Fascism in Ferrara, 1915-25 0198218575, 9780198218579

Table of contents :
Preface
Contents
Abbreviations
Introduction
1. From Unification to Intervention, 1870-1915
2. The Widening of the Divisions 1915-1918
3. The Defeat of the Interventionists, January-November
1919
4. Middle-class Attitudes and Socialist Administration
5. Triumph and Uncertainty: Provincial Socialism from
November 1919 to September 1920
6. The Beginnings of Reaction, September 1920-February
1921
7. The Rank and File of Fascism
8. Crisis and Consolidation: Provincial Fascism during 1921
9. Towards the Control of the State, February 1922 to the March on Rome
10. The First Year of Fascist Government, November 1922-
December 1923
11. From the Elections of 1924 to the Stabilization of the Fascist Regime
Bibliography
Map of the Province of Ferrara
Index

Citation preview

O X FO R D H ISTO R IC A L M ON O GRAPH S Editors BARBARA H ARVEY

A. D. M A C IN T Y R E

R. W. S O U T H E R N

A . F. T H O M P S O N

H. R. T R E V O R - R O P E R

FASCISM IN FERRARA

1915 - 1925 BY

PAUL CORNER

O XFORD

U N IV E R SIT Y PRESS

J975

Oxford University Press, E ly House, London W .i OLASGOW CAPE TOW N DELHI

NEW YORK

IBADAN

BOMBAY

TORONTO

NAIROBI

CALCU TTA

K U ALA LUMPUR

MELBOURNE

D AR ES SALAAM MADRAS

SINGAPORE

W ELLINGTON

LUSAKA

KARACH I

ADDIS ABABA

LAHORE

D ACCA

HONG KONO TOK YO

ISBN O I 9 8 2 1 8 5 7 5

© Oxford University Press 1975 A ll rights reserved. No part o f this publication may be reproducedy stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without thepriorpermission o f Oxford University Press

Printed in Great Britain by Richard Clay ( The Chaucer Press), Ltd. Bungay, Suffolk

PREFACE T h i s study is a revised version o f a thesis submitted for the degree o f D .P hil. in the University o f Oxford during 1971. M y first thanks are due, therefore, to M r. Christopher SetonW atson who acted as supervisor for the thesis; his criticisms and encouragement were at all times much appreciated. I should also like to express my gratitude to M r. Adrian Lyttelton who advised me on the revision o f the original m anuscript; to D r. Stuart W oolf who helped me at the outset o f this study; to Professor Renzo De Felice for his m any valuable indications about source m aterial; and to Professor Giuliano Procacci for reading the final draft and suggesting certain changes. I am also indebted to Giovanna Procacci and M ario Missori for their continued interest and assistance. M uch o f the research was carried out in the Archivio Centrale dello Stato in Rom e and I wish to thank the D irector and his staff for their persistent patience and courtesy when faced with w hat seemed innumerable requests for m aterial. The same thanks must also go to the D irector and staff o f the Biblioteca Ariostea o f Ferrara, to the Cam era di Commercio o f Ferrara, and to the Cassa di Risparmio o f Ferrara. I should also like to acknowledge my debt to the Italian M inistry o f Foreign Affairs for the award o f an Italian Govern­ ment Scholarship, to the Fondazione Luigi Einaudi o f Turin for a one year research fellowship, and to the M aster and Fellows o f Balliol College for a generous travel grant which permitted the further researching o f m any essential points during the course o f one summer vacation. St. Antony's College, Oxford. '

P aul C orner

CONTENTS Page Abbreviations Introduction 1. From U nification to Intervention, 1870-1915

viii ix 1

2. T h e W idening o f the Divisions 1915-1918

28

3. T h e D efeat o f the Interventionists, January-N ovem ber 1919

48

4. M iddle-class A ttitudes and Socialist Adm inistration

76

5. Trium ph and U ncertainty: Provincial Socialism from N ovem ber 1919 to Septem ber 1920

85

6. T h e Beginnings o f R eaction, Septem ber 1920-February 1921

104

7. T h e R ank and File o f Fascism

137

8. Crisis and Consolidation: Provincial Fascism during 1921

170

9. Tow ards the Control o f the State, February 1922 to the M arch on Rom e

209

10. T h e First Y ea r o f Fascist Governm ent, N ovem ber 1922Decem ber 1923

233

11. From the Elections o f 1924 to the Stabilization o f the Fascist Regim e

261

Bibliography

289

Map o f the Province of Ferrara

296

Index

297

ABBREVIATIONS A C S A rchivio Centrale dello Stato M in. Int. M inistero dellTntem o D G PS D irezione Generale di Pubblica Sicurezza A G R A ffari G enerali e Riservati Seg. Part, del D uce Segreteria Particolare del Duce G O Carteggio O rdinario C R C arteggio Riservato M R F M ostra della R ivoluzione Fascista Presidenza Presidenza del Consiglio dei M inistri

IN TR O D U C TIO N W h e n , in late O ctober 1922, Mussolini formed his first government, the fascist squads were permitted a victory parade through the streets o f Rome. Thus passed into fascist mythology the legend that it was the march on Rome and the display o f armed force that had secured the so-called ‘fascist revo­ lution*. In reality, o f course, the victory o f the fascists was political rather than m ilitary. The failure o f the governing class to find any solution to the threat o f fascism other than complete capitulation to Mussolini was a clear indication o f the advanced stage o f political atrophy that had already gripped the liberal Italian state. By late 1922 in fact, much o f northern Italy was already under fascist control. The two years prior to the march on Rom e had witnessed a progressive abdication o f the authority o f the state in province after province and its replacement w ith the authority o f the fascists. This book is a study o f the growth o f fascism in one such province— Ferrara. It is an attem pt to chart the course o f the local movement and to examine the circumstances that gave rise to, and permitted the survival of, that movement. It aims to discover who became fascist, w hy they became fascist, and w hy they remained fascist. Given the w ay in which fascism came to government, the provincial fascist organizations assume particular importance. In effect they provided the basis for the affirmation o f fascism at a national level. W ithout a strong provincial base, Mussolini could never have come to power, much less remained there. M oreover, the provincial movement also exerted a profound influence on the formation o f the ideology and the political programme o f fascism, helping to determine the characteristics o f the party which did even­ tually achieve success. Y et a detailed examination o f a pro­ vincial fascist organization m ay also be o f more general interest. The question o f the nature o f fascism continues to generate debate, and w hat follows is a case study against which norm ally accepted generalizations about fascism can be measured and assessed. The province o f Ferrara was, for crucial months o f 1921,

X

INTRODUCTION

the most vigorous element in the developing national fascist movement. It was Ferrara that formed die spearhead o f the extrem ely rapid expansion o f agrarian fascism w hich— at the beginning o f 1921— effectively rescued the town-based fascism o f M ussolini from political extinction. Although never to assume quite the same degree o f im portance in later years, the province none the less rem ained one o f the principal strong­ holds o f the Italian fascist movement. In addition, it was in Ferrara that one o f the most prom inent o f fascist leaders, Italo Balbo, m ade his name and established his political base. M any o f the themes central to the problem o f the rise and subsequent stabilization o f fascism as a whole are represented, therefore, in a study o f Ferrara. Certain o f them relate to the methods and organization o f fascism— to the system atic em ploym ent o f violence by the squads, to the establishment o f the fascist syndicates as a means o f controlling the agricultural labourers, and to the structure and decision-m aking m achinery o f the local fascist federation. O thers are concerned w ith the divisions that developed w ithin the fascist m ovement itself and w ith the grow ing tendency for fascism to be totally intolerant o f criticism or opposition, whether from fascist or non-fascist sources. T o a great extent, these divisions reflect the diversity o f social origin w hich existed between fascists, particularly between those o f the town and those o f the rural areas, w hile the methods by w hich dissidence was resolved are extrem ely indicative o f the influence the more ruthless agrarian fascism exerted over the whole movement. Y e t the m ain focus o f this study remains that o f the origins o f the m ovement, o f the reasons for, and the extent of, the initial adhesion to fascism in early 1921. Ferrara was rem arkable for the speed w ith which fascism asserted its control. A lthough in 1920 the province had been one o f the bastions o f revolutionary socialism, it took only weeks for the entire socialist organization to be brought to submission. This extrem ely sudden transition is in m any ways the m ain problem in accounting for the rise o f fascism in Ferrara. Violence obviously played its part, as m any interpretations have stressed, yet in provinces where the squads mounted an offensive ju st as violent, the results were less impressive. Certain clues about the other factors involved can be sought in the political background to the fascist onslaught— particularly in the im pact o f the First W orld W ar on provincial

INTRODUCTION

xi

politics and in the m entality developed both by the w ar and by the period o f socialist domination which followed. But such factors cannot be divorced from the economic circumstances o f the province. Ferrara was notable at this time for its modem capitalist systems o f agriculture; yet, side by side with these advanced forms o f farm ing were systems that had changed little over the centuries. The tensions arising from this contact o f old and new were a real factor in provincial life, especially for those who felt most threatened by the growing agricultural prole­ tariat— the small farmers, leaseholders, and sharecroppers. This is the context o f this study; the w ay in which fascism was re­ lated both to deep, underlying tensions and to immediate economic conditions, and the manner in which the fascists exploited the provincial situation to their advantage are the central themes o f the pages that follow. The study has been based largely on m aterial found in the A rchivio Centrale dello Stato, particularly the archive o f the M inistry o f the Interior, on local and national press sources, and on certain— generally lesser known— secondary works. Interviews were conducted with several o f the rem aining participants in the events o f these years, but they revealed themselves to be avid readers o f all available literature on fascism and experience suggested that their testimony should be used only when corroborated from other sources. The two occasions when this practice has not been followed are noted in the text. Finally it should perhaps be stressed that this study does not pretend to do more than illustrate certain aspects o f Italian fascism. There is no suggestion that the experience o f Ferrara was in any sense representative o f most other provinces. Sim ply because it was one o f the first areas to become fascist and did to some extent lead the movement rather than follow, Ferrara was clearly exceptional. In any case, the fascist movement differed greatly from region to region; the fascism o f Ferrara was not that o f M ilan, much less that o f Palermo or Catania. Between agricultural and industrial areas, between large towns and small towns, between north, south, and islands, the social, economic, and political conditions often varied so greatly that effective comparison o f the regional movements becomes very difficult. A n inquiry into the development o f fascism in another area m ight well produce different conclusions from those

•• xu

INTRODUCTION

reported here. Y et, if the conclusions m ight be different, the questions posed by the phenomenon o f fascism w ould rem ain very m uch the same. W hat follows is an attem pt to answer those questions for a single Italian province; it is an attem pt to discover w hy fascism developed as it did and w hy so m any were prepared to em brace it.

I

FROM U N IFIC A TIO N TO IN TE R V E N TIO N , 1870-1915 final decades o f the last century witnessed w hat was to be the crucial development for the future o f the province o f Ferrara— the formation o f an agricultural proletariat. As in m any other provinces, this phenomenon followed the pene­ tration o f capitalism into the countryside, a process which sought to industrialize production and refine the relations between producers in the interests o f greater profits. In Ferrara this process had begun in 1872 with the initiation o f the vast project for the drainage and subsequent’ cultivation o f the marshlands lying to the east o f the provincial capital. M oney— partly foreign, partly drawn from Piedmont and Lom bardy1 — was poured into the programme and, as the drainage canals and evaporation plants began to function, immense areas o f land became available for agricultural development. T h e im portance this work was to have for the province is suggested sim ply by a glance at the statistics; in 1899, out o f a total surface area o f around 264,000 hectares, 87,928 hectares— almost exacdy a third o f the provincial surface area — had been made cultivable as a result o f the works on the bonifica.* H ad the reclaim ed lands remained in the hands o f the es­ tablished landowners o f Ferrara and thus been annexed to existing systems o f cultivation, drastic changes in provincial life m ight have been avoided. As it was, almost h a lf o f the new

T

he

1 The first initiatives were made by the Ferrarese Land Reclam ation Com pany L td . of London, while in subsequent years the principal investor in the Società Anonima per la Bonifica dei Terreni Ferraresi (S.B.T.F.) was the Banca di Torino. For further details of the early development o f the bonifica see, A . Roveri, Socialismo e sindacalismo nel Ferrarese (1870-1915), in Annuario dell’Institelo storico italiano per l'età moderna e contemporanea, vob. X V -X V I, 1963-4 (Rome, 1968), pp. 154-70. * Ibid., p. 157.

2

FROM UNIFICATION TO INTERVENTION

land was acquired by lim ited com panies,1 and these, aim ing at the full exploitation o f the enormous tracts o f land in their possession, em ployed methods o f cultivation previously un­ heard o f in Ferrara. Before 1870, provincial agriculture had been at best semi-feudal. Large holdings were in general divided up into sm aller plots, each o f which would be entrusted to the care o f a labourer dependent on his master.* T h e proprietor provided the capital necessary, repaid the labourer w ith a share o f the crop, and, on occasions, w ith a small am ount o f money. T h e labourers themselves rarely rebelled against this system; as compensation for arduous labour and poor returns, for the unpaid services they were sometimes bound to perform for the proprietor, they at least earned an existence and were relatively secure from one year to the next.* T h e advent o f m echanized agriculture and o f large capitalist enterprises w hich hired labourers by the day and, when there was no work, dismissed them im m ediately inevitably created a crisis in the old lands. T h e juxtaposition o f two such disparate systems could not but provoke stresses and strains, particularly at a tim e when agriculture was in any case having to adjust to the existence o f a national rather than a provincial m arket.1*4 O nce the message o f com petition w ith industrialized agriculture had fu lly registered am ong the established landowners o f the province, there was a movement to reorder the traditional systems o f the old lands. Politically most im portant was the tendency o f the large proprietors to follow the exam ple o f the capitalist companies and rid themselves o f their dependent workers. Those who had been for decades, even centuries, the traditional servants o f a fam ily, who had been a low er branch 1 Besides the land that remained under the control o f the S .B .T .F ., land was acquired by the Società Im m obiliare Lodigiana, the Società di esportazione agricola C irio, and the Société Vaudoise d’exploitations agricoles; see ibid., pp. 161, 165. • T he general term for dependent labourers is obbligati. N o attem pt w ill be made here to describe the various local variations o f this general category. ' O n the type o f agriculture existing in the province before the advent o f the bonifica see P. N iccolini, La questione agraria nella provincia di Ferrara (Ferrara, 1907), passim, and F . Pittorru, ‘O rigini del movimento operaio ferrarese', in Emilia, 16

0953)*

4 For further information on this crisis see R overi, op. d t., pp. 179-84, Pittorru, op. cit., and ‘O rigini d d movimento operaio ferrarese; il patto scritto e la coscienza di classe’, in Emilia, 34 (1954), and, for more general observations, E. Sereni, I l capitalismo nelle campagne (1860-rgoó) (Turin, 1947), p. 265.

FRO M U N I F I C A T I O N T O I N T E R V E N T I O N

3

o f the em ployer’s fam ily,1 were dismissed and sent to sell their labour in the m arket place. These form er obbligati found themselves not alone in their plight. T h e bonifica had in any case destroyed the livelihood o f those— the fishermen and fowlers— who had always draw n a ' living from the marshlands o f the coastal region.8 These too joined the ranks o f the landless labourers. M ore im portant, however, were the large numbers o f im m igrant labourers, those who had arrived from the surrounding provinces, particularly R ovigo and the Veneto, attracted by the promise o f w ork in the transform ation o f the new lands. M any thousands o f these had been engaged by contractors for the heavy m anual labour required in this transform ation, and, because o f the protracted nature o f the work involved and the poor prospects o f work elsewhere, they had decided to setde in the province, forgetting their former homes and gam bling on the future o f the bonifica. Together, native ferraresi and im m igrants com bined to form the vast arm y o f landless labourers (braccianti or avventizi) w hich was to becom e the overriding feature o f provincial life even before the turn o f the century.8 If, in general terms, the crisis in agriculture was occasioned by the pressures o f m odernization, the most obvious manifestation o f this crisis was provided by the harsh reality o f this mass o f labourers. As was soon to be evi­ dent, the braccianti could not be ignored for long. T h eir presence was felt especially in certain zones. For the creation o f this arm y o f braccanti was accom panied b y sub­ stantial changes in die distribution o f population w ithin the province. Im m igration from R ovigo and the V eneto had naturally brought about a rapid over-all increase in the provin­ cial population,1*4* but the fact that both im migrants and

1 N iccolini, op. cit., p. 17. * See Sereni, op. cit., p. 188. ' G iven the unreliability o f the statistical evidence, it is difficult to calculate precisely the proportion o f braccianti to other agricultural classes. It m ay be estim ated, however, that around the turn o f the century the braccianti formed some 55-60 per cent o f the rural population, the sm all leaseholders {piccoli affittuari) and sharecroppers {mezzadri) some 15 per cent, the dependant labourers {obbligati) some 20 per cent, and the sm all proprietors no more than 5 per cent. 4 H ie population is estimated by Roveri to have been around 215,000 in 1871, w hile the census o f 1911 puts the number at 307,924. See A . R overi, 'L o sviluppo economico e sociale della provincia di Ferrara fino alla 1 0 guerra mondiale’, in Ferrara Viva (June 1965), p. 103, and Censimento del Regno ig rr.

4

FRO M U N I F I C A T I O N T O I N T E R V E N T I O N

displaced obbligati tended to converge on the bonifica m eant that certain centres bore the brunt o f the increase in population. Between 1881 and 1901, for exam ple, the population o f Gopparo rose from 30,874 to 38,222,1 while in Com acchio the average rate o f increase in population was double the norm for the rest o f Italy.2 Conversely, areas least affected by the bonifica showed almost no increase in population during these years. Cento, protected more than any other zone o f the pro­ vince from capitalist influence because o f its preservation o f the m edieval systems o f subdivision o f land, had a rate o f increase far below the national norm .8 C learly this represented an em igration from the areas, as poorer workers or those ex­ cluded from a share in the lands, moved towards the bonifica in search o f employment. T h e rapid concentration o f large numbers o f people in certain areas accentuated the particular problems to w hich the braccianti, were prey. H uddled in the clusters o f insanitary huts w hich sprang up around the edge o f the bomficat the workers found themselves w ithout any o f the amenities or institutions o f the older com munal centres. M alaria was rife, as was pellagra.* T h e conditions o f life promised the bracciante an existence which could only be difficult and, very probably, short. His situation becam e worse, however, w ith the agricultural developm ent o f the new lands. W hile the num ber o f braccianti showed a slight increase in the years between 1881 and 1901 (45,359 com pared w ith 45,526),* the amount o f work available diminished. This was, in fact, the norm al feature o f reclam ation, which required large numbers o f labourers for drying and clearance operations but considerably fewer for the cultivation o f the new land, particularly when the main crop was com . From this developed the perennial problem o f the braccianti : in relation to the amount o f work available, there was severe overpopulation am ong the landless labourers o f the province. Concentrated together as they were, com petition for work became intense, often des­ perate, wage rates stayed extrem ely low, and the average labourer could consider him self fortunate if he m anaged to earn in the spring and summer w hat he needed to keep him self and his fam ily alive during the winter. 1 Roveri, Socialismo e sindacalismo, p. 155. 2 Sereni, op. cit., p. 341. * Ibid. 4 Roveri, Socialismo e sindacalismo, p. 154.

5 Censimento del Regno 1881, igor.

FROM U NIFICATION TO INTERVENTION

5

In certain circumstances, a surplus in agriculture m ight have been absorbed in developing industries.1 In Ferrara, however, there were few real industries prior to the end o f the century and thus no safety valve for the problems o f overpopulation. T h e five m ain m anufacturing concerns— Fratelli Santini, H irsch, C hiozza & T u rchi, A . R ietti, and a hemp-processing plant o f an A nglo-Italian com pany— employed in 1907 a total o f only 1,000 workers.8 Even in 1914, the statistics o f the local Cham ber o f Com m erce revealed that, w hile there were 11,654 workers classified as being em ployed in industry, the average num ber o f workers per firm was only seven.* This demonstrated clearly the degree to w hich Ferrara rem ained in an essentially pre-capitalist state, the m ajor part o f m anu­ facturing being dependent on the artisan, the home industry, and the sm all workshop. This was not entirely the result o f conditions unfavourable to industry in the province. Industrial enterprise had not proved to be one o f the stronger points o f the local bourgeoisie, happier w ith m oney in land or in the Cassa di Risparm io (Savings Bank) than in the risky w orld o f m anufacturing. It was no coincidence that the capitalist developm ent w hich did take place in Ferrara was, in general, stim ulated and sustained by non-Ferrarese capital. This was as true o f the bonifica as it was o f the one significant industrial developm ent w hich did take place in the closing years o f the last century and the first o f this. T h e refineries and distilleries built to process sugar beet grown in the province, if they did in some cases represent the investments o f ferraresi at the outset, very soon passed for the most part into the hands o f Eridania, the sugar com pany based on G enoa.4 Y e t even these plants failed to solve the problem s o f the braccianti. A part from m aintenance staff, the zuccherifici em ployed large numbers o f people for only a few weeks o f the year, during the sugar ‘cam paign' o f the autum n. For the agricultural workers, therefore, there was little possibility o f escape. T h e steadily worsening conditions o f 1 For this recurring theme o f Sereni see, in particular, the final pages o f II capitalismo nelle campagne. 1 Roveri, ‘ Lo sviluppo economico’, pp. 111-14 . * R overi, Socialismo e sindacalismo, p. 264« 4 For the early development o f the provincial sugar industry see, Eridania : storia di cinquantanni, (1899-1949) (Genoa, 1949), early section, and Roveri, ‘L o sviluppo economico9, pp. 1 10 -11.

6

FROM U N I F I C A T I O N T O I N T E R V E N T I O N

the 1890s had to be supported sim ply because there were no alternatives. In such circumstances, it was not surprising that anger and desperation found expression in the first movements o f protest against the landed proprietors. As w age labourers, hired only for short periods if not only for the day and w ith none o f that affection for the land that had characterized m any o f the obbligati, the braccianti felt little o f the deference towards the em ployer engendered under the old semi-feudal conditions and had little to lose by revolting against their situation. From 1891 onwards the province witnessed sporadic outbreaks o f economic agitation, in general spontaneous rebellions o f workers against their inhum an existence in the shanty-towns o f the bonifica. It also witnessed the arrest and condem nation o f m any o f these agitators. Repression could not stop the movement, however. In 1897, after two difficult years and w ith the exam ple o f a strike in the socialist stronghold o f M olinella only a few kilometres across the provincial boundary w ith Bologna, the labourers o f Argenta and Portom aggiore went on strike for increased rates o f pay and were soon followed by workers in other communes. T h e outbreak reached such a pitch, particularly in response to attem pts to use blackleg labour, that troops were called in to put down the disturbances and around 300 o f the agricultural workers were arrested.1 Confused, undisciplined, and spontaneous as it was, the strike o f 1897 none the less represented a milestone in the developm ent o f the labour movement in Ferrara. For the first tim e a strike approaching provincial proportions had taken place; the braccianti not only o f the bonifica but o f other zones as w ell had followed a common course and demonstrated that an element o f unity could henceforth be expected in agitations. I t served a w arning on the provincial bourgeoisie, unaccus­ tomed to thinking in provincial rather than com munal terms. A bove all, it served a w arning on the town o f Ferrara. U p to this time, Ferrara had been largely spared the dis­ ruptions occasioned by the immense transition o f the sur­ rounding province. Physically the town reflected its distant rather than its recent past; w ith the cathedral and the castle at the centre, w ith its wide, straight streets and im pressively strong city walls, the provincial centre testified above all to the late-m edieval and renaissance periods when Ferrara, under the 1 Details o f this strike are given in R overi, Socialism e sindacalismo, pp. 185.

FROM U N IF IC A T I O N T O IN T E R V E N T IO N

7

control o f the Dukes o f Este, had become a centre o f European renown. The general decline which had followed this moment o f glory was still very much a feature o f post-unification Ferrara, however. Politically the town had fallen increasingly under die influence o f its more vigorous neighbour, Bologna. Econom ically it remained what it had been over previous decades— the rather sleepy adm inistrative and commercial centre o f an agricultural province, providing those services that the rural hinterland required. T h e absence o f industry on any significant scale had saved it from the turmoils which an industrial working class m ight have created. T h e workers that there were, those o f the factories and the gasworks, formed very much an aristocracy o f labour. W ith the tradesmen and artisans o f the small workshops, they rem ained moderate in their attitudes, betraying litde o f the anger which welled up inside the braccianti. Even less protest against the existing system could be expected from the impiegati— the bank clerks, secre­ taries, and other minor employees o f business and administra­ tion. As always, they were careful to keep in step w ith their employers, the com mercial, professional, and intellectual m iddle class o f the provincial centre. These— together w ith the large proprietors and grandi affittuari o f the hinterland— represented very much the élite o f local society. Am ong them were the teachers o f the middle schools and university, through whose hands passed the sons o f m any o f the richer inhabitants o f the province. Doctors and lawyers also figured in this élite. Ferrara was both the m edical centre o f the province, w ith the hospital, and the legal centre, the m any lawyers being required to facilitate transfers o f land or other property in the surrounding areas. Am ong their clients were doubtless m any o f the merchants and businessmen o f Ferrara, those who bought and sold for the entire province and those whose activities were confined to more modest levels o f shop or warehouse. Certain o f these were Jews, members o f the large and flourishing Jewish com munity o f Ferrara, although it is equally true that the Jews were repre­ sented among the other professions. Indeed this was typical o f the symbiosis between groups in the province. W hile a law yer m ight have a house and studio in the town and be seen principally among his professional counterparts o f the capoluogoy he m ight at the same time be the owner o f substantial areas o f

8

FROM UNIFICATION TO INTERVENTION

land in the province. It was not uncommon for sons o f landowners to pursue a profession before inheriting and to continue that profession after the father’s death, ju st as it was not un­ common for the w ealthier members o f the town society to in­ vest their capital in land. Thus— and this was unusual in Italy— Jewish names figured prom inently among the landowners as w ell.1 Zam orani, Tedeschi, N avarra, Ravenna,— these were the names o f a new Jewish bourgeoisie w hich had joined the ranks o f the provincial agrari.* U niting themselves w ith the agrari, they had soon come to share, even to become the ch ief representatives of, those at­ titudes o f mind w hich were characteristic o f the provincial landowners. W hile it could hardly be expected that the proprietors should be particularly progressive in their thinking, it seems that the agrari o f Ferrara were especially notable for their reactionary tendencies. Accustom ed for m any years to treat their workers as servants, virtu ally slaves in some cases, they m ade little attem pt to adapt their outlook to m atch a changing situation. Certainly, in the pursuit o f profits, ties w ith dependent workers were broken when necessary, but the social consequences o f such actions rem ained largely invisible to the vast m ajority o f the agrari. A s R overi has w ritten, ‘In the m ajority o f the agrari, in fact, was combined the pitiless greed o f the m odem entrepreneur— developed at the school o f finance capitalism constituted by the large companies— and that ancestral reactionary instinct o f the landed proprietor*.8 D uring the early years o f capitalist developm ent at least, such men failed to realize that, in the process o f m odernization, they were destroying the ancestral social order they had always taken for granted. For both town and provincial bourgeoisie, therefore, the strike o f 1897 was an event to be taken seriously. Since there 1*3 1 Sereni, op. cit., p. 264. 1 Strictly speaking, agrario means simply ‘landowner’, but its use is generally confined to those landowners possessing a considerable amount o f property. In this work it should be taken to mean the large landowners— those with more than 200 hectares. Estimates are inevitably imprecise given the lack o f accurate statistics, but it can be calculated approxim ately that there were about sixty such landowners in Ferrara prior to the First W orld W ar. O f these no more than twenty made up the really powerful core o f provincial landowners. Between them, agrari and lim ited companies probably controlled some 60 per cent o f the cultivable surface o f the province. 3 Roveri, Socialismo e sindacalismo, p. 230.

FROM UNIFICATION TO INTERVENTION

9

were few members o f this m iddle class w ithout some direct or indirect connection w ith agriculture, the first signs o f the poli­ tical emergence o f the agricultural proletariat were not to be passed o ff as a phenomenon o f the moment. N ationw ide repression and a period o f relative calm m ay have encouraged some hopes that the strike m ight rem ain an isolated outbreak o f discontent, but when the rural workers passed from spon­ taneous action to preparation and organization for a further contest w ith the proprietors, such hopes could not be sus­ tained. In M arch and A pril o f 1901, reflecting the influence o f a sim ilar movem ent in M antua, the first socialist leagues were formed am ong the rural workers.1 T h e initiative was followed in M ay and June by the constitution o f the Federazione Provinciale delle Leghe di M iglioram ento w ith fifty-six m em ber leagues and a membership o f more than 15,000, and the form ation o f a Cam era del Lavoro, representing in the m ain the low er-paid workers o f the tow n.8 A t first independent o f each other, Cam era and Provincial Federation were pushed together by the second great unified action o f the provincial labourers, the strike o f summer 1901. D uring June and Ju ly, more than 72,000 workers were involved in bitter conflicts over the terms o f harvesting, and class-consciousness was increased by the repressive methods adopted by the authorities, methods w hich culm inated in the famous ‘massacre o f Berra’, in w hich troops killed three and wounded m any more o f the striking workers.3 R ecognizing the necessity for unity, the provincial organizers negotiated at the beginning o f 1902 for die form a­ tion o f a single secretariat to co-ordinate the actions o f both socialist groups, w ith its headquarters at the Cam era o f Ferrara. A n influx o f support followed this unification. A t the first provincial congress o f the com bined organization in M arch 1902, it was reported that there were 161 leagues and 32,000 members enrolled.4 R eaction to the mushrooming o f the socialist organization was, from certain quarters, entirely predictable. Om inous analogies to their situation were m ade by various represen­ 1 For the influence o f M antua on Ferrara at this point see, G . Procacci, La lotta di classe in Italia all’ inizio del secolo X X (Rom e, 1970), pp. 89-90. * R overi, Socialismo e sindacalismo, p. 238. • Ib id ., pp. 247-50. 4 Ib id ., p. 268.

IO

F RO M U N I F I C A T I O N T O I N T E R V E N T I O N

tatives o f the established m iddle class. In 1901, a M onsignor T abellini spoke to some 700 agricultural labourers gathered in church and chose to remind them o f ‘the dam age w hich the French Revolution caused to farmers, workmen, and arti­ sans . . .\ l A year later, a provincial deputy, Pietro N iccolini, m ade a sim ilar observation, claim ing that ‘the new peasant movement bears comparison only w ith those great agitations which prepared the French Revolution’ .* Speeches were accom panied by action. In A pril 1901 the landed proprietors responded to the form ation o f the socialist leagues by setting up their Lega fra i possidenti ferraresi, a prototype agrarian association designed to co-ordinate action against the rural workers.* T h e church was also prepared to use its influence in certain zones, favouring the fortunes o f the unioni professionali— catholic leagues w hich m atched bitter attacks on the socialists w ith m ild and apologetic requests for better conditions for their members.1*4* Preferential treatm ent given to the unioni by the landowners perm itted this tactic to have some lim ited success in the first two or three years o f the century. It provided a means in particular o f putting pressure on m any o f the more m oderate labourers— those who found it as difficult as priests and proprietors to believe that their social position was not preordained. A n y other response to socialism from landowners ór con­ servative clerics w ould have been rem arkable. F ar more significant for the future political developm ent o f the province was the response o f that part o f the bourgeoisie that had always considered itself progressive in its attitudes. D uring the 1890s, these people had largely gathered around the figure o f Severino Sani, the leading member o f the provincial radical movement. Sani, enjoying the popularity that his actions gave him , had repeatedly posed as the cham pion o f the underprivileged agri­ cultural workers, intervening where necessary in local disputes to state the case o f the workers. T h e fundam ental paternalism 1 Quoted from La Domenica dell9Operaio, io M ar. 1901, in Roveri, ibid., p. 352. 1 L . Preti, Le lotte agrarie nella valle padana (Turin, 1955), p. 219. * Roveri, Socialismo e sindacalismo, p. 231. 4 See R . Sgarbanti, Lineamenti storici del movimento cattolico ferrarese (Rocca San Casciano, 1954), pp. 44-5» for the type o f language used by the unioni: ‘But do not doubt us, signori padroni, do not be afraid that we wish to have recourse to violent or illegal methods. N o, the methods our statute permits us are only those permitted by the law, the principles that guide us are those o f justice and Christian charity.’

FROM UNIFICATION TO INTERVENTION

n

o f his position could not be hidden for long, however. T h e m oderate face o f capitalism w hich he represented, that face that had hoped to lim it the threat o f an agricultural proletariat by encouraging themes o f class collaboration, o f co-operation rather than resistance, was quickly unmasked by the grow ing socialist organization. A ttacked by the socialist leaders for being— as he was in fact— an instrum ent o f the landowners, Sani m oved sm artly into the cam p o f the agrari and began, in turn, to vilify the socialist movem ent w hich threatened to under­ m ine his political position. B y 1901, he had even arrived at the level o f boasting o f his part in the form ation o f the Lega fra i possidenti ferraresi.1 M ost significantly, the vast m ajority o f his supporters am ong the m iddle and lower-m iddle class chose to follow him in this transfer o f allegiances. Confronted by the choice w hich had faced Sani, they too preferred to turn their backs on m oderate socialism. As R overi has w ritten o f these events, pointing out w ell the im plications o f this decision, ‘the m ajority o f the petite bourgeoisie preferred to align themselves w ith agrarian capitalism . . .*.* O n ly a few am ong the m iddle class o f the province succeeded in surm ounting the essentially class barrier erected by the increasing political consciousness o f the braccianti. C ertain republicans and a rum p o f the radicals, unable to stom ach the predom inant liberal, clerico-m oderate, flavour o f provincial politics, did m ake attem pts in the early years o f the century to follow independent lines and avoid the outright condem nation o f ‘the plague o f socialism*,8 w hich was typical o f the statements o f the proprietors. T h eir attitude towards the Cam era del Lavoro rem ained at best equivocal, however. T h e republicans, who had never enjoyed the same success in Ferrara as else­ where in Em ilia-R om agna, w ere apt to look on socialism as a com petitor for the allegiances o f the labourers. T h e radicals, on the other hand, benefited from G iolitti's policies towards the socialists to the extent that, under the new leadership o f the 1 A t this point Sani demonstrated his real colours very clearly, replying to criticism w ith the cynical telegram , 'D elighted to have contributed to form ation association landowners province o f Ferrara, in their interests, in those o f Ferrarese agriculture, and in those o f the cause o f the labourers.' Q uoted in R overi, Socialismo e sindacalismo, p. 231. * Ibid., p. 219. * T he phrase is that o f Pope Leone X III in the encyclical Graves de communi o f ig o i ; quoted in R overi, ibid., p. 232.

12

FRO M U N I F I C A T I O N T O I N T E R V E N T I O N

M archese Ercole M osti, Ferrarese radicalism could perm it itself to support m oderate socialism, albeit from a basically paternalistic position. W hile this support was to be o f value on occasions, the degree o f commitment o f m any o f the radicals to the cause o f the agricultural labourers rem ained suspect, and— as w ill be seen below— it was not a com mitm ent which w eathered w ell the crisis o f intervention. Far more sincere in their promotion o f the socialist movement were those very few lawyers and schoolteachers whose sense o f social justice had involved them, from the beginning o f the 1890s, in a developing battle on behalf o f the proletariat. Foremost among these was Francesco Baraldi, firm ly socialist from the time when he had defended braccianti arrested for striking. It was largely as a result o f the work o f Baraldi and his associates that a Cam era del Lavoro had been set up in Ferrara and the network o f rural leagues expanded so quickly. Y et, w hile the sincerity o f these middle-class socialists cannot be doubted, even they rem ained to some extent estranged from the mood o f the growing movement. Reform ist, party members, accustomed to the socialist club o f the town, they succeeded only at times in appreciating the violence and anger which often developed inside the landless labourers. Baraldi, for exam ple, was always m oderate and legalitarian in his approach, advising the workers to be ‘cautious and prudent in their demands’.1 In other circumstances, such advice m ight have been appropriate. In Ferrara, however, it hardly corresponded to the situation in hand. Reformism, in as far as it was a fairly sophisticated policy, tended to represent the attitudes o f an élite among the socialist movement— the artisans, the small tenant farmers, and certain o f the town workers.1 As has been pointed out, it was a policy with little relevance for the brac­ cianti. ‘T h e m oderation o f the reformists . . . was on m any occasions notably in contrast w ith the im patience o f an agricultural proletariat legitim ately exasperated . O nce 1 La Scintilla, 4 M ay ig o i ; quoted in Roveri, ibid., p. 230. * T he reformist leaders, for example, failed to recognize the problem o f com­ munication with the braccianti. In 1905 they invited the labourers to read both re­ formist and syndicalist papers in order to be able to make up their minds better. This in a province where 47*5 per cent o f the population were illiterate in 190t, and where in 1911 centres like O stellato and Jolanda di Savoia had rates o f illi­ teracy o f 63 per cent and 62 per cent respectively. Censimento del Regno 1901, 1911. * Preti, La lotte agrarie, p. 204.

FROM UNIFICATION TO INTERVENTION

13

the braccianti themselves began to voice their opinions and demand the pursuit o f their policies, even these representatives o f the provincial m iddle class found themselves somewhat isolated from the proletarian movement. W ith their isolation, the split which was to dog the progress o f the working-class movement becam e manifest. O n the one hand there were the reformists— capable, extrem ely courageous, but unable to catch the mood o f the m ajority— and on the other hand the braccianti— powerful in numbers and in their despera­ tion, obstinate in their strikes, but fundam entally w ithout con­ sistent policies and thus prey to the rhetoric o f charlatans. It was at one level a split between the intellectuals o f the party and the activists o f the economic movement, between P .S .I. and Fedcrtcrra;1 on another it was the old division between rural hinterland and a town w hich the landless labourers had always regarded as parasitic.8 Both before and after the w ar the consequences o f this division were to go deep. A detailed account o f the developm ent o f the proletarian m ovement in the pre-war years had already been w ritten,8 and it w ould be superfluous to repeat it here. None the less certain features o f the early struggles do m erit attention because o f the ligh t they shed on the strengths and weaknesses— particularly the latter— o f the economic organization. A s m any o f the strikes after 1906 demonstrated, political consciousness, except in a very general sense, was not one o f the principal attributes o f the braccianti. R eady as they were to perform acts o f great courage involving considerable sacrifice, the landless labourers were quite understandably incapable o f ju d gin g issues as a whole or seeing in every case where their actions were leading them. This m ade them particularly dependent on the quality o f their leaders, responsible for covering these deficiencies. W ith the victory o f the revolutionary syndicalists within the Cam era del Lavoro in 1905,1*4 it seemed that a promising alliance had been formed between a leadership ready for direct action and the rank and file ready to support such action. Y e t the promise was not fulfilled. In both 1907 and 1913 the leaders o f the movement betrayed their supporters w ith ill-considered and badly pre1 T he usual abbreviation for theFederazioneNazionale dei Lavoratori della terra. • See G . Procacci, op. cit., p. 93. * Roveri, Socialismo e sindacalismo, on which much o f the following account is based. 4 Ibid., pp. 296-9.

*4

FRO M U N I F I C A T I O N T O I N T E R V E N T IO N

pared strikes. Um berto and G uido Pasella, who controlled the Cam era del Lavoro between 1906 and 1909, abused the en­ thusiasm o f the proletariat and exhausted its potential w ith a series o f strikes which owed more to the theories o f Sorel than to the realities o f the province. Sim ilarly, G iovanni Bitelli, in calling a strike in M assafiscaglia in 1913 w ithout previously consulting either provincial colleagues or Federterra, exposed his supporters to seven months o f fruitless agitation. In neither case did the mass o f the braccianti manage to sense the foolish­ ness o f their leaders in advance o f the disaster. I f the rhetoric were sufficiently powerful, the promises sufficiently alluring, the desperation within the labourers made them ready to follow. Y e t it would be unsatisfactory to ascribe the failures o f the economic organization in the years before the w ar entirely to poor leadership and uncritical support. Considerable difficulties did exist within the provincial context and their solution was rarely obvious. W hile the unioni professionali enjoyed only a short existence at the beginning o f the century, the proprietors were always ready to speculate on the insecurity among the labourers and the divisions w hich existed w ithin the proletarian move­ ment. O n occasions independent unions were established, hated by the .socialists but given preferential treatm ent by the landowners when it cam e to the distribution o f work. Efforts were also m ade to extend the system o f sharecropping (n 1916, >89*4 in 1917, and 264*1 in 1918, according to A . Fossati, Lavoro e produzione in Italia dalla metà del secolo X V III alla seconda guerra mondiale (Turin, 1951), p. 631. Official price ceilings for staple goods were adopted only in the second half of 1916. * A C S , M in. Int., D G PS (1903-49), G 1, b. 19, 4 Sept. 1916. * A C S , Min. Int., DGPS, Conflagrazione Europea (1914-18), b. 18A, 19 Nov. 1916. O n this issue see also R . De Felice, ‘Ordine pubblico e orientamenti delle masse italiane nella prima metà del 1917*, Rivista storica del socialismo, 6 (1963),

485.

32

TH E W ID EN IN G OF TH E D IV ISIO N S

W ithin a few weeks o f this report, the entire situation had changed. W hat had been secret subversive propaganda turned into incitem ent to revolt when, at the end o f Novem ber, violent demonstrations broke out in Argenta. W omen, leaving their work in the fields, gathered in the streets o f the commune and had to be dispersed by force.1 In the following months, such incidents becam e common throughout the province. A t Berra on 27 Decem ber, at Copparo on 29 Decem ber, and at Bondeno on i i January, women were dispersed after row dy demon­ strations.3 Socialist passivity on the issue o f the w ar seemed to have been finally abandoned. O fficially this was denied. Socialist leaders in the province insisted that the movements were spontaneous and were able to point to the sim ilarity between the claim s made by the women o f Ferrara and those o f demonstrators o f other pro­ vinces. Demonstrations over conditions, the cost o f living, and the food shortages, were occurring throughout Italy and gave colour to these disclaimers. C ertainly the protestations had been largely concerned with the government subsidies given to those w ith husbands at the front, although at Bondeno on i i January several unidentified people were reported as dem anding the end o f the w ar and the return o f their husbands.3 But the predom inantly economic nature o f the demonstrations could not conceal from the authorities that it was the socialist organizers who were responsible for giving to the discontent the particular form it took. T h e prefect declared him self o f the opinion that the women were induced to leave their work only ‘following threats o f boycotts and other sanctions on the part o f the leagues’ .4 T h e Com ando del Corpo d’Arm ato at Bologna expressed a more balanced judgem ent, doubtless recognizing that a real basis for discontent did exist. The situation was summed up by saying: C erta in o f the p articu larly active socialist organizers h ave m ade A rg en ta the centre o f their operations and are trying to excite the masses against the w a r b y a ll methods. T h e y are prom pting the w om en to refuse governm ent subsidies and telling the labourers to abandon w ork in the fields.'

T h e w riter could not agree w ith the prefect that the socialist 1 A C S , ibid., 28 Nov. 1916. * A C S, ibid., 11 and 12 Jan. 1917. ' A C S, ibid., i i Jan. 1917. 4 A C S , ibid., 3 Dec. 1916. ' A C S , ibid., Comando del Corpo d’Armato, Bologna to Min. Guerra, Min. Int., 17 Dec. 1916.

TH E W IDENING OF THE D IV IS IO N S

33

leagues should be dissolved, considering this to be an exces­ sively drastic step, nor did he consider the situation to be suffici­ ently grave to w arrant the w ithdraw al o f winter-leave permits for soldiers from the Argenta region. But he did concede that Argenta, close as it was to M olinella, was ‘really dangerous for public order’.1 This view was reinforced by the tone o f a dispatch from the Secretary G eneral for A ffari C ivili, who in the final days o f 1916, wrote suggesting that, in view o f the heavy socialist propaganda circulating in Ferrara, it m ight be wise to prevent refugees com ing down from the Trentino from settling in thc~region.a H ow to deal with the socialists proved something o f a problem . T h e prefect’s im m ediate reactions had been the dissolution o f the leagues, not thought a sensible suggestion by higher authority, and the internm ent o f the leading socialists. H e had called in early Decem ber for the internm ent o f Renato T ega, believed responsible for the disturbances o f Argenta, and fijf the confinement o f Zirardini, assumed to be responsible for anything done by the socialists in the province. M ezzogori, m ayor o f Argenta and also heavily im plicated, was excluded from the list because it was assumed he would soon be called up. As the disorders spread, the list became longer. T h e com­ m andant o f the carabinieri in Ferrara conducted an investigation into the disturbances at Berra and Copparo, and, deciding that the socialist leaders were involved, he called for the intern­ ment o f the four most prominent— Am brogio Pasquali, R utilio R icci, Jone G uglielm ini (‘wom an o f doubtful m orals'), and Aberardo Rom agnoli.8 H owever, the decisions were not supported by the central directorate o f Pubblica Sicurezza. I t was probably considered that the rem oval o f certain o f the very popular provincial leaders m ight provoke larger dis­ turbances than it m ight prevent. T h e better policy was to allow the leaders to retain contact w ith their followers, but to super­ vise them diligently. E qually, it seemed likely that the w ave o f » A C S , ibid. * A C S , ibid., Seg. Gen. Affari Civili to Prefect, 24 Dec. 1916. * A C S, ibid., 12 Jan. 1917. Commandant Division R .R .C .C . Ferrara to Comando Ferrara. The commandant reported that the four mentioned for intern­ ment, 'all opponents of the war, do not let pass an opportunity o f instilling in the minds of those enrolled in the party (who in Copparo are the majority of the popu­ lation) and particularly among the women, ideas against the war, in this way provoking demonstrations which can easily degenerate into disorders’ .

34

THE WIDENING OF THE D IV ISIO N S

demonstrations m ight decline as the serious shortages o f the winter months were overcome. A t this stage, only Renato T ega was arrested and confined at Benevento.1 Seeing that his recommendations were not being followed, the prefect could only advise the minister that he wished for the transfer o f Venetian refugees from Argenta and Copparo in order to avoid more serious troubles.8 Troubles were not long in com ing, however. By early M arch 1917 the situation had once again deteriorated, and workers were threatening to leave the fields and allow the land to remain uncultivated. Increases o f between 50 per cent and 125 per cent were demanded, and the spring sowing used as the means o f putting pressure on the proprietors. Conditions were undoubtedly difficult. W hile the cost o f living had almost doubled since 1913, m any families must have suffered a loss o f regular incom e as husbands and elder sons were called up to fight. Subsidies m ight only in part replace this loss. And it was generally recognized that proprietors were benefiting from high prices for products because o f the demand created by the war. Nevertheless, the prefect was unable to accept that this could be the real justification. ‘As things are,’ he wrote, ‘I think that it is no longer a question o f the usual struggle be­ tween capital and labour.* According to him, the movement was directed ‘to impose the im mediate end o f the w ar, repre­ sented as o f benefit to the possessing classes and therefore wanted only by them at the expense o f the poorer classes’ .* T o an extent this was correct. Spontaneous economic griev­ ances turned to anti-war protests by a fairly simple logic. But the im plication o f the prefect’s remarks— that there existed an insidious socialist plot to subvert the w ar effort— was less justifiable. Y et he could not rid him self o f the notion, reporting again in A pril that the solution o f the disputes was extrem ely difficult ‘in so far as the claims o f the workers have their origins more in political than economic factors’ .4 This hostility o f the prefect towards the socialists did not pass unnoticed. A fter one or two experiences, the Cam era del Lavoro began to refuse his offers o f arbitration because it always resulted in a poorer 1 A C S , ibid., 29 Dec. 1916. * A C S, ibid., 17 Feb. 1917. * A C S , ibid., 5 M ar. 1917. Prefect Chiericati to Commissario Generale dei Consumi, Rome. 4 A C S, ibid., 6 Apr. 1917.

TH E W IDENING OF TH E D IV ISIO N S

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settlement for the workers.1 T h e socialists asserted that the prefect was acting ‘on the basis o f the advice o f the Agrari’ and congratulated themselves that ‘the gentlemen o f the Agrarian Association have used the prefecture in vain in their attem pt to save some money’ .8 H ad the socialists been concerned to make the economic situation in the province impossible, they could have done so quite effectively. A s it was, the strikes were soon settled in most cases, often with increases much lower than those originally demanded, and the spring sowing was continued. There is no indication o f deliberate stalling by the socialists. It was, after all, the husbands o f the women on strike who m ight suffer if production were held up too long. T h e suspicions o f the prefect were reflected in other quarters. A fter their trium ph in gaining their aim in 1915, the inter­ ventionists had inevitably lost some o f their momentum. N ot only was the absence o f an im m ediate aim a factor in this; m uch o f the backbone o f the movement had been rem oved as students were called aw ay to the front. Y et, as morale fell during 1915 throughout Italy, and the casualty lists mounted, the determ ination o f the remnants o f the interventionist group to work for victory increased. In Novem ber 1915 the group was given its first im portant m artyr: Germ ano M anini, one o f the first to go to the front, was killed in action. A special edition o f the Gazzettino Rosa was published to commemorate him, and to sing the glories o f death for the patria. No further action was taken during the winter, however. But as friction between Salandra, as the representative o f the old liberals, and other interventionist groups increased in early 1916, both nationalists and left-wing interventionists came together more closely in agitating for a national government. A t the end o f M arch it was reported that about seventy people, ‘who form the inter­ ventionist group o f Ferrara’, had met at the Unione R adicale to discuss w hat measures could be taken to frustrate any attem pts to change the direction o f the w ar. Five organizations were represented at this meeting— the Unione Liberale, the C ircolo Socialista Autonom o, the Gruppo Nazionalista, the 1 A C S , ibid., reports of 28 Mar. and 6 Apr. 1917; the prefect wrote that the settlements ‘ turn out in every case to be less onerous for the employers than those negotiated directly by the employers themselves— this notwithstanding the fact that I have always been careful to allocate a fair return to the labourers’ . * Bandiera Socialista, i Apr. 1917.

36

THE W IDENING OF THE D IV ISIO N S

Unione Dem ocratica Radicale, and the Circolo Repubblicano.1 It was decided that a fascio nazionale should be constituted, and to the committee were appointed, among others,8 Sergio Panunzio, Egidio Liverani, Giuseppe Longhi,8 and the mason R aoul Caretti. The fruit o f this new initiative was the newspaper Il Fascio, the first number o f which appeared on 20 September 1916. It ran into difficulties im m ediately, however, and was suspended after the first issue until it once again appeared in January 1917. T h e prefect described it as being pro-war and ‘radico-socialista’, and also identified its director as Longhi. Am ong its regular contributors were Guido Podrecca, Sergio Panunzio, and Rom ualdo Rossi.4 It was no coincidence that II Fascio re-emerged precisely at the time— January 1917— when disturbances in the province reached alarm ing proportions. Concern was also raised by the reports that the Germ an Chancellor had offered to negotiate a settlement— a settlement which could never have satisfied the demands o f m any o f the interventionists. The first number o f I l Fascio for 1917 carried the text o f a letter from Mussolini, received in reply to a message o f greetings from certain ferraresi. It answered both o f the main concerns o f the interventionists: G erm an peace, no. never . I ’m fine. M ud and lead. Ask the priests o f the Em ilian “ peace zone” to come and visit me in this amusing wood.’ * This provided very much the line to be followed by the Fascio di Difesa Nazionale, as it now styled itself. It occupied itself with opposition to the socialists, ac1 Groups identified from subsequent reports of prefects. ACS, Min. Int., DGPS (1903-49), G . I . , b. 11, 9 Mar. 1917; and A CS, Min. Int., DGPS, Con­ flagrazione Europea (1914-18), b. 18A, 27 M ay 1917. 1 A C S, Min. Int., DGPS, Conflagrazione Europea (1914-18), b. 2, 3 Apr. I g 16. The predominantly middle-class nature of interventionism is illustrated by the professions of this committee— information provided in this report: Sergio Panunzio— insegnante delle scuoli normali. Edmondo Bruné— insegnante all’Istituto Tecnico. Giuseppe Longhi— laureando in legge. Cav. Guido Magnoni— avvocato. Egidio Liverani— impiegato ferroviario. Umberto Leonardi— commerciante. • Longhi’s desire to go to the front was persistently frustrated. Refused as a volunteer in M ay 1915, probably because of his socialist connections, he was eventually called up in 1917, only to be told that he had a weak heart and was not fit for service. 4 ACS, Min. Int., DGPS (1903-49), G. 1, b. 11, press prospectus of g Mar. 1917. 5 H Fascio, 21 Jan. 1917.

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cused o f attem pting to sabotage the w ar effort, w ith hostility to any moves towards a negotiated peace, and w ith receiving and publishing letters from people o f the province fighting at the front or still in training. O ne such letter cam é1from Italo Balbo, an officer cadet at m ilitary school, who wrote o f the socialist dem onstrations: ‘As far as those scoundrels o f local neutralism are concerned, besmirchers o f the good nam e o f our town, give them a good w hipping— w ith the pen, and, if necessary, in some more convincing w ay.*1 E vidently the prolongation o f hostilities, pushing the socialists into a more overt opposition to the w ar as it did, had greatly increased the distance between neutralists and interventionists. In the same letter, Balbo refers by im plication to the socialists as austriaci,* and language m uch more insulting was to becom e common. It was the fascio that did most to stim ulate this hatred and contem pt for the socialists. For the fascisti it was a question o f treason. T h e convention called by them to m ark the anniversary o f intervention dem anded that the governm ent institute ‘an in­ flexible home policy and move against all those who attem pt to threaten in w hatever w ay the supreme interests o f the Nation*.® Y e t the patience o f the interventionists was to be still further tried. W ith the agitations o f spring 1917 largely settled, the prefect was at this tim e on better terms w ith the socialist leaders and would not back up the alarm ist cries o f the fascio. H e denied that the socialists were w orking against the w ar: T h e opponents o f the w a r, m ade u p o f those enrolled in the official socialist p arty, m aintain in a m ost scrupulous m ann er a perfectly neutral attitud e. T h e y h elp as w ell in innum erable w ays in those works o f ch a rity a n d civil assistance w h ich are sufficient to dispel a n y preconceived suspicion.1*4

T his was something o f a volte-face when com pared w ith his accusations o f the previous winter. T o some extent it was an expression o f a real change o f view follow ing his contacts w ith the Cam era del Lavoro during the economic agitation o f the spring. But undoubtedly a factor was the desire o f the prefect to give reassuring reports from his province whenever possible in order that his own control over public order should not be 1 Ibid., 35 M ar. 1917. T h e letter is dated ‘ February 1917*. * Ibid.: ‘ci occuperemo questa primavera degli altri austriaci che troveremo alla fronte’ .

* ACS, M in. Int., Conflagrazione Europea, b. 3, 35 M ay 1917. 4 A C S , ibid.

THE W IDENING OF THE D IV ISIO N S im pugned. Events soon made it difficult for him to maintain* this attitude. In Ju ly, the moderate socialist Treves made his ominous statement, h alf prediction, h a lf threat, ‘O u t o f the trenches before next winter’ . M ore serious, in August the riots in Turin, although in no w ay backed by the socialist party or the G .G .L ., revealed the degree to which popular opposition to the w ar had increased, and made the authorities look more w arily at the socialists. Then, in September L azzari’s circular, inviting socialist administrations to consider paralysing local government in order to end the w ar before winter, became known. T h e words ‘revolt* and ‘revolution* began to appear in the dispatches o f the prefect. H e was warned, in early Septem ber, that danger existed. Reporting the words o f the Questore o f Bologna, he w rote: T h e preparatory w ork to incite the labourers to strike and revolt is being carried out p rincip ally in the zones o f A rgen ta an d F errara. In these areas th ey are w aitin g for the arrival on the 13 th inst, o f soldiers sent on leave to the farm s before finalizing and beginning their m ovem ent.1

It was further reported that foreigners were com ing from San M arino to the outlying communes o f the province, where they were distributing propaganda against the w ar and talking to soldiers on leave.* Fears o f real subversion were thoroughly aroused, and the provincial congress o f the socialists, held at the end o f September, did nothing to reassure the nervous authorities. A resolution was passed calling for ‘an even more intransigent and revolutionary position’ and denouncing all co-operation with the bourgeoisie, either in working for peace or in the various comitati di assistenza.* The panic following the defeat at Caporetto served at least to clarify the situation in the province, in as far as it brought out into the open attitudes which had previously been con­ cealed. Ferrara, a w ar zone, was near enough the front to feel an im m ediate im pact, as civilian refugees and disarmed soldiers made their w ay down through the province.1*4 T h e pressures 1 A C S , ibid., b. 18A. 'Rivolta’, 17 Sept. 1917, reporting a telegram o f 12 Sept, from Questore of Bologna. * A C S , ibid. ' Bandiera Socialista, 30 Sept. 1917; resolution no. 11 of the congress o f 23 Sept. 4 A C S , Min. Int., DGPS, Conflagrazione Europea (1914-18), b. 18A. Report dated simply 'December 1917’, but clearly written in the last days of that month. T h e prefect wrote 'the passage of disorganized and disbanded troops after the disaster has generated waves of foreboding . . . ’ .

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were great enough to produce near chaos for several days. Shortly after the retreat to the Piave had been com pleted, a letter w ritten by refugees from the Veneto cam e to the attention o f the M inistry o f the Interior. It deplored the situation in Ferrara in the strongest terms: Som ething m ust be done! H ere in F errara there is no m ayor, no m unicipal authority, no one w ho worries about respect for the law . W e refugees from the V en eto , w h o h ave h a d to com e dow n to F errara on foot, in carts, in the p ouring rain, h ave listened astounded to the sw earing an d cursing w h ich is goin g on against the w ar, the soldiers, the fatherland. W e h ave listened to w om en insulting us from the fields, urgin g the soldiers to le t the G erm ans through in order to punish the governm ent o f assassins.1

Certainly the defeatism w hich Cadorna had blam ed for the disaster now cam e out into the open. Despite a manifesto put out by the provincial socialist party condem ning the invading enemy and calling for the m aintenance o f a spirit o f resistance,* reports o f defeatism increased alarm ingly. O n 23 Novem ber three people were arrested at M assa A lbino (M assafiscaglia) for saying that the soldiers had done w ell to throw their guns aw ay ‘because you would be better o ff under the Germ ans than under the thieves in our government*.* This point o f view was fairly widespread am ong the people who rem ained in the rural communes, and the passing o f the im m ediate shock o f Caporetto did nothing to lessen its popularity. In M arch 1918 a man was sentenced for proclaim ing that ‘when the Germ ans were in Italy you ate w ell and you drank better; but let’s hope that in a short tim e they can get to the Po.*1*4 Pro-Germ an feeling was evidently fairly strong. A gain in A pril, a soldier was arrested for denying that the Germ ans were really bar­ barians, as wartim e propaganda had made out; the real barbarians, he suggested, were ‘the signori, the lawyers, and the priests in Italy, and it would be better if the Germ ans did come as far as the Po*.* This attack on the signori was also characteristic o f popular feeling as bitterness at those who had wanted the w ar reached new heights. A wom an from Bondeno wrote to her husband at the front, obviously not anticipating the action o f the censor. She com plained o f ‘those disgusting 1 A C S, ibid., 18 Nov. 1917. Letter forwarded from Dir. Gen. Amministrazione Civile to D G PS who forwarded it to the prefect. * A C S , ibid., 7 Nov. 1917. • A C S , ibid., 33 Nov. 1917. 4 A C S , ibid., 19 M ar. 1918. 4 A C S , ibid., 3 Apr. 1918.

40

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signori who hang on to their m oney but send so m any poor young men to their deaths in their quarrel’ .1 In June three soldiers and three labourers were arrested in Copparo for singing openly an anti-w ar song, ‘Q uei vigliacchi dei sig­ nori . . .'.* Altogether in 1918, there were twenty-nine suc­ cessful prosecutions for defeatism in the province.* T h e mood o f the people outside the town was evidently expressed w ith rem arkable frankness and frequency. Confronted w ith this evidence that the ‘internal enem y' really did exist, both authorities and interventionists were bound to react energetically. T h e spectre raised by the Russian revolutions began, by Decem ber, to give real alarm to those concerned to win the w ar. W hat had happened in Russia could happen in Italy, w ith disintegration and m ilitary defeat paving the w ay for the socialists to come to power. In response to this threat, the authorities in Ferrara were called on to give a careful assessment o f the potential o f the provincial socialist movement. T h e new prefect, G iuffrida, was uneasy about the situation, recognizing that the scenes o f the previous month, Novem ber 1917, had caused m any to think very hard about w hat was going on. Extrem e as popular sentiment evidently was, he took some com fort in the m oderation o f the directorate o f the provincial party. H e pointed out that they had decided to ignore the invitation to sabotage provided by the L azzari circular, and that, subsequent to Caporetto, m any o f the socialists had even expressed grave concern at the position in w hich Italy found herself. Nevertheless, there was a potential 1 A C S , ibid., 6 M ay 1918. 1 A C S, ibid., 9 June 1918. The full version of the song indicates the mood of many of the soldiers. Quei vigliacchi dei signori la credevano una passeggiata ed invece Than sbagliata quei vigliacchi dei signori. L a quadruplice malintesa che di pace non vuol sentire ma non sa cosa sia soffrire là sul Piave a guerreggiar. Dal governo son mal nutriti dagli ufficiali son maltrattati quattro stati si son riuniti per distruggere la gioventù. Quoted in Roveri, Socialismo e sindacalismo, p. 405. For other, slightly different versions of the same song see, L. Capello, Caporetto, perché? (Turin, 1967), pp. 302-3. * Roveri, Socialismo e sindacalismo, p. 405.

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danger. Zirardini, for all his m oderation, was known to be a faithful servant o f the central directorate o f the party. Although he had not approved o f the L azzari circular, he had sent it on to all socialist mayors o f the province— ‘the circular was sent out, even i f w ithout comments, w ithout a covering letter, w ithout opinions being expressed; but it was sent out*. It was from this rigid obedience that the prefect deduced the danger. ‘Perhaps the initiative w ill not spring from here, but the day on w hich the word is given, the organization would respond to the call.*1’ This opinion was shared by the m ajor com m anding the carabiideri in Ferrara. H e denied that there was serious evidence o f defeatist activity by the party, but warned that a strong organ­ ization did exist. ‘In this province, the subversive parties operate little, but they are w aiting. I f the word is given, they could easily rise unexpectedly and follow the instructions o f their leaders.** For both men, some kind o f uprising was a prospect to be considered very seriously. I f it were to come, there were no doubts that it would not be a spontaneous uprising o f the rural population, but a revolt inspired and led by the socialists. T o meet the danger, supervision o f the socialists was increased where possible. M ore im portant for the future, however, than the im m ediate actions were the changes in attitude. N ever w ell disposed to the socialists before the w ar, the authorities— and particularly G iuffrida— now began to see in the socialists a party w hich could in no w ay be considered on the same terms as the others, being basically opposed to the existing authority and dedicated to its overthrow. For the Cam era del Lavoro this change threatened serious consequences. T h e issue o f public order was in danger o f becom ing too closely identified w ith the problem o f curtailing socialist activities. For the Fascio di Difesa N azionale, the events o f 1917 changed no attitudes; rather they provided the long-awaited grounds for attack on the socialists. In Turin, in August, the ‘internal enemy* had finally shown its real colours.8 M ussolini— now very m uch the spokesman o f the interventionist forces— asked 1 A C S , Min. Int., DGPS, Conflagrazione Europea (1914-18), b. 18A, December 1917. * A C S , ibid., 25 Dec. 1917. * Bread riots, which developed spontaneously into violent demonstrations against the war, took large areas o f Turin out of the control of the authorities for almost two days. Order was only restored by the army, using tanks, after more than fifty people had been killed. See C. Seton-Watson, Italy from Liberalism to Fascism, pp. 470-1.

4*

TH E W ID EN IN G O F TH E D IV IS IO N S

for a governm ent based on these groups rather than on parlia­ ment, since it seemed that only such a governm ent would take the necessary repressive measures against the socialists.1 Caporetto and the Novem ber revolution in Russia intensified the fear that the socialists m ight after all w in the day. U nited as never since M ay 1915, the interventionists sprang to raise m orale and to condemn the defeatists. In Ferrara, on the initiative o f the local fascio, propaganda meetings were staged to help bolster the spirits o f the population. O n 30 Novem ber the young Bologna journalist, Pietro Nenni, spoke to a large crowd about the final victory that would be theirs. C ivil and m ilitary authorities were there to support the m eeting.8 A few days later, opportunity was taken to glorify the dead when honorary degrees were conferred on those students who had been killed in action. A gain, the full support o f the authorities was accorded to the patriotic cause. Prefect, deputy, m ayor, police chief, and other em inent personalities o f the town were in attendance, and a guard o f honour was provided by the guardie civiche.9 These efforts were apparently rewarded. B y the end o f Decem ber, the prefect w rote that the urban population— ‘the town o f Ferrara in particular*— was w orking w ith ‘noble sentiments’ to help w ith d ie recovery.4 C are was taken that this momentum should not decline. T h e fascio held an assembly in Jan uary to assess the situation, and launched a two-pronged attack on defeatism. It called for the internm ent o f all the ‘enemies within* and for a greater w ar effort, w ith m obilization o f all men between fifteen and sixty. M ore positively, it began to m ake promises, in the hope that the prospect o f a better future could reassure the combattenti that they were not fighting sim ply in order that the old signori m ight keep their privileged position. It demanded ‘the full m oral fulfilm ent o f the labouring classes . . . w orking to establish the basis for a new social order in such a w ay that, for them, the sacrifice o f the w ar m ay be largely compensated by greater justice in the future*.8 This was the mood w hich, at national level, produced the 1 Popolo d'Italia, 3, 7, 8, Sept. 1917. For the positions o f the principal inter­ ventionist politicians in this period see Giovanna Procacci, ‘ Italy from Interven­ tionism to Fascism 1917-1919’ , in Journal o f Contemporary History, 3 (October 1968). * A C S , M in. Int., D G PS, Conflagrazione Europea (1914-18), b. 2, I Dec. »917. ' A C S , ibid., b. 18A, 10 Dec. 1917. 4 A C S , ibid., Dec. 1917. 4 // Fascio, 27 Jan. 1918.

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O pera N azionale per i Com battenti, the organization estab­ lished in late 1917 for the purpose o f prom oting the interests o f the soldiers who survived the w ar. It was a mood o f under­ standing towards the class that had borne the brunt o f the fighting, but it was not extended to the socialist party. O n the contrary, the language becam e more violent, the hostility verging on hatred. Rom ualdo Rossi, ex-syndicalist, turned on his form er allies in the socialist party w ith this w arning: ‘W hen the w ar is over we shall fight with all our energy against that bolshevism which has been m ade cow ardly by a treacher­ ous, disgraceful, and dishonourable official socialism.*1 A few weeks later Giuseppe Longhi echoed this point o f view . D enying that the fascio would have no purpose at the end o f the w ar, he suggested that its task would be to stay together to fight against ‘those black, red, and scarlet soldiers o f defeatist official socialism*.12*O rlando, now at last advocating repressive measures, lent substance to this standpoint. T h e intervention­ ists, brought to a new unity by opposition to socialism, were, by 1918, foreseeing that the post-war battle was going to be fought around the same pivot o f anti-socialism. As the w ar drew to a close, the socialists were also inclined to look to the future. U nderstandably, they had reasons for confidence. It seemed likely that men returning from the trenches would feel more ready than ever to fight for social justice after their experiences at the front. C ertainly new members were needed. For obvious reasons membership o f the provincial m ovement had fallen drastically during the w ar— sufficiently to make the correspondents o f II Fascio think that the organization was in serious trouble. It reported in Sep­ tem ber 1918 that there were only 150 party members in the whole province— fewer, almost, than the num ber o f sections.* This was something o f an exaggeration, as the num ber o f sections had also fallen drastically. T h e provincial congress o f the party, proposed for A pril 1918, had to be postponed when representatives o f only twelve sections turned up.4 Even so, 1 Ibid., 31 M ar. 1918. * Ibid., 1 M ay 1918. * Ibid., 15 Sept. 1918. T he report claimed to be based on what Luigi Telloli, a prominent member o f the Camera del Lavoro, had told the Resto del Carlino. 4 A C S , Min. Int., D G PS, Conflagrazione Europea (1914-18), b. 18A. Copy o f a letter dated 14 Apr. 1918 from Zappaterra, socialist, to Pasquali, socialist leader of Copparo, interned at Alassio. T he congress; held eventually in M ay, reported 450 members.

44

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Zirardini had perform ed a rem arkable feat in retaining the organization w ith the potential it still had. T h e Cam era was still functioning, and a skeletal fram ework o f leagues existed to be exploited at the right moment. M oreover the provincial adm inistration, and the adm inistration o f thirteen o f the twenty-one com m unes,1 were in socialist hands, giving an invaluable means o f diffusing inform ation through the province by use o f official channels.8 M eetings o f the mayors o f the communes were inclined to become unscheduled party meetings, their expenses paid not by the party, but by the municipio. But unquestionably the greatest achievem ent o f Zirardini was the resolution o f the split between socialists and syndicalists which had vitiated the labour movement before the w ar. T h e Unione Sindacale Ferrarese, which had resisted the interventionist hysteria o f 1915 and continued an independent neutralist existence, had paid the price exacted by the w ar from all popular movements. Starting from a sm aller base than the socialists, the U .S .F . had virtually no support by 1917. In June o f that year Zirardini had w ritten: ‘R evolutionary syndicalism has not been able to stand up to the challenge o f the w ar; it has not been able to m aintain its membership. T od ay the survivors o f that class m ovement are few.*8 This was partially the result o f Zirardini’s intelligent policy in their regard. Ever ready to receive syndicalists into the Cam era, he played his strong hand w ith notable m oderation. O ne by one the syndicalist leaders m ade their peace w ith the more powerful organization— Adelm o N iccolai in Novem ber 1917 (‘N iccolai has had to go to Canossa’, observed II Fascio),* M arangoni in the spring o f 1918. T h e prefect telegraphed that the proposed congress o f the U .S .F ., arranged for 17 February 1918, had been put o ff until 3 M arch ‘for lack o f participants’. O n the 3rd, for the same reason, it was put o ff indefinitely.6 In face o f socialist m aximalism, there was little point in retaining the syndicalist position. Thus, for the first tim e for m any years, the provincial1*4 1 A C S , ibid., December 1917. Several o f the communes were still administered by commissari prefettizi. 9 See for example, A C S , ibid. The prefect mentions 'the correspondence kept up through the mayors' which he complains is subsidized by the official funds. * Bandiera Socialista, 30 June 1917. 4 II Fascio, i l Nov. 1917. * A C S , Min. Int., DGPS (1903-49), G 1, b. 19, 4 M ar. 1918.

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labour movement had a leader whose position was unassailable am ong any o f the currents. T h e prefect recognized the strength o f ZirardinTs hold on the movement, w riting about him in D ecem ber 1917. ‘H e makes all the appointm ents, deposes the recalcitrants, decides the excommunications, distributes the electoral colleges. H e’s not liked by everyone, but feared by all. H e puts other speakers in their place w ith a gesture, a simple movement.*1 W ith such a man o f undoubted strong character and integrity, the movement could reasonably expect to prosper when the w ar was finished. Prospects for the fascio were less encouraging. Form ed in special circumstances for a particular purpose, the fascio had a future only if it could find some new aim to perpetuate the strange alliance o f syndicalists, socialists, and nationalists. As the hostility to the socialists increased during the w ar years and anti-socialism becam e the cohesive element in the interven­ tionist union, it seemed possible that opposition to the alleged disfattisti could provide sufficient m otive for the continued existence o f the fascio. Rossi and Longhi had suggested as m uch in the columns o f II Fascio. It was an opinion not shared b y all, however. Carlo C avallini, in his own words ‘inter­ ventionist o f the prima ora’, was severely rebuked by the directors o f the fascio for sending 5 lire to the socialist paper, Bandiera Socialista, representing in their view the thought o f L azzari and the defeatists. C avallini replied to his critics w ith an eloquent defence o f socialist ideals. O n practical points he claim ed: O n ce b a ck h om e, th e lab ourer in grey-green w ill h ave to take u p ag ain th e b attle in terru p ted in 1915 for oth er indefeasible rights . . . W e m ust m ake sure th a t the soldier— on the d a y w h en h e gets his jo b b ack— finds read y those weapons necessary for the defence o f his class rights: the econom ic an d p olitical organizations.*

H e denied that anti-socialism could be a realistic basis for future policy, sim ply because class interests would reassert themselves. ‘W hen the w ar is over, Longhi m y friend, your fascio w ill break up. L uigi Fabbri w ill continue to defend the interests o f the bourgeoisie in his Rivista. O n ly the Bandiera Socialista w ill take up position for the strenuous defence o f 1 A C S , M in. Int., D G PS, Conflagrazione Europea (1914-18), b. 18A, Decem­ ber 1917. * I l Fascio, 14 Apr. 1918.

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THE WIDENING OF THE D IV ISIO N S

proletarian rights.’ 1 Significantly for the future o f the socialist interventionists, however, C avallin i’s 5 lire were returned to him. Zirardini evidently felt strong enough to be able to refuse support from some quarters. Even so, there was less o f a tendency for the Ferrara inter­ ventionist fascio to disintegrate in 1918 than was true o f the same groups in larger cities. In the big centres, where political debate was more developed, nationalists and interventionists o f the left began to feel their entente strained as the dangers o f defeat receded. O n foreign policy, nationalist im perialism and dem ocratic support for the policy o f nationalities induced a coolness in the alliance, w hile in internal matters the desire o f socialist interventionists to secure a mass base by stealing some o f the socialist thunder on social reform ing met w ith nationalist hostility— the nationalists being more concerned to seek their support for the future among the servicemen's organizations. T h e absence o f this clash in Ferrara in 1918 was partially the result o f a natural inertia which affected m any sm aller towns, particularly where issues o f foreign policy were involved. Such •issues rarely raised the passions which local conflicts could stir. But more im portant in explaining its absence is the fact that the nationalists had never gained that ascendancy over the provincial interventionist movement that had been gained elsewhere. As long as the reformist socialist and syndicalist elements rem ained dom inant, the nationalists had to subm it to their control or else be reduced to an insignificant political club. Thus, in Ferrara, social reforms and policies directed at the combattenti appear on the same manifesto in January 1918. A further incentive to avoid a split was even more powerful, operating w ith equal force on both left and right. Reduced in strength though it m ight be, the socialist organization still presented an obvious threat to the largely middle-class inter­ ventionist interests o f the town. Giuseppe Longhi and Rom u­ aldo Rossi were right, as far as 1918 was concerned, in their estimate o f the unifying effect o f the hostility to the socialists. T h e sight o f Zirardini and his phalanx o f supporters leaving the Cam era del Lavoro provided sufficient reason to forget other differences and work together for the victory w hich would discredit the disfattisti. Y et, even if the combined pressures o f w ar and hatred o f their 1 II Fascioy 14 Apr. 1918.

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opponents could keep the interventionists together for 1918, the future beyond that point promised more for the socialists. T h ey had more to say to the people o f the rural communes than ever the fascio could hope to say. And they had the means to say it. T h e organization was intact, the leadership strong and es­ tablished, and the party as a whole could expect to enjoy the fruits o f a policy w hich had always deplored w hat was, in the agricultural areas, a most unpopular w ar. M ost im portant, the Cam era could at last present a united front to a group w hich could only be expected to disintegrate once its raison d'être was rem oved. For the fascio there were few reasons for optimism. It drew com fort from the fact that in its ranks were some o f the best o f the syndicalist organizers and some o f the more com ­ petent o f the reform ist socialists. Encouragem ent could also be draw n from the circulation o f the newspaper II Fascio— even in N ovem ber 1918 the most w idely read in the province.1 But, in general, it could only look to possibilities and hope that opportunity would arise to perm it their realization. H atred o f the socialists had been greatly increased in the town, and it was clear that prefect and other civil authorities shared this hatred. Soon the shock troops {arditi) w ould be returning, w ith other combattenti who m ight be prepared to pursue an anti-socialist line. G reat hopes were placed in these, particularly in the arditi. T h e fascio had already expressed its respect for these: ‘These young men should be the citizens w e listen to most tom orrow in the post-war w orld.’ 8 A ll depended on the extent to w hich a common aim could be found to unify potentially strong forces and to perm it the exploitation o f sym pathy in certain quarters. W ith the w ar ended, the interventionists could only echo their spokesman, expressing determ ination rather than confidence: ‘If, as M ussolini observes, it has been our w ar and not the w ar o f the clericals or the socialists, then the post-war must be ours as w ell.*3 1 Ibid., 17 Nov. 1918.

* Ibid., 24 Mar. 1918.

3 Ibid., 24 Nov. 1918.

3 TH E D EFEA T OF TH E IN T E R V E N T IO N IST S, J A N U A R Y - N O V E M B E R 1919 I n Italy, as am ong the other victorious allies, the end o f the w ar was greeted w ith exaggerated hopes and unlim ited opti* mism. It seemed for a long tim e that the trium ph o f V ittorio V eneto could w ipe out the m em ory o f the disaster at Caporetto, that the disintegration o f Austria-H ungary would at last perm it unification w ith the irredenta o f the A driatic. Revolutions and soviets promised a new social order. T o m any it appeared, in the words o f Pietro Nenni, that ‘the old w orld was about to collapse and that hum anity was on the threshold o f a new age . . A 1 Servicem en, returning from the front in early 1919, remembered the promises made during the course o f the w ar and looked to a grateful governm ent to keep its w ord. For agricultural labourers, taken from their semi-feudal conditions in the Po valley, for instance, to the trenches, utopian optimism m eant a great deal. Y et, for these and for m any others, the new w orld was slow in com ing. A fter the initial enthusiasm o f late 1918 and early 1919, the extent o f the problems w hich faced Italy becam e apparent. Peace, if it brought a welcom e return from the arm y, also brought economic dislocation o f an un­ precedented m agnitude. R apid dem obilization imposed strains on provincial adm inistration that they could scarcely bear, w hile the dem obilized men themselves, brought to a new awareness o f their rights by the experience o f the w ar, were not prepared to stomach continuing hardships on their return home. In such circum stances, confidence in the post-war w orld could quickly turn to im patience, cynicism , and despair. Ferrara was as m uch prey to these problems as m any other provinces. D em obilization was the most im m ediate difficulty, being too rapid to perm it o f any real program me for the resettle­ ment o f the reduci. Between M arch and Novem ber 1919, eleven 1 P. Nenni, Storia di quattro anni (Rome, 1946), p. 6.

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classes o f conscripts— from 1896 to 1916— were released.1 Readjustm ent to civilian life was bound to be difficult for men who had spent several years alternating between short periods o f activity and long weeks o f idleness. For these men to return to a chaotic local situation w ith no prospect o f em ploym ent to help the process o f readjustment, the problems were inevitably even greater. W ithin a few days o f the new year, the prefect in Ferrara was expressing concern at the situation in the province. M ore people were being released than could be em ployed, and soldiers were returning to their old positions only to find them occupied by old men, women, and even children, w ho had no intention o f m aking w ay for the returning men.8 T h e com­ m unal authorities o f Portom aggiore reported that artisans and avventizi were com ing back to the commune at a rate w hich m ade it impossible for them to be absorbed8— particularly the avventizi, for whom January was always a slack period. B y February more than 7,000 servicemen were back in the pro­ vince and nearly a third o f these were unem ployed.4 Seasonal fluctuations o f an agricultural province undoubtedly played a part in this, but the prefect was able to identify factors w hich aggravated the situation. W hile the m ilitary authorities were so ready to release men, they were less ready to redistribute machines and m aterials w hich had been requisitioned during the w ar. Prefect G iuffrida commented on the shortage o f certain machines necessary for agricultural and industrial w orking in the province, and pointed out that artisans and labourers were finding it difficult to buy the simple tools necessary for their work. O ver 300 barges, used on the Po and other rivers and waterways o f the province, were still in m ilitary hands in January 1919. T h eir im m ediate release was requested.6 In the absence o f these necessities G iuffrida could only call for an increased program m e o f public works to tide the dem obilized over the initial troubles o f civilian life, and for a more rapid paym ent o f special subsidies. This concern was not pure altruism. In early February the prefect was forced to report a great increase in crimes against 1 A . Tasca, Nascita e avvento delfascismo (Florence, 1952), p. 19. * A C S , Min. Int., D G PS, A G R 1919, b. 40, 4 Jan. 1919. ' A C S , ibid., 8 Jan. 1919. * A C S , ibid., 2 Feb. 1919. * A C S , ibid., 4 Jan. 1919.

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property, an increase he attributed directly to the actions o f unemployed ex-servicem en.1 The mood o f these men was such as to present a distinct threat to public order, and any further deterioration o f the situation m ight well have reflected badly on the ability o f the prefect himself. G iuffrida was also vulnerable from another direction. W here public works and subsidies were concerned, the prefect was held directly responsible by m any o f the population. It was his intercession with central ministries that was assumed to be the key factor in the winning o f vital contracts. Failure to produce these contracts could turn all voices in the province against him. G iuffrida, always over­ sensitive to criticism , was clearly anxious that the problems o f the dem obilized should be settled as quickly and as quietly as possible. Despite this anxiety and the pleas for prom pt action, com­ plaints were made. In turning their attentions to the prefect and a lethargic and overloaded bureaucracy, the political organizations o f Ferrara were doing no more than they were com pelled to do by the local situation. A ll groups recognized the political im portance o f the ex-combattenti and m ade ap­ propriately extremist sounds in order to attract them. T h e prefect was an obvious butt for criticism , the attacks on him being just part o f the intense activity o f early 1919 which was calculated to win the support o f the soldiers. Particularly con­ cerned to exploit the sym pathy they could expect to enjoy were, o f course, the interventionist groups. A t Cento, for «cample, the Republican Party benefited from its patriotic position during the war. In January a new section was formed w ith a lieutenant o f the artillery and silver medalist as leader, and members m ainly 'soldiers, returned servicemen, ex-prisoners, and invalids’ .2 A response such as this perm itted left-wing interventionists to claim very reasonably that they were reaping the rewards o f their wartim e policy. In the town o f Ferrara, where the fascio had included all the main political groups with the exception o f the socialists, activity was especially fervent. Giuseppe Longhi, during 1918 one o f the strongest advocates o f m aintaining the interventionist bloc at the end o f the w ar, attempted in January to link the components o f the fascio in a united cam paign on behalf o f 1 A C S , ibid., 2 Feb. 1919. * A C S, ibid., b. 58; reports of 12 and 20 Jan. 1919.

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the returning soldiers. U nder his direction a Sindacato Lavora* tori Sm obilitati was established in m id-January to help the dem obilized and their fam ilies;1 on the 19th an assem bly o f reduci was held to draw up a program m e for the Sindacato.2 Y et, far from unifying the interventionist movement, the creation o f the syndicate proved to be the final straw in persuading those doubtful about the continued existence o f the fascio to w ithdraw their support. Dissension about foreign policy issues had already arisen during the second h a lf o f 1918. Longhi’s allegiance was basically dem ocratic and W ilsonian, a position which gave offence to the nationalists and conservatives more favourable to Sonnino’s point o f view . No rift had occurred during 1918, but the announcem ent that the Sindacato was to be dedicated to acting ‘against the dom inant capitalist classes’ 8 excited atten­ tion precisely am ong those concerned to oppose Longhi’s attitudes on foreign policy. Consequently, on 26 January it was announced that the Fascio di Difesa N azionale had been dissolved, and that Longhi would thenceforward pursue his policies entirely through the syndicate.4 T h e newspaper II Fascio was renam ed La Libera Idea and given over predom inantly to urging the cause o f the unem ployed soldiers. W ith the continued support o f m any o f the republicans, syndicalists, and independent socialists, Longhi im m ediately join ed battle w ith the authorities, calling for the restoration to the dem obilized o f jobs held before the w ar, and dem anding that no women or prisoners should be em ployed so long as exservicem en rem ained w ithout w ork.5 Attention was directed at both prefect and m ayor, the most savage warnings being reserved for the latter. T h e seven directors o f the Sindacato becam e tired o f being shown the projects for relieving un­ em ploym ent drawn up by the m ayor: ‘hunger is not a project*, they com plained. E qually they doubted the good faith o f the m ayor, rem inding him o f the sweet words which had been spoken as men left for the trenches. ‘O n occasions you were am ong those who m ade promises, and the reason was obvious. T h e Germ ans threatened everything and everyone. Even you, therefore. Even your m illions. Now hunger threatens only those w ho defended you .’ N ext tim e, they warned, it would not be 1 II Fascio, 19 Jan. 1919. * Ibid., 19 Jan. 1919.

* Gazzetta Ferrarese, 20 Jan. 19*9. 4 Ibid., 26 Jan. 1919. fi Ibid.

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ju st seven who would knock at the door o f the sindaco, but ‘a whole crowd w hich is hungry*.1 Language like this brought some success to the syndicate. In M arch the prefect wrote that La Libera Idea— ‘radico-socialista’ as he described it— had a w eekly printing o f 2,000 copies, a fairly good circulation by provincial standards.12*Y et, w ith its actions confined to the town, the Sindacato could hardly hope to occupy a really significant position w ithin the province, w hile, with its echoes o f official socialist policy, it was constantly prey to defections to the official socialists as the situation deteriorated through the first h alf o f 1919 and combattenti o f socialist leanings began to feel the need for a more effective organization to press their demands. This was, indeed, the weakness o f the independent socialist position. U nable to countenance a totally independent position for his syndicate since, without the support o f the nationalists, his appeal to the reduci was too lim ited within the town, Longhi was forced back into seeking an alliance w ith existing political groups. For this reason, he rejected M ussolini’s attempts to make the combattenti the fulcrum o f political activity. T h e combattenti had their virtues, he agreed, ‘but that is no reason for turning our backs on or suppressing the parties. R ather w e should wish to see their former functions restored.** But, deprived o f the support o f either the conservative bourgeoisie o f the town or the Cam era del Lavoro, there was no effective party to which Longhi could attach his work for the soldiers. H e made efforts to establish his own base, asking to hear ‘the voices o f all those lower-middle-class people exhausted and impoverished by the dreadful clash between capitalism and proletariat*.4 But the appeal had little effect. From A p ril onwards the Sindacato steadily lost support. In M ay, certain o f those rem aining were incorporated in a section o f the U nione Socialista Italian a,6 while others— Rom ualdo Rossi, for ex­ ample— turned their attention back to the U .I.L . Even so, neither independent socialism nor syndicalism could com pete w ith the increasing extremism o f the P .S .I. By Septem ber only the labour organization at Com acchio remained outside the 1 La Libera Idea, 2 Feb. 1919. * A C S , Min. Int., DGPS (1903-49), G 1, b. 11, 11 Mar. 1919. * La Libera Idea, 30 M ar. 1919. 4 Ibid., 2 Feb. 1919. * Ibid., 1 M ay 1919.

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Cam era del Lavoro, largely because Com acchio was the area in w hich Rossi had concentrated all his attentions, and in w hich he had a very considerable personal follow ing.1 B y the m iddle o f 1919, therefore, the interventionist left was fragm ented and largely defeated. O f the republicans, m oderate socialists, and syndicalists, only small groups rem ained, o f little political im portance. T h e efforts to establish a base for these groups am ong the returning soldiers had proved com pletely unsuccessful. There is evidence that this defeat disheartened m any o f the more m oderate and dem ocratic elements. Giuseppe Longhi, for instance, carried on the Libera Idea only until M ay. T hen, as the U nione Socialista proved a disappointm ent and the dem ocratic position o f the reformists was squeezed between official socialism and opposition to that socialism, he found him self w ith nowhere to go. R ather than compromise his principles, he chose to w ithdraw , and from the m iddle o f 1919, although he rem ained in Ferrara, played no further im portant part in the political life o f the town. M ore successful in recruiting support am ong the combattenti w ere precisely those organizations that did w hat Longhi had refused to do— construct an association designed specifically for ex-servicem en and apparently ow ing allegiance to no particular party. A gain largely confined to the town, these organizations did not m ake the m istake o f attem pting com­ petition w ith the extrem ely powerful socialist m ovem ent on its own terms, but restricted their activities to w elfare operations and their policies to patriotic declarations about the peace settlem ent.8 T h e first such association was the Associazione pro M utilati, set up by the nationalist Francesco Brom bin in Jan uary 1919.3 O bviously lim ited in its scope, it could only cater for a sm all section o f the ex-soldiers. Support gained for the D alm atia cam paign o f February and M arch revealed the 1 Scintilla, 6 Sept. 1919. * A t the Paris peace conference the Italian delegation claim ed not only those parts o f Istria and D alm atia promised by the allies in the T reaty o f London (1915), but also the city o f Fium e (present-day R ijeka). President W ilson, faithful to his principle o f nationalities, refused to consider any proposals that threatened to weaken the new Yugoslav state and rejected the Italian claims. For m any Italians thi» was seen as a straightforward insult, and Fiume subsequently becam e central to the nationalist theory o f the 'm utilated victory* which was developed during 1919. For an account o f the diplom atic proceedings surrounding the conference, see C . Seton-W atson, Italy from Liberalism to Fascism, pp. 537 ff. * Gazzetta Ferrarese, 25 Jan. 1919.

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need for a w ider organization to accom modate servicemen in general. In early A pril an Associazione Ferrarese dei Com ­ battenti was established to fulfil this need. Its programme was sim ply stated; to ensure the m oral and m aterial well-being o f the former soldier, and to prevent the (unspecified) gains o f the w ar from being squandered.1 Both associations were nom inally independent o f any political group, but, through the emphasis given to patriotism and the nationalist point o f view, they were evidently fiefs o f that clerico-m oderate and nationalist w ing o f the Fascio di Difesa Nazionale which had been unable to tolerate Longhi’s unofficial socialism. This was made clear in M ay, when the Gruppo N azionalista Ferrarese, w hich had lost its separate identity during the w ar, was reconstituted. O f the directing com mittee, three were also on the com mittee o f the Associazione dei Com battenti.8 T h e predom inantly right-wing character o f the ex-servicemen's association did not pass unnoticed in Ferrara. La Fiaccola, a ‘periodico quindicinale razionalista’, made persistent attacks on the position m any urban reduci were taking up in early 1919. T h e Associazione Nazionale dei Com battenti (A .N .C .) was accused o f being no more than a front for the interests o f the bourgeoisie,3 while particular attention was directed to the attitudes o f certain o f the returning arditi. These were criticized for being ingenuous in their political attitudes, and for failing to see that all they had done during the w ar was defend the interests o f capitalists.4.The suspicion was obviously strong that this was w hat the arditi were to continue to do, a suspicion no doubt strengthened by a report in the Giornale del 1 Gazzetta Ferrarese, 14 Apr. 1919. * Ibid., 9 M ay 1919. In this issue the members o f both committees. Certain o f later years. Gruppo Nazionalista G iulio Righini Alberto V erdi Luigi G irardi Renato Zamboni Roberto G ulinelli Enrico Fabbri Alberto D e Signo M ario H yerace Alfonso Solimani ' La Fiaccola, 17 M ay 1919. * Ibid., 9 M ar. 1919.

Gazzetta published the names o f the them were to figure more largely in Assoc. Combattenti G iulio Righini Alberto V erdi Luigi G irardi Leopoldo Tum iati Luigi Baldi Annibale Ghedini Fabio Divisi Clem ente Piccinini Fausto Gadani

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Mattino that a group o f Ferrarese agrari had proposed that local landowners should pay L .11 for every hectare o f land owned into a fund which was to be used for subsidizing the arditi and other combattenti returning from the front.1 Nothing appears to have come o f this last initiative. Never­ theless certain arditi did provide a further strand in the post­ w ar picture. Prominent among the local shock troops was the young lieutenant O lao G aggioli, distinguished for his physical courage shown at the front. In 1918 G aggioli had linked him self to M arinetti’s Fasci Futuristi,12* and it was to this movement that he devoted his energies during his periods o f leave during 1919. In February the prefect informed the M inistry o f the Interior that a Gruppo Futurista Ferrarese had been constituted a few weeks previously, with about fifteen members. Its leader, G aggioli, had assured him that the interests o f the group were sim ply literary and artistic.8 In fact the aims were clearly political, as became obvious in A pril when G aggioli explained that the programme o f action o f the group was directed p rin ci­ pally against unemployment and the actions o f the bolsheviks’ .45 Although it remained relatively unim portant in provincial politics, the group did provide a focus for several o f the arditi, inclined to follow G aggioli’s lead. In doing this, o f course, it also provided a link w ith M ussolini, by now one o f the main spokesmen on behalf o f the much criticized shock troops. According to II Popolo d'Italia o f 24 M arch, it was the Fascio Futurista o f Ferrara that adhered to the Piazza San Sepolcro m eeting in M ilan, which is generally regarded as m arking the foundation o f the Italian fascist movement.6 M ario C arli announced the adhesion o f the fascio, and o f its leaders, G aggioli and A ttilio Crêpas, a sixteen-year-old student. Also associating itself with the m eeting was the radical and nationalist Com itato Studentesco d ’Azione o f Ferrara. G aggioli was subsequently to draw a great deal o f credit for his prompt support o f M ussolini’s movement. In reality, there is some doubt whether he did, in fact, have anything to do w ith his name going forward. 1 Giornale del Mattino, 20 Apr. 1919. * For this information on G aggioli, see E. Savino, La nazione operante (Novara, * ). P- ° * A C S, M in. Int., D G PS, À G R 1920, b. 77, 18 Feb. 1919. 4 Gazzetta Ferrarese, 14 A pr. 1919. 5 O f those present only Achille Funi, the futurist artist, was a ferrarese, although it seems that he was not resident in Ferrara after the war.

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Subsequent revelations indicated that Grepas was accustomed to using G aggioli’s name without his permission, and discovery o f this prompted the rapid dissolution and reconstitution o f the Fascio Futurista in A pril in order to exclude Grepas from any significant position.1 None the less, G aggioli was clearly favourable to M ussolini's initiative and encouraged the locati futurists to continue their struggle against the socialists. In this, action w ith other nationalist groups was not un­ common. O nce again, there was a certain overlapping o f membership. Just as the Associazione dei Com battenti was linked to the Gruppo Nazionalista by members who belonged to both committees, so the futurists were connected to the nation­ alists in both sym pathy and personnel. M ario H yerace was a member o f the directing council o f the nationalist group and also administrator o f the reconstituted Fascio Futurista.8 These links made co-operation easier when it cam e to organizing public opinion against the affronts offered by the Paris Peace Conference. Instrum ental in this cam paign was the Gazzetta Ferrarese, always the representative o f the views o f the higher bourgeoisie, and in M ay 1919 com ing under the control o f Alberto V erdi, the leader o f the nationalists. Even before V erdi took over, the Gazzetta had devoted a great deal o f space to the issues o f foreign policy, and had, in February, opened a subscription ‘Pro D alm azia' to provide financial aid for the Italians o f the ‘redeem ed' lands.* A great fuss was made o f students from D alm atia who visited Ferrara in early M arch. Professors Panunzio and Brombin made speeches stressing Italian duty towards D alm atia, and received praise from the Gazzetta for their firm line.4 Feeling within the town at least was evidently fairly favourable to the nationalist 1 Crêpas claimed to have founded a section o f the Fascio Futurista at Rovigo with the patronage o f Gaggioli and the lieutenants Ronchi and Imegli (see Gazzetta Ferrarese, s Apr. 1919). Certain newspaper articles written by Crêpas also carried the signatures o f the same three. G aggioli protested about the unauthorized use o f his name, pointed out that Ronchi and Im egli did not exist except in the 'pseudo* futurist* imagination o f Crêpas, and felt bound to deny all responsibility for actions carried out in the recent past on behalf o f the futurist group (see Giornale del Mat­ tino, 15 Apr. 1919). The names o f the ferraresi published in II Popolo d’Italia and given as adhering to the M ilan movement are all, with the exception o f Grepas, equally spurious. For these names see M . Giam paoli, rgig (M ilan, 1938), p. 178. • Gazzetta Ferrarese, 14 Apr. and 9 M ay 1919. • Ibid., 8 M ar. 1919. The subscription had evidently been open for several days. • Ibid.

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position. T h e burning o f the M ilan offices o f Avanti! in A p ril excited socialist reaction throughout the province, but in the town the ex-combattenti hit back w ith a manifesto and a counter demonstration. Several hundred ‘good citizens’ attended a m eeting in the Piazza del Duom o and listened to a speech by G aggioli. Then, inspired by reports that Fium e was to be Italian, they m arched through the town singing patriotic songs, ending their demonstration in front o f the barracks o f the 27th infantry. T h e prefect reported that m any people had hung flags from their windows along the route o f the m arch.1 A gain, on 25 A pril, in protest at W ilson’s manifesto to the Italian people, a large crowd gathered outside the Palazzo Provinciale and dem anded that the socialist provincial ad­ m inistration should display the tricolour. O n ly when a sm all group o f arditi entered the building and threatened socialist officials was the flag reluctandy unfurled.1 W here Ita ly’s honour was supposedly involved, passions were obviously still fairly high. Both combattenti and nationalist associations recognized this and attem pted to turn to their advantage the difficulties in Paris. D uring M ay and June a cam paign was organized in an attem pt to bolster the patriotic associations. According to a manifesto, reproduced on 3 M ay in the Gazzetta, it was neces­ sary that all soldiers should im ite again to show their strength. Never before now has it been so obvious that you should reinforce your spiritual union by forming a solid and independent organization— an organization that will once again include the most advanced and representa­ tive nucleus of the nation.

It was alleged that Italy was being treated w ith contem pt by the victorious allies. ‘W hile in Paris Am erica, England, and France divide up territories, influence, mandates, ships, iron, and coal, to our rights— natural, historic, necessary— to Fium e and D alm atia are opposed the new-found and artificial rights o f our enemies o f yesterday.*8 Articles o f a sim ilar nature appeared in the Gazzetta five times in the course o f June, al­ ways w ith the suggestion that the rem edy to the situation lay 1 A G S, M in. In t., D G PS, A G R 1919, b. 4 7 ,18 and 19 Apr. 1919. T h e report o f 19 A pr. carries a cutting from the Mattina di Bologna giving an account o f the demonstration, from which the prefect quotes at length. A further account appears in the Gazzetta Ferrarese for 19 A pr. 1 Gazzetta Ferrarese, 36 A pr. 1919. * Ibid., 24 M ay 1919; manifesto o f the Gruppo N azionalista Ferrarese.

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w ith enrolm ent in the association for combattenti.1 Even so suc­ cess was only m oderate. T h e nationalist, patriotic issues o f the spring and summer o f 1919 were rapidly overshadowed by the more im m ediate provincial problems o f rising prices, un­ employment, and a shortage o f accom m odation. Even the occupation o f Fium e in Septem ber, carried out by D ’Annunzio at the head o f a group o f mutineers from the arm y, failed to arouse enthusiasm am ong any but a restricted group o f nationalists and arditi. B y the end o f Septem ber, despite all efforts, the association could claim only 1,500 m em bers8 and it was already clear that in Ferrara, in contrast to m any other centres, the ex-combattente movement had passed its peak.1*3 Right-w ing— ju st as m uch as left-wing— interventionism had failed to exploit the legacy o f the w ar to any lasting advantage. W here success was achieved, it was not always as a result o f the efforts o f the nationalist organization. T h e attitude o f the socialists to the reduci also played a part. Although by no means repugnant to all ex-soldiers, certain o f the themes o f some public meetings m ight have offended soldiers unsure o f w hat position to take in the post-war w orld. It was repeatedly argued, for instance, that the w ar, far from m aking the situation better for the labourer or the artisan, had actually m ade matters worse. N iccolai— one o f the most active speakers for the socialists at this time— argued that ‘the im perialist bourgeoisie w hich the w ar defeated in the central powers is now springing up again am ong the allied governments’ .4*It was a persistent theme that, while others had been fighting and suffering, the possessing 1 Gazzetta Ferrarese, i , 2, 3, 20, 21 June 1919. * A C S , M in. Int., D G PS, A G R 1920 b. 77, 27 Sept. 1919. * Com pare, for example, the situation in Puglia, where the A .N .C . followed a fairly typical trajectory— gaining strength and constituting an extrem ely ac­ tive element in local politics until the elections o f 1919, and thereafter declining gradually as the split between Salveminian democrats and the right-wing group around Caradonna made itself evident. Sim ilar tensions were apparent within the movement in Naples, though here the organization still had substantial political weight in the autumn o f 1920. It was in Sardinia, however, that the combattenti really succeeded in constituting an independent movement. M aintaining ad­ vanced reformist and autonomist positions, they helped to form the Partito Sardo d ’Azione in 1921 and— for the most part— remained consistently opposed to fas­ cism until 1924. See S. Colarizi, Dopoguerra e fascismo in Puglia ( ig ig-rga6) (Bari, 1971); R . Colapietra, Napoli tra dopoguerra e fascismo (M ilan, 1962); and S. Sechi, Dopoguerra e fascismo in Sardegna (Turin, 1969). 4 A C S , M in. In t., D G PS, A G R 1919, b. 47, 27 Jan. 1919; speech o f Adelm o N iccolai at San M artino.

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classes had preserved their wealth and position.1 For m any this would be a popular theme, and would strengthen the belief that social revolution should follow the victory over the central powers. Y et for others the message was less easy to accept. W hile they recognized that the w ar effort had been betrayed by the government, that the sacrifice had not been equally shared by all classes, they were still unable to accept that the victory had never had any meaning, or that their own personal sufferings had been pointless. T o hear the message from Niccolai, who had not him self fought, must have been especially galling. I f they had been wrong to fight, m any soldiers were unlikely to thank a non-com batant for telling them so. For those inclined to this way. o f thinking about the socialist position, there were am ple opportunities for them to confirm their suspicions. T h e apparent indifference o f the ‘maximalists* to the insults offered to Italy at Paris must have irritated men who had seen comrades killed in the effort to gain w hat was now being renounced with little concern. A ffecting the returned soldier more direcdy was the attitude o f socialist employers, particularly communal and provincial administrations, to him. Evidence suggests that a considerable amount o f dis­ crim ination was practised against combattenti. Thus, at the end o f Ju ly, a Signora U ngarelli could write to the Gazzetta about her experiences w ith the provincial administration in trying to find a post for her son, shortly returning from m ilitary service. H er hostile reception prompted some straight talking. L e t’s p u t th e cards on th e tab le! N ow th a t the w ar is over, now th at there is n o m ore need for soldiers, now th at a ll the w orries about the enem y th reat a re dead, now th e soldier is an in tru d er, an encum brance, a m an defeated ; defeated n ot on ly b y those w ho sabotaged the w ar bu t also b y those w ho d id n ’t figh t bu t instead found w ays o f fixin g them selves up very com fort­ a b ly du rin g th e w ar beh ind th e backs o f ou r soldiers.

There was some justification for her indignation, if her account o f what the socialist administrator had said to her was correct. ‘Here there is no need for accountants, nor for any other employees. T h e administration has a duty towards the farm labourers who have worked and acquired rights during the w ar.*s The prefect substantiated this, w riting o f the socialists, 'T h ey even w ant to exclude the combattenti from com peting 1 See, for example, A C S , ibid., 17 Feb., 13 M ar., 7 Apr. 1919. * Gazzetta Ferrarese, 30-31 Ju ly 1919; letter from Signora G . Laurenti Ungarelli.

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for the vacant positions*.1 Y et, in the same report, he did adm it that it was largely a discrim ination against ex-soldiers who were not enrolled in the leagues. T h e adm inistration, he said, paid 'no attention to the combattenti who are not on their side*, and favoured the socialist soldiers by reserving subsidies for the L ega Invalidi Proletaria. This was no very great discovery on the part o f the prefect. I f he had cared to ask any o f the socialist leaders, he would have been told that the Cam era del Lavoro refused to take into account w hat a m an had done during the w ar. W hat was im portant was sim ply whether or not a man was a socialist. This was made perfectly clear by the comments m ade on the O pera N azionale per i Com battenti. It was attacked as an insidious attem pt on the part o f the governm ent to break the ranks o f the workers. '. . . the governm ent is proposing to create a new class, w ith special rights and privileges, and w ith a kind o f socialism only for the benefit o f those returning from the trenches.* I f this was to be resisted it was necessary to see through 'the sentimental trick by which they are trying to set the proletariat against the soldiers’ .2 Providing that a man returning from the trenches was able to see him self as a worker and no longer as a soldier, this policy was consistent and work­ able. O n ly in one case was an exception made. M ario C avallari, socialist deputy and volunteer for the w ar, could not be con­ sidered as guiltless as were ordinary conscripts. In August L azzari visited the province, and, despite local opposition to his views, required that C avallari should resign from M onte­ citorio and from the party. A gain, this action m ay have alien­ ated combattenti. W hat is certain is that, left to themselves, the provincial socialists would have allowed C avallari to retain his positions, given that since his return he had been an active and able speaker on behalf o f the socialist cause.8 O utside the town, this policy o f judgin g the reduci on their socialist merits met w ith considerable success. In the measure to w hich the ex-combattenti had conspicuously failed to find their own voice, so they began to flow back into the socialist organ1 A C S , Presidenza, 1922, 1 ; 1/1; 1832, 'G iuffrida’ ; containing prefect’s report o f 18 Jan. 1920. 1 Scintilla, 23 A ug. 1919. * Ibid., 9 A ug. 1919. Lazzari’s motion stated that the party considered that 'th e lawyer M ario C avallari is guilty o f serious indiscipline and is therefore considered incom patible both as a representative and as a member w ith the P .S .I.’ .

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ization. T h e leagues began to swell again; the economic organization began once again to count its members in tens o f thousands rather than thousands. W hile some previously loyal socialists m ight feel alienated from the movement, for m any others the return home m eant a welcom e return to the econom ic struggles o f the pre-war years. Socialists and syndi­ calists before the w ar, they were convinced by the propaganda o f the trenches that they were right to fight against ‘those cowards o f the signori’ who seemed to have made so much from the conflict. R adicalization o f opinion affected even those who had not previously been convinced o f the socialist cause. Balbo, in the introduction to his D iary o f 1922, reveals how ideas had been changed by experience. F ig h t, stru ggle, to com e b ack to th e co u n try o f G io litti w ho p u t every id e a l u p fo r sale ? N o. B etter to g iv e up everyth in g, destroy everyth in g, i f it m eant th a t everyth in g m igh t be reb u ilt from th e foundations. T h e re w ere m an y a t th a t tim e— even th e m ost w ell-m ean in g— w h o lean ed tow ards com m unist nih ilism . I t w as th e revolu tio n ary program m e a lrea d y p rep ared , an d , ap p aren tly, m ost ra d ical. In m y op inion, it is certain th a t w ith ou t M ussolini three-quarters o f th e youn g Italian s w h o retu rn ed from th e trenches w o u ld h ave becom e bolsheviks; a revolu tio n a t a n y p rice !1

Although Balbo was obviously concerned to m agnify the extent o f the socialist threat, this account has a great deal o f truth in it. It was precisely sentiment o f this kind that m any socialist interventionists o f 1915 had hoped to m anufacture by entry into the w ar. In 1919, since they had neither organi­ zation nor leadership, it was to be expected, as Balbo suggests, that the returning soldiers should turn towards the ‘maximalist* socialists. For those o f less revolutionary aspirations, there were, none the less, equally good reasons for enrolling in the leagues. It was the Cam era del Lavoro more than any other organization that promised to secure better wages and working conditions for the labourer. T h e socialists made sure that the province was aware o f this. In the first six months o f the year, meetings were held throughout the province with rem arkable frequency. In M ay and June alone the prefect reported thirty-three such meetings. Alw ays the themes were the same— the w ar settle­ ment, unemployment, and the rise in the cost o f livin g.2 A t-

1

1 . Balbo, Diario tgsa (M ilan, 1932), p. 6. * A C S , M in. Int., D G PS, A G R 1919, b. 47, numerous reports o f M ay and June

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tendances were often good. A t Com acchio on n M ay 2,000 attended, while the same num ber turned up at Form ignana on 29 June. N iccolai, M arangoni, Bussi, and Ercole Bucco took turns to harangue the crowds and urge join t action to secure the eight-hour day and control o f collocamento (the placing o f labour) by the Cam era del Lavoro. L ittle by little the eighthour day at least was established; at Portom aggiore in M arch, at O stellato in A pril, at V igarano Pieve and R o in M ay.1 And w hile wage rates were consistendy increased under the pressure o f the Cam era— by 70 per cent for avventizi at R o, for exam ple— attention was also paid to the problem o f keeping prices down. The principal actions in this direction were made during the ‘cost o f living* riots w hich erupted in Ferrara, as elsewhere, in early Ju ly. Shortages and profiteering reduced the local population, and the braccianti in particular, to a state o f exas­ peration which brought often spontaneous actions against shopkeepers and other traders. As in other parts o f Italy, the violence with which the movement exploded not only greatly alarm ed the prefect,8 but caught even the socialist leaders o ff their guard. T h eir strength was shown, however, by the speed w ith w hich they succeeded in bringing the disturbances under their control. T h e mayors o f the socialist communes o f O stellato, M igliarino, Codigoro, M assafiscaglia, and M esola, ‘faced by exasperation and discontent o f population for excessive cost o f living’, met at the beginning o f Ju ly and ordered that all goods in their communes should be subject to price ceilings.8 A t Com acchio the population demanded reductions o f 50 per cent,1*3 4* w hile in Ferrara itself the m unicipal authorities were forced, under pressure from the socialists, to order reductions o f 50 per cent on certain articles.8Disturbances, prompted by socialist organizers, took place and required the intervention o f the police, as angry labourers attem pted to sack the shops on several occasions.6 A ction o f this kind brought rapid results for the Cam era del 1 Gazzetta Ferrarese, reports o f 30 Apr. ig ig for Ostellato, 2 M ay for Portomaggiore, 14 M ay for Vigarano, and 26 M ay for Ro. * A C S, M in. Int., D G PS, A G R ig ig , b. 40, 4 July ig ig . 3 A C S , ibid.; Sindaci to M inistry o f the Interior, 5 Ju ly ig ig . 4 A C S , ibid., g Ju ly ig ig . 4 A C S , ibid., 10 Ju ly igi9* See also G . Bardellini, I l compagno Enea, p. 88. 4 A C S , ibid., g Ju ly ig ig .

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Lavoro. B y the m iddle o f August Zirardini was able to an­ nounce that more than 40,000 tessere had been handed out for 1919 and that all sections o f the movement appeared to be functioning w ell. His tone was optim istic: ‘A ll that augurs w ell for the Ferrarese proletarian movement which m u st. . . prepare w ith faith and disciplined forces for very different battles.*1 It was an optimism w ell founded, as Zirardini knew. There were disciplined forces in the rural commîmes w ithout doubt. Y e t the methods o f obtaining both strength and discipline were not always altogether desirable. W hether revolutionary reduce, hard-pressed bracciante, or com pletely apolitical artisan, the fact rem ained that in the isolated rural areas o f the province, adhesion to the league was virtually obligatory. This was partially a result o f circumstances. If, as was usual, the league was the only effective political and economic organization in the area, and as such had a controlling influence on the selection and placing o f labour, it was sim ply expedient for workers to jo in die mass o f their fellows in the league. But if, as did occur, a labourer decided that for political reasons or because he had good contacts w ith a particular em ployer he could m anage w ell enough outside the league, then he was liable to be subjected to more than pressure o f public opinion. W hile he would be ignored b y all the leghisti or, in certain cases, physically as­ saulted, his em ployer m ight be subjected to boycott or violent action against livestock and hayricks. A ll depended on the attitude o f the local capolega, whose word, often not controlled by the Cam era del Lavoro, was the most im portant factor in the local situation. In effect, a separate jurisdiction was set up by the leagues in each area, to be characterized later as the rule o f the ‘red baronies*.2 Although to become more highly developed as the strength o f the socialists increased in 1920, the system brought protests even in August o f 1919. A t the end o f that month, the Gazzetta published an article, ‘Against violence and against deception’, com m enting on facts apparently notorious in the^ province. ‘It is w ell known that in A rgenta the Camera del Lavoro rossa has adopted the system o f im posing fines on all those who dare to use workers not authorized by the league. In the case o f failure to pay up the sum requested, a 1 S cin tilla , 16 Aug. 1919. * See, for example, I. E. Torsiello, Il tramonto dello baronie rosse (Ferrara, 1921).

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rigorous boycott is enforced.’ It was, the Gazzetta lamented, very much a question o f ‘your money or your life*.1 These actions were not simple vindictiveness against those who refused to toe the socialist line. Just as before the w ar the battle over compartecipazione had been unsuccessful because o f the lack o f unity among the workers, and the struggle changed to the demand for control o f collocamento which dealt precisely with this point, so in the post-war world unity among the agricultural workers was still the most im portant point for the socialist organizers. U nder no circumstances could they perm it a situation to exist in which the employers could make use o f non-league labour if other labour was denied to them. T o the regret o f certain o f the leaders o f the movement, this unity could be achieved only at the price o f a certain amount o f violence, since it was violent action that had most meaning to m any o f the hired labourers o f the bonifiche. It is true that, in post-war conditions, m any workers needed little urging where violence was concerned, and it would be unjust to attribute all the blame to socialist organizers. Nevertheless, they did little to restrain their followers. In the ‘cost o f living’ disturbances o f July, the socialist leaders announced that, while they would not encourage people to sack the shops, equally ‘we shall not move a finger, nor say a word, to prevent the starvers o f the people from being strung from the lampposts’.8 W hen it was realized that agitation against high prices resulted simply in hoarding by the shopkeepers, the socialists again went into action. ‘O ne morning were seen groups o f citizens, divided into patrols, forcing shopkeepers to sell all their goods at a reduction o f 50 per cent. In front o f every shop men with red arm-bands were put on guard to check that the decree o f the crowd was respected.’8 Both socialist paper and prefect confirm this account o f red guards patrolling the streets, although both m aintain that the squads disappeared when the prefect gave satisfactory assurances about the maintenance o f price ceilings.1*4* Even so, a precedent had been created for intim idation o f 1 Gazzetta Ferrarese, 26 Aug. 1919. * Bandiera Socialista, 12 July 1919. * G . Bardellini, op. d t., p. 89. 4 Bandiera Socialista, 12 Ju ly 1919; also A C S , M in. Int., D G PS, A G R 1919, b. 40, 10 Ju ly 1919. According to the prefect, 'A s soon as the price ceilings were published, vigilante squads from the Camera del Lavoro began to tour the town. Am ong them the m ajority were people with bad reputations and criminal records’.

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individuals opposed to the socialists. In the case o f the shop­ keepers o f Ferrara this was not an intim idation designed to enforce enrolm ent in the leagues, but sim ilar action was to be taken in other cases where adhesion to the leagues was the factor o f param ount im portance. O n m any occasions in 1919 and 1920 the discipline o f which Zirardini spoke was the disci­ pline o f the violently disposed m any against the relatively defenceless few.1 O n ly in the town itself were there continued stirrings against this socialist dom ination. T h e Gazzetta carried on w ith its cam paign o f protest against the excesses o f the leagues and repeatedly exhorted the governm ent to act against the tyranny it saw in the countryside. Follow ing the terrors o f the ‘cost o f living* riots, however, the tone o f the Gazzetta changed sig­ nificantly. W hile continuing w ith its appeals for governm ent intervention, the paper o f the agrari began to bring the argu­ ment nearer home. Now it was argued that the people o f Ferrara— m any o f them undoubtedly horrified by the events o f Ju ly— should begin to consider taking the initiative in the struggle with socialism. A ll honest an d free citizen s should on ce m ore fin d th e courage necessary to m ake th eir ow n ideas felt. T h e y should organ ize an d p rep are them selves to stan d up to both th e obvious an d th e h idden threats an d rem em ber th a t i f th ey d o n ot succeed in doin g this, th eir position w ill w orsen every d a y u n til it becom es un bearable.*

This call to action had obvious reference to the forthcom ing elections. A t this stage, the landowners still placed a great deal o f faith in the powers o f a reconstituted central governm ent; none the less the appeal for a personal response o f the citizens carried the overtones, characteristic o f the agrari, o f self-help and self-protection when the norm al processes o f provincial and national governm ent failed to intervene in their favour. Even before this appeal, G aggioli had been m aking contacts which m ight have resulted in the formation o f some kind o f anti-socialist organization. W hatever his position had been in M arch w ith respect to the Fasci di Com battim ento, by early Ju ly G aggioli was evidently in full contact w ith the Central Com m ittee. O n 30 Ju ly, Celso M olisi and Giurin from the M ilan Central Com m ittee visited Ferrara, and it is probable 1 For further examples o f socialist intim idation, see below, p. * Gazzetta Ferrarese, 26 Aug. 1919.

97-

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that G aggioli met them. His activities were curtailed almost im m ediately by ill health, however. He wrote to M olisi on 4 Ju ly explaining that he was forced for reasons o f health to leave Ferrara, and inform ing him that he was handing over the tessere and programmes relating to the Fascio di Com batti­ mento to an associate, Renzo V a lli.1 Despite accounts to the contrary,12*it seems unlikely that the visit o f M orisi and G iurin really did result in the constitution o f a fascio in Ferrara. In early August G aggioli again wrote to M orisi, enclosing an article which explained w hy nothing was happening in Ferrara; at the bottom o f the letter, in a different hand, was written ‘Send Ferrari to constitute the fascio. Send him on io August* .# Y et it is clear that this did not happen. T h e lack o f activity was confirmed in Septem ber when Um berto Pasella, secretary o f the Central Com m ittee, made a suggestion to Renzo V a lli. ‘W hy don’t you get to work to found a fascio at Ferrara? There are some good people there who could be called to a meeting. W e would send one o f our speakers to help form the Fascio di Combattimento.* A gain the offer was made to send l’A w . Ferrari. It was hoped that in this w ay Ferrara m ight yet be represented at the approaching convention in Florence.4* The advice was taken and a meeting held, but no representative o f the M ilan Com m ittee appeared, and nothing could be agreed.8 Pasella responded to this news by fixing a new date for a meeting, 26 September, and promising that this tim e he would be there him self to see to the constitution o f a fascio. In fact, the gathering never took place. Renzo V a lli confessed, with evident embarrassment, on the 18th: A s far as the constitution o f a fascio a t F errara is concerned, it’s ve ry d ifficu lt for a va riety o f reasons. . . . th e constitution o f th e fascio is n o t possible. S everal hours ago, I tried b y m eans o f in vitation s to form the basis for a fascio. E veryth in g seem ed to be goin g w ell bu t in the end th e m eeting failed . T h a t is w h at I m ust te ll you in a ll sincerity.* 1 A C S , M ostra della rivoluzione fascista (hereafter M R F ), b. 102 *C.C. Ferrara’, 4 July 1919. * See M . Giam paoli, op. cit., p. 202; G . Chiurco, Storia della rivoluzione fascista (Florence 1929), 1, p. 156. * A C S , M R F, b. 102 ‘C .C . Ferrara'; Gaggioli to M orisi, dated 'August 1919’. 4 A C S , ibid., 5 Sept. 1919. * A C S , ibid., 9 Sept. 1919. * A C S , ibid., 18 Sept. 1919; Pasella’s proposal for the meeting is contained in a letter o f 15 Sept., in the same source.

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C ontact was not lost im m ediately because o f this, however. T h e O ctober convention o f the fasci did include a representative from Ferrara, the ex-syndicalist Pilo R uggeri.1 Even in Novem ­ ber, an announcem ent appeared in the Gazzetta on behalf o f a Fascio di Com battenti [sic], advising people that the request for donations put out by another Fascio di Com battim ento had nothing to do w ith them .8 W hatever organizations these were, they were clearly unofficial as far as the Central Com ­ mittee was concerned. I f a sm all nucleus o f futurists and arditi did rem ain together in some unaffiliated fascio, as seems pos­ sible, they kept very quiet. As elsewhere, after Novem ber, the fascisti were reduced to insignificance. It was a notable failure. O f all the attem pts m ade during 1919 to establish a group which had some connection w ith the old interventionist cause, the fascio was perhaps the least successful. A t least the U nione Socialista Italiana had enjoyed a lim ited follow ing for some tim e, w hile the associations for combattenti continued to m aintain a m oderate membership. T h e failure was not entirely the result o f lack o f interest. T h e num ber o f copies o f the M ilan journal II Fascio ordered in Septem ber was increased from tw enty to eig h ty;8 the atten­ dance at the m eeting reported on 9 Septem ber was sufficiently large to w arrant the reunion being called successful. M uch more, it was a question o f the circumstances o f m id-1919. W ith a program m e which was closely linked to that o f the U nione Italiano del Lavoro, G aggioli and his companions could scarcely hope to win the sym pathy o f the Gazzetta; ideas o f class collaboration or o f an independent syndicalist opposition to official socialism had received very little support during 1919 from the m iddle class o f Ferrara. R ather, given the nature o f its program me, the fascio could only hope to recruit a follow ing from the various components o f the interventionist left— from republicans, independent socialists o f the Unione Socialista, and from the U .I.L . itself. Y et the fascio was no more welcom ed on the left than on the right. Both the interventionist left and the clerico-m oderate and nationalist right pursued their chosen paths, both still convinced that existing political form ations were adequate for the task o f resisting socialism and 1 G iam paoli, op. cit., p. 248. * Gazzetta Ferrarese, 4 N ov. 1919. * A C S , M R F , b. 102, ‘C . C . Ferrara’ , 18 Sept. 1919.

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that the fascio could serve no function. Even the U .I.L . in the province remained uninterested by the proposed fascio. There is no record o f its leader, Rom ualdo Rossi, com m itting him self in any w ay to the projected movement. Significantly it was precisely the people without parties who played the leading role and showed the most interest— the arditi, like G aggioli, determined to retain their separate identity even after the war, and the former syndicalists like T ito A guiari and Pilo R uggeri who remained isolated after their commitment to intervention. The m ajority o f the ex-combattenti^ who m ight have formed the basis o f a fascio, were already divided between the socialists and the right-wing Associazione Nazionale dei Com battenti and had no intention o f abandoning allegiances already formed. In theory there was no real conflict here. The M ilan organ­ ization described itself as a movement and not as a party, and welcomed adhesions from people who retained membership o f other parties. This position as the ‘anti-party’ was to be very useful to the fascist movement until the m iddle o f 1921. But in Ferrara it seems, at least at first, to have been a position which hindered rather than helped the establishment o f a fascio. For those who still believed that the actions o f the existing political parties were all im portant, there appeared to be little point in joining a movement w ith ill-defined aims, led by a man w ith as dubious a reputation as M ussolini. T h e com­ battenti organizations o f Ferrara existed for a practical purpose— to help m utilated and unemployed ex-servicemen, and were not overtly political. T h e fascio appeared to fall somewhere be­ tween two stools, being neither welfare organization nor political party. Even for those prepared to countenance the constitution o f the fascio, this indeterm inate position proved to be something o f a stum bling-block. It was a problem o f inter­ pretation. Just as in M arch and A pril it was not at all clear w hat people intended by their adhesions to the m eeting o f Piazza San Sepolcro, so in Ferrara in September adhesion to a fascio did not signify any one opinion which all adherents shared. Thus A guiari, one o f those instrumental in attem pting to erect a provincial fascio, brought a critical response from Pasella by w riting: ‘It is not im portant that in the rural centres there should be specifically fascist organizations. W hat is im portant at the moment is that the program me o f the fascio

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should triumph. Isn't that rig h t? '1 For him the prospects o f the movement were in any case strictly lim ited. It was neces­ sary to act one w ay or the other im m ediately because ‘after the elections the life o f the fasci w ill be finished’ .8 W hen one o f the most devoted supporters was so uncertain o f precisely w hat was required by the Central Com m ittee, it is hardly rem arkable that agreement could not be reached among sympathizers w ith M ussolini’s movement. W hile favouring the aims o f the fasd , few were ready to com m it themselves to becoming members o f a fascio. Renzo V a lli reported that, o f the people he had can­ vassed, ‘individually they accept our program me, but when it's a question o f form ing part o f a group, they begin to drift aw ay'.8 For most people, other groups existed, better established, more clearly com mitted. T h e confusions o f the fascist movement could scarcely be given whole-hearted support at such a critical time. T h e ferraresi were evidently not alone in this assessment. T h e trajectory followed by the fascist movement in Ferrara in 1919 was common to m any other centres. A ccording to the figures o f the M ilan Central Com m ittee, only thirty-one fasci, w ith a total o f 870 members, were still in existence at the end o f 1919. This compares w ith the seventy fasci announced as constituted in the columns o f II Popolo d’Italia before the end o f August. O f the thirty-one still rem aining, it is estimated that less than a dozen were really functioning.1*4* T h e extent o f the failure in Ferrara was revealed all the more clearly by the positions taken up to fight the political elections o f November. T h e pressure o f the elections, far from pushing would-be fascists and left-wing interventionists together, sim ply form alized the breach between them. The socialists o f the U .S .I. and the republicans preferred to attem pt to run their own list in certain areas rather than join w ith other inter­ ventionist forces.8 Those sym pathetic to the fascist movement, on the other hand, gravitated rapidly towards the Blocco Nazionale sponsored by the Gazzetta, and described by the republican paper, La Fronda, as being ‘radico-liberale-agrario'.6* 1 A C S , ibid., 9 Sept. 1919. * A C S , ibid. ' A C S , ibid., 18 Sept. 1919. 4 For these figures and conclusions, see R . De Felice, Mussolini il rivoluzionario 1883-19SO (Turin, 1965), pp. 510 ff. * Gazzetta Ferrame, 6 O ct. 1919. * Ibid., 37 O ct. 1919, reproduced from La Fronda o f 26 O ct.

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In fact, the Blocco, being far more ‘liberale-agrario’ than it was radical, represented very much the interests o f the rural and urban bourgeoisie who had succeeded so often up to that point in sending a conservative to M ontecitorio. It included in its list such men as Pietro Sitta, the liberal deputy elected in M osti’s place in 1914, R affaele M azzanti, reformist socialist director o f m any o f the co-operatives in the province— a man with views so moderate that he was an acceptable companion o f the proprietors— and Alberto V erdi, described by the Gazzetta (of which he was editor) as a ‘distinguished and courageous publicist*,1 and not as leader o f the nationalist group in the town, his other main concern. A t first sight, the support o f such a bloc by those who had attem pted to set up a fascio adhering to a published programme so much to the left appears anomalous. Y et the apparent anom aly reveals a further reason for the initial difficulties in form ing a fascio. Although certainly radical in the sense o f w anting im portant changes in the political structure o f the nation, those most disposed to support a fascio— the futurists, some o f the arditi, and the ex-syndicalists— were sufficiently anti-socialist and nationalist to find m any friends among the right. It was the Gazzetta that published a long article about Italo Balbo and his appointm ent to be editor o f the Alpino, the newspaper o f the arditi, and which welcomed Balbo’s call for renewed anti-socialist activity with ‘lively satisfaction’.* Support for the arditi from such quarters, plainly designed to woo the anti-socialist vote for the bloc, must have confirmed the suspicions o f m any o f the independent socialists, that, whatever G aggioli and his associates m ight say, their sympathies and their friends were really on the right. These suspicions can only have been strengthened by the fascist endorsement o f the invasion o f Fium e, welcomed in general by the nationalists and the more right-wing interventionists. The would-be fascists could justify their position sim ply on the grounds that, in the absence o f agreement with left-wing interventionists, their only chance o f pursuing a patriotic, anti-socialist policy lay with supporting the bloccardi, like them or not. T o run alone would have been quite impossible. This was a position 1 Ibid., 27 O ct. 1919. * Ibid., 22 Sept. 1919. Balbo was at Udine at this time according to his own account, Diario, p. 7.

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which had been stated w ith force by M ichele Bianchi at the O ctober congress o f the fasci. Possibly thinking at that moment o f his forthcom ing candidature at Ferrara as a member o f the bloc, Bianchi argued that the fascists could not afford to shun the right. W h at substantial reason determ ines th a t th e righ t-w in g interventionists should be exclu ded from an electoral a llia n ce? I ’ve no p articu la r reason for friendship w ith th e righ t-w in g interventionists, an d no m otive for personal dislike o f th e left-w in g interventionists. B u t to b e sincere in the ch oice . . . i f an aut aut w ere proposed an d it becam e necessary to choose betw een the one an d the oth er, w e o f the fa s c i. . . co u ld not forget certain cam paigns to renounce th e gains o f the w a r.1

Here revealing once again the strong nationalist sentiment he had shown in 19 11, Bianchi stood in Ferrara as an independent socialist. In reality, both he and the people closest to the fasci in the province had less in common with the socialists than with the conservative and nationalist bourgeoisie and combattenti who made up the rest o f the Blocco Nazionale. Nevertheless, faced with the dislocation o f 1919 and the widespread desire for change, the Blocco was forced to put forward a programme aimed at collecting votes among those who desired radical reform without socialist government. It was suggested that a thoroughgoing legal reform should be considered in order to bring the legal code up to date; that the bureaucracy should be reorganized, and that state pensions should be granted to those unable to work or above a certain age. A reform o f the Senate was proposed, by which it would become the representative body o f the syndicates, and the votes o f the lower-paid workers were further courted by suggestions that special bodies should be set up to deal with unemploy­ ment, and that w ar profits should be heavily taxed and a process o f redistribution o f w ealth begun.2 Y et, despite these vote-catching proposals, popular particularly to the excombattenti, the programme put forward in speeches and news­ paper articles was more simple— opposition to the socialists and maintenance o f the gains o f the w ar. Bianchi, in a speech reported in early November, concentrated entirely on the w ar and the position taken up by the socialists in relation to the 1 M . Bianchi, I Discorsi « gii Scritti (Rome, 1931), pp. 41 ff.; reproduced in R . D e Felice, Mussolini il rivoluzionario, p. 569. * Programme put forward in Gazzetta Ferrarese, 37 O ct. 1919.

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war and its achievements. No mention was made o f the detailed programme o f the bloc, nor did he speak o f the fasci, a fair indication that the movement had made little progress in the province.1 The Gazzetta stressed the same themes, rem inding its readers particularly o f the horrors o f socialism. It published an appeal to the esercenti and commercianti o f Ferrara, asking them to remember the threats and menaces o f the past and urging them to stand firm. ‘T o vote united and disciplined today means for the shopkeepers not so much to participate in a political demonstration as t o m a k e a s t r o n g a s s e r t io n o f t h e i r GLASS.* V ictory for the bloc, they were advised, would also be a victory for the merchants and shop­ keepers o f Ferrara. Otherwise they would rem ain ‘people without value and without defence’.* Ostensibly radical, the bloccardi were here revealing their true colours. In offering to protect a group which, along with the landed proprietors, must have gained greatly from the difficult conditions o f the w ar and post-war years, they demonstrated how litde their reforming spirit was a serious attem pt to come to terms w ith the problems o f the period. This was not lost on the socialists, o f course. W ell aware o f the true state o f affairs, they mounted a full-scale attack on the pretensions o f the bloc. Pietro Sitta was denounced for being a member o f the Fascio Parlam entare, ‘that is, o f that political group that has the greatest responsibility for the disasters we have suffered*, w hile the candidature o f Bianchi was greeted w ith wonderment, doubtless fairly genuine, that a man so com pletely discredited in the province could have the nerve to show his face again, particularly as a colleague o f those proprietors he had spent so much tim e attacking.8 This of­ fensive was also extended to the Partito Popolare (P .P .I.), the newly-founded catholic party. According to the socialists, 1 Programme put forward in Gazzetta Ferrarese, 8 Nov. 1919. * Ibid., 16 Nov. 1919. • Bianchi was unpopular for reasons other than the failure o f the syndicalist movement with which he had been associated. He treated his wife, a ferrarese, so badly that it created a public scandal when she died in 1913; see G. Bardellini, DalVofficina a Palazzo Madama (Bologna, 1964), pp. 37-41. In addition, he had also gained a reputation for political unreliability. His election expenses for the 1913 election, when he had stood as an anti-libico in Ferrara, were reported by one Guido T orti to have been paid by Ercole M osti, the radical, pro-Libya, candidate. Bianchi’s transfer o f his votes to M osti in the post-electoral ballottaggio created the impression that he had in effect accepted a bribe; see the Scintilla, 1 N ov. 1919.

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popolari and agrari were Working hand in hand in an attem pt to frustrate the P .S .I. in their desire to take over the entire representation o f the province.1 Judged by the standards o f the P .P .I. left w ing, such a claim would have seemed ridiculous. In fact, in Ferrara there was more than an element o f truth in the accusation. The catholic bourgeoisie o f the town was intensely conservative, and no doubt embarrassed by the apparent radicalism o f the Blocco. Centred around Count G iovanni Grosoli Pironi, owner o f the catholic trust o f papers, the clerical movement bore few o f the marks o f that ‘white socialism* it had acquired in areas such as Crem ona. Grosoli him self was both landowner and a member o f the P .P .I. ; other proprietors must have found it difficult to choose between the bloc and the catholic party, since the interests o f the two groups in Ferrara had traditionally been identical.8 O utside the town, little headw ay had been m ade against the enormously strong grip o f the socialists. T h e tradition o f anti-clericalism , especially strong am ong the lower-paid agricultural workers, made it difficult for the P .P .I. to gain anything but the lim ited support o f certain o f the coloni. T h e catholic appeal was, in any case, always more real for these people; in 1920, o f the 944,812 members o f the ‘w hite’ federation o f workers, only 94,961 were salariati.8 T h e socialists had grounds for their attacks, therefore. Significantly, neither the Gazzetta nor the represen­ tatives o f the Blocco N azionale m ade any attacks on the popolari— a point not missed by the socialists. It seemed that neither conservative group felt the need to take issue w ith the position taken up by their form er colleagues in the other. In the event, only proportional representation saved bloccardi and catholics from com plete obliteration. T h e elections gave the socialists in the Ferrara-R ovigo circoscrizione 78,794 votes against the 15,064 o f the Blocco and the 14,217 o f the P .P .I.1*4*O f the eight deputies returned, six were socialist, one liberal, and 1 Scintilla, I N ov. 1919. * For the traditional link between Grosoli and the catholics, and the larger landowners, see R overi, Socialismo e sindacalismo, p. 368. T alking o f the 1913 elections, Roveri refers to the clerico-moderate bloc as ‘agrario-grosoliano’, a bloc which ‘in Ferrara represented a kind o f Patto Gentiioni ante-litteram'. * A . Serpieri, La guerra e le classi rurali italiane (Bari, 1930), pp. 280-3. 4 Election figures as reported by the Gazzetta Ferrarese, 18 N ov. 1919, the Scintilla, ag N ov. 1919.

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one popolare.l T h e votes from the province o f Ferrara alone indicated an even more severe defeat for the m oderate and conservative groups. T h e socialists gained 43,726 votes, w hile the bloc and the catholic party polled respectively only 6,939 and 7,360. O n ly in Cento, the stronghold o f the mezzadri and small landowners, and in Com acchio, where the U .I.L . still kept control, did the socialists fail to reduce the vote against them to negligible proportions. O f the preference votes N iccolai topped the poll w ith more than 23,000. Sitta for the bloc and M erlin for the P .P .I. cam e close w ith 6,498 and 5,827 votes respectively. M ichele Bianchi, so unpopular that he had decided to leave the province before the d ay o f the election, gathered only 918 preference votes, the worst result o f any o f the candidates. It was a victory w hich the socialists rightly claim ed to be a rout for the other parties. Com parisons w ith 1913 elections revealed that the anti-socialist vote had declined, despite an increase in the electorate.2 This was even more true in the town than in the rural areas. W hereas the clerico-m oderate can­ didate o f 1913 had gathered 5,491 votes in the town, the com­ bined vote o f bloccardi and catholics in 1919 was only 5,138. Against this the socialists had polled 11*530, to be com pared w ith a com bined syndicalist-socialist vote in 1913 o f only 3,602. C learly the creation o f the P .P .I. had somewhat dis­ sipated the strength o f the conservative forces, splitting clerical and agrarian interests w hich together would have m ade a much better showing under the proportional system. But, from any point o f view , the superior organization o f the socialists had served to neutralize the efforts o f the interventionists to m ain­ tain a front against them . Patriotic combattenti, nationalists, dem ocrats, and conservatives, could not even dom inate the socialists w ithin their ow n centre, let alone in the communes outside the town. T h eir position appeared sim ply ridiculous when com pared w ith the enormous follow ing o f the Cam era del Lavoro. Even those in the province who were caught up w ith the movement o f the fasci had no effect. T h eir attem pts to 1 H ie socialist deputies returned were: N iccolai, Trevisani, M arangoni (from Ferrara), M atteotti, G allani, Beghi (from R ovigo). Pietro Sitta (liberal) and M erlin (popolare from Rovigo) were also returned; ibid. 1 T h e non-socialist vote in 1913, including that o f the radical M osti (3,426) was 23,451 ; R overi, Socialismo e sindacalismo, p. 384. This compares w ith 15,299 o f the U oc and P .P .I. in 1919.

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influence m atters, apparently by some form o f intim idation, were dismissed by the Scintillât as it rejoiced that ‘the banditismo o f M ussolini has m et the same fate as its Ferrarese brother*.1

*11

1 Scintilla, 22 N ov. 191g; article entitled, Banditismo fascista sbaragliato’ . In M ilan the fascists received only 4,657 votes from a total electorate o f some 270,000; see R . De Felice, Mussolini il rivoluzionario, p. 572.

4

M ID D LE -C LA SS A T T IT U D E S AND SO C IA LIST A D M IN IST R A T IO N N o v e m b e r 1919 appeared to have destroyed the interven­ tionist group for ever. W hile M ussolini licked his wounds in M ilan and Avanti! ironically reported the sighting o f his putrifying corpse in the river,1 conservatives, catholics, and moderates in Ferrara could do little but look with apprehension at the staggering socialist m ajority. Nor was there reassurance to be had from the national results, the socialists winning 156 seats against the fifty-two they had held in 1913. Thus, in the months following the election, political activity on the part o f the former bloccardi was virtually abandoned. Prefect G iuffrida informed his superiors that, 'in all the communes the parties o f order are beginning to break up’ .8 T h e stage seemed set at last for the dictatorship o f the proletariat, w ith Zirardini, N iccolai, and M arangoni the representatives o f the victorious people. Y et, w hatever else the electoral trium ph m ight bring for the party and the Cam era del Lavoro, it could not rem ove the hostility o f those who had always been among the bitterest opponents o f the socialists, the town bourgeoisie. O n the contrary, their hostility, if it was less clearly directed into identifiable political channels after the defeat, was only in­ tensified by the developm ent o f the threat. No one was more aware o f this threat than the prefect, and no one better repre­ sented the attitudes o f the bourgeoisie than he. From the time when, in late 1917, he had joined with the patriotic citizens in their denunciations o f defeatism to the time o f his effusive praise for N itti’s repressive measures in the face o f the 'cost o f 1 Tasca, Nascita e avvento delfascismo, p. 3. * A C S , Presidenza del Consiglio, 1922, 1; 1/1 ; 1832 ‘G iuffrida’. G iuffrida to N itti, 18 Jan. 1920. (This particular source w ill hereafter be indicated as Presi­ denza, 'G iuffrida', with the appropriate date.)

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living* riots in 1919,1 G iuffrida had m ade his position abun­ dan tly clear. In doing so» he had doubtless surprised nobody. Alm ost by definition conservative and traditionalist, the prefect» w ith his overriding preoccupation for public order» could be relied upon to be habitually suspicious o f labour movements and occupationally incapable o f seeing change as anything but decay. G iuffrida was no exception to the rule. From his point o f view» he had certain justifications for his attitudes. T h e socialists in Ferrara had been his principal preoccupation since his arrival. A s opponents o f the war» they had presented a direct challenge to him as adm inistrator o f a w ar zone; as agitators for econom ic im provem ents, they had provided the greatest problem for the m aintenance o f public order. T h e natural allies for him in his trials were those people who were also threatened by socialism, and who w ere, happily enough, also those most socially acceptable to the senior governm ent official in the province. T o this extent, when G iuffrida ex­ pressed opinions about the situation he spoke not only for him­ self but also for those landowners, bank managers, lawyers, university and school teachers, and other bourgeoisie who resented the socialist dom ination o f the province. Cited by the prefect am ong ‘the better elements in the town*, for exam ple, was the deputy Pietro Sitta, interventionist, clerico-m oderate, and form er rettore magnifico o f the university o f Ferrara.2 A s G iuffrida’s exasperation reached a peak at the end o f 1919 and socialist pressure forced him to defend him self and to attack his opponents in return, it was for these people that he was speaking. Behind the professional concerns o f the adminis­ trator can be detected ju st those convictions and attitudes w hich explained w hy a m inority could never concede that its defeat was final. T h e problem facing both bourgeoisie and prefect was, superficially at least, one o f public order, the decline o f w hich threatened vested econom ic interests and prefectorial reputation alike. Put at its lowest it was a m atter o f the suppression o f the more unwelcom e actions o f the leagues, the boycotts, rickbum ings, and assaults which were liable to push the situation

*23

1 A C S , ibid., document dated corn*, which from internal evidence must be 22 Dec. 1919. G iuffrida says, o f the policies o f June 1919, was among the very first to welcome in your Excellency that determ ination to make the guiding hand o f the state really felt*. * A C S , ibid., 18 Jan. 1920.

*1

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beyond control. M atters were serious w ell before the election. In August G iuffrida listed the most common weapons em ployed by the leagues: ‘T h ey are always more ready to stoop to acts o f intim idation and violence; boycotts, fines against the pro­ prietors, claim s to exclude independent labourers from work . . .’ * Agitators— like Ercole Bucco— were working in the province to produce an incendiary situation. ‘T h e opinion is widespread that private property must be smashed*, wrote the prefect in the same report. B y Decem ber he was aw are that killings could not be far aw ay, a particular tragedy he felt because ‘deep down the population is good*, exploited largely by a few unscrupulous leaders, who were too often perm itted to impose their w ill by violence and intim idation.8 Frequently the socialists appeared unconcerned about the provocations they offered to their opponents. T h e red flag hung from the balcony o f the Castello in the centre o f Ferrara and was felt by the authorities to be an open invitation to violence. T h ey removed it, despite protests from the provincial adm inistration that they should be perm itted to do as they pleased w ith their official premises.1*3 Actions o f this kind, not directly illegal but likely to provoke illegal actions, were a m ajor concern for the prefect. He felt he was on a knife edge: ‘A moment o f hesitation in the psychological conditions left by poisonous propaganda and the electoral struggle and the province w ill be lost ir­ rem ediably and for m any years.’ 4 His only response, and one w ith which he was not very happy, was to increase the vigilance o f the police forces under his control. E qually difficult to deal w ith was the alleged m ishandling o f business by the provincial adm inistration. It was at this point that the exclusiveness o f the socialists rankled most, since posts previously open to com petition were now filled b y members o f the party. According to G iuffrida, the priorities o f the socialist leaders were clear: ‘W e must give jobs to the organizers and pay them out o f provincial funds.’ 5 M oney 1 A C S , M in. Int., D G PS, A G R 1919, b. 40, 25 Aug. 1919. * A C S , ibid., 1920, b. 50, 17 Dec. 1919. * For the question o f the alleged misuse o f the Castello degli Estensi see A C S , Presidenza, 'G iuffrida’, 18 Jan. 1920; and A C S , D G PS (1914-26) A G R 1921» b. 77B, 5 M ar. 1920. 4 A C S , M in. Int., D G PS, A G R 1920, b. 50, 17 Dec. 1919. * A C S , Presidenza, 'G iuffrida’, 22 Dec. 1919. A ll examples in this paragraph are drawn from this document.

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intended for the widows and orphans o f combattenti was re­ allocated to the financing o f the U fficio del Lavoro on the grounds that this was o f equal benefit to the bereaved, al­ though non-socialist labour was evidendy excluded where possible. It was, in short, a question o f the socialists using the powers o f the state for their own benefit, with less regard for the w ell-being o f the generalità than G iuffrida would have liked. Propaganda was paid for out o f provincial funds, w hile the provincial party was represented at socialist committees throughout Italy w ith the expenses o f the local representative paid by the adm inistration. T h e irony o f this, in G iuffrida’s eyes, was that m any o f the socialist voters made no contribution to the provincial finances, being below the level o f taxation. Everything that was done by the socialist adm inistration was, therefore, Tor the benefit o f their supporters, paid for w ith the m oney o f the taxpayers who have property, but decided by electors w ho don’t pay anything*. T h e socialists voted them­ selves expenses, increased wages for certain categories o f provincial employees, and took all the holidays they could— civil, religious, socialist, and even the pernicious sabato inglese. Public expenditure was greatly increased, to the extent that the prefect had become convinced that the adm inistration was totally incom petent. ‘T h e socialists know that they do not have people either suited or com petent for public positions,* he wrote. Instead they were taking on people known to be ex­ tremists and given to violence, this in itself seen as a threat to public order. In the interests o f everyone, G iuffrida counselled the dissolution o f the provincial adm inistration. It m ight not be opportune for the governm ent, he recognized, but for him ‘the moment would always be the right one*, a sentiment doubtless echoed by all those who saw their m oney going into the pockets o f their enemies and their opportunities for jobs on the ad­ m inistration destroyed because o f political conviction. I f it had been sim ply a m atter o f lawlessness and adminis­ trative favouritism and incom petence, efficient police action and persistent representations by the prefect m ight have been adequate to m eet the situation. In fact, m any people recog­ nized that something more was going on, that rick-burning and partisan bureaucracy were m erely the visible mani­ festations o f a very considerable challenge to the existing order. In one respect at least, prefect and bourgeoisie did not have the

8o

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same interests. G iuffrida did not regard it as his duty to protect the economic interests o f the merchants and proprietors from legitim ate agitation. W here both cam e together to form a conservative front against the socialist pressures was in recog­ nition o f the im plications o f economic agitation. From the tim e o f the disturbances o f Ju ly, it had been m ade increasingly obvious that the real aims o f the socialist leaders were political rather than purely economic. Ercole Bucco, for exam ple, was reported by the sub-prefect to be m aking deliberately exorbitant demands in order that the relations between labourers and proprietors should be further em bittered.1 This was evidently part o f the cam paign to make the political aspirations o f the socialists more readily acceptable to the agricultural workers. G iuffrida had been aware o f this tactic for some tim e. H e saw that the danger was that the strength o f the leagues in economic matters was gradually being extended to the point where the socialist hierarchy would exert a jurisdiction over the province entirely o f its own creation and largely independent o f the existing powers o f the state. A lready a belief in the im m unity o f the socialists from police action was developing: B y now it is a com m on b e lie f am ong th e people th at th e y are ab le an d h ave th e righ t to do a n y th in g; th at th ey ca n cou n t on im p u n ity, th a t th ey d o n ot h av e to be a fraid o f arrests or le g a l p ro ced u re; th a t it is enough to b rin g everyone o u t in to th e streets to h ave th eir ow n w ay.*

A t times even, it seemed that there were two laws in the land, one for socialists and one for others. According to G iuffrida, the socialists ‘do not appeal to the common law , but to a law o f their own*.* W hat others could not do to them, they could do to others. In support o f this claim , he was able to cite the Scintilla, which m ade clear the socialist position over the out­ going adm inistration at Gom acchio: ‘I f the law protects people like that, then clearly we have the right to tram ple on it in the name o f a higher m orality,*4 G iuffrida had no doubt where this was leading; ‘the tactics o f the socialist party aim tout court to take possession o f the powers o f the state.*5 It was for this reason that it was essential 1 A C S , M in. Int., D G PS, A G R 1919, b. 58, 11 June 1919. 1 A C S , Presidenza, ‘ Giuffrida’, 22 D ec. 1919. * A C S , ibid. 4 Scintilla, 13 Dec. 1919, quoted in A C S , M in. Int., D G PS, A G R , 1920, b. 50, dated sim ply ‘December 1919*. * A C S , Presidenza, ‘Giuffrida*, 18 Jan. 1920.

M ID D LE-G LASS A T T IT U D E S

8i

to interpret correctly the m eaning o f the frequent strikes. For the prefect, ‘the political strike is becom ing an insurrectionist device*.1 A process o f erosion o f state power was taking place w hich had to be halted. H e constantly repeated his opinion that ‘the subversives are living at the expense o f the powers o f the state*.8 A lready in Ferrara the process had gone a long w ay; w hat existed, G iuffrida m aintained was ‘a real dictatorship o f the proletariat, a soviet*.8 C learly he felt that he was sitting on a powder keg. H e even feared for his own safety at times, observing that the m oat around the castle ’still full o f water* m ight provide a convenient w ay for the socialist adm inistration, housed w ith him in the castle, to elim inate unwelcom e residents.4 But he argued that there was little he could do about it, both because the socialists were too strong to be effectively opposed, and because he had not in any case adequate powers to deal w ith them. This last point was a persistent lam ent. In August he had w ritten a sharp note to his ministry, com plaining about the tendency o f the tim es: 'F or some tim e it has been norm al practice to take aw ay from the prefects their powers in every branch o f political and social activity. It is a mistake, it does damage.* W hen things becam e difficult, he pointed out, people still ran to the prefect, but by then it was too late; ‘m iracles are not things o f our times’ .6 In Decem ber he was equally o f the opinion that the only rem edy for the situation was energetic repression o f the socialists, and was bold enough to urge N itti to return to the stronger tacdcs o f the m iddle o f the year. ‘T h e authority o f the state must reassert its power, otherwise it w ill not be able to stand up before the mob*.6 H esitation could only lead to anarchy since, if the socialists could control local events w ith perfect ease, they w ould have no need to take notice o f the ministries in Rom e. It was evident that, despite these appeals, he was not optim istic. By the end o f the year more than a slight tone o f the m artyr foreseeing his fate had crept into the reports. It would be very easy, he adm itted, to engage in a ‘com fortable surrender to the extrem ist parties*, but his conscience w ould not perm it this. ‘It is not a question o f tact nor o f m oderation. It is a state o f 1 ACS, * ACS, * ACS, * ACS,

ibid., 22 D ec. 1919. ' A C S , ibid. ibid., 18 Jan. 1920. 4 A C S , ibid. M in. Int. D G PS, A G R 1919, b. 40, 25 A ug. 1919. Preaidenza, ‘G iuffrida’, 22 D ec. 1919.

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mind which has to be overcom e and I believe, modestly, that I am doing m y duty— even by sacrificing myself.*1 W hen the prefect began to see his task as being the changing o f the attitudes o f mind o f the m ajority o f his province, he was plainly in fairly deep water. H e m ight, indeed, have been more profitably em ployed exam ining his own attitudes. M any o f his statements make it clear that hostility to the socialists was not entirely the result o f the difficulties which they presented to him or to the control o f the state. Connected to these problems, but distinct from them, was the problem o f a hierarchical society w hich was threatened w ith being turned upside down. G iuffrida never tired o f asking how the socialists could be perm itted to rem ain in power since they did not know how to behave as public officials had always behaved. T h e castle, given to the province for preservation as a national monument, now had ‘V iva il socialismo* scrawled on its walls in luminous paint, and was regularly dom inated by the red flag. Inside the castle matters were worse: ‘In the castle, in that m agnificent hall painted by the m agic brush o f the Dossi— all the tim e, day and night, reunions and working-class meetings.* H e included w ith this dispatch a newspaper cutting in w hich it was revealed that the castle had become the ‘ branch office o f the Cam era del Lavoro*. T h e socialists had even held a banquet in those same m agnifi­ cent halls, and at the head o f the table had been placed, ‘to give a proletarian look*, the portiere o f the castle. O bviously there was a certain m alicious delight for the socialists in using places w hich had previously been the preserve o f the higher bourgeoisie, but there was no reason w hy they should not. A t least they provoked the prefect into re­ vealing his double standard. H e reported, w ith evident in­ tention o f dem onstrating the irrationality o f socialist pretensions, their answers to his com plaints: ‘they say, the signori did it, we can do it as well*. This was, in fact, quite reasonable. Y et G iuffrida, able to convince him self that previous administrations really had operated in the interests o f the generalità, never showed the least awareness o f the possibility that the socialists were doing no more and no less for their own supporters than the liberal, clerico-m oderate administrations had done for the proprietors and the bourgeoisie. For him, socialists were sub1 A C S , ibid.

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versives, the red flag was ‘that rag', and flying it was ‘public insult to the state’ .1 W hen attitudes were expressed in this w ay, prefectorial im partiality becam e an obvious sham. I f the prefect had real problems to deal w ith, and it cannot be disputed that his situation was extrem ely difficult, these problems were m agni­ fied m any times by the distorting effect o f social prejudice. M uch the same can be said o f the landowners and m iddle class o f the town, although they, o f course, laid no claim to im ­ partiality. Convinced that social revolution was on the w ay, they becam e incapable o f distinguishing between the real and the im agined situation. U nhappily for the socialists, the intoxication o f successful strike action, a powerful organization, and electoral trium ph, caused certain o f the leaders to adopt positions and use lan­ guage which could only increase fear and hostility among their opponents. O n occasions, this was undoubtedly deliberate, a gentle turning o f the knife in the wound o f those who had been happy to exploit the labourers for so long. But the behaviour o f the socialists, whether deliberate or not, whether correctly viewed or not, had dangerous results for them. Indifferent as they m ight be to the attitudes o f the agrari and the m iddle class, they failed to realize that they alienated the civil authorities at their peril. A t the beginning o f 1920, it is a failure which can be understood; nothing stood in their w ay, all opposition appeared to have been shattered. The prefect, certainly an arch-rcpresentative o f the old order, could therefore be offended and ridiculed at leisure. Even the police could be subjected to the same treatm ent. H ated by the agricultural workers for their violent and sometimes bloody actions against strikers, the police began to suffer for the almost com plete socialist control o f the outlying areas o f the province. In February, for exam ple, five carabinieri were severely beaten up by socialists at Fossanova.2 I f the socialists really did aim at the peaceful takeover o f power, ‘revolutionary n o t . . . anarchist or insurrectionary’, as Zirardini claim ed,8 then the unnecessary alienation o f the police and civil authorities could only m ake 1 AG S, ibid., 18 Jan. 1920. T he whole paragraph is based on this document. * Gazzetta Ferrarese, 8 M ar. 1920. * Scintilla, 27 Sept. 1919. Quoted from Zirardini’s motion at the provincial congress.

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their task more difficult. T h e language and postures o f revolution were valid only if it could be assumed that very shortly all those people offended would be o f no im portance. W ithout the action, w ithout even the peaceful revolution, they rem ained to be reckoned w ith. Before the end o f 1920, this was to be a lesson the socialists learned to their cost.

5 TR IU M PH AND U N C E R T A IN T Y : P R O V IN C IA L SO C IA L ISM FR O M N O V E M B E R 1 9 1 9 T O S E P T E M B E R 1920 A f t e r the elections, w ith their clear message that the socialists and popolari had been elected because o f a desire for social change, m any o f those defeated decided on a tim ely retirem ent from the political scene. T h e prefect’s report that the ‘parties o f order’ were dissolving throughout the province was a fair indication o f this. Further opposition appeared pointless w ithout some new and vitalizin g elem ent to inspire it. G iuffrida, less ready to concede defeat than he was to denigrate the socialists, attem pted to explain the poor showing o f the bloccardi by references to socialist intim idation o f the voters. H e claim ed that as a result o f system atic attem pts to prevent pre-election meetings o f Sitta, the liberal bloccardo, and C alzolari, the catholic party’s candidate, the m ajority o f the more conservative voters had found it expedient to ignore the election. Those th at had gone to the polling stations had been forced to vote outside the booths, or else had been accom panied in the booths b y a representative o f the socialists. Some voters had even been m arched to the stations w ith their hands above their heads.1 This was no doubt true; indeed, the socialists were not at pains to deny it.2 None the less it could hardly be adduced as evidence that the socialist victory was not in large measure a genuine reflection o f public opinion. Despite the prefect’s continued protestations about the dangers o f the situation and his persistent pleas for a policy o f repression, those who w ith­ drew from politics dem onstrated that they had a clearer con­ ception o f how m atters really stood in the province. Intim idation or not, the election was a massive trium ph for the P .S .I., and no 1 A C S , M in. Int., D G PS, A G R 1919, b. 47, 6 Dec. 1919. * Scintilla, I Nov. 1919. Talking o f the bloccardi candidates, the newspaper said, 'T h e champions o f political morality will never talk in public. It’s guaranteed.’

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isolated trium ph. Param ount in the political field, the socialists were soon to occupy the same position in the economic sphere. It was a success all the more telling for having been achieved without any compromise over ultim ate aims. W hatever else M ichele Bianchi had done to deserve the contem pt o f the ferraresi, he had not been mistaken about the key factors in the struggle, nor about the tactics necessary to defeat the pro­ prietors. It was on lines laid down by him that the post-war batdes were to be fought and won. W hile it had been obvious, even to the Pasellas, that nothing could be achieved w ithout solidarity among the agricultural labour force, the stress w hich Bianchi had placed on the securing o f the power o f collocamento for the leagues was to be recognized as justified in later years. Zirardini was equally aware that the control o f employm ent was the pivot around which the labour movement turned. O n the one hand it com pelled labourers to join the leagues if they wanted to w ork; on the other it gave the leagues the whiphand over the proprietors, no longer able to ignore the leagues and em ploy blackleg labour. Uffici di collocamentot only partially effective in 1919, were o f param ount im portance in organizing the braccianti. W here they were less successful was in dealing w ith the interm ediate classes o f coloni, traditionally divided in their loyalties between the employers whose exploitation was often recognized and the labourers whose support on occasions could be useful to them. Bianchi had again given the lead over this problem , refusing to continue the policy o f attacking all employers, large and small, and hoping, by welcom ing those mezzadri who were prepared to enter the leagues, to present a stronger front to the agrari. This did not im ply acceptance o f sharecropping as a perm anent feature o f provincial agri­ culture; the reasoning was rather that strength gained by any means brought the economic organization nearer to its aim o f controlling the use o f the land. W hen this was achieved, the difficulties presented by the coloni could be settled w ith ease. Som ewhat paradoxically, since in 1919 everyone could see how these difficulties would be solved, it was the coloni who provided a further trium ph for the socialists. Despite the fact that the Cam era del Lavoro remained set on its policy o f ultim ate collectivization o f the lan d 1 m any mezzadri and piccoli 1 See, for example, Rinaldo Rigola in Bandiera Socialista, 5 July 1919: ‘The Federazione della Terra is decidedly for a collective regime.’ Ferrate was, if any­ thing, more extreme than the Federterra directorate.

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Ö7

affittuari appeared set on hastening their downfall by apply­ ing for membership o f the socialist organizations.1 Mezzadri o f Poggio Renatico and Sant*Agostino, encouraged by the great gains made for the landless labourers, joined the Cam era in June o f 1919.* It was reported that the mezzadri o f the mediaferrarese had obtained better terms because o f the solidarity o f the lowest-paid workers.* C learly an effort was being made to woo these people, not without opposition from certain quarters, however. Before the provincial congress o f the Cam era del Lavoro, correspondence began to build up in the socialist paper about the advisability o f including coloni, particularly affittuari, in the ranks o f the movement. Some were fearful o f the consequences: ‘It would constitute a serious danger if within the organization o f the mezzadri and the bovai were to infiltrate the class o f the affittuari, a class which always has interests in permanent contradiction with those o f our organ­ izations.’ 4 It was argued that if the affittuari were really con­ vinced o f the virtues o f socialism they had sim ply to w ait until their leases expired and then become ordinary agricultural labourers, at which time they would find the doors o f the leagues open to them. Others argued, w ith reason, that this was too much to expect. It was true, they conceded, that the leaseholders had always been the bulwark o f the proprietors, but this was all the more reason for taking them into the Cam era. The principle was sim ply stated: ‘T ear from the landowners a category o f labourers and direct them along the real path o f the class struggle and proletarian em ancipation.’ 6 The attractions o f such a victory over the landowners proved too great to be resisted. W hen it was made clear that adhesions to the Cam era from w hatever source would be welcome, work was started to construct an association which m ight further strengthen the ranks o f the socialists. In Decem ber a congress was held o f m any o f the mezzadri, piccoli affittuari, and piccoli proprietari o f the province. It was decided that a provincial federation should be established to include all these categories, and that the federation should adhere to both Cam era and the national federation o f agricultural workers, Federterra. 1 For further observations on the attitudes of these intermediate agricultural classes, see Chapter 7, below. 1 Scintilla, g Aug. 1919; the paper reported that these two groups had been 'members of the Camera del Lavoro for two months’. * Ibid. * Ibid., 23 Aug. 1919. * Ibid., 6 Sept. 1919.

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Difficulties inherent in this alliance were dismissed as un­ im portant: ‘The conflict o f interest between braccianti and coloni is o f an absolutely transitory and secondary nature*.1 Instead it was asserted that the interm ediate categories had ‘their natural place among all the agricultural workers*.8 Although it included by no means all the coloni o f the pro­ vince, the federation was to prove a tremendous asset for the leagues. Its establishment had taken place at a most convenient time for the Cam era, giving it a far stronger hand in the re­ negotiation o f the agricultural pacts due to expire at the end o f February 1920. In the past the mezzadri in particular had always proved poor allies, easily seduced from the front opposing the landowners by the offer o f a modest increase in their share o f the crop. T h eir adhesion to the Cam era del Lavoro and to Federterra promised better things from them. It could be reliably assumed, as the possibilities o f strike action were considered, that the sharecroppers would stand firm er on the next occasion, and that the liberty o f the proprietors to undermine the strike movement would be substantially curtailed. Adherence to the Cam era did at least mean that negotiations w ith a consider­ able body o f the coloni would be carried out through the agency o f the socialist leaders, able to m anipulate the federation very m uch as they found necessary for the broader aims o f the strike action.* T h e great strike o f 1920 was called on 24 February. Nego­ tiations about a new pact had been proceeding for several days, but it had been clear from the end o f the previous year that an accom m odation could never be reached w ithout considerable pressure being applied to the proprietors. T h e screw was turned ju st at the right moment for the socialists, the strike call m eaning that all sowing o f hemp and sugar beet was suspended. From the beginning, the proprietors had been more or less half-hearted in their attempts to resist the demands o f the Cam era. There were no attempts to raise blackleg labour to com bat the strike— only protests about the suffering o f animals abandoned in the stalls, and indignation about the rickburning which accom panied the strike.4 Probably the land1 Scintilla, 20 Dec. 1919. * Gazzetta Ferrarese, 15 Dec. 1919. ' The M ay 1920 congress of the Camera del Lavoro put the number o f coloni adhering to it at 4,664, o f whom the majority would certainly be mezzadri. Scintilla, 22 M ay 1920. 4 ibid., 6 M ar. 1920. T he socialist paper claimed, with remarkable sang-froid, that the rick-burnings had resulted from the carelessness o f the proprietors.

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Ö9 owners recognized from the beginning that they would be com pelled to give w ay.1 In face o f the enormously effective organization o f the workers, there was little likelihood o f any other outcome without the massive intervention o f state authority. This was not forthcom ing.8 Zirardini was corres­ pondingly confident o f victory. W riting on 5 M arch, he con­ cluded that success could not be far aw ay, both because the prefect was not present in the negotiations, a point considered to be in favour o f the socialists, and because the strikers were united as never before. ‘A victory which w ill not elude them since the mezzadri are showing solidarity with the avventizi, in this w ay bringing about the union o f all the exploited which is the guarantee o f success for the proletarian cause.*8 His confidence proved to be fully justified. O n 6 M arch the proprietors conceded defeat on all points. Requests for in­ creased wage rates were accepted in full. M ore im portant for the Cam era, the pact stipulated fundamental changes in the system o f recruitm ent and employment o f labour in the pro­ vince. Proprietors agreed to recognize the uffici di collocamento, staffed entirely by representatives o f the labourers, and to deal exclusively with these uffici when w anting labour. T h ey agreed that the category o f fixed labourers, the obbligati, should cease to exist, these workers to be treated no differently from the avventizi. For the winter months, always the most difficult time for the lowest paid workers, they accepted w hat was un­ doubtedly the most bitter pill to swallow, the establishment o f an imponibile di mano d'opera. This required that all employers, whether proprietors or affittuari, should take five labourers for every 30 hectares o f cultivable land in their possession during the months from Novem ber to A pril. Nor was there to be escaping from these terms by w ay o f separate negotiations with individual leagues. T h e pact was established for the first time on a provincial basis and stipulated a uniform enforcement throughout the province. A n y problems relating to its operation were to be referred to an arbitration committee composed o f two representatives o f both Cam era and Agrarian Association, and presided over by a fifth member acceptable to both sides.4 1 This view is expressed in F. Pittorru, 'Origini del fascismo ferrarese', in Emilia,

32 (October 1951), 293 ff. * See below, Chapter 6, p. 108. * Scintilla, 6 M ar. 1920. 4 A C S , Min. Int., D G PS, A G R 1920, b. 50,6 Mar. 1920; also Scintilla, 10 July 1920, when Zirardini recapitulates on the gains made in March, and Pittorru, 'Origini del fascismo ferrarese’, p. 293.

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Doubts about the reality o f the socialist success could no longer be entertained after M arch, even by the prefect. G iuffrida was reduced to com plaining that he had been deserted by overcom pliant proprietors, foolish enough to sign aw ay their liberty and their profits for the com ing two years.1 This was by no means an unreal assessment o f the results o f the agreem ent. In simple m onetary terms the labourers had gained a great deal from increased rates.8 Equally they had gained some security that they would be able to enjoy those rates. Control o f colloca­ mento meant a fair distribution o f work among all workers, while the imponibile made it less likely that they would be forced to depend on their savings and on subsidies during the bad winter months. M ore serious for the proprietors, m any o f them doubtless able to withstand a reduction in profits w ithout falling below the breadline, was the curtailm ent o f their liberty to recruit and employ as they liked. Astute m anoeuvring before the w ar, com bined with tactical errors on the part o f the socialists, had always perm itted the agrari to avoid conceding to the socialists a monopolistic control o f labour. Forced at last into the com er from which there was no escape, they had finally capitulated, fully aware that this gave the Cam era power to dictate conditions o f work, wage rates, even, if they so desired, the choice o f crop. T h e prefect recognized w hat had happened, protesting that, ‘the agrari have almost com pletely lost the right to choose or place their labourers’ .8 Even the obbligati, so useful as a means o f breaking the unity o f the strikers, were no more. T h e proprietors could do little more than provide the capital, until such time as socialist threats o f collectivization were carried out and even that privilege taken from them. Control by the Cam era was so com plete that even compartecipazione, previously assumed to be a tactic o f the landowners, was no longer feared. Zirardini m aintained that, providing land to be worked at compartecipazione was distributed by the socialists themselves, it should be seen as no more than ‘an anticipation o f the control and possession o f the land by those who work it*.1*3 4 T w o months later, the colora who had adhered to the socialist 1 A C S, Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1920, b. 50, 14 M ar. 1920. * A C S, ibid., 6 M ar. 1920. 3 A C S, ibid., 14 Mar. 1920. 4 Preti, Le lotte agrarie, p. 391.

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organization, hoping to em ulate the success o f the avventizi, also determined to take the necessary measures to secure for them­ selves a more favourable capitolato. D eclaring in their pro­ vincial congress that w hat they sought was a more human style o f life, the mezzadri, affittuari, and piccoli proprietari o f the socialist Provincial Federation o f these categories initiated negotiations through the socialist leaders for a new agreem ent.1 The extent to which this Federation had quickly gained the confidence o f the socialist directorate is illustrated by the readiness with which the Cam era took up negotiations, and then, seeing that the proprietors intended to stall until the harvests were past and the coloni put into a weaker position, called for a general strike o f all agricultural workers in support o f their claim . It was support apparently in open contrast with the socialist policy o f working for the abolition o f the coloni. Y et the co-operative attitude o f these workers during the early months o f 1920 had brought about a slight modi­ fication in the position o f the Cam era. Although eventual abolition was still the declared aim , it was recognized that this was best achieved through the protection o f those coloni who were prepared to support the socialist cause, while at the same tim e attacking those who were not and preventing any extension o f the system. O n the whole, therefore, demands were not made on behalf o f the interm ediate agricultural classes in order that the sharecropping system should become uneconom ic. The response o f the owners to such a situation was in any case unpredictable. It was not at all clear that the mezzadri would be dismissed and sent to join the ranks o f the braccianti. T h ey m ight be offered leases or even the opportunity o f buying a small section o f land. Support for sharecroppers and leaseholders was much more an indication that their presence in the front presented to the agrari was extrem ely valuable, and worth this slight deviation from declared policy. T h e socialist coloni sub­ scribed to this interpretation, being prepared themselves to vote a motion urging action to prevent any increase in the number o f mezzadri and to disrupt the activities o f those not belonging to the Federation.2 In the event, solidarity again 1 Scintilla, I M ay 1920; report on the provincial congress o f the Federazione Provinciale dei Mezzadri, Piccoli Affittuari, e Piccoli Proprietari, held 15 Apr. * A C S , Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1920, b. 50, 8 M ay 1920. Circular from the Camera del Lavoro signed by Giulio Guglielmini on behalf o f the Federation of the coloni.

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proved a great benefit. T h e demands o f the mezzadri were accepted in full, often involving the concession o f a share o f the crop well in excess o f 50 per cent.1 Com pared with the struggles taking place in the neighbouring province o f Bologna, this was dom inance indeed. Both brac­ cianti and mezzadri had finally achieved w hat m any had worked for twenty years to obtain. Even the co-operatives which had been developing on lines independent o f the main socialist movement since the outbreak o f the w ar were brought back under the control o f the Cam era. It was argued in late 1919 that there could be no further justification for the independence o f the co-operatives, particularly independence under the control o f the interventionist and bloccardo Raffaele M azzand. But whatever his faults, M azzand was able to provide the Cam era with an organizadon which was financially sound and well administered. His conception o f co-operation was de­ nounced as being purely economista and insufficiently political, yet it was an approach w hich, because o f its m oderation, had perm itted access to valuable sources o f credit at the catholic Piccolo Credito bank, and had resulted in the establishment o f some thirty-six co-operatives in the province.8 M azzanti’s rem oval in O ctober 19198 enabled the socialist organizers to intensify activity in this direction, and by Ju ly 1920 they were able to announce that a further ten co-operatives had been formed while others remained in the process o f formation.4 For the Cam era, the purpose o f the co-operatives at this stage was chiefly educational. Alfeo Liporesi, technical director o f the Consorzio di Produzione e Lavoro, expressed the hope that experience in co-operative ventures would allow the socialists to perfect ‘the technique and the discipline o f the workers in order that the inevitable socialist future finds us prepared for popular management’ .6 Asserting control as they did on so m any bodies within the province, the Ferrara socialists found themselves in a position second to none in Italy. The pacts already concluded were the 1 Gazzetta Ferrarese, 6 July 1910. * M uch of this account is based on R . Sitti and I. Marighelli, Un secolo di storia del movimento co-operativo ferrarese (Rome, i960), pp. 71-83. This work categorizes the co-ops as follows: 18 produzione e lavoro, 13 agricole, 5 consumo. * Scintilla, i l Oct. 1919. 4 Ibid., 17 July 1920. 4 R . Sitti and I. Marighelli, op. cit., p. 80.

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most favourable obtained in any region ;1 the membership o f the economic organization was higher than any other in Italy. In m id M ay 1920, the first provincial congress o f the leagues 'after the uniting o f the proletariat* was held. It was announced that the num ber o f tessere taken out stood at 81,006, and it was calculated that the real strength o f the movement stood at about 90,000. O f those enrolled, 55,735 were agricultural workers, 4,664 were members o f the Federation o f M ezzadri, A ffittuari, and Piccoli Proprietari, and 13,637 were so-called industrial workers, that is the artisans, tradesmen, and crafts­ men at the com munal officine.12 These figures represented an expansion little short o f phenomenal. O n ly once before— in 1907— had the organization been able to claim more than 35,000 members. T h e growth in numbers had taken place w ith steadily growing momentum from the end o f the w ar. In June 1919, Federterra had recorded 25,257 organized workers in the Cam era Provinciale,3 w hile Zirardini had reported a total o f 40,000 in August.4*T h e six branches o f the Cam era all reported vast increases in membership. Particularly strong were the organizations o f Copparo and Codigoro,6 while the commune o f Ferrara boasted almost a third o f the total membership w ith 25,480 enrolled, mostly gathered from the sm all settlements im m ediately surrounding the town. This was a situation w hich seemed calculated to generate optimism am ong the socialist rank and file. T h e revolution they had been promised during 1919 could not now be far aw ay, nor did it seem that it could be resisted by their opponents. Feeling o f this kind was especially strong because the provincial 1 F. P in om i, loc. cit., p. 293; 'In no other part o f Italy had the agricultural proletariat succeeded in extracting such advantageous conditions from the class of the employers.' See also L . Preti, op. cit., p. 427; speaking o f Bologna and the socialist success in that province, Preti expresses the opinion that ‘In no other province, except perhaps Ferrara, did they control the situation with such cer­ tainty’ . * Scintilla, 22 M ay 1920. T he discrepancy between the total o f the individual categories and the grand total was explained by the fact that many workers had not bothered to renew their tessera for 1920. It was assumed that they would do so as the old tessera expired. Argentina Altobelli of Federterra, in a memorial for the Congresso Intemazionale dei Lavoratori della Terra held in Amsterdam in August 1920, quoted the figure of 74,720 for Ferrara. This was the highest figure for any province in Italy. See R . Zangheri, Lotte agrarie in Italia 1901-26, pp. 389 ff. * Zangheri, op. cit., pp. 258 ff. 4 See above, p. 63. * Scintilla, 22 M ay 1920; Codigoro 10,421 and Copparo 13,863.

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labour movement had never been allowed to doubt w hat kind o f a revolution was com ing. In the com pany o f m any other ‘m axim alists', the socialist leaders o f Ferrara had persistently stressed that political gains were only secondary to economic control and would not bring the socialist state any nearer. This was at least partially a result o f the dilatory behaviour o f the central party directorate which prompted considerable im ­ patience at the provincial level. Before the Bologna congress o f 1919, Autunno R ava, editor o f the Scintilla, had stated in his paper w hat was clearly the mood o f the moment in the province. T h e p arty spends its tim e splitting hairs about form ulae w hich w e now believe to be superseded. Reform ism , revolution? But these definitions belong to prehistoric times. T h e centre o f p olitical grav ity has m oved from the political clu b to the league. A n exam ple is our province. T h e political or­ ganizations no longer have either the ab ility or the com petence to deal w ith econom ic an d class questions.1

This was a fairly dam ning indictm ent o f the P .S .I. and its leaders, nor was it a view changed by the more extreme position taken up by the congress. Shortly after it was over, the Scintilla again published an attack on the party, this time by Enrico Leone. ‘The political party ought finally to have the courage to adm it that it is not adapted to take on the historical task o f the passage from the old to the new regim e.'8 Since it was precisely in the field o f the sindacati that the Ferrara movement was strong, there was little disposition to question this reasoning. Advocates o f a policy less localized and more in accord with the moderate position o f someone like T u rati found it difficult to get a hearing. The party as such had only a lim ited membership in the province. In M arch 1920, the congress o f the local sections o f the P .S.I. revealed that there were only 2,171 m em bers;8 the speeches indicated that the leaders o f the provincial party were finding it very hard to avoid trim ming their sails to suit the wind whipped up by the Cam era del Lavoro. Attem pts to spell out the political im pli­ cations o f the economic gains were destined to fall on d eaf ears. In A pril and M ay the Cam era pressed on with its policy o f establishing economic control o f the province in the belief that the road to revolution lay along the w ay o f purely local victory. T h e M ay congress determined to constitute ‘il Com 1 Scintilla, 20 Sept. 1919; 'Avanti il sindacato’. 1 Ibid., 4 Oct. 1919. ' Ibid., 6 Mar. 192Q.

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missariato del Popolo* in order to give some reality to sanctions imposed on merchants thought guilty o f exploiting the con­ sumers.1 Controversy continued over how the soviets and workers* councils were to be set up, and no agreement could be reached.8 Revolution, apparently so near in Ferrara, seemed liable to make such discussions academ ic in any case. O ther, less acceptable results followed from the conviction that the pre-revolutionary phase had already begun. W ielding the power that they did, some socialist organizers became in­ creasingly indiscriminate in exploiting the position they enjoyed. Often it seems the capolega, besides denying the im portance o f the political party, also came very close to denying that any­ thing had im portance except his own undisputed control o f a section. I f the revolution had not come yet— and to m any o f the inhabitants o f certain areas it must have seemed that it had— then the language, the postures, above all the power o f the capolega would m aintain a political temperature conducive to the seizure o f the revolutionary moment when it came. From this revolutionary fervour sprang much o f the violence o f the leagues. Certain socialists made no secret o f their willingness to adopt violent tactics when necessary. Ghelandi, the porter o f the castle in Ferrara, is quoted by the prefect as saying: ‘Do as I do. I always put m yself at the front o f the column o f demonstrators and march straight ahead, even using violence against those who w ant to stop m e.’ 8 T h e political clim ate was in any case liable to encourage the use o f violence. Not only had the psychology o f wartim e had its effect on people who had returned from the front, but periods o f economic struggle had almost always produced a violent response from certain o f the landless workers or from the troops employed to control agitation. T o some extent this trait had been encouraged by the syndicalists o f the pre-war Cam era del Lavoro, and they had always found ready m aterial. Dangerous before the w ar because they were frequently desperate, m any o f the braccianti, were likely to be equally dangerous in 1919 and 1920 when they found that, for the first time, they could act against their opponents w ith relative im punity. M any years o f deprivation 1 A C S, Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1920, b. 64, cutting from La Provincia di Ferrara, 17 M ay ig20. * See Scintilla for April and M ay 1920, passim. • A C S , Presidenza, 1922, 1; 1/1; 1832, 'Giuffrida', 18 Jan. 1920.

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and exploitation were not readily forgotten, even in the year when conditions becam e better. Nevertheless accounts o f socialist violence should be treated w ith some caution. The desire o f the fascists to m agnify the extent o f the ‘tyranny’ from which they claim ed to have saved Italy resulted in much exaggeration and distortion o f w hat went on in the years im m ediately after the w ar. It has to be recognized that the two principal weapons o f the leagues, the boycott and the fine, were non-violent weapons. Intim idation and extortion they m ight be, but only when they were backed up by rick-burning, the m aim ing o f animals, or physical assault, can they be viewed as violent actions. O ften the pressure o f violence was not neces­ sary; a rigid boycott could achieve the desired ends, if a little more slowly. Luigi Preti has warned against giving credence to the picture o f these years painted in the ‘dark colours’ o f the bourgeoisie,1 a picture carefully produced to justify the violence o f the fascists themselves. It is a legitim ate w arning to make, yet Preti is inclined to go to the other extreme. A ccepting that there was considerable violence in the province— he writes, ‘the violence o f the leagues reached its peak in the province o f Ferrara**— he attempts to shift the responsibility for the violence, suggesting that it lay chiefly with the ‘leagues o f the periphery’ 8 presum ably because they were not w ell controlled by the Cam era Provinciale. There is little evidence to support this suggestion. O n the contrary, the prefect provides w ell documented accounts o f incidents involving violence w hich can hardly be said to have occurred on the periphery o f the province. H e reports incidents at Tam ara, V igarano M ainarda, and Porotto, respectively 14, 11, and 6 kilometres from Ferrara itself. Furtherm ore it has to be said that the provincial direc­ torate on no occasion in 1920 denounced the violence w hich was taking place. Capilega, whether in central or outlying areas, could hardly feel themselves restricted by this apparent in­ difference. W here violence did occur it was related m uch more to a change o f tactics in 1920 than to position in the province. Intim idation directed at avventizi during 1919 was less likely to require the use o f force than was found to be necessary when 1 Preti, Le lotte agrarie, p. 423. * Ibid., p. 425. * Ibid.: ‘But the victorious conclusion of the agitation was not enough to calm the leagues of the periphery . . . '

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attention was turned to proprietors and affittuari during 1920. As the consolidation o f the leagues was achieved, it was the efforts o f certain o f the proprietors to extend the system o f share-cropping by creating new mezzadri which became one o f the principal concerns o f the socialists. By 1920 this stage o f thé conflict had reached its height. It meant, o f course, that the leagues were liable to encounter much greater resistance from those determined to do as they liked with their land, and that, when forced to it, the actions o f the socialists could be cor­ respondingly more extreme. T h e worst actions o f 1919 and 1920 all fall within this pattern. It was the opposition o f certain members o f the inter­ mediate agricultural classes which provoked the most severe reprisals, and, in general, this resistance was encountered much more after M arch 1920 when the socialists felt able to concen­ trate their efforts on the areas in which they were not entirely dom inant. T h e attempts o f rag. V ittorio Pedriali o f Tam ara (Copparo) to lease his lands to twenty-five families were made quite vain by the response o f the leagues. T h e families who took the land were rigidly boycotted from the start. It became impossible for them to find anyone who would perform the least service for them, neither barber, nor tailor, neither shoe­ maker, nor grocer. Fires were started on their holdings and animals either killed or maimed.1 The tenants themselves were threatened w ith death if they refused to accept the discipline o f the leagues, and m any o f them were eventually severely beaten up by irate leghisti.* T h e prefect wrote in August 1920 that only four o f the original tenants had rem ained loyal to Pedriali. O ne o f these had taken to protecting him self and his fam ily w ith a gun.3 This was characteristic o f a general deterioration in the situation in m id 1920 as the proprietors made efforts to under­ mine the dominance o f the leagues. A t Berra, for instance, the league condemned one Luigi Bonati to be boycotted for life 1 This account comes from I. E. Tornello, Il tramonto delle baronie rossey p. ioo. Obviously a committed supporter of the fascists, Torsiello’s evidence is none the less frequently substantiated by other accounts in prefectorial reports and in news­ papers. 1 Report of these incidents is given in a letter from the non-socialist provincial federation of piccoli proprietari ed affittuari, Ferrara, to the Minister of Agriculture, subsequently confirmed by the prefect. A C S, Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1920, b. 50, 28 M ay and 2 Aug. 1920. • A C S , ibid., 2 Aug. 1920.

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because he had bought a sm allholding with the intention o f cultivating it himself.1 There was no possible response to this except to leave the province or to try to meet the predictable assaults o f the socialists. Alfredo V olta o f San Bartolomeo in Bosco attempted to set up a club with nationalist leanings. As a result his father was boycotted until such time as he should decide to throw his son out o f the house. His crops rotted in the fields.2 As the prefect had observed in Decóm ber o f 1919, killings were not far away. T h ey came in Ju ly when two socialists were shot dead by coloni during a gunfight arising from charges o f strike-breaking. It was the kind o f incident the prefects had feared. D e Carlo reported that, at the beginning o f July, armed squads o f socialists were patrolling the province to enforce the general strike. ‘Numerous large squads o f “ red’* cyclists armed w ith cudgels are scouring the countryside, forcing people to abandon stalls and other agricultural w ork.’8 O ther casualties occurred at this time. A t Copparo, an affittuario, R oncaglia, refused to leave the animals he was guarding and was shot dead. Again at Copparo, two brothers Colcetti, also leaseholders, were gravely wounded by socialist squads.4 A n affittuario wounded at M asi Torello died shortly after receiving injuries, and a gun battle at M olinellina between another leaseholder and leghisti brought injuries but no deaths.5 T h e prefect telegraphed for urgent reinforcements to his police and even requested 1,000 troops to meet the em ergency,4 but for several days the efforts o f the existing forces proved quite inadequate, and the province was out o f control. Prefect D e Carlo described ‘columns o f hundreds o f armed leghisti who have committed and are com m itting serious crimes against persons and property. There are dead and injured among the agrari and various cases o f unlawful restraint o f persons.’ 7 H ardly surprisingly, the proprietors conceded defeat against the strikers almost im m ediately. Despite these excesses, it remains true that in general the leagues were able to control their localities by having resort only to the threats o f boycotts and fines. V irtu al local dic­ tatorships were established w ith these weapons, and it was

is

1 Torsiello, op. cit., p. 66. * Gazzetta Ferrarese, 31 Aug. 1920. * A C S, Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1920, b. 50, 1 and 2 July 1920. T he quotation fr o m I July. 4 A C S , ibid., 2 July 1920. 6 A C S , ibid., 3 July 1920. 4 A C S, ibid., 30 June and 2 July 1920. 7 A CS, ibid., 3 July 1920.

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rarely necessary to resort to more severe expedients. A t Berra, for exam ple, the capolega forbade parents to take their children to the church to be christened, and warned that all those who attended church or any religious event would be boycotted and prevented from working.1 The league at Cona dictated the days on which young people could dance, decided when the puppet theatre could give performances, and com pelled all enrolled in the leagues to subscribe to the socialist daily paper.* Offences against these regulations m ight be punished with fines, and, in the case o f non-payment, followed by boycotts. Y et, judging by the vast amounts o f money collected through fines,* it was rarely necessary to go beyond these measures. W hen it was determined that a stiffer punishment should be given, the aim was likely to be that o f com pelling the offender to leave the province. Physical violence against property might w ell be used to this end. Against persons violence was used only unusually and then often in face o f violent resistance to the leagues, or, as in the events o f early Ju ly 1920, during the course o f a strike when violence against those considered strike­ breakers was a relatively normal practice. Excesses were, in any case, often spontaneous actions o f the leghisti and not ordered, if condoned by the capilega— themselves, as Preti suggests, given more to rhetoric than to revolution.4 It was rhetoric o f this kind that began to trouble certain o f the directors o f the Cam era del Lavoro during 1920. The pre­ revolutionary mood which produced violence and excessive authoritarianism on the part o f the leagues was also capable o f producing restlessness, im patience, and ultim ately disillusion among the supporters o f the Cam era. The same copy o f the Scintilla which carried the report o f the favourable settlement to the M arch strike also reported a warning from N iccolai that the future was not going to be easy for the party. He stressed in particular his belief that a major danger lay in ‘the wide­ spread opinion among the working people that the revolution w ill occur within a very short tim e’ .5 This warning produced an animated discussion over the next months as the more far1 Gazzetta Ferrarese, 22 M ay 1920, for the ban on christening: Tondello, Il tramonto delle baronie rossey p. 66, for the more general warning against church­ going. 1 Cited in Preti, Le lotte agrarie, p. 424. 3 For examples, see ibid., p. 422, and Tondello, op. cit., pp. 74-102. 4 Preti, op. cit., p. 423. 6 Scintilla, 6 Mar. 1920.

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sighted o f the provincial leaders began to see the difficulties involved in changing w hat had been a movement o f resistance to the landowners into an organization which could itself m anage to command the process o f production. Some recog­ nized the folly o f perpetually exciting the labourers to anticipate revolution and then telling them to calm down again because the right moment had not come. Others m aintained that, w hile it was true that education was first needed before the economic organizations could really manage on their own, it was none the less essential that revolutionary spirit should be kept at a high level in order that the revolutionary moment m ight be exploited when it occurred.1 B y the end o f Ju ly the paralysis o f the movement, caught between promises and their realization, was giving cause for alarm . Outside the province the existence o f a more determined resistance 'to socialism was already apparent. In Turin, in M arch, the industrialists had taken up the challenge o f the metalworkers’ strike and effectively defeated it; in Naples strikes o f both metalworkers and public-transport employees were opposed and the strikers worn down; in Bologna there were no signs that the agrari were prepared to give in to the demands o f the socialist strikers as they had done in Ferrara. A s discussion within the province continued, those able to detach themselves from the rhetoric o f the local organizers saw that the debate was no longer about tactics but about whether or not the socialist party and its economic organization were to survive. A lda Costa, one o f the more influential socialists o f the province, aroused dism ay with an article bitterly critical o f the lack o f determined direction in the party. She recalled that, after the congress o f Bologna in 1919, the great m ajority o f the socialists had come aw ay with the belief that the violent action necessary to destroy the power o f the bourgeoisie was imminent. But since then, she com plained, nothing had hap­ pened. T h e indecision o f the directorate was killing any spirit o f discipline within the party. W hile some supporters becam e w ilder and more extreme, others began to desire nothing more than a quiet life in which they m ight enjoy the benefits gained from recent agitation. No one could be surprised that there was confusion, she argued, when the deputies appeared to deny the 1 For this debate see the Scintilla of late March and April, particularly the corre­ spondence between Ettore Casoni, the moderate, and Ezio Villani.

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need for reform because the revolution was near, and yet continued to work for reforms w hich the supporters were supposed to welcome. ‘In this w ay we are going ahead at random , today for the revolution, tomorrow— it m ay w ell be— for a legalitarian reform, dissipating all our enthusiasm.' T he results o f the vacillation were evident in w hat she termed the decline o f the spirit o f self-sacrifice among the people and the growth o f a false conception o f w hat constituted a revolution. It was too com monly thought that m aking a revolution m eant simply to substitute ‘the new boss for the old, give the land to the peasants and the factories to the industrial workers’, in her view a recipe for chaos. Above all it was necessary to make some decision. ‘Either reform, or revolution', she concluded, other­ wise the party, promising revolution but working for reform, would sim ply disintegrate.1 The flurry o f debate which followed this sweeping condem­ nation o f the party leaders indicated, on the whole, that the points were not taken. Counsels o f despair were for the faint­ hearted; others would continue to believe that the revolution would m aterialize from the economic transformation effected by the leagues. Y et the seriousness o f the situation was already apparent to those not made blind by their desire not to see. In the m iddle o f August, Giuseppe Gugino, the editor o f the Scintilla and a m an o f much more overtly ‘m axim alist' views than Costa, reiterated m any o f her arguments and her con­ clusions but indicated more specifically the ways in which the party was likely to disintegrate. E ven though w e are not a step nearer to the revolution, even though a con­ dition o f unease is obvious because o f the contradiction betw een our words and our actions, even though the people begin to be disorientated an d dis­ appointed, read y perhaps to finish a t the first opportunity am ong the quick­ sands o f anarchism or in the marshes o f an egoistic corporativism , even though the bourgeoisie is regaining its internal strength and organizing its w hite g u ard against the proletariat w hich has no red guard, T u ra ti can’ t offer us anyth in g better than the old m ethod. A h , no! F or G o d ’s sake!*

This disgust with moderation which with m any was a sign o f indecision was revealed once again in September. M oderate leaders in the province who had sown the wind when it was a 1 This paragraph is based on an article by Alda Costa which appeared in the ScmHUa o f 31 July 1920. * Ibid., 14 Aug. 1920.

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question o f gaining the support o f the mass o f workers, began to reap the whirlwind o f their former demagogy. Zirardini, N iccolai, and Bardellini, explaining w hy they had counselled moderation and caution at the M ilan congress o f the G .G .L . in respect o f the strategy to be followed during the occupation o f the factories, were met by shouts o f disgust from the assembled representatives o f the leagues. ‘W e are ready to make the revolution; it's you leaders who are afraid to assume the responsibility.’ In voting as they had done, it was argued, the leaders had expressed their own views ‘and not those o f the people who were w aiting for the order to pick up their weapons and go out into the streets*.1 Here was the paradox o f the socialist position. H aving achieved so m any o f the immediate aims o f the socialist organizers in agricultural areas— support and control o f the mass o f labourers, a united front, domination o f the pro­ prietors— the Cam era was unable to find the method o f achieving the ultim ate aims. In its drive for economic success it had worked itself into a contradictory position. The solution provided by the syndicates, advocated during 1919 and 1920 to the continual tune o f the denigration o f the political party, proved to be no solution. A further move had to be made if the revolution was really to mean the control o f the economy by the labour organizations; a political decision had to be taken. Y et the directors o f the Cam era del Lavoro showed themselves incapable either o f dampening the revolutionary mood they had aroused in their followers, or o f calling for the achievement o f political control o f the nation. Instead they preferred to look to the party for a decision, while their supporters, con­ vinced for more than a year by these men that the party was an irrelevance, looked to them. The crisis o f confidence which followed, and which brought with it disillusion and despair, was especially serious for these reasons. Pursuing their own solutions with scant regard for the political debates o f the deputies, the socialists had assumed that the local kingdom o f Ferrara could stand on its own. Y et they were only as strong as their local organization. W hen this began to falter it became clear that a price would have to be paid for the violence and extremism o f the pre-revolutionary euphoria, since it was only the revolution itself which could save them from that reckoning. 1 ACS, Min. Int., DG PS, A G R 1920, b. 60, 16 Sept. 1920.

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A t this point the weaknesses inherent in the movement began to show through. The coloni who had enrolled in order to gain better terms began to back aw ay; the braccianti who had thought it expedient to ride the wave o f early 1920 began to look for other alternatives. W hen the Gazzetta Ferrarese took to quoting Filippo T u rati, the message was clear: ‘O ur call to violence w ill be taken up by our enemies, a hundred times better armed than us, and then, farewell for a good while parliam entary action, farewell economic organization, farewell socialist party.’ 1 Socialism, which had achieved so much, was betrayed by the nature o f its success. By September 1920 it was plain that the ‘inevitable socialist future’ was further away than m any had imagined. 1 Gazzetta Ferrarese, 28 Sept. 1920. The quotation was taken from Critica Sociale o f November 1919.

6 TH E B EG IN N IN G S O F R E A C T IO N , S E P T E M B E R 1 9 2 0 — F E B R U A R Y 19 21 I f the summer o f 1920 had seen m any socialists confused and dem oralized, the autumn found them more determined. The approaching adm inistrative elections provided that focus for action which had been lacking since the agitations o f February. Criticism o f the leadership died down as attentions were turned to the task o f winning control o f those communal admini­ strations not yet in the hands o f the socialists. Y et the pro­ gram me drawn up by the provincial congress made it perfectly clear that very few o f the representatives o f the leagues ap­ preciated the delicacy o f the socialist position. T heir response to the vacillations o f the summer and to the failure o f the occupation o f the factories1 was to produce a programme which repeated and compounded the errors o f the past.2 It announced that the socialist party was taking part in the electoral battle ‘w ith the sole aim o f taking control of, and paralysing, all the powers and instruments o f the bourgeois state*, in the belief that these should be placed in the hands o f soviets. It declared that the socialist communes would themselves take on respon­ sibility for public order, and that the creation o f a proletarian m ilitia would also be undertaken. A fter this would come the uprising— ‘an enormous movement o f the people, to replace the prefectures and parliam ent w ith the central committees o f independent socialist communes’. 1 The occupation of the factories made little impact on Ferrara. O nly four estab­ lishments were occupied for fifteen days, the end result being the creation of deep divisions among the industrial workers about the wisdom of Buozzi’s settlement. See R . Sitti and I. Marighelli, Un secolo di storia del movimento cooperativo ferrarese, P- 1 The programme, partially reproduced in both Preti, Le lotte agrarie, p. 426, and A . Serpieri, La guerra e le classi rurali, p. 206, is roundly condemned by the moderate socialist Preti. He writes, ‘ In the history of socialism there is no docu­ ment that reaches the same levels of maximalist infatuation9. The full text of the programme is reproduced in the Gazzetta Ferrarese, 8 Oct. 1920.

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T h e program m e was the most extrem e ever put forward by the socialists in Ferrara. I f the intention had been to offend and frighten as m any people as possible in as short a space as possible, it would have been brilliant. As it was, it frightened the opponents o f socialism w ithout giving party and Federterra supporters any more than the old confhsed rhetoric o f revolution. It was assumed that independent socialist communes could exist before the overthrow o f the central authorities; the opposition o f the M inistry o f the Interior to the creation o f a socialist police force or a socialist m ilitia was not anticipated. T h e final blow, the ‘enormous movement o f the people*, was so vague as to be o f only very lim ited m eaning. In short, the docum ent was a recipe for the disillusion o f the mass o f sup­ porters. It encouraged hopes w hich, even in favourable circumstances, would have been difficult to realize. In the atmosphere o f 1920 it was a docum ent w hich reflected the blindness to reality o f the m ajority and w hich increased the desperation o f the more far-sighted few. Against this background o f increasing ‘maximalism*, and aided by it, the opponents o f the socialists were reorganizing. A lthough the bloccardi o f 1919 had experienced such a com plete defeat, isolated events subsequent to the election suggested that, in the town at least, strong anti-socialist feeling com bined w ith patriotic sentiment could still move a few people to action. Although the ex-combattenti organizations themselves com­ pletely failed to provide any basis for opposition to the Cam era del Lavoro, one o f the principal spokesmen for the combattenti, Professor Francesco Brombin, had succeeded in January 1920 in organizing students to break the postal strike.1 V ery close to him in sentiment, the arditi continued to hold reunions during early 1920,* w hile the republican and futurist ardito O lao G aggioli retained sufficient interest in politics to resign in June from the local section o f the P .R .I. because o f its failure to take the nationalist position over the events surrounding Fiume. G aggioli’s declaration to the republicans left little doubt as to where his sympathies lay or as to where he expected to find support for his point o f view . T h e report o f his resignation, published in II Fascio (M ilan), quoted him as sayin g:3 1 Scintilla, 31 Jan. 1930. * Gazzetta Ferrarese, 19 June 1930. * I l Fascio (Milan), 36 June 1930.

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W e fascists . . . are not afraid to declare w ith M ussolini th at for such tim e as the w ord 'F A T H E R L A N D ' is the principal barrier w h ich divides us fascist arditi and legionarifium ani from the socialists an d anarchists . . . there can be nothing b u t open battle betw een us.

His enthusiasm for the cause o f Fium e prompted him to jo in a deputation to the city which, at the end o f Ju ly, returned with a group o f children sponsored by the Ferrarese organization Pro Bim bi di Fium e. T h e welcom e received by these children from the crowds which turned out to greet them m ay w ell have given food for thought to those who had assumed that the struggle w ith the socialists was already over.1 The attem pt to channel much o f this nationalist feeling into political action came in September. W ith the struggle o f the elections imminent, a meeting was held in mid Septem ber at the house o f Francesco Brom bin; the nine people present decided that an attem pt should be made to reactivate the Fascio di Com battim ento which had made such little progress in the previous year.* For more than a month after this m eeting the situation remained confused. O n ly when, in mid O ctober, the fascio wrote to the Central Com m ittee in M ilan requesting membership cards did the position become clearer. U m berto Pasella replied on behalf o f the Central Com m ittee, pointing out that there was no record o f the formation o f a fascio in Ferrara and stating that membership cards could be provided only for fasci officially constituted.8 G aggioli im m ediately hastened to reassure the Central Com mittee. H e informed Pasella that a fascio had been regularly constituted on io O ctober,4 and wrote an article for II Fascio o f M ilan stating that a Fascio di Com battim ento o f Ferrara— ‘w hich in fact has always existed through the work o f volunteers*— was now officially inaugurated.6 U nlike his efforts o f 1919, G aggioli’s initiative o f 1920 was an im mediate success. He informed Pasella at the end o f O ctober 1 II Fascio (Milan), 28 Aug. 1920. * T he meeting was held on 15 Sept. The nine present were Giuseppe Del Fante, Gualtiero Finzi, (tenenti, artiglieria), Alessandro Del Fante, Guido Felici, O lao Gaggioli, Alberto Montanan, Genunzio Servidori, Vincenzo Simoni (tenenti, Bersaglieri), and Professor Francesco Brombin. Details o f the meeting are carried in a letter written by Servidori, Felici, A . and G. Del Fante, and Giuseppe Martinelli, in Gazzetta Ferrarese, 10 Sept. 1922. * A C S , M R F, b. 102, *C. C . Ferrara', 23 Oct. 1920. 4 A C S, ibid., 25 Oct. 1920. 4 A Fascio, 13 O ct. 1920.

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that the fascio had about 200 members, *a num ber which in a short time w ill certainly grow, given the enthusiasm which the constitution o f the fascio has aroused in Ferrara*.1 O n 13 Decem ber the prefect reported that the organization, ‘rapidly increasing its strength’, could count on nearly 1,000 enrolled.2 As im portant, the fascio represented a very wide section o f the town society. Although the Executive Com m ittee elected in O ctober was composed' largely o f ex-combattenti* .Prefect D e Carlo informed the M inistry o f the Interior that the members o f the fascio were people ‘o f all parties except the socialist*. This last rem ark provides one clue to the problem o f w hy the fascio, which had failed so m iserably in 1919, gained support so rapidly during the last months o f 1920. W hereas in the previous year it had still seemed that an effective opposition to the socialists m ight be best achieved through the traditional parties, by 1920 this belief had largely disappeared. Dem ocratic alternatives to socialism had, during the course o f 1920, become far less credible. Thus people from all parties excepting the socialist were prepared at last to look to the fascio. This was true before the elections o f late O ctober; it was even more true after them, the socialists winning control o f the commune o f Ferrara for the first time. Democrats, liberals, and catholics, recognizing the extreme nature o f the crisis, were ready to try extrem e remedies. Further, those who had previously rejected the fascio because o f the radical nature o f its policies cannot have failed to recognize that the fascism o f 1920 was already very different from that o f 1919. In the M ay congress o f the fasci the social and economic programme remained largely unchanged, at least on paper, but the tone o f m any o f the speeches was very m uch altered. T h e virtues o f the bourg­ eoisie were stressed, rather than the defects; themes o f class collaboration were developed in contrast to w hat were termed the ‘degenerations* o f socialism; and clear signals were made in the direction o f industry w ith references to the need for 1 A C S , M R F , b. 102, *C. C. Ferrara*, 25 Oct. 1920. * A C S , Min. Int. DGPS, A G R 1920, b. 70, 13 Dec. 1920. 9 Eight of the nine members were reduci. The committee members were, A . Del Fante (bersagliere), O . Gaggioli (ardito), A . Montanari (bersagliere), G . Servidori (ibersagliere, invalido di guerra), A . Volta (ardito), C . Pasti (mutilato di guerra), F. Brombin (reduce of infantry unit), and G. Magni. See A C S , M R F, b. 102 ‘C. C. Ferrara*, 25 Oct. 1920 for names; information about war record is drawn from various sources.

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increases production in the economy. For those who looked closely at political developments, this shift towards the right undoubtedly served to lessen suspicions about the intentions o f the fascists.1 For the m ajority, however, it was sufficient that the issue that had dom inated the fascist revival in the province from the start was that o f opposition to socialism. It was this above all that gained the fascists support. It was this that brought them to the attention o f the group that had refused to look at fascism in 1919, the agrari. T h at the large landowners began to interest themselves in the fascio o f Ferrara proved to be a fact o f m ajor im portance, not only for the local organization, but for the fascist movement as a whole. W hy they did so at this point was explained at least in part by the president o f the A grarian Association, V ico M antovani, in 1921. In an interview given to the Resto del Carlino he described the w ay in w hich the proprietors had been forced to revise their political attitudes during 1920. H e pointed out that a m ajor shock had been the position assumed by the authorities during the strike o f February and M arch. T h e land­ owners had been horrified at the state o f affairs reached when ‘an inspector o f the M inistry o f the Interior (Inspector Gaudino) could inform us, w ithout beating about the bush, that the government was in no w ay able to guarantee us the respect o f property or persons.*2 Previous to this, it is clear, the proprietors had assumed that the governm ent would intervene if the demands o f the socialists becam e too severe. T h e events o f February and M arch 1920 had shown them, however, that the governm ent o f N itti was not going to protect them from the economic organization o f the socialists. It seemed that they were condemned, saving new factors, to subm it to a gradual 1 Indicative of this move to the right are the reports from Monza in April 1920 that fascists were offering protection to local industrialists in the event of strikes, asking in return for contributions to fascist funds, and from Treviso in June, in which it was revealed that, of the twenty-four enrolled in the local fascio, at least eighteen were professional people, including two industrialists. For this, and a general analysis of the position of the fasci in the first half o f 1920, see De Felice, Mussolini il rivoluzionarioypp. 589 ff. 8 Resto del Carlino, 15 M ar. 1921. Interview of I. E. T[orsiello] with Mantovani. For a very similar statement, see speech of V . Mantovani at Congresso Agrario in Rome; speaking of the incidents of 20 Dec. 1920 in Ferrara, Mantovani said, ‘Here it is necessary to say, however, that we should never have arrived at an excess o f this kind if the state had thought in time about maintaining among the people that sense of respect for authority and for the law which is now totally lacking*. Gazzetta Ferrarese, 23 Feb. 1921.

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spoliation o f profits, social position, and— eventually— lands.1 Hopes o f a political solution m ay have been raised by the fall o f N itti and the reappearance o f G iolitti, but during the summer months, w ith the apparent in activity o f the governm ent in face o f the occupation o f the factories and— more im m ediate for Ferrara— the prolonged agricultural strike in the Bolognese,* these hopes rapidly diminished. B y the autum n, therefore, and particularly after the ad­ m inistrative elections, the proprietors were beginning to look for alternatives to the parliam entary governm ent w hich seemed reluctant to protect them. T h ey were aware, o f course, that the socialists, for all their electoral rhetoric, were in a state o f increasing confusion. N or can the exam ple o f resistance to socialist industrial workers, shown in T u rin in both M arch and Septem ber, have been missed by those who followed national events at all closely. But the determ ining factor in Ferrara, the factor which really concentrated the minds o f the agrarit was undoubtedly the onset during the summer o f a sudden and extrem ely severe economic crisis. In some measure this was sim ply the result o f a bad harvest. T h e report o f the provincial Cham ber o f Com m erce indicates that in almost all the principal communes o f the province bad w eather at the tim e o f harvesting reduced the yield by as m uch as one-third in comparison w ith the previous year. W hat turned a fairly norm al agricultural setback into a crisis, however, was the drastic fall, after Ju ly, in the price o f hem p.9 Dem and for this product, described in the same report o f the Cham ber o f Com m erce as ‘the most im portant source o f agricultural incomes*, fell aw ay sharply and unexpectedly during the second h a lf o f the year as foreign clients reduced their activities.1*4*N or did the gathering inter1 Gazzetta Ferrarese, ibid.; in the same speech, Mantovani gave it as his opinion that, under the pressure of socialism, ‘Agriculture is on the w a y . . . to certain and inevitable ruin’. * For details o f this strike, see L . Arbizzani, ‘Lotte agrarie in provincia di Bologna nel primo dopoguerra’ , in Le campagne emiliane nell'epoca moderna, ed. R . Zangheri (Milan, 1957), pp. 283-332. * Relazione della Camera di Commercio di Ferrara, ig ig -r g s j (Ferrara, 1925), p. 241, ‘ Mercato della Canapa’ . 4 "The second half o f 1920 shows a profound and unexpected change in the general situation in the market for hemp. T h e absence o f demand from those nations that are the best consumers o f our product established a most unfavourable trend, and it is from this time that the crisis . . . begins to become real;’ ibid., p. 241. For reports o f the poor harvest o f 1920, see ibid., pp. 31-76.

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national economic crisis hold out much hope o f a prom pt recovery in demand. Thus, for the first time since the w ar, the landowners faced both political and economic uncertainty at the same moment. It is as well to be aware, however, o f the precise nature o f the crisis which confronted them. It was not that they found them­ selves staring bankruptcy in the face— at least, not im m ediately. I f hemp prices had fallen after J u ly 1920, this had followed several months in which the price o f this crop had never been higher. D uring this period, stockpiles laid up during the w ar, in order to avoid the effects o f governm ent price ceilings, and during 1919 were sold with great rapidity. Two-thirds o f the hemp produced in 1918 and four-fifths o f the 1919 harvest were sold before prices fell.1 C learly, enormous profits were m ade, particularly by the larger producers who had been able to afford to w ait for a favourable moment to sell. W hat the collapse o f the m arket m eant to these, therefore, was less economic ruin than the prospect o f a fall in the level o f profitability o f their holdings. This, in turn, threatened to reduce their room for manoeuvre. Continuously rising prices had made it possible before the summer o f 1920 for producers to concede the economic demands o f the socialists and still make profits. H owever, w ith the collapse o f the hemp market, the larger landowners faced the prospect o f considerably reduced profits— even losses— in the normal course o f business as a result o f the positions gained by the socialists. In these circumstances it became impossible for them to continue to make concessions to the socialists while hoping for an eventual government intervention against them. T h e proprietors had to choose between defeating the provincial socialists them­ selves or accepting the brunt o f the economic crisis on their own balance sheets— something they were evidently not prepared to do, despite the gains made from hemp in the previous six months. It was in this situation that the handful o f fascists present in Ferrara seemed to offer at least one possibility o f salvation. It appears that it took only a few days for the agrari to interest themselves in the developing fascio. Even before the elections the fascists were able to stage a demonstration through the streets o f Ferrara with cars and lorries,8 the presence o f the 1 Relazione della Camera di Commercio di Ferrara, 1919-1924, p. 241. 1 R. Forti and G. Ghedini, V avvento delfascismo: cronacheferraresi (Ferrara, 1923), P-

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h i

lorries in particular arousing suspicions that m aterial support was received from the landowners almost from the first. Indeed, such support was only to be expected given the composition o f the early group o f fascists. For w hile it was principally from the young men o f the town that the fascio drew its active supporters, these young men were not solely those who had grown up in the town. Others were the sons o f the more prosperous landowners and affittuari who, by tradition, were sent to the town to com plete their education.1 There was thus within Ferrara a concentration o f young men who had links with m any parts o f the province, and who also had the means to make fascism an effective and m obile force. From these, both urban and rural bourgeoisie learned w hat fascism had to say; other conditions made them disposed to listen. Despite the early progress o f the fascio, however, the new movement had arisen too late to have any serious im pact on the result o f the elections. The Blocco N azionale, brought together through the mediation o f the prefect,* included all the more moderate and conservative elements in the town. Even the local section o f the P .P .I. joined forces w ith the Blocco, this in itself a measure o f the conservative nature o f the catholic party in Ferrara. Four fascists were included in the list o f candidates, Brombin and G aggioli am ong them .8 None the less, this desperate alliance was incapable o f retaining control o f the com munal administration. The Blocco polled fewer than 7,000 votes in the commune o f Ferrara against a socialist total o f more than 13,000,4 the situation rem aining very much that o f Novem ber 1919. Provincial and all other com munal ad­ ministrations rem ained in socialist hands. Paradoxically, the elections were a trium ph for the fascio. T h e publicity achieved during the cam paign had brought the fascists to the attention o f everyone in the im mediate vicinity o f the town o f Ferrara. E arly accounts o f fascist activity speak o f the fascists handing out leaflets to workers, urging them to 1 It is worth recording that such young men, during their education, were exposed to the teachings of the revolutionary syndicalist and fascist sympathizer, Sergio Panunzio, teaching in Ferrara from 1914 onwards and incaricato in philo­ sophy at the University of Ferrara from 1920 until 1925. See L. Paloscia, *La con­ cezione sindacalista di Sergio Panunzio’ , in Qjtademi di *Pagine Libere*, 2 (1949), p. 46. * Resto del Carlino, 12 Jan. 1921. * Gazzetta Ferrarese, 28 Oct. 1920; Clemente Pasti and Alfredo Volta were the other two. * Ibid., 3 Nov. 1920.

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reject socialism, organizing a public m eeting to rally support for the Blocco, and touring the polling stations on election day in an attem pt to prevent socialist intim idation o f voters.1 T h e recognition they gained in these ways was made o f im ­ mense value precisely by the defeat o f the bloccardi. Election failure made the fascists seem more rather than less necessary. This was brought home to the socialists by the methods o f the fascists, potentially violent from the start. G aggioli informed Pasella in O ctober that one o f the first actions o f the fascio had been the constitution o f ‘special vigilante squads for the town and the surrounding area*,18 and the function o f these squads had been revealed in II Fascio o f 30 O ctober: '. . . they should come into action every time that an attem pt is made to lim it the freedom o f citizens in the case o f strikes or political struggles*. This developm ent was greeted with great en­ thusiasm by the M ilan Central Com m ittee, Cesare Rossi paying a special tribute to the Ferrara fascio on hearing o f the squads. *A special com pliment for die constitution o f the fascist action squads which represent— given the present moment and given the characteristics o f our organization— our most im portant task.*9 The landowners o f Ferrara would have echoed this welcome, particularly reading o f the intention o f the squads to protect the liberty o f citizens during strikes. This could mean, in effect, only one thing: the protection o f blackleg labour and a breach in the monopoly o f labour enjoyed by the socialist uffici di collocamento. W ith all eyes upon them the fascists did not fail to act in the manner expected o f them. T heir election manifesto was violent and provocative, promising that force would be met by force. ‘A n eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a life for a life* was the rule by which they intended to act.4 O n election day fights broke out at certain polling stations and socialists were beaten up.6 After the elections the battle continued, with the fascists breaking a boycott imposed on a farm er by attending to his livestock, on die point o f starvation.6 No opposition was en1 II Fascio, 30 Oct. 1920; and Forti and Ghedini, L'avvento del fascismo, p. 54. * A C S, M R F, b. 102 ‘C. C . Ferrara’, 25 Oct. 1920. ' A C S , ibid., C. Rossi to O . Gaggioli, 26 Oct. 1920. 4 Manifesto published in Gazzetta Ferrarese, 28 Oct. 1920. * Forti and Ghedini, L'avvento delfasciato, p. 54. 4 Ibid., p. 62.

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countered during this action. T h e fascists were able to claim that they alone were capable o f standing up to the dom ination o f the socialists. T h eir propaganda stressed above all their patriotism and accused the socialists o f failing to cater adequately for those who had suffered as a result o f the w ar. A manifesto put out in early Novem ber stated that the fascio accepted the three principal tenets o f the national m ovem ent; the defence o f the gains o f the w ar, the valorizzazione o f the victory, and opposition to w hat was described as the theoretical and practical degeneration o f socialism.1 It was a programme which had appeal above all in the town, where the fascists were soon able to enjoy considerable sym pathy. O n 9 Novem ber, for exam ple, the fascio organized a demonstration at the station to welcom e the colours o f the regim ent stationed at Ferrara. T h e Gazzetta described the procession:8 ‘T h e young men o f the Fascio di Com battim ento led, followed by the students and by a large crowd o f citizens.' T h e vice-prefect, ch ief o f police, and representatives o f the higher bourgeoisie were all present, helping to give an air o f respectability to the organizers. No representative o f the socialist party was reported to be present. O nce again they were cast in the role o f denigratore o f Italy. F ull support for the fascists was given by the Gazzetta Ferrarese from the first week in Novem ber. In the issue o f 6-8 Novem ber, a leading article spelled out word for word the im plications o f the electoral defeat. It was suggested that the bourgeoisie would finally have to organize themselves to face the socialists. Y et, even organized, it was clear that they would not be adequate to the task. T h e w riter saw the necessity o f a further force: N ew , young, courageous forces are needed. F ortunately the recent electoral struggle has shown us these fresh forces: the fascists. People for the most p art veterans o f the trenches, w ho h ave know n every sacrifice and are read y for th at extrem e sacrifice o f life for the good o f this lan d w h ich th ey love today m ore than yesterday because it has been saved b y their blood. T o these, to the fascists, falls the honour an d the duty. O n ly they h ave the righ t to m ake claim s on the future o f Ita ly ; on ly they, w ho love youth a n d force, can arrest the w ave o f madness w h ich is breaking over Italy.

Nothing could have stated more clearly than this that the landed proprietors, and the professional and com m ercial bourgeoisie had already made their decision about the fascio. 1 Gazzetta Ferrarese, 4 Nov. 1920.

* Ibid., 10 Nov. 1920.

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T h e events o f Novem ber only confirmed this decision. A small group o f fascists from Ferrara travelled to Bologna on the 21st and saw for themselves the incidents around Palazzo D ’Accursio.1 Stim ulated by the news these brought back, the Gazzetta Ferrarese sensed that a victory over the provincial socialist organization m ight be even nearer than previously anticipated. By the end o f Novem ber it was acting as the m outhpiece o f the fascio. A headline o f 29 Novem ber stated, ‘Fascism is the new awakening and the new life o f Italy, sanctified by the blood o f its heroes and martyrs.* T h e article went on to say that fascism was 'the spirit o f G aribaldi w hich lives again in our best, strongest, and most courageous young men*. T h e programme o f the fascio was set out in detail in the same issue under the heading ‘Ferrara for the fascio’ . It was claim ed that adhesions had already come from 'old and young, workers and professional people’, from the women o f Ferrara, and from soldiers still scarred from the w ar. W ith less rhetoric but w ith greater regard for accuracy, it welcomed adhesions o f ‘small proprietors, small leaseholders, workers, who appeal for the protection o f the fascio in order to live . . .*. Although such adhesions can have taken place on only a very small scale at this point— G aggioli had claim ed only 150 tesserati for the fascio ten days prior to this article*— the Gazzetta was already indicating the elements o f w hat was to be the base for fascism in the rural areas. Indeed, the articles o f the Gazzetta at this tim e are chiefly interesting for the insight they give into the m entality o f the provincial bourgeoisie. The inspiration o f fascism, it was suggested, lay w ith the Italian who had w aited for years for the governm ent to control the socialists, but in whose mind, finally, 'begins to develop . . . the idea that he must defend himself*. This, still according to the writers o f the Gazzetta, was the only solution : . . . against socialist violence there could on ly be opposed a different violence. I f someone is attacked b y a m an w ho dem ands his m oney or his 1 A C S, M R F, b. 102 ‘C. C . Ferrara’, 19 Nov. 1920. During the inauguration of the newly elected socialist administration, fascists opened fire on the socialists provoking clashes in which ten people were killed. One o f these, the nationalist Giordani, was a councillor for the minority group in the administration and an ex~combattente: his killing created a wave of indignation against the socialists which the fascists were well able to exploit. * A C S , ibid.

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life w h ile a carabiniere near b y rem ains unperturbed, he has no choice bu t to shoot a t his attacker. W ith the carabiniere he can settle the account later.1

This was the 'legitim ate reaction’ o f the exasperated who felt they were being asked, in effect, for their money and their lives. T h e fact that in the same article it appeared that the fascists also stood for a tax on capital to expropriate riches, the seizure o f the goods o f religious congregations, the confis* cation o f the profits o f the w ar, and a heavy tax on inherited wealth— all this did not appear to w orry unduly the rich landowners, the catholics, and the w ealthy urban m iddle class who stood behind the Gazzetta. This alliance between the provincial bourgeoisie and the fascists became explicit only towards the end o f Novem ber. Y et to the socialists it had always been apparent. Even before the elections, socialist leaders had attem pted to reason, through the columns o f the Scintilla, with the young men o f the fascio. Giuseppe Bardellini showed that he understood very w ell that much o f the frustration o f the fascists sprang from their w ar experience, but he pointed out to them that it was not the socialist party that had been responsible for that experience. He suggested that those intent on joining the 'grow ing anti­ socialist G rand A rm y' should learn to look at the existing situation a little more acutely.2 ‘ It is sad to see young men who, disillusioned with their idealism and their hopes after being bled and m artyred in the trenches, do not understand or know how to distinguish who are their real enemies.’ T o Bardellini it was obvious that these fascists were being used by the class they should most despise. 'T h e country has been ruined by the bourgeoisie which led it into the w ar but did not know how to conduct the w ar . . . by that grasping and reactionary bourg­ eoisie o f Ferrara which has earned so much from the sacrifices o f others . . . L et the combattenti remember this.' Appeals were also made to the idealism o f the fascists; showing already an awareness o f the tensions which existed within the fascist cam p : ‘these young men— even if o f bourgeois origin— cannot be so corrupt as to perform these unworthy services for filthy m oney'. Fascism at the service o f the agrari. it was argued, would sim ply disintegrate.3 1 Gazzetta Ferrarese, 30 Nov. 1920. * Scintilla, 23 Oct. 1920. Article entitled, ‘ Mentre s'inquadra la Grande Armata’. 9 Ibid., h Dec. 1920.

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T h e wishful thinking shown in these statements was not always echoed by other writers for the Scintilla. Certain social­ ists, it seems, welcom ed the opportunity provided by the fascist challenge for closing the ranks o f the unstable provincial organization. Calls were m ade for the resistance to the squads: *We shall reply to fascist violence w ith greater violence. And w ith all methods, none excluded.*1 It was suggested that it required only a few more fascist exploits to make even the moderates T u rati and Zibordi tire o f turning the other cheek.2 For this eventuality it was necessary that those most convinced o f the merits o f socialism should be ready to face any situation, ‘even at the level o f arm ed resistance*.® Y et, in spite o f these signs o f determ ination on the part o f certain socialists, the month o f Novem ber also saw the first public indications that the provincial directorate was losing confidence. T h e widespread reaction to the events in Bologna brought the first reappraisal o f the situation, both in Ferrara and in Italy. Fascism, as the socialists saw for the first tim e, was a more deep-rooted movement than they had im agined. W e m ust recognize th at fascism is not on ly the product o f the m ore or less generous donations o f the m oney o f profiteers; fascism— and m an y social­ ists w h o it seems do not succeed in understanding the phenom enon should take note— is the bourgeoisie w hich is defending i t s e l f . . . the bourgeoisie is still m u ch stronger than w e supposed; the bourgeoisie in general an d p articu larly in certain elem ents w h ich constitute it is not as co w ard ly as it seem ed to be u n til yesterday.4

Against this threat the socialists were forced to realize that they were ill prepared. T h e organization was large but not reliable; *we are m any and yet we are few*, observed the same w riter, recognizing that not all the members o f the leagues could be relied on to offer any resistance to fascism.® Events in Bologna proved the point. O n n Decem ber the Scintilla carried the headline ‘Cow ardice !’ because so m any fair-weather supporters were deserting the leagues in the neighbouring province. T h e m enace o f w hat were termed ‘the pay-increase socialists’ was felt to be very near, even in Ferrara: ‘ . . . the same disgusting phenomenon could occur in any other city, ours not excluded*. B y 18 Decem ber the Scintilla was quoting K a rl R adek to the effect that the socialist revolution was not im minent as had been 1 Scintilla, supplement to issue of 26 O ct. 1920. * Ibid., 18 Dec. 1920. 4 Ibid., 27 Nov. 1920.

* Ibid., 20 Nov. 1920. 4 Ibid.

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m aintained even at the beginning o f Novem ber, but th at it w ould require in every country ‘at least a generation*. Between increasing apprehension and a determ ination to protect themselves, the socialists contrived to play right into the hands o f the fascists. O n 20 D ecem ber fascist and socialist demonstrators clashed in the m ain square. Before the cara­ binieri could intervene, one socialist and three fascists had been killed. A fourth died later in hospital. T h e response to this socalled massacre was im m ediate. A lthough it m ight seem that both sides shared the responsibility, since both were aware o f the dangers o f a clash, the fact that the fascists had been fired on from behind the walls o f the castle m ade it appear that some kind o f an ambush had been planned by socialists w ithin the castle. Indignation at the killings was turned alm ost entirely against the socialists. Subsequent admissions that the m unicipal guards had, in fact, been prepared for an assault o f the castle did not help the socialist cause.1 It was not generally known that the fascists themselves had been urged by the Central Com m ittee in M ilan to com mand ‘respect (by any method) from local socialism*.2 Police action was directed, w ith a single exception, against the socialists ; and on the 21 st it becam e known that a search o f the castle had revealed four bombs as w ell as a quantity o f small arms.8 T h e incident was a gift for the fascists and they knew very w ell how to exploit their three ‘martyrs*. Instead o f the slow confrontation w ith the socialists that they had expected, they found themselves w ith an advantage from the start. W ithin the town was sufficient anti-socialist feeling to m ake it appear that the w hole com m unity had turned against the Cam era del Lavoro. M uch o f the shock was undoubtedly genuine. M ore than 14,000 people attended the funerals o f the victim s o f the b rief battle,4 a considerable num ber when com pared w ith the 7,000 who had voted for the Blocco in the O ctober elections. T h e fascists took full advantage o f the crowds to parade through the streets and make themselves known. O ther groups expressed their abhorrence o f the killings. O n the day follow ing the clash, all the associations representing reduci and mutilati 1 Gazzetta Ferrarese, 28 Dec. 1920, quoting an article in Tempo. * A C S , M R F , b. 102, ‘C . C . Ferrara’, 9 Dec. 1920. * A C S , M in. Int., D G PS, A G R 1921, b. 77B, 21 Dec. 1920. * A C S , ibid., 22 Dec. 1920.

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joined with the merchants’ and shopkeepers’ association, the P .P .I. and the Nationalists in sending a telegram to G iolitti protesting at w hat were termed prem editated murders.1 The m inority on the Provincial Council resigned, expressing the belief that it was no longer possible to work with a m ajority responsible for assassination,3 and at the same time a cam paign was initiated with the aim o f bringing about the resignation o f both provincial and com munal administrations. T h e Gazzetta Ferrarese inveighed against the socialists with the pent-up venom o f years and was joined in these attacks by the much more moderate and dem ocratic Provincia di Ferrara. W ith the prefect suspended as a result o f his failure to m aintain public order, his replacem ent, Pugliese, reported that it was the supporters o f the Gazzetta who were doing most to perpetuate the atmosphere o f the crisis. T h e situation was in fact worsening, he reported on 24 Decem ber, because o f the intransigence o f the partito agrario who were all for utter resistance to the socialists. H e m aintained that it was these who were pushing the ex~ combattenti ‘to every excess’ and keeping the town in ferm ent.8 Against this cam paign the socialists had no response. T he Scintilla ceased publication for three weeks, leaving members and adherents without inform ation and guidance at a critical moment. A n element o f panic which had entered the provincial organization was heightened by the knowledge that warrants had been issued on 17 Decem ber for the arrest o f certain capilega accused o f extortion.4 T h e leaders o f the movement were evidendy under considerable pressure from the law as w ell as from the fascists. In face o f this the socialists began to back­ pedal very rapidly. O n the 23rd a m eeting was held between the conflicting pardes and the prefect at which it was agreed that a commission should be set up to exam ine the justice o f the outstanding boycotts in the province.® T h e commission, to be composed o f equal numbers o f socialists and fascists, was to be presided over by the prefect— this, in effect, giving 1 A C S, ibid., telegram to Giolitti from Associazione dei Mutilati ed Invalidi di Guerra, Associazione Nazionale dei Combattenti, Unione Nazionale Reduci di Guerra, Associazione Industriali, Commercianti ed Esercenti, Federazione Agraria Ferrarese, Partito Economie Riformatore, P.P.L, Associazione Reduci Patrie Battaglie, Associazione Nazionalista. 3 Provincia di Ferrara, 24 Dee. 1920. 3 A C S, Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1921, b. 77B, 24 Dee. 1920. 4 Gazzetta Ferrarese, 18 Dee. 1920. 6 A C S, Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1921, b. 77B, 24 Dee. 1920.

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control to the fascists. This decision to form the commission was com m unicated to the assembled capilega on the 27th, when the prefect heard rumours 'that it has been decided to carry out pacifying operations, slowing down on boycotts, but w ith the intention o f taking up the struggle again in better tim es'.1 M orale can hardly have been raised by the fact that Zirardini and Bogiankino, the socialist m ayor o f Ferrara, left for Rom e on the 26th to see G iolitti,2 thrusting much o f the responsibility for leadership in the town on to M ario Cavallari, officially expelled from the party for his interventionism. T h e confusion w hich existed among the socialist leaders was appreciated im m ediately by the fascists, who, in the suc­ ceeding weeks, did everything they could to increase their discomfiture. The squads who walked the streets o f the town harried any o f the opposing leaders who were unwise enough to leave their houses. A t the turn o f the year, Savonuzzi, an assessore comunale, was beaten up in the street and forced, at gunpoint, to sign his resignation from the council. Although this occurred only a few yards from the centre o f the town, there was no intervention by the police. The situation in the town was, in fact, made perfectly clear by Savonuzzi’s refusal to make any com plaint to the authorities or to identify any o f his assailants.* O n 14 January it was the police who did the work o f the fascists for them. W arrants were issued for the arrest o f Zirardini, M ayor Bogiankino, and another assessore, Angelini, for alleged com plicity in the killings o f 20 December. Angelini fled to San M arino— taken by some to be tantam ount to an admission o f guilt— while the other two were imprisoned pending trial. Subsequent to this, Prefect Pugliese reported that even some socialists were prepared to adm it in private the responsibility o f the Cam era del Lavoro for the tragedy, but felt unable to do so in public because the position o f the arrested leaders would have been prejudiced.4 Y et, in spite o f the sub­ missive attitude o f certain socialists and the rem oval o f others, the fascists did not relax their pressures. M atteotti, sent to take control o f the provincial movement in the absence o f Zirardini, was com pelled to go through the streets w ith a body o f clubcarrying 'red guards' surrounding him .6 O n one expedition 1 ACS, ibid., 27 Dec. 1920. 3 ACS, ibid., 2 Jan. 192t. f ACS, ibid., 22 Jan. 1921.

* ACS, ibid., 26 Dec. 1920. 4ACS, ibid., 16 Jan. 1921.

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down Corso G iovecca a crowd o f several thousands gathered within minutes and pelted him w ith fruit and vegetables.1 In February Autunno R ava, editor o f the Scintilla and also an assessore comunalet was badly beaten in the open street.8Bardellini suffered the same fate, w hile M ario C avallari was m enaced but left unharmed. The socialists claim ed that the efforts o f the fascists to separate leaders from the mass o f the organized had m erely brought more socialist leaders to the province.3 Num ­ erically this was so, but all were equally helpless against the terrorism o f the squads. This offensive against the socialist leadership left the economic organization in the rural areas dependent on the often mediocre leadership o f the capilega. Fascist penetration o f the rural hinterland was thus facilitated by the marked dom inance the squads had gained w ithin the town. Before the eccidio, as it becam e known, little headw ay had been made by the fascists outside Ferrara. Although a propagandist w ith special respon­ sibilities for publicizing the fascist program m e outside the town had been appointed, the movement had achieved only isolated adhesions.4 T h e events o f 20 Decem ber, however, changed the situation entirely. N ot only was the whole province made aw are o f the existence o f the fascist m ovem ent; but it was m ade aw are o f the fact that fascism, whatever patriotic declarations it m ade about the w ar or about Fium e, was essentially a move­ ment directed at that moment to the defeat o f the socialists in the province. Fascist enthusiasts touring the sm aller centres during January found, therefore, that the ground was in part prepared for them. This was reflected in the great expansion o f the movement which took place after 20 D ecem ber; from five nuclei before that date, the m ovement increased to twentyfive on 12 January and to forty on 16 January.® T h e figures which are available for the membership o f the fascio demon­ strate the same rise. O n 10 January 1921 a request was made to the Central Com m ittee for 2,000 tessere as previous supplies had already been exhausted,® w hile in m id-February the 1 A C S , ibid., 18 Jan. 1921. * Popolo d'Italia, 15 Feb. 1921. ' Scintilla, 22 Jan. 1921. 4 Before 20 December 1920, Franco Gozzi, the propagandist for the rural communes, had succeeded in founding fascist nuclei in only five centres. See Forti and Ghedini, L'avvento delfascismo, pp. 88-9. * Ibid., pp. 138-40. * A C S , M R F , b. 102 ‘C . C. Ferrara’, 10 Jan. 1921.

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elections for the new directorate o f the fascio revealed that there were more than 6,000 enrolled in the movement.1 The effects o f this explosion o f fascism went far beyond Ferrara. It was largely as a result o f this extraordinarily rapid affirmation o f the movement, rivalled but not matched by Bologna during the first months o f 1921, that fascism began to attract national attention. Prior to the beginning o f 1921 the movement had been almost exclusively urban based and had succeeded in m aking little progress since the disaster o f the elections o f 1919. O nly in Trieste had a real impression been made, and only there through the exploitation o f ethnic problems absent elsewhere in Ita ly .8 In other areas the growth in fascist strength had been at best gradual. M embership figures relative to the situation at the end o f M arch 1921 reveal the extent to which fascism had failed to gain widespread support in the m ajor cities. In Rom e the fascio had only 1,480 adherents, in Turin 581, in Florence 500. G reater, but still relatively modest, success had been achieved in Naples (2,850) and Genoa (2,470), but even in M ilan, the hub o f the national movement, there were no more than 6,000 fascists enrolled. A t the same point and in contrast to this, Ferrara could boast some 7,000 fascists and Bologna 5,i30 .8 O ne consequence o f this success was, undoubtedly, the encouragement o f the fascist movement in other areas. T he exam ple o f Ferrara, previously considered one o f the im­ pregnable strongholds o f socialism, served to convince m any still confused or uncertain about the intentions o f fascism. It was w hat the fascists had done in Ferrara rather than w hat had been said or written in M ilan that removed doubts and demon­ strated the potential o f fascism to such people. Thus, the timid and spasmodic resistance to socialism which had been seen in m any agricultural regions was rapidly transformed into wellorganized and violent reaction. In m any areas o f the Po V alley still predom inantly socialist, in Tuscany and U m bria and in Puglia, the fascists moved on to the offensive during the early months o f 1921, clearly exploiting the favourable moment 1 Forti and Ghedini, L'avvento delfascismo, p. 163. * See E. Apih, Italia, fascismo e antifascismo nella Venezia Giulia (1918-1943) (Bari, 1966). * For both national and provincial membership figures for the period 31 Mar. to 31 M ay 1922, see R . De Felice, Mussolini il fascista, /. La conquista del potere (Turin, 1966), pp. 8 -1 1.

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created by the situation in Ferrara and Bologna. T h e results o f this offensive can be seen in the national membership figures for M ay. Between the end o f M arch and the end o f M ay— that is subsequent to the success realized in Ferrara— membership more than doubled, rising from 80,476 to 187,098. The ridicule directed at the ja sd only little more than a year before was obviously no longer appropriate.1 O ther consequences o f this rapid expansion were less wel­ come to the movement. T h e support which came to fascism in the first months o f 1921 came in large measure from rural areas for reasons which had little to do with the fascist programme proclaim ed in M ilan. W ithin weeks the social composition o f the movement had changed drastically, shifting from an urban to a rural base, and the urban fascists o f 1919 and early 1920 frequently found themselves no longer masters o f the situation. Thus expansion also saw the beginnings o f those conflicts and tensions within fascism which were to trouble the movement during much o f 1921 and— somewhat spasmodically— in the following years. The existence o f these tensions was apparent in the Ferrara fascio almost from the start. Despite an offensive which saw the socialist organization in the province almost com pletely without leaders by m id-February, difficulties had been developing within the fascio from Decem ber onwards. T h e sudden flood o f support which had come to fascism in that month had left certain fascists extrem ely unhappy about the direction their movement was taking. This mood was best represented by a letter sent to Gelso M olisi in M ilan by the younger brother o f O lao G aggioli, L u igi.1 O ne o f the first fascists in the province and a founder member o f the Avan­ guardia Studentesca,8 the fascist student organization, L uigi G aggioli protested principally about the fact that a large number o f popolari and liberals had joined the fasci and had 1 The more spectacular increases in membership during this period (31 M ar.31 M ay 1921) were seen in the rural areas of Pavia (526 to 6,802), Padua (300 to 4,485), Perugia (485 to 4,000), and Mantua (400 to 3,320), and in the cities o f Florence (500 to 6,353), and Turin (581 to 3,993). In the same period membership in Bologna was doubled (5,130 to 10,280). In many other places positions were considerably consolidated; for example, in the predominantly agricultural areas of Bari (2,809 to 6,676) and Cremona (3,745 to 5,000), as well as in Naples (2,850 to 7,300), Genoa (2,470 to 6,806), and Rome (1,480 to 4,163). Ibid. * A C S, M R F, b. 102 (C. C. Ferrara’, 29 Dec. 1920. * News of the foundation of the Avanguardia Studentesca was given in the Gazzetta Ferrarese, 4 Dec. 1920.

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used their influence to secure the adhesion 'm ore official than not* o f the Federazione A graria. Furthermore it had become known in Ferrara that this Federation was subsidizing the fascio, possibly as a result o f some compromise agreement. In Luigi G aggioli’s view , this was intolerable; for him, the fascio had become neither more nor less than 'the bodyguard o f the profiteers’. These were the elements, he m aintained, which had prevented the fascists from offering any support to D ’Annunzio in Fium e1 and which caused the fascio to measure all its actions against the fear o f offending the prefect and other authorities. He was under no illusions about the causes o f the situation, however; in his view , people no longer understood the real m eaning o f fascism. T h e new recruits to the fascio, even those with good intentions, had no idea o f the true ends o f fascism and sim ply allowed themselves to be led by their noses. It was im perative, he argued, that the Central Com m ittee should send someone im m ediately to put the fascio back on its original course; otherwise there was the serious possibility o f a split, with those resigning being prepared even to fight against the rem aining fascio 'm ade up only o f priests and agrari’.* The substance o f these allegations cannot be doubted. From the first the Scintilla had warned the young enthusiasts o f the fascio that they were sim ply doing the work o f the proprietors. By the end o f Decem ber, the alliance between fascists, landed proprietors, industrialists, and com m ercial interests had be­ come obvious. T h e prefect had observed that it was the landowners o f the partito agrario rather than the fascists themselves who were intent on keeping the dangerous situation inflamed. Even the Provincia di Ferrara, a paper which had welcomed the fascio as a means o f curbing the excesses o f socialism, began to realize that thefascio intended to do a great deal more than that. 1 D ’Annunzio had been expelled from Fiume by Italian troops at Christmas 1920 (‘Natale di sangue’). His appeal for help from the fascists was ignored by Mussolini, who confined himself to a rather half-hearted denunciation of the action o f the Italian government. 1 T o be compared with this is the situation in Bologna. There, as in Ferrara, the strong D ’Annunzian influence among many of the young ex-combattenti of the urban fascio created problems during December 1920 and January 1921. The fascist refusal to go to the aid of D ’Annunzio in Fiume and the clear signs that Emilian fascism was assuming the role of an agrarian reaction on behalf of the landowners produced complaints from Dino Grandi very similar to those made by Gaggioli, together with the same threat that the movement would split if action were not taken. See De Felice, Mussolini il fascista, 1, 47-8.

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It changed its tune accordingly and started to issue warnings that the agrari were sim ply bent on turning the clock back seventy years;1 soon, it was argued, the fascists would under­ stand ‘that unhappy task w hich they want them to take on’ .* Evidence o f financial support— o f the subsidy mentioned by Luigi G aggioli— came to light only later. In M arch the Resto del Carlino published an interview w ith V ico M antovani, the president o f the A grarian Association, in w hich M antovani made no secret o f such subsidies. H e confessed, ‘T h e resources o f fascism are w ell known to be in the wallets o f every business­ man, industrialist, landowner, p a trio t. . This was am ply borne out by the publication in M arch and A pril o f the names o f those who had subscribed to an appeal 'Pro vittim e X X Dicembre*, an appeal launched shortly after that date. T h e first list,4 accounting for a total o f L.106,276.10, contained around 450 names. Y e t more than L.60,000 o f this total had been contributed by only thirty-two people. O f these, at least seventeen were landowners.® Conte Severino N avarra, one o f the biggest landowners in the province and by reputation one o f the most mean and grasping, gave L . 15,000. T h e Pedriali brothers, A rrigo Sani, Arturo Spisani, Am adeo Baruffa,* Conte G iovanni Grosoli, and V ico M antovani himself, all cam e forward w ith contributions o f L . 1,000. Com m ercial and small industrial interests were also much in evidence. C hiozza and Turchi provided L.4,000, and the Circolo Società Nego­ zianti gave a further L.5,000. In the second list,7 the Fratelli Santini figured w ith a contribution o f L.2,500, the industrie Hirsch and the setificio R ietti each w ith L.3,000. T h e Associa­ zione Industriali, Com m ercianti ed Esercenti della città e la provincia offered L.6,050. W orthy o f special attention are the contributions o f the sugar companies. Appearing in the two lists were offerings from the Zuccherifici G ulinelli (L. 10,000), Bonora (L.5,000), Agricolo Ferrarese (L.5,000), from the refineries Ferri (L.5,000) and 1 Provincia di Ferrara, io Jan. 1921. 8 Ibid., 5 Jan. 1921. 8 Resto del Carlino, 15 Mar. 1921. 4 Balilla, 27 Mar. 1921. 8 T he occupations of those not otherwise readily identifiable were indicated to me in an interview with the lawyer Alberto Boaro, one o f the first squadristi o f Ferrara. 8 Amadeo Baruffa: large landowner, vice-president o f the Agrarian Association o f Ferrara, and president of the Consorzio della Grande Bonifica Ferrarese. See Forti and Ghedini, V avvento delfascismo9 p. 174. 7 Balilla, 17 Apr. 1921.

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Bonora (L. 1,000), from the distilleries Padana (L.5,000) and Italiane (L. 1,000), while the Società Eridania gave, in its own name, L.5,000. The representative o f Eridania in the province, Serafino Cevasco,1 also gave L.5,000. T h e w ay in which these contributions were made is par­ ticularly notable. A ll the above named companies were members o f the tightly knit Unione Zuccheri, while the m ajority were in the hands o f Eridania.8 Even the G ulinelli, originally independent, had sold a m ajor interest to Eridania in 1919.8 The distribution o f the contributions to the fascio was simply a means, therefore, o f cloaking— or at any rate rendering less blatant— the very considerable aid which the Union, and Eridania in particular, provided for provincial fascism. N or is the m otivation for such aid difficult to establish. In part it was the m otivation which lay behind the contributions o f the landowners. Shortly after the turn o f the century, Eridania, as the principal sugar producer o f the province, had accepted the suggestion o f Serafino Cevasco and begun to acquire land in the province, the intention being to render the com pany less dependent on the whims o f local producers o f sugar beet. By M arch 1917, it had more than L.2,000,000 invested in the province in land.4 Socialist gains for the landless labourers had affected the com pany in just the same w ay as they had affected other possidenti, therefore, while the com pany could ignore no more than these the political im plications o f much o f the socialist agitation. These difficulties coincided w ith considerable problems on the sugar market. The maintenance o f price ceilings in the im mediate post-war period made the production o f sugar a less attractive proposition than it had been before the w ar. As a publication o f the com pany laments, the cost o f labour was going up annually by about 50 per cent, while the price o f sugar remained frozen.6 Fascism, in both its short-term 1 Cevasco was a key figure in the sugar industry. The Cevasco family, based on Genoa, had its principal links with Eridania but was also represented on the boards of the two other large sugar companies— the Italiana Zuccheri and the Saccarifera Lombarda— together with the Piaggio, Croccolo, and Acquarone families. These four families between them dominated the entire Italian sugar market. See E. Sereni, La questione agraria nella rinascita nazionale italiana (Rome, 1946), pp. 211-12. * For information on the progress of Eridania in the province see, Eridania: storia di cinquantanni (1899-1949) (Genoa, 1949); and Roveri, ‘Lo sviluppo eco­ nomico9, p. n o . • Eridania, p. 67. 4 Ibid., p. 65. 5 Ibid., p. 67.

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anti-socialist aspect and in the long-term prospect o f influencing the policies o f the government) offered solutions to these problems. Like the agrari, the directors o f the sugar companies were very quick to seize their chance. T h e m oney they poured into the fascio was evidently not intended to subsidize bereaved ferraresi ; their contributions clearly conform to the general provincial pattern that those who had the most capital invested in the province were those most ready to bolster the fascist movement. This pattern was equally valid for the leading members o f the catholic movement within the province. Allegations about the influence o f the popolari on the fascio were in no w ay exag­ gerated. T o some extent, this was the reverse o f the same coin; agrari and preti, in the sense intended in L uigi G aggioli’s letter, were frequently the same people. Catholic radicalism , exem pli­ fied by the work o f M iglioli in Crem ona, had gained no real foothold in Ferrara. Thus there were no white leagues prepared to argue the point w ith the solidly conservative provincial leadership.1 T h e catholic bourgeoisie, ju st as m uch as the non­ catholic, was deeply involved w ith the fascist movement. Expression o f this involvem ent cam e most obviously from the catholic paper, the Domenica dell* Operaio, and from the most influential member o f the P .P .I. in Ferrara, Count G iovanni Grosoli. T h e Domenica delVOperaio openly supported the fascists from the beginning o f 1921, rejoicing in January that 'the soundest group am ong our citizens’ 2 was to be found enrolled in the fascio. It had little objection to the methods o f the fascists. Speaking o f the members o f the P .P .I. in rural areas, the catholic paper noted that 'N atu rally they are among the most convinced and most lively in the struggle o f the fasci \ not for revenge against their own enemies but to help— even w ith violence (since efforts at persuasion have not brought results)— in establishing the rule o f hum an justice.*8 Grosoli him self made no secret o f his adm iration for fascism or for the fascists. H e declared in an interview given to the Domenica delVOperaio: 1 ‘T he P.P.I. remained a bourgeois body with little following among the pro­ letariat*; the opinion o f R . Sgarbanti in lineamenti storici del movimento cattolico ferrarese, p. 61. * Domenica dell’ Operaio, 23 Jan. 1921. * Ibid., 27 M ar. 1921.

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W h en I stop to consider the w ork o f these young m en w ho, for the defence o f the freedom o f others, go to their deaths w ith a generosity w ithout lim its . . . I am profoundly impressed b y the rectitude o f their intentions and the nobility o f their a im ,w h ich goes beyond sim ple m aterial and factional interest.1

He summed up the movement in the same interview by term ing fascism ‘a genuine and true Crusade for Liberty*. It is enough to glance at Grosoli’s position in the province, however, to begin to doubt that the catholic leader’s opposition to socialism was based entirely on religious belief or an idealistic attachm ent to liberty. As a landowner in his own right, he undoubtedly appreciated the reasons w hich pushed the Federazione A graria towards fascism. Y et it was as a banker and financier that he— and other leading catholics w ith him— really exerted influence within the province. In this respect, Luigi G aggioli's distinction between popolari and landowners was entirely justified. Together w ith two other prominent provincial catholics, Giuseppe V icentini and Ercole Bonfiglioli, Grosoli had succeeded in establishing a network o f economic interests in Ferrara which was second to none.* The three were all directors o f the local catholic bank, the Piccolo Credito, a bank so successful that in 1916 it had ceased to be a subsidiary o f the Credito Rom agnolo and had opened as an autonomous institution. T h e bank specialized in pro­ viding credit for the sm aller farmers o f the province, but extended its operations in m any other directions, even to the point o f financing the reformist socialist co-operatives until 1919, when— and the im plications o f this were not lost on the catholic bankers— Raffaele M azzanti was ousted from control o f the co­ ops.8 Indeed, it is the opinion o f one w riter on provincial Catho­ licism that ‘the catholics controlled a great part o f the economic life o f the province by means o f the Banca Piccolo Credito*. And w hat this bank could not provide for them directly, other con­ nections could. V icentini, a director o f the Banco di Rom a, was also president o f the Società per la Bonifica dei Terreni Ferraresi, a position o f enormous im portance w ithin provincial society. T h e network o f interests did not end there, however. In­ volved w ith agriculture, w ith the bonifica, and w ith banking, the catholic hierarchy did not neglect industry. T h e Piccolo 1 Quoted in Tornello, Il tramonto delle baronie rosse, p. 179. * See Sgarbanti, Lineamenti storici, p. 68. T h e rest o f this paragraph is based on the same source. ' See Chapter 5, p. 92.

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Credito was, in fact, floated as an independent venture w ith capital provided by the Società Im m obiliare Eridania, the branch o f the sugar com pany which had been buying land in the province for the production o f beet. Subsequent increases in the capital o f the bank were subscribed directly by Eridania o f G enoa.1 Consequently it comes as no surprise to learn that V icentini was a president o f Eridania and on the boards o f the G ulinelli, Società Rom ana, and Raffineria Ferrarese sugar companies, w hile Grosoli was a board member o f the Società Ligure Lom barda per la raffinazione degli zuccheri.1 T h e financial support given to the fascio by the sugar companies was, therefore, in large measure a reflection o f the economic interests o f the leading popolari in the province. T h e younger G aggioli was hardly wide o f the m ark when he suggested that the contributions o f such people represented less a recognition o f the ideals o f urban fascism than a desire to protect investments. It m ay be noted in passing that a sim ilar attack could have been directed at the local Jewish com m unity. Am ong the seventeen landowners who m ade donations to the fascio re­ corded in the first list o f 27 M arch, six were Jews— P. and S. N avarra, F. and G . Zam orani, R . Tedeschi, and G . Sinigallia. T u rchi o f the saponificio C hiozza and T u rchi was also Jewish.* It is also highly probable that there were Jews among the shop­ keepers and com m ercial personalities who had m ade substantial contributions. N othing suggests that the Jewish com m unity did not act at this tim e on the basis o f its econom ic interests, uniting itself, as was to be expected, w ith the rest o f the provincial agri­ cultural, industrial, com m ercial, and professional bourgeoisie. From all sources, the subscription ‘Pro vittim e X X Dicembre* raised a total o f L.206,806. Although officially designated for a specific purpose, m uch o f the m oney undoubtedly found its w ay into the funds o f the fascio and was directed to other uses. W hat is clear is that fascism in the province, in its early months at least, did not w ant for financial support. It is equally clear that much o f this support cam e from groups to w hich the original fascists were hostile. 1 Sgarbanti, Lineamenti storici, p. 86. * See G. Falco, ‘ L ’organizzazione bancaria cattolica in Piemonte 1909-1919’, Bollettino storico-bibliografico subalpino, 6 7 .1 1 (1969), 649 f», 657 f. ; quoted in Mario G . Rossi, ‘Movimento cattolico e capitale finanziario: appunti sulla genesi del blocco elenco-moderato’, Studi storici, 2 (1972)» 284. • Identified in an interview with the lawyer Alberto Boaro.

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The existence o f this situation was not unknown to the Central Com mittee, although Luigi G aggioli probably gave a franker account o f the problems than had been received before. In the m iddle o f Decem ber O lao G aggioli and another member o f the Com itato Esecutivo, Alessandro D el Fante, had been in correspondence with M ilan, and had requested that the Central Com m ittee should send a representative to organize the developing'/orcto o f Ferrara.1 This request was clearly m otivated by the desire to see the links between M ilan and Ferrara strengthened in order that the increasing autonom y o f the local movement should be checked. T h e G aggioli brothers saw eye to eye on this. O lao had even resigned from the Executive Com m ittee on 17 Decem ber in order to have greater freedom to express his own opinions about the direction fascism should take.2 Pasella’s response to the growing crisis was to dispatch an organizer, Lieutenant O ttavio M arinoni, and to send w ith him a letter advising the local fascio o f the concern it was beginning to arouse in M ilan.8 Pasella reported that it was being said in certain quarters that the Ferrara fascists were following ‘an entirely local rather than national policy*, a policy directly inspired by the Federazione Agraria. He pointed out that this could only prejudice the chances o f the fascists in their attempts to gain the support o f the agricultural workers. T h e policy that he thought they ought to be following was set out to them: . . . y o u should neither appear nor b e the defenders o f a caste or a class b u t the defenders o f the national interest. I f you lim it yourselves to protecting the freedom o f citizens w ho wish to cu t their links w ith the socialist organi­ zation, you w ill be w ithin the terms o f the Fascist Program m e; b u t i f you intend to give the fascio the ch aracter o f an organization prone to the wishes o f the em ployers, you w ill clash w ith th at program m e, forcing the G .G . to take necessary bu t painful measures.

H e was equally opposed to the presence o f the popolari among the ranks o f the fascists, arguing that the catholic party had shown itself in certain provinces to be no better than the socialist organization. T h ey were therefore to be given much the same treatm ent as the socialists and on no account allowed to hinder ‘that highly reform ative and Italian action o f the fa s c i. . .*. It was M arinoni’s task to bring about the purification o f the provincial movement. 1 ACS, MRF, b. 102 *C. C. Ferrara’, 20 Dec. 1920. * ACS, ibid., 2g Dec. 1920. * ACS, ibid., 2Jan. 1921.

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T h e Ferrara Com m ittee considered the rebukes but denied that there was any foundation for the charges; there were no popolari among the ranks o f thefascio it m aintained, nor was there any relationship ‘diretto o indiretto’ w ith the agrari.1 This m ay have been a simple lie, but it m ay equally have been an indi­ cation that the m ajority o f the directorate were incapable o f seeing which groups were really influencing the policies o f the fascio. T h e segretario politico, Alberto M ontanari, was certainly not noted for his political subtlety.* W hatever the explanation, M arinoni lost no tim e in inform ing the Com itato Centrale o f the situation as he saw it: T h e fascio an d the nuclei form ed here w ith in the last m onth h ave developed expressly an d solely in order to m eet the ve ry serious situation created b y the Socialist P a rty in this province. F or this reason our sections lack a n y real p olitical or idealistic content and still h ave not understood the essentials o f fascism. T h e y are so align ed in this struggle for it to be perfectly reasonable to define them sim ply as an association for self-defence. N atu rally the agrari are rejoicing an d th ey h ave given their most enthusiastic m oral an d m aterial s u p p o rt.. . . T h e fascio here is still not appreciated for its real valu e an d is influenced b y landow ners w h o are represented in the E xecutive C om m ittee a n d the nu clei an d try to carry out their ow n policies. M o re­ over, in the rural areas this state o f affairs is m uch m ore pronounced.*

T o meet this situation M arinoni proposed an im m ediate cam paign ‘to make fascism return to its original function*. From his assessment o f the problem it followed that w hat was necessary was the creation o f a fascio independent o f the more conservative and self-interested elements in the province, yet sufficiently powerful to make its w eight felt am ong such people. O ne o f his first concerns was to make the fascio less dependent on the Gazzetta Ferrarese, too liable to interpret all fascist actions in terms favourable to the landowners. O n 23 January the first num ber o f the Balilla appeared, under the direction o f G uido T orti, one o f the group o f town fascists around G aggioli and M ontanari and a journalist by trade. In purely journalistic terms, the Balilla was an im m ediate success; circulation mounted steadily during February and M arch until, in A pril, it was announced that it had reached a w eekly circulation o f 15,000 copies,4 a very considerable circulation by 1 A C S, ibid., 7 Jan. 1921. * Marinoni reported that Montanari, 'a bright, lively, courageous boy, lacked political qualities’. A C S , ibid., 17 Feb. 1921. * A C S, ibid., 8 Jan. 1921. 4 Balilla, 30 Apr. 1921.

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the standards o f the province. From M arinoni’s point o f view, o f course, its success was dependent on other factors. There was little point in creating an independent voice for the fascio if the organization itself remained dependent on the group represented by the Gazzetta. O ne o f the keys to this situation appeared to be the control o f the finances o f the fascio. Pasella, in his letter o f 2 January, had informed the Com itato Esecutivo that it was forbidden for individual fasci to raise funds for their own uses. A ll contri­ butions received were to be sent to M ilan, where the Central Com mittee would redistribute funds according to w hat were considered to be the needs o f each fascio. For Ferrara, this provision appeared to solve both o f the immediate problems facing the Central Com m ittee; it would effectively prevent the proprietors from calling the tune because o f their financial control o f thefascio, and it would also make the fascio much more dependent on the wishes o f the M ilan Committee. W hen faced with the request that all funds should be sent to M ilan, however, t h t f ascio stalled and prevaricated, m aintaining at first that it was in agreement w ith the policy o f the Central Com mittee but had no m oney,1 and then sim ply refusing to come to any decision. So little progress was made in the negotiations between M ontanari, M arinoni, and the Central Com mittee that on 10 February the Com mittee wrote to M ontanari in stronger terms, advising him that the fasci, including that o f Ferrara, were only o f im portance in as much as they formed part o f a national movement, and that they would lose their value if the leaders in M ilan felt obliged to push them out o f the ‘fam iglia fascista’ .8 Even this scarcely veiled threat achieved little. M arinoni wrote that the fascio was still trying to delay a decision and even suggested that it might be m aking provisions for leaving the movement rather than submit to the directives o f the Central Com m ittee.3 Nothing more was heard about the m atter. It seems that the fascio had successfully called the b lu ff o f the M ilan Com mittee, clearly expecting to be wealthier as a result o f subsidies from the agrari rather than from the Committee. This was not necessarily disastrous for the unity o f the move­ ment. A Com itato Esecutivo in Ferrara which was capable o f 1 ACS, MRF, b. 102, ‘C. C. Ferrara', 7 Jan. 1921. * ACS, ibid., 10 Feb. 1921. * ACS, ibid., 17 Feb. 1921.

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standing up to the threats o f the leaders o f the national move­ ment m ight have been equally capable o f resisting the pressures exerted by local landowners. M arinoni was concerned that this should be the case, and that it should not be the landed proprietors, speaking through the local com m ittee, who were obstructing the policies determ ined in M ilan. Evidently he suspected that the com mittee headed by M ontanari was too responsive to the wishes o f those who held the purse strings, however, because he arranged for the election o f a new com ­ m ittee and began to look round for someone o f a different calibre from M ontanari, someone who m ight indeed dom inate the contending forces o f the province. T h e new com m ittee, elected in the m iddle o f February, reflected fairly faithfully these intentions. G aggioli was re-elected and the original group o f ex-combattenti strongly represented.1 T h e two suspected o f being the supporters o f the agrari were rem oved. M arinoni congratulated him self on the results,8 observing that they demonstrated ‘an ever-im proving understanding o f fascism* am ong the rank and file o f the fascists. H e was equally pleased w ith the new segretario politico, designated w ith the approval o f M ilan rather than elected, whom he described as *a boy full o f enthusiasm, possessing the qualities necessary to hold the jo b o f secretary*. This was the former republican, Italo Balbo. T h e apparent purification o f the personnel o f the fascio was accom panied by w hat seemed to be a political program m e designed to distinguish the position o f the fascists from that o f the agrari. In the first num ber o f the Balilla, for 23 January, the fascists put forward their agrarian program m e. This, in brief,8 called for a great expansion o f the num ber o f small landholders in the province. The proprietors were to provide land for the settlem ent o f landless labourers, who, it was assumed, would cease to agitate through the leagues on finding themselves 1 The new directorate had eleven members. A ll were ex-combattenti. T he members were: Alberto Montanari Barbato Gattelli Giuseppe Marciante Ferruccio Luppis Giulio Divisi Francesco Pistocchi Antonio Camerini Lino Borsetti Raoul Forti Olao Gaggioli segretario politico, Italo Balbo. from Gazzetta Ferrarese, 16 Feb. 1921. 1 AG S, M R F , b. 102, ‘C. C . Ferrara*, 17 Feb. 1921. * Fuller treatment o f this programme will be found in chapter 7.

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w ith their own property. A ll transfers o f property were to be effected under the supervision o f the fascio, which, by virtue o f this position as interm ediary, appeared to be performing precisely that role independent o f class which had been advo­ cated by Pasella. M arinoni welcom ed this programme for ju st this reason. It seemed to fit in very well with the over-all design o f creating an autonomous fascist movement. W hen, in mid February, V ico M antovani wrote back to the fascio accepting their proposals and promising to help in putting them into effect, it seemed that this autonom y had finally been achieved. A newly strengthened Gomitato Esecutivo could look forward to treating w ith a com pliant A grarian Federation. For M arinoni it was, as he put it, ‘a victory for us'.1 So confident was he o f his success in building up the kind o f fascist movement he had envisaged that he asked to be recalled to M ilan at the end o f February. Y et, in reality, he had achieved very little. The purification o f the Com itato Esecutivo and the victory he claim ed over the agrari were to be o f little im portance in the circumstances o f Ferrara. The failure to see this was caused in part by an incorrect assessment o f the developm ent o f the fascio up to the beginning o f 1921. M arinoni had expressed the opinion on his arrival in Ferrara that the local movement had grown up bereft o f political direction or ideals. In fact this was not the case. T h e prefect was much nearer the truth when he wrote that fascism in the province had moved from a position which was fundam entally political to one which gave greater emphasis to economic m atters.2 G aggioli, M ontanari, D el Fante, and certain others o f the first fascists were young men whose political idealism reflected their pre-war radicalism , their patriotism developed during the w ar, and their enthusiasm for m any o f the declarations o f M ussolini and D ’Annunzio. Thus, while they were anti­ socialist, they were not necessarily anti-proletarian. In the conditions o f late 1920, however, it had proved impossible to retain these emphases in Ferrara. The predom inantly anti­ socialist nature o f the struggle and the need for the m aterial support o f the proprietors had pushed the fascists into the arms o f the agrari. M arinoni’s efforts to purify the fascio were there­ fore attempts to restore a situation which had already proved 1 ACS, MRF, b. 102, *C. C. Ferrara’, 17 Feb. 1921. • ACS, Min. Int., DGPS, AGR 1921, b. 77B, 12 Mar. 1921.

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untenable. H ad he recognized this, he m ight have been less sanguine o f his measures to ensure an unsullied fascio. Instead he cam e to the province convinced that the fascism o f M ilan was also that o f Ferrara, that urban anti-socialism was transferable to a province prim arily agricultural. T h e lesson o f the first months o f fascist activity in the province should have been adequate to demonstrate the falsity o f this conviction. W hile— as w ill be suggested below— m any o f the leaders in M ilan succeeded in reaching this conclusion, M ari­ noni was slower to appreciate the situation. He failed to grasp that, in the context o f Ferrara, it was impossible to attack the socialists without at the same time strengthening the position o f the large proprietors. Thus the creation o f an Executive Com mittee in Ferrara without ties w ith the landowners was largely an irrelevance. Do w hat they m ight, the committee could only finish by doing the work o f the agrari. T h e land programme was an exam ple o f this inevitable sequence. Put forward with all the overtones o f the spoliation o f the pro­ prietors, the programme, w ith its terms o f emphyteusis (long lease), was nothing o f the sort. R ather it was a program me which set out to do precisely w hat m any o f the owners had been trying to do for twenty years— to enlarge the categories o f small worker-proprietors and affittuari in order to create a bul­ wark against socialism. M antovani and the Agrarian Federation he represented were giving aw ay nothing when they agreed to this programme. O n the contrary, they were doing nothing which did not further their own interests. This blindness to the situation was not confined to M arinoni. The reconstituted Com itato Esecutivo o f the fascio contained m any members equally incapable o f recognizing the logical outcome o f their anti-socialist crusade. G aggioli, D el Fante, and Barbato G attelli, were also ready to hail the proposed agrarian policy as a victory for the fascio. T hey remained con­ vinced that the fascio should exist, as Pasella had suggested, without ties to any class, able to mete out justice to worker and landowner alike. The subtlety o f M antovani and his fellow landed proprietors was that they encouraged a program m e capable o f this interpretation but, in fact, to the advantage o f the agrari. The land programme was one exam ple, the fascist syndicates a further case in point. T h e very name given to the syndicates— sindacati autonomi— suggested their independence.

TH E BEGINNINGS OF R E A C T IO N

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T o the fascists around G aggioli they appeared a further method o f exerting pressure on proprietors reluctant to make their contribution to a more equable social system in the province. Yet» without establishing a system o f syndicates as powerful ' as that o f the socialist organization and obliged to use m any o f the methods rejected by the fascists, they could not hope to exert any real control on the landowners. O n ly Balbo o f the leading group o f urban fascists seems to have seen the position o f the fascio in clearer term s; yet he was not disposed to dispel the illusions o f the others im m ediately. T h e propaganda value o f the idealist fascists touring the countryside and preaching a gospel o f arbitration and collaboration in w hich they really believed was too great to be forfeited. Eventually a clash was bound to come w ithin the ranks o f the fascists, and, later, come it did; for there were no altern­ atives in Ferrara to a fascist movement based on the direction and support o f the landowners. This was not im m ediately apparent at the beginning o f 1921. T h e original fascists o f the town belonged very much to the tradition o f M ilan fascism, a movement which had developed am ong dem obilized soldiers, syndicalists, and students, and which had seemed a patriotic, even rom antic, movement given to radical reform rather than conservatism. I f its direction had changed in the course o f 1920, there still rem ained enough o f those radical, anti­ bourgeois aspects o f the fascism o f 1919 to ju stify m any ob­ servers in continuing to consider the movement potentially subversive. It was precisely to this kind o f fascism that G aggioli and his companions appealed when they protested about the increasing influence exerted by the A grarian Association. Y et the agrarian fascism they had been instrumental in unleashing had very little in common w ith the urban fascism o f 1919. I f certain o f the slogans remained the same, they did so only to conceal very different intentions.1 This was not im m ediately obvious. It appears to have taken the M ilan Central Com m ittee a few weeks to weigh up the situation and to recognize that the fascism o f M ilan could not dom inate the new phenomenon, at least in the short term , but would have either to break w ith it or 1 See A . Lanzillo, Le rivoluzioni del dopoguerra (Città di Castello, 1922), p. 226, where he says of agrarian fascism, ‘The ideology o f fascism is simply phraseology which serves to cover up the illegal actions o f die organization o f the landowner class— actions intended to shatter the peasant organizations and prevent either the respecting or the renewal o f the agrarian contracts.*

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come to terms w ith it. The appointm ent o f Balbo as director o f the provincial movement, an appointm ent in which M ilan was directly involved, indicated that the Central Com m ittee had taken the point and was not going to pass up the oppor­ tunity afforded by the extrem ely strong agrarian fascism. This was a decisive step for the movement. It m eant that after the am biguities and uncertainties o f the preceding months, the fascism which finally commanded the attention o f the whole country was identified principally w ith virulent anti-socialism and with the violence which the squads dis­ played in rural areas. Support was attracted on these terms; those who took note at this point were those who stood to gain from the shattering o f labour organizations— either in the town or the countryside— and this clearly had a determining influence on much o f the future developm ent o f the fascist movement. N aturally, the fascists who remained loyal to the movement they had known before 1921 were slow to appreciate the im plications o f the decisions made in M ilan. M arinoni worked until the end o f February in order to try to reduce the influence o f the Agrarian Association on the fascio and approved the appointm ent o f Balbo because he considered that it would preserve the independence o f the local movement. T h e fascists o f the town were equally taken in by the appointm ent. Y et, in fact, they were facing a situation which had already deter­ mined their defeat. T heir fascism, which, in addition to anti­ socialism, stressed patriotism and 'national values* and called for certain far-reaching reforms, could find little support in a province which was so largely split between socialism and the interests o f the landowners. The political conditions which had killed Giuseppe Longhi*s attem pt at an organization neither socialist nor bourgeois-conservative were the same conditions which made a fascio independent o f sim ilar interests an im ­ possibility. T h e people who stood in the middle, those who read the Provincia di Ferrara and called a plague on both houses— socialists and proprietors alike— were too few to make it possible for a new political movement to avoid choosing one side or the other. T h e M ilan Com m ittee had shown itself prepared to choose the proprietors. O nly very reluctantly and over a period o f years did the fascists o f the original, tight, townbased group in Ferrara realize that in attacking the socialists they too had already made that choice.

7

TH E RANK AND FILE OF FASCISM the difficulties within the fascio, the influence o f Ferrara remained undiminished during the first months o f 1921. I f it was in Bologna in Novem ber 1920 that the tide had first begun to flow strongly in favour o f fascism, it was in Ferrara in early 1921 that the potential o f fascism was fully demon­ strated. Together these two provinces provided an exam ple for the whole o f Italy. In the north the shock waves generated by the fascist offensive passed rapidly from province to province, bringing to life m any o f those/ar« which had been still-born in 1919 and 1920. From Bologna fascism spread w ith contagious ease up along the Em ilian W ay: within the space o f a few weeks often small but always very vigorous fasci were develop­ ing in M odena, Reggio Em ilia, Parm a, Crem ona, and Pavia. From Ferrara the movement extended northwards— to M an­ tua, and up through the Veneto to R ovigo, Padua, Verona, and V icenza. O ften the contact between provinces was direct. It was, for exam ple, an incursion o f Ferrarese fascists into M antua in M arch that finally tipped the scales, encouraging local fascists to move on to the attack and producing fresh determ ination among local landowners to break the socialist organization.1 W here contact was not direct, it was the exam ple o f successful ‘squadrism’ that did most to catch attention and invite im itation. In Tuscany the squads began intensive operations from the end o f February, striking out from Florence towards the coastal towns o f Livorno, Pisa, and Carrara, and down through Siena and Arezzo to U m bria, where Perugia and Terni were firm ly under fascist control by the end o f A pril. South o f Rom e the response was less im m ediate, reflecting the different political traditions and social structure o f the mezzo­ giorno. But in that area where agricultural structure and in particular the existence o f a large number o f landless labourers D

e s p it e

1 See R . Salvadori, 'l l dopoguerra e le origini del fasciamo nel Mantovano', Rivista storica del socialismo, 3 (1958), 300.

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gave rise to problems similar to those in Ferrara and Bologna— in Puglia— the squads began to attack the socialist organization with a ferocity which more than matched that adopted in m any o f the fascist centres o f the Po V alley. Y et, even given this rem arkable expansion o f the movement in the first h a lf o f 1921, no other province saw quite that speed o f transition from socialism to fascism which characterized the growth o f fascism in Ferrara. A few lines suffice to indicate the extreme rapidity with which the province was conquered. W hile it was obvious at the beginning o f December 1920 that the provincial socialist organization-w as going through an internal crisis, there was little to suggest that it did not still dispose o f the vast mass o f support which had permitted it to win control o f all provincial and communal administrations in the autumn elections. T o all appearances Zirardini was still ablç to count on some 70,000 provincial industrial and agri­ cultural workers. Y et— within weeks— the entire movement had collapsed, and it was the fascists who could claim some 7,000 tesserati, could poll nearly 50,000 votes in the elections o f M ay, and could boast o f more than 40,000 provincial workers organ­ ized in the sindacati autonomi. Mussolini, on his visit to Ferrara at the beginning o f A pril, instead o f being ignored or even menaced, was welcomed by a crowd o f 20,000 in a town fes­ tooned with national flags.1 W hat lay behind this transition, described by the Popolo d'Italia as being a transition from ‘provincia rossa* to ‘pro­ vincia fascista*?1 H ow did the fascist movement succeed in establishing a base among the workers, particularly the rural workers, in so short a tim e? O ne answer springs to mind im m ediately, o f course— violence. W ith the provincial move­ ment led by Balbo, ‘squadrist* par excellence, it would be difficult to avoid arriving, at least initially, at this conclusion. The fascist with revolver and manganello, after all, did not give his opponents a great deal o f choice. Accepting this point o f view, it would seem that fascism was an organization based more or less directly on compulsion. A n examination o f fascist violence, and o f the conditions under which the squadristi were permitted to operate in the province gives a great deal o f colour to this argument. From 1 ACS, Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1921, b. 77B, 5 Apr. 1921. * Popolo d'Italia, 30 M ar. 1921.

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the middle o f January, the spedizioni punitive becam e more and more frequent, declining only after the end o f A pril. Attem pts to estimate the number o f expeditions or the num ber o f socialist properties destroyed are necessarily dependent on m aterial which is frequently very inaccurate, incidents often being understandably exaggerated by the socialists or else com pletely neglected in the reports o f the prefect. O ne w riter has calculated that in February, M arch, and A pril, more than 130 expeditions took place, resulting in the destruction o f around forty socialist properties, including Cam ere del Lavoro, the offices o f the leagues, and certain co-operatives.1 There is little reason to doubt that operations on such a scale did take place. T h e effort to quantify, however, seems largely unnecessary; w hat is clear is that Balbo's squads were sufficiently systematic and w ell organized to leave very few socialist institutions untouched by the summer o f 1921. Those that escaped did so only because o f the concessions they m ade to the fascists, often to the point o f capitulating com pletely to fascist ultimatum s. T h e tactics o f the squads were those w hich were to become general throughout the Po V a lley and earn for Balbo the position o f regional com mander o f the squads at the end o f 1921. O perating usually in fairly large numbers— often more than 100, sometimes as m any as 500— the fascists would descend on a rural centre at night, search out the most promi­ nent socialists o f the area and proceed to beat them up or kill them outright.2 In M arch, for exam ple, three columns o f more than 100 fascists each blocked all exits from R o and syste­ m atically worked through the centre, beating up all those who offered resistance.8 T h e capolega was the prim e target o f these attacks, as the correspondent o f the Giornale d'Italia revealed in late January: E very d a y p unitive expeditions go out. T h e fascist lorry arrives a t a certain village aim ing a t a certain capolega. First they talk. T h en , either the capo­ lega gives in, or violence takes the p lace o f persuasion. It alm ost alw ays happens that the negotiations achieve their end. I f not, it is the turn o f the revolver.4 1 This is the estimate o f Pittorru, Origini delfascismo ferrarese. 4 For the most comprehensive socialist account of fascist violence in Ferrara, see, Fascismo: inchiesta socialista sulle gesta dei fascisti in Italia (edizione Avanti! Milan, 1963), pp. 242-66. * Popolo d'Italia, 19 M ar. 1921. 4 Giornale d'Italia, 23 Jan. 1921 ; quoted also in Chiurco, op. cit. 3, p. 32, and in A . Tasca, Nascita e avvento delfascismo, p. 166.

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O n occasions it would be claim ed that the fascists were m erely responding to provocations. In January, several affittuari were fired on from behind a hedge near Fossanova San Biagio; four nights later the lorries o f the fascists arrived at Fossanova and burned down the league o f the braccianti}- A gain, at Porto­ m aggiore on 28 M arch, a young fascist was killed d in in g a fascist demonstration through the streets, and the same night the local branch o f the Cam era del Lavoro was devastated.2 Efforts to oppose the fascists were almost always fruitless. None the less certain heroic efforts were made, providing graphic evidence o f how the squadristi reacted. A t Codrea on 19 M arch a meeting was held in the local league to determine w hat attitude should be adopted to the fascist movement, and it was decided to resist. Several fascists present then beat up the capolega and the secretary o f the ufficio di collocamento before the eyes o f the assembled members, ‘after which*, reported the Scintilla w ith heavy irony, ‘the workers gave in and w ith great enthusiasm becam e fascist*.8 Another unnamed league wrote to the Scintilla in A pril, explaining the treatm ent that had been the punishment for a strike. T h e league had been burned down, spedizioni had visited the homes o f the more prom inent socialists o f the area, their families had been threatened and various ultim atum s delivered. In face o f this it had been decided that the only w ay to keep the organization together was to subm it and join w ith the fascists, but w ith the intention that one day the league would once again form part o f the Cam era Lavoro Socialista.4 Evidently much o f this could not have taken place w ithout the collusion o f the police and carabinieri. Frequently it was an active rather than a passive collusion. The socialists protested again and again that fascists and carabinieri were operating together and that there was no means o f resisting this com­ bination. A classic exam ple o f this means o f operation was provided by the events at Aguscello on 23 January. D uring the afternoon o f this day the fascists m arched through Aguscello closely followed by a num ber o f carabinieri. T h ey were fired on, again from behind hedges, and one carabiniere was slightly 1 A C S, Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1921, b. 58B, 23 Jan. 1921, and A C S , ibid., b. 77B, 25 Jan. 1921. * A C S, ibid., b. 77B, 29 M ar. 1921. * Scindila, 26 M ar. 1921. 4 Ibid., 23 Apr. 1921,

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wounded. T h e carabinieri then proceeded to the seat o f the league in the area and searched it, carrying aw ay guns and clubs. The same evening four lorries full o f fascists arrived at Aguscello, again accom panied by the R R .C C , and also by two cars occupied by local landowners. These last helped to identify the socialist ringleaders o f the small centre. T h e leagufe was devastated, and several socialists assaulted. W hen they attem pted resistance, they were prom ptly arrested.1 Sometimes it was reported that carabinieri and fascists were patrolling together, the fascists indicating w hich o f the socialists should be arrested.8 O n occasions when fascists appeared to be getting the worst o f any fight, the carabinieri w ould intervene to arrest the victorious socialists.* Efforts were m ade to tighten control o f the province in order to restrict fascist activity, but in m any cases orders given by the prefect or the Q uestura were not observed by the individual officers. It had always been the case that carrying passengers in lorries unlicensed for that purpose was illegal, yet there is not one reported case o f a lorry being stopped for this by the police. O n the contrary, the Scintilla pointed out that the fascist lorries were obliged to leave Ferrara at night by one o f the town gates, and had been seen loaded w ith passengers and w ithout lights; yet they were not stopped by the R R .C C . posted at the gates, either when they left or when they returned.4 This state o f affairs brought com plaints from the M inistry o f the Interior: ‘These arm ed expeditions in lorries from town to town must absolutely be prevented*,8 and in M arch the cir­ culation o f lorries was banned. A n effort was made to divide . the province into zones to be patrolled constantly, but the forces necessary for this were not available.4 Eventually it becam e all too clear that, whatever provisions were m ade, the individual officers would frequently fail to carry them out. G iolitti was com pelled to request that these should be weeded out: ‘ It is necessary to substitute those officers who do not do 1 A C S , M in. Int. D G PS, A G R 1921, b. 77B, 24 and 25 Jan. 1921. See also Scintilla, 29 Jan. 1921. • A C S , ibid., 17 M ar. 1921. ' A C S , ibid., 29 M ar. 1921. For an account o f police collusion in this incident, see M . Cavallari, Critica sociale (1921), 9, pp. 134-5; quoted in Tasca, Nascila » avvento delfascismo, p. 186. * Scintilla, 29 Jan. 1921. • A C S , Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1921, b. 77B, 3 Feb. 1921. * A C S , ibid., undated (3808), Corredini to Pugliese.

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their duty because o f weakness or connivance.’ 1 There is no evidence that any more than a few such transfers ever took place. Certainly the large scale changes necessary to control the situations were never made. T h e ordinary agente continued to express his sym pathy for the fascist cause by at least turning his back when necessary. A iding the unimpeded violence o f the fascists, and increased by that violence, was the dem oralization o f the socialists. T h e im possibility o f responding to a force better-arm ed, more mobile, and possessing leaders o f undoubted physical courage,* com pelled the succession o f socialist leaders in Ferrara to counsel a policy o f non-resistance. This was justified to the rank and file w ith the argum ent that fascism was a transitory phenomenon, incapable o f destroying a deep-rooted organ­ ization by means o f the mechanism o f squadrismo. D o you really believe, gentlem en o f the fascio an d the A g ra ria n Association, that conquests achieved b y virtu e o f these m ethods can h ave a n y sem blance o f stab ility? N o w it is childishly ingenuous to believe th at such a vast p olitical construction . . . can crum ble in a m inute un der the blows o f a cu d gel or the threat o f a revolver.3

Y et, for those who saw the devastated leagues or heard the fascists beating and shooting at night, this was precisely w hat was happening. T o them it seemed that the organizers were leaving them at the m ercy o f the fascio, that the nerve o f the leaders had failed at the critical moment. Although there had been no marked split in the provincial movement as a result o f the congress o f Livorno,4 such actions as the backpedalling w hich had taken place over the use o f the boycott considerably undermined the confidence o f m any socialists in the courage o f their leaders. Resulting despair brought w ith it two responses. 1 A C S, ibid., 20 Apr. 1921. Giolitti to prefects o f Bologna, Ferrara, Modena, Reggio Emilia, Parma, Rovigo, Florence, Arezzo, Siena, Livorno, Rome. * Olao Gaggioli, for instance, had been awarded four silver medals during the course of the war. The citation for the third makes it clear that he was a formidable opponent. ‘An officer of excellent quality, always first to ask for the most daring missions for himself, during a hazardous attack on the enemy trenches he was the first to throw himself on the position, stabbed to death three Austrians, took two prisoners, and was the last to come back, wounded, shouting “ V iva ITtalia’ ” ; quoted from Roma Futurista, 10 Nov. 1918. * Scintilla, 2 Apr. 1921. 4 A t Livorno the representatives o f the Ferrara socialists voted as follows: unitari 2,318» comunisti 414, concentrazione 22. Because of the gravity o f the events in the province, however, the split at Livorno had very little immediate impact in Fer­ rara. Figures quoted from Provincia di Ferrara, 21 Jan. 1921.

THE R A N K AND FILE OF FASCISM

•43

Some leghisti evidently capitulated to the fascists;1 others began to resist in the isolated and spasmodic w ay characteristic o f socialist violence at this time. The prefect pointed to this second response in M arch when he observed that 'the conciliatory attitude shown up to now in the various disputes . . . has exasperated the spirits o f the more violent socialists’ .8 T o this exasperation he attributed the killing o f various fascists. Few socialists, it seems, managed to live on in the hope that w hat the socialist leaders told them o f fascism m ight be true. N or was this surprising; for the Scintilla pursued no consistent course. It published, side by side with articles demonstrating a messianic faith in the survival o f socialism, the most frank and revealing inquests on a movement which, it was clear, had already been defeated. It is worth quoting at length an article o f early M arch.8 O n our side, the errors th at have led to the creation o f this situation h ave been innum erable: the system atic and inconclusive offence o f w h at could be considered the most strongly h eld beliefs o f liberalism , to w h ich a m ajority o f the bourgeoisie w as converted either genuinely or apparen tly; a sim ilar offence o f those concepts o f nationalism , not understood in that episodic an d repressive sense o f the w ord b u t in the sense o f an irrepressible ethical reality, accepted b y the m ore enlightened sections o f the bourgeoisie and not rejected b y the best o f the socialist thinkers; use and abuse o f violence, not as a tem porary means o f achieving a precise and clearly determ ined end, bu t as a blin d an d unthinking instrum ent and as an outlet for the saturation w h ich five years o f w a r h ad produced in both m ind and b o d y; lastly, the devaluation o f the w eigh ty w eapon o f the strike w h ich, instead o f being considered the last resort and as a calculated and delicate means o f dispute w hen used b y the directive organs o f the proletariat, was em ployed every d a y as the solution to m iserable local squabbles o f an inter-category rather than inter-class nature, or else im pulsively proclaim ed for inappropriate and often m istaken political reasons. T o a ll th at can be added the stupid and ruinous ranting o f irresponsible elements, on ly interested in m aking rapid progress in our ranks, and you h ave the total picture o f the action o f the masses in these last years— actio n w hich, disguised as socialism, was really on ly anarchist and destructive.

This astonishing mea culpa com pletely cut the ground aw ay from under the feet o f m any who had believed in the value o f the 1 Incidents o f straight desertion by capiUga did occur and must have become widely known in the province. See a comment of Avanti! about the problem o f reorganization in Ferrara: ‘W e must do away with the capilega, who, tyrannical and dishonest, left their followers in the lurch at the first sign of trouble and went over to the enemy’ ; 5 June 1921. * A C S , M in. Int., DGPS, A G R 1921, b. 77B, 14 M ar. 1921. ' Scintilla, 5 M ar. 1921.

*44

TH E R A N K AND FILE OF FA SC ISM

actions o f the previous years. It suggested that w hat had passed for socialism in the province had been w ithout real worth and seemed even to provide a justification for the actions o f the fascists. T h e publication o f this as early as M arch demonstrated only too w ell the extent to w hich the economic organization had already given up any hope o f survival. It m ight seem possible to leave the account at this point, to see the transfer o f the rural proletariat to fascism as being the result o f a com bination o f violence and dem oralization. C ertainly violence had its effect and m any were com pelled to enrol, w ith great reluctance, in the syndicates. Y e t to attribute so m uch to the actions o f the squads would be to miss something. From several contem porary accounts o f the provincial situation there arises the suspicion that not all the socialists o f the econom ic organization transferred their allegiance w ith reluctance; indeed, there is even talk o f enthusiasm for fascism, and not only from fascist sources. M ost revealing is the letter w ritten by a socialist assessore communale in w hich, in tones o f disgust and exasperation, he informs the provincial directorate o f the P .S .I. o f his resignation from the party because o f its total failure to take realistic counter-measures in the face o f 'the d aily enthusiastic adhesion o f large masses o f labourers to the program m e o f the fascio\ l O ther writers, less directly involved in provincial events, have none the less conceded something o f the same nature. Gram sci, w riting in 1921, adm itted that 'in Em ilia, in Polesine, in the Veneto, m any leagues o f contadini have torn up the red flag and passed to fascism*. W hile recog­ nizing that m any accounts were exaggerated and neglected the part played by violence, he none the less felt bound to add, 'b u t it is not all exaggeration, it is not always a case o f com­ pulsion*.8 Sim ilarly T ogliatti attributed to fascism 'a certain mass base in the countryside, especially in Emilia*,8 w hile Angelo T asca wrote that in Ferrara fascism provided a ‘cry o f 1 Letter of resignation o f Assessore Casoni, addressed to Consiglio Direttorio, Sezione Socialista di Ferrara, and reproduced in the Balilla, 15 M ay 1921. For a further example, see a phrase used by Paolo Maranini in an article in II Secolo, where he speaks, almost in passing, of 'le clamorose manifestazioni d'entusiasmo* for the fascio among certain o f the rural labourers. Article reproduced in the Balilla, 10 Apr. 1921. * A . Gramsci, // prezzmolismo (18 June 1921), in Gramsci, Socialismo e fascismo. L'Ordine Nuovo ig a t-ig a s (Turin, 1970), p. 122. ' P. Togliatti, Lezioni sul fascismo (Rome, 1970), p. 122.

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»45

hope* which drew the rural population towards it.1 W as there an element o f popular support for fascism? T o suggest as m uch m ay appear entirely unreasonable, not only because o f the evident necessity o f the fascists to use violence, but also because it must have been obvious to m any in the province that fascism was bringing a reduction o f the gains m ade by the socialist organization. In January, for exam ple, the proprietors o f Berra announced that they would no longer deal w ith the local ufficio di collocamento. This was in open contravention o f the pact signed in M arch 1920, but the action only moved the prefect to rem ark, 'T his is only the first episode o f a struggle which the agrari intend to fight in the whole province, given the political moment favourable to them after the recent unhappy events.’ * His opinion proved quite justified. D uring February and M arch spring sowing was suspended in m any areas o f the province until the labourers agreed that the uffici di collocamento should no longer be used. W orkers were employed on terms which had been norm al before the w ar; crops were sown at compartecipazione and there was no guaranteed minimum return for the labourer.8 Even the right to strike was often denied. A t Codigoro, for instance, the first point o f the new concordato stated, ‘No stoppage o f work is perm itted’ .4 W orkers in the town were equally defenceless. Defeated in M arch after a month-long strike because o f reductions in wages, the millers and bakers were com pelled to agree not only to the reductions, but also to the abolition o f the commissioni interne in the mills, to a contractual clause which termed resignation an absence from work o f more than three days for reasons other than illness, and to the renewal o f contracts at the end o f Decem ber each year, 'a tim e which permits greater serenity in the negotiations, the harvest not being im minent, as on 31 July*.6 There could be few doubts as to whom this serenity would be o f benefit. Y et the evidence o f enthusiasm for fascism remains. It suggests that, even in the face o f the offensive o f both squads and proprietors, m any saw other aspects o f fascism, and that a straightforward division o f ferraresi into randellati and randel1 Tasca, Nascita e avvento delfascismo, p. 164. ' A C S , Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1921, b. 58B, 6 Jan. 1921. ' A C S , ibid., Prospetto of agriculture in province, undated, but for late Feb­ ruary. 4 Agricoltore Ferrarese, 15 Apr. 1921. * A C S , Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1921, b. 58B, reports o f 17 Feb. and 4 Apr. 1921.

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latori is inadequate. In fact the movement towards fascism by the mass o f the provincial population was far more articulated than is suggested by an explanation solely in terms o f violence. Some people were beaten into submission, certainly, but m any cam e to fascism spontaneously and for varying reasons. Sergio Panunzio, for instance, wrote that w hat was essentially the choreography o f early fascism had a great im pact on a province unused to such demonstrations. In particular, he cites the funerals held for fascists killed in action: ‘T h e funerals organ­ ized by Italo Balbo were a real means ofinfluence on the masses.* The countryside, he considers, was conquered ‘psicologicam ente’ rather than w ith violence.1 W hile not underestim ating such an opinion, it seems far more probable that the real psychological blow dealt by fascism was the announcement o f its agrarian policy, w ith the program me for the system atization on the land o f the agricultural workers. It was this, above all else, that played on fears and exploited hopes, m eeting w ith great astuteness the various desires o f the different categories o f agricultural worker. It showed that the fascists, if they were ready to use the stick when necessary, were also very skilful at offering the carrot. T h e principal features o f the fascist land programme were set out in the Balilla o f 23 January 1921 under the title, ‘T h e A grarian Problem and the fasdo. T o pacify the countryside’ . T h e program m e, which started from the premise that fascism, if it was to be successful in the Ferrarese, would have to be successful at the level o f the agricultural worker, addressed itself in particular to the problem o f the avventizi. It was argued that the solution advocated by the socialists— collectivization o f the land— in fact ran counter to the wishes o f m any agri­ cultural workers : ‘The secret desire o f the individual country­ man is not the passage o f land to collective ownership, but the personal conquest o f property.’ W hat was needed, therefore, was a policy w hich catered for this am bition, which had as its basis the aim o f dividing the larger holdings o f the province in order to create a greater num ber o f smallholders. T o meet this need, the Balilla advanced the slogan, *. . . W e must give each m an as much land as he can work’ . It was proposed that this should be done through the medium o f an U fficio Terre, to be staffed by fascists, which would receive offers o f land from the 1 S. Panunzio, Italo Balbo (Milan, 1923), p. 37.

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larger proprietors and allocate that land to workers who made application for it. T h e land was not in fact to be ‘given’, how­ ever; transfers were to be made through contracts o f emphy­ teusis1 or, failing that, through sale on terms o f residuo-prezzo, by which the new owner would pay o ff his debt over a period o f years. It was even suggested that a special bank should be created in order to finance these operations. The end result, as the authors o f the programme saw it, would be a vast expansion in the num ber o f piccoli proprietari and affittuari. This in turn would have a beneficial effect on production, it being asserted that production would only rise ‘when in all the province of Ferrara the braccianti have disappeared to make room for a blessed oasis o f small proprietors'. T h e program me was put forward with an air o f menace towards the proprietors, as though the agrari were invited to choose between a socialist or a fascist revolution. It was presented as being a realization o f M ussolini’s declaration, ‘the land to him who works it and makes it bear fruit’, and repeated his refusal to consider the establishment o f a ‘landowners’ state’ . Y et the contrast between fascists and landowners at this point was more apparent than real, as is suggested by the fact that the programme was drawn up by V ittorio Pedriali, a fascist but also a landowner.8 Behind the propaganda, it is clear that even at this stage lay the carefully considered interests o f the provincial proprietors. This much was revealed by the reply given by the Federazione A graria to the fascist programme. T h e president o f the Federation, V ico M antovani, wrote to the fascist directorate accepting in full the idea o f a division o f the larger holdings, but also adm itting— significantly— that even before the Balilla had put forward its agrarian policy the Federation had discussed the provincial situation and come to very much the same conclusion as the fascist paper. Thus he was able to offer the unqualified support o f the Federation for the program m e.3 T h e J u n ta has recognized unanim ously the sound and m oderate vision o f the ideals forw arded and put into effect b y the Fascio Ferrarese di C om batti­ m ento and has decided to invite the individual m em ber organizations to nom inate delegates to take up, through the fascio, the requests o f those aspir1 See above, p. 134. * See Pittorru, Origini delfascismo ferrarese, p. 294. * Balilla, 13 Feb. 1921.

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in g to transform them selves into smaU leaseholders o r sm all proprietors, a n d to attem p t to persuade a ll landow ners an d large leaseholders to cede a p a rt o f their lands to the above-m entioned applicants.

T h e tone o f this acceptance— m oderate, conciliatory, exalting the ‘noble appeal’ o f the fascists— carefully concealed the fact that the agrari were themselves the originators o f the program m e. From their point o f view it was a program m e w ith m any advantages. It promised to realize m uch o f w hat had been the traditional policy o f the landowners, particularly prior to the w ar. Since 1910 M antovani had him self been practising at a personal level the division o f his lands.1 Pietro N iccolini, w riting in 1907, had advocated that the class o f sm all pro­ prietors should be extended w herever possible,2 and Pietro Sitta, in his election addresses o f 1915, had repeatedly called for the im plem entation o f an agrarian policy based on 'the gradual division o f holdings’ .8 In some measure, there were econom ic reasons for this emphasis. T h e intensive culture required by hemp and sugar beet, the two most profitable crops o f the province, was best provided— in the absence o f large scale m echanization— by the fam ily unit w orking a sm all plot, aided when necessary by one or two hired labourers. Thus the division o f properties did tend to boost production and increase the profitability o f the territory. M ore im portant, however, was the political m otivation o f the proprietors. From the experience o f the first strikes in the province, the landowners had come to realize very quickly that the interm ediate classes in agriculture— the mezzadri, piccoli affittuari, and piccoli proprietari— consistently provided the best defence against the pretensions o f the socialists. T h ey were the most difficult classes for the Cam era del Lavoro to organize and often the first to leave any agitation into w hich they had been draw n. T h e behaviour o f certain o f the mezzadri during the strike o f 1920 in Bologna had m ade this obvious once again.4 B y advocating an extension o f sm allholding, therefore, the Federazione A graria was seeking to strengthen precisely those elements in agriculture w hich were most conservative 1 Forti and Ghedini, L'avvento del fascismo, pp. 175-6, where the chroniclers o f Ferrarese fascism speak o f * . . . the many, many small proprietors created by him [Mantovani] . . . ' . * P. Niccolini, La questione agraria (Ferrara, 1907), pp. 49 ff. * See, for example, Provincia di Ferrara, 8 Apr. 1915. 4 See Arbizzani, ‘Lotte agrarie', p. 317.

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and least open to the seductions o f socialism. T o use the term inology o f class, the Federation was aim ing at the strengthening o f a piccola borghesia rurale which could be relied on to co-operate w ith the larger agricultural employers. T h e agrari were hoping to realize w hat Argentina A ltobelli had termed ‘an ancient reactionary dream ’ 1— and this at the price o f leasing their poorer land, since it was clearly this which would be put at the disposition o f the fascioy in order that it should be made more profitable. T h e land program m e, in short, suited both their pockets and their politics. T h ey were doubtless also aware o f the favourable reception w hich the program me could expect. In m any ways it was a form ula designed to exploit the m atrix o f ideas which had developed during and im m ediately following the w ar regarding the contadini— particularly the reduci— and the land. T h e phrase, ‘the land to the peasants’, originally coined w ith reference to the problems o f absentee landlords and the latifondi o f the south, had gradually taken on a more general significance, especially after Caporetto, when it had become w idely known. Concurrent w ith die diffusion o f this idea was the gathering movement for the invasion and occupation o f the land, begun in Lazio in 1915.* Contadini returning from the w ar m ight w ell have expected, therefore, that in one w ay or another they m ight acquire a piece o f land for themselves. In this expectation they were encouraged both by the policy o f the O pera N azionale per i Com battenti and by the decreto Visocchi, w hich aimed at stabilizing, at least on a tem porary basis, those occupations w hich had already taken place. Instead, those agricultural workers o f Ferrara who returned from the front w ith hopes raised by these ideas found themselves confronted by the socialists o f Federterra, who called for collectivization o f the land rather than for its redistribution on an individual basis. U n­ doubtedly m any accepted this collectivist policy; w hat is uncertain is how m any accepted it only because there seemed no prospect o f obtaining an individual plot. It was particularly am ong these, the uncertain socialists who still remembered the hopes engendered during the w ar, that the fascist agrarian policy could expect to win ground. 1 Speech o f Argentina Altobelli o f August 1920, quoted in Zangheri, Lotte agrarie in Italia, p. 401. 1 For a detailed study of these developments, see A. Papa, ‘Guerra e Terra 1915-18*, in Studi Storici, 10. i (1969), 3-45.

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M ore specifically, the land program me was intended to exploit the natural conservative tendencies o f the interm ediate agricultural classes. Am ong those who already had land, there were very few who were not frightened by the socialist policy o f bracciantizzazione, a policy w hich, as R enato Zangheri points out, carried only the prospect o f unemployment and pauperism .1 T h e proprietors recognized this fear, knowing w ell that the tendency among the rural m iddle class was to seek a betterm ent o f condition by rising to the position o f owner. T his is clearly explained by L uigi A rbizzani when he writes that, in contrast to m any o f the braccianti, T h e other contadini. . . aspire to the individual possession o f land. T h e mez­ zadro hopes to becom e leaseholder or to b u y the land he works o n ; the lease­ holder dream s o f becom ing a proprietor; the sm all proprietor tends alw ays to becom e m ore independent b y enlargin g his property.*

Thus, notwithstanding A ltobelli’s statem ent that 'the sm all mezzadri are now beginning to understand the spirit o f collect­ ivism ’,* the vast m ajority o f those above the ranks o f the brac­ cianti continued to see in socialism nothing but their ruin. Fascism, since it promised an expansion and a strengthening o f these interm ediate classes, appeared to be a means o f escape from this fate. These general points regarding the expectations o f the contadini and the class attitudes o f the coloni and small pro­ prietors are no doubt valid for other areas o f Italy besides the Po V alley. It was their general appeal w hich prom pted the Popolo d'Italia to put forward, through the articles o f Gaetano Polverelli, an agrarian policy which had m any sim ilarities w ith that advanced in Ferrara. T h e fundam ental concern o f both national and provincial movements was declared to be the creation o f 'a new agrarian dem ocracy, which w ill include the m ajority o f the population’ *— agrarian dem ocracy being synonymous in this case w ith an expansion o f the interm ediate agricultural classes. There can have been few other areas o f Italy, however, where this policy was better tailored to fit the needs o f the local situation than in Ferrara. Besides m eeting 12 3 4 1 Zangheri, Lotte agrarie in Italia, p. L X X IV . 2 Arbizzani, Lotte agrarie, p. 308. 3 Quoted in Zangheri, Lotte agrarie in Italia, p. 400. 4 Popolo d'Italia, 27 Jan. 1921 ; Gaetano Polverelli on ‘ La posizione del Fascismo di fronte alla questione agraria’.

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* *

the general aspirations o f m any involved in agriculture, the policy was an instrument o f immense tactical value to the proprietors in the circumstances o f early 1921. O ne o f its immediate merits was that it was a policy accept­ able to the original group o f fascists. These continued to be suspicious o f the intentions o f the landowners, and retained their conviction that they were the standard-bearers o f a social revolution which ran contrary to the interests o f the proprietari terrieri. As seen by these fascists, the creation o f an 'agrarian dem ocracy’ was the price the landowners were forced to pay in order to be freed from the grasp o f the socialists. T h ey failed to realize that the agrari, far from m aking concessions, were reinforcing their position in the province. T h ey were warned about this by the Provincia di Ferrara, which saw per­ fectly clearly that 'courageous young men, the vast m ajority o f whom are in good faith’ were in reality serving the interests o f the landowners while thinking to further an idealist cause.1 Y et despite these warnings, the urban fascists remained en­ thusiasts o f the land programme, arguing its case at regional congresses and in the province long after it had ceased to serve the purposes o f the national movement. * Thus the pro­ prietors had a ready instrument at hand, and one which not only propagated their policy but did so on terms which made that policy appear unfavourable to them. This gave to the fascism o f early 1921 that revolutionary note which concealed so w ell the reactionary character it really possessed. W hile the Balilla threatened the landowners that, if they went back on their word, 'w e shall throw them to the leagues, as you throw a bone to a starving dog*,8 the agrari could relax and see their work done for them. This was not the only aspect o f the agrarian policy which made it particularly w ell adapted to the provincial situation. Although the aspirations o f the contadini in Italy m ay have been similar in m any areas, there are signs that in Ferrara— possibly more than in other areas— aspirations were also combined w ith the means to realize them. T h at the w ar had not been 1 Provincie di Ferrara, I Feb. 1921. * For the retreat of the national movement from any precise commitment on the distribution of the land to the contadini at the regional congresses of March and April 1921, and for the attitude of the Ferrarese delegates to the congresses, see F. Catalano, Potere economico efascismo: ig ig - ig s i (Milan, 1964), pp. 239-46. 1 Balilla, 15 Feb. 1921.

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econom ically dam aging to m any in the province is suggested by m any reports in the im m ediate postwar period. In 1919 Prefect G iuffrida commented on a movement w hich was quite unique in the history o f Ferrara; people were com ing into the town from rural areas w ith sufficient m oney to buy m any o f the best properties available. H e wrote o f ‘the new bourgeoisie created by agrarian w ealth . . .’, and qualified his statem ent by ob­ serving am ong them ‘hemp producers, including leaseholders and long established mezzadri*.1 T h e mention o f the hemp producers is particularly significant, since it was this crop above all others that had served to bring m any coloni to the point o f both desiring and being able to consider the acquisition o f property. By O ctober 1919 the upw ard movement o f the price o f hemp had still shown no sign o f stopping. T h e report on agricultural prices, issued by the Cham ber o f Com m erce, revealed that the price o f hem p, one o f the principal products o f the province, had risen w ith only m inor fluctuations at a far greater rate than accounted for by the prevalent inflation. By mid 1920, the price index was more than eight times w hat it had been for 1914.* For those producing hemp, a product particularly favoured by smallholders, the profits could clearly be enormous. T h at they were so, and that these profits affected in particular the position o f the sm aller producers, is attested by a num ber o f contem porary witnesses. T h e prefect’s mention o f ‘agrarian w ealth’ was substantiated by an article w hich appeared in the Gazzetta Ferrarese at the end o f 1919.* T h e w riter, Ettore C irelli, was concerned to summ arize the changes w hich had taken place in the agricultural returns o f the previous years. H e reminded his readers o f the enormous increase in the price o f hemp, o f the m oney m ade from corn and other cereals despite price controls, and o f the profits arising from anim al products. ‘Every product,’ he stated, ‘was a source o f riches unhoped for.* H e m aintained that it was obvious who had gained from these phenom enal returns: ‘A n arm y o f small proprietors and mezzadri has become rich.’ Even the braccianti, it seems, becam e m uch more prosperous during this period. Sergio Panunzio recorded 1 A C S , Min. Int., DG PS, A G R 1919, b. 40, 5 Oct. 1919. * The price index of hemp for 1919 and 1920, on a base o f 10Ö for 19141 was 448 and 896 respectively. Figures from Relazione della Camera di Commercio, p. 240 and pp. 262 ff. * Gazzetta Ferrarese, 29 Dec. 1919.

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in 1923 that the rise in hemp prices had benefited everyone, and commented, ‘it’s impossible to estimate in figures how much the Ferrara proletariat wasted on drinking, on sweets . . . and on silk stockings’ .1 In the same year, when the boom had ended and there were serious difficulties arising in the country­ side, the fascist fiduciario chose the prosperity o f 1919 as his point o f comparison, w riting ‘It is w ell known that the economic situation in 1919 was one o f the best and that Ferrara was prosperous’ .8 Y et, if 1919 was the last year in which agri­ cultural prices rose consistently through the year, the first h a lf o f 1920 was no anti-clim ax. It was in June and Ju ly o f that year that the price for the best hemp reached L .1,150 per quintal— more than double the high point o f 1919.* This prosperity was not brought about solely by the success o f the hemp crop, however. As G irelli had pointed out, other crops proved profitable as w ell. T h e price index for grapes, for exam ple, stood at 1,337 in x920 on a base o f 100 for 1914.4 But equally im portant were the features o f wartim e and post­ w ar legislation which favoured those in agriculture. W hile coloni, ju st as much as the families o f braccianti, could benefit from subsidies paid to those w ith essential workers aw ay at the front, their ability to live o ff their own production in large measure cancelled the effect o f the rise in the cost o f living. Affittuari were placed in a good position by the freezing o f rents at pre-war levels, especially if this rent was assessed on the value o f a certain quantity o f corn, as was common, since com prices were themselves controlled by price ceilings. W hat the hemp crop did was to increase the modest gains resulting from the period o f the w ar to gains o f considérable proportions. It was this that brought the canapicoltori into the town to buy them­ selves houses. The published accounts o f certain o f the banks o f Ferrara give some indication o f the extent o f this accum ulation o f capital. The report o f the Cham ber o f Com m erce on these accounts5 makes clear, not only that m any were able to build up savings, but that this ability was more widespread than m ight be thought. This results from the comments made on the 1 S. Panunzio, Italo Balbo, p. 30. 1 A C S, Seg. Partie, del Duce, C R ., 'Gran Consiglio’, b. 19, sf. 1, 1923, Inserto E. ' Relazione delta Camera di Commercio, p. 262. « Ibid. • Ibid., pp. 286-9.

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position in 1919. ‘T h e quantity o f money in circulation, to­ gether w ith its gradual diffusion among all social groups, fully explains the increase in bank deposits which, in respect o f the preceding year, show an increase o f more than L.30 m illion.’ T h e results for 1920 were even more revealing. Despite the subscription o f more than L.80 m illion to the Prestito Nazionale, the increase in deposits in provincial banks was in the order o f L.50 m illion over the previous year. These figures represented, therefore, an increase in savings during 1920 o f around L.130 m illion, and for the two years 1919 and 1920 o f about L.160 m illion. Bearing in mind that the total amount in savings accounts in 1918 was little more than L .141 m illion, this was a very considerable increase, even considering the rapid rate o f inflation. T h e Cham ber o f Com merce had no difficulty in accounting for this increase; it sprang from ‘the heavy gains made by the farmers from the sale o f hemp for which the average price for the year was the highest ever reached’ . For small proprietors, leaseholders, and even mezzadri, the situation in 1919 and 1920 was in some ways very encouraging. Those who wanted to extend their holdings or change their form o f contract had the capital to do so. T h e incentives to this kind o f action were undoubtedly very great, precisely because o f the high profits to be had from agriculture. T h e mezzadro who for years had scraped together a little capital found that, in the favourable conditions o f 1919 and 1920, his savings had m ultiplied considerably. I f they had not increased to the level that perm itted him to consider buying a plot o f land for his own use, they m ight at least have reached that point o f enabling him to pay a deposit on land and obtain credit for the rem ainder o f the price. There was always the prospect that another good year o f hemp would see the debts paid o ff in full. There is evidence to suggest that such a movement had taken place in the last months o f 1918 and during early 1919. Ettore G irelli, in the article cited earlier in this chapter re­ marked on the extrem ely active m arket in land during early 1919. ‘Never did so m any lawyers, notaries, and m iddle men busy themselves for cessions, sales, and transfers.* O ne result o f this increased demand, he noted, had been that land prices had shot up, stabilizing only after the m iddle o f 1919. Another ac­ count, written much later, tends to confirm this picture o f a brief but very intense period o f land transactions. The inquiry

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carried out under fascism into the development o f the category o f small landholders also found that the immediate postwar period in Ferrara was characterized by a wave o f land specu­ lation, so much that people had begun to say that ‘Ferrara was up for sale’ .1 This short-lived boom was not caused simply by sudden prosperity among certain sections o f the agricultural community, however; the position o f m any o f the larger pro­ prietors was also favourable to aspiring purchasers o f property. W ith the w ar over, the potential o f the socialist movement was almost im m ediately apparent. Increased wage rates for the braccianti, shorter hours o f work, a reduced share o f the share­ cropper's produce— all these factors combined to make the outlook somewhat bleak for the larger landowners. Collectiviza­ tion o f the land was a threat which lay in the background. Faced with this situation, the proprietors could adopt two courses o f action, both o f possible advantage to those eager to buy or to lease land. They could sell up and thus place land on the m arket;2 or if they wished to com bat the socialists they might attempt to increase the number o f small independent landowners, small leaseholders, and sharecroppers. During 1919 both courses o f action w ere'evidently tried. The prefect observed that the socialist claims had reached the level that good land was being left uncultivated,8 and some o f this clearly went on to the market in the first h alf o f 1919. The second kind o f reaction is exemplified by the efforts o f Vittorio Pedriali— already described— to break up his holding into smaller units to be worked at mezzadria.1 1 See Inchiesta sulla piccola proprietà coltivatrice formatasi nel dopoguerra,, voi. 15, G . Lorenzoni, Relazionefinale (Milan, 1937), p. 50. A similar phenomenon occurred in certain other parts of Italy in these years, with small savings made during the war being used to purchase land; see, for example, A. Serpieri, La guerra e le classi rurali (Bari, 1930), pp. 485 ff«, where he speaks of rural artisans and even braccianti in Tuscany, Umbria, and Le Marche acquiring land, ‘ the one and the other by virtue of savings made during the period of the war*. For general comments on the passage of land to the peasants in the period 1918-21, see E. Sereni, La ques­ tione agraria nella rinascita nazionale italiana (Rome, 1946), p. 116. 1 Compare with the analogous situation in Mantua, as described by I. Bonomi: ‘The established landowners • . • believed that the agitations o f 1919 and 1920 were the portents of a Russian-style expropriation. For this reason they were induced to sell, to sell their land at bargain prices simply in order to conserve a little money. The affittuari and mezzadri— much smarter— took advantage of this. They bought in haste and with enthusiasm!9 (La politica italiana dopo Vittorio Veneto (Turin, 1953), p. 142.) • ACS, Min. Int., DGPS A G R 1919, b. 40, 25 Aug. 1919. 4 See above, Chapter 5, p. 97.

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T h at he was not successful in this attem pt because o f th e adam ant opposition o f the Cam era del Lavoro demonstrates that, if m any factors were favourable to aspiring coloni, by m id 1919 the political conditions were definitely unfavourable. I t was precisely the extension o f small agricultural units that the socialists were most at pains to prevent. Attem pts at this kind o f expansion were met w ith all the weapons at the disposal o f the Cam era. Pedriali’s tenants were hounded down, a m an at Berra who attem pted to take on a sm allholding was condemned to be boycotted for life, and o f the four dead in the strike o f J u ly 1920, three were affittuari.* A n incident at Trecenta in which socialists clearly acted w ith the intention o f m aking life impossible for certain smallholders provoked a com plaint from the Segretariato Agricolo N azionale to the M inistry o f the Interior that such actions were plainly contrary to the govern­ ment’s declared policy o f ‘the consolidation o f a rural, w orking petite bourgeoisie*.* Even the socialist coloni were adm itted to the Cam era del Lavoro on the understanding that they were to work w ith the rest o f the socialist movement for the destruction o f all other coloni.8 It was the application o f this policy w hich explains w hy the wave o f buying w hich had followed the end o f the w ar stopped so suddenly in m id 1919. It was only at this point that the socialists, recovered from the dislocation o f the w ar years, were strong enough to impose their w ill in the m ajority o f cases. Thus the rush for land was largely blocked, and land prices tended to stabilize, as C irelli had noted— rightly attributing this stabilization to the renewed solidarity o f the labour movement and the end o f the regim e o f ‘com­ petition between labour’ .4 Instead o f into land, m oney w ent into houses, for those who could find them, or into savings, norm ally the last resort during a period o f heavy inflation. I t was not rem arkable, therefore, that one o f the first concessions w rung from the socialists at the beginning o f 1921 was that 1 See above, Chapter 5, p. 98. * A C S , Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1920, b. 50, 30 M ar. 1920. * Ibid., 8 M ay 1920. Circular from Camera del Lavoro on behalf o f Federazione Coloni. 4 Mantovani, of the Agrarian Federation, confirmed this situation in an inter­ view given during 1921. Speaking o f late 1919 and 1920 he said, ‘The proprietors, siezed by panic, thought at this point to sell their lands, but the organizations and the co-operatives which had always wanted collective purchases, refused to buy. And not only that— they also prevented individuals from buying* (Resto del Carlino, 15 M ar. 1921).

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proprietors should have the right to dispose o f their land as they liked. The agreement reached at San M artino, for exam ple, on 31 January 1921 stated explicitly that the labourers recognized the right o f the proprietors to sell or lease land, or work it on terms o f mezzadrìa, whenever they so desired.1 Exploitation o f the economic circumstances favourable to fascist agrarian policy was possible, therefore, only when the requisite political conditions had been established. W ith the socialist leaders removed from the scene, with the legal offensive against the weapon o f the boycott, and with the squads able to protect smallholders and would-be smallholders against socialist reprisals, the w ay was open for the im plementation o f the fascist programme. D uring February, M arch, and A pril, a considerable amount o f land was put at the disposition o f the Ufficio Terre. T h e ‘gifts' o f land were o f all sizes, but came in general from the pro­ prietors o f the larger holdings. Zam orani and Tedeschi, two o f the landowners cited by the fascists as being least likely to respond to the programme, were in fact among the first. Zam orani wrote that o f the eighteen holdings he possessed at Francolino, sixteen had been leased to his workers,8 while Tedeschi put three lots at the disposition o f the fascio, two at Saletta and one at Corlo.8 The first o f the m ajor offers o f land came in M arch when Am adeo Baruffa notified the U fficio Terre o f 1,200 hectares it m ight use at Berra ; the Società G randi Bonifiche offered 2,000 hectares at Am brogio.1*4 Later in the same month, G ulinelli, one o f the richest men in the province, offered more than 2,000 hectares to the north o f Portom aggiore.5 Certain o f the proprietors were evidently much less interested, however, and here the fascio attempted to bring pressure to bear. Severino N avarra, noted as one o f the most unreasonable o f the absentee landlords, refused to reply to the letters o f the fascio requesting that some o f his holdings should be put up for distri­ bution. W hen he was eventually prompted to answer, he said only that he was considering w hat action to take. Not satis­ fied w ith this, the fascists o f the Ufficio Terre reached an accord w ith N avarra’s agents for the division o f the properties in 1 A C S, Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1921, b. 58B, 31 Jan. 1921; see also Provincia di Ferrara, 7 Feb. 1921. * Balilla, 20 Feb. 1921. * Ibid., 28 Feb. 1921. 4 Ibid., 13 M ar. 1921. 4 Ibid., 27 Mar. 1921.

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question.1 By A pril the Balilla announced that more than 12.000 hectares had been put at the disposition o f the Ufficio,* w hile in Septem ber the fascists claim ed to have redistributed some 18,000 hectares8— a little less than 10 per cent o f the productive surface o f the province. Precisely w hat happened to this land is less readily as­ certainable. Prefect Pugliese, w riting o f the land program me in early M arch, testified to the fact that more than 2,000 hec­ tares o f land had been offered to the fascio, but was less specific in explaining exactly w hat had been done w ith it.1*4*There is no record o f the land actually being sold by the larger proprietors, a fact which serves to underline that despite all the fascist propaganda stressing the role o f the small proprietor, the function o f the U fficio Terre was the strengthening o f the categories o f dependent workers— the mezzadri and piccoli affittuari. Thus, where the Balilla provides inform ation on the use to which land was put, it seems that in almost every case the land was taken over under new contract by those workers who had form erly farmed it. It was announced, for instance, that the land offered by the Buosi brothers o f Correggio had been settled: ‘The fascio has transformed into leaseholders about thirty-four families o f avventizi, boari, terziari, and form er obbligati, who previously had worked on the property in these different capacities. No aoomtizio is still unem ployed/8 A later num ber o f the Balilla noted that the property at Fossalta had been divided am ong fifty families o f avventizi, leaving only tw enty such families in the area that were still not settled.6 A t Francolino, the fondi were leased to workers who had form erly been mezzadri and boari. 1 In Septem ber it was claim ed — no doubt w ith a good deal o f exaggeration— that more than 4.000 families had been beneficiaries o f the operations o f the U fficio.8 M any o f these were undoubtedly those who had previously occupied the same land but on different terms. None the less there were applications for land from those who were not already sitting tenants. Pugliese asserted that ‘new farmers* had responded to the offers o f the fascio— people who 1 Balilla, 17, 24 Apr. 1921. 1 Ibid., 10 Apr. 1921. 4 A C S , Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 4 Balilla, 13 M ar. 1921. 7 Ibid., 20 Feb. 1921.

' Ibid., 25 Sept. 1921. 1921, b. 77B, 12 M ar. 1921. 4 Ibid., 27 M ar. 1921. * Ibid., 25 Sept. 1921.

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‘w anting to change their position, to live a decent life . . . have deserted the league and the Cam era del Lavoro*.1 T h at the agricultural workers should abandon the socialist organization had been the ch ief short-term aim o f the fascist agrarian programme. The comment o f Pugliese suggests that it was successful in this respect, and that there were people prepared to take seriously the ideas o f the fascio. This was so even among the braccianti, the category best organized by the socialists. The evidence cited above confirms the impression that the land placed at the disposition o f the U fficio Terre was used, at least in part, to settle workers who had previously been without property. Although there were cases o f labourers refusing the land they were offered,2 it is clear that there were enough workers among the lower categories prepared to take land to make the programme an initial success. In pride o f place, very probably, were the obbligati, who had been deprived o f their position as favoured workers by the agricultural pact o f ig20.* Closely following these were the braccianti who had been com pelled to join the leagues during the course o f the previous two years, but who felt that they could manage better on their own.4 This the socialists were forced to recognize: *. . . the present defections are the work o f those who cam e last to the proletarian organization because they are unhappy with the regime o f social and working-class justice brought about through the labour exchanges.*6 There had been, according to the Scintilla, ‘only a partial class-consciousness, an inadequate 1 A C S , Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1921, b. 77B, 12 Mar. 1921. 1 See, for example, Balilla, 13 and 27 Mar. 1921. * Some approximate idea of the numbers of the obbligati involved may be gained from the following figures: in i g u there were 9,935 obbligati in the province, in 1921, under the pressure of the socialist pacts of 1920, only 1,167, m 1931 (together with the salariati fissi) 18,616. The decline before 1921 and the rise thereafter suggest that there were possibly several thousand displaced obbligati eager to return to their former privileged positions once it was clear that socialism had passed its peak. See Censimento del regno 1911, 1921, 1931. The dissatisfaction of the obbligati with socialism was admitted even by certain socialists. See Mario Cavallari in Critica sociale, (1921), 134, where he asserts that the pact o f 1920 ‘suppressed the institution— of age-long usage— of the obbligorietà in the country­ side, driving the peasant away from that land to which he was tied by indestruc­ tible links and traditions’. Quoted in Tasca, Nascita e avvento delfascismo, p. 206. 4 In this respect, see the opinion of F. Catalano: ‘But the peasants had hoped to gain ownership of a piece of land, and therefore the systems followed by the proletarian organization in order to oppose that process . • • were felt to be an everincreasing violation of individual liberty’, Potere economico e fascismo, p. 238. • Scintilla, 2 Apr. 1921.

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preparation for sacrifice*.1 Thus the basic self-interest o f m any o f the labourers, prepared to abandon their associates if there was the prospect o f personal gain, had reasserted itself at the idea o f the possession o f land. G iovanni Zibordi summed this up by saying o f the land program me, *. . . the strategem is working w ell because in reality there is an innate tendency in man to become “ boss” , to say or to delude him self that he can say “ I ’m in charge here” \ a N or were the workers in the interm ediate agricultural categories any less susceptible to the attractions o f the fascist agrarian policy. O n the contrary, the small proprietors, lease­ holders, and sharecroppers, were am ong the first to swell the ranks o f the provincial fascist movement. For m any o f them this was sim ply a logical extension o f w hat had been a consistent opposition to the impositions o f the socialist organization. T h e small proprietors o f long standing had never welcomed the prospect o f collectivization o f the land, w hile those who had gained land in the wave o f transactions o f late 1918 and early ig ig would be expected to be particularly determined to pre­ serve their recent acquisitions.8 M any mezzadri, for instance, would be hard hit by the high salaries they were obliged to pay to their hired workers and thus eager to break the hold o f the ufficio di collocamento. Y et desertion o f the leagues was equally marked am ong those mezzadri and affittuari who had becom e affiliated to the Cam era del Lavoro during ig ig and ig20. Although they had m ade considerable gains as a result o f this affiliation, they did not hesitate to support the fascists during ig 2 i. This betrayal was noted by the Scintilla: ‘A ll benefits for­ gotten in a moment o f madness! W ith the rise o f fascism, em anation o f the landowners and exclusively for their ends, all these good people joined up w ith fascism— the m ajority o f them going into the action squads.*4 Less noted were the reasons for this desertion, although it must have been obvious at this point that, if the mezzadri and affittuari had adhered to the Cam era, they had done so for reasons that had very little to do w ith socialism. T h e rem aining 1 Scintilla, 4 June 1921. * Ibid., 9 July 1921. * Compare the situation in Mantua, where I. Bonomi observed that 'H ie new landowners, as soon as they had acquired some property, showed the most spirited determination to keep it and defend it . . . Like all new classes, they showed an aggressiveness in the struggle previously unsuspected’ (La politica italiana, p. 14a). 4 Scintilla, 8 O ct. 1921.

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socialists were forced to realize that they had been exploited, as they had feared, by the most recent adherents to the pro* vincial movement. W hat had happened in 1920 was precisely w hat had happened on occasions in the pre-war years: the coloni had seen in the labour organization an excellent weapon w ith which to extract better terms from the proprietors. A d ­ hesion to Federten a was for them a tactic, a means o f selfpreservation from the hostility o f the leagues and at the same tim e a means o f economic advancement. This had been seen w ith the strikes o f 1920. In return for the solidarity o f the share­ croppers and leaseholders in the strike o f February, the brac­ cianti were called out to support the claims o f the coloni in June and July. In this w ay the differential between coloni and landless labourers had been m aintained and the privileged position o f the former reinforced. From the socialist point o f view, however, the better con­ ditions obtained for mezzadri and affittuari were counter­ productive; for it was precisely the better conditions and higher returns gained by these categories that made them abandon the Cam era del Lavoro at the first opportunity. W hat socialism denied them, since it enforced a static situation in the rural areas, was the possibility o f exploiting their prosperity for personal advancement. The fascist agrarian programme offered ju st this possibility. It promised in particular to reopen the provincial land market, frozen by socialist pressure since the middle o f 1919, and to perm it the stipulation o f fresh contracts o f land tenure. This goes far towards accounting for the swift response to fascism from the agricultural workers. M ore im portant to them than the im m ediate programme for the distribution o f land through the Ufficio Terre were the general im plications o f the policy o f the fascio— the im plications that the positions o f the small worker-proprietor, leaseholder, or sharecropper were to be rigorously protected by the fascists, and that the rural situation was to become once more sufficiently fluid to perm it the advancem ent o f the individual worker. Thus theirs was a positive commitment to fascism, based not m erely on opposition to socialism, but on the belief that fascism, with its call for an A grarian democracy*, was dedicated to a strengthening o f their position within the agricultural hierarchy. T h at their new-found freedom o f action was not im m ediately translated into the kind o f land boom witnessed in early 1919 is

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hardly rem arkable; during 1921 agricultural prices were still falling and this discouraged im m ediate investment in land. Y e t the assurance o f favourable treatm ent in a period o f crisis was clearly welcome, the aspiring small producer looking hopefully beyond the crisis for the opportunity to im prove his position. It is not difficult, therefore, to give credence to subsequent statements about the social composition o f pro­ vincial fascism; from Balbo who asserted that ‘the strength o f our arm y’ had come 'from the small leaseholders and sm all proprietors o f the countryside*,1 and from M antovani who countered accusations o f agrarian reaction by stating that '. . . there is not a fam ily o f large or small leaseholders or proprietors, o f farm managers, artisans, or dependent labourers that is not enrolled in the fa sä ’ .* This m uch is also suggested by an exam ination o f the geo­ graphical developm ent o f the provincial movement. D uring the early months o f 1921, at least until the end o f M arch, the nuclei adhering to the central fascio were concentrated very much in four zones. T h ey are to be found in the area to the south-east o f Ferrara running on a line down towards Porto­ m aggiore, but not extending to that centre, the area between Ferrara and Copparo to the north-east o f the provincial centre, the area around M asi Torello and M igliarino, and the ribbon o f higher land running along the northern boundary o f the province, extending almost to Berra.8 N otably absent are the areas around Cento, Bondeno, Portom aggiore, and Argenta. T h e areas o f fascist expansion are in general those in which there is a mixed system o f land-working, where the mezzadri and affittuari predom inate and only a lim ited area o f land is cultivated directly by salariati.1*4*This can be explained in part by the greater tensions present in these areas; where contact between leaseholders, sharecroppers, and braccianti 1 Gazzetta Ferrarese, 7 O ct. 1921. * Report of speech of Deputy Vico Mantovani in Montecitorio, 23 June 1922, published in Gazzetta Ferrarese, 26 June 1922. * Examination of the development o f the nuclei is based on two documents: an account o f the prefect for 3 M ar. 1921, (ACS, Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1925, b. 91B 'Costituzione dei Fasci'), in which fifty-three nuclei are listed, and a list of nuclei produced by the fascio on 29 M ar. 1921, (A CS, M R F, b. 102 ‘C. C. Fer­ rara’), which names sixty-eight nuclei constituted and eleven in the process o f formation. 4 Information on systems of land-working provided in Relazione della Camera di Commercio, pp. 31-76.

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was most direct, the desire to crush the threat o f socialism was often strongest. But equally significant is the fact that the land in these areas was that most suited to subdivision and to the expansion and strengthening o f the categories o f coloni and small proprietors. It is in these zones in particular that the land put at the disposition o f the U fficio Terre is located.1 W hile it is difficult to establish a direct connection between the distribution o f land by the fascists and the developm ent o f fascist nuclei, it m ay none the less be suggested that fascist agrarian policy was o f special appeal in these zones because it promised something to everybody. For the desperate bracciante, there was the promise o f land; for the established smallholder, there was the promise that his position would be protected and strengthened. In the areas where fascism had litde im mediate im pact, however, these promises had little relevance. In the Argentano and in the area around Portom aggiore the land was less adapted to sub­ division and was generally cultivated in economia by landless labourers. Thus there was much less rivalry between the various agricultural classes, making it easier for the socialists to keep a firm hold on their organization, but above all there was little in fascist agrarian policy that was relevant to the local situation. This was equally true o f the Centese and o f Bondeno, though for different reasons. Around Cento, the land was already subdivided to the point where further division was no longer possible, while in both Cento and Bondeno the small landowners felt the need for protection against socialism less strongly; in contrast to much o f the rest o f the province, re­ formist socialism had always dominated in these zones and the threat o f bracciantizzazione had been correspondingly reduced. Fascist promises attractive to their counterparts in the rest o f the province were therefore o f less appeal to the small farmers o f these two communes. Even given these exceptions, however, it is clear that the agrarian policy o f the fascio successfully persuaded a large number o f the coloni and at least some o f the braccianti to embrace the cause o f fascism. In the circumstances o f Ferrara, this was all that was necessary to ensure the victory o f the proprietors. W ith the socialists disarmed and unable to react 1 In early editions of the Balilla, concessions of land arc reported at Francolino, Corlo (twice), Saletta (twice), Piumana (Copparo), Correggio, Sant'Egidio, Ambrogio (twice), Alberonc, Fossalta.

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against those who deserted their ranks, the agrari were once again in a position to dominate the labour market, taking only those labourers acceptable to them and refusing to treat w ith the leagues. The solidarity o f the labour movement, so painfully constructed over the previous twenty years, had been breached once again, and it was only to be expected that the whole edifice o f leagues, Cam era del Lavoro, and uffici di collocamento would come tum bling down. In the province where chronic unemployment was a regular feature o f life, people needed work more than they needed their political convictions. Thus a fam iliar pattern reasserted itself. Groups o f independent agricultural workers— blacklegs to the socialists— appeared on the scene once again, and, faced w ith these, the trickle o f braccianti deserting the leagues developed in the course o f weeks into a flood. It was a case o f simple necessity, a necessity w hich, combined with the prospect o f acquiring land, persuaded the leghisti to place themselves under the protection o f thefascio, and in certain instances to do so w ith apparent enthusiasm. O n ly this can explain the enthusiastic passage to the fascio o f the leagues at M esola1 and Rovereto,2 or the disgusted comment— already quoted— o f that socialist official when he wrote o f the enthusiastic adherence o f the rural 'labourers to the programme o f the fascio. W hile violence had certainly been a precondition o f fascist success, the socialists were com pelled to realize that they had been defeated as much by the agrarian programme as by the manganello. Recognizing the fam iliar rush from the labour organization on the part o f m any o f the organized, the proprietors also remembered that the socialist movement had possessed in the past a rem arkable capacity for reconstituting itself after ju st such a débâcle as was taking place in 1921. It was the desire to prevent this, to consolidate finally their victory and prevent a further resurrection o f socialism, which spurred them to support fascist efforts to establish independent syndicates. T h e first initiatives in this direction appear to have been largely personal. In January Francesco Brombin attempted to set up a sindacato autonomo among town tradesmen, though this was done 1 See Provincia di Ferrara, 12 M ar. 1921. The Provincia was by no means pro­ fascist at this point; none the less it felt bound to comment on the events in Mesola: ‘ It must be a reason for pride among the fascists that they can attract the leagues of the countryside into their sphere.’ 1 For an account of this transfer see Catalano, Potere economico efascismo, p. 243.

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under the auspices o f the Associazione Nazionale Com battenti rather than in the name o f the fascio .1 In February the first fascist syndicate o f agricultural workers formed in Italy was established at San Bartolomeo in Bosco, when L uigi V olta, a local farm er who had been persistently boycotted during 1920 for his opposition to socialism, succeeded in persuading the local league to pass en masse to the fascists.2 Both Brombin and V o lta were fascists o f note, and their actions were im m ediately welcom ed by the Com itato Esecutivo o f the fascio. Y et it cannot really be m aintained that it was from these initiatives that the fascist syndicalist movement sprang in Ferrara; rather it was that these men were acting in a w ay w hich was accepted practice for the conservatives o f the province. From the tim e o f the unioni professionali it had been usual for the proprietors to attem pt to form their own leagues, pliable to their w ill. Such leagues had existed in certain areas for considerable periods, enjoying the benefits o f special treatm ent until the tim e when the socialists had com pelled them to enrol in the Cam era del Lavoro.8 T h e collapse o f the socialist leagues in early 1921 sim ply provided another opportunity for the employment o f this strategy, and, to be at all credible, these leagues clearly had to be established under the name o f the fascio rather than manifestly in the control o f the proprietors. W hat distinguished the sindacati autonomi from the earlier leagues o f the proprietors was the extent o f their success and the speed w ith w hich they cam e to control the m ajority o f the provincial workers. This was in itself a measure o f the deter­ m ination w ith which the landowners set out to attain suprem acy over the labour organization once and for all. A gain the fascio was the ideal instrument through which to work. T h e squads were capable o f doing w hat economic strings alone failed to achieve; thus socialist leagues frequently voted to join the fascio and take on the name o f sindacato autonomo at the point o f a gun. But where more subde methods were required the fascio was. also a potent weapon. M any o f the urban fascists, who spent 1 Balilla, 30 Jan. 1921. * Forti and Ghedini, L'avvento del fascismo, p. 186. * See, for example, a letter of Liberato Pezzoli of Argenta, in Gazzetta Ferrarese, g Apr. 1921. Pezzoli recounts how, in the Argentano, a lega autonoma fra coloni was set up in 1907 and survived until 1915, when it was transformed into the Unione Coloni Basso Argentano, which in turn survived until 1918 when a Unione fra i Coltivatori dei Campi was set up to replace it. This last was compelled to capitulate to the socialists only in 1920.

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much o f the first three months o f 1921 touring the province and talking to the workers, genuinely believed that the fascist syndicates could rem ain independent o f the proprietors and even exert pressures on them. T h eir good faith helped to convince reluctant labourers o f the good intentions o f the fascio. Present among the ranks o f the fascist propagandists at this time were other speakers and organizers o f great value— the leaders o f pre-war revolutionary syndicalism in Ferrara. These, isolated by the interventionist crisis from the mass o f the rural workers, saw in fascism the opportunity to re-establish some o f their lost authority. L uigi G ranata, Cassio Spagnoli, Pilo R uggeri, and T ito A guiari were all men o f this background, attracted to M ussolini by his cham pioning o f the interven­ tionist cause and as hostile as m any o f the landowners to the socialism which had displaced them. T h ey perform ed the same transition as their com panion, M ichele Bianchi, but unlike him remained attached to the provincial rather than the national movement. Certain o f them were undoubtedly in good faith, believing w ith G aggioli, G attelli, and their associates that the syndicates could take up a position which was neither socialist nor favourable to the proprietors.1 O thers w ere possibly more concerned w ith a career than w ith realizing their former principles. T h eir value to the fascists was that they presented to the agricultural workers known faces, the faces o f those who, if they had failed, had none the less attem pted to work in the past for an im provem ent in the conditions o f the labourers. Strangely enough, their previous failures probably did them less harm than m ight be expected. The braccianti were accustomed to frequent changes o f guard among the leadership o f the economic organization and, it m ay be suggested, tended to follow people rather than inquire too deeply into their policies. Thus— ironically— it was in part the failure o f the revolutionary syndicalists to educate their followers in more than the use o f violence and strike action that perm itted them to reappear under the fascist banner.12*5 1 Sec, in this respect, letter of Luigi Granata to Michele Bianchi, quoted below, Chapter 10, p. 249. * Certain of these syndicalist leaders none the less abandoned the movement or were considered unsuitable by the landowners and dismissed. See Avanti! o f 5 and 12 June 1921 where it is reported that, following the appointment o f Ed­ mondo Rossoni to the control of the Camera Sindacale del Lavoro, Cassio Spag­ noli, Pilo Ruggeri, and Romualdo Rossi had all left the syndicalist organization.

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The formation o f a strong syndicalist organization put the seal on the success o f the fascists. It was a success gained as a result o f a sequence which required violence to neutralise the socialist movement, propaganda and a carefully considered agrarian policy to initiate a process o f desertion o f the leagues, and which then relied on the mechanism o f the labour market in order to com plete that process. The speed with which the transition took place, from nothing at the beginning o f February 1921 to a Cam era Sindacale with more than 40,000 enrolled in June, was exceptional, reflecting the means available to those intent on defeating the socialists. But the transition in itself was not so unusual. In the years before the w ar, the Ferrara labour movement had been marked by a persistent instability, fre­ quently hovering between reformism, m axim alist socialism, and revolutionary syndicalism .1 Large-scale transfers o f labourers from one group o f leaders to another had occurred on several occasions, most notably in 1913 when the disastrous strike o f M assafiscaglia induced the braccianXi to abandon the revolutionary syndicalist leaders and pass once again to reformist socialism. It is this instability that prompted Salvem ini to w rite o f ‘a deep m oral weakness’ 2 in provincial socialism. Sim ilarly Angelo Tasca writes o f Ferrara, ‘The rural masses in this province have always been an easy prey to demagogues, to the friends and collaborators o f M ussolini. Socialist propa­ ganda has not put down deep roots’ .8 Such comments are unnecessarily harsh; for if there was weakness in the socialist movement, it lay where it always had lain— with the leadership. None the less they do indicate that wide oscillations among the mass o f labourers were not uncommon. W hat was exceptional about the situation in 1921 was rather the determination o f the proprietors to regim ent the workers who left the leagues. It was this determ ination that perm itted the expansion o f fascist syndicalism in the province and lay behind the formation o f a mass base for fascism. The proprietors, no longer prepared to entrust to the state the task o f controlling the socialists, had The time taken by these men to appreciate their incompatibility with the local syndicalist organization is extremely indicative of the reluctance of many during 1921 to recognize the real character of fascist syndicalism. 1 See above, Chapter i, p. 16. * G . Salvemini, quoted in Roveri, **Lo sviluppo economico e sociale della pro­ vincia di Ferrara9, p. 117. 8 Tasca, Nascita e avvento del fascismo, p. 164.

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evidently decided to do it themselves. W hat to the braccianti m ay have seemed ju st another tem porary shift o f loyalties necessitated by the search for work was for the landowners a perm anent transition. T h ey had no intention that the tide should flow aw ay from them once again. O n ly after several months, after the enthusiasms generated by novelty had passed, did both the original members o f the fascio and the agricultural workers recognize w hat had happened. B y then it was too late. T h e squads were ready to m aintain order am ong the rural labourers and power had long since passed from the hands o f the idealistic fascists o f the town.

T o attem pt to generalize too w idely about the origins o f fascism in rural areas from this exam ple o f Ferrara would be unwise. As is obvious, the social, political, and economic factors w hich com bined in Ferrara to give provincial fascism its particular characteristics were reproduced in only very lim ited ways in the predom inantly mezzadrile system o f Tuscany or in those zones o f the south where the latifondia still dom inated agriculture. C learly no other province was quite like Ferrara. Y et, for w hat has often been called the region o f ‘classical’ fascism— the Po V alley— Ferrara does obviously provide a point o f comparison. M any o f the same factors were present in the neighbouring provinces, though to very varying degrees. Indeed it m ay be suggested that it is precisely these slight variations between the provinces that help to explain not only w hy Ferrara took up fascism so readily and with such violence, but also, conversely, w hy certain other areas needed a great am ount o f prom pting before fascism began to assert its control. As the above account has attem pted to show, two factors in particular provided the Ferrarese agrari with especially fertile ground in which to work at the beginning o f 1921. T h e first was frustration— the frustration o f aspirations developed during and im m ediately after the w ar among certain sections o f the rural population. This was related especially to the speed w ith which provincial socialism reasserted its control over the economic life o f Ferrara after the w ar. Taking Italy as a whole, it is usually considered that the passage o f land to the peasants was a phenomenon which reached its peak in 1920 and con­ tinued well into 1921. In M antua, for exam ple, sales o f land

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were still taking place in 1920. This evidently provided a much longer period for adjustment to post-war conditions than was perm itted in Ferrara. Here the socialists were fully in control by August 1919 and were able to dictate that aspirations not in accord with the programme o f the Cam era del Lavoro should not be realized. Thus the possibility o f a gradual readjustment to the new social and economic situation o f the post-war period, a possibility verified in m any other provinces, was denied to the ferraresi after only a few months o f peace. T he second factor was fear— a fear generated among the numerous small proprietors and coloni and directly related to the type o f socialism preached in the province. In ‘m axim alist’ areas, fear o f the expropriation o f property and o f bracciantizza&one was very great, but where reformist traditions remained strong, tensions between classes could be much less accentuated. T o take once again the exam ple o f M antua, the reformists re­ tained their command for all o f 1919 and had considerable influence even in 1920. It was to some extent predictable, therefore, that M antua should pass to fascism only after the direct encouragement o f the fasci o f Ferrara and Bologna; opposition to socialism was moderated by a slower developm ent o f socialist control and— at least until 1920— by a more m oderate kind o f socialism. T h e very different developm ent o f the socialist movement in Ferrara, however, made it likely that the province would be among the first to pass to an extrem ely vigorous and violent reaction, once the socialists had begun to waver. The rapidity o f the socialist assertion in the province after the w ar and the extreme ‘m axim alist’ nature o f the policies propagated during 1919 and 1920— both clearly reflecting the precise class divisions and the enormous weight o f the braccianti in Ferrara— meant that hostility to socialism was generalized among certain categories as in few other provinces. In presenting the land programme, the represent­ atives o f the Agrarian Association— M antovani in particular— demonstrated that they had made a very careful analysis o f the situation that confronted them at the beginning o f 1921; by promising in effect a free market in land transactions they touched the exposed nerve o f the great m ajority o f those who resented the power o f the socialists and exploited those two sentiments— fear and frustration— which lead notoriously and w ith little urging to sudden and violent reaction.

8 C R ISIS AND C O N S O L ID A T IO N : P R O V I N C I A L F A S C I S M D U R I N G 1921 the early months o f 1921 the provincial fascists found themselves confronted by new problems. Far from being the result o f a lack o f success, these problems sprang precisely from the fact that the anti-socialist battle had succeeded beyond all expectations. Fundam entally, provincial fascism was faced with a change o f scale. W hat had begun as a lim ited and local reaction to socialism had, by February o f 1921, assumed the proportions o f a movement which not only aspired to dom inate the province but had also become increasingly aware o f the position o f im portance it occupied on the national front. It becam e clear, above all, that fascism was not sim ply a transitory operation, destined to exhaust itself in the space o f months, but a political movement w ith considerably longer perspectives. These realizations brought w ith them the recognition that the fascio had to consolidate its position w ithin the province. It was impossible to proceed from the euphoria o f the first offensive to the assumption o f the responsibilities resulting from that offensive without both structuring the provincial organization and determ ining its im peratives and defining, at least to some extent, the relations o f the fascio with other elements in the province. Consolidation necessitated such clarifications. In the course o f them, it was to be expected that differences o f opinion would arise about the role the fascio was to play. L uigi G aggioli’s protests to the Central Com m ittee had already indicated that differences existed in this respect. Consolidation o f the fascio could thus expect to be accom panied by internal crisis, it being precisely the increased definition given to fascism w hich created grounds for opposition and protest. T h e central figure in this process o f consolidation— and indeed in almost the entire subsequent history o f fascism in Ferrara— was Italo Balbo. T o all appearances there was litd e D

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to distinguish him from m any o f the original group o f urban fascists. He him self m aintained in his Diario ig 2 2 that, at the end o f the w ar, he was only ‘one o f the m any, one o f the 4,000,000 ex-servicem en',1 and certainly, unlike O lao G aggioli, for instance, he was w ithout a particularly distinguished w ar record. Nor did his political affiliations mark him out. Before the outbreak o f the w ar he had shared that intense M azzinian outlook common to m any o f his contemporaries in the town, an outlook w hich viewed political action less in terms o f strikes, salaries, and socialist leagues, than in the rom antic terms o f risks and adventure.* This was necessarily a fairly imprecise position. Although it carried him to the local section o f the republican party, there remained in Balbo much o f the rest­ lessness engendered by his early M azzinian allegiance, a restlessness which Sergio Panunzio described as '. . . a sense o f total revolt against reality, a perm anent protest against the actual state o f things, an irrepressible need to overturn the reality o f fact'. T h e experience o f the w ar did little to channel these feelings into more precise political positions. W hat it did was to heighten the desire for radical change in the ordering o f the country, while at the same time intensifying the traditional republican hatred for the socialists. In U Alpino, the paper Balbo edited during the last six months o f 1919 w hile at U dine, the virulent anti-socialism o f the young ardito was made very apparent w ith promises that, when the socialists could be tolerated no longer, 'w e shall kick them out o f this beautiful Italy . . .'.8 Y et in this he was litde different from m any o f the young men o f his time. W hen he returned to Ferrara at the end o f 1920, it was as an anti-socialist republican and reduce, desirous o f drastic political change, but— like so m any o f his contemporaries— unemployed and fundam entally disorientated. W hat served to bring him to the fore were his personal qualities rather than his political convictions. Essentially he 1 Balbo, Diario, p. 5. 1 For an account of the early years of Balbo» see S. Panunzio» Italo Balbo, pp. 815. Panunzio recounts Balbo’s attempt to join an abortive expedition of Ricciotti Garibaldi in 1910» his adherence to the Partito Mazziniano Italiano in 1911» his part in the student agitations of Ferrara between 1910 and 1914» and his contact with Mussolini in late 1914» when he had written a commemorative article on Giuglielmo Oberdan for Popolo d'Italia (20 Dec. 1914). * Quoted in S. Panunzio» op. cit.» p. 26» from L'Alpino of 18 Oct. 1919.

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possessed two qualities w hich distinguished him from the urban fascists he met in Ferrara on his return; the one was a driv­ ing am bition for social success, com bined w ith considerable ability, w hile the other was the cynicism o f the arrivista, ready to sacrifice principle for personal gain. These were the qualities that recommended him to the Central Com m ittee o f the fasci. H e was a character o f sufficient strength and drive to dom inate the town fascists and control their increasing doubts about the direction provincial fascism was taking; he was equally w ithout the idealism o f G aggioli or M ontanari, prepared to accept the support o f the A grarian Federation for the fascio and n ot disposed to jeopardize, as the Central Com m ittee feared the more idealist fascists m ight do, the considerable strength th at agrarian fascism was to bring to the entire fascist m ovem ent. This evidently made him equally acceptable to the Federazione A graria which, as both M arinoni and Prefect Pugliese had testi­ fied, was the force behind the provincial movement. In return for the patronage o f the more influential members o f provincial society, Balbo was to organize and lead their private m ilitia. Stories which circulated about him in later years and the testimony o f certain o f his enemies reinforce the impression that Balbo cam e to the fascio because o f the opportunities it offered for his personal advancem ent. According to one account, he replied to the initial approaches o f the first fascists by asking, ‘H ow m uch do you earn for being a fascist?’ .1 A more detailed description o f his recruitm ent to the fascist cause cam e from G uido T orti, a fascist o f the prima ora in Ferrara. In 1924, during the trial involving Balbo and the Voce Repubblicana, T orti w rote a letter to the paper pointing out that Balbo had not form ally joined the fascio until February 1921,* when there were already fifty-four nuclei established in the province. M oreover, he had joined only on certain conditions: . . . the passage of the future generalissimo from the Republic to the Monarchy was negotiated and completed with three persons— all alive, healthy, and able to testify (the hon. Barbato Gattelli, Olao Gaggioli— now consul of the Ferrara legion of the militia, and the undersigned)— on these conditions: , 1 Pittorru, Origini delfascismo ferrarese, p. 294. * Balbo had certain informal connections with the fascio before February; see Forti and Ghedini, L'avvento del fascismo, p. 132, and the Balilla of 23 Jan. 1921. None the less he clearly refused to take the tessera in January— at a time when others had already committed themselves to fascism.

C R ISIS AND C O N SO L ID A T IO N I.

*73

Monthly salary of L.1500.

3. Immediate appointment to the post of secretary.

3. Guarantee of employment in a bank at the end of the fascist battle (Inspector of the Banca Mutua). Only when we had assured Balbo of these points would he hand in his membership card of the'Republican Party; before, no!1

Attem pts to deny this were scotched by the revelations o f an acquaintance o f G attelli who recounted to the Voce Repubblicana G attelli’s own description o f Balbo’s attitude to fascist ap­ proaches. ‘It was that o f a man who, on taking on a jo b o f great im portance and responsibility in a party to which he had never belonged, showed no concern other than that o f bringing o ff a good piece o f business.*8 The weight o f evidence and the subsequent behaviour o f the young provincial leader makes it difficult to doubt the authenticity o f these accounts.8 T h e employment o f Balbo by the existing/ojao was to prove extrem ely im portant for its future development. It was he more than anyone else who determined that the consolidation o f the fascist movement in the province should be carried out in a manner acceptable to the landed proprietors and to the other groups that favoured fascism, the industrialists and shopkeepers o f the province. Certainly personal am bition played a part in this orientation; if he was to be assured o f a position in Fer­ rarese society, Balbo had to do all he could to please its most powerful elements. Y et there was more to it than that. Balbo, unlike the fascists o f the prima ora, was able to see that there were no alternatives to the course he was taking. Fascism o f the town could not assert itself on a provincial basis without the support o f the landowners. Thus both personally and politically he was prepared to enter into ever closer links w ith the Agrarian Federation. During the early years o f fascism at least, his immense demagogic and organizational abilities were to be placed at the disposition o f the proprietors. For certain fascists this represented a betrayal; G attelli was later to accuse Balbo 1 Voce Repubblicana, 29 Nov. 1924; letter o f Guido Torti, dated Ferrara 27 Nov. 1924. The president o f the Banca Mutua was none other than Vico Mantovani, president of the Agrarian Association. * Ibid., 7 Dec. 1924; letter from Carlo Russo. * It is worth recording at this point that Balbo, by September 192t at the latest, was also a mason (Palazzo Giustiniani), although this, given the strong links which existed between Mazzinians and masons, is less suggestive of certain attitudes than it might be today. See A C S , Seg. Part, del Duce, C R , 362/R ‘Balbo’, sf. 3, 'Appartenenza Massoneria’.

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‘o f having enslaved fascism to the agrari in general and to M antovani in particular*.1 In fact it was far more a tacit recognition that the basis o f power in the fascio lay, and had laid since Novem ber, w ith the agrari, and that there was no future for the fascio in a failure to recognize this reality. From the point o f view o f the proprietors, Balbo was very m uch the ideal leader for the fascio. A p art from the social attitudes o f the arrivista, m aking him particularly susceptible to their influence, his political attitudes at no point conflicted w ith w hat the proprietors could have wished. A t the tim e when the anti-socialism o f the landowners had reached the level o f requiring w hat was, in effect, a provincial rebellion against the authority o f the state, the agrari entrusted their fortunes to a young m an who had exactly the qualities they desired— a hatred o f politicians, a strong opposition to socialism, and a belief in the use o f violence. Balbo makes these attitudes per­ fectly clear in his diary, recounting how, at the end o f the w ar, he held all politicians in contem pt because o f their failure to conduct the w ar in an adequate m anner either m ilitarily or on the home front.* T h e corollary o f this contem pt was a rein­ forcem ent o f those m ilitary virtues w hich the politicians had betrayed. Thus Balbo saw himself, even after the w ar, princi­ pally as a soldier. W hen others returned from the front w ith their minds filled w ith idealism , Balbo returned w ith a kit­ bag full o f bombs, ready for the w ar o f the future.8 *My vocation,* he wrote, ‘was, and rem ained, that o f the soldier.*4 T h e m ajor part o f his attentions was concentrated, therefore, on the fascist squads, w ithout too m uch regard— at least in itially— for the political consequences o f his actions. H e confessed that ‘intuitively I tended to put the defensive and offensive efficiency o f the action squads before all political problem s.’5 For the landowners this emphasis was particularly w elcom e; it m eant that the strenuous pursuit o f violence in the province was not to be accom panied by a set o f embarrassing political conditions. Indeed, to attribute well-form ulated political aims to Balbo in early 1921 would be mistaken— as though he had aim ed from the beginning at fascist control o f the state. C learly, at the tim e 1 Voce Repubblicana, 7 Dec. 1924; letter from Carlo Russo. * Balbo, Diario, p. 6. * Ibid., pp. 7-8. * Ibid., p. 9. • Ibid.

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>75

o f his appointm ent to the leadership o f the fascio, he saw the future o f the movement in terms o f months and had not recognized that it m ight offer a career. E qually his eyes were still very m uch lim ited to the province. W hat he saw in fascism was the opportunity to impose him self at a provincial level, to vent his hostility against the socialists while at the same time being well paid and assured, in the long run, o f a profitable and secure post in a local bank. D uring the first few weeks o f his com mand, Balbo m ay still have been counting on the promised post in the bank. It is unlikely, however, that it took him very long to change his ideas. Fascism, which at least in its m ilitary aspect must have appeared at first to be a tem porary expedient, soon began to assume the proportions o f a movement in which it was possible to make a career. Precisely when Balbo arrived at this con­ clusion it is not possible to say, but certainly there was never any suggestion in Ferrara that he m ight be considering giving up his command o f the fascists. O nce involved in the struggle, he was, in any case, swept up in the gathering momentum o f a movement which saw no reason to call a halt to its actions, and w hich, from certain points o f view , could hardly have done so. As long as there rem ained socialist leagues and Cam ere del Lavoro to be destroyed, Balbo was content to move from one easily gained success to the next. Because there had been no definite target for fascism, there was never a point at which the fascists could feel that the process o f destruction could be halted and the squads disbanded. It was clear as w ell that, even after the socialists were defeated, the squads would still have a role in ensuring that Zirardini did not try to reconstruct his move­ ment. Factors such as these contrived to keep the provincial leader involved with the fascio while it still appeared to have little secure future. By the time the provincial situation was clearer and it m ight have been possible for him to consider a return to more normal civilian existence, he had recognized that there were larger possibilities before him than he had originally im agined. T h e dom inant position which Balbo’s direction o f the fascio perm itted to the proprietors was apparent in all the actions o f the provincial fascist movement during the early months o f 1921. T h e offensive against the leagues was clearly to the benefit o f the vested interests o f the landowners. Equally im portant

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for the agrari and the professional bourgeoisie o f the town was the cam paign conducted against the socialist provincial and com­ m unal administrations. Both the Balilla, the organ o f the fascio, and the Gazzetta Ferrarese published articles during M arch accusing the socialists o f m aladm inistration and mis­ appropriation o f funds. It was alleged, for exam ple, that L.30,000 intended for the aid o f soldiers’ widows and other victim s o f the w ar had been used during 1919 for the financing o f socialist labour exchanges.1 Protests were made about the fact that the furniture o f the provincial council chambers had been transferred in certain cases to the Cam era del Lavoro and its branch offices. M ore effective, however, in dislodging the administrations was the ‘tax strike’ conducted by the landowners o f the A grarian Federation. T h ey refused to pay the sovrimposta due to the councils and were encouraged in this attitude, so the Scintilla claim ed,8 by the Cassa di Risparm io o f Ferrara and other responsible bodies. B y the end o f M arch only about a third o f the total owed to the administrations had been paid, m aking continued functioning o f the councils quite impossible. T h e provincial adm inistration resigned together w ith the Ferrara com munal adm inistration on 29 M arch, giving as their reason the persistent obstruction w ith w hich they were faced. It was adm itted that com munal affairs were in com plete disorder and that the commune was on the point o f bankruptcy, but the blam e was put squarely on the shoulders o f the unco-operative landowners.8 These resignations were followed during A pril by those o f almost all the other com ­ munal administrations.1*4* T h e fall o f the socialist administrations was doubly ad­ vantageous to the fascists; for not only were the socialists out o f power, but the commissari appointed by the prefect were in m any cases pro-fascist. R aoul Caretti was appointed to Poggio R enatico, M ario Sam aritani to Com acchio, G iulio D ivisi to M igliarino, and L uigi Sani to Berra. Ferruccio Luppis 1 Certain o f these charges had at least some basis in fact. In September 1921 the commissario prefettizio of Codigoro revealed that charges were to be laid against the former socialist councillors because much o f the known income o f the commune could not be accounted for under expenditure. See Balilla, 11 Sept. ig 2 i. * Scintilla, 2 Apr. 1921. * Ibid. 4 For details o f certain of these resignations see the Gazzétta Ferrarese, 9 Apr. 1921 for Massafiscaglia, 10 Apr. for Comacchio, 13 Apr. for Berra, and *20 Apr. for Argenta and Bondeno.

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was given special responsibilities for the administration o f the hospitals o f Ferrara.1 A ll these men were known to be either fascist or strongly favourable to fascism at the tim e o f their appointm ent. N or was it surprising that such men were chosen. T h e prefect was entirely sympathetic to the fascist cause. M uch later— in 1924— this was adm itted publicly. W hen Pugliese was attacked in the columns o f Avanti ! for changing his political convictions to suit the prevailing clim ate, it was the Gazzetta Ferrarese that sprang to his defence. . . . Commendatore Samuele Pugliese has always been a fascist. If in the Ferrarese it was possible to open the way to a redemptive fascism and brush aside the rubbish— large and small— of socialism . . . it was due to the open and frank action of Prefect Comm. Pugliese. He stood up with vigour to the socialist rabble which polluted all public administration.'

T h e former prefect made no attem pt to deny that he had been partial in those days. Instead he sent a telegram to the editor o f the Gazzetta, thanking him for his kind words.1*34 T h e value to the landowners o f this substitution o f fascists for socialists in administration became apparent during the course o f the year. The power o f the provincial administration which, through the appointm ent o f the commissari prefettizi, was placed once again in the hands o f the bourgeoisie had very direct uses. M ost im portant was the power o f the commissari to establish the level o f contributions payable by the landowners to the administration. Evidence that the level was in certain cases drastically reduced in comparison with that previously estab­ lished by the socialists was printed in the Scintilla.* T h e socialist paper reported that, in Novem ber o f 1921, the main landed proprietors o f M esola were distributing free to all their workers a paper called the Voce di Mesola, and commented that the agrari were no doubt financing the paper with some o f the L.500,000 they had saved from the reduction in local taxation carried out by the new commissario. In the town o f Ferrara, at least, the price o f a less affluent communal council was paid by the sick and the poor; Ferruccio Luppis reported that he had 1 T he names of these men— with the exception o f Divisi— appear in the Gazzetta Ferrame, passim, for December 1922. For Divisi, see Forti and Ghedini, V amento delfascismo, p. 142. * Gazzetta Ferrarese, io M ar. 1924. ' Ibid., 12 M ar. 1924. 4 4 Nov. 1921.

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attem pted to reduce com munal costs by cutting down on hospital staff and curtailing poor relief.1 A further target for the offensive o f the bourgeoisie was the co-operative organization in the province. Although this organization was in no sense com parable to those existing in other areas o f Em ilia— Rom agna, being both o f very lim ited extent and o f only recent acquisition by the Cam era del Lavoro, it none the less represented a focal point o f socialism in certain areas and a possible means o f escaping the choice between league and fascist syndicate. O n this basis alone its continued existence was intolerable to the fascists. M oreover, the co-operatives, as economic institutions, evidently conflicted w ith the interests o f those who were the m ajor supporters o f the fascio. T h e proprietors resented and feared the cooperative agricole, with their clear collectivist overtones, w hile shopkeepers and com m ercial concerns viewed w ith apprehension the growth o f co-ops o f produzione e lavoro and those o f consumo. T h ey had been left in litde doubt about the purpose o f these. D uring the period o f socialist suprem acy, Giuseppe Bardellini had m ade it clear that the task o f the co-operatives was 'th at o f fighting private business in order to benefit the consumer’ .8 As the fascists took control o f more and more o f the insti­ tutions o f the province, the anomalous position o f the co-ops becam e obvious. Tow ards the end o f A pril— a date suggesting that the co-ops were o f only secondary im portance to the fascists— the fascists decided to put an end to the anom aly. T h e directors o f the Consorzio delle Cooperative were sum­ moned to the seat o f the fascio and, in the course o f w hat was described as 'a friendly discussion’, it was agreed that the co-ops should come under the control o f the fascist sindacati economici. T h e socialist director and the inspectors o f the organization were 'released’ from their duties. In their place, at the head o f the movement he had built up but lost control o f in 1919, was appointed R affaele M azzanti, a further convert to12 1 Gazzetta Ferrarese, 13 Dec. 1922; report of Ferruccio Luppis on his work as commissario prefettizio. The importance of the issue of taxation is revealed by Bachi in his analysis of the economic situation in 1920. He notes large increases in the taxes on land and on commerce in Ferrara, and quotes the socialist declaration that provincial taxes should hit ‘all forms of private wealth and all capitalist profits, without any other maximum limit than necessity*. R . Bachi, V Italia economica nel 1920 (Città di Castello, 1921), pp. 368-71. 2 Quoted in Sitti and Marighelli, op. cit., p. 80.

C R ISIS AND C O N SO L ID A T IO N the fascist cause. Socialist protests at this type o f negotiation did not help théir case. A commission sent from the M inistry o f Labour to examine the situation found that the adminis­ tration had been so haphazard, with registers and accounts not properly kept and misappropriation o f funds for political purposes, that it was considered necessary to appoint a com­ missario governativo to put matters in order.1 So difficult did this prove that the original decree establishing the commissariato for only three months had to be renewed in the autum n.2 D uring this time the co-operatives effectively ceased to function. The political elections o f M ay provided further confirmation o f the progress made by fascism within the province. In very general terms, G iolitti’s decision to dissolve parliam ent was m otivated by the calculation that socialists and catholics would be returned to the new parliam ent weakened and thus more disposed to co-operate with a reformed liberal govern­ ment. His much-discussed decision to invite the fascists to join the governm ental list was taken, therefore, principally in consideration o f the effect their presence in the Blocchi N azionali would have on the socialists and catholics. In respect o f Ferrara, at least, this proved to be no m iscalculation. The election results bore am ple testimony to the decline o f the socialist organization.8 O nly in the town o f Ferrara, where political consciousness was more developed, did the socialist vote hold up at all well. Even here it was cut by h a lf in respect o f the vote gained in 1919. Outside the town the collapse o f the leagues was reflected in the enormous increase in support for the Blocco Nazionale. In the rural areas where, in 1919, it had polled only a few more than 4,000 votes, the Blocco now amassed nearly 37,000. Avanti! and the Scintilla blamed this débâcle on the intim idation o f voters, and their columns provide sufficient 1 Ibid., p. 84. * Ibid. * The results for the province of Ferrara (figures for the elections of 1919 in brackets) were: PSI 16,967 (43»7a6) Blocco Naz. 49,122 ( 6,939) PPI 3 ,7 i 9 ( 7,36 o) Communist 353 ( — ) The results for the town of Ferrara were: PSI 6,832 (11,530) Blocco Naz. ra ( , ) PPI ( 2,564) Figures from the Gazzetta Ferrarese, 18 M ay 1921.

,394 2 574 1,579

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exam ples to put beyond doubt— if any existed— the truth o f these accusations.1 Despite G iolitti’s circular, w arning against the devaluation o f the elections through violence, prefect and police were not disposed to interfere too m uch w ith fascist supervision o f the polling. M ore revealing than the results in themselves were the elements w hich com bined to create the Blocco N azionale. In theory, the political elections were a possible point o f crisis for the fascio, capable o f opening up a conflict between the old political élite o f the province, accustomed to w ielding power in M ontecitorio when it was not excluded by the socialists, and the new force o f young, crusading fascists. In fact there were virtu ally no signs o f friction between the two groups. A t first sight this appeared to be the result o f a compromise reached over the candidates to be put forward by the Blocco. M antovani and Pietro Sitta stood as the representatives o f the agrari and the bourgeoisie o f the town, while M ussolini, G attelli, and Leopoldo T u m iad represented the fascio— the last named having close links w ith the organizadons o f ex-combattcnti. Both old and new political forces appeared to be fairly repre­ sented on the lists. Y e t this equality o f representation was more apparent than real. Testim ony to this was the emphasis that M ussolini gave to his association w ith the agrari rather than w ith the urban fascists o f the original group. It was decided that the key to victory in the elections lay with ‘il binomio M ussolini-M antovani’, a com bination w hich the Central Com m ittee o f the fasci would have rejected out o f hand at the beginning o f the year.2 E qually telling was the careful prearrangem ent o f the preference vote in the province. Fascist organization and violence procured 44,690 preference votes for M ussolini, while M antovani ran him close w ith 42,976. Sitta 1 See» for example. Avanti/, 18 M ay 1921 ‘The workers were attacked and searched before entering the electoral rooms. In the electoral committees o f the communes of Ferrara, Copparo, Ro, Cologna, Formignana, etc., the workers were loaded on to lorries, beaten, threatened, and forced to vote for the Bloc. W ith the help of documents we shall also demonstrate the complicity o f the police.9 See also Forti and Ghedini, L avvento del fascismo, p. 248: ‘Several lorries, loaded with posters and electoral forms for the hammer and sickle were stopped, un­ loaded, and their contents used to make cheerful bonfires along the roads o f the province.9 * Forti and Ghedini, V avvento del fascismo9 p. 212. The alliance, according to these writers, represented ‘il programma fascistico-agrario, through which Italy expects her national revival9.

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and Tum iati followed these, G attelli— the only genuine repre­ sentative o f the local fascio— coming much lower on the list.1 In reality, therefore, the elections were far more a triumph for the supporters— the fiancheggiatori— o f the fascio than for the fascists themselves. Mussolini, certainly, headed the list, but he had given his open support to M antovani, and thus to the old political élite o f which the agrari formed the centre. They, rather than the fascists, were the beneficiaries o f the election, which was fought openly on the basis o f the conflict between fascism and socialism, and which was won— at least in part— because o f the employment o f the fascist squads to regiment the voters. Such a result reflects very clearly the terms on which the fascio operated up to this point, and explains the absence o f friction between old and new political formations. It was not that the fascio needed the support o f the agrari in order to have any chance in the elections; rather it was that, between them, agrari and Balbo had succeeded in depriving the fascio o f all its autonomy, rendering it an instrument to be used for the benefit o f those who supported it financially. A crisis over the elections was unlikely therefore; Balbo understood very well that the power o f the fascio was based firm ly on the support o f the Agrarian Federation and was not prepared to jeopardize that support by claim ing too much for the fascio. This made the agrarian character o f provincial fascism very clear. None the less it was not rejected but supported enthusiastically by Mussolini. Indeed, ‘il binomio M ussolini-M antovani’ was very expressive o f the alliance which had been formed between agrari and fascism : in return for the retention o f their power in 1 Preference votes expressed for Mussolini and the six other Ferrara candidates elected were (for the province only) : Mussolini 44,690 Mantovani 42.976 Tumiati , * Sitta Gattelli 23,107 Zirardini « Bogiankino 12,786 from Gazzetta Ferrarese, 18 M ay 1921. This success of the blocco nazionale was not reproduced on a national level. The socialists returned to the Chamber only slightly less strong than they had been in 1919» while the popolari actually increased their representation. Giolitti’s attempt to utilize the fascists in order to weaken his opponents was a total failure, therefore; it served only to give prominence and a certain respectability to the fascists, who gained thirty-five seats in the new parliament.

35 09 30,437 2,945

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the province, the proprietors were ready to forward a move­ ment which aim ed at the control o f the state. The notable absentees from the Blocco were the popolari, considerably embarrassed by the clarification o f their position which the political elections required. T h e identity o f interest between m any provincial catholics and the supporters o f the fascists had been underlined by the adm inistrative elections o f 1920, when the P .P .I. had been more than ready to enter the contest together w ith the liberals and democrats o f the provin­ cial bourgeoisie. W ith the developm ent o f the fascist movement, the popolari, no less than the other members o f that electoral alliance, had been prepared to offer whole-hearted support to the squadristi. Despite the protests raised about their presence among the fascists at the beginning o f the year, m any members o f the catholic party had continued to hold the fascist tessera and to operate with the squads. Indeed, in 1922 the leader o f the provincial section o f the P .P .I. declared w ith pride that there was a not single member o f the party who had not also been a fascist in the early months o f 1921.1 It was from this symbiosis o f the two movements that the embarrassment for the popolari sprang; for it was difficult to claim allegiance to the cause they were intent on depriving o f votes. Y et it was an embarrassment entirely on the side o f the catholics; it was they who had to choose between the protection o f their social and econom ic positions in the province through a continued support for fascism or the m aintenance o f an allegiance to a party w hich had achieved little in Ferrara. This dilem m a was fully appreciated by the fascists, who did not hesitate to press home their advantage. O pportunity had arisen for the anti-clerical sentiments o f certain o f the fascists to be given free rein. T h e Balilla began to attack the equivocal position o f the popolari, accusing the catholics in particular o f exploiting the collapse o f the socialist leagues in order to strengthen their own position in the rural areas.123 T o these attacks the catholics responded as if astounded at the hostility o f the fascio, m aking pleas that the ‘unione sacra’ between fascists and catholics should not be broken sim ply because they were under the necessity o f running a separate electoral list.8 1 Domenica dell'Operaio, 30 July 1922; article by the lawyer Mario Dotti. 2 See, for example, Balilla, 24 Apr. 1921. 3 Domenica dell'Operaio, 24 Apr. 1921.

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Y et some sort o f choice was clearly required. In the circum ­ stances o f 1921 the fascists were eager that it should be made. T h e results o f the elections confirmed their confidence and substantiated the fears o f the leaders o f the P .P .I.; the catholic party lost at least h a lf its support in the province, support which must have gone almost entirely to the fascists. T h e readiness w ith w hich the fascists were prepared to offend the popolari testified, ju st as m uch as the election success itself, to the position o f strength achieved by the provincial movement. H aving made the right friends, Balbo could afford to risk m aking a few enemies among the bourgeoisie. It is not difficult to see how, from this position o f strength, Balbo’s horizons became far broader than they were in the early weeks o f the ‘squadrisi offensive. The elections confirmed this predom inant position in the province: equally they made clear the im portance o f the Em ilian fascist organization to the national movement. W ithin the space o f a few months, there­ fore, Balbo had ceased to be an unknown, unemployed, exardito, and had become a figure o f considerable im portance in the eyes o f the fascist Central Com m ittee. T o m aintain this im portance he had few alternatives open to him. W ell aware that his principal gifts lay in the organization and deploym ent o f the squads, he had to seek to retain the momentum o f the m ilitary organization, and, since Ferrara no longer provided adequate targets for his actions, his concerns became regional rather than provincial. Thus there is a considerable increase in reports o f the Ferrara squads operating in other provinces during June and July. In mid-June for exam ple, the prefect o f Ferrara was notified that squads from the province had been operating in V enezia,1 while in Ju ly the prefect o f Ravenna reported that ferraresi were circulating with the squads o f his province.8 These operations were required by the internal situation in Ferrara as much as by the problems facing other provincial fascist organizations. T h ey suggested clearly that the momentum o f ‘squadrism’ carried it towards a continual expansion o f activity, first to regional control and then im plicitly towards control o f the state. E qually they demonstrated how im portant it was for Balbo that the fascist movement should continue to develop its m ilitary aspect, since it was only as an 1 A C S, Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 19121, b. 77B, 14 June 1921. * A C S, ibid., 12 July 1921.

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exponent o f 'squadroni' that he could hope to rem ain a figure o f im portance to the national movement. Freedom o f action for the squads becam e in this w ay the overriding concern o f the young provincial leader. O ther considerations were subordinated to this end, particularly those regarding the consolidation o f the provincial movement. It was readily apparent that the greatest freedom o f action could be attained by the avoidance o f problems w ithin the province, thus perm itting attentions to be concentrated on the larger issues o f the extension o f fascist control. This m eant, in effect, that Balbo was disposed to continue the line he had followed in the early months o f the year— accepting the in­ fluence o f the A grarian Federation over the fascio and doing nothing to offend that Federation. T o attem pt to do otherwise, to utilize the stronger position enjoyed by the fascio in the spring o f 1921 in order to conduct an attack on the agrari, was inconceivable, because the links o f finance and personnel were already far too strong to change course w ithout w recking the local organization and destroying the squads. A s at the be­ ginning o f the year, personal interest and political necessity again determined that Balbo and the proprietors retained their alliance— for the first because the alliance established the conditions in the province w hich perm itted him to reinforce his national position, and for the second because, like Balbo, they saw that the possibilities o f fascism extended beyond the provincial reaction they had originally seen in it. Balbo showed him self em inendy capable o f preparing the local fascists to meet their changing function. His ability to do this was increased by his appointm ent in Ju ly to the post o f segretario federale o f the new ly created Federazione Provinciale, a body which effectively took power aw ay from the town fascio and recognized the increased im portance o f the rural nuclei.1 T h e circular distributed through the province as a result o f the first meeting o f the provincial federation showed very clearly where Balbo placed his priorities.* H e was evidently concerned 1 Under the new regulations, nuclei o f more than fifty members became fasci in their own right. See Balilla, 19 June 1921. 1 Federazione dei Fasci Ferraresi di Combattimento, circolare No. 508 di prot. 'A tutti i Segretari politici dei Fasci Ferraresi’. T he circular is undated, but from internal evidence is presumed to be of late June or July 1921. A copy was sent by Prefect M ori of Bologna to the Ministry o f the Interior in August; see A C S , M in. Int., D G PS, A G R 1922, b. 61, 24 Aug. 1921.

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that public opinion should remain as far as possible on the side o f the fascists, advising his supporters that individual actions which brought the fascists into disrepute would in future be dealt with by expulsion. O n a more general level he was anxious that disaffection among the rural workers should not pass unnoticed by the federal authorities. T h e segretario o f each fascio was instructed to send reports twice a month to these authorities, outlining the standing o f the fascio among the rural population and assessing the activity and credit o f the fascist syndicates in the same terms. These instructions were not the central feature o f the cir­ cular, however. Far more space was given to the orders on the streamlining o f the squads. A ll secretaries were ordered to provide, within a week, precise details o f the squads under their control. T h ey were advised that, if they so desired, this side o f their activity ‘which we shall call warlike* could be delegated to responsible fascists, preference in this being due to ex­ officers o f the arditi or the infantry. T h e detailed reports were to include the names o f those in both squadre d'a&one and squadre di riserva (composed o f the older fascists), and were to specify if the individual fascist had served in the arm y and, if so, what his rank and special training had been. Regarding the organ­ ization, squads were to be composed o f ten men including a capo squadray w hile there were to be three squads to a platoon, and three platoons to a com pany. Each platoon and each com pany was to have a commander and a sub-commander. It was urged that squadristi should form squads o f motor cyclists and platoons o f cyclists as soon as possible, while machine gunners were advised that they should have a knowledge o f four different types o f gun.1 Reports on the quantities o f weapons and munitions in the possession o f each fascio were to be made once a m onth to the Consiglio Federale o f the fasci. In con­ clusion Balbo informed the squadristi that they should prepare uniforms for themselves— m ilitary trousers together w ith a black shirt. These were not the instructions o f a poseur. There seems no reason to doubt that the squads did possess machine-guns and were otherwise w ell equipped. In his diary Balbo emphasizes 1 Although not mentioned in the circular, it seems that squads of horsemen were also formed. These were reported in action during the autumn, for example at the funeral o f a fascist, when 'much admired was a group of twenty-four fascists from Vigarano on horseback*. A C S , M R F b. 104, 'Porotto*, 19 O ct. 1921.

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that one o f his principal preoccupations was the arm ing o f the squads; he adds in parentheses, ‘Under m y command we did not want for rifles, bombs, and machine guns.*1 His concern for armaments was matched by his preoccupation w ith rapid organization. In the circular cited above, he exhorted the provincial fascists to act with speed : ‘It is essential that w e see as soon as possible to the regular m ilitary formation o f our forces. Everyone must get to work, therefore, without sparing energy. By next September the fascist regiments o f Ferrara must already be m agnificently drawn up in their ranks.’ Precisely what these regiments were to be used for was not made clear at any point. Balbo confined him self to a vague phrase on this m atter: ‘ O n ly w ith a disciplined arm y shall we win the decisive victory.’ T h e carefully structured organization which Balbo had begun to create was threatened almost at the outset by the pact o f pacification. Scarcely had the fascists relaxed from their exertions at the polling stations when rumours began to cir­ culate that Mussolini was attem pting to arrange some sort o f truce with the socialist party and that this initiative had the support o f the new government headed by Bonomi. As the rumours hardened into fact, the provincial directory made its position quite plain. The Balilla, from the beginning o f July, carried articles arguing that the conflict between socialism and fascism was a struggle between two irreconcilable concepts, and suggesting that between the two there was no possibility o f a peace, or a truce, or indeed o f anything which m ight interfere with the existing form o f the conflict. Peace, it was conceded, was all very well at the right time, but in the conditions o f m id-1921 it was something which could only suppress and destroy fascism, ‘which— for the moment— is not peace but w ar’ .2 Even the socialists, faced by this intransigence, were forced to adm it that an accord in the province was impossible.8 Prefect Pugliese, confronted with Bonomi’s request for repre­ sentatives o f both groups to be sent to M ilan to take part in the negotiations, informed his superiors that he had been unable to persuade either the fascio or the Cam era del Lavoro to send delegates or even to pass a resolution adhering to the talks.4 1 Balbo, Diario, p. 10. 1 Balilla, 7 Aug. 1921. * Scintilla, 9 July 1921 and 6 Aug. 1921. 4 A C S , Min. Int., Gabinetto Bonomi, Ordine Pubblico 1921-2; Pugliese to Min. Int., 12 July 1921.

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This im placable hostility to the pact was retained throughout the struggle. Reporting on the congress o f the opponents o f pacification, held in Bologna on 16 August, the prefect o f Ravenna identified the ferraresi as being not only the largest group o f representatives but also among the most intransigent.1 Besides this intransigence, however, the ferraresi provided little. It was left above all to G randi and M arsich to spell out to the congress both the im plications o f the pact and the road which would have to be taken if the pact were rejected by the congress.8 Balbo was very much the follower rather than the leader at this stage. None the less there are no indications that he disagreed with the opposition presented to M ussolini; for the moment he was perfectly ready to embrace the idea o f a ‘national’, revo­ lutionary solution to Italy’s problems, a solution which would involve both squads and syndicates in decisive roles. He was sufficiently in agreement w ith the others to make the journey w ith G randi to Gardone, ostensibly to ask D ’Annunzio to take part in a fascist commemoration to be staged at D ante's tomb, but most probably to sound out the possibilities o f the hero o f Fiume heading a m arch on Rom e.8 The disappointing response received could not alter the hostility o f the Em ilian fascists to the pact. A ll it meant was that— very quickly— Balbo and G randi in particular began to hedge their opposition, emphasizing that they rejected the pact but not the leadership o f M ussolini.4 T o those who understood the aims o f Balbo's intensive organization o f the squads, certain o f the reasons for the rejec­ tion o f the pact would have been im m ediately clear. Prefect Pugliese succeeded only in demonstrating the extent to which he had failed to understand the intentions o f the young ras when he ascribed the opposition to the pact to the memory o f fascists killed by socialists.6 In some measure, o f course, feelings such as these did count among the rank and file o f the fascist movement: certainly the murder o f three fascists at M igliarino in early 1 A C S, Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1921, b. 74, 19 Aug. 192t. * For a further account of this congress, see A C S, ibid., 16 Aug. 1921, Prefect Mori to Min. Int. • See De Felice, Mussolini il fascista, 1. 151, note 3. 4 For Balbo’s careful courting of Mussolini at this point, see De Felice, ibid., p . 157, note I ; for Grandi’s position, revealed at the consiglio nazionale of Florence o f 26-7 August, see F. Cordova, ‘ Le origini dei sindacati fascisti’, in Storia Con­ temporanea, 4 (1970), 986. 6 AC S, Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1921, b. 74, 14 Aug. 1921 ; Prefect Pugliese to S.E. Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri.

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August did nothing, as it was intended to do nothing, to m ake the agreem ent easier.1 Y et, had it been necessary, feelings resulting from such incidents could undoubtedly have been overridden. T h e point Pugliese neglected wàs that the pact w ould, in effect, have killed the squads since they would have been unable to act w ith the vigour that kept them alive. This, in its turn, would have been the ruin o f Balbo, o f little im ­ portance to the national movement or to the agrari in a situation where his abilities as a m ilitary organizer were not required. T h e abandonm ent o f violence would have m eant nothing less than the collapse o f the provincial fascist movement, w eighted heavily in favour o f the squads as it had become. It would have been more realistic for the prefect to point to the feelings o f the squadristi when faced w ith the prospect o f an end to the com radeship, power, and prestige which had flowed their w ay. T h ey em braced the m ilitary solution to the problems o f the nation because for them, as for Balbo, it appeared to be the only solution which could m aintain the provincial movem ent in being. Balbo was undoubtedly given tem peram entally to such a solution as w ell ; none the less it was the internal situation w ithin the province that dictated his position and required th at the pact be rejected and the . path o f apparent m ilitary in­ surrection pursued. In fact, Balbo cam e out o f the crisis provoked by the pact in a very strong position. Because the rejection o f the pact m eant that the squads were to continue to be o f im portance, the place o f Balbo, already the foremost ‘squadrist’ leader in the region, was confirmed and even enhanced. This was stated very clearly w ith the m arch on Ravenna in Septem ber. A lthough ostensibly a demonstration to honour the tom b o f D ante, the m arch had m any other objectives. It illustrated in particular that B albo and G randi had no intention o f abandoning the squads; the m ilitary precision w ith which the columns o f fascists m oved, their organization into platoons and companies, their uni­ forms— none o f this suggested that the m arch represented the swan song o f squadrismo. Balbo wrote subsequently that it was during this m arch that he saw for the first tim e the potential o f the squads and the possibilities that lay ahead o f the fascists.* » A C S , ibid. 1 For an account of the march on Ravenna, and this comment o f Balbo, see Balbo, Diario, p. ia.

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This is hardly to be credited. His intensive organization o f the fascists o f Ferrara and the rejection o f the pact itself indicate that the march was the first test— and a successful one— o f ideas which had been developing for several months. T h e threat that the pact posed to the provincial fascist movement was seen especially clearly not only in relation to the squads, but also in so far as it threatened the still uncertain syndicalist organization. T h e sindacati autonomy by their very existence, demonstrated the division that existed between M ussolini’s conception o f fascism and the significance the squads had given to it in Ferrara. T heir creation had been intended to institutionalize the defeat o f the socialists, to make a return to the old Cam era del Lavoro an im possibility. The pact would have rendered this anti-socialist basis o f their existence com pletely insecure. M oreover, in rem oving the freedom that the squads enjoyed in their attacks on the socialists, one o f the m ajor supports o f fascist syndicalism would have disappeared; for, if m any had come to the syndicates o f their own accord, by August 1921, when the economic crisis was already becoming more severe, it was plain that they m ight have to be held in by force. T o have perm itted defections would have been disastrous, partly because the syndicalists, to be effective, could no more accept the existence o f a strong com petitor than the socialists before them, and partly because a reduction in the efficiency o f syndicalism would, like the ending o f squadrismoy have resulted in the abandonment o f the fascists by the proprietors, no longer interested in supporting a movement which was o f no use to them. Thus, from the syndicalist point o f view, the vision o f a national revolutionary syndicalism put forward by G randi was acceptable. Y et it was so only to the degree that it preserved syndicalism against the menaces o f the pact. In reality, Fer­ rarese syndicalism showed rem arkably few o f those D ’ Annunzian attitudes which G randi had demonstrated in Bologna. Indeed, it is not possible to find a single case during 1921 o f the syndi­ cates being used to do other than turn back the clock, restore to the agrari the position which the socialists had eroded over the years, and bring about precisely that ‘agrarian slavery’ which D ’Annunzio him self had denounced. Although the Cam era Sindacale m aintained that it stood by the pact o f M arch 1920, the gains that certain proprietors had made during February,

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March» and A pril were never denounced.1 T h e uffici di colloca­ mento were not re-established under fascist control, the obbligati returned to break the front o f worker solidarity; in short, the pact o f M arch 1920 rem ained a dead letter for the m any who felt no obligation to observe it. This situation had become apparent even before the pact o f pacification was mooted. In Ju ly, Rossoni defended his organization from the accusations directed at it by the socialists, arguing that the proprietors had taken a position w hich was Correttissimo* in respect o f the agricultural pacts. T h e Scintilla responded to these claim s by asking w hy it was that, w ith a pact w hich had been designed to provide an equal distribution o f labour through the province, there were labourers who had not been em ployed for seven months and others who had been in work for only six or seven days during that period. It asked in addition if Rossoni knew that harvesters were being used in the fields— this in open contravention o f the agreem ent the Cam era Sindacale claim ed to be honouring.1 From August onwards wage reductions began to take place w ithout any protest from the fascist syndicates. T h e collapse o f the provincial hemp m arket, undoubtedly extrem ely severe,3 was used as an excuse to speculate on the insecure position o f the rural workers. Those involved in the production o f the crop were offered either paym ent in kind or else a paym ent based on a 25 per cent reduction in the agreed tariff.4 In the industrial establishments o f the province, moves were m ade in the same direction. It appears that the zuccherifici were am ong the first to seek an advantage from the destruction o f the socialist organization. In O ctober the Balilla issued a w arning to them concerning the observance o f the pacts to which they had agreed.5 Y et there is no record o f either the sugar com panies backing down on the threatened reductions in wages or o f the fascists taking action. Propaganda was no doubt preferable to action where some o f the m ajor financiers o f fascism w ere concerned. Sim ilarly the D itta Fratelli Santini o f Ferrara began to recoup the L.2,500 it had paid to the fascist subscription o f 1 See above, Chapter 7, p. 145. * Scintilla, 30 July 1921, which also reports Rossoni’s comments. s See above, Chapter 6, p. 109, and also below, Chapter 9, p. 215. 4 A C S , M in. Int., DGPS, A G R 1921, b. 58B, 6 Aug. 1921; Pugliese to S.E, Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri. * Balilla, 9 O ct. 1921.

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A pril. W orkers were given the choice o f accepting wage re­ ductions varying from 18 per cent to 40 per cent or o f leaving the com pany. O vertim e was to be paid at only 10 per cent in excess o f the norm al rate.1 O n one occasion— in O ctober— the Balilla attem pted to scotch the story that the fascists were aiding the proprietors in their reaction against the labourers. It announced that the rates for compartecipazione and mezzadrìa in the region o f Poggiorenatico were being raised from the 31 per cent agreed in M arch 1920 to between 35 per cent and 50 per cent.8 Y et this report has to be seen in the context o f two others, also o f O ctober. Earlier in the month, the Gazzetta Ferrarese had stated that representatives o f the fascio were m aking efforts to dispose o f more than 2,000 plots o f land at Poggiorenatico, and that the land was to be worked in compartecipazione, mezzadria, or affittanza.8 O n 30 O ctober, however, the prefect wrote that disturbances in m any areas o f the province were being caused b y communists who were attem pting to prevent workers from taking on land at compartecipazione.4 T h e increased share o f the crop offered by the fascists was sim ply a move in this conflict; it was the carrot w hich was to entice workers to take up again the old systems o f land-working in the face o f opposition, often violent, from the communists. O nce the land was taken on such terms, the proprietors knew from their experience before the w ar that the compartecipanti would have split loyalties and w ould be very difficult to reorganize in any socialist resurrection. T h e fascist syndicates did nothing to oppose these manoeuvrings; rather they were the instruments by which success was obtained. As such, it would be unrealistic to see in them any o f that ‘revolutionary* charge with which G randi hoped to instil the entire syndicalist movement. The difference o f view between the leaders o f syndicalism in Ferrara and the Bolognese ras became evident at the syndicalist conference held in Ferrara in O ctober. Rossoni and Balbo steadfastly opposed G randi’s call for a syndicalism with a ‘clear fascist imprint*, both main­ taining that the syndicates should rem ain independent o f the political movement.8 Rossoni no doubt found his reasons in 1 Scintilla, 12 Nov. 1921. 1 Balilla, 16 Oct. 1921. * Gazzetta Ferrarese, 3 O ct. 1921. 4 A C S , Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1921, b. 77B, 31 Oct. 1921. * For a further report of the conference see Popolo d'Italia 21 Oct. 1921 ; also Cordova, ‘L e orìgini dei sindacati facisti p. 986.

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the concepts developed w ith the U .I.L .; the syndicates were themselves to provide the government o f the country, and were thus obliged to rem ain without precise links to any party. Balbo, on the other hand, saw in G randi’s call for a ‘sindacalismo nazionale* a threat to his own position. W hile he would possibly not have objected to closer links between syndicates and political movement if the terms had been right, Balbo recognized that G randi’s proposals clearly required a genuine functioning o f the syndicalist movement on the behalf o f its adherents. This to him was unthinkable, since it im plied a separation o f provincial fascism from the landowners and a rejection o f the already advanced stage o f agrarian reaction. This in turn would gravely jeopardize the stability o f the squads, and thus the basis on which he had built his own position. For Balbo the continued support o f the agrari was essential because it was only this which perm itted him to exploit his position as the leading exponent o f squadrismo. T h at these stances had already been taken up in O ctober makes it difficult therefore to regard the defeat o f G randi at the Rom e congress o f the fasci as being a reverse for the Ferrarese leaders. W hile it can be accepted that the young Bolognese leader and his ideas on a national syndicalism emerged from the congress defeated, it is less easy to subscribe to the view that ‘the fascist syndical organizations o f Ferrara also cam e out b e a te n . . .*.1 In fact, the representatives o f the Ferrara syndicalists had never aspired to the victory which the Augusteo is alleged to have denied them. O n the contrary, they had shown every readiness during 1921 to construct a local syndicalist movement subservient to the proprietors. Rossoni continued to make his speeches forwarding the idea o f an autonomous syndicalism ; in Ferrara at the end o f D ecem ber8 and in Bologna in January 1922s he stood by his position. None the less his actions speak louder than his words. Despite his concern for a syndicalism independent o f the party, he showed little interest in constructing in Ferrara a syndicalism independent o f the most im m ediate enemies o f the rural workers— the proprietari terrieri. T h e evidently reactionary nature o f provincial fascism had 1 De Felice, Mussolini il fascista, 1. 187. * A C S, Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1921, b. 58B, 30 Dec. 1921. * See Cordova, 'L e origini dei sindacati fascisti’, pp. 990-1.

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not passed unnoticed, however. The rejection o f the pact was not unanimous among provincial fascists; for some it symbolized only too clearly the extent to which the fascist movement had become the instrument o f the local landowners. Dissent from the position adopted by Balbo was first expressed by Barbato G attelli, now a deputy. In early September he had gone as far as to state on his own initiative that Ferrara was favourable to a pacification.1 Although it was made plain very quickly that he was speaking entirely without authority, he did not renounce his independent position, but purchased a newspaper and, pro­ claim ing it to be a quotidiano fascista, began to set out in full his misgivings about the direction provincial fascism was taking. This brought into the open a situation which had been developing for some time. Reports o f splits between Balbo and other members o f the directorate had been heard since shortly after the elections o f M ay. G aggioli had made some harsh criticisms o f Balbo at this time, alleging that the segretario politico had not done all he should to support the candidature o f G attelli.2 This m ay well have been an allusion to the preference given to M antovani in the list o f the Blocco, a decision in which Balbo must certainly have had a hand.8 A t the time nothing came o f these accusations, but doubts as to the solidarity o f the directorate evidendy remained. In early June a meeting o f the representatives o f the fascio and nuclei was held in order to dispel rumours o f a breach in the leadership, Balbo and G attelli doing their best to appear in harmony.4 The events o f September demonstrated that this had been little more than a papering o f the cracks. The whipping agrarian fascism received during August, not only from its enemies, but also from M us­ solini and Cesare Rossi,6 provided the long-awaited opportunity for a public airing o f the problems o f the province. 1 Gattelli’s statement, made in Milan, is reported in the Balilla of 20 Sept.

1921* 1 A C S, M R F, b. 102 ‘C. C. Ferrara9, 28 M ay 1921; Rag. Aldo Nagliati to Mussolini. • See above, p. 181. 4 AC S, Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1921, b. 96B, 13 June 1921. 4 Grandi and Emilian fascism in general were explicitly attacked by Mussolini, who wrote that he would be quite ready to destroy ‘the fascism which is no longer liberation, but tyranny; no longer protector of the nation, but defence of private interests and of the dullest, deafest, most miserable castes that exist in Italy9. Rossi echoed these views, expressing the opinion that in certain areas fascism had become ‘a pure, authentic and exclusive movement of self-preservation and reaction9. See De Felice, Mussolini il fascista,, I. pp. 150 and 153.

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T h e dissidents were not sparing in their criticisms. From the pages o f the Provincia di Ferrara, G attelli and his associates turned their hostility towards the landowners. It was their betrayal o f fascism, they argued, that had turned the movem ent into pure reaction. A t first the agrari had been prepared to m ake pledges to the people, particularly before the elections. G attelli quoted the proceedings o f an election m eeting o f 8 M ay when he had spoken about the land program m e o f the fascio. H e had attem pted to allay the fears o f the doubtful: 'W e fascists signed a cheque; this has been guaranteed by the agrari. . . I f they refuse to stand by the undertakings made, then they w ill have to undergo our revolution.’ M antovani had been at the same meeting and, according to the account given by G attelli, had accepted in full these obligations, promising on behalf o f the A grarian Association that the cheque would be honoured: 'W hen the day arrives, we shall stand by w hat w e have signed’ .1 A ccordingly the province had given the fascists a substantial victory in the elections, but after that doubts had arisen and people had begun to ask, 'A nd now ?’ . T h is question had rem ained w ithout a reply. T h e reason was soon found: F o r too m an y . . . o f those w ho cam e to fascism in the m om ent o f danger, the 15 M a y m arked the end. T h e danger h ad vanished, the enem y w as w eak­ ened, an d the promises that h ad been m ade w hen the tide h a d threat­ ened to e n g u lf them co u ld be safely repudiated. Before, 'th e la n d to h im w h o works it’ w as a m arvellous form ula, clear, most accep table, even recognized in official letters; after, the creation o f the sm all proprietors seemed the dream o f a m adm an .2

G attelli saw only one possible solution to the situation. T h e w ar which had been waged against the leagues had been w on; now it was necessary to turn the attentions o f the squads to the right, because it was now the proprietors, intent on retaining an antiquated system o f agriculture, who were the real creators o f public unrest. These outbursts revealed that the old divisions w ithin the fascio— those that had driven L uigi G aggioli to foresee a fascio composed solely o f priests and landowners and which M arinoni thought to have resolved— had never really disappeared. A ll that had happened was that it had been possible in the period prior to the elections for the town-based members o f the 1 Provincia di Ferrara, 22 Sept. 1921. 2 Ibid., 14 Sept. 1921 ; article by Professor Luigi Filippi.

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directorate to deceive themselves into thinking that it was they, and not the landed proprietors, who would hold the whip hand when the squads had done their jo b . A fter the elections they had watched, it seems somewhat uncom prehendingly, as Balbo entered into ever closer relations with M antovani and the Agrarian Association and the utopia promised by the land programme receded into the distance. The indignation ex­ pressed when they realized their position was no doubt entirely sincere; for, ingenuous as they were under the circumstances, they were convinced that alternatives did exist to the course chosen by Balbo. The alternative was put forward by Professor Luigi Filippi, a schoolmaster and collaborator with G attelli. H e m aintained that fascism could only escape the logic o f the confrontation between worker and landowner by seeking a new base among people not directly involved in the struggle. These were the impiegati, the teachers and intellectuals, certain o f the profes­ sional people o f the town— in short, all those who rejected socialism because o f its lack o f patriotism, but who felt, none the less, that their role as ‘the brain o f society* was not fully appreciated. Fascism, he suggested, should exploit the dis­ content o f these ‘derelicts o f the intellect’ and attem pt to link them to its future.1 Y et this solution was scarcely consistent with the realities o f the situation. It ignored the fact that m any people o f this type were already enrolled in the fascio. Filippi himself, G aggioli Brombin, Tum iati, M ontanari— these were all representatives o f a lower or middle bourgoisie unconnected with the land. M ore seriously it ignored the fact that provincial fascism, in its earlier stages, had been in the hands o f just such people, but that power had been ceded none the less to the proprietors and their representatives. Couched in apparently forward-looking terms, this appeal for a new base for fascism was, therefore, really nothing more than an appeal for a return to the past. It was a plea by town fascists for a fascism built in their im age at a time when the dom inant role had already passed to the province. It made clear that these men had not yet recognized, as had Balbo, that the m iddle w ay, the moderate w ay, between the conflicting claims o f labourers and proprietors did not exist in Ferrara. For the realization o f such a solution, it required either 1 Ibid.

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an unthinkable self-abnegation on the part o f the landowners or the constraint o f an outside force. This the squads, given their varying composition and diverse motivation, could never provide. Balbo showed him self less concerned w ith the substance o f these criticisms than with w hat lay behind them. H e was ready to adm it that the land programme had, in large measure, been abandoned, but denied that this was to be blamed on the fascio. He maintained that it was rather the result o f the economic crisis which had already struck the province w ith the failure o f the hemp crop and the decline in the hemp market. O f G attelli and his supporters he was contemptuous; ‘Y ou 're ju st trying to make an impression . . . but you’re not com petent’, he countered,1 but he was w ell aware that G attelli’s actions in M ilan, his open criticisms o f Ferrarese fascism, and the estab­ lishment o f the Provincia di Ferrara as a rival to the Balilla, had been part o f a determined bid for the leadership o f the pro­ vincial movement. This came out into the open at the meeting o f the Consiglio Federale, called to discuss the dissidence. G attelli complained that he had been ‘isolated’ and ‘aban­ doned’ by the leaders o f fascism in the province and declared that he would not retract his opposition until ‘certain people’, Balbo evidently principal among them, had left the province for good. Balbo, in turn, observed that he had had very little co-operation from m any o f the fascist leaders during the year and that he was now subject to insults from people who called him the ‘Doge’ as he walked through the streets.8 Grandi, called from Bologna as secretary o f the Consiglio Regionale, could make little headway in his attempts to arbi­ trate. Between the jealousy and anger o f those who felt they had been eclipsed and betrayed and the intransigence o f Balbo, certainly in a strong position, there appeared to be no point o f contact. A t the point o f deadlock, however, higher authority intervened. In Popolo d'Italia o f 25 September, Mussolini issued a call to discipline. H e was openly critical o f the stand taken by the dissidents in their efforts to turn fascism against the agrariy efforts which he considered were in clear contrast with the predominant tendencies o f fascism in the V alle Padana. Con­ fronted with this disavowal and already aware o f the weak position he occupied in the province, G attelli was compelled 1 Provincia di Ferrara, 22 Sept.

1921. * 'Verbale’ given in Balilla, 20 Sept. 1921.

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to back down. There followed a further meeting o f the Consiglio Federale which witnessed a great eating o f words. The director­ ate o f the fascio o f Ferrara declared that it had had the im­ pression, ‘perhaps not totally corresponding to the truth’, that Ferrarese fascism was not going to m aintain its promises, but that it now recognized this to be w holly unfounded and based on hasty judgm ent. It was further agreed that G attelli should renounce control o f the Provincia di Ferrara. T o cap it all, G attelli was obliged to send a telegram to Mussolini in which he and Balbo declared that the view o f fascism in Ferrara presented in the Popolo d'Italia was mistaken.1 The weakness o f this accord was revealed almost im m ediately. In the following week, the fascio o f the town staged a demon­ stration in protest against the killing by the guardie regie o f eight fascists at M odena. G attelli, GaggioH, Tum iati, and other leading members o f the fascio were present, but notably absent were Balbo and M antovani— later learned to have been at a m eeting to decide the future o f the Banca Popolare.8 This was too much for m any o f the members o f the original fascio. The directorate resigned en masse and was backed up by about tw enty other resignations. U nder the headline, ‘E vviva i Fasci Fiorentini’,8 the directorate issued a manifesto which made bitter attacks on the higher bourgeoisie, accused o f having betrayed the original aims o f fascism for their own benefit. T he dissidents called for a renewal o f ‘the pure, original idea o f fascism’ and attempted to define w hat was m eant by this. ‘ . . . fascism hoped to force the rich and powerful classes to carry out their duty in respect o f the serious economic problems which are troubling the country; and especially in respect o f the lower classes o f all types o f labourer who are still aw aiting a friendly approach’ .1*4 Despairing o f achieving this mission o f fascism under the existing system, the dissidents formed an autonomous fascio. From this independent position they continued their attacks on the provincial federation, alleging in particular that it was 1 Report in Balilla, 2 Oct. 1921. Telegram to Mussolini reproduced in Popolo d'Italia, 28 Sept. 1921. See also the prefect’s report of these proceedings in A C S, Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1922, b. 61, 26 Sept. 1921. * For these events see Gazzetta Ferrarese, 5 Oct. 1921. * A similar dissident movement had developed at this time in Florence. See De Felice, Mussolini il fascista, 1. 159. 4 Balilla, g O ct. 1921.

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far too ready to bend to the w ill o f the A grarian Association. T heir fears that this state o f affairs would not only continue but even get worse can only have been increased w ith the introduction in mid O ctober o f a new statute for the ad­ ministration o f the provincial federation.1 This statute not only weighed heavily in favour o f the rural fasci the repre­ sentation on the Consiglio Federale, but also declared that mass assemblies o f the fasci were from that point out o f order. It meant, in effect, that the provincial directorate was no longer subject to the control o f the fascists in assembly, and was clearly intended to make the position o f the segretario politico even more absolute. Against this proposal, the supporters o f G aggioli and M ontanari countered that w hat was needed was more rather than less autonom y for the individual fasci. Their position was based on the com plaint that the whole balance o f the movement had been upset by a fundam ental misinter­ pretation o f the place o f the provincial federation. This, they claim ed, had been created in Ju ly not in order to take control aw ay from the central fascio o f the town, but sim ply to act as a co-ordinating device by which the decisions o f the town were to be transmitted to the rural areas. Y et now it was proposed, under the new statute, that the town fascio should have no more im portance than any other in the province. T h ey pointed the error o f this transition by arguing that agricultural prob­ lems o f the province were too serious to be left in the hands o f rural fascism— ‘controlled by landed proprietors almost in its entirety’— and should be the concern o f those who had less o f a personal interest in rural affairs.8 These arguments attracted a certain amount o f support among those custom arily supporters o f Balbo. G aggioli in particular was sufficiently w ell liked for his protests to be assured o f a hearing. Tow ards the end o f O ctober an effort was made to accom modate the autonomists; they were in­ vited to return to the provincial federation and given a promise that they would be allowed more freedom o f action in the future, a promise which boiled down in practice to little more than an agreement that the offices o f the provincial and town fascist administrations should no longer be in the same building.812 3 1 See supplement to Balilla, 30 Oct. 1921. 2 Ibid.; see also Gazzetta Ferrarese, 25 Oct. 1921. 3 ACS, Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1921, b. 96B, 27 Oct. 1921.

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T h e proxim ity o f the national congress prompted the dissi­ dents to accept this agreement. T h ey hoped that, w ith the establishment o f a party organization, the kind o f one-man rule that had been developing in Ferrara would be less possible, since the party would provide a court o f appeal, absent in the more nebulous movement.1 R ather paradoxically, Balbo was also inclined to accept the creation o f the party. Initially hesitant about the decision8 but reluctant to risk a breach w ith M ussolini, he had come round to the point o f view expressed by the fascist leader because o f his fear o f G randi’s position on the syndicalist question. Thus a tem porary bridge was formed between the two factions and dissidence allayed. Balbo went to Rom e in the com pany o f five delegates from Ferrara, at least three o f whom had been either members o f the autonomous fascio or supporters o f the autonomists* position.8 O n the return from Rom e o f the delegates, G aggioli an­ nounced that the dissidents, reassured by the constitution o f the Partito N azionale Fascista (P .N .F .), were ready to return to the m ain body o f the movement.4 Y e t the fragility o f this settlem ent is im m ediately apparent. Support for the party had come not only from different but from conflicting views. For G aggioli and G attelli, the party was to be a means by w hich their pursuit o f the ‘pure, original idea o f fascism’ could be continued. Re-entry to the federation had not been accom panied by any renunciation o f this intention; they re­ m ained opposed to the idea o f an agrari dom inated fascism. This was made clear at the provincial congress o f the fasci, held at the end o f Novem ber. G uido T orti, one o f the dissi­ dents, made serious criticisms o f the provincial movement, declaring that there were certain rights w hich fascism should protect not only in word, and asking if the representatives present were really sure that fascist control o f the province was not based on armed repression.5 T h e speech provoked such 1 For this interpretation see AG S, ibid., 19 Nov. 1921. * Balbo, Diario, p. 19. • A C S, Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1921, b. 96B, 27 Oct. 1921. Prefect Bladier re­ ported that the Federazione Provinciale had given delegates to the Rome congress instructions to vote for the party. This is confirmed by Popolo d'Italia, 26 Oct. 1921, which also lists the delegates; Mario Busatti, Guido Torti, Gaetano Ulivi, Augusto Liverani, and Genunzio Servidori. The first three, and possibly the fourth, were members of the autonomous fascio. 4 A C S, ibid., 19 Nov. 1921. 6 Report of provincial congress of Ferrara fascists in Popolo d'Italia, 2 Dec. 1921.

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hostility among the supporters o f certain o f the rural leaders that a fight broke out in the congress hall. Attem pts were made to smooth over the differences, appointing a directorate which represented both points o f view ,1 but it was not possible to conceal the deep differences which rem ained. T h e m ajority around Balbo would have accepted the view o f the unidentified Em ilian politician that, as far as the land program me was concerned, Ferrarese fascism '. . . has begun a third phase, the conclusive one, in which the great m ajority o f the supporters o f that program me have renounced its realization w ithout too much displeasure, and are disposed to consider it to be the product o f an im pulsive and provisional gesture’ .* T h e ob­ stinate refusal o f the dissidents to accept this suggested that their readmission to the federation, far from resolving the conflict, only made disputes more rather than less likely. Balbo, no doubt aware o f this possibility, was not particularly concerned by it. His indifference to the protests o f the dissi­ dents had already become fairly marked. In part this repre­ sented his knowledge that his position as provincial leader was unassailable. M ore conducive to this indifference, however, was the fact that Balbo had very litde interest in the polemics about agricultural policy or provincial organization. His attention was increasingly taken up after the summer o f 1921 w ith two problems. T h e first was the co-ordination o f the squadrist actions o f the region. The im portance he attached to the squads required that collective action should be developed along the lines o f that demonstrated by the m arch on Ravenna. By the beginning o f January 1922, when Balbo was appointed zone com mander o f the squads o f Em ilia, Rom agna, M antova, L e M arche, the Veneto, Istria, and Zara, this preoccupation m eant that he had very little time for the carpings o f G attelli or G aggioli. T h e second problem concerned Ferrara, but was seen, in the same w ay, as being a problem which involved the squads rather than the dissidents. This was the attem pt o f the socialists to ressurrect and reorganize their lifeless movement. In Ju ly o f 1921 it had seemed that the socialist movement in the province was, with the exception o f one or two areas, al­ ready destroyed. T h e actions o f the squads had declined within 1 A C S , Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1922, b. 61, 28 Nov. 1921. * Il Secolo, 12 Nov. 1921 ; reproduced in full in the Scintilla, 19 Nov. 1921, and in part in D e Felice, Mussolini il fascista, 1. 187-8.

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the province, while the Agrarian Federation had rejoiced that there had not been ‘so much fruitful work* for a good m any years.1 None the less the socialists were not so far gone that efforts at renewed action should be manifestly pointless. The more m ilitant supporters o f the movement had reached the point where their frustration at the lack o f leadership was beginning to erupt. In one issue o f the Scintilla for July, there was a plea from ‘the workman observer* that leadership should be provided or that the workers should be left free to work out their own plan o f defence. This produced very little response from the paper, which simply remarked that people should keep calm and m aintain their dignity because ‘on. the horizon the sun is about to break out*.2 Even so, these moderates rem aining in the party were sufficiently encouraged by the promise o f a political and economic crisis for fascism that an appeal was made in August and September for the faithful to return to their leagues.2 The greatest response to these appeals came from the fascists. D uring the last quarter o f the year, the squads once again concentrated their actions in the province. In early November a w riter in the Scintilla observed that there was a new phase o f violence, quite equal to the first: ‘By now there is not a village which has not once again experienced the terror o f last winter and last spring.’ 4 The socialist offices at M ontesanto, M alborghetto, Com acchio, and Goro were burned down in September and early O ctober.6 Around Argenta the conflict was particularly bitter. Despite repeated large-scale punitive expeditions over the spring and summer, socialist resistance had never been entirely broken, and the economic crisis gave the survivors something on w hich to build.2 In O ctober it was reported from Argenta that more than a hundred workers had 1 A C S , Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1921, b. 77B, 16 July 1921 ; Federazione Agraria Ferrarese to Bonomi. * Scintilla, 30 July 1921. * Ibid., 20 Aug. and 10 Sept. 1921. 4 Ibid., 4 Nov. 1921. » A C S, Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1921, b. 77B, 8 Oct. 1921; protest o f Bonomi to the prefect of Ferrara about conditions of public order. 4 For the situation in the Ferrarese at this time and an account o f the develop­ ment o f the situation around Argenta, see two memorials of the Ispettore Generale P.S., Paolella. A C S , Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1921, b. 77B, 2 and 8 Nov. 1921. It was Paolella’s view that socialist reorganization could hardly hope to succeed because the fascists were still extremely strong ‘because of a large number o f ad­ herents and extent of resources provided in the main by agrari’ (2 Nov.).

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handed in their fascist tessere and started to sing socialist songs.1 Reprisals had followed quite predictably.8 M uch the same had happened at V igarano M ainardo, where more than 300 agricultural workers had determined to leave the sindacato autonomo and constitute an independent league.8 In reply the squads had burned down the Gasa del Consumo o f the centre, w hile lorries packed w ith squadristi had com bed the area for a whole night, terrifying the entire neighbourhood.4 The culm ination o f this renewed violence against the socialists was the occupation by the fascists o f the Cam era del Lavoro in Ferrara, accom plished after the rem em brance ceremonies o f 20 Decem ber 1921. Registers and papers were burned, as always in such an action. T h e fascists announced their intention o f retaining control o f the building because, they claim ed, it had been purchased w ith the subscriptions o f people who now formed part o f the fascist sindacati. Pending a decision, the prefect agreed to prevent the socialists from taking control o f their property again.5 O n ly w ith the intervention o f the governm ent, which gave the prefect to understand that his attitude was quite intolerable, was the Cam era returned to its original owners.6 Against this fresh w ave o f attacks, there was no more defence than against the first. There is very little evidence to suggest that the more m ilitant socialists succeeded in organizing groups o f arditi del popolo to oppose the squads. By the strange logic that characterized so m uch o f the police action at this tim e, those who attem pted to form such groups were arrested. Thus the new prefect, Bladier, reported that one Pasetti M orando had been arrested because he was suspected o f trying to create a movement o f arditi del popolo. H e added in his report that it w as unlikely that anyone else would try, ‘both because there are no methods that could be used, and because no one would dare to take on the responsibility o f organizing and ordering the bat­ talions*.7 In any case, there were few prepared to support such initiatives. B y the end o f the year, the dem oralization o f the 1 A C S , ibid., 8 Nov. 1921. * A C S , ibid., 22 Oct. 1921. * A C S , ibid., 15 Nov. 1921. 4 Scintilla, 4 Nov. 1921. 4 A C S , Min. Int., Gabinetto Bonomi, Ordine Pubblico 1921-2, 2 Jan. 1922; Questore con funzioni di Ispettore Generale P.S. to Min. Int. * A C S , ibid., 13 Jan. 1922; Prefect Bladier to Min. Int. 7 A C S , M in, Int., D G PS, A G R 1922, b. 5 9 ,12 O ct. 1921.

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agricultural workers, subjected to both fascist violence and economic hardship, had reached an unprecedented level. Even the 'workm an observer*, who in Ju ly had still nourished hope that something could be done against the fascists, could not help noticing the change that had come about am ong the workers since the summer. In Decem ber he wrote that he had visited the people who, six months before, had been hopefully aw aiting the passing o f fascism; now he had found them 'physically prostrated and psychologically changed*.1 Ex­ hortations for courage among the rural labourers carried often im plicitly, sometimes very explicitly, the same message. The socialists, w ith their policy o f non-resistance, had effectively lost contact w ith the mass o f the workers, responsive only to a firm er lead. It was left to the Scintilla to lam ent 'the weakness o f the labourers, the absolute passivity o f the labourers, the deplorable acquiescence o f the labourers*.8 Y et the problem rem ained unresolved. In the same article a socialist could w rite that the proletariat could never have won on the basis o f opposing violence w ith violence, but com plain none the less o f socialist passivity: ‘Y ou have been too m uch like sheep and the fascists have eaten you.*8 This m uch, at any rate, was un­ challengeable. B y January o f 1922 the socialist movement had been reduced in m orale and organization to the point where only the most dedicated or the most obstinate could rem ain active in the province. M any had found no alternative before them but to leave Ferrara. Certain o f them, living in M ilan, summed up the situation very briefly when, at the N ew Y e a r they wrote a greeting to the 'few comrades who are left to defend our ideals*.4 Nor were the socialists the only ones to suffer the renewed attentions o f the squads. A fter Novem ber, it was increasingly the case that the popolari came under fire as w ell. This was in part a result o f the economic crisis. M any fascists who had always seen the popolari as 'false friends* o f the fasci becam e ever more suspicious o f the actions o f the catholic associations as the incentives to leave the fascist syndicates became greater. In some respects this suspicion was justified; the socialists at this time did make efforts to reach some sort o f alliance w ith the catholics, in the hope that by changing their name but not their 1 Scintilla, 3 Dec. 1921. » Ibid.

* Ibid., 14 Jan. 1922. 4 Ibid., 4 Jan. 1922.

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politics they m ight m anage to escape the fascist onslaught. D uring 1922, for instance» the Scintilla on more than one occasion expressed its support for the popolari. In January it declared itself prepared to recognize that the popolari o f A rgenta in particular were able and active, and had m anaged very w ell to keep their flag flying during difficult times. It noted their efforts to m aintain catholic co-operatives and expressed the opinion that, as far as co-ops were concerned, the catholics o f Argenta had achieved a great deal.1 Especial praise was re­ served for the man responsible for these developments, the local priest, Don G iovanni M inzoni, who appealed to the socialists because he had shown him self not afraid to confront the fascists on his own and tell them w hat he thought o f them.* T h e fascists made it clear from the start that they were not prepared to see any organization o f agricultural workers in­ crease its strength at the expense o f the fascist syndicates. T h e efforts o f certain priests to create 'w hite’ leagues from workers too frightened to rem ain socialist was the subject o f some straight talking from the Balilla. W riters in the fascist paper advised the priests that they should consider their place to be in the church, their m inistry a m inistry o f piety and love; if, on the other hand, they persisted in transforming their churches into Cam ere del Lavoro, the fascists would treat them as they had treated the capilega in the past.* In this they proved true to their word. O n 8 February the building o f the w hite league a t Cologna was destroyed by a group o f more than 300 fascists, on the grounds— adm itted by the socialists4— that the members o f the league were sim ply socialists attem pting to deceive the fascists by joining the Unione del Lavoro.6 Various leaders o f the P .P .I. were beaten up at this time, and members o f the catholic leagues subjected to menaces.6 A t Bondeno, the segretario politico o f the local fascio intervened personally on one occasion when young catholics met to go to church; one who refused to go home was beaten up.7 Y et even these actions did 1 Scintilla, 8 Jan. 1922. 1 Ibid., 15 Apr. 1922. * Balilla, 24 Jan. 1922. 4 Scintilla, 18 Feb. 1922; V Avvenire d'Italia, i i Feb. 1922. 6 Also confirmed by Prefect Bladier. A C S, Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1922, b. 71 A , g Feb. 1922. 4 See, for example, the report of the beating up of Buttieri Arnaldo, the secre­ tary of the section of the P.P.I. at Pieve di Cento, in A C S , ibid., 22 Dec. 1921 ; and of molesting of Buzzoni, a prominent organizer of the P.P.I. at Cona, in A C S , ibid., 17 Mar. 1922. 7 A C S, ibid., 27 Mar. 1922.

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not result in a com plete disavowal o f fascism by the provincial leaders o f the P .P .I. The Domenica dell'Operàio retained stead­ fastly that the real nature o f fascism should not be confused w ith its excesses.1 Grosoli, no more favourable to migliolismo than were the fascists, m ight have said the same thing. T h e activities o f the squads revealed once again to both socialists and popolari that they could expect very little help from the authorities. Bonomi’s government made special provisions to try to arrest the developm ent o f ‘squadrism’, but they were to little effect. The attem pt in Novem ber to give Prefect M ori o f Bologna control o f the entire region proved to be quite unworkable because o f the failure o f the other prefects to collaborate. Bladier him self was accused o f reporting inci­ dents too late to perm it M ori to send forces to intervene.1 Provisions regarding the circulation o f lorries and the dis­ arm ing o f the civilian population were equally ineffective.* R oad blocks had to be withdrawn during the w inter because o f the cold and because, as the prefect explained, everyone in the province knew o f ways to get round them .1*4 M obile columns operating on the borders o f Ferrara in an effort to prevent the Ferrara squads from m oving into Bologna, Ravenna, and M odena, provoked greater disturbances than they prevented.* T h e technical solutions, in fact, proved to be no answer. The root o f the problem did not lie w ith the inadequacy o f the forces or their methods but w ith the general lack o f desire among police and authorities to control the fascists. D irect collusion o f police and fascists became apparent once again. It was alleged during Novem ber that lorry loads o f fascists were going round from commune to commune openly escorted by carabinieri— and this notwithstanding the ban on the cir­ culation o f lorries.4 Nor can this be judged to be an effort to control the fascists by collaborating with them. Certain o f the 1 Domenica dell’ Operaio, 19 Feb. 1922. * A C S , Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1922, b. 61, 8 Feb. 1922. Prefect M ori to Min. Int. * Following a call from Bonomi on 21 Dec. 1921 for the seizure of arms held illegally, the prefect of Ferrara collected— up to 9 Jan. 1922— only seven revolvers, seven rifles, and three knives. ACS, Min. Int., Gabinetto Bonomi, Ordine Pubblico 1921-2, 21 Dec. 1921 and 9 Jan. 1922. 4 A C S, Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1922, b. 61, 3 Dec. 1921. * A C S, ibid., 30 Jan. 1922. Prefect of Ravenna to Min. Int. * A C S, Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1921, b. 77B, 14 Nov. 1921. Interrogation o f Deputy Ercolani.

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police— notably the vice-Questore G uarducci— were evidently pro-fascist and activated by a desire to see the socialists crushed. In the previous A pril G uarducci had encouraged several fascists to infiltrate the socialist organization w ith the object o f then denouncing the socialists to the authorities. W hen the trial o f these men took place in Decem ber, the procuratore deplored the methods employed by the police on this occasion, but was told in reply that they had had the approval o f the prefect.1 Am ong other incidents it is frequently difficult to decide if the police were lax, incom petent, afraid, or pro-fascist. T h e Cam era del Lavoro o f Ferrara, for instance, was occupied by the fascists after the prefect had taken strict measures to prevent such an occurrence. T h e catholic league o f Cotogna, burnt down in February, stood within a few hundred yards o f the barracks o f the carabinieri, yet, notwithstanding the sound o f shots and the general commotion o f more than 300 fascists, the forces o f order m anaged to arrive on the scene only when the last fascist had left the village.8 T h e last months o f 1921 and the first o f 1922 provided a very vivid contrast therefore w ith those early days o f 1921 when, i f there had been extensive fascist violence, there had also been promises, enthusiasm, idealistic speeches, and the suggestion that fascism was a liberating movement. As the euphoria passed, the degree o f dem agogy involved in those days had become obvious. Fascism, far from liberating the mass o f the ferraresit had revealed itself to be the instrument o f their repression. This was particularly evident w ith regard to the syndicates. Disillusioned workers were given no opportunity to express their grievances and no chance to abandon the organization they considered they had betrayed them. Even the catholic leagues, guilty only o f com peting very m odestly w ith the fascist syndicates, were gradually crushed. Repression had become equally clear within the fascio. Independent opinions about the direction to be taken by local fascism were greeted with disdain by Balbo and the voicers o f such opinions told to save their breath. Discussions in provincial assemblies turned into brawls when the official line was contested. T h e total intolerance o f other groups, other opinions, was already manifest. W ithin the 1 A C S, ibid., 22 Dec. 1921. * A C S , M in. Int., DGPS, A G R 1922, b. 71A, 18 Feb. 1922. Ispettore Generale P. S. Ferrara to Min. Int.

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space o f a year, provincial fascism had openly assumed those characteristics w hich had been im plicit almost from the start— certainly from the time when Balbo and the landowners had begun to put their alliance into effect. T h eir concepts had very little in common w ith those o f the dissident fascists. For them fascism m eant not so much a political movement o f the left or right, w ith links w ith M azzinianism , radicalism , or nationalism, as a movement w hich distinguished clearly between the mass o f the labourers in the province and the bourgeoisie. Strict regim entation o f the labourers through the syndicates and the absence o f labour disputes perm itted the landed proprietors and com m ercial interests o f the province to strengthen their social position and m inimize, as far as possible, the effects o f the economic crisis. In return for these benefits, they en­ couraged both financially and m orally a restricted group o f career minded fascists. Intolerance o f opposition was a necessary condition o f the continuance o f this situation. O n ly by repres­ sion and regim entation o f the rural workers could a m inority— a provincial élite— continue to enjoy the fruits o f silence and subservience. In m any respects the changing face o f provincial fascism was m atched by a corresponding evolution within the national movement. M ussolini’s quiet abandoning o f the pact o f paci­ fication had been a clear acknowledgem ent that agrarian fascism could not be cast adrift. It was a tacit recognition that during 1921 the fasci o f Tuscany, o f Puglia, and particularly those o f the V alle Padana had become o f central im portance to the whole movement and could not be perm anently alien­ ated. G randi certainly had been defeated at the Novem ber congress and M ussolini’s control over the movement re-estab­ lished, but those interests that had supported the Bolognese leader so forcibly during the summer— the agrari and the squads— had emerged from the crisis unscathed. No more was heard from M ussolini about Em ilian fascism being Synonymous w ith terror’ or sim ply a ‘defence o f private interests’ ; in respect o f the provincial situations, at least, the squads and the agrari were accepted on their own terms. This meant the acceptance o f precisely that kind o f fascism developing in Ferrara— vio­ lently repressive o f those outside the fascio, rigidly authoritarian for those w ithin it. D ebate within the movement had no place in such areas. U rban fascism— at least initially heterogeneous in

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social and political composition— could hardly avoid some form o f discussion. But in rural areas, where it was clear that all that was in question was the continued dom inance o f a small group o f landowners, merchants, and fascist gerarchs, there was really very little to talk about. Discussion was pointless and could only be dangerous. T h at the areas w ith those charac­ teristics had become and were to rem ain the strongholds o f fascism could not but have an influence on the general evolution o f the movement. In the early years o f fascism M ussolini's room for manoeuvre was evidently restricted by the nature o f the support he depended on. Equally clear was the im pact o f agrarian fascism on the personnel o f the m ovement; the rural areas thrust their own men to the fore, w hile the sight o f agrarian reaction continued to repel m any others from fascism. But it was chiefly the attitudes demonstrated by agrarian fascism that were to become diffused within the fascist organ­ ization. As subsequent years were to demonstrate the agrarian element in fascism could eventually be outm anoeuvred, but the violence, the intolerance, the authoritarianism that were above all the characteristics o f the rural fasci were never to be erased from the movement.

9

TOW ARDS THE CO N TR O L OF THE STATE: F E B R U A R Y 1922 T O T H E M A R C H O N R O M E A s the second w ave o f fascist violence against the socialists subsided during January and February 1922 into isolated actions against the few catholic organizations, the provincial fascists were com pelled to realize that the terms o f their struggle were changing. W ith the exception o f certain zones around Argenta and, to a lesser extent, Portom aggiore, the original m ilitary function o f fascism in the province was becom ing ever less relevant. There was no longer any serious prospect that opposition could succeed in displacing the squads from their dom inant position. Balbo had expressed this opinion at the new year, w riting in his diary that a great part o f the fascist task had apparently been com pleted. H e based this assertion on the degree to w hich the fascists already controlled the provincial situation : the socialists were evidently finished, the provincial administrations were in the hands o f commissari prefettizi; public order was frequently fascist order because o f the power o f the squads. H e even boasted that ‘the prefect must do w hat I tell him on behalf o f the fascists*.1 Y e t Balbo also expressed the view that fascism could not stop at this point: *. . . it is impossible to halt our actions at this point. Fascism is not a static party. T h e local situations do not count if the life o f the whole nation does not change*. Here he was reflecting something o f the general unease o f the fascist organization in early 1922. T h e movement was undoubtedly strong, w ith more than 218,000 enrolled at the end o f 1921, and the internal crisis provoked by the pact o f pacification appeared to have been resolved satisfactorily. Y e t the passing o f the crisis perm itted m any to see that fascism was not faced only by internal problems. T h e hostility shown to the fascists by large sections o f the population o f Rom e during the Novem ber 1 Balbo, Diario, p. so.

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congress had underlined this fact, particularly to those Tuscan and Em ilian fascists already accustomed to consider themselves masters o f any situation. U ncertainty was further increased by the fall o f Bonomi in February and the prolongation o f a crisis in which fears were aroused that socialists and catholics m ight finally unite to form an anti-fascist coalition. T h e clearly transitional governm ent formed by Facta removed this danger, but could not rem ove the unease o f an organization which had gained a position o f strength unacknowledged by the political authorities and therefore, to some extent, threatened by them. T h e necessity for a much more pronounced political affirm ation o f fascism was increasingly evident. Bai bo’s response to this situation was characteristically straightforward: ‘W e must conquer the nation . . .’ 1 H e was not prepared, like the socialists before him , to rest content w ith a provincial trium ph, recog­ nizing the disastrous effect such a pause could have on the m orale o f the squads. A ccordingly he occupied him self more and more w ith preparations for this frontal conflict w ith the authorities o f the state, working to transform the unco­ ordinated squads into a national m ilitia, and dream ing o f the arm y o f arditi, commanded by arditi, that he would have at his com m and.8 It was to be expected, therefore, that 1922 would see the original struggle between socialists and fascists turned into a developing confrontation between fascism and the authority o f the state. T o conquer the nation, as Balbo w anted, m ight possibly involve conflict w ith the carabinieri at a provincial level, w hile the shadow o f the arm y always lay behind these. Y et the changing problems to which fascism addressed itself were not confined solely to the m ilitary aspects o f the challenge . to authority; for while Balbo moved into a position o f national im portance and becam e less involved w ith the problems o f Ferrara than w ith those o f the m ilitia, the same confrontation between fascism and the governm ent was developing in political and economic terms w ithin the province. T h e fascists, if they need the capability o f a coup d’état, had also reached the point where they required the recognition— even the support at times— o f the governm ent in respect o f provincial problems. No issue made this more apparent than the dispute that developed around the Bonifica Renana. T h e Bonifica, in part 1 Balbo, Diario, p. 20.

2 Ibid., p. 21.

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subsidized by the state but m anaged and partially financed by a group o f landowners, business men, and bankers o f Ferrara and Bologna, was composed o f territory in both provinces, and concerned with both land reclam ation and the developm ent o f land already reclaim ed. D uring the period o f socialist dom­ ination o f the area, the Consorzio (consortium) had been obliged, in common with other employers, to accept the establishment o f an ufficio di collocamento for the bonifica and had undertaken to em ploy only labour that was passed to it by the ufficio. This socialist monopoly was an obvious target for fascist attentions during 1921. As early as M ay, certain groups o f workers had refused to apply for employment on the bonifica to the socialist ufficio and yet had been taken on all the same.1 In June and Ju ly difficulties developed in the workshops on the bonifica. Ferrara fascists refused to accept that a certain number o f socialists from Bologna should be employed on jobs that were specifically concerned with the province o f Ferrara; they occupied the workshops and insisted that the bolognesi should either join the fascist syndicates or leave their job s.123 These incidents produced a detailed report from the secretary o f the ufficio, a report which protested particularly about the attitude o f the directors o f the Consorzio.8 O riginally, the secretary m aintained, groups o f workers from Ferrara had avoided the socialist office by going directly to the engineers and technicians employed on the bonifica. These, since they were fascist in the main, had not only taken them on but had tried to give them the most rem unerative and least tiring jobs available. T h e socialists had attem pted to ignore these incidents, recognizing that once the issue o f the employment o f fascist syndicalists was raised, things m ight go badly for the socialists. W hen the occupation o f the workshops had made a protest necessary, however, they had found that the directors o f the bonifica were disposed to support the fascists, arguing that disputes between labourers were none o f their business so long as labour came from some source. By the end o f July, it was 1 Report of secretary Tosi, ufficio centrale di collocamento, Bologna, on work of Bonifica Renana and Crevalcorcse; A C S, Presidenza, 1922, 7; 1; 1069, 3 Sept.

192I' * A C S , ibid. See also reports of Prefects Pugliese (Ferrara) and Mori (Bologna) for 8 July and 16 Aug. 1921 respectively, in ACS, Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1922, b. 45A, under dates given. 3 Report of secretary Tosi, cited above.

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alleged, the employers were refusing to take on socialists even though jobs were available. A ccording to the secretary o f the ufficio, there was only one explanation for the open rupture o f agreements by the em ployers: they hoped to speculate on the com petition between fascists and socialists in order to rid themselves o f the ufficio di collocamento. From the evidence provided, this conclusion was fairly obviously correct; yet the public authorities were very slow to act. D uring Septem ber and O ctober, Prefect M ori m ade various attempts to persuade the fascist syndicates to accept a m ixed ufficio, w hile they obstinately refused any solution other than that o f a separate labour office to deal only w ith fascist workers. This was an arrangem ent evidently unsuitable to the representatives o f Federterra since they recognized that there was little likelihood o f the directors o f the bonifica using the socialist labour exchange if there was the possibility o f using one dependent on the Cam era Sindacale. Provisionally a com­ missario governativo was appointed in an attem pt to arrive at an im perial distribution o f labour; but it was only when this commissario was refused recognition by the direction o f the Consorzio that Prefect M ori was prepared to concede that the direction was pro-fascist.1 T h e reluctance o f the authorities to reach this conclusion is understandable. T h e partisan character o f the Consorzio m eant, in effect, that it was no longer possible to treat the dispute as a struggle between labour organizations. Since public m oney was involved, the intervention o f public authori­ ties becam e essential. Y et the necessity for intervention pre­ sented the prefects— particularly M ori o f Bologna— with a dilem m a to w hich there was in the end no satisfactory solution. It was clear that the success achieved by the fascist syndicates, especially in Ferrara, m ade their claim s to share the work on the bonifica quite realistic; even the socialists were prepared to adm it that their m onopoly o f labour was no longer justified b y the local situation. It was equally clear, however, that the aims o f the fascist syndicates were fundam entally political rather than economic. Supported by the Consorzio, the syndicates aim ed not m erely at providing work for their members but at denying to the socialist organization the means by w hich it 1 A C S , M in. Int., DGPS, A G R 1922, b. 45A, 26 Nov. 1921; Prefect Mori to Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri.

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retained its hold on certain areas— M olinella in Bologna and Argenta together with Portom aggiore in Ferrara. T o recognize the position o f the syndicates, therefore, was to accept that m oney provided by the state was in fact being used to strengthen the political hold o f the fascists— particularly since it was apparent that any concession to the syndicates would be ex­ ploited by the Consorzio to the greater disadvantage o f the socialists. T o refuse the fascists their right to enjoy the benefits o f public works would be to discrim inate against them quite unjustly; and as long as the fascists m aintained their intransi­ gent attitude and refused to recognize an im partial commissario the possibilities o f a compromise solution by which percentages o f both organizations were em ployed proved few. D uring the early months o f 1922 this dilemm a becam e ever more inescapable. T h e fascists made their intentions very clear by declaring a strike against the bonifica at the beginning o f the year. In this action, the extensive use o f the squads to occupy the area o f the bonifica and to intim idate all those who dared to turn up for work indicated the degree to which ‘squadrism’ and syndicalism were essentially different methods o f achieving the same result— the subjugation o f the agricultural workers. I f one proved to be less successful than anticipated, the other would be tried in its place. E qually apparent was the collusion o f the Consorzio in the strike. Representatives o f Federtcrra pointed out in a subsequent report1 that the fascists had had access to parts o f the bonifica which could be reached only by those in possession o f the keys kept by the managers. It was plainly the intention that the Consorzio should give w ay before the irresistible demands o f the fascists— thus weakening still further the position o f the socialists. Against these tactics the socialists could do little more than protest. A strike would have been the perfect opportunity for the employers to renounce all links with Federtcrra and to fill their workshops w ith members o f the fascist syndicates. Prefect M ori was undoubtedly able to recognize that the strike represented a further increase in the pressure o f the syndicates for the recognition o f the position they had attained. 1 For this report, which contains the account of the strike given here, see A C S, Min. Int., Gabinetto Bonomi, Ordine Pubblico 1921-2, 5 Jan. 1922; Federazione Nazionale dei Lavoratori della Terra: Relazione sullo sciopero dei Sindacati Autonomi nella Bonifica Renana«

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U nlike Prefect Bladier o f Ferrara, who denied both th at violence had been used during the strike or that there w as evidence to suggest that the Consorzio was favourable to the fascists,1 he did not attem pt to sidestep the problem by denying its existence. Instead, he persisted w ith his efforts to secure a fair distribution o f labour to both parties by means o f a neutral commissario— efforts which subsequent reports suggest w ere largely fruitless.2 In February, however, it becam e impossible to avoid aiding, at least tacitly, the fascist syndicates. This tim e it was the Consorzio that gave a further turn o f the screw, letting it be known that unless more money were made available for public works, work on the bonifica would have to be stopped and the 5,000 workers laid off. In the circumstances this was something o f a blackm ail. T h e crisis that had hit agriculture from the m iddle o f 1920 was producing distress in the tw o provinces; thus jobs were at a premium— particularly those on the public works projects o f the bonifica. It was this that gave added significance to the preference given to workers from the fascist syndicates. Y e t the crisis also m eant that, to reject the request for more money on the grounds that it would only be used to strengthen the fascist position, w ould be to create a m ajor problem for public order. In fact there was really no choice for the prefect: the fascists had evidently reached the position where the resources o f the state for the alleviation o f unemployment were bound to flow through fascist hands and benefit the fascist cause. M ori bowed before the storm and wrote an urgent request for L.20,000,000 to be put at the disposition o f the Bonifica Renana,3 fully aware that the m oney would be used, in effect, to break the resistance o f the socialists in M olinella and Argenta. Looking at other aspects o f the provincial situations, the prefects o f Bologna and Ferrara could have found little reason for rejoicing. It was clear that, w hile the syndicates extended their control over the working force, the squads were con­ solidating a position which made it difficult to think o f opposing any resistance to them. In his diary Balbo recounts how, in early January 1922, he spent three days at O neglia together 1 A C S , M in. Int., Gabinetto Bonomi, Ordine Pubblico 1921-2,18 Jan. 1922. For a confirmation o f certain aspects of the socialist account, see Balbo, Diario, p. 21. * See below, p. 219. • A C S , Presidenza, 1922, 7; 1/2; 457; Prefect M ori to Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri.

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with General Gandolfo and Dino Perrone Com pagni, working out the basis for the fascist m ilitia.1 Som ething o f this became known to the authorities by the end o f M arch, when a circular was sent out to prefects informing them o f the zones that had been created for the organization o f the m ilitia.2 Even so, local situations served better to make thé presence o f the squadristi felt, and Balbo was not above challenging M ori to a contest o f strength. In late January, when carabinieri fired on the fascists trying to occupy the Cam era del Lavoro o f Form ignana, Balbo claim s to have warned the prefect o f Bologna to be more cir­ cumspect in his orders to his men: *. . . there are 10,000 armed fascists in m y province and only several hundred carabinieri. W hat would happen i f I were not to succeed in restraining the squads in their desire for reprisals.*8 Equally, the threat to seize the M inister o f Agriculture, on a visit to Fer­ rara, if M ori continued to hold the fascist Baroncini in prison in Bologna m ay have had less effect than Balbo im agined; but it is hardly likely to have escaped the prefect that he was power­ less to resist the fascists i f they decided on such a course o f action.4 In the confrontation between the forces o f order and the squadristi, ju st as in that between public authorities and syndicates, it was no longer possible to govern w ithout recognizing the de facto position o f the fascists. T h e clash which was to make this public cam e with the occupation o f Ferrara in M ay. Such a drastic action was made necessary by the com plete failure o f the fascists to find any satisfactory solution to the severe economic crisis which had hit the province. Purely objectively the situation was very difficult. T h e rapid decline o f prices for agricultural products had pro­ duced uncertainty among the landowners and curtailed sowing.6 1 Balbo, Diario, p. 25. * A C S , Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1921, b. 74, circular 8541, dated 30 M ar. 1922, to prefects of realm. * Balbo, Diario, p. 25. 4 Ibid., pp. 48-9. Tasca’s account of this episode, suggesting that Baroncini was freed as a result of the occupation, is a little inaccurate. Baroncini was freed well before the occupation of Ferrara was planned. See Tasca, Nascita « avvento del fascismo, p. 310. * Prices for hemp fell from an average per quintal o f L.814.43 in 1920 to L.382.45 in 1922; the area of hemp sown fell from 30,000 hectares in 1920 to 12,000 hectares in 1922. This was only partially offset by an increased production o f sugar beet, the other labour intensive crop. Although providing a much higher yield per hectare, the low price of beet (L.9 p. quint, in 1920, L.13.5 in 1922) made it an unattractive substitute. Figures from Relazione della Camera di Commercio di Ferrara, tables V II and X V II.

3 i6

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co n tr o l

o f th e

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In this respect, Ferrara suffered along w ith m any other pro­ vinces. Y et the advent o f fascism had not served to make the situation any easier. Q u ite apart from the economic dis­ location caused by the transfer o f provincial power from the Cam era del Lavoro to the Cam era Sindacale, and by the con­ tinued existence o f the squads, the victory o f fascism m eant that the few safeguards w hich the socialists had created against unem ploym ent were no longer observed. T h e fascists denied that this was so, claim ing that the pact o f M arch 1920 was being respected in full, but reports in the Scintilla indicated that this was not so. Although in M arch 1922 the original pact was extended for a further six months, it was not renewed w ithout certain modifications. T h e ufficio misto di collocamento w hich replaced the old uffici were to be staffed by two representatives o f the landowners, two from the syndicates, w ith a fifth from the fascio— hardly the im partial com m ittee it was supposed to be. Obbligati were perm itted again. T h e imponibile di mano d'opera was reprinted in the new pact w ith the original pro­ portions, but it was conceded to be ‘a general norm* rather than an obligation for proprietors.1 Thus the equal distribution o f work at w hich the socialists had aim ed was no longer a criterion o f any im portance. In fact the revisions o f the p act ultim ately had only lim ited relevance anyw ay; where they could get aw ay w ith it, the landowners frequently reverted to the separate agreements they had operated before the ascend­ ancy o f the socialists.1 A w are that the crisis greatly compromised their position among the workers— even if it could not threaten it, the fascists were forced to look for scapegoats. Since open attacks on the pro-fascist agrari were evidently unthinkable for the official party spokesmen, attention was turned towards the few small employers who owed allegiance to the P .P .I. Balbo attacked these very strongly in April,* particularly because they were breaking the provincial pact, but the attacks becam e impossible to sustain when the popolari pointed out w ith perfect justice that in the areas where land had been redistributed at the hands o f the fascists, the old pact had proved com pletely inapplicable.4 Consequently the fascists made their excuses more and more at the expense o f the state, considered to be guilty o f extrem e 1 Scintilla, 22 Apr. 1922; ‘ In tema di patti agrari*. * Ibid. a Gazzetta Ferrarese, 14 Aprii 1922. 4 Domenica dell'Operaio, 16 Apr. 1922.

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dilatoriness in the provision o f public works. Representations made in A pril to both prefect and M inistry brought no results,1 and at the end o f A pril, the fascists threatened to begin pro­ jected public works without the permission o f the M inistry.8 In this situation, unable to produce an effect using only the threat o f their force, the fascists were com pelled to move to more direct action to make it clear that the policies o f the central government were o f no im portance if they contrasted with the interests o f the fascio o f Ferrara. This was am ply demonstrated by the fascist occupation o f Ferrara. D uring the night o f 11 M ay Balbo m obilized more than 40,000 squadristi8 and agricultural workers o f the province, bringing them by morning to file through the streets o f the town, com pletely paralysing all normal activity. T h e operation was organized with a m ilitary precision typical o f the young ras: telephone lines were cut; the gates o f the town taken by specially.designated squads; food and drink provided for those involved in the occupation. The ostensible reason for the action was the failure o f the government to provide funds for public works, and undoubtedly the province was in the throes o f a severe economic crisis. The prefect had informed his ministry only the day before the occupation that ‘in m any communes the population is suffering from hunger’ .4 Supported by the immense crowd o f demonstrators, Balbo told the prefect that he would w ait forty-eight hours for a promise o f public works, during which time he would personally assume responsibility for public order in the town. I f at the end o f that time no promise had been given, he would begin an offensive against the prefecture. O n the morning o f 14 M ay, after the assembled mass had spent two nights camped in the streets and parks o f the provincial capital, the promise was given and the occupation called off.6 Balbo had seen the occupation as a test for his squads, ‘the thermometer o f our strength’,6 and in this respect he could feel entirely satisfied with the result. Although the prefect had known 1 Balilla, 9 Apr. 1922. 1 Ibid., 30 Apr. 1922. claimed exactly 63,000, Diano, p. 65. The prefect’s estimate was more modest, however; A C S, Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1922, b. 71 A, 19 M ay 1922. For a socialist account of how this mass of labourers was marshalled by the fascists, see F. Cordova, ‘Le origini dei sindacati fascisti’, pp. 1004-5. 4 A C S, Presidenza, 1922, 7; 1/2; 1172, 11 M ay 1922. 9 For the account of the occupation from which this is taken see Balbo, Diario,

9Balbo

pp

. 63-72. • Ibid., p. 53.

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beforehand that a mass demonstration was planned, he had not made any attem pt at resistance, recognizing that this w as beyond his resources.1 Im plicit in the concession o f funds, however, was a much greater success; the governm ent had been seen by the whole o f Italy to be supporting the fascist syndi­ cates, and had been seen to have had little choice in the m atter. T h e occupation was the public statem ent o f a reality which had been recognized only tacitly up to that point. It was in m any ways the watershed in relations between the existing authorities and the provincial fascists— once passed, the prefect continued to exert his authority very much by permission o f the fascists. In this respect, Balbo was justified in his opinion, expressed ju st before the occupation, that he was on the eve o f a revo­ lution.8 For w hile the m arch on Rom e would make the situ­ ation easier in Ferrara, it would not do more than confirm a transition o f power which had already taken place. As a deputy o f the P .P .I. put it at M ontecitorio only a m onth later, *. . . the real authority in Ferrara is not the state, but the fascists’.8 O ne result o f the occupation was that it finally becam e plain to the prefect in whose interests the fascists were working. Bladier had not been notable for his denunciations o f fascism before 12 M ay, but, sm arting from the public hum iliation he had received, he wrote a report on the occupation w hich contained insights previously w ithheld from the prefects o f Ferrara.4 It was, in fact, the first substantially anti-fascist docum ent to come out o f the prefecture since the m ovem ent had begun. Ferrara, he lam ented, had become ‘the brain and heart o f the new fascist party’ . N or did he ascribe this to the misguided politics o f a m inority. He pointed out that all parties except the socialists had supported the occupation and asserted that am ong the citizens, ‘the great m ajority is favourable to fascism*. But he was particularly bitter in his attacks on the agrari, alleging that they, ‘who could w ell be defined the promotors o f the movement*, were financing fascism for their own econom ic benefit. He saw for the first tim e that the 1 A C S , Presidenza, 1922, 7; 1/2; 1172, 11 M ay 1922. Balbo’s supposition that the lack of resistance was due to surprise (Diario, p. 64) did not do full justice to the extent to which he had intimidated the authorities. * Balbo, Diario, p. 56. * Speech of on. M ilani on 16 June 1922; reported in the Gazzetta Ferrarese of 19 June 1922. 4 A C S , Min. Int., D G PS A G R 1922, b. 71A, 19 M ay 1922.

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fascists were exploiting the economic crisis in order to tie the workers more securely to the sindacati economici, and alleged that the agrari were deliberately m aintaining a high rate o f unemployment in order to further this process. T h e desire for public works, he suggested, was sim ply the desire o f the pro­ prietors that they should not have to pay for w hatever work was done in the province during the crisis. C learly this animus against fascism was stimulated by per­ sonal rather than political considerations. None the less, m any o f the accusations made by Bladier were to the point. M ost were confirmed by the commissario governativo in charge o f the distri­ bution o f labour on the Bonifica Renana in a report he made to Prefect M ori.1 H e, too, saw that there was a deliberate attem pt on the part o f the employers to m aintain a high level o f un­ employment in certain zones. He alleged that Ferrara workers were being used with the principal idea o f breaking the socialist organizations; thus, when workers were requested from Ferrara, they were brought not from Argenta, which tradition­ ally supplied labour for the bonifica, but from other areas less socialist in sympathy. The intention was that those refused work— socialists in the main— would think again about their political affiliations when they became desperate. It was this which led him to deny very strongly that fascism could be called anything but a reaction o f the landowners o f the area. H e illustrated this claim by recounting how even the fascist workers employed by the Consorzio had been com pelled to work on terms which were in direct contravention o f the established pacts. According to the commissario, it was impossible to ignore ‘. . . the tight link which exists between Consorzio, agrari, and fascist syndicates, a link which has an essentially political content, being in open contrast w ith those union objectives o f the defence o f the interests o f the proletariat’ . His report suggested that, in effect, the techniques developed between Consorzio and landowners provided everything the proprietors could wish for; the destruction o f the socialist leagues, the paym ent o f m any o f the fascist workers by the state, and a reservoir o f desperate, unorganized workers, prepared to take work on almost any conditions.8 1 A C S, ibid., 23 M ay 1922 ; Commissario Governativo del ufficio di collocamento, Bonifiche Renana e Crevalcore to prefect of Bologna. * An accusation of this kind was made in Montecitorio by the socialist deputy Mazzoni. He claimed that ‘the agrari who subsidize the fascist syndicates have a

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O nce Bladier had become aware o f the real nature o f fascism in his province, he had been unable to think o f any means o f resolving the situation other than m ilitary suppression o f the squads, recognized to be the backbone o f the movement. T o this end he had asked for w hat amounted to a small arm y to be placed at his disposal in Ferrara. H e asked for 2,000 soldiers, at least 300 cavalry, m achine-gun parties, 300 cara­ binieri, 300 guardie regie, and for the provision o f an arm oured car for the Questura. Otherwise he warned that the action which had been carried out against him m ight w ell be repeated on a larger scale.*1 This realization evidently cam e far too late; the movement he and preceding prefects had favoured against the socialists was now seen to be sufficiently powerful to turn on its protectors. A ccordingly Bladier’s request was not answered; instead he was transferred from Ferrara. This was not a suggestion that he was exaggerating the problem that fascism posed, however. It was rather the recognition o f the im possibility o f a purely m ilitary solution when whole sections o f certain provincial communities openly sided w ith the fascists. In the absence o f any other solution, the squads rem ained relatively free to continue and expand their mass actions. Prefect M ori o f Bologna was the next to suffer. D uring M ay he had continued his efforts to resist the demands o f the fascist syndicates in relation to the Bonifica Renana, efforts w hich made him a particular target for both Bologna and Ferrara fascists. His success in pressuring the Consorzio into taking labour only from the ufficio di collocamento, not recognized by the fascists, and his decree prohibiting the circulation o f labour from one area to another prompted the occupation o f Bologna and the demands for his rem oval. Rossoni m aintained that the syndicates were fighting for their survival in this action*— true only in the sense that failure to achieve com plete dom ination o f the labour m arket threatened the stability o f the fascist position. single aim: to bring many ferraresi into the bonifica in order that the socialists are left unemployed; these— starving give in and go to work in the countryside re­ nouncing the terms laid out in the contracts’. Atti Parlamentari della Camera, Discussioni X X X I legislatura, vol. V I, pp. 6015 ff, 12 June 1922; quoted by M . A. Salvaco, ‘Riflessi parlamentari delle lotte agrarie emiliane,’ in R . Zangheri, Le campagne emiliane nelVepoca moderna (Milan, 1957), p. 226. 1 A C S, Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1922, b. 71A , 19 M ay 1922. * Gazzetta Ferrarese, 5 June 1922.

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T h e rem oval o f M ori, at a discreet distance from the ending o f the occupation, suggested that further support o f the socialist position could hardly be expected. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that in August the socialist leagues o f Argenta began, one by one, to capitulate to the Cam era Sindacale o f Ferrara.1 The last went over in early Septem ber.2 The prospect o f being excluded from public works all the winter, and from agricultural works all the summer was sufficient to destroy even the most determined resistance. As with his action in Ferrara, Balbo chose to stress the im­ portance particularly o f the m ilitary success o f the manoeuvre. For him the days o f Bologna represented another ‘general test o f the revolution', m aking it clear that a movement o f squad­ risti, ‘from the north to the cen tre'3 could be realized if necessary. From June onwards, his actions were designed to confirm the m obility and effectiveness o f the squads. In large measure, the m ajor undertakings o f the squads in Ju ly and August— the occupation o f Ravenna, followed by the notorious ‘colum n o f fire’ through the Rom agna, and the battle o f the Oltre Torrente in Parm a— were undertakings not strictly rele­ vant to the developm ent o f fascism in Ferrara. None the less, the fact that squads o f ferraresi were involved in these actions is indicative o f the extent to which, for the ordinary squadrista, fascism had changed its significance. Initially the squads had operated m ainly at night and only interm ittently. M obilizations o f the kind required for the larger actions o f 1922, however, m eant that squadristi were occupied for days, even weeks, solely on the business o f the fascio. For m any it had become a perm anent occupation. In such circumstances, it becomes necessary to ask w hat precisely the individual member o f a squad considered him self to be accom plishing by his actions. T h e ends o f early squadrismo had been largely self-evident; the leagues were devastated, the socialists beaten up, because they represented a threat to an established pattern o f existence. O n ly the more idealist o f the early squadristi could have provided less self-centred reasons for their actions. Y et in 1922, w ith the provincial danger entirely passed, thousands continued to follow Balbo in operations which had little to do with their own province. * A C S , M in. Int., DGPS, A G R 1922, b. 71A, 24 Aug. 1922. * Balilla, 10 Sept. 1922. * Balbo, Diano, p. 89.

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It is probably not unrealistic to suggest that this continued support sprang from no w ell-elaborated m otive am ong m any o f the squadristi. For these it was sufficient that they rem ained as they had been in the early days o f the expeditions, that they could still enjoy the excitem ent, com radeship, and respect o f others. Indeed, this was precisely the virtue o f ‘squadrism* ; it m ade necessary no decisions other than those o f the im m ediate objective, w hile providing a position o f some respect in pro­ vincial society. Balbo rem arked on the utter indifference o f his followers to everyday political events: ‘ It is extraordinary how m y squadristi do not know even the names o f the ministers w ho have resigned or o f those in office.*1 Y e t even he was not entirely w ithout this indifference, being caught up to a great degree w ith w hat was really an internal momentum o f squadrismo. Convinced that fascism w ould ultim ately com e to power by means o f an insurrection, he was frequently unconcerned to understand the political m anoeuvrings o f M ussolini. For him provincial gains were more im portant to the fascists than political alliances. A gain, in his diary, he makes this clear: ‘Rom e can do w hat it wants. H ere we*re in com m and. W e shall think about Rom e on the day on w hich w e can descend on that ow l’s nest to w ipe it out.*8 Thus he often failed to see that for M ussolini ‘squadrism* was essentially a means o f exerting pressure on the political centre in order to gain political concessions. For Balbo, parlia­ m ent was already only o f lim ited im portance. ‘N ow adays the gam e is being played outside parliam ent,* he wrote in Ju ly, adding a com m ent w hich suggests perhaps that his pre­ occupation w ith the squads was a com pensation for his in ability to understand more com plex problem s: ‘A fine intelligence is not alw ays w orth as m uch as a m an o f courage and goodw ill. In any case, to the devil w ith these crises! I ’m going back to the province w here problems are sim pler and methods more straightforward.*8 C ertainly the problem s that there were w ithin the province no longer involved the socialists in any great measure. D uring the first nine months o f 1922 isolated incidents continued to be reported, but their m agnification b y the fascists said m ore about the fascist in ability to brook any opposition than about the real strength o f the so-called social-communists. A p art from the area around A rgenta, organized socialism had largely 1 Balbo, Diario, p. 29.

* Ibid.

* Ibid., p. 95.

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disappeared. A m ajor cause o f this was the persistent harrying o f anyone suspected o f being a leader, or even a potential leader. This was carried to the extent that, for m any socialists, it was no longer possible for them to continue living in the province. A t the end o f M arch, Bladier had com piled a list o f forty-nine names o f socialist organizers living outside Ferrara because they feared for the safety o f themselves and their fam ilies.1 Gaetano Zirardini, the former director o f the pro­ vincial movement, was warned again and again that he would return to Ferrara at the risk o f his life. In June the Gazzetta Ferrarese published an open letter to him in which certain squadristi asserted that they would never perm it him to set foot in Ferrara again.8 No action was taken against them. M enaces such as this were so successful that the prefect discounted the possibility o f the ^egalitarian strike* (so called because its declared aim was the re-establishment o f political and syndi­ calist liberties) having any im portance at Ferrara: Since the socialist organizations in this province have almost totally dis­ appeared because they have been replaced by those of the fascist syndicates, I think I can assure you that it is unlikely that an eventual general strike called by the socialist party could take place here.*

In the event, only a few railw ay workers in Ferrara dared to stand up to the intim idation o f the fascists.4 None the less, in the absence o f the socialists, the fascists provided their own problems. W hile Balbo refined the practices o f ‘squadrism’ and turned his attentions more to national than to local issues, the economic crisis served to resurrect the feelings o f the urban fascists that the mission o f fascism had somehow been betrayed. Certain o f them began to show a concern for the misfortunes o f the labourers which was cer­ tainly not characteristic o f Balbo or the proprietors at this time. O nce again it was G attelli who made him self the ch ief spokesman o f these sentiments, setting up another newspaper, Videa Fascista, to publicize his views. Through its columns, he made repeated appeals dining A pril, M ay, and June for the provincial fascist movement to seek the support rather than the fearful acquiescence o f the agricultural labourers. He pointed out that, since the workers were in large part too frightened to 1 A C S , Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1922, b. 71A , 30 M ar. 1922. * Gazzetta Ferrarese, 29 June 1922. * A C S , Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1922, b. 41A, 31 July 1922. 4 A C S , ibid., b. 41B, 2 Aug. 1922.

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consider approaching the fascists w ith their com plaints, the fascists would have to make the first moves. A ccordingly he issued an invitation to the workers o f the officine and the fields, asking them to place a little confidence in the fascists: ‘T ry to ask for our protection when it seems to you that your interests have been misunderstood or betrayed. Put us between yourselves and your employers when you come upon an injustice to be corrected.’ 1 Promises were made that agricultural pacts w ould be respected in full, particularly w ith regard to the imponibile,9 w hile in Ju ly he reverted to the old theme o f the land pro­ gram m e, reprinting the promises o f 1921,9 and asserting that the fascists o f his convictions would not perm it those who had trusted in the realization o f this program m e to be betrayed.4 T h e other face o f this cam paign was an increasingly violent denunciation o f the proprietors and the bourgeoisie, accused o f falling down on their responsibilities towards fascism. G attelli rem embered how at one tim e everyone in the province had been fascist— ‘Priests and landowners, reformists and masons, petite bourgeoisie and profiteers . . .’— and how the original group o f fascists had believed, ‘poor fools’, that these people shared their aims. Instead they had found that, w ith the passing o f the danger o f socialism, their supporters were no longer the least bit concerned to listen to them ; ‘T h e w ild anim al has been dom esticated. Y ou can dismiss the trainer.* This was a fate G attelli was not prepared to suffer, and he attem pted to clarify the situation for his enemies. We fascists have never been your white guard, even if our anti-socialist ac­ tion has indirectly brought you great advantages. You infamous speculators . . . will not triumph. We put to flight the proletarian army of 90,000 Zirardiniani ; we can easily wipe out your little band of egoists and cowards.6

T h e fact that more specific accusations were not m ade suggests that the actions o f the speculatori were considered sufficiently w ell known to be passed over. O n ly on one occasion did G attelli provide a particular instance o f w hat he was w orking against; he alleged that, not only had the num ber o f mezzadri not decreased, but affittuari whose contracts finished were being com pelled to accept new terms at mezzadrìa.• It was impossible to w rite such powerful attacks as these 1 L'Idea Fascista, 7 M ay 1922. * Ibid., 9 Apr. 1922. * ‘W e must give every man as much land as he can work; we must bypass the mezzadrìa', taken from Balilla, 20 M ar. 1921. 4 L'Idea Fascista, 8 July 1922. 6 Ibid., 23 Apr. 1922. • Ibid., 8 Ju ly 1922.

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without at the same time indirectly criticizing the existing directorate o f the Federazione Provinciale. The appeals for a policy more favourable to the workers, ju st as much as the insults hurled at the agrari, im plied that the directorate, known to be hand in glove with m any o f the proprietors, was taking the wrong road. G attelli was thus reopening the battle against Balbo, adjourned but not concluded in the previous autum n. As before, his methods were those o f the would-be leader; the personally financed newspaper, in com petition w ith the Balilla,, was a challenge to the provincial directorate, not a means o f advising it. M any o f his reasons for resuming this challenge were fundam entally the same as they had been in the previous year, but the winter and the economic crisis had provided tim e and m aterial for the enlargem ent o f the former discontent. In the intervening months it had become clear that the fascio o f Ferrara had failed in its efforts to secure a more influential position in the provincial movement. Not only was Balbo still very m uch the D oge he had been before, but the men o f secondary im portance were seen to be often either friends or creatures o f the provincial leader. T h e w inter had witnessed the rise o f Tom m aso Beltram i, Renzo Ravenna, and Renzo Chierici; G iulio D ivisi, G uido Felici, Feliciano Bignozzi, Enrico C aretd, and Brondi had all consolidated their positions.1 O f these, only Felici was o f the original group, but he was still in the confidence o f Balbo. It is significant that in his diary Balbo never mentions G attelli, G aggioli, or M ontanan, although they were prom inent in provincial affairs at several points during 1922. T h eir exclusion from positions o f pro­ vincial im portance was quite as deliberate as their exclusion from the record. A t one point during Ju ly, G attelli’s im plicit protest at this em pire-building was supported by a comment o f M ario D otti, the leader o f the local P .P .I. D otti blam ed the difficult relations then existing between popolari and fascists partly on the fact that there had been a change o f guard in the fascist cam p, the better men having been replaced by those, ‘endowed w ith less sense o f responsibility’ .2 Y et there was more to the conflict with Balbo than the per1 Names drawn from Balbo’s Diario, passim. The fact that relatively few provincial personalities are mentioned in this diary gives added weight to those whose names do appear. * Domenica dell'Operaio, 30 July 1922.

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sonai ambitions o f G attelli or the resentment felt by die urban fascists at their neglect. T h e accusations m ade in the Idea Fascista were not sim ply the pretexts o f a personal struggle, even i f the existence o f personal hostility often m ade it look like it. O n the contrary, the exclusion o f the town fascists from provincial roles was a reflection o f fundam entally differing views about the aims o f fascism. W ith each crisis w ithin the fascist movement, the terms o f this difference becam e clearer. G aggioli, U livi, and M ontanari, who, w ith G attelli, were the leaders o f the dissident group, were dem onstrating by their protests that, i f they had been am ong the most determ inedly anti-socialist o f the fascists, they had never been anti-proletarian. T h e appeals for the confidence o f the workers were genuinely m eant, ju st as the land program m e o f the previous year had seemed a project w ith real possibilities o f settling certain pro­ vincial problems. Basically D ’Annunzian in m any o f their attitudes, they too were revolted by the sight o f agrarian fascism, apparently restoring all that had been worst in the pre-war system o f agriculture. Thus, far from being anti­ proletarian, they were in m any ways anti-bourgeois, rejecting the patent self-interest o f landowner, businessman, and shop­ keeper. G attelli, in conform ity w ith w hat he considered to be ‘an innate sense o f aristocracy’ 1 in fascism, wished to see the foundation o f a dictatorship2 which would create a new social hierarchy, no longer based on the values o f property or w ealth. In this hierarchy the m anual worker was not to be exploited by the landowner, but he was to recognize the superiority o f the uomo di pensiero— the impiegato o f the commune or the state, the m anager o f the small workshop, or the im poverished intel­ lectual.2 Class collaboration on these terms was to control the 1 For many of the attitudes of Gattelli see B. Gattelli, Il Fascism nella vita locale. Discorso pronunciato 1 8.12.1g ot al Teatro Comunale, Ferrara (Ferrara, 1921). This quotation is from p. 8. ' A C S , Min. Int. D G PS, A G R 1922, b. 57A, 6 M ar. 1922; report o f fascist meeting to discuss events of Fiume. Gattelli urged those present to be prepared for the next crisis and to be ready for 'the march o f the fascist squads to Rome and the dictatorship*. * Gattelli, op. d t., passim. Gattelli’s views are fairly characteristic o f a young, urban, ex-combattente element in fascism. They may be compared, for example, with those o f Padovani of Naples, who rejected the fascism o f agrarian terrorism and called for a popularly based dictatorship which would destroy the corruption of the dient system in southern politics and open the way for the rise o f a new political class in the south. See R . Colapietra, Napoli tra dopoguerra efascism (Milan, 1962), particularly pp. 165 ff.

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anti-social habits o f controlling elements within the existing bourgeoisie. Although this point o f view had some lim ited appeal within the town o f Ferrara, it had no choice whatsoever o f success at a provincial level. Bidding for the affections o f the workers was not going to dissolve the bonds that held them in the control the proprietors. T h e im portance o f the renewed dissidence o f spring 1922 was that, for the first time, the town fascists began to appreciate that argum ent was not going to change the existing course o f fascism; the existing divisions had become too great for that to be expected. The Idea Fascista in M ay expressed the belief that there were really two spirits m otivating fascism, ‘two spirits which are m oving aw ay from each other more and more and whose divorce . . . w ill not be far away*.1 O n the same day the socialist paper also mentioned these differences, suggesting that fascism in the city had always been principally political and concerned with agrarian reform, while in the rural areas it had been economic and entirely opposed to any reform. The socialists regretted that the town fascists had never been strong enough to impose their w ill on the others.* T h e position o f the dissidents was well known, therefore. T h ey had finally reached that point where they had to choose between precipitating the divorce themselves and leaving the fascist movement, continuing to create trouble while rem aining officially within the party, or compromising with their principles and stifling their criticisms. D uring the following eighteen months most o f the dissidents were to take, at different times, all three courses o f action. U ntil September, when events were to be taken out o f their hands, they pursued the second, rem aining within the party but not letting up the cam paign against the agrari. U ndoubtedly they remained at least in part because o f a loyalty felt towards M ussolini, still not considered im plicated in the transformation they resented in provincial fascism. Both G attelli and G aggioli knew M ussolini personally, and it would be unwise to under­ estimate the restraining effect o f his personality in this period. T h ey continued to see their quarrel as being essentially o f a local nature— against the proprietors in the first place and the Federazione Provinciale in the second. Initially they encountered very little opposition. Balbo was * V idea Fascista, 20 M ay 1922.

1 Sciattila, 20 M ay 1922.

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working intensively on the organization o f the squads and had little tim e for provincial disputes. No doubt he recognized in any case that, so long as the dissidents confined themselves to propaganda on beh alf o f the workers, their effect could only be beneficial to the provincial movement. T h e crisis cam e when words were abandoned in favour o f actions. In J u ly Prefect G iovara reported that there had been a series o f clashes be­ tween fascist proprietors and fascists he described as being politically on the left. These, he continued, had been cham ­ pioning the cause o f the w orking class. T h e most notable incident had occurred only three days before at Q uartesana, a suburb o f Ferrara, where about tw enty o f these left-wing fascists had invaded the seat o f the fascio, carried out tables and chairs and burned them, alleging that the fascio was a base from w hich the agrari were im posing their own wishes on the rural popu­ lation. T h e action had been successful and the Quartesana fascio now insisted on excluding all landowners from membership.1 There was no im m ediate reaction to this rebellion; Balbo’s operations in R avenna, Ancona, and Parm a perm itted it to pass almost w ithout comment. In August, however, G attelli overstepped the lim it and brought the whole o f the Federazione Provinciale down on his head. W orkers in the sugar factories, adhering to the Cam era Sindacale, reacted strongly against a further cut in wages agreed between their representatives and the employers. In their reaction, they were supported by the fascio o f Ferrara, and particularly by G attelli and U livi, who were instrum ental in organizing a strike against the Cam era Sindacale.1 Balbo, no doubt recognizing that August 1922 was not the moment for fascism to begin to take up an independent position in respect o f the industrialists, succeeded in preventing the strike taking place. His comments on the efforts o f ‘some irresponsible fool am ong Ferrara’s fascists* are illustrative o f his attitude to labour problems. T o him the whole idea o f a strike against the employers was ‘absurd’, w hile the attem pt to pro­ tect labourers from reductions in wages was sim ply anarchism : ‘T h at was all we needed— some foolery o f an anarchist strike right in F errara!’ * Follow ing this action, the situation in the province im ­ m ediately worsened. O n both 27 and 28 August the M inistry 1 ACS, Min. Int., DGPS, AGR 1922, b. 71 A, 16 July 1922. * ACS, ibid., 22 Aug. 1922. ■ * Balbo, Diariot p. 149. -

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o f the Interior received reports that the province was on the brink o f a bloody conflict.1 Beltram i, now provisional secretary o f the Cam era Sindacale, publicly insulted G attelli, who replied by dem anding a duel.* T o contain the trouble, Balbo acted with great haste, telling M ichele Bianchi— now secretary o f the P.N .F.— that if a commission o f inquiry had not arrived by 30 August, he would decline all responsibility for w hat m ight occur.* In the event, the commission, com prising C . M . D e V ecch i, A ttilio T eruzzi, and Gino Baroncini, had assembled by 31 August. O n the next day, the directorate o f the fascio o f Ferrara announced that it intended holding a meeting to dis­ cuss the commission and was sum m arily dissolved for in­ discipline;4 the commission nom inated a provisional directorate o f three to take its place— all three friends o f Balbo.* O n 5 Septem ber the commission issued its report. G attelli, M ontanari, and U livi were declared to be expelled from the P.N .F. Tor m oral incom patibility’, a reference to their mistresses rather than their politics. G uido T orti suffered the same fate for denigrating fascism. O ther members o f the town fascioy including G aggioli, were criticized for indiscipline. Y et, while the dissidents suffered a predictable fate, certain o f their points were conceded them. The syndicates were severely criticized for their failure to apply in full in the province the fascist law that all individual interests were to be subjected to the national interest o f greater production. Instead, it was asserted, the various groups concerned had continued to act ‘on the basis o f class concepts’ . This was obviously aim ed particularly at the agrari since it was regretted that no move had been made to set up a syndicate o f employers over w hich the fascist party could have authority.* 1 A C S , Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1922, b. 71 A ; reports from prefect of Bologna to Ministry of the Interior o f 27 and 28 August 1922. * A C S , ibid., 28 Aug. 1922. ' A C S , ibid., the prefect quotes a telegram sent from Balbo at Cattolica to M . Bianchi in Rome. 4 Gazzetta Ferrarese, 1 and 2 Sept. 1922; also A C S , Min. Int. DGPS, A G R 1922, b. 71A , for same dates. 4 Gazzetta Ferrarese, 4 Sept. 1922. The three were Raoul Caretti, a mason, and father o f Enrico, Balbo’s right-hand man at this time; A. Brandi, a landowner, honoured by being described in Balbo’s diary as a ‘fascista attivissimo' (p. 64); and Genunzio Servidori, one o f the original nine Ferrara fascists and one of the few to remain loyal to Balbo. * Ibid., 6 Sept. 1922; see also A C S, Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1922, b. 71A , 8 Sept. 1922.

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The report served only to inflame the situation further. A bout a hundred o f the fascists o f the town, unw illing to accept the sacrifice o f their leaders, resigned from the provincial federation.1 G aggioli, together with others who had been criticized in the report, attempted to resign, but their resignations were refused and they were expelled.12*As in the previous year, they set up a Fascio Autonom o. This justified its existence by ap­ pealing to the original ideals the dissidents had followed in fascism, while at the same time denouncing the official federation for inaugurating a system o f schiavismo (slavery).2 It was the continued use o f this accusation that rankled particularly among the provincial fascists rem aining loyal to Balbo, and on 12 Septem ber a group o f more than 100 squadristi from Copparo descended on the town w ith the intention o f quashing the dissidence by force.4 Autonomists were beaten up in the streets, and during the afternoon a gun battle developed between the two groups in the course o f which three fascists were wounded.56 The gun fight, bringing the two factions face to face w ith the prospect o f killing each other, caused a slight calm ing o f tem­ pers. The Gazzetta Ferrarese had already mooted the idea that the commission had not been correctly conducted, and should therefore be revised by higher authority.4 As the autonomists had hoped, eyes began to turn in the direction o f M ussolini. Balbo was called to M ilan for discussions w ith the fascist leader, and, when he returned, G aggioli was also requested to m ake the journey to M ilan .7 T h e mere fact that the autonomists were to receive a hearing suggested that they had already gained a certain amount o f ground. The personal position o f G aggioli as, in effect, the founder o f the provincial fascist movement no doubt contributed to the strength o f their position, as did the evidence that G aggioli’s efforts to recruit support among the rural fasci had not been entirely w ithout 1 A C S, ibid. * Balilla, io Sept. 1922. • Gazzetta Ferrarese, 9 Sept. 1922. The autonomists described themselves in the manifesto quoted here as * . . . ribelli allo schiavismo9. 4 Domenica dell'Operaio, 17 Sept. 1922, for information about the composition of this squadra. 6 Gazzetta Ferrarese, 13 Sept. 1922; see also A C S, Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1922, b. 71A, 12 and 13 Sept. 1922. • Gaietta Ferrarese, 12 Sept. 1922. 7 A C S, Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1922, b. 71 A, 13 and 17 Sept. 1922.

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result.1 M ussolini appears to have told G aggioli that the judge­ m ent o f the commission would have to be accepted for the moment, in this w ay letting it be known that there was the prospect o f a revision in the future.8 O n his return to Ferrara, G aggioli acted w ith a m ixture o f conciliatory and provocative gestures, closing the enrolm ent in the autonomous fascio w ith 453 names and promising an end to recruitm ent in the country­ side, but at the same- tim e continuing bitter attacks on the regular fascists through the columns o f V Aratro d*Italia> a paper new ly established by the autonomists.8 H e was thus indicating that, while he was not prepared to abandon his criticisms o f provincial fascism, he was ready to stop eroding its position. Even so, the autonomists enjoyed a great deal o f support; a meeting o f the Fascio Autonom o on 8 O ctober was attended by about 500 people, including the representatives o f sixteen rural centres and twenty-one syndicates. It was claim ed at the m eeting that the autonomists had the support o f about two-thirds o f the fascists o f the town— a fair indication o f where the divisions w ithin the provincial movement lay.4 T h e events o f the m arch on Rom e intervened to conclude the hostile confrontation between the two sides. T h e auto­ nomists, who had always m aintained that they rem ained loyal fascists even w ithout the tessera, were not going to be left in the cold at the critical moment. O n 27 O ctober they put themselves at the disposition o f the general command and were im­ m ediately allocated positions o f responsibility in the occupation o f Ferrara.8 For Ferrara, the m arch passed o ff largely w ithout incident. T h e station, post office, and law courts were occupied ; groups o f squadristi left for both Rom e and M ilan .8 This lack o f incident was in itself significant; it demonstrated the extent to w hich all resistance to fascism w ithin the province had long since been crushed. O f the power that Zirardini had wielded in early 1920 there was no longer the slightest sign. Even presented w ith a fascism divided against itself, the former leghisti had rem ained cowed and silent. T h e authorities, who 1 Gaggioli received immediate support from the fascio of San Giorgio, a suburb o f Ferrara, while, at the same time, the fasci of both San Giorgio and Marrara were dissolved by Balbo for indiscipline, suggesting that Marrara had also supported the autonomists. See Balilla, 17 Sept. 1922, and Gazzetta Ferrarese, 19 Sept. 1922. * A C S, M in. Int., DGPS, A G R 1922, b. 71A, 17 Sept. 1922. _ * A C S , ibid., 25 Sept. 1922. 4 Gazzetta Ferrarese, 10 Oct. 1922. * Ibid., 29 Oct. 1922. * Ibid., 31 O ct. 1922.

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at best had presented only half-hearted resistance to the growth o f fascism, had learned the lesson o f the occupation o f Ferrara in M ay and abdicated com pletely in the face o f the movement o f the squadre. Indeed, Prefect G iovara was more than pleased by the favourable result o f the march on Rom e, promising his devoted collaboration to the D uce, 'to whom the heart o f the Fatherland goes out with a single beat o f trust’ .1 Behind him were ranged almost all the influential elements o f a provincial society— landowners, professional, and business interests. Even the popolari, in the same year subject to the violence o f the squads, could only find one word to express their feelings at the success o f Mussolini— ‘Benissimo’ .* 1 Text of telegram from Prefect Giovara to Mussolini, quoted in Domenica dell* Operaio, 5 Nov. 1922. • Ibid.

IO

TH E F IR ST Y E A R OF FA SC IST G O V E R N M E N T , N O V E M B E R 1922D E C E M B E R 19 23 T h e successful conclusion o f the m arch on Rom e produced rem arkably little echo in Ferrara. There was no sense in which the fascists suddenly demonstrated that they had come to power, nor did m any o f the problems that confronted them appear to have been altered by M ussolini’s victory. Provincial dissidence, econom ic problems, the progress o f the syndicates— these rem ained the principal issues during the rem ainder o f the year, the only new elem ent being provided by the manoeuvrings that preceded the adm inistrative elections o f early Decem ber. G iven the conditions that had existed in the province before O ctober, the absence o f any sudden change was not surprising; for it was m anifestly not the case that local fascism had achieved a dom inant position only as a result o f the m arch. This it had held for most o f 1922. Nevertheless, for all the apparent con­ tinuity, the appointm ent o f M ussolini to the presidency o f the council m eant that the conditions, both psychological and political, on w hich provincial power was exercised were greatly altered, and in a w ay which carried m any inherent dangers for the movement. L ocal fascism had grown and developed its strength as a movement o f opposition, in opposition first to the socialists and then to the authorities o f state. M uch o f the unity it had enjoyed had sprung from the stimulus o f the struggle, and even before O ctober it had been seen that the stimulus was dim inishing and that divisions w ithin the move­ m ent were increasing dram atically. W ith fascism in govern­ ment, the dangers o f a progressive strengthening o f centrifugal forces were increased. This applied not only to the squadristi, faced w ith the problems o f com m itting actions illegal in the eyes o f a fascist governm ent, but also to the fascist politicians and to the less w holly com m itted supporters o f fascism. W hile the first m ight feel more able to make their differences known in

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the relative security o f the new government and in their eager­ ness to compete for posts, the second— landed proprietors, liberals, and catholics— m ight have been tempted to consider that, with the socialist peril safely o ff the stage, the opportunity had come for them to reassert their independence from the somewhat equivocal fascist movement. The events in Ferrara during the year following the m arch on Rom e fit into this context. T h e politics o f the province are concerned w ith the internal struggles o f fascism, w ith the relations between the fascists and their allies, and with the problems o f fascist syndicalism. In this respect, the account seems strangely one-sided, as though the great mass o f the population in the province played no part in the political events surrounding it. A part from the extent to which the agricultural and industrial workers were involved w ith the syndicates, this impression is nevertheless not m isleading. D uring most o f 1923 the fascists operate in w hat is very much a political void, contending only with the remnants o f other urban and largely bourgeois parties. O f the political partici­ pation o f the rural workers there is very little sign. Evidently this was in part a product o f the fascist operations o f the pre­ ceding two years. T h e socialist movement had been left dem oralized and— more im portant— largely w ithout leaders as a result o f persistent persecutions. O f the former leaders o f Ferrarese socialism, only the reformist M ario C avallari re­ mained active and unsilenced, profiting from a certain respect which his courageous personal resistance to various squadristi had earned for him. Y et it m ay also be suggested that there was no longer much disposition to oppose the fascists among m any o f the labourers. The desire for a quiet existence which had induced some o f them to tire o f the socialist movement in m id-19201 can only have been strengthened by the events o f the following years. Sim ply, they were tired o f fighting. As D e Felice suggests, ‘By now a deep sense o f weariness ran through everyone.’ 2 For those few possessed o f unusual fortitude, whether socialist or popolari, the squads and M ilizia V olontaria2 discouraged all open opposition. Such a political clim ate did much to encourage the open 1 See speech o f Alda Costa, quoted above, p. ioo. Ä De Felice, Mussolini il fascista, i, 389. 8 M ilizia Volontaria di Sicurezza Nazionale (M .V.S.N .)— the fascist militia formed in early 1923.

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expression o f disagreements and the adoption o f independent positions. Initially, however, there was no indication that this m ight be the result in Ferrara. A part from continuing troubles w ith G attelli, G aggioli, and the dissidents o f the Fascio A uto­ nomo, the situation im m ediately following the m arch on Rom e was one that appeared only to confirm the im mensely strong position already enjoyed by fascism in the province. This was m ade evident by the adm inistrative elections o f early Decem ­ ber, required to replace the socialist councils which had resigned during 1921. In the communes o f the hinterland, the fascists presented their own lists, m aking no concessions to any other group and clearly confident that their dom ination o f the rural centres was such as to w arrant this uncompromising position. In Ferrara, however, where political activity still bore some sm all signs o f articulation, Balbo brought together a bloc o f ‘partiti nazionali' which included, besides the P .N .F ., the popolariy Partito Liberale, A .N .G ., Associazione M utilati e Invalidi, Federazione A graria Ferrarese, and the Partito R adicale.1 Y et this was not a m ark o f the weakness o f town fascism. T h e terms o f the union were made very clear by the manifesto issued by the alliance, prefaced as it was by the phrase, ‘U nder the auspices o f the local fascio . . . ' . * R ather it was the case that the bloc represented the degree to which the organizations nom inally independent o f the fascio had effectively ceased to have any genuinely autonomous existence. It was very m uch upon this reality that Balbo based his position ; for his support cam e from a m uch w ider section o f the politi­ cally active com m unity o f Ferrara than that present solely in the P.N .F. N or was this a phenomenon resulting from en­ thusiasm for the new fascist governm ent. T h e Federazione A graria, the Liberals, the popolariy had been with fascism from the earliest days; the Association for combattenti and mutilati had never achieved that independent position in Ferrara that they had enjoyed, at least for a lim ited tim e, in certain other places; and the radicals, sadly reduced in strength since the pre-war days o f Ercole M osti, had determined before the m arch on Rom e that their independent existence was no longer possible, w hile a section o f them declared that they found most acceptable the program me o f the P.N .F.* 1 See manifesto signed by these parties in Gazzetta Ferrarese, 30 Nov. 1922. • Ibid. * Ibid., 21 Oct. 1922.

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It is not possible, therefore, to consider the alliance o f the elections as representing the insertion o f the more influential members o f the political groups extraneous to fascism into the fascist victory. Such people had always been present in the provincial movement, if not w ithin the provincial party. Grosoli, Sitta, N iccolini— three o f the candidates— had re­ m ained outside the P .N .F ., yet none had ever shown anything less than the staunchest loyalty for the fascist cause. Balbo, in creating the electoral alliance, was sim ply recognizing that fascism in the province was something w ith a m uch broader base than the P .N .F ., and that the party could ill afford to renounce m any o f its ablest supporters sim ply because they chose to retain their form er links. As the list o f candidates for the commune m ade clear, alliances w ithin the town were still essentially based on class, as they had been under the threat o f socialism, rather than ideology; o f the forty-seven candidates, ten were prom inent landowners, nine were avvocati, and eight were ragionieri.1 As long as fascism continued to guarantee the social position o f such people, it was unlikely that they w ould insist on asserting positions independent o f fascism. Social divisions w ithin the province were too precise for them to consider such a liberty. Thus, antagonisms w hich were to arise were far more likely to be based on personal hostility w ithin the dom inant group than on any fundam ental divergence o f political principle. T h e impression that emerges from the adm inistrative elections is one o f a broad front o f support for the fascist position. This impression is increased by the fact that both republicans and socialists decided not to contest the elections, both evidently fearing that the inevitable poor showing could only further harm their positions in the province.2 W hat difficulties there were for the official fascists cam e from the continued existence o f the Fascio Autonom o. Y e t even here, the im m ediate effect o f the m arch on Rom e was to reduce the effectiveness o f the dissident movement. It was plainly something o f a shock for m any o f the autonomists to find themselves outside the official fascio at the moment o f trium ph, and consequently unlikely to 1 Gazzetta Ferrarese, 30 Nov. 1922; list of candidates to communal council. * The socialists appear also to have considered it pointless to confront potential fascist violence; see Avanti! of 1 Dec. 1922— ‘Does Dr. Balbo think that he could find ten people in Italy ready to believe that in Ferrara you could carry out a socialist electoral campaign? E via!9.

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benefit from the victory they too had worked to secure. D uring the course o f Novem ber several o f the leading members o f the Fascio Autonom o made conciliatory noises in the direction o f the provincial directorate,1 G attelli even going so far as to suggest that the original reasons for disagreem ent were now unim portant in the light o f the position fascism now enjoyed. His attempts to regain the favour o f the provincial leaders were not successful, and he was consistently rebuffed, but Balbo understood very w ell the m otivation behind the attempts and turned this to good account. W hile rejecting the overtures of G attelli, he succeeded in seducing G aggioli from his dissident position, offering him a place on the list o f candidates for the com munal council.8 Although G aggioli felt unable to accept, the split between him and G attelli was made sufficiently large for there to be no more than a rum p o f autonomists left at the beginning o f Decem ber. These, encouraged only by G attelli and G uido T orti, a particular enemy o f Balbo, attem pted to run an independent list in the elections o f the town and to sow the seeds o f dissent in certain o f the rural communes.8 A part from a certain amount o f success in Copparo,1*4*however, the autonomists were shown to be o f little account at this stage, reduced by internal divisions and the débâcle o f the elections to a state o f hostile silence. V irtu ally unopposed, the fascist alliance o f the town and the exclusive fascist lists o f the rural communes swept the board, capturing both maggioranza and minoranza in all areas. W hat followed this victory was one o f the culm inating points o f the fascist movement in the province. T h e political power exer­ cised through provincial and com munal administrations, which the socialists had wrested from the provincial bourgeoisie in the years before 1921, was officially restored to that bourgeoisie. 1 For Gattelli, see Gazzetta Ferrarese, 22 Nov. 1922; for Gaggioli, Barbieri, Montanari, and Ulivi, see the same paper for 23, 24, 25, and 27 Nov. 1922 re­ spectively. * For details of this dissidence and these manoeuvrings which surrounded it, see a letter of Balbo to Michele Bianchi in A CS, Michele Bianchi, b. 1, fase. 12 ‘Elezioni 1924’, 18 Nov. 1922. This document is clearly relevant to the administrative elec­ tions of 1922, however, and not to the political elections of 1924 to which it is related in De Felice, Mussolini il fascista, 1, 575, n. 4. # A C S, Min. Int., Gabinetto Finzi, Ordine Pubblico 1923, b. 54, 3 Dec. 1922. 4 For the incidents at Copparo, where there was a strong protest against the candidates imposed by the Federazione Provinciale, see A C S , M R F, b. 41 ‘Cop­ paro’, i i Jan. 1923.

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A nd the fascists took great care that they should be the ch ief custodians o f that power. T h e m ajority o f the com m unal adm inistration cam e from the ranks o f the fascio. Balbo becam e an assessore comunale, w hile as m ayor was appointed R aoul C aretti, a mason, an ex-radical, and a fascist since 1921.1 M uch the same can be said o f the provincial adm inistration w hich included at least six fascists, and w hich was inaugurated to the strains o f the vice-prefect o f Ferrara rem em bering the fascist dead and prom ising ‘our adm iration, our perennial gratitude*. Francesco Brom bin was appointed president o f the council, w hile two fascists w ith nationalist links, A lberto V erd i and G iulio R ighini, were m ade vice-president and secretary respectively.2 G iovanni Forti, who had had a large hand in the prom ulgation o f the land program m e o f 1921, w as m ade president o f the D eputazione Provinciale.2 In the rural com ­ munes the tendency was even m ore m arked. T h e situation a t A rgenta, for exam ple, was summed up by the Gazzetta Ferrarese : ‘A rgenta w hich has its own council composed alm ost ex­ clusively o f ex-squadristi ; w hich has as m ayor one o f the finest black-shirts o f the zone; w hich has as councillors young m en who for our p arty have suffered months and months o f im ­ prisonment.*4 T his dom inance was em phasized b y the creation in early Jan uary o f an association o f specifically fascist communes o f the province,5 designed to do for the communes very m uch w hat the Federazione Provinciale did for the scattered fasci. In the first weeks o f 1923, therefore, it seemed th at the fascists had m ade the transition from being a party o f opposition to being a p arty o f pow er w ith great ease and all-enveloping success. N ot only were all the channels o f econom ic and political power in the province under their control, but this control was alm ost entirely uncontested. It appeared that the point had been reached where provincial politics had become synonymous w ith fascism and where the problem s w hich rem ained to be solved were o f an essentially technical nature. A t first it seems that the distinction between the functions o f the party and 1 T he names o f the communal council are printed in the Gazzetta Ferrame, 27 M ar. 1923. * Ibid., 9 Jan. 1923. • Ibid., 1 M ar. 1923. 4 Ibid., 11 Apr. 1923. * This was termed the Associazione dei Comuni Ferraresi fascisti, and included the mayors o f all communes, together with the mayor of Ferrara, the segretario politico of the Federazione Provinciale, and the ragioniere Vittorio Pedriali; see ibid., 7 Jan. 1923.

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those o f the state were not clearly recognized. Squadristi, doubtless at something o f a loose end during January, formed platoons o f ‘polizia fascista* and began to try to enforce the law themselves. O n one occasion at least, a platoon o f this kind was commanded by an officer o f the carabinieri.1 N or was the apparent unanim ity o f the fascist victory disturbed by the first provisions concerning the composition o f the party and the reorganization o f the action squads. There were no reports o f opposition to the formation o f the M .V .S .N . in the province, the squads being reorganized into legions but in large measure retaining their old commanders.12* T h e decision to consider membership o f the masonic orders incom patible w ith fascism passed over equally quietly in the province; the prefect re­ ported sim ply that all those concerned had resigned from their lodges.2 T h e nationalists, already weakened by the loss o f their two principal members, V erdi and R ighini, to the fascists, m ade no difficulties about uniting w ith the fascio, w hile there were no objections from the fascist side.4 This calm was broken only at the end o f M arch. Francesco Brom bin, president o f the provincial adm inistration and secre­ tary o f the town fascio, resigned from all his official positions and handed in his tessera, declaring that he was resigning ‘in order not to be a slave o f the clique o f fascists and masons*.5 T h e causes o f the conflict were trivial (his com petence as local music critic had been put in doubt by several o f the younger fascists), but the resignation served to reopen those divisions that had been latent since the adm inistrative elections. Brombin’s accusations were clearly levelled at R aoul G aretti, at his son Enrico who was com mander o f the provincial m ilitia and secretary o f the provincial federation, and at Tom m aso Bel­ tram i o f the Cam era Sindacale, all known to be masons at least 1 T w o examples o f the functioning o f a 'polizia fascista’ appear in the Gazzetta Ferrar«« for 8 and 11 Jan. 1923, while in the Balilla o f 14 Jan. 1923 it was announced that in several centres of the province fascist police squads would soon be in action 'together with the legally recognized officials of the government'. * Gazzetta Ferrarese, 13 Feb. 1923. ' A C S , Min. Int., DGPS, A G R 1923, b. 30, 23 Feb. 1923. 4 Report of agreement o f nationalists, Gazzetta Ferrarese, 14 M ar. 1923. Accord­ ing to one report, however, Balbo opposed the decision when it was taken in Rome because of his dislike of the monarchist position o f the nationalists. His comment to Mussolini was typical of his mode o f expression 'provinciale’ ; 'T i fregheranno’. See Y . De Begnac, Palazzo Venezia (Rome, 1950), p. 199. * Balilla, I Apr. 1923.

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until the decree o f the G rand Council and all associates o f Balbo, him self a presumed ex-m em ber o f the local lodge.1 It was against precisely these people that the dissidents had al­ w ays nourished the greatest resentment, considering them to be essentially arrivisti and fascists o f the seconda ora. T h e acceptance o f Brom bin’s resignation and the public hum iliation to w hich he was subjected seemed to confirm in their eyes the existence o f something o f a vendetta against the original fascists. Conse­ quently agitation was renewed and aim ed particularly at Enrico C aretti. D uring A pril the Avanguardisti o f the tow n, closely linked to Brom bin, dem onstrated against the official fascio and their section was prom ptly dissolved.* G aggioli and G attelli m ade few moves during the m onth, although it is evident from the events o f early M ay that a considerable struggle was being waged in private. This renewed dissidence was given its opportunity o f m aking a really serious im pact on provincial fascism because o f the gravity o f the local econom ic situation. T h e measures adopted by Balbo during 1922 to alleviate unem ploym ent had been o f no more than transitory effect; the w inning o f public work grants could only conceal for a tim e the fact that the most profitable crop o f the province, hemp, had become totally uneconom ic to produce. A lthough in 1923, hemp prices were to rise slightly from the low point o f 1922 and a greater area was to be sown w ith it than in the previous year,8 the im pact on the local econom y was only m arginal. Particularly in the last months o f 1922 and the first o f 1923 unem ploym ent reached very serious levels.1*4*O ne cause o f this was that the duration o f the crisis in 1 It seems likely that this provision of the Grand Council remained very much a dead letter. This, at least, was the opinion of Massimo Rocca; see Come il fascimo divenne una dittatura (Milan, 1952), p. 119. Balbo, on the other hand, maintained to Mussolini that he had been ‘perhaps the only one of your close collaborators to comply with the decision of the Grand Council seriously, and not for fun\ See A C S , Seg. Part, del Duce, C R , 362/R ‘Balbo*, sf. 3. ‘Appartenenza Massoneria9, Balbo to Mussolini, 4 Aug. 1924. 1 Gazzetta Ferrarese, i i Apr. 1923. T he section was reconstituted later in the month after several expulsions had been made. 9 Area sown with hemp in 1923 (figures for 1922 in brackets): 20,300 hectares (12,000). Average price per quintal: L.466.87 (L.382.45). Figures from Relazione della Camera di Commercio di Ferrara, Tables V II and X V II. 4 For example, 12,369 unemployed on 28 Feb. 1923, 15,455 at the end o f April, and 15,075 at the end of M ay. Figures from the monthly bulletin, La disoccupazione in Italia, published by the Ufficio Nazionale per il Collocamento e la Disoccupazione, Ministero del Lavoro e Previdenza Sociale, Rome.

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agriculture was finally having its effect on industries subsidiary to agriculture— the dairies, carpentry workshops, stoneworks, for exam ple. Thus a feature o f the unemployment figures for certain months is the high num ber o f industrial workers with­ out w ork.1 T h e tendency was for m any o f these to go to look for tem porary employment on the land, in this w ay further ag­ gravating the plight o f the regular agricultural workers. From August 1921 onwards the dissidents had always as­ sumed a position favourable to the agricultural and industrial workers o f the syndicates and hostile to the agrari. T h e extent o f the crisis o f early 1923 m eant that this position was more telling than ever. This was particularly so because o f an argu­ ment which had already developed during February and M arch between M antovani o f the A grarian Association and Beltram i o f the Cam era Sindacale, an argum ent which provided ready m aterial for the autonomists from an official source. Beltram i, given the task o f renegotiating an agricultural pact for the whole province, had encountered prolonged resistance to his con­ ditions on the part o f the employers, and, although in late January a pact was signed,-he was so unsatisfied w ith the attitude o f the proprietors that he made public criticism o f the new pact in the Resto del Carlino o f 1 February. A gain in M arch he returned to the attack, publishing in the Balilla a ‘declaration o f war* on the proprietors. In this he com plained that the idea o f collaboration had been com pletely betrayed : ‘. . . collabor­ ation, as it is understood and practised by m any employers, is about as near to true collaboration as real civilization is to w hat certain European nations take to Africa*. Fascism, he continued, had frequently tipped the scales o f justice in favour o f the employers during the previous two years, but it was now clear that this favour was sim ply being exploited for personal benefit. For Beltram i the lim it had been reached. Enough! we shout. The agreements are sacred and must be respected. We are tired of rushing round by car— the expenses of which are paid by the labourers— to calm things down, or worse, to convince the workers to bow their heads in face of the greed of the employers, simply in order to realize class collaboration at any price. We are tired of the fact that people are taking advantage of a special political situation in order to create a special economic situation which could be defined as 'the hegemony of 1 In M ay, for example, 7,512 of the 15,075 unemployed were classed as those normally employed in working minerals, in building, roadmaking, or hydraulic works; ibid., 31 M ay 1923.

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capital over labour'. We could argue, and to our own advantage, that if there has to be hegemony, it ought to be the hegemony of labour over capi­ tal.1

Such a well-pointed attack considerably strengthened the position o f the dissidents w ithin the province and seemed to favour the solution they had consistently argued for— the total independence o f the Cam era Sindacale in the face o f the proprietors and a stronger com m itm ent to the interests o f the provincial workers. O n the part o f the proprietors M antovani rem ained unruffled, sim ply answering the attacks by ex­ plaining that about h a lf o f the landowners in the province had rem ained outside the organization o f the proprietors and w ere therefore not his responsibility.8 O therw ise he m aintained th at the new ly created provincial organization o f Sindacati A gri­ coltori was quite capable o f dealing w ith its own members.3 T h e calm dem onstrated by the landowners, the silence o f Balbo, and the knowledge that Beltram i had always been con­ sidered Balbo’s m an give rise to suspicions about the m otivation behind this outburst o f syndicalist independence. O bviously, in a tim e o f severe econom ic crisis it was to the advantage o f the fascists that the syndicates should at least appear to be func­ tioning effectively on beh alf o f the rural workers. But the w ave o f protests against the proprietors must also be seen in the context o f sim ilar outbursts o f syndicalist dem agogy in other provinces at this tim e. M ussolini’s concern for an agreem ent w ith the socialist union organizations (G .G .L . and Federterra), demonstrated im m ediately after the form ation o f the fascist governm ent, had prom pted fears am ong m any fascist syndi­ calist leaders, and even, it m ay be assumed, am ong certain landowners, that some sort o f syndicalist unity m ight be achieved, threatening to some extent the control that agrari and fascist syndicates had already established over the agricultural workers. F ar from expressing any real concern for the con­ ditions o f the labourers, therefore, the sudden affirm ation o f fascist syndicalism in the spring o f 1923 m ay w ell have been a means o f w arning M ussolini to leave w ell alone and not destroy fascist syndicalist positions already w ell entrenched.4 1 Balilla, 25 M ar. 1923. * Gazzetta Ferrarese, 13 Apr. 1923. * T he transformation o f the various branches o f the provincial Agrarian Associ­ ation into Sindacati Agricoltori, adhering to the Federazione Italiana Sindacati Agricoltori, was announced in the Gazzetta Ferrarese o f 5 Jan. 1923. 4 See De Felice, Mussolini il fascista, 1. 403-4.

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None the less, i f such were the reasons, the storm that the stim ulation o f dissidence in the province could provoke was clearly not anticipated. In fact it was not on M antovani that the greatest pressure fell. H e, secure in his close relationship w ith Balbo and aw are o f the dependence o f provincial fascism on the agrari, was ready to w ait for the crisis to subside. In ­ stead it was G aretti, as segretario politico o f the provincial federation and com m ander o f the local M .V .S .N ., who found him self exposed in the crossfire. A lthough he too was w ellknown as one o f Balbo’s right hand men, he lacked the personal prestige o f his protector and was unable to check the rising frustration w ith the proprietors sim ply by appeals to loyalty and discipline. In early M ay he found the position intolerable and announced his resignation from all his posts and from the party. In his letter o f resignation he m ade clear that he, too, felt that local fascism had to take a new line: I resign irrevocably from the positions that I hold at present. . . because I do not see sufficient energy put into the efforts that should be made to bring about the victory of the only fundamental principle of fascism: ‘war and merciless war on all forms of exploitation, from whatever part they come, for the victory of that pure ideal of justice and for the equal distribu­ tion of those sacrifices necessary for the real well-being of the Italian people.1

In a subsequent letter he m ade absolutely clear at whom this was directed: *1 have no intention o f appearing, w hile I serve fascism, to be the servant o f that plutocratic bourgeois class w hich has profited from the bloody sacrifices o f hundreds and hundreds o f our brothers.*8 T h e adoption o f such a position by the m an who, after Balbo, had been the principal fascist o f the province during the previous year was evidently extrem ely serious for the provincial move­ m ent, particularly as it was not the case that G aretti was sim ply conducting a political m anoeuvre; after his resignation he retired entirely from public life. It indicated the extent to w hich the criticisms o f local fascism that G attelli had made repeatedly, albeit partly for personal motives, were now seen to be valid by a very m uch w ider spectrum o f people than before. D uring 1921 and 1922 G aretti, faced w ith a choice between socialists and proprietors, was prepared to support the pro­ prietors, and had never shown any sign o f favour towards the dissidents when they pointed to the im plications o f his choice. 1 Gaietta Ferrarcsey5 M ay 1923.

8 Ibid,, 11 M ay 1923*

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In the changed political situation o f 1923, how ever, when the ground had changed from the struggles o f a fascism aspiring to power to the questions o f the direction a trium phant fascism should take, he was unable to m aintain his form er position, even though it cost him his political career. T h e response to his resignation dem onstrated that he was b y no means alone in his dissatisfaction w ith local fascism. T h e frustration w hich had been building up during the spring in several o f the rural communes exploded in a series o f revolts against the existing directorates, often accom panied by vio­ lence.1 From Bologna, Baroncini telegraphed in M ay to D e Bono S itu atio n Ferrara very serious’ ,2 and this judgem ent was backed up the next day by the vice federale o f Ferrara who urged ’intervention party and Governm ent to avoid sad and ir­ reparable consequences’ .* Elements o f the M .V .S .N . sided w ith the dissidents and several were prom ptly arrested b y the prefect.4 In his m em orial, w ritten in 1924, Beltram i recounts that the crisis was such that ’at one point it seemed that official socialism m ight rem ain isolated and in the m inority. Public opinion, forced to choose between the two groups, did not hesitate to show sym pathy for the dissidents’ .6 G attelli characterized the situation as being ’a real M essianic ex­ pectation o f revolt’ .6 A t the root o f this movement o f protest were tw o currents. There were those who had persistently been the thorn in B albo’s flesh and who had always argued that provincial fascism should change its direction; and there were those— m ainly the younger fascists in the rural com m unes7— who, like C aretti, found th at 1 There were reports o f disturbances at Copparo on 30 Apr., at Bondeno on 6 M ay, and at Massafiscaglia on 10 M ay; see A C S , M in. Int., D G PS., A G R 1923, b. 30, 4, 6, and 10 M ay 1923. ' A C S , Min. Int., Gabinetto Finzi, Ordine Pubblico 1923, b. 54A, Baroncini to De Bono, io M ay 1923. * A C S , ibid. ; vice federale Ferrara, Cristofori to De Bono, communicated b y Prefect Aphel of Bologna. 4 A C S , Min. Int., D G PS, A G R 1923, b. 30, io M ay 1923. * Beltrami’s memorial, published in II Mondo of 6 Dec. 1924, was evidently written with the intention of damaging Balbo’s reputation and exculpating him­ self. None the less, it seems from other evidence that the memorial is substantially accurate except in those places where Beltrami speaks of his own motivations. This document is hereafter referred to as Beltrami memorial. * A C S , Michele Bianchi, b. 3, fase. 53 ‘Ferrara’, Barbato Gattelli to Mussolini, 14 M ay 1923. 1 Beltrami described the dissidents in his memorial as 'the most active young men of the fascist movements of both town and surrounding area’ .

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after the violence and rhetoric o f the previous two years they had sim ply succeeded in enslaving the province to the landed proprietors. For these, this was a realization w hich cam e only in 1923, largely because m any o f them had had no clear con­ ception o f w hat they w ere trying to do during the preceding years. Nevertheless, since their aims w ere very sim ilar, the differing origins o f protest did not prevent the currents from linking up. In general terms their aims were best summed up by G attelli in several statements and letters o f June. G attelli, unquestionably, was inclined to extrem e statements, but the m ajor preoccupations o f dissidence at this tim e can be seen in his plans for the foundation o f a L ega della R inascita N azionale.1 H e described it as ‘a m ovem ent o f an Italian character, des­ tined to correct, to com plete fascism, or even to succeed fascism . . .** It was to have as its basis those combattente elements now being neglected in his view . Its principal object was very clear: ‘T h e foundation o f the new m ovem ent is the genuine and honest defence o f the workers w ith the prevailing criterion being that o f a rb itra tio n ,. . . A nd, as the final weapon, [we should use] the class struggle.* It was this above all that was applicable to the situation in Ferrara and that G attelli denied to be the intention o f the official P .N .F . in Ferrara.1*3 For the solution o f the local crisis he was also ready to m ake suggestions to M ussolini.4 A s a first step he proposed th at all authority in the province should be placed firm ly in the hands 1 G attelli’s idea received short shrift from M ussolini, who w rote the follow ing telegram to Prefect G iovara. 'R eceived statutes so-called lega rinascita nazionale. Com m unicate to promoters that national revival has begun w ithout having to ask the advice and help o f G attelli and lesser com panions.' Q uoted in Balilla, 17 June 1933. G attelli, unabashed, replied rem inding M ussolini that it was he and his 'lesser companions' who had put M ussolini where he was. For this comment and G attelli’s views on Ferrarese fascism, see A C S , M in. Int., G abinetto Finzi, O rdine Pubblico 1933, b. 5, fase. 4 7 ,1 9 June 1933. * Interview w ith G attelli in Gazzetta Ferrarese, is June 1933. ' R eplying to M ussolini’s telegram (see note I above), G attelli wrote, ' . . . I don’t doubt that you have begun the fruitful national r e v iv a l. . . But to us it seems that the O fficial Ferrara Party is not on the track o f this revival, and it is this idea o f ours, and not sterile personal squabbles, the only, the real reason for our dissidence. And if the O fficial Ferrara P arty really and honestly follows not the interests o f a class but that revival wanted by yourself and defended by us in every moment, then our feeling w ill not be destructive but constructive*. A C S , M in. In t., G abinetto Finzi, O rdine Pubblico 1933, b . 5, fase. 47, 19 June 19234 Letter and Memoriale o f G attelli to M ussolini, A C S , M ichele Bianchi, b. 3, fase. 53, 'Ferrara*, 14 M ay 1933.

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o f a trium virate.1 These were to proceed to a ‘purification* o f fascism, allow ing all those expelled by the lodo D e V ecch i o f the previous year to re-enter die fa s do, w hile ex-communists or others considered unreliable were to be expelled. It was also to be ensured that the functions o f m ilitia and party were clearly divided in order that ‘the unfortunate aspects o f “ squadrism** * should not be reproduced. But most im portant for G attelli was the overriding principle which was to govern this process o f purification and reorganization; he m aintained that the actions o f the trium virate should be carried out, ‘alw ays keeping in mind that the goal to reach is that summ arized by the D uce o f fascism at the H otel des Princes in that m em orable phrase “ Cudgels to the right !’*’ . This would require in particular the ex­ pulsion o f all those agrari who had violated the existing pacts and m ade difficult the negotiation o f new agreements, w ith special attention being paid to the establishment o f measures to enforce the observance o f pacts by the proprietors. G attelli considered that only when these steps had been taken could provincial fascism hope to regain the confidence o f the mass o f ferraresi. T h e extent o f the discontent and widespread alarm among the fascist hierarchy which the events in early M ay created m ade it appear that the dissidents m ight at least gain some satisfaction. By 1923 however, the fascist party was sufficiently w ell organ­ ized to hold in check a provincial rebellion. T o the national leaders it was clear that the dissidents were occupying a fundam entally contradictory position; they were asking for the alienation o f precisely those elements that had perm itted the growth o f the provincial fascist movement and were essential for its continued existence. It was in fact the proprietors’ control o f the province that was the precondition o f dissidence. As had been obvious during 1921, the battle for control o f Ferrara had had to be won before dissidence cam e to the fore. There was no question, therefore, o f acceding to the demands o f the autonomists and discontented. G randi was sent to resolve the position2 and he proceeded to dissolve and reconstitute the 1 T he trium virate, which was to exercise 'essentially an intelligent and independ­ ent dictatorship’, was to be composed o f the secretary o f the fascist syndicates, the secretary o f the Federazione Provinciale, and the Console Generale o f the m ilitia. A C S , ibid. * For G randi’s activities in Ferrara at this time see his telegrams to De Bono in A C S , M in. Int., Gabinetto Finzi, O rdine Pubblico 1923, b. 54A, 13, 14, and 16 M ay 1923. Balbo was unable to return to Ferrara, being occupied with the trouble surrounding E. Torre in Alessandria.

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fasci o f troublesome communes, taking this as an opportunity to expel those who continued to cause difficulties. A sim ilar pro­ cedure was followed with the fascio o f Ferrara, with the council o f the Federazione Provinciale, and with the M .V .S .N ., the leaders o f w hich were considered to have too great a sym pathy for the dissidents. A great show was made o f recognizing the existence o f egoistic landowners; G randi on several occasions stressed the need for all the proprietors o f the province to be enrolled in a single syndicate ‘ because it is w ell known that some people profit from the absence o f sanctions and from mis­ understandings in order not to respect the agreements’,1 but nothing positive was done to ensure that this cam e about. T h e rhetoric served to defuse the issue to some extent, however, as did the appointm ent o f Beltram i to the post o f fiduciario o f the provincial organization.8 Although apparently a concession to the dissidents, since it was Beltram i who had made public criticism o f the agrari during the spring, this appointm ent signified nothing more than a securer hold for Balbo over the province. In addition to the links which already existed be­ tween the two men, it was ju st at this tim e that Balbo dis­ covered facts about Beltram i w hich perm itted him over the following year to hold any independent spirit firm ly in check.8 G randi’s actions, if they succeeded fairly w ell in calm ing the disturbances in the rural areas, were less successful in satisfying the dissidents o f long standing in the town o f Ferrara. T h eir continued opposition was encouraged at this tim e by certain events outside the province, particularly the speech o f the dissident fascist deputy M isuri in parliam ent on 29 M ay. Although there can have been little in the speech w ith which the autonomists agreed,4 the beating he received as a result o f it 1 Grandi’s speeches on this theme are reported in the Gazzetta Ferrarese, 19 M ay 1923, and the Resto del Carlino, 13 June 1923. In this second report, Grandi is quoted as saying, . . the fascio has lost its essential function; that is, being the authority that judges im partially in labour disputes’. * Gazzetta Ferrarese, 8 June 1923. 8 Beltrami had boasted o f having two decorations for courage as a result o f his war service, although in reality these had never been awarded: *• • • when I was nominated consul o f the m ilitia Balbo knew the truth’ (Beltrami memorial). In this regard, it is difficult to give much credit to De Begnac’s suggestion (op. cit., p. 193) that in 1923 the contest for power in Ferrara was between Balbo and Bel­ tram i. 4 This speech, as reported by De Felice, Mussolini il fascista, 1, p. 448, suggested that it was necessary t o €. . . dissolve the fascist spirit and gradually demobilize the fascist organizations, give the responsibility o f forming the basis o f a new govern-

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was sufficient to excite the sym pathy o f m any o f the younger provincial fascists who themselves felt persecuted. W ritings appeared on the walls o f the town— ‘Long live M isuri, D eath to M ussolini, D eath to the assassin B alb o '1 and, as a reaction to police searches o f the houses o f leading dissidents, demonstrations against the official fascio took place in the streets.* It seems th at at this point Balbo's patience broke. Beltram i recounts in his m em orial how, in mid-June, he and others prom inent in the adm inistration o f Ferrara and the local P.N .F. attended a m eeting at the V im inale in w hich an irate Balbo announced that the m ovement o f the dissidents was to be liquidated b y means o f an energetic repression.* As a result o f this decision, a squad o f perugini appeared in the provincial capital at the end o f June and proceeded to beat up such dissidents as could be found.*1*4*Although few actually suffered from the actions o f this squad, the autonomists were left in little doubt about where further protest would ultim ately lead them. A fter such an obvious w arning m any decided that the lim it had been reached and that there was nothing to be achieved by further protest. D uring Ju ly the dissident movement died down slow ly and over the following three months disintegrated entirely.6 ment to a ll healthy national currents, elim inate the interference o f the P .N .F. secretary on the government and o f the political secretaries on the prefects and other local authorities, enrol the m ilitia in the arm y . . A M uch o f this was the opposite o f what the Ferrara dissidents desired. 1 This is taken from the account o f M isuri himself, given in the Voce Repubblicana o f 30 N ov. 1924. * Gazzetta Ferrante, 8 and 12 Ju ly 1923. ' According to this memorial, others present at the meeting besides Beltram i and Balbo were the prefect o f Ferrara, the questore, M antovani, Rem o M agri (a close advisor o f Balbo), Alfredo Brandi (a member o f the directorate o f the town fascio), seniore Raoul Forti, M arciante (at this point in command o f the provincial M .V .S .N .), and G uido Felici. T he involvem ent o f the prefect, police chief, and M antovani is particular suggestive. 4 The perugini, according to M isuri, were 'the well-known squadracela made up o f various officers and soldiers o f Perugia and the surrounding district and an ex-lieutenant o f the arditi more than once employed on jobs o f this kind*; see Voce Repubblicana, 30 N ov. 1924. Confirmation o f the presence o f the perugini in Ferrara came from the Gazzetta Ferrarese, 22 June 1923, in which M ario Barbieri explained 'm y attackers told me that they were strangers and that they had beaten me believing me to be a supporter o f M isuri’. * O f the four principal dissidents— G attelli, G aggioli, U livi, and T orti— only G attelli continued his activity during the summer o f 1923. It was reported in August that links were being established between Preziosi, Pantaleoni, C alza Bini, Padovani, and G attelli o f Ferrara; see A C S , M in. Int., D G PS, A G R 1923, unsigned report headed 'Congiure di dissidenti fascisti contro il Ministro*, 24 A u g.

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H ow little they had gained is shown extrem ely vividly in a letter from L uigi G ranata, the former revolutionary syndicalist organizer o f Ferrara who was currently involved w ith the fascist syndicates o f Bari, to M ichele Bianchi.*1 In August o f 1923 he returned to Ferrara for several days and was appalled by the situation he found there : *A grarian slavery rules supreme, shattering contracts and w age rates.* H e reported that in certain zones the proprietors were sacking their workers w ith no regard to the conditions o f the individual families involved, and that m any mutilati had been w ithout work for months. Some proprietors had organized their own armed guards to protect themselves from reaction and on at least one occasion these bands had come into conflict w ith the M ilizia N azionale. ‘This is the w ay they repay the sacrifices o f the first black­ shirts,* observed G ranata. H e encouraged Bianchi to return to the province to see for him self the plight o f the workers and the potential danger o f the situation: Y o u w ould realize th a t here th ey suffer in silence, th a t slavery has com e b ack stronger than before, th at the class m en tality o f the agrari has n ot ch an ged ; an d the labourers w ould repeat to yo u th e phrase o f the agrari, 'Y esterd a y you w ere in ch arg e; tod ay w e a re in control an d y o u w ill p a y for it ’. T h e w orkers keep q u iet b u t deep dow n perhaps th ey a re thin kin g ab o u t a coun ter-attack.

T h e partial solution he suggested showed ju st how m uch o f the argum ent over syndicalism during the previous year had been simple propaganda. H e asked w hy Bianchi did not dis­ solve the Federazione A graria and com pel the proprietors to enrol in syndicates. This had been the recomm endation o f the lodo De Vecchi in Septem ber 1922. It had been claim ed as partially achieved by M antovani during the spring o f 1923; it had again been recommended by G randi in his brief period o f control over the province in M ay. Y et even in August it was 1923. Little more was heard o f G attelli in provincial politics after this. O f the other three, Gaetano U livi, although officially expelled from the party, was appointed segretario sindacalefascista at Bergamo in June 1923; see Gazzetta Ferrarese, 19 June 1923. Gaggioli was appointed to the M .V .S.N . as consul and posted to Ancona in O ctober 1923; ibid., 8 O ct. 1923. Guido T orti, pursued with particular hostility by Balbo, was kept at the post office o f O neglia, and by September 1923 was re­ duced to pleading with M ichele Bianchi that he might re-enter, not the party, but 'nella vita’ ; AG S, M ichele Bianchi, b. 1, fase. 6, Guido T orti to M ichele Bianchi, I Sept. 1923. 1 A C S , M ichele Bianchi, b. 3, fase. 53 'Ferrara’, Luigi G ranata to M ichele Bianchi, 27 Aug. 1923.

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still possible for a man w ell informed in the proceedings o f agriculture in the province to consider that the Federazione A graria was still operating and operating even more unscrupu­ lously than it had done before. U ndoubtedly aw are o f w hat was happening in Ferrara in this respect, Balbo showed little inclination to intervene to balance the situation. For him it was sufficient that the dissidents should have been routed. In mid Ju ly, therefore, he felt able to report to M ussolini that the situation in Ferrara was Adm irable for enthusiasm and discipline*. Sim ilar optim istic judgem ents on the local position were m ade by Beltram i in a report he wrote for the attention o f the G ran Consiglio during Ju ly.1 In this report it becomes plain to w hat extent Beltram i had become the instrument o f Balbo, and how m uch both were eager to p lay down the predom inant position o f the agrari. Beltram i, who had spent the first three months o f the year publicly attacking the attitude o f the great m ajority o f the proprietors wrote that the situation in the province was bad but conceded only that ‘the situation has been a little aggravated— fortunately only in a relatively small w ay— by the employers who, as alw ays happens, live on the edges o f all political movements, not carrying out their duty*. H e was equally submissive when dis­ cussing the pact in operation in the province, describing it as not ‘unlike the pact o f Zirardini, w hich was termed the greatest working class victory in Italy*. Y et it was Beltram i him self who had w ritten a bitter attack on this pact in the Resto del Carlino o f I February. T h e change o f tune w hich Balbo imposed on Beltram i says m uch about the position o f the provincial ras; Balbo was not concerned w ith the question o f the exploitation o f the workers by the proprietors but w ith the total situation in the province which served as his power base. H e was eager to gloss over the control enjoyed by the agrari, certainly in order to avoid the criticism o f his colleagues, but principally in order that there should be no attem pt from the central fascist authorities to change the structure o f power in Ferrara. It was this funda­ m entally that the dissidents had wished to accom plish. T h ey, in their desire to follow a policy o f ‘cudgels to the right!*, had 1 A C S , Seg. Part, del Duce, C R , G ran Consiglio, b. 19, sf. 1, 1923, inserto E , signed 'il fiduciario Beltrami*. T he document is undated, but can be dated from internal evidence to Ju ly 1923.

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hoped to produce a really radical change in the relationship be­ tween classes in the province, inserting themselves— the young, lower-m iddle class, largely urban ex-combattenti— into a political fram ework w hich had previously had little room for them. For them, the creation o f a new class o f provincial leaders was essential for the realization o f what they understood fascism to be. Thus, they stood fairly near to Farinacci and the intransigent fascists in their conception o f the direction fascism should take. T o Balbo, however, the application o f such ideas to Ferrara appeared impossible. A fascism which had strong links w ith neither the proprietors and the existing m iddle class nor w ith the agricultural workers would have been destined to fall between the two camps. Politically it was considered im possible; personally it would also have been unwelcom e to Balbo. It was agrarian fascism, after all, that had made him a rich m an1 and already a figure o f great prom inence, able to talk w ith any o f the dignitaries o f provincial society on equal terms. H e was, therefore, very much for the preservation o f the existing situation in Ferrara, and in this respect, despite all his con­ nections w ith the violence o f the squads, in favour o f a policy o f norm alization, o f the insertion o f fascism into the existing structure o f provincial life. This definition o f Balbo, one o f the m ain exponents o f squadrism and fascist violence, as a norm alizer rather than an intransigent fascist m ay appear unreasonable. Y et it is only his connection w ith violence— that is w ith extrem e means— w hich gives the impression o f an extremist. Politically he had never pursued extrem e ends in Ferrara, as is m ade very evident by his close association w ith the proprietors;8 he had sim ply sought for an adjustment o f the relations between the existing con­ tending classes. Paradoxically, it was the autonomous fascists, pursuing an end that would have m eant a considerable change in the structure o f power in the province, who were m uch more 1 T he Voce Repubblicana o f 13 N ov. 1924 reported in its biografia di un generalis­ simo9 that Balbo was receiving L.26,000 a month for his m ilitary position and L . 15,000 a month as a deputy. In addition it was alleged that he had business interests in the Riunione Adriatica di Sicurità, an insurance company, and that he had received a house, a car, and other large gifts as wedding presents when married in 1924. T he same paper carried a letter from Guido T orti on 29 N ov. 1924, in which T orti, who knew Balbo w ell, observed, T n as far as the unexpected development o f fascism has unexpectedly changed Balbo9s economic position • • 1 See, in this context, the comment o f Massimo R occa, op. cit., p. 123: ‘Balbo, who was not an extremist, and in those days condemned illegality . . ,\

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concerned to avoid the use o f violence, since this had been directed solely at the agricultural workers they wished to protect. Violence and political extremism w ithin fascism, therefore, were not in the case o f Ferrara linked, but rather expressions o f very different points o f view. O nce Balbo’s aims are seen in the above terms, it becomes very difficult to consider that fascist syndicalism as developed in Ferrara had any genuine force o f its own. W ith Beltram i taken from the Cam era Sindacale and the dissidents defeated, there no longer rem ained in the province any person or group o f people who were concerned to realize a conception o f fascist syndicalism different from that o f Balbo. A nd for the provincial leader, fascist syndicalism rem ained w hat it always had been for him— a means o f control and regim entation o f the mass o f labourers in the province. T h e conditions that this regim en­ tation imposed on the labourers were o f only secondary im ­ portance to Balbo; w hat m attered to him was that the mass o f the population should be controlled and that it should be con­ trolled in a w ay which did not offend the dom inant class in the province, since these were the guarantors o f his position and o f fascist influence in the province. From Balbo’s point o f view , therefore, Beltram i was perfecdy justified in w riting in his report o f Ju ly 1923 that ‘Ferrara fascism is strong.*1 T h e report went on to show ju st how success­ ful the fascists had been in organizing the agricultural labourers and workers o f the small industrial establishments. T h e figures presented concerning the membership o f the Federazione Sindacale demonstrated a control o f the labour force o f the province only a little short o f that achieved by the socialists a t the peak o f their success. It was claim ed that there were 71,877 workers in the syndicates, that there were 827 fam ilies o f piccoli proprietari and affittuari representing an area o f 11,627 hectares, and that there were 939 families o f mezzadri also enrolled. Beltram i also m aintained that there were 1,892 employers enrolled in the federazione, controlling between them 120,944 hectares o f land, as w ell as a dependent federation o f fomacai with twenty-one workshops and a consorzio di co­ operative. This last, evidently the continuation o f that consorzio taken over from the socialists during 1921, had 15,000 members 1 A C S , Seg. Part, del Duce, C R , G ran Consiglio, b. 19, sf. 1, 1923, inserto E , signed ‘il fiduciario Beltrami*.

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and twenty-eight branches. These figures suggest that the extent o f control enjoyed by the syndical organization was con­ siderable. T h e independence o f the syndicates and their capacity for a genuine assertion o f the claims o f the workers was less marked, however. O n this point Beltram i was evi­ dently rather embarrassed, w riting that the Federazione Sindacale was able to pursue its functions ‘with every freedom even if it is controlled by us*, and asserting only a few lines later that the federation ‘is a free body, even i f controlled*. As is clear from these remarks, the Cam era Sindacale was very m uch an instrument in the hands o f the political leaders o f the province. For these, the economic conditions o f the labourers were o f im portance only in so far as they threatened, if ex­ ceptionally bad, to disrupt the political stability o f the province.1 T h e corollary o f this policy was that provincial fascism, if it was not to create for itself an independent position or a position sustained by the labourers, should strengthen its links with the existing dom inant class. T h e elections o f late 1922 had already indicated that this was not likely to prove a particularly difficult task, and the events o f 1923 confirm this impression. T he fiancheggiatori o f provincial fascism provided none o f those problems that liberals and popolari posed for M ussolini at a parliam entary level. In effect, the great m ajority o f the members o f these parties in Ferrara were fascists w ithout the tessera. D uring 1923 there was a gathering tendency for such people to take the membership card 8 or at least to make absolutely clear where their sympathies lay. Thus the liberals, according to Beltram i in July, presented no problems for provincial fascism: ‘T h e liberals— who in any case are very few— are the so-called “ fascist sympathizers**. T h ey have never given us any trouble, and criticize the position taken up by the Corriere della Sera.*9 T h e popolari, who m ight have proved more o f a problem , were equally keen to ally themselves w ith fascism— this w ith the exception o f the very small radical catholic movement centred on Argenta. T h e comments o f the Domenica 1 Eloquent o f the real significance o f fascist syndicalism are the figures for strikes in Ferrara in the period 1920-3; in 1920 thirty-six strikes were recorded, in 1921 twelve, in 1923 one. See Relazione della Camera di Commercio di Ferrara, pp. 23 ff. * Membership o f the party in the province rose from 8,450 in M ay 1922 (De Felice, Mussolini il fascista, 1, 8-9) to 10,624 in July 1923, according to Beltram i's report, A C S, Seg. Part, del Duce, C R , G ran Consiglio, b. 19, sf. 1,1923, inserto E. » A C S , ibid.

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deWOperaio after the A pril congress o f the P .P .I. showed none o f the reserve which had been the prevailing note o f the con­ gress. Instead the paper m aintained that catholics o f the P .P .I. should feel it a duty to support ‘the noble efforts o f onorevole M ussolini’, and M ario D otti, the political secretary o f the Ferrara section, rejoiced that this was evidently w hat had taken place in Ferrara: ‘N ot in all the provinces or m unici­ palities o f Italy has there been that cordial collaboration be­ tween fascists and popolari w hich has been realized in Ferrara.1 Even when M ussolini determ ined to accept the resignation o f the P .P .I. ministers, the tone rem ained unchanged. R eprinting the article w hich referred to the ‘noble efforts' o f M ussolini, the writers insisted on their former position: * . . . we do not believe that we should change even a syllable o f w hat we have w ritten above . . .’ Besides M ussolini they could see no alternative except ‘the abyss, void, chaos, ruin'.* This was the situation which Beltram i recounted to the Gran Consiglio in Ju ly. His report emphasizes not only the extent to w hich this process o f approaching fascism had been carried, but also the great value this had for local fascism: T h e P artito P op olare, w h ich , though sm all in num bers, is none th e less strong because o f the netw ork o f interests b u ilt up over tw en ty years b y m eans o f the banks an d the large farm s, does not g iv e cause for w o rry since w ith every d a y th at passes it tries to m ove n earer to fascism — p a rticu la rly in recen t tim es d u rin g the liv e ly discussion over electo ral reform . It has m ade d eclaration s o f lo y a lty throu gh its m ost au th o ritative spokesm en. I should ad d th at several o f th e m ore prom inent popolari h ave even gone so fa r as to refuse the m em bership ca rd [o f th e P .P .I.]— a ll this thanks to C o n te Sen a­ tore G rosoli, h ead o f the F errara P a rtito P opolare.*

Thus, the great m ajority o f the provincialpopolari, if they becam e a dissident group in respect o f the national party, brought their support— both m oral and m aterial— to the fascists. T h e open confirm ation o f this situation cam e w ith the P .N .F . directive, issued in August, that popolari should no longer be perm itted to hold adm inistrative positions in provincial life. A t this point, virtually all the leaders o f the Ferrara P .P .I. left the party; Grosoli, Socrate R eali, M ario D otti— all continued to hold their posts on provincial and com munal councils and

1Domenica dell'Operaio, 32 Apr. 1923. • Ibid., 29 Apr. 1923. * A C S , Seg. P art, del D uce, C R , G ran Consiglio, b. 19, sf. 1, 1923, inserto E , signed ‘il fiduciario Beltrami*.

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ceased to take an active part in the operations o f the P .P .I.1 As a result the local section o f the party was critically weakened, it being the opinion o f one w riter on provincial Catholicism that the party was no longer 'capable o f carrying out any regular or notable activity'.8 This becam e even more marked, o f course, w ith the m urder in late August o f Don M inzoni o f Argenta— a m urder which was to have serious repercussions for Balbo more than a year later. Although, in the circumstances o f 1923 in Ferrara, the killing appears to be an isolated incident, it was in fact only another aspect o f the fascist policy o f weakening all other parties. From the spring o f 1922 M inzoni had been creating problems for the fascists in Argenta, an area in w hich they had sufficient problems w ith the socialists without the popolari adding to them .9 Indeed, the success o f Don M inzoni la y precisely in his ability to unify local hostility to the fascists and to make that hostility apparent by exploiting his position as a priest. T h e tensions to w hich his actions had given rise can be seen in a series o f inci­ dents during 1923 in which the Argenta fascists intervened in meetings and demonstrations organized by M inzoni to protest against the predom inance o f the fascists in the province.4 In Ju ly it was reported that Ladislao R occa, the leader o f the local fascio, and M inzoni had almost come to blows during a m eeting o f the G iovani Esploratori organized by the priest because it had been publicly stated that 'nowadays there are no men capable o f governing Ita ly '.5 The issue o f popolari in governm ent which arose during August served to exacer­ bate the situation even further, provoking demonstrations and counter-demonstrations and culm inating in the assassination o f D on M inzoni on 23 August.6 1 List o f communal councillors reproduced in Gazzetta Ferrame, 6 Dec. 1923. News o f the resignation o f Grosoli and R eali was given in the Domenica dell'Operaio, 5 A ug. 1923. * Sgarbanti, Lineamenti storici del movimento cattolicoferrame, p. 74. * See above, p. 204. 4 According to II Popolo, 27 D ec. 1924» P&rt o f the reason for the dispute lay in the fascists* desire to lay their hands on a flourishing co-operative run by the popolari in Argenta. M inzoni had consistently opposed the entry o f the fascists, realizing that their request for membership was sim ply a stratagem which would perm it them to take control. H e was warned as a result o f this that his work grated ‘dam nably on the nerves o f the extremists o f local fascism*. Copy o f this paper to be found in A C S , M in. Int., D G PS, A G R 1924, b. 87. 1 Gazzetta Ferrarese, 1 1 July 1923. * For the events leading up to the assassination and the w ay in which it was

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W ith his death the process o f weakening and slow ly destroying the other provincial parties was practically com pleted. Indeed, it was a measure o f the com pletion o f that process that the m urder itself raised so little resentment w ithin political circles in the province. T h e Domenica dell**Operaio, w hich had never nourished any great lové for M inzoni or his politics, carried side by side w ith the report o f the assassination an article in w hich it was stated that fascism was the ‘m ovement o f liberation and recovery w hich brought together all honest and well-m eaning people*.1 Even the Diocesan authorities rem ained relatively undism ayed, confining their reaction to a dem and that the culprits should be caught and punished. D on M inzoni had in any case been something o f an embarrassment to them ; in August the publication o f the Diocesan Junta had advocated that religious organizations should keep to purely religious functions and not dabble in politics.1 It was lim ited reaction o f this kind in the face o f w hat was m anifestly a political m urder that m arked, in effect, the total trium ph o f Balbo and official fascism in Ferrara. T h e first eight months o f 1923 had seen a great strengthening o f those forces that threatened to pull provincial fascism to pieces; during M ay and June dissidence had reached its peak, econom ic depression had been the severest for years, and personal antagonisms had flowered as petty rivalries for position and prestige developed. Each o f these factors m ight have wrecked the system that Balbo had erected and yet none did. Instead Balbo emerged un­ questionably in control o f the situation, gravely im plicated in one o f the more notable assassinations o f the fascist era, yet none the less unchallenged. Such control indicated the extent to w hich the forces that kept provincial fascism in a position o f power had resisted disruptive pressures and had themselves come closer together over the months. D uring this tim e nothing had happened to make the larger proprietors regret their heavy investm ent in fascism; on the contrary, all the signs were that they w ould reap greater profits from that investm ent as tim e went on. T h e liberals had virtually disappeared, absorbed into carried out, sec Beltram i mem orial; also Voce Repubblicana, 28 and 30 N ov. 1924; and L . Bedeschi, Don Minzoni (M onza, 1952). 1 Domenica deWOperaio, 26 Aug. 1923. * See report o f imminent publication o f the pronouncement to this effect in A C S , M in. Int., G abinetto Finzi, O rdine Pubblico 1923, b. 5, 3 Aug. 1923.

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the fascist circle. T h e catholics o f the Partito Popolare— m any o f these evidently landed proprietors as w ell— had m ade very obvious their com mitm ent to fascism. W ith the defeat o f dissidence and the survival o f fascism in the face o f economic depression, it is the unifying effect o f 1923 that assumes the greatest im portance; for w hat was em erging under the stresses o f these months was a progressive delineation o f the fascist system as it was to continue for several years. Indeed, when it is considered that severe crises had changed nothing and that not even political assassination had proved counter-productive, it is not difficult to see that there were very few factors that could have induced a change in this system. Despite the am ount o f tim e he spent in Rom e, Balbo rem ained the key to this situation. His interests and his attitudes con­ tinued to be the critical factor in provincial politics. His over­ riding consideration, o f course, was that his influence should continue and that his personal position should not be threatened. A s Beltram i wrote, Balbo was not prepared to see a provincial fascism which was not his fief; ‘Balbo identified the honour o f Ferrara fascism w ith his personal position.’ 1 T h e principal effect o f this concern was to keep the links between the ras and the proprietors and bourgeoisie very close. T h e system w hich becam e apparent during 1923 had this alliance as its basis, ju st as it had always been basic to provincial fascism in the preceding years. A t no point during the rem ainder o f 1923 or 1924 was there the suggestion that the alliance m ight break or that Balbo m ight wish to m odify it. It was too convenient for both, giving the agrari and bourgeoisie the opportunity to regulate the economic system o f the province as they desired w hile providing Balbo w ith a solid political base from which to engage in the w ider field o f national politics. This evidently had its effect on the progress o f fascist syndicalism . As already suggested, syndicalism was viewed by Balbo as principally a means o f exerting fascist control over the labourers and o f restraining the recrudescence o f agitation, socialist or other­ wise. T h e fundam ental elem ent in this was the control o f the labour m arket, an elem ent w hich required no ideas o f social justice or the rights o f the labourers for its realization. Thus his alliance w ith the proprietors left them essentially free to do w hat they liked, providing they retained that control. The Cam era 1 Beltram i memorial.

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Sindacale, after its b rief moment o f self-assertion in the spring o f 1923, ceased to have very m uch influence on this situation. A n y serious attem pt m ade to counter the pretensions o f the em ployers would have met w ith the intervention o f B albo, and w hile it m ight have been conceivable to enter into a struggle w ith the employers, the pointlessness o f standing out against the provincial leader had already becom e evident. T h is is not to suggest, however, that Balbo was prepared to ignore the provincial situation so long as the proprietors m ain­ tained their control and thus the control o f the fascists. A ll the indications are that he kept a very close w atch on events in Ferrara, even when he was in Rom e. Beltram i w ent so far as to assert that ‘the politics and adm inistrative life o f Ferrara w as controlled and directed by him in every d etail', and claim ed that he, as fiduciario, was no more than ‘the docile tool o f the long arm o f Sua Eccellenza B albo'.1 T h e m ajor effect o f this careful attention was felt by individuals rather than by the com m unal and provincial adm inistrations, however, since between these and Balbo there was a substantial identity o f interest.* Ind i­ viduals who had the misfortune to incur the w rath o f the pro­ vincial leader soon lived to regret it. Indeed, the pitiless harrying o f personal and political enemies o f Balbo becam e very m uch part o f the established system o f control. Francesco Brom bin, in Balbo’s eyes gu ilty principally o f being a fascist o f the prima ora, was sum m arily transferred from his teaching post in Ferrara to Foggia after his resignation from the fascio in M arch 1923. G uido T o rti, described in a docum ent o f 1928 as being 'excellently inform ed about all the activities o f B albo's gro u p ',8 was transferred from O neglia to Sassari in order th at he should not be able to make his periodic visits to Ferrara to see his friends am ong the dissidents; this— according to T o rti's account— because he was one o f a group o f people ‘able, because o f tem peram ent, education, and culture, to overshadow and put in question Balbo's glittering fam e’ .1*4* 1 Beltram i m em orial. * It seems that few councillors had the courage to stand up to Balbo in any case; see comment o f the law yer G . Forti, president o f the Deputazione Provinciale: '‘Balbo’s opinion was norm ally decisive’, reported in the Voce Repubblicana, 20 N ov. 1924. • A G S, Seg. P art, del D uce, C O , 208625 T orti G ., note for 21 M ar. 1928. 4 Gases o f both Brombin and T o rti are recounted in a letter o f G uido T o rti to Voce Repubblicana, published 29 N ov. 1924.

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Violence also continued to be used to perpetuate Balbo’s hold on the province. Although he undoubtedly wished to see a norm alization o f the provincial situation and a decline in the atmosphere o f illegality which had pervaded before the m arch on Rom e, Balbo was none the less ready to resolve difficult problems by his old methods. T h e m urder o f M inzoni was a case in point, the use o f the perugini against the dissidents another. Such actions, although possibly counter-productive and liable to strengthen the cause they sought to destroy, were frequently effected without too much risk because o f the com­ plicity o f the provincial authorities and the judiciary. Illustrative o f this recourse to violence and o f the subservient attitude o f the provincial authorities is the letter w ritten by Balbo to Beltram i shortly after certain o f the socialists accused o f being involved in the eccidio o f 20 Decem ber 1920 had been acquitted. It is worth quoting at length: A s fa r as those acq u itted in th e tria l fo r 20 D ecem ber are concerned, yo u should exp lain to them th at it w ould b e h ealth y for them to h ave a ch an ge o f a ir an d to settle dow n in som e oth er p rovin ce. I f th ey insist on stayin g an d as a result cause us sp iritu al unease, you should beat them u p , w ith ou t exag­ g eratin g b u t w ith regu larity, u n til th ey d ecide. Show this p art o f m y letter to th e p refect, to w hom y o u should say in m y nam e th at I h ave ad equ ate reasons to ju stify m y desire n ot to h ave such scoundrels in the tow n. T h e p olice station w ou ld d o w ell to persecute them w ith arrests a t least once a w eek an d it w ould b e as w ell i f th e p refect m akes the S ta te Prosecutor understand th at, in th e event o f beatin gs (w hich m ust b e done w ith style), w e do not w an t troubles w ith trials. T h is section o f the letter yo u should read to th e C on siglio F ederale. I f I w rite this from R om e, it is a sign th at I know w h at I am talkin g a b o u t.1

As the Voce Repubblicana ascertained more than a year after this letter was w ritten, the orders were carried out in almost every case,2 nor were arrests made as a result o f the beatings. Beltram i, in his testimony against Balbo, made it plain that the above letter was by no means exceptional, and that, pressure exerted on the authorities was *in the general run o f things*.* H e claim ed that Balbo was in the habit o f threatening the local authorities w ith the prospect o f undesirable transfers; *1*11 send the Questore to Agrigento if he doesn’t get on w ith the job* and ‘T h e prefect knows that I have a possible substitute 1 Balbo to Beltram i, 3 1 Aug. 1923 ; reproduced in Voce Repubblicana, 27 N ov. 1924. * Ibid., 30 N ov. 1924; o f the eight acquitted, six had been forced to leave Ferrara because o f fascist pressures. * Beltram i memorial.

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for him re a d y . . If, notwithstanding such tactics, both political organs o f the fascio and local authorities proved unco­ operative, it was always open to Balbo to go over their heads to the m ilitia in order to gain his ends through the m ore subservient officers o f the M . V .S .N . This was almost certain ly his strategy in early 1924 when Beltram i failed to act w ith sufficient zeal against provincial republicans, and m ay w ell have been the case w ith the murder o f Don M inzoni.1 T h e system as it emerged, therefore, had elements o f both stability and instability. Superficially there appeared to be something o f an equilibrium in the political and econom ic structure o f the province— between the political organs o f the P.N .F. and the economic fram ework o f the syndicates, between Balbo and young ex-combattente element o f fascism and the landed proprietors and provincial bourgeoisie. T h e considerable fusion between these elements, w ith the proprietors having a great deal o f influence on both Balbo and the syndical organi­ zation, seemed to guarantee that conflicts between the various interests would not occur on too serious a scale. Y e t this was a stability confined to the fascist organization; it ignored the fact that, in all but name, the vast m ajority o f the provincial population were excluded from any real representation. T h e continual recourse to violence on the part o f the fascists was an indication that the equilibrium was both precarious and arti­ ficial. The threat o f a revived working-class movement m ade even the smallest sign o f opposition to the provincial directorate intolerable, and, in the absence o f legitim ate sanctions against opponents, violence was the only answer. This was the paradox o f the situation. The system which, after a certain movem ent towards norm alization, was supposed to work w ithin the existing legal fram ework, plainly could not do so. T oo m any people were excluded from the provincial fascist élite to perm it that relatively small group to relax its attentions. The fascists could feel safe in that they could— quite literally— get aw ay w ith murder, but as long as they needed to do so they could hardly avoid revealing the precarious nature o f their control. 1 In both cases, the initiative appears to have been taken by Console R aoul Forti o f the M .V .S .N . In the case o f the devastation o f the republican section, Beltram i limits him self to saying that he is unable to say whether Forti was acting on his own responsibility or whether the order had come 'from high up* (ibid.). It seems unlikely, given the circumstances, that Forti would have acted in either case without first consulting his superiors.

II

F R O M T H E E L E C T I O N S O F 1924 T O T H E S T A B IL IZ A T IO N OF TH E FA SC IST R E G IM E I t was w ithin the context o f the precarious stability achieved during 1923 that the provincial fascist movement continued to operate during 1924. In m any respects the effects o f stabiliza­ tion were apparent; personal rivalries did not figure so largely in the changes that occurred am ong office-holders, nor did any form o f dissidence threaten to split the local organization. Syndicalist activity continued quietly, w ith no attem pts being m ade to take up positions embarrassing to the proprietors. Y e t 1924 was by no means a year o f calm for Ferrara. Although m any o f the provincial problems o f the fascists had been re­ solved and a system developed w hich held the province under firm control in all norm al circum stances, abnorm al calls upon that system could still reveal the phoney nature o f the fascist ‘pacification' o f the province. T h is was the case w ith the elections o f A p ril 1924. M ore seriously disturbing for the calm o f provincial fascists, however, were the problems revealed by the m urder o f M atteotti in June— problems connected not so m uch w ith local fascism, already fairly clearly defined, but w ith the position o f the national movem ent as a w hole in its as yet undefined relation w ith the state. Both the elections and the M atteotti crisis com pelled provincial fascism to reveal its true, colours in respect o f its opponents, and forced the fascio and its principal supporters to m ake clear once again their determ in­ ation to use any means to m aintain their prim e priority— the perpetuation o f the provincial status quo. T h e elections, in as far as the com position o f the lista nazionale was concerned, appeared only to confirm the consolidation w hich had taken place during the previous year. T h e degree o f unanim ity achieved am ong the provincial bourgeoisie was clear­ ly reflected in the choice o f candidates. A ll were prom inent fascists. There was no longer need for the lista to include pro-

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fascist liberals in order to attract support o f the m iddle classes, as had been done in 1921, when Pietro Sitta had been am ong the candidates o f the Blocco. Instead the candidates were selected to represent the different aspects o f a general consensus for fascism among the provincial bourgeoisie. A lberto V erdi could expect to attract support particularly from those w ith nationalist leanings or links w ith die combattenti organizations. Rossoni evidently had a certain appeal to those concerned w ith fascist syndicalism in F errara. M antovani— as president o f the A grarian Association, president o f the Banca M utua, and a board member o f the Banca Popolare1— had a following am ong the landowners and professional classes o f the province, w hile Balbo, as the saviour o f the province from socialism and a figure o f influence in Rom e, could anticipate support from almost all fascist and pro-fascist quarters. T h at this fascist m onopoly o f the candidates was not a case o f a strengthened fascio eclipsing the liberal and dem ocratic groups is suggested as much by the cam paign leading up to polling day as by the results. As suggested elsewhere, real distinctions between the fascists and the bourgeoisie who w ere not socialist, republican, or genuine supporters o f the P .P .I., had ceased to exist almost w ith the developm ent o f fascism. A ll that had happened since 1921 was that this general com ­ mitment to fascism had become more explicit. Thus it is not surprising to find pro-fascist liberals and catholics cam paigning for the lista nazionale. Indeed, so general was the support for the lista among the noted members o f Ferrara society that the political meetings organized by the fascio assumed the character o f town fêtes. O n the last day o f M arch, for exam ple, the m eeting held to support the P.N .F. was attended by prefect, vice-prefect, police chief, the ch ief m agistrate, the Procuratore del R e, various judges, and the officers o f the R R .G G . A guard o f honour was provided by the ordinary ranks o f the carabinieri. Prom inent on the platform , together w ith M antovani, w ere N iccolini and Sitta, the principal representatives o f the old liberals.8 Grosoli, unable to be present on this occasion, had already m ade his position clear. O n behalf o f the catholics am ong his following, he had pledged full support for the listone, 1 For information on M antovani, see Relazione o f Professor Francesco Brom bin to Mussolini in, A C S , Seg. Part, del Duce, C O , 1938, 533306, dated October. 1 Gazzetta Ferrarese, I Apr. 1934.

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in the confidence that he would see com pleted the work w hich M ussolini had ‘vigorously and happily begun and carried on*.1 T his support was as near unanimous am ong the landed proprietors and professional people o f the town as the fascists could expect to get. Nevertheless the w ay in w hich the cam ­ paign was conducted in the rural areas suggested very strongly that this near unanim ity was by no means present in the hinter­ land. From the beginning o f M arch, reports o f violence becam e more frequent. T h e province began once again to suffer the sleepless nights o f 1921. ‘T h e quietest and safest o f villages were woken up by revelries w ith hand grenades; the first wounded were at Gom acchio w hile at San Bartolom eo in Bosco a m an was killed.’ 8 Despite the efforts o f the authorities to deny that there was political m otivation behind m any o f these actions, it is evident that the fascists had returned to their old method o f cam paigning. In doing so, they were very much in conflict w ith M ussolini’s wish that the elections should be conducted in as peaceful an atmosphere as possible. Y e t Beltram i m aintained that it was Balbo, fresh from Rom e, who gave the orders for a resumption o f ‘squadrist’ activity.8 According to the provincial fiduciario yBalbo refused to rely solely on the systems o f preference vote control which had been worked out by M antovani, or on the pressures w hich could be exercised through the syndicates. H e expressed an open disdain for means w hich he defined ‘sedentary*, preferring the ‘open battle’ which would provide the opportunity to break a few heads. T h e method he advocated was very straightforward. L e t us tak e, therefore, this p rivileged elector [the first to lea ve the booth] an d b reak his h ead open— even i f h e has vo ted fo r us, too b a d fo r him — sh outin g, ‘B astard, yo u vo ted for th e socialists*. In this w a y w e ca n be sure th a t, a fter this exam p le, no one w ill risk n o t vo tin g fo r th e lista nazionale.

A s a result o f this speech, Beltram i alleged, the leaders o f the local fasci returned to their communes convinced that the governm ent had given them a free hand to be as violent as they wished. Even given Balbo’s violent character though, Beltram i’s testim ony fails to convince. A lthough his reporting o f the 4 Ibid., 4 M ar. 1924. For the attitude o f Grosoli towards the listone see also, Sgarbanti, Lineamenti storici del movimento cattolicoferrarese, p. 76. * Beltram i memorial. * Ibid. T h e remainder o f this paragraph is based on the same source.

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speech m ay be textually accurate, the fiduciario grossly under­ estimated his leader’s political realism i f he im agined that violence was renewed sim ply because it pleased Balbo to fight. Both M ussolini’s directives and his own desire to see a quieter rather than an inflam ed province would have conducted Balbo to renounce the use o f force if it had seemed possible to do so. Instead he found him self under the necessity o f stirring up his local commanders w ith cynical rhetoric and launching once again the squadrismo which in 1923 he had wished to dam p down. E vidently this was because he felt that he had no choice. H e recognized that to obtain the kind o f consensus support he desired, systems o f controlling the vote and peaceful intim ida­ tion would have been inadequate. Beltram i him self had got near this conclusion when he wrote that, in the absence o f an effective system o f control, ‘violence would have inevitably been neces­ sary because w ithout coercion the masses in the syndicates would have abandoned us’ .1 T h e instability o f the fascist position becam e apparent once again. Elections w hich w ere intended to dem onstrate a large measure o f public approval for fascism, w hich were to show that fascism even had the support o f m oderate, law -abiding citizens, could only be w on by returning to the violent intim idation o f the rural labourers. N ear unanim ity am ong the bourgeois political groups o f the town could not always conceal the terms on w hich the suprem­ acy o f those groups was m aintained. T h e results o f the elections am ply confirm ed both the strength o f the fascists am ong the provincial bourgeoisie and their weakness am ong the agricultural and industrial workers. O u t o f a total vote o f over 80,000 in the province, the republicans, liberals, and popolari together polled only 1,114 votes.2 In the rural communes the fascists carried all before them, obtaining alm ost total support in certain o f the communes o f the basso ferrarese— the area most easy to m anipulate politically. C ertain o f the results speak for themselves. A n exam ple is Lagosanto, where the returns read: 'Lagosanto: sezione 501 : scuola com ­ unale— Iscritti 747, votanti 683. Lista N azionale 683, U n itari o, Popolari o, M assim alisti o, Com unisti o, P .R .I. o, O rologio 1 Beltram i mem orial. * T he results were, Lista N azionale 75,517, Lista Socialista U nitari 1,088, Lista P .P .I. 761, M assimalisti 1,194, Com unisti 507, P R I 273, L iberali 80. Gazzetta Ferrarese, 8 Apr. 1924.

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o .’ 1 O n ly the extensive intim idation proposed by Balbo could have achieved such results in this agricultural area. None the less, it is not unreasonable to postulate that intim i­ dation had more effect on the socialist vote than on the returns o f the liberals, republicans, and catholics. W hereas in 1921 the socialists had still retained at least the bare fram ework o f a provincial organization, in 1924 this had com pletely disap­ peared from the rural areas. T h e more bourgeois parties which opposed the listone, however, had m aintained their organiza­ tions, and were thus in a position not dissimilar to that occupied during the elections o f 1921. In both elections there had been fascist intim idation; in both, these parties had retained some o f the means o f com bating that intim idation. It is not unrealistic, therefore, to com pare the results o f the two elections, and to assert that the decline in support for these parties— the popolari, for exam ple, m oved from 3,719 votes in 1921 to 761 in 1924— reflected a real shift o f support towards fascism. Also suggestive o f this interpretation are precisely the results o f the socialists, totally dom inated in the rural areas where they had no organi­ zation, but still able to m anage some showing in the town,8 where a rudim entary organization still existed around M ario C avallari and am ong the workers o f the urban officine. T h e votes obtained by the individual fascist candidates are less revealing o f the relations between fascio and its supporters than m ight at first appear. In the province alone, Balbo gained 49,764 preference votes,3 while in Em ilia as a whole he polled a little more than 16 per cent o f all preference votes cast.4 Rossoni followed him w ith 27,776 votes, while V erd i and M antovani returned 17,743 and 9,937 votes respectively. T h e striking result is that o f M antovani, reduced from a preference vote on a level with that o f M ussolini in the elections o f 1921 to a far more low ly position on the list. W as not this a sign that the fascio had achieved an independent position and was less pre­ pared to see the agrari exert their influence over the provincial m ovem ent? O n ly in a very lim ited sense was this true. C ertainly Balbo, 1 Ibid. 1 In Ferrara {città and forese together), the U nitari polled 519 votes, the Massi­ m alisti 501. Balilla, 8 Apr. 1924. * For the preference votes o f the fascist candidate, see Gazzetta Ferrarese, 8 Apr. 1924. 4 See De Felice, Mussolini il fascista, 1. 586.

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as the provincial figure w ith most influence on the fascist governm ent, had far more authority than he had possessed in 1921. Y et the local fascio still rem ained very dependent for financial support on the A grarian Association and could ill afford to do anything to upset the proprietors. It was clear th at the agrari would have thought tw ice before upsetting the fascio, but they were not entirely w ithout alternatives. T h e latent divisions within the local m ovement, am ply dem onstrated during 1923, m ight have been used to topple the local ras, or at least to embarrass him considerably at a tim e when he was com peting for favours in Rom e and needed a secure base to reinforce his position. In fact, such issues did not arise. T h e back seat taken by M antovani during the elections was directed by considerations other than that o f a desire to discard the representative o f the landowners. Both Balbo and Rossoni were eager to assert their 'national stature’ by impressive results in the province, and this required that other candidates accepted more modest results.1 N or can M antovani have objected very strongly to this. A fter all, he had received nothing but benefits from both Balbo and Rossoni, and it was in his interest, and in the interests o f the landowners, that the position o f these figures should be reinforced. A grarian fascism had not changed its character, therefore; the decline in the vote for M antovani suggested only that the Agrarian Federation was fully con­ fident o f its representatives from the fascio and wished to see those most able to exert pressure on the governm ent in their favour in as strong a position as possible. In other words, w hat M antovani was to do for the influential sections o f the com ­ m unity in 1921, Balbo and Rossoni were to do in 1924. V ictory in the elections placed both national and provincial fascist movements in a fairly com fortable position. In Ferrara violence was not continued after polling day; instead the fascists m ade a great show, through the press, o f busying themselves w ith the economic difficulties which faced Ferrara once again in 1924. Post-electoral tranquillity was soon replaced b y an atmosphere o f crisis, however, when the news o f M atteotti’s disappearance and presumed m urder becam e known. T he im m ediate reaction am ong fascist circles was somewhat m uted. T h e Gazzetta Ferrarese confined itself to b rief reports o f the events, such as were known, and m ade no attem pt to comment 1 This was stated in the Beltram i memorial.

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on the im plications o f the m urder. O n ly after several days did the reaction become more positive. O n 20 June A lberto V erdi, the former nationalist, spoke at a public m eeting about ‘the present hour and the duty o f Italians*. His confidence expressed in the governm ent o f M ussolini was reiterated by Sergio Panunzio and R aoul G aretti at the same m eeting.1 From this point, telegram s from fascist sections, combattente associations, and other pro-fascist groups, began to flow thick and fast to­ wards Rom e.8 T h e A .N .C . reaffirm ed its determ ination to co-operate with M ussolini, adding that the members wished to send to him ‘their words o f com fort, frank, w ithout m ental reservations . . . *. There were no signs here o f the doubts w hich were to assail the A .N .C . as a whole at its national congress in Ju ly. Even am ong the provincial working class there was hardly any sign o f protest. In the town, the ten-m inute strike called to commemorate the socialist deputy was observed in the few industrial concerns, but am ong the rural labourers no reactions o f any kind were reported. Y et there was another current developing alongside the modest reaction o f the distressed, but com placent, bourgeoisie o f the town. First indications o f this cam e on 22 June w ith an assembly in Bologna o f more than 40,000 camicie nere. Squadristi from Ferrara were present, and Balbo was one o f the principal speakers to express, in somewhat threatening terms, the confidence that the m ilitant fascists had in M ussolini’s ability to resolve the crisis.3 Preparations made by the M .V .S .N . in Ferrara left little doubt about how they proposed to face approaching difficulties. D uring the last ten days o f June, weapons stockpiled at the barracks o f the R R .C G . were w ith­ drawn and placed at the disposition o f the commanders o f the local sections o f the m ilitia.4 Excitem ent among the m iliti was m aintained through Ju ly by the demands com ing from the parliam entary opposition to M ussolini that the M .V .S .N . be disbanded, and exasperation only increased by the reforms announced in August, stating that the m ilitia was to be con­ sidered an integral part o f the arm y and to have officers drawn from arm y or ex-arm y officer personnel.5 1 Gazzetta Ferrarese, 20 and 21 June 1924 * Ibid., 24 and 15 June 1924. For the telegram o f the A .N .C ., ibid., 26 June. ' Balilla, 24 June 1924. 4 A C S , M in. Int., D G PS, A G R 1924, b. 87, 26 June 1924. * See De Felice, Mussolini il fascista, i . 658-9.

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B y September, the desire o f the provincial camicie nere for the ‘second wave* o f violence had become obvious. M ussolini, b y m oving towards the intransigents during Ju ly and August, had reinforced that desire and had seemed to w ant to reactivate the dynamism o f old ‘squadrism*. Large posters appeared on the walls o f Ferrara quoting M ussolini’s speech o f 31 August in which he threatened to use the enemies o f fascism as ‘the straw for the camps o f the blackshirts*.1 This extremist them e was taken up by the Gazzetta Ferrarese w hich, several days before the murder o f the fascist deputy Casalini, began to ask w hat fascism was w aiting for. I t is three m onths now th at fascism has h ad to m ask its w arlike sp irit w ith fran ciscan p atien ce. It has been sw allow ing b itte r m edicine from m orn in g to evening. It has taken an d continues to take th e m ost atrocious in su lts, th e m ost infam ous calum nies, th e m ost w icked provocation s. I t ca n ’ t stan d it an y lo n ger; th e cu p is fu ll an d runn in g over. T h e m uscles a re tw itch in g in a fren etic dan ce w h ich is threatening to force even those w ho do n ot w a n t to dan ce to do so.*

T h e Voce Repubblicana, w hich cited this article under the heading ‘M anoeuvres for the second w ave. C rack platoons at Ferrara*, commented only that behind such manoeuvres it was not difficult to pick out the sinister influence o f Italo Balbo. Balbo and the Voce Repubblicana provided, in fact, a further element in the gathering crisis o f fascism. O n the anniversary o f the death o f Don M inzoni— not a date the provincial fascists cared to remember— the Voce had carried an article w hich, besides m aking various derogatory remarks about ‘the ex­ lieutenant and present generalissimo*, had im plied fairly directly that Balbo had been im plicated in the killing o f the priest.* In the trial which ensued, brought by Balbo against the news­ paper, the tables were quickly turned on the ras. As a result o f the declarations o f certain dissident and disgraced fascists o f Ferrara and, above all, as a result o f the declarations o f the former favourite o f Balbo, Tomm aso Beltram i, the trial assumed the character o f a trial o f the methods and morals o f provincial fascism.4 Balbo, caught lying on several occasions and revealed as the violent and cynical arrivista that he was, attem pted first 1 Voce Repubblicana, 7 Sept. 1924. * Gazzetta Ferrarese, 5 Sept. 1924, quoted in Voce Repubblicana, 7 Sept. 1924. * Voce Repubblicana, 24 Aug. 1924. 4 T he testimony given during this trial has been reported in this work at the points where it is most relevant. It w ill not be repeated here.

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to stop the trial, and then, when judgem ent was given against him , felt com pelled to resign his position as provisional com­ m ander o f the M .V .S .N . H e returned to a trium phal reception in Ferrara.1 But clearly his hum iliation and the public exposure, through the columns o f the Voce and II Mondot o f the dirty linen o f provincial fascism did little to m ollify the exasperation o f the local squadristi against their apparently untouchable opponents o f the press. This was shown im m ediately at the meeting in Bologna o f the representatives o f eight fascist provincial federations. T h e prefect o f Bologna, Bocchini, reported on 1 Decem ber that the discussions had revealed the existence o f two currents among the fascists, the one for the second w ave and the other for norm alization. ‘T h e first current’, he wrote, ‘was supported by the representatives o f Ferrara and Ravenna who de­ manded the reconstitution o f the action squads.’ None the less the second current carried the day and the ferraresi o f the M .V .S .N . received little com fort from the regional assem bly.1 T h e situation threatened to get out o f hand. O n 9 Decem ber a m eeting o f M .V .S .N . leaders in the province was called in great haste because Consul R aoul Forti had announced that ‘he was no longer able to control the m iliti*.9 This seemed indeed to be the case. O n the 18th, Avanti! reported that in Ferrara ‘W e are still in the era o f punitive expeditions', and recounted how, on the previous day, squads from the m ilitia had run w ildly through the streets o f the town, firing as they went and beating several people who stood in their w ay. L* Unità reported later in the m onth how the provincial fascists had taken to burning all the opposition papers they could lay their hands on, even destroying copies o f the Resto del Carlino. It concluded w ith the comment, ‘In the province, Balbo's system is still in action.’ 1*4* From this point it was only a short step to the ‘movement o f the consuls’ o f 31 Decem ber and the beginning o f Tam burini’s reaction in Florence.6*Although the consuls o f Ferrara were not 1 A C S , M in. Int., D G PS, A G R 1924, b. 91, 29 N ov. 1924. 1 A C S , ibid., b. 89, I Dec. 1924. * A C S , ibid., b. 87, 11 D ec. 1924. 4 L ’ Unità, 27 Dec. 1924. * For a detailed account o f these moves surrounding the M atteotti crisis, see A . Lyttelton, 'Fascism in Italy: The Second W ave’, in Journal o f Contemporary History, 1 (1966).

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directly im plicated in the attem pt to force M ussolini's hand, they were evidently o f the same school o f thought as their more decided colleagues. Balbo's position— still unclarified1— cannot have been very different. His contacts w ith the zone com ­ manders o f the m ilitia were very close; certain o f them m ay even have been directly dependent on him . A gostini o f Perugia, for exam ple, one o f the leaders in the plotting against G andolfo, was notoriously the creature o f the ras o f Ferrara.* W hat lay behind this crisis o f 1924? H ow was it th at the fascists o f a province, at least superficially calm until M ay, had been thrown into a panic by a m urder in R om e? C ertain elements in the provincial situation provide at least part o f th e answers to these questions. Although in itial reaction to th e m urder am ong urban workers and rural labourers had been very restrained, fear that the embarrassment o f the govern­ m ent m ight lead to a strengthening o f the forces o f the ‘sub­ versives’ was very pronounced. From certain points o f view , it seemed that there was little possibility o f this. T h e fascists were w ell aw are that the provincial authorities were keeping a very close eye on developm ents and could, by various m eans at their disposal, m ake life difficult for those who attem pted reorganization o f anti-fascist groups. E qu ally it was clear th a t there were few really capable socialist or com m unist leaders in the province and that they, even when they succeeded in operating secretly, faced a fairly apathetic rural proletariat. T h e report from the comando generale o f thé M . V .S .N . was to th e point in this respect when it suggested that in E m ilia ‘w ork keeps the minds o f the peasants o ff politics’ .3 None the less, there were plenty o f incidents to arouse the concern o f the fascists. In the strike held to com m em orate M atteotti, m any o f the fascist syndicates also took p art,4 increasing the belief that the syndical organization was funda­ m entally unreliable. T h e investigations o f the prefect ju st at this 1 For a difference o f opinion on Balbo’s position, see A . Lyttelton, loc. cit., who leaves open the possibility o f Balbo’s connivance, and D e Felice, Mussolini il fascista, i. 7 1 1, who considers Balbo to have been totally extraneous to the manoeuvre. * This was asserted by M isuri at the Balbo/ Voce Repubblicana trial o f 1924, and reported in the Voce o f 30 N ov. 1924. * A C S , M in. In t., D G PS, A G R 1924, b. 87, 10 Ju ly 1924, Com ando Generale M .V .S .N . to M inistry o f the Interior; quoted also in D e Felice, Mussolini il fascista, 1. 641. * A C S , ibid., b. 65, 2i June 1924.

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tim e confirmed these fears. In the seven communist sections he succeeded in identifying in the province he found that m any o f those enrolled were also enrolled in the fascist syndicates.1 Leaflets ascribing the m urder o f M atteotd to the ‘governm ent and fascist party* were discovered in the possession o f a man who was fiduciario o f several o f the fascist syndicates o f sugar workers.* O n other occasions, workers o f the town openly manifested their opposition to fascism. Avanti! reported in August that more than 300 youths belonging to Italia Libera had left Piazza Ariostea in Ferrara in order to cycle to the funeral o f M atteotti.* Others— again the workers from the sugar factories to the fore— went to salute the train carrying the socialist deputy’s body as it passed through the province towards R ovigo.1*4 B y Septem ber, the existence o f a great deal o f disaffection with fascism had become obvious. ‘For some tim e the town and suburbs o f Ferrara have been disturbed by subversive demonstrations— in some part secret but in great measure unconcealed.*5* T h e prefect was forced to confirm this, but was inclined to attribute the success o f anti-fascist propaganda to factors other than the assassination o f M atteotti. It would not be out of place to note that this subversive propaganda has found fertile ground because of the discontent existing in the working class, which has been able to watch the lack of honesty, at its expense, of a large number of proprietors in respect of the agricultural pacts, and has suffered a reduction in wages.*

It seemed that this political and economic discontent m ight be about to come to a head in O ctober, when rumours were heard o f a proposed ‘azione di piazza’, to be organized by the republicans and Italia Libera and to coincide with the an­ niversary o f the march on Rom e.7 Although nothing happened on that day, Prefect G iovara noted ‘a certain alarm in the 1 A C S , ibid., 24 June 1924. * A C S , ibid., 11 July 1924. * Avanti!, 24-5 Aug. 1924. Italia Libera was an association founded at the beginning o f 1924 which drew its strength principally from republican and socialist tx-combattenti. It was one o f the more successful anti-fascist organizations during 1924, a fact which prompted the order for its dissolution in January 1925. See De Felice, Mussolini il fascista, 1. 566. 4 Avanti! 24-5 A ug., 1924. s A C S, M in. Int., D G PS, A G R 1924, b. 87, 5 Sept. 1924. * A C S, ibid., 29 Sept. 1924. 7 A C S, ibid., b. 74B, 5 O ct. 1924.

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fascist cam p’,1 an alarm w hich can only have been increased by the encouragement the trial o f Novem ber provided for the opposition. Y et were these movements and rumours o f movement really o f sufficient w eight to threaten the basis o f fascist power in Ferrara? It is difficult to think so. There was clearly a potential danger to fascism, but the squads, when they had been given a free hand, had handled situations far more difficult in the past. And in the reported strengths o f the opposition groups8 there were few signs o f the mass revolt against fascism which the M .V .S .N . m ight find impossible to control. N or were there indications that the provincial bourgeoisie were beginning to detach themselves from the movement they had supported so readily in the elections o f A pril. T h e firmness w ith w hich Panunzio and Garetti, fascists o f the higher bourgeoisie, met the crisis o f June has already been noted. It was a firmness m ain­ tained throughout the crisis. The Gazzetta Ferrarese was in fact more intransigent in its tone than the Balilla, where certain o f the former dissidents retained their more moderate attitude, calling certainly for the com pletion o f the fascist revolution, ‘without second waves, without St. Bartholom ew’s nights*.* Few o f the agrari shared this moderation. I f it is true that the M atteotti crisis saw m any middle-class fascists o f certain areas furtively rem oving the fascist badge from their buttonhole, there were no reports o f sim ilar occurrences in Ferrara. Those who abandoned the movement at this point were, according to D e F elice,4 the fascists o f the twelfth and thirteenth hour, those who had joined the party only in 1923 when it had already achieved success. In Ferrara there were relatively few o f these. M embership figures show very .clearly that the bulk o f the tesserati— a good 70 per cent o f the figure for Ju ly 1923— had been w ith the movement from at least the seconda orat the beginning o f 1921. In any case, in Ferrara there were few o f 1 A C S , ibid., 27 O ct. 1924. * The 300 reported for Italia Libera in August was the largest estimate o f opposition given during the year. T he prefect put the number o f communists at about fifty, a figure hardly borne out by the election results o f A pril. A C S , ibid., 29 Sept. 1924. • See the article by M ario Barbieri in Balilla, 19 O ct. 1924. T he paper had little following by this time, however. In November Barbieri, the editor, com plained that no one read his paper any more, and this was reported in the Voce Repub­ blicana o f 8 Nov. 1924. 4 De Felice, Mussolini il fascista, 1, 635.

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those constitutionalists and liberals who, in other parts o f Italy, had supported fascism on the supposition that once in power it would become more moderate. The leading members o f Ferrara society had been among the first to instigate and encourage the violence o f agrarian fascism in 1921, a violence w hich had subsequently become common to the whole move­ ment. T h ey had had no illusions about the possible evolution o f fascism, therefore; and as long as they held firm and con­ tinued to voice support for M ussolini there was the probability that others would follow them. T yp ical o f their attitude was that o f Grosoli. Although never him self enrolled in the fascio, he had been a consistent supporter o f fascism, and it was precisely in a moment o f great embarrassment for the govern­ ment— m id-August, when the body o f M atteotti was found— that he and others who had left the P .P .I. determined on the formation o f the Centro N azionale Italiano, a movement dedicated to giving lu ll support to M ussolini.1 T h e turbulence that marked Ferrara fascism during these months did not come, therefore, from dangers arising w ithin the local situation. Fifty communists m ight alarm the in­ tolerant members o f the m ilitia, but they could hardly threaten them— particularly so long as the fascio retained its strong links w ith the provincial m iddle class. The crisis developed rather from the initial fear that the governm ent would fall and that a still strong provincial organization would find itself, in effect, decapitated. O nce this fear was allayed and it was seen that M ussolini still had room for m anoeuvre, the problem becam e less whether fascism would survive, but on w hat terms it would survive. It was a problem which sooner or later, M atteotti or no M atteotti, the fascist movement had to face. T h e conflicts w ithin a movement w hich could not tolerate opposition but had no legal means o f suppressing it were too great to be ignored for long. Balbo’s efforts in the months following June, the actions o f his former squadristi, and the position adopted by the bourgeoisie, were aU directed towards the solution o f this problem on terms favourable to Ferrara and the fascist ferraresi. T h eir hopes and fears indicate clearly ju st w hat provincial fascism m eant to its various components. For the former squadrisi incorporated in the m ilitia, the crisis meant above all uncertainty. Alm ost im m ediately on the 1 See R . Sgarbanti, Ritratto politico di Giovarmi Grosoli (Rome, 1959), pp. 155 ff.

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news o f the disappearance o f the socialist deputy» calls were m ade in parliam ent and in the opposition press for the dis­ banding o f the m ilitia. It was argued that the task o f m ain­ taining public order should be placed once again very firm ly in the hands o f the existing forces o f police and carabinieri. A lthough M ussolini refused to accept these demands» stating explicitly in June that the m ilitia was not to be dissolved, the new regulations for the M .V .S .N .— particularly those th at related to the qualifications o f the officers— aroused suspicions that an attem pt was being m ade to phase out the m ilitary w ing o f the fascist movement. A gain in O ctober, notw ith­ standing the mood o f the m ilitia subsequent to the m urder o f Casalini, Federzoni issued directives to the prefects w hich seemed to be aim ed at the restraining o f all the more m ilitant fascists. T h e message that seemed im plicit in these moves was that the m ilitary sections o f the fascist party were to be dis­ m antled and that M ussolini, in order to arrange his ow n salvation, was prepared to sacrifice his most ardent followers at the moment in w hich they becam e something o f an em ­ barrassment. For these it was a serious crisis. For almost four years m any o f them had done little but serve the fascist m ove­ m ent and, m oving from squads to m ilitia, they had assumed that fascism was to be a career in itself. Rum ours o f disbandm ent, or o f subordination o f the m ilitia to the arm y, conjured up spectres o f the loss o f the privileges they had worked for and enjoyed over the preceding years. T h e response to these threats was characteristically unsubtle. Failing to see any promise in the future, the leaders o f the M .V .S .N . began to look back to the past, to the days o f the unhindered actions o f the squads. This nostalgia was reflected in the request m ade by the ferraresi at the regional assembly o f fascists in Bologna for the reconstitution o f the squadre d'a&one.x This request was supplemented by a further dem and that the m ilitia be retained, com prising the best elements o f the old ‘squadrism’ and perform ing the same function. E qually clear was the response to G andolfo's directive to replace all zone commanders o f the m ilitia who had not achieved the rank o f colonel in the arm y. Balbo im m ediately demanded that the officers o f the Em ilian m ilitia be left untouched, w hile it was 1 For an account of this assembly see, ACS, Min. Int., DGPS, AGR 1924, b. 8 9 ,1'Dec. 1924.

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reported on 11 Decem ber that, at a m eeting o f all the consuls o f E m ilia-R om agna, all those present had shown themselves extrem ely depressed, had objected to Gandolfo's directives, and had expressed the desire that the old officers be retained because they were the heads o f the old squadre d'azione.1 O n ly by a preservation o f the system o f the past, it seemed, could the positions, the careers, o f the squadristi be retained. Considerations o f career also applied in some measure to Balbo; but he, being in much closer contact w ith the political centre, was able to see the problem in more general and less purely personal terms. His alarm developed from the fear that, w ith a certain institutionalization o f fascism in governm ent, the position that he had previously enjoyed would be difficult to retain. T h e ras and the ‘rasdom’, i f fully subordinated to the authority o f the state, could have little further influence. D uring 1923 and 1924 Balbo, the hero o f so m any o f the actions o f 1922, had seen power running aw ay from him. T h e M at­ teotti crisis threatened only to confirm this movement, w ith the threats to the m ilitia, the calls to legality, and the appointm ent o f Federam i— a particular enemy o f the ex-republicans— to the M inistry o f the Interior.8 Balbo’s reaction to these threats was, like that o f his squadlisti followers, to appeal for a reactivation o f that old dynamism w hich had carried him to the top o f the fascist movement. For him , it was, o f course, im portant that fascism should survive, but it was equally im portant that it should survive on terms which would re-establish his position as one o f the key figures o f the movement. I f he was a norm alizer within the province o f Ferrara because his position was secure, he was an intransigent on the national scene because the politics o f norm alization had done nothing but weaken his national standing. He saw clearly that it was necessary to resolve the situation in w hich violence, still required on occasions by the fascists, could not be recon­ ciled w ith the norm alizing tendencies o f the fascist movement. T h e threat o f the second wave was the answer to this situation. It was designed to force M ussolini to move aw ay from norm al1 A C S , ibid., b. 87, 1 1 Dec. 1924. * It was reported in the Voce Repubblicana, 21 June 1924, that Balbo was parti­ cularly concerned because Federzoni appeared to be gaining from the crisis. H e was reported to have told Federzoni that the M .V .S .N . would not take orders from the M inistry o f the Interior and that he intended to free fascists imprisoned in Regina Coeli and bring about a coup d’état.

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ization and to em brace the intransigent w ing o f the m ovem ent under conditions w hich w ould give that w ing a renewed im ­ portance. A St. Bartholom ew’s night o f terror, the ultim ate m ove, would have given M ussolini little choice but to fa ll back on the intransigents in order to save himself. A nd in such circum stances, the m ilitia and B albo' w ould have been the key elements in the situation. T o a solution o f this kind the provincial bourgeoisie had little to object. Just as it was in the interests o f the M .V .S .N . and their leaders to work for a fascism as intransigent as possible, so it was in the interests o f the bourgeoisie, and above all, the landowners, that there should be no w ithdraw al from the positions gained since 1921. T h e agrari had already shown themselves ready to resort to the most barefaced repression o f the pro­ vincial workers, on no occasion deprecating the violence o f the local squads in anything but equivocal terms. It was unlikely that the m urder o f another socialist— even i f a deputy— was going to change their attitudes. This was particularly so in the circum stances o f 1924 when, as the prefect had observed, econom ic difficulties in the province encouraged a certain revival o f discontent am ong the rural labourers, serving to rem ind the proprietors very forcibly o f w hat fascism had saved them from. T h e potential danger o f a resurrection o f socialism, m ade more determ ined by the years o f repression, was always present. There was very little to tem pt these aw ay from fascism, therefore. I f M ussolini had his alternatives, they had none. Even the possibility o f a m odified fascism, a fascism ‘nazional-liberal-conservatore’,1 had few attractions i f it m eant an abandonm ent o f the repressive mechanism o f fascism w hich had served them so w ell in Ferrara. Thus there are no reports o f the agrari calling for M ussolini’s resignation, as did certain industrial interests elsewhere in Italy. M anto­ vani, presidentof the Federazione A graria in F errara, was am ong those Ferrarese representatives at the assembly o f Bologna w ho declared themselves favourable to the second wave.* T h e speech o f 3 Jan uary 1925 s appeared to give the fascists o f Ferrara very m uch w hat they had hoped to obtain by the second w ave. M ussolini's words were music in the ears o f the 1 O n this possibility, see D e Felice, Mussolini il fascista, I . 661. * A C S , M in. Int., D G PS, A G R 1924, b. 89, 1 D ec. 1924. '[Q uoted in De Felice, Mussolini il fascista, 1. 721-2.

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militants, terrified o f being abandoned by their leader. T h eir actions were exalted and there was no attem pt to sidestep the ultim ate responsibility: T f fascism has been only castor oil and cudgels, and not instead the proud passion o f the best o f Italian youth, the fault is m ine! I f fascism has been a crim inal organization, then I am the leader o f that crim inal organiza­ tion.’ E qually welcome, though considered insufficient by m any o f the intransigents, were the provisions for the suppression o f the opposition, dictated to the prefects by Federzoni on the night o f the 3rd.1 Clubs and other organizations suspected o f representing a danger for the governm ent were to be closed or disbanded; Italia Libera was to be outlawed, and communists and other ‘subversives* were to be kept under close supervision, always bearing in mind that ‘every attem pt at resistance must be severely repressed by any method*. N ot only was the m ilitia finally reassured, therefore; the potential danger o f clandestine organizations in the province was also to be removed by a prom pt repression. T h e subsequent history o f the province during 1925 and 1926 indicates that this is precisely w hat happened. Resistance to the fascists, encouraged in 1924 by the embarrassment o f the P .N .F ., was firm ly suppressed. A variety o f means was em­ ployed. In early 1925, the fascists themselves, taking little notice o f Federzoni’s calls for discipline am ong the form er squadristi, returned on occasion to their old methods. A fter an incident at Casum aro in w hich two fascists were killed, the offices o f two reformist socialist lawyers in Ferrara were in­ vaded and devastated.1 Criticism o f these actions in the press produced a boycott, declared b y the Federazione Provinciale, o f nine newspapers considered to be hostile to fascism. People were warned that if they continued to read these papers they would autom atically be considered enemies.8 The treatm ent that would then be accorded them was w ell known to every­ one. Either they would be beaten up, or more subtle methods would be employed to crush opposition. A communist o f Copparo, for exam ple, was evicted from his holdings ‘for 1 A C S , M in. In t., D G PS, A G R 1935, b. 56B, 3 Jan. 1925; circulars 169 and 179 from Federzoni to prefects o f the realm . * A C S , ibid., b. 60, 18 M ay 1925. * Corriere Padano, 23 M ay 1925. T he papers boycotted were L a G iu stizia , A v a n ti!, V U n ità, Corriere della Sera, L a Stam pa, L a Voce R epubblicana, I l G iornale d ’Ita lia , I l P opolo, and II M ondo.

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political reasons*, and forced to take all his belongings and his fam ily o f twelve to another area.1 Even without these attentions, it was difficult enough for any opposition to develop. The hopes that had been raised after the murder o f M atteotti were soon dispelled w ith the renewed determ ination o f the fascists during 1925. T h e serious economic problems o f the province m eant that work, rather than politics, was the m ajor preoccupation o f the m ajority o f provincial workers, whether in the town or the rural hinter­ land. A t the beginning o f February, a local communist organ­ izer had w ritten to Rom e, explaining the situation w hich faced him .8 H e wrote that the organization was in decline: ‘O u r m orale is on the decline, following our financial difficulties.* It had been hoped in the previous year to overcom e these financial problems, and thus to proceed to some active work o f propaganda: B u t given th e fertile root an d th e w ell-cu ltivated tree o f fascism in an a g ri­ cu ltu ral zone such as ours, w here th e agrari ru le an d dom inate th e co u n try­ side, an d w here th e sugar m agnates throw a ll th e casu al w orkers in to desti­ tution togeth er w ith m any o f th e fixed w orkers once th e sugar cam p aign is over . . . you can ve ry read ily understand th a t n oth in g can b e saved even w hen there is w ork, given th e rates o f p a y agreed betw een fascist syndicates an d industrialists.

Instead o f local contributions, funds could only be found through the generosity o f the Central Com m ittee. T h e same w riter did not fail to note a further factor— in reality the most im portant. T h e provincial authorities, fol­ low ing Federzoni*s instructions, m ade it extrem ely difficult for the clandestine organizations to co-ordinate any m ajor action. Prefect Em ina informed Federzoni in February that all means available had been used to carry out the dispositions o f the previous month.8 Houses o f known opponents o f fascism had been searched, leaflets confiscated, and various cafés and clubs, considered to be the centres o f subversive action, had been forced to close. This much was confirmed by the correspondent o f the communist Central Com m ittee. H e wrote o f the ‘zeal* 1 This incident is recounted in a letter of Alfredo Sacchi to the Central Committee of the P.C.I., I Feb. 1925. The letter was seized by the police while they searched the house of Sacchi and then sent off by the authorities, who received the answer. See ACS, Min. Int., DGPS, AGR 1925, b. 104,25 Mar. 1925. * ACS, ibid. * ACS, ibid., b. 56B, 21 Feb. 1925.

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o f the Q uestura in perform ing these functions, the Q uestura which ‘w ith every little gesture o f rebellion attempts to round up the more determined o f the workers and keeps them in prison for ten or fifteen days by producing false evidence . . .*l W orkers soon learned that this was the price they had to pay for daring to oppose the fascists. In June o f 1925, for exam ple, a socialist attempted to set up a socialist electricians’ union. T he police and carabinieri let it be known that they were aware o f this move, w ith the result, as Prefect Gasti reported, that there were no further subscriptions.8 It was, in any case, difficult to elude the attentions o f the Q uestura. E arly in 1925 the local authorities had managed to intercept letters com ing from the headquarters o f the communist party, and for several months kept up a phoney correspondence w ith Rom e, in this w ay learning exactly w hat was being planned in the province.8 O nce the m ain areas o f opposition were identified, requests were m ade that police spies be sent to the province in order to continue the investigation and gain precise inform ation on the organization and plans o f the communists.4 V ery little resistance could be offered to these methods. In general, the tendency was for opponents o f fascism to enter the syndicates and attem pt to work from within, throwing the investigators o ff the scent by occasional declarations o f loyalty to the regime. In Ferrara several cases had been noted during 1924,8 and it is likely that such tactics were employed in subsequent years. T h e level o f activity o f the opponents o f the regime was so low, however, that the ever-vigilant authorities considered their victory com plete. By Septem ber o f 1926 the prefect was ready to state categorically that subversive organ­ izations no longer existed in the province, ‘because o f the uninterrupted action o f the police*.4 For the opposition there was evidently little to do but w ait, in the hope that some political or economic crisis m ight loosen the tightening hold o f the regime. 1 A C S , ibid., b 104, 25 M ar. 1925. * A C S , ibid., b. 6 0 ,6 June 1925. ' For the continuation o f the correspondence mentioned in note 1 p. 278, above, see the letter o f Prefect Emina to die M inistry o f the Interior in A C S , ibid., b. 104,8 Apr. 1925. 4 A C S , ibid. 4 See, for example, p. 271 o f this chapter, and also a report o f 31 Dec. 1924 that a syndicate o f Copparo had been devastated by fascists on the 29th because it was held to be the centre o f communist activity. A C S , ibid., A G R 1924,31 Dec. 1924. * A C S , ibid., A G R 1926, b. 88, 24 Sept. 1926.

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T h at it was the police who eradicated subversive organiza­ tions was in itself a fact o f great im portance. W hile the speech o f 3 January greatly encouraged the intransigent w ing o f the P.N .F. and renewed the confidence o f the m ilitants o f the M .V .S .N ., the m achine that that speech set in motion was destined to make the m ilitants irrelevant to the working o f fascism. It had for long been clear to M ussolini that the state would have to dom inate the party. This necessitated that the authorities o f the state, the police and carabinieri, should assume the role that had been played by the squadristi in previous years. T h e move towards dictatorship, therefore, w hile it was welcom ed by the intransigents o f Ferrara because it im plied a general repression o f the type that had already been largely effected in the province, promised a repression through legislation and police action rather than through violence. Thus the dynamism o f the squads could not be retained for long. T h eir actions becam e more than ever counter-productive and it was the fascist governm ent that, through the directives o f Federzoni, arrived at the point o f describing the old methods o f ‘squadrism’ as no more than a dangerous and indisciplined survival o f the past.1 T h e transition was not easy for the form er squadristi, o f Ferrara. Particularly in the first h a lf o f 1925 there were still open ‘provocations* w hich the M .V .S .N . felt obliged to deal w ith in the old style. T h e two fascists killed at Casum aro in M ay called out for vengeance o f the kind that had been meted out to A rgenta and Portom aggiore during 1921. Balbo succeeded in large measure in restraining his forces, but the tensions w hich even he felt were evident. O n ly a few days after the Casum aro incident, fascists in Polesine put two ‘assassini* up against a w all and shot them. Balbo responded to the news o f their arrest by pointing to the contradictions o f the situation. W h o w ants to punish these fascists o f ours? T h e ju stice o f th e state ca n ch ain them up in p rison ? N o, signori, it ’s not p ossible; because th e o rd in ary legislation is not com petent to issue ju dgem ents in areas lik e ours, w here w a r has alread y broken ou t an d w here th e num ber o f victim s m ounts from d a y to day.*

Y e t this was precisely w hat the state intended to do, and the more violent fascists were forced— slowly— to recognize this. 1 ACS, ibid., AGR 1926, b. 95,6 Oct. 1925; Federzoni to prefects of the realm. * Corriere Padano, 23 M ay 1925.

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W hat was left for them was very little. The excitem ent o f the early days o f ‘squadrism’ had passed, as had the novelty o f the transition to the legions o f the M .V .S .N . Instead they rem ained, largely without authority, as functionaries o f a state which had little use for them. Some stayed in the ranks o f the m ilitia; G aggioli, for instance, remained as a m ilitary commander until he was finally appointed federale o f Ferrara on the death o f Balbo. Others drifted aw ay or were found other jobs. A general report on the syndical situation in 1926, for exam ple, mentioned that leaders o f former action squads were being put at the head o f local syndical organizations, and were com pletely inept in performing their new functions.1 Every so often there were demonstrations at which the m iliti were able to express a little o f their former enthusiasm. These were exceptional occasions, though. In general they rem ained, uniformed, worthy o f a certain respect in the locality, but very much reduced from the positions they had enjoyed in earlier years. In a sense, much the same fate awaited Balbo. W hile always retaining a great deal o f popularity among fascist supporters, he became politically less im portant with the establishment o f the regime. The principal exponent o f ‘squadrism’ had much less to offer when it came to the political manoeuvrings o f Rom e. Certainly he still held a strong power base in Ferrara, and during 1925 this was reinforced by the usual trappings o f the ras— the faithful provincial secretary, Um berto K linger, and the newspaper through which the provincial leader could voice his personal views. In this respect the Corriere Padano2 was a success, establishing itself as one o f a group o f regional fascist papers, although this success was undoubtedly more the work o f its editor, Nello Q uilici, than o f Balbo himself. It served Balbo very little, however. H e remained largely as a pawn to be used by Mussolini against Farinacci, while the latter was still secretary o f the P.N .F., and had to content him self with the minor post o f under-secretary at the M inistry o f Econom ia N azionale.8 His political concepts were in any case out o f step w ith those o f his superiors. He was strongly opposed, 1 AG S, M in. Int., D G PS, A G R 1926, b. 95; report marked 'Informazione*, 12 Aug. 1926. * The first number o f the Corriere Padano, which substituted the B alilla, appeared on I Apr. 1925. • T he appointment was made on 31 O ct. 1925.

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for exam ple, to the introduction o f the corporative state, in­ veighing against the ‘committees, technical councils, cor­ porative chambers* and other ‘institutional snares* w hich could only make life more difficult for the mass o f the Italians.1 His solution to the problems o f labour organization needed little explanation; the Corriere Padano carried a leading article during the controversy o f 1925 suggesting sim ply that Italians were divided into two classes, the employers and the em ployed, and that it was best to leave matters there.1 Balbo’s transfer to the command o f the Aeronautica,* therefore, took him to a field to w hich he was better suited. U nhappy and disillusioned w ith politics, he was able to return to action and to danger. This he expressed succincdy in 1929 rem arking, ‘Politics no longer interests me. T h ey can do w hat they like. I*m busy w ith flying.*1*4 Y e t not everyone in Ferrara lost w ith the m ovement towards the fascist regim e. Suppression o f opposition and a stabilization o f the provincial situation through the Q uestura provided ju st those conditions which agrarian and com m ercial interests had always hoped to establish. For the businessmen and shop­ keepers, the incubus o f the co-operatives or o f actions sim ilar to those o f Ju ly 1919 had finally been rem oved. For the agrari the world seemed safe once again. O nce more they were fully in control o f provincial and com m unal adm inistration, w hile, at the centre, the strong governm ent they had sought in the years following the w ar had shown its face at last. This m eant that the landowners were above all free to pursue those 1 C om ete Padano, io O ct. 1927; quoted In D e Felice, M u sso lin i i l fa sc ista , a , L 'O rg a n izza zio n e d ello Stato fa scista (Turin, 1969), p. 318. * Corriere Padano, 3 Ju ly 1925. * Balbo was transferred to the command o f the A ir Force on 6 N ov. 1926. 4 U . O jetti, I taccuini 1 9 1 4 -4 3 (Florence, 1954) ; quoted in De Felice, M u sso lin i i l fa sc ista , 2.6 9. Balbo remained at the command o f the A ir Force until 1933 when he was nominated governor o f Libya. Although outside Italy, he continued to have considerable political weight and was more than once reported to be at the centre o f plots directed against other senior fascists and even against M ussolini. T he truth o f these reports remains suspect, however, although they do testify both to the enormous popularity on which the provincial leader could count and to the m ildly polem ical position that he assumed in respect o f m any o f the provisions o f fascism. H e drew attention to him self in the late 1930s chiefly through his open opposition to the anti-sem itic tendency shown by fascism— an opposition which was doubtless a reflection o f the strong Jewish element within the Ferrara fa sc io . He died in June 1940 over Tobruk when his plane was shot down in error by Italian anti-aircraft emplacements.

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policies that guaranteed their position. The structure o f provincial agriculture favourable to them— a structure based on the conservative alliance between large landowners, affittuari, and coloni— could be m aintained without trouble and, hopefully, reinforced in subsequent years. Collectivization o f the land could be forgotten as a slogan; in its place could be put those slogans that had helped to bring the provincial fascists their success, slogans which exalted the role o f the piccola proprietà and the im portance o f sub-division o f holdings.1 The persistent recourse to these policies on the part o f the large landowners is particularly suggestive o f w hat fascism m eant for them. For if, in regard to certain labour intensive crops, the small unit was the most productive, it was so only in the context o f an agricultural system fundam entally backward. The extension and reinforcement o f the system based on the small unit represented no more, therefore, than the refusal to modernize and industrialize agriculture. The agrari were knowingly turning their backs on the more advanced forms o f cultivation. In doing so, they were, o f course, opting for a system which was essentially less productive and therefore less profitable. As the growing number o f lim ited companies in agriculture were to show,8 the employment o f machines and salaried labour over large tracts o f land offered advantages in economy and efficiency which the old system based on small units could not hope to enjoy. Y et for the ordinary landowners o f Ferrara— for the M antovani, the Baruffa, the Spisani o f the province— the political dangers o f such modernization had been apparent for decades. The potential o f an arm y o f braccianti had already been am ply demonstrated in the im ­ mediate post-war period. For the agrari, the virtue o f fascism was that it solved for them the dilemma o f a choice between declining profitability, through the maintenance o f the old system, or political extinction, through the adoption o f the new. Instead they hoped to enjoy the best o f both worlds, benefiting from the political stability to be found in general among piccoli proprietari, affittuari, and mezzadri, while at the 1 See, for example, the recommendations o f Pietro N iccolini in Ferraro Agricola (Ferrara, 1926), p. 173, or o f V ittorio C ini in his report on provincial agricultural problems written for M ussolini; A C S , Seg. Part, del Duce, C R , b. 26, 242/R, 6 O ct. 1927. * T he number rose from five in 1913 to 77 in 1922. See E. Sereni, La questione agrario, p. 207.

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same tim e taking advantage o f the repressive mechanism o f fascism to squeeze the subordinate agricultural classes and thus m aintain the maximum level o f profit possible in the circum ­ stances. In the events o f the years between 1925 and 1930 there is m uch to support this view. It was essential, for instance, that the syndicates should rem ain ineffective in their relations w ith the landowners, and certain reports suggest that the syndical organization o f the province never becam e more than a mechanism for the regim entation o f the rural labourers. Pacts were carefully drawn up, signed by representatives o f the employers and the syndicates, and then ignored. In M ay 1925, the Corriere Padano carried a report o f a syndicalist m eeting at Copparo in w hich the farce o f fascist syndicalism was m ade apparent. T h e increase agreed a t F errara for th e boari has n ot been observed b y th e farm ers w ith the necessary d iscip lin e, an d even to d ay m an y farm s still d o not p a y [these rates]. T h e contracts an d w age rates are n ot alw ays fu lly respected, an d lab ou r is requested from the syndicates in on ly a few villag es.1

T h e province was, in short, back to the free-for-all so disas­ trous for labour and so welcom e to the landowners. Between promises and practice the distance grew ever greater. W hile the Corriere Padano m ight, on another occasion, boast about the increases in salary which had been granted to the various categories o f labourer,8 it was also bound to concede that the vast m ajority o f the landowners never paid these increases in full, and that the sindacato o f proprietors had no means o f com­ pelling paym ent.8 Even the increases granted on paper bore little relation to the economic conditions o f the province. In early 1926, Avanti! pointed out that, w hile the profits o f a norm al holding in Ferrara would have risen by an average o f about 20 per cent since 1920, the increases conceded in the pacts were nowhere near the same percentage.1*4* W hat the 1 Corriere Padano, 2 M ay 1925. * For example, ibid., 12 Jan. 1926. ' Ibid., 25 Sept. 1925. 4 Avanti/, 9 Jan. 1926. In respect o f diminishing salaries it is worth recording Sereni’s findings that, on a base o f 100 for the first semester o f 1922 (when many reductions had already been made), the index o f real wages fell to 84*7 by the m iddle o f 1925. See E. Sereni, 'S u l carattere della crisi italiana’, in Lo stato operaio, June 1931.

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Corriere Padano described as the A gricultural plebs*1 were paying the price o f fascist syndicalism. T h e more devoted syndicalist organizers m ight make repeated requests that class collabor­ ation be taken seriously, but there was little they could do to back up their demands. A ll the cards were in the hands o f the proprietors, and the labourers were left dependent on little more than the goodw ill o f their employers for the betterm ent o f their conditions. Certainly the fascist governm ent made few moves to relieve the situation. As the agrari had always expected, the policies pursued by fascism were favourable to the large landowners rather than the interm ediate agricultural classes. Fiscal policy was revised in such a w ay that the small holder or sharecropper was forced to pay a larger proportion o f his incom e in taxes than was the large proprietor.8 The battaglia del grano, excellent as a propaganda device, but paid for dearly in the price o f bread, benefited the large producers o f grain and left the small pro­ ducer w ith little but increased costs resulting from protection­ ism.8 Sim ilarly, the crisis o f 1927 and the revaluation o f the lira caught the man w ithout reserves— the small farm er rather than the well-protected larger proprietor. It was from this tim e, when m onetary policy and a dram atic fall in agricultural prices4 com bined to make life extrem ely difficult in agriculture, that m any o f the small farmers and small leaseholders faced bank­ ruptcy and the phenomenon o f the developm ent o f the piccola proprietà was reversed, w ith land flowing once again into the hands o f the m ajor proprietors. T h e assault on the catholic banks was to confirm this movement.6 Even observers favourable to fascism were forced to comment on the numerous retro1 C om ere P adano, 12 Jan. 1926, which carried the headline ‘ Le M enzogne del giornale A v a n ti! sulle plebi agricole ferraresi*. 1 See P. Grifone, H capitale fin a n zia rio in Ita lia (Turin, 1971), p. 45. ' For the general effect o f the government’s protectionist policies in agriculture see E. Sereni, 'S ulle cause della crisi agraria* in his Capitalism o e mercato nazionale in Ita lia (Bari, 1966), pp. 279-85. 4 This was part o f a world-wide decline in agricultural prices. Some idea o f the effect in Italy can be formed from the following figures for 1931 (base 1925:100) : m aize 46, rice 43, hemp 24, lemons 18, wool 23. N aturally some allowance must also be made for the effect o f the revaluation o f the lira. See G . Tassinari, L e vicende d el reddito deW agricoltura d a l 1 9 s 5 a l 19 3 0 (Rome, 1935), p. 332. * T he Piccolo Credito o f Ferrara went bankrupt in November 1928, paying its debts at only 40 per cent o f full value. T he failure o f the bank is seen as being engineered by the fascist government in Sgarbanti, Lineam enti sto rici d el movimento cattolico ferra rese, pp. 88-9.

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cessions o f land in Ferrara during this period, and to observe that there was a tendency for piccoli proprietari, piccoli affittuari, and mezzadri— that is, those who had been am ong the first to support fascism in 1921— to move down the scale at least one grade, w ith certain o f the mezzadri being reduced to a position very little different from that o f the braccianti.l In recompense, the fascio occupied itself w ith the building o f case popolari for the braccianti, though there is evidence to suggest that even these frequently found their w ay into the hands o f those other than the landless labourers.* T h e benefits deriving from fascism are even more apparent in the case o f the other m ain interest that had supported the fascio from its early days. T h e sugar m anufacturers w ent from strength to strength after 1925. W hile there was a severe crisis in agriculture and the position o f the agrari in respect o f the indust­ rialists deteriorated after 1928,* the sugar industry suffered from no such problems. D eclared profits for the U nione Zuccheri rose from L.27 m illion in 1927 to L.67 m illion in 1930.1*4 Strong in the virtual m onopoly they enjoyed, the sugar m anufacturers 1 See the remarks o f O . Passerini in Inchiesta sulla p iccola proprietà coltrioatriceform a­ ta si nel dopoguerra, voi. 7, E m ilia e L e M arche, pp. 58-9. According to the somewhat unreliable statistics available, there was no significant increase in the number o f sm all landowners between 1921 and 1936. There was a notable increase, however, in the numbers o f a ffittuari and coloni p a rzia ri (sharecroppers) ; from 7 per cent to 18 per cent o f the total population in agriculture for the affittu ari and from 15 per cent to 19 per cent for the coloni (see O . V itali, L a popolazione attiva in agricoltura attraverso i censi­ m enti (Rome, 1968), T able 4, p. 204). T he convenience to the larger landowners o f these two categories in a period o f crisis should be noted. T h ey provided a rela­ tively secure income for the landowner at minimum cost; heavy outlay on mach­ ines, other agricultural equipment, or wages, was not necessary. This fact— to­ gether w ith the circumstances o f the crisis— goes far towards explaining w hy m any landowners failed to modernize fully even when it was clear that fascism had the means o f controlling a rural proletariat, although here it is also necessary to bear in mind that the regime proclaimed the ‘ruralization’ o f Italy at least in part because the large-scale exodus from the countryside that modernization would have provoked could not have been absorbed by industry. * This is the clear im plication o f M ussolini’s directive to V ittorio nini in 1928, when the fascist leader made the point that a ll the houses built, and not just the first few, should go to braccianti o f the area. A C S , Seg. Part, del Duce, C R , b. 26, 242/R, 30 M ar. 1928. * See Sereni, ’Sulle cause della crisi agraria’ . 4 Sereni, La questione agraria, pp. 213-14. See also P. M . A rcati, ’Zucchero e protezione’, extract from La vita italiana, voi. 9, fascic. C C X X II (Crem ona, Sep­ tember 1931), who reveals that the general index o f shares on the Italian stock exchange was 96*8 in 1930 (1913 = 100), while the average index o f sugar shares was 390*5. Several o f the companies paid between 20 per cent and 25 per cent in dividends in this year.

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387

were able to exert irresistible pressure on governm ent and beet producers alike. Thus the conditions imposed on beet pro­ ducers were so onerous as to prom pt the rem ark o f certain o f the smaller Em ilian bieticoltori that the scope o f the companies was sim ply the destruction o f the organization o f bieticolteri in the region.1 W hile crushing the producers o f beet, the efforts o f the Unione to enforce a strongly protectionist policy did not pass unrewarded. From February 1925 onwards the duty on im ported sugar was raised progressively,8 guaranteeing high prices to the manufacturers, but at the same tim e m aking Italy the country w ith the highest-priced sugar and the lowest consumption per head in W estern Europe.8 It was the irony o f provincial fascism, therefore, that its success was not o f most benefit to those who had given most, in terms o f tim e, dedication, and emotion, to the movement. T h e squadristi benefited far less than the agrari or the sugar companies from the movement o f which they had been the spearhead. Indeed the rewards seemed inversely proportional; as Eridania enjoyed ever increasing profits and the proprietors relaxed in their increased security, so the m ilitants o f the M .V .S .N . be­ cam e progressively less im portant. Y e t this was an outcome inherent in the situation from the start. T h e overriding feature o f the Ferrarese situation since at least 1900 had been the directness o f the clash between capital and labour. No third force— republican, catholic, or radical— had ever m anaged to establish for long a strong independent position between the labour organization and the clerico-m oderate bourgeoisie in w hich the agrari were always the decisive element. Subtle political gradations w hich, through the possibility o f alliance w hich they offered, m ight have softened the political clim ate in Ferrara did not exist. Between revolutionary and reactionary politics there had never been much room for m anoeuvre; there was even less in a tim e o f economic crisis. It was precisely this direct confrontation between capital and labour that had made 1 A C S , Presidenza, 1925, 3; 8; 424, Appunto from M inistry o f Agricolture for Mussolini, 33 M ar. 1925. See also the protests o f the Sindacato Provinciale Fascista Piccoli Proprietari ed Affittuari, Ferrara to Mussolini in the same source, 25 M ar. 1925. 1 The dazio, suspended in 1923, was renewed at a level o f L.9 oro on 1 1 Feb. 1925, went up to L.24.75 oro on 10 M ar. 1926, and by 1930, stood at L.45 oro. Sec Eridania: storia dicinquant*anm, p. 76, and P. M . A rcari, 'Zucchero e protezione.' ' Sereni, La questione agraria, p. 213.

988

S T A B IL IZ A T IO N OF TH E F A S C IS T R E G IM E

Ferrara a zone o f striking political violence in the years before the w ar; it was the same direct confrontation that not only made Ferrara one o f the first provinces to em brace fascism but also made o f it a province particularly noted for fascist vio­ lence. And ju st as there had been no strong m oderating force in Ferrara prior to the w ar, so fresh attempts at siding w ith neither socialists nor landowners were condemned to failure from the start. In 1919 this had been the fate o f both Giuseppe Longhi’s independent syndicate and o f the first fascio; in subsequent years it was to be the lesson learned by the fascist dissidents. These— ingenuous in the m ain, but lacking the courage to leave fascism when the extent o f their m iscalcu­ lation becam e obvious— took tim e to appreciate their position and it was only the threat o f violent suppression that fin ally brought them to heel. Y et even those who had favoured that violence— Balbo and the squadristi around him — learned the same lesson in later years. Essentially they had mistaken the nature o f the conflict. The real struggle in Ferrara had not been between squadristi and leghisti, but between hard-pressed proprietors and w hat for them were the undesirable conse­ quences o f m odernization in agriculture. It was the agrari, w ith their money, their influence, but above all their skill in exploit­ ing the divisions between those who represented the more traditional forms o f farm ing and the new class o f the braccianti, who were the key to the provincial struggle. T h e squadristi had been— certainly— a necessary element in the m anoeuvre against socialism; but once that manoeuvre was over, they ceased to have very much relevance to the provincial situation. In respect o f Ferrara, therefore, the Corriere Padano had hardly been mistaken when it had suggested that Italians were divided essentially into employers and em ployed. In Ferrara the employed had been defeated. W hat rem ained was the predom inance o f the landowners. T h e predictions o f local socialists had proved to be very accurate. Fascism, at least in its manifestation in Ferrara, was a system constructed for the m aintenance o f profit, o f social position, and o f political power.

BIBLIOGRAPHY I.

A R C H IV A L SO U R C E S

T h e following series o f documents were consulted at the A rchivio Centrale dello Stato, Rom e. Specific references to the items consulted w ill be found in the notes to the text. A . M inistero delPIntem o. D irezione G enerale di Pubblica Sicurezza, U fficio Riservato (19 11-19 15 ). D irezione Generale di Pubblica Sicurezza, A ffari G enerali e Riservati (1914-1926). This series includes the subsection entitled Conflagrazione Europea (1914-1918 ). D irezione Generale di Pubblica Sicurezza, A ffari G enerali e Riservati (1903-1949). G abinetto Bonomi, 1921-1922. G abinetto Finzi, 1922-1924. Direzione Generale A ffari di Culto (1819-1945). B. Segreteria Particolare del D uce, Carteggio Riservato (1922-1943), and Carteggio O rdinario (1922-1943). C . M ostra della Rivoluzione Fascista. D . Presidenza del Consiglio dei M inistri. E. C arte dei Q uadrum viri: Carte M ichele Bianchi (1923-

I925)-

2.

N EW SPAPER S

A . F ully consulted for the period relevant to this work. V Avanguardia (Ferrara) I l Balilla (Ferrara) La Bandiera Socialista (Ferrara) La Domenica dell* Operaio (Ferrara) I l Fascio (Ferrara) Gazzetta Ferrarese Gazzettino Rosa (Ferrara)

B IB L IO G R A P H Y

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V idea Fascista (Ferrara) La Libera Idea (Ferrara) La Raffica (Ferrara) La Scintilla (Ferrara) La Voce Democratica (Ferrara) La Voce Socialista (Ferrara) B. Consulted on specific issues, or for lim ited periods V Agricoltore Ferrarese V Ardito (M ilan) Avanti! Corriere Padano I l Fascio (M ilan) La Fiaccola (Ferrara) La Fiamma (Bologna) La Fronda (Ferrara) Giornale del Mattino (Bologna) La Gioventù Sindacalista (Parma) Popolo d'Italia Provimia di Ferrara Resto del Carlino Roma Futurista La Voce Repubblicana 3.

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1964) ------, L'Italia dalla dittatura alla democrazia,, 1919-1948 (M ilan, 1962) . C asucci, C ., Ilfascism o: antologia di scritti critici (Bologna, 1961). Censimento del regno, 1901, 19 11, 1921, 1931. C hiurco , G ., Storia della rivoluzione fascista, 5 vols. (Florence, *9 * 9 )C iancarelli , U ., Ricordando Emilio Maraini (Genoa, 1939). CoLARizi, S., Dopoguerra e fascismo in Puglia (1919-1926) (Bari, 1971). C ordova , F ., Arditi e legionari dannunziani (Padua, 1969). C ortesi, L ., I l socialismo italiano tra riforma e rivoluzione, 1892I 1921 (Bari, 1969). D e B egnac , Y ., Palazzo Venezia (Rom e, 1950). D e F elice , R ., Mussolini il rivoluzionario, 1883-1920 (Turin, 1965) ------, Mussolini il fascista. 1. La conquista del potere, 1921-1925 (Turin, 1966). ------, Mussolini il fascista. 2. L'organizzazione dello Stato fascista, 1925-1929 (Turin, 1968). D e R osa, G ., Storia del partito popolare (Bari, 1958). ------, I conservatori nazionali (Brescia, 1962). D e l C a r r ia , R ., Proletari senza rivoluzione, 2 vols. (M ilan, 1970). Endemia: storia di cinquemt'emni (Genoa, 1949). Fedeismo: inchiesta socialista sulle gesta dei fascisti in Italia (M ilan, 1963 ) * F ederzoni, L ., Italia di ieri per la storia di domani (M ilan, 1967). F erri , F ., I l bracciantato agricolo nel Ferrarese (Ferrara, 1934). F orti , R ., and G hedini, G ., L'avvento del fascismo: cronache ferraresi (Ferrara, 1923).

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F ortunati , P., ‘L a Provincia di Ferrara*, pp. 47-81, in Primi lineamenti di statistica corporativa: il problema demograficoagraria del Veneto e del Ferrarese (Padua, 1935). F ossati, A ., Lavoro e produzione in Italia dalla metà del secolo X V III alla seconda guerra mondiale (Turin, 1951). F ried , R ., The Italian prefects (New H aven, 1963). G a tte lli , B., I l fascismo nella vita locale (Ferrara, 1921). G iampaoli , M ., i g i g (M ilan, 1928). G rifone , P., I l capitale finanziario in Italia (Rom e, 1945)* G uérin , D ., (italian edition) Fascismo e grande capitale (Turin, I 9 5 6)J emolo , A ., Chiesa e stato in Italia negli ultimi cento anni (Turin, 1948). J o ll , J ., Intellectuals in politics (London, i960); in particular, ‘F. T . M arinetti: futurism and fascism*, pp. 133-84. L orenzoni, G ., Inchiesta sulla piccola proprietà coltivatriceformatasi nel dopoguerra. Relazione finale: Vascesa del contadino italiano nel dopoguerra (Rome, 1938). M a ck S mith, D ., Italy: a modem history (Ann Arbor, 1959). M oore B arrington J n r ., Social origins o f dictatorship and demo­ cracy: lord and peasant in the making o f the modem world (Boston, 1966). N enni, P., Storia di quattro anni ( ig r g -2 2 ) (Rom e, 1946). N eppi M odena , G ., Sciopero, potere politico, e magistratura, 1870 ig 2 2 (Bari, 1969). N eufeld , M ., Italy— school for awakening countries (New Y ork,

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Ï 9 6 1). N iccolini, P., La questione agraria nella provincia di Ferrara (Ferrara, 1907). ------, Ferrara agricola (Ferrara, 1926). N olte , E ., The three faces o f fascism (London, 1965). P anunzio , S., Italo Balbo (M ilan, 1923). P asserini, O ., Inchiesta sulla piccola proprietà coltivatrice formatasi nel dopoguerra ; voi. 7, Emilia e le Marche (M ilan, 1932). P eglion , V ., Le nostre piante industriali (Bologna, 1919). ------, Relazione della cattedra ambulante di agricoltura per la pro­ vincia di Ferrara (Ferrara, 1902). ------, Vazienda agricola della Società per la bonifica dei tirreni ferraresi nel i g n (Bergamo, 1911). P esce, G ., Agrari! (Rom e, 1923). ------, La marcia del rurali (Rome, 1929).

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PiNGHiNi, G.» La ricchezza privata dei ferraresi prima e dopo la guerra (Ferrara, 1932). P reti , L ., Le lotte agrarie nella valle padana (Turin, 1955). P rocacci , G ., La lotta di classe in Italia aWinizio del secolo X X , (Rom e, 1970). Rassegna della mostra delle attività di Ferrara fascista nel ventennale dellafondazione deifasci 1919-1939* 1-2 8 ottobre X V II (Bologna, 1940). Relazione della Camera di Commercio di Ferrara, 1919-1924 (Ferrara, 1925). R occa , M ., Come il fascismo divenne una dittatura (M ilan, 1952). R overi , A ., Socialismo e sindacalismo nel Ferrarese (1870 -1913), in Annuario d ellIstituto storico per l’età moderna e contemporanea, vols. 25-26 (1963-4) (Rom e, 1968). S a lvato r elli , L . and M ir a , G ., Storia d’Italia nel periodo fascista (Turin, 1961). S avino , E ., La nazione operante, 3rd edition (Novara, 1937). S echi , S., Dopoguerra e fascismo in Sardegna (Turin, 1969). S ereni, E ., La questione agraria nella rinascita nazionale italiana (Rom e, 1946). ------, Capitalismo nelle campagne (Turin, 1947). ------, ‘Sulle cause della crisi agraria’, in Capitalismo e mercato nazionale in Italia (Rom e, 1966). S erpieri , A ., La guerra e le classi rurali (Bari, 1930). S eton -W atson , C ., Italy from liberalism to fascism (London, I96^ ‘ S garbanti , R ., Lineamenti storici del movimento cattolico ferrarese (R occa San Casciano, 1954). ------, Ritratto politico di Giovanni Grosoli (Rom e, 1959). S it ta , P., La popolazione della provincia di Ferrara (Ferrara, 1933). ------ , I l catasto nella provincia di Ferrara (Ferrara, 1938). S rm , R ., I l primo antifascismo ferrarese (Ferrara, 1963). S rm , R ., and M a r ig h e l u , I., Un secolo di storia del movimento cooperativo ferrarese 1860-1960 (Rom e, i960). T amaro , A ., Venti anni di storia 1922-1943, 2 vols. (Rom e, I 952 )T asca , A ., Nascita e avvento delfascismo (Florence, 1952). T erz aghi , M ., Fascismo e Massoneria (M ilan, 1950). T ogliatti , P., Lezioni sul fascismo (Rom e, 1970). T orsiello , I., I l tramonto delle baronie rosse (Ferrara, 1921). V aini , M ., Le origini delfascismo a Mantova (Rom e, 1961).

BIB LIO G R A PH Y 294 Ver Sacrum: Antobgia di discorsi dei professori della scuola normale G. Carducci (Ferrara, 1916). V ige z zi, B., Da G blitti a Salandra (Florence, 1969). V i v a r e l l i , R ., I l dopoguerra in Italia e lamento del fascismo ( igi& -iQ 22). i. Dalla fine detta guerra alVimpresa di Fiume (Naples, 1967). W ebster , R ., Christian democracy in Italy (i8 6 o-ig 6 o) (London, 1960)W oolf , S., (ed.), European fascism (London, 1968). ------(ed.), The nature o f fascism (London, 1968). Z angheri, R ., Le campagne emiliane neWepoca moderna (M ilan, i 9 5 7 )------, Lotte agrarie in Italia ig o i-2 6 : La Federazione nazionale dà lavoratori della terra (M ilan, i960). Z anorandi , R ., I l lungo maggio attraverso il fascismo (M ilan, 1962). Zucchero Italiano Lo. Conferenza (Turin, 1912). Z ucchini, M ., Vappoderamento ferrarese (Florence, 1941).

a r t ic l e s

A rcari , P., ‘Zucchero e protezione; extract from La vita italiana, voi. 19, fase. C C X X II (Crem ona, Sept. 1931). C ervetto , A ., ‘Dopoguerra rossa e avvento del fascismo nel Novarese’, in Rivista storica del sodalismo, 4 (1958). C ordova , F., ‘Le origini dei sindacati fascisti*, in Storia contemporanea, 1, voi. 4 (December, 1970). D e F elice , R ., ‘Giovanni Preziosi e le origini del fascismo (19 17-19 3 1), in Rivista storica del socialismo (Sept.-D ec. 1962). ------, ‘Prim i elementi sul finanziamento del fascismo dalle origini al 1924,’ in Rivista storica del soàalismo (M ay-A ug. ! 9 64 )* ------, ‘O rdine pubblico e orientam enti delle masse italiane nella prim a metà di 1917*, in Rivista storica del socialismo, 6 ( i 963 )P aloscia , L ., ‘L a concezione sindacalista di Sergio Panunzio*, in Pagine Libere, 2 (1949). P a p a , A ., ‘G uerra e terra 1915-1918*, in Studi storia io , no.

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S ketch m ap o f th e P rovin ce o f F erra ra

IN D EX Agostini, Augusto, 270 Aguiari, T ito, 20, 68, 166 Altobelli, Argentina, 93, 149, 150 Angelini, Araldo, 119 Apih, Elio, 121 Aphel, Faustino, 244 Acquarone, fam ily, 125 Arbizzani, Luigi, 109, 148, 150 Arcari, Paola M aria, 286, 287

Buttieri, Arnaldo, 204 Buzzoni, Giuseppe, 204

Cadorna, Luigi, 39 Calzolari, Alessandro, 85 C alza Bini, Gino, 248 Cam erini, Antonio, 132 Capello, Luigi, 40 Caradonna, Giuseppe, 58 Caretti, Enrico, 225,229,239,240,243, Bachi, Riccardo, 178 244 Caretti, Raoul, 36, 176, 229, 238, 239, Balbo, Italo, 23, 27, 37, 61, 70, 132, 267, 272 135» *36 » *38 , 139» «4 Ò> 162» i 7° - 5 » C arli, M ario, 55 181, 183-8, 191-3, 195-200, 206, Casalini, Armando, 268, 274 207, 209, 210, 214-18, 221-3 225, Casoni, Ettore, 100, 144 227-31,235-40,242-4,246-8,250-2, 255- 60,262-6,268-70,273-6,280-2, Castelfranchi, Renato, 27 Catalano, Franco, 151, 159, 164 C avallari, M ario, 21, 28, 60, 119, 120, Baldi, Luigi, 54 Baraldi, Francesco, 12 H 1» * » » 265 Cavallini, Carlo, 21, 45, 46 Barbieri, M ario, 237, 248, 272 Cevasco, Serafino, 125 Bardellini, Giuseppe, 20, 2 1,6 2 ,6 4 , 72, Chiericati Salvioni, Gabriele, 34 102, 115, 120, 178 Chierici, Renzo, 225 Baroncini, Gino, 215, 229, 244 Chiù reo, Giorgio, 60, 139 Baruffa, Am adeo, 124, 157, 283 C iardi, Luigi, 20 Battisti, Cesare, 24 Bedeschi, Lorenzo, 256 Cini, V ittorio, 283, 286 C irelli, Ettore, 152-4, 156 Beghi, G alileo, 74 Colapietra, Raffaele, 58, 226 Beltrami, Tommaso, 225,229,23g, 241, C olarizi, Simona, 58 242, 244, 247, 248, 250, 252-4, Colcetti, brothers, 98 256- 60, 263, 264, 268 Cordova, Ferdinando, 187, 191, 192, Bianchi, M ichele, 15 ,16 , 19-21, 71, 72, 74, 86, 166, 229, 237, 249 217 Corradini, Cam illo, 141 Bignozzi, Feliciano, 225 Bi teilt, Giovanni, 14 Costa, A lda, 100, 101, 234 Crêpas, Attilio, 55, 56 Bladier, Gennaro, 199, 202, 204, 205, Cristofori, Antonio, 244 214, 218-20, 223 Croccolo, fam ily, 125 Boaro, Alberto, 124, 128 Bocchini, Arturo, 269 D ’Annunzio, Gabriele, 58, 123, 133, Bogiankino, Edoardo, 119, 181 Boriati, Luigi, 97 187, 189 D e Am bris, Alceste, 19 Bonfìglioli, Ercole, 127 D e Begnac, Yvon, 239, 247 Bonomi, Ivanoe, 155, 160, 186, 201, D e Bono, Emilio, 244, 246 202, 205, 210 D e Carlo, Eugenio, 98, 107 Borsetti, Lino, 132 Brombin, Francesco, 5 3 ,5 6 ,10 5 -7 ,• • *> De Felice, Renzo, 31, 69, 71, 75, 108, 121, 123, 187, 192, 193, 197, 200, 164, 165, 195, 238-40, 258, 262 Brandi, Alfredo, 225, 229, 248 234* 237» 242, 247, 253, 265, 267, Bruné, Edmondo, 36 270, 272, 276, 282 D el Fante, Alessandro, 106, 107, 129, Bucco, Ercole, 62, 78, 80 Buosi, brothers, 158 • * „ Buozzi, Bruno, 104 D el Fante, Giuseppe, 106 De Pieri, Rinaldo, 22 Busatti, M ario, 199 D e Signo, Alberto, 54 Bussi, Arm ando, 62

59 234

33 134

INDEX

298

De Vecchi, Cesare M aria, 229,246,249 Divisi, Fabio, 54 Divisi, G iulio, 132, 176, 177, 225 D otti, M ario, 27, 182, 225, 254 Emina, Ernesto, 278, 279 Ercolani, Andrea, 205 Fabbri, Enrico, 54 Fabbri, Luigi, 45 Facta, Luigi, 210 Falco, Giancarlo, 128 Farinacci, Roberto, 251, 281 Federzoni, Luigi, 274, 275, 277, 278, 280 Felici, Guido, 106, 225, 248 Ferrari, Enzo, 66 Filippi, Luigi, 194, 195 Finzi, Gualtiero, 106 Forti, Giovanni, 238, 258 Forti, Raoul, 110, 112, 120, 121, 124, 132, 148, 165, 172, 177, 180, 248, 260, 269 Fossati, Antonio, 31 Funi, Achille, 55 Gadani, Fausto, 54 G aggioli, Luigi, 122-4, > - » ' . G aggioli, O lao, 23, 28, 55-7, 65-8, 70, 105-7, n i , 112, 114, 122, 129, 130, 132-5, 142, 166, 171, 172, 193, 195, 197-200, 225-7, 229-31, 235, 237, 240, 248, 249, 281 G allani, Dante, 74 Gandolfo, Asclepio, 215, 270, 274, 275 G aribaldi, R icciotti, 171 Casti, Giovanni, 279 G attelli, Barbato, 22, 132, 134, 166, 172, 173, 180, 181, 193-7, 199» 200, 223-9, 235» 237» 240,243-6,248,249 Caudino (Inspector, M inistry o f the Interior), 108 Ghedini, Annibale, 54 Ghedini, Giuseppe, n o , 112, 120, 121, 124, 148, 165, 172, 177, 180 Ghelandi (portiere, Castello Estense), 95 Giam paoli, M ario, 56, 66 G iolitti, Giovanni, 11, 2 4 ,6 1, 109, 118, 1 19, 141, 142, 179-81 G iovara, Cesare, 228, 232, 245, 271 Girardi, Luigi, 54 Giuffrida, O razio, 40, 41, 49, 50, 60, 76-82, 85, 90, 95, 152 Giurin, Amedeo, 65, 66 G ozzi, Franco, 120 Gramsci, Antonio, 144 Granata, Luigi, 166, 249 Grandi, Dino, 25, 28, 123, 187-9, >9, - 3» >96, 199. 207, 246, 247, 249 Grifone, Pietro, 285 Grosoli Pironi, Giovanni, 73, 124,

26 9 70 >94

126-8, 205, 236, 254, 255, 262, 263,

273

Guarducci (vice questore), 206 Cugino, Giuseppe, 101 Guglielm ini, G iulio, 91 Guglielm ini, Jone, 33 G ulinelli, Roberto, 54, 157 Hyerace, M ario, 54, 56 Im egli, Romano, 56 K linger, Um berto, 281 Labriola, Arturo, 19 Lanzillo, Agostino, 135 Lazzari, Costantino, 30, 38, 40, 41, 45, 60 Leonardi, Umberto, 36 Leone X III, 11 Leone, Enrico, 94 Liporesi, Alfeo, 92 Liverani, Augusto, 199 Liverani, Egidio, 22, 36 Longhi, Giuseppe, 22, 23, 28, 36, 43, »46, - » > » 288 Lorand, Georges, 24 Lorenzoni, Giovanni, 155 Luppis, Ferruccio, 132, 176-8 Lyttelton, Adrian, 269, 270

45

50 4 36

M agni, Giuseppe, 107 M agnoni, Guido, 36 M agri, Remo, 248 M anini, Germano, 22, 23, 28, 35 M antovani, V ico, 108, 109, 124, 133, »34» *47» >48» *56» >62, 169, 173, 174, 180, 181, 193-5, >97» 241-3, 248, 249, 262, 263, 265, 266, 276, 283 M arangoni, Guido, 44, 62, 74, 76 M aranini, Paolo, 144 M arnante, Giuseppe, 132, 248 ' M arighelli, Italo, 92, 104, 178 M arinetti, Filippo Tommaso, 19, 55 M arinoni, O ttavio, 129-34, >38» >72 M arsich, Pietro, 187 M artinelli, Giuseppe, 106 M atteotti, Giacomo, 74, 119, 261, 266, 269-73, 275, 278 M azzanti, Raffaele, 70, 92, 127, 178 M azzoni, Nino, 219 M erlin, Umberto, 74 M ezzogori (mayor o f Argenta), 33 M iglioli, Guido, 126 M ilani, Fulvio, 218 M inzoni, Giovanni, 204, 255,256, 259, 260, 268 M isuri, Alfredo, 247, 248, 270 M ontanari, Alberto, 106, 107, 130-3, 172, >95» >98» 225, 226, 229, 237

IN D E X M orì, Cesare, 184, 187, 205, 2 11-15 , 219^-21 M olisi, Celso, 65, 66, 122 M osti, Ercole, 12 ,2 5 ,2 6 ,70 ,72 ,74 ,2 3 5 M ussolini, Benito, 2 3 ,2 4 ,3 6 ,4 1,4 7 ,5 2 , 55* 56» 61, 68, 69, 75, 76, 106, 123, 133» *38» »47* «67» '80, 181, 186, 187, 189, 193, 196, 197, 199, 207, 208, 222, 227, 230-3, 239, 240, 242, 244, 245, 248, 250, 253, 254, 263-5, 267, 268, 270, 271, 273-6, 280-3, 286, 287 N agliati, Aldo, 193 N avarra, P ., 128 N avarra, Severino, 8, 124, 128, 157 Nenni, Pietro, 42, 48 N iccolai, Adelm o, 4 4 ,5 8 ,5 9 ,6 2 ,7 4 ,7 6 , » 102 N iccolini, Pietro, 2 ,3 , io , 148,236,262, 283 N itrì, Francesco Saverio, 76, 81, 108, 109

99

O jetti, U go, 282 O rlando, V ittorio Emanuele, 43 Padovani, Aurelio, 226, 248 Paloscia, Leonardo, 111 Pantaleoni, M affeo, 248 Panunzio, Sergio, 24, 25, 36, 56, n i , 146, 152, 153, 171, 267, 272 Paolella (Inspector, Pubblica Sicurezza), 201 Papa, Antonio, 149 Pasella, G uido, 14, 15, 86 Pasella, Um berto, 14, 15, 66, 68, 86, 106, 112, 129, 131, 133, 134 Pasetti, M orando, 202 Pasquali, Am brogio, 33, 43 Passerini, Osvaldo, 286 Pasti, Clem ente, 107, 111 Pedriali, brothers, 124 Pedriali, V ittorio, 9 7,14 7 ,15 5 ,15 6 ,2 3 8 Perrone Com pagni, Dino, 215 Pezzoli, Liberato, 165 Piaggio, fam ily, 125 Piccinini, Clem ente, 54 ' Pistocchi, Francesco, 132 Pittorru, Fabio, 2 ,8 9 ,9 3 ,13 9 ,14 7 , 172 Podrecca, Guido, 26, 36 Poledrelli, M ario, 27 Polverelli, Gaetano, 150 Preti, Luigi, 10, 12, 90, 93, 96, 99, 104 Preziosi, G iovanni, 248 Procacci, Giovanna, 42 Procacci, G iuliano, 9, 13 Pugliese, Sam uele, 118, 119, 141, 158, 159, 172, 177, 186-8, 190, 2 11 Q uilici, N ello, 22, 23, 28, 281

299

Radek, K arl, 116 R ava, Autunno, 94, 120 Ravenna, Renzo, 225 R eali, Socrate, 254, 255 R icci, R utilio, 33 Righini, G iulio, 54, 238, 239 R igola, Rinaldo, 86 Rocca, Ladislao, 255 Rocca, Massimo, 240, 251 Rom agnoli, Aberardo, 33 Roncaglia (leaseholder), 98 Ronchi, Berto, 56 Rossi, Cesare, 112, 193 Rossi, M ario G ., 128 Rossi, Rom ualdo, 2 0 ,2 7 ,3 6 ,4 3 ,4 5 ,4 6 , 52, 53, 68, 166 Rossoni, Edmondo, 190-2, 220, 262, 265, 266 Roveri, Alessandro, 1-6, 8 -13, 15, 16, 18-22, 40, 73, 74, 125, 167 Ruggerì, Pilo, 67, 68, 166 Russo, Carlo, 173, 174 Sacelli, Alfredo, 278 Salandra, Antonio, 25, 35 Salvaco, M aria Adelaide, 220 Salvadorì, Rinaldo, 137 Salvem ini, Gaetano, 167 Sam aritani, M ario, 176 Sani, Arrigo, 124 Sani, Luigi, 176 Sani, Severino, 10, 11 Santarelli, Enzo, 20 Savino, Edoardo, 55 Savonuzzi (assessore comunale), 119 Sechi, Salvatore, 58 Sereni, Em ilio, 2-5, 8, 14, 125, 155, 283-7 Serpierì, Arrigo, 73, 104, 155 Servidori, Genunzio, 106, 107, 199, 229 Seton-W atson, Christopher, 17, 41, 53 Sgarbanti, Romeo, 10, 126-8,255, 263, 273, 285 Simoni, Vincenzo, 106 Sinigallia, G ., 128 Sitta, Pietro, 70, 72, 74, 77, 85, 148, 180, 181, 236, 262 Sitti, Renato, 92, 104, 178 Solimani, Alfonso, 54 Sonnino, Sidney, 51 Sorel, Georges, 14 Spagnoli, Cassio, 166 Spisani, Arturo, 124, 283 T abellini, monsignore, io Tam burini, T ullio, 269 Tasca, Angelo, 49, 76, 139, 141, 144, » . »£ * »67, 215 Tassinari, Giuseppe, 285 Tedeschi, Riccardo, 8, 128, 157

45 9

300

IN D E X

T ega, Renato, 33, 34 T elloli, Luigi, 43 T eru zzi, A ttilio, 229 T ogliatti, Paim iro, 144 Torre, Edoardo, 246 Torsiello, Italo, 63, 97-9, 108, 127 T orti, G uido, 72, 130, 172, 173, 199, 229, 237, 248, 249, 251, 258 Tosi (secretary, ufficio di collocamento, Bonifica Renana), 211 Treves, Claudio, 38 Trevisani, G iulio, 15, 74 T um iati, Leopoldo, 54, 180, 181, 195, 197 T urati, Filippo, 94, 101, 103, 116 T urchi, 128 U livi, G aetano, 199, 226, 228,229, 237, 248, 249 U ngarelli, G . Laurenti, 59 V a lli, Renzo, 66, 69

V erdi, A lberto, 2 7 ,5 4 ,5 6 , 70, 238, 239, 262, 265, 267 V icentini, Giuseppe, 127, 128 V igezzi, Brunello, 29 V illan i, Ezio, 100 Visocchi, A chille, 149 V ita li, O rnello, 286 V olta, Alfredo, 98, 107, 111 V olta, L uigi, 165 W ilson, Thom as W oodrow, 53, 57 Zam boni, Renato, 54 Zam orani, F ., 128 Zam orani, G ., 128, 157 Zangheri, Renato, 16, 93, 109, 149, 150, 220 Zappaterra, Egidio, 43 Zibordi, G iovanni, 116, 160 Zirardini, Gaetano, 17, 30, 33, 4 1, 44-6, 63, 65, 76, 83, 86, 89, 90, 93, 10 2,119, 138, 17 5 ,18 1,2 2 3 ,2 3 1,2 5 0