merchant, Piero Ferrantini, was proscribed as a Ghibelline. This provoked a storm of criticism. Both colleges expressed their disapproval in sharp and unequivocal terms, and the incident was made the subject of a general discussion by counselors summoned by the Signoria.*°

Participants in the debate did not limit themselves to mild appeals that the proscription be reviewed; they openly denounced

the Parte’s action and demanded its revocation. Even such oligarchs as Filippo Corsini and Uberto degli Albizzi joined the chorus of those who deplored the incident, and the Parte cap-

tains themselves seemed chastened by the uproar they had caused."°* While most speakers limited themselves to the Fer-

rantini case, others pressed for a general investigation of the 162 CP, 4, f. 47v. 163 CP, 4, ff. 101Vv-r02r. 164 Velluti, pp. 243-46. 165 CP, 5, ff. 7r-8r. 186 The viewpoint of the Guelf extremists was generally expressed with mildness and caution; thus in October 1363 the comments of Piero Canigiani, “Uniantur cives cum favore partis guelforum, quod modus est”; and Messer Tommaso Altoviti, “De favore guelforum tractetur, et non ghibellinorum”; CP, 4, f. 113v. The Parte, however, did not make any concession to its critics, and Ferrantini’s proscription remained in effect.

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ammonizione procedure. Giovanni del Bello advised the Signoria to take action to dispel the unrest and discontent which was be-

coming general in the city.’ A noted magnate opponent of the oligarchic faction, Alessandro de’ Bardi, warned that the manner in which the captains were applying the Ghibelline legislation was detrimental rather than beneficial to the Guelf cause. Yet, seemingly unconcerned by this mounting tide of protest and criticism, the captains six months later proscribed a banker, Sandro Barucci. Once again, the colleges protested vehemently,

demanding that Barucci be restored to Guelf status, a remonstrance which was, as usual, without effect.*** The plea for peace,

ut omnes sint fratres, made a few weeks before by the Sixteen, had fallen on deaf ears.*® War burdens and losses, the plague of 1363, proscriptions and fear of proscription darkened the political scene in these years. The clearest indication that the era of relative stability and calm

had come to an end was the disquieting revival of proletarian ferment. In May 1363 there occurred the first serious outbreak of mob violence in the city since the Black Death. A rumor had circulated that a patrician named Guelfo Scali was bribed to surrender the town of Altopascio to the Pisans. The lower classes,

only too willing to believe that an ex-magnate was guilty of treason, looted and burned several houses belonging to the Scali, which provoked the inevitable demands in the councils for the detection and punishment of the offenders.’”? The demands for 187 Giovanni del Bello’s statement: “Quod domini convocent capitaneos partis

et quosdam bonos cives, zelatores partis guelforum, coram quibus pandantur que gesta sunt contra Pierum, et ab eis petatur consilium quod fieri debeat, ut hoc scandalum, quod assidue oritur occasione monitioni, que fit de civibus, tollatur; et circa hoc domini dent salutiferam operam”; CP, 5, f. 7r. 168 CP, 5, f. 1o2r: “Quod Sandro Barucci fiat ius, et imponatur capitaneis quod, cum Sander predictus se doleat de iniustitia, velint sibi ius favere ne conqueri possit debite; et si gratia possit fieri sibi, etiam placeret quod fat, consideratis bonis conditionibus dicti Sandri.” 169 CP, 5, f£. 66r: “Circa unionem civium domini velint operare et laborare, ut omnes sint fratres et ad bonum comunis dispositi”?; and the comment of the spokesman for the Twelve, “Super unionem civium suspectum habentium monitionis et habentium insimul rancores et divisiones, domini provideant, commictendo capitaneis quod circa factum suspectorum ipsi de conscientia guelforum provideant.” 170 “A di 21 di Maggio 1363 il di della Pentecoste furono a furore arse tutte le case degli Scali, perché Guelfo Scali perdé Altopascio”; Diario del Monaldi,

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Justice expressed in the council debates were tempered, however, by pleas for moderation, “lest scandal should arise.”*”! Violence flared up again in September, when a demonstration was staged against a police official." Then followed the tumult of September 1364, when a mob hurled imprecations at Carlo degli Strozzi.*” The signing of the peace treaty with Pisa did not relax tensions in the city; instead, it ushered in a period of economic depression and intensified partisan conflict, weakening the foundations of

the regime and preparing the way for its demise. p. 496; See also Sozomen, Specimen, col. 1072. For an expression of this attitude in a different context, see the anonymous denunciation of a magnate, Alessandro

de’ Cerchi. An official in charge of supplying the Florentine army, he was accused in May 1364 of deliberately withholding supplies from the commune’s troops; Deliberaziont det Signori e collegi (ordinaria autorita), 12, £. 15¢. 171 CP, 4, ff. 56v, 59v-61v. Among the speakers there was apprehension that harsh treatment of the culprits would lead to greater unrest: “Item quod illis

qui delinquerunt, fiat ius; placetur tamen quod potius punirentur in pecunia et carcere quam alio modo, ne scandala oriri valeat.” 172 CP, 4, f. roov. 173On this occasion, the colleges demanded that those responsible for the demonstration be apprehended; CP, 5, f. 130r, 1 September 1364.

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oo CHAPTER V Domestic Ferment and Foreign Perils 1366-1370

: Storm Signals Court records constitute one of the most accurate gauges of Florence’s political condition in the fourteenth century. When the city’s economy was flourishing and relations between social classes were harmonious, the judicial documents were filled with details of offenses committed by individuals against their fellows, the crises in human relationships characteristic of an urban society

in any age. During troubled times, however, these records described more serious phenomena: conspiracies, mass demonstrations, mob violence, the dissemination of seditious opinion. In the 1340’s the courts dealt with cases reflecting all these manifestations of an unstable political and social order. The next decade was relatively peaceful, but after 1365 indications of popular un-

rest and overt hostility toward the regime appeared more frequently in the judicial records. In other sources, too, the signs of danger multiplied. Just before his death in 1370, Donato Vel-

luti somberly recorded his apprehensions of the future. “May it please God,” he wrote, “that this city . . . remain in peace, which is unlikely, considering the discontent and the antagonisms which exist and the prominent men who are said to direct them.”*

This mounting tension was due partly to the regime’s inability to provide acceptable solutions for the internal problems, above all, for the distribution of political power. Equally important was a serious economic depression which struck the city in the 1360’s. After the temporary prosperity of the years following the Black Death, business conditions deteriorated, notably in the woolen cloth industry.” Markets in northern Europe were disrupted by

the renewal of the Anglo-French war in 1369, and the growth of local industry in England and the Low Countries lessened the 1 Ia cronica domestica di Messer Donato Vellutt, p. 258. 2 See above, pp. 14-16; C. Cipolla, “The Trends in Italian Economic History in the Later Middle Ages,” Journal of Economic History, 1x (1949), 181-82.

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*e3.

demand for Florentine cloth.* Manufacturers endeavored to com-

pete in a shrinking foreign market by cutting production costs at home; the result was a lengthy and acrimonious dispute between the /anaiuoli and the dyers in 1369 and 1370. Woad dyers, protesting the Lana guild’s efforts to fix rates for dyeing cloth, had refused to work. Their strike was broken eventually by severe penalties meted out to them by the guild’s foreign official.* The

records of both the guild and the commune contain references to the business slump.” To the misery caused by unemployment was added the distress from famine. Bad weather in the 1360's was responsible for a series of lean harvests, with the inevitable grain shortage and rise in bread prices. “Profits have greatly declined and grain is very dear,” commented one chronicler in 1369."

The business depression complicated the commune’s fiscal problems. While tax revenues were declining, expenditures increased for grain purchases to alleviate famine conditions, and for the hire of the ubiquitous condottieri." This forced the government to rely ® For the decline in wool exports from England in this period, see A. Beardwood, Alien Merchants in England (1350-1377), p. 160. English cloth exports also increased rapidly in these years; E. Carus Wilson, “Trends in the Export of English Woolens in the Fourteenth Century,” Economic History Review, ser. 2, 11 (1950), 166-75.

*A. Doren, Die Florentiner Wollentuchindustrie vom vierzehnten bis zum sechzehnten Jahrhundert, pp. 300-02; N. Rodolico, Il Popolo minuto. Note di storia fiorentina (1343-1378), docs. 26, 27. 5 Doren, Wollentuchindustrie, p. 230, and his Le arti fiorentine, 1, 255. 6 Cronichetta d’incerto (1301-1379), in Cronichette antiche di varit scrittori del buon secolo della lingua toscana, ed. Manni (Florence, 1733), p. 191. For references to grain shortages and bad weather, see Cronaca fiorentina di Marchtonne di Coppo Stefani, Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, new ed., xxx, Part 1 (Bologna, 1903-1955), 709, 712, 723; Cronica senese di Donato di Neri, in Cronache senest, RRIISS, new ed., xv, Part 6 (Bologna, 1931-1939), 633, 655. A reference to the

difficulties encountered by Florentine merchants in the Low Countries ts contained in a letter of August 1375, from Luigi Marsili to a wealthy merchant, Guido di Tommaso del Palagio: “De’ danni, che nei beni temporali avete ricevuti a Bruggia, e ne’ Paesi [Bassi], mi pesa.. .. Ma molti dei nostri cittadini, e altri italiani, hanno ricevute la di gran percosse per questi tempi passati: quali per disavventure causali: quali per malizia d’uomini che pit li dovevano francare. E a me pare, che le signorie temporali d’oggi non sieno attente a correggere i costumi dei loro sudditi, anzi eziandio a torto votare le loro borse”; F. Selmi, “Documenti cavati dai trecentisti circa al potere temporale della chiesa,” Rivista contemporanea, xxx (1862), 118. 7As a result of the rebellion of S. Miniato and the war with the Visconti,

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more heavily on the forced loan as a fiscal device; the amounts levied upon the citizenry soared.* Every possible source of revenue was

tapped, and even the clergy, who had been quite successful in avoiding communal taxation, were required to pay subsidies to the treasury.’ The intensified search for revenue brought agonized protests from inhabitants of both city and contado.”° In one plea

for tax relief, it was stated that the poor were migrating from Florence in large numbers to avoid assessments which they were unable to pay.” A more serious matter for the communal treasury was the resistance to these levies by influential citizens who sought to reduce or avoid their tax payments.” Several provisions

enacted by the councils were designed to force delinquents to meet their fiscal obligations fully and promptly, but rarely were the collectors a match for the resourceful tax dodger.” military expenditures increased rapidly between 1368 and 1370. See the numerous provisions pertaining to the hire of condottieri; Provvisiont, 57, ff. 471, 69V, 226v; 58, ff. 113r-114r, 163r, 173v. For reasons not easily explicable, Florence consist-

ently paid more for the hire of troops than did other Italian states, including the papacy; K. Schafer, Deutsche Ritter und Edelknechte in Italien wahrend des 14. Jahrhunderts (Paderborn, 1911-1940), Iv, 9, 19. 8 For the prestanze levied in the year 1370, see Prestanze, 191-208; Prov., 57, ff. 153V, IgIv-192r, 198r-200r, 209r, 2331-234r, 238r-239V; 58, ff. 98r-gQv. ® On the question of clerical taxation, see Prov., 55, £. 108r; Consulte e Pratiche, 8, ff. 23v, 24v-28r; 9, ff. 18v-19Vv; 11, ff. 12r, 18r, 20r, 39v-4or, 56r. In 1367 Pope

Urban V protested against the tax levy on the clergy; in 1370, he approved a clerical subsidy of 6000 f.; Prov., 58, £. 10o9v; CP, 9, f. ror; 11, £. 88v; 7 Capitol del Comune di Firenze, 11, 523.

10The direct tax rate in the contado was doubled in February 1368, from 20 s. to 40 s. per lire of the estimo; Prov., 55, f. 134r. In 1370 protests from many contadini that they were unable to pay their taxes induced the commune to extend the deadline for payment from May to August; Prov., 58, f£. 3v. 11 Cf, the appeals of 2 June 1369, 4 May and 11 October 1370; Att: del Esecutore

degli Ordinamenti della Guiustizia, 575, £. 48v; 589, f. 1o7r; 621, f. 37r. It is probable that the exodus from Florence was a consequence of the closing of the cloth factories and the resultant unemployment. 12 Reduction and cancellation of prestanza levies were very common. See the lengthy list of revisions made by the Signoria on 29 May 1364; Deliberazioni dei signori e collegi (ordinaria autorita), 12, ff. 73-90. Pleas for tax relief came indiscriminately from the rich and the poor; e.g. Castrone di Sinibaldo de’ Bardi (2979 f.), Bartolomeo Davizzi (900 fi.), Bartolo, cimatore (24 fi.), Andrea di Cenni (12 f1.), Lapo di Bindo Cavalcanti (240 fl.); Prov., 52, ff. 111v-112v. See

also Prov., 52, ff. 156r-157v, for the petitions of Goro Ricasoli, Baldiccione Monaldi, and Arnoldo Ruspi, all wealthy men. 18 On discussions of measures to force payment of prestanza levies, see CP, 10, ff. 27v, 80v; 11, f. 5v. A provision of September 1369 stated: “Quod multi sunt

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The economic crisis also intensified the antagonisms between social classes. A mass of hungry and unemployed workers was a

stark reminder of the dangers of revolution inherent in Florence’s economic and social system. But in a less obvious way, the depression contributed to the exacerbation of relations between the patriciate and the gente nuova. From the eleventh to the early fourteenth century, “new men” had been absorbed with relative

ease into the economy, society, and political structure of Florence. This period of the city’s rapid growth was characterized by

extensive economic opportunity and a high degree of social mobility. However, during the period of economic contraction, which began in the 1340’s, this absorption was much more dif_cult and painful. The old order could less afford to grant political power to the newcomers, to surrender a portion of the substantial economic benefits and perquisites which the commune had at its disposal, to share more equitably in the fiscal burdens of government. If the possession of political power was important in the prosperous thirteenth century, this became an imperative, a question of survival, after 1343.

A clear danger signal was the resurgence of mass unrest, the first signs of which appeared in the last months of the Pisa war. In July 1367 a disturbance erupted in the quarter of S. Croce when some of the inhabitants of that cloth manufacturing district participated in an illegal demonstration. A year later, in June 1368, an ofhcial of the captain of the popolo, searching for hidden arms, was attacked by a mob in the S. Spirito quarter.” There followed in July a very serious riot in the grain market at Or San Michele. Inspired by the scarcity and the high price of bread, this violent outburst, involving five hundred persons, was directed against the grain dealers and the communal authorities. The mob carried sacks of wheat and flour from the storage

granary and brought them to the square before the palace of the Signoria, shouting: “Long live the popolo minuto and death in civitate Florentie qui propter ipsorum audaciam et potentiam non solverunt prestantias eis imponitas”; Prov., 57, f. 78r. Another law of June 1370 stipulated that citizens who neglected to pay their prestanze could not be elected to any communal office for ten years; Prov., 58, f. r1v. See also Prov., 57, ff. 230r-230Vv. 14 CP, 8, f. 87r. 15 Atti del Capitano del Popolo, 145, f. 7r.

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to the popolo grasso who starve us and refuse to sell us grain!”*®

This tumult caused great concern among officials; several citizens urged the Signoria to punish the participants with severity, as a warning to the populace.” Sixteen men, all from the lower classes, were accused of taking part in the riot; five were absolved and the remainder were sentenced to death. These, however, had taken the precaution of fleeing the city to avoid execution.

Equally indicative of the prevailing political currents were the references in the official records to growing criticism of the

regime, its policies, and personnel. One collegiate group in February 1368 demanded the detection and punishment “of those who speak against the office of the Signoria and the present government.” The most virulent expression of hostility, reminiscent of the 1340’s was voiced by a magnate, Gherardo di Messer

Lorenzo Buondelmonti: “The time will come when we will no longer endure the rule of these execrable priors, nor of this rabble.

One day we will cut to pieces those who have given office to such people.”*” One of Gherardo’s relatives, Messer Uguccione Buondelmonti, whose hatred for the regime was notorious, sent one of his friends to assault the chronicler, Marchionne Stefani. The latter’s offense consisted solely of membership in a tax commission which levied a prestanza against Uguccione.”

Not an isolated event, the attack upon Stefani was one of a series of incidents in these years in which men closely identified

with the regime and with its liberal faction were subjected to physical violence. There is no direct proof that these attacks were inspired by partisan enmity, but it is unlikely that they were all devoid of political significance. A lower guildsman named Giovanni Ciari, very active in communal politics, was assaulted 16 For the condemnation of the rioters, see Rodolico, Popolo minuto, doc. 11; ACP, 165, f£. 1v; Atti del Podesta, 1902, ff. 305r, 367r, 369r; AEO], 568, ff. 4rr42r, 53V.

17 CP, 9, £. rror. 18 CP, 9, f. 48v. For a similar complaint, see CP, 9, f. 34v, 18 January 1368. 19 AEO], 555, f£. 42r; “Ma eglie é venuto tempo, che noi non sosteremmo questo stato di questi priori chachati, né di questo popolazzo, che noi gli tagliaremo un di tutti a pezzi chi danno uficio a tal giente.” 20 AEO], 575, £. 44r, 23 June 1369. Uguccione was once described as one who

had worked unceasingly to destroy the popular regime; AEOJ, 644, f. 85r. Although Stefani did not sit in the Signoria until 1379, he held many communal offices in these years.

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and nearly killed in 1368 by one Nanni Compagni.” The aggressors in three other altercations—Francesco di Giovanni Peruzzi, Angelo di Andrea, and Rodolfo di Taddeo de’ Bardi—

belonged to families prominent in the oligarchic camp. Their victims—Bernardo and Vieri Rimbaldesi, Tommaso di Luigi Mozzi, and Giovanni di Francesco Magalotti—were all from patrician families who were hostile to the Albizzi faction.” Another incident, apparently inspired by personal animosity and partisan rancor, involved Lorenzo di Messer Dino, a druggist and a bitter foe of the oligarchic faction, who was proscribed in 1377. Lorenzo denounced Priore Baldovinetti, an important figure

in the Parte Guelfa: “You are a robber and a traitor, and you seek to force me and fifty others to leave Florence, but I will

join with them to kill you.” The most sensational crime of this type was the murder (November 1370) of Sandro da Quarata, one of the leaders of the Ricci faction.”* The manner in which the assault was planned

suggests that the killers were hired assassins.” In his private chronicle, Guido Monaldi stated that the Panzano, a branch of the noble Firidolfi clan, were responsible for the murder.”* An 21 4CP, 165, f. 3r, 19 August 1368. Ciari, who was proscribed by the Parte in 1378, was in the Signoria five times. He was one of the rising “new men” who was originally enrolled in the arte det rigattiert, but who later matriculated in the Por San Maria guild. He was a frequent speaker in Pratiche sessions. 22 These attacks are described in AP, 2645, f. 21r; AEO], 656, £. 29v; 688, f. 15v. The Rimbaldesi and Mozzi were all proscribed as Ghibellines in 1378. Giovanni Magalotti had a consistent record of opposition to the Parte hierarchy; Stefani, 731, 752; Manoscritti, 222, £. 265. Two other attacks of this period, in which factional rivalry may have played a part, were perpetrated by Simone di

Bettino Ricasoli and Bartolomeo di Niccolé Cione Ridolfi against Niccold Pantaleoni and Pagolo de’ Ricci; AEOJ, 662, f. 136r; 672, f. 13r. Ridolfi was a Guelf extremist; Stefani, 775. 23 ACP, 320, f. 54r. On Lorenzo, see Stefani, 779. He was active in the 13781382 regime; Stefani, 910. Baldovinetti was one of the arciguelfi who was made a magnate after the revolution of June 1378; Stefani, 795. 24On Sandro’s hostility to the Parte, see Velluti, p. 252. He sat in the Signoria seven times between 1343 and 1370, and was a frequent participant in Pratiche discussions.

25 Eight men were convicted of the crime in absentia; none were from prominent families. Three were contadini; two others came from Siena and Romagna; ACP, 320, f. 112r. The assassins hid in a house near the monastery of S. Spirito, to await Sandro’s exit from the church after mass. Elaborate provisions were made for their escape through the city gates. 26 Diario del Monaldi, appended to Istorie pistolesi (Prato, 1835), p. 502.

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anonymous denunciation accused a “great and powerful citizen” named Jacopo di Federigo, whose background and family connections were not further identified.” Whatever motives lay behind the crime, the death of Sandro da Quarata removed from

the political arena one of the sharpest critics of the oligarchic group. If the leaders of this faction were not implicated in the assassination, they gained much profit from it. The documents that most clearly reflect the poisoning of the political atmosphere are the tamburazioni or secret accusations which were dropped into a box in the executor’s palace, and which that official was required to investigate.** While most of these denunciations pertained to assaults and other criminal acts per-

petrated by magnates, a few had political implications. These described defamatory statements allegedly made by opponents of the regime, or the treasonable activity in which they engaged. It is difficult to judge the veracity of these documents; some are convincing, others are palpably false. They were all inspired by the

desire to impugn the character of the most distinguished members of the community.” The campaign to discredit prominent Florentines reached a climax during the winter and spring of 1368-1369. Several oligarchic leaders—Pazzino degli Strozzi, Attaviano Brunelleschi, Matteo Cavalcanti, Niccolé Buondelmonti, Bartolo Biliotti—were

accused of supporting S. Miniato’s rebellion against Florence in 1368.°° These denunciations, all couched in similar terms, were 27 The only member of a magnate family with the given names of the accused in §. Maria Novella was Jacopo di Federigo Soldanieri; Prestanze, 336, £. 114Vv.

The author of the accusation made this plea to the judge: “Vi si prega che retegniate iustitia, si ché ei grandi omini non si tragono i popolari, si ché i ghebeglini non sopressino i boni e ghelfi di Firenze”; AEOJ, 610, f£. 6v. 28 These secret denunciations had been abolished in 1355; Prov., 41, ff. 137v138r; but they were revived again in 1360; zb7d., 48, f. 30r. 29 Included in these accusations is a minor charge against Lapo da Castiglionchio. He was accused of violating communal regulations by transacting personal business, the quest of a benefice for his nephew Simone, while serving as an ambassador to the papal curia. Lapo was absolved of the charge; AEO], 510, f. 33v, 29 January 1368. This is the same Simone who in 1362 pressed a charge of Ghibellinism against Matteo Villani; Brucker, “The Ghibelline Trial of Matteo Villani (1362),” Medievalia et Humanistica, xu (1960), 49-51. Simone died in

1369; see the laudatory letter from his friend, Coluccio Salutati, to Lapo; Epistolario di Coluccio Salutati, 1, 100-03. 80 The accusations are in AEOJ, 553, ff. 3v-4r, 25r, 38r, 451r; all were quashed by the executor.

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probably the work of the Ricci faction, seeking to blacken the reputations of the Albizzi leaders by accusing them of treason. One informant claimed that Piero degli Albizzi had secretly pledged his support to the S. Miniato rebels: “You begin a revolt

in the territory of S. Miniato. I, with your other friends here [in Florence] will guarantee that you will remain in the good graces of the commune. You have nothing to fear as long as you keep the plot secret. If it is discovered, you will be lost.” There-

upon, the accusation continued, the men from S. Miniato returned home and organized the revolt, “and this man [Piero] has always supported these traitors.” The executor was urged to have no regard for Piero’s status, since there were many popolani in Florence as powerful as the Albizzi who would sustain the judge’s position. None of the witnesses cited in the accusation could throw any light on the charges, which were then quashed.* These zamburazioni were not monopolized by the enemies of the oligarchic faction; they were also used to cast suspicion upon Ricci partisans. In October 1368 Andrea de’ Ricci was accused of giving aid and comfort to the S. Miniato rebels, and of being a Ghibelline and a secret supporter of Charles IV, who was then

in the midst of his second Italian tour.*? A document which throws much light upon the partisan mentality was deposited with the executor in August 1370 by a zealous Guelf from the S. Spirito quarter.** This irate citizen informed the executor that all true Guelfs in his district (Scala) were being systematically oppressed by Ghibellines through arbitrary and inequitable prestanza assessments. The three ringleaders of this conspiracy were identified as members of a commission responsible for raising communal revenue. One, Alessandro de’ Bardi, was indisputably Guelf, but the others, according to the informant, were Ghibellines: Lodovico di Banco di Ser Bartolo and Niccol6 di Francesco Mannelli. Lodovico was a merchant matriculated in the Por San

Maria guild; his family had first entered the Signoria in 1349. Mannelli belonged to an ex-magnate family that had recently achieved popolano status. The writer of the denunciation contended that these officials had appointed some twenty assessors, 81 AEO], 576, f. 18r. 82 AEO], 553, £. 44r. Also implicated in the rebellion were Piero Guicciardini and Messer Niccolé Alberti; zdzd., ff. 36r, 48r. 88 AEO], 621, f. 4r.

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notorious Ghibellines, who taxed lightly the individuals of their political persuasion, “while the Guelfs are assessed more than

they can possibly pay.” |

This illuminating document indicates that partisan antagonisms were not limited to the palace of the Signoria; they had descended to the local level and had become enmeshed with such mundane but vital issues as the apportionment of the tax burden. The author of the document was from an old, established Guelf family, and

his hostility toward the parvenus was typical of his caste. The targets of his wrath were, with few exceptions, gente nuova. They __ included lower guildsmen (Caroccio, a baker; Paolo delle Recchiate, a second-hand clothier; Biondo, a pork butcher); a noted Ricci partisan (Vieri Rimbaldesi); a prominent merchant (Giovanni da Uzzano), and two ex-magnates from the Mannelli family. This indictment accurately reflects the prejudices of the Guelf extremists, who placed the Ghibelline label indiscriminately upon anyone who was not submissive to the Parte hierarchy, and who favored a regime with a broad popular base. These arciguelfi had not deviated from this attitude since the regime’s inception in 1343, or the introduction of the first anti-Ghibelline law four years later.

The Popular Resurgence: the Reform of | the Parte Guelfa, 1366-1367 The factions contributed to the pressures endangering the regime, and drew sustenance from these forces, After two decades,

these partisan coalitions had become familiar fixtures on the Florentine political scene. They were firmly established, with corps of leaders, lower echelons of secondary figures, and a shift-

ing, vacillating rank and file, who voted the “party line” in council meetings, exerted influence upon their relatives and neighbors, insulted and baited their partisan rivals, and engaged in street demonstrations. Dwindling in numbers and influence

were those men who remained uncommitted in the factional feuds, who sought to maintain a viable middle ground in communal politics.

These factions, dubbed Albizzi and Ricci by the chroniclers, were led by small patrician elites composed of representatives from the most prominent families in Florence. The leaders, called

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DOMESTIC FERMENT AND FOREIGN PERILS, 1366-1370

caporalt by Stefani, possessed ambition, influence, strong convic-

tions, a partisan temperament, and the time and resources to devote a large portion of their energies to the political maelstrom.

The forces which these caporali led were not homogeneous blocs.** Even the oligarchic faction, with its focus in the Parte Guelfa, and its cohesiveness fortified by blood ties between aristo-

cratic families, was not monolithic. Stefani lists only a few houses—Albizzi, Peruzzi, Altoviti, Buondelmonti, Rucellai—all of whose members actively promoted the cause of Guelfism and oligarchy.*° More common were those families in which only certain branches or a few individuals engaged in partisan politics.

Thus the chronicler noted that some of the Acciaiuoli and the Ardinghelli, the descendants of Messer Piero de’ Bardi, and two each of the Baroncelli, Canigiani, and Ridolfi families were promi-

nent in the Albizzi faction. Their relatives were indifferent to politics, possessed such limited influence that they did not deserve

mention as partigiani, or, as in the case of the Bardi and the Medici, they adhered to the rival party.** Not every magnate house was committed en bloc to the oligarchic group, although these families did furnish a substantial portion of its leadership. 84 On the origin and composition of the factions, see Ch. 3, Part 2. It is difficult to obtain information on the personnel of these factions; the chroniclers furnish only the names of a few leaders. One cannot be certain that Parte hierarchs and citizens who advocated Ghibelline proscriptions and a propapal foreign policy were all associated with the Albizzi faction. It is equally dangerous to assume

that proscribed citizens, and those who opposed a foreign policy tied to the Papacy, were zpso facto in the Ricci camp. Such arciguelfi as Lapo da Castiglion-

chio, Simone Peruzzi, and Migliore Guadagni were at times in opposition to the Albizzi; Stefani, 731, 733. In addition to the Consulte e Pratiche protocols, the

most useful, but not infallible, guides to the membership of the sette are, for the oligarchic party, the lists of captains involved in ammonizione; the Guelf hierarchs recorded by Stefani, 775, 788; and the lists of citizens condemned or exiled between 1378 and 1382; Stefani, 790, 795, 799, 810, 814, 821, 326, 845, 851. For defining the composition of the popular faction, the most valuable sources are

the lists of ammoniti; the citizens who were knighted by the Ciompi; Stefani, 795; and those who were executed, fined, or exiled after the 1382 revolution; Stefani, gto, 918. 85 Stefani lists the important members of the Guelf hierarchy; 775, 790. 36 Those Bardi who belonged to the popular faction were Alessandro di Messer Riccardo and Messer Andrea; on their political orientation, see CP, 8, f. 57v; Cronache e memorte sul tumulto det Ciomp1, ed. G. Scaramella, RRIISS, new ed., xvi, Part 3 (Bologna, 1917-1934), 49. On the Medici, see Brucker, “The Medici in the Fourteenth Century,” Speculum, xxxu (1957), 17-19. Other families with members belonging to both factions were the Antellesi, Magalottt, Baldovinetti, and Strozzi.

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Many magnates, perhaps discouraged by their exclusion from the highest offices, did not participate in politics;*’ a handful were actually hostile to the Albizzi faction and paid for their temerity by suffering proscription.” Among the patricians who constituted the leadership of the con-

' servative faction, there was considerable diversity and variety in background, wealth, and status. Bettino Ricasoli could trace his lineage back to the twelfth century and earlier,’ while Bonaiuto _ Serragli was, by patrician standards, a parvenu. His family did not

enter the Signoria until 1324. There were sharp contrasts, too, between the active businessmen and the rentiers (scioperati), and between the very wealthy and the impecunious. Piero degli Albizzi, Carlo degli Strozzi, and Michele Castellani were all rich merchant capitalists who personally directed their companies engaged in cloth manufacture and overseas trade and finance.” Vieri di Cambio de’ Medici was a wealthy banker, the most ardent Guelf partisan in his large and politically divided family.” But these entrepreneurs were a minority in the oligarchic faction, most of whose adherents were rentiers. Bettino Ricasoli’s fortune 37 Forty-five members of the Buondelmonti family are recorded by name in the 1352 sega, and the 1364 and 1378 prestanza records, Of those, only nineteen held communal offices; Manoscritti, 534, no pag. Between 1350 and 1378, these nineteen Buondelmonti held approximately one hundred communal offices: castellan and podesta posts in the contado, members of commissions in charge of collecting taxes, recruiting troops, administering communal property. 38 Those magnates who were proscribed included Antonio di Nepo and Niccolo di Donzello Brunelleschi; Luigi di Poltrone Cavalcanti; Francesco, Niccolo di Lodovico and Giovanni di Riccardo de’ Cerchi; Tuccio Falconieri; and Francesco del Boschiere della Tosa; Stefani, 678, 681, 743, 765, 775; Diario d’anonimo

fiorentino, p. 292. Francesco de’ Cerchi and Messer Nofrio and Giovanni di Messer Pino de’ Rossi were three magnates who were adherents of the 1378-1382

regime; they were fined after the oligarchic coup of 1382; Stefani, gro, 918. Several Adimari were also ammoniti; Stefani, 681, 743, 775. 89 The Ricasoli were a branch of the Firidolfi, a feudal family of great antiquity; Passerini, Genealogia e storia della famiglia Ricasoli (Florence, 1870), Ch. 1. 40 Stefani, 411. Bonaiuto’s brother, Banchello, was a factor in the Bardi company, 1328-1345; A. Sapori, La crist delle compagnie mercantili det Bardi e det Peruzzi, p. 256.

41In the April 1378 prestanza, the assessments of Albizzi, Strozzi, and Castellani were 49, 105, and gt fl., respectively; Pres., 333, f. 2v; 335, ff. 8r, 78r. Carlo and Michele are recorded in the list of companies using the port of Pisa in 1369; Peruzzi, Storia del commercio e det banchteri di Firenze, pp. 220-22. Piero degli Albizzi was in the Lana guild; he was consul in 1351, 1356, and 1370. 42 Brucker, “Medici,” 6, 9-10, 17.

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owed little, if anything, to commerce and industry, but was founded upon real estate.“* His fellow magnate, Adoardo de’ Pulci,

another leader in the faction, lived in poverty—if his prestanza assessments are an accurate indication of his wealth.** The ration-

ale for his political convictions differed from that of the enormously rich Carlo degli Strozzi. Pulci’s situation was desperate, for the gente nuova threatened his political and social status as well as a vital source of his income, communal office. An even more heterogeneous group headed the faction which claimed to speak for the guild community, the business elements, the “middle classes” of Florence. At the center of this party were

the Ricci, bankers and cloth merchants whose fortunes were mediocre by comparison with those of the wealthiest oligarchic leaders.** Other family blocs represented in the councils of this faction were the Capponi, Covoni, and Salviati, houses which were all engaged in woolen cloth production. Allied with them were men from small patrician families: Luigi Aldobrandini and Sandro da Quarata, both rentiers; Niccold Rimbaldesi, a banker; Andrea Rondinelli and Francesco Rinuccini, international traders. Two lawyers, Messer Donato Barbadori and Messer Donato Aldighieri, were also prominent in this faction. Among the “new men”

were two lower guildsmen, Matteo di Federigo Soldi, a wine merchant, and Giovanni Ciari, a retail clothier; and two lanazuolz,

Tommaso Soldani and Guccio di Dino Gucci.** None of these 48 Bettino’s prestanza in April 1378 was 28 f1., in the upper one per cent of assessments; Pres., 333, f. 74v. Although none of the Ricasoli were active in business, nor enrolled in any guild, Bettino’s father, Messer Bindaccio, had invested 380 fl. in the Antellesi company before its bankruptcy in 1342; A. Sapori,

“Tl quaderno dei creditori di Taddeo dell’Antella e compagni,” Rivista delle biblioteche e degli archivi, n.s., 111 (1925), 180. 44 Adoardo’s prestanza (April 1378), was 1 f., 4s., 4d.; Pres., 335, £. 4r. Most

artisans paid higher levies. 45 The wealthiest members of the family were Messer Rosso and Messer Giovanni; in the April 1378 prestanza, they were assessed 30 and 32 fl.; Pres., 335, ff. 185v-186r. Uguccione paid only g fl., 155.; zbid., £. 185v. Fourteen Ricci were enrolled in the Cambio guild and three in the Calimala guild between 1357 and 1372; Rosso and Uguccione were both in the Calimala; Cambio, 12, passim; Manoscritti, 542, passim. 46 The majority of the leaders of the Ricci faction were entrepreneurs. Many

are included in the 1369 list of mercantile companies using the Pisan port: Guccio Gucci, Tommaso Soldani, Andrea Salviati, Filippo and Cappone Capponi, Matteo, Bettino, and Bartolomeo Covoni; Peruzzi, pp. 219-22. They were men of substantial though not great wealth; see, e.g., the 1378 prestanza records of

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men was from a family of the highest social stratum. The patri-

clans among them belonged to the middle rank of the city’s aristocracy; they did not possess the lofty and impregnable status of a Bardi, a Pazzi, or a Strozzi. By 1370, however, this faction had gained the support of such eminent citizens as Salvestro de’ Medici, Benedetto di Nerozzo Alberti, Tommaso degli Strozzi,

and Messer Andrea de’ Bardi. The entry of these men into the Ricci circle invested that group with much greater influence and prestige in communal politics.*’ Open warfare between the two factions burst in the autumn of

1366 over the inflammable Ghibelline issue. Even though the Parte Guelfa did not engage in extensive and indiscriminate ammonizione, the fear of proscription, which hung like a pall over the guild community, was not dispelled. For every citizen who was proscribed, ‘perhaps ten were warned explicitly or by subtle hints to behave properly in political matters, or face the danger of ostracism for themselves and their descendants. No citizen, reported one observer, dared to speak candidly on issues confronting the commune, fearing that he might invite retaliation by a vindictive Parte hierarchy.“ Even more insidious was the suspicion that the captains, by agreeing to proscribe each other’s private enemies, had converted ammonizione into a diabolical farce.* There is little doubt that personal antagonisms and even baser considerations played a role in some proscriptions. In one case of attempted bribery which was exposed, a notary named

Ser Paolo Silvestri was condemned in court for offering fifty florins to a Parte captain if he would induce his colleagues to designate Ser Benozzo Pieri as a Ghibelline.*’ Concerning other the Capponi and the Covoni; Pres., 332, ff. 88r-gor, g2r, 115r-116v; 333, ff. 67v69v, 128v-129r.

47 These men were wealthy, and their frequent appearance in the Pratiche records attested to their political influence. The record of their opinions prove that they were hostile to the Parte hierarchy; however, there is no evidence to show how intimately they were affiliated with the Ricci faction, nor why they were opposed to the oligarchic group. 48 Delizie degli eruditi toscani, 1x, 279: “. . . Assai volte per tema, e per paura la ragione e ’l consiglio per non dispiacere a una delle parti de’ maggiori; e nondimeno il Comune perisce; perché questi tali, che dubitano non osano consigliare per non dispiacere a’ maggiori.” 49 Stefani, 674, 695. 50 AFO], 426, f. 4or, 9 January 1366.

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DOMESTIC FERMENT AND FOREIGN PERILS, 1366-1370 occasions when similar agreements were made and money or favors changed hands, the records are silent. The proscription which revived the partisan feud has been de-

scribed in detail by the victim himself, Ser Niccolé Monachi, chancellor of the commune.” Securely established in that lucrative and influential post since the death of his father in 1348, Ser Niccolé had apparently used his office to gain both friends and enemies. His behavior was typical of the parvenu; Stefani described him as an “ungrateful man” (#omo sconoscente) with whom dealings were likely to be tedious and expensive.” The chancellor wrote in his ricordanze that on 10 October 1366 four of the six Parte captains declared him ammoniii, “against God, justice, and truth, and for their own evildoing.” Monachi identified his four persecutors—Ormanno Foraboschi, Simone di Francesco Donati (both magnates), Uberto degli Albizzi, and Alberto di Lapo da Castiglionchio—and also the two captains who defended him, Piero Brancacci and Recco di Guido Guazza. This proscription aroused partisan tempers to white heat, since the Albizzi were believed to be the instigators. Velluti stated that Uberto degli Albizzi, disturbed by the adverse reaction to Monachi’s ammonizione, had discussed the case with him, “but he

was blinded by pride and did nothing.” The old lawyer then added, “May it please God that the retaliation will fall upon the Albizzi and not upon the other Guelfs.”’* Ser Niccold’s friends in the Ricci faction, notably Uguccione de’ Ricci, Messer Jacopo Alberti, and Messer Andrea de’ Bardi, immediately began to work on his behalf.°* A month after the proscription, the Signoria and the councils, with strong dissenting minorities, passed a provision voiding the ammonizione. The Parte captains were ordered to revoke all measures taken against the chancellor.”* It was the first 51 Carte Strozziane, ser. 2, 2, ff. 6gv-7or. 52 Stefani, 749.

58 Velluti, p. 247.

54 Carte Strozziane, ser. 2, 2, f. 69r (in margin): “E pero, ch’io ho facta scriptura di chi m/’offese, cioé, di quactro di sei capitani i quali nimichevolente

contro Dio, giustizia e verita, e per lor propria malitia e iniquita, mi volono disfare, € convenevole et dovuto ch’io faccia memoria di chi mi servi. E generalmente i buoni e cari e originari cittadini et guelfi m’aiutarono, et in spetialita i Ricci, cioé, Uguccione e fratelli e consorti tutti, messer Andrea de’ Bardi, messer Iacopo Alberti et molti altri, a’quali per debito sono obbligato.” 55 Prov., 54, ff. 72v-73r. The votes on this provision: 160-32 and 105-36.

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| DOMESTIC FERMENT AND FOREIGN PERILS, 1366-1370 time that the Guelf society had been forced to revoke a Ghibelline

condemnation. |

Encouraged by the furor aroused by Monachi’s proscription, the

Signoria which entered office in November 1366 promptly approved a provision directed against the Parte hierarchy. When this measure was presented to the councils by two Ricci partisans, Niccolé Rimbaldesi and Messer Donato Aldighieri, it gained large majorities: 175-38 and 105-27.°° The preface described the purpose

of the law. Since the authority to proscribe citizens had been abused by the Parte captains, it had become necessary to modify this power for the welfare of both Parte and commune. The provision increased the number of captains from six to eight, of whom two were to be lower guildsmen. To make the ammonizione procedure less arbitrary, the law also provided that future proscriptions were not valid unless they were ratified by a committee of twenty four Guelfs, chosen specifically for that purpose. The author of this provision was one of the priors, Uguccione de’ Ricci, who, in Velluti’s judgment, “with his faction always

maligned the Parte and gathered Ghibellines and false Guelfs

around him.’ In an attempt to forestall opposition from the oligarchic forces, Ricci and his cohorts pushed the provision through the colleges and the councils in two days, allowing no opportunity for a full discussion of the proposal. When presenting the measure to the colleges for approval, Uguccione proclaimed that the law was designed “to cleanse the city and release it from vassalage and tyranny, so that the merchants and artisans would

prosper and would be able to carry on their affairs and speak freely. . . . This provision seeks to restrain the evil and wicked practices of those who, by means of the Parte decree [establishing ammonizione |, held in subjection the merchants and artisans of Florence.””**

Through their spokesman, Tommaso Guidetti, the Sixteen commended the Signoria for introducing the provision; they an58 Prov., 54, ff. 67v-68r. 57 Velluti, pp. 247-51.

58 Velluti, p. 248: “. . . Intendeano sanicare Firenze e trarla di fedalta e tirannia, e ch’ e’ mercatanti e artefici avrebbono buono stato, e potrebbono fare loro mercatantie, e potrebbono favellare, e spezialmente in favore di Comune, € questo era in modificare e raffrenare le male e ree operazioni di coloro che colla riformagione della Parte teneano in fedalta i mercatanti e artefici di Firenze e chi bene voleano vivere, raffrenando e modificando la detta legge.”

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nounced their willingness to cooperate with the priors in promoting measures which contributed “to the honor of the commune,

the strengthening of the popolo, the unity of the citizenry, and

the security of the middle and lower classes (mediocrum et minorum concivium).” A Ricci partisan, Piero Aldobrandini, heaped fulsome praise upon the measure and its authors. The citizenry, he announced on behalf of the Twelve, was filled with joy by this law, from which would flow manifold benefits to the commune and the popolo.”

The Parte hierarchy did not accept the passage of this law without protest; even some moderates were displeased with the tactics adopted by the Ricci faction. Velluti recalled that in the meeting of priors and collegiate groups to discuss the provision, he had suggested that such controversial legislation should be in-

troduced not as a partisan measure, but with the advice and consent of all Guelfs. The city’s internal difficulties could not be

solved by half measures, he argued, but only by attacking the sources of discontent and conflict in their totality. His views were supported by Pazzino degli Strozzi, who cited the divieto restrictions as an example of a problem that required immediate attention. He implied that if these limitations on patrician officeholding

were relaxed, the oligarchic faction might be reconciled to the Parte’s reform.” In reply, Uguccione de’ Ricci asserted that although his own family suffered more than any other from the divieto restrictions, he did not wish it to be said that the great families had antagonized the popolo and the artisans on this issue. In a veiled threat to his opponents, Uguccione hinted that if the Parte reform provision were not accepted, his faction might

issue a call for a parlamento, an assembly of the entire guild community, to reorganize the regime.” The chroniclers’ attention to this November law shows the general awareness of its significance.” It was, first, a strong af°° CP, 8, f. tv, 3 November 1366. 69 Velluti, p. 240.

° [dtd., pp. 249-50: “. . . Disse ch’egli e’ consorti suoi e’ frategli erano di quegli a’ quali toccava cos! il fatto de’ divieti come a niuna altra persona, e ch’egli era di quegli che non intendea che si dicesse che le famiglie popolari grande di Firenze pe’ fatti de’ divieti tenessono incanati i popolari e artefici e ’ popolo di Firenze, e che se dovessono sonare a parlamento, il bene comune non rimarrebbe.” 2 In addition to Velluti, cf. Stefani, 695; Manoscritti, 222, f. 265; BNF, Maghabechiana, u, ww, 347, £. tor.

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firmation of the commune’s supremacy over the Parte, an expres-

sion of its determination to regulate the Guelf society and its activities. It shattered permanently the threadbare myth, inscribed in the Parte’s statute, that pars, populus, et comunis sit unum et

idem. The provision was also a definite sign that the popular

| faction had taken the initiative, which it had surrendered in 1358, in the struggle over the Ghibelline issue and the composition of the ruling group. The law itself, and the means by which

it was promulgated, contrasted sharply with the cautious and tentative efforts, the oblique measures, which had characterized the opposition to the oligarchy since 1358. With some trepidation, the Signoria and the colleges awaited

the oligarchic reaction to this frontal assault upon the Parte Guelfa. Anticipating some adverse public response, the Sixteen proposed that action be taken to calm and reassure the citizenry,

. ‘ ‘ 64

and to clarify any doubts and confusion which the reform measure

may have raised. The priors also summoned a group of prominent jurisconsults to report upon the provision’s legality; the law- _ yers assured them that the law was valid in all respects.** The colleges expressed a desire to consult with the Parte captains concerning the law’s application, and were prepared to consider their

suggestions for means to achieve civic peace and unity.” The Sixteen even announced that they were willing to discuss the divieto issue, in the hope that this might contribute to internal harmony.” The documents contain vague hints that the Guelf hierarchy had refused to cooperate with the regime on Parte reform.” To press further his faction’s advantage, and possibility to cow the 63 CP, 8, f. 2v; Tommaso di Mone Guidetti, spokesman: “Si quid factum est circa negotium partis valet, bene quidem .. . et si aliquid dubium vertitur etiam

per opportuna consilia firmius roboretur; et si quid aliud faciendum est ad assicuramentum civium, etiam fiat ut omnis dubietas clarificetur pro statu comunis. Etiam si alique familie videretur non esse bene contente, quod domini videant de modis per quos omnis displicentia tollatur et unitas sit inter cives.” 64 CP, 8, f. 3v, 7 November. 85 Tbid., £. 4v, 12 November. 86 Thid., £. 5r, 13 November.

87 In the statements of the colleges made on 12 November there are hints that the Parte captains were reluctant to meet with the priors to discuss the reform; CP, 8, f. av. Not until 24 December, five weeks after the passage of the provision (19 November) restoring Ser Niccol6 Monachi’s Guelf status, was he formally readmitted into the Parte; Carte Strozztane, ser. 2, 2, f. 69r.

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opposition into silence, Uguccione de’ Ricci proposed additional changes in the structure of the Guelf organization. This second reform measure provided for an increase in the number of captains from eight to nine (two magnates, two lower guildsmen, and five popolani from the greater guilds). The provision also authorized the approval by the Parte captains of defense witnesses in Ghibelline trials, whose testimony was to have the same weight as that of the prosecution. To discuss the Ricci proposal, the Signoria convoked a large assembly of six hundred citizens, who approved the measure by a vote of 411 to 161.°° The legislative councils then accepted it with even larger majorities on 8 and 10 December.” The meeting of the richiesti called to debate this provision was not a forum where opinions were expressed candidly. If Donato

Velluti could write in his private chronicle that the provision “satisfied the Ghibellines and pseudo-Guelfs,””® the Parte hierarchy must have been infuriated by this provocative law. But no Albizzi

partisan rose to denounce a measure which clearly reflected the

majority will. The sole negative chord was struck by Messer Filippo Corsini, who complained that the provision should have

been drawn up with the cooperation and consent of the Parte captains.” Ricci partisans were eloquent in their praise of the reform, and such phrases as “well and prudently done” and “the priors are to be commended” were sprinkled liberally through their speeches.”

Andrea Rondinelli could not refrain from a caustic attack upon his oligarchic enemies. The Parte’s affairs, he contended, “were disrupted and dislocated,’ and he condemned “the actions of many captains who from hatred, revenge, or malignity proscribe 68 CP, 8, f. 13v, 3 December. 89 Prov., 54, ff. 81r-82v. The vote: 177-30 and 104-27.

70 Velluti, p. 251: “. . . E in questo modo s’acconciéd Parte Guelfa, e contentaronsi Ghibellini e non veri Guelfi.” 71 CP, 8, f. 12v. Another critical comment was made by a magnate, Niccold di Scolaio della Tosa: “De admonitis tamen non fiat verecundia capitaneorum

partis”; zid., f. rar. 72 Typical is the comment of Guido del Forese, zbid., f£. 13v: Quod que facta sunt, fuerunt utilia et bona; et omnino provideatur ne guelfis possit fieri iniuria deinceps; et corrigatur siquis guelforum fuisset admonitus; in pristinum statum reducatur.” Other Ricci partisans who supported the reform were Uguccione

and Messer Giovanni de’ Ricci, Tommaso di Marco degli Strozzi, Jacopo Domenici, and Filippo Capponi.

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true Guelfs.” “* Three lower guildsmen—a coppersmith, a blacksmith, and an innkeeper—voiced their enthusiastic support for the law. The coppersmith, Ricco di Taldo, “announced his approval of the provision made in favor of the popolo, the commune and the Parte Guelfa, and he expressed gratitude for the honor done

to the lower guildsmen with respect to their entrance into the captaincy of the Parte Guelfa, seeing that they now had that honor which had been promised to them.””*

In the weeks that followed the passage of the second reform provision, there was intensive discussion and debate on a series of issues regarding officeholding. The oligarchic faction, stung by its recent defeat, demanded concessions which would give the large patrician families a greater share of communal offices.

. Above all, the conservatives pressed for a revision of the divieto ! limitations. Their secondary demands included the relaxation of restrictions against magnate officeholding and the reform of the

scrutiny process, to eliminate those men who were, in their opinion, unqualified for high office.” In his continuation of Matteo’s chronicle, Filippo Villani expressed patrician sentiment on the scrutiny. The gente nuova, he wrote, bought their nomination to offices “with gifts, banquets, and persuasion, both open and hidden,” while the great houses of the popolani were excluded by the divieto. Many young men still in adolescence obtained entry into the offices through the

machinations of their fathers, and Filippo asserted that threefourths of the citizens accepted in the scrutiny were under twenty years of age (an absurd exaggeration ).’* That there was some basis

for these patrician grievances was proved by the discovery of irregularities in the 1361 scrutiny for the Signoria. A dozen men, all gente nuova save one, were convicted of bribery in connection 78 “Taudando et approbando velut utilia et bona que facta fuerunt in facto partis guelforum, quam invenerunt dissipatam et sgangeratam .. . et inducantur capitanei quod sint contenti. Dampnavit etiam gestus et opera multorum capitaneorum, qui solum ex hodio vel iniuriis seu malivolentiis monebant etiam guelfos”; ibid., £. 12r. 74 CP, 8, f£. 12r. The other artisan speakers were the blacksmith, Barnabo, and the innkeeper, Cenno di Marco. Opinions of lower guildsmen were rarely re-

corded in Pratiche protocols.

75 Qn magnate officeholding, see CP, 8, f. 17v; on the scrutiny reform, see

tbid., ff. 14Vv, 20r, 33r-36v, 38r. : 76 FB, Villani, x1, 65. 212

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with the nomination of the scrutators. Stefani reported that the 1367 scrutiny was also marred by attempts to manipulate the electoral process.” The priors and members of the collegiate bodies who held office

in December and January were generally sympathetic to these oligarchic demands. The conviction that discontented groups within the commune must be pacified was still very strong. Such phrases as peace, harmony, and the suppression of discord came

automatically to the lips of politicians.” On the question of scrutiny reform, the Signoria and the colleges entered into lengthy communication with the Parte captains, who were asked to submit specific proposals for changes.*° Approved by the priors and the colleges, and presented to the Council of the Popolo on 12 De-

cember, was a measure which provided “that magnates be admitted to certain offices and that divieto restrictions be reduced.” The provision failed to gain the necessary two-thirds majority and

was rejected. On 17 December both colleges again announced their support for an identical proposal submitted to them, contending that it would promote civic unity. But this measure was killed by the colleges. Substantial blocs in the collegiate bodies and legislative councils opposed any concession whatsoever to the oligarchy. Another sign of popular resentment against the oligarchy was the report in December of public statements which were critical of the Parte Guelfa.** That this sacrosanct institution should be ™ Convicted of offering bribes to be included among the scrutators were: Bartolo Banchelli, Pagno di Chele Pagnini, Lapo Salvucci, Luigi Pini, Guerriante di Biligardo Bagnesi (patrician), Francesco Benedicti, Niccolé di Andrea, and Filippo di Vanni Bellandi. Those who accepted bribes were Giovanni Vite, an

armor maker from the lower guilds; Nardo Lippi and Bonaguida di Jacopo Simoni, priors; and Giovanni di Tedici Manovelli, one of the Twelve; AEOJ, 347, ff. 3r, or-tov. On these events, see M. Villani, x, 35. 78 Stefani, 694. A question was raised in a Consulte discussion concerning fraud in the 1364 scrutiny, but it was later withdrawn; CP, 5, f£. 21r, 21 February 1364. 78 See the comments of the richiesti in early January 1367; CP, 8, ff. 23v-27r. One of the most belligerent and factious arciguelfi, Messer Uguccione Buondelmonti, proclaimed piously: “Quod si discordia est inter guelfos, reducantur ad unionem”; z07d., f£. 25r.

80 CP, 8, ff. 20r, 33r-33v, 35r. The colleges complained that the statements of the Parte captains on scrutiny reform were too vague and general to be of value. 81 Libri Fabarum, 38, f. 58r. 82 Velluti, p. 251. 88 CP, 8, ff. 20r, 21r, 24 and 28 December.

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openly attacked suggested that the Parte’s mystique had lost some of its force among the Florentines. The references in the protocols are vague, but apparently, informers notified the Signoria that certain unidentified citizens had made derogatory comments about the Guelf society and its leaders. When this information was first presented to the colleges, it prompted demands for punishment of the culprits. A few days later, however, collegiate opinion had become more cautious. The Sixteen doubted whether the Parte’s detractors could be successfully prosecuted in the courts; if punishment were required, then it should be administered benigne et misericorditer. The colleges apparently did not wish to stir up trouble, or to create martyrs of the popolo. The

commune had in effect abandoned its traditional role of protector and defender of the Parte Guelfa. In February and March 1367 the crisis which had begun with Chancellor Monachi’s proscription the previous October reached its dramatic and explosive climax. Leaders of the Albizzi faction had realized that their efforts to obtain more offices for the patriciate were doomed to failure by the votes of the artisans and petty merchants in the councils. Embittered by the galling loss of prestige, weakened by the restraints placed upon a@mmonizione, and

frightened by the steady influx of gente nuova into the commune,” these oligarchs turned again to the Parte Guelfa as their ultimate refuge and defense. Only if the Guelf society could protect itself from communal control and establish its unchallenged right to screen officeholders, they reasoned, could patricians with oligarchic convictions retain their influence in the regime. In the group of Parte captains who entered office in mid-February were three arciguelfi with strong partisan convictions: Messer Pazzino degli Strozzi, Messer Geri de’ Pazzi, and Filippo Baroncelli.” Even while uttering pious phrases concerning the need for unity 84In 1366, seven “new men” from the greater guilds entered the Signoria as the first representatives of their families in the priorate: Manetto di Ser Riccardo Gucci, Nastagio di Ser Francesco Benvenuti, Michele di Brunaccio, lanatuolo, Jacopo di Bernardo, retail merchant, Duccio di Giovanni Ducci, druggist, Tom-

maso di Francesco di Giunta, flask seller, Giovanni di Conte Ammannati; Stefani, 699.

85 The captains are recorded in CP, 8, f. 65r. Others were Piero di Silvo Serragli, Durazzino Tigliamochi, Piero di Cacciatino Gherardini, and Lippo di Ser Giovanni. The two lower guild captains were not listed and presumably opposed the measure sponsored by their colleagues.

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in the face of another imperial threat, and while offering their services to the Signoria to achieve this end,** these men were preparing to recover the losses their faction had suffered. Convinced that the communal government would not sanction measures to strengthen the Parte and its anti-Ghibelline machinery, the captains presented their proposal to the Guelf organization itself. The Parte’s legislative assembly accepted the measure in late February.”

This enactment contained some important innovations. First, it required the Parte captains to vote upon the exclusion from communal office of anyone denounced to them “as a Ghibelline, a non-Guelf, or a suspect of the Parte Guelfa.” The language of the document significantly widened the category of citizens who could be proscribed: it now included anyone whose ancestry was pure Guelf, but whose actions or opinions could be construed as inimical to Parte interests. The decree also established a new book of Ghibellines, which would carry the names of all citizens who

were ammoniti, and also of those who refused to cooperate as witnesses in the proscription of Ghibelline suspects. Anyone who denounced or criticized the Parte, its officials, or its activities was

also subject to proscription; and if the offender held communal office, he was to be accused of Ghibellinism before the courts. Judicial officials were forbidden to entertain any accusation made

against the Parte. If any Guelf complained that he had been offended while favoring or defending the Parte, or after injuring a Ghibelline, the captains were required to use every means in

their power to punish those who had committed the injury. Finally, all communal officials were threatened with inclusion

in the new Ghibelline directory if they failed to enforce this Parte measure. 86 The rumor that Charles IV was planning another Italian journey inspired several demands for unity; CP, 8, f. 48r. Thus Messer Filippo Corsini: “Principale

remedium est unio civium et sublatio discordarum;”’ Uguccione de’ Ricci: “Super aliis expedit et necessaria est unio civium. .. . Provideatur quod populus Florentinus sit unitus et fortis omni fortitudine possibili”; and Messer Pazzino degli Strozzi, spokesman for the Parte captains: “Quod unitas civium est necessaria, circa quam fecerunt et facere sunt parati, offerendo se ad beneplacitum dominorum circa dictam unionem operari.” The note of insincerity in all of these statements by partisan leaders is apparent. 87 No record of this provision survives in the records of the Parte Guelfa. An Italian version is in CP, 8, ff. 65r-65v.

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Had this statute been rigorously applied, it would have destroyed the political power of the gente nuova and given the oligarchic faction effective control of the regime. Even if used with caution and discretion, it would have demoralized the opponents of the Parte hierarchy. When informed of this measure,” the Sixteen announced through their spokesman, Andrea Ron-

dinelli, “that they had never heard of so evil a law, nor one so prejudicial to the status of the commune and the Parte Guelfa; it could lead the city of Florence into tyranny.”* They demanded the convocation of a “large council of guildsmen (artifices) and citizens of every rank, before whom the Parte decrees should be read.” More cautious in their verbal reaction were the Twelve, who requested simply the convocation of an assembly to discuss

the problem.*” With unusual alacrity, the Signoria called a council of richiesti to meet on the same day (16 March). The Parte’s enactment was intensively debated in the palace of the Signoria and, a few hundred yards away, in the headquarters of the Guelf society. Leading the demand for repeal were Andrea Rondinelli and Sandro da Quarata, whom Velluti described as “more fiery than Uguccione de’ Ricci.””* From the

hostile reactions of the richiesti, the Parte captains may have sensed that repeal was inevitable. Consequently, they offered to strike a bargain with their opponents. In exchange for repealing the measure, they insisted upon the satisfaction of two perennial

oligarchic demands: a relaxation of divieto limitations upon patrician officeholding, and a larger role in the regime for the magnates.

The priors and the colleges were receptive to this overture. Of 88 There was a surprising time lag between the passage of the Parte provision

in February and the communal government’s reaction to the measure on 16 March. It is difficult to believe that the document had been kept secret for two weeks; more plausible is the theory that its contents were not officially announced to the Signoria and the colleges until mid-March.

89 CP, 8, f£. 53r: “Quando audiverunt legi ordinamenta facta in parte per capitaneos partis guelfe, multum admirati fuerunt et doluerunt; cum numquam audiverunt tam iniquas leges, nec tam preiudicales statui comunis Florentie et

partis guelforum, et inductivas civitatem Florentie ad tirampnidem.” 9° Ibid. In a statement made later in the day, the spokesman for the Twelve, Simone dell’Antella, commented: “Quod cum capitanei pluries dixerunt de uniendo cives, . . . sed cum leges non videantur hanc finem inspicere, quod

ipse velint eas corrigere et emendare.” |

91 Velluti, p.216252. ,

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four proposals submitted by the captains to the Signoria and the colleges, three were accepted without delay. The first repealed the Parte enactment; the others reduced the divzeto for the Signoria and admitted magnates to five major posts in the contado and district.” On the 18th, these provisions were then submitted to the Council of the Popolo—a major stumbling block to electoral reform because of its large contingent of gente nuova. Seeking some guarantee that the bargain that had been negotiated

would be kept, Lapo da Castiglionchio requested in vain that the vote on the Parte measure be postponed until after the provisions containing the oligarchic demands had been approved.” After the repeal of the Guelf decree gained the council’s acceptance by a small margin (148-67), Lapo’s worst fears were realized:

the assembly rejected the other proposals. The Parte captains, however, had not spoken their last word. Whipping up oligarchic sentiment in the Council of the Commune, where the presence

of forty magnates gave them a sizable bloc of supporters, they arranged for the defeat of the provision repealing the Parte decree. One of the gente nuova, a silk manufacturer named Francesco Benini, urged the Parte captains to reverse their stand, but

his plea went unheeded. By this action, the Parte hierarchy issued a direct challenge to the communal government; the crisis had reached its most acute stage. Guelf partisans carried the struggle into the streets. In public demonstrations organized by oligarchic sympathizers, speeches were made denouncing the Signoria for its hostility ®2 The pattern of developments is pieced together from references in Consulte e Pratiche discussions on 16 and 17 March; CP, 8, ff. 53v-55r. See, particularly, the statements of Andrea Rondinelli, Giovanni de’ Mozzi, and Simone Peruzzi, on 16 March, tdid., f. 53v; and of the colleges on 17 March, zdid., f. 54v. 83 Libri Fabarum, 38, f. zor. The first provision submitted to the council pertained to the revocation of the Parte decree; the third and fourth were entitled: “Disponentes quod magnates possint admicti ad unum ex quinque maioribus ofhtiis comitatus seu districtus Florentie” and “Circa diminuenda deveta offitii prioratus et cetera.” Before the vote, Lapo da Castiglionchio stated: “Quod super prima supersedeatur; et alia procedant.” Andrea Rondinelli’s comment was: “Super prima et alia quod fiat.” 94 TF, 38, £. yov: “Quod ad presens supersedeatur aliquibus diebus .. . et quod domini priores habeant secum capitaneos partis, et conentur eos reducere secum

ad concordium in predictis, sperans quod ipsi capitanei reducentur ad convenentia.” Benini thus placed the responsibility for the provision’s failure squarely upon the captains.

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toward the Parte Guelfa. These defiant gestures against the regime provoked a storm of criticism. Salvestro de’ Medici’s reaction

was particularly vehement: “The priors should prescribe such punishment for those who

have besmirched the honor of the Florentine commune that it will always be an example to others. They should recover their honor, and they should not be lenient with anyone offending them. They should resist these evil men who seek to control the government of Florence and to subjugate the weak citizens, as they have done several times in the past. The merchants and guildsmen must join forces to avoid being divided by those who wish to seize power in Florence.” Uguccione de’ Ricci advocated the harsh punishment of those citizens guilty of “injuries, insults and villany which were heaped upon the priors.” Messer Andrea de’ Bardi counseled modera-

tion, although, as he said, “he detested the laws made by the captains as iniquitous and indiscreet.””® The heat generated by this crisis could easily have ignited a civil

war in Florence; Uguccione de’ Ricci’s threat of the previous November to call out the armed popolo might well have materialized. Leaders of the Ricci faction interpreted the maneuvers of the Parte captains as a deliberate and provocative affront to the commune’s dignity. The Sixteen announced that they were “heartily sick of the statements and actions made against the honor of the Signoria,” and they demanded prompt and energetic action by the priors to reassert their authority."’ Spokesmen for two other advisory groups, the capitudini of the lower guilds and the governors of the wine gabelle, insisted that the supreme power of the Signoria could not be challenged by any other body,

by which they meant the Parte Guelfa.** Sovereignty was not 85 CP, 8, f. 57v: “Domini dent talem disciplinam et punitionem illis qui contrafecissent honori comunis Florentie, quod sit semper exemplum aliis. Et quod domini recuperent honorem suum, nec illum patientur quomodolibet offendi,

sed resistant sussurronibus et malis hominibus querentibus occupare statum civitatis Florentie, et reduci facere cives debiles sicut pluries fecerunt. Et mercatores et artifices se insimul teneant, ne possint seduci ab illis qui volunt occupare statum civitatis Florentie.” 96 These statements are in zbid., 8, ff. 57r-57v. °7 CP, 8, f. 58v: “Quod eos tedet usque ad animam de dictis et factis contra

honorem dominorum... .” °8 The spokesmen were Firenze Panze, a shoemaker, and Remigio Rondinelli; CP, 8, ff. 58v-5or.

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to be shared; Parte and commune were not equal partners in the business of governing Florence. Piero Petriboni, a Ricci partisan, formulated this theory as a proverb: Ut sicut est unus grex, ita sit unicus pastor.’ The minimum demands of the popular faction were outlined by three artisans: Barnabo, a blacksmith; Ricco di Taldo, a coppersmith; and Michele di Jacopo, an armor maker.

These were the immediate and unconditional repeal of the Parte’s February decree, and the reaffirmation of the 1366 provisions reforming the Guelf organization.*” Interspersed between these inflammatory statements, however, were the calmer voices of the moderates, counseling restraint and caution. Throughout the crisis, the Twelve had been considerably less vehement in their comments than the Sixteen. Speaking for this group on 20 March, Simone dell’Antella proposed that representatives of the Signoria, the colleges, and the Parte captains should meet to work out a compromise solution.*” This course was enthusiastically approved by several counselors, including two

adherents of the oligarchic faction, Alessandro degli Albizzi and Messer Gherardo Buondelmonti."” The Parte captains, too, made a conciliatory gesture by announcing their willingness “to do everything which will contribute to the status of the commune and the welfare of the Parte Guelfa.”**® Speaking for the officials

of the merchants’ court, the Mercanzia, Benedetto di Nerozzo Alberti commented: “The times are not propitious for discord, but rather for unity and harmony, and every effort should be directed toward this end.” The priors were urged to treat the Guelf captains as a patient and loving father would deal with his erring sons.*™

The crisis was resolved when the Parte hierarchs, after lengthy

deliberation,’ surrendered completely to the commune. After promising to use their influence to obtain the repeal of the Parte’s decree, the captains, through their spokesman Simone Siminetti,

put the seal upon their capitulation with this announcement: °° Ibid. £. sov. 3 Jbid., £. syv. 1° Ibid., £. 56v. 102 Thid., {. 57v. The perennial peacemaker, Donato Velluti, also urged compromise, 103 Ibid, 8, f. 58v. 194 Ibid., £. 57Vv. 105 These negotiations extended from 22 March through the 26th. On the 23rd, the Sixteen asked for a postponement of the convocation of the councils, “cum capitanei sint congregati cum parteficibus”; zbid., f. 614.

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“They are prepared to do in every respect what is pleasing to the will of the priors, as they have done in the past.” The Parte’s demand for divieto reform was not couched in terms of an ultimatum; the captains were supplicants begging their superiors for a boon. “If it pleases the priors to propose anew the divieto pro-

vision,” Siminetti stated, “then let it be submitted.’*°* On 26 March the Signoria sent to the councils the provisions which had

been rejected a week before. The repeal of the Parte measure passed both councils by larger majorities (173-52 and 94-40) than on its first submission, as did the measure granting magnates a higher proportion of contado offices. Once again, however, the notary recorded displicet after the proposal authorizing divieto

reform.*”” |

From this prolonged and bitter struggle the popular party emerged as undisputed victor. Its leaders had acted with boldness and resolution, and had not crumpled under the counterattack of the Parte hierarchy. The rank and file exhibited remark-

able firmness and independence in thrice rejecting the divieto reform measure which their own leaders had supported.*”* Arti-

sans and small merchants had become more cognizant of their interests since the 1340's, when many of their number voted for the provisions against foreigners and Ghibellines. An indication of the temporary demoralization of the oligarchic faction was the breakdown of the ammonizione machinery; only once, between 1367 and 1371, did the Parte proscribe any Ghibelline suspects.” A significant feature of this controversy was the intrusion of a new theme which was articulated for the first time in council debates: class divisions. Patrician leaders of the Ricci faction emphasized that they represented the business elements, those individuals who desired peace so that they could attend to their

1368, 106 CP, 8, f. 61Vv.

107 TF, 38, ff. 72r-72v. The vote on the provision pertaining to magnates in

contado offices was 151-71 and 93-42; it is in Prov., 54, ff. 138v-139r. The revocation

of the Parte decree and the reafirmation of the legislation of 1366 is in sbid., ff. 133V-134Vv.

108 Commenting on the divieto provision, Velluti wrote, p. 252: “Il fatto de’

divieti scemare missono pit volte, e nol poterano mai vincere.” , 109 Stefani, 696. Four men, all gente nuova, were proscribed on 15 February

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cloth factories, their druggist shops, and their moneychanging. They proclaimed themselves, too, the champions of the “middle and lower classes” (mediocrum et minorum concivinm).*° Salvestro de’ Medici’s contention that the merchants and artisans should remain united was typical of the class appeal that the Ricci partisans were making.’ These overtures were effective. Lower guildsmen were solidly in favor of the Parte reforms, and they resolutely opposed all measures sponsored by the oligarchic faction. Indicative of the bond forged between the Ricci group and the lower ranks of the guild community were the expressions of praise and gratitude which such artisans as Ricco di Taldo and Cenno di Marco bestowed upon their benefactors who had opened the doors to the Parte captaincy. The Ricci faction also systematically denigrated the activities and objectives of their oligarchic antagonists. Who were the enemies of the popolo and the regime? They were the powerful and arrogant men from the great patrician families, seeking to establish a tyranny in Florence, to exclude from office the honest

artisans and merchants. This was the picture that Sandro da Quarata, Andrea Rondinelli, Uguccione de’ Ricci and their fol-

lowers sketched of their opponents. In their speeches in the council halls, they stressed by implication and occasionally by direct statement the cleavage between the wealthy and indolent rentier and the industrious entrepreneur, between the grandi e possenti and the humble and lowly. These provocative statements were barely concealed incitements to class war. Echoing throughout the city—in the Piazza della Signoria, in the Mercato Vecchio,

in streets and private dwellings—they served to intensify fears and rancors and to widen the gulf between patrician and parvenu.

External Dangers After the Ricci faction triumphed over the Parte hierarchy in March 1367, Florentine statesmen turned their attention from domestic to foreign problems. Within a period of forty months, the commune was confronted by a series of diplomatic crises

as grave as any in the regime’s experience: the return of the 110 CP, 8, f. rv. For other statements which reflect these class views, see above,

notes 59, 61, 89, 95. , 111 See above, n. 95.

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papacy to Rome, the emperor’s second Italian journey, the revolt of S. Miniato, and the war against Bernabo Visconti. These were

the topics that received priority in council meetings, and that filled the pages of the Consulte e Pratiche protocols for these years.

Although diverted from their preoccupation with such internal problems as Parte reform and Ghibelline proscriptions and scruti-

nies, the factions discovered a fertile field for combat in the debates over communal diplomacy. The foundations for a partisan division on foreign policy had been laid in the early years of the regime,’ although the issue remained fluid. The Pisan war tended to blur factional differences over the city’s external affairs; concern for the commune’s security usually transcended party commitments.’ With the war’s end, however, sectarian prejudice

was again interjected into foreign policy discussions. In the debates on both domestic and external questions between 1365 and 1370, partisan attitudes had become more rigid.“* A member of the Ricci faction invariably opposed any alliance with the papacy, in the same consistent and intransigent way he objected to the proscription of Ghibelline suspects. During these years, too, the factions hammered out their respective doctrines on foreign

policy questions. The hints and fleeting references to a party creed, scattered through the official records of the 1350’s, were supplanted by more solid and sustained arguments, which were developed at length in the Pratiche protocols. 112 See Ch. 3, Part 3; Ch. 4, Part 3.

118 An example is the discussion concerning a league with the papacy in September and October 1363; CP, 4, ff. rorv-ro8v. Although some partisan figures followed the “party line” on this issue, many did not. Several individuals associated with the Ricci faction (Luigi Aldobrandini, Messer Andrea de’ Bardi, Bernardo Covoni, Messer Donato Aldighieri, Filippo Capponi, Matteo Soldi)

announced their support for a league, while a few Parte hierarchs (Biagio Guasconi, Giannozzo and Carlo degli Strozzi) opposed the alliance. Carlo degli

Strozzi’s statement reflects an honest and nonpartisan effort to formulate a policy which would be most beneficial for the commune: “Ubi liga fiat, nova imprehensa fit cum illis de Mediolano, que non videtur sibi facienda; et ubi littera concedatur, venire debet ad ligam verisimiliter. Et pro tanto nec liga placet nec quod lettera concedatur d. legato”; CP, 4, f. 108r. 114 The first positive statement by a chronicler concerning partisan attitudes on a foreign policy issue was Stefani’s comment on the situation in 1367: “Ma la setta degli Albizi in quella materia volea la lega colla Chiesa, e quella de’ Ricci il contradio”; Stefani, 7or. See also ibtd., 711.

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One theme runs like a thread through the foreign policy debates in the 1360's: the papacy’s vigorous efforts to pry Florence loose from her neutral position and to make her, in deed as well

as in word, “a devoted and obedient daughter of the church.” Ambassadors visited the city at regular intervals to proclaim the advantages of a papal alliance, and the curia directed a steady stream of letters to the dilect; fila of Florence. The arguments and enticements varied according to circumstances. In 1362, when the church was defending Bologna from the assaults of Bernabo Visconti, the envoy from the papal legate stressed the dangers that would befall Florence if the besieged city capitulated to the Milanese.**® A year later, in the autumn of 1363, Cardinal Albornoz took advantage of the city’s desperate

plight in her war with Pisa to offer military assistance, in exchange for the commune’s promise to enter a league against the Visconti.*’ After the Pisan war ended, the emphasis in papal letters was on the need for common defense against the armed companies.” In one missive written in October 1364, Urban V pointed out that a league under his sponsorship was supported by the queen of Naples and the Tuscan communes; he was perplexed by the city’s reluctance to join a federation imbued with such power and prestige.’*® Occasionally, the curia used a dif-

ferent type of argument to persuade the Florentines to follow the papal banner. In July 1365, after denouncing the commune for its refusal to help the church, Urban stated that he would no longer appoint Florentines to ecclesiastical benefices unless the government changed its policy.” It was inevitable that these diplomatic pressures would stimulate partisan rancors. For example, in the debate of January 1365 115Jn the summer of 1365, the pope had complained that the commune “e amico e vero devoto di Sancta Chiesa de parole”; the Signoria indignantly denied the charge; Missive, 13, f. 52v. Even an implacable opponent of a Guelf foreign

policy, Sandro da Quarata, claimed that Florence “semper fuit devotum et obbediens ecclesie Romane”; CP, 3, f. 129v, 22 September 1362. 116 CP, 3, ff. 3or-30v. A similar plea was made by the commander of the papal army defending Bologna, Pandolfo Malatesta; zbid., ff. 25r-26r. 117 CP, 4, ff. 1orv-ro8v. 118 CP, 5, ff. 22v-23r, 47v, 65r, 134V-136v.

119 Tettres secretes et curiales du Pape Urbain V (1362-1370) se rapportant @ la France (Bibliotheque des Ecoles francaises d’Athenes et de Rome, ser. 3, Vv) (Paris, 1902-1955), doc. 1298, 9 October 1364. 120 Missive, 14, ff. 52v-54r.

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over the question of sending an embassy to Avignon, several members of the Albizzi faction—Carlo degli Strozzi, Piero degli Albizzi, Messer Filippo Corsini, Zanobi dell’Antella—made elo-

quent speeches urging that the mission be sent immediately. Simone Peruzzi stated that the embassy “should persuade the pope to come to Italy and provide for the welfare of his devoted Italians.” Zanobi dell’Antella favored the dispatch of the mis-

sion for two reasons: “first, lest the commune be accused of pride; and secondly, so that the church can take measures to provide for Italy.” Implicit in these arguments was the premise that more active papal intervention in Italian affairs would benefit Florence. Leading the opposition to the embassy was Uguccione de’ Ricci: “The time is not propitious for sending an em-

bassy to the church; it is more dangerous to send it than to

postpone it.” | A few months after this partisan skirmish, an envoy from Cardinal Albornoz visited the city, bearing proposals for a league

of Italian states under papal aegis. In support of this plan, the oligarchic leader, Piero Canigiani, stated: “The commune must remain bound to his Holiness with all devotion and reverence.” Piero degli Albizzi stressed the practical necessity of the alliance, citing the bands of unemployed soldiers who were crossing the

Alps in great numbers and menacing the commune. A Ricci partisan, Piero Aldobrandini, presented the opposition’s case: “On

several occasions the commune has been deceived by its allies. It is dangerous to make a league for two reasons: first, on account of the agreements with the companies which are in effect; sec-

ondly, the expenses which the commune would incur.” , Amidst the partisan wrangling over this issue, there were signs

that the propapal forces were gradually gaining an advantage over their opponents. For this shift in communal opinion, the Consulte e Pratiche records constitute the most sensitive index. Week by week, month by month, the number of speeches made in favor of a papal alliance increased, while those of the oppo121 This debate is recorded in CP, 6, ff. 35v-43r, 13 January to 1 February 1365. The mission was eventually sent to Avignon; see the comments upon its return; ibid., ff. 74r-75v. 122 Uguccione’s views were supported by Alamanno Salviati, Messer Andrea

de’ Bardi, and a lower guildsman, Tellino Dini. | |

123CP, 6, f. 83r. 124 Ibid, f. Sor. 12> Ibid, £. Bov. | 224

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sition steadily dwindled.”* Declarations of the city’s loyalty to the papacy were frequent and effusive: “The commune was always devoted to the Roman church and intends to continue, cum omni suo spirito.”*" Papal complaints about the treatment of the Florentine clergy prompted speeches urging that everything possible be done to placate Urban and to remove the sources of his discontent.*”* In letters to Avignon, the commune emphasized

the city’s unwavering dedication to the church and the Parte Guelfa; instructions to Florentine ambassadors at the papal court were filled with details of the sacrifices the city had made over the years on behalf of the church.’ Not since 1343 had the

regime been so eager to maintain cordial relations with the Holy See.

Another manifestation of the revival of Guelf sympathies in Florence was the commune’s intervention in a conflict that broke out between the Guelf lord of Padua, Francesco da Carrara, and

Rudolf of Hapsburg, ruler of Styria and Carinthia. For some years the Hapsburgs had been extending their authority southward, encroaching into the Friuli area and menacing the territory of the Carrara, traditional friends of Florence. In March 1365 a Paduan ambassador arrived in the city to request that the Signoria use its influence to break up a marriage that had been

contracted between Rudolf of Hapsburg and the daughter of King Louis of Hungary. A Pratica session was convened to decide

whether an ambassador should be sent to Avignon, to persuade 126Jn the summer of 1365, a spirited controversy developed over the league. Advocates of the alliance included Piero and Bartolomeo degli Albizzi, Messer Filippo Corsini, Filippo Baroncelli, Giachinotto Tornaquinci, Messer Pazzino and Carlo degli Strozzi; the opponents included Uguccione de’ Ricci, Andrea Rondinelli, Salvestro de’ Medici, Luigi de’ Mozzi, Messer Jacopo Alberti, and Francesco Benini; CP, 6, ff. 79r-81v, 102r-103v, 1o6v. The commune consistently refused to join the league in the autumn of 1365; Missive, 13, ff. 73v, 76v, 81r. By the spring of 1366, there was scarcely a dissident voice raised to question the value of a league; CP, 7, ff. 86r, gov-95v. For the unanimous support of the league in November 1366 and February and April 1367, cf. CP, 8, ff. 6r-ror, 39v-40r, 46v, 67r. 127 Simone Peruzzi’s statement; CP, 8, f. 67v. See also CP, 6, ff. 80v, 86v-87r; 7, ff. 7r, 23v, 67v-68r. 128 CP, 6, ff. 74r, 76v.

129See the letters published in G. Filippi, “Il Comune di Firenze ed il ritorno della S. Sede in Roma,” Miscellanea di storia itahana, xxvi (1887), docs. I, 2.

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the pope to forbid the marriage. The Albizzi faction strongly favored the mission; Simone Peruzzi argued that “any relationship between the king [of Hungary] and the lord [Rudolf of Hapsburg] is extremely dangerous to the status of the Guelfs.” Leaders of the Ricci group—Andrea Rondinelli, Uguccione de’ Ricci, Sandro da Quarata—contended that the commune should not become involved in a situation so far removed from its own interests. When the issue came to a vote, the proponents of intervention were victorious by a small margin. The ambassador sent

to Avignon was instructed to inform Urban V of the dangers that could result from the marriage. Since Louis of Hungary was not likely to have any direct male descendants, it was pos-

sible that the Hapsburgs would fall heir to the kingdom of Naples, an event which would endanger the position of the church and the Parte Guelfa in Italy.*** Convinced by these arguments,

the pope did prohibit the marriage. Four months later, when Francesco da Carrara requested military aid in his war with Rudolf there was little opposition voiced in council meetings to his petition. In July 1365 two hundred troops were sent north to join the Paduan army. These forces were soon recalled, however, when Rudolf’s death ended the immediate Hapsburg threat to Paduan territory.** The climax of the Guelf renaissance in Florence came in the

autumn of 1366 when, after eight years of papal appeals and cajolery, the city finally signed a treaty with the church which provided for joint military action against the companies. Piero degli Albizzi, who was then in the Signoria, was primarily responsible for bringing the commune into the league." At the same time, the Signoria sent an embassy, led by Lapo da Castigli-

onchio, to Avignon; its task was to persuade Urban to return to Rome.*** In the letter of instructions to the ambassadors, the 180 This development has been described, with publication of the relevant documents, in F. Cusin, “Rodolfo IV d’Absburgo, la Curia Avignonese e la politica italiana nel 1363-1365,” ASI, xcvitt (1940), 1, 68-89, 107-136. The extracts from the Pratiche sessions of March 1365 are printed in zbid., 129-30. 131 The letter of instruction to the Florentine ambassador, Messer Rinaldo da Romena, is in zbid., 130-32; see also T. E. Mommsen, Italienische Analekten zur Reichsgeschichte des 14. Jahrhunderts (1310-1378), doc. 321. 182 Cusin, 134. 133 Velluti, p. 253.

184 This mission is described by R. Davidsohn, “Tre orazioni di Lapo da

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Signoria directed them “to recommend to the Apostolic Holiness the Catholic Parte Guelfa, as a prominent member of the Roman

church . . . which, for the exaltation and honor of that church, had exposed itself and its members to danger of death; the hope of the Parte and of the Guelfs rested fully in the Roman church, as its most special mother and mistress.” At the audience granted

to this mission, Lapo delivered a brilliant oration in which he emphasized the historic bonds uniting the papacy and the Parte Guelfa in Italy. This discourse was a florid and grandiose summary of the Guelf creed, uttered by a man who believed firmly that the struggle between Guelf and Ghibelline was still the fundamental political problem in Italy. The papal alliance was strenuously opposed by Ricci parttsans; their silence on the eve of the pact’s conclusion did not indicate their acceptance of the league, but the recognition that theirs was a lost cause. During the months of negotiation, these critics kept up a steady barrage of criticism against the proposed federation. Messer Rosso de’ Ricci, Messer Jacopo Alberti, and an

artisan, Maso Neri, were among those who emphasized the danger of violating the Sarzana treaty and the folly of fighting companies with which the commune had previously signed agreements.**° Although finally defeated on this issue, the Ricci faction

did delay the conclusion of the pact until September 1266. Through its efforts, too, Florence stipulated that she would not

fight against bands already organized in Italy (including the companies headed by Hawkwood and Baumgarten), but only against new groups that might be formed in the future.“* The instrument against the armed societies was thus emasculated at birth. Urban V recognized the enemies in Florence who opposed Castiglionchio, ambasciadore fiorentino a Papa Urbano V e alla curia in Avignone,” ASI, ser. 5, xx (1897), 225-45. Davidsohn published the texts of Lapo’s orations. On Florentine diplomatic relations with the curia, see G. Pirchan, Italien und Kaiser Karl IV in der Zeit seiner zweiten Romfahrt, 1, 23-25. 185 CP, 7, f. 86r. For other negative opinion, see CP, 7, ff. gov, 92v; 8, ff. 24V, 42V.

186 The text of the alliance is in G. Canestrini, “Documenti per servire a la storia della milizia italiana dal xiii secolo al xvi, raccolti in gli archivi della Toscana,” ASI, ser. 1, xv (1851), 89-118. For the pope’s reaction, see his letter to Bishop Piero Corsini, in Theiner, Codex diplomaticus dominu temporalis Sanctae Sedts, 11, doc. 423. See also Pirchan, 1, 26.

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his objectives. In a letter written in April 1366, the pope denounced the small minority in the city that opposed the creation of the league (hoc sanctum negotium), and he berated the citi-

zens for allowing themselves to be deluded by the few “who call light darkness and darkness light.”**’ Two factors may be adduced to explain the commune’s abandonment of her independent policy in favor of a course based upon Guelf tradition, so ardently advocated by the Parte hierarchy and the Albizzi circle. First, a heightened sense of danger and vulnerability permeated the city, which felt itself seriously menaced by the companies, Bernabd Visconti, and the peripatetic emperor, Charles IV, who was preparing for his second incursion into Italy. Secondly, the advantages of a papal alliance appeared much greater after Urban V had announced his firm decision to end the papal residence in France and return to the Eternal City. Florence was capable of defending herself against the companies, but Bernabod Visconti was a more difficult problem. Had

he so desired, the Milanese tyrant could have lived in amity with the Arno city. An alliance was not inconceivable; many Ricci partisans would have welcomed it as a solution to the city’s security problem. But Bernabo’s aggressive actions in Tuscany

destroyed any possibility of an accord, and gave force to Carlo degli Strozzi’s contention that “Messer Bernabd is disposed to destroy Tuscan liberties, and the sooner this is believed, the more easily will we defend ourselves.”"** Florentine fears of the Vis-

conti did not subside with the signing of the peace treaty between Milan and the papacy in March 1364, which ended momen-

tarily the Visconti pressures upon Bologna.” It was widely believed that Bernabé had furnished Pisa with assistance in her war against Florence; one reason for the commune’s peace settle-

ment with her Tuscan neighbor was the fear that an exhausted 137 Capitoli, 11, 508, 10 April 1366. For another expression of papal anger against Florence, see Urban’s letter to Bishop Piero Corsini, in Bullartum Franciscanum (Rome, 1759-1908), vi, doc. 971. 138 C’P, 10, f. 115r. 25 May 1369. On this problem, see N. Rubinstein, “Florence and the Despots. Some Aspects of Florentine Diplomacy in the Fourteenth Century,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, ser. 5, 1 (1952), 36-38. 189 Florentines were in favor of a clause included in the treaty between the

papacy and Bernabé which prohibited the latter from attacking the city or intervening in Tuscan affairs; CP, 3, f. 126v; 4, ff. 51v, 609r.

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and desperate enemy might surrender itself to the lord of Milan.**

Bernabo’s flirtation with Pisa was but one facet of his probing into the power vacuum on his southern frontier, from the Ligurian coast to the Apennines. At regular intervals, disquieting reports

filtered into Florence of Milanese activities in this vulnerable area. In March 1365 the commune queried Bernabo about a rumor that the Ubaldini, a fierce mountain clan with Ghibelline traditions, had invited the Visconti to take over their lands and construct fortresses in the Apennines. A few months later, Florence learned that Bernabo’s bastard son, Ambrogio, had joined

forces with John Hawkwood in the Lunigiana area north of Pisa. In 1366 Bernabo’s activities shifted to Genoa, and reports circulated that the Ligurian seaport was about to fall into Visconti hands.*** Such information was not calculated to lull the Arno city into a sense of security, and it bolstered the contention of the Guelf partisans that the enmity between Florence and the Visconti was permanent. Guelf partisans were jubilant at the prospect of Urban’s return

to Rome, and they unleashed a massive propaganda campaign to gain support for a rapprochement with the church. “The commune rejoices and exults over the pope’s coming,” proclaimed a spokesman for the Sixteen.” In one letter sent to Avignon urging

the pope to persevere in his planned journey, the Signoria de-

scribed in glowing terms the new age that would dawn for Italy upon the pope’s arrival: the end of war, discord, and misery;

the restoration of peace, prosperity, and virtue; the renaissance of Rome and the peninsula.““* The rhetorical exaggeration in this appeal is obvious, but the church party in Florence did entertain these hopes. Those citizens who did not subscribe to this optimistic vision found it prudent to remain silent. Behind this surge of enthusiasm for a Guelf foreign policy was a significant factor not mentioned in communal records, and receiving only passing attention in the chronicles. Many offices in the ecclesiastical bureaucracy were open to Florentines, 140 Velluti, p. 240; Sozomen Pistoriensis, Specimen Historiae, RRIISS, xv1, col. 1081; Cronica dt Matteo Villant, x1, 102. 141 Missive, 13, ff. 36r, 64v-65r; CP, 7, ff. 41v, 80v-81v, 83v. On Bernabd’s use of the compantes for his purposes, see Pirchan, 1, 26-27.

142 CP, 8, f. 74, | |

143 Filippi, doc. 1.

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particularly those citizens who possessed an impeccable Guelf lineage and a record of devotion to the papal cause. That the expectation of material rewards in the form of offices was a factor in creating support for a prochurch policy was noted by Matteo Villani: “Some, to obtain ecclesiastical benefices, others, to be treasurer and captain in the territory of the Rome church, have advocated that help be given to the . . . foreigners who, with the titles of dukes, counts, captains or papal legates, have left the poverty of Provence to become lords of the noble and famous provinces of Italy, and by one means or another, have dishonestly forced our commune to assist them.’*** The influx of Florentine patricians into the papal administration increased as the territory under church control expanded. Between 1354 and 1372 nine citizens from old Guelf families, the majority from the Albizzi faction, were selected as papal vicars of Orvieto. Filling the important post of podesta of Bologna were five prom-

inent Florentines: Messer Americo Cavalcanti, Messer Jacopo Alberti, Messer Guelfo Gherardini, Messer Rosso de’ Ricci, and Messer Uguccione Buondelmonti.**° Urban’s successor, Pope Gregory XI, wrote numerous letters to his officials in Italy, ordering them to provide offices for Florentines who were dedicated

supporters of the church: Filippo and Antonio degli Albizzi, Messer Geri de’ Pazzi and his son Corrado, Simone Baroncelli, Bettino and Lapo Ricasoli, Scolaio Cavalcanti.*“* This lucrative source of patronage, available only to the patriciate, angered the

gente nuova. For them it constituted additional proof of the alliance between the church and the old order in Florence.**’ 144M. Villani, vim, 103.

145 Discorso historico con molti accidenti occorsi in Orvieto et in altre parti, RRIISS, new ed., xv, Part 5 (Citta di Castello, 1903), 69, 72, 86, 88; Historie di Cipriano Manenti, ibid., 457, 464-66; M. Griffoni, Memoriale historicum de rebus Bononiensium, RRIISS, new ed., xvitt, Part 2 (Citta di Castello, 1902), 63, 66, 67, 69. 148 Tetires secretes et curiales du Pape Grégoire XI (1370-1378), relatives &@ la

France extraites des registres du Vatican (Bibliothéque des Ecoles frangaises a’Athenes et de Rome, ser. 3, vit) (Paris, 1935-1957), docs. 2188, 2196, 21098, 2208, 2225, 2908, 3009, 3010, 3048. The letter from Gregory XI appointing Bettino Ricasoli as papal vicar of Ancona, 15 June 1371, contains this significant statement: “Propter sue et suorum progenitorum devocionis sinceritatem, quam semper erga Romana ecclesiam impensa servicie et sue probitatis et virtutum merita favore precipuo. . . .” Theiner, Codex diplomaticus, 11, doc. 505. 147 See above, pp. 134-40. There were many patricians who, like Matteo

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The climax of Guelf aspirations occurred in May 1367, when Urban V disembarked from a galley at Corneto and made his way to Viterbo. From Todi, where he was employed as chancellor, Coluccio Salutati described his personal reaction to the papal

return: “I rejoice . . . to see the return to its own Lares of the seat of the Holy Church, and with the return to Rome of pontifical rule, the restoration to all Italy of its long desired honor. How I would have wished to be present on that day when our divine Urban, entering Rome, had bestowed upon the city its ancient

majesty... . I will always be happy to remember that this has occurred while I was alive, and with all the force of my spirit, I pray that this joy will not be momentary but eternal.”*** But the large hopes for the restoration of peace and security voiced

by the young humanist and by Guelfs throughout Italy were quickly blighted. In Florence the collapse of the Guelf dream had swift and significant repercussions in the political arena.

Proponents of a Guelf foreign policy in Florence had based much of their case upon the argument advanced by a Parte stalwart, Messer Scolaio Cavalcanti: “The pope is a powerful lord,

and the support of his Italian friends will suffice [to pacify Italy].”**° This myth was punctured within weeks of Urban’s arrival in his temporal domain. While still at Viterbo, preparing for his triumphal entry into Rome, the pontiff suffered a humiliating rebuff. Altercations between townspeople and members of the papal court touched off a violent uprising; Urban’s palace was besieged for two days by a mob shouting, “Death to the church and long live the popolo!” The rebellion was quickly suppressed; the banners welcoming the pontiff were replaced in the streets

by gibbets, upon which the ringleaders of the revolt were hanged.” Even before the pontiff’s arrival in church territory, Villani, did not share in these patronage plums, who were as incensed by this practice as the gente nuova; see Stefani, 726. 148Tetter to Francesco Bruni, 3 November 1367; Epistolario di Coluccio Salutati, 1, 44. For similar comments, see the commune’s letter to Urban, 31 May 1367; Filippi, doc. 18.

149 CP, 8, f. 6r, 17 November 1366: “. . . Cum papa sit potens dominus, et favor italicorum devotorum sufficiebat.” 150G, Mollat, Les papes d’Avignon (1305-1378), p. 255. The commune immediately sent three hundred troops to Viterbo upon receipt of the news of the rebellion; Missive, 14, f. 74v, 11 September 1367.

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the citizens of Todi had rebelled against papal rule. Urban sent

an appeal for aid to the Signoria, requesting two thousand soldiers to quench this uprising. The commune refused this demand and suggested rather tartly that Urban use a less violent form of persuasion than military force in dealing with his sub-

jects.”>* |

The pope’s presence had not brought peace to Italy, and these events in the papal states had demonstrated the serious limitations of his temporal power. Urban was still heavily dependent

on the support of his Guelf allies, who could expect little in return, The church’s requisitions upon communal resources

| would not be diminished by the transfer of the curia to Rome: the digestion of this unpalatable fact revived the partisan feud over a new Guelf alliance which Urban labored to construct. As conceived by the pope, this federation was to be a general defensive alliance, not limited to the companies; it was to have greater military resources, and it was to include the Tuscan communes,

the Lombard signori of Ferrara, Mantua, and Padua, and the queen of Naples.” Even before Urban’s arrival in Italy, his ambassador, Niccolo Spinelli, had obtained from a reluctant Signoria a statement, in the form of a letter to the curia, that the commune would join a league of this enlarged scope.*** But a vague promise was not a legally binding commitment, as the

pope discovered. When negotiations for a formal treaty of alliance began at Viterbo in July 1367, communal opinion was split asunder on the issue. For months the debate dragged on in the council halls, and a succession of embassies traveled to Rome

to negotiate with Urban V. In no previous discussion on a foreign policy issue were factional

antagonisms so acute or so well publicized. There were several references in the chronicles and in Pratiche debates to the intense partisan passions which had been generated over this problem.*™* 151 Missive, 14, f. 63r. Opinion expressed in the Pratiche protocols was unani-

Pirchan, 1, 33-35. | mously opposed to the dispatch of troops; CP, 8, f. 91v. On this revolt, see 152 Qn the negotiations for the league of Viterbo, see Pirchan, 1, 36-48. 153 CP, 8, ff. 64r, 67r-Gor.

154 See the comment of the Twelve: “Quod ambaxiatores ad urbem mictantur;

... placeret tamen ... propter variam loquellam que fit inter cives, quod de maiori concordia civium irent, et de eorum assensu”; CP, 9, f. 49r; and the

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The factions wrangled interminably over the composition of embassies sent to the curia during negotiations. In July 1367 the colleges refused to authorize the dispatch of one mission, composed of four Albizzi partisans, until a fifth ambassador, Messer Giovanni de’ Ricci, was added to the group.**”’ Six months later, another embassy was twice enlarged so that each faction would have its proper representation. Uguccione de’ Ricci gave his bene-

diction to this mission, although he favored the addition of a scholar (/etteratum) who, as he expressed it with brutal candor, “was not an adherent of the sect of the Florentine church, and who has the interests of the commune rather than the pope at heart.”*’* The decision to send this mission had apparently aroused some popular opposition; the Sixteen expressed indignation over

public criticism directed against the priors, and urged them to dispatch the embassy to Rome, “no matter what the citizens say.’ The controversy over the papal league had spread from the council halls to the streets and market places. A point frequently made by the league’s advocates was that Florence’s honor was at stake: “The commune should remain firmly and legally bound to its promises, and therefore conclude the alliance,” insisted Messer Uguccione Buondelmonti.*** The crux of the Guelf argument was stated forcefully by Lapo da Castiglionchio: “The priors should in no way whatsoever allow Florence to deviate from devotion and obedience to the Roman church.

... If the pope insists upon the league as he has requested, then consent to it; for to swerve from his will or from obedience to him is dangerous to the status of a Guelf city.”*°° Opposing argustatement of Bartolo Biliotti; “Quod domini assumant aliquos cives . .. non passionatos in aliquam partium, qui audiant super facto lige et cives qui illa nolunt et qui volunt”; CP, 9, f. 65v. 155 Velluti, p. 257. The Ricci faction had some cause for annoyance, since the

embassy of twelve citizens sent to welcome the pope at Viterbo (June 1367) was dominated by Albizzi partisans; Filippi, doc. 18. 156 CP, g, f. 29v: “Quod ambaxiatores electi mictantur urbem ad d. papam; . .. addere tamen unum litteratum placetur, dummodo esset talis conditionis quod non esset pendere settam ecclesie Florentie; et quod habeat potius animum ad facta comunis quam pape.”

157 CP, go, f. 48v, 14 February 1368: “Mictantur oratores ad urbem, non

obstantiis hiis que dicuntur per cives.” , 158 “Quod comune stet firmum et legale de suis promissionibus et . . . ideo fiat liga”; CP, 8, f. 86r, 25 June 1367. 159 CP, g, f. 22v, 29 December 1367. Proof that the Guelf argument had not

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ments repeated the reservations which had been voiced in the past: the danger of breaking the Sarzana peace, doubts about the military efficacy of the league. Critics of the proposed pact sought to limit its scope and thus restrict the extent of Florence’s obligations. They contended that the inclusion of the Lombard signori could be a direct violation of the peace with Milan, and

they also wished to avoid any commitment to defend Bologna against the Visconti.*®

At the heart of the debate was a thorny question: did Urban plan to use this league as an offensive weapon against Bernabo Visconti? The historian Ammirato reported a speech, unverified by any extant documentary evidence, which Urban allegedly made to Florentine ambassadors in July 1367. According to this account, the pope described the numerous injuries that Bernabd had inflicted upon the church and the commune, and he urged Florence to join with the emperor and himself to rid Italy of “the perpetual enemy.’”® Stefani, who was in Rome at the time,

wrote in his chronicle that the pope was furious with the Florentines because he had received assurances from this embassy that the commune would join a league against Milan, a promise which was later repudiated.*” The news of Urban’s anger reached changed in nearly a century is the speech made by Oddone Altoviti in a council meeting in 1285: “Commune Florentie oportet obedire ecclesie Romane, quod persone et res Florentinorum sunt in forcia domini pape et ecclesie Romane; et sic non modicum dubitandum est de veniendo contra precepta domini pape”; quoted in Pirchan, 1, 227, n. 26. 160 These negative comments are scattered throughout the debate on the league; e.g. the statement of Salvestro de’ Medici: “Quod liga non fiat, nisi cum omnibus Lombardis et Tuscis”; CP, 9, f. 22v. On the conflicting views concerning the necessity for defending Bologna from Visconti attack, see idid., f. 2or. 1615, Ammirato, [storie fiorentine, 1, 661-62. Ammirato may well have obtained this information from a diplomatic missive which is no longer extant; see Pirchan, 1, 44, n. 19. I am inclined to believe this interpretation. According to Ammirato, the spokesman for the embassy told the pope that they would urge the commune to join “cosi giusta impresa,’ which may have misled Urban

, into believing that the league was already a reality. The Signoria’s reply, however, was negative. For Sienese reports of the negotiations, see L. Fumi, “Un’ ambasciata de’ Sanesi a Urbano V nel trasferimento della sede in Roma,” Archivio

della R. Societ2 romana di storia patria, 1x (1886), 129-62, and particularly docs. 2 and 4. F. Cognasso also states that Urban was organizing a league to attack the Visconti; Storia di Milano (Fondazione Treccani degli Alfieri per la Storia di Milano) (Milan, 1955—), v, 436-39. 162 Stefani, 7or. Sozomen, col. 1082, makes the same statement: “Quod summe

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Florence in December 1367 and prompted anguished pleas from Albizzi partisans that the pontiff be appeased.*®* Nevertheless, the possibility that the city might be involved in offensive action against the Milanese tyrant made staunch Guelfs blanch: “If it is true that the pope wants the league to destroy Messer Bernabo,” Simone Peruzzi stated, “then it should not be made.””™ Both factions used the Visconti issue in their strategy. Ricci partisans were receptive to the proposal that Bernabo be invited

to join the federation, thus eliminating any possibility that it could be directed against him.**° The Albizzi group secretly informed the pope that its partisan rivals were negotiating a separate alliance with the Milanese ruler. This provoked furious denunciations from the colleges, whose members demanded that the culpable citizens be punished for revealing state secrets." The interjection of the Visconti question into the debate sounded

the death knell to the papal alliance. On 3 February 1368 Piero degli Albizzi made a final plea for the league: “By every means possible, the commune should free itself from any connections with Messer Bernabo, and should then conclude an alliance with the church and others with whom it is accustomed to federate.

Send the elected ambassadors to the pope. ... To fail to send them, or to retard [the mission] is dangerous.”’*’ Sandro da Quarata summed up the position of his faction: “Suspend the Papae displicuit, et multum contra Florentinos indignatus fuit, maxime quia Florentinis deficientibus videbatur sibi non posse consequi quod paraverat, quum potentia Florentinorum esse maxima pars Italiae.” For other evidence that Urban planned to move against Bernabo, see Pirchan, 1, 49-57, 70-75. 163 See the statements of Bindo Guasconi, Messer Giovanni de’ Medici, Simone Peruzzi, Messer Luigi Gianfigliazzi, and Michele Castellani; CP, 9, ff. 16r-16v. Cf. the statement of Sandro da Quarata: “Quod domini et collegia faciant pro

parte sua quod papa removeatur ab indignatione sumpta contra comune, et conservetur in devotione solita; non tamen in tantum curetur de sua indignatione, quod comune possit periclitari”; zdid., f. 17r. 164 CP, go, f. 17r, 12 December 1367. See also the negative attitude of Messer Geri de’ Pazzi, whose devotion to the Parte Guelfa was unequaled. 165 See the views of Tellino Dini and Messer Donato Barbadori, both Ricci partisans: CP, 9, f. 22r. 166 CP, o, f. 27r. 167 CP, 9, f. 41r: “Quod omnis via et modus videatur quod comune liberetur a ligamine domini Bernabonis, et quod comune colligetur ecclesie et aliis cum

quibus soluit colligari. . . . Et ambaxiatores electi destinentur ad papam ... et non mictere vel retardare est periculosum.”

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dispatch of an ambassador to the curia. The commune should observe its peace with Milan and maintain amicable relations with

Messer Bernabo; nor is it praiseworthy to say the contrary.”** Despite Lapo da Castiglionchio’s warning of the dangers that Florence would incur by flouting the papal will, the commune eventually decided to remain outside the league, and to avoid the extensive obligations pertaining thereto.*®

Thwarted in his efforts to forge a strong Italian federation to crush the Visconti, Urban V placed all his hopes in the emperor, Charles IV, with whom he had maintained cordial relations. Italy was to be treated to the unusual spectacle of an emperor coming to the peninsula at the behest of the pope. The Florentines, recall-

ing their difficulties with Charles on his first Italian journey in 1354, sought to discourage Urban from inviting the German monarch, but the commune’s credit at the curia was never lower than in the spring of 1368. Charles crossed the Alps in May and im-

mediately betrayed his papal patron by making peace with Bernabo. He then proceeded southward on his way to his “imperial possessions” in Tuscany, with the ultimate objective of visiting Rome." His appearance in central Italy touched off a series of disorders and upheavals in Lucca, Pisa, Siena, and S. Miniato, the latter city under Florentine control. These disturbances, coupled with the military threat of the imperial forces, caused grave concern in Florence. As in 1354-1355, opinion was divided over the commune’s proper course of action in its relations with the emperor.

An illuminating debate on this subject occurred in November 1368, when Charles was in Lucca with his army. Before a large convocation of citizens, the Signoria presented a list of possible 188 Tbid., f£. 41v: “Quod supersedeatur missioni ambaxiatorum ad curiam. Et quod comune observet pacem d. Bernabone et secum amicabiliter conversetur; nec est laudabile vel utile dicere contrarium.” 169 For Lapo’s statement, see CP, 9, f. 71v. The league of Viterbo was formed without Florence in August 1367; its members were the pope, Queen Joanna of Naples, Siena, and Perugia; Pirchan, 1, 46. Pirchan summarizes the subsequent papal efforts to arrange an alliance with Florence; 1, 229-39. On these diplomatic developments, see Velluti, pp. 256-59.

170 The imperial journey is described in great detail by Pirchan, 1, 87ff. In addition to the extensive documentation published by Pirchan in vol. u, see also the additional documents on Charles’s journey in Mommsen, Jtalienische Analekten, docs. 329-50.

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courses to follow in negotiating with the emperor.’ One plan, on which opinion was divided, was to pay Charles to retire from Italy. The proposal of a papal league naturally won the support of the Albizzi faction. But even more popular was a projected general league, to include the church, Bernaboé Visconti, and other major Italian states. A few hardy individuals dared to announce their support for an alliance with the lord of Milan, but this idea was

anathema to the arciguelfi, who recoiled in horror before the vision of a federation with the ancient Ghibelline enemy. Filippo Baroncelli contended that a league with Milan would result in the destruction of the commune and the loss of its liberty. Lapo da Castiglionchio was equally dogmatic: “It would not be desirable to make a league with Messer Bernabo, since the nature of the Guelfs is repelled by the Ghibelline enemy.’*” In contrast to these ideological arguments, the Ricci faction based its position on prag-

matic grounds. The Visconti alliance was merely one possible alternative, to be judged on its practical value as a contribution to the commune’s security.”” Florence was able to solve the imperial problem without resorting to a pact with either the pope or the Visconti. In its relations

with Charles, the commune exhibited remarkable spirit and resourcefulness. The inept attempts by the emperor’s agents to incite a revolution in the city were easily thwarted; no spark of 171 The debate occurred on 11 and 15 November 1368; CP, 10, ff. 34v-36v, 38v-3or.

172 For the comments of Filippo and Lapo, see CP, 10, ff. 35v, 38v. 178 Those who expressed willingness to consider a league with Bernabé were Uguccione de’ Ricci, Messer Niccold Alberti, Giorgio Aldobrandini, all Ricci partisans; and also two members of the Albizzi circle, Carlo degli Strozzi and Filippo Corsini; CP, 10, ff. 34v-36r. That the Visconti question was considered a very delicate and dangerous issue is indicated by a marginal notation in the Pratica protocol. The notary had recorded this statement by the spokesman for the Sixteen, Giorgio Aldobrandini: “Et unus ambasciator mictatur ad dominum Albanum cardinalem, ad hostendendum sibi quod liga generalis est salus Ytalie, et ideo reducant ad illam dominum papam. Et si predicta non haberent locum, fiat liga etiam cum d. Bernabone et qualibet alia, ut libertas Florentie conservetur.” In the margin is this significant comment: “Ego, N[icolaus], concepi con-

silium gonfalonerii ut scriptum est. Tamen Georgius predictus dixit die xii novembris declarando quod non dixit quod fieret liga cum d. Bernabone et alia, sed dixit quod in casu quod premissa non haberent locum, tunc domini priori... possent habere consilia et tunc facere secundum consilia. ... Negat esse in puncto quod esset utile facere liga cum d. Bernabone et alia pro conservanda libertate comunis”; zd1d., f. 36r.

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Ghibelline sentiment was ignited by the imperial presence. In marked contrast to its hypersensitive reaction in 1354, the government remained very calm in this crisis, with no sign of panic and apparently little fear of an internal rebellion in favor of the German.*”* Refusing to be intimidated by threats of force, communal authorities made no concessions to the emperor beyond the terms originally offered to him, and repelled without difficulty the weak military invasion launched in the contado by imperial forces. In May 1369 Florence obtained from Charles the renewal of its rights and privileges, which previously had been granted iN 1355, in exchange for a payment of 50,000 florins.*”

After the emperor’s departure, Florence still had to contend with rebellious S. Miniato. When negotiations with the city failed in the spring of 1369, the commune organized a military force to

subdue the city. This immediately prompted the leaders of the revolt to seek foreign aid from the Visconti. Through the summer and autumn of 1369, Florence grew more suspicious that Bernabo

was secretly aiding the rebels. The Albizzi faction, which had consistently used the Visconti threat as an argument for a papal alliance, heaped recriminations upon the Ricci partisans for their lenient and indulgent attitude toward the Ghibelline tyrant. Reporting the opinion of the Parte captains, Lapo da Castiglionchio asserted that the Florentines were too cautious in their search for remedies against Bernabd’s machinations. Disputing this view, Uguccione de’ Ricci advised the Signoria to undertake no military

campaign, although he admitted that the Visconti had violated the Sarzana peace.*’® When Bernabo sent troops to the imperial

vicar in Lucca to be used in S. Miniato’s defense, the Albizzi partisans denounced their opponents for allowing themselves to be tricked by Bernabo, thereby placing the commune in grave 174 For the internal situation in 1354-1355, see above, Ch. 4, Part 2. On subversive efforts in 1368, see Pirchan, 1, 137-39; CP, 10, ff. 15r, I7r, 19QV, 27r. Three contadini, one a noble named Marco Abbati, were implicated in attempts

to stir up rebellion by shouting “Viva Pimperadore!” and by parading in the streets holding aloft a banner with the imperial arms. So confident were the colleges that these puny efforts were futile that they advised the Signoria to display the banner “ignominiose” from the windows of the palace of the Signoria; CP, 10, ff. r7r-19Vv.

175Qn Florence’s relations with the emperor, see Stefani, 708; Pirchan, 1, 250-57, 377-87; Ul, 209-15.

178 For these partisan views on Bernabd, see CP, 10, ff. 115r, 118v, 119V.

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peril.” The Ricci were thus forced to accept the renewal of negotiations with Urban V for an alliance. Concluded in November 1369, this five-year pact established a joint military force of six thousand troops, to be used in the common defense of Florence and the papal states.*" After so many frustrations and disappointments, the dream of Florentine Guelfs had finally materialized: a firm alliance with the church against the common Ghibelline enemy. Papal forces joined the Florentine army laying siege to S. Miniato, and although the communal forces suffered a defeat at the hands of Hawkwood’s band, reputedly in Bernabo’s pay, the rebel city was recovered in January 1370. But the Guelf faction, now firmly in

control of foreign policy, scored a further success. In April the commune signed an agreement with Urban to participate in an invasion of Milanese territory.” Florence organized a military force and sent it north to Lombardy, and her ambassadors began negotiations with other Guelf rulers—the signori of Padua and Ferrara, the marquis of Montferrat, the king of Hungary—to build a grand alliance against Milan.*® All signs indicate that the war against the Visconti was popular in Florence, and that it was vigorously prosecuted by a united citizenry. The qualms and fears of those who had sought to appease Bernabd were submerged in

a wave of anger against the ambitious and aggressive tyrant.** The campaign in Lombardy was not, however, a notable success. Papal interest in the conflict was tepid, since the curia was then making plans to return to Avignon.” In the early weeks of the campaign, Florentines urged the pope to mobilize his military

forces and commit them fully to the struggle against the Vis177 Stefani, 715.

178 Velluti, 282-83; Stefani, 715. For the pope’s letter informing the commune of the pact’s ratification, see Capitoli, 11, 522. 179 Prov., 58, f£. 155v; Stefani, 720. 180 CP, 11, ff. 14v, 34r-36r, 37V, 43V-45r, 48r, 49Vv-50r, 61r-61v, 7IV-73F.

181 Provisions pertaining to the prosecution of the war were passed with large majorities; e.g. the provisions authorizing the leagues with the papacy, Prov., 57, ff. 180r, 204v, passed by votes of 193-4, 128-4; and 145-17, 124-6. There were no

statements in the Pratiche records opposing the war, and several citizens who had opposed a papal alliance announced their support: Salvestro de’ Medici, Filippo Capponi, Messer Donato Aldighieri, Uguccione de’ Ricci, Luigi Aldobrandini; CP, 11, ff. rar, 15r, 37Vv. 182 Mollat, Papes, pp. 256-57.

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conti.** By July, however, statements began to appear in the Pratiche protocols to the effect that Florence’s allies were shirking their responsibilities in the common effort.*** Having consistently evinced a willingness to negotiate peace, the Florentines were even more eager to end the war when it became evident that

the campaign was losing impetus. The commune demanded a guarantee from Bernabé that he would stay out of Tuscany, and that he would not intervene in the affairs of Pisa, Lucca, and S. Miniato. After receiving promises which were considered satisfactory, the Signoria concluded a peace treaty in November 1370."

During these turbulent years, Florentines oscillated between periods of harmony and solidarity on foreign policy questions, and phases of acute controversy. The city was never more united than in 1368 when it was menaced by Charles IV. Jacopo Gavacciani spoke for the great majority: “The commune should main-

tain itself with spirit and energy, for to lose liberty is to lose everything.” No citizen publicly contradicted Niccolo Soderint’s

grandiloquent assertion: “The emperor should know that the commune intends to defend itself, and that [the citizens] will devour each other rather than give him a stone!’’** But this unanimity of opinion and purpose prevailed only during the crisis;

it did not eliminate or soften the profound disagreements on foreign affairs within the ruling group. The central issue was that perennial source of discord, the papal alliance. In these years Florence had thrice entered into agreements with the church, but the pacts were never popular. They were concluded only in times 188 CP, x1, ff. 13r-13V, 14v-15r, L6v-17r.

184 CP, 11, ff. 77r, 78v, 81r-81v, 84r. | 185 As early as April, speakers in Pratiche sessions expressed willingness to negotiate a peace with Bernabo; CP, 11, ff. 5v-8r, ov, 12r, 16v-17r. This sentiment was frequently echoed in Pratiche debates throughout the summer of 1370; ibid., ff. 61r, 63r-63V, I02V-I04V, Ioor-IIIV, 114v-115r. The announcement of peace was made on 13 November, zd7d., f. 115v.

186 Gavacciani’s statement: “Quod animose et viriliter comune se tueatur et fortificet, quia perdere libertatem est perdere totum”; and Soderini: “Bonum esset quod imperator sciat quod comune intendit se tueri, et ante comedere

se invicem quam dare sibi unam petram territorii Florentie’; CP, 10, f. “r, 13 September 1368. For similar views by Ricci partisans, Uguccione de’ Ricci and Messer Niccolé Alberti, see zzd., f£. rrr. An anonymous chronicler proudly

asserted: “. . . Per tutta quella guerra non ebbono veruno mutamento, tanto si ressono savi e ordinati”; Cronzchetta d’incerto, p. 191.

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DOMESTIC FERMENT AND FOREIGN PERILS, 1366-1370

of grave stress, when an alliance seemed imperative for defense or survival.

The dispute over a Guelf foreign policy was part of a larger issue which gradually emerged after the Pisan war: the role that Florence should play in Italian politics. There was general agreement on some facets of this problem: the maintenance of Tuscan independence; the encouragement of republican regimes in central Italy.**’ But the crises of the late 1360’s had forced the commune to abandon its provincial isolation; to seek, for example, an alliance with the distant king of Hungary against the emperor.** Proponents of a Guelf foreign policy accepted and encouraged this extension of the city’s diplomatic horizons. Convinced that Florence was permanently endangered by natural enemies, principally the Ghibelline tyrant of Milan, they favored the maintenance of alliances with the city’s traditional friends: the papacy, Naples, Padua, Hungary. Inevitably, such alliances involved an enlarge-

ment of the commune’s foreign commitments. Thus the Guelf faction advocated the grant of subsidies to the queen of Naples, and the dispatch of troops to assist Francesco da Carrara in his Alpine war with the Hapsburgs.** Guelf partisans evinced a lively interest in the future of the Neapolitan kingdom,” and in 187 See Rubinstein, “Florence and the Despots,” 32-35; H. Baron, The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance, pp. 15-19, 445-48. An example of Florentine interest in preserving republicanism is her concern over Genoa in 1366, afflicted by internecine strife. Messer Pazzino degli Strozzi commented: “Si videret illam civitatem debere mutare statum, tunc ortetur eos de eorum statu, offerendo quod comune pro eorum pace et concordia se intramictetur si vellent”; CP, 7, f. 83v, 19 January 1366.

188 The eagerness with which Florentines sought an accord with Louis of Hungary contrasted sharply with the apathy shown toward a papal alliance; CP, 9, ff. 59v-6ov; 10, ff. 15v, 17V, IQV-2IV, 23r-23v. Typical is the comment of Alessandro degli Albizzi: “Quod benivolentia d. Regis tenaciter conservetur velut necessaria conservationi status comunis Florentie et quod in nullo a suis voluntatibus et consiliis discedatur”; CP, 9, f. 59v, 10 March 1368. Similar in tone is the eulogy of Uguccione de’ Ricci; CP, 10, f. 23r, 6 October 1368. ,

189 See above, pp. 144-47, 225-26.

190 For indications of Florentine interest in the fate. of the Regno, see CP, 10, ff. 17v-18r, 20r, 23r-23v. Carlo degli Strozzi’s statement, zbid., f. 18r, is particularly significant, for it reflects some of the ramifications of Florentine interests which

men of his status habitually considered: “Quod operetur cum d. regina [of Naples] quod ipsa sit contenta quod post mortem suam Regnum non transferatur in aliam stirpem vel sanguinem quam Regis Karoli [of Anjou]. Et si-circa hoc

non annuerit voluntati d. Regis [of Hungary], tunc fiat liga cum d. Rege, ne

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DOMESTIC FERMENT AND FOREIGN PERILS, 1366-1370

1365 they urged Urban V to appoint a faithful friend to a key position on the north Italian frontier, the patriarchate of Aquileia.*™* According to their view, Florence’s concerns and her political and diplomatic responsibilities stretched from the Straits of Messina to the Alps and beyond. Critics of a Guelf foreign policy—Ricci partisans and the majority of the gente nuova—tended, by contrast, to be more parochial and isolationist. Their diplomatic interests rarely extended beyond Tuscany. In the early years of the regime they had favored defensive leagues with Siena and Perugia; this was the maximum extension of Florentine obligations which they were prepared to condone.’”? On three counts they criticized a foreign policy tied

to the Guelf standard: it was expensive; it failed to provide pro-

tection; and it actually increased the danger of war. In their opinion, Florence was gravely weakened by joining Guelf federa-

tions, for she channeled her resources into remote causes and quarrels, instead of using her money and troops exclusively for her own defense. Furthermore, such involvement greatly increased the possibility of open conflict with the powerful and dangerous Visconti, There was, in this group, a deep fear of diplomatic entanglements. In a Pratica session in May 1369, two

Ricci partisans articulated this sentiment. Sandro da Quarata stated that Florence should make no alliances whatsoever with other states. A butcher, Schiatta Ricchi, reflecting the caution and conservatism of the petty bourgeoisie, favored the promulgation

of a law prohibiting Florence from making any league with a commune or a signore more powerful than herself.*** Such views found wide support in Florence, particularly among the gente nuova, who were not strongly imbued with Guelf traditions. To these practical and pragmatic men, ideology had little place in foreign policy. Diplomacy was an affair of material retransferri possit in aliam sanguinem ut petitur. Et supersedeatur constitutioni sindici [to the king of Hungary], quia eius constitutio est periculosa mercatoribus qui sunt in curia romana, Regno et aliis mundi partibus suppositis pape et impero.” 191 Missive, 13, f£. 62v.

192 Rubinstein, 39-42.

198 CP, 10, f. 114r, 25 May 1369. Ricchi’s statement: “Fiat reformatio in comuni

quod comune Florentie deinceps non possit facere ligam cum aliquo domino vel comuni maiori comunis Florentie.”

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DOMESTIC FERMENT AND FOREIGN PERILS, 1366-1370

sources: fortresses, troops, money, and, as a last resort, allies; it could not be constructed upon the shifting sands of ideological belief. The Guelf contention that the interests of Florence and the papacy were identical had been proved wrong on several occa-

sions: the curia had abandoned the city when attacked by the Visconti (1351-1353) and in her difficulty with the companies in

1359. The alliance with the church in 1366 had not protected Florence from the papal protegé, Charles IV, nor had the 1370 pact against the Visconti achieved satisfactory results. Guelf par-

tisans could lay some blame for these misunderstandings and blighted hopes upon the commune’s negative, grudging attitude

toward the papacy. But this did not alter the fact that Guelf ideology was no longer a vital factor in Florentine diplomacy, or indeed in Italian politics, after 1370."**

It is one of the ironies of Florentine history that those men who favored an isolationist course in foreign policy should be responsible, in the 1370's, for the commune’s metamorphosis into the most dynamic force in Italian diplomacy. 194 On the transformation of Guelf ideology in this period, see Baron, Crisis, pp. 14-16.

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| : CHAPTER VI ~—

OO 1371-1375 Che Burgeoning Crisis

“,..Frale pessime setie che ct sono” “When foreign war subsided,” wrote Donato Velluti in describing the end of the Pisan conflict in 1364, “the internal war among the citizens began to boil.”* Had he lived long enough, Velluti might well have used similar language to describe the Florentine scene after the conclusion of the Visconti conflict in November 1370.” The termination of foreign crises invariably signalled trouble for the regime, as Florentines focused their attention on the visceral issues that impinged directly on their lives and fortunes, In 1371 the political atmosphere was charged with greater tension, for the factions had been locked in bitter combat

over the papal league. The Albizzi, it was believed, had scored a resounding success with the conclusion of the alliance with the church, and the family’s prestige soared even higher with the appointment of Piero degli Albizzi’s nephew Piero Corsini to the college of cardinals. The city awaited a revival of Ghibelline proscriptions to mark the beginning of another era of factional strife.*

It fell to the opponents of the oligarchic bloc, however, to take the offensive. In January 1371 this group secured the passage of a law which prohibited any magnate who had achieved popolano status from entering the Signoria or the colleges for twenty years. Stefani explained that this provision was directed against a belligerent oligarch, Benghi Buondelmonti, who had gained entry into popolano ranks as a reward for his military exploits in the Pisa war.” Another law, passed in September, was likewise di1“Riposati della guerra di fuori, si comincié a riscaldare la guerra cittadinescha dentro”; La cronica domestica di Messer Donato Velluti, p. 241. 2 Ammirato, Istorte fiorentine, 1, 678, noted: “Talche poco diletto sentiva il popolo della pace fatta, poiche secondo l’antico uso di questa citta, subito che le molestie di fuori posavano, crescevano quelle di dentro.” 8 Cronaca fiorentina di Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, rubrics 725, 726. * Provuisioni, 58, f. 164r. The vote: 129-42 and 74-37. See Stefani’s comment, 725,

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rected against the grand1; it provided that victims of magnate assaults could appeal directly to the Signoria, which then initiated action to bar the offender from all communal offices.” The third provision, a “civil rights” measure, sought to protect citizens from judicial infringement of their liberty. Frequently in the past, the preamble stated, judicial officials had exceeded their authority by

investigating and punishing citizens involved in public disturbances. Henceforth, no executor could prosecute a popolano for subversive activity unless homicide or arson had been committed,

or unless the judge was authorized to proceed by the Signoria.° These measures encountered little difficulty in the councils, where the opposition could muster no more than a quarter of the votes. The oligarchy’s legislative efforts met with greater resistance. In May 1371 the Parte captains sent a petition to the Signoria,

requesting certain revisions in the anti-Ghibelline laws. A provision enacted in 1359 had stipulated that individuals convicted as Ghibelline officeholders could not enjoy any of the benefits pertaining to the office, such as the right to bear arms. In their petition, the captains complained that some citizens had sought to weaken this law by declaring that it did not apply to men who were ammoniti, but only to those convicted in the courts. The captains wished to extend this prohibition to everyone who had been proscribed by the Parte. In the Council of the Popolo, however, the vote was negative. Only after the petition had been pre-

sented three times was it finally accepted, by a very narrow margin."

For six months the Parte’s cautious maneuver went unchallenged. Then in December the Signoria which had initiated the law restricting the executor’s authority reopened the attack on the Guelf society. Though only one person had been proscribed by the Parte since 1368, the authors of the provision professed great concern over the irregularities in the ammonizione procedure, “considering how much danger could arise from the hasty

and incautious deliberations which have been taken in the past 5 Prov., 59, ff. 1o2v-103v. Another law which revised the procedure to be followed was enacted in the spring of 1372; Prov., 60, ff. 16r-17v. The vote on these provisions: 139-29 and 83-20; 164-19 and 77-38. 8 Prov., 59, f. 188r. The vote: 125-32 and 78-30.

7 Libri Fabarum, 39, f. 247r (23 May) and f. 253r (7 July). The text of the petition is in Prov., 59, ff. 43v-44r. The vote on this measure: 133-59 and 77-26.

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THE BURGEONING CRISIS, 1371-1375

by the captains of the Parte Guelfa, with respect to the approval of witnesses against Florentine citizens accused of Ghibellinism.” The authority for approving these witnesses was withdrawn from

the captains, and this function was vested in an assembly of twenty four citizens, to be drawn from the same lists as those who

approved proscriptions.” The Parte hierarchy reacted swiftly to this provocation. The captains presented a petition to the Signoria,

“concerning ammonizione,” which was approved by the priors and the colleges. But, like so many other legislative proposals sponsored by the oligarchic faction, this measure died in the Council of the Popolo. Another Parte petition a week later (23 December) met the same fate.’ This assembly had become the chief stronghold of the popular forces in the commune, far more successful than the Signoria and the colleges in resisting oligarchic pressures. In the absence of documentation, one can only speculate about the atmosphere of gloom and despair in which the Parte hierarchs met in their palace early in 1372. Judging from their actions, they

must have been convinced that the Parte’s power and prestige were threatened with imminent destruction. Their reply to the December provision was a petition presented by the captains to the Signoria in late January; it was a veritable declaration of independence by the Guelf society. No provision pertaining to the Parte, “its augmentation or diminution, its mutation, alteration, variation or addition,” could be presented to the councils by the Signoria without the prior authorization of the Parte captains and their councils. To be approved, such proposals required a twothirds vote by the Parte officials, and no single provision could be presented for ratification more than three times.” Two Guelf extremists, Bonaiuto Serragli and Bartolo Siminetti,

piloted the measure through the Signoria and the colleges. To 8 Prov., 59, ff. 145r-146v. This provision apparently had difficulty in gaining acceptance in the Council of the Commune, the more conservative of the two assemblies. It was presented on 12 December, but no action was taken. Proposed the following day, it passed by the narrow margin of 90-44. It had been accepted by the Council of the Popolo, 148-52; LF, 40, ff. 7r-or. ®° LF, 40, ff. ov-tor. This petition was first presented to the Council of the Popolo on 14 December, the day after the final passage of the measure which reformed the ammonizione procedure. 10 The text is in Prov., 59, ff. 209r-210r. It is printed in G. Capponi, Storia della Repubblica di Firenze, 1, 586-88.

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THE BURGEONING CRISIS, 1371-1375

obtain its acceptance in the Council of the Popolo, the captains applied heavy pressure, reminiscent of the Parte’s tactics in 1358, and of Uguccione de’ Ricci’s machinations in November 1366.

On the first vote, the council rejected the provision decisively. Stefani described the dramatic scene which followed: “The Parte captains began to use threats in the council and sent for those whom they suspected of voting against the petition and demanded: ‘Are you a Guelf?’ Each replied, ‘Yes.’ “Then why don’t you wish this petition to be approved?’ Fearing proscription, those who had been interrogated returned to their seats and voted for the petition. Others, seeing themselves menaced, did likewise,

but the petition still failed. Then, Bartolo [Siminetti] began to collect the votes from bench to bench and said: ‘We wish to see where the white beans [negative votes] are coming from, and who are not Guelfs, and who do not wish the petition to be accepted.’ And thus, with the assembly terrorized, the petition was finally approved.””*

When in 1358 the Parte captains had used similar tactics to secure the passage of anti-Ghibelline legislation, they cowed the liberal opposition into submission and silence, from which it did not fully recover until 1366. Far different was the reaction to the Parte’s blatant subversion of the legislative process in 1372. “Bar-

tolo [Siminetti] was regarded with contempt by many, nearly all buoni uomini, on account of the dishonest manner in which he used violence in the councils,” wrote Stefani.” The opinions of the mass, those not included in the chronicler’s definition of buoni uomini, may be inferred from the statement of an indiscreet

proletarian, Giovanni Ciuteli: “If I had anything to do with the

affairs of the Parte Guelfa, I would make the Parte’s palace into a ditch, into which I would empty all of the excrement in Florence.” 11 Stefani, 730. For an identical account of the incident see BNF, Magliabechiana, u1, Iv, 347, £. 12r. The final vote on this provision: 152-55 and 76-35. 12 Stefani, 730. For the background to Bartolo’s allegiance to the Albizzi, see above, p. 127. There is no known reason for the adhesion of Bonaiuto Serragli to

the oligarchic faction. The family was not large, nor rich, nor distinguished. Bonaiuto’s father Ser Belcaro was the first member of the family to enter the Signoria in 1329. For the Serragli’s economic status, see Prestanze, 116, ff. 136r137V3 332, ff. 132v-136v.

18 Atti del Capitano del Popolo, 453, f. 41r. Ciuteli was fined roo 1. for his remark.

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THE BURGEONING CRISIS, 1371-1375

The mobilization of popular forces against the Parte Guelfa would doubtless have occurred in any event, but it was hastened by two developments: the defection of the Ricci from their own faction, and the renewal of proscriptions. The story of the Ricci betrayal is complex, and it embraces many of the strands in the intricate network of private and public relationships within Flor-

ence. It is one of the rare political episodes in this remote age which throws some light on the characters and motivations of the participants. The human qualities that were displayed, however, were not heroic or noble: this is a story of human failure, of greed and the surrender of principle, and of deft political manipulation. The central figures in the drama were three partisan leaders— Piero degli Albizzi, Carlo degli Strozzi, and Uguccione de’ Ricci.

Piero was a patrician of strong convictions and few words. On those rare occasions when he addressed his fellow citizens in Pratiche sessions, his comments were brief and pithy. Like Lapo da Castiglionchio, he possessed qualities of leadership, but he was also endowed with advantages which Lapo did not enjoy: money and a large and powerful family.** His close ally was Carlo degli Strozzi, merchant, financier, and astute politician. Carlo had de-

vised a plan to strengthen the oligarchic forces by bribing Ricci partisans to join the Albizzi faction. He had been instrumental in persuading Bartolo Siminetti to break with the Ricci, and it was through his mediation that Uguccione de’ Ricci and his family allied with their former enemies. Uguccione and his relatives— Rosso, Giorgio, Giovanni, Gucciozzo—were men of a different mold. Their words and actions were redolent of the parvenu, the arriviste whose exalted status and influence must constantly be advertised. The Ricci were the most tireless and verbose speechmakers in the councils. They took inordinate pleasure in filling ofices which conferred prestige—above all, embassies to popes, emperors, and kings. They fancied themselves, too, as military leaders; it was Rosso who commanded the Florentine army sent 14 See Ammirato, 1, 567: “Era allora capo di tutta quella famiglia Piero figliuolo

di Filippo . . . huomo di non mediocri ricchezze, di pronto ingengo, vivo, e pieno di grandissimi parentadi, come quelli, che havendo il padre havuto cinque fratelli, e di tutti essendo nati figliuoli, si trovava havere interno 4 trenta cugini carnali; i quali per le donne uscite di casa loro, e per quelle che haveano ricevute, si trovavano imparentati quasi con tutte le famiglie pith stimate di

Firenze.” os 248

THE BURGEONING CRISIS, 1371-1375

against the Visconti into Lombardy and who suffered the igno-

miny of being captured by enemy forces.” .

The Ricci betrayed their faction for gold. In these times the Florentine economic scene was dark, and men were deeply concerned about their material fortunes and prospects. Among the many business firms in the city to fail in this period, the largest was the Guardi, which went into bankruptcy in September 1371 with a loss of 100,000 florins. It was this failure which enabled the oligarchy to win the allegiance of Bartolo Siminetti, who had been

connected with the Guardi firm. Being pressed by his creditors, he was saved from ruin by a timely loan from Carlo degli Strozzi and Michele Castellani.**® Uguccione de’ Ricci was also in economic difficulty. He had devoted so much of his time to politics that his personal affairs had suffered, and he could not provide adequately for his family. Seeing that his rival, Piero degli Albizzi,

had won a cardinal’s hat for his nephew and a post in the papal administration at Bologna for another relative, Uguccione also sought to obtain offices for his sons. One received an ecclesiastical

benefice; another was given a stipend of forty florins per month from the legate in Bologna. This was the prelude to the conciliation of the Ricci and Piero degli Albizzi, arranged in the autumn of 1371 by Carlo degli Strozzi, when he and Uguccione were both in the Signoria. The other leaders of the popular faction were infuriated by this desertion, and by the oligarchy’s utilization of its clerical connections to win over the Ricci. According to Stefani, some sharp-tongued critics made the uncharitable suggestion that Uguccione had led the struggle against the papal alliance only to

command a greater bribe when he eventually defected to the oligarchic ranks.” 15 According to an incomplete compilation of Florentine ambassadors, Rosso and Uguccione were sent on twenty three embassies between 1343 and 1373; F. Soldini, Delle eccellenze e grandezze della nazione fiorentina, pp. 100-01, 123-24. On Rosso’s military exploits in Lombardy, see Stefani, 720. 16 Stefani, 730. On the Guardi bankruptcy, see Diario del Monaldi, in Istorie pistolest, p. 504; Y. Renouard, Les relations des Papes d’Avignon et des compagnies commerciales et bancatires de 1316 a 1378, pp. 280-85. 17 The details of the Ricci defection are in Stefani, 726, 727, and in Manoscrittt, 222, ff. 243-44: “Ughuccione di Riccardo de Ricci avea un suo figliuolo ch’avea

nome Ghuglielmo, ch’avea in se pil ponpa che senno, e none avendo pit figliuoli, lo sechondava ne suoi voleri e pitt che none era ragionevole. E Ughuccione avea pocha sostanza perché sempre avea atteso alla republica, e

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The Ricci enthusiastically joined with their new allies to proscribe Ghibelline suspects, or, perhaps more accurately, their

personal enemies. In January 1372 a parvenu named Zanobi Macigni had been selected to the Sixteen, his first opportunity to hold high communal office. Residing in the same quarter as the Ricci, he had apparently incurred their displeasure. Messer Rosso de’ Ricci was then a Parte captain, and he led the fight to pro-

scribe Zanobi. But the Council of Twenty Four, convoked to

3 ratify the captains’ decision, refused to sanction this ammonizione on three ballots. According to the procedure established in 1366, the action against the accused should then have been dropped. Rosso, however, insisted that he would propose Zanobi’s exclusion one hundred times until it was accepted. The session continued

through the night until finally a weary group of citizens succumbed to fatigue and threats and voted for Macigni’s ammonzzione.* The union of the Albizzi and the Ricci and the tactics they and

their cohorts had used in the councils of both commune and Parte spread fear through the city. Men gathered furtively in groups to discuss these events, and to grumble about this tyranny which had sprouted from the alliance of erstwhile enemies. The product of these clandestine discussions was a secret association of gzurati, men who had taken oaths to unite against this partisan

menace. In this federation were some one hundred citizens, all prominent in Florentine politics and society. Many had been leaders in the old Ricci faction: Salvestro de’ Medici, Andrea Rondinelli, Luigi Aldobrandini, Giovanni de’ Mozzi, and Giovanni Magalotti. Some, like Filippo Bastari, were independents. At least two, Simone Peruzzi and Lapo da Castiglionchio, had nettamente e vedendo detto Ghuglielmo che molti ingrassavano alla mensa di santa chiesa, chercd avere amicizia e familiarita chol detto leghato, Messer di

Burci [Bourges], e de lo vedea volentieri e davagli ufizi. El padre se ne passava di legieri e a chiusi ochi sanza dargliene nessuna ripensione. Per la quale chosa detto Ughuccione ne chadde in disgrazia de’ maggiori del regimento, parendo loro che quello che dovea esere chapo a salvare lo stato del suo chomune, s’intendesse cho’ prelati del papa, sospetti a tutti i rregienti per li cenni e operazione ch’avea mosso chontro al nostro chomune.” This anonymous account contradicts Stefani’s narration on one point, by stating that Uguccione

had only one son. 18 Stefani, 726.

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THE BURGEONING CRISIS, 1371-1375

been intimately associated with the Albizzi.*° The reasons for their defection are not known; one can surmise that they were antagonized by the rapprochement between the Albizzi and their rivals.

In sympathy with the “conspirators” were the priors who en-

tered office in March 1372; their number included only one Albizzi partisan, Andrea di Lippozzo Mangioni. With the approval of the gzurati, this Signoria called a large citizen assembly to investigate the secret meetings, which had become common knowledge. By this device the internal imbroglio, the hidden and festering sores plaguing the body politic, could be brought into

the open.” In the palace of the Signoria assembled magnates, merchants, rentiers, notaries, butchers, blacksmiths. Another crisis was at hand. First to address the parliament was a spokesman for the priors,

who announced to the richiesti the purpose of the session. The Signoria had been informed that unauthorized secret assemblies had been held in the city, a violation of the statutes for which the death penalty could be prescribed. The assembly had been convened to investigate these rumors, as well as reports that certain families were seeking to dominate the commune.

This speech was followed by a lengthy pause, since no one wished to be the first to commit himself. The silence was broken by an Albizzi partisan, Jacopo Gavacciani, who blandly inquired about the reason for the agitation; those who had been meeting in secret should have voiced their opinions in public councils. The case, he suggested, was one for the judicial authorities, who were to prosecute those citizens who had participated in illegal gather-

ings. Had other members of the oligarchic faction supported Jacopo’s argument, they would have carried the day, in Stefant’s opinion. But rising from the benches was the venerable and re19 The details of these assemblies are in Stefani, 731. 20 Tbhid.: “Nel detto anno 1372 d’aprile veduti li Priori nuovi di buono animo

e persone di non grande leva e da starsi volentieri sanza parti e sette, salvo Andrea di Lippozzo [Mangioni], ch’era gonfaloniere di iustizia, ch’era della setta degli Albizzi, molto fiero; li cittadini si strinsero insieme di volonta segreta d’alcuni Priori e d’alcuni Collegi, e cominciarsi a ragunare a due e tre insieme. ... Di questo nacque quello che per gli predetti ragunati era ordinato: di tenere uno consiglio di richiesti, al quale si proponesse queste cose, e quivi ognuno consigliasse, E questi aveano ordinato chi dicesse, chi rispondesse, chi seguitasse, e chi arringasse.”

21

THE BURGEONING CRISIS, 1371-1375

spected Filippo Bastari, himself one of the giurati. His speech, recorded in the Pratiche protocols, is one of the most lengthy and

detailed statements contained in that source.” . | . The Signoria should be informed, said Filippo, of what had

actually been discussed in the secret meetings. He contended that the participants were good Guelfs, “with status in the city,” loyal

to the regime. Since the antagonisms between Florentines had created a situation prejudicial to the commune, there was an overwhelming need for civic unity to preserve freedom. Bastari then launched a sharp attack upon the commune’s foreign policy. The city “should neither wage war nor engage in military campaigns nor spend an excessive amount of money, since through

intolerable expenditure the commune might lose its freedom.” His criticism was obviously aimed at the Visconti war and the military invasion of Lombardy, which had aggravated the fiscal crisis which then confronted the commune.” Turning back to the domestic scene, Filippo asserted that citizens who desired favors from the commune should not go to private individuals, but to the legitimate founts of authority: the Signoria and the colleges. The gravest threat confronting the republic was the perpetual striving for superiority by those “who crave to be above all other citizens.” These were the ills to be remedied, and these were the problems discussed by the patriots in the secret assemblies.” _ 21 Stefani, 731, is the source of information for this paragraph. The oligarchic _ spokesman who attacked the giurati, Jacopo Gavacciani, was a prominent politiclan, nominated for the Signoria in five scrutinies. He was the sole member of his small family to be active in communal politics. 22 The serious nature of this crisis may be seen from the comments in CP, 12, ff. 4r-6v, IIv-12v. Some of the radical suggestions made for solving the crisis were the levy of interest-free prestanze, the suspension of interest payments on

outstanding loans, and the reduction of the monti. |

23 CP, 12, f. r1r, 16 March 1372: “Item dixit dictus Filippus quod occasione certorum colloquiorum factorum per Jacobum Lapi Gavacciani, circa quamdam unionem que dixit facta per multos cives pro negotiis publicis tractandis sub certa forma, deinceps deliberaverunt omnes requisiti cives concorditer astantes

in presenti consilio quod domini et collegia astantes informentur de veritate colloquiorum factorum per cives multos habentes statum in civitate, et qui sunt vere guelfi et zelatores honoris et status popularis et dominorum priorum et -vexilliferi iustitie et comunis Florentie. Quod quia cives hactenus erant in magna division que preiudicialis multum est comunitati, per multos locutum fuit in ista

forma, videlicet, quod cives invicem uniantur ad conservationem libertatis comunis Florentie et ad non faciendum guerram vel imprehensam vel expensas, cum pluries, propter guerram et expensas intollerabiles, comune Florentie suam

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THE BURGEONING CRISIS, 1371-1375

The sources reveal that Bastari’s speech was lauded by spokes-

men for the Signoria and the colleges.* Stefani asserted that Simone Peruzzi and Lapo da Castiglionchio were among the giurati who commended the speech. The chronicler also described how the alliance between Albizzi and the Ricci dissolved in the pitiless glare of publicity.” Francesco degli Albizzi vehemently protested that his family, unlike the Ricci, had never sought to sell the city, and he accused Uguccione of promising to give Florence

to Bernabd Visconti. Giorgio de’ Ricci denied this charge; he countered with the statement that Pepo degli Albizzi had once visited the signori of Padua and Ferrara, and informed them that his family was the master of Florence. The regime attacked this grave crisis in a traditional, time-hal-

lowed manner. It appointed a committee of ten men (Direct di balia) with authority to investigate the charges made by Bastari, and to propose remedies for the restoration of peace and security. Within a week the committee reported its findings to the Signoria. . Speaking for his colleagues in the dalia, Lapo da Castiglionchio stated that they had. interviewed citizens of every social rank— magnates, popolani, artisans—and asked them if they had knowledge of the secret assemblies.”° All replied that they had known of the private meetings of “ancient Guelf citizens who were ferperdiderit libertatem. Et quod ad istum finem factum est colloquium suum, aliud reperiretur vel actentaretur aliquid, quod adversaretur honori et reverentie dominorum priorum et vexilliferi iustitie et comunis status, qui actentasset vel diceret, et sit quicumque vult, puniatur usque ad confessionem illius talis et totius sui generis. “Et quia dignum est quod quicumque vult aliquid a comuni, non recurat ad singulares cives sed ad dominos et collegia, ut hec tollatur ambitio ne aliquis supra comune se mostret, idcirco quod domini favorent tales cives qui appetunt

comune esse supra omnes cives. Et quod domini predicti cives qui ad hunc actum et finem volunt venire, amplecti eos debeant et recipere cum talia colloquia

sint facta in palatio populi, et non secrete sed palam et ad bonum publicum. Et quoniam aliqui cives aut timent aut timere simulant de hiis colloquiis, quod domini deputent aliquos cives, numero otto guelfos et bonos, qui recipiant omnes ad hoc venire volentes pro bono statu dicte civitatis. ... Et ad hoc ut domini priores et eorum. collegia sint capita dicte civitatis et non aliqui privati cives, qui si indignantur de gestis non possunt reputari boni cives, et si aliquis tante temeritatis fuerit quod contrafecerit premissis, puniatur usque ad suum

finalem exitium.” , 24 CP, 12, f. rIv. 5 Stefani, 731. ,

26 CP, 12, £. 13r, 24 March 1372: “Quod ipsi diligenter et solicite investigaverunt

de predictis diversis viis et modis, et maxime quia quilibet eorum de X de per

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THE BURGEONING CRISIS, 1371-1375

vent supporters of the regime and the city of Florence.” According to these informants, the topics discussed at these sessions were in-

deed those mentioned by Bastari: excessive expenditure, an aggressive foreign policy, and the inordinate influence of certain private citizens in the regime. They agreed unanimously that, although secret, such discussions were not evil, and the views advanced in these meetings should be put into effect “for the public welfare and utility.” In a council assembled to discuss this report, each speaker announced his full approval of the commission’s findings. Several emphasized the need for repressing the excessive

power of certain citizens. Even the Albizzi and the Ricci commended the report, although they constituted its primary target.” Fortified with this resounding mandate, the Signoria then presented a provision to the councils, embodying the recommendations made by the commission. It provided for the establishment of a balia of fifty nine citizens with authority throughout the month of April “to restrain war and the causes of war, military campaigns and their causes; to remove sects and divisions, to repress and restrain the power and audacity of the maggiori in the city; and to

city.””* |

preserve the liberty and the peaceful and popular regime of the se congregavit in sua convicinia plures cives cujuscumque status, tam nobiles quam populares mediocrium et artificium dicte civitatis; et ad eis quesiverunt si de predictis ratiociniis aliquid senserunt, et per quos facta fuerunt et ad quem finem; et an in eis sentirent aliquid latere mali, et quod diceretur per civitatem de istis colloquiis. Et quod omnes responderunt clare et aperte quod senserunt quod quidam venerabiles cives guelfi et zelatores status et civitatis Florentie sepe sepius adinvicem contulerant quod erat bonum quod cives huius civitatis essent uniti ad manutenendum libertatem dicte civitatis, et dicta civitas non reduceretur ad imprehensas novas vel ad gravamina expensarum, ex quibus posset sequi periculum libertatis.

“Et quod omnia que fierent in civitate Florentie reputarentur per ordinem a dominis prioribus et collegis et comuni; et non ab aliqua singulari persona; et quod tolleretur omnis divisio et dissensio inter bonos cives dicte civitatis, ut libere possint intendere et consulere ad mandata dominorum priorum et bonum comune dicte civitatis.”

27 The comments of the richtesti are in CP, 12, ff. 13v-15r, 31 March. The interlude between the presentation of the report and the richiesti discussion was due to the recess for the Easter holiday; Easter was on 28 March. Speakers who stressed the need to restrain the authority of powerful individuals were Andrea de’ Ricci, Giovanni di Neri Pitti, and Niccolé Rimbaldesi. Uguccione and Giorgio de’ Ricci and Francesco di Uberto degli Albizzi all commended the report. 28 Proy., 60, ff. 2v-3r, 2 April 1372. The vote on the provision: 150-64 and 129-17,

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THE BURGEONING CRISIS, 1371-1375

This commission proceeded immediately to discharge its duties.

On 5 April it passed a series of important decrees by a narrow margin.” First, it prohibited the waging of war, the dispatch of armed troops, the making or breaking of peace, and the acquisition or relinquishment of territory without the prior approval of a special assembly.*° To meet the complaint that some citizens had exercised undue influence in the administration of justice, the balia decreed that no one was permitted to visit the residences of

the judges, except during public sessions, or to loan them any money. The commission then ordered the dissolution and eradication of all sects in the city, so that “no one shall dare to name himself or others as belonging to any sect whatsoever.” A perma-

nent Council of Ten was created to enforce this decree; it was empowered to seek out and identify such factions, and to inform the Signoria of its investigations. Finally, the commission tackled the delicate problem of partisan leadership. Suspended from communal office for five years were three of the Albizzi (Piero, Pepo, and Francesco di Antonio), and three Ricci (Uguccione, Rosso, and Messer Giovanni). The commission continued to meet throughout April, revising earlier measures and formulating new ones.” The immunity from

reprisal which had been granted to members of the balia was extended to include all their male descendants. There followed a series of enactments designed to restrain the authority of pow-

erful families and individuals, and to punish those who went beyond permissible limits. One decree simplified the procedure

whereby popolani guilty of certain crimes could be declared magnates by the Signoria and the colleges. All scrutiny lists of foreign judges were invalidated and new ones were to be compiled, “in order to have rectors and officials who are more independent and useful.” Citizens who held posts or received stipends from any foreign signori were not permitted to hold communal 29 These decrees are published in I Capitol: del Comune di Firenze, 1, 71-73. The names of the fifty-seven members of the balia are in Epistola o sta ragionamento di Messer Lapo da Castighonchio, pp. 142-44. 80 This assembly was to comprise the Signoria, colleges, the Parte captains, the Mercanzta, two representatives from each guild, and six from each district (gonfalone), a total of 187 citizens. 31 Capitoli, u, 74-84. Summaries of the dalia’s legislation are in Stefani, 732; BNF, Magliabechiana, 11, 1v, 347, ff. 13r-13v; Manoscritti, 222, £. 243.

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THE BURGEONING CRISIS, 1371-1375

office for six months thereafter. The commission also limited the number of individuals from one family who could participate in the scrutinies for the Signoria. The final decree was a gesture to the lower guilds: two representatives of the artisan-shopkeeper class were added to the merchant’s court, the Mercanzia.”

This crisis revealed clearly how personality and principle merged to shape communal politics. Ruptured personal relations, not major disagreement over policy, precipitated it. The alliance of the Albizzi and the Ricci had caused upheavals in both factions

which led to the reform commission. But the aftermath of the crisis proved, too, that these coalitions were based on more solid

foundations than personal ties: they were also nourished by a common commitment to specific political principles. From the wreckage of the Ricci faction, another popular party was reconstituted, led by former Ricci partisans in the Dalia: Salvestro de’ Medici, Giovanni de’ Mozzi, Mico Capponi, Giovanni Magalotti, Matteo Soldi. These men directed the balia’s attack upon the per-

sonnel and policies of the oligarchic group. They criticized the militant and aggressive foreign policy advocated by the Albizzi; their program of peace and economy appealed strongly to a warweary and overtaxed populace. Their main target, however, was the powerful and arrogant oligarchic type against which Ricci partisans had fulminated during the crisis of 1366-1367. Ambitio, matoritas, preheminentia—these were the civic evils which the

reformers denounced.” Their efforts constituted another phase in the perpetual battle between the lesser elements of the guild community and that patrician elite whose members, by virtue of their wealth and status, were able to commit aggressions with impunity and to obtain favors and advantages not available to the common citizen.

The extent to which political power had gravitated into the 32 This enactment annoyed Stefani, 734: “Parve sempre che d’ogni novita che Firenze ebbe, che gli artefici meno avanzassero gli ufici e stato per la disconoscenza e ambizione. Cosi per la cacciata del Duca d’Ateni ogni volta, allora e

poi, non hanno avanzato stato; e peré come fu mosso lo stato delli Ricci e Albizi, gli artefict addomandarono piu parte.” 83 See the comments of Andrea de’ Ricci, Giovanni di Neri Pitti, Messer Donato

Aldighieri, and Niccolé Rimbaldesi; CP, 12, ff. r4r-14v. The statement by the latter, a leader of the popular faction, is particularly significant: “Quod colloquiis

habitis et relatis per X detur ordo firmus, ut cives, repulsis maioritatibus et

preheminentis civium, possint consulere libere comuni.”

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THE BURGEONING CRISIS, 1371-1375

hands of a few influential men is graphically illustrated by diplomatic documents. Sienese ambassadors sent to Florence in these years had learned through experience that talks with oligarchic

leaders were as useful and productive as negotiations with the Signoria. One ambassador described his secret conversations with

Piero degli Albizzi and Buonaccorso di Lapo Buonaccorsi. A short time later, the Sienese envoy reported on another discussion with Buonaccorso, who informed him that he would seek to have

certain matters affecting relations between the two communes handled by himself and Carlo degli Strozzi.“* The extent to which these men engaged in personal diplomacy may also be seen from a letter sent by Piero degli Albizzi to the Sienese government in January 1371.°° By his own testimony, Piero had assumed the role of unofficial Florentine ambassador, engaging in diplomatic conversations with the papal vicar-general in Bologna, Anglic Gri-

moard, and with the communes of Perugia, Arezzo, and Siena. It was this usurpation of public authority by influential citizens which the reformers sought to control. Although the Jalia approached its work energetically, it also exercised considerable caution and restraint. Simone Peruzzi admonished the reformers to be “wise, modest, cautious, and honest” in their proceedings,*° and they tended to follow this advice. These reform measures were not radical innovations; the balia preferred to tamper with the constitutional machinery rather than overhaul 84 Archivio di Stato di Siena, Concistoro, 1781, £. togr, 22 March 1372 and n.d. I owe the discovery and the microfilming of these documents to my friend, Professor Lauro Martines, of Reed College. Buonaccorsi was a major political figure in the commune, a frequent speaker in Pratiche discussions, four times selected to the Signoria. He was a cloth manufacturer who was twice designated as consul of the Lana guild. 85 Thid., 1780, f. 72r, 26 January 1371. The letter begins: “Magnifici signori miei. Perch’io sono e intendo sempre essere servidore della vostra Signoria e

sollicito dello vostro stato e onore, quanto di quello di questa cicta. ..-..” It concludes: “. . . Che andando io da Perugia a Bologna passando per Arezzo, in qual comune io ragionai quello vidi essere utile al fatto; dapoi i’o ricivuto

lettere dal mio riverendisimo signore Messer de Albano [papal legate] ...e di , tutto sono bene avisato, e come dal detto Ser Agnolo [Sienese ambassador] sarete avisati; intendo aoperarmi giusta posso in ogni vostro bene; e in cid voi reverentemente prego, e in questo e in ogni altra cosa amo commandare come a qualungo vostro servidore. Data a Firenze di xxvi di Gennaio [1371] da

Piero di Filippo degli Albizzi.” :

36 CP, 12, f. 14r: “Processus sint sapientes, modesti, cauti et honesti, dummodo negotium habet effectum.”

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THE BURGEONING CRISIS, 1371-1375

it. The commission debated one proposal for the exclusion from office of one hundred oligarchs, but rejected it on the ground that it was too radical.* Neither the Parte Guelfa nor the ammonizione process were touched by balia decrees. One explanation for this restraint was the considerable influence of conservative elements, particularly the Parte hierarchy, in the balia.** The sects, not the Guelf society, had ignited the crisis. Thus the latter could claim some consideration and even play the role of peacemaker. The temper of the electorate was not yet sympathetic to abrupt

change. Indeed, when the dalia’s authority came to an end on 30 April, there was some sentiment expressed in Pratiche debates for revising certain decrees.*° The dalia’s grant of widespread immunity from prosecution to its members and their descendants was annulled by communal legislation in July 1372.*° This tendency to avoid extremes, to operate through a system of checks and balances, to pacify and conciliate, was characteristic of the regime. Its virtue lay in the avoidance of violent and tempestuous reper-

cussions; its weakness was a failure to extirpate the forces that corroded the foundations of the government. The work of this Salta constituted the regime’s most ambitious

attempt to reform itself. But it was not a success. It did not accomplish its announced objective, “to remove sects and divisions, to repress and restrain the power of the maggiorz,” for it did not

touch the roots of these phenomena. The balia did not, and could not, eliminate the competition for political power between individuals and groups; it sought to make that competition

more equitable. It provided no solution for the regime’s most pressing problem: securing general agreement over the apportionment of power. This could not be solved by legislative fiat, but

only through the growth of mutual tolerance among the competing groups. In order for this spirit to develop, the regime required time, security, and economic prosperity. It was granted none of these essential conditions. 87 Stefani, 732.

88 The captains were members of the dalia. See the warning of the spokesmen for the captains, Foligno di Conte de’ Medici: “Si vero tamen dominis placet balia sumere, placet; et si non, etiam placet; sed nil fiat quod aversetur ordinamenta partis guelfe”; CP, 12, f£. 15v. 89 CP, 12, f. 338. 40 Prov., 60, ff. 48r-5IVv.

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THE BURGEONING CRISIS, 1371-1375

The decrees of the balia did not have a soporific effect upon Florence. Evidence from diverse sources—judicial condemnations, secret denunciations, Pratiche protocols, provisions, chronicles—

attests to the straining tempers, the burning antagonisms, the tautness of social relations. Manifestations of this malaise assumed various forms and dimensions: a mob assaulting a police official;

a riot in the parish of S. Frediano in which the participants shouted, “Kill the traitors”; a quarrel between the Albizzi and the Rondinelli so violent that the Signoria intervened; a mélée outside the Ricci palace in which one of the Strozzi allegedly killed an artisan with a stone.** Another Strozzi, Jacopo di Ubertino, assaulted a prominent statesman, Niccolé Malegonelle, two days after the latter had left the Signoria.” A magnate, Alamanno

degli Agli, attacked a popolano and accused him of accepting a bribe to betray the Parte Guelfa.* Words accompanied deeds. One of the most vituperative critics

of the regime was Gherardo di Messer Lorenzo Buondelmonti, who apparently could not refrain from publicly proclaiming his hostile sentiments. In the spring of 1374 he was accused of an-

nouncing that “within six months, or even two, he and other magnates would crush the Florentine popolo and abolish the Ordinances of Justice and the tamburo and the standard of Jus-

tice.” Later, in his own home where he operated a gambling casino, “he denounced the regime and the office of the priors and said that soon the city would have a revolution and would change regimes. He spoke many injurious and villainous words against

Leonardo Beccanugi, standard-bearer of justice, and said that when he left office, he would die.”** These boastings were prob41 Atti del Podesta, 2562, f. 243%; Atti del Esecutore degli Ordinamenti della

Giustizia, 699, f£. 63r; CP, 12, f. rorv; AEOJ, 601, f. 136r. For other similar examples, see AP, 2562, £. 247r; Atti del Capitano del Popolo, 453, ff. 45r, 139V, 178v.

42 AEO], 699, f£. 38r. Few citizens held office more frequently than Niccold Malegonelle. He was seven times a member of the Signoria between 1353 and 1376, and selected to the colleges on fourteen occasions. 43 AEO], 716, £. 274r.

44 Tbid., £. 10ogr: “. . . Come reo e nimicho del popolo di Firenze [Gherardo] a detto che a dispecto del priori e del ghonfalonieri della iustizia e de Ja siguitore e di tutti 1 collegi innanzi che sia sei mesi o anche due, elgli e gli altri grandi ronperono el popolo di Firenze, e faranno stracciare gli ordini de la giustizia.”

The incident which apparently aroused Gherardo’s ire against Beccanugi is reported only by Ammirato, [storie fiorentine, 1, 693, who must have obtained

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IT'HE BURGEONING CRISIS, 1371-1375

ably without foundation. But such public comments did not con-

tribute to peace, any more than did the unprovoked assault by Gherardo’s two brothers, Piero and Banchello, upon a druggist in his own shop. So terrified was the merchant by the threats of these “proud and arrogant men” that he feared to denounce his

assailants to the authorities.* |

These incidents recalled the tense early years of the regime, but there was a significant difference. In the 1370’s the gente nuova, fortified by three decades of political experience, were prepared to defend themselves. Oligarchic leaders were subjected to heavy and sustained attack. In reprisal for his overly zealous efforts on the Parte’s behalf in 1372, Bonaiuto Serragli was accused of accept-

ing bribes from individuals who sought favors from the commune. The denunciation, made “on behalf of good and honorable citizens, peaceful men and merchants and artisans of good reputation and rank,” was corroborated by Salvestro de’ Medici, who

testified that Bonaiuto had received roo florins and two silver cups from a contado magnate.** In January 1373 the Albizzi and Ricci families were excluded en bloc from all communal offices

for ten years.”’

In the same year the popular party also launched an attack

on the economic privileges and concessions which influential citi-

zens had wrung from an acquiescent and indulgent commune. Stefani was one of the four officials (ragionieri) who inspected communal accounts and forced many prominent Florentines to disgorge their illicit gains. The chronicler singled out for special the information from a source now lost. Giovanni Magalotti had launched an attack upon the Parte Guelfa and proscription, and he was then sharply criticized

by Lapo da Castiglionchio. Beccanugi interrupted Lapo’s tirade: “Disse al

| Castiglionchio che seguitasse di dire il suo parere ma con brevita.”

45 AEOJ, 711, £. 20v: “... Per la magioranza di Piero e di Banchello, non ardiscie d’acchusare né denumptiare, ch’ é stato minacciato de morte.” 46 AEO], 675, ff. 32r-34r, 125v; Stefani, 749. — ‘7 Prov., 60, ff. 143v-144v. The vote on the provision was 187-67 and 93-36. The

comment in Cronichetta d’incerto, in Crontchette antiche di vari serittori del buon secolo della lingua toscana (Florence, 1733), p. 200, is pertinent: “E questo feciono le genti comuni per volere che la citta si regesse in pace e a popolo, e ’n liberta, e che ogni uomo avesse sua ragione, e sua parte agli ufici.” According

to Stefani, 733, the prime mover of this provision was an oligarchic leader, Migliore Guadagni, who turned against the Albizzi on account of a dispute over property with Francesco di Uberto degli Albizzi.

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mention the wealthy merchant, Giovanni da Uzzano, who had cheated the commune in the acquisition of confiscated property, and Totto di Filipozzo de’ Bardi, who had illegally expropriated a piece of contado land.** Also charged with fiscal irregularities was Ubertino di Niccold degli Strozzi, whose difficulties became a topic of discussion in a meeting of the Signoria and the colleges.” The cries of anguish which these investigations elicited were so

loud (Stefani commented that “the pleas reached the clouds”) that the Signoria interceded for the victims and forced the commission to move more cautiously. No communal action could have inspired more fear among members of the aristocracy than this attack upon their economic perquisites. The assault upon the fiscal privileges of the patriciate was one of the most significant

gente nuova. |

aspects of the political struggle between the old order and the A most effective weapon against the oligarchy was the device, refurbished by the 1372 dalia, for filling magnate ranks with delinquent popolani. A citizen who had been maltreated by another could denounce his assailant to the priors, who were then required to convene the colleges and representatives from the twenty one guilds to vote upon the case. By a two-thirds vote, the accused received magnate status and was thereby liable to all the penalties and disabilities attached to that rank.

The first prominent oligarch to suffer from this device was Bartolomeo di Niccolé Ridolfi, who was declared a magnate in April 1373. Following him into the magnate ranks were two Albizzi, Francesco di Uberto and Lando di Antonio, Ubertino degli Strozzi, and Salvestro di Serotine Brancacci. The details of their misdemeanors are not known; they probably involved physical assault or despoliation of property, common practices of aggressive patrician types.’ Concerning one accusation made against

Salvestro de’ Medici’s brother Africhello, the facts are in the record. Africhello was convicted of assaulting a widow in the contado, and of attempting to seize her property. He was described as “a man who has never led anything but a dishonest life, robbing 48 Stefani, 740.

— 49CP, 12, ff. 112v, 114v. Francesco degli Albizzi was another oligarch who .was forced to return money to the commune; Prov., 61, ff. 47v-49Vv. 5° Diario del Monaldt, p. 504; AEOJ, 672, £. 3r; 600, f. 5or; 711, £. 25v; 716, f. 167r; AP, 2760, f. 7Ir.

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and preying upon the poor and weak, and enriching himself as

he has done and always intends to do. . .. He determined to make himself master of these poor people, since he had need of that inheritance, and he intended to treat her [the widow] as he had treated others in the neighborhood, whom he has driven out. ... And in this way he continually enriches himself. He has never engaged in mercantile activity nor does he practice any trade. He has never earned an honest penny... .”** The oligarchy realized immediately the dangers inherent in this procedure; it was the most effective method yet created for taming the turbulent elements of the aristocracy and for promoting respect for law. During the summer of 1372 patricians repeatedly urged revision of this instrument. “The law is good, just, and useful,” admitted Filippo Bastari, “but it is not practiced well, but against the wishes of those who enacted it.” Proponents of revision complained that the device was used to penalize individuals who committed petty misdemeanors; they sought to limit its application only to such major crimes as murder and arson. Against these demands to weaken this potent political weapon, the gente nuova stood firm and unyielding. Rarely did they voice their sentiments publicly, as did one Filippo Brunellini—“Let the law be preserved”**—but their votes in the councils were sufficient

to prevent revision or repeal. Two attempts to weaken the procedure were rebuffed in the Council of the Popolo in June 1372. Later efforts to amend it were also defeated by the silent but determined opposition of the “new men.”* 51 Brucker, “The Medici in the Fourteenth Century,” 12-13. 52 CP, 12, f. 44v, 12 August 1372. See also ibid., ff. 32v, 39V, 42v-45r. The issue was still being discussed in January 1374, idid., ff. 184v-185v. In this dis-

cussion, Messer Donato Aldighieri stated: “Petitiones stent firme, sed super pratica provideatur per dominos .. . cum salute tamen impotentium.” 53 “Quod lex servetur”; CP, 12, f£. 44r.

54 TF, 40, ff. 33r, 34r. The provisions presented to the council were summarized as follows: “Quod nulla petitio per quam petatur fieri de populari magnatem possit recipi nisi soluto 1 flor.”; and “Quod nulla petitio disponens quod aliquis popularis fiat magnas possit recipi nisi a cive vel districtuali Florentie, et nisi apposito nomine et pronomine.” 55 The oligarchy did succeed in pushing through the councils by a narrow

margin a petition which forbade the executor to investigate anonymous denunciations against popolani; Prov., 62, ff. 55r-55v, 16 June 1374. The vote: 115-

47 and 105-21. This provision, however, did not limit the right to denounce

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Not since 1348 had conditions been so unfavorable to the patrician conservatives. As the power and confidence of the popular faction steadily increased, the oligarchy was thrown back upon its final defense: proscription. Despite the limitations that now hedged in its practice, the ammonizione was occasionally used to

exclude from office men who had antagonized the oligarchy. Between May 1372 and July 1375 the political careers of seventeen

Florentines were terminated by the Parte’s action. Most were gente nuova, but they also included a Peruzzi, an Adimari, and a Cerchi.’* That the Parte had not lost all its energy or venom was illustrated by the proscription of a banker who had been associ-

ated with the popular faction, Piero Petriboni. In January 1373 Piero had sponsored a measure forbidding the Parte Guelfa to enact any law without the prior approval of the Signoria and the colleges. Even though this proposal did not gain acceptance, its author was disciplined by the Parte. According to one anonymous source, the captains discussed the possibility of seeking the death penalty for the offending banker as soon as he left the Signoria. Unnerved by these threats, Piero went down on his knees before

the captains to beg their forgiveness; relenting, they decided to limit his punishment to proscription.” popolani to the Signoria, or the right of the priors and their associates to confer magnate status upon popolani who were guilty of criminal acts. 56 Stefani, 726, 735, 743, 755. In 1371 several members of the armorers’ guild were accused in the courts of holding office although they were Ghibellines. The accusations were brought by one man, Andrea di Piero Bracci; the Parte Guelfa collaborated by approving the witnesses. One of the accused, Giovanni di Piero Parenti, had been a member of the Signoria five times. After a lengthy trial, Giovanni was absolved of the charge; ACP, 371, ff. 118r-121v; 372, ff. 21r-33V; 382, ff. or-gv. Seventy-five years later, one of Giovanni’s descendants married a Strozzi, who were no longer concerned about the Parenti’s Ghibelline taint. The Parenti had moved up the social scale; they were setaiuoli “e hanno un poco di stato”; Alessandro Macinghi degli Strozzi, Lettere di una gentildonna fiorentina del secolo xv, pp. 3, 10-11. Along with Giovanni Parenti, three brothers, Gino, Bernardino, and Bartolomeo Bernardi, were also acquitted of Ghibellinism; ACP, 382, ff. 89r-gor. In his defense, Bartolomeo claimed that his accuser, Andrea Bracci, owed him roo fl., and that he made the accusation to avoid payment. Bartolomeo contended that he was a prosperous artisan, worth more than 2000 f1,, while Andrea did not possess 50 fl. of property value; ACP, 374, f. 30v. One armorer, Feo di Piero, was convicted of Ghibellinism; ACP, 382, f. 32r. 57 Manoscritti, 222, f. 265: “Essendo de’ priori Piero Fastelli Petriboni de gennaio 1372 [1373], volle a cid riparare, e mettea che nulla aprovagione vallesse alla Parte, se prima non era approvata tra signiori e chollegi, ma di tratto gli fu

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The most serious mistake made by the Parte hierarchy was its use of ammonizione to indulge in personal vendettas. Stefani reported that conversations in this vein between captains were not uncommon: “Don’t you have someone whom you hate? I do! Now let us all, by turns, propose and vote on our enemies [to be proscribed ].”°* If the victims of these machinations were without friends or influence, their misfortune had few repercussions. Occasionally, however, the captains committed grave blunders. Such was the proscription in 1374 of Vieri de’ Scali, a member of an ancient Guelf family. This act so infuriated Vieri’s cousin Giorgio that he became one of the patrician leaders of the popular faction. He promoted legislation that struck at the economic resources of the magnates, their landholdings in the contado. The Parte then proscribed Giorgio, fearing that he would use his influence to

destroy the Guelf society.” |

These incidents reflect an ominous feature of communal politics in the 1370’s: a penchant for adopting intransigent and bel-

ligerent postures, a tendency to engage in immoderate and irrational political behavior. Former restraints and controls were less effective; compromise and conciliation were no longer mean-

ingful words in the Florentine political vocabulary. Areas of agreement narrowed, and tolerance for opposing policies and convictions shrank to the vanishing point. The oligarchic bloc, on the defensive since 1372, believed that its influence was being

systematically undermined by the gente nuova; the latter were levato e rotto suo disengno, e chome fu uscitto, pratichorono alla Parte fargli tagliare la testa, onde gli ando inanzi a chapitani in ginochione e chiese perdonanze e miserichordia, che lo facea a buon fine, e rimasene ammonito.” Messer Ristoro Canigiani was apparently the leader of the movement to discipline Petriboni. The case was brought to the attention of the colleges by the Signoria. Their reply: “Quod dominus Ristorus non est culpabilis eorum que sibi oblocuntur in tamburatione facta de ipso, et quod hec creduntur tam a

58 Stefani, 725.

civibus in -generali quam etiam a collegiis”; CP, 12, f. 94r, 7 March 1373. Ristoro was again accused of this act in May 1378, AEOJ, 811, f. 284v.

59 Tbid., 748: “. . . Di che fece una riformagione fare il detto Giorgio degli Scali, gonfaloniere di Iustizia, che niuno Grande potesse avere niuna tenuta o Terra o fedeli, e dove fedeli abitassero, che a loro di ragione fossero loro, si comprassero per lo Comune giusto prezzo. Molto piacque; ma mai si misse a secuzione a loro tempo; a mano a mano entrarono nuovi Priori, e per gli amici e parenti valsero le preghiere, e di subito si rivocé la riformagione.” For a more

detailed account, see BNF, Magliabechiana, 1, 1, 347, f£. r4v. :

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haunted by fears of an aristocratic coup. Only faintly audible were the hollow, ineffectual pleas for peace and unity which sounded fitfully from the council halls.°° No words ever fell on less attentive ears.

The Disintegration of the Guelf Entente The tormented course of Florentine internal politics between 1371 and 1375 indicated that the regime was approaching its climacteric. However, it was not a specific domestic problem— offices, scrutinies, magnates, or proscriptions—that caused the regime’s ultimate undoing. It was the war between the republic and the papacy, between a city which had for a century espoused Guelfism as a political creed, and her traditional friend, ally, protector, and fount of wealth and profit. Few events in frecento Italian history had so many important consequences as this “War of the Eight Saints.” In Florence it destroyed a major political tradition; it led to the Ciompi revolution and five years of instability. The war’s impact on the church was no less grave. Florence’s breach with the papacy was a vital factor in the rebellions that tore loose from ecclesiastical control

large areas of the papal states. The war played a part in the return of the papal curia to Rome, and thus contributed to that fateful sequence of events which culminated in the Great Schism.

By forcing the papacy to concentrate its energies and resources on its temporal possessions in Italy, it diverted the curia’s attention from the ecclesiastical reforms so desperately needed. The origins of the conflict are complex.” Some of the elements are visible in the checkered course of Florentine-papal relations after 1343: in the quarrels and misunderstandings between commune and curia; in the republic’s sporadic efforts to escape from

papal tutelage; in the recurrent outbursts of pontifical anger at Florence’s sabotage of Avignon’s diplomatic policy. Two impor-

tant developments followed the termination of the Pisan war. 8° For these recurrent pleas for unity, see CP, 12, ff. 37v, 51V-52v, 113V, II5r, I21IV-I22Yr.

611n the interpretation which follows, I differ on certain important points with the generally accepted view that full responsibility for the war must be assigned to Florence, and that the papacy was innocent of any provocation or blame. The most recent advocate of this thesis is G. Mollat, whose sympathetic treatment of the Avignonese papacy is summarized in Les papes d’ Avignon.

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First, the commune’s relations with the church were transformed into a controversial political issue within the regime.” And sec-

ond, the republic’s relations with her neighbors were altered and the commune established a quasi-hegemony in Tuscany. This new role decisively changed Florentine attitudes toward the papacy. Instead of regarding the Holy See as a source of security and benefits, or at worst as an ineffectual ally and a drain upon

communal resources, many citizens were persuaded that the church had become a definite menace to Tuscan communal liberties in general, and to Florence’s independence in particular. As early as 1354 the republic had exhibited some misgivings over the church’s efforts to establish direct control over the papal

states.’ Not until a decade later, however, was there any hint of disquietude over papal encroachments into communal territory. In a letter of December 1364, the Signoria complained to Cardinal Albornoz that church officials has occupied land near

Bologna that belonged to Florence. A few months later (January 1365), Albornoz received another communication from the republic’s chancery, protesting that his agents were levying

taxes on the inhabitants of an Apennine district (Valle Maggiore) which belonged to a nobleman under Florentine protection. By the spring of 1367 the dispute over this territory was

still not settled. The problem was then raised in a Consulte discussion, and the Sixteen advised the Signoria to send a lawyer to the vicar-general, the abbot of Cluny, “to show him the rights (tura) of the commune and to ask him to desist from molesting the men of that place.”™ Such small, niggling matters alone would not have precipi62 This theme has been overlooked or minimized by some historians treating the subject. Mollat, for example, makes no reference to this factor; “Preliminaires

de la guerre des otto santi (1371-1375),” Académie des inscriptions et belleslettres. Comptes rendus des séances (1955), 113-17. L. Mirot, La politique pontificale et le retour du Saint-siége a Rome en 1376 (Paris, 1899), pp. 25-26, briefly mentions the existence of propapal and antipapal factions in Florence. See

also A. Gherardi, “La guerra dei Fiorentini con papa Gregorio XI detta la guerra degli Otto Santi,” ASI, ser. 3, v, i (1867), 39-41. For a good general

(1900), 437-42.

discussion of the war’s origins, see G. Romano, “Niccolé Spinelli da Giovinazzo,

diplomatico del secolo xiv,” Archivio storico per le province napoletane, xxv

83 See above, pp. 174-75. a

84 See Missive, 13, ff. ov, 26v; 14, ff. 50v-51r; CP, 8, ff. 77r-93Vv. ,

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tated a diplomatic crisis. But they played a part in stirring up resentment against the papal administration, and in focusing attention on the expanding church state. It was one factor among

several which fostered the conviction that the papacy was no longer the benevolent protector of Italian Guelfism, but a menacing power bent upon aggrandizement. Other aspects of papal diplomacy in central Italy aroused Florentine suspicions. That the church and the commune might have contradictory objectives was clearly illustrated by the German emperor’s sojourn in the peninsula, which had been sponsored by Urban V. Did Charles IV intend to conquer Tuscany, his legal possession, and was he secretly abetted in this plan by the pope?® Some Ricci partisans believed that Urban was co-

operating with the emperor to destroy the communal regime in Siena. Uguccione de’ Ricci favored the dispatch of an ambassador to Rome to warn the pontiff “that his actions against the city of Siena do not benefit the church, and [to inform him]

how much the church would profit if the liberty of that city and Florence were preserved.” During the civil war between Sienese nobles and popolani which broke out in the autumn of 1368, several citizens urged the Signoria to prevent papal ambassadors from traveling to Siena.” The curia was not ignorant of Florentine apprehensions over papal intervention in Tuscan affairs. In June 1369 Urban expressed his surprise and grief that Florentines suspected him of planning to seize S. Miniato for the church. Two years later, Urban’s successor, Gregory XI, also commented on rumors of papal designs upon Tuscan territory:

“Recently it has come to our attention that the Florentines believed that church troops wished to occupy imperial lands and

disturb the status of Tuscan cities... . This suspicion is completely false and has no basis in reality... . Our intention has never been, nor is it now, to disturb the pacific and tranquil state of Tuscany by means of church forces, nor to occupy imperial territory. We are quite content with the lands which belong to the church.”” 6° One Florentine was convinced that Urban actively supported imperial aggression in Tuscany; Cronichetta d’incerto, p. 190. 66 CP, 10, £. 8v. 87 CP, 10, ff. 65v-66r. 88 Urban’s letter is in I Capitoli del Comune di Firenze, 11, 518, 25 June 1369;

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THE BURGEONING CRISIS, 1371-1375

It was during the emperor’s second Italian journey, when the commune suspected both imperial and papal motives, that Florence evolved a policy of actively promoting and defending the independence of her Tuscan neighbors. While traditionally supporting free communes in central Italy, Florence’s concern for the liberty of her sister republics was magnified by the imperial crisis.” A theme frequently articulated in Pratiche sessions was that Florentine security depended on the maintenance of free, republican government in the Tuscan towns.” The consequences of this policy were described by an anonymous chronicler, who wrote that after the emperor’s departure, “the Florentines acquired greater honor than they had ever possessed, since they had been

confronted by the whole of Italy and the great lords of the world. ... They sent ambassadors to every part of Tuscany, arranging peace agreements. They assisted the Tuscan cities with troops and money, so that they would remain in peace.””

Other sources corroborate this statement that Florence had become the dominant power in Tuscany, her hegemony based not

upon military might, but upon a recognition of her value as a protector of Tuscan liberty. The commune was extremely solici-

tous of the new republican governments that sprang up in the wake of the emperor’s departure. After a revolution in Pisa had substituted a pro-Florentine regime for its predecessor, Donato Velluti wrote: “The Pisans began to humble themselves and to regard the Florentines as their lords and masters, not denying them any of the things which they requested.”” At the same time, Lucca broke away from Pisan domination and established an independent communal regime. It was so weak, however, that Gregory’s in Theiner, Codex diplomaticus domini temporalis Sanctae Sedts, 1, doc. 5109.

6° This point is amply supported by the evidence in Missive and Consulte e Pratiche documents; see also H. Baron, The Crisis of the Early Italian Renatssance, p. 17. 70 A typical statement is that of Messer Niccolé Alberti: “Quod comunia Tuscie uniantur et inter ea secrete sentiatur de statu vicinorum, et ortentur circa eorum libertatem manutenendam”; CP, 10, f. 7v, 13 September 1368. For similar comments, see CP, 11, f. 137v; 12, f. 6or. "1 Cronichetta d’incerto, pp. 191-92.

7 Velluti, p. 274. On furnishing aid to Pisa after the revolution, see CP, 10, ff. g5r-g6r, 18 and 24 April 1369. The commune loaned Pisa the sum of 15,000 f.;

Prov., 57, £. or. .

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it was forced to depend on Florence’s subsidies for survival; Lucca became, in effect, a Florentine satellite.” To resolve the crisis that arose in Siena after the emperor’s visit, the Signoria sent troops into Sienese territory and forced the new regime to settle its quarrel with its noble exiles."* The diplomatic reports of the Sienese ambassadors in Florence provide ample evidence of the patron-client relationship which existed between the two Tuscan communes during these years.” By this conscious and articulate concern for the preservation of “Tuscan liberties,” Florence magnified the possibility of conflict with the papacy, whose sphere of interest, like that of the Arno city, was not confined to its own territory. The first major clash between the two powers occurred over Perugia, the Umbrian town some eighty miles southeast of Florence, with whose govern-

ment the commune had traditionally maintained cordial relations. Located within the papal states, Perugia had been a faithful ally of the church, paying a yearly tax in return for the right of self-government, joining papal leagues, and contributing to church armies. But its survival as an independent commune was threatened by the determination of the ecclesiastical bureaucracy to place all papal territory under the direct control of the Holy See.

Florence viewed with alarm this threat to Perugia’s independence. As early as 1366, the commune warned Cardinal Albornoz of the dangers which could arise if his quarrel with the Umbrian commune were not settled. The Parte Guelfa publicly announced 73 Florence made a loan of 25,000 fl. to Lucca; Prov., 57, £. 33r. For statements

favoring Lucchese independence, see CP, 9, f. 121v; 10, f. g7v; 11, f. ro4r. Typical is the comment by Niccolé Cocchi, spokesman for the Twelve: “Suadeantur Lucani de recuperatione eorum libertatis, et quod per comune operatum est, et adhuc est facere posse suum”; CP, 10, f. gtr, 15 November 1368. Concerning

Arezzo, the Sixteen commented: “Dicantur ambasciatori Aretii quod comune Florentie habebit curam libertatis et status eorum sicut prope Florentini”; CP, 10, f. 43r, 24 November 1368. For additional evidence of the close cooperation between Florence and Lucca, see R. Fumi, ed., R. Archivio di Stato di Lucca. Regesti, 11, Part 2, docs. 49, 50, 68, 386, 456.

74 The events in Siena are described in detail by Velluti, pp. 275-76, and by Cronaca di Donato di Neri, in Cronache senesi, RRIISS, new ed., xvi, Part 6 (Bologna, 1931-1939), 629-31. For Pratiche discussions of the Sienese crisis, see

CP, 10, ff. 24v, 27Vv, 50r-51Vv, 67r-72V, 103K, 131 V-132r. , 7 See, for example, ASS, Conctstoro, 1777, ff. 69r, 71r, 81r, 85r, g6r; letters

of May and June, 1369. On this point, cf. Perrens’ comments; Histoire de

Florence, v, 78. ,

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THE BURGEONING CRISIS, 1371-1375

that it favored the maintenance of Perugian independence, and in 1367 Uguccione de’ Ricci demanded that Florentine troops be sent to defend the city against papal attack."* But this bold

posture did not win general support; the dangers from overt Opposition to the papacy were too grave. With only sporadic manifestations of concern, Florence acquiesced in the gradual reduction of Perugian resistance, until the city fell into papal hands in May 1371. A few voices in the councils spoke out in favor of lending money to the beleaguered city, and the commune frequently offered its services as mediator in the quarrel. But its attitude remained passive. It was Florence’s awareness of her unheroic role in the demise of her sister republic which may account for the vehement protests when Perugia eventually

capitulated to the church.” | From the Florentine viewpoint, the papal conquest of Perugia was an inauspicious beginning to Gregory XI’s pontificate. This

' pope, perhaps the most competent and dedicated occupant of the Holy See in the fourteenth century, never succeeded in his efforts to establish friendly relations with the Arno city. Correspondence between Gregory and Florence was commonly filled with grievances, complaints, and justifications. Typical was the

letter which the pope addressed to the Signoria in the summer of 1371. The Florentines were in error, Gregory insisted, when they criticized the conquest of Perugia. That city was papal territory; it was only natural that the church should seek to recover its own property. The pontiff then broached a subject which ap76 CP, 8, £. 64r. 7™7 On this episode in Perugian history, see E. Dupré Theseider, “La rivolta di

Perugia nel 1375 contro l’abate di Monmaggiore e i suoi precedenti politici,” Bollettino della R. Deputazione di storia patria per VUmbria, xxxv (1938), 6985. For references to Florentine apprehensions over Perugia, see Missive, 14, ff. 23r, 41v-42r; CP, 8, ff. 7ov, 72r, 74r-76r; 10, ff. 12v-14r, 27v, g6v, 118r, I2IV; 11, ff. 13r, 93r, 99V, I122V, 124r. The most outspoken statement on this question was made by the Twelve, in June 1369, which asked the Signoria to inform Urban V “quod imprehensa quam fecit contra perusinos non placet,” and then added: “Comune non intendit quod libertas perusinorum submictetur, sed pro manutenendo statum eorum comune auxiliatur eis pro conservatione eorum civitatis”; CP, 10, f. 121v. A divergent opinion, reflecting the views of the Guelf extremists, was voiced at the same time by Lapo da Castiglionchio. Lapo urged the Signoria to persuade the Perugians to become reconciled with the pope, “ut discedant a pertinacia et superbia eorum. Regratietur papa et confortetur de recuperatione

statu sui, offerendo sibi comune in casu necessitatis”; idid., £. 120K. |

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peared with increasing frequency in papal letters to Tuscan communes: “The clergy are falsely accused of not being satisfied with their possessions, and of seeking to aggrandize themselves at the expense of Tuscany. The popes have always defended the

peace and liberty of Italy.” For three years, Florence faced a barrage of papal appeals for help in the war against the church’s inveterate enemy, Bernabo Visconti. To Gregory XI, the abasement of the Milanese despot was a sine qua non upon which depended all of his larger goals and objectives: the return of the curia to Rome, the launching

of a crusade in the Holy Land, the reform of the church.” Excommunicated and declared a heretic, Bernabé became the target of a papal crusade, in support of which the whole of Latin Chris-

tendom was canvassed for money.” Florence’s reaction to the urgent and insistent pleas from the pope and his vicars in Bologna was chilly. When these appeals were discussed in council meet-

ings during the summer of 1372, one speaker after another stressed the need for peace and economy: no war, no military

enterprises, no commitments, no expenses.” The prevailing opinion was bluntly summed up by Salvestro de’ Medici: “Under

no conditions nor for any reason whatsoever should the commune commit itself to any military campaign, or involve itself 78 Mirot, Politique pontificale, p. 27. 79 Mirot, pp. 10-19, summarizes the major objectives of Gregory’s pontificate.

80 This war, which broke out in the summer of 1371, is described in G. Romano, “La guerra tra i Visconti e la Chiesa (1360-1376),” Bollettino della Societa pavese di storia patria, 11 (1903), 412-37, and by F. Cognasso, in Storia di Milano (Fondazione Treccani degli Alfieri per la Storia di Milano) (Milan, 1955—), V, 465-86. Two recent articles by J. Glénisson furnish much new informa-

tion on the military and diplomatic aspects of the war, and of the efforts made by the church to finance the struggle: “La politique de Louis de Gonzague, seigneur de Mantoue pendant la guerra entre Grégoire XI et Bernabd Visconti (1371-1375),” Bibliotheque de l’Ecole des Chartes, c1x (1951), 232-76; and “Les origines de la révolte de ’Etat pontifical en 1375. Les subsides extraordinaires dans les provinces italiennes de l’Eglise au temps de Grégoire XI,” Rivista di storia della Chiesa in Italia, v (1951), 145-68. 81 The first negative reaction to a papal request, recorded in the Consulte e Pratiche, was on 5 May 1372; CP, 12, f. 22r. Only the Parte captains were in favor of sending aid. The issue was raised frequently throughout the summer and autumn of 1372; ibid., ff. 33r-33v, 35r-36r, 4or, 42V, 45v-46r, 7ov-72r. See particularly the comments of the richiesti on 19 August; idid., f. 45v. For the commune’s negative replies to papal requests in 1371, see Glénisson, “Politique,” 243-44.

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in the present war.’** So strong was the fear of being trapped into an obligation that the colleges wished to forbid the commune’s ambassador in Avignon to enter into any discussions with members of the curia.** Gregory XI perhaps derived some cold comfort from the assurances of several counselors that Florence remained, as ever, eternally devoted to the Roman church.”

This deliberate abandonment of the papacy, with whom the commune had a military alliance,*° was striking proof that the anticlerical elements, the enemies of the Parte Guelfa, had consolidated their power and were dictating foreign policy. Those citizens who sympathized with the church, and who remained Joyal to Guelf ideals, feared to make any public statement of their

true convictions. Not even Lapo da Castiglionchio ventured to recommend assistance for the papacy in these years.”°

_ The strength of antipapal sentiment in Florence was further demonstrated in the autumn of 1372 by the revival of fears concerning the church’s aggrandizement in Tuscany. Church troops engaged in military operations against Bernabé had conquered some territory near Lunigiaria on Florence’s northwestern frontier. This prompted speculation that the church intended to occupy

this land permanently. The rumor also circulated that the Ubaldini, a rebellious clan of Apennine nobles, might escape the commune’s tutelage by submitting to the church. Finally, 82 CP, 12, f. 72v. “Quod nullo modo nec aliqua causa comune promictat se induci ad aliquam imprehensam, nec ad se immiscendum in presenti guerra.” 88 CP, 12, f. 46r. The ambassador, Messer Alessandro dell’Antella, was to be permitted only to recommend the commune to the pope “et in nichil alia intret.” As a private citizen (ut civis et suo motu), he was authorized to defend the commune from slanderous attacks. _ 84 Thus the comments of Tommaso degli Strozzi, Messer Lapo da Castiglionchio, and Messer Jacopo Alberti; CP, 12, ff. 25r, 26r, 75v. 85 The commune’s last defensive alliance with the papacy was signed and ratified in October 1371; Prov., 59, ff. 153r-153v. The war had begun between the Marquis of Ferrara, a papal ally, and some of his rebellious nobles, with the papacy and Bernabo assisting the belligerents; Glénisson, “Politique,” 239. Thus in the commune’s opinion the papacy had not been assaulted and the commune was not obligated to assist her. See CP, 12, f. 24v, for the legal opinion of a group of Florentine lawyers; and also the arguments of counselors: “Quod guerra non est ecclesie, sed Marchionne”; sbid., f. 37v. Gregory believed that the commune had violated the terms of the alliance; see his complaining letter to the king of Hungary; A. Theiner, Vetera monumenta historica Hungarium

sacrum illustrantia (Rome, 1860), 1, 113. , 86 See Lapo’s opinions, CP, 12, ff. 43r, 45v, 77r.

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the Sienese discovered a plot to overthrow their regime, in which church officials were allegedly implicated. To those Florentines

who viewed the papacy as a threat to the commune’s security, these events looked like a concerted effort to surround the Arno city with papal forces—a prelude to its conquest.” So hostile was the Florentine reaction to these developments that the vicar-general in Bologna, Pierre d’Estaing, immediately sent an ambassador to the city to quiet the agitation. The envoy, Messer Francesco da Capallo, delivered a lengthy oration before the Signoria and the colleges.** He denied any complicity by his officials in the Siena plot; his master, he insisted, loved the Sienese and their regime. Pierre d’Estaing expressed such confidence in

the church’s innocence that he offered to deliver three of his own relatives as hostages, who could be prosecuted as traitors by Florence and Siena, if it were proved that papal officials had conspired against the Sienese government. The envoy then pointed

out two instances when the church had voluntarily given up Tuscan territory which had fallen into its hands: Castiglione Aretino, a town on Florence’s southern border which was returned to Arezzo; and Lucca, which had been restored to the Lucchese themselves. “Even if all Tuscany wished to submit to the church,” the ambassador argued, “the cardinal and his ofhcials could not accept, because it would be contrary to the pope’s will, as they [the Florentines] well knew.”* Referring again to 87 The concern in Florence over these developments is reflected in the Pratiche protocols; CP, 12, ff. 6or, 63v, 64v, 65v, between 18 and 26 October. 88 The speech is summarized in CP, 12, f. 66r, 26 October. Similar protesta-

tions of innocence were sent to Siena. The bishop of Siena, Giovanni de’ Guasconi, wrote to the commune from Bologna, denying that any church official was involved in this conspiracy: “Ymmo dominus noster papamet personaliter nobis, licet indignis, audientibus asseruit ac in verbo fidei firmavit quod, etiam si tota Italia vellet se libere tradere et subiugare Ecclesie et postea Imperator confirmaret, eos non reciperet nec in hoc aliquo modo consentiret, quia

suficiunt sibi que sua sunt. ... Et promittimus et iuramus vobis . . . quod, si sciremus istud vel aliquid ad id tendens verum esse vel fuisse, id vobis incontinenti revelaremus aut statim espicopatu renuntiaremus. . . . Ubi si ea que vobis, ut predicitur, sunt suggesta, vera reperiantur, nedum mori quinymmo ut Bartholomeus volumus excoriari”; Mollat, “Deux Fréres Mineurs, Marc de Viterbe et Guillaume de’ Guasconi, au service de la papauté (1363-1375),” Archivum franciscanum historicum, xiv (1955), 67-68. 89 “Et quod si tota Tuscia vellet se submictere, ipse dominus cardinalis et officiales ecclesie non acceptarent, quod esse contra intentionem domini pape,

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the “pure and sincere intentions” of the papal administrators, Messer Francesco concluded his address by stating that the papal war against Bernabo was not fought to gain more territory for the

church, “but only to suppress his tyranny.” The colleges were not completely convinced by these protestations.’ “Good words should be repaid by good words,” commented Matteo Alderotti, the spokesman for the Twelve, but he added that the commune should be prepared for any eventuality by a vigilant custody of its territory. While accepting the cardinal’s assurance that he personally had no knowledge of the Sienese conspiracy, the colleges hinted strongly that some minor church officials were implicated in the affair. They suggested that the vicar-general should take pains to supervise the activities of his subordinates, to avoid such incidents in the future. Applauding the church’s release of Lucca and Castiglione Aretino,

the colleges complained, however, that the latter territory had

not been abandoned “fully and freely.” They argued that a total withdrawal would redound to the church’s honor and would dispel any suspicion held “by those who wish to live in freedom.” The Sixteen sounded a final note of warning. “The legate and the church act properly by not wishing to acquire [territory] in Tuscany, for since they possess the souls of all, they need no more; and if the church were to attempt to acquire

more, it might lose what it now has.” Frequent manifestations of antipapal sentiment in the Pratiche

protocols in the last weeks of 1372 revealed the extent of the commune’s alienation from the church. In defense of an unpopular cause, Guelf partisans pleaded for measures to dispel the suspicion and distrust which clouded relations between Florence and Avignon. Messer Bindo de’ Bardi proposed that an embassy be sent to the pope and the college of cardinals, informquam bene sciunt, et quod intentio dicti domini et offitialium ecclesie est pura

et sincere... .” 99 There is a record, CP, 12, f. 66v, of a private meeting, in which the colleges reported their reaction to the ambassador’s speech, and then the public reply to the envoy, made on behalf of the Signoria and the colleges by Matteo Alderotti, thid., £. 67r. ®1 “Quod ipse [the cardinal] et ecclesia bene facient nolli acquirere in Tuscia, quia cum habeant animos omnium, non indiget pluri, et si quereret ultra acquirere, esset perdere quod habet”; CP, 12, f. 67r.

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ing them of the fears and misgivings aroused by the practices of papal officials in Italy. A Parte stalwart, Niccolé Soderini, suggested that relations could be improved if the papacy restored Perugian independence.” Other comments, however, were less conciliatory. Messer Donato Aldighieri denounced Pierre d’Estaing

as an official bent upon aggrandizement, whose promises were worthy of little faith.°* With perhaps a note of irony, Geri Ghiberti favored the dispatch of an embassy to Charles IV, to learn whether he had given Tuscany to the papacy. If that province still belonged

to the emperor, Ghiberti added, “then the church should keep hands off our affairs.””* From the nadir touched in the winter of 1372, relations between Florence and the papacy improved slightly in the spring and summer of 1373. There were still occasional warnings about ecclesiastical intrigue among the Ubaldini; Stefani claimed that this family

received support from the Albizzi and Pierre d’Estaing.*” However, this ceased to be a burning issue after the commune’s punitive expedition into the Apennines restored a measure of respect for Florentine power among those intractable mountaineers. The cardinal’s offer of military aid against the Ubaldini may have mollified the Florentines.** Oligarchic supporters of the Guelf 82 CP, 12, f. 72r. See also the pleas for reconciliation by other Guelf partisans, Biagio Guasconi and Leonardo Beccanugi; idid., ff. 72r-72v. A few days later,

Niccolé Soderini referred to the antipapal opinions voiced in the councils: “Loquatur bene contra ecclesiam et non male, et operetur quod suspictio, que orta est, praticetur tolli”; CP, 12, f. 75r. 88 CP, 12, f. 71v: “Et consideranda sunt omnia propter condictionem domini cardinalis Bituricensis qui affectat dominari et occupare, et suis promissionibus modica fides detur.”

94 CP, 12, f. 75r: “Quod ad papam ambaxiata destinetur, et similiter ad imperatorem, et ab eo sciatur si civitas Florentie est de imperatori vel ecclesia;

et si est de imperio, ecclesia se non intromictat de nostris factis.” A similar opinion was voiced by Niccolo Giugni. 85 CP, 12, £. ro5r3 Stefani, 739: “. . . Sentendosi di fuori gli Ubaldini, li quali teneano 14 castella nelle Alpi, e temendo della Chiesa, che si era adampiata, che

gia tenea lo Patrimonio, il Ducato e parte della Marca, e suggiogava tutti li Signori di la, e prosperava in Bologna, signore di gran parte di Romagna, e tenea Perugia; vedendo tutto di gli scatuzzamenti, che si faceano in Firenze, e gli Ubaldini si faceano amici e provvisionati delli Legati di Bologna, e tutto di faceano rubare i pellegrini ed altri—diciesi per lo mondo che nell’alpe dei Fiorentini si rubava, e gli Albizi in sino a questo di gli aveano mantenuti—onde per

bene fare a’ passanti, ed ancora alla infamia porre remedio, cercarono come potessero essere al di sopra degli Ubaldini.” ®6 For references to the cardinal’s offer, see CP, 12, ff. 86r, 116r.

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tradition again raised their voices in the councils, extolling the advantages of more friendly contacts with Avignon and Bologna.”

One stratagem of the Parte hierarchy was to use the king of Hungary as peacemaker between the commune and Gregory XI. The more ebullient Guelf spirits favored a triple alliance comprising Florence, the Angevin monarch, and the papacy.” This, however, did not commend itself to those citizens who dominated

the communal government. Nor did Parte leaders succeed in persuading the regime to grant assistance to the church in its continuing struggle with the Visconti. From this conflict, Florence persistently remained aloof.” In September 1372, Gerard du Puy, abbot of Marmoutiers, was appointed vicar-general in Perugia, creating another source of dis-

cord between the republic and the papal bureaucracy in Italy. This nephew of Gregory XI was viewed with profound mistrust in Florence. He was accused of fomenting unrest in southern Tuscany to disturb the existing order and to promote the church’s

territorial ambitions. According to one protesting letter sent to Avignon, Gerard had supported the bishop of Arezzo in his efforts

to seize Castiglione Aretino. The Signoria claimed, too, that the abbot had given aid and comfort to a Sienese noble family, the Salimbene, in their dispute with the commune of Siena. When the abbot organized a military company to reinforce the papal armies in Lombardy (October 1374), both Florence and Siena suspected that he was preparing an invasion of their territory."”” Fear of an overt papal attack was intensified by the suspicion, held by many, that disgruntled Florentine oligarchs were secretly negotiating with officials in the papal states. In 1373 communal 87 CP, 12, ff. 10gV, IOV, 113V, 122f-123r. For a reference to an interesting letter from Gregory XI to Simone Peruzzi, praising him for his efforts to lead Florence

into sincere devotion to the church, see Dupré Theseider, “Rivolta,” 103. 88 CP, 12, ff. 132r, 133r, 135V, 137V.

®9 For the negative reaction to papal requests in the autumn of 1373, see CP, 12, ff. 1390v, 1421, 156v, 157r, 166r, 169r. See also papal references to Florentine suspicions; Mirot, pp. 31-33. 100 See Cronaca di Donato di Neri, 655; Mollat, “Preliminaires,” 114-16; and his “Relations politiques de Grégoire XI avec les Siennois et les Florentins,” Mélanges d’archéologie et d’histoire, txvit (1956), 335-76. For other evidence of the controversy between the Sienese and the church officials, see Mollat, “Deux Freres,” 63; A. Garosci, “La vita e l’opera di Francesco Casini archiatro di sei papi,” Bullettino senese di storia patria, new ser., vit (1935), docs. 6, 9, 13, 19.

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authorities were profoundly disturbed by rumors that a party of treason within the city walls was conspiring to overthrow the regime, possibly with the connivance, or at least with the approbation, of the papal bureaucracy. In August a lawyer named Messer Giovanni di Ser Fruosino was condemned in court for making this statement: “The present regime in Florence is putrid. Certain citizens from the quarter of S. Croce have divided the government among themselves and wish to do as they please. They have excluded certain families [i.e. the Albizzi and the Ricci], among whom were prudent men. There is a certain powerful lord in this area who, at the

proper time and place, will rectify this situation. ... In a short time, they [the regime’s leaders] will all be executed.”*”* The “powerful lord” to whom Messer Giovanni referred was,

according to Stefani, Gerard du Puy. In describing the circumstances which led to his conviction, the chronicler noted that the incident “had a long tail.” It was widely believed in Florence that the Albizzi were secretly communicating with the abbot in Perugia. A crucial document in this affair was a letter written by five Albizzi partisans, including a brother of Cardinal Corsini, a

copy of which had been purloined from the monastery of S. Trinita. The original missive had been addressed to Gregory XI, urging him to appoint a successor to the deceased abbot of Vallambrosa who would be loyal to the Holy See and to friends of the papacy in Florence. The authors of the letter contended that the monastery was a very strategic post, and whoever controlled

it in time of war would be able to dominate Florence.’ From 101 AP, 2562, f. gir, 9 August 1373. Stefani, 738, reported a slightly different version of Messer Giovanni’s statement: “. . . Dovea avere detto, che solea in Firenze essere la famiglia degli Albizi e Ricci, che per senno e per pratica sapeano reggere come si convenia, ma ora é venuto il reggimento in mano di gente nuova e nimici di color, perché erano buoni; ma che lo Abate di Perugia e lo Cardinale da Bologna erano bene avvisati di cid; e che questi che si stavano cosi sicuri, e avieno il reggimento, e cacciati gli altri, sarieno ammazzati, ovvero desti col capo della scura.”

102“. . Cinque cittadini scriveano al Papa, significando la morte dell’Abate, e supplicandolo che gli piacesse riformare quella Chiesa di Abate, che fosse confidente allo Stato della Sua Santita, e’ fosse confidente alli suoi amici da Firenze, considerando che la badia di Vallembrosa era, chi la tenea, da potere quasi tenere assediata Firenze da quella parte, ed a tempo di guerra era, chi avea quella Badia con gli altri suoi amici, potea essere quasi signore e favoreggiatore a Santa Chiesa ed altre parole simili a queste”; Stefani, 738.

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this document the anti-papal party inferred that a plan had been conceived for a military attack upon the city by church forces, supported from within by a revolt of the Albizzi. Throughout the summer of 1373, communal officials labored to unravel the strands of this mystery. In mid-July the first details of the alleged collusion between Gerard du Puy and the Albizzi faction were revealed by an unnamed priest, who was “examined”

by judicial authorities. This cleric had apparently implicated Messer Giovanni di Ser Fruosino, for his name cropped up in the protocols a few days later.*°* Six weeks after Messer Giovanni’s condemnation, the subject was again included on the collegiate agenda. The Sixteen requested information about a letter which a monk, the abbot of Spugna, had received from Gerard du Puy.*”* A native of Faenza named Ser Giovanni then appeared

on the scene, to furnish additional details about contacts between Florentine citizens and papal officials. Unconvinced by his allegations, the colleges demanded that the truth be extracted from him by torture, and “if he has been lying, then notify the curia and the

abbot.”*” The final piece of evidence pertaining to this cloudy affair was a statement by the Sixteen on 26 September: “Release Ser Giovanni of Faenza and conserve his writings, and the confession which he has made.”*°® No clue is given to the contents of

this document, nor to the credit which it received among the authorities.

A year later, in the summer of 1374, the executor received an anonymous denunciation which contained overtones of con-

| spiracy and intrigue. The target of this accusation was a certain Bernardo de la Corsa, but by imputation the document charged the Albizzi faction and the papal bureaucracy with plotting to overthrow the regime: 103 The evidence concerning this investigation is fragmentary; CP, 12, ff. 126v1271, 128r, 129r-129V; 18-23 July 1373.

104 CP, 12, f. r42v, 15 September 1373: “Quod domini faciant se informari per ambaxiatam ab Abbate Spungie, et sciat ab eo de lettera quam abbas recepit ab abbate maioris monasterii.” The Vallambrosan monastery of Spugna was located

near Colle in the Val d’Elsa. , 105 CP, 12, ff. 144v-145r, 146v, 147Vv.

106 CP, 12, f. 148r. Five years later, in 1378, Bartolomeo di Niccolé Cione Ridolfi

was anonymously accused of participating in this plot: “. . . Teneva tractata col’abato ch’era sengniore de Perusia pro dissfare li guelfi de Florentia e per soctomettere el comune de Florentia a lui”; AEOJ, 811, f. 125v.

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“Bernardo, powerful in his own right and by virtue of his family, an enemy of the popolo ... frequently has vilified the communal government. .. . As a friend and follower of Pepo di Antonio degli Albizzi, he said that this regime would not survive, because the church would make peace with Messer Bernabo, and soon after, it would surround Florence with an army. As a consequence, the citizens who had lost control of the

city would return and cut to pieces their enemies and start a revolution. Bernardo said that he would be pleased if this were to occur soon, and that he would assist the Albizzi to attack those

who were in power.’ According to this denunciation, Pepo degli Albizzi had compiled a list of his political enemies, and alongside their names he had written the punishment to be meted out to them: “. . . who would have his hand amputated, who would be hanged and who would be torn to pieces.” Given the present state of our knowledge, it is not possible to

determine conclusively whether Florentine suspicions of the papacy had any basis in fact. The evidence adduced to prove the church’s guilt is indirect and circumstantial, derived in large part from rumor and allegation. It is scarcely more persuasive than the solemn affirmations of innocence reiterated by the pope and his subordinates. However, from what is known of Gregory XI’s character and political convictions, it seems most unlikely that he would have conceived a plan to incorporate Tuscany into the papal states.”°* The innocence of the prelates who governed the church’s temporal possessions is less certain. These men did not hide their distaste for the Florentine regime, and they could easily visualize

the advantages of its overthrow.’ Ever since Albornoz launched 107 AEO], 716, f. 181r, ro July 1374.

108 Gregory XI was scrupulous in his regard for the rights of his subjects; he frequently reprimanded his officials for arbitrary actions and for levying excessive taxes; Theiner, Codex diplomaticus, 11, docs. 510, 511, 589; Lettres secretes et curiales du pape Grégoire XI (1370-1378), relatives a la France extraites des registres du Vatican (Bibliothéque des Ecoles francaises d’Athénes et de Rome, ser. 3, vit) (Paris, 1935-1957), Preface, zv-v1; docs. 2555, 2601, 2804, 2830, 3449.

109 See Pierre d’Estaing’s comment, Lettres ... du pape Grégoire XI, Preface, v,n. 7: “Item, dicetur per vos, ex parte nostra, quod plures Ytalici, qui vellent Ecclesiam suppeditare, scribent contra me, vel saltim pro aliis . . . quia Florentini,

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his campaign to recover the papal states, church officials had been hampered by the commune’s failure to provide consistent support

for their projects. If a regime controlled by the Albizzi faction could be established in Florence, it would provide the papacy with

a strong, loyal ally, and would greatly strengthen the church’s temporal position in Italy. A bureaucrat of Gerard du Puy’s stamp —able, ambitious, and eager to push his authority to its limits— may well have been receptive to proposals made by emissaries from the church’s supporters in Florence.**° But even if projects of this

nature were considered by the abbot and the vicar-general in Bologna, Guilliaume Noellet, these officials had little opportunity to implement them. Their resources were wholly absorbed in the Visconti struggle.

What intensified Florentine fears of the church’s temporal power? This question is equally as significant, historically, as that of papal motives and designs. The problem was not simply one of jealousy inspired by the emergence of a strong rival state. One difficulty was the unique character of the papacy’s political role in central Italy. In the name of peace and order, church officials

could and did intervene in the domestic affairs of the Tuscan communes, seeking to mediate between rival factions, and conceivably giving a decisive advantage to the party which favored the church. Gregory XI contended that the promotion of peace was the objective of Gerard du Puy’s intervention in southern ad instanciam Perusinorum, procurant contra me ut non remaneam .. . Dicere qualiter, inimici mei, qui aliter michi nocere non possent, fingunt mendacia contra me.” In September 1369, the imperial vicar in Lucca, Cardinal Guido of Boulogne, expressed himself on the same subject in a letter to Urban V: “Florentini adhuc florent, si florere dici debet malitia, circa Sanctum Miniatem: quid tamen finaliter continget de dicto negotio, ignoro; sed si male, prout meruerunt,

propter fracta eorum juramenta, eis contingat, tam patienter et diu eorum tolleravi malitiam, quod penes deum et vos et in terris vicarium et ceteros mundi principes et homines ero veraciter excusatus”; Fumi, Lucca, 11, 2, doc. 1989.

110 On Gerard, see Lettres ... du pape Grégoire XI, Preface, v-vt; Dupré Theseider, “Rivolta di Perugia,” 90-109. Papal officials in Italy favored the development of a centralized administration in the papal states. See M. Antonelli, “La dominazione pontifica nel Patrimonio negli ultimi venti anni del periodo avignonese,” Archivio della R. Societa romana di storia patria, xxx1 (1908), 129-40. See, in particular, the memorandum of Pierre d’Estaing on papal government in Italy, zbid., 321-28; and also in Lettres ... du pape Grégoire XI, appendix, cols. 1251-62.

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Tuscany." The same argument might well have been advanced to justify Pierre d’Estaing’s intrusion into the quarrel between Florence and the Ubaldini. Papal mediation was not a novelty in Tuscany; the innovation was its foundation upon a strong temporal position. The line between arbitration and dictation is particularly narrow when the arbitrator is a powerful neighbor.

Four incidents illustrate another aspect of this problem. In July 1371 a Sienese diplomat in Perugia reported a meeting between Pierre d’Estaing, the papal vicar-general, and a nobleman from Montepulciano, a south Tuscan town under Sienese control. The noble offered to instigate a rebellion in his native city and deliver it into the hands of the church. According to the diplomat’s

report, the vicar-general indignantly rejected the offer and announced his firm decision to refrain from intervention in Tuscan affairs.’ Two years later, in June 1373, a resident of Civitella in the Florentine district was denounced to the executor for sponsoring a campaign to deliver that town to the papacy. A similar oc-

currence was reported in July. A friar in a district near Volterra was accused of inciting rebellion against Florentine rule by informing his neighbors that “a better government is that of the

church of Rome.’ The most publicized incident of this kind reported in the judicial records was the plot devised in June 1375

by a notary and a friar in Prato to deliver that city into papal hands.’**

Through its rise as a major territorial power, the church had thus become ipso facto a subversive force in central Italy. The mere existence of the papal state stimulated discontent against the

status quo; it induced malcontents to regard the church as the 111 Theiner, Codex diplomaticus, 11, doc. 567. 112 4SS, Concistoro, 1781, ff. 48r-48v: “. .. Uno altro gentile huomo di presso

a questo paese ... gia pit di viene allui et in presentia di parechie de’ quali sono a provisione et consiglio del signore, disse ad esso signore [Pierre d’Estaing] come esso aveva in Montepulciano tale e si fatto tractato, che in quanto esso gli desse suo bracchio e sua potentia, gli darebbe sotto la sua signoria Montepulciano infra brevi di; la qual cosa el signore a pena compi da dire che esso con rimbrutti e grande vitopero el caccié non solo da Ja sua presentia ma etiamdio di Perugia; con dirli et commandarli che pit innanzi non ardisse apparirli; et con affermare

che de fatti di Toscani non intendeva per veruna cagione impacciarsi ... et che la chiesa non aveva et non a in Toscana a far niente.” This report was dated 18 August 1371. 118 4FOJ, 688, f. 208r; 680, £. 37r. Civitella is ten miles northwest of Arezzo. 114 See below, pp. 292-93.

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instrument of their political deliverance. The popes had replaced the emperors in their traditional role as disturbers of the Tuscan peace. And by opposing this tangible threat to its security, Florence was adhering to a policy even more ancient than its commitment to Guelfism.

The Path to War “The world appears to be all in turmoil.” This comment by the Lucchese chancellor reflected the feeling of uncertainty, tinged with premonitions of disaster, which prevailed in governing councils throughout northern and central Italy in the spring of 1375.” The key question was the outcome of the war in Lombardy between the papal armies and the forces of Bernabo Visconti. The church, exhausted by the inconclusive conflict, was making conciliatory gestures to its archenemy as a prelude to peace negotia-

tions.** While Tuscans hoped for the end of war, they also feared it. Peace would mean the disbanding of the armies and, inevitably, the ravages and depredations of the companies. Rumors

circulated, too, that after the war’s end, the pope would seck a protector in Charles IV, and that the peninsula would again be visited by the emperor, escorting Gregory XI to Rome.’ Italy faced the possibility of another foreign incursion, compounding its domestic difficulties.

Although Florence’s strength had not been sapped by war, the city’s condition in the early months of 1375 was parlous. A plague had struck the year before, and in its wake came a poor harvest, which was insufficient to feed the survivors of the pestilence.” In desperation the commune had begged Gregory XI to authorize 115 “Tg mondo pare che sia tucto in commotione”; Fumi, Lucca, uu, Part 2, doc. 493. The letter, written to the Lucchese ambassador in Florence, is dated 17 April 1375.

116Qn 11 April 1375, Gregory XI authorized his vicar-general in Bologna, Guillaume Noellet, to begin truce talks with the Visconti; Lettres ... du pape Grégoire XI, doc. 3667. For the background to these peace discussions, see the dispatches of Cristoforo da Piacenza, Mantuan representative in Avignon; A. Segre, “I dispacci di Cristoforo da Piacenza procuratore mantovano alla Corte pontificia,” ASI, ser. 5, xLu1 (1909), 7, 63-69, dispatches of 14 December 1374 and 11 February 1375; and Garosci, “Francesco Casini,” doc. 20. 117Qn these rumors, see Fumi, Lucca, u, 2, doc. 493; Mollat, “Relations politiques,” 354-55; CP, 12, f. 3Vv. 118 Stefani, 745, 746.

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its agents to purchase grain in the papal states. In Florentine eyes, the persistent refusal of Gerard du Puy to permit the transport of

grain from Umbria and the Marches into Tuscany was further proof of the abbot’s inveterate hostility.” The sequence of events which culminated in war between Florence and the papacy is difficult to trace with accuracy. While maintaining traditional poses in their relations with each other, officials

of the commune and the church were also engaged in activities and negotiations which contradicted their public statements. The official records throw little light on the final stages of the crisis, since neither party admitted that their relationship had altered. In the Consulte e Pratiche protocols, there is no mention of the possibility of war or a diplomatic volte-face; the conventional phrases of respect and deference toward the Roman church are blandly repeated.” Gregory XI continued to play his customary role of loving and benevolent father, grieving over the wrongdoing of his Florentine sons, but confident in their eventual repentance and return to the proper path. This pose was maintained by the pope in two communications to the Signoria in the spring of 1375. The accusations, the justifications, the pleas and exhortations are all familiar. In the first letter written in February, Gregory replied to the commune’s complaint of interference by church officials in southern Tuscany. The pope

justified these actions by claiming that his subordinates were seeking to settle quarrels which had disturbed this zone; he denied once again that he or his lieutenants wanted to enlarge the papal

domain. He also answered the commune’s plaint about a grain embargo, by informing the Signoria that Gerard du Puy had been instructed to permit Florentine officials to purchase and transport 118 Glénisson has discussed the grain problem thoroughly and refutes the argument that Gregory XI and Gerard du Puy deliberately sought to withhold grain

supplies from Florence; “Une administration médiévale aux prises avec la disette. La question des blés dans les provinces italiennes de l’etat pontifical en 1374-1375, Le moyen dge, tvit (1951), 303-26. See also the documentation in Mirot, “La question des blés dans la rupture entre Florence et le Saint-siége en 1375,” Mélanges d’archéologie et d’histoire, xvi (1896), 182-205. 120 Thus the comment of Biagio Guasconi, concerning the formulation of a response to the papal ambassador, “Et quod exponere quod comune intendit esse in eius devotione”; CP, 13, f. 6v, 3 May 1375. See also zdid., ff. 6r, 7r, 119. Customary business was also transacted. See the references (December 1374) to

Florentine efforts to secure the bishopric of Volterra for one of its citizens; Garosci, “Francesco Casini,” doc. 12.

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wheat from Umbria. Gregory concluded his letter with a plea for the restoration of the ancient friendship between Florence and the Holy See.’ In April the pope sent another, more critical, missive to the republic. He expressed displeasure at the commune’s refusal to honor its obligation to help the papacy against the Visconti. We believe, he wrote, that the Florentines are devoted to the church, “and therefore those citizens act wrongly who seek to destroy this devotion with insidious suggestions.” In a direct attack upon his Florentine critics, he denounced those who disseminated false rumors that the church wished to occupy Tuscan

territory.” The Florentine response was in the hallowed tradition. Early in May a papal ambassador was greeted with warmth and cordiality. Gregory’s envoy was informed that the commune remained

bound to the church with firm ties of respect and devotion. Speak- : ing for the Twelve, Andrea Salviati referred to the “strange activities” of certain clerics which had given rise to suspicions, but he

added that the commune was not troubled, since it had faith in the pope.*”* In a special meeting of counselors assembled on 16 May, speakers referred to papal accusations against the republic

and advised the Signoria to reply with stout affirmations of innocence.***

While this ritual was being enacted with punctilious care, both Gregory and the Florentine authorities were taking precautionary measures. A papal letter written in January to Francesco da Car-

rata, signore of Padua, contained the sharpest criticism of the 121 Theiner, Codex diplomaticus, u, doc. 567. 1227, Linig, Codex Italiae Diplomaticus (Frankfurt, 1723-1735), 11, cols. 155962: “Nos enim credimus, prout saepe audivimus, quod populus vestrae civitatis

sit devotus et purus erga ecclesiam praelibatam; et propterea iniquius agunt quidam, qui devotionem illius depravare perversis suggestionibus moliuntur. Dicitur enim, quod quidam ex vobis palam et saepius, sed temere et minus vere, protolerant in populo, quod dicta ecclesia volebat terras Tusciae occupare. .. .” 123 CP, 13, f. 7r: “Ad ambaxiatam summi pontificis, respondeatur ostendendo devotionem et confidentiam quam habet comune; et quod circa securitatem dicatur quomodo per quosdam positos ecclesie modi satis extranei et generativi suspicionis; sed tanta est fides quod putatur superfluum omnem securitatem.” See the similar comment of the Sixteen, idid., f. 6r: “Dixit quod respondeatur, ostendendo fidem quam habet comune ad ecclesiam et personam domini pape;

et quod dicatur quod ut creditur preter voluntatem summi pontificis certi offitiales salubriter se habuerunt; et quod rogetur operari quod hec non fiant.” 124 CP., 13, ff. 12v-14r.

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republic yet delivered by the curia. In this document, Gregory stated that the Florentines, their pride inflated and their intellect deranged, had sought to stir up discontent among the church’s subjects in Tuscany. The pope feared that they might use similar tactics in Bologna, Romagna, and the Marches. He particularly requested Francesco to furnish troops and support to Guillaume

Noellet in defense of Bologna and the surrounding territory. Open conflict with its Tuscan ally was thus one contingency that the curia had considered.*” Gregory also accused the commune of negotiating with Bernabo

Visconti, a charge which he repeated in his April letter to the Signoria. Like most of the rumors and accusations which filled the air in these months, this claim cannot be substantiated by solid proof.’”* It is quite certain, however, that the commune was 125 The letter is printed in Theiner, Codex diplomaticus, 11, doc. 566, 25 January 1375. “Sane, fili dilectissime, quoniam altitudo divina, cuius iudicia velut abissus multa ad humanis intellectibus comprehendi non possunt, sic multorum iniquorum Florentinorum ipsorum induravit animos et elatorum in superbia sic ebruit intellectum, ut preter quamvis nostram nostrorumque culpam obauditis spretisque causa nostris sepius repetitis, quam vestris et quorumlibet zelatorum salutis eorum monitis, ad prosequendam Christi sponsam prefatam ecclesiam et totalem subversionem status eiusdem veluti perditionis et degeneris filii vires suas, et ingenia totis studiis acuentes undique circuunt querentes assidue, quod subiectos ipsius ecclesie sua caliditate damnali quam populi libertatem appellant, faciant deviare, prout in provincia beati Petri in Tuscia plurimos iam fecerunt, quod non sine gravi cordis amaritudine recensemus, timentes permaxime, ne simplices aures fidelium populorum Bononie, Romandiole et Marchie susi temptent inficere flatibus venenosis.” In a letter of 25 January 1375, Gregory asked Niccol6é d’Este, stgnore of Ferrara, to impede an alliance between Florence and the Visconti; Romano, “Niccoldé Spinelli,” Archivio storico per le province napoletane, Xxv, 436. 126 As early as 18 May, the papacy had accused the commune of dispatching

an envoy, Messer Pazzino degli Strozzi, to Milan: “Et quod fiat excusatio de eo quod dicitur Pazinum esse Mediolanum”; CP, 13, f. r3r. Lending weight to this accusation is the statement by an anonymous chronicler that Pazzino had indeed initiated diplomatic conversations with the Visconti; Manoscritt1, 222, f. 246. In December 1374 the Sienese were accused in Avignon of receiving Milanese ambassadors after they had been repulsed by the Florentines; Garosci, “Francesco Casini,” 317. In May 1375 a Lucchese report stated that ambassadors

from Bernabéd had come to Florence: “. . . Si dice che non furono ricevuti e stieno nel contado”; Fumi, Lucca, ur, 2, doc. 503. Mirot, Politique pontificale, pp. 30, 35, does not submit any proof for his assertion that Florence was secretly negotiating with the Visconti since 1373. Milanese ambassadors did appear in Florence in October 1373, but their overtures were apparently rebuffed. See the comment of Biagio Guasconi: “Quod ambaxiatoribus dominorum Medio-

THE BURGEONING CRISIS, 1371-1375

engaged in promoting a league of Tuscan cities, from which the papacy was deliberately excluded. Although unsuccessful in this project, the commune had served notice that it intended to maintain its hegemony in the province.’”

The future of Florence’s relations with the church and the course of Italian politics hung upon the outcome of peace talks between Noellet and the Visconti. If a truce were signed, John Hawkwood’s mercenary band would then be free to engage in whatever depredations its leader desired. Indeed, church officials had already warned the Tuscan cities of this eventuality.”* The pope had invited the Signoria to send representatives to the peace colloquy, but the republic, remaining aloof, had ignored the invitation. While these discussions were proceeding in Bologna,

another diplomatic convention was held in Florence early in June. Called by two papal ambassadors, it included representatives from every major Tuscan commune: Florence, Siena, Pisa, Lucca, and Arezzo. This convocation, the details of which were reported by the Sienese envoys at the congress, offers an excellent vantage

point from which to observe the final dissolution of the Guelf entente."””

At the initial session of the conference on 5 June, the church’s dilemma was described by one of the papal ambassadors, the archlani non detur audientia; sed discedatur a verbis eorum; et ambaxiata eorum notificetur papa et cardinalibus”; CP, 12, f. 158v, 24 October 1373. This opinion was supported by other counselors and the colleges. 127 See Gregory’s letter to his two envoys in Tuscany, 29 April 1375: “Audivimus nuper quod dilecti filii Florentini et quidam alii Tusci procurant ligam facere, invicem nobis nullatenus requisitis, quam ex eo suspectam habemus, quia cum Romana Ecclesia sunt ligati, nec ad hoc requirant eamdem. .. . Durante liga

quam habent cum dicta Ecclesia, nullam aliam in qua non includatur eadem Ecclesia inire possunt”; Mirot, Politique pontificale, p. 34. Mirot dated the letter incorrectly in April 1374; the correct date is in Lettres ... du pape Grégoire XI, doc. 3677. For evidence of Florence’s canvassing of the Tuscan towns on the subject of a league, see Fumi, Lucca, 11, 2, doc. 493. 128 For the warning to Siena, see Mollat, “Relations politiques,” 367, doc. 12. Florence received a similar caution from Gregory XI; CP, 12, ff. 6v-7r, 3 May 1375. For Lucca, see Fumi, Lucca, uu, 2, doc. 511. See also the papal letter to Siena, Arezzo and Pisa, 21 June 1375; Theiner, Codex diplomaticus, 11, doc. 578. 128 This congress, an important event in the crisis, has not been noted by scholars. I owe the discovery of the documents reporting on the congress, in the Archivio di Stato di Siena, to Professor Lauro Martines of Reed College.

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bishop of Otranto.**° He admitted that the church could no longer sustain the heavy expenses of the Visconti war without assistance. However, if the Tuscan communes agreed to lend 25,000 florins to the papacy and then promised an additional 50,000 florins over a period of six months, the church would make no peace or truce

with the Visconti.** The money would be used to pay Hawkwood, who was contracted to remain in papal service until midOctober. During that time the English captain would be stationed on church territory, prepared to defend Tuscany against any Visconti incursions. While the delegates sent this proposal to their respective governments for consideration, ominous reports were filtering into the city from the north. Hawkwood’s forces were said to be moving from Lombardy across the Apennines, posing an immediate threat to the Tuscan cities.**’ On the evening of the 6th, the news arrived from Bologna that

Noellet had signed a truce with Bernabé two days before. The second papal envoy, Berengar, the abbot of Lézat, appeared before the delegates to denounce Noellet’s treachery. To exculpate him-

self, he exhibited a memorandum he had sent to the cardinal in Bologna, outlining the proposals he had made to the Tuscan communes.’ Florentine representatives immediately capitalized 180 The report was written on 5 June; ASS, Concistoro, 1786, f. 39r. The two papal envoys at the congress were Jacopo de Itro, archbishop of Otranto, later

patriarch of Constantinople and created cardinal by the Avignonese pope, Clement VII, and Berengar, abbot of Lézat. These two men had been sent into Italy in April on a papal mission; Lettres ... du pape Grégoire XI, doc. 3677. Berengar was an experienced diplomat, engaged on Italian missions since 1371; see zbid., doc. 2176 bis, 2300.

181 The Lucchese government wrote to its ambassador in Florence on 7 June rejecting the request for a subsidy, contending that the commune was impoverished; Fumi, Lucca, 11, 2, doc. 508. A distorted version of these negotiations is given in the Cronica di Pisa, RRIISS, ed. Muratori, xv, col. 1067. According to this source, the papacy requested only 8000 f., and had this been forthcoming,

the church would have continued the war against Bernabd. “E di questo ne funno colpa li Fiorentini, che non volleno prestare al Papa alcuno danaro... e perché Firenze, che fu la prima chiesta, non ne prestd, cosi fecono T’altre citta di Toscana.” 182 This information, as well as data upon a private colloquy of the Tuscan envoys, is included in the dispatch of 6 June; Concistoro, 1786, f. 5or. 183 Tbid., 1786, f. 51r, dispatch of 7 June: “Teri sera sul vespero mando Messer Yabbate per noi e per gli altri ambassadori. . . . Messer l’abbate disse volendo provedere scusa di quello ch’era proceduto de la triegua fatta, che esso era stato

287

} THE BURGEONING CRISIS, 1371-1375 on the abbot’s embarrassment. Messer Donato Barbadori denounced the papal officials for their faithlessness and duplicity. If Hawkwood invaded Tuscany, he declared, then his action would be interpreted as a direct papal assault, since the English captain was still in the church’s pay.*** The abbot sought to salvage something from the congress by suggesting that if payment were made immediately, Hawkwood might still be induced to defend Tuscany instead of ravaging it. With some asperity, the Sienese envoy

reported the reaction to this desperate maneuver: “It was now clear to all that even if the money were paid as a gift, the invasion would not be halted.” The delegates grew suspicious that the abbot had deliberately deluded them: that he had endeavored to extract money from their governments while knowing that a truce was imminent. It was suspected, too, that the meeting was a device to lull the Tuscans into a sense of false security, and that Hawkwood’s objective was the military conquest of Tuscany on behalf of the papacy. To strengthen these impressions among the delegates, the Florentine Signoria launched its own propaganda offensive. A citizen named Annibaldo described to the diplomats his experiences in Genoa as a member of a grain procurement commission, During his sojourn in the Ligurian port, three papal embassies visited that city. The doge, Domenico Fregoso, informed Annibaldo that

these emissaries had publicly urged the Genoese to maintain their independence with such fervor that he became suspicious of their motives. He then discovered that they were engaged in secret parleys with prominent citizens, in which they promised ecclesiastical offices in exchange for supporting papal schemes to annex Genoese territory. The ambassadors even approached the ingannato dal cardinale, e che come esso ci aveva dimandato e promesso cosi, in

diritta verita, aveva avuto dal cardinale, e di questo fece grandi saramenti, mostrandoci una memoria che aveva fatta dare in scriptura al detto cardinale de le dette cose. E di quello ch’era seguito, mostrd molto corrucciata. .. .” 184 Ibid, “. . . In prima, dolendosi de la triegua fatta, avendo egli fatte le demande che a llui erano piaciute e ancora le promesse fatte a questi comuni, le quali di sua volonta aveva ciascuno scripte a suoi comuni, né sera aspettato alcuna risposta dal loro .. . dicendogli ancora apertamente che ove avenisse che Messer Giovanni Agut cavalcasse o danneggiasse questi comuni, essendo al soldo

dela chiesa com’egl’é, che sarebbe malagevole a trar del animo de popoli di Toscana che cid non fusse operatione de commessarii di sancta chiesa, di che potrebbero seguire grandi scandali e pensieri, i quali mai non furono pit pensati.”

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THE BURGEONING CRISIS, 1371-1375

doge himself and his son Jacopo, offering them large estates during their lifetimes. Their arguments were persuasive: “They said that

they had an abundance [of land] in the Marches, the Duchy [of Spoleto], the Patrimony and Romagna, and pointed out that after the doge’s death, his sons would remain without any honor or means of livelihood beyond that of other citizens.” The doge angrily rebuffed these advances and requested Annibaldo to relate the incident to the Signoria, which in turn passed the information

on to the Tuscan communes.” Gregory’s emissaries in Florence labored futilely to restrain the

mounting hostility to the church. The abbot Berengar secretly called on the Sienese diplomats, assuring them that the pope held their government in special favor. He knew from many sources, the abbot declared, that the Florentines were angry with the pope and sought to block his objectives, but he urged the Sienese to remain aloof from these machinations, Answering Berengar with polite, noncommittal phrases, the envoys then reported the entire conversation to the Florentine Signoria. The priors exhibited a letter which they had received from the archbishop of Otranto, who had gone to Bologna to discuss the situation with Noellet. This letter reveals the degree to which the papal bureaucracy was riven by dissension. The archbishop professed himself to be a true friend of the Tuscan communes, and he warned the Signoria to be cautious in their negotiations with the abbot of Lézat. He had very limited knowledge of the situation, and his pronouncements to the commune did not accord with the statements he had made to Noellet.**®

The alleged deception practiced by the papal officials was apparently the decisive factor in shifting Florentine opinion firmly 185 This information is included in the dispatch of 12 June; Concistoro, 1786, f. 67r. 188 Ibid., 1786, 74r, 12 June. The summary of the archbishop’s letter to the

Signoria is of particular interest: “Poi ci mostrano essi priori una lettara, la quale lo mandava Messer l’archvescovo d’Otranto, el quale a preghiera Joro era

andato a Bologna per questi fatti, el quale secondo a Iloro parlare é molto amadore de le comunita di Toscana, e molto gli spiacciono queste operationi, e in quella lettara in sustantia si conteneva che esso era stato con Messer lo

cardinale [Noellet] e ragionato collui del ritenere questa gente con pagare questi comunie le XXV™ de fiorini, e che cid non poteva avere luogo. Anco diceva in esse lettare che ragionare con questo abbate [Berengar] non era sicuro,

perché esso o per none intendare pil o ppoco se non; aveva molte cose detto e al cardinale e a questi comunie contrarie e non corrispondentt Puna al altra.”

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THE BURGEONING CRISIS, 1371-1375

against the church. In the fragmentary records of the Consulte e Pratiche, a spokesman for the Twelve, Niccolé Ricoveri, advised the Signoria “to tell the bishop clearly and boldly the deception which has been practiced upon us.’*** Recounting these events in his diary, Simone Peruzzi, once a strong papal supporter, described

his own conversion to the camp of the church’s enemies. While Simone was in Bologna with his family, fleeing from the rigors of pestilence and famine, the abbot Berengar was in Florence,

“and he negotiated with the commune in bad faith.” Peruzzi claimed that the pope and Noellet had arranged with John Hawkwood to move his army to Rifredi, a village a few miles from the

city. “We were without troops, and in Florence there was food for only eight days. Had we trusted in the negotiations of the abbot of Lézat, which were fraudulently designed to delay [defense preparations|, we would have been lost. We would have been forced to throw ourselves into the hands of the rectors of the church.”***

Even before the truce was signed, communal authorities were aware of the potential danger from the companies. On 27 May, Cipriano Alberti had noted that the menace from Hawkwood’s army was very serious, “on account of the reduction [in the num-

ber] of citizens, as well as money and food.’ After the truce

was signed, however, this fear increased, stimulated by the sus- | picion that the commune had been duped. It was fed, too, by the 187 CP, 13, f. ror, 14 June: “Quod dicatur dicto domino episcopo clare et audacter deceptionem quam [lacuna] nos recepisse.” The bishop to whom reference is made is the bishop of Cluny, another papal envoy sent to Florence. The protocol is in very poor condition; there are no records for the period 27 May14 June. 188] Jibro di commercio dei Peruzzi, p. 522: “Istando a Bolongnia colla mia famiglia per chagione della moria al tempo della charestia, a Firenze ambasciadore del papa era uno abate di Lisaccie [Lézat], e trattava chol Commune nostro in fraude. Il chardinale di Santo Angielo che istava in Bolongnia [Noellet] e ’l

papa inn Avingnione avieno fermo chon messere Gianni Aghud e chon tutti i suoi Inghilesi, mostrando fossero isforzati da lloro, ci chavalchassero in sino in sulle porti; e dovieno essere il di di San Giovanni [24 June] in sulle mosse a Rifredi. Noi eravamo isproveduti di gente e in Firenze non avia che mangiare per otto di; afidavanci al trattato dell’abate di Lisaccie, ch’erano chose frodolent

290 |

per tenerci a bada; se questo fosse seguito, noi eravamo perdute per fame, e chonvenianci gittarci nella ghola de’ rettori della Chiesa. . . .” 189 CP, 13, f. 18r. In January the commune had warned Siena of the danger from the companies if peace between the papacy and the Visconti were concluded; Conctstoro, 1786, f. 3or.

THE BURGEONING CRISIS, 1371-1375

rumors of Hawkwood’s plans and movements. The English captain was said to be particularly hostile toward the Florentines, whom he believed to be responsible for the death of his brother. Reports from the camp emphasized the great size of his army and

the large number of recruits who joined him each day.” The dispatches of the Florentine envoys sent to treat with Hawkwood were not encouraging: “They are transporting bombards and iron assault machines, and they are a vast army, greater than was reported. According to their statements, they will conquer the cities [of Tuscany] through their dissensions, and they speak frequently of our [city], saying: “You are not united and you call each other Ghibellines. You will have much to occupy yourselves, particularly if peace is made between France and England, as we believe.’ They joke about our

commune and the others of Tuscany.” The fate of Florence, so its citizens believed, was not to be de-

cided in the palace of the Signoria, or in Bologna or Avignon, but in the military camp of the English soldier of fortune near Imola. There Hawkwood made known his truly exorbitant demands: the payment of 130,000 florins over a period of three months. Indicative of the sense of isolation and vulnerability which gripped the Florentines was the commune’s full acceptance of the condottiere’s fiscal demands, and the inordinate speed with which the agreement was reached. In a council meeting called on 16 June to debate Hawkwood’s ultimatum, the speakers, with one exception, urged the Signoria to come to terms with the English-

man immediately. Only the butcher, Antonio Martini, opposed the pact; he favored the defense of Florentine territory against the imminent invasion.’*” On 22 June the Sienese ambassadors reported the terms of the agreement to their government. In return for its massive expenditure, the commune obtained Hawkwood’s promise that he would not attack its possessions for five years. It was a costly bargain.” 140 These reports were transmitted to the Sienese diplomats by Florentine officials; Concistoro, 1786, ff. 50r, 74r. 141 “T ettere alla Signoria relative alla venuta in Toscana di Giovanni Acuto,” in Miscellanea fiorentina di storia e erudizione, 1, 172-73. 142 CP, 13, ff. 20r-20v. The protocol terminates at this crucial date. 148 Concistoro, 1788, f. 8r, 22 June. The text of the agreement is published by Gherardi, “Otto Santi,” doc. 6.

29]

THE BURGEONING CRISIS, 1371-1375

At this critical juncture, the Florentine authorities uncovered a plot to foment a rebellion in Prato, a city under the commune’s control. Two disgruntled residents of Prato, a notary and a friar, entered into negotiations with the castellan of Barga, a town in

papal territory near Bologna. Prato, they said, was ruled by Ghibellines, and they wished to deliver the city into papal hands.*“*

According to the plan devised by these malcontents, an uprising would be arranged to coincide with the approach of an ecclesi-

astical army. The castellan, acting as liaison agent between the | conspirators and Guillaume Noellet, informed them that the cardinal did not wish to participate in their scheme. However, this

official did inform the conspirators that two armed companies would soon be moving in close proximity to Prato, a broad hint that Noellet was not opposed to an independent uprising.**° The exposure of this conspiracy shocked the Florentines, who were already unnerved by the ordeal they had just gone through. Upon Ser Piero were focused all the fears, suspicions, and preju144Tn the record of Ser Piero’s inquisition was a copy of the document which the notary allegedly sent to the castellan: “Considerato lo avenemento del nostro

Sancto Patre, et como lo Comune di Firenza con tradementi se porta colla Sancta Acchiesa, lu modo c’é d’avere per |’Acchiesa una terra en Toschana, cid é Prato; dando ordene in prima, lo quale ordine pote stare secreto quanto bisogna. Et posi avere la decta terra, como l’uomo, a se senza fatiga, et non corre termino, dato prima l’ordine sopradicto. Lo secreto ¢ agevele. Le quali cose fa uno savio et soctile de spirito de la decta terra: et posso co lui ongni cosa fare como devoto

da Sancta Acchiesa, et nemicho del Comune di Firenza. La quale terra auta, per consequentia Firenze et Pistoia sonno assediate, et posi dire perdute. Et pero, se secretamente ad cio volete entendere, posi fare con grandissima honore et

prode de Sancta Acchiesa”; A. Gherardi, “Di un trattato per far ribellare al comune di Firenze la terra di Prato, nell’anno 1375,” ASI, ser. 3, x (1869), 2, 18. 145 “Cui fratri Nicholao dictus castellanus respondit et dixit: Quod Cardinalis Bononie non volebat actendere ad res eidem portatas, scriptas et narratas per dictum ser Pierum proditorem inquisitum. Sed dictus castellanus dixit eidem fratri Nicholao: “Vos cito habebitis compagnam in Mugello, deinde ipsa veniet in territorio terre Prati predicte. Et una altera compagnia veniet per Carfagnanam [Garfagnana] super territorio civitatis Pistorii’ ”; id¢d., 20-21. Some Florentines doubted whether a conspiracy had actually existed; Stefani, 752. In my opinion, there is strong evidence for its existence. Had the plot been fabricated by the war party, the architects would certainly have incorporated evidence of Noellet’s complicity into the record.

146 A Pratese merchant wrote to Francesco Datini in Avignon, 16 July: “Perche sono certo che lle male novelle e I’abominio delle chose mal fatto vanno

toste in qua e lla; so che sara chosta novelle del trattato che dovea essere a Prato”; R. Piattoli, “L’origine dei fondaci datiniani di Pisa e Genova,” Archivio storico pratese, vu (1927), 185.

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dices generated by the papal question in communal politics. The notary was regarded as the living symbol of the church’s betrayal; the treatment he received reflected the intensity of Florentine hostility toward its former patron. Interrogated on 28 June, Ser Piero was condemned to a death which was unusually brutal even by fourteenth century standards.**’ The chronicler, Morelli, reported that the notary died from the effects of torture before he reached the place of execution outside the Porta alla Guiustizia. His accomplice, the friar Niccold, suffered the same fate ten days later.***

On the morrow of Ser Piero’s death, a new group of priors entered office, headed by the standard-bearer of justice, Luigi Aldo-

brandini, an inveterate foe of the oligarchy and the papacy.” Under the direction of this Signoria, the commune prepared to engage in war with the church. The government passed two stringent anticlerical provisions, formed an alliance with Bernabo Visconti, and appointed a commission (Ozto di balia) to direct the

war effort.” Even before this Signoria assumed office, four citizens with pronounced antipapal sentiments had been authorized (27 June) to conclude leagues with or against any foreign state, at their discretion." These officials sought to create a federation of Tuscan communes, and they spread antipapal propaganda throughout central Italy. Typical of their methods was a letter sent on 22 July 147 Fis punishment was the most barbarous that I have seen described in the judicial records for this period: “Quod prefatum ser Pierum proditorem super quodam veyculo firmiter ligatum, cum tenagleis ferreis et ardentibus, a palatio nostre residentie usque ad locum iustitie consuetum, per loca consueta civitatis Florentie, duci, trahi et actenagliari faciat; et in dicto locho iustitie ipsum cum capite inferius in terram implantari—et id quod de eius persona a terra supererit totaliter amputari faciat”; Gherardi, “Trattato,” 25. 148 Diario del Monaldt, p. 507. 149 Stefani, 750. Among the priors were two artisans (Geri di Chele, inn-

keeper, and Branca d’Amerigo, butcher), two “new men” from the greater guilds (Maffeo di Vanni and Piero Bini), and Agnolo Covoni, whose patrician family had been consistently opposed to the oligarchy. For Luigi Aldobrandini’s political position, see Stefani, 731, 790. 150 See below, Ch. 7, Part 1. 151 The provision authorizing the appointment of the commissioners (sindact) is in Prov., 63, ff. 59v-6ov, 27 June 1375. The names of the commissioners are

recorded in LF, 40, f. 148v: Messer Donato Barbadori, Messer Donato Aldighieri, Bardo Altoviti, and Salvestro de’ Medici.

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to Piero Gambacorti, the head of the Pisan government: “With diligent care we have kept watch over the perils confronting you, and we have seized upon a report, from a trustworthy and reliable

source, that a certain abbot [Gerard du Puy?] is attempting to subvert the city of Pisa in the name of the pastors of the church.”””

In Lucca it was reported that Florentine agents were recruiting troops who had previously been employed by the Visconti; these forces were to be used “against the church and her allies."

The commune formally proclaimed its alienation from the Holy See by entering into a defensive alliance with Bernabo Visconti on 24 July. This pact provided for a joint military force of 2,350 lances with subsidiary corps of archers, balestrieri, and foot soldiers, for the mutual defense of the signatories.*** To dispel any doubts about the scope and intent of the league, the Signoria wrote

a clarifying letter to Bernabé on 13 August. “. . . Since in the pacts of the league no specific mention was made of the pope or

the emperor, we declare that this league . . . is to be extended to the pope and the emperor, and against them.’”*** Rarely is the language of diplomacy so explicit or unequivocal.

Thus was consummated one of the most radical revolutions in Florentine history. In the diplomatic sphere it constituted a rejection of a century-old tradition of loyalty and devotion to the 152 Missive, 16, £. Ir, 22 July 1375. On 16 July a Florentine emissary came to Lucca to inform the authorities of that city of the league between Florence and the Visconti; Fumi, Lucca, 11, 2, doc. 516. For the text of a letter sent to all Tuscan communes by the Signoria on 25 July, see Gherardi, “Otto Santi,” doc. 14. 158 Fumi, Lucca, 11, 2, docs. 2003, 2004.

154 The text of this alliance is not extant, but the news of the pact was immediately circulated throughout Italy. See the letter sent by Lucca to Noellet in Bologna, 28 July; Fumi, Lucca, u, 2, doc. 2005. On 29 July the Signoria sent a congratulatory message to Bernabo; Gherardi, “Otto Santi,” doc. 18. That negotiations for an alliance had begun much earlier is proved by a letter sent by Bernabé to his ambassador in Florence, on 11 July; Diario d’anonimo fiorentino, in Cronache dei secolt xtit e xiv, pp. 492-93. 155 Gherardi, “Otto Santi,” doc. 22: “Quoniam plerumque veri sensus subtilitate nimia pervertuntur, ne possit in futurum dubium aliquod exoriri occasione lige, quam cum fraternitate vestra contraximus die xxiv mensis iulii proxime elapsi; quod, quamvis in actis eiusdem lige nulla fuerit de Papa vel Imperatore facta mentio singularis; nos tamen eamdem ligam ad ipsos Papam et Impera-

torem, et contra ipsos cum suis modis et capitulis extendi et intelligi tenore presentium declaramus. ...” The document is copied in Missive, 16, £. 5v, and also in CP, 12, f. rr.

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Holy See. It represented an effort by the “new men” to abandon certain anachronistic features of the commune’s foreign relations, and to adjust its policy to changed conditions.*** Such a course required a vast expenditure and a deep involvement in peninsular diplomacy. Its revolutionary nature is emphasized by the fact that it was led by men who had previously been committed to a policy

of economy and isolation.’ But this was also a revolution of internal politics, a critical phase of the struggle between the old

order and the new, which had continued without interruption since 1343. The attack on the papacy was a direct assault by the gente nuova upon that complex of ideals and principles whose visible symbol was the palace of the Parte Guelfa. If we interpret the war as the result of certain fundamental de-

velopments in the history of Italy and the papacy in the late trecento,’* we can see the events which precipitated it in their proper perspective. They become mere incidents, whose function was catalytic, not causative. The course of papal diplomacy in the spring of 1375 did serve to magnify the fears of church objectives

which had been germinating in Tuscany for nearly a decade. Mollat’s recent investigations have shown that these apprehensions were as strong in Siena as in Florence.*” But long before the war’s outbreak the republic had become estranged from the papacy, and

Florence’s failure to cooperate with the curia was a factor in the Visconti truce and the unleashing of Hawkwood’s army. There is some evidence to suggest that the antipapal forces in Florence utilized and manipulated events—the grain shortage, the truce, the Hawkwood invasion, the Prato conspiracy—to exacerbate the antagonisms which already existed, to create sentiment which was receptive to war. The Florentine accusation that Hawkwood was a papal agent 156 There are striking parallels between Florence’s abandonment of Guelfism and Pisa’s diplomatic revolution early in the fourteenth century, when it forsook its “Ghibelline” orientation for a policy based upon friendship with Florence; C. Violante, “Per la storia economica e sociale di Pisa nel Trecento,” Bullettino

dell’Istituto Storico Italiano per il medio evo e Archivio Muratortano, uxvi (1954), 120ff. 157 See above, pp. 292-93. 158 Concerning the war’s implications for Italian diplomacy, see the perceptive

comments of N. Valeri, L’Italia nell’eta dei principati, pp. 200-04. 159 Mollat, “Relations politiques de Grégoire XI avec les Siennois et les Florentins,” 335-76.

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sent to conquer the city is not corroborated by documentary evidence.*®” Reports did circulate that the Florentines had been informed of the church’s plan to annex Tuscany, but their veracity is highly suspect, since the commune did not publicize the details of the plot." However, if papal officials cannot be convicted of a conspiracy to destroy Tuscan liberty, they may legitimately be charged with ineptness and bad judgment. By intervening constantly in Tuscan disputes, they invited suspicion and recrimination. Noellet’s failure to coordinate his truce negotiations with the mission of Gregory’s ambassadors to Florence is an extreme ex-

ample of administrative bungling. The primary defect in the papacy’s Italian policy was not avarice or a lust for power, the crimes usually attributed to the ecclesiastical officials. The most

| glaring error was ignorance, a chronic failure to comprehend the | intricacies and involutions of Italian politics. The archbishop of Otranto touched upon the core of the papal difficulty when he described his colleague, the French abbot of Lézat, as a man “who knows nothing or very little.”*** This was the fatal weakness. 160 With rare exceptions, Italian chroniclers accepted the theory that Hawkwood had been ordered to attack and conquer Florence by papal officials; cf. Chronicon Placentinum, RRIISS, xvi, cols. 520-21; Cronaca Riminese, RRIISS, xv, col. 915; Sozomen Pistoriensis, Specimen Historiae, RRIISS, xvi, col. 1094. For a critical view of Florentine policy, see Le croniche di Giovanni Sercamlt Lucchese, rubs. 250, 251. 161 See the statement of a Sienese chronicler: “E’ Fiorentini presero el vescovo

di Narni e tennerlo sostenuto, e sepero da lui tutto l’ordine e trattato che la Chiesa tenea di tutta Toscana”; Cronica di Donato di Neri, 659. An anonymous chronicler stated that Hawkwood himself had informed the commune of papal

designs on Florentine territory; “. . . I gran chortigiani chol papa, i quali desiderano la distruzione di Firenze, feciono pensiero chome aveano ridotto Perugia sotto la chiesa, chosi fare de’ fiorentini, e cierto venia loro fatto, se non fusse la benivolenzia de M. Giovanni Aghuto, ch’amava i fiorentini e in seghretto gli avisava nel’loro pericholi. . . . Ancora lo leghato di Bologna tenne trattato di torci Prato e doveavi chavalcare M. Giovanni Aghutto, che di tutto n’aviso partichulari de reggimenti e furono presi dua monachi che teneano manno a detto trattato, e furono attavagliati, e doveva detto M. Giovanni darci il guasto della richolta, e rimanea la terra afamata, e perd detta chortesie fatte del detto Aghuto, ebbe dal chomune in pit volte CXXX milia fiorini, e furono molto bene spessi che ci levo da tali pericholi”; Manoscritti, 222, f£. 246. 162 See above, p. 289, n. 136. Franco Sacchetti summed up the Italian opinion of the papal bureaucracy in one of his Novelle, 41. In the autumn of 1375 the condottiere Rodolfo da Camerino visited Gerard du Puy, who had just received the cardinal’s hat. Rodolfo’s comment: “Avendoci fatto male, se’ fatto cardinale; se ci avessi fatto peggio, saresti fatto papa.”

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CHAPTER VII

54Saints ° 99 Ghe War of the ce “Eight 1375-1378

The War Within During the war with the papacy, the metamorphosis of the Florentine political leadership reached its climax. Since 1372 the

power of the oligarchic faction had steadily dwindled, and the predominance of the gente nuova and the liberal patricians was securely established.

The personnel records of the Signoria and the colleges for the war years provide conclusive proof of the numerical superiority of the “new men” in communal politics. Four of the priors who entered office in July 1375 were from old families, but two of these patricians, Agnolo Covoni and Luigi Aldobrandini, were enemies of the Guelf hierarchy, and therefore strong supporters

of the war. They were the natural leaders of the gente nuova among their colleagues in the Signoria: the innkeeper, Geri di Chele, the butcher, Branca d’Amerigo, the merchant, Piero Bini, and the draper, Maffeo di Vanni.’ This pattern was repeated in succeeding priorates. The gente nuova regularly constituted a

majority, and the patrician representatives invariably included one or two opponents of the oligarchy.’ In the colleges, too, the old families had lost strength. Thus the Twelve buon’uomini in office at the war’s outbreak included a stonemason, a cuirass maker,

two druggists, a goldsmith, and only three patricians, none of whom was associated with the conservative faction.’ Although a 1 Cronaca fiorentina di Marchtonne di Coppo Stefani, RRIISS, new ser., Xxx, Part 1, 750. The prior lists for the war years are in ibid., 762, 778, 785.

2During the war, the average patrician representation in the Signoria was forty per cent. In January 1377 seven members of old families entered the priorate; Stefani, 774. Of this number, however, only four (Antonio Ridolfy, Raimondino de’ Vecchietti, Priore Baldovinetti, and Migliore Guadagni) belonged to the oligarchic faction, while three others (Filippo Capponi, Marco Alberti, and Bernardo Covoni) strongly supported the war and incurred the enmity of the Parte hierarchy. Four months later (May 1377) only one patrician, Giovanni Magalotti, sat in the Signoria. 8 ASF, Manoscritti, 542, no pag. The patriciate’s share of both colleges was forty per cent.

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handful of these artisans and small merchants who filled the executive offices may have been oligarchic sympathizers, most were hostile to the papacy, the domestic clergy, and the aristocrats

who controlled the Parte Guelfa. Only with their votes and their

support could the commune have embarked upon war with the church. The magnates, once influential in the formulation of communal

policy, had been reduced to political impotence. Their share of the minor offices had shrunk, and their voices were rarely heard in Pratiche sessions.* The absence of Albizzi and Ricci names from

the protocols was a reminder of the disfranchisement of these families, whose members had once figured so prominently in the regime. Other great popolano houses with oligarchic sympathies still participated in the government; the Strozzi, Corsini, Rucellai, and Castiglionchi entered the Signoria and made speeches in the deliberative assemblies. But their influence was limited. The war stifled free and open discussion, and the oligarchs feared to express their true opinions on issues connected with the conflict.° Their prejudices notwithstanding, these men were often summoned to perform arduous tasks for the republic. Embassies sent to negoti# There is a complete record of the personnel in minor communal offices from

September 1375 through December 1377, in Tratte, 219, 220. There was a noticeable decline in the number of magnates in the contado offices, the vicariates

and castellanies, since the early years of the regime. Between 15 January and 15 February 1377, only seven magnates were included among the ninety nine men extracted to fill administrative posts in the contado; Tratte, 220, ff. 7or-85r. Significant, too, among these contado officials is the inclusion of such names as Cino Ciati, wineseller; Luto, saddlemaker; Nuccio di Matteo, shieldmaker; and Giovanni di Ser Dato, furrier. Lower guildsmen had not been selected for these posts in the 1350’s; see above, pp. 106-07, 122-23.

5 A scrutiny held on 29 November 1376 to select eligibles for the important

post of governor of Pistoia illustrates the political decline of the old order; Tratte, 59, £. 338r. Casting ballots in this scrutiny were the members of the Signoria, the colleges, and the Parte captaincy. Among those validated for the office were several leaders of the popular faction: Tommaso degli Strozzi (32 votes of 43 cast), Piero Aldobrandini (32), Luigi Aldobrandini (39), Tommaso del Palagio (32), Niccold Giugni (31), Andrea Salviati (35), Francesco Rinuccini (29), and Giovanni Magalotti (37). Oligarchs fared badly, even though they could expect to receive the votes of the Parte captains: Lapo da Castiglionchio obtained only 14 votes of 43 cast, Messer Filippo Corsini (12), Piero Soderini

(17), Benghi Buondelmonti (15), Messer Pazzino degli Strozzi (16), Carlo degli Strozzi (20), all short of the two-thirds majority required for nomination. 6 Pratiche debates were rarely held during the war years. The Eight had assumed the major responsibility for the formulation and execution of policy.

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ate with Gregory XI were staffed by distinguished members of the oligarchic bloc—Pazzino degli Strozzi, Michele Castellani, Lapo da Castiglionchio—who were presumed to have more influence in the curia than men with records of vociferous opposition to the church.’

The most influential figures in communal politics were those patricians whose persistent hostility to the papacy and the Guelf hierarchy had catapulted them into positions of leadership. Three from this category were selected to the committee of eight men

(Otto di balia) who directed the war effort: Tommaso degli Strozzi, Andrea Salviati, and Giovanni Magalotti.® Others held office in the commissions which supervised the confiscation of

ecclesiastical property: Giovanni Capponi, Antonio Tolosini, Tommaso Soldani, Luigi da Quarata, Giovanni del Bene, and Filippo Rondinelli.° Certain members of this ruling elite distinguished themselves in Pratiche debates (Salvestro de’ Medici, Filippo Capponi, Vanni da Quarata), or through their diplomatic services (Messer Donato Barbadori, Messer Donato Aldighieri, Messer Alessandro dell’Antella).

The war also provided many “new men” with the opportunity to enhance their status and prestige. Membership in the Otto di balia, for example, brought several parvenus from relative obscurity into the limelight, and endowed them with a measure of fame and popularity which none of their peers had ever enjoyed in Florence. To such exalted heights were raised the druggist, Giovanni Dini, the /anaiuolo, Guccio Gucci, and the grain merchant from the lower guilds, Giovanni di Mone. The gente nuova also served in other important war offices and were sent on major diplomatic missions. When Benci di Cione, a stonemason, and 7 There is a list of important embassies to the curia in Memorie storiche cavate da un libro di ricordt scritto da Naddo di Ser Nepo di Ser Gallo da Montecatini, in Delizte degli eruditi toscani, xvii, 5, 7, 9-10. 8 On the establishment of the Eight, see above, p. 293. The members of this commission are listed in Stefani, 752. Tommaso’s father Marco degli Strozzi was an opponent of the Parte hierarchy; see above, pp. 161-62. Magalotti had been a leader of the 1372 attack against the Albizzi faction, and thus incurred the enmity of Parte leaders; see above, pp. 152, 172, 191; and S. Ammirato, [storie fiorentine, I, 690.

2 Por the personnel of these commissions, see A. Gherardi, “La guerra dei florentini con papa Gregorio XI detta la guerra degli Otto Santi,” Archivio storico italiano, ser. 3, v (1867), it, 115, Nn. 7.

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Niccold Delli, a pork butcher, were invested with the dignity of communal ambassadors, this constituted a landmark in the democratization of Florentine politics.”° A major objective of the communal leadership was to stimulate

sympathy and support for the war in both foreign and domestic spheres. The official justification of Florence’s belligerency was contained in the letters which the republic’s chancellor, Coluccio Salutati, sent to governments throughout Europe in the late months of 1375. In these diplomatic messages, the chancellor described the plight of Florence, menaced by a predatory ecclesiastical bureauc-

racy. Writing to the Angevin prince, Carlo of Durazzo, Salutati noted that Pope Gregory’s anger had been turned against the commune after its refusal to join him in his unjust war against the Visconti.’ Coluccio then listed the commune’s specific grievances against the church: the refusal to provide grain for the faminestricken city, the plot to seize Prato, and, finally, Hawkwood’s military assault, which had been instigated by papal officials. When addressing Italian states, Salutati employed his rhetorical gifts to extol the virtues of freedom. In his famous letter to the Romans in January 1376, he cited the passion for liberty which the inhabitants of that city had always possessed, and which in ancient times had impelled them toward world domination. The grave menace to Italian freedom, the chancellor argued, was the horde of French prelates who ‘had crossed the Alps to loot the peninsula: “How sad to see noble Italy, whose right it is to rule other nations, itself suffer slavery! What a sight to see this abject barbarism seize upon Latium with ferocious cruelty, creating havoc and preying upon the Latins! Therefore, arise .. . and expel this abomination from Italian territory, and protect those who desire liberty. Do not allow these Gallic devourers to oppress your

Italy with such cruelty!” Salutati’s rationale for the war obtained general acceptance in Florence, and it was incorporated into the city’s historical legend. 10 Benci was sent to Arezzo in November 1375; Niccolo Delli accompanied two

other citizens, Donato Acciaiuoli and Tommaso Soldani, to Bologna in June 1376; Balie, 12, ff. 31r, 98v.

11 The text of this letter is printed in A. Gherardi, “Otto Santi,” ASI, ser. 3, vi (1867), it, 234-36.

12 This letter is published by L. von Pastor, History of the Popes from the Close of the Middle Ages (St. Louis, 1902-1953), 1, 366.

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Not even the high priest of Guelfism, Lapo da Castiglionchio, attempted publicly to refute the chancellor’s accusations against the papal bureaucracy."* Some evidence concerning the state of public opinion is contained in a letter written in November 1375 by a young patrician, Gherardino di Niccolé Gherardini Gianni, to his friend in Bruges, Tommaso de’ Bardi. The commune, Gherardino wrote, “is prepared to impose a loan every day, if this proves necessary to defend our liberty against those treasonous

pastors of the Holy Church. Their rule is a monstrous tyranny, and everyone in this city should be prepared to sacrifice his property and his person to maintain his freedom and to avoid falling

into their hands. ... In those provinces where they rule, there is no woman whose person or family is not disgraced. The Florentines think of this, those who have mothers, sisters, wives or daughters, who might fall into the hands of these clerical traitors, or those who supply them, or their soldiers or their Englishmen, who have become too arrogant in the church dominions and think

that all these women belong to them. The Florentines are not disposed to suffer these indignities.””* This crude anticlericalism was doubtless a repetition of propa-

ganda circulated by the government to stimulate support for the war effort.” A more sophisticated analysis of the war’s import came from the pens of two renowned clerics: the Vallambrosan

hermit, Giovanni dalle Celle, and the Augustinian humanist, Luigi Marsili. Both men sanctioned and even applauded the struggle against the papacy. Marsili expressed his opinions in a 18 Lapo made no reference to the war’s origins in his Epistola, nor did his son

comment on the question in discussing his father’s career and his exile from Florence, 1378-1381, Epistola o sia ragionamento di Messer Lapo da Castighionchio, pp. 138-48. For the accepted views of papal culpability, see G. Morelli, Ricordz, pp. 315-18, written about 1400; and a century later, Machiavelli, Le istorie fiorentine, 111, Ch. 7; in Tutte le opere storiche e letterarie di Niccolé Machiavelli, ed. G. Mazzoni and M. Casella (Florence, 1929), p. 449. 14 The letter is printed in Brucker, “Un documento fiorentino sulla guerra, sulla finanza e sulla amministrazione pubblica (1375),” ASI, cxv (1957), 171-76. For the quotation, see ibid., 171-72. 1® For the transcription of a poem narrating the papal delicts which brought on the war, see Diario d’anonimo fiorentino dall’anno 1358 al 1389, in Cronache det secoli xill e x1V, pp. 315-22. Gherardi suggested that the poem was recited orally before Florentine audiences. Franco Sacchetti also composed a diatribe against Gregory XI; Rime di Franco Sacchetti contro papa Gregorio XI, ed. G. Sforza (Lucca, 1868).

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letter written from Paris (August 1375) to his friend, the /anasuolo, Guido del Palagio. The Augustinian had just learned of the commune’s antipapal operations, and he strongly supported “this blessed enterprise” upon which the regime had embarked.” In scathing language Marsili denounced “the avaricious, dissolute, importunate, famished Limousins” who usurped the legitimate authority of secular powers, and who were seeking to reduce Italy to servitude. He asserted that his recently deceased master, Petrarch, would have been sympathetic with Florence’s action,

and to prove his contention, he copied three famous sonnets in which the eminent humanist denounced the evils of the Avignon court. Marsili criticized the ecclesiastical estate for its encroachment upon the lay sphere. He quoted with approval the manner in which the Germans treated their clergy: “Germans are so wise that their priests are not Limousins, but all come from Germany. They obey them to the extent that appears fitting, and no more. If a bishop, even a German, comes from Avignon who does not please them, their methods of handling them have been demonstrated on several occasions. . . .” Marsili considered an unjust excommunication to be invalid, and no cause for apprehension. God would help the Florentines, he asserted, because they were fighting to cleanse and purify his corrupt church.” The Augustinian thus enlarged the target against which the commune’s hostility could be directed: not exclusively the French

prelates in the papal states, but the entire clerical caste. In his view, Florence’s war was a crusade against all abuses and defects in the ecclesiastical order. This opinion received a sympathetic 16 The letters from these two clerics to Guido del Palagio are printed in F. Tocco, “I Fraticelli,” ASI, ser. 5, xxxv (1905), 348-51. On Giovanni dalle Celle, see P. Cividali, “Il beato Giovanni dalle Celle,” Memorie della R. Accademia dei Lincet. Classe di sctenze morali, storiche e filologiche, ser. 5, x11 (1907), 353477-

17“ se altri dicesse: come si fara si siamo exscomunicati, dico che bene se a torto, e se male si facesse, non fia per la excomunicazione, che ¢ pena non colpa, ma per gli peccati delli uomini per li quali si vive male et muore peggio. Ma dico io dall’ altro lato come si fara, se Firenze sia de preti, che saranno servi

e anco poi excommunicati, e spetialmente chi avera bella moglie o altra congiunta di cui la guardia gli tocchi”; Tocco, 350. See also Giovanni dalle Celle’s comment: “Le scomunicazioni sono fatte per coloro che peccano mortalmente, et pero tieni certamente che niuno innocente puo essere scomunicato, e se pure fosse scomunicato, non vale appo iddio, il quale suole seguitare la sentenza di pastori, i quali lighino giustamente con legittima cagione”; zbid., 348.

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hearing in Florence. The proselytizing activities of the Fraticelli had convinced many, particularly among the lower classes, that the pope was anti-Christ, and that all priests who had been ordained since the pontificate of John XXII were holding their offices

illegally. These doctrines had become so widespread in the city that the Signoria had scheduled a debate between the orthodox clergy and the Fraticelli, an ideological contest which was cancelled at the insistence of the bishop.”** The opinions advanced by Marsili and Giovanni dalle Celle may

also have been decisive in persuading such pious Florentines as Guido del Palagio, Giorgio di Guccio Gucci, and Ser Lapo Mazzei that the war could be justified before God.*® Certainly, these arguments would have found favor with men like the merchant, Buonaccorso Pitti; in commenting upon the war in his chronicle, Pitti referred to “the evil clerics who lived in that time, in whom neither before nor since have I ever seen any virtue.””° If distin-

guished clerics commended this struggle, then it was safe for the layman to denounce the crimes and vices of the clergy, not only the French prelates in the papal states, but the unpopular canon or priest who lived comfortably from the revenues of his 18Qn the Fraticelli movement in Florence, see D. Douie, The Nature and the Effect of the Heresy of the Fraticelli (Manchester, 1932), pp. 226-28, 232-40;

and M. Becker, “Florentine Politics and the Diffusion of Heresy in the Trecento: a Socio-Economic Inquiry,” Speculum, xxx1v (1959), 60-75. The reference to the cancelled debate is in a letter written by members of the sect to Giovanni dalle Celle: “Tutt’ i maestri di Firenze furono a San Piero Scheraggio per comandamento de’ signori, e il vescovo pregé e fe’ pregare che non dovessoro disputare; e partironsi come pietre sanza dire parola”; I] paradiso degli Alberti, ed. A. Wesselofsky (Bologna, 1867), 1, 1, 350. 19 Guido, Giorgio, and Ser Lapo were all devotees of Giovanni dalle Celle. On their relations with the hermit, see Cividali, pp. 383-87. On the friendship between Guido and Ser Lapo, see I. Origo, The Merchant of Prato, pp. 142-43, 182. It is significant that Guido and Giorgio were closely connected with leading figures in the regime. Guido’s father, a prominent politician, was sympathetic

to the popular faction; he was knighted by the Ciompi in July 1378; Stefani, 795. Giorgio Gucci was the son of Guccio di Dino Gucci, one of the “Eight Saints.”

20 |. Malvagi cherici ch’erano per quello tempo, i quali mai né prima né poi vidi buoni”; Cronica di Buonaccorso Pitti, ed. A. Bacchi della Lega (Bologna,

1905), p. 38. This passage was deleted from the edition published by Manni in 1720, Pitti was no friend of the gente nuova; he later conspired against the regime which governed Florence from 1378 to 1382.

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benefice, who complained about the regime’s persecution of the church, and who was suspected of oligarchic sympathies.” The domestic clergy immediately received notice of their involvement in the conflict against the papacy. T'wo provisions, enacted on

28 June and 8 July, established a commission, known as the Ufficiali de’ preti, with authority to levy forced loans upon all individuals and societies owning property or receiving income in Florentine territory. These officials were authorized to sequester property if necessary.” Stefani noted that the laws were enacted so that “the commune should not pay that which the pastors of

the church had wrongly forced the Florentines to give Messer John Hawkwood.” The chronicler reported that the clergy, “by force or by love,” contributed some go,ooo florins toward this obligation.”

Appended to the July provision authorizing clerical taxation was another measure, which carried further the struggle against the internal enemy. This law renewed the attack on the rights and privileges of the Florentine church, which had first been launched in the 1340's but had since been suspended in response to energetic papal protests. The preamble to this measure read: “The episcopal sees of Florence and Fiesole are occasionally filled by Florentine

citizens. . .. Members of these episcopal families, inflated with power and pride, frequently commit crimes and perpetrate extortions, under the guise of justice, against the people of the city.” In future, if a Florentine citizen accepted either of these ecclesiastical dignities, his family would be placed in the magnate ranks, thereby ineligible for the Signoria. Even harsher penalties were prescribed for episcopal families who were already magnazz: their members would be designated as rebels, thus subject to execution 21 One of the most violent outbursts of anticlerical sentiment recorded in the communal records occurred in January 1371. A magnate, Jacopo di Bartolomeo degli Agolanti, was accused of denouncing the famed Dominican preacher, Fra

Domenico da Peccioli, in these terms: “O frate, bugerone! O huomo di mala condizione! Credi tu che io non sappi che tu sei? Tu tiene molte bagasscie e dio lo sa!” Att del Esecutore degli Ordinamenti della Gtustizia, 619, f. 23r, 17 January 1371. On Fra Domenico, see S. Orlandi, “Necrologio” di S. Maria Novella, 11, 58, 89, 538.

22 These provisions are summarized in Gherardi, “Otto Santi,” docs. 7, 12. 23 Stefani, 752.

24 This provision was published by Panella, “La guerra degli Otto Santi e le vicende della lega contro i vescovi,” ASI, xcrx (1941), 7, 45-47.

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and the confiscation of property. Anyone who protested that this provision violated ecclesiastical liberty or canon law, or who criticized it in any manner, was to be fined one thousand florins. The passage of this provision by substantial margins (130-39 and 88-32) was proof that resentment against the alliance between the patriciate and the higher clergy had not abated. Although this law did not apply to the current occupants of these sees, it effectively excluded the aristocracy from these benefices in future. The

measure was thus a two-pronged attack by the popular forces against their domestic adversaries: the church and the oligarchy.”

Its promulgation supports the conclusion that the war was launched not solely as a response to a military or diplomatic threat, but also as a solution to an internal crisis. The oligarchy suffered further buffets at the hands of its enemies in the early months of the war. Patricians who had been serving in the papal administration were ordered to return home; those

who ignored this summons paid a heavy penalty for their disobedience. In November 1375 Francesco di Antonio degli Albizzi was fined 3000 lire for accepting the vicariate of Todi from Gerard du Puy.** Messer Tassino Donati was denounced for remaining in the abbot’s employment in Perugia: “May he be whipped to death,

he and any other citizen who thus betrays his city!” exclaimed one chronicler.” The colleges also issued a sharp warning to 25In its assault upon the rights and privileges of the Florentine church, the commune passed legislation which limited the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts, excluded clerics from interference in usury cases, and licensed Jewish pawnbrokers in the contado; M. Becker, “Some Economic Implications of the Conflict Between Church and State in Trecento Florence,” Mediaeval Studies, XxI (1959), 14. There had been a revival of anticlerical legislation in 1373 and 1374, coinciding with the abasement of the oligarchic faction. See the provision of January 1373, prohibiting clerics accused of assault from seeking sanctuary in churches; Provvisiont, 60, f. 189v; and another law of June 1374, which limited ecclesiastical privileges with respect to property ownership; Prov., 62, ff. 76r-77v. 26 Atu del Podesta, 2798, f. 106r, 6 November 1375. 27 Diario d’anonimo, p. 305. However, Tassino was absolved by the courts of the charge that he had been in papal service; AP, 2805, f. 18r, 31 May 1376.

Some Florentines prudently resigned from papal offices. In October 1375, Gregory XI wrote to Noellet, asking him to seek a replacement for Filippo Corsini, who had refused the post of vicar of Urbino; Lettres secrétes et curiales du pape Grégoire XI (1370-1378), doc. 3766. The pope also tried to find other employment for some of his Florentine followers; in November 1375 he wrote to Queen Joanna of Naples, asking her to provide an office for Alessio di Pepo degli Albizzi, whose father had recently died, “recedens ex curia”; zbid., doc. 3847.

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judicial officials, forbidding them to entertain any petition from

men who had been declared magnates for crimes committed against popolant.”* Since it had been so closely identified with the

papacy, the Parte Guelfa was particularly vulnerable to harassment. In December the captains presented an innocuous petition to the Signoria, requesting permission to sell a house. Rejected by the Council of the Popolo, it was later submitted five times before it was finally accepted in March 1376.” Perhaps fearing that any vocal opposition would only provoke further reprisals, the minority of loyal Guelfs who regarded the war as a calamity remained discreetly silent during the early stages of the conflict. No word of criticism against the commune’s foreign policy was inscribed in Consulte e Pratiche protocols; these records

| would suggest that the war was universally popular in the city.*° | It is true that many conservative patricians, formerly associated with the Parte hierarchy and the Albizzi faction, sincerely supported the war, either convinced of the justice of the Florentine

cause, or persuaded that their primary loyalty was to their native city. Simone Peruzzi belonged to this category,” as did the anonymous author of a chronicle, identified by Davidsohn as a

| member of the Machiavelli family.** The Machiavelli were patri-

| cians of ancient lineage, and in this period they were zealous Guelf partisans. In his chronicle the anonimo frequently expressed

his devotion to the Parte and its principles. Nevertheless, he strongly supported the war, and one of his favorite expressions

was: “In honor of God, and misfortune and death to the evil pastors, amen!” 28 Consulte e Pratiche, 14, ff. 119-11Vv.

29 Tibri Fabarum, 40, ff. 163r, 17or, 172r, 173r, 174r. 80 There are no records for those crucial weeks in the summer and fall of 1375; the Consulte e Pratiche protocols resume again in December. 81 Peruzzi proclaimed his conversion to antipapalism in his ricordanze; Il libro di commercio det Peruzzi, p. 522. 82 See R. Davidsohn, “L’avo di Niccolo Machiavelli cronista fiorentina,” AST, xem (1935), #4, 35-47. I accept Davidsohn’s argument that the author of the

chronicle was a member of the Machiavelli family, although I question his specific identification of the writer as Buoninsegna, from a single passage, Diario d’anonimo, p. 359. In my opinion, any member of the Machiavelli family could have written that passage, and the chronicle. See, for example, the intimate details of an incident involving another Machiavelli, Guido; ibid., p. 312. 88 Tbid., pp. 306, 342. For the chronicler’s devotion to the Parte, see Davidsohn, 41-42.

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But there were dissidents. Some Florentines, even though convinced of the papacy’s culpability, still opposed the war because

it invited ecclesiastical penalties which would endanger their souls.** Others could not stomach an alliance with the Ghibelline;

Simone Peruzzi noted that the proposal to form a league with Bernabd Visconti provoked intense controversy in the councils.” From the votes on the key war measures, one may estimate that one-quarter of the electorate disapproved of the commune’s belligerent policy in these early months.** Pro-war statements by such arciguelfi as Lapo da Castiglionchio and Filippo Corsini must be interpreted as prudent genuflections to majority opinion, not as manifestations of their true sentiments.”’

Thus behind the facade of solidarity lay the reality of a city divided, its antipathies exacerbated by the war. In the fullest sense,

the conflict was a partisan issue. To a friend who cited internal discord as a source of Florentine weakness, Salutati had replied stoutly: “I, who attend the secret council sessions every day, have

always witnessed the most perfect concord, and you should 84 For a rare expression of this sentiment, written after the Ciompi revolution, see the comment of one citizen, identified by Scaramella as Alamanno Acciaiuoli: “Per lo peccato commeso contro la santa Chiesa d’Iddio, perché non rimanesse

impunita, essendosi per li mali cittadini di Firenze fatto la impresa contro a quella, di fare ribellare tante cittade e castella . . . € poi suseguentemente di vendere le possessioni e beni eclesiastici, tanti danari quanti se ne trasseno, e li obro’brii e vituperii e le ingiurie che tutto di si faceano nelle persone eclesiastiche; promise Iddio di dare questa disciplina a questa nostra citta”; Cronache e memorie sul tumulto det Ciompi, 18. Both Giovanni dalle Celle and Luigi Marsili referred to the existence of individuals who favored the church, or who were disturbed by anticlerical opinions. Thus Giovanni’s comment to Guido del Palagio: “Molte cose ti arei detto di queste cose fi.e. excommunication] se non se che io temo che la lettera non venisse alle mani di coloro che amano poco il buono stato di codesta citta”; Tocco, 348. And Marsili: “Avvisovi che questa parte della lettera non veggiano gli semplici che ne piglierebbero schandalo, e se del vostro conoscimento non mi fossi fidato non ve ne avrei parlato”; ibid., 351.

85 Tibro di commercto det Peruzzi, p. 522. 86 The votes on four key provisions (creating a commission to make alliances, establishing the Otto dz balia, taxing the clergy and penalizing families holding bishoprics) reveal negative minorities which ranged between twenty and thirty per cent. 87 Thus Messer Filippo Corsini, speaking on behalf of the Parte captains,

9 February 1376, stated that the war was necessary for the preservation of Florentine liberty; CP, 14, f. 13v. Similarly, Lapo da Castiglionchio made this bellicose statement: “Quod sollicitentur Octo quod incepta viriliter prosequantur, non obstantibus colloquiis pacis, et eis subveniantur de omnibus”; zd7d., f£. 14r.

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believe me, when one fights for liberty, all civic discord will cease,

and you will see this most numerous people, as one body, turn over its substance for the expenses [of war] and hurl its spirit against the perils. They delude themselves, I believe, who place their hopes in our disunity; for as danger approaches more closely,

the more will the Florentine people consolidate into a single spirit.”°*

This passage can be interpreted in two ways: either Salutati was sincere and unperceptive, or he was engaged in his familiar role as propagandist, employing humanist rhetoric and hyperbole on behalf of his employers.

The Pattern of Conflict In the early months of the war, the climate of opinion in Florence was both bellicose and optimistic. Gherardino Giani wrote to his friend in Bruges that the commune was prepared to utilize the entire wealth of its citizenry in the conflict. But such sacrifices would not be necessary, he asserted confidently, for the struggle would end within a year, “and we will be the victors

in this war, or it [the papacy] will make peace with us.” Contributing to this optimism were the rebellions which broke out in the papal dominions in the winter of 1375-1376. One city after another—Citta di Castello, Perugia, Viterbo, Orvieto, Bologna—took up arms against the church, expelled its papal garrison, established a communal government, and entered into a federation with Florence and her allies.*° In Avignon, Gregory XI 88 Fpistolario di Coluccio Salutati, 1, 217: “Nec iam, quod tu in argumentum adducis impotentie, discordiam Florentinorum obicias, putas, ut arbitror, te vera

proferre; ego autem, qui quotidie secretis intervenio consiliis, summam concordiam deprehendi. et crede michi: cum de libertate lucetur, omnes cessabunt civiles altercationes et videbis hunc innumerabilem populum, corpus unum, conferre substantias in expensis et animas in periculis obiectare. decipientur, crede michi, qui spem in discordia nostra ponent; et quanto veniet res periculo propior, tanto magis in unum animum Florentinus populus unietur.” 39 Brucker, “Documento,” 172-73. See also Gherardino’s comment: “E abi di cierto che questa guerra non durera troppo; fia vie meno d’un anno”; ii:d., 174. For an official document which reflects this optimism, see Gherardi, “Otto Santi,” doc. r10.

40 For the details of these rebellions, see Diario d’anonimo, pp. 305-06; Cronaca dt Donato di Neri e dt suo figlio Neri, in Cronache senesi, RRIISS, new ed., xv, Part 6 (Bologna, 1931-1939), 659. Prior to the outbreak of these

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looked on helplessly while his temporal possessions melted away. Lacking military and fiscal resources, his only defense was epistolary; he wrote bitter denunciations against the perfidious Florentines and sent frantic appeals to Italian states, urging them to come

to his aid.” Gregory also offered to negotiate peace with the Arno commune, but the Florentines, convinced that their debilitated enemy would soon be forced to capitulate, rejected these overtures.”

In assuming that the pope would be demoralized by defeat, the commune had made a grave miscalculation. Misfortune served only to strengthen Gregory’s determination to recover the church’s

temporal possessions and to crush his Florentine enemies.” He pursued his objectives along several fronts. In the spring of 1376, he organized an army of Breton soldiers and sent them over the Alps to attack Florence and the cities that had rebelled against papal rule. By bribes and threats he sought to entice towns away from the league that Florence had organized. The pope also proceeded with plans to return to Rome. By restoring the curia to the Eternal City, he could personally direct the offensive against his foes and could also hope to gain sympathy from those Cathoupheavals, the Florentine government intimated to its Milanese ally that disorders would erupt in the papal states; Missive, 15, £. 8r; 16, ff. 12r, 13r. Florentine complicity in the revolt of Citta di Castello is proved by a document

authorizing payment to the men who had been sent to foment trouble; Gherardi, “Otto Santi,” doc. 204. On the role of the commune in the Bologna uprising, see Stefani, 756. 41 The best sources for Gregory’s reaction to the outbreak of hostilities are the dispatches of the Mantuan ambassador; A. Segre, “I dispacci di Cristoforo da Piacenza, procuratore mantovano alla corte pontificia (1371-1383), ASI, ser. 5, XLII (1909), 75-85. For the pope’s exhortatory letters to Lucca, see R. Fumi, ed., R. Archivio di Stato di Lucca. Regesti, 1, Part 2 (Carteggio degli Anziant, 1333-1400) (Lucca, 1903), docs. 521, 525, 532, 533, 536; to Queen Joanna of Naples, F. Cerasoli, “Gregorio XI e Giovanna I Regina di Napoli,” Archivio storico per le provincie napoletane, xxv (1900), 9-14, 23. 42 For the negative Florentine response to peace proposals in the early stages of the conflict, see CP, 14, ff. 7v, 12r-14r, 23v. The pope made his most serious peace offer in March 1376; Diario d’anonimo, p. 306; Manoscritti, 222, f. 250; Gherardi, “Otto Santi,” ASI, ser. 3, v, 75, n. 73 CP, 14, ff. 24v-28r. Peace negotiations broke down when the news reached Florence that Bologna had rebelled against papal rule. 43 The pontiff’s attitude was clearly indicated in his proclamation (31 December 1375) of a heavy tax to be levied against Florentine merchants in Avignon; Segre, 84-85.

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lics who deplored the “Babylonian captivity.”** On the last day of March, 1376, Gregory published an interdict against the Arno city. Within Florentine territory, all religious services and functions were suspended. Thirty six citizens who had held important offices since the war’s outbreak were excommunicated. The Florentines were declared outlaws of Christendom; no one was permitted

to have any dealings or contacts with them. They were to be expelled forthwith from every state; their property could be confiscated, and they could be imprisoned or enslaved.* Some aspects of Gregory’s campaign were more successful than

others. The military prosecution of the war was, from the papal

standpoint, a dismal failure. The Bretons invaded Italy and settled in Romagna, where they looted the countryside and carefully avoided any pitched battles with enemy troops.** On the diplomatic front, however, Gregory scored important gains. By evincing his determination to restore papal power in the peninsula, he discouraged the uncommitted states from entering the antipapal league, induced many who had joined to adopt a position

of neutrality, and encouraged his supporters to organize plots against the communal regimes in such cities as Bologna, Perugia, Arezzo, and Citta di Castello.** The pope was also quite successful 44 The pope’s return to Rome in January 1377, is described in L. Mirot, La politique pontificale et le retour du Saint-siége a Rome en 1376, pp. 98-178; and in J. Kirsch, Die Riickkehr der Papste Urban V und Gregor XI von Avignon nach Rom (Paderborn, 1898), pp. 169-273. 4° The condemnation is printed in Liinig, Codex Italiae diplomaticus (Frankfurt, 1725-1755), u, cols. 1087-91. See also Gherardi, “Otto Santi,” doc. 198. On the Florentine reaction to the interdict, see Diario d’anonimo, p. 308; CP, 14, ff. 37V, 43-43V.

46 There was very little serious fighting anywhere in central Italy during the war, and scarcely any in Florentine territory. For descriptions of the skirmishes which did take place, see Diario d’anonimo, pp. 311, 326, 329; Stefani, 786.

Papal troops would not fight without pay, and this was frequently lacking; Stefani, 760.

47 For Gregory’s gentle treatment of one rebel city, Perugia, see Dupré Theseider, “La rivolta di Perugia nel 1375 contro l’abate di Monmaggiore e i suoi precedenti politici,” Bollettino della R. Deputazione di storta patria per l’Umbria, xxxv (1938), 153-58. Lucca, which had reluctantly joined the Florentine league, quickly adopted a neutral posture. For plots organized by papal sympathizers in several towns of central Italy, see Diario d’anonimo, pp. 311, 314, 327; G. degli Azzi Vitelleschi, Le relazioni tra la Repubblica di Firenze e

Umbria nel secolo xiv, secondo i documenti del R. Archivio di Stato di Firenze, 1, doc. 488.

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in obtaining the execution of his edicts against Florentine merchants. Few princes could resist the temptation to enrich themselves with the confiscated property of outlaws, while also gaining

credit for obeying their spiritual lord. Florentines in Avignon were imprisoned and despoiled of their goods, and large numbers

of their compatriots in other areas suffered expulsion and impoverishment.** The Cardinal of Limoges, entrusted with the enforcement of the ban in France, informed the Mantuan ambas-

sador in Avignon that “not one Florentine dares to remain in the kingdom, and all of their goods have been confiscated; like-

wise in the kingdoms of England, Spain, Scotland, Aragon, Portugal, Navarre and in the county of Flanders.”* Although individual merchants might evade these sanctions in some parts of Catholic Europe, as did Matteo Tinghi and Buonaccorso Pitti

in Hungary, the activities of the large firms were totally disrupted.” Even Italian states which had been friendly to Florence succumbed to ecclesiastical pressure. Florentines were expelled

from Naples, Rome, and Genoa; among the major peninsular states, only Venice ignored the papal order.” Florence responded to the papal offensive in several ways. The

commune sought to reopen peace negotiations with the pope, whose overtures it had previously spurned.” But Gregory now 48 Stefani, 754; Cronica di Buonaccorso Pitti, pp. 37-38. A Pisan chronicler stated that 600 Florentine merchants from Avignon passed through Pisa on their way home; Cronica di Pisa, RRIISS, ed. Muratori, xv, col. 1070. 49 Segre, 90. In France, however, King Charles V rescinded the ban and re-

leased those merchants who had been imprisoned (December 1376); Diario d’anonimo, p. 326.

50 After escaping from Avignon, Tinghi and Pitti embarked upon a trip to Prussia. En route, Tinghi bought a cargo of saffron in Venice and sold it in Buda; Cronica di Buonaccorso Pitti, p. 38. The largest trading company in Europe, the Alberti company, was seriously damaged by the war, since it was excluded from papal banking business; Y. Renouard, Les relations des Papes d’ Avignon et des compagnies commerciales et bancatres de 1316 a 1378, pp. 28586, 334-35.

51 For letters to Italian rulers, asking them to treat Florentine merchants with consideration, see Gherardi, “Otto Santi,” docs. 284, 292, 336, 337, 357. The persistent refusal of Venice to publish or enforce the ban against Florentines is documented by Gregory’s letters to his officials in Venice; Pastor, History of the Popes, 1, 374-77, 7 October and 26 December 1377. 52 A spirited controversy has developed over the role of S. Catherine of Siena

in the republic’s first peace initiative in the spring of 1376. Catherine’s biographers have stressed her important role in these peace efforts; they contend that

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adopted an intransigent posture, and the peace terms which he presented to the Florentine embassy in the summer of 1376 were so exorbitant that they were instantly rejected.°* Unable or unwilling to crush the papacy by military action, the commune fought its major struggle against Gregory not on the battlefield, but in the chancery. In a diplomatic campaign of unprecedented intensity and scope, the commune sent hundreds of letters to kings, princes, communes, clerics, and nobles, presenting its version of the conflict and appealing either for assistance or neutrality.” The belief was strong in Florence that the republic’s fortunes in the war depended in large measure on the vitality and durability of the antipapal federation. As chief architect and keystone of this alliance, the commune labored diligently to stimulate she received a commission from the Florentine government to treat with the pope. Their case is based upon the account of Catherine’s friend, Fra Raimondo

of Capua, and upon two of the saint’s letters addressed to “the signori of Florence” and to Buonaccorso di Lapo Buonaccorsi; Le lettere di S. Caterina da

Siena, ed. N. Tommaseo (Florence, 1860), m1, 280-83, 291-94. In his Saint Catherine de Sienne, essai de critique des sources (Paris, 1921-1930), R. Fawtier

disputes these claims. He argues that Catherine was not sent to Avignon by the Florentine authorities, but went on her own accord, with a vague idea of persuading the pope to make peace with his enemies and then return to Rome. His argument is based on the absence of corroborative evidence for Catherine’s

mission, either in Florence or Avignon. Fawtier’s views have been attacked by A. Alessandrini, “Il ritorno dei papi da Avignone e S. Caterina da Siena,” Archivio storico romano per la storia patria, LvI-Lvul (1933-1934), 36-99, who

reafirms the traditional view that Catherine played a major role in peace negotiations and was instrumental in persuading the pope to return to Rome. A milder criticism of the Fawtier thesis is found in N. Denis-Boulet, La carriére politique de Sainte Catherine de Sienne (Paris, 1939). It is clear from Avignonese sources that Gregory had no intention of making peace with Florence; see Segre, 89-90; G. Mollat, “Relations politiques de Grégoire XI avec les Siennois et les Florentins,” Mélanges d’archéologie e d’histotre, uxvitt (1956), 372.

53 The pope demanded an indemnity of three million florins, and the commune’s assistance in the recovery of the rebel cities; Gherardi, “Otto Santi,” docs. 305, 309. For the reaction in Florence to these proposals, see CP, 14, ff. 79V, 8ov, 86r-88r; Diario d’anonimo, p. 323. 54 There was little sentiment in Florence for waging an offensive war against

the pope. Religious inhibitions hampered the commune’s military activities, as this collegiate opinion reveals: “Super equitando territorium Romanorum, est periculosum, provocando Romanos et reprehensibile pro persona pape, qui est vicarius Christi”; CP, 14, f. 138r. 55 Gherardi has summarized many of these diplomatic appeals; see, for example, “Otto Santi,” docs. 266, 268, 295, 297, 330.

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enthusiasm, to ward off threats and dangers, and to promote cooperation and trust among the allies.°° But this league was composed of states with diverse, even conflicting interests; it was the republic’s arduous task to persuade its confederates that their contributions and sacrifices benefited themselves as well as their colleagues.” Salutati endeavored to provide an ideological base

for the league with his slogans of Italian liberty, but few took the chancellor’s rhetorical flourishes seriously. They were as anachronistic as Cola di Rienzo’s proclamations thirty years before.” The commune also exploited the Italian penchant for festivities by promoting a fraternal spirit among its allies. In December 1376 it invited delegates from each member of the alliance to a sumptuous banquet in the Signoria’s palace. There was an abundance of food, drink, music, and conviviality, but the chronicler who described this glittering event did not record whether it had any noticeable effect upon diplomatic policy.” Communal authorities also utilized spectacle and ceremony to stimulate enthusiasm for the war on the home front. The square 58 For examples of exhortatory letters written by Salutati to members of the league, see Lint Coluct Piert Salutati Epistolarum, ed. J. Rigacci (Florence, 1741), 11, 38-40, 68-69, 104-05, 107-08.

57 The members of the league which contributed money to hire troops were: Bernabo Visconti, Perugia, Siena, Arezzo, the Prefect di Vico, Ascoli, Forli, Urbino, Fermo, Citta di Castello, Messer Guido da Polenta, lord of Ravenna, Messer Bartolomeo de San Severino and Messer Ridolfo da Camerino; zdid., 1, 84-85.

58 See the perceptive comments of N. Valeri, L’Ttalia nell’eta dei principati dal 1343 al 1516, pp. 204-06. There are scarcely any echoes of Coluccio’s rhetoric in the Consulte e Pratiche protocols. But see Filippo Bastari’s statement, urging

that the Pisan government “sequi italos et non aliengenos qui volunt occupare libertatem Italie’; CP, 14, f. 6ov. 59 Diario d’anonimo, p. 326: “. . . Si vennono in Firenze, nel Palagio di nostri Signiori, tutti 1 collegati della lega co’ nostri Collegi; e ivi si fecie un grande e bello mangiare. E miso’si le tavole nella sala del Consiglio; e furono assal mangiatori, co’ molte buone vivande e confetti e molti suoni, e co’molti giovani Fiorentini con grande festa e allegrezza, a onore di Dio e a onore del popolo di Firenze e di Parte Guelfa e del nostro Comune, che Iddio mantenga.” There is an account of this banquet by the Sienese ambassador; ASS, Concistoro, 1790, f. 34r, 16 December: “Lunedi feciono e priori un grande coredo nel quale furvi tute l’ambasciate de collegati, e fato el deto desinare, e priori con tute

lambasciate de collegati andaro[no] nela sala di sopra e ine posti tuti a sedere, si levd in pie el gonfaloniere e uso parole, diciendo che luficio loro aveva grande alegreza, vedendo tanti frategli raunati per bene e per liberta del paese, e che gia 150 ani si belo colegio nelo citta di Fiorenza non era raunato per bene [e] liberta del paese.”

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in front of the Franciscan church of S. Croce was the scene of a tournament dedicated to Madonna Liberta. In announcing this affair, the Machiavelli chronicler wrote that warriors were to joust for the favor of “Miss Liberty,” who would bestow a lance and a garland upon the victor.”

By staging the tournament and the banquet, Florence’s rulers were, perhaps unconsciously, revealing their anxieties over the state of citizen morale.” After eighteen months of conflict, the initial enthusiasm for the war had evaporated. The failure of peace negotiations and the pope’s obduracy had raised the prospect of a

long, exhausting struggle. It is true that Florentines were not being killed in this relatively bloodless campaign, nor were their homes and farms ravaged. But the economic burdens were quickly sensed by a people who customarily thought in terms of florins, lire, and soldt. The effects of the papal attack on the city’s foreign trade were soon visible; every day, Stefani wrote, Florentine merchants streamed back to the city from foreign marts, despoiled of their property and their livelihood.” The losses suffered by some of these businessmen are described in their petitions to the Signoria

for relief. One of the Eight, Guccio Gucci, lost a cargo of cotton valued at 6,600 florins, which was confiscated by papal officials in Ancona. Jacopo Scali was unable to satisfy his Florentine creditors

when the war prevented him from recovering his property in Catalonia. Another merchant, Antonio Altoviti, was jailed in Spain and spent two hundred florins to obtain his release. The tempo of business in the city slackened; cloth factories closed 6° Diario d’anonimo, p. 325. 61 The first hint in the official records that the citizenry might not be united in support of the war was made on 24 September 1376 by Bettino Covoni, CP,

14, f. 87r: “Considerato quod papa querit divisionem inter cives, ideo guelfi civitatis uniantur, et depositis rancoribus, ad unam finem libertatis fiant unite

omnia... .”

62 Stefani, 765. The severe depression in the cloth industry is indicated by the demands made by the Ciompi in 1378 that the factory owners promise to manufacture a minimum of 24,000 pieces of cloth annually; N. Rodolico, J Ciompi, p. 147. Actual production must have been below that figure. An estimated 30,000 pieces of cloth were produced in 1370; see above, p. 14, n. 52. 63 These cases are described in Prov., 65, ff. 7r-8r, 182v, 224r. Scali’s plight was

typical of the difficulties encountered by these merchants. He was unable to recover money owed him in Catalonia, where he had been engaged in trade, “propter novitates incursas et propter discordiam habitam cum ecclesia.” Ofhcials were appointed to seize and sell his Florentine property to satisfy his creditors.

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down, the botteghe of the merchants and the tables of the moneychangers were without customers. Florentines had been banned from European market places and foreign traders were reluctant to risk their souls by coming to an accursed city. Only the soldier

prospered in these circumstances, and his pay came not from profits but from capital. The war hurt the Florentine economy, which had been slumping since the beginning of the decade,” and it devoured a substantial portion of the city’s capital resources. Stefani estimated that

the war’s total cost was 2,243,000 florins.” One-fourth of this expenditure was raised from forced loans: sixteen of these prestanze, totaling 570,000 florins, were levied from June 1375 through June 1378.°° This constituted a per capita assessment of ten florins

upon every resident of the city, an amount equal to one-third of the yearly salary of an unskilled laborer, or the annual rent of a large shop.*’ By any standard, this was an imposing burden. Finance was a major concern of the communal authorities. The

official records are filled with material pertaining to revenue: provisions authorizing loans and gabelles, exhortations to tax

; 3a , , ,

officials to collect revenue, demands that delinquents be forced to pay their quotas.”* The difficulties of collecting money naturally

increased as the war dragged on. There are references in the protocols to the “intolerable burdens” shouldered by the citizenry,” 64 On the business decline c.1370, see above, pp. 194-95. One indication of the war’s impact upon the Florentine economy was the decline in communal revenue. A provision pertaining to the construction of the Loggia dei Lancei, enacted on

21 October 1377, containing this revealing statement: “. . . Quod pecunie, hactenus per dictum commune deputate ad fabricam supradictam, et redditus et proventus ipsarum pecuniarum sunt adeo dimuniti tum propter conductam stipendiorum ad lancias, tum propter dimunitionem introytuum comunis Florentie . . . et aliis pluribus causis”; K. Frey, Die Loggia det Lanzi zu Florenz (Berlin, 1885), p. 257. 65 Stefani, 795. °° Prestanze, 253-56. 87 These calculations are based upon rental figures in A. Sapori, Studi di storia economica medievale, pp. 305-36; and on salaries for manual laborers in Frey, Loggia, p. 265. The Florentine population in 1375 was approximately 50,000. 88 For the first six months of 1376, see CP, 14, ff. 3v, 4v, 5v, 411, 48r-4or, 571-581; Prov., 63, ff. 203r-204r; 64, ff. grr, 85v-87r. In demanding greater

revenue for the war, Vanni da Quarata favored an increase in gabelles, and additional levies upon the clergy and contadini; CP, 14, f. 86r. In his argument for a greater military effort, Filippo Bastari stated that adequate defense was impossible without heavy expenditures; zdid., f. 86v. 89 CP, 14, f. 28r, 20 March 1376.

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and the tax commissions were urged alternatively to use coercion to obtain revenue, and to extract money from the populace “gently, equitably and without complaints.””” More precise evidence of the commune’s fiscal problems is furnished by the prestanze rec-

ords themselves. These show, first, that the tax base was progressively enlarged, and that a greater number of poorer citizens were forced to pay prestanze.” They also indicate that many soon exhausted their liquid capital and were unable to pay their levies. Their loans were paid for them by bankers, who received a fee

for this service, and eventually their investment with interest from the commune.” This profiteering by prestanza brokers was not the most glaring defect in the commune’s revenue system. The apportionment of the forced loans was notoriously inequitable, a fact which was mentioned in the protocols."* For example, an artisan, Bernardino Bernardi, owned property valued at two thousand florins; yet he was assessed one-fourth as much as Ser Niccoldé Monachi, whose

capital assets well exceeded ten thousand florins.’* Gherardino Giani could proclaim that Florentines were prepared to sacrifice 70 For a typical exhortation to tax officials, “quod bene et viriliter procurent pecuniam,” see CP, 14, ff. g7r, 99v, 119v. There are, however, other pleas that money be obtained “dulciter et moderate”; CP, 15, ff. 24r, 28r, 42r. See also the opinion of Vanni da Quarata, in F. Perrens, Histoire de Florence, v, 162, n. 6. 11 The prestanza of June 1375 (30,000 fl.) was levied upon 1148 households; that of April 1378 (30,000 fl.) was assessed against 2594 households; Pres., 253-57; 332-35-

7 On this practice, which became more common as the war continued, see Brucker, “Documento fiorentino,” ASI, cxv, 168. One of these speculators was Vieri di Cambio de’ Medici, who in April 1378 paid loans totaling 1000 fi. on behalf of 800 households. Even affluent citizens had difficulty in making their prestanza payments; members of the Bardi family petitioned the commune for cancellation of penalties incurred by late payment of their assessments; CP, 14, ff. ro8v, 11Ir. 73 Thus the comment of the Sixteen on 14 January 1376; CP, 14, f. 6v: “Quod pax semper fuit dilectio civitatis Florentie, et propter mercantias et inequalitatem prestantiorum omnino est necessaria comuni.” See also CP, 13, f. 6v; 15, f. 28v.

: “4On Bernardi’s worth, see above, p. 263, n. 56. The data on Monachi is contained in his ricordanze; Carte Strozziane, ser. 2, 2. Ser Niccold’s regular prestanza assessment was 10 fl., 3 s.. while Bernardino paid 2 fl, 15 5.3; Pres., 333, £. 81v; 335, £. 127v. Monachi spent 1600 fl. on dowries for his two daughters. He also invested ro0o fi. in a business partnership with Francesco Alderotti, and spent over 3300 fl. in purchasing real estate; Carte Strozziane, ser. 2, 2, ff. Ir-5V, 26r, 3Ir, 34r.

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their entire wealth in the papal war, but he and his friends were busily engaged in manipulating their finances to reduce their share of the tax burden.” Nevertheless, there is no evidence of popular hostility against the war profiteers, or against those rich men who paid less than their share of the costs. Apparently, the poor artisan or shopkeeper focused his anger on the clergy and the pope instead of on the popolo grasso. Church property was one potential source of revenue which did not escape the attention of fiscal authorities. A precedent for taxing the clerical estate had already been established in 1375, with the

imposition of a forced loan to raise Hawkwood’s stipend.” For several months after this levy, restrained by religious scruples and possibly by a desire to placate Gregory XI, the commune made no

further attempt to impose taxes upon the clergy. However, the pressures for another assault upon clerical purses increased as the war continued, and these became irresistible when peace negotiations failed in September 1376. Vanni da Quarata, whose political opinions paralleled those of his assassinated cousin Sandro, suggested one hundred thousand florins as a proper clerical contribution, but others were more moderate in their demands.” The most radical view on this issue was expressed by Salvestro de’ Medici: “The bishops of Florence and Fiesole, and all prelates of the city of Florence, should be sent to the pope to procure his withdrawal from the war, and to induce him to [make] peace. If he does not, then let all ecclesiastical property come into the commune, and make war at their [the clergy’s] expense.””

In a series of provisions enacted in the autumn of 1376, the 7 Brucker, “Documento fiorentino,” 170, 173. See the comment of Lapo da Castiglionchio, spokesman for the Diect della libertad: “Omnes cives cum personis

et bonis se disponant ad defendandam libertatem”; CP, 14, f. 87v. The poet Antonio Pucci also portrayed the Florentines as willing and eager to pay their prestanze; Gori, La Toscana illustrata nella sua storia (Livorno, 1755), 1, 149. 78 See above, p. 304.

7 Vanni’s counsel is in CP, 14, f. 18r, 25 February 1376. For other statements favoring clerical taxation, see zbid., ff. 41r, 57v, 58v, 63r, 65v, 73r-74r. 78 CP, 14, f£. 86v, 24 September 1376: “Episcopi florentinus et fesulanus et omnes prelati civitatis Florentie mittantur ad papam, et procurent eum removere a bello et deducere ad pacem. Quod si non fiat, omnia clericorum bona veniant

in comuni, et fiat bellum eorum expensis.” For another blunt proposal on clerical taxation, see Jacopo Sacchetti’s statement: “Quod usque ad feces pre-

mantur clerici pro pecunia, et postea recurratur ad bursas civium”; Diario d’anonimo, p. 232.

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machinery for confiscating and liquidating ecclesiastical property was set in motion. A commission of eight officials, the Otto de’ preti, was empowered to make a census of all ecclesiastical property in Florentine territory and to seize and sell that part which was not needed for the decent maintenance of religious institutions. The liquidation of this property was to continue until the sum of one hundred thousand florins was realized; provision was

also made for the eventual reimbursement of the ecclesiastical establishments whose property was seized.” Initially, this confiscated property was sold on a voluntary basis, but when buyers did not come forward, the officials used coercive tactics. One of the wealthiest men in Florence, Francesco Rinuccini, was forced to purchase seven farms, which had originally belonged to the monastery of Vallambrosa, for 3,850 florins.”

The decision to confiscate church property illustrates the dilemma confronting the communal leadership in the winter of 1376-1377. It was motivated as much by political considerations as

by economic need, since it placated the strong anticlerical sentiment in the city and made war sacrifices more bearable to the populace. It also committed the purchasers of ecclesiastical property firmly to the war, since their private economic interests could

be adversely affected by an unfavorable settlement with the papacy.” On the other hand, confiscation made peace more difh-

cult to attain: this further gesture of defiance would not be ignored or forgotten by Gregory XI. Moreover, the scheme for liquidating ecclesiastical assets had aroused strong opposition 79 The pertinent provisions are in Prov., 64, ff. 137r-140v (22-25 September), I53f-154V, 155r-157r (18-20 October), rgir-rg2r (5-6 November). 80 Ricordi storici di Filippo di Cino Rinuccini dal 1282 al 1460, ed. G. Aiazzi (Florence, 1840), pp. 44-46. 81 Becker, “Florentine Politics and the Diffusion of Heresy,” 70-71, n. 62, has noted that large numbers of citizens from all social classes purchased ecclesiastical

property. The parallel with the buyers of church property during the French Revolution is obvious. 82 Another issue involving the same considerations was the interdict. Radical opinion was in favor of ignoring the papal ban and celebrating divine service; see Salvestro de’ Medici’s comment: “Quod quia papa non sequiatur voluntatem

Dei, habeatur consilium aliorum sapientium et videatur an sit possibile licite videre et ordinare quod misse canantur, et si fieri possint, canantur”; CP, 14, f. gtr, 4 October 1376. But the majority did not wish to antagonize further the pope on this question, and the churches remained closed and silent. For discussion of this problem, see CP, 14, ff. 88v-ger.

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within the city, as indicated by the large number of votes cast against the provisions.”* These negative ballots constituted one of the first definite signals of disapproval of the regime’s war policy.

They brought into the open the internal conflict that had been hidden under the war-imposed shroud of conformity; and they set the stage for the bitter struggle for control of the government,

which was fought without respite during the last months of the conflict.

The Problem of Peace Opposition to the war in Florence increased in the winter and spring of 1376-1377. It is difficult to trace this development, since

critics of the war did not voice their opinions publicly. Vocal dissent would have been considered tantamount to treason.®* But a

party dedicated to peace did form in these months, with its nucleus in the palace of the Parte Guelfa. It drew support from various elements: sworn enemies of the regime, merchants who had suffered economic loss,” pious individuals whose religious sensibilities were affected by the interdict, and others who believed that war expenditures would devour the city’s wealth. The peace

campaign took several forms. Two of the earliest manifestations were the opposition to the confiscation of church property and the effort to limit or terminate the dalia of the Eight. Proponents of peace organized religious processions and conventicles devoted to pious exercises. They also sought to embarrass the regime by renewing the attack on Ghibelline suspects and by raising the issue of magnate petitions,

Since the Eight bore the major responsibility for the war’s management, this commission became a prime target of the 83 When the key measure authorizing confiscation was presented to the Council

of the Popolo on 12 September, it was rejected. Two weeks later, the Signoria resubmitted the provision, which passed both councils with very slim majorities, 120-55 and 81-40; LF, 40, ff. 227r, 228r-228v. The subsidiary provisions which established confiscation procedures also received many negative votes, 136-61 and 83-37, 130-61 and 85-38; LF, 40, ff. 230r, 231r, 233r-233V.

84It was permissible to express a fervent desire for peace, so long as it was accompanied by a statement that the war should be continued; see Luigi Aldobrandini’s comment for the Twelve, 23 November 1376; CP, 14, f£. ro8r.

85 Stefani, 765, reported that many merchants who were forced to return home from abroad began to complain “che gli Otto della balia guastavano Firenze, e non voleano pace, e che per certo Firenze non potea pit. .. .”

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peace faction. It was dangerous to launch a frontal assault against these officials, for they were popular heroes, lauded for their integrity and dedication to the public welfare. So exalted was their reputation that Giovanni Morelli, writing twenty years later, referred to them as “the most famous, sagacious, and valiant men that were ever seen in Florence.”** The honors bestowed upon

the Eight in a public ceremony of April 1376 were the most extensive ever granted by the regime to any citizen.*’ But the Opposition to these paragons of civic virtue increased steadily in the councils, as attested by the votes on provisions pertaining to their stewardship. When in July 1376 a measure was submitted

to extend their authority for six months, only twenty seven councilors opposed it. Three months later, this number had increased to sixty. In July 1377 nearly eighty white beans were deposited in the council boxes against the Eight’s tenure of office.™

An anonymous priorista friendly to the war leaders stated that they were much hated and envied by the chieftains of the Parte Guelfa, who sought unsuccessfully to prevent their confirmation in office.”

This chronicler also pointed to another channel whereby the oligarchy expressed its opposition to. the war: the companies of disciplinati, which sprang up after the imposition of the interdict. Ostensibly devoted to religious exercises, fasting, and penance, these conventicles attracted large numbers of young patricians who made a gesture of abandoning the world. Stefani considered them to be wholly praiseworthy: “So widespread was this movement that it appeared as though it would conquer and humble the pope.”’° The priorista, however, viewed these companies as a sinister device to turn public opinion against the Eight, and to stimulate peace sentiment. Communal authorities apparently shared these suspicions, for they ordered their dissolution.” It is 86 G, Morelli, Ricordi, pp. 288-89: “I piu famosi e i pit sagaci e valenti uomini

che mai fussono veduti in Firenze.” 87 See Prov., 64, ff. 18v-t9v; CP, 14, f. 38v; and for a description, Diario d’anonimo, p. 307. 88 Prov., 64, ff. 89r-89v, 183r-184r; 65, f. o5r; LF, 40, ff. 188r-188v, 232r-232Vv, 259r-259v. White beans indicated a negative vote, black beans a favorable one. 89 Manoscritti, 222, ff. 257-58. °° Stefani, 757. 91 Manoscritti, 222, ff. 257-58: “. . . E perché la setta della parte ghuelfa molto preseghuitavano inchontro affare che gl’otto none regniassino, e questo nasciea

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likely, too, that the Parte leadership actively promoted the mass demonstrations of religious enthusiasm, the processions which circulated through the streets on feast days. These exhibitions were visible appeals for the cessation of hostilities, but as protests in a religious guise they could not be suppressed easily. The flagellanti presented the most serious problem, for they constituted a threat to public order. After a vast concourse of these fanatics had roamed

through the city in April 1377, the Signoria called for collegiate

opinion on this problem. The Sixteen favored their expulsion from Florence, while the Twelve were divided. Some wished to ban them only if they became a menace to public security, while others contended that “citizens should be permitted to chastise and discipline themselves as it pleased them.” The increase in the tempo of proscriptions in the late months of 1376 was another sign that the Parte hierarchy had recovered confidence, and was prepared to renew the struggle for control of the commune. Eleven men were ammoniti, a motley group which included two magnates, Giovanni di Riccardo de’ Cerchi and Francesco della Tosa, a patrician, Bernardo di Cecco Spina, and two parvenu merchants, the druggist, Filippo d’Ugo, and Niccold

di Ammannato Tecchini”* The Guelf society also appointed certain “defenders,” whose task it was to identify those Florentines who criticized the Parte, its captains, or its proscriptions.”* da certe loro chonbibbie o raunamenti che faceano sotto cierte chonpagnie di diciplinatt in certe chiese ove faceano molte chobibbie. I detti otto chol braccio de’ priori le voro[no] che dette chonpangnie non si potessino piu raunare sotto grave pene.” Sozomen, Specimen, RRIISS, xvi, col. 1100, wrote: “Quod nullus de societatibus disciplinatorum posset se congregare in aliqua ecclesia, ubi esset societas disciplinae.” 82 Diario d’anonimo, p. 331; for the statements of the colleges, see zbid., n. 2.

Six months earlier, the colleges had expressed concern over the flagellanti; CP, 14, f. ovr, 25 October 1376: “Quod de adunationibus que fuerint per frustratores,

provideatur per decem libertatis ita quod non fiant.” On the flagellani in Florence in the fourteenth century, and the efforts of communal authorities to suppress them, see Davidsohn, Geschichte von Florenz, w, ut, 76-78. 8 Stefani, 765. Filippo d’Ugo had been a prior in 1365, 1370, and in July 1376. Niccolé’s father had been in the Signoria six times between 1349 and 1370. The others were obscure men with little status in politics and society: Beltramo Davanzi, Francesco di Messer Guido di ser Guerriante, Ser Bonare di Ser Piero Arrigucci, Guglielmo Stracciabende, Ser Albizo di Messer Filippo da Barberino, Bernardo di Sandro di Ser Amadore. 94 Stefani, 767. The chronicler also described the Parte’s harassment of its

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IHE WAR OF THE “EIGHT SAINTS,” 1375-1378

In December 1376 the Parte captains revived another controversial issue that had lain dormant since the war began. This was the procedure for conferring magnate status upon popolani who had committed crimes, by means of petitions to the Signoria, Ever since this device had been established in 13472, the old families had sought to limit its application.” Stefani, no friend of the oligarchy,

admitted that the use of these petitions had been abused, even though he argued that the popolani who had been declared magnates were all guilty. However, by threatening to invoke this procedure, some unscrupulous individuals had forced debtors to pay their obligations, and even those contracted by parents and grand-

parents. Originally designed to punish powerful citizens who could not be touched by regular judicial methods, the petition had become a weapon with which to wage private vendettas and to settle old scores.”®

When this question was raised by the captains on 11 December, the collegiate response was moderate and conciliatory. The Sixteen advised the priors to appoint a commission to study both proscriptions and the petitions. Their spokesman, Leonardo Beccanugi, defined the problem: “It is well known that war, particularly in-

ternal conflict, destroys cities. The commune is now waging a foreign war, and also an internal one, which is being fought to the bitter end by means of petitions and proscriptions. To eliminate discord, it is necessary to act on both issues for the security of the

republic.” In January the new group of priors contained four men who, in Stefani’s words, “were from that group which engaged in ambitter critic, Giovanni di Luigi de’ Mozzi. Reluctant to proscribe this scion of a distinguished family, Parte leaders denounced him to the executor for misconduct as vicar of Valdinievole. Only strenuous efforts by his friends saved him from punishment and disgrace; Stefani, 7609. 85 See above, p. 262.

96 Stefani, 766. Writing from Verona in January 1377, Donato Acciaiuoli noted that several citizens “had been struck by petitions,’ and he deplored the poisonous effect of these petitions upon the social order; Carte Del Bene, 4g, f. I24r.

a7 CP, 14, f. 114v. “Cum notorium sit bello urbes annichilari, et maxime

intestino, et cum comune bellum gerat extrinsecus et ab intus, et cum petitionibus

et cum admonitionibus decertetur, quod ad tollendum scandala ad utramque partem pro salute rei publice provideatur.”

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monizione”’: Antonio Ridolfi, Raimondino de’ Vecchietti, Priore Baldovinetti, and Migliore Guadagni. All belonged to old Guelf families; Ridolfi and Guadagni were particularly noted for their ultra-conservative politics, These men led the campaign to revise the procedure for designating magnates.** Their efforts at persuasion were reminiscent of the heavyhanded tactics employed by the Parte in 1358 and 1372: threats against the Sixteen were voiced in the Parte’s palace, and the rumor was circulated that anyone who opposed revision “was acting against the Parte.”*® So ardent a Guelf as the Machiavelli chronicler charged that the four priors “wished to destroy Florence by cancelling the penalties against those who had been named magnates for their crimes.”*”° The revision, finally published by the Signoria on 19 January 1377, went far to meet the oligarchic demands. It limited the ap-

plication of the magnatizing procedure to individuals charged with serious crimes—murder, arson, robbery, assault, rape, sodomy. It also prohibited its use in any civil process, or in connection with

any commercial debt. The rigid regulations established for draw-

ing up and submitting petitions eliminated most of the abuses and injustices that had crept into this practice.*” This was an important victory for the oligarchy, the first it had

scored in five years." In the Signoria which promulgated this revision were three leaders of the popular forces—Giovanni Pa88 Stefani described this campaign in detail, 766. 89 See the statement of Niccold Malegonelle: “Et quod de verbis que dicuntur

fuisse dicta in palatio partis contra gonfalonerios, domini provideant prout viderint conveniens ad honorem ipsorum et satisfactionem gonfaloneriorum”; CP, 14, f. 116v, 23 January 1377. See also Stefani, 766: “Era tanta la paura di quelli che erano nel bilico della Parte negli animo de’ contrarj, che chiunque facea cosa non piacesse loro, era in gran pericolo, perocché quelli partigiani diceano: ‘fa contro alla Parte.’” 100 Diario d’anonimo, pp. 327-28. 101 This revision was not enacted as a law, but as a clarification of the original provision; an Italian text is printed in Diario d’anonimo, pp. 494-96. The preface stated the purpose of the clarification: “. . . Vogliendo che le riformagioni facte

per lo decto Comune, le quali dispongono in che modo... si debbian far de’ Grandi o vero sopragrandi, s’osservino e pratichino, secondo il vero e sano intellecto et secondo la mente delle predecte riformagioni, et secondo la vera intentione di coloro che le fecero; et a rifrenare ogni inlicito uso e fuori della vera intentione delle decte riformagioni. .. .” 102 The last legislative success of the oligarchy was the provision prohibiting any communal legislation affecting the Parte Guelfa in January 1372; see above, pp. 246-47.

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renti, Bernardo Covoni, Filippo Capponi—who were induced to

support the measure, either from fear of retaliation, or from a belief that it would correct an abuse which fomented internal unrest and thus hampered the war effort. Those who justified the revision on the latter grounds were soon disillusioned, for two months later the Parte captains again broached the question of petitions. They sought to further weaken this instrument for curbing aristocratic excesses by requiring that fines be levied against anyone whose magnatizing petition was rejected. Throughout the spring of 1377 the priors and the colleges devoted time and energy to this petty issue, voicing traditional sentiments and convictions

whose tenor had not changed in thirty years.*°* Although the commune was engaged in an enterprise which violated every tenet of the Guelf creed, some citizens still publicly espoused the principle that “the welfare and contentment of the Guelfs” was a primary goal of communal policy.*** But the most fallacious con- . cept underlying this debate, and indeed the regime itself, was the belief that genuine unity could be achieved by passing laws and tampering with political institutions. While pursuing these tactics to embarrass the communal leadership, the Guelf hierarchy boldly embarked upon its first serious effort to force the regime to make peace. Negotiations between the curia and the commune had resumed

in January 1377, when Gregory XI arrived in Rome. Early in March the head of the Pisan government, Piero Gambacorti, came to Florence with a set of peace proposals from the pope. Gregory’s demands had not diminished appreciably since his ultimatum of the previous September; in a large council convened to discuss these terms, the majority favored the continuation of the war. A single speaker, Carlo degli Strozzi, expressed an unqualified de-

sire for a peace settlement: “To conserve that liberty for which the commune began its undertaking, peace is the only solution.” While others who participated in the debate wished to continue discussions with the curia, they all insisted that the peace be honor108 For this debate, see CP, 15, ff. 3v-4r, 5r-7r, 8r-8v, tor-r4r, I5v-16r, 17r. For comparison with a discussion concerning Guelfism in 1354, see above, pp. 161-63.

104 See the phrases, “ad bonum statum et contentationem guelforum,” “circa unionem guelforum,” “zelatores partis et concordie”; CP, 15, ff. 3v, 11Vv.

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able and just, and that Florence should not break faith with her allies.*”°

During the course of this debate, Simone Peruzzi had charged that the pope was not sincere in his peace overtures, but merely sought to cause dissension among the Florentines.'”° If this was the papal objective, it succeeded. For the first time since the beginning of hostilities, criticism of the war was publicly voiced in the streets. Perhaps sensing that the public outcry was inspired by the oligarchy, the Eight demanded the imposition of conformity and silence. As in past moments of crisis, the authorities con-

veniently forgot their republican principles. “With respect to civic unity,” asserted Tommaso degli Strozzi, “see to it that citizens do not speak against the commune’s undertaking [1.e. the war], and that they speak with unanimity.”**’ Commenting on

the same theme was Marchionne Stefani, who demanded the suppression of criticism against the regime and its policies, and the punishment of the detractors.*°* That the Parte hierarchy was implicated in this peace agitation was indicated by Bartolomeo

Peruzzi: “The priors, in conjunction with the Parte captains, should procure the unity of the citizenry, so that Guelfs speak in concord and are guided by one hand.” Another reference to the Parte’s divisive tactics was made by the Sixteen a few days later: “The priors should complain to the captains concerning the news which they have heard, pointing out to them the commune’s desperate need for unity, and informing them that scandal

and discord between themselves and Guelfs is abhorrent.” 105 Carlo degli Strozzi: “Ad conservationem libertatis per quam comune fecit inceptum suum, sola pax est via, et ideo circa hoc provideant domini”; CP, 14, f. 125v. Speakers who emphasized the need for an “honorable and just” peace were Simone Peruzzi, Recco di Guido Guazza, Salvestro de’ Medici, Filippo Bastari, Messer Donato Aldighieri. 108 CP, 14, f. 125r: “Et quod papa querit ponere scandalum inter comune et colligatos et divisionem inter cives, et ideo honeste convenienter et discrete provideatur circa civium unionem.” 107 “Circa unionem civium, provideatur quod cives non loquantur contra incepta comunis, obloquendo per plateas, et provideatur ita quod cives unanimiter

loquantur; zbid., f. 127r, 5 March 1377. For previous instances in which the authorities demanded the suppression of criticism, see above, pp. 149, 198.

108 “Provideant quod locutiones male que fiunt per civitatem sedentur, et oblocutores puniantur”; CP, 14, f. 130v, 7 March. 109 For these statements, see CP, 14, ff. 129r, 129v, 7 March. See also the comment of an oligarchic leader, Alberto da Castiglionchio: “Quod uniantur

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The antipathy which some oligarchs felt toward the regime and its war policy is documented by two items in the judicial records of March 1377. A magnate named Giovanello di Manno Adimari allegedly predicted that God would chastise the Floren-

tines for fighting against the church, and that the commune’s leaders would all be hanged.“® An anonymous denunciation against Gherardo di Messer Lorenzo Buondelmonti contained an account of his quarrel with Marchionne Stefani: “Gherardo struck Marchionne in the face several times and spoke outrageous words to him, insulting him and the popolo of Florence, saying: ‘Not a year shall pass before I cut your face, and those of all the other popolani of Florence, if it pleases God that the church prosper, as it appears to me that it now commences to do. And IJ and the other magnates of this city must have offices and be members of

the colleges and the priorate, in spite of you and the other popolani\??™ Only a small minority held these extreme views, but in the city,

the longing for peace grew more intense as the war entered into its third year."” Increasing the pressures for the cessation of hostilities was the fact that the conflict had become a military and diplomatic stalemate, with little prospect of a decisive conclusion. The establishment of the curia in Rome did not fulfill Gregory’s hopes of an overwhelming tide of sentiment in favor of the church.

While there was no stampede among rebel cities to return to the papal fold,” neither did the league make any progress toward guelfi civitatis Florentie, ita quod sint unanimes circa quod capitanei partis intendunt totis viribus”; zbzd., f. 127r. 110 4EO], 787, £. 233r, 21 March 1377. 111 M. Becker, “Un avvenimento riguardante il cronista Marchionne di Coppo

Stefani conservato nei documenti giudiziari dell’Archivio di Stato di Firenze,” ASI, cxvit (1959), 145-46. There is no proof that these accusations had any basis in fact, since no testimony of witnesses, nor record of condemnation, has survived. But such extreme statements are not inconsistent with the character and temperament of the magnatt. 112 Some of the more fervent expressions in favor of peace were made in March 1377; CP, 14, ff. 127v-130v. Typical is the comment of a “new man,” Lodovico di Banco di Ser Bartolo, who was later accused of Ghibellinism: “Quod pax, quia utile et bona et delectabile, modis omnibus procuretur”; zb7d., £. 127v. 118 For details of the church’s partial recovery of territory around Orvieto and Viterbo, see G. Mollat, “Fin de la carriére du Cardinal Pierre d’Estaing (13761377),” Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres. Comptes rendus des séances de l’année 1956, 422-25.

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destroying the church’s power. Florence was hopeful that the brutal sack of Cesena by church forces in February would revive Italian hatred of the foreigner, and inspire a new surge of resentment against the papacy. But the commune’s frenetic advertise-

ment of the massacre found no response; Italians had become

inured to tales of horror."* Gregory did succeed in enticing Bologna away from the league,” but this defection did not destroy the antipapal alliance. Nor was the military balance seriously affected by John Hawkwood’s entrance into the league’s service, or by the transfer of Florence’s general, Rodolfo of Camerino, to papal allegiance.***

Through the hot, turbid summer of 1377, the peace issue was debated in Florence and in Anagni, where the papal court had moved to escape the malarial fevers of Rome. In June, an imposing embassy of five of the republic’s most distinguished citizens—

Pazzino degli Strozzi, Alessandro dell’Antella, Lapo da Castiglionchio, Simone Peruzzi, and Benedetto Alberti—journeyed south

to renew negotiations with Gregory XI." Their reception was less frigid than that accorded to previous embassies; the pope condescended to receive them personally. Early reports from the mission were encouraging, and the Machiavelli chronicler wrote: “Tt is believed that there will be an accord.” He added this fervent plea: “May God so will it.”*""* This optimism soon faded, however.

The pope confounded the envoys by presenting them with a Florentine cleric, the prior of S. Stefano, who had offered the pope

a larger sum of money than the commune was prepared to con114 Breton soldiers quartered in Cesena had been killed in a riot of the townspeople, whereupon Cardinal Robert of Geneva, commander of the papal army, ordered his troops to sack the city. Thousands were killed in this blood bath. The event was described in great detail in contemporary chronicles, and Florence sent accounts to its allies and to European states; Gherardi, “Otto Santi,” docs. 332, 333, 335. 115 Jn March 1377 Bologna made a truce with the papacy; zd1d., doc. 341. In

July the city signed a formal peace treaty and accepted papal authority; idid., doc. 363.

116 The papacy made plans for a general offensive against Florence in the summer of 1377, but it collapsed when the Bretons refused to march; Le#tres ... du pape Grégoire XI, docs, 2036, 2048, 2060. 117 Prov., 65, ff. 43r-44r. Our knowledge of papal diplomacy, its tactics and

objectives, is very limited for these months. The papal registers for the last two years of Gregory’s pontificate have not survived; Lettres . .. du pape Grégoire XI, appendix, col. 677. 118 Diario d’anonimo, p. 332.

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cede. So furious was the Machiavelli chronicler over this unauthorized intervention that he prescribed flaying as the only adequate

punishment for such treasonous behavior.“® With neither side willing to make the concessions demanded by the other, peace talks floundered. The pessimistic tone of the embassy’s letter which reached Florence in late July prompted the Twelve to state that they were “astonished and grieved, and it seems to them

that the pope, an evil and diabolical man, is not proceeding wisely.”22”

The intervention of the prior of S. Stefano may have been spon-

sored by the philo-papal faction in the city,’ and it emphasized the sharp disagreements among the Florentines over peace terms. A sizable group of dedicated Guelfs was prepared to accept papal demands without demur, considering them fit punishment for the commune’s crime perpetrated in 1375. At the opposite pole was a small minority which was so convinced of papal insincerity and

malevolence that it opposed any formal negotiations with the curia.””” Between these extreme positions stood the bulk of the electorate, including many communal leaders, who were prepared to make concessions to the papacy but found its terms excessive. 119 Thid., p. 333. According to one chronicle source, the embassy offered Gregory 700,000 fl. over a period of seven years, but the pope demanded more than one million fl.; Cronichetta d’incerto, in Crontchette antiche di varit scrittort del buon secolo della lingua toscana, p. 212. In a letter to Florence, 15 July 1377, the pope stated that the commune had offered 300,000 fl. over a six-year period; Diario d’anonimo, p. 497. 120 The spokesman was Jacopo Sacchetti: “Quod ipsi valde mirantur et dolent, et videtur eis quod papa non procedat sagaciter, et tanquam malus homo et diabolicus”; CP, 15, f. 26r, 24 July. The Sixteen were slightly more optimistic: “Quod littere oratorum qui sunt in curia quamvis dure videantur, tamen quod disperandum non est.” 121 The prior was Ubaldino Bonamichi, a good friend of Lapo da Castiglionchio; Epistola, pp. xxxv, 203-05. Rumors circulated at this time that papal sympathizers in Florence were revealing communal secrets to the curia. Vanni da Quarata’s reaction to this rumor was violent: “Utinam decorietur unus, et eius pellis ponatur ante Palatium in exemplum”; Diario d’anonimo, p. 230. In December the Signoria obtained possession of a letter containing communal secrets, allegedly sent by a Florentine to the papal court; CP, 15, ff. 66r, 68v. 122 The size of this minority may be gauged from the votes on the measures authorizing a peace embassy to the curia: the June provision, 220-17 and 125-8; and a July provision extending the embassy’s authority, 151-28 and 99-11. Six months before, when peace sentiment was weaker, the opposing votes were more numerous: 110-50 and 104-11, 28-30 December 1376; LF, 40, ff. 239r-230v, 252r-253r, 261r, 263Vv.

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Particularly unpalatable to Florentine taste were the size of the indemnity demanded by Gregory XI and his insistence that the commune abandon her allies in the papal states. Many Florentines believed that their liberty would be secure only if Perugia and Citta di Castello remained independent,’”* and thus served as a buffer zone to protect the republic from a vengeful papacy. This was in Donato Barbadori’s mind when he warned his hearers that “we should beware lest the pope, having received our money,

should be in a position to destroy our state or those of our confederates,”*”*

Thus one reason for the commune’s deliberate and cautious deportment in peace negotiations was the conviction held by many

citizens that Florence’s future as an independent republic hung in the balance. But equally important were the possible repercussions of a peace settlement upon domestic politics. A favorable treaty that won the acclaim of the citizenry would enhance the prestige of the Eight and would strengthen those groups that had strongly supported the war: the gente nuova, the artisans, the liberal patricians. But an unsatisfactory peace, involving a heavy monetary expenditure and the abandonment of Florence’s allies, would redound to the advantage of the oligarchy, the Parte Guelfa, and the clergy. It would seriously weaken the political influence

of those forces that had dominated the commune since 1372. Despite a total lack of documentation on this important theme, there can be little doubt that these domestic considerations induced the communal leadership to resist peace pressures, and to prolong negotiations until the republic gained more favorable terms.

The pope was not ignorant of this fact, for he sought to drive a wedge between the people and their leaders. In August, Gregory sent two friars to the city. Ostensibly, their mission was the presen123 That the commune insisted upon the independence of these cities is clear from one statement in the protocols. Leonardo Beccanugi advised the Signoria to justify the republic’s position “circa tractatum pacis et illos duos punctos et libertatis et pecunie; ostendendo quod ecclesia concedit quotidie terras suas dominis et tirannis, et de terris datis et concessis domino Galeaz”; CP, 15, f£. 29Vv.

In his letter to the commune, Gregory XI published Florence’s demands: the papacy’s guarantee that the rebel cities would remain free for six years, with the right to join a Florentine league during that period; Diario d’anonimo, p. 497. 124“Caveatur ne recepta nostra pecunia, papa non possit destruere statum nostrum vel collegatorum”; CP, 15, f. 29v.

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tation of the curia’s latest proposals, but their primary objective was to discredit the regime, and particularly the Eight, by suggesting that they were obstructing a peace agreement. The chroniclers reported that the envoys were reluctant to treat with the

Signoria or the Eight, but preferred instead to harangue the crowds in the streets. The gist of their message was the pope’s ardent desire for peace, and the frustration of his pacific efforts by a diabolical minority bent upon continuing the struggle.’” Neither the proposals nor the behavior of the papal envoys made a favorable impression in Florence. One chronicler exclaimed indignantly that the church’s demands were so outrageous that they signified nothing.*** Strong protests were voiced against the diplomatic tactics employed by the ambassadors: they were termed “vulpine” by the Sixteen and “poisonous” by Messer

Donato Aldighieri.’ Filippo Bastari was so incensed by these practices that he urged the Signoria to terminate negotiations, “since they [the friars] have no other purpose than to disseminate scandal.”*** The Sixteen advised the priors to inform Gregory XI

“that the commune is united, and that no one can push through a policy which is against the will of the people.”*”* 125 See Manoscritti, 222, f. 260; Sozomen, Specimen, RRIISS, xvi, col. 1102. Sozomen asserted that the ambassadors “noluerunt nisi in congregatione populi loqui, qua congregata, ut seminarent scandala, dixerunt, papam diligere populum Florentinum et semper voluisse pacem cum eis, sed malitia aliquorum civium numquam potuit facere, qui ut facerent se divites semper quaerebant bellum et discordias.” An eyewitness account by the Sienese ambassador contained the same information: “Causa commisionis ambaxiate in istos religiosos fuit quia pape fuit relatus per plures quod comune et populus Florentie volebant omnino pacem, et quod per paucos magnos cives impediebatur. Unde noluit quod ambaxiata exponetur solum in consilio”; ASS, Concistoro, 1792, f. 86r. 126 Diario d’anonimo, p. 335: “. . . Tante cose addomandavano al nostro Comune, ed era si fuori di verita e si disonesta e sconcia, che venne a dire non

nulla.” At the same time, Gregory was complaining of the impossibility of concluding a peace with the intransigent and perfidious Florentines. See his letter of 25 July, Lettres... du pape Grégoire XI, doc. 2036: “Verum quia cum Florentinis eisdem ... nullam pacis viam possumus invenire, quin imo continue per ambages et verba-ducimur sine fructu. .. .” 127 CP, 15, ff. 29r-29QV.

128 Tbid., f. 30r: “Domini expediant quanto citius possunt, quia non venerunt nisi scandalum seminare.”

129 Uberto di Schiatta Ridolfi, spokesman for the Sixteen, ibid., f. 30v: “Ostendatur unio comunis et populi, et quomodo nullus est qui conducat rem publicam ultra voluntatem populi.” Additional details of this embassy are provided by the anonymous priorista, Manoscritti, 222, £. 260. He reported that

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In an assembly convened on 6 October, the popolo gained an unusual opportunity to express its sentiments on the war.’** Before

this parliament of the entire electorate, the commune’s ambassadors, recently returned from Anagni, presented the curia’s latest terms for peace. Gregory’s principal demands were: the payment of one million florins, the rehabilitation of Florentine rebels who had adhered to the papacy, the dissolution of the league, and the

commune’s promise to make no alliance with papal subjects in the future.*** The assembly’s response was overwhelmingly negative. In the words of the Machiavelli chronicler, “The pope made

sO many varied and strange and burdensome demands upon the

commune that all who heard them spoke in unison: “We will sacrifice our property and our lives, until nothing remains, rather than surrender to his will. Death to the rapacious wolf and cruel tyrant!’ ”*** Foligno diConte de’ Medici, whose political sympathies

were strongly Guelf and oligarchic, made this bellicose comment: “Since we cannot have peace, let us wage war vigorously, and to this end encourage the Eight, and procure for them the necessary funds.”**°

Fortified by this demonstration of public support, the Signoria decided to violate the papal interdict. After consulting with advisory groups, the priors ordered the reopening of the churches and the celebration of divine services.“** Thus the commune pubthe ambassadors proclaimed that the war had been the work of the Eight and other powerful citizens “per ingrassare e dominare contro la volonta del popolo.”

In reply, Messer Pazzino degli Strozzi informed the envoys that Florentines were united in their determination to resist papal aggression, and he expressed astonishment that the pope would give credence to “cierti schandalosi e mal-

chontenti nimici della loro patria.” The chronicler added: “E per questa risposta fra cittadini chrebbe grande hodii e nimicizie.” 180 The speeches made in this assembly are summarized in CP, 15, ff. 42r-42v. For a reference to Lapo da Castiglionchio’s role in this convocation, see his Epistola, p. xlvii. A month earlier, another magno consilio was called to listen

to a progress report on peace negotiations; zbid., ff. 32v-35v, 4 September. Opinions expressed in this council were generally pessimistic. See the comment in Diario d’anonimo, p. 336: “. . . Sono tutti ladri e traditori e micidiali lupi rapaci.”

181 These proposals are outlined in Salutati’s letter to Galeazzo Malatesta, Epistolae, 1, no. 69. There were seventeen capitol: in the papal ultimatum. | 132 Diario d’anonimo, pp. 339-40. 1383 CP, 15, f. 44r, 9 October. 184 For opinions on this problem, see CP, 15, ff. 43v-45r, 9 October. See also Diario d’anonimo, p. 340; Perrens, Histoire de Florence, v, 162-63.

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licized its defiance of the papacy. Further, it committed the entire populace to overt disobedience of the Holy See. All who refused to attend mass, Foligno de’ Medici asserted, should leave communal territory or suffer heavy penalties. A member of the Eight, Matteo Soldi, demanded that all clerics who refused to celebrate mass be expelled, while laymen who did not participate should

be severely punished.“* This communal action dimmed even further the possibility of a rapprochement with the papacy, and Gregory’s response was to increase the spiritual penalties upon the

city. The Eight were designated as heretics—a judgment which threatened the entire citizenry—and all clerics were ordered to abandon Florentine territory.**°

The position of the Eight had been strengthened by the collapse of peace negotiations and the consequent surge of antipapal feeling in the city. But this did not deter the Guelf hierarchy from

continuing to agitate for peace. Among the principal figures in this oligarchic campaign were three devotees of Catherine of Siena: Ristoro Canigiani, Stoldo Altoviti, and Niccolé Soderini, all from ancient patrician families.**’ The Guelf sentiments of these men were intensified by their strong religious convictions.***

They persuaded the Sienese mystic to visit the Arno city for a second time on a peace mission, to convince the Florentines that they must return to papal obedience. Catherine did not hesitate to intervene in communal politics. According to Stefani’s report, 185 CP, 15, ff. 43v-44r. Others who advocated the punishment of reluctant participants in divine services were Messer Donato Barbadori, Donnino Donnini, Messer Alessandro dell’Antella, and even Lapo da Castiglionchio, speaking on

behalf of the five ambassadors to the curia. On this issue, as on many others during these tense months, Lapo probably dissimulated his true sentiments. See Perrens, v, 163-64.

186 The details of these sentences are in one of Cristoforo da Piacenza’s dispatches, 15 November 1377; ASI; ser. 5, XLII, 7, 265. See also Lettres ... du Grégoire XI, docs. 2052, 2086; Perrens, v, 164-65. 187 These men are identified by Stefani, 773, as Catherine’s strong supporters

in Florence. Among her extant letters are three to Soderini and five to Canigiani; Le lettere di S. Caterina da Siena, wi, nos. 131, 171, 258, 266; 1Vv, nos. 279, 297, 299, 301. Canigiani’s brother Barduccio was Catherine’s secretary and a member of her circle of intimates. Catherine also had followers among the Florentine lower classes: there are twenty-four letters written to a tailor, Francesco di Pipino, and his wife Agnese, who were among the saint’s adherents. 188So strong were these convictions in certain oligarchic leaders that two of them, Filippo Baroncelli and Paolo di Bingieri Rucellai, entered religious orders; Stefani, 790; Tratte, 193, no pag., 28 April 1377.

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she denounced those politicians who had led the struggle against the church, and she publicly defended the practice of ammonizione in which her oligarchic patrons engaged.**® Thus intimately associated with the Parte leadership, she aroused both enthusiasm and hostility in the city. Communal officials deplored her activities, but they feared that any reprisal against her might discredit them. Reliable information on Catherine’s political role in Florence 1s very scanty, but it is possible, as her biographers insisted, that the

demonstrations against her were inspired and directed by the “Eight Saints.”**°

The Parte hierarchy also made a direct attack upon the league.

In December, the captains agitated for its dissolution, on the grounds that its existence antagonized the pope. The league was “harmful and a stumbling block to peace,” argued Priore Baldovinetti, spokesman for the captains.*** But others contended that the commune’s withdrawal from the league would demoralize Florence’s allies, and would destroy any possibility of effective military action against the papacy. When the captains’ proposal to disband the league was first broached to the Signoria on 19 December, it was emphatically rejected by the colleges and the

Fight." On the day after Christmas, a large assembly of richiesti participated in the most candid debate on a war issue recorded in the protocols.** For the first time, the oligarchy abandoned its protective mantle of silence and spoke its mind. One after another of 139 Stefani, 773. No hint of her presence or activities in Florence is found in the commune’s official records, nor are there any references in other chronicles. 140 According to these sources, Catherine was attacked by a hostile mob; see Fawtier, Sainte Catherine de Sienne, 1, 197-203. Stefani, 773, notes only that her house was destroyed, but says nothing of the circumstances. On these events, see Denis-Boulet, Catherine de Sienne, pp. 147-51. Catherine had apparently used

her influence to persuade the Florentines to obey the interdict, which may have intensified popular resentment against her. 141 CP, 15, f. 68v, 28 December. At this time the commune had accepted Bernabd Visconti’s offer to mediate between Florence and Gregory XI. Joanna of Naples had also offered her services, which were being considered by the Fight; ziid., ff. 62r-63r. 142 CP, 15, ff. 64v-65r. Andrea Capponi and Piero Canigiani spoke for the colleges, and Tommaso degli Strozzi for the Eight. 143 In this Pratica debate, the opinions of twelve citizens were recorded, an

exceptionally high number for the war period; CP, 15, ff. 66r-66v. Perrens, Histoire de Florence, v, 169-70, has published excerpts from several opinions.

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the Parte hierarchs—Pazzino and Carlo degli Strozzi, Messer Filippo Corsini, Antonio Ridolfi, Lapo da Castiglionchio—urged

that the antipapal league be dissolved as the first step to peace. The speedy end of the conflict was necessary for the security and independence of the republic, they insisted; and since the league was an impediment to peace, it should be abandoned forthwith. This policy did not really constitute a betrayal of the commune’s allies, Filippo Corsini asserted, for if the papacy attacked Perugia or Citta di Castello, the commune would be free to defend these towns.*** Lapo da Castiglionchio began his speech with this grim warning: “The city of Florence is in grave danger, since it is engaged in a struggle with an invincible enemy, who, even though

it has been dislodged from Italy, still possesses much [power] in facto et in ture.”*° Therefore, Lapo concluded, peace was neces-

sary to avert disaster. And dissolution of the league was an essential preliminary. Defenders of the commune’s policy were subdued and cautious in their comments; they eschewed the bellicose proclamations to

which they had been addicted. Vanni da Quarata claimed that the pope did not really want peace, and that the commune must tread warily in negotiating with him, to avoid being deceived. Gino Anselmi, a consistent opponent of the Parte leadership, argued that any Florentine move to disband the league would

| demoralize its members. Mezza Attaviani favored the prorogation of the federation, on the grounds that this would be a warning to the pope. Filippo Bastari defended the Eight and their handling of peace negotiations;**’ he also criticized the Parte’s eagerness to 144 Messer Pazzino degli Strozzi: “Quod pax esse debet cordi omnibus civibus.” Carlo degli Strozzi: “Quod pax est comuni necessaria propter omnes respectus.” Messer Filippo Corsini: “Quod pax procuretur.” Antonio Ridolfi: “Consideratis maximis expensis, pax est necessaria comuni.” 145 “Facere autem ligam donec consentientur vicariatus per papam non est

necessarium, quia si papa contrafaceret, rumperet pacem et comune posset quemlibet adiuvare.”

146 “Quod civitas Florentina est in magno periculo, attento quod bellum geritur cum hoste invincibili qui quamvis pellatur Italia, tamen maximus remanet in facto et in jure. Et ideo pax sine intermissione procuretur. Et quia prorogatio lege manifestum est nichil aliud esse quam impedire pacem, ideo bonum est quod prorogatio non fiat, sed supersedatur.” 147 Implicit in the arguments of the oligarchic spokesman was the charge that the Eight were not genuinely interested in obtaining peace. See Pazzino degli Strozzi’s comment: “Quod pax esse debet cordi omnibus civibus, et maxime

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obtain a settlement with Gregory XI. “To desire peace excessively,” he contended, “might impede the achievement of peace.”

He added that the commune had done everything possible to end the war, and he deplored the interjection of the league issue,

which would only complicate the problems confronting the government.” Bastari’s viewpoint prevailed. The league was not dissolved, and the war’s management remained in the hands of the Eight. Neither this issue, nor the threat of another imperial invasion of Italy,**® weakened the confidence of the majority of the Florentine

people in their leaders. It was the awareness of this fact which induced the oligarchy to embark upon its desperate expedient to end the war: the wholesale proscription of its political enemies. officio Octo.” Gino Anselmi referred to the discord between the Parte captains

and the Eight: “Et faciant ita quod capitanei et octo guerre remaneant contenti et concordes.” 148 “Nimium velle pacem esset impedimentum pacis, et quod hucusque circa eam factum est tantum quantum fieri potest. Circa prorogationem lige, dixit quod consulere precise affirmative vel negative est periculosum, quia dabitur materia hinc pape denegandi pacem, inde collegatis de se suspicandi.” 149 The Parte captains made a formal statement to the Signoria that Charles IV was embarking upon his third Italian journey; CP, 15, f. 73v, 26 January 1378. Rumors of this invasion reached Florence as early as November; Diario d’anonimo, p. 346.

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CHAPTER VIII | Ghe Demise of the Regime 1378

The Guelf Terror While describing an incident in the life of S. Catherine of Siena, Fra Raimondo of Capua recalled a conversation he had had with Niccoléd Soderini, “a man faithful to God and to the Holy Church.” Their discussion had centered on the hypocritical demeanor of the commune’s leaders, who publicly avowed their desire for peace while at the same time avoiding a settlement with the church. “You may be certain,” Raimondo quoted Soderini as saying, “that the entire Florentine people and all honorable citizens desire peace, but there are a few evil men governing our city who are obstacles to peace.” The friar inquired whether a remedy existed for this unfortunate state of affairs. Soderini replied: “Certainly, if the good citizens commit themselves fervently to God’s cause, and with the help of the captains of the Parte Guelfa, they

relieve these men from their positions, as enemies of the commonweal.” The Parte chieftain added that it would be sufficient to proscribe four or six of these benighted officials, in order to terminate the war.’ Neither in the surviving records of the Parte Guelfa nor in the memoirs of its devotees do we find any details of the discussions 1 Acta Sanctorum, 3rd ed., Aprilis, m1, 965: “. . . Contuleram cum quodam cive Florentino, fideli Deo ac sanctae Ecclesiae, qui vocabatur Nicolaus Soderini,

et erat sanctae virgini valde devotus, super negotiis civitatis Florentiae, et potissime super malitia supra scripta, qua praetendebant se velle pacem cum sancta Ecclesia, quam tantum offenderant, et nihilominus pacem fugiebant. De qua cum ego conquererer, ille vir bonus, prudens et laudabilis famae, respondit: Habeatis pro certo, quod populus Florentinus universaliter et omnes probi viri civitatis ejusdem vellent pacem: sed quidam maligni et pauci, qui peccatis nostris exigentibus hodie civitatem nostram gubernant, sunt qui pacem impediunt. Tunc ego: Huic malo non posset apponi remedium? At ille: Posset utique, si aliqui ex bonis civibus, ferventer apprehenderent negotium Dei, et cum officialibus seu Capitaneis partis Guelfae facerent illos paucos privari officiis,

tamquam hostes boni comunis: et non essent isti privandi, ultra numerum quaternarium vel senarium.” Raimondo stated that this conversation took place in Siena, perhaps while Soderini was attempting to persuade Catherine to visit Florence. See above, Pp. 332.

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on this issue. There is no evidence to indicate by what stages the Parte’s leadership became converted to Sederini’s argument that only through ammonizione could peace be attained. Bese Magalotti, a member of the Parte’s ruling elite, reported in his diary that a proposal “to make a search for Ghibellines” was twice voted down by the Guelf society in the spring of 1377.” By year’s end, however, oligarchic opinion had become more receptive to extreme

measures. Parte leaders were apparently convinced that only a massive attack upon the regime, its leaders, and its principles could save the city from major disaster.” The oligarchy’s decision to embark upon its bold and dangerous policy of mass proscription was based on two considerations. Foremost was the conviction that the communal leadership was de-

termined to continue the war until it obtained more favorable terms: a smaller indemnity, a papal promise to recognize the independence of Perugia and Citta di Castello, and the curia’s acceptance of certain restrictions upon ecclesiastical liberty.* The Eight’s intransigence, their refusal to yield to oligarchic pressures, was demonstrated by the decision to convene another congress of the league in February 1378.° 2 Magalotti’s ricordanze, copied in an eighteenth century hand, are in Carte Strozziane, ser. 2, 116. See f. 229v: “Fui chiamato arroto alla parte del mese di febbraio [1377], e non si segui di far la cerca de Ghibellini, e del mese di marzo all’entrata, si fe da capo la detta chiamata a fave tra priori e segretari e capitani, e fui de detti eletti, misesi a partito se fare si dovessi, e non si vinse. .. .” 8 Supporters of the regime, too, discussed desperate measures to end the war.

The most radical proposal was advanced by two men, a notary named Ser Gregorio and a dyer named Domenico di Sandro Donnini. They suggested that the commune submit to the rule of a signore, the Duke of Anjou. But memories of 1342 and the Duke of Athens were still strong in Florence. See this statement by the Sixteen: “Quod Pierus Siminetti nominet illum. civem qui dixit quod oportebat comune venire sub dominum, et quod melior esse dux Andegavensis”; Consulte e Pratiche, 15, f. 57v, 24 November 1377. Later in the same day, the Sixteen spoke again on this issue: “Quod verba dicta de duce Andegavensis videntur verba frustratoria. Et quod quando Domenico Sandri [Donnini] reversus de Sancti Geminiano, habeantur ipse et Ser Gregorius, et moneantur quod talia colloquia alia non haberent vel frequentent”; zdid., f. 58r. *Two unresolved issues which separated the commune and the papacy in

the spring of 1378 were the authority of the inquisitor and the problem of confiscated clerical property; see CP, 15, ff. 93r-94r, 27 March 1378. 5 See the letter of 18 December 1377 to all members of the league, announcing

a convocation of ambassadors in Florence on 2 February 1378: “Quoniam statum Libertatis Italiae videmus a Sacrae Ligae nexibus dependere, et quoniam

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Secondly, the Parte leaders were spurred to action by the swelling peace sentiment in the city; they believed that their campaign would obtain strong support, or at least tacit acceptance, from a war-weary populace.* Evidence to support this calculation was not lacking. The desire for peace in mercantile circles was indicated by this collegiate appeal, made on 19 March: “Let us have peace, and obtain it on behalf of the merchants, so that they may transact

their business throughout the world and recover their debts.” The Machiavelli chronicler ceased to make derogatory comments about the pope and the clergy, and abandoned his demands that

| the war be prosecuted with vigor. Instead, he transcribed a poem in which pacifist sentiments were fervently expressed, and which contained some oblique criticism of warmongers:

Pacie, per Dio, né mai altro che pacie, : Pacie, ché per Firenze non fa guerra, Pacie, pero che rifa questa terra, Pacie dimando perché la mia piacie Pacie, pacie di Dio cheggio;

Pacie ci dia iSignior, che in pacie n’aggia E pacie metta in cuore a chi la sdegnia.® convocatio Sociorum nostrorum consuevit esse consolationis et fructus, .. . consulte decrevimus in Civitate Florentiae, omnes colligatos et socios convocare, ut de statu publico totius ligae in medium consulatur, et ut prorogentur tempora

ligae, prout tunc videbitur omnibus adunandis”; Lint Coluct Ptert Salutati Epistolarum, u, 92-93. A copy of this letter is in ASS, Conctstoro, 1794, f. 7r. For another sign of the Ejight’s coolness toward a peace settlement, see the comment by their spokesman, Matteo Soldi: “Quod eis non videtur procedendum circa pacem ulterius donec sciatur intentio pape”; CP, 15, f. 80v, 12 February 1378.

®On the growth of peace sentiment in the city, see the Sixteen’s comment, “Quod considerata voluntate populi circa pacem”; CP, 15, f. 93v, 27 March; and Stefani’s comment: “Nello anno 1377 si si seguia molto l’ammonire, perocché la guerra era incominciata a rincrescere, ed il pagare si facea malvolentieri, ed erono gli attizzatori della Parte contro agli Otto della balia, e dicieno che eglino voleano guerra e non pace; e con questo chi li favoreggiava era in grande paura e pericolo”; Cronaca fiorentina di Marchionne di Coppo Stefant, 771. 7“Quod pax procuretur, et pro mercatoribus procuretur quod possint facere per mundum suas mercantias et exigere debita sibi”; CP, 15, f. gov. It is noteworthy that this college was then composed of small businessmen and artisans, not international merchants. Five of the Twelve were lower guildsmen. 8 Diario d’anonimo fiorentino, in Cronache dei secoli xiti e xiv, pp. 350-51.

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THE DEMISE OF THE REGIME, 1378

But just as the men who maneuvered the commune into war in 1375 were motivated as much by emotion as by logic and calculation, so did the oligarchs in 1378 succumb to irrational impulses. The immoderate character of their actions suggests the preponderant influence of such extremists as Gherardo Buondelmonti

and Bonaiuto Serragli, whose passions were not curbed by an appreciation of political realities.’ Oligarchic policy in these months thus cannot be explained entirely in terms of the rational linking of means to ends. In varying degrees, the Parte hierarchs were afflicted by political madness. Both Stefani and the Machiavelli chronicler identify the leaders of the oligarchic campaign.*® In the front rank were those aristocrats with long experience in partisan warfare: Lapo da Castiglionchio, Piero degli Albizzi, Benghi Buondelmonti, Niccold Soderini, Bonaiuto Serragli, Bartolo Siminetti, Carlo degli Strozzi, Piero Canigiani, Stoldo Altoviti, Migliore Guadagni. In his catalogue of the Parte chieftains who directed the proscription cam-

paign, Stefani included members from most of the important patrician families. Representing S. Spirito were leaders of the two great magnate houses, the Bardi and the Rossi, and scions of three popolano families: Giovanni Biliotti, Buoninsegna Machiavelli, and Antonio Ridolfi. The contingent from S. Croce included two members of the small but wealthy mercantile family, the Castel-

lani, and also men from three houses that had dominated the Florentine business world before 1343: Simone and Benedetto Peruzzi, Giovanni and Buonaccorso Buonaccorsi, Filippo and Giovanni Baroncelli. Associated with these wealthy oligarchs from

S. Croce were three impecunious rentiers: Bardo Mancini, Bese Magalotti, and Adoardo de’ Pulci, who possessed little beyond their illustrious family names to support their pretensions to influence and power. S. Maria Novella furnished large blocs from three prominent Even more explicit was this statement: “E a chi volesse guastare la nostra citta e a chi vuole guerra, che si gli possa appiccare in casa sua un fuoco che no’ si possa mai ispegniere, ammenne”; zbid., p. 355. ® For the views and practices of these oligarchs, see above, pp. 247, 259, 326. 10 In two places in his chronicle, Stefani lists the Parte chieftains who led the ammonizione campaign; 775, 790. The Machiavelli chronicler recorded the

names of the Parte captains through the first six months of 1378; Diario d’anomimo, pp. 347, 351, 355-

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mercantile families—Strozzi, Rucellai, Altoviti—to the Parte leadership. Joining them in the Parte’s inner circle were the Acciaiuoli and the Mangioni, two families who had lost much of their former

wealth and prestige, together with two of Florence’s richest

| citizens, Andrea Baldesi and Salice Cavalcanti. The Albizzi were still prominent among the S. Giovanni representatives to the Parte councils. Among their neighbors with oligarchic sympathies were an eminent statesman, Biagio Guasconi, a rich banker, Vieri di Cambio de’ Medici, and members of three magnate houses, the Pazzi, Brunelleschi, and Adimari. The list included rich and poor, businessmen and scioperati, descendants of feudal nobility and social upstarts,* but all united in their determination to transform the regime and reverse its foreign policy. Nearly one hundred Florentines fell victim to the Guelf terror in the winter and spring of 1377-1378. The Parte had reactivated its ammonizione machinery in September 1377, and twenty two

citizens were deprived of their political rights during the remainder of the year. But the great purge began in January, when

another twenty three were proscribed.” Thereafter, scarcely a week passed without its quota of seven or eight men leaving the

Parte’s palace in disgrace, to be taunted by a crowd of young aristocrats: “Now go and make war against the church.”** Every level of the social hierarchy was represented among the ammoniti: artisans and contadini, merchants and lawyers, as well as magnates

| from the city’s oldest families. As in the past, the group that suffered most was the rising business class, which had only recently obtained egress into high communal office.** Among the disfranchised were no less than twelve “new men” from the Lana guild. 11 The variations in the economic status of these Guelf leaders may be seen by comparing their prestanze levies in April 1378: Michele Castellani (105 f1.), Carlo and Messer Pazzino degli Strozzi (91, 70), Salice Cavalcanti (73), Niccold

Soderini (30), Andrea Baldesi (42), Piero Canigiani (5), Bese Magalotti (4), Bardo Mancini (2), Bonaiuto Serragli (2), Ormanno Foraboschi (3), and Vieri Cavicciuli (4); Prestanze, 332, ff. 27v, 129V, 134V3 333, ff. 2v, or, I5V, 33V3 334, ff. 53r, 103r; 335, ff. 78v, 95v.

12'The names of the ninety-two men who were proscribed from September 1377 through June 1378 are in Stefani, 770, 775, 788. 18 Stefani, 765.

14, A score of the ammoniti had first entered the Signoria just before or during the war with the papacy, having been selected in the scrutinies of 1360 and 1363.

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But this purge differed from earlier ones in certain important respects, First, the Parte inaugurated the practice of screening those men whose names were drawn from the borse to fill the priorate and the colleges. For example, in late April it proscribed three men, Stefano Benini, Giovanni di Ser Rucco, and Piero Donati, who had just been selected to the Signoria, and two others, the furrier, Simone Palmieri, and the druggist, Francesco di Ser

Donato, who had been extracted as members of the incoming Sixteen.” Nor did the Parte flinch from striking men while they held office. The ropemaker, Maso Neri, who had been a fixture in the government since 1354, was proscribed while a member of the Twelve. Another victim was Messer Donato Aldighieri, who played an important role in the commune’s war diplomacy. For his actions against the Parte he was excluded from office and sentenced by the podesta to a three-year term of exile at Ferrara. But the Parte achieved a high point of reckless bravado when it placed the Ghibelline stigma upon one of the “Eight Saints,” the druggist, Giovanni Din1.**

These provocative actions were matched by the proscription of several distinguished citizens of the highest social rank, men who combined active business careers with prominent roles in the communal government. Such were three bankers, Niccol6 Rimbaldesi, Nofri dell’Antella, and Giovanni de’ Mozzi; three cloth manufacturers, Giovanni del Bene, Bettino Covoni, and Lapo Tolosini; and one of Florence’s richest citizens, the international trader and financier, Francesco Rinuccini.™ 15 Diario d’anonimo, p. 353; Diario del Monaldi, appended to Istorte pistolesi

(Prato, 1835), p. 514. 16 For these penalties, see Stefani, 775, 788; Diario d’anonimo, p. 349.

17 These men were all from patrician families. The Rimbaldesi had first entered the Signoria in 1316, the Tolosini in 1318, the Del Bene in 1283, the Covoni in 1303, the Antellesi in 1282, and the Mozzi (former magnates) in 1327.

That many conservative patricians were appalled by these proscriptions is suggested by Donato Acciaiuoli’s comments on the ammonizione of Jacopo and Francesco del Bene: “A mme piacie l’anmunisca che n’a bisongno, servendo giustizia. Dicoti che mai non senti tanta pena per nulla avversita d’amico o ddi parente, quanto sento ongn’ora per Franciesco e Giovanni, e mai non potrebbe per ispazio di tempo dimenticarsi. Non mi pare sia di lui uscito mai opera che questo meritasse, il contrario, si. E molte volte per lui e per suoi ¢€ scritto n’appariscie, e ssicuro mi parea fosse la casa sua, che sse un picholo pensiero

m’avesse avuta, arei trovato de modi a stare costa per darli quello aiuto e

34]

THE DEMISE OF THE REGIME, 1378

Only an extreme sense of urgency and desperation, or the total abandonment of rational calculation, can account for the Parte’s purge of these patricians. For they were not weak, isolated, vulner-

able, and friendless; they were capable of mustering as many supporters and as much wealth as their enemies, The impact of their proscription was greater than that of the parvenu, for the relatives of these citizens were likewise barred from office.** For the ostracized families, the loss of political power, or stato, was a

misfortune of the utmost gravity. It imperiled both their social standing and their economic status. In addition to losing such lucrative benefits as offices, communal contracts, and leases, the ammoniti were liable to discriminatory taxation, unfair treatment in the courts, and disregard for their petitions and appeals.” But, as Stefani noted, the most serious aspect of ammonizione was its ineradicable character; like original sin, it passed from generation

to generation in perpetuity.” A glimpse into the Parte’s activities during these tense weeks is afforded by Bese Magalotti’s diary.” Although his cryptic references to his personal role in the Guelf society are not exceptionally illuminating, they do convey something of the spirit which then pervaded the Guelf palace. On 27 February 1378 Bese wrote: “I

was one of the Twenty-four who proscribed Stefano Brunacci, Agnolo Palarcioni, who had been a prior, Mazza the armorer, Raimondo, the brother of Giorgio da Barberino, Davanzato di

Montelupo, Cantino di Agnolo and Alberto di Ser Lippo da Barberino.” Magalotti then identified the captains who had initiated these ammonizioni, noting that they were also responsible for the purge of the Covoni, Soldani, Tolosini, and Mozzi. On 1 March, Bese recorded his election to one of the Parte’s minor councils, and noted that a general scrutiny of all Parte offices was conducted a week later. His entry for 1 April is more informative. Again he was chosen to the commission which ratified the prorrimedio ch’avessi potuto. ... Parmi erano 1 pitt intimi amici avesse tutta la nostra familglia.” Letter of ro March 1378 from Verona; Carte Del Bene, 53, np. 18 Monaldi, pp. 512-13, stated that all members of the Covoni, Mannelli, Tolosini, and Soldani families were disfranchised along with those who were specifically ammonitz.

19 See above, pp. 80-81. 20 Stefani, 923. ,

21 Carte Strozziane, ser. 2, 116, ff. 235v-236r.

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scription of five men. One of these, Ser Cristofano da Barberino, was convicted of Ghibellinism by a document alleging that his ancestors had conspired to surrender Barberino to Emperor Henry VII. Manno di Boccaccio di Messer Ardovino had been designated as a Ghibelline by the captains, but he was saved by the Twentyfour, who refused to ratify his proscription. In May, Bese entered the Parte captaincy alongside such prominent Guelf hierarchs as Bettino Ricasoli, Taddeo degli Agli, and Giovanni Biliotti. He belonged to that captaincy which precipitated the final crisis before the regime’s collapse. While engaging in this sustained attack on its political enemies, the Parte also initiated measures to fortify its privileges and immunities. The first reform decree, formulated as an amendment to the Parte’s statute, provided that no captain in office could be prosecuted for crime by the commune’s judicial authorities. The second enactment took note of “the excellent and salubrious work accomplished by the Parte captains now in office, and particularly their proscription of many Florentine citizens as Ghibellines, and that on account of these and other activities, they have become the object of hatred and envy.” As a reward for their diligent service,

these men were to be protected by Parte authorities from any future reprisal.*” The Guelf society also authorized the design of a special banner, adorned with the arms of Charles I of Anjou,

under whose aegis the Parte Guelfa had become the dominant force in Italian politics in the thirteenth century.” Those captains

who had been cited for meritorious service were also granted special powers for one year to reform the Parte’s constitution, and to make any provisions which they deemed necessary for the organization’s welfare.** As Stefani pointed out, they became the dictators of the Guelf society for one year. But the most significant 22 Archivio di Parte Guelfa, rosso, 1, ff. 49v, 50v-51r. Other minor reforms pertaining to procedural details are in idid., ff. 46v-52r. The reform measures were enacted in January 1378. 28 Stefani, 778; Diario d’anonimo, p. 350. This banner was consigned to the charge of Benghi Buondelmonti. 24 APG, rosso, 1, £. 4gv. These captains, who held office from mid-January to mid-March are identified in Diario d’anonimo, p. 347. They were: Lapo da Castiglionchio, Benghi Buondelmonti, Bonaiuto Serragli, Adoardo de’ Pulci, Francesco Arrigucci, Antonio de’ Pazzi, Vieri de’ Medici and two lower guildsmen, Domenico, a shoemaker, and Giovanni di Ser Donato, a blacksmith.

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action taken by these captains, led by Lapo da Castiglionchio, was

a reform of the scrutiny for the Parte captaincy. Selection to the supreme executive was so manipulated that the extremists had a majority in each captaincy for the entire year.” Having strengthened its defenses, the Parte was alert to repulse any attack on its organization and personnel. An opportunity to display its aggressive temper soon presented itself. Two neighbors

of Benghi Buondelmonti, Lorenzo di Messer Dino and Alessio Baldovinetti, had been involved in private quarrels with that Parte figure. They presented a petition against Benghi to the Signoria, but this maneuver failed. In retaliation, the Parte chieftains threatened to press for their execution by the judicial authorities. Alessio

| was accused of shouting “Vzva el popolo!” outside the Parte palace, and of threatening to burn down the building while the captains were inside. Four Guelf partisans testified that the indictment against Alessio was true, and he was sent to prison, a punishment

which Stefani described as “abominable and beyond all reason and equity.””°

To illustrate the profound fears which the Guelf terror had engendered, Stefani related the story of a man who was seated at table, preparing to break a day’s fast. Someone came to him and remarked, “That bread is against the Parte,” whereupon the diner

forgot his hunger and arose from the table without eating. No citizen could feel secure in this atmosphere, the chronicler stated, “even if he were more Guelf than Charlemagne.”” The truth of this observation was borne out by Giovanni Morelli’s description of his family’s frenetic efforts to safeguard its political status. The

Morelli, who had resided in Florence for more than a century, invoked the aid of their powerful neighbor, Lapo da Castiglionchio. Through Lapo’s intercession with his friends in the Parte executive, the Morelli obtained a document which certified that 25 These slates were called pallottole; they are listed in Diario d’anonimo, pp. 362-63.

26 On this incident, see Stefani, 779. Only the condemnation of Baldovinetti survives in the judicial records, although Stefani asserted that Lorenzo was also condemned and jailed. The chronicler’s statement is confirmed by the balia records of 27 June 1378; I Capitol: del Comune di Firenze, 11, 92. For the records of Baldovinetti’s trial, see Att: del Capitano del Popolo, 1087, f. 1771; 1089, ff. 3r-4v. 27 Stefani, 766, 788.

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they had always been true and loyal Guelfs.”* By this means, and

by loud protestations of support for the Parte and its policies,” the fainthearted sought to protect themselves. The judicial records contain a set of documents which throw much light on the state of the Florentine civic mind in the regime’s final weeks. These are the anonymous denunciations against Ghibelline suspects: they constitute the most important source of in-

formation on Florentine political ideology in the late trecento. The first consignments of these accusations, some ten or twelve per week, were deposited in the executor’s palace in October; the tempo of denunciation increased, however, until by January over one hundred depositions were presented to the judge in a single week.*’ Each document contained the same request. The executor

and the Parte captains were asked to conduct an investigation against the accused, who was charged with holding communal office as a Ghibelline. To each accusation was attached a list of witnesses who could testify to the validity of the charge. There was nothing spontaneous about this campaign of denunciation and calumny; it was an organized movement. Identically-worded accusations against certain individuals were deposited in the executor’s zamburo on two, three, and even four occasions.** That the majority of these denuciations originated in the Parte’s palace

PP. 43-44. |

28 Giovanni di Paolo Morelli, Ricord1, pp. 133-35. On Morelli, see above,

29 “F per certo non era si Guelfo, che gli paresse essere sicuro, se non dicea quello ch’essi diceano. E tali li diceano; ‘Bene fate; ammonite’; ché di cid crepavano e tutto per paura; e quando passava il collegio de’ Capitani, erano pit per la citta scappucciate e trarre di berrette, che a’ Priori. E teneano modo d’arrecarsi gente a casa, perocché assai fosse ghibellino, che essi non lo tenessero,

e adoperasserlo per guelfo, se abbaiava per le piazze e per li palagi in favore loro, e se era de’ Priori, e favoreggiava a loro modo, per guelfissimo lo teneano, e cosi assai era guelfo, che se non facea’ per loro, ogni di lo tramestavano, dicendo

egli é¢ nato di luogo che, non che ne fosse nato, ma non lo avea mai udito ricordare. E cosi si guidava la Terra in malo stato.” Stefani, 755. 80 The lists of individuals accused of Ghibellinism for October and November 1377 are in Att del Esecutore degli Ordinament della Giustizia, 791, ff. 12r16v. These accusations were all copied into a book by the executor’s notary. The lists of the accused from December 1377 through May 1378 are in AEO], 800, ff, 2r-26v.

81 Identical accusations were deposited against Niccolé di Ciuto di Ser Goccio on five occasions; AEOJ, 811, ff. 190r, 210v, 221V, 231r, 249r; against Manno di Boccaccio di Messer Ardovino eight times; zbd., ff. 112v, I19Vv, 130r, 133r, 138v, 1309r, 217V, 222r.

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THE DEMISE OF THE REGIME, 1378

is suggested, if not proved, by the citations and references to volumes in the Parte archives.” The most striking revelation of these documents is the survival in some Florentine minds of a passionate commitment to Guelf

ideals, and an implacable hatred of the Ghibelline. For many oligarchs, Guelfism had lost its ideological content and had become merely a useful political weapon.** But there is no trace of cant, or hypocrisy in the proclamation that preceded one denuncia-

tion: “In the name of the Lord, his mother, and the entire court of paradise, to the honor of the Parte Guelfa in all its members, may God preserve it; evil, death and destruction to whoever desires the contrary! So be it!”** The fervor of deep conviction also

rings from this statement directed to the Parte captains: “On behalf of the true Guelfs of this city, and also by the oath which you have taken when you began your office .. . and considering the shame and the harm which has befallen this city, that is, the Catholic Parte Guelfa. .. .” The author of this appeal urged the captains to drive from office “the Ghibelline traitors” and to pay no heed to the prayers of their relatives and friends.** Another tamburazione contained the oftrepeated charge that the Ghibellines controlled the scrutinies and that, as a consequence, true Guelfs were systematically excluded from office.” Who were denounced as Ghibellines in these accusations and how were they identified? The majority were “new men”: arti-

sans, retail merchants, notaries, and some, like Matteo di Ser 82 See, for example, the citation of documents in the accusations against Amaretto Mannelli; AEOJ, 811, £. 160r, and Andrea di Francesco Venture, f. Ig2r. Even the page was cited, carta 72, which contained the inscription of Venture’s family in the book of Ghibellines. 33 See above, pp. 74, 87-89.

84 “Al nome de Dio e dela sua madre e de tucta la corte de paradiso, al onore

de Parte Guelfa en qualuncha parte fosse, che la mantegna, e mala, morte e destructione de chi volesse lo contrario e cosi sia!” AEOJ, 811, f. 1278. 85 Thid., ff. 157v-158r.

86 Tbid., £. r19v: “Sia manifesti a voi, singniore capitani del Parte Guelfa, che

per tucta questa citta, si dice che i ghibellini per casione de essere a fare lu scrutino . . . none rendono mai honore a nesio guelfo.” An accusation against Jacopo di Paolo contended that he had held many communal offices “in grande dampno e victuperio de li capitani e vergogna dela Parte Guelfa e de tucti le gelfi de Florentia.” The captains were urged to proceed against him “accid che sia exempio ali altri gibellini che none accepti pit offici . . . accid che sia deli guelfi l’onori e hoffici”; thid., f. 126r.

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THE DEMISE OF THE REGIME, 1378

Giovanni da Barberino and Biagio Vanni da Castel Fiorentino, whose names betrayed their conzado origins. The proof adduced in most cases was that of blood: the accused possessed Ghibelline ancestors, and they carried the taint of treason in their veins. Thus

the artisans Ristoro and Benci di Cione were denounced as foreigners from Romagna, whose forebears had been fedelz of a notorious Ghibelline, Messer Giovanni Albertini. Jacopo di Paolo was identified as a native of Lombardy, whose lord had been the “Ghibelline tyrant,” Bernabo Visconti.*’ Frequently, the denuncia-

tions included the information that the ancestors of the accused had fought against the Florentines in the army of Emperor Henry VII or the Lucchese tyrant, Castruccio Castracani.** How these foreign elements had infiltrated into communal offices was described in a denunciation against a coppersmith, Piero Paccini: “In 1348 there came the great pestilence, and many passed from this life to the other, whence Florence was denuded of a large number of people. And this Piero di Piero Paccini and his brother,

not being perceived or known as Ghibellines, as they were and knew themselves to be, were successful in the scrutinies and placed in the offices.’*” The native’s jealousy and resentment against the

climbing parvenu, which infuses all of these documents, is expressed with particular clarity and force in this denunciation, For Piero is charged with abusing the political power that he had obtained illicitly. With the authority and influence obtained from holding office, he indulged in bribery (so the accusation alleged) 87 The accusations against these artisans are in idid., ff. 115r, 162v. Two shoemakers, Firenze and Benghi Panze, were characterized as “el piu originali gibellini che sia al mondo, troppo pit che Uberti”; zd7d., £. 148v. 88 Among the accused whose ancestors allegedly were loyal to Henry VII were Ser Goro di Ser Grifo, Francesco di Giovanni, and Matteo di Ser Giovanni

da Barberino; zdid., ff. 145v, 257r, 284v. The forbears of Paolo di Giusto, Jacopo di Bernardo, and Cristoforo Giraldi were accused of supporting the Lucchese tyrant, Castruccio Castracani; zbid., ff. 122r, 137r, 163Vv.

89 AEO], 811r, f. 106r: “Viena la mortalita nel 1348, la quale fu grande infinita, e molti paxa di questa vita al altra, di que exendo voto Fiorena de grandi multitudine de gente, e il dicto Pero de Pero Pacini e ’1 suo fratello, none exendo ischorti ne conusci pro gibellini, come sanno et furono, e per la ingnoranza de colloro ch’erano rimasi dopo la mortalita, furono inborsati et posti neli officia, e pero, il dicto Pero di Pero, vedendo essere grande e possente

neli offici a lui conceduti per la comune di Firenze, e baractero soperbo, la quale soperbia Dio stacche dassu, e la baraccterie e magioranze usa contra al persone menimi e possenti, la quale cosa ene injusta e iniqua et mala fame.”

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THE DEMISE OF THE REGIME, 1378

and was arrogant and domineering in his relations with both the lowly and the powerful. The search for the Ghibelline ancestors of Florentines active in politics was not limited to the lower classes. The Antellesi, who had been represented in the Signoria since 1282, were de-

nounced as fedeli of a prominent Ghibelline clan, the Uberti. According to this charge, Messer Alessandro dell’Antella’s grand-

father, Guido, was inscribed in the Parte’s book of Ghibellines and had consorted with Henry VII in 1312. An ancient magnate house of S. Spirito, the Mannelli, were likewise accused of possessing Ghibelline ancestors who supported the German emperor in his campaign against Florence. Three other leading families from S. Spirito, the Guicciardini, Mozzi, and Quaratesi, were also denounced as Ghibellines, and evidence from Parte records was presented to support these charges.*°

While most of these documents cited ancestry as proof of guilt, there were some that adduced specific actions and opinions

to substantiate the charge of Ghibellinism. A number of the accused were characterized as “defamers” (sparlatori) of the Guelf society." A few denunciations were more specific. Buonac-

corso di Vanni, a goldsmith, allegedly referred to the Parte’s palace in these terms: “In that house the wolves are assembled to harm all good Guelfs.” Another denunciation charged that two furriers, Antonio and Giovanni Cantelli, spoke of their plan to burn or destroy the palace. A glassmaker, Manieri di Jacopo, was quoted as expressing his desire to burn the Parte’s books, in which were inscribed the names of Guelfs and Ghibellines. From another suspect, Lorenzo Lottini, came the suggestion that

the Parte’s property be confiscated, with the proceeds used to 40 The accusations against these families are in zid., f. 270v (Guicciardini) ; ff. 105r, 107v, I1Iv, 151v (Antellesi); 157v-158r, 16or (Mannelli); 174r, 222v (Quaratesi); 111r, 135r, 233v (Mozzi). 41 Among those accused of defaming the Parte were Manno di Boccaccio di Messer Ardovino, condemned to death in 1382; Ubaldo di Maffeo Ubertini, whose grandfather had been chief accountant of the Bardi company; Tommaso di Piero Nucci Parigi, an international trader; and several artisans and

petty merchants: Cenni di Marco, innkeeper; Nicco di Ser Lapo, Luca di Nanni, Manfredo di Giovanni Ciuti, Lapo di Lorenzo, pork butcher, Domenico Ciampelli, Tinaccio Baroncini, druggist; AEOJ, 811, ff. 133r, 137V, 152r, 164r, I7QV, 20IV, 204V, 245r, 254V, 26IV.

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liquidate the public debt.” Paolo Malefici, a member of the Otto de’ preti, was accused of demanding the execution of Lapo da Castiglionchio, while two citizens were denounced for their criticism of Benghi Buondelmonti and Messer Lotto Castellani.*

The single denunciation that contained a trace of humor described the heinous crime of a shoemaker, Benghi Panze: “A lion had been made of snow in the Piazza del Porte. . . . One night this Ghibelline, in the presence of the entire neighborhood,

cut the head off the lion, crushed it and said: ‘Let us go and hang all of the Guelfs.’””* These accusations suggest that hostility toward the Parte was most intensely felt, and most forcefully expressed, by the gente

nuova, and particularly the artisan class, But two important patrician families, the Capponi and the Quaratesi, were also indicted for their enmity toward the Guelf society. The Capponi,

it was charged, persistently vilified the Parte and its captains, while the Quaratesi “have always intrigued to destroy the Parte Guelfa and the Guelfs of this city, and every day they consort and conspire with Ghibellines, denouncing the Parte Guelfa.”*° These documents also express the bitter resentment which the proscriptions had aroused in the city, among “new men” and patricians alike. Identified as sharp critics of the Ghibelline purge

were the shoemaker, Bartolo Sangiugni, and the wealthy lanaiuolo, Donato Busini.** Patricians also joined in the chorus of criticism. Nofri dell’Antella was accused of making this derogatory statement: “You see how these captains have proscribed countless citizens; truly they seek to destroy the city.’*’ Some 42 The allegations against these men are in ibid., ff. 155v, 176r, 285r. 48 For the accusation against Paolo, see ibid., ff. 158v-159r. Two sons of a butcher, Bartolo Lori, who had often been selected to the priorate, denounced Lapo da Castiglionchio and Benghi Buondelmonti as traitors of the commune; f. 202r. For the denunciation of Messer Lotto Castellani, see f. 285r. 44 Tbid., £. 221r. For an earlier incident (1354) involving the destruction of snow lions, see above, pp. 164-65. 45 AEO], 811, ff. 174r, 175r, 222K. 46 For these allegations, see zbid., ff. 132v, 224r. According to the accusation

against the Busini, “Pit volte anno exparlato contra la vostra chasa e dicto che l’amonire € male facto, e uno di dirra ad voi che voi faciete male, e anchora anno dicto che uno di se troverebe a disfarla.” Both Bartolo Sangiugni and Donato Busini had been in the Signoria. 47 Thid., £. 189r. Nofri also reputedly threatened to take the initiative against

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outbursts against ammonizione were provoked by the disfranchisement of certain individuals. Thus Luca di Nanno became infuriated (or so the denunciation against him claimed) when the Parte barred from office his kin, the Covoni. After a prominent and respected merchant, Francesco Alderotti, was proscribed

in January 1378, Maffeo Ubertini allegedly denounced two of the responsible captains, Lapo da Castiglionchio and Benghi Buondelmonti, for taking bribes to exclude certain men from office.” Stefani’s charge, that the captains used ammonizione to gain vengeance on their personal enemies, was also aired in these documents. A magnate, Attaviano Brunelleschi, was denounced

for arranging the proscription of two men, Cino Federighi and Jacopo di Bonafede, with whom he had had a private quarrel. One of the most damning pieces of evidence against the Parte’s methods was produced by a sincere Guelf, who charged that Amaretto Mannelli had paid the Parte captains to quash any move to disfranchise him.“ Apparently, even those who were committed to the system of ammonizione were aware of abuses in its practice. In this outpouring of Guelf sentiment there is a surprising paucity of comment about the war, the issue primarily responsible for initiating the purge. Only two documents explicitly posit the connection between Ghibellinism and support for the papal conflict. Messer Alessandro dell’Antella, one of the leading figures in communal diplomacy during the war years, was stigmatized as a Ghibelline, “by his origin and by his works.” He had been sent as an ambassador to Bernabo Visconti by the Eight, “whose interest was rather to place this state under Ghibel-

line domination, than to honor the Guelfs.” The author of this

indictment added that the political convictions of the Eight Saints “were more Ghibelline than otherwise.”’® A second docuthe Parte: “Io posso essere en kalendi maggio che io avero compagni che me seguitare a fare alcuna cosa.” 48 Tbid., ff. 13'7v, 201K.

#9 The charge against Brunelleschi is in zdid., f. 155r; against Mannelli, ff. r6or, r8rr. 50 AEO], 811, £. 151v. Alessandro was described as “originale gibellino e per natione e opere, veduto che egli é facto ambaxiatore e secretario di questa octa dela guerra, imperd che una parte de loro se tengono collui . . . e mandalo a Messere Bernabo, e questo fanno chon altri ententione di soctamectere questa

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ment which refers to the papal war pertained to a lesser figure in communal politics, Benozzo Amadori, who, as a prior (July 1377), “joined those who shouted that they did not want peace, in order to destroy the Parte Guelfa.”” Although their veracity may be seriously questioned, these anonymous denunciations do portray the intense antipathies which infected the respublica, and which corroded the ligaments

between the social and political order. If these accusations reflect accurately the temperament of the citizenry, they are incontrovertible proof that the aristocratic hatred of the parvenu had not abated by one iota since the regime’s establishment. This feeling was reciprocated, as the documents amply demonstrate. Among the scores of denunciations against the Parte leadership,

a few contained ominous portents for the future. The son of a parvenu merchant, Lorenzo di Cecco Cione, was quoted as saying

that the Parte Guelfa would not alter its ammonizione policy unless it was coerced “with sword in hand.” A prominent patrician from S. Spirito, Gerozzo Cacciafuori, complained that the Parte captains had unjustly proscribed many citizens, and he warned that a continuation of this practice would plunge Florence into revolution. There will be no relief from the mischief of these Guelf scoundrels, cried Maffeo Ubertini, until we expel them forcibly from their offices.°” Some Florentines were appar-

ently considering the resort to violence as a solution to the political crisis.

The Response to the Oligarchic Challenge Preserved in the state archives of Siena is an important docu-

ment sent to the government of that city by the priors of the Perugian commune. It is dated 31 March 1378. “We do not hesitate,” the priors wrote, “to inform you of the dissensions and the

scandal which have arisen in Florence [which will] lead to the destruction of its regime, unless immediate remedies are applied.” The source of the disorder was the orgy of proscriptions in which terra en parte gibellina pit che per avere esperanza di fare honore a guelfi, e che l’animo loro é pit: di gibellini che d’altro.” 81 Ibid., £. 1938. 52 For these statements, see zbid., ff. 118r, 137v, 188r-188v.

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the Florentines had indulged, and which had adversely affected relations between the Arno city and its allies. The letter continued: “We love and cherish the regime of these Florentines, as if it were our own, for they are the glory of the fatherland (Jamine patrie).” ‘The Perugians then informed their Sienese counterparts that they were sending an embassy to Florence to serve as “guard-

ians of their regime and of the fatherland, and to remove these discords.” They urged Siena to cooperate with the Perugians “to cut off these internal diseases of the Florentines before they increase in strength, for the well-being of the whole fatherland.”™

This document places Florence’s internal crisis in the larger perspective of central Italian politics. The Perugian commune obviously viewed this crisis as a threat to its own security, and indeed as a danger to the entire peninsula. If civil war erupted in Florence, the antipapal league would inevitably dissolve, leaving

Perugia and Siena in a vulnerable position. Or, alternatively, the philo-papal faction in the Arno city might seize control of the

| government and make peace with Gregory XI on his terms, without any concern for the fate of Florence’s allies, Perhaps

| the most significant revelation of this document is the acknowledgement, from an independent source, of Florence’s hegemony in central Italy, and the expression of genuine concern over the possibility that the republic might abandon this role. Perugia’s lament that Florence “had attacked and molested” her™ 53 The letter is in ASS, Concistoro, 1794, f. 19r: “Fratres karissimi. Non ambigemus vos sentire dissensiones et materiam scandalosam in civitate Florentie exortam in pernicem status sui, nisi subitis remediis occurantur. Et ut sufficeret in non modico numero admonitos fecisse sed quod assidue ad ultiora procedavit profecto nos accediat et molestat. Statum eisdem Florentinorum velut proprium quia lumine patrie sunt diligimus et amamus. Ea propter cure nobis

inest ut eorum periculis reparetur, et ad hujusmodi scandala removenda solenni deliberatione decrevimus ambaxiatores nostros at Florentinos ipsos illico destinare curaturos pro statu ipsorum et patrie dissensiones hujusmodi removere. Ut autem hoc cautius et habilius exequi possint, quia utraque illorum fortuna

statul vestro pariter velut nostro prodesse potest etiam et nocere, vestram fraternitatem instantius deprecamur quatenus de aliquibus ambaxiatoribus ex notabilibus civibus vestris velitis et placeat omni mora postponita providere qui una cum nostris Florentiam adeant morbos intrinsecos Florentinorum antequam

convalescavit pro statu totius patrie recisuri.” / 54The Perugian authorities may have been angered by several sharp letters from Florence, criticizing their policies, particularly their quarrel with Spoleto and their expulsion of several citizens from the city; Lini Coluct Pieri Salutat Epistolarum, 11, 127-31, 149-50, 164-65.

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implied that the commune had already turned against its confederates, an allegation which the evidence does not support. Although unable to satisfy fully every appeal for succor, the republic continued to expend its resources in defense of its allies.”

After their intensive effort to dissolve the league in December 1377, the oligarchic forces did not again raise this issue in the councils, The correspondence emanating from the Florentine chancery did not change its tone in these months, but continued to show concern for unity and concord among the allies.°* In Pratiche discussions, speakers still voiced the opinion that Florence must keep faith with other league members while negotiating peace with the church.” And the communal leadership showed no sign of panic, nor any inclination to capitulate, in its management of peace negotiations. In mid-February a new embassy was sent to Sarzana, to continue discussions with papal representatives and with Bernabo Visconti,

who had been accepted as mediator in the peace talks.°* Under instructions from the Signoria and the Eight, these envoys adamantly resisted papal demands, and continued to bargain stub-

bornly over the unresolved issues. In council debates on the peace question, there was no hint that majority opinion favored “peace at any price.” Indeed, several speakers argued that the commune should prepare to renew hostilities if negotiations at Sarzana failed.” 65 Evidence concerning the commune’s relations with its allies is contained in three dispatches from the Sienese ambassador in Florence to his government, 6, 8, and 12 May 1378; ASS, Concistoro, 1794, ff. 37r, 63r, 75r. Siena had de-

manded protection from a German condottiere who was threatening its territory. Florentine officials reluctantly promised to send one hundred lances for Siena’s defense, a force much smaller than its Tuscan neighbor requested. The Florentines justified their position by citing the commune’s military commitments in Umbria and the Marches; however, they did authorize the transfer of forty five lances from Perugia to Siena; zbzd., f. 75r. 56 See, for example, the commune’s Ietters to its allies; Salutatz Epistolarum, Il, 110-11, 126-27, 173. The Missive records for 1378 are fragmentary. 57 CP, 15, ff. 80r, g6r. It is true, however, that these pronouncements were

less frequent than in the early months of the war. 58 Diario d’anonimo, p. 349. The delegation consisted of two members of the Eight, Simone Peruzzi and Andrea Salviati, who were joined by Messer Pazzino degli Strozzi, Messer Alessandro dell’Antella and Benedetto Alberti. 59 CP, 15, ff. 78v-80r, 84v-85r, 86v, gIVv.

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The critical moment in the peace colloquy occurred during the last week of March. Agreement had apparently been reached over the amount of the indemnity which Florence must pay, a sum specified by one chronicler as 800,000 florins.” But two issues

remained in dispute: the confiscation of ecclesiastical property and the status and authority of the Florentine inquisitor. Resistance to papal demands on these two relatively minor problems indicated the importance which the commune attached to the question of ecclesiastical privilege. The pope insisted that all confiscated property be returned forthwith to the original pro-

prietors, and he also demanded the repeal of communal provisions limiting the inquisitor’s power. In urging the acceptance

of Gregory’s terms, Niccolé Soderini argued that “peace is a supreme necessity, and if it is not achieved now, it will be diffcult to obtain later.”” This plea for an immediate settlement was opposed by three counselors, Matteo di Jacopo Arrighi, Recco di

Guido Guazza, and Mezza di Jacopo Attaviani, all of whom advised the Signoria to reject the curia’s demands on these controversial questions.”

The chroniclers, however, are agreed that the diplomats at Sarzana had reconciled their differences, and indeed may actually have reached a settlement, when the rumor that Gregory XI had

died in Rome reached Sarzana on the last day of March.” The advent of this startling report totally disrupted the congress: 80 Manoscritti, 222, f. 262. The sum of 800,000 fl. was to be paid over a period of five years. These terms were also described by Sozomen Pistoriensis, Spectmen Historiae, xvi, col. 1103. Stefani, 780, quotes a figure of 700,000 ff. 61 CP, 15, f. gar. 82 The debate on this question is recorded in CP, 15, ff. g2r-94r, 26-28 March.

Those who favored the continuation of the commune’s restrictions on the inquisitorial office also wanted to have the inquisitor chosen by the commune

and ratified by the pope. Some even argued that the bishop should also be chosen in this manner. See the statements of Mezza Attaviani and Niccold Soderini, zbzd., f. 93Vv.

88 Stefani, 780: “Quando la cosa era quasi a conclusione li Cardinali si partirono per la novella ch’ebbono che il papa Ghrigoro XI era morto, e lassarono le cose scompigliate.” Sozomen, col. 1103, says that a provisional peace agreement was reached on 27 March, the day of the pope’s death, but that it was not signed, since the Florentine envoys wished to receive final approval from the commune. The report of the pope’s death did not reach the city until 30 March; CP, 15, f. 96r. Our knowledge of Florentine diplomatic strategy is limited by the fact that the Missive records for these months have not survived.

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neither the Florentines nor the papal envoys wished to commit themselves to a peace treaty. Addressing the republic’s ambassadors, Bernabd Visconti could not disguise his chagrin over the turn of events: “You Florentines know very well how much I have wished that you might have peace; I have done everything possible to

achieve it. It appeared to me that negotiations had reached a point acceptable both to the Holy Church and to you. Now that we are about to conclude peace, it is reported that the pope is dead. So you Florentines say that you do not have a mandate to conclude [peace]. And I say that I do not know whether he is dead or alive. But whatever the case, we must have a pope.” Bernabo then ordered his officials to transmit the peace terms, which had been tentatively accepted, to Florence and Rome, in the hope that they would be ratified. In Florence the populace indulged in an orgy of celebration over the demise of the city’s redoubtable antagonist,” while the politicians considered how to turn this fortuitous event to the republic’s advantage. The commune was unwilling to ratify the settlement so painfully and arduously constructed at Sarzana, and thereby incurred the wrath of Bernabo Visconti.** Many citizens believed that peace terms could be revised in Florence’s favor if the new pope were sympathetic to the republic. In the councils, 6¢ This important document is in ASS, Concistoro, 1794, f. 31r. The ambassador summarized Bernabo’s speech as follows: “Voi fiorentini sapete bene come io one voluto che abbiate pace, et qui ho fatto ch’io o possuto per darnela, e parevami avere ridotte le cose in termini che stavano bene per sancta chiesa e per voi. Hora che eravamo per conchiudere pace, si dica che ’] papa sia

morto. Et per questo dite voi fiorentini che non avete mandato di potere conchiudere. Et io dico ch’io non so se morto o nno. Ma come si sia, papa dobiamo avere. Et pero credo sia bene che sopra le cose ch’erano messe in me e di che concordavate si pratichi a Roma col papa se é vivo, e se non fusse vivo, con chui apertenesse, e simile si faccia a Fiorenza.”

85 The report of the pope’s death, which had reached the palace of the Signoria on 30 March, was not known publicly until two days later; Diario d’anonimo, p. 352. The celebrations in the city and contado were inspired also by a false rumor that peace had been signed; Cronichetta d’incerto, pp. 212-13. 86 On 30 March, when Gregory’s death was first reported, counselors advised the Signoria to cease negotiations “donec sciatur veritas,” and to instruct the commune’s ambassadors to obtain “copias et scripturas datas in tractatu pacis,

ita quod de hoc nichil possit aliquo tempore apparere”; CP, 15, f. o6r. For references to Bernabo’s anger over the commune’s conduct in the peace negotiations, see zLid., f. 97v, 3 April.

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speakers urged the Signoria to press for the election of an Italian pope.*’ The choice of the archbishop of Bari, Bartolomeo Prignano, was warmly applauded, for he was reputed to be a friend of Florence and hostile to the Limousin cardinals who had been influential in the councils of his predecessor. The Machiavelli

chronicler reported Urban VI’s proclamation to the Roman people: “I wish to stay in Rome and appoint Italian cardinals, and I wish to make peace, not for money but for the love of God.”*°

Amidst the confused welter of political maneuvers which characterized communal politics in the weeks after Gregory’s death,

two trends can be distinguished. There was, first, a strong current of moderate sentiment in favor of peace at home and abroad,

an end to the harrowing years of crisis, and a return to “normalcy.” But resisting this pressure were extremists at both ends of the political spectrum: the antipapal forces that did not favor a quick settlement with the church, and the Guelf fanatics who could not restrain their purging instincts. The sources shed practically no light on the course of Florence’s negotiations with Urban VI. Despite the strong pressures for a settlement, the communal leadership moved with extreme caution. Fear and suspicion of the papacy had not disappeared with Gregory’s death; a provision of 22 April authorizing the

| appointment of a peace commission was opposed by one-fourth of the councils.” Eight ambassadors were chosen to treat with the pope, but they repeatedly postponed their departure. The embassy did not leave Florence until 17 May, three weeks after its composition. The exasperation of the colleges over this delay suggests that certain members of the embassy deliberately engaged in dilatory tactics, to postpone the resumption of negotiations as long as possible. The peace party, however, did win 87 See the counsel of Messer Ristoro Canigiani and Recco Guazza, CP, 15, ff. g6r-o6v.

68 Diario d’anonimo, p. 353.

; 68 The vote on this measure was 158-35 and 84-42; Prov., 66, ff. 23r-24r. Another provision, authorizing an embassy to congratulate Urban VI upon his election, was also opposed by sizable minorities, 158-35 and 103-23; idid., ff. 24r-25r; LF, 41, ff. 292r-292Vv.

70 See the admonition of the Sixteen: “Omnino oratores sine temporis omissione compellantur ad eundum, quia tota salus patrie stat in pace”; CP, 15, f.

togv, 8 May. Two days later, the Sixteen urged the Signoria to order the

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two important victories. The commune announced that it would refrain from any hostile action against the church; and, in another conciliatory gesture, it ordered the churches closed and the interdict observed.” With the war issue deflated by the cessation of hostilities and the strong possibility of a favorable settlement, the attention of the citizenry was focused squarely on the Parte Guelfa and its proscriptions, The Parte’s appetite for victims was unsated; twenty three men were ammoniti in April, after the news of Gregory’s

death had reached Florence. The sources give no clues to the motives of the oligarchic chieftains. Possibly they feared that to halt the purge would be interpreted as a sign of weakness. Some

may have believed that the commune would not make peace with Urban VI unless prodded by the Guelf society. And certain leaders were apparently convinced that the time was ripe for a

final effort to destroy the political power of the gente nuova, and to restore the commune to its legitimate proprietors, the patriciate. They may have been encouraged to adopt this intransigent posture by the failure of communal officials to react strongly

against the proscription campaign. Not a whisper of protest against ammonizione appears in the protocols; indeed, the colleges actually commended the Parte for rooting out subversives from the electorate.” embassy to depart immediately; zdzd., f. 111r. On 12 May the exasperated college issued this ultimatum: if eight ambassadors cannot go, then six; if not six, then four; if not by horse, then by foot, “et citissime transmittantur”; zid., f. 111v. That the postponement of the embassy’s departure may have been the work of those who opposed peace was suggested by Rodolico, 1 Ciompi, p. 79. 71. On the observation of the interdict, see CP, 15, f. rr0r. On abstaining from offensive action, see the statements of both colleges on 7 May, zbid., f. togr, and particularly the statement of the Twelve: “Quod omnino ab offensionibus terrarum ecclesie gentes nostre se abstineant, et solum militent ad defensam.” This policy was also strongly supported in a council of richiestt called on 15 May; zbid., f. 113¢. 72 The issue of proscriptions was discussed on only two occasions during the first five months of 1378; CP, 15, ff. 80r, 83v, 12 February and 1 March. In these discussions the colleges supported the removal of Ghibellines from offices. See, for example, the counsel of the Eight: “Domini capitanei provideant quod gebellini ab officiis removeantur; cum illis de quibus dubitetur an sint

gebellini, agatur gratiose et benigne”; ibid., f. 80v. The colleges also made the customary appeal for civic unity, which had become a ritual: “Quod domini dignentur insimul esse concordes, et ut pacificetur et uniatur civitas, adunetur

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Lapo da Castiglionchio and his confederates could not assume, however, that this immunity from criticism and reprisal would be permanent. At any time, the fortunes of the dorse might fashion a priorate which was prepared to resist the oligarchic challenge.

An immediate prospect of danger presented itself in late April in the person of Salvestro de’ Medici, who was scheduled to enter the Signoria on 1 May. No citizen was more feared by the Guelf extremists than this tempestuous and outspoken patrician, notorious for his vehement denunciations of the Parte leadership

and the papacy.” The Parte sought to forestall his selection by means of the dzvzeto, but this subtle maneuver was foiled by the

Fight.” Then the Guelf captains considered the possibility of proscribing the Medici firebrand, but they refrained for two reasons. Salvestro’s Guelf status was indisputable, and his ammonizione would inevitably provoke a loud outcry. Furthermore, the captains counted four of their supporters in the new Signoria, and they were apparently convinced that these oligarchic adherents could neutralize any effort by Salvestro to damage the Guelf society.””

The apprehensions in the Parte palace over Salvestro’s selection unum magnum consilium in quo sint omnia officia et collegia et capitudines, in

quo proponatur status comunis et ibidem consulatur de re publica. Et quod adunandi sint de omni statu et conditione.” This statement by Gino Anselmi, spokesman for the Sixteen, was seconded by Giovanni Giugni for the Twelve: “Dixit idem et quod in eo omnia negotia comunis tam belli quam pacis et expensarum proponantur. Et quod adunandi sint omnes guelfi’; CP, 15, f. 78r, 10 February. 73 For his most extreme statements, see above, pp. 218, 271-72, 317. 74 This intricate maneuver, described by Stefani, illustrates the finesse of factional strategy. To make Salvestro ineligible for the Signoria, the captains

proscribed one of the Twelve from the quarter of S. Giovanni, Maso Neri. They expected that he would be replaced by Jacopo di Bartolomeo de’ Medici,

apparently a likely selection. Salvestro would then be excluded from the Signoria by the divieto regulations. The Eight thwarted this stratagem by prohibiting the selection of Maso’s replacement (possibly an illegal action) until after the new Signoria for May and June was constituted, 7 “Essendo il priorato, nel quale Salvestro di messer Alamanno de’ Medici fu gonfalonieri di giustizia, a cui molto dispiacea l’ammonire, e spezialmente fare torto a’ Guelfi, i capitani della Parte ne presero gran sospetto, e la cagione, perché non ammonirono lui, fu perché nel vero era guelfissimo, ed aveano molto

grande speranza negli suoi compagni, che ve ne avea assai di loro animo”; Stefani, 789.

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as standard-bearer of justice were soon justified.”° Two days after

he entered office, he placed the ammonizione question on the collegiate agenda. There it was to remain for the next four wecks,

along with that other controversial topic, petitions, which was interjected into the discussion by the oligarchy. In form and content this was the same debate that had been waged, openly or covertly, since these two issues were first raised in 1358 and 1372. Even the speeches were identical to those delivered in past

decades. “The priors should provide for the unity and concord of the citizens, and the captains .. . should be warned to refrain from injustice,” intoned a liberal politician, Gino Anselmi. Replying for the oligarchy, Niccold Soderini proposed that the commune should concern itself solely with petitions, leaving pro-

scriptions to the captains, “so that the city will be united.” Giovanni Cambi urged that officials of commune and Parte cooperate “to extinguish the flames of proscriptions and petitions.””’

Throughout the month of May, the debate continued over proposals to reform these controversial procedures. Oligarchs com-

plained that the Signoria was still accepting illegal petitions to confer magnate status upon popolani, in contravention of the regulations. They demanded that anyone submitting a false criminal petition be penalized, and that petitions based upon civil litigation be quashed.” Fearing that their most cherished partisan weapon might be sacrificed on behalf of civic unity, the pop-

ular forces refused to countenance any major revision of the magnatizing procedure. “Under no circumstances should the criminal petitions be abolished,” argued the Sixteen.” The foes of the oligarchy also presented their gravamina against the Parte, charging that it had violated the rules for designating Ghibellines. Specifically, they demanded the enactment of a rule limiting the number of times a proposal for ammonizione could be presented to the captains and the council of Twenty-four. They 76 Stefani, 787.

77 CP, 15, ff. 107V, 113r, II7V, 3, 15, and 21 May. The records of the debate from 15 May through 1 June are published by Gherardi, in Diario d’anonimo, pp. 500-01. For the debate before 15 May, see CP, 15, ff. 107v, I1or-IIov, I113rIr4r. 3 See the statements of Ristoro Canigiani and Niccolé Soderini, Duzario d’anonimo, p. 500, and of Niccolo Giugni; CP, 15, f. 113r. 79 Diario d’anonimo, p. 501, the statement of Giovanni Cambi, 27 May.

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also requested that a revised proscription procedure, once accepted

by the commune and the Parte, be made fixed and immutable.” The legislation resulting from these four weeks of intensive deliberation was a feeble compromise. One measure provided for a preliminary vote by the Signoria on any magnatizing petition, before it could be submitted to the colleges and guild representatives. This provision was designed to placate the oligarchy

by erecting another barrier against illegal or baseless petitions. And, as a sop to those who cried for relief from the threat of proscription, the councils passed another law which prohibited anonymous denunciations against suspected Ghibellines.” Remaining intact were both the ammonizione machinery and the procedure for designating magnates. In its moderate tone and its aversion to radical reform,” this legislation epitomized the regime’s political philosophy. Yet, by its failure to grapple with fundamental issues, these laws also emphasized one of its most serious weaknesses.

However cautious and limited in scope was this “reform,” it did reflect the strong sentiment in favor of political moderation.* Another indication of this temper was a revolt in the Parte palace against the Guelf hierarchy. In an unusual display of independ-

ence, some three hundred Parte members gathered on 13 May to censure the policies and activities of the organization’s leadership. The Machiavelli chronicler described this conclave in brief

and cryptic fashion, but his account indicates that the Guelf leaders were forced to allow the rank and file a greater voice in Parte affairs. The Parte hierarchs accepted one restriction upon 80 Statements by Giovanni Cambi and Filippo Marsili, spokesmen for the colleges, 27 May, ibid. 81 These provisions, passed on 5 June, are in tbid., pp. 502-03. The votes on these measures: 151-72 and 106-43; 212-11 and 149-11. For the magnatizing

procedure established originally in 1352, and revised in 1372, see above, pp. 129, 261.

82 Another indication of the reluctance to inaugurate a thorough reform is the refusal of the Sixteen to sanction the establishment of a dalia with power to pacify the city, “sed per alium modum procuretur pacificatio predicta”; CP, 15, f£. 118v, 26 May.

83 The provision abolishing the Ghibelline denunciations contained a sharp attack upon them, noting that the accusations “facte fuerunt tipo malitie et odii fomite, etiam contra veros guelfos, ad infamandum et aliis diversis malis respectibus”; Diario d’anonimo, p. 503. 84 Diario d’anonimo, p. 354: “Oggi, a di xiii di maggio 1378, i Capitani della

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ammonizione: the captains could not propose the name of any citizen more than three times to the council of Twenty-four which ratified all proscriptions. The rebel group also forced through the Parte councils two constitutional amendments designed to limit the captains’ authority. During their two-month tenure of office, the Parte’s chief executive could spend only thirty

florins, and each group of captains was required to inspect the accounts of its predecessors.”

The evidence, though scanty and inconclusive, does suggest that these palliative measures may have lowered the political temperature in the city. During May and the first two weeks of June, the Parte captains had responded to the pressures from the communal government by refraining from any proscriptions. After the intensive debates which preceded the passage of the laws on petitions and denunciations (5 June), internal problems are no longer mentioned in the protocols.** In fact, the political scene seemed to be a replica of earlier periods of crisis, when a climax in the internal struggle was followed by a convalescent phase, during which time febrile spirits were calmed and the regime recovered its equilibrium.

But the oligarchic extremists were unwilling to accept a situation in which their opponents remained in control of communal offices and policies. The brief truce was broken on 14 June when the Parte captains placed the Ghibelline stigma upon two men,

a cloth manufacturer named Francesco Martini and a tanner from the lower guilds, Giraldo Giraldi. This act contradicted Parte Guelfa si feciono in casa della Parte bene presso a 300 cittadini, e si volieano pigliare balia di fare cierte cose; onde molto si praticO di molte ragione. Onde infine, per non dare atedio a’cittadini, si si consiglio per xiii — dicitori, [e] si diliberé, ch’e Capitani pigliassono loro consiglio, e chiarissino quelle parti per un’altra forma che pit piaciesse a’ partefici; e per tanto non s'and6é pil innanzi.” For an earlier attempt (1350) to break the hierarchy’s control over the Parte, see above, pp. 100-01. 85 The restriction on ammonizione is mentioned by Stefani, 789, and by Bese Magalotti in his ricordanze; Carte Strozziane, ser. 2, 116, f. 236r. For the regulations pertaining to expenditures of the captains, see Diario d’anonimo, pp. 35556. This revision is included in the Parte statute; Archivio di Parte Guelfa, 1, ff. 51r-52v, rubrics 70-76. 88 The single discussion on internal problems recorded in the protocols occurred on 8 June, when the colleges counseled the Signoria to ask the captains to refrain from any judicial prosecution against proscribed citizens; CP, 15, f. 122K.

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: the prevailing mood of the Parte membership, and only after a bitter and protracted struggle did the captains gain their objective. The council of Twenty-four, assembled to ratify these proscriptions, vetoed them three times. One of the captains, Gino Anselmi, then left the palace after stating that it would be unwise to proceed in violation of the ammonizione regulations. But the magnate Ricasoli was determined to have his prey; again

and again without success, he submitted the names of Martini and Giraldi to the Twenty-four. At midnight another captain arose to leave, whereupon the infuriated Ricasoli seized the palace

keys and announced that no one would be allowed to depart until the two men had been condemned. Dawn was breaking before the weary and intimidated council, after twenty-three ballots, finally approved the proscriptions.”” —

The chroniclers do not speculate on the motives behind this action of Bettino Ricasoli and his oligarchic allies, and any explanation can only be a surmise. Clearly, this was not a routine resumption of ammonizione: elementary prudence would have dictated a respite until tensions had subsided, and at least until Salvestro de’ Medici had served his term in the Signoria. Nor was it an act of impulse or caprice. The proscriptions appear to have been deliberately provocative, designed: to bait the opposition and to precipitate a test of strength. By breaching the laws

of both commune and Parte, Ricasoli was proclaiming the supremacy of private over public right.*° This position could not go unchallenged by the communal government: to accept it would be to admit that the will of private citizens could prevail over the authority of commune and popolo, Another factor may have influenced Ricasoli’s calculation. Among the oligarchic leaders, there had apparently been a controversy over political 87 The details of this episode are in Stefani, 789, and in Manoscritti, 222, f. 267. In his diary, Bese Magalotti described the incident very briefly: “. . . Ammonimmo Francesco Martini . . . e Giraldo di Paolo Giraldi, galigaio. Furo deliberati per gl’altri compagni, pero che io non vi fu’, ché mori il di la donna mia. Anda’vi la sera che furo ammoniti, che fu in domenica, e non si vinse; ritrassonsi altri 24 il lunedi sera, vinsesi con grande stento”; Carte Strozziane, ser. 2, 116, f. 236r.

88 Communal legislation prohibited the submission of names to the committee of Twenty-four more than three times. In 1372 Rosso de’ Ricci had violated this rule in pressing for the proscription of Zanobi Macigni; it had aroused great resentment. See above, p. 250.

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tactics. The extremists, led by Ricasoli and Lapo da Castiglionchio, reputedly favored an immediate uprising by the oligarchy, while

the more cautious Piero degli Albizzi preferred to wait until 25 June, the feast day of Florence’s patron saint, S. John the Baptist, when conditions would be more propitious for a coup d'état.” By fomenting a crisis, Ricasoli was perhaps seeking to force the oligarchy to seize the initiative. The public reacted strongly to the episode in the Parte palace. “The good citizens, the merchants and artisans, considered this

an abominable thing,” declared Stefani, and his views were echoed by other chroniclers. Stefani reported that Salvestro de’ Medici was criticized for his part in arranging a truce with the oligarchy, which had immediately violated the agreement by the illegal proscription of Martini and Giraldi. Salvestro promised, however, that this affront would not be tolerated, “and he sent for those whom he trusted and conversed with them personally, and with others by means of messengers, and they prepared their plans.”’® On 18 June these plans were unveiled.

June Salvestro de’ Medici’s qualifications for the role of leader of the popular revolution are not impressive at first sight. Neither his family background nor his own character could have appealed strongly to the middle and lower ranks of the guild community—

the artisans, petty retailers, and parvenu entrepreneurs. The Medici were notorious for their lawless behavior; they aped the customs and mannerisms of the arrogant magnat. One of Salvestro’s brothers had been implicated in the revolutionary plot of 1360; two others were convicted of robbery; a fourth, Africhello, was made a magnate for maltreating a poor widow in the contado. Five of his relatives had been convicted of murder since

1343. Salvestro himself was not an “honest merchant,” but a rentier, who, like many oligarchs, lived from the income of his land and buildings, Not until July 1378 did he deem it expedient to join a guild, the merchant corporation of Por San Maria. But throughout his political career he had been a persistent and vocal

critic of the oligarchy and the papacy, and this undoubtedly 89 There is a brief allusion to this division within the hierarchy in Stefani, 792. 9° Stefani, 789.

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gained him sympathy and support from the gente nuova. They may have been attracted, too, by certain of his character traits: courage, a large capacity for hatred, and a penchant for demagoguery.

In challenging the oligarchy, Salvestro did not stand alone. He was the spokesman for a large and influential group of politicians who were convinced that the oligarchy menaced their own security and that of the republic. These were the men who lived in

constant fear of oligarchic reprisal, who gathered together in secret to consider means of combating the Guelf terror. Participating in these meetings were five members of the war balia, led by the wealthy industrialist, Tommaso degli Strozzi, an aristocrat who had long been an adversary of the Parte. Among others identified by the chroniclers as leaders of this faction were Luigi Aldobrandini, a veteran in the struggle between the oligarchic

and popular forces; Remigio di Andrea Rondinelli, the son of a prominent Ricci partisan; Bernardo di Matteo Velluti; and Benedetto Alberti, scion of the richest mercantile family in Flor-

ence. Joining this phalanx of prominent patricians were those families—Covoni, Soldani, Antellesi, Rinuccini, Del Bene, Tolosini, Rimbaldesi—that had been struck by proscription, and whose

Guelf hierarchy.” |

loss of status could only be remedied by the abasement of the On 18 June, Salvestro de’ Medici was proposto of the Signoria, invested with authority to receive petitions and to present them

to his colleagues. Only one measure received consideration on that day, a petition to revive, in full force and vigor, the Ordinances of Justice against the magnates. Drafted the night before at the home of Luigi Aldobrandini, this measure was presented to the Signoria “on behalf of the popolani, the merchants and artisans of Florence, and also the poor and impotent . . . who desire to live in peace from their labor and their possessions.” The objective of the law, so the preamble read, was to protect the weak from oppression, and to eliminate any possibility that the regime ®1 For the identification of these partisan leaders, and the circumstances of their association, see Stefani, 787, 789, 790; and Cronache e memorte sul tumulto det Ciompi, 55. For biographical information on Benedetto Alberti, see L. Passerini, Gli Alberti di Firenze, genealogia, storia e documentt, 1, 113-21.

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' might be subverted, “in order that the popolani may live in security and freedom, and that justice might be restored to the city... .”°* Like so much of the previous partisan legislation, this petition did not touch on any of the controversial questions which

then agitated the citizenry. There was no mention of the Parte Guelfa or of proscriptions in Salvestro’s proposal. Nor did anyone really believe that the imposition of greater penalties upon the magnates and their exclusion from office for one year would eliminate abuses and inequities in government, or restore justice, security, and tranquillity. The measure’s significance was sym-

bolic: it heralded the revival of the liberal assault upon the intransigent and reactionary elements of the old order. Salvestro’s petition encountered strong opposition as soon as he unveiled it. Half of his colleagues in the Signoria were reputedly

sympathetic to the oligarchy, and both colleges initially voiced their strong disappproval of the measure. This negative attitude was partly due to Salvestro’s tactics: scarcely more concerned with

legal niceties than Bettino Ricasoli, he had endeavored to push the law through the colleges without discussion or debate. But a more fundamental reason for the lack of enthusiasm was the fear that it would precipitate revolution. The Twelve announced their decision to abstain from any consideration of the petition, “considering the present state of affairs.’”’* Angered by this rebuff, Salvestro withdrew from the collegiate assembly and entered the large hall where the legislative councils had gathered. There, he dramatically announced that he had resigned his office and was returning to his house, since he had been thwarted in his efforts to bring peace and unity to Florence. Pandemonium broke out in the assembly, and Salvestro’s confederates shouted inflammatory slogans to the crowd assembled in the square outside the

palace: “Long live liberty! Kull the traitors!” Thus gently persuaded of their error, the colleges hurriedly recalled Salvestro and 82 The provision is published in Diario d’anonimo, p. 504. The Ordinances of Justice had never been entirely rescinded since their re-imposition in 1343, but several of their provisions had been softened; see above, pp. 114-16, 153-56. ®3 The collegiate statements are in itbid., pp. 242-43. In 1366 Uguccione de’ Ricci had pushed his Parte reform measure through the colleges and the councils without allowing time for discussions; see above, p. 208.

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voted approval of his petition. It was then presented to the coun-

cils, where it passed despite a substantial number of negative votes.”*

Meanwhile, the captains had called together the Guelfs in their palace to discuss the crisis. One faction of the Parte leadership, led by the magnate Adoardo de’ Pulci, favored direct action: a revolt of Guelf sympathizers, to be sparked by the parading of the Parte’s standard through the streets. But in the Parte councils, caution predominated over impulse. When the partefici learned

that Salvestro’s petition contained nothing which specifically harmed the Parte, the popolani among them chose to sacrifice their magnate comrades. Forese Salviati was identified by one chronicler as the leading proponent of moderation, although Piero degli Albizzi undoubtedly used his influence in favor of restraint. The issue had created a schism among the Guelfs, and many extremists, fearing retaliation, prepared to leave the city.” One significant conclusion can be drawn from the events of this week. A substantial portion, perhaps a majority, of the officeholding class was opposed to a violent resolution of the internal crisis. In the ranks of the partefici, in the colleges and councils, there was strong opposition to provocative measures and inflammatory gestures. Appalled by the potential dangers of revolution, these men tended to favor conciliation and compromise, and to reject any extreme solution to internal problems. Such, after all, ®4 The vote: 166-73 and 108-50; Diario d’anonimo, p. 243. See G. Scaramella, “La petizione di Salvestro de’ Medici e i tumulti di Firenze del giugno, 1378,” Annuario del R. Liceo Michelangtolo di Firenze (1927-1928), 79-86. Also passed was a measure (Prov., 66, ff. 53r-54r) that cancelled the law of January 1372, prohibiting the commune’s enactment of any provision which pertained to the Parte, without the express permission of its officials. See above, pp. 246-47. The events of this crisis and those of the July revolution are described in detail, and with little variation, by Stefani, the Machiavelli chronicler, and the minor chroniclers whose works have been edited by Scaramella, Cronache e memorie. A factual account of these developments can also be found in the secondary works on the Ciompi: C. Falletti Fossati, 17 tumulto det Ciompi (Florence, 1875); G. Corazzini, I Ciompi—cronache e documenti con notizie intorno alla vita di Michele di Lando (Florence, 1887); N. Rodolico, La democrazia fiorentina nel suo tramonto (1378-1382), and his 1 Ciompi. The best treatment remains that of Perrens, Histoire de Florence, v, 182-301. My object is not to relate the details of these events, which are not in dispute, but rather to discuss aspects of the crisis which, in my opinion, have been neglected or misinterpreted. ®5 Rodolico, Crompt, p. 88.

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had been the modus vivendi of the regime since its inception. This attitude found clear expression in the collegiate statements on 21 June, when the threat of popular disorder loomed. “Let us speed-

ily remedy this unrest,” urged the Sixteen’s spokesman, Giovanni Cambi, “and afterwards, when the situation is more peace-

ful, let us proceed to other matters which will be beneficial.” Cambi advised the priors to call together the capitudini of the guilds, to inform them that the government was determined to impose peace and order, and to request the guildsmen to remain quietly in their shops.°° This advice was warmly seconded by the other consultative bodies, in which the “new men,” not the patriciate, held a majority. Their opinions reflected the general outlook of the men of property and status—both patrician and parvenu, industrialist and shopkeeper—who held office and had a voice in the formulation of policy. They sought to pacify their

fellow guildsmen who did not belong to the inner circle of privileged officeholders: who had not enjoyed the honor of mem-

bership in the Signoria, a lucrative post in the contado, or a favorable response to a petition.’ But their appeal for restraint went unheeded. The storm broke on the next day. The violence which erupted on 22 June was the work of the guild community, led by the furriers, While the unorganized mass of laborers in the cloth industry, the Ciompi, did not pre®6 Cambi’s statement, CP, 15, f. 125v, 21 June: “Quod citissime veniatur ad remedia scandalorum, et ad hoc intendatur ad presens; postea vero quando res erunt pacifice, procedatur ad alia que fuerint utilia, offerentes fabas suas. Et quod domini deputent duos aut plures per collegium, de capitaneis, decem libertatis et Octo, qui non discedant, sed praticent super hoc. Et quod domini mittant pro capitaneis particulariter, et dicant eis quod ipsi intendunt dare pacem et bonum statum civitati, et quod velint stare ad suas apothecas. Et quod alii de collegiis vadant et cum bonis verbis mitigent animos civium.” This was the first time in the regime’s history that an advisory body had requested a convocation of guild officials to solve an internal crisis. In the past, the Parte captains were normally summoned, but the colleges had realized that the captains were powerless in this situation. 87 The members of the collegiate bodies who had opposed Salvestro’s petition were not all oligarchic partisans, but the aroused popolo made this assumption; Stefani, 792. Only three members of the Twelve in office can be identified as sup-

porters of the oligarchy: Buonaccorso di Lapo Buonaccorsi, Lapo di Vanni Rucellai, and Jacopo di Schiatta Mangioni. Their colleagues included five “new men” and one patrician, Bernardo Velluti, who belonged to Salvestro de’ Medic1’s coterie. Ten members of the Sixteen were gente nuova. In this collegiate group, only Andrea Baldesi was prominently associated with the Guelf hierarchy.

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cipitate the disorder, they eagerly joined the throngs of artisans and shopkeepers who coursed through the streets, burning the houses of the hated oligarchs. The controlled character of this violence suggests that it was inspired and directed “from the palace,” as Stefani phrased it.°* As though operating by chart, the mob moved systematically from one patrician mansion to the other. Put to the torch were the homes of Lapo da Castiglionchio, Carlo degli Strozzi, Bartolo Siminetti, Niccol6 Soderini, Messer Benghi Buondelmonti. Also destroyed were the palaces of the Albizzi, Canigiani, Pazzi, Cavicciuli, and Guadagni. Private feuds and antipathies played a certain role in this wave of arson. The Covoni led the rioters to the house of Migliore Guadagni, who had engineered their proscription. For like reason, the Mannelli gained vengeance upon their neighbors in S. Spirito, the Canigiani, Only the intervention of the Signoria saved Buoninsegna Machiavelli’s house from destruction at the hands of his

personal enemy, Giorgio degli Scali.” | - Perhaps the most significant feature of this explosion was the speed with which it was restrained by the authorities. Inevitably the mob got out of hand: the Stinche was opened and the pris-

oners released; the convent of the Romiti degli Agnoli was looted and two inmates slain. But the officials quickly rallied their forces and blanketed the disorder before it became unmanageable. A prior, Piero di Fronte, and a member of the Twelve, Niccolé Rinucci, displayed exemplary courage in routing

a crowd which attacked the monastery of S. Spirito. An effort by another band of rioters to break into the communal treasury was repelled by the guild of pork butchers.*° Five foreigners 98 Stefani, 792, noted the different opinions on this question: “. .. E chi dice che il popolo da sé si mosse, e chi dice, che venne scritta di palagio, ove erano scritti quelli che dovessero essere arsi; questo rimanga nel suo luogo. Ma io mi credo che vero guidicio divino fosse che niuno altro che gl’ infrascritti furono né arsi, né tocchi, né rubati.” Other chroniclers, however, stated categorically that the burnings were ordered by Salvestro de’ Medici’s faction; see Cronache e

memorie, 14, 49, 55; Manoscritti, 222, f. 267. ®9 On these private vendettas, see Cronache e memorie, 15; Diario d’anonimo, p. 359. Buoninsegna Machiavelli had been instrumental in the proscription of Giorgio degli Scali; BNF, Maghabechiana, u, tv, 347, f. 15r. 109Jn addition to the general accounts of these events in Stefani, 792, and Diario d’anonimo, pp. 358-60, see, for specific details, the anonymous reports in Cronache e memorie, 15, 45-46, 129; and the interesting unpublished ricordanze

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were convicted of looting and were summarily hanged at strategic locations through the city, a graphic warning against further violence. It was this act of force, and not the publication of edicts and decrees by the Signoria, which eventually restored order.*”*

In the communal palace the authorities worked feverishly to save the regime from disintegration. There was no talk of punishing those who had participated in the disorder: the commune tacitly recognized the right of the guilds to chastise “the guilty ones” (culpabiles) in the Parte Guelfa.’ With near unanimity, the government entrusted its fate to a balia of eighty one citizens, who were granted extraordinary powers until 30 June to reform the regime.*® The task of this balia was extremely delicate. It had to placate the popular demands for reform, while so limiting and

restraining these pressures that moderates would accept the changes. If the regime did not move far enough in the direction

of reform, it would be threatened by another surge of mass violence, which could destroy not only the political structure but the city itself. If, on the other hand, the dalia’s legislation was too radical, a desperate patriciate might be driven to launch a counterrevolution,

The first acts of the reform commission were aimed at the magnates, the favorite targets of the popolo. The penalties imof Pagolo di Ser Guido, a wool shearer, in Carte Strozziane, ser. 2, 59, f. Igor. Bese Magalotti has a brief account in his diary; zdzd., ser. 2, 116, £. 236r. 101 Some chroniclers identified the executed men as “Flemings.” The Signoria had published decrees ordering contadini to leave the city, and authorizing any

citizen to execute looters and arsonists; Diario d’anonimo, pp. 359-60. One chronicler suggested that the executions were a political expedient. The victims,

he wrote, “furono forestieri, e forse fu fatto pid tosto a terrore che per colpa ch’egli avessoro”; Cronache e memorte, 1209. 102 The advisory groups in the Consulte meeting of 23 June urged the Signoria to declare an amnesty on all criminal acts committed during the crisis; to punish

the guilty Parte leaders; and to permit citizens to denounce those oligarchs who had committed crimes against the commune; CP, 15, f. 126r. This lenient attitude may be compared with that which prevailed in the colleges after previous outbursts of disorder, in 1363 and 1368; see above, pp. 192-93, 197-98.

108 The provision establishing the dalia is printed in Falletti Fossati, Ciompz, pp. 331-32. Of 325 votes cast in the councils, only eight were negative. Comprising

the membership of the dalia were the Signoria, colleges, Parte captains, the Diect della Libertad, the Eight, and 21 guild capitudini; they are identified in Diario d’anonimo, p. 505. Slightly more than half of the balia’s membership (44) were gente nuova.

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| posed on this group by Salvestro de’ Medict’s petition were ratified, and were extended for twenty years, instead of the twelve months prescribed in the original law. The only offices which remained open to the magnates were those in the Parte Guelfa, and twenty seats in the Council of the Commune. After disposing of the magnati, the dalia then turned its attention to the individual oligarchic leaders. Lapo da Castiglionchio received the most severe penalties: he was declared a magnate and —a rebel, thus liable to execution if he fell into the hands of com~ munal authorities.*°* To the other Parte leaders the commission

meted out varying degrees of punishment. Piero degli Albizzi, Carlo degli Strozzi, Bonaiuto Serragli, and Ristoro Canigiani were

made magnates, together with their male offspring; and several magnates—Adoardo de’ Pulci, Attaviano Brunelleschi, Alessandro Buondelmonti, Vieri Adimari, Jacopo de’ Pazzi, and Guerrieri de’ Rossi—were designated as sopramagnatt, thereby incurring even

greater penalties than those that normally applied to possessors of that rank. Thirteen other oligarchic leaders were excluded from office for periods ranging from one year to life. This was the appli-

cation, on a vaster scale, of the principle first invoked in 1372 against the Ricci and the Albizzi. In barring the most important oligarchic chieftains from office, it went far toward destroying the political power of the ultra-conservatives in the communal government.” Much of the dalia’s work centered on the ubiquitous problem of proscriptions, and its approach to this question reflected its conservative orientation. On 25 June the commission promulgated two edicts concerning ammonizione, one pertaining to past practice, the second to the future. Any Parte official who was judged

guilty of receiving bribes was fined double the amount of his bribe, and was barred from all communal and Parte offices for life. 104 Tapo had left the city disguised as a monk; he went first to Padua and then to Rome; Stefani, 792. For his life in Rome, see Epistola o sia ragionamento di Messer Lapo da Castighonchto, pp. li-lx. Lapo’s property in Florence was con-

fiscated; see P. J. Jones, “Florentine families and Florentine diaries in the fourteenth century,” Studies in Italian Medieval History presented to Miss E. M. Jamison (Rome, 1956), pp. 192-93. 105 A précis of the dalia’s enactments is in Capitol, 11, 84-98. For the measures against the magnates and oligarchic leaders, see zbid., 85-86, 92. The sopramagnati were barred from all communal offices.

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The second provision stipulated that any individual who was classified as a Ghibelline could appeal to the priors, who, with their advisory bodies, could nullify the ammontzione by a twothirds vote.*®°

The balia also displayed caution in its treatment of those men who had lost their political rights in the recent purge. The commission did not cancel Ghibelline sentences automatically. Instead,

it undertook to review the cases of citizens who had been proscribed since 1 September 1377. Those who received the Jdalia’s vote of confidence (a two-thirds vote) would be restored to Guelf status, with one significant limitation: they could not hold com-

munal office for three years. Anyone who did not receive the balia’s stamp of approval could appeal to the Signoria during July and August for the cancellation of his Ghibelline title.“°’ On the 27th and 28th, the names of eighty eight “Ghibellines” were

presented to the balia. Of this number, only fifty four were restored to full civic rights. Those pariahs who were not cleansed of their guilt were, for the most part, obscure “new men,” but there were significant exceptions. Among those who continued to bear the Ghibelline label were Giovanni de’ Mozzi and Messer Donato Aldighieri, and those two celebrated figures whose ammonizione had precipitated the crisis, Giraldo Giraldi and Francesco Martini.*”*

The work of this balia reflected its efforts to steer a course between Scylla and Charybdis. It endeavored to placate and mollify the discontented elements that had indulged in violence, without altering the regime’s structure, and without alienating the moderates. Thus it proclaimed an amnesty for all crimes committed during the disorders, on condition that all stolen property be restored to its owners. Prisoners who had escaped from the Stinche

were not to be prosecuted for that act, but neither were they absolved of the penalties for which they had been incarcerated."” 106 On these provisions, see Capitoli, u, 86-87. The same penalties applied to bribery involving officials of the commune. In both cases the recipient was required to return half of the bribe to the giver. 107 Capitoli, 11, 90-91.

108 The names of the 88 ammoniti, and the votes cast on each, are in zbid., II, 93-04. Opposing nearly all cancellations was a minority of approximately twenty intransigent Guelfs. 109 Capitoli, 11, 92, 96. Those who had looted the home of Lapo da Castiglionchio were not required to return the stolen property.

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The most serious criticism that can be levied against the balia was that its decrees pertained to immediate issues and grievances, but, like the earlier reform of 1372, it did not touch the roots of disunity and discord.*”* In its one serious effort to solve this prob-

lem, the dalia transformed itself into a permanent organization, the Consorteria della Liberta. The members of this society were to consider each other as blood kin. They could bear arms; they had the right to assemble at any time and were largely exempt from control by communal authorities.** By this association, the balia apparently hoped to utilize the concept of family bonds and obligations to shore up a tottering regime. It was an attempt to revive the venerated ideals of unity and fraternity which had, in Florence mythology, animated the ancient commune.” While pursuing this chimerical ideal of resurrecting the ancient Guelf spirit and saving the regime by means of an artificial brotherhood, the balia was confronted with the ugly reality of a restive populace that had not been calmed by its ministrations. On the day that its tenure expired (30 June), the Jalia returned to the problem of ammonizione. It decreed, first, that all citizens who since 1357 had been condemned as Ghibellines in the courts or ammoniti by the Parte could appeal to the Signoria for the restoration of their Guelf status. Then, in its final action, the balia recognized an obvious fact: “The imminent dangers have not been, and cannot be surmounted, save by the revocation of proscriptions and the restitution of those who have been ammonitt.” It decreed that the incoming Signoria should examine the cases of

all citizens, living and dead, who had been proscribed by the Parte, and should restore full civil rights to those who had been unjustly deprived of their political heritage.*** Beyond this point the dalia would not go. It was not prepared to take the ultimate 110 For a discussion of the achievement of the 1372 balia, see above, p. 258. 111 For the text of the Jalia’s decree creating this consorteria, and stipulating the privileges of its members, see Diario d’anonimo, pp. 506-10. The objective of this organization was stated in vague terms: “Quod ad libertatem popularem conservandam augendam et manutenendam publice utile est ipsis popularibus assistere favoribus, privilegiis et gratiis opportunis, ut idem reddantur audaciores ad tutelam populi et ad promovendum salutaria populari libertati, et ut idem appetentes populi quietem et salutem turbare et inquietare velle impedire com-

pescantur et terreantur... .” 112 For Matteo Villani’s articulation of this ideal, see above, p. 83, n. 109. 118 Capitol, 11, 97-98.

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step of dismantling the ammonizione machinery, and of eradicating the Guelf-Ghibelline controversy from Florentine politics. Its final action was a hesitant compromise.

July

To the Signoria that entered office on 1 July, the dalia had bequeathed a troublesome legacy: a profoundly disturbed city. Although the June disorders had been quickly suppressed, they had weakened normal restraints and controls, had brought to the

surface latent hostilities, and had whetted the appetite of the populace for more violence. One merchant expressed the sanguine

hope that the crisis had been surmounted: “The situation has calmed down,” he wrote, “and the Signoria with their colleges and capitudini are putting affairs in order so that all will be well.”*** His optimism was not shared by many of his fellows.

Day and night the militia companies stood guard in the city streets; the shops remained closed and shuttered. In anticipation of another outbreak of disorder, merchants moved goods out of the city, and many patrician families imported retainers from the contado to protect their homes and property.” With a fidelity that is truly remarkable for a source so limited in form and content, the Consulte e Pratiche protocols reflected the varied reactions of the communal authorities in these critical days. The currents of unrest which swept through the city were 114 The letter was sent on 26 June by Andrea di Messer Ambrogio to Agnolo degli Agli in Pisa; R. Piattoli, “L’origine dei fondaci datiani di Pisa e Genova,”

Archivio storico pratese, vu (1927), 176. On 7 July Andrea wrote another optimistic note: “Queste chose qua si sono molto riposate e ciaschuno fa di fatti suoi. Non pare ci fosse mai né romore né altra cosa veruna. Idio ne sia sempre

lodato. E parecchi e chattivi uomini sono puniti, che guastavan questa terra: aranone paura deg!’ altri.” In a dispatch dated 26 June, the Sienese ambassadors also indicated their belief that the troubles were over, although they noted that opinion was divided on this question: “E non pare che anco la gente sta contenta, e chi dice le cose essare acconcie, e chi dice non. Pare che s’aspetti el trare del nuovo offitio che si trara lunedi. Come seguiranno cosi, vi scrivaremo, ma secondo che ci pare, el nostro essare qua non é di necessita, perché vi preghiamo che vi piaccia che ritorniamo a la Vostra Signoria”; ASS, Concistoro, 1794, f. 76r. 115 Cronache e memorie, 16. In his diary, Carte Strozziane, ser. 2, 4, ff. 54r-54v, Paolo Sassetti recorded that he received goods for safekeeping from Bernardo degli Agli and Giachimono di Ghoccio, who apparently feared another outbreak of disorder.

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distinctly felt in the palace of the Signoria. Nearly every speech delivered in the meetings of the priors and their advisory groups made some reference to the agitation: the “murmurings” of malcontents, the criticism leveled against the regime by the oblocutores, and, most ominously, the formation of secret assemblies of

those who were plotting to subvert the regime.* There was a pronounced tendency, in this crisis, for speakers to fall back upon traditional ideas and clichés. Thus the Sixteen on 18 July made the profound observation that the city would be destroyed only by the disunity of its citizens. This college also advanced the dubi-

ous argument that to preserve the regime, the Signoria should seek the counsel of citizens who were pre-eminent by virtue of their family’s antiquity, their personal wealth, intellect, and social

status." Out of this plethora of banal platitudes there emerged some concrete proposals for solving the crisis. A prime requisite, according to many speakers, was the strong and forceful assertion of the

commune’s authority. “The priors should demonstrate their determination to be masters of the city.” So counseled Giovanni Cambi, spokesman for the Sixteen. Several advisory groups called for the appointment of a new official, a Defender of the commune,

to be equipped with a large police force for maintaining order. Others demanded that the judicial officials dedicate all their energies to the problem. The judges of the merchant’s court, the Mercanzia, were urged “to repress discord and criticism”; the captain of the popolo received a similar mandate, to “prosecute, by day and by night, all conspirators and those who form assemblies.”*** Unrest would be contained, some believed, if those

oligarchs who had been penalized by the dalia were forced to leave the city, and if armed men from the contado were denied entrance into Florence. The maintenance of order was imperative for the regime’s sur116 Statements in the protocols referring to the internal crisis (2-19 July) are published in Diario d’anonimo, pp. 511-14. 117 Thus on 10 July Marco Fantoni’s comment: “Quod die lune Domini faciant unum consilium antiquorum hominum civium maturorum artificum mercatorum et scloperatorum”; and on 16 July, Andrea Baldesi counseled: “Et quod domini habeant Consilium optimorum civium divitum et sapientum”; zbid., pp. 513-14. For earlier expressions of this theme, see above, pp. 89-90. 118 Diario d’anonimo, pp. 512-13.

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vival. But equally important was a diagnosis and cure for the dis-

content, which was manifest in the crescendo of criticism and obloguy and in the secret conventicles. The guilds were foci of unrest, and to these organizations the government turned for enlightenment and support. “Find out what the guilds want, and what they are discussing,” advised the Sixteen on 3 July.’ Foremost among the grievances harbored by the guild community was the regime’s failure to settle the Ghibelline issue, Not only was the machinery of proscription still intact, but scores of disgruntled ammoniti, who had not been cleansed of their stigma

of disloyaity, agitated incessantly for a full restitution of their civil rights. The colleges were generally sympathetic to their demands for rehabilitation, and they also favored additional changes in the Parte’s constitution and in the operation of ammonizione.””

But the Signoria, following the lead of the standard-bearer of justice, Luigi Guicciardini, stubbornly resisted these pressures for

Parte reform. In his diary Guicciardini wrote that he and his colleagues had been subjected to great pressure from “evil men, Ghibellines, ammoniti, their traitorous Guelf followers, and the Eight.” These men had demanded that a number of Guelf par-

tisans be condemned and exiled, and that the commune adopt new laws concerning the Parte, “which in fact would have destroyed it.”*** When the Signoria took no action to comply with 119 “Ft quod Domini procurent scire inter quas Artes fiant colloquia que fieri dicuntur: et quod habeant aliquos de melioribus Artis et reprehendant eos; et sciscitentur de eo quod querunt et tractant”; zdid., p. 511. 120 Thus on 2 July the Twelve stated: “Exequantur que fieri debent ad domum Partis et de hoc requirantur Capitanei”; and on 3 July, “Super restitutione admonitorum servetur forma data per illos de Balia.” Two days later, the Eight counseled: “Et quod ultima insaccatio facta ad domum Partis tollatur, que dicitur insaccatio domini Lapi [da Castiglionchio]. Et quod in recursu monendorum fiat lex quod monitio non valent nisi confermetur per Priores et Collegia, unum per Capitudinem et Decem libertatis seu duas partes presentium. .. .” See also the statements of both colleges on 6 July; Diario d’anonimo, pp. 511-12. 121 The relevant portion of Luigi Guicciardini’s diary is published in Cronache € memortie, 49. His political orientation is quite apparent from this statement:

“... volendo cierti malifici e ghibelini e amuniti e loro seguaci guelfi traditori et i detto otto della balia, che per lo detto nostro ufficio del priorato e per gli nostri colegi si prociedesse contra i detti cittadini e partefici guelfi rigidamente, in confinagli e in isbandegiagli fuori de la cita di Firenze; e volendo che per lo nostro uficio si faciesono cierti ordini contro a la parte guelfa in disfalla a fatto; et io Luigi ponendomi al contrario, e volendo sostenere che cid non si faciese.

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these demands, the guilds seized the initiative. On 8 July they presented a petition to the Signoria; it was debated briefly by the

colleges, who supported its adoption.” Although the measure passed the councils by substantial majorities, the voting statistics are not an accurate index of sentiment. The councils were keenly

aware that the guildsmen were poised, arms in hand, to overwhelm the regime by force if the petition were rejected.*”

This law dealt with two related questions: proscription and communal ofhices.*** It did not propose the dissolution of the Parte Guelfa or the abolition of ammonizione, but it did bring the society and its activities under the effective control of the com-

munal government. Its main feature was a provision granting to the Signoria and its advisory groups the right to veto any proscrip-

tion.’ The measure also stipulated that representatives of all twenty one guilds must participate in scrutinies for the Signoria, and that every citizen nominated by the gonfalonieri of the dis.. -” Guicciardini was not, however, closely identified with partisan politics or with the Guelf hierarchy.

| 122 The strongest statement in favor of the petition was made by the Sixteen on 10 July. They urged the Signoria to exert influence to obtain the petition’s approval by the councils, and to recruit speakers who would support the measure before the assemblies; Diario d’anonimo, p. 513. The day before, the Sixteen had expressed some reservations about certain provisions. The Parte captains were not enthusiastic about the measure, but they did not oppose it; zbid., p. 512. One witness, Pagolo di Ser Guido, stated that the colleges at first opposed the petition: “L’arti diedono la petizione contro alla Parte e contro a grandi, e pit altre cose;

non si potea vincere tra collegi; armaronsi tutti l’arti, allhora si vinse”’; Carte Strozgiane, ser. 2, 59, f. rgor. 123 The vote on the measure: 161-41 and 81-33; Libri Fabarum, 40, f£. 300r. The atmosphere in which the petition was passed was described by one chronicler, Cronache e memorie, 18: “Porta per l’arti e per li artefici la detta petizione, fu messa per li priori innanzi a collegi, e di presente fu vinta, e, di presente sonato a consiglio di popolo e ragunatosi, fu messa dinanzi al consiglio e subito fu vinta per propria paura. Imperoché li artefici erano tutti alle botteghe delle loro arti armati, e€ avevano spiegati gid i gonfaloni dell’arti per rumoreggiare. Di che, sapendo che la detta petizione era vinta nel consiglio del popolo, furono forte contenti e levoronsi dal loro proponimento.” 124 The petition is in Prov., 66, ff. 57r-Gov. It is printed in Falletti Fossati, Ciompi, p. 346 ff., and summarized in Diario d’anonimo, pp. 364-65, n. I. 125 The measure provided that no one whose kin had held communal office since 1312 could be proscribed without the prior approval of the Signoria and its advisory bodies. Others who had not held office could be ammoniti by the captains only after they had been given the opportunity to defend themselves. These proscriptions could also be annulled by the Signoria.

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tricts must be presented to the scrutators for a vote. Finally, any individual who did not exercise his guild occupation was prohibited from holding office in the commune, the Parte, or a guild. This petition embodied the political ideals and objectives of the guild community. It was a conservative document, reflecting the temperament of its proponents, who disliked and feared the arrogant aristocrat as much as the propertyless worker. These artefici wanted the restoration of a genuine guild regime, in which the druggist, the notary, the furrier, and the blacksmith would be on an equal footing with the international merchant, the wealthy rentier, and the magnate of noble blood.” Although these guildsmen did not wish to destroy the Parte Guelfa, which remained a focal point of traditional loyalties, they were determined to place this aristocratic society under communal control.*** The provisions for officeholding were repetitious of past enactments, which ap-

parently had been abrogated or ignored in practice. These were designed to strengthen the role of the guild community in selecting eligible officeholders. Highly significant was the clause which

barred from office the scioperati, those citizens who were not active in business. If rigidly enforced, this rule would destroy the

political power of the magnates, and would also exclude from the government a large proportion of the patrician popolani.’” This document may also be interpreted as an expression of revolt by the mass of artefici against their leaders, who had heretofore monopolized the offices of both commune and guilds, In exchange for offices and benefits, the elite that controlled the corporations of artisans and petty merchants had accepted communal policies which adversely affected the interests of the ma-

jority of their guild colleagues.” They had acquiesced in a 126 One provision of the petition stipulated that the consuls and sindachi of the guilds then in office were to have “quelle gratie et immunita et delle arme et d’ongna altra cosa che anno avuto e debbono ... Salvestro di Messer Alamanno

e conpagni e gli altri della balia....” 127 On the conflict between public and private jurisdiction in Florence, see above, pp. 96-99. 128 “FE che nessuna persona il quale fosse matricolato in alcuna arte delle decte

ventuna capitudine del arti il quale non facesse o facesse fare realmente et con effecto al tempo d’alcuna imborsagione o insacchagione l’arte non possa ne debbia da quindi innanzi essere imborsato per cagione overo pretesto della decta arte in alcuno ufficio d’arte o di comune o della citta di Firenze o di parte.” 129 On the small group of lower guildsmen who monopolized the offices allotted

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regime dominated by affluent patricians. Now, in this moment of crisis, these erstwhile leaders were pushed aside by the rank and file, who had not enjoyed the prestige of a prior’s seat or the emoluments of a contado rectorship. The failure of the communal authorities to liquidate, finally and conclusively, the Ghibelline issue was a tactical error of the first magnitude. By leaving grievances unassuaged, the regime had contributed to the perpetuation of discontent and restiveness. And

it also provided the spectacle of a government that faltered and surrendered when confronted by a show of force. But the most pernicious consequence of the commune’s policy of vacillation and

indecision was its effect upon the lower classes, Aroused by the disturbances and by the signs of the regime’s weakness, this un-

privileged mass shook off its lethargy and, after thirty years, again prepared to play an active role in Florentine politics. For a decade, the proletariat had remained unusually quiet and

passive, as though unconscious of the discords animating the ruling class. The judicial records contain no trace of the mob disorders which plagued Florence in the 1340’s. The only recent outbreak of any significance was a small riot in April 1378, inspired by the misbehavior of a band of German mercenaries.**® But when in June the guildsmen seized their arms and torches, the popolo

minuto accepted the license to burn and loot the houses of the hated aristocrats. This brief interlude of violence ignited the spirit of rebellion among the carders, shearers, washers, and fullers in the cloth industry. When, in the days after the June riots, the artisans and shopkeepers formulated their political demands, the laborers

were also discussing their grievances. There is little doubt that some of the “conspirators,” whose secret meetings caused concern

to the authorities in early July, were from the ranks of the disfranchised proletariat. to the arti minori, see M. Becker and G. Brucker, “The Arti Minori in Florentine Politics, 1342-1378,” Mediaeval Studies, xvi11 (1956), 101-02. The June dalia had affirmed the principle established in 1350: that the lower guilds were limited to one fourth of communal offices; Capitoli, 1, 95. Even though there had been an expansion of the officeholding class during the war with the papacy (see above, pp. 297-300), the officeholders still constituted only a small minority of the guild community. For the limited size of this group, see the records of selection to the commune’s minor offices for 1375-1378; Tratte, 219-20, passim. 180 On this riot, see Prov., 66, f. 31r.

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The most informed source on these illicit gatherings, their composition and their objectives, is the anonymous chronicle written by a direct observer of the proceedings in the priors’ palace.*** This reporter received his information from witnesses who were seized and interrogated by the police officials after they had been

denounced as conspirators. First to be apprehended was a man named Simoncino, arrested on the evening of the 1gth; his testimony was corroborated by that of two other ringleaders, Pagolo del Bodda and a man identified only as Filippo. The conspirators had met in a church in the Via S. Gallo, near the city’s north wall, and later in a place called the Ronco, in the quarter of S. Spirito. Scheduled to begin on the following day, the revolt was to con-

sist of four separate uprisings: one in the church of S. Spirito, comprising one thousand men; the second in the church of S. Stefano, in which four hundred men from the quarter of S. Croce would join; and the others in S. Lorenzo and S. Piero Maggiore, in the northern districts of the city. The bulk of the revolutionaries were laborers from the quarters of S. Spirito and S. Giovanni, but

according to Simoncino their number also included “many respectable guildsmen” and “a very large proportion of the ammoniti.” When pressed to identify the leaders of the conspiracy, the informer pronounced the names of four men who had been proscribed: the druggist, Giovanni Dini, formerly one of the Eight; the wealthy ropemaker, Maso Neri; and two artisans, Guglielmo and Andrea di Feo. After being placed on the torturer’s rack, Simoncino volunteered another name, that of Salvestro de’

Medici, who, when called to the palace, admitted that he knew about the secret assemblies, but believed them to be too insignificant to report to the Signoria. In addition to furnishing the communal authorities with names, 131 This account is in Cronache e memorie, 20-23. Scaramella makes a good case for his contention that the chronicle’s author was one of the priors, Alamanno Acciaiuoli; Archivio Muratoriano, 1 (1913), 307-25, but his identification is questioned by Rodolico, Ciompi, p. viit. Just before the July revolution erupted, news reached the city that peace had been signed with the papacy (18 July). Thus the issue that had contributed most to internal discords was eliminated on the eve of the regime’s collapse. The Machiavelli chronicler, Diario d’anonimo, pp. 365-66, stated that the news inspired great rejoicing and celebration, but another anonymous chronicler asserted that the popolo minuto believed “ch’aveano fatto pace per meglio potergli punire”; Manoscritti, 222, f. 270.

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Simoncino also described the motivation behind the revolutionary movement. The conspirators had heard rumors that the commune was preparing a massive campaign of repression against those who had participated in the June riots. They had been told, he reported, that a foreign official, Ser Nuto di Citta di Castello, was brought

into the city “to hang us all by the neck.” When questioned further about the objectives of the movement, Simoncino stated that the workers in the cloth industry wished to escape from the

jurisdiction of the Lana guild, and from the authority of the guild’s foreign official. “They are badly treated,” he stated, “both by the official who punishes them for every petty thing, and by the employers who pay them badly, and for work which is worth

twelve [soldi], they give them eight.” The Ciompi’s other demands included the right to form their own guild, to choose their own consuls, “and ... to have a part in the government of the city.”**? Thus was the commune presented with the revolutionary program of the proletariat, first articulated and elaborated in the 1340’s when the regime was born and now raised again to foreshadow its downfall. The confessions of these tortured men conjured up the shades of Ciuto Brandini and the other proletarian leaders, whose efforts

to unite the workers in the cloth industry had been crushed in the 1340’s.’* Confronted by the spectacle of social revolution, the Signoria reacted quickly and decisively. Letters were sent to fortified places in the contado and the district, requesting the dispatch of troops into Florence. The sixteen gonfalonieri were sent home to their districts, with orders to bring their militia troops into the

Piazza della Signoria, to protect the regime from a possible uprising.

The priors who stared out of the palace windows the next morning witnessed an awesome spectacle. The square was choked with thousands of people. During the night a contingent of eighty

lances had arrived and stationed itself in front of the palace; it numbered only one-third of the reinforcements promised by the Eight. Around these soldiers milled throngs of the popolo minuto, demanding the release of Simoncino and the other incarcerated

proletarian leaders. Shouts of “Long live the popolo and the 182 Cronache e memorie, 20-21. 133 See above, pp. I10-1I.

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guilds!” reverberated through the square and reached the ears of the frightened officials within the palace. Since the mercenaries made no move to suppress the demonstrations, the regime’s sole

hope lay with the civic militia led by the sixteen gonfaloniert. But only two districts sent their contingents into the square, and these quickly retired when they realized that they were alone. Now the Signoria was powerless, Simoncino and his companions were turned over to the mob, which had begun another campaign of destruction. A score of houses belonging to oligarchic leaders were burned. Among the victims were Messer Filippo Corsini,

Antonio Ridolfi, Michele Castellani, Simone Peruzzi, Andrea Baldesi, Alessandro Alessandri, and the standard-bearer of justice, Luigi Guicciardini.™*

While the mob destroyed, it also created. Some sixty citizens, headed by Salvestro de’ Medici, were knighted by the Ciompi for their services to the popolo. But the selection of those to be hon-

ored with this distinguished accolade was haphazard. Stefani noted that several oligarchs presented themselves and their friends

as candidates for knighthood, hoping thus to protect their property from the flames. Some were knighted whose houses had already been put to the torch. “It was,” concluded Stefani, “the most incredible disorder that had ever occurred.”***

Night fell, and the city was illuminated by the flames of the smoldering palaces. These fires symbolized the victory of the popolo minuto, but it was a precarious victory. The government still remained intact behind the forbidding walls of the Signoria’s

palace, and it was still capable of an effort to crush the revolt. Sensing this fact, the crowd of six thousand artisans and laborers moved aimlessly through the city in search of security, across the

Arno into the friendly territory of S. Spirito, then back again over the Ponte Vecchio to the northern sections of the city. In a 184 These events are described in detail by the anonymous chronicler, idid., 22-23, and also in a letter written by another unknown Florentine on 23 July, tbid., 142-43. See also Diario d’anonimo, p. 366; and Stefani, 795. 135 Stefani, 795. Among those who were made knights, and who had lost their homes, were Luigi Guicciardini and Alessandro Alessandri. The Ciompi’s petition, enacted into law on 22 July, cancelled the conferment of knighthood upon those men whose houses had been destroyed. Oligarchs who were knighted included Biagio Guasconi, Salice Cavalcanti, and Francesco di Uberto degli Albizzi.

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building near the church of S. Barnaba, the tired throng halted, and there it placed for safekeeping the communal standard that had been seized earlier from the executor’s palace.**°

There was, that night, no rest for the leaders of the revolution. A score of proletarian spokesmen, who had organized and led the disorders on the 2oth, met in the church of S. Lorenzo with the guild officials who were sympathetic to their cause. Their purpose was to formulate a political program which would be submitted to the Signoria and the councils, and thus would legitimize the revolt of the lower classes. Although the radical guildsmen and the Ciompi had sealed their alliance with an oath, they did not succeed in hammering out a common policy. Instead, each group formulated its own demands, in accordance with its particular needs and objectives. These were presented to the Signoria on the morning of the 2rst.**"

Considering the revolutionary milieu in which it was formulated, the petition submitted by the guildsmen was a very moderate

document. Primarily concerned with that moribund institution, the Parte Guelfa, it did not deal with any of the critical issues raised by the Ciompi revolt.*** All who had been proscribed by the Parte since 1358 were restored to Guelf status and were made immediately eligible for communal offices; even the dead were rehabilitated. Specifically mentioned as beneficiaries of this act were Uguccione and Rosso de’ Ricci, Giorgio degli Scali, Messer Donato Aldighieri, and Giovanni Dini, Two of the “Eight Saints”

were also rewarded for their services to the artefici. The grain merchant, Giovanni di Mone, received an annual pension of three

hundred florins, and Messer Alessandro de’ Bardi was granted popolano status.

The petitions drawn up by the Ciompi leaders covered a wide variety of problems, ranging from basic alterations in the communal structure to petty particulars.” The latter included those 186 See Rodolico, Ciompi, pp. 113-14. One chronicler stated that one part of the

mob remained in the quarter of S. Spirito, while some who participated in the rioting went to their homes; Cronache e memorie, 112. 187 Rodolico, Ciompi, pp. 114-15.

138 The petition is printed in G. Capponi, Storia della Repubblica di Firenze,

I, -QQ.

20 The Ciompi submitted two petitions to the Signoria, not one, as Rodolico

asserts; Ciompi, p. 119. The most important petition is printed by Falletti

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clauses which cancelled the proscription of Andrea di Feo, barred

Ser Piero di Ser Grifo from all communal offices for life, and granted to Salvestro de’ Medici the revenues from the shops on the Ponte Vecchio. But the petitions also dealt with significant issues affecting the social and economic status of the popolo minuto, as well as their role in the government. Of central importance was the demand for the creation of a separate and independent guild of the popolo minuto, whose members would enjoy all the privileges and prerogatives of the matricolati in the other twenty one corporations.’*° These included a meeting place, to be purchased with communal funds, the right to elect guild officials, and a quarter share of all offices. Several of the clauses concerned the administration of justice, which had been a perennial source of proletarian discontent. Judicial officials were barred from prosecuting any case arising from the recent disorders. All citizens who had been placed under the communal ban were to be pardoned;

the only exceptions were those who had been convicted of rebellion, treason, bribery or perjury.** The petition also provided for the cancellation of a law which had prescribed the amputation

of a hand for convicted criminals who did not pay their fines within ten days. For a two-year period, none of the popolo minuto could be arrested for debt. Proletarian dislike of the commune’s fiscal system was also manifest in this petition. One clause prohibited the levy of a forced loan for six months; another proFossati, Ciompi, appendix, doc. 9, p. 365 ff. (not by Capponi, as Rodolico stated). The second petition of the popolo minuto, Prov., 67, ff. or-13v, was directed against their oligarchic enemies. Among those deprived of the right to hold communal office were: Lodovico di Banco di Ser Bartolo, Priore and Pera Baldovinetti, Simone di Messer Bindo Altoviti, Piero Canigiani, Tommaso

Soderini, Migliore Guadagni. Several citizens (Antonio Ridolfi, Annibaldo and Currado degli Strozzi, Alessandro and Bartolomeo Alessandri) were named magnates; others (Piero and Maso degli Albizzi, Bartolo Siminetti, Niccolo

Soderini, Manetto da Filicaia, and Carlo degli Strozzi) were exiled from Florence and confined to specific locations. This measure also cancelled the ammonizione of Maso Neri, Giovanni de’ Mozzi, Francesco Martini, Giraldo Giraldi, Mazza di Andrea, Piero Petriboni, and Francesco and Alessandro Gucci.

140 This was a primary goal of the cloth workers in the 1340's; see Rodolico, Popolo minuto, pp. 28-64. 141 For criticisms of communal justice, see above, pp. 62-64, 130-31. In the judicial records of the 1370’s there are many cancellations of sentences promulgated during July and August 1378.

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vided for the repayment, without interest, of the commune’s funded debt, the monti, over a twelve-year period.*” The Ciompi program is noteworthy both for its restraint and its political sophistication. The haste with which it was composed accounts for its disorganized character, for the varied and incongruous themes it encompassed. But its creators were men with a firm grasp of political realities, The petition did not seek to destroy the traditional framework of Florentine politics and society; its objective was a readjustment of that order to give the lower classes a greater voice in the regime.*** Of particular significance were its proposals for remedying the abuses and inequities of the existing system, particularly in the spheres of justice and finance. One fundamental question, however, the authors of this program did not and could not answer: the ultimate limits of lowerclass aspirations. Neither in the petition nor, presumably, among the Ciompi themselves was there an articulated demand for the destruction of the regime and the establishment of a new egali-

tarian order. But the forces marshalled around the communal standard near S. Barnaba were capable of accomplishing that end. As one chronicler noted, revolutions do not stop at the terminals prescribed by their original promoters.*“ The revolutionary élan of the Ciompi was dampened by a sum-

mer storm, which deluged the city in the morning hours of the 21st. But the suspension of activity was momentary. The popolo 142 One clause also stipulated that the florin should not be valued higher than 68 soldi. Cloth manufacturers profited from an increase in the value of the gold florin, and the consequent depreciation of silver currency. They received payment for their goods in gold, while they paid their workers in silver. 143 Tn its petition, the popolo minuto demanded two seats in the priorate, which would have reduced the representation of the seven greater guilds to one half. One chronicler stated that the petition provided for a redistribution of the seats in the priorate: two reserved for the popolo minuto, four for the

fourteen lower guilds, and two for the seven greater guilds; Cronache e memorie, 110. However, there is no mention of this change in any of the petitions. The best chronicle summary of the proletarian demands is provided by the anonymous author, identified by Scaramella as Alamanno Acciaiuoli; ibid., 28-29. 144 “Ma la grande, quando é mossa, ispesse volte non rista a posta di chi la muove; e cosi fe la citta di Firenze: non si fermo dove averebe voluto messer Tommaso di Marco degli Strozzi, messer Salvestro de’ Medici, messer Benedetto

degli Alberti, Giovanni Dini e gli altri movitori di tanto male e scandolo, quanto ne segui”; Cronache e memorie, 55.

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minuto was angered but not thrown into panic by the rumor that an exiled oligarch, Migliore Guadagni, was moving toward the city with a force of five thousand troops.” The revolution acted to defend itself. After a fierce struggle, the Ciompi seized the palace of the podesta, a strategic stronghold and a potential source of counterrevolution. They also commandeered the keys of the city gates and mounted guard upon the walls. The palaces of the Lana guild and the judges, as well as the offices of the grain commission in Or San Michele, were ransacked, not for treasure or booty, but for records. It was natural that this largely illiterate crowd should seek to destroy documents which it associated with the nefarious work of judges, police officials, and tax collectors.

The mob indulged, too, in a rare outburst of bloodletting, by killing and mutilating the police official, Ser Nuto di Citta di Castello, who had been authorized to execute the ringleaders of the proletarian conspiracy.**°

In their palace, meanwhile, the apprehensive priors went through the motions of governing a city which they no longer controlled. The record of their deliberations was not inscribed in

the protocols; for these days of crisis, the official sources are silent.“*’ The Signoria with its colleges did approve the three petitions that had been submitted to it. A sure indication that the regular process of government had broken down are the voting statistics on these measures. Only a handful of councillors—less

than five per cent of the total—dared to cast negative ballots against these petitions, which normally would have aroused strong opposition.™*

The regime finally collapsed on the afternoon of the 22nd, shortly after the petitions had been approved. One of the priors, having excused himself from his colleagues on a pretext, fled

from the palace to his home. But he was spied by the crowd, which immediately shouted for the demission of the Signoria. The ensuing scene inside the palace was described by an eyewitness: 145 Diario d’anonimo, pp. 367-68. 146 On these manifestations of violence, see Rodolico, Ciompi, pp. 116-18. Ser

Nuto was the sole known casualty of the July disorders; the revolutionaries exhibited remarkable discipline and restraint. Stefani, 795, noted that no looting was permitted in the houses which were burned on the 2oth. 147 The final entry was on 19 July; CP, 17, f. ror. 148 The votes on the three petitions were: 164-10 and 129-3; 172-2 and 12%-5; 154-20 and 130-2; LF, 40, ff. 301r-30IVv.

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“The priors looked at one another, to decide what to do. And they determined to inform the colleges and the Eight to learn their reaction. .. . The members of the colleges wept: some twisted

their hands, while others struck themselves in the face. Totally disoriented, they did not know what advice to give. The Eight displayed sadness and grief. The priors were nonplussed. Outside

the noise was deafening, [the crowd] shouting that it wanted the priors to go to their homes, and that the Eight should remain in the palace. Otherwise, the city would be given over to fire and flame, and their houses and those of the collegiate members and their relatives would be burned, their wives and children would

be seized and killed before their eyes if they did not depart immediately.”*“°

According to this witness, two of the priors, Niccolé del Nero and Alamanno Acciaiuoli, stoutly voiced their determination to remain at their posts. However, when their colleagues stole away one by one, they too finally joined the exodus. The triumphant throng of popolo minuto which filed into the palace found only the “Eight Saints” waiting to greet it. The regime expired just three months before it would have completed its thirty fifth year.*° 149 Cronache e memorie, 31: “Di che i priori uno guardare l’altro, che é da fare. E deliberossi significarlo a collegi e alli otto e di vedere Ja loro volonta.... I collegi piangevano, chi torceva le mani, chi con esse si batteva il viso; e tutti sbalorditi non sapevano pigliare partito. Li otto si mostravano tristi e dolorosi. I priori erano smemorati. “El romore di fuora era grandissimo, dicendo che al postutto vogliono che i priori se ne vadino alle loro case, e vogliono che li otto rimanghino in palazzo; altrimenti questa citta andra a fuoco e fiamma, e che arderanno le case loro, e de’ collegi, e di tutti i loro parenti e consorti; che piglierebbono le loro donne e figliuoli, che gli ucciderebbono tutti in loro presenza, se di subito non ne Uscissino.”

150 Qn 23 July the Sienese envoy in Florence wrote a very brief and hasty account of the Ciompi upheaval; ASS, Concistoro, 1794, £. 7or: “Sapiate che che martedi a di xx di luglio, si levd e popolo minuto e andaro a chasa de cofaloniere

dela giustizia e arseno la chasa sua e pit altre case di popolo graso. E fecieno pit e pid chavalieri di [lacuna] quali fu Savestro di Messer Alamanno di Medici e Mateo di Federicho Soldi e Meza di Ma [?]. A di xxi detto mese presero e palacio de la podesta e erobalé e giuvedi a di xxii del [de]tto mese si trasero e priori di palazo e feciero uno chofaloniere di giustizia ch’a nome Michele di Lando, eschardaziere e . . . anno arso tutti libri del arte de lana e de l’uficiale dela grascia e ano arso la casa di Ser Piero de la Riformagione e Ser Nuto da Chastelli.”

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Post-Mortem An analysis of the regime which governed Florence from 1343 to 1348 properly begins with an explanation, not of its downfall, but of its survival. One must account for its durability in an age of endemic crisis, when republican governments were foundering elsewhere in Italy. The regime survived for nearly four decades because it had won

the allegiance and support of large and important segments of the citizenry. In moments of extreme crisis, such as the Pisan war or the struggle with the papacy, this commitment to the regime was so intense that it enabled the authorities to demand heavy sacrifices from the populace. These sentiments of loyalty tended to grow stronger as the regime endured. The lower classes in particular were more attached to their government during the papal war than they had been three decades before. One of the

republic’s major achievements in this period was its ability to inculcate a sense of loyalty in the throngs of immigrants who came into the city after the plagues of 1348, 1363, and 1374.

The regime gained strength and stability, too, from the conservative orientation of the populace. This was an age which resisted change, which sought to compensate for the instability of life by clinging to established patterns and norms.*** Most Flor-

entines preferred the habitual and the familiar to the uncertainties which would result from innovation. Politically, this conservatism expressed itself in a reluctance to abandon old institutions and practices, or to sanction changes in communal policy.*”” Those reforms which were enacted tended to be quite limited in scope and purpose.*”* Although the aristocracy was most strongly imbued with this desire to avoid novelties and to preserve traditions, the sentiment was not entirely foreign to other classes, the 151 The conservative bent of the Florentine educated class in the late Trecento has been emphasized by H. Baron, The Crists of the Early Italian Renaissance, pp. 3-21. M. Meiss has noted the conservative taste of artists and patrons, as contrasted to the “progressive” trend represented by Giotto; Painting in Florence and Siena after the Black Death, pp. 9-58. 152 For examples of political conservatism, see above, pp. 140, 148-51, 258, 360, 366, 371. Perhaps the most striking illustration is the survival of the Guelf ideal in communal politics; above, pp. 324, 346. 153 Typical examples are the minor reforms of the Parte Guelfa in 1366 and the work of the 1372 dalia; see above, pp. 208-10, 257-58.

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gente nuova and the proletariat. After the June revolution, for example, the communal authorities refused to consider the abolition of that obvious anachronism, the Parte Guelfa.*™ Illustrative of lower-class conservatism was the Ciompi’s acceptance of the constitutional structure under which it had been suppressed and exploited for a century. Another element of stability was the large degree of agreement within the guild community on certain issues, particularly in the economic sphere. The electorate was sympathetic to the entrepreneurs, both large and small, who directed the business life of Florence. It accepted the regime’s fiscal policy, based upon indirect taxation and forced loans, and the principle of a permanent funded debt, which had been inaugurated in 1345. Opposition to this program was weak, sporadic, and ineffective, for it came from those groups with little or no political influence: the proletariat and the poorer artisans and shopkeepers.*” It is significant that none of the guild demands articulated in June and July pertained to economic issues; only the popolo minuto formulated a comprehensive reform of the commune’s fiscal policy.’*° Of all the explanations advanced to account for the regime’s collapse, the least plausible, in terms of the evidence, is that which

emphasizes the revolutionary role of the proletariat.’ The disorders of 1378 were not initiated by the Ciompi; they were instigated and directed by a faction within the regime. The first manifestations of violence involved guildsmen, not the disfranchised cloth workers. As in the 1340's, lower-class participation in revolution occurred only after the ruling group had precipitated the 154 There was apparently no popular demand for the Parte’s suppression, nor did the Ciompi government abolish the society. 155 See above, pp. 92-96.

156 For an analysis of the commune’s economic policy, see the last section of E. Fiumi’s monograph, “Fioritura e decadenza dell’economia fiorentina,” ASI, cxvir (1959), 427-502. I do not entirely accept his argument that the commune’s economic policy from the twelfth through the fourteenth century was determined almost exclusively by economic factors confronting the whole society, and not by class differences. In attempting to bury the Salvemini thesis, Fiumi has, in my opinion, erred in the opposite direction. 157 First propounded by Rodolico sixty years ago, this thesis has been restated in his chapter, “L’ascesa politica del Popolo minuto,” in Ciompt, pp. 28-62. Cf. also R. Caggese, Firenze dalla decadenza di Roma al Risorgimento d'Italia, 11, 188, 207-08.

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crisis: in 1342, by establishing a dictatorship, in 1378, by indulging

in irresponsible partisan tactics. These included indiscriminate proscriptions and plans for a coup d’état by the oligarchy, and the incitement of the populace to violence by Salvestro de’ Medict’s faction.** Noteworthy in the troubled weeks of June and July were the moderate legislative demands of the lower classes, their attachment to communal institutions, and, above all, their very gradual transformation into a radical political force. What strikes the observer is not the existence of proletarian discontent on the eve of the revolution, but its absence. By contrast to the 1340's, the regime’s last years were relatively untroubled by

mass unrest. Save for a few sporadic riots which were quickly suppressed, there were no mass disorders of consequence after 1370. The judicial archives record no trace of labor conspiracies

or attempts to organize the cloth workers, nor do they contain the bitter proletarian denunciations of the government which were so common in the 1340’s.’*” This is not to say that the work-

ers had become contented with their lot, or reconciled to the political and economic system. But their hostility took no overt form; it remained latent and largely inarticulate. Even the Fraticelli heresy, with its potentially subversive credo, was not considered a serious threat by the regime, and this suggests that its primary target was the ecclesiastical hierarchy and not the political and social order.*® 158 Although the complicity of Salvestro and his allies in the July disorders cannot be fully documented, the evidence to support their involvement is substantial. The Ciompi granted lucrative rewards to Salvestro and a member of

the Eight, Giovanni di Mone; and important offices to other adherents of Salvestro’s faction: Giovanni Capponi, Mezza di Jacopo Attaviani, Duccio Alberti; Cronache e memorie, 25, 28-29, 73, 76, 108-110, 113-114, 142-146; Stefani, 796. Also significant was the role played by Benedetto Alberti and Tommaso degli Strozzi in arranging for the transfer of power to the Ciompi; Cronache e memorite, 30-35. Finally, there is evidence that the Eight deliberately sabotaged the Signoria’s efforts to defend the government, by impeding the movement of communal troops into the city; zdid., 30, 36; and by diverting troops to guard their own homes instead of the Signoria’s palace; ibid., 27, 35. 159 See above, pp. 107-11. The dyers who feuded with the Janazuol: in 13681370 were not poverty-stricken laborers, but independent entrepreneurs of considerable substance. The two important examples of mass unrest after 1350 were the riots against the Scali in 1363, and the hunger march of 1368; see above, pp. 192-93, 197-98.

160%n his article, “Florentine Politics and the Diffusion of Heresy in the

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The regime fell through its failure to resolve the internal conflicts and discords of its members. These antagonisms had several dimensions. One was the antipathy between citizen and citizen, between family and family, which colored Florentine life from the commune’s origins to the final destruction of the republic in 1530." In part a heritage from the city’s feudal past, this hostility also fed upon the intensely competitive conditions of existence in Florence, where the line between success and failure in business and politics was extremely narrow, and where defeat could signify disaster. Another dimension of the discord was the strife between social groups, which in this period centered around the quarrels between a patriciate accustomed to a monopoly of political authority, and

an aggressive group of newly-rich entrepreneurs who fought to

maintain their foothold in the regime and their share of the emoluments which were the rewards of power: lucrative offices, government contracts and leases, social prestige." The forces of tradition were based solidly upon the cadre of old families who had controlled the government and the economy before 1343. This group’s political philosophy was oligarchic: it believed that the commune belonged to men of wealth and status, that is, the ancient families. Bound to the local church and the papacy by mutual interest and sympathy, it was staunchly Guelf. Although the oligarchic group contained bankers, merchants, and industrialists within its ranks, many of its adherents were rentiers, Trecento: a Socio-Economic Inquiry,” Speculum, xxxtv (1959), 66, M. Becker has argued that the regime was not hostile to the Fraticelli, believing that it could control this heretical current. He accepts Rodolico’s contention that the Fraticelli doctrines were a potent factor in stimulating proletarian unrest, and in crystallizing opposition to the existing social and political order; zbid., 67-68. I do not believe that this thesis is proved by the very scanty and fragmentary evidence which is extant. 161 In his article, “Fioritura e decadenza,” 492, Fiumi has stated that factionalism did not become a serious factor in communal politics until the thirteenth century. He marks its beginning with the famous Buondelmonti-Amadei quarrel

in 1215. I cannot accept this revisionist interpretation, nor do I agree with Fiumi’s contention that factional strife in the Trecento had no basis in class differences.

162 This has been one of the major themes of this book, and I must acknowl-

edge my debt to G. Scaramella, who first developed this thesis in his work, Firenze allo scoppio del tumulto dei Ciompi.

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or scioperati, who had abandoned active business careers."** Even

though their forbears had established a guild government in the previous century, these conservatives were not strongly committed

to a regime based upon guild membership. Indeed, they rejected certain basic principles of guild government. They disliked its egalitarian features, its tendency to give equal voice and vote to the artisan and to the wealthy merchant. These men favored a system of personal government, in which political power was determined by the individual’s wealth, family antiquity, and social status. It is paradoxical that the oligarchy, which emphasized tradition and the maintenance of ancient institutions, actually rejected this century-old principle of Florentine government.’ Ranged in opposition to these conservatives were the groups that supported a regime with a broad base, in which petty retailers and

artisans participated, as well as big business interests. The gente nuova constituted the majority of this popular party; they banded together in self-defense to protect themselves from oligarchic efforts to exclude them from office. The posture of the patrician enemies of the ultra-conservative faction is less easily explained. In this group were men from small families—Quaratesi, Aldobrandini, Rondinelli, Rinuccini—who feared the concentrated power of the great aristocratic clans. Such prominent members of this coterie as Salvestro de’ Medici, Benedetto Alberti, and

Tommaso degli Strozzi may have become committed to their position by genuine sympathy for the popular cause, but it is more likely that they were motivated by personal quarrels with oligarchic chieftains, and by the hope that their influence would

be enhanced through an alliance with the gente nuova. Each individual case was probably a mixture of principle and opportunism.’”° 163} have not been able to consult N. Ottokar’s article, “Gli scioperati a Firenze nel °300,” in Studi storict in onore di Gioacchino Volpe (Florence, 1958).

ey The alienation of the oligarchy from the concept of guild government is a significant development in communal politics in the fourteenth century. On the role of the guilds in Florentine politics, see A. Doren, Le art fiorentine, uy, 252-098; M. Becker, “The Republican City State in Florence: an Inquiry into its Origins and Survival (1280-1434),” Speculum, xxxv (1960), 39-50. Becker perhaps lays too much stress upon the patriciate’s commitment to the principles of guild government after 1343. 165 The position of another antagonist of the oligarchy, Giorgio degli Scalli,

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An important question must be posed at this point. What obstacles prevented the resolution of these factional discords? After three decades, artisans, parvenu merchants, and aristocrats should have learned to tolerate each other, to make concessions to each other’s needs and desires, particularly since they were in accord

on many issues. The relatively peaceful fusion of old and new

elements in Florentine society had been the normal pattern throughout the city’s history.*°* During this period, however, antipathies did not subside: they grew more intense. In 1378 recon-

ciliation of opposing interests appeared to be more remote than

| in the difficult years of the regime’s infancy. The most concrete factor in the perpetuation and intensification

of partisan conflict would seem to be the depressed economic situation in Florence, a compound of plague and famine, population decline, shrunken markets, the loss of economic opportunity and incentive. In the 1370’s the scene was particularly bleak: a

depression in the cloth industry, a rising bankruptcy rate, a visitation of the plague in 1374 followed by a famine, and the heavy burdens and losses occasioned by the papal war.’ These conditions moved thoughtful men like Foligno de’ Medici to consider the decline of their family fortunes, and to regard the future with grave apprehension.*® Since the possession of political influence was a vital bulwark of social and economic status, men

fought desperately for this prize. And none struggled more fiercely in this competition than the group that had once enjoyed unchallenged supremacy: the aristocracy.*° The steady debilitation of the oligarchic position, particularly after 1372, induced in the ultra-conservative faction a mood akin to panic. Gathered in the precincts of the Parte Guelfa to exchange laments and share was determined exclusively by personal quarrels and not by political principle; see above, p. 264.

166 This is noted by P. J. Jones, “Florentine families and Florentine diaries in the fourteenth century,” p. 203, n. 170. 167 See above, pp. 194-95, 282-83, 314-17.

168 G, Brucker, “The Medici in the Fourteenth Century,” 1. Foligno urged his descendants “to conserve not only the possessions, but also the status acquired

by our ancestors, which is great, and was still greater in the past, and which began to decline as a result of the lack of valiant men . . . of whom we always | possessed a great number.”

169 See above, p. 197. ,

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grievances, they became convinced that the fate of their class Jay in the balance. The defective machinery of government also exacerbated politi-

cal rivalries. In 1378 the executive branch of the commune, the priorate, had nearly achieved its centenary. It had been created to meet the city’s political needs in the late thirteenth century, and these had changed. The artificial division between magnates and popolani was one anachronism that no longer corresponded to political reality. Questionable, too, was the wisdom of basing a political order upon the guilds, which were declining in power and influence in the late trecento.*’’ The confusion engendered by the multiplicity of offices and the overlapping of jurisdictions was another serious defect. The short terms of office prescribed by the statutes had become so prejudicial to efficient administration

that the commune had been forced to rely more heavily upon the extraordinary commission, the dalia, to formulate and execute policy."”* Although this innovation permitted greater efficiency, it

also involved dangers. The most powerful communal office in the regime’s last years was not the Signoria but the Eight, whose activities were not and could not be subjected to the same scrutiny and control as those of the regularly constituted authorities.

No institutional vestige did greater harm to the regime than some of the political myths inherited from the past. A major source of political frustration was the government’s inability to deal squarely with controversial issues—the result of a belief that

unity was essential, and of an etiquette that frowned upon the exposure of irreconcilable viewpoints. This accounts for much of the unreal quality of political discussion, particularly during the papal war, and for the failure of the Florentines to emancipate themselves from illusion and cliché. It explains, too, why political conflict so often centered upon peripheral issues rather than upon central problems. Shackled by their commitment to the myths of civic unity and Guelfism, Florentines were restrained from making a realistic examination of critical issues, and were thus hampered in their efforts to devise feasible solutions. The deleterious effect of factional divisions became particularly noticeable after 1370. Immediately following the imperial crisis 170 A, Doren, Le arti fiorentine, 1, 268-298; 11, 285-208. 171 Above, pp. 70-71.

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of 1368-1369, in which commune and people had achieved an unusual degree of unity, there came the bitter rift over the papal alliance. The flood of secret denunciations against prominent citizens in 1369 heralded this new phase of communal politics, characterized by emotion and extremism. Political influence and initiative shifted from moderates like Donato Velluti and Filippo Bastari to fanatical partisans: Bettino Ricasoli, Benghi Buondelmonti, Lapo da Castiglionchio, Bartolo Siminetti, Salvestro de’ Medici, Giorgio degli Scali. Before the Pisan war, the commune was largely controlled by cautious, deliberate men, who might engage in partisan bickering, but who normally practiced restraint. By 1370 a different climate prevailed; political activity became more extreme, less inhibited, less cautious, less rational.

The papal war intensified partisan passions, and more than any single phenomenon, it was responsible for the crisis of 1378.

In part a reaction against papal expansion, and in this sense a rational response to a genuine threat, the war was also a partisan weapon, forged by the popular faction to belabor the oligarchy.

It began in a moment of panic, and to the end, the conflict retained this irrational and emotional character. The war had an

abrasive effect upon Florentine life: it rubbed salt into old wounds and opened new ones. It worsened the economic situation; it antagonized the oligarchy; it intensified anticlerical and antipapal sentiment among the populace. It drove men to take extreme measures and dangerous risks. It brought the city under the shadow of dictatorial government, and it reduced the elec-

torate’s control over policy to a minimum. Long after it became evident that most Florentines wanted peace, the war party continued the struggle, motivated in part by its desire for partisan advantage. Reacting to this situation, the oligarchy in turn

indulged in extreme tactics, thereby sharpening the tensions within the city. Only political leadership of the highest order could have saved the regime from collapse in 1378, and this was clearly lacking.

While most glaring in these final days, this failure of leadership was a permanent element in the regime’s history. Few men in Florence understood the nature of those disruptive forces which had reached a climax during the papal war and which, since the thirteenth century, had destroyed communal govern394

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ments throughout northern and central Italy. The republic’s leaders were, for the most part, men of mediocre talents, inhibited

by the deadening weight of conservatism and conformity, distracted by partisan feelings. The predominant impression one receives from studying the official record is muddle, confusion, disorder, and divided purpose. There is little evidence of perception and insight, of bold, original thinking and planning in the political sphere. But the picture is not entirely dark. There is some evidence of

a willingness to deal with basic problems, and to search for solutions. Most significant was the incorporation of the artisans and petty retailers into the political structure, to give this group a limited voice in, and a sense of identification with, the regime.

The organization of the Ciompi into a guild and its inclusion into the constitutional structure represented a radical and futile attempt to create a political order in which all segments of society participated. Another positive accomplishment of the regime was the whittling away of special privileges, the growth of a concept of impersonal government, of a political order in which the administration dealt impartially with all its members.*” The institution of the dalia as a quasi-permanent feature of government was another development which signified an awareness of the need for efficient, professional administration." It was in the realm of foreign affairs that the regime exhibited the greatest measure of enterprise and innovation. In the 1340's Florence had taken the lead in forming defensive leagues with other city states, while still maintaining its traditional allegiance to the papacy and the Guelf ideology. The commune became an articulate supporter of the city state ideal, and by 1370 it emerged 172 On this trend, see Becker, “The Republican City State in Florence,” 48-49. 173 An incident which reflects the growing demand for this type of institu-

tion occurred in July 1378, before the Ciompi revolt. Andrea Salviati of the Fight had tendered his group’s resignation to the Signoria; he and his colleagues wished to attend to their private affairs which had been neglected: “Che assai tempo era che non avevono atteso a niuno loro fatto e che egli erano diserti e affamati; e che per Dio e misericordia avessino compassione a loro e alle loro

famiglie.” Their resignation was rejected on these grounds: “Ora che la pace era fatta colla Chiesa, era pure bisogno che eglino esercitassino l’uficio loro pit che mai, imperoché eglino avevano nel capo le cose delle ferme de’ soldati e delle leghe delle province, e che ora bisognava ch’eglino facessino come per lo adrieto avevono fatto e operato .. .” Cronache e memorie, 20.

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as the leading champion of republican government in the peninsula. Increasingly fearful of the threat to its independence presented by the nascent papal power, Florence finally repudiated

its century-old Guelf attachment and crossed swords with its ancient friend and ally. By this revolutionary act, the republic signified an awareness of the new realities in peninsular politics, and of the need for a more flexible foreign policy. Through its diplomacy and propaganda, it endeavored to create viable political ideals to replace the outmoded slogans of Guelf and Ghibelline. The commune was already adopting certain postures and practices which it would later use to defend itself against Giangaleazzo Visconti.*™

The limited and marginal success of the Florentine response to

the political crisis was not due solely to the ineptness or the stupidity of the ruling group. Times were not propitious for reform; there was little positive achievement in the political sphere anywhere in Western Europe in the late fourteenth century. The Florentine republic was forced to expend most of its energies and resources in surmounting the immediate dangers which threatened the city. An administration which must concentrate on repairing the ravages of a plague, or feeding a hungry populace, or raising troops to ward off an armed company, has

little opportunity to plan and execute major reforms. The men who controlled Florence’s destinies were frequently guilty of mismanagement, bungling, and shortsightedness. But against the weaknesses and failures of the regime must be set two very significant achievements; the survival of republican institutions and the maintenance of the city’s independence. Florentines had discharged a major responsibility, which one of their leaders defined in these terms: “to leave to posterity that which was left to us by our ancestors.”*”° They deserve no more blame for the ulti-

mate failure of republican government than their forbears, or the new generation of politicians who succeeded them. 174 See H. Baron, “A Struggle for Liberty in the Renaissance: Florence, Venice

and Milan in the Early Quattrocento,” American Htstorical Review, tv (1953), 269-73. 175 See above, p. 73. The statement was made in 1368 by Uguccione de’ Ricci.

396

BIBLIOGRAPHY I. Archival Material Archivio di Stato, Florence: Registri e filze dell’Estimo

Archivio delle Arti Registri di Duplicati delle ProvArchivio dei Notarili Antecosi- visioni

miani Registri del Monte Comune

Archivio di Parte Guelfa Registri delle Lettere Missive Archivio Mediceo avanti il Prin- della prima Cancelleria

cipato Registri delle Prestanze

Carte Strozziane Registri delle Provvisioni

Carte Del Bene Registri delle Tratte Manoscritti Vari

Registri delle Balie Archivio di Stato, Siena: Registri dei Capitoli Registri del Concistoro Registri delle Consulte detti anche

Libri Fabarum Biblioteca Nazionale, Florence:

Registri delle Consulte e Pratiche Fondo Magliabechiano Registri delle Deliberazioni dei Fondo Panciatichiano Signori e Collegi

IT. Published Sources A. Chronicles

The major chronicle sources for this period of Florentine history are

the works of Marchionne Stefani and the two Villanis, Giovanni and Matteo. The Villani contribution to Florentine historiography was terminated by Matteo’s death in 1363; Stefani then assumed the major burden of reporting the Florentine experience until his own death in 1385. An important source of information for the last years of the regime is the anonymous diary, presumed to be written by a member of the Machiavelli family: Diario d’anonimo fiorentino dall’ anno 1358 al 1389, in Cronache det secoli xitt e xiv, ed. A. Gherardi (Florence, 1876). Unlike the other major chronicles, which contain opinions and judgments of men and events, the Diario is almost exclusively factual. The most dramatic historical incident of the century, the Ciompi revolution, was described in copious detail by many witnesses. The extant reports on this upheaval have been collected and edited by G. Corazzini, 1 Ciompi—Cronache e documenti con notizie

intorno alla vita di Michele di Lando (Florence, 1887); and by G.

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Scaramella, Cronache e memorie sul tumulto det Ciompt, RRIISS, new ed., xvi, Part 1 (Citta di Castello, 1917-1934). Of the private memoirs and diaries which have been published, the most valuable is the Cronica domestica di Messer Donato Vellutt, ed. I. del Badia and G. Volpi (Florence, 1914). Through a description of his family and his personal career, Velluti throws much light on the social and political milieu of Florence. Also valuable as sources of contemporary opinion and prejudice are the Ricordi of Giovanni Morelli, ed. V. Branca (Florence, 1956); and the Cronica of Buonaccorso Pitti, ed. A. Bacchi della Lega (Bologna, 1905). Chronicles of lesser importance include the Cronichetta d’incerto, in

Cronichette antiche di varu scrittort del buon secolo della lingua toscana, ed. Manni (Florence, 1733); the Diario del [Giovanni] Monaldi, appended to Istorie pistolesi (Prato, 1835); the Ricordi fatti

in Firenze per Giovanni di Jacopo Morelli, in Delizie degli eruditi toscant, ed. I. di San Luigi, x1x (Florence, 1770-1789) ; and the Memorie

storiche of Naddo di Ser Nepo di Ser Gallo da Montecatini; Delizze, xvii. Among the Tuscan chronicles which contain some information on Florence, the most important are the Cronica senese di Donato di Neri e di suo figho Nert, in Cronache senest, ed. A. Lisini and F. Jacometti, RRIISS, new ser., xv, Part 6 (Bologna, 1931-1939) ; Sozomen

Pistoriensis, Spectmen Historiae, RRIISS, ed. Muratori, xvi (Milan, 1723-1751); and Le croniche di Giovanni Sercambi Lucchese, ed. S. Bongi (Lucca, 1892). B. Constitutional, Legislative, and Judictal Records The communal statutes of 1322-1325 have been edited by R. Caggese: Statuti della Repubblica fiorentina, 2 vols. (Florence, 1910-1921). The

statute compiled in 1355 has not been published; many of its rubrics,

however, are contained in the 1415 compilation: Statuta populi et comunts Florentiae publica auctoritate collecta castigata et praeposita anno salutis mccccxv, 4 vols. (Freiburg, 1778-1781). Several constitu-

tional documents are contained in the appendix of 'D. Marzi, La Cancellerta della Repubblica fiorentina (Rocca San Casciano, 1910). Records of several balie are printed in I Capitol: del Comune di Firenze. Inventario e regesto, ed. C. Guasti and A. Gherardi, 2 vols. (Florence, 1866-1893). In the appendices of vols. 7-19 of the Delizie degli eruditi toscani, there are printed several legislative enactments of the commune, together with other official documents from archival depositories. In the Giornale storico degli archivi toscant, 1 (1857), 1-41, F. Bonaini has edited the statute of the Parte Guelfa compiled in 1335. One of the first scholars to explore systematically the commune’s

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judicial records was N. Rodolico. In the appendix of his I/ Popolo minuto (Bologna, 1899), he published the texts of several documents extracted from the archives of the criminal courts. A collection of judicial documents was edited by J. Kohler and G. degli Azzi, Das Florentiner Strafrecht des XIV. Jahrhunderts mit einem Abhang tiber den Strafprozess der italienischen Statuten (Mannheim and Leipzig, 1900). M. Becker and G. Brucker have published a judicial condemna-

tion dating from the regime’s first decade: “Una lettera in difesa della dittatura nella Firenze del Trecento,” Archivio storico italiano, CXII (1955), 251-261.

C. Diplomatic Sources In striking contrast to other categories of source materials, diplomatic

documents have been published in substantial numbers. Florence’s relations with Charles IV have been documented in T. E. Mommsen, [taltenische Analekten zur Reichsgeschichte des 14. Jahrhunderts, 1310-1378, Schriften der Monumenta Germaniae Historiae, x1 (Stuttgart, 1952). The introduction to this work also contains a valuable descriptive survey of the materials in the Archivio di Stato concerning foreign relations. The second volume of K. Pirchan, Italien und Katser Karl IV in der Zeit seiner zweiten Romfahrt (Prague, 1930) contains documents pertaining to Florence’s relations with Charles IV in 13681369.

The largest category of published diplomatic material concerns the commune’s relations with the Holy See. An important collection of papal letters is being published in Paris by the Bibliotheque des Ecoles francaises d’Athénes et de Rome, in its Lettres des Papes d’ Avignon se rapportant a la France, 3rd series. Included in this collection are the letters of Clement VI, vol. m1, 2 fascs. (1901-1925); Innocent VI,

vol. iv, 1 fasc. (1909); Urban V, vol. v, 4 fascs. (1902-1955); and Gregory XI, vol. vi, 5 fascs. (1935-1957).

This source has two major limitations: it is not complete, but is primarily concerned with Franco-papal relations; and it contains only summaries, not the full texts, of most documents. G. Canestrini has

published several documents from the Missive series in “Di alcuni documenti risguardanti le relazioni politiche dei papi d’Avignone coi

comuni d'Italia avanti e dopo il tribunato di Cola di Rienzo e la calata di Carlo IV,” ASI, ser. 1, vir (1849), 347-446. R. Davidsohn published the texts of three orations delivered by Lapo da Castiglionchio at the papal court in 1366; ASI, ser. 5, xx (1897), 225-243.

The documentation of Florence’s war with the papacy was an important contribution of A. Gherardi, in his “La guerra dei fiorentini

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con papa Gregorio XI detta la guerra degli Otto Santi,” ASI, ser. 3, v-viit_ (1867-1868); and in the appendix of his edition of the Diario d’anonimo, pp. 486-541. This has been supplemented by A. Cerasoli, “Gregorio XI e Giovanna I regina di Napoli, documenti inediti dell’Archivio Vaticano,” Archivio storico per le provincie napoletane, xxitxxv (1898-1900); by A. Segre, “I dispacci di Cristoforo da Piacenza, procuratore mantovano alla corte pontificia,” ASI, ser. 5, XLIII-XLIV (1909-1910); and by A. Theiner, Codex diplomaticus dominti temporalis Sanctae Sedis, 2 vols. (Rome, 1861-1862). Material on the republic’s relations with Perugia has been edited by G. degli Azzi Vitelleschi, Le relaztoni tra la Repubblica di Firenze e lUmbria nel secolo xiv, secondo i documenti di R. Archivio di Stato di Firenze, 2 vols. (Perugia, 1904). R. Fumi’s edition of Lucca’s diplomatic correspondence contains much information on that city’s relations with Florence: R. Archivio di Stato di Lucca. Regesti, 11, Part 2, Carteggio degli Anziani, 1333-1400 (Lucca, 1903). There are a few documents pertaining to Florence in G. Wenzel’s collection: Monumenta Hungariae historica. Acta extera, 3 vols. (Budapest, 1874-1876). D. Economic Documents The publication of economic sources falls into two main categories: the account books of business companies, and guild statutes. A. Sapori has published the extant account books of three societies: the Peruzzi

(Milan, 1934); the Gianfigliazzi (Milan, 1946); and the Alberti (Milan, 1952). Although the records of these firms antedate the period of this book, they provide valuable information on the internal struc-

ture of Florentine business organizations. Surviving records of a smaller firm of the 1360’s have been edited by P. Ginori Conti: Id bro segreto della ragione di Piero Benini e compagni (Florence, 1937).

The statute of the Calimala guild was published by G. Filippi, L’arte det mercanti di Calimala in Firenze ed il suo pit antico statuto (Turin, 1889), with additions in ASI, ser. 5, 1v (1889), 3-33. This was followed by U. Dorini, Statuti dell’arte di Por Santa Maria del tempo della Repubblica (Florence, 1934). In 1940 a new series, the Fonti sulle corporazioni medioevale, was inaugurated by the Deputazzone di storia patria per la Toscana, with the publication, by A. Agnoletti, of the Statuti dell’arte della lana di Firenze (1317-1319). In the same year appeared F., Sartini’s edition of the Statuti dell’arte dei rigattiert e linatoli di Firenze (1296-1340). Since the war, four more publications have been issued in this series: Statuti dell’arte degh albergatori della citta e contado di Firenze (1324-1342), ed. F. Sartini (1953); Statuti dell’arte del cambio (1299-1316), ed. G. Camerani

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Marri (1955); Statuti delle arti det fornai e det vinattiert di Firenze

(1337-1339), ed. F. Morandini (1956); and Statuti delle arti det corazzai, dei chiavatoli, ferraiolt e calderai e det fabbri di Firenze (1321-1344), ed. G. Camerani Marri (1957). E.. Private Letters

Very few personal letters from this period have survived; fewer still contain any significant information on politics and society. The largest collection is from the pen of Coluccio Salutati: the eighteenth century edition by J. Rigacci, Lint Coluct Pieri Salutati Epistolarum,

2 vols. (Florence, 1741); and the modern edition by F. Novati, Epistolario di Coluccio Salutati (Rome, 1891), of which the first volume is relevant for this period. Some of Boccaccio’s letters have been edited by F. Corazzini, Le lettere edite e inedite di Messer Giovanni Boccaccio (Florence, 1877). Even though they date from a later period, the collection of Ser Lapo Mazzei’s letters edited by C. Guasti, Lettere di un notaro a un mercante del secolo xiv, 2 vols. (Florence, 1880), constitutes a valuable source of information on Florentine life and mores in the late trecento. R. Piattoli has published several let-

ters from the Datini archives containing information on politics: “L’origine dei fondaci datiniani di Pisa e Genova,” Archivio storico pratese, vit (1927). One of the most revealing personal missives is that

penned by Gherardino di Niccol6 Gherardini Gianni: “Un documento fiorentino sulla guerra, sulla finanza e sulla amministrazione pubblica (1375),” ASI, cxv (1957), 165-176. Letters written by two important religious figures have been published by B. Sorio, Lettere del beato Don Giovanni dalle Celle (Rome, 1845); by F. Selmi, in Rivista contemporanea, XXX (1862); by F. Tocco, “I Fraticelli,” ASY, ser. 5, XXXV (1905), 331-368; and by P. Cividali, in Memorie della R. Accademia dei Lincei, Classe di scienze moralt, storiche e filologiche, ser. 5, X11 (1907). Included in Le lettere di S. Caterina di Siena, ed. N. Tommaseo, 4 vols. (Florence, 1860), are several letters which are pertinent to Florentine history in the 13'70’s.

F. Literary Sources The literary work of the late trecento which is of most value to the historian is Sacchetti’s Novelle; it reflects characteristic attitudes, and also describes historical incidents and personalities. Boccaccio’s Decameron is of less significance as a commentary on customs and mores. A useful source is the book of proverbs, the Libro di buoni costumi,

ed. A. Schiafini (Florence, 1945), written by Paolo di Ser Pace da Certaldo, who may justly be described as Florence’s “average man.”

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The Epzstola o sia ragionamento di Messer Lapo da Castiglionchio, ed. Mehus (Bologna, 1733), is a pretentious exercise in self-aggrandizement, but it does portray the aristocratic viewpoint, so rarely articulated in this period.

III. Secondary Works A. General Histories

An early interpretation of Florence’s past is Leonardo Bruni Aretino’s Histortarum Florent populi libri XII, ed. E. Santini, RRIISS, new ed., xxx, Part 3 (Citta di Castello, 1914). Significant as an example of humanist historiography in the early quattrocento, it contains

little information that is not found in the chronicles of Stefani and the Villanis. The same is true of Machiavelli’s Storia fiorentina, in Tutte le opere storiche e letterarie di Niccol6 Machiavelli, ed. G. Mazzoni and M. Casella (Florence, 1929). However, the work of Scipione Ammirato, Istorie fiorentine, 1 (Florence, 1647), does contain some material which is in no other extant source.

Modern Florentine historiography begins with Gino Capponi’s | Storia della Repubblica fiorentina, the first edition of which was published in 1875, the second in 1930. This is the first comprehensive study of the city’s history which made some use of archival material. It was followed by F. Perrens, Histoire de Florence depuis ses origines jusqu’a la domination des Médicis (Paris, 1877-1883), of which vols. Iv-v pertain to our period. These histories were essentially political narratives; they accepted, without significant alteration, the interpretations established by the trecento chronicles and the Renaissance historians.

A new dimension to the history of the 1343 regime was developed by Niccolé Rodolico. In his works published at the turn of the century, Il Popolo minuto (Bologna, 1899) and La democrazia fiorentina nel

suo tramonto, 1378-1382, and summarized a half-century later in I Ciompi (Florence, 1945), Rodolico stressed the significance of social conflict in trecento Florence, and emphasized particularly the revolutionary pressures exerted by the proletariat, the popolo minuto. This

orientation had been foreshadowed by earlier work on the Ciompi revolution; C. Falletti Fossati, IJ tumulto det Ciompt. Studio storico sociale (Rome, 1882). The influence of Rodolico’s work can be seen in the two general histories of Florence written in the twentieth century: R. Caggese, Firenze dalla decadenza di Roma al Risorgimento @'Italia (Florence, 1912-1921), u, Ch. 3; and F. Schevill, History of

Florence from the Founding of the City through the Renatssance

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(New York, 1936), Ch. 16. Rodolico advanced the thesis that the communal regime established in 1343 was dominated by the fourteen lower guilds, and that the struggle of the popolo minuto to achieve political power was a significant factor in communal politics. This view was challenged in a provocative essay by G. Scaramella, Firenze

allo scoppio del tumulto det Ciompi (Pisa, 1914), who argued that the major political struggle developed between factions within the greater guilds. A series of lectures sponsored by the Libera Cattedra di Storia della

Civilta Fiorentina (Unione Fiorentina) was printed in Il] Trecento (Florence, 1953); it contains discussions on significant aspects of Florentine life and thought in the fourteenth century. The most recent synthesis of trecento Florentine history is M. Becker’s article, “The

Republican City State in Florence: an Inquiry into its Origins and Survival (1280-1434),” Speculum, xxxv (1960), 39-50. Of the works

of larger scope that treat this epoch of Florence’s past, the most valuable is N. Valeri, L’Italia nell’eta dei principati, Storia d'Italia, v (Milan, 1949), Ch. 5. B. Social and Economic History

A study of Florentine society must begin with genealogy. Luigi Passerini is the pioneer of modern Florentine genealogical investigation. In 1858 he published his first essay, Genealogia e storia della

famiglha Corsini (Florence, 1858). This was followed by similar studies on the Rucellai (1861), Alberti, 2 vols. (1869-1870), Ricasoli (1870), Altoviti (1871), and Guadagni (1873). Included in P. Litta’s Famigl celebri italiani (Milan and Turin, 1847-1899), are studies of several prominent Florentine families: the Alberti, Medici, Strozzi,

Machiavelli, Soderini, Guicciardini, Pazzi, Albizzi, Capponi, Acciaiuoli, Aldobrandini, Buondelmonti, Da Uzzano. Recent scholarship on Florentine families has concentrated on their economic status and activity. Two examples are: A. Sapori, “Gli Alberti Del Giudice di Firenze,” in Studi in onore di Gino Luzzatto (Milan,

1950), 1, 254-273; and G. Brucker, “The Medici in the Fourteenth Century,” Speculum, xxxtt (1957), 1-26. There is a brief sketch of the history of the Niccolini family in the fourteenth century in G. Niccolini di Camugliano, The Chronicles of a Florentine Family, 1200-1470 (London, 1933). L. Martines has traced the rise of a family

of gente nuova, the Martelli: “La famiglia Martelli e un documento sulla vigilia del ritorno dall’esilio di Cosimo de’ Medici (1434),” ASI, cxviII (1959), 29-43. In The Merchant of Prato (New York, 1957), I.

Origo has written a biography of another “new man,” Francesco di

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Marco Datini. In his important study of social and economic trends within the Florentine patriciate, P. J. Jones has stressed the continuity of economic practices and attitudes: “Florentine families and Florentine diaries in the fourteenth century,” Studies in Italian Medieval History presented to Miss E. M. Jamison (Rome, 1956), pp. 183-205. One of the most illuminating studies in Florentine social history to appear in recent years is the article by I. Origo, “The Domestic Enemy: Eastern Slaves in Tuscany in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth

Centuries,” Speculum, xxx (1955), 321-366. | Florence’s population in the fourteenth century has been a subject of much controversy. The fragmentary statistics provide a limited amount of evidence to permit the formulation of estimates, but they are neither so extensive nor so reliable as to constitute substantial proof.

The first modern scholar to consider the problem was N. Rodbolico, in ASI, 5th ser., xxx (1902), 241-274, reprinted in La democrazia fiorentina nel suo tramonto, Ch. 1. Other studies on the question are: G. Pardi, “Disegno della demografia di Firenze,” ASI, txxiv (1916), i, 3-84; and K. Beloch, Bevélkerungsgeschichte Italtens, 2nd ed. (Berlin and Leipzig, 1937-1940), 11, 127-148. The most recent analysis is the article by E. Fiumi, “La demografia fiorentina nelle pagine di Giovanni

Villani,” ASI, cvs (1950), 78-158.

The study of Florentine business activity was inaugurated by G. Pagnini, Della dectma e di varie altre gravezze imposte dal Comune dt Firenze, della moneta e della mercatura de’ fiorentini fino al secolo XVI, 4 vols. (Lisbon and Lucca, 1765-1766). This was followed, a century later, by L. Peruzzi, Storia del commercio e dei banchieri di Firenze in tutto tl mondo conosciuto dal 1200 al 1345 (Florence, 1868). In his Forschungen zur Geschichte von Florenz (Berlin, 1896-1908), Iv, 268-356, and his Geschichte von Florenz (Berlin, 1896-1927), 1v, 21,

273-472, R. Davidsohn incorporated a large body of information on the business activity of Florentines in the thirteenth and early fourteenth century, very little of which pertains to the period after 1343. No scholar in recent years has contributed more to our knowledge of Florentine history than Armando Sapori. Collected in his Studi di storia economica (secoli xit1-xiv-xv), 3rd ed., 2 vols. (Florence, 1955), are thirty eight articles, the fruit of three decades of research. While

Sapori has concentrated on the internal structure and function of Florentine companies, he has also investigated such problems as prices and rents, usury, business ethics, and the culture of the Florentine mercantile class. His early monograph, La crisi delle compagnie

mercantili det Bardi e det Peruzzi (Florence, 1926), is a brilliant analysis of an economic crisis and its impact upon politics.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

The guild structure in Florence is analyzed by A. Doren in Entwitcklung und Organisation der Florentiner Ziinfte im 13. und 14. Jahrhun-

dert (Leipzig, 1897), and in Das Florentiner Zunftwesen vom XIV. bis zum XVI. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart, 1908), Italian trans. by G. Klein,

Le arti fiorentine, 2 vols. (Florence, 1940). E. Staley has written a superficial popular account, The Guilds of Florence (London, 1906). On Florence’s woolen cloth industry, the major work is A. Doren,

Die florentiner Wollentuchindustrie vom vtierzehnten bis zum sechzehnten Jahrhundert (Stuttgart, 1901). Important articles on the subject are: R. Davidsohn, “Blute und Niedergang der florentiner Tuchindustrie,” in Zeztschrift fir die Gesammte Staatswissenschaft, Lxxx (1928); and G. Hermes, “Der Kapitalismus der Florentiner Wollentuchindustrie,” zbid., txtr (1916). Silk manufacture in the Arno city is described briefly by P. Pieri, Imtorno alla storia dell’arte della seta a Firenze (Bologna, 1927), and by U. Dorini, L’arte della seta in Toscana (Florence, 1928). The history of the guild of doctors and druggists has been written by R. Ciasca, L’arte det medici e speztali

nella storia e nel commercio fiorentino dal secolo xt al secolo xv (Florence, 1927). G. Filippi is the historian of the Calimala guild: L’arte det mercanti di Calimala in Firenze ed il suo pitt antico statuto (Turin, 1889). S. La Sorsa has written a monograph on the Cambio guild: L’organizzazione dei cambiatori fiorentini nel Medioevo (Cerignola, 1904).

Y. Renouard has made a significant contribution to the economic history of Florence in the fourteenth century in his Les relations des Papes d’Avignon et les compagnies commerciales et bancatres de 1316 @ 1378 (Paris, 1941). The French scholar has extracted much in-

formation on Florentine business companies from the Vatican archives: “Le compagnie commerciale fiorentine del Trecento,” ASI, xcvt (1938), 163-179; and Recherches sur les compagnies commerciales et

bancatres utilisées par les Papes d’ Avignon avant le grand Schisme (Paris, 1942). R. de Roover has recently published a study on the Alberti company: “The Story of the Alberti Company in Florence as Revealed in its Account Books,” The Business History Review,

Xxx (1958), 14-59. V. Rutenberg described the activities of the Uzzano company in “La compagnia Uzzano,” Studi in onore di Armando Sapori (Milan, 1957), 1, 689-706.

The activities of Florentine merchants in the kingdom of Naples are discussed in G. Yver, Le commerce et les marchands dans l'Italie meridionale au xi° e au xiv® stécle (Paris, 1903). Information on the Florentine business community in England is contained in A. Beardwood, Alien Merchants in England from 1350 to 1377 (Cambridge,

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Mass., 1931). The major work on German-Italian trade is A. Schulte, Geschichte des mittelalterlichen Handels und Verkehrs zwischen Westdeutschland und Itahen mit Ausschluss von Venedig, 2 vols. (Leipzig,

1900). There is no comprehensive study of Florentine trade with France, but vol. 1 of the Histoire du commerce de Marseille by E. Baratier (Marseille, 1951) and P. Wolff's Commerce et marchands de Toulouse, vers 1350-vers 1450 (Paris, 1954) contain some informa-

tion on Italian business activity in those commercial centers. There is information on the Florentine mercantile community in Bruges in R. de Roover, Money, Banking and Credit in Medieval Bruges (Cambridge, Mass., 1948). The Arno city’s commercial relations with

the Orient are described in W. Heyd, Histoire du commerce du Levant au moyen dge, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1936), and in S. Borsari, “L’espansione economica fiorentina nell’Oriente cristiano sino alla meta del Trecento,” Rivista storica italiana, uxx (1958), 477-507. Other aspects of Florentine business activity have been investigated

by economic historians. Recent works on money include: A. Evans, “Some Coinage Systems of the Fourteenth Century,” Journal of Economic and Business History, ut (1931); Carlo M. Cipolla, Studi di storia della moneta, 1 (Pavia, 1948); and the same author’s Le avventure della lira (Milan, 1958). F. Melis analyzed Florentine accounting prac-

tices in his comprehensive work, Storia della ragioneria (Bologna, 1950). The function and jurisdiction of the Merchant’s court (Mercanzia) is treated by G. Bonolis, La giurisdizione della Mercanzia in Firenze nel secolo xiv (Florence, 1901). C. Internal Politics

There is a great dearth of monographic material on Florentine domestic politics during this period. For a history of communal politics in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century, the significant works are: R. Davidsohn, Geschichte von Florenz, 11; G. Salvemini, Magnati e popolani in Firenze dal 1280 al 1295 (Florence, 1899); N. Ottokar, IJ Comune di Firenze alla fine del dugento (Florence, 1926); and G. Masi, La struttura sociale delle fazioni politiche fiorentine ai

tempi di Dante (Florence, 1930). : The dictatorship of Walter of Brienne has been studied by C. Paoli, Della Signoria di Gualtieri Duca d’Atene (Florence, 1862); and by A. Sapori, La crisi delle compagnie dei Bardi e dei Peruzzt. For the period after 1343, there is a general discussion of political develop-

ments by N. Rodolico in his three works, I] Popolo minuto, La democrazia fiorentina nel suo tramonto; and J Crompi. In “The Aru Minor: in Florentine Politics, 1342-1378,” Mediaeval Studies, xvii

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(1956), 93-104, M. Becker and G. Brucker analyze the political role

of the lower guilds and conclude that the power and influence of the arti minori was minimal. The history of the Parte Guelfa has been sketched in cursory fashion by F. Bonaini, “Della Parte Guelfa in Firenze,” Giornale storico degli archivi toscant, 11, (1858), 171-187, 257-289; 111 (1859), 77-99, 167-184; and by U. Dorini, Notzzte storiche

sull Universita di Parte Guelfa in Firenze (Florence, 1912). Specific incidents in the political struggles of these years have been described in recent articles. Two lower guildsmen who were fervent

partisans of the Duke of Athens are the subject of a note by M. Becker and G. Brucker, “Una lettera in difesa della dittatura nella Firenze del Trecento,” ASI, cxit (1955), 251-260. The political difhculties of Matteo Villani are described by Brucker, “The Ghibelline Trial of Matteo Villani (1362),” Medievalia et Humanistica, xu (1960), 48-55. Becker has investigated a case involving another well-known Florentine: “Un avvenimento riguardante il cronista Marchionne di Coppo Stefani conservato nei documenti giudiziari del? Archivio di Stato di Firenze,” ASI, cxvut (1959), 137-146. The study of Florentine fiscal policy was initiated by G. Pagnini, Della decima e di varie altre gravezze imposte dal Comune di Firenze, 1. The first scholar in the nineteenth century to investigate the problem was G. Canestrini, La scienza e arte di stato desunta dagh atti ufficiali della Repubblica fiorentina e dei Medici. Ordinamenti economici. Della finanza (Florence, 1862). The major work on communal finance is B. Barbadoro, Le finanze della Repubblica fiorentina, im posta

diretta e debito pubblico fino allstituzione del Monte (Florence, 1929). Unfortunately, Barbadoro terminated his study in 1345, and there has been no systematic investigation of this important problem for the subsequent period. He did, however, analyze the sega records of 1352, in “Finanza e demografia nei ruoli fiorentine d’imposte del

1352-1355, in Att del Congresso internazionale per lo studio det problemi della popolazione (Rome, 1933), 1x, 615-646. In recent years, scholars have probed into the complex question of the commune’s economic policies in the trecento. E. Fiumi ‘has pre-

sented a revisionist interpretation of the commune’s relations with the contado: “Sui rapporti fra citta e contado,” ASI, cxiv (1956), 18-68. In a lengthy article on the Florentine economy, the same author

has advanced some stimulating arguments on the commune’s economic policy: “Fioritura e decadenza dell’economia fiorentina,”’ ASI, CXV (1957), 385-439; Cxv1 (1958), 443-510; and cxvil (1959), 427-502. The

commune’s attitude toward guild monopolies has been investigated in recent articles by R. de Roover, “The Concept of a Just Price: Theory

407

BIBLIOGRAPHY

and Economic Policy,” Journal of Economic History, xvii (1958), 418434; M. Becker, “La esecuzione della legislazione contro le pratiche

monopolistiche delle arti fiorentine alla meta del secolo quattordicesimo,” ASI, cxvui (1959), 8-28; and E. Fiumn, “Fioritura e decadenza

dell’economia fiorentina, ibid., 478-486. |

Several scholars have been interested in the complex question of relations between church and state in trecento Florence. Two articles on this problem during the regime’s first decade appeared almost simultaneously: A. Panella, “Politica ecclesiastica del Comune fiorentino

dopo la cacciata del Duca d’Atene,” ASI, txxt (1913), i, 271-365; and F. Baldasseroni, “Una controversia fra stato e chiesa in Firenze nel 1355,” ASI, ser. 5, Lxx (1912), 39-54. Panella later investigated the issue at the outbreak of the papal war in 1375, “La guerra degli Otto Santi e le vicende della legge contro i vescovi,” ASI, xctx (1941), t, 36-45. M. Becker has recently published two articles on the social

and economic implications of the church-state conflict in Florence: “Some Economic Implications of the Conflict Between Church and State in Trecento Florence,” Mediaeval Studies, xx (1959), 1-16; and “Florentine Politics and the Diffusion of Heresy in the Trecento: a Socio-Economic Inquiry,” Speculum, xxxtv (1959), 60-75. In two short notes, the same author has considered the question of usury, which exacerbated relations between the commune and the church: “Three Cases Concerning the Restitution of Usury in Florence,” Journal of Economic History, xvi (1957), 445-450; and “Nota dei processi riguardanti prestatori di danaro nei tribunali fiorentini dal 1343 al 1379,” ASI, cxiv (1956), 741-748.

D. Foreign Affairs Relations between the Italian states have been more intensively studied than other aspects of the peninsula’s history in the fourteenth century. Two recent works of synthesis are: L. Simeoni, Le signorie (Milan, 1950), 1, Part 1; and N. Valeri, L’Italia nell’eta det principati dal 1343 al 1516 (Milan, 1949), Chs. 1-5. Specifically concerned with

Florence’s role in Italian politics during the fourteenth century is the second chapter of H. Baron’s book, The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance. Civic Humanism and Republican Liberty in an Age of Classicism and Tyranny (Princeton, N.J., 1955). In his article, “Florence and the Despots: Some Aspects of Florentine Diplomacy in the Fourteenth Century,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th ser., 1 (1952), 21-45, N. Rubinstein traces certain permanent elements of Florentine foreign policy in the srecento.

408

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The commune’s relations with the kingdom of Naples are described in E, Léonard’s uncompleted biography, Histoire de Jeanne I"*, reine de Naples, comtesse de Provence (1343-1382), 3 vols. (Paris and Monaco, 1932-1936). The author has announced the forthcoming publication of the fourth and last volume of this study, covering the period 1362-1382. Léonard has also written a work of synthesis on the Angevin dynasty: Les Angevins de Naples (Paris, 1954). Florence’s difficulties with her Lombard nemesis, the Visconti, are

treated in three monographs: F. Landogna, La politica det Visconti in Toscana (Milan, 1929); A. Sorbelli, La Signoria di Giovanni Visconti a Bologna e le sue relazioni con la Toscana (Bologna, 1901); and F. Baldasseroni, “La guerra tra Firenze e Giovanni Visconti,” Studi storici diretti da F. Crivellucct, x1 (1902), 361-407; xt (1903), 41-94. The fifth volume of the Storia di Milano published by the Fondazione Treccani degli Alfieri (Milan, 1955—), contains a good survey of Visconti foreign policy. The commune’s relations with the papacy constitute a major theme in the political history of trecento Italy. In Les Papes d’ Avignon, gth ed. (Paris, 1949), G. Mollat presents a sympathetic interpretation of the church’s Italian policy. F. Filippini has written a mediocre biog-

raphy of a prominent executor of that policy: Il cardinale Egidio Albornoz (Bologna, 1933). The career of another important papal oficial has been investigated by G. Romano: Niccolo Spinelli da Giovinazzo diplomatico del secolo xiv (Naples, 1902). There is much information on Florentine-papal relations in Y. Renouard, Les relations des Papes d’ Avignon et des compagnies commerciales et bancatres de 1316 2 1378 (Paris, 1941).

F, Baldasseroni has described the commune’s relations with the papacy and the emperor during Charles IV’s first Italian journey: “Relazioni tra Firenze, la Chiesa e Carlo IV (1353-1355),” ASI, 5th ser., XXXVII (1906), 3-60, 322-347. On the same subject is the earlier work

by G. Canestrini, “Di alcuni documenti risguardanti le relazioni politiche dei papi d’Avignone coi comuni d'Italia avanti e dopo il tribunato di Cola di Rienzo e la calata di Carlo IV,” ASI, 1st ser., vit (1849), 347446. The incursion of the Hapsburgs into northern Italy and the impact of that development on Florence and the papacy is the subject

of an article by F. Cusin: “Rodolfo IV d’Absburgo, la Curia Avignonese e la politica italiana nel 1363-1365,” ASI, xcvin, 7, 68-89, 107-136.

The return of the papacy to Italy in 1367 has been studied by G. Filippi,

“Il Comune di Firenze ed il ritorno della S. Sede in Roma nell’anno 1367,” Miscellanea di storia italiana, xxvi (1887), 387-426; and J.

Kirsch, Die Ruckkehre der Papste Urban V und Gregor XI von

409

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Avignon nach Rom (Paderborn, 1898). The impact of Charles IV’s second Italenreise upon Italian Guelfism is described by G. Pirchan, Italien und Kaiser Karl IV in der Zeit seiner zweiten Romfahrt, 2 vols. (Prague, 1930). Historians have carefully investigated the policy and the fortunes of the papacy in Italy on the eve of the war with Florence and the rebellion of the papal states. A general discussion of this critical phase of

Italian history is found in L. Mirot, La politique pontificale et le retour du Saint-stége 4 Rome en 1376 (Paris, 1899). The church’s war with the Visconti has been treated by G. Romano, “La guerra tra i Visconti e la Chiesa (1360-1376),” Bollettino della Societa pavese di storia patria, 1 (1903), 412-437; and by J. Glénisson, “La politique de

Louis de Gonzague, seigneur de Mantoue pendant la guerre entre Grégoire XI et Bernabd Visconti (1371-1375),” Bibliotheque de Ecole

_ des Chartes, c1x (1952), 232-276. Conditions within the papal states are analyzed by M. Antonelli, “La dominazione pontificia nel Patrimonio negli ultimi anni del periodo avignonese,” Archivio della R. Societa romana di storia patria, xxx (1907), 269-332; xxx1 (1908), 121168, 315-355; O. Vancini, “Bologna nella chiesa, 1360-1376,” Atti della R. Deputazione di storia patria per Romagna, 3rd ser., xxiv (1906), 239320, 508-552; xxv (1908), 16-108; and E. Dupré Theseider, “La rivolta di Perugia nel 1375 contro l’abate di Monmaggiore e i suoi precedenti politici,” Bollettino della R. Deputazione di storia patria per (Umbria, XXX (1938), 69-158. Two recent articles by J. Glénisson treat important

aspects of the subject: “Les origines de la révolte de l’Etat pontifical en 1375. Les subsides extraordinaires dans Jes provinces italiennes de PEglise au temps de Grégoire XI,” Rivista di storia della Chiesa in Italia, v (1951), 145-168; and “Une administration médiévale aux prises

avec la disette. La question des blés dans les provinces italiennes de Etat pontifical en 1374-1345,” Le moyen dge, vit (1951), 303-326. The immediate background of the Florentine-papal war has been investigated in two recent articles by G. Mollat: “Relations politiques de Grégoire XI avec les Siennois et les Florentins,” Mélanges d’archéologie et d'histoire, uxvit (1956), 335-376; and “Preliminaires de la guerre des otto santi (1371-1375), Académie des inscriptions et belleslettres. Comptes rendus des séances (1955), 113-117. The Prato conspiracy of June 1375 is the subject of an article by A. Gherardi, “Di

un trattato per far rebellare al Comune di Firenze la terra di Prato, nell’anno 1375,” ASI, 3rd ser., x (1869), 2, 3-26. The commune’s negotiations with John Hawkwood are described and documented by I. Del Badia, “Lettere alla Signoria relative alla venuta in Toscana di Giovanni

410

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Acuto,” Miscellanea fiorentina di storia e erudizione (Florence, 1892), I, 171-174.

On the war itself, the basic study is still A. Gherardi, “La guerra dei Fiorentini con papa Gregorio XI detta la guerra degli Otto Santi,” ASI, 3rd ser., v (1867), 27, 36-1313 vi (1867), #, 208-2325 22, 229-251; vil (1868),

4, 211-232; i, 235-248; vill (1868), 2, 260-296. The interpretations advanced by Gherardi are now somewhat dated, and the documentation

for the last two years of the war is extremely sketchy. The subject deserves a comprehensive monograph.

Still useful for the history of the commune’s military policy and organization is G. Canestrini, “Documenti per servire a la storia della milizia italiana dal xiii secolo al xvi, raccolti in gli archivi della Toscana,” ASI, 1st ser., xv (1851). G. Girola has written a study of Fra Moriale, a dangerous antagonist of the commune in the 1350’s: “Fra Moriale in Toscana,” ASI, 5th ser., xxxvi1 (1906), 261-300. On the most famous military captain of the age, there is a very inadequate treat-

ment by G. Temple Leader and G. Marcotti, Sir John Hawkwood (London, 1889). E. Ricotti has written a general work on the companies: Storia delle compagnie di ventura in Italia (Turin, 1893). A thorough, scholarly treatment of German soldiers of fortune in Italy is K. H. Schafer, Deutsche Ritter und Edelknechte in Italien wahrend des XIV Jahrhunderts, 4 vols. (Paderborn, 1911-1940). E. Religious and Intellectual History

There is scattered information on Florentine religious and intelJectual life in the early trecento in Davidsohn, Geschichte von Florenz,

Iv, 2, trans. by E. Dupré Theseider, Firenze ai tempi di Dante (Florence, 1929). The best treatment of the religious and intellectual milieu in the second half of the century is the work of an art historian: M. Meiss, Painting in Florence and Siena after the Black Death (Princeton,

NJ., 1951). The rigid Marxist interpretation by F. Antal, Florentine Painting and its Soctal Background (London, 1947), is less satisfactory.

An important study on Florentine attitudes toward wealth is H. Baron’s article, “Franciscan Poverty and Civic Wealth as Factors in the Rise of Humanistic Thought,” Speculum, xu (1938), 1-37. In his Crisis of the Early Italian Renatssance, Baron discusses the nature of Florentine humanism in the late trecento. Studies of individual writers cast some light upon the thought of the age. The best survey of Florentine literature in the fourteenth century is N. Sapegno, [7 Trecento (Milan, 1942). Giovanni Villani’s ideas are

analyzed by E. Mehl, Die Weltanschauung des Giovanni Villani (Leipzig, 1927). A recent study of Boccaccio’s work and thought is

41]

BIBLIOGRAPHY

V. Branca, Boccaccio medievale (Florence, 1956). E. Li Gotti has written a biography of another important literary figure: Franco Sacchetti, uomo “discolo e grosso” (Florence, 1940). The vast Petrarch literature contains much information on the famous humanist’s contacts with the Arno city. For example, T. E. Mommsen has noted Petrarch’s friendship with Michele di Vanni degli Albizzi, in his edition of Petrarch’s Testament (Ithaca, N.Y., 1957). Coluccio Salutati is the subject of a monograph by A. von Martin, Mittelalterliche Welt- und Lebensan-

schauung 1m Spiegel der Schriften Coluccto Salutatis (Munich and Berlin, 1913).

No aspect of Florentine history in the trecento has been more neglected than the church. Some information on ecclesiastical institutions and personnel can be gleaned from eighteenth century works: B. Lami, Monumenta Ecclesiae Florentinae (Florence, 1758); Mores et Consuetudines Ecclesiae Florentinae, ed. Moreni (Florence, 1794); G. Richa, Notizie istoriche delle Chiese fiorentine (Florence, 1754-1761); L. Cerracchini, Cronologia sacra de’ vescovi e archivescovi (Florence, 1716); S. Salvini, Catalogo cronologico dei canonici della chiesa metropolitana fiorentina (Florence, 1752). A valuable source of information on ecclesiastical buildings, works

of art, and patronage is W. and E. Paatz, Die Kirchen von Florenz, 6 vols, (Frankfurt am Main, 1941-1955). The Fraticelli in Florence have been investigated by F. Tocco, “I Fraticelli,” ASJ, 5th ser. xxxv (1905), 331-368; and by D. Douie, The Nature and Effect of the Heresy of the Fraticelli (Manchester, 1932). There are no biographies of Florentine bishops in this period, and among the religious orders, only the Dominicans of S. Maria Novella have found a modern historian: S, Orlandi, I] “Necrologio” di S. Maria Novella, 2 vols. (Florence, 1955). The Cistercian monastery at Settimo has been the subject of two recent works: P. J. Jones, “Le finanze della badia cistercense di Settimo nel xiv secolo,” Rivista di storia della Chiesa in Italia, x (1956), go-122; and C. Calzolai, La storia della Badia a Settimo (Florence, 1958). Special studies have been devoted to two of the city’s most illustrious religious figures: C. di Pierro, “Contributo alla biografia di Fra Jacopo Passavanti,” Giornale storico della letteratura italiana, xLvil (1906), 1-24; and P. Cividali, “Il Beato Giovanni dalle Celle,” Memorte

della R. Accademia dei Lincei, Classe di scienze morali, storiche e filologiche, 5th ser., x11 (1907), 353-477.

412

INDEX Note: In this index, individuals with surnames are indexed alphabetically under their family name. All other persons are indexed by their Christian names.

Abbati, Marco, 238n Alberto of Siena, 113n

Abruzzi, 14 Albizo di Messer Filippo da Barberino, Acciaiuoli, family, 17, 24, 26, 32, 51n, Ser, 321n 125, 133, 134, 138, 203, 340; com- Albizzi, family, 21, 24, 26, 33, 51, 68, pany, 8, 17, 133-34; Adoardo, 17; 123, 124, 125, 129, 139n, 160, 161, Alamanno, 63n, 307n, 379n, 384n, 176, 188n, 203, 222n, 250, 253, 254, 386; Angelo, bishop of Florence, 136, 256, 259, 260, 275, 277, 278, 279, 208, 144n, 146, 158; Donato, 300n, 322n, 340, 368, 370; Alessandro di Niccold, 3410; Francesco di Meo, 146; Jacopo 34N, 51, 219, 241n, 381, 383n; Alessio

di Donato, 144n, 146; Niccold, grand di Pepo, 305n; Antonio di Lando, seneschal of Naples, 4’7N, 143-47 tin, 230; Bartolomeo di Niccolo, ie Francesco de, bishop of Florence, 34n, 5h 225n, 3830 Francesco, 94, Adimari, family, 8, 34, 156, 185, 204n, Francesco di Uberto, 34n, 254n,

50 . 253; Francesco di Antonio, 255, 305;

°4939>

263, 340; Alamanno, 63n; Monna 260n, 261, 381n; Filippo, 230; Lando Antonia, 17n; Giovanello di Manno, di Antonio, 34n, 261; Maso, 383n; 326; Leonardo di Messer Ranieri, Matteo, 110; Pepo di Antonio, 34n, 156n; Messer Talano, 17n; Tom- 253, 255, 279; Uberto, 51, tgon, ror

maso di Buonaccorso, 154n, 185n, 207

190; Viert, 370 Piero dt Filippo: business activi-

Agli, family, 156; Agnolo, 373n; Ala- ties, 33-34, 204; political influence, manno, 259; Bernardo, 373n; Ceffo, 68, 201, 226, 244, 248, 257, 366; po-

52; Taddeo, 343; Tieri, 155n . , P

‘ ie , 7 7awife ne litical views, 89, 176, 179-80, 189n, Agnese, of Francesco di Pipino, a: 330n 2250, 235, 339; 362; political activiAgnolo, Ser, 259n ties, 161, 226, 248-49, 339% 366; opAlamanni, Neri, 168 pension from office, 255; named a

Agolanti, Jacopo di Bartolomeo, 304n P osition fo, 201; wealth, 2045 sus-

Alberti, family, 21, 24, 31, 39n, 43n, magnate, 3703 exiled, 383n 125, 126, 188n; company, 13-14, 16n, Albornoz, cardinal, 173-80, 182, 183, 139n, 174; Albertozzo di Lapo, 106; 186, 223, 224; 266, 269, 279 Bartolomeo di Caroccio, 14; Duccio, Alderotti, Francesco, 316n, 350; Mat-

389n; Benedetto di Nerozzo, 189n, teo, 274 206, 219, 327, 353N, 364, 384n, 389n, Aldighieri, Messer Donato, 205, 208,

391; Jacopo di Caroccio, 122n, 188n, 222n, 239n, 256n, 262n, 275, 299, 189n, 207, 225n, 227, 230, 272m; 325M, 330, 341, 371, 382 Marco, 297n; Niccola di Lippo, 127; Aldobrandini, family, 125n, 391; GiMesser Niccold, 21n, 94, 201n, 237N, orgio, 191, 237; Luigi di Lippo, 33, 240n, 268n; Tommaso di Caroccio, 125, 205, 222n, 239n, 250, 293, 297,

164n 298n, 319n, 364; Piero di Lippo, 33,

Albertini, Messer Giovanni, 347 209, 224, 298n

Alberto di Ser Lippo da Barberino, Alessandri, see Albizzi, Alessandro di

342 Niccolo, Bartolomeo di Niccolé 413

INDEX

Alighieri, Gabriello di Dante, 31n. See 24n, 76n, 151, 152, 153n, 176n, 177n,

also Dante 178n, 182, 216, 219; Taddeo, 7n, 17; Aliotti, family, 155n Zanobi, 1gon, 224 Alps, 236, 242, 275n, 300 anticlericalism, in Florence, 133-39, Altopascio, 192; battle of, 28 300-4, 307n, 318, 394. See also Altoviti, family, 32, 50n, 125, 139n, church; papacy 153N, 203, 233n, 340; Antonio, 314; Apennines, 79, 102, 175, 229, 287

Messer Arnaldo, 94n, 164n, 179n, Aquileia, patriarchate of, 242 182n; Bardo di Paolo, 63n; Messer Aragon, 311 Bindo, 115, 147; Messer Oddo, Ardinghelli, family, 139n, 203; Marco, 189n; Paolo, 122n; Simone di Messer 138n Bindo, 383n; Stefano di Piero, 170n; Arezzo, 8, 10, 160, 257, 269n, 273, Stoldo, 332, 339; Messer Tommaso, 281n, 286, 300n, 310, 313n; bishop

177, Igon, gin : of, 276

Amadori, family, 41, 42n; Benozzo, armorers’ guild, 263n

351 Arnolfi, Giovanni, 107; Nofri di Gio-

Amieri, family, 22; Filippozzo di Mes- vanni, 127; Fra Michele, 134, 139

ser Jacopo, 23n Arrighi, Matteo di Jacopo, 354

Amiratis, Bartolomea, 80n; Selvaggia, Arrigucci, family, 139n, 153n; Ser

8on Bonare di Ser Piero, 321n; Francesco,

Amizzini, Tommaso di Lippo, 23n 343n; Giovanni di Alessandro, 28n, Ammannati, Giovanni di Conte, 214n 139n

Ammirato, Scipione, historian, 234 artefici, 45-48, 105, 299-300, 329, 340, ammonizione, institution of, 170-71; 367, 3905. See also guilds operation of, 171-72, 190-92, 206-8, arti maggiori, 46, 90 250, 263, 264, 319, 321, 336-37, 340- arti minori, 46, 90, 121-24; communal 43, 3573 opposition to, 184-85, r9I- policy toward, 152-53; represented g2, 206-8, 220, 260n, 349-50, 359; in Parte captaincy, 211-12; support abuses of, 206-7, 264; reform of, 208- reforms of Parte, 219-20; represented 10, 245-46, 360; during papal war, in Mercanzta, 256. See also artefict; 321, 336-37, 340-43, 357. See also — guilds

Ghibellinism, Parte Guelfa Ascoli, 313n : Anagni, 327, 331 Asini, Jacopo, 190 Ancisa, 42 Athens, duke of, see Walter of Brienne Ancona, 314 Attaviani, Mezza di Jacopo, 334, 354,

Andrea di Messer Ambrogio, 79, 373n 38on : Andrea di Cenni, 196n Avignon, 12, 14, 24n, 41m, 44, 132, Andrea di Feo, 379, 383 134, 138, 139, I40, 143, 157, 158, Angioleri, Gianozzo, 138n 174, 175, 224, 226, 229, 239, 272,

Anjou, house of, 143; duke of, 74, 337n 274, 276, 285n, 291, 292n, 302, 308, Annibaldo, Florentine diplomat, 288, 309n, 31INn 289

Anselmi, Gino di Bernardo, 33, 69, Bagnesi, family, 43; Guerriante di Bili-

334, 3350, 3570, 359, 362 gardo, 78, 213n Antellesi (Dell’Antella), family, 17, 24, Baldesi, family, 22; Andrea di Segnino, 31, 138, 153n, 203n, 341n, 348, 364; 22, 340, 367n, 374n, 381; Baldese di

company, 7n, 17, 205n; Messer Ales- Torino, 22 sandro, 272n, 299, 327, 332n, 348, Baldovinetti, family, 203n; Alessio, 350, 353n; Azzone, 138n; Guido, 344; Andrea, 168n; Pera, 383n; Pri348; Nofri, 341, 349; Simone di Neri, —_— ore, 199, 297N, 323, 333, 383n

414

INDEX

balie, 59, 121-22, 149n, 164, 253-58, Leonardo di Niccolo, 23n, 259, 275n, 261, 369-73, 393, 395. See also Eight 322, 329n

Banchelli, Bartolo di Luce, 78 Becchi, Francesco, 1gon

Banchini, Lorenzo, 80n Bellandi, Albizzo di Lippo, 24n; FilipBandini, Domenico, 185, 186 po di Vanni, 78, 213n bankruptcy, 4, 9-11, 15-18, 22n, 249, Benci di Cione, shoemaker, 299, 300n,

392. See also depression , 347

Barbadori, Messer Donato, torn, 205, Bencivenni, Jacopo, 89n

235n, 288, 299, 329, 332n Benedict XI, pope, 103 Barberino di Mugello, 343 Benedicti, Francesco, 213n

Barcelona, 44 Benedicti, Niccold, 23n

Bardi, family, 4, 6, 8, 17, 21, 23n, 24, Benghi di Panze, shoemaker, 347n, 25, 29, 36, 38, 51n, 54, 133n, 139N, 155, 349

188n, 203, 206, 339; company, 4, 6, Benini, Francesco, 115, r7gn, 217, 8, 17-18, 123, 133n, 204n; Messer 225n; Piero di Bindo, 127n; Stefano Alessandro, 192, 201, 203n, 382; Mes- di Bindo, 127, 341 ser Andrea di Filippozzo, 36, 199, Benvenuti, Nastagio di Ser Francesco,

206, 207, 218, 222n, 224n; Angelo 2140 di Andrea, 199; Bartolo di Giovanni, Benvenuti, Uberto, gon 18; Messer Bindo, 274; Castrone di Berengar, abbot of Lézat, 287n, 280,

° b) 3 n

Sinibaldo, 21n, 196n; Gherardo di 7995 296

. ; dino, 263n, 316; Gino, 263n

Gualtiere, 155n, 156n; Jacopo, Son; Bernardi, Bartolomeo, 263n; Bernar-

Piero di Messer Ridolfo, 18, 203; » 20303 3103 » 203 » 7°, 203) Bernardo della Corsa, 278, 2

» 270, 279

Roberto di Neri, 53n; Rodolfo di Bernardo di Andrea, armor maker, 80 Taddeo, 1993 Sandro di Bartolo, 18; Bernardo di Sandro di Ser Amadore,

Simone di Geri, 113n, 165; Tom- 32In

maso di Messer Riccardo, 82, 112, Bernardo di Simone, baker, 106, 119 301; Totto di Filippozzo, 81; Uberto, Betti, Jacopo, 23n

261 Biagio Vanni da Castel Fiorentino, 347

Barga, castellan of, 292 Bianchi, Romolo, 188n

Barletta, 14 Bianciardi, Giovanni, 24n, 168, 1609, 234 Barnabo, blacksmith, 212, 219 Bibbiena, 151n, 175

Baroncelli, family, 17, 31, 125, 157, Biliotti, family, 24; Bartolo, 200, 232n;

203; Bartolo, 157n; Ferrante, 64n; Giovanni, 339, 343; Sandro, 164n Filippo di Giamori, 31, 157, 214, Bini, Piero, 40, 293n, 207 225n, 237, 339; Giovanni, 339; Sal- Biondo, pork butcher, 202

vestro, 134; Simone, 230 Black Death, see plague of 1348 Baroncini, Tinaccio, 348n blacksmiths’ guild, 123

Baroni, Giorgio, 177n Boccaccio, Giovanni, 52 Bartoli, Lorenzo, 23n Bocchini, Cecco, shoemaker, 108

Bartolo, cimatore, 196n Bologna, 36, 47, 102n, 141, 175, 178, Bartolo di Loro, butcher, 349n 182, 183n, 223, 228, 230, 234, 249, Bartolo Sangiugni, shoemaker, 349 257n, 266, 271, 273n, 275n, 276, 285,

Barucci, Sandro, 24n, 1gon, 192 286, 287, 289, 290, 201, 292, 294n, Bastari, family, 125; Filippo di Cionet- 300n, 308, 309n, 310, 327 to, 124, 151, 152, 158n, 250, 252, 253, Bonafati, Francesco, 24n 254, 262, 313n, 325n, 330, 334, 335, Bonamichi, Francesco, r90n; Ubaldino,

394 prior of S. Stefano, 327-28

Beccanugi, family, 22, 50n, 129n, 131; Bonciani, Pinuccio, 127n

415

INDEX

Bongianni, Bartolomeo, wineseller, 39 ser Tegghie, 19; Messer Uguccione, Bordoni, family, 22, 26, 50n, 130, 131; 165, 198, 213n, 230, 233 Angelo di Paolo, 63n; Angelo di Busini, family, 42; Donato, 349 Jacopo, 23n; Bordone, 130; Chele di butchers’ guild, 153

Jacopo, 23n; Messer Gherardo, 122n; Buti, Lapo, 107 : Niccolo di Jacopo, 23n; Simone di

Bordone, 23n Cacciafuori, Gerozzo, 351

Borgo Sansepulcro, 10 Calabria, duke of, 4, 93n

Boscoli, Buonaccorso di Messer Gio- Calimala guild, 11, 23, 42, 90, 97, 205n

vanni, 136 Cambi, Giovanni, 359, 360n, 367, 374

Bostichi, family, 156n Cambi, Nastagio, 103n | Bracci, Andrea di Piero, 263n Cambio guild, 11, 23, 25n, 97, 205n

Branca d’Amerigo, butcher, 293n, 297 Camerini, Zanobi, 120 Brancacci, family, 51n, 166n; Piero, Camerino, Rodolfo da, 296, 313n, 327 168n, 207; Salvestro di Serotine, 162, Canigiani, family, 23n, 30, 125, 203,

261; Tommaso, 162n, 165 368; Barduccio, 332n; Piero di Dati, Branchelli, Bartolo, 213n 30, 148, 153, 177, Igon, IgIn, 224,

Brandini, Ciuto, 54, 110-11, 380 333n, 339, 340n, 383n; Messer Ris-

; Bricciolo, robber, 157 toro, 264n, 332, 356n, 359n, 370

Bruges, 79, 195n, 301, 308 Cantelli, Antonio, 348; Giovanni, 348

Brunacci, Stefano, 342 Cantino di Agnolo, 342 :

Brunelleschi, family, 125, 340; An- capitudini, 122, 133, 134, 218, 367, 373.

tonio, 190, 204n; Attaviano, 185n, See also guilds 200, 350, 370; Francesco, 122n; Mes- Caponsacchi, family, 42

ser Niccolo di Donzello, 204n Capponi, family, 26, 30, 126, 153n,

Brunellini, Filippo, 262 188n, 205, 206n, 349; company, 93; Bruni, Francesco, papal secretary, Andrea, 333n; Cappone, 205n; Filip-

138n, 231n po di Recco, 30n, 93, Iorn, 174, 184,

Bruni, Leonardo (Aretino), 72 205n, 21In, 222n, 239n, 297n, 299,

Bucelli, family, 26 324; Giovanni, 299, 383n, 389n Buda, 31r1n captain of the popolo, 61, 110, 197, 374 Buere, family, 22 Cardinali, family, see Tornaquinci Bufache, Lorenzo, 21n Carlo of Durazzo, 300

Buonaccorsi, family, 24; company, 17, Caroccio, baker, 202 69n; Buonaccorso di Lapo Giovanni, Carrara, Francesco da, lord of Padua, _ 69, 257, 312n, 339, 367n; Giovanni, 225-26, 241, 284-85

339; Jacopo di Gherardo, 182n; Casini, Francesco, 128

Lorenzo, 118 Castellani, family, 31n, 339; company, Buonaccorso di Vanni, goldsmith, 348 174; Messer Lotto, 349; Michele di Buonarroti, Buonarrote di Simone, 105; Vanni, 31, 127, 204, 235N, 249, 299,

Michelangelo, 105 340n, 381; Niccolo di Michele, 127;

Buondelmonti, family, 33, 38, 146, 203, Vanni, 189n

204n, 390n; Alessandro, 370; An- Castiglionchi (Da Castiglionchio), drea, ron, 147; Banchello di Messer family, 29, 31n, 37, 298; Alberto di Lorenzo, 260; Messer Benghi, 109, Lapo, 207, 325n; Bernardo, 35, 37; 33n, 156, 244, 298n, 339, 3430, 344, Ruggiero, 107; Simone, 190, 200n 349, 350, 368, 3904; Gherardo di Mes- Messer Lapo: 39, 72, 298n, 328n, ser Lorenzo, 198, 219, 259, 260, 326, 375n; social status and ideology, 35339; Niccold, 200; Piero di Messer 36; political views, 35-36, 89, 203n,

Lorenzo, 260; Ruggiero, 19; Mes- 233, 236, 237, 238, 253-54, 260n,

416

INDEX

270, 272, 307, 317M, 33In, 332n, — diction of, 133-36, 157-59, 225, 304334, 362; leader of oligarchic faction, 5, 317-18; quarrel over economic is-

31, 34, 203n, 248, 301, 331n, 334, sues, 136-38; patrician domination 339, 3430, 344, 358, 362, 304; op- _— of, 138-393 patrician quest for beneposition to, 200n, 260n, 349, 3503 as fices in, 138-39, 157, 223, 283n, 305n; diplomat, 226-27, 299, 327; as leader of taxation of clergy, 158-59, 196, 304-

1372 balia, 250, 253-54; exiled in 5; attack upon, during papal war,

1378, 370 302-5; the papal interdict, 310, 331-

Castiglione Aretino, 273, 274, 276 32, 357; confiscation of property of,

347 papacy

Castracani, Castruccio, lord of Lucca, 317-18, 354. See also anticlericalism;

Catalonia, 314 Cialli di Ser Dino, Ser, 167n Catherine of Siena, see S. Catherine of | Ciampelli, Domenico, 348n

Siena Ciari, Giovanni, 168n, 198, r99n, 205

Cavalcanti, family, 32, 36, 139n, 146, Ciati, Cino, wineseller, 298n 155; Amerigo di Messer Giannozzo, Ciecharini, Aldobrandino, rro 127n, 230; Giannozzo, 189n; Jacopo, Ciompi revolution, 15, 55, 69n, 90, 96,

20n; Lapo di Bindo, 196n; Luigi di 128, 203n, 265, 303n, 307n, 314n, Poltrone, 204n; Matteo, 200; Salice, 388, 389, 395n; the June uprising, 340, 381n; Scolaio, 230-31; Uberto, 363-73; the July revolt, 379-86

127n Cione, Lorenzo di Cecco, 351

Cavicciuli, family, 368; Angelo, 112; Citta di Castello, 308, 309n, 310, 313n,

Vieri, 340n. See also Adimari 329, 334, 337

Cecco di Cenno, r1ron Ciuteli, Giovanni, 247

40 Civitella, 281

Ceffini, family, 41n; Lodovico di Lippo, Ciuti, Manfredo di Giovanni, 348n

Cenno di Marco, innkeeper, 212, 221, Clement VI, pope, 120, 132-33, 139,

348n 141-42, 173. See also papacy

Cerchi, family, 23n, 25, 29, 32, 36, Clement VII, pope, 287n 263; Alessandro, 193n; Francesco, Cluny, abbot of, 266; bishop of, 290 204n; Giovanni di Riccardo, 204n, Cocchi, family, 153n; company, 174;

321; Niccolé di Lodovico, 204n Niccold, 269n

Cesena, 179, 327 ! Cola di Rienzo, 313

Charlemagne, 344 Colle di Val d’Elsa, 278n Charles I, of Anjou, king of Naples, colleges, see Sixteen, Twelve

24In, 343 commune, Florentine, see constitution,

Charles IV, of Luxemburg, emperor, factions, foreign policy, offices, Sig84, 88n, gon, 120, 142, 144, 146, 148, noria 151, 154, 158n, 163-65, 201, 215n, Compagni, Nanni, 199 222, 228, 236-38, 240, 243, 267, 275, companies, armed, 14, 85, 149n, 151, 282, 284, 335; Italian journey of 175-78, 181, 224, 228-29 (1354-55), 84, 149, I51, 154, 163-65; companies, business, difficulties in Italian journey of (1368-69), 73, 201, 1340's, 4, 7, 8-11, 16-18; activity after 215, 222, 228, 236-38, 267-68, 393-94 1348, 12-14, 24-25; controlled by

Charles V, king of France, 311n gente nuova, 40-41; involved in conChelluccio di Chele, old clothes dealer, flict with papacy, 133-34; participate

23n in papal banking activities, 174, 205n;

Chianti, district of, 33 suffer losses through papal interdict, church, Florentine, privileges of, 96; 3I0-II, 314-15 quarrel with commune over juris- Compiobesi, family, 155n

417

INDEX

Consorterta della Liberta, 372 342, 350, 364, 368; Agnolo, 293n, conspiracies, of the Bardi (1340), 6; 297; Bartolomeo, 205n; Bernardo, of the Donati (1344), 113; of the 222n, 297N, 324; Bettino, 205n, 341; Pazzi (1350), 113; of 1360, 45n, Lodovico di Naddo, 64n; Matteo, 185-87; threats of, 55-56, 85-86, 105- 205n 14, 149-50, 194, 197-98, 264-65; in Cristofano da Barberino, Ser, 343 Prato, 281, 292-93, 300; in the Ciom- Cristoforo da Piacenza, 282n, 309n, pi revolution, 363, 367-69, 374-75, 311, 332n 378-80, 389-90

constitution, communal, description, Dante, 52, 58, 72 57-69; strength and weaknesses, 69- Datini, Francesco di Marco, 44-47, 77,

71, 303, 305 } 82n, 292n; Margherita, 44

Consulte e Pratiche records, 225, 242, Davanzato di Montelupo, 342 266, 298, 299; value of, 76; descrip- Davanzi, Beltramo, 321n tion of material in, 85, 89, 91n, 94, Davizzi, family, 102, 103n; Bartolo98, 129, 151, 161-62, 164, 172, 179, meo, 196n; Francesco di Giovanni, 182, 184, 203n, 217N, 222, 224, 232, 21n; Giovanni di Lapo, 21n; Tom237N, 239n, 240, 258, 259, 268, 273n, maso, 190 274, 283, 306, 313n, 361, 373; lacunae De Monarchia, 72

in, 174, 290 Decameron, 120n

contado, 36, 37, 41-42, 52, 57, 79, 93n, Del Bagniuolo, Niccold di Piero, 23 107, 151, 172, 179, 196n, 217, 220, Del Bello, Giovanni, 161, 162n, 163n,

238, 261, 298n, 367, 374 1770, 192

coppersmiths’ guild, 123 Del Bene, family, 11n, 81n, 126n, 341n,

Corneto, 231 364; Amerigo, 19n; Bene, 139n; Corsi, family, 68; Bardo, 68n; Fran- Francesco di Jacopo, 33, 81n, 125, cesco di Lapo, 68n; Giovanni, 68n; 341; Giovanni, 299, 341; Jacopo,

Simone, 68n Ign, 138n, 341n; Taddeo, 190

Corsini, family, 24, 27, 30, 125, 138, Del Buono, Ciore, roon

298; Amerigo di Tommaso, 27n, 69; Del Buono, Niccolo, 185, 186, 187

Andrea di Niccolé, 27; Andrea di Del Cane, Selvolo di Lippo di Cione, Tommaso, 27n; Corsino di Mozzo, 127 27n; Duccio di Niccold, 27n; Filippo Del Forese, Stefano, 163, 178n, 211n di Tommaso, 27, 30, 190n, 191, 211, Del Garbo, Messer Tommaso, 162,

215N, 224, 225n, 237n, 298n, 305n, 176n, 182n 307, 334, 3813; Gherardo di Duccio, Del Nero, Niccold, 386

27n; Jacopo di Jacopo, 27; Piero di Del Palagio, family, 34; Andrea di Tommaso, cardinal of Florence, 27, Neri, 34; Guido di Tommaso, rg5n, 227n, 228n, 244, 277; Matteo di Nic- 302, 303, 307n; Tommaso di Neri, colé, 27; Stefano, 27; Messer Tom- 34, 298n maso di Duccio, 27, 30, 143, 144n, Delli, Niccolé, pork butcher, 300

147 depression, business, 6-8, 15, 110, 187,

Corso di Ser Vita, Ser, 165 193, 194-97, 392. See also companies, Cortigiani, family, see Visdomini business Council of the Commune, 61, 135n, Deti, Ormanozzo, 172

162, 217, 246n, 370 Diect della Liberta, 59n, 255

Council of the Popolo, 61, 135n, 162, Dietaiuti, Tommaso, 147 171, 213, 217, 245, 246n, 247, 262, Dietsalvi, family, 22

306, 3I19n Dini, Giovanni, druggist, 299, 341,

Covoni, family, 31, 125-26, 205, 341n, 379, 382, 384n

418

INDEX

Dini, Tellino, ironmonger, 162, 164, 63; significance in communal poli-

178n, 224n, 235n tics, 390-95. See also foreign policy;

divieto, 67-68, 163, 167, 209-10, 212-13, oligarchic faction; Parte Guelfa; 216, 217, 220, 358. See also offices popular faction

Divine Comedy, 52n, 58, 59n Faenza, 278

Dolcibene, Valeriano, 24, 127n Falconieri, Tuccio, 204n

Domenici, Jacopo, 211n famine, 9, 84, 95, 195, 197-98, 282-83,

Domenico, shoemaker, 343n 392

Domenico da Certaldo, Ser, 129 Fano, 12 Domenico da Peccioli, Fra, 304n . Fantoni, Marco, 374n Donati, family, 35, 185; Corso di Mes- Federighi, Cino, 350 ser Amerigo, 113; Messer Manno, Fei, Cambio di Arrigo, 24n 156n; Pazzino, 156n; Piero, 341; Feo di Guido, stonemason, 189 Simone di Francesco, 207; Messer Feo di Piero, armorer, 263n

Tassino, 305 Fermo, 313n

Donnini, Domenico di Sandro, 73, 74, Ferrantini, Piero, 191

3370; Donnino, 332n Ferrara, 140, 176, 181, 232, 239, 253

Ducci, Duccio di Giovanni, 214n Ferrucci, Leonardo, 168n; Piero di

Duranti, Francesco, 110, r11n Tuccio, 78

Durfort, Astorre, 141 Fiesole, 120n, 304 Filicaia, Manetto da, 383n

Edward III, king of England, 6 Filippo di Spinello da Mosciano, 41 Eight (Otto di balia), 293-99, 319-20, Filippo d’Ugo, druggist, 321 375» 379, 330; 331, 332; 333, 3372, Firenze di Panze, shoemaker, 218n, 341, 353, 358, 375, 386, 393. See also yyy

war, Florentine, against papacy Firenzuola, district of, 79 England, 13, 37, 194, 291, 311 Firidolfi, family, 199, 204n. See also

Estaing, Pierre d’, cardinal archbishop Ricasoli

of Bourges, vicar-general in Bologna, Flagellanti, 321

2490, 273, 275, 277n, 279n, 280n, Flanders, county of, 311

281 Folchi, family, 37n, 39; Margherita di

Este, Niccolé d’, marquis of Ferrara, Bernardo, 37

2720, 285n Foraboschi, family, 36; Ormanno, 207, estimo, See sega 340n executor of the Ordinances of Justice, forced loans, see prestanze 53-54, 61, 201, 345. See also justice foreign policy, crisis of Lucca war, 4-5;

F aes Francesco, wineseller, 120, mas Pranciplss von 6: 083 done factions (sette), 69, 291; origins of, with wicca, 750, 268-69, 273-745 re86, 131-32; sources of discord, 8¥- ations WIED Papacy, 132-35, 140-42, 104, 132; growth after 1350, 124-25; 173-80, 223-37, 240-42, 265-96, 297-

composition of, 125-28, 202-6; op- 337; relations with Siena, 140, 257, posed by moderates, 151-52; quarrels 269, 273-74 276, 351-525 35393 reover foreign policy, 143-45, 172-83, lations with Perugia, 140-42; with 188-89, 221-43, 266, 272-76; quarrels the Malatesta, 141n, 175; with over internal issues, 183-84, 244-65; Charles IV, 142, 236-38; with Naples, reflected in violence, 198-200; reflected 143-47, 241; with Hungary, 143-45,

in tamburazione, 200-2; legal aboli- 226, 241, 276; with the Gonzaga, tion of, 255, 258; in papal war, 297- 144; with the Visconti, 181-83, 228300, 304-8, 318-26, 328, 336-51, 357- 29, -234-41, 204, 353-55; with the

419

INDEX

Carrara, 225-26, 241; Florentine op- 205-6; involved in election scandals, position to aggressive foreign policy, 212-13; role in the papal war, 294252, 254-56; Florentine hegemony 95, 297-300, 329. See also popular in Tuscany, 266, 268-69, 285-86; re- faction lations with Pisa, 268, 293-94; crisis Gerard du Puy, abbot of Marmoutiers, in papal relations, 290-96; war with vicar-general in Perugia, 276, 277, the papacy, 297-337. See also oli- 278, 280, 283, 294, 296n, 305 garchic faction; papacy; popular fac- Geri di Chele, innkeeper, 293n, 297

tion; war(s) Florentine Germany, 10, 14, 150, 302

Forli, 313n Gherardi, Benedetto, 107

France, 6, 7, 10, 14, 37, 228, 291, 311 Gherardini, family, 32, 45, 80n, 113,

Francesco, priest, 8on 149, 185; Carlo di Baldovinetto, Francesco da Capallo, Messer, 273, 274 114n; Messer Guelfo, 165, 230; Pel-

Francesco di Ser Donato, druggist, 341 liccia, 187n; Piero di Cacciatino, Francesco di Giovanni, 12In, 3447n 214n Francesco di Messer Guido di Ser Gri- Ghibelline legislation, of 1347, 117-

mante, 32In 20; of 1354, 161-63; of 1358, 162n,

Francesco di Lapo, cloth worker, rro 165-70; of I 367, 214-21; Parte’s ef-

Francesco di Pipino, tailor, 332n forts to reinforce, 2455 repeal of,

Francesco di Zanobi, 8on 371. See also Ghibellinism; GuelfFraticelli, 55, 303, 389, 390n ism; Parte Guelfa Fregoso, Domenico, doge of Genoa, Ghibellinism, . r08n, 112, 1130, 163,

288, 2893 Jacopo, 289 164; as an issue in communal poll-

Frescobaldi, family, 6, 25, 30n, 36, 38, tics, 87-89, 117-20, 159-72, 184-85, 190-92, 201-2, 206-11, 214-21, 263n,

153m, 185; Messer Berto, 38, 1290, 319, 337, 345-51, 371, 378. See also 164n;3 Messer Bindo, 176; Giovanni, Guelfism: Parte Guelfa

385 Ippolito, 155 Ghiberti, Geri, 275

Fr iuli, 225 ; Ghinazzi, Tosco, 190n

furriers’ guild, 367 Giachimono di Ghoccio, 373n Giandonati, family, 156n; Bernardo, Gambacorti, Piero, of Pisa, 294, 324 63n; Jacopo, 20n; Lodovico, 54n

Gamberello di Piero, 19on Gianfigliazzi, family, 156n; Messer

Garfagnana, 292n Giovanni, 20n; Messer Luigi, 155n, Gavacciani, Jacopo, 73, 240, 251, 252n 235n

Genoa, 44, 229, 241n, 288, 311 Giani, Gherardino di Niccold Gherargente nuova, 27, 50; economic status, dini, 79, 82, 301, 308, 316 20-24; definition of, 21, 40-45; hostili- Gino da Calenzano, Ser, 108 ty toward patriciate, 53-56; political Gino de Goiano, 8on program, 87-90, 260, 388; political Giorgio da Barberino, 342

role, 105-7, 116-25, 159-60, 214, Giotto, 387n 216; hostility toward magnates, 114- Giovanni, priest, 158 15, 156; opposition to church, 135- Giovanni, Ser, 278

38; views on foreign policy, 147, Giovanni dalle Celle, Vallambrosan 242-43, 294-95; opposition to Ghibel- _— hermit, 47n, 301, 302n, 303, 307n

line legislation, 161-63; convicted as Giovanni di Ser Dato, 298n Ghibellines, 169; conflict with oli- Giovanni di Ser Donato, blacksmith,

garchic faction, 165, 197, 216, 230, 343n 262, 264-65; among the ammoniti, Giovanni di Ser Fruosino, Messer, 277-

190, 263, 340; in popular faction, 78

420

INDEX

Giovanni di Mone, graindealer, 168n, 37, 265-81, 294-96, 324. See also

299, 382, 389n Ghibellinism; Parte Guelfa

Giovanni di Ser Rucco, 341 Guglielmi, Betto, 188n

Giovanni di Vite, armor maker, 213n Guglielmi, Giovanni, 21n Giraldi, Cristoforo, 347n; Giraldo, Guglielmo di Feo, 379

361-62, 363, 371, 383n Guicciardini, family, 30, 31n, 125, 348; Girolami, Giovanni, 168, 169 Jacopo, 63n; Luigi, 375, 381; Piero Giugni, Filippo, 168n; Giovanni, 357n; di Gino, 31, 201n; Tuccio, r19n

Niccolé, 275n, 298n, 359n Guidetti, Tommaso, 177n, 208, 210n

Goggio, Giovanni, 41 Guidi, Angelo, 1gon

Gonzaga, Filippino, lord of Mantua, Guidi, Giovanni di Matteo, 24n

144 Guido of Boulogne, cardinal, imperial

Goro di Ser Grifo, Ser, 347n vicar in Lucca, 280n

grandi, see magnates guild of the popolo minuto, 383, 395 Gratini, Bencivenni, tanner, 23n guilds, 107, 255n, 388, 393; matricula-

Gregorio, Ser, notary, 337n tion in, 11-12, 23, 25-26; communal Gregory XI, pope, 230, 267, 270, 271, policy toward, 96-99, 152; role in 272, 276-77, 279, 282-85, 286n, 289, Ciompi revolution, 367-69, 375-77. 294, 299, 300, 30IN, 305n, 308-12, See also artefict; artt minort

317, 318, 324-27, 328n, 320-33, 335, ; 352, 354, 355, 356, 357. See also Hapspurgs family, 225, 241; Rudolf of,

papacys war, Florentine, with papa- Ha a d, Sir John, 85, 227, 229, Grimoard, Anglic, cardinal bishop of 239, 286, 287, 288, 290, 291, 295; Albano, vicar-general in Bologna 296, 300, 304, 3175 327

237n, 25 : , Henry Vil, emperor, 74, 88-89, 120,

Guadagni, family, 153n, 166n, 368; 109, 343, 347) 34

Migliore, 125, 128, 166, 203n, 260n, Hungary, 13, 140, 247, 311

297N, 323, 339, 368, 383n, 385 Imola, 291 Gualberti, Ser Jacopo di Ser Gherardo, Infanghati, Uberto, 118, 160, 185, I90n

gon, 115 innkeepers’ guild, 55, 90

Guardi, company, 249 Innocent VI, pope, 157, 158, 159, 173n, Guasconi, family, 26, 34, 149n; Biagio, 182 222n, 275n, 283n, 285n, 340, 381n; Inquisitor of Tuscany, 133-34, 1370,

Bindo, 235n I4I, 3370, 354

Guazza, Recco di Guido, 207, 325n, Isacchi, Salvestro, 178n, I90n

354, 356n Ischia, Andrea dell’, 118, 185, 187

Gucci, family, 42; Alessandro di Bene- Itro, Jacopo de, archbishop of Otranto,

detto, 42, 383n; Francesco di Bene- 286-87, 289, 296 de tto; 4, 3 83n Gennaio, 4? Gior- Jacopo di Bernardo, 214n, 347n gio di Guccio, 303; Guccio di Dino, Jacopo di Bonafede, 350 60, 205, 299, 303n, 314; Manetto di Jacopo di Paolo, 346n, 347

Ser Riccardo, 214n , _. Jacopo di Riccio, blacksmith, 23n Guelfism, as part of Florentine politi- Joanna, queen of Naples, 12, 91n, 143, cal tradition, 4, 74, 101-4, 132, 265, 144, 145, 223, 232, 236n, 241n, 305n, 346-51, 393; as issue in internal polli- 309n, 3330

tics, 87-88, 19-92, 201-2, 206-21, John XXII, pope, 303 324-25, 336-51; as issue in foreign justice, administration of, 62-64, 110-11, policy, 140-42, 145-47, 173-77, 224- 130-31, 371, 383-84

42]

INDEX

Lana guild, 11, 15, 23, 25n, 42, 48, 54, Machiavelli, chronicler, 314, 323, 327, 91, 97, III, 195, 204n, 205, 257n, 380, 328, 331, 338, 339, 356, 360 | 385, 389n. See also woolen cloth in- Machiavelli, family, 26, 30, 31n, 30,

dustry 113, 125, 306; Buoninsegna, 306n, 180, 181 Giovanni di Chiovo, r14n

Landau, Count, 151, 176, 177, 178, 179, 339, 368; Filippo, 122n, 178, 182n;

Landucci, Ser, 98n Macigni, Zanobi, 250, 362n Lanfredini, Filippo, 168n; Giovanni, Maffeo di Vanni, 293n, 297

163 Magalotti, family, 26, 125, 128, 203n;

-Lapi, Bardo, rgon Bese di Guido, 128, 337, 339, 340n,

Lapo, Ser, 108 342, 343, 361n, 362n, 368n; Filippo, Lapo di Cione, 109 147, 148, 151, 152, 164n, 172, 179n,

Lapo di Lorenzo, pork butcher, 348n 184; Giovanni di Francesco, 63n, 128,

Latium, 300 199, 250, 256, 260n, 297n, 298n, 299;

League against papacy, establishment, Tommaso di Filippo, ror 285-86, 293, 294; papal efforts magnates (magnati), (grandi), 29, 50, against, 310, 327; Florentine promo- 51, 86, 363, 393; in communal polition of, 312-13, 337, 352-53; oligar- tics, 6-8, 87, 185-87, 298; families of, chic attack upon, 333-35, 351-52. See 29-34; in offices, 70, 71, 154, 156, 213,

also papacy; war, Florentine, against 217, 220, 244-45, 364-65, 370; peti-

papacy tions for popolano status, 81-82, 155-

Lemmo di Ser Cambi, druggist, 17n 56; opposition to regime, 111-14,

Lézat, abbot of, see Berengar, abbot of 198-200, 259-60, 326; communal poli-

Lézat cy toward, 114-16, 153-56, 245, 264,

Liguria, 229 364-65; delinquent popolani named

Limoges, cardinal of, 311 as, 129-30, 261-62, 322-24, 359-60; in

Lippi, Nardo, 213n oligarchic faction, 203-4, 339-40; as Lippi, Roggerio, 41, 126 ammoniti, 204n, 340; legislation Lippo di Ser Giovanni, 214n against, 245, 264, 364-65. See also

Litius, Messer, papal collector, 137n patriciate Lodovico di Banco di Ser Bartolo, Majorca, 44 | !

326n, 383n Malatesta, of Rimini, Galeatto, 175, Loggia dei Lancei, 315n 223n Lodovico di Matteo, 168 | 331n; Malatesta, r41n; Pandolfo, 73, Lombardy, 10, 113n, 150, 164, 176, Malefici, Niccold, 49 |

181, 234n, 239, 240, 252, 276, 282, Malefici, Paolo, 340 ,

287, 347 Malegonelle, Neri di Filippo, 127; Nic-

Lorenzo di Messer Dino, 199, 344 cold, 259, 323n

Lottini, Lorenzo, 348 Mancini, family, 31n, 153n; Bardo, 3309, Louis the Bavarian, emperor, 109 340n Louis, king of Hungary, gin, 116, 143, Mangioni, family, 22, 26, 131, 340; 145, 225, 226, 239, 241, 272n, 276 Andrea di Lippozzo, 251; Carlo di

Louis of Taranto, 143, 144 Francesco, 23n; Cipriano di LippozLow Countries, 194, 195n ZO, 23n; Francesco di Lapo, 17n; Lucca, 5, 75n, 92, 163, 236, 238, 240, Jacopo di Schiatta, 367n 268, 269, 273, 274, 286, 294n, 309n, Manieri, family, 155n

310n Manieri di Jacopo, glassmaker, 348

Luca di Nanni, 348n, 350 Mannelli, family, 38, 82, r49n, 156, 202,

Lunigiana, 113n, 272 342, 348, 368; Amaretto, 156, 346n, Luto, saddlemaker, 298n 350; Amio, 82n; Jacopo, 82n; Nic422

INDEX

colo di Francesco, 201; Zanobi, 81, lution, 358, 363-66, 367n, 368n, 377n,

82 379, 381, 383, 384n, 386n, 389

Manno di Boccaccio di Messer Ardo- Mercato Vecchio, 221

vino, 343, 345n, 348n Mercanzia, 219, 255n, 256, 374 Manovelli, Giovanni di Tedici, 78, 213n Messina, Straits of, 242

Mantua, 232 Michele di Brunaccio, 214n Marches, 174, 275n, 283, 285, 289, Michele di Jacopo, armor maker, 219 353n Milan, 84, 146, 176, 181, 222n, 228, 234,

Marseilles, 13 236, 237, 239, 285n

Marsili, Filippo di Jacopo, 54, 360n; Musstve records, 172, 174, 354n Luigi, Augustinian humanist, 195n, Monachi, Niccolé di Ser Ventura, 60,

301, 302, 303. 207-8, 210n, 214, 316 maker, 41n, 68 Francesco, 21n, 199

Martelli, family, 41n; Roberto, sword- Monaldi, Baldiccione, 196n; Guido di

Martini, Antonio, butcher, 68, 168n, Montaperti, battle of, 28

291 Monte, 19-20, 26, 60, 81, 92, 95, 137,

Martini, Francesco, 361, 362, 363, 371, 252n, 384, 388

383n Monte di Lippo, 108 Matteo di Ser Giovanni da Barberino, Montepulciano, 281 346-47 . Montereggi, 42 Mazza, armorer, 342 Montferrat, marquis of, 239

Maso, carpenter, 47n Montecarelli, 42 Mazza di Andrea, 383n Montpellier, 13

Mazzei, Ser Lapo, 47-48, 303 Morelli, family, 42, 43n, 293, 344; Mazzetti, Giovanni, 190n; Manetto, Bernardo di Giovanni, 43n; Calan-

168, 169 dro, 10, 42n; Morello di Giraldo, 42n;

Medici family, 34, 35, 45n, 50N, 51, 52, Giovanni di Paolo, author of Ricord1,

64, 68, 125, 126n, 128, 129, 139n, 42-43, 44n, 82, 93n, 320, 344; Paolo, T49n, 203, 363; Africhello di Messer 10, 42n, Alamanno, 261, 363; Andrea di Mes- Moriale, Fra, leader of armed comser Alamanno, 64n, 130; Bartolo- pany, 131n, I149n, 151 meo, 186; Foligno di Conte, 51, 99n, Mozzi, family, 23n, '125, r199n, 34In, 258n, 331, 332, 392; Francesco di Bic- 342, 348; Giovanni di Luigi, 177n, ci, 26n; Messer Giovanni, 189n, I90n; 217N, 250, 256, 322N, 341, 371, 383n; Giovanni di Bicci, 26n, 45; Giovan- Luigi, 115, 177, 179N, 225N; Tom-

ni di Cambio, 26, 51; Giovanni di maso di Luigi, 199 Conte, 51, 99n; Jacopo di Bartolo- Mugello, 42, 93n, 292n meo, 385n; Lorenzo the Magnificent, Mugnaio di Recco da Ghiaceto, 41 80; Michele di Messer Alamanno,

30; Niccols di Messer Giovanni, Naples, city, 24n, 41, 9In, 140, 145, 108n; Vieri di Cambio, 26, 51, 204, 241n, 311; kingdom of, 7, 143, 144,

340, 343n 145, 146, 147, 181, 226, 241. See also Salvestro di Messer Alamanno: 261, Joanna, queen of Naples 362; wealth, 51; social status, 51, 68, Narni, bishop of, 296n 109; political views, 153, 154, 182n, Navarre, 311 218, 225n, 234n, 239, 271-72, 317, Neri, goldsmith, 188n 318n, 325n, 301; political activities, Neri, Maso, ropemaker, 227, 341, 358n, 186, 260, 299, 363-65; leader of popu- 379, 383n lar faction, 206, 221, 250, 256, 367n, Nerli, family, 6, 155; Carlo di Naddo, 368n, 391, 394; role in Ciompi revo- 156n

423

INDEX

Neroccio di Bartolomeo, 49 381. See also Albizzi; Guelfism;

Nicco di Ser Lapo, 348n Parte Guelfa

Niccolo, friar, 292n, 293 Orcagna, Ign

Niccolo di Andrea, 213n Ordelaff, Francesco, lord of Forli and Niccolo di Ser Ciuto da Figline, Ser, Cesena, 175

169, 345n Ordinances of Justice, 58, 114-15, 153-

Niccolé di Giovanni, 78n 54, 259, 364

Niccold di Tieri, blacksmith, 23n Orlandi, Orlando, 69 |

Nigi, Ser Manno, 188n Orlandini, Matteo, 78n; Nozo, 78n;

Nimes, 13 Orlandino, 78n

Noellet, Guilliaume, cardinal deacon, Or San Michele, 4, 19n, 97n, 197, 385 vicar-general in Bologna, 280, 282n, Orvieto, 230, 308, 326n 285, 286, 287, 290, 292, 294n, 296, Otranto, archbishop of, see Itro, Jacopo

305n de

Nucci, Cambio, druggist, 118n Otto di balia, see Eight Nuccio di Matteo, shieldmaker, 298n Otto di Guardia, 59 Nuto di Citta di Castello, Ser, 380,

347 :

385, 386n Paccini, Piero di Piero, coppersmith,

offices, communal, description of, 52- Padua, I 40, 176, 181, 226, 232, 239, 241,

53, 59-66, 393; selection to, 70-71; 253, 370n competition for, 77-79, 87; benefits Pagnini, Pagno di Chele, 213n of, 80-83; personnel in, 105-7, 297- Pagolo del Bodda, 379 300; malfeasance in, 114, 193n; and Pagolo di Ser Guido, wool shearer, gente nuova, 118-19, 122-23, 159-60, 368n, 376n 212, 297-300; and oligarchic faction, Palarcioni, Agnolo, 342 165, 167, 370; and the Ciompi, 376- Palmieri, Simone, 341 “8. See also ammonizione; divieto; Panciatichi, Bartolomeo, 21n

factions Pantaleoni, family, 21n; Francesco di

Oleggio, Giovanni d’, lord of Bologna, Tani, 20; Niccolé, 199n; Piero di

141, 176, 186 | Tani, 20

oligarchic faction, origin, composition Panzano, family, 35n, 199; Luca di and character, 87-90, 124-29, 202-5, Totto, 35, 71, 128, 184. See also

330-40, 390-91; favors Ghibelline Ricasoli legislation, 160-61, 190-92; conflict Paolo delle Recchiate, second-hand with popular faction, 198-202, 207- clothier, 202 13, 217-22, 250-56, 259-60, 264, 322- Paolo di Giusto, 347n 24, 336-51, 359-60; favors papal al- Paolo di Ser Pace da Certaldo, 16, 43n, liance, 222n, 224-29, 231-36, 241-44, 72 274-76; opposition to Visconti, 237- papacy, relations with commune, 13240; favors Guelf foreign policy, 241- 34, 139-42, 157-59, 173-80, 221-43, 43; favors legislation in support of 265-95, 3090, 3II-I2, 324-25, 329-313

Parte, 245-47; joined by Ricci, 248- conflict with commune on internal 50; influence of leaders in foreign issues, 132-33, 157-59; over external affairs, 256-57; status during papal issues, 141-42, 178-80, 265-95; rewar, 297-99, 305-06, 392; opposition covery of papal states, 173-80; efforts

to papal war, 306-07, 319-21, 325-26, to conclude Florentine alliance 328, 329, 332-34; inaugurates Guelf against Visconti, 221-29, 232-37, 271terror, 336-51, 356-57; target of rev- 72; return to Rome, 221-22, 226-209, olutionary violence, 367-68, 370, 375, 231-32, 309-10; disclaims intentions

424

INDEX

of aggrandizement in Tuscany, 267, 138-39; and foreign policy, 146-47; 273-74; assessment of papal power among the ammoniti, 190, 341-42; and policy in Italy, 281, 295-96; and the factions, 202-6, 250-53, 364 Florentine denunciations of, 300-4; Pazzi, family, 23n, 25, 34, 35n, 113, offensive against Florence, 309-11, 114, 125, 185, 206, 340, 368; Andrea, 326-27, 329-30; peace negotiations 8on; Antonio, 343n; Bertramino, 113; with Florence, 309, 311-12, 324-25, Corrado, 230; Francesco di Ghinoz329-31, 379n. See also church, Flor- ZO, 113; Messer Geri, 113, 161, 165, entine; Guelfism; papal states; war, 214, 230, 235n; Jacopo, 370

Florentine, against papacy Pepoli, of Bologna, 141 . papal states, Albornoz’ campaign for Perini, Giovanni di Guido, 21n, 127n recovery of, 159, 173-75; Florentine Perugia, 12, 140, 175n, 236n, 242, 257, patricians obtain offices in, 229-30, 269, 270, 275n, 278n, 279n, 281, 296n, 249; opposition to Urban VI, 231-32; 305, 308, 310, 313, 329, 334, 337, rebellion in 1375, 265, 308-9; Floren- 351, 352, 353n tine opposition to expansion of, 266- Peruzzi, family, 4, 6, 17, 23n, 24, 31, 69; Florentine suspicion of papal AIN, 51N, 123, 139N, 203, 205n, 263; officials in, 276-79. See also Albor- company, 4, 6, 8, 17; Bartolomeo,

noz; Estaing, Pierre d’; Gerard du 325; Benedetto, 339; Francesco di

Puy; Grimoard; papacy Giovanni, 199; Gherardo, 138n;

Pape, Piero, 115 Simone di Rinieri, 18, 73, 89n, 148, Parenti, family, 263n; Giovanni di 163, 173, 176, 189n, 203n, 207, 217n,

Piero, 69, 263n, 323-24 224, 225N, 235, 250, 253, 276n, 290, Parigi, Tommaso di Piero, 24, 348n 306, 325, 327, 339, 353n, 381

Paris, 302 Pescara, 12 Parte Guelfa, 31-32, 34, 57, 98, 365, 370; Pescia, castle of, 79

origins of, 99; power and influence, petitions, private, 80; magnate, 81-82, 99-100; organization, 100; principles 154-56; against delinquent popolant, and activities, 101-4; campaign 129-30, 261-62, 322-24, 359-60 against Ghibellines, 117-20, 165-67, Petrarch, 302 170-72, 215-19, 263-64, 321-25, 336-51, Petriboni, Piero, 126, 219, 263, 383n;

361-63; reform of, 170, 206-21, 263, Ubaldino di Fastello, 24n 360-61; criticism of, 213-14, 247, 260n, Philip VI, king of France, 10

306, 348-51, 358-60; opposition to Piedmont, 14 papal war, 321-25, 336-51; role in Pieri, Ser Benozzo, 206 1378 crisis, 361-63, 366-67, 369-70, Piero, Ser, of Prato, 292, 293

375-77 Piero d’Aquila, Inquisitor of Tuscany, captains: 100, 117-19, 139n, 161, 133, 134, 138, 139 162n, 165-69, 171, 172, 179, 185, 191- Piero di Fronte, 128, 368 92, 203n, 207-8, 210-11, 213, 215, 217- Piero di Ser Grifo, Ser, 60, 383, 386n 20, 245-47, 255n, 263, 27In, 307N, 323, Piero di Guccio, 106

325, 333, 336 Piero di Lippo, old-clothes dealer, 23n

Passavanti, Zato, 69, 189n Pietrabuona, 188

patriciate, economic activity of, 24-27; Pigli, Geri, 81 definition of, 28-29; identification of Pini, Ser Guglielmo di Ser Francesco,

families, 29-35; outlook, 35-40, 87, rrgn 103, 387; hostility toward lower Pini, Luigi, 213n classes, 50, 52-53, 159, 165; political Pisa, 10, 15, 18n, 24, gon, 41, 44, 66, role, 105-7, III-14, 117-23, 197, 260- = 73, 75, 76n, 78n, 54, 90, 93, 94, 95n,

62; and the Florentine church, 135, g7N, II2, I13n, 148, 150, 151, 163,

425

INDEX

187-89, 193, 197, 204n, 205n, 223, Portugal, 311 228, 229, 236, 240, 268, 286, 294, 295, Prague, 142, 165

373n. See also war, Florentine, Prato, 44, 45, 145, 281, 292, 296n, 300

against Pisa prestanze, 21n, 31-34, 48, 82, 92, 147,

Pistoia, 8, 82n, 151, 292n, 298n 195-96, I97n, 198, 201-2, 204n, 205, Pitt, Buonaccorso, chronicler, 303, 252n, 315-16, 340n, 383, 388 311; Ciore, 17n; Giovanni di Neri, proscriptions, see ammonizione 254n, 256n; Neri, 17n, 78; Piero di Provence, 230

Ciore, 39 Prussia, 311n

plague, of 1340, 5; of 1347, 9; of 1348, Pucci, Antonio, poet, 14n, 317n Q, II, 12, 14, 16, 18, 84, 120, 123, 150, Pulci, family, 23n, 25, 32; Adoardo,

347, 387; of 1363, 10, 84, 387; of 205, 339, 343, 366, 370

1374, 84, 282, 387, 392 Puy, Gerard du, see Gerard du Puy podesta, 61, 63n, 82n, 113, 130-31,

168, 187, 341 Quaratesi (Da Quarata), family, 26, Ravenna, 313n di Castello, 30n; Bernardo di Cino,

Polenta, Messer Guido da, lord of 30, 43, 126, 348, 349, 391; Bernardo

Popoleschi, see Tornaquinci 76n; Castello, 122n; Luigi, 299;

popolo minuto, 18, 86, 150, 188-89, 388; Sandro di Simone, 30n, 176, 182, definition of, 48-49; hostility toward 199, 200, 205, 216, 221, 223n, 226, patriciate, 54-56; hostility toward 235, 242, 317; Vanni di Simone, 30n, regime, 107-11; political passivity 299, 315n, 316n, 328n, 334 after 1348, 123, 152; involvement in

1368 riot, 197-98; in June, 1378, dis- Raffacani, family, 166n; Giovanni, orders, 367-69; in July, 1378 revolu- 149n, 164n; Massaiozzo, 166 tion, 379-86; analysis of revolution- Raimondo da Barberino, 342

ary role, 388-89 Raimondo of Capua, Fra, 312n, 336 popular faction, origin and objectives, Regno, see Naples, kingdom of 87-90, 124-29, 301; attitudes on Renzi, Jacopo, 24n, 41, 126

foreign policy, 147, 164, 172-83, 189, revolution of 1343, 8, 105, 107, 114 222n, 224-28, 232-36, 237, 241-43, revolution of 1378, see Ciompi revolu-

266-67, 270-73, 293-95, 320, 336-37, tion 353-54, 356; opinions on Ghibelline Ricasoli, family, 25, 33, 36, 138, 146, issue, 160-61, 184, 207-12; involve- 204n, 205n; Bettino, 21n, 33n, r9g9n, ment in 1360 conspiracy, 186; con- 204, 205N, 230n, 343, 362, 363, 365,

flict with oligarchic faction, 198- 304; Messer Bindaccio, 17n, 205n; 202, 207-12, 217-21, 244-46, 251-54, Goro, 196n; Lapo, 230 260-62, 364-66; composition of, 205- Ricchi, Schiatta, 242 6; opposition to papal alliance, 224- Ricci, family, 26, 33, 43, 68, 124, 125, 28, 232-36; favors isolationist foreign 160, 205, 248, 249, 250, 253, 254, 256, policy, 241-43; defection of the Ricci, 260, 277, 298, 370; Andrea, 201, 254,

248-51; opposition to papal expan- 256; Bernardo, 81n; Guglielmo, sion, 266-67, 270-73, 293-95; domin- 249n; Giorgio, 180, 181, 248, 253, ant role during papal war, 297-300; 254n; Messer Giovanni, 94, 189n, opposition to peace with papacy, 3209, 205N, 211n, 233, 248, 255; Gucciozzo

336-37, 353-54, 356. See also Ricci di Ardingho, 34n, 127, 170n, 172, population, of Florence, 3, 9, 315n 248; Pagolo, 199n; Rosso di Riccardo, Por San Maria guild, 13, 21, 23, 25n, 34, 81n, 115, 179N, 205N, 227, 230,

97, 201, 363 248, 249, 250, 255, 362n, 380; Salves-

Portinari, Adoardo, 63n tro, 81n 426

INDEX

Uguccione: 34, 247; political 184n, 205, 211%, 216, 217n, 221, 225n, views, 73, 153, 164, I90n, 209, 215n, 226, 250; Filippo, 299; Paolo di 216, 218, 224, 225n, 226, 233, 237n, Michele, 39; Remigio di Andrea, 238, 239, 240n, 241n, 248, 254n, 267, 218n, 364 270, 396; business activities, 205n, Rosini, Giunta, 21n 249; leader of popular faction, 207-9, Rossi, family, 6, 8, 30, 38, 80n, 114, 211, 218, 221, 226, 365n; defects 155, 185, 339; Barna, 155n; Giovanni

from popular faction, 248-50, 253; di Messer Pino, 204n; Guerrieri, suspension from office, 255; restored 370; Jacopo di Messer Porcello, 155n;

to office by Ciompi, 382 Lapo, 183, r90n; Messer Nofri, 156n, Ricco di Taldo, coppersmith, 212, 219, 204n; Messer Pino, 149n, 187n; Ro-

221 berto di Messer Barone, 155n; Si-

richiestt, 71, 89-90, 211, 216, 251, 333 mone di Messer Porcello, 155n; Tom-

Ricoveri, family, 24N; Niccold, 290; maso, 156n

Piero di Bonaventura, 24n Rosso, Bernarduolo, 186 Ridolfi, family, 125, 203; Antonio, Rosso, Salvestro, 186 297N, 323, 334, 339, 381, 383n; Bar- Rucellai, family, 20, 24, 26, 32, 55, 68,

tolomeo di Niccolo, 199n, 261, 278; 107, 108, 125, 129, 139, 203, 208, Fecino di Biagio, 63n; Jacopo, 164n; 340; Giovanni di Lorenzo, 8on; Niccold di Cione, 107, 1770; Schiatta, Lapo di Vanni, 367n; Niccold, 122n;

124; Uberto di Schiatta, 330n Paolo di Bingieri, 332n

Rifr edi, 290 Rudolf of Hapsburg, see Hapsburg, Rimbaldesi, family, 126n, r99n, 341n, Rudolf of 364; Bernardo, 199; Niccolo, 68, 69, Ruspi, Arnoldo, 196n; Messer Lapo, 125, 177; ‘TO, 205; 208, 2540, 256n, 2In

Reis eo ee 202 | Rustico, a purse maker, 39

Rinaldi, Giovanni, rgon Rinaldo da Romena, Messer, 226n Sabina, cardinal, 133, 134, 13000 Rinuccini, family, 31, 72, 126n, 364, Sacchetti, family, 24n; Antonio di

368 , 328n

301; company, 174; Francesco, 21n, Forese, 63n; Franco, 16, 52, 62, 296n,

31n, 205, 298n, 318, 341; Niccolo, 3o1n; Jacopo di Piero, 24n, 3170,

Risaliti, family, 26, 51n Saggina, Lippo Doni del, 21n Ristoro di Cione, stonemason, 168n, S. Barnaba, church of, 382, 384

347 | S. Catherine of Siena, 312n, 332, 333,

Robert, cardinal, of Geneva, 327n 336 Robert, king of Naples, 103, 143 S. Croce, quarter of, 31, 49, 67, 69, Rocchi, Francesco di Ser Arrigo, 76n 110, 128, 197, 277, 379; monks of, Rodolfo da Camerino, see Camerino, 1573 church of, 314

Rodolfo da S. Frediano, parish of, 259

Romagna, 174, 177, 178, r9gn, 275n, S. Gimignano, 74, 337n

285, 289, 310, 347 S. Giorgio, church of, 40

Rome, 3, 120, 222, 226, 228, 229, 231, S. Giovanni, quarter of, 32n, 33, 34, 60, 232, 233, 234, 236, 267, 271, 282, 310n, 340, 358n, 379 311, 324, 326, 327, 354, 355, 370n S. John the Baptist, feast of, 363 Romiti degli Agnoli, convent of the, §S. Lorenzo, parish of, 110, 379; church

368 of, 382

Rondinelli, family, 34, 125n, 126n, S. Marco, monastery of, 108 391; Andrea di Veri, 96n, rorn, 125, S. Maria Bertelde, parish of, 42

427

INDEX

S. Maria Novella, church of, 84; mon- 60; of 1364, 213n; of 1367, 213. See

astery of, on, 32, 139n; quarter of, also offices IQN, 20, 21, 22, 32-33, 69, 125n, 200n, sega, 21n, 6on, 93n, 151, 204n

339 Segna di Nigi, 109 S. Miniato, 102, 195n, 200, 201, 222, Serragli, family, 26; Banchello di Ser 236, 239, 240, 267; revolt of (1360- Belcaro, 113, 204n; Ser Belcaro, 247n;

70), 222, 236, 238, 239, 267 Bonaiuto, 204, 246, 247n, 260, 330,

S. Paolo, parish of, 107 340, 343n, 370; Piero di Silvo, 214n S. Piero Maggiore, parish of, 379 Serravale, castle of, 79

S. Piero Scheraggio, 303n sette, see factions |

S. Prisca, cardinal of, 133n Sicily, 13

S. Reparata, cathedral church of, 77 Siena, 10, 85, 134, 140, 163, 199n,

S. Salvator, church of, 136 236, 242, 257, 267, 269, 273, 276,

3130 3530

San Severino, Messer Bartolomeo de, 286, 290n, 295, 313n, 336n, 351, 352,

S. Spirito, quarter of, 18, 29, 30, 37, Signoria (priorate), 83, 118, 138, 155, 49, 68, 108n, 114, 197, 201, 339, 348, 178, 192, 212, 215, 217, 238, 246, 351, 368, 379, 381, 382n; monastery = 59, 261, 267, 270n, 273, 283, 284,

of, togn, 368; church of, 379 285, 286, 289, 314, 325, 330, 333, 347,

S. Stefano, church of, 379 356, 364, 365, 360, 374, 376, 380; S. Tommaso, church of, 139n membership in, 22, 38, 41, 43, 52, 81, S. Trinita, monastery of, 277 90, 105, 122, 124, 128, 151, 154, 156Salimbene, family, of Siena, 276 57, 159-60, 169, I90n, I99n, 201, 204,

Salutati, Coluccio, Florentine chancel8. descrip249, 259M, 2907, 321M, 350; descrip lor, 00) Orns 72, 78n, 200N, 231, 300, tion of, 59, 61, 64-66; selection to,

Saivectsi, Ser Paolo, 206 67-693 authority of, 70, 71, 76, 117, soe ; I2I, 129, 161, 218, 245, 263, 360, Salviati, family, 26, 31, 126, 205; Ala- ‘oe of 8. hostil manno, IoIn, roon, 224n; Andrea, 372, 3933 Prestige ot, 77-703 nostulty 205n, 284, 298n, 299, 353n, 395n; toWard, 108, 198, 217-18, 385-86;

Forese, 366; Salvi, 110 political activity of, 130, 134, 144, Salvucci, Lapo, 213n 146, 148, 158, 167, 174, 1775 186,

Sarzana, city, 353, 354, 3553 treaty of, 187 19%, 207, 208, 210, 213, 216, “sn, 142, 176, 227, 234, 238 220, 227, 229, 245, 253, 266, 260, 276, Sassetti, family, 22; Paolo, 81, 373n 288, 293, 323, 331, 353, 373, 381, 385,

Savini, Giovanni di Rucco, 144n, 147 386

Savonarola, Girolamo, 86 Signorini, Cambio, 177 Scala, Mastino della (Scaligeri), lord Siminett,, family, 166n; Bartolo di of Verona, 5 Giovanni, 127, 246, 247; 248, 249; Scali, family, 22, 25, 192, 389n; Giorgio, 339, 368, 383n, 394; Piero dit Gio128, 264, 368, 382, 391n, 394; Guelfo, vanni, 127, 337n; Simone di Ser 192; Jacopo, 314; Vieri, 128, 264 Giovannl, 1270, 166, 219, 220

Scarperia, 172n Simoncino, Ciompi leader, 379, 380, Scelto, Gherarduccio di Lapo dello, 381 38n; Sandro di Zanobi, 38n Simoni, Bonaguida di Jacopo, 213n

scioperati, 26, 340, 377, 301 Sixteen (gonfaloniert delle compag-

Scotland, 311 nie), 50, 74, 76n, 98n, 173, 176, scrutiny, 66-67, 160n, 161n, 212-13, 178, 192, 210, 214, 216, 219, 233, 222, 265, 298n; of 1343, 90, 105; of 266, 274, 278, 316n, 322, 323, 330, 1348, 122; of 1351, 159; of 1354, 159- 337, 338n, 359, 367, 374, 380-81

428

INDEX

Soderini, family, 30, 38, 125, 146; Pagnozzo, 52, 112; Palla di Messer company, 174; Niccolo di Geri, 30, Jacopo, 20n; Messer Pazzino, 21n, 32, 126, 147, 240, 275, 332, 336, 337, 51, 68, 109n, 188n, 189n, Igon, 200, 339, 340N, 354, 359; 368, 383n; Piero, 2090, 214, 215M, 225N, 241, 285n,

298n; Tommaso, 383n 298n, 299, 327, 331N, 334, 340N, 353n;

Soldani, family, 126, 342, 364; Tom- Stefano di Sanze, 63n; Soldo, 106;

maso, 205, 299, 300 Strozza di Rosso, 20n; Tommaso di

Soldanieri, Jacopo di Federigo, 200 Marco, 32, 10rn, 128, 206, 211n, 272, Soldi, Matteo di Federigo, wine mer- 298n, 299, 325, 333n, 364, 384n, chant, 68, 182n, 205, 222n, 256, 332, 389n, 391; Ubertino, 261

337n, 386n , Carlo: 298n; business activities,

Sommaia, Amerigo di Bernardo da, 16n, 20n, 204; wealth, 22, 127, 204,

24n 205, 304n; social status, 32; political

Sozomen, chronicler, 73 opposition to, 66, 189, 193, 370, 383n;

Spain, 14, 311, 314 political views, 115, 178n, 188n, 222n,

Spina, Bernardo di Cecco, 321 224, 225n, 228, 237n, 24In, 324, 325n, Spinelli, Francesco, 128; Niccold, 232 334; leader of oligarchic faction, Spini, family, 23n; Guglielmo, 138n 224, 248-49, 257, 334, 339; arranges Spoleto, city, 352n; duchy of, 275n, reconciliation between Albizzi and

289 Ricci, 248-50; made magnate, 370;

Spugna, Vallambrosan monastery of, exiled, 383n

278n; abbot of, 278 Sulli, Ser Brunaccio, 113n

standard-bearer of justice (gonfalontere della giustizia), 59, 81, 264n, Taddeo di Risalsi, 108

293, 375 tamburazione, 154, 200-2, 278-79, 34558, gin, 157n Tanagli, Giachinotto, 1gon

statute of the captain of the popolo, 51, 394

statute of the podesta, 58 Tarlati, of Arezzo, 112

Stefani, Marchionne, chronicler, 81, taxation, communal, 80, 82, 83, 92-96,

II2, 114, 127, 130, 147, 161, 165, 195-96, 201, 315-19. See also pre170, 185, 186, 198, 203, 207, 213, stanze; sega 234, 244, 247, 249, 251, 253, 260, Tecchini, Niccol6 di Ammannato, 321 261, 264, 275, 277, 304, 314, 320, Tedaldi, Tedaldo, 21n 322, 325, 326, 332, 339, 342, 343, Tigliamochi, family, 43; Durazzino,

344, 350, 363, 368 214n

Stefani, Stefano, 103n, I9o0n Tinghi, Matteo, 311

Stinche, 59, 109, 368, 371 Todi, 231, 232, 305 Stracciabende, Guglielmo, 321n Tolosini, family, 126, 341n, 342, 364;

Strada, Zanobi da, 149n Antonio, 299; Lapo, 341

Strozzi, family, 20, 21, 26, 32, 38, 51, Tommaso di Francesco di Giunta, 214n 68, 125, 128, 129, 139n, 203n, 206, 259, Tornaquinci, family, 22; Domenico di

263n, 298, 340; company, 16n, 174; Manetto, 23n; Giachinotto, 225n; Andrea, 64, 107; Annibaldo, 383n; Giovanni, 64n; Gregorio di PagnozBenedetto di Messer Giovanni, 20n; zo, 156n; Messer Biagio, 19n; NicBindo, 184; Currado, 383n; Gian- colé di Pagnozzo, 76n, 156n; Niccold noZzo, 222n; Jacopo di Ubertino, di Tegghie, 23n; Sandro di Simone,

259; Messer Leonardo di Messer 23n; Simone di Tieri, 23n; Tiero di Giovanni, 20n, 122n; Marco, 153, Francesco, 23n; Tommaso di Piero, 161, 162, 164n, 174, 179n, 299N; 156n

429

INDEX

Tosinghi (Della Tosa), family, 114, Buonaccorso, 37; Messer Donato, 155, 156; Francesco del Boschiere, chronicler, 13n, 18-19, 37, 39, 52-53, 204n, 321; Niccold di Scolaio, 211n; 72, 78, 81, 82, II9, 124, 131, I5I, 150,

Simone, 35, 156n 162, 163n, Igon, 194, 207, 208, 209,

Toulouse, 13 211, 216, 219n, 244, 268, 394; GherTozzi, Filippo, 126 ardo di Filippo, 39; Gherardino di Tratte records, 16-17, 160n, 1gon Piero, 38; Matteo di Gherardino, 81;

Trent, 120 Piccio, 13n Truffe, Zanobi, 24, 127n— Venice, 13, 27, gIn, 311 Tuscany, 5, 8, 44, 72n, 88, ror, ro2n, Venozzi, Giorgio, 137

140, 145, 164, 175, 177, 178, 181, 223, Venture, Andrea di Francesco, 346n 228, 232, 234n, 236, 240, 242, 266-68, Verona, 322

271-76, 279-89, 291-96 Vettori, family, 153n; Messer Paolo, Twelve (dodici buon’uomint), 59, 630, 106, 122n 149, 178n, 192n, 209, 219, 269n, Vico, Giovanni di, prefect of Rome, 270n, 274, 284, 290, 297, 319M, 328, =—- 173, 313

338n, 341, 358, 365, 368 Vigorosi, Francesco, 24, 170n Villani, family of chroniclers, Filippo,

Ubaldini, family, in Apennines, 102, 53, 136, 212; Giovanni, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 112, 229, 272, 275, 281. See also war, 9, 17, 66-67, 86, 114, 116, 117, II9, Florentine, against Ubaldini 122, 130, 134, 135, 136, 138, 139, 1473

Ubaldini, Niccolo, 177n Matteo, 17, 18, 53, 65, 72, 75, 83, 86,

Uberti, family, 348 8on, 131, 136, 137, 142, 145, 149, 150, Ubertini, Maffeo, 350, 351; Ubaldo di 165, 166, 167, 169, 170, 175, 178, 179,

Maffeo, 348n 180, 182, 185, 186, 190, I9I, 200n,

Ugolini, Luca, 185, 187; Piero, 190n 230

Umbria, 283, 284, 353n Villanuzzi, family, 139n

Unganelli, Fruosino, 162 Visconti, of Milan, 75n, 141-42, 146, Urban V, pope, 223-36, 239, 242, 267, 174-76, 178, 181n, 182-83, I95n, 207,

270n, 280n. See also papacy 223, 234, 236, 238-39, 242, 243, 249,

Urban VI, pope, 356, 357 276, 282n, 284, 285n, 286, 290n, 294n,

Urbino, 305n, 3130 300; Ambrogio, 229; Bernabd, lord usury, 4, 136-37 of Milan, 176-77, 181-82, 222-23, 228, Uzzano, company 16n; Giovanni da, 229, 234-41, 253, 271, 272, 274, 282,

Sts 202 201 285, 287, 293, 204, 3130, 3330, 347,

Valdinievole, vicariate of, 122n, 322n 359, 353: 3593 _Giangaleazzo, 396;

> b] Luchino, 334 Valencia Matteo, 186 » 44 Visdomini,113; family, 25, 80n, 156

Valdisieve. district of. 26. ain Giovanni, archbishop of Milan, 141; Vallambrosa, abbot of, 277; monastery iscomani, Ys 25 » TS

of, 318 Viterbo, 231, 232n, 233n, 236n, 308,

Valori, Bartolomeo di Niccolo, 77; Nic- 326n

cold di Taldo, 77 Volterra, 8, 151, 281, 283n

Valorini, Valorino di Barna, 96n

Varazzano, Niccolé di Ser Bene da, 41, Walter of Brienne, duke of Athens, 7,

115 8, 10, 34, 64n, 73, 93n, 107, 109, ITO, 297N, 323 war, Florentine, against Emperor

Vecchietti, family, 155n; Raimondino, 114n, 133, 256n, 337n

Velluti, family, 37, 38, 81, 153n; Ber- Henry VII (1311-12), 74, 88-89, 169,

nardo di Matteo, 39, 81, 364, 367n; 347, 348

430

INDEX

war, Florentine, against Mastino della peace, 379n; significance of, 394. See

Scala, 5, 7 also foreign policy; papacy; papal

war, Florentine, against Milan, in states

1351-53, 84, 141-42; 1n 1369-70, 84, war, Florentine, against Pisa, 15, 73,

222, 239-40, 244, 248-49 76n, 84, 90, 93-94, 188-90, 192-93, war, Florentine, against papacy, I5, 73- 197, 222, 223, 228-29, 244, 265, 387,

74, 84, 387, 394; background and = 394 origins, 265-96; internal aspects of, war, Florentine, against Ubaldini, 103, 297-308, 314-24, 329-35; military and 275 diplomatic aspects of, 298-300, 309- War, Hundred Years’, 6, 194 13, 326-27, 333-35; Florentine justifi- war, papal-Milanese (1371-75), 271-72, cation of, 300-3; opposition in Flor- 276, 282, 286-87, 300 ence to, 306-8, 319-21, 326, 332-35, White Lion, district of, 22 338; peace negotiations, 309, 311-12, woolen cloth industry, 3, 14-15, 150, 324-35, 337, 352-57; conclusion of 187, 194-97, 392. See also Lana guild

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