Faith and Knowledge 087395338X, 0873953398, 088706826X

Table of contents :
Cover
Title Page
Copyright
Table of Contents
Translators' Preface
Speculative Philosophy and Intellectual Intuition: An Introduction to Hegel's Essays
Introduction to Faith and Knowledge
Note on the Text and on Conventions
FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE
Introduction
A. Kantian Philosophy
B. Jacobian Philosophy
C. Fichtean Philosophy
Conclusion
Bibliographic Index
Analytic Index

Citation preview

G. W. F. Hegel

Faith & Knowledge Translated by Walter Cerf and H. S. Harris

State University of New York Press

Albany 1977

Originally Published in 1802 as Glauben und Wissen Published by State University of New York Press 99 Washington Avenue, Albany, New York 12246 Translation

© 1977 State University of New York

All rights reserved Printed in the U.S.A. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831. Faith and Knowledge. Translation of Glauben und Wissen published in the Critical Journal of Philosophy, v. 2, pt. 1, 1802. Bibliography: pp. 193-7 Includes index. 1. Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804.

2. Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich, 1743-1819. 3. Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 1762-1814. 4. Faith and Reason I. Title. B292l.E5

1976

121

76-10250

ISBN 0-87395-338-X ISBN 0-87395-339-8 microfiche. ISBN 0-88706-826-X (pbk.)

Contents

Translator's Preface

Speculative Philosophy and Intellectual Intuition: An Introduction to Hegel's Essays. Walter Cerf

vii

xi

Introduction to Faith and Knowledge H. 5. Harris

1

Note on the Text and on Conventions

51

FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE

1

G. W. F. Hegel Introduction

55

A Kantian Philosophy

67

B. Jacobian Philosophy

97

C. Fichtean Philosophy

153

Conclusion

189

Bibliographic Index

193

Analytic Index

199

Translators' Preface

The occasion for the initial attempt to translate Hegel's essay on Faith and Knowledge {1802-3) 1 into English, was the giving of graduate courses on "The Young Hegel" and on "Post-Kantian Philosophy" by Walter Cerf at the University of the City of New York and the University of Wisconsin during the 1960s. Our first thanks must go to the students in those courses, who never tired of suggesting improvements, and to the City University of New York, which contributed $100 to help cover the expense of typing and mimeographing that first draft. The mimeographed translation was duly registered with the Translation Center of the University of Southern Illinois. We owe a great debt of gratitude to Professor Fritz Marti whose brainchild this Center is. He never wavered in his interest in, and encouragement of, our translation and he put at Walter Cerf's disposal certain pages of his own translation. Had it not been for Marti's Translation Center, it is very doubtful that H. 5. Harris (at Glendon College of York University in Toronto) would ever have learned of the existence of the Cerf translation, and Cerf is certain that without the cooperation of Harris the translation would not have reached the stage of publication. Harris became involved during a sabbatical leave from York University in 1971-72. Thanks are due both to York University and to the Canada Council for providing the leisure that made his participation possible. The research grant that went with his Canada Council Leave Fellowship also paid for the typing of the final draft of the translation. Our cooperative effort was from beginning to end under a lucky star of complementarity. Translating Faith and Knowledge fitted in nicely with Harris' research for the second volume of his Hegel's Development.2 Cerf's interest in Hegel, on the other hand, has been motivated more by his studies of Kant. The reader will find therefore, that Harris' introduction to the essay seeks both to connect it with the earlier and later thought of Hegel, and to offer explanatory com1. As likewise Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's Systems of Philosophy (1801), Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977. 2. The first volume-Toward the Sunlight, 1770-1801-was published by the Clarendon Press, Oxford, in 1972.

viii

Translators' Preface ments on the detail of the rather difficult text. Cerf's introduction, on the other hand, is directed to readers who may not be too familiar either with Kant's Critical Idealism or with Schelling's Philosophy of Identity. He deals in the main with the difference between reflective and speculative philosophy and with the concept of intellectual intuition.1 We have each studied and criticized the other's contribution, and both of us have profited greatly (though of course we have not always agreed perfectly). Harris is a native speaker of English, but his knowledge of German is by no means perfect. Cerf is a native German whose forty years of sojourn in the United States have not prevented German from remaining in the full sense his mother tongue. Cerf must therefore bear the main responsibility for mistakes in the rendering of Hegel's text. But Harris assumes a full share of the responsibility for any errors of interpretation, since he will not allow the fault to rest with Hegel (though Cerf maintains, and Hegel's own first audience agreed, that Hegel's German offers difficulties frequently insurmountable even to a native German). We were agreed on making a translation that would be as faithful to Hegel's German as could be reconciled with its readability in English. Harris was more inclined to sacrifice readability to faithfulness, Cerf faithfulness to readability. Moreover, while Harris believed he could detect in the language of the Essays a consistency and precision commensurate to their content, Cerf tended to detect in it speculative insouciance and even simple carelessness, the latter no doubt due to the extraordinary speed with which Hegel wrote the Essays. The translators hope that they have hit an acceptable balance in trying to reconcile their divergent tendencies. Our paragraphing generally follows that of Lasson rather than Hegel. The frequently monstrous sentences of the original, some of which cover more than a full page of small print, were ruthlessly cut into manageable pieces. But Hegel's actual language has been rendered with a sort of flexible rigidity. That is to say that although there are many cases where the same German expression is rendered by two different English expressions, there are 1. Cerf wrote two introductions: one inquiring into ways of making the Hegel of the Essays interesting to contemporary analytic philosophy, the other putting the accent on existentialism's relation to Hegel. The first one-of which there was only one copy-was lost in transit between Toronto and Brandon. But as the second introduction was also meant to be useful to readers having little acquaintance with either critical or speculative philosophy it was decided to print it with each of the two Essays.

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Translators' Preface

almost no cases where the same English word is used for two different words in German. Our desire to maintain this much consistency has led us to adopt the artificial expedient of marking three breaches in it with daggers. The English words "formal," "ideal," "real" are, in most contexts, the only possible representatives of the three pairs of terms formal/ formellt, idealt I ideel and realt I reell. For the most part Hegel appears to use these pairs as synonyms; but there are occasions where we suspect that he intends some distinction of meaning between them. We have therefore marked the occurrence of the less frequent member of each part with a dagger (i.e., the daggers in our translation indicate the German words here marked). We must draw the reader's attention to our using "Reason" for the peculiarly Hegelian conception of what Kant called Vernunft, and "intellect" for his conception of what Kant called Verstand. For both of us, the labor of translation was far greater than we had expected at the outset. The work had to be relegated to hours that we could spare from other assignments; and our lucky star was often hidden behind the clouds of a postal service that ranged from dead slow at the best to dead stop during the Canadian postal strikes. We are all the more grateful therefore to Caroline Gray, who helped with the Bibliography, and to Lawrence Lyons, who did much of the dullest work for the analytical Index. Nor should the labor of several willing and able typists be forgotten, though their names are not here recorded. Above all, we wish to thank our respective spouses whose love and patience sustained us over the years. Finally, acknowledgment is due to Professor Marvin Farber, editor of the series Modern Concepts of Philosophy, and Warren H. Green, the publisher of the series. After years of patiently waiting for our translation they very graciously permitted us to transfer the publication to the State University of New York Press whose director, Norman Mangouni, and editor, W. Bruce Johnson, have been most cooperative and helpful. Walter Cerf H. 5. Harris Brandon and Toronto, Lady Day, 1976

Speculative Philosophy and Intellectual Intuition: An Introduction to Hegel's Essays. I.

SPECULATIVE

PHILOSOPHY:

A

FIRST SKETCH

"Speculation" is a bad word nowadays. On the stock market speculators are peo.ple who, wanting to get rich fast and without work, invest their money in untested stocks or on the basis of information that gives the prediction of success only a hazardously low degree of probability. And so, when we believe that a scientific hypothesis or a presumed psychological insight or indeed even a statement claiming to be "factual" has no evidence or hardly any evidence that could serve as foundation of its truth claims, we say: "This is mere speculation." Yet when the congressional committee investigating the wild girations of the stock market asked Bernard Baruch what he did for a living he is supposed to have answered proudly, "I am a speculator." Rather surprisingly, old Bernard Baruch and the young Hegel of these Essays have one thing in common: they were proud of being engaged in speculation. Of course they meant two different things by "speculation"-even though the latter-day use of the word is connected in some bizarre way with the earlier meaning. The term "speculation" comes from "speculare," which is taken to be synonymous with "intuire" (from which comes "intuition"). In a very preliminary way we can describe what the author of the Essays meant by speculation as the intuition or vision of the true nature of the relations among God, nature, and self-consciousness or reason. "Self-consciousness" and "reason" are interchangeable on the basis of the Kantian "I think" -"1 think the categories" -rather than on the basis of the Cartesian "cogito," which comprises acts other than those of thinking, let alone "pure" thinking. It was Schelling who tried to articulate this vision of the true nature of the relation of God, nature and self-consciousness in his Philosophy of Identity-so called because the relation was to be one of identity, a basically simple design trying to hold together a complex composition. The vision was of course not a sensuous intuition, but an intellectual intui-

xii Walter Cerf tion. 1 When Hegel speaks of speculative philosophy he has the Philosophy of Identity in mind and its intellectual intuition of the allcomprising and ultimate whole of God, nature, and self-consciousness. The Philosophy of Identity had to have the form of a system whose organic wholeness, reflecting the wholeness of the vision, was to be the test of the truth of the vision. The system consisted of two parts: the Philosophy of Nature and the Transcendental Philosophy, a division obviously at odds with the Kantian as well as the preKantian divisions of philosophy. At the time when Hegel wrote the Essays Schelling had published several drafts of the Philosophy of Nature 2 and one of the Transcendental Philosophy. 3 Although Schelling was forever revising his system, the holistic vision behind it is clear. It was a singularly beautiful vision. If ever the time should come when philosophy is judged in terms of ~sthetic criteria, the general scheme of the Philosophy of Identity (rather than the detailed execution) would surely be among the crowned victors. Its vision of the whole is the vision of an unconscious God (Spinoza's natura naturans) revealing Himself in the ever ascending levels of nature (natura naturata) until self-consciousness emerges in rational man. This is the story the Philosophy of Nature tells. The Transcendental Philosophy, on the other hand, claims to trace God's coming to know Himself in a sequence of stages that culminate in art, according to Schelling; in religion or rather, a re-union of art and religion, according to the young Hegel; and in philosophy, according to the mature Hegel. For although Hegel's mature thought and system became more complex and subtle, they never completely lost their connection with the basic vision and division of the Philosophy of Identity. His Philosophy of Nature, like Schelling's though critical of it, was still meant, if not to replace the natural sciences altogether, at least to provide them with the basic framework without which they lose themselves in the infinite chaos of experience and remain atomistic and mechanistic instead of becoming holistic and dynamic. And Hegel's Logic, his Philosophy of History, and perhaps even his Phenomenology, may be said to explicate themes that Schelling's Transcendental Philosophy was unable to shelter and develop in its relatively simplistic frame. Further, Hegel could integrate these themes into the total vision. In any case, the Hegel of the Essays, following Schelling though not without reservations, is convinced that philosophy has finally come into its own as speculative philosophy envisioning the inner unity of God, nature, and self-consciousness, and it has gained its systematic presentation in the Philosophy of Identity with its two

xiii Speculative Philosophy organic parts, the Philosophy of Nature tracing the emergence of selfconsciousness, and the Transcendental Philosophy tracing the emergence of God's knowledge of Himself. None of this is likely to sound convincing to a reader with an analytically trained intellect. I shall try in Section III of this Introduction to make the conception of speculative philosophy appear less strange by pointing out how speculative philosophy takes care of objections which non-speculative philosophy raises against it. Nor will speculative philosophy make sense to any historian of philosophy who knows that "speculation" is just another term for "intellectual intuition" and is aware of what Kant did to that concept. In Section IV I hope to show where in Kant's work the speculative philosophers believed to find justification for reintroducing intellectual intuition into the cognitive enterprise of philosophy. In Section II, however, I shall try my hand at an entirely different approach to the Philosophy of Identity, an approach by way of the human or, to use a fashionable term, existential motivations that drove Hegel into the arms of Schelling's Philosophy of Identity. But first we must return for a moment to the term "speculation." It was of course precisely its Philosophy of Nature that brought speculative philosophy into disrepute. The triumphant march of the natural sciences throughout the nineteenth century turned speculation qua intellectual intuition into speculation qua unwarranted by any acceptable evidences. In their Philosophy of Nature Schelling and Hegel were like two brave medieval knights fighting a division of tanks. The battle was lost before it began. Yet the thought is perhaps not without some twilight charm that someday the sciences themselves will feel a hankering after a unity that could not be satisfied by the logical reconstruction of the language of science and to which the holistic passion that shaped these now forgotten Philosophies of Nature may be congenial. To be sure, the fuzzy-heads that make up the small but noisy army of today's anti-science and anti-technology prophets may joyfully return to the speculative Philosophy of Nature and claim it as an ally. But its sound re-appropriation, if there is to be another one after the debacle of B·ergson's elan vital, will have to arise from a need within the sciences themselves.

II. HE G E L

AN D

T HE

P H I L0 S0 P H Y

0 F I DEN TI TY

In his introduction to the Difference essay Hegel writes that philoso-

xiv Walter Cerf phy becomes a need in times when the simple and beautiful harmony of existence is sundered by the awareness of basic dichotomies and antinomies, when the believers become alienated from the gods, man from nature, the individual from his community. In historical situations of this sort philosophy is born and re-born in order to prepare through its systematic thought the revolution through which civilization's many-dimensional alienation will be overcome in a higher cultural synthesis. We can see by inference from his early theological writings4 and by what we know of the circumstances of his first thirty years that these views reflect Hegel's own existential situation. On the level of values he was torn apart by clashing loyalties, loyalties to Greek Apollo, Christian Jesus, and Judeo-Prussian Kant. Liberated in mind by the French Revolution like every young German worth his salt, he yet remained in political bondage to the absolutist Duke of Wiirttemberg. He was tied down to the study of dogmatic theology, although there was probably little that interested him less at the time. He who later drew the wide panorama of human history and civilizations into his philosophy lived as a young man in exceedingly narrow conditions of financial, social, and sexual deprivation as stipendiate in Tiibingen and as tutor in private homes of the moderately wealthy in Bern and Frankfurt. Only an iron self-discipline can have kept him from exploding and going mad as his friend Holderlin did. His was a thoroughly alienated existence in which the clash between the life he led and his aspirations, between what was the case and what should and could be the case drove him, as it drove so many of his generation, to dream the idealizing dream of the Hellenic age and of the Christian Middle Ages and to trust in philosophy to prepare the revolution of the German situation. It is important to be aware of the personal urgency in Hegel's commitment to philosophy. What motivated and energized his philosophical beginnings were not at all intellectual puzzles, but the deeply felt disturbances of the situation in which he found himself and his generation, with the clash between Apollo, Jesus, and Kant the most articulate of these personal aspects of the general malaise. At least that much the young Hegel and our own existentialists have in common: rna tters of personal urgency rather than an interest in intellectual puzzles motivated their philosophizing. And when Kierkegaard compared the later Hegel's Logic with a dance of skeletons he was not aware-and in fact could not have been aware-of how similar the personal problems behind his Either-Or were with the clash of value constellations that split the

XV

Speculative Philosophy young Hegel. Although their motivational situation was similar they took off in very different directions indeed, doing so on the basis of the sort of decision which is not exactly made by men, but which rather makes men: Kierkegaard to explore, and lead his public into what, in this time and place of his, it should mean to be a Christian in Christianity, and Hegel to explore and finally present what, in this time and place of his, the system of philosophia perennis is. How did the existential situation of the young Hegel lead him in the Essays to embrace Schelling's Philosophy of Identity? To be sure, Hegel might never have become a Schellingian if the accidents of life had not brought him together with Schelling in Tiibingen and made them good enough friends to remain in contact even after they went their different ways from Tiibingen, Schelling to fame and professorship in Jena, Hegel to the obscurity of a private tutorship in Bern and Frankfurt. Nor must it be forgotten that Schelling, in making Hegel his neighbor and his colleague at the University of Jena, freed Hegel from the social and financial-if not sexualfrustrations of the preceeding decades. It is not cynical to ascribe importance to biographical data of this sort. On the other hand, there must have been something in Schelling's Philosophy of Identity that made it look attractive to Hegel as philosophy from the perspective of his own existential travail. Kant's Critical Idealism lay before the public in its whole extension and depth. There was Fichte's philosophy as Wissenschaftslehre. Hegel was familiar with both. In the rich firmament of Goethe's Germany there was a multitude of other philosophers, now known only to specialist scholars but then quite visible stars, a few of them generally believed at the time to be stars of the first magnitude. What Hegel could see in Schelling's philosophy and in none of the others was the construction-or at least the sketch for it-of a harmonious whole in which Hegel's own basic conflicts, though expressed in the most abstract terms, found their solution. He was able to project the longing after harmony that was energized by his personal turmoil into Schelling's philosophy, a philosophy which aimed at overcoming and bringing into systematic unity the basic conceptual dichotomies and antinomies that had evolved in modern metaphysics from Descartes to Kant around the relation between the infinite and the finite (God and His creation) and between the subject and object (man and nature, the knower and the known). It was not at all impossible to project one's own alienations into these and connected dichotomies and to consider the Philosophy of Identity, with the interdependence

xvi Walter Cerf of its two parts and their intrinsic relation to the Absolute, as the vehicle of one's own reconciliation with God, nature, and society. Thus Hegel, quite unlike Kierkegaard, took the first and decisive step away from his existential motivations and moved toward the grand tradition of modern philosophy-whose Plotinus he was destined to become. His Essays are the documents marking the beginning of his career. Without this first step Hegel rather than Kierkegaard might have become the father of existentialism. His giftsamong which ordinary logical thinking was conspicuously absent -might have well prepared him for this; and the influence which parts of the Phenomenology had, for example on Sartre, corroborate it.

III. SPECULATIVE VERSUS REFLECTIVE PHILOSOPHY

Our excursion in the preceding section was intended to aid in an understanding of how the general scheme of Schelling's systemwith its view of the Absolute revealing itself in nature and rational self-consciousness and revealing itself to itself in the two parts of the Philosophy of Identity-found a ready response in Hegel. The schisms characteristic of his situation and that of his generation, when expressed in philosophical dichotomies such as those of the infinite and finite and of subject and object, could find their harmonious solution in the Philosophy of Identity, which seemed to offer on the academic level a view of the whole uniting in harmony all sorts of opposites. As such, it could serve as a philosophical basis for the revolution that would turn modern civilization, sick from and of its schisms, into a truly integrated culture to be described in metaphors taken from the romantic conception of nature: a living whole of which the individuals were organs rather than atoms. As each part was sustained and enriched by the whole, so each part functioned to sustain the whole. But here a problem arises. If speculative philosophy, having its sight on that final whole of God, nature, and self-consciousness, is philosophy as it has finally come into its own truth, then what about all those philosophical efforts that cannot be said even by the most tolerant historian to anticipate speculative philosophy at least germinally? That is, what about all non-speculative philosophy? And what about the interrelations, if any, between speculative and non-

xvii Speculative Philosophy

speculative philosophy? These questions are among the questions which Hegel himself takes up in his Introduction to the Essays. The Essays have a name for non-speculative philosophy: reflective philosophy. The term has here only an indirect connection with the various uses Kant assigned to 'reflection' and 'reflective' in The Critique of Pure Reason and The Critique of Judgment. Basically, Hegel uses it as Schelling had done in his System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), where reflection was what the second of the three "epochs" in the "history of self-consciousness" led to, reflection going hand in hand with analysis, both being opposed to the "productive intuition" and "synthesis" that characterize the first epoch. And Kant's philosophy was taken to be the typical culmination of the epoch of reflection. (The third epoch was that of "the absolute act of will.") But as no concept remained quite the same when Hegel took it up in his own thought, we can understand what Hegel meant by 'reflective philosophy' without discussing Schelling's view. The distinction between reflective and speculative philosophy is not meant to be a distinction between different schools of philosophy. To Hegel, English empiricism from Locke on as well as continental rationalism (with the exception of Spinoza) were reflective pl\ilosophies. The whole philosophy of the Enlightenment was reflective. And so was most of Kant's transcendental idealism. Reflective philosophy is philosophy that has not come to the true conception of philosophy, philosophy that is not really philosophy-inauthentic philosophy over against authentic philosophy which is, and cannot but be speculative. In terms of the Kantian faculties, reflective philosophy is philosophy of the intellect (der Verstand), speculative philosophy is philosophy of Reason (die Vernunft), but of a Reason which has been allowed to trespass on territory Kant believed to be inaccessible to finite man. It is typical of reflective philosophy, though it does not exhaust its nature, that it relies on arguments, proofs, and the whole apparatus of logic, that it insists on clear-cut dichotomies in terms of abstract universals, dichotomies such as those of the infinite and the finite, subject and object, universal and particular, freedom and necessity, causality and teleology, etc., etc.; that it tries to solve intellectual puzzles rather than give the true conceptual vision of the whole; that it sticks to the natural sciences as the source of the only reliable knowledge of nature, thus committing itself, in the first place, to a concept of experience reduced to sense perception and to a concept of sense perception reduced to some causal chain, and in the second place, to a pervasive atomism that reduces the whole to the

xviii

Walter Cerf

sum of its parts, and to a mechanism that excludes teleology from a positive role in cognition. No reflective philosophy need have all of these characteristics although any one of them would be the indication of a philosophy that has not reached the one authentic conception of philosophy. Hence, any assault that reflective philosophy directs against speculative philosophy can be taken care of simply by pointing out that it is a reflective assault. Answering it by counterarguments would turn the speculative philosopher into a reflective one. What is wrong with the attack is that it is reflective; it is made in a style of doing philosophy that is not truly philosophical. Whatever the argument may be which a reflective philosopher uses against speculative philosophy, his very arguing shows that he is not really a philosopher. Contempt is the only answer to all reflective assaults. No dialogue is possible. We shall soon observe that this is only one side of Hegel's attitude toward reflective philosophy. But before we come to the other side we may want to illustrate this conception of the relation between reflective and speculative philosophy by way of a contemporary parallel. I mean the relation between existentialism and analytic philosophy. There can be no doubt at all that our own contemporary analytic philosophy, in its narrowest as well as in its widest meaning (which excludes only the existentialists, the Whiteheadians, and the Thomists), would be judged by Hegel to be a very typical reflective philosophy. There must be considerable doubt, however, whether or not Hegel would acknowledge existentialism to be speculative philosophy. From the viewpoint of the Philosophy of Identity, existentialism spoiled its chance of being authentic philosophy by concentrating not just on man but on man as condemned to finitude. And from the viewpoint of existentialism Hegel spoiled his chance of being the first modern existentialist when he permitted the urge that drove him into philosophy to find satisfaction in the more or less traditional apparatus of the Philosophy of Identity. Yet there are several aspects of existentialism in which the Hegel of the Essays could recognize himself. Besides the already mentioned motivational factor (one does not do philosophy to solve intellectual puzzles, though a positive version would have to have recourse to some colorless formula such as searching for meaning in a world become meaningless, which fits neither Hegel nor existentialism), Hegel would recognize his contempt for the philosophy of the intellect in existentialism's contempt for a civilization in which the empirical sciences and technology have be-

xix Speculative Philosophy come predominant and where philosophy has very largely become the handmaiden of science. He would recognize, as we already did, his distinction between reflective and speculative philosophy in the distinction so dear to existentialists, the distinction between what is authentic and what is inauthentic, between eigentlich and uneigentlich. And speculation itself, intellectual intuition as vision of the whole, has its analogue or rather, its subjective caricature in the cognitive function existentialists ascribe to moods, the mood of boredom, for example, being said to reveal the Whole of Being or Being as a Whole. In any case, whether or not existentialism is what speculative philosophy would have come to be in our own day, it is quite certain that the reaction existentialism has shown towards even the most devastating attacks launched against it by analytic philosophers is very much the same as the reaction of speculative philosophy towards reflective attacks. These attacks are attacks that need not be answered except by classifying them as analytic, that is, as basically unphilosophic, as philosophically inauthentic. From the side of existentialism no dialogue is possible between it and analytic philosophy, just as from the side of speculative philosophy no dialogue is possible between it and reflective philosophy. (From the side of analytic philosophy as from the side of reflective philosophy in general, the situation is of course quite different as they are committed to the idea of rational discourse. It seems to them incomprehensible that there are philosophies which in principle refuse to argue or, if they condescend to argue, know that they are lowering themselves to a pseudophilosophical level.) We had mentioned that the contempt for reflective philosophy will turn out to be only one side of Hegel's attitude toward reflective philosophy. To the reader of the Essays it may appear to be the most prominent part, as they abound with ferocious sarcasms directed at reflective philosophy in general and at this or that reflective philosopher in particular. Yet there is something authentically inauthentic, so to speak, about the very dichotomy of reflective and speculative philosophy. For like all the other dichotomies mentioned before, the dichotomy of reflective and speculative philosophy is itself typical of the style of reflective philosophy, and not at all typical of speculative philosophy, in which the reflective dichotomies are overcome in a vision of the organic whole that builds up its richness of harmony out of the tensions between its constituents. To be sure, unlike the reflective dichotomies separating the infinite from the finite, subject from object, freedom from necessity, etc., the dichotomy separating

XX

Walter Cerf reflective from speculative philosophy is not a dichotomy in philosophy, but a dichotomy about philosophy, a second-level dichotomy. But this should make no difference at all; for meta-philosophy is itself an essential part of philosophy and the meta-philosophical dichotomy is philosophical-although Hegel should have called it a reflective philosophical dichotomy, a dichotomy which sets speculative philosophy the task of overcoming it as it is to overcome the first-level dichotomies that reflective philosophy prides itself of. Here we reach the positive side of Hegel's attitude toward reflective philosophy. It is historical or at least, it is historical in a way. Only after reflective philosophy has gone through all its paces and realized its major possibilities can philosophy come into its own as speculative philosophy. The analytic gifts of the intellect must have bloomed and so made all the dichotomies of the time explicit before the bud (ever present?) of speculation can open up in its full glory. In particular, reflective philosophy must have reached the stage where it sees itself split into unsolvable antinomies and is forced into scepticism concerning the very problems that form its traditional core. It is at this historical point when philosophy despairs of metaphysics -as it does in Kant's Dialectic of Pure Reason-and forbids pure Reason to have any but a methodological ("regulative'') role in cognition, that philosophy can and must come into its own as speculation. In Hegel's style of speculative philosophy this necessity is at once historical and conceptual-without much awareness of this reflective distinction. Rather it is taken for granted that the logical dependence of the concept of speculative philosophy-the overcoming of the dichotomies-on the concept of reflective philosophy is eo ipso a temporal sequence or, to express it in a somewhat different way, as if the teleological unfolding of philosophy is identical with the causal chain of historical events. (It needs no stressing that this sort of identification as it occurs in the Essays, is at the very heart of the later Hegel's elaborate and subtle historical dialectic.) (In the Essays Hegel's view of the history of philosophy is rather ambivalent. At times he does seem to view the history of philosophy as leading "necessarily" in its last stages from reflective philosophy t:l speculative philosophy. At other times he seems to think that any philosophy which deserves the name is germinally speculative, but kept from knowing itself as such by the cultural situation in which it makes its appearance. Yet there is Spinoza, the great inspirator of the Philosophy of Identity. It seems difficult for either of these views

xxi Speculative Philosophy to account for Spinoza's system appearing at the time when it did appear.) There are two images that the Essays occasionally use for the relation between reflective and speculative philosophy, and they show how ambiguous Hegel's concept of this relation is. In one image, what philosophy is about is compared with a grove. To speculative philosophy the grove is where the god dwells. To reflective philosophy, the grove is a number of trees. In the other image, philosophy is compared with a temple. Speculative philosophy dwells in it, but reflective philosophy remains in the forecourt. The first image appears to make the difference between reflective and speculative philosophy so radical as to exclude all relation, let alone dialogue, between them. Yet in his earlier theological writings Hegel also uses the image of the hallowed grove for the youthful organic and holistic culture of Hellas, in which nature and the divine were not yet split one from the other nor the individual from his community. If we remember this, then we may also interpret the hallowed grove image with respect to speculative philosophy in a dialectical way: reflective philosophy had to separate the sacred grove into its component trees so that in speculative philosophy the divine, the natural, and the rational could achieve consciousness of their unity. Exactly the opposite holds for the other image, that of the temple and its forecourt. Obviously, if there is a forecourt one cannot enter the temple of speculative philosophy without passing through the forecourt of reflective philosophy. On the surface, then, the second image seems to be that of a necessary connection between reflective and speculative philosophy. But why does there have to be a forecourt at all? And in fact, Hegel stresses that there is no approach to speculative philosophy but a salta mortale, corps perdu, by a jump that must be lethal to reflective philosophy if it is to be resurrected as speculation. Besides the rather hedged-in admission that reflective philosophy had to run its full course before the true conception of authentic philosophy could arise, the Essays contain a second positive appraisal of reflective philosophy. For it would seem that Hegel concedes that the very language of speculative philosophy must for purposes of communication be to a large extent the language of reflective philosophy and even the language of ordinary discourse. There are certain indications that the writer of the Essays had already given considerable thought to the problem of how to communicate speculative philoso-

a

xxii Walter Cerf

phy. He is convmced that it should not be done more geometrico, not even in the very attenuated form in which it occurs in Fichte's Science of Knowledge and Schelling's publications up to 1801. This logical apparatus is hopelessly reflective. Nor would Hegel's own inclinations and logical gifts be appropriate to it. But then, how can speculation, extra-ordinary and extra-reflective as it is, be communicated at all? How can ordinary language and reflective philosophical discourse be made to do an extra-ordinary and non-reflective job? There is quite a similarity here between the speculative philosopher and Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard focused in on this sort of problem very early and his whole literary style is a deliberate answer to it, an answer full of astonishing deviousness. Even the most prejudiced Hegelian will have to admit, I think, that in this respect Kierkegaard was much the greater craftsman of the two. Hegel found the full measure of his style only in the Phenomenology (1807) when he was 37 years old, and it consisted mainly in various singular ways of adapting the grammar and terms of ordinary and reflective discourses to the presentation of an ever ongoing movement of concepts fed by dialectical tensions. Kierkegaard was an artful spider weaving intricate nets to catch his readers, Hegel a busy bird bravely bending and stretching the available material to build a fine nest for his dialectical eggs, and the reader be damned. Some of this bending and stretching can already be observed in the Essays. Hegel's style in the Essays was unlike that of anybody else then writing in German philosophy. This is not necessarily a praise, least of all in Hegel's own judgment, which condemns the idiosyncratic in philosophy. I am somewhat inclined to agree with those critics who say that the main stylistic rule of the Essays is this: the more complex the grammatical construction of a sentence and the less clear its meaning, the more speculative it will be. In any case, the uniqueness of his style in the Essays seems due less to any clear insight into how speculative philosophy should and could be communicated than to a rather tentative groping in many divergent directions of adapting the linguistic medium to speculative purposes. The reflective dichotomy, for example, of subject and object is overcome linguistically with Schelling's aid by way of the awkward formulas at the heart of the Philosophy of Identity: "the subjective Subject-Object" and "the objective SubjectObject." The latter is dealt with in the Philosophy of Nature, the former in the Transcendental Philosophy. The same procedure might have been used for the reflective dichotomy of the Infinite and the Finite, but neither Schelling nor Hegel does so, though they use "the

xxiii Speculative Philosophy finitely Infinite" and "the infinitely Finite," neither of which would indicate what it should: the overcoming of the dichotomy in the "identity" of the Infinite and the Finite. To speak of God in epistemological terms as Subject-Object must have seemed less iconoclastic and objectionable than to speak of Him as the Finite-Infinite. One shudders to think of Schelling and Hegel extending the symbolization of the identity of subject and object to other dichotomies such as those of freedom and necessity or causality and teleology. Parenthetically we may note here that Hegel is rather flexible in relating these two basic dichotomies of subject and object and of the infinite and the finite to one another. Sometimes it is the subject that is infinite and the object finite, sometimes the other way around, a flexibility that only a philosophy contemptuous of reflective philosophy could allow itself. In any event one has to keep in mind the whole glorious scheme of the Philosophy of Identity to give to the 'objective and subjective Subject-Object' the flesh and blood it seems to lack in the Essays. One must keep in mind, moreover, that these abstract identity formulas were alive with the existential agony felt by Hegel and his contemporaries and that the holistic passion at the living core of the Philosophy of Identity was fed by the alienation of the individual from nature, community (das Volk), and God. Speculative philosophy, in sum, defends itself against the attacks of reflective philosophy by labelling the attacks reflective, and not by arguing with them-because it would then abandon itself as speculation and surrender to reflection. On the other hand, reflective philosophers, cupidi rerum novarum, see in the speculators an interesting new sort of monkey they would like to get better acquainted with. In fact, if the monkey could convince them that his system is not just another cage but what he claims it to be, the ultimate whole as known in the only sort of knowledge that deserves the name, the reflectors might in the end want to share the cage with him. But instead of trying to convince them in the style they expect from a philosopher, the monkey develops his salta mortale rhetoric which ls as convincing as telling a healthy man that he must go through cancer of the brain in order to enjoy true health. So what can speculative philosophy actually do to convince reflective philosophy (as well as common sense and the general public) that it is what it claims to be? Perhaps this is one of the problems, taken in its most catholic scope, that the Phenomenology, as the prolegomena to Hegel's sys-

xxiv Walter Cerf tern, was later intended to answer. In the Essays the answer is an inaudible sigh of regret joined with an affirmation of hope. The sigh of regret: if only THE speculative system existed, not in fragments and sketches as in Schelling, but as an organic whole detailed in its totality! The affirmation of hope: once this system exists, the spirit of the time will reach out toward it, its time will have come, es wird sein Glueck machen. 5 For civilization is longing to be cured of the dichotomies that rend it and that reflective philosophy had the task of bringing into the open. And the spirit did reach out toward it. However, it was not in the Philosophy of Identity that the spirit recognized itself, not in Schelling and not in the Hegel of the Essays. It recognized itself in the Hegel of the Phenomenology, the Logic and the Philosophy of History. In them, speculative philosophy, though greatly changed, fulfilled its promises, and died (except in England, where religion found a strong ally in it, and in Italy, where liberalism was the ally and where national pride could claim Vico to be St. John the Baptist to Hegel, the savior). After all is said and done it must yet be admitted that the Essays, notwithstanding Hegel's unwillingness to let speculative philosophy descend to the level of reflective philosophy, give not only a speculative judgment on reflective philosophy, but also a reflective approach of sorts to speculative philosophy. Contemptuous of the forecourt of the temple, the Essays manage just the same to spend much time and effort in it-just as Michelangelo did in la bella rusticana, the little Quattrocento church on the hills of Florence whose simple static harmonies he was in need of as a foil for the complex dynamic tensions of his own revolutionary style.

IV· I NT E L L E C T U A I.

I N T U IT I 0 N

We might begin in a cavalier fashion by saying that intellectual intuition furnishes the evidences on which the Philosophy of Identity is built. In saying this we are, however, already victims of reflective philosophy. For the concept of "being based upon ... " involves some logical relation pertaining to induction or deduction, as if intellectual intuition either furnished the evidences that could verify or falsify the truth claims of statements, or were some set of self-evident axioms at the basis of a body of theorems. In the former case the Phi-

XXV

Speculative Philosophy

losphy of Identity would be an empirical science with an exceedingly strange sort of evidence as its experiential ground. In the latter case it would be like geometry as traditionally conceived, and hence subject to the threat of the Kantian question whether the apriority of the axioms is analytic or synthetic; and if synthetic a priori, the possibility of their objective reference would have to be made intelligible. But this whole apparatus remains of course in the forecourt of the temple of philosophy and is, or should be, foreign to speculative philosophy-which dwells in the temple itself. We have already suggested that intellectual intuition became, in Schelling and Hegel, the vision of the whole, a vision in which God, nature, and self-consciousness (or reason) come into their truth. Spinoza's scientia sub specie wledge. But this directly violates Kant's definition of an "Idea of Reason": I understand by Idea a necessary concept of Reason to which no congruent object can be given in sense-experience ... the pure concepts of Reason are transcendental Ideas. They are not arbitrarily invented; they are imposed by the very nature of Reason itself, and therefore stand in necessary relation to the whole employment of understanding. Finally, they are transcendent and overstep the limits of all experience; no object adequate to the transcendental Idea can ever be found within experience. 29 Hegel denies this last claim; and having denied it he goes on to turn Kant's whole position upside down, by pointing out that if, contrary to Kant's belief, the Ideas of Reason are necessarily "objective" (i.e., instantiated in experience) then all empirically instantiated concepts

18

H. 5. Harris

have a good claim to be regarded as Ideas precisely because the synthesis of intuition and concept is a necessary condition of experience. In the Difference essay Hegel claims that Kant's philosophy is "authentic idealism" "in the principle of the deduction of the categories" (i.e., in the "transcendental unity of apperception"). Now he says that Kant's philosophy "has the merit of being idealism" because of his doctrine of then przor' syntl1esis (68). It is because of Kant's doctrine of the highest Ideas of Reason, on the other hand, that Hegel stigmatizes the principle of his philosophy as "formal thinking."'lo Kant's Ideas are "pure concepts" (acts of the subject) without obiects. Or, as Kant says, their "objective employment ... is always transcendent." Now, Kant does allow the employment of the Ideas of Reason in a practical context. The Idea of God, for example, has a fundamental role in rational ethics. But it remains, for him, a tnmscendent concept (i.e., it is beyond the limits of possible experience), and to complete Kant's "system of reflection" bv resolving all the "antitheses" of the Ideas in a system of "practical faith," as Fichte does, is not the proper business of philosophy. If the rational concept is "empty" without an intuitive content, then it will be just as empty for practical purposes as it is for theoretical ones. And because it is empty any use of it in thought will be "formal." Because Kant recognized the true nature of the Idea, the identity of thought and being, in his account of the a priori synthesis of concept and intuition in sense experience, Hegel regards the theory of the "productive imagination" that produces this a priori synthesis as a genuine achievement of speculation. But when we study this doctrine we must not make-and Hegel thinks that Kant did not make-the typical "reflective" error of assuming that the "synthesis" is a putting together of heterogeneous components, the uniting of a conceptual form with a sensible matter. Far from being a separate facult~t, the intellect (which according to Kant, furnishes the forms or concepts), is just the higher "potency" of the productive imagination. Once it has achieved sense and intuition-which already involves an a priori synthesis of matter and form-the intelligence can advance to pure concepts. Having arrived at "red," brown," "green," etc., it can advance to "color." 81 The "identity" of the visual field is "color," the "difference" of the visual field is "colors." Thus the identity discovered by the intellect is the same as the differences discovered by the visual sense. There is, of course, an evident antithesis which does not disappear, between the abstract universal "color" and the particular colors of the field. As Aristotle would have said, the universal

19 Introduction

"color" exists in one way in the mind, and in another way in the different colors of the field. Sense and intellect are thus two forms of "intuiting." Intellectual intuition is the thinking that fills time, and sense intuition is the being that fills space. But we should say rather that "the Ego" exists in these two ways. If I think of the red, brown, green, etc., that I perceive, as "colored patches," then "the synthetic unity" which is what makes them a "visual field" "steps outside" of the colored field "and faces it in relative antithesis"-it becomes the abstract universal "color." This is an "empty" identity. It is not an "intuition," for there is no universal color, there are only particular colors; but when we turn all this into its proper idealist form, we realize that although there is no "abstract Ego," no "empty" form of the "unity of apperception," no self without some definite thoughts and intuitions, still the thinking and intuiting nctiv,"ty of the Ego is the concrete universal which is the "principle" of experience. Thinking and intuiting are quite "heterogeneous." But intelligent cmi.sciousness is "the original absolute identity of the heterogeneous." Just as the universal concept of color is "immersed" in the differences of the perceived colors, so at the higher level where concepts have been abstracted, the category, the constitutive principle by which Reason unifies experience is "immersed" in the variety of the phenomena that are conceptualized in judgments. The rational principles involved only become apparent when we begin to reason syllogistically from our conceptual judgments. The categories have to be abstracted then, because the ultimate major premises of scientific syllogizing are formations of categorical principle. But we are not normally conscious of the legislative function of our intelligence, when we constitute our sense-intuitions into a world of objects. It is this activity of our own Reason-and at its most primitive level the activity of the "productive imagination" that produces the synthesis of sense-intuitioP-which is the "sole In-itself" (73). The reflective split into subject and object, self and world, is logically posterior to this original unity. Kant himself did not recognize this, he did not perceive that the thing-in-itself must be the necessary origin of appearing and being appeared to as an n priori synthesis, not the problematic origin of the objective appearance. Thus "he turned the true n priori back into a pure unity, i.e., one that is not originally synthetic." Because of this mistake, the rational (necessary) and the empirical (accidental) aspects of experience were reflectively separated at their point of origin. As a result only "relative identities'' of the pure con-

20

H. S. Harris

cepts (the categories) and empirical data were possible. Reason lays down categorical laws which "govern" the "relations" of phenomena, but the categories and the intuited data remain obstinately heterogeneous. Hence Kant simply does not realize that in the "Transcendental Dialectic" he is investigating the nature of the "In-itself." Instead, he takes the organizing activity of Reason in experience to be the contribution of the human mind regarded as if it were something separate from the objective world which it organizes for cognition. The empirical aspect of experience is assigned one problematic origin, the rational aspect another. Speculation puts the two problems of origin together into the one absolute certainty (the ground of the a priori synthe~is} and accounts for the dialectical character of pure Reason (the one reality-in-itself) by a sort of "principle of complementarity." Thus gravity has an intuitive (subjective or particular) aspect as body and a conceptual (objective or universal) aspect as motion. This is an example from the philosophy of Nature. In transcendental philosophy, the activity of imagination has an intuitive (subjective, particular) side as the Ego, and a conceptual (objective, universal) side as experience. 32 The subjective side is the finite and existential side, the objective side is the infinite (hence conceptual) side. The existing source or "center" of gravity is a physical body. Bodies are seen to move. But motion is the conceptual or universal side of gravity because the resting equilibrium of a gravitational system of moving bodies is only comprehended in thought. It is not abstracted like "color" but grasped as a "periodicity of motion." On the transcendental side, the Ego is the existing source of Reason, and the infinity of experience is its ,realized (or "immersed") concept. As soon as we stabilize the infinity of possible experience-for example, by considering a color-wheel instead of the indefinite play of color, light and shade in our primitive sense experience-the "universal" (or conceptual) character of the "infinite" even at this "immersed" level of imagination, becomes obvious enough. 33 Having given us these examples of the subjective side as particular (intuitive) and the objective side as universal (conceptual), Hegel now makes one of those switches of perspective that renders his discussion of the Identity theory so hard to follow. Within either one of the "philosophical sciences" the "subjective" side is particular and the objective side is "universal." But when we consider the ultimate speculative "identity" of the two sciences with one another, the situation is reversed: Natural philosophy, the science of the object, is the

21 Introduction sphere of reality, where the moment of particular existence, of intuition, is dominant; and transcendental philosophy, the science of the subject, is the sphere of ideality, where the universal, the concept, is no longer "immersed" in the manifold. 34 Having shown that Kant got his transcendental theory right, Hegel now moves on to discuss his failure to grasp the identity of self (the concept) and nature (the empirical particulars). The "rational identity" which Kant has uncovered in his theory of the synthetic a priori judgment, is the "substance" of the world just as much as it is the "necessity" of the judgment. This identity Kant did not recognize. Or more precisely, he had an inkling of it in his doctrine of the use of the "Ideas" as regulative principles of teleological judgment. But this "regulative" use only preserves the "identity," the rationality of the transcendental science. Kant's "thing-in-itself" on the side of nature is the "composite" king in Goethe's allegorical presentation of the different philosophies of Nature, Das Miirchen. 35 Kant's deliberate restriction of perspective to the "transcendental" side springs from his initial commitment to the psychological standpoint of Locke, the standpoint of "reflective subjectivity." In his distinction of the "secondary" from the "primary" qualities of bodies, Locke had advanced to the recognition of the "productive imagination." By regarding "secondary" qualities as "subjective," Locke "transfers perceiving . . . into the subject" (78). Kant developed this fundamental insight into a complete theory of subjectivity. But he ignored the fact that he was accepting human finitude as if it were an absolute unconditioned reality. The upshot of the Critical Philosophy is that we know absolutely (rationally) that our experience is phenomenal, etc. This absolute knowledge of finitude has its "infinite" side. But Kant prefers not to pursue his occasional intimations of that. His "formal idealism" rests on an uncritical dualism. The Ding-an~ich is Locke's substantial "something I know not what." We might object here that it is unfair to charge Kant with retaining an uncritical, dogmatic, conception of the Ding-an-sich. He consistently maintains that its status is problematic. Thus, for example, it cannot be numbered either as a singular falling together lump or as a falling apart many. We cannot ask how many there are, or whether there is more than one type. Hegel generally recognizes and admits this. The Kant of the first Critique is, in his view, a consistent sceptic because of his strictly problematic conception of the Ding-an-sich. But in Faith and Knowledge Hegel is concerned ultimately with the "rational faith" for which Kant explicitly claims to have "made

22

H. S. Harris

room." This faith does make an absolute out of finite human individuality, for the law of duty is laid upon me, the hope of immortality is mine, and I am an autonomous member of the Kingdom of Ends -a Kingdom which is "beyond" the order of Nature that has the Ding-an-sich so problematically behind it. In Kant's philosophy as a whole the "In-itself of Reasf>~'~oes get distinguished from the "Initself of things" precisely because ~proves to be capable of this practical development. But this distinction of the two sides (the practical faith and the theoretical problem) violates or is false to Kant's original comprehension of experience as an a priori synthesis. Thus Kant's theory of the synthesis of imagination is a truer expression of his speculative genius, than the "deduction of the categories." The "deduction of the categories" was the speculative completion of his transcendental science, as we have seen. But he only half grasped the significance of the "deduction" because he did not grasp the true import of his "necessary Idea" of an "intuitive intellect" at all. Of course, if all "universals" are conceived reflectively as possibilities or ranges of possibility for experience and existence, their function can only be regulative. Thus, within his own perspective, Kant is quite consistent and correct in regarding the Ideas in this way. The trouble is that, within that perspective, the autonomous development of practical Reason cannot be justified. In his practical philosophy, the pure Reason which, qua theoretical, is condemned as "dialetictical" and allowed only to "regulate" our phenomenal experience, is permitted to constitute the noumenal realm. The "pure form" of the "transcendental unity of apperception" becomes a "rational being" which imposes the law of duty upon itself, etc. This is inconsistent with Kant's critique of the "paralogisms," just as the postulate of immortality and the "infinite progress" violates his theoretical solution of the "I'I'lathematical antinomies." But the way to this "practical faith" is opened by his theoretical solution of the "dynamic antinomies." Here he momentarily abandons his sceptical stance, and at least suggests the dogmatic acceptance of two distinct worlds, the phenomenal and the noumenal, the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom. Hegel admits that in the first Critique Kant only asserts his solution of the antinomies in a properly "critical" fashion. But he claims that in his attack on the Ontological Argument Kant emerges as a dogmatic dualist. I confess that I cannot see why he says this. The reflective separation of thought and being is evident enough in Kant's argument; but this only gives rise to "dualism" when we have

23

Introduction

admitted that Reason is an "In-itself." Now, even if it be true that the first Critique shows this, Kant certainly did not recognize it. So he is, at most, an unconscious dogmatist. Hegel deliberately postpones discussion of Kant's practical philosophy, because it is in Fichte that we shall see "rational faith" deyeloped systematically. For this reason, he can pass straight to the Critique of Judgment and preserve his consistent image of Kant as a purely "critical" (i.e., sceptical) thinker. The polemical imputation of dogmatism is a distortion of this image, called forth by Kant's critique of the Ontological Argument, because of Hegel's emotional overreaction against Kant's failure of historical comprehension with respect to the great tradition of speculative rationalism. Kant overthrows Mendelssohn; and he thinks that, in doing so, he has overthrown Spinoza. The two sections of the Critique of Judgment, aesthetic judgment and teleological judgment, deal with "beauty as conscious intuition" and "beauty as non-conscious intuition" (86). This characterization of Kant's theory of organism is very puzzling, because it is not at all evident what a "non-conscious intuition" can be. But if we remember the "non-conscious rational" in the synthetic a priori judgment ear_lier, we have the clue that we need. Just as "the rational" was the necessary, a priori element in sense-experience,~- the "beauty" of it is the aspect of freedom in it. An organism is a self-determining, selfmaintaining individual entity. Thus to perceive something as an organism, is to make "unconscious" use of the category of freedom, to "imagine" or be sensibly aware of a practical concept "immersed" in intuition. But this practical concept is one which, according to Kant's theory, cannot be "immersed" in intuition as "color" or "causality" is, because no "demonstration" of it in intuition could possibly be adequate. Hence Kant regards the conscious intuition of beauty as non-cognitive; and he restricts the employment of "free" organic categories in our cognitive science to their use as "regulative maxims." Actually the conceptual exposition of the "Idea of Reason" in the Transcendental Dialectic has its intuitive demonstration in our aesthetic experience. This is Hegel's version of Schelling's dictum that "Art is the organon of philosophy." The best illustratio~ of what he means by it is his claim in the System of Ethical Life, that the "intuition" of "ethical life" is "das Volk." 36 Unfortunately it is very difficult to unpack the "speculative" meaning of that claim. But, at least, the relation between Athens and Athena provides a simple illustration of the function of art as an intuitive expression of the

2.J

H. 5. Harris "absolute indifference point" in religious experience. We shall return to the problem of "speculative demonstration" later.'17 Of course, this "intuition" is not finite; that is why an adequate exposition of it is so difficult. But this exposition is the task of speculative Reason, not of the intellect as it is (correctly) delimited by Kant. We have the "intuition" before us in objective form in the living organism. But the natural organism is not conscious of itself, and for an intellect which is conscious of itself, but only as finite, the necessary ground of explanation for the unconscious system of organic nature can only be another problematic noumenal entity, the "intuitive intellect" of the Creator. This Idea is therefore subjectively necessary for us, we can only unify and organize our science of nature, living and non-living, by regarding nature as a whole ns if it were the creation of such an intellect. But, of course, we cannot dogmatically assert that any such intellect exists. Here, at least, Kant is right in his restraint, for the intuitive intellect does not need to be postulated; it only needs to be discovered, raised to consciousness in his own doctrine of the productive imagination. By returning to this, he could have found the clue through which he could have comprehended Nature and Intelligence as an organic whole, thus escaping from the mechanical determinism which was all that he could recognize in Spinoza. "Kant himself recognized in the beautiful an intuition other than the sensuous" (91). This is an acknowledgement that in their abiding concern about art, the Identity philosophers were following a clue provided by Kant. Their "speculative" theory was intended as the completion of Kant's critical theory. Behind Hegel's brusque condemnation of Kant for not doing what Schelling and he have done, there lies a clear consciousness that Kant provided the foundations for what they have done. In sum, then, Kant's philosophy is a "formal" theory, i.e., it is the theory of Reason as an empty concept, whether we "run along the thread of identity" (the necessary a priori synthesis in the Critique of Pure Reason) or the "thread of causality" (the free causality of the rational being in the Critique of Practical Reason). The "pure concept" A needs to be complemented by the "sensible manifold" B, in either case. This manifold which supplies the "matter" of experience remains an absolute mystery. The "copying of Reason by the intellect brings forth only a formal identity"38 in Kant's great critical system, just as it does in the work of the epigones Reinhold and Bardili. 39 But unlike these lesser thinkers, Kant did begin from the very "point

25

Introduction of union" between form and content, concept and manifold. His theory of the original synthesis of the manifold contained the ''middle term" that he needed; Reason itself was here "immersed" and hence unrecognized. Because he did not recognize it, Kant had to replace Reason by "practical faith" in a "noumenal world." The unity of thought and being became an ideal, a Sol/en. Although the systematic development of this solution was Fichte's contribution, Hegel ends his reconstructive account of Kant's philosophy very properly with a brief summary of Kant's theory of the summum bonum. Even here, as he emphasizes, Kant remains tentative. His "practical faith" is not proposed as the ultimate ground and explanation for the very existence of finite consciousness-as it is by Fichte-but as a regulative use of the "Ideas of Reason" like the employment of the concept of organism in the life sciences. Just what this "subjective" faith amounts to, remains unctear. But the objectivity of the law of Reason admits no doubt at all. This is the "formal" (i.e., empty universal) aspect of speculative Reason, the infinity which is opposed to the finite. We shall see in the theory of Fichte, how disastrous the consequences of this reflective opposition between the infinite "concept" and the finite "intuition" are.

4. J A C 0

BI

The discussion of Jacobi forms the longest section of Faith and Knowledge and the one that has the smallest positive content. Many pages are here devoted to the ironic exposure of "unphilosophy." Here Hegel deploys a sarcastic wit and a polemic gift which become in the end repellent because they are so unrelieved by that appreciation of positive achievement which he had himself declared to be the first essential of genuinely philosophical criticism. Yet Hegel did appreciate Jacobi's positive contribution. He always continued to allot to Jacobi a place of prominence in the development of the speculative viewpoint, a prominence which Jacobi has not managed to retain in the general history of philosophy. In the introduction to the Encyclopactical Reaso'1, Book II, Chapter II, section V (Akad V, 12432)

87 Ibid, section IV (Akad V, 122-4). 88. Ibid, section V (Akad V, 125)

95

A. Kantian Philosophy this morality and this happiness the highest good! But then, of course, Reason as active in the finite, and nature as sensed in the finite, cannot raise themselves to anything higher than a practical faith of this kind. This faith is just made to measure for the state of absolute immersion in the empirical; for it lets Reason 89 keep the finitude of thought, and action, as well as the finitude of enjoyment. If Reason were to arrive at intuition and knowledge that Reason and nature are in absolute harmony and are in themselves blissful, it would recognize its wretched morality which does not harmonize with happiness and the wretched happiness which does not harmonize with morality, as the nothings that they are. But what matters [to Kant] is that both morality and happiness be something, and something high and absolute. This morality reviles nature and its spirit, as if the order and direction (die Einrichtung) in nature was not itself made rational, while on the contrary this morality in its misery-it was not for this, surely, that the spirit of the universe organized itself?-existed in itself and eternally. Moreover, this morality means indeed to justify itself and do itself honor on the ground that it does set the reality of Reason before itself in faith though not as something that possesses absolute being. Yet if the absolute reality of Reason were truly certain, then limited being and the finite and this morality could not have either certainty or truth. It should not be overlooked, however, that Kant remains within the right and proper bounds of his postulates, which Fichte does not respect. According to Kant himself the postulates and the faith that goes with them (ihr Glauben) are subjective; 90 the only question is how to take this "subjective." Is it the identity of infinite thought and being, of Reason and its reality, that is subjective? Or is it only the postulating and the believing of them? Is it the content or the form of the postulates? It cannot be the content that is subjective, for the negative content of the postulates immediately suspends everything subjective. Hence it is the form, or in other words it is something subjective and contingent that the Idea is only a subjective thing. There should in principle (an sich) be no postulating, no ought and no [mere] believing, and the postulating of the absolute reality of the highest Idea is something non-rational. Fichte did not acknowl89. The text has ihr which may refer to die Vernunft (as we think) or to die Natur or finally to die Empirie (which Mery prefers). 90. Critique of Practical Reason, Book II, Chapter II, section VIII (Akad. V, 145-6).

96

Faith and Knowledge

edge this subjectivity of postulating and believing and ought. To him, this is the In-itself. Kant, on the contrary, does acknowledge that the postulating and the ought and [346] the believing are only a subjective and finite thing. Nevertheless, the matter must simply rest there, just as with morality. Letting it rest there meets with universal approval, and what is approved is just exactly the worst thing about it, namely the form of postulating. This, then, is the character of the Kantian philosophy. The common ground which it shares with the philosophies of reflection that we are talking about is that knowledge is formal knowledge; Reason as a pure negativity is an absolute Beyond; as a Beyond and as negativity it is conditioned by this-worldliness (Diesseits) and by positivity; infinity and finitude, each with its opposite, are all equally absolute. What is peculiar to the Kantian philosophy is the form in which it presents itself, its richly instructive and well-organized range; also its truth within the bounds that it sets, however, not only for itself, but for Reason in general. Then there is that interesting aspect of it in which it happens on truly speculative Ideas, though as if they were incidental ideas and mere thoughts without reality. Not counting all this, the uniqueness of the Kantian philosophy is that it establishes its absolute subjectivity in objective form, that is, as concept and law-and it is only because of its purity that subjectivity is capable of passing into its opposite, objectivity. -Of the two parts of reflection, the finite and the infinite, therefore, it raises th~- infinite above the finite, thus vindicating at least the formalt aspect of Reason. The highest Idea of the Kantian philosophy is the complete emptiness of subjectivity, or the purity of the infinite concept, which is also posited as what is objective in the sphere of the intellect, though there it has the dimensions of the categories; whereas on the practical side the infinite concept is posited as objective law. On one side there is infinity infected with finitude, on the other side, there is pure infinity, and in the middle there is posited the identity of the finite and the infinite, 91 though once more only in the form of the infinite, that is, as concept. The authentic Idea remains an absolutely subjective maxim, partly for reflecting judgment, and partly for faith; but it does not exist for the middle of cognition and of Reason. 92 91. In the doctrines of the Critique of Judgment concerning beauty and natural teleology. 92. The "authentic Idea" has its real "middle" when Reason comes into its own as intellectual intuition. In Kant, however, this "middle of Reason" takes the form not of intellectual intuition, but of reflective intellect and faith.

B. Jacobian Philosophy

Jacobi's philosophy shares with Kant's the common ground of absoT~te finitude, both in its ideal form, as formal knowledge, and in its real form as an absolute empiricism. They also agree about the integration of these two absolute finitudes by way of a faith that posits an absolute Beyond. Within this common [347] sphere, however, the philosophy of Jacobi forms the opposite pole to that of Kant. In Kant's philosophy finitude and subjectivity have an objective form, the form of the concept. J~cobi's philosophy, on the contrary, makes subjectivity entirely subjective, it turns it into individuality. This subjective core of the subjective thus regains an inner life so that it seems to be capable of the beauty of feeling (Empfindung). We begin with the subjectivity of knowledge. Jacobi immediately recognizes and consciously abstracts the formal side of knowledge, and expounds it in its purity. He asserts positively that knowledge exists only in this form and he denies the objectivity of Reason in knowledge. 1 It is this formal knowledge therefore that he accepts as valid in his polemics, and he combats the science of Reason by means of it. All that Jacobi knows of throughout is this formal knowledge, an ~dentity of the intellect whose content is supplied by experience, a thinking to which reality in general supervenes in some inconceivable way. This is one of the few points, indeed the only point, about which Jacobi's philosophy is objective and pertains to science; and it is a point which is presented in clear concepts. Thus Jacobi says (David Hume, Preface, p. V): "My philosophy [... ] limits Reason, considered by itself, to the mere faculty of perceiving relations distinctly, that is, to forming the principle of contradiction 2 and judging according to it. So, of course, I [Jacobi] have to admit that only the affirmation of identical propositions is apodictic and accompanied 1. I.e., he denies the possibility of speculative philosophy. 2. Jacobi wrote: "the principle of identity." This is the one place where Hegel's

citation is not exact. It is probably a slip of the pen, since Hegel goes on to call the principle of sufficient reason "the necessary counterpart of the principle of identity"; and he expounds it as a "principle of contradiction" in Jacobi's philosophy (p. 99 below).

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with absolute certainty." 3 Similarly (Letters on Spinoza, p. 215 seq.): Conviction upon rational grounds4 is a second-hand certainty (firsthand certainty is faith, of which more later). Rational grounds are but marks of similarity with something of which we are certain (namely through faith). The conviction produced by reason emerges "from comparison and can never be quite certain and perfect." 5 One of the five theses that summarize his assertions (ibidem. p. 225) is: "We can demonstrate only similarities"-for demonstration is advance by way of identical propositions-" ... and every proof presupposes something already proved, of which the principle is nothing but revelation." 6 Cf. p. 421: "The business of Reason in general is a progressive tying together (Verkniipfung) and its speculative business is a tying together according to known (erkannte) laws of necessity .... The essential indeterminateness of human language and notation and the changeable aspect of sensuous shapes permits almost all these propositions to acquire a~ external appearance (Ansehen) of saying something more than the mere quidquid est, illud est, more than a mere fact which was perceived, observed, compared, recognized and linked with other concepts." 7 Cf. also p. 283 and David Hume, p. 94. 8 [348) The necessary counterpart to the principle of identity is the principal of sufficient reason (Satz des Grundes), whether-following Jacobi's distinctions in the Letters on Spinoza, p. 415 9 -we mean by this the general principle of sufficient reason or the principle of cause and effect or a union of both; and considering its content, whether one proceeds from concepts to concepts or from the concept to its reality or from some objective realities to others. The earlier philosophical culture has deposited the testimony of its rational endeavours in the formulation of the principle of sufficient reason. The principle has swayed between Reason and reflection, and passed over into the latter. All this shows up very characteristically in the distinction that Jacobi draws between its function as logical principle and its function as causal relation. He uses this distinction both as a way to understand philosophy and as a way to combat it. 3. Jacobi did not reprint this "Preface" in his Collected Works, Vol. II. 4. Hegel substitutes Grunde for Jacobi's Beweise. 5. Jacobi, Werke IV, 1, 210. 6. Werke IV, 1, 223 (Hegel added the "nothing but"). 7. Ibid., IV, 2, 150-151. 8. The corresponding references for the Werke are: IV, 1, 231 and II, 193. 9. Ibid, IV, 2, 144-47.

99

B. Jacobian Philosophy We want now to follow him upon his road. Jacobi recognizes in the principle of sufficient reason its significance as principle of rational cognition: to tum parte prius esse necesse est [the whole is necessarily prior to the part]. (David Hume, p. 94). 10 In other words, the single part only gets determined in the whole. It has its reality only in the absolute identity which, insofar as discernibles are posited in it, is absolute totality. In one connection, so Jacobi says, the proposition tatum parte prius esse necesse est is "nothing but idem est idem" 11 while in another it is not. It is essential [according to Jacobi] that tbese two c;:ontexts be distinguished and kept absolutely apart; and this is precisely the point where this basic dogmatism 12 takes its beginning. For Jacobi conceives the principle of sufficient reason as pure principle of contradiction and calls it in this sense logical-an abstract unity to which it is, of course, necessary that the difference should supervene as an empirical content. From this logical sense of the principle he distinguishes a causal relation in which the heterogeneous element, the empirical datum that is added to the identity of .the concept, is reflected upon. He asserts that the causal relation is .__in respect of this peculiarity an empirical concept. The way in which he makes this out in David Hume (p. 99 seq.) 13 and which he appeals to in the Letters on Spinoza (p. 415) 14 is a remarkable piece of empiricism Ia Locke and Hume with an equally glaring piece of German dogmatism of the analysing kind kneaded into it. This last is even worse than the Mendelssohn variety,-~nd the world can never be grateful enough to the Gods-next to Kant-for its salvation from that. Specifically what.Jacobi misses in the principle of sufficient reason and in the totality, is the parts, and he has to fetch them from somewhere outside the whole. Or, as he conceives it, all parts are already actually united in a whole and present in it; but such an intuitive cognition of the parts within and through the whole is merely something subjective and incomplete, because the objective becoming and the succession are still lacking, and for their sake [349] the causal relation must still supervene to the totality. 15 Just listen to the

a

10. Ibid., II, 193. 11. Ibid., II, 193. 12. Grund-Dogmatismus-i.e., dogmatism about the "principle of sufficient reason." 13. Ibid., II, 199 ff. 14. Ibid., IV, 2, 144 ff. 15. Hegel is here summarizing from the same context referred to above (ibid., Werke II, 193-200).

100

Faith and Knowledge following series of propositions which give the deduction of what Jacobi calls the absolute necessity of the concept of cause and effect and of succession (David Hume, pp. 111 ff.): "For our human consciousness and I may add immediately, for the consciousness of every finite being, an actual thing that is sensed is necessary, besides the thing that senses. [... ] "Where two created beings, which are external to each other, stand in such a relation that one acts upon the other, there is an extended being. [... ] "We feel the manifold of our being knitted together in a pure unity we call our Ego. The indivisible (das Unzertrennliche) in a being defines its individuality; it makes it an actual whole. [... ] In corporeal extension in general we perceive something that is somewhat analogous to individuality; for the extended being as such is always indivisible, setting before us everywhere the same unity that knits a plurality together indivisibly within itself. 16 "If [organicP 7 individuals [... ] also have the capacity to act externally, they must, in order for the effect to take place, mediately or immediately touch other beings. [... ] "The immediate consequence of impenetrability to the touch we call resistance. So, where there is touch, there is impenetrability on both sides, and hence also resistance, action and reaction; both are the source 18 of the successive and of time, which is the idea of the successive. " 19 [In sum,] this deduction of the concepts of extension, of cause and effect, and of succession, in other words, the deduction of the absoluteness of finitude results from the presupposition that "there exist single beings that are aware of themselves and in community with one another." 20 At the same time the deduction shows that these concepts "must be common to all self-aware finite beings, and that these concepts have their objective correlate independent of ~he con16. In a footnote (ibid., II, 212} Jacobi connects this analogy between the wholeness of individuals and that of "the extended being" with Link's now forgotten book on the Philosophy of Nature; but in another context he connects it with the "Metaphysical Exposition of Space" in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (A 25; B 39}. 17. That Jacobi's Individua are primarily organisms is made clear in the preceding omission. 18. Jacobi wrote "Resistance in space, action and reaction, is the source. . . " 19. Ibid., II, 208-213 (Hegel's quotation marks). 20. Ibid., II, 213.

101

B. Jacobian Philosophy cept in the things in themselves and consequently that they have a true objective significance."21 "These concepts are concepts which must be given completely in any experience, and they are so basic that without their object no concept would have an object, and without them no cognition would be possible at all. Such concepts are called strictly universal or necessary concepts, and the judgments and conclusions originating from them are called a priori cognitions." - 22 We note that this deduction .was supposed to concern the causal relation in its entire scope and to deliver something more compelling than the Kantian deduction. This deduction of Jacobi's, however, is so little deserving of the name that it cannot even be called an ordinary analysis of its presupposition, which is the concept of a community of single things. It is surely something [350] which all speculation must recoil at, to see the absoluteness of a human consciousness, of a thing that senses, a thing that is sensed, and of their community, presupposed straight off, in the spirit of the most vulgar empiricism. By way of superfluous mediating concepts they [the singles in their community] are analytically messed up into action and reaction, and this-here even the analyzing runs olJ,t-is the source of the successive. One cannot see what all the elaborate artifice is supposed to be good for at all; for all philosophy is already driven from the field by the unanalyzed and absolute assumption of a thing that senses and a thing sensed. There is a noteworthy difference between Jacobi's presupposition and result, and the result of the Kantian deduction of the categories. According to Kant, all these concepts of cause and effect, succession, etc., are strictly limited to appearance; .!he things in which these forms are objective as well as any cognition of them are simply nothing at all in themselves. The 'ln.,Jtself and Reason are wholly raised above these forms of finitude and kept clear of them. This is the very result which gives Kant the immortal merit of having really made the beginning of a philosophy. Yet it is precisely in this nothingness of finitude that Jacobi sees an absolute in-itself. With this dream as his weapon he fights Spinoza wide awake. We previously located the inadequacy of Kant's annihilation of the intellect in his treating the intellect and its forms as something which, though subjective, is still positive and absolute even in that 21. Ibid., II, 114.

22. Ibid., II, 214 (Hegel's quotation marks).

102 Faith and Knowledge shape. Jacobi, after having so felicitously squeezed action and reaction, succession, time, etc. out of the community of finite things, opines, on the contrary, that ''to become independent of experience, these basic concepts and judgments do not need to be turned into prejudices of the intellect, from which we have to be cured by learning to recognize that they are not connected with anything in itself and consequently have no true objective significance. For the basic concepts and judgments lose neither their universality nor their necessity if they are taken from what must be common and basic to all experiences. Rather they gain a far higher degree of unconditioned universality"-does the unconditioned have degrees?-"if they can be derived [not merely as valid for man and his peculiar sensibility, but] 23 from the essence and community of singular things in general. [. . . ] -[According to Kant] our senses teach us nothing of the qualities of things, nothing of their mutual relations and connections, they do not even teach us that, in a transcendental sense, things are actually there. 24 This would be a sensibility that represented nothing at all of the things themselves, [351] a sensibility that is decidedly empty of objective reference. Our intellect is supposed to connect with this sensibility in order to give radically subjective forms to radically subjective intuitions according to radically subjective rules. [... ] In that case I am everything and, properly speaking, nothing exists outside me. I, and everything of mine, am in the end also nothing but a mere delusion of something or other, the form of a form, [... ] a ghost. [... ] A system of this sort completely uproots all claims to the cognition of truth and leaves for the most important matters only a faith more blind and utterly devoid of cognition than anyone ever imputed to man before." 25 We should do well to make a distinction here. Kant's view that faith is non-cognitive is grounded only in his misjudgment of the rational as such, and not in his great theory that the intellect cognizes nothing in itself. What Jacobi enriches the human cognition with, on the other hand, is such discoveries as the absoluteness of finite things a_nd their community, the absoluteness of time and succession and the causal nexus, each of which (Hume, p. 119) "has an objective 23. The words here bracketed were inserted by Hegel. They are not in Jacobi's text. 24. Here Jacobi wrote "do not even teach us that things are actually there outside of us." 25. Ibid, II, 214-7 (Hegel's quotation marks).

103

B. Jacobian Philosophy correlate independent of the concept in~the~ tbjnzs-:in-themselves." 26 J ~cobi fin as it shocking and horrifying that these absolutes of objective finitude should be negated and recognized as nothing in themselves, and that in consequence subjective finitude, the Ego that is sensuous and thinks reflectively, my whole world, should likewise be only an empty illusion of something-in-itself. He finds it shocking and horrifying that my finite world should perish in the face of Reason, no less than the world of finite objects. His abhorrence of the nullification of the finite is as fixed as his corresponding absolute certainty of the finite; and this abhorrence will everywhere show itself to be the basic character of Jacobi's philosophy. If what we have quoted above could be called a deduction at all, it might at first be considered an improvement upon Kant's because Jacobi conceives of succession and causality as relation in general, that is, as a merely relative connection, restricted to finite things, and in that the deduction proceeds not merely from a conscious intellect, as Kant does, but also from a non-conscious intellect. 27 In Jacobi, however, relation regarded as subjective, that is, the conscious intellect, stand:i quite independently and dualistically alongside relation regarded as objective, that is, as intellect and relation of things; whereas in Kant relation is one and one only-without any distinction between a subjective intellect and a separate objective intellect. For though we must conceive the intellect as something subjective in Kant, still there is no external and alien relation of things; so that there is only one intellect, and in this Kant expresses at least the formal aspect of philosophy. But even if we pass over all that, Kant's most important result [as against Jacobi] will always remain this: these relations of the finite (whether they are relations within the sphere of the subject alone, or relations of things as well) are nothing in themselves, and .cognition in accordance with them is only [352] a cognition of appearances, (even though it becomes absolute because it is not to be transcended). The apriority of Jacobi's relations, on the contrary, consists in their belonging also to the things-in-themselves, which is to say that the finite things, both the thing that senses and, apart from it, the actual thing that is sensed, are things-in:-Jhemselves. Relations of th~se things, relations such as succession, causal nexus, resistance, etc. are [in Jacobi] true rational relations, that is, Ideas. As a result the apparent improvement, according to which the rela26. Ibid., II, 214 27. Compare Jacobi's account of "the extended being" on p. 100 above.

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tions are not merely subjective, belonging to the conscious intellect, but also something objective and non-conscious, is really the establishment of an absolute dogmatism, the elevation of the finite to an In-itself. [As we have seen] the important distinction of the principle of sufficient reason from the principle of causality resulted, for Jacobi, in a founding of the absoluteness of the finite. 28 [We shall see now how] he applies this result to Spinoza's system in two ways. He argues, on the one hand, that Spinoza lacks the concept of succession; and, on the other, that in the last analysis Spinoza does have it, but in the absurd form of an eternal time. ·' ' As to the first point, the lack [of the concept] of time, Jacobi understands Spinoza's philosophy as meaning to achieve a "natural explanation of the existence of finite and successive things."29 But because, by the standard of the concept of Reason, Spinoza regarded things as present at once-"for in the concept of Reason there is no before and after, everything is necessary and simultaneous"30-and because he cognized the universe sub specie J!terni, he mistook the principle of sufficient reason for a merely logical principle and thus established "not an objective and actual succession, but only a subjective and ideational one. But in fact there could not even be an ideational succession if it were not grounded on an actual succession in the subject that produces it in thought.' 131 In the logical principle of sufficient reason succession itself is what is inconceivable. 32 It is not worth talking about a psychological reminder of this kind -to the effect that a subjective and ideational succession presupposes an actual succession in the subject. It either says nothing or it says something false. The reason for this is that ideational succession is connected with Spinoza's mathematical similes (which we shall discuss later) ;33 and that in its truth it can only be something real because it is the absolute simultaneity of the totality and not a succession Compare p. 98 ff. above, and Jacobi, Werke II, pp. 197-217. Ibid., IV, 2, 135. Jacobi's' complaint about "eternal time" is ibid., p. 136. Ibid., IV, 2, 140. Ibid., IV, 2, 136; compare II, 198. We take the main strand of the meaning of Jacobi's term idealisch ("ideational") to be "pertaining to mere ideas." Thus "succession" as idealisch is the mere idea of succession; but this mere idea of succession would have to be grounded on an actual succession of ideas. Compare, however, Mery, p. 306. 32. Ibid., II, 199. 33. See p. 110 ff. below. 28. 29. 30. 31.

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B. Jacobian Philosophy at all. Jacobi, however,