Field-theory: A Study of its Application in the Social Sciences 9780415727310, 9781315769974, 9781138783065, 9781315763637

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Title Page
Copyright Page
Original Title Page
Original Copyright Page
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements
Introduction
Part One Presuppositions of field-theories in social science
1 Certain observations on field-theory in physics
2 Gestalt psychology as field-theory
3 Basic assumptions of Lewin's topological psychology: psychological field-theory, part one
4 Basic assumptions of Lewin's dynamic psychology: psychological field-theory, part two
Part Two The path followed by field-theory from individual psychology to social science
5 Moving from the unit of consciousness to the multi-personal field, by way of 'psychological induction'
6 The social field as an interpersonal space of conflict and tension
7 Contributions to the theory of the 'role-field'
Part Three The field-theory in social science versus the theories of system and structures
8 A criticism of the 'system' of structural functionalism and of the departure from 'elements'
9 A first attempt at the field-theory of society as a whole
10 Thoughts on structure and change
Part Four Social field-theories concerned with fields of opinion and interests
11 Fields of opinion as a basis for norm- and role-formation
12 Multi-person fields, image-fields and the norm-field of society
13 Interest-fields and fields of social conflict
Part Five Further applications of the field-concept, and field-theoretical methods in social sciences
14 Field-ideas as applied in cultural anthropology
15 On the educational concept of field
16 The theory of level of aspiration, and 'opportunities for climbing' in the social field
17 'Field-models' in the sense of a 'formal field-method', together with final conclusions concerning the methodology
Appendix
Notes
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

ROUTLEDGE LIBRARY EDITIONS: SOCIAL THEORY

Volume 22

FIELD-THEORY

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FIELD-THEORY

a study of its application in the social sciences

HARALD MEY

Translated by DOUGLAS SCOTT

ROUTLEDGE

Routledge Taylor & Francis Group

LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published in Great Britain in 1972 This edition first published in 2015 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OXI4 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

German Text © 1965 R. Piper & Co Verlag This translation © 1972 Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN: 978-0-415-72731-0 (Set) eISBN: 978-1-315-76997-4 (Set) ISBN: 978-1-138-78306-5 (Volume 22) eISBN: 978-1-315-76363-7 (Volume 22) Publisher's Note

The publisher has gone to great lengths to ensure the quality of this reprint but points out that some imperfections in the original copies may be apparent. Disclaimer

The publisher has made every effort to trace copyright holders and would welcome correspondence from those they have been unable to trace.

Field-theory: a study of its application in the social sciences

by Harald Mey

translated by Douglas Scott

London Routledge & Kegan Paul

Translated from the German Studien zur Anwendung des FeldbegrifJs in den Sozialwissenschajten R. Piper & Co Verlag, Miinchen 1965 First published in Great Britain in 1972 by Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd Broadway House, 68-74 Carter Lane LondonEC4 Made and printed in Great Britain by Butler & Tanner Ltd Frome and London © German Text, R. Piper & Co Verlag, 1965 © This translation, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1972 No part of this book may be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except for the quotation of brief passages in criticism I SEN 0 710068271

Contents

Acknowledgements Introduction

VII

IX

part one Presuppositions of field-theories in social science 1 Certain observations on field-theory in physics 2 Gestalt psychology as field-theory 3 Basic assumptions of Lewin's topological psychology: psychological field-theory, part one 4 Basic assumptions of Lewin's dynamic psychology: psychological field-theory, part two part two

3 13 21

37

The path followed by field-theory from individual psychology to social science

5 Moving from the unit of consciousness to the

6 7 part three

multi-personal field, by way of 'psychological induction' The social field as an interpersonal space of conflict and tension Contributions to the theory of the 'role-field'

51 57 76

The field-theory in social science versus the theories of system and structures

8 A criticism of the 'system' of structural functionalism and of the departure from 'elements'

89 v

CONTENTS

9 A first attempt at the field-theory of society as a whole

10 Thoughts on structure and change

103 124

part four Social field-theories concerned with fields of opinion and interests 11 Fields of opinion as a basis for norm- and role-formation 12 Multi-person fields, image-fields and the normfield of society 13 Interest-fields and fields of social conflict

149 156 172

part five Further applications of the field-concept, and field-theoretical methods in social sciences

14 Field-ideas as applied in cultural anthropology 15 On the educational concept of field 16 The theory of level of aspiration, and 'opportunities for climbing' in the social field 17 'Field-models' in the sense of a 'formal fieldmethod', together with final conclusions concerning the methodology

vi

189 197 208 223

Appendix

243

Notes

246

Bibliography

305

Index

317

Acknowledgements

On the publication of the enlarged English edition of this book I have to thank many persons who contributed to it. First I am very obliged to those whose criticism and advice were helpful in preparing the German version, both in its first draft as a thesis submitted to the University of Tiibingen and the published book, especially Professors Ralf Dahrendorf, Wilhelm Witte, Norbert Kloten, Karl Brandt, and my colleagues at the Tiibingen Seminaries, and my friends Wolfgang Zapf (now Professor at Frankfurt) and Martin Jackel (now at Pittsburgh College). I am grateful to Professor Werner Cohn of the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, for many important suggestions both for the German and the English edition. The German edition of 1965 produced much criticism and encouragement, which helped to improve this English edition. For this I am grateful to Professors Heinz Hartmann (Miinster), Friedrich FUrstenberg (Linz), G. S. Scur (Moscow), Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom (Yale), G. C. Homans (indirectly through Wolfgang Zapf's first visit to Harvard), Winfried Lohr (who is one of the translators and editors of Kurt Lewin's late work in Switzerland), and the reviewers of my book in newspapers and journals in Germany and abroad. For this English edition I have written new Sections 111/4, IX/4, XIV /4 and parts of chapter XVII. Chapter XII/4 is the translation of an essay, which originally appeared in autumn 1965 in 'Studien und Berichte aus dem Soziologischen Seminar der Universitat Tiibingen', Berichte 6, pp. 16-24. My special thanks to the editor of the International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction, Professor W. J. H. Sprott, and the publisher, Mr Norman Franklin and the translator Douglas Scott for having so much patience with me during the period of vii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

translation and correction of my additional material. I am very grateful, too, to the known and unknown persons, who helped in making the subject index and in the final editing, and last but not least to the staffs of the publishing and printing houses, at Piper in Munich and Routledge and Kegan Paul in London. Konstanz

VIII

Harald Mey

Introduction

Influences leading to the application of the concept of 'field' I The pioneer role played by natural science in the social sciences In the physics of the twentieth century there was a shift in scientific emphasis away from the classical mechanics which held sway during the nineteenth century. This led to a viewpoint which may be characterized as belonging to field-theory. Together with the quantum physics of Planck and Heisenberg, which gave scope for the use of statistical laws in natural science, and Einstein's Theory of Relativity, field-physics constitutes the third pillar of the scientific view of the atomic age. This new development did not invalidate classical mechanics; but it did relegate it, as a special branch of physics of moderate importance, to a narrower sphere within the more comprehensive total picture given by the theories of field and relativity. Those tendencies in the social sciences which strive after scientific exactitude and do not simply utilize an approach based on history and the humanities still bear, even today, the unmistakable imprint of the nineteenth-century view of nature. It is a particular quality of the growth of knowledge that the political questions of today are approached via the theories of yesterday, and these in turn show traces of the state of logic and of the scientific world-view obtaining the day before yesterday; this is usually the period when the author was at school or university. According to Norbert Kloten certain things may be done to reduce this time-lag involved in the spread of knowledge, but it cannot be eliminated altogether. 1 While the more recent developments in logic since the thirties,2 and new mathematical discoveries such as cybernetics and the Theory of Games have now been adopted very successfully in the social sciences, especially in ix

INTRODUCTION

economics, attempts to assimilate field-theory have been noticeably partial and infrequent. A few timid attempts made in the thirties3 were abandoned by the authors themselves in view of the swift progress achieved in other theories, and the early work of Kurt Lewin remained nearly unknown. It is not in the nature of social science to depend on developments in natural science. For instance, the recognition of the relativity of historical processes can be more justifiably ascribed to recent historical experience and to existentialist philosophy than to the successful assimilation of Einstein's Theory of Relativity. 4 Yet no science can permanently ignore stimuli coming from other disciplines without scrutinizing their effectiveness. It was not until the end of World War II that social scientists, becoming dissatisfied with the situation in sociology and economics, attempted to use the concept of field to gain a certain reorientation of the scientific outlook. Their 'field-theoretical' studies are part of the preparatory work before the great rise of systems theory in the social sciences in the sixties. So it now seems to us a favourable moment to take stock of the older applications of the concept of field and their methodological assumptions. It is first necessary to enumerate the direct influences which give rise to this book. II Direct influences deriving from problems in social science

Two groups of stimuli led us to begin our studies in field-theory: 1 Stimuli from economics

Here we find the recognition by certain economists that a theory whose form, relative to the actual situations in which it has been tested, is of a rational logical kind, stands in sharp contrast to spheres of a different, and in particular of an irrational character. This fundamental recognition leads to the assumption that the science of finance has a dual nature. The precise doctrine of fiscal efficiency, for example, is balanced by the investigation of 'psychological' irrationalities (Schmolders 5) in the behaviour of the taxpayer and in political power-conflicts which have an effect on financial policy. Norbert Kloten worked out this point of view very carefully in a treatise,6 to which we linked our own research. 'l More recent views regarding the frontiers of the discipline of economics tend to show that those frontiers do not coincide exactly with the boundary between the 'rational' and the 'irrational' in social reality (as was assumed by Einaudi, following Pareto).9 Parallel with the elaboration of the science of finance certain considerations of economic and social policy gave rise to another elaboration: this was in the direction of relativizing Eucken's data

x

INTRODUCTION

(for market economy) to include the political and social forces which enter into the 'economic process'. This gave rise to the conception of the social responsibility of the economist - particularly marked for example in the case of Hans Peter;IO it can also be seen in the work of his successor to the professorial chair, Karl Brandt, for whom the socio-political forces operating within the economy were thought of on a direct analogy with the physical force-fieldY 2 Sociological stimuli

Among modern sociologists we find a number, who are to some extent dissatisfied with that body of theory, known in the United States under the rubric of structural functionalism. There is particular dissatisfaction with its apparent implications of support for a liberal-conservative ideology.12 These criticisms may be divided into the following two streams: (a) Critical developments of the system of structural functionalism. Robert K. Merton and Neal Gross aimed to give a more empirical form to Parsons' role-theory by introducing the 'role-set'.13 This is similar to Dahrendorf's idea of the 'position-field', which is a microsociological refinement of role-theory. 14 In addition Friedrich FUrstenberg argued for increasing the power of structural theory by putting it into an overall field-theoretical context. Theories of normgeneration can be considered a further critical expansion of structural theory. IS (b) The counter-theory ofan irrational element as consciously opposed to the system of structural functionalism. Here the system of structural functionalism is either opposed by power-theories, as by Mills;16 or else attempts are made to trace irrational sub- or anti-cultures such as National Socialism, something of which the structural-functionalist mode of thought is not capable. This last is consciously envisaged by Werner Cohn as 'field-theory' Y From the variety of the foregoing allusions it is clear that in the area of social science solid hopes have been placed on the application of the concept of field, and this seems to justify our closer examination of it. Three different procedures are possible. At some risk of excessive heterogeneity, we have attempted to combine all these in this book, in order to be able to begin arranging the material and influences in our discussion.

xi

INTRODUCTION

The three-fold approach I Encyclopedia of theoretical applications of the term 'field' This aspect of a collection tends to give the present investigation an uncritical and encyclopedic character. To begin with, the sole criterion for deciding whether a statement using the notion of field fell within our frame of reference was an express assertion on the part of each author that he considered he was concerned with fieldtheory, or that his reasoning began with an explicit field-concept. This tended to bring together theories which were conceived very differently and with different degrees of exactitude. II The conceptual criteria of field-theory Most extensions of field-theory that we have found show too little agreement and are often too incomplete to permit the extraction of any clear universal principles. We have therefore retained a number of definitions given by different authors. Instead of critically eliminating imprecise theories we tended to concentrate on those that were susceptible of graphic and concrete presentation, with brief methodical discussions of models that could be expressed in mathematical notation (when these amounted to something more than pipe-dreams). Since almost all theorists who employ the field concept rely on the physical field 18 or on Lewin's 'field-psychology', it seemed useful to begin the discussion with a few instances of the physical field-theory and of Kurt Lewin's psychological theory, including a statement of the spatial operations symbolizing the field of forces. This is done in the first part of the book; later chapters deal in greater detail with Lewin's reflections on social psychology and micro-sociology, these being used as exemplars. Taking into account all the existing statements couched in fieldtheoretical terminology, it is not possible to give a clear and binding formulation as to what constitutes field-theory. It is only in the relatively uncommitted form of this introduction, based principally on Lewin, that we will try to offer some indications towards a systematic classification of the various ways in which the fieldconcept has been applied. Attempts at defining field-theory

'A totality of coexisting facts which are conceived of as mutually interdependent is called afield.'19 xii

INTRODLlCTION

This concept of field, which Lewin takes from Einstein, is not essentially different (when applied in psychology) from gestalt psychology's attempt to view the whole as distinct from the parts. Thought and action are not provided with separate causes and motives; instead all aspects of the total psychic situation are grasped at one and the same time. This principle may be transferred to social questions. It may possibly be linked with Eucken's criticism of the tendency to construct economic theories out of a number of separate categories used as an axiomatic system. Eucken criticized the method by which conceptions approximating inaccurately to reality were related logically so that they became axiomatic systems. Such a method served only to veil the empirical imprecision of the basic assumptions through the apparent logical completeness of the system. 20 Both Eucken and Lewin adopt the counter-principle of proceeding from more comprehensive relations towards the parts. But now Lewin also presents a wider and more important aspect, which sets the field-theories of social psychology far apart from their model in physics: his viewpoint of conflict. Even the physiological type of field-concept adopted by Wolfgang Kohler (one of Lewin's teachers in gestalt psychology) is closely related to the classical concept of organism, which ever since antiquity has been readily applied to the life of human beings in social communities. For Lewin on the other hand the approach adopted by field-theory meant taking a comprehensive view of constellations of tension and conflict. From the socio-psychological viewpoint of this book three modes of applying the concept of 'field' emerge, ranging from small to great according to their scope. As a fourth, we may add the formally abstract field-model for special relations. a

'Totality' and 'field' within personal consciousness

(a) Simple totalities. Considered as a unit of consciousness, the person is a totality, but separate physiological or psychic processes can also be conceived of as totalities. Thus, for example, the field of vision is a totality, and even partial perceptions such as those of a tree or a drop of water constitute totalities. Fields of forces with total effect are necessary for such to come into existence. Totality can be narrowed down still further to a more special (dynamic) notion of field: a field is a dynamic totality. Lewin and the gestalt psychologists transfer this type of approach to psychic spheres such as memory-, will- or learning-processes. (b) The simple central field. Lewin divides up will-processes into the psychic attraction which a desired (or instinctively sought for) goal xiii

INTRODUCTION

possesses, and the psychic equivalent of the path towards it. 21 Consciousness of these constituent parts in the psychic field is not presupposed; even such an uninstinctive process as trying to solve a theoretical problem may not involve full initial consciousness. 22 Every aim-demand 23 orientates around itself a psychic sphere which is subordinate to it, just as, according to field-physics, a body does with forces of attraction. In such a case we talk of a positive central field. And the same explanation applies to instances of repulsion, the opposite of attraction, deriving perhaps from fear or antipathy, where we talk of a negative central field. (c) Intra-personal fields of conflict. Conflicts between positive and negative valences are represented by Lewin spatially as conflicts between overlapping central fields. This picture moves particularly far away from the analogy with physics by reason of the specifically psychological rules for assessing the opposing forces. Lewin considers that personal tension - the 'field of tension' - is the most important source of energy for human thought and action. 24

2 Fields of one or several persons (exceeding the limits of the' Unit of Consciousness') (a) The 'interlocking' of totalities. Whether a totality, including that of the dynamic variety, is conceived of as broad or narrow depends upon the particular subject of scientific study. Reality can be thought of as an interlocking of totalistic forces ('fields of forces' in an extended sense).25 Thus different psychic spheres (e.g., the sphere of sexual experience, musical recollection, reflection on professional success and failure) are comprised within a so-called 'unit of consciousness' or personality. But people (including each individual's subjective field of world-perception, Lewin's life-space) may be seen as comprised within larger units, such as the field in which a group functions. 26 (b) Fields of induction or influence. The influence of a mother on her child can be thought of as a field exceeding the unit of consciousness. It is then a 'source of power' existing outside the person, introduced among those forces which influence the child's thoughts and actions. (c) The 'outfield' (Umfeld) of the person ('field in the narrower sense', following Lewin). As the combination of all external influences acting on a person, it represents the field-theoretical equivalent of Riesman's 'outer-directed' person. 27 By a process of specifically sociological abstraction we can pass from the psychological outfield to the field XIV

INTRODUCTION

of a 'position' or 'role'. Linked with this too is the pedagogic 'field of socialization', which is really nothing else but the central outfield which constitutes the position and role of the youth or schoolboy.28 (d) Inter-personal fields of tension and conflict. Most inter-personal fields of conflict contain forces that are induced by other people. These fields too, released from the individual unit of consciousness, can be viewed as fields oftension and conflict for several people. This process of release, which is very interesting from the aspect of scientific theory, constitutes a step from psychology to sociology which we shall discuss in more detail in its proper place. 3

Social fields

(a) Sector-fields. The field-theory approach to processes in order of social magnitude may be seen in Karl Mannheim's 'segment-fields'or 'sector-fields'. 29 Mannheim takes the example of the relationship of mutual interdependence among the members of the class of international merchants; this mobilizes itself through units consisting of earlier or primary social units such as the family or clan - indeed, even from the individual shareholders - and becomes to a certain extent autonomous of them. The way in which segment-fields or sector-fields grow up nowadays is a characteristic mark of modern societies as against concentric and 'circular' clan-orders stretching back to the medieval feudal state. It is responsible for their particular dynamic. (b) Fields of social conflict. Conflicts between different social interests or power-groups, considered as groups or as sector-fields, can be presented graphically in the form offield-models. Connected with this are Myrdal's 'interest-fields' and J. F. Brown's or Theodor Geiger's presentations of 'polarization-processes' in societies of two or more classes. 3o (c) Society as a combinedfield. Society as a whole can be viewed as a combination of very different dynamic totalities, divisions into segments, and fields of tension and conflict. There is no field-theory dealing with society as a whole which corresponds with this; the resources available for elaborating this completely are either too inadequate or too complex. In addition, the implicit conception of society as a changeable conglomeration of conflicts, tensions and power-struggles does not encourage one to hope for a fully worked-out total model (e.g. on the lines of Walras' economy) corresponding to harmonious conceptions of mechanism and order. 31 xv

INTRODUCTION

4 Highly abstract field-models for special relations (a) Lewin's fields of equilibrium with respect to particular social conditions - the Theory of Quasi-Stationary Processes. The sectional view (the so-called 'phase-space') which Lewin uses in groupdynamics for partial criteria of social fields 32 is a far-reaching abstract equilibrium model. For example, an attempt is made to give a diagrammatic representation of the forces which favour adherence to a particular level of production or to a policy of saving,33 or favour a constant level of aggression. Here Lewin's concept of social theory is applied with particular consistency: namely that a constant progression of social processes is only possible if mutually contrary social forces are held in balance within definite zones. An existing condition and a later change are the result of differing constellations among similar social field-forces.

(b) Formal field-models. Different models which incorporate variables whose magnitudes reciprocally influence one another can be represented in field-terms. This approach is particularly suitable for situations where variables covary, e.g. the relation between group solidarity and group performance,34 the dependence between the application of one supply of material and the supply of another material, and the mutual dependence of different manufacturers with respect to the behaviour of others in a case of oligopoly. 35 Here there is possibly a special opportunity for field-theory to develop into a mathematical model, since it can give a simultaneous account of processes that can usually only be combined in series of simultaneous equations 36 or in the probability-alternatives of the Theory of Games. But this application suffers from the excessive complexity of algebraic methods; and for this reason we have, in the present treatise, confined ourselves to verbal and graphic metaphors as being more convincing because they are relatively simple.

ill Working out the nature of field-theories as distinct from other types of theory in social science From the enumeration of the various influences in the first section of this Introduction, it must already be clear that in many cases fieldtheory can be thought of as a contrast to the structural or logicalrationalistic types of theory. Apart from the objections raised by Lewin and the gestalt psychologists to constructing a theory out of parts and building it into a whole, and apart from a critique of Parsons' 'social system' from the standpoint offield-theory, we have chosen to give a simple presentation of extensions introduced by field-theory rather than to wage a continuous critical attack. xvi

INTRODUCTION

To some extent this is connected simply with the current state of the theories. So long as empirical results are not available in sufficient quantities, the battle cannot be decided. Moreover, most field-theories are too incomplete as regards their internal construction for any definitive judgment to be passed about what they are capable or incapable of accomplishing. On the other hand, Lewin's theory, which is fairly well developed, has been taken by us within the framework of the present work as a yardstick by which to judge the quality of other field-theories and the operational applicability that conceptualization in spatial terms may have. Thus my book has tended to avoid contradiction in favour of consolidating a general field-theory position made up of a number of fragments. We also give methodological consideration to the question (which equally cannot yet be subjected to final discussion) of whether the method of field-theory - and in particular, of spatial analogy - constitutes an additional tool for understanding as against the more usual method of logical classification. We consider it a heuristic means for discovering analogous causal constellations, which can also contribute to the discovery of fundamental regularities in variation. No empirical proof can yet be given on the basis of the material available. The author asks the reader's indulgence if, as a result of compressed presentation, there should be a suggestion that this is an intolerant and dogmatic 'textbook'. Nothing could be further from our intention than any dogmatic closure of discussion. Rather it is to be hoped that the concise and sometimes distinctly odd formulations will promote discussion and offer suggestive openings for it to be extended.

xvii

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part one

Presuppositions of field-theories in social science

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1 Certain observations on field-theory in physics

I Prefatory note on the history of science Field-theory in physics made one real intellectual advance over mechanics; this consisted in the recognition that energy can be communicated through space, and not merely by means of impact and pull. 'Through space' does not mean 'across space', in which at first the puzzling element seemed to be 'attraction from a distance', e.g., of the planets (even Newton could see no other solution for this except divine intervention). 'Through space' means rather that energy exists and operates in space. The first step towards the later field-theory of the distribution of energy in space therefore came from the physics of fluids and gases, for which Newtonian mechanics was an inappropriate explanatory framework. The first successful treatment of this area by Euler can be looked upon as the preliminary stage of subsequent field-theory. 1 A field in mathematical physics is generally taken to be a region of space in which each point (with possibly isolated exceptions) is characterized by some quantity or quantities which are functions of the space co-ordinates and of time, the nature of the quantities depending on the physical theory in which they occur. The properties of the field are described by partial differential equations in which these co-ordinates are dependent variables, and the space and time co-ordinates are independent variables. In Euler's hands, hydrodynamics became a field theory, the field of motion of a fluid being characterized by the velocity of the fluid at each point, and the motion being described by partial differential equations involving the velocity components u, v, W, at the point [with the spatial co-ordinates] x, y, z and time t. 2

3

PRESUPPOSITIONS OF FIELD THEORIES

Faraday and Maxwell, the founders of a field-theory of energy, in the modern sense The English scientists Faraday (as the pragmatic experimenter) and Maxwell (as his mathematical perfecter), can be taken as the founders of the physical-field theory, which describes the distribution of energy in empty space in the modern sense. 3 Faraday discovered the lines of the magnetic field, the curved path of which, amongst other things, led him to conclude that the medium between the startingand finishing-points of force, the two poles, must itself have qualities which contradicted the assumption of a timeless and rectilinear communication of force at a distance, 4 as was then advanced by physicists of the so-called 'continental school'. 5 The idea that space in between observable 'solid' bodies might itself possess properties, was epoch-making. And it is amusing to note that the much-despised ether-theories of space, to which in fact even Faraday and Maxwell came very close, have turned out to be, in the form of modern field and quantum physics, not anything like so nonsensical as was at first believed. It is purely a matter of terminology what name one employs today to describe the energy distributed in space. 6

n

Examples of the concept of a physical field

Einstein and Infeld, in their popular work The Evolution ofPhysics, introduce a very simple example of the advantages of the fieldtheoretical mode of thought: At first sight an observer can detect nothing much in common between a bar-magnet and a coil carrying an electrical current (known as a solenoid), as in Figures lb and lc.

Ca)

a

a a

a Cb)

(c)

Figure 1. The Magnetic Field. (a) 'Field'; (b) Solenoid; (c) Bar magnet. 4

OBSERVATIONS ON FIELD-THEORY IN PHYSICS

But if, on the other hand, one observes their magnetic field (Figure la), they are seen to be identical and it is clear that their effects are similar. 7 A magnetic field is primarily a field of energy; it only becomes a 'force-field', as it is generally called, when certain definite assumptions are made.

Forces in physical field-theory For our purposes it is necessary to make a distinction between the situation of energies in space and the operation of forces, according to the following aspects: (a) For an energy to be converted into a force, something must occur within the field of energy. Bodies must be introduced into the field, upon which the force will operate, and movement occurs - it may happen that a force is cancelled out by a directly opposite force of equal strength. As one instance leading to a force, we may take a fall in energy between two points in the field (e.g., a difference in potential in the electrical field).

-

+

(a)

(b)

Figure 2. (After Einstein and lnfeld, Evolution of Physics, Figures 26 & 31.) (a) Field of Attraction; (b) Field of Repulsion. Figures 2a and 2b show bodies giving off straight lines of force, which at the same time represent force-vectors. Figure 2a shows a field of attraction, such as the field of gravity of the sun, or the attractive field of a negatively charged sphere as it affects experimental bodies with a positive charge; 2b shows a field of repulsion, such as that of experimental bodies with the same electrical charge. 8 Figure 2b also illustrates the distribution of charge according to Coulomb; in Figures 2a and 2b, the density of the field increases in proportion to the closure of the lines of force as they approach the centre. Figure 2b can also be taken to represent a transmitter of electromagnetic waves (e.g., a radio transmitter), which is equally a physical field-phenomenon. 9 (b) A force is always bound up with a particular direction. The direction of spread of a field and the direction of the effective force 5

PRESUPPOSITIONS OF fIELD THEORIES

a

a a

Figure 3. (After Einstein and Infeld, Evolution of Physics, Figure 28.) may be different. This happens, for example, with the force in a magnetic field around a conductor at right angles to it (see Figure 3: k = force-vector, while the unmarked arrow gives the direction of the electric current or the lines of the magnetic field). 10

Induction A fundamental element in field-physics - and at the same time a process which is very fruitful for what we shall later have to say about psychological and social field-theories - is induction. If we are correct in our interpretation of Einstein and Infeld, an electric current passed along a conductor constitutes an electrical field,l1 while energy communicated in space around it and through magnets constitutes a magnetic field. The field represented in Figure la is a magnetic field (as well as that of the bar-magnet in Figure Ie, and also that of the solenoid passing a current). Figure 4a now shows an electric and a magnetic field with mutual interpenetration. Here the circular conductor carries the electric field.

(a)

(a)

Figure 4. (After Einstein and Infeld, Evolution of Physics, Figures 33 and 27.)

Any movement of the electrical field (displacement of an electricallycharged sphere or of the ring in Figure 4a) alters the magnetic field 6

OBSERVATIONS ON FIELD-THEORY IN PHYSICS

because it produces magnetic energy, and the lines of force in Figure 4a, as was discovered by Oersted. Any movement of the magnetic field (by displacement of a bar-magnet, for example, or by switching the current on or off through a solenoid) alters the electrical field (produces a current - according to Faraday's experiment - as in Figure 4b, from higher to lower potential, i.e., flowing from positive to negative).12 If one wishes, one can view the two fields as combined, though quite distinct, into a 'dynamic whole' or into a 'field', which once again is primarily a matter of terminology. As far as physics is concerned, electrical fields, magnetic fields and fields of gravity are still entirely different types of energy-phenomena, which never blend in spite of the analogy implicit in their conformity to law. J. F. Brown assumes the same distinctness in the case of psychological and social fields. 13 Nevertheless, between electrical and magnetic fields (and by analogy, between social and psychological fields) a certain interaction does take place, as we have seen, namely, induction. The concept of 'induction' in Lewin's psychological field-theory is connected with external influences exerted on people by individual persons or by groups; this happens, for example, in the case of the forces which a mother is in a position to arouse within the lifespace 14 of her child. Maxwell's concept of space in his equations

Maxwell based his mathematical derivations concerning electrical and magnetic fields on abstraction from the spatial dimensions of electric conductors (the ring around a magnetic field in Figure 4a) or of magnetic lines of force around the cross-section of an electric conductor (see Figures 3 and 4b). The respective phenomena are linked intellectually in the way possible in differential and integral calculus. Thus Maxwell thought out in a concentrated fashion the conversion of electrical energy into magnetic energy and vice versa; in the process he started out from the assumption that any altered electrical energy is surrounded by magnetic energy as well as the reverse, even if no conductor and no magnetic needle are available to demonstrate their existence.!S Here a further decisive intellectual development was added to Faraday's discovery that material bodies are not alone in possessing physical characteristics, the latter being exhibited also in the space surrounding the bodies. Just as the characteristics of the space are a primary influence with respect to the bodies that are more or less accidentally present there, so mathematical procedure advances from

7

PRESUPPOSITIONS OF FIELD THEORIES

the more comprehensive whole towards the parts. The classical mode of constructing thought out of basic elements, now being applied as a new discovery in social science, no longer serves as a presupposition in crucial discoveries and theorems of physics. Maxwell elucidates both methods in Euclid: In his First Book Euclid follows the first method, when he views a line as produced by the movement of a point, a surface as produced by the movement of a line, and a body by the movement of a surface; on the other hand, he adopts the second method when he views a surface as the limitation of a body, a line as the limitation of a surface, and a point as the end of a line. I6 We shall frequently re-encounter this 'totalistic' procedure even in the case of non-physical field-theoreticians, and even if it is not expressed in this mathematical form. For Maxwell, for example, the force operating on a body which happens to lie in an electrical field is determined by its 'resultant electrical power-intensity', which 'depends only on the configuration and position of the other bodies lying in the electrical field' and its own charge. I7 One may compare this with Lewin's view of the way in which a person's behaviour is determined by the forces of the surrounding field and forces within himself. Finally, in order to understand Maxwell's conception of physical space, there is no need at all to have recourse to specially prominent bodies. The space in which a field lies is infinitesimally structured, i.e., it is continuous. The processes in it do not leap from one material part to another, as in the conception of 'action at a distance'. It is not bodies or particles that are under investigation, but the composition of physical space.

ill The transfer of energy in space and time On the phenomenon of the physical wave Any field-theoretician who is a social scientist must be pleased that Einstein and Infeld chose to illustrate the physical wave by means of a sociological example. Any rumour produced, shall we say, in Washington, very quickly reaches New York, even when it happens that not one single person who has passed on the rumour actually travels from one city to the other. To some extent we are dealing here with two quite different movements: that of the rumour itself which hurries from Washington to New York, and that of the people who spread the rumour. IS

8

OBSERVATIONS ON FIELD-THEORY IN PHYSICS

In the physical instance we are dealing with energy, which is 'passed on' from one point in space to the next, although no piece of matter travels the whole distance. The energy in a field of attraction, for example, thus moves in this way much more quickly than any corpuscle, with the exception of the light-quantum, could move, namely with the speed of light. But, on the other hand, there is no simultaneous transmission and reception of energy such as would have to form the basis of any 'action at a distance'. We shall now see the importance of this passage of time.

Remark on 'reality' in field-theory Max Born gives the following criterion aimed against Laplace and Poisson for the reality or unreality of a physical field: In this treatise on electrostatics ... we are not really dealing with a theory of continuous action.... The differential equations do indeed cover the change of intensity in the field from place to place, but there is no variable for the change in time. 19 This led Born to conclude that, in spite of the application of differential equations, direct action at a distance was being assumed, since any action through a real field requires time. Now, in psychological and social fields speed has none of the significance that it has in physics; but the general conclusion which Mary B. Hesse draws from the above relation is important for us. In order to decide if we are concerned with a real physical field, it is important to establish whether the field also possesses other demonstrable properties in addition to that for which the mathematical field-construction was intellectually adduced. 20 With respect to psychological and sociological fields, as we shall see, this is very largely the case. This does not mean that we also have to maintain that the corresponding fundamental facts constitute fields in the precise mathematical and physical sense; it only means that our field-type constructions, which are not eminently perfect, do in fact embrace real processes in a form which is to some extent adequate. IV A remark on 'field' and 'cause' (especially with reference to psychological and social 'forces') 1 A physical definition of 'force'

Crudely expressed, a physical force is something that gives movement to a mass. Possibly it may also achieve the compression of liquids, but there is no need to go into this distinction any further. 21

9

PRESUPPOSITIONS OF FIELD THEORIES

Now psychic and social forces are to be conceived in a manner similar to the above statement, though not with respect to the further physical derivation, which is why we do not stress it at present. The first thing to be observed, as usually happens also in natural science, is an event, a 'movement'; the forces which cause this must then be constructively inquired into (in accordance with the proved assumption that nothing happens without a cause). Only later experiments can convert the causal chain of the genesis into a causal demonstration. 22 Thus, Lewin presents the construction of forces and causes, the 'field', as a 'genotype' (or as pointing the way towards the genotype) lying behind the observed 'phenotypes', i.e., the directly observable events. 23 More precisely then, Lewin, as W. Lohr points out in connection with Leeper, wished to posit psychological energy and distribution of energy, which then gave rise to lines of action;24 thus Lewin wanted to delve even deeper than the forces, and to penetrate as far as the conditions or causes of the latter.

2 Is 'force' a metaphor for 'cause' ? I am doubtful ifit is always possible to say in physics, as it is hardly possible in our sphere of sociology, whether the acceptance of a force is an actual assertion of causality or is the intellectual construction which links an event with its cause. Nevertheless, 'force' can in many cases be used as a metaphor for 'cause'. Not every cause is a force, but every force is the cause of something. The construct of 'force' - even where it is hypothetical- does always direct thought towards the cause, and thus makes it easier to discover it. In psychological and social field-theories we do not always get as far as 'final' causes (as with physics in the case of a field of energy), even if we do construct 'fields of energy'. 26 The joint action of forces - even the 'field of force' in the psychological and sociological assumption - can result from very different further constellations of causes in the field of the social sciences; the establishable vectors of a 'field' are generally resultants of forces. 26 Now, as Max Weber pointed out, amongst a large number of jointly-acting causes one can separate out those that are temporarily interesting and adapt them to a theory - what Eucken called the process of ' pointed abstraction'. 27 But one can also try to combine together as completely as possible all the components of a situation, and thus ascribe an action not to a 'typical cause' (or partial constellation), but to the whole 'field at a given time' in which it takes place. 28 This last is the method preferred by Lewin. In social science we must not allow one method to supplant the other, but let each supplement the other. According to Lewin's 10

OBSERVATIO N S ON FIELD-THEORY I N PHYSICS

definition, the method of the comprehensive field is closer to reality, but the method of pointed abstraction can be used for special purposes,29 and in many cases of 'rationalization' or planning it is extremely useful. 3 Is causality superseded by the 'field' ?

We are not going to try, as Winfried Lohr did in connection with Michotte,30 to describe causality as having been superseded by fieldtheory as a mode of scientific explanation. We feel that the explanation of events by means of their 'conditional genetic field' does not stand in contrast to causality. To some extent this is an argument about terminology, though it has some foundation in fact. 'Field-determination' or 'field-causation' is a more general form of the classical type of causality. An event B is not, as in 'pure causality', caused by an event A; instead event B is produced by a whole series of factors a, b, c, d, e, f, g ... operating simultaneously. More precisely stated: this series of factors constitutes the energyfield F in which these separate factors are infinitesimally incorporated. This composite field, reduced infinitesimally to a point, determines a particular event 'all at once'. In this sense, Lewin's 'field at a given time' (as the cause of an act of thought or behaviour) is, when viewed from the point of view of Maxwell's physics, a value-limit of jointlyoperating causes. On the other hand, it would be false to take two (even if only separated by a millimetre) simultaneous events within a magnetic field and conceive that they themselves stood to one another in some new 'non-causal' form of relationship of mutual determination (somewhat in the manner of Dewey's 'transaction').31 There is no type of mysterious simultaneous linkage between distant events, as has in fact been demonstrated by modern field-physics. That is why in the last section it was so important to stress the introduction of time, even though in most terrestrial matters the speed of light is of no practical significance. In field-physics, too, a present event (and even a present 'field') cannot be explained other than by means of a field in a past point oftime, however immediately previous it may be. Thus there fails to be any essential reason for replacing the relationship of cause and effect (as understood by science) with something of a completely different type. We have here only a more general form of the old cause-and-effect relationship, and it is not superseded by using the method of constellations of forces to reach 'causes'. The concept of 'co variation', which is used in somewhat looser types of 'field-theory' (as for example in Homans),32 is an ancillary construct for cases in which events are looked upon as coupled together, or are assumed to be so; the detailed succession of causes

11

PRESUPPOSITIONS OF FIELD THEORIES

underlying these simultaneous events or the 'field' that is jointly producing them may then be either unknown, or else it may be a succession which it is impossible to present without difficulties that are unreasonable for the purpose of investigation. This concept is very close to 'spurious correlation'.33 We shall, in later sections of this treatise, reckon it amongst the more strictly abstract or 'formal' field-constructs. 34

12

2 Gestalt psychology as field-theory

I Perceptual fields as a starting-point for gestalt theory Wolfgang Kohler, argued that, according to the present-day state of knowledge, a theory of perception must be a field-theory; and he explains his notion of field-theory as follows: Hence we understand that the neurological functions and processes, which are bound up with perceptual processes, are localized in each case in a constant sphere; and that the processes in one part of this sphere exercise an influence on the processes in other regions, this influence being directly dependent on the properties of both in their reciprocal relation. 1 As an example of this principle, Kohler adduces the act of seeing that two similar shapes (in our case, two circles) stand out as belonging together (i.e., forming a pattern) amongst a number of

Ca)

Cb)

Figure 5. An Experiment in Perception (after W. Kohler, Dynamische Zusammenhiinge in der Psychologie, Figures 16 and 17). different kinds of shapes 2 - see Figure 5. Kohler assumes that, in some electrolytic manner, a perception 'emits' a field in the brain, and that this field then operates as a bond for similar shapes, e.g., by combining the act of seeing the dual figures in Figure 5 into a pattern

13

PRESUPPOSITIONS OF FIELD THEORIES

or Gestalt. 3 Kohler also applies these ideas to memory-traces; in Figure 5 observation shows that a previous look at the circles against the more sharply differentiated background (Figure 5b) makes it easier to perceive the pattern against the less differentiated background (Figure 5a). The loutfield' (Umfeld)

The fact that separate percepts must have an 'outfield'4 is deduced by W. Kohler with particular clarity from the following gestaltexperiment: three small squares are under the influence of a stronger field emitted by a large and more strongly-drawn rectangle (Figure 6).

x

Figure 6. An Experiment in Perception. The cross X is the point on which the eyes should be fixed for a few minutes at the beginning of the experiment, in order to get the best results from the observation (after W. Kohler, Dynamische Zusammenhiinge ... , Figure 11). One is forced to recognize that the square inside the strongly-drawn rectangle appears as the smallest and seems to be lying furthest back in space; the adjoining square appears as somewhat more raised and yet as still under the influence of the 'gestalt' of the rectangle. The topmost square is the least affected. 5 Just as a 'gestalt' has a field around it, which influences the surrounding shapes in the picture, so too the constituents of the 'gestaltforming' shape itself have a tendency to build a field about one another. Kohler says:

It was our intention to explain why percepts at a distance have an effect on one another. This is only possible, we assumed (and we followed Faraday in doing so), if the individual percept 14

GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY A S FIELD-THEORY

has a field and if the field, which surrounds a percept, does not merely reveal the presence of this percept but also presents its specific properties. 6

A neuro-physical explanation of the ¢-phenomenon at the sight of movement In practically the same way it is also possible to explain the original basic experiment in gestalt psychology (carried out in 1912): Wertheimer's discovery of the so-called c/>-phenomenon during the sight of movement, which, puzzling as it was for the psychology of the time, is the interpolation of a connecting-link between points of light appearing in the perceptual image of the observer. 7 Petermann 8 offers the following graphic field-presentation as an illustration of Wertheimer's thesis (Figure 7):

Phenomenal sphere

Neurophysical sector

Ex perience :

sector physical

gest~1 t

R1

R1

R1

R1

R1

R1

Die

sector

Die

Sphere of stimUlation

Sim ul taneous

(level of organs of percept ion)

R1 R1

R1

R1

R2

Figure 7. (After Bruno Peterman, Die Wertheimer-, KojJka-, Kohlersche Gestaltstheorie, Figure 1, p. 15.)

In the phenomenal sphere there occur the objective points of light e1 and e2 (in the experiment naturally a whole series eI , e2 , e3' etc., follow swiftly one upon the other). These appear in the neuro-physiological sphere (retina and brain) as the images Al and A2, which then emit a field leading to the interpolation (illusion) of the intermediate cp. FT-B

15

PRESUPPOSITIONS OF FIELD THEORIES

Lewin's application of the principle of physio-psychological isomorphism In an introduction to Lewin's field-theory there is no need to enter in any great detail into a certain physiological field-extension of gestalt psychology. In the next section we shall discuss this basic element in the concept of gestalt. But we must keep firmly in mind the dualistic view which equates mental or perceptual-psychological observation with (underlying) chemical-physical-biological 'real processes', as promulgated by the fathers of gestalt psychologythe principle of isomorphism. 9 Modern neurophysiology ranks the assumptions of Wertheimer, Koffka and Kohler as something approaching probability.IO And yet it can be considered a merit on the part of Lewin that he helped psychological field-theory to achieve its full manreuvrability, even as far as the socio-psychological and sociological spheres, and freed it from being a mere appendage of neurophysiology. It was only once this had been achieved that field-theory could be used as a scientific method in the social sciences. There it naturally plays a part which is by no means without substance or content; but we have already seen in the case of physics that the notion of 'field', even as a metaphor, offered the advantage of penetrating meaningfully into certain force-relationships, although it would be only at a much more advanced stage of investigation that assertions could be made about the substantial reality of these relationships. II Basic features of the notion of totality adopted by gestalt psychology

The two 'Ehren/els criteria' The oldest explicit gestalt-concept is that of 'gestalt-qualities' in von Ehrenfels; 11 this did not have a physiological derivation, but it was still so closely linked with later gestalt psychology that his gestaltcriteria can be applied to the latter. The most important example in von Ehrenfels is that of melody. The essence of a melody lies in its totality, not in its elements. 'The whole is [qualitatively] more than the sum of its parts.' This proposition is the first Ehrenfels criterion. According to Kohler, this is necessary for his own concept of gestalt, but not sufficient. 12 The first Ehrenfels criterion is valid in general for phenomena of dispersion and grouping which cannot be covered by additive summation;13 basically it is also valid for the physical field - at least with Kohler's limitation, to which we shall soon return. The second Ehrenfels criterion, that of 'transponibiIity', does not

16

GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY AS FlELD-THEORY

hold in every case for the field or 'dynamic whole' in social sciences. According to Kohler, it is sufficient but not necessary;14 but it is, generally speaking, applicable to perceptual psychology. A melody, when played in a different key or on different instruments, is recognized as the same melody; a picture, when enlarged or reduced in size, is seen to be the same image. 15

Gestalt and 'organic totality According to Wolfgang Kohler, a special charm of gestalt psychology, and of the way it is founded in logic and epistemology, lies in the fact that here is a mode of knowledge which strikes one as a prototype for use in intellectual sciences, and which should be introduced and tested in experimental science. I6 The fact that man - and probably also the higher animals - is accustomed to perceive by means of related patterns (Gestalten) formed the starting-point for gestalt psychology. The notion of 'gestalt' therefore springs from perceptual psychology.I7 But suppose that we find - e.g., in the case of Wertheimer - totality considered as 'existence of "the meaningful" " as 'viewed outwardly from within', standing opposed to 'what is partial and blindly mechanical', to the 'superficially accidental' elementary analyses, according to the customary scientific method. IS Then we feel that the phenomenological viewpoint of the kind of phenomenologist deriving from Husserl, and the viewpoint of Dilthey and Scheler (and of other sociologists, particularly in Germany)I9 is not accidentally contemporary. Wolfgang Kohler did in fact believe that when he discovered the notion of 'gestalt' he had found the category which brought together natural science and the humanities. He saw the same principle operating in the teleological view of organism adopted in biology, in the physical field, and in the regularities of mental and psychic processes. The fact that, in the cell-growth of primitive organisms, the functions of odd cells are taken over by others, allowed him to argue from the totality and draw an inference about individual behaviour, and this inference he now analogously transferred to other disciplines. The organism-principle was then reinforced by the conviction that field-physical processes underlie the psychic events in the human brain. Functionalism and the field-principle then become reflections of the same fundamental law, ranging from inanimate nature to the highest development of culture, with the organism at its centre. 20 This total picture is fascinating; yet, though valid in parts, it is not really tenable in its full simplification. The question of whether the totalistic 'functioning' of organisms can be traced back to

17

PRESUPPOSITIONS Of fIELD THEORIES

physical fields (or to analogous processes of a physio-chemical type, as Kohler assumed) cannot, in the present state of knowledge, be either refuted or demonstrated. Viewing matters the other way round, it does not seem to us that the basic elements of field-physics contain any necessary implication of functionalistic principles. As Maslow establishes in his criticism of Kohler, the recognition that everything is connected with everything else (which is approximately what the generalized analogy with the physical field will lead to) does not constitute any proof that there is a functional interplay between more distinct totalities, selected by the human understanding. Why precisely should a working-group or a nation be an organism, which functionally determines every individual event within itself? This cannot be convincingly demonstrated. As an assumption, the organism-type functioning of a totality presupposes that it should be proven why this particular 'totality' should 'naturally' belong together in one whole, and why parts of it should not stand to each other in some other relationship of determination, so that different purposive-determinations might contradict one another. 21 There is an inherent danger of producing stereotypic relationships if one describes certain processes with respect to certain totalities as being functional or dysfunctional. The unambiguous (as regards cell-growth) function of certain cells in the maintenance of the organism really only provides a limited explanation when applied to psychic and social processes. Thus Lewin might wish to consider the explanation of psychic processes in totalistic relationships, always conceived purely as a technique for methodological classification, so long as a functional reality-relationship has not really been demonstrated. In any case, a totalistic relationship can permit very different kinds of 'functioning'. It is not the fact that the personality functions as a whole which gives a sufficient explanation for all psychic events; rather it is a question, when it comes to seeking laws, of which psychic spheres were reacting in a more, and which in a less, tightly-bound fashion. 22 Lewin's unit of action, the 'aim-path' or Ziel- Weg (Le., the consciousness of both) for selected psychic situations 23 does not acquire any additional substantiation from the fact that the person is an organism. It must also be mentioned that situations of conflict and tension, as they occupy a central position in Lewin's psychology, must, by virtue of their very disharmony, have a tendency to call forth action without following objective functional goals in every real case. 24 The function of 'fulfilling an aim' really exists primarily in the 'imagination' of the subject, and tends to favour action even in cases where it does not coincide with the 'function' of the 'objective' situation in a system.

18

GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY AS FIELD-THEORY

J. F. Brown describes his own course as 'organismic', in contrast to 'mechanist-atomistic'. But he does not believe in a rationally organic order of society; rather he sees it almost as a chaos filled with conflict. The totalistic view he favours of revolutionary situations of opposition, such as, for example, the power-formation of Fascism, has very little to do with any self-regulating total order. 2:'; In his case, as in the case of most of the 'field-theoreticians' whom we shall go on to discuss, we are concerned with a totalistic-dynamic point of view with a minimum of functional presuppositions. Later on, when we come to discuss the differences between 'theories of structure and function' and 'field-theory', we shall try to work out more precisely the peculiar characteristics of a mode of thinking in terms of power-constellations. First of all, we should like to give a brief sketch of gestalt psychology's idea ofthe 'dynamic totality' or the 'operational system', free from any secondary material involving philosophical preconceptions and assumptions, and in the form in which it served for Lewin as the starting-point for the individual process. III Gestalt as 'operational system', the dynamics of field-theories The notion of gestalt held by Kohler and by the other 'gestalt psychologists' is, as Grelling and Oppenheim have established, to be conceived essentially as a physiologically real field of force or 'operational system'. 26 Intervention at one place also has the effect here of altering the whole; yet the concept, by reason of the linked idea of combinative forces, is no longer so philosophically universal as it is with Ehrenfels. A social order conceived as a rigid structure can be a 'gestalt' in Ehrenfels' sense. A society conceived as a field or operational system is something more. When Myrdal speaks of a 'field of interest', he means that even a social order with the best institutions is capable of being altered as a whole, in accordance with the strength of the interest-forces in it, and does in fact alter in the course of history. This is the essential point of difference that is expressed in the discussion about 'structure' and 'field', as contrasted, for example, with Parsons' 'system'. The static viewpoint is replaced by the 'dynamic' viewpoint. What Kurt Lewin took over from physics and from gestalt psychology was that his 'fields' constitute 'dynamic wholes', even if he does not have recourse to physiology. 'To see the whole before the part' and 'to pay constant attention to the operative forces' might be taken as the key-propositions throughout Lewin's whole work. These are principles that we shall continually be meeting when we come to discuss 'field-theories'. 19

PRESUPPOSITIONS OF FIELD THEORIES

On the notion of ldynamic' adopted by Lewin and the gestalt psychologists In Lewin - and in other psychologists such as Kohler and Maslow 27 - the word 'dynamic' betokens a reference to the sense of dynamis = force, being an interpretation of changes as the result of forces. 28 The 'dynamic' view does not mean that changes take place in every case. As with Myrdal, so also with Lewin - the forces can remain in equilibrium for a time. There can also be a field of energy elements which do not result in movements until other factors enter in - as in field-physics. It is important to say this, because in economics (although forces qua forces are considered here) 'dynamic theory' has taken on the character of explicating the termination of movements, or to speak more precisely: the explication of movement by differential calculus, in contrast to the explication of movement by means of 'comparative statics' (which takes an intermediate place between 'dynamics' and 'statics').29 As viewed by field· theory, 'dynamics' also embraces a part of statics (components of energy and equilibrium); but since it also includes the viewpoint of 'force' or 'energy' it must always be distinguished from pure 'structural theory'.

20

3 Basic assumptions of Lewin's topological psychology: psychological field-theory, part one

I Totality and the discovery of law: Lewin's 'Galilean Principle'

Dismissal of the aristotelian ens In the last section of the previous chapter we emphasized the aspect of totality in gestalt- and field-theory. At first sight this seems to conflict with Lewin's concept of law - one which he himself called 'galilean' .1 Lewin blames traditional - or as he calls it, 'aristotelian' - psychology for selecting the individual person as a final and indissoluble unit in attempts at generalization. To say that the individual person is the final unit in psychology is just as untrue as in the case of the atom in physics (which used to be described as 'indivisible'). In psychology, too, one must go back to less substantial units. Generalizations such as 'all children' have never led to laws; in the same way, Galileo would never have arrived at his law of free fall if he had made use of the generalization 'all stones'.2 Psychological laws are probably founded on events and forces which cannot be handled as simple qualities of all persons in general; on the contrary it is only their variability in different persons and different situations that makes them recognizable as subject to law. To name a few generalizing processes which are outside the individual person in the aristotelian sense: frustration and its consequences, the laws of perception, learning processes and the like, but not on the other hand concepts such as 'all men with a certain definite colour of hair or skin'. Innate abilities eventually become components of variation among others.

21

PRESUPPOSITIONS OF FIELD THEORIES

AM/ym and then totality This leads in the direction of dissecting the individual person rather than viewing him as a totality. Yet it is possible to combine the abovedescribed method of finding a law with the attention paid by fieldtheory to relations of dynamic totality; this combination led to Lewin's fruitful experiments, which also bore many results applicable in psychology, and hence also to a verification of the concept of field-theory.3 Analysis in the fullest sense presumes a prior realization of the total situation of the thing to be analysed. For his concept offield, Lewin takes over a definition of Einstein's: 'A totality of coexisting facts, which are conceived of as mutually dependent is called afield.'4 This is the fundamental principle of the mode of procedure in field-theory; to put it another way: 'Behaviour has to be derived from a totality of coexisting facts .... ' 5 This is another special reason why in the following pages we make full use of the method of representing field-situations as transposed into spatial terms. Even under great disruption the human personality is a totality and reacts as a whole. The personality can at the same time be viewed as structured from within and, which is even more important for our methods, as linked outside in any form at all with the environment. The totality, the 'individual person', is imbedded in other relations of interdependence, and it is in these that we must look for the source of the laws of field-theory.6 In what follows we can only enter into a few basic concepts and touch on a few examples indicating the mode of application. Our presentation will concentrate on the concept offield as an intellectual approach or demonstration-model. II Lewin's 'topology of bodological space' or path-space

Remark The 'fields' of psychology and social science are in many ways similar to those in physics;7 but they are not so similar that the modes of reaction, the field-structure and the mathematical foundations could simply be transferred. One may look upon them as less regular and less straightforward as regards the sources and media of force. 8 It is for this reason that we avoided introducing any formulre into our preface on physics. We now intend to give some hints on the mathematical theory of space and on Lewin's 'topology' (or rather his theory of 'path-space', his 'hodological space') in order to facilitate as far as possible our own and his further discussion of the subject. We shall only deal

22

LEWIN'S TOPOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY

cursorily with the way in which the vector presentation of 'fields' departs from real mathematical topology, and we shall later discuss the vector presentation in more detail. We intend to deal in detail only with one special theory of Lewin's of a topological type, the elaboration of dynamic relations of belongingness (a further development of the idea of weak and strong gestalten); besides serving as an introduction to figurative spatial thinking, this is fundamental for sociological field-theory. In the first place, it is chiefly a matter of being able to think in terms of fields and field-concepts, and of being able to have an idea of field-relations. Only this will enable one to analyse a complex reality successfully in terms of laws, if one is to give an adequate idea of the regularities. Before men could make the simplest9 calculation of the courses of the planets it was necessary for them first of all to think in terms of the heliocentric system. For modern fieldphysics it was necessary to think of energies in fluids or of a space permeated with energy, a space which solely or largely determines the reactions perceptible in particles of matter according to relative situation,speed, etc. lOIn the sphere of social psychology and sociology we adopt the analogous idea of interdependence-relations in the form of a field as the primary requirement. 'Space' is a mathematical system of axioms just like any other, and many events can be expressed in algebra and many 'in space'. On account of the human consciousness of space, figurative spatial representations have the advantage of a certain vividness; thus men of Faraday's type, who can think of processes more easily in pictorial than in mathematical terms,11 offer a unique approach to theoretical thinking. What is 'topology'?

Topology is also called analysis situs. 12 Fundamentally, the essence of 'spaces' consists in making such an analysis of positions possible. 'Spatially' all logical constructs are concerned with positional relationships.13 Physical space is infinitesimally metric (as we saw for instance in Maxwell's procedure), all values in the scale from zero to infinity can be applied to it and measured. But there is also a mathematical theory of space which is concerned with non-metric spaces, and today this is generally known as 'topology'. From a topological point of view, for example, the three diagrams in Figure 8 are similar to one another. In all three the point a belongs to an inner region which is separated by a Jordan curve b 14 from the surrounding region; in other words, this is a relation which is not affected by so-called 'point-to-point transformations' in plane

23

PRESUPPOSITIONS OF FIELD THEORIES

figures with different measurements. Similar conversions may be made when the surfaces of bodies are changed into plane polygons in the more general 'topology of surfaces'Y' Abstract algebraic topology goes as far as the nth dimension - in degrees of generality which extend as far as the limits of human

a a

a

b

b

b

Figure 8. (After J. F. Brown, Psychology and the Social Order, Figure 1, p. 48.)

understanding; the spaces finally become sets of numbers, or points, or else classes divided into sub-classes, i.e., they are assigned or not assigned to certain definite criteria 16 which are only very distantly related to 'spaces' in the visual sense. This very general theory of position contains no measurements; it is the theory of non-metric spaces. Theoretically, it would be quite conceivable to arrange psychological or social subject-matter in such a way that the axiomatic propositions of topology would apply. H1 For this, all assertions in positional relationships would have to be translated, e.g., as a psychological path-situation to the effect that a Path P, P2

P2

p 1

A

B C

(a)

C

P2

P1

A

C

(b)

Figure 9.

point in region C could only be reached from a point in region A by traversing region BY In topology, routes or 'paths' are used as criteria for the connectedness or non-connectedness of regions (a 'region' is any part of a space)18 - we shall later be dealing with their psychological significance. Thus in Figure 9a, for example, the regions A and C (surrounding points PI and P 2) are connected; in Figure 9b they are not connected.

24

LEWiN'S TOPOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY

Frontiers of what is permissible for genel'al topology

In general topology (which might also be called the algebra of relationships) it is not permissible to include any metric statements at all, for instance statements concerning the size of vectors or the strength of barriers; either there is a connection or there is not. On the frontiers of what is permissible we might place the introduction of directions and of ordinal systems, e.g., stratification, or Chipman's 'lexigraphic arrangement'.19 When HofsHitter reproaches Lewin for misusing the term 'topology',20 he is referring to the impermissibility of directional vectors and statements of size. The introduction of a metric size invalidates the transformability of figures as a presupposition of topological generalization. We shall return to this when discussing Figure 11. 21 The introduction of directions, so long as they are not fixed according to metric systems of co-ordinates, is compatible with most propositions in general topology. The only thing lacking is the reciprocity of the relation, with the result that general topological statements based on it no longer hold good; yet the same thing happens in algebraic topology, namely with the direction from one class of numbers (when carrying out certain operations) to another class, e.g., from real to complex numbers. 22 On account of direction Lewin did, in any case, try to create for himself a special psychological 'topology', and we intend to deal with this in greater detail. Observation on Lewin's idea of space

With regard to Lewin's idea of space, it should be remarked that he largely links up with topology as a general theory of space, approximately as it was at the time when he was a student and a young lecturer; this involved the consciousness of freedom which Riemann gave to spatial thinking. 23 Lewin developed and refined his own idea of space independent of the line of development in algebraic topology at the time, although there is an apparently similar use of algebraic symbols. If he now and then refers to mathematical topology, this is generally in order to defend figurative spatial thinking. 24 Lewin's 'hodological space' is in many ways very close to mathematical topology; it is occasionally possible to transfer models from one to the other. By his choice of terminology (particularly in formulre), and by striving for logical precision in it, Lewin constantly tried to encourage this possibility for further mathematical process. 25 In my opinion, Lewin's hodological space constitutes something

25

PRESUPPOSITIONS OF FIELD THEORIES

intermediate between topological and metric space, capable in individual cases of being extended in either direction according to the possibilities of the particular psychological experiment under consideration.

Hodological space, the space o!'paths' Lewin's space is structured; so is topological space in a certain sense. The paths in the latter have no direction, while those in Lewin's 'path-space' do have the directions 'forwards' and 'backwards'.26 Of course with psychological paths one is generally concerned with cases that are not reversible. 27 Intellectual movement along a path (locomotion)28 also usually changes the total structure of the intellectual field, as one sees from changes in 'cognitive structure' through continuous experience. Processes of a dynamic type, which we are now concerned with, are not of any significance for mathematical topology. For this reason Lewin was forced to diverge from mathematical topology as it is at the present time, in just the same way as field-physics cannot follow the general lines of topology, however useful these may occasionally be to it. According to J. F. Brown, Lewin's hodological space is a 'dynamic space-construct'.29 Brown (following Lewin) characterizes general hodological space as 'structured to a limited degree', in contrast, for instance, to physical space which is infinitesimally structured, and which in Lewin's theory of space features as 'special hodological space'.so Points are characterized by the region in which they lie. P2 p1

P3 P4

Figure 10. From the point of view of Plo the points P 2 , P 3 and P, are all similarly accessible, or hodologically identical. More

accurately speaking, they are in the same direction. 31

Regions are arranged in such a way that they can be denoted by directions (as regards their relation to one another). This representation does not occur in mathematical topology, but it has proved itself to be of great use in psychological topology on the following pragmatic grounds: itis rather difficult to divide psychological spaces empirically and fairly exactly into regions; to make an infinitesimal division down as far as points has not been possible hitherto, nor is it generally meaningful. On the other hand, the

26

LEWIN'S TOPOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY

degree or generality must not be taken so far as in mathematical topology. Lewin's topology is characterized by a limited degree of fineness in structurization together with the simultaneous use of directions in relationships (at least in relation to the 'general pathspace'). This distinguishes his topology from physical space and also from the algebraic-topological theories of sets of points,32 while at the same time it brings it closer to structures of a gestalt type as they exist in fields of perception or systems of reference according to H. Helson and W. Witte. 33 Clumge of model by 'distinguished paths' and metric vectors

The paths in Lewin's hodological space are always to be viewed in connection with so-called psychological 'locomotions', and must not be confused with the topological paths of mathematical topology, which are only a kind of measure for spatial belongingness or the necessary crossing of boundaries. In any particular case, the 'distinguished' path34 follows the shortest route (judged by consumption of time, space or energy) or is subject to other criteria appropriate to the particular psychological model; these are usually 'dynamic'. The introduction of such an arrangement - just like the introduction of power-vectors that were only approximately definite as regards direction and size - makes it unavoidable in the occasional case taken from psychology or sociology to renounce further development into general topology. A space then remains which largely corresponds to the physical one. 35 The 'circle' in Figure II, which corresponds topologically to a ql1adrilateral, a polygon. or some other region enclosed by a Jordan

=

Figure J J. curve, is unequivocally and unalterably fixed as a shape, as soon as a directed 36 vector of some definite magnitude occurs inside it. Even the neighbouring regions become fixed in their relative or absolute location. A new kind of model appears which is no longer topological in the general sense - and this implies no kind of value-judgment, since this model is better suited to the particular purpose of the psychological or social investigation than a general topological one would be.

27

PRESUPPOSITIONS OF FIELD THEORIES

Where measurement can be utilized, it would constitute a retrograde step in knowledge to proceed in a general topological fashion.s7 Lewin's topology between 'gestalt' and metric space

Anyone who has dealt with the psychological notion of gestalt is bound to find it a puzzling omission in mathematical topology that the specific element of a relationship, the 'gestalt' (one thinks for example of Wertheimer's 'point-shapes' or Punktgestalten,38 as in Figure 12) has no relevance in the 'general algebraic theory of space'. Even a 'lexical order' of sets of points, such as that in Chipman's 'topology of utility',a9 does not wholly embrace the gestalt, in spite

Figure 12. A gestalt of points, before and after a transformation has been carried out in accordance with the conditions for similarity of gestalt. 40

of the constant order of relations in the outcome. It only follows the Ehrenfels criterion of transponibility; it does not embrace the 'whole which is more than the sum of its parts', and what it does include is almost unreasonably complicated. The relationship of 'gestalt' also appears to some extent in Lewin's structured spaces in the figurative sense (structure of personality, structure of life-space), which can contain fields of vectors. 41 These figures are not properly metric in a real sense (at least in my opinion, since they contain no absolute magnitudes), and in any case they do not really belong to general topology. One cannot help thinking that a geometry of angles and relations, in the manner of normal euclidean geometry, would really be adequate for this; nor do we need any 'higher' topology in order to follow Lewin's demonstrations. It is often simply not possible to elaborate a parallelogram of forces from the direction-resultants; this does not always lie in the possible arrangement of the space-spheres, since for instance a chosen arrangement cannot be generalized for all conceivable criteria. Thus in Figure 13, for example, it is not possible to make a direct summation of the vector-directions towards regions A and C (e.g., two psychological goal-regions) and conclude from this a resultant psychological movement towards B.

28

LEWIN'S TOPOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY

In the case of Lewin's space-models, one is generally dealing with relatively simple 'structures', which are basically extensions of the perceptual idea of gestalt. Lewin is really concerned with a method of representating 'relations between the parts and the whole, and changes in the distance or direction',42 as a heuristic method for use in psychological theories. This does not require the degree of generality present in mathematical topology or its subtle possibilities for transformation, for these would destroy the gestalt-relations. They do have common elements with the origins of mathematical topoA

B

C

Figure 13. logy,43 but not to the same extent with recent refinements of it. The same is true of the notation of algebraic symbols, which Lewin shares with the logic of Carnap; but, as regards the degree of complexity, he did not follow the recent algebra of relations any more closely than was useful for the figurative spatial representation of psychological subject-matter. 44 On the other hand, HofsHitter's statement that Lewin's topology has nothing in common with mathematical topology except the name, is somewhat exaggerated. 45 In both cases one is concerned with 'theories of space' (the name 'topology' does not of course mean anything more than this) which do possess something in common, especially in their origins. The symbols of the algebra of relations can also be applied in sociological structure-theories. The differences between the field-theories of Lewin, or those derived from physics on the one hand and the 'structure-theories' on the other, do not lie so much in the structural foundations; they lie rather in the combination of structural ideas with a structure-changing dynamic in the case of Lewin and other field-theorists, in contrast to the 'structuremaintaining' function evident in most theoreticians of 'structure'. III The theory of the dynamic part-whole relationship Weak and strong gestalten

Without wishing to anticipate Lewin's later doctrine of dynamic part-whole relations,46 it does seem appropriate to make some reference here to its origins in gestalt psychology. The idea of weak and

29

PRESUPPOSITIONS OF FIELD THEORIES

strong gestalten causes the doctrine of relations in gestalt theory to pass over into a consideration of forces, and this must necessarily be very different from a pure doctrine of relations in topological space, or even in a space of paths and relations. Kurt Lewin talks about smaller strong gestalten (gestalten of an intensive dynamic homogeneity) within the psychic context, which form parts of more comprehensive weak gestalten (gestalten with a weak dynamic solidarity). More important perhaps than the statement that everything psychic is related, is the question of what kind of 'structurization' there may be in dynamic wholes of different strengths.4.7 This thought-process holds just as much in field-physics, though here it must be understood entirely in a figurative sense. One might for example imagine a small intensive electrical field inside a large weak magnetic field. In a similar way, perhaps, different dynamic 'structures of effect' are contained inside one another. If we wish to make a precise statement about how the regions of a person fit together, and how a person with different regions fits into a life-space, we must first come to terms with Lewin's theory of dynamic wholes.4.8 These reflections will also turn out to be useful later on in connection with the ingroup-outgroup distinctions and other examples in sociology and social psychology.4.g We combine into a 'whole' certain spheres which are more dependent upon one another than any of themis on some sphere outside this whole. 50 In Figure 14 the whole W includes the regions A and B, they depend more on one another than they do upon unspecified regions w b

a

c A

B

Figure 14. (After K. Lewin, Field Theory . .. , Figure 64, p. 316.) around. The spatial juxtaposition, as in the figurative spatial meaning of any other model, does not constitute an assumption of this. If the cells a, band c inside A are more dependent on one another than anyone of them is on B, then A can be treated meaningfully as a whole (as a 'sub-whole', so to speak, within a more comprehensive totality, corresponding to sub-classes and classes in algebra). 51

Differentiation The conversion value to unity is the degree of differentiation. Thus it is convenient to divide a whole up into regions or cells, if the differences (or the degree of mutual independence) between points 30

LEWIN'S TOPOLOG 1(" AL PSYCHOLOGY

on both sides of a bouudary drawn in between are greater than between points inside a cell which is formed in this way. 52 The facts may best be represented by taking a cross-section through a whole, which has a varying degree of differentiation in its regions and cells. The height of the 'barriers' between the cells in the diagrammatic cross-section (centre of Figure 15) or the thickness of the lines in the plane diagram (top of Figure 15) show the degree of difference or independence between any two neighbouring cells. The question of whether these barriers may be crossed (i.e., how far they offer obstruction to locomotions in psychological examples) is not the concern of this diagram.

Reactibility as a criterion of 'dynamic' homogeneity To get right to the heart ofthe matter, we shall now introduce Lewin's decisive criterion for dependence or independence: it is the degree to which cells or regions react to changes in other cells or regions, especially neighbouring ones. This was to be expected, after the earlier remarks on the subject of 'field' and 'dynamic whole'. A degree of change Ch is laid down; beneath this strength changes do not take effect on neighbouring spheres, or are infinitesimally weak and can therefore be ignored. Thus in Figure IS, with a Ch below the strength w (w = weak), we find a large number of differentiated cells; with a Ch greater than w these would react together as a large unified sphere. The more

1'Whole' 3 Regions 11 Cells

Figure 15. (After K. Lewin, Field Theory . .. , Figures 55, 61 and 66, pp. 307, 312, and 314.)

31

PRESUPPOSITIONS OF FIELD THEORIES

delicate the processes are which we wish to take into account, the more differentiated our whole may be; whereas in the case of very crude changes, the actual totality that we are dealing with may no longer be separated from the environment. 53

More concerning 'totality': natural and organized totality What has been said above makes it easier to grasp the concept of simple or natural unity or totality. For every totality in the sense specified, there is a maximal value of change (Chmax), below which the totality reacts separately from the environment. It is necessary to distinguish between the natural unity and the organizational unity of a whole. The criterion of this (organizational dependence: org. dep.) is the power of one (or several) principalregion(s), over a number of subordinate or instrumental-regions (head- and tool-regions according to Lewin). 'Organizational dependence' is unilateral, in contrast to natural or simple dependence (which was the sense implied hitherto). From an intra-personal point of view the concept of 'organizational unity' is used for self-control, and in cases where several persons are involved it is used to express predominance and power-relationships. In a discussion of social or political circumstances Lewin's formula org. uni. (W)

=

F(n(~»)

(where n(h) means the number of independent heads) proves very interesting; for example, 'the degree of organizational unity of a whole is inversely related to the number of independent leaders'. Following democratic procedure, a group of leaders can be combined in one policy-determining part of the whole. Lewin compares this form of organizational unity with the organizational type of more harmonious and easy-going persons. 54 This view is a little too harmonic, but the formula seems to me a very good characterization of the degree of democracy or 'polyarchy' in Dahl and Lindblom's sense (see Chapter 9). In general it may also be said that it clearly depends on the interests and criteria of the particular investigator as to which part of the infinite number of processes and relations concerned with interdependence in the real world he chooses to select as a 'totality', a 'syndrome', or whatever he wants to call it, and whether and in what manner he draws any boundaries. 55

32

LEWIN'S TOPOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY

IV Introduction to the figurative spatial representation of 'person' and 'life-space'

Internal structurization of the Iperson' A simple topological, figuratively spatial, representation of the person, is the basic three-fold division employed by Kurt Lewin and Tamara Dembo,56 into: (1) central layers of the personality; (2) more peripheral layers or spheres; and (3) the so-called 'motorperceptual region'. This last acts as a boundary zone between the person and the environment. Normally there is a close relation between more peripheral movements of the personality and the motor movements of the

M

-+-+---pL

cL ~

Ca)

Cb)

Figure 16. Structure of the Person, with and without Tension (after K. Lewin, Principles of Topological Psychology, Figure 42, p. 181).

M = motor-perceptual region pL = peripheral layers cL = central layers body. The boundary between these regions is therefore drawn in faintly in the diagram; on the other hand the boundary between the peripheral and the central regions is marked in more heavily (Figure 16a). In the event of strong internal tension (excitement and a contrary tendency towards self-restraint) the boundary between the motor zone and the inner feelings can become stronger, and so also can the exterior boundary between the person and the environment. The motor region (distracting chatter, smiling, etc.) then becomes more of a separation from, than a link with, the environment. It is even possible for the person to shut himself off completely from the environment, e.g., as children do by hiding (see Figure 16b). The more fully developed a personality is, the more differentiated it becomes, i.e., the more numerous and diverse are the regions in it. In a state of excitement the differentiation can regress, and one then

33

PRESUPPOSITIONS OF fiELD THEORIES

speaks of 'primitivation' of the person - see Figure 16b and Figure

25b.

A child in the first month of life is still very little differentiated. Feelings, wishes and bodily movements comprise as it were a unity. Only after the third month, perhaps, are the limbs used in a consciously different fashion. 57 Even the distinction between person and environment, viewed from the point of view of the consciousness of the person, is a stage in the differentiation of personality. As we go on we shall examine G

RO

BE

RO PhB

Figure 17. (After Kurt Koffka, Principles 0/ Gestalt Psychology, p. 40, taken from K. Lewin, Principles a/Topological Psychology, Figure 7, p. 77.) Interpretation in the text.

more closely the subjective environment (it is an essential concept of Lewin's to give this a topological representation as 'life-space') as well as the position occupied by the person inside it. Koffka offers a conceptual model of the relationship between the person and the environment 5B (Figure 17). Although this is not entirely accepted by Lewin, it does seem useful as an introduction. G is the geographical or ecological environment, i.e., it is independent of the thought of the person. This produces in the perceptual organs, e.g., the retina, the behavioural environment B.E. In consciousness this evokes the phenomenal behaviour Ph B; I would say this refers to local orientation, aesthetic feelings, etc. Finally this last gives rise to the real behaviour RB, which in its turn reacts on the environment and takes place there. In Koffka's view the unit which supports the whole process is the real organism RO, which includes perception, consciousness and behaviour. Lewin, on the other hand, throws the emphasis on the perceived environment as a unit of extended consciousness. For the most part men do not act in the world as it is, but as they perceive it. This world as perceived and felt, including the self-awareness of the person (P in Figure 18), constitutes the 'life-space'. In our subsequent reflections this will form the standard unit;59 wherever necessary the real organism and the real environment will be introduced as an ecological framework. 34

LEWIN'S TOPOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY

it is in the subjective environment, which can be differentiated ever more closely, that all real possibilities for action on the part of the person are to be found. P

ls E P

Figure 18. A Simplified Picture of the' Life-Space'. E = psychological environment60 P = the person Ls = life-space The behaviour of a person is a function F of the condition of the person P and the environment E: B = F(P, E) According to Lewin's definition, the life-space Ls embraces both the person and the (subjective) environment, so that Lewin can also formulate: B = F(Ls) i.e., behaviour is a function of the life-space. 61 Differentiation of the life-space, and movement of the person inside it

The differentiation of the life-space, apart from the person in the narrower sense as hitherto - in Figure 16 it is undifferentiated as E - is carried out on the same topological basis as with the person. For a non-psychologist it is even slightly easier to accomplish. Regions of the external life-space (Ls outside the region P) consist, for example, of: family life, occupation, recreation, etc., as viewed subjectively by the person, whose inner characteristics are reflected in the manner in which he perceives his life-space. Closely related to the life-space are the cognitive structure and value-structure of the person. One important tool for representing human 'acts' in the life-space is the so-called 'locomotion', Such acts also include intellectual acts and changes in evaluation, in so far as these do not alter the actual regional structure. If I move from my home to my place of work, even if only in thought, then my Ego performs a locomotion in my life-space from

35

PRESUPPOSITIONS OF FIELD THEORIES

region H to region O. Ideas of movement in the life-space are represented as instantaneous configurations, so that the diagrams are comparatively static (Figure 19a = before, Figure 19b = after). 62 O

H

R

P) (a)

H

?J

O

R (b)

Figure 19. A Psychological Change of Situation in the Life-Space (Locomotion). P = Ego (or 'person') H = home o = occupation or job R = recreation, hobby or club Regarding the constellations of forces leading to a locomotion (we may anticipate by describing this as the 'field'), we shall have more to say in the following chapter.

36

4 Basic assumptions of Lewin's dynamic psychology: psychological field-theory, part two

I

'Field at a given time' and 'time-perspective'

'Life-space at a given time'

Lewin was in a certain conflict with the psychology of his time, and this difference of opinion may prove instructive for present-day sociology. At times he strove for stricter scientific thinking in accordance with laws as against psychological concepts of essence (Wesens-Begrijfe); 1 at other times he ranged himself with the gestalt psychologists in favour of totalistic thinking as against partial explanations (in concrete terms, particularly against the so-called stimulus-response theories).2 He therefore had to emphasize that man, and also the higher animals, though these lie more in Wolfgang Kohler's sphere of interest,3 aspires to interconnected goals, as is shown particularly in interruption experiments. 4 Thus Lewin reached the conclusion that action was to be derived from totalistic 'systems of stress'. 5 This points to a kind of pattern of stress within human psychic life as the source of action, leading to a kind of theory of constellations of forces, and a temporal view of a sequence of actions leading to relations. In the sense used by Lewin, a closed system is a 'gestalt'6 not only by reason of its simultaneous operative relations but also in a temporal connection; as examples we may quote a unit of wish-fulfilment or the psychological totality of a game of chess. In the time dimension, Figure 20 shows a closed system of the specified type from t - n to t + n; it embraces the situations St-n to SHn, but not, however, S'.7 The passage of time is like a river. Any situational cross-section embraces a 'field at a given time' in an infinitely small duration of time. Any action and any intellectual act in a moment is conditioned

37

Dimensions of the field

PRESUPPOSITIONS OF FIELD THEORIES St-n

St

S t +A t

St+n

LAt

S'

L=Ax x At

t-n

t t+At

t+n

Time

Figure 20. (Based on K. Lewin, Field Theory . .. , Figures 1 and 2, pp. 46 and 51.) by the situational field existing at an infinitely close instant previous to it. The situational field St determines as a whole the action ('locomotion') L. The more distant past or future (within the psychological durational-totality of the closed system) is mentally referred at any moment to the momentary field St; i.e., it is only relevant for the action in so far as it operates 'here and now'. The movement :: (locomotion

L.it

of the point x during the short time ilt) is a

function of the situational field St

~: =

F(St).8

This idea of a limiting value is a kind of ideal conception 9 in fieldtheory; it is the pictorial expression of how one can determine the strength of the floor of a room - not from the constructional details of ten years ago, but from a direct observation of its present condition. 10 In our introduction to 'locomotion' we saw a representation oftwo instantaneous records following one upon the other (Figures 19a and b). The division into spheres need not have been transferred without alteration from Figures 19a to 19b, for during this moment it was probably changed to a greater or lesser extent. Every new experience brings a change in the subjective perception and idea of 'the world in which we live', namely in the subjective life-space. Such a restructuring of the life-space can occur without action L; in addition it has already been established from the field-concept, that the slightest movement of a point x alters the field as a whole. For this reason it is not possible to analyse together the situational framework (the field St as a determinant of action) and the passage of time. 11 Differentiation of the life-space in reality and unreality, present, past andfuture

Lewin was also in conflict with Freudian psychiatry, particularly with the over-emphasis it laid upon childhood experiences, specifically

38

LEWIN'S DYNAMIC PSYCHOLOGY

the Oedipus complex, as exerting a determining influence on grownups. Unlike the latter he followed the economic pattern in discounting more distant past events as against the present, or more recent past, and he introduces purposeful thinking about the future as a further determining variable affecting action,12 Moreover, it turned out to be meaningful if, in the 'subjective world' (which is of course the lifespace), one also differentiated the subjective record of levels of increasing consciousness ofreality or unreality (wish and fear).13 We have already mentioned that 'differentiation' normally increases steadily from early childhood to adulthood, and certainly I

I

I

R

R R

More distant

Person's past

Person's present

Person's future

More distant

Figure 21. 'Time-Perspectives' (after K. Lewin, Field Theory, . " Figure 38, p. 246). R = the (subjective) level of reality J = the (subjective) level of irreality within the person and life-space in close harmony. In addition to becoming more differentiated according to spheres in the usual sense, e.g., for different possibilities of action, the life-space also becomes more differentiated as regards the distinction between reality and unreality and as regards the time-perspective (see Figure 21). Linked with the time-perspective is the concept of a 'referred gratification pattern' in economics, e.g., the diminishing value of gains in the distant future,14 and the 'level of aspiration' which we shaH discuss later (Chapter 16). The whole representation in Figure 21 is concerned with the present thought (or feeling, or after-effect and effect of hope and expectation) about the past, the future, the real and the less real; it does not cover any passage of time. It should not be confused with the time-dimension in Figure 20: Figure 21 concerns a single situational field S in the course of the real passage of events. One can think about the effects of all levels of consciousness upon the present field of action within the 'present level of reality' concentrated in a situation of stress (cf. Figure 87). Different degrees of past and future may be distinguished by intellectually normal adults. The picture of the past and of the future appear, as they become more distant from the present, to be increasingly simplified and less differentiated structurally, At the

39

PRESUPPOSITIONS OF FIELD THEORIES

same time the reality-plane R and the irreality-plane I come increasingly closer together. The difference, which is relatively sharp in the case of mentally healthy adults, is rendered increasingly difficult and unclear by distance from the present.

II Introduction to several basic constructs of vector psychology Prefatory remark on Lewin's 'psychological field offorces' The theoretical representation of a person or life-space as dynamic totalities or wholes in the previous chapter belonged to field-theory in Lewin's sense. But his sense of 'field', as he uses it in the narrower sense of 'field of tension' or often also of 'field of conflict' (and this is generally

Ca)

(b)

Figure 22. Structure and the Vector Field. (a) Structure of the life-space ; (b) 'Quasi-physical force-field'. what we shall mean by 'field' in the future), is something which we shall only be able to understand clearly, if we introduce vectors into the life-space. In simple terms, we can conceive that the cognitive and perceptual structure of the life-space of a man (which is 'totally dynamic' or, according to Lewin's rather too loose concept of field, belongs to field-theory 15 - Figure 22a) is overlaid by a 'field' of volitional forces and inner impulses of a different kind (as in Figure 22b),16 which we can represent to ourselves as the physical vectorplan of a force-field. This separation into a kind of basic structure and a superimposed 'near-physical' vector-field may strike one at first as arbitrary; but, as we shall see, it does turn out to be appropriate. As with the modelconstructs in economics for example, it is now possible for certain of the variables to be fixed, and for those which are specially interesting to be abstracted and varied. 17 Although it is not possible to deal simultaneously with the structure and the forces altering the structure, yet they can be grasped concurrently in the same topological dynamic construct.

40

LEWIN'S DYNAMIC PSYCHOLOGY

Force and locomotion We may best begin our introduction to vector-psychology, which is a further mode of representation in dynamic psychology,18 with the familiar construct of 'movement within the psychological space' or 'locomotion', which is shown simply as a human act represented on the subjective reality-plane of the present. In our introductory description oflocomotion - with the constructs discussed at that stage it was only possible to give an incomplete description of it as an 'act' 19 - we really left out something: namely, I FPB FAB

P A

B C

Figure 23. 'Locomotion'. L = Locomotion the force behind the movement. Now we shall not simply say, like amateur depth-psychologists: 'Those are the impulses,' nor like amateur economists: 'Aha, the economic motive!' Instead we shall use the model to analyse situations in an unbiased manner. This is a very good example of the real value of Lewin's method of fieldtheory. Until we are dealing with a precise experimental situation, nothing whatsoever is said about the motives for action or the qualities of the participant(s). Only the following theoretical generalizations can be reached: a movement is caused by a force f (in the diagram movement is shown by a dotted line, and the force by a firmly-drawn vector). The force!, which lies behind an action, is part of a field and can be a resultant drawn from many components; it has a definite strength, which corresponds to the length of the vector as drawn in the diagram. In our case (Figure 23) the direction of the force is from region A to region B; so we call it fA,B, or in terms of 10comotion/p,B, because it operates on the person P, who is in the region A to begin with, and in the direction of B.

The 'vector-field' in connection with 'valences' Let us recall the physical field (in particular, the centripetal and centrifugal field) and let us also remember the basic idea behind Maxwell's equations: namely, that the field of energy is in space, even when no bodies subject to the field are contained in this space. The vectors in the diagram show, in accordance with Maxwell's

41

PRESUPPOSITIONS OF FIELD THEORIES

equations in physics, how forces in different parts of the field will operate on a body that happens to be there (Figure 24). The field of a person's life-space, i.e., the forces operating therein, is adjusted by means of a valence. The special attractive-force of a region in a man's life-space, e.g., love of his work, produces similarly-orientated forces in other regions of his life-space. Lewin F

E

D

FD,V

E

V+

P

FP,V

D

F V-

A

B

B

Ca) (a)

FP,v-

P A

(b) (b)

Figure 24. (After K. Lewin, Field Theory . .. , Figures 43 and 44, pp. 256 and 257.) (a) Positive central force-field; (b) Negative central force-field. says that a sphere in the life-space which particularly attracts us has a positive valence (V +, Figure 24a). Something which we fear or avoid permeates our whole subjective world; it has a negative valence (V -, Figure 24b). 20 Here we can see how viewing things in terms of life-space has greater possibilities than the Freudian way of over-emphasizing Jibido. Perceptual or factual stimuli from outside can be embraced on equal terms. HI Tension and conflict in the life-space

Field in the life-space on the basis of a situation which produces anger Tamara Demb0 21 gives an example ofthe way in which a field in the life-space operates on the inner structure of a person. It concerns the arousing of tension in a whole life-space as a result of anger, and the resultant primitivation of the person. The positive valence, the goal striven for, is surrounded in this case by a barrier,22 which bears a negative charge,23 as in Figure 25a. The goal that is sought is unattainable, which angers the person to such an extent that finally not only the barrier, but even 'the entire life' appears to bear a negative charge. In Tamara Dembo's example only the 'ultimate core of the Self' remains healthy and unaffected. 42

LEWIN'S DYNAMIC PSYCHOLOGY

+

+ (a)

(b)

Figure 25. (Based on T. Dembo, Arger als dynamisches Problem, Figures 18 and 19, pp. 109 and 110 - we have taken this from Lewin, A Dynamic Theory of Personality, p. 266. In our Figure 25(b) we have supplemented the new negative valences by providing corresponding additional vectors.) (a) Starting position; (b) Situation of tension.

Some problems in field-theory: a situation of inner conjlkt, tension as the result of a barrier, and the spread of excitement This example leads to several problems in field-theory. (a) Situations of 'inner' conflict. Figure 25a is an example of a situation of psychic conflict: a positive and a negative valence exert opposing forces on a person. This does not give rise to nothing at all, but to a state of inner tension. 24 (b) Tension as the result of a barrier. A barrier is some obstacle or other, which prevents a psychological change of location or locomotion (an internal check, ecological restriction or social hindrance). The negative charge, i.e., repulsive force, is not contained in the concept of 'barrier' ; in .our example anger may cause it to provide an additional element of Hindrance. (c) The spread of excitement. Thirdly and most important of all, the above example ought to provide a model and pattern for the way of viewing a totality in field-theory. One may compare the spread of exasperation over a person's whole SUbjective world with what was said on p. 31 (Figure 15) regarding 'dynamic totalities'. There is quite a large number of social examples of this - also under the name of 'syndrome'; one may think of a wife on whom the husband releases his anger from the office, or the anti-semitism fostered by lack of success, and other similar examples. 23

Fields of conflict Conflict situations arise by reason of overlapping (mutually opposed) fields offorce. In the context of his special example Lewin talks about

43

PRESUPPOSITIONS OF FIELD THEORIES

'quasi-physical' fields,26 if the situation in Figure 26 is created by the physical or geographical lay-out; this can easily be imagined, though it is not a necessary prerequisite. This expression of Lewin's can easily lead the reader into error, if the latter looks for an analogy with physics in the representation. The conflict due to an overlapping of the fields is a construct, which goes somewhat further than the physical pattern. Figure 26 shows bipolar fields of conflict, in which the two valences are similar. If one assumes that the two valences are of equal strength,

G+

G-

G+

G-

Ca) (a)

(b) (b)

Figure 26. (Based on K. Lewin, Field Theory . .. , Figure 45, p.261.)

then at any point in the overlapping fields the force of attraction in Figure 26a (or the repulsive force, in Figure 26b) will be preponderant which is related to the nearer source of power; and proximity can be reckoned in spatial or in symbolic terms. What one is directly obliged to do may appear to be carrying the strongest negative charge. What may strike one at first sight as a somewhat peculiar arrangement of the vectors in Figure 26a has reference to the problem of the zone of tension. The effective operation of a force is always thought of as being at the place to which the point of a vector is directed; in Figure 26a the direction of the vectors should be taken as a sign of what particular valence they belong to, and the same is true in Figure 26b. 27 A third variant of fields of conflict, in addition to Figures 26a and 26b, is still conceivable. This is a case where a positive and a negative valence are in opposition, as is shown for example in the introductory situation to Tamara Dembo's example of 'anger' (Figure 25a). All three variations are simplified diagrams of situations which occur frequently in the life of any man, and which may also be represented in a psychological experiment.

44

LEWIN'S DYNAMIC PSYCHOLOGY

Zones of greatest tension We may go on to consider the specially interesting case of fields of forces which intersect in the manner described, and in which there are zones where the opposing forces (represented by vectors) are almost equally strong. In Figures 26a and 26b one can clearly see that the line of eqUilibrium, conflict, decision or indecision, depending on what one chooses to call it in any particular situation, lies in the middle between the two poles. For Figure 25a let us assume that the person is to be found in this sphere; it does not always have to be a straight line. In the zone of conflict between two positive valences (Figure 26a) one can discern a certain tendency towards a point of decision in the middle. In the zone of conflict between two negative valences, the point of greatest tension (in Figure 26b) lies at the same spot, but the vectors appear to struggle away towards the sides. This is in fact an obvious result; when choosing between two evils, a person has a tendency to 'leave the field'. If one wishes to make some kind of decision obligatory (e.g., in the case of educational situations or taskpunishment situations), barriers must be set up to prevent any attempt at avoidance. Here, when constructing the field, it is preferable to create a task-reward situation, which is diagrammatically a variation of situation 25a. In order to understand Lewin's dynamic field-theory, it is important to recognize that actions and change always result from tensions and, where psychology is concerned, from psychic tensions. This insight is in no way diminished by the fact that certain constellations of vectors may lead, at least temporarily, to a condition of tense inactivity. This may happen for example in over-tension, as in Figure 25b, or in indecision, as in the middle of the diagrams in Figure 26. A collection of Lewin's most important constructs in connection with vector and dynamic psychology is to be found in the Appendix. IV Lewin's topological-dynamic psychology as a basis for sociological field-thought Before we leave Lewin's field-psychology and pass on to considerations which rea]]y belong more to social psychology, let us recapitulate briefly the methodological foundations which Lewin's early work in individual psychology has already prepared for sociological field-thought. 1 Lewin's 'Galilean Principle'28

Lewin's more scientific mode of proceeding by means of observable variables, instead of by 'studying the essence' (Wesens-Schau) of

45

PRESUPPOSITIONS OF FIELD THEORIES

personality, already constituted a considerable step forward for psychology. And this was a step which sociology, particularly in Germany, and to a lesser extent in the Anglo-Saxon countries, found equally necessary on its path towards becoming an empirical science. It must be admitted that the path towards empirical experimental psychology had already been trodden by others - in particular, the American behaviourists, whose procedure of stimulus and response had however been superseded by Lewin with his field-concept. The methodological kinship, which was at first supposed to exist between the two tendencies, facilitated a number of useful discussions, such as that between Tolman and Lewin. 29 We have of course already seen that gestalt psychology contains certain elements both of the humanities and of empirical science. Lewin decisively strengthened the second of these elements. Moreover this was assisted by the stronger formalization which he gave to the conceptual apparatus of his field-theory, as against the vague teleology which, in spite of associations with physiology of the brain, was present in early ideas about gestalt. Lewin's concept cannot, however, be held in any way responsible for those totality-myths, with their mingling of what is and what ought to be, which crop up continually in German social science right up to the present day.30 His conception is also insured against the kind of classificatory conceptual-thinking, which is basically 'aristotelian' (i.e., pre-galilean) in origin. Together with J. F. Brown's associated criticism of the classificatory procedure, Lewin's essay on aristotelian and galilean thinking offers the best kind of scientific foundation for any application of the principles of field-theory to social science. 31 It is precisely this which is lacking in the American theory of structural functionalism. 32 2 Lewin's 'field' in the narrower and wider senses Lewin's 'field in the narrower sense' is an idea that we can link up with 'action in the field' as an intellectual construct made up of a combination of outer and inner life-space; it is not very different from 'the social role', and could therefore act as sponsor to positionfields and role-sets. 33 But, viewed from Lewin's methodological concept of field, it is only a small exemplary instance. But it is Parsons, much more than Lewin, who might be reproached with surreptitiously transferring the 'gestalt' of perceptual psychology, in the form of 'orientation-pattern', to a society or culture. 34 It is characteristic of Lewin that he should approach any unit under investigation without previous assumption; he sees it as an 'effective whole' (Wirkganzheit) in the sense of Grelling and Oppenheim. 36 Proceeding from the whole to the parts, he searches for its own 46

LEWIN'S DYNAMiC PSYCHOLOGY

particular laws, without being plagued by any personalist scruples. The key to a 'group' lies in the atmosphere and the supposed causal relations of the group-unit - not in any 'man' or 'person'. This is a repetition of the methodological principle already stated in Lewin's essay on the structure of the psyche. According to this, it is not so much a question of whether the whole person is coherent, but rather of what coheres together to a greater or lesser extent within the psychic sphere. This is Lewin's doctrine of strong gestalten within more comprehensive weaker gestalten - one which might contain a number of fruitful and unexplored possibilities for social science. 36 Lewin does not appear to frame his concept of field in any strict definition, which might anticipate in a provisional manner the research-results that he had in mind. The only one at all valid is the one he takes over from Einstein: 'A totality of coexisting facts, which are conceived of as mutually dependent, is called a field'3? which we already quoted in our introduction. The concrete procedure can only be practised gradually by completing Lewin's researches; and the first requisite for this is to use the method of comprehending a situation graphically by means of its structure and vectors. This diagram will then form a working-sketch, to be continually improved, and a plan of action for the intellectual procedure. This is largely why, in all our work on applications of the field-concept, we have tried wherever possible to make use of diagrams; for these are better than words when one wants to establish the common element that is present in the methods of almost all the field-theorists comparable with Lewin. This is really a formal method of discovery, and not an example of 'physicalism', as has occasionally been wrongly assumed. 3S 3 The unity of structure and dynamic In addition to the scientific and hypothetical procedure of the nonaristotelian method, and the method of proceeding (within causal totalities) from the whole to the parts, the unity of structure and dynamic is one of Lewin's most important ideas, as far as social science is concerned. A structure contains the forces which will alter that same structure the very next moment. The only thing is that, as with Heisenberg's uncertainty principle in quantum physics, it is not possible for the observer to grasp simultaneously both the total structure and the forces as they come into operation. Quite separate operational methods are needed to study structure and to study the passage of time; yet in theory both result from constellations of the same forces. This part of Lewin's field-theory links up with Wolfgang Kohler's theory of 'quasi-stationary processes' ;39 we shall take it up once again in the sociological context of structure and change, in PT-C

47

PRESUPPOSITIONS OF FIELD THEORIES

Chapter 10, and this will give a clearer idea of the consequences it has for social science. The principle has already been advanced in the idea of the 'field at a given time'40 (Figure 20). Further important concepts and notions from Lewin's dynamic field-psychology are set out in the Appendix.

48

part two

The path followed by field-theory from individual psychology to social science

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5 Moving from the unit of consciousness to the multi-personal field, by way of 'psychological induction'

I

'Establishing contact' between units of consciousness

Prefatory remark A problem, to which we should like to devote more space than a merely formal field-theory might demand, is the question of how one passes from the field-theory of individual psychology to that of social psychology and the psychology of groups, especially in the work of Lewin. From a purely formal aspect this transition does not contain any special difficulties. Just as one could draw analogies with the physical field when dealing with individual psychology, so one can do the same in other spheres where one supposes that this type of construct is adequate to express reality. But it does not seem to us probable that Lewin should have merely made a formal 'leap' in this way. It seems more likely that there was an inner transition, and we now intend to see whether this was so. It seems to us that it was the rise of National Socialism together with the antisemitism linked with it and the subsequent emigration, which impelled Lewin to concern himself more and more with the problems of social psychology.1 Another stimulus, which is not quite so dramatic but also belonged essentially to the transitional phase, is that of dual and triple situations in children's play2 and marital problems. Lewin also concerned himself in detail with these. 3 (Cf. the examples of the 'problem of the dual life-space' and the 'problem of over-subjective life-spaces' in Chapter 6.) In what we now have to say we shall not follow Lewin's actual biography; instead we shall start from the individual person and proceed from there to multi-person problems. 51

FROM INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY TO SOCIAL SCIENCE

Perceptions of a man by other men An interesting phenomenon in small children is so-called 'social smiling'. 4 It has been established that this is quite independent of the impulse to be fed, and that social smiling occurs upon the friendly approach of an adult. It seems to be a method of making contact. How can this be represented graphically? B

A

(a) (a)

A'

A (b)

B

A

B (c)

Figure 27. (After K. Lewin, Principles of Topological Psychology, Figures 22a, band c, p. 128.) By means of a glance, Person A tries to establish a link with Person B (say with an infant, or as a preliminary to a greeting or a conversation among adults). Some kind of extension of Person A reaches out to B. Lewin passed from the transitory notion of an amoeba-like arm of the personality (Figure 27a), or a 'buzzing' region of A (Figure 27b), and eventually reached the idea of a field, which seemed to be more adequate for the process (Figure 27c). This field represents a quite gentle influence exerted by the personality of A upon B; it does not merely consist in the fact that A is noticed by B, although normally this also happens. The readiness of B to reciprocate naturally plays a part in further events; one can also imagine a field from B, although in the example of the infant this is bound to be weaker than that of A. This idea of establishing contact between units of consciousness touches on regions of such 'non-material' delicacy that hitherto scientific psychology has left the whole matter almost completely to philosophy and poetry. 5 But this should not lead to the assumption that we are not dealing with real phenomena here. 6

The problem 01 altruism There is also a way of bringing another person intellectually within one's own life-space, without any kind of forces being supposed to proceed from that other person (such as acts of will, for example). In experiments with children playing, this question arises in the form of 'the problem of altruism'. The situation is shown in Figure 28. A child C wants to play with the toy T; in the notation of vector psychology this is expressed as: the force fe. T operates in the direction of T in the consciousness of the child.

52

PSYCHOLOG IC AL INDUCTION

Another child (oc) also wants to play with the toy T, but for some reason or other does not want to give expression to this wish. In this altruism-situation, where no influence is exerted by the other person, we can entirely ignore the individual wish of the second child. Child C believes that oC wants to play with the toy. In his own consciousness, his own wish and the supposed wish of the other (foc. T) are weighed in the balance. When the altruistic wish (foc. T) outweighs the child's own wish (fc. T), so the child gives the T+

C FC,T

oC FOC,T

Figure 28. Representation of an 'Altruism'-Situation in the 'LifeSpace' of the Child C (after K. Lewin, Field Theory . .. , Figure 53, p. 291). toy to the other child; or else (and this is particularly suggestive) he gives it as a token of agreement to an adult, who cannot play with the toy and does not even want to. 7 In most cases of communal play amongst children we are dealing with the ability to perceive fairly obvious visible wishes on the part of the other (this ability only emerges at a certain age, which Lewin puts at about eight). Here there is only a very thin boundary to the clearly-expressed wishes of the educational personnel or to the different forms of group pressure. In the latter cases of obvious external influence Lewin speaks of 'induced forces'. What makes the distinction so difficult is that these do not need to be connected at all with corporal power, but already begin to be present with the nonmaterial delicacy of perceptual contact. II Psychological 'induction' An introduction to the representation of induced forces by means of the conflict case

Many situations of conflict in human life (we have already shown this in connection with fields of conflict)8 are cases of conflict between one's own and other people's wills. 'It is the will of his parents and companions that gives the child his definite goals, evaluations, friendships and enmities. It is chiefly through the sphere of force of other people that reality and unreality become separated for the child.'9 Naturally this is predominantly

S3

FROM INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY TO socrAL SCIENCE

true of the social sphere which finds its 'reality', not in trees and ditches, but chiefly in the will and power of other people. For example, let us take the conflict that arises between the will of a child, who wishes to reach an object G, and the opposing will of his mother. The child C feels himself urged towards the goal G by the force/c, G, as in Figure 29. But his life-space is permeated by the power of the mother, who is thus in a position to induce the force M/c,-G in the conceptual world of the child. In the primitive

iMf

C,-G

c

G+M

fC,G Figure 29. Psychological Induction (after K. Lewin, A Dynamic Theory of Personality, p. 98). instance of children it is not difficult to vary the individual powerfield, by turning one's back on the child or leaving the room; small children sense the power-field of the adult in a physical manner, almost as with the perceptual contact we have described 10 - even with older children one can get some surprises when conducting this experiment. l1 The person in authority (the mother M in this example) has to be included in the life-space of the child in the diagram, because the child knows her and is thinking about her. In fact all the persons known to the child are contained there, in the form in which the child imagines them. The force-field around them can be thought of as a simplified representation of the power-relationship that is known to the child, but which can still be existent in a real fashion even without the imagination of the child.

An elucidlltory example in connection with personal power-fields 12 In accordance with his figurative-spatial method, Lewin illustrated one episode recounted by Tolstoy.13 The youth Nikolai (C in the example) is locked in a room by the tutor Saint-Jerome (J). He thus finds himself in the power of J, who is backed up on his side by the power of the father F. The state of being locked up constitutes an induced barrier, and the situation is rather like that with a person conducting an experiment and an experimental subject. Indeed many situations in school are like this: teaching, class work, etc.

54

PSYCHOLOGICAL

INDUCTIO~

What is psychologically interesting in the Tolstoy example (indeed this may well have been what attracted Lewin's attention in the first place) is the reversal of the real power-situation in the wish-fulfilment dream of the subject C, who feels he is being treated unjustly. In a daydream (the upper level in Figure 30) the youth C wants to be allied with his father against the tutor, in order to extend his own weak power-field by participating in the stronger power-field of his Level Levelofof 'Irreality irreality

F

C

F

J

C

F

Level Levelofof reality reality

Figure 30. Power-Fields and their Reversal in Fantasy (after K. Lewin, A Dynamic Theory of Personality, Figure 18b, p. 149).

father. One special element in the situation is that the tutor is an employee of the father's, or even a servant, in the old feudal style of the nobility; but even in very different hierarchies instances of similar wishful thinking can occur. Summary: power-field and induced force

An induced force in the shape of a vector is a part of the power-field or to put it less strongly: 'the field of influence'u - exerted by one person over another; but at the same time it also forms part of the inner conflict-field within the SUbjective life-space of the person affected. We may recall here the notion of electrical induction in field-physics. But of course the analogy should not be taken too literally; nothing should be said here about the form of energy or matter that makes up the interhuman relations. The simple truth is that in social psychology, and we may draw a comparison with medicine,15 it is occasionally necessary to conceive of processes only half-adequately, and carry on with them for the moment, without dividing them up into their infinitely numerous components that are more or less real, or indulging in ontological disputes about them. It should be particularly emphasized, however, that Lewin's idea of an induced field forms only a small part of his field-theory, and

55

FROM INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY TO SOCIAL SCIENCE

in no sense should it be altogether identified with the latter. The 'external' forces are always counterbalanced by the inner forces of the person, and it should never be maintained that the external forces will 'automatically' prove the stronger, as the role-theories occasionally suggest to a very great extent. I6

56

6 The social field as an interpersonal space of conflict and tension

I Remarks on the 'tension-space' of two persons

Summary of several approaches to the social field We should like to distinguish between two important phenomena in the transition from individual psychology to the social fields: (a) Induced forces . People exercise some kind of power- or forceeffect on other people; that is to say, they induce forces in the lifespace of those other particular people. Normally speaking (on account of the inner counter-forces of the person), these induced forces take the form of fields of inner tension. These so-called 'stress systems'l can lead to conditions of unrest 2 in people (and in extreme cases, even to neuroses). But in the last resort it is really only these fields of tension that drive men on to act at all, though the tension may be the result of inner impulses and intrapersonal counter-forces, or it may be the result of 'internal' and 'external' forces. 3 Induced forces can be taken to mean 'environmental forces', 4 or more precisely: forces from the living environment,5 from the milieu. (But this does not mean milieu in the sense of a past which leaves its mark; rather, it is in the sense of the 'here-and-now' viewpoint which is typical of Lewin's field-theory.) (b) The interpersonal conflict- or tension-space; the social field of at least two persons. In the next few sections we shall attempt to approach the social field from various different angles; to begin with, we shall treat the social field around or between two persons. From there we shall only need to take a step or two further in the same direction in order to arrive at 'group-fields' and the general fieldview which deals with society as a whole. 6

57

FROM INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY TO SOCIAL SCIENCE

The anticipation-effect in interpersonal relations If one compares our altruism example with the model of psychological induction (Chapter 5) one arrives at a phenomenon which may be described as the anticipation-effect. (a) A 'real' power-field. Person B, by whom a person A feels himself to be affected, may really exist and may be perceived by A, i.e., he may be included in A's life-space. The person B therefore exerts real forces on A, by means of words or actions or anything

A

iBfA

B

B

fA

Figure 31. A 'Real' Power-Field exerted by Person B upon Person A. fA = A's own will iBfA = the induced force exerted by B upon A

else we like to imagine; it may even be by means of a glance, although of course this would not be capable of transferring the precise content of B's will to A. 7 This situation can be illustrated graphically, as in Figure 31. (b) An anticipated power-field. In a case where the person B does not exert any real forces upon A, but where A, either from past experience or from fear, assumes the existence of a real power-field proceeding from B and enveloping hin, then the situation in Figure 32 is produced. Such a case occurs when there is so-called anticipation, though in my opinion this is usually the result of an after-effect. 8 A teacher, for example, can exert an influence even in his absence; this is the internalization of a Super-Ego. The violence of a dictatorship operates by way of fear, so to speak, while making sparing use of any real physical violence (in a period of terror physical violence is restricted to a few persons selected to be made examples of). Then the intimidated citizen 'anticipates' with his behaviour the reactions of the dictatorship. In democracies care is taken to foresee and adjust to the wishes of groups of potential voters, and to some extent this can also be described as anticipatory (on the part of a government which reacts in accordance with electoral strategy). 9 It may happen, for example, that vehement speeches are made by

58

THE SOCIAL fIELD AS AN INTERPERSONAL SPACE

representatives of individual or popular interests; and this can lead to the supposed wishes of popular groups, wishes which are by no means as strongly supported as they appear to be, quite erroneously being accorded 'satisfaction'. In the subjective representation (shown in Figure 32) there is no difference between the genuine and the false 'anticipatory attraction'. Perhaps there may exist some parallel with the experiments that Holst carried out with chickens; here A

iB'f A

B'

B

fA

Figure 32. The Power-Field of B over A, as anticipated by Person A. Symbols as in Figure 31; in this case iBfA exists only in the 'imagination' of A(iB'fA). repeated stimulation by means of electrodes gave rise to actions, which continued to be performed even when the 'real' stimulation was no longer offered. 10 The anticipation-situation resembles the altruism-situation discussed in the last chapter, but without the 'unselfish' motivation. In both instances an analysis or guess at the probable wishes or acts of the other person can be treated as 'creating' something that has not yet occurred, but in our diagram we have not assumed this.

fA

A

B

iBf

(a)

A

iAf

B

fB

(b)

fA

A

iBf

iAf

B FB

(c)

Figure 33. (a) Induction field exerted by B upon A; (b) Induction field exerted by A upon B; (c) Attempt at a representation of the Reciprocal Induction Field between two Life-Spaces; symbols as in Figure 31. 11 S9

FROM INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY TO SOCIAL SCIENCE

A meeting between two persons in tension (the two-person field)

What is the appearance of a field of two persons, who are joined in a dynamic relation ?12 In this instance any person may, in the (inner) force-field of his life-space, 'scent' some trace of the other person, i.e., there may be a reciprocal psychological induction. We shall later attempt to evaluate more precisely how far the situations 33a and 33b may be united with 33c. The diagram does of course unite (as Figures 31 and 32 did before) subjective lifespaces with 'objective' constellations; and in the last instance (33c) two subjective life-spaces are united with an objective confrontation. This attempt in 33c appears to us to be less problematical than the attempt which Lewin made to combine two subjective life-spaces with one 'objective social field' (Figure 35). We shall later discuss and criticize this. II A discussion of the 'social space' and the 'social field' in connection with Lewin's study of a double life-space On the comparability of life-spaces

Since the life-space of a man is his subjective world, it cannot really be compared either logically or theoretically with the subjective world of another man; but in practice we are continually making this comparison. The use of language as a means of communication does of course make it possible for the views and ideas of several men to be compared with each other. Here we are faced once again with the problem of the hermeneutic method, about which Hans Schafer says that even its scientific opponents would not be able to manage entirely without it. 13 (Even scientists must of course be able to have a reciprocal understanding of one another, but this does not remove entirely the inner logic or the algebraic form of their statements, quite apart from the fact that we also wish to be able to 'understand'14 natural laws.) Lewin describes groups by saying that they are not characterized merely by similarity, but by a dynamic dependence that exists between their members;15 and this ought to explain for us the significance of the similarity, or at least the comparability between different subjective worlds, e.g., as a force tending to promote friendship. An example of comparison in a marital situation

Figure 34 shows a comparison made by Lewin between the lifespaces of two marital partners, in order to demonstrate a source of conflict in differences of opinion. 60

THE SOCIAL FIELD AS AN INTERPERSONAL SPACE

The communal life-space of the two partners (the marital region M) arouses different ideas of breadth or narrowness in the two partners. A friendship in the office is thought of by the husband as forming part of his occupation (Figure 34a), whilst the wife thinks of it as an intrusion into the sexual region, which is protected by the marriage and is her exclusive preserve (Figure 34b). Bu

M

M

So

FR

hl Sex

hl Cl

Ch

(a)

FR

BU

Sex

So

Ch

Cl

(b)

Figure 34. (After K. Lewin, Resolving Social Conflicts, Figure XV.) (a) Life-Space of the Husband; (b) Life-Space of the Wife. M = marriage region Bu = business life of husband hI = home life CI = club life of husband Ch = life with the children Sex = sexual relations So = social life of the couple Fr = friendship of the husband with third person (i.e., the 'ground of conflict')

A comparative view of a dual life-space: Lewin's method of three stages

In order to deal with the problem of the confrontation and joint development of two life-spaces Lewin adopts a procedure in the following three stages: Stage 1: An analysis of the two life-spaces at the preliminary stage of a psychological change of location (locomotion) undertaken by each, and starting out from the perception of each of the partners. The life-spaces of the partners are framed in such a way that each includes, within his own life-space, an individual picture of the lifespace of the other. Stage 2: A combination of the joint 'objective' life-space of both partners. This is the 'social space', or, as Lewin himself calls it, the 'social field'; this contains the actual psychic or corporal locomotions of the two partners. In my opinion this latter development is a very dubious step, and one on which we shall have to concentrate our critical attention. Stage 3: The two life-spaces are separated once again, and a

61

FROM INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY TO SOCIAL SCIENCE

study is made of the respective reactions of the two partners when confronted with the actual behaviour of the other. I6 These stages can also be viewed as a spiral in the following way: subjective perception - confrontation with reality - altered subjective perception, etc. I7

A snuzll drama with psychological l spaces' Let us take the following little story as an illustration. IS The husband H wishes to keep his evening free in order to go to the theatre B with his wife W. He assumes that she has the time to come with him (region C in Figure 35a, lefthand diagram). But the wife thinks (Figure 35a, righthand diagram) that her husband has a meeting this evening or is going to his club G; so she A

B

H

D

C

A

W E F

Intended locomotion

G

B

H

C

E F

w Intended

Expected locomotion

Expected locomotion

D

locomotion

Life-Space of the Wife W at Time 1

Life-Space of the Husband H at Time 1

Stage one (a) B H

A

C

F W

D E

Completed locomotion

The 'Social Space' (or 'Social Field' according to Lewin) at Time 2 Stage two (b) B A

C

H

Intended locomotion

E

D

W F

G

Expected locomotion

Life-Space of the Husband H at Time 2

E

H B

A

Expected locomotion

C

WD F

Intended locomotion

Life-Space of the Wife W at Time 2

Stage three (c)

Figure 35. (After K. Lewin, Field Theory . .. , Figure 20, p. 196.)

62

THE SOCIAL FIELD AS AN INTERPERSONAL SPACE

intends (or even arranges on the telephone) to go and visit her family F in the evening. The present occupation of the husband (A, e.g., writing a manuscript) is common ground between them at Time 1. A conversation between the couple clarifies the matter superficially, in that H discovers that his wife has arranged a visit to her relatives, while W finds that H has bought tickets for the theatre. Now neither of them knows what they ought to do. But arrangements for a compromise adjustment have to be made; how and in what 'space' do these take place?

Can the life-spaces of several people be united into one common space? The life-spaces of Hand W (or their 'real' actions taken from the sUbjective world of each) now come into direct conflict with one another. Here one could really think of them as two subjective fields in a state of induced tension as in Figure 33c, but this is a point of view that Lewin does not discuss in any detail in this context. Each of the two partners tries to adjust in some way to the wishes of the other. Ought one to treat this confrontation as forming a common social space? The answer is both yes and no. Any actions that are really performed will take place in the actual world, and hence they will obviously share a common space. In this way one might take the 'social space' of two people to be merely a section of the world itself. (It may seem strange to us to represent this in a figurative spatial manner, but why not? Membership of a club, a feeling of mutual sympathy, etc. - these are not geographical.) The subjective worlds of the two partners are by no means nullified by the necessity they are both under to adapt themselves to 'facts'. The real space in Figure 35b is not sufficiently distinct from the subjective spaces. The next two sections will indicate why we are unwilling to think of it as being a 'field'. In our example, the fact that it is theoretically impossible to nullify the personal spaces becomes perfectly clear when one views the very different reactions to the real (or 'behavioural') confrontation. No one is going to slide over from his perceptual world into the 'real' world, even if he detects traces of it. Each of the two people in our example will try to assess the subjective world of the other, although of course as a sUbjective world of the second order, an achievement which is only possible if one thinks in a detached manner (apart from the view of a professional psychologist). In the illustration we give in our example, both give way too much, purely out oflove; the husband returns the tickets and is willing to visit his parents-in-law, while the wife dresses up in order to go to the theatre. 63

FROM INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY TO SOCIAL SCIENCE

Critical reflections on social fspaces' and 'lie/ds', as used by Lewin Once more let us ask the question: Is there such a thing as a social field or group-field? This is really the central question of field-theory as far as social psychology or group psychology is concerned. In order to clarify the matter we find ourselves obliged to make our distinctions somewhat more sharp and definitive than Lewin does. The 'social' situation in Figure 35b, which we described as loosely as possible as a 'social space' (in the figurative sense), was described by Lewin as a 'social field' .19 I consider that in this special context this expression is, to say the very least, somewhat careless; it may indeed contradict Lewin's own concept of 'field' in individual psychology. In our remarks on gestalt psychology we have already seen that the concept of 'field' borders on that of 'totality'. In fact Lewin occasionally treats 'field theory' altogether in the sense of 'the totalistic method', much as with Maslow's concept of 'syndrome'. 20 'Field' can mean practically anything which is concerned in any way with the totalistic mode of looking at things. In a certain sense Lewin views the transition from the individual totality of 'person' to the totalistic study of group phenomena merely as a question of various degrees of magnitude in the units employed when dealing with totality in field-theory. I suggest that the concept 'field' should not be used so widely. Instead, group phenomena should be referred to by their particular names or as social 'spaces' in the figurative sense. Not in all circumstances should they be described as a 'field'. Whenever he is considering individual psychology, Lewin uses 'field' in the narrower sense to mean 'field of tension'. In fact it really seems to me that it was the concept of the 'stress system'21 which originally led Lewin to transfer the concept of field from perceptual psychology to general psychology. Of course, when we were discussing the dynamic totality of the structure of personality, we already mentioned how close it was to the concept of field. But then we followed Lewin in applying the explicit concept of 'field' only to a 'central force-field' concerned with a valence or the confrontation of two or more valences or forcefields, and used the term 'field of conflict' in individual psychology. We now intend to continue in this manner. To return now to Figure 35b: the representation of the 'locomotions' (whether figuratively psychic or actually spatial) of two persons in one and the same social space cannot be described as a field of tension; and hence in our sense it cannot be described as a 'field'. In order to be described as a 'field', a similar situation has got to show a relationship of reciprocal tension existing between two per-

64

THE SOCIAL F IELD AS AN INTERPERSO N AL SPACI:,

sons. This does not need to be a quarrel; one only needs to think of concepts such as 'erotic tension'. But there has got to be a 'dynamic' relation or one of 'forces', existing between them. As we have seen, it is really scarcely possible for there to be a communal psychological life-space in the sense of a joint subjective world of several people. But we do frequently meet with a relationship of tension or a 'connection of forces' linking several people, and in group or social psychology this is represented as a totalistic situation. Later on we shall frequently return to the subject of 'social fields' of this kind, which in my view can more truly be described as such. Common ideologies or ideas jointly shared by several persons (I should like to describe them as 'quasi-common life-spaces')22 do form a special area, which certainly also belongs to psychological field-theory. But this is so only if they deal, not with mere a priori generalizations, but with genuine investigations of the dispersion and structure of 'fields of opinion' in groups and societies. 23 III Power-struggles in the 'social field' of two persons

PreUminary remark on the mode of presentation Lewin's idea of a 'group' is the best example of a social field. A 'group' should not primarily be determined by the common characteristics shared by its members, for this would be a logical 'class'; it is determined instead by the dynamic relations (the relationships of forces) existing between them. A father, mother and child are made into a family by the dynamic relationship they have with one another, although their individual characteristics are extremely different. 'All the fair-haired women in this town'24 would not comprise a dynamic group at all, though it might, for example, if persecution by a majority of dark-haired women had united them into a dynamic group. Let us now examine the dynamic relation existing between persons in a dyad. We can deduce these directly from our earlier accounts of dual-fields of influence and power in the first section of this chapter. In order to leave out of account the problem of the dual life-space, let us locate both persons as simple undifferentiated regions within a single space. This can then be thought of as being either social or geographical, depending on the example; i.e., it can be especially conceived as 'objective'. The conflict around a goal G in Figure 36a, which two persons want to arrive at but which only one of them can realize, contains 65

FROM INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY TO SOCIAL SCIENCE

a double-sided inductional field (Figure 36b), which can also be represented (either with or without open conflict) as a direct confrontation of the forces of the persons A and B (Figure 36c). Figure 36c is an objective statement of the conflict-situation; it is a simplified version of J. F. Brown's diagram of group conflicts (for example, a dispute over wages).25 This simplification of the situation can also be applied to more elaborate diagrams of dynamic relations between persons, without

Sphere B

Sphere A

A

(b) (b)

fA

he Sp

iAf

B

fB

B

(c) re

6± iBf

A

fBG

G

iBf

fB

A

B

fA

iAf G

B

B

re

G±

he

(a)

A

A

fAG

iAfBG_

Sp

iBfAG_

(d)

Figure 36. Dynamic Confrontations between Two Persons in the ('Objective') 'Social Space'.

stating whether one is dealing with conflicts or with relationships of tension or influence of any kind. In actual fact, on account of the inevitable difference between the subjective life-spaces (e.g., the perceptual and sensory world, or the world of ideas), any relationship between people is always bound up with inner tensions; these are not necessarily felt as burdensome, but may be stimulating or even pleasurable. Figure 36d shows a dispute or a conversation between different persons concerning two goals, each thought good by one person and bad by the other. The arrangements for adaptation and compromise usually take place peacefully. A true appreciation of the element of 'being different' in another person, and the charm that lies in this, are things which do not seem to be sufficiently developed in many men. In my opinion this lies right at the root of any ethical education, and particularly in a society inspired by democratic ideals. A sense of the dignity and individuality of the other person can never be replaced by a dutiful obedience towards a Super-Ego, at least as regards the inner vitality of the relationship with another concrete Ego. 66

THE SOCIAL FJELD AS AN INTERPERSONAL SPACE

Asymmett'ic 'power '-relationships Reciprocal relationships of force, power or influence can be asymmetrical; i.e., the power or influence exerted by a person A, for example, upon a person B can be appreciably greater than the other way round. 28 We have already seen in Figure 30 the way in which Lewin represen ts such differences in power-fields; this was particularly clear on the irreality-plane in that example (the large power-field of F + C as against the small power-field of J). Now it seems to me that this mode of expression is open to a certain objection. This is that it does not make it possible to express (e.g., in a mother-child relationship) how the weaker power-field can also exert an influence on the source of the stronger power-field when this is viewed in a figuratively spatial manner; i.e., that the weaker power-field occasionally permeates the stronger one. Let us therefore compose a graphic illustration, in which both power-fields penetrate one another reciprocally, and let us try and find other symbols for the difference in force. If we are dealing with specific constellations of induction-fields, then power-differences can be noted simply by means of the strength (i.e., the length) of the vectors for induced forces in the two 'personspheres'. This can be done in Figure 36a, where there are two lifespaces with induced vectors directed towards a definite goal, and all simplified within a single 'objective' space. For example, iAfB; would have to be drawn as larger than iBfA; or to put it more precisely, the ratio iAfn:fn must be greater than the ratio iBfA : fA' 27 In the following illustration of a power-conflict, we do not show the relation between the induced forces of influence and the respective force of self-assertion; instead we show only a resultant vector 28 without making any graphical presentation of the subjective lifespaces. In this way one can differentiate graphically the 'density' of the power-fields (according to the thickness of the lines of force, as in physics, or by the thickness or distinctness of the rings in Lewin's diagram, on our Figure 30). This is indicated in Figure 37a. In addition we may draw in 'spaces' of any kind that will be most effective for our purposes of demonstration, such as 'spaces of free movement' or 'exercise of power', in the same way that animals in the wilds will separate off their hunting-grounds or pastures. We shall see later on that social overlappings and penetrations make it far more difficult for our zoon politikon, Man, than for any rhinoceros, to capture definite spaces for himself in the teeth of the others. In the light of Figure 37a, the simplified diagram on 37b will need no further explanation. In both diagrams (37a and b) it should be noted that here we are presenting open situations of conflict or 67

FROM INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY TO SOCIAL SCIENCE

A

B

Ca) (a)

A

B (b)

Figure 37. (a) Differing 'Density' of the 'Power~Fields', with a Simultaneous Representation of the Struggle to Extend the Spaces of Free Movement and (or) the Exercise of Power; (b) Abbrevi~ ated Representation of the Asymmetric Power-Constellation. tension without any idea of equilibrium. In a case of equilibrium the vectors which meet at the boundary between the regions would have to be equal, as in Figure 39 29 for instance. In the above case therefore, A can be conceived of as extending, and B as reducing, the area of his region, until either the pressure from A diminishes (as a result of some reciprocal 'arrangement', for example) or else B, still harder pressed, increases in aggressiveness. A struggle for individual territory, where there is interpenetration of life-spaces

In many human situations the life-spaces of different persons interpenetrate. We do not want to enter into an ontological discussion here, on the whole question of how the subjective spaces of different persons can interpenetrate. Let us first briefly describe the subject-matter with which we shall be dealing. A lack of harmony between the life-ideas of two persons, though it is quite taken for granted, will make itself disturbingly noticeable if a joint life-sphere or a particular pressure obliges them to accommodate their actions to one another. Each has the impression that some other person (or persons) is interfering in his own subjective life-space, quite apart from whether this is ontologically possible or not. Of course we occasionally love the inner world of another person; this essential difference of life~spaces does contain something like

68

THE SOCIAL FIELD AS AN INTERPERSONAL SPACE

that 'mystery of Woman' which so attracts men, though it is often wrongly assumed that this mystery disappears with 'conquest'. But as soon as one is forced (or wishes) to live in close contact with another, these inner worlds begin to chafe badly against one another. This is due to what we have called interpenetration, to a kind of permanent mutual encroachment - the very thing which in the last section we envied the rhinoceros for being able to avoid in such an elegant manner. Let us look at a graphic illustration. One important basis of conflict in marriages arises out of the fact that one of the partners would like to be responsible for a larger part of the life-space, whether conceived subjectively or objectively, of the other than the latter is prepared to surrender to his jurisdiction. Let us illustrate here the territory of a man who is interfered with in practically every sphere by somebody else. How annoying, for example, even young people occasionally find the continual meddling of their parents, teachers, brothers and sisters. A glance at Figure 38 will show briefly and conclusively that our wretched 'prisoner of wedlock' is really only free from the influence Ch

Of

Pr

Ho

Va

so

GO

Mc

Figure 38. The Life-Space of a Husband; the shaded areas are those over which the spouse exercises some influence (after K. Lewin, Resolving Social Conflicts, Figure XI). Labelling of Areas,' Ho = home management Ch = children So = social life ('social obligations') Va = vacancy Pr = professional life (of the husband) including Of = office life and Mc = men's club, with the sub-area Go = playing golf of his wife when he is at the office or at his golf-club. Of course the wife, both out of love and as a result of her education in traditional ideals, believes that it is her duty to be completely absorbed in the life of her husband and the family. How can this fail to lead to conflict?

69

FROM INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY TO SOCIAL SCIENCE

In the following example Lewin shows us the struggle that goes

on for zones of influence within the life-space of the partner, while he also shows the struggle for those spheres that have still remained private. In this connection one thinks of a similar problem in economics: namely, the questionable utility of extra work, if it simultaneously encroaches on one's leisure;3o in a two-person conflict we are also dealing with a sphere that is striven for and a sphere that is residual, even if the time and persons involved do make some difference, and may even invert matters. In Figure 39 the life-space of the husband overlaps with the lifespace of the wife. Figure 38 shows a similar overlap or penetration

fW Fl

fH

fw

OuW

fH

fw

fH

w

fW

SEX

fH

fW fW fHfw

fH OUH

fH H

Figure 39. Conflict over the Scope of Common Life in a Marriage (after K. Lewin, Resolving Social Conflicts, Figure xnD. F1 = common family life W = sphere of activity of the wife OuW = sphere of the wife outside the 'common life' fw = a force corresponding to the wishes of the wife H = sphere of the husband's activities OuH = sphere of the husband outside the 'common life' SEX = sexual life fH = a force corresponding to the wishes of the husband

into the life-space of one of the participants, at least according to the subjective idea of the latter. This can be reconstructed if necessary by interrogation. Figure 39 attempts a kind of objective presentation, in order to bring both spaces on to the same plane so that they can overlap with one another. Instead of life-spaces, Lewin is here illustrating the 'objective' spheres of activity of the marital partners. The region that is jointly covered by both spaces is the 'region of communal life' . The husband is tending to increase his sphere of freedom outside the common region, or to restrict the common space. At the same time, let us hope, he would surrender a larger independent space to his wife. The wife is pulling in the opposite direction, as in a real tug-of-war. Within the communal space the husband, according to our assumptions, would like to increase the region of sexual life, while the wife 70

THE SOCIAL rIELD AS AN INTERPERSONAL SPACE

wants to increase the region of 'family life' (this means common activities of a different kind, since in a dyadic example we are ignoring children for the moment). In order to simplify the 'objective' denominator of the diagram, we may follow Lewin in taking the unit of measurement for the respective spaces (in Figure 39) to be the amount of time which each of them devotes to it. 31 Lewin believes (and I think, quite correctly) that the cause of most marital conflicts lies in a fundamental divergence of view over the significance of marriage in the life of the two partners; for one of them it can mean something much more comprehensive than for the other. In particular, it may not be possible for the two respective interpretations both to be realized alongside one another.32 The various individual disputes are usually only symptoms of this total situation. An appeal for 'more common interest in the conduct of life' does not usually succeed in solving the problems, especially if this 'common interest' is not already present in terms of experience and aptitude. We generally go about things in too crude a manner, when we are faced with the wonderful mystery of a dear one, who is both spiritually tied to us and yet independent. For this is an ineffably tender plant, but whether it blooms or fades will be a source of happiness or sorrow to us. IV Remarks on the totality of the group and on reference-group conflicts as a field-model 1 The authoritarian and democratic 'group-atmosphere' in Lewinexamples of the gestalt- or field-character of the group

A very important investigation by Lewin and his students, and one which we shall subsequently have occasion to touch upon several times, was the experimental research on children's groups under authoritarian and non-authoritarian leaders.33 In our present context the formal mode of presentation by Lewin's student, R. Lippitt, may serve as a further confirmation of the fact that group theory forms part of the field-theory (in the sense of fields of tension between persons). The diagram of the groups in Figure 40 differs from the fields of tension so far discussed, quite apart from the greater number of persons involved, in that a special emphasis is laid on the total homogeneity of the group. One thinks of the expression 'more than the sum of the parts' in connection with the psychological gestalt. Here we see an example of Lewin's primary principle in any procedure with field-theory: namely, to keep one's attention fixed on the

71

FROM INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY TO SOCIAL SCIENCE

whole, while making a very close analysis of the individual relations. The homogeneity or 'coherence' of the groups does, of course, have a decisive total influence on the behaviour of the group-members. But it does not constitute any kind of mythical soul for the group; on the contrary it is the result of the total field of the relations of the group-members with each other. The group-leader L of the authoritarian group in Figure 40a stands in a direct power-relationship to

C1 B C5

7

C2

7

7

L

3

C1

L

7 C3

C3

C5

7

Gr.P.=1

C4

(a) (a)

C2

3

C4

Gr.P.=6

(b)

Figure 40. An Authoritarian and a Democratic Group (after. R. Lippitt, taken from K. Lewin, Field Theory . .. , Figure 40,

p.250).

Gr.P. = group-potency L = leader C (the children) = the group-members each individual child (Cl to C5); the 'potency' of each of these relationships is very high, as shown by the ordinal number 7. The onesidedness of the power-relationships is also indicated by a barrier B drawn around the person of the leader. Almost no relationships at all exist between the group-members; so the potency of the groups as such is minimal, apart from the power of the leader. Hence if the leader is taken away, disputes or aggression occur between the members. I believe that, in an 'objective' study of groups, it is better to speak of coherence rather than group-potency; for potency always means the exertion of a violent influence on a definite person, and it is improbable that it would be the same for all members of a group. The democratic group is more loosely organized in a number of reciprocal relationships of medium potency, and at the same time there is a higher potency or coherence of the group as such. Both sketches are abbreviations of the results of a large number of experiments. 34 72

THE SOCIAL FIELD AS AN INTERPERSONAL SPACE

2 From Lewin's contribution to the theory ofreference-group conflicts An example of stress in a marriage Instead of entering into a long discussion as to what reference-groups really are, we should prefer to discuss a short example. In a marriage the husband and the wife form a group. The marriage is therefore at the very least the 'membership-group' (or one of several membership-groups) of both partners. The question of whether the marriage also constitutes a reference-group, by which they orientate their actions (or even merely their values), 35 would depend from case to case on whether conflicts arose with other membership-groups and reference-groups. A critical instance for every young marriage is behaviour towards respective parental families. The husband Hand f

Fa w

fH,FaH

W

H

W,Fa w

Fa H

Ma

Figure 41. Reference-Group Conflicts in a Marriage (after K. Lewin, Resolving Social Conflicts, Figure XIV). Ma = marriage group (W Faw = family of wife FaR = family of husband

+ H)

the wife W belong immediately to the narrower group of the marriage M (the circle in the middle of the diagram); but in addition they each belong respectively to the larger family of the husband FaH, and the wife FaW. In the event of conflict each of the original families tries to draw its member over to its own side, and in practice this can lead to a break-up of the marriage, if both sides are successful. Of course it is possible for these three groups and their forces of attraction to be combined in other variations. In the example illustrated in Figure 40, the induced forces of the wife's family are directed only on her and those of the husband's family only on him, given as CW, Paw and fH, FaR; for reasons of space we have omitted any reference to induction, otherwise they would have to be: iFaWfw, FaW and iFaHfR, FaR. 36 Here the counter-forces would be the forces of marital attraction and the solidity of the marriage group as a whole, in the face of the suction exerted by the two families. In a two-fold instance we may replace group-coherence and refer to the partner as a person, i.e. fw. H andfR, w, each with its own induced component.

73

FROM INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY TO SOCIAL SCIENCE

'Naturally this question plays a most important role, if the husband and wife belong to different racial or religious groups, or come from widely separated social or economic c1asses!37

L.St.

+

I.St.

J P

h.St.

+

+ H.St. H.St.

NJ

Figure 42. (After K. Lewin, Resolving Social Conflicts, Figure

XX.) L.St. (and I.St.) = lower stratum H.St. (and h.St.) = higher stratum J = Jews NJ = Non-Jews

A reference-group conflict as a valence-model The wish (whether of a single person or more widespread) to belong to or to shun certain social regions is one that creates valences. In the case of under-privileged minorities one may assume that gaps will appear between ascribed membership and an inner inclination for some group as a reference-group.38 Lewin concerned himself particularly with the situation of the Jewish minority (chiefly in the U.S.A., but naturally also with a glance at the fate of the Jews in Germany), and it is from here that we draw our example. 39 The field of the model is to be understood as arising out of a wish for social mobility or locomotion. In any comparison between the social strata the under-privileged group is in danger of being ascribed as a whole to the lower stratum. The emancipated Jew P has already taken over the values of the higher strata of non-Jews; now he hates the members of his own group, who are unlike his reference-group (the higher stratum of non-Jews), out of fear that he will be pulled down by them. The force applied to P in the diagram is the result of repulsion from the lower strata of his group (J.LSt, strong negative valence) and the attraction exerted on him by the higher strata of non-Jews (NJ.HSt, positive valence). It is obvious from what has been said that the internal coherence of a group will not be large, when the individual is assigned to it against his will. It is particularly the persons in the marginal areas that push outwards, the others are to some extent merely resigned.

74

THE SOCIAL FIELD AS AN INTERPERSONAL SPACE

Usually it is only external pressure that holds them together; but in special cases an inner spirit of battle, awakened by the leading personalities, may also weld the group together from within, i.e., it may compensate for the centrifugal forces. In Lewin's opinion, on the other hand, privileged groups usually operate as fields of centripetal force. Anyone assigned to the periphery wants to occupy a more central position. 40 Here one might put forward theories of the decay of privileged groups as a critical objection. But this would involve a field with a quite different structure from the one we are studying. Lewin starts out from the special structure of a social field for members on the boundary between two groupings, particularly students of Jewish origin (Negro students are in a similar position). Though these could not choose their origin, they could still choose their ideals and their friends, subject to the usual restrictions or difficulties, in accordance with their status-goals. Out of the privileged group the field-model only includes persons who marry-in or change their religion or come from several generations of underprivilege, and who are struggling out of peripheral regions of the privileged class towards a more central position. This may also include cases where people are trying to ensure a greater degree of inter-generation mobility for their own children. Other problems of social mobility, such as disintegration or decline of the privileged group, would require different field-models of the situation.

75

7 Contributions to the theory of the 'role-field'

I Remarks on group-belongingness in the light of several modelconcepts in Lewin's field-theory

Lewin's field-theory and 'roles' Lewin did not establish any real theory of position and roles. His indirect contribution to role-theory was much rather to say this: that the dynamic presentation of relations between people and of the influence exerted by situations on people's behaviour made it fundamentally impossible to lay down any rigid schema of position. To show how this point of view arose out of field-theory seems to us a far more important task than it would be to collect statements by Lewin on practical questions, which might lead to inferences about role-theory. This basic attitude in Lewin's field-theory has been built upon by a number of theorists, and we shall be coming back to them in the second part of this treatise. 1 One who did not base himself upon it is Robert K. Merton; yet his theory of the role-set,2 as we shall see, is particularly well suited to supplement and carryon from Lewin's starting-point.

An overlapping situation in Lewin's example: the field of conflict of a dual-situation A special instance of the field of conflict, which bears more of a formal than a factual relation to our problem of role-conflict (more accurately: of conflict within a role, if we wish to follow Merton), 3 is the overlapping of two situations in the life-space of an individual. The simplest case of this kind is plain distraction of attention. During

76

THE THEORY OF THE 'ROLE-FIELD'

an arithmetical problem, for example, a child may be thinking of some other activity after the end of school. The situation Sl and the situation S2 both lay a claim on the intellectual abilities of the person,4 as in Figure 43. The influence exerted by both situations on the momentary behaviour of the person is described by Lewin as the 'potency' of each situation. The potency of the situation, on which the person is concentrating more attentively, is the greater; so the forces emanating from Sl and S2 (or more accurately: the valences of the goals G 1 s1 G1+

G+2 P fP,G1

fP,G2 S2

Figure 43. An Overlapping Situation (after K. Lewin, Field Theory . .. , Figure 51, p. 270). and G 2 in the two situations) have to be weighed up. Many situations where there is a choice of decision are really overlapping situations of this kind (e.g., the case of 'what shall I do this evening?' where Possibility 1 or 2 involves this or that situation). 5

The effect of group-belonging ness With reference to the overlapping reproduced in our Figure 43, Lewin remarks that even group-belongingness can also be viewed in this way. Then Sl corresponds to the structure of the individual wishes and goals ofthe person, while S2 represents the goals, rules and values which are valid for the individual as a member of a particular group.6 How they become valid for him is something we are going to leave open for the present. The way in which a person belongs to a whole series of groups, to his class, etc., is something that can be thought out in an analogous fashion. The degree to which the various forms of belongingness (in the more restricted model: his value-scales and suchlike) act upon the person, is described by Lewin as the 'potency' of the relationship. 7 Ragnar Rommetveit incorporates Lewin's statement as 'the potency of a norm-sender', relative to the potency of other norm-senders with reference to the behaviour of the receiver. This potency cannot be measured very exactly, but it is nevertheless very important for the analysis of social and group structures; it corresponds approximately to Merton's 'importance' and 'power' of a member of the role-set, if these are taken together. 8

77

FROM INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY TO SOCIAL SCIENCE

Sketch of the modes of belongingness to groups and classes, on the part of a 'socialized' man A very impressive presentation, in figurative spatial terms, of belongingness to groups and classes on the part of a social subject is reproduced from Lewin and given in our Figure 44. At the same time it is a 'topological' representation of an entire social sphere. We begin with the person P. P is a member of the smaller family F, of the larger family LF, of the upper middle-class u.M., and of the u.M. Republicans

Socialists Irish immigrants

P LF

F

3.G

'Elks'

2.G

1.G

Democrats

Figure 44. Modes of Belongingness to Groups and Classes, on the Part of a Person P (after K. Lewin, Resolving Social Conflicts, Figure XVI). Interpretation of the symbols is given in the text. third generation of Irish immigrants (3.G) to the United States. Apart from this the person in our example belongs to a beneficent and patriotic association called the Elks, and is closely connected with the Republican Party. 9 It would be possible to introduce into the schema his membership of the Catholic church too. The influence which the individual groups had upon the person's behaviour (i.e., their relative potency) is to be investigated in each case. According to Merton, in our culture the smaller family and occupational belongingness have the greatest influence,lo greater for example than any voluntary membership. Moreover the influence of belongingness differs in accordance with momentary proximity to a group. 11 II Observations derived from field-theory on the role-set and rolesegments (extrapolated from Lewin's field-theory) A ret,'ospective glance at power-fields and tension-fields involving several persons The theory of the role-set is concerned with a kind of loosening-up in the norms of social positions in interpersonal relations or in the fluctuating influences of reference-groups.

78

THE THEORY OF THE 'ROLE-FIELD"

According to the theory of induced forces and power-fields, the individual is always situated within the fields of influence of different persons. If we assume that the person has an individual will for independent action, linked with a certain individual power exerted by the person influenced, we can assume reciprocal fields of tension surrounding the pairs of persons in the representation. If we conceive of the whole of society as a field of such tensionrelationships, then Merton's role-set is only a section of these relations centred about a position. According to Merton, every person M P

M

M

M

M

M

P M

(b)

M

M

M P M

M

(a) (al

(c)

Figure 45. Representations of the Position-Field. (a) 'PowerFields'; (b) 'Fields of Tension'; (c) Representation of the Forces. P = position-holder M = member of the 'role-set' or complementary position

arranges a different batch of such positions P (which Merton calls 'status'); whereas contrary to Gross, positions and their partners are not terminologically distinct. We may be already drawing an interpretation, if we think of 'those in the role-set' as role-partners exerting power (M in our diagrams).12 To begin with we should like to represent the relations of tension or influence as a network, in order to preserve a certain similarity with the structural theory of roles (later on we shall retreat from this). A section of this social network is then the basis of the role-field or position-field 13 (see Figure 45a, band c with their alternative presentations of the facts). A remark on t role-segments'

Merton and Neal Gross 14 divide up the role of a position-holder into 'parts of the role-set' or 'role-segments'. In the example given by Gross and his co-workers, the school FT-D

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FROM INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY TO SOCIAL SCIENCE

superintendent has different segments of his position in the field of influence of a definite circle of persons (school authority, teachers, parental school board members, pupils). This not only characterizes him as School Superintendent X, but also forms part of his social 'position' - as a 'father', for example, he stands in other segmentrelationships; and it determines his similarity with other school M

M

M p P (a)

(b) (b)

Figure 46. Role-Segments. The portion shown as shaded is the

position on which the particular investigation concentrates, e.g. 'the School Superintendent' (based on Neal Gross et al., Explorations in Role Analysis, Figures 4-2 and 4-3, pp. 52 and 53). superintendents in terms of structural theory (and also, of field theory). The arrangement and designation in Figure 46a has not been essentially changed from that in Gross et al. It shows role-segment relationships in the manner of 'role-fields', viewed only in relation to the central personage. Figure 46b is extended to include connecting-links between the members of the role-field. We shall later proceed to a form of presentation in which overlapping social 'sector-fields' affect a number of scattered persons, and where a dominating influence is exerted on one segment of the personality of each. 15 The segmentation carried out by Gross and his co-workers, and correspondingly in the case of Merton, has to do with parts of a 'role' (or 'position'),16 which in its turn forms only a part of a whole personality. This dividing-up also corresponds entirely with Lewin's psychological recognition that consistent human conduct also assumes that the psychic life is divided up into relatively separate regions. 17 III A reflection, derived from field psychology, concerning the segment-theory of roles

Let us first combine both aspects of the segment-theory of roles in the terminology of field-theory: (a) Every person stands within the fields of tension with respect 80

THE THEORY OF THE 'ROLE-FIELD'

to several persons or groups. Thus the personality is divided up into roles, though a mediating 'Self' is left free, and the roles are once again divided up in an analogous fashion. The role is a generalization (or typification) of life-sections of definite 'classes' IS of persons. So each segment of the role can be referred to a group of members of the role-set (who on their side are not 'whole persons' either, but are typified sections, cf. Figures 46a and 48). (b) Different parts of the life-space of a person can be exposed, in a relatively separate fashion, to different zones of interpersonal tension (generalized not only according to role-segments, but also according to the psychological theory of personality). Whereas the role-field view, which is a conscious generalization of the personal outfield,19 is principally interested in extending the segmentation towards the outside,20 Lewin feels that the psychological view enables one to pursue more closely the division of the personal life-space. The latter course is the one which we intend to follow now. It therefore consists in presenting external influences in the field of intrapersonal consciousness and perception (i.e., the life-space). This must not be confused with an internalization of the role, which is something that we are deliberately ignoring, because it seems to us only significant as an inertia-factor (in the physical sense) when we come to offer an explanation of social occurrence and change. 21 We now want to refer to a model which we previously discussed (Figure 38),22 concerning the bases of marital conflict in the lifespace of a professional man. We also want to introduce the influence of the wife or the family F, and that of a supposed 'professional power-unit' B in the form of an overlapping induction ai-field. We therefore have a case of conflict between two induction-bearers within the 'field of consciousness' of one person. We symbolize the induced forces by means of vectors directed towards the respective inductionbearers (Figure 47). The individual forces of the husband H, with whose life-space we are concerned, are ignored. We assume that from time to time these individual forces will select certain areas, in which the individual will yield more to the induced forces coming from F or from B. The wife or family F alone will influence the spheres in the life-space (reading from left to right) comprising 'Housekeeping' and 'Children'. 'Profession' alone will influence the sub-sphere 'Office' within the professional sphere (top right in Figure 47), as well as the recreational sphere, particularly the golf club (bottom right). Competitive induction from both sources will affect the 'Social Obligations' (bottom left), as well as a part of 'Recreational Life' (bottom right) and a part of the 'Professional Sphere' (top right). One psychological consequence follows from a consideration of this model: namely, if frequent conflicts arise between the family

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influence and the professional influence over large areas of his lifespace, the person P will tend to separate the two zones of influence as much as possible from one another, so that their activities can proceed as far as possible in undisturbed 'totalities of action'. The way in which field-psychology here comes to the assistance of sociological role-theory should provide a basis for the following proposed distinction: Insofar as continuous totalities of action can be derived from the life-field (of a series) of persons, and these totalities can LsH

F

B

Figure 47. The Life-Space of a Person Situated in Two Induction Fields. LsH = life-space of the husband H F = family, especially the wife (as the 'first induction-source') B = profession or job - personified, e.g. as 'the boss' or 'Colleagues' (second induction-source) The life-space is divided up exactly as in our Figure 38. be standardized in their repeatability and possess largely continuous outfields in the social context, then we speak of 'roles' of the persons concerned. But if, within continuous totalities of action (which, as we have already said, are conceived of as repeatable), parts of the outfield can be separately identified but cannot be released from the 'totality of action', then we speak of segments (or parts of the roleset) of the existing roles. 23

IV Attempt at a field-theory of the social role

On the complexity of different tension-relationships (the 'field element' in the role-set) The tension-relationships in Figures 45 and 46 remind one of Moreno's sociograms, and the way in which they were also used by Hofstatter. 24 Without raising any direct disagreement, we should like to draw attention to a few ways in which these tension-relationships are peculiar in terms of field-theory. (a) As viewed typically by perceptual psychology, any tensionrelationship also constitutes a dispute between a person and some

82

THE THEORY OF TH E ' ROLE-FIELD'

'objective' power coming from outside and its subjective consciousness. The 'potency' of any relation as viewed by Lewin and Rommetveit,25 and Merton's 'intensity of role-involvement', lay the emphasis on subjective evaluation; Merton's 'differences of power of those involved in the role-set' put the stress more on the objective relation (though of course from an empirical point of view both are strongly intermingled). (b) All tension-relationships of a segmental type, in which a 'person'26 (or a position or a role) is involved, can also be seen as a field. This comprehensive field of possible conflicts within a role can then be described as a 'role-field' (or a position-field, in the case of positions). Here we follow Dahrendorf. 27 A role which is well-defined due to the frequent emergence of its more or less 'dominating characteristic'28 is not determined by analogous qualities of its representative, but by analogous qualities of its typical role-field. The characteristic behaviour of 'teachers' or 'young people at the age of puberty' - to quote two examples of roles - may be primarily traced back to similarities in the respective fields of tension (especially in the comparison of the role-sets), in which those particular 'classes of persons' 29 are to be found. Conflict in the role-field and t clouds of ideas'

An analogous role-field always means that there are also analogous possibilities for intra-role conflict. To actualize this in each case would involve a special application of the more general statement of the role-field of a particular role. Thus for example, the engagement of teachers at a denominational or co-educational school will depend on the influential weight (i.e., the potency) of the school authority, the parents' council, the local authorities and the churches, whose weight will multiply the weight of the particular engagement. A verbal version of the corresponding equations may be presented as follows: 'Parents' council for co-educational school' times 'potency of parents' council for teacher of town of X' plus 'school authority for co-educational school' times 'potency of school authority . . .' minus 'local authority for denominational school' times 'potency of local authority .. .' minus 'church for denominational school' times 'potency of clergy for teacher of town of X'. The construct of potency emphasizes the characteristic mixture of 'shared frames of reference' and 'enduring social pressure' (to use Rommetveit's terminology)30 which is to be found in role-norms and which leads to a lack of uniform interpretation. A minimum of intra-role conflict occurs when there is a consensus between the members of the role-sets in the role-field (then there is 83

FROM INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY TO SOCIAL SCIENCE

merely the conflict between the Ego and its role as a whole); but in the instance we are quoting this does not happen. This consensus can be exchanged with the valid norm for a role. 31 We are not concerning ourselves here with the norm of role or position, because we believe them to be an ambiguous concept. In our opinion, the theoretical definition of a class of roles is not separated sharply enough from the operating power field of the role in question, so that cases of confusion may occur. We should prefer to assume that

State educational authority

'Public opinion'

(Cath.)

School directors Parents'

(Of town X)

Clergy

Council

Churches

Y

association

Local authority

(Protestant)

party Z

Figure 48. Extended Role-Field. 'ideological clouds' or, to use a more neutral expression 'clouds of ideas'32 are superimposed (perhaps in the marxist sense) on the tension-relationships of the concrete role-fields. The genesis of these belongs to the sociology of opinion and the formation of norms. 33 They influence the role-field of each role directly through the persons who fill these roles or positions (e.g., by the reading of newspapers), but also by means of the members of the role-sets, who are under corresponding influences. If rolerepresentatives and members of the role-set, or different members of the role-set, are not influenced by the same 'cloud of ideas', then one may assume that conflict will occur; to follow out the cloudanalogy, one might jokingly say: stormy weather. Such a conflict might spread not only inside the special role-field, but also, socially

84

THE THEORY OF THE 'ROLE-FIELD'

speaking, in the direct relations between the different 'ideologies' or 'clouds of ideas' (viewed as products of their supporters with reactions on these). The juridical norms for a position constitute one 'cloud of ideas' among others; another possibility is a widespread rational theory concerning a definite role. We may think for instance of the role of the entrepreneur in the theory of market economy. By this means the potency of the first could be founded on state power, and that of the last grounded on the authority of the rational element in Western society (Max Weber). But theoretically both legal norm and recognized theory in the role-field are in competition with 'polylogical fields' and 'fields of interest' (following Linde or Myrdal).34 These contain irrational and multifarious clusters of opinion, or can even be permeated by them. In a non-revolutionary society the competing influences of 'clouds of ideas' might not lead to open conflict; they might lead to silent shifts of importance in the social positions and roles, in the course of the evolutionary process of history. The identification of elites and power-groupings with the super-structure that conceals them, endows the 'irrigation' by means of clouds of ideas with the inductive force of magnetic fields. We pursue this idea in Chapters 11_13. 35

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part three

The field-theory in social science versus the theories of system and structures

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8 A criticism of the 'system' of

structural functionalism and of the departure from 'elements'

I On the starting-point of the discussion about system-theories The difference between Parsons' attitude and that common to the ~arious field-theories

The discussion of the subject of 'field versus structure or system', for example for and against Parsons, resolves itself on closer examination into a more subtle confrontation. It is quite possible to take Parsons' The Structure of Social Action and include it under the heading of field-theory, in the way that Morton Deutsch tries to do. 1 The way in which his attempt at an orientation-pattern comes close to perceptual and gestalt psychology is unmistakable. The unity of the 'life-space' perceived by the person is applied to the personality-system. Parsons' concept of socialization is close to Tolman's learning psychology, which in its turn is not far removed from gestalt and field psychology.2 In all his work Parsons shows a great interest in totalistic connections. He has the incontrovertible merit of having drawn the attention of American sociologists to the subject of forming theories about society as a whole. The formation of systems and sub-systems, apart from its particular inadequacy in classificatory procedure, does not need to contradict field-theory. It comes quite close to the view taken by field-theory regarding the part-whole relationship. On the other hand the special sort of division which Parsons makes into systems and sub-systems (in his The Social System) is just that which is attacked by Lewin and J. F. Brown, when they condemn the so-called 'classification-theories'. 3 Parsons in his Social System is not presenting himself as the Darwin of sociology, but much more as its Linnaeus. I think that The Social System quite definitely moves in the wrong direction, not only when it takes refuge in abstraction,

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FIELD-THEORY VERSUS SYSTEM AND STRUCTURES THEORIES

but when it simply disavows the 'dynamic principle' in The Theory of Social Action. We are referring to the inter-relationship between person and society, which in The Social System, as against The Structure of Social Action, is surrendered in favour of a one-sided imprint-system of society on to person. Nor is this described as being a result of social forces; on the contrary it is presented like a religion, as a super-personality system in a cultural vein. The culture-system, which is more like a Super-Ego than the result of historical powerconstellations, dominates the whole system of social relationships. 4 One clear sign of the change which overtook Parsons as a theorist, between his early work and The Social System, is the way in which he withdrew the 'subjective view of the actors' in favour of the symbols of culture. 5 By this means Parsons wanted to facilitate the generalization, which is necessary to explain action on the basis of a system of structural functionalism. Yet the goal was too far off, if Parsons thought he could eliminate factors like sUbjective interests by this means. The incorporation of 'actions' into an 'objective' social system appears to have been attained, but only at the expense of substantial and excessive losses. These losses - apart from the failure in generalization - have led to the same error appearing in The Social System (which is only logically, and not dynamically, constructed): namely, that it excludes ex definitione any changes by influencing the basic arrangement. 6 We shall come back to this when we contrast it with the social field-theory. An anticipated summary of the most essential points of difference

The dispute for or against Parsons (or for and against the 'system of structural functionalism' and its supporters)7 appears to come to a head in two groups of questions at different levels: A: Is society in a static or quasi-staticS equilibrium, or, in other words: 'Does change occur 1'9 This question can be divided in its turn into two sub-groups: (a) How do the positions and roles really come into existence, as well as the structure of society and its norms? How is it that they appear in the system all at once and operate on people's behaviour? Here, in my opinion, an element of generalization in the theory is mistaken for a real causal connection. (b) Is society really so atomistic and canalized into orders as the liberal theory of market economy and the liberal-conservative tendency of the sociology of structural functionalism appear to assume? Is it not a struggle between power-blocs and a dynamic of tension-relationships of the most varied kind ?10 B: Which procedures for generalization are really permissible? Can a theorist say that his theory is valid in general, but is not

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THE 'SYSTEM' OF STRUCTURAL FUNCTIONALISM

applicable to the individual instance?l1 In what follows, we should like to treat this point in connection with (A), on the lines of our thesis that the apparent or real conservatism and lack of dynamic in Parsons' system is closely connected with his specific procedure for generalization. A critical remark on theol'ies of system and structure

In order that our critical methodology should not be misunderstood as a personal polemic against a particular author, we should like to define our adversary in a fictitious manner. What do we mean antithetically by theories of structure or system? By theories of structure and system we mean logically rational constructs compounded out of a few 'elements', which are classificatory and tend to overemphasize orders as against the flow of events. This type of procedure should not be summarily described as useless, but it does stand in great need of being expanded. It does of course have some scientific meaning, if one follows Kant in impressing ordered schemata on reality. Much of the progress made in the exact sciences over the last century (I am thinking particularly of natural science and economics) has only been possible in this way. The axiomatic arrangement of data into logical systems, which then permit further calculation internally, does certainly contribute to the solution of many practical or theoretical tasks. In its most modern form, we think of the systems of electronic calculation or cybernetics,12 particularly by reproducing repeatable basic forms. The only thing is that the particular system of axioms in question must not be mistaken for reality itself. For it is in the essence of any system of axioms, that, taken by itself alone, it always tends to confirm itself even more,l3 For this reason the pre-mathematical (or pre-logical) possibly vivid construction of the model is very much more important for the empirical correctness of theoretical assertions than any internal development of the model. 14 In the event that a particular structure-model or order-mode finds (or appears to find) certain confirmations in reality, one will be glad to forget the extent to which its historical basis is subject to changes, which mostly proceed from facts that are not adequately contained in the 'System' itself. The reason is that at the time when the model was created they did not seem essential for this.15 Of course it is always convenient to use several different methods (e.g., a mathematical model and a historical description) on the same problem. This means that one does not always have to be concocting reality out of one's favourite system in order to make it fit, by explaining away the smaller deviations as inessential, and 91

FIELD-THEORY VERSUS SYSTEM AND STRUCTURES THEORIES

describing the larger ones as pathological deviations, which have to be 'cured' .16 II A criticism of 'thinking in elements' In his discussion with Parsons, Dahrendorf admits that in the category of social 'action' he is dealing with the most elementary frames of reference in social theory. 1 7 Now this does not seem to me to be such an indisputable fact that, when criticizing Parsons' system of structural functionalism, it should (so to speak) represent neutral ground and be left out of the line of fire. Parsons has not committed a personal sin of omission, in that he has failed to establish a meaningful link between the elementary part of 'social action' and the later instrumental category of 'status-role' for his Social System. Nor is it connected with the so-called aggregation-problem. I believe this to be an illusory problem which is not soluble, because it is not meaningfully stated. IS It could also be that there is something wrong with the category of 'social action' and with the wish to depart from 'elements' in social theory altogether. A criticism of the 'category of social action'

Human action is not an elementary category of social activity, any more than the stone is an elementary category of free fall (or a category consisting of 'falling stones'). Both are an instance of pregalilean thinking, in the sense used by Lewin. 19 In addition there is the fact that human action is not autonomous, whatever ethical pleas one may offer in favour of the independence and consistency of the person. In the first place it is the result of many factors, and only when all these are combined do we get definite forms of social or other action. It may indeed be meaningful to define 'sociology' provisionally as a branch of science concerned with 'social action'. Moreover it is very instructive to investigate (and theoretically elaborate) concrete variations of social action; but as a universal and fundamental category it fails to grasp sufficiently the essence of itself and is a mere empty envelope, which simultaneously says everything and nothing. It would be equally useless, for example, to consider 'being ill' or 'feeling ill' as an elementary category of medicine. 20 In the second place, even more important than the divisibility is the fact that any social, and indeed, any human, conduct is determined by the physio-psychological and social field in which it occurs. The person cannot be defined without the all-embracing whole in which he stands, even if the latter can be formed within certain limits by

92

THE 'SYSTEM' OF STRUCTURAL FUNCTIONALISM

the individual and assigns a certain limited scope for individual initiative, none of which excludes the scientific determinism of the field. 21 This also constitutes an error in the individualistic approach of Max Weber, in that his idea of the purposiveness of human action causes him to neglect (or at least seem to neglect) its causal social determinism. This Ideal-type is connected with his ideal of freedom for the entrepreneur and the politician, but it is known that Weber analysed the forced actions in the so-called Verband - for instance 'Bureaucracy' - tOO.22 Parsons may have been following an inspiration which is fundamentally correct, when, in contrast to his earlier Theory of Social Action (which is better, and largely based on Max Weber),23 he took a different line in his Social System; here he established the category of 'status-role', determined functionally out of the whole, as an elementary category in place of social action. Only now he went much too far in the direction of 'functionalism', to make sure that he did not have to register any fact from outside his system. This produced nothing but the famous cat that bit its own tail; except that, from an economic point of view, this was somewhat nearer the middle of the cat.

The wish to depart from elements in an intellectual error Here is one very simple parallel: how did Watt come to discover the steam-engine? He certainly did not begin by inventing connectingrods, cylinders, etc., as elementary categories, and then go on to construct systems with them, until finally the steam-engine appeared. 24 In the case of a logically constructed theory, however, one fails to notice the senselessness of such a procedure because the degree of abstraction is so far off from reality. Walter Eucken was therefore certainly correct, when he accused Otmar Spann and other system-theorists of always starting from elementary categories and going on to build axiomatically. An intellectual edifice, based upon elementary categories which are empirically doubtful, easily becomes warped. Heisenberg's recommendation in this case is that one should 'begin somewhere in the middle'. Only when applied in a wider context (particularly with empirical checks) does it become clear what can be meaningfully employed as a component. Here it can also turn out that the 'elements' are no more fundamental than their connecting-links. 25 Nor should one forget the possibility of a change in understanding over time, e.g., as happened with atoms; earlier on, molecules were taken for atoms, and today even the atoms have proved to be less fundamental than the fields of energy that govern them. 93

FIELD-THEORY VERSUS SYSTEM AND STRUCTURES THEORIES

It is only apparently, or from a purely operational point of view, that 'elements' can be conceived of before the theory is constructed. In actual fact they are no more and no less important than the theory as a whole, and they constitute an intermediate result of this.26 What remedy for this seems likely to be most successful? The only possible way out is Dahrendorf's proposal that one should start from real problems 27 and, as we should like to add, from the constellations of forces which we suppose to exist in those real problems. In addition there should be testing of all models 'somewhere in the middle' in the light of the reality which they represent. When the proof cannot be done quantitatively, it is better that there should be comparisons by similarity rather than nothing at all.

In

Warnings against the 'classifying theory'

A conceptualized system produces neither a sociological model nor a theory of society

Even if the concepts are simplified, the most essential reason why a theoretical system, such as Parsons' 'Social System' or M. J. Levy's 'Social Structure', 28 is scarcely in a position to explain social events, is to be found in its predominantly classificatory construction. The Social System does not produce any model of a physical or modern economic type, even if it may contain such in the form of a smoothlyfunctioning ideal-type of American society. There has been much criticism of this static concept of society, but mostly from marginal notes or between-the-lines. Most categories or concepts formed were on the lines of this kind of model; one only detects this, for example, by the definition of behaviour which conforms to and deviates from the system. 29 The Social System can be taken as a guide to classification of phenomena in a world which corresponds to a type of model that is liberal-economic and specifically democratic. C. Wright Mills has very strikingly summarized the great classificatory work of The Social System, and on the subject of all subsequent theorizing, he remarks that anyone who dislikes systembuilding is bound to feel that 'the Emperor has no clothes'. 30 A misunderstanding of Max Weber's 'Wertfreiheit' from his basic sociological concepts?

How did Parsons become so deeply involved in this abstraction? In my opinion this may have started with his attempt at classification, and this in its turn grew out of a misunderstanding of Weber's concept of 'value-freedom' assisted perhaps by a mistake about the essence and intention of Weber's Grundbegriffe (basic concepts in sociology).31 94

THE 'SYSTEM' OF STRUCTURAL FUNCTIONALISM

Max Weber had already made a strict distinction between classificatory ideal-types and those representing hypotheses for causal connections. Here he again distinguished between those representing short-term causal connections and those which characterized historical periods. 32 Max Weber himself was interested almost exclusively in the two latter, or rather he saw them as a theoretical and scientific goal that had to be attained as an instrument for the causal explanation of individual historical events. The purely classificatory ideal-type is to be found once again in Bochenski. under the name of 'constitution-system'; in his own words, it 'can be viewed as an axiomatic system of conventional symbols'.33 The construction of axiom-systems may be altogether questionable in social science, except for clearly circumscribed models, though even here it must be preceded by a proper theory of content, but the constitution-system is a positive snare. Anyone who is not clear about its essence and instrumental character, may diverge completely from reality. A constitution-system is a system of nominal definitions which determine each other mutually; it is the logical extension of syntax. Its 'laws' are the rules by which the existing expressions may be converted into other expressions. Any definition requires such rules. But in an empirical science any real definition also contains 'real' statements (even if initially they are only hypothetical) concerning the relations of objects which are to be incorporated in the theory. Now the purpose of a good theory is to analyse and set free the real assertions locked up in the definitions (or even in axiom-systems, where the definitions take the place of what Kant would call a priori axioms, and where definition and synthesis develop from each other).34 In addition the 'constitutionsystem' (like any axiom-system) can be used as a means, but in itself alone it explains nothing. Straightaway comes C. Wright Mills' remark, aimed at Parsons, to the effect that the 'Great System' theory is 'drunken in syntax, blind in semantics'.as The Social System really ceases to operate effectively, when it passes through the stage of classifying concepts and peters out in a system of agreements about nomenclature. This does, however, still contain real statements from earlier and better arguments in the form of subordinate clauses and footnotes. Max Weber's 'basic sociological concepts' (GrundbegrifJe) can give the impression that they will pave the way for systems of nomenclature such as Parsons'. We believe it is possible that they may have had this effect on Parsons himself, who laid great importance on his succession to Weber. The principal difference lies in the position occupied by the conceptual system within the whole edifice of research. Moreover one should not be misled by the fact that Weber's definitions came so near the end of his research-life that in some ways 95

FIELD-THEORY VERSUS SYSTEM AND STRUCTURES THEORIES

they give the impression of a summing-up. They were thought out in a purely instrumental fashion. 36 If he had allotted his system of definitions the supreme theoretical place, he would not have been Max Weber, but at best Parsons. The bad habit of mistaking systems of nomenclature for a higher type of theory seems to be very widespread. Even a social anthropologist like S. F. Nadel, who tries so hard to be realistic, succumbs to this temptation when assessing his own 'role-inventories'. 37 It was Max Weber's intention to take these very careful real definitions and have them ready as a tool-kit which would be of some assistance with more comprehensive statements about the relations of reality. His procedure of maintaining a distance from reality with the aid of ideal types was intended to open up reality for the human understanding. It was rather like an intellectual equivalent of the principle by which psychological gestalten are perceived. But this procedure should in no way be confused with an invitation to abandon theory and substitute systems of nomenclature with an increasing degree of abstraction. It is not true that systems of nomenclature are the most 'value-free' type of theory, simply because their nature prevents them from including any causal statements. 3S On the contrary, they tend to lead one particularly into making evaluations, precisely because they do not necessarily force one into any empirical order. Looked at from this point of view it is only natural that the ordering categories in Parsons' Social System should be of a normative kind - and deductions from them seriously offend against Max Weber's demand for value-freedom. For the whole point of the latter is that orders of value occurring in reality, as well as in the investigator himself, should not be intellectually confused with the order of theory, which is developed for purposes of knowledge and by means of which one hopes to comprehend this very reality.

Consequences of the Aristotelian origin of classification It was characteristic of the original theory of classes (which sprang

from the aristotelian discussion of substance) to deduce the behaviour of individuals from the classes to which they were allotted. This is something that a classificatory system of concepts will no longer provide in the way of foundation for a modern theory.39 But any theory of structure and roles does contain a danger of this. The classes of 'conformist' and 'nonconformist behaviour', for example, are purely arbitrary and ancillary concepts, which can make no statement about the causality of events. The behaviour is divided into classes, and then these are used to explain the behaviour. But this is a circular argument, which gains nothing in scientific value by the fact that it is accompanied by a moralistic undertone.

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THE 'SYSTEM' OF STRUCTURAL FUNCTIONALISM

But we do not wish to argue against classification by ideal types, as Max Weber and Pareto did, when they proposed to separate rational from irrational or impulsive conduct, which the rationalists found less comfortable. 40 These are 'concepts and judgments which do not constitute empirical reality, or even represent it, but enable it to be intellectually ordered in a valid manner'41 ('valid' refers only to the particular purpose of the investigation).42 As scientists, however, we wish to grasp reality - or what else do we want? To make a division into classes, as a game for its own sake? Then the remark of C. Wright Mills would apply to us: 'Drunken in syntax, blind in semantics'. 43 Why then do we form concepts, if not to establish connections between real events and so that we can always scrutinize further theorizing in the light of reality? The logical development of a classification system does not constitute genuine theory, from which behaviour or events may be deduced. 44 Now we do not wish to maintain that any system, or any theory of structure, must lead to unpractical and nonsensical theorizing. We only wish to draw attention to the dangers involved in this particular kind of theorizing. In the case of system-theories these dangers lie in the axiomatic construction; with structural theories they lie in the classificatory procedure; and in systems that are both they lie in both (as, for instance, in Parsons' Social System).

IV A criticism of normative functionalism 45 On the idea of organism in functional theories

Our criticism of the construction of systems from elements appears to lead on to organic functionalism. 46 We should like to halt this impression at once. The fact that something exists in more comprehensive relationships of interdependence, cannot allow one to conclude that these function as a closed organism. In complex social relations one can never take a loose 'super-organism', as if it were a 'super-concept', and deduce from this with certainty the functions of all individuals (not even in the form of 'role-concepts'). Before investigating it, one can never know whether a coherent reality possesses an organic or some other form of harmonious total system; nor can one know it with certainty even after investigation, because present 'functioning' cannot enable one to draw conclusions about the distant future, however excellent the logic of the 'system' may be. A priori, functionalism almost always has a tendency to favour the ruling authority. It is true that the 'field-theories' we are concerned with are not far removed from organic-functionalist thought, but there is no harmony within them, and the boundaries of each totality are 'open'Y

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SO, in the absence of hypocritical analogies with organisms, we should always remember (and this is something they tend to neglect) that a real organism does not merely 'function' in itself, but also grows and develops. Change, genesis and decay form a part of everything natural (and 'cultural') just as much as the structure at a particular moment in time. According to one familiar remark of RadcliffeBrown, societies can 'become sick as a pig and recover as a hippopotamus'.48 So theories of structural functionalism, which are not exactly organic and harmonious, must not abandon this. Any effective totality in field-theory is changeable and yet operationally fixed in its structure and delimitation. A remark on the integration of the social system as a norm-system

In Parsons the integration of the social system is the integration of a norm-system. He himself compares it with the ordering of a theory;49 more precise would be the integration of a statute-book, in which everything and anything can be subsumed under some paragraph or other. Certain possible variations are actually given; in the schemata presented by Parsons different constituent facts may be filled in. 50 But as a whole the reality arranged in this way tends to become a classification of concepts. Even if Parsons wishes to feel that his theory and the interpretation of reality are strictly separate, there is still some compulsion to think in hierarchical, and to some extent quasi-juridical orders,51 a tendency to select the constituent facts. Individual actions (or better: the degree of variation in filling roles in society) are functionally determined in accordance with a system of norms; and the problem of how this arises, in contrast to how it is intellectually integrated, which lies on a quite different plane, is not even allusively recognized as an object for investigation. Parsons takes up a strange attitude regarding the significance of achieving social positions and roles. The origin of definite forms of human activity and division of labour (from various motives, needs, etc.), or of particular ranks, norms and customs, seems to Parsons to be worthy of investigation only in the initial stages of cultures. 52 If the integrated system of symbols that one calls a culture is present in a highly developed form, as in the U.S.A. for instance, it will be learnt by individuals; in addition their personal motives and interests will retire into the background (or at least will be 'canalized'). All human actions then take place in a system of relations governed by the division of labour - a system which will only be modified to an insignificant degree by technical innovation and medical progress. 53 A classic example of this would be the relation between worker and employer; in spite of a change in persons, such as revolutions in 98

THE 'SY STEM' OF STRUCTURAL FUNCTIONALISM

Pareto's sense, this simply cannot be eliminated because it is functionally unavoidable. Parsons was strongly influenced by Alfred Marshall's ideas on the economic cycle. 64 Here the circulation of goods determines the functions or positions of the individuals. Even social positions are something like the places taken up by players in a game such as football or, in the manner of the economic theory of circulation, they resemble branchings-off in a system of pipes or an electrical network. They are defined in the social system by their relative position to one another. They do not determine each other causally in a reciprocal manner, but stay in place like logical classes or forms, held by the 'logic' of the division of labour and of the 'cultural integration'. 55 , Processes' as a schema of circulation

In his Social System Parsons emphasizes in one place the fundamental distinction between 'processes in the system' and 'processes which alter the system'. 56 Almost always, when Parsons misleadingly speaks of 'processes', he means the first of these, which we follow Lewin in describing as 'quasi-stationary'. 57 The second usage he avoids as much as possible. 58 Since Parsons' real ideas regarding the structure of the role-system A THE ECONOMY G Sub-system

A Sub-system I Sub-system

Productivity Capital

A Sub-system I Sub-system

G THE POLITY G Sub-system

P 'imperative cooperation'

r

we

fp o

'Contingent support'

Al

y

no

tio

loc a

a

oli tic atl

l lo y

s ion at bin s) om ice -c ut ion rv tp at l se ou niz ra w ga ue Ne Or ren p re nt

(E

Consumer goods and services

Labour services

G Sub-system (aspect of household)

I Sub-system

Pattern content

I Sub-system

G Sub-system

PATTERN MAINTENANCESYSTEM L

A Sub-system

Motivation lor structural conformity

A Sub-system

INTEGRATING SYSTEM I

Figure 49. 'A Sociological Schema of Circulation' (after T. Parsons, Economy and Society, p. 68).59

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in reality are generally very nebulously expressed, we are following his own hint about his parallel procedure with economics. 60 There are in fact schematic diagrams of Parsons' idea of the system, which recall the schemata of economic circulation (apart from the somewhat remarkable aggregate-formation),61 such as the one reproduced in Figure 49. This diagram is a typical input-output schema on the lines of economic theory62 (as in Figure 50a). The principle of exchange relationships, which is valid for larger social or economic units, can also be applied to the relation between Structure Goods

(In return for money) Employers

P1 P2 'Processes'

Housekeeping Wages

P4

P3

(In return for labour)

(a)

(b)

Figure 50. (a) A Schema of Economic Circulation; (b) A 'PositionStructure' (section). individual positions (or roles). I believe it also applies to other theories of structural functionalism, particularly that of Davis and Moore. 63 Figure 50a shows an economic schema of circulation, consisting of employers and workers, the last being customers, too. This system can easily be transferred to a functional position-structure (such as Figure 50b). Each position involves a function for holders of other positions. The functioning of the whole system requires above all a certain institutionalization of relations in order to ensure a calculable degree of stability in the same. 64 Mechanisms for this stabilization are summarized in the so-called 'pattern maintenance-system' of Parsons (see Figure 49).65 It supplies division of labour and stability of structure, and connected to some extent with these it also provides for political loyalty towards the existing political system. The 'integrative system' consists in the main of entrepreneurial activities, it creates organization and is interested in maintaining the existing order (stability of structure). The whole existing system is integrated normatively, like a religion for instance, which has to be learnt by all the participants. 66 Now

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THE 'SYSTEM' OF STRUCTURAL FUNCTIONALISM

even with the worst will in the world nothing can change (or so Parsons seems to hope); no change is needed, because all functions are carried out for the greatest good of all (only medical and technical improvements are excepted).67 The only movements in the system are functional currents and (these, of course, are theoretically uninteresting) occasional changes of position-holders. Ideas of equilibrium and the significance of deviations according to the economic pattern

(a) The old harmonistic idea of equilibrium. Between the old liberal economics and the modern brand, the idea of economic equilibrium has changed in a remarkable fashion. The origin of the idea of equilibrium lay in the notion of harmony; one thinks for example of Adam Smith's 'invisible hand', which was of theological origin. 68 The old idea of equilibrium was perhaps even connected with the notion of equality. The idea of harmony allied with considerations of equality leads on to the view that all possess an equally small amount of power in the competition between them, and also suggests that all will have equal happiness or satisfaction. Differences in ability bring with them a certain modification (today we say: 'Equal opportunity for all'), but do not alter the fundamental idea. (b) Practical equilibrium ('if nothing really alters'). The modern economic notion of equilibrium is far more prosaic. In an economy or any other situation involving a number of participants, equilibrium exists if none of the participants feels he has any occasion to alter his dispositions. 69 If then someone has been calculating on a misfortune and has prudently held back (with his production, for instance) and the failure occurs, equilibrium is held to exist. Much the same happens with Parsons' 'inner equilibrium' of the person-role, when there is internalization of a role. If a person accommodates himself to the role-expectations, there is said to be internal equilibrium; inappropriate wishes are balanced by, for example, fear of sanctions. 70 This notion of equilibrium has its operational meaning in the modern theory of investment and expansion. Here there is even a 'dynamic equilibrium': if entrepreneurs recognize a trend and adjust their investments accordingly so that the change passes off evenly, then the change is said to have 'equilibrium'. 71 We hear no more about happiness or harmony. If someone cheats somebody else, and the latter does not defend himself because he sees that he is too weak, this is a case of equilibrium. To put it briefly, equilibrium exists if, within a definite sphere, nothing changes for a certain period.

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(C) The confusion of both these in the system of structural functionalism and in neo-liberal economic theory. Neo-liberal economics and the liberal-conservative tendency in American sociology now treat this altered concept of equilibrium just as if it were still the old one. Any interference that alters something fundamental is a sin; any deviationist behaviour borders on the criminal. If men do not reconcile themselves to what is 'orderly' (i.e., to one possible equilibrium among many), they are plunging into communism or chaos. 72 Now we are not going to deny that certain social and economic conditions are preferable to others on their merits. But it is not the task of a realistic theory to stigmatize certain deviations as ethically dangerous, and exclude them from investigation by means of the logical construction of the theory.

(d) Equilibrium and circulation. The idea of economic circulation originally came from the doctor and economist Quesnay, who was doubtless led to it by the discovery of the circulation of the blood. 73 Basically his idea is not unlike the way in which the Romans compared the different classes to the organs of the body, This was certainly also the view of society adopted by Parsons and DavisMoore. Quesnay felt that his model positively confirmed the (normative!) order of Natural Right. Here equilibrium is held to be the undisturbed course of the whole self-regulating process, on the lines of the classical English economics of Adam Smith, who was also a theologian and a professor of moral science. The way in which the circulation idea was taken up a second time by Keynes (the earlier revival by Marshall was less striking) was indicative of something quite different. The newer more moderate notion of equilibrium produced a break-through to a dynamic view. There is a lack of equilibrium, for instance, if the economic investments are considerably larger than the volume of savings. Now devices are sought which will tend to equate the volume of savings with the investments (so-called forced saving) in such a way that equilibrium in these important factors will be once again achieved. This can occur either statically or (and this was more interesting to Keynes and his students) in the process of economic change. 74 This recognition that there was a circulatory movement throughout the whole economy helped to indicate the most effective points at which to apply politico-economic measures (e.g., to bring about an increase in employment). In addition, all theorizing was forced to remain in closer touch with the observation of real events (even if 'models' were constructed) than was possible in the case of Parsons' nominalist system of concepts.

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9 A first attempt at the field-theory of society as a whole

I Reciprocity and reversibility of the field relationship, the main starting-point in field-theory procedure How do we

arri~e

at the social forces?

Friedrich Fiirstenberg uses a basic conception of field-theory to approach society, which he distinguishes from both the predominant tendencies in sociological theory. These are the 'normative ethical view' and the 'logically coherent ahistorical model'. This last is the theory of system and structure in the sense criticized by us. 1 As against this, the third method consists in 'making a dynamic analysis of present-day society within the context of a model, while renouncing any quantitative statements; it also keeps in view the forces which shape and determine the structure of society. Thus the processes are not (as Parsons, for example, proposed) incorporated a priori in a social system; instead they are viewed as its foundation often operating independently of it.'2 This view of the field has to grasp the formal and informal structure of society, 3 and in particular the part that is conditioned by power. Furstenberg does not go as far as H. Kluth (who comes close to his, and our, conception), in the way of disputing the objective existence of any kind of social structure. 4 But he does assert that various different systems, dependent on more than one elite, combine together in operation alongside one another. In Chapters 12 and 13 we try to put forward a similar model of our own, while we will look at Fiirstenberg's conception at the end of this chapter and in Chapter 16. Fiirstenberg holds that the investigatory position, which we are talking about, can seldom be applied, and then only tentatively.5 In 103

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this treatise we present a whole series of approaches to field-theory, and in most cases their authors are quite unaware how often their position has already been presented. In fact, however, no theory has yet been elaborated which completely combines theory and practice. The reason is that most field-theorists do not know whether they are supposed to be giving a description, or whether they should be making their approach by means of more abstract model-constructs. In Chapter 17, Sections 2-4, we propose that covariation models or a kind of 'decision-model' should be introduced into a not-tooabstract theory. Let us start again from our critique of social action as an elementary category for systems. We certainly recognize that social forces are exerted by individuals. It is not easy, particularly with modern scientific education, to imagine supra-individual forces at work in society. And yet when men are together, they act quite differently from how they do when they are alone (i.e., in isolation, as far as we can assume this to be possible). Social life produces forces, which we can quite well think of as localized in individuals, but which cannot possibly be deduced by the isolated analysis of those individuals. This must be amplified however: human work and human influences can be rendered independent or 'alienated' - e.g., by the death of the creator - and this can be perpetuated by modern techniques of communication. On the other hand, it is not by norms and values becoming independent that we can arrive at these forces in their regular efficacy. The firmly ordained system of norms, which assigns everyone to his position and role, is the obverse of an atomistic and harmonious conception of the world. The individual can change nothing in such a system. He must leave those in authority to carry on quietly and follow out their roles, even if this means that he has to play the part of a small free economic man, while having a place in a combine. 6

Reversibility and graduations in the nexus of power If one wishes to investigate the real influences on a system (assuming it really exists), one needs a few ideas of a different kind. First of all it should be noted that men exert very different influences on social events. Then it should be emphasized that there is an elite in the theory, or rather, a whole number of different 'elites' of different strengths. 'Who influences whom? Who lets himself be influenced by whom 1 And how strongly in each case l' Those would be the central questions. 7 Lewin himself never produced any elite theory, but his idea of a planned re-education of German lower and middle elites, from the

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National Socialist and authoritarian mode to the democratic style of government, shows that he had this in mind. In my opinion, his ideas might come close to those of Katz and Lazarsfeld, for instance, or of planning economists such as Tinbergen, or Dahl and Lindblom. s As the obverse of the elite conception, we must note something which seems closer to ideas about norms and roles: namely, most people act within the context of facts, which can be more easily influenced by others than by themselves. But, and this is important, even powerful people are subject to the influence of non-powerful people. 9 This is not a mere mirrorimage. Considered as individuals, the 'governors' have more opportunities of 'directing'; but even the laws of their conduct are not quite divine. To a large extent they are determined by the 'field' of their subjects and peers. It is here that we find the concrete research-problem of social science, and not in analysing or classifying norms in themselves. These norms themselves are not of any divine origin; when they were formed they were subject to laws similar to those of elite-formation. To some extent they are 'emanations' of elite-formation.

The field of the individual, a 8y mptom of the totalistic theory ofsociety Concerning roles, we should like to assume that these derive quite as much (i.e., partly) out of direct field-influences from persons or groups to persons (cf. Merton's role-set and our own reflections in Chapter 7) as they do from 'alienated' norms. In some way, however, these norms overlap the social relationships in the form of 'mists' or 'clouds' of varying thickness. Let us begin with the first aspect; the second can be introduced later in a supplementary form. Every person acts within a field, which is under the causative influence of other persons, of the ecological environment and of himself. As I think has been demonstrated very credibly by Gehlen,lO Man is not affected to any great extent by the environmental conditions of Nature. We may also compare Rothacker's remark, in connection with a quotation from Holderlin, that a tree offers considerably less resistance to human thought than other men do. l l On the other hand Lewin considers that human institutions in their real essence (in contrast to the human consciousness, which alone is capable of determining action) also forms part of the ecological environment. Suppose we leave on one side the distinction, which perceptual psychology makes, between 'subjective' and 'objective'; then we can place the person and the social (i.e., human) environment over against

lOS

FIELD-THEORY VERSUS SYSTEM AND STRUCTURES THEORIES

one another as opposite poles. 12 The environment conceived in this way acts as a field of forces to shape the person (as for the perception, this can easily be reconciled); but the person also forms a field around himself (for himself just as much as for others, in whose field he acts as a force-factor). To pass from this statement, which can be extended from the person to positions and roles, over to a reciprocal theory for the whole of society, is the feat which we aim to perform.There are various conceivable ways of doing this,13 but I think that the one followed by Dahl and Lindblom is by no means the worst. The causal conception of field, the presupposition that structural models and theories of historical issues may be combined We should like to deal with one point, which perhaps remains obscure from our earlier arguments. The criticism that a classificatory view of structure was not causal, and the other remark that it could not explain historical issues, seem to be concerned with quite different points of view. And yet we should like to follow Lewin in asserting that both are indissolubly bound up together. Not only is there a difference between 'structural' ideal types and long-term historical types (Max Weber does not confine himself to classificatory types);14 there are also structural cross-sections which contain history15 (a limiting-value that is particularly interesting in the case of the present as a cross-section in the flow of actions),16 and there are those that are blind to history. In my opinion, structural models that are purely classificatory or valid 'for all time', belong to the latter type; even when one classifies historical issues and forces, I think that one often finishes up 'alongside' history. The field-view of social structure, when considered as a dynamic cross-sectional model, is open to the dynamic of actions as well as to history. The model taken by Dahl and Lindblom is not a theory of history on the lines of Marx; fundamentally it is nothing very different from a rather more realistic and practical version of Parsons' Social System. It takes a field-theoretical view and skilfully combines partial ideal types in a pragmatic and variable fashion. It is deliberately orientated to present-day American events, and makes no valuejudgments or prophecies at all. And it was successful in playing down the contrast between structure and the course of events, by avoiding unnecessary classifications and abstractions, while still theorizing in a valid manner.

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THE FIELD-THEORY OF SOCIETY AS A WHOLE

II The micro-sociological field-statement made by Dahl and Lindblom 'People operate in the fields of other people'

The principal basis of Dahl and Lindblom's conception can be summarized in the proposition: 'People operate in the fields of other people.'l7 As regards the individual, we already have the proposition which we elaborated with reference to Lewin: 'Every person is within the field of other persons.' One only needs to think, for example, of the construction of the role-field. IS But the interesting thing about Dahl and Lindblom is that they do not remain trapped in this individual view; instead they go on to frame a theory about society as a whole. How far do they succeed in doing this? Dahl and Lindblom began with the field-concept of perceptual psychology, but one that could be extended to positions and roles; then they advanced to a theory of society by joining up with the idea of 'social control', which was used by Parsons et al. for the role-system. 19 Social control by means of the 'subjective field'

To control people one must produce responses in them. To produce responses in others, usually one must act on their subjective 'field' of awareness, that is, each individual's own special conscious and unconscious awareness of the universe made up of the self and its relation with other objects, resources and capacities, feelings of reward and deprivation, symbols and expectations. One may, of course, act on some elements in an individual's field to influence other elements. 2o This description by Dahl and Lindblom, of the way in which people act on one another, goes to the heart of every functional 'mechanism' in the common life of human beings, from kinship relations to the price-system of the market economy and the political systems. The above statements do in fact add up to a definition of social Man, as a zoon politikon. It is only possible for normal people to exist by having an influence and reacting on other people; that is their principal need. This statement is more comprehensive and fundamental than the way in which Parsons apostrophizes conformism as needing to be adapted to role and norm systems. The mechanisms of social rules, whatever they are like, can only proceed from this basic fact.

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According to Dahl and Lindblom, the other ways in which people can influence each other besides making use of the subjective field (e.g., the direct use of physical force, drugs, intoxicants, etc.) do not play any striking part in the important cultures of the modern world. Hence they can usually be ignored. Even dictatorships usually work on people more by disseminating fear, i.e., through the psychological field, rather than by the actual use of violence. Types of 'field-control

In most modern cultures, particularly in the western world (though not merely there) the different kinds of reciprocal influence can be listed in the following manner: 1 Command. The exertion of a unilateral influence, generally by the threat of punishment. 2 Manipulated field-control. Deliberate interference in the fields of others, by manipulating devices, expectations, feelings, etc. It ranges from the crying of an infant to advertising and the policy of an issuing bank. To a large extent it can replace the function of command, e.g., in the loose forms of economic planning. Unlike command, it is loosened up in most cases by elements of reciprocity (the person controlled frequently reacts upon the controlling authority). 3 'Reciprocity'. As used by Dahl and Lindblom, this is a kind of reversal of (2); it is characterized as a democratic control of the elite by the non-elite. It involves the opportunity to test the function of government (e.g., by voting), after this has been delegated more or less voluntarily by the electorate. 4 Spontaneous field-control. It often happens that human actions accidentally produce signals, rewards or punishments for other people. 21 The economic market contains numerous processes of this kind. Spontaneous field-control is usually reciprocal. On a small scale it is a sign of freedom, but in large groups it can turn into tyranny; and this can take a particularly cruel form, because the individuals often notice too late or not at all, exactly who it is that their actions are affecting. 22 Controlled actions of the above type, or 'field-actions' as Lewin calls them,23 have a theoretical counterpart in the form of the socalled autonomous action. But apart from aesthetic enjoyment this seldom appears in reality. Friendship and love, for example, like almost all human pleasures and activities, require the presence of another person. Having said this, we do not deny that personality-

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components play their part in any action aimed at other people or produced conjointly with them. The different degrees of reciprocal human influence which we have described allow one, I think, to build up practically any human social system. Dahl and Lindblom themselves undertake to do this for western democracies, particularly the U.S.A., bearing in mind that even democracy and free enterprise do not arise 'naturally' or automatically maintain themselves. On the contrary they require that certain types of human influence should be carefully fostered and promoted (as well as being efficiently measured out), and moreover certain types of personality are needed for particular positions and roles . Rationalization and the reduction of variables in society (a further criterion of Dahl and Lindblom) One other point, which Dahl and Lindblom introduce into the theory of society, follows, I think, from the 'artificial character of welfare economics'24 or from a kind of 'realistic functionalism', The vast number of variables, which surround modern man, require that these should be reduced if he is to survive at all. With the aid of systems of values and norms he tries to reduce the numbers of possibilities; in a democracy this is assisted by elections, which of course take place within the framework of a constitution and mean that certain activities are delegated, e.g., jurisdiction and political offices. The citizen has to prevent himself from being concerned with everything; and he must do this in a way that ensures some control of misuse (e.g., especially with elections 'upwards' and delegation downwards). In addition there are the processes which one can describe as 'economizing'. In particular this involves the tendency towards rationalization, which is implicit in the process of modern industry (as sparing and calculable as possible).25 We shall see later on that these tendencies towards rationalization, if they are not to become a curse instead of a blessing, must be further restricted by other mechanisms in order that the social ideals of a free and dignified culture should be preserved. Positions, roles, and the concept of identification, in relation to the field-theory of Dahl and Lindblom According to Dahl and Lindblom, the way in which a person becomes 'socialized' from early childhood onwards is not due so much to the fact that he learns the norms; it is much more that he learns to accept the influence of certain persons rather than others. 26 This is quite in line with Lewin's statement that a 'decision' in favour of a

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particular morality, is really a decision that one wishes to belong to certain groups or classes. 27 What the individual positions or roles actually are, is therefore something that is determined by the question of who allows himself to be influenced or controlled by whom. Here we must also consider the concept of 'identification', which was introduced into social theory by Lasswell. 28 Trade unions generally have more influence on the workers than on the employers, for example. Similarly, if social control is to be effective, every state must possess a minimum degree of compatibility of ideals or ideologies shared between the governors and the governed; and this is particularly true in a democracy.29 This leaves room for Parsons' system of integrated values, or more precisely, for a whole number of such systems, about one for every elite - with a minimum of common values at least in a vigilant democratic state.

ill To construct a picture of society out of the four ideal-types of the 'central socio-political processes'

The coexistence of the four bases of the model of society Of the various forms of interpersonal field-control, Dahl and Lindblom take four 'central socio-political processes' - we should describe them as ideal-types. These seem to be intended as spheres of social action, which can be treated separately or combined into a joint picture. I believe they are four different approaches that are capable of being combined; in each case the emphasis is on distinct spheres of events.30 1. Hierarchy - control ofthe governed by the governors. This view is taken particularly by Gaetano Mosca, Robert Michels and Vilfredo Pareto in Europe, and James Burnham in the U.S.A. 2. Polyarchy - control of the rulers by the non-rulers; this refers particularly to democracy. This view was taken by Alexis de Tocqueville and others.31 3. The price-system - control of the participants by other participants. This is dealt with by the science of economics. 4. Bargaining - control between the elites. This is dealt with especially by David Truman and John K. Galbraith. 32 The order of the list is altered according to various theoretical points of view. 33 The list of authors added shows how cleverly the types are adapted to the available literature, in contrast to the way in which Parsons' 'systems' can often scarcely be completed. Dahl and Lindblom point out that most sociological literature over-emphasizes one of these types and ignores the others. The authors wish to demonstrate that

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all four types are present simultaneously in a system of general interdependence - especially a western democracy; they find that a combination of all four represents the best guarantee of freedom and welfare. Now to deal with the four types individually: 1 The hierarchy. Although a completely hierarchic system of society may seem very undesirable to our ideas of value, yet certain hierarchic spheres of human co-operation are necessary, both for a democracy and a competitive economy, which one expects to settle many different problems in a rational manner.34 For example, every industrial concern is hierarchical in itself, and only the ruling elite is linked to the spontaneous mechanisms of the competitive economy. Even liberal theorists will recognize the need to have an active state bureaucracy in democratic states. 2 Polyarchy. Polyarchy is the best method that has hitherto been discovered in social life, of answering the question: 'Who is to control the controllers l' By this we mean the rulers who, even in nonCommunist countries, have wide powers of interference in private lives. 3s Polyarchy is first of all conceived as the opposite of hierarchy. It really means everything which one usually describes as specifically democratic, and above all the peaceful control and replacement of the governing elites. Dahl and Lindblom have introduced the notion of reciprocity as specially adapted for polyarchy.36 In order that a democracy should function smoothly, it is necessary for the centres of social power to be widely distributed among the political elite. This may be in the form of associations, which hold each other in mutual suspense by means of bargaining; weakened in this way, they cannot exercise any overwhelming influence on the political leadership. 37 This also requires a very widespread preference for the free democratic system. 38 This is expressed by a closeness between the ideals or practice of the changing majorities, so that no minority feels itself obliged to create a civil war, and this requires further bargaining. This close proximity of ideals also tends to be produced by the mechanism of a change of majority (for example a new government will generally refrain from disturbing any measures passed by its predecessor, if they possess wide recognition). 39 3 The price-system. Modern mass-societies stand in need of certain regulating mechanisms if they are to achieve economic maintenance. 40 Now in western cultures the spread of a particular doctrine has built up a rudimentary self-regulating mechanism, which we generally call competitive economy. FT-E

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A number of different economic requirements may be listed: the distribution of available goods in accordance with demand (especially the distribution of income), stabilization (by avoiding under- or overdistribution), choice (among alternatives with the simultaneous indication of wishes), distribution of goods (in accordance with the indications of choice), full exploitation of all resources, and the increase of production. Now only some of these are automatically attained by means of the customary regulating mechanism (really only 'choice' and 'the distribution of goods', from the above list). 41 Hence, in addition to the market mechanism, one really needs the manipulation of field-influences exerted by elites and not merely frameworks. The latter can never function for very long as their creators intended them to, because not all those who are engaged in economic competition are equally strong. The competitive economy promotes the need for rational calculation, and is in turn supported by this. The economic processes, which it alone cannot succeed in regulating, create a demand for the three other techniques of regulation (hierarchy, polyarchy and bargaining) if there is not going to be wide dissatisfaction. 42 The economic system of competitive economy either demands or promotes certain types of personality or role, which we may describe as follows: 1 the 'means-end view' (the price-system, being one of the possible forms of economic maintenance, is the system which best suits the person who thinks in terms of ends and means); 2 the self-interest role; 3 the role of 'the commercial statesman' (there is a certain readiness for irrational deviations in the event of appeals being made to 'common sense'); 4 the disposition to gamble (according to Galbraith, this is a strain on any rational person); 5 the tendency to change one's role suddenly and frequently (this is being 'job-minded'). 43

4 Bargaining. This is largely a case of a residual category, and in a favourable instance this is so not only in theory, but also in reality. Minority-wishes in particular, which have been seriously handicapped by the hierarchy, the electoral system or the market mechanism, are in need of a greater readiness for bargaining on the part of the ruling elite or among different elite-groups. We are thinking of a social partnership (between two elite-groups: trade unions and entrepreneur organizations) or of the public hearings for interest-groups, certain attention voluntarily paid to religious minorities, racial strains and others of the same kind. 44

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Thus 1 believe that in an industrial society with a low agricultural population the destruction of this minority could easily be popularized by means of 'democratic' propaganda and carried through by means of the competitive economy Gust as the workers could easily be suppressed by competition, if it were not for the bargaining-power of the trade unions). Here, as in the treatment of religious or national minorities, the only solution is to be found in voluntary discussion and bargaining with one or more elite-groups. This is one of the elements that is often most difficult to appreciate in a really free social order. Rousseau already recognized this in his preference for federalism,45 but it was disavowed by his followers. In an active modern democracy the key-situation of the political elite lies in its ability to mediate successfully between the other powergroups.46 The total picture

In several chapters of their book, Dahl and Lindblom weigh up various possible combinations of the four types, with reference to their actual occurrence and the ethical aim in mind. No really empirical investigation is made, but on the other hand there is no 'logical' speculation. Relatively concrete statements are made about the possibilities of improving and reinforcing the free democratic system of state and economy in North America, which would fit in with Schumpeter's criterion of the way that democracy should reproduce itself. 47 As regards the dynamic of bargaining and compromise among social groups, Dahl and Lindblom's model of field-theory for the whole of society is well interpreted in Charles Lindblom's sequel, The Intelligence of Democracy. 48 As the authors themselves remark, it is really a question of a theory of welfare; this is on the lines of welfare economics, but spread much wider, and embraces the whole system of society and economy in a particular culture of our time. 49 But the whole discussion is maintained at a level of abstraction which is accessible and moderate, so that empirical researches can apply directly to it. Any advocate of 'grand theories' may be annoyed that we take such a pragmatic compendium of suggestions as this book of Dahl and Lindblom's, and set it above Parsons' Social System. But this work, together with Lindblom's The Intelligence of Democracy, seems to us one of the best attempts made in our time to produce comprehensive sociology on the lines of Max Weber and Schum peter. 50 It is done in such a way that theory and practice, instead of being further divided, are drawn closer together insofar as this is possible at all in the present state of theory and resources. 113

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IV Other social concepts of field-theory

Field-theories 0/ society: the international development If one remembers that both Einstein and Lewin were Germans by birth and that they were banished by a stupid and barbarous tyranny, which might even have tried to put them to death, then one gets a clearer idea of the situation in Germany, and of the extent to which political and intellectual life in Germany was retarded, and also of the degree to which it was necessary, even after liberation from the tyranny had arrived, to establish once again proper standards of liberty and science. A striking example of this is to be found in the type of field-theory which constitutes the subject of this book. Looking at it from another point of view, after 1945 many young German scientists were enabled to view the world with fresh eyes, so to speak; they were spellbound by their first contact with ideas, which were quite new to them but which had long become matters of common knowledge throughout the rest of the world. Once again this is especially true of field-theory. For this reason I intend to treat separately the international development and the German development of ideas concerning society in terms of field-theory. I shall deal with the two different kinds of development one after the other. The concept of field itself does appear to have a periodic influence upon human minds, in the shape of occupying and stimulating men's minds in general; but in the case of most sociologists this influence does not consist of anything more than passing encounters. One first period of international development, during which field thinking overlapped into the social sciences, took place around 1930. It was then that Lewin, who was still in Germany at that time, laid the psychological foundations of what was later to constitute the type of field-theory that he developed in social psychology. Simultaneously however, John K. Galbraith established his 'Principle of Countervailing Power' which is also interesting from a sociological point of view and which he derived from economics. And in 1932 Gunnar Myrdal began to view society as a field of interests. 51 At the same time G. H. Mead focused the co-extensiveness of the 'field of mind' with the field of social experience and behaviour. Perhaps this initial periodr when the field point of view began to be used in sociology, can also be taken to include Mary Parker Follet's totalistic method of viewing social organization, which was something that had such a powerful influence upon Homans. And it might also even include the way in which Karl Mannheim assimilated the fieldconcept into sociological theory, in order to cover such influences as are not spatially orientated. We shall be returning to this point in a later part of the present work. 52 Subsequent development and

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elaboration of the field-concept, and of other similar sociological concepts among the English-speaking peoples, later came to be almost completely dominated by the formation of a school of group psychology that grew up around Lewin. This eventually went so far as to determine the attitude of other sociologists with respect to the opinion they adopted either for or against field-theory. Even Romans, who in my opinion seems to be, next to Lewin, the most important representative of our type of field-theory method, distanced himself from Lewin's own brand of field-theory. 53 I am thinking of the way in which (in connection with Mary Parker Follet) he worked out practically the same epistemological principles; these were only restricted by the overwhelming interest in quantitative experiment shown by the majority of Lewin's pupils who immediately succeeded him. I find it even more remarkable - and here I join Buckley in regretting this - that Romans himself retreated from his broad sociological application of 'field' and 'system', and fell back on social psychology. 54 Thus the only genuinely sociological examples of his procedure that we possess are the two studies concerning Tikopia and Rilltown, and the chapter on 'Social Control' in his book The Human Group. At the same time 'Tikopia' is a border-line case, because in the familial society the socially significant unit is no larger than a 'group' in social psychology. On the other hand the question regarding the survival of the system, which is one that is posed by Romans' distinction between an inner and an outer system, undoubtedly takes on a general sociological significance when he comes to the argument with Malinowski and RadcliffeBrown. 55 The sociological high-point in Homans' The Human Group is the chapter on social control; it is no mere accident that it follows close upon the analysis of Tikopia,which in its turn forms the conclusion of a series of group-analyses that are of increasing sociological importance. Here the social system is interpreted as a configuration of dynamic forces; the relationship between these forces determines whether equilibrium or change will ensue. In the process Homans attaches himself to certain thought-processes derived from physical dynamics and from Pareto (who of course also had a scientific background). Romans takes a more dynamic view of equilibrium than Parsons does - although even he assumes the existence of certain compensatory reactions tending to obviate deviations; of course this happens primarily because his procedure is more realistic, i.e., is not classificatory. The solidarity or cohesion of the system has nothing to do with logical or conceptual order; in the case of Parsons at least this is simulated by a theoretical structure which even Homans recognizes to be false. 56 In Romans' system 'order' constitutes the actual co-ordinations existing between actions, feelings, interactions

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and norms; the system and the sub-systems are equally real, i.e., they function together on the lines of a dynamic, and not of a logical model. A social system such as Hilltown can be freed of its present cohesion and solidarity, without this having to signify total anomia for the individuals concerned or for a wider or newer system. They simply had moved the emphasis of their communal activity away from the small town, and placed it on other social relationships. 57 In Romans' system deviations and tensions which lead to change, do not constitute anything alien; on the contrary, they form integral constituent parts. In Romans (in contrast with Parsons) the theory of equilibrium and the theory of change intermingle smoothly in this manner, as I intend to show in the following chapter, in connection with Lewin. In the present book I shall return on two occasions to deal with Romans: first in Chapter 12 when I deal directly with Romans in my remark on the 'equilibrium of differentiated norm-systems' ; and second in Chapter 17 where I deal in greater detail with formalized field-models. 58 Another view that is rather like the one we have described as 'fieldtheoretical', is the view taken by R. M. Williams, where he makes an analysis of American society based on the theory of structural functionalism. This is especially true of his rather more general concluding remarks where he relates the norms and institutions of society to the available power-relationships. According to Williams, radical collective activity occurs in a case where a particular social class or stratum feels that, from an institutional point of view, fewer rights are being granted to it than would be consonant with the actual distribution of power. 59 It may possibly be the case that one of the most fruitful variations of procedure in field-theory is the 'open field' of co-operation between different centres, leading towards decisions or acts (or standardizations) of some larger unit - such as, for example, a local community. This is not viewed from the point of view of the Theory of Games, but rather from the point of view of the total field. In this respect we are really referring more to the two very significant examples occurring in Charles Lindblom's The Intelligence of Democracy and in Morton Long's The Local Community as an Ecology of Games. In spite of its title this latter work really forms part of 'field-theory' in our sense, and does not in fact actually belong to the mathematical and economic Theory of Games, in the sense used by Neumann and Morgenstern. 6o These studies, as well as various contributions to Administrative Science, provide the best instances ofHomans' fundamental thesis - namely that a 'social system' (in the sense used by Romans, and not in the sense used by Parsons) tends to be more fully viable, depending on the greater possibilities for change that it possesses. 61 At the same time we must also bear in mind the view that

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this holds good to a much greater extent for polycentric or polyarchie (i.e., for decentralized) systems than it does for the more rigid hierarchies of command, even if the latter may possibly prove more effective as far as certain limited and particular aims are concerned. In general we agree with Heinz Hartmann in believing that the field-concept may be more usefully and fruitfully employed in the area of transition from the theory of the intra-system to the theory of the inter-system. For it is here that the field-concept enables one to make statements that cannot be attained so effectively by merely using concepts such as 'system', 'organism' or 'totality', even when certain obstacles are placed in the way by epistemological tradition. 62 The more far-reaching parallel that may be drawn from physics does not lie in an isolated field, even if this idea - such as the analysis of a sectarian or lunatic world, like the SS-State - may prove useful (in the way that Werner Cohn proposes).63 It is much more true to say that we are primarily concerned with cases of one field being superimposed upon another. It is similar to the way in which the gravitational fields of the sun, moon and planets interact reciprocally; they are to be conceived of as forming a totalistic unit, and not as being mutually exclusive. A special brand of this theory of an open field is developed by J. A. Barnes in his monograph entitled Class and Committees in a Norwegian Island Parish. Here he uses the expression 'social field', as well as its synonym 'network', to denote relationships of interaction that permeate the whole of society, and which burst the bonds of the closed circle of the community. This is in entire contradiction to the idea of 'network' as advanced by Nadel, who adopts an opposing attitude. Nadel prefers to employ the concept of a closed 'network' or 'social field', though of course one can also describe the latter as a 'system'. But Barnes' point of view links up very well with Homans' interpretation of 'Hilltown', and also with Karl Mannheim's idea of influences or of segmentary fields, which burst the bonds of the old social units. 64 One particular high-spot of field-theory in American sociology is to be found in Quincey Wright's theory of international relations. This is much too voluminous, and also in places too complex, for me to give any similar brief survey of it here in the present context. The essential fact is that Quincey Wright carried on his researches in field-theory simultaneously, so to speak, at two different levels of abstraction. On the one hand he viewed the 'geographical field' (i.e., the field within which events occur) as a condition of total interdependence between various branches of science, having regard to the causal factors of social and political events. Upon this he then proceeds to build up a more abstract stage, consisting of 'analytic fields' by means of which different societies can be subjected to international 117

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comparison according to definite isolated factors. Thus, for example, the various standards of living and of culture, together with the aggressiveness or peacefulness of different nations (and perhaps also of their governments) can be set out in the form of co-ordinatesystems - rather like those of Bernt Spiegel in Chapter 12 (Figure 64) of this book. Within these analytic fields Quincey Wright introduces different nations for the purpose of comparing their trends of movement; and this enables him to arrive at conclusions regarding the degree to which they resemble or differ from one another.65 One result of this theory is that Wright finds himself at the very opposite end of the scale from the old-fashioned type of history professor who traces everything back to the actions of outstanding individual personages. The 'all-embracing' character of his attitude reminds one to a certain extent of the group of 'gestalt anthropologists' that grew up around Franz Boas (cf. my Chapter 14) - or at least certainly as far as the geographical field is concerned. In the analytic field, this all-inclusive point of view is slightly confused by being expressed in a vocabulary which is highly reminiscent of Talcott Parsons in its complexity. This vocabulary, combined with the voluminous scope of the work itself, is liable to prove a serious hindrance to any widespread dissemination of the basic ideas expressed there. Looked at from the point of view of my own inter-system interpretation of sociological field-theory, the most characteristic element in Quincey Wright's procedure is the way in which it suggests that there is a theoretical similarity between intra-social and inter-social theory. A further step in analytical field theory is Rudolph J. Rummel's field theory of 'conflict behaviour', following K. Lewin, Q. Wright, and General Systems Theory. His model is composed of two isomorphic vector-fields: the attribute space and the behaviour space, each including pairs of behavioural units (dyads) within a social system (e.g., nation or international system). The distance of the conflicting parties in the attribute space determines their mutual interactions (their 'conflict behaviour', e.g., turmoil, revolution or subversion) in the behaviour space. R. J. Rummel avoids sterile classification and focuses relations and correlations of factors which have their equivalence in empirical facts and lead to prediction. Perhaps Rummel's field theory is a little too mathematically perfect, but I think it is full of stimulating ideas for social theory and research. 66 The 'modern wave offield-theory' in German sociology

We have already mentioned that, in Germany after 1945, there existed a certain scientific time-lag; and that this was simultaneously both an indication of backwardness, and also made it possible for 118

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problems to be thought out afresh without them suffering from being over-burdened by tradition. Thus it also came about that the sociological 'field-theory' had all the appearance of an entirely fresh discovery, just as if there had never been any international developments abroad at all. Apart from FUrstenberg, or apart from Dahrendorf's transitory acceptance of the field-concept in his 'positionfield', or apart from my own application in the present book, there has not really been - outside of psychology - any general acceptance at all of the work of Lewin and the international discussion that has gone on around him, within the whole sphere of German sociology. One of two things has always happened: either reference has been made to the 'origins' that lay prior to field-theory, i.e., in gestalt psychology; or else, in the case of a few sociologists who were more scientifically or empirically orientated, reference was made directly to the prototype originating in physics. Thus it happened that a few pedagogic or philological attempts were made, to carryon the gestalt movement rather in the vein of the Humanities - we intend to hold these in reserve for the moment and deal with them in Chapter 15 - whereas the first real applications made in economics in the 1950s (by Karl Brandt and Predohl)67 seem to dovetail in with the field-concept as it appears in physics. In addition the metaphor of a force-field came into fashion as a scientific slogan, sometimes without the support of any theoretical framework. We intend now to lay full emphasis on those few works, in which the field-idea holds a dominant position, and was not merely used quite casually as an occasional trial-balloon. Theodor Geiger, when writing his book Klassengesellschaft im Schmelztiegel in exile in Denmark, did hit upon certain related ideas, though without explicitly mentioning the concept of field. But I prefer to include him rather with the group of scientists (such as Mannheim and Myrdal) who are interested in stimulating and encouraging fieldtheory, and not with the group of sociologists in whose work the idea of field occupies an absolutely central position. 68 One's attention is immediately drawn to three sociological applications of fieldtheory in Germany, which appeared after 1960 quite independently of one another. The first of these is the pretentious book by Jacobus Wossner, entitled Mensch und Gesellschaft. This links up with a certain ideology of society that was not suppressed or persecuted by Fascism but was actually encouraged. Secondly there is the application made by Friedrich FUrstenberg, an attempt that is really distributed over several different books and essays. And thirdly there is my own application. Both FUrstenberg's and my own attitude is one that takes up a position partly opposed to, and partly supplementing, the sociology of structural functionalism. 69 119

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1 Wossner's 'field hypostasis'

On the one hand Wossner's viewpoint is of a somewhat old-fashioned type; he views society in terms of the Catholic-Fascist 'organic community', on the lines of Dollfuss or Salazar or Franco - a viewpoint that is also to be found in certain parts of the German C.D.U. especially in the C.S. U. wing that grew up around the former Defence Minister Strauss. On the other hand Wossner does undoubtedly hit upon certain analytic insights, which altogether correspond with the field-theory view of society. He sees clearly that society has grown up out of different spheres of action and groupings of power. The reality of the various groups of interests, and the inevitable compromise that is necessary between them (what Dahl and Lindblom call 'bargaining'), is much more clearly envisaged than in the type of 'harmony'-concept to be found among liberal-economic ideas such as those adopted by Parsons or the former German chancellor Erhard. Compromise mechanisms of this type do also operate within the parliamentary democracies - they operate even within the monster-parties ofthe two-party system, and within coalition governments. On account of the way in which they tend to operate so as to protect and foster minorities, it might even be said that they ought to be accorded far more recognition in the bulk of democratic theory. But this, however, is not equivalent, by any means, to saying that it is absolutely imperative that the Catholic Church should be allowed to take up a position of commanding authority as mandatrix of what constitutes true human nature. 70 The position is nearly the same as the viewpoint adopted by Wossner in connection with role-theory. He takes over from Tarde the idea that acts of volition on the part of human personalities are actualized on the lines of, and by means of, the pattern recommended by society. 71 This notion is also to be found in the Anglo-Saxon type of role-theory, ranging from G. H. Mead and Linton to Parsons. Dahrendorf's 'position-field' has also told us something about the way in which Man takes up his appointed position in the fields allotted to him by society; and even before that, we were told a good deal about it in Lewin's psychological field-theory. But Wossner appears to know nothing whatsoever about Lewin, and seems not even to have heard of him. 72 In addition to Tarde he also bases himself on Vierkandt, Simmel, Sombart, Tonnies, and on Weippert (by whom he was actually taught); from all these he takes over a kind of exaggerated adulation of 'Gemeinschaft'. This enthusiasm takes the rather unconvincing form of seeking to save 'personal humanity' from the snares and pitfalls both of totalitarianism (e.g., Communism) and of Liberalism. 73 On the other hand there is something very impressive indeed

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about his criticism of Max Weber's reception in American sociology. Here he takes up a position in opposition to Parsons and to the latter's interpretation of Weber, and invokes in his favour Weber's own theory of a league of dominion (Herrschaftsverband). Hence he goes on to show that subjectively motivated conduct is a derivative, and not really an original constituent of the system of social action. 74 By doing this he succeeds remarkably in diagnosing a real weakness in Weber's use of the term 'action' - as well as a weakness in the whole 'action theory' constructed in connection with it by Parsons and Bales. But then Wossner links this up with a demand for the hypostasis of the true essence of society in human nature, as consti· tuting the objective meaning of humanity in general. Here - as happens so often in this very old-fashioned and characteristically German type of work - a scientifically useful kind of analysis is altogether cancelled out and replaced by a lot of moral philosophy. 75 2 Structure made dynamic, and fields of conflict

Now we are faced with something of a quite different kind from Wossner's 600-page-long and altogether too self-conscious 'confession'. And this is FUrstenberg's concept of field-theory, the most essential points of which he has set down in a brief journal article. 76 It was probably the material published by Wossner and Mey that caused FUrstenberg at last to make public the groundwork, which he had been preparing over the last ten years, to frame a sociological field-theory. In spite of the fact that they are completely independent it is possible to take these three attempts together and view them all as 'a wave of field-theory'. Retrospectively, we can now include FUrstenberg's former publication about the 'field of social climbing' in this wave too and view it as forming part of the field-theory of society (this is discussed in Chapter 16 of the present book). FUrstenberg makes use of the field-concept, in a way that we altogether approve of, in order to arbitrate in the scientific dispute that exists between Parsons and Dahrendorf. Society is not to be conceived of either as an integrated whole or as merely a social conflict-field. Instead, the question of whether the forces leading to maintenance of the status quo or to a conflict-induced state of change prove to be superior in the long run, depends in turn on the constella.. tion of the various factors involved. This procedure can of course be described as 'dialectical'; but I should call such a name merely possible, rather than inevitable. It would certainly be in line with FUrstenberg's attitude if we were to take an important point out of Dahrendorf's contrast between the theory of consensus and conflict, and reformulate it as follows: Dahrendorf imputes to Parsons the assumption that 'Every element in a society has a function, i.e.,

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renders a contribution to its maintenance as a system', and counters this with his own assertion that 'Every element in a society renders a contribution to its disintegration and change.' Thus, according to Furstenberg's view (which I am now stating that I endorse) every element is capable in like manner, depending on the conditions, of contributing to integration or to disintegration - or in other words, of contributing either to stability or to change. 77 Thus, for all concepts of field, we are able to make the assumption that the elements are non-autonomous as contrasted with the relationships; and FUrstenberg quotes me on this point. But the assertion could equally well have been made on the basis of his own example of the way in which the individual level of aspiration depends upon the requirements of society, particularly the demands of the ruling strata of society, and also upon the actual possibilities available for social mobility, as determined by the existing constellation of forces. 78 FUrstenberg considers - and quite correctly, we should like to add - that the Lewinian type offield-concept ought not to be looked upon as being the opposite of structure. On the contrary, it should be viewed as a prerequisite for a structural analysis. 'System' or 'organism' is only a border-line case in the various possible continua of social relationships. Social structure is a 'continuum of multiple social fields', which do of course operate upon one another, but which cannot be incorporated a priori (i.e., deductively) into a social system or hence explained by such a system. At the same time Furstenberg also takes Gurvitch to task, for describing social structures as 'highly vulnerable conditions of equilibrium existing among multiple hierarchies'. 79 Meanwhile FUrstenberg, in a publication describing the social structure of the German Federal Republic, gives yet a further definition of 'structure' in the sense in which it is used in field-theory. After briefly alluding to its recurrent features, he says: 'This recognizable causal nexus of social forces in societya nexus which alters only very gradually - is known as its social structure.'80 This should be compared with Homans' view of 'system' according to the interpretation of Buckley, which is something we have already discussed. It is an unmistakable fact that what at first seemed to be a number of quite independent applications of 'field-theory', ranging from Galbraith and Mannheim to Lindblom and even as far as Wossner and Furstenberg, do all finally arrive at extremely similar conclusions. In the face of this, even a hostile critic could scarcely maintain that the use of the metaphor of 'field' was entirely arbitrary. It also says a lot for its empirical relevance that the underlying analytical conception is accepted as a further development of structural theoryaccepted, that is to say, by an increasing number of sociologists, even those closely associated with the main stream of structural function122

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alism. It even appears to be a side-issue of the controversies carried on by Mills, Dahrendorf and Homans against Parsons (e.g., in the case of Merton, Lockwood or Buckley).81 Since the present section is written after the rest of the book was first published in German, perhaps I may be permitted to say a few words regarding this attempt of mine that I am now engaged in. My attitude is of course fairly close to the view taken by FUrstenberg, as described above and as expressed in his more recent published work. I myself think that my theoretical reflections on society revolved around the application offields of norm-conflict; and I take this last to be a kind of superstructure built upon the real structure of society, which I propose to subdivide further by means of a kind of inter-system theory. Hence even the concept of 'role' acquires a certain significance as being deducible and therefore not constituting an elementary category (see Chapter 13 of this book). For the sake of clarity I have decided to make a certain addition to the German edition of the book; I have resolved to include in it (as Section IV of Chapter 12) an essay which I wrote on the equilibrium of normsystems, and which appeared as a university publication in 1965. Heinz Hartmann has interpreted my application of field-theory as being an open social inter-system theory, and I can only give this my entire and complete agreement; indeed this must already be clear from the remarks I have made in the present volume. 82 I believe that sociological 'field-theory', considered as an analytical method, is not tied down either to a closed society or to an oversocialized view of man. And I feel that I am justified and confirmed in this belief - not only by the analogy with physics, but also by a quite considerable number of social theorists, to whom this book is devoted. In recent times the idea of 'field' has even been adopted in German philosophy of history, as the sign of an open view of possibilities of historical development, and also as an indication that deterministic and culturally pessimistic ideas have been overcome. The recent application made by Hugo Fischer seems to lie in exactly the same direction as that favoured by myself; namely, the intention seems to be to overcome Fascist-type ideas, such as are so extremely liable (particularly in Germany) to be connected with totalistic philosophies. For this reason we should like to be as magnanimous as possible and do our best to overlook certain other things; here I am thinking especially of his rather excessive interpretation when he comes to discuss the physical field as offering the basis for a philosophy of freedom.83 Even in the sociological field we have not remained too close to physics.

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10 Thoughts on structure and change

I E. Z. Vogt's confrontation of the analyses of structure and process Preliminary remark Evon Z. Vogt, Andrew Hacker and others l criticize the theories of structure and function for having often been shown to be unable to assimilate social change within their theoretical edifice. This should not blind one to the fact that theories of structure and function (such as Parsons', for example) do contain or even rely to some extent on processes. 2 Mention is made of 'social interaction', for instance, or actions. These actions or processes are accomplished solely within the framework of the particular given structure or order in which they are imbedded as in logical classes 3 and are incapable of explaining why, how or by what laws the latter changes - how changes occur in the social life of cultures. With any (unsystematic) change it is usually a case of: 'What may not be, cannot be.' With Parsons and the 'ordo-liberals', one tends to think of the eighteenthand nineteenth-century liberals of the Enlightenment who were criticized in a similar way by Ludwig Marcuse; in reference to their views on sexuality and instinct, words taken from Schiller were applied: And do not seek to view aright What fear and horror have clothed in night. 4, What improvement can one make here, without forfeiting the positive advantages of the theory of structural functionalism? I believe that the answer lies with Lewin's field-theory, for which 'equilibrium' and 'movement' cease to be exclusive logical classes, and can be analysed according to the same rules. 124

THOUGHTS ON STRUCTURE AND CHANGE

In addition one must begin by abandoning the a priori proposition that tendencies towards harmony or conformity are 'natural' or in some other way self-evident. The very thing we have to do is to examine the conditions under which these appear. And even here one must beware of endowing these conditions, under which equilibria of some form of rational action will appear, with a priority, which they may perhaps have for an orderly mind, but do not possess where the course of natural events is concerned. It is clear that in a rational harmonious system such as this, the kind of power-struggles suggested by Marx and Pareto (or as regards democratic cultures, by Galbraith and Mills)5 simply do not fit in. If they are noticed at all, they are felt as horrible disruptions, which must at all costs be remedied -like distortions of the picture in a television set. Thus even Parsons avoids the question posed by Andrew Hacker, as to whether his assumptions prevent him from grasping Mills' power-theory, or make him unwilling to understand it at all; and Parsons' argument that he has not enough space to answer within the limits of a single rather long essay must appear somewhat threadbare. 6 The only reply which Parsons makes to a whole number of questions dealing with social change, is the following statement: 'It should be clearly understood that not only are equilibrating processes very frequently doubtful in their outcome so that breakdown of equilibrium is scientifically as important a phenomenon as its preservation (but of course not inherently more important), but also that equilibrium itself is neither attained nor maintained simply by the persistence of some "static" factor.'7 In an equilibrating system something - a pattern of orientation, for instance - must remain unchanged; otherwise it might be possible that the very alteration of things might provide a condition for the constancy of the system (the stock instance in biology is the constancy of the body-temperature). Then Parsons quotes the example of the Belgian Congo in 1960, where order collapsed, as an instance of 'disorder'; but this was only a pathological exception, which could not be desired. 8 Here basically there was an element of cross-purposes between the questioner (Hacker) and Parsons (who was answering), because neither partner in the discussion seemed to realize that they were dealing with different kinds of scientific approach, and not with two realities - even jf any scientific tendency seems to prefer to view certain parts of reality. Parsons' confrontation of structure and process, wherever it occurs, 9 is bound to disappoint the theorist of field or power. Structure comprises the framework of conditions, while processes are the games of tennis played according to rule, which may take place within the structure. The only developments permitted are to

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FIELD-THEORY VERSUS SYSTEM AND STRUCTURES THEORIES

some extent systematic: the refinement of the division of labour and the progress made in medicine. 10 As far as we can see, we are not yet reaching the basis of the problems. We must first break up the scientific and logical peculiarities of the theories of structure and system and the anthropological assumptions implied in them. In this we may be helped by one theorist, who does not belong to field-theory and is not a marxist, but who has been trying to loosen the bonds of structural thought on the basis of that theory itself. This is the anthropologist, E. Z. Vogt. l l Scientific causal laws are laws of change, which are ,alid even in apparently static coniditions The outcome of a drama cannot be explained merely by the structure of the role-distribution at a certain point of time, however much this may help with interpretation. It is possible to analyse the structure of stars, mountains, trees and human bodies, and at first sight it may seem that this has enabled one to comprehend them exhaustively. But when they are considered over periods of time, one sees that their (a)

I

II

III

(b) 1 2 3

Figure 51. (After E. Z. Vogt, Structure and Process . .. , Figures 1 and 2.) Roman numerals = structures Arabic numerals = processes Time-sequence is from left to right 126

THOUGHTS ON STRUCTLRE A N D CHANGE

laws are different; one must look at their origin, their growth, and their change and decay.12 Short-term investigations, such as those that deal with processes in the human body (,functions' too are really teleological processes), are more easily studied through their structure. This is not so true of the laws of change in the social sphere, laws that are still largely undiscovered. 13 This is obvious of course, for in any study of change the frame of reference differs according to the time-period under consideration and can be completely upset (for example as the unseen future advances to become the past during the course of the researcher's life - something which must be very uncomfortable for a structural theorist). The galilean law of free fall is a law of change. It was here that Lewin broke away from what he called aristotelian psychology,14 In an almost analogous fashion his pupil, J. F. Brown, criticized in 1936 the 'classificatory theories', particularly those of social science, as being pre-galilean. 15 Closer attention reveals that he meant his criticism to apply to several sociological and economic theories of structure and function. The fact that Lewin himself, like Maxwell in physics, considers the field at separate given points of time, must not be interpreted as if he were thinking in terms of static structure and function. In Lewin's view the relative unalterability of a field-structure at a given time is an infinitesimal approach, a limiting value, and contains in itself the conditions of its own alteration in the form of tension and variations In energy. In a simplified graphic form Evon Z. Vogt takes the comparativestructural view of a course of events in more or less disconnected sections, e.g., a culture like that of the Navaho Indians at different times separated by ten years (Figure 51a). He then compares this with a long-term process, by which the separate structural sections become related (Figure 51b).16 To recognize this second view as a possibility at all, seems to me to constitute the decisive step away from thinking in terms of a structural order internal to the system, and an advance towards movement. This view reaches behind the cross-sections and grasps at the tendencies.

Tensions in the socio-culturalfield, as a cause of changes Vogt believes that one of the reasons for socio-cultural change is to be found in tensions between different spheres of society, such as the cultural and the social system. 17 With certain reservations we agree with this. Instead of 'systems' we should like to use Karl Mannheim's expression 'sectoral fields', 18 for more or less open products of influence or power. 19 Obviously, when accepting any theory of change, it is wise not to forget the

127

FIELD-THEORY VERSUS SYSTEM AND STRUCTURES THEORIES

scientific principle that one should never place absolute reliance on a particular model or on one single method. On the other hand Vogt's proposal that one should study certain cultures or tribes over a period of years or decades in full detail (on the lines of the anthropological field-method),20 in the hope that a theory of change will emerge, seems to us inadequate. One may think for example of the methodological controversy between the factual 'historical school' of Gustav von Schmoller and the theoretical (or precise) economics of Karl Menger; here the theoretical type of economics, using hypothesis and deduction, emerged victoriouspartly because it was in a better position to embrace various tendencies, although it had always contained strong elements of structural functionalism. Perhaps we may begin here. Judging by intention, it is certainly correct to study reality during the course of historical events. But it is important that one should already have theories or at least certain trends worked out, so that one can test them with observation in a 'quasi-experimental' fashion. All the same we should not deny that the trained eye of the anthropological investigator does provide some equivalent for working with strict hypotheses. We find a similar pattern in the procedure of modern growth-economics, where, particularly in the studies on developing countries, facts outside the economic field, such as the growth of population in Indian planning for example, are recorded in the form of trends and drawn into the theory. Let us take as a model the idea that the theory of economic growth has selected out of the 'cultural-anthropological whole' a certain line of structural change (as in the diagram by Vogt in Figure 51): the so-called industrial-technical growth. Let us assume in general that such lines could be selected from the socio-cultural structure and each viewed as operating as the central line in a progressive social field. 21 Then within the field of the whole culture, certain industrial processes might be posited as a 'sub-totality' acting within the context of the other cultural processes and the social forces not contained in the economic model. This sort of division has advantages in the way of 'economic research' and has really proved itself in the modern history of science - for instance, as a division of the disciplines. 22 II An economic growth-model in the social field (after Karl Brandt)

Enlightened economists have continually been forced to observe that economic events are influenced by factors or forces which are not contained in the economic pattern. Starting out from the physical field 23 and stimulated by 'a conjectural oligopoly-model'

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THOUGHTS ON STRUCTURE AND CHANGE

composed by Ragnar Frisch (which we cannot discuss here),24 Karl Brandt has produced a diagram of an economic growth-curve in the field of social forces. Deliberately surmounting Eucken's chain of data as a fence round the 'economic arena', Brandt chooses to illustrate the direct influence Magnitude M (e.g. population)

II

M M2

M1 M

F2

-F1

II

Time

Figure 52. Alteration of a Magnitude in the Field (after Karl Brandt, Struktur der Wirtschaftsdynamik, Figure 47; we have introduced the extra letters F and G).

of social forces upon industrial development, simply as a certain social magnitude in a social field: e.g., the size of population. This magnitude varies in accordance with the tendencies of forces in the social field. The way in which Brandt's model develops from a field at a given time to a field which changes in time - an attempt to show this from our previous assumptions in field-theory without any specific economic constructs

(a) How a magnitude G is determined by the field at time I. The magnitude G 1 at time I is G I because the social force-field at time I is structured in such a way that a positive central force-field 25 is directed at G 1 • Thus G 1 is the only possible point of rest or equilibrium for the magnitude G in a social field FI at time I. Is this true for Figure 50? As the vector-field FI in Figure 50 (from Brandt) is represented, we do not have a case of the situation we described at time I. I should prefer to describe it as follows: The social field Fl at time I is structured in such a way that the magnitude G 1 can exist at time I at the very spot in the field at which economic reasons have caused it to be situated.

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FIELD~THEORY

VERSUS SYSTEM AND STRUCTURES THEORIES

The oligopoly~model of Ragnar Frisch and the 'formal field~ diagram' of Coleman 26 make certain statements about the tendencies governing the magnitude G in the field F, if certain conditions cause it to be situated at different points in the formal field. 27 Brandt does not follow suit; instead he is concerned to establish that G must alter its situation, if the field F changes. (b) A change in the magnitude due to a change in the determinant field. In our Figure 52 the field Fl changes in the course of time to field F 2 • The force·vectors change in such a way as to move G from G1 to G 2• The combined action of economic and socio·political processes in an application of Brandt's model

In my view the greatest interest of the model lies in the case which Brandt is chiefly considering. A growth-curve which is governed by economic factors (that of a social product, for instance) changes in a specific fashion, which is not to be deduced from the purely economic growth·model, because the social field as a whole has altered. In contrast to the usual 'one-sided' growth·models, Karl Marx incorporated the political or social forces of conflict into his model of the economic development of capitalism. As Professor Brandt remarked during a seminar, which the author attended,28 the Marxist theory of the decline of capitalism is based on the following reasons. Causes within the economy lead to a concentration and reduction in the profit·rate of the entrepreneurs, and this produces a fall in 'accumulation' and a consequent im· poverishment of the workers. All this tends to increase the dissatisfaction of the proletariat and social tension as a whole, until finally political and social causes produce a revolution, which overthrows the economic system. It has been realized, however, that the actual course of events was somewhat different to what Marx assumed. Above all this was due to investment credit made available out of the savings of the entrepreneurs and the non-entrepreneurial sections of the population, which caused the staving-off of 'stagnation' and its socio-political consequences. But the lesson to be learnt from Marx today is that one should take account of the social and political influences which are caused by economic processes, as well as the non-economic factors that affect economic events. Thus Brandt's model is certainly a useful attempt to supplement economics with field-theory. We have certain reservations to make against Akerman's idea of 'social synthesis', 29 which on methodological grounds we find our130

THOUGHTS ON STRUCTURE AND CHANGE

selves unable to accept as it stands. But from practical considerations, particularly those of the 'developing countries', 30 we find we must advocate a synthesis on the lines of Brandt's model. For Brandt, as for us, the question of the field is the primary one. 'It is necessary that qualitative statements should be made about the field-forces and that one should know the milieu in which the economic processes will develop, before this process itself can be established.'3! Growth-rates cannot be known solely through quantitative 'economic' magnitudes; according to Brandt qualitative degrees of change must also be incorporated in the fields to be constructed, if one is to be able to comprehend the 'aims' of a social-economic system. 32 Brandt's model remained incomplete, because he followed Pareto's example in viewing the social field-components as residual factors in economic theory which could not be grasped with any precision. In sociology as in psychology, the subject-matter may in fact be more difficult to quantify than in economics (so long as the economists are not exaggerating the quantifiability of their subject); but this would not altogether prevent the construction of equivalent theoretical models. We should now like to discuss a procedure of Lewin's which may give us some help on this. ill Social status 33 as a problem of equilibrium in social forces (quasistationary processes)

What is a •quasi-stationary process'?

(a) Description by means of examples. The simplest example of a quasi-stationary process is a volume of flowing water, which moves but keeps a recognizable form. Lewin took this concept over from physics via Wolfgang Kohler.34 As in the case of the concept offield, this is not an instance of mere blind 'physicalist'3S borrowing. We have here an independent psychological or sociological theory, in which the borrowed concept only gives some rough indication of what is involved. It is not unusual to find social processes that are changing according to some criteria, but constant with regard to others. Traditions, customs, and also phenomena such as the constancy of aggressive actions against minorities, a constant output of production or a constant quota of savings are all among these. In each of these cases one must investigate which psychological or social constellations of forces thus coincide, in order that a relative stability of the quasistationary processes should be maintained over certain periods of time. 131

FIELD-THEORY VERSUS SYSTEM AND STRUCTURES THEORIES

(b) The idea of equal regularity in stable and changing status. Parsons contrasts stable order and chaos as the only possible alternatives. 36 But Lewin considers that both stable and changing social conditions follow the same laws. We shall return to this again when we have dealt with a few examples of Lewin's methodological procedure.

Lewin's comtruct o!'phase-space' as a special case ofhisjield-theory - a deviation from 'totality'? As a 'substructure' in the Marxist sense, Lewin's field-theory is really concerned with realistic totalities. In the narrower psychological theory this comprises the person and his perceptual space or life-space; in a more sociological context it consists of groups with regard to their internal force-relationships (members or sub-groups) as well as the environment considered both subjectively and objectively. 37 In this sense even society would be a system ofinterdependence and influence on field lines, consisting of groups and sub-groups in definite force-relationships to each other. Here internal forces and subjective-objective external perception tend to produce a field. The 'phase-spaces'38 on the other hand are separate special relationships. Instead of engaging in further discussion, we shall pass straight on to the first example.

Levels of aggressiveness in authoritarian and democratic groups In investigations by Lewin, Lippitt and White 39 the number of aggressive acts (the concept is defined operationally within the experiment) are counted as they occur in 50-minute meetings. The average for a group of days (of aggressive acts in 50 minutes)40 is plotted on the vertical scale of a co-ordinate-system, while the time (in days) is plotted on the horizontal scale. A group under authoritarian control was subjected to a sudden weakening of authority, and a group which had been under democratic control was governed on authoritarian lines from a definite day onwards. A week later both groups (one again and the other for the first time) were placed under democratic control. The form of control can be seen in Figure 53 as shown by the different types of line. A diagram of this kind is described by Lewin as a phase-space. A selected characteristic of some particular social event is recorded as its intensity changes over a certain period of time. Figure 53 clearly shows different levels of intensity of the aggressiveness.41 Each of these levels denotes a 'quasi-stationary condition' over a certain period. One may presume that the forces are in equilibrium; in the event of oscillation around the respective level, the quasi-stationary

132

THOUGHTS ON STRUCTURE AND CHANGE

60

Aggressive actions

50

Laissez-Faire

40 30 20 10

Democracy

Democracy Democracy

Autocracy

Autocracy 2-6

7

7-13

14

14-19

Days

Figure 53. Degrees of Aggression in Two Groups with a Changing 'Social Climate' (after K. Lewin, Field Theory . .. , Figure 24, p. 211). Levels, reading upwards = number of aggressive actions in 50-minute meetings quality is even clearer. 42 We shall now introduce vectors for the operative forces.

Forces and counter-Jorces in the example of aggression (a) A verbal description and an initial diagram of forces. Now we must try to include in the diagram the forces which tend to raise or lower the quasi-stationary level of aggression. fL2,2 f

fLt,a

L1

fLh,ca (a)

L2

L2,c2

L'1

f

L'1,ca

(b)

Figure 54. Representation of a Phase-Space together with an Example of Aggression 43 (variations on Lewin's Figure 28 in Field Theory . .. , p. 216, with the example dealing with production). (a) Autocracy; (b) A new equilibrium after autocracy has been suspended.

133

FIELD-THEORY VERSUS SYSTEM AND STRUCTURES THEORIES

In this example the forces may be inferred very adequately from the various changes. The authority of the leader is a force that tends to reduce the number of acts of aggression (as seen clearly in Figure 54a); ifthis authority is removed, then the situation seems to explode, because the pent-up counter-forces burst out (Figure 54b) - and characteristically against fellow-pupils. 44 After a short time the level of aggressiveness settles down at a higher level, though not so high as on the first day of relaxed authority (cf. Figure 53). A new equilibrium now seems to set in, because the forces directed towards increasing aggressiveness tend to be reduced with the progressive 'abatement' and the forces of authority required for interception can operate to produce a state of equilibrium (Figure 54b). (b) An instantaneous view of the new equilibrium. 45 The phase-space, as in Figure 53, is seen from left to right as a time-series of phases. Instead of average values, let us take moments in the school situation; this is an approach to Lewin's 'field at a given time', having regard to the sectional character of the phase-space. 46 At the imaginary moment of measurement only one vector or pair of vectors can be established. 47 If the supervisor measures, or more probably estimates,48 he maintains the point at which the pupils' urge-to-freedom meets his

Eq

1

2

3 (a)

4

5 (b)

Figure 55. Processes in the 'Formation of an Equilibrium' (see

the text). (a) Series of 'phases'; (b) The formation of an averagelevel (time-sequence from left to right).

authority. As a further enlargement of the field, which is divided into two lines in each phase, let us assume the expected forces (dotted vectors in Figure 55). The line pointing down is the punitive action of the teacher which the pupils expect if they misbehave more, and the line pointing upwards is the additional aggressiveness which the teacher expects from the pupils if he relaxes his authority. 134

THOUGHTS ON STRUCTURE AND CHANGE

One might also plot the 'application of force' intended by the persons involved, or one might plot an objective probability;49 but the method chosen seems to us to be the most suitable. Now we take the phases from left to right: Phase 1: starting-position; Phase 2: outburst of aggressiveness from the pupils (slight reaction expected from the teacher); Phase 3: sharp reaction from the teacher; relaxation (small counter-force) from the pupils; Phase 4: the 'cowering' state of phase 3 may continue for a little; the teacher waits again; Phase 5: a new equilibrium, somewhat deeper than in phase 1 and more tense (strong vectors on both sides). Here we saw a 'real' tendency towards equilibrium in a social state: in the event of one of the forces changing, there is a reaction of the counter-force. It is probable that regulating mechanisms of this kind are by no means infrequent in complex social conditions. This is indicated by the relative frequency of quasi-stationary conditions. In fact in social life so much is 'stable' that the structural theorist ceases to think of it as changeable; how many things in the course of history have been thought of as unalterable! One must distinguish the real temporary stability of quasistationary processes (which are recognizable also in the oscillations of Figure 58) from a statistical formation of average-levels over periods of time. At a level formed in this way (Figure 55b) no equilibrating forces actually come into operation. In Lewin's customary representation of phase-space (which we follow in Figure 54) it does not seem to me that this idea is ever fully worked out. Lewin's vectorview includes a 'phase' of average levels which are occasionally somewhat irregular in duration; the question of how the vector-field was really formed did not seem to him of great importance for the early stages of the theory. (c) Algebraic symbolization of the equilibrium. The authoritarian and counter-authoritarian forces of our example on Figure 54 can also be rendered algebraically. At each level of equilibrium (Ll in Figure 54a, L2 in Figure 54b) the counter-authoritarian forces F ca are absolutely equal to the authoritarian forces Fa (in accordance to its direction - counter to a - ca can also be interpreted as a minus sign).50 FLi,a (FLi,a+

+ F Liea = + F L1ca - =

0 0)

and this merely establishes the condition of equilibrium.

135

FIELD-THEORY VERSUS SYSTEM AND STRUCTURES THEORIES

At the level Ll' in Figure 54b the opposing forces can be balanced out (FL,'.ca> F-L... a - though this is not entered in Figure 54b) to produce a forces-resultant: 51 FL,',ca

>0

A view of the situation, not 'final causes' However obvious these forces may be in an example of 'authority and aggression' in a group of boys or a school class, it is still clear that the power-symbols cannot offer any explanation on the lines of final causes. Here we may recall a certain phenomenological element in Lewin's field-theory (which came from gestalt psychology). 52 It is first of all necessary to comprehend the situation; then one can go on to investigate what lies behind. The force-vectors only symbolize the resultants of a large number of environmental forces, jointly conditioned and taken from individual psychology, which cannot usually be completely deduced. 53 Without this type of procedure one could never arrive at a forcesdiagram of the situation. The forces behind the resultants and the causes of these can easily ramify uncontrollably. A statement of behaviour (somewhat on the lines of Behaviourism)54 will show the end-resultants, which can usually be combined with the action in a forces-model, and both Lewin and I feel that this is the most expedient course. 55 It is theoretically meaningful to proceed a small distance behind the resultants. Thus, for example, the tendency to group-conformity among the other forces or tendencies can be separately introduced into the phase-space, and one can form resultants from this overlap (Figure 57). It is also possible to subdivide the operative forces according to inclinations, wishes, interests, antipathies, etc., and these may occasionally be introduced into the analysis of phasespace. IV On the changeability of social conditions, the stability and lability of equilibria

The theory of 'slopes', the extent 01 force-fields and field-overlaps in the phase-space, explained by the example of groll]J-'conformity (a) 'Slopes' or 'gradients' with the assumption of positive central (orce-fields. If social conditions reveal tendencies for certain courses of action or other characteristics to combine,56 then Lewin assumes the existence of so-called 'positive central force-fields'. 57 This really amounts to nothing else but force-vectors, or 'slopes or energy' on the physical pattern. 58

136

THOUGHTS ON STRUCTURE AND CHANGE

Now in fact (and this is confirmed by certain assumptions of Parsons) there is a tendency towards group-conformity in a typical force-field of this kind. But it is seldom enough in itself to explain a particular condition; it usually overlaps with other force-fields, which stem from other contexts (cf. Paragraph c). Group-conformity is a good example to illustrate the different slopes at various levels of equilibrium. For instance it frequently happens that slight deviations from the group-standard are simply tolerated, while larger deviations are looked at askance or laughed at, and larger deviations still may invite serious reprisals. Thus: as the distance from the line of equilibrium G 1 increases, so the forces directed at G 1 also increase (Figure 56a)59

Eq

Eq

Eq

(a)

Eq

(b)

Figure 56. 'Lapses' (or 'Valleys') in 'Equilibria'. The degrees of inclination, which we call 'slopes' (or, in the case of positive central force-fields, 'trenches'), were described by Lewin as 'gradients'. 60 In the special case of our example (group-conformity), it comes to exactly the same thing whether we view the equilibrium from the point of view of the whole group standard or from the point of view of possibilities for deviation on the part of separate individuals. This will not always be the case. But we can stay with this for our next variation as well. (b) The force-field within and outside the neighbouring range,61 with differing 'slope-direction'. In many social conditions the slope of forces can turn out differently from the case described. It happens that, at a certain distance from a definite social status, the forcedirection proceeds not towards it but away from it (Figure 56b). This can apply equally to separate individuals (e.g., someone who has once become slightly criminal can easily move further from the usual social standard). Or it can apply to whole groups or societies (e.g.,

137

FIELD-THEORY VERSUS SYSTEM AND STRUCTURES THEORIES

when an impoverished but stable peasant society becomes increasingly removed from its level by industrialization). The theoretical form of a completely labile equilibrium, to which there may be no centripetal, or even actually a centrifugal, forcefield, is not essential for our purposes, because such a level would only be infinitesimally 'quasi-stationary'. In my opinion this would only be conceivable if there were an overlap between several fields. It might happen, for example, if a completely undesired status were maintained by external compulsion, or if a completely obsolete custom were simulated, perhaps for reasons of religious confonnity.62 (c) Field-overlaps in the phase-space. The overlapping of different force-fields in the phase-space is shown in our Figure 57. We have already mentioned (in point (a) of this Section) that the inclination towards group-conformity increasingly reinforces a constellation of forces which is already present. Now the site of the group-desired standard (L2) may deviate to some extent from the standard resulting from other forces (Ll)' Let us assume that the desired group value (the prestige level, for

L2

Eq

L1

(a)

(b)

(a)+(b)

Figure 57. Overlaps of the Force-Field in the Phase-Space (a variant of Lewin's Figure 33 in Chapter IX of his Field Theory ... , p.226). instance)63 lies above the other level of actions (scholastic achievements, for instance). Then the final level of total equilibrium (Eq) may settle down above the level resulting from the 'previous' forces. Variations of this case occur in Festinger's research on a level of aspiration. 64 Frequently the group pressure supports the 'traditional leve1'65 but its ability to separate off from the other forces is of great significance for any attempts at retraining.

138

THOUGHTS ON STRUCTURE AND

CHA~GE

A change in the social level through retraining (a) Changes via 'group-formation' in experiments with housewives. In experiments with retraining, the tendency towards group conformity has turned out to be of some assistance towards transformation, and not merely a hindrance. In many cases this tendency is all that enables the retraining to achieve some permanence. This is an essential aspect of education in democratic groups. If by education one manages to separate an individual from his group level, then forces will begin to operate on him to draw him back. This is not merely a case of 'custom' - the wish 'not to drop out' can easily be confused with the pressure of custom. On the other hand, if one succeeds in changing the group level, then forces will work on the individual to make him persist in what he has learnt, even when the learning group does not remain together. 66 In experiments with American housewives on the possibility of changing eating-habits,61 Lewin found this to be overwhelmingly confirmed. The results of group discussions (communal decision, so to speak, which has a strong binding effect) had a much more comprehensive effect, both as regards the content and the number of 'responsive' persons, and produced longer-lasting changes than any form of individual persuasion. 68 The instructor must be clear that he is not merely aiming for a goal; he must realize that, where effective relearning-processes are concerned, he is dealing with changes in the quasi-stationary processes, i.e., that the constellations of forces must be 'unfrozen', 'moved' and then re-frozen. 69 (b) Experiments with production-levels. In connection with the industrial experiments carried out by Bavelas,70 I feel there is some importance in Lewin's idea that the desired group levels should be restored with as little tension as possible; I mean for instance by removing forces which operate against a higher production-level (ignorance, technical deficiencies, a 'bad working atmosphere') rather than by exerting direct pressure for more overtime. This situation shows certain things in common with the example of aggression. A less aggressive attitude on the part of the pupils could be achieved either by heightened authoritarian pressure (though perhaps at a higher lasting cost) or by some other direct reduction of the tendency towards aggression; one is reminded of the experiences of the educational reformer, A. S. Neill. 71 In the case of the production-level, the forces tending to maintain the level are of many different kinds. Apart from the group-dynamic elements, the technical data and the abilities of the participants play a certain role. Particularly in the event of changes, these forces 139

FIELD-THEORY VERSUS SYSTEM AND STRUCTURES THEORIES

operate against one another. Technical improvements in machinery, for example, may lead to no higher production (this may even fall), because it may be hindered by the group-power, which may affect the ability (or feeling of ability) too. Here again group-decisions are the best method for improvement, possibly when linked with additional technical knowledge. The learning-curve will then provide a basis for the new group-standard to be achieved. 72 With the production-level, a special case of a supra-individual or group-tendency towards equilibrium occurs, where perhaps falling achievements on the part of a group-worker may be helped out if necessary by his colleagues. 73 V More complex levels and structural points in the phase-space

An example of adherence to a more complex level One example of changing levels of equilibrium which depend on external events is given by Lewin, when he talks about the redeeming of war saving bonds in the U.S.A. 74 While the war was still on, a relaxation of the conditions for redemption had already led to a higher level of redemption; but there was a considerably larger rise at the end of the war (approaching a level of balance again), when the obligation towards patriotic solidarity was reduced and the private requirements of individual citizens made themselves felt. 190 180 170 160 150 140 130 120 110 100 90

Easier redemption policy

End of war

90 April-Dec 1943

Jan-Dec 1944

Jan-Dec 1945

Jan-June 1946

Figure 58. Redemptions of Series E Savings Bonds as a Percentage of the Total Outstanding (after K. Lewin, Field Theory ... , Figure 32, p. 223).

140

THOUGHTS ON STRUCTURE AND CHANGE

In this example it is important to notice that the level of redemption maintained throughout a certain fluctuation does not itself exert any power of social attraction (in contrast to group-standards such as eating habits, for instance). Almost without exception the participants do not realize that they are maintaining a definite level of redemption, or producing it as an average value. 75 It can be gathered from this that the relative stability of social conditions in certain areas of human communal life may have more complex causes than the urge towards conformity on the part of a clearly definable group. Here, as is also common in economics, there are so-called 'objective' factors,76 such as receptivity and a corresponding capacity for restitution on the part of a popUlation with a definite income-structure, that have to be combined with 'subjective' psychological considerations. 77 There are also certain more or less unanimous elements of public feeling, etc., which come into operation. The question of whether it is meaningful to represent such processes as a field of different forces, is one that may occasionally differ from one case to another. 78 The phase-space shows a cross-section of a situation; and it seems to me convenient to conceive of opposing forces as a statement of the problem directly at the status-level. Further subdivision (as seen in the context of imbedding the selected view in more comprehensive 'social fields') shows the applicability of the approach. It is also worth considering whether Lewin's approach might be continued on the lines of the 'dynamic equilibria' used as a construct in economics, i.e., as well-balanced lines of growth. For example, one might consider processes such as the evolution of the consciousness of the workers proceeding towards citizenhood in a kind of evenly growing economy. A model of this kind might be applied in Figure 52.79 The field-view of social stratification (to supplement Lewin) (a) Prefatory remark. We may follow Professor Dahrendorf in describing social stratification as a hierarchical type of position-field. 80 Stratification is an example of a social structure (or more precisely: a special aspect of one), as indicated by E. Z. Vogt in Figure 51. The formal parallel between stratification and the phase-space (a field of overlapping horizontal planes, each of which can be adjusted to the others by social forces) seems to me to contain valuable possibilities. Let us examine one of Lewin's examples of phase-space which is connected to some extent with social stratification: the example of racial discrimination.

(b) Racial discrimination in two towns. Regarding this diagram it should be remarked that, even more than in the example of aggres-

141

FIELD-THEORY VERSUS SYSTEM AND STRUCTURES THEORIE S

sion, the choice of units of measurement is a difficult matter. Lewin says nothing more definite about this. On the other hand there can be no doubt that the representation, viewed qualitatively, has a concrete content. In actual fact (e.g., in different American places dealt with by the study) there are different degrees of racial discrimination, both spatially and at various times. The only thing that has to be clarified is the manner in which one tries to bring deceptions of the authorities, difficulties with recruitment in industry, and various hostilities between different parts of the population, under a common denominator. But let us simply assume hypothetically that it works. Now we can sift out the forces aimed at greater discrimination ( / A,g for example) and those aimed at smaller discriminations (fA,s for example). For the first, Lewin mentions: 'The interest of certain sections of the white population to keep certain jobs for themselves ... ' and 'ideals of the white and coloured population about what is "proper" or "not proper" work'. As forces acting against greater discrimination, he mentions: an increasing degree of rebellion among the coloured population, as well as feelings of the white population that' "too much" discrimination is unfair'. 81 Great (g)

f

fA2S

A,s

fA3S fA1g

f

A2g

fB3S f fB 5 B2 2s

fB1s fB15 .j.

Small Small

A3g

f

B3g

~ f B 2 g9 tfB2

f tfB1 9 B1g

(s) (5)

1

f

2

2

33

4 4

5 5

6 6 Time

Figure 59. Racial Discrimination in Two Towns over a Period of Time. Reading from bottom to top (small to great) = degree of discrimination (after K. Lewin, Field Theory ... , Figure 21, p.201).

At the respective level for each moment of time the equality of the opposing forces is assumed (/g - Is = 0), and their summation without a sign can indicate varying degrees of tension. Increasing tension often precedes changes of level (assumed in the examples on Figure 59). Or to put it differently, it can lead to the acquiescence of 142

THOUGHTS ON STRUCTURE AND CHANGE

one side or to increased pressure, 82 just as reduced tension can lead to greater fluidity of the level or to social stability. Different constellations in towns A and B cause different effects. For example, A might be in a northern state of the U.S.A. and B in a southern. In my opinion this model in Figure 59 can be rearranged to include two lines connected with one another, e.g., Line A = prestige of the skilled white worker in Town X, Line B = prestige (status-level) of the coloured worker in Town X. Moreover the phasespace attitude would pass over into a structural view of field theory which could develop Vogt's model a stage further (Figure 51). Lewin never took this step. (c) On social stratification. At first sight Lewin's racial discrimination model does not seem to have much to do with social stratification, apart from the fact that it is concerned with discrimination. Social stratification is not so much composed of aggressive acts performed against one another by different parts of the population, or by forces acting in a similar way, as it is composed of the reciprocal views of sections of the population. 83 But if the stratification model is not to be a purely abstract classification but is really going to say something about the actual relationship between people, then it must also contain certain forces. The only question is whether those forces are directed towards strata, or towards positions and roles in some other fashion. Looked at from the point of view of the separate position or role, there exists a hierarchical relationship, and surprisingly enough there is often no direct dispute. What relationship is there, for example, between a professor and a general, or between a locksmith and a tailor, when one compares their respective prestige? Of course there is some kind of relationship of tension when people compare themselves with others - either consciously or unconsciously, depending on their stratum. In many cases there is also a direct dispute, perhaps on grounds of interest (within the same firm, for example, or between neighbours or simply against 'those on top').84 We must admit that at the moment we can do no more than indicate that there is a problem here, which needs working out. 85 Perhaps the discussion on 'level of aspiration' (which will come later in Chapter 16) will throw some light on the social side of the individual desire for advancement. VI Social engineering?

Lewin's field-theory, especially in his comparatively late essays (e.g.,

Frontiers in Group Dynamics which is really what we have been

following in the last section) contains the idea of social planning. FT-P

143

FIELD-THEORY VERSUS SYSTEM AND STRUCTURES THEORIES

Lewin was already thinking about this after 1943 in relation to Germany. 86 Lewin is anxious to come closer to the 'more exact' social sciences, such as economics which is often supported with calculable findings, and aims at comprehensive and precise social investigation. 87 We also need a type of sociological theory that is better developed and has greater verifiability. Lewin wanted to smooth the way for this. How far he has been successful in this it is impossible to say yet with any certainty, because since his death his numerous suggestions have been very little developed. Lewin wanted to take the analytical tools of a psychologically orientated sociology and bring them up to the level of economic and mathematical theories of equilibrium (he mentions Hicks, Lange and Samuelson)88 and the theory of games (von Neumann and Morgenstern),89 so that these theories could work hand in hand.

The revolutionary element in Lewin's field-theory Any social condition is an equilibrium of forces, which may alter or be altered by any change in the forces involved. This psychologicallyorientated and fundamental idea lies behind the whole conception of forces in Lewin's compendium of field-theories, and it is certainly revolutionary as compared with the ideas of the 'harmonists' and the 'order-theorists' such as the school of Parsons and other structural theorists. 90 Periods of social change may differ quite markedly from periods of relative social stability. Still the conditions of these two states of affairs should be analysed together for two reasons: (a) Change and constancy are relative concepts; group life is never without change, merely differences in the amount and type of change exist. (b) Any formula which states the conditions for change implies the conditions for no-change as limit, and the conditions of constancy can be analysed only against a background of 'potential' change. 91 In another place he remarks that stable conditions conceal a 'certain need for change', which can be brought to light by analysis. 92 Here Lewin mentions the other, more or less social-evolutionary (or 'social-democratic') field-theorists such as Mannheim and Myrda1.93 It was this that caused his student, J. F. Brown, to feel justified in linking field-theory with certain Marxist attitudes, wellrecognized in the 'solid' sciences such as economics. 94 Even the more pragmatic procedure of Dahl and Lindblom,9a which is ready to accept evolution, is based on a related idea: namely, the solution of social problems piecemeal in a world with

144

THOUGHTS ON STRUCT U RE A N D CHANGE

certain stabilization processes, which responsible men not only permit themselves to be regulated by but deliberately assist. Then too Ernst Bloch's notion of the various changing forces and trends operating at any time, out of which the responsible man can choose to promote certain ones that tend towards desirable social goals, and restrict others (on the basis of a utopian goal that he keeps before his eyes,96 is not far removed from Kurt Lewin's concept of science. One need only think of the ideas on re-education which Lewin had for the German nation (especially its lower elites) after the end of the War. The forces, which had supported the previous German society, were to be systematically readjusted in order to fit in with the goal (at first utopian) of a 'self-balancing' democracy.97 His idea of tackling the 'lower elite' presupposes a picture of the force-field in the structure of society. Here Lewin's methodology might usefully be linked up with the modern type of social and economic planning, and at the same time smooth the way for a precise theorizing about historical change.

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part four

Social field-theories concerned with fields of opinion and interests

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11 Fields of opinion as a basis for norm- and role-formation

I

The formation of opinion as group-behaviour

Social behaviour as a special case of the psychological'detour problem' (a) Prefatory remark on social behaviour. When using the term 'social behaviour' we (and Lewin) have something more particular in mind than Max Weber had when he used the concept 'social action'. 1 We are not concerned here with action based on a rational appraisement of the behaviour of others (as Max Weber was); we are concerned with action performed in common with others, or in special cases 'action assisted by others'. An early form of this social behaviour is illustrated in the detour experiment on Figure 60.

(b) Advancing from a 'detour problem' to a 'social detour problem'. The original detour problem is a much-used construct in learning theory.2 Figure 60a shows the classic case. A child C wishes to reach the goal G+ (positive valence); left to itself it would choose the direct path, for any diversion of the force that seeks the goal (Fc,G) would require a psychic act of insight, i.e., a learning process. In the terminology of topological psychology this would involve a 'change in the cognitive structure' leading to a change in the volitional forces. Now if a small child finds itself unable to overcome an obstacle such as a playpen, then it will appeal for help to some nearby adult, perhaps by stretching out its arms. One assumes that here there is a change from an isolated to a social view of the situation (on the part of the child), i.e., he gets an insight that someone else's help will enable him to overcome an obstacle which he cannot overcome by himself. 149

FIELDS OF OPINION AND INTERESTS

In Figure 60b in spatial terms part of the barrier surrounding the goal G+ is marked out as the 'social path' which has to be found. 3 Many combinations between people can be explained in this fashion, though naturally not all, particularly where the individual joins up with a stronger group. G+

B

? ?

B

C

C

?

?

G+

S

(a)

Cb) (b)

Figure 60. A Simple and a Social Detour Problem (simplified from K. Lewin, Field Theory . .. , Figures 41 and 42, on p. 252,

as well as from Figure 48, p. 264). (a) A simple detour problem; (b) A social detour problem. B = barrier S = social sector of the barrier

Formation of opinion as an act of 'group discovery'

Many social decisions, particularly of an ethical or a religious kind, can be interpreted as decisions about whether to join one group or another. Lewin performed a number of experiments on this, in the informative area of eating habits. 4 Eating habits are typical instances of social standards; they can be laden with taboos. They are supported by definite social force-relationships, and hence by induced intra-personal structures of knowledge and opinion, and any change in the force-relationships (e.g., in time of emergency or through a change in the reference-groups) can overthrow or at least alter them. By experiments with retraining American housewives in the consumption of different kinds of bread Lewin established that effective retraining was really only possible, if the person whose opinion was being altered took the decision as part of a group (the effect of influence and solidarity). I) We spoke of this in Chapter 10. Remarks on 'social forces' in groups

(a) The 'super-personality' of group pressure. Social forces proceed either from persons or from groups of persons. We mention both of these, because group forces are never entirely a matter of persons, 150

A BASIS FOR NORM- AND ROLE-FORMATION

even though in the last resort these must have a place. The pressure which forces the individual into conformity does not result primarily from the fact that the persons X, Y and Z are involved, but rather from the fact that a whole group is involved. Thus the perception of any individual confronted with a group must contain a perceptual picture (going somewhat beyond the persons involved) of the group situation that is capable of inducing forces in him. (b) The alienation of social forces from persons. We have already dealt with position-fields and role-fields. 6 Peripherally we also discovered that neither the external influences exerted on a person nor the individual influence exerted on others necessarily needed to involve the whole person. In spite of the unity of the psychological person as a dynamic whole and a field in himself, it is meaningful to divide it up theoretically in connection with more comprehensive structural realities or social fields. From among the infinite interdependence of social reality one selects different units of influence or dynamic wholes, in order to be able to investigate their particular systematic qualities. 7 At the same time from many points of view the person is not the strongest bond of forces. As has long been familiar from the discussion on division oflabour and mechanization, the influence exerted by people - particularly in those sectors where they underrate their own influence - can express itself as being 'alienated'S from the original personality. On the one hand the person himself constitutes a field (including his perceptual field or life-space); on the other hand opinions or influences emanating from several people may form a field separate from the persons involved. When analysing a situation or a social condition, it may therefore be meaningful to ignore the persons and look for force-fields that strive to affect this condition or to change it.

n

Are 'Folkways' not fulIy-developed norms? (concerning Hans Linde's theory of 'Polylogical Fields')

Norms are not independent causes, but something in need of explanation

Regarding a study on group-norms by Sherif, Sodhi raised the objection that what had been taken for an explanation of a certain social behaviour was itself really something that ought to be explained. 9 The same error is committed in the idea of total cultures viewed as a role-system governed by norms (e.g., in the manner of Parsons). The fact that people tend to act according to certain norm-expectations,10 does not offer any real explanation for their behaviour. On

151

FIELDS OF OPINION AND INTERESTS

the contrary, the essential thing is to discover how certain norms and social roles come to be formed in such a way that certain groups of people have a greater tendency to observe them than others do. I think that one may be able to find a key to this in the way that opinions originate and develop into a norm, which is something that can vary according to the type of culture. One thinks for instance of the medieval and more concentric type of development comparable with the family-centred formation of opinion and norms as against the sectional influences exerted in modem times, particularly in Europe and North America. l l We do not deny the importance that functional differentiation such as the modem division oflabour have for the formation of roles and norms; but we should like to point out that the logical integration of cultural ideologies overstresses a rational aspect of culture which is really only predominant in exceptional instances, e.g., when there is a dictatorship by a priestly caste or a party. The logic of a system tells us nothing about its real occurrence or about the structure of reality, however valuable it may be from an educational point of view to have information about the logical compatibility or incompatibility between the different parts of a conceptual system represented by a person, by a weltanschauung or by a culture. I2 Hans Linde's

~Polylogical

Fields'

Hans Linde tries to examine the origin of so-called 'Folkways',13 a phenomenon which is closely connected with the origin of customs and norms. 14 A polylogical field in Linde's sense is a nexus of statements, all of which proceed from the subjective 'logic'I5 of different people, as well as from those who spread rumours and believe them without reference to any logical consistency. If I interpret Linde correctly, 16 he is saying that common ideas (e.g., 'People say .. .' or 'It is a fact that .. .') permeate society like magnetic fields, and quite considerably affect all human action. As a result of rumours and gossip we are liable to find that the 'superstructure' of a culture or society 'contains a field, which is not only influenced by communal ideas of very heterogeneous origin, but even appears clearly defined by them: fortuitous, indeterminate, variable, altogether subjective as regards the separate elements, but ultimately lacking the originality and compactness of the pUlsating totality. These are what we call polylogical fields.'17 One must not be confused by this very vague conception; there is something very concrete and quite analysable about it. As examples of polylogical fields, Linde himself lists: ideas on 'the problems of 152

A BASIS FOR NORM- AND ROL E- f ORMATIO N

juvenile delinquency, of the flow from country to town, of marriage, of alcoholism, and on the problem of leisure' .18 These seem as if they were philological ones, like the 'word-fields' of Wilhelm Roessler. 19 But we believe that Linde's approach should be followed up, if we feel that fields of this kind do really overlay society and tend to produce certain types of behaviour. They are superstructures built over disputed social areas, usually over innovations which clash with traditional ideas. 20 This raises a theoretical idea of the intellectual and ideological superstructure of a society (perhaps a continuation of the early work of Karl Mannheim),21 which is quite contrary to the idea of a logical and integrated norm-system, such as the notion of 'position and role behaviour' held by the Parsons school. In this context a unified cultural system is only conceivable as a very simplified rational idealtype. 22 A nation's store of ideas or standards is a graduated and varied polylogical field. We refer the reader here to Bernt Spiegel's graphic illustration of the 'image-model' ;23 and we may also recall our own interpretation of Merton's role-set, which we shall find to be confirmed by Katz and Lazarsfeld's concept of molecular leadership.

III A remark on the change of opinion in standard and law, in connection with Barna Horwarth's 'Law Field' It was already obvious to Max Weber that there were continual exchanges between convention, custom and law. 24 To these three we may add opinion, especially 'folkways'. This connection can be clearly seen in Germanic and English Law. But it is not so clear in a mode of thought influenced by the law of a dictatorship or by Natural Law, typical cases of which are provided by Roman Law or by the ancient Chinese and Confucianist system. In this way Barna Horwarth argues against the nominalist legal system of Kelsen. 25 The educational influences of Mosaic or Solonian Law are of the greatest importance for sociology, and we do not deny this. When properly applied they are very useful for reducing prejudice, as was the case with the emancipation of women during the present century. Either of these, or a combination of both, may be a proper subject for investigation, but not by the way of a priori assumptions. In his article on 'Field Law and Law Field' Barna Horwarth deals with the early stages of Soviet legal theory. This ran into great difficulty when Sztuchka tried to reduce 'laws' to social realities, or when Pashukanis attempted to explain the change-over from social to legal realities on a partly Marxist basis. 26 Horwarth sees this as a victory for the nominalist view over an excessively substantialist

153

FIELDS OF OPINION AND INTERESTS

view, and notes a parallel between empirical and juridical laws. But when he goes on to say that he thinks modern probability- and field-theory (in physics as well as in social science) may be reducing the difference between empirical and normative theories, this may be a false continuation of his excellent start. 27 IV 'Communication Research' (taken from Katz and Lazarsfeld)28 as a main preoccupation for field sociology In many ways we have already been working on the assumption that the integration of norms and values Uust like crowd psychology on the lines of Le Bon) may be resolved into variegated fields. Thus we remarked on one occasion that Merton's role-set seems more humane to us as a basis for positions and roles than a unified normsystem does. 29 Here the word 'humane' is simply used to mean: 'as happens in human social life as far as we know up to now'. Katz and Lazarsfeld, on whom we are relying here, want to detach the theory of opinion from Le Bon's type of crowd psychology and investigate it in closer detail. In the process they discovered the molecular leaders (cf. Lewin's gatekeepers)30 to be just as important for the formation and distribution of opinion as the so-called elite. 31 The central question is: 'Who says what to whom, and with what effect?'32 In their empirical investigations, which should be studied in the original account, they confirm the following thesis: 'There it is demonstrated, on the basis of empirical evidence, that individuals are influenced by quite different kinds of people on different sorts of things.'33 Technical stimuli are different from the stimuli of fashion or politics. Every society has a specific network of influences, and when these change it means that the society itself is changing. Both these questions are important subjects for research. According to a particular situation (and this is the secret of social success or failure, of individual status, or of special interests) any individual person adjusts himself in different fields of influence which he feels will tend to consolidate him 34 - as in the case of choosing a reference-group.36 'It is also important to investigate how changes in a situation will influence an individual's choice of network [of communication] and, similarly, how changes in a situation affect the patterns of communication within a group.'36 A change of this kind in the structure of influence is equivalent to changes in the various chosen elites, whether molecular or 'super-molecular'. 37 By the use of personal interests (or attitudes)38 I believe it is fundamentally possible to integrate different groups of the population within the communication structures (which in turn, I think, determine the role structures) with considerable approximation.

154

A BA S IS FOR NORM- A N D ROLE-fOR\IATION

Katz and Lazarsfeld corroborate their communication theory by means of investigations in American communities. 39 Methods and contents of communication: elements of social fielddetermination

The social role behaviour of individual members of society depends on the power and communication network around them (or more precisely: on different networks in different areas) and on what they receive from this network. Thus we do not simply imagine the 'position and role system' of a society as being defined by some sort of 'inherent' norm-system of behaviour; on the contrary it is defined by causal networks of reciprocal power-relations and influences, in rather the same way as we considered relations between members of Merton's role-set to be both relational and causal at the same time.'o Thus within and by means of these influence-relationships certain contents are exchanged,41 which constitute further factors in behaviour. By just the same methods of communication the direct influence of others (perhaps expressed non-verbally, as with animals), as well as the 'contents' of the communications which are symbolically independent and are typical of human cultural behaviour, all become part of the external influences in the perceptual field of the individual- i.e., the external imprint of Lewin's life-space. 42 Both the communication network and the informative and normative contents are among the objective or sociological factors of the individual psychological fields. Thus they really determine the roles, and the expectations of these, which are normatively directed upon the rolebearers, become canalized by the power and communication networks and cannot be effective independently of them. They spread outwards like fields with a definite structure (namely, the communication structure) throughout society and induce 4s behaviour. In a similar way a number of field-theorists (social psychologists or anthropologists) have arrived at their idea of what is social in the social creatures (whether the zoon politikon or the 'social animal') to hit on the phenomenon of language. We may mention here the anthropological article by Schenkel, and W. Roessler's analysis of the social fields regarding the speech characteristics of generations and classes. 44 I believe that the usual so-called 'position and role structure' is merely secondary to the power structure and the communication structure that we have just been discussing; it is a rational generalization of the external element in psychological fields and cannot itself be held to be causal.

155

12 Multi-person fields, image-fields and the norm-field of society

I J. F. Brown's 'Topological'l representation of groups and sets of people

The figurative spatial representation 0/ groups in J. F. Brown (a) Prefatory remark on J. F. Brown. The early student of Lewin who is of the most importance for social science, is Junius Flagg Brown. Brown studied as a psychologist in Berlin 2 with Wertheimer, Koehler and Lewin. It was at this time that he, like Lewin, must have come in contact with the intellectual wealth of Cassirer and Carnap. Today his work is seriously underestimated, and the reason for this is that he forestalled Lewin in applying the latter's field-concept to the social sphere, 3 but that shortly after this he appeared to be overtaken by Lewin himself." The appearance is deceptive, however, for Brown distinguishes himself from Lewin completely by reason of his evolutionary (not to say, revolutionary) interest. J. F. Brown's interesting survey of field-theory and the Marxist social dynamic (in Section 2 of this chapter we shall evaluate this in greater detail) includes a very pointed distinction between the theory of structural functionalism on the one hand, and field-theory as dealt with by Lewin on the other. One may also recall J. F. Brown's criticism of the classificatory theory.s Brown succeeded in bursting out of the framework of social psychology, which had been generally concerned, especially at the time of Brown's book, with the influences exerted by the social element upon the individual, when he made his large-scale attempt to penetrate the dynamics of politics and history.

156

MULTI-PERSON, IMAGE- AND NORM-FIELDS OF SOCIETY

(b) The multi-person field. The arrangement of groups, as shown on Figure 61a, seems to me to have been taken over straight from Wertheimer's theory of gestalt perception. 6 This purely relational connection between persons (every point in the diagram - or more correctly, every point-region - represents a person) was supplemented by Brown with a line of demarcation which indicates the more or less obviously closed character of the group (Figures 61 b and C).7

Cal

Cb)

Cal

(e)

Cb) (e) (d) (d)

Figure 61. «a), (b) and (c) after J. F. Brown, Psychology and the Social Order, Figure 17, p. 120; (d) after Figure 15, p. 118.) (a), (b), (c), Increasingly closed groups; (d) The ingroup-outgroup relationship.

Figure 61d now shows the interconnection of social group-relations, and the way in which the more exclusive 'ingroup' is relatively isolated from the outer-lying parts of the whole (i.e., the 'outgroup', as seen from the point of view of the ingroup). As an example of a graduated 'ingroup-outgroup' relationship on the lines of Figure 61d, Brown describes the following distribution of the American nation (into A + B + C + D): there is the exclusive upper class (A), the middle-class region (B), the region of the white proletariat (C), and the region of the black proletariat (D). The regions A + B play the part of an ingroup with respect to C + D; and A + B + C are the ingroup as against D.8

A dynamic presentation oJ 'whipping up a mob'9 A typical situation where a crowd of people becomes dynamically regrouped and emotionally charged is as follows: A German immigrant called Schmidt has been living ever since 1900 as a respected citizen in a certain American city (Figure 62a).

157

FIELDS OF OPINION AND INTERESTS

The vectors in the drawing indicate the relative similarity of interests, e.g., the wish to make financial progress or the wish to read a newspaper. On the outbreak of war in 1914 the situation changes. All at once Schmidt finds himself outside the group formed by the others. Hostility against him rises, until eventually the news that a ship has been sunk causes an excited mob to smash the windows of poor Schmidt's shop. The mob has now, so to speak, become charged. The vectors, which in Figure 62a show a certain similarity of direction within the ingroup (to which Schmidt himself belongs), now take on the aspect of aggression against 'the German'.

Ca)

Schmidt

(b)

Schmidt

Figure 62. (After J. F. Brown, Psychology and the Social Order, Figures 13 and 14, p. 76; in 62(b) we have expanded this by drawing the vectors more heavily.) (a) Peaceful structure of a crowd; (b) Field-structure of a mob. Schmidt, who was once a member of the group, has now become a kind offocus of hatred. In the example given, the group is surrounded by a strong barrier (the nation, in the narrower sense), and this restricts the social mobility both of the victim, Schmidt, and of the other people as well. Even former friends of Schmidt take part in the reprisals against him, in order that they should not find themselves assigned to the outgroup, i.e., they find themselves in the pull of the mob-field. To assist in interpreting the diagram we have also shown the vectors in Figure 62b as considerably thicker than in 62a. We have not shown them as longer, for in Lewin's notation this would indicate that they had increased in strength; we did it to show that we think that a qualitative change has occurred in the operative forces. 10 Since the time of Brown's example of Mr Schmidt, history has provided us with many other examples of the same kind of thing. One need only think of the way in which the Jews in Germany were stigmatized as an outgroup, and mass tension was unleashed against them on occasions such as the notorious Kristallnacht in 1938. 158

MULTI-PERSON, IMAGE- AND NORM-FIELDS OF SOCIETY

II Bernt Spiegel's image-model l l An introduction to the way in which Spiegel's model is constructed out of l semantic differentials'

Bernt Spiegel's model analyses the way in which the images of advertised products are distributed among the popUlation. It is carried out in a figurative spatial manner.12 In connection with the term 'semantic differential', which is commonly used in psychology,13 we may think of instances of distribution of opinion among the population as being one-dimensional in character (cf. Figure 63a). In the similar attempt made by Anthony Downs, he sets up a scale of attitudes ranging from the political left to the political right. This can be done, for example, by ordering the percentages of desired nationalization of industry from right to left. Then the number of people favouring each particular view can be worked out. The political parties tend to 'settle' around the points of frequent occurrence or high points.].),

Respective density of the population

Graduated shades of grey White

Political 'left'

(a)

Political 'centre'

Black

Political

'right'

Figure 63. (a) A 'Semantic Differential'; (b) Distribution of the population on a semantic differential, according to the method of Anthony Downs. 15 In Bernt Spiegel we find the distribution of the population represented on a fiat surface, more or less as in Figure 63b. One need not have a one-dimensional count of the population, since the density of the points on the surface tells us the same thing; instead of this a second dimension can be introduced as an additional semantic differential. Outside the social field, which is arranged in figurative spatial terms according to opinion and is surrounded by a dotted line, it makes for greater clarity to introduce symbols in the vertical and horizontal dimensions in order to show the endpoints (contrasting pairs of the respective semantic differential measures). In order to make things clearer still one can mark the various point-regions or

159

FIELDS OF OPINION AND INTERESTS

persons themselves by graduating them according to the notation for the qualitative series; in the example of Figure 64a this is shown as ranging from black, and through half-black to white. I feel that this gives one a good opportunity to overlay the different arrangements and place them one on top of the other; and in Section 4 of Chapter 13 I intend to deal with this in greater detail. 18 In addition to the population field, as I should like to call it, e.g., one giving the results of opinion polls, one can also use the same X

x

y

y

(a)

(b)

Figure 64. (64(a) after Bernt Spiegel, Struktur der Meinungsverteilung . .. , Figure 4, p. 23; 64(b) after ibid., Figure 9, p. 27.) (a) A population-field (arranged according to opinions) ; (b) The 'image' of a product.

schema to plot the 'image' of any product manufactured by a firm, according to its different qualities (as on Figure 64b). If the two diagrams, 64a and 64b, are laid one on top of the other this will indicate the potential buyers. This double diagram also symbolizes very clearly how any particular opinion-image can be identified with a group of supportersY

'Equipotentials' in the distribution of opinion (according to intensity of attraction) and 'niches' There is an interesting connection between what Lewin calls 'valences', IS and the distribution of opinion as we have explained it with reference to Spiegel. The way in which an opinion-content, desired by certain people, moves further and further away from a point in figurative space, can also be equated with a diminishing valence. Spiegel raises the idea of an opinion-point, at which a product occurs, into a third dimension above the surface of the population-field, and connects it with lines to the points on the surface. Then as these lines come closer they become steeper, and Spiegel describes this as 'an increasing slope' .19 This slope is practically identical with Lewin's 'valence' (Aufforde-

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rungscharakter: literally, 'demand value'); Spiegel himself uses the expression 'demand quantity'. The theory suggests several possible methods, which the manufacturer has at his disposal, for selling his product by increasing the valence or slope. He can either intensify his advertising campaign and thus raise the valence of his product in itself (in Spiegel's symbolism this would be equivalent to raising the product above the Product I Product II

Niche

Niche (a)

Whigs

Tories

(Labour) (b)

Figure 65. Equipotentials and Niches. 20 (a) Equipotentials taken from Spiegel's model; (b) Arrangement of the parties according to Downs, showing the 'niche' for the Labour Party in the older British party-system (shaded area). surface of the population). Or he can bring it closer on the level of distinctive features, by changing its properties, to the image that the desired consumer forms of the product. The valence of the image can also be represented by so-called equipotentials,21 i.e., by lines joining points having the same degree of slope or valence. The product (the subject of opinion) is equated with a point, around which the equipotentials arrange themselves. At a certain distance from this point the attraction of a neighbouring product is equally strong, and beyond this point the neighbouring product has a stronger attraction than the original product. In the boundary area we find the products coming into competition with each other. We have already mentioned a possible form of tactics (here price-competition is not necessarily excepted, since price constitutes a qualitative difference just like any other). Now any new

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competitor will find it easiest to break into the market at the point where the valences of the products already available are particularly weak, and these points are called niches. 22 Figure 65b indicates the prospects for founding a new party in one of these 'places that are incompletely filled'. In England at the beginning of this century there were a number of electors, who were not really satisfied either with the Tories or the Whigs, and their only problem was that they did not know who else they could vote for. Into this niche, which was of very considerable size in comparison with the total number of the population, the Labour Party stepped, and then managed to beat both its opponents in an election. 23 We shall now pass on from the theoretical discussion of this model; but in what follows we shall have something to say about the shifts in the distribution of opinion, which will lead on to a consideration of the forces and conflicts operating within social fields. 24 ITI The origin of social forces with a change in the normal distribution of attitudes (with reference to J. F. Brown)25 Brown puts forward the thesis that the average and the deviation for personality qualities in a population can in fact be altered by manipulation. As regards the probability of their occurrence, unmanipulated random distributions correspond to the Gaussian normal distribution. This is the rule that we find applies in nature; for example, with reference to the distribution of physical height or of talent,26 and probably also concerning someone viewing relatively distant objects. According to Brown's view the personality is made up of a number of 'personality traits', and the distribution of these is dependent on the particular group-belongingness of each person. 27 In Brown's estimation, even Goethe did not possess the same personality throughout his entire life; on the contrary it may be said that his personality changed with the changing 'fields' under whose influence he came at various periods throughout the course of his life. We are not going to discuss here whether disposition or environment is of the greater importance; Brown himself tended more than Lewin did to overemphasize the external field-influences. 28 Where larger numbers of people are concerned, Brown assumed that personal qualities and attitudes are subject to normal distribution. Changes in the normal distribution, or so-called 'skewed curves', do occur when there is any deliberate selection of certain characteristics, e.g., with the distribution of physical height in a specially selected regiment of tall men. 29 Other personal characteristics, of course, may be found to be distributed quite normally in such a regiment, apart from the fact that, statistically speaking, normal dis162

MULTI-PERSON, IMAGE- AND NORM-FIELDS OF SOCIETY

tribution presupposes a fairly large number of observed instances; this is the so-called Law of Large Numbers, which is a requisite assumption for random distribution. Something that is of more interest to us is Brown's assumption that a change in the distribution of attitudes occurs when there is any change in the social field. Here Brown is thinking chiefly of changes in the state of the average value and of deviation, without any change in the normal distribution itself. He only deals quite briefly with one case of 'skewed distribution', but this is one that interests us more than his earlier remarks. In Lewin's terminology, we should state our own thesis on this subject in the following words: A normal distribution of attitudes (particularly, gradations of attitudes for and against) is usually to be found in a relaxed social field; a skewed distribution is a sign of increased tension in the social field, i.e., in the appropriate area of opinion.

B

A

Pro-A attitudes in group B

Pro-A attitudes in group A

+

(a)

B

A

+ (b)

Figure 66. The Theoretical Distribution of Pro-A Attitudes in the Two Nations A and B, in a Relaxed Field and in a Tense Field (after J. F. Brown, Psychology and the Social Order, Figure 57 A and B, p. 253 30). (a) Time of Peace ; (b) Time of War.

Figure 66 shows the respective degrees of a positive attitude towards the country A, among the popUlations ofthe nations A and B. In time of war the normal distribution of attitudes for and against is replaced by a strong predominance of anti-A attitudes among the 163

FIELDS OF OPINION AND INTERESTS

nation Band pro-A attitudes among the nation A. One assumes that there is no revolutionary situation obtaining within the respective nations, and I believe that this is already implicit in the normal distribution represented in Figure 66a. Probably there is a similarity in the shift that takes place in attitudes towards marketing or capitalism, when changes occur in the field structure from times of prosperity and harmony to periods of depression and conflict in the economic cycle (compare Chapter 13).31 The area we are touching on here is as yet so unexplored, and the possibilities for reciprocal co-ordination of logical and empirical statements are still so incomplete, that we must refrain from saying very much about the uniform regularity of shifts in normal distribution, which take place in a field of social tension. Thus we can do no more than indicate that here is something which we consider worthy of investigation. 32 IV The balance of differentiated norm-systems - balance of power instead of consensus 33 If a society is to achieve stability, does it require a unified normsystem? The promoters of totalitarian systems will answer this question with an emphatic 'Yes'; and those inclined towards an authoritarian socio-political view will usually give an affirmative answer that takes these ideas for granted. On the other hand, I think it would be typical of the partisans of representative democracy to give some such answer as the following: It is merely necessary that, as a common wish on the part of a society, there should be a general Willingness to accept and tolerate various different norm-systems ranged alongside one another. As far as possible these should be guaranteed by a minimum consensus of opinion exerted upon the constitution. To a large extent the dispute is really one between different philosophical systems. We are going to try to bring the question down to a level of differentiating between various observable areas of human social life. As an example of a miniature society we are going to take the bank-wiring group, as reported in the Hawthorn Experiment which occurs in the well-known series of experiments in Social Psychology, conducted by the school of Elton Mayo.34 George C. Homans, following Roethlisberger and Dickson,35 interprets one element in the Hawthorn Experiment in such a way that it could possibly lead on to a kind of balance-of-power theory of norms. The bank-wiring group in the experimental area can be divided into two sub-groups: the workers on 'connector', and the workers on 'selector' equipment. The two soldermen who worked in the bank-wiring group must be counted as forming part of the sub-group for which they chiefly did the soldering of connections; the supervisors can be 164

MUL TI-PERSON, IMAGE- AND NORM-FIELDS OF SOCIETY

left out of account altogether, as also can the officials in the factory hierarchy. The group is conceived of as being normally integrated, while the centrifugal forces of the sub-grouping are more than offset by the group feeling of solidarity as a whole. Nevertheless two very characteristic differences between the sub-groups can be observed: the connector-workers definitely feel themselves to be higher in rank than the selector-workers, and the selector-workers do in fact work at a lower rate than the connector-workers. In the bank-wiring group there exists a common group-norm of two apparatuses or 6,600 connections completed daily; and this norm is largely set and maintained by the leading members of the particular group which is dominant in prestige and in number. A few outsiders in the 'higher' group actually work at a higher rate. The output of the selector-workers, however, appears to remain consistently and without exception at a lower rate, even though these selector-workers (and this has been proved by the results of tests) are by no means inferior to the others either in intelligence or in manual ability. It therefore follows that the deviation must be socially determined, and moreover (which seems to me to be even more important) that both its scale and direction must be based on the social powerrelationships existing in the group. In Romans' view we are concerned here with some form of protest against under-valuation; and at the same time this protest also contains a kind of sanction against 'people who are overbearing', since the earnings of the whole group are on a joint piece-rate. The consciousness that one is standing apart and annoying those with 'higher prestige' brings more satisfaction than can be offset by any loss involved in the go-slow. But the element of deviation does not go beyond bounds, for then the effect of the sanction would prove harsher than the satisfaction achieved by the deviation is really 'worth'. The result of the measurement of forces in the sub-groups is therefore a balance of differentiated normfulfilment, which provides a certain stability for the group. Romans takes this and other ideas like it, and builds them up into a correlation between norm-fulfilment and rank, according to which each is both cause and effect simultaneously. Re finally arrives at the result that the individual is not always expected to fulfil the groupnorm, but on the other hand he is expected to maintain in the future the particular deviation reflected by his rank. 36 This tendency can easily be discerned, whenever we are dealing with a large-scale hierarchical type of norm-fulfilment, such as in the Hawthorn Experiment or with the bowling-alley successes of members of the Norton Street Gang.37 It is easy to pass from this view of the subject to another one, namely from the scale of hierarchical norm-fulfilment to a corresponding scale of differentiated norms, in which each rank is allotted its own norm of corresponding rank. In the example

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of the hierarchical scale then, we should arrive at something like the norms of the Indian caste-system. The Brahman has his first-class norms, the warrior has his second-class norms, and finally the U ntouchable has his lowest-class norms. Norm-scales of this kind can easily be found in every authoritarian system, and in the last resort, if one considers the question logically, even our own modern professional scale is not anything very different, apart from the fact that it can be distributed along horizontal axes as well as on the hierarchical ones. The fulfilment of a role-expectation can frequently also be looked upon as a deviation from the fulfilment of norms of a different role. Very likely this possibility is one that is largely responsible for the business of grading into different professions, and also perhaps for age roles and ethnic roles. At this point in our reflections we must be careful to see that what we originally intended to prove does not turn into its opposite, in the sense that we ourselves may incorporate the differentiated normsystem into a unified system of norms and rank. When simplified in this manner, the others have the appearance, in a society of available norms, of being nothing more than the representatives of a specific norm-system. The dominant sub-group which is 'of higher rank' will unfailingly apply its norms to the subordinate sub-group, which will seem to it to be made up of nothing but loafers; and the fact that they are loafers will only provide an additional reason why they should be lower in rank. We can assume it to be self-evident that a dominant stratum, which has the power requisite to maintain itself with success, will impose its norms on other strata, or will make them pay for any deviation. What is more problematic, and in this context much more interesting, is the behaviour of the other group. This is a case of a subtle question - namely, whether the behaviour of the selector-workers constitutes recognition or rejection of the ruling norms, or whether it represents some sort of a mixture between these two. Let us take a further demonstration-example from society as a whole: the group of intellectuals or, more particularly, the group of writers who criticize political and social questions. Insofar as they are successful, they deviate from the norms of the ruling class just to the extent of producing a slight shudder of horror in that class but not to such an extent that they could not still be recognized as belonging to that class. It is in some such fashion as this that we must view the behaviour of the selector-workers vis-a-vis the connector-workers. As regards the total norms of the group however they are not without a certain influence, an influence which can even be seen in the behaviour of the entire group towards the works. management, including the invoking of sanctions against 'deviationists upwards'. The process of norm and balance would therefore 166

MULTI-PERSON, IMAGE- AND NORM-FIELDS OF SOCIETY

still have to be played out to the end between the management and the bank-wiring group as a whole; and this offers further support for our view that the whole process by which norms are fixed in society is revealed as a tenaciously fought-out process of co-ordinating differentiated norm-systems. Figure 67 shows two norm-scales taken from the Theory of Level of Aspiration. 38 ALi is the scale of aspiration-levels in a group of AJ

AHI

AH3

A L5 AH2

AL

4

AL

3

AH1

Upward force exerted on the ALj levels by the potency of group H

AHO

AL2 AH-1

AL 1 Scale of values of a member

of group L

Scale of values of group H

Figure 67. A comparison of two norm-scales, or of the groups they represent. lower prestige, and AHi is a similar scale in a group of higher prestige; in terms of our illustration these may be conceived of as groupestimates for production-output. Let us assume that in each group the figure 2 stands for 'adequate performance', the figure 3 and above stands for 'eagerness or ambition', 1 for 'working slowly', 0 for 'loafing', and -1 for 'swindling'; then this will give us approximately the same arrangement as exists among the sub-groups of the BankWiring Group. According to Roethlisberger, Dickson and Homans it is not quite clear whether the lower-prestige group will adopt the norm allotted to it by the higher-prestige group (i.e., 'go-slow' or 'loafing') or will fall below it. The drift of the discussion seems to point rather to the latter. Any further fall in ALi is impeded by the force of the sanction exerted by the group H (i.e., the connectorworkers), since from the point of view of group L this force appears as a 'potency' in the Lewinian sense. The reader can amplify this by studying Figure 78d; this diagram shows members of groups, which are put in a state of inner tension by reason of differentiated expectations arising out of norm-systems; the forms of estimate are embodied in the 'elites' Em and En. This diagram is taken from an example

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involving society as a whole (namely, the split that occurred in the role-segments ofa working-class soldier during the First World War, where role-obligations as 'soldier' and 'worker' were involved) ;39 this may offer some additional explanation. And now let us try to summarize our ideas in the form of a number of propositions: 1 From a socially effective point of view, it cannot be said that any norms exist independently of the persons or groups that advocate them; 2 What one thinks of as a norm-system in society as a whole is really a kind of balance of differentiated norms; and this is nothing else but a reflection of the power-relationships existing between various social sub-groups; 3 As far as the intellectual location of groups is concerned in norm-systems which overlap both vertically and horizontally, it is better to start out from considerations of utility, into which sanctions and power-constellations can later be introduced. Something more will be said about this in greater detail. In social psychology the term 'utility' has a wider connotation than in economics. It refers principally to the satisfaction obtained by group-specific or social recognition. It is always particularly interesting when we find cases where the utility in terms of social psychology differs from the purely economic utility, and where compromises have to be made between the two. We may recall the social group-norm that was set up not only by the sub-groups but also by the whole group in our example, in the face of the economic advantage to be gained from the joint piece-rate. However subjective and uncertain such considerations of utility may be, this example certainly shows that they are at least capable of acting as pointers towards scientific insights. 40 Besides offering a special instance, sanction~theories can also be thought of as a supplementary framework for theories of social utility. In the case of Homans' account of the Bank-Wiring Group, we have seen that the solution was perceived in terms of utility-categories, which were in some way interwoven with the power of the sub-groups. The 'potency' of the 'higher-prestige group' H symbolizes simultaneously both power and attraction, since it always happens that persons and groups which attract us have a certain power over us; and groups which have power over us are capable of ensuring that whatever it is they want will exert a certain power of attraction for us. Power possesses the ability to confer sanctions of a negative or positive kind, and the attainment or non-attainment of these will involve a positive or negative advantage for the receiver. Therefore it is possible for disputes between 'power' and 'counterpower' to be settled in terms of units of utility or of disadvantage. In order to elucidate a model described by John W. Thibaut and

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Harold H. Kelley (using a 'case' taken from Peter M. Blau)41 Homans quotes the following example: two bureaucratic experts are related to one another by a difference in rank, such that one is in a position to help the other by virtue of his superior knowledge. The senior expert is prepared to make his knowledge available to his colleague, but only so long as the admiration of the latter continues to produce enough satisfaction to outweigh the harm he will suffer from loss of prestige due to a cheapening of his advice. The junior official will continue to ask for advice only so long as the help that E

Em

pol Erel

Eeco

En

(a)

(b)

Figure 68. A symbolic representation of (a) a social norm-and role conflict and (b) of the graduated norm-systems of a society. 'norm-leadership' of the economic elite = E eco of a political elite = Epol of a religious elite = Erel this gives him with his work is greater than the harm he will suffer from loss of prestige, through admitting his own inferiority. On this basis we arrive at a state of equilibrium, which is comparable with that of the two Bank-Wiring Groups.42 As a result of what each can give to the other, both experts are related to one another by a relationship of attraction, which is accompanied by power. According to Lewinian psychology, to have power over another person always means too that one has the ability to endow one's own aims with a balance in the life-space of the other person. 43 Thus we see that the norms, which are imposed on other persons or groups, are related in turn to a struggle for power between those persons or groups. Social norms are generally understood as patterns of behaviour that are willed and sanctioned by 'Society' itself, and not by any separate particular partners or reference-groups.44 A system of'sanctions by virtue of dominion', when seen from the point of view of the individual who appears as a 'poor sinner', is bound to seem fairly threatening. And this is certain to be the case even if he also has some

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hopes that the persons in authority will, if they go too far, eventually meet with resistance. On the other hand he is able to feel considerably happier, if he knows how insecure are the foundations of the whole system of norms by which he is supposed to act. Of course it is not actually collapsing, but it is supported on the backs of 'caryatids' wrestling with each other, and not upon pillars set firmly at rest. Various parts of the social 'norm-system' are borne by different groups, and move about among these in accordance with the powerrelationships. For instance, one may find parts of the industrial law that are backed by the trade unions, and parts that are backed by the employers; and behind the resistance to family planning one may find certain definite circles of world opinion, and so forth. That which is really put into practice in the long run - even 'by virtue of authority' - finally depends on the particular conjunction of forces that exists. One need only compare the attitude of the Catholic Church in North America with that in Spain, or the attitude of the Communist Party in West Germany or even in Italy with that in Russia, in order to see that there is an inverse correlation between democratic feeling and any particular ability to impose one's own norms upon others. The libertarian basic order therefore rests, not on any consensus of the population with a President, but rather on a splitting up and reciprocal adjustment between the power-groups, such as Dahl and Lindblom are thinking of when they use the term 'polyarchy' for 'democracy'. 45 Thus stability is based on a balance of power between the social groups; the groups try to shift the different patches in the conglomerate of social norms over onto one another (cf. Figure 68) - and this is what we call (for want of a better term) a 'balance of differentiated norm-systems'. It should also be added that, in the case of the conflicting parties, we are not dealing with 'groups' in any real sense. On the contrary, here we generally have a case of roles or will-sectors (cf. Figures 77-8)46 of the role-bearers, and this is something that we have neglected to deal with properly when considering groups in the 'small' example. The overlap between them does to some extent explain the need felt by individuals and by the groups - particularly in a society that is still locked in internal conflict - to have some semblance of a unified norm-system, in order that energy should not have to be expended upon role-conflicts, or upon intra-role conflicts. This makes conflict more difficult for the groupings - and this is the reason why certain groups struggle to achieve separate education or some other kind of separate sphere. But on the other hand it makes it easier for norms to bunch together dishonestly and produce a bogus form of corroboration; I am thinking of the way in which the desire for economic security may bring about a majority in an election, which afterwards calls for more difficult divorce laws, or will support

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parties in Germany, which simulate the 'wish' to regain the former German territory in the east. The equilibrium (or rather let us say: the compromise achieved at any one time) between the power-groups, which represent the normsystems, does simulate an imitation form of social consensus. Particularly in authoritarian-democratic mixed systems such as West Germany, this goes far beyond the degree of consensus which is needed as a framework to preserve the State, and frequently reveals itself in the uncertainty of governmental measures. It really forms part of the essence of a mature democracy that it should be able to display clearly the actual degrees of overlap between the various competing norm-systems - the kind of thing, for example, which cannot be completely suppressed when hammering out a governmental programme. Whether these underground processes are manifest or camouflaged, they must nevertheless remain subject to the same laws; and it will always constitute a supreme guarantee for a tolerant society that no one of the power-groups fighting for a norm should ever be strong enough to eliminate the others with impunity. There is always a danger of certain areas being faced with unclear constellations at the mercy of a determined pressure-group, while the opposing groups are only partly interested in the issue and cannot easily be co-ordinated - particularly when one is dealing with a 'disguised' society such as the German one. Incomplete though our ideas are, they may stimulate one to see through the illusory consensus of social norm-systems and arrive at the underground currents, which, to some extent at least, act as a substitute for an open discussion, when this is lacking in social activity.

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13 Interest-fields and fields of social conflict

I Myrdal's 'Interest-Fields'

The field of interests One of the few applications of social field-theory that may be considered completely independent of Kurt Lewin has been made by Gunnar MyrdaP It arose out of a criticism of liberal economics, particularly with regard to the way in which this neglects situations of interest. Myrdal, somewhat on the lines of Karl Mannheim's enlightened Marxist view, sets up an opposing concept of 'society as a field of interests'. It is argued in the following passage by Beat Huber, that what Myrdal has to say may be taken as a striking principle in field-theory: Myrdal's remarks imply that the analysis postulated by him is bound to view the entire institutional system (including law, convention and custom) as a variable one. Then secondly, one has to investigate 'how far certain social groups are of sufficient political importance to be able to institute changes within this system' (Myrdal, p. 295). Once the interest-field is elucidated through a consideration of the institutional basis, which is itself subject to political pressure, an understanding is attained which Myrdal describes as 'the responsibility demanded by scientific integrity'.2 (The Interest-Field is the constellation of the interests of groups as classes in society.) This does not exclude the possibility that conditions resembling a harmony of interests, may possibly occur; but these can never be postulated simply a priori without entering into a detailed elucidation of the balancing interest-forces which may perhaps be involved in

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such conditions. Here one can compare, for example, the kind of balance of power envisaged by Galbraith, which can simulate harmony or free competition, when it is relatively stable. Law, convention and custom produce a type of resultant structure, only 'momentarily' stable, in which the real causal forces consist, metaphorically speaking, in magnetic fields emanating from the interests which permeate society.3 The field of attitudes

I t is characteristic of the lack of materialistic stubbornness in Myrdal's point of view (and this is why we began by comparing him with Mannheim) that he should make a distinction between interests and attitudes. He says for example that:

It will not generally be appropriate to represent the political attitudes of social classes by means of their interests. Interests are blended to a much greater extent with a certain moral feeling; and often this merely reinforces an attitude that is chiefly based on interest, while at the same time it represses other emotional components of the attitude, which are founded on other opposing interests within the interest-field of the individual concerned.