Family and Empire: The Fernandez de Cordoba and the Spanish Realm (Haney Foundation Series) 0812243404, 9780812243406

Table of contents :
Cover
Contents
Note on Documentation
Introduction
1: The ´Fernandez de Cordoba Lineage in Late Medieval Cordoba, 1236–1500
2: The ´Fernandez de Cordoba Lineage and Early Spanish Expansion, 1482–1518
3: The Regeneration of Monarchy and Nobility: ´Martın de Cordoba in Toledo, 1520–1525
4: Navarre and the Imperialization of the House of Alcaudete, 1525–1534
5: The Fernandez de Cordoba Lineage and the Transfer of Frontier Expertise to Algeria, 1512–1558
Epilogue. Children of Empire: The Latter-Day Comares and Alcaudete
List of Abbreviations
Notes

Citation preview

Family and Empire

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Family and Empire The Fernández de Córdoba and the Spanish Realm

Yuen-Gen Liang

universit y of pennsylvania press phil adelphia

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A volume in the Haney Foundation Series established in 1961 with the generous support of Dr. John Louis Haney. Publication of this volume was aided by a grant from the Program for Cultural Cooperation Between Spain’s Ministry of Culture and United States Universities. Copyright 䉷 2011 University of Pennsylvania Press All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations used for purposes of review or scholarly citation, none of this book may be reproduced in any form by any means without written permission from the publisher. Published by University of Pennsylvania Press Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104-4112 www.upenn.edu/pennpress Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Liang, Yuen-Gen. Family and empire : the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba and the Spanish realm / Yuen-Gen Liang.—1st ed. p. cm.— (Haney Foundation series) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-8122-4340-6 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba family. 2. Co´rdoba (Spain: Province)—History. 3. Spain—History—Ferdinand and Isabella, 1479–1516. 4. Spain—History—Charles I, 1516– 1556. 5. Spain—History—Philip II, 1556–1598. I. Title. II. Series: Haney Foundation series. DP60.F47L53 2011 946.0092⬘2—dc22 2011011179

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To my friends

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contents

Note on Documentation ix Introduction 1 1: The Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba Lineage in Late Medieval Co´rdoba, 1236–1500 26 2: The Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba Lineage and Early Spanish Expansion, 1482–1518 54 3: The Regeneration of Monarchy and Nobility: Martı´n de Co´rdoba in Toledo, 1520–1525 82 4: Navarre and the Imperialization of the House of Alcaudete, 1525–1534 111 5: The Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba Lineage and the Transfer of Frontier Expertise to Algeria, 1512–1558 139 Epilogue. Children of Empire: The Latter-Day Comares and Alcaudete 171

List of Abbreviations 187 Notes

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viii c o n t e n t s

Bibliography 239 Index 269 Acknowledgments 279

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note on documentation

I am responsible for all translations, unless otherwise noted. Names of peoples and places are in their original form except those that are commonly known in English such as Isabella, Navarre, and Seville, and Ahmed, Muhammad, and Oran. To avoid confusion, I refer to Charles of Habsburg as the Emperor Charles V, rather than King Charles I of Spain. The titles of the four main houses of the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba lineage changed over time as they accumulated new properties and honors. For example, the lords of Montemayor became the lords of Alcaudete and later the counts of Alcaudete. The lords of Chillo´n became the lords of Espejo, Lucena, and Comares and later the marquises of Comares. To simplify matters, I refer to the four branches of the lineage as the Aguilar, Alcaudete, Comares, and Cabra consistently throughout the book. The main protagonists are always called Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba (rather than his many titles, including the Alcaide de los Donceles and the Marquis of Comares I) and Martı´n de Co´rdoba y de Velasco (rather than the Lord of Montemayor VII, Lord of Alcaudete VI, and the Count of Alcaudete I). An exception is made in the notes, which preserve the names and titles used in the original documents. Documents in several files (legajos) in the Archivo General de Simancas are unnumbered. In such cases, note citations list them by legajo but as ‘‘s.n.’’ (sin nu´mero). I have assigned them my own tracking number (preceded by ‘‘YGL’’) that corresponds to my filing system.

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Martín de Córdoba y de Velasco Count of Alcaudete I

Figure 1. The Houses of Comares and Alcaudete (late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries)

Diego Fernández de Córdoba Marquis of Comares I

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Sometime during the first years of the sixteenth century, Leonor Pacheco and Martı´n de Co´rdoba y de Velasco celebrated their wedding. The bride and groom had grown up on neighboring estates in the verdant Andalusian countryside in southern Spain. The adjacency of their properties reflected the close blood ties that united their two families; Leonor and Martı´n were cousins who belonged to two interrelated branches of the up-and-coming noble lineage known as the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba. Their marriage, like those of other premodern elites, was crafted with biological, social, economic, and even political calculations in mind. In many ways, Leonor and Martı´n’s match was arranged to meet the expectations of the country gentry. The bride brought a handsome dowry to augment her husband’s estate. She bore him eight heirs, and with her management skills organized his hearth, properties, and finances. Her father, Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, the first Marquis of Comares, even used his influence with the Catholic Monarchs Queen Isabella and King Ferdinand to secure the crown’s favor, including royal offices for his new son-in-law. In turn, Martı´n de Co´rdoba provided Leonor with the creature comforts that suited the wife of the future Count of Alcaudete I. His political ambitions brought her into contact with other ladies and lords, some at the glamorous court of the Spanish sovereigns. His sizable income enabled her to live well beyond the means of most people. The story of Leonor and Martı´n richly illustrates the comfortable life of provincial nobles. Marked by the conventions of pedigree, property, wealth, and status, the couple seemed to typify the affluent security of the elite. Their lives, however, also tell a more important history of the early Spanish empire. The couple and their family formed the nexus of an administrative network of officers that helped create and sustain the expanding polity. Leonor’s father, Diego, had pioneered what came to be the family’s tradition of service

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by being one of the first to depart his provincial home to fight for the empire. He captained companies of soldiers in the invasions of Granada (1482–92), Algeria (1505, 1509), and Navarre (1512).1 He stayed on in the latter two as their first governor.2 His son-in-law Martı´n followed in these footsteps and also served as governor of Algeria and Navarre. Leonor and Martı´n’s children and grandchildren went on to replicate the careers that their elders had undertaken. Seven of them commanded in Algeria, and four in Navarre. Four consecutive generations of the lineage ruled as royal executive officers in Co´rdoba, Granada, Toledo, Algeria, and Navarre over the course of the sixteenth century.3 The repeated appointments of the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba to the same critical posts, especially in Algeria and Navarre, reveal that the deployment of this particular family network ultimately constituted an organizing principle of imperial administration.4 Scholars have usually defined Spanish imperial administration in terms of official institutions and positions, such as the chancellery, state councils, royal secretariat, and viceroyalties.5 Yet the fact that the individuals who manned these offices also led personal lives is often overlooked. At the same time that officers were members of an administrative hierarchy, they also belonged to other structures of relations, most importantly their immediate and extended families. It is well known that family relations created personal and patronage obligations that influenced the functions of premodern governments. Appointments were made and actions taken based partly on these commitments. However, the importance of family networks to the structure of imperial administration extends even further. I argue that family networks constituted an essential pillar of Spanish imperial administration that stood next to the official hierarchy of offices. In other words, as much as imperial administration consisted of institutions and offices, it also has to be seen as networks of family ties. The networks that made some of the greatest impacts were those of noble families. The most powerful order in medieval society continued to play important roles in managing early modern empires. Noble families enabled military expansion from the very start. For example, it was the Marquis of Ca´diz, his relatives, and his retainers, not a royal force, that seized the Granadine town of Alhama in 1482 and sparked the Granada War.6 Lineages such as the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba made enormous contributions to the war effort by mobilizing seigneurial troops and leading them into battle. They and their descendants served in senior martial and administrative capacities in Italy, the Low Countries, the New World, and North Africa. These nobles,

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then, made up the first officer corps of the nascent empire. Family relations went on to organize imperial office-holding at a time when defined bureaucratic structures had not come into being. The crown recruited personnel via familial ties. The Catholic Monarchs took notice of Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s skills as a battlefield commander in Granada and employed him again in the conquest and administration of Algeria and Navarre. The crown then drew Diego’s son-in-law Martı´n and other Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba kin into the same offices. The succession of the captaincy general of Algeria and viceroyalty of Navarre went through the bloodline of the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba lineage, even though these were not, technically, inheritable offices. The processes of biological and social reproduction that took place in families even helped imperial administration endure over time. Families dedicated to imperial affairs brought new generations of potential personnel to life. Families also enabled social reproduction. Usually understood to mean the passing down of status and property, in this case social reproduction transmitted skills, knowledge, and experience accumulated by earlier generations of officers to later ones. Such expertise was essential for service. The nepotism that was typical of a society of patronage may have helped perpetuate families in office.7 However, the fact that these families managed the affairs of the most perilous frontiers generation after generation, as the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba did in Algeria and Navarre, meant that skills were just as important as personal connections for service. The crown would not have appointed officers of lesser abilities when the security of vital borderlands was at stake.8 In an age when there was no formal training for imperial officers, the crown could draw only from a short list of candidates with the requisite status, ability, knowledge, and will to manage a far-flung, extensive, and heavily populated empire. The biological reproduction of families supplied bodies to serve the empire, and their social reproduction transmitted the necessary experience for office. Family networks, then, were a pillar of imperial administration and critical for its survival. Family networks, thus, structured imperial administration. Administration, in turn, constituted the skeleton that supported the empire. Family administrative networks therefore helped give the empire visceral form. As such, this account of family history is in essence imperial history. The conception of empire as a collection of human beings who envisioned and enacted the polity is innovative. It stands alongside new ideas of empire as networks of exchanges and challenges conventional representations of empire as inert territories, a glorious monarch, the projection of disembodied power,

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grand strategies, and abstract theories. To reconstitute a more functional empire and locate power in human agency, it is crucial to recognize that imperial officers created empires. Officers led armies that conquered territories. Afterward they enforced and managed the allegiance of new communities to an overarching political authority. They transmitted the orders of monarchs and royal councils to the provinces. They also conveyed the needs of subjects to decision-makers at court. The ties they cultivated in the territories brought other provincials into a transregional world. In their minds officers envisioned an interconnected political community out of the discrete physical spaces that Spain controlled. They ascertained the needs of one territory and weighed them against others. They acquired skills in one locale, then applied their experience elsewhere. They conveyed such knowledge to subsequent generations of officers, often relatives, who reproduced their career trajectories. Networks of administrators whose peripatetic careers spanned multiple territories gave structure to empire. As one such familial-administrative network, the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba provides a new way for understanding empire. The work of these officers came at a critical juncture when the inception of imperial expansion intersected with the transition from the Middle Ages to early modernity. This was a moment in which new government institutions were being established, and in the case of Spain, through necessities presented by a growing realm. Where medieval government was based on the conservation of rights, customs, and privileges, the early modern state was faced with a growing range and density of martial, financial, judicial, and patronage affairs that required proactive administration and management.9 Just as permanent diplomatic missions emerged at this time, specialized governing councils were also established to conduct business where such gatherings had been ad hoc and the personnel undifferentiated.10 Spain was setting up a government of territorial and thematic councils, including something as elemental as the Council of War.11 Family networks were key participants at the very beginnings of this process, and their contributions serve to remind us that though this was a critical moment in state formation, we are still far from the ‘‘rational’’ and ‘‘impartial’’ concept of modern bureaucracy that conditions our understanding of the state today. Officials connected through blood, affinity, and patronage ties largely staffed administration. Moreover, administration was often effectuated through the cooperation of individuals who expected favors, honors, and rewards in return. The contributions that family networks made to the construction of imperial administration and the empire itself have been overlooked. So too

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has the way service transformed families embedded in local communities into imperial officers operating in the cosmopolitan milieus of an emerging global empire.12 The Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba made a mark on the construction of the Spanish realm and was deeply etched by it in turn. This book analyzes the family’s history from the thirteenth to the seventeenth centuries to identify how early modern imperial careers upended once-parochial lives in the late Middle Ages. Exploits on the battlefield often shortened lives, and therefore licit reproduction. Martı´n de Co´rdoba and his three brothers all died in battle, and only one had married and produced legitimate offspring.13 To conserve resources and direct them toward the demands of office, thirteen of Martı´n’s fourteen sisters and daughters entered the family convent.14 When marriages were celebrated, the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba preferred partners from distant Old Castile and even once-foreign Aragon and Navarre, whereas it had once almost exclusively wedded local nobles. Patronage ties that nearly made the monumental mosque-cathedral of Co´rdoba a part of the family’s patrimony were transferred to churches, chapels, and convents elsewhere in the realm. Previously anchored to Co´rdoba, its household became mobile as members ascended the military-administrative cursus honorum. The history of the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba—its participation in imperial affairs and the changes it underwent—introduces a larger history of the nobility in the construction of the Spanish empire. Nobles played vital roles in administration. In an age of extreme social stratification, only the most elevated members of society could serve as viceroys, captains general, and governors, offices that embodied the authority of the royal person. As Philip II instructed the viceroy of Naples, the Duke of Alcala´ de los Gazules: ‘‘You will have to represent our person and act as we would act if we were present.’’15 Indeed, Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba received the title of Marquis of Comares, and Martı´n de Co´rdoba became the Count of Alcaudete over the course of their service. Among the extensive personnel that the crown employed, the nobility nearly monopolized the highest command posts.16 Important officers in the sixteenth century came from the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba clan as well as a long list of other illustrious families, including the A´fan de Ribera, A´lago´n, Arago´n, A´lvarez de Toledo, Borja, Ca´rdenas, Castro, de la Cerda, de la Cueva, Enrı´quez, Guzma´n, Manrique de Lara, Mendoza, Pimentel, Sua´rez de Figueroa, Te´llez Giro´n, Velasco, and Zu´n˜iga, among others. These names came with impressive titles: the dukes of Alba, Albuquerque, Alcala´ de los Gazules, Cardona and Segorbe, Feria, Maqueda, Medinaceli, and Na´jera; the marquises of Aguilar de Campoo, Can˜ete, Denia,

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and Villafranca; and the counts of Almaza´n, Benavente, Castrogeriz, La Corun˜a, Miranda, Monterrey, Olivares, Sa´stago, and Tendilla.17 Like the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, many of these nobles served throughout the realm. Their relatives also joined them in office, and the repetition of surnames over time is notable. Their history, however, has been sidelined by a focus on a centralizing monarchy in the early modern period. Aside from the story of the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, there are many other family stories waiting to be told. The Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s history is typical of nobles serving in imperial administration.18 However, the lineage’s dual feats—domination of executive office in multiple territories that endured over the span of four generations—were unique. Though historians have not studied early modern lineages sufficiently, it appears that only the Mendoza, A´lvarez de Toledo, Guzma´n, Ca´rdenas, de la Cueva, and Manrique de Lara lineages approximated one aspect of this achievement.19 Most of these families placed its members in viceregal offices in different territories.20 Very few families repeated service as viceroys of one territory, much less two, over generations.21 Both representative and unusual, the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s history sheds light on dynamics that were experienced more broadly by a critical caste of society. At the same time, its continuity and longevity in service enable us to minutely track the transformation of locally rooted sen˜ores into international imperial officers. Imperial history ultimately balances with that of the family to form the core of this book. Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba lives intertwined with imperial affairs. Their history logically illuminates the development of the state and forms part of the annals of the Spanish realm. While other scholars have ably reconstructed the narrative of Spanish expansion elsewhere, I address events that touched the lineage and that were in turn shaped by the clan.22 These events include the inception of Spain’s early modern expansion in the Granada War, the establishment of a string of presidio outposts on the North African shore of the Mediterranean, the tense transition from the Trasta´mara dynasty of Isabella and Ferdinand to the Habsburg regime of Philip I, the violent outbreak of the Comunidades Revolt that marked Charles V’s succession to the Spanish throne, and Spain’s long struggle with France over Navarre and with the Ottoman and Moroccan sultanates over the Maghrib. These and other events were enmeshed in the family’s history. The Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba also intersected with critical dynamics in the sociopolitical organization of the empire. Its history opens a window onto

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the recruitment of the first generations of administrative personnel, the establishment of governing institutions, the management of logistics, and the negotiation of rule. The vantage point of this study is that of individuals who were on-the-ground, at the scene, and crucially involved in these endeavors from the very start. Finally, a study of the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba takes us on a panoramic tour of five distinct territories of the Spanish Mediterranean realm, each treated in its own chapter.23 Though these lands formed a part of the imperial polity, no scholar has ever linked their narratives. Yet from the perspective and experience of the clan, they were vital parts of the empire and interconnected theaters of operation. To take just one example, Algeria and Navarre bordered Spain’s two most capable enemies—France and the Ottoman Empire. The state’s overall well-being required the clan to defend both, not just one.24 That Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba and its family ties could have so critically contributed to the structure and history of an empire may be hard to grasp. Before moving further, it is useful to examine how another late medieval marriage and the reproduction it engendered also shaped the Spanish polity. Although of a different caliber, the wedding of Isabella of Castile and Ferdinand of Aragon in 1469 bore a striking resemblance to that of the Cordovan pair. Like Leonor and Martı´n, the future Catholic Monarchs were relatives. Their intermingled blood, however royal, did not guarantee them a stellar future. After all, the bride was estranged from her half-brother King Enrique IV of Castile, and the groom was heir to a realm that had seen its glory days wane with the passing of the Middle Ages. The king of Castile opposed their match, so the wedding was a furtive affair, celebrated without fanfare, out of the sight of Enrique and the adulation of his subjects. It was a sorry commentary on the precarious position of the couple.25 From unpromising beginnings Isabella and Ferdinand’s marriage famously united the destinies of Castile and Aragon and came to effect unforeseen changes on Europe and the rest of the world. Combining their energy and guile, the Catholic Monarchs initiated an acquisitive foreign policy that led to the conquest of Granada, Naples, Navarre, a significant portion of the North African coast, and the Caribbean basin. The two sovereigns stood at the head of developing government institutions that managed the expanding realm; they drew in personnel to serve in these positions through affinity ties. These endeavors heralded the creation of a Mediterranean empire that emerged alongside, but has often been overshadowed by, the exploration, colonization, and exploitation of the New World. Once a peripheral actor on

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the European stage, Spain came to intervene in the affairs of other Old World powers and helped to forestall the hegemony of the Ottoman Empire. The mingling of the two sovereigns produced, two generations later, a grandson named Charles who augmented the Spanish realm by combining it with his Habsburg and Burgundian inheritances. In hindsight, the Catholic Monarchs’ wedding, the family network it created, and administrative institutions they directed reorganized much of Europe and even the world.

The Theory and Practice of Empire in History and Historiography The unorthodox method of using family networks of administrators to understand, structure, and tell imperial history begins with the question, how do we characterize an empire?26 I employ the term empire to mean a polity cobbled together from multiple territories, peoples, and cultures. At the same time, empire was also constituted by the people that circulated through this space, built social ties, transmitted power, and performed administrative duties. In the late medieval period, however, the word empire possessed a more specific meaning. It referred to the Holy Roman Empire, a polity that claimed descent and cultural-political legitimacy from Rome, the empire par excellence in European historical memory.27 Still, though Germans and the Habsburgs may have claimed the title of empire for their own polity, this does not preclude historians from examining a state like Spain as one.28 Early modern Spaniards recognized their realm as such. The fact that the Iberian kingdom’s most extensive expansion coincided with Charles V’s reign over both Spain and the Holy Roman Empire conflated the Spanish domain with empire. The conquistador Herna´n Corte´s even suggested to the sovereign that ‘‘one might call oneself the emperor of this kingdom [Mexico] with no less glory than of Germany.’’29 It is important to note, though, that Spaniards did not use the term imperio in administrative documents, employing monarquı´a instead. Anthony Pagden has explained that in early modern usage this word also signified a multiterritorial polity subject to one ruler and hence was a synonym of empire.30 The study of empire and empires has long absorbed the attention of scholars. In recent years, studies have proliferated analyzing the ‘‘hyperpower’’ that the United States has projected far afield in its ‘‘War on Terror.’’ Despite taking a critical attitude toward unilateralism, preemptive strikes, and hegemony, academics are not immune to a grandiose notion of empire.

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For a long time the discipline of history accepted politics, war, and diplomacy as humankind’s most worthy deeds. It has studied empires as the embodiment of the omnipotent agency of monarchs. From the top down, their power was considered capable of enforcing allegiance and service on the masses. In essence, the names of kings and emperors stood in the place of a considered appraisal of how power worked, how policies were implemented, and how other social actors such as allies, rivals, and subjects behaved. Postcolonial and subaltern studies have reevaluated empires by resurrecting the presence, participation, and resistance of subjects in the polity and analyzing the ambivalence and refusal produced by hegemony. Still, despite the obvious divergences between top-down imposition and bottom-up resistance, both of these approaches conceptualize power as vertical. This understanding of force does not adequately characterize the horizontal mechanisms that held together a complex multiterritorial and multiethnic polity developing simultaneously on different fronts. The linearity of power, either from above or from below, is too limited to explain the maintenance of the empire. To be able to characterize an empire, we must take into account how power was distributed and dispersed, vertically as well as horizontally, and how rule was negotiated and contested.31 Existing side by side with the grandiose conception of empire is its corresponding mirror image, decadence and decline. How empires came crashing down, caused by their apparent inability to adapt to the challenge of rising competitors (seen, of course, as other empires on their way toward greatness), seems to attract as much attention as the majesty of the golden ages. Sociologist of empire Karen Barkey has argued that the standard division of imperial histories into ‘‘set periods of rise, apogee, stagnation, and decline’’ that inevitably follow one another ‘‘[casts] molds into which chunks of history were neatly arranged.’’32 The fact that the ‘‘decline thesis’’ has dominated work on the Spanish, Roman, Ottoman, Chinese, Mughal, and other empires demonstrates both the moral hold and the undiminished power that this analytical tool and narrative mode continue to have as an explanatory mechanism for the history of these diverse and unique polities.33 Telling history as rise to glory and decline to obscurity sets empires down linear trajectories and precludes what Barkey terms ‘‘the possibilities of empire.’’34 In the case of Spanish historiography, this means that much more attention has been focused on the reigns of Philip II as the avatar of apogee and harbinger of decline and Philip IV as a tragic figure who tried to fend off but could not escape the fate of decline. Focus on these two monarchs

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has prejudiced our understanding of the Spanish empire under the Catholic Monarchs and Charles V (as well as Philip III and Charles II). Apart from traditional political histories that narrate the conquest of territories, few studies have examined the social processes and mechanisms that brought together the Spanish empire—yet this was an incredibly rich period full of human agents emerging from local communities to create political institutions that managed a global empire. It is worthwhile to dig deeper into this incipient era of imperial formation. To understand early modern empires, it is necessary to examine how historical actors from this period thought of them. Scholars have often focused on the point of view of Renaissance jurists and humanists who derived notions of empire from what they understood of ancient Rome. To them, Roman imperium consisted of three principal attributes: authority to rule, the sovereign ruler, and unified political community encompassing more than one territory.35 Attached to these primary definitions were additional meanings and, more significantly, values. Romans considered imperium as the civilized world (defined of course by the polity encompassed by Rome) standing against barbarity (everything else). The law that permeated the empire further accentuated the divide between the two, since jurisprudence, developed through the application of reason, gave ethical purpose to the state and its people. In contrast, barbarity, susceptible as it were to the passions, wallowed in despotism, and thus its denizens were subject to tutelage or natural slavery. The transition from antiquity to the Middle Ages Christianized the concept of empire. Empire, especially as asserted by the popes, claimed broad jurisdiction over peoples because Christianity was meant to be a universal religion applicable to all. A redemptive purpose joined the civilizational and legalist conceptions of the polity so that membership suggested a path toward salvation. The polity that Spaniards constructed in the Old and New Worlds was conditioned by these conceptions of empire.36 Intellectual musings certainly played a role in creating the Spanish empire and justifying imperial authority. Yet they mostly belonged to elite political theorists, propagandists, jurists, humanists, and clerics. It is true that some of these people were closely affiliated with the centers of power, and a few even transformed their thinking into practical tools of domination that commanders deployed on the battlefield or in administration. Juan Lo´pez de Palacios Rubios, a jurist at the Spanish court, composed the notorious ‘‘Requerimiento’’ to legitimize the conquistadors’ conquest, subjugation, and evangelization of Native Americans.37 The conceptions of armchair theoreticians, however, tell only part of the story. A perspective that has not been

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examined at length is that of noble commanders who directly molded the empire in the field. Possessing different educational and cultural backgrounds, these officers represented another sector of society, one that Helen Nader has termed caballero.38 What motivated the actions of these men? How did they envision the polity they were constructing and maintaining? Aristocratic officers partly shared the cultural idiom of empire articulated by the theorists. Corte´s invented the ‘‘donation’’ of Montezuma in order to legitimize the transfer of the Aztec empire to Charles V. This language echoed both Emperor Constantine’s donation of the Western Roman Empire to the pope (also a forgery) and Pope Alexander VI’s bulls granting much of the New World to Spain in 1497. By invoking this rhetoric, the conquistador displayed knowledge of the imagined lineage of empire in the West and its close connection to Christian community. This hidalgo also revealed his familiarity with the legal discourse that justified imperial authority and with how to transfer and apply that authority from the Old World to the New.39 Still, the primary goal of Corte´s’s expedition to Mexico was conquest and, by association, the acquisition of economic, political, social, and cultural resources. Caballeros had long valued waging war, demonstrating martial prowess, garnering fame, and earning rewards for their endeavors. These, more than abstract theories of imperium constituted critical impulses for early expansion. Even though military expeditions were launched mostly under the auspices of royal authority, campaigning created opportunities for the nobility to take independent action, win glory and fame, and acquire power. Acts of insubordination against King Alfonso VI of Leo´n-Castile laced the eleventhcentury career of Rodrigo Dı´az ‘‘El Cid,’’ yet he was celebrated for striking out on his own, mustering a private army, and capturing the taifa state of Valencia in 1094.40 In our period, the Duke of Medina Sidonia’s storming of Gibraltar in 1462 followed by the Marquis of Ca´diz’s seizure of Alhama in 1482 preempted the crown’s launch of the Granada War.41 Medina Sidonia’s expedition to and conquest of Melilla in 1497, conducted without the support of the crown, also anticipated Spain’s invasion of North Africa in 1505 and 1509–10.42 Although Corte´s was dispatched by the governor of Cuba Diego Vela´zquez to the Yucatan to search for an earlier expedition, redeem captive Christians, reconnoiter, and trade, he conquered Mexico on his own initiative, contravening the authority of crown officials in the Caribbean.43 Aristocrats at times followed their own agenda that, perhaps not explicitly disobeying royal orders, went beyond them. In military and administrative service they preempted the actions of the crown or other adventurers by

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taking the initiative, creating ‘‘facts on the ground,’’ and then forcing the crown to either catch up to or ratify them. Along with pursuing battlefield feats, noble officers engaged in military activities in the Middle Ages to win grants of properties, rents, and honors. The nobility enjoyed a windfall for its participation in the thirteenth-century conquest of Andalusia, receiving lands from the king that were later combined to form the region’s notorious latifundia. The campaign to North Africa in 1509–10, patronized by the archbishop of Toledo and led by nobles, was still organized with this goal in mind. Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, a commander at the siege of Oran, anticipated and received lands and rents for his service. His peers, including the Segovian nobleman Pedrarias Da´vila, also won grants.44 The early explorers sailed to the New World with the same expectations. The ‘‘Book of Privileges’’ that Christopher Columbus assiduously compiled included claims to titles and revenues in the Mar Oce´ano. The fact that he copied the rights that King Juan II issued to the Admiral of Castile in the early 1400s into his own records shows how much he envisioned this New World in terms of the socioeconomic priorities of the nobility in medieval conquests.45 Early empire building, then, was as much motivated by traditional noble pursuits as it was by royal power or theories of imperium. Still, in an era of royal centralization, the Catholic Monarchs were asserting and reserving more direct rights to the expanding realm and fending off the aristocracy’s claim to privileges. In comparison to previous eras of the Reconquest, they restricted the land granted to high nobles in Granada following the subjugation of the emirate.46 The crown protected its prerogatives even more jealously in the New World, limiting the amount of land distributed to any single individual, refusing to grant jurisdictional rights, and creating very few noble titles.47 Adapting to expanding royal powers, caballeros that followed the first generation of imperial ventures served as crown officers. Such service still garnered them prestige, but status was achieved by performing duties and responsibilities commissioned by the crown. Revenue continued to flow into their coffers, but mostly in the form of annual salaries paid by royal treasurers. Once a fiercely independent warrior caste, nobles gradually transformed into military and administrative officers whose lives were directed toward and conditioned by royal service.48 In royal service, noble administrators still exercised influence that was felt on a variety of administrative levels. Viceroys, governors, and captains general were responsible for military and civil administration in the territories. Taken together, they headed the empire in the provinces. Although they

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resided in the periphery, they also made their presence felt at the royal court by corresponding regularly and frequently with the monarchs and royal councils.49 Many would sit on the councils after they completed their terms as viceroys. Josep Marı´a Batista i Roca sampled forty members of the Council of State in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries and found that twenty-eight were high nobles—of whom eleven had been viceroys (of Naples, Sicily, Catalonia, Valencia, and Navarre) and another ten were generals or captains general of the army and navy.50 Martı´n de Co´rdoba II, one of Leonor and Martı´n’s four sons, served as captain general of Oran and the viceroy of Navarre before ascending to the Council of Military Orders. Having close patronage ties to critical royal secretaries, as the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba did with Francisco de los Cobos, gave noble administrators additional influence over imperial affairs. These noble administrators, then, helped formulate policy and determine the shape and nature of the empire both in the provinces and at the core. How did officers think of empire? More than anyone else, they were able to envision the on-the-ground needs of territories vis-a`-vis one another. They understood how actions initiated in or directed against one territory would affect another.51 In a memorial to Philip II, the viceroy of Sicily the Duke of Tagliacozzo de Marsi y Paleano Marco Antonio Colonna expressed his expectation that administrators should take into consideration the needs of other parts of the empire, admonishing those who did not: ‘‘ ‘I have never seen Your Majesty’s affairs in danger, or lost, for lack of money, men or munitions, but because there was an abundance in one part and want in another; and because the vanity of ministers prevented them from giving full support to their colleagues.’ ’’52 Others were also capable of conceiving of the empire holistically, such as monarchs and royal councilors.53 The latter two, however, were rooted to a fixed capital. They depended on written and oral reports from officers on the scene, rather than direct experience, to keep abreast of imperial affairs.54 Officers possessed practical knowledge over the territories they administered. They were experts on the status of military forces, installations, and armaments in the area; external pressures that impacted territories; the identity and affairs of regional elites; the dealings of local individuals and groups who either cooperated with or resisted royal authority; and the dynamics of regional governmental institutions, including the rivalries of local factions. Over the course of their careers, noble administrators passed through a number of territories, accumulating knowledge of a variety of locales. They also gathered information from peers, often family members, who administered other lands.55

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For noble officers, the practical administration of territories and the empire as a whole trumped theoretical imaginings. While they may have applied theories of legitimation and concepts of imperial community, they were engaged with the contingencies and exigencies of governance. Helmut Koenigsberger has noted that the ‘‘theory of empire’’ particular to Spanish administrators in the viceroyalty of Sicily ‘‘came into existence by force of circumstances [and] was never a coherent body of carefully thought-out principles.’’56 The possession of practical expertise was highly valued. Not all knowledge may have been learned in the field, however. Like the historical memory that still weighed upon theoretical conceptions of empire, Spanish governance traced some of its methods back to the experience of others. The medieval Crown of Aragon had already developed a system of viceroyalties to manage territories spread across the western Mediterranean. King Ferdinand, especially during his governorship of Castile from 1506 to 1516, employed key Aragonese officials to run Spain’s expanding realm.57 Other polities also instructed Spaniards on the ‘‘practice of empire.’’ The personnel that Charles V brought to Spain from other parts of Europe, including the Low Countries, Italy, the Franche-Comte´, and Germany, imported ideas and methods.58 Portuguese and Castilian royal dynasties continuously exchanged marriage partners, bringing with them more officials, who staffed two global empires.59 The circulation of methods and practices of governance among European states is still, however, an area that requires further investigation. Officers were men who had to use the necessary means and justifications to face very real challenges and to carry out their duties, which ranged from leading forces into battle to presiding over regional parliaments. These commanders brought the skills, expertise, and knowledge needed to perform essential tasks.60 This was the experiencia to which Corte´s’s letters constantly refer, an abstract element that John Elliott has defined as ‘‘personal and individual knowledge of men and of things which an increasing number of early sixteenth-century Spaniards were coming to regard as superior to the knowledge derived from traditional authority.’’61 The experience that Corte´s had garnered as a student in Salamanca and a notary in Hispaniola was deftly applied to the legalist incorporation of Mexico into the Spanish realm.62 The abilities he acquired in Mexico were likewise transferred and instituted elsewhere when he sailed on Charles V’s expedition to Algiers in 1541.63 A premium was placed on experience, a commodity that the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba also identified and valued. The accumulation of experience by a coterie of officers circulating around Spain’s imperial world, its application to other areas of the

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realm, and its transmission to other individuals, including the offspring of administrators, kept the empire running. The Spanish empire was distinguished from its European contemporaries by the fact that it enfolded heavily populated regions in both the Old and the New Worlds. To manage such a polity it was essential to develop a fullfledged administrative system and institute a legal code tailored to the colonies.64 Given the importance of administration for the longevity of the empire, institutional histories enjoy a distinguished place in scholarship on Spain. Scholars have examined the royal councils that were founded in the empire’s early years.65 They have shined the spotlight on royal favorites (validos) and the controversial regimes they headed.66 Other important offices like those of viceroy and captain general have also received attention.67 Yet these works tend to study how institutions ideally functioned rather than how administrators faced the challenges of everyday administration. They often do not analyze how subjects of the empire interacted with the institutions. A closer look at administrators exposes the practical everyday structure of empire. Interactions between administrators and other social actors can tell us a great deal about the formation, function, and maintenance of the Spanish empire.

The Study of Social Networks in Empires In an era before the rise of impersonal economic, bureaucratic, and social systems, the functions of governance, trade, business, vocation, education, and private life went through personal ties.68 Viewing government as a set of relations underlines the fact that rule had to be negotiated and cajoled, not merely forced. By nature elastic, networks describe how polities absorbed new members while they expanded, and withdrew affiliation when they contracted. By highlighting individuals whose influence and control enacted force onto others, power is finally embodied in real human beings. Composed of a variety of individuals, networks remind us that people had to make choices and decisions, even if they were at times in response to contingencies or subject to compulsion. Ultimately, social networks were mechanisms that kept disparate communities, whose particular identities and geostrategic interests diverged from one another, tethered together to form empires. Studying polities as social networks takes issue with telling the history of empires as ‘‘macro-history.’’ Such an approach invokes the name ‘‘Spain’’ to

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signify and explain decisions, actions, and processes that were carried out by human beings; it renders a society of individuals into a unitary totality. Sociologist Michael Mann has criticized the treatment of polities as undifferentiated units of analysis, asserting instead that ‘‘societies are constituted of multiple overlapping and intersecting sociospatial networks of power.’’69 Within this framework, social units such as organizations can form as ‘‘institutional means of attaining human goals.’’70 Officers seeking to manage a polity constituted such an association, in this case the nascent imperial administration. Historians working across a number of fields have investigated social networks within the context of empires. Ottoman scholars have applied the concept of networks to their studies, and the implications are telling for Hispanists. Leslie Peirce’s study of the imperial harem has dissected the relationships among sultans, concubines, other members of the imperial household, and bureaucratic officers to understand how relations within the palace affected the larger administration of the empire. Jane Hathaway, Dina Rizk Khoury, and Amy Singer have examined how ‘‘household’’ networks helped organize diverse elites in the provinces, connect them to the imperial center, and effectuate local rule.71 Karen Barkey has envisioned a social network at the core of the Ottoman state that from its very beginnings was able to incorporate individuals ranging across religious and ethnic lines to form a multicultural government.72 Ottoman scholarship illuminates a critical path for Hispanists to take. Though the Ottoman and Spanish empires battled mightily with each other, and Ottoman society did not possess a juridically defined noble caste, the two realms had more in common than meets the eye. The two emerged at coincident moments in the Mediterranean basin. Both came to erect large-scale territorial empires that encompassed a variety of peoples and communities, the first of their kind in the European world since Charlemagne. Social networks explain how both Ottomans and Spaniards, facing similar challenges, managed their ethnically, religiously, and culturally diverse populations. This approach opens up new ways to compare Spanish and Ottoman histories, too often overlooked because of political and cultural barriers between the ‘‘West’’ and ‘‘Islam.’’73 The role that the nobility has played as an intermediary body linking different sectors of society has also helped explain the structure of a number of empires. In Spanish historiography, Helen Nader’s study of the fabled House of Mendoza remains the touchstone for understanding how a noble

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lineage helped organize the politics and culture of a kingdom in the transition from the late medieval to the early modern period. Valerie Kivelson has studied the Muscovite gentry to understand how an intermediary stratum of state and society helped enact imperial government in the provinces and at the same time preserve an autonomous sphere of activity in what had previously been considered a monolithic ‘‘autocracy.’’ Robert Harding has explored how the early modern French crown relied on nobles from a select number of wealthy and powerful provincial families to serve as territorial governors, making use of their personal clientele networks to effectuate rule. Nobleadministrative networks in Spain, Russia, and France transmitted and negotiated power up and down a vertical spectrum of actors and distributed it horizontally across the polity.74 How networks abetted the circulation of bodies and the transmission of knowledge across the expanse of an empire has also caught the attention of historians. Ida Altman has analyzed how family ties from Brihuega in Castile were transposed to structure the community of Puebla de los Angeles in Mexico. Historians of science such as Daniela Bleichmar and Antonio Barrera-Osorio have also uncovered how astronomical, navigational, natural, and other scientific knowledge critical for the exploration, conquest, and exploitation of the empire was transmitted across geographic expanses and down through time via social networks of scholars, merchants, and sailors. Alison Games has traced British subjects who circulated through the Mediterranean, Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian ocean worlds, forming connections through which they gained specific knowledge about trade, governance, and cultural relations that they then applied to other theaters of operation. Luı´s Fı´lipe Thomaz has stressed that the Portuguese Estado da ´India was a network more than it was a geographic space. This network was capable of disseminating and diffusing persons, goods, and ideologies, some of them universalist, to the extreme ends of the world. The circulation of individuals, then, helped shape the social structure of imperial communities as well as pass on critical information, including specialized knowledge on administration.75 Of particular resonance for my work is the scholarship of Bartolome´ Yun Casalilla. A historian who began his career investigating the local world of Co´rdoba in the late medieval and early modern periods, he has since moved on to study the formation of the Spanish imperial state, including the contributions of the nobility.76 Despite his change of focus, Yun Casalilla has not lost sight of the fact that the empire was composed of communities. Part of

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his recent work seeks to connect peripheral regions through the networks that noble administrators formed. In the introduction of a collection of essays, Yun Casalilla proposes to ‘‘investigate the relations between distinct territories that comprised the [Spanish] monarchy from the point of view of connections (and disconnections, if the case may be) between elites of such spaces.’’77 Very few historians have recognized that the territories of empires were linked to one another with some autonomy from the center, much less teased out these relations.78 Even a work as conceptually sophisticated as Barkey’s downplays interregional ties, privileging instead the conventional focus on center-periphery dynamics.79 While scholars have invested social networks with the power to absorb diverse peoples and communities to create an empire, they have yet to examine how networks bonded inhabitants across the realm independently of the center.

The Multiterritoriality and Simultaneity of Empire Empires by nature consisted of multiple territories developing simultaneously and in conjunction with one another.80 Most scholars would contend that disparate territories of a world empire did not have much in common with one another. After all, each region existed in situational contexts that were distinct from the others’. For example, Algeria and Navarre were each subject to internal and international dynamics that corresponded to their unique geopolitical situations. As part of the Islamic North African world, Spanish Algeria was constantly threatened by Ottoman and Moroccan forces eager to expel the Christians. In contrast, Navarre was once a storied Christian kingdom whose forced incorporation into Spain attracted the ire of Catholic France. On the surface, the two regions shared little in common. Yet their inclusion in the same empire tied their fortunes together. The resources that the crown expended in Algeria impacted on what it could accomplish in Navarre and elsewhere. The monarchy’s actions in one of its territories were weighed and balanced against what it did in others. To represent an empire accurately, historians must capture a sense of this simultaneous and conjoined development that was one of its defining characteristics. Much more conceptual thinking needs to be done to capture the multiterritoriality and simultaneity of empire in historical narrative. Sanjay Subrahmanyam has advanced the concept of ‘‘connected histories’’ that bring disparate areas together, but his work is an exception to the rule.81 Historians

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have tended to study territories on their own, though with good reason. A. J. R. Russell-Wood has observed that documentation in myriad languages and the need to access archives dispersed across the breadth of former world empires have affected the study of the Portuguese realm.82 Furthermore, the history of each territory must be contextualized in its particular geopolitical milieu. Finally, today’s political landscape, organized around modern nationstates, has narrowed our vision, obscuring the imperial structures that at one time connected disparate places and diverse elements across the expanse of humanity. Unlike the obsession modern nation-states have for the holistic sanctity of delineated boundary lines that limit, close off, and divide the nation from the huddled masses just on the other side, rulers of premodern empires seemed to revel in multiterritoriality.83 Long lists of territories—from kingdoms down to counties—preface documents signed by the kings and queens of Spain. These inventories were obviously meant to impress the awesome reach of the Spanish monarchy upon the document’s recipient. At the same time, they also capture the conglomerate or ‘‘composite’’ nature of the imperial polity that the monarchs themselves consciously regarded with pride.84 Yet, much like the nightmare that these lists must have presented to premodern scribes who laboriously hand-copied them out for the king and queen, they also verbally symbolize the conundrum that conglomerate empires pose to scholars. Despite our best efforts, we are still limited to the linearity and two-dimensionality of text. To better characterize empires, we must find ways to encapsulate the histories of many territories, each subject to particular local, regional, and international exigencies that nonetheless developed simultaneously alongside and at the intersections of one another. We must write about empire in such a way that individual histories of different localities, when merged together, achieve coherent meaning rather than appear pieced together out of convenience and in a contrived manner. Family networks point us to a new approach. Tracing a family of imperial administrators whose footsteps crisscrossed the realm enables us to reconstruct the expansion of the empire on its multiple fronts, thereby capturing some of the multiterritorial and simultaneous qualities of the development of the polity. At the same time, the identity and affinity that these individuals shared by dint of their membership in the same family network help alleviate some of the disorientation that following footsteps falling far away from others may induce in readers.85 The delicate balance between the centrifugal and the centripetal—an individual’s independent career path and his or her

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obligations to the family he or she belonged to—is reflected in the history of imperial locales undertaken here. The Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba weaves a narrative of empire that captures a sense of these territories as parts of an integrative polity. The histories of multiple territories of the Spanish empire play out in the lives of the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba family. This does not mean, however, that I will downplay the individuality, distinctiveness, and vitality of the local histories that make up the imperial. On the contrary, I attempt to minutely analyze how early modern individuals experienced the unfamiliar physical geographies, topographies, and landscapes that were newly accessible through imperial expansion. On the surface, empire building meant piecing together lands and peoples into one political community. Below the surface, however, the individuals who lived in and, more specifically, governed the empire had to adjust their mental outlook to include the exigencies of individual lands and varieties of people into their mental world. The five local histories examined in this book include three regions— Co´rdoba, Granada, and Oran—that were ruled by Muslims immediately prior to their incorporation under the Spanish-Catholic crown. In the premodern era, Christians and Muslims exchanged control of territories in the Mediterranean basin in a surprisingly fluid way. This stands in contrast to the relationship between the two communities today that is perceived in dualistic terms—Christian/Islamic, northern/southern, and developed/ underdeveloped. Nowadays, it seems that a nearly impenetrable barrier has been erected stretching from the Strait of Gibraltar in the west all the way to the Bosporus Straits in the east. Rather than constituting a transportation and communications conduit uniting the different coastlines, the Mediterranean is bisected geographically, ideologically, and economically, with each side meant to stand for certain values of civilization.86 More integrative forces such as political unions, economic free trade zones, and immigration have strived to bridge this divide. However, Turkey’s stalled application to join the European Union and the perilous voyages of emigrants embarking from North Africa for the shores of Spain, Italy, and Greece show that such a barrier is difficult to breach. By analyzing how Co´rdoba, Granada, Toledo, Navarre, and Oran were interconnected through the activities and mental world of the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba lineage, a hidden history of a more integrated Mediterranean region surfaces, one that defies the easy categorization of relationships between the Christian and Islamic worlds as a ‘‘clash of civilizations.’’87

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The Impact of Empire on Family The seventeenth-century Spanish economic thinker Martı´n Gonza´lez de Cellorigo once remarked that ‘‘a commonwealth is the proper management of a gathering of families.’’88 This observation succinctly summarizes the conception of the Spanish empire that I have proposed above, a polity that noble families helped administer and a living organism that they embodied in part. Modern scholars have corroborated Gonza´lez de Cellorigo’s statement, with David Sabean and Simon Teuscher recently explaining that the development of lineages was ‘‘closely connected to processes of state formation.’’89 Given the interlocking evolution of family and state, it is not surprising that as much as families gave life to the empire, they were in turn transformed by their activities on its behalf. The expansion of the empire made an especially profound impact on the noble lineages that were actively engaged in managing the polity. The changes that these noble families underwent, however, have remained unrecognized. This would seem paradoxical as historians, social scientists, and genealogists have devoted much attention to aristocratic families.90 After all, as a group they were the most powerful and visible in society. Yet scholars have focused on the development of elite families in conjunction with their ownership of land, a possession whose immobility anchored them to a place. This orientation within kinship studies is understandable; property certainly shaped the structure and identity of noble families. Land and its devolution were so important that James Casey has defined lineages as descent groups focused ‘‘on the transmission of patrimony.’’91 Land would continue to remain critical to noble families in the imperial age, but their relationship to fixed properties changed in an era of mobile service. The late Middle Ages was a period in which elite families accrued more and more land in Spain.92 The Castilian civil war of the mid-fourteenth century resulted in the usurper Enrique II awarding land to his noble supporters. Such grants (mercedes) helped solidify support for a dynasty that had been established through regicide. New laws were put into place to preserve the fortunes of these large landowners. Where inheritance was once partible and multilateral, trusts or entails (mayorazgos) were instituted that allowed a lord to gather all or a portion of his landed property and pass it on intact to one successor. An emerging preference for patrilineal descent further privileged the eldest male as successor. Although other offspring, both male and female, continued to inherit non-entailed property and moveable goods

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(bienes muebles) such as specie, bonds and rents, jewelry and other precious items, furniture, clothing, and livestock, the entail made sure that one chunk of the land would be concentrated in the hands of one successor each generation.93 By establishing a procedure of inheritance that was based on direct blood descent, gender, and seniority, a successor could be designated as early as his birth. Given advantages and treated with deference all his life, he could assert a natural leadership among his kin. Authority derived from succession rights thereby created ‘‘heads’’ of houses and differentiated senior (the line that passed from eldest son to eldest son) and junior branches (the lines established by second sons) of lineages. Owning the most important properties and enjoying the largest share of the inheritance, a head of a house could potentially wield considerable power, controlling marriage prospects of younger kin and influencing the direction of their careers. How ancestral land was passed down thus did much to structure relations within families. The stress that scholars have put on the ties between clans and land was warranted in other ways as property over time came to encapsulate families’ identity. Since the entail concentrated the bulk of a lineage’s property in the hands of one successor, other members of the family rarely had any land of comparable extension. The entail constituted a delimited space where kin could, but did not have to, cohabit. Family members also shared an interest in the use, cultivation, and well-being of the estate, as it was one of the main sources of their wealth. The permanent concentration of property created a seat for the family. The devolution of property over the course of generations also created associations between the land and the clan. The name of the estate came to stand for the family itself. This was the origin of the idea of casa (house). More than just a manor where the lineage resided or the territory over which the clan had legal jurisdiction, it was a shorthand way to signify the family. The name of the house (referencing geographic space and location) could supplant the surname of the clan (representing blood) in popular usage. Land, an inert piece of terrain, came to represent a lineage. In many ways, it was an ideal carrier or vessel of identity. Unlike perishable human bodies, the property’s permanence and near indestructibility enabled it to transmit identity through time despite the vagaries and precariousness of the life cycle. Though scholars have devoted much attention to the development of lineages in the late Middle Ages, few have examined how territorial expansion and careers in service in the early modern imperial age impacted lineages.94

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Neglect of this subject may be attributed to a focus, instead, on the ‘‘absolutist’’ monarchy as the hegemonic force in society. Still, royal authority had its limits, and monarchs did not strive to eliminate competing social bonds that rivaled their power.95 So while historians focusing on centralization have noted the transposition of aristocrats to the new physical and social environment of royal courts,96 they have not studied the dispersion of nobles into newly conquered territories.97 Not only is it critical to investigate the changing relationship between the nobility and land in an era of increased mobility, it is also essential to examine how the expansion of physical and mental worlds affected the development, structure, and identity of lineages.

The Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba Lineage: An Introduction to Its Origins The Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba will help us in this endeavor. Although its members never achieved the fame of Queen Isabella, King Ferdinand, and Emperor Charles V nor the notoriety of Christopher Columbus, Herna´n Corte´s, and Francisco Pizarro, they were local sen˜ores who transformed into imperial officers laboring in an international setting.98 The origins of the lineage can be traced back to the era of the thirteenth-century ‘‘Reconquest,’’ when King Fernando III and his Christian forces captured much of the heartland of Muslim Andalusia. Among the warriors who served with distinction at the conquest of Co´rdoba in 1236 were two middle-ranking noblemen named Ferna´n Nu´n˜ez de Te´mez and Domingo Mun˜oz. The first was a Leonese who was awarded the castles of Dos Hermanas and Abentojiel in the Cordovan countryside as well as houses in the city’s parish of San Nicola´s de la Villa. Ferna´n Nu´n˜ez married Ora Mun˜oz, the daughter of the second nobleman, Domingo. Ora brought to her marriage the cognomen ‘‘de Co´rdoba,’’ which the king had granted her father in recognition of his deeds.99 Over the ensuing 250 years, their offspring accumulated vast and well-populated landholdings and constituted the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba lineage.100 Over the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the lineage branched off into separate lines, all of which retained the surname Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba. The main trunk of the lineage was formed by the generationto-generation succession of eldest surviving sons (primoge´nitos). This line came to be known as the House of Aguilar, or, later, the marquises of Priego.101 Second sons in the first three generations established junior

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Figure 2. Separation of the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba branches (fourteenth and fifteenth centuries)

branches of the lineage. These three reached levels of prominence comparable to the Aguilar. In the first branch were the lords of Montemayor and Alcaudete, later becoming the counts of Alcaudete. Martı´n de Co´rdoba belonged to this house. Members of the second branch went by the titles Alcaides de los Donceles (literally Governor of the Royal Pages) and the lords of Lucena, Espejo, and Chillo´n. In the sixteenth century this line would win the title Marquis of Comares. Leonor Pacheco was born into this house. The third branch was known as the lords of Baena, later the counts of Cabra and the dukes of Sessa. From the fifteenth century onward these four houses constituted the core of the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba lineage.102 For the sake of

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consistency, I will refer to these families throughout as the Aguilar, Alcaudete, Comares, and Cabra. While a shared identity helped unify these four lines to a certain degree, the process that disaggregated the clan into separate houses created divergent political interests in each branch. For example, members of all four families contributed soldiers, funds, and their own lives to the Granada War, the campaign that initiated Spain’s imperial expansion. Yet the Aguilar and Cabra would ultimately retreat from direct involvement in military and administrative service.103 Instead, they came to acquire the greatest fortunes and centered their activities at the royal court as courtiers performing honorific duties. The Comares and the Alcaudete, in contrast, chose to garner distinction through military and administrative careers. These latter two branches, relatively more modest and certainly scrappier, form the core of this book.

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chapter 1

The Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba Lineage in Late Medieval Co´rdoba, 1236–1500

A dry, barren impoverished land: 10 per cent of its soil bare rock; 35 per cent poor and unproductive; 45 per cent moderately fertile; 10 per cent rich. A peninsula separated from the continent of Europe by the mountain barrier of the Pyrenees—isolated and remote. A country divided within itself, broken by a high central tableland that stretches from the Pyrenees to the southern coast. No natural center, no easy routes. Fragmented, disparate, a complex of different races, languages, and civilizations—this was, and is, Spain. —John H. Elliott, Imperial Spain

The Ferna´ ndez de Co´rdoba lineage emerged in the city and region of Co´rdoba over the last 250 years of the Middle Ages. Topographic, ecologic, and demographic features unique to the locality of Co´rdoba favored the clan’s development and shaped its identity. Likewise, historical circumstances such as the process by which the region was incorporated into Christian Castile in the thirteenth century, the changes it underwent over the course of the late Middle Ages, and its long-term position on a precarious frontier shaped the evolution of the lineage. Investigating local geohistorical factors exposes the intimate connection the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba had to its immediate surroundings. The clan’s fixation on this home base is not wholly unexpected, but it stands in sharp contrast to the peripatetic lifestyles that its members undertook in the far-flung corners of the Mediterranean world in

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the imperial age. The significance of the lineage’s later metamorphosis stands out after first locating it in Co´rdoba. To appreciate how closely the clan’s development was conditioned by its particular surroundings, it is vital to heed John Elliott’s call for a more realistic sense of the diversity and fragmentation of Spanish geography.1 Spain tends to evoke idyllic images of sun-kissed beaches on balmy winter days until the unwary vacationer arrives at Bilbao’s ferry terminal on a drab and drizzly morning or at Madrid’s international airport on a torrid July afternoon. While travel guides tout the vacation paradise of the Costa del Sol, the prologue of Elliott’s classic history reveals that such an alluring depiction hardly represents the rest of the country. Instead, a perpetually soggy northern coast and a vast central plateau that spends one-third of the year baking and the remaining two-thirds half-frozen characterize Spain just as much as the lush citrus orchards on the Mediterranean Riviera. Like travelers, historians would do well to keep in mind the surprising variety of landscapes and climates that make up the peninsular country. We must take these factors into account because they made a direct impact on the evolution of each local community and its inhabitants. In contrast to the rocky terrain and arid climate that dominate much of Spain, Co´rdoba possesses some of the most desirable farmland on the Iberian Peninsula. This land, however, is concentrated only in the southern half of the province, an area that bordered the emirate of Granada in the late Middle Ages. Christians conquered Co´rdoba in 1236 in a campaign that also seized the neighboring provinces of Jae´n and Seville. These conquests marked the end of large-scale expansion until the final war against Granada that came in the late 1400s. Without additional land seizures, Co´rdoba’s vanguard position on the frontier endured for the intervening two and a half centuries. This longevity required settlers who wanted to own, work, and benefit from the fertile soils of southern Co´rdoba to be able to defend it against raids originating from the emirate. Stewardship over this region also prepared its local landlords for the ensuing age of imperial expansion. Because of their prolonged exposure to the emirate, southern Cordovans honed and sustained their military prowess to an extent and a degree that few others in Spain had the opportunity to achieve. When the Granada War broke out in their backyards in 1482, they were ready to contribute to the beginnings of Spain’s imperial enterprise in the early modern period. Distinguished service further secured them leadership positions in expeditions to North Africa, Italy, and Navarre, conquests that would construct the Spanish Mediterranean empire.

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Figure 3. Late medieval Iberia ................. 18044$

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Late Medieval Co´rdoba, 1236–1500 29

Figure 4. Topography and population centers of late medieval Co´rdoba

Particularities of place and of historical circumstance thus molded southern Cordovans in the late Middle Ages and prepared them to undertake imperial service later on. In fact, the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba lords were the very custodians of southern Co´rdoba. The ancestors of the clan first arrived to the region as part of King Fernando III of Castile-Leo´n’s invasion force that conquered the city. Its very surname enshrines the historical event that contributed to its genesis. While ‘‘Ferna´ndez’’ signifies ‘‘son of Ferna´n,’’ the particle ‘‘Co´rdoba’’ was granted

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by the crown to commemorate the clan’s service in vanquishing the Muslim city. The conflation of lineage with location eloquently expresses the close identification of the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba to the region’s space and history. In the years that followed the conquest, the clan helped organize the material and human resources of the province. The conquered land was awarded to the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba as well as other individuals and groups. As the region’s new seigneurial lords, they settled colonists coming from the north to hold on to and defend the frontier. The clan thus played a role in the redistribution (repartimiento) and resettlement (repoblacio´n) of land. These efforts helped establish late medieval Cordovan society and anchor it to Christian Castile. Beyond its custodial role, the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba rooted itself to this region in less apparent ways. Co´rdoba’s geographic elements also included the human communities that lived on and shaped the land. Through marriage ties that were contracted overwhelmingly with notables from the immediate area, the clan knit a tight community of kin, friends, supporters, and clients. Endogamous unions also produced other advantages. Mirroring the castle walls that the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba erected to ward off raiders, blood alliances with local elites cordoned off bodies and restricted them from mingling with outsiders. Social prestige and economic wealth also came attached to the bodies of Cordovan aristocrats. The Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba marshaled these resources through the institution of marriage. Repeated matches between the lineage and the same noble families created multigenerational relationships that helped bond a community in the physical space of Co´rdoba. The vital process of biological reproduction, through which name, blood, identity, values, experience, landed property, and moveable possessions were passed down from generation to generation, enabled such a society to perpetuate itself through the late Middle Ages. The Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s participation in biological and social reproduction constituted one of the fundamental building blocks of Cordovan society.

The Conquest of Co´rdoba and the Establishment of Seigneurial Preeminence In 711, a mixed group of Muslim Arabs and Berbers crossed the Strait of Gibraltar into Iberia. The invaders quickly conquered the Visigothic kingdom and incorporated the land into the Umayyad Caliphate based in faraway

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Damascus. When the Umayyad dynasty fell to the Abbasids in 751, a survivor of the purge fled Syria and sought sanctuary in Iberia. This exile established himself in Co´rdoba in 756 as Abd al-Rahman I. By the time his descendants declared themselves caliphs anew in the ninth and tenth centuries, Co´rdoba had turned into a bustling capital city. With a population that reached 200,000 to 300,000 in the tenth century, it was the largest city in the medieval Mediterranean world after Constantinople. The Great Mosque they built still recalls the grandeur of the caliphal capital today. When the second Umayyad caliphate collapsed in the eleventh century, Co´rdoba was ravaged by violence perpetrated first by warring taifas, a kaleidoscope of small states that succeeded the caliphate, and then the Almoravids and the Almohads.2 In time the Christian kingdoms of the north also menaced Co´rdoba. Castile-Leo´n captured Toledo in 1085, enabling Christians to spread south across the vast plateau of La Mancha and begin raiding Andalusia in the twelfth century.3 The Almohads, the last regime to unify a substantial portion of Muslim Iberia, were defeated at Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212, making Andalusia even more vulnerable to Christian power. In 1236 King Fernando III of Castile-Leo´n and his army captured Co´rdoba.4 Subsequent victories against Jae´n (1246) and Seville (1248) gave Christians control over most of the region. By the mid-thirteenth century Granada and a small number of petty lordships were all that remained of a once-powerful Islamic polity. Fernando III’s conquest of Co´rdoba severed the city from its past. The surrender treaty negotiated with Muslim residents stipulated that they had to abandon the capital after the Christian takeover. Following the departure of the Muslims, settlers from the north transplanted their political and social institutions from Castile to Co´rdoba.5 Subsequent campaigns in 1240–41 conquered the farmland south of the city known as the Campin˜a. Between the conquest and 1264, Muslims, Jews, and Christians continued to share the countryside of Co´rdoba, as well as Seville and Jae´n. Following a regionwide revolt in 1265, however, the remaining Muslim farmers and artisans were finally expelled, completing a tragedy that had begun in the conquest of the capital city. The expulsion left the Castilian-Leonese with sole possession of the region. In this tabula rasa of sorts, they set out to create a Christian Co´rdoba.6 The first step in Christianizing the former caliphal capital was dividing the urban space into fourteen parishes. The parish of San Nicola´s de la Villa came to house several prominent families, including three branches of the

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Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba.7 At the time of the conquest it encompassed a sparsely populated residential area. An ample space made up of yards and orchards allowed elite families to construct spacious urban mansions later on.8 By prerogative of heading the military campaign, the king possessed all the land in the city and countryside. Through the repartimiento, the crown devolved urban and rural properties to institutions and individuals. The bulk was granted to the municipal council of Co´rdoba to administer, and a number of subsidiary towns in the countryside were included in its territory. A separate council known as the Junta de Partidores distributed city land to settlers according to their social position. It partitioned land in two phases: in 1236–38, and again when Fernando III returned, from 1240–41. Some of the grants (donaciones reales) confirmed previous possession, indicating that in some cases land had been occupied provisionally or without permission.9 Although the register of redistributed property (libro de repartimiento) for Co´rdoba has perished, we know that some of the notable institutions and individuals that received grants included the military orders of San Juan de Jerusale´n, Santiago, Calatrava, Alca´ntara, Temple, Alemanes (Santa Marı´a de los Teuto´nicos); the archbishop and Cathedral of Toledo; the bishops and cathedrals of Coria, Cuenca, and Co´rdoba; the monasteries of San Pablo and San Pedro el Real; Don Gonzalo Prior of Co´rdoba; and the chancellor Don Juan. Other elites, including a number of nobles, also received properties. The descendants of these individuals would form Co´rdoba’s oligarchy in the early modern period.10 The crown, however, did not make grants to the great aristocrats of Old Castile. This may have been a key factor that assisted the subsequent emergence of a local nobility whose identity was very much connected to the geohistorical milieu of Co´rdoba.11 Through the course of the mid-thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, local lords amassed land at the expense of the crown (and its proxy the municipal council of Co´rdoba), the church, and the military orders.12 The nobility’s dominance in Co´rdoba was unique as a more mixed pattern of ownership characterized the land regime in neighboring New Castile, Extremadura, Jae´n, and Seville. The military orders of Alca´ntara, Calatrava, and Santiago and ecclesiastical institutions such as the Archbishopric of Toledo dominated the former two. By the end of the Middle Ages, the orders of Santiago and Alca´ntara owned an estimated 48.2 percent of the land in Extremadura alone. Similarly, a number of ecclesiastical, aristocratic, and military groups held sway over Jae´n and Seville.13

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The way that the conquest of Co´rdoba played out facilitated the rise of local landowning elites. The city was the first major piece of Andalusian land seized by the Christians. Most of the territory that was conquered with the capital, however, consisted of mountainous wastes between New Castile–La Mancha and the Cordovan capital. Unable to see into the future, the northerners could not have predicted that the agricultural land to the south would also be taken in the ensuing years. Without the incentive of arable land, most of the warriors that joined the expedition in 1236 soon returned home to tend to estates they already possessed in Castile-Leo´n.14 Other circumstances also impacted landownership trends in Co´rdoba. Although it was the first territory to be colonized, many settlers did not stay on in the area. As Jae´n and Seville were seized and their Muslim residents expelled, new lands opened up for occupation and many colonists moved to these neighboring regions.15 By the 1270s, the colonization of Co´rdoba had ended in ambivalence. Demographic stagnation and then decline set in from the last quarter of the thirteenth century to the second half of the fifteenth century. The arrival of the plague in 1349 and later outbreaks in 1363–64, 1383, 1400, 1442, 1458–59, and 1481 further depleted the population.16 The unexpected results of conquest, settlement, and demographic crises thus increased the availability of property for a select few.17 Historical circumstances—the conquest of Co´rdoba, the expulsion of the Muslims, and an ambivalent resettlement—created a situation that allowed for the nobility, over time, to amass property. In rigidly hierarchical times, it comes as no surprise that the richest and most powerful members of society would triumph. However, local conditions in Co´rdoba further favored the nobility even more so than those in the neighboring regions of Jae´n and Seville. Geography combined with historic circumstances to position Co´rdoba’s southern and most verdant lands on the border with the emirate of Granada. Attracted to this land and capable of defending it, the warrior nobility came to monopolize these properties. Its landownership, economic means, and military vocation would give the nobility the power to dominate the region. The social edifice built in Co´rdoba was custom-fitted to the specific contours of its topography, ecology, and history.

The Geography of Co´rdoba and Its Impact on Seigneurial Society Co´rdoba’s geography played an important role in shaping the society that emerged in the postconquest era. The three defining topographical features

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encompassed by the province each contributed to conditioning the human life that evolved there.18 The first of these is the Guadalquivir River, which crosses through the Reino de Co´rdoba and bisects it into roughly equal halves. The Sierra Morena mountains, the second feature, occupy nearly all the land that stretches north from the river to the province’s border with the plains of New Castile–La Mancha. The hills of the Campin˜a, the third feature, roll south from the banks of the Guadalquivir until the land rises to form the Sierra Subbe´tica, a low ridge of mountains that divides Co´rdoba from Granada. Among the three features, the Guadalquivir River molded life in the province in the most palpable way. The river passes alongside the southern edge of the capital city on its way to Seville and ultimately the Atlantic. It gives life to Co´rdoba and irrigates the lush citrus orchards that line the water’s edge, yet it also made the city a tempting target for conquest, as the capital was located on the strategic mid-course of the vital river. Like the Guadalquivir River, the Sierra Morena mountains and the Campin˜a hills also shaped life in the region, but perhaps in less apparent ways. The high terrain and arid climate of the Sierra Morena made it virtually an unusable wasteland. The range’s elevation averages 600 meters, while peaks rise to nearly 1,000 meters. The climate is dry, with winds coming out of the steppe lands of the north, bringing little precipitation to the land. Aridity and bad soils permitted only subsistence agriculture—some grains and vines. Instead, livestock rearing dominated the economy of the area, and grazing further damaged the prospects for crops.19 In sharp contrast, the rich soils of the Campin˜a and the moist Atlantic climate make the southern portion of Co´rdoba some of the most fertile land on the peninsula. Grain was cultivated widely, and vines and olives thrived on rockier soils and highlands. The first regional census dating from the end of the Middle Ages confirms the allure of the south versus the north. Conducted in 1530, the survey found that 25,099 vecinos (tax-paying households) inhabited the province south of the Guadalquivir. Multiplied by a coefficient of 4 to 4.5 members per household, an estimated 100,396 to 112,946 people lived on this land. In contrast, the Sierra Morena contained only 8,318 vecinos, or an estimated 33,272 to 37,431 individuals. The population density for the south averaged 4.24 vecinos per square kilometer, while 1.02 vecinos per square kilometer lived in the north (the average for the whole province was 2.37 vecinos per square kilometer).20 The same census reported that among the region’s thirteen largest population centers, nine were located in the south, one (the capital city) was set on the Guadalquivir River, and only two were found in

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the Sierra Morena. The capital city’s population outstripped any one individual town, numbering 6,283 vecinos (25,132 to 28,274 residents). The largest southern towns, listed in order of size, were Lucena, Bujalance, Baena, La Rambla, Palma del Rı´o, Cabra, Priego, Montilla, Aguilar, and Alcaudete. Lucena, the largest, possessed 2,043 vecinos (8,172 to 9,194 residents). Alcaudete, the smallest of the larger towns, had 1,136 vecinos (4,544 to 5,112 residents).21 The two towns from the Sierra Morena that made the top thirteen were Fuenteovejuna (1,377 vecinos, or 5,508 to 6,197 residents) and Pedroche (1,158 vecinos, or 4,632 to 5,211 residents).22 Despite the draw of the south, historical circumstances made this land part of a frontier that buffered the rest of Co´rdoba, and Castile as well, from Granada. Muslim soldiers sallied forth periodically from the emirate to raid the borderlands, and at times these forces penetrated deeper. During the Castilian civil war of the 1360s waged between Pedro I ‘‘the Cruel’’ and his half-brother Enrique II, Muslims supporting Pedro marched as far north as the provincial capital and laid siege to the city. In fact, the lands of the Campin˜a and the Sierra Subbe´tica were the Christian territories located closest to the capital city of Granada, the emirate’s largest population center. Because Castile’s expansion against Islamic power stalled from the 1250s until 1482, this frontier endured for nearly 250 years. The long exposure made life in Co´rdoba’s southern district particularly vulnerable. The insecure but rich lands of the Campin˜a, especially those in the far south, were precisely those that noble families would come to dominate. A number of reasons explain this phenomenon. The distance that separated this area from the city of Co´rdoba enhanced seigneurial rule. Towns and estates in the province that belonged to the crown were administered by Co´rdoba’s municipal council. Most of this royal property was located within a day or two’s travel from the capital. Territory farther away was out of reach of the municipal council’s effective supervision. Such land came under the control of lords. This configuration was true for the province on both sides of the Guadalquivir. Although seigneurial regimes were particularly prevalent in the south, the estates of Belalca´zar, Santa Eufemia, and Chillo´n were also established on the northern periphery. Lords were able to acquire properties in the far south and north because of their distance from the capital and its municipal council. Distance from the city of Co´rdoba, however, only partly explains why lords controlled the southern extremity of the province. An examination of landownership patterns in Co´rdoba alongside those of Seville, Jae´n, and

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Murcia (the other provinces that bordered Granada) shows that seigneurial properties lined the entire frontier from Seville in the west all the way to Murcia in the east. Most of this borderland in Seville, Co´rdoba, and Murcia was owned by noble lords, while a constellation of nobles, military orders, and church institutions dominated Jae´n.23 In other words, the crown played a limited role everywhere on the frontier that separated the kingdom of Castile and the emirate of Granada. In 1480, two years before the final war against Granada was launched, the crown possessed only five fortress towns on the entire Granadine frontier—Tarifa, Antequera, Alcala´ la Real, Quesada, and Lorca. The rest of the land belonged mostly to nobles. Seigneurial lands linked up to form one continuous barrier that separated Christian Andalusia from Islamic Granada.24 The crown clearly delegated the task of defending the long border with Granada to the nobility. It recognized the ability of the warrior caste to repopulate the region and defend it against Muslims.25 Individual lords living on the front line were more capable of responding to localized raids than a municipal council made up of delegates or the royal government based in the far north in Old Castile. Lords could raise companies composed of kin, clients, supporters, servants, and tenants who had personal obligations to their patrons. A comparatively impersonal municipal council could not tap into these bonds of loyalty as easily. Seigneurial forces enjoyed an added advantage in that their warriors were expected to engage in combat and would have trained for such duty. Local fighters defending an estate on the frontier also knew the lay of the land better than troops mobilized from a distant municipality. The crown recognized the critical role played by these noble lords and their private armies and ceded them royal revenues (pagas y llevas) in order to provision and staff frontier outposts.26 A return to census data corroborates the dominance of the nobility in the rich, but hazardous, southern borderland. In 1530 the crown possessed 63 percent of the total land of Co´rdoba, while the lords owned 37 percent. These figures may, at first, appear to tell the opposite story. However, the lords’ true hegemony comes to light when we realize that the bulk of the crown’s lands were concentrated in the rugged and arid wastelands of the north rather than the fertile farmlands of the southern Campin˜a. In the Sierra Morena, the crown owned 75 percent of the land, while lords owned just 25 percent. In contrast, in the south, lords controlled 53 percent of the land, whereas the crown controlled 47 percent. Population estimates from this census confirm

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the lords’ ascendancy. Of Campin˜a residents, 54 percent lived on seigneurial land, while 46 percent lived on royal land.27 The lords controlled the south, and their properties tightly packed the province’s relatively narrow strip of land bound on the east by Jae´n and the west by Seville. Among Co´rdoba’s noble families, the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba was preeminent in this district. The lineage’s estates of Alcaudete, Priego, Cabra, and Lucena (listed in order from east to west) formed a line of properties that completely monopolized the frontier.28 When joined with the clan’s other domains located a step north from the border, including Aguilar, Montilla, and Baena, the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s lands erected a thick barrier that blocked incursions coming out of Granada. These estates, moreover, constituted some of the largest population centers in the province. As we have seen, the estate-town of Lucena was the largest in the province after the capital city itself. It was a seat of the House of Comares. Baena, belonging to the House of Cabra, registered 1,428 vecinos. Priego, an estate of the House of Aguilar, possessed 1,208 vecinos. Between 4,432 and 6,651 residents populated each of these estate-towns, not an insubstantial number for the times. Measured by residents, the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba owned seven of the top twelve population centers in the province. Of the other five, four were royal properties (Bujalance, La Rambla, Fuenteovejuna, and Pedroche). Only one other seigneurial estate matched the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s in population— Palma del Rı´o, the seat of the counts of Palma (1,251 vecinos, or 5,004 to 5,630 residents).29 A number of smaller seigneurial estates did share the far south with the four main branches of the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, including Zuheros, Luque, Ferna´n Nu´n˜ez, El Carpio, and Guadalca´zar. When taken together, these and the great estates densely populated Co´rdoba’s narrow southern territory. Lords, especially those from the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba lineage, played important roles in Co´rdoba during the late medieval period. Seigneurial estates filled the southern borderland. These properties constituted some of the most populated areas of the province after the capital city itself. When compared with the distribution of properties and populations directly subject to royal jurisdiction, lords far and away dominated the south. A combination of natural ecology and political geography favored the rise of seigneurial power in the region. Some of the most fertile lands on the peninsula were located in Co´rdoba, but they were concentrated in an area menaced by Granada. The group most capable of taking control of this land was warrior

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lords, who had the means to defend these properties. The land in turn made them wealthy, while their military duties garnered them immense prestige and authority. Over time, possession of these ideological and material resources also won the lords political prominence, and they came to hold important offices in the city of Co´rdoba. The emergence of the nobility in Co´rdoba, then, relied very much on elements of geography and historical circumstance that were very local in nature.

The Convergence of Noble Identity and Local World in Medieval Co´rdoba The features of topography, ecology, and land tenure testify to the development of late medieval Cordovan society. The natural geography of Co´rdoba and the manmade structures in the region also have a surprising amount to say about noble identity, a generally elusive topic, as self-reflection rarely made an appearance in the documentary records of the period. Traveling through the Campin˜a countryside today, Co´rdoba’s medieval past is still in plain sight.30 Although present-day towns have spread beyond their ancient walls, historic quarters populated by sturdy stone buildings still stand.31 Castles and church towers erected in the medieval and early modern periods continue to dominate the skyline. The boundaries of modern towns still follow the coordinates of former seigneurial estates.32 And although the methods and economies of agriculture have changed dramatically and factories and warehouses now cluster along highways that run through the region, the lay of the land and the primacy of cultivation still remain. The Cordovan countryside today conserves at least a partial image of how land appeared and was organized centuries ago. This unexamined documentary base corroborates the vital role that the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba played as defenders of the frontier. More unexpectedly, it reveals a landscape of internal tensions and competition among lords in the countryside. These divisions would become amplified in the early modern era, and they serve to identify which families of the lineage would align with the imperial enterprise and which would remain rooted to home. Most of all, this documentary base shows us that the nobility in the pre-imperial age were defined by their interactions with their local world. In the face of a common enemy, the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba seemed to stand shoulder to shoulder, and the tight formation of their estates on the

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frontier symbolized the bond of kinship that connected the families of the lineage. However, relations among branches of the clan were not always amicable, and rubbing shoulders on the border may have produced friction as well as camaraderie. As such, the representation of each house on the front line also seemed to evoke competitive jostling to see which family could outmuscle the others to stake a claim as the preeminent fortification abutting the emirate. The feeling of constriction is corroborated by adding a second layer of domains that the four houses owned just one step removed from the frontier. Indeed, since territorial expansion southward stalled from the 1250s until 1482, the density in the Campin˜a could not be alleviated during the long years of the late Middle Ages.33 The layout of estates, towns, and castles, then, evidence a defensive orientation toward the external threat of Granada as well as an internal competition with other landowners. Perhaps the structure that most clearly bespoke lordship in medieval Co´rdoba was castles that dotted the countryside. Lords built, or inherited from the Muslims, fortresses that sat on strategic hilltops or mountain slopes. The castle of Espejo, owned by the House of Comares, is typical of many others in the Cordovan hinterland. It was built on an elevated position that commands a panoramic view of the surrounding land. Residences and shops cluster around the fortification and run down the slopes of the hill. Most seigneurial towns in the region were dominated by castles. Adjacent to Espejo were the towns of Aguilar, Montemayor, and Montilla, all belonging to the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, each with its own fortress. The density of estates in the Cordovan countryside was such that, looking out from the towers of elevated castles, lords literally gazed upon the backyards (wheat fields or olive groves) of their neighbors.34 The proximity of properties frequently led to clashes over boundary lines. In fact, the sweeping sightlines offered by hilltop fortresses enabled lords to track whether neighbors were encroaching on their estates. Perhaps these castles also served as settings where plans were hatched to expand beyond one’s own lands at another’s expense. A large number of complaints, petitions, reports, and lawsuits evidence border disputes in the late 1400s not between Cordovans and Granadine Muslims, but between Cordovan lords themselves. These records have been preserved in the Registro General del Sello section of the Archivo General de Simancas. The fact that estate lords were closely related to one another did not prevent boundary disputes from turning into pitched battles. The same armies that they maintained to defend the frontier were used to attack neighboring relatives. At the conclusion of the Granada War in 1492,

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Alfonso Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, head of the House of Aguilar, used his newly decommissioned private army consisting of hundreds of horsemen to attack the estates of his own nephew, Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, head of the House of Comares.35 Unsurprisingly, their dispute centered on the boundary line shared by their estates of Aguilar and Lucena. In addition to views of adjacent properties, castles also commanded vistas of the critical roads that ran north–south, connecting the capital with the Granadine frontier. The vital nature of these passageways meant that lords took an interest in them. Roads, along with lookout towers, allowed for rapid signaling and dispatches in the event of an attack from the emirate. One of these routes went via the seigneurial estates of Ferna´n Nu´n˜ez, Montemayor, Montilla, Aguilar, and Lucena, while another traversed through Espejo, Castro del Rı´o, Baena, Zuheros, Luque, and Alcaudete.36 During the Granada War, the Catholic Monarchs marched armies, horses, and baggage trains down these highways to battle.37 Lords also took an interest because roads carried the internal business of Cordovans; their hilltop castles gave them vantage points to monitor the traffic. The region’s production passed along these routes to the population centers of Castile. Treaties between Granada and Castile permitted Muslim merchants passage on these paths to the Andalusian cities of Seville, Je´rez de la Frontera, Co´rdoba, and Jae´n. Christians enjoyed similar rights of access to Granada and Ma´laga.38 Farmers taking their produce and livestock to local markets traveled on these roads.39 Many inns lined them to provide itinerant merchants meals or beds for the night.40 Facilities even catered to pack animals—mules, donkeys, and horses—that needed to be housed, fed, or even healed of injuries. Co´rdoba’s roads were conduits that enabled business to be transacted. Lords benefited from these activities by collecting tolls (portazgo) and duties (almojarifazgo) on merchandise crossing their properties. They jealously guarded their privilege to charge duties and at the same time be exempt from them. Thus, it comes as no surprise that they clashed over these revenues. In May 1492, Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba petitioned the crown to confirm his exemption from the tolls that Alfonso de Aguilar had slapped on him when he passed through Aguilar’s estate of Montilla.41 These were the same Diego and Alfonso who had battled earlier that year over a boundary dispute. The adjacency of properties and built structures insinuated and instigated tension among nobles in the countryside. In fact, rural Co´rdoba reflected the strained situation in the provincial capital itself. The city in the fifteenth century was split along two factions, each consisting of two branches

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of the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba lineage. One side was headed by the Aguilar branch and backed by its ally the House of Comares.42 Pitted against them was the Cabra branch supported by the House of Alcaudete. An extensive literature on late medieval Co´rdoba has detailed how the two factions frequently disrupted city life. They competed for control of municipal offices, such as the alcalde mayor (chief magistrate) and the alguacil mayor (chief bailiff ). Battles were waged over key strategic sites in the city, especially the Alca´zar and the Torre de Calahorra, each of which commands an end of the bridge that spans the Guadalquivir River and vitally linked the capital to the south.43 Competition and contention among urban and rural elites were not unique to Co´rdoba. A vast literature explores this phenomenon in other parts of Spain as well as Europe as a whole in the late medieval period. Many Spanish historians consider provincial factionalism as an extension of rivalries at the royal court that disrupted the reigns of the later Trasta´mara monarchs Juan II, Enrique IV, and Isabella I in the fifteenth century. Each of these rulers faced challenges from pretenders to the throne often promoted by powerful magnates. The Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba was not insulated from these conflicts, and at times it weighed in with gusto.44 It is critical not to forget that local noble lineages had connections and interests to a wider world. Indeed, the role that the nobility played in an era of consolidating monarchies stands on its own as a compelling story. However, considerably less attention has been paid to the interactions that lords had with their distinct local spaces.45 Topography, ecology, land use, and physical structures in Co´rdoba provide clues to social organization and identity. While scholars of medieval and early modern Europe have with good reason concentrated on the nobility’s deeds on the national stage and their brilliant patronage of the arts, the nobility existed in a grounded and rooted local world. Recognition of how they shaped and were in turn shaped by this local space amplifies our understanding of noble identity. Historian of the European nobility Jonathan Dewald has observed: ‘‘For nobles thinking about the regions within which they lived, the community of those who mattered was a small, even intimate place: those who mattered socially and politically numbered only in the dozens, for the mass of non-nobles (it was assumed) could be safely disregarded. Men and women within these limited boundaries knew one another and carefully followed one another’s affairs. Everyone knew who were the richest and most powerful families, and these figures expected to dominate local institutions.’’46 Nobles controlled the immediate space around them in many ways. In turn, the local world critically shaped the lives of nobles.

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The importance of the nobility’s local world was recognized long ago by an observer of the aristocracy, Bernabe´ Moreno de Vargas. This regidor (city councilor) of Me´rida in the region of Extremadura directly north of Andalusia published the Discursos, an analysis of the meaning of nobility. In the tract, the author used a complex set of terms—land, lineage, and estate—to argue for an interwoven relationship among the physical land on which one lives (homeland), the familial line (lineage), and seigneurial jurisdiction (lordship): ‘‘In this manner, land47 and lineage48 both mean the same thing, as does habitable building. And the ground of such buildings likewise is called property. And the owners of such grounds are called lords of jurisdictional estates49 according to the law of the Partidas.’’50 Put in simpler words, the author emphasized that lineage, home, and property were all one and the same. Nobility (in terms of lineage and lordship) was inextricably tied to and even defined by territory. In such a case, it did not seem possible to be noble without ties to a place. Moreno de Vargas also explained how family identity was conflated with its land (and vice versa) and that families came to be known by the name of the property: It came to be that the common way to refer to a land was by the name of the seigneurial house since the two were really the same thing. . . . Those who originated from these lands were called nobles [hijosdalgo]51 of a certain property. This is the same as calling them nobles of a lineage which has a house and property indicating and demonstrating the nobility of their ancestors. And since the quality of nobility is neither corporeal nor visible, and valiant and illustrious nobles die and their qualities are obscured through the passage of time, men found a way to incorporate their nobility in an enduring body which could be conserved and perpetuated. This was the property and the house in which they lived for which a local history [memoria local] was composed so that their nobility was never forgotten and was always clear and publicly known and the memory of their ancestors almost alive . . . and in such a way it is agreed by men that this is how a lineage came to be called a house . . . from which it is understood that to say nobleman of a property and nobleman of a lineage means the same thing, because lineage, land, and house in this sense all mean the same thing.52 For Moreno de Vargas, the land not only possessed economic value— providing a family with resources or vassals—but it embodied and transmitted the noble’s identity. Born in 1576, the author published his Discursos in

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1636. He and his work fall outside the late medieval period. Nevertheless, these words would have had special meaning for earlier Spanish nobles, as the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries constituted the age of estate accumulation and, in particular, the formation of Andalusian properties. In the high Middle Ages, power and influence had been centered at the royal court, where those in favor received land grants in the form of tenancies (tenencias) that lasted a few short years and were not heritable. The ‘‘old nobility’’ of Castile did not own vast amounts of heritable properties. It was only through historical processes in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries—namely, the conquest of Andalusia, King Alfonso X’s claim to regal supremacy, King Enrique II’s payoff of nobles for their support in a civil war against his halfbrother Pedro I, and the juridical development of the entailed estate (mayorazgo)—that initiated the nobility’s access to and accumulation of heritable land.53 Moreno de Vargas clearly believed that physical land and property ownership held the identity of a noble lineage.

The Marriages of Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba Daughters and Local Interests As Moreno de Vargas observed, the identity of lineages were inextricably tied to the geohistorical features of its local world. The Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba engaged with its home base in even more ways. The reproductive life cycle that members of the lineage underwent also connected them to Co´rdoba. Through a high birthrate, the clan helped populate the land. Marriages cemented ties between Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba offspring and other local notables. As is well known, contracting marriage ties was one of the most important acts in the life of parents and their offspring. The institution not only enabled one generation to licitly reproduce another; it allowed parents to legally pass the social status, economic and material resources, and political offices that they had earned in their lifetimes to their progeny. This process helped create and perpetuate the hierarchies that structured society. Marriage was important for these purposes, and as such, much calculation was put into finding suitable matches for offspring. The Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba deliberately chose local partners. These unions helped the clan bond a local community by constructing a network of kin, friends, and clients. Interrelations connected individuals horizontally as well as vertically; they veritably knit the fabric of society itself. The clan’s local matches in the late medieval period

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stand in stark contrast to the partners they would find from faraway places in the early modern period. An understanding of marriage patterns begins by calculating the average number of children produced in each generation of the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba.54 Comparing the total number of children with the total number that married gives us a sense of the importance of contracting matrimony in the late Middle Ages. Over the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the four main branches of the lineage produced 135 known offspring.55 The average for each branch per generation was 7.4. The Aguilar had the smallest families, with a median of 6.1 children per generation. The Cabra marked the highest end, with an astonishing 10.7 children per generation due to the remarkably fecund marriages of Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, Count of Cabra I, and his two wives, Marı´a Carrillo and Mencia Ramı´rez de Aguilera y Valenzuela. The Alcaudete and Comares approximated the overall median, averaging seven and eight children each generation, respectively. These figures, however, should be taken with a grain of salt. Daughters were underrecorded in the genealogical studies and likewise in archival documents such as testaments. This must have been true for girls who died prematurely (and boys) as well.56 Illegitimate children may also throw off the numbers.57 There is the chance, however, that some of the 135 offspring that are accounted for may have been illegitimate. When considering the number of children in each generation of each branch of the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, we must therefore keep in mind that it must have been somewhat above the average of 7.4. Unreported children who died young should not, however, throw off marriage statistics, as they would have been too young for the marriage to have been consummated anyway. There were ninety-eight marriages among 135 countable offspring, with eight individuals marrying twice. Forty-four of the progeny were counted as unmarried. Ten died young, twelve entered religious vocations, thirteen never contracted matrimony, and the status of eight is unknown. An estimated 72 percent of Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba children married. If the ten who died young are excluded, that percentage rises to 78 percent. Continuing the analysis of marriages reveals two significant patterns. First, Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba daughters married at a rate that surpassed that of sons. Second, these daughters wedded local males more frequently than their brothers married local females. Daughters, then, were at the nexus of two patterns—higher nuptiality and local marriages—when compared with sons. These trends open the door to understanding the social uses of local marriage. We will start by

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examining the marriage patterns of daughters and then move on to those of sons in the following section. Viewed by gender, daughters contracted ties at higher rates than sons (74 percent versus 72 percent). Broken down by house, female nuptiality was sometimes considerably higher. In the Aguilar family, the ratio was 94 percent female to 79 percent male, and in the Comares, 67 percent to 55 percent.58 Another striking revelation is that in addition to higher nuptiality for daughters, the clan had a strong preference for its offspring to wed local partners. Of the ninety-eight marriages, 60 percent were to partners from Co´rdoba, 36 percent to partners from outside of Co´rdoba, and 4 percent to partners of unrecognized origins. By a ratio of almost two to one, the clan’s progeny wedded individuals who came from within the boundaries of the Reino de Co´rdoba. This preference reached a peak among the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba daughters, of whom 80 percent married males from the region, compared with sons, of whom 43 percent married regional females. High female nuptiality would, in general, seem unexpected. After all, families had to expend significant amounts of resources to equip their daughters with dowries (dotes). Among the nobility in premodern Spain, the dowries consisted of cash, portable goods (jewelry, clothes, furnishings, etc.), nonmoveable property (land, properties, buildings, etc.), and/or rents, incomes, and interest payments. While grooms also proffered ‘‘bride portions’’ (arras) to their future wives, dowries far exceeded the sometimes symbolic sums of the arras by the thirteenth century.59 In fact, high rates of female nuptiality, and specifically the need to provide daughters with dowries, contributed to the preference for local partners. A dowry served several functions for the bride. Legally and theoretically, it provided her with a source of income independent of her husband’s resources. This helped to preserve her husband’s estate for the benefit of the couple’s children. Such an estate was defined as the patrimony that her husband had brought into the marriage as well as additional assets that accumulated over the duration of the union. A suitable dowry ensured that the widow could live off of her own means and not deplete the estate that was left to the children. A dowry also provided a mother the means to endow her heirs separately from her husband and their joint estate. These financial ties helped a mother bind her children to her, especially important if she were to become a widow. The potential inheritance reminded the children of their obligations to her. Because of their practical uses and social meaning, dowries weighed heavily in the equations that determined marriage ties.

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A groom also had an interest in the size of the dowry that his bride brought to the union. Theoretically, a wife had sole possession of her dowry. More realistically, however, a husband could tap into this endowment. Whatever use the husband made of the dowry, he was still expected to pay back his wife. Because grooms partially viewed potential brides in terms of the dowries they contributed, elite families had to equip daughters with sufficient sums to attract partners of a suitable social status. To furnish these dowries, high nobles, despite their affluence, could still expend a prohibitive amount on the marriages of their daughters. Many times a bride’s family was unable to fund her dowry until long after her marriage was contracted. On other occasions daughters were required to forfeit rights of inheritance as a condition for receiving dowries. These examples indicate that families promised considerable dowries and that the sums were a burden on family finances.60 Providing dowries may have proved challenging for Alfonso Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, the Lord of Alcaudete I, who had seven daughters with his wife, Juana Martı´nez de Leiva. Nevertheless, they married off six of their daughters. Constanza, Beatriz, Aldonza, and Leonor were each endowed with 50,000 maravedı´es. Berenguela received a substantially smaller dowry, only 20,000 maravedı´es. All of these daughters wedded local Cordovan notables. Likewise, Alfonso Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, the progenitor of the Aguilar and Alcaudete branches, married off all five of his daughters, also to local Cordovan notables. Despite the considerable expenditures that dowries constituted, female nuptiality rates were actually higher than those of males. What marriage strategies did the families devise for daughters so that high nuptiality rates could be of benefit to them? What made female marriages worthwhile when, after all, women could be cloistered in convents as an alternative?61 And how did the marriage strategies of daughters differ from those of sons?62 An investigation of the partners daughters were paired with—for the most part males from the region of Co´rdoba—helps answer these questions. In the late Middle Ages, the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba preferred to marry local partners. Taken together, female and male offspring of the lineage married other Cordovans 60 percent of the time, and non-Cordovans 36 percent. When viewed separately by gender, however, the difference between daughters and sons is staggering. Among the clan as a whole, 80 percent of daughters married local partners, compared with 43 percent of sons. Within the Aguilar family, 81 percent of the females married local men, while only 27 percent of the males married local women. Among the Alcaudete, the difference was 85 percent to

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47 percent, and the Cabra 75 percent to 30 percent. Both genders of the Comares, however, were rather more oriented toward local marriages, at 75 percent and 72 percent for females and males, respectively. Local matches helped establish links between the lineage and other elite families in the region. Such ties enabled the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba to construct a dense network of blood and clientele relations in its home base.63 Over the late Middle Ages, the clan frequently married the notable families of Co´rdoba. These families all possessed seigneurial estates in the Cordovan countryside. They included the Angulo family (lords of Alizne´), Argote (lords of Lucena and Espejo), Bocanegra-Portocarrero (lords of Palma del Rı´o), Ca´rcamo (lords of Aguilarejo), Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba (lords of Guadalca´zar),64 Gutie´rrez de los Rı´os (lords of Ferna´n Nu´n˜ez), Me´ndez de Sotomayor (lords of El Carpio), Mexı´a-Carrillo (lords of Santa Eufemia), and Venegas (lords of Luque). Some observations can be discerned from the marriages between the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba and these families. In any given generation, no local family married with any two different Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba branches. The Aguilar very rarely married into local families after its third generation unless they were one of the collateral Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba branches. The Venegas and the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba of Guadalca´zar had particularly close relations with the four main branches, each contracting matrimony with one of the branches for four consecutive generations. Ties with these families, together with other connections of affinity, created the structure of Co´rdoba’s hierarchical society. The clan deployed its daughters to marry local males for other reasons. Female marriages expended the lineage’s resources, and, indeed, these properties were alienated in favor of other families. Ties contracted between Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba females and local males, however, could help the lineage conserve its wealth in the long run. The marriage of daughters into families within close geographic proximity presented potential opportunities, through future endogamous unions, to reintegrate the property into the clan that had been alienated in the dowry. For example, the dowry that a Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba female took with her into her local marriage had the potential of becoming the dowry that her own daughter could take into marriage with a Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba male.65 The union of Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba daughters with local notable males also absorbed the eligible elite male population in the region. If unattached to the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, these males would have had the potential to contract marriages with nonlocal females. Nonlocal brides would have

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introduced wealth from the outside into a region whose material and biological resources were dominated by the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba. External inputs could have potentially diluted the lineage’s hegemony over resources in the local world of Co´rdoba. Further, this would have allowed nonlocal elites to enter the region and possibly challenge the position of the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba. Local marriages prevented the entrance of powerful nonlocal families to the area. Local lords vehemently opposed the entrance of the Sotomayor family of Extremadura into Co´rdoba because the latter’s acquisition of land challenged their position in the Sierra Morena.66 Fierce competition for local resources in the form of genetic stock that was already tied to the Aguilar, Alcaudete, and Comares may have impeded the Cabra from marrying among locals at a higher rate, thereby explaining its defiance of the trend of high-frequency local marriages and its search for partners from outside the region.

The Local and Nonlocal Marriages of Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba Sons In contrast to the lineage’s daughters, Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba sons did not marry locals at a high rate. Only 43 percent of sons found local matches, in comparison to 80 percent of daughters. Yet when sons took local wives, they also had the conservation of family resources in mind. This strategy can be discerned from marriages that paired sons of one branch of the lineage with daughters of another. In the late Middle Ages, the Aguilar wedded members of the other lines three times, the Alcaudete six, the Comares five, and the Cabra three. These figures nevertheless overstate the actual number of couples since an Alcaudete-Comares marriage would be counted again as a ComaresAlcaudete marriage. After eliminating duplications, ten pairings between Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba cousins from the four major branches can be counted. The Aguilar married only once with each of the junior branches, clearly preferring contracting ties outside of the clan. In contrast, the Alcaudete wedded once with the Aguilar, twice with the Cabra, and three times with the Comares. The two marriages between the Alcaudete and the Cabra coincided with a period of political and military collaboration between the two families in the political and social upheavals of early fifteenth-century Co´rdoba. As we have seen, the Alcaudete-Comares union between Martı´n de Co´rdoba y de Velasco, the future Count of Alcaudete, and Leonor Pacheco,

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daughter of Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, the Marquis of Comares I, cemented extremely close ties between the two houses at the beginning of the sixteenth century. In addition to the three marriages the Comares contracted with the Alcaudete, it found matches once each in the Aguilar and Cabra. Finally, the Cabra twice wedded the Alcaudete and once each with the Aguilar and the Comares. Certainly these marriages evidence extraordinarily close ties between the collateral lines of the lineage. Yet the particular status of Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba grooms tells an additional story. Among interfamilial unions, seven of ten husbands were primoge´nitos. Moreover, they all came from junior houses: four from the Alcaudete, two from the Comares, and one from the Cabra.67 A significant majority of husbands were slated to inherit the bulk of their parents’ estates. This insight helps us understand the strategy behind marriages among the four houses. Junior houses sought to preserve their patrimony not just locally, but within the lineage. For example, the Alcaudete primoge´nitos’ unions with daughters from the other lines meant that its patrimony could be enfolded into a branch of the clan in the event that they did not have surviving children. Likewise, if the Comares and Cabra sons were not to have surviving offspring, their lines could still collapse into an allied family of the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba lineage. The absence of Aguilar heirs as grooms to Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba brides further suggests that the junior branches mutually supported each other through this pattern of intermarriage. In premodern times, the risk that a family could die out was constant, and this possibility was factored into marriage strategies. That the intersection of marriage and death could mean the unexpected devolution of property to another family is illustrated by Martı´n Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s union with a daughter from the House of Argote, a local notable family. Martı´n, heir of the House of Comares (his father was the first lord of Chillo´n), married Marı´a Alfonso de Argote. Marı´a herself was the daughter of Juan Martı´nez de Argote, Lord of Lucena and Espejo II. Martı´n and Marı´a’s marriage was the second time that ties had been contracted between the House of Comares and the Argote.68 In fact, their marriage coincided with the union of Martı´n’s sister Marı´a Alfon with Juan Martı´nez de Argote’s brother Alfonso Ferna´ndez de Argote. This double marriage clearly represented an attempt to cement the closest relationship possible between the two houses. A double marriage was also arranged with the deliberate idea that if either the Comares or Argote line died off, one house’s estates would fold into the other’s. In

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this case, Martı´n Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba went on to inherit his father’s property and assumed the title Lord of Chillo´n II. The Argote’s estates of Lucena and Espejo were originally intended for Marı´a’s brothers. However, due to the early death of her male relatives, she unexpectedly inherited Lucena and Espejo. The Comares’ estate of Chillo´n thus combined with those of the House of Argote to form a patrimony that consisted of Chillo´n, Lucena, and Espejo. These were passed on undivided to Martı´n and Marı´a’s son Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba as the Lord of Chillo´n III and the Lord of Lucena and Espejo IV. These three estates thereafter formed the core patrimony of the House of Comares into the early modern period.69 Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba sons wedded a few more nonlocal partners than local: 51 percent to 44 percent. The individual rates for each family varied. Of male marriages, 66 percent were nonlocal for the Aguilar, 53 percent for the Alcaudete, a tiny 18 percent for the Comares, and 60 percent for the Cabra. What accounted for the difference between daughters’ preference for local mates and sons’ more numerous matches with distant partners? On the one hand, the potential to recover resources that were expended in dowries helps explain female patterns. On the other hand, sons that married women from outside the region attracted non-autochthonous wealth into the area. The dowries that their brides brought with them could be considered an infusion of capital into the family—nonlocal resources to which rival notables did not have access. Such marriages, then, could help aggrandize the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba. Marriages of daughters constructed and consolidated local social ties. In contrast, sons wedded partners to families in other parts of the realm. From the very first generation of the clan, Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba males contracted ties with females from outside of the region. Among the children of Alfonso Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba (the first to use the compound surname) and Teresa Jime´nez de Go´ngora, both the first and second sons wedded partners from outside the region. Ferna´n Alfonso, the elder, married Marı´a Ruı´z de Biedma, whose family would one day become the counts of Santiesteban del Puerto, the wealthiest and most powerful nobles in neighboring Jae´n.70 The second son, Martı´n, wedded Aldonza Lo´pez de Haro, a descendent of a blue-blooded Old Castilian family that had moved to Seville after its conquest. In the early years of the lineage’s history, Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba sons did not range far if they chose partners from outside their home region. Brides came from Seville, Jae´n, Toledo, and Extremadura, all regions that bordered Co´rdoba. Among Sevillan families, matches were made with the Haro, the Ribera, and especially the Ponce de Leo´n. Ties to the Guzma´n—

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Seville’s wealthiest family—were noticeably absent until the seventeenth century. In Jae´n, only the lords of Santiesteban del Puerto pertained to the same elevated social class as the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, and marriages frequently connected the two lineages. As time went on, both the geographic range and the prestige of partners increased. Examples of the latter included a daughter of the Figueroa family of Extremadura (future counts and dukes of Feria) and a descendant of the Afa´n de Ribera house of Seville (future dukes of Alcala´ de los Gazules and marquises of Tarifa). Prestige marriages culminated in the last years of the fifteenth century when primoge´nitos of all four branches found spectacular matches. Alfonso de Aguilar, heir of the eponymous house, married Catalina Pacheco. Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, the scion of the Comares family, followed in his uncle’s footsteps and wedded Juana Pacheco, Catalina’s sister. Both women were daughters of the Marquis of Villena, King Enrique IV’s favorite, a man whose power made him capable of manipulating royal succession struggles. Villena and Aguilar’s opposition to the succession of the future Queen Isabella, half-sister of Enrique IV, reflected this close political alliance that was sealed by family ties. Mirroring Comares and Aguilar’s success, Alfonso Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, Lord of Alcaudete V, contracted ties with Marı´a de Velasco. The head of Marı´a’s lineage was the Constable of Castile and the Duke of Frı´as, a man who would serve as governor of Spain from 1520 to 1524. Another Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, the Count of Cabra II, married Marı´a Hurtado de Mendoza, the daughter of the Duke of Infantado I. The bride’s father was patriarch of one of the few clans whose political influence and military power extended to almost every corner of the kingdom. Marriages in the late fifteenth century foreshadowed the unions that would link the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba sons as well as daughters to some of the oldest, wealthiest, and most powerful families in Castile as well as the kingdoms of Aragon and Navarre in the early modern period. In contrast to local matches in the Middle Ages, these weddings would alienate the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba more and more from its local community.

Conclusion: Local Place and the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba Clan in the Middle Ages When the Lord of Alcaudete I Alfonso Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba died in 1390, he left a clause in his will that laid out his deep attachment to the local world of Co´rdoba. Alfonso wrote: ‘‘I order that my sepulcher be placed between

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the great altar of my chapel of San Pedro in the Cathedral of Co´rdoba. Let the tomb of Don˜a Juana my wife be constructed in front of the altar. These sepulchers must not be made too high. No one else is to be entombed here except my legitimate sons and daughters. Their sons and daughters may not have honorable burials in any other church. I also command that the sepulchers of these [children] not be made too high . . . and I order that Don˜a Juana and the executors of my will construct, plaster, enclose, elaborate, and decorate my chapel as best they can and as conscientiously as possible.’’71 King Enrique II awarded the Chapel of San Pedro to the Lord of Alcaudete I in 1368.72 Enrique was indebted to the nobleman for defending Co´rdoba from a siege laid by the combined forces of Enrique’s half-brother Pedro I and the emir of Granada. Pedro had called upon the emir’s help to defeat Enrique, his father’s bastard son, who was attempting to usurp his rule in Castile. Alfonso’s defense helped Enrique win the Castilian civil war of the midfourteenth century and found the Trasta´mara dynasty that would rule Spain until the first years of the sixteenth century. At the same moment that a new royal dynasty was established, Alfonso would also cement the fortunes of his junior branch of the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba lineage by acquiring the estate of Alcaudete. Along with his father’s property of Montemayor, the two formed the definitive patrimony of the House of Alcaudete into the late sixteenth century. The establishment of his family in Cordovan society further entailed winning an honorable place of burial, and there was perhaps no more prestigious tomb than the Chapel of San Pedro, a space consecrated from the former mihrab of the Great Umayyad Mosque. In Alfonso’s testament, a clause of which is quoted above, the Cordovan lord sought to use the chapel as a way to safeguard the memory of his glorious deeds among his family and the city. At the same time, by stipulating that his descendants could find honorable burials only in the chapel, Alfonso hoped to maintain the cohesion of the family. Sharing a tomb might symbolize harmony in the afterlife, but it also required cooperation among relatives in the present. Besides storing his family’s bones in the mihrab-chapel, Alfonso also hoped to use the space to preserve his and his house’s identity. The mihrab is an architectural device in a mosque that orients Muslims toward Mecca for prayer. The fantasy arches, columns, and several copulas that formed the Great Mosque’s mihrab were stunningly saturated with intricate mosaics of golden tiles, calligraphic inscriptions from the Quran, and marbled walls.73 The grandeur of this space can still be seen in the restored mihrab today. Alfonso claimed possession of this unique space and left a trace of his personality and presence by decorating it to his own tastes. He commissioned a

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local master influenced by the Italian-Gothic style to create a retable of five pieces.74 Four paintings, all of the same dimensions, portray the saints Catalina of Alexandria, Peter, Paul, and Francis of Assisi. A larger fifth piece shows the Virgin feeding an infant Christ. Angels hover by their side, while kneeling before them are the patrons—Alfonso and Don˜a Juana—presented by the saints Ildefonso and Bernard. The retable still finds a place of honor in the cathedral today. While no longer lodged in the mihrab, these paintings, the oldest conserved by the church, are displayed in front of the hall of the Chapter House. In the times of the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, the incongruence of Gothic art lodged in the setting of an Islamic mihrab must have made the place unique. Alfonso’s testament clearly expressed the significance that place played in the minds and in the lives of the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba and other high noble families in the late Middle Ages. By exhorting his family to bury their bones in San Pedro and encouraging them to patronize the chapel, the lord hoped to establish the family’s identity in, and associate it with, this prestigious space. Association with place would help later generations recall their ancestors’ role in the Castilian civil war as well as the defense of the frontier, and the conquest of the caliphal capital itself. As this chapter has shown, the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba clan demonstrated an acute awareness of the local in the marriages of its daughters and sons. The Alcaudete family tomb further intertwined place with collective identity. The Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s own concern for its immediate surroundings was understandable given that geographic and historical circumstances specific to Co´rdoba played a critical part in the emergence of the clan. The unusual rise to power of four separate branches of one lineage in a delimited local society over a relatively brief period of time was made possible by the particularities of Co´rdoba’s place and its postconquest history. Situating the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba in its local context helps to contrast the phenomenal expansion of the lineage’s professional, geographic, ideological, and reproductive interests in the early modern period, with the Comares and Alcaudete branches leading the way.

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chapter 2

The Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba Lineage and Early Spanish Expansion, 1482–1518

King Ferdinand took King Philip in his right hand and like that they went halfway down the aisle of the church, and there King Philip was passed to his left hand. And then the two kings, the Archbishop of Toledo, Don Juan Manuel, the Ambassador of the King of the Romans, and the Secretary Almac¸a´n entered the vestry where they swore to King Ferdinand that Queen Juana, his daughter, was mad. With this done they went out . . . King Ferdinand left the church weeping so hard that no one was able to see his face, and the next day he departed for Valladolid with the Queen Germaine his wife and her ladies-in-waiting, and the Duke of Alba, the Alcaide de los Donceles, Hernando de Vega, and others. —Pedro de Alcocer, De lo que sucedio´ en Espan˜a en cosas particulares desde la venida del Rey Felippe I hasta su muerto

Starting in the late fifteenth century, Spaniards embarked on an acquisitions spree that gathered an array of disparate territories into an empire. In a few short decades this realm came to encompass most of the Iberian Peninsula, chunks of the New World, a chain of presidios in North Africa, half of Italy, and even the Low Countries and much of central Europe. Despite the size and power it would eventually reach, the polity’s longevity and cohesion were predicated first on the ability of Queen Isabella and King Ferdinand to bequeath their Castilian and Aragonese possessions intact to a successor. Such

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a task proved tricky.1 After Isabella’s death in 1504, the unexpected succession of her third child, Juana, also brought the latter’s ambitious Habsburg husband, Philip I, to the Castilian throne. Philip consolidated his power by marginalizing both his wife and her father, Ferdinand. The passage quoted at the beginning of the chapter vividly captures the moment in which Juana was declared insane, removing her from the power that was legitimately hers, and Ferdinand was dismissed from the governorship of Castile.2 Although the latter would regain control of Castile following Philip’s brief reign, he temporarily retired to his Aragonese possessions.3 Attending to Ferdinand as he left Castile was Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, the Alcaide de los Donceles and head of the House of Comares, one of the few nobles that remained faithful to the old king at this moment of debility.4 Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba was one of Ferdinand’s great collaborators. He first caught the king’s attention during the Granada War. Every year during the ten-year conflict, the Cordovan lord marshaled a seigneurial army made up of hundreds of men from his own estates and led them into combat at his sovereign’s side. Royal favor as well as his own skills ensured that after the fall of the emirate Diego would continue to exercise high military and administrative leadership. In 1505, he commanded an expedition that crossed the Strait of Gibraltar to Algeria and seized the presidio of Mers el-Kebir. Four years later, he helped conquer the neighboring city of Oran, where he was installed as the first captain general of what Spaniards called the ‘‘kingdom’’ of Tremece´n and Tenez. In 1512 he was recalled to Spain to captain the invasion of Navarre.5 Ferdinand conferred the title of Marquis of Comares on the nobleman that same year and appointed him the first viceroy of Navarre. He would hold this office until 1515 and then return to Oran as captain general until his death in 1518, two years following the demise of his great patron the king. Service on behalf of the crown and the empire took Diego into a burgeoning imperial world. His career set a pattern that his descendants would replicate in the following three generations. Stepping foot onto new lands detached Diego and his family from their Cordovan home base, one that their ancestors had long embraced.6 This rupture would be especially pronounced for his daughter Leonor Pacheco and the family she engendered with her husband, Martı´n de Co´rdoba of the House of Alcaudete. Such a break even meant distancing themselves from other branches of the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba clan—the Aguilar and the Cabra. In fact, the Comares’s and Alcaudete’s consistent service as high-level military commanders, governors,

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and royal councilors set them down a new path that diverged from the lineage’s medieval history. Diego’s life marked this moment of change. The reason he and his descendants undertook this trajectory can be readily discerned by drawing comparisons between the Comares and the Alcaudete and their cousins the Aguilar and Cabra. Although all four houses of the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba ranked among the upper echelons of the high nobility, Comares and Alcaudete incomes were actually dwarfed by their richer cousins’. As a consequence, they sought royal favor and offices in order to aggrandize their fortunes. Like the Comares and Alcaudete, the lords of Aguilar and Cabra also contributed soldiers to the Granada War. However, they did not continue to participate in imperial campaigns to the degree that their cousins did. Secure in their wealth, prestige, and power, the Aguilar and Cabra resumed their lives as seigneurial lords and urban aristocrats, and then moved on to the capital as courtiers discharging honorific duties.7 Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s service in the early expansion of the empire represented the roles that high nobles broadly played in these years. After all, the realm’s immense growth over a relatively short period of time necessitated collaborators willing to commit energy, resources, and at times their own blood to the enterprise. And yet a focus on royal centralization and ‘‘absolutism’’ has downplayed the contributions aristocrats made to the construction of the early modern empire. Similarly, the ‘‘military revolution’’ was supposed to have rendered medieval knights obsolete. In both formulae, the nobility represent a reactionary force stubbornly refusing to adapt to both a modernizing society and the perceived good of a centralizing state. While historians have shed their assumptions about both the effectiveness and the beneficence of the early modern state, the nobility’s contributions to the creation of the empire has not been reclaimed. The processes of conquest, colonization, and administration that produced a new empire were effectuated by an invigorated monarchy combined with the efforts of a broad spectrum of Spanish society. The Cordovan lord and his fellow aristocrats were the members of society that commanded sufficient resources and status to serve in the prestigious roles of military commanders and royal governors, especially in the conflictive societies of newly conquered territories.8 Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s history stands in for the activities of the nobility in general. Yet the difference that is revealed between his and the House of Alcaudete’s contributions to the imperial enterprise and those of their cousins also marks distinctions among the high nobility. Diego highlights the trajectory of what I call the middle stratum of the high nobility made up of seigneurial lords yet to receive titles, members of junior branches

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of great houses, and second sons. While their resources were not negligible, a gulf divided them from the great land magnates who would be recognized by Charles V in 1520 as grandees possessing the means to project power on a national level.9 An examination of Diego’s history, then, also helps pinpoint a cohort of middle-stratum high nobles who, when put together, constituted the staff that helped birth and then nurture the early empire.

Resume´ of a Sen˜or, Captain, and Governor in the Early Era of Spanish Conquests A new age of Spanish territorial expansion began in 1482 with the Granada War. Different elements of Spanish society, including city militias, military orders, and the nobility and their vassals and retainers, emerged out of their fragmented localities to fight, fund, and support a military endeavor that lasted ten years. Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba began his service to the crown in this war. In one of the first acts preceding the outbreak of the general conflict, the Marquis of Ca´diz, Rodrigo Ponce de Leo´n, laid siege to the strategic town of Alhama at the heart of the emirate in 1482. Diego and his Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba cousins came to the aid of Ca´diz when Muslims attempted to retake it.10 Following the relief of Alhama, Diego’s next great feat was the capture of Emir Boabdil (Abu Abdallah Muhammad XII) of Granada when the ruler invaded Diego’s frontier estate of Lucena in April 1483. The Lord of Lucena had been warned that Granadine forces were massing on the border, preparing to mount an invasion. In the prelude to the battle, he doubled the guards in his castles, sent reconnaissance into the countryside, and recruited knights from the city of Co´rdoba. Once he ascertained that the enemy had assembled a large force, he conveyed the intelligence to his cousin and neighbor the Count of Cabra and other lords in the area. Women and those who were unable to fight were collected from the surrounding countryside into the walled compound of Lucena. On the night of April 20, under the cover of darkness, the emir marched in force against Lucena. Once he had news of the Muslims’ movements, Diego lit beacons to summon help from the count, whose estate bordered his own in the densely seigneurial southern region. The ensuing battle resulted in the emir’s capture and ransom.11 Diego’s valor in combat brought him to the attention of the Catholic Monarchs.12 He and the Count of Cabra were feˆted by Isabella and Ferdinand, who journeyed to Co´rdoba a year later to commemorate their deed. Summoned to the royal audience, Diego and Cabra marched to the capital

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from their seigneurial estates. One league from the city gates, they were met by the grandees of Spain, who provided an escort of honor as they made their triumphal entry into the capital.13 The following day, the two Cordovan lords dined with Ferdinand amid festivities that included twenty richly attired dancing ladies and singing minstrels. At the celebration, Isabella danced with a daughter of the Marquis of Astorga, the infanta with a Portuguese lady-in-waiting, and Ferdinand with his cousin Don Fadrique, the son of the Duke of Alba.14 Diego and Cabra had choice seats beside the king, queen, and infanta at the dinner table. The meal itself consisted of a great variety of meats. After dinner, the two lords were invited for private audiences with the monarchs in their quarters. They were also presented with monetary awards. Diego received a perpetual bond (juro) of 150,000 mrs per year and another juro of 100,000 mrs for life.15 Boabdil had been held prisoner in Diego’s castle in Lucena, and the lord commemorated this deed by adding an image of the emir to his family coat of arms. The defeated ruler was depicted dressed in royal purple, but his submission was symbolized by an iron chain clasped around his neck. The haughty motto ‘‘omnia per ipsum facta sunt’’ (‘‘all was done by him’’) accompanied the image.16 An illustration of this battle is depicted in one of the fifty-four wood reliefs that were carved into the lower row of seats encircling the choir of the Cathedral of Toledo. These reliefs feature heroic scenes from the Granada War. Diego and the Count of Cabra can be seen clad in armor smiting the turbaned enemy from atop their steeds with the castle walls of Lucena in the background.17 The Catholic Monarchs continued to honor Diego’s service by confirming in 1484 the martial title Alcaide de los Donceles in perpetuity to the nobleman and his successors.18 For the duration of the war, the lord and the companies of soldiers he commanded occupied the preeminent vanguard position of the royal army when it was in formation.19 Isabella and Ferdinand once again awarded Diego’s service at the war’s end in 1492, granting him the Granadine town of Sedella, which he later exchanged for Comares.20 Diego’s title of marquis, conceded in 1512, bore the name of Comares.21 The town formed part of a chain of fortresses and towers that lined Granada’s coast. As the highest settlement in the area, its strategic location was even more exceptional. Diego’s acquisition of the town in 1512 reflected a continuation of his family’s late medieval occupation as defenders of the frontier. Though the Muslims of Granada were guaranteed protections following the conquest, tolerance of Islam dissipated a few short years after 1492. In

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Figure 5. Relief, Battle of Lucena, Choir of the Cathedral of Toledo

early December 1499, Francisco Jime´nez de Cisneros, archbishop of Toledo, future regent and inquisitor general of Spain, arrived in Granada to prosecute renegade Christians who had converted to Islam, a group he did not consider to be protected by the surrender treaties. The persecution provoked fear and unrest among Muslims, and ended up inciting a revolt in the Albaicı´n quarter of the city on December 18, 1499.22 With the uprising spreading in 1500 to the Alpujarras mountains south of the capital and to the Serranı´a de Ronda highlands west of Ma´laga, the Catholic Monarchs appointed Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba to serve as their captain general in Almeria, a region southeast of the capital where a particularly resistant insurrection was holding out.23 Mobilizing men from the towns of Murcia and Lorca, Diego laid siege and captured the Muslim stronghold of Belefique in 1501.24 The Cordovan lord counted this victory as another significant deed as he again added symbols of

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his vanquished foes to his family crest, in this case the twenty-one banners of the Muslim insurgents captured at the sieges of Belefique, Nı´jar, and Huebro. A royal license from the Catholic Monarchs on October 15, 1501, recognized this honor.25 Queen Isabella, whose religious fervency had guided Spain’s drive to conquer Granada, died in 1504. Her testament urged her successors to press on against the Muslims. In 1505, Spaniards crossed the Strait of Gibraltar and seized Mers el-Kebir, the strategic fortress that commanded the bay where the city of Oran is also situated. Ferdinand appointed Diego captain general of the 7,000 Spanish soldiers who embarked in an armada of 170 ships to capture Mers el-Kebir.26 On September 10, 1505, the Spaniards defeated the Muslim defenders of the presidio.27 The Christians broadened their control in 1509, conquering the city of Oran itself and imposing its suzerainty over the Reino de Tremece´n through proxies.28 Diego, who had stayed on as alcaide (commander) and captain of Mers el-Kebir, fought in the conquest of Oran under the generalship of Pedro Navarro, Count of Oliveto.29 Afterward the Cordovan lord was appointed captain general of the Reino in 1509.30 He remained in Oran until 1512, when he was ordered to quickly draw up a peace treaty with local Muslims and immediately head north to assist the Duke of Alba in the invasion of Navarre.31 The Navarrese put up token resistance to a far superior Spanish force, and the campaign was effectuated in a matter of weeks in September 1512. Diego’s service earned him the title of Marquis of Comares at the end of 1512.32 After the takeover, the new marquis remained as viceroy of the mountain kingdom until 1515, when he returned to Oran and served a second term as captain general until his death in 1518.33 Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s service to the crown helped enrich him as a sen˜or. The crown awarded him lands and rights over revenues on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. The Cordovan possessed the titles to these properties and bequeathed them to his descendants. These included several towns in Oran’s environs—Mostagani, Mazargani, Canastel, and the port of Arzeo, as well as the depopulated hinterlands surrounding the latter two.34 Unique among the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, the House of Comares owned property in North Africa. Akin to receiving a sen˜orı´o on the Iberian mainland, possession of the properties came with jurisdiction over ‘‘its boundaries, lands, districts, territories, and with all the subjects which are found there henceforth, with jurisdiction over civil and criminal justice.’’35 The lands came with obligations that harked back to those that Diego’s

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ancestors had to fulfill on the frontier with Granada in the late Middle Ages. The Spanish monarchs required that Diego build fortresses on his territory at his own expense to defend against North Africans. In addition to estates, Diego also received income from the saltworks of Arzeo and the Campo de Cerette.36 These saltworks remained a part of the Comares family’s patrimony. Andre´s Ferna´ndez Caldero´n, the notary of Oran, gave sworn testimony of how the third marquis of Comares, grandson of Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba and himself captain general of Oran, confirmed possession of the saltworks in 1593.37 His vivid description follows: Sen˜or Don Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, Duke of Cardona and of Segorbe, Marquis of Comares [III] . . . Captain General and Justicia Mayor of these presidios of Oran, Mers el-Kebir, the kingdoms of Tlemcen and Tenez on behalf of the King our lord, being present at the salt mines five leagues to the east of the said city of Oran with the greater part of the soldiers, requested that I witness how he took possession of the said salt mines as his own. . . . The sen˜or Duke walked through the salt mine and took salt in his hands and offered it to some of the persons present there and ordered those who wanted to, to take and carry away some [salt], all in demonstration of ownership. And he took possession of it calmly and peacefully without contradiction by anybody.38 The Marquis of Comares III asserted his rights over the patrimony won by his grandfather in North Africa in a highly tactile and symbolic act. This manner of taking possession conformed to the application of Roman law in medieval Spain for claiming ownership of property but goes further to highlight the House of Comares’s direct ties to lands on the southern shores of the Mediterranean throughout the sixteenth century. In contrast, when the Marquis of Comares III’s son and successor Enrique took possession of the salt mines in 1615, he did not attend personally, but acted through a proxy.39 Other nobles, ranging from the highest grandees of the realm, such as the Duke of Medina Sidonia, to less prominent provincial elites like Pedrarias Da´vila from Segovia, also received grants of property in North Africa during the process of conquest.40 Medina Sidonia led his own strike force to conquer Melilla, a city on the Moroccan coast, in 1497. He captured the enclave, one of two in North Africa still owned by Spain today, for the crown but claimed it as part of his own patrimony. However, by 1556 he had to relinquish Melilla to the monarchy due to the high cost of maintaining and securing

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the presidio.41 If Medina Sidonia, Spain’s richest grandee, had difficulty holding on to his property, it is likely that lesser nobles ran into similar problems. Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba possessed resources far inferior to those of the duke. In comparison, however, the marquises of Comares continued to effectively claim lordship over North African lands well into the seventeenth century. As we will see next, it was often the lesser members of the high nobility who invested more in imperial expansion.

A ‘‘Middle Member’’ of the High Nobility Although his family had a long tradition of defending the border, Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba would not seem a likely candidate to achieve exceptional distinction in the Granada War. The great Andalusian nobles who commanded more lavish fortunes while sharing a similarly distinguished pedigree of frontier service should have overshadowed him. An examination of the number of troops nobles mobilized for the war effort each year demonstrates that the Andalusian aristocrats the Lord of Aguilar, the Count of Cabra, the Duke of Medina Sidonia, and the Marquis of Ca´diz did indeed supply more men than Diego. Other great nobles from outside of Andalusia—such as the Constable of Castile and the Admiral of Castile; the dukes of Medinaceli, Alba, Infantado, and Albuquerque; the marquises of Villena and Astorga; and the Count of Benavente—may also have been expected to participate more intensively in the war than a modest provincial lord. After all, these dukes, marquises, counts, and lords were among the twenty-five who would be designated ‘‘grandees of Spain’’ by Emperor Charles V. Yet the service of the highest nobles was uneven. Determining the relative means of nobles by analyzing their incomes, the number of troops they fielded, the population of their estates, the tax contributions of their subjects, and the awards they received at the end of the war reveals that Diego’s contribution to the campaign matched or surpassed many of his more illustrious peers, despite his relative handicaps. This comparison sheds light on the roles that other middle members of the high nobility, including the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba Lord of Alcaudete, played at the start of imperial expansion. The Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba Lord of Aguilar and Count of Cabra, along with the vast majority of Spain’s dukes and marquises, outdistanced Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba in financial resources. Lucio Marineo Sı´culo’s chronicle Obra de las cosas memorables de Espan˜a, published in 1533, enables us to

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situate the annual income enjoyed by Diego’s House of Comares vis-a`-vis those of his cousins and other Spanish nobles.42 According to Obra, the thirteen dukes of Spain enjoyed annual incomes that averaged 43,000 ducats. The dukes of Frı´as (Constable of Castile), Escalona (Marquis of Villena), Medina Sidonia, and Medinaceli far outstripped their peers with revenues ranging between 50,000 and 60,000 ducats. The Count of Cabra (who, by the 1530s, went by the title Duke of Sessa) also ranked among these very wealthiest, collecting 60,000 ducats per year. In contrast, the Marquis of Ca´diz (now the Duke of Arcos), an outstanding contributor to the Granada War, earned only 25,000 ducats, the lowest among dukes. The sum of 25,000 ducats was also the average annual income of the thirteen marquises of Spain. Earning well above the mean of marquises, the Lord of Aguilar (now Marquis de Priego) took in the most among his peers at 40,000 ducats a year, a handsome sum equivalent to the income of a duke. On the lower end of the spectrum, the Marquis of Monde´jar (also the Count of Tendilla), son of the first captain general of postconquest Granada, mustered only 15,000 ducats a year. A step below Monde´jar, Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s son Luis (Marquis of Comares II) had only 12,000 ducats at his disposal each year, less than half of the average of his marquis peers. In fact, Comares had the unhappy distinction of being the second most impecunious of the marquises.43 The average count among the thirty-four listed in the chronicle extracted 11,000 ducats of yearly income. The Lord of Alcaudete (now Count of Alcaudete), fourth and arguably the least powerful among the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba lineage, collected a little less than the average, at 10,000 ducats. In comparison, the Count of Benavente earned as much as the wealthiest duke at 60,000 ducats. Within the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba lineage, the Houses of Comares and Alcaudete earned annual incomes that approximated each other—12,000 and 10,000 ducats, respectively. They were dwarfed by their cousins the Lord of Aguilar and the Count of Cabra, who extracted revenues some three to six times greater. Even when compared with their marquis and condal peers as a whole, Comares’s and Alcaudete’s revenues were on the low end of the spectrum. They were certainly far below those of the other great nobles of Andalusia, including the Duke of Medina Sidonia and the Marquis of Ca´diz. Although 12,000 and 10,000 ducats must still have been comfortable sums, they paled in comparison to the incomes of their peers among the high nobility. Based on income, Comares and Alcaudete belonged to a class below the upper stratum of the high nobility. Along with others such as the Marquis of

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Monde´jar (Count of Tendilla), they should be considered a middle stratum of the high nobility. Comparing incomes is only one way of determining the relative status of members of the high nobility. Another indication is the number of people that lived, worked, and paid taxes on their seigneurial estates. The population figures for the four Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba houses corroborate the conclusion derived from an analysis of revenue: Comares and the Alcaudete ranked below their more resourceful Aguilar and Cabra relatives. According to the census of 1530, an estimated 5,237 taxpaying households (vecinos) resided on the estates of the Lord of Aguilar. The lands of the Count of Cabra had 3,410 vecinos. In contrast, the Marquisate of Comares possessed 3,094 vecinos, somewhat fewer than Cabra but certainly far fewer than Aguilar. The Count of Alcaudete’s territory was the least populated; only 1,391 vecinos lived on his estates.44 Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba and the Lord of Alcaudete belonged to a more humble class of the high nobility. However, earning smaller incomes and possessing fewer subjects did not prevent these two lords from contributing heavily to the Granada War. In fact, the number of soldiers that they fielded each year compared to, and at times surpassed, those of their grandee peers. Miguel A´ngel Ladero Quesada has calculated the numbers of cavalrymen that fifty or so different aristocrats sent off to battle from 1483 to 1491.45 In 1483, Diego fielded 170 cavalrymen and Alcaudete 150. A number of magnates performed up to expectations and surpassed these two relatively modest Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba lords, including the Count of Cabra (550 cavalry), the Duke of Medina Sidonia (550), the Marquis of Ca´diz (300), the Lord of Aguilar (270), and the Duke of Na´jera (250). However, other grandees such as the dukes of Medinaceli (126), Albuquerque (125), Infantado (89), and Alba (14) and the Marquis of Villena (90) fielded significantly fewer men than Diego and Alcaudete. An analysis of other years of the war confirms the pattern. While the great lords of Andalusia—the Duke of Medina Sidonia, the Marquis of Ca´diz, the Count of Cabra, and the Lord of Aguilar—ranked among the most generous contributors of troops to the yearly campaigns, Diego and Alcaudete also fielded enough soldiers to consistently match or outstrip a number of the magnates. They were joined in this distinction by other mid-level high nobles such as the Count of Belalca´zar and the Lord of Palma, both Cordovans, and the Count of Feria from Extremadura.46 The outsized contributions that Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba and the Lord of Alcaudete made to the war were mirrored in the tax contributions

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(servicio) that the subjects living on their estates paid to the crown. Despite possessing a smaller number of households, the two lords actually paid proportionally higher servicios than those residing on Aguilar and Cabra estates. Accounts for the province of Co´rdoba exist for 1527–28 and 1530. In 1527–28, a household living on the estates of the Lord of Alcaudete paid 193 maravedı´s (mrs) per year, 4.5 times more than the 42.3 mrs/per year that a household on the Marquisate of Priego turned over that same year. Households on the estates of the Count of Cabra and the Marquis of Comares annually paid 70.5 mrs and 63 mrs, respectively. Although Comares households contributed somewhat less than Cabra households, they still paid 50 percent more than a Priego household. In fact, the largest seigneurial estates paid by far the smallest per-household share of servicio taxes in 1527–28, while residents of smaller estates bore a heavier burden. Despite an adjustment in 1530 that broadly equalized the tax contributions of Cordovan residents, Alcaudete and Comares households still paid a rate similar to those of the far-richer estates of Priego and Cabra.47 It is surprising that some of the great magnates did not make contributions to the war at a consistently high level compared with some of their more modest peers. Miguel A´ngel Ladero Quesada has also recognized this imbalance among high nobles. He has differentiated between courtesans who attended to the monarchs, aristocrats who sent troops captained by proxies, and lords who led their soldiers into battle and engaged personally in combat.48 Geography may have played a role in determining how the nobles responded to the war. Lords from northern Castile seemed more aloof.49 Andre´s Berna´ldez, a chronicler during the reign of the Catholic Monarchs, explained that the Castilian nobles declined to attend to Isabella and Ferdinand toward the end of the war, when they had pushed to the gates of the Granadine capital and established a camp at Santa Fe just outside the city in preparation for a siege: The king set up his camp in a very orderly fashion at the same place where they built the town of Santa Fe, two leagues from Granada, where there were continually more than 50,000 men of war, of whom 10,000 were cavalrymen. . . . The capitanes mayores that the king had at that siege were: the Maestre de Santiago, the [Marquis] of Ca´diz, the Duke of Escalona, the Count of Tendilla, the Count of Cifuentes, the Count of Cabra, the [Lord] of Aguilar, and the Count of Uruen˜a—knights of Andalusia, who, since they were close by, came to the siege. . . . And the

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grandees of Castile, as they were tired of coming from so far away to the past battles and sieges, many did not come to [this siege] in person, but sent their captains with the men.50 As Berna´ldez observed, the nobles from the north did not seem to perform at the same level. They sent proxies to captain their companies instead of leading them in person. In 1482, the dukes of Alba and Infantado and the counts of Alba de Liste, Castan˜eda, Siruela, and Osorno all sent proxy captains to serve in their place.51 Some nobles may also have been able to sidestep martial service by lending the crown generous sums. The Count and Countess of Corun˜a each lent the crown 1,000,000 maravedı´s in 1487, the count another 1,000,000 mrs in 1489, and his brother 4,988,000 mrs in the same year. Likewise, the Count of Benavente, a man whose descendants enjoyed a phenomenal annual income of 60,000 ducats in 1530, handed over 5,000,000 mrs in 1487, perhaps to make up for the embarrassingly low number of troops that he contributed to the war.52 The inconsistent service of the northern nobility stands in contrast to that of the great magnates and the middle-stratum lords of Andalusia. Having long cultivated a frontier-warrior identity, the latter were expected to personally engage in battle.53 The proximity of their estates to the border provided additional opportunities to contribute to the war. The Catholic Monarchs mustered their army year after year in the city of Co´rdoba. They also loaded the baggage trains and the armaments of the invasion force in the capital.54 The local nobility provided needed resources for this mobilization. The Lord of Aguilar sold 6,626 fanegas of wheat to the royal treasurer for the army’s consumption during the war.55 Muleteers from the Lord of Alcaudete’s small estate of Montemayor were paid 225,757 maravedı´s in 1487 for transporting provisions along the roads, over which Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba–owned castles loomed, to the army camps in the south. Apparently, their business competed very well with the services offered by carriers of the much more populous capital city of Co´rdoba, who were paid 402,724 mrs the same year.56 In fact, the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba lords seemed to hover omnipresently at the elbows of the Catholic Monarchs. When the queen arrived at Santa Fe and wanted to reconnoiter the city of Granada, she was escorted by three of the four Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba lords (Cabra, Aguilar, and Alcaudete), the Marquis of Ca´diz, and the Count of Tendilla. Along with their men, these lords formed a moving shield that protected their sovereign from possible forays coming out of the city.57 The Ferna´ndez de Co´rdobas’ service in the war kept them

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constantly at the sides of the Catholic Monarchs, and such proximity must have also provided them with close access to the channels of power. Several conclusions can be drawn from these comparisons of the high nobility. First, the middle stratum performed services on behalf of the crown to help augment their limited fortunes and resources. Second, the amount of service or its quality did not necessarily correlate with the limited financial, material, or human resources at the nobles’ disposal. While their contributions were consistently smaller than those of the great magnates of Andalusia, they could still be viewed positively in relation to those of northern grandees, who did not send as many troops. Third, the highest members of the nobility did not need to devote themselves to such service. Their fortunes, resources, and status were sufficiently secure as to excuse them from being present on the front lines of the Granada War or other campaigns that launched the Spanish empire. These aristocrats enjoyed the privilege of residing in the comfort of their seigneurial estates or urban palaces far removed from the realities of warfare. The middle stratum of the high nobility needed to serve on behalf of the crown in order to compete with the highest nobles. Indeed, such service could also win them honors that matched those of the grandees. In the aftermath of the Granada War, these mercedes took the form of a limited number of estates that the crown granted to select individuals in appreciation of their service. An examination of the recipients helps situate Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba and the Lord of Alcaudete once again among their peers. Enrique Soria Mesa has compiled a list of these awards.58 As expected, the grants highlighted the elite minority of an already distinguished group of high nobles who contributed to the war. Among the recipients were thirteen out of twenty-five future grandees, including the Constable and the Admiral of Castile; the dukes of Alba, Medinaceli, Medina Sidonia, and Na´jera; the marquises of Ca´diz, Astorga, and Villena; the counts of Cabra, Benavente, and Lerı´n; and the Lord of Aguilar.59 However, it is noteworthy that the great magnates shared the honor with peers whose incomes, resources, and prestige did not match their own. Among them were such middle-stratum nobles as the counts of Cifuentes, Feria, and Tendilla; the lords of Palma and Alcaudete; the future Gran Capita´n Gonzalo Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba; and indeed, Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba. Diego was awarded the estate of Sedella. The Lord of Alcaudete received the towns of Fines and Somontı´n. More modest members of the high nobility thus joined their wealthier peers in obtaining a highly restricted number of grants in Granada.

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As a more modest member of the high nobility, Diego nonetheless still performed duties that commanded prestige among his peers. The responsibilities that corresponded to his title Alcaide de los Donceles put him in a preeminent position among all those who fought in the Granada War. Diego’s office, translated literally as ‘‘governor of the royal pages,’’ gave him command of the personal guards of the king and queen.60 In 1512, Queen Juana reconfirmed his title with a document enumerating the important responsibilities of his office along with its corresponding prestige: Whenever I [the queen] or any others who succeed me go into battle . . . the Alcaide de los Donceles should command the vanguard of the king against any enemy whether infidel or Christian. Being at the front of the army assembled in battle formation, he should choose the site to set up the camp for the host and the marshals. The Alcaide de los Donceles should organize and post all the watches which guard the camp, including the secret guards. . . . None of the officers and foot soldiers who go on raids in enemy territory can depart the camp without license from him. And if they do set out [the Alcaide] can impose the punishment that he sees fit unless we order otherwise.61 The office of Alcaide de los Donceles had been in Diego’s family for several generations. It would take him until 1512, however, to attain the title Marquis of Comares. Among his Cordovan peers, the Count of Cabra, the Count of Belalca´zar, and the Marquis of Priego (Lord of Aguilar) all achieved titles before him. Diego’s son-in-law Martı´n de Co´rdoba would take even longer to acquire the title of Count of Alcaudete. Nevertheless, the exposure, attention, and privileges that Diego enjoyed as the Alcaide de los Donceles certainly made him stand out among high nobles, especially during a war that endured for ten years. Despite lacking a noble title, he held a military office that enabled him to assert a social position unlike any other nobleman, including the great magnates of the realm. Critical moments in the early history of imperial expansion open windows onto a stratum of the nobility that served the cause of Spanish power. The conquest and colonization of the Americas, coinciding with the subjugation of Granada and the expeditions to North Africa, Italy, and Navarre, also help identify the select individuals, including nobles, who were willing to serve in an environment of hardship and adversity. In a recent book on this era of conquest, Bethany Aram has recounted the history of the conquistador

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Pedrarias Da´vila, who was appointed by King Ferdinand as the first governor of Panama and Nicaragua in 1513. Da´vila, whose grandfather was a high official at the court of King Enrique IV and whose uncle was a bishop of Segovia, had been raised in the conventions, and with the expectations of, privilege. However, as a younger brother of the Count of Pun˜onrostro I, he was well aware that he did not enjoy the advantages of primogeniture. In order to ‘‘reinforce and defend his social position,’’ Da´vila was willing to face the hardship of relocation and sail halfway across the world in order to take on this office. Da´vila’s life paralleled and intersected with Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s. He had also initiated his career fighting in the Granada War. He later sailed to North Africa and participated in the assault on Oran. As a contemporary of Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba and an early officer of the empire, Da´vila’s example illustrates the type of individual who chose to dedicate his life to the cause of conquest and administration and the possible reasons that motivated such service.62 A study of the viceroys who governed Spain’s territories further uncovers the presence and contribution of the middle stratum of the high nobility. Virreyes exercised the king’s executive powers as his surrogates in imperial territories.63 By all accounts, the highest members of the nobility—the grandees—would have made the most appropriate candidates for these positions. After all, early viceroys entered communities reeling from their recent incorporation into the Spanish empire. Under such conditions, they had to perform some of the political, social, and cultural duties of indigenous kings who once ruled in these lands and assert the usurping authority of the Spanish monarch. It was thus critical that viceroys embody the status necessary to undertake these tasks. It comes as a surprise, then, that we find very few grandee viceroys in the sixteenth century. An analysis reveals that the great majority of viceroys and governors commanding Aragon, Catalonia, Granada, Mallorca, Mexico, Naples, Navarre, Oran, Peru, Sardinia, Sicily, and Valencia came from the middle stratum of the high nobility. The monarchy likely feared that appointing grandees to posts could augment their already substantial influence. Yet the selection of middle-stratum high nobles also indicates the availability and suitability of these individuals to act in the capacity of viceroys. High nobles, especially those of the middle stratum, played key roles in imperial expansion from the very beginnings of the empire. Although they were everywhere in high-level administration—as territorial governors, military commanders, diplomats, and royal councilors—such roles have been

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downplayed by a historiography that has more often focused on the establishment of an ‘‘absolutist’’ monarchy by the Catholic Monarchs and early Habsburgs. The nobility clearly made an important impact. Those who contributed the most in the Granada War, in fact, identify a cohort that helped establish the nascent empire.

Between Lineage, Community, and Service to the King Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s political alignment with King Ferdinand also helped him attain high offices during his career. The succession crisis that engulfed Castile after the death of Queen Isabella in 1504 showed off his support for the Aragonese king. The Castilian nobility took part in this struggle, with most of them siding with Juana and Philip I.64 As the opening passage of this chapter related, only a few remained loyal to the former sovereign.65 When Ferdinand returned to power after Philip’s brief reign, Diego was rewarded for his fidelity.66 Like his service to territorial expansion after the Granada War, Diego’s affinity to the king continued to distinguish him from other nobles, especially the Lord of Aguilar and the Count of Cabra. Both of them opposed Ferdinand even after Philip’s death. Diego’s support of Ferdinand put him in conflict with his Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba cousins, while his service in North Africa and Navarre distanced him from the tight embrace of his ancestral home base. The alliance that his predecessors had cultivated with Aguilar, in particular, fell by the wayside at this time. In contrast, Diego’s connections with the House of Alcaudete would become ever stronger, and he would also establish a new set of social ties with other noblemen and administrators who contributed to the imperial enterprise. These ties constituted part of the early administrative core of the empire. The journey that King Ferdinand made to Galicia to greet Juana and Philip when they landed on April 26, 1506, highlighted the loyalists who constituted his close supporters. Only a handful of Castilian nobles attended to him, and Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba was among them.67 At the audience between the three royals, Diego’s zeal for Ferdinand and the tension of the audience must have been palpable. The Aragonese had to order Diego to control one of his retainers who was armed with a lance and shield, reminding the Cordovan’s men that they had come to negotiate with words, not wield arms.68 After some three weeks of protracted discussions, Ferdinand, Philip, and their advisers decided to declare Juana unsound to rule. Ferdinand was also forced

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to leave Castile to his son-in-law Philip. Diego continued for a time in the company of his old patron as he retired to Aragon.69 From there, Ferdinand embarked for Italy to make his first tour of Aragon’s Sicilian and Neapolitan possessions, abandoning Iberia entirely.70 In one of his last acts before Philip’s investment, Ferdinand awarded Diego’s brother the captaincy of the royal town of Castro del Rı´o in Co´rdoba, a strategic site that the Comares and Aguilar had fought over throughout the 1490s and which both had hoped to usurp from the crown. That the king should entrust the government of such a sensitive royal property to one of the nobles seeking to seize it says much about his inclination toward the House of Comares.71 Even after Ferdinand had retired from Castile, Diego remained in contact with the king of Aragon. Despite holding the overseas office of captain of Mers el-Kebir in North Africa, he was physically present and immersed in the power struggles encircling Juana at her court after the untimely death of Philip. From the queen’s residence at Burgos in October 1506, Diego worked to secure Ferdinand’s return to Castile. He also conveyed reports of his friend the Duke of Alba, an important ally of Ferdinand, as well as information on the machinations of the king’s grandee adversaries.72 King Philip died unexpectedly on the night of September 25, 1506, only five months after landing in the kingdom of Castile. The archbishop of Toledo, Francisco Jime´nez de Cisneros, headed the government for Juana.73 The flux in royal authority was causing increasing disorder in the realm. Some members of the nobility took advantage of the power vacuum by usurping lands and local rights and powers. Years of poor harvests were also provoking local riots. At this critical moment, Cisneros entreated Ferdinand to return to Castile and take over the government. Ferdinand delayed nearly a year before departing Italy for his Aragonese territory of Valencia, a lag calculated to bring home to the Castilians his status as the only person who could effectively rule the kingdom. Even upon his entry into Castile, most of the nobility remained hostile, and some of the most acute challenges came from the great houses of Andalusia. After Philip’s death, the Duke of Medina Sidonia, the Count of Uruen˜a, the Count of Cabra, and the Lord of Aguilar had contracted a league that called on Queen Juana to take over the government, attempting to prevent the return of her father.74 On October 10, 1506, Diego wrote to Ferdinand from Queen Juana’s residence at Burgos, reporting that ‘‘everything at court and in the realm is at peace, although divergent ambitions and factions are emerging.’’75 Although the Cordovan’s premonitions of factional violence would turn out to

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be accurate, he must not yet have been informed of the seditious acts of his cousins were undertaking at home in Andalusia. In 1506, Aguilar and Cabra initiated a rebellion against Ferdinand. They had taken advantage of the absence of Co´rdoba’s royal governor (corregidor) at court to usurp the symbols of justice (varas de justicia) and effectuate a takeover of municipal government. Around this time, the Duke of Medina Sidonia, Juan de Guzma´n, was also defying royal authority by audaciously laying siege to the strategic promontory of Gibraltar with his private army. The duke’s grandfather had conquered Gibraltar in 1462, but the Catholic Monarchs had forced the family to relinquish it to the crown.76 When ordered to march against the duke, Aguilar pressured Co´rdoba’s municipal council to reject the Royal Council’s command to raise an army. With the duke’s rebellion in full swing, Aguilar himself instigated an assault on the prisons of the Inquisition in Co´rdoba and on the inquisitor Diego Rodrı´guez de Lucero, one of Ferdinand’s supporters. The inquisitor had been using his office’s power to detain Co´rdoba’s notables to prevent them from rebelling against the king.77 The Lord of Aguilar continued his resistance in 1508 by expelling Nun˜o de Argote, deputy of the chief magistrate (alcalde mayor), Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba. When Ferdinand sent a royal magistrate (alcalde de la casa y corte), Herna´n Go´mez de Herrera, to investigate Aguilar’s outrages, the lord kidnapped and imprisoned the crown official in his castle in the town of Montilla. In the summer of 1508, the king finally halted Aguilar’s rebellion by personally leading a military force of 4,000 men from Old Castile, joined by the municipal militias of Andalusian towns, to Co´rdoba to punish the lord for his years of defiance.78 The sentence of death pronounced against Aguilar was commuted after special pleading by his uncle, Ferdinand’s great collaborator, the Gran Capita´n Gonzalo Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba.79 Instead, Ferdinand exiled the lord from Andalusia, confiscated all his offices and property, forced him to pay the salaries of the royal magistrates governing his former estates, fined him twenty million maravedı´s, and demolished the castle at Aguilar’s ancestral seat of Montilla.80 According to the chronicler Berna´ldez, Ferdinand felt deeply betrayed by the Cordovan whom he had married to his cousin Elvira Enrı´quez, the daughter of his uncle Enrique Enrı´quez.81 Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s activities on behalf of Ferdinand after Philip’s death contrasted sharply with the Lord of Aguilar’s rebellion. Diego had reported to his old patron the emergence of factions ten days after Philip I’s demise. In fact, even before the Habsburg’s passing, the chronicler Zurita

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noted that ‘‘there was great agitation and disquiet among the grandees and lords who were already taking sides, because those who followed the side of King Philip had been promised grants.’’82 In the face of partisan struggle, Diego worked with other nobles to forestall infighting by composing a pact on October 1, 1506. The nobles committed themselves to come to the aid of royal magistrates, to forestall the mobilization of private seigneurial armies, to respect the liberty and will of Queen Juana and her second son the infante Ferdinand, to maintain the peace, and to secure their own towns, estates, fortresses, and vassals.83 The pact was drafted in the names of Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba; the bishop of Badajoz; the Count of Santiesteban del Puerto; the Comendador Mayor Garcilaso de la Vega; don Alonso Te´llez; Licenciado Tello of the Royal Council; Contador Mayor Juan Vela´zquez; don Bernaldino de Arellano; Diego Lo´pez de Zu´n˜iga, son of Francisco de Zu´n˜iga; don Antonio de Zu´n˜iga, brother of the Duke of Be´jar; don Alonso de Arellano; and Francisco de Mendoza. It was then signed by the archbishop of Toledo; the Constable of Castile; the Admiral of Castile; the dukes of Infantado, Albuquerque, Na´jera, and Be´jar; the Marquis of Villena; the Count of Castro; the imperial ambassador and Philip’s favorite don Juan Manuel; Juan de Luxembourg; and Mare´chal Philibert de Vere, former ambassador of Philip I.84 The distinction between drafters and signers is telling. The first consisted entirely of ecclesiasts and nontitled nobles (with the exception of the Count of Santiesteban del Puerto, a close associate of the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba lineage based in neighboring Jae´n).85 The great majority of signatories would all become grandees of Castile, with the addition of high imperial dignitaries. The line of demarcation between the middle stratum and the highest members of the nobility comes across clearly in this pivotal document. Away from the court, Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba continued to work in favor of Ferdinand’s authority. As chief magistrate of Co´rdoba, he led a mission to the archbishop of Seville in March 1507 to discuss the attack on the inquisitor Lucero.86 He worked among the middle-stratum high nobles of Andalusia to draw up a pact of allegiance to the king. Concluded at the beginning of 1509, this confederation of fifteen to twenty aristocrats included Alonso Venegas, Diego Lo´pez de Haro (Lord of El Carpio), Pedro Portocarrero (Lord of Moguer), Pedro Mejı´a (Lord of La Guardia), and the Count of Tendilla.87 This was also the moment that Diego was entrusted with the captaincy general of Oran and, a little later, the invasion and governance of Navarre.88 Diego’s close affinity to King Ferdinand lasted, literally, until the

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sovereign drew his last breath. During what would turn out to be Ferdinand’s final days, the Cordovan (along with select nobles, including the Duke of Alba) accompanied the king on a tour of his realm starting in mid-1515.89 Entering Castile in the frontier town of Sigu¨enza, Ferdinand and his retinue traveled to Madrid and then to the Extremaduran towns of Plasencia, El Abadı´a, Trujillo, Guadalupe, and Madrigalejo, where the king died on January 23, 1516. Diego’s movements with the king can be traced through a remarkable series of letters that the former viceroy of Navarre sent to his colleague and friend Mic¸er Juan Rena in Pamplona during his perambulations.90 The Italian seemed to be a jack-of-all-trades cleric-administrator in the first decades of the empire, when expertise and responsibilities spanned the boundaries between different offices. Rena first gained the trust of the Catholic Monarchs when he served as royal chaplain. He was then appointed, in succession, bishop of Alghero (Sardinia), Tuy (Galicia), and Pamplona. At the same time, he must have shown a particular aptitude for organization, as he was selected to serve as provisioner of the fleet. He was responsible for mobilizing the ships that carried troops and supplies for the invasion of North Africa. He then moved on to Pamplona, and from this perch he outfitted the fleets that were assembled in the Basque country. Diego met this trusted servant of the Catholic King in Oran, and their relationship intertwined further as they both followed the expansion of the empire to its next phase in Navarre.91 The Cordovan’s relationship with King Ferdinand explains how the nobleman ascended to high office and through this service constituted a keystone of early imperial administration. An examination of his connection with Rena and other officials demonstrates how professional and personal bonds were built as imperial expansion unfolded. These webs of contacts formed one of the frameworks of imperial administration. The correspondence that has been preserved between Diego and Rena first strikes the reader due to the close affective relationship that it reveals between a battle-hardened captain-viceroy-lord and a clergyman with a talent for managing the minutiae of provisioning. In his letters between 1515 and 1516, the former viceroy of Navarre left his affairs in Pamplona in Rena’s care, including a great deal of personal property consisting of papers; books; furniture such as carpets, tapestries, and silk-upholstered chairs; as well as clothes, armor, a clavichord, a Genoese chest for storing documents, a pewter wine jug from England, and horses. Diego requested that Rena take personal charge of dispatching these items from Pamplona to his castle in Chillo´n, one of his estates in Co´rdoba.92

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He also extended several invitations to Rena to visit him on his Andalusian estates, writing with particular graciousness: ‘‘God knows how much I desire your freedom [from your tasks] and that you could have left [Navarre] and come to be by my side.’’93 However, this friendship also had a mutually supportive side when it came to matters of royal administration. Rena loaned Diego money, making possible the fulfillment of his viceregal duties, while the viceroy directly intervened with Ferdinand in an attempt to secure a benefice for Rena in Granada.94 The relationship between Rena and the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba continued in the following generation. When Diego’s son-in-law Martı´n de Co´rdoba y de Velasco trekked up to Pamplona to serve as viceroy in 1525, he also worked with Juan Rena. In fact, Martı´n and his wife, Leonor Pacheco, became guardians of Rena’s illegitimate daughter Juana. That Martı´n was able to establish such a bond with Rena reflects the close ties that Rena had with the Cordovan’s father-in-law.95 In addition to Rena, Diego built connections with other royal bureaucrats. Some of these officials started their careers during Ferdinand’s reign and continued to serve under the Habsburgs. They helped bridge the Trasta´mara– Habsburg dynastic transition, bringing a degree of continuity to an unstable moment in which Spain’s expansive realm was in danger of implosion. Some would, in fact, be the very founders of the councilor government that arose in the 1520s and would come to manage an increasingly complex empire that spanned multiple continents. They also played a role in securing Diego’s descendants’ ascendancy with Charles V. One key example was Diego’s employment and patronage of Pedro de los Cobos, his personal secretary in Navarre.96 Pedro drafted documents on Diego’s behalf, appearing as witness when such records were notarized. He also happened to be the first cousin of Francisco de los Cobos.97 The Cobos, a family of impecunious and undistin´ beda in the province guished nobles, hailed from the Andalusian town of U of Jae´n directly east of Co´rdoba. Francisco had taken advantage of family and professional contacts to attain employment at the royal accountants’ office at court in 1503. Over time, he served in a number of administrative posts including as the chief assistant of Lope Conchillos, King Ferdinand’s royal secretary. The two great collaborators—King Ferdinand and Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba—were thus connected not only by their mutual affinity, but by Francisco and Pedro de los Cobos, blood-related cousins who were embedded in their respective secretarial staffs. After the king’s death, both Francisco and Pedro departed for Brussels to seek the patronage of Charles.98 Francisco would go on to become one of

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Charles V’s most trusted and powerful secretaries, and Pedro, after serving in Diego’s household, would substitute for his cousin as secretary of the Council of Indies when the former left Castile with Charles in 1520.99 Diego’s son, the Marquis of Comares II, and his son-in-law Martı´n de Co´rdoba y de Velasco would be in constant correspondence with Francisco and the secretary’s prote´ge´s Juan Va´zquez de Molina and Francisco de Eraso from the 1520s onward. The close relationship that the royal secretary and Martı´n would develop is evidenced in the money that the former lent to the Cordovan lord. Francisco de los Cobos’s testament itemized a loan to the lord worth 750,000 maravedı´s at the time of his death in 1547. The financial value of the debt was significant but the symbolism even more prodigious, as the will recognized only three other individuals who owed money to Cobos, one of whom was the emperor Charles himself.100 Martı´n de Co´rdoba must have been on especially good terms with Cobos.101 Diego had developed relationships with Rena and Cobos that helped him govern Navarre. He then, in essence, bequeathed them to his son-inlaw. The transference of Rena and Cobos’s professional and affective ties to Diego’s heirs showed care, loyalty, and affinity to the Cordovan’s relatives. The fact that Rena and Cobos continued in positions of responsibility after Diego’s death helped ease his descendants into new jobs in imperial service. These two relationships that Diego built and then passed on to his heirs show us a side of imperial administration that functioned based on patronageclientelism, favor, and affinity. But it also demonstrates how biological and social reproduction went hand in hand to perpetuate the administrative organism of the imperial bureaucracy. Diego constructed a social network among royal administrators to help further his career and those of his descendants. His political trajectory, however, also caused previously close personal relationships to break down. His support of Ferdinand’s regency snapped the Comares-Aguilar alliance. This pact, in competition with the Alcaudete-Cabra affinity, had structured political life in Co´rdoba during most of the fifteenth century.102 The two factions had competed over municipal offices, rights over revenues, land, prestige, and power. Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s father Martı´n had reaffirmed his house’s ties with the Aguilar by marrying Leonor Arellano, daughter of the fifth Lord of Aguilar and sister of Alfonso de Aguilar and the Gran Capita´n Gonzalo Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba. Taking their united front to the national stage, Alfonso de Aguilar (Diego’s uncle on his mother’s side) and Diego himself both wedded daughters of Juan Pacheco, Marquis of Villena, one of

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the most powerful men in Spain during the reign of King Enrique IV. Aguilar married Catalina Pacheco, who was originally betrothed to Bernardino Ferna´ndez de Velasco, son of the Count of Haro II. Diego married Juana Pacheco. Pacheco’s other daughters made unions with some of the highest nobles of the land.103 For Diego, one of the weaker Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, to secure such a match meant that his uncle likely intervened on his behalf. Competition for royal favors and scarce local resources and a divergent attitude toward Ferdinand’s regency caused the Comares-Aguilar relationship to sour in the 1480s. Earlier in this chapter, we examined how the Granada War presented an opportunity for members of the high nobility to compete for royal favors and prestige. Conflict over royal offices in Co´rdoba had actually intensified before the war even started, in the late 1470s. When the Catholic Monarchs swept through Andalusia in 1477 to subjugate the nobles who had challenged the succession of Isabella, they removed both Alfonso de Aguilar and the Count of Cabra from their de facto hereditary posts of alcalde mayor and alguacil mayor of Co´rdoba.104 Instead, they awarded the prestigious alcalde mayor office to Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba in 1488.105 Likewise, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, we find Diego in possession of the post of alguacil mayor. The crown’s preference for a Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba lord that usually played second fiddle in local politics to the Aguilar and Cabra must have been a further affront to the two houses that historically monopolized these offices.106 The last decades of the fifteenth century witnessed ever-intensifying competition for resources as the economy and population boomed in Co´rdoba. With the conquest of Granada the frontier with a dangerous enemy was finally dismantled, making southern Campin˜a land even more valuable. An active land market of sales, purchases, inheritances, and usurpations led to disputes in the Cordovan countryside, including direct confrontation between the Comares and Aguilar.107 As noted earlier, one of the major conflicts at the end of the century centered on the royal town of Castro del Rı´o which, from 1490 onward, desperately and incessantly appealed for the Royal Council’s intervention to defend it against Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s attempts to annex the town’s land to his neighboring estate of Espejo.108 As a sign of the times, Diego was not the only one preying on Castro del Rı´o. He competed against his uncle Alfonso de Aguilar and the Count of Cabra, both of whom sought to claim the royal town for themselves.109 At the very same time that Diego’s dispute with Castro del Rı´o was taking place, he and Aguilar also began contesting the lands bordering Diego’s estates of Lucena

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Figure 6. The Comares-Aguilar affinity (late fifteenth century)

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and Espejo and Aguilar’s estate of Montilla.110 The conflict led to an armed skirmish in which Diego’s uncle invaded Lucena at the end of 1491, using troops recruited for the Granada War.111 Fighting continued, including an armed clash in 1498 that alarmed the Catholic Monarchs sufficiently enough for them to order their corregidor in Co´rdoba to undertake an investigation.112 At the same time, the Royal Council heard lawsuits between Diego and Alfonso de Aguilar, with the former trekking to court in 1493 to plead his case.113 Conflict also arose as both Diego and Aguilar attempted to direct trade passing to and from Granada to cross the Genil River at their respective bridges, the Ponto´n del Maestre or the Ponto´n de don Gonzalo.114 The two lords competed for merchants who would have paid tolls to cross these bridges. Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba helped conquer and administer the early Spanish empire. At the time that expansion began, an administrative structure did not exist to run this vastly expanding polity. Little by little, institutions and other mechanisms of governance emerged responding to the contingencies that territorial conquest faced and exigencies that it produced. Diego’s labor, combined with that of other officials, constituted the governance and, in essence, the early administration for a polity in flux. As we have seen, the framework of such an administration was based not so much on defined hierarchies as on new social networks of blood and affinity ties that were reproduced biologically and socially. Sometimes these new alignments even displaced older ones from the pre-imperial era. It was also a system that reflected the power and status of high nobles serving as the captains and governors of the empire.

Conclusion: The High Nobility in Imperial Administration Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s life and career overlapped with an exceptional generation of Aguilar, Cabra, and Alcaudete cousins, other outstanding Andalusian nobles, and resource-rich Castilian peers. To list just a few of his Granadine colleagues and their ensuing careers, the Gran Capita´n Gonzalo Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba would leave for Italy in 1495 and defeat France in Ferdinand’s Italian wars. The Count of Tendilla from the great Mendoza lineage would stay on as the captain general of Granada and manage its incorporation into Castile. The Duke of Alba would conquer the kingdom

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of Navarre. Finally, the Duke of Medina Sidonia would subjugate the Moroccan outpost of Melilla and thereby initiate Spain’s campaign of ‘‘presidio hopping’’ along the North African coast.115 Even among these peers, Diego and his cousin the Lord of Alcaudete stood out by contributing disproportionately to the war. Granada provided the training ground for a generation of soldiers and captains who later went on to Italy and the Americas,116 and the experience and expertise gained by Diego must have made him an appropriate candidate to lead the assaults on Mers el-Kebir, Oran, and Navarre. With limited resources, these two Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba lords risked their lives in the Granada War, while other nobles, frequently of higher stature, sent proxies or money instead. Some of the grandees seemed to go to war in order to show off the finery of their soldiers’ clothes: ‘‘And so the Duke of Infantado came to serve the king from the city of Guadalajara with 400 men-at-arms and 500 armed footmen. They were all so richly dressed; the cavalrymen were cloaked in many vestments of silk, brocade, and traditional dress. No other grandee could match such finery in our time.’’117 Those who belonged to the ‘‘Granadine generation’’ of fighting and administrating lords tended to come from the middle stratum of the high nobility rather than the great magnates of Castile.118 In fact, the division between the two groups was clear in the eyes of contemporary nobles. A candid letter that the Count of Tendilla, a leading contributor to the Granada War, addressed to his daughter the Countess of Monteagudo in 1508 reveals just such an awareness. Discussing the factional fighting that was breaking out in Castile following the death of Philip I, the governor of Granada warned: ‘‘The biggest error that those of us who aren’t grandees can make is to ally ourselves with them because they want to work against the monarchs. Since we eat on the monarchs’ salaries and wages, we have to serve the monarchs. We have to stand with them or we are lost without their goodwill.’’119 It is striking that Tendilla, a member of the immensely powerful Mendoza lineage, nevertheless stressed that differences existed between ‘‘us’’ and ‘‘them’’ (grandees). More remarkable still, this relative of the Duke of Infantado, one of the greatest of all the grandees, advocated siding with the crown against his more prominent cousin. Indeed, Tendilla and Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba were friends (and their wives were sisters). The garrulous Tendilla corresponded with Diego, congratulating him on being awarded the title of Marquis of Comares and even boasting to his confidant of his pursuit of a maiden.120 The two colleagues from the Granada War also consulted each other on the administration of

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Oran,121 adopted convergent attitudes in national politics, and arranged marriages between their respective relatives. Diego and Tendilla constituted part of a cohort of middle-stratum high nobles who entered service in the Granada War and continued to fight in subsequent campaigns, ultimately forming a cohort of early imperial administrators. An examination of Spanish viceroys confirms that Diego and Tendilla’s colleagues shared a similar social background. Only in the seventeenth century did the grandees take on more of a presence. Here, I should stress that a distinction between service and honor-oriented nobles within the high nobility was not set in stone, and the type of service a person or members of a family performed changed during their lifetimes or over generations.122 Still, it is striking that when compared with the more modest Comares and Alcaudete Houses of the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, members of the grandee Aguilar and Cabra branches would never hold any of the viceroyalties in the sixteenth century. Instead, they seemed to take on more honorific court roles. In 1522, the Count of Cabra III traveled to Badajoz on the Castilian-Portuguese border in order to greet Leonor, Charles V’s sister and queen of Portugal, who was returning to Spain after the death of her husband, the king of Portugal, in 1521. At the same time, Cabra’s heir arrived in Rome to serve as Spanish ambassador.123 In contrast, the Comares and the Alcaudete continued in military-administrative careers for the following three generations. The early expansion of the Spanish empire depended heavily on the participation of the middle-stratum high nobles. These aristocrats left their home bases, dipped into their limited resources, traveled throughout the empire, and navigated through court politics for the imperial enterprise. Their contribution was vital to the early phase of expansion, and consequently, our understanding of the purpose of the early Spanish empire has to be revised along the ways that they thought, understood, and experienced the venture.

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chapter 3

The Regeneration of Monarchy and Nobility Martı´n de Co´rdoba in Toledo, 1520–1525

It is now nine o’clock at night. The Grand Master of Ocan˜a just came by in a great rush . . . to tell me that he had learned an hour before noon today that . . . the Alcalde of Fuenteduen˜a was hurrying to fortify his castle because the King [Charles] our lord has died. Go´mez Mexı´a de Figueroa, who had reported this to the Grand Master, was himself rushing to get home thinking that Toledo was already in revolt. And although I personally cannot believe this to be true given the great harm it would cause the realm and the servants of the crown, it is my obligation to alert Your Lordship so that the city can be prepared since there is no lack of hostility there. I am writing to Ocan˜a right now to see if there are any new reports. —Juan Ruys to Juan de Ribera (1522)

At ten o’clock on the night of May 27, 1522, Captain Juan de Ribera, keeper of the gates of the city of Toledo, received the urgent dispatch quoted above. Reporting that Emperor Charles V had died fighting the French on the battlefields of Lombardy, the message warned the gatekeeper to prepare for insurrection among the city’s unsettled residents. Toledo’s officials raised the alarm, keeping in mind the city was the last holdout of the Comunidades Revolt, an uprising that had been suppressed only four months earlier.1 The rebellion had lasted for two years and was a major challenge to royal authority in Castile. In fact, many of its most charismatic leaders called Toledo home.

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Much was at stake for crown officials when it came to the security of the city. Toledo was steeped in symbolism as the capital of the ancient Visigothic kingdom, a seat of the itinerant Castilian court in the Middle Ages, and one of the largest population centers of the early modern realm. When he received the startling news, Captain Ribera immediately ordered his son to seek the advice of the royal governor (corregidor) of Toledo, Martı´n de Co´rdoba y de Velasco. The Lord of Alcaudete had served as the city’s first corregidor after the end of the revolt, and as we shall see, the crown had good reasons to rely on Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s son-in-law to reimpose its authority on the rebel capital. Charles V died in 1558, not 1522. However, the false alarm caused a stir due to the precariousness of his authority at that time. In Toledo, Martı´n de Co´rdoba buttressed the government of a young, unknown, unproven, and foreign sovereign who had only recently ascended to the Spanish throne. Raised in Flanders, Charles only became acquainted with Spain when he sailed there to claim his inheritance after the death of his grandfather King Ferdinand and upon reaching his majority in 1517. Charles arrived to his domain with Flemish, French, and German courtiers who displaced native Spaniards in administration. He inopportunely demanded an extraordinary subsidy (servicio) from royal cities to fund election to become Holy Roman emperor, an affair that concerned central Europeans more than Spaniards. Accustomed to having an indigenous monarch looking out for their local interests, Charles’s Spanish subjects sensed that the proud kingdom had been reduced to secondary status, becoming nothing more than a purse for the Habsburgs. When the emperor departed the peninsula after a sojourn of two short years, some of the royal cities sparked a rebellion. Charles’s ascent to the throne should have been celebrated as a renewal of the Spanish monarchy. In this case, however, the crown’s regeneration led to a conflagration that endangered its very survival. At the same moment that the monarchy faced challenges to its renewal, a new generation of the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba lineage was reproducing the career path that Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba had pioneered. After the patriarch died in 1518, his heir, Luis Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, took over the captaincy general of Oran (we will set aside his life and career for the time being and return to them in Chapter 5). His son-in-law Martı´n de Co´rdoba also went down the trail that Diego had blazed.2 Though Martı´n headed the House of Alcaudete, the humblest of the four branches of the lineage, he still came to lead an impressive career as corregidor of Toledo, viceroy of Navarre,

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and captain general of Oran. In 1529 he was awarded the title of Count of Alcaudete, the last of the four main branches to win such an honor.3 The crown’s decision to entrust these sensitive posts of imperial administration to Diego’s son and son-in-law (and future grandsons and great-grandsons down the line) was deliberate. The Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba knit a web of political and social contacts in these newly conquered territories that it passed down, along with accumulated experience, to subsequent generations of family members. The lineage came to reinforce the persistence of imperial government in these two critical frontier borderlands. The continuation of the monarchy depended on the renewal of the royal dynasty. In a similar way, the longevity of administration in Navarre and Oran was predicated on the social and biological reproduction of the two Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba families. The reproduction of noble families served the interest and furthered the survival of the monarchy and empire. The dependence of Charles V on noble supporters—and in this case a new generation of Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba loyalists—is clearly corroborated by the history of the Comunidades Revolt. The rebellion was led by the royal cities, traditionally a bulwark of the crown against predatory nobles who competed with the monarchy for local power. In a weakened position, Charles put the government in the hands of two paragons of the highest nobility, the Constable of Castile ´In˜igo Ferna´ndez de Velasco and the Admiral of Castile Fadrique Enrı´quez. The emperor called upon other high nobles to help suppress the uprising and defend Spain against foreign meddling. It was at this moment that Martı´n de Co´rdoba took up his father-in-law’s mantle and embarked on his career. The Lord of Alcaudete entered service by helping to pacify his native Andalusia at the advent of the revolt. He then trekked north with a detachment of troops to the Basque country, where troops were mustering to fend off a French invasion of neighboring Navarre. Following the end of the rebellion in 1522, he was appointed corregidor of Toledo, where he governed until 1525. The continuity of Diego’s support of the crown in the subsequent generations of his family abetted the succession or, in essence, the reproduction of the monarchy. The regeneration of the monarchy, then, went through the nobility and depended on the ability of noble families themselves to reproduce biologically and socially. And yet the renewal of noble families, like that of the royal dynasty, was sometimes a fraught affair. The death of a patriarch or matriarch often brought about an extended period of conflict and contention over legacies. Bearing an uncanny resemblance to the dilemma faced by his king, Martı´n

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Figure 7. The Comares-Alcaudete affinity (early sixteenth century)

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de Co´rdoba had to resort to arms to make a claim on the patrimony left by his maternal grandfather, the Count of Siruela. Ironically, service to the empire was also disrupting the ability of Martı´n’s family to reproduce itself biologically. Imperial careers soaked up the family’s financial resources in an age of dramatically escalating dowries that daughters needed in order to marry social equals. Rather than marrying, the vast majority of Martı´n’s sisters and daughters (an estimated fourteen out of fifteen women) were cloistered en masse in the family’s newly established Convent of Santa Clara on its estate of Alcaudete. In parallel, Martı´n’s brothers and sons pursued military careers that saw the majority of them lose their lives in battle before they could licitly reproduce. The decline in reproduction that began in this period threatened the family line with extinction. In effect, the service that noble families rendered to renew and perpetuate the empire endangered their own reproduction. This chapter exposes the intricate dependency of the crown on the biological and social replication of the nobility. It also highlights the changes in reproduction that an aristocratic family underwent at this same moment. Our continuing investigation of the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba family takes us to another locale in the burgeoning Spanish empire—Toledo. Historians have long studied the city where some of the Comunidades Revolt’s most charismatic leaders were based. However, comparatively little attention has been paid to the city in the immediate aftermath of the uprising. As the rebels’ capital and last holdout, the city’s return to royal service was especially important to the crown. Both the decision to base the Cortes of 1525 in Toledo just three years after the suppression of the insurrection and Charles’s stay in the city during the proceedings suggest that the city underwent a significant process of political rehabilitation immediately after the revolt. By following Martı´n’s career to the city, we tour another part of the empire and explore Toledo at a key moment in its history. Martı´n’s footsteps also lead us to the restoration of Habsburg government after the internal strife that it had suffered in its early years. Historians of the long Habsburg succession that began with Isabel’s death in 1504 and lasted until Charles’s victory over the Comuneros in 1522 have concentrated on Queen Juana’s tragic life, Charles’s maladroit introduction to Spain in 1517–19, and the Comunidades Revolt’s revolutionary ambitions. In contrast, the post-1522 restoration period has been left out of this sequence of events even though it laid the foundation for a dynasty and government that would endure for the next 178 years. This chapter will also contribute to reclaiming some of that history by exploring Martı´n’s experiences in Toledo.4

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From Co´rdoba to Toledo: The Expansion of the Clan’s Presence in the Empire The governorship of Toledo was Martı´n de Co´rdoba’s first permanent assignment away from his home base. How did a native Cordovan whose roots were so deeply planted in the south take in the new surroundings at the center of the realm? The following description of the city will situate Martı´n in sixteenth-century Toledo. Mirroring that of Co´rdoba, Toledo’s development also incubated a unique local society and sheltered its own group of denizens, including elites that dominated the city and its hinterland. It comes as a surprise, then, to find that the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba lineage was building a presence there in the sixteenth century. Three members would serve as corregidores of Toledo in the sixteenth century, and marriage alliances would come to connect the Cordovans to powerful residents of the city. The Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba even made an appearance in the monuments and art that adorned Toledo. These images celebrated their deeds and commemorated them for future generations. The Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s presence in the city illustrates the expansion of its activities outside of its local home base starting in the late Middle Ages. The city that Martı´n encountered shared certain characteristics with his hometown. The two were comparable in size. A census taken in 1528, just three years after the Cordovan’s term of office ended, found that Toledo had 5,898 vecinos—around 23,500 to 26,500 inhabitants if we estimate that each household included 4 to 4.5 members. The census of 1530 showed that Co´rdoba’s population held a slight edge over its northern sibling—6,238 vecinos, or roughly 25,000 to 28,000 residents.5 Toledo and Co´rdoba are also located in the middle stretches of two of the most important rivers in Iberia. Co´rdoba depended on the life-giving Guadalquivir. Toledo was protected on three sides by the Tagus. A formidable wall and a monumental gate defended the one side not guarded by water. Thus enclosed, neither the Almohads sweeping into Castile from North Africa in the early thirteenth century nor Charles’s royalist troops in 1521 could breach the city’s defenses.6 Toledo’s location, while eminently strategic, did reduce its capacity to expand. Urban vistas from the sixteenth century, including El Greco’s dramatic landscapes and Anton van den Wyngaerde’s more academic study, all attest to a city perched on a hill that was thickly packed with residences, numerous Renaissance palaces, shops, artisan workshops, churches and monasteries, hospitals, and other structures competing for limited space.7

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Toledo has a long and storied history dating back to Roman times, and like Co´rdoba, it lustred as a royal capital in the Middle Ages. Co´rdoba served as the flourishing seat of the Umayyad caliphate in the ninth to eleventh centuries. After Toledo was conquered by King Alfonso VI in 1085, it was an organizational beachhead for the conquest of the vast La Mancha plateau that extended south to the borders of Andalusia. Over the ensuing centuries, Castile’s roving court and its Cortes frequently made the city their home. The city preserved its national prominence into the first half of the sixteenth century. Emperor Charles convened a critical meeting of the Cortes in the city in 1525. He and his wife, Isabel of Portugal, also spent considerable time in Toledo in the 1530s. They added to the many towers that form the city’s skyline by massively amplifying the Alca´zar.8 The city’s fortunes would not alter drastically until Philip II chose Madrid as his permanent capital in 1561. Madrid’s proximity to Toledo siphoned off the inhabitants, resources, and status from the former medieval capital. As a demographic, geographic, economic, political, and cultural center, Toledo enjoyed a prominent place in Castilian history and society. It also housed institutions of international stature, including the Catholic Church. In 1088, Pope Urban II made the city the seat of the church in Spain, bestowing upon its archbishops the status of Primate of Spain with ceremonial and procedural precedence over all other bishops in the kingdom.9 The cathedral, having won extensive territories by helping direct the conquest of La Mancha as well as parts of Andalusia (especially the Cazorla area of Jae´n), was one of Spain’s largest landowners, and its income may have been the highest in all of Catholic Europe after the Papal States itself. The cathedral chapter directly employed perhaps 600 people in the city. Added to the cathedral was a plethora of churches, convents, and monasteries along with their attendant population of regular and secular clergy and staff.10 Church councils that convened representatives of regional congregations from all over Spain, moreover, frequently held their meetings in Toledo. A succession of powerful cardinal-archbishops in the late fifteenth century and early sixteenth century, such as Pedro Gonza´lez de Mendoza and Francisco Jime´nez de Cisneros, also gave the see an impressive presence in the affairs of the kingdom. Pedro Gonza´lez de Mendoza (1482–95) was a member of the potent Mendoza lineage. He led troops into battle against Granada and bore a son to whom the titles of Marquis of Cenete and Count of Me´lito were awarded. He was even referred to as the ‘‘third king’’ (alongside the Catholic monarchs themselves).11 We have already met his immediate

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successor, Francisco Jime´nez de Cisneros (1495–1517). Cisneros served twice as regent of Spain following Philip I’s and Ferdinand’s deaths. He financed and directed the Spanish expedition to conquer Oran. He also served as inquisitor general, initiated important reforms in the Spanish church prior to Martı´n Luther and the Council of Trent, and patronized humanist scholarship, including the publication of the Complutense Polyglot Bible and the establishment of the University of Alcala´ de Henares. Both of these archbishops worked to expand the see’s influence. Cisneros’s invasion of North Africa was an attempt to press on with the crusade that had conquered Granada. When Oran fell to the Spaniards, the archbishop directly incorporated this overseas territory under the jurisdiction of the diocese of Toledo. Even though Castile did not have a single permanent capital until the second half of the sixteenth century, Toledo’s political and cultural cachet was felt throughout the whole kingdom. Thus, when the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s contributions to military and state affairs started to make an impact on the national level, their persons and accomplishments also found a showcase in the city. As its home base, Co´rdoba had long felt the lineage’s political, social, and cultural presence. Toledo would come to know the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba as well. Three members of the family governed the city in the sixteenth century. Martı´n de Co´rdoba was preceded by his cousin from the House of Cabra, Antonio Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba (1518–20). Martı´n’s son Alonso served as corregidor briefly in 1558.12 The deeds of the Cordovan lords in the early conquest of the empire would also be enshrined in the city’s monuments. These artifacts preserved such exploits in the memory of the cultural capital of the kingdom. We have already examined the relief carved into one of the stalls of the cathedral’s choir that depicts Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba and the Count of Cabra’s defense of Lucena in the Granada War. In that same cathedral, a monumental fresco decorates the Moza´rabe Chapel commemorating the Spanish invasion of Oran in 1509 captained by the Cordovan lord. Painted in the 1510s by Juan de Borgon˜a, an early master of the Renaissance style active in Spain, the imposing fresco richly illustrates the siege in fine detail. Framed by the vaulted ceiling of the chapel, the scene plays out with the walls, parapets, towers, and houses of the North African city occupying the left half of the painting, while Spanish troops in various formations outside the walls occupy the right half. Taking center stage is a company of armored knights charging up the slopes and chasing away Muslim defenders who are fleeing back toward the city. Lower on the canvas, the Spanish infantry is

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Figure 8. Mural, Conquest of Oran, Capilla Moza´rabe of the Cathedral of Toledo

shown scaling the walls near one of the city’s gates. A defender can even be seen clutching a large stone over his head, ready to fling it on the attackers. Set off from the front line in the lower right of the fresco are two cannoniers and a group of musketeers who are amassed in front of an imposing man in a cardinal’s habit sitting atop a steed. These gunners are in fact carrying the cardinal’s banner, which displays a large shield in the center topped by a cardinal’s red galero and framed by fifteen red tassels on each side. This standard is the largest heraldic emblem depicted in the fresco. In this richly rendered work, few individuals have been identified other than the archbishop of Toledo, Francisco Jime´nez de Cisneros. Although other participants in the expedition may not be recognizable, Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, who helped lead the assault on Oran, must have been depicted among a group of mounted knights who follow behind Cisneros. The horses of these dignitaries are extravagantly draped in golden cloth. The caballeros themselves are bedecked in shining armor, clutching lances whose

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tips point toward the sky.13 When Martı´n arrived at Toledo, he was greeted by depictions of his lineage’s recent deeds. The place of honor that his relatives had found in the commemorative artwork housed in Toledo’s cathedral mirrored the images that the lineage placed in their own chapels in the mosque-cathedral of Co´rdoba. These artifacts in Toledo, however, enshrined the growing importance of the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba on a national stage. The clan’s presence in the city was not restricted to political office and cultural artifacts. The lineage also had marriage and blood ties to key residents of the city, including Archbishop Pedro Gonza´lez de Mendoza, who had actually commissioned the construction of the cathedral’s choir and its decorative reliefs. These connections were the result of an extension of the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s marriage strategy to link with elites in distant parts of the realm starting at the end of the fifteenth century. Martı´n de Co´rdoba’s connection to the archbishop went through his wife, Leonor. Leonor’s father was Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, but her mother was Juana Pacheco, a daughter of the Marquis of Villena, Juan Pacheco. Juana’s sister Francisca Pacheco wedded ´In˜igo Lo´pez de Mendoza, the Count of Tendilla II and the first captain general of Granada. Tendilla’s uncle was none other than the archbishop of Toledo. Along with a connection to one of the most outstanding Toledans, the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba also had blood ties to one of the most ignominious— Marı´a Pacheco, a leader of the Comunidades Revolt.14 Marı´a was an offspring of the marriage between Francisca Pacheco and the Count of Tendilla II. Since Marı´a and Leonor Pacheco’s mothers were sisters, they were first cousins. So once again, through his wife, Martı´n had ties to another important Toledan.15 Married to Juan de Padilla of Toledo, Marı´a settled in her husband’s hometown, and the two came to be key leaders of the Comunidades Revolt. Ironically, then, Martı´n was connected to both the ‘‘third king of Spain’’ as well as the rebel leaders who attempted to oppose a royal dynasty. Though the Cordovan would never have known Pedro Gonza´lez de Mendoza (the archbishop died in 1495), he must have been keenly aware of his contemporary Marı´a Pacheco. No records have survived that might indicate how Martı´n would have felt about governing a city in the aftermath of a revolt led in part by his wife’s first cousin. However, the marriage strategies that he, his wife, and his father-in-law would adopt connected them in unexpected ways to key Toledans. Toledo is the current stop on an itinerary that traces the footsteps of an increasingly mobile Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba clan. From the clan’s local home

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base to the last emirate in Iberia, we have now arrived at the old Visigothic capital itself. Particular circumstances and dynamics make the history of each of these localities unique, yet family history ties them together. From commemorative representations to administrative office to blood ties, the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba lineage was extending its cultural, political, and social presence beyond the confines of its estates to one of the symbolic capitals of Castile. The restoration after the Comunidades Revolt marked the moment that the House of Alcaudete, humblest among the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, entered high office. But such an entrance was modeled after, and eased by, predecessors in the lineage. Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s exploits were vividly depicted in Toledo’s cathedral. A second relative, Antonio Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, also established a beachhead in the city on behalf of the lineage. Martı´n’s cousin served as the city’s last corregidor before the rebels forcibly expelled him. Once Martı´n was appointed to the office, he would seek royal dispensation to bring in members of his own family to serve as his deputies.16 Toledo, a city of enormous status and symbolism for the whole kingdom, would thus be encompassed in the expanding purview of the Fe´rnandez de Co´rdoba lineage.

Martı´n de Co´rdoba’s Military Service During the Comunidades Revolt (1521–22) Martı´n de Co´rdoba launched his career by defending the emperor Charles during and after the Comunidades Revolt. Andalusia did not go over to the rebels en masse like Old and New Castile, but rumblings of malcontent were heard in the region.17 Sympathizers could be found in the province of Jae´n. ´ beda and Baeza, and the territory of The capital city Jae´n, the towns of U Cazorla rose up against established authorities, though they did not all declare allegiance to the Comuneros. Unrest also touched Seville. Taking advantage of weak central power, the dukes of Arcos (formerly Marquis of Ca´diz) and of Medina Sidonia chose this moment to renew their traditional rivalry and try to win ascendancy over the other.18 It seems that even Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s son, the Marquis of Comares II, Luis Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, adopted an ambiguous attitude toward the new Habsburg sovereign. Luis gathered his bloc of supporters from all levels of Cordovan society to weigh the ramifications of the revolt. His actions attracted the attention of the

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crown so much so that he was forced to protest his innocence after the revolt.19 Comares’s brother-in-law Martı´n, however, firmly sided with the crown. Martı´n used his own funds to pay for repairs on the fortification of La Rambla, a royal town immediately outside of Co´rdoba where representatives from Andalusian cities convened a meeting in January 1521. There, the ‘‘Junta de La Rambla’’ drafted a collective rebuff to the Comunero council’s call for the south to join its cause, affirmed its fidelity to the emperor and his regime, and committed troops to defend Andalusia from any forays made by the rebel army.20 Following his work at La Rambla, Martı´n led a group of his own men north to defend the Basque country and Navarre against French invaders. There, he joined a seigneurial army assembled by his peers in September 1521. Like his father-in-law before him, Martı´n projected an armed force far beyond his Cordovan home base despite both the exorbitant costs of maintaining these troops and the relatively modest resources at his disposal.21 A list of the lords mustered at Vitoria places ‘‘Don Martı´n de Co´rdoba y de Velasco sen˜or de Alcaudete’’ ninth among thirty-seven nobles.22 At this critical moment, Martı´n joined an elite group of some of the highest aristocrats in the realm to fight on behalf of the crown. Two grandees of Spain appeared in the muster, the Marquis of Astorga and the Count of Benavente. Fighting alongside these powerful magnates were other titled nobles, including the counts of Haro, Cifuentes, Alba de Liste, Luna, and Salinas, as well as Martı´n’s cousin the Count of Siruela and his brother-in-law the Count of Santiesteban del Puerto from neighboring Jae´n.23 At the same time, middle-stratum untitled nobles were also present with their companies. These included Martı´n himself and sons from the blue-blooded families of Acun˜a, de la Cerda, de la Cueva, Enrı´quez, Mendoza, Pimentel, Quin˜ones, Rojas, and Silva. During Martı´n’s early years of service, the emperor was not present in his realm. Thus, the Cordovan corresponded with the governors in whose care Charles had entrusted the kingdom. The first of these was Charles’s Dutch tutor, Adrian of Utrecht, the future Pope Adrian VI.24 Once the Comunidades Revolt began, the Admiral of Castile and the Constable of Castile were also added to the council, forming a triumvirate. The increase in number responded to criticism that the emperor’s northern advisers had usurped the role of Spaniards in their own kingdom. Although administrative records do not hint of any personal familiarity between the Cordovan and the governors, the Constable ´In˜igo Ferna´ndez de Velasco was in fact Martı´n de Co´rdoba y de Velasco’s third cousin on his mother Marı´a de Velasco’s side. Still,

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even while Martı´n wrote to the constable and his co-governors with the expectation of being commended for his work, he took no chances and actively sought the emperor’s attention. The letters that he addressed to Charles chronicled the vital service that he was performing on the emperor’s behalf and requested further employment. Martı´n redacted a letter in Vitoria on November 4, 1521, that declared his pride in serving Charles, highlighted some of his efforts, and directly requested additional orders: ‘‘As your very loyal vassal, I have served Your Majesty since you departed from these kingdoms in everything that concerns Andalusia . . . I believe that your governors will have written to you about this. Given that [Andalusia] has now been reduced to loyalty . . . I came [to Vitoria] with the people of my house [to counter] what the French have launched as Your Majesty will be informed at greater length by other letters. I supplicate Your Majesty to always remember to command me.’’25 Martı´n’s letter alerted the emperor to expect the governors to report his deeds. Clearly, though, he was not taking the chance of them not fulfilling their responsibilities. Instead, the Cordovan lord wrote to the embattled monarch himself to inform him of his good service. The importance that Charles and his successors attached to Martı´n’s service is indicated by the fact that the letter came to be filed in the Patronato Real section of the Archivo General de Simancas. For an archive that normally categorizes documents based on the jurisdictional divisions of the royal councils, Patronato Real is unusual. Archivists collated records they considered vital to the rights of the crown into this collection irrespective of the organ of government to which the record pertained. In fact, Philip II deliberately created Patronato Real as one of the first sections when the archive was established. The inclusion of Martı´n’s letters from this period and his subsequent missives from Toledo into Patronato Real reveals that the Habsburgs considered his service and that of other nobles to have been vital to their interests. That these documents were filed with others of a caliber that include royal marriage contracts and testaments, treaties, titles to territories, oaths of allegiance of vassals, and powers granted to ambassadors and agents speaks to the importance of noble service during the Comunidades Revolt.26 Martı´n de Co´rdoba’s decision to contact Charles was calculated to draw notice to his performance at a moment when the Habsburg monarchy needed all the loyalists that it could find among the high nobility. It was also meant to solicit favor from a desperate monarch. A direct result of his obsequious correspondence may have been a dispatch sent out of Vitoria two weeks later, on November 19, 1521, to the High Court (Audiencia) of Granada. The court was at that time adjudicating a property dispute between Martı´n and his cousin

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Teresa Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, a member of the House of Aguilar.27 In fact, the order to the Audiencia referred to a memorial that Martı´n had sent Charles before joining the Spanish forces in Vitoria and asked for the court to delay its command to demolish the watermill in contention while the Cordovan was away fighting for the emperor.28 With the favor he enjoyed, Martı´n secured reimbursement from the crown for the salaries that he had personally paid to the soldiers he brought to Vitoria. On November 17, 1521, the governors in the name of the emperor sent out another order to the chief accountants (Contadores Mayores) to release monies that the paymasters (Contadores del Sueldo) owed Martı´n for having brought horsemen to fight the French in 1521 as well as advance payment for his services in the following year, 1522.29 The numerous times the crown intervened on Martı´n’s behalf in November 1522 indicate that the Cordovan lord must have performed exceptionally as a military commander fighting the French invasion. Confirming their faith in him, the governors of Spain appointed Martı´n corregidor of Toledo on February 18, 1522. Corregidores were royal governors in municipalities. Toledo had only recently surrendered to pro-Habsburg forces, and the governors’ choice of an officer whose abilities had been tested in Andalusia and the Basque country reflected the perilousness and insecurity of the crown’s position. Despite asserting that the city was now ‘‘calm and reduced to our service,’’ they wrote to Martı´n with clear anxiety that ‘‘there is much need for your arrival. I entrust and order you, given the present situation, to put everything aside and go to Toledo and take possession of municipal administration . . . because this fulfills service to us [and] brings peace and tranquility to the city.’’30 The unease expressed by the governors was real. On February 3, two weeks before Martı´n’s appointment, the city was again in turmoil. A popular uprising had broken out in opposition to Dr. Zumel, the crown’s interim commander in the city, and his repressive measures. This insurrection looked once again to Marı´a Pacheco, who was still living in the city.31 With these difficulties in the immediate background, the governors entrusted the pacification of Toledo to a Cordovan lord.

Martı´n de Co´rdoba and Toledo After the Comunidades Revolt (1522–25) Charles’s early reign sparked uprisings that almost cost him his Spanish kingdoms. The restoration following these revolts established a relationship between the monarchy and society that sustained the Habsburg dynasty and

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government until 1700. Little is known of this pivotal period in Spanish history. Royal and municipal documents are notoriously fragmentary for these years. The following history attempts to fill a portion of the lacuna by focusing on Martı´n de Co´rdoba’s experience in the microcosm of Toledo. Even here, major holes in the historical record hinder us from reliving the daily tasks that the corregidor undertook. The minutes from the city council meetings have perished, and the Archivo General de Simancas yields fairly little information on Toledo in this period. The surviving documents paint a picture of a city plagued by continuing instability and tension. The crown depended on Martı´n to help restore royal authority in the city.32 A fragile peace seemed to have reigned over Toledo, though ‘‘it was a subdued emperor who came back to a still restive and hostile kingdom in 1522.’’33 Yet the tensions destablizing Toledo months after the surrender are revealed by the panic that rumors of Charles’s death caused city officials. In addition to the gatekeeper of Toledo, whom we met at the beginning of this chapter, the news alarmed others in and around the city on May 27, 1522. The commotion exposes the precariousness of the emperor’s government and his dynasty in Spain. The death of Charles would have been a disaster because no Habsburg had been groomed to succeed the young emperor. Just twenty-two years old, Charles was still unmarried and had no offspring. His death would have endangered direct-blood succession. Of his immediate family members only his mother Queen Juana was present, yet her competence was in doubt and she had been cloistered in her Tordesillas palace since 1508. Charles himself had sent his younger brother Ferdinand to Vienna shortly after his own arrival in Spain in 1518. Ferdinand, who had been raised in Spain and had toured the realm with his grandfather and namesake King Ferdinand, was feared as a popular rival to Charles, who had grown up in Flanders. No member of the Habsburg family, thus, would have been immediately capable of taking over the throne in the event of Charles’s death. The importance of having close relatives to serve as governor during his absence from Spain would be accentuated later in the emperor’s reign. Charles’s wife Isabel, their son, two daughters, and nephew/son-in-law all took turns serving as governors in his absence. This stands in contrast to the late 1510s, when the new emperor could count on only his tutor Adrian of Utrecht and two grandees to take his place. Reassuring the residents that the emperor had not died in this world of rumors was thus essential for maintaining the stability of post-Comunidades Castile. Toward such an end, one of Toledo’s public notaries, Alfonso Ferna´ndez de Osegura, wrote to the Constable of Castile on May 30, 1522, thanking

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the latter for informing the city of Charles’s victory in Lombardy.34 The official eagerly added that the constable’s report had inspired ‘‘in this city such happiness that, as vassals of His Majesty, we must all possess. The Holy Church has given many thanks to our Lord, and for our part, we have convoked and will convoke many celebrations.’’35 It may seem unlikely that the former capital of a rebellion would so enthusiastically embrace the emperor’s victory. Putting aside doubts about the revelers’ sincerity, however, the notary’s letter reveals anxiety among Toledo’s officials, who, in other communications, repeatedly emphasized the residents’ joyful reception of the news and their readiness to serve Charles. Ferna´ndez de Osegura’s obsequious letter sought to highlight Toledo’s devotion to the emperor. It was also a way to solicit more information about the well-being of a monarch engaged in foreign wars, a request couched in terms of seeking favor. At the same time that he wrote the letter, the notary also contacted Juan de Zumel, Toledo’s agent (procurador) at court.36 After reporting the city’s jubilation (perhaps hoping that Zumel would share this with court officials), Ferna´ndez de Osegura more bluntly asked that the procurador ‘‘take care to advise us of that which may arise in the favor of His Majesty.’’37 While a rumor of the emperor’s death had precipitated an alarm in Toledo, the correspondence of Toledo’s public notary attests to the equally exaggerated attempts by city officials to demonstrate Toledo’s adherence to loyalty. These letters expose the mood in Toledo and much of Castile, insecure after a two-year civil war and edgy about a monarch leading troops into battle.38 Martı´n de Co´rdoba confirmed the anxiety of the city at the end of May 1522, writing of the whispered rumors, disturbances, and ‘‘wicked intentions’’ (malas voluntades) that he encountered two months into his regime.39 On June 1, the corregidor’s cousin and chief magistrate (alcalde mayor) Luis Ponce de Leo´n reported in more detail: ‘‘Some people here have said certain scandalous things and put up a poster in one of the major public streets. . . . I am informing Your Lordship of what has been done to punish so much shamelessness. One man who was already in custody was found to have said these things and I have ordered him to be hanged. Others have been brought to justice who said things that, though frivolous, were outrageous to make in this climate. Those who saw the poster but did not report it have also been detained.’’40 By early August, the situation had not changed, and Charles himself was requesting more information from the city. Because of continuing ‘‘disturbances’’ (ruidos y questiones), he ordered Martı´n to submit a new

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report detailing what had occurred, the cause of the commotion, and the punishments that had been imposed. After receiving such accounts, the emperor would be able to give additional orders. The detailed instructions in the request, especially the care with which Charles asked the corregidor to preserve the secrecy of the correspondence, underline the continued sensitivity of the situation in Toledo.41 The disturbances were caused by the very process of restoring Habsburg government in the city, including the ensuing retribution meted out against Comunero leaders. From the earliest days of the restoration, the governors, in the name of Charles, were reinstating pre-revolt administrators, officers, and employees—loyalists to the crown who were themselves unpopular in the city. On February 27, 1522, the governors ordered Martı´n de Co´rdoba to reappoint Anto´n Go´mez de Go´mara as notary. This notorious royalist had served as the ‘‘secret notary’’ (escribano del secreto) at the beginning of the revolt under the former corregidor, Martı´n’s cousin Antonio Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba. His duty was to deliver the crown’s demands to the Comunero leaders Juan de Padilla, Juan Carrillo, and Hernando de Avalos during the revolt for which he had been ‘‘expelled from the city, his house twice sacked, and his person threatened with death.’’42 Although Charles had ordered a general pardon of the rebels, some 293 individuals were excluded, of whom twenty were from Toledo.43 Some were punished by having their property confiscated. On June 3, 1522, the governors sent an order from Vitoria to Martı´n de Co´rdoba in Charles’s name explaining that ‘‘the wives of Hernando Davalos and don Pedro de Ayala have hidden many moveable goods, gold and silver of their husbands. . . . I order that you compel these wives of Hernando Davalos and Don Pedro de Ayala and any other people to declare and swear to you where to find these goods.’’44 In addition to the retribution against Comunero leaders, Charles and his governors also sought to pacify the city by suppressing political activity. On June 1, 1522, Luis Ponce de Leo´n wrote to the constable about agitation in the city for the election of deputies (regidores) to the city council. The alcalde mayor reported that despite the city’s demands, he postponed the elections. He justified the delay by arguing that the Catholic Monarchs had stripped the city of the right to elect regidores and suggested that having the emperor hand-pick the city councilors would be more conducive to the security of the city: ‘‘It would seem better for the governance of this city to submit the

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election to the will of our lord the King and to Your Lordship. This will also eliminate some of the passions that exist between the regidores of the city.’’45 The election of regidores was not the only poll that crown officials attempted to forestall through appointment. A year and a half after Ponce de Leo´n cancelled the election of city councilors, Martı´n warned Charles that an impending vote to fill the vacant seat of a representative (jurado) of the parish of San Tome´ to the city council was inciting latent ‘‘factions and animosities.’’46 On January 12, 1524, Martı´n ordered Alonso Martı´nes de Mora, a jurado and notary on the Council of Parishes (Cabildo de los Honrados Jurados), to notify the other members that he had postponed the election on pain of confiscation of office and a fine of 100,000 maravedı´es.47 He also informed them that he would address the council the following morning at eight o’clock.48 When one of the jurados refused to comply, arguing that the corregidor’s order contradicted their privileges, rights, and customs, Martı´n had him arrested and punished ‘‘for such a great offence.’’ The corregidor justified his response by claiming that the same man had also affronted royal officials at the beginning of the Comunidades Revolt and, indeed, ‘‘here [in Toledo], it is necessary to punish more rigorously than anywhere else.’’49 In Toledo, Charles and the crown wanted to discourage residents from gathering for political purposes, fearing unrest. Additional anxiety arose in June 1523 when the canons of the Cathedral of Toledo wanted to convene a meeting of the Junta de Iglesias (Castilian Assembly of the Clergy) in order to discuss a new tax (decima quarto) that the pope was attempting to institute.50 As Charles’s eyes and ears on the scene, Martı´n de Co´rdoba strained hard to uncover what the church officials were discussing in their meetings by questioning those who attended them. He found his efforts thwarted, however, ‘‘because the first thing that was done [at the meeting] was to make everyone swear not to communicate what anyone said to anyone else.’’51 When the corregidor did grasp that the Toledan church wanted to assemble the other cathedral chapters, he pleaded with them to first obtain a license from the emperor and also to see if Charles could meet their requests without resorting to convening a gathering or doing anything ‘‘scandalous.’’52 Despite these urgings, the church officials, armed with supporting letters from the dioceses of Seville and Co´rdoba, met to vote on the Junta. Charles attempted to deflect the convocation by having his agents, the canons Juan de Salazar and the Licenciado Pen˜a, intervene with their peers. Indeed, in the meeting,

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Salazar pressed the other canons not to summon the Junta because neither the pope nor the emperor had authorized it. Though the Junta did meet from July 17 to August 27 that summer, the emperor’s agents apparently succeeded in sabotaging the vote to at least make a second poll necessary.53 The process of royal restoration in Toledo included elements of repression and retribution. Nevertheless, Stephen Haliczer argues that in the long term, Charles attempted to make peace with the urban elite. The monarch was keen to defuse the discontents that had been at the center of the Comunidades Revolt and to forestall an overweening dependence on the high nobility that had saved his kingdom in his absence. Haliczer contends that down the line, the emperor quietly adopted the agenda of the Comuneros. This program sought to reform royal administration by replacing unpopular, abusive, or ineffective officials; creating new specialized governing councils; and expediting judicial cases by transferring much of the legal oversight exercised by the Council of Castile to the regional high courts (audiencias). These measures, Haliczer suggests, were aimed at undermining the control and abuse of government by the high aristocracy.54 Charles’s attempts to restore royal control also included assessing the performance of the high nobles who governed his realm while he went abroad. Even before he had returned to Castile, he replaced the Duke of Na´jera as viceroy of Navarre. This grandee had notoriously misused the royal guards under his command. During the revolt, he had sent them to secure his own estates immediately south of Navarre from popular attack when the viceroyalty itself was facing a French invasion.55 Charles went further, denying claims made by private persons for damages done by the Comuneros and refusing to grant new properties as rewards to his supporters, both direct affronts to the nobility. By revoking certain grants, appointments, pardons, and compensations made to nobles by his governors, the emperor even reprimanded the constable and the admiral for taking actions in his name but without his approval.56 Charles went on to cancel appointments made by the governors to royal posts, including members of the Royal Council and corregidores. The admiral, responding to the emperor’s actions, wrote didactic letters to Charles on how to better treat the high nobility among his royal officials. Charles left these letters unanswered, and the admiral never received another important royal assignment.57 Despite Charles’s mistrust of administrators who had been appointed to govern during his absence, he continued to employ Martı´n de Co´rdoba as corregidor of Toledo after returning to Spain in 1522. Martı´n came to the

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attention of the constable and the admiral in the defense of Navarre in 1521. From early on, Charles graciously commended the Cordovan’s service: ‘‘I have been well informed of everything that you have done during my absence. It is service that conforms to what you and your predecessors are used to providing the royal crown and it is the way that I order and charge you to continue to serve, with the certainty that I will remember you and your services in order to award you what you deserve.’’58 Charles’s positive disposition toward Martı´n is made clear in another letter he wrote a year later to Martı´n’s cousin the Duke of Sessa (formerly the Count of Cabra), who was serving as Spanish ambassador in Rome. In this correspondence, the emperor asks the duke to intervene with the pope on behalf of Martı´n’s younger brother Alfonso. The latter had fathered illegitimate children with a woman named Teresa Ramı´rez de Ca´rdenas. Alfonso had been seeking intercession from Martı´n, the emperor, and now the Duke of Sessa, in order to secure the pensions of his two deceased brothers for his children:59 Illustrious Duke, cousin, member of my council, and ambassador: Don Martı´n de Co´rdoba y de Velasco my corregidor in the city of Toledo has written to this court about a certain business that touches upon his brother of which you yourself have been informed. And because the said Don Martı´n is our good officer and is serving me in the city of Toledo, it is my will to favor him and award him in everything that arises. I request and obligate you to show him favor in this business. And if it is conducive to talk on my behalf with our very Holy Father or with other persons, do so the best you can. This will give me much pleasure and service.60 Martı´n’s service to the emperor brought him commendation, mediation, and financial recompense and reimbursement. He also received honorary offices in his hometown of Co´rdoba that came with stipends. On March 24, 1525, at the end of his term as corregidor, the emperor awarded him the office of obrero of Co´rdoba.61 However, he was never granted landed properties as his father, father-in-law, and other Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba relatives in the previous generation had received from King Ferdinand. Significantly, the lack of land as a part of Martı´n’s recompense signaled that the lord was no longer a medieval caballero conquering territories in the Reconquista. He was transforming into an administrator for a developing state.

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This type of administrator was expected to root himself in the locality of his assignment rather than to court a still-itinerant monarch. Charles wanted Martı´n to remain at his post in Toledo to carry out his duties as corregidor. On many occasions, the emperor, as well as Spain’s governors, rejected Martı´n’s request to attend to them and pay homage. In the same effusive letter of commendation that Charles sent Martı´n in August 1522, the emperor deflected the nobleman’s request to see him, explaining, ‘‘I will be served if you stay and attend well to the government of the city.’’62 This rejection contrasted with Martı´n’s father-in-law’s privileged access when he accompanied Ferdinand on military campaigns and on tours of the realm. Martı´n’s stationary duties as corregidor and the professionalism that the crown was beginning to expect from its noble administrators, however, resulted in disadvantaged access to the ultimate center of power and patronage for Martı´n. The consequences of this restriction will be explored in later chapters. While royal service brought awards, serving the crown also came with scrutiny. The Spanish government had formal checks on its officials. The crown ordered audits, called visitas or residencias, on its officeholders at the end of their terms. The vastness of administrative office in the Spanish empire seemed to make the unwieldy procedure relatively rare or rarely effective. Nevertheless, Martı´n de Co´rdoba was subject to one of these residencias. Since Charles had decided at the beginning of 1524 to extend Martı´n’s tenure for a second term (and the audit was ordered only after his reappointment had been awarded), it appears that the corregidor was the subject of an attack by Toledan residents who had influence at court.63 Martı´n did ask Charles to explain the reason for the investigation, and in this letter, the nobleman defended his service in Toledo while at the same time broadly hinting that he was being unfairly attacked: ‘‘All that Your Majesty orders done to me I consider to be very just and in this audit more than in any other because I hope to God that Your Majesty will learn that I have served you more faithfully than those who seek the audit desired. May those who inform badly of me acknowledge their guilt. However, I am injured because Your Majesty did not order this audit when I willingly petitioned for it, but rather, you allowed it to be initiated only at the insistence of inflamed [apasionadas] persons.’’64 Martı´n survived the audit to retake office in 1525. That same year, Charles made his first official visit to the city to attend the Cortes of Castile. The Cordovan’s reappointment to Toledo during the emperor’s sensitive sojourn suggests that the results of the inquiry had not lost him favor. Charles felt safe to enter the former rebel capital with Martı´n as corregidor.

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The Licenciado Juan Sa´nchez de Briviesca, magistrate of the royal household (alcalde de casa y corte), conducted the audit. During the proceedings, he also substituted for Martı´n as interim corregidor of Toledo, taking over the government on May 6, 1524, and replacing the Cordovan’s officials with his own.65 His work as judge (juez de residencia) entailed taking testimony from city residents on any abuses perpetrated by the corregidor and his lieutenants, including the magistrates, bailiffs, and notaries. The testimony of the informants could immeasurably enrich our knowledge of Toledan history following the Comunidades Revolt and shed light on Martı´n’s administration. Unfortunately, such depositions have perished. However, both the amount of testimony and the zeal of the auditor must have been substantial, for while the term of the residencia was limited to thirty days, by June 1524 Sa´nchez de Briviesca had written to the court asking for a prolongation of the term of the audit by four more months. The crown balked at this request, allowing for an extension of only thirty more days. It further stipulated that only ten could be spent taking testimony on the governor, chief magistrate, and chief bailiff (alguacil mayor) and the remaining twenty on the other magistrates, notaries, and officials of Toledo.66 In 1525, Charles attended the Cortes of Castile meeting in Toledo. At the same time, Martı´n de Co´rdoba returned to serve as corregidor. This indicates that he more than survived the audit. In fact, the crown thought that his presence as head of the city’s government would help guarantee the emperor’s security in the former Comunero center. Martı´n must have enjoyed privileged access to the emperor during his visit. The proximity of the Cordovan to the sovereign during this time was further confirmed when the emperor lodged for three nights on the lord’s seigneurial estate of Alcaudete from May 26 to May 28, 1526, when he was on his way from Co´rdoba to Granada after marrying Isabel of Portugal in Seville. Strikingly, this was Charles’s only visit to Co´rdoba, and Alcaudete was the only seigneurial estate, among so many others in the region, including those of the Aguilar and Cabra branches of the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, where he stayed the night (in this case, three nights).67 The Cortes of Toledo has largely been overshadowed by its two immediate predecessors, the Cortes of Santiago in 1520, which precipitated the Comunidades Revolt, and the Cortes of Valladolid in 1523, which reaffirmed royal authority after the rebellion. However, James Tracy has noted that while the assembly at Valladolid naturally treated important issues related to the restoration of domestic tranquility, the meeting in Toledo dealt with the pressing considerations arising from Charles’s burgeoning foreign policy.68

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Since the revolt, Charles had been elected Holy Roman emperor, defeating rivals that included the French king Francis I. The two had also waged a war in Italy that resulted in the French sovereign’s capture. Indeed, the Cortes of Toledo was taking place with Francis in captivity in Spain. With a foreign king imprisioned in their realm, the Castilian cities were at that very moment coming face to face with the implications of having transformed into a constituent piece of the Habsburg empire whose interests included the containment of France, a historic ally of Castile in the Middle Ages. It was at this Cortes that the royal cities approved the emperor’s marriage to his first cousin Isabel, sister of King Manuel of Portugal and granddaughter of Queen Isabella of Castile. The emperor hoped that the marriage and the children it could produce would help cement the Habsburg dynasty in Spain after its hold had been shaken by the Comunidades Revolt. This marriage was also a critical component of Charles’s foreign policy goals. The wedding of the emperor’s grandparents had finally led to the unification of Castile and Aragon. His union with Isabel of Portugal had the potential of doing the same for Spain and Portugal. Finally, Charles procured funds to help conduct his exorbitantly expensive foreign policy goals. Along with a regular levy (servicio ordinario) of 410,666 ducats over two years, from 1527 to 1529, the representatives of the Castilian cities also approved the first ever extraordinary subsidy (servicio extraordinario) of 400,000 ducats. The latter would be the first of many in the coming years that would make Castile a key tax base supporting the burden of the Habsburg world empire. In many ways then, the Cortes of Toledo was a foundational moment when the dynasty’s longevity was finally ensured biologically and financially. The Cortes of Toledo also clarified Castile’s role in the Habsburgs’ venture for European domination. The governor whom Emperor Charles wanted to rule the city that hosted the pivotal event was Martı´n de Co´rdoba. After anchoring one of the capitals of Castile while the emperor secured his realm and dynasty, Martı´n set off for his next assignment in Navarre.

Internal Dislocations Within the Alcaudete Family Troubles frequently accompanied the death of monarchs and the crowning of their successors. Ambitious royals could seek to contest the succession. Groups and individuals could take advantage of these transitional moments of weakness to seek redress of grievances with the crown. But just as monarchs left upheaval in the wake of their deaths, so too did nobles whose estates

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were fought over by family members. Like his emperor, Martı´n had to resort to arms to contend for an inheritance that he claimed from his maternal grandfather. Successions were thus just as precarious for nobles as they were for kings. Yet the cycle of death and succession, along with marriage, procreation, and the accumulation of resources, all constituted the process of families reproducing themselves. Martı´n de Co´rdoba’s marriage to Leonor Pacheco enabled a nobleman to perpetuate his lineage. In this case, however, it turned out that the union also had repercussions for the regeneration of imperial administration. As Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s son-in-law, Martı´n gained access to a network of officers that managed the early empire. These ties helped ensure that he could enter what was becoming a family profession in an advantageous way. While the lives of nobles were not in the same league as an emperor’s, the biological and social reproduction of Charles and his high noble supporters went hand in hand to impact the continued survival of the Spanish realm. In his youth, Martı´n de Co´rdoba faced a succession crisis of his own. As the eldest son, he inherited his father’s mayorazgo without contest. At the same time, however, he was eager to claim his maternal grandfather’s properties. Martı´n’s mother, Marı´a de Velasco, was the eldest daughter of Juan de Velasco, the Count of Siruela I. Although the Siruela branch of the Velasco lineage was not among the highest nobles of the land, the clan was headed by the Constable of Castile, a grandee of the realm and one of the governors of Castile during the Comunidades Revolt.69 Martı´n’s maternal grandfather, the Count of Siruela I, was succeeded by his son Francisco, who was also the Cordovan’s uncle. However, Francisco produced only a daughter, Leonor de Velasco.70 When he died around 1504–5, Martı´n claimed the rights to the patrimony of Siruela as a male descendant of the first Count of Siruela. Martı´n took preemptive action in a three-sided contest (the other parties were Leonor de Velasco and another cousin, Antonio de Velasco). Marshalling an overwhelming force of 600 cavalry and footmen, the young Cordovan lord and his father, Alfonso, marched into the town of Siruela in Extremadura.71 In retaliation, Leonor filed several lawsuits to reclaim her inheritance. In 1509, the Royal Council ordered Martı´n to withdraw from Siruela, at which time he also appealed to the Audiencia in Valladolid. When the Audiencia ruled in 1512 that a notarized copy of the title of Sireula that he possessed was a forgery, Martı´n settled the dispute with Leonor by accepting a payment of 23,400 ducats. The case did not end there. After attaining his majority, Martı´n’s heir, Alonso de Co´rdoba, Count of Alcaudete II, filed a new claim in 1532 arguing

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that his title to the estate was authentic and that the 1512 settlement had done him grievous harm (‘‘enormissima lesion’’) as the rightful heir of Siruela. The case dragged on into the lifetime of Alonso’s son and heir Francisco de Co´rdoba, Count of Alcaudete IV. The issue also continued to weigh on Martı´n’s mind. In the will that he drew up in 1554, Martı´n claimed to have the ‘‘certification of jurists [letrados] of such knowledge and conscience’’ that Siruela belonged to his descendants. He instructed Alonso and any future successors to pursue their rights ‘‘because God does not allow such a great deception like the one that has been committed against me to pass.’’72 Martı´n’s persisting anger at the inheritance dispute and his desire for Alonso to continue the lawsuit were, however, mitigated by his recognition that the employment of solicitors in Valladolid and at court was causing much strain on the family finances. This was made clear in another provision of the will requiring Alonso to pay for the litigation expenses from his share of the potential inheritance so that such costs would not prejudice the fortunes of his siblings.73 Martı´n also ordered Alonso to share the Siruela fortune with his brothers and sisters in the form of allowances once the lawsuit was settled. Martı´n’s inheritance dispute and the litigation that it caused were not unique. The nobility’s great fortunes naturally attracted attention from a variety of claimants. Although Martı´n was fighting to inherit an estate, not a kingdom, his predicament mirrored that of a monarch, albeit on a smaller scale. Succession struggles were part of the reproduction cycle of noble families that naturally also included biological procreation. Here, as in the passing of property, the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba would also run into difficulties. Chapter 1 examined the reproduction patterns of the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba clan in the late Middle Ages that were tailored to enfold the resources—material and human—of the locality of Co´rdoba. Large families that averaged more than seven children per generation, high marriage rates, and a predilection for offspring (especially daughters) to marry local partners characterized the reproduction pattern of the lineage. This trend began to change in the eighth generation of the clan, a period that coincided with Spain’s transition from an Iberia-centered state to a world empire. Martı´n’s generation straddled the fault line between these two eras. As he and his brothers and sons entered the military and administrative professions that had created such an empire, the family adapted to new demands on their resources and bodies. Careers were frequently conducted on the front lines, and casualties were high. Premature deaths limited men’s access to procreation, especially that of a legitimate nature. In an effort to conserve resources, Martı´n’s sisters and daughters were

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cloistered en masse in the family’s convent, eliminating the need to provide them with expensive dowries. The offspring that did wed now found matches from among the high nobility of the whole realm, reflecting the expansion of the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s theater of operations. A return to statistics compiled from genealogical records helps reveal the changes that the lineage underwent.74 From the beginning of the sixteenth century into the first decades of the seventeenth (corresponding to the seventh through the tenth generations of the lineage), the four branches produced 117 known children. During this period, the average family size decreased slightly from the 7.5 per generation in the late Middle Ages to 7.3 children in the early modern period.75 Out of these 117 children, there were, however, only fifty-two marriages, a rate of 44 percent, compared with a far higher medieval rate of 73 percent.76 Specifically, unions between Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba children and members of local families decreased to 30 percent from a medieval high of 60 percent. In contrast, matches with members of nonlocal families increased dramatically to 70 percent from an earlier low of 36 percent. This amounted to a complete reversal of the medieval pattern. Among the children who did not marry (57 percent), thirty-three are known to have entered into religious vocations (28 percent). Again, this contrasts with the medieval figure of only twelve children (9 percent) entering ecclesiastical careers or monasteries. These statistics demonstrate that in the early modern period, the lineage preferred matches with peers from further afield in Castile as well as Aragon and Navarre. At the same time, it restricted access to this institution, and consequently the possibility of legitimate reproduction, to a limited number of individuals. Select examples from the Houses of Comares and Alcaudete will help illustrate these trends more vividly, and a comprehensive survey of their marriage partners will be provided in the epilogue. In the new era, the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba achieved brilliantly successful matches on a level that far surpassed the unions it contracted in the late Middle Ages. Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba himself wedded Juana Pacheco, daughter of the Marquis of Villena, the favorite of King Enrique IV. His grandson the Marquis of Comares III married Juana de Arago´n, who, as Duchess of Cardona and Segorbe, was a descendant of Aragonese royalty and a grandee of Spain, and she possessed one of the oldest titles and certainly the greatest fortune in the entire Crown of Aragon. While few would have the luck of marrying into a grandee fortune, the Marquis III’s siblings and cousins achieved unions with titled nobles and second sons or daughters of

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other grandee families.77 Looking for partners beyond the immediate Cordovan hinterland mirrored the extension of the lineage’s military, political, administrative, and court activites to a national level. Marriages with distant members of the nobility also helped the clan access material and human resources beyond the finite stock of their home base. Even as the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba achieved high-status marriages from across the realm, it also restricted its children’s access to this institution. Perhaps the branch of the lineage that rationed marriage most severely was the House of Alcaudete. Such restrictions impacted the sons as well as the daughters of the family. Martı´n’s generation came immediately after the end of the Granada War. His and his brothers’ entrance into, and dedication to, imperial service represented the contribution of middle-stratum high nobles to the early era of territorial expansion. All three of Martı´n’s brothers, Alfonso, Pedro, and Diego, fought in Emperor Charles’s Italian wars. Alfonso was a cavalry captain and commander (alcaide) of the fortress of Civitavecchia. Pedro and Diego were both captains of tercios.78 Of the four brothers, three died in battle. Among them, only Martı´n had legitimate children. Alfonso also fathered children but, as related earlier, he required the intervention of the pope to legitimate them. The other two brothers, Pedro and Diego, were not married and are not known to have had any issue. It is possible that Martı´n had ten sisters.79 Of them, only one, Marı´a Carrillo, was known to have married. Her partner was the Count of Santiesteban del Puerto, Francisco de Benavides, from the neighboring region of Jae´n. The match cemented close relations between these two middle-stratum high-noble families. After the death of Marı´a’s father, her widowed mother resided on Santiesteban’s estates. Martı´n de Co´rdoba raised Marı´a and Francisco’s son in his own household. However, Marı´a’s dowry indicated the costly nature of marriages for brides and their family. The Cordovan brought to her union the estates of Fines and Somontı´n.80 Queen Isabella and King Ferdinand had granted her father these properties in appreciation of the family’s efforts during the Granada War just a generation prior. The alienation of these two estates, so soon after the family had attained them, demonstrates the costs of marrying out daughters. This factor must have inhibited the matrimonial hopes of the remaining nine daughters. At least five of Martı´n’s sisters, Leonor, Francisca, Beatriz, Sancha, and Catalina, entered the Convent of Santa Clara founded by their parents on their estate of Alcaudete. Two more, Ana and Elvira, may also have followed this profession. The status of the final two, Isabel and Luisa, is unknown.81

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These same patterns were perpetuated in the generation of Martı´n’s children. The Cordovan lord fathered nine children—four sons and four daughters with his wife Leonor and one illegitimate son with an unknown woman. Like their father, three of the five sons, Alonso, Francisco, and Martı´n II, served as military and administrative officers in North Africa, Granada, and Navarre. A fourth son, Diego, led a distinguished career as bishop of Calahorra and royal auditor (visitador) in Valladolid, Valencia, and Sicily. The fifth and illegimate son, Carlos, also pursued a religious profession as a Dominican friar.82 It is a sign of the toll that imperial service took on the lives and bodies of these men that among the five sons, only two married and produced legitimate children. When examining Martı´n and his sons’ generations together, only three out of eight men were married, and only two produced legitimate children. Of Martı´n and Leonor’s four daughters, none married. Instead, Juana, Elvira, Francisca, and Leonor all joined their aunts in the Convent of Santa Clara in Alcaudete. After two fecund generations, the ones following Martı´n’s children experienced a high rate of attrition. Among Martı´n’s grandchildren, four out of eight married (with three sons dying young). In the generation after that, only one of three children (all daughters) married. In the final generation of the Alcaudete family that will be considered in this study, there were only two known children, of whom one daughter survived and married.83 Endowed with privilege that included legal rights, social status, and property, the nobility were anxiously concerned with the survival of the lineage in order to pass on these tangible and intangible attributes. The renewal of a family required successful reproduction of the nobility’s social and biological beings. The expansion of the empire and the opportunities to hold military and administrative office changed the dynamics of reproduction for the Alcaudete family. Service helped the family’s social reproduction, as office brought with it income, status, and power. Martı´n de Co´rdoba’s defense of the crown in the Comunidades Revolt and his service as corregidor of Toledo and viceroy of Navarre won him the noble title Count of Alcaudete. The crown also awarded his labors with intercession on a variety of matters, ranging from a property dispute to the legitimation of his brother’s children. However, this very service made a severe impact on his family’s ability to regenerate biologically. The dedication of the family’s resources—financial, material, and bodily—limited the ability of both sons and daughters to marry and produce legitimate offspring. Martı´n’s service replicated that of his father-in-law’s. The Lord of Alcaudete helped his family achieve a level of

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prestige that it never enjoyed as the weakest of the four houses of the lineage. However, this success came with a price. The following chapters will continue to monitor the biological impact of service on the family.

Conclusion: Renewal of Empire and the Reproduction of Noble Families The Comunidades Revolt and its aftermath in Toledo represent the renewal of the Spanish monarchy. This process faced many obstacles and was in no way a preordained fact. The history of this regeneration, especially the restoration years immediately after the rebellion was suppressed, has been hidden. This chapter resurrects some of that knowledge. The Comunidades Revolt also provides a setting to explore and analyze the parallel reproduction of the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba lineage. It was at this moment that Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s son-in-law Martı´n de Co´rdoba embarked on his own career. Although Martı´n’s first important post was that of the corregidor of Toledo, he also came to replicate his father-in-law’s career path in Navarre and Oran. The continuity of the family’s service in these two territories speaks of Diego’s successful effort to hand down his offices to the next generation. At the same time, the crown’s persistent appointment of the sons of Comares and Alcaudete to these positions evidence that it viewed administrative continuity and longevity in the two territories through the medium of family. The monarchy and royal dynasty’s constant need of renewal, one that faced so many critical challenges, was abetted by the social and biological reproduction of noble families. Members of the high nobility constituted a backbone of support for the imperial monarchy; their service had a heavy impact on their own biological survival. Still, the regeneration of noble families served the interests and furthered the survival of the monarchy and empire.

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chapter 4

Navarre and the Imperialization of the House of Alcaudete, 1525–1534

The Count of Alcaudete, Captain General of the Kingdom of Navarre . . . requests that Your Majesty order sufficient soldiers to reside in the Navarre because [the people of] Pamplona are armed and arming themselves every day and there is no greater danger than losing it by treason or usurpation. The only way to be safe is to station sufficient guards to hold down the city. . . . Likewise, it is necessary to improve both the defensive and offensive capabilities of the fortress for the security of the city. Otherwise, if there were to be a revolution, all would be lost. —Count of Alcaudete to Empress Isabel

From the suppression of a domestic revolt at the heart of Spain, Martı´n de Co´rdoba y de Velasco moved north to take over the governorship of Navarre in 1525. The Cordovan’s previous professional experience in Toledo, his personal connections, and the role that his ancestors had historically played defending the frontier of Granada all helped ease him into the new position.1 However, connections and prior service went only so far to prepare the lord to face quite a different task: overseeing the administration of a formerly independent Christian kingdom still very much enmeshed in the international system of European states. Although Spain had conquered Navarre in 1512, a decade later the vanquished kingdom still felt the impact of interests and forces that considered the occupation to be reversible. Factions

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of Navarrese nobles agitated against Spain while France invaded the Pyrenean kingdom attempting to reestablish the independence of the strategic buffer state. Martı´n’s efforts to defuse internal opposition, defend Navarre from France, and integrate it into the Spanish empire conditioned him to tasks that encompassed imperial and international dimensions. This world took him and his family even farther away from the environs that he and his ancestors called home. As viceroy and captain general of Navarre, the work Martı´n undertook changed him in many ways, as he navigated the difficulties of managing the civil and military affairs of a threatened kingdom. His duties brought him into close contact with the people of Navarre, foreigners to the Spanish empire just ten years earlier. He monitored the machinations of France and prepared for attacks coming from the north. Martı´n’s position also expanded the range of his travels as he trekked back and forth between Andalusia and the Pyrenees. Martı´n’s term of office from 1525 to 1534 also brackets a period when the rest of his family dispersed across the western Mediterranean on imperial assignments or in preparation for them. All three of Martı´n’s brothers left for Italy to fight in Charles V’s armies. His sons served as pageboys in the empress’s court and studied at the University of Salamanca. His wife, and for a while his daughters, traveled by his side, organizing a viceregal court that contributed to the administration of the kingdom. Trained and deployed on imperial lives, his closest kin helped transform service to the empire into a true family affair.

Medieval Navarre: A Pyrenean Kingdom on an International Stage Since the early Middle Ages, Navarre had been intricately bound to its neighbors through an international framework of political, military, and dynastic relations. To the south, these included, for a while, the Umayyad emirate and numerous Muslim-ruled successor states (taifas). Over time, other Christian states, Leo´n, Castile, Aragon, and Barcelona, would emerge on its borders, and their longevity would ultimately make a greater impact on the Pamplonese kingdom. North of the Pyrenees, Navarre bordered the French crown, the English territory of Aquitaine, and an array of lesser duchies, counties, and lordships. Navarre’s affairs in the Middle Ages and the early modern period were intertwined with those of its neighbors, and its history

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must be considered in reference to the international system of European states. Although Navarre would never become one of the leading powers of Europe, it enjoyed a long and proud history. The Pyrenean kingdom distinguished itself as one of the earliest Christian states to emerge following the Arab-Berber conquest of Iberia in the eighth century. At its height in the mid-eleventh century, the kingdom held territories in today’s Navarre, Aragon (Huesca), and Castile (La Rioja and the three Basque provinces of Guipu´zcoa, Vizcaya, and A´lava). Its preeminence, however, would not endure, as its territory was under constant threat from annexation by its larger neighbors Aragon and Castile. These two states also blocked the Pyrenean state from the front lines of the war against the taifas and therefore access to new land. In contrast, Aragon and Castile (along with Portugal) seized Muslim territories and grew into major European powers. Eclipsed by its siblings, Navarre struggled to survive by negotiating uneasy, precarious, and at times treacherous relations with its Iberian rivals through the remainder of the Middle Ages.2 When Navarre found its growth southward restricted in the late eleventh century, it sought new lands and allies north of the Pyrenees. King Sancho VI (r. 1150–94) claimed San Juan de Pie de Puerto, a town at the northern outlet of the Roncesvalles Pass. This territory and additional lands came to form Lower Navarre (also known as Ultrapuertos or Basse-Navarre). Ultrapuertos remained a part of the independent kingdom of Navarre and Spanish Navarre until 1529, when the Spanish government realized that these transPyrenean lands were too vulnerable to defend against the French and ordered the viceroy Martı´n de Co´rdoba to abandon them. Along with territorial acquisition in the north, Sancho VI also contracted marriage ties to royal and noble houses of England and France.3 His son married a daughter of the Count of Toulouse, and a daughter wedded the Count of Champagne. Another daughter, Berenguela, even won the hand of King Richard I the Lionheart of England.4 Marriage unions with northern powers came with consequences for the small mountain kingdom. The extinction of the native Jimeno dynasty’s male line in 1234 started the ascent of foreign rulers to the Pamplonese throne that lasted throughout the late Middle Ages. The first of these came from the House of Champagne, which ruled from 1234 to 1305. The Capetians followed from 1305 to 1349, then the Evreux from 1349 to 1446, and finally the Foix-Albret from 1479 to 1512. These ties linked Navarre’s fate ever closer to

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the French monarchy itself, and under the Capetians, the two kingdoms even shared the same sovereigns. The foreign dynasties inserted the Pyrenean kingdom into patrimonies that included other possessions. Many of these properties were located far away from Navarre’s perch in the Pyrenees. When the counts of Champagne inherited Navarre, they ruled over vast landholdings both northeast and southwest of Paris. The House of Evreux possessed estates scattered all over Normandy north and northwest of Paris, along with Angouleˆme in the center-west. Although the Foix-Albret ruled Be´arn, Bigorra, and Foix, all properties lining the north-central side of the Pyrenees, they also owned lands farther away in Gascony, Limoges, and Perigord.5 Some of these territories rivaled Navarre, and even the French crown itself, in size, wealth, and power. The counts of Champagne’s territories included the towns of Troyes, Provins, Lagny, and Bar-sur-Aube. The famous fairs staged there helped connect the economies of Italy and the Low Countries. Feeding off these markets, Champagne’s wealth in the high Middle Ages equaled that of the Capetians.6 The need to administer and defend some extremely important, albeit dispersed, properties meant that Navarre’s foreign rulers passed most of their lives outside of their Pyrenean domain. Owning lands in the fragmented political world of France, Navarre’s foreign rulers were also drawn into the conflicts that plagued the unstable region. The Hundred Years’ War clearly demonstrated this peril. Although Navarre was not a direct contestant, France and England’s dispute over the succession to the last Capetian king wreaked havoc on the kingdom. The conflict exposed Navarre’s vulnerability to the great European powers to the north and south.7 Politics connected Navarre to states on the Iberian Peninsula and in the trans-Pyrenean world. Demographic, cultural, and economic indicators also reveal how the medieval kingdom was situated at the crossroads of Europe. Inhabitants of the kingdom in the Middle Ages consisted of a heterogeneous mixture of ethnolinguistic groups. Basque speakers—or Vascones—formed the demographic foundation of Navarre. Their presence in the region had been recorded since antiquity, and they continued to dominate the rural and mountainous zones. Other languages were also present in Navarre. As in the rest of western Europe, Latin dominated the world of learning and royal administration. In the tenth century, the use of a Romance language that would develop into Castilian emerged in the lower reaches of the Ega, Arga, and Arago´n rivers in the realm’s southwestern district. Added to the mix of tongues was Gascon, a variant of Occitan, which was spoken in Ultrapuertos.

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In one very special way, Navarre was quite literally a crossroads of Europe. Pilgrims on their way to St. James’s tomb in Santiago de Compostela in Galicia passed through the kingdom and still do. Three major branches of the pilgrimage road originating from various sites in France all converge in Ultrapuertos.8 There, a single path leads first to San Juan de Pie de Puerto and then to the Roncesvalles pass, which crosses the Pyrenees into Iberian Navarre, where an impressive hospice receives travelers. A fourth branch of the road originates from Arles in Provence, scales the Pyrenees at Somport, reaches the Aragonese town of Jaca, and from there enters Navarre at Sangu¨esa. From Navarre, the road crosses through northern Castile and Leo´n before terminating in Galicia. The pilgrimage brought northern Europeans to Navarre. The church, monarchy, and nobility founded a host of institutions such as monasteries, hospitals, and inns in the 1070s and 1080s to serve the needs of these foreign travelers. Some of them settled in Navarre, populating the towns along the road. In the eleventh century, towns like Pamplona and Estella inaugurated new quarters to absorb these immigrants.9 Sandwiched between northern and southwestern Europe, Navarre was able to balance French and Castilian pressure for a while. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, both powers were immersed in debilitating wars.10 Their long-standing alliance also helped keep the buffer state safe. By the late fifteenth century, however, France and Castile were reconsolidating, and their subsequent expansion brought them into conflict over the rich prize of Italy and the borderlands of Rousillion, Cerdagne, and indeed Navarre.11 At this time, Navarre’s ruling dynasty, the Foix, was particularly close to the Valois of France. Queen Catherine, Navarre’s last independent monarch, was the daughter of Madeleine, a sister of King Louis XI of France. Catherine came to the throne as a minor, and her mother ruled as regent. She took as her husband Jean II d’Albret, a vassal of the king of France and in fact the latter’s candidate for her hand.12 Spain, though, was able to put pressure on Navarre by threatening to invade. At the same time, it also cajoled its neighbor by promising to return occupied Navarrese land and appealing to a band of sympathetic Navarrese nobles called the Beamontes.13 After the death of Queen Isabella, Ferdinand even took as a second wife Germaine de Foix, a collateral member of the House of Foix and a possible claimant to the throne. Lurching between the dangers of becoming a French protectorate and a Spanish one, Navarre finally sided with its northern neighbor against Spain when war broke out in Italy in 1512. When Navarre and France concluded the Treaty of Blois on July 12, 1512, Ferdinand responded immediately by sending

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an army across the border on July 21. Navarre capitulated in a matter of weeks, and Catherine and Jean fled north, relocating to their county of Be´arn under the protection of the French.14 The invasion terminated the independence of a realm whose roots went back to the dawn of Christian states in Iberia.15 Navarre belonged to an international system of European states in the Middle Ages, and it continued to participate in such a framework in the early modern period.16 The Spanish takeover in 1512 was not a conclusive fact. Instead, a protracted multiphase war from 1512 to 1529 during which Navarre alternated between Spanish and French control kept the kingdom in play. Indeed, Spain was ultimately unable to take possession of the entire kingdom, and it definitively abandoned Ultrapuertos in 1529. Even after this period of direct confrontation, Navarre’s dethroned royal family continued to loom over the kingdom from the other side of the border.17 It is also too easy to assume that Spain itself was a monolithic and cohesive state in these years. Navarre’s long-term membership in the Spanish crown was an uncertain matter; the emperor Charles V had such strong misgivings about his grandfather’s invasion of a sovereign Christian kingdom that he even entertained the idea of returning Navarre to the Foix-Albrets. Finally, the annexation of Navarre must be situated in an international setting. Spain’s expansion in Granada, the Americas, Italy, and North Africa was fueling concern in France and England, leading to their intervention in Navarre. The kingdom’s fate, then, was subject not only to the will of the Spanish king but also to the maneuverings of other powers. Indeed, the emerging rivalry between Spain and France in Italy in the late fifteenth century also affected Navarre. Directly bordering these two superpowers, Navarre was actually more susceptible to their muscle-flexing than the Italian states.18 Within the Spanish realm itself, Navarre stood out from its sibling territories. Unlike the other reinos that had been absorbed into a Castiliandominated Spanish empire, Navarre preserved a homegrown royal council. Not even the Crown of Aragon maintained this type of indigenous executive institution. The scope of Navarre’s medieval boundaries was brought to mind in the rights that residents of Ultrapuertos enjoyed even after Spain abandoned the northern territory in 1529. Claiming to be the legitimate kingdom of Navarre, Spanish Navarre had to honor the rights of these former subjects to access its legal institutions. And though many were suspected of being spies, petitioners crossed from north to south with ease because they enjoyed the right of entry into the southern lands.19 Finally, the cohabitation of three

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linguistic communities—Castilian, French, and Basque—in an area comparable to today’s Kosovo (or somewhat smaller in area than Connecticut) also distinguished it from the rest of Spain.20 Situating Navarre in its very international medieval past and examining a legacy that was preserved in the early modern period helps us understand the nature of the territory that Martı´n de Co´rdoba governed and the way it transformed him.

Martı´n de Co´rdoba and the Ransom of the French Princes Navarre’s legacy as an independent kingdom was preserved in the oath of office Martı´n de Co´rdoba took as viceroy. In it, he swore to ‘‘uphold, observe, and guard the rights, laws, customs, ordinances, offices, freedoms, liberties, and privileges’’ that the kingdom enjoyed.21 Along with his title of viceroy, the Cordovan also exercised the office of captain general.22 In contrast, the duties that came with this position reflected Navarre’s status as a recently conquered territory that was still threatened by France. In the years following the Spanish seizure of 1512, the French had counterattacked three times—in 1512, 1516, and 1521. During the third invasion, the enemy had overrun Navarre and penetrated as far south as La Rioja in the Castilian heartland, laying siege to its capital of Logron˜o.23 Although Martı´n never faced a full-scale invasion himself, border skirmishes, threatened incursions, troop movements, and rumors constantly preoccupied him. This section explores Martı´n’s service as chief military officer when the French royal hostages, held by Spain since Charles V’s victory at the Battle of Pavia, were to be returned home. France’s military options were limited while the hostages were still in Spanish hands. Once they were released, however, it was unclear whether the Valois monarchy was going to honor the terms of the ransom or resume its war against the Habsburgs. The Pyrenean state was already vulnerable on the frontier, but it was brought into further danger since the hostages were passing close to Navarre on their way back to France. Martı´n’s role at this precarious moment exposed France’s pressure on Navarre, internal dissention that still opposed the Spanish occupation, and the incomplete integration of the kingdom into the Spanish realm. Navarre’s place in the international system of European states was still a factor, and its contested status made an impact on Martı´n’s job. The captain general’s martial duties were spelled out in a commission issued by Charles V on August 25, 1525.24 The Cordovan possessed supreme

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command over Navarre’s armed forces and installations ‘‘as if we [the king] were there in person to command.’’ The upkeep of the servicemen was perhaps Martı´n’s most important obligation, and he was charged with paying the regular (ordinario) and auxiliary (extraordinario) soldiers stationed in the kingdom.25 Martı´n took periodic musters (alardes) to keep track of the men on assignment as well as their fitness to serve. He exercised civil and criminal jurisdiction over military personnel. Other officers, including ‘‘captains of the cavalry and their lances, the lieutenants, colonels, and captains of the regular and auxiliary infantry, the paymasters, the inspectors, and any other officials who have a role in releasing funds and paying for the men,’’ along with the commanders (alcaı´des) of fortresses, were likewise ordered to obey the Cordovan.26 Finally, the regent, the members of the royal council, and the magistrates of courts, towns, and villages were also required to assist the captain general.27 Martı´n also took charge of maintaining Navarre’s fortifications. With the bastions of nearby San Sebastian in the west and Perpignan in the east on the Mediterranean coast, Pamplona’s fortress complex helped anchor Spain’s defenses on the French border. Pamplona sits on top of a sheer bluff that overlooks the Arga River winding around the northern edge of the city. Its defensible position was one reason why settlers in antiquity chose the site. A medieval castle, thick walls, and bastion towers built on the highland guarded the city. A massive citadel (ciudadela) was added to the vulnerable southern flank of the city in the sixteenth century. It stood apart from other quarters of the city. This separation helped ensure that even if the residential districts fell or rose up in rebellion, the citadel could be held.28 Townspeople living under Spanish rule must have felt squeezed between the medieval castle in the north and the sixteenth-century citadel in the south. The orientation of the two fortresses vis-a`-vis the civilian dwellings physically represented Spain’s posture toward Pamplona and Navarre. The difficulty of keeping enough soldiers stationed in Navarre was a constant concern for the viceroy. Pamplona’s castle was especially hard to staff. An adequate muster would have consisted of 400 cavalrymen, 500 infantrymen, and 50 artillery specialists, but only 300 men were stationed in the fortress.29 The Cordovan repeatedly complained of chronically truant men and a shortage of funds, munitions, and foodstuffs.30 In one report to Empress Isabel, Martı´n grumbled: ‘‘The number of men is insufficient; out of the eighty-nine that are supposed to be present, fifteen are absent. . . . And those who are in the fortress seem to me to be useless.’’ The captain general

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reported that men did not want to remain in their posts because of guard duty, bad pay, and delays in wage distribution. While Pamplona’s fortress was understaffed, Navarre did host more captaincies than any other region on the French border. In 1530, twelve captaincies resided in Navarre, compared with six in Perpignan and seven in Castile.31 The kingdom’s importance as a defensive bulwark was reinforced by these numbers. Double or nearly double the number of captaincies was stationed in Navarre than in any other territory in Spain. The year 1530, however, was an extraordinary one as the kingdom prepared to face a massive mobilization of French forces on the other side of the border in anticipation of the return of two French princes who had been held hostage. The princes had been exchanged in 1526 for their father, King Francis I, captured in battle by the troops of Charles V at Pavia (1525). They were to be handed back on June 28, 1530, following the negotiation of the Treaty of Cambrai in 1529, which ostensibly ended hostilities between the two rivals.32 The massing of French soldiers was intended as a show of force to compel the Spanish to keep to the terms of the ransom. Martı´n perceived the French threat acutely at this time. A flurry of correspondence, memorials, urgent appeals by other royal officials, and spy reports revealed the dangers that the kingdom faced. From the start of the year, the viceroy had urged the empress to raise the number of soldiers guarding Pamplona, pointing out that Henri II d’Albret, the heir of Catherine and Jean of Navarre, did not subscribe to the Treaty of Cambrai and was eager to incite a confrontation that would draw in the French troops massed on the frontier.33 In a memorial to the empress, he warned that spies were reporting that the king of France had accumulated a ‘‘very great’’ sum of money that more than met what was needed to ransom his sons. They suggested that such funds were meant to pay the 9,000 or 10,000 German soldiers stationed on the French side. Some of these men had already passed through Navarre with the ostensible purpose of making the pilgrimage to Santiago. Martı´n reported that more Germans were expected to arrive in the coming days. He ended the letter ironically: ‘‘The French in fact are showing such enthusiasm for the treaty that there is a drive to recruit more troops to help preserve the peace!’’34 As final preparation for the release of the princes were being made in June 1530, Martı´n continued to warn of formidable forces gathering on the border. The viceroy reported that six or seven companies, including those commanded by Henri and the captain general of Francis I, had joined the

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two hundred soldiers already present in the French border town of Bayonne. Henri was also mobilizing the knights and nobles of his own lands, while the French were recruiting men to form four more companies. The viceroy insisted that the 300 soldiers protecting the fortress of Pamplona were outnumbered by the enemy army only ten leagues away from the capital. He added that he could not count on any reinforcements from the frontiers of Castile and Aragon, regions that were suffering from the plague at that moment.35 Martı´n reminded the empress that one of his predecessors, the Duke of Na´jera, had many more men at his disposal when the French last invaded in 1521, during the middle of the Comunidades Revolt in Castile. At that time, Na´jera occupied Pamplona, a city of 2,000 households and 3,000 able-bodied men, with 500 to 600 veterans and another 1,000 Castilian soldiers.36 Martı´n explained that despite this show of force, the residents of Pamplona rose up in rebellion, expelling the soldiers, sacking the palace of the Duke of Alba, and laying siege to the fortress. Trying to impress the gravity of the situation even deeper on the empress, Martı´n pointed out that the Pamplonese had risen up even though they were aware that the French expeditionary force was made up of only 150 cavalry and 5,000 to 6,000 infantrymen and at a time when the royalists in Castile had turned the tide against the Comuneros, defeating them at the Battle of Villalar.37 The viceroy added that at the present time he ‘‘does not have any reason to trust the residents of the city nor believe that they would just stand by while the French laid siege to the city, damaging their properties in the city outskirts when in the kingdom there were only one thousand men from Castile.’’38 Martı´n appealed to the empress to send one thousand more men to reinforce Navarre and mobilize another 1,500 in the Basque country, at least until the French princes were returned.39 In addition to the dearth of men, the weakness of the fortresses also required attention. At the beginning of the year, Pedro del Paso, an engineer and assistant to the viceroy, had already warned the Council of War of the major repair and construction work still in progress at the strongholds of Pamplona, Fuenterrabia, and San Sebastian.40 The viceroy of Navarre, also concerned about the fortifications, directly beseeched the emperor, seeking approval to breach Pamplona’s customs and bring four hundred more soldiers into the city and one hundred more into the fortress. Martı´n also protested to Charles V that the empress had not sent him the gunpowder and munitions that the emperor himself had authorized in 1529, and that she wanted him to further reduce the number of men in the fortresses of Pamplona and Estella.41 As a final appeal, Martı´n sent a special representative, the

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captain Don Hernando de Sandoval, to the emperor to plead his case.42 In the end, Martı´n took matters into his own hands and defied the empress’s orders: ‘‘At this hour, I received Your Majesty’s order to dismiss thirty soldiers from the fortress of Estella and leave only twenty as guard. Because it seems to me more of a time to recruit rather than dismiss men, I desist until Your Majesty once more orders what is best for her service.’’43 At this highly charged moment, other anxious officials pressed the viceroy to take additional measures. On June 20, 1530, as Martı´n continued to receive alarming reports that Francis I and Henri II had disembarked at Bordeaux with sixteen pieces of heavy and more than fifty pieces of light artillery (with more on the way), the viceroy faced a challenge from the Constable of Castile, supreme commander of the Castilian army in the absence of the emperor.44 The constable started by reporting that troops from Picardy and musketeers from Italy had arrived at Oztariz in the French Basque country. He declared that these troops indicated the king of France’s intention to ‘‘have us understand that either we give him his sons or they make war on us.’’ He then turned to chastising Martı´n, unhappy with the viceroy’s preparation for a potential French attack: Although this affair seems to principally concern His Majesty and the power of Castile, [in reality] this affair concerns Your Lordship and myself more than anyone else. It concerns me because I have to vouch for our best possible preparation. And while I am obligated as Captain General of Castile to secure us all, Your Lordship, being in the direct line of attack by France, would put much of the authority of your person and your house on the line if by our bad fortune or lack of vigilance the enemies should enter and pass through to the lands of Castile without there being the appropriate resistance. It is thus my principal business to make sure that Your Lordship performs what your office charges of you.45 The constable’s exigent tone reflects his belief that the ransom was too small and that the return of the French hostages was detrimental to the emperor’s interests. The constable, however, did moderate his anger toward the viceroy. In the course of writing the letter cited above, he received a report from Martı´n that gave him an update on the viceroy’s activities. In a postscript, he referred to the new information and admitted that he was satisfied with Martı´n’s preparations. The Constable of Castile’s candor reveals the great peril that threatened Navarre. His letter betrays an additional insight about the

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nature of Martı´n’s work. Charging that the ransom of the hostages—an event of the utmost importance to international power politics—was an affair that concerned the two noble officers more than anyone else, he squarely placed Martı´n’s job in the fray of two European superpowers. Much more than the governor of a province whose affairs were localized within the Spanish empire, Martı´n’s position embroiled him in the affairs of a kingdom whose past and present played out on the chessboard of European states. Letters and reports from June 20, 1530, accentuate the anxiety Martı´n and other officers felt in the face of French power. Martı´n’s wariness was compounded by the danger he also perceived within the kingdom itself— from the very people he was charged to defend. Despite Charles V’s general pardon of 1524 forgiving almost all the champions of the House of FoixAlbret, the viceroy still sensed a strong sentiment in favor of the dethroned dynasty as well as animosity toward himself.46 In a candid letter to Francisco de los Cobos, Martı´n complained that ‘‘some people have turned the residents of this city [Pamplona] and others in this kingdom against me. . . . I don’t believe [their goal] was anything less than to try to incite my men to do something that they could have justly used to rouse the populace. . . . His Majesty has already embarked for Italy . . . and for this reason they rise up. . . . And while on the one hand they overestimate their [abilities], on the other when I recall that fewer and more moderate words incited the Comunidades of Castile and caused disruption to this city and the whole kingdom. . . . I think very badly of these people and I take what they do as very great malice.’’47 Martı´n was very conscious of history, an awareness that I will return to in Chapter 5. By comparing Navarre’s state of affairs to the Comunidades Revolt, he was arguing that the greatest danger to the security of Navarre came from its own citizens. He also suggested that the Navarrese perceived the soldiers to be an army of occupation there to pacify the kingdom. On several occasions, he insisted on spreading the troops out in the residential neighborhoods of the city to help clamp down on treasonous activity.48 And yet the viceroy expressed the concomitant fear that guards housed among the residents of Pamplona would become ‘‘part of the people.’’49 To address this dilemma, he even proposed to raise 1,000 men from his own lands in Andalusia to station in Navarre, because ‘‘they were trustworthy.’’50 Martı´n also warned of basing the Royal Council of Navarre itself in Pamplona, saying that it was impossible to control who entered the city, and consequently, it was full of spies from France and Be´arn who came to Pamplona pretending to plead court cases.51 Internal security among a people

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that had only recently been made into subjects of the Spanish empire, then, was just as serious a concern for the viceroy as threats of external invasion. The crisis of 1530, dramatically seen through the eyes of Martı´n de Co´rdoba and his colleagues, ended on June 29. The royal hostages were restored to France, the armies withdrew, and the border quieted down, at least for the time being. In a terse note to the empress, the viceroy simply reported that the Spanish forces accompanying the hostages had retired.52 Although the return of the princes did not lead to a French invasion, the incident reveals realities and perceptions about Navarre’s place in the European world as well as the Spanish empire. Martı´n began his term of office only thirteen years after the Pyrenean kingdom had been forcibly incorporated into the Spanish empire. As such, its new status was still contested by the dethroned Navarrese royal family, France, and some members of the Navarrese community. The return of the hostages highlighted this insecurity as well as the need of the viceroy–captain general to manage a land whose affairs were deeply impacted by powers to the north. This work played a part in transforming Martı´n from a provincial lord into an imperial officer acquainted with international affairs important to his assignment as well as the empire in general. This personal and professional growth was reflected both in his daily life and in his mental awareness.

The House of Alcaudete and the Stages and Stations of Imperial Lives Martı´n de Co´rdoba’s assignment to Navarre expanded the geographic range of his activities. It increased the distance as well as the frequency of his travels. Service took him from Co´rdoba to Navarre and then back again as he returned to his estates several times while he was viceroy. Travel also characterized the lives of other members of the House of Alcaudete. Martı´n’s three brothers all embarked on military careers in Italy at this time. The Cordovan lord’s sons also left for various destinations—some to the empress’s court and one to the University of Salamanca. These trajectories took the boys to places where they received the training that would prepare them to undertake offices later. On these journeys, some members of the family reached the ultimate destination—a meeting with their deaths. The period of time that Martı´n served as viceroy of Navarre was formative for the whole house. Just as he adopted and adapted to a more mobile life, so too did his family. Travels and

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the experiences learned through them were defining characteristics of imperial lives. The viceroy’s journey from his home base to Navarre spanned the length of southwest Europe. To reach the Pyrenean kingdom from his home in Co´rdoba, he scaled the Sierra Morena and Guadarrama mountains. He trekked through the steppe lands of La Mancha and Old Castile. He also crossed the Tagus, Duero, and Ebro rivers. This march was wearying and he complained about it from time to time. In the winter of 1532, Martı´n was granted permission by the empress to return to Co´rdoba and attend to his ailing wife. When France suddenly threatened war, Isabel ordered him to report back to Pamplona so that he could tap into his spy network for intelligence. The nobleman advised the Royal Council of Navarre, however, that he would not reach the kingdom as soon as he expected. In a tone of resignation, the Cordovan lamented that though he had ‘‘sped up [his] journey and arrived at the village of Cintrue´nigo on Thursday, illness, the long road, and several days of bad weather had all affected [him] in such a way that [he] would not go further than Valtierra today and [he hopes to reach] Tafalla tomorrow, if God wishes.’’53 Martı´n traveled to Andalusia in the winters of 1528, 1531, and 1532, when snow rendered the Pyrenees impassable to invading armies. He returned to Navarre after brief sojourns.54 Only five Andalusians—four Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba men and the Count of Tendilla from Granada—trekked up to Navarre to serve as viceroy. Most of the kingdom’s executive officers originated from Old Castilian noble families based in the north. Martı´n’s constant travels required him to uproot his home and make it ‘‘mobile.’’ The Cordovan hauled along furnishings that were necessary to outfit a viceroy’s residence. His father-in-law, Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, already gave us a glimpse of what adorned such a home when he asked Juan Rena to ship his luxury goods back to Co´rdoba. Martı´n must have required similarly sumptuous items. The journey between Navarre and Co´rdoba was already made difficult by geography, weather, and health. Yet the movement of material objects presented its own problems. Spain was not a country of unified legal jurisdictions. Instead, seigneurial lords, religious institutions, military orders, towns, and other corporate groups possessed rights that included the ability to assess custom duties. Indeed, the viceroy preemptively secured licenses from the emperor himself to guarantee the free passage of his goods to Navarre.55 The Cordovan’s fears were realized when the Count of Aguilar de Campoo raided and impounded the silks and other luxuries in

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Martı´n’s cargo when they passed through his estate in northeastern Castile on the pretext that customs had not been paid.56 Martı´n’s increased mobility was reflected in the lives of his children. While the viceroy traveled to perform service, his sons journeyed to stations where they received the training necessary for lives in imperial office. In 1528, the third year of his term as viceroy, Martı´n sent his primoge´nito Alonso de Co´rdoba y de Velasco to the empress Isabel’s court to serve as a royal page.57 The youth may have remained in the empress’s household service until 1531 when he began to act as his father’s assistant in Navarrese state affairs.58 Noble families in premodern Europe commonly sent their adolescent children to live in the households of relatives, friends, patrons, or professionals. Such sojourns helped train youths to assume their station in life and socialize them among their peers.59 Perhaps a key to reproducing his father’s mobile lifestyle was the very physical displacement that took the youth from his ancestral home to the royal court. The court represented an unusual and uncommon social space in society. It gathered together an array of individuals, including royalty, courtiers, clerics, jurists, government officials, assorted professionals, academics, petitioners, artists and entertainers, servants, slaves, and—in this case—children. Alonso would have shared the court with dignitaries from all over Europe and even some from Islamic North Africa. He would have run across people of different ethnicities, faiths, appearances, social stations, and professions. The court, moreover, was still peripatetic in the time of Charles V and the empress Isabel, a lifestyle that Alonso himself would adopt. Among this crowd of notables, Alonso would have been fairly anonymous and, even as a noble page, somewhat insignificant. The Cordovan was thus forced to establish his own status through performance, service, and skill. The royal court contrasted sharply with Alonso’s familial home in Co´rdoba, where the population was comparatively homogenous, acquaintances long established, and social hierarchies well defined. The court exposed Alonso to a community as varied as the Spanish empire that his family was working to expand. Exposure to this world may have helped him adapt to his duties as an imperial officer later on. Alonso’s passage through the empress’s court also socialized him to the culture of the nobility. Alonso learned the rigid court ceremonial and honed the manners that befitted the primoge´nito of a noble house. He dedicated himself to book learning and engaged in the games and pastimes that other noble youths enjoyed. By demonstrating that he was well versed in activities

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practiced by other nobles, Alonso claimed a place in the rarified society of the elite.60 Indeed, the Cordovan proved to be adept at these pursuits. At the wedding of his cousin the Count of Cabra (now the Duke of Sessa) in 1539, he impressed and delighted Charles V and a host of grandees by putting on a joust with the Count of Mansfelt.61 Practicing and performing these activities, rituals, and gestures, Alonso learned a form of communication that was particular to the nobility. Such knowledge was critical to holding imperial office, as his colleagues would come mostly from the aristocracy. Alonso’s exploits at court drew the attention of his peers, some of whom became allies.62 A number of boys from the cream of the nobility entered service in the empress’s court at the same time as Alonso. They included Juan Pimentel, son of the Count of Benavente; Juan and Hernando de la Cerda, sons of the Duke of Medinaceli; Antonio de Guzma´n, son of the Count of Alba de Liste; Garcı´a de Toledo, son of the Marquis of Villafranca; Martı´n de Benavides, son of the Count of Santiesteban del Puerto and Alonso’s first cousin; and even the son of the Marquis of Valle.63 Among the fathers of these boys, Benavente and Medinaceli were two of the richest nobles in the whole realm, and the Marquis of Villafranca, Pedro A´lvarez de Toledo, was the celebrated viceroy of Naples. Perhaps the most extraordinary father of all was the Marquis of Valle, better known as the conquistador Herna´n Corte´s. Alonso must have taken advantage of his sojourn at the empress’s court to make connections that would be helpful to his career and life. Indeed, his fourth son and eventual heir would marry a Pimentel daughter. This was the first known pairing of a Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba and a Pimentel, and the ties between the two families may have originated way back to the time when Alonso and Juan Pimentel served together as court pages. The entrance of a new generation of Alcaudete sons into imperial service came at a critical moment for the family.64 Travel that led to offices and new stations in life also ended in death. By 1529, all three of Martı´n de Co´rdoba’s brothers who embarked on military assignments in Italy were dead or seriously wounded. In many ways, the viceroy’s sons were sent out to replace their uncles in service. The demise of one of these brothers, Pedro de Co´rdoba, was vividly recorded by a letter the Comendador Juan de Vilanova sent to Charles V. Pedro was a captain serving the emperor in Italy. Since the early 1520s, Spain’s rivals the Ottomans had penetrated western Italian waters and were brazenly patrolling the coast between Livorno and Naples. On May 26, 1529, when sailing into the port town of Piombino just south of Livorno, Pedro and his crew discovered that five Turkish vessels were in dock seizing

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boats and taking captives. Apparently, he and his men became aware of the Turks too late: ‘‘In one moment [the Turks] were inside the brigantine employing all forms of cruelty and not allowing any man among us to save himself nor anything he was carrying. . . . And they killed and seized many people,’’ Panic struck the men, and some leaped into the water to their deaths: ‘‘Some of us jumped overboard quickly and with abandon, risking the danger of the water rather than the cruelty of the infidels. They jumped in after us and before reaching land they killed and captured some of us. Don Pedro de Co´rdoba drowned.’’65 Upon learning of his brother’s fate, Martı´n wrote the emperor one of the most candid letters that has come down to us. His words allow us almost to relive his struggle to reconcile the grief and anguish he felt for his family’s personal sacrifice in imperial service and its continued need to dedicate lives and blood to such risky but prestigious professions. The viceroy began the letter by lamenting the attrition that his generation of Alcaudete men were suffering: ‘‘Although I [already] have good reason and a duty to be sorrowful, my feelings grow even more intense when thinking that his [Pedro’s] life was cut short while he still had more to give to Your Majesty. . . . Of three brothers that I had in Italy serving Your Majesty two are already dead and the other is each day closer to it on account of a blow that he suffered at the battle of Pavia.’’ The grieving brother did use the occasion to entreat the emperor to reward his family’s dedication and sacrifice. Martı´n emphasized that ‘‘until now [we] have served at the cost of my estate and with what [we] have been able to win by [our] hands as caballeros.’’ The nobleman was politic when he declared that he ‘‘considered all of this to have been well spent on behalf of Your Majesty.’’ Even still, he betrayed pointed resentment by complaining that the king had ‘‘given countless rewards to others who have not put as much care into service,’’ while he himself ‘‘[esteemed] the obligation to serve you more than any other in the world.’’66 Martı´n ended this extraordinary letter, however, by promising to put more members of his family in the line of fire: ‘‘Because at present there is no child of mine who is of age to send to Your Majesty’s service, in the place of my brother I offer Don Francisco de Benavides, my nephew . . . whom I have cared for as a member of my own house in order that Your Majesty is served by him in this campaign.’’67 The fact that Martı´n mentioned his underage children is especially arresting. It indicates that he was already calculating the role that they would play in imperial service and likely determining

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how they could also contribute to increasing the family’s political capital. In a letter that juxtaposes the deaths of his brothers with the tender age of his offspring, this line of thinking must also have reached a poignant conclusion: a recognition of the vulnerability, and perhaps disposability, of his own children. Each in its own way, these two letters relate how the far-flung imperial careers undertaken and yet to be undertaken by his kin must have weighed on Martı´n’s mind. Such an equation balanced service to the sovereign with biological survival of the family itself.68 Like their male relatives, Leonor Pacheco and her daughters also participated in the family’s increased mobility. The women of the house accompanied Martı´n to his assignment in Navarre. There is a striking, but fleeting, glimpse of Leonor exercising executive command in Navarre. When Martı´n returned to his estates for two months in 1531, he explicitly informed the Royal Council of Navarre that he was leaving ‘‘in my place the Countess my wife and Don Alonso my son as Her Majesty orders.’’69 Leonor’s role was not unique in Navarrese history. The Duke of Na´jera named his wife as his lieutenant in Navarre and gave her powers to negotiate with the Cortes and sign orders in his name, including the appointment of a notary for the town of Santiesteban. There is even an example of the Duchess of Na´jera signing an order in her own name prohibiting soldiers from taking any Navarrese into custody.70 Leonor also played the conventional, but no less important, role of mistress of the viceregal court in Pamplona. There, she established a presence that supported and enhanced her husband’s formal duties. The silk and other luxury fabrics laboriously transported by caravan from Co´rdoba adorned her and her family and fostered an air of splendor that reflected on her husband. She hosted and entertained an array of local notables. This social role enabled her to tap into Navarrese society and connect to its elites in a less formal way. In an age when patronage constituted a purpose and a conduit of government, her authority over the viceregal court was critical. Like the royal court, this setting provided a means for individuals from Navarrese society to connect with the viceroy, gain his favor, and in turn allow him to suffuse his power throughout local society. The court, then, was a vital institution of provincial government. The development of this organ was made even more crucial in the early postconquest years as it substituted for a royal court, centered on legitimate kings and queens that Navarre had boasted for hundreds of years. Control over the function and space of the court enabled Leonor to contribute to Spanish imperial administration. This role must have made her a very powerful person in viceregal Navarre.

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One notable local that Leonor bound to her household was a girl named Juana Rena, the illegitimate daughter of Juan Rena. The Venetian clericadministrator, whom we first met in Chapter 2, was a key royal officer responsible for outfitting fleets in the Basque provinces. In Navarre, he also served as the paymaster distributing wages to the soldiers. The professional and affective relationship that Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba had developed with Rena was one that he transferred to Leonor and Martı´n. The fact that Rena entrusted his daughter to the Cordovans expressed the confidence he had in them. The couple must have taken Juana in as a favor to her father’s longtime associate and friend. Despite her status, the girl grew up in the respectability and comfort of the viceroy’s household. Juan Rena’s agents who periodically checked up on the girl remarked that she was treated by Leonor as one of her own. She ate, slept, and learned domestic duties alongside Leonor’s daughters. They also remarked on the girl’s modesty, beauty, and ability to engage in conversation.71 It was necessary for Juan Rena to solicit reports on his daughter’s welfare because life in the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba household removed her from Pamplona and rendered her as mobile as her guardians. During Martı´n’s term as viceroy, Leonor and her daughters alternated their residence between Navarre and their ancestral home in Co´rdoba. Although the viceroy had moved his casa, it was still necessary to manage his estates that were rooted to Co´rdoba. The nobleman was granted leave to tend to his properties from time to time, but he relied on his wife as well as estate agents to oversee the obligations that a lord owed to the thousands of residents living on his land.72 Juana’s mobility made some of Juan Rena’s agents uncomfortable. Indeed, Rena’s secretary Martı´n de Ollacarizqueta even took the cleric to task for not appreciating the fact that the Alcaudete’s wandering habits meant that Juana would be swept off on sojourns along with the rest of the family: ‘‘The Countess [Leonor Pacheco] left here [Pamplona] ten or twelve days ago. Juana Rena departed first with her governess and with the children of the Count [Martı´n de Co´rdoba] to Andalusia as I already wrote you. God forgive your grace for not responding to or writing about what Juana Rena is to do in the case of the Countess’s death or if she left for Andalusia.’’73 It appears that Rena’s secretary had apprehensions that the Alcaudete family’s mobility would put Rena’s family ties at risk. This was indeed another consequence of mobility. Martı´n’s next assignment in 1535 was in Oran, where he served until his death in 1558. Leonor would once again accompany her husband. However, the daughters were left behind this time. Sometime before the couple left for

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North Africa, their four daughters entered the Convent of Santa Clara in their seigneurial town of Alcaudete.74 There, they joined their aunts in a cloistered life. Juana would also leave Leonor’s household to return to Navarre and marry a local Navarrese notable. The history of the House of Alcaudete from 1525 to 1534 describes a family whose members dispersed themselves across the western Mediterranean on quintessentially imperial pursuits. Martı´n embarked on his assignment in Navarre. His brothers traveled to Italy, where they fought the French and the Turks on behalf of the emperor Charles V. Martı´n and Leonor’s sons stayed at the empress Isabel’s court to undergo training that prepared them to replace their uncles in imperial office and take their place in noble circles. The family’s girls traveled down the same paths as their parents until the demands of service cloistered them in the family convent. Imperial lives took the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba to different destinations—to offices, training grounds, the cloister, or death. What these lives shared in common was mobility.

An Empire of Diverse Communities, Connected Bodies, and Expansive Mental Worlds Martı´n de Co´rdoba and his family spent much of their lives moving about the territories of the Spanish empire. They served in Toledo, Navarre, Italy, and Oran. The Cordovans met a variety of people on their travels and assignments. They went into combat against some of them and absorbed others into their lives as contacts, colleagues, friends, and spouses. The Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba governors trained their minds on the territories they administered and the people they encountered. They also kept an eye on matters that concerned other parts of the realm and the foreign lands that extended beyond it. Taken together, these activities gave consistency to the Spanish empire. ‘‘Empire’’ is usually envisioned as a collection of territories arrayed around one person’s rule. Such a conventional conception, however, does not capture a complete sense of the multidimensional nature of this entity that went beyond land. The activities that the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba pursued— travel, combat, governance, personal ties, and thought—enacted empire, in contrast to land that merely existed, largely inert. A conglomeration of territories certainly constituted the physical space of empires. Empires, however, were also an intermixing of bodies, performance of tasks such as governance

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and exchange, and an abstraction that existed in people’s minds.75 A return to the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s activities in Navarre will show how the family helped create this multidimensional definition of empire. The imperial world was composed of dynamically moving and intermixing peoples. Spanish Navarre was a crossroad for such people. Martı´n de Co´rdoba and other viceroys came to govern the kingdom. They brought with them their families and retainers. Other imperial officials and employees hailing from all over the empire were stationed in the Pyrenean state. The Venetian cleric and jack-of-all-trades administrator Juan Rena was only one example of such a person. The outsiders that moved into Navarre in the greatest numbers were ordinary soldiers. A roster of the fighters that were mustered at the fortress of Pamplona on May 12, 1531, gives us a sense of the origins of the seventy-four out of the eighty-nine men stationed there.76 Thirty-two men (almost half ) came from the Basque provinces that adjoin Navarre—Guipu´zcoa, Vizcaya, and A´lava. Eight of the remaining originated from Old Castile (Valladolid, Logron˜o, A´vila, Cantabria), six from the Crown of Aragon (Huesca, Zaragoza, Catalonia), twelve from the former kingdom of Leo´n (Leo´n, Salamanca, Zamora, Asturias, Galicia), four from New Castile, and another four from Andalusia. The roster also identifies at least one Fleming and one Neapolitan. Only six of the guards defending the fortress were Navarrese. The community residing in Pamplona’s castle represented a cross section of the subjects that lived in the four corners of Spain’s peninsular realm and even included a couple of men from farther afield. An intermixing of people characterized imperial societies. So did connections between these individuals. Some links, such as elite marriages, had the power to bond separate territories of the empire into a more cohesive community. High nobles possessed estates, some of them vast properties. Weddings would have juridically united these estates to one another. This was indeed the result of the Marquis of Comares III Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s marriage to Juana de Arago´n, heiress of the ducal house of Cardona and Segorbe in the sixteenth century. As the Crown of Aragon’s most prominent noble family, she owned enormous estates in Catalonia. The marriage joined the patrimonies of an Andalusian lord and an Aragonese heiress as well as their immense properties in two formerly separate kingdoms. Marriages were deliberately employed by the Spanish monarchy to envelop influential, and sometimes seditious, subjects on the margins of the empire into the social world of their loyalist spouses. In fact, matrimonial ties contracted by the nobility had to win the approval of the monarch.

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Sometimes they were even instigated by the sovereign. Thus, marriages could even be deployed on behalf of imperial interests and policies. The history of the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba in Navarre provides an example of this unexpected use of marriage; in this case, a match between the lineage and a prominent Navarrese family helped ensure the fidelity of the latter to the Spanish realm. This example takes us ahead in time to 1564. In that year, Alonso de Co´rdoba, who had been serving as captain general of Oran since his father Martı´n’s death in 1558, was reassigned to Navarre as viceroy. The mountain kingdom was again in peril, this time from a Protestant faith that was expanding out of Lower Navarre and France, with the dethroned Albrets as important patrons. Reports in the final months of 1564 suggested that Protestants were infiltrating the frontier kingdom, while Navarrese officials, possibly working as French spies or clandestinely practicing the reform faith, were fleeing into France in search of refuge.77 The situation clearly agitated King Philip II. His response was to return a trusted family to the unstable territory. As in the past, Alonso’s term was a full-fledged family affair, and he did not venture back to Navarre alone. He was accompanied by his nephew Diego, who was appointed the viceroy’s majordomo and commander (alcaide) of the fortress of Pamplona.78 Alonso’s younger brother, another Diego, had already preceded them north. In 1557, he was named bishop of Calahorra, a city in La Rioja on the other side of the Navarrese border. During the Middle Ages, the jurisdiction of the bishops of Calahorra extended over a chunk of the Pyrenean kingdom.79 Diego’s Catholic (and royalist) credentials were impeccable, and given the nature of the threat, he was clearly a good candidate for the job. In his varied career, he had served as a member of the Council of the Inquisition, royal chaplain, rector of the University of Salamanca, and auditor of the Real Chancellerı´a de Valladolid and the viceroyalties of Sicily and Valencia. Like Juan Rena, he was another jack-of-all-trades cleric-administrator. The two brothers of the House of Alcaudete were joined by a third, Martı´n de Co´rdoba II. Martı´n II had served as their father’s assistant in Oran. He would rise to the post of captain general of Oran in his own right in 1575 and become viceroy of Navarre in 1589. When he trekked up to the mountain kingdom in 1565, however, he was on his way to marry Gero´nima de Navarra.80 The noblewoman was a member of the Navarrese aristocracy and had recently become a widow. She was also matriarch of the Marquisate of Cortes, a house that also possessed the title Marshal (Mariscal) of Navarre.81 In fact, the House of Cortes, along with those of Beamonte (counts

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of Lerı´n and constables of Navarre) and Peralta (marquises of Falces), composed the kingdom’s triumvirate of grand noble lineages. Martı´n II was marrying into one of Navarre’s most storied families, made even more notorious by its opposition to the Spanish conquest of 1512. At that time, the head of the house, Pedro de Navarra, was an adamant loyalist of the Foix-Albret dynasty and was imprisoned for his agitation.82 Martı´n II’s marriage was a strategic maneuver to attach a family with a habit of opposing Spanish supremacy to one of the most assiduous proponents of Spain’s imperial interests. Martı´n II and Gero´nima’s union was only one way that the Navarrese family’s loyalty to Spain was being enforced through interlocking social ties. At the same time that the Cordovan was entering the family, one of its members was being forced out. The exile was Gero´nima’s own daughter and heiress Ana de Navarra, then only an adolescent girl. King Philip II had instructed Ana be sent to the queen’s household, where she would be raised.83 The Catholic Monarch couched his order in terms of honoring the friendship and affection he shared with Gero´nima’s deceased first husband.84 However, the act was clearly coerced, as he advised his agents that the mother may resist the removal of her daughter.85 The order to seize the girl coincided with the return of the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba to Navarre. In fact, Philip requested that the viceroy Alonso de Co´rdoba send for assistance if Gero´nima defied his command. In essence, the king was asking his viceroy to help abduct his brother’s stepdaughter and send her to court! The removal of Ana was the counterpoint of the crown’s strategy for Martı´n de Co´rdoba II. With one hand Philip injected the Cordovan into a prominent but rebellious Navarrese family. With the other hand, the king removed that family’s scion. Such an act prevented her from growing up in local Navarrese society, where she could have established contacts. Instead, she was to be socialized among loyalist nobles of the Spanish court. The reunion of the House of Alcaudete in Navarre was not coincidental. King Philip, like his predecessors, was deploying a whole family to serve the needs of the empire. The Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba engaged the contested society of Navarre through a variety of offices—viceroy, fortress commander, bishop, and head of a noble house. These positions allowed them to interact with society on administrative, military, spiritual, and social levels. Social contacts, along with political and military roles, integrated the family into the fabric of Navarrese society. Family thus was being used to reinforce the ties of a suspect territory to the Spanish crown.

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Alonso de Co´rdoba was conscious of the role that marriage ties played in Philip’s attempt to link Navarre closer to Spain.86 The viceroy even abetted his sovereign’s policy. In December 1564, Philip II instructed Alonso to confiscate the property of the Navarrese officials who were suspected of being Protestants. These functionaries had fled north to France. By prescribing this punishment, the king hoped to cow other Protestant sympathizers who may have remained in the kingdom. Rather than implementing the king’s order, Alonso wrote to the royal secretary, Francisco de Eraso, to express his disagreement and to suggest, as an alternative, the marriage of Diego de Toledo (second son and future heir of the Duke of Alba III) to Brianda de Beamonte (the daughter of the Count of Lerı´n–Constable of Navarre).87 To refuse the royal order to confiscate property was unusual by itself. But to counter the command by proposing a wedding—one that was likely an uneven match— seemed even more bizarre.88 The match makes sense only when we consider that shortly after it was consummated, Diego de Toledo was named Constable of Navarre by Philip II.89 The son of one of the Spanish monarchy’s fiercest noble collaborators had, through marriage, become head of one of Navarre’s most powerful noble houses. Taking his brother’s marriage with the Marquise of Cortes as a cue, Alonso advocated the union between Toledo and Beamonte so that another powerful Castilian family could extend its influence over the Navarrese elite. The viceroy understood that social ties could bind territories of the far-flung empire. By suggesting the Toledo-Beamonte match, Alonso de Co´rdoba was helping ensure the loyalty of Navarre to Spain. As viceroy, he focused his attention, understandably, on Navarre. However, an imperial officer was also aware of matters facing other parts of the empire. A return to Alonso’s father Martı´n de Co´rdoba and his term in Navarre in the 1520s and 1530s will help illustrate this point. Even though Martı´n held office in the faraway north, he remained connected to the people and affairs of other parts of the realm. Most immediately, the Cordovan was lord over his own estates in Andalusia, and their management weighed on him and his family. Martı´n and his family must have made a special effort to maintain close ties to their ancestral home—despite embarking on imperial peregrinations. The viceroy’s repeated offer to raise 1,000 men from his estates and lead them to Navarre shows that he continued to tap into a clientele network in his ‘‘tierra.’’90 Martı´n’s proposal to mobilize such a high number of troops suggests that the viceroy was very successful in sustaining his ties to local Cordovan society.91

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Even from far away, Martı´n kept a finger on the pulse of Cordovan politics, including its ever-shifting rivalries. Premodern nobles frequently combined forces and formed alliances against one another. A pact concluded in 1526 joined the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba Count of Cabra (now Duke of Sessa) and the Duke of Arcos in a bloc. In the agreement, Cabra swore perpetual friendship to Arcos and pledged to defend his ally from any attack on his person or house. Although Cabra’s oath of loyalty obliged him to support Arcos against any assailant, he proclaimed that their pact would be nonbinding when it came to three individuals. These were the Count of Palma and Cabra’s cousins the Marquis of Comares and Martı´n de Co´rdoba. Cabra explained that he owed these individuals ‘‘a great debt’’ and had an ‘‘obligation not to desert them.’’ These were bonds that he would not break, and ‘‘for this reason [he] was free to help them even against’’ Arcos.92 Despite having decamped from his ancestral home five years before the alliance was contracted, Martı´n de Co´rdoba was nonetheless invoked in the pact. Mention of the viceroy indicates that his presence was still felt among the nobility in Andalusia to a degree that his peers continued to take his political interests into consideration. Martı´n de Co´rdoba’s attention naturally gravitated to the affairs of Navarre, his professional charge, and to Co´rdoba, his ancestral home. However, the nobleman’s interests and expertise apparently ranged even farther across the Spanish imperial world. As the commanding officer of a frontier kingdom, the viceroy headed an information-gathering apparatus, in essence a spy network that kept tabs on the French monarchy on the other side of the border. Spies reported on such matters as the personal and political relations between the French monarchy and the Foix-Albret dynasty. An undated letter that the Cordovan sent the empress informed Isabel that the king, queen, and queen-regent of France all embarked from Bordeaux for Angouleˆme, where they would attend the baptism of a daughter of Henri II d’Albret, heir of Catherine and Jean II of Navarre. Such information enabled the viceroy to track the French royal family’s movements and also measure the proximity of the ties between the French monarchs and Navarre’s former royal family.93 Spies also kept a particular watch on French troop mobilizations for the viceroy. Such musters could, of course, have a potentially devastating impact on the border state. However, the viceroy’s attention was also drawn to these activities as the French recruited forces that served in Italy from Guyenne and Gascony, lands directly north of Navarre. It could be said that the first

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line of defense for Spanish Italy was Navarre.94 The Cordovan’s charge in the mountain kingdom, then, included keeping track of the affairs of France, French relations with the Foix-Albrets, and its designs on Spanish Italy. Martı´n’s knowledge, however, extended beyond matters that directly or indirectly pertained to the Pyrenean kingdom or his homeland. His expertise, it seems, reached down to the southern Mediterranean theater of the Spanish empire. On December 13, 1529, the empress wrote to inform her viceroy of the ‘‘injuries that the Grand Turk had inflicted on the Kingdom of Hungary and the Archduchy of Austria’’ as well as the danger that Muslims posed to the coastline of Spain and the string of presidios that the empire held in North Africa. Martı´n drafted a reply to the empress dated January 8, 1530. Explaining that the memorial was written to ‘‘fulfill Your Majesty’s order to inform her on what [he] thought of the defense of Granada and what could be done to improve it,’’ his letter revealed a magisterial understanding of the pressures weighing on the empire’s southern shores. The nobleman began by arguing that the fortresses guarding Spain’s long southern coast were too dispersed from each other. This allowed pro-Ottoman forces ‘‘to land, raid a town, and return to the sea without suffering any harm, and they commit such acts with only two or three ships (fustas).’’ The enemy could also count on spies from among New Christians (Moriscos) to supply them with information on points of weakness in the coastal line of defense. Martı´n then contrasted Granada’s inadequacies with the presidio complex of Mers elKebir and Oran on the other side of the sea in Algeria. The concentration of Spain’s forces at this site obligated Muslims to direct and ultimately expend their power in vain against its thick walls. The viceroy of Navarre concluded his assessment by urging the empress to mobilize a powerful armada. Such a fleet could alleviate the deficiencies of land-based defense works by taking the fight to the Turks, attacking their North African ports, and burning their ships. Only with such a fleet could the coasts of Granada, Valencia, and Catalonia be protected.95 It may come as a surprise that the empress would consult the viceroy of Navarre and former municipal governor of Toledo on the security apparatus of Spain’s Mediterranean and North African coasts. Nevertheless, Martı´n de Co´rdoba’s memorial displayed fluent and panoramic knowledge of affairs that had only a tangential relationship to the Pyrenean state. The Cordovan may have gained his expertise on southern Iberia and North Africa by indulging an innate interest in these imperial territories. However, it was more likely that family connections kept him well informed of events in these

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faraway lands. After all, during these very years Martı´n’s brother-in-law the Marquis of Comares II served as captain general of Oran, succeeding to the post held by his own father, Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba. Comares II must have kept his counterpart in Navarre abreast of matters concerning the region. In fact, Martı´n was so familiar with the imperial officers of the southern Mediterranean region that in the same memorial discussed above, he was able to submit a list of individuals whom he thought could command the armada. He urged the empress to ‘‘appoint a person of quality to this office, one who has the will and drive to serve in a war against the Moors because this campaign will be dangerous and laborious; if the [commander] is discouraged, then it is unlikely to succeed.’’ The Cordovan also explained that such a leader must ‘‘mobilize galleys made up of his retainers, friends, vassals, and other honorable men five hundred of whom would be worth a thousand other men.’’ Martı´n identified four members of the Andalusian nobility who would be suitable for this assignment: the Duke of Arcos and the marquises of Comares and Los Ve´lez, and the Count of Tendilla. Among these four men, three were known to have close affinity ties with Martı´n.96 Martı´n de Co´rdoba displayed an impressive awareness of empire-wide affairs.97 His memorial on the southern Mediterranean revealed a virtuoso command of the region’s geostrategic position. The empress also expected the viceroy of Navarre to be well-enough informed on an entirely different region of the empire to be able to submit a thoughtful opinion about its defenses at a moment’s notice. The Cordovan kept abreast of affairs that ranged from Navarre to France to Italy and then from Granada to North Africa to the Mediterranean expanse. Such awareness betrayed an imperial perspective, one that could encapsulate, grasp, and grapple with matters that were undergoing simultaneous development in different parts of the empire. It was a capacity to understand how events affecting one part of the empire related to and had repercussions on other parts of the realm. It was the ability to apply experience gathered in one part of the empire to another. By nature, the imperial world that Martı´n inhabited had physical properties—it was the collection of territories through which the officer moved in order to carry out his duties. Along the way, he encountered and engaged with a myriad of individuals who traveled similar paths on itinerant careers. In addition to the physical and the social, a key component of this imperial world was the expansion of mental horizons that forced anyone who worked for the empire to think in terms of the needs of its individual components as well as the larger whole. Martı´n and his family unveil this nature of empire.

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Conclusion: Family and the Formation of the Imperial World Martı´n de Co´rdoba’s professional and personal history during his term as viceroy of Navarre relates how a local sen˜or transformed into an imperial officer. Administering the affairs of a formerly independent kingdom still impacted by French power immersed the viceroy in a perilous world of international relations and military force. Travel also came to dominate his life, and his movement took him farther and farther away from his home. The transformation the Cordovan underwent was shared by his family. Martı´n’s brothers, wife, sons, and for a while his daughters all embarked on imperial lives. That the institution of family had a role in formulating this physical, social, and mental world is now clear. The Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba had helped conquer Co´rdoba, Granada, North Africa, Italy, and Navarre, and it reintegrated Toledo into the crown following the Comunidades Revolt. Its subsequent generations kept these territories in the thrall of the Spanish monarchy, serving as lords, corregidores, captains, viceroys, and captains general of each of these territories multiple times. The family, then, contributed to the formation and perpetuation of empire as a territorial polity. The web of relations between Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, his children Luis and Leonor, and his son-in-law Martı´n constituted the consistency of the empire, one that was human rather than territorial. Such a web was to be recreated by Martı´n and his descendants who served as imperial officers. These human bodies and relations formed the conduits that collected and distributed power and enforced and negotiated the empire. These human relations also gathered and passed on the awareness, knowledge, and thinking that created a sense of the empire in the mind as well as on land and in networks of bodies.

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chapter 5

The Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba Lineage and the Transfer of Frontier Expertise to Algeria, 1512–1558

I accepted this office [of captain general of Oran] because it seemed to be the best way to serve God and Their Majesties. In this they should be certain since I took office at a time when Barbarossa was circling in force off the coast, as Her Majesty well knows. [In contrast], there was no longer memory of war in the Navarre I left behind. Her Majesty granted me the favor of increasing my prestige with this office. And in order to show my willingness to serve God and Their Majesties, I was pleased to come here [Oran], despite the risk that I mentioned, rather than remain in safety in Navarre. —Martı´n de Co´rdoba y de Velasco

In 1534, Martı´n de Co´rdoba y de Velasco left Navarre for Oran, where he would serve as captain general for an unprecedented twenty-four years. He was the third Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba to occupy this post. In 1509, his fatherin-law Diego had helped conquer the enclave, where he served as governor until 1512. Diego’s son Luis Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba succeeded his father in 1518 and held the position until 1534 when he handed it over to his brotherin-law. Martı´n served from 1534 until his death in 1558. After Martı´n, four more members of the lineage commanded the outpost, three from the Alcaudete family and one from the House of Comares. The crown’s continual

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employment of four generations of the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba makes it clear that the clan had an aptitude for governing Oran. Its long-term tenure there mirrored its hold over the viceroyalty of Navarre, where four from the two families served. In fact, every Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba viceroy of Navarre also held office as captain general of Oran—Diego, Martı´n, and the latter’s sons Alonso and Martı´n II. This pattern of service was remarkable. Although the high nobility governed in every imperial territory, very few of them held the office of viceroy or captain general in more than one province over the course of their careers.1 The Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s record was even more unusual since there is little to suggest, at least at first glance, that service in Navarre resembled that in Oran. After all, the two were located on opposite sides of the Mediterranean. Even in a Mediterranean world connected by geography, economies, and material culture, each region was situated in a different geohistorical context. As a Christian outpost in Islamic North Africa, Oran was threatened by Ottoman and Moroccan forces. In contrast, Navarre was once a storied Christian kingdom whose forced incorporation into Spain attracted the ire of Catholic France. Nonetheless, time and again the Spanish government chose the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba to govern the two posts. Understanding why the clan achieved this unique pattern of service will reveal that, despite first impressions, Navarre and Oran did find common ground: both were frontiers, and the expertise that was useful in managing one borderland could be applied to the other. In fact, the circulation of skills between the two identifies another mechanism that enacted empire. We have already considered a number of these mechanisms. First, imperial officers enacted empire through mobility and the sharing of their bodies. The expansion of their range of movement put officers in contact with a greater number of people. Social ties that were formed through these encounters could create links within and between lands. Second, administrative personnel also enacted empire by envisioning it in their minds. Officers were capable of wrapping their minds around the affairs of multiple territories. By reflecting on the exigencies faced by one region and how they affected another, officers associated territories vis-a`-vis each other. The clan’s pattern of service in Navarre and Oran leads us to a third way of enacting empire. By making multiple round-trip journeys administering the two areas, members of the lineage transmitted skills and knowledge acquired in one theater and applied them to another. The circulation of these ideas helped create the empire. Successful techniques could be replicated in, or modified to suit,

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different places. These actions were, again, performed by the members of a family network. The Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s frequent service in Navarre and North Africa indicates that administrative experience in one was valuable in another. By exploring the clan’s service in Oran—and simultaneously keeping its activities in Navarre in the back of our minds—we learn that expertise on borderlands was the lineage’s particular specialty. Such experience became a vital component of the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s identity.

Oran: A ‘‘Forgotten Frontier’’ in an Interconnected Mediterranean The conquest of Granada in 1492 opened a new frontier with the Islamic world as the Christians continued to push across the Strait of Gibraltar into North Africa. From 1497 to 1510, Spanish forces seized a number of coastal settlements that stretched from Morocco in the west all the way to Tripoli (Libya) in the east.2 Spain would control the enclave of Oran for more than 250 years, longer than France’s occupation during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.3 Even though Oran is modern Algeria’s second largest city and famous as the setting of Albert Camus’s novel The Plague and a center of Raı¨ music, its history is little known. Spain’s encounters in the New World and its Machiavellian contest with France in Italy have displaced historical interest in the North African theater. The tragedy of French colonialism also occupies the attention of contemporary minds more than its earlier history. Lack of attention to Oran, however, is surprising because it was Fernand Braudel himself who pioneered the modern study of Spanish North Africa. Twenty years before the publication of The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (1949), Braudel penned a two-part, 155-page article outlining themes that continues to structure scholarship on the region today.4 Still, apart from the work of a handful of scholars, research on Spain’s North African domain has languished. Andrew Hess has even called it the ‘‘forgotten frontier.’’ This section seeks to bring attention back to Oran and its history in the greater Spanish imperial world. Many reasons explain Spain’s invasion of North Africa and its conquest of a line of fortress outposts. Powerful individuals wanted to follow the Granada War with an attack on the Maghrib. In her will, Queen Isabella charged her successors to carry the war over to the Muslims. The archbishop of Toledo Francisco Jime´nez de Cisneros, for a time regent of Castile, also urged

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fighters to extend their crusading zeal to North Africa. King Ferdinand sought to advance Aragon’s traditional interests in the Mediterranean by colonizing its southern shores. Noble lords asserting a warrior ethic wanted to extend seigneurial control over new lands. In fact, the Duke of Medina Sidonia, one of the greatest contributors of seigneurial troops to the Granada War, was the first to seize an outpost in North Africa—Melilla, one of two that Spain still possesses to this day.5 Spaniards also crossed the Strait of Gibraltar for strategic reasons. Muslim armies—the original Arab-Berber invasion force, the Almoravids, the Almohads, and the Marinids—had all crossed from North Africa into Iberia and challenged Christian power throughout the Middle Ages. By making North Africa its theater of operations, Spain created a buffer zone that kept warfare to the southern shores of the Mediterranean. If a North African expeditionary force landed in Spain, it could have connected with the large Morisco population that persisted in Granada and Valencia and incited the distressed community to revolt. Spain also established outposts on the North African shore in order to control the trade that passed through the port cities of the region into the Mediterranean. These products included grain from coastal communities and gold and slaves from sub-Saharan Africa. Oran was one such outlet for merchandise coming from the interior. Strategically, Spain was also competing against Portugal in North Africa. The Lusitanians had already crossed over to Morocco in 1415, seizing Ceuta and its own string of presidio outposts running down the western coast.6 Spain’s push into North Africa created a new zone where Christians, Jews, and Muslims intermixed. While Spaniards were zealously persecuting, expelling, and evangelizing Jews and Muslims (and later Conversos and Moriscos) on the peninsula, they still tolerated religious diversity in such places as Oran to a limited degree. Along with Christians, the city housed Jews expelled from Spain in 1492, and it received and processed Moriscos exiled to North Africa in 1609. The region also constituted a new point of contact between Christians and Muslims in the Mediterranean world. Oran, the largest and most important of the presidios, was a focal point for Ottoman and Moroccan power. In turn, Oran’s captains general sent out armies to stake out a protectorate in the city’s hinterland. Yet relations with local Muslims were not always hostile. Cut off from the Spanish mainland by a hostile sea, Oran depended on allied or client communities outside its city walls to help supply food for the presidioenclave. The commanders of the city managed diplomatic relations with these communities and with the regional powers of Algiers and Tlemcen.

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In relation to Spain, the city lies due south across the Mediterranean from the Murcian port of Cartagena. Only 110 miles (thirty-five leagues) separate the two cities. In the sixteenth century, a ship could cover the distance in sixteen hours.7 Though the city lines a shallow bay, steep bluffs cut it off from the water and prevented ships from docking there.8 Instead, vessels docked at Mers el-Kebir, a peninsula that juts out like a dagger into the western end of the bay. Merchandise was loaded and unloaded on beaches shielded by the peninsula and then transported overland to Oran, one league away. A mighty fortress at the promontory of Mers el-Kebir commanded the bay and protected Oran from seaborne attack.9 Under Muslim rule, the enclave, with its high double walls, fortresses, mosques, a church, schools, hospitals, markets, warehouses, and civilian housing, had been a center of administrative, political, commercial, cultural, and religious life. Under Spanish rule, Oran and Mers el-Kebir formed a population, defense, and commercial complex. An estimated 3,000 residents lived in Oran in the mid-sixteenth century, rising to 6,000 in the seventeenth century.10 Set on rocky, narrow, and insufficiently watered land, Mers el-Kebir supported a garrison of soldiers.11 Together, the two formed what some historians have termed the ‘‘double presidio.’’ After conquering Oran, Christians reconstructed and thickened the city walls, converted mosques to churches, and built a hospital, prisons, and monasteries. Later captains general continued to add and renovate fortresses, many according to the latest advances in engineering and technology. By the eighteenth century, an astounding five citadels defended the enclave of Oran. Figure 11 shows the entire complex in the eighteenth century, including castles, bastions, towers, and walls. Two doors allowed access to the city. The first, called Canastel, opened to the southeast, and the second, called Tremece´n, to the southwest. The urban nucleus was dominated by the fortress of Alcazaba. Dating from the Islamic period, the castle sits on a meseta (highland) that towers over the city. It served as the governor’s residence and also warehoused supplies. Another citadel that dated to the conquest was the Rosalcazar, located 500 feet east of the city walls along the shoreline. From its position, it could monitor movements originating from the cities of Arzeo, Mostaganem, and Algiers to the east.12 There were also at least three fortified towers, named Madrigal, Torregorda, and Los Santos.13 Even under Spanish rule, the double presidio was connected to the political and economic world of North Africa. If we organize neighboring communities within bands of expanding concentric circles, the first ring on the

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Figure 9. Bay of Oran and Mers el-Kebir (BNE GM-M XLII n. 386 Oran 1732. 䉷 Biblioteca Nacional de Espan˜a)

east would encompass Ifre (a settlement very close to the city walls), Canastel (three leagues), Arzeo (a good port with important saltworks, seven leagues), and Mostaganem, a major port city of the kingdom of Tlemcen (fourteen leagues). Southwest of the city, the first ring enclosed Tlemcen, the capital city of the eponymous kingdom, 100 kilometers away toward Morocco. A second ring included Tenez and Cherchel, both cities on the eastern route to Algiers (itself seventy leagues away), and Cuco (a settlement of confederated Berber tribes eighteen leagues southeast of Algiers in the Kabila). Oran’s neighbors in the third ring included Tunis and Tripoli on the east and Morocco (the kingdoms of Fez and Marrakesh) on the west. Sub-Saharan Africa, though separated by the vast desert, also played a role in Oran’s and North Africa’s socio-commercial world by supplying both slaves and gold that passed through the coastal cities for export into the Mediterranean. Oran also belonged to the imperial world of the early modern Mediterranean. As Spain’s possession, the enclave depended on goods and men shipped

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Figure 10. Mers el-Kebir in 1775 (Courtesy: Espan˜a. Ministerio de Cultura. Archivo General de Simancas, MPD, 4, 118)

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Figure 11. Fortress complex of Oran (Courtesy: Espan˜a. Ministerio de Cultura. Archivo General de Simancas, MPD, 4 102)

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Figure 12. Oran: View of city, fortresses, and highland (Courtesy: Espan˜a. Ministerio de Cultura. Archivo General de Simancas, MPD, 4, 107)

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Figure 13. The Iberian Peninsula and North Africa

from the peninsula or other parts of the empire to supply, populate, and defend the enclave. The city’s governors and officers kept in close contact with the royal family and councils through correspondence and messengers.14 They communicated regularly with the royal provisioners (proveedores) and paymasters (pagadores) of Ma´laga and Cartagena. These officials were charged with procuring and shipping food, munitions, money, and other necessities to Oran. The enclave completely relied on grain imports to sustain its soldiers and residents.15 Shipments came primarily from Andalusia, though the Baleares Islands and Spanish Italy (Sardinia, Naples, and Sicily) also supplied Oran in times of need. When Europe fell short of grain and the Maghrib enjoyed a surplus, Oran supplemented Spain and Italy with North African production.16 Soldiers, professionals, and laborers, including masons, carpenters, and other construction workers, traveled from the peninsula to Oran.17 The provisions of the enclave and North African politics were the topics that dominated correspondence between the outpost and the court.

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Spain’s imperial enemies also showed up at Oran’s front doors. The Ottoman Empire loomed large as the Catholic Monarchy’s most potent adversary in North Africa. The two projected their power into the region almost at the same time. Spain had swept down from the northwest at the beginning of the sixteenth century. In 1516–17, the Ottomans marched from Anatolia into the Levant and Egypt. Having secured most of the eastern Mediterranean basin, they moved west toward Libya and Tunis. By 1516, the fleets commanded by the Barbarossa brothers Aruj and Khayr al-Din based at Algiers regularly cruised the western Mediterranean. After being expelled from several presidio outposts, Spaniards attempted, with limited success, to recapture the momentum by attacking Algiers and Tunis. The Ottomans responded in kind, building a cycle of hostility that also included other Mediterranean powers such as France and the Italian states. Oran, as a crossroads for forces moving from the east to Morocco, suffered from marauding fleets and armies that either besieged it or bypassed it for Tlemcen and Fez. The presidio monitored the Ottoman fleet that cruised offshore, sending reports to the royal councils speculating about its projected trajectory to Granada, Valencia, or the Baleares. Oran existed in an interconnected Mediterranean world. Geography, trade, and politics linked the enclave with the northern and southern shores of the sea. Yet there are also other ways to talk about the connections between Oran and the Spanish empire—through the personnel that traveled, and the expertise that was transmitted, from one part of the empire to another. Once again the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdobas show us the way, this time through the history of Luis Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, son of Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba and brother-in-law of Martı´n de Co´rdoba y de Velasco.

The Discourse and the Value of ‘‘Experience’’ on an Overseas Frontier The Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba alternated office in Navarre with service in Oran. The two regions were connected by dint of the clan’s movement between them. But this unusual pattern also raises the question, why were members of the lineage selected for these two posts time and again? A close relationship to powerful figures such as King Ferdinand, the emperor Charles, and the royal secretary Francisco de los Cobos, as well as a degree of nepotism, helped

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them hold onto office and pass positions on to descendants. However, service in both territories that was repeated by the Cordovans across three generations also intimates that the lineage had a special aptitude to govern these two territories, both of them recently conquered frontiers. This is what captain general Luis Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba identified as ‘‘experience.’’ Such a concept emerges in an extended correspondence exchanged between him and the empress and emperor. While the commander argued that experience made him worthy of service, the correspondence also identified the specific skills that qualified him to serve as captain general of Oran.18 Luis Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s term coincided with a shift in power in the Mediterranean. The Ottomans were extending their sway into the western half of the sea, tamping down on Spanish ascendancy that had held the region in its thrall since the 1510s. Khayr al-Din Barbarossa was establishing a formidable base in Algiers, and the corsairs along the coast were joining his cause. By 1531, the king of Tlemcen had renounced a decade and a half of vassalage in favor of an alliance with the Ottomans. He dispatched cavalrymen and musketeers to block the inhabitants of Oran from leaving the city to collect firewood and grass for the horses.19 The enclave was becoming increasingly besieged from the east, the west, and the sea.20 While officers on the scene were aware of this change, the Council of War, empress, and emperor seemed slow to recognize the new balance of power.21 The contract (capitulacio´n or asiento) that had commissioned the captain general and defined his and the crown’s obligations to Oran was drawn up in the era of Spanish hegemony. By the late 1520s, it had become obsolete. The new situation forced the commander to request more men to defend the presidio than the number that the crown had a responsibility to supply. When the royal government resisted, Luis denounced the Council of War for failing to provide adequate soldiers, monies, munitions, and victuals to sustain Oran.22 Instead, the Council’s inaction was forcing the captain general to supplement Oran with his own resources.23 In the end, the captain general charged the Council of War with ignoring the new political realities in North Africa. In one of his final memorials as governor, Luis concluded that ‘‘it was necessary that Your Majesty [Charles V] and your council make up your minds about whether Oran was a frontier of war or one of peace and commerce.’’24 The captain general’s fears were realized when the promontory at the entrance of Algier’s harbor that was controlled by Spain, the Pen˜o´n de A´rgel, fell to the Ottomans in 1529, helping to strengthen their presence in the western Mediterranean.25

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Under such conditions, Luis left Oran for the empress’s court, ostensibly to report on the deteriorating situation in person.26 However, he also made use of this opportunity to upbraid the empress for disregarding his warnings and to emphasize his own expertise. He began by criticizing the monarch for ‘‘not ordering the number of men who normally reside [in Oran] be increased by 500 or 600.’’ He then accused the crown of ignoring his ‘‘experience’’ on the North African frontier.27 Brimming with indignation, he claimed: ‘‘Apparently Your Majesty does not give credit to the things I say and write with the concern that is due. . . . Seeing that Your Majesty must provision Oran with sufficient men and that this is not being done, I am obligated to present this memorial to fulfill my duties. . . . Your Majesty causes me great grief by provisioning [the presidio] so poorly. . . . If it is lost I will not take the blame, . . . and henceforth I will protest everything that needs to be protested.’’28 Luis’s memorial reveals a strong awareness of duty. He was willing to stand up to the empress and admonish her for her failings. Yet he also perceived that the monarch was not taking his counsel seriously. Implicit in his rebuke is the captain general’s proud sense that he possessed the knowledge and expertise—in other words, the experience—to act in Oran’s best interests. The language that the governor employed recalls the memorials that his brother-in-law Martı´n de Co´rdoba used with the same monarch during a critical moment in Navarre. These remonstrances, sifted through by the secretaries and members of the royal councils, may never have reached the empress’s eyes in their original phrasing. Luis’s words must be understood in the context of an ongoing process of negotiation between the captain general and the crown to better provide for Oran and clarify his obligations—and therefore the qualities demanded of him—as commander.29 The highlight of this protracted negotiation came in the spring and summer of 1530 when Luis’s discontent, compounded by ill health, forced him to travel to the empress’s court to personally tender his resignation.30 Far from expressing any outrage or annoyance at the captain general’s complaints, demands, and scolding language, Charles V was eager to appease the indignant lord.31 Writing to the empress from Augsburg, the emperor explained that ‘‘because the Marquis’s [Luis’s] resignation is of no help to us, it would be good to restore the terms of his contract and redress his complaints about the administration of justice and other matters.’’32 Around the same time that Charles V wrote to his wife, he also addressed the governor. In strikingly soothing tones, the sovereign hinted that he felt injured by Luis’s resignation: ‘‘Marquis, kinsman, our Captain General of the Kingdom of Tlemcen. . . .

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It displeases me greatly that, having confidence in your person like I do and with my absence from [Spain], you have turned in your resignation. If something has caused you to do this, you should write to me so that I can rectify it rather than resign. Since I am absent, I do not wish to discharge you from the post. Rather, I wish you to serve me in person so that knowing that you are there, I may be at ease and rest without concern, confident in the good administration of Oran.’’33 The reason for the emperor’s willingness to accommodate Luis is readily explained by the letter he sent the empress from Brussels a year later: ‘‘I beseech you [empress] to work with him on all matters in accordance with what I have written you. . . . Treat him with respect because he is a good officer and a person whose presence, experience, and quality are beneficial and very suitable for the post.’’34 The discussion of Luis’s grievances ultimately revealed Charles V’s appreciation of the captain general’s abilities. With his absence from Spain compounding the crisis in North Africa, Charles needed to assuage the nobleman to retain his service. The emperor’s correspondence acknowledged the lord’s abilities to defend Oran. Luis’s dispute with the crown, then, centered on crediting him with this quality, one that seemed to be an essential part of the officer’s professional identity. Receiving such credit was important for Luis on a personal level, and it was also critical in the eyes of his peers. The crown’s refusal to act on his counsel endangered Oran and threatened Luis’s reputation. The loss of the presidio would have brought the governor infamy among his peers. In March 1530, when Oran was once again being threatened, the empress ordered Luis to Ma´laga to help gather arms to ship to the outpost. When he arrived at the port city, the captain general did not find the necessary artillery or supplies. Although in the end the threat to Oran was alleviated, if it had been greater, Luis complained, ‘‘There wouldn’t have been any way to serve Your Majesty and I would have been left with eternal infamy or I would have had to sacrifice myself.’’35 In these dramatic terms, the captain general was suggesting that an inability to perform his duty, or the mere perception that he had failed in it, might force him to an ignominious end.36 Juxtaposed against such a fate was the value of his ability to provision Oran. Luis implied that even by hindering his service, the crown made it ‘‘look like [he was] being punished for some defect or inability,’’ the opposite of being experienced or exercising expertise.37 Historians have generally assumed that if a person was appointed to a post then he had the qualifications to exercise the office. Rarely do we dig

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deeper to identify the experience, expertise, and skills individuals possessed to make them suitable for holding office. It does not help that consultas left behind by the royal councils rarely explain the reasons for making appointments. Discussions of officers’ qualifications seemed to have been carried out orally rather than through written communication. Luis’s extended correspondence with the crown, then, does reveal that experience was an important criteria considered by the crown when seeking officers. Recent works by historians of science have indicated that the crown valued experience in the appointment of administrators. Antonio Barrera-Osorio has argued that the imperial expansion of Spain was itself the enterprise that abetted the ascent of personal experience, expertise, and observation over a reliance on theoretical and classical knowledge.38 The Casa de la Contratacio´n, the institution that managed the exploration, colonization, trade, and study of the New World, employed pilots with proven training and cosmographers who analyzed observations gathered from the field rather than relying on the Ptolemaic tradition.39 Other organs of government from the royal Council of Indies to viceroys also enacted procedures to weigh the quality of information. Within the empire’s institutional framework, experience was esteemed. Luis Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s correspondence with the crown was an attempt to negotiate the value of his unique experience. In this case, the governor seemed to have achieved the recognition of the skills that he sought.40 What, then, were the abilities that Luis manifested as a captain general in North Africa? Clearly, a commander should be capable of managing evershifting relations with potentially hostile communities on a borderland, using the threat of war and the lure of peace to help secure the vulnerable outpost. A second skill a captain general had to possess was the ability to provide for an outpost where everything had to be brought in. Basic needs included water, currency, metal, fuel (firewood, lighting oil, coal, wax), textiles (clothing, canvas, wool, linen), and victuals (wheat, oats, biscuit, oil, wine, vinegar, dates, beans, chickpeas, cheese, rice, livestock, salted meats, salted fish). The presidio required a wide assortment of equipment such as munitions, artillery, land transport, and ships. Lastly, personnel were needed to keep an overseas community running, including administrators of many kinds, soldiers of many specialties, engineers, carpenters, stonemasons, doctors, secular and regular clergy, translators, messengers, spies, merchants, solicitors, notaries, settlers of both genders and their children, other laborers, slaves, captives, and even Jewish and Muslim allies. The impairment of Luis’s ability to support Oran’s material needs almost drove him to resign his post. A frontier

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commander’s most visible job was in warfare and diplomacy. Perhaps more basic to the functioning of a frontier, however, was its provision. The governor was aware that the survival of the outpost depended on adequate supplies. For him, experience administering a frontier came down to his ability to provision Oran. Luis was a member of the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba line of administrators that commanded in Oran and Navarre. Like him, the others also possessed the requisite experience to hold positions on sensitive frontiers. Such a pattern suggests that although the two territories existed in distinct geohistorical milieus, they had more in common than one might expect. First and foremost, Oran and Navarre were both frontiers; on the other side of their boundary lines were hostile powers eager to retake possession of these lands. Second, these frontiers brought together peoples of different cultures, languages, and religions or sects (the Albrets came to be one of the key patrons of Calvinism in France). Third, internal diversity characterized these two communities; a mixture of Castilian, Basque, and Gascon speakers inhabited Navarre, while Christians, Jews, and Muslims resided in and around Oran. If this description of Oran and Navarre also paints a portrait of Co´rdoba and Granada at their time of conquest, and to some extent even Toledo, such a resemblance is probably not coincidental. The Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba played prominent roles in all five regions because it specialized in managing postconquest lands, most of them frontiers. The specific expertise the lineage possessed explains its trajectory in imperial office. This experience was passed on from generation to generation. As it turns out, a large number of personnel alternated service between North Africa and Navarre. A widespread pattern of office holding that combined the two areas lends additional weight to the argument that skill and technique acquired in one were applicable in the other. Among officers who spanned the North African and Navarrese theaters in the first half of the sixteenth century were the Venetian cleric Juan Rena; Miguel de Herrera, governor of the fortress of Pamplona and captain general of the artillery in Ma´laga; Cristo´bal Rejo´n, Martı´n de Co´rdoba’s messenger in Pamplona and then paymaster, treasurer, and supervisor of supplies in Oran;41 Captain Martı´n Dı´az de Aramenda´riz, a Navarrese nobleman who served in North Africa;42 Don Luis de Peralta, one of the highest nobles of Navarre, who served as captain of the fortresses of Bugı´a;43 and Jacobo (or Jacomo) Palearo and his family of engineers and architects, who helped design and construct the fortresses in Pamplona, Mers el-Kebir, and Valencia. Even soldiers manning outposts were

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cycled among parts of the empire. Those stationed in North Africa came from garrisons or battlefields in the Pyrenees as well as other parts of Spain, Italy, and the Low Countries. This is a partial list; more officers may surface in other documents. Miguel de Herrera, one of the administrators mentioned above, even admitted that it was not uncommon for administrators to hold offices in multiple parts of the empire simultaneously. Herrera first made an appearance as commander of Pamplona’s fortress in the 1520s. He later transferred to Ma´laga’s arsenal, where he served as captain general of the artillery charged with procuring munitions and dispatching them to armies and fortifications, particularly in nearby North Africa.44 Residing in Ma´laga but still maintaining possession of his Pamplonese office, Herrera attracted unwelcome attention from the Council of War, which questioned his ability to carry out such geographically dispersed responsibilities.45 Brushing off the council’s doubts, he observed that holding multiple offices was not unusual: ‘‘I have been advised that His Majesty and the Council of War are confused by how I can serve as captain of the artillery and as governor of [the fortress] of Pamplona. . . . It is nothing new for a caballero to hold two or three or even more offices. Alcarcon is governor of Gaeta and Brindez and a captain of soldiers. The maestre de campo Antonio de Leyva commands two fortresses in Naples that he has never once entered and many other offices in the army of His Majesty.’’46 Herrera and other administrators straddled North Africa and Navarre, suggesting that the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s extended service in the two regions was no fluke nor merely the result of nepotism. Rather, experience garnered on one frontier was useful and applicable to another, and the crown recognized as much. The association of two regions by the people who traveled, lived, and worked between them is not unknown to other parts of the empire. The citizens of Trujillo in Extremadura had a strong presence in Peru. Andalusians served disproportionately in the conquest of Granada as well as North Africa. Valencians and Catalans maintained ties to Italy dating back to the late Middle Ages. The residents of Brihuega near Guadalajara emigrated en masse to Puebla de Los Angeles in Mexico.47 Recently, Bethany Aram has also exposed links between Segovians and Nicaragua, first developed through the service of the Da´vila family, which recruited its kin and clients to help colonize the region.48 By definition, colonial empires were fostered by metropolitans who set out for the peripheries, where they settled and built new communities. The examples above illlustrate this kind of movement. Less common, however, are

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stories of metropolitans moving from one imperial periphery to another. As the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba history illustrates, such trajectories did occur. In the case of this lineage, the crown sent members of the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba repeatedly to Oran and Navarre because of the particular expertise they possessed on frontiers. Martı´n de Co´rdoba demonstrated this through his independent initiative in North Africa.

Martı´n de Co´rdoba and Administrative Autonomy in North Africa Spain’s struggle with Muslims in the western Mediterranean built to a crescendo during Martı´n de Co´rdoba’s term as captain general of Oran. In August 1534 the Ottomans seized Tunis, until then a protectorate of Spain under the rule of Muley Hassan of the Hafsid dynasty. A Spanish expedition in July 1535 was able to recapture the city.49 Nevertheless, the Ottomans continued to raid the coast of Spain in 1536 and western Italy in 1537. Barbarossa defeated another Spanish-led naval campaign that included Venice and the Papacy at Prevesa in 1538. Charles V’s last great Mediterranean enterprise, an attack on Algiers in 1541, ended in disaster. In August 1551, the Turks took Tripoli, conquered in 1511 by Spaniards and ceded to the Hospitalers.50 Closer to Oran, Ottoman influence also loomed over Tlemcen, which descended into political chaos when its long-ruling king Muley Abdallah al-Thabti of the Zayanid dynasty died in 1534.51 A number of heirs claimed the throne, and twenty years of rapid successions and short-lived reigns plagued the kingdom. Both Spanish and Ottoman forces vied to take advantage of the fluid situation and install a pretender to the throne sympathetic to their cause. However, with many other territories making demands, the crown’s energy was spread thin, and it could give Oran only limited attention. The royal councils, then, depended on the captain general to keep them advised of the different political permutations taking shape in the region. The crown’s reliance on Martı´n de Co´rdoba accentuated the value of his ability to take independent political and military action on Spain’s southern flank. Martı´n’s unprecedented twenty-four-year tenure as governor highlights this quality as he presided over policy, warfare, and daily life in the presidio.52 The Cordovan came to office eager to take on the Ottomans’ rising power. He achieved so much control that he drew the attention of Charles V’s son Prince Philip, who would initiate an audit (visita) on Martı´n’s affairs, thereby leaving for modern historians evidence of the governor’s powers.53

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At the beginning of Martı´n’s term, the crown finally recognized the vital role that seigneurial power played in securing the North African frontier. As we have seen, Luis Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba had already been forced to go beyond the terms of his commission and supplement the limited resources the Council of War had provided with his own men and supplies. The crown formalized these contributions from the start by granting Martı´n the power to mobilize troops from his clients and friends in Andalusia in times of urgent need. These forces, in addition, would be paid for by the crown.54 The significance of this privilege becomes clear when viewed in relation to the Cordovan’s many requests to raise and station troops from his own estates in Navarre. The emperor had resisted these offers, fearing the introduction of seigneurial forces into a kingdom whose loyalty was already doubtful. The concession now of this power indicates the crown’s inability or unwillingness to devote more resources to the North African frontier. It underlines the monarchy’s reliance on lords who possessed the capability of augmenting the enclave’s defenses. Charles V himself showed only fluctuating concern for North Africa, and this disinterest further enabled Martı´n to assert his own authority. Charles’s own advisers urged the emperor to pay more attention to North Africa, especially as his departure for the imperial coronation in Italy coincided with the Ottoman threat to besiege Oran in 1529.55 The president of the Council of State appealed to the empress ‘‘to advise, remind, supplicate and press His Majesty to lose all interest in Italian affairs . . . so that he can employ his grand strategies [pensamientos] . . . to conquer Africa where he can best employ his youth and power to win more glory than anywhere else.’’56 Charles did not heed his councilors, though he did carefully retain an offended Luis Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba as captain general of Oran. In 1534, the emperor returned to Spain, and in the following year undertook an expedition to Tunis, newly captured by the Turks. Despite the role this expedition would play in the emperor’s propaganda, the attention he paid to North Africa during the remainder of his reign was inconsistent.57 Charles V relied on Luis and Martı´n to provide leadership in Oran. In fact, Martı´n did pursue an enduring foreign policy goal—to place the neighboring city-state of Tlemcen and its port city of Mostaganem under a Spanish protectorate. From 1534 to 1551, the throne of Tlemcen changed hands at least twelve times between six members of the Zayanid dynasty.58 The Cordovan inserted himself into this volatile mix, leading expeditions in 1535, 1543, 1545, and 1558 to Tlemcen and/or Mostaganem seeking to install a

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Spanish proxy in power.59 His management and execution of the expedition in 1543 exposes his independent action.60 In January 1543, Martı´n led an invasion force of several thousand soldiers to install Abu Abdallah Muhammad and his grandfather Abd al-Rahman ben Reduan on Tlemcen’s throne. The Cordovan was granted extraordinary leeway in mobilizing the necessary forces, supplies, and transport in Spain and to take his expeditionary force across the Mediterranean to accomplish a set of goals. The crown did lend its support to a limited degree. Charles V ordered the royal accountants (contadores mayores) to pay the captain general his annual salary for 1542 even though he only resided two and a half months that year in Oran out of the minimum requirement of six.61 The emperor further granted the lord ‘‘a fifth of the spoils’’ (quinta de la cavalgada), a privilege usually reserved for the crown, to help him recover the costs of the armada.62 Still, Charles expected the captain general to act independently, obligating the Cordovan to ‘‘mobilize at your own cost the required ships to pass over to Africa.’’63 On more than one occasion the crown made it clear that the Cordovan lord had offered to mount this expedition. Finance weighed heavily on the crown in the early 1540s because it had just bankrolled Charles V’s disastrous expedition to Algiers in 1541. The crown was willing to help fund the campaign, but only through loans or other indirect means. Charles directed royal officials in Ma´laga to lend Martı´n ‘‘artillery, cannon balls, gunpowder, rifles, pikes, crossbows, and other arms to launch artillery. . . . I order you to turn over these munitions in the arsenal to him . . . and to take a security [deposit] from him so that at the end of the expedition he will return the materials.’’64 While the crown was unwilling to pay for the campaign, it did requisition money from other nobles. The emperor ordered the executors of the defunct Marquis of Tarifa’s will to loan 20,000 ducats of the nobleman’s estate to Martı´n. Charles explained: ‘‘To pay for the costs of such an expedition, I have granted [Martı´n de Co´rdoba] permission to sell up to 3,000 ducats of rent on his entailed estates. And because no one has cash on hand to purchase the rent at such short notice, I would like you [the executors] to give up to 20,000 ducats in monies from the Marquis of Tarifa’s legacy.’’65 The reasoning behind the crown’s actions seems questionable. It argued that since Martı´n could not find a buyer for the 3,000 ducats worth of rent on his own estate, Tarifa’s estate should transfer 20,000 ducats to the captain general. Even Charles came to express some hesitancy over this frank opportunism, although he appropriated the money anyway: ‘‘The loan of money that you [Martı´n de

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Co´rdoba] have asked for can come from two sources—the Marquis of Tarifa’s estate or the Indies, assuming that they are reassured that you will pay the interest. You should know that we are glad to do this for your cause. . . . [But, though] the matter of the marquis may be something that is tolerated and that we might even do according to our necessities, it has been a long time since we have helped ourselves to it because it is something we are not accustomed to do.’’66 The financing of the count’s expedition came from personal and seigneurial sources. Arms, while supplied by royal arsenals and stockpiles, were only lent to the count, who was forced to pay back the goods. Volunteer soldiers for the campaign were expected to profit from spoils rather than salaries from the crown, and they were also recruited through direct appeals to local noblemen, including the count’s nephew, the Count of Santiesteban del Puerto.67 Martı´n and his forces crossed to North Africa in January 1543. Torrential rain and an unusual snowstorm made rivers in the countryside impassable and bogged down the expedition. The captain general had only a limited supply of men and resources and was under a deadline. In the end, he conquered Tlemcen and delivered it to his Muslim clients, briefly occupying the city himself for fifteen days. At the emperor’s order, he had to dispatch the soldiers to the borders of France before he had a chance to take Mostaganem.68 The Cordovan’s campaign in 1543, like the other expeditions he led, made a limited impact. Taken together, he succeeded in keeping the Ottomans from entrenching their rule in Tlemcen and Mostaganem. However, Martı´n never received enough financial, material, and personnel support to extend Oran’s control permanently or to conquer the Ottoman base at Algiers. The governor also lacked allies among the members of the Tlemcen royal family who enjoyed sufficient local support; his own proxies soon lost control after the withdrawal of Spanish forces. In the end, the captain general’s relative inability to effect long-term changes in the political landscape of North Africa marked the limits of his autonomous action in the region. Nevertheless, by voluntarily undertaking these expeditions and mobilizing munitions and financial resources for them, Martı´n effectively ran foreign policy in Oran. In a note congratulating the lord for his success in 1543, Charles V addressed the Cordovan almost as if he recognized the lord’s equal standing as a battlefield commander: Count, kinsman, etc. I read your letter from the 8th of last month and we understood the reason you abandoned your plans to go to

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Mostaganem; why you continued to Tlemcen; what happened on the way; the formation of the army when the Moors attacked; and the expedition’s success. We are content and give many thanks to Our Lord for being so well served, for the minor injuries the Christians have suffered, and for you having accomplished what you desired. May news spread of your valor and efforts and the good spirit in which everyone fought. . . . For this service and others, we will especially remember to honor, favor, and grant you the awards that you merit. We impatiently await the arrival of your son Don Alonso so that we can find out what happened afterward and what you have done with the army against Mostaganem.69 In this letter, Charles V offhandedly signaled his superior position by promising to reward his liege. At the same time, he expressed his keen interest in the companies’ formation in combat, his relief that few men were lost, and his delight in the soldiers’ fighting spirit. The use of such language by this emperor was not contrived, as he personally led armies into battle. However, by writing with such familiarity, Charles seemed to put status aside and address Martı´n as another general-equal. He emphasized that the feats belonged to the Cordovan, in no way claiming a share of the accomplishments. He deliberately praised the lord’s valor and efforts. In the face of a perpetually overextended crown, the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba may very well have become accustomed to acting independently and asserting leadership over foreign policy in North Africa. Indeed, Luis Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba entertained the ambassadors of Tlemcen on his Cordovan estate of Espejo, where he concluded a peace treaty with Abdallah b. Muhammad b. Bogani in the spring of 1533.70 Likewise, Martı´n also received dignitaries from Tlemcen on his estates in Co´rdoba, accommodating the ambassadors Ahmed Beneat and Jacob Veniciar for several weeks in January and February 1539 while they awaited an audience with Charles V in Toledo.71 The captain general also received similar visits in Oran, and he offered sanctuary to various princes of Tlemcen throughout his tenure. In 1555, royal auditor Antonio Galı´ndez de Carvajal complained that the count was maintaining two sons of the king of Tlemcen in Oran with their Arab supporters camped in tents outside the city walls. The auditor emphasized that this was inappropriate and protested that they were eating all the food!72 When Prince Philip became governor of Spain, he ordered an audit on Martı´n de Co´rdoba, wary of the captain general’s independence.73 The visitador Antonio Galı´ndez de Carvajal, Comendador de la Madalena,

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commenced the examination in 1554, and it lasted until 1556. In his instructions to Carvajal, Philip explained that ‘‘because the presidios have not been audited since [Martı´n de Co´rdoba] began his service as captain general, we are determined to conduct it principally to discharge the conscience of His Majesty and our own.’’74 In practice, however, the visita degenerated into a polemical and bitter feud between Carvajal and Martı´n, with the visitador lamenting to Princess Juana halfway through the investigation that the captain general’s ‘‘principal occupation is to write complaints about me to Your Highness at all hours.’’75 The lord even sent delegations to Charles V, Prince Philip, and Princess Juana to accuse the visitador of biased attacks against him. Carvajal’s investigations and the testimony of royal officials and residents of Oran raised numerous charges against the captain general.76 They also reveal the governor’s independent streak in the administration of Oran. Martı´n’s autonomy constituted the underlying concern of the audit. The prince’s lengthy instructions consisted of forty-four articles. The first directed Carvajal to investigate whether the Cordovan had kept to the terms of his contract, determine whether he had obtained permission for his actions, and solicit explanations for actions that fell outside the terms of the contract.77 The remaining articles indicate the areas where Philip considered the Cordovan to have exceeded his authority. These touch on three major areas: the treatment of Muslims and Jews, finance, and the maintenance of soldiers and fortifications. Starting with the treatment of non-Christians, Philip instructed Carvajal to investigate whether the lord had sold out Prince Ahmed, one of the pretenders to Tlemcen’s throne, to the king of Tlemcen, who had him beheaded.78 Martı´n was also accused of seizing Muslims guaranteed protection by Charles V, extorting Jews who lived in Oran to obey his orders under pain of expulsion, attacking two Algerian ships during peacetime, and hanging two Muslims who were attempting to travel to Spain to alert the emperor of the captain general’s abuses.79 Some seventeen articles specifically address matters of finance. These charges accused Martı´n of withholding booty, customs, and other dues from the crown; restricting trade to a limited number of merchants (Christian, Jewish, and Muslim) while intimidating and mistreating others, thereby causing royal rents to decrease; minting money in Oran’s fortress and decreasing the weight of the coins; misusing funds targeted for repair work on the fortifications; listing public notaries as soldiers and paying them additional salaries; and spending 400 ducats meant for the fortifications on the captain general’s personal lodging. The prince also charged the Cordovan and his son

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Martı´n II of selling grain to allied and enemy Muslims during times of need in Oran. In fact, the crown accused the lord of buying grain from Muslims and exporting it to Castile for a profit while at the same time demanding that the crown ship grain to Oran at high cost.80 A final section of the instructions covers matters related to the maintenance of soldiers and fortifications. Prince Philip asked Carvajal to inspect the fortification works, artillery, and munitions and to determine the way that grain and victuals were distributed to soldiers. He directed the visitador to look into allegations that Martı´n had appointed clients, incompetent in matters of warfare, to serve as captains; brought a large number of dependents who were now receiving royal salaries from Alcaudete to Oran; left the city defenseless by taking large numbers of soldiers on raids lasting three or four days; and paid salaries to soldiers who did not serve or were absent in Spain without license.81 The gravity of these accusations makes the reader wonder whether Martı´n committed these deeds. How the visita concluded and how the captain general held onto office remain mysteries.82 The audit’s final report has not been found. It may even be possible that the audit was aborted. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that these allegations were drawn up before the visitador commenced his investigation. The governor and his officials had a right to testify in front of Carvajal and explain their actions. The Cordovan responded to the charges by writing directly to his longtime patron Charles V.83 Many of his justifications seem reasonable, but in some cases he did confirm the accusation, explaining that he would offer a complete account of what happened at his discharge. Martı´n clearly knew how to defend himself, and he sent memorials and petitions as well as representatives directly to court to present his case.84 The governor also waged a campaign to discredit the auditor. The crown took up the Cordovan’s claim that Carvajal himself had exceeded his authority and demanded that the auditor not meddle in the critical areas of defense and warfare.85 In the pressurized environment of Oran, brawls also broke out between Carvajal’s assistants and the captain general’s men.86 Martı´n de Co´rdoba displayed a significant degree of assertiveness in applying for the governorship of Oran. He sought the position at a time when Ottoman power was reaching its apex. He then pursued policies with the enclave’s neighbors that were largely of his own design. Luis Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba and Martı´n’s careers in the North African outpost reveal that essential and obligatory duties, such as provisioning, combined with an

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ability to assert autonomous authority were two basic elements of the skill and expertise that were requisite for service on the North African frontier.

Imperial Experience in Family History: Administrative Reports as Autobiography Experience and expertise in imperial service were important for the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba. Possessing experience qualified the clan for office and enhanced its reputation. Applying expertise, skill, and knowledge in the management of imperial territories sustained the Cordovans in dangerous environments. Lived experience and practical abilities were passed on to subsequent generations in the form of training. They were also passed on as historical memory. These memories—in essence family histories—shaped the identity of the individuals present at the scene, their descendants, and their whole lineage. Martı´n de Co´rdoba was conscious of his role in both Navarre and North Africa. The epigraph at the beginning of this chapter shows how careful he was to remind the crown of his distinguished service, referring to his transition from Spain’s northern to its southern frontier on this and many other occasions during his twenty-four-year career in Oran. The nobleman’s memorials repeatedly recall the history of his service. He deployed such a memory to maneuver the crown on several occasions. His writings thus amply reflect an awareness of how his past experiences contributed to his identity as an administrative officer. These documents, when collected together, ultimately recorded and composed a history for himself and his family that wove experience in imperial service into family history. Indeed, the captain general adopted these administrative experiences as the substance of his family’s history. Neither the Alcaudete nor the Comares family was known to have commissioned genealogical studies eulogizing the deeds of glorious ancestors. In fact, Marı´a Concepcion Quintanilla Raso has remarked that unlike other noble peers, the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba did not seek an illustrious ancestor from among the varied characters that populated classical mythology.87 It was only in the mid-seventeenth century that one member of the lineage, Francisco Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba (a descendant of the House of Cabra), composed an extensive genealogy that, unfortunately for the Alcaudete branch, was left incomplete. Despite the lack of conventional narratives, however, administrative documents contain much family history. A corpus of perhaps thousands

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of records composed by members of the Alcaudete and Comares families, when taken as a whole, forms the essence of a historical record. And while most of these documents casually report history through the affairs they recounted to the crown, others seem to have been written as a deliberate record of the families’ experiences.88 The knowledge of history and an understanding of its uses formed part of Martı´n de Co´rdoba’s job in Oran. To a degree the nobleman was responsible for educating other crown officers on the historical, as well as the actual, situation in North Africa. On occasion, both Luis and Martı´n reminded the crown officials how political dynamics in the western Mediterranean had undergone a transformation from the reign of King Ferdinand to the late 1520s. Such an education was even more necessary toward the end of the 1540s when control of the Spanish government alternated in rapid succession between Charles V’s children Philip, Marı´a, and Juana, creating a certain amount of flux in policy. When Marı´a and her husband, Maximilian of Bohemia, became governors of Spain, Martı´n acknowledged the need to debrief his new superiors. He sent a letter asking them to review the correspondence he had recently exchanged with Prince Philip, their predecessor, for useful background information. He then went on to give the governors supplemental knowledge of current events in North Africa: ‘‘I have given an account of the situation in Oran to the Prince and Your Highness [Maximilian] should also be aware of the situation if you have read my correspondence dated 7, 9, and 29 of October. . . . For this reason I will concentrate on what is new at the moment rather than what has happened.’’89 In addition to supplying royal officials with essential background knowledge, Martı´n also employed historical references to leverage the crown. In Chapter 4, we saw the Cordovan comparing the tense situation in Pamplona in 1529 to the Comunidades uprising in 1520–22. He did so to draw the attention of Charles V and make him take the city’s needs seriously. Likewise, he reminded the empress of his honorable services and selfless sacrifices. This constituted Martı´n’s most oft-repeated appeal to history, and he did so to pressure the crown to fulfill its obligations.90 The nobleman drew on other historical references related to his ancestors, going as far back as Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s captaincy general in the 1510s. In a letter to Philip warning of an Ottoman attack on Tlemcen in 1543, he reached back to the early era of Spanish Oran to remind the young prince of the enclave’s importance. This letter was personally delivered by Martı´n’s second son, Francisco:

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So that Your Highness knows how the Turks have attempted to take over the Kingdom of Tlemcen over the years and that it is important for Spain to defend the presidios, I will tell you what has gone on over time. . . . During the time of my father-in-law [Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba], Barbarossa and his brother undertook to seize Tlemcen and all of the kingdom. And at that time the King of Tlemcen requested help from His Majesty. Don Fray Francisco Jime´nez [de Cisneros], who was governor, understood the great damage that could be done to Spain to have Turks at our frontiers even though they only had ten or twelve light galeotas, not galleys, at the time. He sent 6,000 to 7,000 soldiers and 600 cavalrymen to assist the King of Tlemcen at the crown’s cost. With these men, Barbarossa was besieged in the fortress of Tlemcen and his lieutenant in Alcala´ de Benarax. They along with their men were taken and killed.91 Another message to the Council of State, dated 1555 and conveyed this time by his fourth son, Martı´n II, reached back some forty years as the captain general tried to convince his superiors to limit the visitador Carvajal’s time for conducting the audit. Martı´n appealed to a prior precedent that restricted audits on Diego and Luis Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba to a few months: Don Martı´n de Co´rdoba [II], in the name of his father, says that [Carvajal’s] audit is now going on to its eighth month. If he had no other motive than to serve Your Majesty, he could have finished everything by now since Lope Hurtado de Mendoza was able to complete his audit on [Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba] in much less time, even though he had additional responsibilities as paymaster. Likewise, Per Afa´n de Ribera audited [Luis Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba] in less than three months. Thus, I supplicate Your Majesty to set a deadline for [Carvajal] like the 100 days that was given to the auditor of Bugı´a. Given [my father’s] services, [he] does not deserve to be treated worse than any other.92 Martı´n used family history as evidence and as precedent to leverage the crown. Such allusions also reminded royal officials of his clan’s long service in Oran and Navarre, especially as the messengers who took his letters to court were often Martı´n’s sons Alonso, Francisco, and Martı´n II. Each time

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they appeared at court, the councilors were confronted with the fact that a third generation of the family was now in service. Martı´n’s deployment of historical references was not new. Appeals to precedence were common in a society based on the conservation of powers, rights, customs, and privileges. Hidden in this use of history, however, was the creation of family history itself. The official letters that the captains general and their kin composed were infused with the families’ deeds. Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s, Luis’s, and Martı´n’s places in the documents have occupied our attention so far. However, other members of the families in succeeding generations made appearances in the documentary record as they came of age. In Oran, Martı´n’s eldest and second sons Alonso and Francisco emerged as early as 1534 when they were designated lieutenants to their father. A third son, Diego, intervened with the crown on the count’s behalf during Carvajal’s audit.93 The youngest son, Martı´n II, captained raiding parties that scavenged Oran’s hinterland. He also commanded the presidio during his father’s extended absence at court in the late 1540s. In contrast to Martı´n’s four sons, his four daughters, Juana, Elvira, Francisca, and Leonor, did not appear in the administrative record once the family reached Oran.94 Still, documents generated by male members once again hint at Leonor Pacheco taking part in professional life with her husband. In one letter dated December 2, 1544, Martı´n informed Alonso that he should consult with his mother for information on the diplomatic affairs of North Africa, in particular the king of Tlemcen’s request for a detachment of Spanish soldiers: ‘‘Beloved son: The message that I sent with Juan Martı´n and another that was dispatched with the brigantine from Ma´laga should tell you what to say [to the Prince]. You can find additional information in a report that I am sending to [your mother, the Countess].’’95 In another letter, this time directly addressing Prince Philip, Martı´n mentioned that his wife had contracted a caravel to transport grain from Cartagena to Oran: ‘‘On the fourth of this month, I wrote to Your Highness. . . . And at the hour that it set sail, a caravel that my wife had loaded with wheat from Cartagena was sighted.’’96 In one final reference to his wife, the captain general wrote to the royal secretary Juan Va´zquez de Molina that he was traveling to court and had been granted permission by the emperor to leave Leonor Pacheco in Oran to act as his substitute: ‘‘I have been organizing my voyage to pay homage to His Majesty [Charles V] and to serve His Highness [Prince Philip]. . . . To be able to leave Oran, I have made an agreement to bring over my wife.’’97 The role that Leonor

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played during Martı´n’s nearly four decades in imperial service is largely unknown and most likely unrecoverable. However, references to her in the affairs of Oran and Navarre suggest that she assisted her husband in the logistics of communications and provision, and she may have even possessed some degree of command.98 Correspondence that the captain general and his sons sent to the crown provided them opportunities to shape how their deeds would be preserved in the historical record. Martı´n even edited the texts composed by other members of the family before they reached the royal councils. Reports drawn up by Martı´n’s sons while he was absent from the enclave were first sent to him for vetting. The nobleman then filtered the correspondence by selecting the best parts, adding context, and even embellishing passages before dispatching them on to the crown. Martı´n edited one lengthy account that Alonso gave of a raid by selecting relevant passages, copying them, and sending the new version to the crown along with an accompanying explanation of how Alonso’s sortie boosted Oran’s morale. He commented: ‘‘Don Alonso my son wrote to me about the raid. I am sending a copy of part of his letter to His Highness. The raid made an even greater impact than we expected because, as Don Alonso emphasizes, there was a great need to drive away fear from the people as well as hunger.’’99 The captain general’s editorial interventions subtly guided royal councilors and the monarchs toward an interpretation of his son’s actions. Reports on raids and battles documented the military exploits of a caballero family. Martı´n and his sons drew up these accounts for the crown as well as for their own consumption. These reports were extensive in length and dense in description. They were packed with minute details about the course of battles, replete with technical terms, unfamiliar geographic and proper names, and inscrutably informative about political and diplomatic affairs. The Alcaudetes’ reports, though a common genre of administrative correspondence, nevertheless seem to be of questionable value to an audience like royal councilors. Council members may have appreciated a chronicle of military feats. Nevertheless, in other types of letters sent to the crown, Martı´n asked for pardon when a dispatch was lengthy, or he declined to provide additional information, explaining that he did not want to trouble the reader with such a long narrative. These detailed reports, sent first to Martı´n, served to document the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s participation in an event. Martı´n dispatched copied portions to the crown; the captain general and his sons would have kept the original drafts.

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The dense reports composed by the Alcaudete officers mirrored a common literary genre in premodern Spain—chronicles of battles and of deeds (relaciones de guerra and hazan˜as) written about members of the royal family as well as the high nobility. Two such works narrate the Alcaudetes’ campaigns in North Africa. Francisco de la Cueva wrote the Relacio´n de la guerra de Tremece´n recounting Martı´n’s expedition to Tlemcen in 1543, while Baltasar de Morales’s Dia´logo de las guerras de Ora´n discusses the Cordovan’s campaigns from 1543 to 1558 as well as a part of Alonso de Co´rdoba’s tenure as captain general following his father’s death.100 Both authors were contemporaries of Martı´n and his sons. La Cueva was in fact the governor’s chaplain, and Morales served in the campaigns as a company captain. Apart from the fact that Morales structured his work in the form of a conversation shared by three knights set in the cathedral-mosque of Co´rdoba, these chronicles and the administrative documents generated by the Alcaudetes bear striking resemblances. They relate the provision of supplies, organization of forces, the course of battles, and the outcome of events. More than that, names of individuals, including captains, soldiers, Muslim adversaries, and above all, members of the Alcaudete family, densely pack both the chronicles and the administrative documents. Reports highlighting individuals who had performed noteworthy deeds certainly helped the Council of War reward service and identify officers worthy of promotion. It may even have been part of a commander’s duty to honor his subordinates by writing them up in accounts. However, the likelihood that the Council of War was being flooded with names from Navarre, the Basque country, Perpignan, Valencia, and other frontiers made the impact of these reports uncertain. Already weighed down by a mountain of paperwork, were councilors willing to read through a long narrative and pick names out one by one? Rather than constituting a practical and efficient means of communication, the Alcaudetes’ administrative correspondence mirror chronicles that recorded names and deeds to preserve as history.101 Martı´n’s preoccupation with documenting his family’s service complemented a general interest in the subject of history among the high nobility. Works of classical history, medieval chronicles, and biographies filled the libraries of aristocrats, alongside religious and devotional works, classical treatises on rhetoric and grammar, and recent humanist publications. An inventory dating from 1518 of Pedro Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s possessions included 309 books, among which were histories by late medieval chroniclers Alonso de Palencia and Hernando Pulgar.102 Although Pedro, the head of the House

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of Aguilar in the first two decades of the sixteenth century, was not close to the Alcaudete family, his branch’s wealth and influence must have shaped the tastes of the Cordovan nobility around him, especially those of the junior branches of his lineage. Nobles also engaged with the past by composing and commissioning works of history, especially accounts of the deeds of glorious ancestors. These works recorded an ancestor’s feats, reminded descendants of their predecessor’s moral qualities, and provided a model for younger members to emulate. Ultimately, they were meant to preserve familial identity in an age of radical change. One family that took particular care in preparing chronicles was the Giro´n dukes of Osuna.103 A branch of the Giro´nPacheco lineage that included the marquises of Villena, the Osuna had accumulated vast estates in Seville in the late fifteenth century, established a university at their ducal seat, and led administrative careers oriented toward Italy.104 The Duke of Osuna I served as viceroy of Naples (1582), and like Martı´n de Co´rdoba, he took along his wife, son, daughter-in-law, and grandson, the future Duke of Osuna III, to Italy. The latter went on to rule the kingdom of Sicily (1611) as King Philip III’s viceroy. Perhaps inspired by the Dia´logos de la Monterı´a, a treatise on knightly service that his grandfather had commissioned expressly for his edification,105 the Duke III also patronized works ‘‘to illuminate [his] marvelous and heroic deeds’’ for his son to emulate.106 Emulating the pattern set by his ancestors, the Duke IV commissioned the Espejo cristiano de armas para generales valerosos; ideado en la serie Historial y Panegı´rica de los He´roes Augustos, que ilustraron las dos esclarecidas familias de Girones y Pachecos so that his son Gaspar could ‘‘look toward his ancestors as models of virtue.’’107 Interest in didactic literature that both recorded and moralized the history of a family was by no means confined to the dukes of Osuna.108 Albeit not so prolifically as the Osuna, other families commissioned or were subjects of such works. The production of family histories and ‘‘mirror of princes’’ manuals by the dukes of Osuna came several generations after Martı´n de Co´rdoba’s time. Beyond the Relacio´n that his chaplain Francisco de la Cueva composed, it does not appear that he or his descendants directly commissioned anything similar to the treatises that the Osuna family helped produce. An absence of this kind of artifact did not mean, however, that the Alcaudetes neglected the reproduction of family memory. Taken as a whole, the long memorials, reports, and correspondence that the captain general and his sons drafted formed the corpus of a family history.

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Conclusion: Experience, Webs of Empire, and Family History Though it was a ‘‘forgotten frontier,’’ Spanish North Africa, including Oran, developed alongside other parts of the Spanish empire. Fernand Braudel sought to reclaim its history by focusing on the role it played in the geopolitical world of the Spanish realm. This study, however, has looked to family networks as a medium that linked different places. The commutes that the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba officers made between Oran, Navarre, and other regions, and the work that they conducted in them, connected the Maghribi enclave to the affairs of the wider empire. The abstract, but practical, skills that the clan gathered on one frontier were transmitted and applied to another. The crown’s disregard for North Africa enabled the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba to take independent action in this arena and garner even more expertise. The clan held this experience in high regard, and the service they performed as officers came to form the core of the family history it compiled. The accumulation, transference, application, and compilation of this experience was another mechanism that enacted and ultimately constituted the entity of empire. Much more than a mere collection of inanimate territories, empire became an organism alive in the movement, minds, and activities of the administrative nobility.

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epilogue

Children of Empire The Latter-Day Comares and Alcaudete

Being of sound mind, memory, and consciousness and wishing to put in order my last will and testament; firmly believing in everything that the holy mother Church believes, as a true Catholic and loyal Christian ought to believe; being in the city of Cartagena on my way to Oran where I serve by appointment of His Majesty as captain general and where I will continue the war against the infidels as I am able with a great desire to end my life by exalting the faith of Our Lord Jesus Christ, subjugating all of that frontier under the yoke of the church and the power of the Emperor my lord. —Martı´n de Co´rdoba

Martı´n de Co´ rdoba y de Velasco died leading a final expedition against Mostaganem on August 26, 1558.1 His demise came a little less than a month before that of Charles V on September 21. The proximity of their deaths symbolizes the close collaboration that linked the nobleman to the emperor.2 Since the tumult at the beginning of Charles’s reign, Martı´n had closely served his sovereign’s imperial interests. The preamble of his testament, cited above, left no doubt as to the role that service had played in his life. In the course of professing his allegiance to the Catholic Church, he related his impending return to the captaincy general. He then affirmed his obligation to ‘‘continue the war against the infidels as [he was] able’’ and to subject them to the rule of the Church as well as the emperor. Declaring one’s belief

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in the Church constituted an obligatory and legalistic formula replicated in other preambles of the period. Autobiographical references to careers were rather less common.3 Even at death, Martı´n emphasized his identity as a man in military and administrative service. Devotion to imperial careers impacted the family’s life cycle. Although Martı´n’s service lasted thirty-eight long years, the lives of his three younger brothers were all cut short fighting for the emperor. Martı´n’s sisters were cloistered in the family convent of Santa Clara to preserve the family’s fortune for imperial careers rather than expend it as dowries. In both cases, the Alcaudetes’ dedication to empire curtailed the access that males and females had to marriage and licit reproduction. The few unions that were celebrated wedded the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba lineage to high nobles from an expanding circle of partners hailing from the once-foreign kingdoms of Aragon and Navarre. Reproduction patterns indicate how the family adjusted to imperial careers at the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth centuries. A return to marriage data will reveal the final changes that the Alcaudete and the Comares families underwent from the mid-sixteenth to the seventeenth centuries. This epilogue tells the story of what became of the two houses in the generations after Martı´n de Co´rdoba and Luis Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba until both branches became extinct in their male lines. Marriage patterns show that the Comares and Alcaudete, so closely matched in the early sixteenth century, took separate and distinct paths later on. At the end of the fifteenth century, the two had celebrated a double marriage that sealed an alliance between related families of similar means and career paths.4 The fortunes of the two houses diverged in the mid-sixteenth century. After Luis Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, the Comares limited its participation in administrative careers. The family never produced another viceroy of Navarre, and only one more Comares served as captain general of Oran. Instead of seeking honor in royal office, the Comares sought distinction from prestigious marriages with local, regional, and distant partners. It continued to wed Aguilar and Cabra cousins until its final heiress folded the house into the Aguilar, sealing a breach that had opened 400 years earlier. In contrast, the Alcaudetes labored tirelessly as captains general of Oran, presidents of royal councils, and even governor of a prince’s household under the reigns of Philip II and Philip III. Continuing its itinerant ways, the family moved its residence to the royal capitals of Madrid and Valladolid. Sons and daughters married among middle-stratum high nobles from Castile-Leo´n but never with another Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba or a member of the Andalusian nobility.

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At the end of the seventeenth century, the last Alcaudete heiress folded the family into the House of Oropesa, severing its close ties to Co´rdoba.

Comares Marriages and Connections to a Cordovan Base Without a doubt, the union between Luis Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s son Diego, Marquis of Comares III, and Juana de Arago´n Folch de Cardona would set a precedent that the offspring of the house would seek to follow.5 Juana’s parents, the dukes of Cardona, were by far the richest nobles in the Crown of Aragon. The Cardona estate passed to Juana when her brother Francesc Ramo´n de Folch died without succession. When the Comares and Cardona patrimonies merged, they formed one of the greatest fortunes of the Habsburg era. Indeed, Luis sought to arrange equally advantageous matches for his three daughters. Marı´a married the heir of the Duke of Albuquerque; Ana wedded the Marquis of Ayamonte; and Juana contracted ties with the Count of Medellı´n. Luis’s son and three daughters thus marked a sharp change in the family’s marriage patterns. In the late Middle Ages the family had represented the lineage’s preference for local marriages par excellence. Seventy-five percent of daughters and 72 percent of sons chose spouses from the notable but less prestigious families from Co´rdoba. By the mid-1500s, Luis’s children not only married as far away as Catalonia but wedded into two ducal families. The escalating dowries that outside brides brought and the corresponding sums that the house endowed on its own daughters reveal the transformation of the family’s fortunes. In the late 1400s Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba had married Juana Pacheco, daughter of the Marquis of Villena. Juana brought a dowry worth 5,333 ducats to the marriage. In the early 1500s, Luis’s wedding to Francisca Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, daughter of the Count of Cabra, attracted a significantly higher dowry worth 21,333 ducats. Another generation later, the alliance of Luis and Francisca’s primoge´nito the Marquis of Comares III and Juana de Arago´n brought a dowry worth an astronomical 90,000 ducats. Luis and Francisca themselves endowed their daughter Marı´a 90,000 ducats for her marriage with a ducal heir and their daughter Ana 53,906 ducats for her wedding with the Marquis of Ayamonte.6 From the late fifteenth to the mid-sixteenth century, dowries escalated from 2,333 ducats to 90,000 ducats, a growth of nearly 3,900 percent. In the seventeenth century, they would stabilize around 70,000 ducats.

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Figure 14. The House of Comares (sixteenth and seventeenth centuries)

The Marquis of Comares III and Juana de Arago´n’s descendants in the following generations also contracted high-level marriages. Their primoge´nito Luis Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, Marquis of Comares IV, wedded Ana Enrı´quez de Mendoza. Despite being the daughter of the untitled lord of Ita and Buitrago, she was a member of the immensely powerful and rich Mendoza clan. Accordingly, she brought another dowry of 90,000 ducats to the marriage. Comares III and Juana’s two daughters Juana and Ana both wedded ducal heirs (Sessa and Albuquerque, respectively). Children in the following generations married other prestigious aristocrats, such as the Duke of Arcos, the Count-Duke of Olivares, the Duchess of Lerma, the Duke of Medinaceli,

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the Marquis of Los Ve´lez, and the Marquis of Poza.7 Finally, Felicha de la Cerda, one of Comares IV’s great-granddaughters and heiress of the estate, married the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba Marquis of Priego (formerly the lord of Aguilar).8 The prestigious marriages that the Comares contracted included the relations of three royal favorites: the Marquis of Villena, the Duke of Lerma, and the Count-Duke of Olivares. Yet the Comares also continued to marry great nobles on the local and regional levels. Matches connected the Comares to their cousins the Aguilar and Cabra. They were also made with the elite families of Co´rdoba, Seville, Jae´n, and Extremadura, including the El CarpioGuzma´n, Arcos, Santiesteban del Puerto, and Medellı´n. The continued preference for local and regional partners produced the final merger of Comares and Aguilar. The Comares’ persistent ties to local houses, then, suggest that it pursued regional alliances in the event that its line, or its partner’s, ended without male heirs and had to fold into another house. In such a scenario, the bride and groom’s extensive estates would have been brought under one roof. How such a fit would have worked was a matter worthy of careful consideration when arranging a match. A candid letter written by the bishop of Osma to King Philip IV seeking approval for the wedding of Ana Mo´nica de Co´rdoba, a member of the House of Alcaudete, addressed this very issue.9 The bride was the bishop’s niece and, as the Countess of Alcaudete VI, sole heiress of the house. By the seventeenth century, the Alcaudete estate also included the marquisates of Viana and El Villar, incorporated into the family through marriages in the previous two generations. Ana Mo´nica must have been a catch for almost any groom from the high nobility. Contrary to conventional wisdom, however, the bishop did not advocate for the most prestigious match possible—with the primoge´nito of a grandee house. Instead, he insisted that the conservation of the family’s estates should be the top priority: ‘‘Since my niece has so many [estates] and of such high quality (although none are rich), the Alcaudete do not want the properties to be included nor subordinated to those of a great lord.’’10 Land that was added to a grandee’s domain could ‘‘experience difficulties because more attention tends to be paid to the core properties. [Great estates] are also prone to suffer lawsuits from relatives [who want a share]. And if the matrimony dissolves after many years, many calculations would have to be made to divide the gains.’’ For these reasons, the bishop urged that ‘‘it would be better [for Ana Mo´nica] to marry a second son of a great house which also helps her to conserve her name and honors.’’ He then

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suggested Don Juan de Zu´n˜iga, second son of the Duke of Be´jar, as the most suitable candidate. The prospective groom ‘‘possesses the same last name as the father of [Ana Mo´nica], is comparable with her in age, health, and good upbringing, and brings quality properties consisting of six entailed estates worth 6,000 to 8,000 ducats of fixed and certified rent.’’11 Though the bishop’s letter addressed the marriage prospects of an Alcaudete heiress, it may also have reflected some of the reasoning behind the Comares’ unions with the Houses of Aguilar and Cabra, and with other regional families. All families faced extinction at unexpected moments. The House of Cardona had already folded into the House of Comares. The Comares’ local alliances made sense if conservation of identity and properties within a circumscribed geographic and blood group was its overall goal. Such a logic of ‘‘keeping it in the family’’ was also reflected in the same passage, as Ana Mo´nica’s uncle recommended that she marry a Zu´n˜iga who shared her father’s last name. It was ultimately a matter of chance that Comares and Aguilar merged, but their marriage planning facilitated the integration of two estates whose physical proximity in the Cordovan countryside made it an extremely practical and attractive fit. The prestigious marriages that the House of Comares was able to arrange contrasted with those of the House of Alcaudete. Its success in achieving these matches also highlights the family’s comparative disengagement from imperial careers—again, in relation to the Alcaudete. Luis Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba resigned from the captaincy general of Oran in 1534. Although he had justified his departure from the post on poor health, the fact that he lived until 1554 might argue otherwise. Luis’s son the Marquis of Comares III served only two brief years as captain general of Oran.12 No other descendants held another captaincy general or viceroyalty. Juxtaposed against the family’s prestigious marriages, the House of Comares was more focused on acquiring honor through connections than via distinguished service on behalf of the empire.

Alcaudete Marriages and Dislocation from Co´rdoba In the late Middle Ages, the sons and daughters of the Alcaudete family married at the highest and second-highest rates (89 percent and 82 percent, respectively) in comparison to their Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba cousins. In the early modern period, however, the house celebrated far fewer weddings. In

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the four generations that followed Martı´n de Co´rdoba, only eight of twentytwo offspring wedded (36 percent). Most of these ties were contracted with middle-level high nobles from outside the region of Andalusia. The Alcaudete developed particularly close relations with the junior branches of the Pimentel clan of Old Castile–Leo´n. These marriages coincided with a shift in the family’s service away from military-administrative governorships toward honorary positions at the royal courts in Madrid and Valladolid. Valladolid, in fact, fell within the sphere of influence of the House of Pimentel. Both career trajectories and marriage ties ultimately severed the family from its ancestral home of Co´rdoba. Patronage ties with Cordovan institutions, such as the Convent of Santa Clara in Alcaudete, waned in favor of the Pimentel’s preferred institutions. Of Martı´n de Co´rdoba and Leonor Pacheco’s eight children, only two married, both sons.13 Unlike the Comares, the Alcaudete wedded middlestratum high nobles, not grandees. The union that Martı´n’s heir Alonso contracted with Francisca de Mendoza represents the level at which the Alcaudete married. Francisca was the daughter of Antonio de Mendoza, the first viceroy of Mexico and the third son of the Count of Tendilla. Her dowry of 43,000 ducats, though a handsome sum and substantial enough to require Philip II’s dispensation for exceeding legal limits, compared unfavorably to the 90,000 ducats that Juana de Arago´n brought to her wedding with the Marquis of Comares III at around the same time.14 Alonso and Francisca’s heir Francisco, the Count of Alcaudete IV, wedded the heiress of the Marquis of Viana from the House of Pimentel. Later matches between the Alcaudetes and the Marquise of Cortes, the Marquis of El Villar, the Count of Oropesa, the Lord of Villaverde, and a granddaughter of the Count of Sa´stago were all extremely respectable, but fell just outside of spectacular. Alcaudete marriages did not compare to the high prestige and money that Comares matches commanded. Even members of the family recognized their status. In the same treatise that addressed the marriage prospects of Ana Mo´nica de Co´rdoba, her uncle the bishop of Osma admitted that the heiress owned quality properties but none were rich. Martı´n and Leonor’s four daughters all entered the Convent of Santa Clara, an indication of the restrictions on licit reproduction placed on many females of the family. In fact, the institution housed Martı´n’s aunts, sisters, daughters, and granddaughters. Preventing female offspring from marrying assisted the family in applying its resources toward the careers of sons conquering and administering a new empire. Ironically, the conquest of new

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Sástago

Figure 15. The House of Alcaudete (sixteenth and seventeenth centuries)

territories was itself a factor that enabled Martı´n’s parents Alfonso Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, Lord of Alcaudete V, and Marı´a de Velasco to establish the religious community in 1500. Antonio Urquı´zar Herrera has observed that few religious institutions were established in Co´rdoba’s southern district during the late Middle Ages due to its precarious location on the Granadine frontier. However, the conquest of the emirate in 1492 dismantled the border, and construction of new religious houses boomed.15 Thus, the expansion of the empire and changes in the reproduction of the Alcaudete family were again closely intertwined. The religious house came to encapsulate the identity of the Alcaudetes. Along with generations of unwed women, the Convent of Santa Clara stored the bones of deceased family members. In many ways, patronage of the institution was the best way for the family to show its ties to its Cordovan homeland. As discussed in Chapter 1, the family had once entombed its members in the Chapel of San Pedro in the Cathedral-Mosque of Co´rdoba before the construction of the convent. Alfonso Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, Lord of Alcaudete I and an early patriarch of the family, directed the decoration of the

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space. The construction and ornamentation of the chapel were meant to convey his tastes, and thus his identity. The fact that he forbade his descendants from being buried anywhere else indicates that he expected this identity to extend over his progeny for generations to come. Physical structures had the ability to express, encapsulate, and preserve a family’s identity. Like Alfonso, later members of the family also decorated the Convent of Santa Clara to represent their identities. Portraying himself as a Christian warrior, Martı´n de Co´rdoba wanted a bell that he seized in an expedition to Tlemcen to be hung in the tomb where his parents were buried and where he and his wife would be laid to rest. A bronze plaque placed underneath the bell was to explain the provenance of the object and that it had been dedicated to the Virgin Mary. Apart from the physical objects, Martı´n also commissioned prayers to be said for his and his parents’ souls, again invoking the memory and identity of the family, this time orally.16 In order to accommodate more and more Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba bones, the convent was progressively enlarged. Martı´n de Co´rdoba’s son Martı´n II constructed a new chapel dedicated to his patron saint where he was to be entombed. Santa Clara’s physical structure, its ornamentation, the nuns it housed, the bones that it entombed, and the prayers that were said in its halls all came together to physically and figuratively articulate the identity of the Alcaudete family. Even more, religious endowments, as property divested from a noble house’s entailed estates (mayorazgos), were preserved from the vagaries of inheritance as they could not be handed over, sold off, or folded into another noble house. Separated from the family’s transferable property, a convent could theoretically store its patrons’ bones and keepsakes generation after generation and preserve their identity.17 While the construction of Santa Clara followed a trend in Co´rdoba, the convent was a uniquely Alcaudete family institution.18 The convent served as the family’s seat to such an extent that even some of its men came to dwell in its walls. Martı´n II had especially strong ties to Santa Clara and its inhabitants. Martı´n II came of age in Oran, where he served as his father Martı´n de Co´rdoba y de Velasco’s substitute in the presidio in the late 1540s. During the attack his father led on Mostaganem in 1558, he was captured by Ottoman forces. After being held captive for roughly two years in Algiers where he faced the threat of being shipped to Istanbul, he was ransomed for 10,000 ducats, paid for by money set aside in Charles V’s will.19 Even after his death, then, Charles V’s patronage proved vital for the Alcaudete family’s welfare. Upon release, Martı´n II returned to assist his

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brother Alonso de Co´rdoba, whom Philip II had appointed captain general of Oran after their father’s death. He then followed his brother to the viceroyalty of Navarre in 1564. Martı´n II would take over the governorship of Oran under his own name from 1575 to 1585 before being appointed viceroy of Navarre in 1589. He ended his career as president of the Council of Military Orders. Despite having led a mobile career, or perhaps because of the inability to establish a permanent home, Martı´n II retired to Santa Clara in his final years, a spent man. Martı´n II’s testament has been preserved in the Alcaudete family archives. For a man who occupied such high offices, his personality and his means are striking for their humility. He fretted anxiously about repaying his creditors, while still honoring the prayers requested by his deceased parents and grandparents: ‘‘I greatly desire that the debts be disposed of but at the present I do not have the means to honor them and to fulfill the other terms of my testament.’’20 In the same document, Martı´n II also expressed his special feelings toward the Convent of Santa Clara, where he was passing his final days under the care of his youngest sister, Leonor. By the beginning of the seventeenth century, Martı´n and Leonor were the only children of Martı´n de Co´rdoba and Leonor Pacheco still alive.21 Their brothers had died between 1558 and 1584 (the dates of the sisters’ deaths are unknown). In the convent, Leonor cared for her brother, ill and worn out after a lifetime of service. In appreciation, he endowed the convent with precious gifts: Ever since I left the court for [Alcaudete] to pass my remaining days in the Convent of Santa Clara more than four years ago, I have resided in a room of the house. So many illnesses have plagued me, and my sister the Sen˜ora Don˜a Leonor Pacheco, Abbess of this convent, and the nuns have gone to a lot of trouble to tend to me. In appreciation for the cares I have given them day and night, I have bestowed some items for the divine cult as well as silver for the ornamentation of the chapel, all of which I have given of my free will. . . . I order the executors of my will not to request from the convent, the abbesses, and the nuns any of the things that I have given them because I confess that my obligation to them is even greater.22 Martı´n II came to be a key benefactor of the convent. He endowed a new chapel devoted to San Martı´n. He asked Leonor to entomb his body there after its completion. In the meantime he was to find rest, along with his

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brother Alonso, next to their parents (and grandparents). Housing the Alcaudete women and the bones of many of its men, Santa Clara was a home to the family, perhaps more than even their rural mansions and urban palaces. It is significant that after a lifetime of wanderings, Martı´n II would go to the convent to rest his weary bones, seek solace from his sister, commune with his deceased relatives, and ultimately entomb his own body permanently within the convent’s walls. Despite the Alcaudetes’ migrations, home was still a religious house on the Cordovan estates of their ancestors. The Convent of Santa Clara, established at the beginning of Spanish expansion, facilitated the Alcaudete family’s dedication to imperial office. At a time when many of its members embarked on peripatetic careers, the institution helped root them to an ancestral space that encapsulated both the family’s bodies and its identity. Waning devotion to the institution in the seventeenth century, then, indicates how later Alcaudetes became increasingly detached from imperial careers as well as their home base until the house’s last heiress finally folded the family into an Old Castilian lineage. This shift started after the death of Francisco de Co´rdoba y de Velasco, Martı´n de Co´rdoba’s grandson and the Count of Alcaudete IV. The Count IV, as captain general of Oran, was the last member of the family to serve as a territorial governor. After completing an eight-year term in the enclave in 1604, his career diverged from the military-administrative path of his ancestors. He became governor (ayo and mayordomo mayor) of King Philip III’s son the infante Carlos’s household in Valladolid.23 Once commander of a desolate presidio in North Africa, he now lived at a sumptuous court not lacking in any material wants. Establishing the family in the Old Castilian capital, the Alcaudetes distanced themselves more and more from Co´rdoba. When the Count IV died in 1632, he was the last head of the house to be buried in Santa Clara. His wife, Ana Pimentel de Herrera, chose to be entombed with her brother in the Monastery of San Francisco in Benavente, the Pimentel’s ancestral seat near Valladolid. She broke a custom among wives of Alcaudete primoge´nitos to be buried beside their husbands. Ana was heiress of the Marquis of Viana, a junior member of the Pimentel lineage. She chose to identify with and patronize an institution that was located on the Pimentel estate in northern Spain. The Count IV and Ana’s daughter Antonia Marı´a de Co´rdoba y de Pimentel, Countess of Alcaudete V, would also continue to move away from the family’s Cordovan roots. The Countess V married Juan de Pimentel, the Marquis of El Villar. She stipulated burial in the Convent of Santa Catalina

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in Valladolid, the institution patronized by her Pimentel husband.24 Their heir, Ana Mo´nica, married the Count of Oropesa and was buried in the Convent of Santa Ana, likewise in Valladolid.25 Established now in the capital, the last members of the House of Alcaudete placed their identity in the religious institutions of Old Castile–Leo´n rather than Co´rdoba.

Conclusion: A Family History of Empire At the heart of this book has been the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba lineage. In 1236, the progenitors of the clan helped conquer the city and countryside of Co´rdoba, where they then settled. Over the next two centuries, the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba evolved into seigneurial lords who dominated over the area. Its rise to power was determined by local topographical, ecological, demographic, and historical features specific to Co´rdoba. The fact that the most fertile farmland was located on the border of the emirate of Granada meant that those who could safeguard the frontier—the noble warriors—also reaped the rewards of the rich soils. The clan’s social, economic, and political development was shaped by the contours of Co´rdoba’s land. Even its reproduction was closely tied to the region. The Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba offspring chose partners from local notable families in order to foster a close-knit community of kin, clients, and supporters. The clan was deeply rooted to the land and enmeshed with its people. In the late Middle Ages, the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba was defined by its home base as much as it took part in shaping a local society. The Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s livelihood on a frontier that endured for 250 years positioned the clan to take part in the expansion of Spain at the end of the fifteenth century. The Granada War launched the imperial era, and the clan furnished seigneurial troops for the royal host and even led them into battle. The contributions of two families of the lineage, the Comares and the Alcaudete, were disproportionate to those of other high noble houses that enjoyed greater incomes. Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, the head of the House of Comares, also achieved renown for capturing Boabdil, the king of Granada. He went on to develop a close relationship with King Ferdinand, who entrusted the nobleman with the assault on Mers el-Kebir and Oran in Algeria and the invasion of Navarre. Diego pioneered a career that would take him beyond the confines of his ancestors’ local world. His descendants

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would follow in his footsteps and lead careers in Granada, Toledo, Navarre, North Africa, and Italy. Uprooted from its ancestral home of Co´rdoba, the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba now stepped onto an imperial stage that encompassed the western Mediterranean basin. For the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, the conquest and administration of the empire was an affair that encompassed entire families. All members were deployed to perform service. Fathers and husbands held office as viceroys and governors. Brothers and sons embarked on careers of their own or undertook training to prepare them for office. Wives and daughters helped establish viceregal courts, creating a more sociable venue for the enactment of government. Leading the vanguard of imperial expansion had repercussions for the clan. Families, their possessions, and their households were uprooted and rendered mobile. Movement between, and sojourns in, a number of imperial territories also created new connections between the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba and the diverse peoples and communities of the western Mediterranean basin. Ultimately, its itinerant lifestyle in imperial administration expanded the mental world of the clan. Governing frontier regions required the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba to monitor a larger world beyond the borders. As part of an interconnected imperial polity, officers also tracked other territories whose affairs could make an impact on the governance of their own charges. Itinerant careers that crisscrossed different communities of an imperial world expanded the mental horizons of members of the clan. From denizens of a local Cordovan community, they transformed into imperial citizens of a global world. Imperial service also altered the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s reproduction patterns. Marriage strategies that once created a network of local collaborators came to reflect the clan’s extended range of motion. Matches were now made between Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba offspring and partners who came from faraway places in the kingdom. The crown, an arbiter of marriage unions of the nobility, even encouraged the clan to wed partners from the once-foreign lands of Aragon and Navarre. Such alliances helped anchor non-Castilian families to a lineage whose dedication to the empire was nearly unmatched. However, while imperial service broadened the scope of marriages, it also reduced the access that most members of the families had to licit reproduction. Males who died in battle frequently did not have a chance to marry or did not engender legitimate children. Entire generations of Alcaudete women were cloistered in the family convent to conserve family resources and apply

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them toward careers rather than disperse them as dowries. As much as the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba helped shape the Spanish empire, it was, in turn, deeply influenced by its service. The Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba took part in the formation of the Spanish empire, and as such, the empire has shared center stage with the lineage in this book. Queen Isabella, King Ferdinand, and the combined energies of Castile and Aragon helped renew territorial expansion in the late fifteenth century. The first state to fall victim to Spain was Granada in 1492. Following the annexation of the emirate, the Spanish moved on to the New World, North Africa, Italy, and Navarre. When the Trasta´mara dynasty finally died out in its male line in 1516, the Habsburgs ascended the Spanish throne, adding more lands to the realm. Together, these patrimonies formed the largest empire in Europe since the time of Charlemagne. The Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba has provided us an unusual perspective on the formation of the empire. By following the clan’s footsteps, we have been able to shadow the expansion of Spain in Co´rdoba, Granada, Toledo, Navarre, and North Africa. Because the clan played a role in so many events that were central to the empire’s early history, we have also been able to examine such topics as the high nobility’s contribution to the establishment of an incipient imperial bureaucracy, the restoration of imperial government following the suppression of the Comunidades Revolt, the contest between France and Spain over Navarre, and the Spanish empire’s history on the ‘‘forgotten frontier’’ of North Africa. The melding of family and empire has shown us the crucial role that social networks played in defining a polity known as empire. Too often envisioned as collections of inanimate physical territories, empires instead turn out to be networks of socially embedded individuals who moved from territory to territory and established contacts, weaving them into a web. These officers also enacted empire by enforcing policies, many times through their contacts, that maintained the adherence of communities to a central authority. They gathered experience, expertise, knowledge, and techniques of governance, applied them to other territories where useful, and transmitted them to subsequent generations of administrators. Added to the work they did enacting empire, these administrators also created the polity by envisioning it. By informing themselves about affairs in other places, by analyzing how conditions in one place affected another, these individuals constructed relationships between otherwise disparate territories. Located in distinct geohistorical contexts facing different geopolitical exigencies, these territories, on

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the surface, shared only a Spanish imperial pedigree in common. The thoughts of officers enabled them to be connected; officers created intangible ties between different lands. All together, these ideas redefine empires in more dynamic and organic ways. In the end, I tell a history of empire in a different way. Empires were multiterritorial polities whose disparate parts developed at the same time as one another. Narrative, in contrast, is linear; most of the time it can tell the history of empires only one territory at a time with any coherence or elaboration. Though there are still limits to narrative, I have developed a way to relate the history of an empire that preserves some element of its fundamental multiterritorial nature. The experiences of an extended family network enable us to examine and connect five territories. The family provides a central plotline that gives coherence to the story of these local communities. While simultaneity is still elusive, the fact that members of the lineage were in different territories at the same time helps us collate these histories together. Family history, then, provides new perspectives on, and new methods to narrate, the history of empire.

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abbreviations

Archives and Libraries ADA ADM

AGN

AGS

AHN AHPV AMC ARCG BNE

BPR BZ

Archivo Ducal de Alba Archivo Ducal de Medinaceli AH—Archivo Histo´rico EC—Estado Comares Archivo General de Navarra AP-PR—Seccio´n de Archivos Particulares, Papeles de Rena RE—Seccio´n Reino TR—Seccio´n de Tribunales Reales Archivo General de Simancas CC—Seccio´n de Ca´mara de Castilla CdS—Seccio´n de Contadurı´a de Sueldo CMC—Seccio´n de Contadurı´a Mayor de Cuentas GA—Seccio´n de Guerra Antigua L-R—Libro Registros PR—Seccio´n de Patronato Real RGS—Registro General del Sello Archivo Histo´rico Nacional Archivo Histo´rico Provincial de Valladolid Archivo Municipal de Co´rdoba Archivo de la Real Chancellerı´a de Granada Biblioteca Nacional de Espan˜a Ms.—Manuscrito de la Sala Cervantes GM—Seccio´n Cartografı´a de la Sala Goya Biblioteca del Palacio Real Biblioteca Zaba´lburu

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188 a b b r e v i a t i o n s

RAH

Biblioteca de la Real Academia de la Historia SyC—Coleccio´n de Salazar y Castro

Other Abbreviations ACHA/1 ACHA/2 AEOO AMed carp. CSIC CVEU CVQH f. HSJ leg. mrs Ms. SEFC s.a. s.f. s.l. s.n.

Actas del I Congreso de Historia de Andalucı´a diciembre de 1976 Actas del II Congreso de Historia de Andalucı´a Co´rdoba, 1991 Andalucı´a entre oriente y occidente (1236–1492) Andalucı´a Medieval: Actas del I Coloquio Historia de Andalucı´a carpeta Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientı´ficas Carlos V. Europeı´smo y Universalidad Carlos V y la quiebra del Humanismo polı´tico en Europa (1530–1558) folio Huarte de San Juan: Geografı´a y Historia legajo maravedı´s manuscript Sociedad Estatal para la Conmemorizacio´n de los Centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V unknown author undated document unspecified place unnumbered document

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notes

introduction 1. Spain’s empire in North Africa was centered on the western Algerian city of Oran. In the early modern period, this region was called the Kingdom of Tremece´n and Tenez. Tremece´n is known today as Tlemcen. 2. Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba served as Oran’s first captain general and Navarre’s first viceroy. 3. Other members of the clan—the couple’s respective brothers, uncles, and cousins—served in similar posts. 4. Networks could also break down or be dismantled, especially at the death of a particularly central figure. 5. Government also included less formal institutions such as Philip II’s ‘‘juntas de noche’’ and the kings’ royal favorites. These positions were dominated even more by affinity ties, in this case between the monarch and his officers. 6. Among Ca´diz’s allies were the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, who came to the aid of Ca´diz when, after he had seized the town, the Granadines in turn laid siege on him. 7. The tint of corruption that comes with nepotism has often invalidated the effectiveness of government by aristocrats. In an age when very few people had the skills to serve as military and administrative officers, it would be more useful to understand why members of affinity networks occupied posts and how these networks reproduced social knowledge that made government possible. 8. The Catholic Monarchs employed many soldiers from the Granada War in the Italian wars precisely due to their military experience. See Manuel Gonza´lez Jime´nez, ‘‘La guerra en su vertiente andaluza: Participacio´n de las ciudades, villas y sen˜orı´os andaluces,’’ in La incorporacio´n de Granada a la Corona de Castilla, ed. Miguel A´ngel Ladero Quesada (Granada: Diputacio´n Provincial de Granada, 1993), 663. Geoffrey Parker has also noted that Philip II appointed some of his top generals, such as Garcı´a de Toledo, Pedro Mene´ndez de Avile´s, and Alvaro de Baza´n, based on their experience. See Parker, The Grand Strategy of Philip II (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 38–39. 9. John Collins has made a similar point in regard to the French monarchy. The exigencies of the Hundred Years’ War forced the state to take on new roles and trans-

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190 n o t e s t o p a g e s 4 – 6 formed it into a legislating and administrating entity. See Collins, The State in Early Modern France (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 5–6. 10. M. S. Anderson, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1450–1919 (London: Longman, 1993); Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (London: Cape, 1955); and Miguel A´ngel Ochoa Brun, Historia de la diplomacia espan˜ola, vols. 4 and 5 (Madrid: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1995). 11. Juan Carlos Domı´nguez Nafrı´a, El Real y Supremo Consejo de Guerra (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Polı´ticos y Constitucionales, 2001). 12. Margaret Jacob, Strangers Nowhere in the World: The Rise of Cosmopolitanism in Early Modern Europe (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006). 13. In Martı´n’s generation, the marriage rate of males was 25 percent. In the generation of Martı´n’s sons, it was 50 percent. As we will see in Chapter 1, these figures contrasts with a male nuptiality rate of 72 percent for the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba clan in the late Middle Ages. 14. A nuptiality rate of 7 percent for Martı´n’s sisters and daughters stands in contrast to a rate of 74 percent for Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba females in the late Middle Ages. The lineage did not place a high number of offspring in religious houses until the frontier with Granada was secured in 1492 and convents and monasteries could be constructed in its seigneurial estate towns. Antonio Urquı´zar Herrera, El Renacimiento en la periferia: La recepcio´n de los modos italianos en la experiencia picto´rica del Quinientos Co´rdoba (Co´rdoba: Universidad de Co´rdoba, 2001). The life of aristocratic women in sixteenth-century Spanish convents was not necessarily bleak. See Jodi Bilinkoff, The Avila of St. Teresa: Religious Reform in a Sixteenth-Century City (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989). 15. Philip II quoted in H. G. Koenigsberger, The Practice of Empire (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1969), 172. 16. Collins has likewise observed that in the case of France, high noblemen were appointed to serve as military officers and provincial governors because anyone of lower social status ‘‘could easily be humiliated by higher-ranking local notables: the king’s majesty could not allow such a possibility.’’ Collins, The State in Early Modern France, 59. Robert Harding gives an account of the high nobles who served as territorial governors in early modern France. See Harding, Anatomy of a Power Elite: The Provincial Governors of Early Modern France (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978). 17. For lists of the viceroys of Aragon, Catalonia, Naples, Sicily, and Valencia, see Josefina Mateu Ibars, ‘‘No´minas y cronologı´a de los virreyes de los estados de la Corona de Arago´n en el siglo XVI,’’ VIII Congreso de Historia de la Corona de Arago´n: Valencia, 1 a 8 octubre de 1967 (Valencia: Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad, 1969), 235–62; for Navarre, see Florencio Idoate, Esfuerzo be´lico de Navarra en el siglo XVI (Pamplona: Diputacio´n Foral de Navarra, 1981); for Mexico, see Alejandro Can˜eque, The King’s Living Image: The Culture and Politics of Viceregal Power in Colonial Mexico (New York: Routledge, 2004); and for Peru, see Guillermo Lohmann Villena, Las relaciones de los virreyes del Peru´ (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1959). See also Enrique

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n o t e s t o p a g e s 6 – 8 191 Garcı´a Herna´n, Polı´ticos de la monarquı´a hispa´nica (1469–1700): Ensayo y diccionario (Madrid: Fundacio´n MAPRE Tavera, 2002). 18. The lineage typified even nobles who did not serve. All four main branches entered imperial service in the Granada War. Though the Comares and Alcaudete continued to contribute after the war, the Aguilar and Cabra left the field to take honorific offices at court. 19. While scholars have produced biographies on individual nobles, few have analyzed the collective roles the nobility played in the construction of the state. One exception is Helen Nader, The Mendoza Family in the Spanish Renaissance, 1350–1550 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1979). 20. In the sixteenth century the A´lvarez de Toledo (the houses of Alba and of Villafranca) served as viceroys of Catalonia, Flanders, Naples, and Peru; the Ca´rdenas (the House of Maqueda) served in Navarre, Sicily, and Valencia; the de la Cueva (the House of Albuquerque) in Aragon, Naples, and Navarre; the Manrique de Lara (the houses of Na´jera and of Aguilar de Campoo) in Catalonia, Naples, and Valencia; and the Mendoza (the House of Tendilla) in Aragon, Catalonia, Granada, Mexico, Naples, Navarre, Peru, and Valencia. 21. The Mendoza House of Tendilla’s service as captains general of Granada stands out as one of the exceptions. Some military offices, however, were passed down within the family, such as the offices of Constable and of Admiral of Castile. 22. For narrative histories of the Spanish empire, see such English-language classics as John Elliott, Imperial Spain, 1469–1716 (London: Edward Arnold, 1963); Henry Kamen, Empire: How Spain Became a World Power (New York: HarperCollins, 2003); Henry Kamen, Spain, 1469–1716: A Society of Conflict (London: Longman, 1983); John Lynch, Spain, 1516–1598: From Nation State to World Empire (Oxford: Blackwell, 1964); Roger Merriman, The Rise of the Spanish Empire in the Old World and in the New, 4 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1918–34); John Parry, The Spanish Seaborne Empire (New York: Knopf, 1966); and Hugh Thomas, Rivers of Gold: The Rise of the Spanish Empire (New York: Random House, 2003). 23. The Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba did not hold important offices in the Americas in the sixteenth century, and thus the New World makes a limited appearance in this study. For a preliminary prosopographic study of the lineage in the Americas, see Guillermo Lohmann Villena, ‘‘Los Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba: Un linaje preponderante en el Peru´ en los siglos XVI y XVII,’’ Anuario de estudios americanos 45 (1988): 167–240. 24. Especially as France and the Ottoman Empire were often in alliance in the sixteenth century. 25. Even after King Enrique’s death in 1474, Isabella and Ferdinand waged war for five years against the king’s daughter Juana ‘‘la Beltraneja’’ before they could take the throne. 26. Charles Maier asked the same question in ‘‘What Is an Empire,’’ the first chapter of his book Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), 24–77.

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192 n o t e s t o p a g e s 8 – 1 1 27. Marie Tanner, The Last Descendant of Aeneas: The Hapsburgs and the Mythic Image of the Emperor (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993); and Larry Silver, Marketing Maximilian: The Visual Ideology of a Holy Roman Emperor (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008). 28. The French and English also had competing claims to be empires. See Frances Yates, Astraea: The Imperial Theme in the Sixteenth Century (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975). 29. Herna´n Corte´s quoted in Elliott, Spain and Its World, 8. 30. Anthony Pagden, Lords of All the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 15. 31. Anto´nio Hespanha has developed this point further in Vı´speras del Leviata´n: Instituciones y poder polı´tico (Portugal, siglo XVII) (Madrid: Taurus, 1989). 32. Karen Barkey, Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 3. 33. The ‘‘decline of Spain’’ was the subject of a spirited debate from the 1960s to the 1980s. John Elliott first laid out the modern iteration of the decline thesis by highlighting Castile’s unbalanced economy, decreasing population, and financial indebtedness and the writings of the arbitristas. See Elliott, ‘‘The Decline of Spain,’’ Past and Present 20 (Nov. 1961): 52–75. Kamen interjected that Spain never experienced a ‘‘golden age’’ and therefore did not have a peak from which to enter into decline. He radically argued that Spain’s economy never grew out of being an exporter of raw materials and an importer of manufactured products from northern Europe. See Kamen, ‘‘The Decline of Spain: A Historical Myth?’’ Past and Present 81 (Nov. 1978): 24–50. Also see Jonathan Israel, ‘‘Decline of Spain: A Historical Myth?’’ Past and Present 91 (May 1981): 170–80; and R. A. Stradling, ‘‘Seventeenth-Century Spain: Decline or Survival?’’ European Studies Review 9 (1979): 157–94. The fact that William Maltby titled his recent book The Rise and Fall of the Spanish Empire (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) indicates that the rise-and-decline paradigm is still present today. 34. Barkey, Empire of Difference, 3. 35. Pagden, Lords of All the World, 14–15. 36. Ibid., 15. France, which ultimately could not compete with the Habsburgs for the imperial title, and England, which lost its universalist claim by breaking from the Catholic Church, had different justifications for empires. See David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 37. Patricia Seed, Ceremonies of Possession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 69–99. Of course theorists advanced different notions of empire, power, and subjugation. While Palacios Rubios dismissed the rights of Native Americans, Francisco de Vitoria and most notably Bartolome´ de las Casas defended them. See Anthony Pagden, The Fall of Natural Man: The American Indian and the Origins of Ethnography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 38. Nader, Mendoza Family.

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n o t e s t o p a g e s 1 1 – 1 3 193 39. Pagden, Lords of All the World, 2. Elliott suggests that Corte´s’s limited training at the University of Salamanca and his work as a notary gave him a sufficient understanding of law to recognize the need to legitimize his actions. Elliott, Spain and Its World, 29–30. 40. For an account of the life and times of El Cid, see Richard Fletcher, The Quest for El Cid (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). 41. J. N. Hillgarth, The Spanish Kingdoms, 1250–1516 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 2:373. 42. Rafael Gutie´rrez Cruz, Los presidios espan˜oles del Norte de A´frica en tiempo de los Reyes Cato´licos (Melilla: Ciudad Auto´noma de Melilla, 1997), 18. 43. John Elliott, ‘‘Corte´s, Vela´zquez and Charles V,’’ in Letters from Mexico, by Herna´n Corte´s, trans. and ed. Anthony Pagden (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), xiv–xv. 44. Bethany Aram, Leyenda negra y leyendas doradas en la conquista de Ame´rica: Pedrarias y Balboa (Madrid: Fundacio´n Jorge Juan and Marcial Pons Historia, 2008), 59. 45. The Book of Privileges Issued to Christopher Columbus by King Fernando and Queen Isabel, 1492–1502, ed. and trans. Helen Nader (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 52, 138–50. 46. Miguel A´ngel Ladero Quesada, Granada despue´s de la conquista: Repobladores y mude´jares (Granada: Diputacio´n Provincial de Granada, 1993), 15; and Bernard Vincent, ‘‘Les Rois Catholiques, le Royaume de Grenade et la construction de l’E´tat,’’ in Recherche sur l’histoire de l’e´tat dans le monde ibe´rique, ed. Jean-Fre´de´ric Schaub (Paris: Presse de l’E´cole Normale Supe´rieure, 1993), 7–8. 47. Elliott, Imperial Spain, 74–75. 48. Still called upon to perform caballero duties, these nobles should be distinguished from the letrados, who took responsibility for the juridical side of administration. See I. A. A. Thompson, ‘‘Administracio´n y administradores en el reinado de Carlos V,’’ in En torno a las Comunidades de Castilla en la Espan˜a de Carlos I, coord. Fernando Martı´nez Gil (Cuenca: Universidad de Castilla–La Mancha, 2002), 93–108. For letrados, see Richard Kagan, Students and Society in Early Modern Spain (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974). 49. Parker provides numerous examples of officers in the field submitting memorials to the crown proposing initiatives. See Parker, Grand Strategy. 50. J. M. Batista i Roca, ‘‘Foreword,’’ in Koenigsberger, Practice of Empire, 28. 51. This is not to say that the administrative nobility did not also have particularistic and individual interests. 52. Quoted in Koenigsberger, Practice of Empire, 56–57. 53. For this ‘‘global’’ vision, see especially Parker, Grand Strategy. 54. Parker also notes that Charles V and Philip II recognized that ‘‘there [was] no substitute either for seeing the situation in a theatre for oneself, or for building bonds of confidence and trust with theatre commanders.’’ The latter, removed from the field in

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194 n o t e s t o p a g e s 1 3 – 1 5 comparison to his father, ‘‘became entirely dependent on what he was told by the subordinates to whom he had communicated the orders.’’ Ibid., 40–41. 55. Parker points out that ‘‘Philip could call upon the personal knowledge of his well-travelled advisers.’’ Ibid., 59. 56. Koenigsberger, Practice of Empire, 53. 57. Examples include the royal secretaries Juan de Coloma, who drafted the Capitulations of Santa Fe the Catholic Monarchs granted to Columbus; Miguel Pe´rez de Almaza´n, who helped organize the Cortes of Castile; Lope Conchillos, who helped set up the Casa de Contratacio´n and the early administration of the New World; and Pedro de Quintana, who helped manage diplomatic affairs. Pere Molas Ribalta, Los gobernantes de la Espan˜a moderna (Madrid: Actas, 2008), 41–42, 50. Ferdinand’s expansion in North Africa was also impelled, in part, by traditional Aragonese mercantile interests. Ernest Belenguer, El imperio hispa´nico, 1479–1665 (Barcelona: Grijalbo Mondadori), 105. 58. See John Headley, The Emperor and His Chancellor: A Study of the Imperial Chancellery Under Gattinara (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). Belenguer also argues that Gattinara took control of the Council of Aragon, because of the primacy of Italian affairs, and in the process adopted some of the practices of the exceptional staff of Aragonese officials who had worked under Ferdinand. Belenguer, El imperio hispa´nico, 1479–1665, 181–82. 59. Sanjay Subrahmanyam, ‘‘Holding the World in Balance: The Connected Histories of the Iberian Overseas Empires, 1500–1640,’’ American Historical Review 112, no. 5 (Dec. 2007): 1363–65, 1373. 60. This is not to say that officers did not claim skills that in reality they did not possess or that there were not incompetent, corrupt, and self-serving administrators. 61. Elliott, Spain and Its World, 35. 62. Ibid., 29. 63. Lynch, Spain, 1516–1598, 122. 64. Pagden, Lords of All the World, 65, 138–39. Under Philip II, comprehensive law codes were compiled for the Americas, Netherlands, and Philippines. See Parker, Grand Strategy, 37. 65. See Chapter 2 for an extensive bibliography. 66. Patrick Williams, The Great Favourite: The Duke of Lerma and the Court and Government of Philip III of Spain, 1598–1621 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006); Antonio Feros, Kingship and Favoritism in the Spain of Philip III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); John H. Elliott and L. W. B. Brockliss, eds., The World of the Favourite (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999); James Boyden, The Courtier and the King: Ruy Go´mez de Silva, Philip II, and the Court of Spain (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); and John Elliott, The Count-Duke of Olivares: The Statesman in an Age of Decline (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986). 67. Molas Ribalta, Los gobernantes de la Espan˜a moderna; H. G. Koenigsberger, The Government of Sicily Under Philip II of Spain (London: Staple Press, 1951); Antonio Jime´nez Estrella, Poder, eje´rcito y gobierno en el siglo XVI: La capitanı´a general del reino de Granada y sus agentes (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 2004); Koenigsberger, Practice

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n o t e s t o p a g e s 1 5 – 1 7 195 of Empire; Jose´ Marı´a Ortun˜o Sa´nchez-Pedren˜o, El adelantado de la Corona de Castilla (Murcia: Universidad de Murcia, 1997); and Pilar Arregui Zamorano, Monarquı´a y sen˜orı´os en la Castilla moderna: Los adelantamientos de Castilla, Leo´n, y Campos (1474–1643) (Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y Leo´n, 2000). 68. Bartolome´ Yun Casalilla has argued: ‘‘Y se trata tambie´n de llamar la atencio´n sobre el hecho de que . . . entre dichos espacios polı´ticos y sociales [the constituent parts of composite monarchies] se estaba trabando—y en algunos casos existı´a con antelacio´n—un conjunto de relaciones, sin cuya consideracio´n no se puede entender ni el funcionamiento polı´tico del imperio, ni sus implicaciones y escenario social, cultural y econo´mico.’’ Yun Casalilla, ‘‘Introduccio´n: Entre el imperio colonial y la monarquı´a compuesta,’’ in Las redes del imperio: E´lites sociales en la articulacio´n de la Monarquı´a Hispa´nica, 1492–1714 (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2009), 16. 69. Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 1–2. 70. Ibid. 71. In Ottoman historiography, the term household encompasses far more than just kin but also janissaries and other soldiers, religious scholars, merchants, servants, and slaves who all participated in a set of patron-client relationships. 72. Barkey, Empire of Difference; Leslie Peirce, The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Jane Hathaway, The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt: The Rise of the Qazdaglis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Dina Rizk Khoury, State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire: Mosul, 1540–1834 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); and Amy Singer, Palestinian Peasants and Ottoman Officials: Rural Administration Around Sixteenth-Century Jerusalem (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 73. It is telling, though, that both Leopold von Ranke and Fernand Braudel, seminal figures in the development of the modern historical profession, wrote important works comparing or juxtaposing the two empires. See Ranke, Die Osmanen und die Spanische monarchie im 16. und 17. Jahr (Leipzig: Dunker & Humblot, 1877); and Braudel, La Me´diterrane´e et le monde Me´diterrane´en a` l’e´poque de Philippe II (Paris: Colin, 1949). 74. Nader, Mendoza Family; Molas Ribalta, Los gobernantes de la Espan˜a moderna; Hugh Thomas, Who’s Who of the Conquistadors (London: Cassell, 2000); Valerie Kivelson, Autocracy in the Provinces: The Muscovite Gentry and Political Culture in the Seventeenth Century (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1996); and Harding, Anatomy of a Power Elite. 75. Ida Altman, Transatlantic Ties in the Spanish Empire: Brihuega, Spain, and Puebla, Mexico, 1560–1620 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000); Daniela Bleichmar et al., eds., Science in the Spanish and Portuguese, 1500–1800 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2008); Antonio Barerra-Osorio, Experiencing Nature: The Spanish American Empire and the Early Scientific Revolution (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006); Alison Games, The Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in an Age of Expansion, 1560–1660 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Luı´s Fı´lipe Thomaz, De Ceuta a Timor (Linda-A-Velha: Memorı´a e Sociedade, 1994), 208–10.

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196 n o t e s t o p a g e s 1 7 – 2 0 76. Bartolome´ Yun Casalilla, Crisis de subsistencias y conflictividad social en Co´rdoba a principios del siglo XVI: Una ciudad andaluza en los comienzos de la modernidad (Co´rdoba: Diputacio´n Provincial de Co´rdoba, 1980); La gestio´n del poder: Corona y economı´as aristocra´ticas en Castilla (siglos XVI–XVIII) (Madrid: Ediciones Akal, 2002); and Marte contra Minerva: El precio del imperio espan˜ol, 1450–1600 (Barcelona: Crı´tica, 2004). 77. He continues: ‘‘Se trata ası´ de mirar el sistema polı´tico de los Habsburgos espan˜oles desde ‘abajo’ (si es que se admite este te´rmino al hablar de las e´lites aunque sean locales) y como conjunto de relaciones inter-territoriales.’’ Yun Casalilla, ‘‘Introduccio´n,’’ Las Redes del Imperio, 14–15. 78. Parker has observed that ‘‘to save time, [Philip II] expected his senior officials to move around from one posting to another without coming back to Court for a briefing.’’ The king also ‘‘expected his ministers abroad to correspond extensively with their colleagues’’ elsewhere in the empire. Some of this communication was conducted via kinship networks. Parker, Grand Strategy, 39, 56–57. 79. Barkey’s emphasis on the ‘‘hub-and-spoke network pattern’’ sees the center as arbitrator of inter-imperial relations, discounting the importance of periphery–periphery contact. Barkey, Empires of Difference, 10. 80. Parker relates an interesting episode that illustrates the simultaneity of empire very clearly. In 1582–83 scholars at Philip II’s Academy of Mathematics sent out instructions for observing a lunar eclipse to personnel in Antwerp, Toledo, Seville, Mexico City, Manila, and possibly Macao. Recipients were to observe the eclipse predicted for November 17, 1584, and send data back to the academy, where the mathematicians hoped to use the information to calculate longitude. Such a mapping would help demarcate the Portuguese and Spanish empires in east Asia. Parker, Grand Strategy, 63. 81. Subrahmanyam, ‘‘Holding the World in Balance.’’ 82. A. J. R. Russell-Wood, The Portuguese Empire, 1415–1808 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), xviii, 10. 83. Conceptions of citizenship reflected the porous boundaries of the early modern empire, in contrast to the modern nation-state. See Tamar Herzog, Defining Nations: Immigrants and Citizens in Early Modern Spain and Spanish America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003). 84. John Elliott, ‘‘A Europe of Composite Monarchies,’’ Past and Present 137 (1992): 48–71. 85. Altman’s Transatlantic Ties connects the history of two locales, Brihuega in Spain and Puebla de los Angeles in Mexico, by studying the history of the networks of immigrants that moved from one to another and how such movement affected the development of both communities. 86. Andrew Hess has studied how the Ottoman-Habsburg wars came to divide the Mediterranean: The Forgotten Frontier: A Study of the Sixteenth Century Ibero-African Frontier (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). Molly Greene offers a revisionist view that periodizes such a division later in the seventeenth century: ‘‘Beyond the Northern Invasion: The Mediterranean in the Seventeenth Century,’’ Past and Present 174, no. 1 (2002): 42–71.

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n o t e s t o p a g e s 2 0 – 2 3 197 87. Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). 88. Quoted in James Casey, Family and Community in Early Modern Spain: The Citizens of Granada, 1570–1739 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 1. 89. David Sabean and Simon Teuscher, ‘‘Kinship in Europe: A New Approach to Long-Term Development,’’ in Kinship in Europe: Approaches to Long-Term Development (1300–1900) (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 2. 90. For a sampling of the extensive scholarship, see Isabel Beceiro Pita and Ricardo Co´rdoba de la Llave, Parentesco, poder y mentalidad: La nobleza castellana siglos XII–XV (Madrid: CSIC, 1990); James Casey, The History of the Family (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Francisco Chaco´n Jime´nez, Historia social de la familia en Espan˜a: Aproximacio´n a los problemas de familia, tierra y sociedad en Castilla (ss. XV–XIX) (Alicante: Diputacio´n de Alicante, 1990); Jack Goody, The Development of the Family and Marriage in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); David Herlihy, Medieval Households (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985); Reyna Pastor de Togneri, Relaciones de poder, de produccio´n y parentesco en la Edad Media y Moderna (Madrid: CSIC, 1990); and Sabean et al., eds., Kinship in Europe. 91. Casey, History of the Family, 195. Casey explains that, though lineages and clans were both descent groups, the solidarity of clans was based on blood ties more than the inheritance of property. 92. The bibliography on this topic is extensive. For example, see Simon Barton, The Aristocracy in Twelfth-Century Leo´n and Castile (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Isabel Beceiro Pita, El condado de Benavente en el siglo XV (Benavente: Instituto de Estudios Benaventaos, 1998); Emilio Cabrera Mun˜oz, El Condado de Belalca´zar (1444– 1518): Aportacio´n al estudio del re´gimen sen˜orial en la Baja Edad Media (Co´rdoba: Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros, 1977); Esther Gonza´lez Crespo, Elevacio´n de un linaje nobiliario castellano en la Baja Edad Media: Los Velasco (Madrid: Universidad Complutense Madrid, 1981); and Marı´a Concepcio´n Quintanilla Raso, Nobleza y sen˜orı´os en el reino de Co´rdoba: La casa de Aguilar (siglos XIV y XV) (Co´rdoba: Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros, 1979). 93. While the entail preserved property, early modern noble lineages would find that they were unable to access wealth tied up as land. The crown periodically granted permission to alienate some land so that the nobility could raise funds. 94. Of the few examples, see Ignacio Atienza Herna´ndez, Aristocracia, poder y riqueza en la Espan˜a moderna: La Casa de Osuna siglos XV–XIX (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1987); David Garcı´a Herna´n, Aristocracia y sen˜orı´o en la Espan˜a de Felipe II: Los duques de Arcos (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1999); David Garcı´a Herna´n, Los grandes de Espan˜a en la ´epoca de Felipe: Los duques de Arcos (Madrid: Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 1993); and Enrique Soria Mesa, Sen˜ores y oligarcas: Los sen˜orı´os del Reino de Granada en la Edad Moderna (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1997). 95. To paraphrase the title of Ruth Mackay’s Limits of Royal Authority: Resistance and Obedience in Seventeenth-Century Castile (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). For the nobility’s continued relevance in power, see Yun Casalilla, La gestio´n del poder, and Molas Ribalta, Los gobernantes de la Espan˜a moderna.

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198 n o t e s t o p a g e s 2 3 – 2 7 96. For prosopographic studies of nobles in the royal court, see Jose´ Martı´nez Milla´n, dir., La corte de Felipe II (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1994); Jose´ Martı´nez Milla´n et al., eds., La corte de Carlos V, 5 vols. (Madrid: SECC, 2000); Jose´ Martı´nez Milla´n et al., eds., La monarquı´a de Felipe II: La casa del rey, 2 vols. (Madrid: MAPFRE Tavera, 2005); Jose´ Martı´nez Milla´n et al., eds., La monarquı´a de Felipe III, 4 vols. (Madrid: MAPFRE, 2008); and Garcı´a Herna´n, Polı´ticos de la monarquı´a hispa´nica. 97. The one exception is Spanish nobles in Italy. For recent studies, see Thomas Dandelet and John Marino, eds., Spain in Italy: Politics, Society, and Religion, 1500–1700 (Leiden: Brill, 2007). 98. The Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba produced several important captains and governors, but only the ‘‘Gran Capita´n’’ Gonzalo Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba has received much attention. The general who secured Spanish control over the kingdom of Naples by defeating a French invasion army in a series of battles in the late 1400s and early 1500s enjoys an extensive historiography. For example, see Jose´ Enrique Ruiz-Dome`nec, El Gran Capita´n: Retrato de una ´epoca (Barcelona: Cı´rculo de Lectores, 2002), and Jose´ Antonio Vaca de Osma, El Gran Capita´n (Madrid: Espasa, 1998). 99. ‘‘El heredamiento mas glorioso es el esclarecido renombre y apellido de Co´rdoba que gano´ para sı´ y dejo´ en herencia a los de su casa, toma´ndolo por expreso mando del Santo Rey.’’ Francisco Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, quoted in Marı´a Concepcio´n Quintanilla Raso, ‘‘Los grandes linajes: Una investigacio´n histo´rica sobre el linaje de Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba,’’ Nobleza y sociedad en la Espan˜a moderna (Oviedo: Fundacio´n Central Hispano, 1996), 81. 100. Francisco Ferna´ndez de Bethencourt compiled the most complete genealogy on the lineage. See Historia genealo´gica y hera´ldica la monarquı´a espan˜ola: Casa real y grandes de Espan˜a, vols. 6–9 (Madrid: Estab. Tip. De Enrique Teodoro, 1897–1920). For modern works, see Quintanilla Raso, Nobleza y sen˜orı´os en el reino de Co´rdoba; and Rau´l Molina Recio, ‘‘La nobleza espan˜ola en la Edad Moderna: Los Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba: Familia, riqueza, poder y cultura,’’ Ph.D. diss., Universidad de Co´rdoba, 2004. 101. Over time, the crown would recognize the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s service and its leverage in political affairs by granting each of the four houses noble titles. 102. The clan branched out into other junior lines. For a complete account, see Ferna´ndez de Bethencourt, Historia genealo´gica, vols. 6–9. 103. Of course there were exceptions to the general rule, the Gran Capita´n being one of them (he was a second son of the House of Aguilar).

chapter 1. the ferna´ ndez de co´ rdoba lineage in late medieval co´ rdoba, 1236 –1500 Note to epigraph: Elliott, Imperial Spain, 1. 1. Elliott wrote these words during the dictatorship of Francisco Franco. Since then, Spain has emerged out of its political isolation. Its fragmented physical geography, however, remains the same.

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n o t e s t o p a g e s 3 1 – 3 3 199 2. Though contemporary Arab authors chronicled the city’s devastation, they paid homage to its enduring symbolic importance, lamenting that without Co´rdoba as capital, al-Andalus would never again be united as an independent, prosperous, and powerful state. M’hammad Benaboud, ‘‘La caı´da de Co´rdoba segu´n las fuentes andalusı´es,’’ in AEOO, coord. Emilio Cabrera Mun˜oz (Co´rdoba: Diputacio´n Provincial de Co´rdoba, 1986), 74. 3. Christian victory at Toledo evoked enormous symbolism because the city had been the capital of the Christian Visigothic kingdom before the North African invasion in 711. 4. Jose´ Manuel Escobar Camacho, Co´rdoba en la Baja Edad Media (Co´rdoba: Caja de Ahorros de Co´rdoba, 1989), 39. ´ beda 5. Surrender treaties (capitulaciones) forced the evacuation of Muslims from U and Baeza in Jae´n, Andujar, Arjona, Co´rdoba, and the Sierra Morena in Co´rdoba, and Carmona and Seville in Seville. Muslims were allowed to remain in the rural zones of the Cordovan and Sevillan Campin˜as, and in some towns such as E´cija, Jerez, Arcos, and Niebla. However, almost all remaining Muslims were expelled to Granada, North Africa, and the Middle East following the 1264 revolt. Postconquest Andalusia thus experienced a nearly complete substitution of a Muslim population for Christian settlers, and the society that emerged was a ‘‘transplantation’’ from northern Spain. Miguel A´ngel Ladero Quesada, ‘‘Ensayo sobre la historia social de Andalucı´a en la Baja Edad Media y los motivos del predominio aristocra´tico,’’ AMed (Co´rdoba: Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros de Co´rdoba, 1982), 1:220–21. 6. To echo John Edwards’ Christian Co´rdoba: The City and Its Region in the Late Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 7. These included the Mexı´a, Biedma, Reguera, Godoy, Sousa, and Rı´os families. Ibid., 161. 8. The mansions owned by the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba were demolished in the eighteenth century to build the Convento de San Martı´n, which was in turn paved over in the nineteenth century by the Avenida del Gran Capita´n, one of the main thoroughfares of contemporary Co´rdoba. Ibid., 159–61. 9. Escobar Camacho, Co´rdoba en la Baja Edad Media, 283. 10. These included the Mexı´a, Me´ndez de Sotomayor, Argote, and Venegas families. Ibid., 284–85. 11. Simon Doubleday, The Lara Family: Crown and Nobility in Medieval Spain (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), 68–69. 12. Emilio Cabrera Mun˜oz, ‘‘El re´gimen sen˜orial en Andalucı´a,’’ AMed (Co´rdoba: Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros de Co´rdoba, 1982), 1:60–61. 13. Ibid., p. 62. 14. Ladero Quesada, ‘‘Ensayo sobre la historia social de Andalucı´a,’’ 225. 15. Escobar Camacho, Co´rdoba en la Baja Edad Media, 282. 16. Manuel Gonza´lez Jime´nez characterized this period as a prolonged crisis from the mid-fourteenth century until the end of the Middle Ages. Gonza´lez Jime´nez discussed in ibid., 281–82.

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200 n o t e s t o p a g e s 3 3 – 3 7 17. Emilio Cabrera Mun˜oz, ‘‘Orı´genes del sen˜orı´o de Espejo y formacio´n de su patrimonio territorial (1297–1319),’’ En la Espan˜a medieval 2 (1982): 213. 18. The new Reino de Co´rdoba had previously formed an Almohad administrative district that the Christians kept intact. Even today, the province of Co´rdoba largely maintains these boundaries, with only small parcels ceded to the provinces of Ciudad Real, Badajoz, and Seville. Cabrera Mun˜oz estimates that the former kingdom of Co´rdoba spanned 14,100 square kilometers, compared with the current size of 13,718 square kilometers. Edwards, Christian Co´rdoba, 1. 19. Of course even arid Mediterranean mountains supported communities. J. R. McNeill has argued that until the modern era, Mediterranean populations were settled in the interior instead of along the coast. See McNeill, The Mountains of the Mediterranean World: An Environmental History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 20. Emilio Cabrera Mun˜oz, ‘‘Tierras realengas y tierras de sen˜orı´o en Co´rdoba a fines de la Edad Media: Distribucio´n geogra´fica y niveles de poblacio´n,’’ ACHA/1 (Co´rdoba: Junta de Andalucı´a and Cajasur, 1982), 1:300–307. The figures that Cabrera cites show some minor inconsistencies. On page 300, he breaks down Co´rdoba’s land into 8,826.23 square kilometers as crown and 5,281.33 square kilometers as seigneurial. On page 303, royal lands grow to 8,924 square kilometers, while seigneurial lands shrink to 5,183.37 square kilometers. The discrepancies are minor but are not explained. I utilize the second set of numbers because Cabrera’s later calculations of population densities are based on those figures. 21. Although Alcaudete is located in the archdiocese of Jae´n (and the modern province of Jae´n), its ties to the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba were such that it can be considered politically, socially, and culturally within the orbit of Co´rdoba. It is located just on the other side of the Co´rdoba-Jae´n boundary line and was adjacent to the Cordovan estatetowns of Baena, Luque, and Priego. The House of Alcaudete’s field of operation was certainly between Alcaudete, Montemayor, and Co´rdoba rather than between Alcaudete and Jae´n. Population figures for Alcaudete come from a 1535 census cited in Pedro A. Porras Arboledas, ‘‘El legado de la Edad Media: El re´gimen sen˜orial en el Reino de Jae´n (siglos XV–XVIII),’’ En la Espan˜a Medieval 5 (1984): 800. 22. Jose´ Ignacio Fortea Pe´rez, Co´rdoba en el siglo XVI: Las bases demogra´ficas y econo´micas de una expansio´n urbana (Co´rdoba: Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros de Co´rdoba, 1981), 79–81. 23. In fact, it seems that land on the frontier immediately following the conquest of the Cordovan countryside in the 1240s was granted to the military orders. However, subsequent invasions from Granada demonstrated the military orders’ inability to hold the land, which was then redistributed to local lords. This was the case of Alcaudete as well as Priego. 24. Cabrera Mun˜oz, ‘‘El re´gimen sen˜orial,’’ 62. 25. Ibid. 26. Ladero Quesada, ‘‘Ensayo sobre la historia social de Andalucı´a,’’ 224. 27. Cabrera Mun˜oz, ‘‘Tierras Realengas,’’ 300.

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28. The estates of the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba were composed of smaller villages. For the sake of simplicity, I refer to the estate by the main town. In this case, Cabra instead of Izna´jar, Rute, Zambra, and so on, or Priego instead of Carcabuey. 29. Fortea Pe´rez, Co´rdoba en el siglo XVI, 79–81. 30. This is not to say that the Cordovan countryside has remained static since the late Middle Ages. See David Vassberg, The Village and the Outside World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 2. 31. Some historic centers are better preserved than others. The Spanish Civil War destroyed much of the historic quarter of Alcaudete, including the Convent of Santa Clara, which the Alcaudete family had founded in 1500. 32. Cabrera Mun˜oz, ‘‘Tierras realengas,’’ 296. 33. During the ‘‘Reconquest,’’ towns and villages were founded on sites chosen for their defensive value. After the dismantling of each frontier, some of these towns were abandoned for locations closer to water or other resources. In contrast, the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s estates on the Granadine frontier grew in population during the sixteenth century, further pointing to the importance of these towns in the internal Cordovan land regime. 34. Vassberg has made a similar observation: ‘‘The outside world was never beyond the reach of early modern rural Spaniards. In the first place, they could usually see other villages.’’ Vassberg, Village and the Outside World, 6. 35. AGS RGS, Jan. 1492, f. 148. 36. Among the eleven estates listed, only Castro del Rı´o was a royal town. Ricardo Co´rdoba de la Llave, ‘‘Comunicaciones, transportes y albergues en el reino de Co´rdoba a fines de la Edad Media,’’ Historia. Instituciones. Documentos 22 (1995): 90. 37. Ibid., 99. For a full account of Isabella and Ferdinand’s itineraries during the Granada War and during their reign, see Antonio Rumeu de Armas, Itinerario de los Reyes Cato´licos (Madrid: CSIC, 1974). 38. Miguel A´ngel Ladero Quesada, ‘‘Isabel y los musulmanes de Castilla y Granada,’’ in Isabel la Cato´lica y la Polı´tica, ed. Julio Valdeo´n Baruque (Valladolid: A´mbito Ediciones and Instituto Universitario de Historia Simancas, 2001), 100. 39. Vassberg, Village and the Outside World, ch. 2. 40. Co´rdoba de la Llave, ‘‘Comunicaciones, transportes y albergues,’’ 107–16. 41. AGS RGS, May 1492, f. 397. 42. Prior to Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba and Alfonso de Aguilar’s falling out in the late 1400s, the Comares and Aguilar branches were aligned in Cordovan politics. 43. The literature on late medieval factional violence for the city and region of Co´rdoba is extensive. See especially the works of John Edwards and Marı´a Concepcio´n Quintanilla Raso. 44. The lords of the Houses of Aguilar and Comares both married the daughters of Juan Pacheco, the Marquis of Villena, and one of the key power brokers behind King Enrique IV. They supported Pacheco against Isabella’s brother Prince Juan, whom certain noble factions were trying to use to unseat the unpopular king.

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202 n o t e s t o p a g e s 4 1 – 4 4 45. Works that do study the nobility on a provincial level tend to focus on seigneurial power and institutions. Topography and ecology were not concerns of these works, as they were seeking to revise notions of a declining nobility in the face of a centralizing state by understanding aristocratic political and economic power in the countryside. See Jonathan Dewald, The Formation of a Provincial Nobility: The Magistrates of the Parlement of Rouen, 1499–1610 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979); James B. Wood, The Nobility of the Election of Bayeux, 1463–1666: Continuity Through Change (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980); and William Beik, Absolutism and Society in SeventeenthCentury France: State Power and Provincial Aristocracy in Languedoc (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). Dewald has studied the nobility of Normandy and its relationship to local geography. See Pont-St.-Pierre, 1398–1789: Lordship, Community, and Capitalism in Early Modern France (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987). 46. Jonathan Dewald, The European Nobility, 1400–1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 113. 47. Solar—the nuances that the word conveys include both a physical piece of land (property) and a piece of land embedded with identity and sentimental attachments (home). 48. Casa—in this case the word conveys both the meaning of lineage (e.g., casa de Comares, or House of Comares) as well as a place where generations of one family (lineage) resided. 49. Solariegos—Doubleday defines solariego as ‘‘a full and hereditary seigneurial property.’’ Doubleday, Lara Family, 191. 50. Emphasis added. Bernabe´ Moreno de Vargas, Discursos de la nobleza de Espan˜a (Valladolid: Editorial Lex Nova, 1997), f. 27v. 51. Literally hijos de algo. I translate the term generally as ‘‘noble’’ instead of the historiographical term hidalgo, which carries a gamut of juridical meanings. 52. Moreno de Vargas, f. 27v–28r. 53. Doubleday, Lara Family, 13–16, 67–68. The transition of the nobility from the high to the late Middle Ages has been studied by three pioneer scholars. See Emilio Mitre Ferna´ndez, La evolucio´n de la nobleza bajo Enrique III (1396–1406) (Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 1968); Salvador de Moxo´, Fuedalismo, sen˜orı´o y nobleza en la Castilla medieval (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 2000); and Luis Sua´rez Ferna´ndez, Nobleza y monarquı´a: Puntos de vista sobre la historia castellana del siglo XV (Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 1959). 54. The analysis in the following pages relies on data collected from Francisco Ferna´ndez de Bethancourt’s monumental ten-volume genealogical history of the grandees of Spain. See Historia genealo´gica y hera´ldica de la Monarquı´a Espan˜ola Casa Real y Grandes de Espan˜a, vols. 6–9 (Madrid: Enrique Teodoro, 1897–1920). This work is based on information excavated from testaments, marriage contracts, royal grants of privileges, and other primary sources. Bethencourt also drew upon the accumulated knowledge of other genealogical works (including Francisco Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s Historia genealo´gica del linaje de Co´rdova), frequently making comparisons and glosses between the different studies, explaining the relevance or the accuracy of his predecessors’ works. At times extant archival

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n o t e s t o p a g e s 4 4 – 4 9 203 sources that I have examined supplement Ferna´ndez de Bethencourt. Such documents are cited when used. 55. These two centuries encompassed the first six generations of the lineage. 56. Though I counted 129 sons (51 percent) and 122 daughters (49 percent) out of 252 children in ten generations of the lineage. 57. I suspect that the sixteen illegitimate children that Ferna´ndez de Bethencourt lists, in four branches of the lineage over ten generations, is low. Still, none of the analysis takes into consideration the birth or marriage of illegitimate children. 58. These rates matched the nuptiality of other Spanish noble houses. In their surveys of the Cordovan and Sevillan nobilities, both Marı´a Concepcio´n Quintanilla Raso and Rafael Sa´nchez Saus arrive at percentages in the low eighties for daughters. Rosa Montero Tejada finds a rate of 66.9 percent for the females of the Manrique lineage of northern Castile. Quintanilla Raso, ‘‘Estructuras sociales y familiares y papel polı´tico de la nobleza cordobesa (siglos XIV y XV),’’ En la Espan˜a Medieval 3 (1982): 342; Sa´nchez Saus, Caballerı´a y linaje en la Sevilla medieval: Estudio genealo´gico y social (Seville and Ca´diz: Diputacio´n Provincial de Sevilla and Universidad de Ca´diz, 1989), 91; and Rosa Marı´a Montero Tejada, Nobleza y sociedad en Castilla: El linaje Manrique (siglos XIV–XVI) (Madrid: Caja de Madrid, 1996), 57. 59. In marriage contracts, the arras weighed more than the dowry in Spain until the thirteenth century, at which time dowry outstripped the sometimes symbolic sum of the arras. Beceiro Pita and Co´rdoba de la Llave, Parentesco, poder y mentalidad, 182. 60. Ibid., 184, 188. 61. Though elite women entering convents also had to bring with them a ‘‘dowry.’’ 62. Casey has observed that ‘‘where daughters inherit, control of their marriage becomes very important.’’ Casey, History of the Family, 85. 63. The late Middle Ages constituted a moment when members of lineages formed extensive ties with one another. Beceiro Pita and Co´rdoba de la Llave, Parentesco, poder y mentalidad, 54–55. It could be said that such bonds constituted local societies, especially communities that were recently settled during the Reconquest. Casey also noted that ‘‘marriage with relatives seems to have spread in Europe after 1000 as part of the normal process of the settling down of a society. Ties of neighbourhood and of property provided the context within which cousin marriage would occasionally occur.’’ Casey, History of the Family, 80. 64. Lope Gutie´rrez founded the Guadalca´zar line. He was a second son of Martı´n Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, Lord of Montemayor I of the House of Alcaudete. 65. Casey makes a similar point that as dowries became greater in value than bride portions, fathers wanted to marry daughters to ‘‘known people rather than strangers’’ so that they could keep track of the alienated wealth. Casey, History of the Family, 79. 66. Emilio Cabrera Mun˜oz, ‘‘La oposicio´n de las ciudades al re´gimen sen˜orial: El caso de Co´rdoba frente a los Sotomayor de Belalca´zar,’’ Historia. Instituciones. Documentos 1 (1974): 13–39. 67. None of the Aguilar primoge´nitos ever married a daughter from the three junior branches of the lineage in the late medieval period.

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204 n o t e s t o p a g e s 4 9 – 5 5 68. Marı´a Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba married Juan Martı´nez de Argote. 69. In this case, Marı´a’s rights of succession trumped her uncle Alfonso’s. Double marriages as well as marriages across generations were common to the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba and other noble families in the late medieval period. See the three works of Jesu´s Padilla Gonza´lez, El fundador y la fundacio´n del sen˜orı´o de Espejo (1260–1330) (Co´rdoba: Art. Graf. Rodrı´guez, 1978); ‘‘Pay Arias de Castro, un ejemplo de la formacio´n del patrimonio sen˜orial de la nobleza bajomedieval cordobesa (siglos XIII–XIV),’’ AMed, vol. 1 (Co´rdoba: Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros de Co´rdoba, 1982); and ‘‘Repoblacio´n y creacio´n del sen˜orı´o de Espejo,’’ ACHA/1. Andalucia Medieval (Co´rdoba, 1978), 309–23. 70. Marı´a Ruı´z de Biedma was Ferna´n Alfonso’s second wife. He contracted his first marriage with Urraca Gonza´lez Mexı´a of the local Mexı´a family (later lords of Santa Eufemia). The Biedma family would die out, but their estates would be inherited by a distant cousin, the Benavides of Leo´n, which would establish itself in Jae´n and earn the title counts of Santiesteban del Puerto. 71. Emphasis added. AHN Nobleza Frı´as leg. 1339, n. 3; Alfonso Ferna´ndez de Montemayor, Testament; Co´rdoba, 1 Aug. 1390. 72. Enrique also awarded the prestigious office of Adelantado Mayor de Andalucı´a to Alfonso. 73. In addition to the mihrab itself, the Lord of Alcaudete I was also given a private passageway used by the caliphs of Co´rdoba to access the mihrab directly from the outside rather than having to pass through the masses gathered in the courtyard and the immense interior of the mosque. 74. The artist is unknown, but the style of the retable recalls that of Bernardo Daddi or Puccio di Simone. The work was realized between 1368 and 1390. Marı´a A´ngeles Raya Raya, Cata´logo de las pinturas de la Catedral de Co´rdoba (Co´rdoba: Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros de Co´rdoba, 1987), 19–20.

chapter 2. the ferna´ ndez de co´ rdoba lineage and early spanish expansion, 1482–1518 Note to epigraph: Pedro de Alcocer, ‘‘De lo que sucedio´ en Espan˜a en cosas particulares desde la venida del Rey Felippe I hasta su muerto,’’ undated manuscript in the Biblioteca Nacional, BNE Ms. 13127, f. 195. Emphasis added. 1. Under Isabella and Ferdinand, the two kingdoms remained juridically and institutionally separate. Their association existed so long as the two sovereigns remained conjoined. Upon Isabella’s death, Ferdinand would no longer exercise prerogatives over Castile as a king. The Catholic Monarchs had envisioned that their son Prince Juan would inherit and unite both thrones. Instead, Juan’s premature death in 1497 (and Princess Isabel’s in 1498) left Castile to Princess Juana, third in the line of succession. Juana was married to the Archduke of Austria Philip I, the heir of the Habsburg-Burgundian realm. Though Juana would have inherited Aragon at Ferdinand’s death, the king was reluctant to leave his beloved kingdom to his daughter’s foreign consort. To prevent this Ferdinand

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took a second wife, Germaine de Foix. If this marriage were to have produced a son, his claim to Aragon would have trumped his half-sister’s, and Aragon and Castile would not have united to form the core of the Spanish empire. 2. At Isabella’s death, Juana and Philip resided at his court in Brussels. When they journeyed to Castile in 1506, Ferdinand was forced to give up the office of governor. According to Aram, Ferdinand ‘‘promised to leave Castile in exchange for control of its military orders and one-half of the profits from the Indies.’’ Philip, Ferdinand, and various Spanish dignitaries also colluded to consolidate Philip’s power by testifying to Juana’s insanity. Still, the complexity of human emotions was on display in the passage quoted at the beginning of the chapter. Ferdinand, though a contributor to Juana’s misfortune, left the proceedings stricken by the fate of his daughter and his dynasty. Bethany Aram, Juana the Mad: Sovereignty and Dynasty in Renaissance Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 84–86. 3. When Ferdinand did return to power, he continued to marginalize Juana, confining her to a palace alongside the Convent of Santa Clara of Tordesillas in February 1509. She spent most of the remaining forty-nine years of her life there. In title, she remained queen of Castile alongside her father and later her son Charles. Official documents were drafted in her name as well as the kings’. Ibid. 4. The title translates literally to ‘‘governor of the royal pages.’’ Most of the Castilian aristocrats had deserted Ferdinand in favor of the Habsburg outsider. They hoped the new king would compensate their loyalty with lands, incomes, and rights that the Catholic Monarchs had been able to confiscate for the crown. The few nobles who attended to the old king when his power was stripped were truly his most dedicated allies. 5. Diego served under the Duke of Alba, Fadrique A´lvarez de Toledo, general of the Spanish expedition. 6. Charles Maier has noted that after elites had ‘‘achieved status within their own societies, they can now play a role on a transnational stage’’ by serving the empire. Maier, Among Empires, p. 33. 7. Most members of the Aguilar and Cabra families chose careers as courtiers or ecclesiasts. Only one member of the houses of Aguilar and Cabra was known to have served at the level of territorial governor in the sixteenth century. Gabriel Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, a second son of the Count of Cabra III, was captain general of Granada. See Ferna´ndez de Bethencourt, Historia genealo´gica, 7:77–79. Gabriel’s brother Pedro Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba also led a distinguished military and administrative career that saw him become the first president of the Council of Military Orders. However, he never governed a territory. See Rau´l Molina Recio, ‘‘La nobleza castellana en el reinado de Carlos V: Don ´ rdenes,’’ in CVEU, ed. Pedro Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, primer presidente del Consejo de O J. L. Castellano Castellano et al. (Madrid: SEFC, 2001), 2:405–20; and ‘‘La nobleza cordobesa en la corte de Felipe II: Los Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba,’’ in Madrid, Felipe II y las ciudades de la monarquı´a, dir. Enrique Martı´nez Ruiz (Madrid: Actas, 2000), 2:107–21. 8. I. A. A. Thompson has also taken note of the service nobles performed in imperial administration in the sixteenth century. See Thompson, ‘‘Consideraciones sobre el papel de la nobleza como recurso militar en la Espan˜a moderna,’’ in Los nervios de la guerra:

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206 n o t e s t o p a g e s 5 6 – 5 9 Estudios sociales sobre el eje´rcito de la monarquı´a hispa´nica (s. XVI–XVIII); nuevas perspectivas, ed. Antonio Jime´nez Estrella and Francisco Andu´jar Castillo (Granada: Editorial Comares, 2007), 15–35; and ‘‘Administracio´n y administradores en el reinado de Carlos V.’’ 9. Certain grandees did serve imperial expansion, the dukes of Alba being the most striking case. See William Maltby, Alba: A Biography of Fernando Alvarez de Toledo, Third Duke of Alba, 1507–1582 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); and Henry Kamen, The Duke of Alba (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004). Still, their service was not as consistent as that of their less prominent peers. Lower nobles (hidalgos) as well as non-nobles also held offices, though mostly in supporting roles below executive command. 10. Joaquin Dura´n y Lerchundi, La toma de Granada y caballeros que concurrieron a ella (Madrid: Imp. de los Huerfanos, 1893), 382. 11. Diego de Valera, Cro´nica de los Reyes Cato´licos, ed. Juan de Mata Carriazo (Madrid: Jose´ Molina, 1927), 166–72. 12. Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba and the Count of Cabra’s feat also went down in the chronicles of history, recorded by Valera, Cro´nica de los Reyes Cato´licos; Jero´nimo Zurita, Anales de la Corona de Arago´n (Zaragoza: Institucio´n ‘‘Fernando el Cato´lico,’’ 1967); and Gonzalo Ferna´ndez de Oviedo, Batallas y Quinquagenas, transcribed by Jose´ Amador de los Rı´os y Padilla, 4 vols. (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1983–2002). 13. The two lords were honored individually, with Cabra entering one day and Diego several days later. 14. Valera erroneously identified Fadrique A´lvarez de Toledo as Ferdinand’s nephew. Fadrique was Ferdinand’s first cousin, son of Marı´a Enrı´quez, the king’s aunt. Maltby, Alba, 1. 15. Cabra received a perpetual bond of 300,000 mrs and another bond of 100,000 mrs for life. 16. For an image of the coat of arms, see Ferna´ndez de Bethencourt, Historia genealo´gica, 9:39. 17. These reliefs were completed around 1495. Juan de Mata Carriazo y Arroquı´a, Los relieves de la Guerra de Granada en la sillerı´a del coro de la Catedral de Toledo (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1985), 38–39. 18. ADM AH leg. 162, n. 13. In the same document, the monarchs referred to Diego as a member of their royal council, a position suggesting trust, favor, privilege, and access to the queen and king. 19. Fernando del Pulgar, Cro´nica de los Reyes Cato´licos, ed. Juan de Mata Carriazo, vol. 2 (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1943). 20. ADM AH leg. 180, n. 7; Catholic Monarchs to Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba; Guadalupe, 25 June 1492. 21. ADM Comares leg. 14, n. 1–1; Queen Juana to Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba; Logron˜o, 20 Dec. 1512. 22. Ladero Quesada, ‘‘Isabel y los musulmanes de Castilla y Granada,’’ 108; Ladero Quesada, Granada despue´s de la conquista, 292–301; and David Coleman, Creating Christian Granada: Society and Religious Culture in an Old-World Frontier City (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003), 38.

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n o t e s t o p a g e s 5 9 – 6 1 207 23. Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s appointment was made in October 1500. See Archivo Municipal de Murcia, Cartulario Real 1494–1505, fol. 91v–92r, transcribed in Rodolfo Bosque Carceller, Murcia y los Reyes Cato´licos (Murcia: Regio´n de Murcia, 1994), 278–82. 24. Alonso de Santa Cruz, Cro´nica de los Reyes Cato´licos (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1951), 1:242. 25. ADM AH leg. 162, n. 86; Catholic Monarchs to Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba; Granada, 15 Oct. 1501. For an image of the coat of arms, see Ferna´ndez de Bethencourt, Historia genealo´gica, 9:56. 26. Jero´nimo Zurita, Historia del Rey don Hernando el Cato´lico: De las empresas y ligas de Italia, ed. A´ngel Canellas Lo´pez (Zaragoza: Diputacio´n General de Arago´n), 3:412. 27. Andre´s Berna´ldez, Historia de los Reyes Cato´licos Don Fernando y Don˜a Isabel (Granada: Jose´ Marı´a Zamora, 1856), 117. 28. Diego’s career was not without its setbacks. For example, in June 1507 he set out with 3,000 men to raid Tlemcen, seizing 1,500 captives and 4,000 head of livestock. With so much booty weighing them down, the men had to spend a night out in the open countryside. When the king of Tlemcen struck back, Diego was forced to save himself by having some his soldiers strike through the king’s army and dash for the gates of Mers elKebir. The rest of his men either died in battle or were taken captive. Rodolfo Bosque Carceller, Murcia y Mazalquivir (Murcia: La Academia Alfonso X el Sabio, 1960), 10–11. 29. Zurita, Historia del Rey Don Hernando, 3:416. 30. BNE Ms. 1890, f. 260r; Queen Juana to Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba; Valladolid, 16 Aug. 1509. 31. Berna´ldez, Memoria del Reinado de los Reyes Cato´licos, ed. Manuel Go´mezMoreno and Juan de Mata Carriazo (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia and CSIC, 1962), 587. 32. The title was officially granted by Queen Juana. RAH SyC M-45, f. 91; Queen Juana to Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba; Burgos, 27 Dec. 1512. 33. ADM EC leg. 14, n. 8; Luis Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, Marquis of Comares II, to his uncle, Pedro Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, settling of debts owed by his deceased father Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, Marquis of Comares I, to Pedro; Co´rdoba, 19 Jan. 1519. The date of this document approximates the year of Diego’s death at around the end of 1518. 34. ADM EC leg. 37, n. 13; Queen Juana to Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba; Burgos, 20 June 1512. ADM EC leg. 37, n. 15; Queen Juana to Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba; Logron˜o, 19 Dec. 1512. ADM Comares leg. 14, n. 7; King Ferdinand to Contadores Mayores; Valladolid, 13 Aug. 1514. 35. ADM EC leg. 37, n. 13; Queen Juana to Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba; Burgos, 20 June 1512. 36. ADM EC leg. 37, n. 14; Queen Juana to Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba; Burgos, 20 June 1512. 37. The Marquis of Comares III was the third captain general of Oran from the Comares family in three generations. The Marquis III was nicknamed ‘‘el Africano’’ because he was born in Oran.

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208 n o t e s t o p a g e s 6 1 – 6 6 38. ADM EC leg. 37, n. 21; Andre´s Ferna´ndez de Caldero´n, testimonio; s.f. 1593. 39. Ibid. 40. Aram, Leyenda negra, 55. 41. Peter Pierson, Commander of the Armada: The Seventh Duke of Medina Sidonia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 10. 42. Lucio Marineo Sı´culo, Obra de las cosas memorables de Espan˜a (Alcala de Henares, 1533). The Obra contains a ledger of the annual incomes of the entire titled nobility. It was published in the 1530s, not too distant from the era of the Granada War. Lucio Marineo Sı´culo, a humanist of Sicilian origin, was a longtime royal chaplain and chronicler at the courts of the Catholic Monarchs and Charles V. The work describes the people, geography, notables (prelates and aristocrats), and saints of Iberia and offers a lengthy history of Aragon. See Erika Rummel, ‘‘Marineo Siculo: A Protagonist of Humanism in Spain,’’ Renaissance Quarterly 50, no. 3 (Autumn 1997), 703, 707–8, 720. 43. The Marquis of Villafranca, viceroy of Naples and later of Peru, ranked the lowest at 10,000 ducats. 44. In Montemayor, 283 vecinos, and in Alcaudete, 1,108 vecinos. All demographic data, excluding the population of Alcaudete, come from Fortea Pe´rez, Co´rdoba en el siglo XVI, 113. The population of Alcaudete is taken from the 1535 census cited in Pedro A. Porras Arboledas, ‘‘El legado de la Edad Media: El re´gimen sen˜orial en el Reino de Jae´n (siglos XV–XVIII),’’ En la Espan˜a Medieval 5 (1984): 800. 45. Ladero Quesada drew his data from Archivo General de Simancas Contadurı´a Mayor de Cuentas leg. 106, with some names added from two chronicles, Valera’s Memoria and Alonso Maldonado Barrantes’s Ilustraciones de la Casa de Niebla (c. 1541). See Miguel A´ngel Ladero Quesada, Castilla y la conquista del Reino de Granada (Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 1967), 229–31. 46. It may be possible that these more modest Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba received royal stipends (acostamientos) that helped pay for their service. 47. Fortea Pe´rez, Co´rdoba en el siglo XVI, 112–13. 48. Ladero Quesada, Castilla y la conquista, 130. 49. Hillgarth also writes: ‘‘In the past the incense burnt before the Catholic Monarchs has often obscured, however, the figures of the Andalusian leaders to whom victory [in the Granada War] was largely due.’’ Hillgarth, Spanish Kingdoms, 2:374. 50. Emphasis added. Berna´ldez, Memoria, 225. 51. ‘‘Noticias sobre nobles que envian tropas a la guerra,’’ document from AGS CMC leg. 108, cited in Ladero Quesada, Castilla y la conquista, 229–31. 52. Ladero Quesada, Castilla y la conquista, 293–99. 53. John Edwards, The Spain of the Catholic Monarchs, 1474–1520 (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 120. 54. Gonza´lez Jime´nez, ‘‘La guerra en su vertiente andaluza: Participacio´n de las ciudades, villas, y sen˜orı´os andaluces,’’ in La incorporacio´n de Granada a la Corona de Castilla: Actas del Symposium Conmemorativo del Quinto Centenario (Granada, 2 al 5 de diciembre de 1991), ed. Miguel A´ngel Ladero Quesada (Granada: Diputacio´n Provincial de Granada, 1993), 653.

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n o t e s t o p a g e s 6 6 – 7 1 209 55. Ibid., 656. 56. Ladero Quesada, Castilla y la conquista, 240. 57. Berna´ldez, Memoria, 226. 58. Soria Mesa, Sen˜ores y oligarcas, 87. 59. Among the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, the Cabra and the Aguilar branches both achieved grandee status. 60. ADM AH leg. 162, n. 38; Catholic Monarchs to the corregidores and justicias of Andalusian cities requesting information on the rights and privileges of office of Alcaide de los Donceles, testimony of witnesses; Granada, 7 Sept. 1491. 61. ADM AH leg. 162, n. 151; Queen Juana to Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba; Burgos, 8 March 1512. Diego had requested confirmation of his title at the end of the Granada War. 62. Da´vila, a middle member of the high nobility, also set up imperial administration in Panama and Nicaragua. Aram, Leyenda negra, 69–74. 63. Spain’s ‘‘composite’’ empire was cobbled together from stand-alone kingdoms that boasted long histories of independence. Incorporation—violent in the cases of Granada and Navarre—severed residents of these kingdoms from indigenous authorities whose power they often had a say, even if only symbolic, in instituting. 64. These nobles hoped to regain a degree of local control undermined during the reign of the Catholic Monarchs, expecting that Juana and Philip’s need for support would translate to rewards of new privileges. For example, the Catholic Monarchs had forced the House of Aguilar to return several Cordovan fortresses that it had seized from the crown during the late Middle Ages. Yun Casalilla, Crisis de subsistencia, 197–200; and Elliott, Imperial Spain, 137–39. 65. Jose´ Szmolka Clares dissects the allegiances of the Andalusian nobility in the succession crisis in ‘‘Nobleza y autoritarismo en Andalucı´a: La contribucio´n de Granada a la sumisio´n del estamento nobiliario andaluz, 1504–1510,’’ Cuadernos de Estudios Medievales 6–7 (1981): 277–96. 66. Philip’s rule lasted a short five months before he suddenly died on September 25, 1506. Ferdinand was recalled to serve as regent for his grandson Charles from 1508 to 1516. 67. Diego’s presence at the meeting was recorded in BNE Ms. 13127, f. 191r; Pedro de Alcocer, De lo que sucedio´ en Espan˜a en cosas particulares desde la venida del Rey Felippe I hasta su muerto; s.l., s.f. 68. Ibid., f. 191v. 69. Ibid., f. 195. Aram, Juana the Mad, 152–58. 70. Ironically, Ferdinand took refuge in Naples, a territory that was conquered on his behalf in 1503 by a Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, the Gran Capita´n, Diego’s uncle Gonzalo. 71. AGS RGS, April 1506, f. 14, cited in Yun Casalilla, Crisis de subsistencia, 205–6. 72. RAH A-12, f. 77–78; Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba to King Ferdinand; Burgos, 10 Oct. 1506. I am grateful to Bethany Aram for sharing a copy of this document. 73. Juana and Philip’s eldest son and heir Charles was only six years old in 1506 and living at the Burgundian court in Flanders. Aram, Juana the Mad, 158–59.

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210 n o t e s t o p a g e s 7 1 – 7 3 74. BZ Altamira leg. 12–80; Alcala´ la Real, 27 Dec. 1507; and ADM AH leg. 347, n. 18; ‘‘Confederacio´n entre el Arzobispo de Sevilla [et al.] tener en paz las provincias de Andalucı´a. . . .’’ Thanks go to Bethany Aram for bringing these two documents to my attention. Also see John Edwards, ‘‘La Re´volte du Marquis de Priego a` Cordoue en 1508: Un symptoˆme des tensions d’une socie´te´ urbaine,’’ Me´langes de la Casa de Vela´zquez 12 (1976): 167. Chronicler Andre´s Berna´ldez notes the significant absence of Marquis of Ca´diz, now Duke of Arcos, from the alliance. See Berna´ldez, Memoria, 542. 75. RAH Salazar A-12, f. 77r. 76. Szmolka Clares, ‘‘La contribucio´n de Granada,’’ 280–82. 77. Yun Casalilla, Crisis y subsistencia, 206. Quintanilla Raso presents a somewhat different account of the events, writing that the Marquis of Priego as Alcalde Mayor of Co´rdoba did not instigate the attack on the Inquisition prison but merely declined to stop it. Quintanilla Raso, Nobleza y sen˜orio´s, 150–52. 78. Berna´ldez, Memoria, 539–42; Santa Cruz, Cro´nica de los Reyes Cato´licos, 2:104; Edwards, ‘‘La Revolte du Marquis,’’ 166; and Szmolka Clares, ‘‘La contribucio´n de Granada,’’ 287. 79. Berna´ldez, Memoria, 542; and Jose´ Antonio Vaca de Osma, El Gran Capita´n (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1998), 261. 80. Edwards, ‘‘La Re´volte du Marquis de Priego,’’ 166. In a letter dated April 2, 1510, Queen Juana reduced Priego’s punishment, returning to the lord his properties, income, and fortresses and permitting him to return to the region of Co´rdoba although forbidding him to enter the capital. Quintanilla Raso, Nobleza y sen˜orı´os, 151. 81. Berna´ldez, Memoria, 542. Tensions continued to simmer between Ferdinand and the Marquis of Priego, with the marquis and his uncle the Gran Capita´n apparently plotting to sail to Flanders in 1515 to appeal for the support of Charles V, a strategy forestalled by the death of Ferdinand on January 23, 1516. Elliott, Imperial Spain, 141–42. 82. Zurita, Historia del Rey Don Hernando, 4:76. 83. Ferdinand would succeed his brother Charles V to the imperial throne in 1558. 84. Zurita, Historia del Rey Don Hernando, 4:76–80. 85. The Count of Santiesteban and the House of Alcaudete were especially close. Marı´a Carrillo, the sister of Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba’s son-in-law Martı´n de Co´rdoba y de Velasco, married the Count of Santiesteban III Francisco de Benavides. Marı´a and Francisco’s son, also named Francisco, lived in Martı´n’s household while he was viceroy of Navarre in 1529. In 1517, Martı´n’s mother, Marı´a de Velasco, was residing on Santiesteban’s estate following the death of her husband. BNE Ms. 2077, f. 214. Bethencourt, Historia genealo´gica, 9:291. AGS GA leg. 2, no. 92; Martı´n de Co´rdoba to Charles V; Pamplona, 2 July 1529. ARCG Pleitos 741/no. 4 (1517). 86. ‘‘Tribunal de la Inquisicio´n (Archivo del Ayuntamiento de Co´rdoba),’’ in Coleccio´n de documentos ine´ditos para la historia de Espan˜a (Madrid: Imprenta de Jose´ Perales y Martı´nez, 1895), 112:245. 87. Szmolka Clares, ‘‘La contribucio´n de Granada,’’ 296. 88. Diego seemed to have alternated frequently between Co´rdoba and Mers elKebir. On January 5, 1509, he was found again in Co´rdoba, confirming the sale of grain

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n o t e s t o p a g e s 7 3 – 7 7 211 by Genoese merchants to municipal officials. Archivo Provincial de Co´rdoba, Oficio 14, protocolo 44, cuaderno 2, f. 6r–7v, cited in Jose´ Antonio Garcı´a Luja´n and Alicia Co´rdoba Deorador, ‘‘Mercaderes y artesanos italianos en Co´rdoba (1466–1538),’’ Presencia italiana en Andalucı´a siglos XIV–XVII: Actas del III Coloquio Hispano-Italiano (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1989), 287. 89. Kamen, Duke of Alba, 3. 90. AGN AP-PR caja 31, carp. 21; correspondence between Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba and Juan Rena; various dates. 91. AGN AP-PR caja 9, carp. 24. Gratitude goes to Peio Monteano Sorbet for sharing this document. 92. AGN AP-PR caja 31, carp. 21. 93. AGN AP-PR caja 31, carp. 1; Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba to Juan Rena; Chillo´n, 26 Feb. 1516. ‘‘Dios sabe quanto yo deseo vuestra libertad y que fuesedes salido de ay y venido a mi conpania.’’ See also AGN AP-PR caja 31, carp. 21, n. 14; Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba to Juan Rena; Plasencia, 4 Dec. 1515. 94. AGN AP-PR caja 31, carp. 21. 95. We will return to the relationship between Rena and Martı´n in Chapter 4. 96. AGN AP-PR caja 31, carp. 25; Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba to Juan Rena; Pamplona, 23 Sept. 1513. 97. For a biography of Cobos, see Hayward Keniston, Francisco de los Cobos, Secretary of the Emperor Charles V (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1960). 98. Elliott, Imperial Spain, 143. Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba would himself send a servant to Charles’s court in Brussels shortly after the death of Ferdinand to seek royal favor. AGN AP-PR caja 36, carp. 19; Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba to Juan Rena; Madrid, 18 June 1516. 99. Keniston, Francisco de los Cobos, 62. 100. In comparison to Martı´n, Charles V owed Cobos 6,875,000 mrs. The others were a group of unspecified Genoese bankers (750,000 mrs) and merchant-financier Toma´s de Forne´ (157,000 mrs). Ibid., 420. 101. In fact, Francisco de los Cobos’s daughter Marı´a Sarmiento married a Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, the Count of Cabra V (now the Duke of Sessa). Ibid., 217. 102. M. C. Quintanilla Raso, ‘‘Les confe´de´rations de nobles et les bandos dans le royaume de Castille au bas moyen-aˆge: L’Exemple de Cordoue,’’ Journal of Medieval History 16 (1990): 173–77. 103. The eldest daughter, Marı´a Pacheco, married the Count of Benavente, Rodrigo Pimentel. The second daughter, Beatriz Pacheco, was originally betrothed to the Duke of Alba but wedded Marquis of Ca´diz Rodrigo Ponce de Leo´n. According to Ferna´ndez de Bethencourt, Beatriz could also have married Prince Ferdinand of Aragon (before he wedded Isabella of Castile) or the infante Alfonso, Isabella’s brother. Either way, she could have become queen. Francisca Pacheco married ´In˜igo Lo´pez de Mendoza, Count of Tendilla II and captain general of Granada. The last daughter, Mencı´a Pacheco de Velasco, married Diego de Ca´rdenas, son of Gutierre de Ca´rdenas and future Duke of Maqueda, Marquis of Elche, and adelantado mayor de Granada. Nancy Marino, Don Juan Pacheco:

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212 n o t e s t o p a g e s 7 7 – 7 9 Wealth and Power in Late Medieval Spain (Tempe: Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 2006), 177–79. The men who married the Pacheco daughters were especially close in the late 1400s. Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba was the nephew of Alfonso de Aguilar, a close friend of the Count of Tendilla and the Marquis of Ca´diz, and an ally of the Duke of Alba. All of these nobles were important contributors to the Granada War, as was Gutierre de Ca´rdenas, the father of Diego de Ca´rdenas. Marriage to Pacheco daughters may identify a nexus of individuals who both were active in military and administrative service in the early years of imperial expansion and maintained close professional and affective ties with one another. 104. Edwards, ‘‘La Re´volte du Marquis de Priego,’’ 165. 105. AGS RGS Nov. 1488, f. 251; Catholic Monarchs to Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, Valladolid, 10 Nov. 1488. 106. Similarly, the Marquis of Priego may have been jealous of Diego’s proximity to Ferdinand and the fact that despite the death of Priego’s father Alfonso in the 1499 Muslim uprising, it was Diego who was awarded the captaincy of the Mers el-Kebir expedition, a campaign largely staged in Co´rdoba. Yun Casalilla, Crisis y subsistencia, 205. 107. Apparently, the nobility of Co´rdoba were so successful and hegemonic in acquiring properties that the Royal Council had to repeatedly order the leading elites to desist from their acquisitions. These royal orders listed almost all the leading nobles of Co´rdoba or addressed them collectively. AGS RGS May 1492, f. 269; Catholic Monarchs to the lords of Co´rdoba; Santa Fe, 4 May 1492. AGS RGS Jan 1493, f. 239; Catholic Monarchs to Count of Cabra, Alfonso de Aguilar, Gonzalo Mejı´a, and the Alcaide de los Donceles; Barcelona, 30 Jan 1493. AGS RGS Oct 1493, f. 40; Catholic Monarchs to Count of Cabra, Alfonso de Aguilar, the Alcaide de los Donceles, Gonzalo Mejı´a, and the Lord of Alcaudete; Barcelona, 14 Oct 1493. AGS RGS May 1497, f. 163; Catholic Monarchs to Count of Cabra, Alfonso de Aguilar, the Alcaide de los Donceles, the Lord of Alcaudete, and their dependents; Valladolid, 15 May 1497. 108. Numerous lawsuits were brought by the city council of Co´rdoba, on behalf of Castro del Rio, against Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba and his descendants into the seventeenth century that protested the lords’ encroachment on the town’s territory. These lawsuits are preserved in the Archivo de la Real Chancillerı´a de Granada. See ARCG Pleitos 5418/1, 523/1, 1965/16, 5333/14, 1362/1, 1215/11, 1571/7, 417/8, 1366/12, 735/1, 5356/3, 1287/5, 5409/3, 95/2, 1413/10, 1574/7, 1598/6, 5410/2, 1302/11, 1072/10, 1033/7, and 3180/2. 109. AGS RGS July 1490, f. 7, Catholic Monarchs to the town of Castro del Rio, Co´rdoba, 10 July 1490. 110. Diego also disputed the boundaries of Lucena and the estate of Benamejı´, with Aguilar’s brother the Gran Capita´n. AGS RGS Feb. 1495, f. 81; Consejo Real, order to preserve the boundaries of Benamejı´; Madrid, 16 Feb. 1495. 111. AGS RGS Jan. 1492, f. 148; Consejo Real to the Bachiller Francisco del Fresno; Co´rdoba, 9 Jan. 1492. 112. ADM AH leg. 162, n. 60; Catholic Monarchs to Alonso Enrı´quez, Corregidor of Co´rdoba; Alcala´ de Henares, 31 March 1498.

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n o t e s t o p a g e s 7 9 – 8 3 213 113. AGS RGS March 1493, f. 213; Catholic Monarchs to the Corregidor of E´cija; Barcelona, 20 March 1493. 114. AGS RGS Nov. 1494, f. 186; Consejo Real to Corregidor of E´cija; Madrid, 21 Nov. 1494. 115. A full study of the lives and career paths of the noblemen who fought in Granada would contribute greatly to our understanding of Spain’s early expansion. Helen Nader also envisions a ‘‘generation’’ of nobles among those who fought together on the side of Enrique II against his half-brother Pedro I in the Castilian civil war of the 1360s. The bonds that they developed, especially between those who suffered defeat at the disastrous Battle of Na´jera, translated into personal alliances and marriage ties in the following generations. The marriage networks were so dense that Nader goes so far as to consider the following generation as one large extended family. See Nader, Mendoza Family, 40. 116. Gonza´lez Jime´nez, ‘‘La guerra en su vertiente,’’ 663. 117. Valera, Cro´nica de los Reyes Cato´licos, 205. 118. Of course there were exceptions, the Duke of Alba being an obvious one. 119. ´In˜igo Lo´pez de Mendoza, Correspondencia del Conde de Tendilla, transcribed by Emilio Meneses Garcı´a (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1974), 1:442. Tendilla wrote this passage at a time when the Castilian nobility was fragmenting into factions divided between those who supported and those who opposed the then-governor Ferdinand. 120. Lo´pez de Mendoza, Correspondencia, 2:39. 121. Tendilla helped to provision the North African outpost from Granada. 122. Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba himself held the title repostero de camas of the Princess Catalina (the future wife of King Henry VIII of England) circa 1506. ‘‘Poder de Pedro de Clavijo, escribano de Co´rdoba, a Diego de Vivanco, criado de Don Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, Alcaide de los Donceles, estante en la Corte, para cobrar lo que se le debiere por su oficio de repostero de camas de la Princesa de Gales.’’ AGS Casa y Sitios Reales leg. 9, f. 756–57, cited in Amalia Prieto Cantero, Casa y descargos de los Reyes Cato´licos: Cata´logo XXIV del Archivo General de Simancas (Valladolid: Instituto ‘‘Isabel la Cato´lica’’ de Historia Eclesia´stica, 1969). 123. Luis Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, the future Count of Cabra III, married his cousin from the House of Aguilar, Elvira Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba. Elvira, the only surviving daughter of the Gran Capita´n, inherited her father’s title as Duchess of Sessa. Pedro Mexı´a, Historia del Emperador Carlos V (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1945), 324.

chapter 3. the regeneration of monarchy and nobility Note to epigraph: AGS CC leg. 145, n. 6–3; Juan Ruyz to Juan de Ribera; s.l., 27 May 1522. 1. AGS CC leg. 145, n. 6–1; Juan de Ribera to the Governors; Toledo, 29 May 1522. 2. Diego and Juana Pacheco had a third child, Marı´a, who was a nun in the Convent of Santa Clara in Carmona.

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214 n o t e s t o p a g e s 8 4 – 8 8 3. AHN Nobleza Frias leg. 1339, n. 33; Charles V to Martı´n de Co´rdoba, title of Count of Alcaudete; Zaragoza, 11 April 1529. 4. Joseph Pe´rez’s and other general studies on the rebellion invariably end at February 1522 and do not address the restoration period. One exception is Stephen Haliczer’s brief treatment of Charles’s governmental reforms after the revolt in The Comuneros of Castile: The Forging of a Revolution, 1475–1521 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981). Historians who study Toledo in the sixteenth century tend to skip the period from 1522 to 1550. See Julian Montemayor, Tole`de entre fortune et de´clin (Limoges: Presses Universitaires de Limoges, 1996), and Tole`de et l’expansion urbaine en Espagne (1450–1650) (Madrid: Casa de Vela´zquez, 1991). Fernando Martı´nez Gil’s book, La ciudad inquieta, was the first to treat the city’s Comunero history monographically. Despite his contributions, only twenty pages of his 350-page book concern the city’s history during the restoration. See Martı´nez Gil, La ciudad inquieta: Toledo comunera, 1520–1522 (Toledo: Instituto Provincial de Investigaciones y Estudios Toledanos and Diputacio´n Provincial de Toledo, 1993), 15. In the late nineteenth century Alfonso Danvila addressed the history of postrevolt Toledo, albeit mainly by editing critical documents. See Danvila, Historia crı´tica y documentada de las Comunidades de Castilla, in Memorial histo´rico espan˜ol, vols. 35–40 (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1899). 5. Linda Martz, A Network of Converso Families in Early Modern Toledo: Assimilating a Minority (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), 3. There is some debate about the relative size of Spanish cities in the late 1520s and early 1530s. Joseph Pe´rez ascribes Seville with 45,395 residents, followed by Valladolid with 38,100. Co´rdoba ranked third, with 33,060, and Toledo fourth with 31,930. Granada, however, is not listed. Joseph Pe´rez, La revolucio´n de las Comunidades de Castilla, 1520–1521 (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1981), 14. 6. The royalist forces, having reached Toledo in autumn 1521, preferred to negotiate with the Comuneros leaders rather than try to lay down an extended siege, knowing that winter and continuing threats from France on the northern frontier would play to Toledo’s advantage. Ibid., 231. 7. For an analysis of Wyngaerde and El Greco’s depictions of Toledo’s urban landscape, see Richard Kagan, Urban Images of the Hispanic World, 1493–1793 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 200–201. 8. Ibid., 200. 9. Montemayor, Tole`de entre fortune et de´clin, 33. At various moments, other archbishoprics, such as Seville, Tarragona (Crown of Aragon), and Braga (Portugal), contested Toledo’s status. See Ramo´n Sa´nchez Gonza´lez, Iglesia y sociedad en la Castilla moderna: El cabildo catedralicio de la Sede Primada (siglo XVII) (Cuenca: Universidad de Castilla–La Mancha, 2000), 54–56. 10. Kagan, Urban Images, 200. 11. Pedro Gonza´lez de Mendoza and his generation of powerful and influential Mendoza relatives have been extensively studied in Nader, Mendoza Family.

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n o t e s t o p a g e s 8 9 – 9 3 215 12. Francisco Jose´ Aranda Pe´rez, Poderes intermedios, poderes interpuestos: Sociedad y oligarquı´as en la Espan˜a moderna (Cuenca: Universidad de Castilla–La Mancha, 1999), 236. 13. For a discussion of the Moza´rabe chapel in Toledo, see A´ngel Ferna´ndez Collado, La Catedral de Toledo en el siglo XVI (Toledo: Diputacio´n Provincial de Toledo, 1999), 125–27. For some of Mendoza and Cisneros’s building projects in Toledo, see Martz, A Network of Converso Families, 88–89. 14. Fernando Martı´nez Gil, Marı´a Pacheco (1497–1531): La mujer valerosa; Historia de don˜a Marı´a Pacheco, comunera de Castilla (Toledo: Almud, 2005); and Stephanie Fink de Backer, ‘‘Rebel with a Cause: The Marriage of Marı´a Pacheco and the Formation of Mendoza Identity,’’ in Power and Gender in Renaissance Spain: Eight Women of the Mendoza Family, 1450–1650, ed. Helen Nader (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004), 71–92. 15. An additional tie between the Alcaudete and Marı´a Pacheco was made in the following generation. Martı´n’s heir Alsono de Co´rdoba y de Velasco married the Count of Tendilla II’s granddaughter Francisca de Mendoza in 1546. Though she had died in exile before 1546, Marı´a Pacheco was Francisca’s aunt. 16. Toledo’s municipal government had been dominated by local families, at least one of which—the Ayala—was active in the revolt. It is likely that the crown allowed Martı´n to take his own clients to Toledo since the loyalty of some local notables was doubtful. 17. For the general history of Andalusia during the revolt, see Pe´rez, La revolucio´n, 389–403. For Seville, see Juan Jua´rez Moreno, ‘‘La guerra de las Comunidades en Sevilla,’’ Andalucı´a moderna: Actas del II Coloquio Historia de Andalucı´a (Co´rdoba: Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros de Co´rdoba, 1983), 2:103–15. 18. Pe´rez, La revolucio´n, 398; John Edwards, ‘‘La nobleza de Co´rdoba y la revuelta de las ‘Comunidades,’ ’’ Las ciudades andaluzas (siglos XIII–XVI) (Ma´laga: Universidad de Ma´laga, 1991), 561–74; and Francisco de Leiva y Mun˜oz, Comuneros de Co´rdoba ante Carlos I (Co´rdoba: Diario de Co´rdoba, 1870). 19. It is possible that the Marquis of Comares II’s agitation was directed against the corregidor of Co´rdoba rather than the crown, and also against the delegates that the city sent to the Cortes of La Corun˜a, both of whom were relatives of the Marquis of Priego, his rival. John Edwards, ‘‘La re´volte du Marquis de Priego,’’ 165–72. 20. AGS CC Ce´dulas libro 62, f. 202r; Charles V to Corregidor of Co´rdoba; Valladolid, 13 June 1523. Henry Latimer Seaver, The Great Revolt in Castile (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1928), 235–45. 21. Apparently this was not the first time that the House of Alcaudete mobilized forces for service in distant lands. The chronicler of Martı´n de Co´rdoba’s future campaigns in North Africa relates that the founder of the house, Martı´n Alonso de Montemayor, led troops to strike ‘‘casi todos los puebles de Castilla.’’ The Cordovan lord was protesting King Alfonso XI’s (r. 1312–50) execution of Lope Dı´az de Haro, Lord of Lara

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216 n o t e s t o p a g e s 9 3 – 9 7 and Vizcaya, whose daughter, Aldonza Lo´pez de Haro, he had married. Francisco de la Cueva, Relacio´n de la guerra de Tremece´n (Granada: Antonio Rivas Morales, 1991), 231. 22. AGS Estado 345, n. 145, s.a., ‘‘Las personas que han estado en servicio de su magestad y son venydas de nuebo a serville en esta jornada son las seguyentes,’’ s.l., s.f. (c. 1520–21). Mexı´a, Historia del Emperador, 295. 23. The Count of Siruela III was the husband of Martı´n’s cousin Leonor de Velasco on his mother Marı´a de Velasco’s side. Marı´a herself was the daughter of the Count of Siruela I. During the first decade of the sixteenth century, a succession struggle had broken out between Martı´n and Leonor for the patrimony of Siruela (although not the title, it seems) after Francisco de Velasco, Count of Siruela II, died without male heirs. I will discuss this conflict in more detail later in this chapter. 24. Adrian of Utrecht held the title Cardinal of Tortosa. 25. AGS Patronato Real leg. 1, n. 76–2; Martı´n de Co´rdoba to Charles V; Vitoria, 4 Nov. 1521. 26. Julia´n Paz, ‘‘Advertencia,’’ in Catalogo V: Patronato Real (854–1851), ed. Amalia Prieto Cantero (Valladolid: Archivo General de Simancas, 1946), viii. 27. AGS CC Ce´dulas libro 60, f. 135v; Charles V to the Audiencia of Granada, signed the Cardinal, the Admiral, and the Constable; Vitoria, 8 Nov. 1521. 28. AGS CC Ce´dulas libro 60, f. 107v; Charles V to the Audiencia of Granada, signed the Cardinal, the Admiral, and the Constable; Vitoria, 19 Nov. 1521. 29. AGS CC libro 60, f. 126v; Charles V to Contadores Mayores; Vitoria, 17 Nov. 1521. 30. AGS CC Ce´dulas, libro 46, f. 184v; Charles V to Martı´n de Co´rdoba, signed the Admiral and the Constable; Vitoria, 18 Feb. 1522. 31. Joseph Pe´rez, Los comuneros (Barcelona: Cı´rculo de Lectores, 2001), 130. 32. This section relies on the Archivo General de Simancas’s Ca´mara de Castilla, Patronato Real, and Estado (and Estado-Libros) sections to recover some of Toledo’s postrevolt history. One potentially rich source, the Registro General del Sello section, can be only partially accessed because its catalogue is incomplete after 1500. 33. Charles disembarked in Cantabria on July 16, 1522. Haliczer, Comuneros of Castile, 207. Another cause of internal instability after the civil war was the state of royal finances. Royal finances were in shambles due to the appropriations of tax revenues made by the ruling council of the Comuneros (Junta de las Comunidades), debt owed to the Fugger bankers for the imperial elections as well as for the emperor’s household expenditures, additional demands to pay for Navarre’s defense from the French invasion, and extraordinary demands from Flanders. The crown’s poor financial state threatened the loyalty of the troops. The soldiers under Captain Beltra´n de la Cueva’s command in San Sebastian mutinied after receiving only one out of four months’ pay. Haliczer, Comuneros of Castile, 207. 34. AGS CC Memoriales leg. 145, n. 6–4; Alfonso Ferna´ndez de Osegura to the Constable of Castile; Toledo, 30 May 1522. 35. Ibid.

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n o t e s t o p a g e s 9 7 – 9 9 217 36. Dr. Zumel was also Toledo’s interim governor immediately after the city’s surrender until the nomination of Martı´n in February 1522. He was in charge of many of the persecutions against Toledo’s Comuneros leaders. Martı´nez Gil, La ciudad inquieta, 15. 37. AGS CC Memoriales leg. 145, n. 6–5; Alfonso Ferna´ndez de Osegura to Juan de Zumel; Toledo, 30 May 1522. 38. Kings leading troops into battle was unwise, as demonstrated by the capture of Francis I of France by the forces of Charles at Pavia in Italy (1525) and Sebastian of Portugal’s death in the Battle of Alca´zarquivir in Morocco (1578). The latter led to a succession crisis because Sebastian left no heir to replace him in Portugal (which resulted in Philip II’s ascension to the Luistanian throne). 39. AGS CC Memoriales leg. 145, n. 6–6; Martı´n de Co´rdoba to the Governors of Spain; Toledo 30 May 1522. 40. AGS CC Memoriales leg. 145, n. 6–7; Luis Ponce de Leo´n to the Constable; Toledo, 1 June 1522. 41. AGS CC Ce´dulas libro 49, f. 328v; Charles V to Martı´n de Co´rdoba, countersigned by the Secretary Cobos and the President; Palencia, 9 Aug. 1522. 42. AGS CC Ce´dulas libro 56, f. 407v; Charles V to Martı´n de Co´rdoba, signed by the Governors; Vitoria, 27 Feb. 1522. 43. Fernando Martı´nez Gil, Toledo en las Comunidades de Castilla (Toledo: Diputa´ cion Provincial de Toledo, 1981), 53. Haliczer argues that the pardon helped reconcile Charles with the cities and at the same time underlined his authority to punish the instigators, selecting a few for punishment in order to set an example. Even among the 293 exceptuados, only twenty-three were executed, and approximately twenty died in prison, fifty purchased amnesties, and one hundred were pardoned at a later date. Haliczer, Comuneros of Castile, 211. 44. AGS CC Ce´dulas libro 61, f. 135r; Charles V to Martı´n de Co´rdoba and the royal officials of Toledo, signed the Governors; Vitoria, 3 June 1522. 45. AGS CC Memoriales leg. 145, n. 6–7; Luis Ponce de Leo´n to the Constable; Toledo, 1 June 1522. 46. AGS CC Memoriales leg. 168, n. 102–1; Martı´n de Co´rdoba to Charles V; Toledo, 21 Jan. 1524. 47. Two jurados were selected from each of Toledo’s parishes to sit alongside the twenty-four deputies and the city administrators (including the corregidor) to form the city government (ayuntamiento). However, the jurados, unlike the regidores, did not have a vote on the council. 48. AGS CC Memoriales leg. 168, n. 102–2; Martı´n de Co´rdoba to Alonso Martı´nes de Mora and the Jurados of Toledo, copy of mandamiento dated 12 Jan. 1524; Toledo, 21 Jan. 1524. 49. AGS CC Memoriales leg. 168, n. 102–1; Martı´n de Co´rdoba to Charles V; Toledo, 21 Jan. 1524. 50. AGS Estado leg. 11, n. 182; Martı´n de Co´rdoba to Charles V; Toledo, 22 June 1523. For a recent history on the Junta de Iglesias, see Sean Perrone, Charles V and the

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218 n o t e s t o p a g e s 9 9 – 1 0 5 Castilian Assembly of the Clergy: Negotiations for the Ecclesiastical Subsidy (Boston: Brill, 2008). 51. AGS Estado leg. 11, n. 180; Martı´n de Co´rdoba to Charles V; Toledo, 2 July 1523. 52. Ibid. 53. Perrone, Charles V and the Castilian Assembly of the Clergy, 29. AGS CC Ce´dulas libro 62. f. 239r; Charles V to Martı´n de Co´rdoba; Valladolid, 11 July 1523. AGS Estado leg. 11, n. 181; Martı´n de Co´rdoba to Charles V; Toledo, 30 July 1523. 54. Haliczer, Comuneros of Castile, 212–17. 55. Ibid., p. 213. 56. Ibid., p. 210. 57. Pe´rez, La revolucio´n, 669–75. 58. Surviving documents give no reason as to why Martı´n de Co´rdoba was chosen and later survived the renovation, but it must not have hurt him to have Francisco de los Cobos as an ally. Indeed, this commendation was countersigned by the influential royal secretary. AGS CC Ce´dulas libro 53, f. 156r; Charles V to Martı´n de Co´rdoba, countersigned Francisco de los Cobos; Valladolid, 29 Aug. 1522. 59. Ferna´ndez de Bethencourt, Historia genealo´gica, 9:289. 60. The title Duke of Sessa was used by the counts of Cabra after the Count of Cabra IV married Elvira Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, the heiress of Gonzalo Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, the Gran Capita´n and Duke of Sessa I. AGS CC Ce´dulas libro 62, f. 269; Charles V to the Duke of Sessa, countersigned the Secretary Cobos and the Doctor Carvajal; Logron˜o, 24 Sept. 1523. 61. Soon thereafter, on August 28, 1525, Martı´n renounced this office in favor of his cousin Luis Ponce de Leo´n. AGS CC Memoriales leg. 176, n. 35; Martı´n de Co´rdoba to Charles V; Toledo, 28 April 1525. AGS CC Memoriales leg. 175, n. 21; Martı´n de Co´rdoba to Charles V; Toledo, 28 Aug. 1525. 62. AGS CC Ce´dulas libro 53, f. 156r; Charles V to Martı´n de Co´rdoba; Valladolid, 29 Aug. 1522. 63. AGS Estado leg. 12, n. 260; Martı´n de Co´rdoba to Charles V; Alcaudete, 22 March 1524. 64. Ibid. 65. AGS Escribanı´a Mayor de Rentas Quitaciones de Corte leg. 33–2, f. 1371–72; Alonso A´lvarez de Toledo to Ca´mara de Castilla; Toledo, 6 May 1524. 66. AGS RGS June 1524; Queen Juana and Charles V to the Licenciado Briviesca; Burgos, 6 June 1524. 67. Manuel Foronda y Aguilera, Estancias y viajes del Emperador Carlos V (Madrid: Sucesores de Ribadeneyra, 1914), 273. Juan Antonio Vilar Sa´nchez gives a brief account of Charles’s stay in Co´rdoba in 1526. Boda y luna de miel del emperador Carlos V: La visita imperial a Andalucı´a y al reino de Granada (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 2000), 49–50. 68. James Tracy, Emperor Charles V, Impresario of War: Campaign Strategy, International Finance, and Domestic Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 290. 69. Juan de Velasco was the heir of Hernando de Velasco, Lord of Siruela I, who was a second son of Juan de Velasco, Lord of Briviesca. The Lord of Briviesca’s first son,

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n o t e s t o p a g e s 1 0 5 – 1 0 9 219 Pedro de Velasco, Count of Haro I, would produce the line of the constables of Castile and the dukes of Frı´as. During the Comunidades Revolt, Martı´n fought alongside his distant cousin the Count of Haro in Navarre and was commanded by one of the governors of Castile, the Constable of Castile. There was a concerted attempt to ally the Alcaudete and Siruela families in the generation of Martı´n’s father. While Martı´n’s father Alfonso married Marı´a, the daughter of Juan de Velasco, his aunt Francisca married Francisco de Velasco, Juan’s son and heir. 70. Leonor de Velasco was Martı´n’s first cousin on both his mother and his father’s sides. 71. BPR VIII 261; ‘‘Informacio´n en derecho por don Cristo´bal de Velasco y de la Cueva Conde de Siruela contra don Francisco de Co´rdoba y de Velasco Conde de Alcaudete’’; s.l., s.f. 72. AHN Nobleza Frias leg. 1339, n. 7; Martı´n de Co´rdoba y de Velasco, Testamento; Cartagena, 15 Jan. 1554. 73. Ibid. 74. Again, this analysis relies on data collected from Ferna´ndez de Bethencourt, Historia genealo´gica, vols. 6–9. 75. Records related to daughters and sons who died young in the medieval period are probably more incomplete than similar documents for the early modern period. Keeping in mind that the total number of offspring in the Middle Ages should be higher than the 7.5 average per generation, the difference of offspring between the two periods is thus probably greater than it seems. 76. Two individuals married twice. 77. Including but not limited to the de la Cueva House of Albuquerque, the de la Cerda House of Medinaceli, the Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba House of Sessa, the Ribera House of Alcala´ de los Gazules, the Figueroa House of Feria, the Fajardo House of los Ve´lez, and the Ponce de Leo´n House of Arcos. 78. Telesforo Ulierte Ruiz, Los otros Ferna´ndez de Co´rdova de la Casa de Alcaudete (Alcaudete: Ayuntamiento de Alcaudete, 1999), 72. Ferna´ndez de Bethencourt, Historia genealo´gica, 9:289. 79. Ferna´ndez de Bethencourt’s genealogical study does not list most of these daughters. However, they were referenced in documents from the ARCG. 80. Enrique Soria Mesa, Sen˜ores y oligarcas: Los sen˜orı´os del Reino de Granada en la Edad Moderna (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1997), 61. For the Comares family, the exchange went the other way. When the Marquis of Comares II Luis Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba married Francisca, his cousin from the House of Cabra, part of the dowry included the Granadine estates of Canillas de Aceituno, Arches, and Corumbela. These estates combined with Luis’s own property of Comares to form a core part of the house’s property. 81. ARCG Pleitos 741/no. 4. 82. AHN Ordenes Militares—Caballeros—Pruebas de Santiago, exp. 2107, n. 4. 83. Ana Mo´nica, the final Alcaudete daughter, married Duarte A´lvarez de Toledo, Count of Oropesa, from one of the oldest and most prestigious, albeit not one of the

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220 n o t e s t o p a g e s 1 0 9 – 1 1 5 wealthiest, families of the kingdom. The Alcaudete line and title continued in use with the family, eventually merging with the Velasco dukes de Frı´as. Genealogists, however, tend to identify Ana Mo´nica as the last Alcaudete, considering the line to have ended when it merged with the House of Oropesa.

chapter 4. navarre and the imperialization of the house of alcaudete, 1525–1534 Note to epigraph: AGS GA leg. 3138 caja 2, n. 903; Count of Alcaudete to Empress Isabel; Pamplona?, s.f. 1528–1530. 1. Martı´n’s relative the Constable of Castile likely facilitated his appointment to the viceroyalty of Navarre. As governor of Spain during Charles V’s absence, he had appointed the Cordovan corregidor of Toledo. The constable had previously secured the viceroyalty for his nephew and Martı´n’s immediate predecessor, the Count of Miranda. See Marı´a Isabel Ostolaza Elizondo, ‘‘El Reino de Navarra en el dilema de su incorporacio´n a Castilla o su fidelidad a los Albret. Agramonteses y beamonteses entre 1512–1524,’’ HSJ 1 (1994): 67. 2. Luis Javier Fortu´n Pe´rez de Ciriza and Carmen Jusue´ Simonena, Historia de Navarra I: Antigu¨edad y Alta Edad Media (Pamplona: Gobierno de Navarra, 1999), 74–105, 133–54; and Jesu´s Marı´a Usuna´riz Garayoa, Historia breve de Navarra (Madrid: Sı´lex, 2006), 25–40. 3. These alliances helped stabilize Navarre’s northern frontier. The tie with Plantagenet England, in particular, buffered the kingdom from the expanding Capetian monarchy of Philip II Augustus. In return, Sancho VI helped guard Richard’s patrimony of Gascony from the predations of regional nobles such as the Count of Tolosa, who sought to usurp certain properties during the king’s absence on crusade. 4. Usuna´riz Garayoa, Historia breve de Navarra, 52. 5. Eloı´sa Ramı´rez Vaquero, Historia de Navarra II: La Baja Edad Media (Pamplona: Gobierno de Navarra, 1999), 30–79, 99–120; and Usuna´riz Garayoa, Historia breve de Navarra, 67–84, 108–17. 6. Ramı´rez Vaquero, Historia de Navarra II, 30–37; and Usuna´riz Garayoa, Historia breve de Navarra, 67–74. 7. Ramı´rez Vaquero, Historia de Navarra II, 67–74; and Usuna´riz Garayoa, Historia breve de Navarra, 78–84. 8. The points of origin were Paris, Vezelay, and Le Puy. The roads converge at Ostobat. 9. The Burgo Nuevo, which was built around the Church of San Saturnino, the Burgo de San Cernin, and the Poblacio´n de San Nicola´s all housed new residents in Pamplona. 10. The Hundred Years’ War in the case of France, and the civil war between Pedro I and Enrique of Trasta´mara in the case of Castile. The ascension of the bastard Trasta´mara

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line through regicide continued to weaken the monarchy, which continually had to fend off constestants to the throne. 11. The enormous importance of the kingdom in the struggles between France and Spain has been underestimated. Marı´a Puy Huici Gon˜i argues that historians have fallen into the trap of defenders of the Spanish conquest who attempted to downplay the ethics of the invasion by describing the kingdom as poor, insignificant, badly armed, and small. Huici Gon˜i, En torno a la conquista de Navarra (Pamplona: Castuera, 1993), 85. 12. The Catholic Monarchs proposed their own candidate, their son the crown prince Juan. 13. There was also a pro-French faction of nobles, the Agramontes. 14. The Foix-Albret, whose scion Henry III of Navarre became King Henri IV of France, controlled extensive territories throughout France. After the death of Spain’s last Habsburg king, Charles II, in 1700, Philip V of Bourbon, a direct descendant of Catherine and Jean, took the throne. Ironically, an offspring of the monarchs of Navarre who were dethroned by Spain took over the Spanish crown. 15. This is a brief summary of Navarre’s complicated political history in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Peio Monteano Sorbet has recently published a comprehensive revision of the history of the conquest and its aftermath that includes consideration of new documents. See La Guerra de Navarra (1512–1529): Cro´nica de la conquista espan˜ola (Pamplona: Pamiela, 2010). For the classic historiography, see Luis Sua´rez Ferna´ndez, Fernando el Cato´lico y Navarra: El proceso de la incorporacio´n del reino a la Corona de Espan˜a (Madrid: Rialp, 1985); and Jose´ Marı´a Lacarra, Historia polı´tica del Reino de Navarra: Desde sus orı´genes hasta su incorporacio´n a Castilla, vol. 3 (Pamplona: Arazadi, 1972). 16. Florista´n Imı´zcoz has made a similar point in ‘‘¿Conquista o restauracio´n?’’; Historia de Navarra III: Lealtad y patriotismo; and ‘‘Lealtad personal, fidelidad nacional y fe religiosa: Reflexiones morales en torno a la conquista de Navarra,’’ in Monarquia, imperio y pueblos en la Espan˜a moderna, ed. Pablo Ferna´ndez Albadalejo (Alicante: Universidad de Alicante, 1997). 17. Fernando Santamarı´a Rekarte, ‘‘Intentos de recuperacio´n del Reino de Navarra por la Dinastı´a de los Albret 1512–1521,’’ HSJ 1 (1994): 39–53. 18. Likewise, it was partly due to England’s alliance with Ferdinand the Catholic, resulting in the landing of an English expeditionary force in French Guyenne on the eve of the Spanish invasion, that allowed Spain itself to take Navarre. 19. Martı´n de Co´rdoba reminded the crown that it was dangerous to allow former subjects in Lower Navarre freedom of movement in Upper Navarre. AGS GA leg. 3138, caja 2, n. 903; Martı´n de Co´rdoba to the Consejo de Guerra; s.l., c. 1528–30. 20. Except for the detachment of Lower Navarre, the boundaries of early modern and contemporary Navarre differ very little. Today’s autonomous community measures 10,391 square kilometers. Kosovo’s area measures 10,908 square kilometers, and Connecticut approximately 14,358 square kilometers. 21. AGS PR leg. 10, n. 33; ‘‘Juramento del Conde de Alcaudete del an˜o de mill y quinientos y veynte e ocho’’; Pamplona, May 1528. These privileges preserved the activity

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222 n o t e s t o p a g e s 1 1 7 – 1 1 9 of the Cortes, an independent legislative body over which Martı´n presided. The Navarrese Cortes assembled far more frequently and regularly, and its legislative activity was more voluminous, than the parliaments of Castile-Leo´n, Aragon, Valencia, and Catalonia. See Valentı´n Va´zquez de Prada et al., eds., Las Cortes de Navarra desde su incorporacio´n a la Corona de Castilla (Pamplona: Universidad de Navarra, 1993), 1:xvii. 22. Offices of viceroy and captain general were frequently performed by the same person in territories that faced the threat of war. Luis Salas Almela, Colaboracio´n y conflicto: La Capitanı´a General del Mar Oce´ano y Costas de Andalucı´a, 1588–1660 (Co´rdoba: Universidad de Co´rdoba, 2002). 23. France also seized Fuenterrabia, a front-line fortress that guarded San Sebastian and the rest of the Basque country. Spain recovered Fuenterrabia only when the Constable of Castile expelled the entrenched enemy in 1524. See Tracy, Emperor Charles V, Impresario of War, 6. 24. The commission was copied into the minutes (actas) of the Cortes of Navarra. See AGN Seccio´n Reino, Cortes, Recopilacio´n de Actas de Cortes libro 20, f. 263r–264r; Charles V to Martı´n de Co´rdoba, ‘‘Tı´tulo de Capita´n General de Navarra’’; Toledo, 25 Aug. 1525. Martı´n de Co´rdoba’s commission was also preserved in AGS PR leg. 13, n. 104; and AGS PR leg. 26, n. 10; Charles V to Martı´n de Co´rdoba; Burgos, s.f., 1528. 25. AGN Seccio´n Reino, Cortes, Recopilacio´n de Actas de Cortes libro 20, f. 263– 264r. 26. Ibid. 27. The commission of captain general makes no mention of any recruiting duties, though Martı´n eagerly offered to mobilize troops from his own estates to serve in the kingdom. 28. The Italian Jacobo Pelearo and his family of engineers and architects designed and constructed the ciudadela. They applied the star-shaped design to withstand the bombardment of early modern artillery. Members of the Pelearo family made up just such a corps, and they also helped construct the fortress of Mers el-Kebir in Spanish Oran. 29. Florencio Idoate, Esfuerzo be´lico de Navarra en el siglo XVI (Pamplona: Diputacio´n Foral de Navarra, 1981), 86–87. Idoate notes that Pamplona could be reinforced by men from the fortress of Fuenterrabia and could count on 1,500 stationed in A´lava. There were also 3,000 Navarrese troops available, although Martı´n de Co´rdoba frequently expressed doubts about their loyalty. 30. Florista´n, Historia de Navarra III, 16. 31. The captaincies stationed in Castile were likely located in the Basque provinces near the French border. AGS GA leg. 3137, s.n. (YGL-33). 32. Details of the treaty reached Martı´n de Co´rdoba on September 10, 1529, and news was circulated throughout the kingdom and the neighbouring regions, including Guipu´zcoa. AGS GA leg. 2, no. 95; Martı´n de Co´rdoba to Charles V; Pamplona, 22 Sept. 1529. 33. AGS GA leg. 3139, atado 2, n. 342; Martı´n de Co´rdoba to Empress Isabel; Pamplona, 8 June 1530. Throughout the first half of the year, Martı´n de Co´rdoba and others

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n o t e s t o p a g e s 1 1 9 – 1 2 2 223 reported that Henri II was enrolling thousands of soldiers being demobilized by Francis I, that the pretender was amassing large quantities of supplies, and that the Navarrese sympathized with Henri. Martı´n also reported that Francis had appointed Henri governor of Guyenne, allowing him to control the merchants and their products that passed between France and Spain. See AGS GA leg. 3, n. 274; Martı´n de Co´rdoba to Charles V; Fuenterrabia, 6 April 1530. 34. AGS GA leg. 3139, atado 2, n. 342; Martı´n de Co´rdoba to Empress Isabel; Pamplona, 8 June 1530. 35. AGS Estado leg. 346, n. 4; Martı´n de Co´rdoba to Empress Isabel; Pamplona, 13 June 1530. 36. Two thousand households translated to a population of 6,000 to 10,000 residents. 37. AGS Estado leg. 346, n. 4; Martı´n de Co´rdoba to Empress Isabel; Pamplona, 13 June 1530. 38. Ibid. 39. Ibid. 40. AGS GA leg. 3139, atado 2, n. 344; Pedro del Paso to the Council of War; s.l., c. Jan. 1530. 41. AGS GA leg. 3, n. 274; Martı´n de Co´rdoba to Charles V; Fuenterrabia, 6 April 1530. The empress wanted 100 auxiliary infantrymen in Pamplona and the guards in Estella to be dismissed. She explained that they were unnecessary and that their double wages could be better employed elsewhere. AGS Estado leg. 346, n. 8; Empress Isabel to Martı´n de Co´rdoba; Madrid, 9 April 1530. 42. Sandoval may have been a relation of the Marquis de Denia (whose descendant would become Philip III’s favorite, the Duke of Lerma), who maintained a company of soldiers in Navarre. AGS Estado leg. 346, n. 5; Martı´n de Co´rdoba to Hernando de Sandoval; Pamplona, 14 June 1530. AGS GA leg. 3137, s.n. (YGL-32); ‘‘Relacio´n de la gente de las guardas e donde residen’’; s.l., 30 Feb. 1530. 43. AGS GA leg. 3137, s.n. (YGL-55); Martı´n de Co´rdoba to Empress Isabel; Pamplona, 20 June 1530. 44. This spy, a courtier (gentilhombre) travelling with Francis I, was able to give such vivid details as the ash-coloured heavy cloak, a cap of the same material, black stockings, half-boots of corduroy, and a long beard that the king was wearing. AGS GA leg. 3137, s.n. (YGL-53); Criado del Capita´n Alonso de Valsuase to Martı´n de Co´rdoba; s.l., c. June 1530. 45. AGS GA leg. 3137, s.n. (YGL-10); Constable of Castile to Martı´n de Co´rdoba; Pamplona, 20 June 1530. 46. The amnesty was directed toward those who rose in favor of the French invasion of 1521. Florista´n, Historia de Navarra, p. 26. 47. AGS Estado leg. 345, n. 95; Martı´n de Co´rdoba to Francisco de los Cobos; Pamplona, 11 Feb. 1529. 48. AGS GA leg. 3138, caja 2, n. 903; Martı´n de Co´rdoba to the Consejo de Guerra; s.l., c. 1528–30. The empress, however, was opposed to stationing soldiers in the city of

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224 n o t e s t o p a g e s 1 2 2 – 1 2 6 Pamplona at times of peace, arguing that it was unnecessary, violated the city’s privileges, and showed a lack of confidence in the Pamplonese. See AGS GA leg. 3139, atado 1, s.n. (YGL-4); Empress Isabel to Martı´n de Co´rdoba, minutas de una carta; Madrid, Dec. 1529. 49. AGS Estado leg. 468, s.n. (YGL-1); Martı´n de Co´rdoba to the Council of State, relacio´n de una carta; s.l., s.f. 50. AGS Estado leg. 345, n. 186; Emil Rajoy to Charles V; Pamplona, 6 Aug. 1529. This request was renewed again in 1530: AGS Estado leg. 346, n. 4; Martı´n de Co´rdoba to Empress Isabel; Pamplona, 13 June 1530. 51. Be´arn was a territory owned by the Foix-Albret. AGS Estado leg. 468, s.n. (YGL-1); Martı´n de Co´rdoba to the Council of State, relacio´n de una carta; s.l., s.f. 52. AGS Estado leg. 344, n. 132; Martı´n de Co´rdoba to Empress Isabel; Pamplona, 29 June 1530. See also AGS Estado leg. 20, n. 163; Conde de Alcaudete to Charles V; Borox, 10 Oct. 1530. 53. Cintrue´nigo was a town in southern Navarre. AGN TR Archivo Secreto 7.1.5 (2); Martı´n de Co´rdoba to the Royal Council of Navarre; Cintrue´nigo, 28 March 1533. 54. AGN TR Archivo Secreto 7.1.1; Martı´n de Co´rdoba to officials and soldiers of Navarre; Cascante, 7 Dec. 1528. 55. AGS CC Ce´dulas libro 72, f. 405v; Charles V to officials of Logron˜o; Granada, 11 June 1526. AGS CC Memoriales leg. 180, n. 39; Ca´mara de Castilla to Charles V; s.l., s.f. 1526. 56. AGS CC Memoriales leg. 180, n. 39; Martı´n de Co´rdoba to Ca´mara de Castilla, relacio´n de carta; s.l., s.f. 57. AGS GA leg. 3138, caja 1, n. 64–3; ‘‘Pajes Recibidos;’’ s.l., s.f. (c. 1528). It is curious that this roster should be found in the Guerra Antigua section. Perhaps part of the preparation these particular inductees received included a dose of military training. See also Jose´ Martı´nez Milla´n, dir., La corte de Carlos V: Tercera parte; los servidores de las casas reales, vol. 5 (Madrid: SEFC, 2000). A description of the court can be found in Marı´a del Carmen Mazarı´o Coleto, Isabel de Portugal: Emperatriz y reina de Espan˜a (Madrid: CSIC, 1951), 77–92. 58. AGN TR Archivo Secreto 7.1.4 (1); Martı´n de Co´rdoba to the Royal Council; Tafalla, 11 Nov. 1531. 59. This includes children of popular classes who were also sent out of the family home to serve as apprentices in artisan workshops. 60. Baldassare Castiglione’s Book of the Courtier vividly illustrates this courtly world. See also Isabel Beceiro Pita, ‘‘Educacio´n y cultura en la nobleza (siglos XIII–XV),’’ Anuario de Estudios Medievales 21 (1991): 571–90; Marı´a Concepcio´n Quintanilla Raso, ‘‘La biblioteca del marque´s de Priego (1518),’’ En la Espan˜a Medieval 1 (1980): 347–82; Javier Ignacio Martı´nez de Barrio, ‘‘Educacio´n y mentalidad de la alta nobleza espan˜ola en los siglos XVI y XVII: La formacio´n de la biblioteca de la Casa Ducal de Osuna,’’ Cuadernos de Historia Moderna 12 (1991): 67–81; and Eliza Ruı´z Garcı´a and Marı´a del Pilar Carceller Cervin˜o, ‘‘La biblioteca del II duque de Albuquerque (1467–1526),’’ Anuarios de Estudios Medievales 32, 1 (2002): 361–400.

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n o t e s t o p a g e s 1 2 6 – 1 2 8 225 61. Don Martı´n de Salinas, the ambassador to Ferdinand, Charles’s brother, and future Holy Roman emperor, made note of Alonso’s performance. Martı´n de Salinas, El emperador Carlos V y su corte segu´n las cartas de don Martı´n de Salinas embajador del Infante don Fernando (1522–1539) (Madrid: Estab. Tip. de Fortanet, 1903), 901–3. 62. He likely made enemies as well. 63. AGS GA leg. 3138, caja 1, n. 64–3; ‘‘Pajes Recibidos’’; s.l., s.f. (c. 1528). 64. Martı´n de Co´rdoba’s second sons also embarked on life paths at this moment. Francisco served as a page at court from 1530–31. Diego enrolled at the University of Salamanca. For Francisco, see AHN Ordenes Militares Caballeros, Calatrava carp. 436, expediente n. 1604; Francisco Mendoza y Co´rdoba Velasco y Pacheco, prueba; Burgos, 5 Nov. 1523. AGS GA leg. 2, n. 94; Martı´n de Co´rdoba to Charles V; Pamplona, 22 Sept. 1529. For Diego, see Martı´nez Milla´n, dir., La Corte de Carlos V, 3:98. 65. AGS Estado 1362, n. 150; Comendador Juan de Vilanova to Charles V; Genoa, 4 June 1529. 66. In this comment, the viceroy may have been referring to grandee courtiers performing honorific, but financially lucrative, duties at court. According to his thinking, it must have been perverse that imperial administrators, most of whom belonged to the middle stratum of the high nobility, risked their lives on the frontiers of the empire but did not reap the same rewards that grandees safely ensconced at court did. 67. AGS GA leg. 2, no. 92; Martı´n de Co´rdoba to Charles V; Pamplona, 2 July 1529. 68. Despite these very real dangers, Martı´n realized that the interests of his family were deeply intertwined with service to the crown. It was very soon after Pedro’s death in 1529 that Martı´n sent a second son, Francisco, to the empress’s court. The viceroy also sought out further opportunities to serve. He asked to accompany Charles V to Hungary to fight the Turks in 1532 and join the empress when she journeyed to Barcelona to receive the emperor upon his return to Spain in 1533. These and a subsequent petition to travel to the Cortes of Aragon meeting in Monzo´n in 1533 were all denied. These prestigious and extremely visible roles were most likely granted to court grandees. The negative outcome of his requests added to Martı´n’s complaints that the emperor rewarded those who had not shed blood in the way his family had. 69. AGN TR Archivo Secreto 7.1.4 (1); Martı´n de Co´rdoba to the Consejo Real; Tafalla, 11 Nov. 1531. See also AGN TR Archivo Secreto 7.1.4 (2); Martı´n de Co´rdoba to the Consejo Real; Tafalla, 12 Nov. 1531. Joaquı´n Jose´ Salcedo Izu, El Consejo Real de Navarra en el siglo XVI (Pamplona: Universidad de Navarra and Institucio´n ‘‘Principe de Viana,’’ 1964), 67. 70. Marı´a Teresa Sola Landa, ‘‘Gobierno y Administracio´n del Reino de Navarra en el siglo XVI: Las instrucciones al Virrey,’’ HSJ 1 (1994): 95. See also Salcedo Izu, El Consejo Real de Navarra, 67. AGN RE Legislacio´n leg. 1, n. 8; Reparo de agravio del virrey Duque de Na´jera a peticio´n de las Cortes de Tafalla, firmado por la Duquesa. The power that these women wielded may have mirrored the authority that the empress Isabel and her two daughters Juana and Marı´a exercised. All of them were appointed governor of Spain at some moment in their lives. Other precedences came from a closer source. Navarre itself had a history of ruling queens such as Jeanne I (r. 1274–1305) of the House of

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226 n o t e s t o p a g e s 1 2 9 – 1 3 1 Champagne; her Capetian granddaughter Jeanne II (r. 1328–49); Blanche (r. 1425–46) and Ele´onore (r. 1479), both from the house of Evreux; and Catherine (1483–1517) of the House of Foix. According to Robert Harding, France’s late sixteenth-century history is also replete with women governing provincial territories: ‘‘Henri IV had appointed his sister ‘gouvernate’ of Navarre and Be´arn in 1583 before ascending to the throne, and after his accession, he named the duchesse d’Angouleˆme to the government of Limousin in 1593 and later allowed her to trade this charge for the government of Bourbonnais. Later, with the failure of the Gonzague male line in 1637, Marie de Gonzague became gouvernate and lieutenantgeneral of Nivernais and Donzois. The first woman governor of a major province was Marie de Medici, who became governor of Normandy in 1612 and later traded this charge for the government of Anjou. Anne of Austria was named governor of Paris in 1636 and in 1647 became the second female governor of a major province—Brittany.’’ Harding, Anatomy of a Power Elite, 127. 71. AGN AP-PR caja 66, s.n.; Francisco Duarte to Juan Rena, ‘‘Desde que parti de Toledo . . .’’; Seville, 30 June 1534. 72. It was common for noblewomen like Leonor to manage the lands of husbands absent on royal service. If needed, she could even tap into the staff that her own family, the Comares, employed to help her administer her husband’s estates. The House of Comares’s estates were conveniently located adjacent to those of the Alcaudete in the Cordovan countryside. Also on hand were her husband’s relatives, such as aunts and sisters living in the Convent of Santa Clara in Alcaudete. AGN AP-PR caja 15, carp. 22–2. Martı´n thanked Leonor for taking care of the property in his will: AHN Nobleza Frı´as leg. 1339, n. 8, capı´tulo 17; Martı´n de Co´rdoba, Testament; Cartagena, 7 Jan. 1553. For a recent work that explores the management of an absent lord’s estate, see Santiago Arago´n Mateos, El sen˜or ausente: El sen˜orı´o nobiliario en la Espan˜a del setecientos; La administracio´n del ducado de Feria en el siglo XV (Lleida: Editorial Milenio, 2000). 73. AGN AP-PR caja 15, carp. 22–2; Martı´n de Ollacarizqueta to Juan Rena; Pamplona, 5 Aug. 1532. 74. The lives of Martı´n and Leonor’s daughters generally do not appear in the historical record, though Alonso de Torres includes hagiographic descriptions of Juana and Leonor as nuns in the Convent of Santa Clara in Alcaudete. See Cro´nica de la provincia franciscana de Granada, ed. Rafael Mota Murillo, vol. 1 (Madrid: Editorial Cisneros, 1984), 589–600. 75. Daniela Bleichmar has argued that the enormous production of drawings by eighteenth-century Spanish botanical expeditions to the Americas was an attempt to force the crown to see ‘‘anew the same plants that had for centuries grown in the colonies—that is, seeing them for the useful and profitable natural commodities that they truly were.’’ In this case, one of the defining attributes of empire, the exploitation of resources, was enabled first through the enactment of sight. See Bleichmar, ‘‘A Visible and Useful Empire: Visual Culture and Colonial Natural History in the Eighteenth-Century Spanish World,’’ in Science in the Spanish and Portuguese Empires, 1500–1800 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2009), 293.

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n o t e s t o p a g e s 1 3 1 – 1 3 4 227 76. AGS GA leg. 3137, s.n. (YGL-36); Martı´n de Co´rdoba, ‘‘Alarde de Pamplona’’; Pamplona, 12 May 1531. 77. AGS Estado leg. 358, n. 68; Count of Alcaudete II and Consejo Real de Navarra to Philip II; Pamplona, 7 Dec. 1564. AGS Estado leg. 358, n. 70; Antonio Cruzat, Oidor de la Ca´mara de Comptos de Navarra to Licenciado Otalora, of the Consejo Real de Navarra; Villa de San Pelay, 2 Feb. 1564. AGS Estado leg. 358, n. 57; Count of Alcaudete II to Francisco de Eraso; s.l. Tudela, s.f. Dec. 1564. 78. AGN Comptos Libros de Mercedes Reales 7, f. 27; Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba to Count of Alcaudete II, pleito homenaje; Tudela, 27 Nov. 1564. 79. Jose´ Marı´a Solano Anon˜anzas, El gobierno eclesia´stico de la vasta dio´cesis de Calahorra (Calahorra: Gutenberg, 1967), 91. 80. AGS Estado leg. 358, n. 77; Martı´n de Co´rdoba II to Philip II; Estella, 15 Feb. 1565. 81. Navarre’s House of Cortes had no relation to the conquistador Herna´n Corte´s. 82. Ostolaza Elizondo, ‘‘El reino de Navarra,’’ 56–61. Pedro de Navarra should not be confused with Pedro Navarro, Count of Oliveto. 83. AGS Estado leg. 358, n. 73; Philip II to Count of Alcaudete II; Madrid, 8 Dec. 1564. 84. AGS Estado leg. 358, n. 73; Philip II to Gero´nima de Navarra, Marquise of Cortes; Madrid, 8 Dec. 1564. 85. AGS Estado leg. 358, n. 65; Licenciado Herna´n Vela´zquez to Francisco de Eraso; Estella, 22 Dec. 1564. 86. Navarre’s other noble families had marriage ties with Castilian and Aragonese houses. See Alfredo Florista´n, ‘‘Entre la casa y la corte: Una aproximacio´n a las e´lites dirigentes del Reino de Navarra (siglos XVI–XVIII),’’ in Las ´elites del Paı´s Vasco y Navarra en la Edad Moderna, ed. Jose´ Marı´a Imı´zcoz Buenza (Bilbao: Universidad del Paı´s Vasco, 1996), 175–91. 87. AGS Estado leg. 358, n. 67; Count of Alcaudete II to Francisco de Eraso; Tudela, 13 Dec. 1564. 88. On the one hand, the Count of Lerı´n, like the Duke of Alba, possessed sufficient prestige to be considered a grandee among the Spanish nobility. In fact, the House of Lerı´n was the only Navarrese lineage to win that honor in the sixteenth century. On the other hand, the actual disparity between Alba and Lerı´n’s status was enormous. In 1530, the duke’s income stood at 50,000 ducats. Although we do not have information on the count’s wealth in 1530, his descendant in 1616 wielded no more than 12,000 ducats. 89. AGN Comptos Libros de Mercedes Reales 7, f. 27; Philip II to Diego de Toledo, Tı´tulo de Condestable de Navarra; Madrid, 7 Jan. 1565. Diego, after the death of his elder brother, would inherit the title Duke of Alba. 90. The crown denied each of these requests. It clearly feared that the presence of a force owing allegiance to a lord could further unbalance a territory only tenuously attached to the monarchy. AGS Estado leg. 345, n. 92; Martı´n de Co´rdoba to Empress Isabel; Pamplona 24 June 1529. AGS Estado leg. 345, n. 186; Emil Rajoy to Charles V;

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228 n o t e s t o p a g e s 1 3 4 – 1 4 1 Pamplona, 6 Aug. 1529. AGS Estado leg. 346, n. 4; Martı´n de Co´rdoba to Empress Isabel; Pamplona, 13 June 1530. 91. In comparison, the most troops that any one lord raised in a given year in the Granada War was the Duke of Medina Sidonia, who sent 614 men into battle in 1485. 92. BNE Ms. 9393, f. 189r; Luis Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba to Rodrigo Ponce de Leo´n, pact; Rome, 25 May 1526. 93. AGS Estado leg. 344, n. 36; Martı´n de Co´rdoba to the Empress Isabel; s.l., s.f. 94. Ernest Belenguer has argued that one reason King Ferdinand wanted to secure Navarre was to make sure that France could not invade Spain through the kingdom. During the Franco-Spanish wars in Italy, such an invasion would have distracted Spain’s attention from Italy. The Duke of Nemours Gaston VI de Foix’s victory against Spain at Ravenna in April 1512 may have brought the point home to Ferdinand. A claimant to the Navarrese throne (he was the first cousin of Catherine de Foix and moreover, brother of Germaine de Foix, Ferdinand’s second wife), Gaston won great prestige in Italy that could have strengthened his hand in the succession struggle in Navarre. His victory may have incited Ferdinand’s preemptive invasion of Navarre in July 1512. Belenguer, El imperio hispa´nico, 107–8. 95. AGS Estado leg. 346, n. 56; Martı´n de Co´rdoba to Empress Isabel; Pamplona, 8 Jan. 1530. 96. Ibid. 97. He also gave an opinion on the Franco-Ottoman alliance in 1532. AGS GA leg. 3137, s.n. (YGL-1); Martı´n de Co´rdoba to Empress Isabel; Tafalla, 19 July 1532.

chapter 5. the ferna´ ndez de co´ rdoba lineage and the transfer of frontier expertise to algeria, 1512–1558 Note to epigraph: AGS Estado leg. 462, n. 165; Count of Alcaudete to Garcı´a de Navarrete Alcalde of Mers el-Kebir, instructions for audience with Empress Isabel; Oran, s.f. 1535. 1. Perhaps the best known were Antonio de Mendoza, the first viceroy of Mexico and the first of Peru, and the Count of Tendilla, captain general of Granada and viceroy of Navarre. Fittingly, Martı´n de Co´rdoba’s primogenitor was married to Antonio de Mendoza’s daughter Francisca, who herself was the cousin of Monde´jar. 2. The outposts that Spain conquered were Melilla (1497); Mers el-Kebir and Cazaza (1505); Pen˜o´n de Ve´lez de la Go´mera (1508); Oran (1509); Pen˜o´n de A´rgel, Bugı´a, and Tripoli (1510); One (1531); and Tunis (1535). Over time North Africans and Ottomans reclaimed them, including Pen˜o´n de A´rgel (1529), Cazaza (1531), and One (1534). See Miguel A´ngel de Bunes Ibarra, ‘‘Pro´logo,’’ in Beatriz Alonso Acero, Ora´n-Mazalquivir (Madrid: CSIC, 2000), xi–xx. Portuguese conquests in North Africa preceded Spanish ones by almost a century with the taking of Ceuta in 1415. Others were added over the next hundred years, including Alcazar el-Saghir (1458), Tangier and Arzila (1471), Larache (1489), Mazaga´n (1502), Agadir (1505), and Safi (1508), mostly on Morocco’s Atlantic coast.

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n o t e s t o p a g e s 1 4 1 – 1 4 3 229 Andrew Hess, The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth-Century Ibero-African Frontier (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 17, 21. 3. A first phase of Spanish control lasted from 1509 to 1708. After losing the presidio to the Ottomans based out of Algiers, Spain retook Oran and held it from 1732 to 1792. It abandoned the enclave following a series of earthquakes that devastated the city in the fall of 1790 and throughout 1791. 4. Fernand Braudel, ‘‘Les espagnols et l’Afrique du Nord de 1492–1577,’’ Revue Africaine 69, 335–36 (1928): 184–233, 351–428. Published in Algiers, the Revue Africaine hosted a number of scholars who researched Spanish North African history. These include Jean Cazenave, Robert Brunschvig, and Robert Ricard. 5. Braudel does warn of considering the invasion of North Africa as an inevitable consequence of the conquest of Granada. Braudel, ‘‘Les espagnols,’’ 192. 6. Ceuta became a Spanish possession when Philip II inherited the Portuguese empire in 1580. When the Portuguese revolted and reestablished independence in 1640, Spain was able to hold on to Ceuta. 7. Alonso Acero, Ora´n-Mazalquivir, 8. Modern-day ferries still connect the Spanish Mediterranean port city of Alicante with Oran. 8. A manmade harbor has since been constructed to allow ships to dock at Oran, despite the cliffs. 9. Alonso Acero, Ora´n-Mazalquivir, 13, 16. 10. AGS Estado 472, s.n. (YGL-7); Count of Alcaudete to Philip II, ‘‘El Conde de Alcaudete suplica a Vuestra Alteza mande proueer luego para la prouision . . . ,’’ relacio´n de memorial; Madrid, 4 Feb. 1546. Jean-Fre´de´ric Schaub estimates that, including soldiers, residents, Jews, and Muslim slaves, Oran’s population in the seventeenth century may have hovered around 6,000. This figure is possible, as the bustling port city’s residents prior to the Spanish conquest may have numbered more than 10,000. Schaub, Les juifs du roi d’Espagne: Oran 1509–1669 (Paris: Hachette, 1999), 17; and Chantal de La Veronne, Oran et Tlemcen dans la premie`re moitie´ du XVIe sie`cle (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1983), 4. For Oran and Tlemcen’s commercial history in the late 1400s and early 1500s, see Jose´ Enrique Lo´pez de Coca Castan˜er, ‘‘Oran y el comercio genove´s en la transicio´n a los tiempos modernos,’’ Anuario de Estudios Medievales 24 (1994): 275–98. Lo´pez de Coca’s description of the Genoese caravan trade that passed from Ca´diz to Chios by way of Oran, or from Marseilles to Oran via Valencia, reflects a Braudelian vision of trade connecting the Mediterranean. See also Jose´ Enrique Lo´pez de Coca Castan˜er, ‘‘Granada, el Magreb y las galeras mercantiles de Venecia en tiempo de los Reyes Cato´licos y Carlos I,’’ in 1490: En el umbral de la modernidad (Valencia: Generalitat Valenciana, 1994), 23–55. 11. AGS GA Libros 7, f. 133r; Charles V to Conde de Alcaudete; Palencia; 10 Aug. 1534. 12. By the end of the sixteenth century, there would be three fortresses, with a fourth and a fifth built during the seventeenth century. Alonso Acero, Ora´n-Mazalquivir, 19. 13. AGS CMC Primera E´poca leg. 956, quinto capı´tulo; ‘‘Visitacion e inventario del artilleria y municiones questan en la c¸ibdad de Ora´n y castillo de Rac¸alcac¸ar y torres y en la villa de Mac¸arquivir’’; Copia de un capitulo de un memorial; Oran, s.f. 1556.

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230 n o t e s t o p a g e s 1 4 8 – 1 5 1 14. Alonso Acero, Ora´n-Mazalquivir, 7. 15. Mercedes Garcı´a-Arenal and Miguel A´ngel de Bunes Ibarra, Los espan˜oles y el Norte de A´frica: Siglos XV–XVIII (Madrid: MAPFRE, 1992), 61. 16. Alonso Acero, Ora´n-Mazalquivir, p. 10; Alonso Acero, ‘‘El Norte de A´frica en el ocaso del emperador (1549–1558),’’ in CVQH, ed. J. L. Castellano Castellano et al. (Madrid: SEFC, 2001), 3:400. 17. Alonso Acero, Ora´n-Mazalquivir, 8–9. 18. The recognition of the value of experiential knowledge, frequently in opposition to the theoretical, also took place in other areas of the imperial enterprise. Portuguese exploration of the Atlantic in the fifteenth century produced a division between navigators and seamen who possessed experiential knowledge versus scholars who obtained geographic knowledge through the speculation of antique philosophers. See One´simo T. Almeida, ‘‘Science During the Portuguese Maritime Discoveries: A Telling Case of Interaction Between Experimenters and Theoreticians,’’ in Science in the Spanish and Portuguese Empires, 1500–1800, ed. Daniela Bleichmar et al. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2009), 78–92. 19. AGS GA leg. 3137, s.n. (YGL-27); Marquis of Comares II to Empress Isabel; Espejo, 10 March 1531. 20. AGS PR leg. 11, n. 178; Marquis of Comares II to Charles V; Toledo, 17 April 1534. 21. As late as 1544, Martı´n de Co´rdoba was still warning the crown that North Africa had changed since Ferdinand the Catholic was king. AGS Estado leg. 471, s.n. (YGL-56); Count of Alcaudete to Philip II, ‘‘La carta de Vuestra Alteza de 19 de marc¸o recebi a los 29 . . .’’; Granada, 30 March 1544. 22. AGS GA leg. 3137, s.n. (YGL-27); Marquis of Comares II to Empress Isabel; Espejo, 10 March 1531. 23. Ibid. 24. AGS PR 11, n. 178; Marquis of Comares II to Charles V; Toledo, 17 April 1534. 25. The outpost allowed the Spanish to monitor and control the city’s shipping. 26. Luis left sometime in early 1529. Although his departure was meant to be temporary, there is no evidence that he ever returned to the enclave. He left his lieutenant Pedro de Godoy in charge of the presidios. 27. Luis’s conflict with the crown also had to do with the power of Oran’s corregidor Sancho de Lebrija. Luis and Lebrija clashed over legal jurisdictions. Luis also claimed the right to distribute soldiers’ wages, to determine how many men should be stationed in Oran, and to dismiss those who could not provide adequate service, powers that Lebrija was usurping. Other conflicts between the two officers may have included disagreements over the role of merchants in Oran, their rights, and attitudes toward diplomatic negotiations with local Muslim communities. AGS GA leg. 3, n. 277; Marquis of Comares II to Charles V; Lucena, 6 July 1530. 28. AGS GA leg. 3139 atado 1, s.n. (YGL-15); Marquis of Comares II to Empress Isabel; Lucena, 24 Oct. 1529.

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n o t e s t o p a g e s 1 5 1 – 1 5 3 231 29. As in the case of Martı´n de Co´rdoba, Luis was careful to combine verbal bluster with declarations of fidelity. In a long and moderately toned letter to the empress later that same year, the captain general discussed the provision of artillery and soldiers for Oran, recognizing ‘‘that it is my responsibility to do everything I can to alleviate the danger to Oran by committing my person and spending resources from my estate for the task. I don’t believe that there is a lack of men for this, and my land and casa should be the first to be tapped.’’ AGS GA leg. 3139 atado 1, s.n. (YGL-25); Marquis of Comares II to Empress Isabel; Lucena, 6 Nov. 1529. Also see AGS GA 3139 atado 1, s.n. (YGL-24); Marquis of Comares II to Empress Isabel; Lucena, 11 Dec. 1529. 30. AGS GA leg. 3, n. 264; Marquis of Comares II to Empress Isabel; Lucena, 23 June 1530. 31. It should be remembered that at this time, Martı´n de Co´rdoba was warning the crown of the danger of a French invasion on Spain’s northern frontier. 32. AGS GA leg. 3140, s.n. (YGL-1); Charles V to Empress Isabel; Augsburg, 22 Nov. 1530. 33. AGS GA leg. 1317, n. 42; Charles V to Marquis of Comares II; Augsburg, 30 Sept. 1530. 34. Emphasis added. The three key terms are estado, experiencia, and calidad. AGS GA 3140 atado 1, s.n. (YGL-3); Charles V to Empress Isabel; Brussels, 18 Oct. 1531. There are indications that the crown assigned less-demanding offices to unseasoned officers so that they could acquire the requisite experience to move on to harder assignments. The Duke of Medina Sidonia and Alcala´ Antonio Juan Luis de la Cerda was appointed viceroy of Valencia ‘‘con atencio´n a que conviene ir probando los [tı´tulos] ma´s mozos para que con la experiencia se hagan capaces de mayores puestos.’’ AGS Estado leg. 2665, s.f. Aug. 1641; quoted in Luis Salas Almela, Colaboracio´n y conflicto: La Capitanı´a General del Mar Oce´ano y Costas de Andalucı´a, 1588–1660 (Co´rdoba: Universidad de Co´rdoba, 2002), 16. 35. AGS PR leg. 11, n. 178; Marquis of Comares II to Charles V; Toledo, 17 April 1534. 36. There was precedence for such a sacrifice or ignominious end. The Duke of Medina Sidonia abandoned the governorship of Melilla in 1556 when the outpost, conquered by his ancestors in 1497, was threatened by Salih Rais, commander of Algiers. He feared suffering the fate of Don Alonso Peralta. Peralta had been governor of Bugı´a and had capitulated to Salih Rais when the Turks attacked. When Salih Rais sent him back to Spain, Peralta was executed for cowardice and treason. Medina Sidonia, rather than suffer the possible infamy of defeat, retired from his family’s North African foothold. Garcı´a Arenal and Bunes Ibarra, Los espan˜oles, 81. 37. AGS PR leg. 11, n. 178; Marquis of Comares II to Charles V; Toledo, 17 April 1534. 38. Barrera-Osorio, ‘‘Knowledge and Empiricism,’’ 219. 39. In addition to Barrera-Osorio’s essay, see Marı´a M. Portuondo, ‘‘Cosmography at the Casa, Consejo, and Corte During the Century of Discovery,’’ 57–77; and Almeida, ‘‘Science During the Portuguese Maritime Discoveries,’’ 78–92. All three are in Daniela Bleichmar et al., eds., Science in the Spanish and Portuguese Empires, 1500–1800.

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232 n o t e s t o p a g e s 1 5 3 – 1 5 6 40. Literary studies also address how cultural experiences, forms, rituals, and values were transported, transmitted, and adapted from one imperial locale to another. See Barbara Fuchs, Mimesis and Empire: The New World, Islam, and European Identities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 41. It may be possible that Rejo´n had formal roles in the royal administration of Navarre. It is uncertain whether Rejo´n was originally a client of Alcaudete in Co´rdoba or whether he may have had other patronage relationships in Navarre. His last name is unfamiliar among the Angulo, Argote, Venegas, de los Rios, and other families that served the Alcaudete and Comares in Co´rdoba, and he may have been connected with Juan Rena, Bishop of Alghero. However, he seems to have followed the count to Oran, and his family would serve in the enclave for generations to come. In Oran, Rejo´n possessed at different times the titles of pagador, tesorero, and tenedor de los bastimentos of Oran. For Rejo´n in Navarre, see AGS Estado leg. 345, n. 159; Martı´n de Co´rdoba to the crown, relacio´n de una carta; s.l., 5 Aug. 1529? Alonso Acero also discusses the activity of the Rejo´n family in Oran throughout the sixteenth century (although she does not follow them to Navarre). See Alonso Acero, Ora´n-Mazalquivir, 67. 42. AGS Estado leg. 470, n. 152; Count of Alcaudete to Charles V; Oran, 11 May 1543. 43. His family was the Peralta, marquises of Falces. 44. He also held the title of Comendador de Zalamea. 45. Although presumably the Council of War itself assigned these offices to Herrera in the first place. 46. AGS GA leg. 3137, s.n. (YGL-49); Miguel de Herrera to Muy Ilustre Sen˜or (Francisco de los Cobos or Juan Va´zquez de Molina?); s.l., s.f. 1531? 47. Altman, Transatlantic Ties. 48. Aram, Leyendas negra. 49. Spain’s hold on Tunis lasted until Euldj Ali seized it in 1570, during the revolt of Moriscos in the Alpujarras. Philip’s half-brother Don Juan recovered the city on October 11, 1573, but the Turks retook it for good in July 1574 (the Spanish garrison capitulated on September 13). 50. Lynch, Spain, 121–22, 315, 338. 51. AGS Estado leg. 461, n. 164. 52. Leaving aside governors drawn from the Habsburg royal family (who served mostly in Flanders), the only governor that held office for more than twenty years in the sixteenth century was Pedro A´lvarez de Toledo, Marquis of Villafranca and viceroy of Naples. Few governors ever served longer than ten years. For Villafranca, see Carlos Jose´ Hernando Sa´nchez, Castilla y Na´poles en el siglo XVI: El virrey Pedro de Toledo (Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y Leo´n, 1994). 53. High-ranking officials were subjected to visitas and residencias. Nevertheless, Martı´n’s audit was exceptional in that it was initiated in 1554, twenty years into the captain general’s term of office. Enjoying so much protection from Charles V, Martı´n’s administration had never been audited until Philip II took over as governor of Spain.

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n o t e s t o p a g e s 1 5 7 – 1 6 0 233 54. This privilege did not form part of the text of the contract, although both were issued from Segovia on June 4, 1534. AGS GA L-R n. 8, f. 201r; Charles V to Count of Alcaudete; Segovia, 4 June 1534. 55. BNE Ms. 1778, f. 151; Consejo de Estado to Charles V; Toledo, 1 July 1529. 56. BNE Ms. 1778, f. 155r; Presidente del Consejo to Charles V; s.l., s.f. (1529). On other occasions, the Count of Alcaudete also lobbied the emperor to tend to North Africa. AGS Estado leg. 470, n. 167; Count of Alcaudete to Philip II; Montemayor, 5 Aug. 1543. 57. Miguel Falomir Faus and Miguel A´ngel de Bunes Ibarra, ‘‘Carlos V, Vermeyen y la conquista de Tu´nez,’’ in CVEU, ed. J. L. Castellano Castellano et al. (Madrid: SEPC, 2001), 5:243–58; Alonso Acero, ‘‘El Norte de A´frica en el ocaso del emperador (1549– 1558).’’ 58. Five of them were sons of Abdallah al-Thabti, who reigned in Tlemcen from 1521 to 1534. Another was his nephew el-Montasar. La Veronne, Oran et Tlemcen, viii. 59. Paul Ruff, La domination espagnole a` Oran sous le gouvernement du comte d’Alcaudete, 1534–1558 (Paris: Editions Bouchene, 1998). La Veronne, Oran et Tlemcen. Also see Chantal de La Veronne, ‘‘Polı´tica del Mizwar al-Mansur B. Abi Ganim a mitad del siglo XVI,’’ Relaciones de la Penı´nsula Ibe´rica con el Magreb, siglos XIII–XVI (Madrid, 1988), 389–408. 60. Ruff gives an extensive account of the campaign itself in La domination espagnole, 117–37. He draws his narrative mainly from contemporary chronicles by Francisco de la Cueva and Baltasar de Morales. 61. AGS GA leg. 3141, s.n. (YGL-10); Charles V to Contadores Mayores; s.l., s.f. 1542. 62. AGS GA leg. 3141, s.n. (YGL-11); Charles V to Count of Alcaudete; s.l., s.f. 1542. 63. Emphasis added. AGS GA leg. 3141, s.n. (YGL-11); Charles V to Count of Alcaudete; s.l., s.f. 1542. 64. AGS GA leg. 3141, s.n. (YGL-14); Charles V to Francisco de Verdugo and Diego Cac¸alla; s.l., s.f. 1542. 65. AGS GA leg. 3141, s.n. (YGL-12); Charles V to albaceas of the Marquis of Tarifa; s.l., s.f. 1542. 66. AGS GA leg. 3141, s.n. (YGL-13); Charles V to Count of Alcaudete; s.l., s.f. 1542. 67. Ruff, La domination espagnole, 92. GA leg. 3141, s.n. (YGL-13); Charles V to Count of Alcaudete; s.l., s.f. 1542. 68. Martı´n de Co´rdoba had originally intended to hit Mostaganem first and then Tlemcen. In the end, he reversed the order of the campaign. 69. Emphasis added. AGS Estado leg. 351, n. 36; Charles V to Count of Alcaudete; s.l. March 1543. 70. AGS PR leg. 11, n. 108; Abdallah b. Muhammad b. Bogani, dicho original; Espejo, 14 March 1533. AGS PR leg. 11, n. 110; Marquis of Comares II to Charles V; Espejo, 16 March 1533. 71. AGS GA L-R n. 16, f. 104r; Charles V to Ahmed Beneat and Jacob Veniciar; Toledo, 10 Jan. 1539. AGS GA L-R n. 16, f. 118; Charles V to Ambassador of Tlemcen; Toledo, 1 Feb. 1539. At the end of their audience, the emperor instructed the Count of

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234 n o t e s t o p a g e s 1 6 0 – 1 6 2 Alcaudete to treat them with hospitality on their way back to Tlemcen via Oran, and to transport them in his own ship if no others were available in Ma´laga: AGS GA L-R n. 16, f. 152v; Charles V to Count of Alcaudete; Toledo, 18 April 1539. 72. AGS Estado leg. 479, n. 9–10; Carvajal to Princesa Juana; Oran, 15 May 1555. 73. M. J. Rodrı´guez-Salgado, The Changing Face of Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 266–88; Schaub, ‘‘El lado oscuro de la epopeya: La visita al conde de Alcaudete,’’ in CVEU, ed. J. L. Castellano Castellano et al. (Madrid: SEFC, 2001), 3:447. Philip’s thinking about North Africa differed markedly from that of his father and Martı´n. Philip and Martı´n would clash in 1556–58 when the new king would not commit sufficient forces for the defense of Oran during a critical moment when the Ottomans took Bugı´a from the Spaniards and laid siege to Oran. Philip also refused to authorize Martı´n’s request to lead a counterattack against the North Africans in 1557–58. In these years, however, the captain general was supported by Princess Juana, governor of Spain in Philip’s absence. 74. AGS GA leg. 58, f. 118; Prince Philip to Carvajal; La Corun˜a, 8 July 1554. 75. AGS Estado leg. 479, n. 9–10; Carvajal to Princess Juana; Oran, 15 May 1555. 76. The significance of the visita requires a study onto itself. Jean-Fre´de´ric Schaub briefly introduced the visita and published the count’s response to Carvajal’s charges in ‘‘El lado oscuro de la epopeya,’’ 449–57. 77. AGS GA leg. 59, n. 118. 78. Allegedly for 15,000 doublets and 30,000 fanegas of grain. Ahmed’s uncle and patron ben Reduan suffered the same fate. 79. For charges concerning the treatment of Muslims and Jews, see articles III–VI, X, and XI. AGS GA leg. 59, n. 118. 80. For charges concerning finance, see articles VII–IX and XII–XXVI. AGS GA leg. 59, n. 118. 81. For charges concerning soldiers and fortifications, see articles XXX–XXXVIII. AGS GA leg. 59, n. 118. The remaining articles, XXXIX–XLV, relate to jurisdictions, justice, and other royal officials in Oran and call for investigations into any other complaints brought to the attention of the visitador. 82. In the 1550s, the Spanish crown was undergoing an unstable succession of royal governors, from Prince Philip to Marı´a and Maximilian of Bohemia to Princess Juana and back to Philip. Administrative discontinuities must have been pervasive at this time, and furthermore, Martı´n was able to seek redress from Charles V in northern Europe and in Yuste. In particular, the count enjoyed the support of Princess Juana and the royal secretaries Juan Va´zquez de Molina and Francisco de Ledesma. The crown itself did not view the accusations against the captain general as violations of laws or moral affronts, but rather it felt that the officer, by not requesting royal license for his actions, exceeded his authority. 83. AGS Estado leg. 479, n. 129–30. Martı´n refused to give his discharge (descargo) to the visitador and requested an audience with Princess Juana or the Council of War to give his testimony instead. Officers were required to justify their management in descargos at the end of their term. Those with enough prestige presented the discharge in front of

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n o t e s t o p a g e s 1 6 2 – 1 6 7 235 the royal councils or the monarchs themselves. AGS Estado leg. 481, n. 184; Carvajal, information about the count refusing to give his discharge; Oran, 9 Jan. 1556. AGS Estado leg. 481, n. 93; Pedro de Ca´rdenas to Charles V; s.l., s.f. 1556. 84. AGS Estado leg. 480, n. 106; Carvajal to Princess Juana; Oran, 26 May 1555. 85. AGS GA leg. 60, n. 77; Carvajal to Princess Juana; Oran, 20 July 1555. AGS Estado leg. 479, n. 63–64; Carvajal to Consejo de Estado, Relacio´n de cartas; Oran, 12 Aug. 1555. AGS Estado leg. 480, n. 192–93; Carvajal to Princess Juana; Oran, 26 Nov. 1555. 86. AGS Estado leg. 480, n. 77–78; ‘‘Lo que paso don Martı´n de Co´rdoba y de Velasco quando vino con algunas personas y ynformac¸ion contra un criado suyo’’; Oran, 22 Dec. 1555. 87. Quintanilla Raso, ‘‘Los grandes linajes,’’ 79–110. 88. A wide variety of documents, including correspondence, depositions before tribunals, etc., have come to be accepted as autobiographical sources. James Amelang has observed that the early modern period saw a rise in soldiers’ autobiographies and that commanders often left behind a formal, printed account of their exploits. He has also noted that families often had traditions of recording ancestors’ advice and admonitions. See Amelang, ‘‘Popular Autobiography in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe: A Preliminary Approach,’’ in 1490: En el umbral de la modernidad (Valencia: Generalitat Valenciana, 1994), 407–9, 419. 89. AGS Estado leg. 473, s.n. (YGL-11); Count of Alcaudete to King Maximilian of Bohemia, ‘‘Al Principe mi sen˜or . . .’’; Oran, 17 Dec. 1548. 90. In contrast to Martı´n’s repeated reference to his move from Navarre to Oran, he never mentioned his move from Toledo to Navarre. This elevates the importance of the Navarre–Oran connection in how Martı´n viewed the development of his own identity. 91. AGS Estado leg. 470, n. 167; Count of Alcaudete to Philip II; Montemayor; 5 Aug. 1543. 92. AGS Estado leg. 480, n. 249; Consejo de Estado to Charles V, Relacio´n de carta of the Count of Alcaudete; s.l., s.f. 1555. I have been unable to locate additional records pertaining to the audits on Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba and the Marquis of Comares II. 93. Ironically, at the same time that Carvajal was investigating his father, Diego was auditing the viceroyalty of Valencia. See Ignacio J. Ezquerra Revilla, ‘‘Rehabilitacio´n de la justicia cortesana: La visita de Diego de Co´rdoba (1553–1554),’’ in CVQH, coord. Jose´ Martı´nez Milla´n (Madrid: SEFC, 2001), 2:199–320. 94. They do appear in Torres, Cro´nica de la provincia franciscana de Granada. 95. AGS Estado leg. 471, s.n. (YGL-57); Count of Alcaudete to Alonso de Co´rdoba, ‘‘Muy amado hijo. Por lo que tengo escrito . . .’’; Oran, 2 Dec. 1544. 96. AGS Estado 473, s.n. (YGL-7); Count of Alcaudete to Philip II, ‘‘A quatro del presente escreui a Vuestra Alteza con el vergantin . . .’’; Oran, 19 Feb. 1548. 97. AGS Estado leg. 473, s.n. (YGL-9); Count of Alcaudete to Juan Va´zquez de Molina, ‘‘Al princ¸ipe nuestro sen˜or . . .’’; Oran, 23 Oct. 1548. 98. In the introduction of her recent collection of essays, Helen Nader argues that the public roles exerted by noblewomen in early modern Spain were so commonplace as to have been missed by historical scholarship. Helen Nader, ed., Power and Gender in

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236 n o t e s t o p a g e s 1 6 7 – 1 7 1 Renaissance Spain: Eight Women of the Mendoza Family, 1450–1650 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004). 99. AGS Estado leg. 470, n. 170; Conde de Alcaudete to Juan Va´zquez de Molina; Alcaudete, 24 Oct. 1543. See also AGS Estado leg. 470, n. 182; Conde de Alcaudete to Philip II; Alcaudete, 24 Oct. 1543. 100. Cueva, Relacio´n de la guerra de Tremece´n; and Baltasar Morales, Dia´logo de las guerras de Ora´n, first published by Francisco de Cea (Co´rdoba, 1593) and republished by Antonio Rivas Morales (Granada, 1991). 101. Fernando Bouza has suggested that nobles and their secretaries were conscious of the fact that the various types of documents they produced, from estate records to correspondence with the crown, constituted a historical archive for the family. See Corre manuscrito: Una historia cultural del Silgo de Oro (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2001), 241–88. 102. Pedro Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba was Lord of Aguilar, now Marquis of Priego. He studied Latin under the tutelage of the Italian humanist Peter Martyr. Quintanilla Raso, ‘‘La biblioteca del marque´s de Priego (1518),’’ 351, 354. 103. The counts of Uruen˜a were also known for chronicles. 104. The Universidad de Osuna was established by Juan Te´llez Giro´n, Count of Uruen˜a IV, in 1548. Martı´nez del Barrio, ‘‘Educacio´n y mentalidad,’’ 68. 105. Luis Barahona de Soto, Dia´logos de la Monterı´a (Madrid: Sociedad de Biblio´filos Espan˜oles, 1890). Coincidentally, Barahona de Soto (1548–1595) was born on the Comares estate of Lucena in Co´rdoba. 106. Martı´nez del Barrio, ‘‘Educacio´n y mentalidad,’’ 72. The Duke of Osuna III also commissioned his chaplain Jayme Saporiti to write a work about his and his ancestors’ deeds: Jayme Saporiti, La combra de las heroycas hazan˜as, antigua nobleza y famosisismo gobierno del Excelentissimo sen˜or don Pedro Te´llez Giro´n, III duque de Osuna (Palermo, 1611). 107. Martı´nez del Barrio, ‘‘Educacio´n y mentalidad,’’ 73. 108. According to Nader, a good part of the Mendoza lineage’s intellectual production was aimed at preserving and interpreting its deeds. See Nader, Mendoza Family.

epilogue. children of empire Note to epigraph: AHN Nobleza Frı´as leg. 1339, n. 7; Martı´n de Co´rdoba y de Velasco, Testamento; Cartagena, 15 Jan. 1554. 1. Ruff, La domination espagnole, 173. 2. From his retirement at the Heronymite monastery of Yuste, the emperor was able to keep a closer watch on North African affairs and his collaborator and prote´ge´ Martı´n de Co´rdoba. The two remained in contact during the final two years of their lives, with the captain general appealing for an interview with the emperor in 1558. Charles, recognizing the dangers that Oran faced at that moment, refused the request. Alonso Acero, ‘‘El Norte de A´frica y el ocaso del emperador (1549–1558),’’ 410–11.

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n o t e s t o p a g e s 1 7 2 – 1 7 9 237 3. No other Alcaudete or Comares testament preserved in the historical record makes any kind of personal reference in the preamble. 4. Alfonso Ferna´ndez de Montemayor Lord of Alcaudete V married Catalina Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, sister of Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, as his second wife. Alfonso’s son Martı´n de Co´rdoba y de Velasco wedded Diego’s daughter Leonor Pacheco. 5. Unless otherwise specified, genealogical information in the following pages comes from Ferna´ndez de Bethencourt, Historia genealo´gica, vols. 6–9. 6. RAH Ms. M-45, f. 78r–81v; Luis Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba Marquis of Comares II, Testamento and codices; Lucena, 30 June 1564. 7. Catalina Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba married Luis Me´ndez de Haro y Guzma´n, who inherited the title of Count-Duque de Olivares from his mother, Francisca de Guzma´n, herself the sister of Gaspar de Guzma´n, King Philip IV’s famous chief minister and favorite. Luis de Co´rdoba y Arago´n Marquis of Comares VI took as his first wife the Duchess of Lerma III, granddaughter of Philip III’s favorite. Comares VI and the Duchess of Lerma did not have children, and he took a second wife, a daughter of the Count of Santiesteban. This latter family had contracted ties with a daughter of the Alcaudete family at the beginning of the sixteenth century. 8. The two titles continue to exist together today within the House of Medinaceli. 9. Kings had the right to ratify the marriages of their noble subjects. 10. Such concern for the bride’s estates may call into question how much an heiress’s identity was subsumed under her husband and lineage. It seems that an heiress could maintain her family’s separate identity to a degree. 11. AHN Nobleza Frı´as leg. 1334, n. 12; Bishop of Osma to Philip IV; s.l., s.f. (between 1633 and 1636). The match, however, did not come to fruition. She eventually married the Count of Oropesa. 12. Although his second son Luis died fighting on Philip II’s behalf in Antwerp and, characteristically, left no known children. BNE Ms. 1701, f. 142–143r; Transcription in Catalan and Castilian of the epitaph of Alfonso de Co´rdoba y de Arago´n’s tombstone in Poblet, Catalonia; Poblet, s.f. 1587. 13. Among the other two sons, one entered an ecclesiastical career and the other remained unmarried but fostered illegitimate children. 14. AHN Nobleza Osuna leg. 1858, n. 35; Philip II to Count of Alcaudete and Alonso de Co´rdoba y de Velasco, ‘‘Licencia y facultad para prometer 6,000 ducados de arras’’; Valladolid, 20 Feb. 1545. 15. Urquı´zar Herrera, El Renacimiento en la periferia, 152. 16. As a conscientious commander, Martı´n even left money for prayers to be said for the men who had died in his North African campaigns. 17. Provided, of course, the institution had a source of income in the form of either an endowment or continuing family patronage. 18. Santa Clara certainly was not the only institution patronized by the Alcaudete. The others were almost all in the environs of Co´rdoba or Andalusia. In his will, Martı´n de Co´rdoba also left money to the church of Santa Marı´a de Alcaudete; the Convent of

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238 n o t e s t o p a g e s 1 8 0 – 1 8 2 Santa Isabel de los A´ngeles de Co´rdoba; the monasteries of San Francisco, Santo Domingo, San Pablo de Co´rdoba, Santa Trinidad de la Cruzada de Co´rdoba, Santa Marı´a de la Merced de Co´rdoba, San Francisco del Monte, and San Francisco de la Vitoria de Ma´laga; the chapel of San Pedro de la Catedral de Co´rdoba; and the cathedral of Jae´n. AHN Nobleza Frı´as leg. 1339, n. 8; Martı´n de Co´rdoba, Testamento; Cartagena, 7 Jan. 1553. AHN Nobleza Frı´as leg. 1339, n. 7; Count of Alcaudete, Testamento; Cartagena, 15 Jan. 1554. 19. AGS Casa y Sitios Reales leg. 14, n. 226; Martı´n de Co´rdoba II to Philip II; Alcaudete, 7 Aug. 1561. AGS Casa y Sitios Reales leg. 14, n. 73; Martı´n de Co´rdoba II to Testamentarios of Charles V; Ma´laga,12 Sept. 1562. 20. AHN Nobleza Frı´as leg. 9, f. 13r; Martı´n de Co´rdoba II, Testamento; Alcaudete, s.f. 1604. 21. Leonor died in 1618, according to Torres, Cro´nica de la provincia franciscana de Granada, 598. 22. AHN Nobleza Frı´as leg. 9, f. 13r; Martı´n de Co´rdoba II, Testamento; Alcaudete, s.f. 1604. 23. He was also a member of the Council of State, the Comendador del Corral de Almaguer, and one of Co´rdoba’s two representatives to the Cortes. He also held the offices of Comendador de los Bastimentos de Castilla and Gentilhombre de la Camara de Felipe IV. AHPV Protocolos 1135, f. 732, 774; AHPV Protocolos 1145, f. 231. 24. The Pimentels possessed estates near Valladolid and dominated the city. The city also had strong ties to the royal family. Charles V, the empress, and their children frequently resided in Valladolid, where Philip II was born. Although Philip II established Spain’s first permanent capital city in Madrid, the Real Chancellerı´a was still based in Valladolid. Philip III later returned to the capital briefly to Valladolid, coinciding with the House of Alcaudete’s presence in Valladolid. 25. The Oropesa was a branch of the A´lvarez de Toledo, whose heads, the dukes of Alba, thoroughly validated its Castilian credentials.

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bibliography

Archival and Manuscript Sources ADA—Archivo Ducal de Alba (Madrid) Caja 32 ADM—Archivo Ducal de Medinaceli (Seville) Archivo Histo´rico legajos: 99, 162, 180, 347 Seccio´n Estado Comares legajos: 5, 6, 7, 14, 37 AGA—Archivo General de Andalucı´a (Seville) Seccio´n Estado Comares microfilms: 295, 296, 297, 340, 435 AGN—Archivo General de Navarra (Pamplona) Archivos Particulares Papeles de Rena cajas: 7, 9, 12, 15, 26, 29, 30, 31, 36, 37 Seccio´n Comptos Cajo´n 130 Libros de Mercedes Reales: 7, 13 Papeles Sueltos, Primera Serie legajos: 1, 23, 28 Seccio´n Reino Cortes legajos: 1, 2 Cortes—Recopilacio´n de Actas de Cortes libro: 20 Guerra, su fuero, acostamientos, suministros, bagajes, etc. legajos: 1, 2 Virreyes, sus nombramientos, recibimientos, juramentos y prerrogativas legajo: 1 Seccio´n Tribunales Reales Archivo Secreto del Consejo Real tı´tulos: 3.1, 4.1, 6.1, 7.1, 8.1, 9.1, 18.1, 20.1, 26.1 AGS—Archivo General de Simancas (Simancas) Seccio´n Ca´mara de Castilla Ce´dulas libros: 27, 46, 49, 50, 53, 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 71, 72, 248, 249, 250, 251 Memoriales legajos: 118, 121, 123, 126, 142, 145, 148, 155, 166, 168, 169, 175, 176, 180, 192, 193, 194, 195, 198, 199, 222, 298 Personas legajo: 1

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240 b i b l i o g r a p h y Seccio´n Casa y Sitios Reales legajos: 14, 141, 142 Seccio´n Consejo Real legajos: 67, 459, 635 Seccio´n Contadurı´a Mayor de Cuentas Primera E´poca legajo: 956 Seccio´n Contadurı´a de Mercedes legajo: 81 Seccio´n Escribanı´a Mayor de Rentas Incorporado legajos: 29, 31 Quitaciones de Corte legajo: 33 Seccio´n Estado Legajos: 2, 10, 11, 12, 22, 27, 30, 50, 58, 69, 70, 72, 80, 81, 83, 89, 96, 130, 267, 299, 305, 306, 313, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 344, 345, 346, 350, 351, 358, 361, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 484, 1362, 1562 Estado Libro: 68 Seccio´n Guerra Antigua Legajos: 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 16, 29, 30, 58, 60, 65, 3137, 3138, 3139, 3140, 3141 Libros-Registros: 6, 7, 8, 15, 16, 17, 18, 24, 25 Seccio´n Patronato Real legajos: 1, 10, 11, 13, 26 Seccio´n Mapas Planos, y Dibujos: I-9–I, III-32, IV-102, IV-103, IV-107, IV-118, V-155, VII-164, VII-131, VII-165, VIII-71, IX-49, IX-59, XI-36, XI-98, XIX-149. XIX-151, XXII-16, XXIII-72, XXIII-73, XXV-61, XXIX-100, XIX-150, XXV-61, XXXI-13, XLVII-71, XLVII-72, XLVII-75 Seccio´n Registro General del Sello 1488—November 1490—July, October 1492—January, May, June 1493—February, March, August 1494—November, December 1495—February 1497—May AHN—Archivo Histo´rico Nacional (Madrid) Seccio´n Co´dices libro: 1384–B Seccio´n Nobleza (Toledo) Frı´as legajos: 1333, 1334, 1335, 1336, 1337, 1338, 1339, 1340, 1349, 1353, 1354, 1355, 1356, 1357 Osuna legajos: 205, 241, 269, 285, 316, 320, 1635, 1776, 1781, 1858 Seccio´n Ordenes Militares Calatrava carpeta: 436 Pruebas de Santiago expedientes: 2102, 2107, 2123, 2916, 3861, 6560, 6566 Alca´ntara Pruebas Matrimoniales expediente: 121 Seccio´n Universidades legajo: 713 AHPV—Archivo Histo´rico Provincial de Valladolid (Valladolid) Protocolos cajas: 1133, 1134, 1135, 1136, 1137, 1138, 1139, 1140, 1141, 1142, 1143, 1144, 1145, 1146, 1147

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b i b l i o g r a p h y 241 AMC—Archivo Municipal de Co´rdoba (Co´rdoba) Cajas: 8, 21, 22, 1149, 1271, 1306, 1721 AMT—Archivo Municipal de Toledo (Toledo) Manuscript: 131 ARCG—Archivo de la Real Chancellerı´a de Granada (Granada) Pleitos: 95/2, 523/1, 417/8, 735/1, 741/4, 1033/7, 1072/10, 1215/11, 1287/5, 1302/11, 1362/ 1, 1366/12, 1413/10, 1571/7, 1574/7, 1598/6, 1965/16, 3180/2, 5333/14, 5356/3, 5409/ 3, 5410/2, 5418/1 BNE—Biblioteca Nacional de Espan˜a (Madrid) Sala de Cervantes manuscripts: 781, 784, 991, 1490, 1701, 1778, 1815, 1890, 2077, 2431, 2477, 2993, 3269, 3270, 3271, 3336, 3510, 4219, 7423, 9175, 9393, 13127, 20476 Sala de Cervantes printed rare books: R-6.459, R-25917 Sala de Goya maps: GM—M. II (179?) GM—M. XLII n. 386 (1732) GM—M. XLII n. 390 (1732–33) BPR—Biblioteca del Palacio Real (Madrid) Manuscripts: II/2143, II/2175, II/2445, II/3284, VIII/261, XIV/2978 BZ—Biblioteca Zaba´lburu (Madrid) Seccio´n Altamira legajo: 12 RAH—Biblioteca de la Real Academia de la Historia (Madrid) Manuscripts (I´ndice de Antonio Rodrı´guez Villa): 9/7161 Coleccio´n Salazar y Castro manuscripts: A-12, A-30, A-43, A-52, A-60, B-85, D-18, D-21, D-27, H-12, M-6, M-10, M-45, M-82, M-87, M-90, M-93, M-140, M-141

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b i b l i o g r a p h y 267 Va´zquez de Prada, Valentı´n, and Alfredo Florista´n Imı´zcoz. ‘‘The Relationship of the Kingdom of Navarre with the Central Government.’’ Parliaments, Estates and Representation 9, no. 2 (1989): 123–35. Va´zquez de Prada, Valentı´n et al., eds. Las Cortes de Navarra desde su incorporacio´n a la Corona de Castilla: Tres siglos de actividad legislativa (1513–1829). Vol. 1 (1513–1621). Pamplona: Universidad de Navarra, 1993. Vilar, Juan Bautista. Mapas, planos y fortificaciones hispa´nicos de Tu´nez (s. XVI–XIX). Madrid: Instituto de Cooperacio´n con el Mundo A´rabe, 1991. Vilar Sa´nchez, Juan Antonio. 1526. Boda y luna de miel del emperador Carlos V: La visita imperial a Andalucı´a y al reino de Granada. Granada: Universidad de Granada, 2000. Villegas Dı´az, Luis Rafael. ‘‘El caso de la villa de Chillo´n (1525).’’ Las ciudades andaluzas, 189–99. Ma´laga: Universidad de Ma´laga, 1991. Vincent, Bernard. ‘‘Les Rois Catholiques, le Royaume de Grenade et la construction de l’Etat.’’ In Recherce sur l’histoire de l’e´tat dans le monde ibe´rique, edited by Jean-Fre´de´ric Schaub. Paris: Presse de l’Ecole Normale Supe´rieure, 1993. Williams, Patrick. The Great Favourite: The Duke of Lerma and the Court and Government of Philip III of Spain, 1598–1621. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006. Wood, James. The Nobility of the Election of Bayeux, 1463–1666: Continuity Through Change. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980. Yahya, Dahiru. Morocco in the Sixteenth Century: Problems and Patterns in African Foreign Policy. Burnt Mill, Essex: Longman, 1981. Yates, Frances. Astraea: The Imperial Theme in the Sixteenth Century. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975. Yun Casalilla, Bartolome´. Crisis de subsistencias y conflictividad social en Co´rdoba a principios del siglo XVI: Una ciudad andaluza en los comienzos de la modernidad. Co´rdoba: Diputacio´n Provincial, 1980. ———. La gestio´n del poder: Corona y economı´as aristocra´ticas en Castilla (siglos XVI– XVIII). Madrid: Ediciones Akal, 2002. ———. Marte contra Minerva: El precio del imperio espan˜ol, 1450–1600. Barcelona: Crı´tica, 2004. Yun Casalilla, Bartolome´, dir. Las redes del imperio: E´lites sociales en la articulacio´n de la Monarquı´a Hispa´nica, 1492–1714. Madrid: Marcial Pons Historia, 2009. Zabalza Aldave, Marı´a Itziar. ‘‘Elaboracio´n de la no´mina de Navarra en el s. XVI.’’ HSJ 1 (1994): 99–113.

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index

absolutism, 12, 23, 56, 69–70, 100. See also administration; Catholic Monarchs; Charles V; monarchy; nobles administration, 2–7, 15, 79; audiencias, 94–95, 100, 105; Casa de Contratacio´n, 153; contadores mayores, 158; Council of Military Orders, 23, 180; Council of War, 4, 120, 150, 155, 157, 168; documentation, 19, 39, 94, 163–67; foreigners in, 14, 194 n.57; governors of Spain, 93, 96, 164, 225 n.70, 234 n.82; holding multiple offices, 155, 222 n.22; juntas, 189 n.5; jurists, 10, 106, 125, 193 n.48; law, 10, 11, 14–15, 21–22, 33, 42, 61, 117, 196 n.83; municipal officers, 41, 42, 72, 77, 79, 83–84, 87, 89, 92, 95–103, 110, 138; networks of, 1–5, 74–76, 79–80, 105, 126, 129, 211 n.103; provisioners, 36, 74, 129, 148, 152, 154, 162, 167, 213 n.121; quinta de la cavalgada, 158; reproduction of, 3, 75–76, 82–87, 105, 130, 139–40; royal councils, 2, 15, 56, 69, 72–73, 75–77, 79, 100–101, 105, 148–49, 151, 153, 156–57, 165; royal favorites, 15, 237 n.7; servicios, 83, 104; viceroys, 15, 69, 81, 118, 140. See also Catholic Monarchs; connected histories; empire; experience; monarchy; nobles; residencia; visita Admiral of Castile: 12, 62, 67, 73; governor of Spain, 84, 90, 93, 98, 100–101 Adrian of Utrecht, 93, 96 Afa´n de Ribera, Per, 165 Agramontes, faction of, 221 n.13 Aguilar, Alfonso de (Lord of Aguilar VI), 40, 62, 64–67, 70, 77 Aguilar (Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba), House of, ix, 23–25, 70, 95, 169, 172; alliance with

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Comares, 41, 76, 172, 175–76; birthrates, 44; conflict with Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, 40, 55–56, 70–71, 77–79; estates, 35, 37, 39–40, 64, 67, 72, 79, 103; honorific service, 55–56, 81, income, 63–64, 66; library, 168–69; marriage strategies, 43–51, 76–77, 172, 175–76; municipal offices, 77; rebellion, 70–72; service to empire, 56, 64, 66, 79, 205 n.7; servicios, 65, title of Marquis of Priego, 68. See also Aguilar, Alfonso de; Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba lineage; Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, Pedro Alba (A´lvarez de Toledo), House of: 5, 134; conquest of Navarre, 60, 79, 120; Constable of Navarre, 134; Granada War, 62, 64, 66–67; relations with Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, 60, 71, 74; service at court, 54, 58, 74, 126 Albret dynasty, 113–14, 122, 132–33, 135–36; Jean II de, 115–16, 119, 135; Henri II de, 119– 21, 135; patrons of Calvinism, 154 Albuquerque (de la Cueva), House of, 5–6, 62, 64, 73, 93, 173–74 Alcala´ de los Gazules (Afa´n de Ribera), House of: 5, 15, 50–51; Marquis of Tarifa, 51, 158– 59. See also Afa´n de Ribera, Per Alcaudete (Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba), House of, ix, 24–25, 83; attrition, 5, 106–8, 127, 183; autobiography, 163–72, 178; birthrates, 44, 107; Chapel of San Pedro, 5, 51–53, 177; Convent of Santa Clara, 5, 107–8, 172, 177– 81, 183; estates, 35–43, 64–65, 67–68, 103, 108, 134, 160, 175–76, 179; Granada War, 64, 66; identity, 51–53, 123–33, 163–70, 177–82; income, 56, 63; marriage strategies,

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270 i n d e x Alcaudete (Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba) (continued ) 1, 43–51, 91, 106–9, 126, 131–33, 172–73, 175–82; relations with Comares, 48–49, 70, 81; relations with Cabra, 48–49, 76, 91, 126, 135; service to empire, 2, 55–56, 62, 66, 80, 83, 92, 108, 123–40, 163, 165, 171–72; servicios, 65; testaments, 51–52, 171, 180. See also Co´rdoba y de Velasco, Martı´n; Co´rdoba y de Velasco, Alonso; Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba lineage Algiers, 14, 142–44, 148, 150, 156, 158–59, 179; Pen˜o´n de A´rgel, 150 Alhama, 2, 11, 57 Almohad dynasty, 31, 87, 142, 200 n.18 Almoravid dynasty, 31, 142 Altman, Ida, 17 Americas, 7, 12, 15, 68, 191n.23. See also Caribbean; Mexico; Nicaragua; Peru Andalusia, 72, 77, 84, 112, 124, 129; Comunidades Revolt, 92–95; conquest of, 12, 23, 31, 33, 43, 88; geography, 1, 36, 40, 88; grain, 148; nobles, 62, 64–67, 71–75, 122, 131, 134– 35, 137, 157, 172, 176. See also Co´rdoba; Jae´n; Seville Aragon, 7, 54–55, 71, 112–13, 120, 131, 184; administration of, 14, 69, 116; Mediterranean interests, 142; nobles of, 5, 51, 107, 131, 172– 73, 183; road to Santiago, 115; soldiers from, 131. See also frontiers Arago´n, Juana de (wife of Marquis of Comares III), 107, 131, 173–74, 177 Aram, Bethany, 68, 155, 193 n.44 Archivo General de Simancas ix, 39, 94, 96 Argote, family of, 47, 49–50 Arzeo, 60–61, 143–44 Barahona de Soto, Luis, Dia´logos de la Monterı´a, 169 Barbarossa brothers, Aruj and Khayr al-Din, 139, 149–50, 156, 165 Barkey, Karen, 9, 16, 18 Barrera-Osorio, Antonio, 17, 153 Basque Country, 74, 84, 93–95, 113, 119–21, 129, 131, 168 Basque language, 114, 117, 154 Beamontes, faction of, 115, 132, 134. See also Lerı´n (Beamonte), House of Be´arn, 114, 116, 122 Bejar (Zu´n˜iga), House of, 73, 176

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Benavente (Pimentel), House of, 5, 62–63, 66–67, 93, 126, 177, 181–82 Bleichmar, Daniela, 17, 226 n.75 Boabdil (Abu ‘Abdallah Muhammad), emir of Granada, 57–58, 182 Braudel, Fernand, 141, 170 Burgundian dynasty, 8 caballeros, 11–12, 101, 127, 155, 193 n.48 Cabra (Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba), House of, 24–25, 70–71, 89, 126, 135, 163, 172; battle of Lucena, 57; birthrates, 44; Duke of Sessa, ambassador of Spain in Rome, 101; estates, 35, 37, 64–67, 103; honorific service, 56, 81; income, 62–63; marriage strategies, 43–51, 172–76; municipal offices, 77; rebellion against King Ferdinand, 70–72; relations with Alcaudete, 41, 76, 101, 126, 135; relations with Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, 55, 77; service to empire, 56–58, 62, 64, 66, 79, 89, 205 n.7; servicios, 65; title of Count of Cabra, 24, 68. See also Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba lineage Ca´diz (Ponce de Leo´n), House of, 92, 135, 137; in the Comunidades Revolt, 92; Granada War, 2, 11, 62–67; income, 63; marriage strategies, 50, 174; relations with Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, 50, 57; Rodrigo Ponce de Leo´n, 57. See also Luis Ponce de Leo´n Cambrai, Treaty of, 119 Capetian dynasty, 113–14 Cardona (Arago´n Folch), House of, 5, 107, 131, 173, 176. See also Arago´n, Juana de; Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, Diego (Marquis of Comares III) Caribbean, 7, 11 Carrillo, Marı´a (sister of Martı´n de Co´rdoba), 108 Cartagena, 143, 148, 166, 171 Casey, James, 21 Castile, 7, 26, 30–31, 35–36, 40, 52, 70–71, 79–80, 82, 87–89, 92, 96–97, 100, 104, 112– 15, 119–22, 162; governorship of, 14, 55, 105, 131; Old Castile, 36, 72, 92, 96, 124, 131, 182; nobles of, 5, 32–33, 43, 51, 65–66, 73, 80, 107, 172, 177; union with Aragon, 7, 184 Castro del Rı´o, 71, 77 Catholic Monarchs (Isabella and Ferdinand), 65, 88; Battle of Lucena, 57–58; centralization, 10, 12, 70, 72, 79, 98; Granada War,

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i n d e x 271 40, 58, 66; marriage, 7–8; relations with Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, 1, 3, 57–60, 67, 79, 108. See also Ferdinand, king of Spain; Isabella, queen of Spain Ceuta, 142 Champagne, House of, 113–14 Charles II, king of Spain, 10 Charles V, king of Spain, ix, 8, 10–11, 23, 75, 76, 81–83, 88, 156, 164; Battle of Pavia, 97, 117, 119, 127; Comunidades Revolt, 6, 86– 87, 92–104; death of, 82–83, 96, 171; foreign king, 14, 83, 86, 96; Holy Roman Emperor, 8, 83, 104, 216 n.33; Navarre, 116, 120, 122; marriage, 103–4; North Africa policy, 14, 150–60; relations with family, 96, 156, 163; relations with Luis Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, 150–52, 157; relations with nobles, 57, 62, 84, 93, 100, 126; relations with Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, 75, 94–95, 100–104, 126, 130, 149, 157–62, 164, 166, 171, 179, 234 n.82, 236 n.2; rumors about, 82–83, 97; visit to Alcaudete, 103 Cobos, Francisco de los, 13, 75–76, 122, 149, 211 n.101, 218 n.58 Cobos, Pedro de los, 75–76 Colonna, Marco Antonio (Duke of Tagliacozzo de Marsi y Paleano), 13 Columbus, Christopher, 12, 23 Comares (Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba), House of, ix, 24–25, 163–64; birthrates, 44; coat of arms, 58, 60; estates, 37, 39, 49–50, 58, 60– 62, 64–65, 71, 160; extinction, 176; income, 56, 63; marriage strategies, 44–51, 107–8, 172–76; municipal offices, 77; relations with Aguilar, 41, 71–77; relations with Alcaudete, 48–49, 56, 81; relations with Ca´diz, 135, 189 n.6; relations with Tendilla, 80; service to empire, 25, 55, 81, 110, 139, 164, 172, 176, 237 n.12; servicios, 65. See also Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, Diego; Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba lineage; Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, Luis Comunidades Revolt, 6, 83–84, 86, 110, 122; in Andalusia, 92; in Toledo, 82–83, 86, 97; Battle of Villalar, 120; in historical memory, 120, 122, 164; leaders of, 91, 98; service of nobles, 94; threat of France, 93–94. See also Charles V; Co´rdoba y de Velasco,

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Martı´n de; monarchy: restoration; Pacheco, Marı´a Conchillos, Lope de, 75, 194 n.57 connected histories, 2–3, 7–8, 13–14, 17–19, 130–38, 149, 154–56, 170, 183, 196 n.80, 209 n.63; Algeria and Navarre, 2–3, 18, 55, 84, 136–38, 154–55, 163, 235 n.90; Andalusia and Aragon, 5, 131; Andalusia and Granada, 27, 33, 35–40, 57–58, 64–66, 155; Andalusia and Navarre, 124–25, 131–37, 209 n.63; Andalusia and North Africa, 60–62, 137, 148, 152, 155, 157, 199 n.5, 210 n.88; Aragon and Italy, 155; Brihuega and Puebla de los Angeles, 17, 196 n.85; Castile and Aragon, 7–8, 14, 54–55, 194 nn.57–58, 205 n.2; Castile and Portugal, 18, 104; Co´rdoba and Toledo, 87–92; disconnections, 19–20, 31, 113, 116, 157, 204 n.1; Navarre and Basque Country, 114, 131; Navarre and Iberia, 112– 17, 132–37, 227 n.86; Navarre and Italy, 135–36, 228 n.94; Navarre and northern Europe, 112–17, 132, 135, 221 nn.14, 18; North Africa and Italy, 148, 157; peripheryperiphery connections, 18, 196 nn.77–78, 80; Segovia and Nicaragua, 155; Spain and the Holy Roman Empire, 8, 82, 117, 119, 225 n.68, 136, 151; Spain and the Ottoman Empire, 16, 195 n.73; Trujillo and Peru, 155. See also experience; family; monarchy Constable of Castile, 51, 63, 73, 105; governor of Spain, 84, 93–94, 96, 98, 100–101; Granada War, 62, 67; income, 63; ransom of French princes, 121–22. See also Frı´as, House of Convent of Santa Clara, 86, 106, 108–9, 130, 172, 177–81, 226 n.72 Co´rdoba, Ana Mo´nica (Countess of Alcaudete VI), 175–77, 182, 219 n.83 Co´rdoba, Carlos de (illegitimate son of Count of Alcaudete I), 109 Co´rdoba, cathedral-mosque of, 5, 51–53, 91, 168, 178 Co´rdoba, city and province of: Campin˜a, 31, 34–39, 77; castles, 38–40; Christianization, 31; conquest of, 31, 33; demography, 31, 33– 35, 37; geography, 26, 33–34, 38–40; Inquisition, 72; Granada War, 66; landownership, 32–40; municipal offices,

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272 i n d e x Co´rdoba (continued ) 41, 72, 77; local history, 20, 26–53; local nobility, 38–41, 43–53, 73, 134–35, 194 n.43; Muslims, 31, 33; parish of San Nicola´s de la Villa, 23, 31; plague, 33; repartimiento of, 32; repoblacio´n of, 30, 33; roads, 40. See also Andalusia; Co´rdoba, cathedral-mosque; Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba lineage Co´rdoba y de Pimentel, Antonia Marı´a de (Countess of Alcaudete V), 181 Co´rdoba y de Velasco, Alfonso de (brother of Martı´n de Co´rdoba), 5, 86, 101, 106, 108–9, 123, 126–28, 130, 138, 172 Co´rdoba y de Velasco, Alonso de (Count of Alcaudete II): assistant in Navarre, 128; assistant in Oran, 128, 140, 160, 165–67; captain general of Oran, 109, 132, 168, 180; corregidor of Toledo, 89; death, 181; marriage, 177, 215 n.15; pageboy of Isabel of Portugal, 112, 124–26; succession to Siruela, 105–6; viceroy of Navarre, 132–35 Co´rdoba y de Velasco, Diego de (son of Martı´n de Co´rdoba), 109, 112, 123, 132, 166 Co´rdoba y de Velasco, Francisco de (Count of Alcaudete IV), 106, 177, 181 Co´rdoba y de Velasco, Francisco de (son of Martı´n de Co´rdoba), 109, 112, 164, 166, 225 n.68 Co´rdoba y de Velasco, Martı´n de (Count of Alcaudete I): autonomy in North Africa, 156–63, 171–72; captain general of Oran, 84, 139–41, 156–68, 171–72; corregidor of Toledo, 83–84, 95–104, 109; daughters, 5, 106–7, 112, 166, 177–81, 183; death, 132, 171; defense of Basque Country, 93–94; historical consciousness, 120, 122, 163–70; marriage, 1; mental world, 135–37; middle member of high nobility, 93; military forces, 86, 105, 122; obrero of Co´rdoba, 101; mother, 93, 105, 178; patronage of Tlemcen, 160, 165–66, 233 n.71; relations with Cabra, 135; relations with Charles V, 95, 101–3, 117, 126–28, 159–60, 225 n.68, 232 n.53, 234 n.82, 236 n.2; relations with Constable of Castile, 51, 93–94, 105, 121; relations with Francisco de los Cobos, 76, 218 n.58; relations with Juan Rena, 75–76, 129–30; residencia in Toledo, 102–3; service

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in Comunidades Revolt, 84, 92–94, 109; sisters of, 108; succession to Siruela, 84–86, 105–6; testament, 171; title of Count of Alcaudete, ix, 5, 24, 84, 109; viceroy of Navarre, 83, 109, 111, 113, 117–23, 134–38, 151; visita of Oran, 160–63. See also Alcaudete, House of; Pacheco, Leonor (wife of Martı´n de Co´rdoba) Co´rdoba y de Velasco, Martı´n II de (son of Martı´n de Co´rdoba): assistant in Oran, 132, 162, 165–66, 179–80; captain general of Oran, 13, 109, 132, 140, 180; captivity and ransom, 179; marriage, 132–33, 177; patronage of Convent of Santa Clara, 179–81; viceroy of Navarre, 13, 140, 180 Co´rdoba y de Velasco, Pedro de (brother of Martı´n de Co´rdoba), 108, 126–27 Corte´s, Herna´n, 8, 11, 14, 23, 126 Cortes (Navarra), House of, 132–34, 177 Cortes of Santiago (1520), 83, 103 Cortes of Toledo (1525), 86, 88, 102–4 Cortes of Valladolid (1523), 103 Cueva, Francisco de la, Relacio´n de la guerra de Tremece´n, 168 Da´vila, Pedrarias, 12, 61, 69, 155 Dı´az, Rodrigo ‘‘El Cid,’’ 11 Elliott, John, 14, 26–27, 192 n.33 empire: assembly of territories, 3, 8, 18–19, 130; circulation of individuals, 2, 13, 17, 123–34, 140, 154–56, 170, 183; decline of, 9, 192 n.33; enactment of, 4, 130, 140; envisioning, 13–14, 135–37, 140, 183, 226 n.75; impact on families, 5, 21–23, 106–10, 123– 30, 183; imperium, 10; mobility, 123–30; monarchical power, 3–4, 9; as networks, 2–4, 15–18, 132–34, 155, 170–82, 184, 195 n.68, 196 n.80; subalterns, 9; theory, 8–15; universal, 10. See also administration; connected histories; experience; monarchy; nobles; social networks England, 74, 112–14, 221 n.18 Enrique II, king of Castile-Leo´n, 21, 35, 43, 52 Enrique IV, king of Castile, 7, 41, 51, 69, 77, 107 Eraso, Francisco de, 76, 134 Estella, 115, 120–21 Evreux, House of, 113–14

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i n d e x 273 experience: concept of, 14, 140, 149–56, 231 n.34; gathering, 167–69; in imperial service, 13–15, 153–54; transmission, 3, 14, 17, 140, 154–55, 167–70, 194 n.55, 232 n.40; value of, 3, 151–53, 189 n.8, 193 n.54, 230 n.18. See also Co´rdoba y de Velasco, Martı´n de; empire; Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, Diego; Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, Luis Extremadura, 42, 48, 50–51, 64, 74, 105, 155, 175 Falces (Peralta), House of, 133, 154 family: biological reproduction, 3, 5, 7–8, 23– 25, 30, 43–51, 86, 106–7; casa, 22, 52–53, 129; clan and lineage, 21–23, 52–53; disaggregation of branches, 22; extinction, 48– 50, 107, 131, 172–73, 175, 182; genealogical tables, x, 24, 78, 85, 174, 178; identity, 22, 52–53, 123–30, 163–69, 171–82; landownership, 21–23, 52–53; networks, 1–5, 7–8, 19– 20, 43–51, 76–79, 91, 93, 104–10, 131–37, 172–82, 211 n.103; patrilineal descent, 21; primoge´nito, 21, 24, 48–49; reproduction of state and administration, 2–3, 7–8, 21, 76, 84, 105, 203 n.63; social reproduction, 21–23, 43–51, 104–10, 169. See also Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba lineage; experience; mayorazgo; nobles; women Ferdinand, Holy Roman Emperor, 73, 96, 225 n.61 Ferdinand, king of Spain, 23, 69, 72, 98, 164, 184; Aragonese interests, 14, 79, 142; death of, 73–74, 83, 89; governor of Castile, 14, 54–55, 69–71, 164; invasion of Navarre, 115–16, 228 n.94; marriage to Germaine de Foix, 115, 204 n.1; namesake of grandson, 96; relations with Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, 1, 3, 60, 70, 72–77, 79, 101, 149, 182; relations with Juan Rena, 74. See also Catholic Monarchs; Isabella, queen of Spain Ferna´ndez de Bethencourt, Francisco, 198 n.100, 202 n.54 Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, Alfonso (Lord of Alcaudete I), 51–53, 77, 178–79 Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, Alfonso (Lord of Alcaudete V, father of Martı´n de Co´rdoba), 178 Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, Antonio (Corregidor of Toledo), 89, 92, 98

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Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, Diego (Marquis of Comares I): battle of Lucena, 57; captain general of Oran, 55, 73, 80, 139, 164–66; conquest of Mers el-Kebir, 2, 12, 55, 80, 182; conquest of Navarre, 2, 55, 60, 73, 80; Granada War, 2, 64, 80; marriage, 77, 107; presence in Toledo, 92; relations with House of Aguilar, 40–41, 77–79; relations with Juan Rena, 74–75, 124, 129; relations with King Ferdinand, 1, 3, 60, 70–77, 182; relations with Martı´n de Co´rdoba, 1–2, 83–84; revolt of Granada, 59; title of Alcaide de los Donceles, ix, 24, 58, 68; title of Marquis of Comares, ix, 5, 24, 55, 58, 237 n.8; visita of Oran, 165. See also Comares, House of Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, Diego (Marquis of Comares III), 61, 107, 131, 173–74, 176–77 Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, Francisca (wife of Luis Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba), 173 Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, Francisco (Abad de Rute), 163 Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, Gonzalo (Gran Capita´n), 72, 79 Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba lineage: birthrates, 44, 106–7; branches, 23–25, 43–51; circulation, 19–20; endogamy, 48–49, 176; estates, 23, 35, 37–40, 64, 75–77, 202 n.45; factions, 39–41, 55–56, 76, 135, 201 n.43; identity, 5, 23, 38–43, 51–55, 205 n.6; income, 63; marriage strategies, 5, 22, 44–51, 106–8, 131–34, 172–83, 213 n.123; military forces, 40, 64; name, ix, 23–24, 29–30, 50; origins, 23–25; primoge´nitos, 23, 48–49; presence in Toledo, 87, 89–92; service at court, 25; service for empire, 1–8, 25, 138, 163, 183–84; servicios, 65; titles, ix, 24, 68;. See also Aguilar, Cabra, Comares, Alcaudete, Houses of; Co´rdoba y de Velasco, Martı´n de; Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, Luis (Marquis of Comares II), 76, 172; ambassadors of Tlemcen, 160; captain general of Oran, 83, 137, 139, 149–56, 162, 164, 166, 230 n.27; children, 173; in the Comunidades Revolt, 92; discourse of experience, 150–54, 163; marriage, 173, 219 n.80; provision of Oran, 150–51, 153, 156; resignation from

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274 i n d e x Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, Luis (continued ) captaincy general, 151, 153–54, 176; visita of Oran, 165 Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, Pedro de (Lord of Aguilar VII and Marquis of Priego I), 68, 70–72, 168–69. See also Aguilar, House of Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, Teresa, 95 Fernando III, king of Castile-Leo´n, 23, 29, 31–32 Flanders, 2, 14, 54, 83, 96, 131, 155 Foix dynasty, 113–16, 122, 133, 135–36; Catherine de (queen of Navarre), 115–16, 119, 135; Gaston de, 228 n.94; Germaine de, 54, 115, 204 n.1 France: colonialism in North Africa, 141; military forces, 119–20, 135; monarchy of, 114, 135–37, 149, 154, 159; Ottoman alliance, 149; relations with Navarre, 93, 112–24, 132, 134; relations with Spain, 6–7, 18, 79, 104, 140, 184. See also Francis I Francis I, king of France: 104; capture of, 117, 119; ransom of sons, 117, 119–23 Frı´as (Velasco), House of, 5, 77, 219 n.83. See also Constable of Castile; Siruela, House of; Velasco, Marı´a de frontier: Aragon, 120; Baleares Islands, 149, 156; Basque Country, 84, 93, 119–20, 168; Cerdagne, 115, 120; Christians, Muslims, and Jews, 142; experience on frontiers, 3, 154–55, 163; Granada, 27, 35–39, 149, 156, 178; mental, 3–4, 13–14, 135–38, 183; Navarre, 18, 112–23, 140, 154; North Africa, 18, 136–37, 140, 142, 149; Perpignan and Rousillon, 115, 168; Valencia, 11, 136, 142, 149, 154, 168. See also Americas; Castile; connected histories; Co´rdoba; Granada; Navarre; Oran Galı´ndez de Carvajal, Antonio, 160–66 Games, Alison, 17 geography: Co´rdoba, 26–30, 38; Navarre, 124; Oran, 141–49; Spain, 27, 124; Toledo, 87. See also connected histories; Mediterranean; North Africa Gibraltar: siege, 11, 72; Strait, 20, 30, 55, 60, 141–42 Gonza´lez de Cellorigo, Martı´n, 21 Gonza´lez de Mendoza, Pedro (archbishop of Toledo), 88, 91

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Granada, 20, 27, 75, 79, 103, 109, 111, 116, 124, 138, 142; audiencia, 94; captaincy general, 79, 91; capital city, 35; defense of, 136–37; emirate, 31, 33–40, 52, 182–84. See also Granada War Granada War, 2–3, 7, 11, 25, 27, 40, 64–70, 77, 80–81, 88–89, 141–42, 155; Battle of Lucena, 57–58; distribution of estates, 12, 67; Muslims of, 58–59; siege of Alhama, 2. See also Granada Guadalquivir River, 34–35, 41, 87 Guzma´n lineage, 5–6, 50; House of Olivares, 16, 174–75; Marquis of Ayamonte, 173. See also Medina Sidonia, House of Habsburg dynasty, 8, 54–55, 70–71, 75–76, 82–83, 86–117, 184. See also Charles V; Comunidades Revolt; Philip I Hafsid dynasty, 156 Haliczer, Stephen, 100, 214 n.4 Harding, Robert, 17 Hathaway, Jane, 16 Herrera, Miguel de, 154–55 Hess, Andrew, 141, 170 history: autobiographies, 235 n.88; chronicles, 168, 206 n.12; and geography, 18–20, 27, 29–30, 33–40, 112–17, 182, 202 n.45; family archives, history, and genealogy, x, 1–3, 6–8, 21–25, 43–53, 78, 85, 105–10, 163–70, 198 n.100, 202 n.54, 236 n.101; historical memory, 38, 61, 163–72, 230 n.21; relaciones de guerra and hazan˜as, 168–69; local, 20, 26–53, 87–104, 141–49; memorials and monuments, 38–39, 51–52, 58–60, 87, 89– 91, 178–79; family history of empire, 7, 19– 20, 184; narratives of nation-states, 19; testaments, 51–52, 171–72, 178–81; transition from Middle Ages to early modern period, 2, 4–6, 22–23, 27, 38, 41, 44, 51, 53, 56, 107–10, 176. See also connected histories; family Hundred Years’ War, 114 Hurtado de Mendoza, Lope, 165 Inquisition, 59, 72–73, 89, 132 Isabel of Portugal (wife of Charles V): court of, 125–26; governor of Spain, 96, 111–12, 118–26, 135–37, 150–52, 157–64; marriage

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i n d e x 275 of, 103–4; provision of North Africa, 151. See also Charles V Isabella, queen of Spain: ix, 23, 41, 58, 77, 104; death of, 55, 60, 70, 115, 141. See also Catholic Monarchs; Ferdinand, king of Spain Italy, 14, 20, 135, 137, 155, 169, 183–84; Aragonese territories in, 71; grain, 148; Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba in, 123, 126–27, 130, 138, 141; Franco-Spanish wars, 2, 27, 54, 68, 79– 80, 104, 112, 115–16, 121–23, 136. See also Naples; Sicily Jae´n, 27, 31–33, 35–37, 40, 50–51, 73, 75, 88, 92–93, 108, 175 Jews, 31, 142, 153–54, 161 Jime´nez de Cisneros, Francisco (archbishop of Toledo), 88–90; conquest of Oran, 12, 89–90, 141–42, 165; Granada, 59; regent, 54, 59, 71, 73, 89, 141 Juana, princess of Spain, 161, 164, 234 nn.73, 82–83 Juana, queen of Castile, 54–55, 68, 70–73, 86, 96; court of, 70–71, 73 Junta de La Rambla, 93 Khoury, Dina Rizk, 16 Kivelson, Valerie, 17 Koenigsberger, Helmut, 14 Ladero Quesada, Miguel A´ngel, 64–65 Le´rin (Beamonte), House of, 115, 132–34 Lerma (Sandoval), House of, 174–75 Lo´pez de Palacios Rubios, Juan, 10 Madrid, 27, 84, 88, 172, 177 Ma´laga, 40, 59, 148, 152, 154–55, 158, 166 Mann, Michael, 16 Marı´a, princess of Spain and Maximilian, archduke of Austria, 164, 234 n.82 Marineo Sı´culo, Lucio, 62, 208 n.42 Marinid dynasty, 142 mayorazgo, 21–22, 43, 105, 158, 176, 179 Medinaceli (de la Cerda), House of, 5, 62–64, 67, 93, 126, 174, 237 n.8 Medina Sidonia (Guzma´n), House of, 61–62; in the Comunidades Revolt, 92; conquest of Melilla, 11, 61, 80, 142; Granada War, 62, 64, 67; income, 63; siege of Gibraltar, 11, 72;

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Mediterranean, 6–7, 17, 20, 26, 27, 30, 118, 130, 136, 140–44, 149; Muslim-Christian relations in, 20, 142; southern, 61, 136–37, 141–44, 156, 158; Spanish Empire in, 7, 27, 31, 136; Ottoman Empire in, 16, 149–50; western, 14, 112, 149–50, 156, 164, 183 Melilla, 11, 61, 80, 142, 231 n.36 Mendoza, Antonio de, 177 Mendoza, Francisca de (wife of Alonso de Co´rdoba y de Velasco), 177, 215 n.15 Mendoza lineage, 5–6, 16–17, 62, 70, 80, 88, 93; Count and Countess of Corun˜a, 66; Duke of Infantado, 51, 66, 73, 80; identity, 236 n.108; income, 63; Lord of Ita and Buitrago, 174. See also Gonza´lez de Mendoza, Pedro; Mendoza, Marı´a; Tendilla, House of Mers el-Kebir, 55, 60–61, 71, 80, 136, 143–44, 154, 182 Mexico, 8, 11, 14, 17, 69, 155, 177 military orders, 13, 32, 36, 57, 124, 180 military revolution, 56 monarchy: centralization, 6, 12, 23, 56, 61, 69–70; control of noble marriages, 131–32, 175–77, 183; decline, 9; as empire, 8–9; dependence on nobility, 54–57, 64–74, 83– 87, 92–104, 211 n.103; reproduction of, 82–84, 95–96, 104; restoration after Comunidades Revolt, 86, 92, 95–104, 110, 138, 214 n.6. See also administration; Catholic Monarchs; Charles V; nobles Morales, Baltasar de, Dia´logo de las guerras de Ora´n, 168 Moreno de Vargas, Bernabe´, 42–43 Moriscos, 136, 142 Morocco, 141–42, 144, 149 Mostaganem, 60, 143–44, 157, 159–60, 171, 179 Muhammad, Abu Abdallah (king of Tlemcen), 158 Mun˜oz, Domingo, 23 Mun˜oz, Ora, 23 Muslims, 20, 23, 35, 52, 112–13, 156; of Co´rdoba, 30–31, 33, 39; expulsion of, 30–31, 33; of Granada, 35–36, 39–40, 57–60; invasions of Iberia, 30, 142; of North Africa, 89, 136, 141–43, 153–54, 156, 159–62, 168. See also Granada War; North Africa; Ottoman Empire

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276 i n d e x Nader, Helen, 11, 16, 191 n.19, 213 n.115, 235 n.98 Na´jera, House of, 5, 64, 67, 73, 100, 120, 128 Naples, 5, 7, 69, 126, 131, 148, 155, 169 Navarre, ix; Cortes of, 128; court of, 128; demographics, 114, 117, 154; fortifications, 118–19; international affairs, 7, 18, 20, 111– 17, 123, 132; Jimeno dynasty, 113; Lower Navarre, 113–16, 132, 136, 154–56; medieval history, 18, 112–17; military forces in, 118– 22, 131, 168; nobles of, 5, 51, 107, 112, 115, 132–34; Protestantism, 132–34; relations with France, 84, 93, 114–17, 120, 132; relations with Spain, 2–3, 5, 7, 27, 55, 60, 80, 84, 101, 109, 111, 115–17, 123, 131, 151, 157; road to Santiago, 115; Royal Council of, 116, 124, 128, 221 n.21; spies, 122, 135, 223 n.44; viceroys of, 13, 69, 73–76, 83, 100, 104, 109, 117–24, 128–30, 132, 141, 154, 165, 167, 180. See also connected histories; France; frontier New Castile, 32–34, 92; plateau of La Mancha, 31, 88, 124 Nicaragua, 69, 155 nobles: administrators, 1–6, 11–17, 79–81, 101–2, 117–23, 132–41, 149–63, 211 n.103; competition between, 39, 48, 70–81, 135, 152; concept of casa, 21–23, 50–51; court nobility, 25, 56, 58, 81, 125–26, 176, 181; culture, 1, 11–15, 38–43, 51–53, 121, 125–26, 131–34, 152, 163–69, 171–82; estates, 35–37, 41–43, 73, 202 n.45; grandees, 5–6, 25, 57– 58, 62, 64–67, 73, 81, 93–94, 134, 172–76, 227 n.88; identity, 42–43, 133–34; income, 62–63, 208 n.42; inheritance, 21–23; landownership, 21–23, 33–38; ‘‘middle’’ nobility, 5–6, 56–57, 64–67, 73, 79–81, 93–94, 177, 182; reproduction of, 43–51, 83–86, 104–10, 109, 127, 132–34, 171–82; service in Comunidades Revolt, 90, 93, 100; service in war, 2–4, 11, 36, 40, 64, 90, 121, 126–27, 167, 211 n.103; succession of Philip I, 70– 71. See also administration; Co´rdoba y de Velasco, Martı´n de; family; Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, Diego; Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba lineage; monarchy North Africa, 87; Ottoman expansion in, 139–40, 149–50; relations with Spain, 2, 7,

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11, 18, 27, 54, 68–71, 74, 80, 89, 116, 136–37, 141–70, 183–84; sen˜orı´os in, 60–62; waning of Spanish hegemony, 136–37, 150, 164–65. See also connected histories; Mediterranean; Muslims; Oran; Ottoman Empire Nu´n˜ez de Te´mez, Ferna´n, 23 Oran, ix; administration, 80–81, 149–63; armaments, 150–55, 158, 162; Spanish conquest and occupation, 2–3, 20, 55, 60–61, 69, 80–84, 89–90, 136–37, 139–70, 182; distance from Spain, 143; fortresses, 143, 162; fresco of siege, 89; Jews, 161; local history, 20, 140–49; maps, 144–48; military forces, 143, 151; officers in, 148; provision, 148, 150, 153, 162. See also connected histories; Co´rdoba y de Velasco, Martı´n de; Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, Diego; Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, Luis; Muslims; North Africa Oropesa (A´lvarez de Toledo), House of, 173, 176–77, 182, 210 n.83. See also Zu´n˜iga, Juan de Osuna (Giro´n), House of, 169 Ottoman Empire, 6–9; in central Europe, 136; decline thesis, 9; historiography, 16; imperial networks, 16; in North Africa, 140, 142, 149–50, 156–57, 159, 162, 164, 179; relations with Italy, 126–27, 156; relations with Spain, 18, 136, 156, 159. See also Mediterranean; North Africa; Oran Pacheco, Catalina, 51, 77, 211 n.103 Pacheco, Francisca, 91, 211 n.103 Pacheco, Juan (Marquis of Villena), 51, 76– 77, 91, 107, 173, 185, 211 n.103 Pacheco, Juana (wife of Diego Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba), 77, 91, 107, 173, 211 n.103 Pacheco, Leonor (daughter of Martı´n de Co´rdoba), 180 Pacheco, Leonor (wife of Martı´n de Co´rdoba), 13–14; executive power, 128, 166–67; marriage, 1–2, 7, 48, 55, 91, 105, 119, 129–30, 177; household of, 112, 128–29; relations with Juana Rena, 75, 129; relations with Villena, 91. See also Co´rdoba y de Velasco, Martı´n; Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, Diego Pacheco, Marı´a, 91, 95, 215 n.15 Padilla, Juan, 91, 98 Pagden, Anthony, 8

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i n d e x 277 Palearo family, 154, 222 n.28 Pamplona: fortresses, 74–75, 118–20, 124, 128–29, 131–32, 154–55; internal security, 111, 122; rebellion against Duke of Na´jera, 120; residential quarters, 115, 118. See also Navarre Papacy, 10–11, 88, 93, 99, 100–101, 108 Peirce, Leslie, 16 Peru, 69, 155 Philip I, king of Spain: death of, 71–72, 80, 89; succession struggle, 6, 54–55, 70–73 Philip II, king of Spain, 5, 9, 13, 88, 164, 166, 169, 172; creation of Patronato Real, 94; defense of Navarre, 132–34; governor of Spain, 234 n.82; marriage strategies of nobles, 132–34, 177; North Africa policy, 160– 63, 180, 234 n.73; succession to Portugal, 217 n.38; visita of Oran, 156, 160–63 Philip III, king of Spain, 10, 169, 172, 181 Philip IV, king of Spain, 9, 175 Pimentel de Herrera, Ana (wife of Count of Alcaudete IV), 181. See also Pimentel lineage Pimentel lineage, 5, 93, 126, 175, 177, 181–82. See also Benavente, House of Pizarro, Francisco, 23 Ponce de Leo´n, Luis, 97–99 Portugal, 17, 19, 81, 104, 113, 142, 217 n.38 Protestantism, 132–34 Pyrenees Mountains, 26, 112–15, 124, 155 Quintanilla Raso, Marı´a Concepcio´n, 163 Rejo´n, Cristo´bal, 154, 232 n.41 Rena, Juan (Mic¸er), 74–76, 124, 129, 131–32, 154 Rena, Juana, 75, 129–31 repartimiento of Co´rdoba, 30, 32 repoblacio´n of Co´rdoba, 30 residencia, 102–3 Russell-Wood, A. J. R., 19 Sabean, David, 21 Sa´nchez de Briviesca, Juan, 103 Santiesteban del Puerto (Benavides), House of, 50–51, 73, 159; defense of Basque Country, 93; Francisco de Benavides, 127; marriage strategies, 50, 108, 175, 210 n.85; service at court, 126

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Saporiti, Jayme, Espejo cristiano de armas, 169 Sa´stago (Alago´n), House of, 177 Seville, 8, 27, 31–37, 40, 73, 92, 99, 103, 169; nobles of, 50–51, 169, 175 Sicily, 13–14, 69, 109, 132, 148, 169 Sierra Morena Mountains, 34–36, 48, 124 Sierra Subbe´tica Mountains, 34–44 Singer, Amy, 16 Siruela (Velasco), House of, 66, 86, 93, 105–6, 218 n.69 social networks, 1–4, 15–18, 43–51, 74–79, 104–10, 125–26, 129–35, 154–56, 171–82, 184–85, 195 n.71. See also administration; connected histories; empire; family; Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba lineage; monarchy; nobles Spain: ambivalence of power, 75, 84, 96, 111, 116; conception of, 4, 8, 15, 17, 19, 26–27, 88; consolidation of, ix, 8, 14, 83, 86, 104; empire building, 6, 11, 14, 27, 60–61, 69, 90, 106, 115–16, 152–53; historiography, 9, 15; decline thesis, 9; expansion of, 2–4, 6–8, 116, 184; relations with France, 7, 111– 23, 132–36. See also administration; Aragon; Castile; Italy; monarchy; North Africa; Ottoman Empire Subrahmanyam, Sanjay, 18 Tagus River, 87, 124 Tendilla (Mendoza), House of: income, 63–64; middle stratum of high nobility, 73, 80–81; relations with Ferna´ndez de Co´rdoba, 73, 80, 91, 137, 177; service to empire, 6, 65–67, 79–81, 137; viceroy of Navarre, 124. See also Mendoza, Francisca de; Mendoza, House of; Pacheco, Marı´a Teuscher, Simon, 21 Al-Thabti, Muley Abdallah (king of Tlemcen), 156 Thomaz, Luı´s Fı´lipe, 17 Tlemcen, 55, 61, 142–44, 149, 159, 179; ambassadors to Spain, 160, 233 n.71; factions, 156; Ottoman threat, 156, 164; relations with Spain, 60, 157–59, 164, 167 Toledo: capital, 31, 83, 88–92, 160; Comunidades Revolt; demography, 87; geography, 31, 87–88; local history, 87–104; municipal officers, 82–83; restoration, 86, 96–104. See also Cortes of Toledo; Toledo, Cathedral of

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278 i n d e x Toledo, Cathedral of: archbishops of, 88–89; choir of, 58, 89; conquest of Andalusia, 32, 88; Junta de Iglesias, 99–100; Moza´rabe Chapel, 89–91; seat of church in Spain, 88. See also Toledo Trasta´mara dynasty. See Catholic Monarchs; Enrique II; Enrique IV; Ferdinand, king of Spain; Juana, queen of Castile; Isabella, queen of Spain Tripoli, 141, 144, 156 Tunis, 144, 149, 156–57 Umayyad dynasty, 30–31, 52, 88, 112–13 University of Salamanca, 14, 112, 123, 132 Urquı´zar Herrera, Antonio, 178 Valladolid, 54, 103, 105–6, 109, 131–32, 172, 177, 181–82 Valois dynasty, 115, 117; King Louis XI, 115; Madeleine de, 115. See Francis I Va´zquez de Molina, Juan: 76, 166, 234 n.82 Velasco, Marı´a de (mother of Count of Alcaudete I), 93, 105, 178, 209 n.85, 216 n.23 Ve´lez (Fajardo), House of los, 137, 175 Viana (Pimentel), House of. See Pimentel lineage Viceroy: commissions, 117–18, 150, 157; courts, 128–30. See also administration; monarchy; nobles

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Villar (Pimentel), House of el. See Pimentel lineage Villena (Pacheco), House of, 62, 64, 67, 73, 76–77, 91, 169, 175; daughters of Juan Pacheco, 51, 76–77, 91, 101, 173, 211 n.103; income, 63; Juan Pacheco, 51, 76, 91, 107, 173 visita, 102, 109, 156, 160–65, 235 n.93 women: cloistering, 5, 46, 86, 96, 107, 129–30, 172, 177, 183; dowries, 1, 45–47, 49–50, 86, 107–8, 172–77, 184; executive power, 128, 166–67, 225n.70, 235 n.98; heiresses, 49– 50, 107, 131, 175–76, 181, 183–84, 187; in Households, 128–29, 183, 226 n.72; social ties, 129–30. See also administration; Convent of Santa Clara; Co´rdoba y de Velasco, Martı´n de: daughters; Isabel, queen of Portugal; Isabella, queen of Spain; monarchy; nobles; Pacheco, Leonor (wife of Martı´n de Co´rdoba) Yun Casalilla, Bartolome´, 17–18 Zayanid dynasty, 156–57, 159, 161 Zu´n˜iga, Juan de (husband of Ana Mo´nica de Co´rdoba), 176, 182. See also Oropesa, House of

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acknowledgments

Wonderful people have supported this project. Heartfelt gratitude goes to my mentors Anthony Grafton, Teo´filo Ruiz, Molly Greene, William C. Jordan, Ira Lapidus, Kenneth Mills, and Susan Naquin. Friends who helped me reach the finish line, Marı´a Cruz de Carlos Varona, Sean Eldridge, Martı´n Ferna´ndez Ferro, Ce´sar Jesu´s Garcı´a Gonza´lez, Ricardo Garcı´a Moreno, and Arang Keshavarzian, have my enduring affection. James Amelang, Bethany Aram, Anni Baker, Andrew Devereux, Nancy Evans, Touba Ghadessi, Kenneth Gouwens, Frances Jeffries, Brendan Kane, Ruth Mackay, Alan Mikhail, James Mulholland, Jeremy Mumford, Rolf Nelson, Francesca Trivellato, Bartolome´ Yun Casalilla, and Jorge Flores, Tara Nummedal, Tim Harris, and other participants at Brown University’s Medieval and Early Modern History Seminar generously read and commented on drafts. Peio Monteano Sorbet, Adeline Rucquoi, David Alonso Garcı´a, Antonio Jime´nez Estrella, Jocelyn Hendrickson, Enrique Soria Mesa, Geoffrey Parker, and Elizabeth Wright transmitted key references. Jerome Singerman at the University of Pennsylvania Press and two anonymous readers provided expert guidance and incisive suggestions. Jesu´s Rodrı´guez Izquierdo of the Biblioteca Nacional de Espan¯a, Mariano Garcı´a Ruipe´rez of the Archivo Municipal de Toledo, Fernando Salvador Contreras Gila of the Instituto de Estudios Giennenses, Sor Gema Anguita of the Convento de Santa Clara de Alcaudete, and Francisco Molina Aranda of the Ayuntamiento de Alcaudete supplied valuable information and resources. My deepest respect goes to Don˜a Isabel Aguirre Landa of the Archivo General de Simancas. At Wheaton College, Kenneth Davignon, Christopher Hyde, Jenni Lund, and E. Patrick Rashleigh helped create illustrations, and Jan Adie, Barbara Curtis, and Fran Weldon provided clerical support.

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280 a c k n o w l e d g m e n t s

Other friends not yet mentioned have made work on this book an especially rewarding journey: Laurice Hwang and Greg Pomerantz, Lucelle Hoefnagels and David Harp, Kuanwu Lin and David Reisinger, Lisa Bailey and James Cunningham, and my dear companions at the 2010 National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Institute in Barcelona Abigail Krasner Balbale, Camilo Go´mez-Rivas, Paul Sidelko, and Joseph Stanley. This book was written on four continents. In Spain, the United States, France, Norway, Belgium, Thailand, and New Zealand, I enjoyed the warm hospitality of Adam Becker, Pey-Yi Chu, Robert Feldmann, Frank Gardsø, Ari Gershman, Paul Greene, Daniel Gutie´rrez, Joyce Hwang, Antonio Javato Martı´n, Janice Lai, Guy Margalith, Satoko Nakajima, Dario Sa´nchez Gonza´lez, Pedro Urruzuno, Guy Vermeylen, Paris Gonza´lez Daporta and Matias Daporta Gonza´lez, and A´ngel Domı´nguez Pequen˜o and Ana Alonso de Mena. Work in the classroom distilled and clarified my ideas, and my former students Robert Callahan, William Kaufman, Albert Kramer, and Stephen Penney challenged me with critical questions and braced me with steadfast enthusiasm. Finally, I would like to thank my mother, Grace Shi Chiu Lin; my father, Michael Hsung Ying Liang; and my sister, Yue-June Liang, for their support. The bulk of the research was performed under a Social Science Research Council International Dissertation Research Fellowship. Further support was provided by the Program for Cultural Cooperation between Spain’s Ministry of Education and Culture and United States Universities; the Fundacio´n Sa´nchez Albornoz; the Mellon Foundation; Princeton University’s Department of History, Graduate School, and Council on Regional Studies; and Wheaton College’s Department of History and Office of the Provost. The Fulbright Commission and its Syrian and U.S. administrators made possible a year of intellectual inquiry on the eastern Mediterranean world.

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