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Faith, Freedom, and Value: Introductory Philosophical Dialogues
 0367003481, 9780367003487

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FAITH, FREEDOM, AND VALUE

FAITH, FREEDOM, AND VALUE

Introductory Philosophical Dialogues Randolph M. Feezell CREIGHTON UNIVERSITY

First published 1989 by Westview Press, Inc. Published 2018 by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business Copyright © 1989 Taylor & Francis All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Feezell, Randolph M., 1950Faith, freedom, and value : introductory philosophical dialogues / Randolph M. Feezell. p. em. ISBN 0-8133-1021-0. - ISBN 0-8133-0892-5 (pbk.) 1. Philosophy-Introductions. 2. Imaginary conversations. I. Title. BD2l.F37 1989 100-dc20

ISBN 13: 978-0-367-00348-7 (hbk)

89-37516 CJP

For Barb, Travis, Evan, Tyler, and Allie

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments Introduction

ix xi

Dialogue One: What Is Philosophy?

1

Dialogue Two: Faith and Reason

19

Dialogue Three: Order and Evil

35

Dialogue Four: Freedom

55

Dialogue Five: Persons, Souls, and Bodies

77

Dialogue Six: Moral Skepticism

95

Dialogue Seven: Morality: Divine Commands, Social Approval, or Respect for Others?

113

Dialogue Eight: Animals and Ethics

131

Dialogue Nine: Abortion

149

Dialogue Ten: Philosophy and the Meaning of Life

165

Dialogue Eleven: Suggested Reading

181

vii

Acknowledgments I want to thank Daniel Dombrowski for providing the first inspiration to write a dialogue. After numerous conversations with him concerning the moral arguments for vegetarianism, I wrote a dialogue to clarify my own thoughts and to confront his arguments. He offered some suggestions and additions to my draft and we published it in the APA Newsletter on Teaching Philosophy. I want to thank the American Philosophical Association for permission to use a revision of that early dialogue in this book. That dialogue proved to be useful in my ethics course so I decided to embark on this longer project. A Summer Faculty Research Fellowship from the Creighton University Graduate School supported the project in its early stages. I am also grateful to the College of Arts and Sciences, Creighton University, for the sabbatical that enabled me to finish writing this book. I acknowledge with thanks the helpful criticisms, suggestions, and comments from several reviewers. Spencer Carr and the people at Westview Press have been superb in helping me to produce a better book. Finally, special thanks to Peggy Troy, our precious resource in the Philosophy Department, Joan Ruhlman, and Stacee Koester for their invaluable help in preparing the manuscript.

Randolph M. Feezell

ix

Introduction This book contains a series of philosophical conversations between two old college friends. Nicholas is an engineer. He's bright, opinionated, and argumentative, but not philosophically sophisticated. He discovers that Phillip now teaches philosophy at the local university. Nicholas is skeptical about the nature and value of philosophical thinking and Phillip responds. By the end of the first dialogue they agree to renew their old college debates in regular meetings. In this book I have tried to provide a readable and clear examination of certain fundamental philosophical questions. Unlike authors of other standard introductory textbooks, I have done this by using the dialogue form. I approached the project with trepidation. The potential pitfalls are numerous. The model for philosophical dialogue must always be Plato, and the standards he set seem impossibly high. Dialogues must be philosophically coherent and dramatically realistic. Characters must have some lifelike appeal and their conversation should appear natural. I offer my own set of dialogues with modest literary goals in mind. I'm most interested in the pedagogical value of these dialogues. My intent is to engage introductory students, to challenge them to think about their beliefs, to show them some of the standard arguments in the history of philosophy and in contemporary philosophy, and to do this in a more lively and accessible manner than usual. As for the characters in these dialogues, Nicholas is a spokesman for some of the prevalent views and arguments that philosophy teachers hear in the classroom and in SOciety. Many students will hear Nicholas express their own ideas. I hope they will feel challenged, not threatened, by Phillip's critical responses. Some will find Phillip too analytic, too philosophically sophisticated, too "academic," in the worst sense. Likewise, Nicholas will appear to some as too naive, narrowly practical, and unreflective to a fault. I admit that these characters are not fully fleshed out, but I do not see how they could be unless I resorted to writing a novel. I have tried not to overstate drastically either the philosophical or practical personality, but if there is overstatement I hope it is justified by my pedagogical ends. Sometimes the reader may feel that Phillip's analytic skills are too oppressive, so the conversa tion is less than realistic or believable. Here I can only say that philosophers often really talk like this. One of the intrinsic problems in using the Socratic teacher-student format is that the teacher always appears to "win" the arguments. The xi

xii

Introduction

student appears as the teacher's necessary stooge. In these dialogues it will seem that Phillip always wins and Nicholas always loses, but it is a mistake to think of either character as winning or losing arguments. Think of these conversations as moments in a process, in which Nicholas (and the students) have finally confronted a more philosophically astute person who challenges them to defend their beliefs by giving arguments. If the arguments tum out to be less than successful, then Nicholas needs to seek better arguments or show Phillip what's wrong with his. The students should take none of these discussions as the final wordobviously. They should view the dialogues as catalysts, occasioning further questioning and study. The topics I have chosen are, for the most part, the topics that are often discussed in an introductory philosophy course. I don't think all teachers and readers would agree with any choice of topics, but the issues discussed are ones that people seem naturally to be concerned about. It's no surprise that, historically, philosophers have had a great deal to say aboutthese concerns. I have also found thatthese issues often provoke lively discussion in the classroom. I have not included a dialogue on epistemology, not because I think epistemological issues are uninteresting or shouldn't be discussed in introductory philosophy. Rather, the unity and realism of these conversations seemed best served by avoiding an extended discussion of epistemological issues. I have included a number of dialogues on issues in theoretical and applied ethics, so the book might be used in an ethics course. The dialogues on abortion and the moral status of animals are somewhat odd for an introductory text, but they are provocative topics that students are interested in. One of the underlying themes in these dialogues concerns the relationship between Nicholas' s beliefin God and his other beliefs. Again, I have done this for pedagogical reasons. Because philosophy seeks to find a rationally satisfying world view, the issue of coherence among beliefs is important. Many (most?) students in our Judeo-Christian American culture believe that God exists. Questioning whether classical theism dictates views about freedom, the soul, death, morality, and the meaning of life is a way of forcing students to think about questions of consistency and the consequences of certain pieces of their worldview, including their selective respect for scientific explanation and the assumptions underlying the scientific enterprise. I don't believe that all philosophical issues revolve around the question of God; that would be silly. I do think, however, that making these connections is useful in an introductory philosophy class. There are a number of other loose ends in the dialogues. There are, for

Introduction

xiii

example, many comments about rationality and science. Phillip's naturalism and his appeals to science need to be explored further, but these are issues that could be pursued by the teacher and students in discussion. Also, I have not cited the sources of certain arguments. Phillip uses Ludwig Wittgenstein on family resemblances, David Humeon miracles, Gilbert Ryle's behaviorist account of mental language, and so forth. The teacher can make the historical references explicit. A teacher might use the dialogues in a variety of ways: to generate initial discussion of the issues; to reinforce main points that might have surfaced informally in class discussion; as a source to use along with readings from the history of philosophy or from an anthology. Some passages will require further explanation. Students might think that Nicholas could give better responses at times or that Phillip has, at some point, given a poor argument. At the end of each dialogue I have offered a series of questions that provide a helpful guide to the dialogue and to related issues. These questions can be used for class discussion or for brief writing assignments. I have also added a brief list of suggested readings that relate fairly directly to main points in each dialogue. One final thing: Phillip and Nicholas are friends. They're very different kinds of people, and they fundamentally disagree about many of the most important elements of their respective world views. However, the battle they engage in is for truth, not domination. Karl Jaspers once called such communication a '10ving struggle." As Phillip says, philosophical discussion is one of the great goods of life, but it should serve to strengthen and reinforce what may be an even greater good: friendship.

R.M.F.

DIALOGUE ONE: WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY?

Phillip is a young philosopher employed at the local university. One afternoon, as he is walking across campus, he notices a person approaching him from the opposite direction. As the person nears, Phillip grins and holds out his hand.

Phillip: Nicholas? Nick, is that really you? Nicholas: Phillip? Is that you behind all that stuff on your face? Phillip: Remember? Didn't I start growing a beard when we were still at State?

Nicholas: You did quit shaving, but I wouldn't have called it a beard. Phillip: So we pick up where we left off? Couldn't agree on anything, could we?

Nicholas: Man, you really changed. You were such a nerd when you

walked on campus. Hush Puppies. A brand new shiny briefcase. Then you got into leftist politics. Now a beard.

Phillip:

I wouldn't call the "Young Democrats" leftist politics. I just started to become aware of what was going on. I wanted to understand things and maybe even change some of them.

Nicholas: So you became "Mr. Campus Activist". Phillip: Long time ago, Nick. I guess we didn't see each other much the last two years. No more dorm arguments.

Nicholas: Didn't have time. Engineering courses kept me plenty busy. 1

2 Phillip:

Dialogue One And now?

Nicholas: I'm an engineer for Smithson Corporation, here in town. So are you still trying to change the world?

Phillip:

Oh, I don't know about that.

Nicholas: Slippery Phil. So what are you doing? I remember you changed your major, but I can't remember what it was you changed it to.

Phillip:

Philosophy.

Nicholas: Oh yeah, now I remember. Philosophy! The meaning of life!

What did you do with that degree? Start a natural foods health store?

Phillip:

No. I got a Ph.D.

Nicholas: Phillip, the mystical guru! Phillip:

Nick, you're as opinionated as ever. Philosophy isn't "mystical guru stuff." Didn't you take any philosophy courses as an undergraduate?

Nicholas: Didn't have time to listen to a lot of loose talk. Sounded like a bunch of words, words, words.

Phillip:

What do you mean?

Nicholas: You know what I mean. Phillip:

No, I don't. I've heard some of my students say that when they seem to be frustrated. I know philosophy can be frustrating at times.

Nicholas: Look, I'll tell you why I've always liked mathematics and

engineering and science. I like facts. I love to be given a problem and have to try to figure out how to solve it. I like knowing that there is an answer, a practical solution that needs to be found, and if you work hard enough and have good ideas you'll probably find it.

What Is Philosophy? Phillip:

3

Philosophers think and write, so they do have to use words, as you say. I think about philosophical issues with the hope that I'll find acceptable answers, just as you hope to solve engineering problems.

Nicholas: Philosophers just talk and talk in ambiguous ways and never agree on anything. At least in my work we get somewhere.

Phillip:

Have you read any of the great philosophers? Plato? Aristotle? Kant?

Nicholas: Throw out all the big names you want. I still say that nothing ever gets decided in something like philosophy. I want answers, not mumbo-jumbo.

Phillip:

How can you say these things if you've never studied philosophy?

Nicholas: I don't need to. Phillip:

As for "mumbo-jumbo," clarity and rigor are really important in philosophical writing and thinking. In fact, some philosophers today try to make philosophy like proofs in mathematics. Philosophers don't always communicate and argue in an unambiguous manner, but we sure try. When someone asserts something, the philosopher often asks, "What does that mean?" You say philosophy is a bunch of words. I want you to clarify that, and as far as I can tell you still haven't done much to help me understand what you mean when you say that philosophy is just "a bunch of words."

Nicholas: Philosophers talk and talk and don't agree about anything. Phillip:

That's just not true. Philosophers try harder than most scientists do to avoid contradiction and meet the highest standards of reason and evidence in their investigations. One of the most central tasks of philosophers is to find out what is reasonable to believe and, in doing so, to find out what it means, in general, to hold reasonable beliefs.

Nicholas: Hold it! Hold it! You sound like you're kicking in to the "Professor mode."

4 Phillip:

Dialogue One Sorry, but how can I help it? I've been studying and teaching philosophy for ten or fifteen years. That makes me feel old. Let's go sit down on that bench over there. (They walk to a bench and sit down.)

Nicholas: You still didn't tell me specific ideas that philosophers agree about.

Phillip:

Again, it depends on what you mean by "specific." The commitment to avoid contradiction is relatively specific.

Nicholas: No, I mean ideas like God or communism. Philosophers don't agree on these things; neither do other people.

Phillip:

I wouldn't deny part of your basic point. Some philosophers do agree on some things, they disagree on others. But what follows from this? From the fact that you and I disagree about something, it certainly doesn't follow that there is no correct answer. Scientists disagree also, but you wouldn't say that because two biologists disagree about the mechanism of evolution, there is no true position on the matter. What is crucial is the method by which we attempt to resolve our disagreements in matters of supposed knowledge. Perhaps the methods of justifying claims and resolving conflicting beliefs are somewhat different in science than in philosophical inquiry, but that doesn't mean scientific reasoning is the only avenue to true belief or knowledge, and that doesn't rule out rigorous standards of philosophical justification.

Nicholas: That sounds good, but it so happens that there is more agree-

ment in science than in philosophy. Philosophers express their opinions on things, but that's just what they are: opinions.

Phillip:

Join the club. You've just expressed a philosophic,al position. Unfortunately, it is a weak position. You say philosophy doesn't give knowledge, that in philosophy only opinions or . IIfeelings" are expressed. But that position is a philosophical belief that needs to be explained, defended, or recognized as just plain inconsistent. Since you seem to be offering a view about what counts as true knowledge and what is the nature of philosophy in relation to science, then according to your own position, your claim, as philosophical, ought not to be

What Is Philosophy?

5

taken seriously. I don't see how you can consistently assert your view. It is a philosophical one that has been offered in a more sophisticated and interesting way by a variety of people in the philosophical tradition, and critics have responded in a like manner.

Nicholas: If philosophy is more than just opinions or feelings, why isn't there progress in philosophy? Look at science and technology.

Phillip:

You say that there is no "progress" in philosophy. That is a large and difficult issue, one I couldn't possibly tackle briefly, but one that shouldn't be tackled without an extensive knowledge of human thinking. I do think there has been progress in philosophy (in a certain sense), that there continues to beprogress, and that individuals who seriously undertake philosophical inquiry can hope to gain valuable insights. However, it would take some time to explain and defend these views.

Nicholas: Try me. It looks like you're avoiding the question. Phillip:

Fine. First, I think philosophical thinking can show us that certain views, beliefs, positions, are simply untenable. That is, some philosophical positions are so rationally weak that we can probably ignore them as acceptable candidates for truth. Do you see what I'm getting at? Philosophy, it seems to me, can narrow the range of plausible candidates for beliefs.

Nicholas: For instance? Phillip:

For example, some think that everyone inevitably "looks out for number one" at all times. Philosophers call this view of human nature "psychological egoism," as if people always and only act to maximize their own pleasure or good. It is either obviously false or doesn't count as a real hypothesis about human behavior. It would take some time to try to show this, but I think psychological egoism is a view of human nature, held by many, that is simply confused.

Nicholas: Look, maybe we're making a mountain out of a mole hill. There is nothing to get so worked up about. I'm just saying that I like results, and I haven't seen them in philosophy.

6 Phillip:

Dialogue One Now who is not responding to the issue? Ithinkthere is much going on when someone makes claims like the ones you made. We do live in an age in which scientific influences dominate our lives. There is something natural about our faith in science as the sole source of our knowledge-gathering activities. I appreciate your skepticism. But don't you see? The expression of your skepticism about philosophy puts you in my ballpark. It's a philosophical issue; that's what we're discussing.

Nicholas: Okay, okay. I am starting to see that those years of studying philosophy may have sharpened your argument skills, but I'm still not convinced.

Phillip:

Of what?

Nicholas: Your faith in progress in philosophy. Phillip:

Let me try it another way. Whether philosophy has progressed or groups of people can agree on things, I can tell you one location where progress has been experienced.

Nicholas: Where? Phillip:

(Pointing a finger at himself.) Here. At one point in my life I realized that I knew little about what really matters in life. I felt ignorant. I knew there was a world of ideas that I knew little about. I knew I had been taught many things-about God and America and what I should do with my life and what kind of person I should be. But I realized that I shouldn't accept those things simply because my family or my country taught them to me. I decided that I wanted to think things through on my own. I didn't realize how long it would take or how much effort it would require. But I do know that in one sense I was no different than any other human being. We all have philosophical beliefs; we can't live without them. The issue is whether we decide to think as well as we can about the tradition in which we find ourselves.

Nicholas: Philosophical beliefs? Such as? Phillip:

You have beliefs about God, evil, the nature of the person,

What Is Philosophy?

7

human destiny, knowledge, politics, morality, aesthetics, and so on. That's the raw material that philosophy refines. I don't think it is possible for a person to live without any relation to philosophy, broadly speaking, because a person can't live without some commitment to ideas that give some pattern to human experience and meaning to the way we live our lives.

Nicholas: Come on! You make it sound as if everyone is a "philosopher," so you can make it look so important.

Phillip:

Not at all. People tend to hold a ragged collection of beliefs, but few pursue the criticism of their beliefs with sustained reflection. The difference between the philosopher and nonphilosopher involves the philosopher's dissatisfaction with simply taking over beliefs uncritically from one's background. He wants to think things through, as I said.

Nicholas: Let's get to specificS. Give me a definition. What's your definition of philosophy?

Phillip:

I don't have one.

Nicholas: Wait a minute. Now I've heard everything. You're a philosopher and you can't even define what you do.

Phillip:

Have you ever played games?

Nicholas: What do you mean? Phillip:

Come on, Nick, it's not a difficult question. Ball games, card games. Could you define "game" for me?

Nicholas: Get to the point, Phil. Don't be cute. Phillip:

I'm trying. You've actually touched a tough philosophical issue: the possibility of defining, in a certain way, our concepts. For the time being let me just point out that you can certainly play games, and explain to me how some of them are played, without defining "game." It's not clear that a definition is required in order to claim to know something about the object of a proposed definition. Examples are usually very helpful.

8

Dialogue One

Nicholas: So you can't define philosophy. Then how do you expect me to understand what you do?

Phillip:

If you allow me to sound as if I'm giving my standard "introductory philosophy" lecture, I'll tell you what I tell my students.

Nicholas: Proceed, Herr Professor Doctor Phillip. Phillip:

Philosophers traditionally have tried to arrive at what I would call the "Big Picture." They have wanted to find the most acceptable general view of things. A world view consists of interrelated beliefs about the major dimensions of human existence: the religious, the moral, the political, theaesthetic,and how we can come to know about these things or anything at all. Generally, philosophical questions are about reality, or what is ultimately there; knowledge, or how we can come to know things, and various questions of value, or what sorts of things we ought to strive for or appreciate. I know this is very general. You want examples?

Nicholas: Stop right there. You say philosophers have wondered about

what is real, butisn'titreallysdence that shows us what reality is like? I don't want speculation; I want evidence, observation. Show me the facts.

Phillip:

I wouldn't deny what you're saying, to a certain extent. No philosopher can afford to ignore the claims of science. Appeals to scientific claims and conceptions are often crucial in philosophical argumentation. But there appear to be some questions about reality that can't, in principle, be answered by scientific methods. For example, the question about the supposed existence and nature of God is a question about what is real, but it can't be answered solely by science just because of the nature of the being in question. The question of human freedom seems to arise because science proceeds by assuming that nature works in terms of causes. The question of the mind or soul is troublesome because we are beginning to know more and more about the brain and we wonder how the notion of a "soul" would fit into this scientific framework.

Nicholas: Very interesting.

What Is Philosophy?

Phillip:

9

Remember, however, there are a host of other philosophical questions, especially questions of value, that aren't "scientific" in any obvious sense but are unavoidable since we are, it appears, valuing creatures.

Nicholas: It still sounds like you're trying to make everyone into a

philosopher, and I don't agree with that. But I admit that almost everyone has beliefs that you call "philosophical." I don't know. Maybe people are more philosophical than I give them credit for being.

Phillip:

It is natural and unavoidable to hold philosophical views, but in my experience I've found that not everyone is inclined to think philosophically. Sometimes they're so self-certain, questioning makes no sense. Others just can't see the point. I think I heard you saying that.

Nicholas: Maybe. It probably depends on the kind of ideas you're talkingabout.

Phillip:

Some people are naturally thoughtful, or critical, or reflective, and when they encounter philosophy, they're captured. Others are not so sure when they encounter philosophy, at least as it is taught in colleges and universities. I think you're right. They even react differently to different philosophical problems. If someone were untroubled by religious questions, he or she might wonder why anyone could get so concerned about issues in the philosophy of religion. For others, questions concerning the existence and nature of God are troubling and, as William James said, of momentous concern. For the latter, philosophical reflection about God becomes important.

Nicholas: I can see that. We argued about politics because there were

always lectures and debates on the issues. I'll confess: You were a little threatening to me. My parents had taught me traditional American values and then I started to see that some people-you and others-wanted to reject those values.

Phillip:

I didn't automatically want to reject them, Nicholas. But I did want to think about them, to understand them, to see whether they could withstand critical scrutiny.

Dialogue One

10

Nicholas: But college isn't like real life. People don't have time for that stuff.

Phillip:

But people always confront situations in which philosophical reflection is called for, don't they? When people face some tough situations in life, like evil or death, philosophical questions arise. Let me give you another example. Suppose a young woman faces an unwanted or dangerous pregnancy. If she wants to take the situation seriously, she must confront very difficult questions like the nature and ground of moral rights and what it means to be a person. These are very difficult questions to deal with. Naturally, they are often ignored. It would be easy simply to accept the slogans of your church, or friends, or whatever, and think the issue is resolved.

Nicholas: Well, you're definitely getting me interested. But all of these questions you ask seem so abstract, and I like concrete issues. Philosophy sounds so abstract.

Phillip:

Students say that, too. But just think about it. When I look at a chalkboard filled with equations, now that seems abstract to me. Philosophy is theoretical; it seeks to understand. In this sense the abstract quality of philosophy is shared by any theoretical or general inquiry, including the sciences, but it is not a category of condemnation. It may bake no bread, but it helpsusfigureoutwhatkindoflife to live in order to put bread on our table.

Nicholas: That's not quite what I have in mind. Philosophical questions are difficult to get a hold of. Equations are precise; they work. They're absolutely clear if you understand the mathematics involved, and they're applicable.

Phillip:

You don'tthink philosophy has practical consequences? Consider this: The so-called abstractions of philosophy, like reason, truth, God, freedom, and beauty, have been ideals that people have lived and died for. Only historical ignorance could cause one to think of philosophical idealsas impractical, or insignificant, or unrelated to "real life." Also, one of the areas of most intense activity in philosophy today is so-called applied philosophy, especially applied ethics, for example, medical ethics. Philosophers are explicitly talking about

What Is Philosophy?

11

supposed real-life situations and concrete problems. Many hospitals now have trained medical ethicists on staff to help doctors and nurses make tough decisions. So in a wayphilosophers have responded to this challenge to make their discipline more "concrete." I wouldn't deny that philosophy seems very "abstract" to some people, but I would ask them to think carefully about what they mean or what bothers them when they say this about philosophy.

Nicholas: So philosophy is really just thinking about big questions? Sounds good, but everyone has their own views anyway. What right do you have to try to change peoples' minds? That'swhere we come back to the issue of knowledge versus opinion. Phillip:

Although we probably need to say more about the ''bigness'' of traditional philosophical questions, I agree with what you first said. Here, I have a couple of quotes handy. (He reaches into his bag, pulls out a book, and flips through the pages.) They are both from William James: ''We philosophize to attain a conception of the frame of things which shall on the whole be more rational than the somewhat chaotic view which everyone by nature carries about with him under his hat." And this: "Philosophy is the attempt to think clearly and methodically about certain notions (concepts) which are always turning up in our thinking and which seem necessary to our thinking but which the special sciences do not tell us about."

Nicholas: I like those quotes. Sounds like our discussion of whether all people have philosophical beliefs or are philosophers. Phillip:

These quotes are very suggestive. Philosophy, at least for the ' beginner, might be characterized as "critique of everydayness." I mean by "everydayness" views of things before we begin to think critically or philosophically. Some of these involve matters of common sense; for example, that there is a world external to us that is made up of material objects, or that we seem to experience ourselves confronting choices and an open future. But part of our everyday view of things is also made up of very complex notions that have filtered down to us from science; for example, that there are unconscious mental states or that anthropology has been able to show definitely

12

Dialogue One that different cultures have very different moral beliefs. And then there are these common views, such as Beauty is in the eye of the beholder. Or, related to what you just said, because everyone has a right to his own opinion, it must follow that all opinions are equal. All of these views require some hard thinking if we want to decide whether to hold them and what follows from them. This last belief is especially troubling. It bars one from the openness that is a condition for intellectual growth. To my mind, philosophy is essentially undogmatic. AIl it requires is that an individual think for himself and not accept uncritically any view offered by others.

Nicholas: I don't understand what you're saying. You don't think everyone has a right to their own opinion? Phillip:

Of course I do.

Nicholas: What are you saying? Phillip:

To say that everyone has the right to his or her own opinion is a political or moral claim, which only says that people have a right to believe what they want, however stupid or irrational it might be, and as long as their beliefs do not have harmful consequences. But this right says nothing about the content of belief, about whether there is evidence for the belief, whether it is justified, consistent with other true beliefs, and so forth. There are conventions of reasoning that operate when people think about things. You might be morally or politically justified in holding or expressing any belief you might have; that doesn't mean you are logically justified in holding it. If you begin to read the people who are considered the great thinkers of our tradition you will start to see why they are considered as such. To read good thinkers is to begin to have a profound sense of one's limitations. You can see that there are people of great genius whose vision of things is profound, whose defense of their views novel, and from whom we can learn.

Nicholas: AIl of that sounds elitist to me. I am interested in my own ideas, not the ideas of others. I thought you said that philosophy is the attempt by an individual to think about his own beliefs. Now you say that people who are not philosophers are

What Is Philosophy?

13

so shallow that their opinions are not as worthwhile as supposedly "great" philosophers.

Phillip:

Not exactly. You say you are interested in your "own" ideas. But where did these ideas come from?

Nicholas: What do you mean? Phillip:

Did you just think of them in a vacuum? Of course not. You are part of a complex historical tradition, from which you take your ideas. To understand your "own" ideas is to understand the historical development of these notions and to see them as alternatives in a wider fabric of possibilities. Perhaps none of your ideas are really your "own," in this sense.

Nicholas: Just because I may have been influenced doesn't mean that my ideas aren't really mine. Phillip:

This may overstate the historical determination of your worldview. To begin to think, to read good thinkers and evaluate their ideas is to start to achieve the autonomy that is a condition of truly having your "own" ideas. Perhaps the most important point is this: Do you believe you have thought of all the possibilities and arguments? Do you actually think that you would encounter no novelty or genius in reading Aristotle or Spinoza or Marx or Nietzsche? That's pretentious. Reflecting on the ideas of the great thinkers doesn't mean you give up your autonomy and become an intellectual slave. It may well be an important part of becoming autonomous. Such a process is ditected toward gaining a worldview that is your "own" in ~ore profound sense and that is rich in insight and breadth. ·nk of others as partners in seeking the truth, not as adversa .es.

Nicholas: This sounds fine, but you have my head spinning. Where does

someone start? And how does a person do this? It still sounds so abstract.

Phillip:

Just look at what we have done. We have been "doing" philosophy in this very conversation. You made certain claims about philosophy. I began to respond. I asked you to clarify. I brought out presuppositions in your statements and briefly

14

Dialogue One examined them. I pointed out inconsistencies, I made some distinctions, I offered some tentative generalizations that, I think, are true about the nature of philosophy. At many points you questioned me, criticized me, and our dialogue advanced. I believe we have advanced from the beginning of our conversation.

Nicholas: Hmm. Very interesting. Phillip:

Nicholas, I have an idea.

Nicholas: I bet you have a lot of ideas. Phillip:

Seriously ... we haven't talked for years. I find philosophical conversation enjoyable and you seemed to enjoy this conversation.

Nicholas: I need to think about some ofthe things we've talked about. To be honest, it has been years since I thought and argued about all of those things we used to discuss. I wonder whether I know myself now. Phillip:

It is interesting that you say that, because it was used centuries

ago by Socrates. He thought that the pursuit of wisdom was the most significant project in human life, much more important than the pursuit of wealth, honor, and success. Plato's early dialogues show Socrates roaming the streets of Athens, talking to people who were supposedly wise, proclaimed knowledge, and sometimes ridiculed Socrates for wasting his time. He seemed to hold few views himself, but the moral beauty of a person honestly seeking the truth was significant for many following him. Even if assured answers are difficult to come by in philosophy, I think something good happens to people when they engage in serious philosophical questioning. In the spirit of Socrates, I suggest that we meet every week or two and talk about some central philosophical issues. Although I'm not claiming to be Socrates. It's the spirit that counts!

Nicholas: I'm still not so sure I know what philosophy is, but you say we've been doing it. What a paradox!

What Is Philosophy?

Phillip:

15

We could make that a point of further conversations. Each time, one of us will suggest a topic. Maybe I will have to ask a question or two to put us on the right track and direct us in the way philosophers have approached the issue at hand. We will see where the conversation goes. I think this might be fun and a good introduction to philosophy. Then if you are interested in pursuing the topic, I can suggest some further reading.

Nicholas: Okay. It sounds like fun. I'll call you later about a particular time. I do have to work, you know, unlike some of us.

Phillip:

Ah, but that is the joy of philosophy. This is my work! One . other thing: If I start to sound too much like a philosophy professor, you'll let me know?

Nicholas: Don't worry, pal. I'll beam you back if you get outthere too far!

Dialogue One

16

Questions for Thought, Study, and Discussion: Dialogue One 1. Do you have any initial presuppositions aboutthe nature and value of philosophy? What are they? Why do you have these views? Are any of Nicholas's comments close to your own ideas as you begin the study of philosophy? 2.

For reflection: Would you say that you have a natural philosophical bent? What might that mean? Would that influence your attitude toward the study of philosophy?

3. Do you think that some people are better thinkers than others, even concerning philosophical questions? Do you believe that some people are wiser than others? Have you ever learned from a person considered-by you or others-wise? 4. What is meant when someone accuses philosophy of being "abstract"? How does Phillip respond to such an accusati9n? Do you agree? 5. Summarize the main points Phillip makes about the nature of philosophy. 6. What views of your own would you call "philosophical"? Do you have reasons for these beliefs? 7.

How would you characterize the difference between science and philosophy?

8. Do you think that questions of value are subject to rational dispute? Give examples of such questions. What would be the difference between showing that a belief is true as opposed to showing that it is rational?

A Few Suggested Readings Bontempo, Charles J., and Odell, S. Jack, eds. The Owl of Minerva: Philosophers on Philosophy. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975. (A collection of essays by contemporary philosophers about the nature of philosophy.)

What Is Philosophy?

17

Descartes, Rene. Discourse on Method, trans. Donald A. Cress. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1980. (A famous and influential reflection on intellectual dissatisfaction, philosophical method, and the foundations of knowledge.) James, William. liThe Sentiment of Rationality." InEssaysinPragmatism. New York: Hafner Press, 1948. (The source of the quote "We philosophize to attain a conception of the frame of things.... ") Passmore, John. "Philosophy." In The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 6. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1%7. (A helpful article for the beginning student of philosophy.) Plato. The Trial and Death of Socrates, trans. G.M.A. Grube. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1975. (Contains the Euthyphro, an excellent example of philosophy as Socrates lived and practiced it, and the Apology, the classic defense of the philosophical life.) Russell, Bertrand. The Problems of Philosophy, Ch. 15. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970. (An eloquent statement about the value of philosophy.)

DIALOGUE TWO: FAITH AND REASON

Nicholas: Hi, Professor. How goes it? Phillip:

Not bad. Are you still up for some philosophical converstion?

Nicholas: Sure. I really enjoyed our first get-together. I haven't had a

conversation like that since college days. I remember how much I used to like to talk about serious things. The level of conversation at work is dismal. Lots of racy jokes and sports talk. I like to talk about sports, but sometimes it's enjoyable to have a deeper conversation.

Phillip:

Great. What should we talk about now? Have you been thinking about anything in particular lately?

Nicholas: Well, believe it or not, I do sometimes read serious books.

Asimov's science books. Stuff about the origins of life written by physicists and biologists. Really fascinating stuff.

Phillip:

Hmm. That surprises me a little. I remember some conversations we had about religion. Changed your mind about God and creation?

Nicholas: Not at all. My faith is strong. It always has been. Phillip:

And when you read about the earth as four billion years old, about the primeval soup out of which organic molecules sprang, about the incredibly powerful way in which biologists explain the evolutionary history of the world, you don't get just a tiny skeptical twinge?

Nicholas: Come on, Phil. I've heard this line before, but there's a per19

20

Dialogue Two fectly natural response. I've been trained in science, and I have a profound respect for scientific knowledge and scientific view of the world. But I also have my God and my faith. The two aren't incompatible at all. Faith isn't a matter of scientific thinking. It's personal. It's inner. It's a feeling. There's no conflict at all between believing in science and believing in God.

Phillip:

In one sense you're clearly right. Even if evolution is true, as it plainly seems to be, God could have used this as the mechanism by which he'd have organisms develop, adapt, change, die out. But science doesn't need God to explain the phenomena of the world. It is wholly this-worldly and naturalistic. Its categories, which are so successful in understanding and explaining the natural world-as you've insisted-make no reference to anything "above" or "beyond" nature. Don't you see any tension between the naturalism that seems to be implied by science and your own supernaturalism?

Nicholas: Notreally. Science shows how this world can be known. Faith lets you know God. Not everything you know can be understood scientifically.

Phillip:

That's an interesting claim, given what you said in our first conversation. I quite agree that not everything can be known by the methods of science; in fact I insisted on it, since philosophical reasoning is required in many areas.

Nicholas: That's not what I mean at all. Faith isn't a matter of reason. It's personal, in here.

Phillip:

I don't see why you want to completely separate faith and reason. One of the traditional questions in philosophy has been Is it reasonable to believe that God exists? Isn't that a question we've got to face?

Nicholas: No. You're barking up the wrong tree. You're trying to use reason where it doesn't work.

Phillip:

Why shouldn't it work here? Philosophers have wondered whether there are any good reasons that can be offered to support a belief that God exists. Why not pursue the question ?

Faith And Reason

21

Don't you think there are good reasons for believing in God's existence?

Nicholas: You want to talk about God as something that involves look-

ing for reasons or evidence? But my faith is different from my scientific beliefs about the world. I have my faith and that assures me of God and helps me know him, just like my equations assure me of things when I solve engineering problems.

Phillip:

YOlt talk as if faith has nothing to do with reason. Why would faith give you assurance about God if it has nothing to do with reason? If faith in God is just belief without evidence, how could you possibly find any assurance in this? How would faith in God be different from faith in Santa Caus or any other kind of wishful thinking? Isn't there supposed to be a difference between your belief in God and a child's belief in Santa Claus?

Nicholas: That's not what I mean by faith. Phillip:

I'm trying to understand. Think about what we normally mean by faith. In my understanding it's often a form of trust. When you have trust in someone or something it's usually for some reason. You might have faith in someone you know well because his past behavior shows that he is a person you can trust. Or it may be some stranger you trust because you have a certain view of human nature. In both cases your faith or trust is based on some reason; it is supported. So if you have faith that God exists, I see no reason to think that it is inappropriate to ask why you have such faith. That is, is your belief a reasonable one? Is your confidence justified? Philosophers have always considered this one of the central questions concerning religious belief.

Nicholas: But not everything can be rationalized. Maybe belief in God is one ofthose beliefs you can't rationalize. I don't see why you want to make everything "rational." We're not totally rational beings, you know.

Phillip:

Your use of the term "rationalize" would bother most philosophers. "Rationalization"usually means a psychological defense mechanism that involves justifying or explaining some

22

Dialogue Two belief or action on grounds that invol ve self-deception. In this sense philosophers don't attempt to rationalize beliefs. I wouldn't think you would want to either.

Nicholas: Picky, picky. Phillip:

But if you mean the attempt to justify or argue for a certain belief, that is a central concern in philosophy. In fact, philosophy is greatly concerned with the attempt to examine arguments that are offered for fundamental beliefs. An argument is simply the attempt to provide some support for a belief. Arguments arise when one statement or group of statements is taken to be good reason for believing some other statement. The original statements are the premises of an argument, and what you're trying to prove is the conclusion. Logic is the study of what makes arguments good and bad. People give all kinds of arguments, especially when they are called upon to show why they believe something. I know we're not totally rational beings, but surely we're partially rational and at times ought to be more rational. Now, are you holding that belief in the existence of God is a belief that can't be supported by any reasons? Why would you say that? You don't think anyone has any reason to believe that God exists?

Nicholas: No. I just don't see how you can reason about God with the

limitations of a finite mind. God is an infinite being. How could a human being ever hope to think about or prove the existence of an infinite being? How could mere human thought do this? Faith must come in. You can't define God, because that would limit him. And if you can't even define God, how could you go about proving his existence?

Phillip:

Well, the concept of the infinite is used in other areas of human thinking, for example, mathematics, so you surely aren't saying that it's, in principle, impossible for a finite being to reason about the notion of the infinite, or use the conception in a useful manner. Also, since the being in question is conceived in a certain way, such a being must be intelligible or definable to the extent that our conception makes some sense. After all, it is supposedly "mere" human thought that gives meaning to the concept of God and gives some content to the supposed object of worship. If the infinite is wholly unintelligible to a

Faith And Reason

23

finite mind, how can you even speak of "God" as a religious object?

Nicholas: I don't follow you. Phillip:

People in our tradition usually conceive God to be a being with an infinitely perfect set of characteristics. He is supposedly imrnaterial,all-knowing,all-powerful,all-Ioving,and unchanging. To the extent that we understand what it means for us to know, have power, and be loving or morally good, we at least have some idea about the nature of God, since a being infinite in power, knowledge, and goodness would have to be at least as powerful, knowledgeable, and good as we are. Hence, to have a conception of this kind of God as the object of faith is to admit that God is intelligible or to some extent definable, that is, can be thought about by a finite mind. Also, I see nothing to keep us from asking whether there is any reason to think that such a being, so conceived, actually exists. This is just the sort of being some have invoked to explain certain things about our world and our experience. People do talk as if they know something about God's nature. They say God has purposes, loves us, does certain things, and so forth. If such talk makes any sense, then one must admit that a finite mind can think somewhat adequately about God. I don't see how religion would be possible if people couldn't conceive of, talk about, or define God in some way. This doesn't mean that we can fully understand God, if he or she exists. It only means we must understand something about God or else our religious talk would make no sense.

Nicholas: Okay. So maybe we can conceptualize God. But that doesn't mean we can prove that he exists. That's why we need faith. If we could offer an airtight proof, we wouldn't need faith.

Phillip:

I didn't assert that. I only concluded that I can see nothing in principle barring us from thinking about whether there are any reasons for believing that such a being, so conceived, exists. Maybe we can't find a "proof," in a strong sense. But that doesn't rule out the notion that there might be some considerations that could be relevant when deciding whether belief in God is warranted. If there are no reasons, I don't see why a person ought to believe. Usually, if you have no reason to

Dialogue Two

24

believe something, you just don't believe. It's that simple. Look, let's pu tthis on a more personal level. Instead of asking, Is it reasonable to believe that God exists? let me ask you, Nicholas, Why do you have the faith you talked about? Are there no reasons?

Nicholas: Let me think-it was a belief that I was taught when I was very young. My Mom and Dad were very religious and we went to church regularly. I'm sure that has something to do with my faith in God, but it's more than that.

Phillip:

That's not the sort of answer I was looking for. The "why" in the question doesn't ask for the psychological or sociological conditions that might explain where your faith came from. It is a "why" of logic, asking for reasons as the ground or justification for your belief, not a "why" looking for social or psychological causes. I'm asking about the "more" you spoke of. Let's try again: Why do you believe in God?

Nicholas: But the fact that my parents taught me this belief is one of the

reasons why I have faith. They are fine people, and their religion has been one of the most important things in their lives. I realize I'm my own person, but this trust in them is important to me, and my own religion is important to me. They taught me something that I have come to feel is as important to me as it was to them.

Phillip:

Surely you don't believe everything you have been taught. At some point people start to think about what they have been taught. They might end by retaining belief in these original ideas, but not just because they have been taught to believe them. They ask why they should believe certain things, and that is the "why" that seeks reasons and good arguments. The force of tradition is strong, but if you say that you believe something ''because that's what I have been taught," you are just confessing that you haven't taken the time or made the effort to think about it.

Nicholas: I didn't want to say that is the only factor in my belief, only that it is a factor.

Phillip:

But not one relevant to the reasonableness of religious belief.

Faith And Reason

25

Nicholas: I suppose so. But a lot of people have this belief, not just my

parents. Belief in God has always been a part of life. There must be something to it; everybody couldn't be wrong. Just look around you at how many people believe in God, and look at human history. I just don't see how everybody could be mistaken.

Phillip:

But just because almost everyone believes something doesn't make it true. You don't find out truth by counting how many people agree on some issue. That is an invalid argument. The truth of a belief just doesn't follow from common agreement. At one time almost everyone agreed that the earth was the center of the universe, but the earth is not the center of the universe or our solar system. Mere agreement doesn't entail the truth of the agreed-upon belief, then or now.

Nicholas: You're talking about beliefs that can be proven to be true or

false, and religious beliefs aren't like that. I still say there must be something to religious beliefs or they wouldn't be so common among people.

Phillip:

That's a very different claim from the one you made earlier. If it's true that religious belief is very common, not only in our culture, but in others, then religious belief probably does tell us something very important. It may reveal some important truths, but these may be truths about human nature, about our needs and desires, not about God. The argument from common agreement is just not a good one for inferring the existence of God. What is important for establishing truth is to show that the agreement is based upon something that would justify it.

Nicholas: But there is something the agreement is based on. People have

faith based on personal experience. That'swhatImeantwhen I said that I experienced the truth of what my parents taught me. I think belief in God is common because so many people have religious experience showing them God's existence. The faith experience is a reality, isn't it? It is for me and it is for others. That's what I meant when I said it's personal, a feeling inside.

Phillip:

What do you mean by religious experience? That's a very big

26

Dialogue Two topic. You might be referring to some kind of direct experience of divine reality, either a mystical experience of the unity of all reality or a revelation of some Absolute Other standing over against the experiencer. Whatever the description, though, I want to know the relevance of such experiences to your belief. That is where we started. Are you saying that your belief is rooted in a direct experience of God? Or are you saying that because others claim to have experienced God directly, you believe this is evidence that there is a God?

Nicholas: What do you mean by "direct experience"? Phillip:

Have you ever had an experience in which you directly experienced God's presence?

Nicholas: Not exactly, although I have had experiences that made me feel very religious. It's very hard to describe.

Phillip:

That's the whole problem. The experiences people have are so private and personal, it's difficult to know how to evaluate claims made about them. From your own experience, can you be sure that you were making contact with God, or are there other possible explanations?

Nicholas: I see your point. These feelings I've had are very hard to

describe or explain, although they've seemed to me to have something to do with God. I don't know for sure, but you can't take my experiences from me or from others. Other people have these same feelings and agree about experiencing God.

Phillip:

But what could that mean? What do you mean by "same feelings"? You certainly can't compare your experiences with others, since they are in principle intensely personal and private. People tend to interpret their experiences in light of their own conception of God. Some people have said they experienced oneness with all of reality, so God becomes synonymous with the unity of the universe. Others have said they experienced God as transcending the world. Buddhists may not interpret supposed religious experiences as a revelation of God at all. If your parents had been Zen Buddhists, do you think you would now be talking about God or about the transmission of the "Buddha-mind"?

Faith And Reason

27

Nicholas: I'd be talking about God. Phillip:

I'm not so sure. I'd be very hesitant to conclude that agreement among religious believers about the meaning of religious experience is a good reason for someone to believe that a God really exists. There isn't as much agreement as you might think. Seeing God may be the result of a preexisting religious disposition to see God. When you combine this line ofthought with the factthatmanypeople have claimed to have "religious experiences" when drugs have altered what's going on in their brain, and that such experiences could be the result of some kind of organic change, I don't think religious experience is very compelling evidence for God's existence.

Nicholas: That's not the way I see it. Maybe the evidence is inconclusive, but the existence of religious experience, especially my religious experience, does support faith. You just can't take away a person's experience. Phillip:

I'm nottrying to take away anyone's experience. But a rational person ought to be critical of her experience. Any person aware of the developments of modem psychology ought to be cautious in interpreting the meaning of her experience. Your belief in science ought to extend that far. Do you have any other reasons for having faith in God?

Nicholas: Well, I don't see how you can deny the Bible. Phillip:

Whose Bible?

Nicholas: You know what I mean. The Bible testifies to the existence of God. Phillip:

Come on, Nick. I know this is a popular argument, but it's also a bad one. To think of the Bible as testifying to the existence of God, you must assume that it is a divinely inspired text. But that assumption begs the question. If you are trying to prove the existence of God you can't assume God exists to inspire the authors of Scripture. That is a classic example of assuming what you are trying to prove.

Nicholas: That's not what I meant. What I meant is that the Bible

28

Dialogue Two describes miracles in which God intervened in the world. I think miracles still sometimes happen and God is the only possible explanation for them.

Phillip:

Instead of citing specific supposed examples, let's try to figure out what a miracle is. What is a miracle?

Nicholas: It's difficult to say. Let's see ... I'd say it's something very unusual or extraordinary that you just can't explain without God.

Phillip:

So if Wade Boggs hit .400, would that be a miracle? Or how about Bo Jackson hitting four home runs in a game? Would you call these miracles?

Nicholas: No. That's not what I mean. It's more than that. Phillip:

Not just statistical irregularities? Then your notion of a miracle needs to be sharpened.

Nicholas: Well, it's an event that can only be explained by God's acting in the world.

Phillip:

If you define a miracle as an instance of God intervening in the world, don't you again beg the question? Since you are trying to prove God's existence by the occurrence of miracles, I don't see how you can assume the existence of God in the very defini tion.

Nicholas: I don't agree. Since nothing else can explain these things, you

can say that God must have brought them about. I'm not including God in my definition of a miracle. God comes in as a conclusion or explanation.

Phillip:

But how do you know there aren't other explanations? All you can say is that some extraordinary event has occurred that so far hasn't been explained by science. The history of scientific explanation is the history of increasingly successful attempts to understand things that people once thought of as magic or the work of the gods. If someone recovers from a supposedly terminal illness, I would say we have an incomplete understanding of the causal conditions associated with the illness

Faith And Reason

29

and its cure, not that God miraculously intervened. For example, I wouldn't deny the existence of amazing occurrences of healing, but the more natural avenue of explanation would involve inquiries into psychosomatic phenomena and causes. Your notion of a miracle simply seems to be the religious expression of ignorance concerning the causes of some event.

Nicholas: Now it seems that you're using faith, since you have so much

faith that science might explain miracles. How can you be so sure that science will explain everything?

Phillip:

Ican't. !think it's more reasonable to go with the track record of science.

Nicholas: But what if the events are so amazing they couldn't possibly be explained by science?

Phillip:

How?

Nicholas: I think we should define a miracle as the occurrence of an event

that is outside the laws of nature; that's why science can't explain it. If an event violates natural laws, then your faith in scientific explanation is misguided.

Phillip:

If that's your definition of a miracle, I just don't think it's

ever plausible to believe reports of such events. Sincea natural law has the backing of an enormous range of observations and experiences, there will always be more evidence against the report of a supposed violation of natural law than for it. That' sone reason why a rational person should always be suspicious about reports of such events. Keep that in mind the next time you're waiting in line at the grocery store and you see those tabloid headlines describing weekly "miracles."

Nicholas: Very slippery. You deny that you could ever take the report

of a miracle seriously? I think that's being narrow-minded and closed.

Phillip:

That's too strong. I do think my argument counterbalances the tendency of many people to see God lurking behind every odd event. The case for God based on miracles should hardly

30

Dialogue Two give much assurance to the thoughtful person. We should be very skeptical of any report, and even if it turns out that an extraordinary event does occur, we can only say that it is, so far, unexplained by science, not that it can't be explained in any way except by an appeal to God.

Nicholas: Okay, so there might be natural causes for events we describe as miraculous. But I know one miraculous thing that God must have caused-the world. God must exist to have caused the existence of everything.

Phillip:

Why do you say that?

Nicholas: The world couldn't have caused itself to exist. Everything must have a cause.

Phillip:

You know the natural question that arises now; even children see the logic of such a response. If everything must have a cause, then how do you account for the existence of God?

Nicholas: I meant everything but God because God has always existed. Phillip:

But if it's possible that God has always existed, then why isn't it possible that the world, or the stuff out of which the universe is constituted, has always existed? You offer no argument for that, and if you can't offer such an argument, you're simply being arbitrary in asserting that everything-except Godhas a cause.

Nicholas: But you can't just go back infinitely in tracing the causes of things.

Phillip:

Why not?

Nicholas: So you think the universe always existed in some form? Phillip:

Not necessarily. I'm only holding that it is possible that the universe has always been here, so it isn't ne"~ssary to admit the existence of God as a temporally first cause of everything.

Nicholas: But what about the Big Bang?

Faith And Reason Phillip:

31

What about it?

Nicholas: Doesn't that show the universe came into being? And who caused the Big Bang? Phillip:

That only shows that physicists try to trace our universe back to its primordial beginnings. But there was something there to explode. It's possible that the stuff of the universe always has existed. There's nothing logically incoherent about supposing that there was no "first event" in time. If that's true, your first cause argument fails.

Nicholas: Look, I'm getting frustrated. Everything I say you criticize with your skeptical arguments. You don't find any of these arguments good? Phillip:

I don't find any of these arguments compelling as formulated in the way we have discussed them. These are traditional and popular attempts to argue that beliefin God is reasonable, and in each case there is much more to be said. But the popular versions are unconvincing. More philosophical work needs to be done.

Nicholas: This has been fun. I need to think these things through a little better. Why don't we talk about the existence of God again? I have another argument that you won't be able to criticize so easily. Phillip:

Then I'll see you next week.

32

Dialogue Two

Questions tor Thought, Study, and Discussion: Dialogue Two 1.

Why do people believe that God exists? Is that question ambiguous? Are there different senses in which "why" can be understood in the initial question? What are they?

2.

Why might it be of interest to look at arguments for God's existence? Do you find it of interest? Why or why not? If you don't find it to be to be of interest, how does that relate to your view of religious belief or faith?

3. How does Phillip respond to the notion that God can't be defined? If God can't be defined, what would a person believe if he claimed, "I believe in God"? 4.

What is the argumentfrom common agreement? Are you convinced by Phillip's response?

5.

Provide an argument for the following claim: Many people hold false religious beliefs.

6.

Compare these two claims: I have had an experience of God; I had a toothache yesterday. How would I claim to know these? Could I be mistaken about my toothache? Could I be mistaken about my experience of God?

7.

How should "miracle" be defined? What kind of evidence would convince you that a miracle occurred?

8.

Fonnulate Nicholas's causal argument for God's existence. Why would some people think it is more believable to hold that God has always existed than to hold that the universe has always existed?

A Few Suggested Readings Hume, David. Of Miracles. LaSalle,Ill.: Open Court, 1985. (The classic skeptical response to the argument from miracles.)

Faith And Reason

33

James, William. The Varieties of Religious Experience, esp. Lecture XVII. New York: The Modem Library, 1902. (A sympathetic treatment of mystical claims.) Russell, Bertrand. Religion and Science, Ch. 7. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970. (A critique of mysticism.) Scriven, Michael. Primary Philosophy, Ch. 4. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966. (A relatively complete critical treatment of the major arguments for God' sexistence; especially good on the faith versus reason controversy.) Taylor, Richard. Metaphysics, 3rd ed., Ch. 10. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1983. (A clear and sophisticated revision of the causal argument for God's existence; Taylor's argument is based on the principle of sufficient reason.)

DIALOGUE THREE: ORDER AND EVIL

Phillip:

Well, Nick. Have you had a chance to think about our last conversation?

Nicholas: Yes. I wonder what we're doing. We look at this argument, then that one and the next one; but where does all this logicchopping lead? Religion doesn't involve intellectualizing, like we've been doing. Nobody believes in God because of arguments. I think religion involves our feelings more than our reason, and it helps us become involved in a whole way of life. It gives us meaning or purpose in life.

Phillip:

Good point. I agree that religion involves the whole person. It involves emotional commitment. It's not just a matter of defending certain arguments. But surely it involves some intellectual commitment. Why do you think people study theology? Why do you think people wonder about the meaning and consistency of doctrines within a religion? We've been through some of these arguments already. I don't see how you could have a religion, with a meaningful object of worship and guidelines for living, without some intellectual attachment to-that is, understanding of-the meaning of certain concepts and principles. Suppose you're a Christian. You believe that certain propositions are true: that there is a God who has some identifiable characteristics, that the Divine appeared in history, and so forth. If you really felt that religion was only a matter of feeling and emotional attachment, how could you think that your religion, which you would be attached to in a nonrational and intellectually blind manner, was true? Why believe in Christianity rather than Buddhism, or Islam, or any crazy beliefs someone might dream up? People don't start to believe because of arguments, 35

36

Dialogue Three but many reflective people require some intellectual support to continue in their beliefs, or to redirect them in some more satisfying manner. To think about religious beliefs doesn't mean that you are immediately on a slippery slope that will inevitably lead to skepticism. Look, I'm not trying to be pompous here. I just don't think some people have thought through the consequences of completely divorcing religious belief from reason. It seems to me that if you want to hold that your beliefs are in some sense true, then it' s natural~ven necessary-to wonder about reasons, or evidence, or support-however you want to put it.

Nicholas: Okay, I see your point, but I have the feeling that you are professionally committed to relying too much on arguments and too little on personal experience and feelings. That might change the whole tone of your inquiry and your conclusions. I still say not everything in life is rational. Phillip:

That's a fair point. Sounds a little like the argument from religious experience, but we don't need to go through that again. What did you have in mind last time as we ended our conversation?

Nicholas: If you look honestly at the world, I believe it's not difficult to see the hand of God in things. I think it's just amazing to reflect on the complexity in things. I'm probably not being too original here, but I think I've heard many people compare the world to a finely made watch. If you found a watch in the desert, you would know that somebody made it and put it there. Now look at things in the world. How about the human eye? Or the brain? Or the complex workings of other organisms? Of the ecosystem? Things could not have just happened. Ithinkevena scientist would have to agree. God,inhisinfinite wisdom, planned and created the world, and it's up to us to appreciate the wonders of nature. Phillip:

Where did you hear that watch analogy?

Nicholas: I can't remember. Phillip:

Actually, that argument was offered long ago.

Nicholas: And criticized, no doubt.

Order And Evil

Phillip:

37

Of course. The problems with the argument aren't too difficult to see. Let's consider them and then you can see whether you can salvage anything from the argument. I'd agree that the order of the world seems to be something that should count for the existence of a rational, creative intelligence ''behind'' the world. The question is whether that evidence is strong enough to warrant the conclusion you desire.

Nicholas: Meaning? Phillip:

Look at it this way. There's some "evidence" that long ago astronauts from another planet visited the earth. There are some things that support such a hypothesis. Should we believe it? Depends on the nature of the evidence and whether it can be explained in other ways. Likewise, the world is orderly in some sense. Is God the best explanation of the order? We'll see.

Nicholas: I don't see anything wrong in thinking that God created such an amazing, complex world.

Phillip:

Well, you say the world is like a watch. The watch is created in such a way as to produce some end or purpose, that is, telling time. Since we have observed that watches are designed by some human intelligence, then the world, in keeping with the analogy, must be the product of some intelligence on a much more magnificent scale. Is that a fair statement of the argument?

Nicholas: Yes. I guess so. Phillip:

First, I think you need to clarify the sense in which there is order in the world. Scientists also speak of randomness and chance with regard to some events that occur, but I won't press the point. There is obviously a sense in which the world manifests some order. From your analogy I gather that it has something to do with means and ends. Things have purposes and they seem to be put together in some mysterious way so they'll achieve those purposes. Is that the point?

Nicholas: Yes.

38 Phillip:

Dialogue Three My first question is this: Why compare the world to a watch? Why not a plant? Or some kind of animal?

Nicholas: I don't see your point. What are you talking about? Phillip:

Suppose you compare the world to some kind of living organism, instead of a watch or some other human artifact. I don't see why the analogy wouldn't be just as good-or badsince the purposes within nature could be exemplified in some aspect of nature, like a flower. So on this analogy God may be the Big Tulip.

Nicholas: You're being silly. Phillip:

No, I'm serious. Think of all the things we might compare the world to. You smuggle in the desired conclusion by comparing it to some object that has been observed to be the result of intelligent design. You could compare the world to many other things that have not been observed to be the result of design. Worse yet, your original analogy has one glaring weakness. We have seen watches made; we have some experience upon which to base our claim that the watch found in the desert didn't just happen to be there. That's the basis for our inference. (Sorry about the philosophical talk.) The reason we think that the design in the watch points to a designer is because of this past experience. But we cannot say the order in the world is the product of design, since we have no comparable experience of the creation of the world. As Hume said long ago, your supposi tion is mere conjecture, a guess. We can only know the causes of things based on experience. The world need not be compared to manufactured things, and in one sense is wholly unlike manufactured things.

Nicholas: Big deal. No one would deny what you said about not having

experienced the creation of the world. Given the amazing complexity of things and how everything fits together so magnificently, I still don't see how you can say it just happened. The odds are against.

Phillip:

Now you seem to have different arguments involved. One is the argument from order, which you started with, and the second seems to be an argument from probabli ty. Think about

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this. Suppose you're playing poker or craps and you get a certain hand or roll of the dice. Now consider the odds of getting the further hands you actually receive. Chances are if the hands of poker are very good, or perhaps, very bad, and you lose, you'll start to think about the possibility of being cheated, because the odds against the results are so high. But the odds against any hand or set of hands are the same; you're just looking at things differently. Given some possible state of affairs, I suppose the odds against it are high, but I don't see why this is so extraordinary. You're the one with the mathematics background; I shouldn't have to point this out. The odds against the world being as it is are probably enormous, but untroubling as far as I can see, and in need of no divine explanation. The odds against any possible world, God or no God, are high. And for arguments invoking such theistic explanations, one should always remember to ask the same questions about God. If God happens to exist, would the odds be against this? Does the question even make sense?

Nicholas: You didn't really get my point. I'm still saying that the order

in nature is so amazing and so complex that it is unimaginable it's just there, with no explanation.

Phillip:

That' snot what the critic holds, and thatleads us to another big problem. It's not that the critic says the order in nature has no explanation. You have a hypothesis that attempts to explain the order, but many have felt it is a very weak hypothesis, especially since the order or purpose you observe in nature can be explained without reference to a Divine Architect. The naturalistic, scientific, explanation, is offered by evolutionary theory, which shows the way in which organisms have adapted to their environment and developed characteristics that are most useful for their survival. Means are adapted to the survival purposes of organisms over a vast expanse of time. This struggle for existence in organic history is the cornerstone of modern biological thinking. The philosopher of science calls this theory one that is overwhelmingly "well confirmed." Scientific explanation renders the "God hypothesis" unneeded.

Nicholas: But that doesn't show there is no God or no designer. He could have used evolution to bring about his purposes.

40 Phillip:

Dialogue Three That's true. It just shows how weak your hypothesis is. If we can explain what needs to be explained, using the well-established methods of science, an alternative explanation just falls out of the picture. Let me point out something else. Suppose you still insist that the "God hypothesis" is a possible explanation, given the original analogy. But consider how watches are made. A watch may be made by more than one watchmaker. The watch is made out of preexisting materials. The maker or makers of the watch may now be dead. The watch may be a poor imitation of a better watch, made cheaply after several previous botched attempts. It may lose one minu te per hour, and so forth.

Nicholas: What's the point? Phillip:

Analogies are only good if the things compared are really similar. Analogies say something like this. If x has certain characteristics, and x is like y, then y also has those characteristics. If you are strict in your original analogy, that the world and its creation are to be compared to a watch and its manufacture, then you can't support a concl usion that one presently existing perfect Being, creating out of nothing, is responsible for the world. Perhaps thirteen stupid but very powerful alien beings, now dead, conjured up this world for some curious experimental reason. That would seem to be a logically more fitting conclusion based on your watch analogy.

Nicholas: Come on. You're not being serious again. Phillip:

Yes, I am.

Nicholas: But my original analogy was more like comparing the world

to the finest, most beautiful timepiece, known to have been made by a solitary genius working high up in the Swiss Alps. Also, even if evolution is a fact, I still say God could be using evolution as his primary creative instrument to bring about creation. Evolution isn't necessarily inconsistent with God's plan.

Phillip:

All right, but I believe you will have a difficult time getting a benevolent God, on the model of a perfect timepiece, from your attempt to include evolution into your theistic scheme of things.

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Nicholas: Not at all. The world is a place of beauty and love, where things work out for the best. God has a purpose in things.

Phillip:

The first curious thing about your attempt to make evolution consistent with God's creative scheme is that it has taken billions of years for things to evolve from that first primeval soup. If God is so powerful, why would he use such a slowmoving mechanism to bring about his plan? He could do it much more quickly.

Nicholas: I have no idea. I'm saying that it is possible. Phillip:

The big problem isn't this little curiosity. The big problem is the way evolution has proceeded and continues to proceed. Evolutionary history involves a struggle for existence, with enormous amounts of pain and suffering. This hardly sounds like the way that a loving God would do things.

Nicholas: Are we talking about the animal kingdom or human history? Phillip:

It doesn't really matter, since I believe animals are capable of suffering. For convenience we could simply focus on the experiences of human beings.

Nicholas: Look, I've heard all of this before. There can't be a God since the world is full of pain and suffering. I don't buy it. That problem has been answered long ago.

Phillip:

I want to hear how you think it's been answered. I think the issue is a natural one to discuss, and it's inevitable that it has surfaced. You began by saying this: Given the way the world is, there must be a God to have produced it. You point to characteristics of the world that would seem to count for the existence of God. But many people have used the same type of argument and have been led to a very different conclusion. Given the way the world is (and has been), there can't possibly be the kind of God most people believe in. If you want to compare the world to a watch, you better see how botched it is in some respects and how it could easily be made better by a competent and loving watchmaker. Back to the workshop!

42

Dialogue Three

Nicholas: What do you mean, "could easily be made better"? You don't think you're in a position to judge the works of God? You don't know everything. That's the sin of human pride.

Phillip:

I think I'm in a position to wonder whether the kind of world we have is consistent with the existence of an all-powerful and all-loving God. An all-powerful God could have created any world he wanted, and as all-loving, his choices would have been limited by his loving nature. Assume he knows what the best kind of world would be for us. Since there is evil in the world, some have concluded that there can't be a being who is both all-loving and all-powerful. Look at it in this way. Do you think this is the best of all possible worlds?

Nicholas: I don't think that question makes any sense. All we have is this world. How could we possibly answer such a question? We don't have anything to compare it with.

Phillip:

Do you ever read science fiction?

Nicholas: Sometimes. Phillip:

One way to look at science fiction-or any literature, for that matter-is as an imaginative construction of possible worlds. Surely we can imagine what other kinds of worlds would be like-with different physical laws, different kinds of beings with different habits, et cetera. I don't see why such an imaginative procedure wouldn't be useful here, especially since you have to answer our question in a certain way, and thinking of other possible worlds will be a useful way of evaluating God's supposed creation.

Nicholas: What do you mean, I have to answer the question in a certain way? I can answer it any way I want.

Phillip:

I mean that you are logically required to answer it in a certain way, just as you are logically required to hold that "Socrates is mortal," if you know tha t "all men are mortal" and "Socrates is a man." I ask, Is this the best of all possible worlds? Suppose you believe that there exists an all-powerful and all-loving God. It seems to me that you are required to answer the question in the affirmative. Do you see why?

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Nicholas: Hold it. I still don't see what you mean by "best." "Best" in what sense?

Phillip:

Good question. I mean that this must be the morally best world that God could have created, in terms of possible goods and evils and in relation to saying that God has a perfect or infinite moral nature. When you say God is all-loving or allgood, this tells us about God's moral nature. "Best" implies that there can be no unnecessary or unneeded evil in the world and that God would bring into being a world consistent with his infinite love for his creatures. Anything less would mean he created in a defective manner.

Nicholas: I still don't see how you can answer the question, since God

could have created other worlds that we don't know about and we have no way of knowing whether our world is better than these other worlds.

Phillip:

I realize that's possible. All I mean is that this world is such that there couldn't be one that is morally better, although there might be other worlds, quite differently constituted, that are morally on a par with our own. Look, all I mean is this: If God is all-powerful and all-loving, he could have created a world that was the best for us, given his creative intentions. If we can conceive of a better world and it doesn't exist, this would have to be because of some defect in God's nature, because he either lacked the power to bring it into being or lacked the love to want to bring it into being, or he doesn't exist. If you believe in an all-powerful and all-loving God, you must also hold that this is the best of all possible worlds, in the sense that we have discussed. A better conceivable world is simply inconsistent with God's nature.

Nicholas: I still don't buy it. If a perfect world doesn't exist, then God doesn't exist? No way.

Phillip:

Not exactly. First, we still don't know that "morally best" equals "perfect," or the absence of evil, or whatever that means. Second, our conclusion isn't that God doesn't existalthough this stronger conclusion might be considered later. All we could say is that the God of classical theism does not exist. God can't be both all-loving and all-powerful.

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Dialogue Three

Nicholas: But there has to be evil in the world. Phillip:

Maybe. Remember: My argument-simply says there can't be any superfluous or unneeded evil. If we can conceive of a possible world that is morally better in some respects than the one we have now, the classical theist has some real problems.

Nicholas: What makes you think you can judge what is good and evil?

Maybe it's just your opinion. And sometimes bad things tum out to be good things. We'll never be able to see things the way God does.

Phillip:

Sometimes bad things tum outto be good, but not always. But more important, it's not that I am the only moral judge. If you happen to be a Christian, you believe that there really are, objectively, goods and evils, right ways to act and wrong ways to act. A religion requires you to act morally and says that there is an absolute sense of morality. So I don't think you can avoid the problem by denying the existence of goods and evils. God's requirements, for example the Ten Commandments, constitute some system of nonsubjective morality. We can use Christian morality itself to make our moral judgments.

Nicholas: But if you have good in the world, you also have to have evil. Phillip:

Now we need to get more specific. What you have just said is false in many cases. For example, good health can exist withou t disease. Pleasure can exist without pain. If your claim is about the existence of certain goods, then it's just not true.

Nicholas: But we wouldn't know about the good without the evils. If life was a paradise we couldn't even judge the good things to be good.

Phillip:

First, I'm not sure that's true, since we could still imagine worse worlds, without their actual existence. Second, why think that the knowledge of goods and evils is worth so much? I would happily give up the knowledge for less pain and suffering.

Nicholas: I don't think you get my point. The reason knowing the differ-

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ence between good and evil or right and wrong is so important is that God gave us the free will to choose. Sometimes we go wrong, but it's not God's fault; it's our fault. We're responsible.

Phillip:

At least we can finally get down to specifics: rape, murder, torture, greed,dishonesty. Dostoyevski was particularly good at describing some of the really hideous things that have been done to children. Like blowing out a baby's brains in front of its mother, or bayonetting babies after they had been tossed into the air. Somehow atrocities done to innocent children really get at the depths of possible human cruelty, but we could pick other good examples. How about gang rape and physical violence? It would be easy to go on.

Nicholas: Don't bother. These things make me sick. Phillip:

They should. I just want to make sure we're not talking about vague abstractions. These things are real evils. They're called moral evils, since they are caused by human beings who bring about badness through their actions. We can consider your free-will argument now, but remember that there is a whole class of evils that do not fall into your first category. Evils like disease and natural disasters are not caused by human actions, so you also need an answer to so-called nonmoral evils, unless the same answer fits both categories of evil. So why does God allow a world in which there is so much evil caused by humans? How many millions of Jews were killed during World War II? How many millions have been killed in other totalitarian countries? How many people still live in repression? How long has it taken in our own country to make our laws reflect an adequate sense of justice for all our citizens, regardless of race?

Nicholas: In my opinion these are the costs of freedom and responsibil-

ity. God could have made us into robots acting out programs and always doing the right thing. Instead, he gave us freedom to live our own lives, to choose the best way-his way-and to fight to become better people. I also think that's why we have the other kind of evil. We've got to face some challenges in order to become better people, to respond to the challenge of living, to have courage and become more loving and helpful.

46

Dialogue Three What would be the point of making a perfect world with no suffering or discouragement? Religion tells us to take up the challenge so that someday we can be developed into persons who will spend eternity with God.

Phillip:

Let me see if I have understood your position. Moral evil is a necessary consequence of freedom, and the value of freedom is greater than the disvalue of the evil caused by free beings who act terribly at times. The only alternative to this is a world of robots that always do the right thing. On the other hand, nonmoral evil makes us better people. It builds our souls. It develops virtues that God requires of us in order to be qualified for eternal life. So the value of these moral qualities is greater than the disvalue of creating a less hostile environment in which to live. Is that about right?

Nicholas: Yes. Phillip:

So it all hinges on freedom and choosing the right way to live?

Nicholas: God gave us the freedom to turn toward him or away from him. If we choose the wrong way, it's not his fault.

Phillip:

I don't want to get sidetracked, since we're talking about the problem of evil, not freedom, but remember this. First, for a complete defense of your views, you would need to explain more fully your conception of freedom. Second, it's not obvious to me that we are free in the very strong sense required by your argument. Third, even if we are free, I'm not sure it's worth the misery and torment that people have encountered in human history. But these points would require an extended discussion and we should stick to our current topic.

Nicholas: So you think it would have been better if God had made us into machines? I'll take freedom any day.

Phillip:

I believe that's what the logicians call a "falsedilemma," and it makes your argument rather shaky.

Nicholas: What do you mean?

Order And Evil Phillip:

47

You're arguing that God had only two choices: either create free beings who will cause moral evil or create machines that will always act rightly. Then you say it is clear that the first alternative is better, so in fact you defended the notion that this is the best of all possible worlds with respect to human nature, since, supposedly, the two possibilities at hand are the only possibilities, and one alternative, our current world, is better.

Nicholas: So? I don't see anything wrong with that argument. Phillip:

I don't believe those are the only possibilities, and that is why you have given me a false dilemma. It's like the old bumper sticker, "America: Love It or Leave It." That is a false dilemma, since you can also love your country but remain and become involved in the attempt to improve it.

Nicholas: What's the alternative? Phillip:

Consider two people: Aunt Alice and Uncle Charlie. Uncle Charlie is not a nice person. He lies, cheats, he has been in jail for theft and for assault, even attempted murder. He has a few good qualities, but not many. Now consider Aunt Alice. It is the mystery of love that the two have stayed together. She's kind, considerate, helpful, sympathetic-in short, everything that Charlie isn't. She's gone wrong a few times, as we all have. Overall, however, she is an admirable person; Charlie is despicable. Now I ask you one very simple question. Wouldn't the world be betterifthere existed more people like Aunt Alice and fewer like Uncle Charlie? Stronger still, wouldn't the world be better if there were no Uncle Charlies at all?

Nicholas: I don't know. Phillip:

Come on, if we can't agree on this, I don't see how we can go on. What is the point of Christian morality if not to become more Christ-like, or more Aunt Alice-like? "Love your neighbor"?

Nicholas: But if God created us like Aunt Alice, we wouldn't be free. Phillip:

Now we get to the crucial point. Compare God's world, the current world, with my possible world, the one I would have

48

Dialogue Three created if I had been God. In my world, I would simply have created more virtuous people. More virtuous people produce more goodness, or at least bring less badness into being. Hence, the badness that occurs now, which would not occur in a world populated by more loving and caring human beings, is superfluous. Since there is superfluous or unneeded evil in the world, there cannot exist a God who is both allloving and all-powerful, since he would have created that better possible world if he existed.

Nicholas: Very neat but very false, since in your world people wouldn't be free. God doesn't want to determine our destiny. We have to face the consequences of our free choices. That's why he gave us free will.

Phillip:

Ah, but that's the beauty of my possible world. For the time being, I will grant you the great value of freedom that you hold, but in my world it's not as if people are not free or even less free.

Nicholas: Sure they are. You, as God, cause them to act in certain ways. Phillip:

No. I give them stronger dispositions to actin certain ways, but they are still free to act contrary to these dispositions. Look at it this way. In our current world people are disposed to eat when they are hungry, protect themselves when threatened, fulfill themselves sexually and procreate, and so forth. Notice that you don't say that they are any less free because they have certain desires they can choose to fulfill or restrain. On your view people can choose to eat or choose to diet or choose to fast for some cause. The existence of relatively strong or weak desires can't count against freedom. In my world I give all people, not just some, sufficiently strong moral desires to make them disposed not to murder, rape, torture, et cetera.

Nicholas: But that means they're not free. Phillip:

Of course they are. Would you say you are free, in your sense, to murder or assault me right now?

Nicholas: I suppose so.

Order And Evil Phillip:

49

But you don't. For whatever reason, good moral upbringing or natural inclination, you don't have these damaging desires. If you do get extremely mad at someone, a certain moral outlook shapes your response. That would be what I would instill in everyone, so the world would be populated by people like you and me, and there would be no murderers in the world. Or even more simply, how about allowing desires to kill just one or two people but not more? The world would be better if we had no mass-murderers--no Mansons or Eichmanns. God is all-powerful, isn't he? Why wouldn't he do this? Even my little finite pea-brain can easily imagine little changes like this that would make this a much better world.

Nicholas: But if you give them these moral qualities, aren't you causing them to act in certain ways? Aren't you determining their behavior?

Phillip:

Try this: You say the point of nonmoral evil, like disease and sickness and disasters, is to create an environment of adversity where we can grow and develop into better people, that is, more virtuous people. The whole point of your response to nonmoral evil relies on the possible development of more virtuous free beings. Don't you see this? Virtues are qualities of character that make us disposed to act in certain ways; for example, a friendly person is disposed to and does act in a friendly manner. Therefore, you can't hold that virtue is inconsistent with freedom, since on your view we are called upon as free beings to respond to adversity positively by becoming more virtuous. So God, if he exists, could have created free beings more strongly disposed to act virtuously. More virtue isn't inconsistent with freedom. Notice also that many people respond to the terrible aspects of the world by turning away from God, so if God's purpose is to create better people by giving us a world with disease and disaster, he's made a mess of it. And for those who become irreversibly insane or severely retarded at birth, it is difficult to see how their character could be developed. But these are problems with your response to nonmoral evil. For now it is enough to see that the disposition argument shows why the free-will defense is inadequate. It's not the mere existence of evil that is such a problem for theists; it is the amount of evil that is the barrier to believing that an all-loving, omnipotent God exists.

50

Dialogue Three

Nicholas: It just doesn't click with me, Phillip. It seems too easy.

Wouldn't the world be more boring if we had nothing but nice people?

Phillip:

If you think that a world in which there was no torture, rape, or murder would be more "boring," whatever that means, and its exciting aesthetic aspect is of greater value than the suffering of human beings, I don't know what to say. We are talking about people, who suffer. I always thought the point of educating our children morally was to produce a more boring world, in your sense.

Nicholas: Where does this leave us, Professor? I don'tthink it's this easy. Phillip:

It's so easy to conceive of a morally better world I can't understand why anyone believes that perfect love and power are the ground of creation. Even without the disposition argument, which to my mind is a devastating response to your free-will argument, think of the countless other ways in which such a God could lessen the suffering of his creatures. For example, he could intervene to prevent particularly devastating evils from occurring. Or he could eliminate a few diseases. For instance, since he is all-knowing, he knows how to cure those diseases that cause untold suffering and that we spend millions of research dollars on. Why not put the right ideas in the scientists' minds? What do you think?

Nicholas: I still think there's Something out there. Evidently you don't. Phillip:

Be sure you're clear about the conclusion drawn from the

problem of evil. There may be Something there, but I think this shows that the Something can't be both all-powerful and allloving. Do you find that disturbing?

Nicholas: If you're right, I would find it disturbing, but I'm still not convinced.

Phillip:

All I can do is think through the issue with you. I can't see anything wrong with the argument that leads us to this conclusion. But the problem of evil doesn't show that God, in any sense, doesn't exist. Some have responded to the problem by denying that God is omnipotent, and they think of him as some

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kind of loving spiritual influence in the universe.

Nicholas: I take it that is not your attitude. What is your attitude? Phillip:

I'm not sure. I suppose the source of religious belief may be some personal experience that is alien to my own, but I'm skeptical about this, since people are not always very reliable judges or interpreters of their experience. We've talked about this before. All I can go on is an examination of the various arguments for God's existence. As far as I can see, none of them work, although I'm open to new and imaginative renderings of them, and much more work needs to be done than what we've done here. So I don't have any reason to think there is a God, in the traditional sense, although I'm willing to waffle a bit since some formulations of certain arguments leave me with uncertainty. I'm sympathetic to Spinoza's view that God is nothing but the unfolding determined universe, a position that people of his time found to be shocking and heretical, since such a God doesn't create, will, act, or care about us. But that would require a lot of explanation and philosophical labor. And you?

Nicholas: I still choose to beijeve, based on my personal experience and faith.

Phillip:

Hmm. That's an interesting way of putting it. I'm not sure we can choose to believe certain things. For example, if I see a car passing me, I can't choose to believe the car is there; I just believe it. I find something happening to me. In this sense, belief is often involuntary, as if we can't help what we believe in certain matters. It's as if a person reflectively discovers something about himself and he's not sure how the belief got there. You say you choose to believe. Think about whether you are capable of not believing in God at this point in your life. Can you really choose? Likewise, I could only say that I couldn't possibly choose to believe in God right now, since I find it such a fantastic claim and I just don't see much basis for it. But I can't think of anything more interesting to think about.

Nicholas: Well, that belief is still an important part of my life and no

philosophy can take that away from me. God gives me a sense of values and a sense of purpose in life. I don't see how you can

52

Dialogue Three go on without God or what the point of living is if we're just specks in a Godless universe.

Phillip:

Those are interesting issues. We should talk about this later. I've heard people say what you're saying, and I suppose my approach to life is so different from theirs it's difficult for us to understand each other's viewpoint. I really don't think it should make much difference in life whether people do or don't believe in God. I don't think it really matters, in the way most ordinary people think, whether you are a theist, atheist, pantheist, or whatever. But that would take a longer conversation. Off to the library.

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Order And Evil

Questions for Thought, Study, and Discussion: Dialogue Three 1. In what sense is there order in the world? In what sense is there disorder? 2. What are Phillip's central criticisms of Nicholas's argument from order? 3. Is there a conflict between evolution and God's existence? Why do people think there is such a conflict? 4.

Formulate the problem of evil. What is the conclusion?

5. Is this the best of all possible worlds? What would it mean to speak of the best of all possible worlds? Suppose the following: At 6 p.m. today you become God. In what ways would you attempt to bring about a better world? What would be the consequences? Would it be worth it? 6. Would it make sense to deny the existence of evil? 7.

At one point Phillip accuses Nicholas of a "false dilemma." What is afalse dilemma? Give examples. What is the false dilemma in Nicholas' free-will defense?

8. Reconstruct Phillip's disposi tion argument. Is it obvious that Phillip's imagined world is better than our present world? Is virtue compatible with freedom?

A Few Suggested Readings Hick,John. PhilosophyofReligion,3rded., Ch.4. EnglewoodOiffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1983. (Clear and sympathetic discussion of Christian responses to the problem of evil.) Hume, David. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1980. (The classic criticism of the argument from design; Parts Xand XI offer a famous discussion of the problem of evil.)

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Dialogue Three

McCloskey, H. J. "God and EviL" In Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 39,1960. (Critical discussion of the major proposed solutions to the problem of evil.) Matson, Wallace. The Existence of God. Ithaca, N.,Y.: Cornell University Press, 1965. (An extensive examination of the classical arguments for God's existence; see his treatment of the argument from probability.) Taylor, Richard. Metaphysics, 3rd ed., Ch.l0. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1983. (Contains a brief contemporary defense of the argument from design.)

DIALOGUE FOUR: FREEDOM

Phillip:

Hi, Nick. Ready for some more philosophy?

Nicholas: Sure. Got any ideas? Phillip:

One or two. It's a natural transition. I recall that you tried to solve the problem of evil by appealing to freedom.

Nicholas: People are free and responsible for their lives. When they do

bad things, it's their own fault and they should take the punishment, either society's or God's. You're not going to criticize that, are you? I thought you agreed that people are free, you just thought God could make them better people.

Phillip:

I agreed only for the time being. Now we can talk aboutit more fully. I do think you're correct to see that your worldview demands consistency on the issue of freedom and evil.

Nicholas: What do you mean? Phillip:

Suppose you believe that the God of the Judeo-Christian tradition exists, but you also believe that some human events occur that are determined. If God is responsible for creation, but there are people who are not responsible for their conduct, God is. So if their conduct causes evil, it appears that God is the source of evil. Consistency demands that you hold the view that all people are responsible human agents. If freedom is more limited or the conditions for freedom are not met in everyone's experience, I would say your free-will defense is once again shaken. Of course, I think it's unconvincing anyway. 55

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Nicholas: Well I don't! And I think it's obvious that people are free. Phillip:

Utterly predictable that you would say that, which counts against your position, doesn't it?

Nicholas: What do you mean, "predictable"? You didn't know what I would say. Phillip:

Here's what I sometimes do in my classes. Before our first discussion of freedom I ask the students to write for a few minutes on whether they think people are free. I also give them some questions to answer concerning their religious, moral, and aesthetic preferences. After I receive their brief essays and before I read them I make a series of predictions concerning their responses. Unscientific, I suppose, but my predictions are usually very accurate. Why do you think that happens?

Nicholas: I have no idea. Phillip:

Come now; you're being disingenuous. The positions they take are predictable; the views of freedom are predictable; the values they have are predictable. For the most part the students I teach are white, middle-class, and have a homogeneous religious background. It goes without saying-I guess I'm saying it-that they are Americans. Given a thorough knowledge of their cultural and social background, successful prediction is easy. ''I'm free; I'm an individual; anyone can make it if she works hard enough." Need I go on? These are the predictable responses from people who live in a culture where important concepts become buzzwords, where difficult ideas are made to appear pat and obvious. Cultural condi tioning, plain and simple; notfreedom, butthe most obvious evidence for determinism.

Nicholas: Very cynical, Prof. I can't even tell whether you're being serious. Maybe you can make pretty good predictions, but I bet they're not 100 percent accurate. You can't tell what everyone will say. That's a big bluff. Phillip:

I'm not bluffing. Predictions may be limited, but that only suggests that I need more information to get better predic-

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tions for a few people. You tell me: Why do you think people are free, since we are able to predict human behavior? Why do you think you are free? Give me an example.

Nicholas: There are lots of reasons why I think I'm free--and other

people too. I can come and go as I please, although I realize there are laws restricting some of my actions. I can make free choices about things. I can think freely, decide, do anything I want, within limitations. Even if I'm put in jail, no one can control my thoughts. There are so many reasons showing people are free. We think and choose all the time. You can see that.

Phillip:

Just give me one concrete example to examine. Give me an example of a free act or free choice or whatever you think is free.

Nicholas: Coming to meet you today was an example of a free act. I didn't have to come here. I wasn't forced in any way, but I chose to come. I could have done something else if I had wanted.

Phillip:

Did you actually think about coming? Did you actually choose, in the sense that you pondered alternatives and chose one rather than another?

Nicholas: Not exactly. I knew we had agreed to meet and I decided to come.

Phillip:

But you didn't really decide or choose to act; you simply acted.

Nicholas: So? What difference does that make? Phillip:

Because it seems to me that there are many occasions on which people might say, reflecting back on their experience, that they chose to do x rather than y, when in fact, they didn't choose in any explicit sense. It's as if reflection creates a fictitious aspect of experience. I would say that on those occasions people are sort of "going with the flow," if you will. A kind of experiential inertia carries them from one moment to another, and there is no real agency at all. The past leads inexorably to the future.

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Nicholas: But people can and do make explicit choices; that happens all the time.

Phillip:

First recognize that often people simply find things happening to them, without the influence of agency, and maybe freedom, even in your sense, is not as ever-present as you think.

Nicholas: But at every moment people can reflect and make decisions.

They can choose. They can always do otherwise and that's the key for freedom.

Phillip:

All right. Let's say you did choose to meet me today, even though you could have done otherwise. Why did you decide to come?

Nicholas: I told you I would be here. Phillip:

And why did you keep your word?

Nicholas: I think it's the right thing to do. I think it's important for a person to be trustworthy.

Phillip:

Let's keep it in your own terms. Why do you think you should do the right thing?

Nicholas: Hold it. What's the point? Phillip:

Surely you can answer that last question. You have been trained, that is, strongly conditioned to act that way. Your parents probably conditioned you to act morally. Your character has been shaped by such training and the reinforcements associated with it. Actions are the results of choices, which are expressions of character. Character is determined by forces over which you have no control, including cultural, familial, and genetic factors. So people are not free. That is a simple, but powerful argument for determinism. Someone knowing your character could have easily foreseen that you would meet me.

Nicholas: First, I don't accept the idea that character is always caused by things you can't control. And I didn't have to come. I might have decided to do something else.

Freedom Phillip:

59 My reason for saying that character is caused is that everything is caused; that is what I mean by determinism. Events don't just pop into being; there are explanations to be found. To speak of a person's character is a shorthand way of speaking in general terms about those desires, inclinations, motivations, and habits that are the springs of human action, and the actions themselves. The actions are caused by our desiring nature, and desires are caused. We could look at other examples, but the analysis would look the same. You may say that you didn't have to meet me-but you did. That occurrence can be explained adequately. You may think you could have done otherwise, but how can you possibly know this, since you may not be aware of the causal forces determining your conduct? You probably know something about modem psychology. There are numerous examples of people whose actions are caused by factors that psychologists are perfectly aware of, but the people themselves are not aware of the causes. You don't deny the existence of at least some compulsive behavior, do you? The kleptomaniac? The addict? Their desires determine their actions, unbeknownst to the persons themselves.

Nicholas: But they are free to change their behavior. They can change

their character. It happens all the time. People quit smoking or drinking or gambling because they have a free will to change.

Phillip:

I suppose some can, but that only means they are lucky to have sufficiently strong counterdesires, either psychologically, socially, or biologically caused, to overcome the desires that caused their compulsion. Either way, one can't escape the mechanism of determinism. Only a stronger desire can overcome a weaker one.

Nicholas: You think that our desires always cause us to act in certain ways? I don't see that.

Phillip:

What else could? Justlookatall the examplesthatfitdeterminism. Drive your car down the street, turn on the radio, go home and watch 1V. You are bombarded by attempts to influence desires. Walk into a store. Your behavior is manipulated. Thinkofit: I want these new shoes; I want to look good;

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Dialogue Four I want to be accepted; I really want this expensive beautiful car; I want that high-paying job with a big company; I want that new house in the suburbs; I want that person elected who will look out for my interests. Hey, I'm free, a person says, as he marches, in lockstep, along the moments of life. No wonder critics of highly developed countries have focused on the more subtle forms of repression in advanced societies. You are, in part, the sum of your desires, and those have been caused by all sorts of factors.

Nicholas: I don't see anything wrong in wanting those things, if it makes me happy.

Phillip:

That's not the point; the value issue is not what we're discussing right now. We are talking about the ways in which our desiring lives are constantly manipulated, and those choices that some might think are the hallmark of freedom aren't free at all. Isn't it depressingly clear that the conformism that fulfills cultural expectations is more apparent than the countercultural life-styles that are contrary to such conformism?

Nicholas: My God! Deja vu! We're back to the sixties and all that hollow

rhetoric about how terrible American society is. You're lost in the past. There's nothing wrong with this country.

Phillip:

No. My point is metaphysical, not political. I'm arguing for some kind of determinism at the present, not for the thinness of American cultural experience. And I admit my determining influences. Do you?

Nicholas: You make it sound like we can never think about what we're doing. We are emotional, desiring creatures; I admit that.

And I suppose that some people let their desires rule their life more than others. But we are also people who can step back and reflect about different possibilities instead of acting without thinking. Even if our desires are shaped, I don't think our thoughts are, and we can decide things based on our thoughts. What goes on in my mind is something that no one can control-except maybe in extreme cases like brainwashing. My thoughts are mine, and I can make free choices based on my uncontrolled thoughts.

Freedom Phillip:

61 Interesting. Let's go back to your original defense of freedom. You originally said, among other things, that you were free if you could do as you please. Notice this has a great deal to do with our notion that America is a land of freedom because there is lack of external constraint. You did qualify this by recognizing the restraining influences of laws, and you would recognize the restraints of physical nature. So on this view the only limitations on my freedom would be externally imposed. For example, an adolescent would be "free" if his parents imposed no restrictions on his actions, like curfews and the like. It's as if one is saying, ''What's 'in here' is mine, and as long as what's 'out there' doesn't restrict me, I am free."

Nicholas: That's not what I just said. Phillip:

I'm getting to that. This view of freedom depends on a fairly strict internal-external distinction as the basis for freedom, since the inner is the locus of true freedom and the outer is the only hindrance and can be the arena in which my actions are allowed to be consistent with inner life. But the problems with such a view have already surfaced.

Nicholas: You mean all that stuff about desires? Phillip:

Of course. To allow someone freedom from external constraint doesn't automatically equal freedom, since the springs of action, which are internal, are also subject to constraint or causation. Being subjected to causation doesn't begin at the physical boundaries of my body. Again, think of children. Some parents seem to think, in a misguided way, that allowing children "freedom" means letting them do what they want. Unfortunately, it is apparent that such children aren't free at all. They're often uncontrolled, uncivilized brats. They act spontaneously, based on their own selfish desires. We think of them as more determined than a mature and reflective child, not more free.

Nicholas: That was my point. Since we can think, we don't have to be compelled by desires, as you say.

Phillip:

I offer this example and what I've been explaining in order to break down an overly simplified intemal-external model, so

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Dialogue Four we can think about what you're now saying. You said at least yourthoughtsare uncontrolled. They are your "own," as you said. So at least something that is "in here" is mine, even if not my desires. Is that right?

Nicholas: Yes. Phillip:

But consider another type of child. Instead of being given license to act so thoughtlessly, think of a child who is taught to consider others, understand social situations, and reflect intelligently on the consequences of his actions. If moral education and socialization succeed, we do have a child who acts more intelligently; we might even say more rationally, since his own interests are maximized by such conduct. But why think such a child is any less determined? He might have been fortunate to have more insightful parents and a more thoughtful and responsive personality, but that only means that he is lucky to have a different set of causal factors in his experience. We tend to blame one child for being an uncivilized brat and praise another for being such a bright mature child, but I'm not sure such praise and blame are appropriate.

Nicholas: Children aren't like adults. I'm talking about mature adults

who can think for themselves and choose on their own, without that kind of outside, parental influence you are talking about.

Phillip:

Or otherkindsofinfluence, like societal or historical? Yousay at least our thoughts are our own. Think of just one small example. A baseball team rallies in the bottom of the ninth to take the championship. Members of the team are interviewed after the game. What do they say? "We didn't give up." 'We showed a lot of character." 'We knew we had to do it." "I just thank the Almighty we were given the opportunity to succeed." ''It's a great feeling-I can't explain it." Blah,blah,blah. One cliche after another. You say at least our thoughts are our own. In one sense that is obviously true, but trivially so, and irrelevant for the defense of freedom. My pains are my own also, but that doesn't mean I'm free to have them or not. In another sense, when we find ourselves falling into cliche, saying what's expected of us, saying what others say, thinking what we have been taught by our family, our society,

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an entire intellectual tradition, I begin to wonder whether or how it's possible to have thoughts that are truly our "own." Think of how much of our talk· is "idle chatter," as one contemporary philosopher calls it. 'Well, that's what they say." Indeed: Think of how much this anonymous cultural "they" really controls how we think, what we say, and what we choose to be.

Nicholas: You have a knack for twisting around what I'm trying to say.

Just because we sometimes utter cliches doesn't mean we're not free.

Phillip:

But it's symptomatic. I'm sorry if it seems as if I'm not responding adequately. I'm trying to understand your positions and arguments. In this instance I find it unconvincing to base the argument for freedom on external lack of constraint consistent with an internal world not subject to causation. That inner world, whether psychological or intellectual, also appears to be subject to causation. I do think you're on to something when you attempt to allow for the possibility of the self being more than a collection of caused desires, but the general way you've put it-that our thought is somehow uncaused or our "own"-doesn't always seem to be true. Again, it's striking when I hear my students say virtually the same things, class after class, year after year, about certain topics, and then, with a great amount of pride, talk about their "own" views, individuality, and autonomy.

Nicholas: Hold it. I've had to defend freedom. You defend what you call determinism.

Phillip:

I think I've been doing that. Let's summarize the most basic defenses of each position and see which one has the stronger case.

Nicholas: Okay. Phillip:

First, what is the evidence or argument for determinism and the denial of freedom? Determinism is simply the position that everything is caused, and many believe that if determinism is true, then persons aren't free and responsible for their conduct. What is the evidence for the principle of causation?

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Dialogue Four To say it is very strong may be an understaternent. Looking for causes is one of the cornerstones of scientific inquiry.

Nicholas: But maybe not everything is caused. Even scientists talk about chance events.

Phillip:

The question is, when they talk about chance events are they talking about uncaused events? I think not. They're usually talking about statistical limitations on prediction. Whatever they are talking about, the argument for the principle of causation is also logical or conceptual or intuitive, however you want to put it. Can we even rnake any sense of an uncaused event? What would it look like? Would it rnake sense to think of sorne occurrence, causally unconnected to anything previous, arising literally frorn nothing? I don't know how to understand that.

Nicholas: I see what you rnean, but maybe that's true only for the world, and not for people. Maybe sornetirnes people just do things, without any cause.

Phillip:

Think about that. First, if the person does it-whatever you're talking about-the "it" is caused by the person, so "it" is caused. Second, suppose we say "it" just happened. I'rn holding an ice crearn cone and I just spontaneously throw it in your face. If you try to defend freedorn by saying that a free act is a spontaneous uncaused act,like this, I don't see how that advances the cause of freedorn and responsibility, since if the event is uncaused, "I" didn't do it, so I'rn not responsible for it. It just happened. And you seern rnost interested in defending freedorn, so people are responsible for their actions. What good would freedorn be without responsibility?

Nicholas: All right, but looking for causes in nature is not like looking for causes when people act, is it?

Phillip:

Think first of psychology as the science of hurnan behavior, based on an understanding of behavioral conditioning by rneans of positive and negative reinforcernents. Think of the way in which sociology, anthropology, history, and other social sciences ernphasize the role of cultural conditioning in understanding human beings. Think of biological and

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medical science offering genetic and biochemical accounts of behavior, disease, and mental illness. The scientific evidence for determinism and the denial of freedom appears strong. We are subject to both laws of nature and laws of human behavior that can be used to understand and predict successfully human conduct.

Nicholas: You have this overwhelming faith in science, here as in our

previous discussions. I still don't think science can tell us everything, especially when it comes to the mystery of God and his creatures. Just because science can sometimes give explanations and make predictions doesn't mean it always can. Scientists might be able to explain my body, but not my soul.

Phillip:

I'm not sure what that means, but we could take it up later. For now, I think it is reasonable to conclude that the argument for determinism is strong.

Nicholas: There's a big leap in your argument, though. What if determinism is true, but people are still free?

Phillip:

Let's look at the argument for freedom and consider that. What is the evidence for freedom?

Nicholas: As I said before, I have choices, make decisions, and I don't

feel controlled. I can leave right now, or punch you, or yell, or do hundreds of other things. I can choose! How many times do I have to say it? If your determinism is true, there are no real choices; everything that occurs has to occur. It can't be any other way. For you to be correct it's as if the whole of history, once set in motion, necessarily led to us talking with each other right now. And whatever is up there in the future can't be changed. I think that's absurd. I just can't believe the future is set up and nothing can change. If I believed that, what would be the use in doing anything? I'd just give up.

Phillip:

But you won't, because you don't believe it. And if determinism is true, which it might be, the future will be as it has to be. You'll forget these arguments. They won't affect you and you will go on living your life. I think attitudes can be affected by these arguments, but that doesn't mean that a belief in deter-

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Dialogue Four minism means you should give up and be a pessimist. One other possible response would be to quit scorning reality, to be resigned to your fate and learn to avoid the wishful thinking that things could be other than they are. I think one could be a determinist and have very positive attitudes. Also, notice that when parents nurture their children, educate them, and love them, they must be closet determinists because they really want to cause their children to be wise and successful. There are so many areas in life in which we must at least somewhat believe that present facts will cause or determine future events.

Nicholas: Still, whatever your attitude, my experience tells me I am free.

The future is open to me; I always have possibili ties before me. All you can ever do is look back as a determinist and explain what has occurred. But you will never be able to show that whatever occurs must occur and there are no other possibilities. Your position contains a big leap from explaining what has occurred to saying that was the only thing which could have occurred. How do you know that?

Phillip:

Excellent point, Nicholas. But what makes you deny it? If I throw a rock right now, I know it will drop, given the physical conditions that exist. I see no great leap, however, in supposing that, given the causal conditions associated with human nature, such lawlike generalizations also apply to people.

Nicholas: I deny it because my experience shows me I am free. No

wonder you would originally predict that I would say I am free. That doesn't show I'm not free. If you look behind you right now I predict you will see a white BMW, because that is what your experience will show you. So if my experienceand everyone's-indicates that I make choices and have alternatives, it would be predictable that I would say I am free. It would also be predictable that others would say this. But that's not a result of cultural conditioning; it's because people have good evidence to show they're free. Believing in freedom shows that people are intelligent, not that they're determined.

Phillip:

Good point again, but it's not just the fact that they say they are free. It's the way they understand the concept that also is a product of conditioning, and remember the countless other

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ways in which prediction can be successful. So you think the best evidence for freedom is your own personal experience, which, you think, has a certain meaning?

Nicholas: Come again? Phillip:

Your experience is-pardon me if this sounds too "philosophical"-laden with a certain meaning. Your experience tells you that the future is open, and when you reflect on alternatives, it's really your "own" responsibility to determine what the future will be like. Let's call this the "argument from immediate experience."

Nicholas: You love to label arguments. Phillip:

It's handy. The first problem with your argument is this: You said that the determinist could only explain what has occurred, but can't show there was no other possibility. So the determinist can't in principle deal with the openness of the future. But your argument from immediate experience founders on a similar point in relation to the past. You can only reflect on current and future experience; for example, you find within yourself a certain desire. But your reflection could never uncover the causal connections that tie the present to the past. You can't discover the causes of your experience within the flow of your experience. You "need" outside reflection for this.

Nicholas: Even if that's true, my experience doesn't lie about the future. Phillip:

Let's think aboutthat. This next point mightlooka little sticky, and I'm not sure how to make it without using some odd sounding terminology, but the determinist would naturally ask the following: What makes you think your experience is as it appears to be? What model of consciousness is presupposed in your argument from immediate experience? Are there other models of consciousness that count against this one?

Nicholas: Where do you come up with this stuff? Please explain. Phillip:

Sure. What I primarily mean by "consciousness" is "aware-

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Dialogue Four ness." Now when I look at the BMW, I am aware of an object external to myself and I am also clearly aware of this awareness. I am aware of myself looking at the car. Although this might be misleading, think of your experience as if it's going on inside your head and you can step back and watch it, reflect on it, try to understand it. Now think of a window through which you have to look at your experience. Your argumentfor freedom is based on the notion that the window is clear or transparent, as if everything going on on the other side of the window can be seen clearly through the window. We will call this the "transparency of the consciousness" model. You say experience shows you the future is open and experience doesn't lie. It' sas ifthere is nothing hidden in one's awareness of oneself. Do you see what I'm getting at?

Nicholas: I think so. Phillip:

Then you can also probably predict that the determinist rejects this view of consciousness. Let's call his view the "opacity of consciousness" model, as if your window to your experience is muddied, or obscured, or unclear in some respects. He believes consciousness is, in some respects, opaque to itself, not always adequately given its true meaning to itself. For example, think of someone who is controlled by some compulsion or a person who behaves because of some unconscious motivation. Certainly the psychoanalyst believes that there is some hiddenness in consciousness. Add to that the way in which historical, cultural, and biological factors are effective in producing desires and conceptions that cause us to act in certain ways, although we are unaware of these causal determinants, just as the neurotic is unaware of the motivations causing his neurosis. The determinist does not believe thatimmediate experience is good evidence for freedom, since immediate experience is often such an unfaithful and fickle companion with regard to its truthfulness.

Nicholas: Admitted. But sometimes our experience is truthful, and even if it isn't, we can sometimes find out when it isn't, and when we do, we have found the true meaning of our experience.

Phillip:

Nicholas, you're being so dialectical. This gets more and more interesting.

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Nicholas: I can see what you're getting at-that sometimes we just don't know ourselves. We don't realize that what we're thinking or wanting or choosing may be the result of things that happened to us in the past.

Phillip:

Or biological factors, or historical factors preceding our existence.

Nicholas: Okay. But we can come to know these factors, can't we? You're

always talking about the psychologically troubled. But when that person comes to know the causes of his behavior, when he begins to realize why he feels and acts as he does, he can free himself. We can truly step back from our experience and understand these things about ourselves, so we're no longer under the control of these factors.

Phillip:

We've arrived at an interesting point, my friend. The view you're espousing is one I've been sympathetic toward for years, butit's not withoutits problems. I suppose it's a version of your "my thoughts are my own" position, but we've taken it to a more provocative level. May I see if this is what you have in mind?

Nicholas: The stage is yours, Herr Professor! Phillip:

It's difficult to describe what we're talking about without the spatial metaphor of "stepping back." We could use more highsounding terms if you like, because what we're really talking about is subjectivity and objectivity, an internal individual perspective and an external anonymous perspective on experience. Think of the child again. The uncivilized brat, or even the normal adolescent, is, as it were, too close to his experience. It's as if a child is swimming ina river,having a wonderful time in the middle of the stream, and doesn't have any idea what is upriver. He doesn't think about what's upriver; he doesn't care what is ahead or how the stream has taken him to that point. But maybe the current becomes stronger and it's clear that a wise swimmer might climb out and check out what's up ahead. Maybe the example fails miserably, but what we are talking about is somehow stepping out of or back from the flow of our experience and starting to understand it in reflection. Such reflection means that I can attain a perspective

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Dialogue Four outside of my life in order to understand an almost infinite web of causal influences that serve to make me what I am. And when I begin to understand that I am this thing determined to like this, want that, and think in certain ways, those very aspects of me become indeterminant, contingent. I can choose to be a different person, with different ideas, desires, goals, and values. So character can be changed. Is that what you're getting at?

Nicholas: (Smiling.) Exactly as I would have put it. Phillip:

How does such a process take place?

Nicholas: It happens to everyone, doesn't it? Phillip:

Does it?

Nicholas: Isn't that what education is all about? Phillip:

It's what it should beabout, if freedom has anything to do with a self-understanding that is the foundation of autonomy. It is what I sometimes see in the growth of some of my students. Education should liberate, but some students---and others, I presume-have no time for such impractical matters. It's as if they, also, are too "dose" to their experience and have no desire to step back at all, perhaps for fear of where they will land. I know this sounds pompous, but if you believe that freedom has something to do with an autonomy fueled by learning, by an understanding of the ways we are embedded in history, culture, and physical nature, I can't see that the task of becoming free is taken up by everyone, since it is a consuming and overwhelming task to pursue such self-understanding.

Nicholas: I think you continue to underestimate people. Phillip:

I suppose. It's just somewhat disappointing to leave the confines of the university and step out into the "real world." I believe an intellectual life is satisfying-you would say liberating-but the masses don't feel this way.

Nicholas: Elitist again.

Freedom

Phillip:

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You're the one who led us to a position that relates freedom and the possibility of attaining an objective perspective on experience in order to attain adequate self-understanding. It seems to me that the possibility of objectivity is necessarily related to a reflection that depends upon education and a rational balancing of evidence-at least when it comes to belief and acting on beliefs. If that's the case, I would say freedom is much more limited than you initially held, if it exists at all.

Nicholas: Somehow I'm losing the gist of the argument. Why do you keep mentioning objectivity? I didn't say anything about that.

Phillip:

Because your position seems to depend on the notion that freedom means you can step back from your experience, understand it, evaluate it as a pure observer, then make your free decisions, based on your own autonomous reasons. Think of making moral decisions, based on the best moral reasons you determine. You attempt to decide based on what is the morally correct action, not just what would benefit you most. Here you attempt to be "objective" in acting on impersonal reasons. When you act, your reason would explain why you acted, and your act would be caused. This, by the way, is why some would say that determinism is compatible with freedom, since a free act would be caused, but by rational considerations coming from a free agent. I put it this way to point out the seeming strengths and weaknesses of the view. I said I have been sympathetic to this view, but I'm more pessimistic now, because the pure, rational self, which is supposedly the agent of free choice, may be a fiction.

Nicholas: Why do you say that? Phillip:

I want you to consider two examples. We had a lengthy discussion of religious belief. I suppose that your view is that one is "free" to believe or not to believe,and thus all the actions that would be an expression of religious belief would also be free. Is it possible to step back from our whole life, as a pure reflecting agent, and evaluate "objectively"-if that makes sense---whywe believe and whether we should? When we're engaged in this self-understanding and when we are evaluating our experience and the various arguments, is our thought unmuddied by the influences of our past, our dispositions,

Dialogue Four

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our desires? Can we be sure that our conclusions are uninfluenced by our preexisting prejudices? Or take a moral example. How about the attempt to evaluate impersonally the various arguments concerning abortion? Consider a devout Catholic. From the inside of his experience he has a moral certainty that likens the current situation to the Holocaust. Can he detach himself from his commitments in order to understand other positions and arguments? Is tolerance a proper expectation?

Nicholas: I considered all your arguments and counterarguments on the God issue. I just didn't change my mind.

Phillip:

I'm not trying to be unkind, Nicholas, but from my point of view your conclusion seems to be a predictable result of past determining influences. It's theinternal-external problem again. From the inside, your experience appears to you in a certain way. From the outside, it can be explained in a very different way. And I'm not attempting to rise above the issue myself. My conclusions are wholly different. It seems that I have been objective and rational in my deliberations. Externally, some would see my experience as a typical result of twentiethcentury academic philosophizing, corrupted by the pervasive but unseen influence of scientific, anti metaphysical reflection and having lost an unmediated and direct contact with the simplicity of religious experience and community.

Nicholas: Whew! Phillip:

Sorry. Now you see why I'm sympathetic to the position

we've been discussing. Philosophical reflection attempts to question prejudices and presuppositions in order to get at the way things are. I still think that is possible to some extent, but I admit that it is more difficult than I once thought. The supposed autonomy of philosophical reflection is important to me .

. Nicholas: You sound like you can't make up your mind about freedom. Phillip:

It's just that itis a much more difficult notion than some might think. Just look at these paradoxes: Freedom is such an important idea that people will fight and die for it. Whatever the metaphysical arguments, it is so politically and existen-

Freedom

73 tiallyimportanta notion that we can hardly do without it. Yet people seem frightened by it, avoid it, escape it. Even if we are left to our own devices in being allowed to act as we wish, it's as if that is sometimes too much for us. Freedom may be burdensome. If we have to reflect, if we do step back, it may be that the stepping back alienates us from what makes us concrete selves. It gives us no ground to stand on, from which to choose. Some people may feel "unfree" when forced to think hard in a process of self-understanding, and feel more "liberated" when acting naturally and simply from the desires that make them a certain kind of person. You see, in this sense, I'm not sure that determinism is such a bad thing, because it gives substance to a self. Being an American, a midwesterner, reflective, active, et cetera, may be determining causes in my behavior, so I will inevitably act in a certain way. But it also makes me a concrete self, with real desires and goals, not just a shadowy expression of objective understanding.

Nicholas: Well, I still say that even if we have been influenced in certain ways, we can choose alternatives and change our character. We can form our own destiny; that is the dignity of being a human.

Phillip:

A beautiful, if not true, ideal. At the least I would say that it's probably a mistake, a false dilemma, to think that people either are or are notfree, in a full and un troubling sense. It's probably useful to think of degrees of freedom and the conditions under which a free self might emerge. I do think that a good dose of determinism is needed to counterbalance the overly judgmental attitude that some have about themselves and about others. Some have been quite fortunate in the natural lottery; others have been very unlucky. That's what we need to remember when we think about what people deserve. Excessive pride and excessive condemnation of others are neither virtuous nor truthful, in my humble view. Recognition of the role of luck in life breeds humility.

Nicholas: Please. You don't wear that virtue well! Phillip:

It's underneath my surface garments. Shall we meet again?

Nicholas: I freely choose to say yes.

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Dialogue Four

Questions for Thought, Study, and Discussion: Dialogue Four 1. Do you think you are free? Why? Give an example of a free act. Are you free in all the things you do? What are situations in which you think you are unfree or less free? 2. Can a person change her character? What would that mean? Have you ever consciously attempted to change an aspect of your character? Why? 3. Jean-Paul Sartre, the French existentialist, held that a person, in a strong and almost literal sense, is absolutely free to "invent" or "create" his "self." What might that mean? What examples would count for Sartre's philosophy of human nature? What would count against it? 4.

Do you agree with Phillip that our desires are caused?

5. Comment on Phillip's notion that the prevalence of talk about freedom in our culture is actually evidence for determinism. 6. If freedom does not simply involve the removal of external obstacles to action, what implications would this have for the view that American society is the "most free" country in the world? 7. Are our thoughts our "own"? 8. What is determinism? Is there good evidence for the truth of determinism? 9. How does Phillip respond to the argument from immediate experience? 10. Why does Phillip relate the questions of objectivity and freedom?

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A Few Suggested Readings Bergmann, Frithjof. On Being Free. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977. (A novel contemporary reflection on freedom; argues thatanactis free if the self identifies with elements from which the act flows.) Hospers, John. "Free-Will and Psychoanalysis." In Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 10, No.3, March 1950. (Examjnes the consequences of the notion of unconscious motivation on the freedom issue.) James, William. liThe Dilemma of Determinism." In Essays in Pragmatism. New York: Hafner Press, 1948. (Aclassicdefenseoffreedom.) Nagel, Thomas. "Moral Luck" and "Subjective and Objective." In Mortal Questions. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979. (Two sophisticated contemporary essays; the first arguing in a direction that denies responsibility, the second examining the internal-external dilemma in a variety of areas of philosophy, including the problem of free will.) Stace, W. T. Religion and the Modern Mind, Ch.n. New York: J. B. Uppincott Company, 1952. (Argues that freedom and determinism are compatible.) Taylor, Richard. Metaphysics, 3rd ed., Ch.5. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,1983. (A clear overview of major positions and arguments; defends a theory of agency.)

DIALOGUE FIVE: PERSONS, SOULS, AND BODIES

Nicholas: Now I can see what your problem is. Phillip:

Pleasant greetings to you also. Thanks so much for the cordial salutations. I take it you have been thinking about our discussion of freedom.

Nicholas: I sure have. It's been bothering me. To think that everything is determined is just too much. There must be some flaw in your view and I think I've found it. Phillip:

Go right ahead.

Nicholas: I see man as created by God, given the gift of life and the free will to become a better person, to do God's works, and to attempt to know him better. The problem with your view is that you see everything in terms of this world, in terms of matter rather than spirit. Man is also a spiritual being, a member of God's kingdom, not just the material world. I remember you ignored one thing I said. Scientists might be able to explain my body, but not my soul. We're not like rocks or trees or animals or anything else in nature. We have souls. So what you say about everything being caused might be true for the material world but not for the spiritual world. That is the world of freedom. You think of everything in terms of matter; I think of some things in terms of spirit. You think of everything as caused; I think of spirit as above the world of causality. So if man is also spirit, he too must be above nature. That is my philosophy. Phillip:

So you think half of the people in the world are free. Men are free, women aren't. 77

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Nicholas: Very funny. You know what I mean. People are spiritual beings. Is that better?

Phillip:

Sounds very philosophical. I guess we should investigate what you have said. Certainly many people share your worldview. My approach, as a philosopher, is to get clear on what you mean and then ask why you hold these beliefs. What is your evidence for them? It sounds as if you're accusing me of being some kind of materialist and you are a dualist.

Nicholas: Labels again? Phillip:

Remember, they're handy for reference; it's their meaning that's important. I'm not sure I would accept the way you categorize my views, since you don't have enough of a taste of my ideas to describe them in that way.

Nicholas: If a dualist holds that there is both matter and spirit, then I'm a dualist.

Phillip:

Okay. Let's restrict our terms to a description of the nature of the human person-"man," as you say. Some find such talk sexist and therefore objectionable. I prefer to talk about "persons," not "man."

Nicholas: Typical liberal stuff. I'm talking about people and I intended no sexism in my terms.

Phillip:

One doesn't have to be a liberal to recognize the way in which language reflects certain prejudices. You might not think it is very important, but the move to gender-neutral language is a verbal symbol of the rejection of some deep-seated prejudices. I think it's important and that is why I try to do it, especially in my writing. Sometimes I slip when I speak. You'll remind me, won't you, Nick? Anyway, I'm trying to understand your dualistic conception of persons.

Nicholas: Simple. People have bodies and they have souls. When the

body dies, the soul lives on, and while a person is alive, the soul can think and feel and hope and pray. It's the soul that makes us human.

Persons, Souls, And Bodies Phillip:

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You're making some kind of distinction between the soul and thinking, feeling, desiring? I'm not sure I understand that.

Nicholas: Even if our thoughts are sometimes influenced or even controlled, our soul is still free.

Phillip:

Let me first just respond to your view and express my reaction as bluntly and provocatively as possible. Then we can work out our disagreements.

Nicholas: All right. Phillip:

As understood and propounded by the ordinary person, I suspect the notion of a soul is a part of popular mythology, popular tripe sustained as a piece of religious baggage and generated because of hopes of a life beyond this world and fear of death. The notion of a soul is puzzling at best; fiction at worst.

Nicholas: I figured as much, since you don't believe in God. Since I do

believe in God, I also believe in an immortal soul, and I don't care for your pessimism. Belief in God and immortality give people hope. It's an important part of their faith and mine too.

Phillip:

If that is your only defense, then the evidence for the soul is only as good as the evidence for your religious beliefs. Since the evidence for your religious beliefs is so weak-faith without evidence-I should think your view of human nature is on shaky grounds. Also, there are other religions that don't invoke the use of an immortal soul-whatever that means-in their understanding of human nature, so it's not clear to me that a religious understanding of human nature requires such a view. Don't you have any other reason to believe such a thing? Since you're making claims about human nature and not about some unseen Being beyond the world, I'd think it is entirely appropriate to ask for your evidence. People are here, in this world. They should be able to consult their experience and make observations supporting your claims. And what exactly do you mean by "soul"? As I said, I have a difficult time even trying to understand what you're getting at.

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Nicholas: Come on. You know what I'm getting at. It's the nonmaterial

part that makes each of us a unique being. It's what makes us different from mere animals. We can feel it inside of us.

Phillip:

You say it's nonmaterial?

Nicholas: That's right. Phillip:

Then how can it be a part of me? Here I am; a body situated in the world. Things that have parts can be divided because they take up space. If the soul is nonspatial, how can it be said to be a part of me?

Nicholas: You're just playing with words. I mean the soul is an aspect of us, but it doesn't take up space, as you say.

Phillip:

Where is it?

Nicholas: What do you mean? Phillip:

I mean, is it "in here" somewhere? Is it in my legs? My chest? My head? You say you can feelitinside of you. Where can you feel it?

Nicholas: I guess inside my head. That's where we think and reason, but I don't see why that's important.

Phillip:

First, if I am supposed to be able to "feel it," to recognize it, I need to know how and where this acquaintance can be made. Second, if the soul is nonmaterial, by defini tion, it doesn't take up space. If it doesn't take up space, why should what's mine be "in here" at all? Why not "ou t there" somewhere? Why not in my big toe? Or over in the corner? Or nowhere?

Nicholas: Look, you can play your games all you want. I know what I mean.

Phillip:

But I don't. I'm not playing games. You hold a dualistic conception of human nature. I'm trying to understand it. Evidently you hold what could be called a kind of "entity dualism," since the soul is some kind of immaterial entity or thing. You seem to think that it is the soul that is the subject of

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certain qualities or activities, which are also immaterial, like . . . what did you say?

Nicholas: Thinking, hoping, praying, loving. Phillip:

Now when I look into myself and attempt to feel my soul, as you say, all I recognize are certain fleeting experiences, and as far as I can tell, it's not my soul that is the subject of such experiences, but my body, in particular, for some of these experiences, my brain. My brain is certainly material, in the sense most scientists and philosophers would understand. The material aspect of nature is simply whatever can be characterized using the categories of physics, chemistry, biology, and so forth. So if it's my brain and body that have these experiences, I don't see that there is any evidence for the soul. On your view, is the soul in the brain? Near the brain? Next to the brain?

Nicholas: I don't know. I do know, however, that if people don't have souls, they're like animals. That's what makes us human. And if people are nothing but bodies, how do you account for the fact that they think and hope and love, unlike animals?

Phillip:

Be very clear what I am holding. I think people are like animals in some respects and unlike animals in others. Animals don't write novels, do philosophy, build computers, contemplate their death, or a host of other things. I'm unsure whether they use language; that seems to be in dispute nowadays. I don't see why we should say people have souls because they do these things. People also play, jump, run, walk, and many other things that animals do. Remember, we are animals.

Nicholas: My point exactly. Insofar as we run, jump, and walk, we have bodies, like animals. But we also think, feel, hope, love, understand, et cetera. So we can't just be animals; we can't just be bodies.

Phillip:

Ah, very interesting. Let's construct your argument more exactly. Persons have certain characteristics that physical bodies do not have. If persons were the same as bodies, they would have the same characteristics. Since they don't, persons must be different from bodies. Persons have mental characteristics

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Dialogue Five unlike the physical characteristics of the body. Is that the argument?

Nicholas: I suppose so. Phillip:

Give me some examples of so-called mental characteristics of persons, or "souls," as you say.

Nicholas: I already have. People hope, believe, love, understand, think, feel, et cetera.

Phillip:

Let's consider love first. Let me be sure that I don't misunderstand your view. Whenever I say, "John loves Mary," you think that "love" refers to some inner experience that is an aspect of the soul. It is a private experience to which only John has access. Only John has a direct acquaintance with the private world of his soul, and "love" refers to this unique experience we are talking about when we say, "John loves Mary." It's the soul that is characterized by love. Is that your view?

Nicholas: I think so. Phillip:

One twentieth-century philosopher called this view the Myth of the Ghost in the Machine, as if our use of supposed mental terms refers to something hidden, or private.

Nicholas: So what if someone called it a myth. I can't see anything wrong with the view. What's the problem?

Phillip:

Notice that the very meaning of the term love, on your view, refers to something inner or private. Suppose you say, truthfully, "I love my mother, or wife, et cetera," and try to locate exactly wha tthe term refers to. Can you do it? Is ita Ii Ule tingly sensation?

Nicholas: What's the point? Phillip:

The point is this: When I introspect and try to find such a feeling, it's not like locating a toothache or some other sensation. I do love many people, but I can't spot, in my own experience, what you're pointing to. I would think I should

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be able to do this if your view is correct, but I can't. Moreover, your view has a number of oddities that are inconsistent with the facts.

Nicholas: What facts? Phillip:

For example, on your view no one but John could really know if "John loves Mary." More strongly, certainly no one could know better than John himself whether John loves Mary, since the meaning oflove is essentially private. But those claims are false. It's a perfectly ordinary experience for others to realize before John himself that John loves Mary. John mopes, isn't hungry, constantly talks of Mary, calls her often, but says, "I don't know what's wrong with me." Anyone who observes John's behavior knows that John has fallen in love with Mary. So the observer knows better than John himself that John loves Mary, and thatis possible only if what we mean by '10ve"isnot something hidden or private, but something based on the publicly observable behavior of John.

Nicholas: Hold it. Wait just a minute. You're not saying that "love" isn't an inner experience? Phillip:

I am saying that your view of mental language isan expression of an established myth and that such a view can't account for various facts about the meaning of mental terms. For example, if your view of mental terms is correct, we could never adequately apply supposed mental characteristics to others, since the terms refer to experiences that are, in principle, private. But we are justified in saying that people are happy, sad, believe, understand, love, et cetera. In fact, if mental terms refer only to something private, I could never compare what's "in here" in my mental box with what's in your own private mental box, so I could never know whether I'm ascribing mental terms correctly even to myself. But I am correct in doing this since such terms are part of a public language that we use with no metaphysical puzzlement. This could only be so if the basis for using such language, that is, the very meaning of such terms, refers to ways I behave or am disposed to behave.

Nicholas: Slowdown! I still don't getit. I can't be hearing you right. You can't be denying that people have private, inner, experiences.

84 Phillip:

Dialogue Five Consider this example. Sometimes my students will say something like this: "Oh, I understand this argument, I just can't express it." It's as if the "understanding" is hidden or private, and the public behavior consistent with this is unneeded. But if they cannot correctly formulate the argument, explain it, answer questions about it, and relate it to other ideas and arguments, what kind of understanding is that? What do we mean when we say, "John understands the argument"? We simply mean that if asked to formulate it, John can do it; if asked questions about it, he can answer correctly; and so on. So "understanding" means he can perform certain behaviors correctly, or he is disposed to. Just as we say that elasticity is a dispositional property of a rubber band because if it is pulled, it will stretch, mental terms don't get their meaning by referring to characteristics of persons' souls or something hidden. Mental terms describe dispositional characteristics of bodily behavior.

Nicholas: You know, I see a pattern here. It's happened over and over.

I say something, you rephrase it, and all of a sudden we're talking about something different.

Phillip:

If I don't interpret correctly what you say, stop me! I'm just

tryingtoclarify,inmyownmind, what you say and then relate it to some things I've learned in philosophy. Now, can you show me what's wrong with the view I've just described?

Nicholas: I thought we were talking about experiences, not language. What difference does it make whether mental terms refer to behavior? I'm talking about my experiences.

Phillip:

But you have a whole theory of the meaning of mental terms presupposed when you say you are talking about experiences. Look at it this way. In principle, on your view, we can never be sure when we are ascribing certain mental characteristics to persons, since such qualities are supposedly characteristics of a private soul. But that is nonsense. It's not as if we have to have access to a person's soul to say he is happy, sad, intelligent, friendly, thoughtful, believes something, loves his family, and so on. There's nothing mysterious about talking in this way. It's not as if we have to have access to other minds or souls to attribute mental characteristics to others correctly.

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Your view is a metaphysical fiction that can't explain the way we talk about people. Mental qualities aren't ghostly episodes at all.

Nicholas: That's only because the internal is usually expressed in out-

ward behavior, but it doesn't have to be. We are sometimes mistaken about what's going on in others' minds because they don't have to act consistently with their inner experience. For example, you seem to think that when someone is in pain, he is just behaving in a certain way. But that is absurd. I can be in pain and not behave as if I'm in pain, so pain isn't just the behavior. It's what I feel, inside of me.

Phillip:

In your soul?

Nicholas: I don't know. Phillip:

Well, if that is your example of something truly mental, I'd be happy to examine it.

Nicholas: Not so quick. I think I've just refuted your argument with my example. You're not going to slip out of this one.

Phillip:

The view I was defending has been called "philosophical behaviorism," and I admit that it is seriously flawed, but only if it is taken to be a theory of the human person, not a description of our use of mental language. Some people defended it, thinking that if we could show that mental language really referred to behavior and dispositions to behave, the whole mind-body issue was a pseudoproblem, since the supposed mental characteristics of persons don't refer to private experiences at all. I don't think, however, that the metaphysical problem is solved by linguistic analysis; I do think a dose of behaviorism-like a good dose of determinism-is useful though, because many supposed mental characteristics don't refer to some private inner thing at all. Try the analysis on something like belief. I think a dispositional or behavioral analysis of belief makes much more sense than your "ghostly" one. I also think that there is a public mythology surrounding our use of many of these terms. In any case, even with the mental residue you now insist on, I see no reason to attribute it to a soul.

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Nicholas: Mental residue? Phillip:

You say that pain is surely different from pain behavior, so the pain isn't the same as behavior. Is the very experience of pain what you are holding as mental?

Nicholas: Yes, pain and more. When I look into my experience I can feel

my pain, which you can't feel, and I can also feel myself thinking, imagining, and doing other mental things. You can't . tell me these experiences are just parts of my body.

Phillip:

I think we've come across one of the main arguments for dualism. Let's call it the argument from reflection," since you are reflecting on your experience, looking "into" it, or "introspecting," as some philosophers call it. When you reflect or introspect, what is it you find? And where do you find it? 1/

Nicholas: I just told you. I can feel pain, know I'm thinking, and feel other emotions.

Phillip:

Howaboutthepain? Where do you feelit? If you have an ache in the knee, obviously, your pain is in your knee, isn't it?

Nicholas: So? Phillip:

So why in the world would you think that this argument would advance your case for the existence of a soul? It might advance your case for the fact that there are some properties of persons that don't appear to be material, but that doesn't mean they are properties of a nonmaterial entity or thing. As far as I can tell, the knee ache is a property of the knee, not my soul. What a strange notion! If your counterexample to behaviorism is the experience of sensations, like pains, then you must see that such sensations are located in the body; they are attributable to me because I have a nervous system, not because I have a soul. And some animals appear to have complex nervous systems similar to our own. If that's the case, I think there is good reason to think that they feci pain. But even on your own view, animals don't have souls. They are relatively complex material organisms; we are more complex material organisms. As for thought and more complex manifestations of "mental" life, they seem to be predicated of the brain, not the soul.

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Nicholas: So you are a materialist. Phillip:

It depends on what you mean. I guess I do reject the kind of

"entity dualism" you are trying to defend. But there are properties of persons that are difficult to reduce to material ones, and I find the issue very puzzling.

Nicholas: I'm still a dualist. WhatI feel and whatI think can't be reduced to a part of the body. That doesn't even make sense. My "argument from reflection," as you call it, shows me that my awareness is not part of nature. What I'm aware of, whether it's my thought or how my pain feels to me, isn't part of my body, so it must be part of my soul. Someone might be able to tell what's going on in my brain or other parts of my body, but not my mind or soul. Phillip:

Okay. Decently put. As philosophers put it, you have "privileged access" to your own mental contents, precisely because they can't be reduced to aspects ofthe body. It's as if brain and bodily activity can be observed because they are part of nature, but the mental can only be observed by the person whose experiences they are. Fair enough?

Nicholas: Fair enough. That means the mind or soul is separate from the body. Phillip:

You slip in a distinction you aren't entitled to. We are talking about the flow of mental experience, and you immediately translate this into some thing called "mind," which is equivalent to "soul," the immaterial entity you believe in. But at most, the evidence points to qualities or properties that might be immaterial, in a stream of experience, with no "thing" as an apparent part of experience. The Buddhists noticed this, as did certain Western philosophers. The notion of an unchanging, immaterial soul can't be found in experience. I think what you point to might lead to a "property dualism," not an "entity dualism," and even if those properties are immaterial, they might be complex properties of something material. Or they might be only apparently immaterial, but actually brain processes.

Nicholas: But how could that be? I've just said that when I reflect, I know

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Dialogue Five my own experience, which you can't know. You can observe my body, but not my mind. So how could my thoughts be part of the brain?

Phillip:

Because something public, your brain, could have properties thatonly you are aware of at present: your thoughts. Andyou could be mistaken about the nature of these properties.

Nicholas: I'm getting confused. Phillip:

Think of this possibility. Look at some physical object, like this table in front of you. Now what does your experience tell you about it? It is solid, unchanging, and takes up space. From the perspective of common, ordinary experience, the table has certain properties that seem obvious to you. But now consider the way the table is described by the physicist. From this perspective it has wholly different properties, so different, in fact, that it's difficult for "common sense" to see how the same object could have such apparently contradictory descriptions. Notice that the very meaning of "matter" here doesn't simply mean "to occupy space." At the subatomic level the categories we need to describe this aspect of nature are quite unusual. You originally offered an argument relying on the premise that wholly differen t properties of the things compared-persons and bodies-means you have two different things. But the example of the table shows that our ordinary experience can be fundamentally mistaken about the nature of things, and the same thing might have very different, seemingly incompatible, descriptions generated by describing the thing from different perspectives. So from the inside, my thought or awareness might appear to be something fundamentally different from a brain or bodily process, but in reality a scientific description would show that the mental is just a part of nature, described in scientific categories.

Nicholas: Here we go again. The big faith in science. All you can say is that this is possible. You have no proof.

Phillip:

No proof? Your view is that the supposed immaterial aspect of the person is separate from the material aspect. As a dualist, defending a doctrine that underlies life after death, you must hold that some aspect of the person is independent of the

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material realm, in the sense that it doesn't depend for its existence on nature. If your view of thought, emotion, or feeling, or whatever you hold as independent, is correct, if we are talking about an aspect of the soul and not the brain, we would expect these mental characteristics to have a history apart from whatever is going on in the brain. But what we find is just the opposite. Mental disease, mental capabilities, rational and emotional life, are explained by scientists with an increasingly sophisticated knowledge of brain activity. The best way to explain that is to think of the mental as essentially related to the brain, as the brain's characteristics, not the soul's. Your position explains nothing; the materialistic position is the cornerstone of our advancing knowledge of perhaps the most amazing and complex product of evolutionary history, the human brain.

Nicholas: Look, I don't live with my head buried in the sand. I realize

that things that happen in the brain affect the mind and that the mind can affect the body. If I am a dualist, I don't have to deny that. I can hold that the mind is separate from the body, but they still interact. So if something happens in the brain, of course it will cause something in my mind. When people take drugs they see and think differently. That's because you have two different things interacting.

Phillip:

The first thing to notice is that in at least some instances, the relationship is much stronger that you think. If the brain is damaged in certain respects, aspects of mental life are irremediably impaired. That suggests, not just a relationship of causal interaction, but the very dependence of what appears to us to be mental on the physical. Based on this, we should expect that when the brain decomposes after death, there will be no independent mental life still surviving. But the biggest problem with your interaction view has been with us for a very long time and damages any such dualism. It is, in brief, usually called the "interaction problem." You say there are continual examples, in our experience, of the interaction between the mental and the physical. The critic always wonders where such interaction could occur and how it could occur. Interaction must include a spatial component, since the material realm is acted upon. But it makes no sense to say the mental interacts at some point in the brain with physical processes,

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Dialogue Five since the mental is, by definition, not spatial at all. Moreover,

how could the interaction take place? We know what causes

physical processes; we can and do offer naturalistic explanations for these occurrences, whether out in the world or in our brain. We know the sorts oflaws that help us understand such events. How could something immaterial, outside of nature, produce some change in nature? How could two wholly different kinds of being interact? The whole point of your dualism is to place the mental outside of nature, so as to be immune from the history of matter. But to explain our experience, you must attempt to reproduce some mysterious relationship that is incompatible with your original absolute separation. Your view really explains nothing because when we seriously attempt to explain, in a much more specific way, how some thought might produce some bodily change, or vice versa, your whole scheme founders. It can't be done. Compare the complex explanations of mental life offered by the brain scientist and your own very general and seemingly empty notion that it is really the soul that has these characteristics and interacts with the body. The evidence from science surely leads to the reasonable view that our mental life is essentially dependent upon, and perhaps synonymous with, brain processes.

Nicholas: But I just don't see how that could be. How could what I'm thinking right now be a part of the brain? Or suppose I smell

or taste something. How can the qualities of these experiences be reduced to aspects of the brain? It doesn't make sense.

Phillip:

I can't answer that question. The interaction problem is decisive for some and leads us into the materialistic camp, where at least some hope for answers might be found.

Nicholas: A weak reply. Phillip:

No, I don't think so. One thing is pretty obvious when you start thinking about this issue and reading the current literature on the topic. The whole issue is a deeply scientific one as well as a philosophical conundrum. I would not pretend to have mastered the intricacies of neuroscience, artificial intelligence research, and evol utionary biology needed to make real headway in understanding the mental life of human beings.

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It may be a mistake to think of the difference between the mental and the physical in terms of the "stuff" that constitutes each. But it seems to me we are better served, at least intellectually, by giving up the pious declamations of the common "mind" and recognizing that we are creatures of this world, of nature, with an incredibly long evolutionary history and a nervous system far more extraordinary than other species, but no different in kind.

Nicholas: And no spiritual life? How depressing. Phillip:

Don't misunderstand me. Human beings have a rich and varied internal life; no one would deny it. We all stumble around in our own way to achieve some satisfying life and lasting happiness; that will always occur. We'll still love and hope and think. But if we want to understand ourselves, to give a theoretical account of mind, for whatever reason we might have, I think we needn't appeal to some mysterious immaterial stuff. We are complex material organisms; we are a part of nature.

Nicholas: Well, I think there are too many holes in your scientific program. I'm still a dualist; I live with hope.

Phillip:

As do If but my hope is undoubtedly of a different kind. Thanks for an interesting conversation.

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Dialogue Five

Questions for Thought, Study, and Discussion: Dialogue Five 1. When people speak of the "soul," what do they mean?

2. Are you a dualist? Why? Do you have reasons for your view of human nature? 3.

Does the question of immortality necessarily depend upon the notion that persons have souls?

4. What are Phillip's arguments against the dualistic interpretation of mental terms? Explain his behaviorist view of mental language. Offer a behaviorist analysis of the following: John believes that God exists. 5. Must mental properties be properties of mental things? Does it make sense to say that a nonmental thing could have mental properties? Do computers have nonmental properties? 6. What are the main arguments for dualism? 7

Explain the "interaction problem."

8. Does it make sense to say that an afterimage, for example, is part of my brain or identical with brain processes?

A Few Suggested Readings Churchland, Paul M. Matter and Consciousness. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,1984. (Readable introductory discussion of current debate in the philosophy of mind; a must for interested undergraduates.) Descartes, Rene. Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. Donald A. Cress. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1980. (The classic defense of dualistic interactionism, especially Meditations I, II, and VI.) Ryle, Gilbert. The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson Publishing Group Ltd., 1949. (The standard defense of philosophical behaviorism.)

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Searle, John. Minds, Brains and Science, Ch. 1. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984. (Clear attempt to argue that mentalism and physicalism are both true.) Smart, J. J. C. "Materialism./I In Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 60, 1963. (Defends a version of materialism called the "identity theory" according to which brain processes and mental processes are identical.) Taylor, Richard. Metaphysics, 3rd ed., Ch. 2,3,4. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1983. (Clear overview of the mind-body problem; especially good discussion of the problem of interaction.)

DIALOGUE SIX: MORAL SKEPTICISM

Phillip:

Peace! I haven't worn out my "philosophical" welcome yet, have I?

Nicholas: No, not at all. In fact, I found myself browsing through the philosophy section at the mall bookstore the other day. I think you're having a bad influence on me. Phillip:

I hope so. So philosophy is not as "abstract" as you first thought?

Nicholas: Oh, it' sabstract, bull guess I see that any kind of hard thinking is abstract. Maybe that's not a bad thing; that's just the way it is. If you want to understand something, you have to think about it, and that will make some people call the process abstract. Phillip:

Well said.

Nicholas: But I'm not going to give up that easily. We've talked about God, freedom, and the self. Those are abstract things, but whatever you believe about them, you still have to go to the grocery store, take your kids to school, pay the bills, and all that. Phillip:

Very true, but surely you're not holding that beliefs have no effect on how we live. If you believe that Japanese automakers build better cars than the people in Detroit and you want to buy the most dependable car, then you'll buy a Datsun or a Toyota. Your belief is directly related to your action, unless you want to flip a coin, but even in that case you would probably have other beliefs thatled to your coin flip. Beliefs are closely related to action, since you have goals or purposes in

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Dialogue Six acting and your beliefs tell you how to achieve your goals. Beliefs aren't just theoretical constructs with no relation to "real" life. It matters that we attempt to have correct beliefs, since they help us get what we want.

Nicholas: I think that's true in many cases, but not in all cases. I can't see that the abstractions you want to talk about are anything more than interesting things to spend your time on, like crossword puzzles.

Phillip:

I'm very surprised to hear you say that. I suppose you're still a traditional theist, even after our previous conversations. That belief certainly has concrete implications. Your views concerning freedom surely have consequences for your political beliefs, which themselves result in choices concerning voting, perhaps charity, and many other things. Your views about the self might result in decisions concerning how you respond to illness, how you relate to your past-I could go on. In any case, whatever the real-life consequences of such beliefs, human beings are curious; they seek to know and to understand. In that respect knowledge concerning the question of God and human nature is of great value.

Nicholas: I still want something more concrete, more applicable to the real world.

Phillip:

I'm not sure I understand you, but there is an area of philosophy that is directly related to human conduct; in fact, it has been called "practical philosophy," since it involves "practice," or how we act. That's Ethics-some call it moral philosophy. As a philosophical study of morality, it still seeks a theoretical account or understanding of our moral views. But morality itself seems to be necessarily involved with how we think we ought to live and how we ought to act in specific situations. If you want something more concrete in philosophy, maybe we should pursue some issues in Ethics. All people have ideas about what's right and wrong, or good and bad, and those beliefs determine how people choose and act. It should be interesting to think about who is right when espousing certain moral beliefs, or what, in general, makes an act morally right. We could talk about basic principles or particular issues.

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Nicholas: What's the point? As far as I am concerned, no one really knows what the right thing is. Every person has their own views on morals. In fact, if people in philosophy are trying to say what the right thing is for me, I resent that. Everyone has a right to their own opinion. Phillip:

Hmm. It looks as if we do have something interesting to think about.

Nicholas: Uh, oh! I feel a lecture coming on. Phillip:

Not at all, but I do have some questions.

Nicholas: I bet you do. But I'll stand on what I've said. Who's to say what is right or wrong for me? Morals are obviously personal. Phillip:

So you deny that we can have anything that could be called "moral knowledge"?

Nicholas: I know what I believe and what is right for me, whatever you want to call that. Phillip:

What I mean by moral knowledge is that we might have good reason to think that some moral beliefs are actually correct or incorrect.

Nicholas: I have no idea what you mean by "correctness." Phillip:

Now you're sounding like me.

Nicholas: Look. Everyone has their own moral beliefs and we know whether these are correct or acceptable for us, personally, but how can we know whether they are correct for someone else? Phillip:

You seem to deny the possibility of moral knowledge in the sense that there might be some beliefs that could apply with justification to everyone. So we can only have opinions about what's right and wrong?

Nicholas: Yes, I suppose so. Phillip:

You did say that everyone has a right to his own moral opinion, didn't you?

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Nicholas: Yes. Phillip:

Okay. I'm trying to sort out your position. On one understanding, by denying the possibility of really knowing what is right and wrong, you seem to be espousing a kind of moral skepticism. On the other hand, you also seem to be defining what is actually morally right in terms of your own views, so in this latter sense you are saying that one can know what is right, but it'sa rather narrow sense of knowing, since it applies only to your own beliefs and not to what others believe or what might be morally right for them. I'd call this position moral subjectivism.

Nicholas: Okay, I'll accept that, but my position is not that complicated.

I'm just saying that you can't know what is right for everyone, only yourself. There are just two parts to one position.

Phillip:

All right, let's start with your so-called moral skepticism. Now I know what you hold; why do you hold it? What are your reasons for saying that no one really knows what's right and wrong, in a sense of moral rightness that would apply to others as well as yourself?

Nicholas: Well, there are always disagreements among people. There are two sides to every issue in morals. If you had the right viewpoint, people would agree. People have different beliefs. You have your opinion and I have mine.

Phillip:

First, as a plain matter of empirical fact, it just isn't true that all people have different moral beliefs all the way down the line. Thatisn'ttrue. People agree on a great deal in the moral realm. For example, most would agree that unjustified killing of persons is morally wrong. You do believe that, don't you?

Nicholas: Of course. But I may not agree with you about what is unjustified.

Phillip:

True. But that disagreement may be based on other matters, in particular, the facts of some situation. In any case, that is not my main point. As a plain matter of fact, there is much agreement in the moral realm. However, and more important, suppose there is disagreement, as you say. What follows from

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that? From the mere fact that people disagree, it doesn't follow that there is no truth concerning the beliefs at the heart of the disagreement or that truth is simply "relative" to what the individual happens to believe. Haven't we been over this before? That's a classic example of an invalid argument, in which the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises.

Nicholas: I don't see that. Phillip:

All we need is a specific example. Suppose you say that the local grocery store is now selling baseball cards and I disagree, since I just spoke to someone who said she looked for baseball cards at the store but didn'tfind them. You and I disagree. But it doesn't follow from the mere fact of disagreement that there is no truth or truth is relative to what each of us believes, since one of us is right and one of us is wrong. For that matter, suppose we both agree that the store is selling cards and we go down to the store and find we are mistaken. From the mere fact that we agree, it doesn't follow that we are correct in our beliefs. Neither agreement nor disagreement entails conclusions concerning truth.

Nicholas: Your example is misleading, since we can check out the truth

of whether the store is selling cards by going down to the store and seeing whether it's true.

Phillip:

True, but irrelevant to your original claim. You said nothing about whether moral beliefs could be "checked out," as you say. You merely pointed out the fact that people disagree about moral rightness. True, to a certain extent, but logically irrelevant to your original thesis: moral skepticism, or the claim that no one really knows what is right and wrong, in some broad sense.

Nicholas: But people have such different backgrounds when it comes to

their morals. Suppose you and I have had different upbringings. You have been taught that premarital sex is wrong and I have been taught that love is the most important thing in a relationship, so premarital sex might be all right for me. Here we would disagree because of our different backgrounds, and who is to say what is right?

100 Phillip:

Dialogue Six Look, let's extend the example. Suppose we take a class in physics and we are given a pretest. I answer in terms of what "common sense" tells me; fortunately for you, you have been taught by your science-educated mother, who has impressed you with the fact that certain fundamental principles of physics might generate conclusions that are odd or contrary to our natural intuitions. Different upbringings-what follows? Certainly not that both of us are right, or that there is no one right answer to some of the physics questions.

Nicholas: Why do you keep giving misleading examples? In physics we can find out what is right, but we can't when it comes to morals.

Phillip:

You just restate your position; you don't argue for it. My example is not misleading, since your second argument focused only on the fact that because we have different backgrounds, our beliefs will be different. Again, unarguably true but logically irrelevant to the truth of the beliefs in question. In fact, that is a good example of what philosophers call the "genetic fallacy." The origin of a belief is not relevant to its truth.

Nicholas: You still haven't explained how you could check out the truth

of moral beliefs. Your examples show you can check out other beliefs, but not morals.

Phillip:

A fair point. At least we seem to be advancing the discussion, because the key issue seems not to be the mere fact that we disagree about morality, or that we have different moral upbringing, but whether there are ways to "check out" or "justify" moral beliefs amid the diversity of backgrounds and disagreements.

Nicholas: Bu tI don't see how you could go about justifying moral beliefs.

Look at the way things change in history. There are no abso. lutes throughout all of human history. Moral judgmentschange. They always have, they always will. You might think you have the right view now, but you don't know what you will believe in the future.

Phillip:

Isn't this just another version of your first argument?

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Nicholas: How's that? Phillip:

All you're saying now is that there are historical disagreements instead of more recent ones. From the fact that people once believed something that we no longer believe, it doesn't follow that there is no correct view. One of us could be right and one of us could be wrong.

Nicholas: But how can you tell that? Phillip:

That is the crucial question, isn't it? Again, amidst the dis-

agreement how could we go about justifying certain moral claims?

Nicholas: But you keep slip-sliding around. I gave you a good example-which you ignored. My moral beliefs about sex are personal, and no one has a right to tell me what's "absolutely" right or wrong when it's a matter of my own life. I respect your opinions and you respect mine. It's a matter of personal taste. Phillip:

Morality is just an expression of personal taste? You prefer green olives and I prefer black olives. Is that how we're to understand moral opinions?

Nicholas: Something like that. Phillip:

Look, you need to be much more careful in your claims. You don't really believe that.

Nicholas: I just said I did. What's right for me is right for me. I don't expect you to believe what! believe or live like me. Just respect my beliefs. Phillip:

I might even be sympathetic to your view of sexual matters as being, by and large, a matter of personal taste-given other qualifications-but that doesn't mean all of morality is a matter of personal taste unless sexual interactions are paradigm examples of what morality is all about. It could be that there is nothing unique about our evaluation of sexual interactions and unless other moral principles are violated, sexual matters are matters of personal taste.

Nicholas: I don't follow you.

102 Phillip:

Dialogue Six Suppose that the key to morality is that we respect persons. Just a supposition, mind you, but a very provocative one I think. Now if some sexual matter, like masturbation or oral sex, doesn't violate our respect for another human being, then masturbation and oral sex may very well be matters of personal taste without morality as a whole just being a matter of taste. In other words, some sexual matters might be expressions of personal taste because they are morally neutral, not because they are inherently moral or immoral.

Nicholas: Okay. I see that. Phillip:

Also, consider what it would mean to believe that morality is just a matter of personal taste, like your preference for some kinds of olives. You and I wouldn't waste our time arguing about whether black olives taste better than green olives, would we?

Nicholas: I suppose not. Phillip:

Yet we continually dispute about moral matters. Why do we do that?

Nicholas: I have no idea. I told you I think it's a waste of time. Phillip:

Because we think we can find reasons sufficient to establish some moral beliefs as more enlightened than others. Suppose we're not sure about our position on abortion. If we are responsible and intelligent, we want to hear the best arguments, and if we already have a position, we want to clarify it and solidify it by looking at arguments that challenge our view-because we think we're right, and we have good reasons for holding our views. All of this appears to be contrary to the view that morality is just a matter of taste.

Nicholas: But people could be wrong in disputing about moral matters. Phillip:

Yes, but it is a significant fact that people seem to care about moral matters in a way that is striking in relation to the taste of olives. The treatment of people, in ever so many ways, from injustice to exploitation, really matters. I assume you agree, and that is one of the reasons why I said that I suspected you

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didn't really believe the position you were expounding. Combine these thoughts with your historical disagreement example. In our own country we once believed that enslaving black people was permissible. We have also attempted to wipe out the most obvious examples of unjust laws and put some punch into our historical commitment to civil rights. Are these matters of "personal taste"?

Nicholas: They are for some people who wouldn't agree with you. Phillip:

And why should we pay credence to the racist? Because the white supremacist holds certain views, why should we find this interesting or think this is significant from a moral point of view?

Nicholas: Because everyone has a right to their own opinion. Phillip:

I think you are confusing two different notions: One is a political or moral one, the other is an epistemological oneaboutthesupposedtruthofopinions. Ourcountryiscommitted to the value of the free expression of opinions. In that sense the value we place on free speech commits us to the notion that everyone has the right to his or her own opinion. But that says nothing about the content of the opinion. Opinions can be stupid, silly, pretentious, arrogant, or just plain false. As a matter of fact, we are probably committed to the value of free speech precisely because we are committed to the value of individual dignity, which is a moral commitment. To say that everyone has a right to his or her own opinion is already to commit yourself to a moral position inconsistent with your original skepticism, since it is morally right-and you claim to know this-for each person to have the freedom to hold and express his own views. So the white racist may have a political or moral right to hold and express her racist views, but that doesn't mean we have to entertain such opinions as serious candidates for moral reflection. People have all kinds of crazy views in many areas of belief; that is neither surprising nor particularly interesting. That's not a good reason to be a skeptic, in morality or in other areas.

Nicholas: That sounds arrogant to me, as if you know it all and are telling others what they are supposed to believe.

104 Phillip:

Dialogue Six No. I don't "know it all." I do know, however, that if morality means anything-and I think it does-we have to see that the kind of skepticism you're espousing is intellectually "thin," if you will; it superficially transforms an important political or moral point into a questionable one about the nature of morality and our grasp of it. It confusedly emphasizes the difficulty of reaching consensus in morality and uses this as a basis for generating the view that morality has no core content at all, as if morality can end up being whatever an individual wants it to be. There can be real disagreement and profound difficulty in justifying moral beliefs, without making our very notion of the moral vacuous.

Nicholas: Hold it! Hold it! You're starting to talk like a professorinstead of a real person. I'm losing the gist of the conversation.

Phillip:

Okay. Let's return to the original formulation of your views. You held that no one really knows what is right and wrong. You've said that what is right for you isn't necessarily right for others, and you seem to sometimes define moral rightness as whatever an individual happens to believe is right. AmI being accurate?

Nicholas: Yes. Phillip:

Let's start with the first claim, that no one knows what's right and wrong. As I understand it, the claim is a universal one. Logically, if I can find an instance in which someone knows what is morally right, then the claim is falsified. That's not difficult at all.

Nicholas: Well? Phillip:

Suppose someone comes home after a difficult day at work. He is irritable, tired, and ill tempered, generally in a very sour mood. His small child has been sick, is whining and continually crying, begging for attention. The parent shouts, curses, and yells, "Shut up!" The child won't calm down. The parent feels the tension welling up inside. The child spills something and the parent turns around, clenches his fist and finds himself yelling as he starts to strike the child in the head. He stops at the last moment, momentarily under control, breaks down,

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and realizes he did the right thing in not striking the child. It is certainly wrong to physically abuse a child. Here is a common example, which could be multiplied indefinitely, of a person who did in fact know the morally right thing to do. This counterexample falsifies your claim that no one ever knows what is right or wrong.

Nicholas: But he might have thought he was doing the right thing. Phillip:

Look, how can I make the scene more graphic? Suppose he smashes the child, causes brain damage, and then says he did the right thing. My God, what more could be said? It's just plain morally offensive to abuse innocent children, for anyone, anywhere. And if the abuser says otherwise, why should that matter? We might medically treat him, we might jail him, but we don't say: "Oh, it's okay. Everyone has a right to his own moral beliefs."

Nicholas: That is just one small example. Phillip:

But this is the kind of example that we build on. Here is something concrete, substantial, to help us understand what morality is about.

Nicholas: But you haven't explained why it's wrong. Phillip:

True, but you would expect that to arise at some point in our discussion. At this point I'm just trying to show that there are concrete examples from our moral experience that show how flimsy your skepticism is. This doesn't show that it's always clear or easy to see what we should do, morally, but it does show that we can be sure sometimes, and we can use such examples to generate a broader theory about what makes a right act-which is what Ethics is all about. Start with clear cases, see what they might have in common, then move to more puzzling cases. Your view of morality seems to be generated in precisely the opposite way. Starting with the most puzzling or even most personal topics, you move to a general view of morality that wipes out the basis for evaluationsof the murderer, slaveholder, rapist, cheat, et cetera. An intolerance of the most clear examples of moral abuse doesn't mean that we are intolerant of all types of conduct with which we disagree.

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Nicholas: Okay, okay. But I still think that part of what people think of as morality is more personal than what you're saying.

Phillip:

I don't think I disagree, but I think you should recognize that in those paradigm cases I have mentioned, moral evaluations or prescriptions are impersonal. If fact, some think that this is an essential aspect of the moral. Notice: How does this fit into your earlier notion? You said something like, 'What's right for me is right for me, and not necessarily for anyone else."

Nicholas: I still think that's sometimes right. Phillip:

But I wonder whether you are even talking about moral rightness when you say that? Given your talents and interests, it was probably right for you to become an engineer and not become a poor philosopher, like me. But unless we qualify the situation, I'm not sure that has anything to do with morality. On the other hand, consider this example. We decide to meet tomorrow at 4:00 p.m., and you don't show up, although you have no good reason. I accuse you of breaking your word, which is a kind of moral censure of your conduct. Suppose next week a similar situation arises, butthis time I don't show up. On your view, I could say, ''What's right for me is right for me." But you wouldn't accept that. You would accuse me of being inconsistent, because my judgment of my own behavior should be the same as my judgment of your behavior, or, for that matter, anyone in a relevantly similar si tua tion. Our moral judgments are impersonal to that extent, just like my example of the would-be child abuser. Anyone in that situation would be subject to the same judgments. Moral reasons are impersonal, or what moral philosophers call universalizable-but I hesitate to say more about that big word.

Nicholas: What about my example of sex? That seems pretty personal to me.

Phillip:

My point remains the same. To the extent that some matter

seems strictly personal or a matter of taste, so as to involve

oneself and not harm someone else, it probably is not a moral matter at all, although I would need to qualify this also and explain it at greater length. Doesn't it strike you that we have hit upon an interesting aspect of the moral? Moral reasons

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appear to be impersonal reasons insofar as I face moral demands as a person, generally, not as a particular individual. In fact, many hold that moral concemsarise precisely when there is a conflict between personal interests and impersonal moral demands, between self-interest and duty, or between what I want to do and what I feel I ought to do. For example, I may have promised to help you do some work on Saturday and then someone offers me free tickets to go to a big football game. I may want to go to the game, but a promise is a promise. There's the conflict. Would you agree with that?

Nicholas: With what? Phillip:

That moral demands seem to be impersonal.

Nicholas: I guess so. Phillip:

Look,how very far we are from your original skepticism: "Everyone has a right to his own opinion," as if all opinions are equal and there is no sense in speaking of a "correct" opinion. You don't really believe this, do you?

Nicholas: I'm not sure. You make it sound so easy. Phillip:

I don't mean to do this. Somehow I still think that you mistake the denial of an extreme moral skepticism with the affirmation of moral intolerance. I believe that's a false dilemma. We can believe that morality makes sense, that it is "objective" or "universal" in some way, without committing ourselves to thinking that all moral decisions are easy and those who disagree with us are merely wrong. As I said before, although you found yourself espousing a kind of moral skepticism, I would wager that your own experience and reactions are contrary to this. I bet your own views are incompatible with skepticism.

Nicholas: But I am tolerant of other's moral beliefs; there's no inconsistency. Phillip:

Isn't it easy to imagine a situation in which you would find "unacceptable" some belief or piece of conduct, and your supposed tolerance would subside? Consider your job. Suppose you were denied a promotion and found out that a fellow

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worker, unqualified and bumbling, was given the promotion because he was a good friend of the boss. ''Unfair,'' you would react. But doesn't everyone have a right to her own moral beliefs? The boss happens to believe it's always right to help her friends. Here's an example I offer to my students who espouse such skepticism. Suppose I decide to give grades on the basis of sex, race, and geographical origin, giving As only to white males from Poughkeepsie. Obviously an unjust method of grading, but I have a right to my own moral opinions, right? People just don't believe and live such skepticism or subjectivism. All moral opinions are equal? No. On that view there would be no difference in the moral views of Jesus and Buddha as opposed to those of Adolf Hitler and any other mass murderer you might think of. I don't believe that and neither do you.

Nicholas: I believe every person has to make up his own mind about his own moral beliefs. It's an individual's responsibility to make his own choice and decide for himself how he ought to live.

Phillip:

I completely agree, and nothing I have said is incompatible with the value that you and I place on individual autonomy. You and I must choose how we live our own lives. But what has this to do with the notion of what we choose? Why should this rule out the notion that choosing for moral reasons, as opposed to strictly self-interested ones, is often the ''best'' thing to do. An emphasis on individual autonomy is not the same as the view that I called moral subjectivism.

Nicholas: Which was? Phillip:

At one point you appeared to say that whatever is morally right is simply what I believe to be right, or what any individual happens to believe to be right. But if someone believes it is all right to torture and murder innocent children every Tuesday, it doesn't follow thatit is right. In the moral realm as well as other areas, people can have unacceptable beliefs. Furthermore, that view has bizarre consequences. If it is correct, everyone has perfect moral knowledge at every moment, since no one could possibly be wrong in his or her views. What a person believes to be right would in fact be right. Likewise, there would seem to be no sense to our ordinary view that

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people can grow and develop morally as their moral beliefs change and they act according to them. What sense could it make to think someone had better moral beliefs or became a better person? There would be no standard by which to make such a judgment.

Nicholas: I think I'm getting confused. You give argument after argument without explaining anything. You give examples and just take for granted that I'll accept them and then think you've shown my views to be wrong. Phillip:

At this point in our discussion I'm not sure what else would be more effective. You're right. I haven't explained much about the specific content of morality and how that could be justified. But you were the one who initially offered a very general view concerning the nature of morality. Your initial arguments in defense of your view weren't good ones. Then I offered some examples that seemed to conflict with your views. I'm simply trying to show how really odd-even dangerous-your view is. I think it's the result of a hasty generalization about morality based on the real difficulties and disagreements associated with the area. I'm much more sympathetic to your concerns than I might appear to be, but the discussion needs to reach a higher level to get at them. I don't think the only alternatives are a wishy-washy subjectivism or individual relativism where anything goes as opposed to an authoritarian, "fundamentalist" absolutism afraid to face the real difficulties of moral ambiguity and the specific demands on different individuals in different situations.

Nicholas: So what are you? You called me a skeptic and a subjectivist. Phillip:

Again, the labels are handy categories to describe certain views, although I don't find them tenable in the form in which you have offered them.

Nicholas: Do you think these views are defensible in any form? Phillip:

Tough question. Correct me if I'm wrong, but here's how I see our dispute. You seem to say that you can't know what is right or wrong because there's nothing to know-there are no moral "facts" like what we think of as physical facts or mathematical

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Dialogue Six facts. My view is hard to explain. I think there is something to be known, that there are moral "facts" in some sense, and we can know them. But how to clarify what I mean by a moral fact, how to argue for the position, and how to show the application to the "real world" are all very puzzling tasks.

Nicholas: And very abstract. What the hell are you talking about? Phillip:

Okay. Try this. I think the core of morality is fairly clear: We ought to promote goodness and prevent badness, keep our promises, not decei ve others, treat people justly, and generally respect the worth of all individuals. Whether morality involves more than this list, whether all of morality reduces to this list, whether this list can be reduced, how we can explain the list, how we can justify the list, how we can apply the list, why we should act according to the list-these are the interesting questions, after we are convinced that not justany prescription believed by any individual can be added to the list. Is that concrete enough?

Nicholas: No, because I'm still not sure how you can justify the list, as you say.

Phillip:

I have two comments. First, it might be helpful to again ask what morality is, in a general sense. I think it's clear that it is not just an expression of personal taste. We might also ask what morality is for. Why do we have it? Does it have a purpose? These questions might generate insightful answers that would also help us to see what the content of morality is.

Nicholas: The other question? Phillip:

To suggest a path we might take in relation to my first comment, let me remind you that in the course of our conversations you have espoused and defended classical theism. Doesn't your theism have implications for your view of the nature and content of morality? Can you be a theist and also a moral skeptic or moral subjectivist?

Nicholas: I'll have to think about that. Phillip:

See you next week?

Nicholas: Of course.

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Questions for Thought, Study, and Discussion: Dialogue Six 1. Do beliefs have practical consequences? Give examples. Are there

any beliefs that have no effect on how we live?

2. Initially, how would you define morality? Do you think that morality has a purpose? What might that be? 3. What would it mean to say that we can be sure about the "correctness" only of our own moral beliefs? Can you provide an argument showing why some might think that such a claim makes no sense? 4. What is the difference between knowledge and opinion? 5. What are Nicholas's main arguments for moral skepticism? Do you agree with Phillip that they are unsuccessful? 6. Why would someone say that morality is a matter of personal taste? Is there anything true about that claim? 7. Explain Phillip's contention that "everyone has a right to his own opinion" is actually inconsistent with Nicholas's original moral skepticism (and moral subjectivism). 8. What does it mean to say that morality is impersonal? 9. Explain the odd implications of the position that whatever one believes to be morally right is, in fact, morally right. 10. Can one consistently be a theist and also a moral skeptic or moral subjectivist? Provide an argument showing the incompatibility.

A Few Suggested Readings Harman, Gilbert. The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977. (A sophisticated, sustained reflection on a basic problem about morality-that its claims can't be tested by observation.)

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Hospers, John. Human Conduct: Problems of Ethics, 2nd ed., Ch. 1. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1982. (Nice introductory discussion.) Rachels, James. The Elements of Moral Philosophy, Ch. 1,3. New York: Random House, 1986. (Clear discussion of impartiality and subjectivism.) Williams, Bernard. Morality: An Introduction to Ethics. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1972. (Excellent critique of the amoralist and subjectivism.)

DIALOGUE SEVEN: MORALITY: DIVINE COMMANDS, SOCIAL APPROVAL, OR RESPECT FOR OTHERS?

Phillip:

Greetings! Are you ready for some more hard thinking about morality?

Nicholas: I wonder. You must take delight in trying to confuse me. We

talk, I go away muttering to myself, then I invariably think about what I should have said, how you tiptoed around this point and that one, and how you end without ever coming right out and going straight at things. You're cagey. Why do I talk to you?

Phillip:

Come on! You seem to enjoy this as much as I do, and if you think I'm just trying to do the two-step, you're wrong. I think serious conversation about important topics is one of the great goods of life. But good conversation can be serious without being abusive and dull. It can be playful and enlightening. Don't you think we've learned something from our discussions and had some fun? I don't mean to be overbearing.

Nicholas: Maybe. Phillip:

Did you think about our last conversation?

Nicholas: Yes. I'll say one thing. What you said at the end of the

conversation really hit home. Here we are talking about morality and I find myself saying things about how personal someone's morals really are. I still believe that in some ways. But when I started thinking about our talk I was struck by the fact that we didn't say anything about religion. I guess I understand why you wouldn't mention God, since you don't seem to believe in him or need his guidance, but I do. I've got

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Dialogue Seven to admit that your basic examples of wrongness and rightness are hard to argue with, and I'm prepared to say that morality must be absolute in some way. But I don't see how you're going to be able to say that without God in the picture. In fact, I'd say that's probably one of our main problems today: no prayer in school, no teaching of morals in the public schools, no mention of God's way.

Phillip:

Incredible. Am I talking to the same person?

Nicholas: What do you mean? Phillip:

Last time I listened to the pronouncements of the Great American Individualist, resenting any hints of authoritarianism and absolutism in morality, carving out his own solitary moral path and rejecting intrusions from any other source. Now I hear the pronouncements of the Man of God, fearful of social disintegration because people have lost contact with divine moral guidance. Which one do you want?

Nicholas: I'm now willing to admit that there must be some moral abso-

lutes. But I don't see how these can make sense without God. I still think we must be tolerant of others and what God requires of us at times might not be clear. Remember, he does give us the free choice to decide for ourselves how to live. We can be sure, however, that some of his commands are very clear. You do remember the ten he gave to us in the Bible? If we didn't have God, then morals would just be manufactured by different individuals or societies, without guidance or authority.

Phillip:

So morality can't make sense unless it is related to religion? Morality is totally dependent upon religion? Is that what you're saying?

Nicholas: No,onGod. I'm saying that God gives us our morals and helps make us moral.

Phillip:

Let's think about that. I wonder whether you might have heard some phrases that seem to capture what you're saying. I think it was one of Dostoyevski's characters who said something like this: "If God does not exist, everything is permit-

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ted." Or some have said: "If God does not exist, nothing matters." It's as if the moral sphere of human existence can only make sense in the context of belief in God. Is that what you're holding?

Nicholas: I think so, but when you start comparing what I say to tther

things, it gets cloudy. I'm just saying that if there were no God, why would anyone bother to be moral? People could do what they want, and there would be no good basis for being moral.

Phillip:

What we need to get clear about is what kind of dependence is at issue in claiming that morality depends upon religion, or that morality would make no sense if God does not exist. There are undoubtedly different ways in which it could rely on religious belief. What do you have in mind?

Nicholas: Look, I just said that it's religion that causes us to act morally.

You ask most people and they'll tell you that acting morally is what God wants them to do. We're not perfect, but it's a good thing that God is there to help us become as good as we are.

Phillip:

So belief in God provides the necessary motivation to be moral or to act in accordance with moral ideals?

Nicholas: Sure, Professor. Phillip:

Is this necessary?

Nicholas: What do you mean? Phillip:

You did say that most people are motivated to act morally because of belief in God. Do you mean "most" or "all"?

Nicholas: I mean that most people I've met are motivated by God, and I assume that if someone doesn't believe in God, he would do what he wants.

Phillip:

That's a very cynical view of human nature, isn't it?

Nicholas: Just realistic. Phillip:

And false in many instances. You seem to think the worst of

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Dialogue Seven people, in the sense that the only reason people might have for doing the right thing, morally, is that such action might advance their interests. To put it simply, you say that there is a relation of psychological dependence between morality and religion, insofar as religion, or belief in God, provides the only motivation one might have for acting morally. Fear of punishment and hope of reward are the key drives behind moral behavior. Right?

Nicholas: I guess so. I think there is a God and he wants me to do certain things. My God teaches me to love others.

Phillip:

Wonderful. But there are many people who don't believe in God and who also think it's important to act morally, or to love others, or whatever is central to morality. They give no thought to God when deciding what ought to be done or what kind of person they ought to be. They want to do the right thing.

Nicholas: But why do the right if there is no God? Phillip:

Because it's the right thing to do. Is that so difficult to under-

stand?

Nicholas: That doesn't tell me anything. Phillip:

It doesn't say why some action might be the morally rightthing to do, but the reason for acting rests in the rightness, not the explanation of the rightness. To sayan act is right is to say I ought to perform it, or that I have a perfectly good reason to perform it. For many, believer and nonbeliever alike, it's not a matter of fear of Hell or hope of Eternal Reward that fuels moral conduct. It's simply a desire to do the right thing, because it's right. If I promise to do something for you, I have an obligation to do it and, thereby, a good reason to do it, regardless of my eternal destiny.

Nicholas: You deny that many people act morally because of fear of God or hope of reward?

Phillip:

Not at all. As a matter of empirical fact about why people actually behave morally, your moral psychology is probably

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117 true. But insofar as there are other reasons for acting morally, and a host of good counterexamples, your original claim about the necessary relationship between the moral and the religious turns out to be false. You originally claimed that morality can only make sense in the context of religion. As so far discussed, your claim was a piece of moral psychology that is dubious. But my objection scarcely reaches beyond common sense. Atheists and agnostics can be good people and, undoubtedly, often as good or better than some believers.

Nicholas: As usual, you have warped my position. Phillip:

As usual, I have tried to understand your position and have attempted to interpret your statements accurately. I apologize if I'm offtrack. Even if I've misconstrued your position, many others surely hold this view. They somehow have a hard time understanding that for some people God just doesn't enter the picture when it comes to moral motivation.

Nicholas: We were talking moral absolutes, and I thought that people would have no reason to believe in absolutes without a God. Why would people bother to act morally if morality is just a matter of doing what society says you ought to do?

Phillip:

To be honest, I find this talk about "absolute versus relative" to be so unclear as to be unhelpful unless we do some clarifying, but I'm willing to follow the path you're taking. In many persons' minds there is this necessary connection between affirming the absolute character of morality and affirming the existence of God as the foundation of moral absolutes. But I'm still not sure what to make of this view. How is it that God is the foundation or source of morality?

Nicholas: Just look at the Ten Commandments or other important com-

mandments in the Bible. God commands us to do certain things and we have the obligation to obey. Our duty is to do what God says. If God says something is the right thing to do, then it is the right thing to do. It's as simple as that.

Phillip:

So the source of moral obligation is God telling us to do certain

things? You have articulated a full-blown moral theory, haven't you? Moral rightness is whatever God commands us to do. Or

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Dialogue Seven not to do. Or to put it differently, morality is a function of God willing or approving of certain courses of conduct. Is that it? If God says it's morally wrong to kill, steal, or commit adultery, then it's wrong-period.

Nicholas: Yes. Phillip:

The first thing that is a little puzzling about your theory is how we can be sure we know what God's commands are.

Nicholas: I'd say the Bible is a pretty good way. Phillip:

The Koran? The Bhagavad Gita? The Diamond Sutra?

Nicholas: You know what I mean. Don't be coy. Phillip:

Whose holy book are we to attend to? Many people seem to think they have the documents that articulate the word of the Divine. Moreover, even if we confine ourselves to the JudeoChristian Bible, there are enormous differences in interpreting what it is that God supposedly commands. Some think that the Bible prohibits eating meat, undergoing blood transfusions, and engaging in war. Others seem to think it allows slaughtering animals in any way you want and arming yourselves to the teeth with nuclear missiles. Odd, isn't it? And then I wonder what it tells us about the moral significance of gene splicing and in vitro fertilization?

Nicholas: Just because people have different interpretations of the Bible doesn't mean that there is no correct interpretation. You have taught me something.

Phillip:

Hurrah! But my poin t is not a relativistic one concerning tm th, it is an epistemological one concerning the difficulty of ever knowing precisely what God commands if you decide to define moral rightness as a function of God's commands. Add to the previous examples individuals who claim to hear the distinct commands of God-I always put my hand on my wallet when I hear those claims-and you have a big problem in deciding how to react to such spokespersons of God. People seem to be often willing to justify morally questionable conduct, from injustice to exploitation, by appealing to what God suppos-

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edly commands. But the epistemological problems aren't the biggest ones for your view.

Nicholas: Just because there are religious crackpots doesn't mean that we can never know what God commands us to do.

Phillip:

Okay. I'll grant that point. Suppose we hold that whatever God commands is morally right, and there are occasions on which we can be sure that we know what he commands. I'll waive the epistemological objections. You're holding the strongest possible position concerning the relationship between morality and religion. If whatever is morally right is just a function of God's commands or approval, then the nonexistence of God would mean that there would be no basis for moral judgments or moral prescriptions.

Nicholas: Certainly no absolute basis for moral judgments. Phillip:

No God, no morality. If God does not exist, everything is permitted. Life would be a state of war among ruthlessly selfinterested individuals.

Nicholas: I guess so. Look at society now. God is less in the picture and

we have more moral confusion. We're going to Hell in a hand basket.

Phillip:

I'm unsure about your sociology, but I do have some questions about the moral theory you're now defending. Onyourview, "morally right," or "good," is synonymous with whatever God commands. Why do you think God commands as she does?

Nicholas: How should I know? I'm not God. Phillip:

I'm quite serious. My question is one of the mostfamous in the history of philosophy, asked in a slightly different form by Socrates in one of Plato's dialogues. Let's consider an example. Suppose you think that God commands us not to kill others, so it's right to refrain from killing. Is this righ t because God commands, or does God command us to refrain from killing because that's the morally right thing to do?

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Nicholas: I have no idea. Phillip:

There are only two alternatives, both of which we should investigate, but your theory unfortunately commits you to an answer that leads to grave difficulties.

Nicholas: What do you mean, "grave difficulties"? Phillip:

Your moral theory is that whatever is right is so just because God happens to command it and whatever she happens to command must be right. But suppose she happens to command us to torture and murder small children every Tuesday for no reason. On your theory that would be right. But that is absurd.

Nicholas: What is absurd is your example. God would never command

us to do such a thing. And you don't have to be so cute, calling God "she."

Phillip:

Your theory says that whatever God commands is right. God could command this, so your theory says that it could be morally appropriate to torture and murder innocent children. Bu t it could never be right to do this, so your theory about what makes a right act must be mistaken. Look atitthis way. Which is more questionable: your divine command moral theory or the possibility that it could be morally appropriate to torture and murder innocent children for no reason?

Nicholas: You haven't answered what I said. Obviously God would

never command us to do that because he is good-supremely good. What a silly argument.

Phillip:

But what standard do you use to make such an evaluation? You want to say that God is good, or that her actions are those of a morally perfect being. But you define moral concepts strictly in terms of God's commands or approval. So on your theory, what could it mean to say that God is good? That God is commanded by God orGod approves of God? You end with a vacuous notion of what it could mean to say that God is good. The reason you think that God is good is that you have evaluated God's pronouncements or ideals on the basis of some standards that are, in fact, independent of those com-

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mands. That's the only way you judge the difference between the pronouncements of a good God and some evil spirit.

Nicholas: Hold it I'm losing track of the argument. Phillip:

The real problem is this. If you say that the morally right is just whatever God commands, it reduces those commands to arbitrariness. If there is no reason why God might command this rather than that, then anything could become right or obligatory if we just attach God's supposed approval to it. Butagood God couldn't approve of certain actions, precisely because of her moral nature. Your view reduces God to an arbitrary, capricious being who would have no reason to command as she does. That's why the second alternative in the original question must be taken in order to avoid supposing that God is arbitrary and that her goodness is an empty notion.

Nicholas: The second alternative? Phillip:

I originally asked this: Is something right because God commands it or does she command it because it is right? Now it seems clear that to avoid the reduction to absurdity, which is really the problem of arbitrariness, we must admit that if God exists and she commands us to do something, she commands it because it's right. If God exists, she isn't arbitrary; she is supremely reasonable. Religious believers hold this. She has good reason to command or approve of certain things rather than others, and those reasons explain moral rightness. God is forced to appeal to moral standards just as we are, so if morality makes sense, it must be in terms of moral standards that are independent of God's existence.

Nicholas: What standards are we talking about? I don't get the abstract

appeal to some "standards" that you say God appeals to. And why do you insist on calling God a "she?" Are you just trying to irritate me?

Phillip:

No. I think your sexist language feeds into an overly patriarchal view of religion. But that's not the issue. We're trying to understand moral standards. If unjustified killing is wrong, then it's wrong not just because God says it's wrong. It's wrong-period. And if someone thinks that simply attaching

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Dialogue Seven God's approval to some piece of conduct might make it right, he or she hasn't yet gotten to the heart of morality. God's approval, if she exists and if we could know it, would certainly be a very good sign or indication that some piece of conduct was morally permissible or obligatory, since God's wisdom or knowledge would assure us ofthat. But her approval wouldn't explain the rightness; it wouldn't be the reason for a nonarbitrary God's approval. God orno God, we can be sure that it's wrong to make people suffer for no reason, to enslave them, to think of them as objects or intrinsically valueless tools. As far as I can tell, the existence of God is irrelevant to moral matters. It's just not true that morality makes no sense without God.

Nicholas: What's the alternative? Your examples sound like they're based on grand ideals, but there have been times when a society has denied them. Without God all we're left with is that morality is whatever is approved by the society or culture you happen to live in.

Phillip:

I think we're making progress. Morality appears not to be simply an expression of personal taste or simply an expression of whatever God commands. It does appear to involve a code that is taught and learned in a social context, or the embodiment of certain ideals or virtues that are thought to be important. Whatever else, morality is a social institution.

Nicholas: So you think we are left with some kind of social definition? If God is out of the picture, morals are just a matter of doing what society says to do. I think I prefer God's way to the ways of society, whatever you say. I must admit though, that we do end up acting like society wants us to act, and it's pretty obvious that morality is relative to a society. What's right here isn't necessarily right in another culture. I think we have to be tolerant and not go around preaching to others who don't believe what we believe, but I still have a hard time accepting the idea that morality is just social. All of your arguments seem to point to some kind of moral absolu tes, but now that you've ruled out the individual and God as the source of morality, all you're left with is society. This is getting confusing.

Phillip:

Because I'm suggesting that morality might be conceived in

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social terms or that it might in part serve an essentially social function or purpose doesn't mean that we have to define it exclusively in terms of social approval or social conventions. Any approval theory faces the same kinds of dilemmas, logically.

Nicholas: What do you mean?

Phillip:

Let's take it step by step, just as we did with the notion that whatever is morally right is whatever is believed to be right by an individual. Remember how you first attempted to defend that theory?

Nicholas: Yes. People disagree about what is right and wrong and there is no one person who has the right answer to everything in morality.

Phillip:

Likewise, some people think it's an obvious fact that different cultures have different moral beliefs. That in itself is an interesting question, which has caused a great deal of confusion and discussion. There was a time when most anthropologists, sociologists, and even ordinary people took cultural moral diversity as an article of faith. But the problem with this view is that it overlooks some interesting and logically crucial elements involved in whether people actually disagree about moral matters. If I find that the children of some other culture treat elderly parents in a very different way than we do-for example, putting them out on the ice to die-it doesn't follow that we have different moral beliefs. We might both agree that it is morally obligatory to do the most loving thing for our parents as well as for all concerned, but another culture might have peculiar beliefs about afterlife or the survival of the group that may force them to apply these deeply held and shared moral beliefs in a very different way than we do. They may think about putting their parents out to die in a very different way than we do, perhaps as an act of kindness or a way of promoting overall group happiness. So our disagreement at the level of specific rules may hide an agreement at a more basic level that gets applied differently because of different cultural views. Apparent moral disagreement may tum out to be more superficial than real. But we would need many more examples and much more investigation to think this

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Dialogue Seven through. It's my understanding that contemporary anthropological research tends to stress less the differences among cultures--in terms of "moral" customs--and to recognize the extent to which most cultures share certain universal prohibitions and prescriptions, precisely because of the common needs of human nature. In any case, even if there is disagreement, what follows? Do you recall how we treated this in talking about individual relativism?

Nicholas: Yes, I think so. Something about disagreement not leading to relativism.

Phillip:

That's right. Because two cultures disagree about some moral matters, it doesn't follow that there is no "correct" moral position, or that what is right is just what a culture believes to be right. One culture could be mistaken. The same kind of examples are as relevant as the ones we used in criticizing individual relativism. Because South Africa practices apartheid and we do not, it certainly doesn't follow that they are as "right" as we are, or that what is morally right is simply what a culture or society believes to be right. In any area of belief, because someone believes x, it doesn't follow that x is true, because one could be mistaken.

Nicholas: But we once believed it was all right to hold slaves and segregate our society.

Phillip:

What follows from that?

Nicholas: What right do we have to go around preaching about moral1.ty?. Phillip:

Again, it's not a matter of having or not having a moral right to express whatever beliefs one happens to have. Doesn't your example lead one in the opposite direction from the one in which you seem to think it leads?

Nicholas: How's that? Phillip:

I can't think of a better counterexample to an unsophisticated social relativism. Because a society or culture believes slavery to be right, it doesn't follow that it is morally right. In fact, our

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125 own history is a superb example of the notion that a society can be fundamentally mistaken in its moral beliefs. We have decided we were terribly wrong in accepting slavery as a social institution. What could it mean to think that a society could be wrong on the theory of social approval? The only standard of moral rightness is what in fact is approved in a society. We could only say that our beliefs are different now than they were and we are right now, but since we were also right then and the two beliefs are contradictory, it appears that the whole theory is incoherent. How can two incompatible moral beliefs both be right?

Nicholas: I don't know. Phillip:

Look at the enormous oddities of such a view. There could be no moral progress for the social approval view, since there would be no basis for saying that a society has made progress. Bu t we don't believe that. What could it mean to say that moral reform could take place in a society? For example, Martin Luther King and Gandhi were great moral reformers, but in the social approval theory any reformer working against the moral status quo would be mistaken and not be commended, since morality is just defined by the status quo. We don't believe these things. And how do we find out what is moral? Do we continually take polls, to see whether 51 percent of the people think it's okay to have abortions or to lie and cheat when convenient? That's just not the way we decide such issues. Surely many of your own beliefs about morality are once again at odds with the theory we are discussing.

Nicholas: How do we decide issues if we don't look at what SOCiety says? Phillip:

We look at the best available arguments. We investigate the moral reasons for and against certain actions.

Nicholas: Butwheredowegetthemoralreasons? And who decides what the best arguments are?

Phillip:

You or I or anyone who wants to engage in serious moral reflection. It's really not so mysterious. What is mysterious is that people talk about morality in the way we have been discussing. To a certain extent the subject is puzzling. But to

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Dialogue Seven a certain extent it is not nearly as puzzling as one might think, nor, oddly enough, is it quite as simple as these popular views attempt to make it. One thing is very clear: To think of morality as simply the expression of personal taste, divine command, or social approval is to leave the heart, the very substance, of morality untouched. There are profound reasons why an individual must confront hard moral choices, why God, if she exists, wants us to act in certain ways, and why societies, if they want to function well and promote human well-being, approve of some customs and disapprove of others. The mere fact of approval, whether it's individual, divine, or social, leaves the "why" of approval, the rationale or justification for the approval, an irrelevant mystery. But that's where the great questions really are. Why do you think we have morality, in the most general sense? Why do we recommend certain kinds of conduct, discourage others, and promote certain personal qualities or types oflife? Isn't that what we're trying to get at?

Nicholas: Yes, but how do you even start to answer such questions? Phillip:

Try to imagine what it would be like if we didn't have something called morality. Or think about why you teach your children about how they ought to live or what kind of person you would like them to be. Or think of something that you hold to be very basic to the moral sphere and ask yourself why that is important.

Nicholas: Well, how about that last point? My parents always stressed

the importance of the Golden Rule: Do unto others as you would have them do unto you. I'd say that's pretty basic, wouldn't you?

Phillip:

Yes, depending on how we interpret it. I think that's a fine place to begin. Suppose we take that to be a basic requirement of morality, leaving open the question of whether everything in morality can be reduced to this one principle. Now, why is this basic? Why ought we act in this way? And recall, if you say, "Because God tells me," I will wonder why God thinks that principle is so important.

Nicholas: Hmm. Tough question. I suppose, because we need to recog-

nize that there are others in the world who are just as valuable

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Morality as we are, at least in God's eyes. Phillip:

Well, I suppose God sees value that is really there, if there is a God, so God or no God, it must have something to do with the fact that there are other valuable beings in the world besides myself. Doesn't your principle really stress that if I recognize that things matter for me, that I have desires that, if fulfilled, produce satisfaction and well-being for me, then I should recognize that there are other beings who have an equal claim to such satisfaction and well-being? Isn'tthat, to a great extent, what morality is really about?

Nicholas: Maybe. But people don't always act like it is. Phillip:

True, but not to the point. There may be important questions concerning why we ought to be moral, and what this means in a more specific sense, but the concept of morality itself seems to be essentially involved with this. There are beings in the world whose good I ought to be concerned about. In the end . it may be for my own good to be the kind of person who considers the good of others. That is, it may be for our own good to become a moral person, but that is another issue. Certainly this notion tells us more than the other theories we have discussed. And it leaves us with an enormous amount of philosophical work to be done. There have been and continue to be great disputes about how we are to interpret this moral recognition of others and how to apply such recognition in concrete terms.

Nicholas: Okay, Professor. Give me some hints and maybe we can continue this next time. Phillip:

I'll greatly simplify, and even leave out another major option, which we could look at some other time, but the contemporary debate involves, to a large extent, two competing camps. One camp thinks that morality is exclusively a matter of bringing about as much good as you can when you act. There are large questions about how to interpret the good, and whether acting according to common moral rules might be the best way to bring about the most good, but the insight is fairly clear and very provocative. This camp is called utilitarianism. Utilitarians think that moral reasoning is primarily calculative, deter-

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mining the effects of actions or policies in terms of how peoples' lives are actually affected by those actions or policies. They think you have to attempt to figure out how everyone will be affected by what you do. One thing their theory has going for it is that we actually engage in this kind of moral reasoning often. On the other hand, there is a camp that denies that all of morality can be reduced to this kind of thinking. The nonutilitarian camp is harder to explain. I'd say their main contention is that there are other key aspects of morality that aren't a matter of just producing as much total good as you can. For example, the whole question of how you distribute the good is crucial to morality. It's a matter of justice and the fact that no one should be treated as an object, no one should be used simply as a means to produce total good. One great moral philosopher, Immanuel Kant, thought that the basic principle of morality is that we should always treat others as what he called "ends in themselves" and never "merely as means." There is dispute about what that principle means, but it surely means that we must respect the dignity and autonomy of people to the extent that we don't enslave, exploit, or abuse them.

Nicholas: Do these theories really say different things? Phillip:

To a certain extent, no, since that basic core that I've used for examples is also used to generate test cases or counterexamples for these theories. But to a larger extent, the two approaches or interpretations of morality create different prescriptions or different attitudes to issues.

Nicholas: My mind grows weary. Next time we should be less abstract.

Let me digest this conversation and then see what happens when we apply these things.

Phillip:

Great. Perhaps a little applied ethics next time!

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Questions for Thought, Study, and Discussion: Dialogue Seven 1. What are the different senses in which morality might depend upon

religion?

2. Why do you attempt to act morally? Are there religious reasons? For example, when you make a promise and wonder whether to keep it, do you give any thought to God in your reflections? Might a person with religious belief be more likely than a person without religious belief to go beyond her duty? 3. Is it possible for an atheist to be a good person? Is it possible for a devout believer to be a bad person? 4. Is morality relative or absolute? Is that a clear question? What is meant by "relative"? "Absolute"? 5. What is the divine command theory of moral rightness? Do people actually hold this view? If two people claimed to know what God commands, how would we resolve the dispute if they disagreed about the supposed commandments? 6. Carefully reconstruct Phillip's criticisms of the divine command

theory of morality. What is Phillip's conclusion? Is God's existence

"irrelevant in moral matters," as Phillip says?

7. Explain why apparent cultural moral diversity may tum out to be more superficial than real. What is the argument? 8. What sort of objections can be offered to any theory that defines morality merely in terms of some kind of approval? 9. What are Phillip's main criticisms of the view that morality is simply defined in terms of societal or cultural approval? 10. Do you think that cultures can make moral progress? Is U.S. society morally better than it was in the nineteenth century? In what ways?

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11. Whatis the utilitarian interpretation ofthe Golden Rule? Whatis the nonutilitarian interpretation of the Golden Rule? Does the Golden Rule require us to love others? 12. What would a society look like if it had no conception of morality? Could a society have an ethic while also having a limited sense of what we mean by morality?

A Few Suggested Readings Frankena, William. Ethics, 2nd ed. Englewood Oiffs, N.J.: PrenticeHall, 1973. (Oear discussion of many important issues in ethics; offers a moral theory that combines the utilitarian emphasis on beneficence and a nonutilitarian principle of justice.) Hospers, John. Human Conduct: Problems of Ethics, 2nd ed. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1982. (Rigorous treatment of the problems of ethics; excellent exercises.) Johnson, Oliver, ed. Ethics: Selections from Classical and Contemporary Writers, 4th ed. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1978. (A standard collection of readings from the history of ethics; includes Mill and Kant.) Plato. ''Euthyphro." In The Trial and Death of Socrates, trans. G.M.A. Grube. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1975. (The classic criticism of the attempt to define morality in terms of a divine foundation.) Taylor, Paul. Principles of Ethics: An Introduction. Encino, Calif.: Dickenson Publishing Co., 1975. (Excellent discussions of relativism, utilitarianism, and Kant's ethics.)

DIALOGUE EIGHT: ANIMALS AND ETIUeS

Phillip:

Have you eaten yet?

Nicholas: No. Why don't we stroll down to Ernie's for some campus grease. They make the best burgers in town. Phillip:

Sure. We might even find something philosophical to talk about. Any comments on where we ended our last conversation?

Nicholas: Maybe. As usual, it seemed like we were off in the philosophical never-never land of abstractions. Phillip:

As you recall, you were the one that began our discussion by making some very general comments about the nature of morality. It seems to me that one thing that came out of our conversation was that the actual practice of our moral lives and some of our most cherished beliefs about morality are at odds with the general comments you made. I'm willing to be more "concrete," as you say, but I was simply pursuing the conversation in the way in which you started it.

Nicholas: What good is all the theorizing about morality unless you can apply it to the real world? Phillip:

To a certain extent I agree. Morality is about what we are and how we act. You don't have to be a moral philosopher to be a good person, and you don't need to move to the level of generality that we did to engage in serious ethical thinking. I still think it's striking that we agree about so much in this area. What we disagree about tends to be conflicts involving accepted moral principles and how to weigh the competing demands of different moral aspects of situations. 131

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Nicholas: Here we are, Professor. (They read the menu; the waiter comes to take their order.) I'll have the mushroom burger with french fries and iced tea.

Phillip:

I'll have the vegetarian hoagie with iced tea. (The waiter departs.)

Nicholas: No burger? You used to live on hamburgers and french fries. Phillip:

No. I don't eat meat anymore. I've become a vegetarian since our old student days.

Nicholas: Oh, God! Are you one of those "victory through vegetables" health nuts?

Phillip:

Spare me the rhetoric. I didn't become a vegetarian based on reasons of health, al though health is an important factor when one is deciding whether to give up red meat or meat altogether. I guess we do have something philosophical to talk about. I became a vegetarian on moral grounds. I encountered some extremely provocative moral arguments in support of vegetarianism. The more I thought about them, the more I became convinced that they were good arguments. If you want a good example of the way philosophy can change one's life, one's very conduct, this is a good one. If you want ethical thinking applied, here it is. From a rational point of view I was moved to give up eating meat because I found the philosophical arguments in support of moral vegetarianism to be effective.

Nicholas: Forgive the pun, but we started our conversations about

morals talking about personal taste, and if there was ever a matter of "taste," this is one! I respect your views and I suppose they work for you. But don't expect everyone else to become a vegetarian just because you're one.

Phillip:

That's silly. I don't expect everyone to become a vegetarian because I'm one, but I do suppose that the arguments in support of vegetarianism are good ones, and if they're good arguments, they give true conclusions-for everyone. As a matter of logic I've found them convincing, and I believe that other reflective persons ought to see this and act accordingly.

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Nicholas: Look, I've heard about some of these crazy animal rights people. I don't care if animal lovers want to do things in their personal lives, but they don't have to force their views on others. Phillip:

I'm not an "animallover" as you say. I don't own a pet and I have no interest in acquiring one. But I do think that animals should be given moral consideration. Much in the same way that some people once thought that skin color was the deciding factor in how we treat people, morally, and views have changed, I believe that species membership is not a very good way to decide how a being gets treated, and we need to fundamentally change our attitudes toward animals.

Nicholas: You mean you believe we are supposed to treat animals like we treat people? My dog will be happy to hear that. You're damned crazier than I thought. Phillip:

Could you be just a little more serious? Why is it so difficult even to treat the issue as if it were a serious one? First, you need to be more precise. To say that animals should be given moral consideration does not mean that we are supposed to treat animals like people in all respects. That would be crazy. But in some respects animals do deserve equal consideration.

Nicholas: Equal consideration? Nice line. I can understand why people deserve to be treated equally. We talked about this last time. People are rational, as you might say. They can think, talk to each other, decide what to do with their lives, love one another, be creative, and do all sorts of things related to the fact that they're really special. My dog can't do these things. Phillip:

It may be true that your dog can't do these things, at least in a

sophisticated and self-reflective way, but it is equally true that there are humans who don't have these sophisticated capabilities and we still treat them with respect. There are also animals whose capabilities with respect to communication, social behavior, and seemingly satisfying relationships are beyond some humans. So if these criteria are used as a basis for equal moral consideration, you will have to omit some humans and quite probably add some animals to your list of objects of moral consideration.

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Nicholas: Say that again. Phillip:

If you set your standards too high, won't you rule out infants, the severely retarded, and the senile as possible objects of moral consideration? If you want to stress the differences in animals and humans as the basis for different moral treatment, then to the extent that the differences are minimized or absent altogether, you would have to radically change your moral scheme, as a matter of consistency. That's what must happen if you set your standards for moral consideration too high.

Nicholas: But in all those human cases you still have something deeply worthwhile: a person.

Phillip:

That obviously begs the question, since we are trying to find out what it is about a person that demands our consideration and the exclusion of animals. You were the one who attempted to pinpoint the differences between animals and humans so as to justify our vastly different moral attitudes toward them. Now what happens when you set your standard lower in order to protect these marginal cases?

Nicholas: What standard? Phillip:

Suppose all human beings possess some characteristic that is a plausible candidate for being the basis of moral consideration. The characteristic I have in mind is simply the capacity to suffer, in particular, the capacity to feel pain. All human beings can suffer, but not only human beings can suffer. Animals can suffer also.

Nicholas: How do you know that? Phillip:

You're not really going to deny that, are you?

Nicholas: I can't know how animals feel and you can't either. Phillip:

Okay. Let's not even consider animals for the time being. How about people? How do we know when people are suffering or when people are in pain?

Nicholas: Maybe we don't ever really know it. I can't feel what you feel.

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Surely you can see where this argument is going. Your standard for knowing something is incredibly high. Over many, many cases, in most situations, we make perfectly good sense of the claim that I can know when someone else is in pain. Suppose you go home and your child is moaning and holding his jaw because of a terrible toothache. You don't say: ''By golly, I'm a skeptic concerning the existence of another person's pain." No, you feel compassion and want to get your child to the dentist as soon as possible.

Nicholas: But sometimes kids try to fool parents about how much some-

thing hurts. Just because they act in a certain way doesn't always mean they are feeling something consistent with how they act.

Phillip:

That point will end up hurting your case. In some situations we might have reason to think that we're being deceived when someone, like a child, manifests pain behavior, precisely because of the sophistication of human action. In many cases, however, we have very good reason to believe others are suffering or feel pain. I'm not sure of the last time I thought I was being deceived by an animal when it appeared that the animal was suffering. In any case, we believe others suffer, and we often have very good reason to believe this, and having good reasons in this situation is tantamount to claiming to know.

Nicholas: But how do you know this? Phillip:

It is believing on the basis of a very good analogical inference one makes. I associate my own pain with certain kinds of behavior and when I see others manifesting that behavior I infer with good reason that the person is in pain. It seems to me that when I see animals bleeding, yelping, writhing, whining, et cetera, I have equally good reason to say they are suffering, or in pain. I have no reason to think they are deceiving me, so in one sense the behavioral evidence is even better than with human behavior.

Nicholas: But animals aren't human, so your analogy goes haywire. Phillip:

Notice something interesting. The entire edifice of animal

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Dialogue Eight experimentation in science is predicated on the fact that animals are sufficiently similar to human beings to help us generate results that will have implications for humans. In order to avoid moral complications, you now seem to want to deny the very fact that makes animal experimentation useful.

Nicholas: I can insist on useful scientific similarities between humans and animals without admitting that those similarities have the moral consequences you want to argue for. Phillip:

Well said, but the similarities I point to do, as a matter of fact, have moral consequences. Remember, it is not as if we are comparing humans and animals as two wholly separate types of beings. We are considering different types of animals. Animals have a nervous system; they are sensitive or sentient, and many are relatively complex creatures in the way they behave. If you do much research on this I think you'll find that many scientists agree: Higher animals can suffer in relatively complex ways. If you'll grant me that factual premise, and I see no reason to deny it, then the rest of my argument will follow straightforwardly.

Nicholas: Somehow I have the impression that my hamburger is going to seem less agreeable in a few moments. Phillip:

So far I can't see that I've argued for anything very controversial. Don't you believe it's wrong-I should say morally wrong-to be cruel to animals?

Nicholas: I think it's wrong, but I'm not sure it's a matter of morality. Phillip:

We have laws against severe neglector abuse of animals. Most of us feel repugnance when we see examples of extreme cruelty to them. As far as I can tell, the reason for this is dear. It's a bad thing for an animal to suffer. Animals can experience pain, and pain is an intrinsically bad thing. That means causing animal pain is morally significant; causing any pain is morally significant. Insofar as pain is a bad thing wherever it occurs, causing pain stands in need of moral justification. You don't think we can do just anything to animals, do you? You said you have a dog. Do you think it would be permissible for someone to torture your dog just for the perverse pleasure he might have tormenting the poor creature?

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Nicholas: No. Phillip:

Then you are really admitting that animals deserve some moral consideration. Again, I don't see this as a very controversial claim.

Nicholas: I admit they deserve some moral consideration, but how can

you say that they are worth as much as a human being? The life of a dog or cow or horse is not worth as much as the life of a human being. I'm willing to say that animals have some kind of moral status, but not the same kind of status that people have. People have rights. I can't see that animals have any rights.

Phillip:

I have not asserted that animals have the same worth as humans. Let me continue with my argument, because I can support philosophical vegetarianism without making any questionable claims about the relative worth of animals and humans.

Nicholas: Okay. Phillip:

My argumentis really quite simple. It uses premises that most people believe to be true.

Nicholas: Let's hear it. Phillip:

My first premise is this: Any being that can suffer at the very least has a right not to be forced to suffer unnecessarily. Morally, one of our obligations is to attempt to minimize suffering in the world. Would you accept that premise?

Nicholas: For the time being, but sometimes we have to cause pain in

order to bring about some better consequence, like punishing your child for some good reason.

Phillip:

That's precisely what the premise says. I'm not sure why anyone would deny it as an essential aspect of our moral thinking. If you take your child to the dentist, the child will probably experience some pain, but it is necessary for his future dental health. Likewise, if someone decided to starve his pet to death just for the enjoyment of seeing the pet behave

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Dialogue Eight in curious ways, we would say that such cruelty is unnecessary or unjustified and we would morally condemn such behavior. So we can agree that the first premise is a true moral premise?

Nicholas: I suppose so. Phillip:

My second premise, however, is not a moral one. It is the following factual premise: It is not necessary that we inflict suffering on animals in order to eat them, since a vegetarian diet can be very healthy. If you accept the truth of this premise, which I am prepared to explain in a moment, I think it follows that to inflict unnecessary suffering on an animal in order to eat it is morally wrong. This is a simple argument, but exceedingly powerful, don't you think? The premises are true and the conclusion follows.

Nicholas: Not so fast. Let's get back to the second premise. You say it is unnecessary to eat meat, but animal protein is necessary for proper nutrition.

Phillip:

As far as I can tell from my studies and my life, that is just not the case. I believe that most nutritionists agree that a vegetarian diet can be very healthy. Therefore itis not necessary to eat meat, and the second premise is empirically verified.

Nicholas: Very interesting, but there must be something wrong with the argument.

Phillip:

Show me. You are inclined to say that because eating meat is such a pervasive part of our culture and it might be bothersome or inconvenient to become a vegetarian. But notice how I've argued. I haven't used any exotic or obscure claims. The argument seems to lead to some kind of radical alteration of our moral attitudes, but that's not really true. I'm suggesting that we consistently extend the attitudes of compassion that we already have toward the animal kingdom.

Nicholas: I think there's something funny about that second premise.

You say it's not necessary that we inflict suffering on animals so that we can eat them, but I'm not causing any animal suffering when I eat my hamburger, and it makes no differ-

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ence whether you or I decide to eat a hamburger. I can't see that it makes any difference at all.

Phillip:

But you're causing animal suffering, or at least involving yourself in a practice that causes much suffering.

Nicholas: I disagree. Phillip:

Look, because you and others eat meat, the demand for animal flesh is kept high. Because of this demand animals are raised and then slaughtered in the most despicable and cruel manner one can think of. I don't want to spoil our lunch by describing specific situations, but there's plenty of documentation out there if you're interested. I challenge you to read Peter Singer' s Animal Liberation and to remain completely unmoved. I think it would be wildly out of line to deny that the factory-farming methods of contemporary animal production cause an enormous amount of animal suffering.

Nicholas: What if the methods became more humane? Isn't your argument more in support of increased activism to make conditions for animals more humane? I agree with you that animals shouldn't be forced to suffer unnecessarily, and I should probably become more interested in persuading meat producers to do their work more humanely. But that doesn't mean there is anything wrong, in itself, with eating meat. Suppose I have a calf that I treat lovingly, but one day he is accidentally killed, or better yet, suppose I kill the calf painlessly with an injection. Would it then be wrong to butcher the calf and feed my family with the meat? Phillip:

Those are tough questions, but I don't think you seriously damage the argument. From a practical point of view, your "what if' situation is rarely the case. You and I live in a city. We buy our meat in the supermarket and we are participating in a process whose end you find between those pieces of bread. Also, you would have to admit that even if it is permissible to eat animals that were killed painlessly, in the present state of our society there would be a practical imperative to become a vegetarian and remain so until factory farms treated animals better while alive and on the verge of death. I would rather not respond to your "what if" objections because moral vegetari-

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Dialogue Eight anism can be defended without answering the sticky questions about the relative worth of animal lives and persons. However, you speak as if a painless death does not deprive an animal of anything. Would not such a death deprive it not only of its life, which the animal certainly tries to preserve, but also the future experience it would have had? Regardless of the answers to the questions of worth, for the situation most people find themselves in the original argument is very persuasive.

Nicholas: I still say I'm not causing any suffering. There's something tricky going on here. When I pointed out that I am not at this moment directly inflicting suffering on animals when I eat meat, you said I'm at least indirectly causing it or involving myself in a bad process. I think you've left something out of the argument, and it needs to be said directly and defended. You suppressed a crucial premise, that it is somehow morally wrong to indirectly cause bad things or involve yourself with bad things. But my indirect cause isn't much of a cause at all, and I don't see how we can ever be totally free of evil processes in the world.

Phillip:

I suppose the premise is unspoken, but I don't think that it is any more questionable than the original premises I have defended. By eating meat you do contribute to suffering. Many people have boycotted food, clothes, and other products and businesses because they felt it was wrong to participate in practices involving great moral evils. Notice that the whole issueofindividual and institutional divestment with regard to corporations that do business in South Africa is based on such a principle. People do not want to be involved with businesses that contribute to the continuance of that vicious, racist regime.

Nicholas: But that is a very demanding moral principle. We live in a

world full of moral evils. You name it and it is the possible product of exploitation. I think our moral energies would be sapped if we were held to such a demanding standard. Wouldn't it be more realistic if we were more direct in the particular ways we attempt to make the world better? We can't become devoted to all moral causes. That principle means that we should all become saints.

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Excuse me if you think I'm being unkind, but that sounds like a thoroughgoing rationalization for not doing what we in fact recognize that we ought to do. You sound as if it would take great sacrifices to accept such a moral ideal wholeheartedly. Maybe we should interpret it as saying that we ought to do as much as we can without making great sacrifices. But giving up eating meat is no great sacrifice. The argument only suggests that you not do something, and that's not so difficult. Would it really take great moral energy to become a vegetarian?

Nicholas: It would be a major inconvenience, and I'm still unconvinced that it's worth it.

Phillip:

I think only the force of tradition and habit would cause you to say such a thing. It's just not necessary to eat meat, and by not eating meat we will be contributing to a world with less suffering.

Nicholas: Why do you keep talking about whether something is neces-

sary or not? Eating meat might not be "necessary," but it still might be all rightforme to eat meat. ... Now I see! You say that it's morally wrong to cause unnecessary suffering, and since it's unnecessary to eat meat (and thereby contribute to unnecessarysuffering), itismorally wrong to eat meat. You want me to believe that the first premise is an obvious moral truth, and the second one is a true statement about nutrition. But I think you have subtly, to your advantage, changed the meaning of the term "necessary" in the two premises. In the first premise you're saying that it's wrong to cause suffering without good reason. In the second premise you say that a vegetarian diet can be healthy, so it's unnecessary to eat meat. But for the argument to go through from the first statement to the second one you must mean that there's no good reason to eat meat. That's not an unquestionably true statement about nutri tion; that's a very debatable statement of some kind. You've changed the meaning of your terms, and you can't do that if you want your argument to be a good one.

Phillip:

Not bad, Nicholas. You should have gone into philosophy. That is, nice try. You're starting to think like a philosopher. However, the second premise as you've interpreted it is no

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Dialogue Eight less true. I don't believe there is any good reason to contribute indirectly to animal suffering by eating them, or to become involved in an industry that causes so much suffering.

Nicholas: You do admit, though, that the argument is less apparently persuasive when reinterpreted.

Phillip:

No, I don't admit that. A being has a right not to be forced to suffer without good reason, and there is no good reason to eat meat. I still want to hear why you think there might be good reason to eat meat.

Nicholas: What if everyone became a vegetarian? Just think of the

impact that would have on people. Can you imagine how many jobs would be lost and how much human suffering would occur?

Phillip:

As a matter of fact we know that not everyone would even take such arguments seriously, and we have no reason to think that any drastic changes would occur overnight. To the extent that people are gradually won over to the vegetarian point of view, I assume supply would respond to demand. Practical arguments have practical responses, so I believe a scenario could be suggested describing a less drastic turn of events. I think your question is an interesting piece of common moral reasoning that should be analyzed more closely but that would take us far afield. For example, what if you objected to my choice of becoming a philosopher by asking: What if everyone did that? Philosophy bakes no bread! Should my profession be condemned because of that? There are probably very different ways to understand that question. In any case, my argument is directed at any thoughtful individual, like you, who might be persuaded by serious argumentation. So can you, in your situation in life, produce any good reasons for contributing to or associating yourself with the promotion of animal suffering?

Nicholas: I happen to like eating meat-very much. It offers a conven-

ient source of protein, pleasure when eating, and generates an industry that provides a livelihood for hundreds of thousands of people-at least. It seems clear at this point that we must compare in some way the pleasures and benefits of eating

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meat with the supposed pains and evils associated with the production of meat. I enjoy the taste very much. That much is certain. What I find much more uncertain is, first of all, the extent to which animals actually suffer, and second, even if they do, whether the suffering caused by my demand for meat is more important than the pleasurable experiences I have when I eat meat. Perhaps you've convinced me that animals can experience some unpleasant feelings, but I wonder whether they can suffer in the kind of complex and self-reflective way that humans do. Don't you have to show that all of the supposed pain experienced by animals outweighs all of the good things experienced by humans because we eat meat? How can you do this? Phillip:

I suppose I must appeal to the relative triviality of experiences of meat eating in relation to the enormous suffering of animals. Remember also that your continuing comments on the goods associated with the meat industry are countered by my point concerning the way change would occur if people adopted a vegetarian life-style. It's not as if all of those people would suddenly be ou t of work. You might compare your argument with one we hear about the defense industry, in particular, the people who make nuclear weapons.

Nicholas: Okay. Maybe the change would be gradual, if there would be any change at all. Your comments on the "triviality" of meat eating and "enormous" suffering are just rhetoric. That's not good argument. I expected more from you. Phillip:

You could, with relative ease, give up eating meat. It would cause no great sacrifices. In fact, vegetarian dishes are far more varied and tasty than most meat eaters imagine. In the face of obvious animal suffering, I think the burden is on you to show why the taste of meat is so important.

Nicholas: Does it make you feel good, or pious, or superior to other people because you're doing the high and mighty moral thing? Phillip:

So you have now reduced yourself to personal attacks? Come now, Nick, you can do better than that.

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Nicholas: Since I have pleasant experiences when I eat meat, and you

have given me no convincing argument that the value of animal experiences is of the same order as human experiences, I think the burden is on you to produce a more positive account of the worth of animals and the complexity of their feelings.

Phillip:

Then I suggest that you do some extensive reading on the empirical research produced in the last few years on animal suffering. It's there. You can't plead ignorance anymore since you're alerted to the issue. There are undoubtedly methodological problems in understanding how we might decide whether and to what extent animals suffer, but interesting attempts have been made by scientists in this area.

Nicholas: But empirical research and scientific conclusions won't answer questions of value.

Phillip:

It will help us understand animal behavior and enable us to see whether animals are sufficiently similar to us in regard to the development of their nervous system and the complexity of their social life so that we will be able to make reasonable comparative judgments about their experience and ours. Remember, human beings are not similar to animals, they are animals themselves. Unlike you, I see no absolute divorce between the order of nature and an order of reality that is literally supra natural. I think my view leads more naturally to an attitude of kinship with our fellow animals.

Nicholas: Well, I do think we have reached an interesting point. I suppose the "higher" the animal is in the animal chain, the more willing I am to consider the interests of that animal. But where do we draw the line?

Phillip:

At that point which, as we go "down" the evolutionary scale, suffering is no longer evidenced, or at least not evidenced in an acute way. Oysters are in a gray area, perhaps, but for all we can tell, plants do not suffer, or at least do not suffer acutely. Cows, pigs, chickens, and fish do suffer acutely, often at the hands of human beings.

Nicholas: I'll be quite honest, Phillip. Even if I accepted your arguments in general and changed my eating habits, I would find it very

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hard to get worked up about fish suffering. At some point the feelings produced by a nervous system have to be combined with some more complex type of consciousness for me to feel sympathy for a being. Maybe I should have ordered shrimp, or catfish, or even chicken.

Phillip:

The conditions under which massive numbers of chickens are raised are horrible. Fish feel pain. I think it is better to be consistent and feel kinship for all animals that pass the test of sentience. Thanks for an enjoyable luncheon conversation. Think about me tonight when you sit down for supper.

Nicholas: I just might do that.

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Questions for Thought, Study, and Discussion: Dialogue Eight 1. Have you ever changed a relatively major aspect of your life because of moral arguments or moral reasons? 2. What is Phillip's argument from "marginal cases"? 3. Do we have good reason to believe that humans and animals feel pain? 4. Do you think cruelty to animals is wrong? Why? 5. Reconstruct Phillip's central moral argument for vegetarianism. Put the argument in premise-conclusion form. 6. For reflection: What is your initial reaction to Phillip's claim that it is morally wrong to eat meat? Do you find it difficult to take the argument seriously? Why? Recall the freedom-determinism discussion. 7. Phillip endorses what might be called the "principle of moral contamination." This principle proscribes our involvement with larger structures that cause suffering or injustice. Attemptto formulate the principle in a precise way. What role does such a principle have in our moral life? Is it too demanding? 8. Nicholas defends himself by claiming that his actions make no substantial difference in the overall situation. Think of other situations in which this kind of moral reasoning is used. Is such reasoning always convincing? 9. Nicholas accuses Phillip of equivocation concerning the meaning of "unnecessary". What is equivocation? What is Phillip's response? 10. What if everyone became a vegetarian? Is it relevant to ask this? How does Phillip reply?

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A Few Suggested Readings Dombrowski, Daniel A. The Philosophy of Vegetarianism. Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1984. (Traces the history of philosophical vegetarianism; excellent annotated bibliography.) Rachels, James. ''Vegetarianism and 'The Other Weight Problem'." In World Hunger and Moral Obligation, ed. W. Aiken and H. LaFollette. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977. (Relatively brief, clear defense of vegetarianism.) Regan, Tom, and Singer, Peter, eds. Animal Rights and Human Obligations. Englewood Oiffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,1976. (Importantcollection of historical and contemporary readings.) Singer, Peter. Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals. New York: Avon Books, 1975. (Offers extensive documentation of cruelty to animals; compares speciesism to sexism and racism.) Singer, Peter. Practical Ethics, Ch. 3,5. New York: Cambridge University Press,1979. (Tidy and updated utilitarian defense of vegetarianism.)

DIALOGUE NINE: ABORTION

Phillip:

Hi, Nicholas. Still eating hamburgers?

Nicholas: Yup. Phillip:

Not convinced that we ought to give animals a moral break?

Nicholas: Nope. Phillip:

My you're wordy today. I hope it was something I said.

Nicholas: No, it's not you. My best friend at work, Paul, confided in me this afternoon. Ina way I wish he hadn'ttold me. Hisdaughter got herself in a real mess. She's pregnant, the situation in which the baby was conceived was terrible, the father is gone now, and she wants to have an abortion. She is in no condition, psychologically or in terms of maturity, to care for a baby. My friend is going crazy. He doesn't know what to say to his daughter. I'm strongly prolife and I told him I firmly believe that abortion is murder. That seemed to upset him even more. I probably should have been more diplomatic, but I was trying to be honest. Abortion is murder. God, why does life have to be like this? You're the philosopher. Phillip:

I don't have any answers. I just have the questions, right?

Nicholas: If she goes ahead and has the abortion, Paul will know that I think she murdered her unborn child. That would put a real strain on our friendship. Phillip:

When will they make the decision?

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Nicholas: Soon. It's still very early in the pregnancy and they seem to

think that makes a big difference. I don't. As far as I'm concerned it doesn' tmatter whether the abortion takes place in the fourth week or the eighth month; murder is murder.

Phillip:

I recall you making a concerted plea for tolerance when we first started talking about morality. What happened to the spirit of tolerance?

Nicholas: I'm still tolerant about many things but not about abortion. I suppose I've realized that the clear examples you kept pressing me on have to be accepted. I guess I have accepted these things all along. You've convinced me of at least that much. Just because some individual or culture thinks it's okay to murder people doesn't make it right. I've heard it said that the current abortion situation is far worse than the Holocaust in World War II. Tolerance surely ends where genocide begins. This is the greatest evil we face in today's society. It must stop.

Phillip:

Strong words. I know it's a very emotional issue, but it's also a very interesting one, philosophically. Some of the most interesting work in recent philosophical literature has concerned the abortion dilemma.

Nicholas: Interesting? Dilemma? What so interesting about murder? I don't see any dilemma at all. Babies are being killed, usually because the mothers are irresponsible and don't want the inconvenience of a baby. They don't want to take responsibility for their actions.

Phillip:

That's a caricature of the issue. No doubt there is irresponsibility in some situations, but there are also situations in which the choices are terribly difficult and responsible people are torn by the burden. Just think of the example that's bothering you right now. Is the issue really so easy? On the contrary, I find it to be extremely difficult, for any number of reasons.

Nicholas: Ah. I could see it coming. A bleeding-heart liberal, more concerned about frivolous females than the rights of unborn children. You're probably prochoice.

Phillip:

I'm not sure what my position is with regard to certain aspects

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of the issue. I don't find these jargonistic labels, "prolife" and "prochoice," to be very helpful. I would rather investigate the reasons people have for their respective views and see if their arguments are good ones.

Nicholas: You mean their arguments for abortion? Phillip:

I mean the arguments that attempt to support the various general positions on abortion.

Nicholas: What's to argue? It's obvious thatthe fetus is human. Whatdo

you think it is, a vegetable? And it's also quite clear when human life begins. It's a biological fact that when conception occurs a genetically unique human being comes into existence. Human life begins at conception, and since killing innocent human life is murder, abortion is tantamount to murder. I don't see what could be more straightforward or obvious. It's so obvious that I wonder why prochoice people ignore this and continue to violate the right to life of the fetus.

Phillip:

Let me make sure I understand your view. Because the fetus is biologically a member of the species Homo sapiens you say it is "human." Since it is human, the fetus has full moral status. In particular, since it is human, from the moment of conception it has a right to life, so aborting the fetus would be a violation of the most fundamental right we have as human beings: the right to continue to live.

Nicholas: That's it precisely. Phillip:

So for your position species membership is the crucial condition for having moral status?

Nicholas: The fetus is human; that's what I've said and everyone would have to agree.

Phillip:

You're right. Everyone agrees that the fetus is biologically human. No one disputes that. But why do you define the set of moral beings solely in terms of species membership? Why do you think that the genetic humanness of the fetus resolves the moral issue?

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Nicholas: What do you mean? Phillip:

You seem to think that the issue is resolved simply by pointing out that the fetus is "human" and since it's wrong to kill innocent humans, it's wrong to abort fetuses. But you have obviously begged the question. The fetus is human in a biological sense but not obviously in a moral sense. As you have shown in your argument, ''human'' can be used in a factual, biological sense and in a moral sense. You have assumed precisely what you're trying to prove in arguing that it's wrong to kill humans and the fetus is clearly "human." Since what needs to be shown is why a biologically human entity at the moment of conception should be considered to have the same moral status as a fully developed human person.

Nicholas: Hold it. I don't see what you're getting at. Phillip:

You argue that membership in a biological category is the sole condition of having moral status. Our discussion of the moral status of nonhuman animals is useful here. The whole point of that discussion was to see whether some kind of absolute distinction between humans and other animals, in terms of their moral status, is appropriate. You admitted that insofar as there's good reason to believe that animals can suffer, we ought to and in fact do give animals some moral consideration. What is the abortion issue about? It's about our attempt to understand whether the fetus should be placed in the category of beings who have moral status, and it's about the relative weight of that status. We have already admitted that species membership is not an accurate criterion to distinguish moral beings from beings that have no moral status. In our earlier discussion we seemed to agree that sentience, the capacity to feel pleasure and pain, was the basic ground of moral consideration.

Nicholas: But I recall you saying that many think respect for others is the heart of morali ty. Respecting humanity means that we respect persons in whatever stage of development we find them. Phillip:

Respecting persons is crucial to morality. But the key is to ask: What is it about persons that engenders such respect? The fact that the most common examples of moral "persons" are

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153 human persons doesn't mean that being "human," ina genetic sense, is the very reason for our respect. Insofar as nonhuman animals are significantlypersonlike, especially with respect to their capacity for suffering, we treat them as objects of moral consideration. Notice also that when a human becomes significantly unlike a person, we cease to think that there is anything remaining that is worthy of respect. If some misfortune reduces an individual to an irreversible, vegetable-like state, we are skeptical of her moral status, although we might have the technology to keep her alive. So I would say there are nonhumans who are considered as moral entities and there are humans who have doubtful moral status. The key question is not: At what point do we have a "human" being, in the biological sense? That is obvious to everyone. The question is When does the developing entity that we generically call the fetus become a "person," in a moral sense? When does it become so personlike that we ought to give it moral consideration? Species membership, as the condition of having moral status, is arbitrary, and doesn't answer the central question.

Nicholas: Arbitrary? I don't think it's arbitrary at all. At conception you have a being that will inevitably develop into a person, a human being with moral rights. At least at conception we know that we have a being who, in all likelihood, will want to do everything that other people want to do. What is arbitrary is to draw a line at some place and say that it's there the fetus magically becomes a person. That can't be done. Phillip:

You seem to have two arguments going at once. Negatively, one can't nonarbitrarily draw a line and show why, at just that moment, the fetus attains moral status or moral rights. Positively, since at conception the fetus is at least potentially a person, it has the rights of a person, including the right to life. Is that a fair summary of your arguments?

Nicholas: I suppose so. I think the conservative position is really the nonarbitrary one, since it recognizes the potentiality of the fetus. Phillip:

Let's call the first point a slippery-slope-type argument, the second is a potentiality argument.

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Nicholas: Call them whatever you want; the points remain. You can't

draw a line and say that a fetus, one second before a certain point, was nothing, and then at that point it's a full person. That's silly. It can't be done. That is arbitrary.

Phillip:

This is a good example of what logicians call the "fallacy of the beard." How many hairs does it take to make a beard? Is it one?

Nicholas: Of course not. Phillip:

Two? Three? Thirty-two?

Nicholas: I have no idea. Phillip:

From the fact that one can't precisely tell how many hairs make up a beard, it doesn't follow that one can't tell the difference between a clean-shaven man and a bearded one. Just because it is difficult to draw a distinction doesn't mean that there isn't one. This is especially true in terms of developing processes. When does an acorn become an oak tree? At what precise point? Surely that's a bad question.

Nicholas: Then it's a bad question to ask when the fetus becomes a person?

Phillip:

It's bad to ask about a precise point, because when things develop, change often will be gradual. However, two points are clear. From the fact that we can't say precisely when an acorn turns into an oak tree, it doesn't follow that there is no difference between an acorn and an oak tree, nor that we ought to start calling acorns "oak trees." There's a clear difference between acorns and oak trees. Furthermore, there are sometimes practical reasons for drawing a line or making certain distinctions, although we recognize the line we draw as somewhat tenuous. When does a boy become a man? At sixteen? Eighteen? Twenty-one? It depends on the kind of reasons we have for drawing the line in question. We can be sure that a twelve-year-old male is not a man, for almost any reason we might have for making such a distinction. We can also be sure that a twenty-five-year-old male is a man, for all practical purposes. From the fact that it's difficult to specify a moment

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155 when the fetus becomes a person, with full moral status, it doesn't follow that a newly conceived one-celled speck of protoplasm is a person. You can see why many people find that such an amazing claim. It defies common sense.

Nicholas: I don't find it amazing at all. From that very moment a unique individual comes into being, who will develop into a person, just like you and me.

Phillip:

You seem to continue to confuse different arguments. No one denies that the fetus is a potential person, but that doesn't mean that the fetus is actually a person, in the full moral sense. This is precisely why so many find the extreme conservative position so implausible. To hold that a one-celled entity has the same status as a person is simply-how can I put it politely?-amazing. It is extraordinarily counterintuitive. Up to a certain point, the fetus is a glob of cells. It has none of the characteristics that we commonly associate with persons worthy of respect: consciousness, self-awareness, rationality, or ability to communicate. It's not until the eighth week that even rudimentary brain activity can be monitored.

Nicholas: How can you be so callous? Why don't you recognize the right of the baby?

Phillip:

To speak of the fetus as a "baby" or an "unborn child" is once again to beg the question. Those are categories with moral connotations. What we're trying to decide is when the fetus ought to be considered a "baby," or a "child," or a "person," whatever moral category you want to use. It's quite dear to most people, unless they have theological prejudices, that in the very early stages of development the fetus is very unlike a baby, and in the very late stages of development it is very much like a baby. Your person-at-the-moment-of-conception view is unconvincing. I say again: It's wildly counterintuitive.

Nicholas: But you still haven't responded to the potentiality argument.

You can't deny that from conception you have a potential person, and it has rights like everyone else. The fetus is human from conception, and that genetic makeup produces a potentiality. That potentiality is sacred; that has a right to life. There's nothing "counterintuitive," as you say, about its sacred potential.

156 Phillip:

Dialogue Nine I don't know about "sacred," whatever that means, but your other point is worth considering. You seem to think that having a potential status confers the rights that normally are conferred only when the status is actualized-as if potentiality confers a right to life?

Nicholas: The fetus is potentially a person so it ought to have the right to life. It does have that right. Phillip:

This is a very curious claim, if you think about it. I don't know of any other area in life in which we would claim that actual rights arise when the status that qualifies one for those rights is only potentially, not actually met. A boy is potentially a man, but he has no right to drink or vote or drive a car. Consider another example that has been offered. Think of the rights of the president of the United States. Surely you do not have the right to make presidential decisions, although you are a potential president. Or pick someone who at this time seems to be a realistic candidate for future presidential office. At this time such a person would not have the actual rights of the president. Actual rights do not follow from being qualified to be a potential candidate. From the fact that the fetus, at conception, is potentially a person, it doesn't follow that the fetus has the actual rights of a person. I don't see any way around that point.

Nicholas: So you think the fetus is just a worthless glob of cells? Phillip:

Not at all.

Nicholas: That's just what you said. Phillip:

I argued that it would be a logical error to attempt to deduce actual rights from potential qualification for those rights. That does not mean that I think the fetus is just a worthless glob of cells. At conception the fetus is a potential person, not just an unimportant piece of bodily tissue. That means that it is a valuable form of life, and we ought to have an initial bias against abortion.

Nicholas: Now we're getting somewhere. You're starting to sound like a conservative.

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157 Not exactly, although what you might call "conservative" sentiments seem to me to be the place a female ought to begin her reflections. In very early stages of pregnancy, I don't think that the fetus has any rights, but I do think that since it is a valuable formoflife insofar as it will become a person, we need to take into consideration the interests of the person who will exist, rather like our consideration of the interests of future generations when we think about our use and abuse of the earth's resources.

Nicholas: That still sounds conservative to me. Ifyou realize that you are dealing with an entity that will be like you and me then you can't kill it. Phillip:

I suppose this is where we differ. We may have reached one point of agreement: From conception we have a morally relevant being to consider in our deliberations. But how do we factor in the interests of a potential person when we are trying to decide what to do? We may have to begin with an initial bias against abortion, but that doesn't mean that all abortions, except in the extreme cases like danger to the mother's health, are morally impermissible. I just don't think that it's very clear how to fit the interests of a potential person into our present moral scheme. It seems to me that there is real disagreement here, among serious and thoughtful people.

Nicholas: For me that's not a difficult issue. From the start you respect the rights of the fetus. Phillip:

Remember: You have offered no argument that would legitimize talk about the supposed "rights" of the fetus. Maybe we can talk about our duty to consider the interests of a future person, but that only serves to accentuate the difficulty and the ambiguity of the situation. We must weigh the interests of the mother and family with the interests of a not-yet-existing person. It is inevitable that there will bea conflict of competing claims, and it's not inevitable that the fetus must always take precedence.

Nicholas: You keep talking about the fetus only as a potential person. But you have to admit that the fetus develops very quickly into a baby.

158 Phillip:

Dialogue Nine I pursued, as best I could, your person-at-the-moment-ofconception viewpoint. I think the best way to defend that position is to offer some kind of potentiality argument, but that will not resolve all of the difficulties, nor will it answer the question concerning when we ought to think of the fetus as a person, protected by a legitimate claim to a right to life. All we know is that at conception the fetus is incredibly unlike what we mean by a "person," and at birth we are willing to say that a baby, a person with rights, exists.

Nicholas: What do you mean by a "person"? What is that supposed to

be? How is an unborn child, one week before birth, much different than the infant who is born? How about one month before birth? It can exist outside the mother's womb by then. How about two months?

Phillip:

Where are you going with the argument? It's simply another vprsion of your original slippery-slope argument, to which I've already responded.

Nicholas: You keep talking about a "person," and why the fetus at conception is undoubtedly not a person and the newborn baby is a person. But you haven't defined the concept of a person.

Phillip:

I don't think the concept can be sharply defined in terms of conditions that always have to be present for us to be able to speak of a person in a moral sense. Some of the characteristics are relatively sophisticated, like rationality and a sense of selfidentity. But I've already admitted-even insisted-that such sophisticated human characteristics aren't present in animals.

Nicholas: Nor in infants. Phillip:

Excellent point. What do you think follows from this?

Nicholas: If you insist on well-developed and sophisticated characteristics as the conditions necessary for moral personhood, then newborn infants wouldn't be persons. That would mean we could kill babies for no reason. That's crazy.

Phillip:

Interestingly enough, there has been a lively debate among

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contemporary moral philosophers about the moral permissibility of infanticide, precisely because some thinkers have analyzed the concept of "person" in such a way as to exclude infants from the concept. However, some think you can argue against infanticide on other grounds, even if an infant isn't a "person" in a moral sense. In any case I agree with you. I think the conditions that lead us to think that some being is worthy of moral consideration are not as sophisticated as some would argue. For instance, some form of simple consciousness or capacity for feeling was the basis for my argument concerning the moral status of animals. It strikes me that this is a plausible candidate for the fetus, also.

Nicholas: If that's true then you have to have a pretty conservative view also. The fetus can begin to feel things very early in pregnancy. Phillip:

It's my understanding that some kind of primitive form of sentience arises at least in the second trimester, and perhaps somewhat earlier. The capacity for sentience develops, obviously. I am very sympathetic to a moderate position emphasizing the moral Significance of sentience. Prior to the development of sentience I don't see that the actual status of the fetus is morally significant, except in terms of its "actual potential," if I can speak paradoxically. Remember, however, that I also admit that the potential status of the fetus is morally significant. I'm sure much more needs to be said about the neurophysiological development of fetal sentience, but this seems to be a reasonable view that avoids the embarrassments of the extreme positions.

Nicholas: Let me ask you: If you and your wife faced some possible abortion situation, what would you do? I know what I would do. Whatever your arguments, I believe we have to respect potential human life. Phillip:

So you've backed off the claim that the fetus has full moral status at conception?

Nicholas: For me, the fact that you have a potential person is reason enough to say it has full moral status. Phillip:

What I mean by "full moral status" isa status that would entail

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Dialogue Nine the fundamental rights of what we normally take to be a person, and I still insist that you've given no argument that would legitimize such a claim.

Nicholas: You haven't answered my question. What would you do? Phillip:

It's difficult to say, since my wife and I have not been faced with the dilemma. But this is one area in which distinguishing between legality and morality is important. I would have a very strong initial bias against abortion, and I have a difficult time imagining a situation under which we might choose such an option. Having said that, it is not difficult to imagine situations in which other serious people might choose the abortion option, especially in very early stages of pregnancy. For that reason I think that a constitutional right to relatively early abortions should not be eroded or undermined.

Nicholas: So you are prochoice. Phillip:

You have heard my arguments. I do not align myself with the extreme conservative position or with the extreme liberal who seems to think that an appeal to the personal nature of a woman's choice, to bodily and moral autonomy, easily answers the question of the legitimacy of abortions. I do think, however, that any attempt to prohibit abortion by legally or constitutionally defining human life to exist from conception is simply philosophically confused, for reasons we have already discussed. Additionally, the consequences of sucha law would be paradoxical, to say the least. Can you imagine a societal situation in which women wJ'lo take certain kinds of contraceptives would be classified as murderers? And the appropriate governmental invasion to enforce such a notion would be extraordinary.

Nicholas: That sounds inconsistent. Legally, you say we should allow

abortions. Morally, you seem to be closer to my conservative position.

Phillip:

I don't see any inconsistency. We have talked about tolerance. On certain issues tolerance would make no sense because they concern the very heart of our moral scheme. In other areas we need to recognize that our own strong convictions are not

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161 equally shared and living in a liberal democratic society means allowing kinds of conduct that we personally find morally pernicious. However, I admit that there may not be any way to show precisely how to make that distinction. I think the best we can do is to engage in serious philosophical debate, as we have done. Maybe people who bomb abortion clinics and harass women won't be convinced by my argument or my viewpoint. Others might. How about you?

Nicholas: I don't know. I haven't given up my conservative position. I think abortion is repugnant. As for tolerance, I'll have to think about that.

Phillip:

See you later.

Nicholas: Ukewise, Professor.

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Questions for Thought, Study, and Discussion: Dialogue Nine 1. Why is the abortion issue such an emotional one?

2. Reconstruct Nicholas's first argument for the extreme conservative position. Does he beg the question? Why does Phillip argue that species membership is not an adequate criterion for membership in the community of moral beings? 3. Is the fetus a person? When does the fetus become a person? Are these good questions? How would one go about analyzing the concept of personhood? How do we analyze concepts? 4. Some people distinguish between open and closed concepts. Compare the concept "circle" and the concept "art". Think of concepts like "religion," "freedom," or "game". Can we define such notions precisely? Does a lack of precise definition suggest that such concepts have no clear meaning or use in our language? How do these questions relate to the abortion issue? 5. What would it mean to say that it is arbitrary to draw a line at some point and say that a fetus becomes a person at that point? When is a distinction arbitrary? 6. What is the fallacy ofthe beard? Whatis a slippery-slope argument? 7. What does it mean to speak of a claim as counterintuitive? What claim in the dialogue is said to be counterintuitive? Is this a good way to argue? 8. Examine Phillip's criticism of the claim that actual rights follow from potential status. Is this ever true? 9. For reflection: Think about situations in which questions of potentiality arise in our moral reflections. For example, do future generations have rights? Do future persons exert any claim on our moral sensitivities? 10. Would the interests of actual persons always outweigh the interests of potential persons? How would we decide such a question?

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11. Why does Phillip distinguish between the legal and the moral aspects of abortion?

A Few Suggested Readings Feezell, Randolph M. "Potentiality, Death, and Abortion." In Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 25, No.1, 1987. (Develops a potentiality argument as the basis for a moderately conservative attitude toward abortion.) Feinberg, Joel, ed. The Problem of Abortion, 2nd ed. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1984. (The best collection of articles available. Contains many of the most influential articles written on abortion in recent years, including rigorous defenses of the major positions and interesting attempts to overcome the abortion dilemma. M. A. Warren's "On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion" offers the distinction between the moral and biological senses of "human.") Sumner, L. N. Abortion and Moral Theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981. (A defense of a moderate position, based on sentience.)

DIALOGUE TEN: PHILOSOPHY AND mE MEANING OF LIFE

Nicholas: Phillip. I have some sad news to tell you. Phillip:

Not too sad, I hope.

Nicholas: No deaths in the family; nothing like that. I just found out that

I'm being transferred by my company. It all came about very quickly. I start work at my new job in two weeks. I have so much to do in the next few days I probably won't have enough time to sleep, let alone philosophize. This may have to be our last "deep" conversation. Maybe we can get together for a few lighthearted beers before I leave.

Phillip:

We meet again after all these years and now you're going away. That's too bad. Just when we seem to be making some headway in our discussions. Let's try to stay in touch this time, okay?

Nicholas: Sure. I mean, who else do you have for your whipping boy besides good old Nick? And your students, of course.

Phillip:

You've not been my whipping boy. I've really enjoyed our conversations and I think I've gained something by talking to you again. Academic people tend to talk to each other too much, and it's good to be challenged by people who live in the so-called real world.

Nicholas: I've enjoyed our conversations also, although you've irritated me a few times.

Phillip:

I apologize. When people discuss important ideas that they strongly believe in, impersonal philosophical criticism often

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Dialogue Ten seems to be a personal attack on the individual. I never mean it to be. I suspect that sometimes good friends disagree about a great deal but never have the courage to critically discuss their disagreements. There is always a risk involved when philosophical discussion takes place. Too often it degenerates into a battle of egos instead of a lively pursuit of the truth. Maybe one of the tests of friendship is the ability to engage in serious disagreement but overcome the conflict and remain good friends.

Nicholas: So we should agree to disagree? I'll go for that, because I don't think I could go on living with your philosophy.

Phillip:

My philosophy?

Nicholas: Give me a break, Phillip. I'm no nitwit. I've usually been able to see where you're coming from.

Phillip:

And where is it that I've been coming from?

Nicholas: First, you're "Mr. Rationality." Argument. Argument. Argument. You're always trying to pick things apart. I still say that not everything in life can be rationalized. Some things have to be felt. Some things just have to be accepted. And there are some things in life that can't be figured out by science or philosophy or reason, or whatever intellectual approach you take.

Phillip:

As usual, I hardly know where to begin. I answered some of these claims when we talked about the question of God. As a matter of fact, I have a great love for literature and poetry, I believe that some kind of "intuition" is useful at times in life, and I certainly don't think that scientific methodology is useful in deciding all questions, or else I wouldn't have devoted the last fifteen years of my life to philosophy. "Mr. Rationality"? As far as I can tell, if anyone wants to think seriously about the perennial questions facing human beings he must use his reason. I don't see that what I do is exclusive at all. I don't understand why the principles of good thinking can't be learned and incorporated into the lives of everyone. Why do you think it is so radical and odd to be disposed to ask: What does that mean? Why should I believe this? What are the arguments? What is the evidence for a particular claim?

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Nicholas: But nothing is sacred for you. Nothing remains untouched by your skeptical thinking. What remains if you question everything? You can't question everything. Phillip:

You seem to think that once the process of questioning begins, you're bound to lose whatever you have believed in, as if you're bound to lose the very foundation upon which your life rests. That's just not true. The point of philosophical questioning isn't destruction, unless you've got something worthy of being destroyed because it's confused, ill founded, superstitious, contrary to the best available evidence, or whatever . happens to be the form of your criticism. To question something doesn't mean you automatically throw it out. It means to ask whether a certain belief is worthy of embrace. It means to test it, not to destroy it. Above all, it means to understand it, to think about how it relates to other beliefs, and to think about its consequences.

Nicholas: Why test it if we are satisfied with it? Why test it if we're already sure that it's true or that it works for us? Phillip:

That's very interesting. If you're already assured of its truth, then such questioning would be superfluous, but that means you've recognized that the point of any testing is important and the belief has passed standards of rationality, so there is really no dispute between us. More deeply however, your embrace of the value of rationality also commits you to procedures that require further checks. Rationally, we recognize the extent to which our beliefs are coerced, influenced, determined. Recall our discussion of freedom. In the end, questioning is our only alternative to an unseen tyranny that prohibits individual autonomy of belief. I'm thinking of "tyranny" in a very broad sense, but I think there are also quite specific political implications here.

Nicholas: The thing that really bothers me is that I don't see how you can go on in life without the thought of God or an afterlife. Evidently your studies in philosophy have left you without a God or without hope of an afterlife. That's clear from our discussions about religious belief and human nature. For you life is meaningless, so what is the point? We're just here, with no reason or purpose, and then we die. Why go on? There was

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a time, shortly after college, when I had to face that question. My father was dying from cancer. Maybe God was testing me; I don't know. Butit did bring me and my family closer to God. It helped us then and it still helps me to know that I'm loved and that this life is not all there is.

Phillip:

Were you seriously puzzled about the meaning of life?

Nicholas: Yes, I think so. Everyone at a certain time asks himself: What

is the meaning of life? Evidently you think it has no meaning. I do. If that is what you've learned by studying philosophy, I don't care for it. I have hope. Do you?

Phillip:

It's just not clear what you're asking when you wonder whether life has meaning. I'm not even sure what your question means.

Nicholas: I can see it coming. You're feigning ignorance again, hoping to confuse me. Well, on this issue I'm not confused. I know what gives my life meaning, and withoutitIdon'tsee how you or anyone else can get much out of life.

Phillip:

I'm not trying to confuse you. I'm trying to get clear about whatyou'reasking. What is themeaningoflife? It's not clear to me that life is the sort of thing that can be said to have or not to have meaning. Maybe it's not even a good question, rather like: How much does friendship weigh?

Nicholas: What in the hell are you talking about? Phillip:

Some philosophers-with whom I happen to disagree-have wondered whether that question makes any sense. Although I disagree with them, I think their challenge is useful, since it causes one to be more precise in what he is looking for in asking about the meaning of life.

Nicholas: Why wouldn't it make sense? Phillip:

Think of the things that can be said to have meaning: words, phrases, sentences, stories, symbols, gestures. I'm sure we haven't exhausted the list, but even this short list is suggestive. Often we ask for meaning in a linguistic context. With respect to gestures or certain kinds of conduct, we seem to be wonder

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ing about intentions or motives. How does the question of the meaning of life fit into such contexts? How does the question of the meaning of life relate to other situations in which we ask about the meaning of something? What are you looking for when you begin to wonder about the meaning of life? These are fair questions, aren't they? Nicholas: I suppose so, but they can be answered. Phillip:

I agree. What's your answer?

Nicholas: I think of the meaning of life in terms of whether there is a reason for everything being here and whether there is a reason for my own life. Phillip:

What kind of reason do you have in mind?

Nicholas: A purpose. Is everything just here, for no reason or purpose, or is it part of a bigger plan? Phillip:

Now we're getting somewhere. For life to be meaningful it must be part of a larger plan or purpose, and without such a purpose, God's supposed purpose, life is meaningless. Is that it?

Nicholas: Yes, and you seem to believe the strictly scientific world view, in which there is no universal plan. You're left with a meaningless universe and purposeless human beings. I can't accept that viewpoint. Phillip:

It's not as if I believe in a naturalistic viewpoint for no reason at all. There are good reasons for accepting that picture. The universe is evidently billions of years old and is unimaginably immense, the source of organic life is now understood and able to be re-