Fighting in the electromagnetic spectrum: U.S. Navy and Marine Corps electronic warfare aircraft, missions, and equipment 9781682478509, 9781682478493

Table of contents :
List of Tables and Figures vii
Preface ix
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations xi
Electronic Warfare Defined xv
AN Numbers xix
Aircraft Type Numbering System xxi
Author’s Note on Chapter 1 xxiii
1 Radio Intelligence: The Earliest Form of Electronic Warfare 1
2 World War II ELINT: New Missions for the Patrol Squadrons 9
3 Non-Passive ECM: Jammers and Chaff in World War II 20
4 Cold War ELINT 26
5 ECM during the Korean War 39
6 Dedicated ECM Squadrons 46
7 Beggar Shadow Missions and the Loss of Deep Sea 129 55
8 Self-Defense 63
9 F3D-2Q and Marine Leadership in Tactical Jamming 72
10 New EW Platforms: EA-6A Intruder and RA-5C Vigilante 81
11 Vietnam: Countering the SA-2 86
12 Countermeasure vs. Countermeasure 93
13 EA-6B: An EW Platform from the Ground Up 103
14 Prowlers at War 110
15 ARIES Aircraft 121
16 ES-3A Shadow 135
17 Birth of the EA-18G Growler and the Next-Generation Jammer 141
18 Looking Back: A Historical Perspective 152
APPENDICES
I Characteristics of ECM Aircraft 157
II Carrier-Based ECM Aircraft Deployments during the Korean War 173
III Radar Concepts 177
IV ICAP-III Upgrades 181
V Defense Acquisition Management Framework 183
Notes 185
Selected Bibliography 223
Index 259

Citation preview

FIGHTING IN THE ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM

FIGHTING IN THE ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Electronic Warfare Aircraft, Operations, and Equipment

THOMAS WILDENBERG Naval Institute Press A N N A P O L I S, M A R Y L A N D

Naval Institute Press 291 Wood Road Annapolis, MD 21402 © 2023 by Thomas Wildenberg All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Wildenberg, Thomas, 1947– author. Title: Fighting in the electromagnetic spectrum : U.S. Navy and Marine Corps electronic warfare aircraft, missions, and equipment / Thomas Wildenberg. Other titles: US Navy and Marine Corps electronic warfare aircraft, missions, and equipment Description: Annapolis, Maryland : Naval Institute Press, 2023. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2023006233 (print) | LCCN 2023006234 (ebook) | ISBN 9781682478493 (hardcover) | ISBN 9781682478509 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Electronic warfare aircraft—United States. | Electronics in naval aviation. | United States. Navy—Aviation—History. Classification: LCC UG1242.E43 W553 2023 (print) | LCC UG1242.E43 (ebook) | DDC 623.74/6—dc23/eng/20230616 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023006233 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023006234 ∞ Print editions meet the requirements of ANSI/NISO z39.48-1992 (Permanence of Paper). Printed in the United States of America. 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24 23 First printing

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Contents

List of Tables and Figures ---------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - vii Preface - ---------------------------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ix List of Acronyms and Abbreviations- - --- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xi Electronic Warfare Defined- - ------------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xv AN Numbers- ---------------------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xix Aircraft Type Numbering System- - ------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xxi Author’s Note on Chapter 1- - ----------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xxiii 1 Radio Intelligence: The Earliest Form of Electronic Warfare- - - - - - - - - - - - 1 2 World War II ELINT: New Missions for the Patrol Squadrons- - - - - - - - - 9 3 Non-Passive ECM: Jammers and Chaff in World War II- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 20 4 Cold War ELINT- - --------------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 26 5 ECM during the Korean War- --------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 39 6 Dedicated ECM Squadrons- ----------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 46 7 Beggar Shadow Missions and the Loss of Deep Sea 129- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 55 8 Self-Defense- ---------------------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 63 9 F3D-2Q and Marine Leadership in Tactical Jamming - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 72 10 New EW Platforms: EA-6A Intruder and RA-5C Vigilante-- - - - - - - - - - - 81 11 Vietnam: Countering the SA-2 - - ----- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 86 12 Countermeasure vs. Countermeasure- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 93 13 EA-6B: An EW Platform from the Ground Up- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 103 v

vi — Contents

14 15 16 17 18

Prowlers at War - ------------------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ARIES Aircraft- -------------------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ES-3A Shadow- -------------------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Birth of the EA-18G Growler and the Next-Generation Jammer- - - - - Looking Back: A Historical Perspective- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

110 121 135 141 152

APPENDICES I Characteristics of ECM Aircraft- - ------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - II Carrier-Based ECM Aircraft Deployments during the Korean War- - - III Radar Concepts- - ------------------------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - IV ICAP-III Upgrades - - -------------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - V Defense Acquisition Management Framework- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

157 173 177 181 183

Notes - - ------------------------------------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 185 Selected Bibliography---------------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 223 Index-------------------------------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 259

Tables and Figures

TABLES

4-1. Incidents Involving Anti-aircraft Fire and Fighter Attacks on U.S. Navy Patrol Planes, 1950–59- ------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 35 8-1. DECM on the Navy’s Heavy Attack Aircraft, May 1962- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 71 FIGURES

6-1. EA-3B Operator Stations ---------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 50 6-2. EC-121M Internal Layout- - ------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 53 14-1. EA-6B Evolution- - ---------------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 116 15-1. EP-3E Operator Positions- - ------------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 126 15-2. EP-3E Aries II General Arrangement- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 130 17-1. Concept Drawing of Next-Generation Jammer-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 147 17-2. NGJ-LB Protest- - ----------------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 151 18-1. EA-18G ECM Equipment- ------------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 155

vii

Preface

A

t the beginning of the twentieth century, naval warfare, which for centuries had been limited to the surface of the water, moved quickly into the domain below the surface and the air above it. The influence of undersea and aerial warfare in naval history is well known. The fourth domain involving the electromagnetic spectrum, which also appeared at this time, had an impact on naval warfare as well, although much less has been written about this important aspect of military conflict on the high seas. When navies began to make use of the fourth domain, they soon discovered that it could provide a unique source of information about the opposing force, instituting a form of intelligence that would later be termed electronic intelligence (ELINT). Also discovered was the value of interrupting or corrupting the enemy’s communication signals that were transmitted in the “ether,” thus beginning a method of fighting we now term electronic warfare (EW). Although EW has grown in importance over the years, few naval historians, with the exception of those interested in cryptology, have attempted to document the growth and development of the equipment, techniques, and operational use of EW. There are several reasons for this. First is the high level of secrecy surrounding EW; information about it is hard to come by.1 Next is the fact that there is little glory attached to its use. It does not result in great battles (except for code breaking) or memorable actions. Finally, it is highly technical in nature. ix

x — Preface

The subject has not been totally ignored. There is a considerable amount of literature on cryptology, especially with regard to the work of Britain’s Room 40 in World War I and the U.S. Navy’s successful efforts to break the main code used by the Japanese Imperial Navy’s battle fleet that resulted in its defeat at the Battle of Midway. Likewise, there is a considerable field of study regarding the Enigma machine and the British code breakers of Bletchley Park. Because of its importance in the Cold War and the war in Vietnam, there is a reasonable amount of material on the U.S. Air Force’s use of EW during these two conflicts. But sources of information covering the U.S. Navy and the Marine Corps are few and far between.2 To my knowledge, there is no single source on U.S. Navy and Marine EW aircraft and equipment that provides a comprehensive picture of these services’ use of electronic warfare since its inception in 1942. It is my intention to fill this gap in the history of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAA AAW ACRP ACS ADVCAP AEA AESA AEW AIL AMSS ARIES ASW BAMS BGPHES BLC CIA CILOP CINCPAC CNAF CNO COMINT

anti-aircraft artillery anti-aircraft weapon Airborne Communications Reconnaissance Program Aerial Common Sensor advanced capability airborne electronic attack active electronically scanned array airborne early warning Airborne Instruments Laboratory Advanced Multimission Sensor System Airborne Reconnaissance Integrated Electronic System antisubmarine warfare broad area maritime surveillance Battle Group Passive Horizon Extension System boundary layer control Central Intelligence Agency conversion in lieu of procurement commander-in-chief, Pacific Command Chinese National Air Force Chief of Naval Operations communications intelligence xi

xii — Acronyms and Abbreviations

CRT cathode ray tube CV carrier CW continuous wave DIA Defense Intelligence Agency DECM defensive electronic countermeasures DOD Department of Defense EA electronic attack ECCM electronic counter-countermeasures ECM electronic countermeasures ECMO electronic countermeasures operator ECMRON electronic countermeasures squadron ELINT electronic intelligence EMD engineering and manufacturing development ESM electronic support measures EW electronic warfare EWO electronic warfare officer EXCAP expanded capability FM frequency modulation FM-CW frequency-modulated continuous wave FY fiscal year GAO General Accounting Office/Government Accountability Office GCI ground-controlled interception GHQ general headquarters HARM high-speed antiradiation missile HEDRON headquarters squadron HF high frequency IADS integrated air defense system ICAP Improved Capability Program IJN Imperial Japanese Navy IR infrared IRBM intermediate-range ballistic missile JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff JETDS Joint Electronics Type Designation System JSEAD joint suppression of enemy air defense LAN local area network

Acronyms and Abbreviations — xiii

MAD magnetic anomaly detection MAG Marine Air Group MAS Maritime Air Support MAW Marine Air Wing MCAS Marine Corps Air Station MHz megahertz MiG Mikoyan-Gurevich MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology NAF Naval Air Facility NAS Naval Air Station NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NAVAIR Naval Air Systems Command NGJ next generation jammer NGJ-LB next generation jammer–low band NGJ-MB next generation jammer–mid-band NRL Naval Research Laboratory NSA National Security Agency NVA North Vietnamese Army NVADC North Vietnam Air Defense Command NVAF North Vietnamese Air Force OPNAV Office of the Chief of Naval Operations PARPRO Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program PPI plan position indicator PRC People’s Republic of China R&D research and development RCM radar countermeasures RDF radio direction-finding RDT&E research, development, test, and evaluation RRL Radio Research Laboratory SAM surface-to-air missile SEAD suppression of enemy air defense SESP Special Electronic Search Project SIGINT signals intelligence SLEP Service Life Extension Program SOJ stand-off jammer

xiv — Acronyms and Abbreviations

SSIP SWPA TASES TASM TJS TWT UN USAFSS VAH VAW VC VEP VF VP VPB VQ VT VW

Sensor System Improvement Program Southwest Pacific Area Command Tactical Airborne Exploitation System Tomahawk antiship missile tactical jamming system traveling wave tube United Nations U.S. Air Force Security Service heavy attack squadron airborne early warning squadron composite squadron vehicle enhancement program fighter squadron patrol squadron patrol bombing squadron electronic countermeasures squadron torpedo squadron early warning squadron

Electronic Warfare Defined

Electronic warfare has been important ever since the military forces first began using radios and radar. But the proliferation of new sensor and communication technologies in recent years has been so profound that it sometimes seems the concept of “full Spectrum dominance” set forth in the Department of Defense vision statements refers more to electromagnetic wavelengths and frequencies that it does to the range of potential military contingencies.3

E

lectronic warfare is a component of modern warfare that is particularly important in response to threats posed by technologically sophisticated potential adversaries. Electronic warfare generally refers to operations that use the electromagnetic spectrum (the “airwaves”) to detect, listen to, jam, and deceive (or “spoof”) enemy radars, radio communication systems and data links, and other electronic systems. It also refers to operations for defending against enemy attempts to do the same. The Department of Defense defines electronic warfare as military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. The Department of Defense divides electronic warfare into electronic warfare support, electronic protection, and electronic attack. Electronic warfare support, sometimes also referred to as electronic support measures (ESM), relies on signals intelligence (SIGINT), which is the primary means of collecting xv

xvi — Electronic Warfare Defined

immediate threat warnings and updates on targets. SIGINT is made up of two components, electronic intelligence (ELINT) and communications intelligence (COMINT). ELINT is information on enemy threats and capabilities of systems such as radars, surface-to-air missile systems, and non-voice datalinks. It also provides accurate location information. It is, however, susceptible to deception and suffers from only being able to intercept signals on a line of sight. COMINT provides information on enemy intentions and assists in determining the enemy command and control structure. To tactical military commanders, SIGINT operations include a dynamic update capability during the execution phase of military operations, especially in direct support to combat aircraft. Some of the shortfalls of COMINT are the requirements for linguists and for line of sight with a transmitter in the UHF/VHF band. The biggest drawback from an operational standpoint, however, is that in order to protect sources, intelligence derived from COMINT is highly classified and thus limited in distribution. A collector of signals intelligence does not want the enemy to even suspect that his communications, by whatever means he conducts them, are being monitored, for fear that other frequencies, new codes, or different forms of communications would be used. Thus, signals intelligence remains one of the most classified and protected intelligence sources. This concern, however, must be counterbalanced by military necessity—winning and achieving one’s political and military goals. Historical examples show that during military operations, information must flow to decision-makers in a timely manner in order to be useful and relevant.4 Electronic protection involves limiting the electromagnetic signatures of one’s own military equipment and hardening one’s own military equipment against the effects of enemy electronic warfare operations. Electronic attack (EA) involves jamming and deceiving enemy radars and radio communications and data links. All of the above fall into the broad category of electronic countermeasures (ECM), which prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the electronic spectrum. ECM can take the form of jamming—reflection of electromagnetic energy to impair enemy use of electromagnetic devices—or deception—the deliberate radiation, alteration, or reflection to mislead the enemy in the interpretation or use of the information received by his electronic systems.

Electronic Warfare Defined — xvii

Electronic countermeasures, of which electromagnetic reconnaissance is only a part, divide neatly into two parts: active measures, or jamming, and passive measures, or reconnaissance. Jamming attempts to prevent the enemy from using his electronic equipment by either saturating it with noise (barrage jamming) or deceiving it with intentionally misleading signals (beacons, repeaters, inverse amplifiers, gate stealers, and track breakers). Reconnaissance merely establishes the location and electromagnetic characteristics, or “signature,” of enemy transmitters.5

AN Numbers

S

ince February 1943 communications and electronics systems in the U.S. military have been designated using the Joint Army-Navy Nomenclature System, which is also known as the Joint Communications-Electronics Nomenclature System or “AN System” for the letters that prefaced each type name. The initial emphasis was on airborne radio and radar equipment, but the system was designed to be extendable and soon included other types of equipment. When the Air Force separated from the Army in 1947, it continued to use the system for its electronic equipment. In 1957 the system was formalized in Military Standard 196, “Joint Electronics Type Designation System” (JETDS). All designations are prefixed by AN. Originally, this stood for “ArmyNavy,” but this interpretation is no longer valid. Nowadays, AN is simply an indicator for the JETDS. In nonofficial references to electronic equipment, the AN prefix is often omitted, which will be the practice followed in this work. In the AN system, each piece of equipment is identified by an alphanumeric designator that begins with the letters AN followed by a forward slash and three letters. The first letter indicates the installation location of the equipment (e.g., A for aircraft). The second letter indicates the type of equipment (e.g., P for radar). The third letter defines the purpose of the equipment (e.g., R for receiving or passive detection). The final element is the model number sequence. Thus, AN/APR-5 defines the fifth airborne radar receiver produced. xix

Aircraft Type Numbering System

P

rior to September 18, 1962, when the Department of Defense’s Tri-Service Aircraft Designation System took effect, U.S. Navy aircraft designations were based on the Navy’s mission-manufacturer-number system. The dual numbering system that applied to aircraft designed prior to that date sometimes creates confusion with respect to referencing the correct version of certain aircraft described in the text. For historical accuracy, I have chosen to use the Navy system to describe all aircraft that appear in the text before September 18, 1962, and the Tri-Service system thereafter. Whenever possible I will use parentheses during transition periods to provide the previous or future name change.

xxi

Author’s Note on Chapter 1

A

lthough the subject of this book is the use of electronic warfare by aircraft to collect electronic intelligence on the enemy’s communications, radar, or data handling systems or to provide electronic countermeasures, I believe that the reader can gain significant insights into the evolution of electronic warfare through an understanding of its inception. Thus, the first chapter covers the beginnings of this form of warfare. Readers who are knowledgeable in this area or are uninterested in the early history should skip this chapter and start on chapter 2, which covers the use of specialized aircraft and equipment in World War II for the collection of information in the electromagnetic spectrum.

xxiii

1

Radio Intelligence

The Earliest Form of Electronic Warfare

A

dvances in technology in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries brought forth new forms of naval warfare that expanded the naval battle space from the surface of the oceans to the sky above and the seas below. Although much has been written about the impact of the submarine and the airplane, less has been written about the introduction of radio and the beginning of intelligence gathering by the interception of radio signals—now known as signals intelligence, the earliest form of electronic warfare. From the earliest days of Guglielmo Marconi’s work with wireless, it became evident that the military use of radio communication had serious flaws: the transmitted signals were impossible to hide and were open to all, unless complex codes were used.1 In any case, the source of radio communication was easy to locate, which allowed for the future determination of position. But this would come later. The first recorded use of wireless interception occurred on January 28, 1904, when the crew of the Royal Navy protected cruiser Diana, then stationed in the Suez Canal, found that they could intercept the high-frequency radio signals generated by the Russian navy. The communications intelligence gathered by Diana’s crew indicated that the Russian fleet was mobilizing and heading to the Pacific. This information was passed to Japan, an ally of the United Kingdom, giving the Imperial Japanese Navy advance warning of Russia’s intentions. Although there is no record of either navy listening to the other’s radio 1

2 — Chapter 1

communication during the ensuing Russo-Japanese War of 1904, both navies found the wireless reporting of Lionel James objectionable and took steps to curtail it. James, a newspaper correspondent working jointly for the Times of London and the New York Times, had persuaded the two papers to finance his effort to be the first to broadcast war news from a ship at sea. According to the agreement worked out by the two papers, American inventor Lee De Forest would supply, at cost, the radio equipment as well as two operators trained to send and receive Morse code.2 The newspapers would pay the expenses and salaries of the two operators. In return, De Forest would gain valuable publicity for his system, leading to business for his wireless company.3 James’ idea for chartering a ship, fitting it out with wireless, and establishing a separate station on shore offered a solution to the problem of trying to get war dispatches to the newsroom in a timely manner. He had experienced great difficulties in this regard while working for the Times of London during the Second Boer War. At times he had to rely on everything from pigeons to heliographs to get his dispatches from the battlefield to the pressroom. The sheer physical challenge of getting a report from the field past military censors and to a telegraph office meant it could take up to a month before it even reached the newsroom. James had first observed the use of wireless for reporting the news during the America’s Cup races off New York in 1903 when a wireless set on board one of the press boats was used to report the race results, scooping the other papers. When the Times sent him to the Far East in December 1903 to cover the war that was brewing between Russia and Japan, he had already hatched a plan to secure the necessary wireless equipment that would be needed to outfit a ship and the two shore stations that would be needed to receive the radio dispatches.4 James hired the single-screw, 1,300-ton steamer Haimun to act as the team’s press boat for the sum of £1,500 per month. The 240-foot ship had a big promenade deck that ran aft from the bridge. Its main deck had a spacious saloon and twelve first-class cabins that could accommodate twenty-four passengers. Second-class cabins were located one deck below the main deck, and below that was a deck for native passengers. The crew consisted of six European officers, forty Chinese sailors, and four Malay quartermasters. The ship’s charter, crew, and expenses cost the Times £2,000 per month.5

Radio Intelligence — 3

James boarded Haimun for the first time in Nagasaki before the ship sailed for Weihaiwei (now Weihai) on the Shantung (now Shandong) peninsula approximately ninety miles opposite Port Arthur. Commander Tonami Kurakichi of the Imperial Japanese Navy was also on board to collect intelligence for the Japanese navy and censor James’ wireless transmissions. Commander Kurakichi’s presence on board was part of a secret agreement engineered by James to ensure Haimun’s ability to sail in contested seas without fear of interference from the Japanese navy. This arrangement, according to the authors of Journalism and the Russo-Japanese War, “sprang from the British-Japanese treaty of alliance signed in 1902, which resulted in Britain sharing with its new ally the latest radio technology.” The agreement to place a Japanese officer on board Haimun in return for Japan’s assistance was acknowledged by Vice Admiral ̯ Ijuin Goro, minister of state for the Imperial Japanese Navy, when he wrote, “I take this opportunity to thank you for your cordial offer to place, if required, your telegraphic apparatus and expert operator at the service of the Imperial forces and at the same time I hope you will consider that we shall be happy to give you any such assistance as you may require and which is possible for us under the present circumstances.”6 On March 14 Haimun, with James in charge, departed Weihaiwei and sailed into the Yellow Sea heading for Chinampo (now Nampo), Korea. Eager to test the wireless for the first time, he instructed Harry Brown to send the following message when they were twenty miles from Weihaiwei: “I am at sea on board the Times steamer Haimun, enroute to Chinampo,” in the hopes that it would be received by Pop Athearn, who remained behind to operate the station at Weihaiwei. “Message O.K.,” Brown hollered from Haimun’s radio room, loudly acknowledging that everything was working. James’ first radio dispatch to the New York Times–Times of London collaboration followed shortly thereafter. Though it contained little hard news, it was the first report from the only civilian ship in the war zone equipped with wireless.7 James spent the next five weeks reporting the war news obtained from Haimun’s presence in the war zone. His biggest scoop came on April 13. Acting on a tip from Commander Tonami, he sailed Haimun to the waters off Port Arthur to observe the naval engagement that was expected to take place there. At 4:30 a.m., James and the crew of Haimun observed two squadrons of Japanese

4 — Chapter 1

warships heading to the port. A few hours later, James watched as the Japanese navy laid mines and the armored cruisers Kasuga and Nisshin shelled the port. One source claims that the Japanese were using wireless signals to correct the fall of shot. Where the spotters were located remains unknown. This same source claims that Russian operators heard the Japanese signals, realized their importance, and used a spark transmitter to jam them. If true, it was likely the first time that electronic countermeasures were used in a naval engagement.8 On April 15, a day after James’ long dispatch on the action around Port Arthur, Russian Admiral Yevgeni Ivanovich Alekseyev issued a proclamation warning that the Russian forces would arrest any correspondent found aboard a wireless-equipped ship in the war zone. Such correspondents would be considered spies and the vessel seized as a lawful prize. A week later, on April 21, James learned that Japan had also placed restrictions on Haimun’s movements. The Japanese, apparently tired of Haimun appearing in the wake of its fleet, prohibited the ship from going north of the line joining Chi-fu with Chemulpo. Banned from approaching the scene of action around Port Arthur and with the Times becoming increasingly disenchanted with the results, James sailed Haimun to Nagasaki and canceled the ship’s charter. No further wireless activities were involved in a naval conflict until World War I began in August 1914.9 At the outset of the war, all of the main navies had relatively good wireless services and equipment. As the war progressed, intercepted radio signals began to be used extensively for the first time to track an enemy’s movements, and intercepted communications were decoded to provide information about the enemy’s intentions. Two days before the hostilities initiating World War I began, Maurice Wright, a Marconi radio engineer, was experimenting with a new circuit that made the interception of long-range communications possible for the first time. This allowed Wright to pick up wireless traffic generated by the German navy. He forwarded the text of these messages to the Admiralty’s intelligence division, where they landed on the desk of its director, Rear Admiral Henry Oliver.10 As the messages began to pile up on Oliver’s desk, he gave them to Sir Alfred Ewing, an old friend with a keen interest in cryptography who was also head of the naval education branch. Starting with a couple of German language teachers from the naval colleges at Osborne and Dartmouth, who were available due to the summer holiday break, Ewing assembled a group of would-be

Radio Intelligence — 5

code breakers. They, along with others teachers from other schools, worked temporarily in the corner of Ewing’s office until the start of the new term at the end of September. Whenever Ewing had visitors unrelated to his code-breaking activities, they had to hide in his secretary’s office due to the very secret nature of their work.11 On November 6, 1914, Ewing’s growing staff of code breakers was moved to Room 40 in the Old Admiralty Building. Room 40 became the unofficial name of the code-breaking section even after the growing size of the staff forced it to relocate to other parts of the building. The number of personnel assigned to the section peaked at eight hundred wireless operators, ninety cryptographers, and other specialists. They were located in “a maze of interconnecting ‘cubby-holes, dens, and barrack-like typing pools’ of various shapes and sizes.” The code breakers in Ewing’s cryptanalysis section benefited early on from a number of German navy code books that fell into British hands and made their way to Room 40. Alfred Ewing continued to supervise Room 40 until May 1917, when it was taken over by the director of naval intelligence, Rear Admiral William Reginald “Blinker” Hall.12 Room 40 became the epicenter for British code-breaking efforts that enabled the Royal Navy to keep track of Germany’s Grand Fleet throughout the war. The code breakers who worked in Room 40 relied on a number of radio installations called Y stations established along the coast of England, many of which were set up by radio enthusiasts who went to work for naval intelligence as “voluntary interceptors.” Intercepts were also being reported from other radio stations operated by Marconi, British post office, and Admiralty stations, so that copies of almost every German wireless message was being forwarded to Room 40. Radio direction-finding (RDF) was another form of signals intelligence embraced by the Admiralty’s intelligence division under Captain Hall’s leadership in the early months of 1916 (Hall was promoted to rear admiral a year later). The first British direction-finding system was developed by radio pioneer Henry J. Round, an expert in the development and application of radio tubes (“valves” in British parlance) working for the Marconi Company. Round, using soft C valves and a modified Bellini-Tosi directional, established a directionfinding system at the Marconi station at Broomfield that was in an advanced state of readiness when war broke out.13, 14

6 — Chapter 1

When the war began, Round was called up and assigned to the newly established intelligence corps with the rank of lieutenant. He was sent to France with two sets of equipment to establishing direction-finding stations for the British military in order to determine where the German wireless sets were located. This information could then be used to determine where enemy troops and their headquarters were situated. The success Round achieved with these first two sets led to the establishment of radio listening stations covering the entire front. In the meantime, Round returned to England to commission additional direction-finding stations to track the Zeppelin bombers that were threatening the British Isles. How Hall learned of Round’s direction-finding effort for the British military has never been reported, but once he became aware of the technology, it became evident that giving his wireless stations an RDF capability would allow Room 40 to track German warships. According to David Ramsay, Hall’s biographer, “Hall instructed Marconi to set up a DF station . . . in their factory at Chelmsford,” which proved to be an unsuitable site. The equipment was then moved to Lowestoft, where it became the first in a chain of six stations covering the entire North Sea. By May 15, 1916, Rear Admiral Oliver, who had been advanced to chief of the war staff the previous November, was able to tell the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, Admiral of the Fleet John R. Jellicoe, that thanks to the “Directionals,” they had successfully followed the track of a U-boat right across the North Sea.15 While Room 40 collected an immense amount of valuable information on the movement and intentions of the German fleet, its effectiveness in operational use was hampered by the organizational structure established by First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill and the First Sea Lord, Admiral Fisher. Only Churchill, Fisher, Admiral Sir Frederick Hamilton, the Second Sea Lord, Secretary of the Admiralty Sir Arthur Wilson, Rear Admiral Oliver, naval intelligence director Hall, and a handful of others were supposed to be aware of Room 40’s work. No one in the intelligence division, except Hall, knew about the existence of the codes.16 On November 29, 1914, Churchill ordered that only one copy of the intercepted messages besides the original decode was to be made, with the original being filed in a secret book handled under the direction of the chief of staff. Once a message was enciphered, the only copy was placed in a red envelope and rushed by messenger to Admiral Wilson, who carried the most critical messages

Radio Intelligence — 7

to Churchill, Fisher, and the Admiralty war group. From there, the information was disseminated to the fleet—a time-consuming process that would have significant consequences. Though Admiral of the Fleet Jellicoe complained that too much time was lost having the messages decoded in London, Churchill, fearing that the Germans would discover their codes had been broken, refused to send the intercepts directly to the decoding staff on board Jellicoe’s flagship. As Ronald Lewin wrote in Ultra Goes to War, “Intelligence has a fundamental purpose—to assist in winning the battle. The battle is the pay-off.” To leave the dissemination of Room 40’s priceless information in the hands of so few individuals “was a very serious error,” according to British naval intelligence expert Patrick Beesly.17 The intelligence gathered by Room 40 might have played a decisive role in the Battle of Jutland had it not been for a series of unforeseen errors in its dissemination. The first of these occurred shortly before noon on the day of the battle, May 31, 1916, when Captain Thomas Jackson, director of the operations division within the Admiralty, “made one of his rare visits to Room 40.” Jackson was well aware that Admiral Jellicoe had taken the Grand Fleet to sea the evening before in response to Room 40’s wireless intercept indicating that the German High Seas Fleet was planning to put to sea the next morning.18 Unfortunately for Jellicoe, the Grand Fleet, and the Royal Navy, Jackson “exemplified those British naval officers who scorned such modern capabilities and techniques as deciphering secret codes in Room 40 and he rejected the idea that such people could contribute anything useful to naval operations,” according to Robert Massie. Once in Room 40, Jackson asked where the wireless direction-finding stations placed the call sign “DK,” which he knew was the call sign for Admiral Reinhard Scheer’s high seas flagship, Friedrich der Gross. What he did not know was that the call sign DK was transferred to the shore station whenever the flagship put to sea as a subterfuge. Jackson, according to Patrick Beesly, “was obviously not the sort of senior office to whom one offered gratuitous advice.” Thus, he was only told that the call sign DK was in Wilhelmshaven. Without asking for more information, he left the room. Jackson dutifully reported this information to Oliver, who dispatched a signal advising the commander-in-chief of the Grand Fleet that there was no definite news of the enemy and that it appeared that their sailing had been delayed for want of air reconnaissance. Jellicoe, believing that the Grand Fleet was still in

8 — Chapter 1

harbor, continued to steam toward Jutland at a leisurely speed of seventeen knots. Had he known otherwise, he would have increased the speed of the fleet, which would have allowed him to engage the enemy earlier in the day when the visibility was greatest. Instead, the Grand Fleet did not begin to engage the High Seas Fleet until 6:23 in the evening, and the engagement lasted until 7:18, when the German battleships executed an emergency turnaround and vanished in the evening mist.19 After the Battle of Jutland and for the remainder of the war, the bulk of Room 40’s effort was focused on tracking German submarines as they engaged in a campaign of unrestricted warfare against Allied shipping. Although senior officials of the U.S. Navy were exposed to Room 40 after the United States declared war on Germany, the Navy made limited use of radio intelligence. The Office of Naval Intelligence, however, did establish a research desk and signal section to engage in cryptanalysis just before the end of World War I. Because cryptanalysis was seen as an important adjunct to preparing secure systems for one’s own use, the research desk was kept in existence after the war and placed under the director of naval communications. The research desk was staffed by one officer, two enlisted men, and four civilians in the immediate post–World War I period.20 During the interwar period the Navy built a small staff of trained cryptanalysts and linguists and created a foundation in communications intelligence that would support a vastly expanded and successful COMINT effort during World War II. The cryptological program established by the Navy included direction finding, traffic analysis, and code breaking that would play a decisive role in the Battle of the Coral Sea and the Battle of Midway.21 This effort and its spectacular success in enabling the Pacific Fleet to overwhelm the Japanese navy at Midway are beyond the scope of this work and are best covered by Eliot Carlson (Joe Rochefort’s War, Naval Institute Press, 2011), John Prados (Combined Fleet Decoded, Random House, 1995), Walter Topp (“The Rise of U.S. Codebreaking—America’s Cryptanalysis Coup at Midway Was 20 Years in the Making,” Military History Now, https://militaryhistorynow.com/2021 /02/03/u-s-navy-codebreakers-americas-cryptanalysis-coup-at-the-battle-of -midway-was-20-years-in-the-making/ ), and many others too numerous to list.

2

World War II ELINT

New Missions for the Patrol Squadrons

E

lectronic intelligence, as defined by the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, is “technical and geolocation intelligence derived from foreign non-communications electromagnetic radiations emanating for other than nuclear detonations or radioactive sources.”1 One of the most common sources of ELINT is the collection and analysis of radar signatures.2 By analyzing the characteristics of pulses emitted by a radar (frequency, pulse repetition interval/frequency, beamwidth, scan rate, etc.), it is possible to identify radar types, functions, and locations. With that information, countermeasures can be developed.3 During the 1930s studies and experiments on the use of radio waves to detect aircraft were independently conducted in a number of countries. In June 1935 an experimental pulsed radar designed by the British was detecting aircraft at ranges of up to seventeen miles. By March of the following year an improved version was able to detect aircraft seventy-five miles away.4 By April 1936 a radar set constructed by the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) was detecting and accurately range-tracking airplanes out to twenty-five miles. In September, a high-frequency German radar was detecting aircraft twelve miles away. By the time World War II began, each of these countries had developed elementary radars for aircraft detection and fire control and were rapidly working on advanced models. The British and U.S. military forces recognized the importance of radar and its impact on air warfare early on and began working together after Sir Henry Tizard and his team landed in the United States 9

10 — Chapter 2

in mid-September 1940. The team, officially known as the British Technical and Scientific Mission, was composed of a number of technical experts sent to the United States by Winston Churchill to exchange secret information on the scientific progress being made on a variety of new weapons including the highly secret cavity magnetron, a device used to generate microwaves for radar systems. The Tizard mission convinced U.S. leaders that radar was becoming a supremely important weapon of war, which led directly to the establishment of the U.S. Radiation Laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in October 1940. One of the tasks assigned to the new laboratory was to investigate methods of countering enemy radars. At this time, neither the military nor the laboratory possessed any information on radar developments in Germany and Japan, with whom the United States would be most likely to go to war. Under the direction of Luis W. Alvarez, the sector of the Radiation Laboratory devoted to countering enemy radars began investigating the problem. Alvarez soon realized that nothing could be accomplished until the characteristics of the enemy’s radars could be obtained. This necessitated the development of a radio receiver capable of operating in the frequency bands used by radars, which he initiated.5 In July 1941, using funds provided by the National Defense Research Committee, the Radiation Laboratory placed an order with the General Radio Company for prototypes of an airborne intercept receiver for radar based on a design for a high-frequency radio receiver developed by Don Sinclair that incorporated a ultra-high-frequency tuning device patented by Eduard Karplus and Arnold Peterson. The prototypes that General Radio delivered were designated the P-540 receiver. Performance tests were so successful that the Army Signal Corps ordered one hundred of them from the Philco Corporation under the SCR-587 designation sometime during the spring of 1942. Developing an instrument such as the SCR-587 for detecting radar signals was easier than designing the radar itself, since the signal strength at the target object falls off only as the inverse square of the distance to the transmitter, while the intensity reflected back to the transmitter falls off in the fourth power of the distance.6 Alvarez’s foresight and the preliminary work of the countermeasures section of the Radiation Laboratory would provide the Navy with an essential piece of equipment when the need for airborne ELINT surfaced in the latter half of 1942.

World War II ELINT — 11

With the exception of the P-540 and a high-frequency radio direction finder developed by the NRL, no other significant work on electronic warfare was being undertaken before December 7, 1941. Even though U.S. industry had both the know-how and manufacturing capacity to enter the field of electronic warfare, “the need for electronic warfare systems had to be perceived by those in positions able to switch money and resources to develop such equipment.”7 This changed after the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor on December 7. Just four days after the Pearl Harbor attack, Adm. Julius Furer, a major player in coordinating research and development (R&D), convened a high-level meeting with representatives of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, the Radiation Laboratory, and the Navy. The goal of the meeting was to figure out how the United States was going to create an adequate infrastructure for the sophisticated countermeasures R&D that war planners sensed the United States was going to need. Those attending requested that the National Defense Research Council undertake the development of radar countermeasures (RCM) receivers and jamming equipment in collaboration with the U.S. Navy and the Signal Corps. Less than two weeks later, official machinery had been set in motion to create a radiation research laboratory at Harvard. Essentially adjacent to the Radiation Laboratory at MIT, it would become a national center of a massive countermeasures R&D effort.8 Although the Navy was quick to recognize the importance of developing radar countermeasures, the forces afloat had not encountered any radar equipment until the invasion of Guadalcanal. Until that time the Navy was unaware that the Japanese had also developed radar. When the Marines of the 1st Marine Division stormed ashore on August 7, 1942, and seized the airfield partially completed by the Japanese, they found a box-like operating cabin topped by a bedspring-like structure on the inland end of the field. Unbeknownst to the Marines, they had captured a Japanese Type 2 Mark 1 Model 1 “11-Go” early warning radar. The 11-Go was the culmination of the work the Imperial Japanese Navy’s (IJN’s) technical research department began in 1935. Development was slow until members of the research department visited Germany in March 1941. The examples of radars produced or captured by the Germans shown to the Japanese researchers spurred interest in developing their own sets. Test of the prototype in September 1941 led to the production of the 11-Go, the first IJN land-based radar.9

12 — Chapter 2

The bedspring antenna and three badly damaged radar sets discovered by the Marines on Guadalcanal were carefully crated and shipped to the Naval Research Laboratory for evaluation. Using the various components, the NRL was able to reassemble a working model of the Japanese radar, which provided invaluable information on its operating characteristics and performance. The 11-Go radar evaluated by the NRL had a frequency range of 87 to 105 megahertz (MHz), with three-kilowatt pulses and a range on aircraft of sixty miles. It was designed poorly, had no duplexer, and was large and heavy. The NRL subsequently became the center for all captured electronic equipment sent to the United States for evaluation.10 The discovery that the Japanese had radar came as a complete surprise to the U.S. military and caused a flurry of activity in the NRL, for if there was one radar at a remote Japanese outpost, there were undoubtedly more deployed throughout the Pacific. Any effort to counter the Japanese radars could not begin until a better understanding of the types, numbers, locations, and capabilities of the Japanese sets could be obtained. To provide the Navy with the equipment needed to locate the Japanese radars, a team at the NRL headed by Dr. Robert M. Page began work on the design of a radar intercept receiver intended for airborne use.11 At the same time, Dr. Robert C. Guthrie, who had been working at the NRL since 1929 and had built the transmitter used in Page’s experimental radar setup, began work on a jamming transmitter. Both sets were hand-built in small batches. Page’s crystal-type radar intercept receiver, designated the XARD, could distinguish signals from 50 to 1,000 MHz. Not much is known about Guthrie’s jammer other than that it operated in the 75 to 125 MHz range.12 Enough equipment developed by Page’s group was available at the beginning of September 1942 to begin efforts to deploy it to the Pacific. To obtain qualified operators, Page sought out graduates from the Radio Materials School, located on the NRL campus. The school was established in 1924 to train enlisted men in the operation and maintenance of radio equipment. Six petty officers who had just completed the advanced course volunteered for the program and were quickly detailed to the NRL for two weeks of instruction on the XARD receiver and the jamming transmitter. After completing their training, the six petty officers were formed into a special detachment designated as the Cast Mike Project 1 (CM for countermeasures) and flown to Hawaii with their equipment, which was demonstrated at the Pacific Fleet radar school at Pearl

World War II ELINT — 13

Harbor. At the end of September, two petty officers from the team, Robert Russell and Jack Churchill, were dispatched to the South Pacific war zone with some of the handmade electronic equipment fabricated by the NRL.13 After arriving at Espiritu Santo and reporting to the Commander, Aircraft, South Pacific Force, Rear Adm. Aubrey W. Fitch, the Cast Mike 1 team lead by Petty Officer Churchill received permission to install an XARD on an Army Air Forces B-17E bomber, tail number 41–2523, assigned to the 98th Bomb Squadron, 11th Bomb Group operating out of the Bomber 1 airstrip on Espiritu Santo. The plane, made by Boeing in Seattle, Washington, was delivered to the Army Air Forces on January 30, 1942, and flown to Hill Field near Ogden, Utah, and then to Hickam Field, Hawaii, and assigned to the 72nd Bomb Squadron, 5th Bomb Group. On May 31, 1942, the bomber took off from Hickam Field and was flown to the airfield on Midway’s Eastern Island, arriving just in time to participate in the Battle of Midway. After having trouble with its bomb racks and with concerns about two of its engines, the B-17 returned to Hickam Field for repair, after which it was assigned to the 98th Bomb Squadron and send to Espiritu Santo. By then the plane had been nicknamed “Goonie” (undoubtedly in reference to the birds of that name found on Midway) and was adorned with nose art comprised of a white goonie bird in flight and a four-leaf shamrock above the nickname.14 Jack Churchill installed the XARD in the B-17, but not any of the NRLbuilt jammers.15 These were to be held on the ground until enemy radar signals had been located. The Army airmen didn’t think much of the two Navy men, however. “They thought we were hoodoos,” recalled Churchill in an interview, “and they certainly didn’t like us cutting holes in their airplane to stick out our antenna.”16 The first ELINT mission with the B-17 was flown on October 31, 1942. Churchill was on board to operate the XARD and to double as a gunner if need be. The mission took off from the airfield at Espiritu Santo and flew to Bougainville, which had several Japanese air bases, and then flew back via Guadalcanal without finding any evidence of enemy radar during the elevenhour flight. In November, Churchill made seven more long-range flights in the Goonie, conducting reconnaissance along the Solomon Islands as far as New Britain in the Bismarck Archipelago without detecting any enemy radar signals. Although good readings had been obtained on U.S. radar installations with ranges of around one hundred miles, no enemy land-based radars appeared to be present in the area.17

14 — Chapter 2

The next month Churchill made his first flights in a Navy airplane when he mounted one of the XARD receivers in a new PBY-5A replacement aircraft just received by Patrol Squadron (VP) 72. The squadron operated from the seaplane tender Tangier (AV 8) and had been engaged in reconnaissance missions since deploying to Espiritu Santo on September 4, 1942. Churchill continued to fly ELINT missions in both XARD-equipped aircraft through January 1943 without detecting any enemy radar signals. Whether this was because of a lack of enemy radars or the shortcomings of the XARD has never been determined. The XARD was difficult to operate. It had been put together in a hurry and “was a lemon,” according to one operator. The antenna fed a quarter-wave stub mounted above the operator’s head. There was no tuning knob. To search the frequency spectrum, the operator had to manually slide a shorting bar up and down the stub. When he heard the buzz of radar in his headphones, the operator could read the frequency off the calibrations on the stub. Other issues included the delicate antenna assembly and the high noise level experienced by the operator due to insufficient bonding and shielding of the plane’s electrical installations. It was a crude system.18 Early in 1943 the Cast Mike 1 team received a few ARC-1 receivers. The ARC-1 was a Navy version of the SCR-587 that had been developed by Alvarez’s countermeasures section of the MIT Radiation Laboratory. It had a tuning knob that made it easier to use. The SCR-587 was a much better piece of gear than the XARD, but the need for it to be manually dialed over its entire frequency band in order to detect a signal was a tiresome, error-prone process. Based on information that has survived the passage of time, it is likely the ARC-1 was responsible for the first radar signal detected by any of the Cast Mike 1 team. Although the team flew numerous patrol missions in the early months of 1942 (presumably in XARD-equipped PBYs), they did not obtain a single contact until June 18, 1942. It occurred during a night mission conducted by VP-54, one of the “Black Cat” squadrons based on Guadalcanal. Their aircraft were painted with nonreflective black as camouflage for the night flying missions these squadrons specialized in. The Black Cats took their name from a combination of their black painted PBYs and the name of their aircraft, the Catalina.19 This first indication of a Japanese radar was picked up near the Shortland Islands, the home for the large Japanese installation on the island of Rabaul. Its

World War II ELINT — 15

PBY-5A Catalina The PBY-5A was the amphibious version of the venerable Catalina, the principal patrol bomber employed by the U.S. Navy during World War II. It was the latest and last version of the PBY that first entered service with VP-11F in October 1936 as the PBY-1. It had several distinctive features, including a streamlined pylon that put the engines well above the spray and a parasol-mounted wing that had retractable stabilizing floats at each end that folded upward to become wingtips in flight. The PBY-5, which entered service in September 1940, had more powerful engines (1,200 hp vs 900 hp for the PBY-1), blister fairings over the waist gun positions, and a redesigned rudder. It had a crew of seven or nine men, was armed with two .30-caliber and two .50-caliber machine guns, and could carry a bomb load of four 1,000-pound bombs. Although it was initially designed as a bomber, it proved to be highly vulnerable to enemy antiaircraft and fighters and was rarely used for this mission. Instead, it was painted black, armed with torpedoes during the early stages of the war, and used for nighttime attack on shipping. Its 2,990-mile range and long loiter time made it the ideal platform for long-range patrol, antisubmarine work, and electronic countermeasures. As a flying boat, it was assigned to and serviced from aircraft tenders situated at advanced bases. The addition of the PBY-5A’s tricycle landing gear provided more flexibility by creating an amphibian that could operate from the water or from land-based airstrips.

signal appears to be the one mentioned in an Aubrey Fitch memo dated June 7, 1943. If so, the signal could only be heard for about three minutes before the intercept operator had to man a waist gun to fight off attacking Japanese fighters. It was impossible to pinpoint the location of the source of the radar since the Catalina had no direction-finding equipment and none was available to the Cast Mike 1 team. Since there was little likelihood of obtaining any such device from stateside sources in the near future, Churchill, recognizing the urgent need for such a device, was forced to improvise. Assisted by the aviation metalsmiths of VP-54, he and his team built a pair of Yagi homing antennae and installed them on each side of the nose of a Catalina. These antennae were connected to a standard airborne indicator unit.

16 — Chapter 2

In the fall of 1943 the Cast Mike team was relieved by a number of naval officers trained in the use and maintenance of RCM equipment. Lt. John Martin was typical of those who went through such training. After receiving his commission on December 20, Martin was sent to Harvard University to attend the naval training school for radar. From there he was detailed to the special projects school of the Naval Research Laboratory for further instruction in the Navy’s RCM equipment. He was eventually sent to Australia to support the radar-countermeasures missions being conducted in Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific area of operations.20 Another officer who underwent similar training was Lt. Lawrence Heron. He was sent to Guadalcanal and assigned to join VP-104 operating PB4Y Liberators out of Carney Field (also known as Bomber 2). The squadron was established on April 10, 1943, at Naval Air Station (NAS) Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, and was equipped with the PB4Y-1 Liberator, the Navy version of the Army’s B-24 bomber. Early wartime experience with PBY flying boats had demonstrated the limitations of this type of aircraft. Seeking to pursue a land-based bomber to fly long-range overwater patrols against shipping and submarines, the Navy allowed the Army to take over production at the Boeing plant in Renton, Washington, for the desperately needed B-29s in exchange for a supply of B-24s. Some of the Liberators went to VP-104, which arrived in mid-August with their PB4Y-1s on Guadalcanal, where they conducted daily search, bombing, photographic, and Dumbo (air-sea rescue) missions.21 When Heron arrived on Guadalcanal, none of the PB4Y-1s were equipped with any RCM equipment. He had to figure out how to install his only ARC-1 receiver so that it could be transferred from aircraft to aircraft. He solved this problem by mounting the ARC-1 and its power supply on pieces of sawn plywood sized to fit through the aircraft’s hatches. These were fastened to a table in the aircraft’s interior, and a power cable was connected into the electric power system. He flew twenty missions to such places as Truk, Kapingamarangi in the Caroline Islands, and Rabaul—the latter was particularly harrowing because it was so heavily defended—before he was transferred to command the U.S. Navy’s RCM unit in the southwest Pacific.22 The request to establish a Navy unit dedicated to the RCM mission came from Section 22, the RCM organization within the general headquarters (GHQ) of MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Area Command (SWPA). The need for Section 22 was created on July 5, 1943, when MacArthur issued operational

World War II ELINT — 17

instructions for establishing an RCM division with his headquarters in accordance to the recommendation of Committee J — Radar Projects, for “Technique, Measures, and Coordination” as issued by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. Once established, Section 22’s function was to collect and submit radar and radio countermeasures as directed or undertaken in pursuance of approved policies of MacArthur’s GHQ, and to provide individuals and/or organizations and equipment as may be specifically directed by GHQ for duty with the Radar and Radio Countermeasure Division or under its operational control.23 In the spring of 1944, according to the account provided by Alfred Price in his comprehensive treatise on the history of U.S. electronic warfare, “it was clear [at least in the SWPA GHQ] that permanently modified aircraft such as the Army Air Forces’ Ferrets, flown by crews whose main role was radar signal intercept, were far more effective in finding enemy radars than the makeshift receivers installations on Navy bomber and reconnaissance aircraft operated by ‘gypsy’ crewman. Recognizing this shortcoming, Section 22 directed the formation of a dedicated Navy RCM unit.”24 In April Lt. Heron was sent to the seaplane base at Palm Island near Townsville, Australia, with orders to establish and command Field Unit No. 3, a Navy RCM unit using two PBYs that were specifically modified for this purpose. Heron had no difficulty installing the ARC-1 receivers, but no directionfinding antennae were available. So he had his men make their own out of aluminum tubing, melting the insulation from a spare coaxial for the mount, machining it after it had hardened. The rotating antenna was mounted in the rear of the tunnel gun hatch of the PBY and had to be attached after the aircraft was airborne. As Heron recalled, I would go back to the tunnel hatch of the aircraft—I wouldn’t ask an enlisted man to do it—and put on a safety belt fastened with a steel cable to the frame of the aircraft, then, with one of the enlisted men holding my feet, I would hang out the bottom of the airplane and fasten the antenna with wing nuts on the bottom of the fuselage. There were lots of occasions when I dropped wing nuts into the water 700 or 1,000 feet below. It wasn’t very pleasant. . . . Once the antenna was in place, somebody had to sit over the open tunnel hatch and operate the handle which rotated the dipole, using the interphone to coordinate with the RCM operator to get bearing information.25

18 — Chapter 2

As soon as the modifications to Heron’s PBYs were complete, he took the unit to New Guinea and began flying ELINT missions from seaplane bases at Port Moresby and the Samarai Islands. Although the jury-rigged directionfinding antenna gave satisfactory results, installing it was an extremely hazardous operation. During one flight, Heron’s aircraft came under friendly ground fire. As the pilot maneuvered wildly to avoid being hit, Heron was thrown out of the hatch and back again several times. “If it hadn’t been for the steel safety cable,” he said, “I would probably be somewhere at the bottom of the ocean.”26 As the Navy’s island-hopping campaign advanced toward Japan, ELINT operations were organized from newly established bases on the captured islands. When Enewetak Atoll was secured on February 20, 1944, control of the Marshall Islands, which had been in Japanese hands since 1914, passed to the United States. Within a week, engineers from the Army’s 110th Battalion were hard at work constructing a bomber airstrip, which was named Stickel Field. When completed (the first plane landed on March 11), it had a 400-foot-wide, 6,800-foot-long runway with two taxiways, facilities for major engine overhaul, and Quonset huts for housing personnel.27 On July 7, 1944, PBY-1 Liberators of VPB-116 under the command of Cdr. Donald G. Gumz began arriving on Enewetak. They commenced operational patrols and sector searches on July 12 and were conducting missions against Truk, Japan’s main naval base in the South Pacific, by the first week in August. By then the Navy was well aware of the shore-based air-search radars deployed by the Imperial Japanese Navy. Although Truk had been pounded in February, its airfields continued to be a threat to U.S. forces in the area, so bombings of the atoll continued. To ensure the safety of the attacking forces, the commander of the U.S. Navy Air Force in the forward area asked Gumz to attempt to pinpoint the location for the Japanese radar equipment on Truk. Unbeknownst to Gumz or the higher authorities in the Navy, there were no less than nine enemy air-search radars installed at various locations around the atoll.28 Gumz quickly discovered that it was very difficult to get a bearing on the Japanese radar transmissions, which were operating below or just above the 100 MHz minimum range of the ARC-1 receiver. In order to locate the radars, Gumz came up with a plan to search for holes in the enemy’s radar screen using three RCM planes simultaneously running concentric circles around Truk

World War II ELINT — 19

lagoon at different altitudes. It took six night sorties and a low-level morning strike on shipping in order to locate the source of the radar on Moen Island and the radar shadows created by certain islands. The information gained during this and other ELINT flights in the area allowed for follow-on raids to be planned so that the Japanese radars would provide minimum warning of the attacking forces’ approach.

3

Non-Passive ECM

Jammers and Chaff in World War II

T

he Navy did not begin equipping any of its aircraft with ECM jamming equipment until the fall of 1944. The idea of attempting to jam the newly discovered Japanese use of radar did not receive much attention during the early part of the war for several reasons. First, it was necessary to uncover the technical details of the enemy’s radar systems, the frequencies they were operating on, and what they were used for (i.e., search, fire control, or airborne interception radars)—thus, the early emphasis on ELINT missions. Second, the R&D agencies, most notably the NRL and the Radio Research Laboratory (RRL), had to design equipment to counter the hostile system. By April 1943, however, the RRL had developed and placed into limited production a series of three airborne transmitters designed to counter German and Japanese radars. These included the APT-1, the APT-3, and the APQ-2. The APT-1 Dina was designed to defeat early warning search radars covering the frequency range of 90 to 220 MHz with a power output of twelve watts. The APT-3 Mandrel was engineered specifically to counter the German’s Freya, a 125-MHz early warning radar in the European theater. It operated in the 85 to 135 MHz frequency band and had a power output of twelve watts. The APQ-2 Rug, which was designed to interfere with the German Wurzburg fire-control radar, covered the higher frequency range of 450 to 720 MHz but had a smaller output of just five watts.1 By the end of 1945 thirteen of the eighteen land-based patrol bomber squadrons in the Pacific had been modified to carry the ARC-1 receiver and 20

Non-Passive ECM — 21

one jamming transmitter (either an APT-1, an APT-3, or an APQ-2). A few PB4Ys were also equipped with the APR-5 receiver, a modified version of the Hallicrafter S-27 that was designed to fit into a standard ARINC enclosure.2 The British had considerable success with the Hallicrafter set during 1941 and 1942. It was so useful that the Signal Corps adopted it for military use. Enough TBF/TBM Avengers were supplied to equip each carrier air group with five ECM aircraft.3 One of the first carrier units to conduct operations with ECM-equipped aircraft was VT(N)-90 assigned to Night Air Group 90. They were the first Navy air groups trained and equipped specifically for night and all-weather carrier operations. Before deploying on the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise (CV 6) on December 24, 1944, VT(N)-90 modified its TBM-3D Avengers to disrupt Japanese search and anti-aircraft fire–control radars by installing a radar jammer and a manual system for dropping chaff, short pieces of aluminum foil dispensed in a cloud that would jam the radar signal.4 The TBM-3D Avenger was a version of the Grumman TBF torpedo bomber built by the General Motors Corporation. Although designed primarily as a torpedo bomber, the single-engine plane proved to be a versatile aircraft suitable for bombing, night attack, photo reconnaissance, and antisubmarine warfare. The three-place bomber was large enough to support the RCM equipment and had a standard crew complement of pilot, gunner, and radar/radioman. The latter would have been responsible for operating the RCM gear. In November 1945 the Navy, recognizing the importance of ECM, codified the new mission of the modified TBMs by assigning the letter Q as the suffix to the designation for such aircraft. Henceforth, ECM-equipped Avengers would be known as TBM-3Qs. The letter has been used ever since to signify Navy aircraft and squadrons with an electronic warfare role.5 After the war a number of TBM-3Es, an antisubmarine version of the TBM-2 equipped with AN/APS-4 search radar under the starboard wing, were converted into TBM-3Qs. They were equipped with the manually tuned APR-1 receiver and a manually turned dipole antenna that was extended from the belly of the aircraft. The operator wore a pair of earphones and turned the antenna by hand until a null was received and the relative bearing of the emitting transmitter recorded (a series of such bearings could be plotted to obtain an approximate fix on the emitter). There was also a chute for manually dropping chaff. It had been one of the earliest countermeasure investigations conducted by the RRL.6

22 — Chapter 3

The RRL had begun testing the use of metal foil to jam radars in the summer of 1942 after the laboratory’s director, Dr. Frederick Terman, went to England, where he was briefed on the British experiments with jamming, including the use of chaff, which the British called “Window.” They began their experiments with air drops of metal-foil dipoles.7 When security demands forced a halt to the testing because of the possibility of the information reaching the enemy, Terman asked Lan J. Chu, an expert on antennas, to continue investigating the potential use of metal foil as a jamming technique by conducting a theoretical study on the electrical behavior of the chaff dipoles. Although Window was still top secret, Terman continued the laboratory’s effort by assigning the astronomer Fred Whipple, newly recruited by the RRL, the task of investigating the practical applications that could be garnered from Chu’s highly classified study. After reviewing Chu’s work, Whipple came up with an extremely important discovery: the metal foil would function most effectively if it was cut into thin lengths resonant with the radar to be interfered with.8 Details of Whipple’s discovery (the security clampdown prevented the RRL from conducting any testing) were passed to the telecommunications research establishment in England, which favorably tested the effectiveness of the resonant strips of foil, leading to its immediate use by the British against the muchfeared Wurzburg radar.9 Because of the primitive nature of the Japanese radars and their employment during the latter stages of the war, the Navy’s use of ECM was insignificant until U.S. carriers began to attack targets on the Japanese home islands in the early part of 1945. By then, the Navy had issued a comprehensive doctrine—revised from an earlier, much simpler version—in the use of countermeasures by aircraft. The doctrine for fleet-wide use of ECM was as follows: 1. Jamming transmitters allotted to a carrier for use in carrier aircraft should be used when, in the opinion of the carrier task force commander, the effectiveness of radar-controlled antiaircraft or searchlights warrants the added weight in carrying jammers. 2. Carrier aircraft should employ Window in all attacks against heavily defended target areas or large task forces. The first strike over any such area should carry Window cut for frequencies in accordance with the latest information available prior to the operation. Subsequent strikes

Non-Passive ECM — 23



3.

4.

5.



6.



should carry Window based on the findings of radar countermeasures intercept planes during the first and subsequent strikes, if any change is indicated. Against fire-control radars, Window should be dispensed immediately before reaching, and while over, the target area and when passing over heavy anti-aircraft concentrations enroute to the target. Example: During carrier aircraft strikes, each plane should drop Window cut for the known anti-aircraft fire–control frequencies, beginning about three minutes prior to entering a dive or commencing a run. Against early warning radar, Window may be employed, if desired, in an effort to confuse the enemy fighter direction systems. In the event of a fleet engagement, carrier- or shore-based aircraft are instructed to keep the surface forces covered with a Window-infested area at all times. For the use of shore- or tender-based naval aircraft, electronic jammers are collected in forward area radar countermeasures pools or at squadron bases. They are to be used when the effectiveness of radar-control anti-aircraft fire or searchlights so warrants. Shore- or tender-based aircraft are instructed to employ Window cut for fire-control frequencies in all attacks against heavily defended areas or against large task forces when the altitude of the bomber attack is such that this would be within effective gun range. Example: During horizontal bombing by large bombers, Window should be dropped at regular intervals by each plane during the last portion of the approach and when directly over the target area. Against EW radar, Window can be employed if desired in an effort to confuse fighter direction systems. Specially prepared deception or diversion plans incorporating the combined use of jamming, Window, and deception devices might be undertaken with the proper authorization. Example: (1) Early-warning Window may be employed to simulate a large number of planes orbiting prior to an attack. In this case, the Window should be sown by the plane or planes while circling and climbing in order to increase the duration of its effect on enemy radars. (2) Planes may sow Window in one area prior to making an attack in another in order to create false alerts and disperse enemy intercepting forces.10

24 — Chapter 3

On February 16, 1945, Task Force 58, composed of eleven large carriers and five smaller carriers, carried out a series of attacks on airfields and shipping around Tokyo and nearby Yokosuka. At 4:00 a.m., two hours before the other carriers launched their first strikes, USS Enterprise (CV 6) launched one of the specially modified TBM-3Es on an RCM mission to confuse Japanese radar installations and disrupt the enemy’s ability to intercept the morning strikes. A second TBM-3 ECM accompanied by one of the VF(N)-90’s fighters was dispatched later that morning to the southern end of Tokyo Bay to monitor and jam Japanese radar. It successfully identified twenty-three separate enemy radar sites. Other carriers in the group also carried out additional ECM missions. One conducted by five TBM-3 Avengers of the USS Bunker Hill (CV 17) air group was typical of the operations conducted with the modified Avengers, which were tasked with attacking strategic targets and shipping in the Tokyo area. Each was equipped with an APT-1 jammer. One of the five also carried an APR-1 receiver connected to an APA-11 direction-finding antenna. Accompanying each plane was another Avenger and an SB2C Helldiver, which dispensed Window over the target area. The electronic jammers were used from landfall to land’s end. No planes were lost. Similar attacks were conducted by Task Force 58 in mid-March.11 By then, a new aircraft, the PB4Y-2 Privateer, had entered the Navy’s inventory of ECM-capable aircraft. The Privateer was a navalized version of the PB4Y-1 Liberator, elongated by seven feet to accommodate the extra flight crew the Navy added to reduce pilot fatigue during long-duration over-water patrols. It had a single tail to increase stability at the low to medium altitudes of maritime patrol and had different engine nacelles, but it lacked superchargers, which were not needed for the plane’s low-altitude mission. The PB4Y-2 was more heavily armed than the PB4Y-1, having twelve .50-caliber machine guns for self-defense.12 The seven-foot extension to the fuselage enabled four crewmembers to be added and provided ample room to install a variety of ECM equipment. This included provisions to install APR-1, APR-2, and APR-5 radar intercept receivers with pulse analyzers and direction-finding antennas, APT-1, APQ-2, and APT-5 jammers, and ARR-5 and ARR-7 communications intercept receivers. The latter were repackaged Hallicrafter receivers that had an added isolation stage to reduce local oscillator radiation back through the antenna. Not all of

Non-Passive ECM — 25

this equipment could be carried at the same time, but the standard mounting racks installed in the extended section of the aircraft allowed for the interchange of equipment depending on the nature of the mission.13 Several squadrons equipped with the PB4Y-2s deployed to the Pacific in the early part of 1945. One of the first to reach the combat area was Patrol Bombing Squadron 106 (VPB-106), which had trained at Naval Auxiliary Air Station Camp Kearney, California. It began deploying to Tinian on February 10, 1945. It started flying long-range reconnaissance missions on February 16, conducting sixteen-hour-long barrier patrols in support of naval forces moving in for the assault on Iwo Jima. The squadron’s PB4Y-2s also acted as flying communications centers relaying messages between ships. Once Iwo Jima was secured and most of the Japanese fleet destroyed, there was little opportunity to exploit the PB4Y-2’s ECM capabilities.

4

Cold War ELINT

T

he Japanese surrender that ended World War II on September 2, 1945, was followed by a rapid demobilization of the U.S. military and the disestablishment of the special civilian research organizations, such as the National Defense Research Council, that had been created to assist in the prosecution of the war. The absence of a military threat in the immediate postwar period mitigated the need to continue the various projects under development in Division 15 of the Radio Research Laboratory, leading to a rapid phasedown of its activities. By December 1945 its staff declined from a wartime peak of 923 scientists, engineers, technicians, and administrative personnel to 401 employees. Four months later the staff had been reduced to fewer than twenty-five.1 According to Dr. George W. Rappaport, a pioneer of U.S. military electronics, electronic countermeasures faced opposition on three fronts: the radio industry, radar scientists, and the military top brass. Major companies in the radio industry ceased to be concerned with defense contracts. Many scientists involved in developing advanced microwave radar argued that their innovations made radar immune to jamming. Any number of military leaders considered jamming a wartime weapon that was not needed in peacetime. There were some in the Navy, however, who felt otherwise.2 At least one Navy RRL program survived in the immediate postwar period: the prototype of the X-MBT shipboard jamming system. Shipboard tests of the prototype X-MBT installed on USS Asheville (PF 1) were conducted in the fall 26

Cold War ELINT — 27

of 1945 with varying degrees of success against Navy radars. Jamming range, which was limited to ten thousand yards or less, was a major weakness. “If increased intercept range is paramount,” wrote the author of the report detailing the results, “the obvious solution is a specially equipped ECM aircraft,” and he recommended that serious consideration be given to the development of an airborne ECM equivalent to the airborne early warning radar.3 This advice appears to have been taken to heart, for instead of a shipboard jammer, the Navy went ahead with one for airborne use. In early 1946 the Navy issued a contract to the Airborne Instruments Laboratory (AIL) of Mineola, New York, to redesign the X-MBT as an aircraft ECM receiver. The AIL was formed in September 1945 by businessman and radio engineer Hector Skifter, who had directed a group of scientists working for the laboratory during the war when it was part of the Office of Scientific Research and Development. It was incorporated in late 1945 as a private company with the intention of becoming a technical voice in the airline industry (during the war, the laboratory had done work on air traffic control and landing). In addition to people from the Airborne Instruments Laboratory, Skifter recruited engineers who had worked at the RRL and the Rad Lab during the war. As the company was being formed, Skifter may have been asked to continue work on the Navy countermeasures, for a number of engineers who had worked on electronic countermeasures during the war—men such as Eugene Fabini—were sought after.4 With the contract in hand, a small team of ex–Division 15 engineers hired by the company’s founder began to work on the project. The result was the APR-9 intercept receiver, which consisted of a power tuning unit to cover the 1,000 to 10,750 MHz band, an intermediate frequency amplifier unit, a control unit, an indicator unit, and four tuning units mounted in eight separate ARINC enclosures. The APR-9, which operated over the frequency range of 1,000 to 10,750 MHz, was destined to be built in greater numbers and would serve longer than any other item of equipment in the history of U.S. electronic warfare. The first four prototypes were hand-built by the AIL engineers. An initial production contract for sixty units was issued to the Aircraft Radio Corporation before it was turned over to Collins Radio, which produced thousands of units in a production run that lasted more than ten years. The first operational use of the APR-9 took place during an ELINT mission conducted in 1947.5

28 — Chapter 4

The APR-9 was not the only ECM project of interest to the Navy. A realization of the importance of electronic countermeasures in naval operations and the continued need for research and development of improved ECM equipment led to the establishment of a major program at the NRL to provide new techniques and systems for ECM. There was little urgency, however, and work on a new signal analyzer, several direction finders, and a series of jammers received low priority. In the meantime, the fleet had to make do with the equipment left over from World War II.6 Beginning in 1946, the Navy’s aircraft repair rework facilities began to modify fifty TBM-3Ms into the Q version. Between 1946 and 1948, enough TBM-3Qs were modified to provide a five-plane detachment to ten aircraft carriers. The first postwar operational deployment of the Navy’s carrier-based ECM planes did not take place until the fall of 1948 when four TBM-3Qs of VT-81 on board the Essex-class carrier USS Princeton (CV 37) took part in the exercises conducted in the Pacific by Task Force 38. Although the TBM-3Qs were fitted with wartime countermeasures equipment, no radars were within range of their electronic jamming equipment. Their main contribution to the exercise was the distribution of chaff that was used to mimic a large airborne striking force in order to take attention away from two bombers that were attempting to simulate a sneak atomic bomb attack. For training purposes, the ECM operators assigned to the TBM-3Qs utilized their jammers on their deckbound aircraft to successfully disable the radars on two destroyers located 5,000 to 6,000 yards from the carrier. To accomplish this, the transmitting antennas of their ECM set was elevated to a position above the aircraft with power supplied by electrical outlets in the flight deck. Using this technique, eight of the squadron’s ECM operators were able to jam the SC radar of USS Benner (DD 807) and USS Miles C. Fox (DD 829) with an effectiveness of 75 percent.7 The blockade of Berlin in June 1949, the emergence of the Soviet Union as a nuclear power in August 1949, and the establishment of the communist Peoples’ Republic of China on October 1, 1949, heightened the need for enhanced capabilities in electronic reconnaissance to keep track of potential radars and communications systems being deployed around the peripheries of communist-controlled territories. Although the Strategic Air Command had conducted an ELINT mission in September 1946 to overfly a Soviet ice station in the Arctic that might have been used for military purposes, the need

Cold War ELINT — 29

for an extensive ELINT program within the U.S. military did not arise until two U.S. Air Force C-47 transport planes en route from Vienna, Austria, to Venice, Italy, were downed by Yugoslavian fighters of the Soviet bloc when they got lost and inadvertently entered that country’s air space due to poor weather. How the Yugoslavs found the C-47s under such conditions was a mystery until two Air Force B-17s equipped with two APR-4 search receivers and APA-17 and APA-24 direction-finding antennas flying along the Italian-Yugoslavian frontier picked up emissions from a war surplus German Wurzburg radar. The direction-finding bearings indicated that the emissions were coming from the site of a former German radar school. Evidently Yugoslavia had successfully refurbished the school’s Wurzburg radar.8 The existence of the Yugoslav radar prompted the U.S. military to establish a secret ELINT program, later known as the Special Electronic Search Project (SESP), flown by Air Force bombers and Navy patrol planes to collect information on communist air defense systems throughout Europe. The Navy decided to equip two patrol squadrons for ECM but discovered that it did not have enough ECM equipment. According to one knowledgeable source, The Navy sent two chief electronic technicians to locate and buy back some of the equipment which previously had been sold as surplus. Wearing civilian clothes and carrying large quantities of cash, the two chiefs rooted through war surplus stores in New York City. They purchased all the intercept receivers, direction finders, pulse analyzers, and other electronic reconnaissance equipment they could locate. The equipment was then repaired by Navy technicians and installed in PB4Y-2 Privateers and P2V Neptunes.9

One of the Navy units assigned to “ferret” out the Soviet radars was Patrol Squadron 26 (VP-26).10 The squadron, which had been home-based at NAS Patuxent River, Maryland, since January 1947, had maintained a three-plane detachment of PB4Y-2 Privateers at Port Lyautey, Morocco. According to the official squadron history, antisubmarine warfare was its primary mission. It is not known whether the Privateers were equipped with electronic surveillance equipment at this time. If so, it would have been highly classified. Whatever records existed concerning this equipment would have been destroyed long

30 — Chapter 4

ago. In any case, it appears certain that when the squadron was relocated to Port Lyautey in March 1949, at least some of its PB4Y-2s were equipped with electronic intelligence gear of World War II vintage.11 The detachment of PB4Y-2s assigned to VP-26 stationed at Port Lyautey was part of a secret unit equipped with intercept receivers, direction finders, pulse analyzers, and other gear that could detect and locate emissions from Soviet radars and communications gear. Operating under the guise of courier aircraft for U.S. embassies and missions throughout Europe, they routinely flew signal collection flights along the coasts of Soviet bloc nations on the Baltic Sea. VP-26 aircraft would haul mail to Wiesbaden, Germany, for example, then fly a combination navigation training and electronic intelligence collecting flight to the Baltic Sea, returning to the west to land at Copenhagen, Denmark.12 At 10:31 a.m. local time on April 8, 1950, an unarmed PB4Y-2 assigned to this secret unit took off from Wiesbaden with a ten-man crew on what was later listed as a “navigational training mission.” Like most ELINT missions conducted by the unit at the time, most crewmembers were aviators and electronic specialists, assisted by one or more sailors from the Naval Security Group who were specialists in ELINT and cryptology. The mission seemed to be going along normally when the crew radioed it was crossing the German coast at 1:01 p.m. local time. It was the last message received from the PB4Y-2, which had been named the “Turbulent Turtle.” An extensive air search to locate the missing aircraft and its crew proved fruitless and was called off after ten days. The official crash report listed the entire crew as deceased and speculated the aircraft may have strayed over Soviet territory due to radar failure on a navigation flight. Days later, an empty life raft belonging to VP-26 was pulled from the sea by a Swedish fishing boat along with a bullet-riddled nose strut and a wheel from the missing Privateer. Although the Soviet Union had reported an incident between air defense fighters and an American aircraft (which they described as a B-29) three days after the Turbulent Turtle went missing, it would be decades before the Russians released details of what took place that day. According to the report issued after the end of the Cold War, four piston-engined Lavochkin La-11 fighters intercepted the Turbulent Turtle at 12,000 feet near the port of Liepaja, Latvia. The United States likely already knew this information because the Swedes, unbeknownst to the Russians, were intercepting and decoding Soviet military signals,

Cold War ELINT — 31

and they had recorded the radio communication of the Soviet fighter control ordering the La-11s to intercept and shoot down the PB4Y-2.13 Nine days after the Turbulent Turtle was reported as missing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to discontinue further ferret missions—now called the Special Electronic Search Project—for a period of thirty days. Although the Joint Chiefs recognized the risk of resuming such flights, they “felt that there would be more serious disadvantages accruing to the United States if the cessation of these operations were to be extended over an excessively long period.” Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs urged that SESP be resumed without delay and that the geographic division of effort be maintained in accordance with the normal peacetime deployment of air units: with the Navy responsible for the Mediterranean and Black Sea areas in Europe, and the Air Force responsible for the Baltic, Gulf of Bothnia, Murmansk, and Caucasus areas in Europe and for the Far East. In addition, the Joint Chiefs recommended that aircraft engaged in SESP operations over routes normally flown by unarmed transport-type aircraft— such as the land masses of the Allied occupation zones and the Berlin and Vienna corridors—continue to operate with or without armament. Aircraft engaged in all other routes adjacent to the Soviet Union or to territory controlled by it or its satellites were to be armed and instructed to shoot in selfdefense. Among other requirements, the Joint Chiefs stipulated that SESP flights would not be made closer than twenty miles to Soviet- or satellite-controlled territory. President Harry S. Truman approved the Joint Chiefs recommendations on May 19, 1950.14 The Navy responded by creating the Naval Air Activities Port Lyautey Patrol Unit on July 1, 1950, with three PB4Y-2 aircraft and personnel transferred from VP-26. It was a highly classified unit that worked closely with Port Lyautey’s Naval Security Group, Unit 32 George. The activities of the Naval Security Group can be traced to 1916, when code and signal sections were established in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. However, the Naval Security Group as an organization was not created until January 28, 1950, when it was tasked with intelligence gathering and denial of intelligence to adversaries by the use of signal intelligence gathering, cryptology, and information assurance. It appears that the unit was only equipped with the ECM equipment (such as the APR-4, the Army Air Forces version of the APR-1) developed during World War II.

32 — Chapter 4

Patrol Squadron 26 relocated to NAS Brunswick, Maine, in February 1952. Just prior to its departure a new unit was formed at Port Lyautey dedicated to the airborne electronic reconnaissance mission for the European theater. The new unit was designated the Naval Air Facility (NAF) Patrol Unit. It was manned by approximately seventy personnel and equipped with three P4M-1Qs that had been specially converted for electronic reconnaissance and a stripped-down P2V Neptune for pilot training. The P4M-1 Mercator, from which the Q version was derived, had originally been designed as a long-range patrol bomber, but it soon lost its place to the Lockheed Neptune, which became the Navy’s premier postwar long-range patrol plane. The Mercator was a hybrid airplane powered by two Pratt & Whitney R4360 radial piston engines each turning a four-bladed propeller and two Allison J33-A-23 turbojet engines mounted in the aft portion of the piston engine nacelles. The jet engines, whose intakes were located behind and below the radial engines, burned the same fuel as the piston engines, obviating the need for a separate fuel system. Production P4M-1s were to be armed with nose, dorsal, and tail gun turrets. The P4M-1 Mercators entered service with VP-21 on June 28, 1950, but were quickly exchanged for P2V-4 Neptunes due to severe maintenance problems associated with the Allison engines. All but two of the twenty-two aircraft produced were returned to the Glenn L. Martin Company factory, where they were modified for the electronic reconnaissance mission.15 The P4M-1Q could be readily distinguished from the P4M-1 by a chinmounted “beard” fairing that contained radar-intercept gear. It could carry a heavy payload of electronic reconnaissance equipment and a large crew of intercept operators over extremely long distances. It could cruise at 180 mph to monitor electronic signals but could bring its two jet engines on line if attacked by enemy aircraft and accelerate up to 395 mph. For the reconnaissance role the airplane’s fourteen-man crew consisted of pilot, copilot, navigator (who was trained as an aviator), electronics officer, six intercept operators, plane captain (who doubled as relief on the gun turrets), and three gunners. The P4M-1Qs were equipped with the ARD-6 direction-finding system developed by the NRL after World War II. The origins of the ARD-6 can be traced to problems the laboratory experienced during the war as it tried to develop high-frequency direction finders for installation in aircraft. Antennapattern distortion, caused by the airframe’s surface contours, made it difficult

Cold War ELINT — 33

to obtain useful bearings of intercepted signals. In order to overcome this problem, the NRL developed an antenna system for use on the European ferret aircraft program utilizing three rotating dipole antennae mounted below the fuselage with the signal direction indicated on a cathode-ray tube. The ARD-6 was the first VHF airborne direction finder that could display instantaneously and simultaneously both the bearing and frequency of intercepted radar signals over a broad band. The P4M-1Qs operated by the NAF Patrol Unit also carried a large suite of ECM gear that included a variety of receivers, direction finders, pulse analyzers, and a specialized antenna.16 After the North Koreans invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950, a second special electronic reconnaissance unit was established in the Pacific. The new unit was established within Reserve Patrol Squadron 731, which was recalled to active duty on September 29, 1950. When the squadron deployed with its PBM-5S flying boats to Buckner Bay, Okinawa, on February 7, 1951, a detachment was maintained at Naval Station Sangley Point, Cavite, Philippines, supported by the seaplane tender USS Salisbury Sound (AV 13). This was undoubtedly the special airborne aerial reconnaissance unit frequently mentioned in print but not by name. The Glenn L. Martin PBM-5S Mariner was an antisubmarine warfare version of the PBM-5 patrol bomber equipped with an ECM suite that included an APR-4 radar receiver, an APA-11 pulse analyzer, and an APA-38 panoramic adapter to detect submarine radio transmissions. Both sections of VP-731 conducted patrols over the Formosa Straits and the China coast until the section operating from Sangley Point was replaced by the Special Projects Division of the Navy’s Air Operations Department in October.17 The Special Projects Division, which some sources refer to as the Special Electronic Search Project, was established at Naval Station Sangley Point to provide a dedicated airborne electronic reconnaissance capability in the Pacific. The division employed four P4M-1Q aircraft and was assigned the primary mission of airborne electronic countermeasures for the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The flight crew assigned to operate the ECM equipment were members of Naval Communications Unit 38C, which reported to the Special Projects Division for flight operations. The Special Projects Division continued airborne electronic reconnaissance operations throughout 1952.18 By then the Navy had developed two approaches to the requirement for airborne electronic reconnaissance. The first approach, termed mission support,

34 — Chapter 4

involved patrol squadrons in which the installed electronic reconnaissance equipment was usually operated by squadron personnel as just another sensor to assist in the conduct of the squadrons’ missions. The aircrews of these squadrons performed routine electronic reconnaissance operations in support of their antisubmarine and worldwide surface surveillance missions. The second “dedicated” approach was performed by highly specialized and trained personnel who conducted their missions in a few specially configured aircraft. Both the dedicated and mission support aircraft soon became involved in conducting electronic reconnaissance missions around the peripheral territories of the Soviet bloc and the People’s Republic of China, which they quickly found to be a dangerous undertaking (see table 4-1). One knowledgeable author described it as a “rather bloody espionage war against a hermetically sealed communist society,” made risky by deliberately trying to provoke the enemy’s air defenses by intentionally straying into hostile territory hoping that the air defense would panic and switch on new equipment using previously unknown frequencies that could be recorded by the equipment on the ELINT aircraft. As former patrol squadron commander Don East wrote, “It was during this era that U.S. airborne electronic reconnaissance missions became involved in a bloody series of clashes where they were victims of Soviet, North Korean, and Communist Chinese aggression” that would last from 1950 to 1969.19 During the mid-1950s all of the Navy’s long-range patrol planes were equipped with ELINT-type receivers to carry out ferret missions if required. The two main patrol types at this time were the Martin P5M-2 and the Lockheed P2V-5 and P2V-7 Neptune. By the late 1950s they were equipped with the following ECM gear: • two ALR-3 receivers used to discover the presence of signals and their approximate bearing and frequency for more detailed analysis using the ALR-8 • an ALR-8 superheterodyne receiver with nine tuning units used to determine the exact frequency of signals found using the ALR-320 • an APA-69 direction finder to take bearings on signals picked up on the ALR-3 or ALR-8 • an APA-74 signal analyzer to measure pulse rate frequency and pulse width, scan pattern, and scan modulation pattern of signals picked up on the ALR-8.21, 22

Table 4-1. Incidents Involving Anti-aircraft Fire and Fighter Attacks on U.S. Navy Patrol Planes, 1950–59 April 8, 1950

A PB4Y-2 based at Port Lyautey, Morocco, on a patrol mission from Wiesbaden, West Germany, was intercepted and shot down over Latvia by Soviet La-11 fighters.

Sometime between October and December 1950

A VP-6 P2V Neptune twin-engine anti-submarine warfare aircraft was intercepted at night off the Soviet coast near Vladivostok by four Soviet MiG-15 jet fighters. The Neptune’s tail gunner fired a short 20-mm warning burst when the MiGs got too close, and one of the MiGs exploded. The Neptune dove for the deck and successfully escaped without damage.

November 6, 1951

Two Soviet La-II Fang fighters shot down a VP-6 P2V-3W Neptune conducting a reconnaissance mission near Vladivostok. The Soviets claimed to intercept the aircraft seven to eight miles from shore, and it crashed eighteen miles from shore. All ten crewmen were missing and presumed lost. The United States claimed at the time that the aircraft was conducting a weather reconnaissance mission for the United Nations Command in Korea.

July 31, 1952

While conducting a patrol mission, a PBM-5S2 Mariner of VP-731, based in Iwakuni, Japan, was attacked by two People’s Republic of China (PRC) MiG-15s over the Yellow Sea. Two crewmembers were killed, and two were seriously wounded. The PBM suffered extensive damage but was able to make it safely to Paengyongdo, Korea.

September 20, 1952

A PB4Y-2S Privateer of VP-28 was attacked by two PRC MiG-15s off the coast of China but was able to recover on Okinawa.

November 23, 1952

Another VP-28 PB4Y-2S Privateer was attacked but not damaged by PRC MiG-15s off Shanghai, PRC.

January 18, 1953

A P2V-5 Neptune of VP-22, based at Atsugi, Japan, was damaged by Chinese anti-aircraft fire near Swatow, PRC, but was able to ditch in the Formosa Strait. Eleven of thirteen crewmen were rescued by a U.S. Coast Guard PBM-5 Mariner, under fire from Chinese shore batteries on Nan Ao Tao island. Attempting to take off in eight- to twelve-foot swells, the PBM crashed. Ten survivors out of nineteen total (including five from the P2V-5) were rescued by the destroyer Halsey Powell (DD 686).

April 23, 1953

A P4M-1Q Mercator was attacked by two MiG-15s while flying off the Chinese coast near Shanghai. The MiGs made several firing runs, and the crew of the Mercator returned fire. The Mercator was not hit, and as far as the crew of the Mercator could tell, their return fire did not damage the MiGs.

June 19, 1953

A VP-46 PBM-5S2 Mariner was fired upon by PRC surface ships in the Formosa Strait, and on June 28, a P2V Neptune of VP-1 was also shot at by PRC surface ships. Neither aircraft was damaged.

Continued

Table 4-1. Continued July 8, 1953

A VP-1 P2V-5 Neptune was fired on by PRC anti-aircraft guns near Natien, PRC, but was not damaged.

October 2, 1953

A Navy PBM-5 Mariner of VP-50 was intercepted by two PRC MiG-15s thirty miles east of Tsingtao. The MiGs made twelve firing passes but only hit the PBM twice in the tail with 37-mm cannon shells. The crew was not injured, and the aircraft returned safely to base.

November 18, 1953

A PBM-5 Mariner of VP-50 picked up an unexpected tail wind while approaching Shanghai. The airplane got close to the coast of the People’s Republic of China before the crew determined their position. After the aircraft turned away from the coast, it was jumped by two MiG-15s. Three firing passes were made, but the PBM was not hit.

April 9, 1954

A P2V Neptune from VP-2 was attacked by a PRC MiG-15 while on patrol over the Yellow Sea. The MiG made three firing passes, and the crew of the Neptune returned fire. There was no apparent damage to either aircraft resulting from the encounter.

September 4, 1954

Two Soviet MiG-15s attacked a VP-19 P2V-5 Neptune forty nautical miles off the east coast of the Soviet Union. The Neptune was forced to ditch, and one crewman was lost. The other nine were rescued by the prompt arrival of a U.S. Air Force SA-16 amphibious plane.

February 1955

A P2V Neptune was damaged in the wing by PRC anti-aircraft fire over the Formosa Strait.

June 22, 1955

A P2V-5 Neptune of VP-9 flying a patrol mission from Kodiak, Alaska, was attacked over the Bering Strait by two Soviet MiG-15s. The aircraft crash-landed on St. Lawrence Island after an engine was set afire. Of the eleven crewmembers, four sustained injuries due to gunfire, and six were injured during the landing.

August 22, 1956

While on a patrol mission from Iwakuni, Japan, a P4M-1Q Mercator of VQ-1 was attacked at night by a PRC fighter thirtytwo miles off the PRC coast. There were no survivors among the sixteen-man crew.

June 16, 1959

While flying a patrol mission over the Sea of Japan, a P4M-1Q of VQ-1 was attacked fifty miles east of the Korean demilitarized zone by two North Korean MiG-17s. During the attack, the aircraft sustained serious damage to the starboard engine, and the tail gunner was seriously wounded. The aircraft made it safely back to Miho Air Force Base, Japan.

Sources: Samuel J. Cox, “H-029–3: A Brief History of U.S. Navy Cold War Aviation Incidents (Excluding Korea and Vietnam),” U.S. Navy History and Heritage Command, April 2019, https://www.history.navy.mil /content/history/nhhc/about-us/leadership/director/directors-corner/h-grams/h-gram-029/h-029–3.html; “Aircraft Downed During the Cold War and Thereafter,” Silent-warriors.com, http://www.silent-warriors.com /shootdown_list.html.

Cold War ELINT — 37

The Lockheed Neptune was the first U.S. Navy land-based aircraft designed for long-range, maritime patrol, antisubmarine warfare tasks. Although initial design studies for the Neptune began shortly before Pearl Harbor, the need to concentrate on more immediately needed types during World War II delayed deployment so that the first PV-1s did not enter service until 1946. When it first appeared, the Neptune was powered by two Wright Cyclone R3350-8 engines of approximately 2,300 hp. It handled well on take-off and landing, could climb rapidly for an aircraft of its configuration, and had good singleengine performance.23 The second series, the P2V-2 Neptune, had an upgraded 2,500 hp Wright Cyclone R-3350-24 and an extended nose that lengthened the aircraft by two and a half feet. Additional changes included six fixed forward-firing 20-mm cannon that replaced the nose turret, twin 20-mm guns in the tail, and a redesigned dorsal turret that was lowered and streamlined. The first P2V-2 went into U.S. Navy service in 1947, with the last of the eighty-one built reaching the service in July 1948. The P2V-3 was externally very similar to the P2V-2 but featured an even more powerful 3,200 hp Wright Cyclone R-3350-26W engines. Several variants were built, including thirty early warning platforms designated as the P2V-3W that featured an AN/APS-20 search radar mounted in a big radome under the forward fuselage. P2V-3Ws were used for secret electronic intelligence missions. Whether these aircraft were delivered with ELINT gear or were specially modified is not clear. The P2V-4 was another stepwise refinement of the Neptune type, featuring an uprated powerplant fit, increased fuel capacity, and standard fit of the APS-20 radar and associated enlarged radome used on the P2V-3W. The first P2V-4 flew on November 14, 1949. The P2V-5 was the definitive Neptune variant, with 384 delivered to the Navy. It replaced earlier Neptune variants in first line operation, relegating them to reserve status. The P2V-5 was powered by two 3,250 hp Wright R-3350-30W engines. Major changes included the addition of an Emerson ball turret with two 20-mm cannon in the nose, enlarged wingtip tanks that were attached directly to the wingtips, and a searchlight that was added to the nose of the starboard wing tank to illuminate the target for the nose guns. Most P2V-5s were modified after delivery with two 3,400 lb s.t. Westinghouse turbojets under each wing to improve takeoff performance and speed. These were designated

38 — Chapter 4

as P2V-5Fs. Other modifications made after delivery included the deletion of the ventral and nose turrets and the addition of magnetic anomaly detection (MAD) gear in a lengthened rear fuselage. One version, the P2V-5E, was fitted with additional electronic equipment that has never been identified in print. Whether this version had MAD gear and the Julie/Jezebel active and passive sonar detection systems is also unknown.24 The sixth Neptune version, the P2V-6, was similar to the P2V-5 but had different electronic equipment as well as the APS-70 radar that replaced the APS-220 on earlier versions. The P2V-6 was powered by two 3,700 hp Wright R-3350-36W engines with enlarged tip tanks. It also reverted to the Emerson 20-mm nose turret. The first P2V-6 entered service in the latter part of 1952. The P2V-7 was the final production version of the Neptune. It was the only Neptune built with underwing jet pods and had a distinctive enlarged canopy with a better all-round view and a slightly longer fuselage. Early production models had nose, tail, and dorsal turrets, but these were quickly eliminated in favor of a clear nose, MAD boom, and observer dome. The P2V-7 reverted to the APS-20 radar used on the P2V-5, with its large radome, though the radome was mounted farther forward. It was first flown on August 26, 1954, and probably entered service before the end of the year.

5

ECM during the Korean War

A

lthough the popularity and use of electronic countermeasures waned after 1945, the NRL continued to conduct research on innovative approaches to ECM jamming. The main interest during this period came from the Navy’s aviators, who were growing concerned with the dangers represented by radar. Technicians at the NRL attempted to design an automatic search-lock-jamming system using an APR-9 radar receiver to scan for and analyze potential radar signals. If the signals conformed to certain criteria, the associated APT-10 transmitter would automatically switch on in continuous wave mode until it reached the radar frequency detected by the APR-9. It would then stop scanning and switch to its noise modulation mode to jam the radar identified by the APR-9. One noted authority believes the APT-10 to have been the first such device to operate on microwave frequencies. Fundamental problems with the transmitter and an issue with antenna mismatching created technical problems that could not be resolved, and the APT-10 never reached the production stage.1 In the early 1950s, the Navy, in a highly foresightful decision, issued a contract to the Douglas Aircraft Company to design and build a container the size of a drop tank to hold an ALT-2 noise jammer and its antennae. The jamming pod was to be carried under the wing of the countermeasures version of the Douglas AD Skyraider and would draw power from the plane’s generator. The concept of a jamming pod, according to Alfred Price, “appears to have aroused little interest at the time” and was not employed on attack aircraft until the Vietnam War.2 39

40 — Chapter 5

When the Korean War began, only one carrier-based squadron, Composite Squadron 35 (VC-35), had any active EW capability. The squadron, which was established May 25, 1950, at NAS San Diego, California, was equipped with the Douglas AD-4N Skyraider. The AD-4 was the fourth generation of the highly versatile AD-1: a single-place carrier attack plane that entered service in 1946. The AD-4N version, optimized for night operations, began entering the fleet in the 1950s. It featured a more powerful engine, had a small fuselage compartment aft of the wing for a radar operator and an ECM/ASW operator who sat side-by-side, was equipped with a number of countermeasures receivers, and manually dropped packages of chaff.3 Composite Squadron 35’s main mission was to provide antisubmarine detachments to attack aircraft carriers. Teamed with VC-11’s AD-3Ws, VC-35’s Skyraiders would provide a hunter-killer capability to embarked air groups. Additional missions included night strike, ECM, and search and rescue. Proficiency in night and all-weather flying required many months of training for pilots and aircrews at San Diego and at the Fleet All Weather Training Unit Pacific at NAS Barbers Point, Hawaii. After the United States officially entered the Korean War on June 27, 1950, VC-35’s AD-4Ns were used primarily for night attack missions, using their onboard radar to identify interdiction. They were deployed on all of the attack carriers in theater in detachments called VAN teams (see appendix II). Most teams consisted of four aircraft, six pilots, and thirty-five to forty-three enlisted men, including twelve aircrewmen. Early in the war, one of VC-35’s three plane detachments was ordered to drop chaff. The drops were successful, but within days, the entire inventory of chaff within the U.S. Seventh Fleet was expended. No further chaff drops were made for the duration of the Korean War. In addition to the AD-4Ns, each carrier air group included two AD-2Q or -4Q Skyraiders that operated in the ferret role. The AD-2Q and -4Q were direct descendants of the AD-1Q, a modification to one of the aircraft in the first production run of AD-1s the Navy ordered in May 1945. While the first Skyraider production run was under way, the Navy also decided to convert several of the aircraft to new configurations to evaluate their potential as specialized platforms for night operations, photo reconnaissance, and ECM. Two of the aircraft, dubbed the N version, carried radar and searchlights under the

ECM during the Korean War — 41

wings and two radar operators in the fuselage to evaluate the Skyraider’s potential in night attack. One AD-1 of the first production run was converted into a photo reconnaissance version with fuselage-mounted cameras. It was dubbed the P version.4 The success of the prototype AD-1Q from the first production run resulted in a subsequent order for thirty-five similarly equipped AD-1Qs built as a twoseat electronic countermeasures aircraft. The ECM operators’ station was installed inside the fuselage to the rear of the cockpit. The operator entered his station via a door in the port side of the fuselage. An AN/APS-4 radar pod was installed underneath the starboard wing, and an MX-346/A chaff dispenser pod was installed underneath the port wing. The plane was equipped with an APR-1 search receiver, APA-1l pulse analyzer, and APA-38 panoramic adapter. There was a distinctive ECM blister on the lower rear fuselage, fed by an air scoop aft of the radio antenna, as well as several other bulges and antennae. The AD-2Q had an identical ECM layout and equipment as the AD-1 but had a 2,700 hp Wright R-3350-26W engine rather than a 2,500 hp R-335024W one. It also had a strengthened inner wing, increased internal fuel capacity, and higher operating weights. Deliveries began in 1948. The follow-on AD-3 featured more airframe strengthening, lengthened main landing gear struts, a tailwheel that was no longer fully retractable, an updated propeller, extensive cockpit tweaks, and a redesigned rudder. The ECM suite and arrangement of the AD-3Q was similar to the AD-2Q but with updated equipment. Deliveries of the AD-3Q began in 1950. Further improvements in the Skyraider led to the AD-4, which had a revised cockpit, a wider windscreen with tougher armor glass, and a pitot tube on the tailfin that had been omitted from the AD-3. The general arrangement of the AD-4Q was similar to the AD-3Q, and its ECM equipment included an APA-9 radar receiver, APA-64 radar pulse analyzer, and APA-70A radar homing adapter.5 The last version of the Skyraider, the AD-5, was first flown on August 17, 1951. It was a major redesign that incorporated all of the lessons learned during five years of operations. The most radical change was the widening of the fuselage to accommodate side-by-side seating in the cockpit and the lengthening of the fuselage by two feet. Fifty-four AD-5Qs were converted from AD-5Ns. In 1962 the AD-5Q was redesignated the EA-1F.6

42 — Chapter 5

On July 7, 1950, ten days after the United States entered the war in Korea, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was activated in response for a call for U.S. reinforcements from the Far East Command. The brigade was an air-ground team built around the 5th Marine Regiment and Marine Air Group (MAG) 33 assigned to the 1st Marine Air Wing (MAW). The air group’s first ECM section was formed at K-3 Pohang airfield in Pohang, Korea, when two master sergeants, Joe Bouher and Doc Grimes, arrived. The two Marines transferred from the 2nd Marine Air Wing (MAW-2) where they had been serving in the Marine Corps’ first EW unit, the airborne early warning (AEW) and ECM section of Headquarters Squadron 2 (HEDRON-2), MAW-2, stationed at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Cherry Point, North Carolina. The two men were among the first enlisted ECM operators in the Marine Corps and had been flying in the two TBM-3Q Avengers assigned to HEDRON-2’s ECM section in 1950. The Avenger’s World War II–vintage ECM gear included the APR-4 receiver and the APA-11 pulse analyzer used to intercept and classify radar signals.7 The TBM-3Qs flown by the Marines had a manually rotated dipole antenna that was extended from the fuselage belly. The operator of this equipment wore a set of earphones while listening to signals as he rotated the antenna seeking the audible null that would establish the signal’s bearing. The aircraft was also equipped with a chute to manually drop bundles of chaff. Although the TBM-3Q could optionally carry the APQ-2 jamming transmitter, its use was not allowed to prevent it from interfering with friendly radars. Due to its primitive direction-finding and jamming capabilities, the Avenger was used mainly for interception and classification of radar signals.8 Before shipping out, Bouher and Grimes built and tested a rudimentary jammer in response to reports that the North Koreans were beginning to employ radar-controlled anti-aircraft guns (see sidebar). Although the two Marine electronic countermeasures operators (ECMOs) brought this equipment with them, it was never installed in an aircraft or used in action. Shortly after their arrival, an ECM section was established in MAG-33’s headquarters squadron using two AD-2Q Skyraiders acquired from the Navy. When the AD-2Qs arrived, their ECM gear consisted of an APR-4 receiver and an APA-11 analyzer but no direction-finding equipment. Bouher and Grimes were able to locate and install two APA-17 direction finders. MAG-33’s AD-2Qs—crewed by Bouher and Grimes, the first Marine ECMOs to fly missions in combat—were used to support initial Marine Corps EW operations in Korea.9

ECM during the Korean War — 43

Enemy Anti-aircraft Defenses in North Korea In the early months of the war, the only significant grouping of North Korean anti-aircraft weapons was at Pyongyang. Of the twenty 76-mm Soviet anti-aircraft guns in the vicinity, three were controlled by a radar of the British G. L. Mark II type—an early World War II radar. During World War II, the British sent the Soviets a large quantity of G. L. Mark II radars that were far better than anything the Soviets had. They designated the set the SON-2 and produced a limited number themselves, which were undoubtedly given to the North Koreans.

Sources: Andrew T. Soltys, “Enemy Antiaircraft Defenses in North Korea,” Air University Quarterly Review VII, no. 1 (Spring 1954): 75 (Soltys was the U.S. Army intelligence officer for anti-aircraft during the Korean War); Greg Goebel, “The British Invention of Radar,” Airvectors, https://vc.air vectors.net/ttwiz_01.html.

In February 1952 the ECM section was transferred to Marine Air Control Group’s Headquarters Squadron at the K-3 Pohang airfield. The unit was reassigned to VMC-1 when it was commissioned on September 15, 1952. VMC-1’s AEW section flew AD-4Ws, a radar-equipped Skyraider that was similar to the ECM section’s AD-2Qs. The organizational change was likely done to facilitate maintenance and operation of the ECM aircraft, although it appears that the ECM section remained assigned to HEDRON-33 for administrative purposes. The change in squadrons coincided with the influx of enlisted aircrews. Training ECM operators, a problem that had plagued the former ECM section, now became a major hurdle. Unlike the initial cadre of ECMOs, few of the new aircrew were trained as electronic technicians. An ECM training syllabus was prepared for use by both pilots and ECMOs, but ECMO training was hampered by the lack of multi-place aircraft that could be used to provide supervised instruction to the new operators, as there was no room in the AD-2Q for a second ECM operator/trainer. Bouher was unable to accompany his students and had no way of monitoring the trainee’s progress. He could only show the new men how to turn on and adjust the equipment on the ground, hoping that a few familiarization flights would help them to become proficient in its use. As J. T. O’Brien, a former ECM operator, noted, “One had to assume that he knew what he was doing and in a hostile environment that was a giant assumption.” VMC-1’s ECM section desperately needed a trainer.10

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In July the squadron was assigned its first AD-4NL, the winterized version the AD-4N. By then Bouher and Grimes had gone back to the United States, and it was up to TSgt. Dan Georgia, the most experienced electronics technician and ECMO in the squadron, to supervise the transformation of the three-place AD-4N into a dual-position ECM aircraft—an idea he had pitched to the squadron’s commanding officer. Georgia modified the aircraft with the help of the technicians from Marine Aircraft Squadron 17. To make room for the ECM gear in the crew compartment, the ACR-1 and its associated wiring were relocated to the forward compartment. The technicians removed the wing-mounted APS-31 radar, the APR-9 homing antenna system, and a crude pulse analyzer that had come with the plane. When they were done, they had created two operator positions within the crew compartment with one operator having an APR-9 receiver and the other having an APR-4. The two positions shared an APR-11 signal analyzer and an APR-17 direction finder that had been added to the aircraft’s ECM suite.11 The first test flight, with ECMO Dan Georgia and TSgt. Charles Canter in the crew compartment, happened on November 17, 1952. The aircraft was piloted by Capt. Gordon Keller Jr. The next day, Capt. Keller and Sgt. Georgia flew the first combat mission near Wonsan Harbor. After the mission the aircraft was designated RM-1 and became the prototype for all modifications that were to follow. For his efforts in modifying the AD-4NL to allow inflight training in support of 1st MAW combat operations, Sergeant Georgia was awarded a Bronze Star. By November, VMC-1 was flying an average of one ECM combat mission and two training missions per day, while simultaneously conducting an ECM school for new operators. The combat missions were mostly ELINT operations to detect, classify, and locate enemy radars. A few chaff-dropping training missions were also conducted against friendly radars. Because the MX-900 chaff dispenser was not reliable, chaff was not used against North Korean radars, and no jammers were used, either.12 The passive ECM missions were flown on prescribed tracks up the east and west coasts of North Korea and along the demilitarized zone at an altitude of 10,000 feet between two visually located points. Occasionally, an overland flight in and around Pyongyang was also conducted. The ADs carried a 150-gallon

ECM during the Korean War — 45

centerline drop tank, which gave them well over 4½ hours of endurance. Navigation and communications were handled by the pilot, while the enlisted ECMOs recorded reference points to plot the line of bearings to the intercepted radars once they were back on the ground. The operator also recorded signal characteristics (frequency, pulse repetition rate, pulse width, and sweep rates) of the intercepted radars. After landing, the pilot and ECM technician worked together to plot the location of the enemy radars using the data obtained during the flight.13 Because the majority of ground targets were flown by tactical aircraft during the Korean War, the need to provide ECM jamming did not arise since the main danger to these planes was from visually aimed automatic ground fire. Hence, the role of the Marine air ECM was limited to ferreting out the enemy’s radars in order to determine their electronic order of battle. As Alfred Price noted, “The Korean War was like a catalyst in a chemical reaction—it sparked some major advances [in EW].” Nevertheless, it provided the Marines with their first experience in equipping and operating ECM aircraft in combat and demonstrated that Marine air personnel had the initiative, knowledge, and leadership support to make urgently needed changes to equipment and procedures dictated by wartime needs.14

6

Dedicated ECM Squadrons

O

n May 13, 1953, the special projects division of the air operations department at Sangley Point was assigned to Early Warning Squadron 1 (VW-1) stationed at Barbers Point, Hawaii, and the special projects division at Port Lyautey was assigned to VW-2. Both units were designated as Detachment A within their respective squadrons and were established with four P4M-1Qs. VW-1’s Detachment A was reassigned to VW-3 homeported at NAS Agana, Guam, on June 1, 1954, because it was geographically closer to the detachment’s operational area. The new arrangement worked well for both detachments until 1955, when it became evident that the detachment’s aircraft and chain of command were different from the early warning squadrons to which they were attached. The main reason for establishing the special projects divisions was to provide transportation for the ECM technicians assigned to the naval security group operating the ECM gear in the EW section of their aircraft. The security group and its hosting squadron reported to two different entities. They were two very separate outfits, with completely different chains of command that were not supposed to communicate with each other for security reasons. The pending assignment of A3-D Skywarriors to the special detachments and their added maintenance and operational requirements only furthered the impetus to turn both detachments into full-fledged squadrons.1 The first of the special project detachments converted into an electronic countermeasures squadron (ECMRON) was Detachment A from VW-1, which 46

Dedicated ECM Squadrons — 47

became Electronic Countermeasures Squadron 1 (VQ-1) on June 1, 1955. Shortly thereafter it received two additional P4M-1Q Mercators, bringing the number of aircraft in the squadron to six. The squadron was then moved from the Philippines to Iwakuni, on the southern end of the Japanese island of Honshu.2 The establishment of the second Navy ECMRON took place on September 1, 1955, when Detachment A at Port Lyautey was reorganized and commissioned as Electronic Countermeasures Squadron 2 (VQ-2). The squadron was initially equipped with four P4M-1Qs and a single P2V-2 for training and utility duties. The unit was assigned identification letters PS, while its sister squadron VQ-1 was assigned PR.3 VQ-2 became the first ECM squadron to receive the first all jet aircraft configured as a Navy electronic countermeasures aircraft when two Douglas A3D-1Q Skywarriors arrived at Port Lyautey on September 6, 1956. VQ-1 also began receiving its A3D-1Qs on November 7, 1956. The Douglas A3D-1, from which the Q variant was devised, was developed as a carrier-based superbomber for strategic operations. Although designed to carry a nuclear weapon, it spent most of its service life as an electronics platform and a tanker. The A3D-1 was fitted with tricycle landing gear, had a high-wing configuration with all swept-wing flight surfaces, and was powered by two 9,200 lb s.t. Pratt & Whitney J57-P-6 turbojet engines. For defense, the A3D-1 had a pair of 20-mm cannons in a tail turret controlled from the cockpit by the bombernavigator. When the A3D-1 entered service in 1956, it was the largest aircraft the Navy had ever operated off a carrier deck and was appropriately nicknamed the “Whale.”4 Five of the earliest A3D-1s delivered to the Navy were sent to NAS Norfolk and set aside for conversion to electronic reconnaissance aircraft designated as the A3D-1Q. To convert the A3D-1, aircraft fitters and mechanics removed the rake from in front of the bomb bay doors and installed antennae on each side of the aircraft and on the starboard bomb bay door, which stayed locked. Hydraulic plumbing in the bomb bay was rerouted so that the doors could only be opened using the emergency hydraulic pump. To start the engines, a portable air-start cart was added to a bomb rack above the port bomb bay door. Although the A3D-1Q was considered suitable for carrier operations, it never flew from the carriers, reportedly because the electronic gear was too fragile for the hard deck landings that occurred during such operations.5

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The crew of the A3D-1Q Skywarrior consisted of the pilot, the navigator, and two ECM operators: an officer, who was also the evaluator, and an enlisted operator, who was usually a senior petty officer. All four of the crew were seated in the cockpit: the pilot in the foremost seat on the left, the navigator seated to the right and slightly aft of the pilot, the officer operator/evaluator facing the rear on the right behind the navigator, and the enlisted ECMO next to the evaluator on the left side of the cockpit facing aft. Except for a pair of APR-9 receivers and an ALA-3 pulse analyzer, all the other ECM gear, according to one veteran ECMO, was the same as in the Mercator.6 Production of the A3D-1 was superseded by the A3D-2, which had two 12,400 lb s.t. Pratt & Whitney J57-P-10 turbojet engines, a strengthened airframe, and a revised bomb bay that allowed it to carry a wider range of ordnance. A prototype ECM version, designated as the A3D-2Q, flew for the first time on December 10, 1958. It was followed by twenty-four production aircraft.7 VQ-2, the first squadron to operate the A3D-2Q, received the first of these aircraft on November 13, 1959. VQ-1 received its first on March 5, 1961. The A3D-2Q was designed specifically for electronic warfare. It had a pressurized compartment installed in the bomb bay to provide room for more ECM gear and four ECMOs. The ECM compartment had three windows and an entry door on the right side of the aircraft. Other modifications included the addition of a “canoe” protrusion on the underside of the airframe and a fairing on top of the tailfin. The A3D-2Q also had a variable assortment of other antennae reflecting updates or special mission fits. Some early models had tail guns, but these soon were replaced with a tail extension that functioned as a radome and housed a defensive electronic countermeasures module. The A3D-2Q gave the fleet a substantial boost in ECM capability and would remain in service for thirty years. It was redesignated EA-3B in October 1962 when the Tri-Service Aircraft Designation System was instituted.8 In addition to performing SIGINT reconnaissance missions in support of battle groups, EA-3B crews were tasked to fly missions for the Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program (PARPRO). The latter were peripheral reconnaissance missions around the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China flown under a serious restriction prohibiting overflights of their territories. PARPRO missions were conducted under a special program authorized by the

Dedicated ECM Squadrons — 49

TF-1Q (Later designated EC-1A) The TF-1Q was a dedicated electronic warfare version of the Grumman built C-1 carrier onboard delivery aircraft designed to service as training platform for ECM operators. The TF-1F had a five-man crew that consisted of two pilots located in the forward cockpit and three ECMOs located in the cargo compartment. The relatively large cargo space of the C-1 enabled the TF-1Q to carry a wide variety of ECM equipment to train operators on ELINT and jamming. ECM gear for ELINT training included: • ALQ-2 radar warning receiver (E through I bands, with the antenna for the equipment mounted in the tail) • AAR-5 ECM receiver (covering the A band) • ALR-8 ECM receiving units, comprising of the APR-13 (covering the A and B bands) and the APR-9 (covering the B through I bands) • APA–69A ECM direction finder • APA-74 pulse analyzer ECM gear for jamming: • • • • •

2 ALT-2 radar jammers (covering the C through I bands) 2 ALT-7 radar jammers (covering the A through B bands) ARC-1 VHF radio, with noise modulation for jamming ARC-27 UHF jammer Up to 4 MX 900 chaff dispensers (which could be carried under the wings)

The first TF-1Q was delivered in 1957. A total of four aircraft used for bi-coastal training were produced by Grumman. Two TF-1Qs each were assigned to VAW-33 then based at NAS Quonset Point, Rhode Island, and two went to VAW-13 located at NAS Alameda, California. Source: “Grumman TF-1Q.” XBradTC https://xbradtc2.com/2015/11/17/grumman-tf-1q/.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. The missions were preplanned sensitive reconnaissance events updated while the EA-3B was on station. A PARPRO mission typically lasted four hours, excluding the time to transit to and from the host aircraft carrier or land-based staging site. Since the EA-3B could be refueled in-flight, mission times could be extended as needed. Should a U.S. Air Force RC-135 Rivet

Figure 6-1. EA-3B Operator Stations

Dedicated ECM Squadrons — 51

Joint SIGINT aircraft be departing or relieving the EA-3B, the senior evaluator onboard would make radio contact with the Rivet Joint mission supervisor to receive or provide a status of activities that were observed in the targeted area or country of interest. During times of higher tensions or all-out conflicts, the EA-3B aircrew, upon determining that friendly forces were in danger, could provide real-time indication and warning via a suite of secure and/or clear radio transmissions to the forces in danger.9 On January 1, 1960, Electronic Countermeasures Squadron 2 was renamed Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron 2 while retaining its VQ-2 designation, and it was transferred from Port Lyautey Naval Station to Rota, Spain, where it remained until 2005. Shortly thereafter its P4M-1Qs were replaced with four WV-2Qs, the first of which arrived on March 21, 1960. The EC-121Ms, as they were soon reclassified, continued to be maintained and operated by the squadron until 1974. Electronic Countermeasures Squadron 1 was also renamed on January 1, 1960, becoming Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron 1. The VQ-1 designation remained unchanged. To man the WV-2Q Warning Stars that were scheduled to replace their P4M-1Q Mercators, new personnel reporting to VQ-1were taught how to operate and maintain the aircraft in special training schools established for this purpose. VQ-1 received the first WV-2Q Warning Star on April 30, 1960. By the end of July, the squadron, which had relocated to NAS Atsugi, Japan, had nine A3D-2Qs and four WV-2Qs. The last P4M-1Q had been retired in ceremonies held at NAS Atsugi on July 23.10 The WV-2Q Warning Star was a modified version of the WV-2 long-range early warning aircraft, adapted from Lockheed’s Model L-1049 Super Constellation. Massive radomes were added above and below the fuselage that housed the plane’s long-range radars. In the late 1950s eight of these old WV-2s were pulled out of retirement from Naval Air Facility Litchfield Park, Arizona, and modified extensively by the Martin Company of Baltimore to perform the electronic reconnaissance mission. These eight aircraft were designated WV-2Q but were commonly called “Willie Victors” or just “Willies.” Four of each type were assigned to VQ-1 and VQ-2. They were redesignated as EC-121Ms when the Tri-Service Aircraft Designation System was instituted on September 18, 1962.11 As well as being more reliable than the P4M-2Q, the EC-121M was roomier and could accommodate more equipment and a larger crew. The extra space facilitated modification and/or the addition of more ECM equipment. This

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also made the job of the electronic techs in the special configurations workshop in Atsugi easier. To enhance the sensitivity of the APR-9 receiver, the technicians working under the direction of Charles (Chuck) T. Christman, a civilian in charge of the VQ-1 workshop, connected the directional horn antennae of an ALR-3 receiver via the balanced mixer of an APS-20 radar receiver. This arrangement increased sensitivity of the APR-9 receiver by more than 50 percent. The modified receiver, code-named Gray Shoe, was first employed operationally in September 1960.12 As Alfred Price noted in his history of ECM, the successful application of the Gray Shoe concept—that is, the use of a highly directional antenna to provide an ultra-sensitive ELINT receiver—naturally led to the next step, which was to connect the receivers to an antenna that was both highly directional and trainable. The EC-121M’s APS-20’s radar antenna, which could be pointed toward signals of interest, was ideal for this purpose and provided extreme sensitivity of reception. During the initial Gray Shoe calibration flights, the ECMOs operating the device discovered an interesting phenomenon that greatly increased the accuracy of the EC-121M’s direction-finding capability for locating enemy radar emissions. When the APR-9 was tuned to the frequency of a ground radar and the gain on the APA-74 was fully turned up, the A-scope of the APA-74 displayed signals reflected from the ground features as well as the normal radar signals.13 The operators soon noticed that Soviet radars produced a significant amount of ground clutter that was clearly indicated on the A-scope. This was initially regarded as a nuisance until someone figured out that if the ground clutter signals could be displayed on a plan position indicator scope, it could reproduce the ground clutter pattern of the transmitting radar. If the ground clutter could be matched against a map of the area, it could be used to provide the exact location of the ground radar. During the spring of 1963 technicians at Atsugi under Christman’s leadership assembled a novel type of receiver to exploit the clutter signals. The new receiver was built around an APR-6 whose output was fed to three amplifiers having different sensitivities that were mounted in parallel. The signals received from this device were displayed on a plan position indicator (PPI) scope whose time-base was arranged to rotate in synchronization with the antenna of a CPN-4 air surveillance radar so that the CPN-4’s ground clutter pattern appeared on the PPI screen.14

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Figure 6-2. EC-121M Internal Layout

Commander Charles McMakin, senior electronic warfare officer in VQ-1, thought the concept warranted further development and obtained authorization to install the device in one of the squadron’s EC-121Ms. McMakin named the device Brigand, an acronym for Bistatic Radar Intelligence Generation and Analysis, New Development. The device, which added about one hundred pounds to the airplane’s weight, flew for the first time in June 1963.15 Price tells us that Brigand could do better that that. It could measure the location of an E band surveillance radar to within about 350 yards—a level of accuracy sufficient to enable a reconnaissance plane to photograph the site on a single-run pass if required. To achieve this accuracy the Brigand operator had only to tune the equipment to the radar’s frequency and photograph the latter’s signal through a full rotation of the radar antenna—about ten seconds. The operation could take place up to 250 miles from the radar, without the plane needing to fly any special pattern that might betray its mission.16

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Once on the ground, photographs of the clutter display were compared to maps of the area to determine the radar’s exact location. With a little practice, those analyzing the results could tell at a glance where high ground masked the radar, creating blind spots that could be exploited tactically if needed. Although the location of these blind spots could have been worked out using conventional methods, Brigand allowed the results to be obtained more quickly and with a higher level of confidence. Brigand, however, only worked on ground clutter patterns from search-type radars that radiated full 360-degree rotation; it did not work against height finders, airborne intercept sets, and most firecontrol radars. Brigand underwent its first operational test in August 1963, when it was used to monitor Soviet radar installations around the Soviet naval base at Vladivostok. No fewer than eight radars around the base were quietly but effectively “Briganded.” For the reminder of the year the Brigand-equipped EC-121M was airborne most days, remapping every surveillance radar along the Soviet, North Korean, and Chinese Pacific coasts. Since Christman was the only one who knew how to use the system, he spent some 250 hours in the air for the next six months until additional operators could be trained. By the end of the year, Brigand had also been installed in one of VQ-2’s EC-121Ms and was conducting similar operations in Europe and the Middle East.17 In early 1964 Brigand’s operators discovered that the system could also be used as a passive means to track aircraft equipped with identification friend or foe or other types of radar transponders. Signals from these devices were also reflected from the ground and displayed on the Brigand’s radar screen. By using rule of thumb corrections, experienced operators were able to ascertain realtime information on the relative positions of the planes in their vicinity. This information could also be used to determine the aircraft’s altitude within a few hundred feet. By the middle of 1964 Brigand systems were fully operational aboard the EC-121Ms of VQ-1 operating over the Pacific and VQ-2s operating over the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Using Brigand, the two squadrons began re-fixing the position of every observable surveillance radar throughout the territories of the communist countries.18

7

Beggar Shadow Missions and the Loss of Deep Sea 129

A

s part of the Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program, VQ-1 flew regularly scheduled “Beggar Shadow” missions off the coast of North Korea supposedly to collect COMINT. Before flying any reconnaissance missions of this type, concurrence was required at all levels of command in each of the services, as well as by the commander-in-chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC), and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), which provided the final level of approval. After endorsement of the mission had been obtained at the highest level, any changes, such as requests for armed escort, also required approval through the chain of command. If time or circumstances prevented this, any echelon of command could cancel the mission and later report the reason for this action.1 The COMINT missions conducted by VQ-1 supplemented the flights conducted by the U.S. Air Force to understand communication practices of the Soviet Union and its allies that began in the early 1950s as part of the Air Force Security Service’s Airborne Communications Reconnaissance Program (ACRP). In 1958 the Air Force expanded this program by outfitting ten RB-50 aircraft with sophisticated equipment to record voice transmissions in the VHF/UHF range, along with high frequency and continuous wave monitoring as well as direction-finding capabilities. The Air Force established ACRP detachments in both the Far East and Europe to operate the five RB-50 aircraft assigned to each detachment. By the early 1960s the National Security Agency 55

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(NSA) saw the need to develop an airborne intercept system capable of monitoring the low-powered, directional, and VHF/UHF microwave communication systems recently developed by the Soviet Union. Through NSA-sponsored research and development efforts, USAF aircraft were outfitted with updated equipment that greatly increased the effectiveness of the ACRP effort. In November 1964 NSA director Gen. Gordon A. Blake, USA, outlined to Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara the results of a joint study with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) that addressed the minimum requirements to accomplish the necessary airborne SIGINT tasks. A further stimulant to this NSA/DIA study was the problem of U.S. tenure at some of its base facilities in foreign countries. The loss of these bases threatened to eliminate ground-based collection sites. The NSA/DIA study group recommended that additional RC-135Bs (electronic reconnaissance variants of the C-135 Stratolifter) be transferred to the ACRP fleet to satisfy the increased needs of airborne intelligence. As an interim measure, the NSA/DIA team also suggested that the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, continue EC-121M Beggar Shadow Mission flights.2 In contrast to the Air Force ACRP program, where NSA played a large role in collection requirements and tasking, the Navy program was dedicated largely to fleet support. NSA played only a secondary role in these flights. Two Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadrons (VQ-1 in the Pacific and VQ-2 in Europe) performed these electronic reconnaissance missions. In 1969 VQ-1 conducted these missions with EC-121M and EA-3B aircraft operating from Atsugi, Japan. While nominally under the operational control of the commander of the Seventh Fleet and CINCPAC, the naval security group at Kamiseya, Japan, designated USN-39 by NSA, was the station within the cryptologic community responsible for planning and executing the COMINT phase of the Beggar Shadow flights. The group also provided the personnel needed to operate the electronic equipment associated with the mission objectives.3 NSA’s tasking role on the VQ-1 flights was a very tenuous one. The Navy, fearful of any type of NSA control, jealously guarded its own resources for the flights that were part of the “national tasking” requirements. The planes were looked upon as Navy assets to be used for carrying out Navy missions. Tasking on the EC-121 COMINT/ELINT Beggar Shadow flights was at the discretion of the naval security group at Kamiseya, not NSA. This created major

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difficulties for Eugene Sheck, chief of K17, the mobile collection organization of NSA, who had to coordinate with the Navy on its reconnaissance missions. While the Navy made two or three flights per month to collection information required under NSA’s tasking needs, the Navy usually failed to tell Sheck if and when these flights were scheduled and for what purpose. Sheck concluded that the Navy often used the NSA tasking for its own purposes. Because of the Navy’s failure to communicate, NSA had virtually no voice in the number of flights required, the justification for them, and the risks involved. The Navy, according to Sheck, was a “non-player” with regard to specialized equipment and JCS procedures and/or criteria for providing early warning information to PARPRO aircraft operating near the periphery of target countries. When aircraft were beyond the range of friendly radar, SIGINT sites monitoring communist radar networks provided warnings to aircraft if potentially dangerous conditions (such as the approach of enemy fighters) existed. The JCS approved the special warning system in March 1968 that subsequently was used extensively in the Air Force ACRP. Sheck cited cost considerations and the Navy’s failure to appreciate the need for the system as reasons for its absence on Navy flights. The Navy’s failure to include this still classified piece of equipment in VQ-1’s EC-121M aircraft would have tragic consequences.4 The Air Force had its own COMINT reconnaissance program, code-named Commando Royal, that was flown by its RC-130B ELINT versions of the Lockheed C-130 Hercules bearing the humorous nickname “Sneaky Petes.” The Commando Royal and Beggar Shadow missions were similar. Their tracks in the vicinity of the demilitarized zone were well covered by friendly radar, which could provide warning of impending intercept by North Korean aircraft. Some of the Commando Royal and Beggar Shadow missions on tracks farther north operated well outside the capability of friendly radar, but the majority of their missions were well within the North Korean air defense environment. In November 1968, the Navy had begun conducting its Beggar Shadow missions primarily in response to Seventh Fleet ELINT requirements. VQ-1 scheduled two to three EC-121M missions per month. ELINT tasking was provided by fleet or theater sources with final approval by CINCPAC, which was forwarded to DIA for review before finally being forwarded to the JCS. The NSA role in these flights was limited to a technical review. It was only responsible for ensuring that mission aircraft possessed the technical capability

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to meet requirements. Since the Beggar Shadow flights were primarily ELINToriented, NSA provided no SIGINT tasking on these missions. NSA’s role in these Navy missions was limited to a “technical review” that was part of the fragmented management of all U.S. ELINT resources. NSA officials viewed the ELINT program as one lacking coordination, thus causing gross duplication and waste. On Monday, April 15, 1969, an EC-121M of VQ-1 using the call sign Deep Sea 129 took off from Atsugi Naval Air Station, Japan, at 6:59 a.m. local time (2159Z) with a crew of thirty-one that included nine naval security group and Marine linguists for a routine Beggar Shadow mission.5 Although the Navy called it a Beggar Shadow mission, implying a primary COMINT role with national security tasking, its role was virtually limited to that of an ELINT-only operation. The EC-121M had been directed to proceed to a point off the Musu Peninsula. Its flight profile northwest over the Sea of Japan took it to an area offshore of Musu Point, where the EC-121M would turn northeast toward the Soviet Union and orbit along a 120-nautical-mile-long elliptical track before continuing to Osan Air Base in South Korea. Except for the beginning and ending legs over Japan and South Korea, the entire eight-hour flight was to be over international waters. During most of this time, the EC-121M would be outside the range of friendly radar and would have to rely on other means for warning of possible interception by enemy fighters.6 The route selected for Deep Sea 129’s mission had been flown by VQ-1 EC-121Ms for two years without incident and was graded as being of minimal risk. In the previous three months more than 190 similar missions had been flown by Navy and Air Force reconnaissance aircraft off North Korea’s east coast without incident. As in previous missions, the aircraft commander had been ordered not to come any closer than fifty nautical miles to the North Korean coastline. The EC-121M’s flight was monitored from the ground by Air Force radar sites in Japan and South Korea, as well as by the U.S. Air Force Security Service (USAFSS) 6918th Security Squadron at Hakata, Japan, and Detachment 1 of the 6922nd Security Wing at Osan Air Base, Korea.7, 8 Shortly after 0400Z, as the EC-121M approached the southern limit of its elliptical track, it transmitted its hourly communications check. It was still being tracked by radar, indicating that it was still on a course compatible with the planned route. As the EC-121M approached the northern part of the elliptical

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Division 215, Naval Security Group at Kamiseya, Japan Unofficially called the “Spooks Division,” Division 215 consisted of twenty to twenty-five Russian linguists and five or more support personnel. Few people in VQ-1 were cleared to know about communications intelligence, and so the cryptologists who flew were called “Spooks” or “Big Look Spooks.” Flight crew were issued flight jackets, boots, and orange flight suits, but with typical Navy logic were told not to let anyone (including family) know that they were assigned to flight duty. Unofficially, they referred to flying as “playing ball,” in part so that some limited discussion could occur over nonsecure telephone lines. Source: “Remembering CWO4 John Thomas Wise, USN,” Station HYPO, https://stationhypo .com/2021/02/21/remembering-cwo4-john-thomas-wise-usn/.

orbit at 0430Z, two MiG-21s took off from the Hoemun Air School Air Field in North Korea and flew across the waters of the Sea of Japan in a carefully calculated maneuver to engage VQ-1’s EC-121M. The planes were scrambled at a time that allowed minimum flight time over water to intercept an aircraft that was flying on a previously known reconnaissance track.9 The Air Force radars in Korea detected the two North Korean air force MiGs flying toward the unarmed EC-121M. The USAFSS listening post at Osan, South Korea, which was eavesdropping on North Korean voice and Morse air defense radio traffic, was also tracking the path of the EC-121M as well as the intercept course of the North Korean fighters. The naval security group listening post at Kamiseya in Japan was also intercepting Soviet PVO radar tracking of the EC-121M. Both of these sources provided NSA with real-time information about the flight path of Deep Sea 129 and the MiGs attempting to intercept.10 According to the incident report prepared by Lt. Col. William C. Barnes, “a warning of impending intercept, Condition 3 (150 nautical mile) [message] was issued on 0439, and BEGGER SHADOW [sic] appeared to have heeded the warning by taking up an easterly heading.” The command or unit that issued the warning cannot be determined due to the large number of redactions in the NSA history. Two Condition 5 (fifty nautical mile) warning messages, again according to Barnes, were also sent at 0442Z and at 0443Z. The latter was the

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last known transmission acknowledged by Deep Sea 129. As these messages were being sent, one of the North Korean jets being tracked on radar began flying a defensive patrol over the Sea of Japan sixty-five nautical miles west of Deep Sea 129’s position at its closest approach. The other jet continued on an eastward track merging with the EC-121M’s track at 0444Z.11 The USAFSS listening post at Osan attempted to warn the aircraft’s commander at 0446Z by transmitting a mission abort signal. But the MiG caught up with the slow-flying aircraft as it turned for home ninety miles southeast of the North Korean port city of Chongjin and shot the EC-121M down at 0447Z, killing all thirty-one crewmembers.12 As the expected arrival time of the EC-121M at Osan came and passed, U.S. officials became convinced that the plane was lost. Within the hour, reports of a radio broadcast from Pyongyang further substantiated these fears. The first hard evidence of the shootdown was the spotting of debris by a Navy P-3 rescue plane on the morning of April 16 at 41°14” N/131° 50” E, two nautical miles northeast of the reported shootdown location. This debris consisted of uninflated life rafts, paper, and dye markers.13 NSA personnel reporting to work during the early hours of that April morning faced a confusing situation. NSA’s role in the mission of the aircraft seemed unclear. Although the Navy dubbed the flight a Beggar Shadow mission, implying that it was primarily a COMINT flight and thus under NSA authority, the mission of the aircraft was primarily an ELINT-directed one in support of Seventh Fleet requirements. The Navy, not NSA, had direct control of the mission. The Navy’s super sensitivity in maintaining strict control over its own assets caused NSA major problems in trying to justify the purposes of and needs for these particular intelligence-gathering flights. As the entire airborne reconnaissance program came under the scrutiny of the press and Congress, NSA defended the flight but stressed the importance of other flights conducted by the Air Force Security Service (now Electronic Security Command) that were under NSA tasking. NSA deemed them more valuable to national intelligence requirements. Another unfortunate aspect of the EC-121M shootdown was the Navy practice of double-loading the flights for training purposes, allowing the trainees who accompanied these missions to take advantage of transportation to (as well as a little liberty in) South Korea. This resulted in the loss of thirty-one men instead of the ten or fifteen that would have been part of a normal crew.14

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After the EC-121M was lost, the subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee that had been investigating the Pueblo incident began investigating what happened to Deep Sea 129 and why. One of the things the committee wanted to know was why protective aircraft were not immediately dispatched to the EC-121M when the North Korean aircraft were first detected.15 The subcommittee attempted to ascertain whether DIA, which had the responsibility of evaluating risk on these flights, participated in the decision to no longer require fighter escorts on them. Further statements by those called to testify revealed that the decision appeared to have been made solely by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of State; DIA was merely informed of the change in plans.16 The most critical findings of the subcommittee related to command and control responsibilities. The subcommittee was greatly concerned by the fact that although the commanding officer of VQ-1 was the responsible operating command for the EC-121M, the emergency circumstances confronting the aircraft were never relayed to VQ-1 but rather were handled entirely by communications units in the field and the Fifth Air Force. Equally concerning was the fact that VQ-1 was never informed of the messages being sent to its aircraft. Furthermore, noted the subcommittee, the unacceptable delay in initiating search and rescue efforts for the EC-121M was almost entirely due to the apparent fragmentation of command responsibility and authority of the military by both the Navy and the Department of Defense.17 In the weeks following the shootdown, the command and control aspect of the EC-121M incident was also examined by two official executive office study groups. One was a CINCPAC board of evaluation, the other a JCS ad hoc factfinding group. The consensus of these studies was the need to improve command and control communications in general. Both groups concluded that protection for reconnaissance flights into sensitive areas required more coordination between the SIGINT community and the Air Force operational commands that had protective responsibility. A specific recommendation called for integrating SIGINT information with operational information at command and control centers where decisions could be made based on all-source information.18 A naval board of inquiry into the loss of the EC-121M was also convened on April 20, 1969, at the U.S. Naval Station, Atsugi, Japan. The board met

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from April 24 to May 6 and came up with two major recommendations. One was for a careful assessment of the warning procedures. The second was for procurement of higher performance aircraft to replace the EC-121M aircraft. The EC-121M, with its low maximum speed and altitude limitations, was viewed as vulnerable in peripheral hostile areas. This led to a reduction in the number of Beggar Shadow flights conducted by VQ-1 near North Korea for the remainder of the year. The EC-121Ms were used only in the lower-risk Pacific areas. The EC-121Ms were eventually phased out and replaced by the Lockheed EP-3E in the early 1970s.19 The most critical question faced by the board of inquiry was the issue surrounding the Air Force’s secure communications channel (the name of which has yet to be revealed). Following CINCPAC recommendations, the board recommended the installation of the top-secret data link communications equipment in all reconnaissance aircraft. The faster time factor and the automatic receipt by equipment of this type aboard an aircraft were preferable to the “do not answer” warning messages then in use by the Navy. If such a system had been installed in the EC-121M, at least it would have eliminated the uncertainty about whether the aircraft received the three warning messages. The board considered the installation of this equipment a long-term action. In the interim, it recommended an immediate broadcast of warning messages by the SIGINT site through a direct patch provided by the broadcast station. This eliminated an encode/decode/encode process, which severely delayed the crew’s timely receipt of important warnings. The JCS approved this plan and directed its implementation on March 1, 1970.20

8

Self-Defense

I

n 1946 the U.S. Navy began to think about the need for a large, carrier-based bomber that could provide a sea-based strategic strike capability. Although a design project for an aircraft of this type was initiated in 1947, it took another two years for the Douglas Aircraft Company to complete the design of a jet-powered, 60,000-pound aircraft with a three-man crew in a pressurized cockpit and a large internal bomb bay that could carry twelve thousand pounds of conventional or nuclear ordnance. The first example, designated the A3D-1, flew on September 31, 1953, but did not enter service use until 1957 when it began operations with Heavy Attack Squadron 2 (VAH-2). By then the Navy, as well as the Strategic Air Command, had become concerned with the increasing potency of Soviet air defenses that now included a large number of S-25 anti-aircraft missile batteries surrounding Moscow.1 Western intelligence began spotting the first signs of the S-25 air defense system when construction of the missile sites (which were hard to miss because of the huge scale of construction) was seen around Moscow in 1953. Western intelligence agencies were able to collect a great deal of detail about the system from German engineers who were allowed to return from the Soviet Union after Joseph Stalin’s death. At the heart of the system was the Soviet V-300 missile, a weapon evolved from the design of the German Wasserfall missile the Russians captured in World War II. The V-300 was designated as the SA-1 by U.S. intelligence. The S-25 air defense system around which it was built received the 63

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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) code name Guild. The system’s B-200 fire-control radar was code-named Yo-Yo due to its unusual configuration, and the A-100 long-range surveillance radar was code-named Gage.2 The S-25 systems and associated radars were deployed primarily to defend Moscow in two concentric rings of missile regiments, an outer ring eighty-five to ninety kilometers from Red Square to attrite any incoming bomber formation approaching Moscow, and the inner ring at a radius of forty-five to fifty kilometers to deal with any bombers leaking through the initial ring. As described by Steven Zaloga, ring roads were “designed to provide ready access to the launch areas, and these became the basis for these well-known features in the contemporary Moscow landscape. U.S. intelligence at the time estimated that the creation of the ring roads and launch sites around Moscow in 1953–55 consumed the equivalent of an entire year’s production of concrete, giving some idea of the scale and priority of this program.” The construction program, which began in 1953, took five years to complete. When it was finished, there were twenty-two missile regiments around the inner road and thirty-four on the outer for a total of fifty-six launch sites, each fielding sixty missile launchers. The Central Intelligence Agency was undoubtedly able to plot their locations after Carmine Vito’s U-2 flight over the Soviet Union on July 5, 1956. Vito’s mission took him directly over Moscow; although the city was hidden by the smoggy sky, the filters on the U-2’s camera cut through the haze.3 While Moscow was heavily protected by numerous batteries of surface-toair missiles, many other targets lacked such protection, and the missiles, when deployed elsewhere, were thinly spread out. Because the B-52 bombers assigned to the Strategic Air Command at that time carried up to fourteen jammers, U.S. planners believed that in the event of war, the B-52s could jam their way through the defenses. The A3-D Skywarrior was much smaller than any of the Strategic Air Command planes and lacked sufficient space for the jammers, unless they were placed in the bomb bay in lieu of the ordnance. To penetrate the enemy defenses, the A3-D had only its speed, maneuverability, and a pair of radar-controlled 20-mm guns in the tail. It carried no ECM equipment at all.4 During 1956 as reports came in on the SA-1 and the other Soviet missile systems under development, the Navy’s heavy attack squadrons and their lack of countermeasures protection came under sustained attack from the Air Staff. Faced with the risk that Congress might withdraw funding, the Bureau of

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Aeronautics sought ways of protecting its planes. One solution appeared in the early summer of 1957 when tests of a “bread board” prototype of a jamming repeater designed by Sanders Associates of Nashua, New Hampshire, were conducted against a couple of Marine Corps SCR-584 fire-control radars at Cherry Point, North Carolina. The SCR-584, which entered service in 1944, related on conical scanning and range-gating to achieve target lock-on.5 Alfred Price described the results in his history of electronic warfare: During these tests the repeater functioned exactly as its makers had hoped. For the plane’s initial runs past the radars, the repeater was set to operate only in the range gate pull-off mode. The repeater immediately broke the lock-on of both radars, though when the operators saw what had happened they quickly regained lock-on. During the second series of runs the repeater was set to operate only in the inverse conical scan mode, which caused the radars to oscillate violently. . . . During the third series of runs the repeater was operated in both deception modes simultaneously.6

The performance of the repeater as reported by Lt. James Disney, the Bureau of Aeronautics representative, was “devastating.” When both modes were used in combination, neither radar could lock on. When Disney’s report reached the CNO, he ordered the Bureau of Aeronautics to place a production order for 150 of the jamming repeaters, designated the ALQ-19.7 Although the ALQ-19 had proved that it could defeat the lock-on of a conical scan tracking radar such as the Soviet A-100 long-range radar, it could not defeat the SA-2’s track-while-scan B-200 fire-control radar. The B-200 relied on two separate mechanically scanning narrow fan beams to track and lock on to targets. One radar unit determined the vertical angular coordinate of a target and the other the horizontal coordinate. The fire-control equipment associated with the radars stored the positions of multiple targets in its memory while the radars periodically scanned a wide sector, updating the target coordinates. The system could simultaneously track twenty aircraft as well as the intercepting anti-aircraft missiles.8 To counter the B-200, the engineers at Sanders adjusted the inverse conical scan deception mode of the ALQ-19 so that a tracking error was introduced in the radar scan. To accomplish this, the engineers designed the ALQ-19’s

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circuitry so that when it detected the B-200’s modulation in the normal way, it responded with a maximum signal when the modulation was lowest, and no signal when the modulation was greatest (this technique was called main lobe blanking). The effect of this was to make the target aircraft appear larger than normal on the radar scope, but it did not lie in the center of the enlarged blip. When the radar operator steered the missile toward the center of the blip, it would miss the target by a fraction of a degree. This was just enough to keep the plane outside the warhead’s danger zone.9 A major issue in accomplishing this feature was how to prevent the ALQ-19 from becoming a radar beacon that would make the aircraft even easier to spot. To prevent the jammer from acting as a simple radar transponder, the designers added analog circuitry that rejected signals generated by search radars and only triggered a jamming response from the continuous pulses when a fire-control radar was detected. Because the ALQ-19 only protected against lock-on fire-control radars operating in the E and F bands, additional ECM equipment was needed to defeat other types of radars and to disrupt the enemy’s communications system.10 These were produced by the Navy Avionics Factory at Indianapolis, Emerson Electric, and Melpar. The ALQ-3 produced by the Navy Avionics Factory was an inverse conical scan track breaker designed to counter the Soviet I band airborne intercept radars. The ALQ-35 designed by Emerson Electric was a multiple target repeater that would confuse search radar. To complete the family of countermeasure systems intended for the A3D-2 Skywarrior, Melpar developed the ALQ-38 VHF communications jammer. The device never got past the flight-test stage, however, and never entered service. Finding the space for all of this ECM equipment was not an easy task and was only accomplished by removing the 20-mm cannon and its fire-control radar from the rear fuselage to create a defensive electronic countermeasures (DECM) equipment bay covered by a new fairing.11 The design of the jammers installed in the Skywarrior’s DECM relied upon traveling wave tubes (TWTs) to amplify the microwave signals generated by the jammers. While the TWT was essential for jamming in the microwave region of the spectrum, it was a relatively new device that was both unproven and difficult to manufacture. Issues with the TWTs caused serious problems with the

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DECMs installed in the eight A3D-2Ds that entered service with VAH-9 as part of USS Saratoga’s (CV 60) air group in July 1960. George Steeg, a Sanders Associates engineer on board Saratoga as an observer, described the problems years later in an interview with Alfred Price: When the planes tested their DECMs in the air we found that sometimes the equipment would not work at all, or they might work for 15 minutes and then quit. When we examined the equipment afterwards we discovered that the tube of the TWT had slipped out of place relative to the electromagnet. The tube had to be positioned very accurately inside the magnetic field or the TWT would not work. During a carrier take-off or landing, the G forces were so great that they could jerk the tube out of alignment with the electromagnet; or the process could happen more slowly due to vibration.12

The problem was partially solved by making the tube mounts more secure. This reduced the incidence of failures, but problems with the TWT continued to bedevil the ALQ-19 and ALQ-32 throughout their service lives. Even before the Navy’s first DECM sets entered service, requirements for the next generation of electronic jammers had been laid down and development contracts issued to Sanders Associates for a range of deceptive repeaters. These were designed with more robust TWTs that employed permanent magnets instead of the electromagnets previously used. This produced a series of TWTs that were better able to withstand the rigors of carrier take-offs and landings. As new models of these airborne repeaters became available, they underwent extensive flight tests against various types of fire-control radars. Because these systems employed main lobe blanking to induce an angular error on a trackwhile-scan radar, it was important to quantify the degree of protection afforded the aircraft equipped with such equipment. To evaluate the effectiveness of the Navy’s DECM repeaters, Sanders set up a test range at its facility in Merrimack, New Hampshire, and then constructed a model of the latest Soviet surface-toair missile system (SAM) radar (the SNR-75, NATO code name Fan Song) for use in testing its repeaters. To measure the errors induced by the airborne repeaters, Sanders used tracking radars on unjammed frequencies.13

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The Fan Song was a track-while-scan radar similar to the B-200 designed to work with the S-75 SAM system (NATO code name SA-2 Guide-line). The SA-2 system was developed to provide Soviet forces with a semi-mobile SAM system. The SA-2 missile was mounted on a trainable, single rail launcher carried by a semi-trailer transloader, towed by a tractor. Targets were typically acquired by the VHF band P-12 (Spoon Rest) acquisition radar. Once acquired by the Spoon Rest, the target position was relayed to the Fan Song, which would slew the whole antenna package in the direction of the target and initiate angle and range tracking for a missile shot. A pair of missiles would be fired and an analog computer used to generate steering commands to fly the proximityfuzed missile to a collision with its target, using a radio uplink. The first S-75 batteries were deployed in the Soviet Union in late 1957.14 By the late summer of 1962, two new jet-powered aircraft were operating from the Navy’s aircraft carriers: the A3J-1 (A-5) Vigilante and the Grumman A2F-1 (A-6) Intruder. These and the A3D-2 Skywarriors were now equipped with three types of DECM jammers: the ALQ-35 multiple target repeater, the ALQ-55 communications link disrupter, and the ALQ-41 and ALQ-51 track breakers. The ALQ-35 was designed to confuse, frustrate, and deceive the enemy by painting false returns on enemy search radars so that its operator would be unable to distinguish the true return. The ALQ-35 was intended for use against search radars that emitted radar pulses reflected from the target. The reflected signal was picked up by the radar’s receiver and the result plotted as a blip on the circular radar screen. The ALQ35 was designed to listen for and identify the radar pulses transmitted by search radars. After it received and identified an incoming pulse, and for each pulse thereafter, ALQ-35 would return a greatly amplified pulse after a short delay, causing a false target to appear on the search radar’s scope that was farther away than that reflected back to the radar by the target aircraft. The false return was farther away because of the time delay inserted by the ALQ-35. The succeeding pulses were repeated with random delayed times so that many false targets appeared on the scope. Some of these appeared as shorter ranges because they had been delayed long enough to appear to be the echo of a succeeding pulse as the radar rotated. The ALQ-35 also detected a strong side lobe of the radar (which was too weak to be received by the radar) and repeated it. As a result, the search radar

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received false returns through one angle of sweep and displayed them as well. As the target got closer to the radar, the false target area widened, and the ALQ-35 picked up more and more of the side and back energy. Ultimately, the entire circle of the radar scope would be covered, making it impossible to locate the actual target. The effectiveness of the ALQ-35, however, was also flawed: it was liable to become saturated and cease operating if it had to reply to more than half a dozen radars. Once this was realized, its production contract was cancelled, and it was removed from service.15 The ALQ-55 was a communications countermeasure engineered to disrupt the radio links between the enemy’s fighter and his ground controllers, denying the controllers the ability to direct their interceptors to the target. The ALQ-55 scanned the spectrum for signals that were evaluated when detected. If a particular signal was classified as a threat, the set would transmit an appropriate jamming signal on that frequency. The transmitter only operated when a signal was received. Since the jamming signal was not continuous, the enemy could not use it to detect or home in on aircraft employing the ALQ-55. The set, it was optimistically claimed, could handle at least six signals simultaneously, and possibly as many as twenty radars could be jammed at the same time with a reasonable degree of effectiveness. The ALQ-41 and ALQ-51 were designed to break lock-on by giving false information to the tracking radar and were effective against pulse ranging, frequency-modulated continuous wave (FM-CW), conical scanning, and monopulse radars and could handle them simultaneously by means of built-in programmers. The sets were similar but operated on two different radar bands, the 41 on the X band and the 51 on the S band.16 They worked against firecontrol tracking radars that locked onto a target by means of a range gate. The ALQ-41 and ALQ-51 succeeding in defeating the radar by greatly amplifying the incoming radar pulses and then repeating them with a built-in time delay simulating a return echo. Since the jamming signal was far stronger than the true return, it encaptured the range gate, gradually pulling it away until the gate was no longer on the target. The set then stopped transmitting false returns, leaving the enemy radar without a target. Lock-on was broken, and the enemy had to start searching for the target, losing valuable time. This sequence was repeated every time the enemy radar achieved a lock-on.

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Both sets were also effective against FM-CW tracking radars that relied on the difference in the frequencies between the signal that was sent out and that returned by the target using the Doppler effect to establish a speed gate on the target. To disrupt this form of radar, the ALQ-41/-51 amplified the radar’s transmitted signal and repeated it as a simulated return, gradually increasing the frequency of its repeat signal. Then it would suddenly fly back to the original frequency and proceed to decrease the frequency with another flyback. To the radar, the aircraft appeared to be undergoing impossible maneuvers: instantaneous changes in speed and rapid acceleration and then deceleration, upsetting the speed gate and causing the radar to lose track of the target. Consequently, the speed gate could not function properly, and tracking was disrupted. The ALQ-41/-51s were also capable of breaking the lock-on of conical scanning radars that used a mutated beam to track the target.17 After detecting the modulation envelope, the ALQ-41/-51s would amplify and invert the radar’s signal, sending it back as a simulated modulation envelope in what is known as the scan inversion technique. The enemy radar’s angular tracking circuit would receive the inverted signal and use it to make beam corrections in the opposite direction to what they should. This drove the beam farther away from the target instead of toward it, breaking lock-on and causing the radar to revert to the search mode. To break the lock-on of a monopulse tracking radar, which uses polarized radar to measure target position, the ALQ-41/-51 sets amplified the polarized signals detected and cross-polarized them in the sequence of circular, vertical, and horizontal polarizations. The cross-polarized return signal emitted by the ALQ-41/-51s caused erroneous corrections to be made in the enemy radar beam’s position, causing it to spiral away from the target. The introduction of infrared (IR)-guided missiles in the late 1950s provided the impetus for a new means of self-defense, the decoy flare. The AIM-9A Sidewinder missile, the world’s first air-to-air IR-guided missile, “changed the nature of air warfare” when it became operational on July 14, 1956, entering service on VA-46 F9F-8 Cougars flying from the aircraft carrier USS Randolph (CV 15). It was quickly replaced by the improved B model. Unfortunately for U.S. airmen, the Sidewinder’s great advantage as an aerial weapon was negated when the Soviets reverse-engineered the AIM-9 to provide their own IR-guided air-to-air missile. The tactical edge bestowed by the AIM-9 and its unforeseen

Self-Defense — 71 Table 8-1. DECM on the Navy’s Heavy Attack Aircraft, May 1962 Aircraft

DECM

A3-F (A-6 Intruder)

ALQ-41, -51

A3-J (A-5) Vigilante

ALQ-41, -51, -55

A3-D (A-3) Skywarrior

ALQ-35, -41, -51, -55

Source: U.S. Navy, “Defensive Electronic Countermeasure (May 1962),” NA 75132 (College Park, MD: National Archives).

acquisition by the Soviets occurred over the Taiwan Strait on September 24, 1958, when a force of thirty-two F-86 fighters of the Chinese National Air Force (CNAF) engaged a massive wave of more than one hundred People’s Republic of China MiG-15s and MiG-17s. Despite the higher ceiling advantage of the MiGs, the CNAF destroyed ten MiGs and damaged three others. This victory was highlighted by the destruction of four MiGs by Sidewinders with which twenty of the F-86s had been recently equipped.18 Shortly after the engagement, however, Radio Peiping announced, much to their displeasure, that the Chinese Nationalist pilots had been using the Sidewinder. A picture of what was called a Sidewinder appeared in Chinese Communist papers soon afterward. What was unknown to either the Nationalists or their U.S. suppliers was that one of the missiles struck its target, failed to explode, and became lodged in the plane’s tail, providing the communists with a “gift from heaven.” They removed and disassembled the missile before shipping it off to the Soviet Union.19 Obtaining an early version of the Sidewinder was an unexpected windfall for the Soviets. The missile, as Soviet engineer Gennady Aleksandrovich Sokovsky would later recount, “was to us a university offering a course in missile construction technology which has upgraded our engineering education and updated our approach to production of future missiles.” The K-13 air-to-air IR-guided missile that emerged from the Vympel (Topolov) design bureau was a direct copy of the Sidewinder. Although it entered service in 1960, the U.S. intelligence community did not learn of its existence until it was observed on Soviet fighters during an air display near Moscow in the spring of 1961. By then both the Air Force and the Navy were in the process of deploying infrared decoy systems for the ejection of flairs. Even before the venerable A-6A Intruder went into service, plans were in the works to provide it with a flair dispenser.20

9

F3D-2Q and Marine Leadership in Tactical Jamming

I

n July 1953 VMC-3, the third Marine composite squadron, was activated at Opa Locka, Florida, with seven AD-4Ns, three AD-4Ws, and two AD-3Ws. Soon after its establishment, the squadron received an F3D-2 Skyknight, a transitional aircraft that filled the gap between the technology of propellerpowered aircraft and swept-wing jets. It was designed around a conventional straight wing and a tail grouping similar to that of the Skyraider with side-byside seating for a pilot and a radar operator. A second F3D-2 arrived in April 1955. The jet-powered Skyknight emerged from a Navy request issued to the aircraft industry in 1945 for proposals to produce a two-seat carrier-based night fighter with long range, good performance, and an airborne intercept radar. The specification called for a fighter with 500-mph performance at 40,000 feet and the ability to detect an enemy aircraft at 125 miles. The last requirement dictated the use of a large radar dish in the nose that added to the drag index. It also demanded a second crewmember to operate the APQ-35 radar. The Navy chose the design put forth by the Douglas Aircraft Company and issued a contract to construct three prototypes of an all-weather fighter powered by two 3,000 lb s. t. Westinghouse J34-WE-22 turbojet engines. The first F3D-1 flew on February 13, 1950, and entered operational service with VC-3 at Moffett Field, California, in December 1950. The plane proved to be underpowered, and only twenty-eight of the initial production run were produced. All remained stateside and were only used for training purposes. The F3D-1 was superseded by the F3D-2, which flew for the first time on February 14, 72

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1951. It was powered by two upgraded Westinghouse J34-WE-36 engines rated at 34,000 lb s. t.1 Twelve F3D-2s assigned to VMF(N)-513 were the first to see combat. Although the squadron received them in June 1952, they did not become operation until November 1 due to supply problems and a series of mechanical troubles. Almost as soon as the F3D-2s were ready for action, the Far East Air Force assigned them the task of escorting B-29s on night bombing runs over North Korea. As Greg Goebel explained on his F3D website, The USAF had operated Boeing B-29 Superfortress heavy bombers on daylight raids over enemy territory early in the war, but suffered excessive losses to North Korean MiG-15s, and so the bombers switched to night attacks, their losses then declining considerably. However, by late 1951, the enemy had refined their ability to direct MiG-15s against the Superfortresses using ground radar control, and losses began to rise again. USAF F-94B Starfire night fighters were put into service to protect the bombers, but for various reasons they did not prove satisfactory in this role. Marine Skyknights were pressed into service as night escorts instead and performed the mission very well.2

Instead of sending up groups of night fighters to attack the escorted B-29s, the North Koreans would fly a single jet across the bomber formation. If a Skyknight followed, one or two MiG-15s, well to the rear and higher than the decoy, would attempt to gun it down. This tactic was not very successful due to the warning radar carried by the F3D-2. It alerted the Skyknight crew of the approaching enemy plane before it got within effective firing range, allowing the F3D-2’s pilot to take evasive action.3 After the Korean War ended, the F3D-2s were pulled out of front-line service and replaced by more advanced jet fighters. Why they were assigned to VMC-3 has never been clarified, although it appears likely that they were intended to prepare the unit for conversion to jet aircraft that would replace their obsolete piston-engined planes. Although no jammers were employed by Marine Corps ECM units during the Korean War, there were those in the Corps’ ECM community who were farsighted enough to see the need to provide active EMC support for attacking

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aircraft in light of the proliferation of radar-controlled anti-aircraft weapons systems. A number of officers, including Maj. Thomas MacDonald (commanding officer of the first Marine EW section in Korea), and a few senior enlisted men had served with the first EW units in Korea. These experienced airmen were familiar with the modifications they had made to the AD-4Ns during the war. In late spring 1955, someone serving in VMC-3 (possibly Major MacDonald) went to Marine headquarters and suggested that the F3D-2 be converted into an ECM aircraft as a potential replacement for the piston-engine AD-5Ns then in use by all three VMC squadrons. The first F3D-2 selected for modification was Bureau of Aeronautics number 124620, which had served with VMF(N)-513 in Korea. A second F2D-2 (Bureau of Aeronautics number 125786) was also modified.4 According to the recollections of John Cleveland, an aviation electronics technician and ECM operator who served with VMC-3 and VMCJ-3 from 1954 to 1956, the modification effort was largely carried out by Joe Bouher, who had previously worked on the Corps’ TBM-3Qs and AD-2Qs. Master Sergeant Doc Grimes, another early ECM pioneer, was also involved in modifying the F3D-2s. He seems to have coordinated the work done at the overhaul and repair activity at NAS North Island where modifications were apparently made to the two F3Ds.5 The work in transforming the two aircraft moved swiftly during the summer of 1955 as ECM equipment identical to that used on the AD-4s was installed and tested on the F3D-2s. Col. H. Wayne Whitten, USMC (Ret.), in his book Silent Heroes, described the objective of the Marines involved in modifying the Skyknights: One of the goals of the conversion was to significantly improve the active ECM or jamming capability of the AD-5Ns. This meant the Marines had to find suitable systems and components from a variety of sources and develop an integration plan. The selected ECM package included two ALT-2 noise, or continuous wave, jammers that were installed internally with antennas located in the nose compartment. Wiring provisions were added to control additional jammers mounted in removable pods on the two wing stations to accommodate carriage of chaff pods. This ECM suite was installed and tested over several months after integration of the receiving system.6

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Final technical and operational flight tests of the modified F3D-2s were performed at the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico and at the Navy’s China Lake, California, test ranges. The electronic warfare systems performed so well during these tests that Major MacDonald persuaded Marine Corps HQ to obtain the necessary aircraft and funding to retrofit thirty-five Skyknights for electronic warfare. By then VMC-3 and VMJ-3 had merged into a single squadron consolidating the Third Marine Aircraft Wing’s electronic warfare and photo reconnaissance capabilities. The newly organized squadron, designated VMCJ-3, was commissioned at MCAS El Toro, California, on December 12, 1955.7 In May 1956 the two modified F3D-2s in VMCJ-3’s inventory were designated F3D-2Q variants and their modifications were used as the basis to convert the thirty-five F3D-2s modified by the overhaul and repair department at NAS North Island. The first of the F3D-2Qs entered service with VMCJ-3, one of three Marine squadrons that would operate the modified aircraft. It completed its transition to the F3D-2Q in the spring of 1958. The second squadron to receive the F3D-2Q was VMCJ-1, commissioned at El Toro on July 1, 1958. The third squadron was VMCJ-2. It began to transition to the F3D-2Qs at MCAS Cherry Point early in 1958. The primary mission of the three Marine EW squadrons was tactical ELINT collection in support of amphibious operations and jamming of enemy search and fire-control radars that might threaten such operations. One unquoted historical source told Alfred Price that “the provision of jamming escorts for Navy strike formations was not a Marine mission, and was not considered for the F3D-2Q.”8 In August 1958 VMCJ-3, under the command of Lt. Col. Robert R. Read, deployed to MCAS Iwakuni, Japan, with nine F3D-2Qs. Read was able to convince CINCPAC to allow the squadron’s F3D-2Qs to join the Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program. These missions, code-named Sharkfin, helped fill in information on the employment of radars and provided an excellent training setting.9 The Sharkfin missions were typically conducted at a cruising altitude of thirty thousand feet, which allowed the receiving sets to intercept early warning radars at ranges beyond two hundred miles. The F3D-2Q’s radar receivers included an array of tuners covering all of the adversary radar frequencies with an accurate direction-finding capability. However, the long over-water missions required dead reckoning navigation based on line-of-sight observations, which .

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affected the accuracy of the plotted emitter bearings. In addition to the receivers, the F3D-2Q’s electronic warfare suite included a camera on the signal analyzer display and an analog tape recorder to record signal data and communications. The recorded data and the aircraft logs maintained during the duration of the flight were used for postmission analysis.10 In addition to flying thirty-three Sharkfin missions, VMCJ-1 flew ECM training missions against the Air Force radar on Okinawa that were coordinated with the A-4s from VMFA-322, which simulated an attack force. During the first of these exercises, VMCJ-1’s F3D-2Qs would begin jamming at some given distance from Okinawa. The ALT-2 jammer did not have enough power at this distance to be effective. Instead, it left a strobe on the ground control intercept operator’s scope in Okinawa that pointed directly at the approaching flight, alerting the Air Force to the coming attack from the A-4s. The outcome was not good for the attackers that were intercepted by the Air Force planes.11 New tactics were suggested by CWO-3 Martin “Marty” Lachow. During his tour in Korea with VMCJ-3, he “had spent time reading the books, discovering atmospheric assists, sending aircraft in from different directions and altitudes, employing others as decoys, hiding aircraft within a favorable atmospheric condition and most important, knowing the times, routes, Time Over Targets (TOT) of the attack aircraft we would be supporting.” For the attacks on Okinawa, he suggested they vary the arrival times of the various attacking elements and change the altitudes and course of the attacking force. One tactic “was to send an F3D out on a totally unrelated azimuth and then begin jamming at some range. . . . The Air Force interceptors responded to the single decoy bird, while the rest of the flight came in from a different direction and were successful in their mock attack.”12 These ideas led to the beginning of an ECM doctrine for coordinating ECM jamming with a concerted attack. This, author J. T. O’Brien states, was the beginning of a theory “to develop that jamming is not an end in itself, but a part of an overall plan in which deception and ruse play as important a role as effective jamming. It was a lesson learned and unlearned from time to time.” The Marines also learned that the F3D-2Q had to get close to be effective.13 When VMCJ-1 was relieved by VMCJ-3 in late 1959, they continued to fly F3D-2Qs from MCAS Iwakuni on the Sharkfin missions. All three VMCJs, according to Whitten,

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[w]orked diligently after their transition to the reliable jet aircraft to establish and refine radar jamming tactics that would later pay off in the Vietnam War. Recognizing the relative low power of their jammers and employment limitation due to the lack of steerable antennas, the veteran ECMOs developed spot jamming techniques in conjunction with well-planned use of chaff to maximize effectiveness. They honed their skills conducting ECM training for Marine air control squadrons, and also provided ECM training for fighter pilots by jamming their aircraft target acquisition and tracking control radars after they were locked on to the Skyknight aircraft in mock combat. These missions were often referred to as “break lock” training.14

Although Marine aviators were honing their ECM skills, the Navy’s carrier community was not up to speed with regard to electronic warfare. According to Rear Adm. Julian S. Lake, USN (Ret.), EW “was not generally understood in the Navy.” Lake was well aware of the ECM deficiencies in the Navy’s fighters from his experience during Operation WEXVAL (Weapons Evaluations) II in the spring of 1959.15 In 1958 the Institute for Defense Analyses formulated a comprehensive series of tests, referred to as weapons evaluations, to evaluate various parts of the U.S. armed forces. During the second series of tests, Cdr. Lake was assigned the responsibility of equipping two F4D Phantoms and two F3H Demons with special electronic warfare equipment to defend USS Forrestal (CV 59) from night attacks by Strategic Air Command B-47s. Lake managed to get the equipment installed on the four aircraft, leading to an exercise that was a success despite Lake’s assertion that “squadron pilots knew nothing about ECM.” After the exercise, the Bureau of Weapons removed all of the electronic countercountermeasures (ECCM) “fixes,” indicating the reluctance of higher authorities in the Navy to reveal their ECCM assets (most likely for security reasons). To overcome the lack of ECM equipment and training for his F4H crews, Lake solicited the help of Bob Golding, whom he considered to be “a brilliant NAVAIR engineer.” With Golding’s assistance, they assembled all of the Navy’s ECM jamming assets at NAS Oceana for training and developed an ECCM suite for the F4H. Unfortunately, Lake failed to provide any details of the

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ECCM suite in his description of the event, and whatever records that may have been produced regarding the ECM gear that was installed have been lost to history. Lake took command of VF-74 in March 1961. The squadron began transitioning from the diminutive F4D Skyray to the hulking F-4B Phantom II in July. The “otherwise defenseless” F4D had not fared well during the direct comparison with the Air Force’s F-106 Delta Dart conducted under Project Highspeed, previously held under Lake’s direction. In July 1962, after a brief detached tour of duty to develop and conduct a comprehensive briefing of electronic warfare for Carrier Division Four and duty with Reserve Carrier Group 4 for check-out and refresher training, Lake reported as commander, Carrier Air Wing 8 on USS Forrestal operating in the Mediterranean. The typical air group at the time was supposed to have an electronic warfare capability provided by a squadron of A3D-2Qs and a detachment of four AD-5Qs. When Lake joined Forrestal, he was surprised to learn that the countermeasure equipment had been removed from VHA-8’s A3D-2Q Skywarriors. The ALQ-41s and ALQ-51s and their supporting electronics that were removed from the A3D-2Qs had been designed before the invention of the integrated circuits, and their circuitry relied upon numerous vacuum tubes, making them heavy and difficult to maintain. “The ECM suite,” as Lake later explained, “weighed about eight hundred pounds, and when it was carried the plane had eight hundred pounds less fuel when it landed back on the deck. Pilots preferred having the eight hundred pounds of fuel to eight hundred pounds of EW equipment.” Not surprisingly, the ECM equipment that had been removed failed to work when it was reinstalled in VHA-8’s aircraft. The AD-5Qs (soon to be redesignated as EA-1Fs) were another wasted asset. These aircraft only had space for 2 ECMOs, which limited their use as ECM platforms, and they were employed mostly as transports to ferry important visitors to and from the ship.16 Lake insisted that the A3D-2Qs in his air wing carry their full complement of EW equipment. He also used the EA-1Fs during practice strikes to locate the E-1B early warning planes. Then he would send in the fighters to simulate shooting down the early warning planes. On other exercises he used the EA-1Fs as stand-off jammers. While Lake worked to improve the air group’s electronic warfare capabilities, F3D-2Qs from VMCJ-2 at MCAS Cherry Point had been flying ELINT

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training missions around the island of Cuba. These training flights, begun in 1960, soon turned to electronic reconnaissance when the movement of Soviet personnel and equipment to Cuba aroused suspicions in the U.S. intelligence community. These unofficial missions, staged mostly out of Key West, were later sanctioned and controlled under a PARPRO authorized by the commander in chief, Atlantic Command. The initial intercepts were mainly of air traffic control radars, but as the Soviets steadily increased the flow of military radars to Fidel Castro’s government in 1961, VMCJ-2’s F3D-2Q aircrews began to intercept their transmissions too.17 If a signal was present, the ECMOs would determine the pulse recurrence frequency and the sweep rate, which would tell them what kind of radar was being recorded on the tape machine. A plot would be made of the navigation track and the bearings taken of the radar intercept, which was used to determine its possible location. After landing, the narrative summary of the flight and the data tape would be sent to signals intelligence. Interesting tapes were sent to naval intelligence and then passed on to the CNO.18 The first intercept of a Soviet-supplied military radar in Cuba was made by Sgt. Samuel J. Figueroa. Post-flight analysis showed it to be a Soviet-designed Token ground control radar. The report went directly to the Atlantic Fleet ELINT Center in Norfolk, which viewed the data with skepticism until Figueroa, who was flown there to verify its veracity, convinced the skeptics of what he had uncovered. As more Russian equipment arrived in Cuba, the F3D-2Q crews, whose missions (code-named Smoke Ring) were now being conducted as part of PARPRO, began to detect the Fire Can and Whiff antiaircraft fire-control radars that the Russians were using to build an integrated air defense network for Castro’s military.19 On August 29, 1962, a CIA U-2 photographed several frontline Soviet SA-2 SAM system sites under construction. Shortly thereafter, a pair of F3D-2Qs from VMCJ-2, working together from opposite sides of the island, intercepted a Fan Song target tracking radar associated with the SA-2 SAM system, confirming that at least one of the sites was operational. On October 14 another U-2 discovered the first Soviet medium-range ballistic missile site under construction. Faced with an ominous threat from intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) just one hundred miles from the U.S. mainland, the national command authority tasked the Navy to conduct low-level photo reconnaissance

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flights over the IRBM sites under Operation Blue Moon. Before the operation could get under way, however, the exact location of the missile sites needed to be determined in order for mission planners to lay out the routes needed to fly over them. Since the sites were protected by batteries of surface-to-air missiles, the IRBM sites could be located by using F3D-2Qs to home in on the SAM radars, which would be a dead giveaway to where the IRBMs were located. “We would go around the island and triangulate to find the radar sites,” said retired Lt. Col. Richard Conway, a VMCJ-2 pilot who flew missions during the crisis. “We sent that back to Washington, so when they planned our targets, they knew where the sites were. They could direct us over one, over another and another in a straight line because we had located those sites for them.” To protect the RF-8 Crusaders of VMCJ-1 assigned to carry out Operation Blue Moon, the pilots were supplied with a makeshift radar warning receiver strapped to their leg that provided an alarm when it detected the emission from a Fan Song SA-2 radar. The miniature receiver, about the size of a microcassette recorder, was designed and installed by the CIA.20 A hearing-aid-sized earpiece provided the pilot with an audible tone when the Fan Song was detected, allowing him to take evasive action. According to Price, the “RF-8s were the first tactical aircraft ever to carry radar-warning receivers.”21 If the United States had been forced to attack the Cuban missile sites by air, the electronic order of battle obtained by the ECMOs of VCMJ-2’s F3D-2Qs would have been crucial to the success of the mission. Fortunately, the crisis ended without having to employ active airborne ECM against Soviet-designed air defenses. As Whitten pointed out, “It did further the case for the Marines’ follow-on EW platform, the EA-6A Electric Intruder.”22

10

New EW Platforms

EA-6A Intruder and RA-5C Vigilante

W

hile VMCJ-1 was conducting its Sharkfin missions, the Navy was in the process of soliciting designs for an aircraft to replace the Douglas AD Skyraider. The request was accompanied by Type Specification 149 detailing the requirements for a two-seat aircraft capable of performing in all-weather conditions. The design competition that followed was won by the Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation, which received an initial design contract on February 21, 1958.1 While the design reviews of the new aircraft were under way, Capt. “Poss” Morganville, a senior ECMO attached to VMCJ-1 involved in determining the F3D-2Q requirements for the Marines, discussed the requirements for an EW aircraft to replace the aging F3D-2Q with senior staff officers at Marine Corps Headquarters as well as with Navy and Grumman engineers working on the A2F-1 design. As a result of Morganville’s efforts, the deputy commander for marine aviation asked the Navy program manager overseeing the A2F-1 contract to have Grumman conduct a feasibility study for an electronic warfare variant to replace the F3D-2Q. The ECM community continued to follow this work with interest and at some point in 1961 convinced the Marine Corps authorities to provide funding to modify two of the A2F-1 development aircraft into the EW variant. Money for this project was included in the fiscal year 1962 budget, and Grumman was awarded a development contract for the modification work in March 1962.2 81

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One of the original A2F-1 development aircraft, soon to be redesignated the A-6A, was selected as the aerodynamic prototype. It was fitted with outer wing panels and equipped with two wing pods for the EW passive receivers and tuners required for the mission, and it was subjected to aerodynamic flight tests that began on February 21, 1963. While these tests were being conducted, another A2F-1 development aircraft was configured as the EA-6A. It flew for the first time on April 16, 1963, without any ECM equipment installed, though the components making up the ECM package had already been benchtested on an individual basis.3 Before requesting funds from Congress to procure any EA-6As, the Marines needed to obtain approval for the acquisition from Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. In order for McNamara to approve procurement of a new EW aircraft, the Marines had to demonstrate that the spot jamming technique they employed was effective against known Soviet radars. The spot jammer (as opposed to the barrage jammer, which is designed to operate over a broad range of frequencies and requires a minimum of SIGINT data to be effective) concentrates all of its energy on one frequency, although it needs specific data on the enemy radar to be effective.4 To verify that the Marines could accomplish this mission, the Department of Defense (DOD) set up an exercise in North Carolina using SCR-584 radars situated at abandoned World War II bases. The SCR-584 was chosen because it was similar to the Soviet Fire Can fire-control radar. The objective of the test was to determine if the Marines could use their F3D-2Qs to find the hidden fire-control radars and to jam them effectively. The aircrews involved in the test were not told the type of equipment or the frequency—only that they were to search for fire-control radars. The F3D-2Qs flown during the exercise were able to find and jam the surrogate radars to the satisfaction of the DOD observers, who considered the “enemy radars” to have been rendered nonoperational. The success of the DOD test enabled the Marines to obtain funds to convert four more A-6As to EA-6As. Grumman converted another A-6A into an experimental prototype designated as the NEA-6A. This aircraft was later used to develop the concept for the EA-6B program. Grumman subsequently converted a new lot of six aircraft to round out the first twelve EA-6As procured under the initial Navy contact.5

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In its original configuration, the EA-6A was to carry a Loral ALQ-53 surveillance system housed in the characteristic “football” fairing atop the tail, plus the standard Navy protection suite (a mixture of ALQs and ALTs) placed in eight ALQ-31A underwing pylon-mounted pods. The first operational EA-6A, delivered to VMCJ-2 at Cherry Point in late November 1965, had just seven storage stations—one centerline station, four wing stations, and two outer wing stations beyond the wing fold. These outer wing stations initially were used to carry the low-band receiver pods of the AN/ALQ-53 EW receiving system. Later, these mounting points were used to support ALE-32 or ALE-41 chaff dispensing pods and the AGM-45 Shrike missile. The ALR-15 multi-band threat warning system and AN/ALQ-41 deception repeater jammer were also installed on the wing stations as needed. To make room for the additional ECM equipment, an eight-inch plug was inserted into the forward fuselage. This necessitated the removal of the highly accurate carrier aircraft inertial navigation system. In its place, the EA-6A crews had to rely on an ASN-66 navigation computer and the APQ-103 radar.6 The ALQ-31 was designed by North American Aviation in response to a request from the Tactical Air Command for an external jamming pod. The 12 ft., 28-inch diameter pod was developed to be carried on a regular bomb pylon and had a ram air turbine on its nose to provide power. Although it bore the AN number designation for a jammer, it was just a streamlined container intended to carry jamming equipment such as the ALT-6B.7 When problems with the ALQ-53 threatened to delay delivery of the EA-6A, the Marine team managing the EA-6A program turned to outside vendors for help. One of the unresolved design issues with the ALQ-53 involved its “look-through” mode. Look-through allowed the operator to observe the effect of his jamming on the subject signal. In its look-through mode, the ALQ-53 receiver periodically sampled the signal environment, updating the data that was presented to the operator so that he could adjust the jamming signal to the proper frequency. The effort to resolve the problems with the ALQ-53’s lookthrough mode was solved by issuing a contract to Bunker Ramo Corporation to produce modification kits that would convert the ALQ-53s already delivered into the ALQ-86. Syracuse University’s electronics laboratory was also issued a contract to design modifications that would correct some of the problems

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unrelated to the jammer look-through problem that Bunker Ramo was working on. The ALQ-76, an E/F band noise deception jamming pod then under development, was also supposed to be carried by the EA-6A. But it was behind schedule, forcing Grumman to outfit aircraft being readied to deploy in the fall of 1966 with vintage ALQ-31B pods with their lower-powered ALT-6B noise jammers.8 In 1960 when the Marines were beginning to work out the details of converting the A2F-1 into an EW platform, Cdr. William “Willie” Holcomb, head of the Reconnaissance and Electronic Warfare Systems Office, was putting together the specifications for a reconnaissance version of the of the A3-J strategic bomber. The plane specified by Holcomb would be fitted with a variety of systems enabling it to conduct photographic, infrared, high-resolution radar, and electronic reconnaissance missions simultaneously. The ELINT system selected was a scaled-down version of the Air Force’s ASD-1 built by the Aircraft Instruments Laboratory. It would pick up radar emissions and pin down their coordinates, frequency, and pulse pattern, the data for which would be recorded on magnetic tape. The system could store 112 minutes of data collected by the system. Holcomb, worried that NSA might take control of the aircraft and its highly sophisticated ELINT system, declared the scaled-down ASD-1 to be “passive ECM” equipment needed for tactical support of the fleet. As a further precaution, he arranged for the system to receive the ALQ-61 designation, which was misleading because it suggested an active jamming device. Both declarations ensured that the Navy would retain control of RA-5Cs when they entered service in 1964. Holcomb nicknamed the plane the “Whispering Willie.”9 The decision to develop the Vigilante strictly as a reconnaissance aircraft was taken at a time when efforts were already being made to enhance its attack abilities as well as adapt it to the reconnaissance mission. An improved attack variant, the A3J-2 (later A-5B), and a reconnaissance version, the RA-5C, were both built. The RA-5C was developed in parallel with the A-5B and first flew on June 30, 1962. The RA-5C incorporated all the new features of the A-5B, such as the humpback fuselage, big flaps, and the leading-edge superficial boundary layer control (BLC) system that bled high-pressure engine air to the front of the wing instead of the back. The new BLC scheme proved a little tricky, however, since the RA-5C was substantially heavier than the A-5A. Once the BLC system was engaged, the aircraft lost power and tended to drop abruptly.10

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The RA-5C was a Mach 2 aircraft that was capable of all-weather, longrange, carrier- or land-based, multi-sensor, reconnaissance missions involving high-altitude supersonic or very low-altitude, high-speed penetrations. It had a two-man crew seated in tandem with the pilot in the front and the reconnaissance/navigator in the back. Cameras and EW gear filled the area previously taken up by the bomb bay. After the RA-5C’s introduction to fleet service, the aircraft was almost immediately sent into combat over Southeast Asia, with the first reconnaissance missions flown in August 1964. It was used primarily for tactical reconnaissance to photograph potential targets and to conduct hazardous medium-level poststrike bomb damage assessment. The RA-5C was fast enough to avoid MiGs and agile enough to dodge SAMs. Nevertheless, eighteen were lost in combat: fourteen to anti-aircraft fire, three to SAMs, and one to a MiG-21during Operation Linebacker II.11

11

Vietnam

Countering the SA-2

Our real problem stems to a large degree from the fact that electronic warfare is never popular in peacetime; despite EW’s growing recognition, historically there has always been something else “more important to do.” This was the situation before we started losing aircraft in Vietnam.

I

—CAPT. G. F. PEOPLES, USN 1

n 1962 the U.S. military initiated limited air operations within South Vietnam in an effort to provide air support to South Vietnamese army forces, destroy suspected Viet Cong bases, and spray herbicides to eliminate jungle cover. President Lyndon B. Johnson expanded air operations in August 1964, when he authorized retaliatory airstrikes against North Vietnam following the reported attack on U.S. warships in the Gulf of Tonkin. Before long, U.S. aircraft were flying numerous combat sorties over South Vietnam and some areas of North Vietnam. After a series of Viet Cong attacks on U.S. installations, President Johnson further escalated the air war in South Vietnam on February 19, 1965, when he approved Operation Rolling Thunder—a bombing campaign designed to force North Vietnam’s communist leaders to abandon the war against the U.S.-supported government of South Vietnam. By then the North Vietnamese had deployed a network of no less than twenty-two early warning and at least four SON-4 (NATO code name Whiff) fire-control radars. Special aircrews assigned to the EC-121Ms of VQ-1 flying from Don Muang International Airport in Bangkok, Thailand, and Dan Nang 86

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Airfield in South Vietnam were already conducting secret ELINT missions using the Brigand system to locate and accurately position the early warning and ground-controlled interception (GCI) radars in the north. The squadron, which had been flying missions over the Gulf of Tonkin since 1952, had been tasked with developing the electronic order of battle for North Vietnam in early 1964. First flights from Da Nang began with a single aircraft and one crew that flew every day, seven days a week, in a ten- to twelve-hour run up and down the coast of Vietnam. As each new radar installation was detected, a top priority was assigned to determining its location. As air attacks on targets in North Vietnam increased, the Soviet Union and the Chinese government began supplying the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) with large numbers of anti-aircraft guns accompanied by more fire-control radars (Whiff and Fire Can) for use with the heavier caliber (57-mm, 87-mm, and 100-mm) guns.2 The first carrier-based airstrike of the Rolling Thunder campaign took place on March 15, 1965, when the planes from Carrier Air Wing 9 flying off USS Hancock (CVA 19) struck an ammunition depot in Phu Qui. Hancock’s planes brought down the Tam Da railway bridge on April 9 and destroyed the Kim Kuong highway bridge two days later. When the carrier strikes began, antiaircraft fire was the only air defense system facing U.S. aircrews.3 Then in early April, the North Korean air force began deploying Soviet-supplied MiG-17 fighters. When Operation Rolling Thunder began, the only U.S. carrier-based aircraft equipped to provide stand-off jamming protection for the strike forces were the ten piston-engined EA-1F Skyraiders assigned to VAW-13 Detachment 1. Sub-detachments of two or four aircraft from the squadron were deployed on each of the carriers operating in the Gulf of Tonkin. Lacking the performance to survive the areas of North Vietnam defended by the MiG-17s, the EA-1Fs were restricted to flying off the coast of North Vietnam at altitudes of eight thousand to ten thousand feet, where they would attempt to jam the Whiff and Fire Can fire-control radars.4 On April 5, 1965, an RF-8C from the VFP-63 detachment assigned to USS Coral Sea (CVA 43) flying a reconnaissance mission in the Hanoi area brought back evidence that revealed the distinctive “Star of David” road pattern of an SA-2 missile site under construction fifteen miles southeast of Hanoi. The discovery confirmed what had been anticipated for some time and was considered important enough for Rear Adm. Henry L. Miller, the Task Force 77 commander, to fly to Saigon to discuss the photographs with Lt. Gen. Joseph

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H. Moore, commander of the U.S. Air Force 2nd Air Division, that was responsible for all Air Force units in Southeast Asia. Together they formulated a plan for a joint Navy–Air Force strike on the SAM site that they sent up the chain of command. John T. McNaughton, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, ridiculed the need to strike the SAMs. “You don’t think the North Vietnamese are going to use them!” he scoffed. “Putting them in is just a political ploy by the Russians to appease Hanoi.”5 Whether this influenced Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara is subject to speculation, but McNamara refused permission to strike the site, and its construction continued unhindered and was operational by July. On July 24, 1965, an SA-2 fired from the site shot down an Air Force F-4C, the first of 110 U.S. Air Force aircraft lost to SAMs in Southeast Asia. President Johnson’s order for a retaliatory airstrike was issued to the chain of command, but by the time it got to the 2nd Air Division headquarters, the SAM batteries were long gone. Instead, dummy missiles had been placed at the site as a “flak trap.” By the end of the year, fifty-six SAM batteries dotted the countryside around Hanoi and Haiphong. U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy strike aircraft tasked with carrying out Operation Rolling Thunder were ill equipped to counter North Vietnam’s air defenses, which included cutting-edge Soviet early warning radars, radar-guided surface-to-air missiles, and anti-aircraft artillery. When Operation Rolling Thunder began, the only tactical EW aircraft in Southeast Asia capable of accompanying these strikes into North Vietnam to provide jamming support were the ten EF-10B Skyknights assigned to VMCJ-1 at MCAS Iwakuni, Japan.6 The reported discovery of the construction of SA-2 SAM sites in early April resulted in an urgent requirement for active ECM. As a result, a detachment of six EF-10Bs from VMCJ-1 were ordered to Da Nang Air Base. They would be joined by a detachment of six U.S. Air Force EB-66Cs that were deployed to Takhli Air Base in Thailand and the carrier-based EA-1F Skyraiders. The B-66, a larger winged version of the A3D Skywarrior, was initially intended as a tactical light bomber, but a number were later converted to three types of electronic warfare aircraft designated as EBs, with the B and E models configured for jamming and the C model for passive surveillance.7 When Lt. Col. Otis W. Corman, VMCJ-1 commanding officer, led the contingent of EF-10B Skyknights into Da Nang on April 17, it became the first EW squadron of any service stationed in Vietnam. This squadron was

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not new to air operations in Southeast Asia; it had been providing the Navy and Air Force with ECM support in the region since 1964. Although Colonel Corman’s unit was administratively detached to MAG-16, the unit’s operations were directed by the 2nd Air Division.8 By the time VMCJ-1 arrived in Vietnam, the EF-10B’s EW systems were already ten years old. And while its receiver set (ALR-8 panoramic surveillance receiver, APA-69A direction finder, and ALA-3 pulse analyzer), which covered all emitter frequencies the North Vietnamese used, was an invaluable electronic intelligence asset, its ALT-2 jammer lacked the capability to concentrate energy against a single emitter. Instead, the jamming signal—fed to high gain antennas mounted in the nose—radiated in all directions so that the energy reaching the targeted emitter was too diluted to be effective. Because the EF-10B lacked an aerial refueling capability, its two underwing pylons were needed for external drop tanks in order for the aircraft to reach the northernmost parts of Vietnam. This limited the EF-10B’s ability to augment its internal jamming system with additional jamming pods.9 When the Marine EF-10Bs arrived in theater, the 2nd Air Division was having to deal with the issue of the North Vietnamese Air Force (NVAF) MiGs that now threatened U.S. aircraft during their airstrikes against targets in North Vietnam. To counter the MiGs, the EF-10Bs were tasked with the job of degrading the NVA’s early warning and GCI network in the area of operations, which at that time encompassed all of North Vietnam south of the twentieth parallel. The Air Force EB-66Cs would jam those radars directing anti-aircraft fire. “Thus, the Air Force,” as J. T. O’Brien wrote, “was willing to take on the hot action and the Marines would be relegated to the less glamorous task, which was no surprise.”10 The most pressing need for ECM support was to counter the radarcontrolled anti-aircraft artillery, since the SAM threat had not yet materialized. On a typical mission each EF-10B was configured with two internal ALT-2 noise jamming transmitters, one chaff pod, and one ALQ-31 pod containing one ALT-19 noise jammer and one ALT-17 radar/communications jammer. EF-10Bs were launched at five- to ten-minute intervals and flew a prescribed track north from the demilitarized zone at thirty thousand feet jamming early warning and GCI radars. Other missions were flown at twenty thousand feet in a racetrack pattern along the ingress/egress routes of the attacking aircraft. The ALT-2 and ALT-17 jammers were able prevent or break the lock of a Fire

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Can’s radar until the attacking aircraft were in their low-altitude ordnance delivery mode. Chaff drops were also effective but meant trading off the external fuel tanks, and they required multiple aircraft to provide an effective screening corridor.11 By late 1965 the proliferation of SAM sites and the increased skill of SAM crews had forced the Skyknights to orbit too far from most inland targets for their radar jamming to be effective. The EA-10Bs could disrupt radars along the coastline, but they were only marginally effective against targets more than sixteen nautical miles inland. From April until October, however, the Marine EA-10Bs were an acceptable stand-in for the Air Force EB-66Bs.12 After the ban on attacking the SAM sites was lifted, the 2nd Air Division scheduled a massive strike by forty-eight F-105Ds on two SAM sites located thirty miles from Hanoi. The attack, which took place on July 27, was supported by a combat air patrol of twenty Air Force fighters, all six of the Marine EF-10Bs for ECM support, and three EB-66Cs to provide for threat warning to the strike force. “Those planning the attack,” as Alfred Price noted, “were entering uncharted territory, for nobody had attempted such an enterprise before. Their tactics were harnessed to the belief, almost universal at that time, that SAMs were close to 100 percent effective against aircraft flying any higher than very low.” Thus, the F-105s attacked at an extremely low level in the belief that the greatest threat would be from SAMs and radar-controlled anti-aircraft guns. “The result,” wrote H. Wayne Whitten, “was devastating as six F-105s and five pilots were lost to withering ground fire, none to missiles or radar-controlled weapons.”13 On August 12, 1965, the Air Force and Navy were authorized to destroy the SAM sites in an operation called Iron Hand. The typical carrier air wing was then composed of two fighter squadrons (A-8s and F-4s), two squadrons of light attack A-4 Skyhawks, and one squadron of A-1 Skyraiders. The first A-6A Intruders of VA-75 would not see combat until USS Independence (CVA 62) arrived on Yankee Station in July.14 The single-seat, propeller-driven A-1 Skyraider, which first entered service in 1946, had been very useful during the early strikes in North Vietnam. It could carry heavy bomb loads to long ranges, loiter as necessary, and place its bombs with accuracy. As the defensive environment in the north grew tougher, however, A-1 losses began to climb, and the plane proved too slow and vulnerable for the more difficult targets. This left the jet-powered A-4s as carrier aviation’s main resource to accomplish Iron Hand objectives.15

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Capt. Julian Lake, then responsible for overseeing the Navy’s air electronic warfare systems in the Pentagon, realized that it might be possible to install ALQ-51 “gate stealer” ECMs on the A-4 Skyhawks. If such an installation were possible, it would greatly increase the aircraft’s survivability in the increasingly dangerous environment in the north. To see if the ALQ-51 would fit, Capt. Lake traveled to the Navy’s flight-testing facility at NAS Patuxent River, Maryland, where he crawled around the interior of an A-4 looking for a place to install the ALQ-51 electronics. The gun bay seemed the obvious solution, but Lake and the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) engineers at Patuxent River were reluctant to deprive the plane of its guns. Lake and the NAVAIR engineers could not agree on how to do it. To solve the dilemma, Lake went to the Douglas Aircraft Company plant in Long Beach and spent an entire afternoon on the flight line trying to figure out the best place to put the ALQ-51 using wooden boxes he had made up that mimicked the size and shape of the electronic gear. “In the end we found that there was room in the gun bay to fit the jammer, both cannons and half the ammunition load.”16 Lake’s proposal to add the ALQ-51 to the A-4 Skyhawk led to the establishment of Project Shoe Horn, a NAVAIR-funded program to provide the engineering effort to formalize the modifications needed to equip the A-4s with the jammer. Sanders Associates received a contract to build a prototype that would be installed by the plane’s builder, the Douglas Aircraft Company. The prototype was then tested by Air Test and Evaluation Squadron 5 (VX-5), which evaluated the prototype against the Flint Stone radar, a Fan Song surrogate at the Sanders test facility in Merrimack, New Hampshire. The tests were successful, and the new jammer, modified to increase its effectiveness, was designated the ALQ-51A.17 After the testing of the modified ALQ-51s was completed, Sanders Associates received an order for installation kits to retrofit the ALQ-51s, most of which had been in storage, to the ALQ-51A configuration. Sanders personnel, along with Navy engineers, began installing the upgraded ALQ-5As on Independence’s A-4Es in September. The installation was accomplished by placing the two ALQ-51A electronic enclosures in the space beneath the Skyhawk’s cockpit that had previously been filled by the 20-mm ammunition supply for the plane’s Mk 12 cannon. A smaller replacement ammunition magazine that could hold only forty rounds of ammunition was installed above the gun bay. The A-4s also received an ALE-18 chaff and dispensers.18

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On September 20, the A-4Es used their newly installed ALQ-51s to divert six SA-2s that had been fired at them during an early Iron Hand mission. The ALQ-51A could tackle only one emitter at a time, and the NVA radar operators (or their Soviet advisers) learned to beat it by differentiating false returns from genuine ones. The first successful Iron Hand strike conducted by the Navy’s carriers took place on October 17, 1966, when four A-4E Skyhawks from USS Independence (CV 62), accompanied by an A-6A Intruder, destroyed a SAM site near Kep Airfield northeast of Hanoi with anti-radiation missiles. One month later, on October 17, the modified A-4Es took part in the first successful A-4 Iron Hand attack when four aircraft from VA-72 and VA-86 flying off Independence destroyed a SAM site near Kep.19 Although Project Shoe Horn was considered a success by those involved, the reliability of the ALQ-51A was initially poor due largely to deficiency in spare parts, test equipment, and training. “The guys didn’t have any training in the U.S. because we didn’t have any equipment back here,” explained Lake. “Everything was out there. But they couldn’t support it, they couldn’t use it properly, they couldn’t maintain it properly, they couldn’t test it properly.” Even so, the ALQ-51A proved its worth when it functioned properly. Price tells us that “for planes with operable deception systems, the loss rate to SAMs was about one plane per fifty missiles fired . . . compared with one plane per ten missiles fired if no ALQ-51A was fitted or if the equipment malfunctioned.”20 Nevertheless, the SA-2 remained a formidable threat, particularly when fired in salvoes of three. Their main effect, according to Peter Davies, “was to force aircraft to fly lower, exposing them to AAA. Making evasive maneuvers against multiple SAMs also sapped the energy of the bomb-laden A-4, and pilots attempting to regain altitude found that their forward speed was reduced below 300 mph. Without the boost of an afterburner, regaining the energy in a Skyhawk was a slow process that made the [NVA] gunner’s task easier.”21 As the air war over North Vietnam intensified, a detachment of two EA-3Bs from VQ-2 and their flight crews was transferred to NAS Cubi Point to supplement the ELINT support being provided by VQ-1’s four EC-121Ms. Although the EA-3Bs had the advantage of speed and altitude, they lacked the endurance of the EC-121M and were limited to a four- to five-hour mission, and they only had room for up to five ECMOs.22

12

Countermeasure vs. Countermeasure

W

hile the Navy was working to equip its light attack A-4s with radar countermeasures, the Air Force had begun to work on the development of the hunter-killer team concept to destroy SAM sites. The hunter, dubbed the Wild Weasel, was a modified version of the two-seat F-100F Super Sabre equipped to pinpoint the location of SAMs. The F-100F was chosen because it was immediately available, and the extra cockpit would provide a place for the electronic warfare officer (EWO) who would operate the electronic equipment. To modify the aircraft for the Wild Weasel role, the aft cockpit instrumentation and controls were removed and replaced by the electronics package. The crew concept would allow the EWO to concentrate on identifying and locating threat radars while the pilot concentrated on flying the aircraft, searching visually for the SAM sites, and marking them for the following strike aircraft before taking evasive action. The objectives of the project were laid out by an Air Force task force established under Brig. Gen. Kenneth C. Dempster in August 1965 to study the SA-2 threat and come up with ways to counter it. Dempster’s task force recommended that the Air Force • modify a small number of fighters with electronic equipment to enable them to find active SAM sites. These aircraft would mark the active sites for destruction by accompanying Iron Hand strike aircraft. 93

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• develop a missile that could be fired from a fighter and home in on a radar emitter • develop jamming equipment for carriage on fighters to counter the SAM radars • recognize that a radar homing and warning capability was needed immediately—a capability that would warn the aircrews that a SAM radar was looking at them and provide some clue to its location.1 To meet these requirements, the Air Force acquired the Vector Homing and Warning System, the IR-133 panoramic scan receiver, and the WR-300 receiver, all off-the-shelf equipment produced by Applied Technology Incorporated. The Vector provided 360-degree warning of S, C, and X band radar signals, the frequency bands for early warning, gun-directing, and surface-to-air missile radars. It told the crew which hostile radars were tracking their plane. These threats were displayed on a small, circular cathode ray tube that indicated the direction of the threat from the aircraft. The Vector system included a threat panel that indicated whether the signal was from a SAM, anti-aircraft artillery (AAA), or early warning radar. The system relied on the IR-133 receiver that obtained radar signals through a set of antennae located symmetrically around the nose of the aircraft. The signals were to be analyzed for frequency, which was used to indicate whether the signal was from a SAM, anti-aircraft gun emplacement, or some other type of radar, and for repetition rate, which indicated whether the radar was in a search, tracking, launch, or guidance mode. By comparing the signal strengths on each side of the aircraft’s nose, the EWO could tell the pilot to turn right or left to home in on the signal. The WR-300 picked up the SA-2’s command guidance signals, alerting the Wild Weasel’s crew that one or more of the missiles had been launched.2 This equipment was installed in two F-100Fs by a team of engineers from North American Aviation and the unit’s manufacturer, Applied Technology. Following initial flight testing, four F-100Fs (two more F-100Fs were modified after the equipment had been shown to work) flew to Elgin Air Force Base for training using the base’s SADS-1 surrogate Fan Song radar. The Wild Weasel made some three hundred runs against the SADS-1 radar to become familiar with the EW equipment and refine the tactics that would be used against the

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SAMs. At the beginning of each run, the EWO used the WR-300 receiver to search for radar signals. Once found, he would use the narrow-band, manually tuned IR-133 to home in on the SA-2’s Fan Song radar, switching between the antennae on either side of the plane’s nose and using amplitude comparison to guide the pilot to the Fan Song’s transmitter.3 The initial operational testing phase of the Wild Weasel project at Elgin was completed on November 19, 1965. The next day, the four modified F-100Fs departed for Korat Air Base, Thailand, where they would conduct a sixty-day test and evaluation period from November 28, 1965, to January 26, 1966. While at Korat, the Wild Weasel task force came under the operational control of the 2nd Air Division’s 6234th Tactical Fighter Squadron, whose F-105Ds would join the Wild Weasels on Iron Hand missions. During a typical mission, the F-100Fs used unguided 2.75-inch rockets armed with white phosphorus warheads to mark the SAM sites for the accompanying F-105Ds, which would attempt to destroy missiles and its radar with high-explosive rockets, napalm, cluster bombs, and cannon fire.4 The operations the Wild Weasel task force conducted during the evaluation period revealed that it was much more difficult to destroy the SAM sites than had appeared to be the case during the test flights conducted at Elgin. There were many obstacles to success: “The enemy radars were small, likely to be well hidden, and liable to cease transmissions at any time during the homing. Moreover, the likely presence of AAA defenses around missile sites meant that conducting a lengthy visual search was a hazardous pursuit. . . . It was something that required great care and circumspection, and above average bravery.”5 As one author noted, “Finding a camouflaged missile battery was dangerous as well as difficult, for the Wild Weasel crews had to brave anti-aircraft fire, fighter attack, and the threat of SAMs throughout the painstaking search.”6 Despite these hazards, the F-100Fs continued to lead Iron Hand flights against SAM sites. By the end of March, however, they were no longer trying to penetrate heavily defended areas in the north, the F100Fs being deemed too old and too slow to survive in the hostile skies over North Vietnam. Beginning in May, an improved Wild Weasel—the F-105F—arrived in Southeast Asia, relieving the converted Super Sabres of their daytime role, though they continued for several months to fly single-plane night missions from Korat.7

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The F-105F was the two-seat trainer version of the Republic F-105 that was adapted to perform the Wild Weasel mission. The first F-105 Wild Weasels carried the same electronic equipment as the Wild Weasel I: the Vector (now designated the APR-25), the IR-133, the WR-300 launch warning receiver (now called the APR-26), and a new addition, the AZ-EL system, which provided both bearing and elevation information to the threat radar. The Wild Weasel III, also called the EF-105F (electronic fighter), retained its internal M61 Gatling gun, full ordnance capabilities, plus the capability to launch the new addition to the Weasel line-up, the AGM-45 Shrike—an antiradar missile developed from the Navy’s AIM-7 Sparrow that homed in on radar emitters. The Shrike was a four-hundred-pound solid propellant–fueled rocket with a 140-pound proximity fuzed warhead that could home in on a radar transmitter. Although development had begun in 1958, the first AGM-45 did not enter service until 1966. To get the missile for his Wild Weasels, Gen. Dempster persuaded Julian Lake to swap the Navy Shrikes for APR-25 radar warning receivers that Applied Technology recently had developed for the Air Force, which were far superior to anything the Navy had. By then Julian Lake was assigned to the anti-aircraft weapons section of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations surface warfare division, where he began daily skull sessions on how to defeat the North Vietnamese SA-2 Guideline missiles and radars.8 While the AGM-45 Shrike was much better than the unguided rockets previously used, they were not ideal weapons. The Shrike’s sensor head had a narrow field of view that required the launch aircraft to be pointed toward the SAM site. Although the maximum aerodynamic range of the AGM-45 Shrike was around seventeen miles, its engagement range was limited to around twelve miles. At longer ranges, the SAM crew could launch a missile, guide it to intercept of an aircraft, and shut its radar down before the AGM-45 could hit the site. This was a product of the Shrike’s relatively slow (Mach 2.0) speed compared to the Mach 3.5 speed of the SA-2 missile. Once the enemy radar emitter shut down, the Shrike would be unable to hit its target since it lacked a memory capability for homing.9 Because the electronic gear on board the Wild Weasel could not determine the precise range to target, the crew had to use some other method of getting the Shrike within homing distance of the enemy radar. A typical launch maneuver consisted of diving toward the transmitter until the Shrike’s radiation seeker

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had locked onto the proper azimuth and elevation, then pulling up and lofting it toward the target. The lofted attack increased the useful range of the Shrike to about twelve miles, and the missile’s steep trajectory greatly increased its chances of success. Unfortunately, the missile’s relatively small warhead would only inflict damage in the immediate area of the Fan Song radar van. It was not unusual for the same site to be up and running twenty-four hours after an AGM-45 hit. To knock out the entire battery required a far greater weight of ordnance.10 The NVA found several ways of countering the Shrike. Price describes a number of these in volume III of his History of U.S. Electronic Warfare: “North Vietnamese radar operators quickly learned how the Iron Hand aircraft operated and began devising ways to reduce their effectiveness. The distinctive ‘lofted’ attack maneuver, necessary to achieve a maximum-range shot with a Shrike, was easily recognizable on radar. Also, when a Shrike was launched, metal particles in the rocket exhaust gave a distinctive blooming radar return on Fan Song, so the operators had a clear indication of when a missile was on its way. If the Fan Song ceased transmitting at that point, the Shrike was deprived of homing signals and ‘went stupid.’”11 To reduce the vulnerability of their radars, the Fan Song operators learned to keep their transmissions as short as possible. One disadvantage of this strategy was that it allowed U.S. forces to pass through areas without coming under attack. Another problem with this scheme was the fact that it took nearly a minute for the Fan Song to warm up when switched from stand-by to transmit. As a work-around, the Fan Song operators inserted the dummy load that was supplied as part of the maintenance equipment and plugged into the antenna output to draw off power. This allowed the transmitter to remain at full power without emitting a radar signature (or so the operators thought). When a target came within the SA-2’s engagement range, the transmitter’s output was switched back to the antenna, minimizing the delay.12 Although the dummy load reduced the amount of radiated power, a small amount of power still leaked out. The amount of leaked power was just enough to be picked up the Big Look–equipped EP-3Bs (formerly EC-121Ms) of VQ-1. The Big Look was a special modification to the EP-3B’s APS-20 radar that allowed it to function as a very-high-gain, highly directional ELINT receiver.

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Big Look was the brainchild of Charles Christman, who had also come up with the idea for Brigand. Christman mounted traveling wave tubes and crystal video receivers in the feed arm of the APS-20 high-gain antenna, creating a device that was sensitive enough to pick up the miniscule emissions from the Fan Song’s dummy load.13 Lt. Richard Haver, an EWO serving with VQ-1 at the time, described how the Big Look installation worked: “The signals went directly to the headset of the guy sitting ‘Big Look’ watch, who steered the antenna manually. Using the directivity of the antenna, he could tell there were Fire Can radars active here, Fan Song radars there, and four GCI sites were up. He could do that without using a tuner. He knew what Fan Song radar sounded like: he didn’t need to know the radar was working at 2,956 MHz or whatever. All the radar types sounded different, so he could convert what he heard into what he needed to know.”14 The Big Look system, along with EP-3B’s ELINT and COMINT capabilities, made the Big Look aircraft the most efficient and effective airborne collection and early warning platform during the Vietnam War. Other airborne platforms could do some of what Big Look could, but only Big Look was capable of simultaneous COMINT and ELINT operations. Big Look was supplemented by Wee Look, an EA-3B fleet support aircraft outfitted with ELINT positions. Wee Look was also used for threat emitter warning. Although the EA-3B was designed to operate from carriers, Wee Look aircraft were too heavy to operate from a carrier and could only be launched from land bases.15 The only carrier-based aircraft capable of providing stand-off jamming for the U.S. carriers operating in the Gulf of Tonkin in the late summer and fall of 1965 were the piston-powered EA-1F Skyraiders, which lacked the performance to survive in the defended areas of North Vietnam. Seeking a better solution, Julian Lake came up with the idea of converting the now-obsolete A3D-2 Skywarrior heavy bombers into a stand-off jammer. The fact that the Air Force’s electronic-outfitted RB-66s were built on a similar airframe might have been a factor in his thinking. The idea for converting the Skywarriors came to Lake while he was still in the Far East. As Lake recalled in an interview with Alfred Price: “I called on Admiral John Lacouture who was CO of Saratoga when I was executive officer; now he was the Chief of Staff to the Carrier Division

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Commander in the Tonkin Gulf. We agreed on the need for a plane to provide EW support. Putting the tanker package in the plane’s bomb bay was no big deal, that could be done at squadron level. Putting the ‘E’ into the plane took a bit longer.”16 Conversion of the first five A3D-2 bombers into combined tanker/jammer aircraft was undertaken by the Naval Air Rework Facility at Alameda, California, in 1966 (thirty-four KA-3B aircraft were also rebuilt to this version at a later date). The modifications included the addition of a hose and drogue refueling unit, the installation of electronic jamming equipment in the bomb bay, and countermeasures equipment in the forward section and modified tail cone. The new variant, designated as the EKA-3B, was initially described as the TACOS (TAnker Countermeasures Or Strike) aircraft, despite the fact that the bomb bay was full of jamming equipment and the bomb rack pinned shut. The TACOS name did not last long within the fleet, however; this variant of the A-3B was soon dubbed the “Queer Whale.”17 The EW suite in the EKA-3B consisted of two countermeasures systems (two ALT-27s for jamming air defense radars in the E/F bands) and one ALQ92 communication jammer. The former utilized a pair of steerable antennae covered by the new belly canoe faired into the refueling store. The ALQ-92 had two distinct antenna arrays. One took the form of a single large vertically polarized VHF blade antenna under the nose that was used to jam North Vietnam fighter control frequencies. The other was a set of horizontally polarized antennae housed in four large blisters on the side of the fuselage for use against air search radars such as the Soviet P-10 “Knife Rest.” The plane also carried one ALR-28 X band D/F receiver, one ALR-29 panoramic receiver, one ALR-30 panoramic receiver, one APR-32 SAM launch warning receiver, and two each of the ALQ-41 and ALQ-51 deception jammers in addition to two ALE-2 chaff dispensing pods. The frequency range and power output of this equipment were considerably better than those of the EA-1F, and the high operational altitude of the EKA-3B increased the geographical area that could be covered.18 Airborne Warning Squadron 13 at NAS Alameda was given the job of introducing the EKA-3B to the fleet. The aircraft carried a crew of three that included the pilot, a navigator pilot, and a Navy flying officer who operated the EW equipment. The squadron received the first of these aircraft in May 1967, but the lack of trained A-3 personnel and inadequate parts support hindered the

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squadron’s efforts to become proficient with the aircraft and its electronic gear. Nevertheless, a detachment of EKA-3Bs left California on board USS Ranger (CV 61) heading for the war zone on November 4, 1967. After they arrived in Southeast Asia, the EKA-3Bs operated aboard various carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin, refueling Navy strike formations and giving the stand-off jamming cover.19 By late fall 1966 the air defenses deployed by North Vietnam Air Defense Command (NVADC) were overtaxing the electronic countermeasure of the U.S. forces engaged in attempting to subdue the North Vietnamese. The number of SA-2 sites continued to grow, and intelligence estimates indicated that the NVADC had hundreds of radar-controlled anti-aircraft guns and more than two hundred radars providing warning and guidance to guns, SAMs, and MiGs.20 In late October 1966 the first EA-6As arrived in theater when six of these aircraft and an aircrew/maintenance cadre from VMCJ-2 joined VMCJ-1 at Da Nang. Martin Lachow was an electronic/reconnaissance warrant officer who served with the unit. He had previously been stationed at Naval Air Test Center Patuxent River as project officer for the EA-6A. Lachow recalled in later years, Prior to our arrival, support to the Navy could only be provided by the EF-10. The EF-10 had two small jammers in the nose pointed forward. So whenever offensive tactical ECM support was injected into the plan, all that was done was to point the EF-10 [F3D-2Q Skyknight] at “whatever” and turn on the jammers. . . . We’d only been there less than two weeks when Navy tasked the Wing to support an Alpha strike “now that the EA-6 is in country.” I, as the EW “Maven,” said we could not provide [sic] unless Navy could provide us their plans for all a/c consisting of times off the deck, type of aircraft, targets, TOT, Estimated Time of Arrival Feet Dry, etc. This was met with consternation on the part of the Navy. We had to send a few folks out to the big boat to explain. That done, we then devised our tactics plan to support the Alpha strike. Both the EF-10 and the EA-6 were employed.21

The EA-6As were equipped with the modified ALQ-53 receiver system and ALQ-31 pods with ALT-6B jammers. Because of their increased jamming capability, which was three times that of the EF-10Bs, the EA-6As were tasked with supporting the 7th Air Force and the carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin during

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the operations conducted in high threat areas. During a typical ECM mission, the EA-6As carried three ALT-31 pods containing a pair of steerable ALT-6B jammers, two drop tanks, and two ALE-32 chaff pods. These were in addition to the onboard ALQ-53. The EF-10Bs were relegated to augmenting the EA-6As on some jamming missions and continuing the nightly surveillance of the demilitarized zone.22 The first significant operation conducted by the EA-6As assigned to VMCJ-1 occurred on the night of October 25, 1967, when they accompanied two Marine all-weather squadrons conducting a low-level strike on Phu Yen Air Field northwest of Hanoi. The combination of teamwork, super flying, and VMCJ-1 jamming (and perhaps a bit of luck) enabled the Marines to strike the target without loss. Two days later, an EA-6A teamed with an A6-A from VMA(AW)-242 in a Little Partner mission to identify a Fan Song radar in western North Vietnam that was attacked with AGM-45 Shrike launched from the A6-A.23 In January 1968 the first EA-6As equipped with the ALQ-86 system (the improved ALQ-53) and ALQ-76 ECM pods were ferried to Da Nang where they were swapped with the EA-6As already in country. The ALQ-76 had a ram air turbine generator to power the four 400-watt jamming transmitters that could be selected from a group of seven covering the radio frequency spectrum from 0.13 to 10 GHz. These EA-6As also carried an internally mounted ALQ-55 VHF communications jammer that played havoc with the radio communications between the North Vietnamese fighter pilots and their ground controllers. For security reasons, the crews needed to obtain permission before they could use this device. The upgraded EA-6As sent to the Far East were joined by the first of the modified EF-10B Super Whales that had been upgraded with a panoramic threat display and the ability to carry the ALQ-76. The arrival of the upgraded EA-6As coincided with the delivery of the TSQ-90 ground data readout system. The TSQ-90, which was developed in concert with the EA-6A and housed in a mobile shelter, contained a computer and a host of peripheral equipment to automatically extract and analyze aircraft navigation and signal data gathered during EW operations.24 After the bombing of North Vietnam ended in November 1968, VMCJ-1 provided ECM support for the photoreconnaissance aircraft and drones that continued to fly over the country. The drone operation, code-named Bumpy Action, involved BQM-34F Firebee drones launched from DC-130s in the

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Gulf of Tonkin. In May 1970 the squadron’s aircraft were credited with saving a drone from a MiG attack by jamming the North Vietnam ground controller’s communications with their ALQ-55 communication disrupters. VMCJ-1 also flew numerous sorties from late 1969 into the first half of 1970 in support of Operation Commando Hunt, the interdiction campaign in Laos. VMCJ-1 left Da Nang in July 1970 after logging more than 25,000 combat sorties.25 In fielding the EA-6A, Marine airmen created an aircraft that was on the leading edge of airborne EW. This achievement came about through the efforts of a talented group of enlisted personnel and the EW community and the foresight and initiative of their leadership. This enabled Marine air to be in the forefront of the Navy Department’s airborne EW effort that led to the development of the EA-6B Prowler, whose origins and development are recorded in the next chapter.

13

EA-6B

An EW Platform from the Ground Up

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oward the end of 1965, as the Marines were first beginning to deploy the EA-6A, the Navy issued a requirement for a carrier aircraft having a state-of-the-art countermeasures suite to “support tactical strike aircraft by denying the enemy effective use of his defensive radar and radio communications” to replace its aging EKA-3Bs. Grumman was already at work on an improved version of the EA-6A based on the ALQ-99 tactical jamming system (TJS) being developed by the Airborne Instruments Laboratory. Grumman’s original intent was to modify the A-6 airframe to produce an aircraft similar to the two-seat EA-6A, but the capabilities of the greatly enhanced ECM planned for the new aircraft could not be handled by one ECMO. So the crew was increased to four: a pilot and three ECMOs (one in the front right-hand seat and two in the rear cockpit). To accommodate the additional crewmembers, Grumman redesigned the front fuselage, inserting a 4½-foot section to provide side-by-side seating in the new rear cockpit. To protect the crew from the powerful radar emissions produced by the aircraft’s jamming systems, Grumman applied a thin coating of gold to the cockpit canopy’s glass. Grumman also strengthened the airframe, increased the internal fuel capacity, added more powerful engines, and beefed up the landing gear. The new aircraft, named the Prowler, was designated as the EA-6B. It was the first U.S. aircraft designed from the beginning strictly for use as an electronic warfare platform.1 103

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The heart of the EA-6B’s ECM suite was the ALQ-99 TJS, the first fully integrated computer-controlled jamming system. The on-board portion of this system consisted of a central processor and computer that in its initial version controlled up to four external jamming pods carried on the aircraft’s four wing racks. Also on board was the highly sophisticated ALR-42 radar warning receiver that was able to detect and prioritize radar threats. Data from the ALR-42’s signal analyzer was passed to the ALQ-99’s central processor for use in programming the selected jammers. The ALQ-99’s computer managed the power to each jammer, ensuring that the greatest threats received the most power. The optimization of the jamming transmitters and their modularity allowed the Prowler’s ECM equipment to be tailored to the needs of specific types of missions.2 VAQ-132, which had been flying the EKA-3B, was the first operational squadron to receive the EA-6B Prowler. The squadron transitioned into the new plane during January 1971. In July 1972 a four-plane contingent flew onboard USS America (CV 66), which had been conducting operations in the Gulf of Tonkin. VAQ-132 flew its first combat support mission with the EA-6B on July 11. Four more of the squadron’s EA-6Bs joined USS Enterprise (CVN 65) in September. The EA-6Bs averaged five to six missions each day from the carriers, supporting Navy and Air Force strikes against the North Vietnamese.3  The role of the EA-6B during these missions was to provide stand-off jamming to deny precise location information to the NVA’s GCI, search, and acquisition radars and to disrupt its communication links. As Capt. Albert A. Gallotta Jr. explained to the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Tactical Air Power of the Committee on Armed Services during the defense appropriation hearings for fiscal year 1974, there were three principal reasons why the EA-6Bs operated “from orbits just off the North Vietnam coast” and were not used “in the penetration mode for any penetration in Vietnam.” Unfortunately, the reasons Capt. Gallotta gave during his testimony were deleted for security reasons. However, the reasons for keeping the EA-6Bs off the coast can be deduced from other sources of information related to the SAM threat: primarily because of its lack of maneuverability due to basic characteristics of the airframe, its lack of power, and the heavy load and drag associated with the ECM pods it normally carried. As Maj. Gen. John J. Burns (USAF) revealed in his testimony

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to the subcommittee, neither deceptive jamming nor noise jamming provided enough protection to eliminate the need to maneuver. In order to avoid a SAM, Vice Adm. William D. Houser explained, “You had to be able to maneuver your airplane and out-maneuver the telephone pole chasing you”—something the EA-6B Prowler was not designed to do.4 There may have been other reasons as well. The tactical jamming pods on the original ALQ-99 initially covered only four of the seven radar bands used by the Soviets, a problem alluded to by Capt. Gallotta but not clarified in the public record that contained numerous redactions. Another issue may have been the lack of a missile warning system, which was not delivered with the first production EA-6Bs. Although the APR-27 was later added to the EA-6Bs in Southeast Asia, it proved difficult to integrate into the aircraft’s ECM suite due to the high radiated power of the EA-6B’s jammers. Despite these issues, a number of studies indicated that the EA-6B proved effective in reducing the number of losses due to SAMs and played a significant role in supporting Air Force operations conducted during Linebacker II. One such report produced by the Air Force special communications center concluded that the EA-6B was the most effective tactical electronics jamming system employed against the NVA defenses at any time during the war. The ALQ-99 TJS was so superior to the ECM jammers carried by the Air Force’s EB-66s that the Air Force considered acquiring the Prowler as a replacement for the aging EB-66. Although the advantages of the ALQ-99 were recognized by the Air Force, its leadership concluded that the EA-6B lacked the flight performance to meet the Air Force’s needs. Instead, the Air Force selected the high-performance F-111 Aardvark to house a version of the EA-6B’s jamming system.5 In May 1970 the Navy began development of an expanded capability (EXCAP) electronic countermeasures system for the EA-6B to counter the latest ECM threats being introduced by the NVA. The most significant features of the updated system were improvements to the ALQ-99 jammers, better reliability, and the capacity to support eight frequency bands instead of four. A digital recording system was added along with the ASH-30 tactical electronic processing and evaluation system that gave the EA-6B an ELINT capability, allowing it to locate and characterize radar and radio emitters. Twenty-five EXCAP versions of the EA-6B were built by Grumman. The majority of the earlier Prowlers also received this upgrade. The expanded capability EA-6B

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entered service with VAQ-133, which departed Norfolk, Virginia, in February 1974 on board America for a six-month deployment in the Mediterranean Sea.6 A third upgrade of the EA-6B Prowler, beginning with the fifty-fourth production aircraft, was undertaken under the Improved Capability Program (ICAP). The program improved the response time by adding digital tuning to the receivers, increasing the capabilities of the processor, and providing the operator with a better display. Improved operational utility was also gained by the introduction of new mission-critical software. Other changes included the addition of the ALQ-126 DECM set in place of the ALQ-100. A new communications jamming system, the interim ALQ-191, replaced the ALQ-92, which, according to one source, was seldom installed. The all-weather landing system was added, and the APQ-129 radar replaced the APS-130. To improve crew coordination and reduce the workload of the ECMOs, the cockpit was reconfigured to redistribute the various tasks more efficiently. The communications jamming function was relocated to the navigator’s position up front beside the pilot, and radar jamming functions were relocated to the two rear crew positions. Grumman began production of the ICAP Prowler in late 1977. The company built forty-five new ICAP EA-6Bs and converted seventeen of the previous versions.7 Research and development for a fourth upgrade of the EA-6B (designated ICAP-II) got under way in the spring of 1978 not long after the first ICAP-I entered service. Because the Navy was funding ALQ-99 improvements in parallel with the development of the Air Force EF-111A Raven, ICAP-II was able to capitalize on the technological advances being developed for it. Seventy percent of the Air Force’s ALQ-99-F was taken from the Navy’s ALQ-99. The changes made to the 30 percent that differed from the Navy’s ALQ-99D had more automation (needed for the single ECMO in the EF-111A) and provided faster threat acquisition and identification. The software and improvements in the displays of the ICAP-II’s TJS provided more accurate identification of hostile emitters, better power management, and greater reliability and maintainability. Jamming was also improved by upgrading the pods with a new universal exciter in each of five external jamming pods that could jam in two frequency bands simultaneously. The first of twelve baseline ICAP-II Prowlers was delivered by Grumman on January 3, 1984. The first of twenty-three Block 82 (fiscal year

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[FY] 1982 funding) with high-speed antiradiation missile (HARM) capability was delivered on January 21, 1986, and the first of thirty-seven Block 86 (FY86 funding) EA-6Bs was delivered on July 29, 1988. VAQ-131 was the first to transition into the ICAP-II version of the Prowler and was the first squadron to fly the original four major versions of the EA-6B (Standard, EXCAP, ICAP, and ICAP-II).8 The last of 170 Prowlers built by Grumman was delivered in November 1991. Late production ICAP-II aircraft featured an updated radio set that was to be the forebearer of the move to an advanced capability (ADVCAP) configuration that would see improvements in the airframe and the aircraft’s navigation and EW weapons system. The ADVCAP program was intended to counter the projected weapons systems the Soviet Union was thought to be developing. The ADVCAP upgrade would have introduced new jammer transmission and detection capabilities, along with an expansion of the AN/ALE-39 chaff dispenser set. The ADVCAP also would have incorporated the AN/ALQ-165 airborne self-protection jammer, AN/ALQ-149 communications jamming system, and AN/ALR-67 radar warning receiver. ADVCAP Prowlers would also have a global positioning system for navigation, and two wing stations would be added. The end of the Cold War and the increasing constraints on military spending that followed, however, forced the Navy to remove $7 billion from the planned FY95 budget. The ADVCAP program was one of the items deleted from the budget.9 The airmen flying the ICAP-I version of the EA-6B received their first taste of actual combat during Operation Prairie Fire. The operation, which was conceived by the Pentagon in the fall of 1985, was planned as a freedom of navigation exercise in the Gulf of Sidra to dispute Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi’s claim that the latitude line of 32° 30” north (the so-called Line of Death) marked his country’s northern boundary. In so doing, Qaddafi “sought to exclude U.S. ships and aircraft from a 3,200-square-mile area of the Mediterranean that had always been considered international waters.”10 Because Libya had one of the most sophisticated air defense systems in the world, the support of EA-6Bs would be an essential part of any strike group sent to attack Qaddafi’s forces and bases. But the air group that was assigned to USS Coral Sea (CV 43), which was scheduled to depart for the Mediterranean on

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October 1, 1985, lacked a detachment of EA-6Bs—the only electronic warfare support aircraft operating from U.S. carriers at the time. To make up for the shortfall, a detachment of VAQ-135’s EA-6Bs was taken from America, which was scheduled to redeploy to the Mediterranean in March, and transferred to Coral Sea. To make up for the loss of the EA-6Bs in its air group, a detachment of Marine EA-6Bs from VMAQ-2 was assigned to America.11 Operation Prairie Fire commenced in earnest in late February 1986, when Navy fighters entered the airspace claimed by Libya south of the Line of Death. During the next thirty-two days, Libyan aircraft repeatedly attempted to approach the U.S. carriers but were chased away by Task Force 60’s F-14 and F-18 fighters. By March 22, Task Force 60, composed of the carriers America, Coral Sea, and Saratoga and their supporting ships, was ready to commence Operation Attain Document III, in which a surface force consisting of an Aegis cruiser and destroyers would cross the Line of Death, demonstrating the U.S. right to freedom of navigation in that part of the Mediterranean. The surface force crossed the Line of Death at noon on March 24 protected by a pair of F-14As from America patrolling sixty miles from the Libyan coast and approximately eighty miles from a Libyan missile site near Surt equipped with Russian S-200 rockets. The S-200 (NATO code name SA-5 Gammon) was a long-range, high-altitude, command guidance surface-to-air missile with semi-active terminal guidance. The Libyans fired on the F-14s, which avoided the missiles by diving away, while supporting EA-6Bs jammed the SA-5’s firecontrol radar. Vice Adm. Frank B. Kelso II, in command of the Sixth Fleet, ordered a retaliatory strike on the missile site, which took place later that day. The attack, which was supported by two VAQ-132 EA-6Bs, was conducted by two A-7Es from Saratoga’s VA-81. The A-7Es used two AGM-88 HARMs to put the SA-5’s Square Pair radar out of action, destroying its antenna, cutting power lines, and damaging its control consoles.12 The EA-6Bs were in action again on the night of April 14 when they participated in Operation El Dorado Canyon—a coordinated Navy–Air Force airstrike against Muammar Qaddafi’s military bases as punishment for the terrorist attacks he had directed against U.S. citizens. Adm. Kelso, who was in overall command of this joint service operation, assigned three targets in and around Tripoli to the Air Force’s 48th Tactical Fighter Wing. Two targets at Benghazi

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were assigned to the Sixth Fleet’s carriers. The Sixth Fleet would also be responsible for providing a combat air patrol and suppression of enemy air defenses.13 The Air Force element consisted of eighteen F-111 bombers and five EF-111A electronic warfare aircraft that departed Royal Air Force Lakenheath in Suffolk, England, in the late afternoon. The round trip to Libya and back required eight to twelve in-flight refuelings for each aircraft.14 As the F-111s were nearing the coast of Libya, America and Coral Sea began launching their strike aircraft. The mission plans called for the Navy to conduct the first attack on the SAM sites around Benghazi to eliminate the Libyan air defenses before conducting simultaneous strikes on the Benina air base and the al-Jamahuriyah barracks. Suppression of the enemy air defenses around Benghazi was accomplished by twelve F/A-18 Hornets from Coral Sea supported by heavy jamming from four EA-6Bs (two each from Coral Sea’s VAQ-13 and America’s VMAQ-2). The F-18s, approaching Benghazi from the north and west, fired twenty AGM-88A HARMs that destroyed or shut down all five of the SAM sites around Benghazi. With support from additional EA-6Bs, A6-Es from Coral Sea then attacked the Benina air base, destroying four MiG23s, two Mi-8 helicopters, one G.222 transport, and a Boeing 727. Further west, six A-6Es of VA-34 from America bombed the al-Jamahuriyah barracks, destroying most of the large buildings.15 While the Navy was attacking its targets, the F-111s struck their objectives in and around Tripoli, which included the Bab l-Aziziyah barracks, the Sidi Bilal naval commando training complex, and the military aircraft at the Tripoli airport. By 2:30 a.m., all of the strike aircraft, except one F-111 that crashed into the ocean, had crossed the Libyan coast; the Navy planes were heading toward their carriers, and the F-111s’ forward tankers were waiting for them over the Mediterranean. “Libyan antiaircraft guns and missile batteries,” according to Judy Endicott, “continued to fire blindly into the sky for hours after the American aircraft had departed. Rattled Libyan gunners lit the skies for several nights following as well.” Although the raid did not topple Qaddafi’s regime, his “arrogance,” described Endicott, “was shaken, and he retreated into the desert for many months afterwards.”16

14

Prowlers at War

Electronic warfare played a greater role in Desert Storm than any previous conflict.

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—BRUCE NORDWALL 1

he next large-scale combat operation in which the EA-6Bs played an important role was Operation Desert Storm in the Gulf War against Iraq in 1991. When the war started, the U.S. Navy had one electronic warfare squadron of four EA-6Bs in each carrier air group and eighteen Marine EA-6Bs assigned to VMAQ-2. Iraq, according to a RAND Corporation report, “had an impressive integrated air defense system (IADS). It featured hardened, redundant, internetted, and buried communications links, with some 16,000 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and 7,000 antiaircraft artillery (AAA). . . . [T]he most critical targets were more heavily defended than any Eastern European even during the height of the Cold War.”2 The air campaign began on January 17 when eight U.S. Army AH-64 Apache helicopters led by four Air Force MH-53 Pave Low helicopters destroyed Iraqi radar sites near the Saudi Arabian border with AGM-114 Hellfire missiles. During the hours that followed, more than one hundred coalition fighters flew defense suppression and counterair missions against Iraqi air bases, missiles sites, and command installations supported by EF-111As and EA-6Bs that provided close-in and stand-off jamming. HARMs fired by the EA-6Bs also contributed to the total destruction of the Iraqi IADS. 110

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The Navy contingent of EW aircraft included two EA-3Bs and three EP-3Es that flew support missions out of bases in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Oman. On the first day of the war, Navy EA-6Bs used jamming pods and HARMs to support attacks on airfields in western Iraq while Marine EA-6Bs jammed Iraqi EW/GCI radars to screen a large F/A-18 strike on Tallil airfield. The initial attacks against Iraqi radar systems were so successful that the mere presence of EA-6Bs forced the Iraqis to shut down their radars for fear of losing them to HARMs. Together, the Navy and Marine Corps conducted 1,651 EW missions during the conflict and launched more than 150 HARMs. A total of thirtynine Navy and Marine Corps EA-6Bs took part in the war. Twenty-seven of these were Navy planes flying from carriers stationed in the Persian Gulf. Two six-plane detachments of VMAQ-2 EA-6Bs were deployed to and flew out of the Shaikh Isa air base in Bahrain.3 One unforeseen complication with the EA-6B’s ALQ-99 jamming system was discovered during its wartime missions. In use, the computer-controlled ALQ-99 intercepted and automatically processed Iraqi radar signals and managed the exciters that created the jamming signals. The intense power of the ALQ-99’s jamming signals limited its full power output during peacetime exercises. This had unanticipated consequences, according to aviation journalist Dario Leone, because the full power of the “Prowlers [jammers] caused the radar homing and warning [RHAW] gear of F-14s to literally go crazy, and jammed not only their own [Identification Friend or Foe] signals, but also much of the radio communications. . . . [A] subsequent investigation revealed that their emissions were one of the principal reasons for communication problems experienced by multiple Navy formations underway over Iraq on the first day of the war.”4 Following the end of the Gulf War in March 1991, the Iraqi air force bombed and strafed the Shi’ite Muslims in southern Iraq during the remainder of 1991 and into 1992. This led to Operation Southern Watch (and to Operation Northern Watch that began in 1997) conducted from the summer of 1992 to the spring of 2003 for the purpose of ensuring Iraqi compliance with a United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution to end the repression of the Shi’ite Muslims. To enforce the resolution, President George W. Bush established a no-fly zone over southern Iraq. Flying activities included fighter sweeps and patrols conducted against would-be targets in southern Iraq, reconnaissance, suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD), air-to-air refueling, and airborne warning and control support.5

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The first EA-6Bs on station over Iraq during Operation Southern Watch were those of VAQ-134 assigned to CVW-5 on board USS Independence (CV 62) stationed in the Persian Gulf. The squadron fired its AGM-88 HARMs for the first time during an attack on strategic SAM sites in southern Iraq on January 13 and 18, 1993. These missions were conducted in support of the aircraft assigned to Joint Task Force Southwest Asia that were enforcing the no-fly zone.6 The EA-6B Prowlers were called into action again in 1995 during Operation Deliberate Force, the NATO air campaign conducted in concert with the UN Protection Force ground operations to undermine the military capability of the army of Republika Srpska that had threatened and attacked UN-designated “safe areas” in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Bosnian war.7 The air campaign against the Bosnians began on August 30 with an air defense suppression strike aimed at neutralizing the Bosnian Serb army’s air defense network in southeast Bosnia. Under Deadeye Southeast, a package of seventeen aircraft— F-18C Hornets and EA-6B Prowlers from USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71)— struck SAM sites, command posts, early warning radar sites, and communications nodes to the north, east, and south of Sarajevo. Suppression of enemy air defense tactics, which included the use of AGM-88 HARMs, tactical airlaunched drones, and laser-guided bombs, opened the way for follow-on air strikes by other NATO aircraft at Bosnian Serb army ammunition dumps around Sarajevo.8 Three years before the EA-6Bs were called into action during Desert Storm, the Navy was already planning to improve the aircraft’s ECM suite, which had first entered service seventeen years earlier. In March 1988 the Secretary of the Navy approved a proposal to merge the ongoing development projects designed to improve the EA-6B’s ECM performance into a program titled the Block 91 upgrade. The Navy intended to include the upgraded ECM in the 126 new production EA-6Bs that were to be manufactured beginning in 1991. When procurement of new EA-Bs was eliminated from the FY89 budget, the Block 91 upgrade was redesignated a “manufacturing only” program whose structure consisted of three separate program elements: the ADVCAP onboard system, a vehicle enhancement program, and the avionics improvement program. The specifics of each element are as follows:

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• The ADVCAP onboard system consisted of improvements to the ALQ-99 receiver processor group that had the ability to detect, identify, locate, and provide warning threats, and the replacement of the ALQ-92 jammers with ALQ-149 communications jammers for the interception and identification of voice, data links, and radar threats. This equipment was installed on a test aircraft and used for development and operational testing between January and July 1992. • The vehicle enhancement program (VEP) incorporated maneuver improvements and upgraded engines to increase the stall margin in the EA-6B, which would become critical with the added weight of the ADVCAP system, installed and tested in an aircraft in 1992. • The avionics improvement program would test the ADVCAP and VEP changes to validate system integration and capability and to verify the remanufacture configuration.9 The ALQ-149 and the receiver processor group were “intended to improve the EA-6B’s performance in dense signal environments as well as provide it with a communication jamming ability.” Development of the ALQ-49 began in the late 1970s as part of the Navy’s command, control, and communications countermeasures program. After being evaluated within a controlled environment by the NRL in 1980, an advanced model was flight-tested at China Lake. The Navy completed testing of the advanced development model in FY82 and expected to begin full-scale development the next year. Sanders, which had the contract to produce the system, encountered numerous difficulties trying to get the system to work in accordance with the Navy’s specifications, however. A DOD inspector general’s report on the EA-6B program conducted in 1992 listed no less than forty-six corrective actions that Sanders Associates needed to take to fix the problems with the ALQ-149. The company was unable to fix all of the problems, which contributed to the demise of the ADVCAP program, cancelled in 1994 due to cost constraints and ongoing discrepancies with the Sanders units.10 In November 1994, ten months before EA-6Bs went into action in Serbia, recommendations made by the congressionally mandated Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, established to eliminate redundancy and waste in the DOD, led to increased funding for the EA-6B and a cut in funding

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for the EF-111A. As Lt. Christopher C. Kirkham, USN, noted in his excellent study of interservice rivalry, “the shifting of funds combined with the decision by top Air Force officials to retire the EF-111A left little doubt that the Prowler was intended to be the sole source of Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (JSEAD) support into the 21st century.” A number of factors contributed to the decision to retire the EF-111A in favor of the EA-6B. First and foremost was the issue of operating expenses. Although the F-111s made up 9 percent of the aircraft in the Tactical Air Command, they consumed 25 percent of the command’s maintenance budget. Furthermore, the cost to operate the EF-111A was $5,500 per flight hour, while that for the EA-6B was only $3,255. Second was the issue of upgrades. While both aircraft needed new ECM equipment to counter the next generation of SAM systems, the EA-6B’s ICAP-II weapons system had a better tactical jamming capability. The EA-6B’s four-man crew provided additional operational advantages over the EF-111A’s two-man crew. The EA-6B was also equipped to fire the AGM-88 HARM, which the EF-111A was not. Lastly, and not insignificantly, “the Air Force was promoting a concept that stealth aircraft required no outside electronic support to perform their mission, thus no reason existed to maintain the EF-111A.”11 After the decision was made to retire the EF-111A, the Office of the Secretary of Defense directed the Navy, using the EA-6B, to assume the joint mission of airborne offensive electronic warfare for all of the DOD. The decision to adopt the EA-6B, the most capable existing platform, was made despite its lack of supersonic capability and reduced unrefueled range because it was the best “bang for the DOD buck.” To meet the enhanced requirements to fill the gap left when the EF-111As were retired, the Navy intended to retain twenty additional EA-6Bs that had been scheduled for attrition reserve. These aircraft would need to be refurbished and modified in accordance with the Block 89A upgrade. In its pitch to Congress to fund the program, the Navy described the Block 89A upgrade as a $1.1 billion “low-cost alternative” to the terminated ADVCAP program that would include the same structural and safety changes and the same avionics modifications along with the same jammer pod improvements and low band transmitter capability but would eliminate the highly expensive ALQ-149 communications jammer and the replacement receiver processor group.12 The Navy began funding the revised Block 89A program in FY96 using $219 million in prior year funds. During the congressional hearings on DOD

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appropriations for 1996, Vice Adm. T. Joseph Lopez, deputy CNO for resources, warfare requirements, and assessments, advised the members of the House Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations that the Navy planned “to continue to modify and improve the EA-6B in a flexible, ‘building block’ approach that corrects known problems and permits future upgrades as the threat requires and funds permit.”13 The first phase of the Block 89A called for modifying sixty-nine Block 82 and fifty-six Block 86 EA-6Bs to a standard aircraft configuration while retaining the ICAP-II EW weapons system. Funds to upgrade twenty of the EA-6Bs in storage were authorized by Congress in FY96. A $59.3 million contract to outfit twenty EA-6Bs with the modifications needed to comply with the Block 89A configuration was subsequently awarded to Northrop Grumman on February 18, 1997. The changes made to the EA-6Bs included the addition/ substitution of the AYK-14 mission computer, ARC-210 radios, an embedded global positioning/internal navigation system, and a new electronic flight information system.14 The first of four upgraded Block 89A EA-6Bs flew at Northrop Grumman’s St. Augustine, Florida, facility on June 8, 1997.15 Cancellation of the ALQ-149 left the Navy without a state-of-the-art communications jammer, which was badly needed to enhance the capability of the EA-6B. Using technology migrated from the ALQ-149, the Navy initiated the development of the USQ-113 communications jammer. The first unit designed and built by Sanders was delivered in 1996. It would become a key piece in the next major upgrade of the EA-6B’s weapons system: the ICAP-III program. The program kicked off in March 1998 when Northrop Grumman was awarded a $150 million engineering and manufacturing development contract for the ICAP-III development.16, 17 Many modern enemy radars are capable of employing very fast “frequency hopping” techniques to deceive radar warning receivers and radar jammers. To counter this technique, a key feature of the ICAP-III upgrade was the introduction of “selective-reactive” jamming.18 Instead of jamming all the frequencies on which enemy radars might be emitting, ICAP-III was designed to automatically identify, prioritize, and jam only those frequencies actually in use. If threat radars use frequency-hopping techniques, the selective-reactive system will instantly shift its transmissions to match the adversary’s actions.19

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Figure 14-1. EA-6B Evolution Source: Christopher Bolkcom, “Electronic Warfare: EA-6B Aircraft Modernization and Related Issues for Congress.”

As the prime contractor, Northrop Grumman was responsible for integrating the subsystems being produced by the various subcontractors involved in upgrading the EA-6B. This included Sanders, which was responsible for providing displays related to an integrated USQ-113 jammer (as opposed to the stand-alone ALQ-113); Litton Industries, which was tasked with replacing the ALQ-99; Comptek Federal Systems, which was developing receiver algorithms; and PRB Associates, which would provide graphical user interfaces for the colored displays. Engineering and manufacturing development was scheduled for completion in January 2004.20 The importance of airborne offensive electronic warfare and the mission of the EA-6B was brought into focus again in 1999 during the crisis in Kosovo. “On March 24, 1999, NATO forces,” as documented in a research brief by Benjamin Lambeth, “initiated an air war against Serbia in an effort to put an end to the human rights abuses that were then being perpetrated against the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo.” The ensuing seventy-eight-day campaign, named Operation Allied Force, “was the most intense and sustained military operation to have been conducted in Europe since the end of World War II.”21

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NATO planned to conduct a gradually escalating air campaign that was divided into three phases. The first of these would target the Serbian air defense system. One Air Force historian later described Serbian air defenses as “a credible integrated air defense system from the former Soviet Union that was tiered, offered layered defense and was redundant.” With the demise of the EF-111 (the last was retired in 1998), the only EW jamming platforms in the U.S. military that could support the suppression of Serbian IADS were the EA-6Bs.22 At the beginning of the campaign, the Pentagon sent twenty-two EA-6Bs to Aviano, Italy, to provide electronic warfare support for the Allied airstrike missions. The aircraft came from VMAQ-1 and VMAQ-2 home-based at MCAS Cherry Point, VAW-134 and VAQ-138 stationed at NAS Whidbey Island, and VAQ-209, a reserve squadron based at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. Five more EA-6Bs of VAQ-142 arrived in theater onboard USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) on April 6.23 The EA-6Bs usually flew in pairs, orbiting at medium level above fifteen thousand feet to avoid AAA and man-portable anti-aircraft missiles. David Cenciotti, a former military pilot, aviation enthusiast, and journalist, describes how these missions were flown: “The orbit was positioned at a variable distance from the target depending on weather conditions and altitude in the area, and reciprocal position and separation of the two aircraft was maintained referring to a previously established point, code-named Bullseye, whose distance and radial were broadcasted in frequency by the pilot of the leader aircraft to wingman using one of the on board radios (2 UHF, 2 VHF, 1 HF, and 1 SATCOM for satellite communications) that use the HAVE QUICK II system [a secure communication system that used frequency hopping techniques to randomly fragment sentences].”24 Despite the availability of inflight refueling, the EA-6Bs flying from Aviano—which was more than 450 miles from Kosovo—had to carry a third pylon-mounted fuel tank in order to maintain five to six hours on station during their mission, which typically ran for eight hours. EA-6Bs of VAQ-141 flying off the deck of Theodore Roosevelt stationed off the Albanian coast were closer to the operating areas in Kosovo and could make do with a single external fuel tank. This made one pylon available for an additional AGM-88 HARM. Nearly half of all the HARMs expended during the conflict were fired by Prowlers, which flew more than 1,600 sorties.25

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The EMOs in ICAP-II EA-6Bs had two systems for use in disrupting Serbian air defenses: the ALQ-99 TJS and the USQ-113 communications jamming system. The USQ-113 was operated by the ECMO sitting next to the pilot. He used it to detect, analyze, and disrupt radio communications used by Serbian ground controllers. This ECMO was also responsible for radio communication, navigation, and defensive countermeasures. The two ECMOs in the rear worked with the ALQ-99 to identify enemy radar transmissions that posed a danger to Allied aircraft using a data library within the system’s computer to sort out the various radar signals picked up by the system’s passive receivers. This allowed the ECMOs to select the appropriate frequency for the jamming signal generated in the exciters in the pylon-mounted jamming pods. The jamming tactic used by the EA-6Bs would saturate the radar to blind it completely or deceive it with false targets. This form of “preventive jamming” required relatively large amounts of jamming power spread over a large area. One naval officer who flew missions in the EQA-6B during the conflict described this tactic as “analogous to using free-fall MK80 series ‘dumb’ bombs in strike warfare,” which was unlike the system slated for ICAP-III that would use “selective-reactive” jamming to pinpoint SAM radar frequencies so that concentrated jamming power could be directed at the desired target.26 As noted in the DOD report to Congress on Operation Allied Force, the “EA-6Bs were absolutely important to the air operation.” It was the only U.S. electronic aircraft able to use electronic jamming to suppress enemy air defenses. At the same time, other EA-6Bs were providing support to Operations Southern Watch and Northern Watch. To accomplish this, the Navy had to deploy ten of the nineteen EA-6B squadrons in the Navy and the Marines. Recognizing the need to supplement the heavily overtaxed Prowlers, Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig asked Congress to appropriate $150 million in FY01 for an additional EA-6B squadron, increasing the force to 104 aircraft. Included in the budget was $31 million for improvements in the USQ-113 and $23 million for a new automatic flight control system.27 The Department of Defense was able to secure funds to accelerate the installation of the improved avionics package for the EA-3Bs. It also obtained approval for the formation of the additional EA-6B squadron requested by Secretary Danzig by drawing aircraft from the existing inventory through reassignment of selected test aircraft and previously stored aircraft. This would bring

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the total number of Navy and Marine Corps EA-6B squadrons to twenty—five of which were to be earmarked for land-based expeditionary deployments (see chapter 17 for more on expeditionary squadrons). At the same time, the DOD also initiated a joint effort to determine the capabilities that should be developed to replace the EA-6Bs as they began to be drawn down because of age after 2010. Because of the high operational tempo of the EA-6B and its importance as the only airborne radar jammer in the U.S. inventory, the Pentagon placed the EA-6B on a list of specialized military resources considered to be “low-density, high-demand” assets. In his annual report to the president and Congress in 2000, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen defined low-density, high-demand assets as “force elements consisting of major platforms, weapons systems, units, and/or personnel that possess unique mission capabilities and are in continual high demand to support worldwide joint military operations.”28 EA-6Bs were called into action again on March 20, 2003, when coalition forces invaded Iraq in the opening phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom (the second Gulf War) to prevent the Iraqi government led by Saddam Hussein from developing weapons of mass destruction. Once again EA-6Bs proved essential for the air campaign since “the availability of Navy EA-6B jamming support was an ironclad go/no go criterion for all Iraqi Freedom strike missions, including those that involved stealthy Air Force B-2s and F-117s.” An example of a typical mission was the one flown during the second night of operations when EA-6Bs provided jamming support for Air Force F-15Es and Royal Air Force Tornado GR-4s, which opened a penetration corridor for two F-117s attempting to take out the Iraqi leader. The Prowler also played a key role in psychological operations in Iraq, using its USQ-113 communications jammer to take control of insurgent radio broadcasts and disrupt cell phone traffic.29 On the same day that the EA-6Bs began operations with the coalition forces in Iraq, testing of the ALQ-218 receiver, which began in February of the previous year and involved no fewer than twenty-nine open-air range sorties, was successfully completed. The ALQ-218 was the most significant improvement brought about by the ICAP-III upgrade because it provided the EA-6B with a previously unavailable reactive jamming capability. Approval for low-rate initial production of ten ICAP-III–upgraded Prowlers was received in June 2003. The first five ICAP-III Block 1 EA-6B Prowlers were delivered in FY05.30 By then the Navy, realizing that the EA-6Bs still in service with the Navy and Marines

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were rapidly nearing the end of their useful lives, was already in the process of developing the EA-18G Growler as a replacement. The need to shift resources to the Growler limited the number of EA-6Bs upgraded to the ICAP-III configuration to twenty aircraft, the last of which was delivered in September 2011. ICAP-III aircraft continued to be upgraded with Block 7 software updates continuing through 2017.31 The Navy began phasing out the EA-6B when the EA-18G reached initial operating capability in 2009. The last Navy squadron to fly the EA-6B was VAQ-134. It deployed for the last time on February 15, 2014, when it joined with CVW-8 on USS George H. W. Bush (CVN 77) heading for the Middle East. The squadron was one of the first units called upon to support airstrikes against the Daesh as part of the Combined Task Force conducting Operation Inherent Resolve—a U.S.–led international coalition established on October 17, 2014, to destroy the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).32 The deployment of VAQ-134 on board Bush was the last operational use of the Navy’s EA-6Bs. The last operational flights of a Navy EA-6B took place during the Prowler retirement ceremony held at NAS Whidbey Island in June 2015.33 The four six-plane Marine EA-6B squadrons (VMAQ-T-1, VMAQ-2, VMAQ-3, and VMAQ-4) that remained after the last Navy Prowler was retired continued to operate the aircraft for the next few years until they too were disbanded one by one. The first to be disbanded was the training/replacement squadron VMAQ-T-1, which was deactivated in May 2016. It was followed by VMAQ-4 in June 2017 and VMAQ-3 in May 2018. VMAQ-2, the last to be disbanded, was deactivated on March 18, 2019, marking the end of the Marine Corps electronic warfare community that could trace its lineage back to before the Korean War.34

15

ARIES Aircraft

T

he Airborne Reconnaissance Integrated Electronic System (ARIES) was the name given to the EP-3E, the highly specialized ELINT version of the P-3 Orion that had been preceded by the EP-3B, which itself was preceded by a small number of P-3As modified by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for clandestine ELINT work over communist China. The fourengine turbo-prop Orion was a navalized version of Lockheed’s Electra airliner ordered as a replacement for the P-2 Neptune antisubmarine warfare (ASW) platform. As described by Gordon Swanborough and Peter M. Bowers, “The Orion was very fully equipped for its ASW role, with extensive electronics in the fuselage including APS-80 radar and ASQ-10 MAD [magnetic anomaly detector], plus stowage for search stores, and a thirteen-foot-long unpressurized bomb-bay equipped to carry torpedoes, depth-bombs, mines, or nuclear weapons. Ten external pylons under the wings could carry mines or rockets. A searchlight was located under the starboard wing.” The size and greater performance of the P-3A made it an excellent choice to replace the P-2V Neptune. The P-3 was faster than the P-2V (378 mph vs. 207 mph cruising speed) and had a higher ceiling (28,000 vs. 22,000 feet) as well as a greater range that permitted the P-3 to spend more time on station. The P-3’s greater maximum speed (473 mph vs. 345 mph) was also a big advantage, especially if it had to evade an enemy interception. The first P-3As went into service with VP-8 and VP-44 in August 1962.1 121

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The advantages of the P-3A made it the ideal substitute for the P2V-7Us the CIA had supplied to the Republic of China Air Force for conducting covert, low-altitude reconnaissance flights over communist China. In 1963 three P-3As were transferred to the CIA as part of a top-secret program codenamed ST/SPIN. Funds to obtain the three aircraft from the Navy were provided by the National Reconnaissance Office, which had authorized the project. The requirements for ST/SPIN were laid out in a memorandum for the deputy director of the CIA on May 23, 1963. The number-one priority of the program was to obtain data “urgently needed on the status and activity of the Liquid Fuel Rocket Test Facility.” Information on the Chinese nuclear weapons program was also wanted, as well as any information that could be collected on the production of petroleum and petroleum products, which were important indicators of Chinese economic and military activity.2 The first P-3A arrived at the Naval Aviation Depot at Alameda, California, in June. After widening the main cabin door and adding a duplicate next to the original to create a fifty-three-inch opening in the fuselage, the plane was sent to the electrosystems division of Ling-Temco-Vought in Greenville, Texas. The electrosystems division had been contacted to modify the first P-3A and the two that were to follow for use in the nighttime covert missions to be flown by the Republic of China Air Force 34 Squadron. Along with the ELINT receivers that had been carried in the P-2Vs, the electrosystems division installed a variety of additional equipment that included a side-looking airborne radar, communications interception gear, and an IR detection system. The planes were also equipped with cameras for slant-range oblique photography. In addition to the cargo door already mentioned, changes to the standard P-3A airframe included extended exhaust pipes on the engine nacelles to reduce the IR signature, shortened propeller blades to reduce noise, a bulged observation window on top of the aft fuselage, panel and blade antennas, an air cooler fairing with two intakes positioned just aft of the forward starboard observation window, and modifications to the bomb bay doors. The magnetic anomaly detection boom was also removed. The P-3s, according to Romano and Herndon, were later fitted with AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles on two wing pylons under each wing for self-protection.3 After being modified, the three converted P-3As were flown to Taiwan where they were turned over to the Republic of China Air Force for duty with

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the 34 Squadron. The squadron had been established in 1958 with the support of the CIA for the express purpose of conducting low-altitude reconnaissance missions over the mainland to collect intelligence on the communist regime. Since all of their operations were conducted at night, the squadron’s moniker became the “Black Bat Squadron.” Operations with the converted P-3As began in 1964. “Some missions,” wrote Jeffrey Richelson in The Wizards of Langley, “involved flying along the southern border of the People’s Republic of China, with occasional penetrations to detect air defense radars and determine the characteristics of their signals. Missions into the interior also involved locating military installations, intercepting military communications, and air sampling” using the ram air scoops and collecting apparatus installed by the aerosystems division, air drops of propaganda leaflets, and occasionally parachuting in a spy. Before the third P-3A had been modified, in 1965 the National Reconnaissance Office notified the head of the CIA’s ELINT office that they were terminating the program; it ended the following year after the Black Bats conducted their last flight.4 After the ST/SPIN project was terminated in January 1967, the three P-3As were returned to the United States and flown to NAS Alameda, California, where they were temporarily placed in storage. One of these aircraft was modified as a research, development, test, and evaluation aircraft for use at the Pacific Missile Test Center at Point Mugu, California. This particular aircraft, operating under the EP-3A designation, was utilized to develop the electronic emitter location system used as a SAM warning system in Vietnam. The two remaining P-3As were shipped to the Lockheed plant in Burbank, where they were modified for electronic reconnaissance at a cost of $17 million. The modifications included the installation of a top-secret ELINT-COMINT automatic data processing system for tactical use. The system, code-named White Dove II, was developed by an Air Force engineer working for the CIA and consisted of both an onboard electronics package and a ground system for automatic readout of the sensor data collected. The onboard electronics were installed in the two stored P-3s by the Naval Materiel Command with the assistance of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations working through the assistant CNO for air. The ground system was shipped to the Pacific ELINT center at Fuchu, Japan, in the early summer of 1968.5

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The first of these highly modified P-3s, now identified as EP-3Bs, arrived in Atsugi, Japan, on March 19, 1969. A second followed on June 21. After checkout, both aircraft were assigned to VQ-1 Detachment Bravo (which had been operating EC-121Ms from Da Nang on a permanent basis since September 3, 1965) and given the name Batrack. One former member of the squadron states that the “back end equipment of the EP-3B was similar to that of the EC-121M (Willy)” and that the “real advantage of the EP-3B was its cruising altitude, nearly twice that to the venerable Willy,” which provided a significant improvement in the quality of the signals intercepted.6 In addition to its PARPRO missions (see chapter 6), VQ-1’s task was to conduct electronic reconnaissance in support of fleet operations in order to obtain information and intelligence on areas and targets of naval interest. The detachment at Da Nang (task element TE 70.2.3.1) conducted electronic warfare operations in direct support of U.S. combat forces in Southeast Asia, including missions over Laos in search of fire-control radars. As documented in A Century of U.S. Naval Intelligence, “Southeast Asian operations by VQ-1 provided nearly 1,000 warnings of impending MiG fighter and surface-to-air missile attacks against endangered U.S. aircraft. VQ-1 also provided warning services in case of surface-to-surface missile threats and other attack threats. In addition to tactical warning services, VQ-1 updated electronic order-of battle data for Southeast Asian area.” The unique capabilities of Detachment Bravo’s EP-3Bs were demonstrated in the late summer and early fall of 1971 when the Soviet fleet conducted extensive out-of-area operations in the western Pacific. An RA-EB photo reconnaissance aircraft enticed many of the Soviet ships to turn on their radars by making low-altitude passes against them. VQ-1’s EP-3 obtained data on many of the Soviet emitters and “fingerprinted” a majority of the participating combatants. The EP-3B also monitored a number of antiship cruise missile exercises and was able to intercept and record all of the signals normally associated with such operations.7 While the Batrack EP-3Bs were entering service with VQ-1, Congress appropriated $2 million to convert one of the P-3As into a prototype for the EP-3E type that was to replace the vulnerable EC-121M. The establishment of the EP-3E program coincided with a project to improve and update the EC-121M called UPCON (UPdate CONstellation). In 1970 it was decided to include

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these improvements as part of the EP-3E program. Funding for three EP-3Es was provided for one aircraft in 1970 in the amount of $5.88 million and for two aircraft in 1971 in the amount of $10.46 million. By then the EP-3E had been christened the ARIES, which some authors attribute to the personnel in VQ-2 who claimed to have had a major input in the UPCON program. Which electronic gear was included in the delivery of the first three EP-3Es has been obscured by the passage of time and the production of the seven EP-3E ARIES Deep Well variants that entered service in 1974 with VQ-1 and VQ-2.8 Deep Well was an automated communications intercept and recording system manufactured by the electronic systems division of the Sylvania Electric Products Company. The system, which relied on early digital computer technology, was developed to identify and track the ships of the Soviet navy. According to one authority, “Deep Well was the heart and soul of the NAVSECGRU

EP-3E ARIES Deep Well Variant ELINT Operators and Equipment The ELINT section of the EP-3E’s electronic warfare compartment had six operator positions in the forward section on the port side. The operators sat side by side and faced outboard. Position one, the most forward, had the ALR-44 broadband ECM receiver that was the primary ELINT collection system for the EP-3E. Positions two and three each had two SR-212 receivers covering the VHF and UHF bands. Position four was for the operator of the Brigand system; five had another ALR44; and six operated Big Look, which utilized the ALR-44 and ALR-52 instantaneous frequency measurement system. Each operator could select a direction-finding antenna system, a left-right fixed antenna, or the Big Look antenna. Because of the smaller radome on the EP-3, the Big Look antenna reflector was only 9½ feet in width compared to that of the EC-121M, which was 17½ feet. Position seven, on the outboard starboard side, was occupied by the tactical evaluator. A certified calibration technician usually sat in position eight behind the Big Look operator facing aft. The HP8555 spectrum analyzer at that position could also be used as a receiver. Source: C. Lyle Fisher, “Arrival of EP-3E Deepwell,” VQ Association, http://vqassociation .org/history.

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[Naval Security Group] manned mission system of the Navy’s new EP-3E.” The Naval Security Group provided the operators to support the electronic intercept equipment carried by the EP-3s. Operation of the Deep Well system, which bore the official designation of ALR-60, revolved around two digitally tuned receivers that would alert the operator when a specified or requested signal became active. Upon signal activation, Deep Well’s computer would start one of the fifteen open, reelless audio recorders that were part of the system. Each of the operators (one for each digital receiver) also had access to two manually tuned SR-212 receivers that were used for searching or monitoring other

Figure 15-1. EP-3E Operator Positions

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signals of interest. The system’s computer was an essential piece of equipment, for if it failed, it would be impossible to recover the audio recordings. “It [the computer] was a step too far,” according to Lt. Cdr. George “Guy” Thomas, who, as officer in charge of the Naval Security Group Atsugi, was given the task of directing the operational testing of the Deep Well system.9 Although a few of the enlisted personnel had received initial training on the system at the electronic systems division in Mountain View, California, most of the senior operators felt challenged by the automation. They believed that the “computers were trying to replace them” and would revert to the manual mode at the first indication of trouble. Besides problems with the computer, which often froze, the designers omitted any data systems collection and analysis capability, which would have been very helpful for the post-mission evaluation of the data. Commander Thomas and the leadership in VQ-1 “thought this was a big mistake.” Trying to run the multiposition tactical support EP-3E ARIES with a computer having just 15K or 32K of memory, according to Thomas, proved too difficult given the technology of the 1970s.10 The deficiencies documented by Thomas and by those in VQ-2 who were also using Deep Well eventually made their way up the chain of command. By 1978 the Board of Inspection and Survey Trials had identified “significant deficiencies in the performance of some [unspecified] equipment on the EP-3E ARIES.” To rectify these deficiencies, the Navy requested $17 million in the FY78 budget to retrofit all ten EP-3Es.11 By 1978 the two EP-3Bs that had been converted from the first production run of P-3As was nearing the end of their service lives. The Navy planned to replace the EP-3s in the 1990s. To keep the EP-3Bs in operation, the Navy requested $3.1 million in the FY79 budget for a service life extension of the fuselage, wing structures, and landing gear. It also planned to replace the EP-3B’s avionics equipment with the EP-3E’s avionic subsystems, which would improve the performance, reliability, and maintainability of the two aircraft.12 A year later the Navy requested $10 million in the FY81 budget to start a combination service life extension/conversion in lieu of procurement program for the EP-3E and EP-3B aircraft. The Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) would initiate an inspection program for ten EP-3E aircraft to extend their service life to the 1996–2001 time frame. The conversion in lieu of procurement (CILOP) was to procure, install, and integrate a number of devices, including

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an airborne ESM data analysis system and an automated radar pattern recognition system, along with high-resolution multipurpose displays for all twelve of the EP-3E/B aircraft in service. In 1980 the Navy changed its request to $8.4 million in FY81 and $7.4 million in FY82 while decreasing the number of aircraft in the CILOP program to the ten EP-3Es, dropping the two EP-3Bs that presumably were too expensive to convert given their age and limited life expectancy.13 In the latter part of 1983, the Navy began deploying the BGM-109B antiship version of the Tomahawk cruise missile. One of the major problems confronting the developers of the Tomahawk anti-ship missile (TASM) was how to get surveillance information to the launching platform.14 The problem was solved by the electronic systems division’s experimental computer system named Outlaw Shark, a shore-based digital computer system that collected and condensed targeting information for the TASM that was transmitted to a submarine equipped with the missile over a computer-to-computer encrypted radio link. The addition of the TASM added a new mission for the EP-3E ARIES: over-the-horizon targeting. Recognizing the need for additional aircraft to provide this important function, the Navy requested that funds be provided in the FY81 budget to procure two new EP-3C aircraft that had a fly-away cost of $43.9 million apiece. This dollar amount did not include the cost of any government-supplied equipment such as the engines or ESM gear. The Navy justified its decision to buy the new aircraft by claiming that the desired mission capability could “be more effectively achieved by purchasing fourteen new basic type P-3C aircraft configured for the reconnaissance and electronic warfare mission with automated electronic and communication intercept equipment.”15 These fourteen aircraft would provide tactical airborne SIGINT reconnaissance and over-the-horizon targeting to the battle group.16 Representative Joseph P. Addabbo (D-NY), who served as chairman of the subcommittee on DOD appropriations, was not amenable to the Navy’s request. He reminded Lt. Cdr. John R. Lapaille, who made the funding request as the representative for the deputy CNO for air, that Congress had appropriated $28.2 million the year before for EP-3 modifications that would continue the SLEP program to ten EP-3Es that would extend their service life expiration in 1984. “And now suddenly,” he admonished Commander Lapaille, “we find that the airframe needs to be replaced.” He told Lapaille to carefully review

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the request, “because we are not getting a list of so-called like-to-have items.” Although the Navy conducted a review of foreign and domestic airframes for the same application, it did not find any that could be procured within the funding constraints placed by Congress and had to settle for a CILOP program.17 In June 1986 the Navy awarded a $60 million CILOP contract to the Lockheed Aircraft Service Company to modify twelve existing P-3Cs into EP-3E ARIES II aircraft. The task of stripping the P-3Cs of equipment racks, sonobuoy chutes, and other unneeded components and installing the modification kits engineered and manufactured at Lockheed’s Ontario, California, facility was undertaken by Lockheed’s Aeromod Center in Greensville, South Carolina. Because of production delays experienced by Lockheed, the sixth through twelfth aircraft were modified at the Naval Aviation Depot, Alameda. Each P-3C required approximately eighteen months to be modified, including the installation of electronic equipment, some of which was removed from the existing fleet of EP-3E ARIES I and reinstalled in the new aircraft along with ESM upgrade kits supplied by Lockheed.18 The first of the new EP-3E ARIES II took to the air on April 11, 1990. They entered service with VQ-2 at Rota, Spain, on June 29, 1991. The last example was delivered in 1997. Four more P-3Cs were modified in the 2000s to sustain twelve operational aircraft in the fleet at all times.19 As it entered service, the EP-3E ARIES II was configured as a multi-intelligence tactical asset designed to evaluate the battlefield electronic threat, provide real-time threat warning, and conduct long-range radar targeting and analysis. It provided fleet and theater commanders with real-time tactical SIGINT and full motion video intelligence. The exact nature of the electronic suite, according to one source, appears to have varied from aircraft to aircraft. The main systems carried by these EP-3E ARIES II aircraft consisted of the ALQ-110 Big Look signals gathering and analyzing system, the ALR-60 Deep Well multiposition intercept and recording system, and the ALD-8 ECM communications receiving system. Other equipment included the ALR-77 ECM threat location and targeting system, the ALR-52 IMF receiver, and the AAR-37 IR receiver.20 In 1997 the Navy began testing a new upgrade package for the EP-3E ARIES II called the Sensor System Improvement Program (SSIP) that would exploit future threats by enhancing the communication connectivity and joint interoperability.21 Installation and developmental testing of the first SSIP kit at

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EP-3J The EP-3J (J for jammer) was the designation for the two converted P-3 Orions that were modified to portray hostile patrol and reconnaissance aircraft during fleet exercises that entered service in 1992. Specialized equipment on the EP-3J enabled the crew to imitate the radar signature of a Tupolev Bear. This Orion variant was developed by Chrysler Technologies Airborne Systems, Inc., and was fitted with an AN/USQ133 intrusion deception and jamming set, AST-4/6 radar emissions simulating pods, and ALE-43 chaff pods. Source: Naval Aviation News 74, no. 3 (March-April 1992): 8; “Lockheed Martin P-3 Orion Variants,” P-3 Orion Research Group, the Netherlands, https://www.p3orion.nl/variants.html.

Figure 15-2. EP-3E Aries II General Arrangement

NAS Patuxent River was completed in December 1999. Ten major discrepancies uncovered during the operational test and evaluation conducted in July 2000 delayed its introduction until FY01, when the first five SSIP modifications were scheduled to be installed in aircraft belonging to VQ-1 (three sets) and VQ-2 (two sets). Three more SSIP packages were scheduled to be installed in FY02.22

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The EP-3E ARIES II SSIP package to be installed in FY01 and FY02 consisted of four mission subsystems, including Story Teller, Story Book, Story Classic, and a modified AN/ULQ-16. These subsystems were connected to each other on an Ethernet local area network (LAN), which interfaced with the existing EP-3E ARIES II ESM via a systems interface processor. The functions and equipment details were spelled out in the Navy’s training manual as follows: (1) Story Teller provides the capability to manipulate selected organic and non-organic data and view a composite tactical situation display, correlate multiple onboard sensor inputs with selected external data link inputs, and communicate value added information via selected data links and communication networks. Story Teller is installed at positions 12, 13, and 14, and enables the following data and voice networks: • Tactical Receive Equipment and Related Applications • Tactical Digital Information Exchange System–B • Tactical Digital Information Link–A (TADIL-A) Tactical Information Broadcast Service (TIBS) • Tactical Reconnaissance Information Exchange Services • Advisory Support Network • Intelligence Network

Story Teller consists of the following major hardware units: three ruggedized TAC-3 work stations with three ruggedized high resolution color monitors, a Sensitive Compartmented Information Systems Interface, an EPR-165 TADIL-A Processor, a Commander’s Tactical Terminal/Hybrid Receiver, a TIBS Data Link Interface, an Advanced Narrow-band Digital Voice Terminal, and three RT-1273AG Satellite Communication–capable radios. Story Teller is networked on the common SSIP Ethernet LAN and on its own Story Teller Ethernet LAN. It interfaces with the operator through the Story Teller Man-to-Machine Interface (MMI) software.

(2) Story Book is an integrated special signal acquisition, data processing, and data fusion system that provides situation awareness based on special signals exploitation. Story Book provides the capability to assess the tactical

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picture and expeditiously add SIGINT data to communications data links. Story Book consists of a ruggedized TAC-3 work station with a ruggedized high resolution color monitor networked on the common SSIP Ethernet LAN and Story Book Ethernet LAN, the Fusion Engine (Windjammer) software and processing system hosted in a Versa Modular Eurocard (VME) chassis, Mission Processor Software, and the EPR-208 Signal Processor and Common Database Server system with Watkins Johnson (WJ) 8604 Signal Collection receivers. Story Book includes software and hardware interfaces to the aircraft Global Positioning System (GPS) and Inertial Navigation System (INS). Story Book is installed at position 9. (3) Story Classic system provides Special Operators at positions 15 through 20 with an upgraded search and acquisition system for low band signals. Story Classic consists of three ruggedized TAC-3 work stations, two x-terminal work stations, five ruggedized high resolution color monitors, and a flatpanel Liquid Crystal Display portable workstation. These workstations are networked on the common SSIP Ethernet LAN and Story Classic Ethernet LAN. Story Classic includes a signal acquisition, distribution, and exploitation system which incorporates general search and directed search capabilities through a pool of 24 WJ 8607 receivers, a set of SP-202 Spectrum Processors, matrix switches, and demodulators. Other Story Classic hardware includes a WJ-8700 Dual High Frequency (HF) receiver, DI-930 digital recorders, and a VME chassis, which hosts the Data Server, the Navigation Data Interface, and the Pool Manager. The operator’s MMI software is similar to that of Story Teller. (4) AN/ULQ-16 Signal Data Processor at positions 8, 10, 11, 12, and 20 has been modified to upgrade electromagnetic pulse processing capabilities. The modification replaces the IP-1159 and the FR-185 (XAN-3) Electrical Pulse Analyzer and adds dual channel real-time video inputs. The modification involves new circuitry in the Signal Data Processor (CP-1499 Mod), the addition of a nine-inch-high resolution display (EI-1700), an EI-1400 Control Display Unit, and processor software upgrades.23 The flight crew of the EP-3E ARIES II consisted of eight officers (three pilots, one flight engineer, one navigator, and three tactical analysts) and sixteen enlisted ECMOs.

The Hainan Island Incident On April 1, 2001, an EP-3E ARIES II with a crew of twenty-four was flying a routine reconnaissance mission off the coast of China when it collided with a Chinese F-8 fighter jet that was making a series of aggressive passes. The F-8 struck the EP-3E’s number-one engine, smashed the nose, and took off the radome, causing the pilot, Lt. Shane Osborne, to temporarily lose control of the aircraft. When Osborne regained control of the crippled plane, he realized the safest course to take was to head for the nearest runway, which unfortunately turned out to be Lingshui airfield on China’s Hainan Island. The crew used the short time before landing to destroy as much of the sensitive equipment and documents as possible. Once on the ground, they continued this effort as the plane was surrounded by armed military personnel. After deplaning, the crew was detained by the Chinese government, which stripped the plane of its electronic gear. What secret information was obtained by the Chinese has never been revealed, but as Steven Aftergood, an intelligence analyst at the Federation of American Scientists, noted, “Even the most trivial information they pick up will be something they didn’t know before.” According to military and intelligence experts, the crew of the plane probably had plenty of time to conduct emergency destruction procedures on all of the aircraft’s most sensitive computers and digital media, including hard drives and cryptographic keys. Such actions are called for as part of the crew’s standard operating procedures during such emergencies, but “the information on paper, media or [in] people’s heads is indeed the most important thing,” according to former CIA scientist Allen Thomson. The physical equipment is probably the least sensitive aspect of the aircraft. The crew was eventually released after the U.S. government delivered a letter “expressing sorrow” (but not apologizing) for the incident. The stripped and damaged EP-3 was eventually disassembled and returned to the United States in July. Source: Dan Verton, “Spy Plane Incident Raises Concerns Over Access to Secret U.S. Technology,” Computer World, April 3, 2001, https://www.computerworld.com/article/2590970/ spy-plane-incident-raises-concerns-over-access-to-secret-u-s—technology.html.

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In 2003 the Navy laid out an acquisition road map for future modifications to the EP-3E and its eventual replacement. Based on a decision by the CNO, the Navy would pursue the Army’s Aerial Common Sensor (ACS) program as a replacement for the EP-3E. The ACS program was initiated to upgrade and consolidate the capabilities of the three intelligence collection aircraft used by the Army and the Navy. The Navy planned to begin deploying the ACS platform in FY12 so that the EP-3E could be retired in FY14. In the interim the Navy would continue to upgrade the EP-3Es by bringing the aircraft in compliance with the Joint Airborne Signals Intelligence Architecture Modernization program, the Airborne Signals Intelligence Architecture program, and the Joint Common Configuration program.24 The Navy’s plans for the ACS were terminated when the Army cancelled its contact for its next generation intelligence and reconnaissance aircraft in January 2006, after Lockheed was unable to fit all of the sensors on the Embraer 145 airframe that had been chosen to carry them. With the airframes on the EP-3Es rapidly approaching the end of their useful life, the Navy began the planning process for a new aircraft to replace them. In November 2007 it initiated a competition to study the replacement. The initial design competition was won by the Northrop Grumman Corporation, which received a $1.25 million study contract for the Navy’s EPX—a shore-based, manned aircraft providing intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting support to carrier strike groups and theater, combatant, and national commanders. In 2008 the Navy conducted an “EPX industry day” for prospective bidders. The EPX, explained a NAVAIR spokesperson, would “be a manned ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] and targeting aircraft capable of operating in a SatCom-constrained environment, in concert with the P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft and the UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle] ultimately selected for the Navy’s Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS).” The EXP program was cancelled in February 2010, however, because of excessive cost growth and the potential to use new technologies.25 By 2003 the Navy’s strategy to replace the EP-3E turned to the process of developing an airborne intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting system focusing on modularity and payloads that could be installed on a variety of platforms. One of these platforms, the MQ-4C Triton built by Northrop Grumman, was ultimately selected to replace the EP-3E.26

16

ES-3A Shadow

T

he idea of converting the S-3A Viking antisubmarine warfare aircraft into an open ocean fleet electric support platform emerged in 1975 in response to the Navy’s need for an aircraft suitable for the Tactical Airborne Exploitation System (TASES) then under initial development. The TASES program, which had first been presented to Congress in 1970, was described by Dr. Robert A. Frosch (assistant Secretary of the Navy for R&D) as a development program for a follow-on system to replace the current fleet of EC-121M and EA-3B aircraft that would use the just-completed Big Look improvement program. The latter produced an advanced signal acquisition and precision direction-finding system.1 By the mid-1970s, when the idea of converting the S-3A was put forward, the primary mission of the fleet’s air reconnaissance squadrons had transformed from intelligence gathering to direct, tactical, real-time support of task group commanders. The importance of this mission was confirmed to Congress on March 18, 1975, by Capt. William B. Nevius, head of the Aviation Electronics Warfare Section in the office of the CNO, who provided a detailed review of the TASES program to the senators on the Armed Services Committee. He informed the committee that TASES “will greatly enhance the operation commander’s knowledge of the enemy’s identification, location, activity, intentions and effectiveness. . . . The aircraft could also provide support to a commander based ashore during power projection operations; it could support an amphibious operation within range of the CVA; or it could be dispatched to support 135

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any other ship, submarine, aircraft or land-based unit within range of its communication systems.” The TASES aircraft, he explained, was a passive intercept system to exploit the enemy’s signals, unlike the EA-6B, whose powerful passive system was built specifically to control jamming and covered a limited number of frequencies. Once the EA-6B jammers were activated, their passive collection systems could not be used as robustly as when they were inactive and therefore did not approach the intercept capability seen in TASES.2 The Navy, Captain Nevius explained, planned to buy twenty S-3s in FY76 that would be converted to TASES aircraft in FY80 to replace the EA-3Bs that were being phased out. The projected cost of procuring and converting the S-3s was more than half a billion dollars. This was too much of a bill for Congress to swallow. It did provide $2.9 million in FY75 funds, however, for the feasibility demonstration model of a TASES–configured S-3A already under way.3 The feasibility demonstration model phase, which involved the modification of two S-3As, was conducted by Lockheed with three major subcontractors: Sanders Associates (communications intercept), IBM (electronic intercept), and UNIVAC (software). Flight testing was scheduled to begin in December 1978 and continue through FY79. The program was terminated in 1977, however, when Congress deleted its funding from the FY78 DOD budget “because it was felt that the system was redundant with existing national resources.”4 At the end of 1983, many in the Navy, according to defense analyst Floyd D. Kennedy Jr., “recognized the need for a follow-on to the EA-3B, but could not muster the support to include it in the budget despite the fact that the projected cost to operate the EA-3B over five years was $120 million with another $235 million in upgrades to meet current needs.” Instead of replacing the EA-3Bs the Navy was forced to extend the service life of these aircraft and provide upgraded electronics.5 In 1984 the Navy was unsuccessful in its attempt to secure funding to purchase fourteen new P-3Cs to replace its aging fleet of EP-3B aircraft. In the next year, the Navy, well aware of Congress’s reluctance to provide unlimited funding for its aircraft needs, established a program dubbed the Advanced Multimission Sensor System (AMSS) that would provide a single platform to replace all carrier-based electronic/antisubmarine aircraft. In late September 1985 NAVAIR released an industry request for information pertaining to an AMSS seeking “to identify technically feasible and affordable development options to ultimately

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replace the current sensor aircraft systems of E-2C, S-3A/B, EA-6B, and EA-3B.” The S-3A/B Viking was removed from the program in November after the Navy selected the V-22 Osprey as Viking’s successor.6 In 1986 a replacement for the EA-3B termed the Battle Group Passive Horizon Extension System (BGPHES) was integrated into the AMSS program, and the Navy began preparing a request for proposal to procure twenty-four BGPHES aircraft to perform electronic warfare reconnaissance, over-the-horizon targeting, and airborne command, control, communications, and intelligence. NAVAIR planned to procure the aircraft over a two-year period with deliveries in 1990 and 1991. To achieve this timetable, NAVAIR restricted the proposal to existing carrier-capable aircraft, which by default left only the C-2 and S-3 as potential candidates.7 In the meantime, those familiar with the development of the BGPHES proposed to solve the shortage of carrier-based SIGINT aircraft by installing it in the standard S-3. As originally conceived, BGPHES was a “black box” installed in the aircraft that would receive and automatically data-link signals back to the carrier, where they would be processed by non-aircrew personnel. As Don East, who commanded VQ-2 and served as senior evaluator in both the EA-3B and the EP-3E, noted, “The disadvantages of such a system were immediately and intuitively obvious. Not only was the S-3 on a short, tight tether to the carrier because of transmission path limitation, but while flying this black box in the electronic reconnaissance role, the S-3 would be effectively taken out of its primary ASW mission.” And the S-3, lacking a trained and experienced VQ team, would be unable to provide the operational flexibility and immediate distillation of information for use by the battle group. “Such an operation,” insisted East, “removed the VQ aircrew talent from the carrier where it has always provided a synergistic interaction with specialized command spaces such as CIC. Perhaps the ultimate flaw in this program,” he continued, “was the effective severing of carrier experience carried back to the VQ squadrons by the EA-3B detachments. Without this personal fleet input to the VQ squadrons from the tailhook community, the ability of squadrons to understand and fulfill the information needs of the battle group decision maker would be dramatically diminished.” Opposition to the installation of BGPHES in a standard S-3 led to NAVAIR’s decision to develop a new aircraft for the carrier-capable SIGINT mission.8

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When the Navy began preparing its budget for the next fiscal year in the early part of 1987, replacing the EA-3Bs that were rapidly approaching the end of their extended service life had become a major priority. The average age of the EA-3B operating in the VQ squadrons was now twenty-five years, with some thirty-one years old. Secretary of the Navy John Lehman told the members of a House of Representatives subcommittee looking into the future years defense program that the EA-3B was “clearly inadequate for the task,” and that the Navy “did not have enough EA-3B aircraft to meet the Battle Group’s requirement for CV-organic SIGINT. . . . The FY88 budget submission reflects a major change in the airborne component of the Battle Group Passive Horizon Extension System (BGPHES). Our operational experience off the coast of Libya re-emphasized the absolute value of a dedicated, battle group organic aircraft with manned flexibility.”9 The Navy, under Lehman’s initial budget plan, intended to address the EA-6B replacement based on NAVAIR’s BGPHES platform and had included a funding request in the FY88/89 budget for an ECX competition. The winner of the competition would be awarded a contract to produce twenty-four new aircraft (either C-2s or S-3s), which were to be configured for the SIGINT mission. After its initial budget was “rescoped” by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, however, the Navy ended up with less money for aircraft production. This necessitated a change in the plan for replacing the EA-3Bs.10 In place of the ECX program, the Navy proposed producing the CV-based SIGINT aircraft by a conversion in lieu of procurement using sixteen existing S-3A aircraft from the Navy’s inventory and the same mission avionics systems derived from the EP-3 CILOP effort directed by Congress in FY84.11 The plan was to take the existing S-3A aircraft, remove the aviation warfare suite, insert the avionics from the EP-3 CILOP, add an APS-137 inverse synthetic aperture radar, include the ALR-67 for additional ESM capability, and include a data link from the aircraft to the BGPHES ground station on the aircraft carriers. This was considered to be the most cost-effective and timely replacement for the EA-3B that could be achieved. Congress approved the plan and appropriated $80 million to convert the sixteen S-3As, “thereby satisfying the Navy’s requirement for a ‘battle group passive horizon extension system’ platform.”12 The S-3A Viking, which entered operational service with VS-21 in July 1974, was a high-wing jet powered by two General Electric TF-34 turbofan

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engines designed as a carrier-based ASW platform. It had a crew of four and “was designed to carry a comprehensive array of avionics including passive and active sensors, computers, navigation and communication equipment.” The S-3A was converted into the ES-3A by removing the S-3’s ASW gear and converting the weapons bays on each side of the belly to hold avionics racks for processing equipment associated with the ELINT package that was based on the ARIES II system. The ES-3A, dubbed the Shadow, had a crew of four seated forward in a two-by-two arrangement in a pressurized cockpit. The pilot and copilot were in the left and right forward seats, and a sensor operator and a tactical coordinator sat in the left and right rear seats. The crew entered through a small door at the rear of the cockpit with a built-in step that opened downward on the right side of the fuselage. The ES-3A was heavier than the S-3A and had more than sixty drag-producing antennae that reduced the aircraft’s top speed by 10 percent. In other respects, it shared the same flight characteristics as the S-3A. According to one source, “The ES-3A was an immensely valuable aircraft because it offered the ability to provide over-the-horizon detection and classification using passive sensors. Its passive nature and relatively small size compared to the E-2 Hawkeye gave it the ability to wander farther afield than the Hawkeye and expand the sensor picture.”13 The first Lockheed ES-3A made its first flight in the new configuration on May 15, 1991, at Palmdale, California. It is notable that the new plane was only referred to as a “carrier-based electronic reconnaissance aircraft” with no mention made of the BGPHES package, presumably because the ULQ-20 was experiencing severe “teething” problems. ULQ-20 was the official designation for the BGPHES electronics package that was supposed to extend the battle group’s line-of-sight radio horizon and joint interoperability by controlling remote receivers in the aircraft’s sensor payload to relay radio transmissions to the ship’s surface terminal via the common high bandwidth data link. The Navy undertook the development of BGPHES in an effort to expand the mission of the ES-3A, but the program, according to one industry source interviewed by Zachery Lum for the Journal of Electronic Defense, “struggled . . . for years looking for the right avenue. . . . [There were] lots of problems with the airborne end of it, the data link end of it, the surface terminal part of it. There were decisions that were made and then reversed and that just caused a great amount of difficulty, to the point where the Navy was . . . seriously considering just

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abandoning the whole attempt.” BGPHES also suffered from extensive integration difficulties due to multiple government project offices with multiple prime contractors. The technical evaluation needed to certify that the ULQ-20 had met the contract requirements specified by the Navy would not be undertaken until 1994. The system was installed on USS John F. Kennedy (CV 67) and successfully completed operational evaluation on March 18, 1996, with both an ES-3A and a U-2. BGPHES-ST completed its Milestone III acquisition decision on July 1, 1996, and received approval for full-rate production of twentyseven shipboard systems. The first production system was installed aboard USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) in the third quarter of FY98 and after follow-on test and evaluation reached initial operational capability.14 The first ES-3A Shadow was delivered to VQ-5 in May 1992. By June 1994 all sixteen aircraft were evenly divided between VQ-6 at NAS Cecil Field, Florida, and VQ-5, then stationed at NAS Agana, Guam. VQ-5 deployed its aircraft with carrier air wings in detachments of two ES-3As each. The first major deployment for the squadron, Detachment Alpha, began in November 1993 on board USS Independence (CV 62) forward-deployed to Japan. Deployments of Detachments Bravo and Charlie followed on other carriers. VQ-6 also deployed its ES-3As in detachments of two aircraft, which were used to support the airwings of the Atlantic Fleet. The first Atlantic Fleet ES-3A deployment was on USS Saratoga (CV 60) with Detachment Alpha in January 1994.15 The Shadow was destined for a short service life, however. In 1988 the Navy decided to remove the ES-3A from its inventory due to the improvement in the tactical picture provided by other signals intelligence sources. That, coupled with requirements to upgrade the ES-3A aircraft, “made it unaffordable.” The ES-3A’s mission would now be filled by the RC-135, the EP-3E, and other national assets. The last two of VQ-6’s ES-3As were retired on August 10, 1999.16

A PBY-5A Catalina amphibian similar to one of VP’s aircraft in which Jack Churchill installed a XARD receiver. By the time Churchill began flying reconnaissance missions with XARD in September 1942, the red and white horizontal tail stripes (shown on this aircraft) had been removed from Navy planes. U.S. NAVY

The PB4Y-1 was the Navy version of the AAF’s B-24 Liberator bomber. The Navy, seeking a land-based, long-range, over-water patrol plane, gave up an aircraft plant in exchange for the Army planes. NARA

The PB4Y-2 Privateer was deployed to the Pacific in early 1945. A number of these aircraft were fitted with radar intercept receivers, communications interception receivers, jammers, and their associated pulse analyzers and direction-finding antennae. U.S. NAVY

A TBM similar to the ones modified by VT(N)-90 to carry a radar jammer and chaff dispensing system intended to disrupt Japanese search and antiaircraft fire-control radars. U.S. NAVY

A PBM-5 Mariner flying boat assigned to VP-731 in Buckner Bay, Okinawa, in 1951. Note the radar dome on the dorsal side of the fuselage just aft of the cockpit for the APS-15 radar. All PBM-5s delivered after August 1944 were fitted with this feature. U.S. NAVY VIA U.S. NAVY PATROL SQUADRONS VP-731 AIRCRAFT

A retired U.S. Navy Martin P4M-1Q Mercator of VQ-1 in 1960. Note the chin-mounted fairing in the nose that contained the radar-interception gear that readily identified the Q version of this aircraft. U.S. NAVY

A U.S. Navy AD-5Q Skyraider aircraft from Airborne Early Warning Squadron VAW-33 Det. 41 Night Hawks in flight. VAW-33 Det. 41 was assigned to Carrier Air Group 7 on aircraft carrier USS Independence (CVA 62) in the early 1960s. U.S. NAVY

A U.S. Navy TF-1Q Trader aircraft (one of only four such aircraft built) flown by Attack Squadron (All-Weather) 35 at MCAS El Toro, California, in March 1957. U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PHOTO ARCHIVE

An EA-3B assigned to VQ-9 landing on the deck of USS Coral Sea (CV 43), March 1986. U.S. NAVY

An EC-121M Warning Star of VQ-2 U.S. NAVY

A VMCJ-1 EA-6A Electric Intruder just after landing. Note the large antenna at the top of the vertical stabilizer and the ECM pod attached to the pylon of the right wing. U.S. NAVY

An RA-5C Vigilante of Reconnaissance Attack Heavy Squadron 9 flies over USS Saratoga (CV 60) during her eighth Mediterranean deployment. U.S. NAVY

An EA-6B from Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 130, attached to Carrier Air Wing Three, embarked on USS John F. Kennedy (CV 67), conducts low-level flight training over Saudi Arabia. U.S. NAVY

First EP-3B arrives at Atsugi, Japan, March 17, 1969. U.S. NAVY VIA ROBERT E. MORRISON, STATIONHYPO.COM.

An ES-3A of VQ-5 assigned to USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) air group flies over the carrier in 1998. U.S. NAVY

An EA-18G Growler of test and evaluation squadron VX-9 Vampires, carrying a payload of external fuel tanks, jamming pods, AGM-88C HARM antiradiation missiles, and AIM-120 air-to-air missiles flies over California in 2008. U.S. NAVY BY CDR. IAN C. ANDERSON, USN

17

Birth of the EA-18G Growler and the Next-Generation Jammer

A

fter the last EF-111 was retired in 1998, the EA-6B Prowler became the primary airborne tactical jamming platform providing support for all U.S. military services. The high demand to meet the military’s needs for suppression exacerbated wing fatigue and engine problems that grounded aircraft. Downtime required to perform routinely scheduled depot-level maintenance and to install major capability upgrades further reduced the availability of EA-6Bs. This situation was worsened in 2001 by the loss of two EA-6Bs that crashed, bringing their total number in the Navy’s inventory to 122 aircraft. At the beginning of 2002, however, the Navy had only 91 EA-6Bs available for operations instead of the 104 required.1 Congress was already aware of the problem, having expressed concerns for the successor to the EA-6B two years earlier when it directed the DOD to conduct an analysis of alternatives for replacing the Prowlers. The analysis, led by the Navy and completed in 2001, concluded that the services needed a standoff system or a combination of systems to operate at a distance from enemy targets, and a stand-in system that would provide close-in suppression protection for attacking aircraft where the threat was too great for the stand-off systems. The analysis established that the foundation for any future system would be equivalent to the capabilities of the EA-6B ICAP-III.2 Even before the results of the Navy-led Joint Electronic Attack Analysis of Alternatives study was completed, the Navy had already decided to replace the 141

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EA-6B with a radar variant of Boeing’s two-seat F/A-18F Super Hornet. The Navy selected the F/A-18 platform because it was a proven design that could be quickly converted into an airborne electronic attack (AEA) aircraft and would share many of the flight characteristics of the F/A-18s it would be protecting. This would enable it to escort the F/A-18s throughout its mission, greatly facilitating operational coordination.3 Boeing had been working on the EA-18 (AEA) concept since 1993 when it began an engineering design, development, and test program that included studies of the plane’s avionic and aircraft design. The test portion of the program consisted of high- and low-speed wind tunnel work, electromagnetic interference/compatibility testing, antenna range testing, and crew-vehicle interface development. The initial demonstration flight of F/A-18F fitted with three ALQ-99 jamming pods and two external fuel tanks was successfully completed on November 15, 2001. The success of Boeing’s development program (a third demonstration flight was conducted in April 8, 2002) led to a five-year system design and development program for the EA-18G that was included in the $9.76 billion Super Hornet contract issued to Boeing on December 30, 2003. As primary contractor, Boeing was to construct the forward fuselage and wings and perform the final assembly. Northrop Grumman was the principal airframe subcontractor responsible for producing the center and aft fuselage as well as the electronic combat system.4 The decision to proceed with the development of the EA-18G was not without risk. None of the EA-18G’s critical technologies were fully mature when the contract was issued, according to the General Accounting Office’s (GAO’s) 2004 assessment of major weapons systems. Although the ALQ-99 pods, the F/A-18F platform, and the tactical terminal system were fully developed, they still needed to be integrated into the EA-18G. And while the receiver system was similar to that of the EA-6B, it had to be modified to fit onboard the F/A-18F platform. The communications countermeasures set, as the GAO pointed out, was no longer in production, however, and a new contractor would have to be selected to produce a new set. All of the electronic gear on the EA-18G would also have to be modified or redesigned to counter the higher levels of vibration experienced during the more severe environment in which the EA-18G was expected to operate.5

Birth of the EA-18G Growler and the Next-Generation Jammer — 143

One of the biggest technical hurdles that had to be overcome was the “comm while jam” capability that would allow the crew to use the UHF voice communication system while the ALQ-99 jamming pods were transmitting at full power. This milestone was passed when the interference cancellation system developed by the EDO Corporation was successfully demonstrated in March 2005, one month before a critical design review of EDO’s brassboard model was scheduled.6, 7 During Congressional hearings conducted in March 2007, Congressman Rick Larsen (D-WA) echoed concerns raised by the GAO about the capabilities of the EA-18G Growler versus its predecessor, the EA-6B. Assistant Secretary of the Navy William Balderson and Deputy CNO Adm. Bruce Clingan addressed Larsen’s concerns in a written statement asserting the advantages of the EA-18G: The EA-18G platform provides capabilities exceeding those in the EA-6B. The Growler has nine available weapons stations for carriage of ALQ-99 pods, fuel, HARM, and AIM-120 missiles. The EA-6B has no air-to-air capability and only five stations for its stores, requiring a trade-off of electronic attack capability when carrying HARM. The Growler has greater aircraft carrier launch and landing weights than the EA-6B that permit it to carry the additional payload. Airborne, the Growler is faster and more maneuverable. Growler’s F/A-18F heritage (i.e., common avionics, sensors, and flight characteristics) enhances integration with the strike force in an escort mission, increasing probability of mission success. The Growler is also more survivable than the EA-6B, as it possesses a lower radar signature, improved defensive countermeasures, and greater agility to evade threat from the air and ground. Cost per flight hour on the EA-18G is approximately $5,000 less than that of the Prowler. Finally, the EA-18G is 85% common with the F/A-18F, which provides additional cost savings, as opposed to operating two separate aircraft models.8

By April 2008 the system development and demonstration program for the EA-18G was on schedule.9 Two development aircraft had first flown in 2006 and were on track to begin operational evaluation in the fall of 2008. The Navy planned to buy twenty-seven EA-18Gs in 2009, using the F/A-18E/F multiyear procurement contract signed at the end of 2003 to fund procurement of Lot 3 aircraft.10

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The Navy also requested $46.1 million for research on the next generation jammer (NGJ) that was needed to replace the vacuum tube–era ALQ-99 that entered service in 1971. The directive initiating the effort to develop a new jammer for the Navy came from Deputy Secretary of the Navy Gordon England after he received a classified briefing on future threats. We do not know what information was shared with Secretary England. However, by 2008 the technology upon which the ALQ-99 was based was thirty-seven years old. An upgraded version, the ALQ-99(V), had been developed for use in severe interference environments, but it was cancelled in 1993. The existing ALQ-99 jammer could not cover all of the frequencies that now needed to be addressed, did not have enough power to jam remote emitters, could not handle a sufficient number of threats simultaneously, and did not have the precision to avoid degrading friendly communications.11 “The new Navy program,” in the words of Loren Thompson, a civilian authority on military affairs, “is important to the entire joint forces because the other services have dropped the ball on electronic warfare.” Thompson was referring to the Air Force’s decision in December 2005 to cancel the B-52 stand-off jammer (SOJ) because of its estimated $7 billion cost, which left the Navy shouldering the electronic warfare mission. The B-52 stand-off jammer was supposed to meet the challenge of evolving integrated air defense systems of future adversaries whose capabilities were becoming more difficult to overwhelm with current jamming technologies.12 “When the Air Force cancelled the B-52 SOJ program in late 2005,” reported one journalist, “it threw the U.S. military’s Airborne Electronic Attack capabilities into disarray,” leaving the Air Force totally dependent on the Navy for electronic warfare.13 The Air Force’s budget priorities had always been directed toward aircraft development, and it did not have enough money to develop both the F-22 Raptor and the jamming pod, so the latter was dropped. Analyst Kernan Chaisson described the Air Force’s attitude toward electronic warfare as one of ambivalence dating back to the 1980s and 1990s, when it began placing greater emphasis on stealth technology: “The Air Force became so enamored with stealth technology that it began to look away from electronic warfare. Many in the Air Force felt that stealth would make electronic warfare unnecessary, so they put a lot of investment in stealth technologies like the EF-117, the B-2 bomber, and others.”14

Birth of the EA-18G Growler and the Next-Generation Jammer — 145

During budget request hearings held on March 11, 2008, Representative Neil Abercrombie (D-HI) submitted a written question to Rear Adm. Allen G. Myers asking if the EA-18G would be able to fill the gap that the B-52 SOJ program was intended to fill. The EA-18G, replied Admiral Myers, “is not designed nor was it intended to replace the B-52 SOJ.” But he informed Abercrombie that the Air Force was working on a scaled-down version of the SOJ known as the core component jammer. The Navy, Admiral Myers continued, “has leveraged off the previous work that the Air Force conducted in the early stages of the B-52 SOJ and has applied it toward technology maturation. This will conceptually ensure that the EA-18G with the Next Generation Jammer will become an essential part of the system of systems to counter enemy electro-magnetic capabilities.”15 Efforts to procure the NGJ were based on an evolutionary acquisition approach that would be pursued in three increments: increment one for midband jamming capabilities, increment two for low-band jamming, and increment three for high-frequency jamming. The increment one acquisition approach involved four phases: technology maturation, technology development, engineering and manufacturing development, and production and development. The Navy began the program in July 2010 by awarding technology maturation contracts to four firms: BAE Systems, ITT, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon. Each company received a $6 million contract to begin developing its concepts for replacing the ALQ-99 pod. Each of the four companies received an additional $42 million in July 2010 for the technology maturation phase that was due to be completed in April 2012. The technology maturation phase, according to Bill Carey in an article for Aviation Today, would be followed by a competitive prototyping phase or fly-off involving just two contractors. After this phase the Navy would choose a single vendor for engineering and manufacturing development before a low-rate initial production contract was issued.16 The Navy expected the NGJ to make extensive use of an active electronically scanned array (AESA), which would give the Growler the ability to simultaneous shape and steer a number of jamming beams.17 The AESA concepts called for an advanced low-profile, electronically steered array that supported a wide-bandwidth, high-duty-cycle operation that was compatible in size, weight, and power with the constrained dimensions of the ALQ-99 pod. Another critical area in the design of the NGJ was the ability to provide exciters that would

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be effective against present and future high-power radars.18 This presented several challenges with regard to beam formers, high-power amplifiers, and power supplies that would be needed to optimize the jamming signals.19 The first production EA-18G (without NGJ) was delivered to Fleet Replacement Squadron VAQ-129 on June 3, 2008. VAQ-132, the first operational squadron to receive the new plane, began transitioning to the Growler in February of the following year. By the end of 2011, ninety EA-18Gs had been delivered and were operational in three expeditionary squadrons and two carrier squadrons. Twenty-six more EA-18Gs scheduled for delivery in 2012 were added to the multi-year production contract by the secretary of defense in 2009 to increase the joint force capacity to conduct expeditionary electronic attack.20 The heart of the EA-18G’s digital EW suite is the ALQ-218(V)2 wideband receiver that is distributed around the Growler’s nose, mid-fuselage, and wingtips. The ALQ-218(V)2 is a passive sensor system that functions as a radar warning receiver and provides electronic support measures and electronic intelligence. The system provides airborne situational awareness and SIGINT by detecting, identifying, locating, and analyzing sources of radio frequency emissions. The EA-18G is also fitted with the ALQ-277 communications countermeasures system to locate and jam enemy communications. The ALQ-77 locates, records, plays back, and digitally jams enemy communications through an ALQ-99 pod, addressing more complex waveforms over a broader frequency range than the EA-6B’s USQ-113. The EA-18G selectively jams electronic threats with up to five ALQ-99 transmitter pods fixed on underwing pylons that contain the transmitters and exciters used to cover the different jamming bands as selected. The plan was to replace the ALQ-99s with the NGJ when it became available. To remove jammer interference and protect the pilot’s communications when the EA-18G’s powerful jammers are active, the Growler is also equipped with an interference cancellation system initially developed by ITT Electronic Systems.21 While not directly considered part of the EA-18G’s electronic suite, the APG-79 multimode, electronically scanned array radar is an essential piece of equipment that provides air-to-air and air-to-ground capability with detection, targeting, tracking, and protection modes. The interleaved radar modes include real beam-mapping mode and synthetic aperture radar mode with air-to-air search, air-to-air tracking, sea surface search, and ground moving target indication and tracking. It also has the ability to operate in multiple air-to-air and air-to-ground modes simultaneously.22

Birth of the EA-18G Growler and the Next-Generation Jammer — 147

In November 2010 VAQ-132 Scorpions became the first squadron to fly operational sorties with the EA-18G after it deployed to the Al Asad Air Base in Iraq in support of Operation New Dawn overwatch flights. In mid-March 2011 the squadron’s five EA-18Gs redeployed to Aviano Air Base, Italy, on short notice as part of the buildup of forces for Operation Odyssey Dawn to enforce UN Security Council Resolution 1973 to protect the Libyan people from the Muammar Qaddafi regime. Within eighteen hours of getting the word to relocate, the EA-18Gs were over Libyan air space, jamming Libyan radar and communications in support of the coalition aircraft attacking Libyan ground forces, air defenses, and airfields. While providing support to Operation Odyssey Dawn, the Scorpions were the first to employ the AGM-88 HARM in combat from the Growler.23 VAQ-132 was an expeditionary squadron, then home-based at NAS Whidbey Island, Washington. The concept of the expeditionary squadron was established after the retirement of the EF-111s when the EA-6B Prowler became the military’s only airborne tactical jamming platform. The expeditionary squadrons were formed to support Air Force expeditionary wings. The Navy’s expeditionary Prowler squadrons were required to meet the same readiness standards as other carrier-based squadrons, but they operated from land. As Cdr. Dave Kurtz (VAQ-132’s commanding officer during Odyssey Dawn) explained in his

Figure 17-1. Concept Drawing of Next-Generation Jammer

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article on the origins of the expeditionary Growler: “The expeditionary model was scheduled to retire with the Prowler as the community transitioned to the EA-18G. All Growlers were going to be carrier-based, a decision made based on the Air Force’s commitment to a system-of-systems concept of expeditionary aircraft involving the B-52 bombers, unmanned aerial vehicles, ground based systems, and more. However, the Air Force plan failed to materialize, while simultaneously, AEA became ‘go/no-go’ criteria for Army and Marine Corps forces operating in Iraq and Afghanistan.” 24 As a result, airborne electronic attack became a strategic resource controlled and tasked at higher levels of command as the expeditionary Prowler squadrons transitioned to the EA-18G Growler. There are four key advantages to the expeditionary model of deploying the EA-18G: capacity, flexibility, persistence, and freedom of maneuver. Basing the Growlers ashore enables a theater commander to add high-capacity AEA capability without straining an already crowed carrier deck. From an air tasking order standpoint, there was no difference whether the EA-18G was shore- or carrier-based. Expeditionary squadrons can be deployed from carriers or ashore, which provides a great deal of flexibility. Theater commanders can move AEA units around in a short time, which allows the Growlers to provide support from multiple directions for multiple lines of approach. Being based ashore ensures that the Growlers can avoid the multi-day transit for a carrier air wing and can be deployed on scene quickly during a crisis. As Kurtz pointed out, “Being free from the deck’s schedule also means that an expeditionary Growler squadron can operate off-cycle, covering missions while the carrier rests. Providing battlespace-wide persistence and responsive to support joint force makes expeditionary AEA flexible for commanders in theater. And most importantly, untying the EA-18G from the deck provides the aircraft carrier and the carrier strike group freedom to maneuver.”25 After the three-year preliminary phase of the NGJ program was completed in April 2013, the Navy selected Raytheon as the contractor to develop the jammer. Raytheon was awarded a $279.4 million contract for the NGJ technology development phase on July 8.26 The cost-plus-incentive-fee contract covered a twenty-two-month development project that would transform the mature components into testable subsystems. Many observers were surprised when Raytheon won the contract based on the extensive jamming background of

Birth of the EA-18G Growler and the Next-Generation Jammer — 149

BAE and its partner Northrop Grumman. Thus, the protest filed by BAE after the award was not unexpected. Although BAE’s challenge was upheld by GAO, the Navy, after completing corrective action and re-evaluating proposals, decided to keep the existing contract with Raytheon and recommenced work at the end of January 2014.27 From the outset of the NGJ program, keeping discipline within the system engineering process established for the program was a top priority for the Navy. In November 2015 the Navy-Raytheon team successfully completed the preliminary design review for NGJ, which was a key milestone in the acquisition process leading to the next stage in the process: the engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) phase (also known as the system development and demonstration phase).28 On April 13, 2016, the Navy announced that it had awarded Raytheon a $1 billion sole source EMD contract for increment one of the NGJ program. Under increment one, Raytheon would produce stateof-the-art mid-band jamming pods to replace the existing ALQ-99 pods that had recently been upgraded and modernized. Under the terms of the contract Raytheon was required to deliver fifteen EMD pods for mission systems testing and qualification and fourteen aeromechanical pods for airworthiness along with simulators and hardware to support flight testing and system integration.29 Raytheon’s jammer would generate ten times the radiated power of the ALQ-99, would handle a greater number of assignments, and would be able to switch from target to target almost simultaneously. It also had the built-in ability to collect, analyze, and jam new enemy signals as they occurred, enabling the system to adjust in-flight to evolving threat profiles and apply appropriate countermeasures.30 Capt. Michael Orr, program manager for the Navy’s airborne electronic attack systems office, described for Jamie Hunter of Combat Aircraft the difficulties in moving from the mechanical technology of the ALQ-99 pod to the active electronic scanned array of mid-band ALQ-29 as the mid-band NGJ was now designated. “The challenge for NGJ mid-band,” wrote Hunter, “has been the need to produce an immense amount of power in a pod carried under the wings of a tactical fighter that will be required to make years of carrier landings. The combination of high-powered, agile beam-jamming techniques and cutting-edge solid-state electronics gives the Navy an open systems architecture

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pod that can be upgraded and reconfigured as threats and requirements evolve.” Providing power to supply the densely packaged electronics without adding excessive aerodynamic drag to the pod was achieved by incorporating an internal ram-air turbine fed by large air scoops on the side of the pod.31 Development testing for the ALQ-29 began after the critical design review was completed on April 27, 2017, and continued into the next year. Flight testing of Raytheon’s NGJ–mid-band (NGJ-MB) jammer—an important step toward Milestone C approval—began on August 7, 2020, at NAS Patuxent River using the initial EMD pods delivered in the third quarter of FY19. During the next eleven months, the Navy subjected NGJ-MB to 145 hours of developmental flight testing and completed more than 3,100 hours of anechoic chamber and lab testing. Milestone C, the review conducted at the end of the EMD phase, was completed on June 29, 2021, with the recommendation to seek approval to enter the production and deployment phase of the NGJ program. On July 2, the DOD announced that Raytheon had been awarded a $171 million contract to begin the low-rate initial production phase of the program, the starting point for the production and deployment phase of an acquisition program. It provides funding to produce a small quantity of manufactured units for use for initial operational test and evaluation. It also establishes an initial production base for full-rate production upon completion of operational test and evaluation. This contract, which covered the production of three Lot 1 NGJ-MB jammers, was followed by a $227 million contract modification for five additional sets (Lot 2) issued on December 23.32 Raytheon was not the only contractor involved in the NGJ program. On June 29, 2013, NAVAIR issued a draft statement on the objectives of the increment two preliminary demonstration contract that was issued as a broad agency announcement on November 16, 2017, for the award of one or more contracts to develop a prototype low-band jammer. The announcement explained that the agency was seeking to increase its knowledge and understanding of existing technologies supporting a low-band jammer where “significant size, weight, power, and cooling constraints exist.” In the summer of 2018, after having received multiple proposals from several companies, the Navy awarded two separate contracts, each worth more than $35 million, to L3 Harris and Northrop Grumman to continue developing prototypes for the NGJ–low band (NGJLB) jammer.33

Birth of the EA-18G Growler and the Next-Generation Jammer — 151

Figure 17-2. NGJ-LB Protest

On September 9, 2019, the Navy sent both companies a request for proposal to bid on the EMD portion of the increment two program for the lowband jammer. After reviewing the final proposals, which were submitted on November 5, the Navy, concluding that L3 Harris offered the best value, awarded the company a $544 million contract on December 20, 2020. Within weeks, Northrop Grumman protested the award, alleging a variety of conflicts of interest. After GAO rejected this claim, Northrop protested again on the basis that L3 Harris’s proposal failed to demonstrate that its proposed approach met certain threshold requirements set forth in the solicitation. Although this protest was sustained by GAO, the Navy refused to recompete the contract. L3 Harris then sued the Navy in the Court of Federal Claims on September 21, 2021, seeking to break the legal log jam holding up development of the NGJLB jammer.34 In June 2022 the Navy, along with L3 Harris and Northrop, agreed to a negotiated settlement that was accepted by the Court of Federal Claims. Under the terms of the settlement the Navy agreed to cancel the $495.5 million contract with L3 Harris to develop the NGJ-LB jammer and to reaward the contract in early 2023.35

18

Looking Back

A Historical Perspective

Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it. —GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON, 1905

I

t is hoped that the operations, personal experiences, and innovations discussed in this work may help prevent future military leaders and planners from repeating the mistakes of the past. Although electronic warfare has played an important role in every major aerial campaign since World War II began, interest in its continued support and development has often waned during the peaceful interlude that inevitably follows such conflicts. This phenomenon can be attributed to a number of factors concerning the nature of electronic warfare. First is the secrecy surrounding its operations and equipment, which limits the dissemination of this information to the public and within the military itself. Rarely if ever (except perhaps in the recent past) have military dispatches containing such information appeared in the press. Since the mission of such aircraft is to collect information or suppress enemy air defenses, it lacks the glamour associated with missions flown by attacking aircraft. This discrepancy is reflected in the attitude and elan of the pilots in the attack community who have great influence over what type of aircraft need to be procured or developed. Then there is the question of funding. When budgets become tight—as illustrated by the forced retirement of the Air Force’s EF-111A discussed in chapter 14—leadership within the aviation community prefers to spend their 152

Looking Back — 153

limited resources on obtaining more fighter, bomber, or attack aircraft. When the next major conflict arises, however, the military frequently finds that it lacks EW assets to support all of the mission objectives and is forced to rely on a limited number of somewhat obsolete (in terms of EW capabilities) aircraft. This paradigm appeared to have been left in the late 1990s when the Navy was forced to expand the EA-6B fleet in order to meet the U.S. defense establishment’s requirement for the joint suppression of enemy air defense (JSEAD) mission. The importance of the JSEAD mission and the need to rely on the EA-6B’s aging thirty-year-old platform led to the development and subsequent procurement of the EA-18G Growler. It appears, however, that history is destined to repeat itself. In late March 2022 the aircraft from one of the Navy’s EA-18G expeditionary squadrons were once again called up in response to the potential threat to NATO posed by the potential escalation of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. On March 28 six EA-18G Growlers from VAQ-134 based at Naval Air Station Whidbey Island arrived at Spangdahlem Air Base in Germany. They were accompanied by about 240 aircrew, aircraft maintainers, and pilots. The purpose of their deployment, according to Pentagon press secretary John F. Kirby, was “to bolster readiness, enhance NATO’s collective defense posture and further increase air integration capabilities with our allied and partner nations.” They were deployed to bolster NATO’s deterrence and defense capabilities along the eastern flank. The Navy E/A-18 Growlers, wrote Abraham Mahshie, Pentagon editor for Air & Space Forces Magazine, were conducting NATO enhanced air policing in Eastern Europe near Ukraine to show Russia that the United States stands ready with electronic warfare capabilities. Less than a month later, on April 22, Rick Burgess, editor of Seapower, reported that the recently released booklet highlighting the Navy’s 2023 budget laid out plans to deactivate the five active expeditionary squadrons assigned to the EA-18G expeditionary force and mothball their twenty-five EA-18Gs. According to the Navy booklet, the decision would eliminate 1,020 officer and enlisted billets, saving the Navy $807 million in future years’ budgets.1 How this will affect the earlier memorandum with the Air Force to maintain five expeditionary VAQ squadrons for the JSEAD mission remains to be determined. As noted in chapter 14, after the Air Force’s EF-111As were retired in the mid-1990s, the expeditionary EW mission was transferred to the Navy.

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Since then, the Navy has been the primary supplier of electronic warfare aircraft to the U.S. military, and it has been constantly working to modernize the Growler. As Ashish Dangwal, reporter for the Eurasian Times, noted in an article published shortly after the Navy’s plans for the EA-18Gs became known, “The decision to send 25 of these highly potent jets to the vault puzzled many, especially because the Growler fleet will grow even more powerful with the addition of Next Generation Jammer pods.” The Navy’s EA-18Gs are slated to become even sharper thanks to a Block 2 upgrade program. The decision to mothball twenty-five EA-18Gs also comes at a time when China is beefing up its electronic assault capacity, with the J-16D an electronic warfare variant of the J-16 multirole strike fighter.2 The Navy’s decision to abandon its role as expeditionary JSEAD supplier may have been influenced by changes in the Air Force’s ability to accomplish this mission. When the EF-111A was retired, there were no other EW attack (i.e., suppression) aircraft in its inventory. This is no longer the case. As of June 2022 several sources asserted that an unknown number of Block 50/52 aircraft modified to perform the SEAD mission have been delivered to the Air Force. Designated as F-16CJs, they are capable of launching both the AGM-88 HARM and AGM-45 Shrike antiradiation missiles and are equipped with the Texas Instruments ASQ-213 HARM targeting system. In addition, Lockheed Martin is in the process of modifying Lots 14 and 15 of its F-35 strike fighter to improve its suppression/destruction of enemy air defense capabilities. This work was scheduled to be completed in August 2022, and Lockheed Martin received a follow-on contract for Lot 17. It is interesting to note that both contracts (the first issued on June 1, 2020) were issued by the Naval Air Systems Command on behalf of all F-35 users. Naval Air Systems Command has also been placing orders with BAE Systems to provide large numbers (1,464 in one contract alone) of its fourth-generation ASQ-239 electronic warfare countermeasures systems for use on the F-35. What will transpire in the future is beyond the scope of this work.3 When the need for a new EW platform arises, the most expeditious and economical way to fill it is to convert an existing platform. Of the eighteen aircraft discussed in the work, only one, the EA-6B Prowler, was designed from the ground up—and even the design of the EA-6B made significant use of the

Looking Back — 155

A6-B’s airframe, electronics, and flight avionics. This approach to fulfilling the electronic warfare needs of the Navy makes sense based on the relatively low number of EW platforms required in relation to the much larger production runs of other combat aircraft. More than 1,500 F-18s of all varieties have been delivered since it was first introduced in 1983. Of these, only 150 were Growlers. Technological advances in electronics have also played an important role in the development of EW platforms. The designs of the earliest systems were based exclusively around the use of the vacuum tube and circuit boards. They were bulky, manually operated black boxes that were relatively heavy, had limited power outputs, and required constant maintenance. The introduction of transistors, integrated circuits, and other solid-state components reduced the weight and bulk of the EW equipment, permitted greater flexibility of use, and improved reliability. The introduction of digital computing and the associated ongoing improvements in software that followed added yet another magnitude

Figure 18-1. EA-18G ECM Equipment

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of flexibility and performance, allowing the present generation of ECM aircraft to simultaneously identify, jam, and attack a variety of threats. The continuing trend in miniaturization, the introduction of liquid crystal displays, and the dynamic improvements in software that have emerged during the twenty-first century have advanced the state of the art to the point that every strike fighter can now be equipped to perform the SEAD mission using an ECM package such as BAE’s ASE-239 ECM suite along with the latest anti-radiation missiles and targeting systems. The question remains as to whether these systems will perform as well as the next generation jammers being developed for the EA-18G.

APPE ND IX I

Characteristics of ECM Aircraft (In chronological order employed)

PBY-5/PBY-5A CATALINA

Manufacturer: Consolidated Aircraft Entered service: 1936/1941 Number procured: 979/782 General Characteristics Crew: seven to nine; up to fifteen when operated in ECM mode Length: 74 ft. 7 in./74 ft. 7 in. Wingspan (ft.): 110/110 Height: 30 ft. 1 in./20 ft. 2 in. Wing area (sq. ft.): 1,048/1,048 Empty weight (lbs.): 17,526/20,910 Maximum takeoff weight (lbs.): 34,000/35,420 Powerplant: two Pratt & Whitney 1,200 hp R-1830-92 radial engines Performance Maximum speed (mph): 189/175 (at 7,000 ft.) Cruise speed (mph): 115/113 Range (mi.): 2,990/2,350 Service ceiling (ft.): 18,100/13,000

157

158 — Appendix I

Ordnance Machine guns: two .30 cal. and two .50 cal./one .30 cal. and three .50 cal. Bombs: up to four pylon-mounted one-thousand-pound bombs or two Mark 13 torpedoes ECM Equipment (when configured for ECM missions) Initially XARD or ARC-1 receiver PB4Y-1 LIBERATOR

Manufacturer: Consolidated Aircraft Entered service: 1943 Number procured: 736 General Characteristics Crew: nine to eleven (two pilots, navigator, radio operator, five gunners, bombardier, ECM operator) Length: 67 ft. 3 in. Wingspan: 110 ft. Height: 17 ft. 11 in. Wing area: 1,048 sq. ft. Empty weight: 36,950 lbs. Maximum takeoff weight: 60,000 lbs. Powerplant: four Pratt & Whitney 1,200 hp R-1830-43 radial engines Performance Maximum speed: 279 mph Cruise speed: 148 mph Range: 2,960 mi. Service ceiling: 31,800 ft. Ordnance Machine guns: eight .50 cal. in nose, dorsal, tail turrets, and waist mounts Bombs: up to eight 1,600-lb. bombs ECM Equipment (when configured for ECM missions) ARC-1 receiver

Characteristics of ECM Aircraft — 159

PB4Y-2 PRIVATEER

Manufacturer: Consolidated Aircraft Entered service: 1944 Number procured: 736 General Characteristics Crew: eleven (two pilots, flight engineer navigator, bombardier, radio operators, five gunners); up to fifteen when operated in ECM mode Length: 74 ft. 7 in. Wingspan: 110 ft. Height: 30 ft. 1 in. Wing area: 1,048 sq. ft. Empty weight: 27,485 lbs. Maximum takeoff weight: 65,000 lbs. Powerplant: four Pratt & Whitney 1,350 hp R-1830-94 radial engines Performance Maximum speed: 300 mph Cruise speed: 175 mph Range: 2,820 mi. Service ceiling: 21,000 ft. Ordnance Machine guns: twelve .50 cal. in four turrets forward, aft, dorsal, and two waist mounts Bombs: up to eight 1,600-lb. bombs ECM Equipment (when configured for ECM missions) Combination of APR-1, APR-2, and APR-5 with pulse analyzers and direction-finding antennae; ARR-5 and ARR-7 communication intercept receivers; APT-1, APQ-2, and APT-5 jammers TBM-3E AVENGER/TBM-3Q (Redesignated November 1945)

Manufacturer: Eastern Aircraft Div. General Motors Corp. Entered service: 1944–45 Number procured: 4,664 (all versions)

160 — Appendix I

General Characteristics Crew: three (pilot, radar/ECM operator, gunner) Length: 40 ft. 11.5 in. Wingspan: 54 ft. 2 in. Height: 15 ft. 5 in. Wing area: 490 sq. ft. Empty weight: 10,554 lbs. Maximum takeoff weight: 17,895 lbs. Powerplant: one Pratt & Whitney 1,900 hp R-2600-20 radial engines Performance Maximum speed: 276 mph (at 16,500 ft.) Cruise speed (mph): 115/113 Range (mi.): 2,990/2,350 Service ceiling (ft.): 18,100/13,000 Ordnance Machine guns: two fixed forward-firing .50 cal./one .50 cal. in a dorsal turret Bombs: up to 2,000 lbs. in bomb bay ECM Equipment APT-1 jammer and/or APT-1 jammer with APR-1 receiver and APA-11 direction-finding antenna PBM-5S MARINER

Manufacturer: Glenn L. Martin Company Entered service: 1950 Number procured: thirty-six General Characteristics Crew: ten Length: 79 ft. 10 in. Wingspan: 118 ft. Height: 24 ft. 10 in. Wing area: 1,408 sq. ft. Empty weight: 35,500 lbs. Maximum takeoff weight: 60,300 lbs. Powerplant: two 1,700 hp Wright R-2600-12s

Characteristics of ECM Aircraft — 161

Performance Maximum speed: 200 kts (at 18,000 ft.) Cruise speed: 166 kts Range: 1,880 nautical miles (nm) Service ceiling: 20,800 ft. Ordnance Two .50 cal. nose turret, two .50 cal. tail turret Up to 12,800 lbs. in bomb bay: bomb, mines, or torpedoes ECM Equipment Receivers: APR-4 Direction finder: APA-69 Pulse analyzers: APA/11-38 P4M-1Q MERCATOR

Manufacturer: Glenn L. Martin Company Entered service: 1950 Number procured: nineteen General Characteristics Crew: thirteen Length: 86 ft. 3 in. Wingspan: 113 ft. 10 in. Height: 29 ft. 2 in. Wing area: 1,311 sq. ft. Empty weight: 52,723 lbs. Maximum takeoff weight: 95,009 lbs. Powerplant: two 3,250 hp Pratt & Whitney R-4360-20 radial engines and two 3,825-lb. thrust Allison J33-A-10 turbojet engines Performance Maximum speed: 223 kts (at 8,000 ft.) Cruise speed: 166 kts Range: 2,460 nm Service ceiling: 30,000 ft.

162 — Appendix I

Ordnance Two 20-mm in bow, two .50-cal. deck, two 20-mm tail Up to 12,000 lbs. in bomb bay: bomb, mines, or torpedoes ECM Equipment circa 1952 Receivers: APR-4, APR-9, APR-9A, ARR-7 Direction finder: APA-69 Pulse analyzers: APA-10, APA-38, APA-74, SLA-1 Antenna assembly: APA-24 AD-2Q/AD-4Q/AD-5Q (EA-1F) SKYRAIDER

Manufacturer: Douglas Aircraft Company Entered service: 1948/1950/1952 Number procured: twenty-one/thirty-nine/fifty-four General Characteristics Crew: two (pilot, ECM operator)/three (pilot, two ECM operators)/four (pilot, navigator, two ECM operators) Length: 38 ft. 2 in./38 ft. 2 in./50 ft. Wingspan: 50 ft. 10 in./50 ft. 10 in./50 ft. 10 in. Height: 15 ft. 7.5. in./15 ft. 7.5. in./15 ft. 8 in. Wing area (sq. ft.): 400.3/400.3/400.3 Empty weight (lbs.): 11,159/11,730/12,097 Maximum takeoff weight (lbs.): 19,134/24,595/25,000 (land takeoff) Powerplant: one 2,700 hp Wright R-3350-26 radial engine Performance Maximum speed (kts): 275/319/252 Cruise speed (kts): 178/180/180 Range (mi.): 1,479/1,650/1,358 Service ceiling (ft.): 26,600/31,900/23,100 Ordnance Two fixed forward-firing 20-mm guns AD-4Q: seven-thousand-pound external mounting ECM Equipment Receivers: APR-1/APR-4, APR-9/APR-9

Characteristics of ECM Aircraft — 163

Direction finder: APA-17/APA-17/APA-70A Pulse analyzers: APA-11, APA-38/APA-11, APA-38(?)/APR-9B, APA-69A, APA-64 TF-1Q/ EC-1A (C1-A CONVERSION)

Manufacturer: Grumman Aircraft Company Entered service: 1957 Number procured: four General Characteristics Crew: five (two pilots, three ECM operators) Length: 42 ft. Wingspan: 69 ft. 8 in. Height: 16 ft. 6 in. Wing area: 485 sq. ft. Empty weight: 16,631 lbs. Maximum takeoff weight: 23,031 lbs. Powerplant: two 1,525 hp Wright R-1820-82W radial engines Performance Maximum speed: 240 kts Cruise speed: 167 kts Range: 1,100 mi. Service ceiling: 24,800 ft. Ordnance: none ECM Equipment Receivers: AAR-5, ALR-8, APR-9, APR-13 Radar warning receiver: ALQ-2 Jammers: ALT-2, ALT-7 VHF radio jammer: ARC-1 UHF radio jammer: ARC-27 Chaff dispensers: up to four MX900 carried under wings A3D-2Q/EA-3B SKYWARRIOR/EKA-3B “QUEER WHALE”

Manufacturer: Douglas Aircraft Company Entered service: 1959 Number procured: 164

164 — Appendix I

General Characteristics Crew: seven (pilot, navigator/assistant pilot, gunner/radio man, four ECM operators including an evaluator) Length: 76.4 ft. Wingspan: 72.5 ft. Height: 23.4 ft. Wing area: 779 sq. ft. Empty weight: 41,193 lbs. Maximum takeoff weight: 78,00 lbs. (land takeoff) Powerplant: two 10,500-lb. s.t. Pratt & Whitney J57-P-10 turbojet Performance Maximum speed: 557 kts Cruise speed: 459 kts Range: 2,260 nm Service ceiling: 39,000 ft. Ordnance Two 20-mm guns in tail turret (original configuration) ECM Equipment Receivers: ALR-3, APR-9, APR-13 Countermeasures receiver: ALR-8 Direction finder: APA-69 Pulse analyzer: ALA-3 Signal analyzer: APA-74 DECM: ALQ-35/-41/-51 Jamming Equipment (EKA-3B) ALT-27 jamming system ALQ-92 A band communications jammer WV-2Q/EC-121M WARNING STAR

Manufacturer: Lockheed Aircraft Company Entered service: 1960 Number converted: eight

Characteristics of ECM Aircraft — 165

General Characteristics Crew: six flight crew, eleven to twenty-five ECMOs Length: 116 ft. 2 in. Wingspan: 150 ft. Height: 24 ft. 9 in. Wing area: 1,650 sq. ft. Empty weight: 69,210 lbs. Gross weight: 145,000 lbs. Powerplant: four 3,700 hp Curtis Wright R-3350-42 Turbo Compound 18-cylinder supercharged radial engines Performance Maximum speed: 295 kts Cruise speed: 255 kts Range: 4,250 mi. Service ceiling: 25,000 ft. Ordnance: none ECM Equipment Receivers: APR-9, APR-13, ALQ-28 Direction finder: APA-69 Signal analyzer: APA-74 Radar: APS-20 TARS (Transistorized automatic recording system) EA-6A INTRUDER

Manufacturer: Grumman Aircraft Company Entered service: 1965 Number procured: twenty-seven General Characteristics Crew: two pilots, one ECM operator Length: 55 ft. 5.8 in. Wingspan: 53 ft. Height: 15 ft. 5.9 in. Wing area: 528.9 sq. ft. Empty weight: 27,769 lbs.

166 — Appendix I

Maximum takeoff weight: 54,571 lbs. Powerplant: two 8,500-lb. s.t. Pratt & Whitney J52-P-6 turbojet engines Performance (Tactical ECM two ALQ-31B pods and two 300-gal. tanks) Maximum speed: 510 kts Cruise speed: 410 kts Range: 1,756 mi. Service ceiling: 34,500 ft. Ordnance Maximum capacity (bomb, special weapons, rockets): 18,000 lbs. ECM pods: ALQ-31A, -31B, -54 Practice bomb dispenser A1 dispenser Shrike provisions ECM Equipment Radar warning receiver: four ALR-15s Detection system: ALQ-53 Chaff dispenser: two ALE-18s Repeat jammer: ALQ-41, two ALQ-51s Communications jammer: ALQ-55 Self-protective pod: ALQ-31A Jamming pod: ALQ-31B Decoy pod: ALQ-54 Recorder: two UNH-9s RA-5C VIGILANTE

Manufacturer: North American Aviation Entered service: 1963 Number procured: forty-three (converted from A-5)/forty-six (procured 1968) General Characteristics Crew: two (pilot, reconnaissance/navigator) Length: 76 ft. 6 in. Wingspan: 53 ft. Height: 19 ft. 4 in. Wing area: 753.79 sq. ft.

Characteristics of ECM Aircraft — 167

Empty weight: 37,498 lbs. Maximum takeoff weight: 79,588 lbs. Powerplant: two 17,000-lb. s.t. J79-GE-8 General Electric J79-GE-8 turbojet engines; two 17,860-lb. s.t. J79-GE-8 General Electric J79-GE-10 turbojet engines (1968) Performance Maximum speed: 2,215 kts Cruise speed: 1,254 kts Range: 2,500 mi. Service ceiling: 52,100 ft. ECM Equipment ALQ-41 X band track breaker ALQ-51 S/E/F band deception jammer ALQ-55 VHF data link jammer ALQ-100 E/F/G/H band jammer (post-1970) ALQ-61 radio/radar ECM receiver ARL-18 radar passive warning receiver ALR-45 “Compass Tie” radar warning receiver (post-1967) EA-6B PROWLER

Manufacturer: Grumman Aircraft Company Entered service: 1971 Number procured: 149 General Characteristics Crew: four (pilot, three ECM operators) Length: 59 ft. 1 in. Wingspan: 53 ft. Height: 16 ft. 3 in. Wing area: 528.9 sq. ft. Empty weight: 32,162 lbs. Normal takeoff weight: 54,460 lbs. with five jammer pods Maximum takeoff weight: 65,000 lbs. Powerplant: two 8,500-lb. s.t. Pratt & Whitney J52-P-8A turbojet engines (first 21 aircraft); two 11,200-lb. s.t. Pratt & Whitney J52-P-408 turbojet engines (next 128 aircraft)

168 — Appendix I

Performance Maximum speed: 565 kts clean Maximum speed: 530 kts at sea level with five jammers Cruise speed: 418 kts Range: 1,100 mi. with maximum external load Service ceiling: 38,000 ft. Defensive ECM Equipment System integration receiver: ALR-42 Repeat jammer: ALQ-41 Repeat jammer: two ALQ-100s Communications jammer: ALQ-92 Chaff dispenser: ALE-29E Offensive ECM Equipment Tactical jammer, low band: OT-21/ALQ-99(V) Tactical jammer, P band: OR-41/ALQ-99(V) Tactical jammer, S band: OR-42/ALQ-99(V) Surveillance subsystem: OR-40/ALQ/-99(V) Pods: External Tanks: Aero 1D 300-gallon tank Tactical Jammer, Low Band Tactical Jammer, P Band Ejector Bomb Racks: four Aero-7A-1 wings store stations Tactical Jammer, S Band one Aero-7B-1 centerline store station EA-6B Prowler Upgrades BASCAP (1971) new production: twenty-eight Offensive Jamming Equipment ALQ-99 TJS Defensive ECM Equipment System integration receiver: ALR-42 Repeat jammer: ALQ-41 Repeat jammer: two ALQ-100s Communications jammer: ALQ-92 Chaff dispenser: ALE-29E

Characteristics of ECM Aircraft — 169

EXCAP (1973) new aircraft: twenty-five; BASCAP converted: twenty-one Offensive Jamming Equipment: ALQ-99 “B” and “C” TJS ELINT: ASH-30 tactical electronic processing and evaluation system Defensive ECM Equipment System integration receiver: ALR-42 Repeat jammer: ALQ-41 Repeat jammer: two ALQ-100s Communications jammer: ALQ-92 Chaff dispenser: ALE-32 ICAP-I (1976) new aircraft: forty-five; BASCAP/EXCAP converted: twenty-one Offensive jamming equipment: ALQ-99 “B” and “C” TJS ELINT: ASH-30 tactical electronic processing and evaluation system Defensive ECM Equipment System integration receiver: ALR-42 ALQ-126A multi-band jammer Communications jammer: ALQ-191 Chaff dispenser: ALE-32 EP-3E ARIES I/EP-3E ARIES II

Manufacturer: Lockheed Aircraft/Lockheed Aircraft Entered Service: 1961/1991 Number Procured: ten/sixteen General Characteristics Crew: fifteen (two pilots, flight engineer, twelve ECMOs)/twenty-five (three pilots, two flight engineers, navigator, three tactical evaluators, sixteen ECMOs) Length: 116 ft. 7 in. Wingspan: 99.6 ft. Height: 33.7 ft. Wing area: 1,300 sq. ft. Empty weight: 61,491 lbs. Maximum takeoff weight: 65,000 lbs./142,000 lbs. Powerplant: Four 4,600 hp Allison T-56-A-14 turboprop engines

170 — Appendix I

Performance (ARIES II) Maximum speed: 411 kts Cruise speed: 328 kts Range: 2,380 nm Service ceiling: 28,000 ft. Note: Unless noted otherwise, characteristics are for P-3 Orions as those for EP-3Es have not been located. ELINT Equipment (ARIES I c. 1974) Station 8-15 (ARIES II 2001) Two ALR-42 receivers ALR-44 broadband ECM receiver Two ALQ-41 repeat jammers ALR-76 radar warning system Four SR-212 manually tuned receivers ALR-82 ELINT system Big Look: ALR-44 receiver and ALRS ALR-84 broadband ECM receiver IFM system Two HP8555 receivers ALA-12 DF antenna pedestals COMINT Equipment (ARIES I c. 1974) Station 14-19 (ARIES II 2001) URR-74 HF receiver ARR-8(V2) communication intel. system ALR-60 Deepwell receiver system URR-74(V2) multi-purpose receiver Two SR-212 manually tuned receivers ARIES SSIP (ARIES II 2001) Story Book signals collection suite Story Teller data comparison/ correlation reporting system Story Classic communications and intelligence system Big Look: ALR-44 ECM receiver ALR-81 ESM/ELINT system ULQ-16 pulse analyzer ES-3A SHADOW

Manufacturer: Lockheed-California Company Entered Service: 1972 Number Procured: sixteen

Characteristics of ECM Aircraft — 171

General Characteristics Crew: four (pilot, NFO, two system operators) Length: 53 ft. 4 in. Wingspan: 68 ft. 8 in. Height: 22 ft. 9 in. Wing area: 598 sq. ft. Empty weight: 26,650 lbs. Maximum takeoff weight: 52,539 lbs. Powerplant: two 9,275-lb. s.t. General Electric TF34-GE-2 turbojet engines Performance Maximum speed: 550 kts Loiter speed: 210 kts at 20,000 ft. Range: 3,000 nm Service ceiling: 35,000 ft. (S-3A) ECM Equipment: Similar to EP-3E (exact details have not been determined) EA-18G GROWLER

Manufacturer: Boeing Company Entered service: 2009 Number procured: 139 General Characteristics Crew: two (pilot, NFO weapons system operator) Length: 60.2 ft. Wingspan: 44.9 ft. Height: 16.9 ft. Wing area: 500 sq. ft. Empty weight: 33,094 lbs. Max. takeoff weight: 64,000 lbs. Powerplant: two 14,000-lb. dry s.t. General Electric TF414-GE-400 turbofan engines; 22,000-lb. with afterburner Performance Maximum speed: Mach 1.6 Range: 850+ nm with two AIM-120, three ALQ-99 TJS, two AGM-88 HARM, two 480-gallon external fuel tanks

172 — Appendix I

Service ceiling: 50,000 ft. Available store stations: nine ECM Equipment (Block II Growler) ALQ-218 radar warning receiver ALQ-277 communication countermeasures system ALQ-99 radar jamming pods (up to three) ALE-47 countermeasures dispenser Other Electronic Equipment APG-79 AESA radar Joint Tactical Terminal–Receiver Ordnance: Two AIM-120s, two AGM-88 HARMs Sources: Swanborough and Bowers; Price, The History of U.S. Electronic Warfare, vols. I, II; NAVAIR Standard Aircraft Characteristics: “PBM-5S Mariner,” “P4M-1Q Mercator,” “AD-4Q ‘Skyraider,’” “A3D-2Q Skywarrior April 15, 1961,” “EA-3B Skywarrior July 1, 1967,” “Navy Model EA-6A,” “Navy Model RA-5C Aircraft,” “Navy Model EA-6B,” “P-3C Orion,” “MQ-4C Triton”; Baugher, “Douglas AD-2Q Skyraider”; Naval History and Heritage Command, “EA-1F Skyraider”; “MCARA Aircraft > AD-2Q Skyraider”; Whitten, “MCARA Aircraft > AD-4NL”; National Naval Aviation Museum, “C-1A (TF-1) Trader”; Morgan, A-3 Skywarrior Units of the Vietnam War; VQ Association, “EC121M Configuration”; Whitten, “MCARA Aircraft > Grumman EA-6A Intruder— History”; Goebel, “The North American A-5/RA-5 Vigilante”; Parsch; Davis and Willson”; “Grumman EA-6B Prowler Electronic Counter Measures”; “Pratt & Whitney J52/JT8A/PW1212/PW1216”; Navy Fact File, “EP-3E Aries II”; Fisher; U.S. Navy, Navy Training Plan for the EP-3E Airborne Reconnaissance Integrated Electronics Suite II Sensor System Improvement Program Aircraft; Federation of American Scientists, “ES-3A Shadow”; “MQ-4C Triton Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAS”; Shulgin; Burgess, “Triton Deploys at Last”; Scott.

APPE NDIX II

Carrier-Based ECM Aircraft Deployments during the Korean War

CARRIER AIR GROUP DATES SQUADRON AIRCRAFT USS Essex (CV 9) CVG-5 June 26, 1951–March 25, 1952 VF-54 AD-2Q AD-4Q VC-35 Det B AD-4NL* USS Essex (CV 9) VC-35 Det B

ATG-2 AD-4N

June 16, 1953–February 1954

USS Boxer (CV 21) VC-35 Det

CVG-2 AD-4N

August 24, 1950–November 11, 1950

USS Boxer (CV 21) CVG-101 VA-702 AD-2/4Q VC-35 Det F AD-4N

March 2, 1951–October 24, 1951

USS Boxer (CV 21) CVG-2 VF-194 AD-4Q VC-35 Det H AD-4N

March 30, 1953–November 28, 1953

USS Bon Homme Richard (CV 31) CVG-102 VA-923 AD-4Q VC-35 Det G AD-4N

May 10, 1951–December 17, 1951

*

L = Winterized version

173

174 — Appendix II

USS Bon Homme Richard (CV 31) CVG-7 VC-33 Det 41 AD-4NL

May 20, 1952–January 8, 1953

USS Leyte (CV 32) VC-33 Det 3

CVG-3 AD-4N

September 6, 1950–February 3, 1951

USS Kearsarge (CV 33) VC-35 Det F

CVG-101 AD-4N

August 11, 1952–March 17, 1953

USS Oriskany (CVA 34) VC-35 Det G

CVG-102 AD-4N

September 15, 1952–May 18, 1953

USS Antietam (CV 36) VC-35 Det D

CVG-15 AD-4NL

September 8, 1951–May 2, 1952

USS Princeton (CV 37) VC-35 Det 3

CVG-19 AD-4N

November 9, 1950–May 29, 1952

USS Princeton (CV 37) VC-35 Det 7

CVG-19X AD-4N

May 31, 1951–August 29, 1951

USS Princeton (CV 37) VC-35 Det E

CVG-19 AD-4NL

March 21, 1952–November 3, 1952

USS Princeton (CV 37) VC-35 Det D

CVG-15 AD-4N

January 24, 1953–September 21, 1953

USS Lake Champlain (CVA 39) CVG-4 VC-33 Det 44 AD-4N

April 26, 1953–December 4, 1953

USS Valley Forge (CV 45) CVG-5 VA-55 AD-4Q

May 1, 1950–December 1, 1950

USS Valley Forge (CV 45) VC-35 Det 4

CVG-2 AD-4N

December 6, 1950–April 7, 1951

USS Valley Forge (CV 45) VC-35 Det H (10)

ATG-1 AD-4NL

October 15, 1951–July 3, 1952

USS Valley Forge (CV 45) VC-35 Det B

CVG-5 AD-4N

November 20, 1952–June 25, 1953

USS Philippine Sea (CV 47) CVG-11 VA-115 AD-4Q

July 5, 1950–March 26, 1951

Carrier-Based ECM Aircraft Deployments during the Korean War — 175

USS Philippine Sea (CV 47) VC-25 Det 4

CVG-2 AD-4N

March 28, 1951–June 9, 1951

USS Philippine Sea (CV 47) CVG-11 VC-35 Unit C AD-4NL AD-2Q

December 31, 1951–August 8, 1952

USS Philippine Sea (CV 47) CVG-9 VA-95 AD-4N AD-4NL

December 15, 1952–August 19, 1953

Source: U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command, https://www.history.navy.mil /content /dam/nhhc/research/histories/naval-aviation/pdf/app25.pdf.

APPE NDI X III

Radar Concepts

Power Density

A

s radar waves travel out to a target, their power is spread over an increasingly large area so that the power density (Pt) at the target is related to the inverse square of the distance (range, R) so that the power at the target is Pt =Pavg x G/R2, where Pavg is the average power produced by the radar, and G is the gain. Thus, maximum range of a radar receiver is determined by the smallest value of Pt that can be detected at a given frequency. The power reflected from the target is a function of the power density (Pt) at the target times the radar cross-section (c). The reflected power undergoes an equal amount of spreading as it returns to the radar so that the power received by the radar (Pr) is proportion to the fourth power of range where Pr=Pavg x G x C x Rref/R4, with C being the radar cross-section and R the reflectivity of the target. As can be seen, the receiver portion of a radar has to be much more sensitive than that of a radar detector. For further details on this phenomenon, see George W. Stimson, Introduction to Airborne Radar (Mendham, NJ: SciTech Publishing, 1998), 170–72. RADAR BANDS

Radar systems are often designated by the wavelength or frequency in which they operate using alphabetic band destinations.

177

178 — Appendix III

ECM BANDS Band Frequency A 30–250 MHz B 250–500 MHz C 500–1,000 MHz D 1–2 GHz E 2–3 GHz F 3–4 GHz G 4–6 GHz H 6–8 GHz I 8–10 GHz J 10–20 GHz K 20–40 GHz L 40–60 GHz M 60–100 GHz TRAVELING WAVE TUBE

A traveling wave tube is a high-power amplifier used for the amplification of microwave signals up to a wide range. It is a special type of vacuum tube that offers an operating frequency ranging between 300 MHz and 50 GHz. MODULATION

Modulation is the process whereby some characteristic of one wave is varied in accordance with some characteristic of another wave. The basic types of modulation are angular modulation (including the special cases of phase and frequency modulation) and amplitude modulation. In missile radars, it is common practice to amplitude modulate the transmitted radio frequency carrier wave of tracking and guidance transmitters by using a pulsed wave for modulating, and to frequency modulate the transmitted radio frequency carrier wave of illuminator transmitters by using a sine wave.

Conical Scanning Conical scanning was a system used in early radar units to improve their accuracy. A typical radar antenna commonly has a beam width of a few degrees. While this is adequate for locating the target in an early warning role, it is not nearly accurate

Radar Concepts — 179

enough for gun laying, which demands accuracies on the order of 0.1 degrees. In order to monitor the direction of a designated target, it is only necessary to keep the antenna pointed directly at the target. Knowledge of the pointing direction of the antenna then gives knowledge of the target direction. In order to have the radar system follow a moving target automatically, it is necessary to have a control system that keeps the antenna beam pointing at the target as it moves. The radar receiver will get maximum returned signal strength when the target is in the beam center. If the beam is pointed directly at the target, when the target moves, it will move out of the beam center, and the received signal strength will drop. Circuitry designed to monitor any decrease in received signal strength can be used to control a servo motor that steers the antenna to follow the target motion. Conical scanning addresses this problem by moving the radar beam slightly off center from the antenna’s midline (boresight) and then rotating it. The key concept is that a target located at the midline point will generate a constant return no matter where the lobe is currently pointed, whereas if it is to one side, it will generate a strong return when the lobe is pointed in that general direction and a weak one when pointing away. Additionally, the portion covering the centerline is near the edge of the radar lobe, where sensitivity is falling off rapidly. An aircraft centered in the beam is in the area where even small motions will result in a noticeable change in return, growing much stronger along the direction the radar needs to move. The antenna control system is arranged to move the antenna in azimuth and elevation such that a constant return is obtained from the aircraft being tracked. An animated example of how a conical scan works can be found at https://www.radartutorial.eu/06.antennas/Conical%20Scan.en.html. RANGE GATE

A range gate is a window in range observed for some purpose, mainly for detecting and tracking targets in a radar system. In legacy radar systems, analog circuits were used to define a time window (which corresponds to range) where target energy was allowed to pass and be fed to the detection and tracking circuits. Other energy existing outside of this window was not used. When it came to tracking, there are techniques where you can compare portions of the time window to detect if a target is in front of or behind the center of the window.

180 — Appendix III

Usually, an error signal is generated that would then drive some kind of servomotor, which would move the window to center the target again. This action happened continuously when the radar had a good track. Many systems allowed the human operators to manually adjust this window as they saw fit, usually during the detection phase of an engagement. RANGE GATE PULL OFF/STEALING

This is an ECM technique used against ground tracking radar generally deployed with surface-to-air weapons systems. The aim is to confuse the radar tracker and launch the missile at a wrong range and thus save the actual target. The jammer initially returns an exact copy of the skin echo or its own reflection immediately after receipt of the radar pulse from the target radar. During the next few pulses, the jamming signal is returned with increasing amplitude. The radar signal processing circuit accepts the jamming pulse as a true reflection and reduces the gain of the radar receiver as the jammer pulses grow in magnitude. Slowly, the radar receiver becomes too insensitive to detect the true signal, and the jammer thus captures the radar range gate. The jammer now delays the returns of the successive radar pulses by a growing period, so that the range gate becomes adjusted to accept progressively greater range reflections. At a certain stage, the jammer stops transmissions. The radar is now left without any signal and must commence a range search, during which period the angle circuits are inactive. The jammer repeats the whole process as soon as the radar has reestablished the track.

APPE NDI X IV

ICAP-III Upgrades

Units equipped with EA-6B ICAP-III used its improvements to provide • • • •

counters to emerging threats more flexible and effective protection of strike aircraft more accurate HARM targeting enhanced situational awareness via the Multifunction Information Distribution System (MIDS) for improved battle management, plus enhanced connectivity to national, theater, and tactical strike assets • selective reactive jamming capability to allow automatic detection and jamming of threats as they become active • streamlined mission planning and postflight analysis. ICAP-III Block 1 (FY05) design improvements provided • • • • •

enhanced reliability a new receiver, processor, and antenna system (ALQ-218) new tactical displays/interfaces new joint mission planner better external communications.

ICAP-III Block 2 (FY06) added the following to Block 1: • improved battle space management capabilities with the MIDS/digital link • further improved joint mission planner. 181

182 — Appendix IV

ICAP-III Block 3 (FY09) added the following to Block 2: • • • • •

upgraded messaging capability for MIDS/digital link capability to employ the low band transmitter upgraded end-to-end automatic reactive jamming capability further improved joint mission planner improved software to introduce corrections and enhancements previously integrated in older EA-6B systems.

ICAP-III Block 4 (FY10) added the following to Block 3: • • • • •

upgraded digital flight control system and new power trim indicators control display navigation unit-900A dual-frequency USQ-113(V)4 communications jammer ALE-47 countermeasures dispensing system LITENING pod for Marine Corps Prowlers only.

ICAP-III Block 5 (FY11) added the following to Block 4: • high-priority software deficiencies addressed via candidate change list implementations and correction of deficiencies • ALE-47 mission data file update • USQ-113(V)4 software update that includes improved simultaneous (dual-frequency) jamming capability. Source: Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, “EA-6B Upgrades/ Improved Capability (ICAP) III,” FY2010 Annual Report, https://www.dote.osd.mil/ Portals/97/pub/reports/FY2010/navy/2010ea6b.pdf?ver=2019-08-22-112818-863.

APPE NDIX V

Defense Acquisition Management Framework

MILESTONE

MILESTONE

MILESTONE

A

B

C

Concept & Technology Development

System Development & Demonstrations

Production & Deployment

Operations & Support

Concept Explanation / Analysis of Alterations

Eng. & Manufacturing Development / Low-Rate Initial Production

Operational Test & Evaluation / Full Rate Prod. Decision

Sustainment

Mission Need Statement

Operational Requirements Document

Source: Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, “Operation of Defense Acquisition System,” October 23, 2000, as reproduced in Snowden and Wood, 87.

183

Notes

FRONT MATTER

1. Records relating to EW, if still retained and not declassified, can only be accessed by those having a security clearance, forcing the researcher to rely on other sources of information—ergo the frequent use of personal anecdotes and information published on the Internet. 2. The one exception being the extensive collection of articles and a book selfpublished by retired Marine Col. H. Wayne Whitten, an electronic warfare specialist who served twenty-five years in the Corps. Most of this material was published on the website of the now-defunct Marine Corps Aviation Reconnaissance Association, the future of which remains in doubt. 3. Loren B. Thompson, “Shaping the Battlespace: The Future of Airborne Electronic Warfare,” Seapower, March 2000, 40. 4. Gilles Van Nederveen, “Signals Intelligence Support to the Cockpit” (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, Airpower Research Institute, 2001). 5. John R. Hoehn, “U.S. Airborne Electronic Attack Programs: Background and Issues for Congress,” R44572 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, updated May 14, 2019), 1–2.

CHAPTER 1. RADIO INTELLIGENCE

1. Marconi created the first practical wireless telegraph in 1896 and is generally regarded as the inventor of the wireless, establishing the beginnings of radio communication. 185

186 — Notes to Pages 2–5

2. Lee De Forest was an American inventor and radio pioneer who invented the audion (triode vacuum tube), which made practical radio broadcasts a reality. 3. Thomas Withington, “Japan’s SIGINT Challenge,” Asian Military Review, August 10, 2020, https://asianmilitaryreview.com/2020/08/japans-sigint -challenge/; Gareth Evans, “The Evolution of Electronic Warfare,” Global Defence, https://defence.nridigital.com/global_defence_technology_special /the_evolution_of_electronic_warfare; Michael S. Sweeney and Natascha T. Roelsgaard, Journalism and the Russo-Japanese War: The End of the Golden Age of Combat Correspondence (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2020), 48. 4. Linda Jaivin, “Morrison’s World,” China Heritage Quarterly, no. 27 (September 2021): 5; Brian Best, Reporting from the Front (South Yorkshire, UK: Pen and Sword, 2014), xiii. 5. Cyril Pearl, Morrison of Peking (Middlesex, UK: Penguin, 1967), 145; David Fraser, A Modern Campaign, or War and Wireless Telegraphy in the Far East (London: Methuen, 1905), 36; Sweeney and Roelsgaard, 46. 6. Sweeney and Roelsgaard, 46. 7. “First Messages from the Yellow Sea,” The Times, March 11, 2004, https:// www.thetimes.co.uk/article/first-messages-from-the-yellow-sea-w3zbf hjrp22; Sweeney and Roelsgaard, 46. See also “Japan’s Influence Supreme in Korea,” The New York Times, March 15, 1904, 3. 8. Sweeney and Roelsgaard, 52; Arthur Hezlet, The Electron and Sea Power (London: Peter Davies, 1975), 44–77. 9. Sweeney and Roelsgaard, 51–52; Austin Scandella, “Notes on the Military Telegraphy in Japan,” The Royal Engineers Journal VI (July–December 1907): 122; Denis Warner, “Wireless From Manchuria, or an Early Form of CNN,” The New York Times, September 6, 1996, https://www.nytimes .com/1996/09/06/opinion/IHT-wireless-from-manchuria-or-an-early -form-of-cnn.html. 10. As quoted in Peter Wright, Spycatcher (New York: Dell, 1988), 10; Patrick Beesly, Room 40: British Naval Intelligence, 1914–1918 (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1982), 11–12. 11. Beesly, 11–12.

Notes to Pages 5–8 — 187

12. Christopher Sandford, “Room 40’s Brilliant World War I Codebreakers,” The History Press, https://www.thehistorypress.co.uk/articles/room-40-s -brilliant-world-war-i-codebreakers/; John Johnson, The Evolution of British Sigint, 1653–1939 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1977), 3; The London Gazette, May 1, 1917, 4005, https://www.thegazette.co.uk/ London/issue/30042/page/4095. 13. The Marconi Company had previously acquired patents for this device. 14. Ken Beauchamp, A History of Telegraphy: Its History and Technology (London: The Institution of Electrical Engineers, 2000), 269; W. J. Baker, “Henry Joseph Round, Unrecognized Electronics Pioneer,” Electronics Weekly, https://www.electronicsweekly.com/news/archived/archive-henry -joseph-round-unrecognised-electropnics-pioneer-2017–03/. 15. Beauchamp, 269; The London Gazette, April 23, 1915, 23, https://www .thegazette.co.uk/London/issue/29141/supplement/4034. Henry Round was later promoted to captain; see The London Gazette, October 10, 1916, 9845, https://www.thegazette.co.uk/London/issue/29781/supplement/98 45; “Marconi and the Making of Radio,” Wireless World, https://mhs .ox.ac.uk/marconi/exhibition/worldwarone.htm; David Ramsay, “Blinker” Hall: Spymaster, The Man who Brought America into World War I (Gloucestershire, UK: Spellmount, 2009), 36–37; Beesly, 7. 16. Beesly, 20. 17. Robert K. Massie, Castles of Steel: Britain, Germany, and the Winning of the Great War at Sea (New York: Random House, 2003), 317; Beesly, 18; Ronald Lewin, Ultra Goes to War: The Secret Story (London: Hutchinson, 1978), 237. 18. Beesly, 155. 19. Massie, 580. 20. National Security Agency, Central Security Service, “Navy Cryptology: The Early Days,” https://www.nsa.gov/about/cryptologic-heritage/center -cryptologic-history/pearl-harbor-review/navy-crypt/. 21. For information on the Navy’s radio direction-finding effort, see Louis A. Gebhard, “Evolution of Naval Radio-Electronics and Contributions of the Naval Research Laboratory,” NRL Report 8300 (Washington, DC: Naval Research Laboratory, 1980).

188 — Notes to Pages 9–12

CHAPTER 2. WORLD WAR II ELINT

1. Electronic intelligence is often used to describe actions taken to search, intercept, locate, and identify radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of real-time exploitation of such actions in support of military operations. 2. The term RADAR, an acronym for RAdio Detection And Ranging, was coined by the U.S. Navy in 1940. 3. Kevin Davies, “Australia’s ELINT Commandos, Field Unit 12 Takes New Technology to the War in the South Pacific,” Studies in Intelligence 58, no. 3 (September 2014): 11. 4. Alfred W. Price, The History of U.S. Electronic Warfare, vol. I, The Years of Innovation—Beginnings to 1946 (Arlington, VA: Association of Old Crows, 1984), 9, 13–14; also Alfred W. Price, “The Evolution of Electronic Warfare Equipment and Techniques in the USA, 1901 to 1945” (Loughborough, UK: Loughborough University, 1985), 27, 36–37, https://repository.lboro .ac.uk/articles/thesis/The_evolution_of_electronic_warfare_equipment _and_techniques_in_the_USA_1901_to_1945/9466886/1; David L. Boslaugh, When Computers Went to Sea (Washington, DC: IEEE Computer Society, 1999), 12. 5. Price, vol. I, 14–17. 6. For a more detailed explanation, see the power density section on radar concepts in appendix III. 7. Price, vol. I, 17. 8. Ivan Amato, “Pushing the Horizon: Seventy-Five Years of High Stakes Science and Technology at the Naval Research Laboratory” (Washington, DC: Naval Research Laboratory, 2001), 119; Craig A. Bellamy, “The Beginnings of the Secret Australian Radar Countermeasures Unit During the Pacific War” (Darwin, Australia: Charles Darwin University, 2020), 65. 9. Price, vol. I, 47; Richard C. Knott, Black Cat Raiders of World War II (Annapolis, MD: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Co., 1981), 14; William Cahill, “Thirteenth Air Force Radio Countermeasures Operations, 1944– 45,” Air Power History 64, no. 2 (Summer 2017): 10. 10. Gebhard, 301, 305–6. 11. Dr. Page is often considered the father of radar in the United States because of his work to develop the first pulse radar in 1934 and the invention of the duplexer in 1936. The latter was a critical step in the development of radar that enabled one antenna to be used to both transmit and receive radar signals.

Notes to Pages 12–18 — 189

12. Price, vol. I, 47–48; R. C. Guthrie, “Hindsight,” in Report of NRL Progress (Washington, DC: Naval Research Laboratory, July 1973), 25; Linwood S. Howeth, “RADAR,” History of Communications-Electronics in the United States (Washington, DC: Bureau of Ships and Office of Naval History, 1965), https://earlyradiohistory.us/1963hw38.htm. 13. Price, vol. I, 48. 14. Price, vol. I, 49; “B-17E ‘Goonie’ Serial Number 41–2523,” Pacific Wrecks, https://pacificwrecks.com/aircraft/b-17/41–2523.html. 15. At around this time, in September 1942, naval personal installed an ARC-1 receiver in a U.S. Army Air Forces B-17 at Carins, Australia, according to one World War II veteran (see Bellamy, 76, note 238). This may have been an XARD, however, since the Cast Mike 1 unit did not receive their ARC-1s until the early part of January 1943 (see Bellamy, xx). 16. Jack Churchill quoted in Price, vol. I, 49. 17. Bellamy, 131, note 564. 18. Price, vol. I, 55–56. 19. Greg Goebel, “The Wizard’s War: World War II and the Origins of Radar,” Airvectors, https://vc.airvectors.net/ttwiz_08.html; Price, vol. I, 134. 20. Price, vol. I, 137; Bellamy, 149. 21. Michael D. Roberts, Dictionary of American Naval Squadrons, vol. II, Naval History and Heritage Command, https://www.history.navy.mil/research/ histories/naval-aviation-history/dictionary-of-american-naval-aviationsquadrons-volume-2.html, 152; John Richard, “Consolidated PB4Y-1 Liberator,” Military History Encyclopedia on the Web, http://www.history ofwar.org/articles/weapons_PB4Y-1_Liberator.html. 22. Price, vol. I, 137–38; Bellamy, 192. 23. Bellamy, 159–60. Price’s date for the formation of Section 22 is in error according to Bellamy, 16. 24. Price, vol. I, 138. 25. Lawrence Heron from a taped account cited by Price, vol. I, 145–47. 26. Price, vol. I, 147. 27. U.S. Navy, Bureau of Yards and Docks, Building the Navy’s Bases in World War II (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1947), 125. 28. Roberts, vol. II, 623 (Note: Price’s date on page 143 is in error); Price, vol. I, 144; U.S. Navy, United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Area, “Field Survey of Japanese Defenses on Truk, Part One—The Report,” CINCPAC-CINCPOA bulletin no. 3-46, March 15, 1946, 94.

190 — Notes to Pages 20–26

CHAPTER 3. NON-PASSIVE ECM

1. Price, vol. I, 61; “APT-1 ‘Dina’ Radar Jammer,” aafradio.org, https://aafradio .org/countermeasures/APT-1.html; “Airborne Jammer Radar Set AN/APT1,” Lone Sentry Blog, http://www.lonesentry.com/blog/airborne-jammer -radar-set-anapt-1.html; “APT-3 ‘Mandrel’ Radar Jammer,” aafradio.org, https://aafradio.org/countermeasures/APT-3.htm; “APQ-2 ‘Rug’ Jammer,” aafradio.org, https://aafradio.org/countermeasures/APQ-2jammer.html. 2. Aeronautical Radio, Inc. (ARINC), established in 1929 as the airline industry’s single licensee and coordinator of radio communication, developed standards for trays and boxes used to hold standard replaceable units. 3. Price, vol. I, 61, 201–2; “AN/ARR-5 Receiver Manuals,” aafradio.org, https://aafradio.org/docs/ARR-5.htm. 4. Rick Morgan, “A Short History of U.S. Navy Airborne Electronic Attack,” Prowler Association, https://ea6bprowler.org/us-navy-history. 5. Morgan, “Short History.” 6. J. T. O’Brien, Top Secret: An Informal History of Electronic and Photographic Reconnaissance in Marne Corps Aviation 1940–2000 (Anaheim, CA: Equidata Publishing, 2004), 78. 7. A dipole is the simplest type of radio antenna, consisting of a conductive wire rod. 8. Resonance is the condition in which an electric circuit or device produces the largest possible response to an applied oscillating signal such as radar. 9. Price, vol. I, 32, 61–62. 10. Price, vol. I, 204–5. Price does not provide a source for this material. 11. “1945—Tokyo Raids,” USS Enterprise CV 6, http://www.cv6.org/default .htm; Price, vol. I, 206. 12. “Consolidated Vultee PB4Y-2 Privateer,” Skytamer.com, https://www.sky tamer.com/Consolidated_Vultee_PB4Y-2.html; Gordon Swanborough and Peter M. Bowers, United States Naval Aircraft Since 1911 (London: Putnam Aeronautical Books, 1990), 103–6. 13. “Surveillance and Analysis Equipment,” aafradio.org, https://aafradio.org/ countermeasures/surveillance_bay.htm; Price, vol. I, 207.

CHAPTER 4. COLD WAR ELINT

1. John T. Farquhar, “A Need to Know: The Role of Air Force Reconnaissance in War Planning, 1945–1953” (Columbus: The Ohio State University, 1991), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA249785.pdf, 33, note 65.

Notes to Pages 26–32 — 191

2. Farquhar, 57. 3. Alfred W. Price, The History of U.S. Electronic Warfare, vol. II, The Renaissance Years, 1946 to 1964 (Arlington, VA: Association of Old Crows, 1989), 4. 4. “Airborne Instruments Laboratory (AIL),” stealthskater.com, https://www .stealthskater.com/Documents/AIL_01.pdf; David G. Fubini, Let Me Explain: Eugene G. Fubini’s Life in Defense of America (Santa Fe, NM: Sunstone Press, 2009), 128. 5. Price, vol. II, 5. 6. Gebhard; Price, vol. II, 9. 7. H. Wayne Whitten, “MCARA Aircraft: Grumman TBM-3Q Avenger,” Marine Corps Aviation Reconnaissance Association, https://www.mcara. us/TBM-3Q.html; Price, vol. II, 25–27. 8. Farquhar, 59. 9. Omar N. Bradley, “Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Johnson,” May 5, 1950, in Edward C. Keefer, The Intelligence Community 1950–1955 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), 9–10; Don C. East, “A History of U.S. Navy Fleet Air Reconnaissance—Parts I and II—The Pacific and VQ-1,” U.S. Navy Patrol Squadrons, http://www.vpnavy.org/vq2_1950.html. 10. An Air Force term used unofficially by Navy ECM crews. 11. Roberts, vol. II, 171. 12. John R. Schindler, A Dangerous Business: U.S. Navy and National Reconnaissance During the Cold War (Fort George G. Meade, MD: Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency, 2014), 3; Angelo Romano and John D. Herndon, From Bats to Rangers: A Pictorial History of Electronic Countermeasures Squadron Two (ECMRON2–2) Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron Two (VQ-2) (Simi Valley, CA: Ginter Books, 2017), 15–16. 13. Romano and Herndon, 16. 14. Bradley, in Keefer, 9–10. 15. Roberts, vol. II, 171; Don C. East, “A History of U.S. Navy Air Reconnaissance Squadrons One and Two (VQ-1 and VQ-2),” VQ Association, http://vqassociation.org/history-docs/00d-History-of-Fleet-Recon -Squadrons-1–2.pdf, 53; Bill Walton, “The Mercator: A Cold War Spy Plane Many Never Even Knew Existed,” Avgeekery.com, https://avgeekery

192 — Notes to Pages 33–38

.com/the-mercator-a-cold-war-spy-plane-many-never-even-knew-existed /; Swanborough and Bowers, 513; Roberts, “P4M-1 Mercator,” in vol. II, appendix 1, 661; Robert F. Dorr, “Cold Warrior,” HistoryNet, https:// www.historynet.com/cold-warrior.htm. 16. Gebhard, 316; Romano and Herndon, 19; U.S. Navy, Naval Air Systems Command, “Standard Aircraft Characteristics P4M-1Q ‘Mercator,’ ” https://www.alternatewars.com/SAC/P4M-1Q_Mercator_SAC_-_1_ February_1952.pdf. See Appendix I for a list of ECM equipment carried. 17. Roberts, vol. II, 284; Norman Polmar, “A Very Able Mariner,” Naval History 21, no. 6 (December 2007), https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval -history-magazine/2007/december/historic-aircraft; Farquhar, 153; U.S. Navy, “Standard Aircraft Characteristics PBM-5S ‘Mariner,’” September 1, 1950, https://www.history.navy.mil/content/dam/nhhc/research/histories /naval-aviation/naval-aircraft/pdfs/pbm.pdf; East, “History of U.S. Navy Air Reconnaissance Squadrons One and Two,” 25. 18. East, “History of U.S. Navy Air Reconnaissance Squadrons One and Two,” 26. 19. Dick van der Aart, Aerial Espionage: Secret Intelligence Flights by East and West (New York: Arco/Prentice Hall, 1985), 56; East, “History of U.S. Navy Air Reconnaissance Squadrons One and Two,” 18–21. 20. A superheterodyne receiver is a type of radio receiver that uses frequency mixing to convert a received signal to a fixed intermediate frequency that can be more conveniently processed than the original carrier frequency. 21. In electronics and telecommunications, modulation is the process of varying one or more properties of a periodic waveform, called the carrier signal, with a separate signal called the modulation signal that typically contains information to be transmitted. The modulation pattern identifies the modulation signal. 22. Price, vol. II, 163. 23. Swanborough and Bowers, 290–95; Greg Goebel, “The Lockheed P2V Neptune & Martin Mercator,” AirVectors, https://www.airvectors.net/avp 2v.html. 24. Swanborough and Bowers, 290–95; Goebel, “The Lockheed P2V Neptune & Martin Mercator.”

Notes to Pages 39–42 — 193

CHAPTER 5. ECM DURING THE KOREAN WAR

1. Price, vol. II, 75. 2. Price, vol. II, 76. 3. Ralph E. Poore, “The Value of Electronic Warfare Endures,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 130, no. 9 (September 2004): 36–37; “VC-35 Night Hecklers,” Together We Served, https://navy.togetherweserved.com/usn /servlet/tws.webapp.WebApp?cmd=PublicUnitProfile&type=Unit& ID=18333; H. Wayne Whitten, “MCARA Aircraft: AD-4N,” Marine Corps Aviation Reconnaissance Association, https://www.mcara.us/AD-4N.html. 4. Price, vol. II, 105; Swanborough and Bowers, 93; Joseph F. Baugher, “Douglas AD-1Q Skyraider,” http://www.joebaugher.com/usattack/newa1 _3.html. 5. Baugher, “Douglas AD-1Q Skyraider,” l; Swanborough and Bowers; Greg Goebel, “Douglas AD/A-1 Skyraider,” airvectors.net https://www .airvectors.net/ava1spad.html; U.S. Navy, Naval Air Systems Command, “Standard Aircraft Characteristics AD-4Q ‘Skyraider,’” https://www.alter natewars.com/SAC/AD-4Q_Skyraider_SAC_-_1_December_1949.pdf. 6. Swanborough and Bowers, 196. 7. H. Wayne Whitten, “1st Marine Aircraft Wing Headquarters Squadron (HEDRON-1) and MACG-2 AEW/ECM Section History,” Marine Corps Aviation Reconnaissance Association, https://www.mcara.us/HEDRON-1 .html; H. Wayne Whitten, “MCARA Notables > USMC Electronic Warfare Pioneers,” Marine Corps Aviation Reconnaissance Association, https:// www.mcara.us/notables_ew_pioneers.html; J. T. O’Brien, Top Secret: An Informal History of Electronic and Photographic Reconnaissance in Marine Corps Aviation 1940–2000 (Anaheim, CA: Equidata Publishing, 2004), 79. Both Whitten and O’Brien claim that Bouher and Grimes arrived at the K3 airbase at Phohang in July, but according to John P. Condon (Corsairs to Panthers: U.S. Marine Aviation in Korea [Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps Historical Center, 2002], 8), MAG-33 did not begin shore operations until August; “2nd MAW Headquarters Squadron (HEDRON-2) AEW/ECM Section History,” Marine Corps Aviation Reconnaissance Association, https://www.mcara.us/HEDRON-2.html. 8. “2nd MAW Headquarters Squadron (HEDRON-2) AEW/ECM Section History.”

194 — Notes to Pages 42–51

9. O’Brien, 79–80. 10. H. Wayne Whitten, “Marine Composite Squadron One (VMC-1) History,” Marine Corps Aviation Reconnaissance Association, https://www .mcara.us/VMC-1.html; Whitten, “1st Marine Aircraft Wing Headquarters Squadron”; O’Brien, 82. 11. Whitten, “MCARA Aircraft: AD-4NL”; O’Brien, 82–83. 12. Whitten, “1st Marine Aircraft Wing Headquarters Squadron.” 13. Whitten, “Marine Composite Squadron One (VMC-1) History.” 14. Price, vol. II, 103, 110. CHAPTER 6. DEDICATED ECM SQUADRONS

1. G. A. Frazier, “History of Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron One,” VQ Association, http://vqassociation.org/history-docs/00c%20History%20of %20Fleet%20Air%20Recon%20Squadron%20One.pdf, 1; Romano and Herndon, 24, 28; “Special Electronic Search Project (forerunner of VQ-1) Established October 15, 1951,” Station HYPO, https://stationhypo.com /2019/10/15/vq-1-fleet-air-reconnaissance-squadron-one-established-octo ber-15–1951/. 2. Frazier, 2. 3. Romano and Herndon, 28. 4. Romano and Herndon, 30; Frazier; East, “History of U.S. Navy Fleet Air Reconnaissance”; Swanborough and Bowers, 202; “A-3/EA-3B Sky Warrior,” GlobalSecurity.org, https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/systems/ea-3.htm; Greg Goebel, “The Douglas A3D Skywarrior and B-66 Destroyer,” Airvectors, https://www.airvectors.net/avskywar.html. 5. Romano and Herndon, 30. 6. Adron Joyner, “A3D-1Q at Port Lyautey, French Morocco,” VQ Association, https://vqassociation.org/history/. 7. Swanborough and Bowers, 203. 8. Romano and Herndon, 30, 45; Frazier, “History of Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron One,” 4; Goebel, “The Douglas A3D Skywarrior and B-66 Destroyer.” 9. John J. Anayannis, “From an EA-3B Evaluator,” VQ Association, http:// vqassociation.org/history/. 10. East, “History of U.S. Navy Fleet Air Reconnaissance”; Romano and Herndon, 46; Rich Haver, “Electronic Counter Measures Aircraft Life

Notes to Pages 51–56 — 195

Histories (VQ-1 and VQ-2) 1949–,” VQ Association, http://vqassociation .org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/062-VQ-Aircraft-History-Charts-HQ .pdf. I have taken the delivery date from Haver’s list. East gives it as February 21. 11. Swanborough and Bowers, 16, 299–301; East, “History of U.S. Navy Fleet Air Reconnaissance”; “VQ-2,” U.S. Navy Patrol Squadrons, http://www. vpnavy.org/vq2_1950.html; “Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron TWO [VQ-2] ‘Sandeman,’” GlobalSecurity.org, https://www.globalsecu rity.org/ military/agency/navy/vq-2.htm. 12. Price, vol. II, 281. 13. The A-scope is the oldest form of radar display that displays the amplitude of the echo display measured on the Y axis versus the time or range on the X axis. 14. Price, vol. II, 281; Alfred Price, The History of U.S. Electronic Warfare, vol. III, Rolling Thunder Through Allied Force, 1964 to 2000 (Arlington, VA: Association of Old Crows, 2000), 15. 15. Price, vol. III, 15. 16. Price, vol. II, 281–83. 17. Price, vol. II, 283–84. 18. Price, vol. III, 16. CHAPTER 7. BEGGAR SHADOW MISSIONS

1. William C. Barnes, “The EC-121 Incident 15 April 1969,” DTIC ADA 586295 (Hickam Air Force Base, HI: Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report, March 30, 1970), 1–2. 2. National Security Agency, Central Security Service (NSA-CSS), “The National Security Agency and the EC-121 Shootdown (S-CC0),” 1989, 7–9, https://archive.org/details/EC-121-nsa/mode/2up?view=theater. Note that large portions of this report, as presently published on the Internet, have been redacted. 3. NSA-CSS, “The National Security Agency and the EC-121 Shootdown,” 9; “1969: Navy EC-121 Shot Down Friday,” cryptologicfoundation.org, https://cryptologicfoundation.org/what-we-do/educate/bytes/this_day _in_history_calendar.html/event/2022/04/15/1649998800/1969-navy -ec-121-shot-down-/94205I.

196 — Notes to Pages 57–62

4. NSA-CSS, “The National Security Agency and the EC-121 Shootdown,” 10. 5. Zulu time, military term for Universal Coordinated Time, previously called Greenwich time. 6. Mario Vulcano, “Remembering the Crew of EC-121 Beggar Shadow, April 15,  1969,” Station HYPO, https://stationhypo.com/2016/04/15/remem bering-the-crew-of-ec-121-beggar-shadow-april-15–1969/; NSA-CSS, “The National Security Agency and the EC-121 Shootdown,” 11–13; Barnes, 6. 7. Established June 1948, the U.S. Air Force Security Service was a secretive branch of the Air Force tasked with monitoring, collecting, and interpreting military voice and electronic signals of countries of interest. 8. Vulcano. 9. NSA-CSS, “The National Security Agency and the EC-121 Shootdown,” 19. 10. Vulcano. 11. Barnes, 6–7; NSA-CSS, “The National Security Agency and the EC-121 Shootdown,” 21. 12. Vulcano; NSA-CSS, “The National Security Agency and the EC-121 Shootdown,” 21. 13. NSA-CSS, “The National Security Agency and the EC-121 Shootdown,” 24–25. 14. NSA-CSS, “The National Security Agency and the EC-121 Shootdown,” 1. 15. After the Pueblo incident, the Pacific Air Force command committed considerable resources to provide fighter protection for such missions so that all over water sections of the eastern leg had to be covered with fighter escort. The JCS and CINCPAC canceled this requirement on February 9, 1969. 16. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Special Subcommittee on the U.S.S. Pueblo, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., Inquiry into the U.S.S. Pueblo and EC-121 Plane Incidents, July 28, 1969, 1678–81. 17. Inquiry into the U.S.S. Pueblo and EC-121 Plane Incidents, 1625, 1681. 18. NSA-CSS, “The National Security Agency and the EC-121 Shootdown,” 42–43. 19. NSA-CSS, “The National Security Agency and the EC-121 Shootdown,” 44. 20. NSA-CSS, “The National Security Agency and the EC-121 Shootdown,” 44.

Notes to Pages 63–69 — 197

CHAPTER 8. SELF-DEFENSE

1. Swanborough and Bowers, 202–4. 2. Steven J. Zaloga, “Defending the Kremlin: The First Generation of Soviet Strategic Air Defense Systems 1950–60,” New York Military Affairs Symposium, https://nymas.org/defendingthekremlin.htm. 3. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “National Intelligence Estimate Number 11–57. Sino-Soviet Bloc Air Defense Capabilities Through Mid-1962,” July 16, 1957, 7 (see also annex B, table 4); Zaloga; Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenback, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954–1974 (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1992), 75; Eric Hehs, “Carmine Vito: U-2 Pilot,” Code One 17, no. 1 (2002), https://www.codeonemagazine.com /article.html?item_id=167. See also “Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Sites in the Moscow Area,” https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:SAM _rings_of_Moscow,_1957_CIA_estimate.png. 4. Price, vol. II, 191, 193. 5. For a description of how this and other radar concepts work, see appendix III. 6. Price, vol. II, 194. 7. Jim Disney, as quoted by Price, vol. II, 194. 8. Mike Gruntman, “Intercept 1961: From Air Defense SA-1 to Missile Defense System A,” Proceedings of the IEEE 104, no. 4 (April 2016): 884. 9. Price, vol. II, 195. 10. See the table of radar bands in appendix III. 11. Price, vol. II, 196, 251. 12. George Steeg, as quoted by Price, vol. II, 250. 13. Price, vol. II, 252–53, 261. 14. Sean O’Connor, “Soviet/Russian SAM Site Configuration,” Air Power Australia, December 2009 (updated April 2012), http://www.ausairpower .net/APA-Rus-SAM-Site-Configs-A.html. 15. Of the three aircraft listed in table 8-1, the A3D-2 was the only one equipped with the ALQ-35, which was probably discontinued after the film was produced. U.S. Navy, “Defensive Electronic Countermeasures (May 1962),” NA Identifier 75132, National Archives, College Park, MD; Price, vol. II, 251. 16. See the ECM radar bands table in appendix III.

198 — Notes to Pages 70–74

17. See appendix III for additional details of a conical scanning radar. 18. Ron Westrum, Sidewinder: Creative Missile Development at China Lake (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999), 130, 172; Laurence S. Kuter, “The Meaning of the Taiwan Strait Crisis,” Air Force Magazine, March 1, 1959, https://www.airforcemag.com/article/0359meaning/; Jaco van Staaveren, “Air Operations in the Taiwan Crisis of 1958,” USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, November 1962, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/ nukevault/ebb249/doc11.pdf, 38. 19. Kuter; Alex Hollings, “The Almost-Unbelievable True Story of the Sidewinder Missile,” Popular Mechanics, March 21, 2021, https://www.popular -mechanics.com/military/weapons/a35701747/sidewinder-missile-story/. 20. Hollings; “K-13 (NATO: AA-2 ATOLL),” Weaponsystems.net, https://old .weaponsystems.net/weaponsystem/HH07%20-%20AA-2%20Atoll.html; U.S. Navy, Naval Air Systems Command, “Standard Aircraft Characteristics A2F-1 [A-6A] Grumman,” April 30, 1960 (see ordnance section), https:// www.alternatewars.com/SAC/A2F-1_SAC_-_30_April_1960.pdf. CHAPTER 9. F3D-2Q AND MARINE LEADERSHIP

1. O’Brien, 114, 136; Swanborough and Bowers, 199–98; Joe Coles, “Enter the Skyknight: Hornet Pilot Shares the Dark History of the Douglas F3D ‘Night Killer,’” Hush-Kit: The Alternative Aviation Magazine, https://hush -kit.net/2020/12/29/enter-the-skyknight-hornet-pilot-shares-the-dark-his tory-of-the-douglas-f3d-night-killer/. 2. Greg Goebel, “Douglas F3D Skyknight,” Airvectors, https://www.airvec tors.net/avskykt.html. 3. Pat Meid and James M. Yingling, U.S. Marine Operations in Korea (Washington, DC: Historical Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1972), 241. 4. H. Wayne Whitten, Silent Heroes: U.S. Marines and Airborne Electronic Warfare 1950–2012 (Lutz, FL: Colonel H. Wayne Whitten and Associates, 2011), 22–23; “MCARA Aircraft > F3D-2Q/EF-10B Skyknight,” Marine Corps Aviation Reconnaissance Association, https://www.mcara.us/EF -10B.php; O’Brien, 80, 122–23. 5. Some sources say the work was allegedly accomplished in a small wooden shed at the far end of the flight line at El Toro. It is possible that each of the two, or possibly three, aircraft was modified simultaneously in two different locals.

Notes to Pages 74–80 — 199

6. Whitten, Silent Heroes, 23–24. 7. O’Brien, 123; H. Wayne Whitten, “Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron-3 (VMCJ-3) History,” Marine Corps Aviation Reconnaissance Association, https://www.mcara.us/VMCJ-3.html; “MCARA Aircraft > F3D-2Q/EF-10B Skyknight–History”; Price, vol. II, 198; Whitten, Silent Heroes, 25. The modification effort was under the direction of the avionics officer, Capt. Noble, but was led by Joe Bouher, an electronics technician and ECMO (a pioneer in Marine Corps ECM dating back to 1950 in the TBM-3Q Avengers at MCAS Cherry Point) who had also performed early modification of AD-2Qs in Korea. 8. “MCARA Aircraft > F3D-2Q/EF-10B Skyknight–History”; Price, vol. II, 198–99. 9. Whitten, “Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron-3 (VMCJ-3) History.” 10. Whitten, Silent Heroes, 28–29. 11. O’Brien, 167–68. 12. Martin Lachow, in John D. Weides and J. David Weber, “Evolution of the EA6A,” CV41 Midway, http://cv41.org/EA6A.html; O’Brien, 168. 13. O’Brien, 168. 14. Whitten, Silent Heroes, 30–31. 15. “Julian S. Lake, Rear Admiral, USN (Ret.),” Early and Pioneer Naval Aviators Association, http://epnaao.com/BIOS_files/EMERITUS/Lake-%20 Julian%20S.pdf. 16. “VF-74 Squadron History,” Topedge, http://www.topedge.com/alley/squad ron/lant/vf74hist.htmLate, in Price, vol. II, 301–2. 17. H. Wayne Whitten, “MCARA Units > VMCJ-2 (1955–1975),” Marine Corps Aviation Reconnaissance Association, https://www.mcara.us/VMCJ -2.html. 18. O’Brien, 177. 19. Whitten, Silent Heroes, 34; O’Brien, 176; Whitten, “MCARA Units > VMCJ-2 (1955–1975).” 20. For a detailed description of the CIA mini receiver and details of its installation, see Price, vol. III, 3–4. 21. Scott L. Tomaszycki, “Cherry Point Pilots Played a Pivotal Role in Cuban Missile Crisis,” MCAS Cherry Point News, October 30, 2012, https://www

200 — Notes to Pages 80–85

.cherrypoint.marines.mil/News/Article/525436/cherry-point-pilots -played-pivotal-role-in-cuban-missile-crisis/; Price, vol. III, 3–4. 22. Whitten, Silent Heroes, 34. CHAPTER 10. NEW EW PLATFORMS

1. Joseph F. Baugher, “Grumman A2F-1A/A-6A Intruder,” joebaugher.com, http://www.joebaugher.com/usattack/newa6_1.html. 2. Whitten, Silent Heroes, 44–46; H. Wayne Whitten, “MCARA Aircraft > Grumman EA-6A Intruder—Notables,” Marine Corps Aviation Reconnaissance Association, https://www.mcara.us/EA-6A_notables.html. 3. Swanborough and Bowers, 272; Rear Adm. Kieber S. Masterson, Chief of Bureau of Weapons, testimony before Congress, U.S. Congress, House, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1964, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 5, Procurement, 449. 4. O’Brien, 148; see also statement of Congressman George H. Mahon, U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1964, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 449. 5. O’Brien, 148; Whitten, “Grumman EA-6A Intruder—History.” 6. Price, vol. II, 267; Whitten, “Grumman EA-6A Intruder—History.” 7. Price, vol. II, 262–63. 8. Whitten, “Grumman EA-6A Intruder—History”; Whitten, Silent Heroes, 50; see also statement of Gen. William H. Green, Commandant of the Marine Corps, U.S. Congress, Senate, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1964, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Department of Defense of the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on Armed Services, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., on H.R. 10939, Part 1, 579. 9. Price, vol. II, 229–30; “Flightline: 152–North American Aviation A-5 Vigilante,” https://opposite-lock.com/topic/12814/flightline-152-north -american-aviation-a-5-vigilante/6. 10. Greg Goebel, “The North American A-5/RA-5 Vigilante,” Airvectors, https://www.airvectors.net/ava5.html#m3. 11. Goebel, “The North American A-5/RA-5 Vigilante”; John Davis and D. Willson, Wings over Vietnam (self-published, 2019), 174.

Notes to Pages 86–89 — 201

CHAPTER 11. VIETNAM

1. Statement of Capt. G. F. Peoples, USN, head, Aviation Electronic Warfare Section, DCNO Air Warfare, “Southeast Asia ECM Briefing,” March 15, 1973, U.S. Congress, Senate, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1974, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, 93rd Congr., 1st Sess., Part 6, Tactical Air Power (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1973) (hereafter DOD Appropriations for 1974), 4249. 2. Richard R. Burgess and Rosario M. Rausa, U.S. Navy A-1 Skyraider Units of the Vietnam War (London: Osprey, 2013), 5; Robert E. Morrison, “How VQ-1 Supported Military Actions with SIGINT During Vietnam (Part 1 of 7),” Station HYPO, https://stationhypo.com/2018/04/22/how-vq-1 -supported-military-actions-with-sigint-during-vietnam-part-1-of7-guest-post/; Romano and Herndon, 62; Price, vol. III, 22–23. 3. Between March 15 and April 2, four of Hancock’s aircraft succumbed to ground-based anti-aircraft fire. 4. Burgess and Rosario, 15, 18. 5. John T. Correll, “Take It Down! The Wild Weasels in Vietnam,” Air Force Magazine, July 1, 2010, https://www.airforcemag.com/article/0710 weasels/. 6. Norman Polmar and Edward J. Marolda, Naval Air War: The Rolling Thunder Campaign (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2015), 31; Joe Copalman, “Glory Days//EA-6A in Vietnam,” Combat Aircraft Journal, June 6, 2019, https://www.keymilitary.com/article/electric -intruder-war; H. Wayne Whitten, “Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron One (VMCJ-1) History,” Marine Corps Aviation Reconnaissance Association, https://www.mcara.us/VMCJ-1.html. 7. Whitten, Silent Heroes, 55; O’Brien, 257. 8. Whitten, Silent Heroes, 55; O’Brien, 226; Jack Shulimson and Charles M. Johnson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Landing and the Buildup 1965 (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1978), 27. 9. Whitten, Silent Heroes, 59–61; Bernard Nalty, “Tactics and Techniques of Electronic Warfare: Electronic Countermeasures in the Air War Against North Vietnam 1965–1973,” All World Wars, https://www.allworldwars .com/Tactics-and-Techniques-of-Electronic-Warfare-by-Bernard-Nalty .html.

202 — Notes to Pages 89–95

10. Whitten, Silent Heroes, 62; O’Brien, 255. 11. Whitten, Silent Heroes, 63–64. 12. Whitten, Silent Heroes, 64; Nalty. 13. Whitten, Silent Heroes, 66; Price, vol. III, 36. 14. Michael D. Roberts, Dictionary of American Naval Squadrons, vol. I, Naval History and Heritage Command, https://www.history.navy.mil/content/ dam/nhhc/research/histories/naval-aviation/dictionary-of-american-navalaviation-squadrons-volume-1/pdfs/va-64–75.pdf, 133; Price, vol. III, 29. 15. “Carrier Air and Vietnam . . . an Assessment,” Naval History Magazine 1, no. 1 (April 1987), https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-maga zine/1987/april/carrier-air-and-vietnam-assessment. 16. Peter E. Davies, A-4 Skyhawk vs. North Vietnamese AAA: North Vietnam 1964–68 (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 60; Julian Lake, quoted in Price, vol. III, 30. 17. Price, vol. III, 49. The ALQ-51A employed angle gate deception. As it received signals from the track-while-scan radar, the ALQ-51A retransmitted pulses into the radar’s side lobes but left the main lobe untouched. This induced errors into the radar’s angle tracking system, making it appear that the target aircraft was some distance from its true position. 18. Price, vol. III, 49; Davies, A-4 Skyhawk vs. North Vietnamese AAA, 60. 19. Constellation (CV 64), stated by Price in his description of the attack, was not on station at that time and could not have been the aircraft carrier involved. 20. Price, vol. III, 60. 21. Davies, A-4 Skyhawk vs. North Vietnamese AAA, 60. 22. Romano and Herndon, 62. CHAPTER 12. COUNTERMEASURE VS. COUNTERMEASURE

1. William A. Hewitt, “Planting the Seeds of SEAD: The Wild Weasel in Vietnam” (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, 1992), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA425679. pdf, 12. 2. Price, vol. III, 66–67; Nalty, 7. 3. Price, vol. III, 65–66, 70; Nalty, 8–9. 4. Hewitt, 113; Nalty, 10; Price, vol. III, 70; “LAU-3 Rocket Launcher,” National Museum of the United States Air Force, https://www.national

Notes to Pages 95–100 — 203

museum.af.mil/Visit/Museum-Exhibits/Fact-Sheets/DisplayArticle/19 6036 /lau-3-rocket-launcher/. 5. Price, vol. III, 69. 6. Nalty, 23. 7. Nalty, 16. 8. Nalty, 23; Price, vol. III, 70; Northrop Grumman Corporation, “The Radar Warning Story,” https://www.aef.se/Avionik/Artiklar/Motmedel/Nya_hot bilder/RadarWarnStory.pdf, 2; “Julian S. Lake, Rear Admiral, USN (Ret.).” 9. Hewitt, 23. 10. Hewitt, 24; Price, vol. III, 71. 11. Price, vol. III, 94. 12. Price, vol. III, 94–95. 13. Lex Williams, “NAVCOMMSTA PHIL Fleet Support Detachment Da Nang Command History,” Facebook, April 11, 2020, https://www.facebook.com/groups/1665326010393625/permalink/2585683941691156/; Alan Cranston, “A History of BRIGAND and Big Look,” Ref: 033a Alan Cranston’s recollection, VQ Association, http://vqassociation.org/history/; Price, vol. III, 95–96. By extension, the term Big Look was soon applied to the entire aircraft. 14. Richard Haver, quoted in Price, vol. III, 96. 15. Morrison; National Security Agency, “NSA in Vietnam: Building the Effort— The Early Years,” Homeland Security Digital Library, https://www.hsdl .org/?view&did=233351, 550. 16. Julian Lake, quoted in Price, vol. III, 51. 17. Wersaja Polska, “Douglas EKA-3B ‘Skywarrior/Whale,’” Virtual Museum of the Vietnam War, https://vietnam.net.pl/EKA3Ben.htm; Rick Morgan, A-3 Skywarrior Units of the Vietnam War (Oxford: Osprey, 2015), 53. 18. Morgan, A-3 Skywarrior Units of the Vietnam War, 54; Martin Streetly, Airborne Electronic Warfare: History, Techniques, and Tactics (London: Janes, 1988), 40. 19. Morgan, A-3 Skywarrior Units of the Vietnam War, 54; Streetly, 40. 20. Whitten, Silent Heroes, 90. 21. “Martin Lachow,” Legacy.com, https://www.legacy.com/us/obituaries/ven turacountystar/name/martin-lachow-obituary?pid=175677040; Martin Lachow, in Weides and Weber.

204 — Notes to Pages 101–105

22. Whitten, “Grumman EA-6A Intruder—History”; Whitten, Silent Heroes, 91. 23. Rick Morgan, A-6 Intruder Units of the Vietnam War (Oxford: Osprey, 2012), 112–13. 24. Whitten, Silent Heroes, 101; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Electronic Warfare Advisory Committee, NATO Electronic Warfare Equipment Catalogue, MC-132, ca. 1974, Counter Measure Set AN/ALQ-76; Dario Leone, “A Quick Look at USMC EA-6A ‘Electric Intruder’ Operations During the Vietnam War,” The Aviation Geek Club, https:// theaviationgeekclub.com/a-quick-look-at-usmc-ea-6a-electric-intruderoperations-during-the-vietnam-war/; Copalman. 25. Whitten, Silent Heroes, 106–8. CHAPTER 13. EA-6B

1. Price, vol. III, 122–23; Statement of Vice Adm. Thomas F. Connolly, deputy CNO, July 28, 1969, U.S. Congress, House, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1970, Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 91st Cong., 1 Sess., Part 3, 491; Greg Goebel, “The Grumman A-6 Intruder and EA-6B Prowler,” Airvectors, https://www.air vectors.net/ava6.html; Price, vol. III, 194. 2. “EA-6B Prowler,” Federation of American Scientists, https://irp.fas.org /program/collect/ea-6b_prowler.htm. 3. U.S. Navy, Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, “Electronic Attack Squadron (VAQ) 132,” https://www.airpac.navy.mil/Organization/Electronic -Attack-Squadron-VAQ-132/About-Us/History/; DOD Appropriations for 1974, 4272. 4. Testimony of Capt. Albert A. Gallotta Jr., USN, EA-6B Program Coordinator, March 15, 1973, DOD Appropriations for 1974, 4273; Statement of Maj. Gen. John J. Burns, USAF, March 16, 1973, DOD Appropriations for 1974, 4606; Statement of Vice Adm. William D. Houser, USN, deputy CNO for Air Warfare, DOD Appropriations for 1974, 4269, 4301. 5. Carl O. Schuster, “The EA-6B Prowler: Outwitting Hanoi’s Air Defenses,” HistoryNet, https://www.historynet.com/ea-6b-prowler-outwitting-hanois -air-defenses.htm; Statement of Cdr. D. H. Westbrock, USN, EA-6B Project Manager, DOD Appropriations for 1974, 4281–82; DOD Appropriations for 1974, 4273–74; Michael F. Hake, “Stealth, the End

Notes to Pages 106–107 — 205

of Dedicated Electronic Attack Aircraft” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1999), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA370463.pdf, 13; “A Tribute to the Raven EF-111AA,” Journal of Electronic Defense, May 1, 1998, https://www.thefreelibrary.com/A+tribute+to+the+Raven+EF-111 AA.-a020791918. 6. U.S. Congress, Senate, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1973, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, Part 3, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1972), 689; Goebel, “The Grumman A-6 Intruder and EA-6B Prowler”; U.S. Navy, Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, “Electronic Attack Squadron (VAQ) 133 ‘Wizards,’” https://www.airpac.navy.mil/Organization/ElectronicAttack -Squadron-VAQ-133/About-Us/History/. 7. Marine Corps Aviation Reconnaissance Association, “MCARA Aircraft > EA-6B ICAP II”; H. Wayne Whitten, “MCARA Aircraft > EA-6B ICAP-I Prowler,” Marine Corps Aviation Reconnaissance Association, https://www .mcara.us/EA-6Bphp; Written statement of Vice Adm. F. C. Turner, U.S. Cong., House, Hearings on Military Posture Before the Committee on Armed Services, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 2 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1979), 53; “Northrop Grumman EA-6B Prowler,” Weapons and Warfare, October 28, 2018, https://weaponsandwarfare .com/2018/10/25/northrop-grumman-ea-6b-prowler/; Prepared Statement of Vice Adm. Wesley L. McDonald, USN, Deputy CNO for Air Warfare, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1981, Senate Hearings Before the Committee on Appropriations, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess., Part 4 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1980), 150. 8. McDonald statement, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1981, 150; Statement of Vice Adm. Wesley L. McDonald, USN, U.S. Cong., House, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., Part 5 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1982), 184; “A Tribute to the Raven EF-111AA”; Carlo Kopp, “The Anatomy of the Tacjammer,” Air Power Australia, http://www.ausairpower.net/TE-Tacjammer.html; “Grumman EA-6B Prowler Electronic Counter Measures,” Aerospaceweb, http://www.aerospaceweb.org/aircraft

206 — Notes to Pages 107–109

/recon/ea6b/index.shtml; “Northrop Grumman EA-6B Prowler”; “EA-6B Prowler Upgrades,” Global Security, https://www.globalsecurity.org/ military/systems/aircraft/ea-6-upgrades.htm; U.S. Navy, Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, “Electronic Attack Squadron (VAQ) 131 ‘Lancers,’” https://www.airpac.navy.mil/Organization/Electronic-Attack-Squadron -VAQ-131/About-Us/History/. 9. Northrop Grumman, “EA-6B Electronic Countermeasures Aircraft,” https://fbaum.unc.edu/lobby/_107th/122_EA-6B_Prowler/Organ izational_Statements/NG_EA6B_factsheet.htm; Goebel, “The Grumman A-6 Intruder and EA-6B Prowler”; U.S. Congress, House, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1996, Committee on Appropriations, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 5 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1997), 201. Statement of Vice Adm. T. Joseph Lopez, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Congress, House, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1996, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 5 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1997), 255. 10. Ravi Rikye, “Operations Prairie Fire and El Dorado Canyon,” Warpath.orbit. http://warpath.orbat.info/history/historical/libya/eldoradocanyon1986 .html; Walter J. Boyne, “El Dorado Canyon,” Air Force Magazine (March 1999): 58. 11. Rikye. 12. Joseph T. Stanik, El Dorado Canyon: Reagan’s Undeclared War with Qaddafi (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003); Rikye. 13. Judy G. Endicott, “Raid on Libya: Operation Eldorado Canyon,” U.S. Department of Defense, August 23, 2012, https://media.defense.gov/2012 /Aug/23/2001330097/-1/-1/0/Op%20El%20Dorado%20Canyon.pdf, 149–50; Boyne, 59. 14. Boyne, 60–61. Six F-111s and one EF-111A aborted after the first refueling attempt. 15. Rikye; Tom Cooper, “El Dorado Canyon: a Little-Known Episode,” Linkedin, https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/el-dorado-canyon-little-known -episode-tom-cooper/. 16. Endicott, 153–55.

Notes to Pages 110–113 — 207

CHAPTER 14. PROWLERS AT WAR

1. Bruce D. Nordwall, “Electronic Warfare Played Greater Role in Desert Storm Than Any Conflict,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, April 22, 1991, 68. 2. Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), 2. 3. Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, vol. IV, The Gulf War (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998), 409, 468; Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol. IV, Weapons, Tactics, and Training and Space Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 1993), 94. 4. Dario Leone, “Prowler Trouble: the EA-6B ALQ-99 Jamming Pods Emissions Caused the RHAW Gear of F-14s to Go Crazy During Operation Desert Storm,” The Aviation Geek Club, https://theaviationgeekclub .com/prowler-trouble-the-ea-6b-alq-99-jamming-pods-emissions-caused -the-rhaw-gear-of-f-14s-to-go-crazy-during-operation-desert-storm/. 5. William J. Allen, “Crisis in Southern Iraq: Operation Southern Watch,” U.S. Department of Defense, https://media.defense.gov/2012/Aug/23 /2001330107/-1/-1/0/Oper%20Southern%20Watch.pdf. 6. U.S. Navy, Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, “Electronic Attack Squadron (VAQ) 134 ‘Garudas,’” https://www.airpac.navy.mil/Organization/Elec tronic-Attack-Squadron-VAQ-134/About-Us/History/; Allen. I have been unable to identify the squadron in action on July 29, 1993. 7. For a full account of the political background and events leading up to Operation Deliberate Force, see Robert C. Owen, ed., Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning: Final Report of the Air University Balkans Air Campaign Study (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2000). 8. Robert L. Sargent, “Deliberate Force Targeting,” in Owen, 312–13. 9. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General, “Audit Report: Low-Rate Initial Production of the EA-6B Program,” report no. 93–039, December 18, 1992, 6. 10. Stephan M. Hardy, “EA-6B RPG Replacement Group Suggested,” Journal of Electronic Warfare, March 1, 1995, https://www.thefreelibrary.com/EA -6B+RPG+replacement+suggested-a016782725; Briefing by Capt. D. Mathews, program manager, Reconnaissance and Electronic Warfare Systems, Naval Air Systems Command., U.S. Cong., House, Committee on

208 — Notes to Pages 114–115

Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 1872 [H.R. 4040] Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980 Before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 3, Research and Development (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1979), 1636, 1639; Caspar W. Weinberger, “Annual Report to the Congress Fiscal Year 1983” (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1982), 253; Christopher Bolkcom, “Electronic Warfare: EA-6B Aircraft Modernization and Related Issues for Congress” (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2001), 7; Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General, “Audit Report,” 29–30. 11. Christopher C. Kirkham, “Interservice Rivalry, Mission Consolidation and Issues of Readiness in the DOD: A Case Study of U.S. Navy EA-6B JointService Expeditionary Squadrons” (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1996), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA318178.pdf, 89–90; Richard Crandall and Tyler Rogoway, “Flying the Iconic Swing-Wing F-111 Aardvark at the Height of the Cold War,” The Warzone, https:// www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/4595/flying-the-iconic-swing-wing-f -111-aardvark-at-the-height-of-the-cold-war; Hake, 24–25. 12. Brent M. Bennitt, “Joint Tactical Airborne Electronic Warfare,” Naval Aviation News 77, no. 3 (March-April 1995): 1; Statement of Vice Adm. T. Joseph Lopez, 235–36, 255–56. 13. Statement of Vice Adm. T. Joseph Lopez, 235–36, 255–56. 14. An electronic flight information system is a flight instrument display system that presents data on computer screens as opposed to electromechanical instruments. 15. Baugher, “Grumman A6-Intruder and EA-6B Prowler”; Brendan P. Rivers, “First Upgraded Prowler Delivered to U.S. Navy, More Enhancements to Come,” Journal of Electronic Defense, February 1, 1999, https://www.the freelibrary.com/_/print/PrintArticle.aspx?id=56059285; “Northrop Grumman EA-6B Prowler”; U.S. Marine Corps, United States Marine Corps Concepts & Issues 2000: Leading the Pack in a New Era (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps Programs and Resources Department, 2000), 67. 16. The Northrop Corporation acquired Grumman in 1994 for $2.1 billion.

Notes to Pages 115–118 — 209

17. Adm. Jeremy M. Boorda, CNO, testimony before Congress, March 13, 1996, U.S. Congress, House, Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997–H.R. 3230 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs Before the Committee on National Security, House of Representatives, 104th Cong., 2nd. Sess. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1997), 605; “AN/USQ-113(V)3,” Deagel.com, https:// www.deagel.com/Protection%20Systems/ANUSQ-113/a001349. 18. For a chronological list of the yearly updates, see appendix IV, ICAP-III Upgrades. 19. Bolkcom, “Electronic Warfare,” 7; J. Knowles, “U.S. Navy Awards ICAP III Contract,” Journal of Electronic Defense, April 1, 1998, 26. 20. Knowles, 26; Rivers. 21. Benjamin S. Lambeth, “Operation Allied Force: Lessons for the Future” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), https://www.rand.org/ pubs/research_briefs/RB75.html. 22. Will McLaughlin, “Hostile Airspace: Serbian IADS During Allied Force,” Air Force Materiel Command, May 9, 2019, https://www.afmc.af.mil/News /Article-Display/Article/1843192/hostile-airspace-serbian-iads-during -allied-force/. 23. John Nathman, “Triumph in Kosovo: Naval Aviation Keys Allied Success,” Naval Aviation News 81, no. 6 (September-October 1999), https://www .history.navy.mil/content/dam/nhhc/research/histories/naval-aviation/ Naval%20Aviation%20News/1990/1999/september-october/allied.pdf, 3; Carlton, Jim, ed. “Prowlers Afloat and Ashore,” Naval Aviation News 81, no. 6 (September-October 1999). 24. David Cenciotti, “Flying the Prowler to War,” The Aviationist, https:// theaviationist.com/special-reports/flying-the-prowler-to-war/. 25. Cenciotti; Nathman, “Triumph in Kosovo,” 3. 26. Cenciotti; Allan J. Assel, “Airborne Electronic Attack: What’s Next?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 127, no. 2 (February 2001): 52; Lambeth, “Operation Allied Force,” 83; Thompson, “Shaping the Battlespace,” 42. 27. Department of Defense, “Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After Action Report” (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2000), 66; U.S. Cong., Senate, Department of Defense Authorization for

210 — Notes to Pages 119–120

Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2001 and the Future Years Defense Program, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, 106th Cong., 2nd Sess. on S. 2549, Part 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2000), 183, 189, 190. 28. William S. Cohen, “Annual Report to the President and Congress” (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2000), https://apps.dtic.mil/ sti/pdfs/ADA373908.pdf, 35, 43; James Herrera, “Options for an EA-6B Replacement” (Quantico, VA: School of Advanced Warfighting, Marine Corps University, 2002), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA511244.pdf, 1. 29. Benjamin S. Lambeth, “Air Force-Navy Integration in Strike Warfare,” Naval War College Review 61, no. 1 (Winter 2008): 36; Ray Zuniga, “U.S. Electronic Attack Aircraft” (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Report R44572, July 26, 2016), 14. 30. There would be six additional block upgrades before the last Prowler was retired in 2019. 31. Department of Defense, Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, “FY 2003 Annual Report,” 151, and “FY 2005 Annual Report,” 122; Zuniga, 14; Edward Chang, “Why the Marine Corps and Navy Will Miss the EA-6B Prowler,” Center for National Interest, https://nationalin terest.org/blog/buzz/why-marine-corps-and-navy-will-miss-ea-6b-prowler -37542. 32. The extremist militant group formed ISIL, also known as ISIS. 33. U.S. Department of Defense, “About CJTF-OIR,” Operation Inherent Resolve, https://www.inherentresolve.mil/About-CJTF-OIR/; Chang; Norman Polmar, “The Last Flight of EA-6B,” Station HYPO, https://sta tionhypo.com/2021/05/27/the-last-flight-of-the-ea-6b/. 34. Gina Harkins, “The Last Marine Corps Prowler Squadron Will Deactivate This Week,” Military.com, March 6, 2019, https://www.military.com/dod -buzz/2019/03/06/last-marine-corps-prowler-squadron-will-deactivate -week.html; Dario Leone, “VMAQ-2 Is the Last EA-6B Prowler Squadron,” The Aviation Geek Club, https://theaviationgeekclub.com/vmaq-2-is-the -last-ea-6b-prowler-squadron/; “U.S. Marine Corps Retire Final EA-6B Prowlers After Almost 50 Years in Service,” Military Watch Magazine, March 9, 2019, https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/u-s-marine-corps-retire -final-ea-6b-prowlers-after-almost-50-years-in-service.

Notes to Pages 121–125 — 211

CHAPTER 15. ARIES AIRCRAFT

1. Swanborough and Bowers, 301. 2. Romano and Herndon, 80; Memorandum for Deputy Director, May 23, 1963, CIA Freedom of Information Electronic Reading Room. Note: although the project name has been redacted, this document was retrieved using “ST/SPIN” as the search term and was the only such document listed under this term. For details of these flights, see Chris Pocock with Clarence Fu, The Black Bats: CIA Spy Flight over China from Taiwan, 1951–1969 (Atglen, PA: Schiffer, 2010). 3. Jeffrey T. Richelson, The Wizards of Langley: Inside the CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology (Boulder, CO: Basic Books, 2002), 97; Pocock and Fu, 119; Romano and Herndon, 80. 4. Han Cheung, “Taiwan in Time: Bringing the Black Bats Home,” Taipei Times, November 21, 2012, 13; Richelson, 97–98. 5. U.S. Congress, Senate, Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve, and Civilian Personnel Strengths, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., on S. 1210, Part 6 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1977) (hereafter FY78 Hearings), 4804; Memorandum for Deputy Director for Science and Technology, March 1, 1968, CIA Freedom of Information Electronic Reading Room; Wyman H. Packard, A Century of U.S. Naval Intelligence (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1996), 106. 6. Robert E. Morrison, “March 17, 1969, First EP-3B Orion Arrived at Atsugi Japan,” Station HYPO, https://stationhypo.com/2019/03/17/march-17 -1969-first-ep-3b-orion-arrived-at-atsugi-japan/; FY78 Hearings, 4804; Robert E. Morrison, Naval Communications Station Philippines Fleet Support Detachment Da Nang, Republic of Vietnam (Det Bravo) Command History (self-published, 2017), 13. 7. Packard, 109. 8. U.S. Congress, House, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1972, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., Part 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1971), 428; Romano and Herndon, 79; FY78 Hearings, 4808; C. Lyle Fisher, “Arrival of EP-3E Deepwell,” VQ Association, http://vqassociation.org/history.

212 — Notes to Pages 127–129

9. George Guy Thomas, A Silent Warrior Steps Out of the Shadows (N.p.: Alpha Book Publishers, 2021), 143; Fisher. 10. Thomas, 143–47. 11. FY78 Hearings, 4808. 12. U.S. Congress, Senate, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess., Part 4—Procurement (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1978), 49. 13. U.S. Congress, Senate, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 4—Procurement/R.D.T. & E. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1979), 923; U.S. Congress, Senate, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1981, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 4—Procurement/R.D.T. & E. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1981), 191–92. 14. “TASM,” NavSource Online, http://www.navsource.org/archives/01/57 s1.htm. 15. U.S. Congress, House, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1984, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 2 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1983) (hereafter FY84 Hearings), 285. 16. U.S. Congress, House, Defense Department Authorization and Oversight Hearings on H.R. 2287 Department of Defense Authorization of Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1984 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs Before the Committee on Armed Services, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., Title I—Procurement of Aircraft, Missiles, Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles, Ammunition, and Other Procurement (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1983), 855. 17. Joseph P. Addabbo (D-NY), FY84 Hearings, 862–63; Karl Yeakel, “NADep Alameda Assumes Aries II,” Naval Aviation News 74, no. 1 (November– December 1991): 17. 18. Yeakel, 17. 19. “Lockheed Martin P-3 Orion Variants,” P-3 Orion Research Group, the Netherlands; Romano and Herndon, 178; Rick Burgess, “Lockheed P-3

Notes to Pages 129–134 — 213

Orion,” September 28, 2017, KEY.AERO, https://www.key.aero/article/ orions-final-hunts. 20. Doug Richardson, Bill Gunston, and Ian Hogg, High-Tech Warfare (New York: Crescent Books, 1991), 72. 21. An exploit is a piece of software, data, or sequence of commands that takes advantage of a vulnerability or security flaw. 22. U.S. Congress, House, Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997–H.R. 3230 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs Before the Committee on National Security, 104th Cong., 2nd. Sess. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1997), 13; U.S. Navy, Navy Training Plan for the EP-3E Airborne Reconnaissance Integrated Electronics Suite II Sensor System Improvement Program Aircraft, N88-NTSP -A-50-8605D/P, January 2001, I-2, I-52. 23. U.S. Navy, Navy Training Plan, I-7–I-8. 24. U.S. Congress, House, Aerial Common Sensor Program, Joint Hearings Before the Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services Meeting Jointly with Technical and Tactical Intelligence Subcommittee of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 109th Cong., 1st Sess., October 20, 2006 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), 80–82. 25. “U.S. Army Terminates Aerial Common Sensor Project,” BattleSpace, January 13, 2006, https://battle-updates.com/update/u-s-army-terminates -aerial-common-sensor-project/; “Study Contract Awarded for Navy’s EPX Program,” Aerospace Manufacturing and Design, March 18, 2008, https ://www.aerospacemanufacturinganddesign.com/article/study-contract -awarded-for-navy-s-epx-program/; Kristine Wilcox, quoted by Paul Richfield, “U.S. Navy Gears Up for Long-Awaited EPX Intel Aircraft Competition,” The Boeing 737 Technical Site, http://www.b737.org.uk/737 sigint.htm; Dan Taylor, “Navy Scraps New EPX Platform, Sources Say P-8 Mods Might Fill Capability,” Inside the Navy 23, no. 4 (February 1, 2010), 1. 26. U.S. Congress, House, Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs before the Committee on National Security, House of Representatives, 113th Cong., 1st Sess., Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces Hearing on Fiscal Year 2014 Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force Aviation Programs (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013), 75.

214 — Notes to Pages 135–136

CHAPTER 16. ES-3A SHADOW

1. See statement of Capt.W. B. Nevius, head, Aviation Electronics Warfare Section, deputy CNO Operations TAC AIR Programs, March 18, 1975, in U.S. Congress, Senate, Fiscal Year 1976 and July–September 1976 Transition Period Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve, and Civilian Personnel Strengths, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., on S. 920, Part 9, Tactical Air Power (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1975), 4,891 (hereafter Nevius statement); Statement of Robert A. Frosch, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development, May 1, 1970, in U.S. Congress, Senate, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1971, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., on H.R. Part 3 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1970), 838. 2. Nevius statement, 4891–92, 4897–98. 3. Nevius statement, 4895. 4. U.S. Congress, Senate, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1978, Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., on H.R. 799, Part 6, Research, Test, and Evaluation (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1973), 444; U.S. Congress, Senate, Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve, and Civilian Personnel Strengths, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. on S. 1210, Part 6 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1977), 4809; letter, Thomas J. McIntyre to Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, December 8, 1977, box 79, folder 5, Thomas J. McIntyre Papers, Special Collections, Archives and Museums, University of New Hampshire. 5. Floyd D. Kennedy Jr., “U.S. Naval Aircraft and Missile Development— 1983,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 110, no. 4 (May 1984): 109; U.S. Congress, Senate, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1981, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. on S. 2294, Part 3, Manpower and Personnel (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1980), 2183; U.S. Congress, House, Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years

Notes to Pages 137–140 — 215

1988/1989–H.R. 17480 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs Before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 100th Cong., 1st. Sess., Title I—Procurement of Aircraft, Missiles, Weapons, and Tracked Combat Vehicles, Ammunition, and Other Procurement (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1988), 224. 6. From the Commerce Business Daily as cited by Floyd D. Kennedy Jr., “U.S. Naval Aircraft and Missile Development in 1985,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 112, no. 5 (May 1986): 72; Floyd D. Kennedy Jr., “U.S. Naval Aircraft and Missile Development in 1986,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 113, no. 5 (May 1987): 84. 7. Kennedy Jr., “U.S. Naval Aircraft and Missile Development in 1986,” 84. 8. East, “History of U.S. Navy Fleet Air Reconnaissance.” 9. U.S. Congress, House, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1988, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 2 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1987) (hereafter DOD Appropriations FY88, Part 2), 333, 398; John F. Lehman, “A Report by the Honorable John F. Lehman Jr., Secretary of the Navy, Before the House Appropriations Committee Defense Subcommittee on the Posture and Fiscal Year 1988–1989 Budget of the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 24 February 1987,” 81 (hereafter Lehman Report). 10. Lehman Report, 81. 11. These would be taken from the twenty-two S-3As that had not been upgraded to the S-3B configuration and removed from squadron service. 12. DOD Appropriations FY88, Part 2, 333; U.S. Congress, House, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1988, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 7 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1987), 266–67; Floyd D. Kennedy Jr., “U.S. Naval Aircraft and Missile Development in 1987,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 114, no. 5 (May 1988): 204. 13. Swanborough and Bowers, 310; Goebel, “The Lockheed S-3 Viking”; Jiri Wagner, “Lockheed ES-3 Shadow,” MILITARY.CZ, http://www .military.cz/usa/air/in_service/aircraft/es3/es3_en.htm; “ES-3A Shadow,” Federation of American Scientists. 14. Naval Aviation News 73, no. 6 (September–October 1991): 5; Zachery A. Lum, “U.S. Navy’s BGPHES Will Extend Air Force, Army Horizons,”

216 — Notes to Pages 140–142

Journal of Electronic Defense, June 1, 1995, https://www.thefreelibrary .com/_/print/PrintArticle.aspx?id=17620822; Daniel J. Sherman, “Lessons Learned from the Early Stages of Development of the Guardrail Common Sensor for the Radical Reduction of Cycle Time,” Acquisition Review Quarterly (Summer 2003), 301; U.S. Navy, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Force 2001: A Program Guide to the U.S. Navy, 1994 Edition (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, n.d.); U.S. Navy, Naval Aviation . . . Forward Air Power . . . From the Sea (Washington, DC: Office of Naval Operations, Air Warfare, 1997), 45; “AN/ULQ-20 Battle Group Passive Horizon Extension System (BGPHES),” GlobalSecurity.org, https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/systems/bgphes.htm. 15. Paul D. Micon, “The Shadow Knows,” Naval Aviation News 78, no. 6 (September–October 1996), 34; “Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron Five (VQ-5),” GlobalSecurity.org, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ agency/navy/vq-5.htm; “Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron Six (VQ-6),” GlobalSecurity.org, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/navy/ vq-6.htm 16. Peter A. Buxbaum, “VQ-6 Black Ravens,” Naval Aviation News 81, no. 1 (November–December 1998): 9; Floyd D. Kennedy Jr., “U.S. Naval Aircraft and Weapons Development,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 125, no. 5 (May 1999): 120. CHAPTER 17. BIRTH OF THE EA-18G GROWLER

1. U.S. General Accounting Office, “Electronic Warfare: Comprehensive Strategy Still Needed for Suppressing Enemy Air Defenses,” November 22, 2002, 5. 2. General Accounting Office, “Electronic Warfare,”12. 3. Statement of Christopher Bolkcom, Specialist in National Defense, Congressional Research Service, U.S. Congress, House, Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005—H.R. 4200 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs Before the Committee on Armed Services, 110th Cong., 2nd Sess., Projection Forces Subcommittee on Title I—Procurement, Title II—Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (H.R. 4200) (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005), 103. 4. Boeing, “Boeing Successfully Completes Initial Flight Demonstration of EA-18 Airborne Electronic Attack Variant,” November 15, 2001, https://

Notes to Pages 142–144 — 217

boeing.mediaroom.com/2001–11–15-Boeing-Successfully-Completes -Initial-Flight-Demonstration-of-EA-18-Airborne-Electronic-Attack -Variant; CBS News, “Boeing Wins $9.6B Navy Contract,” December 30, 2003, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/boeing-wins-96-b-navy-contract/; Bolkcom, “Electronic Warfare: EA-6B Aircraft Modernization and Related Issues for Congress,” 89. 5. U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Acquisitions Assessment of Major Weapon Programs (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, March 2004), 51–52. 6. A brassboard is an experimental model designed for field testing outside the laboratory. It contains both the functionality and approximate physical configuration of the final product. 7. Graham Warwick, “Boeing EA-18G Passes Milestone,” FlightGlobal, https ://www.flightglobal.com/boeing-ea-18g-passes-milestone/59571.article. 8. Statement of Assistant Secretary of the Navy William Balderson and Deputy CNO Adm. Bruce Clingan, U.S. Congress, House, Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs Before the Committee on Armed Services, 110th Cong., 1st Sess., Air and Land Forces Subcommittee Meeting Jointly with Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee on Budget Request on Department of Defense Aircraft Programs (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009) (hereafter NDA Authorization Hearings FY08), 192. 9. See the Defense Acquisition Management Framework model shown in appendix V. 10. U.S. Congress, Senate, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2009, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess., on S.3001, Part 4, AIRLAND (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 81 (hereafter DOD Appropriations FY09 Hearings). 11. DOD Appropriations FY09 Hearings, 81; Loren B. Thompson, “Navy Steps Up New Jammer Effort; First New System in 40 Years,” Breaking Defense, July 26, 2012, https://breakingdefense.com/2012/07/navy-steps -up-new-jammer-effort-first-new-system-in-40-years/; “AN/ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System (TJS),” Federation of American Scientists, https:// man.fas.org/dod-101/sys/ac/equip/an-alq-99.htm.

218 — Notes to Pages 144–146

12. Stand-off jamming is designed to disrupt IADS from outside their range, reducing the risk to attacking aircraft. 13. Thompson, “Navy Steps Up New Jammer Effort”; Statement of Lt. Gen. Carrol H. Chandler, NDA Authorization Hearings FY08, 29; Peter A. Buxbaum, “A B-52 Standoff?” Military Aerospace Technology, https://www .military-aerospace-technology.com/print_article.cfm?DocID=1910; On the Air Force’s dependency on the Navy, see statement by Representative Mark Kirk in the aforementioned source. 14. Kernan Chaisson, quoted in Buxbaum, “A B-52 Standoff?” 15. Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record, March 11, 2008, U.S. Congress, House, Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs Before the Committee on Armed Services, 110th Cong., 2nd Sess., Air and Land Forces Subcommittee Meeting Jointly with Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee on Budget Request on Department of Defense Aircraft Programs (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 157. 16. U.S. Government Accountability Office, “BAE Systems Information and Electronic Systems Integration Inc.,” November 13, 2013, https://www .gao.gov/products/b-408565%2Cb-408565.2%2Cb-408565.3; Stephen Trimble, “U.S. Navy Starts Next-Generation Jammer Bidding War,” Flight Global, February 3, 2009, https://www.flightglobal.com/us-navy-starts -next-generation-jammer-bidding-war/84919.article; Bill Carey, “Jammer Next,” Aviation Today, September 1, 2010, https://www.aviationtoday.com /2010/09/01/jammer-next/. 17. An active electronically scanned array is a type of phased array antenna, which is a computer-controlled array antenna in which the beam of radio waves can be electronically steered to point in different directions without moving the antenna. 18. An exciter is a radio frequency transmitter that with the aid of an antenna propagates an electromagnetic signal such as a radar beam. 19. Carey, “Jammer Next.” 20. U.S. Navy, Naval Air Systems Command, “EA-18G Growler,” https://www .navair.navy.mil/product/EA-18G-Growler; Scott Wolf, “Bruner Friday: Boeing EA-18G Growler,” SOFREP, https://sofrep.com/fightersweep

Notes to Pages 146–148 — 219

/burner-friday-boeing-ea-18g-growler-2/); Statement of Vice Adm. Mark Skinner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition), U.S. Congress, House, Fiscal Year 2012 Combat Aviation Program Update, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 36. 21. ITT acquired EDO in December 2007. 22. Frank Colucci, “Teeth of the Growler,” Aviation Today, March 1, 2008, https://www.aviationtoday.com/2008/03/01/teeth-of-the-growler/#; John Keller, “Electronic Warfare (EW) Upgrades to Enhance Electronic Attack Capability of the EA-18G Growler,” Military Aerospace Electronics, October 16, 2018, https://www.militaryaerospace.com/sensors/article/16726752/ electronic-warfare-ew-upgrades-to-enhance-electronic-attack-capability -of-ea18g-growler; Raytheon, “AIR DOMINANCE EA-18G Growler,” https://www.raytheon.com/sites/default/files/2019–06/4421915_ Growler_Final_121316.pdf; L3 Harris Technologies, Inc., “EA-18G Interference Cancellation System (INCANS),” https://www.l3harris.com/all -capabilities/ea-18g-interference-cancellation-system-incans; Zuniga, 6. 23. Statement of Vice Adm. Skinner; “VAQ-132 ‘Scorpions,’” Seaforces.org, https://www.seaforces.org/usnair/VAQ/Electronic-Attack-Squadron-132 .htm; Marina Malenic, “Navy EW Plane Makes Combat Debut over Libya,” Defense Daily, March 23, 2011, https://www.defensedaily.com/navy -ew-plane-makes-combat-debut-over-libya/uncategorized/; Dave Kurtz, “Dawn of the Expeditionary Growler: The Successor to the EA-6B Prowler Has an Effective Ground-Based Model That Offers Valuable Capabilities to the Joint Force,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 139, no. 9 (September 2013): 25; David D. Kirkpatrick and Elisabeth Bumiller, “Allies Target Qaddafi’s Ground Forces as Libyan Rebels Regroup,” The New York Times, March 20, 2011, 1; U.S. Navy, Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, “Electronic Attack Squadron (VAQ) 132.” 24. Kurtz, 24. 25. Kurtz, 24–25. 26. Concept and technology development phase as defined by the Defense Acquisition Framework.

220 — Notes to Pages 149–150

27. U.S. Navy, Naval Air Systems Command, “Next Generation Jammer (NGJ) Overview,” https://discover.dtic.mil/results/?q=ngj-MB#gsc.tab=0&gsc.q =ngj-MB&gsc.ref=more%3Andia_conference_proceedings&gsc.sort=, 11; Bill Carey, “Raytheon Will Develop Next Generation Jammer,” AIN Online, July 12, 2013, https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news /defense/2013–07–12/raytheon-will-develop-next-generation-jammer; Government Accountability Office, “BAE Systems Information and Electronic Systems Integration Inc.”; Joey Cheng, “Raytheon Back to Work on Next Jammer,” Defense Systems, January 30, 2014, https://defensesystems .com/connected-warrior/2014/01/raytheon-back-to-work-on-next-gen eration-jammer/194310/. 28. See appendix V. 29. Oreanda-News, “Next Generation Jammer Completes Preliminary Design Review Milestone,” Oreanda.Ru, November 14, 2015, https://www.oreanda .ru/en/promyshlennost/article954766/; Jamie Hunter, “Jamming for the Next Generation,” Key Military, https://www.keymilitary.com/article/jam ming-next-generation; CISION PR Newswire, “The U.S. Navy Awards Raytheon $1B Next Generation Jammer Engineering and Manufacturing Development Contract,” April 14, 2016, https://www.prnewswire.com /news-releases/the-us-navy-awards-raytheon-1b-next-generation-jammer -engineering-and-manufacturing-development-contract-300251411 .html; Gareth Evans, “A Look at the U.S. Navy’s Next Generation Jammer,” Army Technology, June 14, 2018, https://www.army-technology.com/fea tures/look-us-navys-next-generation-jammer/. 30. Evans, “A Look at the U.S. Navy’s Next Generation Jammer.” 31. Hunter. 32. U.S. Department of Defense, “Selected Acquisition Report (SAR): Next Generation Jammer Mid-Band (NGJ Mid-Band),” December 2017, 9–10; Raytheon Technologies, “Next Generation Jammer Mid-Band Takes to the Skies for the Growler Flight Testing,” August 24, 2020, https://www .rtx.com/News/News-Center/2020/08/24/next-generation-jammer-mid -band-takes-to-the-skies-for-growler-flight-testing; Raytheon Intelligence and Space, “Raytheon Intelligence and Space’s Next Generation Jammer Mid-Band Ready for Production,” June 29, 2021, https://www.raytheon intelligenceandspace.com/news/2021/06/29/ris-next-generation-jammer -mid-band; Martin Manaranche, “The U.S. Navy Has Awarded RI&S a

Notes to Pages 150–153 — 221

$171.6 Million Contract to Begin Low-Rate Initial Production for Their Next Generation Jammer Mid-Band Program,” Naval News, July 2021, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/07/u-s-navy-awarded-con tract-to-raytheon-to-begin-production-for-their-ngj-mb/; Rich Abbott, “Navy Awards Raytheon Second Next-Generation Jammer Order,” Defense Daily, January 3, 2020, https://www.defensedaily.com/navy-awards-raythe on-second-next-gen-jammer-order/navy-usmc/. 33. Hunter; “N/ALQ-249(V)2 Next Generation Jammer Low Band (NGJ-LB),” Global Security.org, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/air craft/systems/ngj-lb.htm. 34. U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Northrop Grumman Systems Corp-oration—Mission Systems,” August 18, 2021, https://www.gao.gov /products/b-419557.2%2Cb-419557.3%2Cb-419557.4, 6; Steve Trimble, “Decision Nears in Lengthy Low-Band Jammer Contract Dispute,” Aviation Week, October 13, 2021, https://www.abra-pc.com.br/index.php /noticias/257-atualidades.html. 35. Mark Pomerleau, “Following Years of Protests and Litigation, Navy to Reaward Aerial Jammer Contract,” Fedscoop, https://www.fedscoop.com/ following-years-of-protests-and-litigation-navy-to-re-award-aerial-jammer -contract/; “In Brief,” Journal of Electromagnetic Dominance 45, no. 9 (September 2022): 18. CHAPTER 18. LOOKING BACK

1. John F. Kirby, “Statement by Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby on U.S. Navy EA-18G Growler Deployment to Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany, March 28, 2022,” U.S. Department of Defense, https://www.defense.gov/ News/Releases/Release/Article/2980528/statement-by-pentagon-press -secretary-john-f-kirby-on-us-navy-ea-18g-growler-de/; Abraham Mahshie, “On NATO’s Eastern Flank, Navy Growlers Highlight Air Force’s Electronic Warfare Gap,” Air Force Magazine, May 13, 2022, https://www .airforcemag.com/on-natos-eastern-flank-navy-growlers-highlight-air -forces-electronic-warfare-gap/; Richard R. Burgess, “Navy Proposes to Cut Five EA-18G Growler Electronic Attack Squadrons,” Seapower, April 20, 2022, https://seapowermagazine.org/navy-proposes-to-cut-five-ea-18g -growler-electronic-attack-squadrons/; U.S. Navy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Budget), Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY

222 — Notes to Pages 154

2023 Budget, https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/23pres /Highlights_Book.pdf, 12–6. 2. Ashish Dangwal, “Competitor to Chinese J-16D, U.S. Navy Could Scrap Its Electronic Attack Squadron of EA-18G Growlers,” Eurasian Times, April 27, 2022, https://eurasiantimes.com/j-16d-us-could-scrap-its-electro nic-attack-squadron-of-ea-18g/. 3. Mahshie; “F-16C/D Block 50/52,” F-16.net, https://www.f-16.net/f-16_ versions_article9.html; John A. Tirpak, “Lockheed to Retrofit F-35s for Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses Role,” Air Force Magazine, June 2, 2020, https://www.airforcemag.com/lockheed-to-retrofit-f-35s -for-suppression-destruction-of-enemy-air-defenses-role/; “Lockheed Martin Aims to Keep F-35 Jet’s AN/ASQ-239 Electronic Warfare (EW) Avionics Production on Schedule,” Military Aerospace Electronics, https://www .militaryaerospace.com/rf-analog/article/14179335/electronic-warfare-ew -avionics-f35; John Keller, “Navy Taps BAE Systems to Provide Electronic Warfare (EW) Avionics for F-35 Combat Jet in $77.5 Million Deal,” Military Aerospace Electronics, April 6, 2020, https://www.militaryaerospace.com/rf-analog/article/14173343/electronic-warfare-ew-avionics-f35.

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Index

AD-3Q, 41 AD-3W, 40 AD-4, 41 AD-4N, 40, 44, 74; VMC-3 AD-4NL, 44 AD-4Q, 40–41; characteristics, 162–63 AD-4W, 43; VMC-3,72 AD-5, 41 AD-5N, 41; ECM improvements, 74 AD-5Q, 41, 78; characteristics, 162–63 Addabbo, Joseph P., 128 Advanced Multi-mission Sensor System (AMSS), 136–37 ADVCAP, 112–13; EA-6B upgrades, 107 AEA. See airborne electronic attack Aerial Common Sensor Program, 124 AESA. See active electronic scanned array AGM-114 Hellfire, 110 AGM-45 Shrike, 83, 96–97, 154 AGM-88 HARM, 107, 108–9; ASQ-213 targeting system, 154; Desert Storm, 110–11; Operation Allied Force, 117; Operation Deadeye Southeast, 112; Operation Odyssey Dawn, 147; Operation Southern Watch, 112 AH-64, 110 AIM-7, 96 AIM-9, 70; fitted to P-3, 122

1st Marine Division, 11 2nd Air Division (USAF), 89 110th Battalion (USA), 18 A-1, 90 A2F-1, 81–82; conversion to EW platform, 84; DECM equipped, 68 A3D-1, 46, 48, 63, 64, 71 A3D-1Q, first squadron 47–48 A3D-2, DECM equipped, 68; tanker/ jammer conversion, 99 A3D-2D, countermeasures for, 66; enters service, 67 A3D-2Q, 48, 51; characteristics, 163–64; ECM suite, 78; enters service,78 A3-F, 71 A3J-1, 71, 84; DECM equipped, 68 A3J-2, 84 A-4, 90; and ALQ-51, 91, 93 A-4E, 92 A-6A, 90, 101 AAR-37, 129 Abercrombie, Neil, 145 active electronic scanned array (AESA), 145 AD-1, 39, 40–41, 81 AD-1Q, 40–41 AD-2Q, 40–43; characteristics, 162–63 AD-3, 41

259

260 — Index

Air Force Magazine, 153 Air Force Security Airborne Communications Reconnaissance Program, 55–57 airborne electronic attack (AEA), 142 airborne electronic reconnaissance, 33–34 Airborne Instrument Laboratory, 103 Airborne Reconnaissance Integrated Electronic System (ARIES), 121. See also EP-3E (ARIES) Airborne Signals Intelligence Architecture program, 124 Aircraft Instruments Laboratory, 84 aircraft numbering system, xxi Aircraft Radio Corporation, 27 Alekseyev, Yevgeni Ivanovich, 4 Alverez, Luis, 10 America (CV 66), 106, 108; in Operation El Dorado Canyon 109 America’s Cup races, 2 AMSS. See Advanced Multi-mission Sensor System AN numbers. See Joint Army-Navy Nomenclature System antennas: APA-24, 162; ALA-12, 170 antennas, direction finding: APA-11, 24; on TBM-3Q, 160 antennas, direction finding system: APR17, 29; APR-24 Applied Technology, 93 ARIES aircraft, 121–34 ARINC enclosure, 21 Ashville (PF-1), 26 ASN-66 inertial navigation computer, 83 ASQ-10 MAD magnetic detecting set, 121 Athearn, Pop, 3 Atlantic Fleet ELINT Center, 79 aviation community preferences, 152 Aviation Today, 145 AYK-14 mission computer, 115 B-2, 119 B-17E, 13, 14, 29 B-29, 73 B-47, 77 B-52, 64; and NGJ competition, 145; and stand-off jammer, 144–45

BAE, and NGJ competition, 145; ASE-239 ECM suite, 156; NGJ protest, 148–49 Balwin, William, 143 barrage jammer, 82 Battle Group Passive Extension System (BGPHES), 137–40 Battle of Coral Sea, 8 Battle of Jutland, 7–8 Battle of Midway, x, 8 Beesly, Patrick, 7 Beggar Shadow, 55–62 Bellini-Tosi directional, 5 Benner (DD 807), 28 BGM-109B Tomahawk, 128 BGPHES. See Battle Group Passive Extension System Big Look (ALQ-110), 97–98, 125, 129; improvement program, 135 bistatic radar intelligence, 53 Black Bat Squadron, 123 Black Cats, 14 Blake, Gordon A., 56 Bletchley Park, x Block 89 upgrade, 114–15 Boeing and EA-18G, 142 Boeing Company, 13, and EA-18G, 143; switches production for Navy, 16 Boeing 727, 109 Boucher, Joe, 42, 74 boundary layer control, 84 Bowers, Peter M., 121 BQM-34F, 102 Brigand, 53–54, 87, 125 British Technical and Scientific Mission, 10 Broad Area Maritime Surveillance, 124 broadband receivers: ALR-22, 125–26 ALR-44, 125 ALR-60, 126, 129 SER-212, 125 Brown, Howard, 3 budgets and electronic warfare, 152 Bumby Action, 101–2 Bunker Hill (CV 17), 24 Burgess, Rick, 153 Burns, John J., 104 Bush, George W., 111

Index — 261

C-1, 49 C-47, 29 Canter, Charles, 44 Carey, Bill, 145 Carlson, Eliot, 8 Cast Mike Project 1, established 12–18 Central Intelligence Agency, 64; and P3A’s to Republic of China, 121, 122; ELINT Office, 123; secret ELINT-COMINT tactical data system, 122 Century of U.S. Naval Intelligence, 124 Chaff, 90 chaff dispensers: ALE-18, 166; ALE-32, 169, 83, 101; ALE-39, 107ALE-41, 83; ALE-43, 130; ALE-92E, 168; MX900, 44,163; in TBM-3M, 21, 28 Chinese National Air Force, 71 Christman, Charles, 98 Chu, Lan, J., 22 Churchill, Jack, 13–15 Churchill, Winston, 6–7, 10 Cleveland, John, 74 Clingan, Bruce, 143 CLIOP. See conversion in lieu of procurement Cohen, William S., 119 Cold War: and electronic warfare, x; attacks on U.S. Navy patrol planes, 35–36 Collins Radio Corporation, 27 Combat Aircraft, 149 Combined Fleet Decoded, 8 COMINT: defined, xvi; WII effort, 8 Commando Royal, 57 Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Force, 113 communication interception receivers: AAR-5, on EC-1A, 163 ALD-8, 129 ALR-67, 138 APR-9, 27–28, 39; in AD-4N, 44 APR-9A, 162 ARR-5, 24; on PB4Y-2, 159 ARR-7, 24; on PB4Y-2, 159; on P4M1Q, 162; on P4M-1Q, 162

communication jammers: ALQ-38, 66 ALQ-55, 68, 69, 71, 101–2 ALQ-77, 146; ALQ-191, 106 ALQ-92, 99; ALQ-149, 113–15 ALQ-227(V)1, 154 URR-74, 170 USQ-113, 115–16, 118–19 Comptek Federal Systems, 116 conversion in lieu of procurement (CILOP), 127–29 Conway, Richard, 80 Coral Sea (CVA 43), 87; in Operation El Dorado Canyon, 107–9 Corman, Otis W, 88 countermeasures dispenser, ALE-47, 172 Court of Federal Claims, 151 Cuban Missile Crisis, 79–80 Dangwal, Ashish, 154 Danzig, Richard, 118 Davis, Peter, 92 DC-130, 102 Deadeye Southeast, 112 Deep Sea 129, 57–62 DECM: ALQ-35 on EA-3B,164 ALQ-41 on EA-3B, 164 ALQ-51 on EA-3B, 164 ALQ-65, 107 ALQ-100, 106 ALQ-126, 106 Deep Well, 126–27 defense acquisition management framework, 183 defensive electronic counter measures, 66–67. See also DECM De Forest, Lee, 2 Dempster Task Force, 93–94 Dempster, Kenneth C., 93 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 9 Department of Defense Tri Service Aircraft Description System, xxi DI-930 digital recorder, 132 Diana, HMS, 1 direction finders: ALR-28, 99

262 — Index

APA-17 on AD-2Q, 163 APA-17 on AD-4Q,163 APA-69, 34; APA-69 on EA-3B, 164; APA-69 on EC-121, 165 APA-69A, 89 APA-70A on EA-1F, 163 ARD-6, 32 Disney, James, 65 Douglas Aircraft Company, 91 drone operations, 101–2 E-1B, 78 E-2, 139–40 E3-SA, 140 EA-18G: advantages over EA-6B,143; AEA capability, 148; and invasions Ukraine, 153; and NGJ, 145; characteristics, 171–72; development of, 142; ECM equipment, 155; first flight, 143; first production run, 146; in Operation Odyssey Dawn, 147; planned buy, 43; replacement for EA-6B, 120; transition to, 148 EA-1F, 42, 78; characteristics, 162–63; in Vietnam, 87, 88; operating in Gulf of Tonkin, 98 EA-3B: Beggar Shadow missions, 56–57; characteristics, 163–64; ELINT in Vietnam, 92; in Desert Storm, 111; mission capabilities, 48–51; operating cost, 136; operator stations, 50; replacement for, 135, 138; Wee Look, 98 EA-6A: 80, arrives in Vietnam, 100; characteristics, 165–66; configuration of, 83; ECM equipment, 100; missions, 101; procurement of, 82 EA-6B: accelerated funding for, 118; Block 91 upgrade, 112; characteristics, 167– 68; disruption of Servian air defenses, 118; ECM suite, 104–6; ICAP-III upgrade, 181–82; importance in Allied Force, 118; increase in squadrons, 118–19; in Deadeye Southeast, 112; in Desert Storm, 110–11; Operation Allied Force, 117–18; origins, 102–3; Operation Deliberate Force, 112; Operation Iraqi Freedom, 119; Operation Southern Watch, 112; phase out, 120;

primary ECM platform for U.S., 141; problems with ALQ-99, 111; replacement of, 141–42; upgrade of, 106; upgrade time line, 116 East, Don, 34, 137 EB-66, 88, 90, 105 EC-121M, 52–54; Beggar Shadow missions, 56–62; characteristics, 164–65; comparison with EP-3, 125; internal layout, 53; replacement for, 135; UPCON improvements, 124; Vietnam missions, 86, 92 EC-135 River Joint, 49, 51 EC-1A, 49; characteristics, 163 ECM: aircraft in Korea, 173–75; AlQ-103 countermeasures, set, 83; capabilities A3D-2Q, description of, xvi-xvii; doctrine developed, 76; for Pacific Fleet, 33, in AD-3W, 40; in AD-4Q, 41; increased fleet capabilities of A3D-2Q, 48; in Koran war, 39–45; Jamming in WWII, 20–25; Marine Corps operators of, 42, 43; Marine Corps pioneers, 74; operator training, 43, 45; U.S.N squadrons, 46–47 ECM operators. See ECMOs ECM squadron, 47 ECM systems: ASE-239, 156; ASQ-239, 154 ECMOs: in EA-6Bs, 106; in EC-121Ms, 92; in Operation Allied Force, 118 ECX competition, 138 EDA-3B, 104 EDO Corporation: and EA-18G communication system, 143 EF-10: jammers, 100 EF-10B: ECM systems, 88, 90; jamming in Vietnam, 88, 89; Super Whales, 101 EF-105F, 96 EF-111A, 106; in Desert Storm, 110; funding cut, 114; retired, 141 EF-117, 145 EKA-3B, 99–100; characteristics, 163–64 electronic attack defined, xvi electronic counter-counter measures (ECCM), 77–78. See also ECM electronic countermeasures. See ECM electronic intelligence. See ELINT

Index — 263

electronic support measures, xv electronic warfare: definition, xv; evolution of, xxii; explained, ix electronic warfare officer, 93 ELINT: defined, xvi; definition, ix; EA-6B capability, 105; first WWII mission, 13; in Cold War, 26–38; in Korean War, 44; in WWII 9–19; over communist China, 121; SAC missions, 28; Seventh Fleet requirements, 60 ELINT receivers: ALR-42, 168, 169; on ARIES I, 170 ALR-44, 170 ALR-82, 170 ALR-84, 170 ALQ-28, 165 ALQ-53, 166 ASH-30, 169 HP8555, 170 SR-212, 170 WJ-8607, 132 WJ-8700, 132 ELINT system; ASD-1, 84 Embracer 145, 124 England, Gordon, 144 Enterprise (CV 6), 24, 104 EP-3 COLOP, 138 EP-3B: 97; 121, 124–25; ECM systems, 98; end of service life, 127 EP-3E: christened ARIES, 125; funding for, 125; in Desert Storm, 111; operator positions, 126; over the horizon targeting, 128; procurement of, 127 EP-3E ARIES: 125–28, characteristics, 169–70; Deep Well, 125 EP-3E ARIES II: 29; crew, 132; Hainan Island Incident, 133; interior arrangement, 120; main systems, 129; SSIP, 129 EP-3J, 130–31 EP-3P, 134 EPR-165 systems interface, 131 EPX industry day, 124 EPX program, 124 ES-3A: characteristics, 170–71; delivered, 140; first flight, 139 Eurasian Times, 154 EW. See electronic warfare

Ewing, Sir Alfred, 4–5 EXCAP, 105 expeditionary squadron, 147–48 F/A-18, 109 F/A-18F, 142 F2D-2, modified for ECM, 74 F3D-1, 72 F3D-2: performance, 72–73 F3D-2: for conversion into ECM aircraft, 74; modified to F3D-2Q 75; performance, 72–73 F3D-2Q, 75–76, 79–80; jamming surrogate Fire Can radar, 82; requirements for, 81 F3H, 77 F-4B, 78 F-4C: downed by SA-2, 88 F4D, 77–78 F4H, 77 F9F-8, 70 F-14A, 108 F-15E, 119 F-16C/J, 154 F-18C, 112 F-22, 144 F-35, 155 F-94B, 73 F-100F, 93, 94 F-105D, 90 F-105F, 93–96 F-106, 78 F-111, 105; in Operation El Dorado Canyon, 109 F-117, 119 Fabini, Eugene, 27 Fan Song radar. See radar, fire control ferret missions, 29 Field Unit 3, Southwest Pacific Area Command, 18 Figueroa, Samuel J. 79 Firebee. See BQM-34F Fisher, John H., 1st Baron, 6 Fitch, Aubrey W., 13, 15 Forrestal (CV 59), 77, 78 Freidrich der Gros, SMS, 7 Frosch, Robert A., 135 Furer, Julius, 11

264 — Index

G.222, 109 Gage radar. See radar, fire control Galotta, Albert A., 104 General Radio Company, 10 George H. W. Bush (CVN 77), 120 Georgia, Dan, 44 Goebel, Greg, 73 Goonie, 13 GR-4 (RAF), 119 Grand Fleet, 7–8 Gray Shoe flights, 52 Grimes, Doc, 42, 74 ground control interception (GCI), 87, 98, Vietnamese, 89 ground data system, TSQ-90, 102 Growler. See EA-18G Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation, 81 Guadalcanal invasion, 11 Guideline missile. See S-75 SAM Gumz, Donald G, 8 Guthrie, Robert C., 12 Haimun, SS, 1–4 Hainan Island Incident, 133 Hall, Reginal “Blinker,” 5–6 Hallicrafter S-27, 21 Hamilton, Sir Frederick, 6 Hancock (CVA 19), 87 HARM. See AGM-88 Have Quick II, 117 Haver, Richard, 98 Herdon, John D., 122 Heron, Lawrence, 16–18 High Seas Fleet (KM), 8 History of U.S. Electronic Warfare, 97 Holcomb, William, 84 Houser, William D., 105 Hunter, James, 149 IBM, 136 ICAP, 106 ICAP-I: EA-6B upgrades, 106; first combat use, 107 ICAP-II, 114–15; AGM-88 added, 107; software improvements, 106

ICAP-III, 115–16; foundation for future systems, 141; funding limitations for, 120; most significant improvement, 119 Ijuin, Vice Admiral Gorô, 3 Imperial Japanese Navy, 1 Imperial Russian Navy, 1 Independence (CVA 62), 90; E3-SA detachment, 140; Operation Southern Watch 112 inertial navigation computer, 83 infrared missiles, 70 Institute for Defense Analysis, 77 integrated air defense system (IADS), 110 Invasion of Ukraine, 153 IR receiver, 129 Iron Hand, 90, 93–96 ITT Electronic Systems, 145–46 Jackson, Thomas, 7 James, Lionel, 1–4 jammers, communication: ALQ-54, 166 ALQ-55, 166–67 ALQ-92, 164; on EA-68, 168–69 ALQ-191, 169 ALQ-277, 172 jammers, noise: ALT-2, 39; ALT-6B, 83– 84; APT-10, 39 jammers, radar: ALQ-19, 65–67 ALQ-29, 149–50 ALQ-31, 100–101 ALQ-31A, 83 ALQ-31B, 84 ALQ-35, 68–69 ALQ-36, 68 ALQ-38, 67 ALQ-41, 166, 68–71, 78; on ARIES I, 170; on EA-6A, 83; on EA-6B, 168, 169; on EKA-3B, 99; on RA-5C, 167 ALQ-51, 166, 68–71, 78; and SA-2s, 92; on EKA-38, 99; for A-4, 91; on RA-5C, 167 ALQ-51A, 91 ALQ-53, 83 ALQ-61, 84

Index — 265

ALQ-76, 84, 101 ALQ-86, 83 ALQ-99, 106, 11, 113, 116, 172; 103–5; and F/A-18F, 142–45; pod, 146; use in Allied Force, 118 ALQ-100, 167, 169; on EA-6B, 168 ALT-2, 74; lack of power, 76, 89 ALT-17, 89 ALT-27, 99 APQ-2, 20–21, 23; on PB4Y-2, 159 APT-1, 20–21, 24; on PB4Y-2, 159; on TBM-3Q, 160 APT-3, 20–21 APT-5, 24; on PB4Y-2, 159 APQ-2, 42 USQ-133, 130 X-MBT, 26–17 jammers, radio: ARC-1 (VHF), 17–18, 20; 158; 163; on PB4Y-1 ARC-27(UHF), 163 ARC-210, 115 jamming, xvii jamming pod. AlQ-31A, 166 jamming systems: ALQ/-99(V), 168; ALQ-99 TJS, 168; ALT-27, 164 Jellico, John R., 6–7 Joe Rochefort’s War, 8 John F. Kennedy (CV 67), 140 Joint Airborne Signals Intelligence Architecture Modernization program, 124 Joint Army-Navy Nomenclature System, xix Joint Chiefs of Staff: Deep Sea 129 investigation, 61–62; reaction to PB4Y-2 loss, 31 Joint Common Configuration program, 124 Joint Communications-Electronics Nomenclature System, xix Joint Electronic Attack Analysis of Alternatives, 141 joint suppression of enemy air defense (JESEAD), 153 Journal of Electronic Defense, 139 Journalism and the Russo-Japanese War, 3 Julie/Jezebel sonar, 38

K-13 IR guided missile, 71 K-3 Pohang airfield, 42–43 KA-3B, 99 Karplus, Eduard, 10 Kauga, IJN, 4 Keller, Gordon Jr., 44 Kelso, Frank B. 108 Kennedy, Floyd D. Jr., 136 Kirkham, Christopher C. 114 Knife Rest. See radar, air search: P10 Korean War ECM aircraft deployed, 173–75 Kosovo. See Operation Allied Force Kurtz, Dave, 147 L3 Harris, NGJ-LB development contract, 150; NGJ-LB protest, 151 La-11 (Soviet), 30 Lachow, Martin, 76 Lacouture, John, 98 Lake, Julian S., 77–78, 91, 96, 98, 128 Lapaille, John R., 128 Larsen, Ric, 143 Lewin, Ronald, 7 Line of Death, 107, 108 Ling-Temco-Vought, 122 Litton Industries, 116 Lockheed Electra, 121 Lockheed Aircraft Service Company, 124, 129; modifies S-3As, 136 Lopez, Joseph T., 115 low-density high-demand, 119 Lum, Zachary, 139 Lyndon B. Johnson, 86 MacArthur, Douglas, 16 MacDonald, Thomas, 74–75 Magnetic Anomaly Detector (MAD), 38 Mahshie, Abraham, 153 Marcani, Guglielmo, 1, 5, 8 McMakin, Charles, 53 McNamara, Robert S., 56, 82, 88 McNaughton, John T., 88 Meyers, Allen G., 145 MH-53, 110 MI-8 (Soviet), 109 mid-band NGJ jammer, 149–50

266 — Index

MiG 15 (Soviet), 71; attacks on U.S. aircraft, 35–36 MiG 17 (Soviet), 71, 87 MiG-21 (Soviet), 59; downs RA-5C, 86 MiG 23 (Soviet), 109 Miles C. Fox (DD 829), 28 Miller, Henry L., 87 Moore, Joseph, 87 Moore, Thomas H., 56 Morganville, Ross, 81 MQ-4C, 124 National Defense Committee, 10–11 National Defense Research Council, 26 National Reconnaissance Office, 123 Naval Air Systems Command, 91 Naval Communications Unit 38C, 33 Naval Research Laboratory: and ECM equipment design, 20; and first radar, 9; ECM research, 39; evaluates Japanese radar, 12; special projects school, 16 Naval Security Group, 30, 31, 126–27 NEA-6A, 82 Nevius, William B., 135–36 New York Times, 2 next-generation jammer (NGJ), 144–46; concept drawing, 147; contract award, 150; EMD phase, 150; future impact, 154 next-generation low-band jammer (NGJLB), 150; contract protest diagram, 151; EMD phase, 150 Nisshin (IJN), 4 NJG. See next-generation jammer Nordwall, Bruce, 110 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 116–17 North Korean air defenses, 43 North Vietnamese Air Defense Command, 100 North Vietnamese air threat, 89 Northrop Grumman, 116, 124; and EA-18G, 142; and NGJ competition, 145; NGJ-LB development contract, 150; NGJ-LB protest, 151 NRL. See Naval Research Laboratory NSA, 56; Beggar Shadow missions, 60

O’Brien, J.T., 43, 76, 89 Office of Naval Intelligence, 8 Office of Scientific Research and Development, 11, 27 Oliver, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Henry F., 4, 6, 7 Operation Allied Force, 116–17 Operation Attain Document III, 108 Operation Batrack, 124 Operation Blue Moon, 80 Operation Deliberate Force, 112 Operation El Dorado Canyon, 108–9 Operation Inherent Resolve, 120 Operation Linebacker II, 86 Operation Northern Watch, 111 Operation Odyssey Dawn, 146 Operation Prairie Fire, 107–9 Operation Rolling Thunder, 86–88 Operation Southern Watch, 111 Operation WEXVAL, 77 Orr, Michael, 149 P2V, 29, 32, 121; Cold War attacks on, 35–36 P2V-2, 37; for VQ-2 training, 47 P2V-3: description of, 37 P2V-3W, 37; Cold War shoot down, 35–36 P2V-4, 37 P2V-5, 38; description of, 37; ELINT gear, 34; Cold War attacks on, 35–36 P2V-6, 38 P2V-7, 122, description of, 38; ELINT gear, 34 P3, 121; fitted with AIM-9, 122 P3A: advantage over P-2V, 121–22; Black Bat operations, 123; characteristics, 121; modification of, 122; end of service life, 127 P-3C, 128 P4M-1Q: 32–33, 46–47, 51; characteristics, 161–62; Cold War attacks on, 35–36 P5M-2: ELINT gear, 34 Pacific Missile Test Center, 123 Page, Robert, 12 PARPRO. See Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program

Index — 267

PB4Y-1, 16, 24; characteristics, 158 PB4Y-2, 24, 25; characteristics, 159; Cold War attacks on, 35–36; downing of, 29–31 PBM-5, 33; Cold War attacks on, 35–36 PBY, 14; ELINT missions, 17–18; modifications for ARC-1, 17 PBY-5A, 15; characteristics, 157–58 Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program, 48–49, 79 Peoples, G. F., 86 Peterson, Arnold, 10 Prados, John, 8 PRB Associates, 116 Price, Alfred, 39, 75, 90, 91–92, 98 Project High Speed, 78 Project Shoe Horn, 91–92 Prowler. See EA-6B pulse analyzers; ALA-3, 48,89; on EA-3B, 164 APA-10, on P4M-1Q, 162 APA-11, 33; on AD-2Q, 163; APA-11 on AD-4Q, 163 APA-38, on P4M-1Q, 163; APA-38 on AD-4Q, 163 APA-64, 41; on EA-1F, 163 APA-69, on EA-1F, 163 APA-74, 34; on P4M-1Q, 162 APR-9B, on EA-1F, 163 SLA-1, on P4M-1Q, 162 ULQ-16, 131–32 Qaddafi, Muammar, 107, 147 Queer Whale, 99 RA-5C, 84: characteristics, 166–67 radar, acquisition: P-12 (Soviet), 68 radar, airborne: APS-20, 37, 52, 97–98; on EC-121, 165 APS-31, 44 APQ-35, 72 APQ-129, 106 APS-130, 106 APG-79, 146, 172 APS-80, 121 radar, air search: 11-Go (Japanese), 11–12; A-100 (Soviet), 63; Knife Rest (Soviet

P-10), 99; G.L. Mark II (British), 43; P-10 (Soviet), 99; PVO (Soviet), 59; Type 2 (Japanese), 11 radar/com receivers: APA-9, 41 ALQ-53, 100–102 ALQ-61, 167 ALQ-218, 119; 146, 155 ALR-3, 34, 52; on EA-3B, 164 ALR-8, 34, 89; on EC-1A, 163 ALR-29, 99 ALR-30, 99 APR-1, 31, 24; on AD-2Q, 162; on AD-4Q, 162; on TBM-3Q, 160 APR-2, 24; on PB4Y2,159 APR-4, 29, 31, 33, 44; on P4M-1Q, 162 APR-5, 21, 24; on PB4Y2, 159 APR-9, on A3D-1, 48; on EA-1F, 162; EA-3B, 164; EA-1F, 162; EC-1A, 163; on EC-121, 165; sensitivity, 52 APR-13, 49; on EA-3B, 164; on EC121, 165 WR-300, 93–96 XARD, 13, 14; on PBY-5, 158 radar detectors: P-540, 10; SCR-587, 10 radar, discovery of: 9 radar, fire control: B-200 (Soviet), 63, 65–66 Fan Song (Soviet), 97 Fan Song surrogates: Flint Stone, 91; SADS-1, 93 Fire Can (Soviet), 88–89, 98; simulator, 82 SCR-584, 65, 82 SNR-75 (Soviet), 67 SON-2 (Soviet), 43 SON-4 (Soviet), 86, 87 radar homing adapter: APA-70, 41 radar principles: conical scanning, 178; ECM bands, 178; modulation, 178; power density, 177; range gate pull, 178 radar warning receivers: ALQ-2, 63 ALQ-218, 172 ALR-15, 166 ARL-18, 167 ALR-45, 167

268 — Index

ALR-67, 107, 138 ALR-76, 170 APR-32, 99 radar warning and homing equipment: ALR-42, 104 APR-25, 96 APR-26, 96 APR-27, 105 ALR-77, 129 AZ-EL, 96 IR-33, 93–96 Radiation Laboratory, 10–11 radio direction finding (RDF) in WWI, 5 Radio Materials School, 12 Radio Research Laboratory, 21–22, 26, 27; antenna system design, 33; ECM equipment design, 20 RA-EB, 124 Ramsey, David, 6 Rand Corporation, 110 Randolf (CV 15), 70 Ranger (CV 61), 100 Rappaport, George, 26 Raytheon: and NGJ competition, 145; NGJ contract award, 148–50; replacement for ALQ-99, 149 RB-50, 55 RB-66, 89, 98 RC-135, 56, 140 Republic of China Air Force 34 Squadron, 122–23 RF-8, 80, 87 Richelson, Jeffery, 123 role of electronic warfare, 152 Romano, Angelo, 122 Room 40, x, 57 Round, Henry J., 5–6 RT-1273AG satellite communication radio, 131 Russell, Robert, 13 Russo-Japanese War, 2 S-3A: characteristics, 138–39; conversion of, 135, 138; ELINT package, 139; entered service, 138; limitations of, 137; modified, 136; removed from AMSS, 137

S-25 air defense system, 63–64 SA-5 (Gammon). See SAM missiles, S-200 SAC, 64 Salisbury Sound (AV 13), 34 SAM missiles: SA-1, 63 SA-2, 79, 87, downs F-4C, 88; guidance signals, 93–96; salvo fire, 92 S-75, 68 S-200, 108 V-300, 63 SAM threat, 89, 93 SAM sites, 90 Sanders Associates, 91, 116 Santayana, George, 152 Saratoga (CV 60), 67, 98; E3-SA detachment, 140 SB2C Helldiver, 24 Seapower, 153 Second Boar War, 2 Section 22, Southwest Pacific Area Command GHQ, 16–17 Senior System Improvement Program (SSIP), 129–30 Serbian IADS, 117 Service Life Extension Program (SLEP), 127–28 Shadow. See E3-SA Sharkfin missions, 75–76 Sheer, Admiral Reinhard, 7 Shrike. See AGM-45 SIGINT: defined, xv–xvi; in RussoJapanese War, 1–4; in WWI, 4–8; on A3D-2Q, 48 signal analyzers: APA-74, 164; APR-11, 44 Signal Corps, USA, 10 signal intercept systems: ALQ-110 (Big Look),129 Silent Heros, 74 Sinclar, Don, 10 Skifter, Hector, 27 Sneaky Petes, 57 SOJ. See stand-off jammer, 144 Southwest Pacific Area Command GHQ, 16–17 Special Electronic Search Project (SESP), 29

Index — 269

Special Projects Division, Navy Air Operations Department, 33 spectrum analyzers: HP8555, 125 Spoon Rest. See radar, acquisition: P-12 spot jammer, 82 SSIP. See Senior System Improvement Program ST/SPIN, 122 stand-off jammer, 144 Stimson, George W., 177 Story Book, 131–32, 170 Story Classic, 131–32, 170 Story Teller, 131–32, 179 Surface-to-air missiles. See SAM Swanborough, Gordon, 121 TAC-3 work station, 131 TACOS, 99 Tactical Air Command, 114 Tactical Air Power Committee, 104 Tactical Airborne Exploitation System (TASES), 135–36 tactical data system: ASH-30, 105 tactical jamming system (TJS), 103–4 TADIL processor, 131 TASES. See Tactical Airborne Exploitation System Task Force 58, 24 Task Force 60, 108 Task Force 77, 87 TASM. See BGM-109B TBM-3D, 21 TBM-3E, 24; characteristics, 160–61 TBM-3Q, 21, 28; characteristics, 160–61; in HEDRON-2, 42 Termam, Frederick, 22 Texas Instruments, 154 TF-1Q, 49 Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71): BGPHES deployed on, 140; in Allied Force, 117; in Deadeye Southeast, 112 Thomas, George, 127 TIBS data link interface, 131 Times of London, 2–4 Tizard Mission, 10 Tizard, Sir Henry, 9

Tomahawk missile. See BGM-109 Tonami, Kurakichi, 3 Topp, Walter, 8 traveling wave tube, 66–67, 178 Turbulent Turtle, 30 U-2, 64, 79 ULQ-20. See Battle Group Passive Extension System Ultra Goes to War, 7 UNIVAC, 136 UPCON program, 124–25 U.S. Airforce bombing squadrons and groups: 5th BG, 13; 11th BG, 13; 72nd BS, 13; 98th BS, 13 U.S. Airforce Security Service, 60; 6918th Security Squadron, 58; 6922nd Security Wing, 58 U.S. Airforce fighter squadrons: 48th TFW, 108; 6234 TFS, 95 U.S. Marine Corps squadrons VMCJ-1 Vietnam deployment, 88–89 U.S. Marine Corps groups: MAG-33, 42 U.S. Marine Corps wings: MAW-1, 42; MAW-2, 42 U.S. Marine Corps squadrons: HEDRON-3, 42 VMA(AW)-242, 101 VMAQ-1: in Allied Force, 117 VMAQ-2, 108, 120; in Allied Force, 117; in Desert Storm, 110–11 VMAQ-3, 120 VMAQ-4, 120 VMAQ-T-1, 120 VMC-1, 43–44 VMC-3, 72–75 VMCJ-1, 76; aircrew for EA-6A, 100; EA-6A missions, 101–2; and requirements for 3D-2Q, 81; Op. Blue Moon, 80 VMCJ-2, 78–79; aircrew for EA-6A, 100; receives first EA-6A, 83 VMCJ-3, 75–76 VMFA-322, 76 VMF(N)-513, 74

270 — Index

U.S. Navy carrier air wings: CVW-5, 112; CVW-8, 78; CVW-9, 87 U.S. Navy Security Group Division 15, 59 U.S. Navy squadrons: VA-34, 109 VA-46, 70 VA-75, 90 VA-81, 108 VAH-2, 63, 67 VAQ-13, 109 VAQ-38, 117 VAQ-132, 104, 108–10; as expeditionary squadron, 147; operates first EA-18G, 146–47; response to invasion of Ukraine, 153 VAQ-133, 106 VAQ-134, 120 VAQ-135, 108–9 VAQ-141, 117 VAQ-209, 117 VAW-134, 7 VC-3, 72 VC-11, 40 VC-35, 40 VF-74, 78 VFP-63, 87 VHA-8, 78 VP-8, 121 VP-21, 32 VP-26, 29–30, 32 VP-44, 121 VP-54, 14–15 VP-72, 14 VP-104, 16 VPB-25, 106, 116, 18 VQ-1, 46–58, 62, 86, 92; A3D-2Q, 48; ARIES II, 130; Beggar Shadow missions, 55–56, 58; Big Look aircraft, 97; computers complaints, 127; Detachment Bravo, 124; EC-121M, 51, 54, in Vietnam, 92

VQ-2: A3D-2Q, 48; ARIES II, 129– 30; Beggar Shadow missions, 56; christens ARIES, 125; EC-121M, 51, 54; Deep Well deficiencies, 127 VQ-5, 140 VQ-6, 140 VS-5, 91 VW-1, 46; in Vietnam, 92 VW-2, 46 VW-3, 46 V-22, 137 VAN teams, 40 Vector Homing and Warning System, 93 Vito, Carmine, 64 waning support for electronic warfare, 152 Wasserfall, 63 Wee Look, 98 Whiff. See radar, fire control: SON-4 Whipple, Fred, L., 22 Whispering Willie, 84–85 White Dove II, 123 Whitten, Wayne H., 74, 80, 90 Wild Weasel, 93–96 Wilson, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur, 6 Window (chaff), 22 wireless, in Russo-Jap. War, 1–4 Wizards of Langley, 123 Wright, Maurice, 4 Wurzburg radar, 20, 29 WV-2Q, 51. See also EC-121 Y stations, 5 Yagi antenna, 15 Yankee Station, 90–92 Yo-Yo radar. See radar, Soviet fire control radar, B-200 Zaloga, Steven, 64 Zepplin bombers, 6

About the Author

Thomas Wildenberg is an award-winning scholar with special interests in aviators, naval aviation, and technological innovation in the military. He is the author of a number of books on a variety of naval topics as well as biographies of Joseph Mason Reeves, Billy Mitchell, and Charles Stark Draper.

271

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