Fire and ice. Li Cunxu and the founding of the Later Tang. 9789888208975, 9888208977

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Fire and Ice “When empires fall, only the bold survive. Who will be the hero, and who the villain, in the eyes of history? Richard Davis takes us into the maelstrom of violence that was early tenth-century China in a lively account of an outstanding warrior king.” —T. H. Barrett, Professor Emeritus of East Asian History, SOAS, University of London “Impressively researched, rich in detail, deeply erudite, this book introduces readers to a fascinating time when the Chinese and ‘barbarian’ worlds were intimately connected. Richard Davis deserves praise and gratitude for bringing history to life with such elegance and panache.” —Nicola Di Cosmo, Professor of East Asian History, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton

The Later Tang dynasty presided over the epic changes that occasioned the Five Dynasties, when China evolved from a moribund medieval state dominated by hereditary elites to one organized around individual merit, an essential element of the nation-state. Critical to the evolution of governance in the tenth century was the rule of military magnates without vested interest in the old order. A Princeton graduate, Richard L. Davis taught for over two decades at Duke and Brown Universities where he was professor, before serving as chair professor at Lingnan University in Hong Kong. He has published five books on China’s middle period.

Chinese History / Biography

Printed and bound in Hong Kong, China

Richard L. Davis

Cover image: Spring Outing by Zhao Yan 趙喦, influential in-law of the Later Liang. Courtesy of the National Palace Museum, Taiwan.

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The Later Tang was the first of several ephemeral states created by the Shatuo Turks in tenth-century China and Li Cunxu, a martial genius, was its founder. In fifteen years, he turned a small satrapy on China’s periphery into a powerhouse capable of unifying the north and much of the southwest. He governed on the principle of racial inclusion and refused to set the ruling minority above the Chinese majority through special privileges. As someone highly literate and artistically gifted, Li Cunxu seemed uniquely capable of bridging rifts within his culturally diverse ruling elite. Unfortunately, he shared the sort of self-absorbed narcissism typical of dynastic founders, which contributed to his denouement merely three years into the reign.

Li Cunxu and the Founding of the Later Tang

“Richard Davis brings us into the fascinating but culturally complicated world of Li Cunxu, a military man as well as man of letters, for whom notions of duty and honor central to the warrior culture of the steppe coexisted with the political and literary values of the Tang.” —Patricia Ebrey, Williams Family Endowed Professor of History, University of Washington

Fire and Ice

Li Cunxu and the Founding of the Later Tang

Fire and Ice Li Cunxu and the Founding of the Later Tang Richard L. Davis

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Fire and Ice

Fire and Ice

Li Cunxu and the Founding of the Later Tang

Richard L. Davis

Hong Kong University Press The University of Hong Kong Pokfulam Road Hong Kong www.hkupress.org © 2016 Hong Kong University Press ISBN 978-988-8208-97-5 (Hardback) All rights reserved. No portion of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed and bound by Hang Tai Printing Co., Ltd. in Hong Kong, China

To Robert L. Davis

Warfare is akin to fire—without proper channeling, it will eventually consume the very powers that unleashed it. Zuozhuan, Chapter 2

Contents

List of Illustrations Preface Acknowledgments

ix x xiii

Chapter 1 The Prodigal Son Roots Doting Father Succession as Prince Maternities Inner Circle The Lord of Nanping

1 3 7 13 14 22 30

Chapter 2 Vassals and Kings Generational Rifts Early Expansion Reprisal against Yan History Summons at Weizhou Barbarians and Chinese Southern Offensive Tensions Within Alliances Matter Final Transition to Dynasty Lingering Volatility

32 32 37 46 56 65 71 77 81 85 88

Chapter 3 The Tang Renaissance Launching the Tongguang Reign Dominoes in the Heartland Consolidating Power The Sway of Favorites Celebrations Rapprochement with Neighbors

91 91 96 107 113 120 126

viii

Contents

Culture Wars Tormented Adopted Brother Extravagance and Histrionics

130 142 144

Chapter 4 Raging Tempest Ties That Bind The Middle Palace Shu Campaign Winter Doldrums Insurrection at Tianxiong Disaffection in the Land

148 148 154 158 172 180 189

Chapter 5 The Hand of History

195

Chronology of Events in the Life of Li Cunxu Sources Cited Index

205 213 220

Illustrations

Front Matter Map of Later Tang xiv Ancestry of Li Cunxu xv

Plates Plate 1: Portrait of Li Cunxu Plate 2: Seal of Li Keyong’s Tomb Plate 3: Exterior of Li Keyong’s Tomb Plate 4: Interior of Li Keyong’s Tomb Plate 5: Tomb of Li Cunxiao

Preface

My scholarly foray into the Five Dynasties, as a carpetbagger from the Southern Song, began with a translation of Ouyang Xiu’s Historical Records of the Five Dynasties, published in 2004. I subsequently produced biographies of two Later Tang emperors, Zhuangzong (Li Cunxu), the dynasty’s founder who ruled for three years, and Mingzong (Li Siyuan), his illustrious successor who reigned for over seven years. The English manuscript on Zhuangzong, drafted in 2005, was masterfully rendered into Chinese by Ma Jia, a former Brown University colleague in East Asian Studies, then published in Beijing in 2009. I followed up with a biography of Mingzong, From Warhorses to Ploughshares. The English version was published in 2014 and work on the Chinese translation is well underway. At the time, I did not pursue publication of the Zhuangzong manuscript in English. After putting to bed the project on Mingzong, I became convinced of the need to bring the Zhuangzong book to Western audiences, as it contains extensive treatment of the period preceding the Later Tang founding, precisely when the small satrapy along the empire’s periphery evolved into the leading contender for imperial power. My own insights into Zhuangzong have been much enriched by intensive research on his successor. The two rulers are largely a lesson in contrasts, but understanding the special challenges of the first reign is critical to contextualizing the stunning achievements of the second. Moreover, I have been able to make use of secondary scholarship produced in the last decade, since drafting the original manuscript, including a biography of the monarch’s father, Li Keyong, which draws extensively upon a little-known tomb inscription unearthed at Daixian, Shanxi, the most authoritative source on the family’s early ancestors. My treatment of the origin of the Shatuo people has been entirely overhauled as a consequence. For these reasons, this English version should supersede the Chinese original. The two biographies, used alongside my Historical Records translation, should provide a sizable body of primary and secondary materials for use in undergraduate teaching, my intended audience. The biographical format should also enhance this particular book’s accessibility to the nonspecialist. In the following pages, I have tried to highlight the positive characterizations of Li Cunxu and his reign, while

Preface

xi

minimizing the generally negative depictions of him in official sources for the period, the two  dynastic histories and Sima Guang’s Comprehensive Mirror. In reality, all three sources, written in the Northern Song, relied heavily on the “Veritable Records” for the reign, a document produced by court historians under Mingzong, who needed to impugn Zhuangzong’s political record and personal life in order to justify the mutiny against him. I have tried to counter such biases through extensive use of Cefu yuangui, an eclectic mix of primary sources less influenced by the agendas of official historians. But Li Cunxu will always be an enigma. Regardless of one’s position on Zhuangzong’s political record, the genius behind nearly two decades of military conquests receives nearly universal praise, strategies studied by aspiring rulers and their advisors for centuries to come. His successor, Mingzong, was the rare emperor able to excel at warfare and governance in almost equal measure, which in turn, allowed the Later Tang to last thirteen years, a decent patch of time in the context of the Five Dynasties, where the average dynasty lasted ten  years. But Mingzong often emerges in the sources as perennially tailoring his actions to project the right image, aware of the eyes of history upon him. His public persona thus seems rather contrived. The appeal of Li Cunxu to audiences today lies in his human imperfections—the strength of his romantic impulses and depths of his narcissistic ego—traits shared with a long line of transformational figures in Chinese history, including Mao Zedong, a secret admirer. Ironically, these two very different founding fathers shared another thing in common: they allowed poor choices in their personal lives to impact negatively upon governance, to the detriment of their historical legacies in the end. Despite the popular appeal of the two leaders, they proved poor judges of people, in the end. In my previous incarnation as a Song dynasty historian, I studied the evolution of the hereditary elite of early imperial China into a class of bureaucratic professionals after the eleventh century, which scholars have long attributed to “the endemic chaos of the Five Dynasties.” To be sure, the tenth century did witness a pervasive downward mobility for the old elite and a similarly sweeping upward mobility for socially marginal groups, resulting in the entire overhaul of the social system. At the court of Zhuangzong, we can find vestiges of the old elite juxtaposed against icons of the new: Chief councilor Doulu Ge, scion of a great family, with little to offer besides family name, and the rising star of commoner background, Feng Dao, debunking class bias by outsmarting his peers. We also witness pressure from successive Later Tang monarchs to place competence before pedigree in recruiting and promoting civilian officials, despite strong resistance from the bureaucratic establishment. And finally, we witness military families forming a third prestige group, one of the most exclusive in fact, as reflected in the social life and marriage alliances of Zhuangzong and his successors. Rather than a time of chaos, the Five Dynasties should rightfully be seen as a time of significant progress on the social front, due precisely to the intrusion of military men

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into the realm of governing. The Five Dynasties was also a time of remarkably colorful characters, akin to another period of division, the Three Kingdoms. The reader should note that Chinese children are considered one year old at birth, the consequence of historically having no concept of zero, and a year is added after the Lunar New Year. Chinese age counted in sui thus tends to be one to two years older than the same age in the West. In Western scholarship, historical figures are referred to either by full name or simply surname for purposes of brevity. When Chinese historians wish to abbreviate a name, they instead employ the individual’s personal name. Below, I have followed Chinese convention by abbreviating “Li Cunxu” as “Cunxu.” Relating the narrative below to the relevant chapters of my Historical Records translation should prove much easier. My translation of most technical terms pertaining to military technology is based on Science and Civilisation in China, Vol. 5, Part 6 by Robin D. S. Yates. Our title draws inspiration from the poem by Robert Frost, “Fire and Ice,” on the biblical end of the world: “Some say the world will end in fire, some say in ice.” But here, “fire” is a metaphor for war and “ice” an allusion to rejection.

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Professor Liu Guangfeng, a fellow Song historian at Central China Normal University in Wuhan, who read through the entire manuscript, checking the accuracy of citations and translations, expanding upon the research base, and imparting his own invaluable perspectives on the topic. Prof. Liu covered my classes in Hong Kong during research leave several years ago and recently traveled on my behalf to northern Shanxi, where the tombs of two figures discussed in the book, Li Keyong and Li Cunxiao, are located. He provided the pictures that appear in this book. The Later Tang map was provided by my colleagues at the Hong Kong and South China Historical Research Program. I am also grateful for a Direct Grant from Lingnan University to permit a thorough vetting of the original manuscript. On the occasion of his retirement from Jinan University, in Guangzhou, I would like to extend a special salute to Professor Zhang Qifan, a middle-period historian with a rare diversity of scholarly interests, including, fortuitously in my case, the military history of the Five Dynasties. He has proven an invaluable resource on the period and a true friend—a big man with an even bigger heart. He can be proud of the legacy he has left in terms of scholarship as well as students. And finally, I should acknowledge Hong Kong University Press for its ongoing commitment to publications on traditional China at a time of retreat for many publishing houses in Europe and North America. This is my second book with them in as many years. I have been impressed by the professionalism of its staff, and especially Yuet Sang Leung, the acquisitions editor for history, who succeeded in accelerating the review process to steer the book toward a speedy publication. Sherlon Ip once again did a stand-up job with editorial support. With the passage of time, as my academic career begins to wind down, the importance of family members who have sustained me over the years comes into greater focus. Growing up in a foster home on the south side of Buffalo, New York, I have faced many challenges in life, but I have also been blessed with two families and two support systems. I am especially indebted to Robert L. Davis, my younger brother, who has somehow kept his sanity through the travails of youth and now the losses of middle age, including his beloved wife, Karen. Unfortunately, it doesn’t get better.

Map of Later Tang

Ancestry of Li Cunxu Zhuye Aque 朱邪阿厥 Zhuye Guzhu 朱邪孤注 Shatuo Jinshan 沙阤金山 Shatuo Fuguo 沙阤輔國 Shatuo Guduozhi 沙阤骨咄支 Zhuye Jinzhong 朱邪盡忠 Sige Abo 思葛阿波 ( Jinzhong’s brother) Zhuye Zhiyi 朱邪執宜 Zhuye Chixin 朱邪赤心 (Li Guochang 李國昌) Li Keyong 李克用

Woman Liu 劉氏

Empress Liu 劉氏

Li Cunxu 李存勗

Li Jiji 李繼岌

Woman Cao 曹氏

Consort Yi 伊氏

Consort Han 韓氏

Plate 1: Portrait of Li Cunxu. Reprinted with permission by National Palace Museum, Taipei.

Plate 2: Seal of Li Keyong’s Tomb. Photo by Liu Guangfeng.

Plate 3: Exterior of Li Keyong’s Tomb. Photo by Liu Guangfeng.

Plate 4: Interior of Li Keyong’s Tomb. Photo by Liu Guangfeng.

Plate 5: Tomb of Li Cunxiao. Photo by Liu Guangfeng.

1 The Prodigal Son

Footing in two cultures proved a mixed blessing for Li Cunxu (885–926), the object of much envy in his day. Through paternal ties to the Shatuo-Turks of Inner Asia, he projected the martial panache reminiscent of his father, Li Keyong (856–908). Equally impressive was Cunxu’s comfort with the culture of his Chinese mother, Woman Cao, who drew upon a dedicated group of local mentors to prepare the youth for his destiny with history. Cunxu made frequent boast of his facility in the literary language and classical traditions of China. He also made much of his creativity as poet and musician, having composed by his own hand the marching songs for his armies. Conscious of his role as model for future Shatuo emperors, Cunxu needed to strike the right balance in negotiating his two identities. But sadly, fifteen years of almost ceaseless warfare in search of realizing other people’s dreams left little time for second thoughts about the cost of dynasty to own individuality. Would he force change upon the institution of monarchy or would the institution humble him? Tragically, so much constructive energy in his short yet historic reign was consumed by this epic contest of wills. The entire trajectory of Cunxu’s life had been set since conception, the expectations of family swelling faster than the years could pass. There were rumors of the usual auguries at birth, including purple vapors emanating from the windows of his mother’s bedroom.1 Another legend years later depicts Cunxu at five sui joining father Keyong at a banquet for officers on the heels of a major military victory in 889. After a long and endearing gaze at the youth, the thirty-something Keyong turned to his men to predict with supreme confidence, “I can avow through personal experience that the boy is a true prodigy, someone destined in coming decades to replace me on a battlefield like this!” The child had barely outgrown the split-back britches of toddlers, but Keyong’s early prediction and lifelong devotion to realizing it would elevate Cunxu above potential rivals in the mindset of many. Sources characterize Keyong as severe

1.

JWDS 27.365. For the key to the abbreviation of titles, see “Sources Cited” section. I have read, but not cited below a biography of Li Cunxu published in 1997 by Yang Jun and Fang Zhengyi, which is organized around Mao Zedong’s ramblings on emperors in Chinese history. Mao especially admired Cunxu’s warrior craft

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in disciplining his underlings in the military, but the son seemed to enjoy a special dispensation. The faith of a single family began to spread beyond the Shatuo base when Cunxu, then eleven sui, represented his father at an imperial reception at Changan, the Tang capital, during the eighth month of 895. “Since youth, the boy had accompanied his father on military missions,” chroniclers write, to provide early exposure to the warrior traditions of his people. Markings of martial greatness instantly impressed Emperor Zhaozong (r. 888–904), who predicted upon concluding the audience, “I have no doubt that a boy so exquisitely endowed will achieve fame and fortune.” And he finished the audience with a wish: “I sincerely hope that you stay forever pious in serving Our Family!” The monarch proceeded to compare Cunxu to Keyong, “The youth somehow manages to eclipse his own father.”2 Thus began the nickname Yazi, the child capable of eclipsing the best of peers. The compliment further impelled Keyong to maximize Cunxu’s exposure, placing the world on notice that spectacular feats would emanate from the Jin kingdom under his stewardship. Keyong produced a sizable progeny, but none came close to rivaling the inimitable Cunxu. Additional factors served to inflate Cunxu’s sense of self-importance, much the handiwork of devoted parents, who spared little in acculturating the youth. By thirteen sui, he had acquired some facility in the Spring and Autumn Annals, the Confucian classics intended to moderate Cunxu’s irrepressible passion for the arts.3 Early education certainly included China’s rich tradition of writings on warfare as well, literature designed to impose reason upon the more intuitive approaches to armed conflict then prevalent in the steppe. The weight of expectations could never allow Cunxu to settle for simple satrapy in the manner of his father and grandfather. Empire was his destiny, and obstacles would evaporate before the might of his armies and the strength of his will. But faster than the people embraced him as their Son of Heaven, they turned a cold shoulder when the egotistical excesses of Cunxu eclipsed his appealing image as martial hero. The game of expectations, which paved the way to monarchy in his twenties and thirties, would work discernibly against him by forty. Contemporaries bearing witness to the rising tide of imperial detractors in the span of so many years commonly look to specific policies for answers. Historians centuries later focused on changes in the living environment and mental outlook of the former prince, the driven warrior losing his discipline amidst the all-consuming distractions of imperial life. Confucian dogmatists invoked ethical arguments, the lethal combination of decadent living and diffident rule. Too many commentators have grievances against the man, agendas to advance at the expense of the historic figure, with the exception

2. 3.

For both stories, see XWDS 5.41; HR p. 40; JWDS 26.352, 27.365–66; ZZTJ 260.8474–75; Beimeng suoyan, 17.326; Nanbu xinshu, 10.176; CFYG 1.13. Italics added. Beimeng suoyan, 17.326; Xu Tang shu, 1.7.

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of literary chroniclers. More interested in the human saga than the ethical messages behind it, they plumbed this remarkable story to amuse audiences. Ironically, the consummate actor in life became grist of entertainment in death.

Roots Origins of a People Pastoral ways played a critical role in shaping Li Cunxu’s identity as a descendant of the Shatuo-Turks, people who had lived along the nomadic diaspora of northern China for centuries. The name Shatuo, people of the “Gravel Sands,” might represent the Chinese rendering of a foreign sound, but more likely it alludes to Shatuoji, an early desert homeland in northern Xinjiang.4 Historical references to the Shatuo come rather late, beginning with the Tang dynasty (617–907). They may have gone by other names, but more likely, Shatuo tribes were conflated with larger border groups by indiscriminating chroniclers. Increasingly over the course of the Tang, they willfully colluded with the court as part of an ongoing policy of “pitting barbarian against barbarian” as a check on foreign aggression.5 The Tujue-Turks dominated much of Inner Asia in the seventh and eighth centuries, the Shatuo likely constituting one ethnic community beneath the broad multicultural umbrella of the Tujue, and especially the Western Tujue, with whom the Shatuo elite often struck strategic marriages in Tang times and earlier.6 Their search for marriage pacts with the Chinese population came much later, in the ninth century. Descendants of the Turks or “Türgish” people of Inner Asia, the Shatuo moved largely within the ambit of China’s “inner zone.”7 Prior to the Tang, they may have splintered off from groups like the Chuyue Turks, but more likely, they were an amalgam of various ethnic communities, including the Hu, Huihe, Tuyuhun, and Tartars, the source of their own tribal divisions, some scholars believe.8 The Shatuo likely knew the language of the Tujue Turks, the lingua franca of the western borderlands in Tang times, their own language likely a derivative thereof.9 They subsequently evolved into a distinct ethnic group after their move to the south and east, referred to centuries later by the Mongols as the “White Tartars” to reflect their fair complexions.10 The Shatuo moved across a vast area in central and northern Xinjiang, their presence extending as

Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, pp. 19–20; Li, Tang Xizhou, pp. 373–403; Tan, Zhongguo lishi dituji, pp. 63–64. JWDS 91.1200; XWDS 46.514; CFYG 956.11076. Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, pp. 9–10. CHC, Vol. 6, p. 8; Lewis, China’s Cosmopolitan Empire, p. 152; Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, pp. 3–5, 8. Chen, Zhongguo lidai minzushi, pp. 132–72, esp. 132; ZZTJ 251.8140; Eberhard, A History of China, pp. 199–204; Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, pp. 6, 12. 9. Chen, Zhongguo lidai minzushi, p. 168. 10. Weatherford, The Secret History of the Mongol Queens, p. 55.

4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

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far west as Mount Yin, the Lake Alaköl region bordering Kazakhstan.11 Their settlement of China’s borderlands over the course of the Tang did not involve a direct progression north-to-south, but more of a back-and-forth in response to a mix of internal and external pressures, which proved especially pronounced in the ninth century.

Nomadic Religious Influences The early Shatuo, “with their reverence for spirits and fondness for divination,” appear to have practiced some aspects of Manichaeism, a religion introduced to China in the period preceding Tang rule.12 The sacrifice of animals upon the death of relatives has its roots in Manichaeism. In addition, Shamanism left an indelible mark upon the Shatuo as reflected in the plethora of rites to appease the gods and their near phobia of nature.13 The notion of a “Heavenly God” or “Sky God” (Tianshen), in particular, traced to the Turks of Inner Asia, similarly appears in the Shatuo pantheon. The Turks bequeathed their distinct form of Buddhism to the Shatuo as well.14 Admittedly, many Chinese spiritual leaders divined to nature, but by the tenth century, most Confucian literati regarded anomalies of nature as predictable, whereas the Shatuo viewed nature as considerably more capricious and in need of perennial assuagement. As for aesthetics with roots in the north, the Shatuo had acquired a high regard for sculpture as craft, as reflected in the popularity of the Longmen Caves to successive Later Tang dynasts.15 Initially dubbed in historical sources as the Turks of Shatuo circuit (Shatuo Tujue), occasional references to the “three tribes” of Shatuo—the Shatuo, Anqing, and Yinge—suggest the existence of multiple confederations, the Shatuo ascent coinciding with the decline of the Eastern Turks in the eighth century.16 Their armies were surprisingly small relative to other minority rulers of China over the past millennium, but Shatuo warriors seemed uniquely “brave and aggressive,” courage in battle buttressed by an enviable expertise in siege warfare and archery. Indeed, the arrows of a skilled bowman could pierce the shield of any foe.17 The Shatuo had served with some distinction in the campaigns against Korea in the 640s, during the reign of Tang Taizong, despite the ultimate failure of those missions.18 11. In my biography of Mingzong, I placed Yinshan in southern Mongolia and northern Ningxia; see Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, pp. 8–9. I have since become aware of a second Yinshan near Lake Alaköl (Alahu), in eastern Kazakhstan, due west of Xinjiang’s Dzungarian Gate. Northern Xinjiang is an alternative place of origin for the Shatuo, but we can never speak with certainty; see Tan, Zhongguo lishi dituji, pp. 63–64; Li, Tang Xizhou, pp. 398–403. 12. Lewis, China between Empires, p. 158; China’s Cosmopolitan Empire, pp. 92, 173. 13. Chen, Zhongguo lidai minzushi, pp. 171–72. 14. Eberhard, Conquerors and Rulers, pp. 146–47; Beckwith, Empires of the Silk Road, p. 115. 15. Eberhard, Conquerors and Rulers, p. 147. 16. XTS 218.6153; Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, p. 22. 17. XWDS 4.33. 18. Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, p. 19.

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But they also found themselves at odds with other ethnic groups in the north and west at intervals during the early eighth century, prompting them to turn increasingly to the Middle Kingdom to serve as a shield, as reflected in the initiation of tribute to the Tang court by Shatuo Jinshan, which occurred in 702.19 In this way, Shatuo autonomy from the steppe evolved in concert with their expanding activities in the borderland, a development that took two centuries.

Resettlement in Hedong After 809, with the blessings of the Tang court, several clusters of Shatuo tribes resettled in northern Shanxi, then known as Hedong, although “Jin” was a more popular appellation in referencing the region’s ancient name.20 The arid terrain and sparse vegetation of Shanxi were ideally suited to the herding and hunting traditions of the settlers, making for a permanent Shatuo presence. They began as traders in horses, sheep, and cattle, but evolved into semi-pastoralists.21 Relocation to the Chinese heartland would facilitate regular contact with the Tang government, as local commanders rallied the scrappy Inner Asians to repulse insurgents in the empire’s interior, including an action against the Chengde governor, Wang Chengzong, in 821, led by the great grandfather of Cunxu.22 Such policies served to integrate the Shatuo into a “patrimonial patron-client” relationship, in the words of one historian, a relationship cynically designed to advance the interests of the Middle Kingdom.23

Numbers Augmenting the tactical value of the Shatuo to the Tang government was significant growth in numbers. Based on highly credible reports of 6,000 to 7,000 “tents” during the early ninth century, some scholars estimate the Shatuo population at just over thirty thousand people, including women and children.24 The estimate appears overly conservative: the frequent inclusion of other Inner Asians and Chinese mercenaries in major military actions militates against the isolation of Shatuo numbers, the basis for any estimate of total population. Moreover, Shatuo armies realized a surge in numbers 19. XTS 218.6154–58; Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, p. 8; Li, Tang Xizhou, pp. 384–96; Lewis, China’s Cosmopolitan Empire, pp. 5–29. 20. Eberhard, Conquerors and Rulers, p. 141; Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, pp. 27–31. 21. JWDS 91.1200; XWDS 46.514, 51.577; Chen, Zhongguo lidai minzushi, pp. 132–36; Fu, “Shatuo zhi hanhua,” pp. 319–20; Wang, “Shatuo hanhua zhi guocheng”; Lewis, China between Empires, p. 168. 22. Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, pp. 21–22. 23. Lewis, China between Empires, p. 146. 24. JTS 196.5257. Eberhard’s estimate of 100,000 for the population of Shatuo men at the peak of their power is clearly overstated; see A History of China, p. 200; Conquerors and Rulers, p. 142. A recent scholar argues that Shatuo numbers may have declined to as low as ten thousand on the eve of Keyong’s reign, another serious exaggeration; see Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, pp. 22–23.

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over the course of the ninth century, partly by absorbing other border peoples and partly by intermarrying with the Chinese. An estimate of fifty to sixty thousand male warriors at the time of Cunxu’s succession as prince seems more probable. By then, the Shatuo had evolved into a group less Turkic in blood and more tied to the land. Their growing strategic clout would transform them into a pivotal force in the politics of a waning Tang, as the imperial line veered toward extinction. At the same time, a heightened presence south of the Great Wall facilitated changes in cultural practices, including the transmission of a written language to a people without their own writing system, nor even a simple surname.

Names “The northern barbarians have no surnames,” Ouyang Xiu asserts in the Historical Records of the Five Dynasties.25 The claim is surely overstated, as the writer tended to generalize for all northerners the customs of only some. But for the Shatuo Turks specifically, the adoption of surnames came late in their evolution and presumably in imitation of Chinese practice. The earliest ancestor for whom historical documentation exists, Shatuo Jinshan, who flourished in the early eighth century, clearly took Shatuo as surname and Jinshan as personal name.26 Similarly, for the great grandfather of Keyong, Zhuye Jinzhong, Zhuye was a tribal name, which later writers misconstrued as surname. In reality, Shatuo and Zhuye both began as place names before evolving into tribal names.27 The grandson of Zhuye Jinzhong, Zhuye Chixin (d. 888), subsequently abandoned his Turkish name after Tang emperors bestowed the name Li Guochang in recognition of services rendered in the suppression of Wang Hongli in 869.28 Guochang had acquired some celebrity decades earlier by leading raids against the Huihu Uighurs at the behest of the court.29 As shown by the ancestral chart (see front matter), the Zhuye clan appears to have shared power with another clan bearing the surname Shatuo— Jinshan, Fuguo, and Guduozhi—although one scholar argues that Zhuye was an ancillary tribe of the Shatuo.30 Shatuo Jinshan was famed for getting relations with the Middle Kingdom on a positive footing by initiating tribute, which culminated in an invitation to Changan in 714, where Emperor Xuanzong personally hosted him in banquet.31 25. XWDS 4.39. 26. Chen, Zhongguo lidai minzu shi, p. 132; Fan, “Shatuo de zuyuan ji qi zaoqi lishi,” pp. 71–73; Li, Tang Xizhou, p. 377. 27. Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, pp. 7–8; Li, Tang Xizhou, pp. 377–78. 28. Cambridge History of China, Vol. 3, pp. 759, 786; JTS 19.674–75; XTS 218.6156–58. 29. ZZTJ 246.7942; Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, pp. 25–26. 30. Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, pp. 7, 16–17. As for the proposition that Zhuye was an ancillary tribe, see Li, Tang Xizhou, pp. 391–93. 31. Li, Tang Xizhou, pp. 384, 395–96.

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The conferral of the imperial surname Li and Chinese personal name, accompanied by registry as Tang subject, constituted the highest form of patronage for the court, which employed the practice of fictive kinship widely. Yet an action borne of strategic need had acquired an added layer of cultural meaning as Shatuo leaders became a symbolic extension of the ruling family and assumed its titles and offices. The patronage reflected in such policies were welcomed by many borderland peoples, including Li Guochang and his son Keyong, who employed their Chinese names so exclusively that their original Shatuo names are forever lost to history. The same applies to Keyong’s sons and grandsons, known solely by their Chinese names. Taboos soon evolved around citing the names of Shatuo royalty, the breaking of which might prove deadly.32 A parallel case occurred with the proto-Tibetan Tangut peoples (Dangxiang), founders of the Xixia dynasty (982–1227), whose leaders were known by their imperially conferred surname, Li.33 For generations, the Shatuo took immense pride in their multiplicity of bonds with the Tang. But the embrace of Chinese names and titles does not necessarily infer spineless subservience to the Middle Kingdom, as the word “patrimony” implies. The beauty of the Tang approach to border management is that it entailed infinitely more carrot than stick, more benevolent bounty than coercive pressure. Moreover, in the absence of names in their indigenous language, the Shatuo would need to develop other ways to define community. In the case of Guochang, he chose to be buried at Yanmen, near his political base in northern Shanxi, precisely where his son, Keyong, was interred decades later (see Plates 2–4).34 For Shatuo leaders, much like their Chinese counterparts, the choice of burial sites was rich with symbolism, but with one notable difference: Shatuo leaders preferred interment at places associated with their political base in life, not the ancestral home in the fashion of the Chinese upper classes.

Doting Father Early Trials Despite their eagerness to serve, and occasionally due to misplaced zeal, the Shatuo collaboration with Tang monarchs evolved unevenly, as parochial suspicions sometimes erupted into armed conflict. Li Guochang, Cunxu’s grandfather, seemed “too aggressive and arbitrary in seeking validation from the throne,” the dynastic history reports. His slaying in 872 of regional governor Duan Wenchu, reportedly at the instigation of son Keyong, would further incite the government.35 Years earlier, Guochang had come into conflict with the Tang over prefectural postings for him and his son in northern 32. 33. 34. 35.

XWDS 32.350; HR p. 268. Cambridge History of China, Vol. 6, p. 158. Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, p. 28. XWDS 4.31; Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, pp. 42–43; ZZTJ 252.8165.

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Shanxi.36 Frictions appear to have peaked in the summer of 880, when Jin armies suffered a bruising loss in the vicinity of Jinyang by mercenaries of the Tang court and lost a reputed seventeen thousand men, a sizable part of Guochang’s standing army, forcing the Shatuo to turn to their “Tartar” friends in Mongolia for sanctuary.37

The Huang Chao Suppression A fresh wave of rebel activity a year later led by Huang Chao, arguably the gravest peril to Tang rule in over a century, gave the Shatuo another chance to wrap themselves in the flag of dynasty and restore their reputation as credible mercenaries. Under the determined leadership of Keyong, Shatuo armies proved decisive in expelling insurgents from the capital in 883, compelling Huang Chao to retreat as splinter groups disintegrated. The feat would elevate the stature of father and son, Guochang and Keyong. And the legitimacy earned by sparing the Tang an early death allowed the Shatuo to attract new recruits for their armies.38 During the same year, Guochang was succeeded by Keyong, his eldest surviving son, then twenty-eight sui.39 The young man wisely enlisted the Tartars along with other borderland ethnics in the last assault against the remnant rebel groups in China’s northwest, which a year later permitted him to celebrate final victory within the hallowed walls of Changan. “Keyong’s contribution to the suppression of Huang Chao was arguably second to none,” reports Sima Guang in the Comprehensive Mirror.40 Without the determined intervention of the Shatuo, the rebellion might have proceeded for some years and wreaked considerably more havoc. The Tang government responded positively by assigning Keyong as prefect of Daizhou and governor of Yanmen, an area already containing many nomadic settlers.41 In the years following Huang Chao’s demise, Keyong moved methodically to expand his base, starting with the strategic prefectures of Jinyang, Zezhou, and Liaozhou in central Hedong, and culminating in 890 in the acquisition of five prefectures in the Zhaoyi command, effectively extending Shatuo influence into large pockets of southern Hedong for the first time.42 Under his leadership, the Jin had begun to reverse some of the losses of recent years, although progress proved uneven.

36. Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, pp. 40–41. 37. XWDS 4.32–38; Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, pp. 45–46, 156–62. 38. Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, pp. 27–28, 50–58; Beckwith, Empires of the Silk Road, p. 171; Lewis, China’s Cosmopolitan Empire, pp. 58–60; Rossabi, A History of China, pp. 165–66. 39. The younger brothers of Keyong are by order of age: Kejin, Kerang, Kegong, Kerou, Kezhang, Kening; only one older brother is known by name, Kejian; see Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, p. 32. 40. ZZTJ 255.8295. 41. Chen, Zhongguo lidai minzushi, pp. 142–43; Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, p. 37; Sekigen Seiyū, “Tōmi Shata Ri Koyō Riyō Boshi Yukuchū Kōsatsu,” p. 21. 42. Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, pp. 106–7.

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Father’s Legacy Keyong’s mother, Woman Qin, was likely a Chinese ethnic based on her surname, but the ways of her son were solidly rooted in the steppe, where he spent most of his formative years. Early on, he won acclaim as an archer capable of “hitting twin flying ducks from a reclining position,” heroic escapades that inspired the sobriquet “Dragon with a Single Eye” (Du yan long), as he had one eye perceptibly larger than the other. But the deformity appears to have had little impact on the accuracy of his arrows.43 As early as fifteen sui, Keyong joined his father in battle to develop a special knack for assessing enemy strengths.44 He was already a known quantity in the community long before his installation as prince. The fact that Keyong succeeded Guochang without incident suggests that father-to-son successions had been become routine among the Shatuo. Their last fraternal succession involved Sige Apo, the brother of Zhuye Jinzhong, great grandfather of Keyong.45 The stewardship of Keyong for the next quarter-century proved beleaguered beyond belief for a man of his many gifts. Partly by intent and partly inertia, he became embedded in the Chinese world. Still, relations with the south soured during Keyong’s initial decade of power: Changan’s enfeebled monarchs were often forced to spurn his council while coddling rival governors like Zhu Wen. Meanwhile, the Shatuo took frequent recourse to plunder, sometimes for self-preservation, but often in a cry for validation, as in the sacking of Changan in 885. Only later did the alliance stabilize, Keyong proving more committed to the dynasty than most Chinese governors in his day.46 In the process, the Shatuo came to be perceived as fundamentally “southern” in orientation, their future increasingly divorced from the steppe and intertwined with Tang dynastic politics.47

Relocation to Shanxi The base of operations for the Shatuo started in northern Shanxi after 809, then shifted to central Shanxi after 882, with the acquisition of the circuit’s capital city, Jinyang.48 Jinyang held historic import as the homeland of the Tuoba (Tabgach), a proto-Turkish group that founded the Wei dynasty in the early fifth century.49 Generations later, the city doubled as the summer resort for Sui emperors. The Sui ruling family also

43. XWDS 4.32; JWDS 25.332, 25.337; ZZTJ 255.8295; Wudai shibu 2; Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, pp. 34–35. 44. JTS 19.681. 45. XTS 218.6154; Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, pp. 8–10. 46. ZZTJ 260.8481. 47. Standen, Unbounded Loyalty, p. 32. 48. XWDS 4.31; HR p. 29; JWDS 25.336. 49. Hansen, The Open Empire, pp. 175–85.

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intermarried with the Jinyang elite and assigned a succession of imperial sons to senior posts in the area, including the dynasty’s second monarch, the brilliant but ill-fated Yangdi.50 In addition, central Shanxi was the region from which founders of the Tang, in 617, launched their armies against the Sui capital.51 After the Tang unification, Jinyang was elevated to “northern capital,” even though its rulers never governed from its precincts.52 The Tang imperial family often married women from the city’s illustrious families, including Gaozong, whose first spouse, Woman Wang, hailed from the area. And Empress Wang’s successor, the iconic Wu Zetian, could claim ancestral roots in central Shanxi.53 The region’s repute as the land of kings and queens continued into the Five Dynasties era, when founders of three of the five houses to unify the north emanated from bases there. The city was also seat of the scrappy Northern Han, the last of the Ten Kingdoms to defy the Song mandate, carrying its resistance until 979. Jinyang prefecture, located on the southern edge of present-day Taiyuan, is nestled between two patches of hills that can rise to mountains as high as a thousand meters. Depicted in the day as “the northern door to the empire,” securing the area was vital to the security of the Chinese heartland, although military intervention by central authorities was no mean chore.54 The mountains combined with craters formed from dry rivers made intervention either from the southeast or the northwest highly hazardous. Further shielding Hedong circuit was the Yellow River, which extended north-tosouth along its western border before flowing eastward. Any advance from the west required crossing the river at some point, maneuvers costly in time and materiel. And outsiders successful at penetrating the provincial borders of Hedong faced a formidably fortified Jinyang, a fortress whose outer wall spanned forty li (nearly twenty kilometers).55 A populous city encircled by marginally fertile lands and difficult-to-manoeuver roadways had been forced by history to accumulate sufficient stores of arms and provisions to fend off besiegers for as long as one year, which presented yet another obstacle for potential besiegers.56 Meanwhile, the region’s scarce resources and rugged terrain had long molded a sturdy populace, an ideal base to recruit some of the country’s scrappiest warriors. In this way, Jin upstarts, Guochang and Keyong, turned a panoply of conditions regarded as negatives in most contexts into positive factors for their future development.

50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56.

Yuan, Sui Yangdi zhuan, pp. 43–44, 62–63, 157. Wright, The Sui Dynasty, pp. 194–96. Benn, China’s Golden Age, p. 46. Cambridge History of China, Vol. 3, pp. 153, 156, 201, 243, 245. XWDS 57.654; HR p. 460; JTS 2.25. XWDS 70.866; HR p. 597. Zhao, Tang Taizong zhuan, pp. 13, 38.

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The Liang Challenge Several hundred kilometers would separate Keyong from his nemesis at the time, Zhu Wen (852–912), the Prince of Liang, whose seat at Kaifeng sat along the Grand Canal as it progressed westward to Changan and northward to Beijing.57 The canal represented a critical lifeline for foodstuffs and taxes headed for the Tang capital, which gave Wen a decisive advantage. In the waning years of Tang rule, Kaifeng, Jinyang, and Changan formed a triangle of intrigue that persisted for two decades, generating fabulous fodder for rumormongers and secret agents in the process. During a rare moment of non-belligerency, in the early summer of 884, Zhu Wen hosted Keyong in banquet near Kaifeng as his armies passed through the area, and plied the twenty-nine-year-old with wine and food in feigned friendship. The two men came to exchange heated words over the course of the evening, at the apparent instigation of the host. Once inebriation had overtaken Keyong, ambushers were unleashed from a concealed lair, proof that the event had been staged from the start as cover for an assassination. Keyong somehow succeeded in slipping away, but he lost several hundred cherished bodyguards, some escaping as others perished.58 And despite appeals to the Tang court for sanctions against Wen, an emperor inclined to empathy with Keyong proved powerless to intervene under pressure from the stronger rival. This was no isolated incident, but part of a pattern of knavery that typified Wen’s relations with rivals. He even engineered the slaying of Li Kegong, a brother of Keyong, further inciting the Shatuo satrap.59 A dying Keyong thus secured a solemn pledge from Cunxu to exact precisely the revenge that had eluded him for two decades, without which he could not rest in peace: “You should never forget the indignities that I have endured.”60 Yet the father’s dying wish would set his son on a collision course with one of the most diabolical figures of their time.

Discipline and Humanity Keyong’s obsession with settling scores emanated from a deeply ingrained sense of duty, fidelity, and honor, values rooted in the warrior culture of the steppe. Family and friends remembered him in death for endearing personal qualities, but his lieutenants in life often saw a severe side as pertains to discipline in the ranks. For example, Keyong frequently applied the full force of the law for the minor infractions of subordinates.61 57. On the belligerency between Keyong and Wen, see Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, pp. 118–24. 58. JTS 19b.718–19; XTS 218.6159; JWDS 25.338–39, 49.672–73; ZZTJ 255.8306–7; XWDS 1.5, 4.34, 14.141; HR pp. 6–7, 32–33, 130–31; Cambridge History of China, Vol. 3, p. 783; Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, pp. 123–24; Fang, “Power Structures,” pp. 52–53. 59. XTS 218.6161; Cambridge History of China, Vol. 3, p. 784. 60. XWDS 37.397; HR p. 309; Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, pp. 169–74. 61. JWDS 91.1207.

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Severity of the sort may have seemed needed in light of the ethnic and social diversity of Jin armies, but no such justification existed for the testy temper and stinging tongue for which the Shatuo was similarly famed. One officer subjected to Keyong’s heavy hand, An Yuanxin, eventually defected to Dingzhou, a rival power, in frustration.62 A case closer to home involved Li Kexiu, a sibling, who was once cursed and flogged for “excessive parsimony” in rewarding troops. The humiliation of thrashing by his own brother so mortified Kexiu that he inexplicably dropped dead.63 Stories of the sort demonstrate that Keyong kept surrogates on a tight leash, including his own kin, although his catholic spirit may have compensated somewhat for his volatility. Navigating the temperament of Keyong required sensitivities that few appear to have possessed, with the exception of Ge Yu.64 An occasional diplomat for the Jin, Yu had evinced similar finesse in managing his personal relationship with Keyong.65 He learned to sway the Prince through reasoned arguments and historic precedent, stirring contrition in a man generally receptive to criticism once momentary passions had passed. The other endearing aspect of their relationship was an abiding faith grounded in mutual respect, such that Liang spies could malign the character of Yu without shaking Keyong’s confidence in the least. Frequent visits at one another’s homes served to strengthen their friendship while cementing bonds between the two families. So, when the lieutenant took ill in 906, Keyong held vigil at his bedside and administered medicines by his own hand, while the subsequent death of the aide devastated Keyong like the loss of a relative, a sign of sentimental charm.66 To his credit, Keyong created an inner circle of male and female companions who could balance and even benefit him by dint of their differences. He seems not given to histrionics like many pretenders in his day, his confidence reflected instead in his capacity to trust. Through force of personality, Keyong somehow held the Jin kingdom together, despite worsening conditions along his borders, especially in the years directly preceding his death. A daring siege of Jinyang by Liang armies in 902 might well have toppled the city, if not for the outbreak of disease within enemy camps on the heels of prolonged rain, due in part to the germ-infested elephant grass surrounding city walls.67 The impotence of the Tang court to harness domestic infidels compelled Keyong to strengthen his hand by allying with the Kitan (Qidan), an emerging nomadic power to the north. The Kitan soon betrayed the alliance to evolve into a rival in his own

62. CFYG 438.4948. 63. XWDS 14.148; HR p. 138. 64. JWDS 55.744–46; CFYG 99.1087–88, 405.4597; Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, p. 93. For a parallel case, see JWDS 96.1282. 65. XWDS 39.423; HR p. 337. 66. JWDS 55.746. 67. XWDS 4.38; HR pp. 37–38; Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, pp. 137–39.

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backyard, occasionally pillaging Jin lands and eventually aligning with Keyong’s archrival, the Liang.68 When death came in early 908 at fifty-three sui, Keyong felt no closure on his two premier missions in life, namely, insulating his Hedong base from the depredations of rivals and shielding Tang emperors from the existential threats posed by rival governors. Worse yet, the kingdom bequeathed to his eldest son remained highly precarious. The year before, Zhu Wen had assumed sovereignty over much of the Central Plains to eradicate the Tang imperium and inaugurate the Liang as the first of the so-called Five Dynasties. The seasoned Emperor Taizu seemed favored by destiny, while the Jin was confined to a single circuit and ruled by a prince with a seriously fractured base.

Succession as Prince His personal name, Cunxu, alludes to a leader’s ability “to rally his people out of endearment,” a notion originating with the Book of Odes (Shijing). He presumably had no formal name in his native tongue, his family having already adopted Chinese names at the time of his birth. Cunxu was twenty-four sui, shy of twenty-two years old by Western reckoning, upon becoming prince, four years younger than his father at the time of accession.69 But he was several years older than Alexander the Great (356–323 BCE) at a similar turn in his life, another martial genius destined to redraw the maps of his day by force of personality.70 By now, the Shatuo of Hedong had moved toward the Chinese practice of succession from father to son, his elevation the fourth such event for the Jin kingdom.71 Prior to this time, they appear to have practiced a mixture of the two succession traditions. For nomadic peoples, the succession of either siblings or same-generation cousins placed priority on maturity and experience in elevating leaders, due preeminently to higher death rates.72 For example, Keyong fathered over twenty sons, but only nine are known by name; the rest presumably died as children before receiving formal names.73 Thus, an age perceived as mature for sedentary empires, might seem too young for 68. ZZTJ 266.8679–80; XTS 218.6165; JWDS 26.360; Cambridge History of China, Vol. 6, pp. 57–61. 69. The birth date for Cunxu, first year of Guangqi [885 ACE], twenty-second day of the tenth month (885.10.22), is based on the Annals in the Old History ( JWDS 27.365). The same source later cites his age at forty-three sui upon death in 926, which should make for a birth date of 884 ( JWDS 34.477). The Historical Records of Ouyang Xiu provides no year of birth, but gives forty-three sui as his age at death (HR p. 50; XWDS 5.51). For a critical treatment of the matter, see Chen, Jiu Wudai shi, 34.998. 70. On the parallels between Cunxu and Alexander the Great, see Norman Cantor, Alexander the Great, pp. 1–33, 37–39. Interestingly, both men had exceptionally strong ties to their mothers, although Cunxu appears considerably less conflicted in relations with his father. 71. JWDS 25.331; XWDS 4.39; HR pp. 38–39. 72. Successions among brothers or same-generation cousins was practiced by the Kitan prior to Abaoji; see Mote, Imperial China, p. 55; Cambridge History of China, Vol. 6, pp. 60–62. 73. Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, p. 69.

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steppe communities with poorer hygiene, greater geographic mobility, and frequently recurring military conflict. Further evidence of fraternal succession in the not-too-distant past is implicit in an incident involving Li Kening, the only brother to survive Keyong. Believed by key insiders as cheated of his rightful inheritance when his nephew was installed, Kening became swept up in a conspiracy against Cunxu, the details of which appear in the next chapter. The attempted coup attests to lingering affinity for sibling succession within key segments of the Shatuo community.74 When news of his uncle’s actions reached Cunxu, he exclaimed, “Flesh-and-blood kin should not treat each other like so much fodder.” He worried that ensuing frictions among kinsmen might further fracture the leadership, where loyalties were preeminently personal. This placed greater pressure on him to validate his father’s choice of successor and prove that his youth might be turned to an asset. The audacity of his martial agenda in the coming decade may well spring from insecurities about suitability to lead. The heir to Jin power, without the benefit of a political honeymoon at home, had to hold his vigilance against the enemy within even as he advanced against rivals without.

Maternities Physical and Cultural Markings The standard historical sources reveal little of Cunxu’s physical traits, nor do they contain references to the exceptional markers that have long fascinated fortunetellers, like his father’s asymmetrical eyes. But contemporaries describe certain Shatuo men as having “deep eyes and whiskers,” traits common among the Uighurs of presentday Xinjiang, with their lithe bodies and light complexion.75 Clearly, intermarriage between the Shatuo and the Han peoples over generations likely produced a people neither distinctively Chinese nor Turkish, in the end. The official portrait of Zhuangzong as a man of forty, in Taiwan’s National Palace Museum, reveals a tall and stout physique, a well-groomed beard of resilient black, plus broad cheeks and prominent nose—his features handsome in the sense of being easy on the eye, but far from strapping (Plate 5). And remarkably, Cunxu’s skin appears free from the usual scars of war, despite two decades on the battlefield and innumerable close encounters with the enemy.76 As for non-physical qualities, the Historical Records describes the future emperor as highly charismatic, “a man endowed with an

74. JWDS 50.68587; XWDS 14.149–50; HR pp. 139–40; ZZTJ 266.8689–91; Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, pp. 163–69. 75. XWDS 43.467; HR p. 363. 76. Guoli Gugong bowuyuan, Gugong tuxiang xuancui, Figure 16.

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extraordinary physical as well as personal presence.”77 Seductive qualities of the sort are never attributed to his father. Born and raised at Jinyang, Cunxu’s mannerisms surely suited the tastes of China’s northwest as well. He presumably spoke the Shanxi local dialect, the tongue of his mother with its lilting consonants.78 But the influx of the Shatuo into northern and central Hedong over the course of the past century would have begun working its cultural influence on the region.79 Hunting, horsemanship, and other athletic activities would have reinserted themselves into local customs while the cuisine came to contain more bread, mutton, and milk products like yogurt and cheese. Relaxation surely involved vigorous dancing to the accompaniment of song, plus regular binges in wine and gambling, activities where people intermingled with casual indifference to Chinese practices of segregation based on class and gender. Lifestyles and values of the sort were rooted in the nomadic north, although the upper classes across North China had also assimilated them in Sui and Tang times.80 The boundaries between Han and Hu had been blurred many centuries before Cunxu’s birth.

Stepmother Liu For his entire life, and especially after his father’s death, Cunxu could draw upon two strong maternal influences, his father’s formal wife and his own biological mother. Woman Liu (d. 925), Keyong’s lifelong spouse, was without male issue, according to her husband’s tomb inscription, whereas Consort Cao gave birth to four males, including Cunxu.81 The two women were presumably Chinese in ancestry, but the meaning of “Chinese” may have differed from today, as the two surnames had been widely adopted by nomadic families for centuries.82 And it appears that marriage occurred in both directions, with a growing number of Jinyang’s elite families electing to marry the newcomers to create a multicultural mix. The most prominent case involved Meng Zhixiang, the future founder of the Later Shu, who took the niece of Keyong as his wife.83 Historically, interracial marriage often coincided with periods of minority rule, the means by which illustrious Han families insulated their social standing from the winds of political change; for precisely this reason, intermarriage usually came after the consolidation of dynastic power. The Later Tang experience in the early tenth century 77. 78. 79. 80. 81.

JWDS 27.365. XWDS 37.398; HR p. 310. Xu Tang shu, 1.6. Benn, China’s Golden Age, pp. 149–75 ff. Sekigen Seiyū, “Tōmi Shata Ri Koyō Riyō Boshi Yukuchū Kōsatsu,” Plate 7; XWDS 14.141–42, 150; HR pp. 130–31. 82. Deng, “Lun Wudai Songchu,” pp. 57–64. 83. Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, pp. 39, 75, 125, 166–68, 175–76, 180.

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differs by a considerable measure, inasmuch as the bonds between Shatuo ethnics and the Hedong elite were forged in the preceding century, at least two generations before their political power peaked. Such cross-fertilization of cultures so early on in the regime’s ascent goes far to explain the independent spirit and political savvy of the leading women in Keyong’s life, women who molded their son in a multiplicity of ways.84 Sources are silent on the social background of Woman Liu, but they do confirm ancestral origins in Daibei, the early Shatuo base in northern Shanxi, where the Liu surname had long been adopted by Inner Asian settlers, including the future founder of the Later Han, Liu Zhiyuan (895–948).85 Multiracial roots goes far to explain Woman Liu’s martial competencies. She became a regular presence in combat during Keyong’s ascent, where she advised him on a combination of military and political matters in the manner of a younger contemporary, the Lady Shulü, spouse of the Kitan leader Abaoji.86 Woman Liu even coached women in the Jin household in archery and horseback riding, activities that hearken back to the seventh century, when a daughter of the Tang founder once commanded a brigade composed mostly of men.87 Royal women had a long history of serving in support missions of the sort in Inner Asia and to a lesser extent the Chinese heartland, although the practice most likely originated abroad. Sources further reveal nerves of steel for Woman Liu as military advisor to her husband. On the heels of the banquet in 884 where Keyong suddenly disappeared, several aides had managed to escape and return to Jinyang to apprise her of events. Having deemed their flight an act of cowardice, “Woman Liu evinced not the faintest emotion as she summarily beheaded the cowardly men, then summoned senior officers for consultations.”88 Hers was a chilling statement on martial discipline consistent with the exacting standards of her husband, not an act of intemperance. Keyong returned a day later, smarting over the ambush and intent on retaliating against Zhu Wen. But his wife, diffusing the passions of the moment, calmly dissuaded him: “If you act preemptively in resorting to arms, then the Tang court will surely ascribe culpability to us.”89 In effect, political solutions through Changan should be exhausted to fully discredit the enemy before prosecuting a vendetta that risked alienating neutral parties. Woman Liu evinced special sensitivity to the wider ramifications of armed conflict and placed her kingdom’s interests in the long-term before the selfaggrandizing impulses of her husband in the short. Such political savvy suggests the life experiences of an educated, if not necessarily elite woman. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89.

XWDS 64.797; HR p. 521. XWDS 14.141; Deng, “Lun Wudai Songchu,” pp. 57–64. Mote, Imperial China, p. 50; LS, 71.1199–1200. Zhao, Tang Taizong zhuan, p. 24. JWDS 25.339; XWDS 14.141; ZZTJ 255.8307. Beimeng suoyan, 17.322.

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Keyong’s wife exhibited a similar pugnacity on another occasion, in 902, as the capital of Jinyang came under siege by Liang forces. The assault had come on the heels of serious territorial losses, which had shaken her husband to the point that he contemplated flight to the northern frontier. A foster son of Uighur extraction, Li Cunxin, further endorsed the evacuation. Woman Liu first impugned the competence of Cunxin, “a stupid shepherd with no standing to counsel on critical matters of strategy,” then pressured Keyong to stand firm. “Our troops have mostly absconded after the recent spate of setbacks,” she noted glibly. “Who will follow, if you lose this city? Even reaching the northern border is no certainty!”90 Her reasoning eventually convinced other officers, including the savvy Li Sizhao, who enjoined Keyong to persevere. Keyong’s new determination ultimately inspired warriors who had once abandoned him to rejoin his ranks, the rally of a unified Jinyang forcing invaders to retreat. In this way, Woman Liu came to rival Ge Yu as one of the most influential advisors to the senior Prince of Jin, especially in his initial decade in power. Woman Liu on occasion revealed a compassionate side in family affairs that diverged appreciably from her harsh public persona. The battle-hardened foster son, Li Cunxiao, after colluding with the enemy in 894, was soon compelled by the turn of events to reverse course.91 He approached Keyong about reconciliation and Keyong, in turn, dispatched his wife to console Cunxiao. Woman Liu was also present through the fiery exchange between the two men, where Cunxiao cited a laundry list of excuses for the betrayal, including the maligning of another foster son. Despite skepticism about motivations for the defection, Keyong and Woman Liu initially preferred to set aside the dictates of martial law by pardoning Cunxiao, but they faced a wall of resistance among senior commanders and only then conceded to imposing the death sentence. The sense of loss left Keyong, “unable to conduct affairs for over ten days,” raw emotions surely shared by his wife, in light of her empathy with Cunxiao from the outset. Reflecting the couple’s special affinity for the foster son, they insisted on burying Cunxiao in a mausoleum near the father’s future burial place, a tomb in northern Shanxi that has survived to this day (Plate 4). Sources divulge little of Cunxu’s feelings for his stepmother as a young man. The heralded friendship between the two leading women in his father’s life, Woman Liu and Consort Cao, likely helped to contain the worst of open conflict, but tensions are hard to avoid. As a rule in traditional China, the offspring of concubines often bear some resentment toward the legal wife, due to ambiguities about social obligations in life and ritual obligations in death—filial duties that form the foundation of personal morality.92 In addition, the superior pedigree of the legal wife and her dominance of 90. XWDS 4.38, 14.142, 36.386; HR pp. 37–38, 131, 299; XTS 218.6165; Beimeng suoyan, 17.323; Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, p. 185. 91. XWDS 36.393; HR p. 305. 92. For comments on the complex ritual obligations for adopted children, see XWDS 17.187–88; HR pp. 174–75.

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the “main household” usually positioned lesser women and their offspring for frictions with her. But in this particular case, Woman Liu’s early regard for Cunxu as an “esteemed son” and his mother as her “bosom friend” infer at least proper relations during the father’s lifetime.93 Any change would come later, after Cunxu’s accession as emperor.

Mother Cao Extant sources are far more revealing about Cunxu’s relationship with his biological mother, Consort Cao (d. 925), a Jinyang native. The eldest of her four surviving sons, Cunxu was likely her favorite, younger son Li Cunwo running a close second.94 She was the sole person able to surpass his father in influence, partly by outliving Keyong by nearly two decades and partly by force of personality. Although born to a “commoner household” (liangjiazi)—a family of neither aristocrats nor military professionals— she somehow managed to acquire the spirited independence that appealed to Keyong, a man likely a decade older than her.95 Sources do not divulge the circumstances by which Keyong came to acquire her as consort, but perhaps her family contained friends of the Prince who pitied him as a man approaching thirty with a barren wife and no potential heirs. Consort Cao came to counsel Keyong in the fashion of his formal wife, her “soberly worded admonitions” sparing the lives of many male associates to cross her spouse during moments of foul temper. She was equally “deft at deliberating matters,” that is, a woman of sound reasoning, according to the dynastic histories.96 Another source, Keyong’s tomb inscription, characterizes Woman Cao as, “pure and wise,” suggesting moral girth and a strong sense of self.97 She came to acquire such qualities by virtue of hard work, as well as sound instincts. Cunxu inherited the impulsiveness of his father, which required the heightened vigilance of his mother.98 The affections shared by mother and son was the stuff of legends. Even though his base of operations shifted to Weizhou after 915, Cunxu still visited Jinyang several times a year, his stays commonly exceeding a month and sometimes several months. Subjects near and far marveled at the genuineness of his filial devotion, especially for a man with his own consorts and children. The passionate Cunxu would fancy many in life, but like Alexander the Great, he loved no one like his mother by birth, which

93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98.

XWDS 14.142; HR p. 131. XWDS 14.150–51; HR pp. 140–41; WDHY 1.19. JWDS 49.671. XWDS 14.142; HR p. 131; JWDS 49.671–72. Sekigen Seiyū, “Tōmi Shata Ri Koyō Riyō Boshi Yukuchū Kōsatsu,” Plate 8. XWDS 14.142; HR p. 131; JWDS 72.950; CFYG 27.277–78.

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probably produced ambivalence toward any rival for his affections, including his stepmother, Woman Liu.99 The depth of their attachment, and ease with which they acknowledged it, emerges in an exchange in 911, after Cunxu consented to intervene at the Zhao satrapy at the behest of its potentate, a historic move for the Shatuo regime. Consort Cao had opposed his command of armies mostly due to the separation of mother and son, the perils of combat relegated to secondary status in her pleas to the twenty-seven-year-old: As age takes its toll, I would be satisfied with the simple retention of the kingdom bequeathed by the Former Prince. Nothing else can justify your exposure to the elements and our inability to meet for our daily greetings at dusk and dawn!

Her words reveal separation pangs for the moment as well as anxieties that higher ambitions were certain to produce separations of greater distance and duration in the future. She would gladly trade the promise of future glory for the pleasure of companionship today, which by her own admission, involved visits at least twice a day. Cunxu would respond by invoking the memory of his father, “The Last Will and Testament of the Former Prince commands me to eradicate an old rival, while conditions east of the mountains are too opportune to ignore.”100 After failing to change his mind, Mother Cao insisted on accompanying Cunxu as he set off for the eastern front. At the same time, this deeply sentimental woman could be severe in chastising Cunxu, especially once her husband died and responsibilities of the sort fell solely upon her shoulders. Cunxu could do little at Jinyang that missed her alert ears, and Mother Cao never ceased to worry over the self-indulgent side of her son, which threatened to undermine the family’s carefully crafted image. Just as his entourage swelled as prince, so did Cunxu’s fondness for gambling. Sometime around 917, after indulging with friends, he pressed fiscal overseer Zhang Chengye to replenish the pot by tapping into the local treasury. “Our kingdom’s public funds cannot be put to personal use,” the eunuch insisted. An unseemly confrontation ensued as the Prince, either drunk or offended by the eunuch’s language, drew his sword in a threatening manner. Chengye crafted an astute response, his tenor shifting from defiant to sober as he diffused tensions by stirring feelings of filial guilt: “When the dying prince, [Keyong], entrusted you to my care, I swore an oath to avenge the wrong against our royal house and principality. Should I die today because My Prince desires things from the treasury, at least I will bring no shame to the Former Prince.”101 And true to principle, he released nothing else. Mother Cao instantly learned of her son’s confrontation with Chengye and summoned him for a verbal thrashing followed by flogging with a light rod. She also 99. On the parallels with Alexander the Great, see footnote 70. 100. JWDS 49.672. 101. XWDS 38.404; HR p. 317; JWDS 72.950.

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dispatched an aide to apologize to the eunuch, referring to Cunxu, then in his thirties, as “the boy.”102 Petrified at the prospect of displeasing his mother, Cunxu had apologized to Chengye a day earlier, a gesture that the eunuch initially spurned. And he proceeded to Chengye’s residence in the company of Mother Cao to render a second apology in as many days, again at her insistence.103 The mother’s diligent monitoring lends evidence to a reckless streak in Cunxu familiar to intimates, a tendency to test boundaries, especially for authority figures. The fact that he endured the thrashing without the slightest diminution of affection for Mother Cao suggests that corporal punishment of the sort was not unexpected of her, despite the son’s advanced age. The prolonged adolescence of Cunxu and the delayed weaning of his mother may also help to explain the juvenile outbursts that continued well into middle age, including Cunxu’s years as Son of Heaven. It may also help to explain his proclivity to bend to the will of his wife in marriage. Cunxu has all the markings of a henpecked husband.

Lady Chen Keyong had another consort, and Cunxu another stepmother, in the person of Lady  Chen. Native to south central China, the city of Xiangzhou, she was once a ranking consort of a Tang emperor, who in a special act of favor conferred her upon Keyong in 895 along with four female palace singers.104 She was surely an attractive woman by dint of credentials as imperial consort, while origin in the heartland infers Chinese ancestry. She appears to have been a decade younger than Consort Cao and two decades younger than Woman Liu. Keyong and Consort Chen came to share such intimacy that she was the only female companion afforded access to him during a bout of depression on the heels of a precipitous dip in fortunes. And in the last days of Keyong’s life, she alone was permitted to administer his medicine. Consort Chen had no known children and left the royal household upon Keyong’s death to become a Buddhist nun.105 Sources divulge little about the Consort’s relations with Woman Liu, formal wife and head of the household, but her bonds with Mother Cao and Cunxu proved deep and abiding. Soon after his accession as Prince of Jin in 908, Cunxu honored Consort Chen with a religious title in recognition of her devotion to Buddhism. And in 924, upon relocating the capital to Luoyang, he conferred another title upon Woman Chen and arranged her relocation to a nearby nunnery to facilitate access to Mother Cao, a sign of continued amity between these two former consorts of Keyong.

102. 103. 104. 105.

XWDS, 38.404; ZZTJ 270.8820. XWDS 38.404; HR pp. 317–18; JWDS 72.951–52; CFYG 660.7683. JWDS 49.673–74. Sekigen Seiyū, “Tōmi Shata Ri Koyō Riyō Boshi Yukuchū Kōsatsu,” Plate 8.

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Interestingly, the several leading women in Keyong’s life, surviving him by nearly two decades, never lost their affections for him nor their affinity for one another. However powerful his passion for feminine beauty, diminished only slightly by the passage of time, Keyong clearly possessed exceptional personal qualities that compensated for the roving eye.106 By all indications, each woman provided a different kind of companionship at different stages in his life, the three as dissimilar from one another as they differed from him. Sources portray neither Woman Liu nor Consort Cao as physically beautiful, a sign that Keyong placed other considerations before beauty in choosing spouses, factors ranging from intellect and integrity to martial competence. His son, to the contrary, tended to be drawn to the superficial in not just female companions, but male friends.

Empress Liu The fourth woman to assume prominence in Cunxu’s life, eclipsing the others in time, was his second wife, Consort Liu (891?–926). The senior Prince of Jin, Keyong, had been in combat to the east at Weizhou, probably in 896, when he came upon the Chinese girl, granddaughter of a fortuneteller and medicine man, and brought her back to Jinyang to be reared in his household at six sui.107 For the next decade, she served Mother Cao as maid, someone never intended to rise higher. By fifteen sui, the girl with the coif of a maiden instantly impressed Cunxu, then just over twenty and without a son. He must have come across the girl through visits to his mother’s residence, but he now saw Consort Liu for the first time as an object of desire. A shared affinity for song and dance served to further solidify their bond. She quickly gave birth to a boy, Jiji, her sole son to reach adulthood. Further advancement for her thus came to rest upon his survival and success. A second source of insecurity for the Consort relates to the other women in Cunxu’s harem, several of whom continued to enjoy favor. Her position in the palace never secure, Consort Liu acquired emotional scars that shaped a radically different personality from the previous generation of female companions, women with decades of exposure to public life. Cunxu had taken a formal wife sometime in his mid-teens, Lady Han, the offspring of a distinguished clan from Jinyang, the sort of pedigree lacking in his father’s spouses.108 She was the woman selected by his parents as partner, so their relations were conventionally proper but not particularly passionate, based on Cunxu’s numerous extramarital dalliances and the absence of children for the couple. For companionship, he turned initially to Woman Hou, the former wife of a vanquished Liang officer. Like 106. On the romantic impulses of Keyong, see Xu Tang shu, 35.323. 107. XWDS 14.143–46; HR pp. 132–37; JWDS 49.674; Beimeng suoyan, 17.332–33; Xu Tang shu, 35.324–27, 37.342. 108. XWDS 14.143, 14.146–47; HR pp. 132, 136–37; JWDS 92.1223.

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the previous generation of royal women, Woman Hou regularly attended Cunxu in battle, her intelligence about the enemy as a former Liang subject likely a major asset. Sometime around 915, as Cunxu turned thirty, Woman Hou found herself replaced on the front lines by Woman Liu, who by then possessed martial skills of her own.109 For a former maid distinguished as a teenager for her sensual gifts, the acquisition of martial competencies in her twenties must have entailed conscious effort. Still, retaining the devotion of her spouse and overcoming the reservations of the powerful remained ongoing challenges before this daughter of a fortuneteller could rise to empress.

Inner Circle Among the unrelated members of Cunxu’s inner circle, several figures emerged as pillars of the administration: Zhang Chengye (845–922), acclaimed eunuch at the Jinyang palace, Guo Chongtao (d. 926), the cocky military commissioner, and Li  Siyuan (867–933), his father’s most revered adopted son. Chengye dominated decision-making at Jinyang during Cunxu’s reign as prince, while Chongtao presided over affairs after his accession as emperor. Siyuan’s relationship with Cunxu was the most enduring, having spanned his entire life as comrade-in-arms, but it also proved the most troubled. The three men were important assets bequeathed by Keyong, individuals with a strong ethical core and independent spirit that promised to contain the worst impulses in his imperfect son.

Eunuch Zhang Unlike the stereotype of eunuchs as reflected in the dynastic histories for Han and Tang times, Zhang Chengye personified the opposite as a man of scrupulous ethics and political vision. His original surname, Kang, was popular among Inner Asians at the time, but nothing in the background of Chengye suggests unorthodox ethnic roots. The surname Zhang was conferred upon entering the palace, presumably through adoption by the senior eunuch. Born near the western capital of Changan, he came to know Keyong as court-appointed coordinator for bandit suppression, in the early-tomid 890s, and later as military inspector on assignment at Jinyang. Chengye conducted secret negotiations between the Tang emperor and the Prince of Jin at different times, then remained at the Jin capital after 904, when the court exterminated seven hundred eunuchs in Changan at the instigation of Zhu Wen, the future Liang emperor. Imperial mandates to governors across the country to conduct similar liquidations in the locales were ignored by Keyong, who extended sanctuary

109. XWDS 14.143; HR pp. 132–33.

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to Chengye instead.110 The near-death experience left Chengye deeply indebted to Keyong in life and devoted to his memory in death. It also caused him to be decisive, even aggressive, in neutralizing potential threats either to himself or his Shatuo patrons, a surprising trait for a castrate raised amidst the palatial comforts of Changan. He exceeded expectations in other regards as well. As chief administrator for the Jinyang palace, Chengye emerged as its daily manager as well as senior strategist. He neutralized challengers to Cunxu’s succession as prince in 908, as shown in Chapter 2, by rallying sympathizers across the domain, including key foster brothers.111 Chengye thereby quickly cemented his political relationship with the young prince. Cunxu liked to acknowledge Chengye as Qige, “Seventh Brother,” implying an affinity akin to siblings.112 Still, Chengye shunned the role conventionally associated with eunuchs as spoiling nanny.113 Someone senior to Cunxu by forty years, he evolved instead into the principal male authority after the father’s passing, or perhaps more accurately, a surrogate uncle. Chengye and Mother Cao were kindred spirits, individuals with shared experiences and similar values. Emanating from this cooperative spirit was a royal principality better run than most dynasties of the era: efficient and incorruptible. “Chengye consistently applied the rule of law to rein in everyone at Jinyang . . . the rich and powerful all recoiling their hands in response to his intimidating presence.”114 By demanding sacrifice of ruler and subject alike, the eunuch engineered the miracle of turning a small kingdom with few resources and many enemies into a powerhouse for the entire north in the short span of a generation. Chengye’s proven loyalty to the Jin royal house made him the principal check on Cunxu, after his mother. In the confrontation cited earlier over monies to wager, the eunuch assumes the moral high ground by resisting pressure from Cunxu: “As eunuch commissioner of long standing, Your Subject acts not on behalf of my own posterity. Rather, I treasure the money, quite simply, because it will advance Your Highness’s mission of world dominance.” He goes on to reiterate the solemn promise made at the deathbed of Cunxu’s father, “to avenge the wrong against the Jin royal family and the kingdom behind it.”115 Here, filial duty resonates with the young prince where civic duty does not, which Chengye exploits with maximum effect. In navigating the headstrong characters of father and son, no figure at Jinyang could rival Chengye, a feat attributable to his unassailable ethics.

110. XWDS 1.8, 38.403–04; HR pp. 11, 316–19; Cambridge History of China, Vol. 3, p. 780; JWDS 26.351, 72.949–53; ZZTJ 266.8675–76; CFYG 660.7683, 668.7698. 111. JWDS 27.367–68. 112. ZZTJ 270.8820. 113. Ma, Shiren, huangdi, huanguan, pp. 146–56. 114. XWDS 38.404; HR p. 317. 115. XWDS 38.404; HR p. 317; CFYG 668.7701.

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Chengye possessed credentials in both the civil and military worlds. He could also boast credentials in fiscal management, important duties assumed by eunuchs in the last century of Tang rule.116 His service as military inspector provided entry into military affairs in the broadest sense, from commanding armies to managing operations. He figured prominently in procuring horses for a region with limited supplies, a key factor in the Jin kingdom’s final victory.117 As the regime’s chief civilian administrator, Chengye recruited talent at a time of unique need at home and rising opportunity abroad. Feng Dao had drifted to Jinyang in 911, having served as a minor aide at the rapidly dissolving Yan kingdom.118 His exceptional literary skills and engaging personality so impressed Chengye that he offered a prominent post, despite objections from colleagues concerned about his limited experience and peasant mannerisms. Decades later, Dao’s spectacular achievements in the political realm would validate the intuition of his earliest patron, the chief eunuch of Jinyang.119 The independent spirit of Chengye extended to military affairs. Personal experience at organizing and leading armies had sensitized him to the ruler’s need to avoid micromanaging commanders in the field, the natural tendency in difficult times. To the contrary, he reasoned, tenuous conditions should present precisely the occasion to convey confidence through continuity in leadership and policy. During a major offensive against Liang positions at Baixiang in 911, to cite one example, Cunxu, just three years into his reign as prince, had censured senior commander Zhou Dewei for excessive dallying in deploying his men. Equating caution with cravenness, he demanded immediate action. The eunuch calmly interceded to commend Dewei’s exemplary record, while citing the negative consequences of overruling one’s own surrogates. Dewei did eventually take action once conditions turned favorable, his rout of the enemy validating the foresight of Chengye.120 The value of Dewei to the Jin would surge in coming years, a man likely lost much sooner had Cunxu ignored the eunuch’s council.

The Strategic Genius of Guo Chongtao After the death of Chengye in 922, his successor as Cunxu’s alter ego was the equally brash and independent Guo Chongtao.121 He was native to Daizhou, northern Shanxi, where the Shatuo had become a sizable presence in the course of his lifetime.122 He worked initially for a brother of Keyong in various advisory capacities, and when Cambridge History of China, Vol. 3, pp. 600–601; Ma, Shiren, huangdi, huanguan, pp. 275–80. CFYG 668.7698. JWDS 72.950; XWDS 25.260–61, 54.612; HR p. 439; ZZTJ 268.8747. JWDS 72.950; Wudai shihua, pp. 45–47; Wang, “Feng Tao: An Essay on Confucian Loyalty,” pp. 123–45; Lu, “Lun Feng Dao de shengya,” pp. 287–330. 120. JWDS 27.371, 56.751–53, 72.950; CFYG 688.7701. 121. XWDS 24.245–51; HR pp. 212–19; Wang, The Structure of Power in North China, pp. 109–15; JWDS 57.762–72; CFYG 331.3734–35, 406.4604. 122. XWDS 24.245–51; HR pp. 212–19.

116. 117. 118. 119.

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the brother died in 890, entered Keyong’s service for nearly two decades. By 917, then likely in his fifties, he became senior military advisor to Cunxu through the recommendation of outgoing advisor Meng Zhixiang. By then, Chongtao’s service to Jin satraps had spanned much of his lifetime.123 At princely domains, the purview of the senior military advisor (zhongmenshi) extended from military affairs to finances and policy, much like military commissioners under the Later Tang. Cunxu had a reputation for managing his senior staff with a heavy hand, causing several of Chongtao’s predecessors to be executed for abuses of power or poor judgment.124 Despite the wellknown perils of service, Chongtao refused to be deterred. Only occasionally did Chongtao lead armies, but he possessed a veritable sixthsense when it came to exploiting changing conditions and fleeting opportunities to accomplish the grandest of feats, his intuition surpassing the best of field commanders. Despite limited literacy, he held the literature on warfare at his fingertips. Chongtao also had the courage of his convictions, so in the summer of 923, he concocted a seemingly suicidal scheme to flush out enemy commander Wang Yanzhang at Yunzhou, then personally volunteered to lead the advance guard. As fate would have it, the scenario unfolded with the requisite speed and decisiveness that enabled Chongtao to prevail.125 In his willingness to embrace high risk for dramatic gain, Chongtao differed demonstrably from the conservative Zhang Chengye, his predecessor. Strong yet informed convictions also explain Chongtao’s stubborn rejection of compromise in war, audacity well suited to the adventurous Prince of Jin. Chongtao’s historic moment came in the late summer of 923, after a newly converted Liang commander divulged plans for a blitzkrieg against the Jin. Most officers preferred to relinquish the single Jin holding south of the Yellow River to buttress defenses in the north. Chongtao countered that the act of retreat would surely demoralize troops and trigger other negative repercussions. Instead, he advocated ingeniously aggression for aggression, “Your Majesty should divide armies to defend Weizhou, fortify Yangliu, then deploy forces from Yunzhou to expel the enemy from their nests, thereby delivering the world to us in less than a month!”126 His words instantly buoyed the despondent Cunxu, “The deed of a true man,” he declared in embracing the plan to attack the Liang capital. The venture permitted the Prince of Jin to cast himself in the image of the iconic Tang Taizong, who defied skeptics centuries earlier in proposing a high-stakes raid on the Sui capital, which ultimately toppled the dynasty.127 Similarly for the Later Tang, the final thrust against the enemy would proceed at a breakneck pace, precisely as Chongtao had predicted. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127.

XWDS 64.797; HR p. 521. XWDS 24.245, 64.797; HR pp. 212, 521. XWDS 24.246; HR p. 213; JWDS 57.763–64. XWDS 24.246–47; HR pp. 213–14; JWDS 57.765. Zhao, Tang Taizong zhuan, p. 22.

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The relationship between Chongtao and Cunxu was never wholly free of tensions, but ongoing war provided a cohesive that weakened under conditions of peace. The Prince of Jin was always something of an authoritarian, proclivities that seem to have worsened as emperor, the similarities between the two men making for a difficult collaboration.128 As military commissioner at the Tongguang court, Chongtao managed affairs with a firm hand but sound policies. He expected circumspection of everyone and lambasted the slightest excess. Much like the eunuch Zhang Chengye, he countenanced little in the way of needless spending for any sector of government, scrutiny that extended to the palace. Chongtao’s counsel on governance after the 923 accession would prove as astute as his strategic council beforehand. He proved especially eloquent on decisions reached in moments of passion. The legendary tempers of the Princes of Jin, Keyong and Cunxu, caused Ouyang Xiu to conclude in the Historical Records, “Barbarians are by nature intemperate and their benevolence lacks clarity, often causing courtiers of the day to lose their lives without legitimate cause.”129 His views seem to mirror the prejudices of many a contemporary as pertains to the nomadic character: the poor temperaments of Shatuo leaders reflected differences in their natural constitution, rather than expressions of culture, environment, or personality. Chongtao knew better as a native of the northern borderlands and could thereby challenge Jin princes without offending them. There was no better choice as court overseer for that critical first reign of the Later Tang, when an ethnically diverse inner circle remained vulnerable to conflicts of every sort. Meanwhile, Cunxu deserves credit for retaining the services of Chongtao through years of bitter differences. His affinity for the senior aide never rose to the level of his father’s fondness for Ge Yu, but Cunxu and Chongtao found common ground in grand ambitions for the dynasty.

Adopted Brother Li Siyuan No man would shadow Cunxu throughout his adult life like adopted brother Li Siyuan, known originally by the name Miaojilie.130 His biological father, Ni, hailed from Yanmen, northern Shanxi, had risen to chieftain under Keyong due to his special gifts as horseman and archer. Siyuan inherited his father’s warrior skills, while honing his own instincts as strategist. His ethnicity was long presumed to be Shatuo. In reality, the dynastic histories simply identify him as a “northern barbarian” (yidi), a term often used for non-Shatuo northerners, so he may well have been a member of a lesser known ethnic group.131 128. 129. 130. 131.

ZZTJ 270.8843. XWDS 6.66–67; HR pp. 63–64. XWDS 6.53–67; HR pp. 51–64. For my biography of Siyuan, see From Warhorses to Ploughshares. A recent biographer of Li Keyong argues that Siyuan was not necessarily a Shatuo ethnic, noting that the official histories merely identify him as a “northern barbarian”; see Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, p. 80. In my

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It was Keyong’s father, Guochang, who initially mentored Siyuan at thirteen sui, after the death of his father, but it was Keyong who adopted him as son and conferred a new name containing the generational identifier “Si,” consistent with the naming pattern for foster sons. The teenager appears to have lived in the royal compound at Jinyang, allowing close bonds to be formed with members of the royal family, as this outsider became an assimilated Shatuo. Keyong had no biological sons when Siyuan arrived at Jinyang and tended to shower the bulk of his paternal affections upon a growing brood of surrogate sons. Siyuan was the supernova within this cluster of martial stars. He was widely heralded for leading elite cavalry in “stampedes of fury” that accomplished near miracles in combat. In the course of military actions at Xingzhou and Mingzhou, for example, arrows had punctured his body in four places, yet Siyuan still finished by forcing the enemy into ignominious flight despite serious injury. Such dedication caused Keyong, “to use his own garment to serve as dressing for the younger man’s wounds.”132 Later in life, Siyuan would reminisce on the rare degree of acceptance within his adopted family, and especially bonds with Keyong’s father, Guochang, whom he likened to a father.133 Validation of those affections required martial exploits of escalating difficulty long after Keyong’s death, each feat of Siyuan a challenge for Cunxu, the son of privilege. Cunxu was unaccustomed to being eclipsed by others, in light of his own legendary exploits, except in the case of Siyuan. Ultimately, the competition between the two men was keen because their martial gifts were similarly stellar. In a battle near Zhaozhou, in 911, the Liang dynasty had arrayed its crack cavalry on red and white horses. Cunxu intimated his own anxiety at the sight of the horses, in a moment of rare modesty, only for Siyuan to respond with an air of self-assurance that bordered on condescension, “They are a mere mirage, horses that will revert to our corrals by tomorrow!”134 It was no bluff, for Siyuan in an instant leaped onto a horse to charge Liang horsemen, apprehending two attending officers before returning. In time, the most critical missions came his way, starting with the campaign against the Yan kingdom in the northeast in 913, which involved standing down its powerful ally to the north, the Kitan. Siyuan was also architect of the drive on Kaifeng in 923, in consultation with Guo Chongtao.135 Whether pitted against foreign or domestic foes, he seemed invincible and served, along with Chongtao, as the vision behind the throne. The final conquest of North China was unthinkable without the guidance of Chongtao and Siyuan. And fittingly, its retention would prove impossible in their absence.

132. 133. 134. 135.

biography of Mingzong, I have assumed Shatuo ethnicity, consistent with centuries of historical consensus, but I can offer little direct evidence; see Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, pp. 1–31. XWDS 6.53; HR pp. 51–52. JWDS 35.491. XWDS 6.53–54; HR p. 52. Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, pp. 37–38.

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At the same time, competition between Cunxu and Siyuan would produce frictions that punctuated much of their political lives, reducing the pair of martial geniuses to petty acrimony and Machiavellian intrigue. Historians have conventionally attributed the problem to the superiority of Siyuan and the jealousy of Cunxu as a lesser man. A sharp eye for talent had caused Siyuan to recruit the scrappiest fighters for his own armies, making them nearly invincible. In battle against the Yan satrapy in 913, Siyuan captured a militia leader of imposing valor, Yuan Xingqin, and cemented bonds by adopting him as foster son. Cunxu soon learned of the man’s abilities and arranged a transfer to his own army while conferring another name.136 The contest over Yuan Xingqin, a short five years into Cunxu’s reign as prince, became an early sign of competition with Siyuan over human resources, the Prince seeming to target the older man’s armies for the greatest siphoning of talent. Anxious to deflate suspicions apparent even to the rank-and-file, Gao Xingzhou, a deputy of Siyuan, would remind Cunxu sometime around 915, “It is solely in the service of Your Highness that we cultivate a cohort of stalwart soldiers.”137 The reassurance helped little, and Cunxu began expanding his own cohort of foster sons, after shunning the practice during his initial years as prince. Competition with Siyuan was surely the leading factor in this change of heart. Tensions surfaced again in late 923, at a banquet for decorated Liang commanders on the heels of victory over the dynasty. The dead emperor’s hall for formal audience, the Chongyuan Palace, had been selected as venue, a stage that automatically placed the assemblage of high-profile deserters on edge. In the course of the banquet, Cunxu mused in a toast to the men, his eyes fixed provocatively on Siyuan, “My most intimidating foes of yesterday joining us in drink today—who but you could have done so?” Those final words horrified the commanders, who sensed a combination of jealousy toward the brother and mistrust toward them. Virtually everyone fell flat on the floor in obeisance, only for Cunxu’s numinous tone to turn suddenly jocular, “I am merely poking fun at my chief officer, Siyuan. Your fears are hardly necessary!”138 The levity of Cunxu had fallen flat for everyone, although the even-tempered Siyuan stood erect throughout the episode. Moreover, the passage suggests that a dangerous rivalry had evolved whose repercussions might well extend to men even marginally associated with some perceived rival, a net that extended well beyond Siyuan’s immediate circle. It did not take long before differences between the adopted brothers became grist for rumormongers and soothsayers.

136. XWDS 25.270; HR p. 227; Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, p. 35. 137. ZZTJ 269.8794. 138. XWDS 46.505; HR p. 386; JWDS 30.412, 30.417; CFYG 111.1207; Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, p. 25. For a slightly different version, see JWDS 64.852.

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Sometime before 922, a fortuneteller renowned for reading faces, Zhou Xuanbao, was invited by an aide to Siyuan to identify him in a test of the man’s talents.139 After deftly distinguishing Siyuan from an imposter, he proceeded to characterize him as “a commander of precious promise” ( guijiang). It was widely known that the phrase, “man of precious promise” ( guiren), had been employed by a fortuneteller centuries earlier with reference to Taizong of Tang on the eve of purging his own father.140 Siyuan tried to recruit Xuanbao for his staff, relenting only under pressure from aides more sensitive to appearances. Gossip about imperial ambitions somehow rose to high places all the same. After acceding as emperor, Cunxu insisted on planting informants in the entourage of his adopted brother for purposes of spying, his actions serving to further poison relations instead.141 A marginally literate Siyuan knew less of Chinese history relative to Cunxu, yet he needed no classical education to have learned of the “Xuanwu Gate Affair,” at the outset of the Tang. In 626, nine years into the dynasty, founder Li Yuan (Gaozu, r. 618–26) was purged by second son Li Shimin (Taizong, r. 626–49) in the wake of ongoing tensions between Shimin and Li Jiancheng, Shimin’s eldest brother and the designated heir to the throne.142 In a classic instance of sibling rivalry, the heir-apparent brooded endlessly over the martial feats of the second son, especially a string of victories against the Tujue-Turks. The brothers initially tried to outmaneuver one another over financial resources and palace networks, and later mobilized assassins and armies. In the end, the highly appealing Shimin murdered the son of privilege, Jiancheng, and then compelled Li Yuan to abdicate, the father finishing his days under house arrest. The act of fratricide, and the wider purge of palace enemies in its wake, might well have unraveled the young dynasty. Yet miraculously, Taizong rose to the challenge. Motivated by the need to legitimize the house of Tang, he became a model of conscientious rule for centuries to come, the Zhenguan reign synonymous with dynastic splendor. Such recent history was certain to leave Tang restorationists in the tenth century anxious to a fault. Cunxu was programmed for paranoia toward closest kin, a group that constituted a bulwark of support for the throne under most dynasties, while Siyuan was reduced to defensiveness about his aspirations. Would he become the Shimin of his day, the anointed hand by which history repeated itself ? Movement forward involved a fixed eye on the past. Sadly, the weight of Tang history effectively doomed any long-term collaboration between the illustrious co-founders of the Later Tang, Cunxu and Siyuan.

139. 140. 141. 142.

XWDS 48.309; HR pp. 234–35; JWDS 71.945–46; Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, pp. 25–26. JTS 2.21; XWDS 28.309. XWDS 38.408, 51.573; HR pp. 321, 411. Cambridge History of China, Vol. 3, pp. 182–89; Zhao, Tang Taizong zhuan, pp. 62–83; ZZTJ 191.6004– 14; XTS 79.3540–45.

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The Lord of Nanping For the short-term, historical memory as pertains to high Tang did not humble so much as embolden the men and women in Cunxu’s inner circle. Despite differences in profession, race, and temperament, they were zealous in faith in the potential of their sovereign to surpass nomadic conquerors of the past in uniting the Four Corners. This partly explains the decision in 925 to invade Shu, modern Sichuan, so soon after consolidating control over the Central Plains. Even the illustrious leaders of the Tuoba Wei (Tabgach), who preceded the Shatuo in occupying the Chinese heartland from bases in Shanxi, could hardly have imagined conquering that vast and resource rich region to the southwest. The elevated passes of the Qinling Mountains along Shu’s northern border presented the first hurdle to horse-bound conquerors, a tradition of local autonomy presented a second hurdle, and the high humidity of the summer presented a third. Such obstacles of history and nature entailed wholly different challenges relative to conquering the fairly level Central Plains. The official histories attribute the timing to external factors like the advice of diplomats recently returned from the region.143 But Cunxu’s sense of mission also fueled his ambitions. The overlord of Nanping, a small kingdom in central China, Gao Jixing, appeared at the Tongguang court in the eleventh month of 923, intent on discerning fact from fiction, separating Cunxu the legend from the man. The two men exchanged confidences during the long audience, where the emperor divulged his determination to pacify belligerent states to the south. He then solicited input from Jixing on which belligerent, Wu to the east and Shu to the west, to target for the first of several offensives and the best approach for his armies. The conversation had occurred scarcely one month after overtaking Kaifeng and Jixing surely found talk of another major mobilization highly premature, although he chose to humor the throne. Later reflections on the audience are invaluable as a mirror on Zhuangzong’s extraordinary personal traits, a combination of magnetic allure and appalling narcissism. The comments of the Nanping governor about the Son of Heaven appear disparaging at first glance: His Majesty is given to bombast in the presence of senior courtiers, writing passages from the Spring and Autumn Annals and commenting, “On the tips of these fingers I managed to conquer the world!” He boasts and brags in this way, wasting time on hunting jaunts as affairs of state commonly get cast aside. I see little in him to cause worry.144

Despite his negativism, Jixing bears unintended witness to the monarch’s disarming charisma. He had been patted on the back as their meeting drew to a close, an act

143. XWDS 63.792–93; HR pp. 516–17. 144. XWDS 69.856–57; HR p. 587; JWDS 133.1752; SGCQ, 100.1433; ZZTJ 272.8910.

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so humbling that Jixing directed craftsmen back home to embroider a likeness of the handprint on his robe as a permanent memento. For a man almost twice the age of Zhuangzong, the response of Jixing to a clap on the back reflects the sort of seductive charm that had won converts in the past. But, with the seduction over, how long would the marriage last?

2 Vassals and Kings

The campaigns of the ancient Emperor Tang began with the state of Ge. When he marched against the east, barbarians to the west sighed in lament; and when he advanced against the south, barbarians to the north grumbled, “Why does he not pacify our lands first?” The people yearned for him as they yearned for a rainbow after the direst of droughts. The Mencius, Book 1, Part B

Generational Rifts Demise of an Icon Death has a way of destabilizing empires organized around hereditary succession, yet transitions for the Shatuo Turks proved more volatile than most. Li Keyong died of a brain tumor on the nineteenth day of the first month (908.01.19).1 Interment ensued months later at Daizhou, halfway between Taiyuan and Datong in northern Shanxi, where he had once served as prefect. The eldest of eight surviving sons, Cunxu succeeded as Prince of Jin, consistent with his father’s dying wishes. Twenty-seven days of rigorous mourning ensued. But even before the deceased could be laid to rest, a plot would unfold that tested the mettle of Cunxu when loyalties to persons collide with deference for traditions.2 Historical sources characterize Uncle Kening as “benevolent and filial,” but at the same time, a gullible man easily swayed by manipulative sorts with agendas of their own.3 The noblest of the numerous biological brothers of Keyong, someone given to placing family and community before private interests, Kening served as “interim 1. 2.

3.

Dates follow Chinese convention: year/month/day based on the lunar calendar. Only dates converted to the Julian calendar appear as month/day/year. Some sources cite Luoluo as Keyong’s eldest son; see JWDS 26.354; WDHY 2.15. The names of Keyong’s other sons contain the character “Cun,” consistent with the family’s naming pattern, which is not the case for Luoluo. More importantly, his name does not appear on Keyong’s tomb inscription; see Sekigen Seiyū, “Tōmi Shata Ri Koyō Riyō Boshi Yukuchū Kōsatsu,” p. 23. On Kening’s coup, see XWDS 14.149–50; HR pp.139–40; JWDS 27.367–68, 49.671–72, 50.685–87; ZZTJ 266.8688–91; CFYG 668.7698; Xu Tang shu, 37.340–41; Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, pp. 163–69.

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overseer” during Keyong’s incapacitating final months, a sign of special trust. He and eunuch Zhang Chengye were at the bedside of Keyong to witness his death-bed plea, “to protect and secure the succession” of his eldest son. Clearly, little had occurred in the form of pre-arrangement, no formal investiture of Cunxu as heir, even though father-to-son successions had been practiced for several generations of Shatuo leaders at this point. Thus, clouding the emotion of final goodbyes were anxieties as to whether the royal family and extended clan would embrace Keyong’s politically unproven son. Cunxu was still deeply immersed in mourning during the third month when Chengye unceremoniously interrupted to issue a chilling alert: “The utmost expression of filial piety involves preserving the Jin legacy and protecting the royal house.” The eunuch’s menacing language left little doubt that the succession was more imperiled than appearances seemed to suggest.

Foster Sons in Profusion The premiere problem for Cunxu and Chengye was the profusion of informally adopted sons of Keyong, dubbed in official sources as “foster sons” ( yi’er) or “fictive sons” ( jiazi), a group distinct from formally adopted boys, yangzi or sizi, who tended to be adopted as children and raised in the royal compound. Up to one hundred males had been taken under Keyong’s wing and given new names as foster sons, which multiplied by the foster sons of his sons and siblings, represented thousands of men.4 “The most intrepid and fiercely martial warriors of the age,” they populated the upper echelons of an elite fighting force, the “Army of Foster Sons,” which contributed appreciably to creating Shatuo invincibility in the field. The practice of informal adoptions and even the term yi’er likely originated with the Tujue Turks many centuries earlier, a practice designed to expand their numbers by assimilating other ethnic groups; in this regard, the bulk of foster sons under the Tujue hailed from other parts of Inner Asian.5 Adoptions for the principal purpose of embellishing armies appears to be a phenomenon unique to the Five Dynasties, but with some important differences relative to the past. Under Shatuo rule, Chinese natives from the margins of society comprised a clear majority of the foster sons, while ethnics from Inner Asia were a minority, for the core purpose had shifted to recruiting the best in martial talent. The most accomplished foster sons rose fast as favorites of Keyong, who “privileged them to costumes and courtesies like sons of a formal wife.” The lack of distinction between formally and informally adopted boys flew in the face of social custom in China, where adoptions 4. 5.

Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, pp. 69–75. I have previously translated yi’er more literally as “Righteous Sons”; see XWDS 36.385–96; HR pp. 296–308. On the adoption practices of the Tujue, see Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, p. 69; for the Yuan dynasty, see Liu, “Yuandai shouyang zhidu yanjiu,” pp. 113–24, respectively.

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are consummated with care and sanctioned by legal authorities as well as society at large.6 The conflating of privileges for foster sons and biological sons within the military elite presented another breach of convention. Unimagined charity forged fidelity in many foster sons, but a visible minority would exploit their position to abuse the local populace, intrigue against one another, and incite rifts between real and fictive sons. Never formally adopted through legal registry, foster sons most likely lacked inheritance rights as well as standing in political successions. Primary sources for the tenth century often indiscriminately conflate “foster” with “adopted” sons, even though each practice had evolved separately. For nearly a century, military governors acknowledged the special merit of lieutenants by informally adopting them. The most egregious case involved Wang Jian, the hereditary governor of Sichuan, who boasted a fictive progeny of 120. As an outsider to the region, he used adoptions to personalize bonds with subordinates and enhance cohesion in the ranks, a practice followed by his son, Wang Yan.7 Early Shatuo leaders were clearly mimicking the adoption practices of other satraps at the time, while likely infusing elements from Inner Asia, where family structures tend to be fluid.8 Nonetheless, many fictive sons, due to closer proximity in age to the senior Prince of Jin, often responded to his successor with ambivalence, a man up to twenty years younger. They also tended to bond with the biological brothers of Keyong, with whom they shared a lifetime of experiences. In this way, indiscriminate adoptions caused generational identities to be blurred, which in turn, introduced frictions into this group of highly competitive men. Two of the four emperors of the Later Tang were adopted into the royal family, Li Siyuan and Li Congke, so the practice would have unforeseen ramifications for the dynasty.9

Uncle in the Wings The youngest male sibling of Keyong, Kening had been a faithful mainstay for much of his life. Through wars against rivals along the northern frontier, through a short banishment to Tartar lands, and finally extended campaigns against rebels in China’s interior, “Kening was never absent from Keyong’s side.” He eventually rose to governor for the strategic Zhenwu command centering on Shuo prefecture, northern Shanxi, near the Great Wall. Decisions of any consequence invariably entailed consultations with Kening, sources say, for the other blood brothers of the senior Prince of Jin had preceded him in death. During the transitional months before Keyong expired and Cunxu acceded as prince, Uncle Kening had marshaled military leaders with a steady 6. 7. 8. 9.

XWDS 14.149, 36.385. XWDS 63.783–84; HR pp. 505–6. Cambridge History of China, Vol. 3, p. 726; ZZTJ 266.8689, 267.8728. XWDS 6.53–67, 7.71–73; HR pp. 51–64, 67–71.

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hand, a critical factor in the ease of the initial transfer of power. In the eyes of many insiders, however, Kening seemed the natural choice for successor based on blood and experience, important factors in elevating Shatuo leaders in the past and a rallying point for nativist elements within the current community.10 Among the foster sons of the deceased prince, many who preferred the uncle as successor engaged in acts of protest from the outset: “some declined appearances at Cunxu’s offices by feigning illness while others appeared but refused to bow,” serious breaches of protocol.11 The obstreperous Li Cunhao seemed especially intent on inflating the ambitions of Kening, and at the same time, stoking suspicions about a likely purge under the new sovereign. Intent on squashing such rumors, Kening revealed a combative side in threats to Cunhao, “If you raise the matter again, I will not hesitate to kill you!”12 His protestations failed to stop supporters. In anticipation of a potential challenge, Cunxu had proposed days earlier to postpone his own succession, citing the inexperience of youth. The tenor of his exchange with Kening suggests a preference to placate opponents rather than preside over a bloodbath in his own backyard: Your Nephew is tender in years and still short on governing skills. Despite the Former Prince’s wishes, I remain poorly prepared to assume the arduous task of governing. Your exalted merit, in contrast, caused the Former Prince [during his incapacity] to entrust the affairs of our kingdom to your stewardship. I should rightfully ask you, Dear Uncle, to assume governance while deferring my succession to the future.13

Cunxu may have been simply testing the waters, but his uncle presumed the offer genuine and declined with neither vacillation nor sleight of hand. “I simply cannot countenance forsaking my brother’s wishes,” Kening insisted. Nonetheless, early on the eunuch Zhang Chengye, then in his early sixties, apprised Cunxu of “diabolical sorts with covetous designs on power.”14 His allusion was likely to the mischief of foster brothers like Cunhao, although by some reports, Uncle Kening had crossed the eunuch in the past and incurred his wrath. The threat from the uncle’s camp proved sufficient to warrant swift and decisive action, in the eunuch’s estimation.15 According to the dynastic histories, it was Uncle Kening’s strident wife, Woman Meng, a Han-Chinese, who swayed him to act against his own instincts, manipulated in turn by her own network of female friends that included the wives and consorts of foster sons.16 Woman Meng was the sister of Meng Zhixiang, whose family had served 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

CFYG 668.7698; Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, pp. 163–69. XWDS 14.150; HR p. 140. ZZTJ 266.8690. XWDS 14.149; HR p. 139; CFYG 668.7698; Xu Tang shu 37.340. JWDS 27.367. JWDS 72.950; ZZTJ 266.8688–91. JWDS 50.687; HR p. 140.

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the Princes of Jin for over two decades and married their womenfolk for even longer: Zhixiang, for example, was married to the daughter of Li Kerang, a younger sibling of Keyong, even as his sister was married to Kening, the brother now challenging Cunxu’s installation.17 Once swayed by their words, Kening became an active agent in the cabal against his nephew. Conspirators would need to enlist a collaborator unrelated to the royal family yet with sufficient standing at Jinyang to direct actions in the capital. Their choice was Shi Jingrong, a Jinyang native with years of experience under Keyong. The officer had merely feigned empathy, however, then betrayed conspirators by divulging the plot to the royal palace, where Mother Cao devised a counterplot led by Chengye.18 The clever and scrappy widow of Keyong, as Mother Cao’s dearest friend, surely joined the counterplot as well, although sources are silent on Woman Liu’s specific contribution. Informants allege that cabal leaders had targeted Chengye, overseer of palace security, for the initial liquidation. If successful, the incarceration of Cunxu and Mother Cao would ensue, the pair ending up in Kaifeng as the Jin entered vassalage under the Liang dynasty—the ultimate treachery for a regime whose raison d’être revolved around uprooting the Liang.19 The usually cocky Cunxu turned suddenly dour upon news of the cabal and briefly considered eluding the menace through flight, his reaction a measure of the perceived strength of his foes. Chengye disagreed, stressing the urgency of a preemptive strike, “If we fail to act immediately, we will all be dead by day’s end!”20 Chengye and Mother Cao prevailed, in the end, by mobilizing the militia of loyal foster sons to buttress palace security. They also enlisted the services of Zhu Shouyin (d. 927), a one-time servant of Cunxu, who rallied other palace menials. The conspirators had been summoned for a banquet at the prefectural office, unaware that government forces awaited them in concealed spaces. Upon rounding up the entire group, Cunxu proceeded to taunt his uncle: At the outset, I offered to transfer powers to you, but you declined saying, “I cannot bear to forsake the final mandate of Our Ancestor.” The matter should have been settled. But now, you scheme to throw me and my mother to the wolves. How could you bear the thought of it?21

Repetitive use of the word “bear” added an element of satire to Cunxu’s otherwise biting rebuke. The uncle could only resort to recrimination, attributing his troubles to the machinations of others. The excuse, although partly true, did not dissuade Cunxu from slaying Kening. Yet the wife rumored to have incited him, Woman Meng, 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

XWDS 64.797, 64.802. JWDS 49.671–72. ZZTJ 266.8690–91. JWDS 50.687. JWDS 50.687. For a slightly different version of Kening’s end, see XWDS 14.150; HR p. 140.

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miraculously eluded the usual calamity through the intervention of her brother. It was a telling sign of Meng Zhixiang’s early clout with Mother Cao. A son born to Woman Meng and Kening was similarly spared in another act of rare beneficence, although he remained under house arrest in perpetuity.22 This potentially divisive imbroglio ended on a tone of equanimity. The precision with which the counterplot unfolded is unimaginable without the high standing at Jinyang of the two royal mothers and confidante Chengye, the tight inner circle of the deceased prince. The coup was directed against Cunxu, but he assumed a minor role in dispatching the renegades relative to them. His reign thus began with a political debt destined to reinforce trust in intimates of the inner palace, while leaving him ambivalent about deploying blood relatives and fictive kin in a future state. A regime transitioning from nomadic satrapy to sedentary empire should expect some resistance from tradition-bound conservatives, regardless of the man at the helm. Meanwhile, Cunxu could take solace in the fact that other adversaries might be chastened by the decisiveness of his inner circle, freeing him to rally remaining friends of his father at home precisely as new initiatives were undertaken abroad.

Early Expansion Courting Zhou Dewei On the heels of resolving the succession dispute, Cunxu deemed the Jinyang base secure enough to test his sway with armies away from the capital. Probing the loyalties of senior officers was likely behind the decision to summon the decorated Zhou Dewei in the fourth month of 908. A reputed fifty thousand troops, the elite Multi-Racial Armies (Fan Han jun), were under his stewardship at Luzhou, making it the largest Jin army at large, even adjusting for massive inflation in numbers.23 Concentrations near the southern border were especially worrisome for Jin policymakers in light of Uncle Kening’s aborted attempt to enter vassalage under the Liang dynasty. Cunxu surely had queries about possible sympathizers of the conspirators within border contingents, even as he rendered reassurances about reconciliation. When he received the summons, which simultaneously apprised him of the aborted coup, Dewei surely sensed that the veil of suspicion extended to him as well. He had to be scrupulous, therefore, to avoid provocative conduct, which involved leaving his border post with the greatest of dispatch, as any delay might infer indifference to the current prince or, worse yet, empathy with the dissident uncle. Upon arrival at Jinyang, he parted with military escorts in the suburbs and walked on foot into the city without a single bodyguard. Senior commanders were known to bring along an escort 22. XWDS 64.802; HR p. 527. 23. JWDS 56.750; XWDS 25.260; ZZTJ 266.8693; Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, p. 94.

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of thousands for meetings of the sort, so Dewei was conscious of striking a contrast.24 He subsequently proceeded first to the coffin of Keyong, whose body still lay instate, then broke into mournful outbursts. During the ensuing exchange with Cunxu, Dewei’s demeanor of strict submission struck a stark contrast with the insolence of some foster brothers. In this way, he assuaged skeptics.

Relieving Luzhou A gracious Cunxu chose to reciprocate by inviting Zhou Dewei, days later, to assist him in a drive to relieve Luzhou. The city had come under the siege of Liang armies soon after its acquisition by the Jin a year earlier, its defense entrusted to Li Sizhao, a foster son of Keyong. In parting words to Cunxu, a dying Keyong had stressed the critical importance of Luzhou to the kingdom’s security: “I cannot close my eyes so long as the Liang siege remains unbroken.” The city stood among the few gains against the enemy in his final years and Keyong feared that rifts between Dewei and Sizhao, two strong-willed but highly able Chinese mercenaries, might undermine the relief effort.25 Those apprehensions were conveyed to Dewei by the new Prince of Jin with enough finesse to reinvigorate his passion for the mission. Collaboration at Luzhou would serve, by  happy coincidence, to rekindle the friendship between Dewei and Sizhao, a still bigger boost for the Jin cause. In recognition of the numerical inferiority of Jin armies, Cunxu could only thwart the enemy with superior strategies and guile. He first moved to neutralize the Kitan by aligning them against local authorities at Luzhou.26 At home, rumors abounded that reports of Keyong’s death had been fabricated by Jinyang for strategic gain, perhaps to camouflage some surprise action, prompting enemies along the kingdom’s borders to assume high alert.27 Cunxu found additional advantage in questions about his competence to lead: The ruler of Liang fears the Deceased Prince and him alone. Having learned of my recent accession, he assumes that my youth and inexperience will preclude any initiative in war. We should rightfully exploit his inattentiveness to strike fast.

Cunxu goes on to invoke the Spring and Autumn Annals, his favorite classic, to recast bald opportunism as something more noble, “an occasion to prove the invincibility of our kingdom and secure its position of dominance.”28 Insights acquired from his Shatuo father had already begun to evolve into a trademark of Cunxu’s own leadership in the field: surprise timing and target to maximize 24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

XWDS 23.236. JWDS 56.750; ZZTJ 266.8695. JWDS 137.1828; Yao, “Abaoji,” Dongbei shi luncong, Vol. 1, p. 231. ZZTJ 266.8691. XWDS 5.42; HR p. 41; ZZTJ 266.8693–94; the translation draws from both sources.

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impact, plus a royal presence on the front lines to rally subordinates. Inscrutable guile is similarly heralded in martial classics like The Art of War, where Sunzi challenges military leaders to “Ride the inadequacies of others, act on the unexpected, attack where one’s foe has failed to take precautions.”29 The stewardship of Cunxu, however, made for a unique blending of Chinese formulas based on calculated assessments of conditions on the ground with the inspired intuition of Shatuo leaders. Cunxu capitalized on natural conditions as well, such as the heavy fog that occasioned the advance of Jin armies against Luzhou early in the fifth month of 908. Adopted brother Siyuan would descend from the northeast and Dewei from the northwest, while Cunxu approached from the south. It took mere days to demolish the barricades of Liang besiegers as prelude to a full retreat by them, having lost a reputed ten thousand warriors, including numerous officers. Cunxu appeared in battle with the white clothing of mourners tucked beneath his armor, his first combat as Prince of Jin doubly symbolic as martial and filial feat. He had redeemed Shatuo honor while projecting the most venerated virtues of Confucian China.30 In another picture-perfect event, he proceeded weeks later to the ancestral temple, “pronouncing his victory to the ancestors with triumphant jubilation.”31 Even Taizu of Liang had to admit sheepishly that none of his sons could rival Cunxu, having suffered his most agonizing rout at the young man’s hand.32

Other Hotspots The audaciousness of Cunxu, while in this case an advantage against the Liang, presented a perennial strain on his own armies, which starting in 908 and continuing for many years to come, rarely faced hostilities on a single front. Jin forces were engaged later in the fifth month at Zezhou, sister-city to Luzhou, then withdrew in the face of stiff resistance.33 Cunxu dispatched to the northeast some five thousand men for a short intervention at Youzhou (modern Beijing), heart of the Yan satrapy, in the eleventh month of 908. He did so at the invitation of Liu Shouguang, who managed with Jin assistance to beat back an incursion led by his own brother.34 Jin mercenaries promptly withdrew upon completing their limited objective of securing Shouguang’s position. A more ambitious action followed during the eighth month of 909, as the Jin collaborated with defiant governors in a drive against Changan, the old Tang capital. Jin forces under the personal command of Cunxu and assisted by Zhang Chengye and 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

The Art of War, p. 47. ZZTJ 266.8695; Fang, “Power Structures,” p. 78. XWDS 5.41; HR p. 41. ZZTJ 266.8695. ZZTJ 266.8695–96. ZZTJ 267.8706.

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Zhou Dewei, conducted diversionary raids against Jinzhou and Jiangzhou, in southern Shanxi near the loop in the Yellow River. The cities were historically part of Hedong circuit and their loss presented a menace to Jin defenses.35 The action drew tens of thousands of Jin warriors. Changan did succumb briefly to the local potentate and Jin ally, Li Maozhen, whose Qi kingdom bordered Changan to the west. The arrival of Liang reinforcements, however, forced Cunxu to lift the siege of Jinzhou.36 His southern flank would never be secure, so long as southern Hedong remained under Liang control. In the case of raids on Changan, diversion, not conquest, was likely the objective from the outset: unrelenting pressure from the west would deflect Liang resources away from its eastern border, a region more vital to the current security and future expansion of the Jin kingdom.37 By placing the enemy on the defensive, Cunxu succeeded in sparing his Shanxi base a direct hit during the early years of his reign, despite the ongoing designs of Liang strategists.38 The approach reflected precisely the sort of proactive posturing that lay at the heart of his martial genius. His father, in contrast, seemed perennially beset with defensive wars that sapped the kingdom of stamina. Thus, scarcely a year into his reign, Cunxu had already proven to be a superior strategist.

Evolving Political Consciousness Immediately after accession as prince, Cunxu and his handlers consciously set out to craft a political image to complement his bona fides in military circles. One story cited in Cefu yuangui for the summer of 908, scarcely a half-year into his reign as prince, reports: Whenever His Highness took to the highways and encountered the hungry and homeless, he would invariably stop and engage them in casual conversation, while personally dispensing food or clothing. In this way, an immense goodwill surged among the people as the foundation for royal hegemony was laid.39

Sources are replete with stories of Cunxu’s special bonding with his military, the inevitable consequence of his early presence in the field. He insisted on boisterous celebrations after victories and honors for martyrs in the form of commemoratives and citations. He also applied medicines to the wounds of warriors in ways reminiscent of his father, conduct seemingly spontaneous but never wholly divorced from family

35. 36. 37. 38. 39.

ZZTJ 192.6033. ZZTJ 267.8710–11, 8715–16. JWDS 27.370–71; ZZTJ 267.8701, 8710–12, 8715–16. ZZTJ 267.8710. JWDS 27.370; CFYG 18.188.

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traditions.40 The generalizing of such efforts to the civilian populace reflects Cunxu’s emerging political consciousness. The paucity of information on early contacts with commoners makes this story especially valuable. As sovereign of a small domain, he did not take the devotion of subjects for granted and endeavored to win hearts at home and abroad in small but steady increments. Accessibility to ordinary subjects seems an integral part of the persona of steppe leaders, who tend to be peers first and sovereigns second. Starting in late 909 and continuing for nearly a year, military activity tapered off, conflicts mostly minor in scope. In the interim, the Jin invested internally in cities like Luzhou, rebuilt after a protracted enemy siege that cut its population by half and crushed its economy.41 In the seventh month of 910, Cunxu deployed westward a force of ten thousand in a siege of Xiazhou at the behest of Li Maozhen and several other defiant governors now allied with the Shatuo against the Liang government. Simple mischief was likely their motive, for Jin forces withdrew within weeks.42 Yet a historic opportunity soon presented itself at the Zhao satrapy, centered on the sister cities of Zhenzhou and Zhaozhou, which Cunxu could scarcely afford to pass up.

Intervening at Zhao The Prince of Zhao, Wang Rong (873–921), had begun in the days of Li Keyong as a friend of the Shatuo, occasionally sharing military intelligence on their common enemy, the Liang. But sometime after 900, on the heels of a Liang assault against Zhenzhou, he shifted alliances to Kaifeng and solidified relations through annual tribute and marriage compacts, with Zhu Wen giving a daughter in marriage to one of Rong’s sons. The goodwill nonetheless proved superficial and short-lived, causing the two sides to revisit options a decade later. The recent death of a key Zhao ally, the governor of Wei/ Bo, had coincided with intelligence suggesting an imminent action by the Liang to solidify its control in the region. Wang Rong thus felt compelled to forge a new alliance and looked in multiple directions for potential suitors. His collaboration with the Jin a generation earlier had seen occasional strains, but no serious acrimony. Geography also explains Rong’s outreach to Jinyang. The potential target of a raid by the Liang, Zhenzhou lies less than one hundred kilometers east of the Jin border and two hundred kilometers from its capital.43 A heightened enemy presence in its very backyard presented a serious threat to Jin security.44 Nor could Cunxu allow some rival to rally behind Rong instead, and 40. 41. 42. 43. 44.

JWDS 61.817; Song shi, 254.8879. ZZTJ 266.8697. ZZTJ 260.8725. ZZTJ 267.8731. On the Zhen intervention, see JWDS 6.92, 27.371–72, 50.751; XWDS 5.42, 25.260–61, 39.413–14, 425; HR pp. 41, 52, 326, 339–40; ZZTJ 277.8728–29.

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rumors were rife of Rong’s outreach to the powerful Yan domain.45 A small command composed of two prefectures, Zhao never presented much of a threat to the Jin, save as spoiler in the pockets of a craftier foe. Almost universally, the Jin military counseled against intervention, citing Zhao’s historic duplicity and demanding demonstrations of good faith before committing armies. Cunxu was not so cynical, and indeed, deftly exploited a state funeral at Zhenzhou to conduct secret negotiations that culminated in a shift in policy.46 In his first major reversal of his military since the succession, the Prince of Jin proved supremely cogent about the need to seize the moment: Wang royals have acted in the past on simple self-interest, sometimes loyal and sometimes disloyal even to the Tang dynasty. So, scarcely should one expect eternal submission to the likes of the Liang! . . . For me to equivocate and withhold assistance would effectively play into the hands of the Liang ruler. It is only fitting that we rush armies to Rong’s aid, the combined might of Jin and Zhao making the demise of Liang an absolute certainty.47

The statement is startling as pragmatic admission that interstate relations are governed by mercenary interests, the Zhao acting on such principles in the past and the Jin changing course for similar reasons. More importantly, intervention seeks, in the words of Cunxu, “to combine the might” of the two kingdoms, not conquer the lands of neighbors in the manner of hegemons in previous periods of division or the preeminent hegemon of his own day, Zhu Wen. He was grossly simplifying reality by predicting that the new alliance would bring the Liang to its knees, but his optimistic tone must have proven irresistible. For now, short-term needs of building within would have to yield to the long-term goal of stabilizing the periphery through timely police actions. As Jinyang entered a new phase in relations with neighbors, Cunxu faced a critical test in negotiating the radically different worlds of war and diplomacy. The Jin reportedly “emptied its own lands” for the Zhao intervention in the eleventh month of 910, dispatching a force of tens of thousands. The kingdom also arrayed an impressive roster of commanders, led initially the seasoned Zhou Dewei, although Cunxu insisted on personally joining combatants before year’s end, flanked by the eunuch Zhang Chengye and adopted brother Siyuan.48 Mercenaries from Dingzhou, the domain of Wang Chuzhi, were deployed on behalf of Zhaozhou as well, with Chuzhi contributing five thousand men and launching a strategic alliance with Jinyang in the process.49 Mother Cao had opposed her son’s command of armies 45. 46. 47. 48. 49.

XWDS 39.425; HR pp. 339–40. XWDS 39.414; HR p. 326; ZZTJ 267.8725. ZZTJ 267.8729. XWDS 39.425; HR pp. 339–40; ZZTJ 267.8731–39; JWDS 27.371–76. XWDS 39.419; HR p. 333.

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at large, as noted earlier, so Cunxu’s presence in the face of her opposition signaled a special commitment to the effort, the only major combat on record for him in a year. The Prince of Jin also rallied local armies deft at defensive tactics for the Zhao intervention, complemented by forces from nearby Dingzhou with similar competencies. Jin armies were heralded for tactics involving geographic dispersion ( yezhan), an early ancestor of “guerilla warfare,” focused on the hinterland, but they found themselves pitched against a Liang commander best at besieging towns and cities, Wang Jingren, so the final outcome would rest upon the performance of armies allied to Jinyang.50 The determining battle occurred in the suburbs of Baixiang county, just south of Zhenzhou. “Our long-term success or failure rests upon this one mission,” Cunxu confided to Dewei, further elevating tensions for all.51 The combined forces of the triangular alliance led by the Jin were vastly overpowered, the Liang government having deployed to the theater a reputed eighty thousand men, mostly concentrated at Baixiang. The numbers cited in primary sources are assuredly exaggerated, due partly to the strategic maneuverings common to such contests, and partly to the proclivity of historians to round off numbers by considerable leaps. But no source disputes the qualitative edge of Liang armies, reflecting the strategic value of Zhenzhou. The helmets, uniforms, and armor afforded elite Liang guardsmen, “trimmed in gold and silver and glistening under the sun’s glare,” reportedly cost several hundred thousand coppers for each soldier. This spectacular display, “suddenly sapped the spirits of Jin warriors,” sources say, although Jin commander Zhou Dewei denigrated the armored men as, “more intent on posing than engaging the enemy.”52 His mockery could scarcely counter the reality on the ground, including the personal presence of the Liang emperor in the theater, proof that his aims went far beyond mere harassment, as some Jin strategists had originally believed.53 Fortunately, Cunxu had never embraced the naïve optimism of his lieutenants. “For the military, more is not necessarily better,” The Art of War cautions, a principle soon to be proven by the Prince of Jin through a measure of organization and discipline far surpassing his better equipped enemy.54 Figuring prominently on the front lines were cavalry from Inner Asia serving under the Jin banner. Dubbed indiscriminately in the relevant sources as the “northern barbarians,” they were presumably chosen by Shatuo strategists to complement their own skills as archers par excellence. At a critical juncture, Cunxu set aside his own preference for speedy engagement after consulting Zhou Dewei, who deemed a direct assault as sheer suicide. Instead, the enemy was

50. 51. 52. 53. 54.

ZZTJ 267.8732. ZZTJ 267.8735. JWDS 27.372; ZZTJ 267.8731, 8734–36; Wudai shihua, p. 15. XWDS 23.236; HR p. 209; ZZTJ 267.8732. The Art of War, p. 38.

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drawn out and harassed so relentlessly that even meals became impossible, turning hungry soldiers into easy prey.55 Jin strategists at Zhenzhou also compensated for finite resources through some astute deployments: as outsiders, they dispersed their own cavalry across the suburbs, leaving locals from Zhenzhou and Dingzhou to concentrate on the Baixiang county seat. Coordination between multiple commands, perhaps the supreme challenge for any alliance, presented no perceptible problems under the Prince of Jin, whose leadership the others embraced remarkably well. Finally, Cunxu issued rules of engagement designed to defer maneuvers until the moment of immanent need: “Our cavalry should wait until the enemy is within sight before mounting their horses.”56 Such policies served to maximize Jin assets, while minimizing waste of men and materiél. Effective leadership and strategies, plus vastly superior discipline, garnered a decisive win for Jin allies by the close of the first month of 911, scarcely two months into combat. “The upset at Zhenzhou would produce convulsions across the northern Yellow River region,” writes the Comprehensive Mirror.57 The victors netted vast troves of provisions, weapons, and armor, along with three thousand horses. The casualty count for the Liang reportedly exceeded twenty thousand, while three hundred commanders and lesser officers chose to surrender.58 The lop-sided win speaks both to the ingenious strategizing of Cunxu and the limited reach of Liang armies in a region too remote to control with arms alone. It  needed a more politically savvy approach, a carrot to complement its stick. The Jin also benefitted from the indecision of the Yan warlord Liu Shouguang, a former Zhao ally, “who refused to send a single soldier to assist Wang Rong at his moment of need.”59 His absence from the theater had the added advantage of isolating Yan in the future, leaving it increasingly irrelevant to developments in the Central Plains. As the intervention came to a close, Cunxu left behind several thousand troops at Zhaozhou under the command of Zhou Dewei, a symbol of the new partnership between the two former rivals.60

Inaugural Alliance with Zhao In the seventh month of 911, Cunxu rendezvoused with Wang Rong, likely their first meeting, to affirm the importance of their compact. His father had been engaged in hostilities against Zhao in 906 when Cunxu counseled him to cast off the old animus in the service of Jin interests in the long-term; in effect, he should prioritize the Liang as 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60.

ZZTJ 267.8732. Wudai shi bu 2.2b. ZZTJ 267.8736. XWDS 5.42; HR p. 41; JWDS 27.373; ZZTJ 267.8736. ZZTJ 267.8738. ZZTJ 267.8739.

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his kingdom’s premiere foe.61 The new rapprochement thus assumed personal import for Cunxu as validation of political instincts. Moreover, the trip allowed him to satisfy a curiosity about a kingdom famed for “women with the sensual beauty of clouds” and “gold and silk piled sky-high.”62 Multiple accounts of the first banquet between the Princes of Jin and Zhao have survived, an event enlivened by unexpected song: Rong raised his goblet in a toast to Cunxu’s longevity and he reciprocated with the deference and courtesy due a one-time friend of his father. Starting to sing as the wine moved him, Cunxu pulled his sword from its scabbard, then severed part of his own garment in an oath of allegiance, promising a daughter in marriage to Rong’s youngest son, Zhaohui.63

Cunxu, then twenty-six sui, had few children at the time, so the commitment of a daughter in marriage carried special symbolism. Many knew of his penchant for singing to family and friends during private moments, but a song for a fellow warlord was a gift that only he could deliver.64 Rong appreciated the favor behind the song and the two men took the opportunity to form an epic friendship. Wang Rong subsequently acknowledged Cunxu as “Forty-Sixth Uncle,” despite the Jin leader’s younger years. And to vouch for his good faith, Rong brought along son Zhaohui to the final gathering between the two men. The boy’s marriage to Cunxu’s daughter would come considerably later, as the pair were young children at the time.65 In many steppe cultures, a child-groom often resided in the home of his future wife, practices certainly familiar to the two princes with roots in Inner Asia and perhaps the inspiration for Zhaohui’s relocation to Jinyang over a decade before the marriage.66 Interestingly, the Jin protocol for swearing this important covenant, the rendering of a garment, differs from the practice in early Tang of beheading a white stallion.67 Horses were likely too cherished in Shatuo culture to countenance the dispatch of the rarified white species for the sake of a simple ceremony. The merriment and exchanges between Cunxu and Wang Rong were altogether fitting in light of the historic feat at hand. The Wang family had been entrenched for five generations as governors, Jin royals for only two generations. The Tang dynasty had rendered respect to successive Zhao satraps through marriage compacts and intelligence sharing. Rong may have inherited power at ten sui, but by twenty he had proven fully capable of insulating his base from predatory neighbors while intervening abroad

61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67.

JWDS 27.376; XWDS 4. 38, 5.42; HR pp. 38, 41; ZZTJ 267.8739, 268.8744. ZZTJ 271.8870. XWDS 39.413; HR p. 326; JWDS 27.376; ZZTJ 267.8739, 268.8744. XWDS 14.143; HR p. 132. ZZTJ 268.8744. Weatherford, The Secret History of the Mongol Queens, p. 13. ZZTJ 191.6020.

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as conditions dictated.68 As an established hereditary house, Wang royals could lend desperately needed legitimacy to Jin upstarts. The Zhao alliance, at the same time, became a model for collaboration with others: rather than browbeat rivals into submission, the Prince of Jin chose the path of mutual benefit. Months earlier, the Jin had repudiated the Liang calendar and resuscitated the reign name for the last Tang emperor, extending the Tianyou reign forward to the present. By creating a fictive designation for time, Jinyang challenged the legitimacy of dynasts in Kaifeng.69 Sources reveal that the Prince of Ding joined Cunxu in this symbolic act of subversion, as did presumably the Prince of Zhao. Thus, the military alliance between the three satraps began to yield political benefits for Jinyang almost overnight. Unfortunately, the dust of war had hardly settled in the east when an intractable problem reemerged to the north whose ramifications for China’s territorial integrity would reverberate for centuries to come.

Reprisal against Yan Past Tensions The powerful Yan kingdom, or Lulong command, centered on Youzhou, present-day Beijing, extended northward into Manchuria to encompass an area similar to the Jin state in size, although strategically far more vital. Historically, relations between Youzhou and Jinyang tended to shift capriciously with imperial politics and local conditions.70 Its previous governor, Liu Rengong, someone originally installed with the endorsement of Li Keyong in 894, would rebel in 897, then realign nine years later in response to internal pressures.71 The kingdom could boast an army of two hundred thousand, which if merely one-third of its reputed size, remained too forbidding to engage frivolously, for the combined forces then under Jin control fell far short of the one hundred thousand mark. Rengong was purged in the fourth month of 907 and imprisoned by his own son, Shouguang, after a family feud stemming from the son’s affair with his father’s concubine, an act that scandalized the local elite and caused many to abscond. Shouguang had initially professed loyalty to Jinyang and pledged joint action against their common enemy, the Liang, promises that rang hollow in the end.72 The political ambitions of Shouguang would swell in a few short years, as he started to

68. XWDS 39.411–12; HR pp. 323–24. 69. ZZTJ 267.8729; XWDS 4.38. 70. On the importance of Lulong in Tang times and nomadic threats to it, see Graff, “Provincial Autonomy and Frontier Defense,” pp. 47–53. 71. XWDS 4.37–38; HR pp. 37–38; JWDS 26.350, 354–55; Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, pp. 169–74. 72. ZZTJ 266.8686, 267.8710, 8712.

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assume imperial trappings.73 The Prince of Jin had been incensed by the Yan satrap’s illicit political posturing, and worse yet, recent efforts to poison Jin relations with its closest allies. After all, Cunxu had provided military cover for Shouguang in 908 in the face of pressure from Liu Shouwen, a sibling threatening his control. Despite a preference to take punitive action on short order, Cunxu deferred to military counsel and dispatched envoys in early 911 to confer esteemed titular honors upon Shouguang, including “Esteemed Father” and “Imperial Secretary.” His advisors had reasoned that token goodwill might leave the overlord less vigilant about defenses.74 Shouguang never took the overtures seriously and soon rebelled outright by jailing a visiting Jin envoy and proclaiming himself the Emperor of Yan. By year’s end, Yan armies advanced southward against Dingzhou, a command allied to the Jin.75 Retaliation by Jinyang now became imperative.

Unleashing Suppression Armies Again, the best commanders on the Jin roster, Zhou Dewei, and adopted brother Li Siyuan, were fielded against the Yan renegade, soon to be joined by contingents from Zhaozhou. The action involved a reported thirty thousand Jin troops at the outset, signaling the start of a distant war where the enemy enjoyed the dual advantages of numbers and home terrain, the most worrisome conditions by conventions of Chinese warfare. More importantly, Jinyang ran the risk of diverting resources away from the Liang, its primary foe to the south. Yet advisors like the eunuch Zhang Chengye, having historically favored a firm hand against Yan, surely endorsed intervention in this case, thereby reinforcing the Prince of Jin’s resolve.76 The timing could hardly have been worse due to commitments seen and unforeseen. Since the second month of 911, Jin armies had been engaged sporadically at Weizhou, one of the six prefectures that comprised the Tianxiong command, competing with the Liang over a prefecture far more critical to its own base. Cunxu led combatants in person at the outset, making minor inroads in the vicinity of Weizhou, but failing to overtake the highly fortified city. The command ultimately retained its nominal submission to the Liang, which moved quickly to consolidate its control over the region.77 Such diversions partly explain the delayed deployment of Jin reinforcements at Yan in the early months of 912.

73. On the Liu Shouguang conflict, see JWDS 27.375–76, 28.379–84, 56.752–53, 135.1799–1806; XWDS 5.42–43, 25.261–62, 39.422–27; HR pp. 41–42, 52, 336–42; ZZTJ 267.8738–39, 268.8742–47, 269.8750–54; Standen, Unbounded Loyalty, pp. 68–72. 74. ZZTJ 268.8742–43. 75. ZZTJ 268.8748–49; JWDS 27.376. 76. ZZTJ 268.8746–50; JWDS 28.379–80. 77. ZZTJ 267.8736–37.

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Cunxu remained in fairly close proximity to his Jinyang base through the winter of 911–12, opting against a personal presence at Yan. The Liang emperor, Zhu Wen, now sixty-one sui, had sufficiently recovered from some infirmity to begin appearing at sites critical to dynastic power directly east of the Jin border, including the Tianxiong command. He also supervised a sortie against Zaoqiang county, domain of Jin confederate Wang Rong, where the intensity of combat had severely undercut locals.78 When the county seat finally fell in the third month of 912, the Liang emperor insisted on a thoroughgoing liquidation in retaliation for heavy losses.79 The most that Jin armies could achieve was sabotage through surprise ambushes and raids, maneuvers conceived to humiliate in the short-term rather than defeat outright. The Liang could better wage war on multiple fronts due to larger armies, a single command, and a still active if aging monarch, a realization that forced the Jin to prioritize targets. Yan was expendable to neither side, however.

Tremors out of Kaifeng The Yan domain was far removed from the Liang heartland, but the dynasty did mobilize confederates in the area against it.80 Meanwhile, Jin armies made steady advances against Liang interests in a progression northward, in the fourth and fifth months of 912. By the sixth month, Jin spirits were further buoyed by shocking news from Kaifeng: the Liang founder Zhu Wen had succumbed to an assassin.81 Domestic frictions, not border policy, had incited Zhu Yougui, the product of an extramarital affair, to kill his father, a man given to the random rape of women, including his own daughter-in-law. Yougui’s half-year rule would end in a palace coup, when the military rallied around a more legitimate heir, Emperor Mo. In the interim, instability in the heartland gave numerous regional governors cause to defy Liang power in varying ways.82 The swell of internal pressures at Kaifeng proved timely for the Jin, which through Spring 912 had experienced a steady harassment of its eastern front by Liang surrogates. In the interim, Yan potentate Liu Shouguang had issued repeated pleas to the Jin command to surrender, faced with the domestic distractions of the Liang, his only ally to the south, and fresh advances by Jin armies from the west. Shouguang’s appeals were rebuffed by commander Zhou Dewei. The hardline at Yan seems to have stemmed from an important defection to Jinyang in the eighth month of 912 that dovetailed with tumult at Kaifeng. 78. 79. 80. 81.

XWDS 23.236, 25.268; HR p. 209. JWDS 22.297, 28.379–80; HR p. 209; ZZTJ 268.8750–54. XWDS 23.236–37; HR pp. 209–10. JWDS 7.107–10; XWDS 3.23, 13.136–38, 23.236–37, 42.462, 45.494–95; HR pp. 23–24, 126–28, 210, 360, 380; ZZTJ 268.8758–59. 82. Wang, Structure of Power, p. 125.

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Intervention at Hezhong The bonds of Zhu Youqian (d. 926) to the Liang founder, Zhu Wen, had far exceeded the ordinary. Sharing a common surname, he changed the generational identifier in his given name in expression of a fictive kinship with the ruling house.83 Local clout and court connections had facilitated his rise to governor of Hezhong, the strategic district adjacent to Changan. The combination of personal ties to the Liang palace and control over a critical command left Zhu Yougui, the founder’s assassin, sufficiently anxious to summon Youqian to court mere weeks into his reign in a test of his fidelity. Youqian declined for fear of subterfuge, electing to realign with Jinyang instead. His conversion, although an act of desperation, came as a windfall for Cunxu. But the defection necessitated a sudden redeployment of Jin armies to defend Youqian, for the Liang had already fielded forces in the tens of thousands against him. Jin intervention at Hezhong, several hundred kilometers southwest of Jinyang and beyond the bend in the Yellow River, presented immense challenges for the horsebound Shatuo. But reflecting the value of Hezhong as future ally, the Prince of Jin commissioned a sizable advance force, then joined combatants in the tenth month. “Conducting combat through the night by the light of torches,” Cunxu paralyzed Liang besiegers with his surprise timing and determination to prevail.84 Youqian chose to convey personal regards to the Jin leader in a rendezvous at a remote site near the border between their satrapies, Yishi county. The first known meeting between the men, Cunxu banqueted Youqian in his private tent and permitted the inebriated guest to stay the night at his side, the unguarded Youqian sleeping so soundly as to snore. After looking down upon Youqian in slumber the next morning, Cunxu intimated to a companion, “While a valuable asset, his arms are regrettably short.”85 Long arms in traditional China symbolized nobility, as in the third century, when Sima Yan (236–90) was esteemed for “arms extending to his knees.”86 And in Shatuo culture, long arms were likely considered advantageous for archers. The defect of Youqian would scarcely dampen spirits: the two leaders resumed their revelry under the tent into a second day, the Prince of Jin again allowing his personal charm to disarm doubters. Youqian later acknowledged Cunxu as “uncle” in deference to his superior political standing, although Youqian was likely older by some years. The relationship between the two men would evolve unevenly in coming years, the boisterous beginning scarcely symptomatic of things to come.

83. XWDS 45.492–94; HR pp. 377–79; JWDS 63.844–48; ZZTJ 268.8761–63; CFYG 148.1657; Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, pp. 107–10. 84. JWDS 63.846. 85. XWDS 45.493; HR p. 378; JWDS 63.845–46; CFYG 148.1657. 86. XWDS 36.392; HR p. 304; Jin Shu 3.49, 113.2883

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Renewed Focus on Yan Despite the speedy conclusion of the Hezhong intervention to Jinyang’s southwest, the isolation and fall of Liu Shouguang in the northeast would take nearly two years, starting in the early weeks of 912 and running through 913. The protracted war reflected the substantial resources still available to Yan, despite the ineptitude of local leaders. Jin armies had captured Yingzhou in the fourth month of 912, placing them within easy striking distance of Youzhou, the prefectural seat, which soon came under siege. The Jin advance coincided with its rout of the decorated Yan commander Shan Tinggui, whom Zhou Dewei succeeded in capturing alive.87 In another major loss for the northeast, the intrepid Yuan Xingqin, after eight exasperating scrimmages, was vanquished by Li Siyuan in hand-to-hand combat and adopted as foster son. In time, Cunxu would adopt Xingqin as well.88 Through 912 and 913, a growing body of senior officers across the Yan region would either surrender or defect, creating enough momentum for Jin besiegers that Liu Shouguang pleaded once again for a ceasefire. Cunxu responded by dispatching the eunuch Zhang Chengye for consultations with Zhou Dewei, in the sixth month of 913, suggesting a preference for a negotiated solution.89 The yearlong siege was draining resources precisely as the Liang had begun to apply fresh pressures against Jin interests closer to home: a reputed hundred thousand men mobilized for a campaign against the Zhao domain.90 A speedy conclusion of the northern expedition was imperative. Upon reaching the region, however, Chengye deemed Shouguang ingenuine.91 Perhaps spies informed him of simultaneous attempts by the Yan potentate to contact the Kitan to his north, overtures ultimately spurned by them. Had his mission succeeded, a Kitan intervention might have prolonged the war indefinitely.92 The actual fall of Youzhou, and indeed the entire Lulong command, seemed to await the Prince of Jin’s appearance in the theater during the eleventh month of 913, his first since hostilities began. Shouguang had requested a private meeting with Cunxu, who accommodated by approaching the city wall without the usual bodyguards in his characteristically cocky fashion. The two men explored prospective relations from opposite sides of the wall, Cunxu trying to convey sincerity on his part, while Shouguang sought to ingratiate with feigned praise, “Much like meat on the butcher’s block, I defer to the wishes of My Prince.” Cunxu offered on the spot to break an arrow in formalizing their alliance, consistent with Shatuo custom, but

87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92.

ZZTJ 268.8756. ZZTJ 268.8769. JWDS 28.379–83, esp. 382; ZZTJ 268.8771–73. ZZTJ 268.8772. XWDS 39.426; HR p. 341; ZZTJ 268.8771, 8773. ZZTJ 268.8769, 8777.

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Shouguang’s dickering, purportedly at the prompting of favorites, thoroughly riled Cunxu, who promptly unleashed a phalanx of besiegers.93 The imposing walls of Youzhou were scaled simultaneously from all four sides and the city overpowered in the course of mere days, a development only possible through massive defections within. Shouguang initially absconded for the north with two spouses and a son, then nearly died of exposure after losing his way in the suburbs. His final capture took roughly one week and he returned to Youzhou in shackles, his capital occupied by the Shatuo for the first time in history.94 It marked the beginning of nearly seven centuries of minority rule over Beijing. The Shatuo would be followed by the Kitan, the Jurchen, and the Mongols. Beijing was also capital of the Manchu Qing dynasty, which added several more centuries to the span of nomadic rule, each group leaving something of its culture behind. The Northern Song never succeeded in prying that strategic beltway from the hands of the Kitan, which in turn, left its northeastern border defenseless.

Kings Relegated to Captives “How can a host shun such an unexpected guest,” the Prince of Jin said in jest as he greeted the pair of prisoners, Liu Rengong and Liu Shouguang.95 At the outset, the depraved Shouguang had turned against his own father, then targeted his father’s administrative aides. “Shouguang loathed Confucian scholars,” causing such promising literati as Feng Dao and Zhao Feng to forsake him.96 “Always a mediocrity, he turned increasingly imperious,” writes the Historical Records.97 Shouguang was known for sadistic executions that involved setting prisoners afire in iron cages or peeling away the skin with iron brushes until the victim dies. “The abominations of Shouguang are certain to precipitate his own demise,” the eunuch Zhang Chengye once astutely predicted.98 Apart from moral deficiencies, Liu Shouguang proved short on strategic vision. In 911, when the Zhao domain faced imminent military action by the Liang dynasty, Wang Rong had simultaneously approached the Yan and Jin kingdoms for relief. Key advisors to Shouguang favored intervention, but he rebuffed Rong citing the conventional argument that, “when a pair of tigers are engaged in contest, it is best to wait things out.”99 Perhaps he appraised the Liang as certain to win, making his own efforts futile; or maybe he saw some advantage in the further weakening of Zhao, heretofore a 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99.

XWDS 39.426; HR p. 341; JWDS 135.1805. ZZTJ 269.8780–81. XWDS 39.427; HR p. 342. XWDS 47.528; HR pp. 395–96. XWDS 39.425; HR p. 339. JWDS 135.1805. XWDS 39.425; HR pp. 339–40; JWDS 135.1803–4.

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faithless ally.100 In any case, his procrastination permitted the Prince of Jin to seize the moment and strike the accord with Zhao that positioned Jinyang for a future showdown with Yan. Liu Shouguang and his father would pass through Zhaozhou on the lunar New Year (914.01.01), the once powerful Yan overlords now prisoners of the Shatuo Prince. Governor Wang Rong asked in good humor to observe the men. Restraints were removed as father and son, once bitter enemies, assumed seats below the main banquet table, on exhibition like animals at a zoo. “They nonetheless ate and drank, nonchalantly, with no sense of shame,” sources say.101 Scarcely did they know that Cunxu was merely fattening them for the slaughter ahead. Rengong had taken refuge at Jinyang in the early 890s, where Keyong extended sanctuary and even provided accommodations.102 So, Rengong’s rebellion against the Jin in 897 and his son’s betrayal after 907 had especially aggrieved Keyong. Seven years after his father’s death, Cunxu could finally exact his revenge, employing rituals that seemed to conflate Shatuo and Chinese traditions. Rengong was carried by younger brother Cunba to the gravesite of Keyong in northern Shanxi, then stabbed in the heart, “his blood rendered as sacrifice to the ancestor before beheading.”103 Shouguang had been slain sometime before at Jinyang. As previously noted, Keyong on his deathbed had presented three arrows to Cunxu, “representing a vengeance still unrequited for three foes.” The Prince of Yan headed that list, followed by the Liang to the south and the Kitan to the north.104 Yan was once the biggest bully in the northeast and its collapse lent credibility to Cunxu’s image as the long arm of justice. With the acquisition of Yan, the Jin army swelled by as much as forty percent through the absorption of vanquished troops.105 Combat readiness also improved substantially, for Yan warriors deployed elsewhere, such as Yuan Xingqin and Zhao Siwen, proved heroic fighters.106 The protracted war, and the Prince of Jin’s instincts as strategist, had been clearly validated by the final outcome.

Summit at Zhao The Prince of Jin departed Youzhou two weeks into the occupation and installed suppression commander Zhou Dewei as governor of Yan.107 In the preceding summer, the Zhao governor Wang Rong had conferred with Cunxu at the border town of 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107.

ZZTJ 267.8729. XWDS 39.427; HR p. 342; JWDS 28.383–84; ZZTJ 269.8781–82. JWDS 135.1799. XWDS 39.427; HR p. 342; JWDS 135.1806. XWDS 37.397; HR p. 309. Mao, “Wei/Bo erbai nian,” p. 360. XWDS 25.270–73; HR pp. 226–29; LS, 76.1250. JWDS 56.753; ZZTJ 269.8780.

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Tianchang, doubtless to review affairs in the wake of escalating hostilities with the Liang government.108 Previous agreements had allowed for the stationing of Jin soldiers at Zhao, units overseen by Shi Jiantang. Sources reveal a force of merely three thousand for the mercenary contingent, which proved too modest, even when combined with local forces, to expel Liang armies that boasted a hundred thousand men.109 Potentates of the era almost never welcomed mercenary operations on their own soil, except for Zhao. A man of benevolence, not war, Wang Rong refused to command armies in person. Whenever his state came under attack, he commonly enlisted neighboring armies to save himself. Other regimes of the day uniformly suffered under the weight of warfare, Zhao alone enjoying peace.110

By creating the right strategic alliances, a kingdom much smaller than the Jin could prosper in greater measure. Not surprisingly, the next meeting between the two princes in the early weeks of 914 came at the invitation of Wang Rong, intended to strengthen an alliance now indispensable to his state’s survival.111 Cunxu had planned the path from Yan to his base at Jinyang via northern Shanxi, but he took the longer southerly path to permit a layover at Zhao. Cunxu and Rong then rendezvoused north of Zhenzhou to savor a hunt two weeks in duration, a special passion for both men. Despite some nomadic blood in his veins, Rong’s prowess as a hunter is dubious, for historians portray the forty-year-old as addicted to creature comforts, and above all, “a reveler in wealth and status.”112 The Prince of Jin, in contrast, ranked hunting alongside polo as his favorite pastimes. Thus, even with a sizable army in tow, Cunxu found time to hunt. Centuries earlier, Taizong of Tang had identified archery and hunting as, “essential to conditioning warriors.”113 Similarly for the Prince of Jin, hunting and combat were intertwined as private leisure and professional training. The hunt even provided a venue for consolidating alliances, as in this case, where men of different backgrounds could bond in the universal pastime of sport. Amidst their revelry, Cunxu and Rong must have found time to review plans for a joint probe against Liang defenses slated for the summer of 914 and concentrated on the region directly south of the Zhao domain. Rong surely endorsed Cunxu’s leadership of combined forces from Jin and Zhao in a raid on Xingzhou, a Liang prefecture on Zhao’s southern border, in the seventh month.114 To elude Liang commander 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114.

JWDS 28.382; ZZTJ 268.8772, 8776. JWDS 28.379. XWDS 39.414; HR p. 326. JWDS 28.383–84; ZZTJ 269.8780–81. XWDS 39.414; HR p. 326; CFYG 115.1261. ZZTJ 192.6034. JWDS 28.384; ZZTJ 269.8784.

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Yang Shihou to the east of Xingzhou, Cunxu proceeded southward to Zhanggongqiao. There, a second-tier Jin officer inexplicably deserted and the usually tenacious Cunxu withdrew on short order. His father had seen combat at the same site sixteen years earlier and lost decisively.115 He refused to defy the historic odds against him. The probe at Xingzhou emerges as the only notable setback in two years, which Cunxu likely attributed to his inspired leadership, although his war council proved particularly deft about avoiding risky adventures. In another watershed moment, Cunxu assumed the esteemed title of Imperial Secretary (Shangshuling) in the Spring of 914.116 The overlords of the Ding and Zhao domains had publicly endorsed the honor on the heels of personal visits by Cunxu, which gave the appearance of orchestration on his part. So, three petitions from them were followed by three declensions before Cunxu finally conceded. It was common knowledge that Taizong of Tang had held the same title on the eve of acceding to the throne, and in deference to him, the titular honor had been retired for the remainder of the dynasty.117 The immodest assumption by Cunxu was conceived to project confidence in his potential to replicate the feats of Taizong, the rare sovereign able to bridge the martial and civil worlds. Cunxu thus had a hand in setting a political standard widely emulated by monarchs in the intervening three centuries, but never duplicated.

Auspicious Omens Remaining near home at Jinyang for the second half of 914, Cunxu’s activities were presumably of a private nature. An anecdote from roughly this period mentions a hunt with companions, where the Prince of Jin stopped at a nearby pond and raised a canopy to relax. Several mammoth serpents emanating from a nearby cave subsequently leaped into the pond. Sometime later in his absence, a white-and-red serpent four feet thick surged forth from the pond, which fellow hunters cut down with their arrows. As the serpent fell into the pond, “a brightness instantly illumined the four mountains like a raging fire.” The hunters noticed several dead water turtles floating on the water, “which once consumed, proved singularly pleasing to the palate.” Cunxu became convinced that they had witnessed an auspicious omen: the Liang signified the serpent slain by Jin archers, who get to savor, quite literally, the sweetness of spoils.118 Legends of the sort, highly appealing to historians of early China, were received more skeptically in the eleventh century, which explains the survival of this story in anecdotal literature.119 Such tall tales would multiply in coming years to reflect the Prince of Jin’s growing visibility away from Hedong, partly the work of his own 115. 116. 117. 118. 119.

JWDS 26.356. ZZTJ 269.8782, notes; Zhao, Tang Taizong zhuan, pp. 73–76. JTS 2.23. Beimeng suoyan, 4.444–45. For a parallel myth from the early Han period, see Shiji, 8.347.

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political handlers and partly the product of individual prognosticators always on the alert for omens with which to amuse friends and seduce the powerful.

Educating Children Apart from hunting, Cunxu devoted some time to his family, which seemed to swell in step with his other fortunes. After all, children in abundance are powerful symbols, not just of male virility, but the wherewithal to support numerous consorts and dozens of children. Several boys were born to concubines after 914, but Cunxu lavished attention on his eldest son Li Jiji (d. 926), nicknamed the “Amiable Boy,” Hege.120 Born to Consort Liu, not Cunxu’s formal wife, Lady Han, the youth’s precise age is unknown. Jiji’s mother became a consort to Cunxu around 904, at fourteen sui. Even assuming a quick pregnancy and a son as first-born, the earliest year of birth for Jiji is 905, when Consort Liu was fifteen and Cunxu just over twenty. She subsequently produced no other sons, or at least none to survive infancy.121 Sources reveal that Jiji contracted an illness as a child that sterilized him for life. Such crises tend to leave parents overly protective. Thus, as a minor, Jiji never left their sight.122 His cultural grooming as successor started at an early age: Chinese education would serve as the foundation in youth, with Shatuo ways relegated to his private life. Hence, the initiation of Jiji into the world of warfare was deferred until his teenage years, much later than Cunxu, who traveled extensively with his father as a young boy and even made a court appearance on his behalf. Jiji likely received rudimentary education in Chinese from the moment he could speak, but the search for tutors in the classics began at seven sui. Two years earlier, in 912, the Prince of Jin had approached a renowned classical and literary scholar to mentor Jiji.123 The scholar, Li Yan, native to Youzhou, had recently converted to Jinyang in the face of endemic tumult in the northeast. His reputation for broad learning and refined speech, complemented by mastery of military affairs, had impressed the father.124 Li Yan “stubbornly declined” the assignment for reasons not given in the sources, but a refusal that the thin-skinned Cunxu received as an insult and planned to punish with death. He desisted only after a forceful plea from Meng Zhixiang, an old family friend. This minor incident involving a tutor’s rejection is pregnant with symbolism, demonstrating on the one hand, Cunxu’s commitment to affording Jiji the finest in Chinese education. Despite a sound classical education, the intellectual pedigree of 120. The Old History cites two sons older than Jiji, who presumably died young; see JWDS 51.691. The Historical Records identifies Jiji as eldest son; see XWDS 14.152; HR p. 142. 121. Xu Tang shu 37.342. 122. XWDS 14.155; HR p. 145. 123. ZZTJ 268.8754–55. 124. XWDS 26.283.

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Cunxu appears lacking in distinction, certainly by the standards of aspiring sovereigns, and he set the bar considerably higher for his own son.125 On the other hand, the incident reveals anxieties about the measure of acceptance of the Shatuo within the wider social elite of Hedong, which was likely more exclusive than its military elite. Only repeated exposure to acts of racial prejudice can explain Cunxu’s overreaction to the simple declension of a teacher. More blatant incidents of racism would emerge after Cunxu’s accession as emperor, so he was hardly paranoid about race, merely sensitized to its reality by virtue of his own acculturation. But frustrations with the bigotry of a few did not diminish the affinity of Cunxu for the culture of his mother, so the search for Chinese tutors would continue.

History Summons at Weizhou Challenging Liang Interests With the exception of the fracas over tutors, the winter 914–15 appears to have passed uneventfully for Cunxu, but leisure would become a luxury in the future, as opportunities to the east would lure him away from Jinyang, initially by increments and later on a permanent basis. The Tianxiong command, also known as Wei/Bo, comprised six modestly sized prefectures at the turn of the tenth century. Although far smaller than the Yan domain, a central location to the southeast of the Jin and north of the Liang created strategic import for Tianxiong, while a reputation for rabble-rousing produced concerns about local stability that reverberated elsewhere. Under nominal Liang control since 899, the command proved perennially volatile and vulnerable to its own guard ( yawei), which “acted obedient in the governor’s presence, but disobedient in his absence.” It was common for guardsmen to purge their superior officers, mutinies that might well engulf the presiding governor.126 By 906, the Liang government intervened to expel the guard itself at Weizhou, ending over a century of autonomy.127 Six years later, it went a step further by expelling the wayward governor Luo Zhouhan, along with his attachés, through the good services of Yang Shihou. More responsive to the Liang court than previous overlords, Shihou nonetheless presided over the resurgence of an independent guard during his brief tenure, to the consternation of Kaifeng.128 His death in 915 presented an opportunity to reassert central control, but intervention ran the risk of either turmoil within by the disaffected or intervention from without by a third party.129 125. Ouyang Xiu characterizes Cunxu’s command of the Spring and Autumn Annals as merely “modest”; see XWDS 5.41; HR p. 40. 126. XWDS 42.462; HR p. 360. For details on the yawei, see ZZTJ 196.6173. 127. On the Wei/Bo intervention, see XWDS 39.415–18; HR pp. lxviii, 328–32; Mao, “Wei/Bo erbai nian,” pp. 358–74; Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, pp. 126–30, 170–71; Wudai shihua, p. 33. 128. XWDS 25.236, 42.462–63; HR pp. 210–11, 360; Wang, Structure of Power, p. 144; ZZTJ 269.8786. 129. XWDS 25.235–36; HR pp. 208–11; Wang, Structure of Power, pp. 125–26.

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The current monarch, Zhu Youzhen, known to posterity as Emperor Mo (r. 913– 23), had been installed in the second month of 913 through a cabal by military leaders and imperial clansmen. The third son of Zhu Wen then in his mid-twenties, Mo was never groomed as successor and often proved politically naïve, the handling of Tianxiong indicative of a tendency to reach decisions in a vacuum, then vacillate over enforcing his own policies. In the third month of 915, he mandated the division of Tianxiong into two commands: the three eastern prefectures of Weizhou, Bozhou, and Beizhou were to comprise a downsized Tianxiong, where He Delun presided as governor.130 The scheme to partition Tianxiong is attributed to Revenues Commissioner Zhao Yan (d. 923), an influential in-law who painted horses in his leisure. In reality, the dynasty’s founder, Zhu Wen, had similarly partitioned parts of other commands to enhance central control.131 Nonetheless, to effect a sweeping realignment of military power by administrative fiat involved immense courage for a court recently wracked by the worst of in-house intrigue. Emperor Mo and his advisors, anticipating resistance from the Weizhou military establishment, simultaneously dispatched a reputed sixty thousand men to enforce the mandate under the direction of Liu Xun—a man soon to become the Prince of Jin’s new nemesis. The governor’s guard at Weizhou did rebel before the arrival of the Liang government’s suppression armies, complaining that the redistricting presented undue hardships for military families, many of whom would have to relocate: The court, due to the might and prosperity of our command, has imposed rules of the sort to ruin it. Long ago, our six prefectures formed a garrison command, yet we never left our own area for service far away. On the day that we part with relatives and villagers, life becomes worse than death.132

The outcry of guardsmen invoking family concerns seemed reasonable enough, although later actions suggest the manipulation of appealing rhetoric in the service of provincial interests. Guardsmen seized the new governor, He Delun, and held him hostage, after which they slayed five hundred bodyguards sent by Kaifeng to protect him. They also repulsed a Liang contingent in the area, then coerced the governor to realign with the Jin. This long-running domestic saga had now ensnared Cunxu.

The Shatuo Step In The coup came as a stroke of remarkably good fortune for the Prince of Jin, but he had reservations all the same. His father had intervened at Weizhou in 896, nearly 130. XWDS 5.42–43, 22.226–27, 32.347–48, 42.462–63, 44.482–83, 47.521–22; HR pp. 42, 204–5, 265–66, 360, 369–70, 394; JWDS 8.120–23, 8.127, 28.384–85; XWDS 25.263–64; ZZTJ 269.8786–87. 131. XWDS 42.462–63; HR pp. 360–61. 132. XWDS 44.482–83; HR p. 369.

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two decades ago, and lost a cherished son in the turmoil of retreat.133 Cunxu had raided the city as well, in 911, then withdrew with no appreciable gains.134 Yet secret petitions from the incarcerated governor persuaded Cunxu to reengage the region, but this time he drew upon a sizable force from Liaozhou, which he personally directed in the fifth month of 915. Jin mercenaries at Zhao, a kingdom two hundred kilometers north of Weizhou, were deployed as well, the allies converging on the city without major incident. Days later, in the suburbs of Weizhou, Cunxu rendered a blistering excoriation of Zhang Yan, chief representative of the governor’s guard. “Our armies appear today to render comfort to commoners, not for want of another man’s lands.” In casting himself as protector of the people against abuse by local guards, a victorious Cunxu was invoking the language of Tang founders as they marshaled armies against the Sui capital.135 His tenor then shifted from past to present, from compassion to martial discipline as he chastised Tianxiong locals: The likes of you have wantonly slain common folk in the city and abducted their wives and daughters. For days, numerous complaints have come my way, compelling me to try to appease the people of Weizhou by liquidating you and your fellow thugs.136

The complaints to which the Prince of Jin refers came mostly from He Delun, the area’s incarcerated governor, whose correspondence exposed the senseless looting and death at the hands of senior guardsmen.137 Zhang Yan and his henchmen were summarily executed, but five hundred residuals in the governor’s guard at Tianxiong, “their asses still shaking,” received word from Cunxu that “he had no issue with them.” And to allay lingering fears, many reprieved guardsmen were enlisted to assist Cunxu in combat a day later. Centuries earlier, a policy of compassion for the vanquished had brought the world to submission under the former Tang dynasty. The Shatuo prince surely recognized the symbolism of the moment and the visibility of his deed.138 He also managed to avoid alienating a military quicker to mutiny than to cower. The occupation of Weizhou by Jin armies proceeded early in the sixth month of 915 at the invitation of He Delun, the newly released governor. Having surmised that only Cunxu possessed sufficient stature to contain the city’s many centrifugal forces, Delun relinquished powers and persuaded a reticent Cunxu to succeed him as governor. He received reassignment to the Datong command in northern Shanxi, only to be

133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138.

XWDS 4.37; HR p. 36; Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, pp. 170–71. ZZTJ 267.8737. Zhao, Tang Taizong zhuan, p. 20. This quote represents a fusion from two sources, JWDS 28.385; ZZTJ 269.8789. XWDS 44.483; HR p. 370. Cambridge History of China, Vol. 3, p. 167.

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waylaid by Zhang Chengye at Jinyang.139 Perhaps the eunuch had another candidate in mind for the post, but more likely, he developed suspicions after meeting Delun and his entourage, suspicions borne out by the subsequent turn of events. In any case, the standoff that Cunxu had expected with Liu Xun never occurred, for the court in Kaifeng inexplicably held back the bulk of its armies in the area.140 The Prince of Jin moved swiftly to consolidate powers at Tianxiong, naming an exceptionally able foster brother, Li Cunjin, as second-in-command. A Chinese ethnic native to Shuozhou, northern Shanxi, Cunjin set a harsh but determined tone for occupying armies, “ending the turmoil through the consistent application of law,” which in turn helped to restore order to the city in a matter of days.141 The appointment of the foster brother as governor attests to a decision by the Jin leader to administer Tianxiong for the moment through transplants from its base in Hedong, rather than retain locals in senior posts, as he had done at the Zhao satrapy. The approach, informed by the recent occupation of Yan, seemed wholly appropriate for hostile takeovers, where unfaithful leaders and intractable problems abound.

Seat of Jin Power “Conquering by force of arms is fairly easy; the greater challenge lies in securing one’s gains,” a confidante once reminded Taizong, the Tang emperor who presided over a massive expansion of the country’s borders.142 In deference to that wisdom, the Prince of Jin assumed residence at Weizhou through the summer of 915, lending his personal clout to the process of administrative integration. Incrementally, he targeted problematic practices for reform and troublesome personalities for replacement. From the outset, Cunxu issued stiff directives to restore law and order by demanding summary executions for “individuals guilty of violence against the people or baseless rumormongering.”143 He even sentenced to death Sikong Ting, an influential administrator at nearby Beizhou, for trying to contact his own relatives, subjects of the Liang, presumably for relocation to Weizhou. Ting had been an ally of the outgoing governor He Delun, so his purge likely assisted in the area’s assimilation.144 The severity of Cunxu surely got the attention of residual guardsmen across the Tianxiong command, men lacking a tangible sense of the man, although resonances with his father’s repute as strict disciplinarian would not have been lost on elders.145 In addition to a rigorous enforcement of the law, the other mechanism for securing 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145.

ZZTJ 269.8790; Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, pp. 36–37. Wang, Structure of Power, p. 126. XWDS 36.394; HR p. 305; ZZTJ 269.8790. ZZTJ 195.6161. ZZTJ 269.8790–91. ZZTJ 269.8789. ZZTJ 269.8791.

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Jin interests at Tianxiong involved reserving key fiscal and military posts for trusted surrogates.146 The turnover at the administrative level must have been high, which clearly laid the seeds for resentment among locals. The goals of asserting Jin control over Weizhou and the larger surrounding area would prove more challenging than anyone had anticipated. The enterprise doubled as a critical test of the Prince of Jin’s ability to focus on a single mission for years, not months, without the support of his extended family and longtime aides at Jinyang. Weizhou would become the permanent base of Jin operations for the next eight years, so Cunxu’s investments in time and energy were altogether necessary. Proceeding alongside targeted political and military purges was a less visible program to recruit local administrators such as Kong Qian, who restructured Weizhou finances in the service of Jin interests by whittling away at the resources of the local governor. He later figured prominently in shaping the fiscal underpinnings of the dynasty after 923.147 Even towns in the vicinity of Weizhou were canvassed for talent, partly as a form of political outreach and partly to effect greater control.148 Eventually, a consensus emerged that Tianxiong, the notorious “command of hegemons,” should remain in tact as six prefectures, rather than weakened by division into two autonomous districts.149 No record remains of the relevant debate, but the rejection of the recent restructuring of Emperor Mo in order to revert to earlier administrative practice would have serious ramifications for the dynasty. Cunxu’s motivation emanated in good measure from his utter contempt for anything associated with the Liang, even such farsighted policies as the partitioning of powerful commands.

Recalcitrance at Beizhou With the acquisition of Weizhou and Bozhou, the only prefecture of Tianxiong still in hostile hands was Beizhou, directly to the north. Some counseled the Prince of Jin to move immediately against the city to create a launching pad against Dezhou and eventually Cangzhou, prefectures located east of Beizhou. Inasmuch as the command bordered the Zhao kingdom and its prefect, Zhang Yuande, had collaborated with Liang loyalists in the area, prioritizing it for pacification made strategic sense. The generally trigger-happy Cunxu demurred, arguing in vintage Chinese fashion for a lower-risk approach of engaging the weak before the strong: With its embankments sturdy and troops plentiful, Beizhou is no easy target. But administratively subordinate to Cangzhou is Dezhou, which lacks military

146. 147. 148. 149.

JWDS 92.1223. JWDS 73.963–65; XWDS 26.280; ZZTJ 269.8791. JWDS 94.1253. ZZTJ 271.8877.

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preparations. If we seize Dezhou to sever links between Beizhou and Cangzhou, the attendant isolation will eventually deliver both prefectures to us.150

Jin forces thus advanced against Dezhou late in the sixth month of 915, and precisely as predicted, the prefecture fell after scant resistance. However, belligerents at Beizhou would persevere for another year, proof that Cunxu’s assumptions about its superior defenses were grounded in credible intelligence.151 In early summer, another prefecture was overtaken by Jin forces, Chanzhou, the southernmost extension of the Tianxiong command located near the Yellow River.152 The city stayed in Jin hands only through the summer, but the occupation permitted Jin armies to apprehend kinsmen of the Liang commander Wang Yanzhang, then residing at Chanzhou. A messenger was subsequently dispatched to pressure him to capitulate, but the unwavering Yanzhang murdered the emissary instead, prompting Cunxu to retaliate by liquidating his entire family, according to most sources.153 But the Historical Records portrays a more charitable dispensation for Yanzhang’s dependents, who were relocated to Jinyang and “treated generously.”154

Adrenalin of the Ambush Some tense moments are on record for the seventh month of 915, when Cunxu barely eluded capture and certain death. He had appeared to reward warriors at Wei county and departed in stealth with a hundred horsemen to conduct surveillance of enemy camps, the contingent’s small size designed to avoid detection. Unfortunately, the poor weather conditions and difficult terrain left the group vulnerable to ambush. Several thousand elite fighters from the camps of Liu Xun had formed multiple rings around Cunxu’s party and killed seven bodyguards in a single afternoon. The Shatuo Prince proved characteristically heroic in the conflagration, buttressed by bodyguard Xia Luqi (883–931), who single-handedly killed or injured a hundred ambushers despite multiple wounds to his own body.155 A legendary fist-fighter, Luqi had assisted Zhou Dewei years earlier in the campaign against Yan, which elevated his profile on short order. “I was nearly their dinner!” Cunxu exclaimed after their miraculous escape, popping morsels of barbarian biscuits into the mouth of another rescuer, Shi Jingtang.156 But even as he fled to safety, the enemy had already shifted its sights to another symbol of Jin power.

150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156.

ZZTJ 269.8791–92. ZZTJ 269.8791–92. JWDS 28.385. Chanzhou is also known as Chanyuan and Shanyuan. ZZTJ 269.8792. XWDS 32.347–48; HR p. 266. XWDS 33.357; HR p. 275; JWDS 70.927–28; Xu Tang shu, 40.366. ZZTJ 269.8792; XWDS 8.77; HR p. 72.

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Raid on Jinyang Liang strategists, taking stock of the Prince of Jin’s extended absence from Jinyang, devised an ingenious scheme to seize his capital. Their last raid in the spring of 902 had failed to take the city, but it had proven sufficiently threatening to keep the current Jinyang leadership anxious about a potential repeat.157 Liang armies, this time deployed by Liu Xun, departed Huangze county heading northward during the seventh month of 915, a modest force of five to ten thousand in all likelihood. Their absence from Huangze went initially undetected due to an ingenious hoax, where dummies astride donkeys patrolled the top of the city wall to give the illusion of soldiers on horses. Several days would pass before Jin observers noticed the absence of smoke over the town, the first clue of a ruse. Cunxu did dispatch a modest force from Weizhou to Jinyang, but Liu Xun’s men were ultimately undone by local developments, including acute food shortages caused by unseasonably heavy rain and contagious disease. Moreover, the eunuch Zhang Chengye had been informed by special courier of the impending threat, which enabled him to mobilize available resources to buttress defenses. Reinforcements were already en route, a thousand cavalry from the former Yan satrapy, complemented by another force from Weizhou led by Li Si’en, Cunxu’s foster brother.158 The drive against the Jin capital quickly lost steam due to this fortuitous confluence of internal and external factors, although enemy armies had come within a hundred kilometers of Jinyang. If not for the resourcefulness of Chengye in the capital and the coordinated response of commanders at large, the enemy may well have reached the walls of Jinyang.159

The Guiles of Liu Xun The Prince of Jin had met his match in Liu Xun, a man similar to his father in battlefield experience. “A hundred schemes emanate from a single step by Liu Xun,” Cunxu once observed in recognition of his rival’s superior skills at “camouflage, deception, and intrigue.”160 Months later, his remarks would prove prophetic when the Liang commander dispatched six undercover agents to Shatuo camps at Weizhou on the pretext of negotiating a defection. After reaching the campsite, they tried to bribe the Prince of Jin’s cooks to poison his food. The conspiracy leaked out before the secret agents could find willing cooks.161 Not even the royal galley was off-limits.

157. XWDS 1.7, 4.38, 22.226; 25.262 HR pp. 9–10, 38, 204, 307; JWDS 28.386; ZZTJ 263.8569–70, 269.8792–93. 158. XWDS 36.390, 36.395; HR pp. 301–2, 307; JWDS 28.386–87, 56.753. 159. JWDS 56.753. 160. ZZTJ 269.8793. 161. JWDS 28.387; ZZTJ 269.8797.

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Just as Cunxu acknowledged Liu Xun’s special knack for “intuiting the vulnerabilities of foes and moving with paralyzing speed,” he had come to identify his Achilles’ heel, namely, vulnerability in a dogfight, or juezhan in the idiom of China.162 In the summer of 915, Xun tried to disrupt Jin channels for provisioning its armies at Beizhou, only to be intercepted by Zhou Dewei. The offensive suddenly devolved into a defensive as Xun’s army headed southward toward the Yellow River. Ensconced at Xin county, to the south of Weizhou, Xun could scarcely provision his men: a fortified causeway had to be dug to access friendly towns along the Yellow River some ten kilometers away.163 He did not weather well under the relentless bombardment of Jin warriors. Apart from countering each initiative, Cunxu had now succeeded in anticipating Xun’s actions in advance. The armies of Liu Xun fought several battles a day against Jin regulars at the time, causing an anxious Cunxu to assume command of his men, determined to erode the enemy’s resources and morale. Once Jin attacks on Liang supply lines started to bear fruit, Xun confronted a court perceptibly less confident in him. Emperor Mo pressed for specifics on strategy, characterizing the current approach as, “doubly taxing on soldiers and resources.” A succession of obscure responses from the commander caused Kaifeng to dispatch an overseer by late summer to apply additional pressure. The reprimand served as a reminder of the limited latitude customarily afforded Liang commanders relative to the insurgents. “Jin forces are too fit for immediate assault,” Xun pleaded, while quietly denigrating Modi “as a novice about military affairs.” By now, even Xun’s own lieutenants preferred a speedy engagement over a seemingly interminable wait.164 This convergence of internal and external pressures contributed to the new susceptibility of the Liang field commander. As the months passed, Cunxu recognized the need to flush out Liu Xun, ideally onto his own terrain and in reaction to events under his control.165 By the second month of 916, as the winter came to a close and impatience set in, the Prince headed northward for nearby Beizhou. He gave the appearance of returning to Jinyang and surely planted rumors to that effect. The trip seemed long overdue, having last visited home ten months ago. It was a ruse all the same. Rushing to exploit his absence, up  to ten thousand Liang warriors assaulted the southern wall of Weizhou in the thick of night, but faced stiff resistance from foster brother Li Cunshen operating beyond the city wall and adopted brother Li Siyuan operating from within. Liu Xun joined the scrimmage with tens of thousands of regulars, for a while battling units led personally by Cunxu, whose men had just returned from Weizhou’s suburbs. Jin armies attacked from every direction, employing overlapping “square formations” to decimate 162. 163. 164. 165.

XWDS 22.227; HR p. 205; ZZTJ 269.8793. XWDS 22.226; HR p. 204; JWDS 28.386; XWDS 25.262; ZZTJ 269.8793–94. XWDS 22.227; HR p. 205; ZZTJ 269.8796. XWDS 22.227; HR p. 205.

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the “round formations” of Liu Xun, who fled southward with a few dozen residual cavalry. The Liang commander now returned to base, only to face a summons to court to render a full accounting of things. The Prince of Jin could look to a more gratifying trip, his return to Jinyang in the fifth month.166

Another Raid on Jinyang The second to third months of 916 witnessed another offensive against Jinyang, a better organized undertaking that involved a reputed thirty thousand enemy soldiers. An approach from the southwest also differed from the previous action, which emanated from the east. The unexpected path plus timing in late winter stunned Jinyang’s defenders, who lacked advance warning. The enemy not only managed to encircle the city, but proceeded to assault its embankments, testing like never before the competence of Zhang Chengye and the royal family. A dearth of able warriors forced Chengye to enlist lowly craftsmen to defend city walls, while awaiting relief from Luzhou to the south.167 Defenders also mobilized An Jinquan, a retired commander and long-time associate of Li Keyong. Against stupendous odds, the leadership at Jinyang managed to thwart invading armies, and in the process, reduced the likelihood of future attacks. It was during the siege of Jinyang that Zhang Chengye disposed of He Delun, the Weizhou governor who had relinquished the city a year earlier. Chengye’s retention of Delun at the Jin capital suggests suspicions about the loyalties of senior lieutenants, suspicions borne out by later events. A cluster of men under Delun had defected to the Liang during its recent siege of Jinyang, exposing the city as vulnerable from within.168 Delun was beheaded as punishment, not afforded an honorable death by suicide, which infers some level of culpability. In any case, Jinyang had been delivered from both internal and external threats when Cunxu returned home. He stayed for under two months, returning to Weizhou in the summer to lead a campaign and negotiate a surrender. A shorter stay at Jinyang ensued four months later. Important offensives proceeded in the eastern theater in Cunxu’s absence, reflecting his growing comfort with delegating missions to others.169

Tragic Turn at Beizhou Cunxu’s vacation at Jinyang would coincide with the surrender of Xiangzhou and Beizhou, the last holdouts of the Tianxiong command.170 Xiangzhou had fallen 166. 167. 168. 169. 170.

XWDS 14.143–44, 47.530; HR p. 133. XWDS 25.273, 36.395; HR pp. 301–2; ZZTJ 269.8801–2. XWDS 44.483; HR p. 370; ZZTJ 269.8801–2. JWDS 8.126–27, 28.389; ZZTJ 269.8804. ZZTJ 269.8804–6.

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uneventfully after a period of isolation, but Beizhou managed to defy the Jin military for a full year. By one account, the depletion of food and supplies had incited lesser officers to slay their chief commander, Zhang Yuande, and relinquish the city. By another account, the officers killed their commander in resolve to resist the Jin, then capitulated in the absence of food.171 In either case, the protocol of surrender for three thousand Beizhou residuals had been negotiated with Jin military leaders on site, men permitted to retain body armor as additional reassurance of amnesty, the Historical Records writes, “yet after emerging from the city and removing their armor, surrendering soldiers were girded by Jin armies on all four sides and massacred.”172 A similarly cruel dispensation for surrendering armies had occurred at the same site, Beizhou, nearly two decades earlier, but at the hand of Liu Rengong, the capricious Yan governor.173 The duplicity of Jin leaders at Beizhou stood in stark contrast with their highly charitable treatment of nearby Weizhou a year earlier, where pardons followed for the local military. Commanders on site may have acted at their own discretion, in light of the difficulty of communicating with Cunxu at Jinyang. But more likely, the massacre at Beizhou was premeditated, with occupation leaders and indigenous powerbrokers acting in concert to send a message. Local soldiers had supported their yearlong resistance by leaving Beizhou under the cover of night to plunder nearby farms, wreaking enough havoc to alienate residents in the countryside.174 In the eyes of the region’s civil and military leaders, who had witnessed their criminality up close, only harsh retribution could atone for their abuses. At the same time, the hardline at Beizhou must have received some measure of endorsement from the Jinyang high command, if not necessarily Cunxu personally. Officers at Beizhou had slain their superior officer to impose their own will from below, so a harsh dispensation might well humble potentially unruly soldiers elsewhere, a message that resonated at Weizhou like nowhere else in light of its checkered past. But mass murders are not easily forgotten and its victims have a way of exacting revenge from the grave.

Barbarians and Chinese Southern Diplomacy By the late 916, the Jin had secured the entire northern expanse of the Yellow River, excluding the town of Liyang, a crossover point to the south that remained in Liang hands. The need to consolidate holdings along the river compelled Cunxu to return to Weizhou. Months earlier, a minor mutiny had erupted within the palace guard at 171. 172. 173. 174.

For both accounts, see notes in ZZTJ 269.8806. XWDS 33.356–57; HR pp. 274–75. XWDS 39.423; HR p. 338. ZZTJ 269.8795.

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Kaifeng, a sign that recent setbacks along the Yellow River front were starting to reverberate politically in the Liang capital by turning military leaders paranoid.175 Cunxu sought to make further mischief for the Liang through diplomatic initiatives with kingdoms to its south, specifically Wu in the east and Chu in the heartland, as possible wedges against Kaifeng. His efforts would reap tangible results in due course, although progress at the time was negligible.176

Kitan Incursion Precisely as the southern front stabilized, relations with the Kitan to the north suddenly spiraled downward. In 916, Abaoji (872–926) had officially launched his own dynasty based on Chinese norms, which included the adoption of father-to-son successions. The dynastic designation of Liao would come later.177 Military conflict with the Shatuo appears to have heightened the resolve of the Kitan to accelerate progress on the political front. For the early tenth century, the Kitan had emerged as the most strategically savvy of the pastoral groups on China’s northern border. Abaoji had entered a “fraternal alliance” with Li Keyong in 905, where the Shatuo was clearly the senior partner, and assisted the Jin in its efforts to isolate the ineptly administered Yan satrapy in the northeast. But scarcely two years later, Abaoji formalized relations with the Liang following its purge of the Tang. He launched raids against Jin interests in northern Shanxi as well, most notably at Yunzhou, actions that so aggrieved Keyong that he exacted a dying promise from his son to avenge matters.178 Despite recent frictions, Abaoji dispatched an envoy to Jinyang in 908, on the heels of Keyong’s death, to extend condolences. The two men had met at least once in the past.179 He was signaling an interest in improved relations and Jinyang responded through symbolic acts of goodwill that included occasional consultation about military initiatives. Cunxu took the courtship one step further by acknowledging the older Abaoji as “uncle.” In this way, sufficiently cordial ties were forged to neutralize any serious conflict between the two powers for nearly eight years, a time of rapid expansion elsewhere for the Kitan.180 Yet instability at the Yan domain following its acquisition by the Jin would introduce a wider vacuum in the northeast, while the preoccupation of Cunxu with the Chinese interior created opportunity. So, the Shatuo

175. 176. 177. 178.

ZZTJ 269.8802. ZZTJ 269.8807–8. Cambridge History of China, Vol. 6, pp. 60–61. XWDS 72.885–89; LS 1.1; Mote, Imperial China, pp. 62–63; ZZTJ 266.8679–80, 8700; Cambridge History of China, Vol. 6, pp. 57–68; Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, pp. 174–79. 179. LS 1.3; Mote, Imperial China, p. 45. 180. ZZTJ 269.8810; LS 1.11.

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bear some responsibility for the fresh crop of tensions and the diversion of resources already stretched thin. In 914, Cunxu installed foster brother Li Cunju as defense commissioner for the western districts of Xinzhou and Wuzhou, on the heels of acquiring the Yan domain.181 Locals quickly found fault with his abuses of power, while the military establishment resented the ongoing deployment of Yan troops away from the area. Cunju would perish in a mutiny within a year. Zhou Dewei subsequently assumed the Youzhou governorship, but the dedicated commander proved a poor administrator: he proceeded to alienate commanders experienced in Kitan affairs, some perishing as others absconded for the northern borderland to convey a sense of post-occupation malaise.182 As people with roots in Manchuria, the Kitan regarded Youzhou as their own backyard and instability there provided cause to extend their presence to other border prefectures, including Yunzhou and Xinzhou in 915–16. It was the first full-fledged war between the Shatuo and the Kitan in many years, and Jin armies performed poorly at the outset, with casualties running in excess of ten thousand.183 Kitan actions seemed sufficiently threatening for the Prince of Jin to appear in person at the affected region, interrupting a family reunion at Jinyang in the ninth month of 916.184 The enemy withdrew on the eve of his arrival, enabling Cunxu to return as he relished rumors that his reputation alone had frightened them off. By early Spring 917, the Kitan unleashed a massive force against the Jin and its allies at Dingzhou and Zhaozhou, a force of three hundred thousand, sources allege. Their numerical superiority allowed them to overrun Xinzhou on short order. The siege of Youzhou ensued, which persisted for a remarkable two hundred days. The Prince of Jin, from headquarters at Weizhou, tapped for the relief two exceptional assets, adopted brother Siyuan and foster brother Cunshen. They would be joined by mercenaries from nearby Zhenzhou and Dingzhou.185 Unflappable and ingenious, Siyuan and cohort confronted tens of thousands of Kitan horsemen and their massive infantry, while his own force of seventy thousand consisted disproportionately of infantry. The ratio of infantry to cavalry in Kitan armies could be as high as four-to-one, while anecdotal evidence suggests a ratio of six-to-one for the Shatuo.186 Both qualitatively and quantitatively, the Kitan held the superior hand by a long shot. Siyuan managed to eke out a competitive edge against the Kitan by many means, including the moving of Jin infantry through hills to avoid exposure on the plains, where the opponent’s cavalry could dominate. He and Cunshen also outmaneuvered 181. 182. 183. 184. 185.

XWDS 48.539; HR p. 400; ZZTJ 269.8811–12. ZZTJ 269.8813–14; LS 1.6–12, 71.1199–1200. JWDS 28.389–90; XWDS 72.887–88. ZZTJ 269.8805. JWDS 28.389, 137.1828; XWDS 25.264; ZZTJ 269.8814–15, 270.8816–19; Xu Tang shu, 40.364–65; Cambridge History of China, Vol. 6, p. 64, Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, pp. 34–37. 186. Mote, Imperial China, p. 47.

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the enemy by setting brush fires as cover, allowing Jin cavalry to attack their forward positions without detection while its infantry closed in along the rear flank. The pincer action proved doubly devastating due to effective camouflage and swift movements.187 In hand-to-hand combat, Siyuan succeeded in cutting down a senior Kitan chieftain, which began to shake their confidence. Relief armies from neighboring commands would further augment Jin strength and compel the enemy to retreat. The experience taught Siyuan that the Kitan could move massive armies with such speed because they were not weighed down with provisions: they expected to forage local villages for food while seizing weapons and fuel from vanquished armies.188 He had to exploit their vulnerability while protecting Jin assets. By the eighth month of 917, tens of thousands of men under the Kitan banner were either slain or imprisoned, a measure of the totality of the Shatuo victory.189 Moreover, their siege of Youzhou, having persisted for over a half-year, exposed the serious misjudgment of Yan Bao, the esteemed Jin commander, who once derided the Kitan as “incapable of sustained combat in the region,” for lack of food, supplies, and implicitly commitment.190 Siyuan had a sharper assessment of his foe’s logistical strengths. Youzhou overseer Zhou Dewei, after securing his compatriots safely within city walls, reportedly, “cried loudly while clenching Siyuan’s hands,” a sign of his previous pessimism about surviving the onslaught. And hereafter, Siyuan becomes heralded as the sole Jin commander capable of “containing the Kitan,” due to the right mix of cunning and bravado.191 News of the magnitude of the victory would quickly reverberate elsewhere, boosting the perception of the Jin military as invincible. The Prince of Jin elected not to appear along the northeastern front in 917, preferring to delegate the entire effort to able surrogates. The confidence reflected in his new approach had historic roots, as reflected in his comment: “Emperor Taizong of Tang formerly captured [the leader] Jieli through the efforts of a single Li Jing. Scarcely need I worry today, thanks to my triumvirate of Siyuan, Cunshen, and Yan Bao!”192 The sentence not only acknowledges the need to utilize others for distant missions like the Kitan intervention, it affirms the inspirational role of the historic Taizong in shaping border policies in the present. In this way, the Jin could pursue strategic targets on multiple fronts.193 Such lofty rhetoric seemed at odds, however, with the reality of Cunxu’s personal life, one diminished by his own antics.

187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193.

ZZTJ 270.8818. ZZTJ 270.8817. ZZTJ 270.8818. ZZTJ 269.8815. XWDS 24.250; HR p. 218. ZZTJ 269.8815. The capture in 630 of Jieli, leader of the eastern Turks, permitted the Tang to secure its borders while dividing its enemies; see Cambridge History of China, Vol. 3, p. 222.

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The Gambler Cunxu had spent scarcely a month at Jinyang, the tenth month of 917, when he crossed Zhang Chengye over gambling to create the fiery exchange cited in the previous chapter. After threatening the eunuch with his sword, Cunxu was summarily flogged by his mother.194 Curiously, the years 916 and 917 had been the most stressful on record and the young man’s separation from family and friends unusually long, so his indulgences appear minor relative to the magnitude of recent wins on the battlefield. Moreover, based on anecdotal evidence, gambling was a popular pastime at Jinyang, embedded in local culture long before the Shatuo presence, so the diversions of Cunxu seemed conventional for men of means in his day.195 And finally, the severe thrift demanded by the eunuch overseer seemed unnecessary, in light of millions in strings of cash in the treasury at the time, by Cunxu’s own admission.196 The eunuch’s adamancy in refusing Cunxu must be understood from the dual perspectives of the times and the man. In recent years, Jinyang had been targeted for enemy raids on two occasions, not to mention an earlier raid in the waning years of Keyong’s reign. Chengye had supervised all three rallies against the intruder, sensitizing him more than anyone to the tenuousness of the entire cause. His duties extended to finances for Jinyang, making finite resources cover the dual costs of defending the capital and maintaining armies at-large, armies overly stretched by new deployments to the northeast plus long-term deployments to the south. Like no one else in the capital, Chengye appreciated the cold reality that the only limits to Jin power were of the financial sort, the kingdom’s military fortunes tied inextricably to resources. He warned about the consequences of resources stretched too thin, “Once our wealth vanishes and soldiers scatter, I will scarcely face calamity alone!” Chengye further reasoned that the financial integrity of any contender for power, and especially a contender as modestly endowed as the Jin, requires a clear separation of public and private spending. “The monies of empire cannot be tapped for private purposes,” the eunuch reminded Cunxu in an important statement on bureaucratic principle.197 Chengye expected similar circumspection of his own family and friends, his political decisions separated from personal considerations with sometimes shocking consequences. A nephew presuming upon his stature at Jinyang, once took to roguery and killed an ox-trader. Chengye ordered summary death for the nephew, the harshest possible punishment, then resisted pressure to lessen the sentence, including a plea directly from Cunxu.198 Clearly, the dispassion to which Chengye aspired, based on the best 194. 195. 196. 197. 198.

XWDS 38.404; HR pp. 317–18; ZZTJ 270.8819–20. JTS 3.52. XWDS 28.312; HR p. 237. XWDS 38.404; HR p. 317; ZZTJ 270.8820. ZZTJ 269.8808; XWDS 38.404; HR p. 317.

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conventions of China, seemed inhumane to Shatuo leaders, who tended to compensate for the harsh discipline demanded of its armed forces by indulging kinsmen in their private lives, including allowances for graft. Thus, conflicts over policies often masked cultural differences between the various ethnic groups represented at Jinyang. It is hardly coincidence that Cunxu’s mother often empathized with the eunuch who shared her own cultural values at the expense of her son by birth.199

Racial Tensions The perception that Chengye could rise above provincial interests qualified him in unique ways for negotiating the most divisive waters for the Jin inner circle: incidents of overt racism. Chinese ethnics may have dominated the civil administration, but the Jin military tended to be populated, especially at the command and mid-officer levels, by Shatuo and other pastoral peoples, including the Huihu, Tujue, and Tuyuhun.200 For most Inner Asians, a poor proficiency in Chinese left them oblivious to demeaning language targeted at them, making Cunxu the exception as someone equally comfortable with both cultures. During the same stay at Jinyang, in late 917, an administrative secretary, Lu Zhi, carelessly uttered the words “dogs and swine” in alluding to the sons of Li Keyong.201 The Shatuo invariably enlisted packs of hounds and other trained animals for hunting jaunts, festive events where humans could bond emotionally with animals. Dogs were ubiquitous in nomadic life: ferocious dogs were often used to protect women, guard prisoners-of-war, and chase criminals on the run.202 Inner Asians tended to prefer dogs as house-pets as well, in contrast with the affinity of upper class Chinese for delicate pets like cats, birds, and gold fish. Outsiders could thereby easily equate the affinity of nomadic peoples for dogs with their aggressive instincts in war.203 In addition, there was legend from the Five Dynasties of a “dog country” to the north (gouguo), where humans copulated with canines to produce boys resembling dogs and girls resembling humans.204 Legends of the sort served to dehumanize northern men specifically, inasmuch as they tended to grow more body hair. Inner Asians of the tenth century thus tended to be highly sensitive to any negative associations of them with dogs. Cunxu would have slain Lu Zhi for the slur against his siblings, if not for the timely intervention of Zhang Chengye, who used humor to cut through the tensions. “Indulgence in alcohol has caused Zhi to act inappropriately. Your Subject begs to slay him on Your behalf !” Cunxu, clearly stunned by the call, cited 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204.

Eberhard, Conquerors and Rulers, p. 149. Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, pp. 76–79. XWDS 38.404–5; HR p. 318; JWDS 72.952; ZZTJ 270.8820. XWDS 33.361; HR p. 279; Weatherford, The Secret History of the Mongol Queens, p. 4. XWDS 33.363; HR p. 281. XWDS 73.907.

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the need for moderation at this historic moment, “I am in the throes of rallying men of competence and character around the cause of dynasty. How can your convictions be so extreme?” Chengye rose to congratulate him, turning the confrontation into a positive lesson on self-restraint: “So long as Your Highness continues to abide by principles like these, then pacification of the world may well be within reach!”205 It was a revealing moment. The eunuch had triumphed by exposing the Prince of Jin’s initial reaction as excessive, even though the offense was real. Cunxu nonetheless grew more sensitive to suspicious uses of the word “dog” by Chinese subjects. A decade later in the palaces of Luoyang, the actor Jing Xinmo was nearly killed for uttering the following words after a ferocious dog pursued him, “Your Majesty should scarcely let loose a child to nip [at my posterior]!”206 Xinmo had intended to shock listeners by likening Shatuo royals to animals, so few would have faulted Zhuangzong for slaying the actor. By then, “dog” had become a slur word, at least when uttered by Chinese. The explosive confrontation with Xinmo further reveals that epithets rooted in cultural and racial differences did not disappear with Cunxu’s accession as emperor, although the offensive language likely assumed additional layers of subtlety as northerners acquired higher levels of literacy in Chinese.

Southern Offensive Martial Exploits at Yangliu In the wake of such potentially divisive racial insults, Cunxu preferred to redouble efforts on border affairs, an arena that embraced and even revered his independent streak. News had reached Jinyang by the eleventh month of 918 that the Yellow River was frozen in large patches due to a recent cold spell. “The freeze signals Heaven’s sanctioning for our cause,” Cunxu pronounced as he rushed to Weizhou to confer with strategists.207 In the next month, he departed the prefectural seat in a southeasterly direction toward the Yellow River. Having eluded enemy monitors, he then proceeded farther east to cross the frozen river and approach Yangliu, a town on the southern bank opposite Bozhou, where waters had fallen to depths of several feet in spots and defending forces had shrunk to a few thousand. Multiple reports indicate that the thirty-four-year-old Cunxu trudged through the frigid water with bundles of reeds on his back, toiling like the lowliest of menials. His passion for combat as contact sport parallels that of Taizong of Tang, who in the heat of battle could forgo food for two days and keep armor fastened for three days, anecdotes familiar to Cunxu.208 The reed bundles carried by Cunxu became filler for 205. 206. 207. 208.

XWDS 38.404; HR p. 318. XWDS 37.399; HR pp. 311–12. JWDS 28.390–91; ZZTJ 270.8821–23. Zhao, Tang Taizong zhuan, pp. 30, 61.

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the moats encircling Yangliu’s outer wall, which Jin contingents handily scaled after decimating palisades along the river. With the presiding commander ensnared, the town of Yangliu changed hands as northern armies acquired a brief foothold south of the Yellow River.209 Cunxu proceeded to sack nearby Yunzhou and Puzhou before returning north of the river. Was he merely making mischief or probing the defenses of prefectures indispensable to the security of the Liang capital? Sources give no clue, but the return of Jin armies to the same sites months later suggests the higher mission of gathering intelligence for the future. The same two cities also figured prominently in the final drive against the Liang in the summer of 923, so familiarity with the area was vital to sound decisions later on. The Prince of Jin’s audacity had reduced the Liang court to bewildered disarray. Emperor Mo, desperate for any sort of countermeasure, had wasted over a week traveling to Luoyang to perform rites in the Southern suburbs, then cancelled the ceremonies due to the inadequacy of advance work.210 His advisors had envisioned symbolic value in performing rites reserved for the Son of Heaven, rites conducted at the eastern capital since Han times. The message meant less to Jing Xiang, his brutally honest military commissioner, who greeted Modi with warnings of vulnerabilities within that rivaled the enemy without: With the passing of each day, the might of the Jin swells while our own correspondingly shrinks. Your Majesty inhabits the inner recesses of his palaces and confers solely with intimates or self-serving in-laws. How can anything meaningful occur? Jin armies have attacked Yangliu, I hear, where Yazi [the Prince of Jin] preceded his men, fording the Yellow River with bundles of reeds strapped to his back.211

The commissioner clearly anguished over his monarch’s dependence on sophisticates like Zhao Yan, but the comments point to a deficiency beyond this particular monarch’s ability to remedy, as he lacked the force of personality of his father. A leader endowed with the martial ardor of Cunxu presented a special menace to the Liang, which had already transitioned from its iron-willed founder to the secondgeneration ruler capable of directing the military from the capital rather than leading from the front, a ruler capable of governing by institutions and traditions rather than charisma and awe. In the wake of Jing Xiang’s censure, Emperor Mo acted in the wrong way by rupturing dikes along the Yellow River in a desperate attempt to halt advancing armies, an action overseen by Duan Ning. The floods did compel Jin warriors to withdraw temporarily, but they returned to Yangliu in the following summer in larger numbers, plus an even greater determination to prevail. With Cunxu again

209. XWDS 5.43, 21.209; HR pp. 43, 194; JWDS 91.1203. 210. ZZTJ 270.8822–23. 211. XWDS 3.26, 21.210; HR pp. 26, 193–94.

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commanding his men, the Jin inflicted another bruising defeat to Liang defenders.212 Northern armies continued to swell as alienated officers and fatigued warriors began to abandon Kaifeng, a phenomenon evident even among civilians.213 Chief councilor Zhao Guangfeng cited “advanced age” as cause for retirement, although his resuscitation years later at the Tongguang court suggests other motivations.214

Close Call at Yangliu The cravenness of the Liang military as reflected in the rupturing of river dikes, rather than dampen Jin spirits, would incite the boldest action thus far. In the eighth month of 918, Cunxu summoned forces from across the northeast. A reputed hundred thousand cavalry and infantry converged on Weizhou, nearly one-third from Youzhou and led by Zhou Dewei, head of the Multi-Racial Armies.215 Most units soon advanced via Yangliu against Yunzhou to the south and Puzhou to the east of the Yellow River, precisely the cities raided by Cunxu in the previous year. In all likelihood, this movement was a probe as well, but rehearsal in full dress. The Liang reinforced its armies in the area and entrenched itself for several months without engaging in major combat, as each side assayed the other’s strengths. Ingenious ambushes were laid in the course of the standoff in the closing months of 918, one of which nearly netted Cunxu. The odds seemed worse than ever: thousands of hostile troops forming over a dozen rings around the Shatuo Prince and a handful of bodyguards led by foster brother Li Cunshen. He survived once again by fending off opponents until reinforcements could arrive.216 Another close call finally prompted a combination of aides and allies to plead with Cunxu to retreat from the front lines, as  too much hung in the balance. Wang Rong of Zhao raised the matter explicitly through a deputy, “On the shoulders of Your Eminence rests the critical mission of restoring the Tang dynasty, yet you slight yourself so!” Cunxu had a witty response, “How do we settle the world if not through hundreds of battles? Surely, idling in canopied rooms and getting fat will scarcely suffice!”217 He was poking fun at Rong’s slovenly lifestyle, but also his propensity to let others fight his battles, highly personal comments reflecting the special bond between the two men. Calls for greater caution began to resonate within the Jin camp as well, including foster brother Cunshen. Late in the year 918, as the Prince of Jin emerged from his barracks for a mission, Cunshen fought back tears as he held onto the horse reins and pleaded, “For the sake of the world, Your Eminence must take care. The scaling of 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217.

ZZTJ 270.8824, 8830. ZZTJ 270.8824. ZZTJ 270.8825. JWDS 28.391–92; ZZTJ 270.8833–34. Xu Tang shu 40.365. ZZTJ 270.8835.

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walls and piercing of enemy lines is our calling as warriors, not yours as sovereign!”218 Earlier warnings, and this one as well, went initially unheeded, until the ambush at Yangliu where the foster brother came to Cunxu’s rescue, and in the process, altered ever so slightly his attitude toward such concerns. Still, having once likened warfare to “theater,” the actor in Cunxu could never be content with supporting roles.219

Sights on Kaifeng The winter of 918 witnessed another conflagration along the Yellow River, coinciding with the tenth anniversary of Cunxu’s accession as prince. Founders of the former Tang had scarcely needed four years to unify the world and the year 918 was the three hundredth anniversary of the dynasty’s founding.220 The confluence of historical commemorations seems to have fired the imagination of Cunxu’s advisors, while he was desperate for some tangible movement on the military front to satisfy rising political expectations, so he set his sights appropriately on the enemy’s capital, Kaifeng. The deployment of Jin armies south of the river came early in the twelfth month.221 Rivalries and suspicions within the Liang military that claimed the life of seasoned commander Xie Yanzhang had heartened the Prince of Jin, who exclaimed, “With enemy officers cannibalizing one another, we stand on the verge of extinguishing the dynasty!”222 The morale of the Liang military certainly suffered from such incidents, but Cunxu’s confidence emanated from simple contempt for Liang warriors, whom he denigrated as cowards certain to flee in the face of his bravado.223 He thus proposed a blitzkrieg against Kaifeng, drawing upon thirty thousand soldiers from nearby districts, thirty thousand from Youzhou, and another thirty thousand from Tianxiong, his current base of operations. The presence of “commoners with white skin” among the conscripts suggests a paucity of professional soldiers with the standard tattoo. In effect, the Jin had resorted to enlisting underage boys to achieve its aims, abuses that appear to have disproportionately affected Tianxiong.

Demise of Zhou Dewei Cunxu personally led forces against Linpu, a county south of Puzhou, on the twentyfourth day of the twelfth month (918.12.24). Liang reinforcements stymied northern armies by surfacing to their rear and sapping the offensive of needed momentum. The manpower and timetable were all wrong, despite a wholly viable strategy. Commander 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223.

JWDS 28.392; ZZTJ, 270.8835. ZZTJ 270.8835. Zhao, Tang Taizong zhuan, pp. 25, 56. JWDS 28.392–93; ZZTJ 270.8833, 8837–42. ZZTJ 270.8838. ZZTJ 270.8830, 8837.

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Zhou Dewei had previously weighed in against the venture, especially in terms of execution. With characteristic caution, he preferred delaying a full frontal assault, “using maneuvers to harass and exhaust the enemy beforehand.” Liang warriors could be expected to fight harder as northerners approached their capital, Dewei reasoned, due to the usual fortitude of the desperate. Dewei also worried about overinvesting in a single action. Cunxu countered by getting personal, “To try to evade war would diminish me as warrior.” He promptly mobilized his rear guard for a forward action, exposing him and his men to potential harm.224 The advance against Kaifeng miscarried badly at the outset, causing the Prince of Jin to take refuge among a cluster of mounds in the early weeks of 919. Soldiers entrusted with the critical task of protecting supply wagons, men under Cunxu’s command, had abandoned positions at the spectacle of Liang warriors amassing nearby. They either lacked combat experience or the requisite equipment, both serious missteps. Then, massive desertions and unruly conduct affected armies on assignment from the far north, Youzhou, raising questions about the efficacy of newly vanquished soldiers on deployments far from home. In sum, it was the poor execution of Jin strategy that allowed the enemy to prevail. To make matters worse, the action at Linpu would claim the lives of Zhou Dewei, the decorated Jin commander, and a son, a tragedy worsened by the fact that their deaths seemed avoidable. Cunxu acknowledged as much in the tearful embrace of surviving officers, “My disregard for the counsel of a seasoned commander has caused father and son to come to this.”225 His remorse may have been genuine, but sadly, Dewei would not be the last casualty of his high-stakes gambles in war. All too frequently, Cunxu expected the best outcome without anticipating worst-case scenarios, a dangerous deficiency for strategists. In the words of Napoleon, “I calculate on the basis of the worst possible case. If I take cautions, it is because my custom is to leave nothing to chance.”226 On the heels of major setbacks at Linpu, Cunxu considered returning to friendly terrain, but foster brother Sizhao warned of the dangers of affording Liang armies any sort of repose. Rather, he called for, “exhausting the enemy through unrelenting pressure by our elite fighters.”227 Sharing the proactive position of Sizhao was commander Yan Bao, who pointed to the perils of retreat after penetration so deep into hostile lands.228 Bao’s counsel simply recognized the reality that Jin armies were too ensnared to withdraw. Cunxu thus pressed on, leading the all-important Center Armies along the southern side of the Yellow River westward to Puyang county, still directing sights against Kaifeng or pretending to do so. A respite at Puyang permitted a stabilizing of 224. 225. 226. 227. 228.

JWDS 56.754; XWDS 25. 262; Xu Tang shu, 41.376–77. XWDS 25.263. See Luvaas, Napoleon, p. 132. XWDS 36.387; HR p. 298. ZZTJ 270.8840.

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fortunes, Cunxu likely finding comfort in the fact that casualties for the Liang had been just as jarring.

Lackluster Performance of Li Siyuan In the winter of 918–19, on the heels of the aborted drive on Kaifeng, Cunxu’s relations with adopted brother Li Siyuan reached a new low. A participant in the current border offensive, Siyuan had directed his armies to Xiangzhou in the immediate wake of setbacks in the preceding twelfth month, including uncertainty about the whereabouts of Li Congke, his adopted son. Moreover, rumors were rife of Cunxu’s retreat northward, rumors likely planted by his own agents to confuse the enemy. Upon confirmation of his continued presence at Puyang, Siyuan crossed the river again in search of the missing prince. During their meeting, Cunxu taunted Siyuan, “How could you possibly presume that I was dead!” Siyuan bowed apologetically in begging for mercy, an agonizing moment for the older man.229 Congke fared much better, having followed closely on the heels of Cunxu throughout the ordeal. The Prince would bestow honors upon Congke at the banquet concluding the event, his dedication at Puyang compensating somewhat for his foster father’s inexplicably mediocre performance. Upon returning to Weizhou in the first month, the Prince of Jin proceeded to reshuffle leadership along the Yellow River front. The foster brother to save his life in the preceding month, Cunshen, received oversight over the strategic Desheng commandery. He also inherited command of the Multi-Racial Armies on the heels of Zhou  Dewei’s death.230 Both the verbal thrashing for Siyuan and incentives for Cunshen reflect Cunxu’s ongoing stress on loyalty among senior officers, and especially his foster brothers with their mixed records of service in the field and questionable loyalties to the person of the prince. The Jin faced the need to replace Zhou Dewei as governor of Youzhou, heart of the Lulong command, and reflecting the importance of the area, Cunxu assumed nominal powers himself. The action paralleled the precedent for Tianxiong years earlier, except that Cunxu had no intention of moving. He tapped Sizhao to be interim prefect, but the highly regarded foster brother retained duties farther south at Xiangzhou, making for nominal oversight as well.231 For this reason, the selection of the eunuch Ma Shaohong as military inspector for Youzhou assumed high symbolism. Long on experience in the Jinyang palace, Shaohong had been conferred the royal surname as an act of favor.232 To the extent that Cunxu and Sizhao resided elsewhere, daily management of Youzhou devolved by default on Shaohong. The appointment is often seen as 229. 230. 231. 232.

ZZTJ 270.8841. XWDS 25.262. XWDS 36.387; HR p. 299. JWDS 29.395; ZZTJ 271.8843.

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symptomatic of expanding eunuch influence. In reality, eunuchs had been favored by Cunxu from early on, as demonstrated by the dominance of Zhang Chengye, but with one difference: Chengye never held a permanent post away from Jinyang and only occasionally directed military missions at large. Having witnessed the excesses, even havoc, wrought by certain foster sons of his father, Cunxu astutely avoided deploying fictive family as extensions of his own power, at least for the initial decade of his reign as prince. The alternative source of surrogates might have been biological kin, but Cunxu’s paternal uncles were all dead and his younger siblings mostly mediocrities whom he wisely shunned for major assignments. As for sons, despite a wife as a teenager, numerous consorts in his twenties, and a sizable harem by his thirties, only five sons were born to Cunxu to record, four of whom were small children.233 His own father was also late in producing male heirs, nearly thirty sui when Cunxu was born. The paucity of male kinsmen, in any case, left Cunxu with few alternatives to eunuchs in the delegation of sensitive tasks. At this point, sources reveal no serious conflict between Ma Shaohong and Guo Chongtao, the senior military advisor, although Chongtao’s private prejudices against eunuchs as a class, already well formed, would surface in time.

Tensions Within Empathetic Ear of Feng Dao Cunxu seems to have increased his delegation of military tasks to others in response to concerns expressed by aides, which permitted an extended family reunion at Jinyang starting in the seventh month of 919 and continuing through the ninth month. Another row with royal managers erupted during his stay that would portend poorly for relations with civilians under a future administration.234 The fiscally conservative Guo Chongtao had requested a reduction in the number of lesser officers permitted to accompany commanders at celebratory banquets, presumably to contain costs. The request understandably inflamed the Prince of Jin, who considered cuts of the sort not just poisonous to military morale, but untimely in the face of a widening war. “I entertain men who expose themselves to mortal danger on my behalf,” he asserted, threatening to extend his stay at Jinyang indefinitely and delegate responsibilities at Weizhou to others. Cunxu importuned Feng Dao, his administrative secretary, to compose a draft directive with the appropriate rules, only for Dao to turn the table, chiding Chongtao for his callousness:

233. XWDS 14.152; HR p. 142. 234. ZZTJ 270.8848.

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Chongtao retreated in response to the censure, allowing Dao to emerge as the dispassionate mediator between Cunxu and senior aides. A triumvirate between Chongtao, Dao, and the Prince of Jin seemed on the horizon, as the aging Zhang Chengye deferred to a team of younger aides, men who owed their careers to him and shared many of his views.

Defending Desheng The Prince of Jin passed an uneventful Spring at Weizhou, appearing at the warfront to his south only after receiving an emergency alert from Desheng commandery in the fourth month of 919.235 Desheng straddled the Yellow River, its Northern and Southern towns located several kilometers from Puyang county. With both areas under Jin control, Liang commander He Xiang had raided the Southern town, intent on denying Jin armies access to the closest crossover point from Weizhou. Over a dozen fortress-like warships covered in ox-hide had been deployed to empower the Liang to dominate the river and isolate Desheng’s southern town. The Prince of Jin and chief bodyguard Wang Jianji, from the northern bank, orchestrated a successful assault on these imposing vessels all the same, recruiting men familiar with the warship and its vulnerabilities. The mercenaries then exploited downstream currents to rush the boats with incendiary devices that destroyed equipment on board. Once set afire, panic ensued on the warships, while several hundred Jin men in armor attacked on command from nearby boats, their axes splitting the warships into pieces that flowed downstream. The Liang would lose half of its fighting force in the area, including He Xiang, who died of depression.236 Control of the Southern city would remain for the moment with the Jin. Infrastructural enhancements proceeded along the Yellow River front, despite Cunxu’s absence from the theater. One technically competent foster brother, Li Cunjin, was charged with constructing a pontoon bridge to facilitate crossing the Yellow River at Desheng. Observers reminded the brother that the area lacked the bamboo poles and plaster adhesives conventionally used to make rafts. He could not be dissuaded, however, and adapted technology to locally available materials: wood replaced 235. JWDS 29.395–96; XWDS 25.270, 47.525; ZZTJ 270.8842–45. 236. XWDS 23.240.

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bamboo in making poles and reeds replaced plaster as adhesive. His feat exhilarated Cunxu, who later visited the site, “stripping the shirt from his own back to present as a gift to Cunjin.”237 The story reveals the prince’s growing appreciation of the technology behind war. With the return of Cunxu to the Weizhou front, the Jin committed itself to expanding Desheng’s Northern city, an enterprise involving tens of thousands of workers and soldiers. “Over a hundred skirmishes erupted in the course of several months,” the Jin making most of younger officers like Shi Jingtang, an archery captain, and Liu Zhiyuan, a cavalry leader. The two Shatuo ethnics would rule over their own dynasties in time.238 Cultivating talent within his own generation assumed greater import as the kingdom expanded. Outreach of the sort also permitted the prince to inaugurate a policy of rotation for men in sensitive military posts. He moved first against the governor’s guard at Weizhou, whose chief, Wang Jianji, was replaced at the outset of 920.239 The rotation of senior officers was widely used by the Liang to limit hereditary power in the locales, policies embraced by the Jin, but limited originally to problematic areas. Even then, the Weizhou military would hold umbrage against any perceived intrusion into its affairs.

Valor of Yuan Xingqin In the twelfth month of 919, a restless Cunxu directed his armies south of the Yellow River in a surprise maneuver to disrupt a critical supply line for Liang armies while despoiling enemy lands. The mission proved an initial success, until the return to home base.240 Cunxu and a handful of bodyguards were waylaid in an ambush in a village near Puyang county, as several hundred enemy troops surrounded them. Fortunately, foster son Yuan Xingqin quickly identified the prince by his flag and challenged an enemy horseman to a scrimmage. Xingqin proceeded to break the lances of two enemy soldiers, causing his opponents to perish as Cunxu fled the scene.241 Nearly two decades earlier, Xingqin had saved the life of the Yan satrap under nearly identical conditions, so actions at Puyang affirmed the totality of his devotion to his new lord. But another near-fatal incident left the Shatuo Prince appearing less the man of destiny and more the daredevil oblivious to human limits. As the Historical Records says succinctly, “In his zeal for war, Cunxu was prone to slight his opponents.”242 Refusing to scuttle fast for the border, Cunxu regrouped his men and continued to harass the enemy, eventually seizing Puyang for the second time. Liang commander 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242.

XWDS 36.394; HR p. 306; ZZTJ 270.8848–49. ZZTJ 271.8850. ZZTJ 271.8853–54. JWDS 29.396; ZZTJ 271.8851–52. JWDS 70.925–27; ZZTJ 271.8851. XWDS 25.271; HR p. 227.

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Wang Zan, after an initial victory, soon suffered a crushing defeat that cost tens of thousands of warriors. He was swiftly sacked by Kaifeng. Cunxu returned to camp after the Puyang incident and tearfully embraced Yuan Xingqin, insisting, “I swear to share rank and riches with you [in perpetuity]!” Xingqin’s star would rise in coming years, as the lieutenant evolved into an intimate. Cunxu also heaped largesse upon the wounded at Puyang.243 At the same time, he felt a sense of profound loss for the many commanders and officers captured during the initial Liang rally, most of whom were liquidated on site, save for Shi Junli, who was conveyed to Kaifeng and held as a prisoner-of-war for nearly three years, the government’s efforts to convert him all falling short.244

Second Hezhong Intervention In the summer and fall of 920, another crisis erupted involving Zhu Youqian, the “short-armed” governor of Hezhong. As noted earlier, Youqian had abandoned the Liang dynasty in 912 after Zhu Wen fell to an assassin. The Jin responded by dispatching armies to shield him from court retaliation. Following the accession of Emperor Mo, Youqian restored relations with Kaifeng without wholly severing ties to Jinyang.245 But in 920, he expelled the governor of neighboring Tongzhou to install his own son as interim regent. The illicit act infuriated Emperor Mo, who sought to make an example of Youqian by refusing to acknowledge the son’s authority, then fielded armies against Tongzhou. Youqian petitioned the Jin to intervene once again, but this time aware of opposition within his own family and the wider military elite.246 The potential for a mutiny at Hezhong, compounded by the looming threat of action by Kaifeng, caused Cunxu to respond with swift and debilitating force. Tongzhou was site of a cluster of tombs for Tang emperors, another reason for the Prince of Jin, as celebrant of that legacy, to ally with the local powerbrokers to protect the artifacts from collateral damage.247 By the eighth month, Liang and Jin armies were fully engaged at Tongzhou. Liu Xun and Duan Ning would direct the Liang effort, while the Jin command included a distinguished triumvirate of royal foster brothers: Cunshen, Cunxian, and Sizhao.248 Jin troops assaulted Liang barricades that enveloped the city and launched diversionary raids against locations farther west such as Huazhou. They also undertook deceptive maneuvers to outwit the Liang military over and again. It took scarcely a month 243. JWDS 65.864; ZZTJ 271.8851–52. 244. JWDS 65.866. 245. XWDS 3.27, 5.42, 22.227, 36.395, 45.493; HR pp. 27, 43, 206, 307, 378; JWDS 63.846; XWDS 25.264; ZZTJ 271.8854–57, 8866. 246. XWDS 36.395; HR p. 307. 247. ZZTJ 271.8857. 248. XWDS 25.264.

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for the Jin to prevail, and prevail handily, while the once formidable Liu Xun was banished and soon poisoned to death at court orders. Related by marriage to Youqian, Xun had tried to sway the governor through personal correspondence and drew a cloud of suspicion once attempts at war and negotiation both failed to yield fruit. The commander’s undeserved fate reflected poorly on Emperor Mo and further strained relations with an army replete with Liu Xun sympathizers. There are reports of a long line of Liang officers absconding for Jin lands, choosing to cast their fortunes with the Shatuo prince, who seemed to have momentum on his side.249

Alliances Matter Demise of Wang Rong The year 921 witnessed some notable political developments in the transition from Jin satrapy to Later Tang empire, but it also brought a momentous military reversal. The demise of the earliest Jin ally, the Prince of Zhao, occurred at the outset and mostly of his own doing. Wang Rong spent lavishly on palaces and gardens, a harem of hundreds plus far off trips to worship Daoist immortals.250 His retinue of palace ladies, eunuchs, and bodyguards occasionally surpassed ten thousand, an extravagance even by imperial standards. The distractions of his private life provided a window for the intrusion of eunuchs into the kingdom’s governance, the most detested of whom was Shi Ximeng. “He shared the bed of Rong from dusk to dawn,” writes the Historical Records in confirmation of romantic ties between the pair, which in turn created undue influence that many senior aides came to resent.251 Ximeng actively promoted Rong’s indulgent lifestyle and bore the brunt of hostility toward the regime within the military. Resentment also emanated from within the Zhao palace among fellow eunuchs jealous of Ximeng. Amidst a month-long excursion in late 920, one senior eunuch, Li Honggui, in collusion with members of Wang Rong’s bodyguard led by Su Hanheng, appeared before his tent to press for Ximeng’s death. Rong’s refusal prompted guards to decapitate Ximeng before his very eyes and he retaliated by summarily slaying Honggui and Hanheng. Rong also threatened extended punishment for dozens of family members and a thorough investigation of the incident by senior commander Zhang Wenli. Baseless rumors soon ran rife within the armed forces, which predictably mutinied. Over one thousand guardsmen brutally killed the fifty-year-old Rong at his residence, led by the duplicitous Wenli. Previously, it was out of “profound love” that Rong adopted Wenli as foster son and conferred the name Wang Deming.252 Although formerly part of the governor’s 249. 250. 251. 252.

JWDS 94.1254. JWDS 29.397–98; XWDS 5.43–44, 26.277, 39.414; HR pp. 43, 327; ZZTJ 271.8859–60, 271.8864–65. XWDS 39.414; HR p. 327. XWDS 39. 415; HR p. 328.

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guard at Yan, Wenli’s expertise in military affairs was negligible, his oversight over the local armed forces attributed entirely to the patronage of the Zhao governor. The governor also deployed Wenli for joint military actions with allies such as the Jin, allowing him to establish networks abroad. But Wenli emerges in the sources as “cunning and mischievous.” In the wake of slaying his adopted father, he proceeded to liquidate all survivors of the Wang family as prelude to his own assumption of royal powers. He brutalized as well the families of Rong devotees like Wu Zhen, only to further fuel the commander’s recalcitrance.253 Zhang Wenli promptly petitioned the Prince of Jin to endorse his appointment as Zhao overseer, a request initially approved under pressure from military advisors, who urged restraint in light of commitments elsewhere. The impulses of Cunxu were far less conciliatory. News of Wang Rong’s assassination had thrown him into a rage, “crashing his goblet against the floor and bursting into tears,” sources say.254 He may have poked occasional fun at Rong’s pampered lifestyle, but Cunxu had found genuinely endearing a man who shared his passion for life and fidelity to allies. Once infamous as fair-weather friend, Rong had evolved in a few short years into a bedrock of support for Jinyang. Moreover, Cunxu had promised a daughter to Rong’s son, which further aggravated his sense of indignation.255 Suppressing his own urge to retaliate forthwith was hard enough, but appeals from other quarters forced Jin leaders to revisit options.

Intervening at Zhao The coup against Wang Rong had stirred indignation in Fu Xi, a leading Zhao commander currently in the Prince of Jin’s service, fearing his extended family might be the next target of conspirators back home. He thus pleaded for action against the renegade. “After learning of the mutiny against Rong, I considered ending my life with this very sword,” Xi said with heavy heart to Cunxu, “then realized that no benefit would come from my demise.”256 The Prince of Jin was also riled by reports from spies intercepting letters from Wenli that solicited aid from the Liang and the Kitan, his erstwhile enemies. These various factors compelled Cunxu to advance the schedule for punitive action.257 Fortunately for the Jin, a representative for Wenli sent to negotiate outstanding matters, Li Lin (860–947), repudiated his patron to offer “a scheme for conquering Wenli.”258 This simplified the task of Jin commanders led by Fu Xi, a Zhao native, who in turn drew upon a stellar group of outsiders, Yan Bao, Shi Jiantang, and Ren Huan. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258.

XWDS 26. 279; HR p. 232. ZZTJ 271.8865. XWDS 39.415; HR p. 327. ZZTJ 271.8867. JWDS 137.1829. XWDS 57.655–56; HR p. 462.

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They overtook Zhaozhou by the eighth month of 921, where the prefect surrendered on short order. By then, Wenli had perished of an ulcer, but his son, Zhang Chujin, continued to resist Jin armies at neighboring Zhenzhou, where hostilities claimed the life of the revered Jiantang. In the absence of the decisive win that honor demanded, Cunxu would feel no closure. Moreover, he must have been baffled that conflicts were erupting on friendly terrain north of the Yellow River, even as progress continued along the southern front, including a decisive win over Liang armies in the tenth month.259 To complicate matters, directly north of the Zhao kingdom lies the Dingzhou satrapy of Wang Chuzhi (d. 923), who saw Jin intervention at Zhaozhou, the step from indirect to direct rule, as detrimental to his own interests.260 Dingzhou leaders had allied with the Shatuo in recent years and the son of Chuzhi, Wang Yu, had long taken up residence at the Jin kingdom and assumed office under its auspices, including defense commissioner for Xinzhou, the former Yan kingdom. By then, Wang Yu had lost favor with his father. The son chose to reverse course in the summer of 921 and approached Chuzhi about allying with the Kitan instead. The idea fell flat on military authorities at Dingzhou as well as Wang Du, Chuzhi’s son by adoption, who placed Chuzhi and his wife under house arrest, then reiterated his alliance with Jinyang. It proved a remarkably fortuitous turn of events.

Chastening the Kitan Abaoji chose to intervene on behalf of the deposed Dingzhou governor, spurning the counsel of his wife, the Shulü Empress, a generally prescient voice on military ventures. His armies raided Youzhou in the last weeks of 921 before progressing southward toward Dingzhou.261 The Prince of Jin, responding to an emergency call from Wang Du, commanded an elite guard of five thousand from Zhenzhou to Dingzhou. Many advisors worried about siphoning resources northward at a time of full-fledged war to the south. The strategist Guo Chongtao rejected their pessimism. The Kitan lacked serious commitment to the venture and would certainly recoil in the face of Jin resolve, he reasoned. Foster brother Sizhao, arriving from Luzhou, concurred. The optimism of advisors buoyed Cunxu, who invoked the memory of Tang Taizong in casting action against the Kitan into a higher mission. In his words: An imperium owes its ascent to the Mandate of Heaven, so the Kitan are in no position to do serious injury to us. Having mobilized tens of thousands of warriors to pacify the regions east of Mount Heng, I could hardly unite the Four Seas were I to flee these petty barbarians or try to elude this passing threat!262 259. 260. 261. 262.

ZZTJ 271.8868. XWDS 39.419–20; HR pp. 332–34; ZZTJ 271.8866–70; LS 2.17–18. ZZTJ 271.8870–72; JWDS 137.1829. ZZTJ 271.8872; JWDS 137.1829. Italics added.

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Standing down the Kitan provided the occasion to prove a higher mandate to rule the world, while distinguishing Jin overlords from the “petty barbarians” new to the neighborhood. The comment sets the Shatuo apart from the so-called “barbarians,” people lacking the unique legitimacy of Jin leaders as successors to the Tang. It also attests to Cunxu’s unbridled confidence that unification of the north was imminent, the Mandate of Heaven resting unquestionably with the Later Tang. The Liang dynasty never fully secured it and the Kitan evinced no such potential. Cunxu and his men moved fast, paralyzing the Kitan by suddenly surfacing north of Xincheng county, in the vicinity of Dingzhou, where his men captured one of Abaoji’s younger sons. Kitan armies, then outside the walls of Dingzhou, progressed toward Wangdu county. The pullout enabled Cunxu from the south to overpower the Kitan with his speed and inscrutability. He managed to reach Dingzhou in a matter of days, greeted effusively by the armed forces, including presiding officer Wang Du, who promised a daughter in marriage to Jiji, Cunxu’s eldest son. Another victory over the Kitan ensued at Wangdu county, although Cunxu nearly snatched defeat from the eyes of victory by falling into another ambush. This time, one thousand of his own bodyguards found themselves encircled by several times as many ambushers. A long afternoon of close combat followed, much at Cunxu’s own hand, before relief could arrive led by foster brother Li Sizhao.263 Kitan armies in retreat suffered massive losses largely through starvation: prolonged snowfall had deprived them of targets to forage for food.264 Their plight demonstrated the downside of campaigning without the usual convoys of provisions. Cunxu had prevailed in direct combat with Kitan armies, his first on such a scale, which even he would concede were without peer in fighting power and organization. Commenting on the precision of their movements such that chaos could be averted even in retreat, he notes almost enviously, “The barbarians could do so through the strict execution of mandates, something unattainable in the Middle Kingdom.”265 As a rule in warfare, few maneuvers are as hazardous as retreat, which makes the Kitan achievement all the more estimable.266 Still, Cunxu could bask in the glory of a decisive win, which in turn consolidated his control over a broad swathe of land south of the Great Wall, including the strategic Youzhou. In addition, a chastened Abaoji would think twice about similar forays on behalf of local surrogates in the future.

263. 264. 265. 266.

XWDS 36.387; HR p. 299; JWDS 137.1829; ZZTJ 271.8872–73; LS 2.17. XWDS 5.44; HR p. 44; ZZTJ 271.8872–73. ZZTJ 271.8873. On the perils of retreat, see Luvaas, Napoleon, p. 128.

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Final Transition to Dynasty Accession Petitions Aplenty The year 921 brought progress on the political front. The rulers of Wu and Shu, the wealthiest of southern kingdoms that bordered the Liang to the east and west, had earlier urged the Prince of Jin to accede as emperor, as they had done themselves in defiance of authorities at Kaifeng.267 The petition from Wu is especially noteworthy, as its leader had spurned overtures from Cunxu five years earlier. The two southern powers likely viewed their own continued autonomy as more secure under a Shatuo regime based north of the Yellow River, a misguided assumption, it turns out. Beginning in the first month, ten governors across the north petitioned for Cunxu’s accession as well, including five foster brothers, plus key allies at Dingzhou, Zhaozhou, and Hezhong. The adoption of Chinese imperial institutions by the Kitan was likely a factor in terms of timing. The petitions from the governors were followed by successive pro forma declensions from Cunxu before the final response, “I will consider it.” The statement sounds more tentative today than listeners at the time seemed to think. The slew of petitions for Cunxu’s accession as emperor coincided with the recovery of the Tang imperial seals (or more likely, a convincing forgery thereof ). Pilfered from Changan forty years earlier in the chaos of rebellion, they miraculously fell into the hands of a Buddhist monk at Weizhou, the Prince of Jin’s current base of operations.268 The monk may have come to know Cunxu through Consort Liu, an ardent Buddhist and Weizhou native. It proved an immensely important discovery, as exquisitely crafted seals of jade or gold, dubbed guo bao, functioned like crowns in other cultures as symbols of imperial authority. Passed from ruler to successor during the dynasty, the seals usually ended up in the vaults of later dynasts as tangible proof of the transfer of sovereignty. For a regime intent on restoring the Tang in name and spirit, the seals provided the most tangible connection to the past.

Admonitions of a Father The whole affair of discovery and celebration of the Tang imperial seals, coinciding with a mass of petitions for Cunxu’s elevation to emperor, had the appearance of orchestration by him. He seemed surprised by the commotion and conjecture, then spurned pleas for his accession by referencing similar requests to his father decades earlier and Keyong’s measured response:

267. XWDS 5.43–44, 61.757, 63.790; HR pp. 43–44, 478–79, 514; ZZTJ 271.8862. 268. ZZTJ 271.8862.

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Cunxu concluded the rather winding exchange with a firm promise, “My father’s words still ring in my ears, so I dare not entertain petitions of the sort.”269 The invocation of Keyong’s words, reportedly uttered between sobs, was intended to allay concerns about any haste in assuming the throne or any objective beyond simply restoring the Tang imperium. The statement also reveals much about the sentiments of Keyong toward the end of his life: the depth of his fidelity to the Tang, such that he could occupy the country’s capital without attempting to seize the throne. For him, “loyalty” was not an abstraction, but a passion. We also witness Keyong’s revulsion for Zhu Wen, who feigned fidelity merely to position himself as a usurper. His son, Cunxu, had to harness his own impulses, and the zealotry of officers, in deference to his father’s principles. Moreover, the act of accession for founders of dynasties have historically coincided with a series of spectacular feats on the front lines of war—concrete manifestations of a Mandate of Heaven—but oracles could wring little by way of positive messages from Heaven based on recent events.

A Eunuch’s Timely Caution The celebrations occasioning the discovery of the Tang seals and the swell of petitions for Cunxu to accede as emperor were enough to alarm Zhang Chengye, then seventyfive. Traversing the difficult terrain from Jinyang to Weizhou on sedan chair, the ailing eunuch tried to dissuade Cunxu from acting without a full appreciation of the ramifications of his actions. He invoked the memory of Keyong in pleading for patience:

269. ZZTJ 271.8862. A letter from the Prince of Shu, Wang Jian, in summer 907, had proposed that Keyong and Jian, “each reign as emperors of their own domain,” in effect, sharing sovereignty over the world; see ZZTJ 266.8675. For more on Keyong’s intervention at Shimen on behalf of the Tang monarch in 895, see XWDS 4.36; HR pp. 35–36.

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For thirty years, Your Eminence joined his father in fighting bloody battles against the Liang: our original intent was to satisfy the vendetta of family and country while restoring the ancestral altars of the Tang dynasty. If you hastily assume esteemed titles today, even as the primal monster remains unvanquished, you would contradict the original will of father and son and lose the respect of the entire world—something wholly unacceptable!

In effect, contemplating a change in mandate was premature so long as the Liang emperor continued to preside over Kaifeng, a reminder of the ongoing struggle for legitimacy between the two houses. His comments serve as a reminder that sovereignty in China can never be shared: only one man can rule as Son of Heaven, historically, the occupier of the Central Plains. An equally compelling reason to defer dynastic ambitions was the myth of fidelity to the Tang imperium: The Liang, erstwhile enemy of the Tang dynasty as well as our own Jin, is loathed by the world. For now, Your Highness should simply expel this horrific scourge on behalf of the world, publicly proclaim its profound offense against Your Highness’s Sagely Predecessor, then search for descendants of Tang royals to install. If suitable heirs can be found, how could you presume to supplant them? But in the absence of suitable heirs alive, then who in the world would challenge your elevation?270

Resuscitating the Tang dynasty had always been the causis bellis of the Jin satrapy, as reflected in the decision to retain the Tang calendar, rather than acknowledge the Liang calendar or create its own like some regimes in the south. The search for a suitable successor to the imperial line would certainly fail, for the last Tang emperor, along with several hundred clansmen, had perished in 904 at the hands of Liang leaders.271 Still, a search would satisfy appearances and legitimize Cunxu as proxy. Chengye’s passion about the succession matter demonstrates the depth of his loyalty to the former dynasty. Like many expatriates from Changan to make their way to Jinyang, service to the Jin allowed him to rally around an ideal of resistance without confronting the finality of the Tang dynasty’s demise. A decade later, Chengye remained wedded to this fiction and realized that the installation of a new line of rulers without the blood of Li royals inferred a sovereignty wholly separate from the past. Cunxu’s manipulation of the Tang namesake to create the appearance of continuity was an act of self-deceit. By one account, Chengye returned to Jinyang and starved himself to death in protest.272 By other accounts, his death in the eleventh month of 922, over a year after the exchange with Cunxu, was a consequence of old age.273

270. 271. 272. 273.

XWDS 38.405; HR p. 318. XWDS 43.469; HR pp. 364–65. XWDS 38.405; HR p. 319. ZZTJ 271.8864.

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In  either case, the eunuch’s anxieties could only have worsened in coming months, as additional indicators of an impending accession emanated from Weizhou.

Brushes for Painting the Sun A summons for former Tang courtiers was issued in the seventh month of 921 in anticipation of forming a civil service based on Tang models.274 For over a decade, official appointments had proceeded without customary procedures of recruitment and review, an arrangement certain to compromise the quality of governance, so pragmatic benefit derived from finally regularizing practices. The most prominent of early recruits was a minister of rites under the Tang, Su Xun, who came to Weizhou from Hezhong, the bailiwick of Zhu Youqian. A generation earlier, in 906, Xun had figured prominently in endorsing the Liang founder as he prepared to purge the last Tang dynast, only to be slighted by receiving no official appointment.275 Appearing at Weizhou in 921, Su Xun evinced an even greater enthusiasm for the Prince of Jin, bowing as would a subject before the emperor, then presenting “thirty brushes for painting the sun.”276 In Tang times, when an heir-apparent oversaw political affairs prior to formal accession, he would express approval by writing the character for sun (ri) with his brush, in lieu of the word for imperial consent (ke), a character reserved for ruling emperors.277 The action of presenting Cunxu with brushes effectively formalized his standing as rising sovereign while affirming the immediacy of his elevation as emperor. Flattered by the attention, Cunxu did nothing to discourage the inappropriate conduct, such as avoiding the prostrations of Xun in the manner of Zhu Wen on the eve of his usurpation.278 Nearly two decades later, the brazenness of Cunxu left little ambiguity about his own aspirations.

Lingering Volatility Refocusing on Desheng With the strategic focus having shifted northward in recent months, it became necessary for the Jin to refocus on its southern border with the Liang in early 922. Desheng commandery, its northern and southern cities straddling the Yellow River, was still unstable and potentially vulnerable to a challenge from Kaifeng. Earlier that winter, the Liang did attempt a raid, which Jin troops managed to foil by securing advance intelligence and setting their own trap. The Liang lost over twenty thousand men in 274. 275. 276. 277. 278.

ZZTJ 271.8866. XWDS 35.380; HR p. 291. XWDS 35.380–81; HR p. 292; JWDS 60.812. XTS 49.1296. XWDS 35.380; HR p. 290.

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the effort.279 Jin defenses were overseen for some months by adopted brother Siyuan and foster brother Cunshen, who later in the same winter managed to uncover a secret Liang plan to attack Weizhou in the Prince of Jin’s absence.280 The raid failed due to the stellar performance of officers on site led by Cunshen. The Liang did launch an offensive against Desheng, fifty thousand men reportedly mobilized against the northern city, setting up blockades to sever contact with the outside and disrupt relief. News of the offensive prompted Cunxu to leave the northern front sometime in the second lunar month of 922, returning to Weizhou in haste. The trip of over seven hundred kilometers was completed in an impressive five days! Liang forces quickly withdrew upon news of his presence.

Instability at Zhenzhou Over the course of the winter, as tensions at Desheng subsided, conditions worsened at Zhenzhou, the former satrapy of Wang Rong. Cunxu had personally led armies against Zhenzhou in the eleventh month of 921, then withdrew after an emergency summons from Dingzhou. The Jin siege continued through the winter under Yan Bao, who cut off supply lines to Zhenzhou to create severe shortages of food and weapons.281 When five hundred hungry troops emerged from the city to beg for food, Bao had not prepared for a possible ruse. Zhenzhou warriors would assault Jin embankments beyond the city wall to maul besiegers, while several thousand auxiliaries followed on their heels, setting torches to Jin assets and stealing provisions. Yan Bao would flee to safety at Zhaozhou, prompting the Prince of Jin to appoint Li Sizhao to Zhenzhou. Yet he fared no better, a casualty of combat within a month of his arrival.282 Devastated by the death of Sizhao, one of the few foster brothers with administrative skills to match his valor, Cunxu refused food and wine for many days. But his strained relations with the offspring of Sizhao would introduce fresh frictions at Zhenzhou, precisely as wayward governors presented threats elsewhere. By the autumn of 922, instability at Zhenzhou demanded further action by Cunxu, who recruited foster brother Li Cunjin for the suppression. A one-time commander of the elite Army of Foster Sons with a distinguished record at Desheng, Cunjin had developed a close working relationship with Cunxu at Weizhou, playing a key role in restoring civil and military order.283 But in the ninth month of 922, soon after his arrival at Zhenzhou, he was waylaid by local saboteurs as he grazed animal herds in the early morning. Miraculously, Cunjin won the scrimmage, only to perish of his injuries. His replacement at Zhenzhou, the fourth in a year, was foster brother Li Cunshen, 279. 280. 281. 282. 283.

JWDS 64.855–56; ZZTJ 271.8868. ZZTJ 271.8873–74. ZZTJ 271.8868, 8870, 8874–75. XWDS 36.387; HR p. 299; ZZTJ 271.8875; LS 2.18. XWDS 5.44, 36.394; HR pp. 44, 305–6; ZZTJ 271.8876–77.

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who managed within weeks to foil rebel armies through some timely defections within the local military. He proved a highly effective leader and reversed the perception of the place as cursed. The abused populace of Zhenzhou, upon liberation by Jin armies, insisted on cannibalizing the renegade Zhang Chujin and exhuming the body of his dead father, Wenli, for dismemberment at the marketplace. The Jin paid dearly to reclaim Zhenzhou in officers sacrificed and momentum lost, but officers on site refrained from the usual dispensation of mass death or plunder. To the contrary, Cunshen secured local treasuries by enlisting the incorruptible Guo Chongtao, while nominating local commander Fu Xi as governor.284 Xi declined due to the magnitude of the challenge and importuned the Prince of Jin to assume concurrent powers as governor for the Chengde command centering on the sister cities of Zhenzhou and Zhaozhou. The panoply of duties reflected precisely the ubiquity expected of a prince on the eve of accession as emperor. In another sign of rising expectations, Cunxu would decide, sometime after regaining Zhenzhou, to claim for himself as much as one hundred beauties from the former harem of Wang Rong, women who presumably ended up in the palaces of Luoyang.285 The action seems especially egregious in light of the heralded friendship between the two men, at least from the perspective of Chinese culture. But taking in the wives and consorts of deceased brothers and close friends had a long history in Inner Asia. As a man with nomadic roots, Rong might well have found solace in death by the fact that his harem would be cared for by a cherished friend.

284. JWDS 57.764; XWDS 25.264, 277; ZZTJ 271.8877. 285. XWDS 28.306.

3 The Tang Renaissance

A ruler, in elevating to office his own clansmen, restricts himself to closest kin; in  selecting people from other clans, he gives preference to longtime acquaintances. He never slights virtue in promoting others and never neglects merit in bestowing bounty. Zuozhuan, Chapter 19

Launching the Tongguang Reign Inner Circle Fifteen years surely seemed an eternity to Cunxu, on the eve of securing the elusive conquest of the Liang. The man derided a decade ago as, “the kid who fancies cockfights,” had turned the corner as underdog and put residual doubters to rest. A sign of his promising political acumen emerges in several appointments at the onset of 923 that included Wu Zhen as prefect for Zhaozhou and Zhang Xian as prefect for Zhenzhou, the twin cities formerly comprising the Zhao domain.1 A one-time foot soldier under Wang Rong, Zhen had risen to lieutenant by dint of loyalty and discipline. Renegades murdering Rong in 921 had cruelly maimed leading members of Zhen’s family to force his surrender. His insistence on placing civic duty before personal considerations by continuing combat so impressed the Prince of Jin that promotion ensued, the beginning of a distinguished career.2 The other appointee, Zhang Xian, native to Jinyang, had collaborated with Cunxu since his early days as prince, initially at Jinyang and then Weizhou. A man of many talents, musical and literary, he was also a voracious reader and bibliophile.3 Xian proved in time an exceedingly able administrator “with a knack for managing personnel,” plus a feisty spirit and critical pen that spared no one, even the supremely powerful. Another episode dating from the period that set a similarly positive tone for the emerging administration was an exchange with a tax accountant at Weizhou, 1. 2. 3.

ZZTJ 271.8877–78. XWDS 26.279; HR pp. 232–33; CFYG 804.9350. XWDS 28.312; HR pp. 236–38; JWDS 69.911–14; Song shi, 263.9086.

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Zhao Jiliang. Taxes at Weizhou had been in arrears for some time, due to a combination of natural disasters and administrative failings, and Cunxu delegated collection to the accountant. It took amazing courage for the accountant to challenge the aspiring emperor on the broader symbolism of pressing for taxes, but Jiliang did precisely this in a spirited tête-à-tête with Cunxu: “When does Your Highness expect to pacify the southern stretches of the Yellow River?” The question initially baffled the Prince, who rejoined, “Your job involves the oversight of taxes. How dare you intrude into my arena of military affairs while a failure in your own!” Rather than back down, the accountant pressed forward with his remonstrance, “In  planning conquest, Your Highness evinces little compassion for the common people. On the day that the people turn disaffected, I fear, even the northern Yellow River region may well be lost, let alone the south!”4 Jiliang’s conviction shocked Cunxu in a positive way as a reminder of the ruler’s ongoing political duties at a time of all-consuming war. “Hereafter, Cunxu turned to Jiliang on all matters of governance,” historians report. This final claim of Jiliang’s comprehensive input is surely exaggerated, but the recruitment of Jiliang in the capital and Wu Zhen and Zhang Xian in the circuits demonstrates the rising monarch’s commitment to men of competence and conviction regardless of social station. He also proved receptive to constructive remonstrance. By no coincidence, the courting of talent and tolerance of critics were trademarks of Cunxu’s evolving model for matters of governance, Taizong of Tang.5 As the institutional foundations of empire came to be laid in early 923, other imperatives emerged to inform official recruitment and demand compromise of the monarch. Zhang Chengye, the most influential opponent of imperial accession, had died several months earlier. Cunxu is reported to have turned “suddenly sullen” and lost his appetite for several days, upon learning of the eunuch’s passing, pillar of the Jinyang palace for nearly three decades. He even questioned why Heaven would deprive the country of its greatest asset, “the Zibu of our times,” referring to an eminent statesman of the Three Kingdoms, Zhang Zhao (156–236), a man famed for combining critical policy input with valor in the field.6 Yet no one grieved the eunuch’s passing like Mother Cao, for whom Chengye had doubled as private bodyguard and political consultant, in addition to functioning as co-parent for her young sons and daughters in the years since Keyong’s death. Mother Cao thus chose to honor his memory by employing the mourning rites for nephews.”7 Nonetheless, Zhang Chengye had been the leading voice against the inauguration of dynasty at Jinyang, and his demise afforded Cunxu far more latitude. The accession’s timing was further informed by the assumption of the title of “king” by the Prince of 4. 5. 6. 7.

ZZTJ 271.8878. Zhao, Tang Taizong zhuan, pp. 158–69. CFYG 688.7701. JWDS 72.953; ZZTJ 271.8877–78; CFYG 668.7698, 7701.

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Wu in the southeast.8 The immensely prosperous state presented no military threat to the Jin, but Cunxu might better contain the ambitions of other wayward southern states by replacing a listless administration in Kaifeng with a newly invigorated Son of Heaven. Orders thus went out to officials at-large, in the second month of 923, to identify eminent scholars of the Tang for a transitional civil service. By the end of the fourth month, provisional chief councilors were named, Doulu Ge and Lu Cheng, as councilors of the left and right, respectively.9 The choice was not without controversy. The Prince of Jin’s own preference for councilor was the well-regarded Lu Zhi, a  man of pedigree and competence, in addition to experience at the former Tang court. He also possessed the ideal political record as an early convert to Cunxu’s father. Lu Zhi declined, citing “a preference for aloof reclusion over the stress of high office.”10 Cunxu only then turned to Doulu Ge as senior councilor, the bureaucracy’s preference it appears. This former prefect in Tang times had little in the way of service in the capital and emerges as a mediocrity with few gifts beyond pedigree, “a man who often folded his hands in silence, for lack of competence to articulate his views.”11 He seemed bereft of either the historical knowledge or experience-based savvy of senior courtiers, the best of whom can creatively manipulate the past to serve the present. The junior councilor chosen as Doulu Ge’s complement, Lu Cheng, had garnered doctoral credentials from a waning Tang. He could also claim service at Jinyang as senior aide to the governor, a post that provided access to key voices in the administration, including Zhang Chengye and Guo Chongtao. Far excelling Doulu Ge in competence, Lu Cheng nonetheless quickly turned pretentious and contrary in similarly irritating ways, plus perennially jealous of better men.12 The Prince of Jin’s considered compromise with bureaucratic tradition would quickly create a deficit of confidence in his own civilian leadership. Social station had meaning for civilian advisors in ways that baffled martial rulers of the day, self-made sorts who counted merit in body bags. Some years earlier, an esteemed edict drafter for the armed forces, Wang Jian, had perished in war and Cunxu selected Feng Dao, his administrative assistant, to draft the commemorative in his honor. Dao  had relocated to Jinyang several years before Cunxu moved his base of operations to Weizhou, so the two men were presumably acquainted. Cunxu’s request met with stiff resistance from Lu Cheng, who resented Dao’s peasant roots, “The Prince of Jin assigns courtiers irrespective of family background, causing a farmpatch peon to receive priority over me!”13 Thus, in the appointment of senior courtiers or the delegation of sensitive tasks, Zhuangzong was forced to place pedigree before 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

XWDS 61.756, 67.840; HR pp. 478, 568; ZZTJ 272.8880. JWDS 67.883–84; ZZTJ 272.8879; XWDS 5.44; HR p. 44. XWDS 56.643; HR p. 455; JWDS 93.1228. XWDS 28.301–3; HR pp. 229–32; JWDS 67.883–85. JWDS 67.886–88; Fang, “Power Structures,” p. 141. XWDS 28.304.

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competence, his personal preferences yielding to the legitimation needs of dynasty. Feng Dao would play a minor role at the Tongguang court, due to a combination of class bias and mourning duties for a father soon to die.14 From the outset, Cunxu seems to have fully sensed the cost of his many compromises with the civilian leadership. The self-absorbed pretense of the chief councilors was already evident at the first assembly of courtiers at Weizhou, which took an unexpectedly comic turn, according to the Historical Records: On the day that Lu Cheng and Doulu Ge appeared to accept their credentials as councilors, rules of court protocol had yet to be established and the two men, on uncoordinated sedan-chairs, created a boisterous commotion on the streets. The throne inquired about the cause of the clamor and an aide replied, “It’s just the chief councilors trying to enter the gate at the same time.” Cunxu climbed a ladder for a glance, then said somewhat slyly, “This is the meaning of deceptive appearances!”15

Literally rendered, the last line goes, “What appears real is actually unreal,” insinuating that the bumbling councilors were less than their credentials seemed to suggest. Despite the levity in his voice, Cunxu appears to have concluded that the men offered little besides filling a roster, which in turn undercut his regard for civilian leaders at the most symbolic moment.

The Accession and Family Honors Cunxu chose the twenty-fifth day of the fourth month (923.04.25), May 13 by the Julian calendar, to accede as emperor of a resuscitated Tang dynasty.16 The event, a first for the Shatuo Turks, coincided with the fifteenth year since his father’s death. The chosen venue was Weizhou, the base of military operations and hub of political activity for over seven years. An accession altar had been hastily erected beyond the southern wall, site of a polo field that the physically active Cunxu seems to have frequented for sport. A man of thirty-eight sui, the emperor declared a general amnesty and the reign name Tongguang, “Common Brilliance.” Inasmuch as tong is a homonym for the copper contained in reflecting mirrors, the designation doubled as harbinger of “illustrious” rule under a reflective sovereign, a utopia of harmony and peace. Taizong of Tang often employed the “reflecting mirror” as a signifier of candid counsel and good governance, an allusion that would have resonated with audiences in the tenth century.17 Cunxu would be called in life the Tongguang emperor and dubbed posthumously as 14. 15. 16. 17.

XWDS 54.612–13; HR p. 440. XWDS 28.304; CFYG 335.3770, 929.10765. XWDS 5.44; HR p. 44; JWDS 29.403; ZZTJ 272.8881–82; Cambridge History of China, Vol. 5, p. 66. ZZTJ 196.6184.

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Zhuangzong, the Sober Ancestor. He chose to elevate Weizhou to capital of the east and Jinyang to capital of the west, temporary designations until the selection of a permanent capital. A generous round of bounty would flow for civil and military officials, an established convention for imperial accessions. Another pronouncement common for the accessions of founding emperors involved the conferral of special privileges for families caring for the very old or cohabiting across multiple generations, outreach to the literati establishment away from the capital. A directive dissuading local officials from reporting auspicious omens to the capital went out as well, mimicking Taizong of Tang three centuries earlier. Apart from paying homage to the past, the Tongguang emperor undoubtedly worried about replicating recent events in Shu, where a profusion of auspicious omens had garnered more scandal than legitimacy for Wang Jian, the bogus king with imperial aspirations.18 The new administration would appoint two commissioners of military affairs, a post more critical than chief councilors due to ongoing wars: Guo Chongtao and Zhang Juhan. Both men were ethical stalwarts, the former presiding over the outer court as senior strategist and the latter representing palace interests as senior eunuch. Juhan continued to reside in Jinyang, in the manner of his predecessor Zhang Chengye, which afforded Chongtao sweeping powers over the interim capital. The candidate originally considered for chief councilor, Lu Zhi, accepted a post as Hanlin academician; his senior complement was Feng Dao. All three academicians possessed strong credentials in either the literary or political realms.19 The monarch aspired to similar levels of competence in elevating Zhang Xian, the former surveillance officer at Weizhou to commissioner of revenues, and imperial in-law Meng Zhixiang to custodian of Jinyang, residence of the two imperial mothers and other kin, including an invalid brother, Li Cunmei.20 The second tier of civilian officials thus handily eclipsed their superiors in the chief councilors’ office, Doulu Ge and Wei Yue. Posthumous honors were bestowed days later upon the imperial ancestors, including Cunxu’s father Keyong, dubbed the “Martial Sovereign,” Wuhuang, with temple designation of Taizu the “Exalted Ancestor.” The rechristening of Keyong’s tomb in Dai county to the Jianji Mausoleum apparently occurred at this time as well.21 Ritual temples at Jinyang were erected honoring deceased rulers of both the former Tang and the Shatuo imperial line, their self-proclaimed successors.22 The act created the fiction of a single dynastic house, albeit with a convoluted mix of bloodlines.

18. XWDS 63.783–96; HR pp. 505–20; Cambridge History of China, Vol. 3, p. 189; Cambridge History of China, Vol. 5, pp. 67–74; ZZTJ 193.6056–57. 19. WDHY 13.173. 20. ZZTJ 272.8883; XWDS 14.140. 21. ZZTJ 269.8782; Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, pp. 2–6, 228–29. 22. XWDS 5.45; HR p. 45; ZZTJ 272.8884.

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Another noteworthy announcement to coincide with the accession involved honors for the previous generation of imperial women. Zhuangzong invested Woman Cao, his father’s consort and his own mother by birth, as “Empress Dowager” (Taihou). His father’s formal wife, Widow Liu, received the curious title of “Consort Dowager” (Taifei), a significant demotion in light of her legal standing.23 In imperial China, the social standing and legal privileges of wives and consorts are clearly delineated, so elevating one’s biological mother above stepmother represents an offense against conventions of filial duty. But Cunxu likely drew upon practices prevalent in Inner Asia, where family systems are more fluid. Both the Empress Dowager and the Consort Dowager still resided at Jinyang and travel to Weizhou for the investiture ceremony would have been too arduous, so Chief Councilor Lu Cheng was dispatched to conduct rituals as imperial proxy. The inversion of roles that elevated Mother Cao to empress left her “blushed” before her lifelong friend, the Widow Liu, who graciously spared her further embarrassment by focusing on their son’s historic feat and the opportunity it presented for her to spend the afterlife with Keyong: “I hope your son enjoys an infinite reign, allowing my spirits in the underground to be worshipped by our descendants.”24 The sole disgrace was Chief Councilor Lu Cheng, who abused his own aides as well as local officials en route to Jinyang, turning the celebration into a spectacle. Once reports made their way back to Weizhou, Zhuangzong derided Cheng as “an imbecile” and sacked him scarcely three months into office.25 The embarrassing episode represents a second thorn in the side for civilian courtiers in as many months.

Dominoes in the Heartland Mutiny at Luzhou Despite the flush of ceremonies in and away from Weizhou, the pretenses of the Tongguang emperor remained premature in the late spring of 923, in light of ongoing challenges. The new dynasty controlled nearly fifty prefectures, leaving the Liang with roughly thirty, a sizable domain that included its main capital of Kaifeng plus the historic capitals of Changan and Luoyang.26 The upstart regime also faced the prospect of losing recent gains due to fissures within, as symbolized by a high-profile defection to the enemy that alarmed Cunxu due to its timing and origin. Li Jitao, the son of Li Sizhao, a foster brother of the throne, had been interim custodian of Lu/Ze, the sister-cities of Luzhou and Zezhou, roughly two hundred

23. 24. 25. 26.

XWDS 14.142; HR p. 131; ZZTJ 272.8882. XWDS 14.142; HR p. 131; ZZTJ 272.8882. JWDS 67.888; XWDS 28.304; ZZTJ 272.8889. XWDS 60.713; ZZTJ 272.8883; Cambridge History of China, Vol. 5, p. 67.

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kilometers west of Weizhou, since the death of Sizhao a year earlier.27 His father had died a martyr, but Jitao seized office by incarcerating his own brother and held no standing in the corridors of Jin power. After Cunxu convened a special meeting with senior advisors, Jitao leaped to the unwarranted conclusion that armies might be unleashed against Luzhou, so he acted preemptively by defecting to the Liang. An infuriated Zhuangzong wished to retaliate against Jitao, but he deferred to advisors concerned with conflicts elsewhere, including the recent Kitan raid on Youzhou.28 The Tongguang emperor did dispatch foster brother Li Cunshen to the Lu/Ze command for the limited mission of rescuing Pei Yue, the commander at Zezhou, a  city then besieged by the renegades. Affirming his high regard for fidelity in the ranks, Cunxu imparted to Cunshen the following marching orders, one remarkably life-affirming for a hardened warrior, “I do not begrudge the loss of Zezhou to the Liang, as a single prefecture can be easily reclaimed, but a man like Yue is a rare asset. If conditions permit, please retrieve him for me.”29 The nearby governor Zhao Dejun, a close family friend of Cunxu, would rush the area with five thousand horsemen, but Liang armies by then had already breached the walls of Zezhou and killed Yue, whose passing left the new sovereign immensely bereaved.

Cost of Cronyism Instability at presumably secure sites like Luzhou reminded Cunxu of the need to buttress positions along the northern bank of the Yellow River, which had served as his empire’s launching pad against towns and garrisons south of the river then under Liang control. He thus personally proceeded to Chanzhou while deploying Zhu Shouyin at Desheng, towns about thirty kilometers apart.30 A humble servant in the Jinyang household, Shouyin had risen to military officer at Jinyang under Keyong. He also played a minor role in securing Cunxu’s succession as prince by mobilizing palace menials against Kening, the rival uncle. Shouyin later ingratiated himself, “by exposing the private lives or personal shortcomings of others,” playing on the insecurities of his patron. Despite little in the way of combat experience, Zhu Shouyin eventually finagled a senior post in the Palace guard. His competence would be put to the test at Desheng, due to the dedication of the Liang commander Wang Yanzhang, dubbed “Iron Lance Wang.”31 For sure, seasoned commanders remained the greatest single asset of the 27. XWDS 36.388; HR pp. 299–300; ZZTJ 272.8880–81. 28. ZZTJ 272.8883. One writer suggests that Zhuangzong had tried to align the Kitan against Luzhou; see Yao, Dongbei shi luncong, p. 231. 29. XWDS 32.350; HR p. 269; JWDS 29.406; ZZTJ 273.8889–90. 30. XWDS 51.573; HR p. 410; JWDS 74.971–72; ZZTJ 272.8885–86; Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, pp. 37–38. 31. XWDS 32.347; HR p. 265.

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Liang regime, while the Later Tang, forced to fight on multiple fronts, risked spreading its human and material resources too thin. The assignment of an inexperienced Shouyin to a key border town reflects precisely such inadequacies in personnel, not solely the provincialism of a novice emperor. In communications with the Liang court, Wang Yanzhang had optimistically predicted the vanquishing of Later Tang armies in a matter of days and unleashed an advance force of six hundred armored men downstream, their mission to disjoin iron locks in the water and slash supports for a critical suspension bridge separating Desheng’s Northern city from its southern complement. A sweeping onslaught ensued on the Southern city, which precisely as predicted, fell on the third day. Yanzhang then proceeded downriver to raid Yangliu, his army inflated by tens of thousands due to reinforcements from Duan Ning. The town would surely have fallen to the Liang as well, if not for the eleventh-hour arrival of relief for Later Tang holdouts.32 Shouyin had thoughtlessly dallied with military preparations at Desheng, causing Cunxu’s dreaded temper to surface as he berated the favorite, “You thwarted our entire defense effort, you rotten scoundrel!”33 Still, he firmly resisted pleas from senior aides, including adopted brother Li Siyuan, to execute Shouyin as dictated by martial law. At the same time, the scolding appears to have marked the beginning of frictions between Shouyin and Cunxu.

Foothold at Yunzhou Beset with internal tensions and external threats, Cunxu convened top commanders during the intercalary fourth month to survey the strategic landscape. He emerged from the deliberations to advocate a blitzkrieg against the Liang, “to sever its right arm” by seizing critical lands directly east of its capital.34 A city over fifty kilometers into the Liang interior would ordinarily be untouchable, as any crossing of the Yellow River risked immediate detection by multiple layers of border patrols. Probes years earlier against Yunzhou had served as recent proof of still effective defenses. But conditions on the ground had changed, the usual defenses failing partly due to the reassignment of local armies to other hotspots and partly due to the accumulation of intelligence gathered by northern armies during previous probes. Later Tang armies could thereby elude patrols and cross over into Liang territory. Zhuangzong wisely chose to limit the advance force to five thousand horsemen to reduce the possibility of detection.35

32. 33. 34. 35.

JWDS 91.1203–4; ZZTJ 272.8886–88. XWDS 51.573; HR p. 410. CFYG 57.602; Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, pp. 37–38. JWDS 29.405–8, 35.486–87; XWDS 6.54–55; HR pp. 52–53; Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, pp. 37–38; Li, “Hou Tang ru Bian zhi yi yanjiu,” pp. 13–26.

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The bulk of the contingent dispatched to Yunzhou was still en route when the advance forces of adopted brother Siyuan and deputy commander Gao Xingzhou swept the city unexpectedly by night, assisted by a heavy rainfall. “The rain is a sign from Heaven,” Xingzhou exclaimed. “Yunzhou cannot possibly prepare its military in advance of our arrival due to the downpour, so we should exploit the element of surprise.” And indeed, local soldiers were still asleep as Later Tang armies approached and then overran the city.36 Commander Wang Yanzhang was forced to flee to Zhongdu, southeast of Yunzhou, a site even less defensible. In this way, Siyuan managed to deliver in matter of days a final rout of Yanzhang, who sustained serious injury.37 From his camp along the border, Cunxu cited Siyuan for special merit in acquiring Yunzhou, “Today’s victory belongs to you and Chongtao. Had I heeded the council of others, our grand moment would have been missed.”38 “Iron Lance Wang,” among the most venerated of Liang commanders, had fallen captive, as did several hundred officers. Cunxu insisted on making the dangerous trip to Zhongdu to meet this legendary foe. “You once mocked me as a child,” he said, alluding to condescending comments about his youthful affinity for cockfights. “Do you intend to submit today?” His humorous tone suggests that Cunxu bore no personal grudge against Yanzhang. He even provided medical attention, while dispatching successive emissaries to try to convert the commander. “I can hardly serve the Liang dynasty at dawn and the Prince of Jin at dusk,” Yanzhang replied, invoking ethical principle in spurning the offer; he died some days later in captivity.39 The dynastic history places casualties for the Yunzhou offensive at twenty thousand, suggesting serious resistance in the city’s suburbs, but acts of retribution by northern occupiers appear to have been few.40 The loss of Yunzhou in the summer of 923 would deal a devastating blow to Liang defenses: a foothold south of the Yellow River would enable Later Tang armies to raid an array of other strategic positions in the Liang heartland. The new momentum inspired the Tongguang emperor to strengthen his hand through diplomacy. He dispatched secret emissaries to Wu, a kingdom whose leaders had earlier encouraged his accession as Son of Heaven. He now went one step further by proposing a coordinated assault against the Liang.41 The overture was spurned by Wu, which had less to gain by starting a war. Still, movement on the diplomatic front doubled as a distraction militarily, reminding Kaifeng of its vulnerability to the south.

36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41.

XWDS 48.549; HR p. 405; Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, pp. 37–38. JWDS 75.979–80; ZZTJ 272.8894. ZZTJ 272.8895. XWDS 32.349; HR p. 268; ZZTJ 272.8895. JWDS 30.411. ZZTJ 272.8885–86.

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Defector-Turned-Informant Over the course of his stay at Yangliu, a stay nearly one month in duration, Zhuangzong received word of the defection of senior Liang commander Kang Yanxiao. A man of nomadic ancestry, Yanxiao had served Li Keyong as a petty foot soldier at the outset, “then cast his fortunes with the Liang after some misdeed.”42 His service to Kaifeng must have spanned at least a decade, for he had risen by then to senior commander of the Right Vanguard. Yanxiao’s defection in the sixth month of 923 with a small contingent of horsemen proved an immense loss for Kaifeng, due to his access to highlevel intelligence. The defection, mediated by Li Siyuan from an occupied Yunzhou, so elated Zhuangzong that he proceeded to the border town of Chaocheng to receive the defector, presenting an imperial robe and gold belt from his personal stock. Yanxiao subsequently received a major command, an official residence at Weizhou, plus a new name, Li Shaochen, as fictive son of the monarch.43 Bonds were forged fast between the two warriors from Inner Asia, Yanxiao’s defection doubling as homecoming. Zhuangzong made much of his instant camaraderie with Kang Yanxiao to solicit his views on a range of issues, and Yanxiao proved amazingly forthright. He reiterated the imperative of retaining the newly acquired Yunzhou in order to protect Later Tang strategic interests, which he perceived as vulnerable in the short-term, due to morale problems within the ranks and ineffective imperial leadership. At the same time, despite such weaknesses, the Liang was planning an offensive against the Later Tang in the coming autumn, an effort drawing upon a hundred thousand warriors and directed against familiar hotspots along the Yellow River. The plan included another foray against the Shatuo homeland at Jinyang, exploiting the recent death of the eunuch Zhang Chengye. Kang Yanxiao went on to provide the key to an effective counter to Liang aggression, namely, preemptive action where the element of surprise compensates for inferior numbers: Despite their superior size, Liang armies are considerably less formidable when divided. Your Subject proposes waiting until they split, then deploy five thousand armored cavalry to rush Kaifeng from the direction of Yunzhou. Your actions unexpected, a surprise strike will deliver the world to you within ten days.44

Yanxiao’s optimistic prediction of a speedy conquest of the heartland did not alter the thrust of his message: a blitzkrieg against a panoply of Later Tang positions had moved from planning to mobilization and Kaifeng was willing to commit the bulk of its armed forces to the effort. The final showdown between these historic rivals promised to be a battle royal, if Modi had his way. 42. JWDS 74.967–70; XWDS 44.485, 51.576; HR pp. 370–71, 412; ZZTJ 272.8887. 43. JWDS 74.967. 44. XWDS 44.485; HR p. 371; JWDS 29.407; ZZTJ 272.8887, 8891.

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Dominating discussion at the command level was the next move in light of this new intelligence. Most officers present proposed, conservatively, the consolidation of holdings to the east of Yunzhou extending to the East China Sea, building momentum for the drive westward against the capital.45 The defector Kang Yanxiao disagreed, as did Siyuan, who cited the fatigue of Later Tang armies: “The military standoff along the river has endured for far too long. Unless some extraordinary measures are taken, no break can occur on our larger agenda.”46 Like the Taizong at the launch of the Tang, Siyuan presented expanded aggression as the only recourse.47 He went on to propose an offensive against the Liang capital that exploited its exposed eastern approach: Duan Ning has yet to learn of Yanzhang’s defeat. Once he learns, another three days of indecision will ensue before countermeasures are taken. If he succeeds at anticipating our approach and promptly releases relief forces, he must cross the Yellow River at Liyang county, and the ships needed to move tens of thousands of warriors can scarcely be assembled in a single day. Yet only several hundred li separate our armies from Kaifeng. In the absence of natural obstacles in our way, we could reach the city in two nights by advancing in “square formation.” And with the conquest of Kaifeng behind us, the threat of Duan Ning will evaporate.48

Concurring with Siyuan was Guo Chongtao, a longtime advocate of an aggressive posture in the border war. The decision must have been easy for Zhuangzong, as no three opinions mattered more.

Kaifeng under Assault As the autumn of 923 approached, even more foreboding than the expansion of war was the threat of finances for the Later Tang, whose treasury could barely cover costs for the next six months. Overtaxed peasants abandoning farms and declining productivity due to prolonged warfare had conspired to shrink the tax base. Worse yet, similar conditions prevailed across the Central Plains, including recently acquired lands south of the Yellow River.49 The monarch thus summoned his war council once again in the ninth month, where the pessimism was palpable. A decided majority favored outright appeasement of the Liang by withdrawing from newly acquired lands south of the Yellow River such as Yunzhou. Among the handful of dissenting voices to favor continued aggression were Chongtao and Siyuan. After the bulk of his lieutenants departed, Zhuangzong retired to his tent to converse privately with Chongtao, who presented continued aggression as the only acceptable option.50 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50.

JWDS 73.962. ZZTJ 272.8896. JTS 2.22; ZZTJ 184.5744. JWDS 29.404–5; XWDS 6.54–55; HR p. 53. ZZTJ 272.8893; JWDS 29.307–8. JWDS 29.406–8; CFYG 57.602; XWDS 24.246–47; HR pp. 213–14.

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Chongtao pointed to the acute fiscal vulnerability of the Later Tang, citing the near depletion of rations in the warzone, with the next harvest a half-year away. He expressed similar concern about troop fatigue after a decade of war, in addition to the recent rise in expectations occasioning the inauguration of dynasty and the potential for backlash. In his words, “We have now gloriously assumed a dynastic name, causing people north of the Yellow River to stand with heads outstretched as they anticipate our victory, everyone longing for combat to cease.”51 In other words, the new political realities necessitated an acceleration of the country’s military agenda. However worrisome conditions north of the river, the situation to the south was demonstrably worse in Chongtao’s estimation: “The arrival of Kang Yanxiao has afforded your subject a full appraisal of real conditions across the Central Plains, proving that Heaven has chosen this moment to rain down ruin upon the Liang regime.” The Liang military was foundering under the weight of its many commitments and the ineptitude of its military overseer, Duan Ning, “a man who presents a trivial menace to us.”52 Rather than withdraw from Yunzhou, Chongtao rallied Zhuangzong to elevate his presence in the area by commanding five thousand fit warriors to the Yellow River front. He could then proceed with a rendezvous with Siyuan at Yunzhou before rushing Kaifeng, where defenses had demonstrably slackened. Chongtao went on to predict the regime’s speedy collapse, “Once the head of that bogus Emperor is in hand, Liang commanders will surrender en masse,” as momentum sweeps the Later Tang to power with domino-like precision.53 Essentially, Chongtao had adopted wholesale the proposals of Kang Yanxiao. The previously sullen Zhuangzong turned instantly exuberant, as he pronounced, “I will end up a sovereign if I succeed, a captive if I lose, but my course is set.”54 The monarch’s intuition stood to be tested as never before, but his subsequent actions reflect far less confidence in the final outcome. For the first time on record, Cunxu arranged for the return to Weizhou of family members currently accompanying him on the front lines at Chaocheng, namely Consort Liu and eldest son Jiji. The act of removing his family was less remarkable than the pessimistic tenor of their last exchange. In parting on the first day of the tenth month (923.10.01), Cunxu instructed the Consort, should he fail, “to assemble the family in the compound at Weizhou and set it afire.”55 He wanted to spare them the physical abuse commonly visited upon the vanquished, a tortured end for the living and bodily exposure for the dead. Mother Cao and Stepmother Liu, who never left Jinyang, were presumably beyond Kaifeng’s arm of retribution.

51. 52. 53. 54. 55.

XWDS 24.246–47; HR p. 214. ZZTJ 272.8893–94; JWDS 29.407–8. ZZTJ 272.8893–94. JWDS 29.408. JWDS 29.408; 57.765–66, 72.954; ZZTJ 272.8894.

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The Squeeze In the early days of the tenth month, adopted brother Siyuan left Yunzhou for Kaifeng, a city roughly 150 kilometers away, precisely as the monarch proceeded westward to secure Caozhou, a prefecture situated directly east of Kaifeng.56 To slow the advance of northern armies, Liang commander Duan Ning would rupture additional dikes on the Yellow River. Such actions had often succeeded in the past in halting the advance of enemy armies, but curiously this time simply slowed them for a few days, most likely for lack of resolve on Ning’s part.57 Siyuan reached the gates of Kaifeng on the ninth day of the tenth month (923.10.09), with Zhuangzong hours behind. Frozen in disbelief, Cunxu greeted Siyuan by butting heads, then burst into utterances of eternal gratitude, “I have won the world thanks to your exemplary valor and intend to share it forever with you!”58 The ingenuity of northern strategists aside, the sudden sweep of Kaifeng was a function of a critical miscalculation for Liang strategists: in trying to maintain offensive pressures against its enemy, they had slighted basic defenses in the interior, the lamenting of which was likely the topic of the night as Shatuo armies encircled city walls.59 One scholar characterizes the strategy behind the conquest of Kaifeng as the most ingenious of the Five Dynasties era, comparable to “Hannibal Crossing the Alps” in 218 BCE, where armies from Carthage (modern Tunis) based in the Iberian peninsula achieved the herculean feat of crossing the Alps to conquer Italy, the beginning of a humiliating fifteen-year occupation.60 Hannibal’s armies faced many more natural obstacles in their long trek through Spain’s Mediterranean coastline before crossing the Pyrenees and descending upon Italy along its northwestern spine, but the two actions are similar in sheer daring. Both required impressive levels of organization as well, the logistical capacity to coordinate vast armies from multiple directions with sufficient speed to paralyze the defender. Ultimately, the Kaifeng offensive was a supremely collaborative effort, a matter often slighted by historians due to their undue focus on the heroics of individual leaders like Siyuan and Cunxu.

A Tame Surrender Trapped in Kaifeng, Emperor Mo tried to summon relief armies, but failed in part through serendipity, his messenger thrown from a horse before establishing contact.61 Worse yet, ordinary citizens across the Liang capital had been forced to man 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61.

XWDS 51.576; HR p. 412. JWDS 29.407–8, 35.487; XWDS 45.498; HR p. 382; ZZTJ 272.8893. XWDS 6.54–55; HR p. 53; ZZTJ 272.8899; Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, p. 38. CFYG 20.202. Li, “Hou Tang ru Bian zhi yi yanjiu,” pp. 1–2. XWDS 45. 498; HR p. 382.

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fortifications in the absence of professionals, a source of popular indignation.62 Desperation led some courtiers to consider outright surrender. Others proposed relocation of the imperial family to Luoyang, a city better protected by mountains, only for critics to note the perilous conditions of nearby highways.63 Chief Councilor Zheng Jue proposed stalling tactics that included relinquishing the imperial seals, as a token of Modi’s willingness to negotiate.64 The delay would give relief armies additional time to reach Kaifeng, although aides with a better sense of Shatuo power rejected the idea as a “long shot.” Left with no viable options, Emperor Mo pleaded with bodyguard Huangfu Lin for an honorable end, “Our feud with the Prince of Jin has spanned generations, so I dare not dally and succumb to his sword.”65 Lin accommodated by beheading the monarch and his family at their residence, then took his own life as decorum dictated for regicide against one’s ruler. Mere hours before his death, Modi issued orders to liquidate numerous enemies in the capital’s jailhouse, including a pair of siblings who had once conspired against him, as well as Shi Junli, a Jin commander who refused to convert.66 The fate of other prisoners-of-war remains unknown, although the speed of the city’s collapse makes survival likely. Imperial concubines previously impressed into service were released en masse to start anew.67 The act of suicide by Modi would spare Kaifeng and its residents the destruction common to final conquests, while the Tongguang emperor would be spared historical censure for “having committed the act of regicide” (shijun), a stigma that followed Zhu Wen to the grave.68 However, a single royal concubine was brutalized for some personal offense. “Former concubines and consorts of the Liang all bowed tearfully in greeting the new sovereign,” the Historical Records writes, except for an unnamed consort of an imperial prince, who reviled the new sovereign to his face. She was slain on the spot. Most siblings and consorts of the dead emperor, including the ravenous Concubine Guo, “turned quick converts to occupying armies for fear of similar consequences.”69 The random rape of harem women or plunder of imperial palaces, common occurrences in times of dynastic change, is not in evidence during the denouement of Kaifeng. Only the strictest of directives from the sovereign himself can explain such rare restraint. And the discipline of Later Tang armies set a positive tone as the conquest transitioned to consolidation. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66.

ZZTJ 272.8897–98. XWDS 42.463; HR p. 361. XWDS 54.619–20; HR p. 443. XWDS 13.131; HR p. 121; JWDS 10.151; ZZTJ 272.8898–99. XWDS 13.133; HR p. 123; JWDS 65.866; ZZTJ 272.8898. The Old History attributes the killings of the two imperial princes to Zhuangzong; see JWDS 12.161. 67. CFYG 42.459. 68. XWDS 1.9; HR p. 12. 69. XWDS 13.131; HR p. 121.

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Kaifeng opened its gates to occupying armies on the tenth day of the tenth month (923.10.10), November 20 by the Julian calendar. Zhuangzong still felt cheated at his moment of victory and validation, “After this stalemate of many decades, I am most aggrieved that I cannot confront the Liang ruler face-to-face.”70 Citing a litany of transgressions before rendering an agonizing death would have better appeased the spirit of his dead father. Additional restraint is in evidence by the burial afforded the last emperor. He may have been stripped of imperial titles and relegated to commoner status, but the body of Modi was not desecrated in the usual fashion, except for his severed head, which was preserved in lacquer and stored at the sacrificial altar to Keyong. The ritual of “boxing” the head of enemies likely has roots in Inner Asia, in light of parallels for the Kitan at the time and the Jurchen centuries later.71 The Liang capital succumbed so quickly because a broad swath of civil and military leaders, as predicted by northern strategists, had deserted the regime, given to neither special affinity for nor fear of their ruler. Chief Councilor Zheng Jue escorted officials in lining up on the left side of the capital’s main thoroughfare to greet the famed Shatuo warrior who was now their lord.72 Among the eminent supplicants was Yuan Xiangxian, the military governor who ten years earlier had facilitated Emperor Mo’s accession by leading a cabal against the usurper Zhu Yougui.73 His dramatic shift in loyalties surely helped to sway others. Apart from the desertion of leading civil and military officials, the collapse of Kaifeng was further facilitated by decades of marriage alliances between Liang and Jin subjects. Kaifeng custodian Wang Zan simply swung open the city gates after modest resistance, plying northern armies with cash from the treasury, in addition to rare horses presumably from imperial stocks.74 Zan’s first cousin, Wang Ke, had close bonds with the first Prince of Jin: Ke’s wife was the daughter of Keyong. The Tongguang emperor thus evinced special beneficence for Zan, whom he raised from a prostrated position to say consolingly, “For generations, we have been related by marriage, although subjects of different rulers. I can scarcely hold umbrage against you today!”75 Zan’s cousin had been similarly pardoned by the Liang court, then assassinated in secret.76 The Shatuo emperor, conscious of shaping a contrast, continued Zan as custodian of Kaifeng, which for now was the country’s capital. Again, parallels emerge with the early Tang,

70. JWDS 10.152. 71. ZZTJ 272.8900. In 942, the Kitan “boxed in lacquer” the heads of two Later Jin councilors; see XWDS 51.585. Over two centuries later, the Jurchen similarly boxed the head of Han Tuozhou for starting a needless war; see Cambridge History of China, Vol. 5, pp. 811–12. 72. XWDS 54.620; HR p. 444; Cambridge History of China, Vol. 5, p. 67. 73. XWDS 3.23–24, 42.460–62, 45.494–95; HR pp. 23–24, 360, 380; JWDS 59.795. 74. JWDS 34.412; XWDS 42.460, 45.494–95; HR pp. 360, 380. 75. XWDS 42.460; HR p. 357. 76. XWDS 42.459–60; HR pp. 354–56.

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where marriage bonds within the metropolitan elite had proven critical to the consolidation of power.77

The Dominoes Mere days after Kaifeng’s collapse, Luoyang governor Zhang Quanyi surrendered unconditionally. As the secondary capital for over a millennium, including the preceding Tang dynasty, the city held special symbolism for Tang revivalists. Partly by design and partly by chance, the best-case scenario unfolded in the most tangible manifestation of a mandate from above. Over fifty governors across the north, mostly military men, would tender petitions of submission in coming weeks, including Li Maozhen, whose Qi satrapy at Changan was an early ally of Jinyang and a nagging thorn in the side of the Liang.78 Liang commanders away from the capital nearly all capitulated on short order, including Duan Ning with fifty thousand first-class warriors.79 As reward for defection and incentive to stay loyal, the Tongguang emperor bestowed bounty upon Ning that included a brocade gown, a horse from imperial stables, gold coins, and a new name akin to Li royalty. It was an unthinkably generous gesture, for Ning had a sister favored as consort of Emperor Mo, creating a dual connection to the Liang throne as officer and affine.80 Moreover, he had recently ruptured dikes along the Yellow River to slow Later Tang armies, an action that should have incurred the ire of Zhuangzong.81 Instead, he allowed Ning to retain command of his own armies and even permitted his lieutenants to retain their posts. The easy reprieve and subsequent trust only makes sense if the commander had intentionally bungled the mission.82 Overall, the military establishment fared well in the transition, but executions awaited a select group of palace favorites and imperial clansmen along with their extended clans, persons accused of disservice to their sovereign. Zhuangzong acted not on impulse, but the recommendation of Duan Ning, who may well have sought to conceal his own misdeeds under the Liang regime by silencing them.83 Exiles awaited another eleven metropolitan officials, mostly high-level civilians. The purges proved minor in scope, especially as pertains to military powers too entrenched to uproot.84 After all, Cunxu was no revolutionary and nothing resembling a revolution would unfold. Zhao, Tang Taizong zhuan, pp. 27–28. JWDS 31.427; ZZTJ 272.8902; Cambridge History of China, Vol. 5, p. 67. XWDS 45.498; HR p. 382; JWDS 73.963; ZZTJ 272.8900–8901, 273.8912. Xu Tang shu 40.372. XWDS 45.498; HR p. 381. ZZTJ 272.8900. CFYG 927.10752; XWDS 22.231, 42.463–64, 45.498; HR pp. 207–8, 360, 362, 382; JWDS 12.160, 14.195, 198, 16.224–25, 30.413–14; ZZTJ 272.8901. 84. JWDS 30.412–13.

77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83.

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Consolidating Power Charm Offensive The Tongguang emperor and his advisors fully appreciated the symbolism of the moment and exploited every opportunity to project a positive image before his subjects. During the last months of 923, lesser officials in the capital received pardons as well as monetary rewards in bolts of silk and strings of cash. The loot likely came from the vaults of the former dynasty, although a nearly depleted Later Tang treasury was replenishing fast as officials at home and potentates abroad began to tender a mass of accession gifts, while regular taxes from the circuits started to make their way to the capital.85 Zhuangzong wasted no time in launching a charm offensive directed at senior military figures. Roughly twenty days after occupying Kaifeng, he presided over the first of several banquets for vanquished commanders that included eminent Liang turncoats like Huo Yanwei and Jin veterans like Li Siyuan. He conferred clothes and wine goblets, while at turns, humoring and humbling the guests with his biting wit. The memorable event, leaving guests momentarily flat on their faces, is detailed in the first chapter.86 Other banquets soon followed, but none with the intensity of the first event. The banquet attended by Lu Siduo merits particular note, a Liang officer whose arrow had once struck Zhuangzong’s saddle. The monarch had memorized the name on the arrow and produced it at their meeting, clenching and consoling the frightened man.87 Similarly moved in the course of a palace banquet was Liu Qi, who for many years had led Liang armies along the Yellow River, at times in close proximity to the Prince of Jin. “So many battles over the years,” his host mused before finishing lightheartedly, “I’m surprised that we have not crossed paths before!”88 Cunxu recognized that his small kingdom had succeeded in unifying the north by converting the top talent of former rivals. The further consolidation of power would necessitate a broader conversion that extended beyond the old base of Shanxi locals and Inner Asian ethnics, which rested in part on projecting the right image. Compassion for the vanquished is most in evidence in the decision to refrain from plundering the tomb of the Liang founder, Zhu Wen, to desecrate his remains, Zhuangzong’s initial impulse. The tomb in the suburbs of Luoyang had been sealed eleven years earlier, so little remained of the corpse to desecrate. More importantly, Luoyang governor Zhang Quanyi provided a “reasoned argument” against sacrilege of the sort in correspondence with the palace. Zhuangzong thus settled for stripping away decorations from the tumulus and posthumously demoting father and son to 85. 86. 87. 88.

JWDS 30.417; ZZTJ 272.8901. XWDS 46.505; HR p. 386; JWDS 30.412, 64.852. JWDS 90.1189; ZZTJ 272.8901; CFYG 43.468. JWDS 64.859.

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commoners.89 Imperial magnanimity was likely shaped by the fact that founders of the preceding Tang had similarly afforded proper burials for clansmen of the Sui dynasty, choosing quiet closure on the past over a desecration that might unsettle one-time subjects.90 An act that made sense morally also proved sound in political terms.

Writs of Immunity The possibility of retribution by some future government likely weighed on the emperor’s mind when he conferred upon Guo Chongtao an “iron writ of immunity” (tie quan) or “iron bull” for up to ten capital offenses. The practice may have originated in Inner Asia, making its way to China in early-to-mid Tang, when the government not only conferred immunity from prosecution, but guaranteed “the material and personal security” of the conferee’s descendants.91 Inner Asian commanders An Lushan and Shi Siming were among the earliest conferees in the mid-eighth century, men who eventually rebelled against the dynasty.92 A century later, in 887, a writ went to Zhu Wen, the Liang satrap who similarly turned against his benefactor. Other hereditary governors to receive writs in the late Tang included Qian Liu of Wuyue, Li Maozhen of Fengxiang, and Han Jian of Tianxiong.93 A writ of immunity also went to Li Keyong, based on his tomb inscription.94 The conferrals seem largely tokens of favor or lures for equivocating hearts at commands too vital to take for granted, but they tended to backfire whenever given out of weakness. Writs of immunity by the Tang court began as rare occurrences, but they increased in the dynasty’s final decades, coinciding with the devolution downward of military power. Under the Later Tang, the writ for Guo Chongtao was presented as an act of simple grace, but it more likely reflects concern for him and his heirs as potential targets of pro-Liang sympathizers in light of his leading role in the Kaifeng conquest. It doubled as a statement of exceptional favor from the reigning Son of Heaven that must be respected by his successors in letter and spirit. In the coming year, writs of immunity would follow for two other military stalwarts, Li Siyuan and Zhu Youqian, inflated promises that the throne could not keep. Liang rulers refrained from issuing immunities, not simply for lack of charity, but perhaps out of concern for the occasional need to break an imperial promise.

89. 90. 91. 92.

XWDS 45.491; HR p. 376; JWDS 30.414; ZZTJ 272.8901; CFYG 374.4241. ZZTJ 193.6087. XWDS 24.247; HR p. 214; JWDS 31.427, 57.766, 63.846. On writs of immunity in Tang times, see JWDS 9.222, 11.272–73; ZZTJ 276.9025; Eberhard, Conquerors and Rulers, pp. 150–52; Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, pp. 128–29. 93. XWDS 1.3, 67.838; HR pp. 5, 565; JWDS 1. 9, 15.204–5; JTS 20a.750–51, 764. 94. Sekigen Seiyū, “Tōmi Shata Ri Koyō Riyō Boshi Yukuchū Kōsatsu,” p. 21.

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Turncoat Returns to the Fold The emperor’s blanket pardon for military and civilian leaders would yield immediate fruit in swaying Li Jitao to capitulate.95 The offspring of a foster son of Li Keyong, it will be recalled, he had relinquished the Lu/Ze command to the Liang in the early months of 923. Jitao had considered realigning with the Kitan when a pardon arrived, along with a summons to the capital. Few intimates of Jitao had confidence in the good intentions of the administration and tried to dissuade him, including a concerned brother, “Better to seal off this city and subsist on surplus grain to lengthen your life, rather than walk willfully to your own slaughter!”96 Jitao proceeded to Kaifeng all the same, in the eleventh month, but with “several hundred thousand ingots of silver” stowed in his baggage to bribe favorites of the emperor, including Consort Liu. Contending that Jitao “deserved leniency” by dint of his father’s distinguished service, the Consort succeeded in persuading her husband to pardon Jitao as part of the larger amnesty.97 The pardon for Jitao was perhaps Zhuangzong’s most agonizing decision since the accession, in light of the magnitude of Jitao’s betrayal as offspring of a foster brother, but he confirmed the pardon. He even recruited former officers of Jitao for the imperial guard, while inviting him to join an imperial hunt.98 Within weeks, however, Jitao undertook idiotic intrigues to incite instability back home to win reassignment there. The affair backfired and he was executed, along with family members. The tumult triggered by Jitao at Luzhou, however, would take months to eradicate, the experience rekindling Cunxu’s qualms about employing fictive kin, men largely recruited by his father with less devotion to him.99

A Friend in Luoyang On the heels of a heavy regime of political action and military posturing, the Tongguang emperor must have savored a reunion with his family in the tenth month. Eldest son Jiji had earlier returned to Weizhou for his own safety, escorted by eunuch bodyguards and Chief Councilor Doulu Ge, who apparently accompanied the youth to Kaifeng on the twentieth day (923.10.20).100 Soon afterwards, a rather minor event occurred that assumed some symbolism in portending the palace’s future relations with the metropolitan elite. It involved the emperor, his teenage son, and Zhang Quanyi, the Luoyang governor now deputy marshal for the armed forces.

95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.

JWDS 30.420; ZZTJ 272.8908–9. XWDS 36.388; HR pp. 299–300. XWDS 36.388; HR p. 300; Xu Tang shu 39.356–57. XWDS 11.109; HR p. 100. JWDS 74.972. ZZTJ 272.8902.

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Quanyi had converted to the new dynasty almost overnight and traveled the several hundred kilometers to Kaifeng, late in the tenth month of 923, to formalize bonds of fealty.101 A man of peasant stock who had risen to the top of the military ladder under the former Tang, Quanyi eventually evolved into a stellar administrator for Luoyang by harnessing the military and stabilizing the local economy, which in turn allowed the city to regain much of its former splendor.102 He continued service under the Liang dynasty, which conferred a personal name. But some years later, he anguished over the rape of his wife and daughter by Zhu Wen, the Liang founder, in the midst of a visit to their home.103 An innocent nephew also succumbed to the whim of Zhu  Wen.104 Quanyi was surely struck by the contrast in fortunes for his younger brother, Zhang Quanwu, who long ago as vanquished officer had relocated to the Jin kingdom and received lifelong favor. For personal reasons, the decision to break with the Liang must have been easy. Upon arriving at Kaifeng, his face besmeared with mud in a sign of submission, the seventy-year-old Quanyi was warmly welcomed by the Son of Heaven, who restored him to office. Quanyi had left an array of gifts with palace caretakers, “horses and cash strings numbering in the thousands,” appreciating the Shatuo affinity for horses and the dire finances of the regime.105 Numerous other contacts between the two families would follow in coming weeks, prompting the monarch to direct eldest son Jiji and younger brother Cunji, “to adopt Quanyi as elder brother.”106 The imperial son’s informal adoption of the Luoyang governor initially seemed simply to reflect the zeal with which the emperor often forged friendships. But some months later, he and Consort Liu paid a visit to the residence of Quanyi and his wife, Woman Chu, which culminated in the throne pressing the older couple to become Consort Liu’s “foster parents.”107 After all, the Consort had lost her father as a child. Quanyi initially declined, only to relent under additional pressure. And from this festive beginning emanated many informal visits between the two men and their families, the concubines of Quanyi visiting the palace of the Empress with casual indifference to imperial traditions, where fictive relations between commoners and the royal family were serious breaches of decorum. The two former military governors, Cunxu and Quanyi, had bonded for a complex range of reasons, not simply for riches and power, as official historians insist. The royal couple found common ground with Quanyi as self-made individuals, social outsiders XWDS 45.489–92; HR pp. 373–77; CFYG 76.822, 678.7819; JWDS 63.837–44; Xu Tang shu 44.406–7. Wudai shihua, pp. 67–68; Tackett, Destruction of the Medieval Chinese Aristocracy, p. 209. XWDS 45.490; HR p. 375; ZZTJ 268.8744. ZZTJ 268.8751. JWDS 30.420; ZZTJ 272.8902. ZZTJ 272.8902. In his petition opposing the adoption, Zhao Feng refers to Woman Liu as guohou, “mother of the empire,” suggesting that the event occurred after her installation in 924; see CFYG 553.6327. 107. XWDS 24.249, 45.491; HR pp. 217, 375–76; JWDS 63.842–43; Luoyang jinshen jiuwenji 2.2b–3a; Xu Tang shu 35.325. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106.

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with similar insecurities in a world where pedigree mattered more. Shared spiritual values may have augmented the special bonds between the families as well: Consort Liu’s faith in Buddhism and her husband’s dual affinities for Buddhism and Daoism would have suited the eclectic religious proclivities of Quanyi.108 Finally, the favor of Quanyi under emperors extending back to Tang times can only reflect highly desirable personal qualities, qualities never divulged by biographers but clearly critical to the older man’s sudden appeal to the latest Son of Heaven. Regardless of the reasons for the imperial family’s bonding with Quanyi, the informality of relations between ruler and subject would generate plenty of scandal once every imperial action assumed high symbolism as historic precedent. Zhuangzong must have appreciated the wider ramifications of activities in his private life, but he often turned combative when aides voiced concerns. Hanlin Academician Zhao Feng “secretly petitioned the throne in strenuous opposition to the adoptions,” citing the absence of precedent allowing subjects to be treated as imperial kin. He even declined to draft the proclamation of adoption, thereby giving this private matter a very public airing.109 The emperor, despite his high personal regard for Zhao Feng, remained undeterred, for he could counter with his own insights from recent history. Emperor Zhaozong of Tang, for example, had once dispatched two imperial princes to Jinyang to bestow bounty upon his father, Keyong, instructing them “to treat Keyong with the deference of a brother.”110 While falling short of adoption, the action suggests that the language of fictive kinship might be employed between commoners and royalty.

Relocating the Capital Zhang Quanyi made much of his instant rapport with the throne to press for relocation of the capital to Luoyang. The move, completed on the first day of the twelfth month (923.12.01), came a mere six weeks after the occupation of Kaifeng.111 Sources reveal little of either the court’s rationale or its urgency to act. Military strategists, on the heels of their invasion of Kaifeng, must have worried over the dearth of natural obstacles to the city’s east. The mountains to the west of Luoyang, combined with rivers to the north and south, promised greater security, assuming that the principal threat to dynasty were lords at large such as regional governors, as in late Tang times, not enemies within the capital, the pattern of the past two decades.112 And the symbolism of reigning from one of the country’s oldest capitals must have appealed to our highly acculturated monarch. In contrast, Kaifeng, capital for only fifteen years, had suffered from its close association with the despised Liang regime. It lacked the 108. 109. 110. 111. 112.

JWDS 63.842. XWDS 28.308; HR pp. 233–34; JWDS 67.889; CFYG 513.6327. JWDS 26.351–52. ZZTJ 272.8905, 272.8909. Sima Qian had long noted the strategic import of Luoyang’s natural barriers; see Shiji 55.2043–44.

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grandeur of historic capitals as well. Recreation presented an additional incentive to move to Luoyang, in light of Zhuangzong’s passion for hunting and the popularity of the local hunting grounds among emperors over the past millennium.113 And finally, a permanent imperial presence was certain to boost the stature of Henan command, further reason for Quanyi to lend his support. Once the decision had been made to relocate to Luoyang, it became necessary for the sovereign to cultivate close ties to Quanyi, now the linchpin in his security. The haste with which the proposal to move the capital became a fait accompli one month later left little time for the usual assessment of pros and cons, including the burden of transporting food farther west by a combination of land and canal to feed a population of a million mouths, including a disproportionate number of high-end consumers. The central location of Kaifeng had the advantage of locating the government closer to the Huai region, an increasingly critical source of revenues as well as foodstuffs. There were also relocation costs to consider, plus the added expense of renovating government buildings and official housing in light of the pervasive despoliation of the city by late Tang rebels.114 But the emperor refused to be dissuaded. He seemed intent on distracting courtiers from such pragmatic considerations by arranging an abundance of ceremony at the other end: thousands greeted him at the gates of Luoyang, a group proceeded by eighty venerable statesmen from Jinyang, a reminder of his extraordinary celebrity back home.115 Prior to the move to Luoyang, Zhuangzong acted to further buttress ties to the powerful warlords of the west by bestowing special honors upon a longtime ally, Zhu Youqian, the Hezhong governor. But he went a step farther by directing son Jiji to adopt Youqian as “elder brother.”116 The imperial banquet for the governor in the eleventh month of 923 was sumptuous, much like the exchange of gifts. In a toast, an effusive and likely inebriated Son of Heaven heaped praise upon Youqian, “I owe a critical debt to you as facilitator of this grand endeavor!”117 However jarring as overstatement, the claim reflects Zhuangzong’s special affinity for this early convert to his cause. He also conferred a new name Li Jilin, where the personal name contains the same character as imperial sons. The goodwill between the two men would be shortlived, but at the moment, the monarch’s sentiments appear genuine. Zhang Quanyi and Zhu Youqian possessed powerful constituencies in the areas around Luoyang and Changan, “a whole cohort of protégés,” in the words of the Historical Records.118 Quanyi had wielded such political clout under the preceding Tang

113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118.

Zhao, Tang Taizong zhuan, p. 401; ZZTJ 196.6170 Tackett, Destruction of the Medieval Chinese Aristocracy, pp. 206–9. CFYG 172.1919. JWDS 30.418; ZZTJ 272.8905. JWDS 63.846. XWDS 24.249; HR p. 217.

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that he once finagled a doctoral degree for a failed candidate.119 And under the Later Tang, he would broker his influence to win appointments for local favorites, effectively deploying his new network in familiar ways.120 It was certainly pragmatic and perhaps even necessary for a regime based north of the Yellow River to cajole regional bosses in the heartland. Meanwhile, generosity in apportioning spoils and decorating officers was a Jin tradition dating to Cunxu’s father, although indulgences of the sort worked better for a petty kingdom than a bureaucratic state where cronyism corrodes the rule of law.121 Many of the court conflicts for the early reign would emanate from the contradiction between the discipline demanded of the Son of Heaven and the latitude commonly afforded regional governors.

Ethnic Inclusion Deference for Chinese traditions and peoples would characterize Shatuo rule for the duration of the Later Tang. For most dynasties founded by Inner Asians, power and privilege tended to be reserved for the ruling minority, which placed them above the indigenous majority through the apportioning of privileges, but such regimes also tend to strictly regulate social engagement to create a segregated society. Little evidence exists of exclusionary practices of the sort under the Later Tang. Even key military missions, assigned disproportionately to Inner Asians during the early conquests, tended to be shared more widely in the years directly preceding the conquest of Kaifeng.122 The ideal of racial inclusion seems a special trait of minority rule in the tenth century, argues Naomi Standen, a Liao historian, due to the porousness of borders.123 But racial inclusion also characterized minority rule under the Tuoba Wei centuries earlier, the likely inspiration for the Shatuo.124 The broad umbrella would serve to expedite the consolidation of power by Later Tang monarchs. If the government became polarized in time, race would play a minor role relative to differences over personality and policy.

The Sway of Favorites Music Man However impressive the surge in political fortunes for the Tongguang emperor, the one continuity from Jinyang to Weizhou, Kaifeng to Luoyang, was the rarified favor 119. 120. 121. 122.

XWDS 54.619; HR p. 443. XWDS 54.620; HR p. 444. JWDS 71.938. For parallels in the final sweep of Yuan armies against the Southern Song, see Cambridge History of China, Vol. 5, pp. 863–72, 917–23. 123. Standen, Unbounded Loyalty, pp. 15–32. 124. Rossabi, A History of China, pp. 107–8.

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afforded “musical performers” (lingren).125 Reflecting his literary refinement, Cunxu wrote Chinese poems in the regulated (shi) as well as lyrical (ci) forms, a handful of which survive today. His poetry proved stylistically rather conventional, but the genius of Cunxu revolved around theater and music. He composed popular songs and many of the ballads associated with tenth-century Jinyang, apparently in the local Shanxi dialect, were his creations and remained popular for centuries to come. He even composed the marching songs for his soldiers.126 In music, performance and creation tend to run along separate tracks, but Cunxu somehow excelled at both. Cunxu reveled in performing alongside actors, often replete with makeup and costumes, while the actor in him made for a better talker than listener.127 A passion that extended back to his years as prince, his frequent cavorting with actors so distressed Mother Cao that “she often pulled his ears in censure.” She knew painfully well the misfortune that befell the theatrical Li Chengqian (d. 644), Tang Taizong’s heir-apparent, given to improper intimacies with male singers on the palace staff.128 Chengqian also had a lifetime obsession with nomadic culture: he not only learned the language of the Tujue-Turks, but “dressed up” in the costumes of their commanders, reflecting his high regard for their masculine virility. His unconventional ways were merely an irritant to Taizong at the outset, until the revelation of an affair with an underage male singer, which finally gave the father cause to disinherit the son.129 The story about Chengqian reflects the historic identification of professional actors with same-sex liaisons; it also documents the presence of an enduring homoerotic subculture centered on theater. Moreover, Chengqians’s tragic end highlights the potential cost of such conduct for prospective rulers, for whom the expectations of moral probity should be higher.130 As recently as 913, Wang Yuanying, son of the Shu potentate Wang Jian, was purged for excessively fraternizing with musical performers, activities that included bouts of binge drinking and wrestling matches.131 His father, a military man of humble birth, ultimately cited acts of treachery against him to justify Yuanying’s purge, like Taizong centuries earlier, but his real motivations were clear to everyone. But neither a mother’s censure nor the distraction of war could erode Cunxu’s passion for musical performance, which continued as Son of Heaven: one stage name, Li Tianxia, alludes to the Li family’s “mastery of the world” and clearly emerged after ZZTJ 272.8904–5; Wudai shihua, pp. 48–50. XWDS 37.398; HR p. 310; Wudai shi bu 2.2b. XWDS 37.397–402; HR pp. 309–15; ZZTJ 272.8904. JWDS 49.672; Cambridge History of China, Vol. 3, p. 237; Zhao, Tang Taizong zhuan, pp. 366–72; XTS 80.3564–65. 129. Zhao, Tang Taizong zhuan, p. 369; ZZTJ 196.6189–92, 197.6193–96; Benn, China’s Golden Age, pp. 40–41. 130. On the sexuality of actors in traditional China, see Song, The Fragile Scholar: Power and Masculinity in Chinese Culture, pp. 125–49; Hinsch, Passions of the Cut Sleeve, pp. 9–13. 131. ZZTJ 268.8773–75; XWDS 63.789; HR p. 513.

125. 126. 127. 128.

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the accession. Rather than outgrow his youthful passion, the higher Cunxu rose in station the more gratification he seemed to derive from relationships without formality, friendships with men who validated his interests. Moreover, as he lost his voice to alcohol and his body to war, the forty-year-old Cunxu grew even more attached to actors as the personification of youth, beauty, and romance. He refused as sovereign to relegate actors to conventional roles in palace life; instead, actors received an array of official assignments, including oversight over important commands in the circuits as well as professional armies in the capital. Curiously, historical sources reveal little interest in associations with contemporary cultural icons, such as the “literary companions” of Yangdi, the last emperor of Sui.132 Despite making much of his own literary skills, the Tongguang emperor preferred cultural associations with marginally educated men, another sign of his disregard for the existing class system.

Entertainers in Office The masterfully written chapter on “Court Actors and Musicians” (Lingguan zhuan) in Ouyang Xiu’s Historical Records remains the most emotionally evocative source on the personal conduct and political influence of actors, which can be traced to the very beginning of the Tongguang reign. Due to his familiarity with performance culture in the Chinese heartland, the emperor was “overjoyed” to recover the famed actor Zhou Za after acquiring Kaifeng in 923, a man missing for many years and presumed a casualty of war. He presented sizable quantities of gold and silk to the performer, while promising appointments as prefect for two longtime patrons of Za.133 The appointment of actors to office, rare for Cunxu during his reign as prince, sparked a stiff rebuke from Military Commissioner Guo Chongtao, who anguished over the symbolism of accommodating imperial favorites before the military mainstay: The warriors to assist Your Majesty in claiming the world are all valorous and venturesome, dedicated and daring. Your great achievements newly won, you reward none of them, but instead wish to install actors as prefect. This is wholly unacceptable and may well cost Your Majesty the loyalties of the world.134

The “world” to which Chongtao alludes is a world of military men accustomed to receiving priority in the apportioning of spoils. After the passage of some months, Zhuangzong prevailed once again upon Chongtao to act on the appointments, “However fair your views, you should indulge me by implementing the directive.” Apart from matters of symbolism, Chongtao surely had pragmatic concerns about the suitability of actors for office. Prefects enjoyed substantive powers, the modern equivalent to mayors, for which actors lacked the relevant experience. Similar 132. Cambridge History of China, Vol. 3, p. 118; Yuan, Sui Yangdi zhuan, pp. 413–45. 133. JWDS 30.412; ZZTJ 272.8904, 273.8920. 134. XWDS 37.398; HR pp. 310–11; ZZTJ 273.8920.

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deficiencies in competence also characterized most military officers, but over the past half-century, they commonly secured postings as prefect through merit in battle, causing this previously civilian post to become the almost exclusive preserve of illiterate warriors.135 Zhuangzong likely regarded the two forms of cronyism as analogous. In addition, as secondary capital, Luoyang never had the vast surplus of literati talent found in and around Changan, so the pool of potential recruits was far smaller. And finally, the entire northwest appears to have faced a shortage of literati due to mass migration in response to political tumult, which in turn, forced rulers there into more creative ways to fill offices.136 The actors eventually assumed office, although the delay of several months undoubtedly helped to contain any backlash from the military, where booty had reached enough pockets to placate the potentially disaffected. Rather than mollify critics in the wake of the controversy, the Tongguang emperor chose to push the envelope further by promoting Li Shaoqin from interim custodian to governor of Huazhou. Although no actor, the rising governor was a mediocrity closely allied to their faction, prompting rumors of bribes to the actor Jing Jin. The charges suggest a structure of institutionalized corruption in place where actors brokered power as imperial surrogates.137 The palace staff of musical performers would swell to over a thousand, numbers unremarkable by historical standards or even relative to other kingdoms at the time.138 Yet their political clout, in many cases formalized by office, empowered actors like few other groups around the throne. And the widening fissure between inner and outer court did not bode well for Chongtao as the palace’s bridge to the outer court.

Improper Intimacies Apart from the graft and cronyism associated with certain actors, senior aides like Guo  Chongtao found even more objectionable their casual fraternizing with the Son of Heaven, which not only tarnished his image, but compromised his security. By  custom, ordinary men were strictly excluded from the “Imperial Compound” (Danei), as the Forbidden City was called in the Five Dynasties. Eunuchs were exempt from the exclusionary rule, a privilege now extended to untold numbers of musical performers. The special access of actors to the palace would foster an unhealthy informality between the emperor and his favorites, which ultimately emboldened the favorites to push the envelope still further. In the midst of one palace event, Zhuangzong insisted

135. 136. 137. 138.

Fang, “Power Structures,” pp. 64–65. ZZTJ 274.8955. ZZTJ 272.8904. JWDS 137.1831; XWDS 72.890.

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on performing in the company of actors, only for Jing Xinmo to push the limits of imperial forbearance and nearly die for the affront. The passage from the Historical Records reads: Zhuangzong peered in every direction as he cried out [invoking his own name], “Li Tianxia, Li Tianxia—where are you?” Xinmo scampered forth to slap his face. The emperor’s face changed color, while aides within earshot panicked. Other similarly astonished actors grabbed Xinmo to restrain him, asking, “How dare you raise your hand against the Son of Heaven!” “Li Tianxia is merely one person,” Xinmo responded. “For whom does he make the second cry?”139

Peals of laughter rippled through the chamber in response to the actor’s quick wit, the monarch conferring bounty upon Xinmo after nearly killing him. Even for an empress, slapping her husband’s face was a matter of such gravity that it might well end in divorce, and Xinmo as a common man enjoyed far less latitude. Despite little in the way of textual evidence, musical performance likely enjoyed a wider acceptance in Shatuo culture at the time, which explains why Keyong and Cunxu, as aficionados of acting and singing, never feared losing the respect of their family and friends as a consequence.140 Cultural differences might also explain why the Chinese mother of Cunxu received his theatrical interests far more negatively than his Shatuo father. In China, actors may have wielded varying degrees of political influence in the Han period and earlier, based on the relevant chapters of Sima Qian’s Records of the Grand Historian.141 Similarly, in the first century of Tang rule, according to modern scholars, elite companies of “court actors” thrived at Changan, men who enjoyed higher social status relative to independent performers. This elite community of actors may have declined by the ninth century, but they would have been familiar to a Tang nostalgic like Cunxu.142 For the tenth to eleventh centuries, however, actors tended to come from disesteemed hereditary households, men seen as more artisan than artist. The Son of Heaven could enjoy their craft at a distance, but never fraternize with actors with any frequency, let alone join their performances on a regular basis. Zhuangzong appreciated the concerns of court handlers, but he refused to deny his own individuality by setting the necessary boundaries. Centuries earlier, courtiers had admonished Tang Taizong for socializing with archers and bowmen, conduct seen as demeaning to his new status as sovereign.143 Taizong’s adamancy about continuing those associations may well have inspired this self-professed successor to the Tang imperium.

139. 140. 141. 142. 143.

XWDS 37.399; HR p. 311; ZZTJ 272.8904. XWDS 5.41; HR p. 40. Shiji 126.3211–13. Benn, China’s Golden Age, pp. 157–60. Zhao, Tang Taizong zhuan, p. 396.

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Sexuality Individual actors and comics might exert influence by humoring the powerful, but rarely did they wield sway as an interest group as came to pass at the Tongguang court. The combination of extraordinary access to the palace and imperial indifference to the failings of individual actors would suggest an intimacy more akin to paramours than ordinary patron and client. Further evidence of unconventional intimacies between Zhuangzong and some actors emerges in comments from Abaoji, the Kitan ruler at the time, who shapes a contrast between his own circumspect relations with actors against Cunxu’s indiscretions. “I too have a thousand actor-musicians recruited from our various tribes, but I refuse any sort of illicit use beyond the customary banquets.”144 In impugning the Shatuo ruler’s “illicit use” (wang ju), Abaoji suggests the crossing of normal heterosexual boundaries. It is noteworthy that the Historical Records employs the word gongye with reference to the inner chambers to which favored actors enjoyed access, the standard term for the “boudoir for palace ladies.”145 The inference of actors serving as the emperor’s male harem is unambiguous. Zhuangzong can hardly be characterized as “gay” in the modern sense of the term, in light of his well-documented heterosexual exploits, but perhaps a bisexual like many emperors in early China or Alexander the Great in the West.146 On the other hand, no single actor appears to have dominated the romantic life of Cunxu, unlike Alexander’s Hephaestion, focus of a lifelong affair.

Eunuchs in Power The intimacy of inner palace favorites presented a special challenge to Guo Chongtao due to his own limited political experience. As military commissioner with councilor standing, he held sweeping powers over the civil and military services from the outset of the dynasty. “He nonetheless knew little of dynastic institutions and historic precedents,” background critical to effective governing.147 The limitations of Chongtao forced monarch to reshuffle the civilian leadership, but with the intent of enhancing the dominance of the military commissioner, not countering his powers in the fashion of the previous Liang dynasty. After a half-year as councilor, the deficiencies of Doulu Ge were abundantly apparent, which prompted the administration to name two concurrent councilors: Wei Yue, a crony of Doulu Ge, and Zhao Guangyin (d. 925), a candidate backed by Chongtao.148 Appointed in the eleventh month of 923, on the heels of the court’s 144. 145. 146. 147. 148.

Mote, Imperial China, p. 46; Yao, “Abaoji,” pp. 233–34; JWDS 137.1831. XWDS 37.400; HR p. 312. Hinsch, Passions of the Cut Sleeve, pp. 1–14; Cantor, Alexander the Great, pp. 44–48. XWDS 24.245, 28. 301; HR pp. 212, 230; ZZTJ 272.8906. XWDS 28.302–3, 35; HR pp. 230–31; JWDS 58.777–78; ZZTJ 272.8906–7.

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relocation from Weizhou to Kaifeng, both men hailed from illustrious Tang families, but Yue quickly proved as inept as his patron, Ge, causing the two men to evolve into ceremonial leaders. Guangyin had long been described as “pure and honest,” but as chief councilor, he proved “impulsive and pompous” in ways that offended colleagues, including Ge and Yue. The constant infighting among civilian leaders would empower informal surrogates of the palace. Unfortunately, Guangyin died a year-and-a-half into his tenure, which in turn left Chongtao without a strong civilian ally at the time of greatest need. The limited literacy of Guo Chongtao seems to have shaped the emperor’s move to employ eunuchs as deputies on the military commission, Ma Shaohong and Zhang Juhan.149 This second generation of highly literate eunuchs knew well the court conventions and palace protocols of the former Tang. They also possessed substantial experience in metropolitan and local affairs.150 The mixing of senior courtiers with palace eunuchs as military commissioners represents an institutional compromise between the previous two dynasties. The former Tang had staffed the Military Commission largely with eunuchs since the office’s inauguration in the eighth century. The mass liquidation of eunuchs over a century later allowed the subsequent Liang dynasty to restore military oversight to the outer court by replacing the Military Commission (Shumiyuan) with the Bureau of Venerable Governance (Chongzhengyuan), staffed by martial figures like Jing Xiang.151 The strong personalities assigned to the post, compounded by the absence of councilor-level checks on the commissioners, served to invigorate the office and foster an authoritarian spirit in its leaders. The assertive style of Chongtao at the Tongguang court is an upshot of this institutional shift that elevated military commissioners to the status of councilors. As prince, Cunxu had already experimented with employing eunuchs alongside civilians as senior military advisors. He continued the practice as emperor, while reviving the Tang nomenclature for the Military Commission, Shumiyuan. His unreflective approach to institution building would not bode well for the administration, for sadly, the hollow mimicry of antiquated institutions extended to other realms of activity. Eunuch numbers in the capital would peak at one thousand in coming years.152 Compared to the five thousand estimated for the late ninth century, the eunuch population under Zhuangzong was still modest.153 Moreover, the monarch initially prohibited the assignment of eunuchs beyond the capital, a principle not operative in the last years of Tang. The restriction would prove difficult to enforce in his own reign

149. XWDS 24.247, 38.406; HR pp. 215, 319; JWDS 72.953–55. 150. Cambridge History of China, Vol. 3, pp. 600–601; ZZTJ 273.8931. 151. XWDS 21.208, 24.247, 257, 38.408; HR pp. lxix–lxx; 193, 215, 226, 321–22; Gong, Songdai guanzhi cidian, pp. 102–3. 152. XWDS 38.407. 153. Cambridge History of China, Vol. 3, pp. 571, 646.

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as well.154 Still, a man as fit intellectually as Zhuangzong would never find himself, “under the thumb of eunuchs,” as one monarch of the late Tang haplessly characterized his own plight.155 As a rule, the throne simply allowed eunuchs to color its perception of events in ways that benefited them. It would take a severe vacuum at the center to give eunuchs sufficient power to change the course of history, as came to pass. Before the throne could reduce its dependency on inner palace favorites, it would need to restore a credible recruitment apparatus to the civil service in the form of examinations, a system only beginning to be revived. Meanwhile, several potentates in the coterminous kingdoms to the south had similarly valued eunuchs as confidantes and diplomats, attesting to a practical utility that transcended the preferences of individual rulers.156 In reality, the leading eunuch at the Tongguang court, Zhang Juhan, possessed moral girth to rival any courtier, including Guo Chongtao.157 The trauma of barely eluding liquidation had fostered circumspection in the eunuchs to experience it. Juhan thus refused to circumvent civil servants in conventional ways. In the end, eunuchs of the next generation were given to greater mischief. Persons never so intimate with the monarch as actors, some proved overly eager to please the palace while others brooded over the smallest slight. It is mistaken to conflate the two groups, actors and eunuchs, as traditional historians tend to do, for better-educated eunuchs likely held actors as a class in contempt. Worse yet, certain actors in the palace had the habit of “mocking” officials for the amusement of the throne, abuse that surely extended to eunuchs, the conventional butt of demeaning jokes about their deformity.158 The mix of actors and eunuchs made for a fractured court, but also a divided palace: the emperor had a soft spot for actors and his wife for eunuchs. Further complicating domestic affairs of the Son of Heaven was the arrival of his beloved but exacting imperial mother, Empress Dowager Cao, soon to settle outstanding domestic issues that included honors for her future daughter-in-law.

Celebrations Reunion with Mother Cao In the first month of 924, the emperor’s teenage son Jiji and younger brother Cunwo were dispatched to Jinyang to escort his mother and stepmother to the capital. Consort Dowager Liu, formal wife of Keyong, declined the offer with characteristic subtlety, “The ritual altars and tomb of Keyong are nearby,” alluding to the Ancestral Temple to the dynasty at Jinyang and the gravesite of her husband at Daizhou, some one hundred 154. 155. 156. 157. 158.

ZZTJ 273.8912. Cambridge History of China, Vol. 3, p. 658. XWDS 63.791–92, 65.816; HR pp. 514–15, 543–47. XWDS 38.403–5; HR pp. 316–19; JWDS 72.949–54; CFYG 688.7701. XWDS 37.400; HR p. 312.

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kilometers to the north. “Who will offer periodic rites were I to join you?”159 Although devotion to her husband’s memory appears genuine, the conduct of rites was likely a secondary concern. She was as much as a decade older than Woman Cao and presumably less mobile. Woman Liu had also lived a highly independent lifestyle at Jinyang and must have also dreaded the prospect of trading her familiar surroundings for an insular existence in the capital. In this way, the two women parted for the first time in four decades. In anticipation of his mother’s arrival, Zhuangzong had initially planned a trip to Huaizhou, some one hundred kilometers north of Luoyang, to personally escort her back to the capital. Surely on his mind was her sentimental send-off twelve years earlier, when he embarked upon the intervention at Zhao—the first step in his long trek toward monarchy. Advisors at the Secretariat, however, deemed the times inauspicious for movements of any distance, so the monarch received his mother at Heyang for the daylong trek to Luoyang. The imperial entourage consisted of a mix of officials and bodyguards, followed by a mass of heralds, musicians, and even scribes to record the event. It was the first meeting between mother and son since Cunxu’s elevation to emperor and Woman Cao’s investiture as empress dowager.160 Even more impressive was the welcoming party awaiting the imperial mother at the gates of the “Luo capital” (variously Luojing or Luodu), the new name for Luoyang. Throngs of civil and military officials in formal costumes assumed formation as the imperial procession passed through the city’s main gate, even though the winter temperatures must have left revelers shivering and sniveling for the duration. A similarly broad spectrum of officials soon reassembled to announce the monarch’s newly minted title of honor: the Luminously Literate, Intelligently Martial, Illustrious, and Filial Emperor.161 Unlike reign names, which needed to be settled early on, titles of honor were superfluous and emperors often waited for special occasions to adopt them, so  Zhuangzong clearly saw the presence of his mother in Luoyang as a historically meaningful moment. The ceremony for assuming titles of honor invariably included citations from senior courtiers employing a mix of poetry and prose.

Suburban Rites Mother Cao arrived in time to attend two venerable sacrifices: rites at the Temple to the Imperial Ancestors (Taimiao), a venue devoted to the present dynasty’s founding fathers, and a second event in the Southern suburbs (Nanjiao), which celebrates the Son of Heaven as arbiter between Heaven and Earth. Fifteen years had elapsed since a reigning monarch, the Liang founder, officiated at observances in the Southern 159. JWDS 30.427, 49.672; ZZTJ 273.8913. 160. CFYG 27.277–78. 161. XWDS 5.47; HR pp. 46–47.

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suburbs. The dynasty’s last ruler, Modi, had planned to do so, but failed due to the bungling of official planners.162 Nonetheless, his preparations reduced the costs for the Later Tang, while permitting an acceleration in the timetable. Rites in the Southern Suburbs tend to be highly stylized events proceeded by fasting and other sorts of abstentions, but they proved uncharacteristically festive under the Tongguang emperor, who appeared in celestial cap and red silk gown, costumes designed specifically for the event. Coinciding with ceremonies in the Southern Suburbs should have been rites at the Altar of Heaven (Yuanqiu) and Temple to the Imperial Ancestors (Taimiao).163 Teenage son Jiji received placement directly behind his father during the procession on the first day of the second month (924.02.01), while officials in formal costume proceeded on his heels. The event provided another unforgettable image for Dowager Cao. A new residence was also erected for her in the imperial compound, dubbed the Palace of Enduring Longevity (Changshou gong). One can well imagine the contrast with the old governor’s residence at Jinyang.164 Mother Cao was likely around sixty years of age, which explains the priority of accommodating her before anyone else. Coinciding with this heady succession of imperial rites, the court promulgated a general amnesty, consistent with convention. But one amnesty-related announcement that broke with the past addressed the fate of displaced children: For common girls and women forced to relocate elsewhere to become servants or consorts, their own families shall be allowed to identify them for return. And for boys forcibly tattooed on the face like conscripts, documents shall be given to permit their release to pursue other professions.165

In two short sentences, the government acknowledged the impact of two decades of war on populations across North China, tens of thousands of underage boys impressed into military service and girls forced into servitude, which in turn created a shortage of able-bodied youth in the countryside. The edict also affirms the court’s desire to restore normalcy to communities by reuniting families. The government’s outreach to displaced girls is especially intriguing. Zhuangzong’s principal consort, Woman Liu, had experienced precisely such displacement as a child, a history familiar to her husband and perceived as a sign of character, as will be shown below.166 Important imperial rites by convention entailed a round of gifts for meritorious subjects, an untimely burden for the administration. Rites in the Southern suburbs 162. XWDS 42.463; HR p. 361. 163. WDHY 2.19–20. Rites in the Southern Suburbs are described in greater detail during Mingzong’s reign. Interestingly, he waited until his fourth year to conduct the rites, then devoted two days to the ceremonies, which included an overnight stay in the suburbs. So, the ceremonies under Zhuangzong appear somewhat truncated; see Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, pp. 89–90. 164. JWDS 31.430. 165. JWDS 31.428. 166. XWDS 14.143; HR p. 132.

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managed to attract over one thousand officials, each of whom expected a gratuity commensurate with rank.167 Imperial charity was also expected to extend down to a wide spectrum of regional officials. The festivities and related costs would create fresh frictions with Military Commissioner Guo Chongtao over a trivial matter that shed an unflattering light on the political sensibilities of the new sovereign. Pursuant to Kaifeng’s surrender, Chongtao had received cash and valuables from governors across the realm as personal gifts. No law barred him from laying private claim to the entire cache, but in an emblematic statement on fiscal responsibility, Chongtao elected to set aside the funds for special expenditures, then released a hundred thousand strings of cash upon completion of the rites to reward the military.168 His reserve still fell short of needs and Chongtao entreated the emperor to tap into his personal privy to cover the difference, funds in surplus even as the public treasury fell short. A prolonged and shrinking silence ensued, after which Zhuangzong countered, “I have stores at Jinyang for precisely this purpose and will direct the local revenues officer to retrieve them.” Several hundred thousand strings of cash and bolts of silk did materialize, but it was the property of Li Jitao at Jinyang, wealth confiscated after his execution, not palace reserves in the capital. The extra time and expense needed to transport the treasure to Luoyang had exasperated Chongtao and left the monarch appearing impervious to principle.

Installation of Empress Liu In the context of frictions with the throne over various matters, Chongtao made the fateful decision, reportedly at a friend’s prompting, to extend a hand of goodwill to the emperor’s favorite concubine. “Despite assisting the Son of Heaven to acquire the world and accomplish the grandest of feats, petty partisans are still conspiring against me,” Chongtao said, in a surprising admission of vulnerability. He was alluding to favorites around the monarch who resented his intrusive oversight.169 By the second month of 924, Chongtao petitioned for a local posting, which was likely simple posturing on his part, but the palace took his pleas seriously and acted affirmatively on “fifteen matters of benefit and detriment to the empire,” Chongtao’s detailed program of political action.170 On the heels of this symbolic accommodation from the throne, the commissioner endorsed the elevation of Consort Liu as empress.171 As Cunxu’s companion for the past decade and mother of his eldest son, Consort Liu had eclipsed potential rivals long before the accession. Zhuangzong did have a formal wife in youth, Lady Han, who produced no sons, while Consorts Hou and Yi 167. 168. 169. 170. 171.

ZZTJ 273.8914. XWDS 24.248; HR pp. 215–16; JWDS 57.766; ZZTJ 273.8914. XWDS 24.247–48; HR p. 215; ZZTJ 273.8915. JWDS 31.430. The Historical Records cites “twenty-five matters”; see XWDS 24.248. JWDS 31.429; ZZTJ 273.8915–16.

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had long ago declined in favor.172 Leaping over his legal wife to invest Consort Liu as empress would require the demotion of Lady Han to concubine, but the inversion of roles had the advantage of sparing his son Jiji, a generation later, the awkward experience of Cunxu of recent, namely, needing to demote to consort his father’s legal wife of forty years in order to properly honor his mother by birth. Still, reservations against installing Woman Liu persisted for many months, if not years, due to resistance at the highest level. One source, the Comprehensive Mirror, identifies Cunxu’s mother as the main impediment to Consort Liu’s elevation: she was repulsed by the notion that the offspring of a medicine man might succeed her as mother of the country.173 After all, Lady Han hailed from a distinguished Jinyang family and represents Keyong’s preference for daughter-in-law.174 Meanwhile, having lived at close quarters with Consort Liu, her servant for nearly a decade, Dowager Cao knew the younger woman’s flaws like no one else. The fact that the announcement of Consort Liu’s forthcoming investiture came nearly a month after Mother Cao reached Luoyang suggests that she continued to have a voice in the relevant discussions and her consent involved further persuasion, ideally from an unimpeachable source. The timely endorsement of Guo Chongtao, a familiar face from the Jinyang palace, must have gone far to sway her.175 As a man of humble birth who had fought against entrenched elites and their prejudice against commoners, Chongtao had personal reasons to empathize with Consort Liu as someone similarly obscure.176 He undoubtedly expected reciprocity from her. Concern for face-saving after the long wait may well explain the special pomp afforded Empress Liu at her investiture ceremony on the eleventh day of the fourth month (924.04.11).177 The event had the unmistakable markings of her theatrical husband: “After accepting vestments, the Empress rode the feathered carriage with imperial insignia to the accompaniment of pipes and drums, then appeared at the Temple to the Imperial Ancestors [to conduct rites].” The detail lavished on the ritual in the Historical Records suggests some departure from Tang conventions, especially as pertains to rites at the ancestral temple, which formalized her place in the twin histories of family and dynasty.178 Consort Liu’s elevation to empress would displease Woman Han, the displaced wife of Zhuangzong, and Consort Yi, his former consort.179 In this way, the palace conferred high office upon the erudite Han Yun, brother of Woman Han, while granting 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179.

XWDS 14.143; HR p. 132. ZZTJ 273.8916. JWDS 92.1223. ZZTJ 273.8916. ZZTJ 273.8915. WDHY 1.10; Wudai shi zuanwu 1.11. JWDS 41.565. XWDS 14.144; HR p. 133; JWDS 32.441.

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titular honors to assorted relatives.180 A noble title for the throne’s sole daughter-inlaw, Consort Wang, daughter of the Dingzhou governor Wang Du, would come in the summer of 924, when she married imperial son Jiji to become the Lady of Wei.181 Zhuangzong turned to an exclusive cluster of military families for the arranged marriages of his children, male and female, reflecting perhaps the circles in which he moved for most of his life. Once his preference continued under subsequent monarchs, a pattern appears to have emerged that elevated military families above literati families, at least in terms of marriage pacts with royals. In contrast, his own father, Keyong, pivoted largely to locally renowned literati families in striking strategic marriages, including the match for Cunxu, his presumptive heir.182 The narrowing of boundaries for arranged marriages reflects the ability of military families to produce social networks able to rival those of literati families, an important step in the decline of the Tang hereditary elite, as noted in the Preface.

Honors for Kinsmen Princely honors were also delayed until 925 for the emperor’s remaining sons, all boys under ten years of age: Jitong, Jisong, Jichan, and Jiyao.183 His married sister, the Yaoying Princess, would receive investiture in due course.184 She is identified as his eleventh younger sister, the rest of whom had presumably died before the accession.185 Investitures also awaited another imperial daughter, the Yining Princess, whose granddaughter married Zhao Kuangyin, the Song founder; she is known to history as the Xiaozhang Empress.186 Investitures as “prince” for the biological brothers of the throne came in late 925; previous honors had been limited to titular governorships.187 Sources do not divulge the reasons for the delay in honoring siblings. The cost of investiture ceremonies seems unlikely. In reality, there was perhaps less urgency to act on titular honors in light of Zhuangzong’s refusal to employ siblings in political office or to enfeoff them with lands.

Setting Ceilings for Siblings In other periods of Chinese history, leading clansmen might be entrusted with strategic satrapies at large or bodyguard contingents in the capital, but the Tongguang emperor 180. JWDS 92.1223. Consorts Han and Yi resided in Jinyang at the time of his death, although the date of their separation from the harem is unclear; see XWDS 14.146–47. 181. XWDS 39.420; HR p. 335; JWDS 32.439, 54.732; ZZTJ 273.8936; WDHY 2.18; Xu Tang shu 35.324–25. 182. Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, pp. 137–38. 183. JWDS 32.446. 184. WDHY 2.17; JWDS 33.461. 185. JWDS 33.465; Fan, Li Keyong pingzhuan, p. 69. 186. Song shi 242.8608, 255.8905, 255.8907. 187. XWDS 5.50; HR p. 49; ZZTJ 274.8963.

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chose to place his brothers on pensions in Luoyang. Perhaps the inspiration was again Taizong of Tang, who shunned office for his own kin, “lest they become a burden on the people.”188 Admittedly, the biological brothers of Zhuangzong were demonstrably lesser men with little in the way of either martial feats or administrative experience, so pensioning was perhaps the wiser alternative.189 Overall, biological siblings garnered less in spoils than the battle-hardened foster brothers and sons, for merit in the building of empire had belonged disproportionately to them. The rather low estimation of his closest kin, as evidenced by such post-accession slights, also helps to explain the proclivity of Zhuangzong to bond with soldiers and actors, men with whom he shared either common life experiences or aesthetic interests. The marginalizing of the imperial clan under the Later Tang represents an innovation that founders of the Song dynasty generations later chose to embrace and even expand.

Rapprochement with Neighbors Wu Amidst the rites and investitures of Spring 924, the administration seemed to be earning speedy validation from abroad. Special envoys arrived with felicitations and gifts from the kings of Silla and Bohai to the east, and captains of the Tangut and Uighur confederations to the west, peoples whose interests had often stood at variance with Shatuo ambitions in the past.190 Diplomatic exchanges occurred with the Kitan as well, despite the recent border conflagration.191 Closer to home, goodwill was reflected in gifts from potentates across the south. The King of Wu in the southeast, Yang Pu (901–38), dispatched envoys bearing tribute that included two thousand ounces of silver, twelve hundred bolts of assorted silks, five hundred catties of fine tea, four tusks of ivory, along with ten rhinoceros horns.192 Months earlier, he had presented to the Tongguang emperor a generous accession gift, as befitting the wealthiest satrap in the south. The additional largess reflects Yang Pu’s keenness to improve relations, having spurned overtures from the Prince of Jin years earlier.193 The throne reviewed outstanding issues with Pu’s emissary during their meeting, which surely included a stiff rebuke for the imperial trappings that the potentate had begun to assume as prelude to accession as emperor. Such actions were received in Luoyang as an affront to its own sovereignty.194 The message must have reached the right ears, for Pu suddenly suspended further advancement. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194.

ZZTJ 192.6025. XWDS 14.150–51; HR p. 141. XWDS 5.46–47; HR pp. 46–47. Cambridge History of China, Vol. 6, p. 62. JWDS 31.432, 134.1779–90. JWDS 30.421; SGCQ 3.59–60. XWDS 61.758; HR p. 479.

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Clearly, diplomacy provided cover for other activities, from intelligence gathering to arm-twisting.

Chu As a rule, diplomacy worked better for kingdoms closest to the capital. In the autumn of 923, the potentate of Chu, Ma Yin (852–930), whose domain lay directly south of the Later Tang and west of Wu, had dispatched his own son as envoy to Kaifeng.195 The timing and stature of the mission affirms the importance attached to relations with the Central Plains as a wedge against Wu. In the tenth month of 924, coinciding with Zhuangzong’s birthday, the Chu state tendered gifts that included a thousand ingots of “white gold.”196 As a further expression of fidelity, the seventy-two-year-old Ma Yin surrendered to the court the general commander’s seal formerly conferred by the Liang court. Chu stood at the vortex of trade between north and south, so cordial relations with Luoyang served to secure the economic interests of both parties.197

Nanping Diplomacy proved more problematic for Nanping, the smallest of the southern kingdoms that straddled the Yangzi River at Jiangling, Hubei. Although only several hundred kilometers from east to west, Nanping held substantial strategic import for the Later Tang, due to its direct access to the larger state of Chu to its south and Shu to the west.198 At the same time, more than any other kingdom, Nanping needed an external ally to contain its neighboring states, so the policy of amicable relations with the north had historic roots. The overlord Gao Jixing had maintained close tributary relations with the Liang dynasty for over a decade.199 As a staunch ally, he once lent nominal support for a Liang campaign against the Jin kingdom, so Jixing was surely startled to receive positive overtures from Cunxu, sometime in the autumn of 923 in his new capacity as Son of Heaven. The missive from Zhuangzong contained an invitation to court. Aides of the Nanping governor tried to dissuade him, characterizing a trip to Kaifeng as tantamount to “entering prison of one’s own volition.” Gao Jixing appeared at court all the same in the eleventh month of 923, albeit with a bodyguard of three hundred. Upon conclusion of the trip, the palace considered detaining him until Military Commissioner Guo Chongtao warned of the potential repercussions of such an egregious breach of good faith: 195. 196. 197. 198. 199.

JWDS 133.1756–66; XWDS 66.824; HR p. 551; SGCQ 67.941. SGCQ 67.942. Wudai shihua, pp. 95. JWDS 133.1751–56; ZZTJ 272.8910. XWDS 69.855–56; HR pp. 585–88.

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The throne was assuaged partly by Chongtao’s reasoning and partly by the forthrightness of the potentate himself. During the visit of Gao Jixing, the Tongguang emperor intimated his resolve to conquer Shu and Wu, where rulers had either assumed illicit titles or prepared to do so. He cited a preference to prioritize the Shu campaign, but voiced concerns about the hazards of the Qinling Mountains for northern horsemen, should they approach from the northwest, making more desirable an approach from the east through Nanping along the Yangzi River. Jixing represented Shu as far the richer target, a statement crafted to position his own state for undeserved spoils. He even promised to commit armies from Nanping in an advance against the region.201 The visit concluded with the monarch clapping Jixing on the back before the festive send-off cited in the first chapter. Assassins unleashed secretly by Zhuangzong would attempt to slay Jixing on the return leg of his trip, a plot that not only failed abysmally, but turned other regional leaders paranoid. Months later, the Later Tang invested Jixing as Prince of Nanping, as  if trying to atone for its previous overreach. The first leader of an autonomous southern state to come to the capital, Jixing was also the last, blame for which rests squarely with the throne. The affair further attests to the success of Chongtao in adapting to his new role as diplomat, while the monarch seemed trapped in a mindset of intrigue better suited to conquest than governance.

Wuyue A different scenario unfolded for Luoyang’s relations with Wuyue, a kingdom of modest dimensions but substantial wealth centered on Zhejiang province. It was a newly acceded Zhuangzong who had initiated diplomatic contact with Wuyue in the fifth month of 923 by dispatching envoys to its capital at Hangzhou bearing presents that included rare horses and medicines, in addition to the jade belts reserved for senior officials. A reciprocal mission from Wuyue was deferred for over a year, likely due to the domestic preoccupations of its aging king. But as emissaries made their way to Luoyang, in the ninth month of 924, they compensated for their tardiness by 200. XWDS 69.856–57. 201. SGCQ 100.1432.

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presenting a treasure trove of gold or silver objects, plus enough cash to placate bureaucrats above and grease the wheels of graft below.202 The immense bounty of Wuyue came as a welcome surprise, but one request caused consternation in official circles. The King, Qian Liu (852–932), had petitioned for jade registers, allowing him to invest his own sons along with nearby tributary supplicants in the manner of autonomous states. The emperor referred the request to the relevant civilian courtiers, and predictably, the greatest resistance came from Military Commissioner Guo Chongtao. As symbols of the Son of Heaven’s authority, he argued, jade registers have historically been employed exclusively by him. The same rule of exclusivity should apply to the investiture of subjects, which precludes the arrogation of such powers to third parties. Despite the sound reasoning of opponents, the palace took swift action to provide a whole stock of jade registers for Wuyue, plus a single gold seal and red gown, presumably for the exclusive use of its king.203 In addition, the seventy-two-year-old Qian Liu was exempted from employing the term “Subject” in future communications with the court. The accommodation, afforded no other southern state, is attributed to the bribes that Qian Liu’s envoys lavished upon palace cronies. More likely, the emperor simply appreciated the utility of close relations with Wuyue as a check on its neighbor, Wu, reminiscent of policy under the preceding dynasty. As a rule, Zhuangzong was preeminently concerned with tangible outcomes in the conduct of border affairs, not the fineries of protocol.

Shu More intractable problems dogged relations with Shu, current-day Sichuan, where five years earlier Wang Yan (d. 926) had acceded as “emperor” of the Former Shu. Soon after occupying Kaifeng, the Tongguang court initiated diplomatic contact with Chengdu, the Shu capital, an overture spurned by locals. A second mission followed in the Spring of 924, led by Li Yan.204 A man of imposing intellect and eloquence, Li Yan could also boast a long association with Cunxu as prince, which augmented his authority as spokesman for the palace. During rambunctious talks at Chengdu, the northern envoy cited the recent profusion of tribute from across the south as proof of the everwidening embrace of the Son of Heaven. A broader unification of the Four Corners was now “an absolute certainty,” Li Yan insisted, a trend that Shu would be foolish to resist. He also articulated his administration’s recently formulated carrot-and-stick policy toward the south that promised, “virtuous dispensation for the submissive, but 202. SGCQ 78.1096; JWDS 133.1768. 203. XWDS 69.857; HR p. 568; WDHY 11.143; ZZTJ 273.8936. 204. JWDS 70.929–30, 136.1815–22; XWDS 26.283–84; ZZTJ 273.8918, 8921; SGCQ 37.540–42; Wang, Power and Politics in Tenth-Century China, pp. 232–36.

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debilitating force for recalcitrant holdouts.”205 A brother of the Shu monarch nearly killed Li Yan in his seat, for he had effectively threatened war unless the ruler shed his imperial trappings. The miscarriage of Li Yan’s mission incited more than royals at Chengdu. The Son of Heaven had imparted to his envoy some prize horses to barter for Shu treasures unavailable in the heartland to furnish his palaces. The region was the leading producer of silk and other textiles in addition to precious metals and gems. The laws of Shu, however, strictly prohibited the export of many luxury products indigenous to the region, causing Li Yan to return north with a paltry two hundred ounces of gold and a pile of furs, the smallest tribute on record since the accession. The hubris of Shu leaders would enrage the monarch, a rage worsened by the rude reception for his emissary. By most accounts, Zhuangzong decided to invade upon conclusion of Li Yan’s mission. But the exchange months earlier with the Nanping governor implies an early preference to prioritize the Shu campaign, which in turn implies the appropriation of diplomacy to create cause. To wit, the rhetoric of Li Yan had been intentionally calibrated to incite Shu royals, who naïvely fell for the bait. The monarch’s urge to retaliate immediately for the slight of Shu overlords would collide with official opinion, which opposed a second mobilization of armies so soon after the long war with the Liang. In a memorial from the fifth month of 924, policy advisor Xue Zhaowen warned about the potential reaction from belligerents across the south, where a plethora of renegade states might be sufficiently threatened by action in one theater to take preemptive action in their own.206 Meanwhile, the Central Plains remained volatile, its armed forces in need of long-deferred bounty and its peasantry demanding appeasement after years of deprivation. Zhaowen’s timely reminder that political consolidation should precede further territorial expansion certainly shaped the decision to defer action against Shu, at least for the moment. Another consideration behind the deferral of war abroad was dissension within the ruling elite over culture and values.

Culture Wars Auxiliary Capitals For the second year of Tongguang, domestic matters eclipsed foreign affairs in molding the administration’s priorities and direction. From the outset of 924, a ruling style had emerged that involved an assertive lead in public affairs. The puppet-emperors of late Tang had offered recent evidence of the perils of surrendering power to either warring

205. XWDS 26.283. 206. ZZTJ 273.8920.

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governors at large or overbearing surrogates in the capital. A man in the mold of Taizong, at the peak of the Zhenguan reign, had bequeathed a far better legacy as the sovereign who balanced strong personal convictions with due deference for tradition. Inspired by his independent spirit, Zhuangzong expected to reach decisions himself, in the fashion of other Inner Asian leaders, not merely rubber-stamp the policies of others. He trusted his instincts in war and saw governance as similarly inspired from the top down. In recognition of roots north of the Yellow River, the Son of Heaven chose to adopt four cities as capitals. Secondary capitals were formed at Jinyang, Weizhou, and Zhenzhou to complement the main capital at Luoyang.207 Jinyang had been auxiliary capital in Tang times as well. The scheme appears designed to sustain strategic and cultural links to the north at a time of escalating anxieties about isolation in China’s interior. Whether the scheme would succeed in keeping Shatuo rulers culturally connected to their roots would ultimately depend on the frequency and duration of imperial stays and the reign proved too short for any trend to emerge. All three auxiliary capitals were far from Luoyang, which reduced the likelihood of regular visits. Moreover, none of the secondary capitals had the appeal of Luoyang or Changan as cultural centers with populations of a million mouths. The administration intentionally snubbed Kaifeng by denying it auxiliary capital status, despite the city’s critical import to the economy and security of Luoyang. The designation of auxiliary capital led to a major enhancement of defenses and a more careful vetting of officials. Kaifeng thereby became more vulnerable to enemies of the state after losing its status as capital, a development never anticipated at the outset.

Social Circles Apart from maintaining a presence beyond the capital, the Tongguang emperor also aimed at a presence within Luoyang through social gatherings with members of the power elite. A generation earlier, his father had frequented the home of the favorite Ge Yu, and building upon that tradition, the new sovereign launched a series of banquets at the residences of commanders to invigorate his political base, events characterized by the generous flow of food and wine that commonly continued into the wee hours of the next day. Socializing with subjects beyond the palace had been rare under the Liang dynasty, with the exception of a visit to the home of Zhang Quanyi, the Luoyang governor, by the dynasty’s founder. Rulers of the Sui and early Tang dynasties tended to entertain courtiers either in their own palaces or at nearby scenic sites in the capital such as the

207. HR p. lviii.

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Xuanwu Gate.208 A monarch’s security was the primary reason for locating banquets historically on palace grounds. In addition, palace banquets doubled as occasions to reward exceptional service, in which case no venue could rival the palace itself, at least from the honoree’s perspective. The initial banquets under Zhuangzong were similarly situated in the capital, but he selected the empire’s most distinguished warrior for his first outing beyond the palace.209 Adopted brother Li Siyuan had led the epic conquest of Kaifeng and recently returned to the capital from a successful action against the Kitan, whereupon an official residence was conferred in Luoyang.210 The banquet at Siyuan’s home in the second month of 924 ended on a tone of “supreme mirth,” sources say, the two men undoubtedly sharing stories of a personal nature.211 Exactly nine days later, Zhuangzong bestowed upon Siyuan an “iron writ of immunity” (tiequan), the second conferral since Guo Chongtao.212 The relevant sources are silent on motivation, but the convergence of their private banquet with the announcement suggests concerns expressed by the adopted brother that necessitated the conferral. Siyuan and Chongtao had been partners in masterminding the collapse of the Liang dynasty, the men equally vulnerable to possible retribution in the future. Curiously, Siyuan petitioned to retire a few weeks after the dinner. The throne not only rejected the petition, but followed through with additional promotions. Zhuangzong would dine with Siyuan once again before the year ended.213 Although never intimates, the pair seem to have shared a genuine camaraderie in the first year of the reign as a consequence of their shared toil in launching the dynasty. The monarch was twice feted at the home of Guo Chongtao in 924, in the fifth and the ninth months. Although described as events of revelry, the separation of business from pleasure is inconceivable for the always-intense Chongtao.214 A foster son who once saved the emperor’s life, Yuan Xingqin pampered the Son of Heaven at his official residence during the eleventh month.215 Soon, the biological brothers and stepbrothers of Zhuangzong, six of whom resided in Luoyang, would entertain him at their official compound.216 For the entire reign, the individuals permitted to host the monarch at their homes were military men, although civilians were included in some banquets

208. On the entertainment of courtiers for the Sui and Tang, see Yuan, Sui Yangdi zhuan, p. 436; Benn, China’s Golden Age, pp. 132–33. On Zhu Wen’s visit to the home of Zhang Quanyi, see XWDS 2.19; HR p. 20; CFYG 111.1207. On the social life of his successor, see Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, pp. 5, 106. 209. CFYG 111.1207. 210. JWDS 91.1209; CFYG 111.1207. 211. JWDS 31.429. 212. JWDS 31.429; Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, pp. 128–29. 213. JWDS 31.431, 32.444. 214. JWDS 32.436, 441; CFYG 111.1207. 215. JWDS 32.444; CFYG 111.1207. 216. JWDS 32.443.

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held on palace grounds.217 The experience of being relegated to second tier in their sovereign’s social life must have proven terribly frustrating for civilian courtiers, who surely expected a greater inclusiveness from their ostensibly “Sinicized” leader. The throne privileged another man of military ilk, the local governor Zhang Quanyi, with two imperial visits toward the close of 924. During the visit to Quanyi’s suburban villa in the eleventh month, Zhuangzong chose to spend the night. Overnight stays with potential allies like Wang Rong and Zhu Youqian had been common before the accession, but they became rare afterward. Rarer still was the visit in the twelfth month, where Zhuangzong appeared at the door of Quanyi’s city residence with Empress Liu at his side. Her presence “startled” the host, a sign of no advance notice. It was during the second visit that the monarch directed his empress to adopt the older couple as parents.218 Admittedly, a minority spent as servant at Jinyang had deprived Woman Liu of a father figure, and the idea of adoption reportedly originated with her. Sources point to lavish gifts from Quanyi as cause for the fast friendship, but gifts as expressions of friendship were rarely given or received so cynically.

The Final Writ of Immunity As the year 924 came to a close, the palace conferred its third “writ of immunity” upon the Hezhong governor, Zhu Youqian, an early ally. The palace had lavished tens of thousands in cash gifts upon Youqian at the outset of the reign, then installed two sons as governors and ten protégés as prefects, effectively reinforcing the family’s tight political grip over the region. “The lavishness of court charity and favor had no parallel at the time,” writes the Historical Records with some hyperbole.219 Part repayment and part reassurance for a man whose loyalties were known to waver, such acts of favor came at little cost, save for the principle of centralizing military power, a cornerstone of Liang governance.

Honoring Tang Martyrs Having slighted senior civilians in his social life, bestowing posthumous honors on the “Six Tang Martyrs” represents something of an outreach to them. These courtiers had been murdered in 906 at Baima Post, as prelude to the Liang usurpation.220 Honors were long overdue and universally applauded. Approbation also came with the administration’s decision to redress the injustice against hundreds of Tang imperial clansmen, and presumably their families, slain at the behest of the Liang founder and tossed 217. 218. 219. 220.

CFYG 111.1207. XWDS 45.491; HR p. 376; JWDS 32.443, 444; ZZTJ 273.8928; CFYG 111.1207, 115.1261. XWDS 45.493; HR p. 378; JWDS 32.449, 63.846–47; ZZTJ 273.8927. XWDS 35.375–76; HR pp. 286–87; JWDS 32.438, 32.449.

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indiscriminately into a pit. Zhuangzong promptly announced ritually appropriate burials in Luoyang for them.221 He also proceeded with preparations to rebury the last two rulers of the Tang, who had fallen to assassins decades earlier.222 He aspired through such acts to atone for historic injustices while celebrating the dynastic legacy to which the Shatuo were now wedded.

Restoring Civil Service Examinations Civilian courtiers must have applauded the restoration of civil service examinations. The first examination, in the tenth month of 924, produced fourteen successful candidates for the doctoral degree ( jinshi) and two candidates for specialized topics under the “various fields” examination (zhuke). Heading the list were Cui Guangbiao and Zhang Li, the former from a hereditary household and the latter from an obscure family. Both men subsequently received entry-level positions in the History Bureau. Chief examiner Zhao Qi, then vice-director of the Ministry of finance, would die mere months after the exercise, so he must have been fairly advanced in age, which in turn suggests strong credentials.223 Another nine boys passed the examination for child prodigies (tongzike) led by a boy of seven sui, Guo Zhongshu.224 Two examinations in 925 produced a total of eight doctoral candidates.225 In the first month of 926, the final exercise of the reign, a reported one hundred individuals passed assorted specialty examinations, ranging from the classics to the histories, a very respectable number, but no doctoral degrees were issued.226 The average yield for doctoral degree exercises under the previous Liang dynasty was fifteen, consistent with the highest yield for the Tongguang reign, in 924.227 The slightly smaller overall yield under Zhuangzong relates to many factors, including the ambivalence of literati to serve in uncertain times and the overall decline of educational institutions after decades of neglect. The shift in capitals from Changan to Kaifeng and then to Luoyang in the course of two decades must have dissuaded many literati from entering public service, individuals whose families had long lived in the region surrounding Changan. Zhuangzong’s successor, Mingzong, who reigned for nearly eight years, would fare slightly better in terms of the civil service examination output, a sign that conditions of political stability figured prominently in widening the civil service pool.228 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228.

JWDS 32.449; ZZTJ 273.8918. XWDS 43.468–69, 56.643; HR pp. 364–65, 455; ZZTJ 273.8929; CFYG 174.1939. Dengkeji kao, p. 949. Dengkeji kao, pp. 948–49, 951. Zhou, Wudai zhuangyuan, pp. 127–28; ZZTJ 275.8984; Dengkeji kao, pp. 948–52. Dengkeji kao, p. 953. Zhou, Wudai zhuangyuan, p. 121. Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, pp. 143–47.

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The degree-winner to rise highest after the Tongguang reign was Sang Weihan. A man of humble birth, grotesque exterior, and an unfortunate surname that rhymed with “mourning,” he initially received placement at the bottom of the doctoral list, due allegedly to the bias of Chief Examiner Pei Hao. Historically, “character” in the broadest sense was a legitimate consideration in assessing candidates, which might include demeanor or physical traits. Zhuangzong demanded a reexamination and elevated Weihan to second place. A decade later, as chief councilor under the Later Jin dynasty, Weihan proved unmatched in political savvy and ethical will.229 Differences over the ranking of examination candidates lends evidence of ongoing frictions between the monarch and senior courtiers over matters of class, which began with the selection of chief councilors and resurfaced whenever recruitment examinations occurred. But the emperor was on the right side of history.230

Controversial Pardon Despite the monarch’s positive presence at the civil service examinations, the sources detail a number of cases where matters of moral principle received short shrift. On the positive side, in response to the ransacking of the Tang imperial tombs under the previous dynasty, Zhuangzong gave formal expression of outrage over the act, then appointed a commissioner to refurbish the sites and protect them from future sacrilege.231 Public outrage was most impassioned over the plunder of the most resplendent mausoleum in the cluster, the tomb of Tang Taizong. From the tumulus above ground to the floor below, the fifty-feet-deep crypt contained replicas of amenities in life as companions in death: stone boxes stuffed with rare books, paintings, calligraphy, and writing implements, plus multiple stone beds adjacent to the coffin. A succession of hooligans had despoiled the site, but the worst offender was Wen Tao, a protégé of local potentate Li Maozhen.232 Sometime earlier, Tao had rummaged through the underground vaults in Changan’s imperial compound for gold and jade objects.233 Soon after the Later Tang unification, Wen Tao appeared at Luoyang to offer fealty in exchange for immunity from prosecution, reportedly plying palace favorites with bribes. The throne quickly confirmed its pardon as part of the amnesty program, for Tao had apprehended and killed the artist Zhao Yan, an imperial in-law under the Liang with undue clout at court. In the process, Zhuangzong turned a blind eye to

229. Zhou, Wudai zhuangyuan, p. 128; XWDS 29.319; HR p. 239. 230. His successor would similarly place merit before pedigree in the civil service recruitment examination; see Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, pp. 29, 124, 140–47. 231. JWDS 32.444; ZZTJ 273.8918. 232. JWDS 73.961; XWDS 40.441; ZZTJ 268.8741, 272.8906. On the depth of Tang imperial tombs, see ZZTJ 194.6114–15. 233. XWDS 47.522; HR p. 394; Xu Tang shu 40.372–73.

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Tao’s infidelity to the former governor to the west, Li Maozhen, a one-time Jin ally.234 Military Commissioner Guo Chongtao resisted the pardon with characteristic forcefulness: “Tao’s offense against the ancestors of our own dynasty rises to the unpardonable,” he argued. The monarch’s position was not without principle. He had employed successive amnesties in 923 to sway prospective holdouts, a general amnesty at the time of his accession in the fourth month and a minor amnesty, or “imperial grace,” after the occupation of Kaifeng in the tenth month. To single out Wen Tao for exclusion would do grave damage to his own credibility. Yet rumors of bribes to his palace relegated such legitimate issues to the sidelines, Zhuangzong appearing more greedy than principled, more responsive to the inner palace than the outer court.

Hunting and Culture Heightened scrutiny of the emperor’s public actions seemed to coincide with official intrusion into his private life, which proved immensely frustrating for him. He was near the end of a year-long regime of filling offices and erecting institutions, wooing foes and cajoling courtiers—meeting the exacting expectations of Chinese monarchy at a moment seen as historic to all. The strain of office perhaps explains the monarch’s impulse to reconnect with his own cultural roots. Hunting was his favorite pastime, duck and geese his preferred game. A total of twenty-four hunts are on record for Zhuangzong’s reign of three years, an average of eight per year, mostly in the winter months.235 He invariably set out with a sizable staff, plus flocks of hounds and falcons trained for the task.236 As prince, Cunxu seems to have frequented the hunting grounds at Weizhou, the interim capital for nearly eight years, which he revisited for a two-month stay in early 925. But most hunts occurred in Luoyang and environs, which as secondary capital for the past millennium had a plenitude of sites. By the second year of the reign, the winter of 924–25, as the excursions grew in frequency and duration, they mushroomed into a major political concern. And later historians took pains to cite mishaps with the clear intent of censure.237 Many emperors of the preceding Tang dynasty were avid hunters and horsemen, none perhaps more than Taizong, for whom the two skills were indispensable to forming the gentleman-warrior.238 The Kitan ruler Abaoji was equally passionate about hunting.239 But for the Tongguang emperor, the frequency of the events increased 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239.

JWDS 14.195, 73.961. CFYG 115.1261. Mote, Imperial China, p. 46. XWDS 5.48–49; HR pp. 47–48. Zhao, Tang Taizong zhuan, pp. 127, 395–404; ZZTJ 192.6021, 6034; Benn, China’s Golden Age, pp. 171–72. JWDS 137.1831.

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the potential for incidents. During an autumn hunt at Zhongmou, a prefecture east of Luoyang, he and an entourage of thousands trampled upon the crops of farmers. An inflamed local custodian, Luo Guan, intercepted the group and stiffly admonished them.240 The custodian would have been slain for his audacity, if not for the artful maneuvering of actors in the entourage, led by Jing Xinmo, who defused tensions by turning the confrontation into farce. You are county magistrate. How could you possibly be ignorant of our Son of Heaven’s affinity for hunting? To accommodate the galloping steeds of our Son of Heaven, why didn’t you simply starve the people and despoil the lands in your district? Your crimes clearly deserve death!

The actor then proceeded to demand summary death for Luo Guan, causing the emperor to burst into laughter upon realizing that the statements were given in jest. Sadly, Zhuangzong’s relationship with civilian leaders was too new to weather missteps of the sort, which threatened to leave him an enigma to many. There are reports of his father, Keyong, inadvertently trampling the fields of farmers and subsequently expressing remorse, but the son’s angry outbursts suggest an unhealthy sense of entitlement.241 For a Shatuo born to a Chinese mother and raised in Jinyang, Cunxu’s connection to Inner Asian culture was surely more abstract than real, causing the hunt to assume higher symbolism as one of the few residual expressions of ancestral identity. But hunting, a luxury for the Chinese majority, should not impede farming, especially when damage to farms comes at the hands of the Son of Heaven, symbolic guardian of the agrarian state. The founder of the previous Liang dynasty gave expression to his martial persona by reviewing and drilling troops, activities received more favorably by his subjects.242 We have no record of similar exercises by Zhuangzong, surprisingly, in light of a major military deployment on the horizon. Ironically, his successor, Mingzong, hunted with far less frequency, due perhaps to superior confidence in his nomadic identity.243 In the closing months of 924, Zhuangzong hunted in Luoyang’s southern suburbs, the county of Yique, with ten thousand guards, aides, and fellow sportsmen in toe. He felled a large deer at the outset, impressing everyone with his prowess.244 Initially buoyed spirits were dampened, however, when horsemen encircling a mountain at nighttime accidentally plunged to their deaths in a ravine. Rather than suspend the activity as many expected in honor of the dead, Zhuangzong resumed the hunt a day later, instructing bodyguards to split into smaller groups to avoid similar perils. Once

240. 241. 242. 243. 244.

XWDS 37.399; HR p. 311. ZZZTJ 277.9061–62; Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, p. 139. XWDS 2.14–20. Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, pp. 74–75, 106, 139. JWDS 32.443; ZZTJ 273.8927; CFYG 115.1261.

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the game kill for the second day exceeded ten thousand, he felt vindicated, proof that the organization of the activity lies at the heart of the problem, not the activity itself. Upon returning from the second hunt, a rather surreal celebration ensued, a celebration whose resonances with early Tang cannot possibly be sheer coincidence.245 “As they returned to the capital that night, torches along the six major thoroughfares created the lightness of daytime, the monarch dispensing venison to officials in audience a day later.” Yet from the perspective of civilian courtiers, in his affinity for sport the emperor had proven insensitive to the cost of his amusements to persons around him, from bodyguards to ordinary subjects. A wiser man might have confined activities to smaller areas or scaled back his entourage, but the Son of Heaven by custom and necessity did not move in small parties and Zhuangzong, by all indications, relished the social dimension of the hunt, where he was frequently in the company of family and friends as well as numerous colleagues. In any case, such activities were concentrated in the winter months and peaked during the second year of the reign, for leisure would become a scarce commodity by his third year.

The Razing of Accession Altar Perhaps the most impassioned confrontation between Zhuangzong and civilian courtiers as a clash of cultures emanated from the razing of the very altar at which he had acceded to the Later Tang throne less than two years earlier.246 He was in residence at Weizhou in the first month of 925, the first visit to the city since conquering the Liang, when Dingzhou governor Wang Du came for an extended stay. After a lavish feast, the emperor was eager to treat his family friend to polo. The sport had come to China from Inner Asia centuries earlier, only to win a wide acceptance among the upper classes of the northwest to become a bridge between the races.247 With little in the way of forethought, Zhuangzong mandated that the polo field formerly converted to his altar of accession revert back to a polo field. The deputy regent for the prefecture, Zhang Xian, a man with years of service under the Prince of Jin at Weizhou, the same Xian who had suffered the maiming of his family in defying renegades at Zhaozhou, in a similar spirit of righteous candor rendered the following remonstrance: “The accession altar is the venue for inaugurating sovereigns. Indeed, altars south of Hao county for the Han dynasty and Fanyang for Wei rulers survive to this day. Sites of the sort cannot be demolished.” Xian began clearing a separate spot for the activity when the emperor directed his military to level the accession altar forthwith. “No omen is worse than disowning heaven and repudiating your own

245. On early Tang parallels, see ZZTJ 193.6086; Zhao, Tang Taizong zhuan, pp. 401–2. 246. CFYG 111.1207. 247. Benn, China’s Golden Age, pp. 172–73.

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history,” Xian exclaimed to Guo Chongtao in exasperation.248 Chongtao did take the matter up with the throne, but to no avail. The row over the polo field had evolved into a matter of principle for the throne. It seemed inconceivable that a monarch otherwise obsessed with intangible symbols of continuity as pertains to the former Tang could be so cavalier about this very concrete manifestation of such links, inconceivable that he would have such disregard for historical relics. As a longtime resident of Weizhou, Zhuangzong surely had a nostalgic attachment to this particular polo field as place of personal sport and social engagement, an attachment that wholly eluded Zhang Xian. Differences between the city’s deputy regent and the monarch were also informed by conflicts over other matters, as will be shown later.249 Sadly, the monarch all too often overreacted to events. Thus, on the heels of threatening to slay someone for a minor transgression, Zhuangzong received the following rebuke from Meng Zhixiang: “Your Majesty should not murder people at whim, as the fidelity of officers might be at risk!”250 The officer’s words would prove prophetic, but few could afford the candor of Zhixiang, an old family friend.

Alien Rites The accession altar controversy would assume high symbolism because it came as the culmination of a full year of imperial insensitivity to Chinese conventions of politics and faith. In the seventh month of 924, the monarch journeyed to Mount Lei, on the southern edge of Luoyang, “to raise effigies to the Sky God (Tianshen).”251 These are glossed in the relevant histories as “the customs of northerners,” that is, nomadic peoples. Icons like “Father of the Sky” and “Almighty Heaven” figured prominently in imperial practices under Mongol rule centuries later, serving to deify male power.252 In all likelihood, the Shatuo did not create such religious symbols, but merely transmitted them from the past and facilitated their continuation into the future. Worship of gods or spirits must have figured prominently in the pantheistic belief system of the Shatuo, so the rites at Mount Lei connected the monarch to his religious roots in critical ways. But the mixing of different religious traditions was problematic for civilian aides, who saw Zhuangzong as cavalier about his imperial responsibilities. The long trip and the controversial rites came scarcely twenty days after a succession of natural disasters struck Kaifeng. Strong winds in its suburbs had uprooted trees and despoiled local farms, while heavy rains at nearby Caozhou had created water accumulations of several feet.253 This particular act of nature in the first month 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253.

XWDS 28.312; HR p. 237; JWDS 32.445, 69.912; ZZTJ 273.8930. ZZTJ 273.8930. XWDS 26.284. XWDS 5.47; JWDS 32.438. Weatherford, The Secret History of the Mongol Queens, pp. 20–21. JWDS 33.438.

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of 924 had wreaked special havoc by dint of human actions, namely, the rupture of dikes along the Yellow River by retreating Liang armies nearly two years earlier.254 The succession of natural disasters did prompt the palace to inquire further of Chief Councilor Doulu Ge, who commented by stating the obvious: “Floods and droughts are the constant way of Heaven and present no reason for special alarm.”255 As the rain worsened, the Son of Heaven insisted on “placing water at the gates of the capital and praying to Mars,” traditional rites his only recourse in light of the ineptitude of his chief councilors.256 It is confounding that the monarch chose to retain the pair, despite the snowball of frustrations in recent months. In resorting to anachronistic rituals to appease nature, the Historical Records writes, “Zhuangzong proved indifferent to the proper way to counter natural disasters by conveying humility to Heaven and rectifying moral conduct.”257 Contemporary officials and later historians alike believed that natural calamities would cease only when the sovereign turned circumspect in the three overlapping spheres of imperial life—the personal, the political, and the ritual—which were all deficient to some degree in this case. A modest earthquake struck Zhenzhou on the twenty-fourth day of the eleventh month (924.11.24).258 Some days before the event, the emperor bestowed noble titles upon seven concubines, and some days afterward, he departed for a hunt in the western suburbs, activities suggesting insensitivity to the plight of his people.259 Historically, natural calamities often caused governments to issue amnesties as outreach to men forced by circumstance into banditry.260 Curiously, the Tongguang emperor had issued his last amnesty in the second month of 924, before the worst of the natural disasters.261 Successive amnesties were not without controversy, however, as his successor would learn.262

Birthday Festivities The Son of Heaven’s birthday, an empire-wide holiday called “Longevity Day” (Wanshoujie), usually entailed celebrations across the country, and especially the capital as the home of the sovereign and seat of his government. Zhuangzong was born in 885, the twenty-second day of the tenth month (885.10.22), December 2 by the Julian calendar. His birthday a year earlier had occurred just twelve days after Kaifeng changed 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262.

ZZTJ 273.8923. XWDS 28.302; HR p. 231. XWDS 5.48. XWDS 5.48. WDHY 10.131. JWDS 32.443–44. XWDS 57.659–60; HR pp. 465–66. XWDS 5.47. ZZTJ 192.6055; XWDS, 6.66–67; 57.659–60; HR pp. 64, 465–66; Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, pp. 130–31.

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hands, so the birthday of 924, this time in Luoyang, would be a special occasion as the all-important fortieth birthday, the age in the words of Confucius, “when one no longer doubts oneself.” It was also a rare moment of peace at home and abroad. Entertainment by palace actors and musicians apparently kicked off festivities, followed by an imperial tour of the holy Mount Song, adding a spiritual dimension to the celebrations. The site was a popular vacation spot for local luminaries like local governor Zhang Quanyi. The emperor presided over the certification of over one hundred Buddhist monks at the venue. He also took advantage of his presence in the area to dedicate a Daoist altar in the vicinity.263 By year’s end, Zhuangzong conducted “prayers for snow” at the Longmen monastery, with its famed panorama of Buddhist icons etched onto the hillside.264 He seemed intent on exploiting Buddhism and Daoism in equal measure to buttress his own political legitimacy, in the manner of many a Tang predecessor, while adding elements from his own culture’s pantheist past through prayers for snow. Empress Liu’s fervor for Buddhism and the emperor’s eclectic mixing of multiple religions did not bode well for Confucian courtiers of the orthodox sort.265 As he left them behind in the capital to traipse across a vast swathe of suburban Luoyang, courtiers surely lamented the further erosion of their influence as the spiritual horizons narrowed perceptibly for the Emperor of Common Brilliance, a name that had promised inclusion for people across race, class, and more importantly, creed. Two months after his fortieth birthday, Zhuangzong celebrated the birthday of his beloved mother, Empress Dowager Cao, on the second day of the first month (925.01.02). Invitations for the event in the sumptuous Jiaqing Palace went out to an exclusive group of imperial clansmen, and presumably their families, but the short guest list did not include the official rank-and-file nor even friends and relatives of the imperial family.266 The mood on her birthday, her first in the capital, was unusually sedate in light of her advanced years and declining health. Days after her birthday, the emperor departed for Weizhou to begin an extended vacation, where he clashed with officials over his accession altar, as noted earlier. As the second year of Tongguang came to a close, the Son of Heaven had retreated to a smaller circle of wartime companions and palace friends. Indicative of his estrangement from the civilian mainstay is a minor scuffle with officials over palace entertainment. As he imbibed and amused all by recounting a lifetime of battles, Zhuangzong noticed the absence of foster son Yuan Xingqin. Once aides explained that, “only councilors and commissioners received invitations,” he indignantly terminated the gathering and ordered Xingqin’s elevation to honorary councilor. Zhuangzong even paid a 263. 264. 265. 266.

JWDS 32.442. JWDS 32.444. XWDS 14.144; HR pp. 133–34. CFYG 111.1207.

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personal visit to his residence in affirmation of rarified esteem. Hereafter, only military men received invitations to palace banquets, a radical departure from the former Tang, where literati dominated the guest lists.267 The declining presence of civilians in imperial life can be traced to the waning years of Tang, but the Tongguang emperor made no attempt to reverse things. Unfortunately, the disillusionment of courtiers would reverberate elsewhere, including a group indispensable to his survival—the military elite.

Tormented Adopted Brother With the exception of Guo Chongtao, the most valuable martial resource in the early reign was adopted brother Li Siyuan. When a mutiny erupted at Luzhou in the fourth month of 924, Zhuangzong entrusted the suppression to Siyuan and foster son Yuan Xingqin. The mutineers’ ringleader was Yang Li, a former officer under Li Jitao, the Luzhou rebel whom the court had recently executed.268 Commander Yang cited as the reason for his mutiny, “the administration’s policy of assigning local soldiers to remote places,” a complaint of some validity in light of resonances elsewhere, but the death of his patron, Jitao, likely crystallized feelings of alienation.269 The renegades had been suppressed on the eve of Siyuan’s arrival at Luzhou, but he garnered much of the credit during the formal announcement of victory in the capital. Promotion ensued in the sixth month to the governor of Xuanwu, the command centered on Kaifeng; he also acquired oversight over the regime’s elite multi-racial infantry and cavalry. These ethnically diverse units lie at the heart of Shatuo military power, while Kaifeng had been the launching pad to power for the previous dynasty. More by accident than design, Siyuan was positioned too well for the court’s comfort. By 924, the only serious border threat to the Later Tang involved the Kitan, another factor behind Siyuan’s elevated stature.270 Raids along the northeastern border, as early as the third month, continued sporadically over the next half-year. Rather than stand-down the mighty armies of the Middle Kingdom, which had routed them in the recent past, the Kitan concentrated on weaker prey farther north and east of the Great Wall. In this way, a panoply of lesser states largely succumbed to their dominance, with the exception of the coastal kingdom of Parhae (Bohai). The brazen expansion for their northern foe had the effect of isolating the Shatuo from much of Inner Asia, an important factor in their eventual extinction as a people, once booted from the political arena.271

267. 268. 269. 270.

XWDS 25.271; HR p. 227; CFYG 111.1207. XWDS 6.55; HR p. 53; JWDS 31.434, 32.436; ZZTJ 273.8919–23. ZZTJ 273.8919, 273.8922. JWDS 31.430–31, 32.441; ZZTJ 273.8916–17, 273.8928; Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, pp. 36–38. 271. ZZTJ 273.8923.

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With the Shatuo overly invested in the Chinese theater, the Kitan could conduct incursions south of the Great Wall, starting with Youzhou, the former Yan satrapy, in the twelfth month of 924. The veteran Siyuan was tapped to lead the suppression with a force of thirty-seven thousand from the Palace Guard. Despite the gravity of the menace, Siyuan succeeded in repulsing the Kitan in two months to capture over thirty officers.272 Prior to dispatching him northward, the emperor visited his home for a private banquet, their second on record since the accession, likely to discuss border affairs as well as outstanding personal issues.273 Among the private frictions were suspicions with long histories, but worsened by Siyuan’s heightened visibility. After vanquishing the Kitan in early 925, Siyuan faced reassignment to Zhenzhou, an auxiliary capital north of the Yellow River.274 The assignment may have placed him closer to the north, whose lingering volatility was presumably cited in the mandate as cause, but other issues were also at play. By one account, Siyuan had previously requested the reassignment to Jinyang of a foster son to care for family members still there. This minor request was received by the throne with undue cynicism: “Matters of military governance fall within the exclusive purview of the court. How dare he petition on behalf of someone else!” Siyuan attempted a written explanation, which was still being processed by courtiers, or possibly obstructed by mischief-makers, when he requested an audience to set the record straight. Zhuangzong not only declined the request, but he reassigned Siyuan’s foster son to a lesser post elsewhere, a minor petition assuming high symbolism due solely to the involvement of Siyuan. A more serious breach of military protocol emanated from the campaign against the Kitan in early 925. As he departed for the north late in the previous year, Siyuan had distributed among underlings a cache of arms and armor from Weizhou, with assistance from its interim regent Zhang Xian, the same Xian who clashed with the monarch over the razing of his accession altar, two unrelated events.275 The equipment given by Siyuan included five hundred pieces of premium-grade armor, items released without informing overseers in Luoyang as rules required. Once the matter came to the monarch’s attention, he characterized Xian’s conduct as self-serving and reprimanded him by deducting a month’s salary and compelling Xian to retrieve the items from Siyuan.276 Without doubt, Xian’s actions had met with extra scrutiny due to the involvement of the adopted brother. After all, special allocations of armor might have served to buttress the loyalty of senior officers to Siyuan at the expense of the throne. In  this way, Weizhou’s interim regent, Zhang Xian, a persistent critic of the palace, came to be perceived as an enemy. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276.

JWDS 32.444–45. CFYG 111.1207. JWDS 32.445; ZZTJ 273.8930. XWDS 28.312; HR p. 237. ZZTJ 272.8930; XWDS 28.313.

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The bad blood between Siyuan and the monarch had become so apparent that Military Commissioner Guo Chongtao secretly petitioned the palace to recall him forthwith, while reassigning his armies. The mere threat of recall in recent history had driven many commanders to mutiny, for on the heels of discharge was usually banishment or death. Zhuangzong rejected the petition, perhaps for fear of triggering something worse, although one source suggests the naïveté of a lesser man. Chongtao reportedly intimated to a friend his own fear that the emperor did not fully appreciate the threat posed by his adopted brother: “General Commander Siyuan is without peer among the men within the imperial family.” The subtle wording clearly relegates everyone to a lesser peerage, including the Son of Heaven.277 This highly unflattering comment from the Comprehensive Mirror sheds invaluable light on the emotional roller-coaster that informed the dynamic between the two men. Most sources cast Zhuangzong in the image of the jealous sibling whose insecurities singularly inflamed relations, much like the eldest son of the former Tang founder, Li Chengqian. But if suspicions about Siyuan emanate more from Chongtao, then the fluctuating fortunes of Siyuan over the course of the year likely reflect different approaches to handling him at the highest level, the palace and the military commission. In that case, the original curtailing of Siyuan’s powers in early 925 must be the handiwork of Chongtao, while the further expansion of powers months later must have originated with the palace, which elevated Siyuan to commissioner for land and water transportation for the northern front. By the ninth month of 925, the powerful brother could add control over the fiscal machinery for the northeast to the military dominance already achieved as overseer of the armed forces extending from Zhenzhou to Youzhou.278 Such concentrated power left Siyuan, ironically, too valuable to hold back and too dangerous to cast off.

Extravagance and Histrionics Unfortunately, differences over how best to contain Siyuan were not the only points of friction between Guo Chongtao and the throne. The two men had been at loggerheads for more than a year over assorted fiscal indiscretions, beginning with the waiver of outstanding debt by a scurrilous official. The former Liang commander Duan Ning had quickly ingratiated himself with the monarch, “to win his deep affections.” During his subsequent posting as Taining governor, Ning had managed in a single month to divert several hundred thousand strings of cash from local coffers, monies allegedly put to private use.279 Even as his bureaucrats pressed for restitution, the emperor dug in, insisting on forgiving the debt. In waiving restitution, he gave the appearance of 277. ZZTJ 273.8932. 278. JWDS 32.448. 279. XWDS 45.498; HR p. 383; Xu Tang shu 40.372.

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playing favorites, in addition to slighting financial accountability, both recurring problems for his administration. After all, coinciding with the controversial waivers was one unpopular program to generate extra revenues by lending money to the private sector, presumably at inflated interest rates.280 The undertaking suggests that the empire could ill afford the sorts of fiscal indulgences reflected in the Duan Ning case. Tensions with the military commissioner persisted through the early months of 925, mostly over fiscal intemperance and misplaced priorities. The emperor’s impulse to histrionics inspired displays of self-aggrandizing pomp. During the third month, after an extended stay at Weizhou, he visited key Yellow River battle sites on the return leg of his trip, from Desheng command to Yangcun and Qicheng counties, sites still littered with refuse and relics from a decade of warfare. Climbing atop city walls to survey the landscape, he lingered with attendants to savor memories of battles, formations, and strategies. The trip culminated in a grand banquet celebrating the tenth anniversary of Weizhou’s surrender.281 Zhuangzong’s schedule could accommodate theatrics of the sort, yet he and his empress declined to appear at the temple to Keyong for the annual sweeping of the graves. They offered instead symbolic sacrifices in Luoyang’s suburbs and delegated rites at the gravesite in northern Shanxi to several lackeys. Among the worshippers dispatched to the north was a female palace slave, whose abusive treatment of the local prefect would create an ugly altercation. When the prefect justifiably flogged the slave, the throne overreacted by nearly killing the official—another trivial affair turned public relations nightmare.282 The incident converged with an eclipse of the sun, the first in over a decade, but the event did little to chasten the monarch.283 The gambling habits of Cunxu, which as prince created frictions with the eunuch Zhang Chengye, presented similar problems for Guo Chongtao as military commissioner.284 By his own admission, Zhuangzong could wager up to one hundred thousand strings of cash in a single binge of gambling.285 Moreover, he was given to betting on virtually anything. In a wrestling match with foster brother Cunxian in 924, he wagered a governorship, not expecting to lose due to his own formidable skills. The brother’s surprising win prompted an instant posting as governor of Youzhou. “I will not eat my words,” the emperor exclaimed, although the prospect of assigning one of the country’s most strategic districts to the best arm-wrestler surely horrified courtiers.286 Yet bets and gambling habits, as private indulgences, were scarcely visible to ordinary subjects.

280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286.

ZZTJ 273.8919. ZZTJ 273.8932. XWDS 46.512; HR p. 391. WDHY 10.132. XWDS 38.404; HR p. 317. XWDS 28.312; HR p. 237. XWDS 36.395–96; HR p. 308; ZZTJ 273.8917.

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A greater toll on public image came in the form of palaces and towers that began sprouting across the capital mere months after the move to Luoyang.

Skyline Extending to the Heavens By late spring of 925, eunuchs in the imperial compound complained of nighttime noises resembling ghosts, which they attributed to a paucity of humans. “There were at least ten thousand people in the Tang palaces at their peak, from the noble to the ignoble, rooms half-empty today.”287 The characterization of palace life in the former Tang was hardly representative of the period generally, for early rulers had insisted on limiting the size of the harem.288 Ignoring the restraint of wise founders, Zhuangzong emulated monarchs of the waning Tang instead, recruiting a reputed one thousand consorts for his harem, often under conditions of such duress that local officials lodged complaints.289 Apart from encouraging harem growth, key eunuchs lent their backing to the further embellishment of capital grounds, “I recall Changan in its full glory, towered mansions numbering in the hundreds. Today’s palaces compare poorly even to a councilor’s residence of old.”290 As principal capital, Changan had always exceeded Luoyang in size and opulence, and any attempt to replicate it within the confines of Luoyang was sheer folly. But based on misinformation of the sort, Zhuangzong proceeded to erect a tower in the heart of the city, citing the “oppressive summer heat” as cause. He clearly anticipated resistance from Chongtao and dispatched a messenger to neutralize him, writing: Oblivious to bitter cold and sweltering heat, I rode horseback in full armor as we waged war against the Liang at various points along the Yellow River, never once complaining about my toils. But today, these cavernous palaces are sweltering beyond belief.

Zhuangzong had already mobilized construction workers when Chongtao issued the following plea for greater discipline in his personal life: Your Majesty’s heart formerly focused on the welfare of the world, while today you act on personal interest. Naturally, concerns do vary when conditions of idle comfort replace exacting hardship. Your Majesty, I hope, will not trivialize our toil in this enterprise of dynasty. You need merely increase visits north of the river to exchange our dreadful summer heat for the crisp temperatures there.

287. 288. 289. 290.

ZZTJ 273.8932. JTS 2.36. XWDS 37.400; HR p. 312; ZZTJ 273.8932. XWDS 24.248–49; HR p. 216.

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Construction of the tower would continue in the end, the emperor compromising by drawing upon his private treasury to cover the cost of materials.291 But workers conscripted for the project were paid out of state coffers, their numbers reportedly surpassing ten thousand a day. The palace had reduced the affair to a budgetary decision, that is, whether to access the public or private treasury to pay for the tower, failing to appreciate the broader symbolism of frivolous spending. Moreover, complaints about the weather had been rendered mute: replacing the drought conditions of the early summer was a late summer of heavy rain, which persisted for a remarkable seventy-five days!292 Water swelled the Luo River to the point of saturation, seriously damaging a key bridge to the city in the process. Court business was affected, with daily audiences reduced to every three days as officials had to travel by boat to reach the imperial compound.293 Yet construction of the tower continued through the summer deluge. The fight over frivolous spending harkened back to Emperor Yangdi (Yang Guang, r. 604–17), second ruler of the Sui dynasty, who rebuilt the city of Luoyang as secondary capital, sparing no cost.294 With walls spanning thirty kilometers, the city was resplendent in every detail and finally came close to rivaling Changan, a city rebuilt a generation earlier by his predecessor. The bombastic Yangdi composed poems to celebrate the city, acquired hundreds of statues and paintings to fill palace halls, and enlisted legions of musicians and dancers to regale guests.295 Yet the burden of this enterprise and others incited commoners to rebel and soldiers to mutiny mere decades into the dynasty. Founders of the Tang were the ultimate beneficiaries of Yangdi’s excess, rising to power on a wave of popular resistance against him and frolicking in the palaces that he paid for with blood. Three short centuries later, it is difficult to fathom the indifference of the Tongguang emperor as he embellished precisely the spaces that had alienated the people of Sui from their sovereign.

291. 292. 293. 294. 295.

XWDS 24.248–49; HR pp. 216–17; ZZTJ 273.8934. JWDS 32.449; ZZTJ 273.8937. WDHY 11.137. Yuan, Sui Yangdi zhuan, pp. 270–76; Cambridge History of China, Vol. 3, pp. 133–34; ZZTJ 193.6079. Yuan, Sui Yangdi zhuan, pp. 420–35.

4 Raging Tempest

Rulers should refrain from rallying armies out of anger, just as commanders should refrain from deploying forces out of petulance: After all, happiness can return once anger subsides and mirth can be resumed once petulance passes, but life can never be restored to the dead! Sunzi, The Art of War

Ties That Bind Loss of the Consort Dowager For historians of the Five Dynasties, the imperial families generally struck a contemptible image: “their perversion of morality was utterly deplorable,” writes Ouyang Xiu.1 The Liang founder died at the hands of his own bastard son, while acts of fratricide dogged several autonomous states to the south.2 The ethics for the ruling class fell far below the hoi polloi due chiefly to the corrosive effects of power and wealth in tandem. Yet the Shatuo ruling house under Li Keyong lived by moral standards that surpassed even the best polities of the era, at least during his lifetime. Keyong’s widow, the Consort Dowager Liu, perished at Jinyang on the sixth day of the fifth month (925.05.06), just over a year after Empress Dowager Cao had relocated to Luoyang.3 The two women, having lived in close proximity for four decades, enjoyed an epic friendship as reflected in their shared biography in the Historical Records, which turns poetic in depicting their unbreakable bonds: The two dowagers utterly adored one another. The Consort Dowager Liu was in tears in the send-off for Empress Dowager Cao [at Jinyang in 924]. Returning to her own palace, she pined endlessly for the Empress Dowager and eventually could no longer rise from bed. The Empress Dowager wanted to hasten to Jinyang to care for the Consort Dowager, upon learning of her illness, and further sought 1. 2. 3.

XWDS 16.173; HR p. 161. XWDS 13.136–38, 65.809–19, 68.845–54; HR pp. 126–28, 535–47, 573–84. XWDS 5.49, 14.141–43; HR pp. 48, 130–32; JWDS 32.448.

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to attend the funeral when her death was confirmed. A tearful Zhuangzong implored her against it, as did a succession of officials, so she stayed behind.4

Their relations were never dogged by the usual jealousies between a ruler’s legal wife and his consort, especially when the consort can produce male heirs that the wife cannot, and Woman Cao proved highly fecund. The paragraph above from the Historical Records attributes the Widow Liu’s yearlong illness to a longing for her friend, while another source, the Comprehensive Mirror, reveals the “unshakably dour spirits” of Dowager Cao after relocation to Luoyang, affirming the reciprocity of affections between the women, the older Widow Liu dying of loneliness as much as advanced age.5 Dowager Cao had dispatched a succession of imperial doctors to Jinyang, intent on slowing the physical decline of her friend, then insisted on going personally to retrieve the Widow Liu as news arrived of her further deterioration. “The Widow Liu has treated me with the charity of a sibling,” Dowager Cao exclaimed in a poignant entreaty to her son. He cited poor weather and road conditions in dissuading his mother from taking the trip. Senior officials similarly implored Dowager Cao to forgo travel, undoubtedly at the emperor’s prompting. The palace compromised by directing imperial brother Cunwo to retrieve Widow Liu, but even before he could leave the capital, word of her death arrived. Again, the emperor’s inner circle acted in concert to dissuade Dowager Cao from performing rites at Jinyang or attending the final interment at Weizhou. The monarch also failed to appear at his stepmother’s funeral. The royal family elected instead to preside over a memorial service for the Widow Liu at Luoyang, while the palace announced a suspension of court business for the next five days.6 Conspicuously missing was the donning of mourning apparel by the stepson as required by Chinese convention. The decision to bury her at the auxiliary capital of Weizhou, not alongside her husband at Daizhou, is equally baffling in light of the Widow’s expressed desire for interment with Keyong two years earlier. Neither was Woman Liu afforded the usual posthumous title of honor (shi), a curious slight that cannot be attributed to simple distraction.7 Sources provide no explanation for the monarch’s coldness of heart, but the intimacy between his mother and his stepmother may have stoked subliminal jealousies in the son, in light of his own unique attachment to his mother. An emotional triangle might also explain the son’s insistence on relocating Dowager Cao to the capital scarcely a month after his own move to Luoyang, effectively separating her from the sole rival for his affections.

4. 5. 6. 7.

XWDS 14.142–43; HR p. 132; JWDS 49.672. ZZTJ 273.8933. JWDS 32.448; ZZTJ 273.8933. XWDS 14.142. Widow Liu’s title of honor came in 940 under the Later Jin dynasty, reflecting the high regard of Shi Jingtang, a Jinyang native and Shatuo ethnic; see WDHY 1.13.

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Death of Dowager Cao Zhuangzong clearly held conflicted feelings for his stepmother, but exacting posthumous revenge only left his biological mother aggrieved beyond measure. She died two months later, the eleventh day of the seventh month (925.07.11).8 “The Consort Dowager Liu’s passing had left the Dowager Cao’s too bereaved to eat or drink for weeks,” according to multiple accounts of her demise.9 As a woman likely shy of sixty, she surely suffered from the usual maladies of age. The monarch insisted upon staying in close proximity to his mother since his return from Weizhou at the end of the third month, with no record of the usual athletic activities, prolonged trips, or even banquets with intimates.10 The sudden change in imperial behavior suggests that Mother Cao’s health had visibly declined. Adopted brother Siyuan pleaded to visit Dowager Cao when news of her illness spread, perhaps prompted by his senior consort, who shared a common surname. The palace spurned the request without further elaboration.11 Despite a two-month decline in health and the opportunity it presented to anticipate the end, the death of Dowager Cao still devastated her son. “It took five days for the sovereign to resume eating,” the Comprehensive Mirror writes.12 And he insisted on conforming to the most rigorous standards of mourning to honor his blood mother in death: The Monarch donned mourning garments at the Longevity Palace on the twelfth day. The official rank-and-file, after organizing under screens before the Longevity Palace to pay respects before her coffin, then appeared in full formation before the Imperial Audience chamber to extend condolences.13

Zhuangzong would suspend court business for seven full days, two days more than the honor for Widow Liu, while waiting twenty-five days to finally shed mourning garments. He also advanced the schedule for the daxiang rites, an event that usually occurs two years after an imperial death, where the tablet for a deceased kinsman is placed in the Ancestral Temple for the dynasty.14 By early Tang practice, the most rigorous regime of parental mourning for a reigning emperor was twenty-seven days, so the monarch came close to meeting these exacting standards.15 In the interim, he had to limit bodily grooming and forgo fine food, while abstaining entirely from alcohol, amusements, and sports.

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

ZZTJ 273.8935. XWDS 14.142; HR p. 132; JWDS 49.672; ZZTJ 273.8933. JWDS 32.448–49. JWDS 35.487; XWDS 6.55; HR p. 53; Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, pp. 41–42. ZZTJ 273.8935. JWDS 33.453. WDHY 8.97. Tang hui yao 38.688.

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The official rank-and-file appeared at Longevity Palace, Dowager Cao’s former residence and now a funeral parlor, for another round of condolences.16 Zhuangzong apparently did not leave the palace, or at least the residential sections of the imperial compound, for the duration of his twenty-five days of mourning. He postponed court business irrespective of import, citing, “distractions occasioning the Empress Dowager Cao’s death.”17 It was his most endearing moment, the Son of Heaven as the supremely filial son humanized by a familiar loss. The moment also involved a memorable contrast: seventeen years earlier in the wake of his father’s death, he unleashed a sortie against the father’s nemesis, directing his grief outward and channeling it constructively. Bereavement for his mother would fester within as suppressed rage in search of an outlet. Sadly, he seems to have forgotten the famous adage from the Classic on Filial Piety. “Fulfilling filial duty involves bequeathing to posterity an honorable name while giving glory to one’s parents.”18 His subsequent actions achieved the opposite as disservice to her memory. The final interment of Dowager Cao, posthumously honored as the “Chaste and Austere” (Zhenjian) Empress Dowager, came three months after her death. Finding an auspicious day for burying royalty commonly takes many weeks and occasionally months. Additional time was needed to erect a mausoleum of appropriate grandeur for the grandmother of the empire, and unlike the early Tang, imperial mausoleums in the Five Dynasties were rarely constructed before death, due to the dire finances and short lives of most regimes. The issue of location proved more complicated still, and surprisingly, a matter not addressed prior to death, at least not publically. The emperor initially preferred as final resting place near his father’s burial place in northern Shanxi, likely the preference of Dowager Cao as a native of nearby Jinyang. Tentative plans for interment there might also explain the decision to bury the Widow Liu at Weizhou, releasing her space in the mausoleum at Daizhou for the consort-turned-empress. The burial preferences of mother and son were soon jettisoned after the SecretariatChancellery invoked universal kingship in arguing for interment near Luoyang: “The ruler of men regards the entire Four Corners as his home, without distinguishing north and south.”19 The secretary noted the historic importance of Luoyang as seat of former dynasties and the site of countless tombs, while citing the inconvenience of traveling long distances to perform regular rites. He further pointed to the Northern Wei dynasty (386–535), founded by the Tuoba Turks, who preferred burial sites near Luoyang over their base in Shanxi. Once persuaded to bury Dowager Cao at Luoyang, the throne arranged for Zhang  Quanyi, now a close family friend, to oversee the clearing of obstacles along 16. 17. 18. 19.

JWDS 33.454. XWDS 56.643; HR p. 455. Xiao Jing, Chap. 1. WDHY 4.55; JWDS 33.458.

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the road to the tomb site.20 The decision reveals much of the unique bonding between mother and son: for the sake of his own proximity to her remains, the emperor would forever separate Dowager Cao from her ancestral home and her lifelong companions in Shanxi. The decision also highlights Zhuangzong’s obsession with placing the Later Tang within the mainstream of dynasties to govern the Central Plains, the interment of his mother at Luoyang proof of the permanence of his family’s presence in the historic heartland. Presumably, he and a profusion of heirs would someday join her in these august hills, Dowager Cao reigning from a place of deserved prominence. Such long-term concerns about legacies would coincide with momentary passions of loss to turn the seventh month of 925 into a veritable nightmare for the emperor. Preceding his mother’s passing were weeks of badgering rainstorms, as noted in the preceding chapter. Water levels had surged to nearly twenty feet in spots, the walls of some towns in the northwest unable to contain the torrents as dikes at nearby rivers ruptured in rapid succession.21 The rains persisted through several more weeks of rigorous mourning, rains that had the potential of slowing progress on tomb construction. Officials petitioned for the Son of Heaven’s return to court initially three days after his mother’s death and again on the seventh day. The pleas still served as protocol at this stage, though not for long. Invasion of the Shu kingdom to the southwest, a mission deferred for two years under official pressure, had moved from planning in the spring to mobilization by late summer—the sort of task that usually invigorates the warriorking now seemed a mere distraction.

Invective against Luo Guan Zhuangzong’s first trip after a month-long isolation was to the mausoleum’s construction site at Shou’an, a county southwest of the capital and situated along the Luo River. The short trip of thirty to forty kilometers was dogged by mudslides related to the unseasonably wet weather, which set the stage for an ugly confrontation with a local administrator. The emperor was in no state to confront the finality of his mother’s death, which explains the senseless rage that befell Luo Guan, the county custodian whose minor oversight did not warrant the wrath that befell him. The event and ensuing exchange with Guo Chongtao is cited in the Historical Records as emblematic of the lapses in judgment and self-control that cost the monarch dearly in political image: During a trip to the mausoleum construction site, the emperor encountered mud obstructions on the highway and a collapsed bridge, querying as he stopped his carriage, “Who has authority here?” Eunuchs indicated the custodian of Henan county. Zhuangzong promptly summoned Luo Guan, who responded upon 20. JWDS 33.453. 21. JWDS 33.454–55.

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arriving, “Your Subject received no advance notice, so inquiry of the relevant supervisor is in order.” But the emperor rejoined, “This is your jurisdiction. Why must I speak to someone else?” Guan was imprisoned and beaten so badly by jailors that his body had no skin intact. The palace authorized his death a day later. In admonishing the throne, Chongtao argued, “Luo Guan committed no crime besides neglecting the condition of a single bridge access, which the law does not punish with death.” Zhuangzong was adamant, “Despite the impending passage of the funeral cortege for the Empress Dowager Cao, plus multiple trips by the Son of Heaven beforehand, Guan allowed the bridge to stand in disrepair. To suggest the absence of a crime can only reflect your own partisan proclivities!” Chongtao [refused to relent], adding, “Even allowing for Guan’s guilt, penal authorities should have been allowed to apply the appropriate ordinances. In an act of fury, Your Majesty has brought down the awesome powers of monarchy upon a single county administrator, causing people of the world to consider Your Majesty unfair in enforcing the laws, responsibility for which must ultimately rest with me.”22

Chongtao continued the exchange precisely as Zhuangzong headed for his palace, slamming the door behind him and refusing to be swayed. Luo Guan was executed on the twenty-third day of the eighth month (925.08.23), five weeks after the death of Mother Cao, his corpse hung from the gates of his office as a lesson to others.23 Zhuangzong’s urgency in sentencing the custodian would cause others to question not just his judgment, but motivation. To be sure, the death sentence for Luo Guan did not fit the crime of negligence, as  Guo Chongtao observes, so later historians have looked to ulterior motives to explain the monarch’s rage, including networks of corruption across the capital. According to the Historical Records, Zhang Quanyi, the influential Luoyang governor, “had possessed an old network of cronies, men who engaged in illegal practices to the material benefit of Quanyi,” a network originating in the late Tang that continued into the Five Dynasties.24 As a county administrator in the same district, Luo Guan refused to cooperate and instead assisted Chongtao in thwarting the profiteering of the governor’s cronies while uprooting their patronage schemes. “Whenever eunuchs and actors approached Luo Guan with requests, the letters would pile on his desk without a single response. He showed them to Chongtao instead, who repeatedly exposed their machinations.”25 In the end, Quanyi succeeded in circumventing the military commissioner through his personal links to the palace, and especially the Middle Palace of Empress Liu, his goddaughter. By this argument, Zhuangzong was merely waiting for the chance to eliminate an impediment to corruption, his indignation over the bridge either wholly contrived 22. 23. 24. 25.

XWDS 24.249; HR pp. 217–18; JWDS 71.943. JWDS 71.942–43; ZZTJ 273.8935–36. XWDS 24.249; HR p. 217; JWDS 63.843. XWDS 24.249; HR p. 217; JWDS 71.942–43.

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or inflamed by intimates. The charge of “partisanship” leveled against Chongtao for defending Luo Guan infers imperial suspicions of favoritism based on political allegiances. Nonetheless, it is unfair to understate the rage caused by events in the monarch’s personal life—parental loss can often trigger irrational behavior as it confronts middle-aged children with their own mortality. For a heavy drinker and border alcoholic, the sudden abstention stipulated by mourning rules surely complicated matters of temperament, which had proven imperfect under the best of circumstances. Cited in the previous chapter is an incident where Cunxu nearly killed the county custodian of Zhongmou after being admonished for damaging farmlands during a hunt.26 The events at Zhongmou and Luoyang suggest a pattern of behavior unrelated to imperial vice, but rather a temper with a loose trigger. By the time of Dowager Cao’s final interment, Chongtao had left the capital on assignment. It would otherwise have been an awkward moment for the two men to share the same space as they parted with the sole person able to save the Tongguang emperor from himself.

The Middle Palace Sensitivity to Social Origins Contributing significantly to the monarch’s dwindling confidence in Guo Chongtao was precisely the woman, ironically, whose elevation to empress he had endorsed a year earlier. She proved another strong-willed person in a palace with no shortage of these, her political and personal conduct part of the lore of the era. Inasmuch as historical work on the reign began under Zhuangzong’s successor, who needed sufficient cause to justify his purge, embellishment and distortion are inevitable.27 Yet the picture retains value as the basis for judgment on the entire reign, and Empress Liu’s imprint is everywhere. Empress Liu surely had the humblest background relative to the other known consorts of Cunxu and his father, which created special sensitivities. Her father was a medicine man from a county near Weizhou with grey beard, someone gifted at fortunetelling who lost her around six sui in the turmoil of a raid on the region by Li Keyong. Shatuo armies subsequently carted her off to Jinyang, where she rose from palace maid to royal consort. Sometime after the Jin acquired Weizhou, her father learned that his daughter was alive and indeed favored in the palace, so he proceeded to the prefectural headquarters to pay his respects, surely expecting a tearful reunion. The identity of Mountain Man Liu had been confirmed independently by Cunxu, who located an officer involved in the action two decades earlier. But Consort Liu had expended considerable effort in reinventing herself as the orphan of a man of stature and deemed her position as consort too precarious to embrace this stark reminder of her past. So, she excoriated the old man in tattered clothes: 26. XWDS 37.399; HR p. 311. 27. Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, pp. 134–35.

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I recollect in large measure the circumstances surrounding my departure from the countryside: my father’s tragic death in a mutiny, as I wept uncontrollably over his corpse before being dragged away by Jin armies. How dare this farm-patch peon insinuate anything else by appearing here?

Guards promptly seized the man for conveyance to headquarters, where a flogging with light rod ensued.28 Any discussion of Consort Liu’s background was now taboo, a minefield that even her husband learned to tread lightly. Making banter of his consort’s super-sensitivity to background and obvious lies about it, Cunxu recruited son Jiji for a palace prank befitting the actor within. The event apparently occurred sometime after the medicine man’s appearance at Weizhou. Dressed in clothing like the old man, Cunxu carried a purse of milfoils in one arm and a satchel of medicines in the other as he entered the family residence, Jiji following on his heels with a tattered cap in hand. Father and son proceeded to the women’s quarters to announce, “Mountain Man Liu comes to visit his daughter.” Peals of laughter instantly erupted among servants in the residence, none more than Cunxu. But Woman Liu summarily flogged her son with a light rod before sending him off, a scene reminiscent of Consort Cao’s flogging of Cunxu years earlier.29 Corporal punishment was surely unwarranted for a juvenile prank, but it placed potential mimickers on alert to steer clear of any unflattering allusions to the Consort’s background. Her humble origins would shape Consort Liu in other ways.

Sway over Fiscal Affairs Consort Liu’s propensities for hoarding objects or profiteering from the people is often attributed to her humble beginnings, a curious attribution in light of a life lived with relative security as a servant in Li Keyong’s household since childhood. The rich can hoard as well: the mother of Li Jitao, Woman Yang, amassed fabulous wealth in her day, although she spent liberally on bribes to shield her family from the vicissitudes of politics.30 Consort Liu lacked Woman Yang’s political sensitivities, but also her circumspection in the methods by which she amassed her fortune. Before her ascent as empress, Consort Liu devised one scheme at Weizhou of unleashing cronies onto marketplaces to sell such inconsequential items as firewood, straw, and fruit and vegetables on behalf of the government in order to manipulate commodity prices in its favor. Her efforts gave the appearance of being petty and intrusive, conduct more bizarre than illegal.31 But another fiscal practice emerging from the Tongguang reign would impact upon her husband’s administration in unforeseen 28. 29. 30. 31.

XWDS 14.143–44; HR p.133; Beimeng suoyan 18.332–33; ZZTJ 270.8821. XWDS 37.398; HR p. 310; Beimeng suoyan 18.333. XWDS 36.388; HR p. 300. JWDS 94.1246; ZZTJ 273.8916.

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ways.32 The Historical Records contains a fascinating anecdote pertaining to Empress Liu’s effective check on government spending, “All tributary assessments from the four corners were divided in half, one portion going to the Son of Heaven and the other to the Middle Palace of the empress, where commodities were piled high like a hill.”33 As prince, Cunxu had created his own private cache (neifu), as noted in the preceding chapter, “diverting tribute from governors across the country to his own treasury.” Empress Liu went one step further by claiming one-half of the governors’ tribute for the Middle Palace.34 The reserve for the two palaces must have grown appreciably after the southern states began tendering tribute in 924. The notion of separate treasuries for emperor and empress originated with Empress Liu, sources say, to facilitate the building of her own networks. But the frivolous spending habits of Cunxu as prince are amply documented, habits that may have compelled his wife to create stockpiles beyond his reach. And as later events will demonstrate, Zhuangzong had little sense of the size of her personal privy, due to Empress Liu’s exclusive access. The matter of separate treasuries ultimately proved less problematic than the exercise of discretionary control by the Empress, who evinced consistently bad judgment in releasing funds. Another practice emanating from the Middle Palace that served to bridle the monarch and monitor business beyond the palace involved issuing “directives” ( jiaoming), literally “palace guidances.” Conveyed mostly to Empress Liu’s inner circle of eunuchs, associates, or family members, the directives might solicit information or command agents to take action.35 A guidance from the empress was not binding in the manner of an imperial decree, but it could achieve the same result in the hands of the right surrogate. More importantly, the practice allowed Empress Liu to act independently of bureaucratic processes and even her own husband. This is another practice where outcome, positive or negative, hinges wholly upon personal judgment. A generation earlier, Mother Cao had employed a similar apparatus to advise and consult her son in the field with no indication of ill-effect, whereas a generation later royal women wreaked havoc in the Shu kingdom through privileged communications.36

Purging Rivals Empress Liu’s formal investiture in early 924, rather than ameliorate her insecurities, actually heightened the need to be proactive about eliminating potential rivals. In this

32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

Beimeng suoyan 18.332–33; JWDS 49.674; Xu Tang shu 35.325. XWDS 14.144; HR pp. 133–34. JWDS 34.475, 104.1381. XWDS 14.144. ZZTJ 270.8842–43.

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way, she kept constant vigil over her husband’s affairs with other women, especially women of his growing harem. Sometime after her installation as empress, she accompanied the monarch to a banquet for Yuan Xingqin, a foster son then leading a key bodyguard contingent. In the course of conversation, the monarch expressed condolences for the loss of his wife, then added in perfunctory fashion: “Let me know if you plan to remarry, so that I might lend assistance.” Empress Liu sat in close proximity, alongside a concubine of immense beauty. The woman had also produced a son, further reason for Empress Liu to facilitate an early purge. The Empress interjected, pointing to the concubine, “If Your Majesty genuinely pities Xingqin, why not relinquish her?” Caught unawares, Zhuangzong could scarcely decline. Xingqin rushed forward with prostrations of gratitude as porters transported the woman to the commander’s residence, allowing no time for second thoughts. “For days, the despondent sovereign refused food on the pretext of illness,” it is said, reflecting the strength of his attachment to the beauty.37 Orchestrating so handily the purge of the mother of an imperial son must have been emotionally empowering for Empress Liu at the moment, but her actions effectively castrated her spouse in the full view of male friends. The story highlights Empress Liu’s deftness at exploiting social events in and away from the capital to protect her own interests. Contrary to popular perception, banter at banquets likely served as mere cover for a range of other activities conducted on behalf of the Middle Palace.

Religious Piety Empress Liu exerted additional influence over her husband through religion. Sources characterize the monarch as increasingly drawn to Buddhism over the course of the reign as a consequence of her pious example. Despite the wide appeal of the religion within the wider Shatuo population, Zhuangzong’s personal faith is difficult to document, as he continued to practice assorted pagan rites even as Son of Heaven.38 He was far from a purist. Empress Liu went beyond mere piety in her private life to favor Buddhism in her role as a public figure, “lavishing grand feasts and exquisite gifts upon her favorite monks and nuns.” She also extended courtesies to individual clerics that violated imperial protocol, if not dynastic law.39 Sometime in 924, when a foreign monk arrived from Khoten (Yutian), he was greeted with bows from the emperor, empress, and several imperial sons, including Jiji. The spectacle of the entire imperial family prostrating themselves before a commoner, and a foreigner no less, was simply 37. XWDS 14.145; HR p. 134; JWDS 70.926; Xu Tang shu 35.325. One source gives the sixth month for the event; see ZZTJ 273.8923. 38. XWDS 14.144; HR p. 134; Eberhard, Conquerors and Rulers, pp. 146–47. On the religious eclecticism of his successor, see Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, p. 138. 39. XWDS 14.144; HR p. 134.

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beyond the pale for most courtiers, as it demeaned the institution of monarchy. The substantial traveling expenses of the monk and his entourage to sacred sites at Wutai Mountain, in northern Shanxi, came out of government coffers as well, despite explicit rules against the practice. Another breach of imperial protocol came in early 925, when Zhuangzong was vacationing at Weizhou and chose to escort back to Luoyang another esteemed cleric, Chenghui. Two years earlier, Chenghui had figured prominently in discovering the Tang imperial seals, a critical step in the the formal launching of the Later Tang dynasty, so the emperor felt indebted to the monk at a personal level. Upon arriving at Luoyang, the entire imperial family appeared to receive the cleric, “greeting Chenghui with bows, even as he sat erect without rising.”40 And the example of deference set by the imperial family inspired, “literati of every station to follow suit in prostrating themselves before the monk.” In Tang times, a handful of esteemed clerics might have been exempted from the mandatory kowtow in the presence of the monarch, but Zhuangzong went a step further by privileging the monk to a bow from the Son of Heaven—perhaps the most egregious breach of imperial protocol since the accession.41 The ever-circumspect Guo Chongto singularly refused to bow before Chenghui, sources say, without further elaboration. But clearly, differences on issues ranging from religion to finances to family contributed in a cumulative way to the worsening of relations between Chongtao and the palace over the course of 925. Admittedly, few of Empress Liu’s activities were illegal or immoral, but objectionable behavior in its totality served to undermine the administration within the all-important cultural establishment.

Shu Campaign Background Empress Liu would also play a pivotal role in the campaign against Shu, the most important military initiative since the conquest of Kaifeng. If successful, it promised to legitimize the empire politically while stabilizing its finances. After all, Shu contained an area roughly one-quarter the size of the Later Tang at the time, a standing army of at least eighty thousand, stupendous wealth as the center of tea and silk production, plus sizable deposits of precious metals, including gold.42 It was only a matter of time before any unifier of the north moved covetously against it, although the government in Luoyang acted sooner than expected.

40. XWDS 14.144; ZZTJ 273.8933. 41. ZZTJ 252.8185–86. 42. Schafer, Golden Peaches of Samarkand, pp. 195–204, 250–54; Lewis, China’s Cosmopolitan Empire, pp. 141–44.

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Since the mission of envoy Li Yan to Chengdu in early 924, the satrap Wang Yan had anticipated Tang expansion and prepared defenses by garrisoning troops at border crossings.43 The precautions were largely suspended by year’s end, in the wake of ambassadorial exchanges between the two capitals, exchanges where Luoyang must have pledged to continue the status quo, intent on luring Chengdu into complacency.44 The Tongguang emperor’s designs on the region had not changed in the least, however, the words of his former ambassador, Li Yan, still ringing in his ears: “Once our majestic armies approach its borders, the regime will collapse in a landslide.”45 The lethal mix of a decadent rule at the top, craven armies in the middle, and a disaffected populace below made for the unique vulnerability of Shu, in the mindset of northern strategists. The kingdom also suffered from generally poor relations with neighboring states to the east, Nanping and Chu, leaving few allies to summon in an emergency. Hostility characterized relations with the Middle Kingdom as well, originally the Liang and now the Later Tang. In effect, the immense size and natural endowments of Sichuan had fostered an imperious indifference in the conduct of border affairs.

Strategy and Leadership In the sixth month of 925, the administration ordered the augmenting of warhorse stocks across the north and reduced the quota for horses supplied to bureaucrats in the capital to one per official, which implies a higher allocation in the past. The directive gave evidence of a major military mobilization underway, but with several potential targets and no sign of special designs upon the southwest.46 The declaration of war came on the tenth day of the ninth month (925.09.10), issued certainly in secret to retain the element of surprise. The timing in early autumn managed to avoid the notorious humidity of Sichuan’s summers as well as winter conditions in the region’s high-elevation passes. Tang strategists chose to forgo a possible alliance with Nanping, as proposed originally by Gao Jixing. His offer in the capital in 923 was never genuine in any event, while the palace’s plot against him in the wake of his audience had shut the door to further collaboration. Moreover, a separate thrust from Nanping ran the risk of alerting the enemy to the advance of Tang armies from other fronts. As for cause for war, the Later Tang government cited the arrogant disregard for sovereigns of the Central Plains: the rude treatment of Jin envoys to Shu during the times of Keyong and offenses against the former Tang dynasty extending back still farther.47 By citing the historic roots of Shu’s belligerency, Luoyang could cloak its cam43. ZZTJ 273.8918, 8924. On the fall of Wang Yan, see Wang, Power and Politics in Tenth-Century China, pp. 228–41; Dudbridge, A Portrait of the Five Dynasties, pp. 124–43. 44. ZZTJ 273.8924–28. 45. ZZTJ 273.8921. 46. JWDS 32.449; WDHY 12.158. 47. JWDS 33.455–57. On the declaration of war, see Wang, Power and Politics in Tenth-Century China, p. 239.

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paign in the trappings of justice—a punitive action on behalf of the ancestors—not a hegemonic grab for power and riches. No doubt, some optimists hoped that the conquest of Sichuan might sufficiently dispirit other autonomous states in the south to produce a grand unification of the Four Corners under the Later Tang banner, much like the collapse of Kaifeng had triggered the speedy defection of one-time Liang surrogates in the heartland. The court also announced the roster of leaders for the Shu campaign: imperial son Jiji as general commander, Guo Chongtao as chief commissioner for bandit suppression, and Public works minister Ren Huan as adjutant.48 The latter, a Chinese civilian with extensive experience in military affairs, also happened to have a sister-in-law who was a niece of Li Keyong, personal factors that augmented the court’s confidence in him.49 With the imperial son likely in his teens and Ren Huan serving as civilian consultant, Chongtao enjoyed a veritable monopoly on decision-making in the field. Zhuangzong had originally proposed commanding the venture in person in the manner of Taizong during the Tang consolidation. But Taizong had mostly campaigned against the north and east, not the geographically insular southwest. Moreover, official opposition to imperial expeditions tended to be vigorous for most periods, for the political risks of an imperial absence from the heartland far outweighed the possible benefits of his presence in the field.50 After all, the hinterland in Later Tang times contained dozens of turncoat governors at large and commanders in the field with dubious devotion to the court, while the Kitan continued to menace the northern border. The commissioning of Chongtao is intriguing in light of his advanced age, limited experience in commanding armies, and more importantly, the recent spate of conflicts with the palace. Cynics might view the assignment as a maneuver by foes to expedite his exit from metropolitan office. More likely, a process of elimination occurred. The palace had briefly considered Duan Ning, the former Liang commander, but Chongtao resisted the assignment of the mission to an eleventh-hour defector with little backbone.51 Adopted brother Siyuan seemed the favorite of military officers in recognition of his inspired role in the Kaifeng conquest. However, Chongtao deemed him too valuable an asset in securing the northern border. The military commissioner’s ongoing suspicions of the loyalties of Siyuan also worked against his deployment in the remote southwest. The notion of investing nominal powers as general commander to the imperial prince originated with Chongtao, seen as a way to impart martial credentials to future leaders in the manner of early Tang emperors as well as successive

48. On the Shu campaign, see XWDS 14.153–55, 24.250–51; HR pp. 142–45, 218–19; JWDS 33.455–57, 57.768–69, 67.895, 70.929–31, 74.967–70, 95.1266; ZZTJ 273.8936–37. 49. Ren Huan’s brother, Ren Tuan, was married to the niece of Li Keyong; see Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, p. 29. 50. On official opposition to Taizong’s military campaigns, see ZZTJ 197.6216–17. 51. JWDS 73.963.

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Shatuo princes. A highly reticent Zhuangzong initially resisted until Chongtao agreed to assume personal oversight.52 The monarch’s direct involvement in selecting the leadership of the Shu campaign is confirmed by his own utterances. As he feted senior officers at the Jiaqing Palace on the eve of their departure and raised his goblet in celebration, Zhuangzong minced no words in stipulating the supreme powers of Chongtao: “Jiji has a negligible grasp of military affairs, but you have long assisted me in battle. Thus, campaign-related decisions will be left entirely to your discretion.”53 In another context some months earlier, when Chongtao admitted to his own limited experience as field commander, the monarch reminded him, “A hundred battles pale in comparison to your feats as facilitator of imperial ambitions.”54 In effect, able commanders abound, but men adroit at both strategizing and logistics are a rare asset and Zhuangzong considered Chongtao peerless in this regard. The insular conditions of Shu would necessitate sweeping discretionary powers for the campaign’s overseer, so personal trust was a key consideration in the selection. With such supreme powers came the far weightier responsibility of securing the safety of the heir to the throne, a youth never separated from parents for any length of time. The presence of royalty on the campaign would elevate the stakes more than anyone could have imagined.

Deployment of Armies Later Tang armies left the capital on the eighteenth day of the ninth month (925.09.18), a force of sixty thousand, heading westward for Changan and then Dasan Pass in a trek of over five hundred kilometers before the turn southward. Roughly a week earlier, more importantly, an advance force of three to five thousand horsemen and ten thousand infantry had been deployed under the command of Kang Yanxiao, the prominent Liang turncoat, and Li Yan, the former envoy to Shu with knowledge of local conditions and personalities.55 The ranks of advance armies swelled further at Changan, where local leaders Zhang Yun and Wang Sitong lent their own expertise, manpower, and materiel.56 The main army of sixty thousand had left Luoyang with ten days of rations, scarcely enough to penetrate the Shu periphery, in the expectation that capitulating cities en route to Chengdu would welcome them as liberators and surrender rations of their own volition. This was clearly the case at Fengxiang, where the presiding governor Li Jiyan threw his local clout and resources behind campaigners from the north.57 The 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57.

XWDS 24.250; HR p. 218; ZZTJ 273.8936–37; Zhao, Tang Taizong zhuan, pp. 366–87. JWDS 57.769; CFYG 111.1207. ZZTJ 273.8931. JWDS 70.930; ZZTJ 273.8938. XWDS 47.522; HR p. 394; JWDS 33.458, 65.868; ZZTJ 273.8938. XWDS 14.153; HR p. 142; ZZTJ 273.8939.

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presumption of no serious opposition involved enormous risk, although strategists in Luoyang were surely familiar with the adage from the Art of War, “a single bushel of food from the enemy is the equivalent of twenty bushels of our own.”58 For campaigns across long distances, transportation costs become prohibitive due to a combination of spoilage and plunder, so the level of provisioning had to be carefully calculated to permit a shift to local suppliers as soon as possible. The steady advance of expeditionary forces was further aided by the Shu potentate himself, Wang Yan, then on an outing some distance from Chengdu. He would return upon learning of the presence of foreign troops on Shu soil, but his absence afforded expeditionary forces precious time to penetrate the border with little organized resistance—a stroke of very good luck. Northern campaigners enjoyed many advantages, but none like the element of surprise. Weiwucheng was the first town south of the border to fall to Kang Yanxiao’s advance regiments, its military leaders relinquishing arms on the nineteenth day of the tenth month (925.10.19).59 Yanxiao promptly released over ten thousand surrendering warriors as incentive for others to submit and retained local commanders in their posts for purposes of continuity—modus operandi almost certainly formulated by the court beforehand. In succession, clusters of cities and towns extending from the border to a hundred kilometers into the Shu interior capitulated on short order, with some local armies facilitating the passage of northern troops.60 The largest armed resistance occurred at Sanquan county (Xingyuan prefecture), on the twenty-sixth day (925.10.26), which Yanxiao suppressed to claim five thousand heads.61 The main armies led by Jiji and Chongtao met with minimal resistance for a single reason: the effectiveness of Yanxiao’s advance teams. Better still, provisions started to surface in such abundance that Chongtao could press forward without commandeering food, which ran the risk of alienating locals.62 By the end of the tenth month, reports from Sichuan had surpassed all expectations. “In the pacification of Shu, the feats of Yanxiao were innumerable,” Ouyang Xiu concludes in the Historical Records, a serious understatement of the yeoman feats of Yanxiao.63

Key Lieutenants Aside from the adroit actions of the Later Tang vanguard, the initial success of the Shu expedition owes much to the civilian leaders assisting Chongtao as chief overseer. Li Yu (d. 935), for example, was a classical scholar from the northeast with credentials as “erudite literatus” (boxue hongci), the highest scholarly degree under the 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63.

Art of War, chap. 2. JWDS 33.458, 57.769. JWDS 57.769. JWDS 33.458; ZZTJ 273.8940; SGCQ 37.549. JWDS 57.769; SGCQ 37.548–49. XWDS 44.486; HR p. 372; JWDS 74.968.

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Tang dynasty.64 In the subsequent Liang, he rose to auxiliary academician and censor. He rose further at the Tongguang court to Hanlin Academician, due to stellar credentials in composition as well as history. Chongtao and Jiji specifically drafted Li Yu to serve as adjutant for the Shu campaign, sources say, a sign of their recognition of the potential value of civilian perspectives within the support staff. A scholar by profession, Li Yu nonetheless counseled on military affairs like a hawk. He was the principal voice behind the strategy to advance quickly against the Shu capital, rather than first amass armies near the border in order to build momentum, the preference of key senior officers. More savvy about the politics of conquest, Li Yu argued, The regime of Wang Yan has brought ruin to his people through indolence, a man despised by them. We should exploit the prevailing confusion to storm sites without defenses. The advantage rests with speed and dallying will not do.

His words were a virtual echo of Chongtao’s own counsel to the Prince of Jin two years earlier at the outset of the Kaifeng offensive, where political dissension within contributed decisively to the Liang demise. At one point, senior officer Chen Yi cited illness in petitioning to extend his army’s stay at the Shu border, which Li Yu viewed as either protest or cowardice. “Chen Yi intends to advance when expedient and recoil when inexpedient,” he insisted, in demanding the officer’s head. He was merely bluffing, “but hereafter officers no longer contemplated staying behind,” due to the heavy-handed tone set by Li Yu.

Mood in Luoyang The exhilaration of campaigners in the southwest, in the tenth month of 925, stood in stark contrast with the pall that continued to hold Luoyang in its grip, as the autumn approached. The month began with the court’s civilian leadership convening at the palace of Mother Cao to confer her posthumous title, the Chaste and Austere Empress Dowager.65 Another tour of the tomb site, now dubbed the Kunling Mausoleum, occurred early in the tenth month, the emperor reviewing progress on construction, presumably to make final adjustments. Final burial and gravesite rituals for Mother Cao came on the twenty-ninth day (925.10.29), which likely ended late into the night. Scarcely two days later, Zhuangzong returned spontaneously to the mausoleum, “where he wept uncontrollably,” reflecting emotions still raw.66 Another round of solemn rites ensued in the eleventh month as the monarch installed a tablet for his mother at the Temple to the Imperial Ancestors, 64. XWDS 54.620–22; HR pp. 444–46; JWDS 33.457; ZZTJ 273.8939. 65. JWDS 33.457–58. 66. JWDS 33.459.

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located in the capital.67 Then, nature wreaked new havoc: a “massive” earthquake affected Weizhou to the north of the capital and Xuzhou to the east late in the tenth month. Sources do not cite fatalities, but major quakes in areas so densely populated makes deaths in the thousands a certainty.68 At the same time, measured steps were taken to restore some normalcy to the Son of Heaven’s personal life. Several short hunting jaunts are recorded in the twelfth month, the same month that the palace reintroduced music to imperial banquets. Nearly a month after his forty-first birthday, Zhuangzong hosted the first palace banquet since his mother’s death, inviting a select group of siblings and military officers.69 Conservatives almost certainly found fault with the timing, in light of the inevitable indulgences in food, wine, music, and dance, although no record exists of official censure, perhaps due to the rigor of mourning exercises at the outset. Potential critics might also have been mollified by the contrast between downsized celebrations in 925 relative to the one in the previous year, which included a trip of some duration to Songshan.

Surrender of Chengdu Dispatches from Sichuan in the eleventh month of 925 began to give evidence of transition from conquest to consolidation. Once the armies of Kang Yanxiao seized the Lutou Pass of Hanzhou, the prefecture directly adjacent to Chengdu, on the eighteenth day (925.11.18), emissaries of the Shu ruler arrived almost immediately with offerings of wine and beef as tokens of submission.70 The delegation included adopted brother Wang Zongbi, who had communicated from the outset with Guo Chongtao, who promised a governorship in exchange for mediating the final protocol of surrender. Zongbi had already switched sides as northern armies approached and forcibly relocated Wang Yan to a separate residence in Chengdu’s western district, then exploited his absence to ransack his palaces while carting off countless consorts.71 Other royal brothers presiding over neighboring prefectures would capitulate en masse, a measure of the Shu leader’s low regard even among his own kin. Later Tang armies could thereby occupy Chengdu uneventfully on the twenty-eighth day (925.11.28), restoring order through their presence and containing the worst in plunder by local soldiers or brigands, a serious risk for this highly populous city. For the duration of the two-month drive from Luoyang to Chengdu, Later Tang armies evinced restraint reminiscent of the campaign against Kaifeng, due to an almost imperious rigor in the ranks. The Former Shu potentate Wang Yan met with 67. 68. 69. 70. 71.

JWDS 33.459–60. JWDS 33.459; WDHY 10.131. JWDS 33.461; CFYG 111.1207. XWDS 24.250, 46.486; HR pp. 218, 372; JWDS 33.459–60, 74.968; ZZTJ 274.8944. ZZTJ 274.8944; Jiu guo zhi 6.59; Wang, Power and Politics in Tenth-Century China, p. 239.

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local officials on the eve of abdicating power, an event so somber that, “it left the lapels of onlookers drenched in tears.”72 Nostalgic poems were exchanged to immortalize the event.73 The ceremony of surrender was performed at a bridge in the city’s northern suburbs, a protocol that included an empty coffin: “Yan assumed plain clothes and a crown of weeds, a lamb on a leash proceeding before him and a coffin carried to his rear, a band in his lapel and a jade disk in his hand.”74 The potentate and his courtiers completed the ceremony with full prostrations, as they looked to the northeast in the direction of Luoyang, their new capital.75 Jiji presided over the entire ceremony and set the coffin alight, effectively reiterating promises of clemency from the court. The youth eventually selected twenty prize horses from the royal stables for himself and three hundred local musicians for his father, but he proved otherwise disinterested in the treasures tendered by favor-seekers such as Zongbi, whom he treated “dismissively.”76

Unfathomable Spoils The trophies of the Shu war were stupendous and, at the same time, the root of serious rifts. Observers at Nanping, the kingdom neighboring Shu, received news of the sweep of northern armies with an astute prediction: “This may well work to our benefit, the conquest instilling insolence in Zhuangzong and causing his days to be numbered.”77 The insight likely derives from Taizong of Tang, who once surmised, “Victory can leave the victor arrogant.”78 And indeed, the military triumph brought out the worst among senior figures at the Tongguang court as well as their surrogates in the field, once the original euphoria had subsided. The eunuch Xiang Yansi, returning to Luoyang in late 925, submitted a list of assets acquired from Shu that included 30,000 surrendering troops; 9,500  horses; 7,000,000 weapons; 2,530,000 piculs in grain; 1,920,000 strings of cash; 220,000 ounces of gold and silver; 20,000 objects made of pearls, jade, rhinoceros horn, or elephant tusk; and 500,000 bolts of either raw or refined silk.79 Surrendering armies of “several tens of thousands” should rightfully represent a serious underreporting, as the armies of Shu, formal and informal, are estimated by modern historians at slightly under one 72. XWDS 63.793; HR p. 517; ZZTJ 274.8943. 73. For a translation of some poems, see Dudbridge, A Portrait of the Five Dynasties, pp. 137–40. 74. XWDS 14.153; 63.793; HR pp. 143, 517; SGCQ 37.553–54; Xu Tang shu 37.343; Wang, Power and Politics in Tenth-Century China, pp. 240–41. 75. ZZTJ 274.8946. 76. SGCQ 37.553-54; JWDS 34.468; ZZTJ 274.8945, 8955. 77. ZZTJ 274.8946. 78. Zhao, Tang Taizong zhuan, p. 56; ZZTJ 196.6170. 79. The Old History and Comprehensive Mirror give 30,000 as the number of surrendering Shu troops, while Ouyang Xiu’s Historical Records cites 300,000 ( JWDS 33.460; ZZTJ 274.8946; XWDS 24.250). The figure of 300,000 seems far too high. Yet for a kingdom with 64 prefectures and 249 counties, an army of 30,000 is inconceivable. Moreover, one contemporary refers to the Shu army as 300,000 strong, while another alludes to 100,000 “crack troops” and presumably many more foot-soldiers (ZZTJ 267.8705, 273.8941).

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hundred thousand. Yet the underreporting of soldiers seemed less problematic to the court than representations pertaining to the region’s wealth. A visibly vexed Zhuangzong received the report with a thud, “Shu purportedly contains untold stores of pearls, jade, gold, and silver. Why are our spoils so few?” It was widely known that a fire at Chengdu in the preceding decade had destroyed the contents of the royal family’s main repository of precious trinkets and cultural relics, the “Hundred-Foot Tower,” which once rose a hundred feet over the city.80 More recently, on the eve of the Later Tang occupation, royal brother Zongbi had raided the vaults of Wang Yan, “diverting sizable quantities of its gold and silk to his own home,” property likely not counted by accountants. 81 The items collected by northern armies probably came entirely from Chengdu’s public treasury, which by all indications remained in tact as the city changed hands. There was also a vast discrepancy between the sums initially reported by the eunuch Xiang Yansi and the sums eventually remitted to the government.82 But Yansi insisted on attributing the shortfall to Guo Chongtao, who along with certain disreputable sons had laid illicit claim to over 400,000 ounces in gold and silver, leaving a mere fraction of the original treasure for remission to the court. In this way, eunuchs allied with the Middle Palace began their campaign of character assassination against the military commissioner, for the retention of wealth was a necessary first step to forming an autonomous state.

Rifts within the Shu Command The damage done by eunuchs in the capital would have been manageable were Chongtao not dogged simultaneously by discord within his closest cohort in the field. In the wake of securing Shu, relations soured between senior aides Kang Yanxiao, the seasoned vanguard, and Dong Zhang, governor of the Bin/Ning command north of Changan. As inspector-in-chief of infantry and cavalry for the Right Detachments, Zhang had cemented bonds with Chongtao over the course of the campaign, their relationship dating to service at Weizhou years earlier. Yanxiao in this way found himself progressively excluded from critical deliberations as the occupation progressed, despite his stellar performance in the field.83 But nothing infuriated Kang Yanxiao like news in the twelfth month of 925 of Dong Zhang’s nomination as governor for the eastern circuits of Shu (Dongchuan) through the special intervention of Chongtao. A houseboy in youth with meager 80. ZZTJ 269.8797. 81. ZZTJ 274.8944; SGCQ 37.550. 82. Xiang Yansi remitted to the capital far less than the sums cited above: only 100,000 ounces in gold and silver were remitted, one-fourth of the amount reported by him; see JWDS 57.770. 83. JWDS 62.831–32, 74.968–69; XWDS 51.575; ZZTJ 274.8947.

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credentials, Zhang had managed to achieve peerage with Yanxiao partly by ingratiating himself and partly by cronyism, namely, Chongtao’s tendency to reserve sensitive posts for old associates with proven loyalties. The common background of the two men as Han-Chinese was not lost upon Yanxiao either, as an Inner Asian ethnic. He confronted Chongtao over the matter and demanded a more respectable nominee, namely Ren  Huan, the campaign’s adjutant. “Are you rebelling,” the vituperative Chongtao queried in a shrill voice, “How dare you challenge my appointments!” Yanxiao had nearly died for his temerity while Chongtao had turned inexplicably cavalier to a man more than qualified to be Shu governor. Moreover, the elevation of Zhang would insulate him from future efforts at containment by Yanxiao, an unintended consequence with serious ramifications for the region. Further aggravating cohort tensions within expeditionary forces at Chengdu were the Machiavellian intrigues of locals like Wang Zongbi, adopted brother of the former potentate and key liaison for the occupation. He plied Chongtao with everything from presents to prostitutes, and even provided his own Chengdu residence as temporary housing, expecting reward in the form of a permanent post in the area. Chongtao procrastinated, however, with the perceived intent of reneging on his promise.84 By now, Zongbi had befriended the mediocre son of Chongtao, Guo Tinghui, then manipulated the son to instill misgivings in Jiji and drive a wedge through the top leadership. In political theater too subtle for the northern occupiers to grasp, a succession of Shu “personages,” presumably military officers and royal clansmen, sought out Jiji shortly before the twelfth month. They proclaimed the utter indispensability of Chongtao to the future security of Shu and pleaded for his retention as governor, while beseeching Jiji to petition the court to confirm the posting. In this way, the innuendo of local mischief-makers made its way, through the most unimpeachable source, back to Luoyang.

Maligning the Commissioner The chorus of appeals to retain Chongtao in Sichuan caused Jiji to personally confront him on the matter. His words were designed to affirm the administration’s ongoing confidence, while challenging Chongtao to reveal more of his plans for the long-term: His Majesty relies on you, Mr. Minister, as he does the steadfast Heng and Hua Mountains, honors you as he does the dynastic altars themselves. Anticipating the day when the Four Corners coalesce under universal rule, he certainly will not relegate a statesman of your stature to the barbarian lands of the south.85

84. XWDS 63.793; HR pp. 517–18; JWDS 57.769–70; ZZTJ 274.8945, 8948; Jiu guo zhi 6.59–60. 85. XWDS 14.153–54; HR p. 143; ZZTJ 274.8948.

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In effect, in Jiji’s estimation, the empire’s new expanse did not diminish the value of Chongtao as chief military advisor for the palace, but rather elevated his importance as its leading point-man on Shu policy in the future. Ironically, Jiji’s last words depicting the barbarian south as ill-suited to a “statesman of your stature” had been uttered almost verbatim a generation earlier to another military leader from the north, Wang Jian, father of the newly deposed Yan, who came to Shu on a mission for the Tang throne, only to convert the district into a satrapy and die as its king.86 The well-tutored Shatuo prince certainly knew of Sichuan’s appeal to exiles since the Three Kingdoms period, seducing them with its riches while testing their ties to the center. His words had to be crafted to convey a presence of mind shaped by history, and at the same time, a sense of skepticism toward the swirl of rumors. Although less educated than Jiji, Chongtao knew enough of the lore about Sichuan to take the intrigues of locals seriously. By now, eunuchs in the inner circle of the Prince of Wei took to feeding suspicions already stoked in other quarters. The disaffected Shu royal, Wang Zongbi, had liquidated a group of local powerbrokers and eunuch intimates precisely as northern armies overran Chengdu, persons blamed for encouraging their king’s reclusion in order to govern illicitly as proxies.87 Eunuch aides in the retinue of Jiji, as witnesses to the bloodshed, were understandably horrified by such scapegoat tactics.88 And with Zongbi seemingly aligned to Chongtao, many eunuchs from Luoyang had reason to suspect the military commissioner of complicity in Zongbi’s schemes. Admittedly, Chongtao dominated every sector of the government through tactics of intimidation that spared none. But by some accounts, he held eunuchs in secret contempt and felt passionately about a thoroughgoing purge. He reportedly said to Jiji on the heels of overtaking Shu, partly in celebration and partly in admonition, Your Highness, having established merit in vanquishing Shu, will surely become heir-apparent upon returning north. Once the present sovereign has lived out a long life and you succeed as Son of Heaven, you should expel palace castrates in their entirety and never so much as mount a castrated horse again.89

The statement was conveyed in confidence, but language directed specifically against the eunuch community would trigger instant alarms in eunuchs present: the last purge a scant two decades earlier had left seven hundred dead in the capital and another thousand in the hinterland.90 Hundreds more lived out their lives as exiles, like Zhang Chengye. Chongtao’s private utterances to the Prince of Wei are also noteworthy for the inference that the current ruler’s very death was necessary before the 86. 87. 88. 89. 90.

XWDS 63.783–91; HR pp. 505–14. XWDS 63.793; HR p. 517; ZZTJ 274.8945. XWDS 14.154; HR p. 143; ZZTJ 274.8948. XWDS 24.250; HR p. 218; ZZTJ 274.8951–52. XWDS 38.407; HR p. 321.

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expulsion of eunuchs could occur, a measure of the implacable favor enjoyed by them, especially in the Middle Palace.

Eliminating Local Threats Chongtao’s assessment of eunuch omnipotence proved highly prescient based on the subsequent turn of events. On the eleventh day of the twelfth month (925.12.11), a  mere two weeks into the occupation of Chengdu, he instructed Jiji to impose death sentences for two biological brothers of the Shu ruler, along with adopted son Wang Zongbi. The interim government also authorized sentences of extended punishment for a cluster of Shu royals deemed troublemakers.91 The cause as cited by Chongtao was local outrage against the men, first, for plundering Chengdu’s royal palaces, then peddling influence among occupation forces for personal gain. The executions emerge in the Historical Records as Chongtao’s desperate attempt to prove his own loyalty in the face of growing doubts. The commissioner could thereby distance himself from the most unsavory of local agents, who also happened to be the chief advocates of his retention in Shu. Abuses of power under the former Shu regime, the reasons cited for liquidating the men, were likely secondary considerations. The slaying of Wang Zongbi and his cronies had coincided with acts of insubordination by Later Tang armies at Chengdu, soldiers heretofore known for self-control. Zongbi had dallied in tendering tens of thousands in cash strings formerly requisitioned by the military commissioner to reward his own men, creating frustration and anger.92 By intent or neglect, the Shu royal had created conditions conducive to mutiny, which for a strict disciplinarian like Guo Chongtao merited the death sentence irrespective of other considerations. Still, rancor within the ranks must have given pause to the campaign’s leaders, for mutiny, common in defeat, rarely occurs on the heels of such a resounding victory. Discord over the spoils of war is noteworthy in suggesting systemic problems with compensating armies on assignment, for whom the “spoils of war” were not just supplements to income, but part and parcel of a warrior’s basic compensation. Occupation leaders in Chengdu would authorize another high-profile execution some four days after the death of Zongbi: the governor Wang Chengxiu, who presided over a district in the northwestern corner of Shu, Qinzhou.93 A man formerly favored by the Shu ruler, he had just reached Chengdu in the twelfth month of 925 after losing his will to resist invading armies and roaming the desolate borderlands of Tibet. His entourage of ten thousand, including numerous civilian aides, had been reduced to 91. XWDS 24.250, 63.793; HR pp. 218, 518; ZZTJ 274.8948; SGCQ 37.554. 92. ZZTJ 274.8948. 93. XWDS 63.793; HR p. 516; JWDS 33.459; XWDS 63.792; ZZTJ 273.8926, 8937–38, 8941, 274.8948– 49; Wang, Power and Politics in Tenth-Century China, p. 238; Dudbridge, A Portrait of the Five Dynasties, pp. 127–42.

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merely two thousand as they approached Chengdu two months later, deaths blamed on the frigid temperatures of the highlands. “You preside over a large district and a strong army,” Jiji observed during interrogation. “Why did you fail to offer resistance?” “I was humbled by Your Highness’s magnificent awe,” explained Chengxiu. His flattery did not placate Jiji, who pressed for details, “In that case, why not simply surrender at the outset?” “Imperial troops never entered my district,” Chengxiu noted, for indeed government armies had proceeded southward upon reaching Dasan Pass without extending as far north as Qinzhou. Once further interrogation revealed that many thousands had perished amidst an aimless flight, Jiji unleashed his full fury, “How can you possibly atone for the loss of ten thousand lives?”94 The execution of Chengxiu was justified on the grounds of ineptitude in serving his Shu overlords and ambivalence toward occupying armies. Meanwhile, the back-and-forth with Chengxiu signals the coming of age for Jiji, who presided over the entire episode from interrogation to sentencing. Despite a pampered life in the past, Jiji had no qualms about signing the death warrant for someone many years his senior.

Dispatch of Meng Zhixiang Stabilizing the leadership of post-war Sichuan soon became the chief priority of the government in Luoyang, which named a trusted Chinese military figure, Meng  Zhixiang, as the next governor for Western Chuan, a decision that followed soon after the succession of high-profile slayings in Chengdu.95 Native to a town northwest of Weizhou, his father had allied with the former Prince of Jin decades earlier, inspiring Keyong to arrange a marriage with a niece.96 Apart from bonds of marriage to Shatuo royalty, Zhixiang could boast a long association with Keyong’s successor, Cunxu, which allowed him to wield exceptional clout as senior military advisor.97 On the heels of Zhuangzong’s accession as emperor, Zhixiang held oversight over the armed forces of Jinyang and later civilian powers as the city’s custodian, posts usually entrusted to fellow Shatuo. His successor as senior advisor, Guo Chongtao, had won the appointment in 919 through Zhixiang’s endorsement.98 On the eve of departing for Shu in the autumn of 925, Chongtao could finally reciprocate by recommending Zhixiang for future leadership in the region, emphatic that, “none can compare to him.”99 The two men shared an abiding mutual admiration, which promised to facilitate an easy integration of the region into empire. As interim governor of 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99.

JWDS 33.459; ZZTJ 274.8948; Dudbridge, A Portrait of the Five Dynasties, p. 141. JWDS 33.461; ZZTJ 274.8949–51. JWDS 33.461; XWDS 64.797. ZZTJ 270.8843. JWDS 33.461; ZZTJ 274.8949–51; XWDS 24.245; HR p. 212. XWDS ch. 64, p. 797–98; HR pp. 521–22.

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Western Chuan, Chongtao expected to transfer powers directly to Zhixiang upon his arrival at Chengdu. Zhuangzong summoned Meng Zhixiang to the capital before dispatching him to the southwest. He bestowed honorary powers as chief councilor, plus exquisite bounty by tapping into his personal privy. The emperor then feted Zhixiang at his private residence within the imperial compound, not the usual public venues, for some reason.100 His comments at the banquet on the first day of the intercalary twelfth month (925.12*.01), cited in the Historical Records, involve a somewhat trite recitation of his own achievements, including a father’s pride in the martial feats of a young son in far-off fields of war: Until recently, Jiji bore the stench of baby’s milk, but today he has pacified the two circuits of Chuan on my behalf. Witnessing the charm of this youth can stir melancholy in a man of my years. I recall the Former Monarch [Keyong] as he left this world, beset by incursions from powerful neighbors, which pared away his lands to leave scarcely a single corner. But today, the entire world embraces our sovereignty and the bursary bulges with treasures from the Nine Domains and the Four Seas. It staggers the mind!101

Clenching a fistful of baubles from Shu, Zhuangzong lavished them on the commander as, “an amiable and worthy man.” The atmosphere seems largely celebratory to reflect the throne’s confidence in a positive conclusion to the campaign, but Zhixiang stayed in Luoyang for ten days, longer than necessary to bestow bounty, and the men had more than one meeting, by all indications. One source, the Comprehensive Mirror, cites a private exchange between the emperor and Meng Zhixiang, perhaps closer to his day of departure, the tenor of which seems a better barometer of the reality on the ground: “I hear that Chongtao is already inclined to treachery, [in which case] I want you to dispose of him on my behalf, upon your arrival.” Zhuangzong’s comments were received skeptically by Zhixiang, who tried to reason with him, “Conduct of the sort is inconceivable in the case of Chongtao, a  distinguished statesman of long standing. After going to Shu to investigate, I will send him back, if he ultimately proves innocent.”102 The throne’s presumption of guilt for the military commissioner is baffling in light of its origins in rumor and innuendo. Zhixiang’s own skepticism suggests insufficient basis for the judgment, as the facts were presented to him—admittedly, someone predisposed to favor Chongtao due to their long association. Curiously, mere days before the meeting with Zhixiang, the emperor conferred with Siyuan, the candidate first considered for the Shu command. The men had not met in the past year, despite at least one plea from Siyuan for an audience in the preceding 100. CFYG 111.1207; XWDS 64.799; HR p. 523. 101. XWDS 64.798; HR p. 522. 102. ZZTJ 274.8952–53.

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summer.103 It cannot be sheer coincidence that imperial consultations with Siyuan and Zhixiang virtually coincided. In all likelihood, the monarch had already entered intensive preparations to fend off a looming threat from Shu. For a man who had borne the brunt of Zhuangzong’s paranoia in the past, the audience must have framed for Siyuan a diminished image of his adopted brother and a heightened sense of his own vulnerability.104 En route to Chengdu at the same time as Meng Zhixiang was a eunuch commissioner, Ma Yangui, dispatched secretly by the monarch to facilitate Chongtao’s purge.105 Palace instructions specifically authorized the liquidation of Chongtao, should he resist dismissal orders either through flight or procrastination. The emperor and empress differed markedly in their perception of the problem as well as the best approach to handling it. By official accounts, Zhuangzong considered the evidence too inconclusive to issue a death warrant, so he opted for conditional instructions to Zhixiang. Empress Liu saw circumstances as too tenuous for conditional orders that might involve further consultations with the court. Her position ostensibly reflected the consensus of eunuch aides, while her husband’s directives reflected the divergence of opinion within court circles. Failing to sway her husband, she insisted upon circumventing him altogether by issuing her own “directive” to Jiji, her son in the field, to summarily dispose of Chongtao. In this way, Yangui left Luoyang with two sets of instructions and Zhixiang with a third mandate that set him on a collision course with the eunuch. Zhixiang held the superior hand as senior statesman, but Yangui evinced greater tenacity as proxy of the Middle Palace.

Winter Doldrums Frustrations at Home The winter of late 925 seemed interminable due partly to the leap month added at the end and partly to the bitter cold that held much of northwest China in its grip. On the twentieth day of the twelfth intercalary month (925.12*.20), perhaps anxious to flee the confines of home, Zhuangzong began a five-day hunt that took him to four sites across a sizable stretch of land to the east and south of Luoyang, including the popular venue of Baisha. It turned into a family outing, the emperor joined by his wife, young children, palace ladies, plus an entourage of thousands from the Imperial Guard.106 The frigid winter temperatures would leave many hunting companions fainting and others freezing to death from exposure, while bodyguards given to foraging local 103. 104. 105. 106.

XWDS 6.55; HR p. 53. Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, pp. 41–42. XWDS 14.153–54; HR pp. 143–44; JWDS 57.771; ZZTJ 274.8953. XWDS 5.50, 14.145; HR p. 49, 135; JWDS 33.461; ZZTJ 274.8949–50; CFYG 115.1261.

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farms for food and refreshments came upon the barest of storehouses. Assorted farms and homes suffered at the hands of angry guards, while local officials fled by the dozens to nearby hills to avoid retaliation from the armed forces. Thousands of men in the Imperial Guard were former Weizhou soldiers with a penchant for abusing locals, conduct aggravated by the paucity of spoils to reach their pockets.107 Perceptions often matter more than reality and the perception of bounty after the conquest of Sichuan, echoed in the monarch’s allusion to a “bulging bursary,” proved frustrating as it failed to square with reality. The riches of Shu, minus incalculable plunder, had scarcely begun to trickle northward to Luoyang. Yet agrarian and commercial revenues across the Central Plains had been undercut by a combination of peasant flight and extreme weather. According to reports out of Zhenzhou, over seven thousand commoners had frozen to death and another two thousand perished by famine.108 But in the face of a revenues shortage, the government still pressed commoners to pay taxes up to a year in advance. In this way, peasant insurrection began to erupt in the early months of 926, the first on record for the reign, although generally small in scale and concentrated away from the capital.109 Ordinary soldiers fared poorly as well. “With granaries for the capital exhausted, nothing remained for troops,” many of whom were forced to abandon wives and children or skulk the hills near the capital as scavengers.110 Zhuangzong alluded to these mounting problems in a mandate from the intercalary twelfth month of 925, where he humbly beseeched subjects to think creatively about ways “to save the country and restore order among the people.” To stress the severity of things, the Son of Heaven employed his personal pen in addressing a wide spectrum of officials, letters transcribed in vermilion ink.111 And indeed, a lively dialogue emerged in coming weeks about the best way forward. Some officials recommended the court’s relocation to Kaifeng to relieve the tax burden on Luoyang, an idea rejected for fear of appearing desperate. Others spoke of the need to better align government income with military spending. In the words of Li Qi, minister of personnel, “It was the practice of the ancients to defer spending until revenues were collected and defer war until the agrarian base was secure. In this way, shortfalls are avoidable even in the context of natural disasters.”112 Li Qi had clearly surmised that the invasion of Shu was premature, the administration acting without the requisite financial cushion. The monarch was not unimpressed, yet frustrations mounted as deliberations progressed, for he recognized that such long-term solutions could not possibly reap benefits in the next few months. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112.

ZZTJ 274.8949. JWDS 34.468. Wudai shihua, pp. 106–7. ZZTJ 274.8949–50. JWDS 33.462–63. ZZTJ 274.8951.

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If the government could survive through the spring, a break in weather might salvage things. However, contrary to perception, a plentitude of silk, jade, and gold from Shu, even if it materialized overnight, could not buy food in short supply. That would take a miracle.

Some Soul-Searching Following this needed dialogue with courtiers, the Tongguang emperor took a combination of tangible as well as symbolic steps to address his seeming indifference in the past. He declined to hold the usual reception for officials on New Year’s Day, the most important holiday on the Chinese calendar, when envelopes of cash and congratulatory greetings are exchanged.113 The spectacle would have seemed so much farce. For areas ravaged by natural disaster, the monarch waived taxes for the previous fall and summer and pardoned deserting soldiers and nonviolent criminals under a minor amnesty. He announced suspensions of imperial audiences and official banquets for the indefinite future, apparently to reduce fuel and food costs. He also curtailed food consumption for members of his own family, cuts restored days later on the heels of petitions from “concerned officials.” Zhuangzong should have imposed stricter restrictions on his own palace and extended amnesties to a wider populace to avoid appearing “tone-deaf.” The Kitan ruler, Abaoji, in the face of similar conditions, led armies on extended hunts that retrieved enough game for him and his inner circle to survive the long winter.114 For a populous country like China, solutions of the sort were not feasible, but they reflect the superior imagination of the northern neighbor.

Wang Royals Depart Chengdu Amidst the soul-searching by the emperor in Luoyang designed to rally the country behind him, conditions in Sichuan in early 926 entered a sudden nosedive. Deposed ruler Wang Yan departed Chengdu on the third day of the first month (926.01.03), after celebrating the New Year at home. His entourage of several thousand included his own mother and wife, concubines and children, in addition to the bulk of royal clansmen and their dependents, plus key members of the former ruling elite.115 The imperial pardon that summoned Shu royals to the capital was emphatic in assurances of immunity, “I promise no risk to human life, in light of the willful surrender of your kingdom. And I swear upon the sun, moon, and stars above the faithfulness of these representations!”116 The official histories report that, “Wang Yan embarked 113. 114. 115. 116.

JWDS 34.467. LS 2.20. ZZTJ 274.8954. XWDS 63.793; HR pp. 517–18; ZZTJ 274.8951.

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gladly on his journey with edict in hand.” Imperial son Jiji even chose to appear at the Chengdu send-off, his presence seeming to vouch for his father’s good intentions. The size of the entourage explains its snail’s pace through northern Sichuan. It took two months to reach the western capital, where the party was greeted with an imperial mandate to await new instructions before proceeding. Their wait in Changan would persist for nearly a month, tensions mounting as the days passed.

Demise of Guo Chongtao Removing thousands of residuals from the former regime would simplify the next task foisted upon the Prince of Wei’s shoulders on the seventh day of the first month (926.01.07), the murder of Guo Chongtao, bulwark of the empire since its founding.117 The eunuch Ma Yangui reached Chengdu two weeks ahead of Meng Zhixiang and disclosed Empress Liu’s “directive” to Jiji and Li Congxi, senior eunuch for the campaign. A vigorous exchange between the two men ensued. A tearful Congxi pressed the Prince, “Your Highness now possesses a secret command. In failing to implement it, we all are minced meat if Chongtao finds out!” But Jiji countered, “We have no imperial edict, merely a directive drafted by Her Majesty the Empress, which scarcely suffices to slay the commissioner of bandit suppression!” Congxi continued his strenuous advocacy, leaving Jiji no recourse.118 The Prince clearly realized that he had no legal authority to liquidate the commissioner, so he enlisted civilian aide Li Song, who shared his skepticism about the legality of “directives” from the empress to shape a uniform message from the capital. It was a politically savvy move, which cannot be said for Empress Liu: the explicitness of her directive left little room for Jiji to act at his own discretion, which might have produced a better outcome. Chongtao was intercepted en route to his office and pummeled to death by Li Huan, Jiji’s bodyguard, on the seventh day of the first month (926.01.07). A public execution would have run the risk of inciting allies in the armed forces. Together, Jiji and Li  Song forged a document on the yellow paper reserved for imperial communiqués that contained Zhuangzong’s cipher, which they showed to military leaders to thwart a possible coup.119 Still, many frightened Chongtao supporters absconded within hours, except for Zhang Li, a civil official, who kneeled in silent protest before Jiji’s office, a reminder of the gravity of the loss.120 The head of Guo Chongtao was immersed in lacquer for conveyance to the capital, presumably at the court’s instructions.121 Two sons perished in Shu as well, although 117. 118. 119. 120. 121.

XWDS 24.250–51; HR p. 219; JWDS 34.468, 57.770–71; ZZTJ 274.8954. XWDS 14.154; HR p. 144. XWDS 57.653; HR p. 459; JWDS 108.1419–20; ZZTJ 274.8955. JWDS 98.1314. JWDS 34.473; Wudai shiji zuanwu bu 1.8–9.

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his wife and two small grandsons were spared the usual extended punishment, as they continued to reside at the ancestral home in northern Shanxi. One unscrupulous son, Guo Tinghui, peddled influence and profited at obscene levels from his father’s clout, so perhaps he deserved to die in ignominy. Sadly, his father did not. The state quickly moved to confiscate Chongtao’s home at Jinyang, in addition to personal assets stashed in his official residence in Luoyang.122 Chongtao was the first recipient of an imperial writ of immunity and the first to die despite it. Another casualty of the widening purge was Chongtao’s son-in-law, Li Cunyi, a stepbrother of the monarch, whom eunuchs maligned for expressing “words of extreme umbrage” for the injustice against the former military commissioner.123 The wife of Cunyi, once favored by the Middle Palace, presumably perished in the extended punishment visited upon his kin. Ironically, marriage alliances designed to bolster bonds within the ruling elite created strange bedfellows as the political system succumbed to paranoia, disproving conventional wisdom about the strength of blood over water.

The Net Extends to Zhu Youqian The second person to succumb to the purge of Guo Chongtao, Zhu Youqian, similarly held immunity from criminal prosecution. The short-armed governor befriended by Cunxu twelve years earlier came under suspicion in late 925 for his reaction to the Shu campaign, in the view of paranoid palace aides.124 When the government drafted Hezhong locals for the campaign, Youqian gladly accommodated, but he insisted on deploying his own son to supervise the men. The palace inferred that Youqian planted the son to protect his own provincial interests.125 The allegations, attributed to the actor Jing Jin, were preposterous, but the traditional explanation for Youqian’s fall from grace—a steadfast refusal to bribe palace favorites—seems narrowly onedimensional. Rather, the punishment of Youqian and others, as part of the Chongtao purge, was more likely a function of an embarrassed emperor sanctioning after-the-fact a purge only passively endorsed at the outset. In reality, the bonds between Youqian and Chongtao had been negligible. Fully aware of the potential consequences of slanders by palace insiders and misjudgments by the throne, Youqian petitioned for an audience to clarify matters. He even dispensed with the usual military escort as he entered the capital, confident in a fair hearing. His audience went without apparent incident, but at the dinner that followed some sort of altercation occurred between Youqian and several imperial brothers. Insults were exchanged and egos bruised such that a combination of imperial 122. 123. 124. 125.

JWDS 57.772. XWDS 14.151, 37.400; HR pp. 141, 313; ZZTJ 274.8956. XWDS 37.400, 45.493–94; HR pp. 313, 378–79; JWDS 34.468; ZZTJ 274.8954, 8956–57. JWDS 63.847.

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kinsmen and palace favorites now joined hands in maligning the Hezhong governor, casting him as a Chongtao confederate.126 Youqian perished in the capital at the hands of an assassin on the twenty-third day of the first month (926.01.23). Clearly, the palace had no interest in scrutinizing the charges through formal channels like the Censorate. One hundred members of Zhu Youqian’s extended family soon perished as part of his extended punishment, along with seven subordinate commanders and hundreds of their own kinsmen; their property was confiscated as well.127 Government troops converging on the Zhu estate at Hezhong came upon Youqian’s wife, Woman Zhang, who entered the residence to retrieve the writ of immunity. “This was conferred by the emperor last year,” she said with a hint of sarcasm, “but as an illiterate housewife, the meaning of the words eludes me.”128 Even the slayers of Woman Zhang were reddened with embarrassment over the perfidiousness of the palace. Later in the month, the court issued a public denunciation of Chongtao, which “struck terror across the country on short order,” sources say, for the slew of slayings triggered by his purge had occurred in secrecy.129 Many must have pondered whether this was the end of the carnage or merely the beginning.

The Disaffected Captain Selected by Jiji to replace Chongtao as general overseer of the Shu campaign was the civilian Ren Huan, a man with family ties to the region.130 Distinguished formerly in the Zhenzhou suppression of 922, which burnished his credentials in the armed forces, Huan went on to serve as senior consultant for the Shu expedition at the specific request of Jiji. His promotion to general overseer had roughly coincided with the arrival at Chengdu of Meng Zhixiang, the governor charged with restoring order across the region. A residual force from the capital would stay behind to assist.131 Huan’s chief task thus became stewardship over the withdrawal of expeditionary forces. For the safety of retreating armies, which departed Chengdu on the twenty-seventh day of the first month (926.01.27), a rear guard of twelve thousand was constituted under Kang Yanxiao, leader of the advance guard during the invasion, which followed some days behind to provide a protective shield for campaigners.132 In less than a week after leaving Chengdu, Jiji received a mandate, this time indisputably from his father, to liquidate Zhu Youqian’s son, then serving to the east of the

126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132.

JWDS 64.857. Xu Tang shu 40.371. XWDS 45.494; HR p. 379; ZZTJ 274.8957. ZZTJ 274.8956. JWDS 67.895; XWDS 28.305–6; Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, pp. 29–31, 54–55, 148, 165. XWDS 64.798; HR p. 524. XWDS 44.486; HR pp. 372–73; ZZTJ 274.8957.

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city as part of the family’s extended punishment.133 Jiji was already some two hundred kilometers to the north, so he delegated the task to Dong Zhang, even though Kang Yanxiao’s rear guard was closer to the target and his men better equipped. Yanxiao resented the snub, which came on the heels of Zhang’s undeserved posting as governor for eastern Sichuan. Moreover, Yanxiao’s rear guard contained countless mercenaries from Hezhong with ties to Youqian or his lieutenants, all dead at court orders. “The Hezhong warriors wailed before the barracks of Yanxiao,” upon news of Youqian’s undeserved demise and refused to risk their lives anymore for a government gone seemingly mad.134 Yanxiao shared their strong passions and well-reasoned apprehensions, concluding that, “the calamity that befell Chongtao and Youqian will inevitably entangle the rest of us as well.”135 He acted preemptively in the middle of the second month by leading his men southward and issuing to the people of Shu a summons to war against his own government. Mounting insecurities had turned Yanxiao into a renegade. The armies of Kang Yanxiao swelled to a reputed fifty thousand in a matter of days, the response of Sichuan locals a telling measure of the magnitude of anti-government sentiment in a region that had rallied around Later Tang dynasts months earlier. Jiji assigned the suppression to Ren Huan and Shen Bin, whose army of seven thousand must have drawn massive assistance from local forces, including those of the incoming governor Meng Zhixiang.136 Miraculously, Huan and Bin needed mere weeks to suppress dissident armies, but victory over Yanxiao in the short term presented a far more serious setback for the Prince of Wei over the long haul: he had squandered most of the second month of 926 south of the Shu border awaiting resolution of the crisis on his southern flank.137 Another critical decision involved leaving behind five thousand crack troops to secure the frontier in northern Sichuan, as Jiji crossed the border into the northwest. Their absence would create serious gaps in his own bodyguard as it progressed toward Changan, an area whose control by the court had always been nebulous.138 Captured alive and carried away in a cage, Kang Yanxiao was later interrogated by Meng Zhixiang and Ren Huan about his reasons for rebelling, conduct so contrary to his acclaim as loyal officer. Yanxiao countered by impugning the actions of Luoyang instead: Guo Chongtao, a subject critical to securing the dynasty’s mandate, ranked first in merit: without shedding the blood of troops, he captured the circuits of Eastern

133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138.

JWDS 34.471–72; ZZTJ 274.8960–61. XWDS 44.486–87; HR p. 373; ZZTJ 274.8961. XWDS 44.486–87; HR p. 373; JWDS 74.969. XWDS 33.362; HR p. 280; JWDS 67.895, 74.969–70, 95.1266. ZZTJ 274.8963. XWDS 64.799–800; HR p. 524.

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and Western Chuan. Suddenly, his entire family is slain without commission of a crime. What chances does someone like myself have to save his own neck?139

The statement speaks to the high regard for the former military commissioner within the armed forces, including individuals who had felt the sting of his reproach. Yanxiao perished in northern Sichuan at the hand of the eunuch Xiang Yansi on the eighth day of the third month (926.03.08). He and Zhixiang acted with such dispatch perhaps out of concern over a potential mutiny by loyal officers, men who felt so passionately for Yanxiao that they gladly risked their careers, and perhaps even their own lives, to retrieve his remains for a fitting burial.140

The Liquidation of Shu Royals The same eunuch responsible for slaying Kang Yanxiao, Xiang Yansi, played a similarly pivotal role in exterminating Shu royals headed for the capital on the eighteenth day of the third month (926.03.18). They had been placed under house arrest in Changan for some weeks. Zhuangzong appears to have worried that the presence of Shu royals in the entourage of Jiji might draw undue attention to him and jeopardize his safety. Meanwhile, intimates like the actor Jing Jin had expressed concern about the potential for armed conflict, should opportunists exploit the presence of the former royals to wreak havoc in the west or exploit their absence from Shu to make mischief there, both highly unlikely scenarios.141 For these various reasons, Wang Yan and closest kin perished at Changan late on the eighteenth day of the third month (926.03.18). The carnage at Changan could have been worse: the imperial edict had originally called for the liquidation of the entire entourage from Shu, both related and unrelated associates of Wang royals, potentially a thousand men and women. But senior eunuch Zhang Juhan, in the independent spirit of predecessor Zhang Chengye, refused to proceed, insisting, “Murdering people already in submission is most unpropitious!”142 So, the edict was modified to limit the slayings to “a single family,” that is, Yan’s nuclear family plus a handful of close relatives. The bad faith of Luoyang especially outraged Yan’s mother, who seemed set on putting a curse on the imperial family in her final utterances to slayers, “My son forfeited an empire of his own volition, only to be slaughtered instead, an act that contravenes both honesty and integrity. I have every certainty that calamity will befall you as well!”143 By now, the political capital of the Son of Heaven had sunk to a new low and the multiplicity of betrayals would produce backlashes elsewhere. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143.

XWDS 44.486–87; HR p. 373; JWDS 74.970; ZZTJ 274.8966. JWDS 74.970. XWDS 37.400, 63.793; HR pp. 313, 518; JWDS 34.475, 90.1182; ZZTJ 274.8970–71, 275.8977. XWDS 38.406; HR p. 319. XWDS 63.793; HR p. 518.

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Insurrection at Tianxiong Local Frustrations Over a thousand kilometers away from Shu, the empire faced its first existential threat since its founding—an event unrelated to the adventure in Sichuan, except in the sense that the war in the southwest created a contagion of insecurity among regional powerbrokers across the country. The new conflagration erupted in the oldest of hotspots, the Tianxiong command, six prefectures dominated by Weizhou, Beizhou, and Bozhou. A vacuum in leadership had been allowed to emerge due to the deployment of local troops away from their bases, plus some ill-advised appointments as military overseers, policy decisions aggravated by a spate of natural disasters that struck the region. In the early days of the second month of 926, a mutiny erupted among embittered guardsmen at Beizhou, men originally based at Weizhou, who elevated Huangfu Hui as steward. The Beizhou renegades promptly lodged the following grievance against Luoyang: Through the acquisition of Weizhou, Our Dynasty was able to absorb armies across the north and obliterate the Liang, which in turn elevated Our Dynasty to supreme sovereignty over the world today. For over a decade, men-of-arms at Weizhou have toiled with armor perpetually on our backs and our horses saddled. The Son of Heaven, despite reigning over the entire world, has ignored the burden that we have borne, men deployed far from home for too long and unable to reunite with families, even those at close quarters.144

As the statement suggests, the administration had proven indifferent to the heavy burden borne by Tianxiong, economically and militarily, as base of operations for nearly eight years preceding the dynasty’s founding, plus the human cost of postings away from home since the accession. Apart from brief stints in the Palace Guard, locals often faced long-term assignments to cities sometimes near and sometimes far from home. In effect, rotations conceived as a wholesome check on local military machines were met with pervasive hostility, circumstances worsened by special deployments to places as far away as Sichuan. Thus, the uprising at Weizhou cannot be wholly divorced from the Shu intervention.

The Infection Spreads to Weizhou After failing to coerce two lieutenants in succession to lead them and summarily slaying both men, mutineers at Beizhou dangled the heads before Zhao Zaili to impress him into service.145 Native to the rapidly dissolving Yan kingdom, Zaili had 144. XWDS 49.556. 145. XWDS 46.503–4; HR pp. 384–85; JWDS 90.1177–78; ZZTJ 274.8958–60.

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joined Jin armies over a decade earlier, rising up the ranks to senior commander. He was on special assignment in the region at the time of the outbreak. The local rumor machine had produced a mass of misinformation about turmoil at court, rumors used to rally the military to protect local interests while professing, “to deliver the dynasty from impending peril.” The court’s erratic conduct since the Shu campaign had thus provided pretext for action by groups with old scores to settle. In the case of Beizhou, the disaffected may have also held umbrage over the massacre there several years earlier. As noted in Chapter 2, military authorities had slain thousands of surrendering soldiers from the city, ignoring promises of clemency from the Prince of Jin. The insurrection migrated from Beizhou to Weizhou by the ninth day of the second month (926.02.09), the speed of which suggests a serious vacuum in the local leadership. The presiding military inspector for Tianxiong happened to be the actor Shi Yanqiong.146 Emperors since the late Tang often preferred eunuchs as military inspectors, as reflected in the career of Zhang Chengye, although growing numbers of actors came to hold the post under the Tongguang emperor. Unfortunately, the highly regarded custodian for Weizhou, Zhang Xian, had been recently reassigned to Jinyang, causing power to devolve downward to the military inspector. On the heels of Zhu Youqian’s death, Shi Yanqiong received secret palace orders to liquidate a son at nearby Chanzhou. He left Weizhou in the dark of night without revealing either intent or final destination, probably to surprise his target. Yet his suspicious movements spawned a rumor that it was imperial son Jiji, not Guo Chongtao, who had perished in Chengdu and an enraged Empress Liu had already assassinated her husband to assume the throne as emperor, so Yanqiong had been summoned for urgent consultations. The speculative buzz about the Empress is intriguing as a reflection of her image away from court as a woman fully capable of following in the footsteps of Wu Zetian of the Tang, the only Chinese woman to rule as “emperor” in her own right. The military establishment at Tianxiong had seen the crazy convergence of other events from severe earthquakes and floods to doomsday auguries by local fortunetellers, then a succession of reports from Shu that sounded too fabulous to believe. For the winter of 925–26, anything seemed possible and mutinous soldiers at Tianxiong found opportunity in the confusion. More detrimental to the court’s declining fortunes at Weizhou was the ineptitude of local administrators. Military inspector Shi Yanqiong had procrastinated in preparing defenses, ignoring a succession of pleas from subordinates. Mutineers could thereby overtake Weizhou in a sortie, leaving a senile interim custodian to capitulate to mutineers; by then, Yanqiong had already absconded for Luoyang.147 The actor should have been executed for his glaring ineptitude, but Zhuangzong spared him out of purely personal considerations. Laxity for Yanqiong thus stood in stark contrast 146. XWDS 37.401; HR p. 313; JWDS 34.469–70, 69.915; ZZTJ 274.8949. 147. JWDS 69.915.

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with the palace’s heavy hand for everyone from Guo Chongtao to the Shu royal family. Inconsistencies of the sort added to the administration’s growing crisis of confidence.

Deficiencies in Vision Ironically, nearly two years earlier, on the heels of instability at Luzhou, the government had prohibited authorities at cities damaged by war from reconstituting walls and moats, their first line of defense.148 A sense of vulnerability to government armies in the wider region would likely inhibit future mutinies, policymakers reasoned, for insurgents over the past century had emerged almost entirely from within as governors or their lieutenants. Weizhou’s vulnerability to intervention by Beizhou was a byproduct of precisely this policy of weakening the external defenses of problematic places, and Zhuangzong, as the policy’s formulator, must bear some culpability for unintended consequences. Another policy pertaining to Weizhou that returned to haunt its creator relates to the retention of Tianxiong as a single command of six prefectures, rather than break its back by ceding several prefectures to form a separate command, as the Liang had tried without success. A different political configuration might well have precluded the current mutiny. Yet as a rule, Zhuangzong and his inner circle of strategists, in the decade preceding the unification, tended to avoid overhauling organizations and personnel after acquiring an area, exerting control instead through existing military and political structures. An expedient that accelerated the final conquest nonetheless came at considerable cost in terms of administrative responsiveness.

First Suppression Another imperial decision with unforeseen consequences involved selecting foster son Yuan Xingqin to lead the Weizhou suppression.149 Then governor of Songzhou, Xingqin was strong on persistence and valor, but weak on commander’s craft. The emperor admitted to his own reservations about Xingqin’s competence and considered alternatives, including Duan Ning, a close friend.150 But Empress Liu had a soft spot for Xingqin, whose home she once visited in the company of her husband, and convinced Zhuangzong of his suitability for this purportedly “minor task.” The fact that Xingqin left the capital with a Palace Guard contingent of several thousand further attests to the magnitude of the monarch’s misunderstanding of local conditions. There was no excuse for the misstep, for Zhuangzong had presided over Weizhou in the eight years preceding his accession; he had even returned to the area in the previous winter for 148. ZZTJ 274.8921–22. 149. XWDS 25.271; HR p. 227; JWDS 34.471–72, 70.926–27; ZZTJ 274.8949, 8960. 150. ZZTJ 274.8960.

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nearly two months. Intelligence for Weizhou should have been better and local allegiances to the court should have been stronger. Reaching Weizhou on the fourteenth day of the second month (926.02.14), Xingqin proceeded to pummel the city’s southern wall. He simultaneously sought to sway mutinous officers with an imperial edict crafted to be conciliatory in tone. Rebel leader Zhao Zaili, a man of moderation due to his long association with Zhuangzong, first feted government armies in a gesture of goodwill, then tried to explain the motivation of Weizhou troops, whose conduct was illicit by the rules of martial law but wholly pardonable in human terms. Addressing Xingqin from atop the city wall, Zaili set an optimistic tone: After separation from parents for many years, the officers and soldiers of Weizhou returned home without awaiting imperial orders. His Majesty now conveys his wise concerns, while we have our regrets. If you, Sir, can explain matters to the throne, perhaps we can atone for our mistakes and begin anew.151

Zaili proceeded to attribute the incident at Tianxiong rather narrowly to the administration’s policy of garrisoning warriors away from their bases, not some broader disaffection from dynasty. Xingqin found the explanation of the rebels credible and proposed pardons for all, yet an accord with the government rattled the rank-and-file at Weizhou, who snatched the imperial edict and ripped it to pieces to the sound of roaring cheers. To the shock of Zaili, his men were fully prepared to stand down the court and he knew better than to challenge them. The resolve of mutineers infuriated the palace, which subsequently hardened its position under the sway of the actor Shi Yanqiong, now back in the capital.152 “On the day that the city falls, I want no survivors,” Zhuangzong said with a thud, his resolve conveyed by messenger to Xingqin at his base of operations, Chanzhou.153 The palace also decided days later to dispatch reinforcements from several commands, including Zhenzhou, the base of adopted brother Siyuan.

Second Suppression Predictably, the decision to deploy Siyuan to Weizhou was neither quick nor easy.154 Zhuangzong originally offered to lead the suppression in person, but senior civil and military officials worked assiduously to dissuade him. “The capital is the foundation of the empire and Your Majesty cannot casually take leave.”155 Recollections of the 151. 152. 153. 154.

XWDS 25.271; HR pp. 227–28. ZZTJ 274.8962. ZZTJ 274.8962. XWDS 6.55; HR p. 54; JWDS 34.473–74, 35.488; ZZTJ 274.8963; Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, pp. 35–36. 155. XWDS 45.491–92; HR pp. 376–77; JWDS 34.473, 35.487–88; ZZTJ 274.8963–64.

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Sui capital overtaken by Tang armies with its emperor in far-off lands surely dogged the minds of many. It was for precisely this reason that subsequent monarchs met a wall of resistance to any imperial presence on the frontlines.156 A year earlier, similar considerations had informed official opposition to imperial command of Shu armies, which proved to be prescient in light of the calamitous turn of events. Despite conceding on the matter of imperial command, Zhuangzong rejected successive petitions from courtiers to dispatch Siyuan to Weizhou. His instincts were for once right, but the reasons all wrong—namely, a fresh crop of suspicions. Siyuan reached Luoyang in the twelfth month of 925, although he surely had no intention of staying three months. As weeks passed into months, his freedom was now in jeopardy. The long stay permitted the monarch to deploy a one-time servant, Zhu Shouyin, to fraternize with Siyuan in order to gauge his fealty. The favorite instead chose to divulge imperial suspicions to Siyuan, while pressing him to return at once to Zhenzhou or face certain calamity. “My heart has not forsaken Heaven and Earth,” Siyuan averred in affirming loyalties to the throne.157 He refused to leave the capital partly to stem further incriminations against his character and partly for reasons of personal security: it seemed safer to linger in Luoyang than take to the unprotected highways, and Siyuan came without a usual retinue of bodyguards out of concern for appearances. Another individual enlisted by the throne to espy Siyuan, eunuch Ma Shaohong, similarly came to empathize and collude with him. The successor to Guo Chongtao as military commissioner, Shaohong had intervened repeatedly of recent to insulate Siyuan from the slanders of palace favorites. He also attested to Siyuan’s near perfect record of victory in battle to avow that, “he alone can prevail at Weizhou.”158 Finally, the dispatch of Siyuan received the critical endorsement of Zhang Quanyi, the icon of Luoyang politics whose sway with the imperial couple was second to none. Quanyi cited the severity of conditions to the north and the potential for circumstances to spin out of control in the absence of someone of Siyuan’s stature. At the same time, he lambasted the current commander, Yuan Xingqin, “a persistent failure.”159 The emperor ultimately conceded to Siyuan’s deployment to Weizhou for lack of credible alternatives. Many commanders had been siphoned off by conflicts near and far. For example, a small contingent in the Imperial guard from the capital, led by a little known Wang Wen, had mutinied on assignment at a town directly south of Weizhou in the middle of the second month, killing their commanding officer.160 Although merely several days in duration, the action cast doubt upon the loyalties of Imperial guardsmen. The mutiny of Wang Wen had coincided with another at Xingzhou, a prefecture 156. 157. 158. 159. 160.

ZZTJ197.6216–17. XWDS 51.573–74; HR p. 411; JWDS 35.488; Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, pp. 42–45. XWDS 38.408; HR p. 321; JWDS 34.473, 35.488; ZZTJ 274.8957. XWDS 45.492; HR pp. 376–77; JWDS 34.473. JWDS 34.472; ZZTJ 274.8962.

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north of Weizhou, where four hundred Imperial guardsmen on assignment had seized the prefectural seat for two weeks before armies from the capital could restore order.161 Similar scenarios of insubordination in the armies of local governors had erupted across much of North China during the second month of 926, according to the official history, their accumulated effect jarring for the throne.162 Sensitive to the symbolism of such acts of infidelity for his own safety and the discipline of armies at large, Zhuangzong intimated to aides his resolve to conduct a thorough cleansing of his bodyguard after settling scores at Weizhou. Unfortunately, his confidential utterances leaked out to guardsmen.163 He was either too careless in speaking or too trusting of the wrong sorts. The emperor would concede to Siyuan’s deployment to Weizhou on condition that he lead professional guardsmen from the capital. The arrangement served to separate Siyuan from warriors from his regional base at Zhenzhou, who joined the action under the command of Huo Yanwei, a man of unimpeachable integrity, in the estimation of court insiders. Siyuan managed to reach Weizhou with astonishing speed on the sixth day of the third month (926.03.06), only for Imperial guard units—precisely the units believed most loyal to the throne—to turn seditious on short order. A minor officer, Zhang Pobai, proceeded to liquidate his company commanders while enlisting dissident soldiers to incite rancor.164

Entanglements among Mutinous Armies The Weizhou suburbs did contain residual forces loyal to the court, but they failed to rival renegade numbers, forcing Siyuan into a dialogue with deserters. The exchange began with a firm upbraiding, “For the bodyguard of the Son of Heaven no less, how can you possibly mimic renegades instead?” The rebels proceeded to cite a litany of complaints against the government, focusing on indifference to the special conditions behind the Weizhou uprising. In effect, professional soldiers from the capital in empathy with local warriors were impeaching the throne for heartlessness in regulating armies and enforcing discipline: What crime did the men of Weizhou commit? As soldiers on assignment, they simply sought to return home and did so without previous approval. The Son of Heaven refuses to consider leniency, but instead insists on a cold-blooded eradication. Rumor has it that Wei/Bo warriors will be completely annihilated once the city falls, men merely fearful of death and otherwise disinclined to mutiny.165 161. 162. 163. 164.

JWDS 34.471, 473; ZZTJ 274.8962. JWDS 34.473. XWDS 37.401; HR p. 314. On the mutiny, see XWDS 6.55–56, 46.503–4; HR pp. 54, 385–87; JWDS 34.474, 35.488–89, 64.852, 75.980; ZZTJ 274.8965–67; Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, pp. 42–49. 165. XWDS 46.505; HR p. 387.

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Clearly, the court’s threat to Weizhou mutineers struck a sensitive chord among imperial guardsmen, against whom Zhuangzong had pledged similar retaliation for the Wang Wen incident. The palace had turned to Guo Congqian, a favorite now working for the metropolitan police, to assist with the suppression, but he only aggravated frictions with the armed forces out of secret empathy with Guo Chongtao, the former military commissioner.166 The Weizhou upstarts initially pressed Siyuan to accede as emperor of the northern Yellow River region, leaving rule over the southern regions to Zhuangzong. The curious proposal suggests that the monarch had grown insensitive to the northern homeland since relocating south of the river. The multi-capital scheme had promised ongoing links, but Zhuangzong had visited only one of the three auxiliary capitals as emperor, Weizhou, fostering a perception of disinterest in the empire’s vast north. A tearful Siyuan tried to reason with guardsmen, but they formed a circle around him with weapons drawn. He could either join insurgents or die at their hands. Siyuan chose to live, which required an immediate cease-fire and collaboration with presiding officer Zhao Zaili. The scenario, although sanitized by contemporary historians to portray the adopted brother as innocently swept up by events, must contain a modicum of truth based on the past century of historical experience at Weizhou and military politics in general for China’s middle period. Indeed, extending back to the times of Tang Taizong, insubordinate officers had a habit of forcing their agendas upon reticent leaders.167 Having conceded to subordinates, Siyuan entered Weizhou with Huo Yanwei, his deputy commander. As he conferred with Zhao Zaili, the backbone of his army outside the city wall faced harassment by government regulars. Many absconded and some perished. Deprived of an army, Siyuan found himself dependent on the goodwill of Weizhou authorities, not all of whom genuinely embraced him. Fortunately, it took mere days to regroup parts of his dispersed army, which were now subordinate to An Chonghui and Shi Jingtang, senior officers with a combination of professional and personal ties to Siyuan. Thousands of Zhenzhou militia would rally further after Yanwei and Siyuan emerged from isolation at Weizhou to confer with officers, their presence allaying fears that they had succumbed to mishap.168 Siyuan’s last regional posting was at Zhenzhou, sister-city of Zhaozhou. Perhaps the most famous Zhenzhou local to be converted to the uprising was Fu Xi: three years earlier, he had fallen prostrate before the Tongguang emperor and sworn fealty in return for assistance in avenging the death of Wang Rong.169 His change of heart came after appeals from Siyuan and Huo Yanwei. A more predictable conversion 166. 167. 168. 169.

ZZTJ 274.8962–63, 274.8965–66. Zhao, Tang Taizong zhuan, p. 78. JWDS 75.980, 91.1209; ZZTJ 274.8967; Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, pp. 43–45. XWDS 26.278.

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involved Li Congke, the forty-something adopted son of Siyuan, whom the Son of Heaven once praised as, “possessing a valor in combat akin to my own.”170 But confronted with the turn of events at Weizhou, Congke sided with Siyuan and provided critical cavalry backup for mutineers. Not all Siyuan partisans followed the lead of the insurgents. Hou Yi, a trusted lieutenant, insisted on taking the hazardous trip from Weizhou to Luoyang with few supports, his fidelity bringing tears to the emperor’s eyes.171 Sadly for the throne, the ranks of the steadfastly loyal were thinning by the day, momentum clearly resting with his rivals.

Drawing in Xiangzhou Additional options became available to Siyuan as a consequence of amassing an army. He personally preferred to proceed northward to Zhenzhou, whose reinforced walls were “impenetrable like iron,” making it the most secure base from which to conduct negotiations with Luoyang.172 Advisors disagreed, preferring a neutral spot slightly south of Weizhou yet north of the Yellow River. Siyuan thus proceeded to Xiangzhou, where he could summon old colleagues and friends.173 Up to several messengers a day were dispatched from Xiangzhou to Luoyang in efforts at dialogue, most intercepted by Yuan Xingqin. Having fled Weizhou after the mutiny, sources say, he feared the death penalty if his cowardice were exposed.174 For days, therefore, Siyuan received no response from the court and inferred a negative answer in the silence. A misguided Xingqin likely failed to fully appreciate the ramifications of disrupted dialogue, for deeds over a lifetime prove him to be neither a coward nor an infidel. At this moment of uncertainty about the throne’s perception of events, and its possible reaction in the form of retaliation, the preeminent concern to Siyuan was the safety of family members. The eldest of four biological sons, Li Congjing, commanding a unit in Luoyang’s Imperial Guard. The honor doubled as ransom and Zhuangzong had ample opportunity to kill him, but he generously enlisted the son’s services as mediator. Through his exemplary record in the guard, the emperor had developed a high regard for the man, so he set a conciliatory tone upon releasing Congjing: “Your father is distinguished in meritorious service to our country and enjoys my complete trust as loyal subject. Today, as he faces coercion from unruly armies, it is critical that you convey my sentiments to him without holding back.”175

170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175.

XWDS 7.71; HR p. 67; JWDS 46.625–27. Song shi 254.8879. ZZTJ 267.8731. ZZTJ 269.8804. ZZTJ 274.8969. JWDS 35.489; XWDS 15.161; HR p. 150; Xu Tang shu 37.344; Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, pp. 45–47, 56, 125.

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Zhuangzong’s nuanced language suggests that he saw Siyuan as the likely victim of military intrigues and had no qualms about a full pardon. The release of Congjing, the sole pawn in his hand, suggests a willingness to trust Siyuan, despite the absence of direct communications. Others did not share his faith in Siyuan’s son, including field commander Xingqin, who intercepted Congjing just south of Weizhou, before he could complete the mission, and forced his return to the capital.176 Zhuangzong was so stirred by Congjing’s devotion that he adopted him as son and conferred a new name, Jijing, employing the same generational identifier as his biological offspring.

Bulls-Eye on Kaifeng Despite worries over the safety of his son at large, Siyuan faced pressures from his closest lieutenants for whom expanded disobedience was the sole option short of surrender. Many believed that Yuan Xingqin would continue to obstruct mediation, irrespective of the personal wishes of the throne, due to alliances with petty persons in the capital, including but not limited to Empress Liu, whose hostility to Siyuan was well documented.177 A greater challenge involved disproving the presumption of guilt and beating the odds of history. In the words of Shi Jingtang, Siyuan’s protégé, “Once subordinate armies turn mutinous, it is rare for the general commander to elude retribution from the government!”178 In the face of such urgency, Jingtang proposed a provocative realignment of power by directing armies immediately against Kaifeng, roughly two hundred kilometers to the south of Xiangzhou. Seizing the former capital would strengthen Siyuan’s hand by placing him in close proximity to Luoyang, but with the professed goal of “proving his innocence” to the world, which fell short of rebellion in Jingtang’s estimation. The difference was solely a matter of semantics. Fellow officer Huo Yanwei and senior strategist An Chonghui also rallied around Jingtang’s proposal, finally swaying a still reticent Siyuan.179 Once committed to a storm on Kaifeng, Siyuan moved to insulate remaining kin from the arm of the law. His emissaries at Xiangzhou clandestinely contacted authorities at several different commands to neutralize them, cajoling when possible and coercing when necessary.180 The most critical contact was Zhenzhou, residence of Siyuan’s future wife, Woman Cao, plus numerous concubines and children. Wang Jianli, the city’s deputy inspector, brazenly assassinated the overseer “to spare Siyuan’s dependents the usual calamity,” due to a long professional association.181 A parallel scenario unfolded at Kaifeng, where 176. XWDS 25.271–72; HR p. 228; JWDS 34.474. 177. JWDS 35.489. 178. XWDS 8.77–78; HR p. 73; Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, p. 46. Citations elsewhere can vary, see JWDS 75.980; ZZTJ 274.8969. 179. JWDS 64.852. 180. ZZTJ 274.8969. 181. XWDS 46.512; HR p. 391.

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Siyuan’s eldest daughter, spouse of Shi Jingtang, was insulated from punishment by local authorities as they awaited the father’s arrival.182 The success of four separate contacts in different parts of the empire suggests a well-oiled network of support for Siyuan, support lacking for the government even at cities as close as Kaifeng. The same network enabled Siyuan partisans to intercept ships on the Grand Canal containing cargoes of tax proceeds to finance the insurrection as it spread southward.183

Disaffection in the Land Fiscal Pinch The emperor’s low regard within military circles in Spring 926 is commonly traced to escalating tensions over compensation and assorted perquisites. In the wake of the Weizhou uprising, senior civilian officials petitioned to release gold and silk from the palace’s private cache as incentive for soldiers.184 Strongly endorsing their petition was Chief Councilor Doulu Ge, who argued: “Government revenues are fully spent, even as the palace treasury contains a surplus. I fear that our soldiers, lacking the means to support their own families, might turn against us.” His well-considered pleas were rejected outright by Kong Qian, the administration’s hard-hearted revenues commissioner.185 Even court astrologers weighed in, predicting dangers to the imperial person and urging special bonuses for bodyguards in closest proximity to the Son of Heaven.186 Comments of the sort suggest that soldiers, even in the elite Palace Guard, could not survive on salaries alone and the government had withheld these needed supplements.187 For a monarch who had fought alongside warriors for a decade, ignorance of their condition is hard to fathom, leaving only indifference to explain the lack of intervention in a timely manner. Another factor undermining the morale of the metropolitan armed forces was the Middle Palace, which controlled roughly half of the palace privy. At the peak of the country’s famine, in response to official pleas to release funds from her own treasury, Empress Liu engaged in bald-faced acts of denial. Displaying a cosmetics chest and three silver basins containing items from her treasury, she insisted, “The tribute from the governors has been fully spent, leaving only such worthless things. Perhaps we can barter these to placate the military!”188 Officials left the palace without pressing matters in the face of her stridency and Zhuangzong never demanded proof. On the 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187.

JWDS 61.823; XWDS 25.275; ZZTJ 274.8968. ZZTJ 274.8971–72. JWDS 34.475. ZZTJ 274.8968. Xu Tang shu 35.326. For imperial Rome as well, “rewards” were not a supplement, but a necessity; see Santosuosso, Storming the Heavens, p. 15. For a perspective of the problem from the Song dynasty, see Song shi 306.10095. 188. XWDS 14.145; HR p. 135; ZZTJ 274.8968.

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heels of the Weizhou mutiny some months later, Empress Liu did release sizable sums of gold and silk for distribution to the military, whose officers could only respond with curses: “Our wives and children have died of hunger. Of what use are these things now?”189 By the middle of the third month, four hundred thousand objects of gold or silver from Sichuan finally reached Luoyang. “The entire cache shall be given to our troops,” the emperor insisted, but the charity came too late to change hearts that had already hardened against him.190

Fall of Kaifeng Commander Yuan Xingqin returned to the capital to confer with the palace about Siyuan’s advance against Kaifeng. It was the eighteenth day of the third month (926.03.18) and his secret plans had somehow made their way to Luoyang.191 In response, Zhuangzong departed for the east, accompanied by Li Congjing, Siyuan’s eldest son. Xingqin rushed eastward in the direction of Kaifeng. But the emperor and his guard, awaiting reinforcements, remained at Sishui county, the outskirts of Luoyang. The backers of Siyuan proved far more daring: crossing the Yellow River, they penetrated Huazhou on short order, the prefecture directly north of Kaifeng. An increasingly desperate Son of Heaven released Siyuan’s son for another attempt at mediation, but Congjing was apprehended for a second time by Xingqin, who pummeled him to death without consulting the throne.192 Aides had repeatedly prodded Congjing to abscond on the heels of his father’s advance southward, actions certain to cast his own fidelity in doubt. “Congjing accepted death as the cost of abiding by his ruler,” writes the Historical Records in a stirring elegy, for he placed loyal principle before life itself.193 Siyuan managed to seize Kaifeng days after Congjing’s death, too late to save him. Zhuangzong had spent four critical days at Sishui, awaiting five hundred elite horsemen from Kaifeng.194 He continued eastward on the twenty-fourth day (926.03.24), but he had barely reached Yingze county, a hundred kilometers west of Kaifeng, when the confederates of his adopted brother swept the city, greeted in its suburbs by Kong  Xun, the city’s overseer. Shi Jingtang had managed to claim Kaifeng without resistance, despite a miniscule advance force of several hundred men.195 The overseer, a former revenues officer under the Liang with little in the way of distinguished service, emerges in the histories as a manipulative man, “given to spineless sycophancy and 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195.

XWDS 14.145; HR p. 135; ZZTJ 274.8970. JWDS 34.475. XWDS 25.272; HR p. 228; ZZTJ 274.8970. JWDS 35.488–89, 70.927; ZZTJ 274.8970. XWDS 15.162; HR pp. 150–51. XWDS 25.275. JWDS 94.1252; ZZTJ 274.8971–72.

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treacherous tricks.” With the emperor approaching Kaifeng from the west and Siyuan from the north, Xun arranged identical greeting parties for both men. “Whoever arrives first, enters first,” he instructed guards at the gates.196 Xun’s lack of scruples reflected poorly not just on him personally, but the judgment of a court that entrusted the strategically vital Kaifeng to such a mediocrity. In all fairness, the palace did offer the post to Guo Chongtao a year earlier, prior to the Shu mission that ended in his death.197 Able alternatives must have been few and loyal alternatives fewer still. In addition, the cream of the city’s military crop was often deployed on special assignments, leaving a vacuum at the top. Siyuan had effectively replicated in 926 the raid on Kaifeng three years earlier, which he had guided from conception to execution. Yet admittedly, he also possessed superior organization on the ground and goodwill among officers. He arranged for negotiators to precede his armies along the entire course from Xiangzhou to Kaifeng to neutralize potential opponents, starting with Wang Yanqiu, commander of a nearby garrison.198 A careful mix of diplomacy and force of arms also occurred in Kaifeng’s suburbs, where an officer initially loyal to the throne, Xifang Ye, defected to the rebels.199 The defections of many within the Imperial guard belie a highly effective machine working on behalf of the seasoned and popular Siyuan. An officer dispatched to Kaifeng by the throne with several thousand crack cavalry, Yao Yanwen, lost roughly a third of his men before even reaching the city: they rushed Kaifeng not to suppress mutineers, but to swell their ranks.200 Most soldiers were locals more passionate about reuniting with families than risking their lives for an unpopular ruler and his despised inner circle. Yanwen attributed his own disaffection to, “the nefarious influence of Yuan Xingqin,” the well-intended but ineffectual field commander. Zhuangzong had gotten as far as Wansheng garrison upon learning of Siyuan’s success at overtaking the city. So, he headed back in the direction of Luoyang, exclaiming with a heavy heart, “The situation is hopeless!”201 Yet he was far from destitute: the west and southwest still seemed solidly under government control as a base of possible resistance. At Sishui Pass, as his men navigated a narrow canyon, the Son of Heaven took special pains to rally residuals with promises of bounty upon return to the capital. He  specifically directed his palace treasurer, Zhang Rongge, to distribute imperial sashes among the men, but the treasurer reported nothing in store. His statement only riled guardsmen, who blamed the treasurer’s parsimony for the current turn of events and demanded his death. A defiant Rongge placed the blame elsewhere, “Empress Liu 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201.

XWDS 43.474; HR p. 366; Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, pp. 47–48. ZZTJ 273.8930–31. XWDS 46.510; HR p. 389. ZZTJ 274.8971–72. JWDS 34.475, 35.489; ZZTJ 274.8972. ZZTJ 274.8972.

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values material things and failed to provide for our soldiers, responsibility for which ultimately rests with me. For failing to anticipate the problem, my body will be rendered into ten thousand pieces!” He subsequently leaped to his death in a nearby river.202 Members of the imperial entourage, whose ranks had thinned considerably, engaged in additional soul-searching in suburban Luoyang on the twenty-eighth day of the third month (926.03.28).203 As he shared wine with Yuan Xingqin and other loyalists, Zhuangzong pondered his remaining options: You Gentlemen, as longtime followers of mine, have stuck with me through thick and thin, never flinching. Yet confronted with today’s peril, you sit quietly without uttering a word, simply awaiting an uncertain outcome. Back at Yingze, I expressed a desire to cross the river by horse to draw out Siyuan in person, but each of you cited the risks entailed. What do you now propose, in light our current predicament?204

His words speak to the frustration that every alternative was not pursued, especially in negotiation. The passage further reveals the emperor’s own impulse to meet with Siyuan under more favorable conditions and regrets about conceding too quickly to advisers. A tearful Xingqin was emphatic in his response: “I began as a man of obscure origins, but Your Majesty’s good graces have allowed me to hold my current credentials as chief councilor. Were I to fail in requiting empire at this moment of peril, even death would seem a small price to pay!” The officers all loosened their hair-knots to sever plaits of hair, then tossed the locks onto the floor in swearing oaths of allegiance. “Ruler and subject embraced one another in unfathomable grief,” the official history writes, reflecting the prevailing sense of dejection.205 The monarch returned immediately to the safety of Luoyang.

The Final Desertion The first day of the fourth month (926.04.01) began with an imperial audience, the palace striving to convey a sense of normalcy. Officials had alerted Zhuangzong to the impending return of Jiji, whose entourage had begun its final approach to Changan.206 The monarch had planned to proceed to Sishui to reconstitute armies recently scattered, then deploy them to facilitate the safe return of campaigners from Shu, so the afternoon was supposed to involve inspections of cavalry in the capital. Deteriorating conditions to the empire’s east must have heightened concern about the safety of his son returning from the west. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206.

XWDS 14.146; HR pp. 135–36; JWDS 34.476; ZZTJ 274.8972–73; Xu Tang shu 35.326. XWDS 25.275; ZZTJ 274.8973. XWDS 25.272; HR pp. 228–29. XWDS 25.272; HR p. 229. On the incident, see XWDS 14.151, 37.401–2, 51.573–74; HR pp. 141, 314–15, 411; JWDS 34.477–78, 35.490, 74.971; ZZTJ 275.8974–75.

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Sometime around the noon hour, chaos erupted at the southern Xingjiao Gate amidst a surprise assault by the actor Guo Congqian, one of four directors in the Imperial Guard. In the closing days of the Tongguang reign, Congqian had finagled a senior post in the guard, despite a mediocre record of service.207 Still, no great affection existed between the monarch and this particular actor. Congqian enjoyed better relations with Guo Chongtao, whom he acknowledged as “uncle” due to a common surname. He could boast close ties to Li Cunyi as well, an imperial stepbrother once adopted by him as foster son; Cunyi also belonged to Chongtao’s political faction. And finally, Congqian had worked alongside Wang Wen in the past, a fellow director in the Imperial guard. All three former associates of the actor had perished in the recent string of palace-mandated executions. The source of even greater anguish for Congqian was the emperor’s own words: “Members of your faction, Cunyi and Chongtao, betrayed me and drove Wang Wen to treachery. What else do you intend?”208 He may have been simply taunting Congqian, but the guardsman took the thrashing as a threat and succeeded in turning the Imperial Guard against the throne by convincing lesser officers of their own vulnerability to purge. Upon learning of Congqian’s apostasy, Zhuangzong summoned Zhu Shouyin from the eastern gate. Shouyin was the capital’s chief of police, an old family friend with little in the way of merit. In the interim, the emperor organized a hundred palace eunuchs along with younger brother Cunwo to engage the mutineers in hand-to-hand combat. By then, the rebels had scaled the Xingjiao Gate to infiltrate the city.209 The critical supports from the eastern gate never materialized, for Shouyin had held back his own men, the capital’s police force and imperial guard now acting in concert against the palace. The emperor cut down dozens of mutinous men in the conflagration at the gate, a sign of his continued prowess as warrior, only to be gravely injured by a stray arrow. A caretaker of imperial falcons, the imperial couple’s hunting companion it would appear, insisted on carrying the monarch’s near lifeless body to a nearby building, where he excised the arrow. Zhuangzong perished all the same within the hour.210 A handful of loyal guardsmen led by Li Yanqing and Wang Quanbin encircled the corpse and wept bitterly in disbelief, but they had arrived too late to save their sovereign.211 A man in his prime at forty-two sui, forty-and-a-half by Western reckoning, his reign of Common Brilliance had barely finished its third year.212 By one account, Empress Liu lit a torch to the hall containing Zhuangzong’s corpse before fleeing for the north, presumably to prevent defilement of his remains. Another 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212.

XWDS 37.402; HR p. 314; ZZTJ 274.8962–63; Wudai shihua, pp. 49–50. XWDS 37.402; HR p. 314. On the strategic importance of the Xingjiao Gate, see ZZTJ 275.8974. ZZTJ 275.8975. Song shi 251.8837, 255.8919. Chen, Jiu Wudai shi, see 34.998. He died on May 15 by the Julian calendar.

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source insists that she had absconded long before her husband had fully expired and left disposal of the remains to their hunting companion.213 In the latter scenario, the stiffening corpse was placed atop a pile of musical instruments for cremation in the open air: acting, hunting, and music, the three loves of Cunxu’s life, each partaking in his final act on earth. The end seemed fitting for this monarch of unruly passions, “who loved not wisely, but too well,” as the mercenary warrior Othello said before taking his own life.214 He too paid dearly for his romantic obsessions and misplaced trust. As news of the Tongguang emperor’s denouement spread afar, even enemies would lament the waste of so much genius. “No land was beyond the reach of his armies,” exclaimed Abaoji, in genuine admiration for his martial genius.215 Much of the monarch’s early life involved such noble deeds as writing the Shatuo people into the history of the Middle Kingdom, but he somehow shrunk in his final years to an object of scorn in his own backyard. The discipline of the battlefield proved impossible to replicate in the palaces of Luoyang. Mother Cao seems to have sensed as much when she tried to dissuade Cunxu from the earliest mission abroad, the intervention at Zhao—the mission that lured her son from satrapy to empire, from obscurity to fame, from her loving hands to the paws of mediocrities and cynics.

213. JWDS 70.927; XWDS 14.146, 37.402. 214. Shakespeare writes in the last act of Othello: “Speak of me as I am; nothing extenuate, Of one that loved not wisely but too well.” The African warrior, Othello, was undone by his love of Desdemona, the Italian woman whom he killed out of jealousy before killing himself. 215. Mote, Imperial China, pp. 46–47.

5 The Hand of History

Subjects treated as their ruler’s hands and feet will deem him a friend; Subjects treated as their ruler’s horses and hounds will deem him a stranger; But people for long oppressed by their sovereign will reckon him a foe. The Mencius, Book IV, Part B

Within hours of the Tongguang emperor’s death, his Luoyang palaces were ransacked by Zhu Shouyin, who had held back the metropolitan police despite multiple summons from the palace. The policeman staked personal claim to over thirty harem ladies in addition to objects that included a priceless cache of musical instruments.1 He even allowed soldiers and other marauders to plunder the capital for a full day before inviting the forces of adopted brother Li Siyuan to restore order. Any undue delay by the caretaker government ran the risk of inviting intervention from powerful adversaries to the south like Chu and Wu, each with standing armies of up to eighty thousand, or the Kitan to the north, whose military machine was even more formidable. Neighbors of every stripe were on constant alert to any vacuum in the Central Plains that they might exploit for strategic gain. Sources portray Siyuan, a man given to a fairly free expression of emotion, as “overcome with irrepressible grief ” upon learning of the former emperor’s demise. He had departed for the west in advance of the mutiny and accelerated his progress in its wake, reaching Luoyang on the third day of the fourth month (926.04.03), two days after the monarch expired.2 And in a tone of neutrality, Siyuan directed the metropolitan police, “to secure the capital in anticipation of the impending return of Jiji, the Prince of Wei.”3 For now, the country had no emperor, and Siyuan, sensitive to appearances, chose to lodge at his private residence in the capital, not imperial palaces. Zhuangzong still had sons and younger siblings at large, by one account eleven, a handful of determined eunuchs overseeing key armies, and clusters of dedicated officials in the Hedong

1. 2. 3.

XWDS 51.574; HR p. 411; JWDS 74.971; ZZTJ 275.8975. JWDS 35.490, 91.1196; Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, pp. 49–50. ZZTJ 275.8976.

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homeland.4 There were many possible outcomes to this scenario, only one of which involved the older man’s accession as Son of Heaven. Zhuangzong’s eldest son, Li Jiji, had learned of his death some days after the event, as he approached the western suburbs of Changan. Someone with remarkably good instincts for his years, he clearly envisioned potential hazards to his person and expressed a preference to return to Sichuan, thereby placing him beyond the reach of conspirators backing his uncle. Jiji might well have created an independent satrapy in that case, like Liu Bei in the third century, who installed a fledgling successor regime to the Han dynasty in the southwest in opposition to the Wei dynasty in the north.5 But the eunuch Li Congxi, companion throughout the Shu campaign, invoked the familiar idiom that, “advance is always better than retreat,” and pressed Jiji to accelerate progress toward Luoyang in the hope of resolving the political crisis in person. Congxi likely also deduced that suppression armies were homesick after an absence spanning a half-year. Early movement back to the Shu border suggests that Jiji initially acted on his own impulses for nearly a week, only to resume movement eastward by the middle of the fourth month, as aides advised. The same eunuch had shaped the decision months earlier to slay Guo Chongtao at Chengdu, defying Jiji’s own reservations and creating the current backlash.6 He was likely homesick as well. The well-being of his mother was likely the determining factor in Jiji’s calculus to return to the capital. Empress Liu had fled Luoyang for Jinyang after her husband’s death.7 Mother and son must have been uncommonly close, having spent little time apart since his birth, the spanking episode cited earlier hardly representative of their broader relationship. Empress Liu’s deeds, including high-profile missteps, were always done in the perceived interests of her first-born. Escorts for her trip of roughly five days to Jinyang included hundreds of bodyguards, plus Cunwo, the deceased emperor’s youngest sibling. Partly for her own safety, the Empress rushed to a nunnery upon reaching Jinyang, her horse bearing treasures from the Middle Palace, perhaps to induce reluctant hosts to extend sanctuary. The practice of a dying ruler’s consorts retiring to nunneries had been well established by Tang times, as reflected in the retirement of Wu Zetian after the death of Taizong. More recently at Jinyang, Consort Chen similarly entered a monastery upon the death of Li Keyong. In addition, the extraordinary religious piety of Empress Liu over the course of her two-year reign made retirement as nun wholly fitting. Roughly coinciding with Empress Liu’s arrival at Jinyang, on the ninth day of the fourth month (926.04.09), a directive of some symbolism emanated from Luoyang in the name of the “interim overseer” ( jianguo), Siyuan’s informal title, and the equivalent 4. 5. 6. 7.

Xu Tang shu 37.344. XWDS 14.154; HR p. 144; ZZTJ 60.2159; 275.8977, 8981. XWDS 14.153–54; HR p. 143. XWDS 14.146, 151; HR p. 136, 141; ZZTJ 275.8979; Xu Tang shu 35.326.

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of regent. It instructed officials near and far to arrange safe passage to the capital for the biological brothers of Zhuangzong.8 “The principle of a surviving brother succeeding the deceased presents no problem for me,” Siyuan subsequently declared. The statement infers a preference for fraternal succession and recognition that the former emperor’s brothers were preferable to Jiji, in light of his youth.9 The search for survivors and related statements implied a commitment to continuity in the succession by retaining the line of Keyong. Four younger siblings of Cunxu were either still alive or believed to be alive when the directive was issued, although not for long. A string of slayings ensued in coming days, some perhaps by serendipity, but others reflecting a conspiracy at the highest levels to eliminate all potential heirs to Zhuangzong, contravening the principles articulated by Siyuan in letter and spirit. Two biological brothers, Cunji and Cunque, who lived in Luoyang for most of the reign, had absconded for the southwest immediately after the coup headed for the nearby Southern Mountains, where commoners offered refuge.10 Neither man had been involved in political crimes of any note, yet they fell to assassins sometime during the fourth month. Notably, Cunji shared the same biological mother as Cunxu, Mother Cao, which made him an ideal candidate for fraternal succession. Most accounts attribute the slayings to An Chonghui, the senior military advisor, who used Siyuan’s preoccupation with mourning rites to issue “secret orders” without consulting him. Siyuan learned of the murders only after the fact, sources say.11 To be sure, such independence of action is consistent with the subsequent political style of Chonghui, “who already exerted a firm grip on government affairs,” by every indication.12 Yet irrespective of the degree of Siyuan’s personal involvement in the affair, the deaths reflected a conspiracy emanating from his inner circle for which he must bear ultimate responsibility. The two remaining brothers of the Tongguang emperor with the same mother would perish by the middle of the fourth month under questionable circumstances. Here, complicity on the part of the new authorities at Luoyang is possible, but not provable. Cunba, governor of the strategic Hezhong command at the time of the coup, was slain by the armies of Fu Yanchao, as he progressed toward Jinyang, presumably by sympathizers of Siyuan’s interim government. He had reached the city without the usual security. An almost identical fate befell youngest brother Cunwo, murdered west of Jinyang by mutinous soldiers for unspecified reasons.13 Perhaps the two men were caught in the crossfire of retribution against their unpopular brother. More importantly, the armies of Cunba surely contained some Hezhong locals who empathized with Zhu Youqian, for Cunba had assumed powers at Hezhong immediately after 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

XWDS 14.152; HR p. 141; JWDS 35.491; ZZTJ 275.8978–80, 275.8982–83. JWDS 35.491. XWDS 14.152; HR pp. 141–42; Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, pp. 51–52. Beimeng suoyan 18.332; Xu Tang shu 40.365. JWDS 66.873. XWDS 14.151–52; HR p. 141; Beimeng suoyan 18.332; ZZTJ 275.8979.

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Youqian’s execution in the capital. But the speedy convergence of so many politically symbolic slayings cannot be sheer coincidence. No source disputes the Interim regent’s complicity in the assassination of Empress Liu, who perished by the middle of the fourth month of 926, apparently without her son’s knowledge.14 Contemporaries charged her with “fornicating” with brother-in-law Cunwo during their hurried flight to Jinyang, a dubious allegation. As the youngest royal sibling, Cunwo always enjoyed special access to the women of the palace. At the outset of the reign, Zhuangzong chose him to escort Mother Cao to the capital, and a year later tapped him once again to escort Consort Dowager Liu to the capital, a trip cancelled due to her death. The assignments reflect Cunwo’s unique standing in the royal palace of Jinyang and subsequently the imperial inner circle at Luoyang, including that of his sister-in-law during her reign as empress. Empress Liu was also maligned for displaying cruel indifference to her husband in his dying hours: she allegedly summoned eunuchs to provide final sustenance to the wounded Zhuangzong, then absconded for the north before he had fully expired, highly improper conduct for the mother of the empire.15 Ultimately, the moral charges against Empress Liu stuck due to her appalling political record, but poor judgment did not rise to a capital offense and her enemies wanted blood. Meanwhile, the elimination of Empress Liu simplified movement against the most vulnerable targets. The four known younger sons of the deceased emperor vanished without evidence of culpability, the time and place of their deaths a mystery as well.16 In this way, potential heirs biologically linked to Zhuangzong had perished within weeks of his death, save for one. In the middle of the fourth month of 926, coinciding with his mother’s death in the north, Jiji led a contingent of civil and military aides numbering in the thousands toward a river crossing near Changan, the western capital. It was the final leg of the Shu campaign and considerable riches still remained under their control.17 Members of the entourage knew the path to contain local leaders with ill intent, but they proceeded through Changan all the same. As they passed through the city’s eastern suburbs, the hereditary custodian Zhang Jian severed a suspension bridge to separate Jiji from the bulk of his companions. He coursed the river eastward for some days with the eunuch Congxi, bodyguard Li Huan, and senior officer Mao Zhang. Desperation now compelled Jiji to seek a merciful end, as he pleaded with Huan: “Having exhausted all conceivable paths, I beseech you to take my life.” The bodyguard initially demurred, then relented under additional pressure. Jiji died by strangulation on the fourteenth day of the fourth month (926.04.14) at Weinan, a site over fifty kilometers east of Changan, 14. 15. 16. 17.

XWDS 14.146; HR p. 136; Beimeng suoyan 18.333; Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, p. 52. XWDS 14.146, 37.402; HR pp. 136, 314. XWDS 6.62,14.155; HR pp. 59, 145. XWDS 14.154–55, 47.522; HR pp. 59, 144–45, 394–95; JWDS 73.959, 90.1183; Song shi 255.8910–11; Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, pp. 53–55.

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nearly far enough to elude the local menace. Huan similarly committed suicide out of fidelity to his prince. Miraculously, commander Mao Zhang not only survived, he made it safely to the capital.18 Historians find puzzling the motivation of Zhang Jian, who in the process of obstructing returning armies from Shu changed the course of dynastic history. In the words of Ouyang Xiu, “Whether Jiji lived or died had no impact, positive or negative, upon Zhang Jian. Why did Jian offer the resistance that prevented Jiji from proceeding eastward? Did others perhaps facilitate Jian’s interception?”19 Jian’s elder brother, Zhang Yun, did serve under Guo Chongtao during the Shu campaign, so the younger sibling may have retaliated for Jiji’s slaying of Chongtao, assuming that Yun, like many senior officers, held the military commissioner in high regard. Political motivation for the Zhang brothers is further inferred by the allusion to potential “facilitators” in the Historical Records, words that cast a suspicious eye on the interim government of Siyuan. Within days of overtaking Luoyang, An Chonghui had been installed as military commissioner and he in turn rushed to appoint trusted lieutenants to prefectures as far west as Huazhou, close enough to Changan to exert sway over the city’s leadership.20 Rather than some complex interplay of local intrigue and external pressure, it was likely baser instincts that motivated the Changan warlords to act against the imperial prince. Zhang Jian’s brother, Zhang Yun, had once committed the sacrilege of plundering the Tang imperial palaces in the heel of the dynasty’s demise, carting off a trove of jade and gold objects. He also gained control over the wealth seized from the Tang imperial tombs in suburban Changan. Yet he miraculously evaded prosecution due to a repute for charity at home in the “Robin Hood” tradition, donating much of his property to the poor. Officials of the western capital could engage in such larceny due to the city’s proximity to the passes of Shu, through which rich merchants and court emissaries passed on a regular basis.21 Zhang Jian lacked the redeeming qualities of the brother. “A man given to heavy drink, avarice, and rustic ways,” he frittered away local wealth like so much water. Based on the well-known depravity of the younger sibling, the vast booty seized initially from the deposed potentate of Shu and later the retinue of Jiji must have been sufficiently alluring, the political repercussions of his actions far beyond Jian’s ability to fathom. The war in Sichuan, a victory in the short term, proved an albatross for Later Tang dynasts over the long haul. Contention over the spoils of war had turned imperial kinsmen into targets of opportunity. By early summer 926, survivors of the royal

18. 19. 20. 21.

ZZTJ 275.8981–83. XWDS 47.522; HR p. 395. ZZTJ 275.8980–82. XWDS 47.522; HR p. 394; JWDS 36.498, 90.1182–83.

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family were few, with men especially hard hit. The sole male sibling to survive the deceased emperor, stepbrother Cunmei, suffered from a debilitating illness in youth and died as an invalid at Jinyang.22 Rumors were rife that another stepbrother, Cunli, had absconded for the Min kingdom in coastal Fujian—reports lacking serious corroboration.23 Similarly incredulous are reports of a young imperial son given sanctuary in a remote corner of Sichuan.24 As for the monarch’s fictive brothers and sons, many reverted to their original names, severing the last residual bond to him.25 Imperial women tended to fare better. Consort Han, Cunxu’s first wife, and the favored Consort Yi, were allowed to be reunited with surviving relatives at Jinyang.26 The fate of an earlier consort of favor, Woman Hou, remains unknown. A woman of more recent favor, Lady Xia, would become a consort years later to the Kitan prince Tuyu, the eldest son of Abaoji, who defected to the Middle Kingdom after losing his inheritance in 930. He assumed a new identity as Li Zanhua and evolved into an aficionado of Chinese culture, but the Kitan proved sadistically abusive and Lady Xia ended her years in a nunnery. Hundreds of lesser consorts were similarly returned to their families as well.27 No purges are reported for the daughters and sisters of the Tongguang emperor. A daughter married to prefect Song Tinghao remained alive a decade after his passing.28 The sole daughter-in-law of record, Woman Wang, the recently betrothed wife of Jiji and daughter of the Dingzhou governor, most likely perished with her husband near Changan. Jiji had been sterilized by a childhood illness, so the couple had no offspring.29 Both dynastic histories portray Siyuan as disinterested in becoming emperor, understandably, in light of criticisms three years earlier of a premature rush to accession by Zhuangzong, who formalized powers a half-year before capturing the Liang capital. For roughly two weeks, Siyuan brushed aside petitions from civil and military officials to formalize powers as monarch, professing resolve to eventually resume duties as Zhenzhou governor.30 However, official historians allude to an agreement reached with courtiers early in the fourth month to act on their petitions in due course. The delay permitted further clarification of conditions out west and especially the status of Jiji. On the twenty-sixth day of the fourth month (926.04.26), the civil overseer for the Shu expedition, Ren Huan, reached Luoyang with twenty thousand residuals, formally XWDS 14.150–51, 152; HR pp. 140, 142; JWDS 51.690; Xu Tang shu 37.341. XWDS 14.152; HR p. 142; Wudai shiji zuanwu bu 2.23. Qing yi lu 4.360. XWDS 33.357–58; HR p. 275. XWDS 14.146; HR pp. 136–37; ZZTJ 275.8976. ZZTJ 275.8983; Song shi 255.8914; XWDS 14.146; Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, pp. 110–11, 156, 160–61. 28. Song shi 255.8905. 29. XWDS 14.154; HR p. 145. 30. JWDS 35.490; Mote, Imperial China, p. 45. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

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concluding the Shu campaign. Siyuan reportedly “extended the visit to console him, then inquired of the fate of the former prince.” Huan had parted with the youth mere days before his suicide, so he provided a full accounting of his death.31 The story implies that Siyuan remained uninformed of the details surrounding his nephew’s demise, which in turn infers little direct involvement in events out west, or more likely, an effort to project ignorance for purposes of historical repute. Another reason for Siyuan’s circumspection as pertains to personal ambitions was concern about potential loyalists away from the capital. On the twelfth day of the fourth month (926.04.12), a fiery exchange is recorded with Yuan Xingqin, the lieutenant who cut his own queue in affirmation of fealty to the deceased emperor. Xingqin had assassinated Siyuan’s eldest son, Li Congjing, in retaliation for the father’s mutiny at Weizhou, ignoring direct instructions from the throne to spare the youth.32 He must have been near Luoyang when Zhuangzong perished, as he initially assisted Empress Liu in fleeing to the north, then headed east in the direction of Shandong. A journey of several hundred kilometers ended in Xingqin’s capture by a recluse in the countryside. The local prefect later lopped off his feet before spiriting him off to the capital in a cage.33 “How did my son betray you?” a raging Siyuan asked during his interrogation of Xingqin, a man raised originally by him as foster son. The response of the lieutenant was rhetorical as well, one that highlighted the higher treachery of the Interim regent: “And what caused you to betray the Former Monarch?”34 Xingqin’s beheading at the marketplace drew throngs of tearful spectators, men and women impressed by his ethical backbone, even though his abilities as commander were middling at best. A serious hotspot for the interim government in the first half of the fourth month of 926 was the Shatuo base at Jinyang, where a man of impeccable integrity presided as custodian: Zhang Xian. Best remembered for lambasting the conversion of Zhuangzong’s accession altar at Weizhou into a polo field, he had been under consideration for chief councilor after the dispatch of Guo Chongtao to Sichuan toward the end of 925. The posting at Jinyang is widely attributed to eunuchs and actors, who resented Xian’s stiff monitoring of court affairs. Yet his presence at Jinyang assumed critical import for the dynasty, for the prefecture became the center of the last showdown between renegades and loyalists of the Tongguang reign. The family of Zhang Xian was residing at Weizhou when mutineers led by Zhao Zaili seized control of the city, in the third month of 926, and incarcerated his dependents. The rebels dispatched a messenger to Jinyang to coerce Xian to join the rising anti-government tide. He summarily murdered the messenger instead, then 31. XWDS 14.154–55; HR p. 145; JWDS 67.895, Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, pp. 54–55. 32. XWDS 25.272; HR pp. 228–29; ZZTJ 275.8980; Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, pp. 35, 42–50, 56–57. 33. JWDS 70.927. 34. XWDS 25.272; HR p. 229.

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forwarded the letter unopened to Luoyang.35 If the letter reached Zhuangzong, it would have been mere days before his death, but the demise of the Son of Heaven did not diminish Xian’s devotion to the principle of loyal service in the abstract. Imperial brother Cunba reached Jinyang on the fifth day of the fourth month (926.04.05), where aides urged Zhang Xian to imprison the brother as a goodwill gesture toward Siyuan’s interim government. Placing personal ethics before political expediency, Xian demurred: “I began as a bookworm devoid of military distinction, then happened upon the extraordinary beneficence of Our Sovereign. To exploit events and compromise loyal principle is simply beyond me!”36 Aides further beseeched Xian to join the swell of petitioners urging Siyuan to accede the throne, pressures resisted by him with similar resolve.37 Based on most accounts, the military elite at Jinyang forced Xian to expel Cunba on the day after his arrival, then mutinied upon rumors of eunuchs colluding with Zhuangzong loyalists to turn the city into a base of resistance against the interim government.38 In the chaos, Xian fled for the northeast, only to be apprehended weeks later and forced to commit suicide. The Jinyang crisis ended with Xian’s demise. Back in Luoyang, political housekeeping proceeded at a furious pace. A sweeping purge of eunuchs ensued, a purge that extended from the capital to regional hotspots like Jinyang, focusing initially on individuals guilty of political crimes. The slaying of over seventy eunuchs at administrative offices at Jinyang in the fifth month “would leave the courtyard covered in blood.”39 Uprooting an unpopular legacy of the era, Siyuan also managed to eliminate a potential source of resistance to him, much like the Liang founder two decades earlier.40 The Tongguang emperor’s close friend, Zhang Quanyi, died of natural causes mere weeks before him.41 He had endorsed Siyuan’s deployment at Weizhou and lived long enough to witness his coup against the government, which no doubt heightened the anxieties of his final days. A succession of executions would be mandated in the coming year for unpopular leftovers from the Tongguang reign, including the actor Guo  Congqian, who had masterminded defections in the armed forces and metropolitan police.42 His actions worked to the benefit of Siyuan in the short-term, but in the long run, he had come to symbolize dereliction of duty, something no responsible government could condone. The interim government soon invoked assorted “misjudg35. XWDS 28.313; HR pp. 237–38; JWDS 69.913–14; ZZTJ 275.8977–78, 8983; Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, pp. 52–53. 36. XWDS 28.313; HR p. 238; JWDS 69.914. 37. Song shi 263.9086; ZZTJ 275.8977. 38. JWDS 69.913–14; XWDS 25.265; ZZTJ 275.8977–78; Xu Tang shu 40.365. 39. XWDS 38.408; HR p. 322. 40. XWDS 38.408; HR p. 322; JWDS 72.954; ZZTJ 275.8983, 8985; Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, p. 55. 41. JWDS 63.843; ZZTJ 274.8968. 42. JWDS 38.520; ZZTJ 275.9002.

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ments” to dismiss Doulu Ge, the most blatantly inept of the former emperor’s chief councilors, along with Duan Ning, the turncoat commander given to abusing official powers.43 The purge in the capital extended to the imperial kitchens, where the staff was slashed to fifty, an action suggesting previous excess.44 Clearly, the Tongguang emperor’s refined tastes extended to food. Conscious of public image and anxious for closure, the interim government was quick to extend measured deference for the dead monarch. His charred remains were retrieved, coffined, then afforded a proper wake, the nearly sixty-year-old Siyuan sobbing as he knelt before the coffin to pay his respects to the younger man.45 Final burial with full imperial honors ensued three months later in the western suburbs of Luoyang, the Yongling Mausoleum, a few kilometers north of his mother’s crypt: Zhuangzong would share the afterlife with Mother Cao after all, but in isolation from their extended family, as envisioned in the preceding autumn when she was laid to rest. The ancients traditionally preferred the seventh month to inter the Son of Heaven, so the burial’s timing symbolized another act of compassion for the dead.46 Siyuan accompanied the funeral cortege as far as the gates of Luoyang, following the precedent of Taizong for his own brother three centuries earlier. He parted with early Tang precedent, however, in forgoing travel to the mausoleum site, where the two chief councilors for the reign, Doulu Ge and Wei Yue, presided over ceremonies, their last official duties.47 Through such acts of measured deference, Siyuan avoided alienating sympathizers of the dead sovereign, deflecting some of the raw emotion generated by the dynasty’s enigmatic founding father. He would preside over the next chapter, a far more productive era, it turns out, having acceded the throne as Emperor Mingzong on the twentieth day of the fourth month (926.04.20).48 Ironically, the accession of Taizong to the former Tang throne had occurred in 626, exactly three hundred years earlier. History did repeat itself, in part due to the paranoia of the actors involved.

43. 44. 45. 46. 47.

XWDS 28.302–3, 45.498; HR p. 232, 383; JWDS 67.884. JWDS 36.495. On the size of kitchen staff in early Tang, see Benn, China’s Golden Age, p. 132. ZZTJ 275.8983. ZZTJ 196.6167. JWDS 36.502; ZZTJ 275.8990; Zhao, Tang Taizong zhuan, pp. 88–90; Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, pp. 49, 60. 48. Davis, From Warhorses to Ploughshares, pp. 58–60.

Chronology of Events in the Life of Li Cunxu1

885 10.22 Born at Jinyang (present-day Taiyuan) to Woman Cao and Li Keyong, then governor of Hedong (present-day Shanxi) 887, three sui Third month: Father expands into Zezhou (present-day Danchuan, Shanxi) 888, four sui Third month: Zhaozong succeeds as Tang emperor 889, five sui Fifth month: Joins father in battle at Sanchui Ridge, Luzhou 890, six sui First month: Father overtakes Xingzhou (present-day Xingtai, Hebei) after prolonged siege 891, seven sui Fourth month: Father blockades Yunzhou (present-day Dadong, Shanxi), which ends successfully in the following year; Father relocates permanently from Daibei to Jinyang Tenth month: Father launches offensive against Wang Rong, Prince of Zhao 892, eight sui Third month: Father suffers rout by Zhao armies

1.

Chronology based on “Basic Annals” of the Old History of the Five Dynasties, supplemented by Zizhi tongjian in the case of discrepancies. Information on Li Keyong based on Fan Wenli, Li Keyong pingzhuan, pp. 215–27.

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893, nine sui Fourth month: Father suffers defeat at the hand of Yan overlord Liu Rengong 894, ten sui Third month: Father regains control of Xingzhou Sixth month: Father defeats Tuyuhun at Yunzhou, killing Helianduo and regaining control over Daibei Twelfth month: Father occupies Youzhou (present-day Beijing) after raids against neighboring cities to its south 895, eleven sui Sixth month: Father leads armies through the passes in response to aggression against the Tang court by Li Maozhen and allies Seventh month: Emperor Zhaozong flees his capital Eighth month: Cunxu receives praise from Emperor Zhaozong at Changan Imperial Consort Chen is bestowed upon his father Eleventh month: investiture of his father to Prince of Jin 896, twelve sui Intercalary first month: Wei/Bo governor Luo Hongxin attacks mercenary Jin armies backing Zhu Xuan Fourth month: Father retaliates against Luo Hongxin at Wei/Bo, which causes Zhu Wen of Liang to intervene on behalf of Hongxin Sixth month: Elder brother Luoluo dies in battle at Huanshui 897, thirteen sui Eighth month: Father fails in retaliatory action against Yan governor Liu Rengong 898, fourteen sui Fifth month: Father loses the prefectures of Xing, Ming, and Ci on the heels of offensive by Zhu Wen 899, fifteen sui Eighth month: Father acquires Luzhou after contest with Li Hanzhi, who enjoyed the backing of Zhu Wen 901, seventeen sui Third month: Zhu Wen of Liang leads offensive against Jin, including a siege of its capital at Jinyang, which fails after two months

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902, eighteen sui Third month: Zhu Wen undertakes massive campaign against Hedong; renews siege of Jinyang, which lasts only seven days 903, nineteen sui Eighth month: Emperor Zhaozong perishes at the hands of Zhu Wen; Aidi succeeds the Tang throne 905, twenty-one sui Shatuo enter fraternal alliance with Kitan 906, twenty-two sui Tenth month: Father occupies Luzhou 907, twenty-three sui Fourth month: Zhu Wen purges Tang emperor to establish Liang dynasty with capital at Kaifeng; Kitan armies attack Yunzhou, prompting father to enter alliance, which the Kitan later betray; Liu Rengong purged at Yan Sixth month: Heightened conflict with Liang over Zezhou and Luzhou Tenth month: Father’s illness causes uncle to preside over Jin kingdom 908, twenty-four sui First month: Father Keyong dies at 53 sui; Cunxu succeeds him as Prince of Jin Second month: Uncle Kening is executed for treachery Fourth month: Zhou Dewei reaches Jinyang Fifth month: Launches offensives against Luzhou and Zezhou Seventh month: Allies with Qi in offensive against Jinzhou Eleventh month: Short intervention at Yan 909, twenty-five sui First month: Liang shifts capital to Luoyang Sixth month: The Prince of Jin rejects alliance with Yan Seventh month: Raid on Xiazhou Eighth month: Unsuccessful assault against Jinzhou (present-day Linfen) 910, twenty-six sui Seventh month: Unsuccessful assault against Hexi in alliance with Qi and Bin Eleventh month: Intervention at Zhao led by Zhou Dewei Twelfth month: Cunxu joins Zhao relief, assisted by Zhang Chengye and Li Siyuan

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911, twenty-seven sui First and second months: Major rout of Liang armies at Zhao Second month: Personal leadership of intervention at Weizhou, which ends in failure; meets Wang Rong at Zhao en route to Jinyang Seventh month: Meets Wang Rong at Chengtian; promises daughter in marriage to Wang Rong’s younger son, Zhaohui Twelfth month: Yan ruler Liu Shouguang assaults Dingzhou; dispatch Li Siyuan and Zhou Dewei to lead retaliation against Youzhou (present-day Beijing) 912, twenty-eight sui Second month: Zaoqiang falls to Liang armies Sixth month: Liang ruler, Zhu Wen, assassinated by son, Zhu Yougui, who accedes as emperor Eighth month: Liang intervention at Hezhong prompts Zhu Youqian to seek relief from Jinyang Tenth month: Prince of Jin meets Zhu Youqian at Hezhong, beginning a strategic alliance 913, twenty-nine sui Second month: Zhu Yougui is murdered, as the Liang throne passes to Zhu Youzhen (Modi) Seventh month: Prince of Jin meets Wang Rong at Tianchang Eleventh month: Prince of Jin joins battle against Yan and secures surrender of Liu Shouguang Twelfth month: Prince of Jin confers with Wang Rong at Xingtang 914, thirty sui First month: Executes Yan rulers Liu Rengong and Liu Shouguang; visits Wang Rong and Zhenzhou; elevated to Shangshuling Seventh month: Conferral with Wang Rong and Zhou Dewei at Zhao Seventh to eight months: After unsuccessful raid against Xing and Ming prefectures, the Jin withdraws armies 915, thirty-one sui Fifth month: Armies overtake Weizhou after local mutiny Sixth month: Weizhou and Dezhou (Tianxiong command) surrender to Jin Seventh month: The Jin briefly occupies Chanzhou (present-day Puyang); the Liang attempts raid on Jin capital, Jinyang, without success Eighth month: Assault on Beizhou begins Tenth month: Liang spies attempt to poison Cunxu at Weizhou

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916, thirty-two sui Second month: Liang attempts an unsuccessful raid against Weizhou; second raid against Jinyang by the Liang Third month: Dispatches Li Siyuan to Yuancheng, Weizhou due to Liang aggression Fifth month: Cunxu visits family at Jinyang Seventh month: Cunxu returns to Weizhou Eighth month: The Prince conquers Xingzhou (present-day Xingtai, Hebei); dispatches Li Siyuan to thwart Kitan armies at Weizhou (present-day Linqiu, Shanxi) Ninth month: The Jin conquers Cangzhou and Beizhou (Tiangxiong command), slaying thousands of surrendering men 917, thirty-three sui Second month: Li Siyuan and Zhou Dewei succeed in repulsing Kitan armies at Youzhou and Xinzhou (present-day Zhuolu, Hebei) Eighth month: Li Siyuan routs Kitan armies at Youzhou Tenth month: Cunxu visits Jinyang Eleventh month: Cunxu returns to Weizhou Twelfth month: Cunxu leads armies at Yangliu (present-day Donga, Shandong) 918, thirty-four sui First month: Rallies armies at Yunzhou and Puzhou (western Shandong) Second to sixth months: A succession of raids against Yangliu Eighth month: Summons armies to Weizhou Eleventh month: Rescue by Li Cunshen near Yunzhou Twelfth month: Offensive against Puzhou; senior commander Zhou Dewei perishes in battle 919, thirty-five sui Third month: Assumes nominal powers as governor of Youzhou; installs Guo Chongtao as deputy palace gate commissioner (Chongmenshi); relocates Meng Zhixiang to Jinyang to serve as inspector-in-chief of the armed forces (duyuhou) Fourth month: Responds to emergency at Desheng Seventh month: Cunxu visits Jinyang Tenth month: Returns to Weizhou for offensive in the area Twelfth month: Rout of Liang armies at Henan 920, thirty-six sui Eighth month: Comes to the rescue of Zhu Youqian at Hezhong Ninth month: Defeats Liang commander Liu Xun at Hezhong

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921, thirty-seven sui Second month: Wang Rong dies amidst mutiny at Zhao Eighth month: Shi Jiantang is dispatched to Zhao, slaying the mutineer Zhang Wenli Tenth month: Jin routs Liang armies at Desheng; Wang Chuzhi at Dingzhou is supplanted by adopted son Wang Du, who enters alliance with the Kitan Eleventh month: Cunxu leads armies at Zhenzhou Twelfth month: Kitan intervene at Dingzhou; Cunxu leads retaliation 922, thirty-eight sui First month: Defeats Kitan armies at Xincheng; falls into Kitan ambush at Wangdu (Dingzhou), then rescued by Li Sizhao Second month: Reaches Desheng five days after departing Youzhou Ninth month: Zhenzhou returns to Jin control after half-year of tumult Eleventh month: Eunuch advisor Zhang Chengye dies 923, thirty-nine sui, inaugural year of Tongguang Third month: Li Jitao of Luzhou defects to the Liang Fourth month 04.25 Cunxu accedes the throne as Later Tang emperor at Weizhou and adopts reign name Tongguang; names Doulu Ge and Lu Cheng as chief councilors Intercalary fourth month: Li Siyuan dispatched to Yunzhou Sixth month: Defection of Liang commander Kang Yanxiao Sixth to eighth months: Leads soldiers in defending Yangliu Seventh month: Dismisses Lu Cheng as chief councilor Eighth month: The Liang replaces commander Wang Yanzhang with Duan Ning Ninth month: Offensive against Kaifeng adopted Tenth month 10.01 Returns family to Weizhou 10.09 Liang Emperor Mo dies after the fall of Kaifeng 10.10 Later Tang armies occupy Kaifeng, elevating it to capital; Zhang Quanyi of Luoyang surrenders to Later Tang and pays visit to emperor 10.29 Entertains Li Siyuan and other commanders at Chongyuan Palace Eleventh month: Li Maozhen of Qi surrenders to Later Tang; rebel Li Jitao comes to capital and receives pardon; elevation of Wei Yue and Zhao Guangyin to chief councilors Twelfth month 12.01 Relocates capital to Luoyang

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924, forty sui, second year of Tongguang First month 01.22 Welcomes Mother Cao to Luoyang Second month 02.01 Conducts sacrifices in Southern Suburbs 02.15 Announces elevation of Consort Liu as Empress Third month: Li Siyuan dispatched to Xingzhou in response to Kitan raid Fourth month 04.11 Empress Liu receives formal installation Luzhou commander Yang Li rebels Fifth month: Li Siyuan regains Luzhou Sixth month: Siyuan named Xuanwu (Kaifeng) governor; Lady Han invested as Pure Concubine and Empress Yi as Virtuous Concubine Eighth month: Natural calamities at Caozhou, Shanzhou, Songzhou and Yunzhou Ninth month: Kitan launch raid against Youzhou Tenth month: Flooding at Kaifeng and Yunzhou; another Kitan raid against Youzhou Eleventh month: Hunt at Yique Twelfth month: Li Siyuan named governor of Kaifeng 925, forty-one sui, third year of Tongguang First month: Kitan incursion at Youzhou results in dispatch of Li Siyuan 01.02 Celebrates mother’s birthday in Luoyang 01.07 Departs for Weizhou Second month: Razing of altar of accession at Weizhou; Li Siyuan reassigned to Zhenzhou Third month: Return to Luoyang, now renamed the Eastern Capital Fourth month: Oversees civil service examination Fifth month 05.06 Consort-Dowager Liu dies at Jinyang Seventh month 07.11 Empress Dowager Cao dies at Luoyang; natural disasters at Huazhou, Luoyang, Kaifeng, and Xuzhou Eighth month: Confrontation with Luoyang county official Luo Guan Ninth month 09.10 Declaration of war against Shu Tenth month 10.29 Buries mother at Shou’an county, Luoyang Earthquakes at Xuzhou and Weizhou

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Eleventh month 11.28 Later Tang armies capture Chengdu Twelfth month: Nomination of Meng Zhixiang as governor of Western Chuan; hunt at Baisha Intercalary twelfth month 12*.01 banquet for Meng Zhixiang in Luoyang 926, forty-two sui, fourth year of Tongguang First month 01.03 Shu royals depart Chengdu 01.07 Guo Chongtao is slain in Chengdu 01.23 Execution of Zhu Youqian and Li Cunyi Second month 02.06 Beizhou mutiny begins 02.09 Weizhou mutiny begins 02.17 Palace guardsman Wang Wen mutinies 02.27 Dispatch Li Siyuan to Weizhou to suppress Zhao Zaili Third month 03.08 Armies of Li Siyuan compel him to mutiny; Kang Yanxiao perishes in Shu 03.18 slaying of Shu ruler Wang Yan near Changan 03.24 Kaifeng occupied by Li Siyuan 03.28 Return to Luoyang Fourth month 04.01 Death at Luoyang 04.03 Armies of Li Siyuan occupy Luoyang, where he becomes interim regent 04.09 Empress Liu arrives at Jinyang 04.14 Imperial son Jiji perishes near Changan 04.26 Zhang Xian perishes in defense of Jinyang 04.28 Li Siyuan succeeds as Emperor Mingzong Seventh month 07.22 Burial in the suburbs of Luoyang at Yongling Mausoleum

Sources Cited

Unthinkably, three official histories exist for the Five Dynasties period (907–79). The source closest in time, the Old History of the Five Dynasties, Jiu Wudai shi ( JWDS), was compiled by the History Bureau at the outset of the Song dynasty, in the 970s, under the editorship of Xue Juzheng. The popular New History of the Five Dynasties (Xin Wudai shi), authored individually by Ouyang Xiu, was published posthumously by the Song government in 1077 under the name Historical Records of the Five Dynasties (Wudai shiji). Due to the government’s imprint, it is considered an official history as well, even though the author wrote privately with neither the sponsorship nor subvention of the government. I have published roughly two-thirds of the Chinese original in English translation. In the notes, references to “HR” allude to the English translation, while “XWDS” refers to the Chinese original. Another more detailed punctuated annotation of the Old History by Chen Shangjun was published in 2005, Jiu Wudai shi: Xin ji hui zheng, which I have consulted to correct errors in the original, but it is not used for citation, due to the wider accessibility of the original. The Historical Records is an important supplement to the Old History: its author, as senior editor of another official history, the New History of the Tang (Xin Tang shu), enjoyed unrestricted access to a broad range of sources in the imperial and private libraries of Kaifeng, from the “Veritable Records” (Shilu) and “National Histories” (Guoshi) to quasi-literary sources like “historical anecdotes” (biji xiaoshuo). The Historical Records also offers an entertaining and tightly knit narrative of the times. It is an infinitely more fluent version of the Old History, but it remains an abridged rendering of the original with less factual detail. Both works were written in the “composite annals and biography format” ( ji zhuan ti) characteristic of the dynastic history. The third major source for the Five Dynasties period, Sima Guang’s Comprehensive Mirror for the Advancement of Governance, Zizhi tong jian, published a decade after Ouyang Xiu’s work, employs the annalistic format throughout, which makes it invaluable for establishing a chronology of political events. The 294-chapter work covers the years 403 BCE to ACE 959, its final thirty chapters devoted to the Five Dynasties. Under the editorial direction of Sima Guang and sponsorship of the Song government, writers of the Comprehensive Mirror could consult the two dynastic histories

214

Sources Cited

as well as contemporary works no longer extant. Sima Guang worked out of Luoyang, capital of the Later Tang, which likely facilitated access to some material unavailable to Ouyang Xiu, who worked out of Kaifeng. Due to the range of sources consulted and an impressive staff of historians, the Comprehensive Mirror is seen as the most informed and objective source. Inasmuch as each work has unique strengths and weaknesses, and none truly deserves to be deemed authoritative, I have avoided undue reliance on any one text. Even in the case of citations from my published translation of the Historical Records, I have compared versions in the several texts when available, and often emended entries to reflect the consensus of the several texts. Cefu yuangui, in 1,000 chapters (over 13,000 pages), represents an important alternative source, compiled under the auspices of the Song court and the editorial oversight of Wang Qinruo. A product of the late tenth century, Cefu yuangui has greater proximity to the period and contains fewer of the biases of eleventh-century writings. I have decided to cite the 2006 punctuated edition published by Fenghuang Publishing House. Some scholars of the period refuse to cite the Fenghuang text, due its numerous technical problems, including missing passages and punctuation errors, which seems something of an overreaction. It remains the easiest text to access information, replete with index. For important passages, I have compared sections of the new edition against earlier editions to address such concerns. The leading primary source on institutions of the Five Dynasties, Wudai huiyao, contains numerous errors, so I have used it cautiously and usually in consultation with other sources, when available. There are also serious technical problems with an important primary source on the Southern States, Shiguo chunqiu, a work compiled in the Qing dynasty, so I have used it in consultation with other primary sources, if possible.

List of Abbreviations The following works are cited by abbreviation: CFYG: Cefu yuangui, Wang Qinruo, 1013 HR: Historical Records of the Five Dynasties, Ouyang Xiu JTS: Jiu Tang shu, 945, Liu Xu JWDS: Jiu Wudai shi, 974, Xue Juzheng LS: Liao shi, 1344, Tuo Tuo SGCQ: Shiguo Chunqiu, ca. 1689, Wu Renchen WDHY: Wudai huiyao, 963, Wang Pu XTS: Xin Tang shu, 1060, Ouyang Xiu XWDS: Xin Wudai shi, 1077, Ouyang Xiu ZZTJ: Zizhi tongjian, 1084, Sima Guang

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Index

Abaoji 阿保機, 872–926, Khitan leader: on Cunxu’s illicit use of actors, 118; Dingzhou intervention, 83–84; facing food shortages, 174; high regard for Cunxu, 194; as hunter, 136; launches dynasty, 66; loss of son, 84; successor Tuyu, 200; wife of, 16 actors and musicians (lingren 伶人): appointment to office, 115–16; artist vs. artisan, 117; banter with, 116–17; corruption of, 153; factions of, 116; favor for individual actors, 114–15; humor of, 70–71; improper intimacies with, 116–18; ineptitude of, 181; performance in Shatuo culture, 117 Alakol Lake, Shatuo origins at, 4n11 Alexander the Great, 356–323 BCE: parallels with Cunxu, 13, 18–19; sexuality of, 118 Altar of Heaven, in Suburban rites, 122 amnesties: general amnesty, 122; minor amnesties, 140, 174 An Chonghui 安重誨, d. 931; as lieutenant of Li Siyuan, 186, 188; as military commissioner, 199; in slaying Cunxu’s brothers, 197 An Lushan 安祿山, Tang rebel: immunity for, 108 An Yuanxin 安元信, 863–936: defection of, 12 Anqing 安慶, Shatuo tribe, 4 Army of Foster Sons 義兒軍: founding of, 33–34; Li Cunjin in, 89 Art of War, Sunzi 孫子兵法: exploiting the unexpected, 39; feeding on the

enemy, 162; perils of overextension, 43; on rallying men to arms, 148 auspicious omens: at birth, 1; at Jinyang, 54–55 Baima Slope 白馬坡: site of late Tang slayings, 133–34 Baisha 白沙, hunting grounds, 172 Baixiang county 柏鄉: battle at, 24, 43–44 banquets: for Meng Zhixiang, 11; rules governing, 77–78; for Wang Rong, 45; for Zhu Youqian, 49 Beijing 北京: alien rule at, 51; terminus of Grand Canal, 11. See also Youzhou Beizhou 貝州, Tianxiong: Liang control over, 60–61, 63; mutiny at, 180–87; surrender of, 64–65, 181 Binzhou 邠州, Bin/Ning 邠寧, 166 Bohai 渤海, Parhae: envoys from, 126; independent of, 142 boxue hongci 博學宏詞, erudite literatus, 162 Bozhou 博州, Tianxiong: mutiny at 180–87; surrender of, 57, 60 Buddhism: Consort Chen’s devotion to, 20; court’s ordination of monks, 141; Empress Liu’s devotion to, 85, 157–58; influence in Shatuo culture, 4 Bureau for Venerable Governance, in Liang times, 119 calendar: adopting new calendar, 94; resuscitating Tang calendar, 46 Cangzhou 滄州, Tianxiong: aggression against, 60–61

Index Cao, Empress Dowager 曹后, d. 925, mother of Cunxu: arrival in Luoyang, 120–21, 148, 198; birthday of, 141; as companion to Keyong, 17–20; death of, 150–52, 163–64, 203; directives to son, 156; disregard for Empress Liu, 124; in educating son, 1; elevation to Dowager, 96; friendship with Keyong’s wife, 148–49; mourning rites for, 150; on son’s acting, 114, 117; on son’s gambling, 19–20, 23, 69–70; in suppression of Li Kening, 36–37; ties to Zhang Chengye, 23, 92; on Zhao intervention, 194 Cao, Woman 曹氏, d. 936, Li Siyuan’s consort: protection of, 188 Caozhou 曹州, natural disaster at, 139 capitals: four-capital scheme, 131 Cefu yuangui 冊府元龜: on Cunxu’s political consciousness, 40–41 Changan 長安, western capital: court actions at, 117; as cultural center, 134; death of Li Jiji at, 198–99; harassment by Li Maozhen, 39–40; imperial reception at, 2; plundering palaces of, 135; proximity to Hezhong, 49; sacking of, 9; seals from, 85; in Shu campaign, 161, 175, 179; size of palaces at, 146; slaying of eunuchs at, 168–69; summoning Shatuo Jinshan to, 6 Changshougong 長壽宮, Dowager Cao’s palace, 122 Chanzhou 澶州, Chanyuan 澶元: as base of Yuan Xingqin, 183; debacle at, 97–98; recalcitrance at, 61; slaying of Zhu Youqian’s son at, 181 Chaocheng 朝城, border town: Cunxu’s visit to, 100, 102 Chen, Woman 陳氏, consort of Li Keyong: background of, 19–20; entering nunnery, 20, 196 Chen Yi 陳義, Shu campaigner: cautious approach of, 163 Chengdu 成都, Shu capital: diplomats arrive at, 129–30; fire at, 166; as residence of Wang Yan, 164; royals depart, 174–75; surrender of, 164–65

221 Chenghui 誠惠, Buddhist monk: imperial escort to Luoyang, 158 child groom: case of Wang Zhaohui, 45 child prodigy examination. See tongzike. Chongyuan Palace 崇元殿, Kaifeng: banquet at, 28 Chongzhengyuan 崇政院. See Bureau for Venerable Governance Chu 楚, southern state: outreach from Cunxu, 66; tribute from, 127 Chu, Woman 褚氏, wife of Zhang Quanyi: adoption by, 110 Chuyue Turks 處月突厥: as Shatuo ancestors, 3 ci 詞 poetry, 114 civil service examinations: revival of, 134–35 Classic of Filial Piety 孝經: on bequeathing an honorable name, 151 Comprehensive Mirror for the Advancement of Governance 資治通鑑, Sima Guang 司馬光: on Cunxu’s dour spirits, 150; on Guo Chongtao’s indictment of Li Siyuan, 144; on Empress Liu, 124; on Li Keyong, 8; on Meng Zhixiang meeting, 171; on Widow Liu’s death, 149; on Zhao upset, 44 concubines: honors for, 140 Confucian: assessment of Cunxu, 2; filial piety in, 39; Liu Shouguang’s contempt for, 51; on nature, 4; orthodox, 141 Cui Guangbiao 崔光表: wins doctoral degree, 124–25, 134 Daibei 代北. See Daizhou Daizhou 代州, Shanxi: Li Keyong’s burial at, 32, 95, 120–21, 149; Keyong’s service at, 8, 16, 24 Daoism: dedicating altars to, 141 Danei 大內, as Imperial Compound, 116 Dangxiang 黨項. See Tangut Dasanguan 大散關, pass to Shu, 161, 170 Datong 大同, northern Shanxi: He Delun’s planned posting at, 58; Li Keyong’s mausoleum at, 32 Daxiang 大祥 rites: acceleration for Dowager Cao, 150

222 Desheng 德勝軍, border town: defense of, 78–79, 88–89, 97–98, 145 Dezhou 德州, Tianxiong: aggression against, 60–61 Dingzhou 定州, satrapy of Wang Du: defection of Li Kexiu to, 12; repudiates Jin, 83 doctoral examination, jinshi 進士, 134–35 Dog Country, Gouguo 狗國: myth of, 70 Dong Zhang 董璋, d. 932, Bin/Ning governor: rift with Kang Yanxiao, 166–67, 178–79 Dongchuan 東川, Eastern Chuan, 166 Doulu Ge 豆盧革, d. 927, chief councilor: on compensating soldiers, 189; at Cunxu’s funeral, 203; death of, 202; as escort for Li Jiji, 109; ineptitude of, 118–19; on natural disasters, 140 Duan Ning 段凝, d. 928, Liang defector: death of, 203; ineptitude of, 102; relief at Yangliu, 98; retaliation at Tongzhou, 80–81; surrender of, 106 Duan Wenchu 段文楚, d. 872: slaying by Li Guochang 7 Du yan long 獨眼龍, Single-eyed Dragon, nickname of Li Keyong, 9 eunuchs: as advisor to heir-apparent, 196; colluding with Li Siyuan, 184; corrupt practices of, 153; defending emperor, 193; dispatch to Shu, 172; in execution of Guo Chongtao, 175–76; expanded powers of, 118–20; on palaces of Changan, 146; purge under Li Siyuan, 202; slaying in Chengdu, 168–69; at Youzhou, 76; Zhang Juhan as, 119–20, 179; at Zhao, 81–82. See also Li Congxi; Ma Shaohong; Ma Yangui; Xiang Yansi; Zhang Chengye; Zhang Juhan Fan Han jun 蕃漢軍. See Multi-Racial Armies Feng Dao 馮道, 882–954, courtier: class background of, 93–94; on entertaining officers, 77–78; flight from Yan, 51; as Hanlin Academician, 95

Index Fengxiang 鳳翔, Shu, surrender of, 161 Five Dynasties, 907–960: class system in, 115; Dog Country of, 70; foster sons in, 33–34; imperial families of, 148; imperial mausoleums in, 151; migration south in, 116; social mobility in, xi–xii; standing of Jinyang in, 10 foster sons, yi’er 義兒: abandoning adopted names, 200; profusion of, 33–34; spoils of, 126. See also Army of Foster Sons Fu Xi 符習, Zhao commander: endorsing intervention, 82–83; in support of Li Siyuan, 186; as Zhaozhou governor, 90 Fu Yanchao 符彥超, d. 934: in slaying imperial brother, 197 gambling: customs at Jinyang, 69; habits of Cunxu, 19–20, 23, 69–70 Gao Jixing 高季興, 858–928, ruler of Nanping: endorsing Shu campaign, 30–31, 159; visit to Luoyang, 30–31, 127–28 Gao Xingzhou 高行周, lieutenant of Li Siyuan: on officer loyalty, 28; at Yunzhou, 99 Gaozong 高宗, r. 649–683, Tang emperor: wife’s ties to Jinyang, 10 Gaozu 高祖, Tang emperor. See Li Yuan Ge Yu 蓋寓, d. 906: devotion to Li Keyong, 12, 17, 26, 131 gongye 宮掖, as Palace boudoir, 118 Grand Canal: hijacking by Li Siyuan, 189; Liang control of, 11 guijiang 貴將, commander of precious promise, 29 guiren 貴人, man of precious promise, 29 Guo, Consort of Liang 郭氏: conversion of, 104 Guo Chongtao 郭崇韜, d. 926, senior strategist: alienating Kang Yanxiao, 166–67; association with Guo Congqian, 193; backing Consort Liu, 124; on debt of Duan Ning, 144–45; in defense of Luo Guan, 152–53; on Dingzhou, 83; on dispensing bounty, 123; disrespecting cleric, 158; early career of, 24–26;

Index entertaining emperor, 132; on entertaining officers, 77; on expanded aggression, 101–2; on gambling, 145; hostility toward eunuchs, 77, 168–69; on jade registers, 129; limitations of, 118–19; maligning character of, 166–69; as military commissioner, 95; murder of, 175–78, 186; on Nanping ruler, 127–28; opposition to actors, 115–16; overseeing Shu campaign, 160–61, 164; on palace spending, 146–47; policy recommendations, 123; on razing accession altar, 139; on recall of Li Siyuan, 144; slaying Wang Zongbi, 169–70; writ of immunity for, 108, 176; and Zhang Yun, 199 Guo Congqian 郭從謙, d. 927, policeman: death of, 202; duplicity of, 186, 193–94 Guo Tinghui 郭廷誨, d. 926, son of Guo Chongtao: befriends Wang Zongbi, 167; slaying of, 176 Guo Zhongshu 郭忠恕, child prodigy, 134 guobao 國寶, imperial seals, 85 Han, Lady 韓氏, wife of Cunxu: pedigree of, 21–22, 55, 123–24; retires to Jinyang, 200 Han Jian 韓簡, Tianxiong governor: immunity for, 108 Han Yun 韓惲, brother of Woman Han, 124 Hanlin Academy 翰林院: Feng Dao at, 95; Li Yu at, 163 Hannibal Crossing the Alps: comparison with Kaifeng offensive, 103 Hanzhou 漢州, Shu: surrender of, 164 He Delun 賀德倫, d. 916, Weizhou governor: association with Sikong Ting, 59; death of, 64; mutiny against, 57–58 He Xiang 賀瓖, Liang commander: raid on Puyang, 78–79 Hedong 河東 circuit, Shanxi province: as burial place, 7; elites of, 15–16, 56; as Shatuo base, 5, 8, 13; vulnerable south, 40 Hege 和哥, Amicable Boy: nickname of Li Jiji, 5

223 Heyang 河陽, north of Luoyang: reception of brother at, 121 Hezhong 河中, base of Zhu Youqian: demise of Youqian, 176–77; empathy away from, 197–98; imperial bounty for, 112–13; Jin intervention at, 49, 80–81; political cronies at, 133 Historical Records of the Five Dynasties 五代史記: on actors, 115, 117–18; on barbarians, 26; on Beizhou surrender, 65; on charity for Zhu Youqian, 133; conversation with Meng Zhixiang, 171–72; on Cunxu’s charity, 61; on Cunxu’s personality, 14–15; on Cunxu’s zeal for war, 79; on Empress Liu’s finances, 156; on Guo Chongtao, 169; on Hezhong elites, 112; on Kang Yanxiao, 162; on Li Congjing, 190; on Li Keyong’s women, 148–49; on Liu Shouguang, 51; on Luo Guan, 152; on marriage to Woman Liu, 124; on meeting with councilors, 94; on natural disasters, 140; on Shatuo surnames, 6; on surrender of Liang consorts, 104; on Wang Rong’s favorites, 81; on Zhang Quanyi, 153. See also Ouyang Xiu homosexuality: association with actors, 114; sexual orientation of Cunxu, 118 Hou, Woman 侯氏, consort of Cunxu: as Liang subject, 21–22; uncertain fate of, 200 Hou Yi 侯益, loyal officer: abandons Li Siyuan, 187 Hu 胡 peoples, intermarriage with Shatuo, 3 Huaizhou 懷州, north of Luoyang: cancels trip to, 121 Huang Chao 黃巢 d. 884, late Tang rebel: Shatuo suppression of, 8–9 Huangfu Hui 皇甫暉, Beizhou guard: in mutiny, 180 Huangfu Lin 皇甫麟, d. 923, Liang bodyguard: murders Modi, 104 Huangze 黃澤 county: in raid on Jinyang, 62 Huazhou 滑州, near Luoyang: capture by Siyuan, 190; diversionary raids at, 80

224 Huihe Uighurs 回鶻 (回紇): intermarriage with Shatuo, 3; Shatuo suppression of, 6 hunting: at Baisha, 172; at Jinyang, 15; at Luoyang, 15, 112, 164; at Zhenzhou, 53 Huo Yanwei 霍彥威, d. 928, Liang commander: on advance against Kaifeng, 188; banquet for, 28, 107; in Weizhou suppression, 185–87 Imperial Ancestors Temple, Taimiao 太廟: ceremonies for Dowager Cao, 150, 163; imperial rites at, 122 imperial guard: compensation for, 189; Congjing’s leadership in, 187; Guo Congqian in, 193–94; hunting companions, 172–73; in mutiny, 185–86; special deployments for, 180 jade registers, for Wuyue, 129 Jiangzhou 絳州, Shanxi: raid by Cunxu, 40 Jianji Mausoleum 建極陵, Shanxi: name of Li Keyong’s tomb, 95 Jianguo 監國, interim regent: Li Siyuan’s interim title, 196–97 jiaoming 教命: directives of Empress Liu, 156 Jiaqing Palace 嘉慶殿, Luoyang: banquet for Guo Chongtao at, 161; venue for birthday party, 141 jiazi 假子, fictive sons, 33 Jieli 頡利, Eastern Turkish leader: Taizong’s deployment of, 68 Jin 晉 satrapy, Shanxi: absorbing Zhao, 41–46; in assimilating new lands, 59–60; conflict over Desheng, 78–79; conquering Yan, 46–52; corporal punishment at, 19–20, 155; and Dingzhou, 83–84; fidelity to Tang, 87; management of, 13; racial tensions at, 70–71; raid on Weizhou, 47; recruiting talent, 110; as Shatuo base, 5, 13; tensions with Kitan, 67–68 Jin dynasty 金朝, 1115–1234: control of Yan, 51

Index Jing Jin 景進, actor: in actors’ faction, 116; maligning Guo Chongtao, 176 Jing Xiang 敬翔, Liang commander: assertive court leadership, 119 Jing Xinmo 敬新磨, actor: poking fun at Luo Guan, 137; slapping emperor’s face, 116–17 Jinyang 晉陽, Taiyuan, Shanxi: ancestral temples at, 95; as auxiliary capital, 131; ballads of, 114; birthplace of Cunxu, 15; birthplace of Dowager Cao, 18, 102, 151; death of brothers at, 197–98; elite society at, 23; Empress Liu’s flight to, 196; ethnic diversity of, 70; eunuch posting at, 76–77, 95; funeral at, 149; Guo Chongtao’s residence at, 176; He Delun’s arrival at, 59; Li Jitao’s property at, 123; Liang raids against, 12, 17, 62, 64, 69, 100; marriage alliances at, 15; Meng Zhixiang as custodian at, 95, 170; mother’s departure from, 120–21; Shatuo occupation of, 8–10, 40; venerable statesmen from, 112; Zhang Xian’s tenure at, 201–2 juezhan 決戰, dogfight: Shatuo superiority in, 63 Kaifeng 開封, Henan: base of Zhu Wen, 11; Jin campaign against, 25, 27, 74, 100–103; Li Siyuan’s advance against, 188–92; mutiny at, 65–66; natural disasters at, 139; prisoners of war at, 80, 104; strategic weaknesses of, 111; surrender of, 103–6 Kang Yanxiao 康延孝, d. 926, Liang commander: advance guard in Shu campaign, 161–62; defection to Later Tang, 100–162; interrogation of, 178–79; rebellion of, 177–79; rift with Dong Zhang, 166–67 ke 可, as imperial consent, 88 Kitan, Qidan 契丹: actors among, 118; alliance with Jin, 12–13, 66; as barbarian other, 83–84; conflicts with Shatuo, 132, 142–43; in Dingzhou intervention, 83–84; drive against, 27; envoys from, 126; neutrality at Luzhou, 38;

Index overtures of Yan to, 50; renewed border war with, 67–68; Wang Chuzhi’s appeal to, 83 Kong Qian 孔謙 (d. 926), Weizhou fiscal officer: recruitment of, 60; on soldiers’ compensation, 189 Kong Xun 孔循, d. 932, Kaifeng overseer: surrender to Li Siyuan, 190–91 Korea: envoys from, 126; Shatuo intervention in, 4 Khoten (Yutian), monk from, 157 Kunling 坤陵, tomb of Dowager Cao, 163 Later Liang empire 後梁, 907–923: aggression against Desheng, 78–79; alliance with Nanping, 127; assault on Luzhou, 38–39; contest over Tongzhou, 80–81; defectors from, 28; defending Zhaozhou, 27; entertaining officials, 131; examination yield, 134; execution of favorites, 106; fall of Kaifeng, 101–6; intervention at Tianxiong, 56–57; launching of, 11, 13; Li Jitao’s defection to, 97; maligning Ge Yu, 12; marriage alliances with Jin subjects, 105; planned offensive against Jin, 12, 17, 62, 64, 69, 100; prisoners-of-war, 86, 104; raiding Jinyang, 12, 17, 40, 62, 64; relations with Kitan, 66; residual power of, 96; rout at Zhao, 43–44; seasoned commanders under, 97–98; sympathizers at Jinyang, 64; tight rein on commanders, 63; writs of immunity under, 108; Zhang Quanyi under, 110 Later Tang 後唐, 923–936: accession altar in, 138–39; actors in office, 115–16; alien rites under, 139–40; civil service under, 134–35; clout of Zhu Youqian, 113; conspiracy against Gao Jixing, 128; contested leadership under, 34; diplomacy of, 126–30; dire finances of, 101–2, 107; diversity of armies, 12, 26; entertaining courtiers, 141–42; foothold at Yunzhou, 98–99; historical consciousness and, 29; hospitality for courtiers, 132–33; intermarriage under, 15–16; legitimacy of, 84, 86;

225 marginalizing of clansmen, 126; marriage alliances with Liang subjects, 105, with military families, 125; Military Commission under, 25; navigating class conflict, 93–94; opposition to Shu war, 130; outreach to Wu, 99; racial inclusiveness of, 113; shift of capitals of, 111–13; suburban rites under, 121–22; superior logistics of, 103 Lei Mountain 雷山, Luoyang suburbs: rites at, 139 Li Chengqian 李承乾, d. 644, son of Taizong: favor for actors, 114; as jealous sibling, 144 Li Congjing 李從璟, d. 926, son of Li Siyuan: loyalty to court, 187–88, 198, 201 Li Congke 李從珂, 885–936, r. 934–946, adopted son of Li Siyuan: rallying behind father, 186–87; recusing Cunxu, 76; usurpation of, 34 Li Congxi 李從襲, eunuch: council to return home, 196; in death of Li Jiji, 198–99; in slaying of Guo Chongtao, 175–76 Li Cunba 李存霸, d. 926, Cunxu’s younger brother: death of, 197; executes Liu Rengong, 52; resistance at Jinyang, 202 Li Cunhao 李存顥, d. 926, foster brother of Cunxu: inciting Uncle Kening, 35 Li Cunji 李存紀, Cunxu’s younger brother: adoption by Zhang Quanyi, 110; death of, 197; residence at Jinyang, 95 Li Cunjin 李存進, Cunxu’s foster brother: assignment to Wei/Bo, 59; infrastructural improvements at Desheng, 78–79; in Zhenzhou suppression, 89 Li Cunju 李存矩, Cunxu’s foster brother: failed policies in northeast, 67 Li Cunli 李存禮, imperial stepbrother: fate of, 200 Li Cunmei 李存美, Cunxu’s younger brother: as invalid at Jinyang, 200 Li Cunque 李存確, Cunxu’s younger brother: death of, 197 Li Cunshen 李存審, foster brother of Cunxu: deployment to Yan, 67–68;

226 distinction at Weizhou, 63; in MultiRacial Armies, 76; in saving brother’s life, 73; in Tongzhou relief, 80–81; in Zezhou relief, 97; at Zhenzhou, 89–90 Li Cunwo 李存渥, d. 926, youngest brother of Cunxu: death of, 197–98; dispatch to Jinyang, 149; as favorite son, 18 Li Cunxian 李存賢, 860–924, foster brother of Cunxu: relief at Tongzhou, 80–81; in wrestling match, 145 Li Cunxiao 李存孝, d. 894, foster brother of Cunxu: defection of, 17; tomb of, Plate 5 Li Cunxin 李存信, 862–902, foster brother of Cunxu: on evacating Jinyang, 17 Li Cunxu 李存朂, 885–926: accession of, 85, 91–94; accession gifts to, 126–27; and actor-musicians, 71, 113–16; adoptions of, 28, 109–12; alliance with Zhao, 41–46, 52–53, 73, 91, 121; amnesties, 122; alien rites under, 139–40; auspicious omens for, 54–55; on barbarian other, 83; birth of, 13n69; birthday celebrations of, 140–42, 164; brothers of, 125–26, 197–98; Buddhist sympathies of, 157–58; cipher of, 175; early years, 1–2, 13; campaign against Kaifeng, 25; challenge of uncle, 23, 32–37; at Changan, 2; charity for, 61, 104; on class, 93–94; classical training of, 2, 13, 30; close calls, 61, 78–80, 84; and cockfights, 91, 99; confrontation with Luo Guan, 137, 152–53; conquering Shu, 130, 158–79; controversial pardon by, 135–36; concubines of, 140, 157; corporal punishment for, 19–20, 155; daughters of, 45, 82, 125; death of, 193; liquidating Kang Yanxiao, 177–79; at Desheng, 78–79; at Dingzhou, 83–84; diplomacy of, 126–30; and Duan Ning, 106, 144–45; egotism of, 30–31; entertaining officials, 132–33, 141–42; ethnicity of, 3–4; eunuch clout under, 118–20; expansion into Yan, 39, 50–52, 67; father’s dying words, 11, 38, 85–86; filial devotion to mother, 19; and foster sons, 28, 34, 37, 77;

Index frictions with Zhu Shouyin, 97–98; gambling habits of, 19–20, 23, 69–70, 145–46; and Guo Chongtao, 25–26, 77–78; harem of, 146; as henpecked husband, 20; in Hezhong intervention, 49, 80–81; histrionics of, 145; honoring Consort Chen, 20; humor of, 155; on interstate relations under, 42; and Kitan, 66–68, 83; hunting habits of, 136–38, 145; Jinyang resistance, 201–2; and Li Siyuan, 28–29, 76–77, 143, 183–85; the Liang collapse, 103–08; and Liu Xun, 63–64; on loyalty, 97, 187–88; move to Luoyang, 111–13; Mao Zedong on, xi, 1n1; marriage of, 123–25; marriage alliances of, 125; meaning of name, 13; and Meng Zhixiang, 170–72; military commissioner under, 119–20; and Mother Cao, 18–20, 96, 120–22, 141, 150–52, 163–64; Nanping governor and, 30–31, 127–28; palace growth under, 146–47; pardoning Li Jitao, 109; physical traits of, 14, Plate 5; poisoning attempt, 62; political consciousness of, 40–41; public appeal of, 173; racial inclusion of, 113; racism and, 56; razing accession altar, 138–39, 141; relieving Luzhou, 38–39; reprimanding uncle, 36; reviving civil service exams, 134–35; rotating armies, 79; on rules of engagement, 44; ruling style of, 130–31; on secondary capitals, 95; severity of, 25; sexuality of, 118; sisters of, 125; son’s marriage, 84; and southern states, 66; and stepmother, 17–18, 109, 148–49; succession as prince, 32, 35; and Tang martyrs, 133–34; taxman’s reproof, 91–92; tensions with Tianxiong, 47, 55–61, 65, 180–87; titles of honor of, 121; wife’s flight, 193–94, 198; wife’s financial clout, 155–56, 189–92; writs of immunity under, 108–09, 132; at Yangliu, 71–72; and Yuan Xingqin, 28, 80, 141–42, 157, 182–83, 192; at Yunzhou, 73, 98–99; and Zhang Chengye, 22–24, 86–88, 92; and Zhang Quanyi, 107–8,

Index 110–13, 131–33; Zhao Kuangyin’s marriage to great granddaughter of, 125; and Zhou Dewei, 24, 37–38; and Zhu Youqian, 112, 176–77 Li Cunyi 李存義, d. 926, stepbrother of Cunxu: slain for Guo Chongtao sympathies, 176, 193 Li Guochang 李國昌, d. 888: burial of, 7; name change, 6; frictions with Tang, 7–8; patronage for Li Siyuan, 27; in suppressing Huang Chao, 8–9 Li Honggui 李宏規, d. 920, Zhao eunuch: in the purge of favorite, 81 Li Huan 李環, d. 926, Jiji’s bodyguard: in death of Li Jiji, 198–99; in slaying Guo Chongtao, 175 Li Jiancheng 李建成, Taizong’s older brother: purge of, 29 Li Jichan 李繼蟾, d. 926, son of Cunxu, 125 Li Jiji 李繼笈, d. 926, eldest son of Cunxu: adoption by imperial favorites, 110, 112; birth of, 21; bonding with mother, 124; Buddhist sympathies of, 157–58; as campaign overseer, 160–61; at Chengdu send-off, 175; death in Changan, 198–99, 201; education of, 55–56; en route to Luoyang, 192, 195–96; executing Wang Zongbi, 169; fate of wife, 200; liquidating Kang Yanxiao, 177–79; marriage of, 84, 123; on mother’s directive, 172; punishment for Wang Chengxiu, 169–70; return to Weizhou, 102, 109; rift with Guo Chongtao, 167–68, 175–76; slaying Guo Chongtao, 175–76; spanking by mother, 155; in surrender ceremony, 165 Li Jijing 李繼璟. See Li Congjing Li Jilin 李繼麟. See Zhu Youqian Li Jisong 李繼嵩, d. 926, Cunxu’s son, 125 Li Jitao 李繼陶, d. 923, Lu/Ze lieutenant: mother of, 153; pardon for, 109; property of, 123; rebellion of, 96–97, 142 Li Jitong 李繼潼, d. 926, Cunxu’s son, 125 Li Jiyan 李繼曮, surrender at Fengxiang, 161 Li Jiyao 李繼嶢, d. 926, Cunxu’s son, 125

227 Li Kegong 李克恭, younger brother of Keyong: murder of, 8n38, 11 Li Kejian 李克儉, older brother of Keyong, 8n38 Li Kening 李克寧, d. 908, youngest brother of Keyong: conspiracy against nephew, 11, 32–37, 97; marrying Meng Zhixiang’s sister, 36 Li Keqin 李克勤, brother of Keyong Li Kerang 李克讓, younger brother of Keyong, 8n38 Li Kerou 李克柔, younger brother of Keyong, 8n38 Li Kexiu 李克修, younger brother of Keyong: death by humiliation, 12 Li Keyong 李克用, 856–908, son of Guochang: adoption of Siyuan, 27; brother’s challenge, 32–33; burial of, x, 7, 13, 32, 52, 149; collaboration with Guochang, 7; and Consort Cao, 18–20; daughter of, 105; foster sons of, 33–34, 70, 109; grave sweeping for, 145; Guo Chongtao under, 24–25; in-laws of, 124–25; intrigues against Zhu Wen, 11; and Kang Yanxiao, 100; and Lady Chen, 20–21; line of succession to, 197; and Meng Zhixiang, 160; morals of, 148–49; niece of, 160; personality of, 11–12, 18, 26, 59; posthumous honors for, 95; on premature accession, 85–86; progeny of, 13; as proud father, 1–2; raid on Weizhou, 21, 57, 154–55; relations with Kitan, 12–13, 66; rout at Xingzhou, 54; Shu’s disregard for, 159–60; son’s filial devotion, 23, 151; in suppression of Huang Chao, 8–9; and Tang subject, 7, 9–10; ties to Zhao, 44–45, 52; wife of, 15–18, 120–21; writ of immunity for, 108; and Zhang Chengye, 22–23; and Zhaozong, 111 Li Kezhang 李克章, younger brother of Keyong, 8n38 Li Lin 李鏻, 860–947, Jin negotiator: betrays Zhang Wenli, 82–83 Li Maozhen 李茂貞, Qi governor: harasses Changan, 39–40; immunity

228 for, 108; infidel to, 135–36; surrender of, 106 Li Qi 李琪, minister of personnel: on government’s overextension, 173 Li Shaochen 李紹琛. See Kang Yanxiao Li Shaoqin 李紹欽, Huazhou governor: link to actors, 116 Li Shaorong 李紹榮. See Yuan Xingqin Li Shimin 李世民. See Tang Taizong Li Si’en 李嗣恩, Cunxu’s foster brother: in rescue at Jinyang, 62 Li Siyuan 李嗣源, 867–933, adopted brother of Cunxu: banquets for, 28, 107; burial of brother, 203; chastising Yuan Xingqin, 201; consideration for Shu campaign, 160; containing the Kitan, 67–68, 142–43; conversation with Ren Huan, 200–201; daughter of, 189; defending Luzhou, 38–39, 142; at Desheng, 89; on Dingzhou intervention, 83; distinction at Weizhou, 63; ethnicity of, 26n131; examination yield under, 134; excoriating Zhu Shouyin, 98; fresh frictions with, 142–44; Guo Chongtao on, 144; hunting habits of, 137; as interim regent, 196–97; intervening at Zhao, 42–43; in Kaifeng’s collapse, 103–5; lackluster performance at Puyang, 76–77; leading Multi-Racial Armies, 142; meeting with Cunxu, 171–72; move to Xiangzhou, 187–88; on pardon, 136; posting at Xiangzhou, 76; purging eunuchs, 202; reprimand for favoritism, 143; rescues Cunxu, 84; savvy judgment of, 17; in Tongzhou relief, 80; usurpation of, 34; war against Yan, 47–51; in Wei/Bo suppression, 183–87; writ of immunity for, 108, 132; and Yuan Xingqin, 50; in Yunzhou offensive, 99–101; at Zhenzhou, 89, 96–97, 143, 185 Li Song 李崧, civilian aide at Chengdu: forges edict, 175 Li Tianxia 李天下, “Li’s World,” 114–15, 117 Li Yan 李曮, d. 927, diplomat: joins Shu campaign, 161; negotiations at Chengdu, 129–30, 159

Index Li Yan 李嚴, tutor: failed recruitment of, 55–56 Li Yanqing 李彥卿, Zhuangzong loyalist, 193 Li Yu 李愚, scholar-warrior, in Shu campaign, 162–63 Li Yuan 李淵, r. 618–626, Tang founder: purge of, 29 Li Zanhua 李贊華, Kitan husband of Woman Xia, 200 liangjiazi 良家子, commoner household, 18 Liaozhou 遼州, Shanxi: Shatuo expansion into, 8; in Tianxiong intervention, 58 Lingguan zhuan 伶官傳, “On Actors in Office,” 115. lingren 伶人. See actors and musicians Linpu 臨濮, border town: Zhou Dewei’s demise at, 75 Liu, Empress 劉后, d. 926, Empress of Zhuangzong: adoption by Zhang Quanyi, 110–11, 133; Buddhist faith of, 141, 157–58; charges of infidelity against, 198; corporal punishment by, 155; corrupt practices of, 153, 188; in death of Guo Chongtao, 166, 175–76; directives from, 156; dispatching Ma Yangui, 172; flight from Luoyang, 193–94; marriage of, 123–25; as missing child, 122; mother of Jiji, 55; on pardoning Li Jitao, 109; repudiating father, 154–55; return to Weizhou, 102; rumors about, 189; social background of, 154; sway over finances, 155–56, 189–90, 191–92 Liu, Woman 劉氏, d. 925, wife of Li Keyong: as companion, 15–18; death and burial of, 148–51; staying on at Jinyang, 120–21 Liu Bei 劉備, 161–223, founder of Shu, 196 Liu Qi 劉玘, Liang officer: long-awaited reunion, 107 Liu Rengong 劉仁恭, d. 914, Yan overlord: death of, 52; massacre at Beizhou, 65; spurns Zhao, 44; ties to Keyong, 46 Liu Shouguang 劉守光, d. 914, son of Rengong: death of, 51–52; first Jin

Index intervention, 39; repudiates Jin, 46–47; second Jin intervention, 50–51 Liu Shouwen 劉守文, d. 908, brother of Shouguang: purge of, 47 Liu Xun 劉訓, Liang commander: assault on Tianxiong, 57–59, 61; botched poisoning of Cunxu, 62; death of, 81; denigrating Modi, 63; dispatch to Tongzhou, 80; outwitted by Cunxu, 63–64; raid on Jinyang, 62; the wiles of, 63 Liu Zhiyuan 劉知遠, 895–948, Later Han founder: as cavalry leader, 76; as ethnic hybrid, 16 Liyang 黎陽 county: as river crossing for Jin armies, 65 Longmen Caves 龍門石窟, Luoyang: as popular venue, 4; prayers for snow at, 141 Lu Cheng 盧程, as senior civilian aide: dismissal of, 96; elevation to chief councilor, 93–94 Lu Siduo 陸思鐸, Liang officer: longawaited reunion with Cunxu, 107 Lu/Ze 潞澤 command. See Luzhou; Zezhou Lu Zhi 盧質, 867–942, administrative secretary: as Hanlin academician, 95; as prospective councilor, 93; racial slur of, 70–71 Lulong 盧龍 command. See Yan or Youzhou Luodu 洛都. See Luoyang Luojing 洛京. See Luoyang Luoluo 落落, as son of Li Keyong, 32n2 Luoshui 洛水, river in Luoyang: flooding of, 147, 152 Luoyang 洛陽, Henan: birthday celebrations at, 140–41; as burial place, 133–34, 151, 163–64; as capital, 20, 106, 111–13, 131; famine at, 173; mother’s move to, 121, 148–49; negotiations with, 187; new tower at, 146–47; paucity of literati at, 116; plundering palaces at, 195; superior topography of, 104; tomb of Zhu Wen at, 107; Zhang Quanyi’s clout at, 109–11 Luo Guan 羅貫, d. 926, Luoyang county custodian: Cunxu’s confrontation with, 137, 152–53

229 Luo Zhouhan 羅周翰, Weizhou governor: expulsion of, 56 Lutou Pass 鹿頭關, Hanzhou: surrenders, 164 Luzhou 潞州: in Jinyang relief, 64; mutiny at, 96, 109, 142, 182; relieving, 38–39, 41; under Zhou Dewei, 37 Ma Shaohong 馬紹宏, eunuch inspector: colluding with Li Siyuan, 184; as military commissioner, 119; posting at Youzhou, 76–77 Ma Yangui 馬彥珪, eunuch: dispatch to Shu, 172; in slaying of Guo Chongtao, 175–76 Ma Yin 馬殷, 852–930, Chu ruler: tribute from, 127 Manichaeism: influence on Shatuo culture, 4 Mao Zedong 毛澤東, on Li Cunxu, xi, 1n1 Mao Zhang 毛璋, Jiji’s senior officer, 198–99 marriage: pacts for children, 21–22, 45, 55, 124–25 Mencius, 372–302 BCE, classical philosopher: on campaigns, 32; on the oppressed, 195 Meng, Woman 孟氏, wife of Li Kening: inciting mutiny, 35–37 Meng Zhixiang 孟知祥, 874–934, Chinese mercenary: as advisor to Keyong, 25; affinal ties to Shatuo, 15; arrival in Chengdu, 177–79; as custodian of Jinyang, 95, 170; dispatch to Chengdu, 177–79; as Guo Chongtao’s mentor, 170; meeting in Luoyang, 170–72; pleas to Cunxu, 55; relative of Woman Meng, 35–36; warning about officer loyalties, 139 Miaojilie 邈吉烈, nickname of Li Siyuan, 26 Middle Palace. See Empress Liu Military Commission, Shumiyuan 樞密院: resurrection of, 118–20; in Tang times, 25 Mingzhou 洺州, campaign against, 27 Mingzong 明宗, r. 926–933. See Li Siyuan Mo/Modi, Emperor 末帝, r. 913–923, successor to Yougui: action against Tianxiong, 57, 60; installation of, 48;

230 Jing Xiang’s reproof of, 72; retaliation against Hezhong, 80–81; sacking of Wang Zan, 79–80; suburban rites by, 122; surrender of, 102–3 Mongolia: control of Yan, 51; Sky God in, 139; White Tartars of, 3 Mountain Man Liu, father of Empress Liu, 154–55 Multi-Racial Armies, Fan Han jun 蕃漢軍: under Li Cunshen, 76; under Li Siyuan, 142; under Zhou Dewei, 37 natural disasters, 139–40, 147, 152, 164, 173 Nanjiao 南郊. See Southern Suburbs Nanping 南平, southern state: leader’s court visit, 30–31, 127–28; on Shu’s surrender, 165 Napoleon, 1769–1821, French leader: on managing risk, 75 neifu 內府, emperor’s private treasury, 156 Ni 霓, father of Li Siyuan, 26 Northern Han 北漢, 951–979: strategic strength of, 10 Odes, Book of 詩經: inspiration for Cunxu’s name, 13 Othello: parallels with Cunxu, 194 Ouyang Xiu 歐陽修, 1007–1072, Song historian: on barbarian nature, 26; on Five Dynasties royals, 148. See also Historical Records of the Five Dynasties palace directives, 156, 175–76 Pei Hao 裴皞, chief examiner, 135 Pei Yue 裴約, d. 923, loyal lieutenant: Cunxu’s high regard for, 97 Parhae. See Bohai polo, Cunxu’s skills at, 138–39 Puyang 濮陽, border town: proximity to Desheng, 78–79; sanctuary at, 75–76 Puzhou 濮州, border town: probes of, 72, 73–74 Qian Liu 錢鏐, 852–932, Wuyue satrap: raids on Changan, 39–40; submits to Later Tang, 106 Qicheng 戚城, border town: trip to, 145

Index Qige 七哥, Seventh Brother, nickname for Zhang Chengye, 23 Qin, Woman 秦氏, mother of Li Keyong, 9 Qinlin 秦嶺山, mountains bordering Shu, 30, 128 Qinzhou 秦州, northern Shu: fall of, 169–70 Records of the Grand Historian, Shiji 史記: on actors, 117 Ren Huan 任圜, d. 927, civil courtier: conversation with Siyuan, 200–201; deployment to Shu, 160; as Guo Chongtao’s replacement, 177–79; as interim leader of forces, 167 ri 日, as consent for heir-apparent, 88 religious practices: eclecticism of, 141; shamanistic roots, 139–40 righteous sons. See foster sons Sang Weihan 桑維翰, 899–947: examination graduate, 135 Shakespeare: on unbridled love, 194n214 Shan Tinggui 單廷珪, Yan commander: surrenders to Jin, 50 Shangshuling 尚書令, Imperial Secretary: titular honor for, 54 Shatuo 沙陀 peoples: affinity for dogs, 70–71; allowance for graft, 69–70; Buddhism’s appeal among, 157; connectedness to the north, 131; as distinct from barbarian, 83–84; hunting as cultural expression, 136–38; ideal of accessibility, 41; inspired intuition of, 39; identity of, 55; interracial marriages among, 15–16, 35–36; isolation from steppe, 142; and long arms, 49; marriage alliances for, 170, 176; martial talent among, 79; origins of, 3–4; population of, 5–6; racial inclusion among, 117; religious values of, 139–40; as rival to the Kitan, 66–68; strength in a dogfight, 63; swearing covenants among, 45, 50–51; Tang patronage of, 7; traits of, 3–4, 14–15, 26; as tribal name, 4 Shatuo Fuguo 沙陀輔國: as ancestor of Cunxu, 6

Index Shatuoji 沙陀蹟: Gravel Sands of Xinjiang, 3 Shatuo Jinshan 沙陀金山, fl. 702, ancestor of Cunxu: on name, 6; renders tribute to Tang, 5 Shatuo Guduozhi 沙陀骨咄支, ancestor of Cunxu, 6 Shen Bin 沈斌, officer in suppression of Kang Yanxiao, 178 shi 諡, as posthumous title of honor, 149, 151 Shi Jiantang 史建瑭, 880–921, Jin commander: death of, 83; at Zhaozhou, 53, 82 Shi Jingrong 史敬鎔, senior aide to Li Keyong: betraying mutineers, 36 Shi Jingtang 石敬瑭, 892–942, Jin commander: on advance against Kaifeng, 188; as archery captain, 79; rescue by, 61; sweep of Kaifeng, 190–91; wife of, 189 Shi Junli 石君立, d. 923, Jin commander: capture of, 80; murder of, 104 shi poetry 詩, 114 Shi Siming 史思明, Tang rebel: immunity for, 108 Shi Ximeng 石希蒙, d. 920, Zhao eunuch: slaying of, 81 Shi Yanqiong 史彥瓊, Weizhou inspector: ineptitude of, 181–83 Shiji 史記. See Records of the Grand Historian shijun 弒君, killing one’s sovereign, 104 Shou’an county 壽安縣, Dowager Cao’s burial site, 152 Shu 蜀, southern state: auspicious omens at, 95; conquest plans for, 30, 152, 158–59; declaration of war against, 159; demise of Guo Chongtao at, 175–76; deployment of armies against, 160–63; dispatch of Ma Yangui to, 172; endorses enthronement, 85; envoy’s Li Yan’s visit to, 129–30; executing Wang Chengxiu, 169–70; mass slaying of eunuchs at, 168–69; Nanping on, 128; palace directives in, 156; retreat of expeditionary forces from, 177–80, 196; return of

231 Li Jiji from, 192; rifts within campaign leadership, 166–67; size of surrendering armies, 165n79; slaying Shu royals, 169–70, 179–80, 192; spoils from, 165–66, 169, 173, 190; surrender of Chengdu, 164–65; war as untimely, 173–74 Shulü, Kitan Empress 述律后, d. 947, wife of Abaoji: political savvy of, 16, 83 Shumiyuan 樞密院. See Military Commission Shuo 朔 prefecture, Shanxi: Li Kening’s service at, 34 Sichuan 四川. See Shu Sige Abo 思葛阿波, brother of Zhuye Jinzhong, 9 Sikong Ting 司空頲, d. 915: slaying by Cunxu, 59 Silla. See Korea Sima Guang 司馬光, 1019–1086. See Comprehensive Mirror. Sima Qian 司馬遷, d. 86 BC, Records of the Grand Historian: on actors, 117 Sima Yan 司馬炎, 236–290: long arms of, 49 Sishui 汜水, near Luoyang: Cunxu’s decision to linger at, 190–92 Sizi 嗣子, as formally adopted sons, 33 Song dynasty 宋代, 960–1279, founded by Zhao Kuangyin: failure to regain Yan, 51; founder marries the Yining Princess’s granddaughter, 125; the marginalizing of clansmen under, 126; social mobility in, xi–xii; views on the barbarian other, 26 Song Mountain 嵩山, imperial tour at, 141 Song Tinghao 宋廷浩, prefect: husband of Cunxu’s daughter, 200 Southern Suburbs: rites by Cunxu, 121–23; rites by Cunxu’s successor, 122n163; rites by Modi, 72, 122; Spring and Autumn Annals, Chunqiu 春秋: Cunxu’s command of, 2, 30; projecting power through, 38 Standen, Naomi, on porous border, 113 Su Hanheng 蘇漢衡, d. 920, Zhao bodyguard: demands favorite’s death, 81

232 Su Xun 蘇循, Tang courtier: recruitment by Cunxu, 88 Sui dynasty 隋代, 581–618: connections to Shanxi, 9–10; entertaining officials in, 131–32; literary companions in, 115; the rebuilding of Luoyang in, 147; relics from, 108; strategic exposure of capital in, 183–84; Tang founder’s invective against, 58 Sunzi 孫子. See Art of War Taifei 太妃, Consort Dowager, 96 Taihou 太后, Empress Dowager, 96 Taimiao 太廟. See Imperial Ancestors Temple Taiyuan 太原. See Jinyang Taizong 唐太宗, r. 626–649, Tang emperor: on auspicious omens, 95; border campaigns of, 160; campaign against Sui, 25, 101; in deploying the Shatuo, 4; disinheriting son, 114; on hubris of victors, 165; hunting habits of, 53, 136; as Imperial Secretary, 54; purge of father, 29; as scrappy warrior, 71; on securing gains, 59; shuns office for clansmen, 126; socializes with archers, 117; tolerance for critics, 92; tomb of, 135 Taizu of Liang 梁太祖. See Zhu Wen Tang dynasty 唐代, 618–906: anniversary of, 74; in burying Sui royals, 108; auxiliary capitals in, 131; campaign against Sui, 25, 58; clerics and the kowtow in, 158; court actors in, 117; entertaining officials in, 131–32, 141–42; eunuch service under, 22–24, 181; exploiting popular grievances, 147; favor for Shatuo, 2; frictions with Shatuo, 7–8; frugal emperors of, 146; heir-apparent in 88; hybrid culture of, 15; hereditary elite in, 125; hunting in, 53, 136; imperial tombs of, 135, 199; liquidating royals from, 87; Luoyang’s decline in, 112; martyrs of, 133–34; military commission in, 119; patronizing outsiders, 7; puppet emperors in, 130–31; purge of founder, 29; quelling Huang Chao,

Index 8–9; recruitment of literati from, 93; reviving reign name of, 46; roots in Shanxi, 10; Shatuo fidelity to, 87; Shu’s disregard for, 159–60; suppressing Eastern Turks, 68; tombs at Tongzhou, 80; women’s martial competence, 16; writs of immunity under, 108; Zhang Quanyi under, 112–13 Tangut, Dangxiang 黨項, as Tang subjects, 7 Tartars: as allies, 34; envoys from, 126; intermarriage with Shatuo, 3, 8–9 Three Kingdoms, 220–280: lure of the south in, 168; romantic allure of, xii Tianchang 天長縣, border town with Zhao: conferring with Wang Rong, 52–53 Tianshen 天神, Sky God, 4, 139 Tianxiong 天雄軍. See Wei/Bo Tianyou 天祐 reign, resuscitation of, 46 tiequan 鐵券. See writs of immunity Tongguang 同光 reign, 923–926: adoption of, 94–95 Tongzhou 同州, near Hezhong: site of Jin intervention, 80–81 tongzike 童子科, child prodigy exam, 134 tributes: from Chu, 127; from Shu, 130; from Wu, 126–27; from Wuyue, 128–29 Tuhun 吐渾 or Tuyuhun 吐谷渾: intermarriage with Shatuo, 3 Tujue 突厥, Turks: foster sons among, 33; language of, 114; in northern Xinjiang, 3–4 Tuoba Wei 拓跋魏, 386–535: founder of, 9; imperial banquet sites, 151; limited aspirations of, 30; racial inclusion under, 113 Tuyu 突欲. See Li Zanhua Uighurs, Xinjiang: envoys from, 126; facial features of, 14; presence among foster sons, 17. See also Huihe Uighurs Wang, Consort 王氏, Dingzhou: marries Li Jiji, 125 Wang, Woman 王氏, empress of Tang Gaozong: ties to Jinyang, 10 Wang, Woman 王氏, wife of Li Jiji, 125, 200

Index Wang Chengxiu 王承休, d. 926, Shu governor: slaying of, 169–70 Wang Chengzong 王承宗, Chengde governor, 5 Wang Chuzhi 王處直, d. 923, Dingzhou governor: intervening at Zhao, 42; repudiates Jin alliance, 83 Wang Deming 王德明. See Zhang Wenli Wang Du 王都, d. 929, Dingzhou leader: giving daughter in marriage, 84, 125; purges Wang Chuzhi, 83; visits Weizhou, 138 Wang Hongli 王弘立, fl. 869: suppression of, 6 Wang Jian 王建, 877–918, Former Shu founder: auspicious omens at, 95; foster sons of, 34; son’s favor for actors, 114 Wang Jian 王緘, slain commander, 93 Wang Jianji 王建及, Jin bodyguard: replacement of, 79; valor at Desheng, 78 Wang Jianli 王建立, 877–946, Zhenzhou inspector: posting at Shu, 168; protecting Siyuan’s family, 188 Wang Jingren 王景仁, Liang commander: defeat at Baixing, 43 Wang Ke 王珂, son-in-law of Li Keyong, 105 Wang Quanbin 王全斌, Zhuangzong loyalist, 193 Wang Rong 王鎔, 873–921, Zhao satrap: appeals to Yan, 51–52; bonds with Cunxu, 44–46; defending Zaoqiang, 48; demise of, 81–82; greeting Liu Shouguang, 52; harem of, 90; hunting habits of, 53; Jin intervention at, 41–44; on the personal safety of Cunxu, 73; sexuality of, 81 Wang Sitong 王思同, d. 934, joins Shu campaign, 161 Wang Wen 王溫, d. 926, Imperial guardsman: in mutiny, 184–86, 193 Wang Yan 王衍, d. 926, second ruler of Former Shu: in adopting foster son, 34; departing Chengdu, 174–75; father of, 168; negotiations with, 129–30, 159; palaces plundered, 165–66; slaying of, 179; surrender of, 164–65

233 Wang Yanqiu 王晏球, commander near Kaifeng: loyalty to Siyuan, 191 Wang Yanzhang 王彥章, 863–923, Liang officer: at Chanzhou, 61, 97–98; at Yunzhou, 25 Wang Yu 王郁, son of Chuzhi: restores ties to Jin, 83 Wang Yuanying 王元膺, son of Yan: association with actors, 114 Wang Zhaohui 王昭誨, son of Rong: marriage to Cunxu’s son, 45 Wang Zan 王瓚, Liang commander: rout at Puyang, 79–80; surrenders Kaifeng, 105 Wang Zongbi 王宗弼, d. 925, adopted brother of Yan: assists with surrender, 164–65; curries favor with Guo Chongtao, 167; mass murder of eunuchs, 168–69; plunders Chengdu palaces, 167 Wangdu 望都 county, Dingzhou: Kitan rout at, 84 wang ju 妄聚, illicit use of actors: Abaoji’s censure of, 118 Wansheng 萬勝 garrison, 191 Wanshoujie 萬壽節, Longevity Day: birthday festivities on, 140–41, 161 Wei/Bo 魏博, Tianxiong command: acquisition of, 56–60; insurrection at, 180–87; as interim capital, 59–60; massacre at, 64–65; mercenaries at, 64–65; pardons for, 58, 65; partitioning of, 182; retention as single command, 59–60 Wei dynasty. See Tuoba Wei Wei Yue 韋說, d. 927, chief councilor: in Cunxu’s burial, 203; ineptitude of, 95, 118–19 Weinan 渭南, place of Jiji’s death, 198 Weiwucheng 威武軍, northern Shu: surrender of, 162 Weizhou 魏州, Tianxiong command: as auxiliary capital, 131; close call at, 61; Empress Liu’s birth at, 154; designs against, 89; dispensing armor at, 143; earthquake at, 164; inaugural audience at, 94; money-making schemes at, 155–56; mutiny at, 180–87; raid by Li Keyong, 21; recruiting for Imperial

234 guard, 173; recruiting talent from, 91–92; Tang imperial seals at, 85; trips to, 136, 141, 145. 158; Wang Du’s visit to, 138, 150; Woman Liu’s burial at, 149 Wen Tao 溫韜, d. 928, Changan resident: plunder of Tang palaces, 135–36 western capital. See Changan Women: consorts of Cunxu, 21–22; consorts of Keyong, 18–21; marriage pacts for, 125; returning displaced girls, 122; wife of Cunxu, 21, 124; wife of Jiji, 125; wife of Keyong, 15–18 writ of immunity: conferrals of, 108–9, 132–33, 176–77 Wu 吳, southern state: endorses Cunxu’s accession, 85; outreach to, 99; repairing relations with, 126–27; royal titles at, 92–93 Wu Zetian 武則天, 624–705: as female emperor, 181; as nun, 196; ties to Jinyang, 10 Wu Zhen 烏震, Zhao officer: dedication of, 82; as Zhao prefect, 91 Wuhuang 武皇, posthumous designation for Li Keyong, 95 Wutai Mountain 五台山, Hedong: monk’s travel to, 158 Xia, Lady 夏氏, favored consort: remarriage to Li Zanhua, 200 Xia Luqi 夏魯奇, Jin bodyguard: valor of, 61 Xiang Yanxi 向延嗣, eunuch; in murder of Kang Yanxiao, 179; report on Shu spoils, 165–66 Xiangzhou 襄州: birthplace of Lady Chen, 20 Xiangzhou 相州, Tianxiong: Li Siyuan’s retreat to, 76; surrender to Jin, 64–65 Xiazhou 夏州, Shanxi: raid by Cunxu, 41 Xiaozhang, Empress 孝章皇后, wife of Zhao Kuangyin, 125 Xichuan 西川, Eastern Chuan, 170 Xie Yanzhang 謝彥章, d. 918, Liang commander: ill-will against, 74 Xifang Ye 西方鄴, officer at Kaifeng: conversion to Li Siyuan, 191

Index Xin county 莘縣, Weizhou: base of Liu Xun, 63 Xincheng 新城 county, near Dingzhou: defeating Kitan armies at, 84 Xingjiao Gate 興教門, Luoyang: mutiny at, 193 Xingyuan 興元 prefecture: resistance to campaigners, 162 Xingzhou 邢州, Liang territory: mutiny at, 184–85; raids against, 27, 53–54 Xinjiang 新疆, home of Uighurs, 14 Xinzhou 新州, Yan domain: Kitan aggression against, 67; Wang Yu at, 83 Xixia dynasty, 982–1227. See Tangut Xuanwu command 宣武. See Kaifeng Xuanwu Gate 玄武門, Changan: venue for Taizong’s usurpation, 29 Xuanzong 唐宣宗, r. 810–859, Tang emperor: summons Shatuo Jinshan, 6 Xuzhou 徐州, earthquake at, 164 Yan 燕 domain: campaign against, 27–28; forces from, 62, 180; ignores Zhao overtures, 44; a tutor’s origins, 55; vacuum at, 66; Yuan Xingqin at, 79 Yan Bao 閻寶, Jin commander: misjudgment of Kitan, 68; on perils of retreat, 75; in Zhao intervention, 82–83, 89 Yang Guang 楊廣. See Yangdi Yang Li 楊立, Luzhou officer: mutiny of, 142 Yang Pu 楊溥, 901–938, Wu satrap: tribute from, 126 Yang Shihou 楊師厚, d. 915, Liang commander: contest at Xingzhou, 53–54; presiding at Weizhou, 56 Yangcun 楊村 county: in border war, 145 Yangdi, 隋煬帝, r. 604–618, Sui emperor: fondness for literary companions, 115; rebuilding Luoyang, 147; ties to Jinyang, 10 Yangliu 楊劉, town near Bozhou: debacle at, 98; martial exploits at, 71–72 yangzi 養子, as formally adopted sons, 33 Yanmen 雁門, northern Shanxi: burial spot for Li Guochang, 7; origin of Li Siyuan, 26

Index Yao Yanwen 姚彥溫, officer near Kaifeng: surrenders, 191 Yaoying Senior Princess 瑤英長公主, sister of Cunxu, 125 Yawei 牙衛 or Yaya 衙牙, governor’s guard: at Weizhou, 56 Yazi 亞子, nickname for Cunxu, 2 yezhan 野戰, geographically dispersed tactics, 43 Yi, Consort 伊氏, favorite of Cunxu: returns to Jinyang, 200; waxing fortunes of, 123–24 yi’er 義兒. See foster sons; Army of Foster Sons Yin Mountain 陰山, Xinjiang, 4n11 Yinge 蔭葛, as tribal name, 4 Yingze county 滎澤, near Kaifeng, 190 Yingzhou 應州, near Yan, 50 Yining Senior Princess 義寧大長公主, daughter of Cunxu: granddaughter’s marriage to Song founder, 125 Yique 伊闕縣, near Luoyang: hunting at, 137 Yishi 猗氏 county: rendezvous with Zhu Youqian, 49 Yongling Mausoleum 雍陵, Cunxu’s tomb: burial at, 203 Youzhou 幽州, modern Beijing: absorption by Jin, 46–48, 50–51; eunuch posting at, 76–77; Kitan raid against, 97, 143; mercenaries from, 74–75; mismanagement of, 67; posting of Li Cunshen to, 76; posting of Li Siyuan at, 47–51 Yuan Xiangxian 袁象先, Liang governor: surrenders, 105 Yuan Xingqin 元行欽, Yan warrior: denouncing Siyuan, 201; dispatch to Weizhou, 182–83; elevation to councilor, 141–42; entertaining emperor, 132; imperial consort as gift to, 157; at Luzhou, 142; pledge of loyalty from, 192; rescue at Puyang, 79–80; return to capital, 190–91; spurning Siyuan’s emissaries, 187; surrenders to Jin, 50; valor of, 52; unpopularity of, 191 Yuanqiu 圜丘, Altar of Heaven: in suburban rites, 122

235 Yunzhou 鄆州: drive against, 25, 98–99; probes of, 72–73 Yunzhou 雲州, Shanxi: Kitan aggression against, 66–67 Yutian 于闐. See Khoten Zaoqiang county 棗彊縣, Zhao kingdom: Liang offensive against, 48 Zezhou 澤州, Shanxi: mutiny at, 96, 109; Shatuo occupation of, 8, 39 Zhang Chengye 章承業, 845–922, Jinyang eunuch: death of, 92, 100; defending Jinyang, 12, 17, 62, 64, 69, 100; on deferring accession, 86–88; on the evils of Liu Shouguang, 51; on gambling, 19–20, 69–70, 145; as hardliner, 47; intervening at Zhao, 42–43; on Lu Zhi’s insult, 70–71; raiding Jin and Jiang, 40; service at Jinyang, 22–24; severity toward kin, 69–70; in suppression of Li Kening, 32–37; waylays He Delun, 57–58; in Yan campaign, 50; Zhang Chujin 張處瑾, d. 922, son of Zhang Wenli: cannibalizing of, 90; inherits father’s position, 83 Zhang Jian 張籛, Changan warlord: in death of Li Jiji, 198–99 Zhang Juhan 張居翰, senior eunuch: executing Shu royals, 179; posting as military commissioner, 95, 119–20 Zhang Li 張礪, Chongtao supporter in Chengdu, 175 Zhang Li 張礪, doctoral degree winner, 134 Zhang Pobai 張破敗, Weizhou officer: inciting rancor, 185 Zhang Quanwu 張全武, brother of Quanyi: service to Jin, 110 Zhang Quanyi 張全義, 850–926, Luoyang governor: death of, 202; in Dowager Cao’s burial, 151–52; on dispatching Siyuan to Weizhou, 184; growing favor for, 109–11; networks of corruption, 153; outings at Songshan, 141; on preserving Liang relics, 107–8; rape of wife and daughter, 110; on relocating the capital, 111–13;

236 socializing with, 131–33; surrender of Kaifeng, 106 Zhang Rongge 張容哥, d. 926, palace treasurer: suicide of, 191–92 Zhang Wenli 張文禮, Zhao commander: purging Wang Rong, 81–82 Zhang, Woman 張氏, d. 926, wife of Zhu Youqian: perishes at home, 177 Zhang Xian 張憲, d. 926, Jinyang native: in dispensing armor, 143; heroic last stand, 201–2 ; on polo field, 138–39; posting at Jinyang, 181; as revenues commissioner, 95; as Zhen prefect, 91 Zhang Yan 張彥, Wei/Bo guardsman: excoriation of, 58 Zhang Yuande 張源德, Beizhou prefect: standing down unruly troops, 60–61, 65 Zhang Yun 張筠, Changan officer: joins Shu campaign, 161; obstructing Jiji, 199; plundering Tang palaces, 199 Zhang Zhao 張昭, 156–236, revered statesman: Cunxu’s regard for, 92 Zhao 趙 satrapy: allying with Jin, 41–46, 51–52; deployments to Yan, 47–48, 67; intervention at, 19, 82–83, 121, 194; joining Wei/Bo offensive, 58; probing Xingzhou, 53–54 Zhao Dejun 趙德鈞, d. 943, Youzhou governor: dispatch to Zezhou, 97 Zhao Feng 趙鳳, d. 935, civilian aide: flight from Yan, 51; reproof for imperial adoptions, 111 Zhao Guangfeng 趙光逢, Liang councilor: resignation of, 73 Zhao Guangyin 趙光胤, chief councilor: problematic personality of, 118–19 Zhao Jiliang 趙季良, tax accountant: reproof over taxes, 91–92 Zhao Kuangyin 趙匡胤, Song founder: marries granddaughter of Yining Princess, 125 Zhao Qi 趙頎, chief examiner, 134 Zhao Siwen 趙思溫, Yan warrior: valor of, 52 Zhao Yan 趙巖, Liang revenues commissioner: apprehension of, 135;

Index as influential in-law, 72; on partitioning of Wei/Bo, 57 Zhao Zaili 趙在禮, 882–947, Beizhou officer: in coercing Zhang Xian, 201–2; in mutiny, 180–81, 183, 186 Zhaozhou 趙州, Zhao satrapy: campaign against, 19, 27; home of Wu Zhen, 91 Zhaozong 唐昭宗, r. 888–904, Tang emperor: confers consort to Li Keyong, 20; meeting with Cunxu, 2; sends brothers to Jinyang, 111 Zheng Jue 鄭玨, Liang councilor: on deferring surrender, 104; welcoming Jin armies, 105 Zhenguan 貞觀 reign, 626–649, as symbol of sagely rule, 29, 131 Zhenzhou 鎮州, Zhao’s sister-city: assault on, 41; Shi Jiantang’s demise at, 83 Zhongdu 中都, near Yunzhou: flight of Wang Yanzhang to, 99 Zhongmenshi 中門使, senior military advisor, 25 Zhongmou county 中牟縣: official reproof at, 137, 154 Zhou Dewei 周德威, d. 918, Jin commander: at Baixiang, 24; death of, 75–76; opposition to Puzhou, 74–75; raiding Jinzhou and Jiangzhou, 39–40; summons to court, 37–38; thwarting Liu Xun, 63; in war against Yan, 47–51, 61; as Youzhou governor, 52–53; in Zhao intervention, 42–44 Zhou Xuanbao 周玄豹, d. 935, fortuneteller: prediction about Li Siyuan, 29 Zhou Za 周匝, actor: official posting for, 115 Zhu Shouyin 朱守殷, d. 927, Cunxu’s servant: defection in the capital, 193; spying on Siyuan, 184; in suppression of Kening, 36 Zhu Wen 朱溫, 852–912, r. 907–912, emperor of Liang: aggression against Jin, 48; exploiting Su Xun, 88; frictions with Li Keyong, 9, 11, 16, 86; as hegemon, 42; high regard for Cunxu, 39; immunity for, 108; marriage of daughter, 41; murder of, 48, 148; plot

Index against Jinyang, 12; rapes by, 110; purge of Tang, 22; in reviewing troops, 137; slaying of Tang courtiers, 133–34; sons of, 57; suburban rites by, 121–22; ties to Zhu Youqian, 49, 80; tomb in Luoyang, 108 Zhu Yougui 朱友珪, r. 912–913, Liang usurper: cabal against, 105; murders father, 48–49 Zhu Youqian 朱友謙, d. 926, Hezhong governor: adopting imperial son, 112; death of, 176–77; solicits Jin support, 49; second Jin intervention, 80–81; son’s execution, 181; writ of immunity for, 108, 133, 177

237 Zhu Youzhen 朱友貞, 888–923. See Mo/ Modi, Emperor Zhuangzong 莊宗. See Li Cunxu zhuke 諸科, various fields exam, 134 Zhuye 朱邪, Turkish tribe, 3, 6 Zhuye Chixin 朱邪赤心. See Li Guochang Zhuye Jinzhong 朱邪盡忠, ancestor of Cunxu, 6, 9 Zhuye Zhiyi 朱邪執宜, ancestor of Cunxu, 6, 9 Zizhi tongjian 資治通鑒. See Comprehensive Mirror for the Advancement of Governance Zuozhuan 左傳, classical work: on elevating men to office, 91; war as fire, vi