Extending the Borders of Russian History: Essays in Honor of Alfred J. Rieber 9789633865163

Citation preview

Extending the Borders of Russian History

Extending the Borders of

Russian History E S S A Y S IN H O N O R

OF

A L F R E D J. R I E B E R EDITED BY M A R S H A

A T

SIEFERT

*•

• C E U PRESS * I

v

Central E u r o p e a n University Press Budapest New York

© 2 0 0 3 by M a r s h a S i e f e r t English e d i t i o n p u b l i s h e d in 2003 by

Central European

University

Press

A n i m p r i n t of t h e Central E u r o p e a n University Share C o m p a n y N â d o r utca 11, H - 1 0 5 1 B u d a p e s t , H u n g a r y Tel: +36-1-327-3138 o r 327-3000 Fax-. +36-1-327-3183 E-mail: c e u p r e s s @ c e u . h u Website: w w w . c e u p r e s s . c o m 400 West 59th S t r e e t , N e w Y o r k N Y 10019, U S A Tel: +1-212-547-6932 Fax: +1-212-548-4607 E-mail, m g r e e n w a l d @ s o r o s n v . o r g

All rights r e s e r v e d . N o p a r t of this p u b l i c a t i o n m a y be r e p r o d u c e d , s t o r e d in a r e t r i e v a l s y s t e m , or t r a n s m i t t e d , in a n y f o r m or by a n y m e a n s , w i t h o u t the p e r m i s s i o n of t h e P u b l i s h e r . I S B N 963 9241 36 9 cloth

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data E x t e n d i n g t h e b o r d e r s of R u s s i a n history: e s s a y s in h o n o r o f A l f r e d J. Rieber / [edited] by Marsha Siefert. p. c m . Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN I. R u s s i a — H i s t o r y . 2. S o v i e t U n i o n — H i s t o r y . 3. R u s s i a ( F e d e r a t i o n ) — H i s t o r y — 1 9 9 1 - I. R i e b e r , A l f r e d J. II. S i e f e r t , M a r s h a , 1 9 4 9 - III. Title. D K 4 0 .E94 2002 947.08—dc21 2002014289

P r e p r i n t by A t t r i b u t u m S t ù d i o , B u d a p e s t P r i n t e d in H u n g a r y by A k a p r i n t K f t .

Table of Contents

List of Tables and Figures

viii

Transliteration and A b b r e v i a t i o n s

ix

Preface

xi I

Agency

and Process

A Dynastic Concepts

or Ethno-Dynastic

Russia,

Tsardom? E.

M.

Sexualized

Narratives Monarchy,

Scenarios, in

the

RICHARD

Existences:

Fire

of

Nineteenth-Century

1812,

of

Nineteenth-Century

S. WORTMAN

51

IMPERIAL

RUSSIA:

MULTICULTURAL

Middling ALEXANDER

The Rise of Male Secondary D.A. Tolstoy's

Households M.

Education

Ministry Revisited,

SOCIETY

BORDERLANDS in

Moscow

MARTIN

67

in Provincial

MARINA

Russia:

LOSKOUTOVA

Ruslan, Bohdan

and Myron: Three Constructed

among Galician

Ruthenians/Ukrainians,

IAROSLAV

Gendered

31

A N D ITS Precarious

17

in the Representation

A

83

Identities

1830-1914,

HRYTSAK

97

From Elisavetgrad

to Broadway: The Strange

of lakov

JOHN KLIER

Gordon,

Odyssey 113

Colonial Frontiers in Eighteenth-Century Russia: From the North Caucasus to Central Asia, MICHAEL KHODARKOVSKY Colonization

by Contract: Russian Settlers, South Caucasian

and the Dynamics NICHOLAS

B.

3

Modern

SCHRADER

II

and

Two Early

LEWIN

KOHUT

and Social Breakdown

ABBY

National Russian

ZENON

of Subversion:

Discourses

RUSSIA

in Russian and Soviet History, MOSHE

of Russia,

Spectacles

NARRATING

of Nineteenth-Century

BREYFOGLE

Tsarist

127

Elites,

Imperialism, 143

Russian

Colonization

FIROUZEH

Diamond Hidden

of Caucasian

Azerbaijan,

1830-1905,

167

MOSTASHARI

in the Rough: The State, Entrepreneurs Resources

in Late Imperial Russia,

III

THE

and

Turkestan's

MURIEL JOFFE

183

REVOLUTIONARY DECADE

Worry about Workers: Concerns

of the Russian

from the 1870s to What is to Be Done? The Political

Evolution

Twentieth-Century LEOPOLD

of Moscow's

E.

REGINALD

and

ZELNIK

Reflections,

H . HAIMSON

to the Imperial, ALEXEI

227

Provisional

Idea: Foreign Ministry

and Bolshevik

Memoranda

Governments,

MILLER

233

The Day before the Downfall in Petrograd,

Unusual Offensive

RAFAIL

Comrades:

in the Russian

Business,

Russia's PETER

of the Old Regime: 26 February SH.

GANELIN

245

Red Planning for the August

Wartime Entrepreneur: Banking

1919

Counter

Civil War, CURTIS S. KING Mikhail

1914-1919,

257

Riabushinskii's BORIS V. ANAN'ICH

First World War: Remembering,

273

Forgetting,

Remembering,

GATRELL

285

I V The Political VIKTOR M .

THE

SOVIET

Police and the Study of History

EXPERIENCE in the

USSR, 301

PANEIAKH

The Internal Soviet Passport: Workers and Free WENDY

ZEVA

Movement, 315

GOLDMAN

Class and Nation at the Borderlands:

Pleas for Soviet

Citizenship 333

during the Great Terror, LESLEY A . RIMMEL The Soviet Position Enigma,

HUGH

at Munich

Reappraised:

The

Romanian 353

RAGSDALE

Allies on Film: US-USSR MARSHA

205

in Early

Kupechestvo

Russia: Observations

A Testament of the All-Russian

IÇ17

Intelligentsia

SIEFERT

Filmmakers

and T h e B a t t l e of R u s s i a ,

373

Khrushchev

and the End of the 1962 Cuban Missile

Crisis,

ALEKSANDR A.FURSENKO

Belief and Disbelief

401

in the Soviet

Union,

N I C H O L A S V. R I A S A N O V S K Y

V

407

PERSISTENT

FACTORS

RUSSIAN The Contemporary

Russian

in Historical

Context,

Intelligentsia,

Intellectuals

A Critical Discourse the Twenty-First Public-Private Historical Dynamic

Models

BORIS

of 443

Education:

HARLEY

Ethnics: Socio-Religious

MARJORIE MANDELSTAM

Transition:

FIRSOV

in Russian

and Lessons,

429

SOGRIN

and Elites in

at the Beginning

Century,

HISTORY

Transformation

VLADIMIR

Partnership

D. BALZER

Movements

Z.

in

457

Siberia,

BALZER

The United States and Russia: From Rivalry ALVIN

481

to

Reconciliation,

RUBINSTEIN

The Democratic

Experience

IN

497

in Transitional

Russia,

WILLIAM G. ROSENBERG

509

Bibliography and Chronology of Alfred J. Rieber

533

List of Contributors

541

Index

543

L I S T OF

TABLES

Table 5.1

T h e C o m p o s i t i o n of the Russian Civilian B u r e a u c r a c y

Table 5.2

Value of I m m o v a b l e P r o p e r t y for Ober- and Shtab-officers

Table 5.3

73

Value of M o v a b l e P r o p e r t y for Ober-

and

Shtab-oifictxs

73

Table 29.1

Specialized Schools in the Ministry of Finance

Table 29.2

D y n a m i c s of C h a n g e in P a y m e n t for H i g h e r E d u c a t i o n in the Russian F e d e r a t i o n

Table 29.3

463 471

E n r o l l m e n t s in Specialized S e c o n d a r y Institutions in the R u s s i a n F e d e r a t i o n by Field

Table 29.4

72

473

E n r o l l m e n t s in H i g h e r E d u c a t i o n a l Institutions in the Russian F e d e r a t i o n by Field L I S T OF

474

FIGURES

Figure

17.1

S o u t h e r n Front O r g a n i z a t i o n for the August 1919 Counter Offensive

Figure

17.2

Figure

24.1

T h e Soviet August 1919 C o u n t e r O f f e n s i v e A d v e r t i s e m e n t f r o m T w e n t i e t h - C e n t u r y - F o x press b o o k , The Battle of Russia

267 269 387

Transliteration and Abbreviations

A modified Library of Congress style of transliteration has been followed throughout. Any specific language uses are explained in the notes. All territorial terms (e.g., oblast, guberniia, raion, uezd), administrative terms (e.g., ukaz, zemstvo, d u m a ) , and measures (e.g., pud, desiatina) have been anglicized. O t h e r common proper names (e.g., Tolstoy, Trotsky) and geographical locations (e.g., Krakow, Pruth River) have been given in their English version unless otherwise explained. AKAK

Akty sobrarmye Kommissieiu

Kavkazskoiu

Arkheograficheskoiu

AMAER

Arkhiva Ministerului Afacerilor E x t e r n e al României

AMR

Arhivele Militare ale României

APRF

Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii

AU FSB

Arkhiv Upravlenia Federal'noi sluzhby bezopasnosti po St. Petersburgu i oblasti

AVPRI

Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Imperii

d.

delo (file)

f.

fond

GAGM

Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv G o r o d a Moskva

GAOO

Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv O r e n b u r g s k o i Oblasti

GARF

Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii

GMISP

Gosudarstvennyi muzei istorii Sankt-Peterburga

GMPIR

Gosudarstvennyi muzei politicheskoi istorii Rossii

GPB

Gosudarstvennaia publichnaia biblioteka, St. Petersburg

(collection)

X

1., 11.

list, listy (folio, folios)

ob

obverse (reverse page)

op.

opis (inventory)

PSZ

Polnoe sobranie zakonov

RGADA

Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv drevnikh aktov

RGAE

Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv ekonomiki

RGASPI

Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial'no-politicheskoi istorii

RGIA

Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv

RGVA

Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voennyi arkhiv

SPChR

Sobranie postanovlenii

SSC'SA

Sak'art'velos saistorio c'entraluri saxelmcip'o ark'ivi

TsA FSB

Tsentral'nyi arkhiv Federal'noi sluzhby bezopasnosti

TsGAIPD

Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv istoriko-politicheskikh dokumentov goroda Peterburga

T s G I A Az

Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv Azerbaidzhana

VIA

Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi voenno-istoricheskii arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii

Rossiiskoi

imperii

po chasti raskola

Preface

W h e n A l f r e d J. R i e b e r i n t r o d u c e d t h e m a g i s t e r i a l

five-volume

w o r k of R u s s i a n

h i s t o r i a n Vasilii O. K l i u c h e v s k i i , he d e s c r i b e d him as "a p a t h b r e a k i n g s c h o l a r , a s p e l l b i n d i n g l e c t u r e r , an e n g a g i n g stylist, a n d a g r e a t s y n t h e s i z e r w h o s e w o r k s h a v e s t o o d t h e test of time." T h e scholarly life of t h e e m i n e n t h i s t o r i a n t o w h o m this v o l u m e is d e d i c a t e d e c h o e s t h a t d e s c r i p t i o n . T h e a u t h o r s w h o s e w o r k is r e p r e s e n t e d in this v o l u m e h a v e c o m e t o k n o w Al R i e b e r at d i f f e r e n t t i m e s a n d u n d e r d i f f e r e n t c i r c u m s t a n c e s . Yet t h e v o l u m e c o h e r e s t h r o u g h t h e h u m a n i t y of t h e m a n a n d his scholarship. H e h a s d e d i c a t e d his a c a d e m i c c a r e e r t o e x t e n d i n g a v a r i e t y of b o r d e r s , n o t only t h o s e of g e o g r a p h y b u t also t h o s e of t h e a c a d e m y . W h e t h e r j o i n i n g t h e first U S - S o v i e t e x c h a n g e in 1958 o r t a k i n g on t h e n e w v e n t u r e as C h a i r of H i s t o r y at t h e C e n t r a l E u r o p e a n U n i v e r s i t y in B u d a p e s t in 1995, he e m b o d i e s t h e spirit of a d v e n t u r e b o r n f r o m his g r a n d f a t h e r ' s tales a n d S a t u r d a y a f t e r n o o n s at t h e movies. T h e D n i e p e r / D n e p r / D n i p r o R i v e r h a s r u n t h r o u g h this b o o k , n o t as a b o r d e r b u t as a c e n t e r of c u l t u r e s . R u s a l k i c l i m b its b a n k s in t h e H a b s b u r g E m p i r e , t h e R u s s i a n E m p i r e , t h e Soviet E m p i r e , a n d E u r o p e writes o r sings a b o u t t h e m . T h e river s e e m s to d e p o s i t its s e d i m e n t o n t h o s e societies e v e n as its n a m e is c h a n g e d t o p r e s e r v e n a t i o n a l identities. P e r i o d i z a t i o n , a l t h o u g h i m p l i e d in this v o l u m e ' s divisions, n o n e t h e l e s s is also a b o r d e r c r o s s e d in t h e articles a p p e a r i n g h e r e . T h r o u g h o u t his c a r e e r , R i e b e r has m a n a g e d t o a p p e a r o n b o t h sides of t h e m a j o r b o r d e r of Slavic studies, t h e R u s sian/Soviet d i v i d e — a n d also w h e n least e x p e c t e d . So t h e c h r o n o l o g i c a l g r o u p i n g s of individual essays s h o u l d n o t o b s c u r e t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h e w h o l e , f o r p e r sistent f a c t o r s a r e w h a t R i e b e r h a s identified a n d e l a b o r a t e d . A s he has s h o w n , e c o n o m i c b a c k w a r d n e s s was a d d r e s s e d by t h e m e r c h a n t s a n d e n t r e p r e n e u r s w h o e n e r g i z e d i m p e r i a l R u s s i a a n d their vitality is r e f l e c t e d by t h e n u m b e r a n d originality of t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n s . His w o r k h a s p e r m e a t e d t h e usual disciplinary f r o n t i e r s as s h o w n by t h e historians, political scientists, sociologists and a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s w h o w r i t e in this v o l u m e . Just as s c h o l a r s h i p o n R u s s i a r a n g e s widely o v e r t e r r i t o r i e s a n d e m p i r e s , t h e a u t h o r s t o o r e p r e s e n t m u l t i c u l t u r a l societies t h r o u g h rich archival w o r k f r o m Tblisi to T u r k e s t a n , f r o m B u c h a r e s t to H o l l y w o o d . R i e b e r a n d his c o l l e a g u e s h a v e h e l p e d to o v e r c o m e R u s s i a ' s c u l t u r a l marginality t h r o u g h f r i e n d s h i p a c r o s s s y m b o l i c as well as t e r r i t o r i a l b o r d e r s . This v o l u m e a p p e a r s at t h e e n d of t h e s e c o n d act of a long life, w h e n a p p l a u s e is d u e t h e w h o l e cast f o r its s p l e n d i d e n s e m b l e . But all a g r e e t o let R i e b e r t a k e a solo bow. T h e final act is yet t o b e p e r f o r m e d , a n d e v e n n o w at this i n t e r m i s s i o n the cast a n d a u d i e n c e a r e e x p e c t a n t . L e t t h e play c o n t i n u e .

This volume could not have been produced without the financial assistance of the Central E u r o p e a n University's Central Administration and Rector Yehuda Elk a n a . T h e C E U History D e p a r t m e n t and its chair, Laszlo Kontler, provided essential support and Sorin A n t o h i and William G. R o s e n b e r g o f f e r e d crucial advice early in the project. T h a n k s for thoughtful and timely translation goes to Olga Kudriashova, Olga Poato, Sergei Polyakov, and O k s a n a Sarkisova. Zsuzsanna Macht worked her magic on the manuscript files and assisted with n u m e r o u s details. The volume owes a great debt to Monika Metykovâ, whose indefatigable efforts, multilingual talents and attention to editorial m a t t e r s great and small m a d e the book possible and pleasurable. At the Central E u r o p e a n University Press the complexities of the book's production have benefitted enormously f r o m the careful attention and professional c o m p e t e n c e of Krisztina Kôs, and Richard Rados and Péter Inkei have d e m o n s t r a t e d great patience and c o m m i t m e n t throughout the editorial process. Finally, my personal and collégial gratitude to Sue Curry Jansen is boundless. I close where I began, with the h o n o r e e whose generosity and goodness have included me in this inspiring circle of scholars.

A l f r e d J. R i e b e r

I NARRATING RUSSIA

Agency and Process in Russian and Soviet History MOSHE LEWIN

T h e pictures of an old and immobile absolutism, followed by an equally immutable Soviet dictatorship, do not have much to do with historical realities. The tsarist o r d e r in the sixteenth century was different from the one in the eighteenth, when it did turn into the imperial absolutism as it was seen and perceived till its very end. But the post-emancipation system changed again quite profoundly, went through stages of economic, social and institutional development after 1861, lost some of its absolutism around 1905 and moved thereafter into another important stage—the last—with the Stolypin reforms. At the same time, and quite symptomatically, "the power scenarios" of the tsarist regime (described by Wortman) although changing, shuffled ideological ingredients from basically the same "deck of cards" to sustain and justify a concept—and reality—of an ever more decrepit power grid. A sequence or sequences of changes and stages are equally pertinent in the Soviet period. Politics and policies, programs, institutional plans and government initiatives amounting to an entirely new regime in action attracted the attention of observers. But those were just one bundle of factors, sometimes more, sometimes less powerful or even plain impotent. As actions, often very dramatic, they were followed by direct and indirect results, strings of developments that in their interactions merged into "processes." The latter, impersonal and (largely) spontaneous by their very essence, were (and are) what in the final analysis took the country to where it is and where it is going.

T U R N I N G TO " P R O C E S S "

Processes are composed of individual and group actions conducted on a massive scale, occurring simultaneously, running parallel, juxtaposed or very often counterpoised to each other. Singling out the individual agents dans cette melee and trying to center history in the making on their actions, as the p r e f e r r e d way of getting a picture true to "reality," is actually "surreal." Such an immensely powerful, intense production of behavior and thought patterns, which occur on every level of social life among masses of people interacting with their environment and conditions as they experience them, can be disregarded by students of systems only

4 • Moshe

Lewin

at the expense of their own irrelevance. Of course, societies are often declared to be state- or upper-class-dominated or "totalitarian," features that cannot be denied if they are in fact there. But the existence of domination is often not an end to the story. The d o m i n a t e d may have a bigger say than the view " f r o m a b o v e " would suggest. A more intricate look would show that the features of historical entities like regimes are rarely defined as the regimes themselves picture (or even strenuously deny) them. The same is even truer in the case of polities presided over by individuals (dictators). However powerful the despot (or whole movement), however lofty or base their purposes and aims, their acts are followed by cascades of consequences. O t h e r people's purposes and hopes join the stream. Yet, dwelling on decision-makers, on actors (loving or hating them) as was practiced by older generations of historians and was criticized by newer trends, seems to have returned now, at the price of dragging history as a profession backward. Decisions—by which I mean, of course, policy making in the broadest sense —are one thing, outcomes are another. The historical trade d e m a n d s the whole chain. But studies of the Soviet system and its history were particularly prone to engage, basically, in "regime studies," i.e. of ideology and of leaders. In addition, many often assumed some basic, inherent immutability of the regime whose leaders appear as the only m a k e r s and shakers of the country's fate. What such studies omitted were, first, the e n o r m o u s changes that took place in the social sphere during the twentieth century and, second, the trends and s p o n t a n e o u s transformations that were occurring in the midst of the state's political executives, inside the Party and the bureaucracies themselves, transformations that gradually merged into the prevailing pattern of the political system. Of course, the actions of the authorities created many new situations, opened or closed chains of events. Still, these authorities and the regimes they governed did not just shape history but were themselves shaped by it. In essence, the "mechanism" of such feedback resides in the fact that the flood of decisions and orders, plans and campaigns are "filtered" through the social sphere—social classes, opinion makers, bureaucratic layers. Hence the claim that orders are one thing, results are another. It seems even quite banal to state that the march of history is not a matter of wishes, even if backed by violence. This does not exclude ukazy and prikazy from the story; they are just a part of the story, at times not even its most important part. Employing a b r o a d e r formula I can now state something rather obvious: the state always played a key role in Russia's history, including during such an agitated period as the 1930s. But the state went through crises, decline or periods of downfall and recovery that resulted f r o m the interplay of many factors, including the state policies in question. The final outcome amounted to historical processes that affected the making and finally the unmaking of the state system. Without studying "processes," historical scholarship loses the ground u n d e r its feet. People who prefer "personality" as the supposed center of things historical, in contraposition to and in negation of "processes" in our century—a century of such enormous structural changes—seem to have missed an essential point: "personality"

Agency (,lichnost'),

and Process

•5

s o c r u c i a l f o r society, c u l t u r e a n d politics, is n o t a m e t a p h y s i c a l c o n -

c e p t . It is a social o n e , a n i m p o r t a n t p a r t of t h e g r e a t s t r e a m . Still, " p r o c e s s e s " d o n o t i m p l y t h a t d i f f e r e n t s p h e r e s of life a r e m a r c h i n g in s t e p l i k e s o l d i e r s o n a p a r a d e . A l t h o u g h t h e t e r m m a y c o n j u r e u p s o m e p i c t u r e of u n i l i n e a r i t y , t h e c o n c e p t of p r o c e s s d o e s n o t i m p l y s u c h a n u n r e a l i s t i c i d e a . T h e o p p o s i t e is t r u e : t r e n d s a r e m u l t i f a r i o u s . H e n c e all k i n d s of c r i s e s a n d all k i n d s of s u r p r i s e s : d e e p r e t r e a t s a n d s e t b a c k s , t h e s t u r d i n e s s of h i s t o r i c a l t r a d i t i o n s e v e n in a n d d e s p i t e h e c t i c c h a n g e s , c o n s i d e r a b l e flux a n d o p e n n e s s o r " f o g g i n e s s " of o u t c o m e s . S u c h flux a n d f o g g i n e s s p r o d u c e o c c a s i o n s a n d c i r c u m s t a n c e s w h e n a c t i o n s by an individual can m a k e a d i f f e r e n c e — o r be entirely futile.

SKETCHING STAGES A N D U N W A N T E D

OUTCOMES

L e t m e s k e t c h t h e m a i n s t a g e s in S o v i e t h i s t o r y , e a c h of t h e m e x h i b i t i n g s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e s t h a t w e r e c r u c i a l f o r t h e m a k i n g of t h e s y s t e m a n d f o r its u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e l a s t c h a p t e r of t h e t s a r i s t p e r i o d w a s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a still d o m i n a n t " a g r a r i a n c o m p l e x " ( o r n e x u s ) in its e c o n o m y , s o c i e t y a n d polity. Its c o m p o n e n t s w e r e t h e p e a s a n t r y w h o s u p p l i e d t h e b u l k of t h e r e g i m e ' s b a y o n e t s , t h e g e n t r y - n o b i l i t y (dvorianstvo)

w h o w e r e t h e m a i n s u p p o r t of a u t o c r a c y , a n d t h e i m p e r i a l c o u r t

w h o t o g e t h e r with the nobility supplied the r e g i m e ' s generals, politicians, a n d ruling camarillas.

This prevailing nexus exhibited at that time quite m e n a c i n g cracks

t h a t k e p t e x p a n d i n g , n o t a b l y u n d e r t h e p r e s s u r e of g r o w i n g c a p i t a l i s t s e c t o r s , c a r r i e r s of t h e m o d e r n e c o n o m y a n d its n e w e r s o c i a l layers. A t this s t a g e t h e w h o l e w a s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by t h e c o e x i s t e n c e of m o d e r n b a n k s , s t o c k e x c h a n g e s a n d c o r p o r a t i o n s with older type rural or s e m i - r u r a l fairs (iarmarki), an agricultural techn o l o g y c o n s i s t i n g of still w i d e s p r e a d w o o d e n p l o w s w i t h a s i n g l e (odnolemeshnyi

plug)

u s e d o n i n a d e q u a t e l y f e r t i l i z e d soil. R u r a l

plowshare

communities

w e r e o r g a n i z e d as m o r e a k i n d of e g a l i t a r i a n social s e c u r i t y s y s t e m t h a n a s a p r o d u c t i o n a n d p r o d u c t i v i t y - o r i e n t e d o r g a n i z a t i o n , a n d s u p e r v i s e d by a s t a t e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t e n p o p u l a t e d b y p r i m i t i v e b u l l i e s ( d e r z h i m o r d y ) in t h e p o l i c e a n d l o c a l b u r e a u c r a c i e s . T h u s , R u s s i a ' s s o c i a l s y s t e m w a s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by t h e e x i s t e n c e of a r a t h e r m o t l e y mnogoukladnost'

or " m u l t i l a y e r e d n e s s " to use Lenin's term or by

a p o o r connectivity (tseplenie) b e t w e e n the u p p e r and lower layers, and b e t w e e n the d i f f e r e n t social layers m a k i n g the social system i n h e r e n t l y fragile a n d p r o n e t o b r e a k d o w n . T h i s h u g e m o s a i c s h o w e d c l e a r signs of crisis, s o c i a l a n d p o l i t i c a l , e x p r e s s i n g itself n o t a b l y in t h e r e g i m e ' s i n a b i l i t y e i t h e r t o c o p e w i t h t h e t a s k s of d e f e n d i n g t h e h u g e t e r r i t o r y o r t o willingly e x t r i c a t e itself f r o m t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y inter-imperialist competition. T h e c o m p l i c a t e d crisis of t h e t s a r i s t s y s t e m w a s at t h e r o o t of t h e d r a m a t i c p e r i o d of 1 9 1 4 - 1 9 2 1 t h a t s a w a v e r y p a i n f u l e c o n o m i c a n d c u l t u r a l b a c k s l i d i n g of t h e w h o l e c o u n t r y , t h e e f f e c t s of w h i c h c a n b e s u b s u m e d u n d e r t h e t e r m of "archaization." Many advanced sectors disappeared or regressed while

some

6 • Moshe

Lewin

quite backward ones became more salient. The numerous and long-suffering peasantry came to the fore of the social landscape, not just because of their numbers but because peasants were more resilient than the modern cities against hard times, especially cataclysms of the Civil War variety. N E P gave the country the chance to restore its "biology" to some normalcy and to acquire a kind of equilibrium, on the basis of those sectors that were able to recover from the ravages of wars sooner than others. The peasantry, a mass of producers operating their structural mir cum dvor duumvirate, was reaping the positive and negative results of the revolution, notably of their own agrarian variety. The old gentry as well as the capitalist sectors were wiped out and the layer of N E P m e n that a p p e a r e d could not even be considered an ersatz of the latter. The state apparatus began to take on an ever more prominent position in the system, although the "bourgeois specialists" still played a disproportionately important role because of their experience and higher professionalism. They worked in an awkward harness with the "red directors," themselves uneven in their degree of proficiency and talent. The relatively small but very creative cultural sectors stood out conspicuously against the rural-plebeian landscape, and the Party still conserved many of its old cadres and its character and functioned as a political elite of the new system. Not for much longer though. T h e relative pluralism of the NEP, even in its polity, was being systematically eased out, paradoxically in the first place in the ruling Party itself. It was replaced by ever hardening monoliths, accompanied by a " m e t a s t a t ic" (as it would transpire later) growth of its apparatuses as well as a drastic ideological smena vekh (changing of landmarks)—all leading finally to the atrophy of Party politics. This was becoming conspicuous as the layer of " f o u n d e r s " was being pushed out, ground down or destroyed, and the Party, despite the presence of a massive rank-and-file (no administrators most of them), was in fact becoming primarily an administration—with a rank-and-file. The country managed to "restore" (as this was called) many of the pre-war economic indicators but this " r e s t o r a t i o n " also had a shadowy side: the indicators of success showed a movement towards Russia's pre-war production levels w h e r e a s the West E u r o p e a n countries were rushing ahead, overtaking by far their pre-war levels. Thus, a rather important achievement of the USSR could, in comparative terms, be seen as a successful m o v e m e n t . . . b a c k w a r d . The bifurcating trends between society (pluralist) and Party (growing m o n o lithic), between the internal (Soviet) and the international economies, p r o m p t e d the "over-administered" Party to launch in 1928-29 its well known " l e a p forward," or "shock treatment," which took the forms of collectivization and the big industrial drive. Such a state-engineered push was quite unusual even for the state-dominated Russian history, and it unleashed mighty streams of masses of people milling in different directions, a social tekuchka, or "flux," quite unprecedented in peace time. People went or fled or were dragged to cities, to industry and onto building sites, to schools and technical institutes, but also to camps and b e f o r e

Agency and Process • 7 firing squads. Creative work mingled with bacchanalian terror. A sui generis regime of "Stalinism" emerged and took root in those years, a regime that was not without its n u m e r o u s complexities and contradictions. A conspicuous class of nachal'stvo (bosses) appeared, flanked and undergirded by a vast, growing but under Stalinism still quite crumbly, bureaucratic maze. A very crucial player indeed, but no o n e suspected at that time (except Stalin himself, probably) that these nachal'stvo would actually become Stalinism's gravediggers. They would replace his " m o d e l " or regime by another I call "bureaucratic absolutism," a term borrowed from a study of Prussian absolutism. At the same time, during the 1930s, the urbanization of the country was proceeding hectically in conflicting and painstaking ways, but after the war migration to cities took on a torrential dimension. The millennial rural sociology of the country was now fast turning urban. This, of course, would bring about a real civilizational shift, although again not without its woes and distortions, due partly to the speed and scope of the p h e n o m e n o n , partly to its specifically Soviet limitations. By the time the political regime was showing signs of not coping with this new internal (and international) reality, the new urban society itself was still not strong and "organic" enough to take advantage of the situation. The system fell apart, leaving behind it its greedy but not too proficient bureaucrats in a situation when the new urban society was not yet ripe enough to produce new leaders and advance towards creating an effective economy and polity. So the old could not anymore and the new was not yet ready. Finally, the "multilayeredness" of "process" must also accommodate the vicissitudes of "ideology." The perfectly ahistorical conception of ideology as fixity, which also expresses corresponding realities of power and of social life in the Soviet system, is a hallucinating case of "surrealism" among supposedly competent experts. There is no need to d o u b t the commitment of the "founding f a t h e r s " to their Marxism and socialism; in fact Marxism taught them that socialism in Russia alone was not feasible. Stalin's statement to the contrary was already a manipulation of ideology, used as camouflage for the fact that the original commitments became suffused with new realities that needed and in fact were replaced, overtly or covertly, by new ideological formulae. Even if some p r o p o n e n t s and opponents continued to claim that the USSR was a socialist system, did they really describe what this system actually was? Socialist (communist) ideology was a phenomenon of a connivance left and right, to keep the fiction alive. The result was a string of consequences.The system was not studied in appropriate terms, its property and power relations were not properly examined and defined, its springs of dynamism and sources of decline and fall were misunderstood. It was misunderstood first by the carriers of the regime themselves who were still dealing with a reality they could not reform because—among other factors—they did not understand what was it that they had to reform, and second also by Westerners and others who perpetrated the great ideological charade of our times—"socialism fell," Marxism died, capitalism—the one and only—won!

8 • Moshe

Lewin

Thus, f o r e a c h of t h e s t a g e s I briefly m e n t i o n e d a set of e x a m p l e s can be o f f e r e d s h o w i n g results b i f u r c a t i n g f r o m " i n t e n t i o n s . " T h e s p h e r e of p l a n n i n g , with its claim of a r a t i o n a l i t y t h a t c h a o t i c capitalist m a r k e t s could n o t m a t c h , w a s helplessly facing t h e e n d l e s s list of n e v e r finished building sites, t h e falling efficiency of c a p i t a l i n v e s t m e n t s , t h e g r o w i n g w a s t e of e n e r g y a n d matériel—all

p o i n t i n g to

a d e e p l y s e a t e d p r o p e n s i t y of t h e p l a n n e d e c o n o m y to s q u a n d e r r e s o u r c e s . T h e d i s c a r d i n g of t h e N e w E c o n o m i c Policy w a s f o l l o w e d by w h a t can be figuratively called t h e r e v e n g e of t h e N E P : t h e a p p e a r a n c e in t h e Stalinist m o d e l of black m a r k e t s , q u a s i - m a r k e t s a n d t r u n c a t e d m a r k e t s inside a n d a m o n g t h e s t a t e e n t e r prises. " D y s f u n c t i o n a l " p e a s a n t b e h a v i o r a n d t h e u n i n t e n d e d s k e w e d

"triple-

w h e e l e d " e c o n o m i c s of collectivized agriculture (the collective fields of t h e

kolkhoz,

t h e p e a s a n t s ' p r i v a t e family plots, t h e s t a t e ' s t r a c t o r s t a t i o n s ) f r u s t r a t e d t h e i n t e n t i o n s of t h e g e n e r a l system. Its p r o p a g a n d a of S t a k h a n o v i s m , f o r e x a m p l e , did n o t fit y o u n g p e o p l e ' s a s p i r a t i o n s . In s h o r t — a h o s t of c o n s t a n t f r u s t r a t i o n s f o r Stalin and n u m e r o u s disappointments for Khrushchev, though the e n o r m o u s difference in t h e way t h e s e two r e a c t e d t o their f r u s t r a t i o n s c a n n o t be d i s r e g a r d e d . All t h e s e p h e n o m e n a h e l p d e e p e n o u r s e n s e of " p r o c e s s , " t h e key i d e a h e r e . T h e o u t c o m e s of i n t e r a c t i o n s a n d m a n i f e s t a t i o n s on a b r o a d c a n v a s a r e f a r t h e r r e a c h i n g and m o r e c o m p l e x t h a n the m o r e n a r r o w d o m a i n of political actions, initiatives and crimes. In fact, such a c t i o n s by l e a d e r s h i p and leaders, in s u m , also get s u b m e r g e d in t h e " p r o c e s s , " as t h e y filter t h r o u g h social realities a n d c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s a n d play their role in t h e flow of h i s t o r y b o t h as its s u b j e c t s a n d its o b j e c t s . S u c h is also t h e case of t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e s , especially in i n t e r p l a y with social t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s a n d t r e n d s of all kinds.

S T A G E S IN T H E OF

DEVELOPMENT

BUREAUCRACY

B u r e a u c r a c y is a complicated and far-flung social milieu per se as well as t h e c a r r i e r of t h e state s y s t e m . It h a d its o w n g r o w t h p a n g s a n d p h a s e s inside t h e g e n e r a l historical f r a m e w o r k s k e t c h e d earlier. I will n o w focus specifically on the p a t h t r a v e l e d by b u r e a u c r a c y t h a t led finally to its full d o m i n a t i o n of t h e system. In t h e p e r i o d a f t e r t h e Civil War, t h e s t a t e b u r e a u c r a c y w a s m a i n l y " p l e b e i a n " in its c o m p o s i t i o n a n d ideology. In this fact r e s i d e d t h e n e w r e g i m e ' s s t r e n g t h , b u t also i m p o r t a n t w e a k n e s s e s : t h e low e d u c a t i o n a l a n d p r o f e s s i o n a l q u a l i f i c a t i o n of t h e s e c a d r e s m a d e t h e r e g i m e d e p e n d e n t o n " b o u r g e o i s specialists." In this c o n text a q u i t e r e m a r k a b l e i n t e r a c t i o n of n e w h o p e s a n d a s p i r a t i o n s r e l a t e d t o t h e r e g i m e ' s i d e o l o g y can b e o b s e r v e d , with t h e u n a v o i d a b l e t h o u g h n o t n e c e s s a r i l y fully r e c o g n i z e d a s s i m i l a t i o n of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e m o d e l s a n d

pre-Revolutionary

a u t h o r i t a r i a n t r a d i t i o n s a n d habits. A l s o d u r i n g t h e c o n d i t i o n s of N E P , w i t h its prevailing mir-cum-dvor

e c o n o m i c s c e n e a n d t h e w e a k n e s s of the s t a t e ' s i n d u s t r i a l

sector, t h e s t a t e m a c h i n e r y a n d its b u r e a u c r a c y did n o t yet r e s e m b l e t h e o c t o p u s it

Agency and Process • 9 was going to become especially after Stalin. Although top officials on all levels were sent in from the cities, they and the majority of lower rank officials were—and could not but be—an administration of a still predominantly rural society. T h e p r e s s u r e on them from above would come f r o m a modernization-oriented regime and its elites, but the counter-pressure from a r o u n d them and f r o m below would p o w e r f u l l y c o m m a n d to adapt to (and to some extent to feed on) a much slower moving structure of a still basically pre-capitalist Russia. T h e Stalinist period created conditions for a fully bureaucratized state model, n o t a b l y because both collectivization, aiming at a mighty boost for the backwater countryside, and accelerated industrialization were imposed by the state and t h e s e types of campaigns pushed the state "machineries" to expand. A n o t h e r angle and aspect of the bureaucratic networks is covered by the term "cadres," referring to people in leadership positions at all levels of the state and Party bodies. T h e quality of these cadres, whoever they h a p p e n e d to be at the time, was crucial. W e r e the cadres modern enough to be capable of modernizing anything? A forceful dynamization of a society from a different age needed those agents that had to be c r e a t e d deus ex machina as the strategies were being perceived and launched. H e n c e this specific flip side permeating Stalinist dynamism and its improvisational character: a coexistence of a d e e p bureaucratization with a powerful and specifically extra-bureaucratic quality—despotism—or, putting it differently, a case of an extra-bureaucratic version of etatism that has to whip its own modernizing bureaucrats. Stalin could not do without the bureaucracy, neither could he trust it and live in peace with it. This explains the coexistence of the mobilization urge versus the need in administrative routine—the proverbial Jekyll and H y d e synd r o m e — t h a t coexisted more than uneasily in the Stalinist dictatorship. This dualism was eventually restored when "Stalinism" was replaced by the administrative logic of a n o t h e r version of etatism. This version was not based on "cults" or "mobilizations" (if they could help it) but m o r e on extolling the state and the principles of statehood and on a take-over of the system by a bureaucracy so tentacular that it would merit the characteristic of a "bureaucratic absolutism" for much of the post-Stalinist period. U n d e r Stalin and due to Stalinism's specific features, bureaucracy could not yet obtain such fullness of power. To its low professional standards must be added the factor that the majority of people in technical and administrative jobs were praktitki who learned their trade on the job. Moreover, many were still new to their bureaucratic jobs and ranks. Thus the bureaucracy was still fragile and vulnerable. The Party, so far almost forgotten in this picture, was so for good reasons: it lost its leading role. During "the cult" it became primarily o n e of the executors of orders. Its own institutions did not really function and it had to e n d u r e the pressure of campaigns, shakeups and either bloodless or ever more often bloody purges not unlike the state apparatus, even if both tried to do as they were told. The "dualism" of administrative routine coexisting with powerful campaignlike drives (kampaneishchina) began to disappear during the post-Stalinist period

10 • Moshe

Lewin

(especially after the removal of Khrushchev f r o m power) because the b u r e a u cracy—as might have been expected—eliminated all the features of Stalinism that were not acceptable to it, did not allow it to sleep at night, did not offer any j o b security, not to mention the security of simple survival. There was no tenure whatsoever, a quality that most bureaucracies crave and obtain. With Stalin gone, the state system was re-stabilized and key bureaucratic agencies reached the apogee of power. Bureaucracy became the system's personification. Khrushchev managed to resurrect, for a time, the Party structures that lost their previous political functions to Stalin but without changing their by now prevailing administrative character. In due course the Party administration would, for all practical purposes, merge with the highest ranks (golovki) of the state-bureaucratic elite, becoming in essence assimilated by the latter and serving mainly as their mouthpiece. Contrary to prevailing interpretations, it was the controlling device of nomenklatura, supposedly the tool for Party control over the state's leading cadres, that m a d e such an outcome possible. In sum, Khrushchev's resurrected Party lost its power again. A stage was reached—notably during the time that half-dead or quickly dying general secretaries supposedly " r a n " the show—when nobody could impose any national policy on the huge ministerial cohorts—udel'nye kniazhestva (princely appanages) to boot. A n d there was no leadership available by then even to formulate a meaningful policy. During early periods in Soviet history, popular and state interests as expressed by at least parts of the leadership and of the Party and state apparaty could be represented even quite openly, but this capacity kept shrinking. The victory in the " G r e a t Patriotic War" and the accession to the role of one of the two superpowers —very remarkable feats indeed - helped camouflage for a time the fact that both the Stalinist and later the post-Khrushchev regimes were exhibiting quite profound signs of decay (zagnivanie or zastoi). In both these cases, not unlike in much of tsarist history, the country was appearing on the world scene and occupying there a position that was not backed up by an adequate techno-economic f o u n dation. The d e e p bureaucratization of the system contributed to a dramatic immobilization of its previously very obvious dynamic. Again, all those were processes — o r a process—which led to self-destruction, some saying "inexorably" ( n e u m o limo), others maintaining that alternatives existed at each stage. Still, political stagnation should not be mistaken for immobility of structures. In fact, the term "immobilized" (in terms of inability to formulate and execute reforms) does not mean that bureaucracy—a complicated maze of structures and layers, a politico-administrative machine—was not undergoing changes. Decay, decline, zastoi also mean changes, trends—in fact, processes—that concerned the political arena as well as the b r o a d e r social system. The two were deeply enmeshed, though certainly not harmoniously. In the final analysis "the whole thing" was moving somewhere else—away f r o m official and even unofficial objectives and towards fracturing the state and depriving its once mighty center of its power.

Agency and Process • 11 HISTORICAL

LIABILITIES

This brings me to the subject of some long-standing liabilities of the historical milieu, notably subsumed under the term "archaic," especially those archaic feat u r e s that can be discerned in the very process of "modernization" that accounted f o r the inability of the Soviet industrial giant to go on, k e e p evolving and finally " m a k e it" into a viable industrial civilization. The explanation lies in decip h e r i n g the features that "closed" the model, r a t h e r than keeping it open and flexible. To use an eye-opener, without claims to scholarly precision, the historical c o n u n d r u m in which the country found itself consisted in having to resolve in the twentieth century problems of the nineteenth by using methods of the eighteenth. A n d they were resolving problems that were not solved (and continued to accum u l a t e ) already during a long, pre-Revolutionary period, with those "archaic" f e a t u r e s being already present, precisely, in the process of the ongoing m o d e r n ization at that time. Such a formula points in the direction of some kind of overlaying (and accumulating) of problems stemming from different periods of Russian history and awaiting solutions that were not forthcoming. T h e inquiry can start from "the s t a t e " and the term "statism" that goes with it, namely an ideology and a practice that was central to the whole Soviet phen o m e n o n and had d e e p precedents in Russia's past. The roots and especially character of this main agency—the state, its rulers and the bureaucracy—should be considered in interrelation with the (changing) social structures, never just "alone," isolated from the relevant context. This idea of "context" is crucial and should, of course, include also the international dimension. Realities of a b r o a d and coming f r o m a b r o a d — f r o m the West, but not only from there—exercised a powerful pressure, contributed to the country's development but often also magnified its problems. This factor was related to and c o m p o u n d e d by Russia's size, which was too large for the h u m a n capital and institutional setting to be mastered "intensively." The extensive m e t h o d s were easier and also self-perpetuating. These features continued in Soviet Russia and are still there, despite the shedding of much of the empire, and they continue during the current restructuring where an extensive squandering of resources is still fully present. Hence the interest in the idea of mnogoukladnost' (multi-layeredness) that might have been inspired by Miliukov's conception of the fragmentation of Russia's social structure and the lack of sufficient sync among the parts. It did not necessarily mean that the social entity was deprived of any "adhesives." Those certainly existed—among them religion, popular monarchism, the state apparatus, emerging national markets (railroads). There must have been enough unifiers for the system to have endured so long and with such long periods of stability, though not without periods of enormous turmoil. The problem then is: why did the "unifiers" give in? The main "unifier" being the state, what made it crack, several times over in Russian history? The answer can be found only "in the interplay," in "a system of imbalances." The most potent general diagnostic formula is the lack

12 • Moshe

Lewin

of fit between the hectic development of the economy and of sectors with a more m o d e m social structure versus important parts moving slower or sideways, or running counter (naperekor) or not at all because the different parts did not really live "in the same age," culturally, economically, mentally. H e r e the idea of an "agrarian nexus" and its longevity can be singled out, useful for the tsarist period when it included the peasantry, the nobility and the tsarist court, powerfully glued, or so it looked, when in fact the potential for fissures was quite visible. In a different interplay, the agrarian nexus was still a powerful factor during the early Soviet period, again not without its vulnerabilities. In the later Soviet period, however, the large social components of the grand historical interplay changed considerably.

T H E W H Y S OF T H E S O V I E T

DEMISE

O n e particularly important "systemic" feature in the Soviet period was the principle of state ownership of the country's economic assets. This theme is not being introduced here suddenly and independently f r o m the previous line of thought. As shall be seen, the more ancient and the more m o d e r n structures of power had something crucial in common. The principle of almost universal state ownership over most of the country's economic and cultural resources is connected to, or correlated with, the monopolization of social and political power by certain networks—something that official ideology would strenuously deny. No wonder! The principle of state ownership was actually dispossessing the bulk of the producing and creative population and empowering mainly the upper layers of bureaucrats and, by omission, also many smaller ones. Once e m b a r k e d on this path, the bureaucratic principle was allowed to reach its fullness by evolving fortress-like networks, defending their vested interests tooth and nail, and was mightily organized (geared) towards this kind of self-centered activity. When concessions of importance to extra-bureaucratic forces (elites, social classes, nationalities) were required and proposals to engage in meaningful reforms began to spurt from all kind of quarters, they were perceived as menacing to the very existence of the power structure, testifying to the fact the system's vitality was extinguished. The inability to provide leaders, to formulate meaningful programs, to impose them on the state machinery—all were manifestations of "immobility," to say the least. In fact, there was no longer anyone above this machinery who would be willing and strong enough to impose anything on it. By now the raison d'être of the ruling networks was to stay put. B u t remaining still was bad for their cholesterol level. Although the enigmatic secretaryship of Iurii A n d r o p o v would allow a welter of problems to be raised, it didn't last long enough to be dealt with meaningfully in this framework. Let me rather continue the inquiry into the whys of the demise. For this the property-ownership conundrum is crucial. Although claiming for itself the super-modern socialist credentials, state ownership of economic assets, notably

Agency and Process • 13 land, was an old feature of Russia's political system, crucial for the making of its autocracy. It was Marx himself who characterized this old state ownership (mostly, but not only of land) as an "Asian" feature (meaning both ancient and "archaic") that the tsarist system was erected on and, in many ways, afflicted by until its very downfall. "State ownership" as a systemic principle was for Marx something " u n - m o d e r n , " even archaic. Underscoring my argument (not derived from Marx in this context) is the fact that, although state-ownership in the USSR was claimed and widely accepted as a socialist principle par excellence, it was continuing an old historical tradition rather than opening a new chapter of social emancipation, which is what socialism was supposed to mean. A n intriguing but relevant aside is that in the historic Soviet "declaration of the rights of the laboring nation" (deklaratsia prav trudovogo naroda) of early 1918, the freshly minted Soviet legislators themselves discerned three forms (or modes) of property and ownership: "socialized" (of land), "nationalized" (of forests, minerals) and direct "state ownership" (of sovkhozy, factories). The latter became the dominant mode of ownership of the highly bureaucratized system. It was plagued by internal contradictions and tensions that worked, paradoxically, in the direction of emptying this concept of its intended c o n t e n t — o n e more of those unintended but powerful, even fatal processes leading, to put it cautiously, towards something different. A f t e r all, although in different circumstances and different in kind, an equally meaningful and astonishing trend was observed in the West where private ownership as the main source of economic power was replaced in the corporate world by the actual power of those who manage, although formally they were, at best, co-owners through shareholding. In Soviet Russia too those who directly managed the productive assets became, for all practical purposes, carriers of state ownership first, almost owners, owners de facto, finally owners tout court, depriving the center of what was its main source of power and its legitimizing principle. Through these processes that worked their way sneakily and underhandedly, the very concept of state ownership and its primordiality for the system's claims was undermined. The realities of bureaucratic planning and management, notably as practiced "on the ground," ushered in a "feudalization" of the national productive assets, with the bureaucratic fiefdoms gaining at the expense of the center and causing the system as a whole to lose its potency. The party-state as a functioning entity became irrelevant. In the post-perestroika era it became clear that although the system exited, its ministries and the administrators (upravlentsy) remained, including in the vast production units-with the proviso that those were not among the best and most honest of the previous casts. The lords of these agencies, in particular of the big economic conglomerates, had to look for a different kind of principle of power and survival and they found it, under Yeltsin. They transformed themselves into corporate entities operating on the m a r k e t having acquired these assets by hook and by crook, in a process of "privatization" that begun to manifest itself in the last years of Brezhnev's rule. The most important became and remain m o n o p o lies—a process still unfolding and far f r o m finished.

14 • Moshe

Lewin CONCLUSIONS

Twentieth-century Russia moved through shattering crises and very complicated break-downs ( \ o m k i ) that almost converged under Stalin whose rule straddled a n u m b e r of those crisis-makers, " h a n d l e d " them and ushered in a regime carrying his name. Considering the different phases the regime went through—notably the Stalinist and the early post-Stalinist one—they appear endowed with a considerable driving power that allowed them to recover the country's capacity to wage warfare (which tsarist Russia seemed to have lost) as well as to manage m o r e effectively its territory, including launching large-scale policies of d e v e l o p m e n t and/or reforms. This capacity was lost twice again during the Soviet period too: u n d e r Stalin, probably during and a r o u n d the great purges, and in the postKhrushchev period, in the late 1960s and early 1970s after Kosygin's 1965 r e f o r m s were scuttled. As it turned out, an inability to act set in for good and finally turned out to be fatal. This latest phase can be subsumed under the general diagnosis I already alluded to, namely that the population, notably the urban one, acquired many m o d e r n features and attitudes, both intended and many u n i n t e n d e d , regim e n t e d by a system that lacked or lost the ability to adapt to this population and, in fact, to its new social structure. The socio-economic underpinnings of those transitions are worth a n o t h e r glance f r o m a different angle. O n e can speak of a march from proto-capitalism to pre-capitalism; f r o m pre-capitalism to a mixed economy, mostly small scale; and next a leap into industrialization, which took on a vast and expansive dimension, accompanied and followed by, first, a sui generis cultic despotism and finally, a full-fledged bureaucratic power. These transitions followed closely upon each o t h e r ' s heels, with a crisis a p p e n d e d to each of them: Stalinism emerging in a concatenation of all of them at one stage, Khrushchev at another, and G o r b a c h e v appearing (and disappearing) in yet another, different "interplay." Thus, whatever the regime (policies, ideologies, decisions) there were at all times historical flows, processes at work, that may be totally missed if the study is purely regime-oriented or, in one of its versions, anti-regime-oriented. The key t o understanding the regime is to be found in "monopoly of power." Writers of social fantasies like Zamiatin, Huxley and Orwell prophesized that a " m o n o p o l y " like that would end up in a complete enslavement of human beings and their transformation into n u m b e r e d cogs. But history, despite its dark pages, dodged this terrible trap. The state monopoly on national wealth—the source of the f a t e f u l power hub—was also harboring, f r o m the outset, an inherent tendency to fragmenting this power hub and to losing control over its own fate. Instead of its p r e dicted function of a nightmarish super-controller, spontaneous processes inside the apparaty, in their interplay with the dynamics of the socio-economic spheres, actually worked against the system. This may be the reason why the h e r o of Alexa n d e r Tvardovskii's poem, the brave soldier Terkin who found himself after t h e war in the heavenly kingdom ("na torn svete"), might have p r e f e r r e d to return t o

Agency and Process • 15 e a r t h and to the Soviet bureaucratic reality instead of enduring the perfection of t h e celestial administration those on earth unsuccessfully tried to achieve. As he put it, in substance, unlike those in the higher spheres, those on earth were at least breathing. O n e of the most pernicious trends—unwanted yet m o r e powerful than all the controllers and agencies set up to prevent it—was a massive, finally fatal squandering of national resources that became the prevailing f e a t u r e of a regime in the stage of decay. Simultaneously, the damage inflicted upon cultural life by the regime's propagandist primitivism also contributed, in the first place, to the lifelessness of the official ideology itself. The internal logic of bureaucratic interests clashed with the rationale of economic, political and even administrative performance. Instead of handling the serious business of systemic politics, the system actually ceased being one and the spontaneous catering to the interests of the maze of administrative agencies began to dominate the agenda. But there was a built-in time limit to the atrophy of the political will: despite the absence of any kind of the proverbial mass revolt (pugachevshchina) so often predicted by the so-called connoisseurs of the Russian soul. Astonishing as it may look, the system was not really toppled—its agencies scuttled it. The regime died from natural causes, killed by its own anachronism. Their own world (not to mention the world tout court) became too complex for this model of governing—they did actually a great j o b in the past that somehow put them to sleep. The p h e n o m e n o n of collapse due to system fatigue h a p p e n e d in Russia's twentieth century several times and it could h a p p e n again, if it is not the case already. The ability to produce capable leaders, lost by the previous regime, has not b e e n recovered so far and the maze of interconnected imbalances, an old historical feature, is still afflicting Russia without showing any sign of abating. The notable fact of Russian life I referred to above that can be called "recurrent relapses into u n d e r d e v e l o p m e n t " is menacing Russia again at the current stage. This is d u e to the inability, despite all the surges forward, to s u r m o u n t an inherited or recurrent "system of imbalances." This historical liability or " b u r d e n , " as I call it, was a crisis-maker par excellence that w a n d e r e d over from the tsarist period and lingered on or was resurrected as measures were taken in response to crises, the Civil War, a switch to the NEP, the switch away f r o m the N E P and into the accelerated industrialization period, the mobilization for the Second World War, for the postwar recovery. So far, the Soviet system was shaped by emergencies and responded by means of military style c o m m a n d and police coercion. The war, despite t h e fatal errors of leadership at its beginning, was actually the sum of the Stalinist regime's abilities as an organization for handling emergencies. The next stage, although marred again by a n o t h e r type of war—the Cold War that has to be left out in this essay—did produce a different, more society-oriented political setting that relaxed considerably the previous coercive state system and enabled an expansion of rights for labor and the intelligentsia, some de facto often also de jure. T h e problem was that the main beneficiary of the emancipation

16 • Moshe

Lewin

( f r o m S t a l i n i s m ) was t h e P a r t y a n d s t a t e b u r e a u c r a c y . R u n n i n g t h e s t a t e stepped b e i n g a c h a i n of e m e r g e n c i e s ; it b e c a m e a b u s i n e s s - a s - u s u a l r o u t i n e a f f a i r rin by a n d e v e r m o r e o b v i o u s l y in t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e b u r e a u c r a c y . W h a t c o n t i n u e d o b e called " p l a n n i n g " was in fact t h e still surviving ability to c o n c e n t r a t e o n "piiorities," m o s t l y in r e s p o n s e t o C o l d W a r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t h a t a l l o w e d , t h o u g h e v e r m o r e t e n u o u s l y to cling t o a s u p e r p o w e r p o s i t i o n . B u t t h e real basis f o r t h e s i p e r p o w e r s t a t u s could h a v e b e e n p r e s e r v e d only t h r o u g h u n l e a s h i n g e c o n o m i c a n d c u l t u r a l g r o w t h by g r a n t i n g t h e p o p u l a t i o n f r e e d o m f o r action a n d m a k i n g i l i n t o t h e s t a t e ' s real p a r t n e r — o r r a t h e r the s y s t e m ' s real s o v e r e i g n . B u t o n c e t h e n o b i lizational f e a t u r e s s u b s i d e d , allowing t h e b u r e a u c r a c y to b e c o m e t h e estallishm e n t par excellence,

a d e e p c o n s e r v a t i v e b e n t t o o k o v e r f o r g o o d . T h e le;ding

b u r e a u c r a t i c p o l i t i c o - a d m i n i s t r a t i v e class did n o t r e s t o r e its d y n a m i c s o n a n e w base. R a t h e r it d e v e l o p e d a t a s t e f o r a s t a t u s q u o a n d it lost its c a p a c i t y f o r politics, j u s t w h e n c o n d i t i o n s w e r e r i p e n i n g a n d t h e n e e d was g r o w i n g t o g e t rid cf t h e old historical liabilities t h a t k e p t p u s h i n g t h e c o u n t r y into excessive reliance o n state power—"statism" for short. It m a y well b e t h a t t h e " y o u n g e r " C h i n e s e m o d e l t h a t r e v e r s e d its collecti/izat i o n - c o m m u n i z a t i o n c o u r s e a n d was t h e r e f o r e a b l e to r e a p p l y its o w n s u p e r W E P , s t o p p i n g just w h e r e t h e Soviets w e n t t o o f a r , i.e., into an i r r e v e r s i b l e b u r e a i c r a t ic cul-de-sac.

But all this is just a t h o u g h t .

A Dynastic or Ethno-Dynastic Tsardom? Two Early Modern Concepts of Russia ZENON E . KOHUT

In 1669 Fedor Akimovich Griboedov (ca. 1620-1673) produced for Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich R o m a n o v a short History of the Tsars and Grand Princes of the Rus' Land, a c o m p e n d i u m of the basic political and historical ideas prevailing at the tsarist court and most likely intended as a textbook for the tsar's children. 1 Soon a f t e r w a r d in 1674, a monk at the Kyivan Caves Monastery sought the attention of the s a m e Tsar Aleksei R o m a n o v by publishing the Synopsis, or short compilation from various chronicles about the origin of the Slavic-Rus' nation and the first princes of the divinely preserved city of Kyiv and the life of the holy, pious grand prince of Kyiv and all Rossiia, the first autocrat Volodimer and about the inheritors of his virtuous Rus' domain, even unto our illustrious and virtuous sovereign, tsar, and grand prince Aleksei Mikhailovich, autocrat of all Great, Little and White Rossiia.2 While these two works were written almost simultaneously, they presented two distinct visions of early m o d e r n Russia—a bifurcation that would persist into the m o d e r n era. For Griboedov, Russian history is the history of dynastic rule, and his principal concern is to establish dynastic legitimacy and continuity from Volodimer to Aleksei Romanov. G r i b o e d o v considers Volodimer the G r e a t to have been the f o u n d e r of tsarist rule, calling him a divinely "crowned prince and equal of the apostles" and an " a u t o c r a t bearing the true tsarist name, possessing the titles of ruler and tsar." 3 G r i b o e d o v then moves back in time f r o m Volodimer to Rurik, the founder of the Rurikid dynasty, w h o "ruled in G r e a t Novgorod and throughout the Rus' land." H e p r o c e e d s to link Rurik with the R o m a n E m p e r o r Augustus Caesar, thereby associating Volodimer with the universal monarchy of Rome. 4 The link with imperial monarchy is bolstered by the claim that Volodimer's successor, Volodimer M o n o m a k h , received the tsar's insignia together with acknowledgement of his tsarist rank from the Byzantine E m p e r o r Constantine IX Monomachos. 5 Following the death of M o n o m a k h , G r i b o e d o v focuses on the transmission of the tsarist scepter to the north, first to Vladimir-Suzdal and then to Moscow: "the Rus' tsarist domain began dividing into many parts and the Kyivan primacy and eminence began to pass elsewhere." 6 Accordingly, Griboedov considers Iurii Dolgorukii the

18 • Zenon E. Kohut "true heir of the Rus' tsarist domain," even though he did not rule in Kyiv, but in Suzdal and Rostov. At every step Griboedov tries to promote the notion that Moscow and its dynasty were divinely elected. For example, he focuses on the fourth son of Aleksandr Nevskii, Daniil, whose descendants ruled in Moscow, linking Daniil alone with both Rurik and Volodimer. "At that very time the honor and glory of grand-princely rule descended upon the God-loving city of Moscow, [where] God wanted to glorify His holy Name and primacy and confirm His divinely appointed tsardom." Daniil is portrayed even more insistently as having been chosen by God; his descendants are loved and glorified by God, who has ensured their rule for generations to come. Consequently, Daniil's son, Ivan Kalita, is characterized by epithets such as "faithful" and "divinely chosen successor and blessed heir of the virtuous state, the God-loving tsardom of the Rus' land." 7 A f t e r mentioning the death of Tsar Fedor and the extinction of the Rurikid dynasty, Griboedov presents the genealogy of the Romanovs. Yet he has to explain the existence of two rulers between the Rurikids and Romanovs, which is particularly difficult in a narrative that insists on the continuous dynastic transmission of the "tsarist scepter" from Volodimer to the current ruler of Muscovy. Boris Godunov is plainly characterized as a usurper unworthy of the crown, but Griboedov regards Vasilii Shuiskii's election as tsar more neutrally: "favored to be tsar of Muscovy was boyar Prince Vasilii Ivanovich Shuiskii." 8 Nevertheless, Griboedov mentions the unpopularity of the new tsar, which led to "mutiny and civil unrest." As far as Griboedov is concerned, the true successor could only be Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov, whose election is described in great detail. Griboedov tries to legitimize and glorify Romanov rule in three ways. First and foremost, he seeks to associate the Romanovs with the Rurikids. Thus he refers to the first wife of Ivan IV, Anastasiia Zakharieva-Iurieva, who supposedly was the aunt of Mikhail Fedorovich (in fact, she was an aunt of Mikhail's father). Griboedov later remedies his previous "oversight" by rightly identifying Mikhail Fedorovich as a nephew of the deceased Fedor Ivanovich. 9 He indirectly bolsters his thesis about Mikhail's close relation to the Rurikids through the biography of his father, Patriarch Filaret of Muscovy, whom Griboedov terms "a relative of Tsar Ivan Vasilievich" and of his son Fedor Ivanovich. Mikhail's son, Aleksei Mikhailovich, is already titled tsar and autocrat of all "Great, Little and White Russia" and "inheritor from father and grandfather, successor, ruler and possessor of many states and lands." 10 Subsequently, the text mentions Aleksei's forebear, St. Volodimer. 11 Finally, near the end of the work, there is an appeal from "the people" to Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich in which the new (Romanov) dynasty is unequivocally and directly linked with the previous one (the Rurikids): the last two Rurikid tsars, Ivan and Fedor, are identified simply as Aleksei's great-grandfather and grandfather, respectively. Griboedov's previous reference to the fact that the last Rurikid tsar, Fedor Ivanovich, died childless is forgotten. 1 2 The Romanov dynasty gains further legitimacy as a result of its election by God and the people alike. Thus Griboedov emphasizes the divine election of the

A Dynastic

or Ethno-Dynastic

Tsardom?

• 19

n e w tsar, " f a i t h f u l a n d noble, elected and blessed by G o d f r o m his m o t h e r ' s w o m b . " 1 3 W h e n M i k h a i l allegedly r e f u s e s t h e c r o w n . A r c h b i s h o p F e o d o r of R i a z a n a n d starets A v r a m i i Palitsin insist t h a t " [ y o u ] d o w h a t G o d has o r d a i n e d t h a t you d o [i.e. a c c e p t t h e c r o w n ] , f o r i n d e e d you a r e c h o s e n ; d o n o t o f f e n d all the bisho p s a n d G o d ! " In G r i b o e d o v ' s a c c o u n t , t h e p e o p l e s t a n d i n g on t h e c e n t r a l m a r k e t s q u a r e n e a r t h e K r e m l i n s h o u t u n a n i m o u s l y : " L e t M i k h a i l F e d o r o v i c h be t s a r a n d r u l e r of t h e w h o l e M u s c o v i t e s t a t e a n d t h e R u s s i a n d o m a i n ! " 1 4 All a t t e m p t s o n t h e p a r t of M i k h a i l a n d his m o t h e r to d e c l i n e t h e election a r e c o u n t e r e d by t h e " w a i l i n g a n d w e e p i n g " of t h e a r c h b i s h o p a n d by t h e b o y a r S h e r e m e t i e v , while " t h e p o p u l a r masses, y o u n g a n d old alike, firmly a n d u n a n i m o u s l y . . . w a n t n o n e o t h e r [than M i k h a i l ] as s o v e r e i g n tsar of t h e M u s c o v i t e s t a t e and have n o t h o u g h t of a n y o n e else." 1 5 T h u s G r i b o e d o v s e e k s t o s h o w t h a t t h e election of Mikhail Fed o r o v i c h was n o t only f a v o r e d by G o d b u t also s u p p o r t e d by the w h o l e p e o p l e . H a v i n g established the primacy of the tsarist dynasty, does G r i b o e d o v indicate over w h a t territory or p e o p l e that dynasty r u l e ? T h e territory is u n d o u b t e d l y s o m e f o r m of " R u s ' . " T h e c o n c e p t of t h e R u s ' land first a p p e a r s in the title of the work, which takes u p two w h o l e pages of t h e original text. T h e title begins with V o l o d i m e r Sviatoslavych e n l i g h t e n i n g t h e " R u s ' l a n d " with t h e introduction of Christianity and goes o n to m e n t i o n Mikhail Fedorovich ( a u t o c r a t of "all R u s ' " ) and Aleksei Mikhailovich ( " a u t o c r a t of all G r e a t and Little and W h i t e R u s ' " ) , concluding with such epithets as " G r e a t R u s s i a " a n d the " G r e a t R u s s i a n t s a r d o m . " 1 6 Thus, for t h e a u t h o r , " R u s s i a " o r the " R u s s i a n t s a r d o m " is a c o n t i n u a t i o n of the R u s ' land first m e n t i o n e d in c o n n e c t i o n with V o l o d i m e r — i n fact, the highest stage of its d e v e l o p m e n t . A t n o t i m e d o e s G r i b o e d o v d e f i n e t h e g e o g r a p h i c a l e x t e n t of t h e " R u s ' l a n d , " b u t in r e f e r e n c e t o t h e reign of V o l o d i m e r he d o e s m e n t i o n Kyiv, N o v g o r o d t h e G r e a t , Polatsk, Tura, Rostov, M u r o m , the Derevlianian land, T m u t o r o k a n , Smolensk, a n d Pskov. S u b s e q u e n t l y he s w i t c h e s f r o m t e r r i t o r i a l r e f e r e n c e s to t h e R u s ' lands t o an e m p h a s i s o n t h e s t a t e — t h e " R u s s i a n s t a t e " o r " R u s s i a n t s a r d o m . " G r i b o e d o v also n o t e s t h a t a f t e r t h e reign of V o l o d i m e r M o n o m a k h , R u s ' b e c a m e increasingly d i v i d e d , a n d " t h e p r i m a c y of Kyiv b e g a n t o pass to Suzdal, R o s t o v , a n d l a t e r t o V l a d i m i r a n d u l t i m a t e l y t o M o s c o w . " 1 7 F r o m t h a t t i m e on, G r i b o e d o v c o n s i d e r s t h e R u s ' l a n d a n d t h e R u s s i a n t s a r d o m to be t e r r i t o r i a l p o s s e s s i o n s of t h e M u s c o v i t e tsars. T h e T i m e of T r o u b l e s t a k e s place in t h e " M u s c o v i t e state," in "cities a n d h a m l e t s of t h e M u s c o v i t e state," in " R u s s i a , " a n d in "all of R u s s i a . " A f t e r t h e e x p u l s i o n of t h e i n t r u d e r s , t h e tsar is e l e c t e d "in V l a d i m i r a n d in M o s c o w a n d in all t h e g r a n d principalities of t h e R u s s i a n s t a t e " o r in "all R u s s i a and o v e r all o t h e r d o m a i n s of t h e R u s s i a n state," etc. 1 8 I n s t a n c e s of t e r r i t o r i a l e x p a n s i o n d u r i n g t h e reign of A l e k s e i M i k h a i l o v i c h , such as t h e acquisition of U k r a i n e , find e x p r e s s i o n in c h a n g e s to t h e title of t h e M u s c o v i t e ruler: " g r e a t r u l e r and g r a n d prince," a u t o c r a t of "all G r e a t a n d Little a n d W h i t e R u s ' a n d i n h e r i t o r f r o m f a t h e r a n d g r a n d f a t h e r , successor a n d r u l e r a n d p o s s e s s o r of m a n y E a s t e r n a n d W e s t e r n a n d N o r t h e r n s t a t e s a n d lands." 1 9 G r i b o e d o v ' s vision of R u s s i a is t h a t of a d y n a s t i c O r t h o d o x R u s ' t s a r d o m orig-

20 • Zenon E. Kohut inating with St. Volodimer of Kyiv and culminating in the reign of Aleksei Romanov in Moscow. H e shows no interest in the people of Rus' or any of their ethnic peculiarities. Also absent from G r i b o e d o v ' s account is any notion of a reunion of previously lost R u s ' lands with the Muscovite Rus' state. Upon the annexation of Ukraine, "Little Russia" is simply added to the tsar's title, with no reference to the fact that the same territory was part of Volodimer's " R u s ' lands."Thus, continuity f r o m Volodimer to Aleksei consists in the transmission of the scepter of the Rus' tsardom, or perhaps even in the translation of the Rus' state, but not necessarily in the possession of the territory itself. Charles Halperin described this phen o m e n o n with reference to an earlier age in terms of two images of Kyiv in early Muscovite political thought: "historical" and " c o n t e m p o r a r y " Kyiv: If the sole ideological function of the Historical Kiev was to pass its ideological inheritance to Moscow, then, after it had done so, the Historical Kiev had no ideological raison d'être. It logically ceased to exist. For this reason, the Historical Kiev was frozen in time, and therefore outside time and immutable, like any classical past or golden age. The city of Kiev that now existed in the f o u r t e e n t h and fifteenth centuries had no claim upon the Kievan inheritance, which no longer resided in Kiev, but in Moscow. Consequently, the Lithuanian grand principality acquired no Kievan legitimacy when it assumed power over the C o n t e m p o r a r y Kiev, and Lithuanian claims to influence a m o n g the East Slavs rooted in her possession of the city of Kiev were devoid of merit. In early Muscovite thought the C o n t e m p o r a r y Kiev could not and did not exist. Thus there was no contradiction between the Historical and C o n t e m p o r a r y Kievs because they were simply different cities, and could be dealt with, easily, in different ways. Implicitly Moscow was the New Kiev, an epithet unattested in the Muscovite sources, and the D n e p r Kiev, the equally unknown Old Kiev, was a has-been. 2 0 D e s p i t e this indifference to the " h a s - b e e n " Old Kyiv, Muscovite diplomacy exploited the "recovery of Rus' lands" argument from time to time. From the late 1480s through the 1530s, Muscovy waged five major wars with the Polish-Lithuanian C o m m o n w e a l t h , resulting in the annexation of several lands of Old Rus': Briansk, Chernihiv, Homel, Novhorod-Siverskyi, Starodub, and Smolensk. 2 1 In the course of these wars, the Muscovite court f o r m u l a t e d ideological claims to all lands of Rus' that were not currently part of Muscovy. Between 1487 and 1493 the Muscovites began using the phrase "sovereign of all R u s ' " as part of the tsar's title, an innovation especially designed for negotiations with the "Lithuanians." (Ivan III added "all R u s ' " to his title in 1481, but initially this was not u n d e r s t o o d to refer to the Rus' lands under Lithuanian rule.) The peace treaty of 1494 even obliged the " L i t h u a n i a n s " to recognize the term as part of the Muscovite ruler's title. In the course of diplomatic negotiations with Poland-Lithuania and H u n g a ry in 1503-4, the Muscovites went even further, explicitly claiming in the tsar's

A Dynastic

or Ethno-Dynastic

Tsardom?

• 21

n a m e t h a t " n o t only t h o s e cities a n d p r o v i n c e s which a r e n o w in o u r h a n d a r e o u r p a t r i m o n y , [but] t h e w h o l e R u s s i a n land, a c c o r d i n g to G o d ' s will, is o u r p a t r i m o ny f r o m o u r a n c e s t o r s a n d since antiquity." This s t a t e m e n t a c c o m p a n i e d t h e first d i r e c t claim t o such " R u s s i a n cities" as Kyiv a n d S m o l e n s k . 2 2 S u c h claims, a s s e r t e d p r i m a r i l y in M u s c o v i t e d i p l o m a t i c c o r r e s p o n d e n c e with t h e P o l i s h - L i t h u a n i a n s t a t e , a p p e a r e d only o c c a s i o n a l l y in historical writing of the time. It is s o b e r i n g to c o m p a r e M u s c o v i t e claims to E a s t Slavic t e r r i t o r i e s with t h e i r c o n t e m p o r a r y i d e o l o g i c a l justification of t h e c o n q u e s t of M u s l i m K a z a n . A s Jaroslaw Pelenski has shown, Muscovite sources represented the Kazan Khanate as " p a r t of t h e R u s s i a n l a n d f r o m a n t i q u i t y " a n d a p a t r i m o n y of the tsarist dynasty. In this r e g a r d , t h e official Kazan

History

(Kazanskaia

istoriia)

paid

unpre-

c e d e n t e d a t t e n t i o n t o t h e Kyivan past, r e p e a t i n g a l m o s t t h e w h o l e Tale of Princes

of Vladimir

(Skazanie

o kniaz'iakh

Vladimirskikh)

the

a n d f o r t h e first time

p r o c l a i m i n g M o s c o w " t h e s e c o n d Kyiv." M o r e o v e r , t h e w o r k c l a i m e d that the K a z a n l a n d h a d originally b e e n i n h a b i t e d by t h e a u t o c h t h o n o u s " p e a c e f u l " R u s ' p e o p l e , w h o w e r e s u b s e q u e n t l y e x p e l l e d by t h e B u l g a r s — a m o d e r n e t h n i c a r g u m e n t u n u s u a l f o r t h e time. B u t such a r g u m e n t s w e r e n o t usually a p p l i e d to the O r t h o d o x E a s t e r n Slavs or to t h e R u s ' of t h e P o l i s h - L i t h u a n i a n C o m m o n w e a l t h . E v e n A l e k s e i R o m a n o v ' s a d d i t i o n of " t s a r of Little R u s s i a " t o his title in 1654 was n o t p r o m p t e d by a claim to s o m e long-lost R u r i k i d p a t r i m o n y , b u t r e s u l t e d directly f r o m t h e P e r e i a s l a v A g r e e m e n t with t h e U k r a i n i a n C o s s a c k s ( a l t h o u g h t h e p a t r i m o n i a l claim w a s s o o n " r e c a l l e d " by t h e M u s c o v i t e a u t h o r i t i e s ) . 2 4 T h e s e e x a m ples suggest t h a t t h e p r a g m a t i c n e e d s of M u s c o v i t e f o r e i g n policy d e t e r m i n e d t h e uses of h i s t o r y r a t h e r t h a n t h e o t h e r way a r o u n d . A s a c o m p i l a t i o n , G r i b o e d o v ' s History

of the Tsars e x p r e s s e d n o innovative

ideas; all its p r i n c i p a l c o n c e p t s w e r e well a t t e s t e d long b e f o r e its publication. For e x a m p l e , t h e Tale of the Princes

of Vladimir

(1520s o r 1530s) a l r e a d y c o n t a i n e d

a mythical g e n e a l o g y of t h e R u s ' princes, tracing t h e i r d e s c e n t f r o m t h e R o m a n e m p e r o r A u g u s t u s t h r o u g h his b r o t h e r Prus, w h o h a d ruled t h e Prussian land and was said to h a v e b e e n an a n c e s t o r of R u r i k a n d successive Kyivan princes. T h e Tale also m a i n t a i n e d t h a t t h e e l e v e n t h - c e n t u r y Kyivan p r i n c e V o l o d i m e r M o n o m a k h h a d r e c e i v e d gifts, insignia, a n d an i m p e r i a l c r o w n f r o m t h e B y z a n t i n e E m p e r o r C o n s t a n t i n e IX M o n o m a c h o s . A s legend h a d it, t h e c r o w n , k n o w n as " M o n o m a k h ' s cap," h a d b e e n h a n d e d d o w n to t h e M u s c o v i t e rulers, a n d a c a p alleged to have b e e n M o n o m a k h ' s b e g a n to be u s e d in the t s a r ' s c o r o n a t i o n ceremony. 2 5 Such c o n c e p t s w e r e e v e n m o r e e l a b o r a t e l y d e v e l o p e d in t h e Book the Tsarist

Genealogy

(Stepennaia

kniga

tsarskogo

rodosloviia),

of Degrees

of

c o m p i l e d in t h e

1580s, which divided its n a r r a t i v e of t h e past into "reigns," s u b d i v i d e d in their t u r n into c h a p t e r s , e a c h d e a l i n g with a single topic. 2 6 T h e i n t r o d u c t i o n to t h e w o r k a n n o u n c e d that t h e s e v e n t e e n " s t e p s " of t h e R u r i k i d dynasty f o r m e d an " u n f a l t e r ing stairway t o h e a v e n , " while tracing the v e n e r a b l e origins of t h e d y n a s t y to E m p e r o r A u g u s t u s t h r o u g h his b r o t h e r Prus. D e s p i t e this m e n t i o n of p a g a n ancestors, t h e Book of Degrees

d e r i v e d princely p o w e r f r o m a C h r i s t i a n source: it did not

22 • Zenon E. Kohut include as a separate degree the founder of the dynasty, Rurik, or his pagan successors Ihor (Igor) and Sviatoslav.The narrative began with a hagiographie account of the life of " G r a n d Princess" Olha (Olga), the first Christian among the Kyivan rulers, yet even this was not the first "degree," but a kind of additional introduction. Significantly, a table of contents was inserted after the story of Olha. The first degree was represented by her grandson Volodimer, whom the author called "coequal with the apostles, holy and blessed Tsar and Grand Prince," or "Autocratic Tsar and G r a n d Prince."Thus the line of princes originated with Rurik, who in turn was linked with the R o m a n emperors, but genuine "imperial" sovereignty and legitimacy derived from the first Christian "tsar." The work ended with Ivan IV, who represented "the seventeenth degree from the first holy Volodimer." 27 It was this narrative sequence, even to the extent of noting the "degree" of each ruler that G r i b o e d o v adopted. H e updated the story by adding all the tsars who came after Ivan IV. G r i b o e d o v ' s main contribution consisted in his multifarious a t t e m p t s to link the R o m a n o v dynasty with Volodimer. Not surprisingly, Sergei Solov'ev dismissed him as simply "attaching the new dynasty to the line of Muscovite rulers." Because G r i b o e d o v ' s work was written only a few years prior the first printing of the Kyivan Synopsis (1674), S.F. Platonov d e e m e d it "the last word in an old testament, a historical view, antiquated and faded immediately a f t e r its appearance." 2 8 W h a t , then, was the "new t e s t a m e n t " that in Platonov's view so fundamentally altered the historical perception of Russia? It came from Ukraine, from the Kyivan Caves Monastery. According to the traditional view, the Synopsis was written by the monastery's archimandrite, Inokentii Gizel; in any case, the book o p e n s with Gizel's benediction. First published in Kyiv in 1674, the work was substantially enlarged for its third edition of 1681. The author's chief concern seems to have b e e n to protect the Caves Monastery's autonomy vis-à-vis the Kyivan Metropolitanate and the Moscow Patriarchate. As Hans Rothe has pointed out, this agenda is implicit in the author's choice and emendation of sources emphasizing the historically stauropegial status of the Caves Monastery—it was subordinate only to the patriarch of Constantinople. 2 9 The second part of the agenda was to enlist the Muscovite tsar as the monastery's protector. Thus the author focuses on Moscow's primacy a m o n g the Slavic peoples and the tsar's "rightful" claims to the Kyivan inheritance. By establishing a link between Kyiv and Moscow through faith, dynasty, land, and even people, the Synopsis seeks to argue for a unique historical relationship between the Caves Monastery and the tsar. U n l i k e Griboedov, whose account originates with St. Volodimer, the Synopsis begins with the biblical descent of the Slavs, the Rus' and other related peoples, and only then focuses on Volodimer and the conversion of the Rus'. Following Muscovite practice, the Synopsis links Volodimer with Augustus Caesar through Rurik. The author then lists the rulers of Kyiv down to the Tatar conquest. H e goes on to relate two parallel stories: an account of Batu's destruction of the Caves Monastery and the devastation of the Kyiv region in the thirteenth century,

A Dynastic or Ethno-Dynastic

Tsardom? • 23

followed by the fourteenth-century struggle of G r a n d Prince Dmitrii Ivanovich of Moscow with the Tatar ruler Mamai. Such " d o u b l i n g " is one of the techniques employed to link the Caves Monastery with a grand prince, and ultimately with the tsar of Muscovy. The author then turns to the fate of Kyiv after Batu's destruction of it and recounts how the metropolitan see of Kyiv was divided. The 1680-81 edition also includes an account of the proclamation of the Moscow Patriarchate. T h e author then turns his attention back to U k r a i n e , listing all the princes and palatines of Kyiv down to A d a m Kysil (1649-53). The work culminates with Kyiv's rightful " r e t u r n " to the rule of Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich. The a u t h o r intertwines vague and. at times, inconsistent concepts of people, dynasty and state. H e begins in pre-Kyivan times with the slaveno-rossiiskii narod (meaning, more or less, the O r t h o d o x Eastern Slavs), which is subsequently ruled by the "Varangian princes," beginning with Ihor Riurykovych. For subsequent periods of history, the a u t h o r uses the terms "rossy," "rusy" and "rossiiane" to d e n o t e the people inhabiting a historical territory north of the Black Sea between the V o l g a - D o n and D a n u b e - D n i s t e r - D n i p r o river systems. Although no northern boundary is given, Novgorod the Great is included. 3 0 The author of the Synopsis states that the Rurikide princely family established the "Russian state." This gosudarstvo Rossiiskoe emerges fully with Volodimer's conversion to Christianity and encompasses Muscovy, as well as the lands of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. 3 1 As in Griboedov's work, the story of the "Russian state" is in fact the story of the Rurikids, which allows the author to include in the chronicle various f r a g m e n t s of Russian and Ukrainian history (including an extensive episode on Dmitrii Donskoi), linking together a variety of territories, time f r a m e s and centers of power. For example, when the princely seat of Rus' moves f r o m Kyiv to Vladimir on the Kliazma, and f r o m there to Moscow, this occurs because it suits princely desires. 3 2 The creation of two metropolitanates (Kyiv and Moscow) is due to the fact that one part of Rus' (Kyiv) comes u n d e r the rule of a foreign prince, the Lithuanian Vytautas. 3 3 A n d , most importantly, when the tsar takes control of Kyiv, this is lauded because "the first-born of all the cities of Rossiia, the tsarist (tsarstvennyi) city of Kyiv," has come under the rule of the O r t h o d o x autocrat. 3 4 O r t h o d o x y is also identified with the tsar, land and people. Thus the wars that the Z a p o r o z h i a n Cossacks fight against the Turks are waged in the interests of the O r t h o d o x Rus' people (pravoslavnyi rossiiskii narod). Rus' is called an O r t h o d o x land and the tsar is referred to as the O r t h o d o x autocrat. 3 5 Despite considerable confusion in its account of history and ethnography, the Synopsis brought together a n u m b e r of ideas that had been reverberating a m o n g some of the Ukrainian clergy during the second half of the seventeenth century: (1) Rus' or, as it was beginning to be referred to in the 1670s and 1680s, "Little Russia," belonged within a larger, all-Russian context because of its historical ties to the house of Rurik and its O r t h o d o x faith; (2) despite ethnic differences, there was a broadly O r t h o d o x Rus' people that inhabited the lands ruled by the house of Rurik; (3) Rossiia, which included Muscovy and Little Russia, and the entire

24 • Zen on E. Kohut rossiiskii

narod

w e r e m e a n t to be r u l e d by t h e O r t h o d o x a u t o c r a t , w h o s e ances-

try d e r i v e d f r o m t h e h o u s e of R u r i k ; (4) t h e M u s c o v i t e tsar r e p r e s e n t e d t h e continuity of t h e h o u s e of R u r i k ( t h e fact t h a t t h e t s a r s w e r e n o l o n g e r R u r i k i d s was conveniently ignored). By m a r s h a l i n g all possible a r g u m e n t s to j u s t i f y the t s a r ' s p a t r o n a g e of the C a v e s M o n a s t e r y , t h e Synopsis,

p e r h a p s unwittingly, p r o d u c e d an a l t e r n a t e vision

of Russia. To t h e s t r o n g M u s c o v i t e t r a d i t i o n of r e g a r d i n g M u s c o v i t e R u s ' as a c o n t i n u o u s O r t h o d o x d y n a s t i c s t a t e , t h e Synopsis

a d d e d the idea of a p r o t o - E a s t

Slavic tsarist p a t r i m o n y . This idea e m e r g e d o u t of t h e U k r a i n i a n e x p e r i e n c e . F r o m t h e l a t t e r half of t h e s i x t e e n t h c e n t u r y , U k r a i n i a n O r t h o d o x society was challenged intellectually by t h e P r o t e s t a n t r e f o r m s a n d t h e C a t h o l i c C o u n t e r - R e f o r m a t i o n alike. In t h e p r o g r a m m a t i c vision of t h e Jesuit i d e o l o g u e Piotr S k a r g a , c o n f e s s i o n a l unity w a s essential f o r political unity; h e n c e E a s t e r n O r t h o d o x y was c o n s i d e r e d n o t only e r r o n e o u s , but also s u b v e r s i v e of t h e state. O w i n g to increased political p r e s s u r e , a c c o m p a n i e d by a f l o w e r i n g of Polish culture, U k r a i n i a n n o b l e s b e g a n c o n v e r t i n g to R o m a n C a t h o l i c i s m a n d a d o p t i n g t h e Polish l a n g u a g e and cultural identity. A s U k r a i n i a n society d e c l i n e d b e c a u s e of t h e s e d e f e c t i o n s , the r e m a i n i n g e l i t e — b o t h n o b l e s a n d c l e r g y — b e g a n l o o k i n g f o r w a y s of defining a R u s ' identity t h a t m i g h t find a c c e p t a n c e within t h e political, social a n d cultural f r a m e w o r k of t h e C o m m o n w e a l t h . O n e a t t e m p t was t h e C h u r c h U n i o n of Brest (1596), w h e r e b y t h e U k r a i n i a n O r t h o d o x C h u r c h recognized t h e P o p e but r e t a i n e d its E a s t e r n C h r i s t i a n t r a d i t i o n s . A n o t h e r r e s p o n s e was a v i g o r o u s O r t h o d o x Slavic r e f o r m t h a t a t t e m p t e d to c o u n t e r t h e C a t h o l i c o f f e n s i v e on t h e o l o g i c a l , intellectual, a n d e v e n c u l t u r a l g r o u n d s . In t h e e n d , t h e s e e f f o r t s failed t o s e c u r e U k r a i n e ' s s t a t u s within t h e C o m m o n w e a l t h , which was b e c o m i n g increasingly a n d m o r e militantly R o m a n C a t h o l i c in religion a n d Polish in l a n g u a g e a n d c u l t u r e . 3 6 The new learning and polemics over the church union sparked a keen interest in history, p a r t i c u l a r l y t h a t of Kyivan R u s ' . N o t only w e r e t h e old Kyivan c h r o n i cles r e c o p i e d in t h e early s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y , b u t n e w historical writing b r o u g h t t h e m u p to m o r e r e c e n t times. T h e polemical literature d e b a t i n g t h e U n i o n of B r e s t d r e w o n t h e R u s ' p a s t . M o r e o v e r , s p u r r e d by Polish historical writings, U k r a i n i a n a u t h o r s i n t r o d u c e d n e w t e r m i n o l o g y a n d c o n c e p t s into h i s t o r y writing, such as a R u s ' " f a t h e r l a n d " a n d a R u t h e n i a n o r R u s ' p e o p l e . T h e s e writings w e n t b e y o n d t h e P o l i s h - L i t h u a n i a n c o n c e p t of a n o b i l i a r y ( s z l a c h t a ) n a t i o n , i m p l y i n g t h e exist e n c e of a R u s ' n a t i o n t h a t i n c l u d e d O r t h o d o x R u t h e n i a n s of v a r i o u s estates. 3 7 T h u s U k r a i n i a n l e a r n i n g b e g a n to d e f i n e a distinct R u s ' e t h n i c , c u l t u r a l a n d religious c o m m u n i t y . G i v e n their r e n e w e d interest in t h e R u s ' past, U k r a i n i a n clerics of t h e 1620s a n d 1640s t u r n e d n o t only to their o w n historical t r a d i t i o n , b u t also to Polish a n d M u s c o v i t e s o u r c e s . F r o m Polish historians, p a r t i c u l a r l y M a c i e j S t r y j k o w s k i , t h e y t o o k o v e r t h e n o t i o n of Slavic unity a n d c a m e t o r e g a r d a n c i e n t R u s ' as t h e j o i n t p a t r i m o n y of M u s c o v i t e s a n d U k r a i n i a n s ( R u t h e n i a n s ) alike. M o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , in trying to d e f i n e a n d d i f f e r e n t i a t e R u s ' f r o m L i t h u a n i a a n d P o l a n d within t h e

A Dynastic or Ethno-Dynastic

Tsardom? • 25

C o m m o n w e a l t h , these writers began to look m o r e closely at Muscovite chronicle writing. From such sources. Ukrainian writers created an image of the Rus' past that transcended current political boundaries. Thus in the Synopsis the author applied the Ukrainian concept of a Rus' ethno-cultural and religious community not only to the Polish-Lithuanian C o m m o n w e a l t h , but also to a larger Rossiia that included both Muscovy and Ukraine. The Synopsis went through nineteen printings by 1836. Until the second half of the eighteenth century, it was the only published "history" of "Russia." According to A l e k s a n d r Samarin, the Synopsis was one of the books most widely distributed and read in the eighteenth century, the only work that actually penetrated to the lower classes. 38 It was so popular because it provided an expanding dynastic e m p i r e with a larger historical f r a m e w o r k . For all its b r o a d distribution, did the Synopsis's vision of Russia as an Orthodox p r o t o - E a s t Slavic dynastic state simply displace the old Muscovite view of an O r t h o d o x dynastic state? Did the ubiquitous presence of the Synopsis result in a f u n d a m e n t a l re-conceptualization of East E u r o p e a n and East Slavic history? How was " n e w t e s t a m e n t " history written? Although t h e impact of the Synopsis on the d e v e l o p m e n t of Russian historical and political thought has yet to be researched, a cursory examination indicates that, while drawing on the Synopsis, most late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century authors paid scant attention to the O r t h o d o x East Slavic patrimony, preferring to follow the Muscovite tradition of tracing the origins of an O r t h o d o x dynastic state. For example, the Masurian Chronicle (Mazurinskii letopisets) of Isidor Snazin, probably written between the late 1660s or early 1670s and 1690, incorporates whole passages f r o m the Synopsis, particularly on the origins of the Slavs. 39 However, Snazin has no concept of an O r t h o d o x slaveno-rossiskii narod (nor does he utilize such terminology). For Snazin, as for Griboedov, the history of the R u r i k i d - R o m a n o v dynasties equals the history of Muscovy-Russia, and the history of Muscovy-Russia equals the history of the Rurikids and Romanovs. H e also follows G r i b o e d o v in his dislike of elected tsars. Thus epithets such as " G o d given" are not conferred on Boris G o d u n o v or Vasilii Shuiskii. In Snazin's view, neither Boris nor his son had a legitimate right to rule the Muscovite state. However, the new R o m a n o v dynasty, which also began with an elected tsar, is considered different because of its links with the Rurikids and its divine election. 4 0 Although the concept of a Rus' patrimony appears in Snazin's work, there seems to be no notion that it encompasses all the R u s ' lands of Kyivan times, not to speak of all the Rus' (East Slavic) people. Snazin d o e s mention that "Dmitrii Ivanovich s u m m o n e d his son, Prince Vasilii, and transferred the succession by seniority and grand-princely power into his hands, which was the legacy of his father, grandfather and great-grandfather, and granted him his patrimony, the Rus' land with all a p p e r t a i n i n g income." 4 1 But this Rus' land seems to refer only to Muscovy.The only clear reference to a lost Rus' territory is Snazin's characterization of the Lithuanian Prince Vytautas's capture of Smolensk as "unlawful theft." 4 2

26 • Zenon

E. Kohut

T h e term " U k r a i n e " occurs f o u r t i m e s in Snazin's work. As a territory o r land it is not c o n s i d e r e d to h a v e had any link with Muscovy until the Muscovite r u l e r s took it over by force of arms. 4 3 Snazin e m p l o y s t h e t e r m "Little R u s s i a " only in r e f e r e n c e to tsar's new title, a d o p t e d a f t e r t a k i n g t h e U k r a i n i a n lands u n d e r his p a t r o n a g e . 4 4 T h e r e is not even a hint that the U k r a i n i a n t e r r i t o r i e s now a c q u i r e d by t h e tsar are t h e very s a m e o n e s that c o n s t i t u t e d t h e R u s ' h e a r t l a n d in V o l o d i m e r ' s day. E i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y h i s t o r i a n s s t r u g g l e d with q u e s t i o n s of e t h n o - g e n e s i s (the d e f i n i t i o n of Slavs, R u s s i a n s , S a r m a t i a n s , Scythians, C h u d and o t h e r s ) , t h e biblical l i n e a g e of n a t i o n s , a n d ways of d e a l i n g with v a r i o u s mythical figures a n d stories. T h e only m a j o r discussion o v e r e t h n i c i t y o c c u r r e d in t h e s e c o n d half of t h e cent u r y a n d c o n c e r n e d t h e n a t i o n a l i t y of t h e V a r a n g i a n princes, s e t t i n g off the N o r m a n i s t d e b a t e . 4 5 D e s p i t e v a r i o u s e x c u r s i o n s into early Slavic history, t h e idea of c o n t i n u o u s tsarist rule o v e r a pravoslavnyi

slaveno-rossiiskii

narod

was not

a d o p t e d , a n d t h e d y n a s t i c s t a t e r e m a i n e d t h e p r i m a r y o r g a n i z i n g principle of such m a j o r h i s t o r i a n s as Boltin, Tatishchev, L o m o n o s o v a n d S h c h e r b a t o v . 4 6 T h a t i d e a was f u r t h e r e l a b o r a t e d in w h a t h a s b e e n c o n s i d e r e d t h e first m o d e r n , c o m p r e hensive a n d scholarly history of R u s s i a , N i k o l a i K a r a m z i n ' s History State (Istoriia

gosudarstva

rossiiskogo,

religion, a n d p e o p l e in the Synopsis,

of the

Russian

1816-24). Ignoring t h e linkage of dynasty, Karamzin followed the Muscovite tradition

of e q u a t i n g t h e r u l i n g d y n a s t y with t h e R u s s i a n state. T h u s K a r a m z i n t r a c e d t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of a u t o c r a c y a n d s t a t e h o o d f r o m p r i m i t i v e society to highly e v o l v e d monarchy. 4 7 Following t h e Stepennaia

kniga.

K a r a m z i n begins his story with a

"Kyivan p e r i o d , " b u t e x p l a i n s t h a t t h e t w e l f t h - c e n t u r y Prince A n d r e i B o g o l i u b s kii a b a n d o n e d S o u t h e r n R u s ' (the U k r a i n i a n a r e a s ) b e c a u s e it was e m b r o i l e d in f e u d s a n d d e c i d e d to establish himself in t h e n o r t h e a s t ( t h e R u s s i a n

areas),

" w h e r e t h e p e o p l e did not h a v e a r e b e l l i o u s spirit." H e also w r i t e s that S o u t h e r n R u s ' s a n k m o r e d e e p l y into d i s o r d e r f r o m t h e e n d of t h e t w e l f t h century, w h i l e t h e n o r t h g r e w in p o w e r a n d p r e s t i g e t h a n k s t o autocracy. 4 8 T h u s t h e political c e n ter of t h e " R u s s i a n " state, originally l o c a t e d in Kyiv, s h i f t e d t o V l a d i m i r - S u z d a l , t h e n t o Moscow, a n d finally to St. P e t e r s b u r g . For K a r a m z i n " R u s s i a n n e s s " is e m b o d i e d in a u t o c r a c y a n d s t a t e h o o d , n o t in a specific territory. C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e R u s s i a d e s c r i b e d in his work m o v e s w h e r e v e r R u s s i a n a u t o c r a c y a n d s t a t e h o o d could find t h e i r best e x p r e s s i o n . C o n t i n u i t y b e t w e e n Kyiv a n d M o s c o w is n o t territorial, c u l t u r a l , r e l i g i o u s o r ethnic, b u t political. T h e d o m i n a n c e of t h e d y n a s t i c - s t a t e vision of R u s s i a was n o t c h a l l e n g e d until t h e 1830s. A t t h a t t i m e Russia was b e c o m i n g p r e o c c u p i e d with t h e "Polish p r o b lem." In t h e w a k e of t h e Polish u p r i s i n g of 1830, the i m p e r i a l g o v e r n m e n t w a s e a g e r t o assert t h e " R u s s i a n " c h a r a c t e r of t h e U k r a i n i a n a n d B e l a r u s i a n l a n d s against t h e claims of t h e Poles. It was this conflict that s p a r k e d a r e - c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of E a s t E u r o p e a n history a m o n g R u s s i a n historians. In K a r a m z i n ' s s c h e m e , R u s s i a n history b e g i n s in Kyivan R u s ' in t h e n i n t h a n d t e n t h c e n t u r i e s . B y t h e t h i r t e e n t h c e n t u r y , U k r a i n e d r o p s o u t of R u s s i a n history, only to r e e n t e r it in t h e s e v e n t e e n t h a n d e i g h t e e n t h centuries. B u t h o w can o n e claim a " R u s s i a n c h a r a c t e r "

A Dynastic

or Ethno-Dynastic

Tsardom?

• 27

f o r a t e r r i t o r y t h a t is n o t l i n k e d t o a R u s s i a n s t a t e ? H o w can t h e " c r a d l e of R u s s i a " exist o u t s i d e R u s s i a f o r m o r e t h a n five c e n t u r i e s ? T h e Synopsis

attempt-

e d t o r e s o l v e this p a r a d o x by e s t a b l i s h i n g dynastic, t e r r i t o r i a l a n d p r o t o - e t h n i c l i n k a g e s . It w a s t h e h i s t o r i a n N i k o l a i U s t r i a l o v w h o t o o k t h e s e s e v e n t e e n t h - c e n t u r y c o n c e p t s a n d i n f u s e d t h e m with m o d e r n R u s s i a n e t h n i c a l l y b a s e d n a t i o n a l ism. H e p r o d u c e d t h e first officially a p p r o v e d t e x t b o o k of R u s s i a n history w r i t t e n w i t h t h e specific a i m of d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h e " u n i t y of Polish, L i t h u a n i a n a n d R u s sian h i s t o r y " a n d t h e " R u s s i a n c h a r a c t e r " of t h e s o u t h w e s t e r n p a r t of t h e e m p i r e (i.e., U k r a i n e ) . 4 9 Its p u r p o s e w a s u n a b a s h e d l y political: to r e f u t e Polish claims to t h e U k r a i n i a n a n d B e l a r u s i a n lands. 5 0 A c c o r d i n g to U s t r i a l o v , Rossiia

a l r e a d y existed in Kyivan t i m e s as a political

n a t i o n with a c o m m o n l a n g u a g e a n d a s h a r e d belief in autocracy. H e c h a l l e n g e d t h e a c c e p t e d p r a c t i c e of d e r i v i n g R u s s i a ' s origins f r o m V l a d i m i r - S u z d a l

and

M u s c o v y ( a f t e r 1157), c l a i m i n g t h a t t h e G r a n d D u c h y of L i t h u a n i a h a d also b e e n a " R u s s i a n " state. T h u s t h e t w o p a r t s of t h e R u s s i a n n a t i o n h a d in fact b e e n aliena t e d by t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of Polish r u l e o v e r U k r a i n e a n d Belarus, a n d t h e m a j o r t r e n d of R u s s i a n h i s t o r y w a s t h e " r e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t h e R u s s i a n land within t h e [ e l e v e n t h - c e n t u r y ] b o r d e r s it h a d u n d e r Y a r o s l a v [the Wise]." 5 1 It was within this f r a m e w o r k t h a t U s t r i a l o v i n c o r p o r a t e d , p e r h a p s f o r t h e first t i m e in i m p e r i a l R u s s i a n h i s t o r i o g r a p h y , e x t e n s i v e p e r i o d s of U k r a i n i a n h i s t o r y i n t o his g e n e r a l s u r v e y of " R u s s i a n " history. It w a s in U s t r i a l o v ' s a c c o u n t t h a t t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h e E a s t e r n Slavic p a t r i m o n y m o d e l w e r e fully r e a l i z e d . By p o s i t i n g R u s s i a ' s f u n d a m e n t a l e t h n i c a n d political unity, U s t r i a l o v c o u l d c h a r a c t e r i z e U k r a i n i a n h i s t o r y as a c o n s t a n t striving f o r u n i o n with M u s c o v y / R u s s i a . U s t r i a l o v ' s a c c o u n t s e r v e d as t h e principal m o d e l f o r m o s t s u b s e q u e n t g e n e r a l histories of R u s s i a , which c a m e to t r e a t t h e past of U k r a i n i a n , B e l a r u s i a n , L i t h u a n i a n , a n d e v e n s o m e Polish e t h n i c t e r r i t o r i e s as p a r t of " R u s s i a n " history. 5 2 F r o m t h e last q u a r t e r of t h e s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y , t h e r e w e r e t w o p a r a l l e l c o n c e p t i o n s of R u s s i a : t h e first, d e r i v i n g f r o m M u s c o v i t e political a n d historical traditions, v i e w e d R u s s i a as a c o n t i n u o u s O r t h o d o x d y n a s t i c t s a r d o m ; t h e s e c o n d , a r t i c u l a t e d by s o m e of t h e U k r a i n i a n clergy, saw R u s s i a as an O r t h o d o x p r o t o E a s t Slavic d y n a s t i c t s a r d o m . N o t until t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y was well a d v a n c e d did an e t h n o - d y n a s t i c c o n c e p t of R u s s i a , a d a p t e d to t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of m o d e r n R u s s i a n n a t i o n a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s , finally e n t e r t h e m a i n s t r e a m of R u s s i a n political and historical t h o u g h t .

Notes 1 Fedor Griboedov, Istoriia

o tsariakh

i velikikh

kniaz'iakh

zemli

russkoi

(St. Petersburg:

Sinodal'naia tipografiia, 1896), xv. 2 Sinopsis,

Kiev 1681: Facsimile

mil einer Einleitung,

ed. Hans R o t h e ( C o l o g n e and Vienna:

Bohlau, 1983). The rendering of the e x t e n d e d title of the Sinopsis

exhibits the termino-

2 8 • Zenon

E.

Kohut

logical minefield t r a v e r s e d in discussing t h e s e early m o d e r n concepts. " V o l o d i m i r " is f r o m the C h u r c h Slavonic, a v o i d i n g t h e U k r a i n i a n " V o l o d y m y r " and the R u s s i a n " V l a d i m i r " ; h o w e v e r t h e principality is l o c a t e d in Russia and t h e r e f o r e called " V l a d i m i r . " T h e s a m e applies to the title of this v o l u m e , in which t h e C h u r c h Slavonic Synopsis is u s e d e x c e p t w h e n citing a u t h o r s w h o use t h e Russified Sinopsis. as in this e d i t i o n . Thus, d i f f e r e n t spellings of the s a m e place (e.g., Kyiv, K i e v ) m a y be used on the s a m e p a g e deliberately. 3 G r i b o e d o v , Istoria, 6. 4 G r i b o e d o v , Istoria, 6. 5 G r i b o e d o v , Istoria,

13-14.

6 G r i b o e d o v , istoria, 7 G r i b o e d o v , Istoria,

14. 19.

8 G r i b o e d o v , Istoria, 9 G r i b o e d o v , Istoria,

30. 39-41.

10 G r i b o e d o v , Istoria, 5 8 - 5 9 . 11 G r i b o e d o v , Istoria, 59. 12 G r i b o e d o v , Istoria, 26, 6 5 - 6 6 . 13 14 15 16

Griboedov, Griboedov, Griboedov, Griboedov,

Istoria, 37. Istoria, 40, 43. Istoria, 44. Istoria, 1.

17 18 19 20

G r i b o e d o v , Istoria, 1 2 - 1 4 , 1 6 - 1 7 . G r i b o e d o v , Istoria, 37, 39, 4 0 - 4 6 . G r i b o e d o v , Istoria, 57. C h a r l e s J. H a l p e r i n . " K i e v a n d M o s c o w : A n A s p e c t of E a r l y M u s c o v i t e T h o u g h t , " Russian History/Histoire russe 7, no. 3 (1980): 3 1 2 - 2 1 , h e r e 320. 21 See K.V. B a z i l e v i c h , Vneshniaia politika Russkogo tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva ( M o s c o w : Izd. M o s k o v s k o g o u n i v e r s i t e t a , 1952). 22 T h e q u e s t i o n of M u s c o v y ' s claim to the Kyivan h e r i t a g e has b e e n a s u b j e c t of p r o t r a c t e d d e b a t e . S o m e of t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n s have b e e n : J a r o s l a w P e l e n s k i , The Contest for the Legacy of Kievan Rus' ( B o u l d e r : East E u r o p e a n M o n o g r a p h s , 1988); C h a r l e s J. H a l p e r i n , " K i e v a n d M o s c o w " a n d " T h e R u s s i a n L a n d a n d t h e R u s s i a n T s a r : T h e E m e r g e n c e of t h e M u s c o v i t e Ideology, 1380-1408," Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte 23 (1976): 7 - 1 0 4 ; E d w a r d L. K e e n a n . " M u s c o v i t e P e r c e p t i o n of O t h e r Slavs B e f o r e 1 6 5 4 - A n A g e n d a for H i s t o r i a n s , " in P e t e r P o t i c h n y j et al., eds., Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter ( E d m o n t o n : C a n a d i a n I n s t i t u t e of U k r a i n i a n S t u d i e s Press, 1992), 2 0 - 3 8 ; a n d " O n C e r t a i n M y t h i c a l Beliefs and R u s s i a n B e h a v i o r s " in S. F r e d e r i c k S t a r r , e d . . The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia ( A r m o n k : M . E . S h a r p e , 1994), 19-40. C i t a t i o n f r o m Pelenski, The Contest, 43.

23 Jaroslaw Pelenski, Russia and Kazan: Conquest and Imperial Ideology (1438-1560s) (The H a g u e : M o u t o n , 1974), 104-35. 24 K e e n a n , " M u s c o v i t e P e r c e p t i o n s , " 2 8 - 3 8 : Serhii Plokhy, The Cossacks and Religion in Early Modern Ukraine ( O x f o r d : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 2001), 3 2 1 - 2 7 ; t h e p a t r i m o n i a l claim m a y be g l e a n e d f r o m t h e o c c a s i o n a l a d d i t i o n of " P r i n c e of Kyiv" t o t h e tsar's title. See for e x a m p l e , Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiei: Dokumenty i materialy v trekh tomakh, 3 vols. ( M o s c o w : A N S S S R , 1953), 3: 506. 25 R.P. D m i t r i e v a , Skazanie o kniaz'iakh Volodimerskikh ( M o s c o w : A N S S S R , 1955). F o r a m o r e d e t a i l e d analysis of t h e d e v e l o p i n g M u s c o v i t e dynastic ideology, see my " T h e Origins of t h e U n i t y P a r a d i g m : U k r a i n e a n d t h e C o n s t r u c t i o n of R u s s i a n N a t i o n a l H i s t o r y (1620s-1820s)," Eighteenth-Century Studies 35, no. 1 (Fall 2001): 7 0 - 7 6

Notes

• 29

2 6 D a v i d B. Miller, " T h e Velikie Chetii a n d t h e Stepennaia Kniga of M e t r o p o l i t a n M a k a r i i a n d t h e O r i g i n s of R u s s i a n N a t i o n a l C o n s c i o u s n e s s , " Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte 26 (1979): 263-382. 2 7 T h e Book of Degrees was p u b l i s h e d in v o l u m e 21 of t h e Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei ( P S R L ) (St. P e t e r s b u r g : Izd. I m p e r a t o r s k o i A k a d e m i i n a u k , 1908); cited h e r e a r e pt. 1. 5 (on O l h a ) ; pt. 1, 135 (on V o l o d i m e r ) ; pt. 2 , 6 2 9 (on Ivan I V ) . 28 G r i b o e d o v , xv. 29 Sinopsis, ed. R o t h e , 7 2 - 8 5 . R o t h e also c o v e r s t h e d e b a t e s o v e r t h e a u t h o r s h i p of t h e Synopsis, 4 2 - 6 4 . In discussing t h e Synopsis, as well as early m o d e r n U k r a i n i a n a n d Russo-Ukrainian R u s s i a n c u l t u r e in g e n e r a l , I r e p e a t p o i n t s m a d e in my The Question of Unity and Ukrainian Distinctiveness in Early Modern Ukrainian Thought and Culture, O c c a s i o n a l P a p e r no. 280 ( W a s h i n g t o n , D C : K e n n a n Institute, 2001). 30 Sinopsis, ed. R o t h e , 149-51. T h e a u t h o r c o n t i n u e s to use t e r m s russkie a n d Rossiia t o d e s c r i b e b o t h V l a d i m i r - M o s c o w a n d t h e U k r a i n i a n lands f r o m the t h i r t e e n t h to t h e fifteenth c e n t u r y , see Sinopsis, 328, 335, 349, 351, 354. His pravoslavnorossiiskii narod designates both U k r a i n i a n s and Muscovites u n d e r Aleksei Mikhailovich, Suiopjis, 2 7 8 , 3 6 4 - 6 5 . 31 For t h e first use of t h e t e r m gosudarstvo Velikii Samoderzhets Rossiiskii, Sinopsis, 32 Sinopsis. 33 Sinopsis. 34 Sinopsis.

Ruskoe, 216.

see Sinopsis,

167. V o l o d i m e r is called

208. 353. 360.

35 Sinopsis, 364. 36 See K o h u t , The Question of Unity, 1 - 4 . 37 See F r a n k E . Sysyn, " T h e C u l t u r a l , Social, and Political C o n t e x t of U k r a i n i a n H i s t o r y Writing, 1620-1690," Europa Orientalis 5 (1986): 285-310; i d e m , " C o n c e p t s of N a t i o n h o o d in U k r a i n i a n H i s t o r y Writing, 1620-1690," Concepts of Nationhood in Early Modern Eastern Europe, H a r v a r d U k r a i n i a n S t u d i e s 10, nos. 3/4 ( D e c e m b e r 1986): 3 9 3 - 4 2 3 ; and Plokhy, The Cossacks and Religion, 145-75. 38 A . Iu. S a m a r i n , Rasprostranenie i chitatel' pervykh pechatnykh knig do istorii Rossii (konets XVU-XVUI v.) ( M o s c o w : M G U P , 1998), 6, 2 0 - 7 6 . 39 Mazurinskii letopisets, ed. V. I. B u g a n o v and p r e p a r e d by F.A. G r e k u l i i a n d V.l. K o r e t s k i i , vol. 31 of Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei ( M o s c o w : N a u k a , 1968), 1 - 1 7 9 . T h e s o u r c e s used by S n a z i n , including all t h e lines c o p i e d f r o m the Synopsis, h a v e b e e n s t u d i e d by A.P. B o g d a n o v , Letopisets i istorik kontsa XVII veka ( M o s c o w : G o s u d a r s t v e n n a i a p u b l i c h n a i a i s t o r i c h e s k a i a b i b l i o t e k a Rossii, 1994), 2 6 - 3 6 . 40 Mazurinskii 41 Mazurinskii

letopisets, letopisets,

156-157. 91.

42 Mazurinskii 43 Mazurinskii 44 Mazurinskii

letopisets, letopisets, letopisets,

98. 119, 150. 164.

45 For a s o m e w h a t d a t e d a n d very Soviet s u m m a r y of this q u e s t i o n , see M . A . A l p a t o v , "Variazhskii v o p r o s v russkoi d o r e v o l i u t s i o n n o i istoriografii," Voprosy istorii 5 (1982): 31-45. 46 S.L. P e s h t i c h , Russkaia istoriografiia XVIII veka, pt. 2 ( L e n i n g r a d : Izd. L e n i n g r a d s k o g o u n i v e r s i t e t a , 1961-65); R u d o l p h L. D a n i e l s , V.N. Tatishchev. Guardian of the Petrine Revolution ( P h i l a d e l p h i a : F r a n k l i n , 1973); V. F u r s e n k o , " S h c h e r b a t o v , k n i a z ' M i k h a i l M i k h a i lovich," Russkii biograficheskii slovar', 25 vols. (St. P e t e r s b u r g : Izd. I m p e r a t o r s k o g o R u s s k o g o i s t o r i c h e s k o g o o b s h c h e s t v a , 1896-1918), 24: 105-124; L.M. G a v r i l o v a a n d A . L . Shapiro, "M.V. L o m o n o s o v v r u s s k o i istoriografii X V I I I v e k a , " Istoriia SSSR 6 (1986): 87-95; V. I k o n n i k o v , " B o i t i n Ivan Nikitich," Russkii biograficheskii slovar', 3 : 1 8 5 - 2 0 4 ; A . G . K a m e n s k i i , "G.F. Miller i n a s l e d i e V.N. Tatishcheva," Voprosy istorii 12 (1987): 154-58;

3 0 • Zenon

E.

Kohut

M.V. L o m o n o s o v , Polnoe sobranie sochinenii. Trudy po russkoi istorii, obshchestvennoekonomicheskim voprosam i geografii, 1747-1765, vol. 6 ( M o s c o w a n d L e n i n g r a d : A N S S S R , 1952); H a n s R o g g e r , National Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century Russia ( C a m b ridge, Mass.: H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1969); D.N. Shanskii, Iz istorii russkoi istoricheskoi mysli. I.N. Boitin ( M o s c o w : Izd. M o s k o v s k o g o u n i v e r s i t e t a , 1983); [ M . M . S h c h e r b a t o v ] , Sochineniia kniazia M.M. Shcherbatova. Istoriia Rossiiskaia ot drevnieishikh vremen, 7 vols. (St. P e t e r s b u r g : Izd. k n i a z i a B.S. S h c h e r b a t o v a , 1901), vols. 1 - 2 ; S.M. Solov'ev, " P i s a t e l i russkoi istorii X V I I I v e k a , " Sobranie sochinenii Sergeia Mikhailovicha Solov'eva (St. P e t e r s b u r g : O b s h c h e s t v e n n a i a p o l ' z a , 1901), 1317-88; V.N. Tatishchev, Istoriia Rossiiskaia, 7 vols. ( M o s c o w : A N S S S R , 1962), vol. 1; E d w a r d C. T h a d e n , "V.N. Tatishchev, G e r m a n Historians, and the St. P e t e r s b u r g A c a d e m y of Sciences," Russian History 13, no. 4 (1986): 367-98. 47 N.M. K a r a m z i n , Istoriia gosudarstva rossiiskogo, 5 t h ed., 12 vols. (St. P e t e r s b u r g , 1842-43). O n K a r a m z i n , see J.L. B l a c k , Nicholas Karamzin and Russian Society in the Nineteenth Century: A Study in Russian Political and Historical Thought ( T o r o n t o : U n i v e r s i t y of Tor o n t o Press, 1975). I discuss K a r a m z i n a n d U s t r i a l o v in " T h e Origins of t h e Unity P a r a d i g m " and in " T h e D e v e l o p m e n t of U k r a i n i a n N a t i o n a l H i s t o r i o g r a p h y in I m p e r i a l R u s s i a " in T h o m a s S a n d e r s , ed., Historiography of Imperial Russia: The Profession and Writing of History in a Multinational State ( A r m o n k : M . E . S h a r p e , 1999), 4 5 3 - 7 7 . 48 K a r a m z i n , Istoriia gosudarstva rossiiskogo, 3: 2 8 , 1 6 0 , 165. 49 D a v i d B. S a u n d e r s , " H i s t o r i a n s a n d C o n c e p t s of N a t i o n a l i t y in Early N i n e t e e n t h - C e n t u r y Russia," Slavonic and East European Review 60, no. 1 ( J a n u a r y 1982): 4 4 - 6 2 . 50 N. Ustrialov, O sisteme pragmaticheskoi russkoi istorii (St. P e t e r s b u r g , 1836), 37-38. Q u o t e d f r o m S t e p h e n V e l y c h e n k o , National History as Cultural Process ( E d m o n t o n : C a n a d i a n I n s t i t u t e of U k r a i n i a n S t u d i e s Press, 1992), xix-xx. 51 N.G. Ustrialov, Russkaia istoriia. 2d ed., 5 vols. (St. P e t e r s b u r g : Tip. E k s p e t s i i z a g o t o v l e n i i a g o s u d a r s t v e n n y k h b u m a g , 1839), 1: 16. 52 Velychenko, National History, xix-xx.

Spectacles of Subversion: Sexualized Scenarios, Gendered Discourses and Social Breakdown in Nineteenth-Century Russia ABBY M.

SCHRADER

G e n d e r e d discourses and sexualized scenarios were central to the morality tales— published and unpublished, anonymous and attributed, fictional and non-fictional—woven by nineteenth-century Russians. From the era of Nicholas I (1825-1855) through the fin de siècle, critics of autocratic institutions repeatedly invoked the notion that depraved private practices and disorderly public politics were mutually reinforcing. Arguing that perverted personal relationships were contagious and threatened to undermine not only individual households but the state itself, the authors of these tales, who stood on the margins of officialdom, deployed their narratives in an attempt to renovate Russia's social and political order. These lurid accounts are fascinating in their own right. Yet their significance transcends the historian's penchant for voyeurism. Examining these sexualized scenarios in relation to official sources that voiced social anxieties in gendered terms illuminates important questions at the heart of the project of writing imperial Russian history. What were the political and social implications of these morality tales? In what ways did their authors draw on and problematize official conceptions of domesticity and official fears about disorderly conjugal and household relations? A n d , equally important, how does the examination of gendered and sexualized discourses illuminate broader historical processes and historiographical questions?

SEXUAL DISORDER A N D SOCIAL IN T H E R U S S I A N

MORALITY

PERVERSION TALE

In an anonymous confession penned during the 1840s, one provincial nobleman depicted his fall from grace by linking the abuses inherent in serfdom to Russian society's sexual degeneration. His morality tale opens in the early years of Nicholas's reign. Even in the wake of Nicholas's suppression of the 1825 Decembrist Revolt, university circles were abuzz with change. During this heady decade, students and professors believed that serfdom constituted a "cruel evil" and, railing

32 • Abby M.

Schroder

against the social system from which they derived unprecedented benefits, championed reform. Circumstances afforded the author the opportunity to do nore than parrot such ideas. While at school in St. Petersburg, the nobleman learned that his recently deceased elderly grandmother had bequeathed to him her and and "souls"—the un-free labor inhabiting the estate. Although he lamentec his education's interruption, the youth eagerly set out to practice the enlightened notions that he had preached. 1 T h e author arrived in the provinces to find the estate mired in disorder. His grandmother had placed her property in the hands of an overseer whom shehad taken as a lover late in life. This D e c e m b e r - M a y affair was only the tip ol the estate's sexual perversions. The cruel overseer also "rewarded himself foi his harsh tasks by mistreating elderly peasant women and virgins. Nothing preveited him from doing what he wanted to do; power was in his hands, making it eas' for him accomplish his goals. ...Apparently, there was not a single young wom;n in the entire village who had not been with him. When drunk, he subjected then to the most torturous things." Male heads of household ( b o l ' s h a k i ) who resistec the overseer's advances to their daughters or sisters were banished to Siberia the overseer then forced himself upon the female kin left behind. 2 However, lascivious abusers like the overseer were not the only ones who ractured family bonds and raped the undefended. Depravity was inherent ii all power relations in the pre-emancipation countryside. Overwhelmed by the ttmptation to abuse his own authority, the narrator "admitted that the power" th;t he "possessed and exercised was unjust, but refused to heed" his own warnings ax>ut the consequences of his actions. Thus, not long after taking charge of the estate, the young owner found himself sexually aroused by a female serf "who cane to [him] not out of love... but because I was her owner." 3 Serfdom violated gender norms not simply because it encouraged immoralsexual conduct but also because it infringed upon "natural" female domestcity. Drawing an analogy between the exploitation of female labor and rape, the aithor noted that, "upon seeing women bending down to the earth or lifting a heavxpail during milking, I would feel shame and become sick. ...I was violently ripping them from their blood families, tearing them away from their domestic dities, from caring for their children. ...I was using them as one would machines.'The young narrator implied that subjecting women to manual labor constituted auniversal wrong because it unsexed them and led to disorder within the houseiold. Yet his efforts to transform the division of labor to conform to what he deemed t o be enlightened ideals about sex-specific gender roles was thwarted by the facithat power dynamics precluded change. While the youth "wished to the fullest e:tent possible to free women from more or less difficult work... the [new] overseerconvinced [him] that this...would lead to the entire estate's demise." 4 Ultimately, the overseer's assessment could not have been further from the ruth. Sexual despotism and social tyranny functioned as a unit to undermine the hiusehold. To clarify this point, the narrator quickly slipped from discussing hov hie

Spectacles of Subversion

• 33

a b u s e d w o m e n to r e c o u n t i n g the p a t h by which he c a m e to rely on t h e lash to chastise his souls. O n e day, the o v e r s e e r r e q u e s t e d permission to flog a r u d e serf. T h e a u t h o r reflected: "Punishing a m a n o v e r w h o m . . . I had n o p o w e r . . . c o n s t i t u t e d t y r a n ny. A n d for what? B e c a u s e he did n o t want to h e e d illegal f o r c e ? . . . A n d c o r p o r a l p u n i s h m e n t d e g r a d e s h u m a n dignity! All of this s e e m e d repulsive to me, and I answ e r e d t h e overseer: can't it be h a n d l e d in a n o t h e r m a n n e r ? " W h e n the a u t h o r sugg e s t e d that the recalcitrant serf be b r o u g h t b e f o r e the police, w h o " a t least constitut e d a legitimate, legal p o w e r , " the o v e r s e e r c o u n t e r e d with the traditional a r g u m e n t that flogging was the only penalty that t h e p e a s a n t r y u n d e r s t o o d : " B e a t [him], sire, b e a t him without fail! W h y else a r e you an e s t a t e owner, if you d o n ' t w a n t to p u n i s h y o u r p e o p l e ? You d o n ' t k n o w what they a r e like, they are such brigands, a n d it's a birch f o r a birch [with t h e m ] . . . . T h e y d o w h a t e v e r they want, a n d you let t h e m get a w a y with it all. N o w we m u s t t a k e b a c k o u r will!" T h e n o b l e m a n r e l e n t e d . H o w ever, he worried that flogging the " u n d e f e n d e d and d e g r a d e d " might t u r n him into a "vile o p p r e s s o r who n o longer had t h e right to consider himself a highborn m a n . " 5 P l a g u e d by his c o n s c i e n c e , t h e i n e x p e r i e n c e d l a n d l o r d t u r n e d t o n e i g h b o r i n g e s t a t e o w n e r s f o r advice. U n a b l e t o f a t h o m t h e a u t h o r ' s d i l e m m a , o n e — a r e t i r e d a r m y o f f i c e r — a s s e r t e d : " T h e r o d , my d e a r sir, t h e rod! It's t h e only way to c o n s e r v e o r d e r . . . . T h e s o l d i e r n e e d s t h e r o d , t h e lackey n e e d s t h e r o d , t h e

muzhik

n e e d s t h e r o d , and f o r e v e r y o n e it is n e c e s s a r y t h a t t h e tsar e m p l o y t h e g o o d r o d . " Yet, n o t e v e r y o n e in R u s s i a w a s s u s c e p t i b l e to t h e rule of t h e rod; a f t e r all, nobles, m e r c h a n t s of t h e first t w o guilds, a n d t h o s e with h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n w e r e s p a r e d floggings by i m p e r i a l d e c r e e . E s t a t e o w n e r s clearly c o m p r e h e n d e d

the

i m p l i c a t i o n s of this s y s t e m . A s o n e n e i g h b o r p u t it, "Is he y o u r b r o t h e r ? A r e n ' t you an o w n e r , a n d he a s e r f ? You s h o u l d be a s h a m e d to i d e n t i f y with him. W h y else a r e you a n o b l e m a n , if you d o n ' t h a v e t h e right to b e a t y o u r l a c k e y ? " By d e p l o y i n g physical v i o l e n c e against t h e i r inferiors, elite R u s s i a n s m a r k e d r e i n f o r c e d their own s u p e r i o r status.

and

6

R u s s i a ' s social p y r a m i d w a s also f u n d a m e n t a l l y p a t r i a r c h a l : m a r i t a l r e l a t i o n s a n d s e r f d o m s h a r e d a c o m m o n f o u n d a t i o n a n d t h e u n e v e n d i s t r i b u t i o n of p o w e r within t h e public s p h e r e w a s m i r r o r e d a n d justified by i n e q u a l i t y within t h e priv a t e s p h e r e . R h e t o r i c a l l y linking social a n d familial v i o l e n c e , o n e

neighbor

m u s e d , "[y]ou know, in t h e old days, w o m e n w h o s e h u s b a n d s did n o t b e a t t h e m c o m p l a i n e d t h a t their h u s b a n d s did n o t love t h e m ! In p e a s a n t daily life, this cust o m is still p r a c t i c e d . . . . [ T ] h e R u s s i a n m a s s e s . . . h a v e e v e n c o m m e m o r a t e d it in a saying: ' T h e o n e I love, is t h e o n e I b e a t ' ( ' k o g o liubliu, togo zhe

b'iu')."1

B e c a u s e v i o l e n c e w a s intrinsic to t h e a u t o c r a t i c social s y s t e m , it was i n e v i t a b l e t h a t the a u t h o r b e g a n t o use it t o a d m i n i s t e r his e s t a t e ; this, in t u r n , r e i n f o r c e d his proclivity t o w a r d s sexual tyranny. 8 O n c e h e h a d i n t e r n a l i z e d t h e r u l e of t h e r o d , t h e young m a s t e r t o o k t o r a p i n g a n d i m p r e g n a t i n g f e m a l e serfs. His i m m o r a l s e x u a l c o n d u c t carried o v e r i n t o his r e l a t i o n s h i p s with w o m e n w h o o s t e n s i b l y s h a r e d t h e privileges of his own milieu: m a r r y i n g a w o m a n against h e r will, t h e n o b l e m a n sexually f o r c e d himself u p o n h e r in o r d e r t o fulfill his c o n j u g a l p r e r o g a t i v e s .

34 • Abby M. Schroder Hence, the perverted master's transgressions not only victimized the lower classes but also allegedly highborn women. 9 The narrative closes in the 1840s with its author's downfall: The nobleman lost his f o r t u n e in an unexplained m a n n e r and, simultaneously, his wife and daughter died. Left alone to c o n t e m p l a t e the mechanisms by which abuse begot abuse, the author reflected that, while he was guilty of actual wrongdoings, the lion's share of the blame for his decline—and that of the entire nobility—resided in the political o r d e r predicated upon serfdom. Because the nobleman o p e r a t e d within the context of this institution, his fate was predetermined: serfdom led to a violation of domesticity, sexual abuse, and physical violence. Not only did women and serfs suffer because of these offenses; so did the author and his estate. 1 0 Should this morality tale be dismissed as the confession of a broken and remorseful serf owner? D o e s it merely constitute an apologia through which the author absolved himself of real blame and held statesmen and tsars responsible for personal failings? Certainly, the a n o n y m o u s narrative does function in these ways. However, situated in the context of b r o a d e r literary and historical trends, this handwritten account, which lacks concrete information about its author and intended audience, acquires additional meaning. 1 1 Works such as the anonymous n o b l e m a n ' s were apparently exceptional in Nicholaevan Russia, where censorship was strict and addressing themes of political importance was expressly forbidden. Nonetheless, this piece can be read as an early prototype for a literary tradition that became prominent at the fin de siècle. Writing in the wake of the 1861 emancipation of the serfs and the substantial yet incomplete reform of Russia's judicial, penal, and administrative institutions, writers increasingly linked sexual depravity to social ills, arguing that private abuses did violence to and infected all sectors of Russian society. This line of reasoning is illustrated by two particularly impassioned sexualized scenarios p e n n e d during the opening years of the twentieth century. The first, published in 1907, is a non-fictional account composed by D o c t o r V.Ia. Kokosov, who supervised the administration of floggings in a Kara prison during the 1870s. In his memoirs, Kokosov repeatedly returned to the theme of the shame involved in witnessing the spectacle of the flogged female body. H e lamented: "It is sad to gaze upon the women brought in for punishment. ...The katorzhnaia is exiled to penal servitude, but she is still a woman. The pain of the lash is the pain of the lash, but the shame of a baba (peasant w o m a n ) remains with her f o r e v e r . . . . The executioner is a muzhik (peasant man), all a r o u n d her are muzhik... and the u n f o r t u n a t e w o m a n has to undress, is stripped naked. ... They observe her from all sides, she becomes ashamed, and she is ready to fall through the ground. ...She grows pale, like a dead woman." 1 2 For Kokosov, the horror associated with flogging women contaminated society. H e clarified this when he described a beating that Nikolai Aleksandrovich Sharabarin, a prison warden whom Kokosov sarcastically nicknamed " S w e e t h e a r t " (Laskovoi), inflicted upon Var'ka Bashmakova.

Spectacles of Subversion • 35 Kokosov's depiction of this flogging is suggestive of rape. First, Sharabarin t a u n t e d Bashmakova mercilessly, driving her to her knees. The warden then o r d e r e d Cossacks to surround Bashmakova. "[OJne grabbed hold of her head, a n d a n o t h e r her feet: two took hold of birch branches and stood on either side of the n a k e d woman." Sharabarin snarled at the frightened woman: "[A]re you lying d o w n , girl? G o o d , good, very good. ...You should have been this way a long time ago." Kokosov rendered Bashmakova's metaphoric rape even more perverse by likening it to lawful marital relations. Explicitly calling attention to B a s h m a k o v a ' s sexually vulnerable predicament, Sharabarin continued: "[D]o you see how white a n d blushing you are? You could be married off, you would show much kindness to any man. ...Lie down, lie down, lie down. ..." Deriving prurient, voyeuristic p l e a s u r e f r o m watching the Cossacks' f r e n z i e d birching of B a s h m a k o v a , Sharabarin urged them on: " . . . G o on, molodtsy (good boys), yes, [beat her] harder, yes, harder, harder, like you teach your [own] wives. ...More strokes, brothers, m o r e and harder, so that our Varen'ka will r e m e m b e r . Five! Six! Listen to my orders, use your muscles, use your muscles...li-ke th-a-at, like th-a-at. ..." For Kokosov, the sexualized violence to which Bashmakova was subjected paralleled the abuse that transpired within legally sanctioned heterosexual marriage; the difference between the two was one of degree, not kind. By correlating the flogging to sadistic conjugal relations, Kokosov implied that depraved sexual tendencies m a r k e d both. 1 3 Equally significant, Kokosov suggested that the lower-estate muzhiki who beat Bashmakova were not the only ones who abused and raped their spouses. R a t h e r , Sharabarin identified with—and acted through—Cossack executioners. Sharabarin, whose experiences as prison warden m a d e him "always fearful, for every hour, every minute of his life," was brutalized by the violent scenarios over which he presided. This led him to "systematically t o r m e n t " inmates with "corporal punishment, infusing this with all of his hatred for the people whom he feared." Moreover, the boundaries between public and private life, fear and torture, and flogging and rape were p e r m e a b l e and easily transgressed. Kokosov noted that "Sharabarin was married, and his relationship to katorga carried over to his own family; that is, he was the same sort of suspicious executioner and torturer in his own family. ,.." 1 4 Yet the sexualization of the penal spectacle engendered more than heterosexual sadism perpetrated by male executioners and overseers on the bodies of female convicts and their own wives. It also led male floggers and officials to perform sadistic acts on the bodies of male victims. These commonplace homosexual spectacles of violence seemed even more lascivious than their heterosexual counterparts and critics implied that they would destroy Russian society. This was the focus of one of Leo Tolstoy's many invectives against corporal punishment, the short story "After the Ball" ("Posle bala"), p e n n e d in 1903, just a year before Nicholas II spared peasants the birch. The story's protagonist recounts how his entire life changed in one night. In the 1840s, Ivan Vasil'evich

36 • Abby M. Schroder had b e e n a young d a n d y : by day, he was an i n d i f f e r e n t student; at night, he attended p a r t i e s and balls. O n the e v e n i n g in q u e s t i o n , Vasil'evich m a d e the acquaint a n c e of a colonel's d a u g h t e r , an e n c h a n t i n g young beauty with w h o m he immediately fell in love. L e a v i n g the ball at d a w n , Vasil'evich could not contain himself a n d raced across town to see his b e l o v e d . A s he a p p r o a c h e d the estate, he heard "cruel, rough music." A h u n d r e d p a c e s later, he c a m e u p o n rows of soldiers; alongside t h e m a d r u m m e r a n d a flutist p l a y e d their instruments. H e i n q u i r e d what was going o n a n d was i n f o r m e d that a T a t a r d e s e r t e r was r u n n i n g the g a u n t l e t . When Vasil'evich d r e w n e a r the e x e c u t i o n site, he "saw s o m e t h i n g horrific"—a man " b a r e d to the waist" being d r a g g e d t h r o u g h the lines; with each blow, the man e x c l a i m e d , " [ B J r o t h e r s , have m e r c y ! " T h e T a t a r ' s spine was " s o m e t h i n g so motley, d a m p , red, and u n n a t u r a l , that [Vasil'evich] could not believe that this h a d b e e n the b o d y of a m a n . " Suddenly, Vasil'evich realized that the individual w h o o r d e r e d this flogging was n o n e o t h e r t h a n his b e l o v e d ' s f a t h e r . W h e n the soldiers refused to use the full s t r e n g t h of their switches on the T a t a r ' s back, the colonel supplied the soldiers with new b r a n c h e s to e n s u r e that the flogging was harsh a n d threate n e d the soldiers with a b e a t i n g if they failed to h e e d his orders. 1 5 Clearly e n t h r a l l e d by t h e spectacle, the colonel derived increasing pleasure with each painful blow sustained by the Tatar, p l e a s u r e suggestive of frenzied, h o m o - e r o t i c , a n d sexualized sadism p u n c t u a t e d a n d a c c e n t u a t e d by t h e steadily increasing d r u m b e a t . Just as this was a b o u t to reach a crescendo, the colonel recognized o u r protagonist. A b r u p t l y , Vasil'evich was o v e r c o m e by s h a m e , which he associated with his own role as v o y e u r to this sadistic spectacle: "I was so a s h a m e d that I did not k n o w w h e r e to look, as if I myself h a d b e e n caught in this s a m e s h a m e f u l transgression. . . . M e a n w h i l e , in my heart I felt a nearly physical, almost sickening anguish so that it s e e m e d to m e that I would just a b o u t be c o n s u m e d by all the h o r r o r of this spectacle." I n d e e d , f o r Vasil'evich—and Tolstoy—this spectacle was r e p l e t e with d a n g e r . O v e r t a k e n by psychological t r a u m a so p r o f o u n d that it p r e v e n t e d him f r o m sleeping, Vasil'evich escaped to a f r i e n d ' s h o m e w h e r e he d r a n k himself into a s t u p o r . But a single alcoholic binge could not e r a s e the spectacle's h o r r o r s . T h e story concludes with Vasil'evich, n o w a n old m a n , r e c o u n t i n g h o w this incident p r e vented him f r o m accomplishing anything in life: he refused to e n t e r military or civil service a n d "was suited to n o t h i n g . " M o r e o v e r — n d this is essential—Vasil'evich was u n a b l e to love. A f t e r this incident, w h e n e v e r Vasil'evich saw his b e l o v e d , he b e c a m e o v e r w h e l m e d by the revulsion that he had experienced w h e n he witnessed the flogging. Ultimately, " l o v e . . . l o v e f r o m that day subsided. . . . A n d love also c a m e to nothing." 1 6 E v e n e n l i g h t e n e d d o c t o r s who c o m p r e h e n d e d that d e p r a v i t y was i n h e r e n t in the Russian p e n a l r e g i m e — a n d not just dandified s t u d e n t s like Tolstoy's p r o t a g o n i s t — w e r e d e b i l i t a t e d by its impact. Reflecting on the first flogging that he supervised, Kokosov r e c o u n t e d h o w his own m o r a l t o r m e n t m i r r o r e d that of t h e lashed criminal: when the convict with his "grey, deathly-pale eyes" emitted a "soul-

Spectacles of Subversion • 37 wrenching, inhuman, wild, animal howl...a frightened half-tremor spread across" Kokosov's back. A f t e r witnessing this beating, which "provoked in [him] a sense of shame," Kokosov became an insomniac predisposed toward uncontrollable bouts of depression during which "scalding tears of shame and helplessness p o u r e d f r o m [his] eyes." Infected by his observation of violence, Kokosov identified with the punished man, whose "legs shook the entire time, involuntarily clanging the shackles," whose "pale-gray, lean faces" convulsed, and who emitted hysterical cries. The doctor described how his own "face burned from the blood that rushed to it," how his "own legs trembled" and "knees gave out," how his own "eyes brimmed with tears," and how his own "head was filled with all sorts of f r a g m e n t a r y thoughts and could concentrate on nothing." 1 7 A n d , as another physician, Doctor P.N. Konovalov, put it, "the sort of moral anguish" that doctors underwent at the scaffold "can manifest itself in the sharpest forms and even induce temporary nervous and psychic illness." 18 No one was immune f r o m the effects of abusive regimes. Through these scenarios, authors like Kokosov and Tolstoy suggested that the continued practice of violence associated with the autocratic system was not merely problematic because it impeded the process of civilizing marginal and debased subjects, but because violence p e r v a d e d the autocratic system and e n d a n g e r e d all of Russian society. Like the landlord who p e n n e d his anonymous challenge to serfdom sixty years earlier, critics who composed their scenarios in the wake of the abolition of serfdom argued that one could not return to society unscathed after exposure to the abuses central to the functioning of the autocratic system. Although the direct targets of such violence were lower-class and marginal subjects, its practice was contagious and its consequences could not be contained. Sexually depraved and socially sickening, these spectacles perverted witnesses' sexual impulses, pathologizing t h e m and making them unable to participate in communal or familial life and unwilling to procreate. Replete as they were with horrific meaning, such scenarios not only led to the victim's civil death but also to the death of Russian civilization. Locating Kokosov's and Tolstoy's morality tales within a longer tradition that includes the anonymous n o b l e m a n ' s depraved scenario demonstrates that sex was not only a "political subject in late imperial Russia." Rather, invoking anxieties about the social implications of sexual disorder was apparently a well-established practice in Russia even before the era of the G r e a t Reforms. 1 9 Examining these tales in relation to the context in which they were p r o d u c e d further bolsters this argument. In deploying gendered language to argue that developments in the private and public spheres were interdependent, the a u t h o r s of these morality tales drew on rhetoric in official circulation. This makes a great deal of sense. A f t e r all, while each of these writers d e n o u n c e d autocratic institutions, they still occupied the margins of official Russia and, their personal discomfort notwithstanding, benefited f r o m the social, educational, and intellectual privileges that their society reserved for elites. 20

38 • Abby

M.

Schroder

N e v e r t h e l e s s , a l t h o u g h critics o f a u t o c r a t i c i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d s t a t e

servitors

b o t h p l a c e d i d e a s a b o u t g e n d e r at t h e c e n t e r o f t h e i r c o n c e p t i o n s o f R u s s i a n s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d v o i c e d f e a r s a b o u t d i s o r d e r in g e n d e r e d a n d s e x u a l i z e d t e r m s , t h e s t r u c t u r e , t h e m e s , a n d p o l i t i c a l m e s s a g e s t r a n s m i t t e d by t h e t w o t y p e s o f d i s c o u r s e s w e r e v e r y d i f f e r e n t . E x p l o r i n g t h e c o n t o u r s o f official a r g u m e n t s , as well as t h e i r i m p l i c a t i o n s , lays b a r e t h e l i m i t a t i o n s o f t h e

state-sponsored

r h e t o r i c o f g e n d e r . T h i s a n a l y s i s a l s o p r o v i d e s insight i n t o why t h o s e w h o c h a l l e n g e d t h e limits o f official e f f o r t s t o r e f o r m R u s s i a n s o c i e t y f o u n d g e n d e r e d a n d s e x u a l i z e d d i s c o u r s e so a p p e a l i n g a n d s o u g h t t o r e f a s h i o n a n d a p p l y t h e m t o e n d s u n a n t i c i p a t e d by s t a t e s e r v i t o r s .

G E N D E R E D D I S C O U R S E S IN OFFICIAL RUSSIAN

RHETORIC

A t least since the e r a o f N i c h o l a s I, s t a t e s e r v i t o r s c o n c e i v e d o f R u s s i a ' s p o l i t i c a l a n d s o c i a l o r d e r in g e n d e r e d terms. T h e y c e l e b r a t e d f e m a l e d o m e s t i c i t y but saw its f u n c t i o n as public, not private. A s R i c h a r d W o r t m a n has d e m o n s t r a t e d , in t h e e a r l y n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , t h e a u t o c r a c y f o r g e d a new familial " s c e n a r i o o f p o w e r " in which d o m e s t i c t r a n q u i l l i t y c o n s t i t u t e d a m i c r o c o s m o f a n d s e r v e d to p r o m o t e s o c i a l o r d e r . A c c o r d i n g t o this s c e n a r i o , P r i n c e s s C h a r l o t t e ( b a p t i z e d A l e x a n d r a F e d o r o v n a ) t r a n s f o r m e d the pugilistic N i c h o l a s into a " l o v i n g h u s b a n d a n d c a r i n g f a t h e r " by h e e d i n g the " n o b l e and r o m a n t i c c a l l i n g " and b e c o m i n g a d e v o t e d wife a n d m o t h e r w h o was " a h o l y and uplifting f o r c e . " 2 1 E v e n as the t s a r i n a was r e p r e s e n t e d as situated within the private s p h e r e , the familial display blurred distinctions b e t w e e n the p u b l i c and p r i v a t e a n d was c e n t r a l to the c o n s t i t u t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l relationships.22 T h e i m p e r i a l f a m i l y was n o t t h e o n l y f a m i l y e s s e n t i a l t o t h e s c e n a r i o o f wello r d e r e d N i c h o l a e v a n R u s s i a . A u t h o r i t i e s b e l i e v e d that p r o p e r d o m e s t i c r e l a t i o n s s y m b o l i z e d R u s s i a ' s a t t a i n m e n t o f civilization and s e r v e d t o uplift t h e m a s s e s in a g e n e r a l i z e d s e n s e , e x t e n d i n g e v e n t o t h e s t a t e ' s margins. T h r o u g h o u t this e r a , f o r e x a m p l e , officials c o n t e n d e d that it w o u l d b e p o s s i b l e to curtail v a g r a n c y a n d c r i m i n a l i t y a m o n g S i b e r i a n e x i l e s by e n c o u r a g i n g t h e m to m a r r y a n d e s t a b l i s h f a m i l i e s . 2 3 A s N. L i n k n o t e d in an 1 8 3 7 a r t i c l e surveying u r b a n life in T o b o l ' s k p r o v i n c e , " p a t r i a r c h a l p o w e r in T o b o l ' s k is t h e m o s t o p p o r t u n e a n d c e r t a i n m e a n s o f c h e c k i n g passions, p r e v e n t i n g d e s c e n t i n t o q u a r r e l , and c o n s e r v i n g

order,

p e a c e , and a c c o r d . " 2 4 A t t r i b u t i n g v a g r a n c y and social u n r e s t to t h e s e v e r e g e n d e r i m b a l a n c e a m o n g exiles, officials a s k e d the c h u r c h to e a s e r e s t r i c t i o n s on e x i l e marriages, provided monetary incentives to Slavic old-timers ( s t a r o z h i l y e ) who b e t r o t h e d f e m a l e kin t o exiles, and i n s t i t u t e d m e a s u r e s to s a f e g u a r d t h e r e p r o d u c t i v e c a p a c i t i e s o f w o m e n t r a n s p o r t e d to S i b e r i a . A u t h o r i t i e s b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e v e r y institution o f m a r r i a g e civilized e x i l e s e v e n when t h e wives t h e m s e l v e s w e r e hardened felons.25

Spectacles of Subversion • 39 Equally important, nineteenth-century state servitors articulated their anxieties in g e n d e r e d terms, arguing that distorted relations between the sexes and the p u b l i c and private abuse of women symbolized b r o a d e r cultural breakdown. 2 6 This concern was central to authorities' imagination of developments on the e m p i r e ' s peripheries. In ethnographic analyses of Siberia's indigenous peoples (inorodtsy) u n d e r t a k e n in the 1830s and 1840s, officials associated with the Ministry of Internal Affairs sought to explain population attrition amongst aboriginal tribes. Noting that "today, only the faintest, weakest ghost of the awesome M o n g o l name—which used to convey a t r e m e n d o u s impression from one end of Asia to the other, threatened E u r o p e with destruction, and is associated with such b i t t e r m e m o r i e s in our Fatherland's history—drags out a miserable existence in t h e d e e p e s t wasteland of the steppes," one author sought to clarify why "[o]nly pitiful, paltry fragments of this mighty tribe...remain." 2 7 Another, Frants Iosofovich Beliavskii, had spent three years working for the Physician's Council ( V r a chebnaia uprava) in Siberia. Dispatched by the crown in 1832 to investigate the o u t b r e a k of illnesses among the far northern Samoeds and Ostiaks, the doctor r e c o u n t e d in his travelogue that "on this trip I saw Siberia with its dejected, b o u n d l e s s wastelands. A d e e p silence reigned over its snow-covered expanses, w h e r e travelers rarely encounter the yurtas of indigenous peoples." 2 8 Even pers o n n e l like State Councilor P. Kirilov, whose twenty-seven-year stint in the Siberian service had left him with an altogether m o r e positive assessment of the region than his colleagues, r e m a r k e d that, while Siberia's Russian population was on the rise, "the inorodtsy, in contrast, are, for various reasons, in decline." 2 9 N u m e r o u s factors contributed to this d e m o g r a p h i c crisis. Certainly, authorities believed that diseases, some of which resulted f r o m contact with Russian merc h a n t s and settlers, had taken their toll on the inorodtsy.30 In 1832, Doctor Kruze b l a m e d the attrition of Irkutsk's Iakut tribes upon severe climate, lack of exposure to sunlight during the long winters, and the smoke-filled and "spoiled air" that filled "uncleanly" aboriginal yurtas, "where people and animals resided side by side." Yet he also suggested that other aspects of their "way of life" contributed to extraordinarily high mortality rates. 3 1 A n d Kirilov noted that, while some indigen o u s peoples transferred out of their clans into the official Russian estate system a n d others succumbed to illnesses, these populations were also decimated by "various discomforts and shortcomings attributable to their nomadic lifestyle." 32 For officials, these "discomforts" were expressed through and amplified by distorted gender relations. First, they accused aboriginal peoples of lacking a d e q u a t e m a r k e r s for differentiating between the sexes. G. Gorokhov, who spent six years as a Tomsk rural district police officer ( z e m s k i i ispravnik), was struck that the "naturally lazy" and illiterate Altai Kalmyks, who were predisposed toward alcoholism, also blurred gender lines in disturbing ways. A woman wore the same clothing as a man and physically resembled her male counterparts in terms of the "filthiness of her body and the unattractive aspect of her face." Likewise, Kruze reflected that, while some Iakut men had " p l e a s a n t " Tatar physical attributes,

40 • Abby M. Schroder "among the women, there was not o n e face that could be d e e m e d at all attractive." According to Beliavskii, female Ostiaks, who were of middling height and had dark hair and small eyes, were "very un-stately." Much of this lack of comeliness was attributable to their possession of " n o n e of the delicacy natural to the fairer sex. In contrast, their facial features and entire constitution are completely coarse." Disconcertingly, they garbed themselves in the same clothing as men and could not beautify themselves in the way that Russian women did. Similarly, while government officials conceded that, on the whole, Mongol-Buriat women were "comelier than m e n " and "one might even call some of them pretty," they lamented that female Buriats "concealed their bodies" in unisex and "unattractive, wide, and disorderly 'dygyi," "ruined their faces" by wearing masculine fur caps, and d o n n e d decidedly unfeminine heavy boots. 3 3 Ethnographers were not only disquieted by aboriginal women's asexual external appearances; inorodlsy also transgressed the purportedly natural precepts governing gender. Gorokhov complained that fathers taught daughters the same skills as sons, notably fishing and trapping. Beliavskii recounted that Ostiak w o m e n not only took responsibility for domestic chores but all of life's needs: in addition to sewing and cooking, they constructed and transported the yurta. fished, h u n t e d birds, carried water, and collected firewood.34 The consequences of these activities were dire: "ceaseless hard labor" caused women to grow old and wizened by age thirty, while their "lazy husbands" remained youthful. 3 5 G e n d e r role reversals also explained why aboriginal women lacked r u d i m e n tary maternal instincts. Authorities were troubled that "mothers, who worked incessantly, dragged their babies with them in baskets," suspending them f r o m convenient posts or trees "in the cold and dirt." This m a l t r e a t m e n t , which aggravated already high infant mortality rates, allegedly explained why "children rarely survived the first year of their lives" and why aboriginal parents failed to n a m e offspring who were under age five. Similarly alarming, Kalmyk w o m e n r e f u s e d to nurse their young, many of whom languished and finally died of hunger. Instead of providing children with nourishing mother-milk, aboriginal women polluted them. A t one popular festival, Kruze witnessed how e v e r y o n e — m a l e and female, young and old—drank to excess; shockingly, mothers even served alcoholic beverages to toddlers. Moreover, because the "wild" and simple aboriginals were unaware that they were being decimated by venereal diseases, they infected o n e another by engaging in sexual relations "and were guilty of bringing into existence martyred, innocent children." Children who somehow managed to survive infancies of neglect and the ravages of disease were left to their own devices; G o r o khov reported that eight- and ten-year-old Kalmyks ran about naked; Beliavskii was astounded that m o t h e r s never b o t h e r e d to wash even older children. 3 6 While ethnographers used disparaging tones to depict aboriginal w o m e n ' s habits, they reserved their most scathing attacks for male m e m b e r s of inorodets households. Even as critics censured fathers and husbands f o r forcing their daughters and wives to p e r f o r m labor that violated the precepts of f e m a l e d o m e s -

Spectacles of Subversion • 41 ticity, they also accused them of privatizing women in a m a n n e r that was u n a m biguously oppressive. Laying bare the commodified n a t u r e of aboriginal marriage, Beliavskii d e e m e d it "essential to recognize that indigenous women are not only considered inhuman, but also are viewed as unclean merchandise." A b original men "purchased wives for themselves" and, " t r e a t i n g ] them like slaves," "dealt with them in a barbaric manner." The author of one survey underscored that " f r o m childhood the Buriat woman is exposed to folk customs and religious precepts that teach her that, once she weds, she must become a servant and slave." 37 Such callous attitudes were manifested in violent "Asiatic marital customs." Fathers betrothed their newborn or young daughters to men who, at most, had seen their brides once prior to the wedding. The ceremony itself consisted of the g r o o m handing a gown to the bride's father, making a bed, forcing his wife to sleep with him in it, and, if he was satisfied with her in the morning, paying his inlaws an additional gown and some reindeer to cement the deal. The maiden was never consulted and any attempts to ward off a suitor's advances were in vain: a f t e r all, the groom was obeying well-regarded "native customs" when he "violently dragged his bride off into his own yurta." These inauspicious beginnings set a violent tone that persisted for the entirety of an aboriginal woman's conjugal life. A Buriat woman's existence was t a n t a m o u n t to "real slavery (rabstvo), or more correctly, female bondage (rabotnichestvo)." She lived in fear of her father and husband who subjected her to "veritable sultanic capriciousness. The will of these unlimited lords is a holy law for their wives." 38 P e r v e r t e d domestic relations not only h a r m e d indigenous females; according to e t h n o g r a p h e r s , they led to t h e whole p o p u l a t i o n ' s decline. Beliavskii explained that, "because husbands are devoid of warmth toward their wives," they subject pregnant wives to various t o r t u r e s and even threaten them with d e a t h if they do not confess to extramarital relations that challenge the husb a n d ' s paternity. Given that violence and abuse were endemic to aboriginal connubiality, it was no w o n d e r that "the S a m o e d and Ostiak w o m e n are so infertile. To what should this be attributed? To their h u s b a n d s ' frigidity (khladnost')l The filthiness of their f o o d ? Or, perhaps, since they are forced to marry against their will, they spend their entire lives in a state of dissatisfaction, want, and l a b o r ? " In deriving this conclusion, Beliavskii intertwined all of the features of aboriginal life that c o n t e m p o r a r y Russian e t h n o g r a p h e r s found so troubling. Tyrannical patriarchal relations, the subjection of w o m e n to labor that violated allegedly natural precepts governing femininity and challenged acceptable notions of masculinity, the practice of what was t a n t a m o u n t to marital rape, and the neglect of the few children that such unions p r o d u c e d had brought indigenous Siberian tribes to the brink of extinction. 3 9 O n the surface, the arguments advanced by authorities in Siberia resemble those elaborated in the morality tales. In each case, well-functioning and p r o p e r patriarchal relations are lauded for their power to safeguard social stability, while even legally-sanctioned abusive relationships are portrayed as leading to

42 • Abby M. Schroder d e p o p u l a t i o n . H o w e v e r , scrutinizing the rhetoric in which e t h n o g r a p h e r s couched their critique of aboriginal gender practices and situating their claims within the larger discursive structures of Russian imperialism clarify important distinctions between the two positions. W h e r e a s the a n o n y m o u s n o b l e m a n , Kokosov, and Tolstoy believed that perverted domestic a r r a n g e m e n t s were communicable and infected the elites exposed to them. Siberian e t h n o g r a p h e r s cont e n d e d that, even given the prevalence of diagnosable diseases a m o n g aboriginals, Russian settlers in Siberia were relatively immune f r o m the impact of the depravities decimating the inorodtsy.40 Nevertheless, even though they portrayed aboriginal depopulation as a localized problem, e t h n o g r a p h e r s were indeed troubled by the negative ramifications of such depopulation in much the same way that imperial authorities were disquieted by exile criminality and vagrancy. In both cases, disorder impeded official a t t e m p t s to settle Siberia, which had become an increasingly pressing goal during the first half of the nineteenth century. 4 1 Hence, administrators sought to reinvigorate aboriginal households and domesticate criminals banished to the realm. Placing a premium on transforming Siberia into a well-ordered imperial domain, they d e e m e d it possible—even if difficult—to instill in the nomadic inorodtsy and vagrant criminals sedentary habits that gradually would allow them to transfer into the state peasantry. Articulating idealized notions of female domesticity and introducing measures to help aboriginal and convict populations establish p r o p e r gender relations seemed critical to the process of transforming potentially problematic and marginal subjects into upstanding and useful settlers. Although authorities invoked g e n d e r e d explanations for the ills that beset Siberia's aboriginals and exiles and a t t e m p t e d to use notions of domesticity to rectify these problems, they a p p e a r e d unwilling to interrogate how gender troubles pervaded the power dynamics of social relations in the Russian E m p i r e generally. This willingness to use the language of gender to sort out social ills whilst refusing to question whether the lower-classes' and marginal populations' abusive sexual and domestic practices indicated the weakness of Russian civilization as a whole can also be detected in a n o t h e r case. In the 1820s. officials began to challenge the propriety and efficacy of putting women to the knout and lash. They c o n t e n d e d that it was essential to free women from floggings both because female reproductive nature m a d e women distinct f r o m and biologically w e a k e r than men and because the shame associated with public lashings compromised femininity and threatened to u n d e r m i n e familial structures and the imperial social order. 4 2 These protests came to a head in the era of the G r e a t R e f o r m s that got u n d e r way upon Alexander II's accession in 1855. In the a f t e r m a t h of Russia's devastating Crimean War loss, enlightened b u r e a u c r a t s were anxious to m o d e r n i z e Russia and ensure its vitality as a E u r o p e a n power. They believed that, a m o n g o t h e r things, it was necessary to emancipate Russia's serfs, introduce rural self-government by establishing the zemstvos, and r e n o v a t e the empire's judicial a n d penal systems. Nevertheless, they shied away f r o m instituting thoroughgoing change,

Spectacles of Subversion • 43 f e a r i n g that this would impede the autocratic system's functioning.To curb potential disruptions, authorities devised a broad range of bureaucratic measures to alter Russia's cultural, social, and political structure in a controlled manner and s o u g h t to limit the scope of the r e f o r m s that they enacted. 4 3 In implementing this strategy, authorities drew on well-established discourses of gender. This is evident in the 1863 "great r e f o r m " of corporal punishment. Alexander II not only abolished branding, prohibited regular criminal courts from lashing convicts, and broadened the number of groups spared corporal punishment on the basis of status, service, and education, but also abrogated floggings for women of all estates except recidivist female exiles. 44 Contending that the spectacle of the beaten female body might incite the masses to riot and correlating the widespread use of the lash to lower-class men's penchant to beat their wives, reformers implied that brutality in the public and domestic spheres reinforced the Russian masses' moral depravity. As Minister of Internal Affairs, R A . Valuev declared, "it is well known that among the lower and, in part among the middle estates, women do not enjoy the respect that they deserve. Even husbands do not perceive their wives as equals, but frequently consider them slaves and treat them cruelly." 45 G u i d e d by such assumptions, enlightened bureaucrats and educated Russians maintained that sparing women the lash and birch would serve larger social goals. Valuev contended that, since "women have considerable influence over their husbands and relatives," freeing members of the "fairer sex" from floggings would have "positive consequences for the family and society." 46 Extricating women's bodies f r o m the spectacular economy of judicial beatings would transmit to the lower estates an example of proper behavior that would promote the civilizing process. 47 Although enlightened bureaucrats sought to renovate the Russian social order, they remained wedded to working within the f r a m e w o r k of the state's traditional institutions. They suggested that enacting limited r e f o r m s like freeing women f r o m lashing, eliminating the penalty of flogging f r o m the regular penal code, and doing away with serfdom would gradually civilize the masses and improve the functioning of the autocratic system. Yet, refusing to entertain the notion that p e r p e t u a t i n g social distinctions not only did violence to Russia's unprivileged masses but to elites themselves, Russian officials failed to abrogate all forms of corporal punishment, dismantle the exile system, or end the practice of treating m e m b e r s of the rural estate as second-class subjects. Hence, the changes that they enacted were, by design, conservative. 4 8

CHALLENGING AUTOCRATIC

POLITICS

Critics of autocratic policies in the late imperial era picked up on and exploited the contradictory bases of these reforms. In essence, enlightened bureaucrats' attempts to elevate the Russian peasantry by freeing w o m e n from floggings had o p e n e d up a P a n d o r a ' s box. The strategies that authorities used end up providing

44 • Abby M. Schroder educated and reform-minded Russians with the opportunity to deploy g e n d e r e d discourses in their own, b r o a d e r campaign against the remnants of corporal punishment and, by extension, the r e m n a n t s of the old order. 4 9 Extending the fears voiced by state servitors during the early and mid-nineteenth century, late imperial critics suggested that beatings were socio-sexually dangerous and would u n d e r m i n e Russian civilization generally, and not just particular components. Russian officials during the eras of Nicholas I and Alexander II had c o n t e n d e d that perverted notions of gender and the depraved treatment of women impeded the proper functioning of peasant and aboriginal families and t h r e a t e n e d to destroy these sectors of imperial society. In contrast, educated Russians who stood on the margins of officialdom extended these traditional arguments to suggest that floggings and abuse transmitted depraved lessons to all Russians. Elements of this analysis were already evident in the critiques against corporal punishment launched by m e m b e r s of Russia's radical intelligentsia during the G r e a t Reforms. For example, o n e jurist, who published an exposé on lawlessness in c o n t e m p o r a r y Russia in the radical journal Sovremennik under the pseudonym " G r e t s k o " in 1860, attributed criminality to "a lack of a reasonable outlook on women." H e suggested that practices like forced marriage, rape, and domestic abuse led to the breakdown of morality and social order in a broad sense. 5 0 Sovremennik's editors were even more emphatic about this point. In a May 1863 article reporting the abolition of flogging for women, they declared that "[t]he question of women's condition was raised by us a long time ago and we have already written much on this matter; as we can see, most educated people agree with our opinion...that w o m e n ' s status in our society is abnormal. ...In general, their role turns them into helpless or sorry creatures. [It would be p r e f e r a b l e ] to draw them into social life. ...Then they will be able to uplift themselves and thereby uplift all of society."51 In advancing this position, critics accused officials of failing to completely grasp the point raised by the anonymous nobleman in the first scenario, namely, that abusive relations within the private sphere were not limited to the lower estates. This line of reasoning gathered strength during the fin de siècle and came to a head in the sexualized morality tales produced by Kokosov and Tolstoy. In deriving their conclusions, the two authors indicated that little had changed over the course of the nineteenth century in Russia. Returning full circle to the observations that were central to the sexualized tale woven by the a n o n y m o u s serf owner in the 1840s, they suggested that abusive social practices e n g e n d e r e d d e p r a v e d personal relations and that the two operated in tandem and were m u t u ally constitutive. The only means of short-circuiting this vicious cycle a p p e a r e d to be abolishing, not tinkering with, the politics of autocracy. Placing all three of these morality tales within the broader context of official discourse d e m o n s t r a t e that ideas about gender and sexuality were central to the discussions about far-reaching political and social questions in which Russians engaged and that such concerns were enduring throughout the n i n e t e e n t h centu-

Spectacles

of Subversion

• 45

ry. Yet, in Russia, like elsewhere in contemporary Europe, notions of how gender and sexuality both symbolized and structured developments in the public sphere were made and did not constitute a priori essential categories; this elaboration took shape within the frameworks of legal, bureaucratic, and medical institutions. 52 As these institutions evolved, so did the sexualized morality tales. During the Nicholaevan era. these scenarios were marginal in two ways. They literally took shape on the margins of imperial society, namely, in the ethnographies woven by Siberian administrators—and one would suspect elsewhere in the borderlands—and in policies concerning outcasts like banished exiles. Or they were figuratively marginal in that they remained unpublished and anonymous. By the post-reform era, matters had changed somewhat. While Kokosov's and Tolstoy's narratives still revolved around marginal people—runaway soldiers and exiles—these works were published and widely disseminated to a larger reading public. At the century's close, educated Russians had greater opportunity to comment on matters of political importance and were more willing to identify with their social inferiors because they were more keenly aware of how elites were oppressed by autocratic political praxis. The tone of such appeals was amplified once the limitations of the Great Reforms became broadly apparent to educated Russians. Operating within a complicated social context in which lines between officialdom and educated society were often blurry and privy to the contours of authorities' arguments revolving around gender and sexual relations, late imperial critics used sexualized rhetoric to ends unintended by Russian officials. Rather than portray distorted gender relations as confinable, they perceived these problems as diffuse and infectious. For them, eradicating domestic abuse and fostering gender-specific roles for aboriginal men and women were simply not enough. Likewise, freeing peasant women from floggings and abolishing public lashing and branding amounted to insufficient palliatives. Rather, denying official attempts to perpetuate social divisions and explicitly linking their own predicament to that of marginalized imperial subjects, the authors of sexualized morality tales argued that perversion in the domestic sphere pervaded the socio-political fabric of the autocratic system and threatened the very integrity of the Russian state.

Notes Research for this article was funded by grants from the International Research and E x c h a n g e s Board, the Eurasia Program and Joint C o m m i t t e e on the Soviet U n i o n and Its Successor States of the Social Science Research Council, the National E n d o w m e n t for the Humanities, and the Faculty Research Fund of Franklin and Marshall College. I am grateful to my colleagues at Franklin and Marshall College, R e n e e Samara and Kathy Brown, for their critical comments and suggestions. Portions of this paper appear in my Languages of the Lash: Corporal Punishment and Identity in Imperial Russia (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2002) and are reprinted with permission.

46 • Abby

M.

Schroder

1 Gosudarstvennaia publichnaia biblioteka (St. Petersburg) [hereafter GPB], Manuscript Division, Olenin Personal Collection, f. 550, OSRK, Q l l , d. 144 (n.d.), II. 4,5-6.This handwritten document is part of the collection maintained by Alexei Olenin, who directed the Russian State Library from 1811 until his death in 1843. 2 Ibid., 1. 6. In an ukaz of 30 September 1812 (Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii [hereafter PSZ], ser. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1830), no. 25,238), the Senate upheld the rulings of 13 December 1760, which permitted noble landowners to transport those serfs who behaved badly or who had committed misdemeanors to Siberia, and of 17 October 1799, which stipulated that resettled serfs could not be separated from spouses who were willing to accompany them into Siberian exile. However, it was not until 1832 that the Senate concluded that "wives of serfs, exiled by the will of their lords, must follow their husbands, even if they were born into free status groups; but upon the death of their husbands, they are able to live wherever they wish." Nevertheless, although landowners were prohibited from separating married couples; they were not compelled to maintain the sanctity of other kinship relationships. On this, see the ukaz of 22 March 1832 (PSZ, ser. 2, no. 5243). 3 GPB, Manuscript Division, Olenin Personal Collection, f. 550, OSRK, Q l l , d. 144 (n.d.), 11. 16-19. 4 Ibid., II. 11-13. 5 Ibid., 11. 19-21, 24. Imperial state servitors engaged in reforming Russia's penal system during the eras of Nicholas I and Alexander II frequently asserted that the lower estates required floggings and that, for the peasantry, abolishing corporal punishment would be tantamount to doing away with all penalties. For example, see RGIA, f. 1251, op. 1, 1829-1844, d. 147,11. 70-71, 84-85; R G I A , f. 1149, t. 5, 1863, d. 47,11. 359ob-360; Rossiia: Gosudarstvennyi Sovet, Departament Zakonov, Ob otmene telesnykh nakazanii (St. Petersburg, 1862), 2: 71-77,134-35. On the problematic underpinnings of this argument, see Stephen P. Frank, Crime, Cultural Conflict, and Justice in Rural Russia, 1856-1914 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 226-35. 6 GPB, Manuscript Division, Olenin Personal Collection, f. 550, OSRK, Q l l , d. 144, (n.d.), 11. 27, 29-30. Catherine the Great exempted nobles and merchants of the first two guilds from corporal punishment in the ukazes of 21 April 1785, PSZ, ser. 1, nos. 16,187 and 16,188. These decrees, which were predicated on the notion that corporal punishment was incompatible with elite social standing, served as the basis for the subsequent broadening of the notion of privilege in nineteenth-century Russia. For example, see the ukazes of 17 May 1808, ibid., no. 23,027; 31 July 1811, ibid., no. 24,739; 13 April 1832, PSZ, ser. 2, no. 5284; 7 February 1834, PSZ, ser. 2, no. 6788; 29 March 1839, PSZ, ser. 2, nos. 12,186 and 12,187; 1 January 1841, PSZ, ser. 2, no. 14,146; 23 June 1842, PSZ, ser. 2, no. 15,886; 30 June 1844, PSZ, ser. 2, no. 18,115, and 10 June 1847, PSZ, ser. 2, no. 21,308. 7 GPB, Manuscript Division, Olenin Personal Collection, f. 550, OSRK, Q l l , d. 144, (n.d.), I. 32. 8 Drew Faust explores this theme in the context of the ante bellum American South in James Henry Hammond and the Old South: A Design for Mastery (Baton Rouge: University of Louisiana Press, 1982). The two situations are clearly analogous, and in each case a master's ideals are perverted by the very order of serfdom or slavery. 9 GPB, Manuscript Division, Olenin Personal Collection, f. 550, OSRK, Q l l , d. 144, (n.d.), II. 49,53-54. 10 Ibid., 11. 94. 11 This manuscript collection, which was personally compiled and managed by Olenin—who conceived of the library as a temple of Enlightenment and a cultural center—contains numerous files depicting provincial life during the reigns of Alexander I and Nicholas I. Unfortunately, the catalogue to the Olenin Collection and the handwritten document itself fail to include details about this particular work's author, the circumstances under

Notes

12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

20

21 22 23

24 25

• 47

which the piece was written, its precise date of composition, or how Olenin came to acquire it. I was able to arrive at an approximate date of composition based on references the author makes to knouting, which was abolished by the 1845 penal code. V.Ia. Kokosov, Rasskazy o Kariiskoi katorge (iz vospominanii vracha) (St. Petersburg, 1907). 123. Kokosov, Rasskazy o Kariiskoi katorge. 245-47; emphasis added. Kokosov, Rasskazy o Kariiskoi katorge, 235-37. L.N.Tolstoy,"Posle baia," Sobranie sochinenii, 20 vols. (Moscow: Gosud. Izd. Khudozh. Lit, 1964), 14: 7-16. Ibid., 16-17. Kokosov, Rasskazy o Kariiskoi katorge, 105-6,113. P.N. Konovalov, Roi i dushevnoe sostoianie vracha v naznachenii i pri ispolnenii telesnykh nakazanii (Krasnoiarsk, 1896), 13. In formulating this argument, I take issue with some of the conclusions reached by Laura Engelstein in The Keys to Happiness: Sex and the Search for Modernity in Fin-de-Siècle Russia (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1992). While Engelstein asserts that sex was central to Russian political culture, she nevertheless deems sexuality to be a product of socalled modernity and suggests that the Great R e f o r m s constituted a turning point that afforded Russians greater exposure to Western ideas, which allowed them to use sexuality to contest the nature of autocratic authority. While ideas about sex and gender did change in significant ways in the late imperial period, such discourses were central to political developments at least as far back as the early nineteenth century and were rooted in both Russian and E u r o p e a n traditions. For a fuller development of this argument, see Schrader, The Languages of the Lash, chaps. 5,6. The anonymous nobleman attacked serfdom whilst benefiting from his official rank (chinstvo) and reaping status-related privileges, including the right to own and dispose of his serfs. Likewise, the doctors who criticized penal practices nonetheless were state employees who paid for government-sponsored education by ministering to imprisoned exiles. And, while moral philosopher and writer Leo Tolstoy was a vocal critic of numerous Russian institutions who had ceased attempting to alter the system from within after his efforts to improve his serfs' lot proved futile, even he never entirely opted out of the system. His solid education, first at home by tutors and later at Kazan University, belied his privileged origins and, although he refused to take a degree and engage in a traditional career path, he served as an army officer while stationed in the Caucasus. Richard S. Wortman, Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy, 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 1: 252-4,260. Ibid, 334-5. See the ukazes of 22 July 1822, articles 225-232, PSZ, ser. 1, no. 29,128; 11 October 1823, ibid., no. 29,624; 20 May 1831, PSZ, ser. 2, no. 4582; 29 O c t o b e r 1834, PSZ, ser. 2, no. 7504; 7 September 1836, PSZ, ser. 2, no. 9504; 10 July 1850, PSZ, ser. 2, no. 24, 316; 29 October 1851, PSZ, ser. 2, no. 25, 960. To compel exiled women to marry male exiles, authorities prohibited these women from wedding free settlers in Siberia under the ukaz of 8 April 1852, PSZ, ser. 2, no. 26,148. N. Link, "Statisticheskoe opisanie gorodov Tobol'skoi gubernii," Zhurnal ministerstva vnutrennikh del, pt. 23, bk. 1 (January 1837): 20. Women constituted only one-fifth of judicial exiles and between one-sixteenth and oneeighteenth of those consigned to penal servitude. For official complaints about this gender imbalance and measures authorities adopted to facilitate exile domesticity, see R G I A , f. 1264, op. 1, 1824, d. 493,1. 1; R G I A , f. 1264, op. 1,1825-6, d. 415,1. 6ob-7; R G I A , f. 1264, op. 1,1825-6, d. 598,11. l o b , 3-3ob; R G I A , f. 1264, op. 1,1827-8, d. 51, II. 178-178ob, 181-2; R G I A , f. 1264, op. 1,1829-30, d. 53, II. 283ob-285; R G I A , f. 1264, op. 1,1828-37, d. 427,11.

4 8 • Abby

M.

Schroder

1 4 - 1 5 , 2 6 , 6 1 o b , 87ob, 9 6 - 1 0 0 o b , 1 0 9 - 1 0 9 o b , 1 1 8 - 1 1 9 , 164ob-165; R G I A , f. 1149,1.2. 832, d. 43. II. 1 4 - 1 4 o b , 2 2 - 3 : R G I A , f. 1264. op. 1, 1833-4, d. 457, 1. 4 o b - 8 ; R G I A , f. 11491. 3, 1840, d. 53,11. 3 2 o b - 3 3 , 408-409. 612, 744; u k a z e s of 22 M a r c h 1828, P S Z , ser. 2. no. 893; 22 M a r c h 1832, ibid., no. 5243; 14 A p r i l 1834. ibid., no. 6989; 2 J a n u a r y 1836. Ibid., no. ¡745. 26 For a d e p i c t i o n of t h e " r u i n o u s c o n s e q u e n c e s for public m o r a l s as well as the l a m e n a b l e a n d d a n g e r o u s t e m p t a t i o n for t h e e n t i r e n a t i o n " w r o u g h t by p e r v e r t e d familial r e l a i o n ships within t h e R o m a n o v h o u s e , s e e W o r t m a n , Scenarios of Power, 1:251. A l s o see Eigelstein. Keys to Happiness, 19,28. 27 " M o n g o l y - B u r i a t y v N e r c h i n s k o m o k r u g e I r k u t s k o i g u b e r n i i , " Zhurnal rennikh del, pt. 3, bk. 7 (July 1843): 3. N o a u t h o r is i n d i c a t e d . 28 F r a n t s l o s o f o v i c h Beliavskii, Poezdka k Ledovitomu moriu ( M o s k v a , 1833), iii. 29 P. Kirilov, " O c h e r k Sibiri," Zhurnal ministerstva vnulrennikh 1839): 434. 30 Beliavskii, Poezdka

k Ledovitomu

moriu,

ministerstva

Fr. Beliavskago

s

mut-

risuikami

del, pt. 34, bk. 1 ( D e c e n b e r

vii.

31 D o c t o r K r u z e , " P u t e v y i a zapiski ot I r k u t s k a d o Viliuiska v 1832 g o d u , " Zhurnal miiisterstva vnutrennikh del, pt. 11, bk. 1 ( J a n u a r y 1834): 7 2 - 7 3 . 32 P. Kirilov, " O c h e r k Sibiri," 434. 33 G. G o r o k h o v , " K r a t k o e e t n o g r a f i c h e s k o e o p i s a n i e Biiskikh, ili Altaiskikh Kalmyk© 1 sost a v l e n n o e iz z a p i s o k b y v s h o g o z e m s k o g o i s p r a v n i k a v Biiskom u e z d e T o m s k o i Gu»ernii g. G o r o k h o v a , " Zhurnal ministerstva vnutrennikh del, pt. 38, bk. 11 ( D e c e m b e r , 1840: 209, 2 1 4 - 1 7 ; K r u z e , " P u t e v y i a zapiski," 59-60; Beliavskii, Poezdka k Ledovitomu moru, 68, 7 2 - 7 3 , 78 ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) ; " M o n g o l y - B u r i a t y v N e r c h i n s k o m o k r u g e , " 13. 34 G. G o r o k h o v , " K r a t k o e e t n o g r a f i c h e s k o e o p i s a n i e , " 213; Beliavskii, Poezdka vitomu moriu, 119-122.

k

Ledo-

35 " M o n g o l y - B u r i a t y v N e r c h i n s k o m o k r u g e , " 14. 36 G. G o r o k h o v . " K r a t k o e e t n o g r a f i c h e s k o e o p i s a n i e , " 213; Beliavskii, Poezdka k Ledovitomu moriu, 71, 119-122, 132-136; K r u z e . " P u t e v y i a zapiski." 60; A k u s h e r A l e l s a n d r U k l o n s k i i , " K r a t k i i a m e d i k o - t o p o g r a f i c h e s k i i a i chastiiu statisticheskiia z a m e c h a i i i a o Viliuiskom o k r u g e I a k u t s k o i o b l a s t i , " Zhurnal ministerstva vnutrennikh del, pt. 39 bk. 1, ( J a n u a r y 1841), 96. 37 G. G o r o k h o v , " K r a t k o e e t n o g r a f i c h e s k o e o p i s a n i e , " 210-214; Beliavskii, Poezdka vitomu moriu, 117-119; " M o n g o l y - B u r i a t y v N e r c h i n s k o m okruge,"15. 38 39 40 41

kLedo-

" M o n g o l y - B u r i a t y v N e r c h i n s k o m o k r u g e , " 15. Beliavskii, Poezdka k Ledovitomu moriu, 119-121. Kirilov, " O c h e r k Sibiri," 434. O n this, see S c h r a d e r , Languages of the Lash, c h a p . 4.

42 For details, see ibid., chaps. 5 , 6 . 43 O. A . V o l k e n s h t e i n , Velikiie reformy 60-kh godov (Moscow, 1910), 2 8 , 3 2 - 7 , 7 3 - 4 , 8 6 - ' ; A . A . G o l o v a c h e v , Desiat' let reform, 1861-1871 gg. (St. P e t e r s b u r g , 1872); Bruce W. Lincoln, In the Vanguard of Reform: Russia's Enlightened Bureaucrats, 1825-1861 ( D e k a l b : Ncrthern Illinois University Press, 1982), 7 7 - 8 3 , 1 9 3 ^ 1 , 2 0 0 ; Lincoln, Nikolai Miliutin:An Enlivened Russian Bureaucrat (Newtonville, Mass.: O r i e n t a l R e s e a r c h P a r t n e r s , 1977), 3 0 - 3 6 . 44 R a t h e r t h a n r e p u d i a t e t h e n o t i o n t h a t status, service, a n d e d u c a t i o n c o n s t i t u t e d l e g t i m a t e c r i t e r i a f o r e x e m p t i o n f r o m floggings, t h e 1863 r e f o r m w i d e n e d t h e g r o u p s s p a r e d c o r p o ral p u n i s h m e n t . A l e x a n d e r II g r a n t e d this privilege t o C h r i s t i a n sacristans; n o n - C l r i s t i a n clergy a n d t h e i r c h i l d r e n ; t e a c h e r s in p o p u l a r p r i m a r y schools; g r a d u a t e s of a g n n o m i c i n s t i t u t e s and o t h e r e d u c a t i o n a l e s t a b l i s h m e n t s : a n d p e a s a n t s elected to c o m m u n t y service. See u k a z of 17 A p r i l 1863, P S Z , ser. 2, no. 39,504. 45 Ob otmene

telesnykh

nakazanii,

35, 109.

46 Ibid.\ R G I A , f. 1181, op. 1 5 , 1 8 6 1 , d. 111,1. 10.

Notes

• 49

47 On this issue, see Schrader, The Languages of the Lash, chaps. 5, 6. 48 Ibid., chap. 6; Lincoln, In the Vanguard of Reform, 139-47, 166-83, 193-4, 200; idem, Nikolai Miliutin. 36. 49 Civil society's campaign against floggings was launched by "the most diverse congresses and societies," including teachers' organizations, school boards, juridical and medical societies, and zemstvo associations. Downey, "Civil Society and the Campaign Against Corporal Punishment," 100-68; D.N. Zhbankov, Kogda u nas prekrashaetsia telesnye nakazaniia? (St. Petersburg, 1905). 10-4; R G I A , f. 1291. op. 2, 1895, d. 110, 1. 66ob; Schrader, Languages of the Lash, chap. 6. 50 Gretsko, "Ugolovnye prestupniki," Sovremennik 1 (1860): 298-300. 51 " O telesnykh nakazaniiakh, po povodu novogo ukaza po etomu predmetu," Sovremennik 5 (1863): 191 (emphasis added). 52 Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1990); Catherine Gallagher and Thomas Laqueur, eds., The Making of the Modern Body. Sexuality and Society in the Nineteenth Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); Isabel V. Hull, Sexuality, State, and Civil Society in Germany, 1700-1815 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Lynn Hunt, The Family Romance of the French Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1992); Hunt, ed., Eroticism and the Body Politic (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), Joan B. Landes, Women in the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Thomas Laqueur, Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990); Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988); Michelle Perrot, ed., A History of Private Life. From the Fires of Revolution to the Great War (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990); and James F. Traer, Marriage and the Family in Eighteenth-Century France (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980). On the production and reproduction of social categories within institutional frameworks, see Scott, Gender and the Politics of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 28-50; Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," in Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), 133, 170-7; Catherine Belsey, Critical Practice (London: Methuen Press, 1980), 56-84; Nancy Fraser, Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 114-5; and Paul Smith, Discerning the Subject (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988). 3-23. On Russia, see Wagner, Marriage, Property, and Law in Late Imperial Russia (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) and Engelstein, The Keys to Happiness.

National Narratives in the Representation of Nineteenth-Century Russian Monarchy R I C H A R D S. WORTMAN

It is a truism in the l i t e r a t u r e a b o u t Russian nationalism that a p o p u l a r , d e m o c ratic n a t i o n a l i s m failed to a p p e a r in p r e - r e v o l u t i o n a r y Russia. Russia diverged f r o m the W e s t e r n E u r o p e a n m o d e l , exemplified by E n g l a n d , France and S w e d e n , w h e r e a c o n c e p t of n a t i o n evolved u n d e r the aegis of a m o n a r c h y providing continuity b e t w e e n p r e - m o d e r n dynastic c o n c e p t s of n a t i o n and m o d e r n civic nationalism. 1 O n e r e a s o n that this transition did not occur in Russia was that the rulers p r e e m p t e d n a t i o n a l a p p e a l s a n d e n d e a v o r e d to p r e s e n t themselves as the expression of the will of the Russian people. Russian m o n a r c h s utilized this f o u n d a t i o n not only to bolster their authority, but also to p r e c l u d e the possibility of civic nationalism and to show that d e m o c r a t i c institutions were alien to Russia. Russian m o n a r c h s s o u g h t to m a k e " n a t i o n a l i t y " ( n a r o d n o s t ' ) an a t t r i b u t e of imperial p o w e r reflected in the past activity and identity of the m o n a r c h y — t o find in the w e s t e r n i z e d court a n d m o n a r c h y a c o m m o n past with the Russian people. To d e m o n s t r a t e their national credentials, Russian m o n a r c h s of the n i n e t e e n t h century e l a b o r a t e d mythical narratives that d e m o n s t r a t e d their b o n d with the Russian p e o p l e . Such n a r r a t i v e s show the ancient c h a r a c t e r of nations, c o m m o n origins evolving f r o m the past. They e v o k e what E t i e n n e B a l a b a r called a "fictive ethnicity which m a k e s it possible for the expression of a preexisting unity to be seen in the state, a n d continually to m e a s u r e the state against its 'historic mission' in the service of the n a t i o n , a n d as a c o n s e q u e n c e to idealize politics." 2 In Russia the mythical "idealization of politics" t o o k the f o r m of an e f f o r t to identify the Petrine heritage—the westernized Russian monarchy and multinational e m p i r e — with narodnost', the term that gained currency a n d r e s o n a n c e in the first d e c a d e s of the n i n e t e e n t h century. T h e word narodnost' s e e m s to have b e e n used first by the p o e t P e t e r Viazemskii as a translation of the F r e n c h nationalité in 1819. (Nationalité did not a p p e a r in a French dictionary until 1835.) It d e n o t e d a distinctive native c h a r a c t e r or identity, but what that identity was and w h e r e it was to be f o u n d r e m a i n e d unclear. W h e t h e r nationality was located in a national literature, language, customs, institutions, p e o p l e or history, or s o m e or all of t h e preceding, was the q u e s t i o n intellectuals d e b a t e d d u r i n g successive decades. In

52 • Richard S.

Wormian

any e v e n t t h e search f o r a distinctive c h a r a c t e r i s t i c b e g a n u n d e r t h e influence of t h e F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n a n d G e r m a n idealistic philosophy, w h e t h e r o r not the w o r d narodnost'

was u s e d . 3

T h e R u s s i a n m o n a r c h y s o u g h t to a p p r o p r i a t e n a t i o n a l i t y f o r itself, d e n y i n g a s e p a r a t e e x i s t e n c e t o t h e p e o p l e , a n d t r y i n g to s q u a r e t h e circle t o s h o w t h a t t h e w e s t e r n i z e d a b s o l u t e m o n a r c h y w a s n a t i v e in origin a n d spirit. 4 H e r e I will a r g u e t h a t this a p p r o p r i a t i o n of t h e i d e a of n a t i o n a s s u m e d t w o q u i t e d i f f e r e n t s y m b o l i c f o r m s f o r m s in t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y — t h e official nationality, which d e f i n e d t h e r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n t s a r a n d p e o p l e d u r i n g t h e r e i g n s of N i c h o l a s I a n d A l e x a n d e r II, a n d w h a t I call t h e n a t i o n a l m y t h , which w a s p r o p a g a t e d d u r i n g t h e r e i g n s of A l e x a n d e r III a n d N i c h o l a s II. T h i s f o r m u l a t i o n d i v e r g e s f r o m t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l view of A l e x a n d e r I l l ' s n a t i o n a l i s m as a c o n t i n u a t i o n of N i c h o l a s I's. A l e x a n d e r I l l ' s n a t i o n a l i m a g e r y , I c o n t e n d , i n t r o d u c e d n o t only a d i f f e r e n t c o n c e p t i o n of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e m o n a r c h a n d R u s s i a n p e o p l e , b u t a n e w c o n c e p t i o n of t h e s t a t e t h a t p l a y e d a crucial role in s h a p i n g t h e policies of t h e a u t o c r a c y in t h e e a r l y t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y .

OFFICIAL

NATIONALITY

N i c h o l a s I, following t h e p a t t e r n of his f o r b e a r s , t o o k on a c o n c e p t p r e v a l e n t in t h e West a n d i n c o r p o r a t e d it into i m p e r i a l mythology. T h e w o r d " n a t i o n a l i t y " sugg e s t e d an idea or spirit distinctive to a p e o p l e ; N i c h o l a s 1 a n d his a d v i s o r s identified this spirit with t h e w e s t e r n i z e d R u s s i a n m o n a r c h y a n d its past. T h e c e n t r a l t h e m e s of official n a t i o n a l i t y w e r e e x p r e s s e d in t h e m a n i f e s t o a n n o u n c i n g t h e sentencing of t h e D e c e m b r i s t s issued o n 13 July 1826. T h e D e c e m b r i s t s ' design t o i n t r o d u c e w e s t e r n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s was alien t o t h e R u s s i a n p e o p l e . " N e i t h e r in t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s n o r t h e w a y s of t h e R u s s i a n is this design t o be f o u n d . .. .The h e a r t of R u s s i a w a s a n d will b e i m p e r v i o u s t o it." T h e m a n i f e s t o c o n t i n u e d , "In a s t a t e w h e r e love f o r m o n a r c h s a n d d e v o t i o n to t h e t h r o n e a r e b a s e d on t h e n a t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h e p e o p l e , w h e r e t h e r e a r e laws of t h e f a t h e r l a n d a n d firmness in a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , all e f f o r t s of t h e e v i l - i n t e n t i o n e d will be in vain a n d insane." 5 T h e f a i l u r e of t h e D e c e m b r i s t u p r i s i n g was itself proof of t h e love of t h e p e o p l e f o r t h e m o n a r c h y a n d its n a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r , which set R u s s i a a p a r t f r o m E u r o p e a n s t a t e s t h a t h a d c o m e t o rely o n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e institutions. T h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of political a u t h o r i t y w a s m o s t s u c c e s s f u l in R u s s i a b e c a u s e of t h e R u s s i a n p e o p l e ' s love f o r t h o s e w h o h a d c o m e f r o m o u t s i d e , o r a p p e a r e d t o c o m e f r o m o u t s i d e , a n d g o v e r n t h e m . T h e R u s s i a n p e o p l e set t h e m o d e l of o b e d i e n c e a n d loyalty f o r t h e o t h e r n a t i o n a l i t i e s of t h e e m p i r e , w h o also a c c e p t ed s u b o r d i n a t i o n t o a m u l t i n a t i o n a l elite, s h a r i n g t h e w e s t e r n c u l t u r e of t h e Pet e r s b u r g c o u r t . T h e m o n a r c h y d e m o n s t r a t e d t h e h i s t o r i c d e v o t i o n of t h e R u s s i a n p e o p l e to t h e i r c o n q u e r o r s a n d rulers, in c e r e m o n y , h i s t o r y a n d c h u r c h a r c h i t e c ture. T h e first c e r e m o n i a l display of this t y p e t o o k p l a c e a f e w m o n t h s a f t e r t h a t

National Narratives • 53 m a n i f e s t o in the s u m m e r of 1826. Following the coronation service in the Assumption Cathedral, Nicholas I made the traditional procession in full regalia, stopping first at the Archangel, then the Annunciation Cathedrals. Then he ascended the R e d Staircase b e f o r e the Palace of Facets, turned to the crowd, and bowed three times, to their t h u n d e r o u s Hoorahs! The bow was an initial ceremony of recognition b e t w e e n the e m p e r o r and the Russian people, expressing an unspoken bond of devotion. It was a true "invented tradition," which was repeated on future cere m o n i a l visits of the e m p e r o r s to Moscow and at all f u t u r e coronations. Later in t h e century, the triple bow came to be hallowed as an "ancient tradition" distinctive to Russia, expressing the popular character of the monarchy. ñ Historical narratives now incorporated the Russian people into the dominant Pe trine myth, giving the monarchy a patina of democracy by showing it to be the choice of the nation. The founding legend for the myth was the invitation to Viking princes in 862 by the people of Novgorod with the words: " O u r land is great and rich, but there is no o r d e r in it. C o m e to rule and reign over us." Nicholas Karamzin's popular History of the Russian State (1818-1829) had described this as "an astonishing and nearly unparalleled case in the chronicles. ...Everyw h e r e the sword of the powerful or the cunning of the ambitious introduced absolute monarchy (samovlastie), in Russia it was confirmed by the general agreement with the citizens. ...The Slavs voluntarily destroy their ancient popular government and d e m a n d sovereigns from the Varangians." 7 T h e historian Michael Pogodin argued that the invitation revealed the paradigm of the historical development of Russia and the political order exemplified by Nicholaean autocracy. In a lecture delivered in 1832 in the presence of the Assistant Minister of Education, Sergei Uvarov, Pogodin declared: "The Varangians came to us, but voluntarily chosen, at least from the start, not like Western victors and conquerors—the first essential distinction in the kernel, the seed of the Russian State." 8 The Russian people had invited their rulers, had obeyed and loved them; autocracy had national roots. The acceptance and worship of the s u p r e m e foreign ruler had become the distinguishing mark of the Russian people. The invitation was enshrined as the official version of foundation of the Russian state. In 1851 the first volume of Sergei Solov'ev's History of Russia argued that the invitation took place in 852, rather than 862, and provoked angry responses f r o m Pogodin, N.M. Ustrialov, and others. Pogodin declared Solov'ev's contention a blasphemy against o n e of the "sacred dates" of Russian history. In 1852 Nicholas I issued an order to the Minister of Education insisting that higher educational institutions preserve the traditional date of 862. 9 The ideological formulation of these themes was the work of the Minister of Education, Sergei Uvarov, who coined the slogan, "orthodoxy, autocracy, nationality" (pravoslavie, samoderzhavie, narodnost'). Uvarov advanced eighteenth-century utilitarian justifications of autocracy as the institution that had created and saved the Russian state. H e made no mention of divine sanction; autocracy was "the necessary condition of the existence of the empire." Orthodoxy was present-

54 • Richard S. Wortman ed not as a revealed truth, but as " g u a r a n t e e of social and family happiness." The Russian nation was defined not as an ethnic entity, but by the utter devotion of the Russian people to their rulers, which set them apart from western peoples, seduced by liberal ideas. 10 The principles of Uvarov's slogan were proclaimed and d e f e n d e d by a n u m b e r of official writers, contributing to such state-subsidized journals as Severnaia Pchela and Moskvitianin and reflected the views of much of the educated public at the time. 11 The subtext of the new version of the Petrine myth was that the institutions of the Russian state had been consecrated by its history: they were not to be judged by western ideas or the experience of western states. The history followed Karamzin's linear pattern, the passing of the tradition of autocracy from reign to reign, its culmination in the existing Russian state. The official nationality doctrine preserved and enhanced the Petrine identification of the e m p e r o r with the state. Michael Cherniavsky wrote that Peter's governmental institutions all were "executive extensions of Peter's personal will." 12 Much the same can be said for the institutions of Nicholas's state. Although the Russian administration had attained massive dimensions by the end of his reign, Nicholas regarded the state as inseparable f r o m his own personal authority. He took care to watch over his officials as closely as possible, either through the function of nadzor (administrative supervision) or through the Third Section of his Chancellery, which served, among other functions, as an organ of personal surveillance over the administration. Nicholas's person was omnipresent, and officials regarded him as the incarnation of the state. " H e gives meaning and color to everything," wrote Baron Modest Korf, a State Secretary of Nicholas's. "All the radii of the many sided public activity converge on him." The imperial court in Nicholas's reign served as a display of the unity of the highest officials of the administration with the emperor and o t h e r m e m b e r s of the imperial family. 13 Nicholas remained fully G e r m a n in manner, t e m p e r a m e n t and dress, and m a d e known his admiration for Frederick the G r e a t and Prussian monarchy. A t the same time, he openly displayed his predilection for Russian culture and history. This took many forms: for example preservation of artifacts of the Russian past, encouraging a national style in church architecture and Russian music, arranging ceremonial visits to Moscow. It was m a d e clear that these were not mere instances of personal taste, but visual statements of the monarchy's identity and past. A new style in church architecture gave visual expression to Nicholas's conception of Russia's national past. Konstantin Thon created an official national style, which in 1841 was established by decree. Breaking f r o m the eighteenth-century classical models, T h o n designed five-cupola churches on the model of the Vladimir and Moscow Assumption Cathedrals. His Moscow-Byzantine style is exemplified by the massive Christ the R e d e e m e r Cathedral in Moscow, which has recently b e e n rebuilt at its original site in the center in Moscow. The Cathedral identifies Russian O r t h o d o x y with the Byzantine imperial tradition, stating its distance f r o m the western monarchical tradition, which had proved weak and decadent.

National

Narratives

• 55

N e o - B y z a n t i n e d e c o r a t i v e e l e m e n t s w e r e g r a f t e d o n t o a massive w e s t e r n n e o classical s t r u c t u r e , c r e a t i n g a f u s i o n of R u s s i a n a n d w e s t e r n m o t i f s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of t h e eclectic spirit of N i c h o l a e a n culture. 1 4 N i c h o l a s d e m o n s t r a t e d t h e m o n a r c h y ' s a t t a c h m e n t t o t h e t r a d i t i o n s of p r e P e t r i n e R u s s i a at c e r e m o n i a l a p p e a r a n c e s in t h e M o s c o w K r e m l i n , w h e r e he r e p e a t e d t h e t r i p l e b o w he h a d p e r f o r m e d in 1826. T h e s e trips a s s u m e d especial i m p o r t a n c e a f t e r t h e R e v o l u t i o n of 1848, w h e n a n c i e n t R u s ' signified t h e religious national faith that preserved Russia from the dissension and upheavals that had a f f l i c t e d t h e W e s t . T h i s display of n a t i o n a l affiliation c o n f i r m e d r a t h e r t h a n cont r a d i c t e d t h e a u t h o r i t y of N i c h o l a s ' s w e s t e r n i z e d elite. H e called u p o n t h e tradit i o n s of a n c i e n t M o s c o w b u t w i t h o u t wishing t o revive t h e m . S o m e of t h e m o r e nationally inclined writers, like P o g o d i n and S t e p a n Shevyrev, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d s a w t h e e m p e r o r ' s p r e s e n c e as a sign of a r e t u r n t o M u s c o v i t e c u l t u r e . T h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n their image of a n a t i o n a l m o n a r c h y a n d t h e e m p e r o r ' s b e c a m e c l e a r d u r i n g a visit to M o s c o w in 1849 t o d e d i c a t e T h o n ' s n e w Kremlin Palace. Pogodin wrote that Nicholas assumed a different persona when h e left t h e s e t t i n g of t h e palace. " A r e t h e R u s s i a n T s a r a n d t h e E u r o p e a n E m p e r o r t w o p e r s o n s ? N o , t h e y a r e o n e ! F r o m t h e V l a d i m i r H a l l [of t h e n e w K r e m l i n P a l a c e ] it is o n l y a f e w s t e p s t o t h e Hall of Facets a n d t h e R e d Staircase. O n c e [Nicholas] o p e n s t h e d o o r t o t h e p e o p l e , o r e v e n o p e n s t h e w i n d o w of T s a r A l e x e i M i k h a i l o v i c h , all of M o s c o w , a n d with h e r all of R u s s i a will see a n d h e a r h i m a n d a n s w e r , ' T h e E u r o p e a n E m p e r o r is again t h e R u s s i a n T s a r ! ' " P o g o d i n ' s article, h o w e v e r , did n o t p a s s t h e censors. 1 5 T h e e f f o r t s of t h e S l a v o p h i l e s to r e c a p t u r e t h e i r c o n c e p t i o n of early R u s s i a n culture evoked a sharp response. W h e n Alexei Khomiakov, Konstantin A k s a k o v a n d s e v e r a l o t h e r S l a v o p h i l e s v e n t u r e d to a p p e a r at c o u r t in b e a r d s a n d w h a t t h e y b e l i e v e d w a s t h e R u s s i a n c l o t h i n g of early R u s s i a , a swift r e b u k e c a m e d o w n f r o m t h e M i n i s t r y of I n t e r i o r . A c i r c u l a r of t h e M i n i s t r y of I n t e r i o r t o p r o v i n c i a l m a r shals of t h e nobility a n n o u n c e d t h a t " T h e T s a r is d i s p l e a s e d t h a t R u s s i a n n o b l e m e n w e a r b e a r d s . B e c a u s e f o r s o m e t i m e n e w s h a s b e e n r e c e i v e d f r o m all p r o v i n c e s t h a t t h e n u m b e r of b e a r d s has g r e a t l y i n c r e a s e d . " It w e n t o n t o e x p l a i n that in t h e West b e a r d s w e r e "a sign of a c e r t a i n t y p e of ideas. We d o n o t h a v e this here." T h e T s a r , it c o n c l u d e d , " c o n s i d e r s t h a t b e a r d s will i n t e r f e r e with t h e n o b l e m a n ' s elective service." 1 6 In N i c h o l a s ' s f r a m e of mind, b e a r d s signified n o t R u s s i a n s b u t Jews a n d radicals. T h e official view identified t h e n a t i o n with t h e ruling weste r n elite, a n d t h e s u g g e s t i o n t h a t t h e r e was a n o t h e r , c o n t r a d i c t o r y m e a s u r e of n a t i o n in t h e p e a s a n t r y o r t h e p a s t i n t i m a t e d r e b e l l i o n . N i c h o l a s ' s s h o w s of n a t i o n a l spirit w e r e m e a n t t o p r e s e r v e , n o t to n a r r o w t h e d i s t a n c e b e t w e e n t h e a u t o c r a t i c - n o b l e elite a n d t h e r u l e d : to d r a m a t i z e o b e d i e n c e as a spiritual q u a l i t y of the n a t i o n . A u t h e n t i c i t y , t r u t h a n d o t h e r v e r s i o n s of t h e n a t i o n a l past j e o p a r dized t h e m o n o l o g i c u n i v e r s e of t h e i m p e r i a l m y t h . T h e b e a r d s y m b o l i z e d a c o m ing t o g e t h e r of elite a n d p e o p l e in a n a t i o n a l c u l t u r e w h o s e f e a t u r e s w e r e n o t defined by t h e a u t o c r a t i c p o w e r . 1 7

56 • Richard S. Wortman B u t t h e official n a t i o n a l i t y also p r o v i d e d t h e g r o u n d i n g f o r a d y n a m i c view of t h e m o n a r c h as t h e r u l e r of a r e f o r m e d s t a t e , leading a mission of building a dynamic and powerful Russian Empire. Such

figures

as N.N. Muraviev, A.P.

Balasoglo, N.I. N a d e z h d i n , a n d o t h e r m e m b e r s of t h e R u s s i a n G e o g r a p h i c a l Society e n v i s i o n e d a r e v i t a l i z e d R u s s i a n E m p i r e t h a t would r e p r e s e n t the R u s s i a n n a t i o n . 1 8 T h e p r e s u m p t i o n of t h e d e v o t i o n of t h e Russian p e o p l e to a m o n a r c h who embodied the state and empire underlay the rationale for the Great Reforms. T h e s t e p s t a k e n in b e h a l f of t h e p e o p l e by t h e m o n a r c h i c a l s t a t e justified t h e love of t h e p e o p l e to t h e i r s o v e r e i g n . R e f o r m h a d b e e n a goal of N i c h o l a s ' s e n l i g h t e n e d d e s p o t i s m , t h o u g h f e a r of d i s r u p t i o n d e t e r r e d all b u t a few e f f o r t s to i n t r o d u c e c h a n g e . A l e x a n d e r II's s c e n a r i o a d a p t e d t h e ideas a n d i m a g e s of official n a t i o n a l i t y to a p r o g r a m of r e f o r m . H e a p p e a r e d as t h e h u m a n e

European

monarch, conferring benefactions on a grateful and devoted people—the emancip a t i o n of t h e serfs, t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of r e f o r m e d c o u r t s a n d o r g a n s of local selfg o v e r n m e n t . T h e G r e a t R e f o r m s w e r e p r e s e n t e d as e x p r e s s i o n s of the love uniting s o v e r e i g n a n d p e o p l e distinctive t o R u s s i a , which w o u l d e n a b l e R u s s i a to r e a p t h e b e n e f i t s of i n c r e a s e d f r e e d o m a n d social d e v e l o p m e n t while a v o i d i n g t h e political u p h e a v a l s of t h e West. F o l l o w i n g t h e p r o m u l g a t i o n of t h e E m a n c i p a t i o n M a n i f e s t o in F e b r u a r y 1861, d e m o n s t r a t i o n s of g r a t i t u d e a n d a p p r o v a l by t h e people show the popular

g r o u n d i n g of m o n a r c h i c a l p o w e r f u n d a m e n t a l

to

o f f i c i a l - n a t i o n a l i t y t h i n k i n g . T h e t s a r r e m a i n e d t h e s u p r e m e w e s t e r n i z e d figure of g o d l i k e e l e g a n c e , d i s t a n t f r o m his p e o p l e a n d b e s t o w i n g the b e n e f i t s of p r o g r e s s and civilization u p o n t h e m . P o p u l a r p r i n t s ( l u b k i ) issued in t h e e r a of E m a n c i p a t i o n p r e s e n t A l e x a n d e r II s t a n d i n g a b o v e p e a s a n t s a n d w o r k e r s on their k n e e s in p r a y e r , d i s p l a y i n g g r a t i t u d e a n d a d o r a t i o n t o t h e e m p e r o r , a figure f r o m a higher r e a l m . 1 9 T h e a n n i v e r s a r y of t h e M i l l e n i u m of R u s s i a in N o v g o r o d in 1862 celeb r a t e d t h e e m b l e m a t i c act of r a p p o r t b e t w e e n r u l e d a n d t h e i r r u l e r s in 862. A l e x a n d e r a d d r e s s e d t h e N o v g o r o d nobility calling t h e c e l e b r a t i o n "a n e w sign of t h e i n d e s t r u c t i b l e b o n d of all t h e e s t a t e s of t h e R u s s i a n land with t h e g o v e r n m e n t with o n e g o a l , t h e h a p p i n e s s a n d w e l l - b e i n g of o u r d e a r f a t h e r l a n d . " 2 0

THE NATIONAL

MYTH

T h e g r e a t divide in t h e history of t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the R u s s i a n e m p e r o r in t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y o c c u r r e d n o t with t h e C r i m e a n W a r and d e a t h of N i c h o l a s I, b u t with t h e a s s a s s i n a t i o n of A l e x a n d e r II in 1881. T h e assassination d e a l t t h e final blow to t h e P e t r i n e m y t h , t h e n o t i o n t h a t t h e R u s s i a n m o n a r c h y e m b o d i e d t h e ideal of t h e E u r o p e a n a b s o l u t e s t a t e , b u t s u r p a s s e d its m o d e l s in p o w e r , m a j e s t y , a n d virtue. If t h e official n a t i o n a l i t y d o c t r i n e a c c o m m o d a t e d t h e c o n c e p t of n a t i o n to t h e P e t r i n e m y t h , A l e x a n d e r I l l ' s s c e n a r i o p r e s e n t e d t h e e m p e r o r as t h e h e r o of a n a t i o n a l m y t h t h a t e m p h a s i z e d his e t h n i c c h a r a c t e r , as t h e m o s t R u s s i a n of Russians, w h o was a b o v e a n d a p a r t f r o m t h e w e s t e r n i z e d R u s s i a n state.

National Narratives • 57 T h e images and themes of the myth took form in the 1860s and the 1870s a m o n g the m e m b e r s of the so-called "Russian party," which consisted of officials a n d journalists, disaffected one way or a n o t h e r f r o m the policies of Alexander II, such as Konstantin Pobedonostsev, Mikhail Katkov, and Vladimir Meshcherskii. T h e i r conceptions of the nation were vague and diverse, but they all opposed w h a t they perceived as irresolute domestic foreign policies and a want of characteristically Russian traits. But none of their views corresponded to the notion of civic nation, which they considered alien to Russia's culture and past. T h e new national myth was elaborated in the manifesto of 29 April 1881. The manifesto, drafted by Pobedonostev, brought to an end the discussions of governm e n t a l reform that had continued u n d e r Loris-Melikov's direction in the weeks a f t e r the assassination. 2 1 The manifesto m a d e the autocratic, unlimited power of t h e tsar a p p e a r as both a divinely ordained obligation and the m a n d a t e of the Russian people. Revising the initial text, Pobedonostsev changed the words "the b u r d e n of supreme rule" ('bremia verkhovnogo pravlenia') to "the Holy Duty of Autocratic rule" {'Sviashchennyi dolg Samoderzhavnogo pravleniia').21 This gave divine sanction to the tsar's absolute p o w e r — n o t only to the sources of imperial p o w e r , but also to the way it was exercised. The people displayed their devotion to the monarchy not as they had under A l e x a n d e r II, in demonstrations of gratitude for benefactions bestowed on them. R a t h e r they showed that the forms of national consent were religious, d e m o n strated through the institutions of the church, in prayer: "the fervent prayers of a pious people known throughout the entire world for their love and devotion to their sovereigns." These prayers brought divine blessing on their sovereign. The manifesto replaced the early eighteenth century with a new founding period of Russian monarchy. Pobedonostsev wrote not of the Russian state or empire, but the "Russian land" ('zemlia russkaia'). The "Russian land" evoked a Slavophile picture of the unity of all estates in Russia, a single people, living in harmony with their tsar. The people in this way became inseparable f r o m an image of an original undifferentiated, abstraction of the land, uncorrupted by the institutions of the Russian state. The Russian land now had been disgraced by vile sedition, but "hereditary tsarist p o w e r " continued to enjoy the love of its subjects, and this power "in u n b r e a k a b l e . . . u n i o n with O u r land" had survived such troubles {smuty) in the past. The historical paradigm now shifts f r o m the legend of the calling of the Varangians to a picture of an idealized Muscovite state. The elevation and glorification of the monarch now take place by claiming to inhabit a n o t h e r time frame, when the tsar was in contact with the nation. The distance between the ruler and educated society was the distance between him and the manifestations of the fallen present that e n c u m b e r e d his power. A f t e r A l e x a n d e r I l l ' s death in 1894, Moskovskie Vedomosti described him as the initiator of a new period in Russian history, "the Russian period"; he was the "great moral gatherer of Russian land," placing him a m o n g the princes of Moscow. H e had restored "Russian autocracy," which had b e e n realized in Muscovy when the idea of autocracy

58 • Richard S.

Wortman

r e c e i v e d f r o m B y z a n t i u m had g a i n e d its distinctively Russian c h a r a c t e r . If the n a t i o n a l m y t h s o u g h t t o divest R u s s i a n a u t o c r a c y of its w e s t e r n t r a p p i n g s , it also a n n o u n c e d t h e s e p a r a t i o n f r o m its B y z a n t i n e origins, which h a d b e e n e m p h a s i z e d u n d e r N i c h o l a s I. 2 3 T h e s y n c h r o n i c m o d e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of late n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y nationalist a n d racial i d e o l o g i e s r e p l a c e s the l i n e a r d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e P e t r i n e m y t h . T h e sync h r o n i c m o d e was p r o f o u n d l y a n t i - t r a d i t i o n a l , f o r it d i m i n i s h e d t h e h e r i t a g e of t h e e i g h t e e n t h a n d n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r i e s a n d d e l e g i t i m i z e d t h e legalistic b u r e a u cracy, t h e intelligentsia, a n d the d y n a m i c of r e f o r m that h a d r e a c h e d its c u l m i n a tion in t h e p r e v i o u s reign. It l o o k e d b a c k to a timeless heritage, u n t o u c h e d by historical c h a n g e . T h e R u s s i a n e m p e r o r m i g h t live in w e s t e r n - s t y l e palaces, c o n s o r t with w e s t e r n royalty, a n d s h a r e E u r o p e a n c u l t u r e , b u t these superficial o v e r l a y s c o n c e a l e d a n a t i o n a l s u b s t r a t u m ( u s t o i ) t h a t could be r e c o v e r e d t h r o u g h a r e s t o r ation of t h e e a r l i e r political a n d s p i r i t u a l o r d e r . T h e image of tsar a n d p e o p l e e x p r e s s e d t h e close cultural a n d even e t h n i c affinity that A l e x a n d e r III c l a i m e d with his subjects. A g a i n , t h e p e r s o n a of t h e e m p e r o r was displayed early in his reign, a n d in public c e r e m o n i a l

form.24

A l e x a n d e r III was p r e s e n t e d as " R u s s i a n t s a r " in t h e first m o n t h s of his reign. D e s p i t e his p a r e n t a g e , c u l t u r e a n d f r e q u e n t trips to D e n m a r k , he w a s e l e v a t e d as t h e e m b o d i m e n t of t h e n a t i o n . A l e x a n d e r ' s g r e a t size, his surly a n d u n c o u t h m a n ner, his i m p a t i e n c e with t h e niceties of society m a d e it possible t o p r e s e n t him as o n e alien to t h e e d u c a t e d elite, w h o s e c h a r a c t e r was close to t h e R u s s i a n

narod.

Most obviously, he was t h e first R u s s i a n m o n a r c h since the s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y t o wear a beard. While wearing beards had become fashionable among the upper classes by t h e 1880s, a large red b e a r d o n t h e face of R u s s i a n m o n a r c h was a statem e n t of association with p r e - P e t r i n e Russia. T h e i m a g e of his massive figure in a R u s s i a n h a t a n d jack b o o t s w a s t h e antithesis of t h e f o r m e r sleek look of t h e g u a r d s ' regiments. It e v o k e d t h e i m a g e of t h e bogatyr',

t h e burly epic h e r o e s of

early Russia, a r e a f f i r m a t i o n of s t a t e p o w e r c o m i n g f r o m within, f r o m R u s s i a itself. T h e c h a n g e was d i s p l a y e d in a n e w look given to t h e military. S h o r t l y a f t e r his accession, A l e x a n d e r issued p e r m i s s i o n , which was t a k e n as an o r d e r , f o r g u a r d s officers to w e a r b e a r d s . ( G u a r d s m e n p r e v i o u s l y h a d b e e n a l l o w e d only a t w o finger-widths

u n s h a v e n strip o n t h e i r chins.) S o o n n e a r l y all g u a r d s officers

a p p e a r e d with b e a r d s , t h o u g h a f e w t h o u g h t t h a t this gave t h e m t h e l o o k of p e a s ants (omuzhlchanie). New Russian-style uniforms were introduced, including the high R u s s i a n b o o t s a n d f u r hats. A t t h e s a m e time, t h e g u a r d s , t h e p a r a g o n of P e t r i n e w e s t e r n i z a t i o n , w e r e s u r r o u n d e d by religious s y m b o l s of O l d R u s s i a . F o r t h e first t i m e b a n n e r s of t h e r e g i m e n t s w e r e e m b l a z o n e d with icons of t h e i r patron

saints. E i g h t - p o i n t e d

flagstaffs.25

Orthodox

crosses appeared

at t h e t o p of

the

V.I. G u r k o later w r o t e t h a t this f u s i o n of " m i l i t a r y a n d religious c e r e -

m o n i e s " p r o d u c e d a f e e l i n g of e l a t i o n , as t h e m o n a r c h b e c a m e t h e s y m b o l of t h e p e o p l e ' s might. Such c e r e m o n i e s , he w r o t e , " w e r e a d i s t i n g u i s h i n g f e a t u r e of t h e R u s s i a n c o u r t , which r e f l e c t e d t h e spirit of ' t h e a n c i e n t M u s c o v i t e E m p i r e ' p e r -

National Narratives • 59 r n e a t e d with religious and secular powers which complemented each other and f o r m e d one whole." 2 6 T h e representations of the monarchy now sought to detach the image of imperial Russia from St. Petersburg and locate it in a new image of Moscow. Symbolic M o s c o w did not encompass m o d e r n Moscow, the city of factories, the liberal intelligentsia and often fractious nobility. It was the Moscow of the Kremlin and Red S q u a r e , recalling an idealized past of spiritual unity between tsar and people and a devotion to the autocratic ruler unsullied by foreign doubts. In the summer of 1881, less than six months after his accession, Alexander unexpectedly announced hns desire to travel to Moscow. In the Kremlin he declared, "Moscow has always served as an example for all of Russia. I hope this will be true in the future. Moscow has attested and now attests that in Russia, Tsar and people compose o n e , concordant (edinodushnoe) strong whole." 2 7 Then, after a religious service, h e stepped out onto the Red Staircase to p e r f o r m the triple bow and to receive t h e acclaim of the crowd. A l e x a n d e r ' s coronation in 1883 confirmed his belief that he was returning Russia to its Muscovite roots. In a letter to the Empress on its first anniversary, he described the coronation as a "great event for us. A n d it proved to a surprised and morally corrupt E u r o p e that Russia is still the same holy, O r t h o d o x Russia as it was under the Muscovite tsars and, if G o d permits, as it will remain forever." 2 8 T h e new prominence of the O r t h o d o x Church showed the persistence of "holy. O r t h o d o x Russia." Under Pobedonostsev's direction the church supplanted the state as the principal national institution of the monarchy. The Holy Synod encouraged the spread of religious literature, the building of church schools, and t h e expansion of church construction. It permitted the spread of pastoral movem e n t s among the secular clergy. The spirit of Russia's religious past was recalled in great religious c o m m e m o r a t i o n s staged to show the autocracy's debt to O r t h o d o x y and the national following c o m m a n d e d by the church. 2 9 A new official national style of church architecture d e m o n s t r a t e d a return to an original Russian spirit. The government gave proof of the vitality of early Russia by building O r t h o d o x churches in Muscovite style. A l e x a n d e r himself wanted the Cathedral of the Resurrection to be built on the site of his f a t h e r ' s assassination in "the Russian style." Russian style meant for him not the Thon, Moscow-Byzantine style of the R e d e e m e r Cathedral but "the style of the times of Moscow tsars of the seventeenth century." By this Alexander meant the flamboyant forms of Vasilii the Blessed on Moscow's Red Square. The external devices— tent forms, the tracery, kokoshtiiki, and shirinki borrowed f r o m a great n u m b e r of seventeenth century churches in the Moscow-Iaroslavl style—are in great contrast with the more reserved and symmetrical forms of the R e d e e m e r Cathedral. Although the Resurrection Cathedral, usually called "the Savior on the Blood," was not consecrated until 1907, it provided the model for church design in the official Russian style after 1881. 30 A report Pobedonostsev wrote as Chief Procurator of the Synod in the 1890s asserted that Alexander himself reviewed pro-

60 • Richard S. Wortman jects for churches and "willingly approved those projects that reproduced the ancient tradition of Russian churches." 3 1 The evocation of Muscovy, couched in Slavophile rhetoric and images, distanced the person of the monarch not only from westernized educated society, but f r o m the institutions of the absolute state, encumbered by forms of European legality and institutional autonomy. For Alexander III and his advisors, the monarchy could regain its lost authority only by a signal rejection of more recent governing traditions, which had enervated and constrained the exercise of autocratic power. The Russian tsar now embodied not the existing state, but the nation, existing from distant times, and it was his personal authority, wielded with diminished regard for legal and bureaucratic formalities, that could bring about the spiritual union between tsar and people. The seventeenth century provided a paradigm for a state power of a different type, a government responsive to the monarch's will that could reunite an administration divided by considerations of legality and institutional autonomy. The manifesto of 29 April 1881 associated the origins of the Russian nation with the restoration of monarchical authority after the breakdown of the Time of Troubles. The "Voice of G o d " ("Glas Bozhii") had summoned the tsar "to turn vigorously to the task of Ruling, with hope in Divine Providence." H e would rule, he promised, "with faith in the force and truth of Autocratic power, which we have b e e n summoned to confirm and preserve for the people's welfare from all encroachments." The word bodro (vigorously) bespoke an assertion of energetic, ruthless authority, inspired by the faith in G o d and the prayers of the people. Bodro became a c o m m o n term in the rhetoric of conservative periodicals in the call for reaffirmation of autocratic power. Alexander's stern and brooding mien, his brusqueness and crudity, presented him as a model of that era, an incarnation of unyielding will and determination. H e sought to restore early Russian autocracy by making the spheres of government directly responsive to his wishes—police, finances, and foreign policy. These spheres would be directed by men completely loyal to him, those whom he regarded as truly Russian. The elite of the Russian monarchy now narrowed to those sharing the tsar's national vision, who were endowed with energy and shared Alexander's arrogance of u n t r a m m e l e d power. Together he and his servitors created an image of strength that exalted the Russian monarchy when the empire's international standing had declined, its finances were in disorder, and many high officials cherished a sense of legality that challenged the totality of autocratic rule. The anti-bureaucratic rhetoric that the Slavophiles had used to d e n o u n c e the entire state administration now served to discredit those parts of the government resistant to the personal power of the monarch, especially the State Council and the court system. The contrast with Nicholas I's official nationality doctrine, which validated the perfection and reinforcement of the existing administrative system, is clear. A n article in Moskovskie Vedomosti upon Alexander I l l ' s death remarked that the official nationality doctrine under Nicholas I remained some kind of

National Narratives • 61 " s t a t e patriotism" ( k a z e n n y i patriotizm) and "was not embodied in living phen o m e n a . " Nicholas I "was not yet conscious with full clarity of the complete sepa r a t i o n between Russia and E u r o p e by type, was not conscious of the complete distinction of Russian autocracy f r o m Western E u r o p e a n monarchism." 3 2 T h e model for Alexander I l l ' s national state was set forth in the pages of Russkii Vestnik by Mikail Katkov's protégé, the Simbirsk landlord, Alexander P a z u k h i n . Pazukhin evoked a seventeenth century Russian state based on close c o o p e r a t i o n between nobility and bureaucracy, where noblemen served as willing e x e c u t o r s rather than as independent citizens. For Pazukhin, the seventeenth century was a period of administrative consolidation and growing state power in Russia. The "land" (zemlia) comprised for him not a community of the people, as it had for the Slavophiles, but the "state ranks" (gosudarstvennye chiny). "The e s t a t e organization in the mind of the old Russian person was the g u a r a n t e e of o r d e r and tranquillity in the country." Peter was not the founder but the beneficiary of an estate system that he used to bring Russia closer to the West. 33 T h e Slavophile picture of the seventeenth century served to delegitimize the p o s t - r e f o r m state with its striving for legality and autonomy. Pazukhin's writings provided a historical paradigm for counter-reforms that aimed to extend the authority of the monarch through administrative institutions of the Ministry of Interior, to the local landed nobility, reconstituting the personal bond between t h e monarch and the estates that had presumably existed in seventeenth-century Russia. The national myth also provided a historical grounding for the enhancem e n t of the role of Russian religion and language in the governing of subject nationalities. It announced a break with the old model of a multinational elite—a g r o u p united by service to their sovereign and a common domination over subject nationalities, among whom the Russian people were exemplary in their devotion and subservience. Now the non-Russian elites could no longer be trusted. The national autocracy identified loyalty and administrative effectiveness with Russian ethnicity and Russian domination of other nationalities. In the western provvinces and Poland the new myth justified policies of Russification, while in Central Asia they provided a rationale for a Russian colonial administration ruling over subject nationalities. To be sure, few of these goals were realized during Alexander I l l ' s brief reign. Pobedonostev's schemes to reinvigorate the clergy as agents of national conscious f o u n d e r e d on his policies of central administrative control of the activities of the church. The counter-reforms were resisted and in many ways emasculated in the State Council. The Petrine state asserted itself in the persons of the liberal bureaucrats and noblemen from the reform era who continued to oppose changes in government particularly in the State Council and the Senate. E f f o r t s at Russification in most areas e n c o u n t e r e d practical obstacles in the local nobilities and administration and fell short of their original goals. In many areas they awakened the national consciousness and stimulated opposition among the subject nationalities.

62 • Richard S. Wortman The national myth continued to define the goals and to represent the symbolic reality of autocratic Russia after A l e x a n d e r ' s death in 1894. Nicholas II saw himself not as heroic westernized ruler, asserting his power through the Petrine state, but as exemplar of the nation, and unlike his father he did not envision a new administration or officials in the image of Pobedonostsev's ideal officials. Nicholas's distrust of governmental officials was visceral—more p r o f o u n d , all encompassing, and undifferentiated than his father's. In the first years of the twentieth century, the imperial Russian state came under challenge both from growing opposition movement d e m a n d i n g constitutional r e f o r m and a no less insurgent monarch, determined to create a form of personal rule that would express his direct bonds with the Russian people, the peasants. 3 4 Russian monarchical nationalism presented appeals to counter democratic ideologies, seeking to thwart the transition from dynastic to civic nationalism that had taken place in the West. National narratives first evoked a past that presented the westernized autocracy as the object of the Russian people's desire for strong authority imposed from above. Later, they emphasized the Russian character of the tsar, who restored strong autocratic rule based on an original unity between tsar and people that had been destroyed by western thought and culture. The image of national monarch sustained the mythical aura of the emperor. It helped preserve forms of mythical thinking that precluded any hint of dissent or politics that might mar the epic unity and silence of the myth by admitting negotiation and compromise. Monarchical nationalism in Russia proved a potent factor impeding the rise of a democratic nationalism that might unite state and society. This became clear after the Revolution of 1905, when efforts to work within the conservative f r a m e work of the Third and Fourth D u m a s e n c o u n t e r e d Nicholas II's stubborn distrust and resistance. The great historical celebrations that took place between 1909 and 1913, and especially the tercentenary celebrations of 1913, he believed, showed that the people were devoted to him and not to elective institutions. Civic or even ethnic concepts of the unity of the Russian nation could not be reconciled with a narrative that emphasized the historical bonds of the people with the monarch. The popular, conservative Russian nationalism that began to spread through m o d e r a t e society after the Revolution of 1905 appeared to Nicholas II as merely another threat to the unity of tsar and people contributing to division and strife in Russian society. O n the other hand, liberal thinkers and political leaders found it difficult to disengage concepts of nationality from the institution that represented a backward and oppressive order. The various groups in Russian society could find little grounds for unity on the eve of a massive war that d e m a n d e d the c o m m o n efforts f r o m a united nation.

Notes • 63

Notes This article is partially drawn from sections and materials in my study of Russian monarchy Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy, vol. 1, From Peter the Great to the Death of Nicholas I (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), vol. 2, From Alexander 11 to the Abdication of Nicholas I (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). 1 See Alain Guéry, "L'état monarchique et la construction de la nation française," Revue de la Bibliothèque Nationale 32 (Summer 1989): 6-17; Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, /707-1837 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992). This corresponds to the first type of nation building in Miroslav Hroch's model. Miroslav Hroch, "From National Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation: The Nation Building Process in Europe," in Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds., Becoming National:A Reader (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 61. On Russia see Hans Rogger, "Nationalism and the State: A Russian Dilemma," Comparative Studies in Society and History 4 (1961-1962): 253-56; Geoffrey Hosking, Russia: People and Empire, 1552-1917 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), xxiv, xxvi. 2 Etienne Balabar, "The Nation Form: History and Ideology," in Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds., Becoming National: A Reader (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 133,140,143-44. 3 On the question of nationality see Nathaniel Knight, "Ethnicity, Nationality, and the Masses: Narodnost' and Modernity in Imperial Russia," in David L. Hoffman and Yanni Kotsonis, eds., Russian Modernity: Politics, Knowledge, Practices (Houndsmills: St. Martin's, 2000), 41-64. 4 This corresponds to the type of national myths imposed by authoritarian states, rather than those worked out through open processes of discussion. David Miller observes that the distortion of the truth in such cases may be blatant, particularly when it touches on the legitimacy of the ruler. David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 39. 5 N.K. Shil'der, Imperator Nikolai Pervyi: ego zhizn' i tsarstvovanie, 2 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1903), 1:704-06. 6 See Scenarios of Power, 1: 290-92. 7 Ol'ga Maiorova, "Bessmertnyi Riurik: Prazdnovanie 'Tysiacheletiia Rossii' v 1862 ," Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie 43, no. 3 (2000): 137. 8 M.P. Pogodin, Istoriko-kriticheskie otryvki (Moscow, 1846), 6-8; original emphasis. 9 Maiorova, "Bessmertnyi Riurik," 137-40. 10 On the idealistic and utilitarian grounds of Uvarov's slogan see Andrei Zorin, "Ideologiia 'Pravoslaviia-Samoderzhaviia-Narodnosti': Opyt rekonstruktsii," Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie 26 (1996): 86-87,92-101. 11 Nicholas Riasanovsky, Nicholas 1 and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825-1855 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), passim. 12 Michael Cherniavsky, Tsar and People: Studies in Russian Myths (New York: Random House, 1969 [1961]), 86. 13 M.A. Korf, "Iz zapisok," Russkaia Starina 98 (1899): 373. 14 E.A. Borisova, Russkaia arkhitektura vtoroi poloviny XIX veka (Moscow: Nauka, 1979), 106-09; E. Kirichenko, Khram Khrista Spasitelia v Moskve (Moscow: Planeta, 1997), 61-63. 15 Nikolai Barsukov, Zhizn' i trudy M.P. Pogodina, 22 vols. (St. Petersburg: Tip. M.M. Stasiulevicha, 1898), 10: 234-35, 238. 16 Ibid., 10: 250-51. 17 On the meanings imputed to the wearing of beards among the Slavophiles, and the Slavophiles' responses see N.N. Mazur, "Delo o borode: Iz arkhiva Khomiakova: pis'mo o

64 • Richard

S.

Wortman

z a p r e s h c h e n i i n o s i t ' b o r o d u i r u s s k o e p l a t ' e . " Novoe 127-38.

lileraturnoe

obozrenie

6 (1993-1994):

18 M a r k Bassin, Imperial Visions: Nationalist Imagination and Geographical Expansion in the Russian Far East, 1840-1865 ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e University Press, 1999), 12-13, 94-101; N a t h a n i e l K n i g h t , " N a r o d n o s t ' a n d M o d e r n i t y in I m p e r i a l R u s s i a , " 48-50; N a t h a n i e l Knight, " S c i e n c e , E m p i r e , a n d N a t i o n a l i t y : E t h n o g r a p h y in the R u s s i a n G e o g r a p h i c Society, 1844-1855," in J a n e B u r b a n k a n d D a v i d L. R a n s e l , eds., Imperial Russia: New Histories for the Empire ( B l o o m i n g t o n : I n d i a n a University Press, 1998), 108-42. 19 See Scenarios of Power, 2: 7 1 - 7 5 . 20 V.N. Tatishchev, Imperator Aleksandr 21 Polnoe 118.

Sobranie

Zakonov

Rossiiskoi

II, 2 vols. (St. P e t e r s b u r g , 1903), 1: 404. Imperii,

ser. 3, 45 vols. (St. P e t e r s b u r g , 1885), 1: no.

22 O. M a i o r o v a , " M i t r o p o l i t Moskovskii Filaret v o b s h c h e s t v e n n o m soznanii k o n t s a X I X veka," Lotmanovskii Sbornik ( M o s c o w : O.G.I., 1997), 2: 617. 23 S. Petrovskii, ed., Pamiati Imperatora 175,286. 24 See Scenarios of Power, 2: 204-06.

Aleksandra

III ( M o s c o w : Izd. S. P e t r o v s k a g o , 1894),

25 Ibid., 2 : 2 4 4 - 5 6 . 26 V.l. G u r k o , Features and Figures of the Past. Government and Opinion in the Reign of Nicholas II, J.E. Wallace Sterling, X e n i a J o u k o f f E u d i n and H. H. Fisher, eds.. trans. L a u r a M a t v e e v ( S t a n f o r d : S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1939), 340. 27 Vsemirnaia Illiustratsiia 656 (1881): 102. 28 G o s u d a r s t v e n n y i A r k h i v Rossiiskoi F e d e r a t s i i [ G A R F ] , f. 642. op. 1, d. 7 0 9 , 2 4 - 2 5 , letter of 16 May 1884. 29 S e v e n t e e n j u b i l e e c e l e b r a t i o n s m a r k e d g r e a t religious e v e n t s of Russia's past d u r i n g A l e x a n d e r ' s reign. T h e five-hundredth a n n i v e r s a r y of the Tikhvin M o t h e r - o f - G o d and the c e n t e n a r y of the d e a t h of T i k h o n Z a d o n s k i i t o o k place in 1883. T h e m i l l e n n i u m of Cyril a n d M e t h o d i u s f o l l o w e d in 1885, t h e n i n e - h u n d r e d t h a n n i v e r s a r y of the b a p t i s m of R u s ' in 1888, t h e fiftieth a n n i v e r s a r y of t h e union with the U n i a t e s of the N o r t h w e s t e r n region and the five-hundredth a n n i v e r s a r y of t h e d e a t h of Sergei of R a d o n e z h in 1892. See A . Iu. Polunov, Pod vlast'iu ober-prokurora: gosudarstvo i iserkov' v epokhu Aleksandra III ( M o s c o w : A I R O - X X , 1996); Scenarios of Power, 2: 239-44. 30 S c e n a r i o s of Power, 2: 2 4 4 - 5 6 . 31 Polunov, Pod vlast'iu ober-prokurora,16. 32 Petrovskii, Pamiati Imperatora Aleksandra

III, 2 8 8 - 8 9 .

33 A . D . P a z u k h i n , " S o v r e m e n n o e s o s t o i a n i e Rossii i soslovnyi vopros," Rtisskii Vestnik ( J a n u a r y 1885): 4 1 - 4 7 . A l f r e d J. R i e b e r has s u g g e s t e d that P a z h u k h i n ' s text m a y d a t e f r o m as early as 1881.This w o u l d i n d i c a t e t h a t his r h e t o r i c and historical i m a g e r y was r o o t e d in A l e x a n d e r ' s s c e n a r i o as it was p r e s e n t e d in t h e first years of the reign. See his Merchants and Entrepreneurs in Imperial Russia ( C h a p e l Hill: University of N o r t h C a r o l i n a Press, 1982), 95n. 34 See Scenarios

of Power, 2: c h a p . 11.

II IMPERIAL R U S S I A : A

MULTICULTURAL S O C I E T Y AND ITS BORDERLANDS

Precarious Existences: Middling Households in Moscow and the Fire of 1812 ALEXANDER M.

MARTIN

The news of the fire of Moscow struck us like lightning. It was fine for Pushkin to exclaim with poetic rapture, a dozen years later: 'Burn, great Moscow!' But the general feeling while it was burning, as far as I know, was not enthusiastic AT

KAROLINA

KARLOVNA

PAVLOVA1

The French historian Arlette Farge gave her book on the common people of eighteenth-century Paris the title Fragile Lives to suggest the precariousness that poverty, disease, and old-regime values and structures imparted to their daily existence. 2 In the case of Moscow, those gritty realities are sometimes hidden from posterity's view by the glitter of the aristocratic life depicted in Aleksandr Griboedov's Woe From Wit and Leo Tolstoy's War and Peace. This essay will explore one aspect of that "fragility": the efforts by Moscow's middling social groups to emulate the elite's way of life, and the disaster that befell those efforts in the 1812 war. Like other societies in the old-regime Atlantic world, imperial Russia was conceived as a hierarchy of estates, each of which was to have a distinct way of life. A development of fundamental importance in the eighteenth-century West was the growing porousness of socio-cultural boundaries, as intermediate social strata adopted cultural patterns traditionally characteristic of the elite. Increasingly, consumer behavior was driven by a quest for conspicuous refinement and improved physical well-being, dress habits reflected heightened concerns about comfort, hygiene, and fashion, and the secular literary high culture acquired a mass audience. In this context, historians have spoken of a "consumer revolution," a "vestimentary revolution," and a "reading revolution." 3 Collectively, these "revolutions" masked or blurred estate identities, subverted habits of austerity and asceticism, encouraged the idea that social status was a function of consumption and culture rather than lineage and occupation, and—by reducing the pressure on individuals to conform to traditional communal norms—facilitated social climbing and individual self-expression.

68 • Alexander

M. Martin

This process was underway in Russia as well. It aroused deep misgivings among the Russian elite and its foreign sympathizers, 4 but to the participants it held out the prospect of a life of greater ease, choice, and dignity. However, emancipation from the constraints of tradition rested on a fragile material base. In Moscow, that base was shattered for many by the cataclysmic events of 1812, which prompted an immense collective howl of pain that created the source base for this essay: the petitions for financial assistance after the Napoleonic occupation. That occupation lasted seven weeks, 2 September/7 October (old style), during which the city (which most of its inhabitants had abandoned in haste) was burned and sacked. As the population gradually r e t u r n e d to the charred remains of their homes and possessions, the government sought to provide relief. Muscovites were invited to inform the authorities of the property they had lost, and could qualify for assistance if they had been left destitute and had not, before the war, been beggars, drifters, or alcoholics. 5 They could also write directly to the E m p r e s s M o t h e r Mariia Fedorovna, the patroness of many charitable institutions and symbolic mother of the dynasty and the nation. 6 Three hundred seventy-six of these documents—full-text petitions, petitions summarized by officials, and appeals to Mariia Fedorovna, all of them written between 1812 and 1826—found their way, without c o m m e n t a r y or apparent order, into the first nine volumes of Petr I. Shchukin's d o c u m e n t collection Bumagi, otnosiashchiiasia do Otechestvennoi voiny 1812 goda. These petitions, which apparently have not been the object of systematic analysis before, provide a rare glimpse of life at the lower end of the propertied classes: low- and mid-level officials, merchants, clerics, and prosperous townspeople {meshchane).1 (The documents define social identity by service rank or estate status; this essay will do the same.) Unfortunately, their formats vary in ways that m a k e systematic statistical analysis difficult, especially since many favor an exclusively narrative approach. Furthermore, while the information they provide on immovable property (land and buildings) could be verified at the time against official records, claims about movable property (furniture, personal effects, cash, and so on) were often vague, generally unverifiable, and considered susceptible to error or fraud, so they were often ignored in the official summaries of petitions; besides, they never list small items that might reveal much about their o w n e r ' s personal habits and way of life, such as the utensils for shaving, writing, or cleaning. Lastly, the Shchukin volumes tend to reproduce the original petitions (complete with personal narratives and/or household inventories) for higher-status petitioners, but only brief official summaries of those filed by people of lower status, and the collection does not address at all the degree to which these petitions may have been representative of 1812 petitions in general. The present analysis recognizes the uncertainties and biases of the source base and t h e r e f o r e m a k e s n o claim to comprehensiveness or finality. However, it may perhaps c o n t r i b u t e a few pieces to the puzzle of Russia's part in the socio-cultural transformation of the Atlantic world in the A g e of Enlightenment.

Precarious Existences • 69 This essay will begin by discussing a provincial clergyman whose life is known to us in ways that clearly reveal the linkages between middling social status, a changing intellectual and material culture, and the evolution of m a n n e r s and behaviors. Subsequently, we will examine evidence that suggests analogous develo p m e n t s a m o n g petitioners from the Moscow parish clergy and meshchanstvo. Finally, the bulk of the essay will focus on the households of junior and middling officials, the social group most strongly represented among the petitioners. ^ ^

^

The f e r m e n t in Russian society a r o u n d 1800 reached d e e p into traditionally isolated and conservative milieus. An example of this p h e n o m e n o n is Father Ioann Martinov, the priest of a village 100 miles east of Moscow, whose way of life we know f r o m the memoirs of his son. 8 Father Ioann was a prosperous householder in a mostly cashless economy, where food was obtained from the family farm and the nearby woods, h o m e m a d e benches and tables served as furniture, and people ate with their fingers or with wooden spoons f r o m a common pot. Into this premodern world, Father Ioann introduced a new level of gentility. O n e of the t o p graduates of his seminary, he had earlier d r e a m e d of going to medical school and had read Voltaire. In many ways, he routinely defied village tradition: he scoffed at folk superstitions; he was sparing in his use of the cane; on his daughter's wedding night, he refused to let the guests inspect her shirt for proof of her virginity; and, appalled at the widespread overindulgence in the local homebrew, he b o u g h t and served tea instead. His wife, a literate woman of similar outlook, p r e f e r r e d contemporary urban styles of dress and commercially distributed cotton fabrics to traditional village costume and h o m e s p u n linen. For special occasions, the couple acquired chairs, pewter plates, and forks, and they allowed three of their grown sons—much-needed workers on the f a r m — t o leave h o m e forever in pursuit of a higher education in faraway St. Petersburg. The factors that motivated Father Ioann to m a k e these cultural efforts and financial sacrifices—the education that had b r o a d e n e d his intellectual horizons, his desire to emulate the gentility he observed a m o n g the nobles, and the o p p o r tunities m a d e available to consumers by his region's growing ties to domestic and world markets—were, of course, all the more powerfully at work in Moscow, Russia s largest city, the hub of its inland trade, and the gathering place for its nobility and merchantry. Evidence of this is contained in the fourteen petitions f r o m Father Ioann's c o u n t e r p a r t s in the Moscow parish clergy, five of w h o m mention books: three specify that their libraries were worth 150, 300, and 360 rubles (the latter representing 430 volumes) and explain that the books were in Greek.Latin, and Russian, i.e., the languages used in the church seminaries w h e r e a growing segment of the clergy was receiving a sophisticated education. (All prices snd incomes are in assignats.) O n e archpriest, Ivan Savel'ev, included a list of boocs that, along with writings of a religious nature, included the complete works Df Cicero, a French dictionary and grammar, and (apparently) Nikolai

70 • Alexander

M. Martin

Ivanovich Novikov's Drevniaia rossiiskaia vivliofika ('Ancient Russian library'). Of the five clerics who reported the value of their movable property, four gave estimates between 933 and 4,519 rubles, while the fifth reported 20,000 rubles. 9 The household of archpriest Timofei Iakovlev, worth 4,519 rubles, included 1,500 rubles worth of clothing, 1,055 rubles worth of linens, and 434 rubles worth of pots, pans, and dishes—the makings of the genteel lifestyle to which Father Ioann likewise aspired. 1 0 By comparison, for c o m m o n Russians untouched by the consumer, vestimentary, and reading "revolutions," a few hundred rubles was plenty to equip a comfortable household: a man could outfit himself in traditional garb at little expense, with a shirt ( r u b a k h a ) worth 1 ruble, boots worth 2 rubles, pants m a d e from coarse linen (kholst) worth 24 kopecks per arshin (28 inches), and a sheepskin coat (tulup) worth 20 rubles, while for transportation, a simple cart (telega) was worth 10 rubles. Most of this was h o m e m a d e and involved little cash expenditure. As for the cost of food in and a r o u n d Moscow, rye flour—the staple—cost 3 - 4 kopeks a pound, chickens were valued at 30 kopeks, and many houses had fruit orchards or vegetable gardens. 1 1 C o m p a r e d with those f r o m the clergy, the 42 petitions from meshchane offer fewer revealing details about their a u t h o r s ' material possessions, although we do gain a general impression f r o m the 26 who assessed the overall value of their movable property: nine (35 percent) r e p o r t e d 250-750 rubles, 13 (50 percent) rep o r t e d 1,000-5,000 rubles, and the r e m a i n i n g four (15 p e r c e n t ) r e p o r t e d 7,000-15,000 rubles; only five (13 percent) reported owning a house. A m o n g these dry and sketchy documents, the petition f r o m Semen Pavlov Kaftannikov stands out. All we learn about him personally is that he, his wife, and a young o r p h a n (Sergei Ivanov Lugovskii) who was their ward, rented an a p a r t m e n t in the house of a noble widow for 180 rubles a year. However, we are exceptionally well informed about the contents of their household. The Kaftannikovs owned 4,590 rubles worth of possessions, and young Lugovskii another 3,000 that may have represented his inheritance. O n e might expect a meshchanstvo household to exhibit signs of cultural traditionalism, and to a degree that is the case. Both K a f t a n n i kov's and Lugovskii's inventories begin by listing their icons, which r e p r e s e n t e d 15 percent of the entire household's value and emphasize the centrality of O r t h o d o x piety. By contrast, they refer only vaguely to "spiritual books and noteb o o k s " and m a k e no mention of a desk or of musical instruments, suggesting that reading, writing, and a refined cultivation of the arts had little importance for them. However, the silver spoons, forks, and knives, the tea cups, plates, and n a p kins—a dozen of each of these items—as well as the tablecloth, two silver salt shakers, three tea pots, four mahogany tables and twelve chairs, and so forth, indicate an aspiration to gentility in dining and hospitality. Mrs. Kaftannikova must have looked more stylish and affluent than the average meshchanka in her 700 rubles fur coat, five dresses of imported taffeta, calico, and chintz, and two muslin skirts, as did her husband in his fur coat, tailcoat, and pantaloons. The presence of a washstand and towel, two mirrors, and two handkerchiefs shows that a p p e a r a n c e and

Precarious Existences • 71 m a n n e r s were valued, while the clock on the wall suggests a modern, abstract s e n s e of time. Kaftannikova's undershirts, of which she owned a dozen (equal to only half the n u m b e r her social peers in Paris owned at the time, but enough to p e r m i t regular laundering), suggest a sensibility about cleanliness and personal m o d e s t y that was gaining ground in E u r o p e but that Western observers thought peculiarly lacking among the Russian common people. 1 2 The Kaftannikovs were o l d - f a s h i o n e d in storing their possessions in trunks, traditionally associated with t h e peripatetic existence of the poor, but young Lugovskii already owned a chest of drawers—typically a bulky, expensive piece of f u r n i t u r e that permitted the orderly arranging of many possessions and implied a more settled life of relative m a t e r i a l plenty. 1 3 Thus, in important ways, the household displayed characteristic f e a t u r e s of upwardly mobile middle strata in eighteenth-century Europe. 1 4 T h e same is true of Pavel Kharlamov A n a n ' i n , a serf who, with his mistress's c o n s e n t , worked as a cook in an aristocratic household. Although he assigned t h e m no monetary value, his petition indicates that, in addition to well over a d o z e n icons, he and his family owned ( a m o n g many other items) fashionable attire for adults and children (the latter a luxury, since the children would soon o u t g r o w it), the accoutrements for an elegant table, enough linens to allow freq u e n t laundering, and a modest library. 15 As with Kaftannikov, we lack c o m p a r a ble inventories from social peers to c o m p a r e with Anan'in's, and no doubt their cases were unusual. Nonetheless, both constitute evidence that elite material culture sometimes reached wider strata of society. This is also apparent in the petitions f r o m merchants (most of which, however, focus on their lost merchandise, not personal effects). This way of life must likewise have "trickled d o w n " to o t h e r g r o u p s that came into contact with elite material culture, including army veterans whom the army had accustomed to shaving and wearing uniforms, liveried house serfs, residents and employees of institutions that sought to inculcate "enlighte n e d " habits and values (the Foundlings Home, schools, hospitals, and so forth), subaltern government employees, and also through the trade in second-hand clothing and household items. *

*

*

The group most strongly identified with social mobility and cultural emulation, however, were officials in ranks X I V through VI: officers f r o m ensign to colonel, bureaucrats f r o m collegiate registrar (kollezhskii registrator) to collegiate councilor (kollezhskii sovetnik), and their widows, orphans, and unmarried daughters. Of the 217 petitions from ranked officials (which represented 58 percent of all the petitions), 194 come f r o m these ranks, which were divided into two categories— ober-officers ( X I V - I X , 137 petitions) and s/ifafe-officers ( V I I I - V I , 57 petitions). The numerical weight of these groups is a p p a r e n t when one considers the overall composition of the civilian bureaucracy, as shown in Table 5.1. 16 Ofter-officers increasingly formed the bulk of Russian officialdom; a r o u n d 1800, the average rank of officials was X. Mostly of c o m m o n origin, officials

72 • Alexander

M. Martin

TABLE THE COMPOSITION

Clerks (below X I V ) Mid-18 l h century

70%

Mid-19 l h century

26%

5.1

OF THE R U S S I A N

CIVILIAN

Ofter-officers (XIV-IX) 20%

60%

BUREAUCRACY

5/woft-officers

"Generals"

(V1II-VI)

(V-I)

8%

2%

11%

2%

Source: Boris N. Mironov, Sotsial'naia isloriia Rossii perioda imperii (XVIII-nachalo XX veka). Genezis lichnosli, demokraticheskoi sem'i, grazhdanskogo obshchestva i pravovogo gosudarstva, 2 vols. (St. Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 1999). 2: 207.

b e c a m e p e r s o n a l nobles at r a n k X I V a n d h e r e d i t a r y nobles at r a n k VIII (rank X I V in the army). T h e s e m e n were key figures in dealing with the general p o p u lation: thus, the officials of the district courts ( u e z d n y i sud) and rural police ( n i z h nii zemskii sud) held r a n k s X I V - V I I I , 1 7 a n d the police in each of M o s c o w ' s 20 w a r d s (chasti) was h e a d e d by a chastnyi pristav w h o usually held rank V I I , while the f o u r or five precincts ( k v a r t a l y ) that m a d e u p a ward were run by kvartal'nye nadzirateli, typically rank IX officials. While socially inferior to senior officials and aristocrats, they t o w e r e d a b o v e most of their compatriots, to w h o m their uniforms, titles, b u r e a u c r a t i c j a r g o n a n d p r o c e d u r e s , and b r u s q u e t o n e r e p r e s e n t e d the public face of imperial authority. T h e i r e c o n o m i c situation reflected this i n t e r m e d i a t e social s t a t u s . T h e i r salaries typically r a n g e d f r o m a b o u t 100 to 400 r u b l e s a year (for ober-officers), or 3 0 0 - 6 0 0 (for s/ifafr-officers), in the bureaucracy, and twice that in the army. By c o m p a r i s o n , the g o v e r n o r of M o s c o w P r o v i n c e e a r n e d 1,800 rubles, while a washe r w o m a n in a St. P e t e r s b u r g hospital e a r n e d 60. 1 8 Yet even the g o v e r n o r ' s salary was, in a way, m o d e s t — t h e f a t h e r of A l e k s a n d r Nikitenko, a m e r e serf, was paid 1,000 rubles a year plus housing and f o o d to be the steward of a wealthy n o b l e w o m a n ' s estate, a n d G e r m a n o b s e r v e r s d i s a g r e e d a b o u t w h e t h e r the 2,000 r u b l e s that Moscow University paid its ( f r e q u e n t l y G e r m a n ) p r o f e s s o r s was a d e q u a t e to s u p p o r t a r e s p e c t a b l e b o u r g e o i s h o u s e h o l d . 1 9 Evidently, an official's salary was not e x p e c t e d to cover most of a h o u s e h o l d ' s expenses, as the g o v e r n m e n t a c k n o w l e d g e d by o f f e r i n g g e n e r o u s f o o d a n d housing s u p p l e m e n t s to i m p o r t a n t officials (for instance, the Moscow g o v e r n o r received 2,400 r u b l e s in " t a b l e mon e y " ) , providing d o m e s t i c s for i m p e c u n i o u s a r m y officers, and s o m e t i m e s p e r m i t ting officials to live r e n t - f r e e at their place of work. 2 0 Of the p e t i t i o n s f r o m ober- and i/ztab-officers, s o m e indicate t h e value of b o t h m o v a b l e and i m m o v a b l e property, s o m e only o n e or the o t h e r , a n d many, n e i t h e r . Tables 5.2 and 5.3 s u m m a r i z e those n u m b e r s , b r o k e n down by o w n e r s h i p of m o v -

Precarious Existences • 73

TABLE

5.2

V A L U E O F I M M O V A B L E P R O P E R T Y FOR O B E R - A N D

SHTAB-OFFICERS

Total

Houses of

Houses

number

unknown

of known

in rubles (as % of all houses

value

of known value)

of houses value

Value of houses where known,

3,500-

Ober-officers

33 (24%

22 (66%

11 (33%

(137

of all

of all

of all

petitions)

petitions)

houses)

houses)

Shlab-

27 (47%

10 (37%

17 (63%

of all

officers (57 petitions)

of all

petitions)

houses)

of all

12,001

20,000

30,000-

12,000

19,999

30,000

60,000

5 (45%)

1 (9%)

5 (45%)

7 (41%)

1 (6%)

7(41%)

2 (12%)

houses)

TABLE

5.3

V A L U E OF M O V A B L E P R O P E R T Y FOR O B E R - A N D

SHTAB-OFFICERS

06er-officers ( X I V - I X )

Shtab-officers (VIII-VI)

Total of 137 petitions

Total of 57 petitions

Known value of

Owners

Not owners

Owners

Not owners

movable property,

of houses

of houses

of houses

of houses

in rubles (as % of all properties of known value) 350-800 r.

1 ( 5%)

13 (26%)

1.000-5,000 r.

6 (32%)

24 (48%)

2 (15%)

5 (33%)

5.001-15,000 r.

11 (58%)

9 (18%)

5 (38%)

4 (27%)

15.00:-30,000 r.

1 ( 5%)

3 ( 6%)

4 (31%)

3 (20%)

1 ( 2%)

2 (15%)

1 ( 7%)

Over 30,000 r.

2 (13%)

Total jf movable

19 (58% of

50 (48% of

14 (52% of

15 (50% of

properties of

all owners

all non-owners

all owners

all owners

knows value:

of houses)

of houses)

of houses)

of houses)

Total of movable

14 (42% of

54 (52% of

14 (52% of

15 (50% of

properties of

all owners

all non-owners

all owners

all non-owners

unkncwn value:

of houses)

of houses)

of houses)

of houses)

74 • Alexander

M. Martin

a b l e o r i m m o v a b l e p r o p e r t y ( t h e l a t t e r i n c l u d i n g p e t i t i o n e r s w h o lived with their parents). G i v e n t h e limited s o u r c e base, a n d with n o d a t a o n half the p e t i t i o n e r s , t h e p r e cision of t h e s e figures is of c o u r s e illusory. N o n e t h e l e s s , certain p a t t e r n s e m e r g e clearly. M o s t o w n e d m o r e t h a n o n e m i g h t e x p e c t in light of their salaries, a n d s/ziafe-officers w e r e w e a l t h i e r t h a n ober-officers. T h e salary d i f f e r e n c e s alone d o n o t s e e m q u i t e a d e q u a t e to explain this discrepancy, which also is not a f u n c t i o n of a g e d i f f e r e n c e s — t h e a v e r a g e age of p e t i t i o n e r s at each r a n k f r o m level X I V to V I r a n g e d f r o m 41 t o 53, b u t t h e r e is n o direct c o r r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n h i g h e r r a n k a n d m o r e a d v a n c e d age, p e r h a p s b e c a u s e m a n y p e t i t i o n e r s w e r e r e t i r e e s or t h e w i d o w s of d e c e a s e d officials, so we c a n n o t a s s u m e that the m o r e s e n i o r officials h a d simply h a d m o r e t i m e t o a c c u m u l a t e possessions. T h e key p r e d i c t o r of t h e v a l u e of o n e ' s m o v a b l e p r o p e r t y a p p e a r s to h a v e b e e n o w n e r s h i p of a h o u s e . For b o t h groups, h o m e v a l u e s a r e evenly d i v i d e d b e t w e e n t h e s a m e t w o c o n t r a s t i n g price r a n g e s ( 3 , 5 0 0 - 1 2 , 0 0 0 versus 20,000-30,000 rubles), b u t t h e shtab-officers

a r e twice as likely to o w n a h o u s e in t h e first place. O v e r a l l ,

t h e e c o n o m i c d i s p a r i t i e s within e a c h g r o u p a r e e n o r m o u s . A small h a n d f u l of p e t i t i o n e r s h a d f o r t u n e s in excess of 100,000 rubles, a n d it s e e m s likely t h a t o t h e r s w e r e similarly w e a l t h y b u t did n o t b o t h e r t o a p p l y f o r s t a t e assistance. By c o n t r a s t , m a n y o w n e d only a b o u t as m u c h (1,000-5,000 r u b l e s ) as did t h e typical meshchanstvo

p e t i t i o n e r . B e n e a t h t h a t level w e r e t h e p o o r officials w h o p o s s e s s e d

o n l y m o v a b l e p r o p e r t y w o r t h 3 0 0 - 8 0 0 rubles. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , their p e t i t i o n s p r o vide no detailed inventories, but Akakii Akakievich Bashmachkin, the t i t u l a r c o u n c i l o r ( r a n k IX) f r o m G o g o l ' s The Overcoat—a

fictional

m a n w h o s e f a n t a s i e s of

p r o s p e r i t y r e v o l v e a r o u n d t h e d r e a m of o w n i n g a new c o a t — m a y b e l o n g in this c a t e g o r y . A t t h e b o t t o m of t h e scale, finally, w e r e p e t i t i o n e r s w h o o w n e d a l m o s t n o t h i n g a n d w h o s e f e w m a t e r i a l p o s s e s s i o n s a r e n o t d e s c r i b e d in detail; that w a s a l s o t h e s i t u a t i o n of m o s t p e t i t i o n e r s w h o w e r e clerks, n o n - c o m m i s s i o n e d officers, o r soldiers. Thus, t h e s u m m a r y of r e t i r e d l i e u t e n a n t ( r a n k X I I I ) Il'ia K o t e l ' n i k o v ' s p e t i t i o n n o t e d simply t h a t " o w i n g to his i m p o v e r i s h e d state, he h a d n o loss of p r o p e r t y " in 1812. 21 V a r i o u s f a c t o r s a p p e a r t o h a v e c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e s e discrepancies, a l t h o u g h t h e i r r e l a t i v e weight r e m a i n s unclear. A n official's c h a n c e s of r e a c h i n g a high r a n k w e r e p r e s u m a b l y r e l a t e d t o t h e social p r o m i n e n c e ( a n d h e n c e t h e w e a l t h ) of his family, so t h e shtab-officers

m a y h a v e c o m e f r o m families t h a t w e r e r i c h e r t o

b e g i n with t h a n t h o s e of ober-officers. F u r t h e r m o r e , e m p i r e - w i d e , o n e - t h i r d of r a n k e d officials c a m e f r o m n o b l e l a n d l o r d (pomeshchik)

families, 2 2 which sug-

g e s t s t h a t l a n d e d e s t a t e s m a y have c o n t r i b u t e d to the i n e q u a l i t y of o b s e r v e d in t h e petitions. H o w e v e r , m o r e t h a n half of all R u s s i a n

wealth

pomeshchiki

o w n e d o n l y 20 o r f e w e r m a l e " s o u l s " a n d h e n c e could e x p e c t n o m o r e t h a n a f e w h u n d r e d r u b l e s a n n u a l i n c o m e f r o m t h e i r e s t a t e s . 2 3 In any case, a m o n g the p e t i t i o n e r s , only f o u r ober- a n d eight shtab-officers—3

p e r c e n t a n d 14 p e r c e n t , r e s p e c -

tively, of t h e t w o c a t e g o r i e s — i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e y or any relatives o w n e d or h a d

Precarious Existences • 75 ever owned peasant serfs, an important issue that the petitions were expected to a d d r e s s and that the authorities could verify; some others mentioned en passant that they owned a few house serfs. Income f r o m landed estates, while more prevalent in the higher ranks, therefore does not a p p e a r to have played a decisive financial role in the petitioners' lives. A n o t h e r source of income may have been the bribe-taking for which the bureaucracy and police were infamous and which likewise favored those in higher ranks. For instance, in a letter citing a host of details a n d witnesses, an outraged French widow n a m e d Madeleine Pierson reported in D e c e m b e r 1812 that Moscow police officers had groundlessly accused her of collaborating with the enemy during the occupation and illegally bullied her into surr e n d e r i n g 2,240 silver rubles (equivalent to about 10,000 rubles assignats). City Police Chief (oberpolitseimeister) Petr Alekseevich Ivashkin noted with apparent irritation that only 2,050 silver rubles (which he r e t u r n e d to Pierson) had actually reached his office. The rest, equal to the annual salary of two precinct police chiefs, 2 4 had somehow disappeared, and so he ordered the accused officer's superior to investigate. Summoned to the police station and confronted with the officer whom she had accused, however, Pierson reportedly recanted and declared that it had all been a misunderstanding, so the case was closed. Such incidents were probably commonplace, as Mar'ia Filippova. the widow of a ward police chief in rank VIII, obliquely confirmed by lamenting that "because he was a good m a n , " her husband "had not succeeded in acquiring a f o r t u n e " and therefore left her "in p o v e r t y " when he died. 2 5 A n o t h e r source of revenue was rental income, which additionally offered security in case of death, disability, or old age, and which of course saved homeowners the expense of paying rent to others. Rents varied greatly: in one case, a sacristan rented out a small room for 30 rubles a year; on the other hand, a substantial house—with twenty rooms, a stable, and a carriage shed—cost around 2,000 rubles a year. 2 6 Only seven ober- and three s/iiai>-officers explicitly mention renting out their house, but it was an option for any h o m e o w n e r . A m o n g the petitioners who were police officers in rank IX, the wealthiest was a mere scribe (pisar') who earned only 120 rubles at his job but owned an 8,000-ruble house that, by 1818, yielded 100 rubles income. In another case, a family had borrowed heavily after the war to build a house that yielded 900-1,000 rubles. Ensign (rank XIV) G o r iushkin received an invalid's pension of only 36 rubles to support himself, his wife, and their young daughter, but they made a comfortable living from their 25,000ruble house. 2 7 Renting out one's house a p p e a r s to have been particularly common among the parish clergy, since they had low incomes but were allotted land by the church; of the 14 petitions from this group, five indicate that they had rented out all or part of their homes. These houses, worth 2,500-5,000 rubles, were probably fairly modest, but they rented for 150-500 rubles a year, as much as most officers' annual salary. 28 Money-lending is an option m e n t i o n e d by five officials. For example, the young o r p h a n Mar'ia Ivanova Voronina (rank IX) inherited 5,900 rubles that had been loaned to individuals; in just one year (1815), she earned 332.50

76 • Alexander M. Martin rubles on 1,500 rubles worth of these loans, i.e., an interest rate in excess of 20 percent. 2 9 Similarly, the rank XIV widow Nastas'ia Osipova Ivanova supported herself, her young daughter, and her elderly m o t h e r with the interest from her 4,000 rubles in loans. To achieve any degree of affluence, an official or his family thus usually had to b e c o m e a rentier. For most petitioners, this involved not the "aristocratic" path of owning serfs, but rather the "bourgeois" approach of lending money and investing in real estate. 3 0 However, since this strategy presupposed the wherewithal for the initial investment, it tended to magnify the discrepancies between haves and have-nots among officials with similar ranks and salaries. O t h e r ways to increase one's income could include work by other family members and support f r o m more distant relatives. However, almost none of the petitioners (who, of course, were trying to show that they were destitute) lived in households where both fathers and sons were gainfully employed. Wives and daughters—about half the petitioners were widows or unmarried women—worked for an income only as a last resort if there was no male breadwinner, evidently because of the visible downward social mobility this represented; a few specified that they m a d e clothing or practiced "handicrafts," but most only described their activities vaguely as "labor." 3 1 Lastly, inheritance probably played a significant role in allowing families to accumulate money and possessions. The pressure to adopt an upper-class lifestyle was strong among officials. To begin with the obvious, every official needed a uniform, usually dark green, that could not be made f r o m homespun linen and was of sufficiently complex design to require the services of a tailor. That made it expensive: in one case, the uniform of a rank X official was estimated to be worth 100 rubles, 32 p e r h a p s half the m a n ' s annual salary. To protect him from the cold, he would also need a cloth overcoat that might cost a n o t h e r 50-100 rubles, while fur coats cost anywhere f r o m 150 to 1,500 rubles. His wife required clothing of similar quality. A dress m a d e f r o m chintz might cost a r o u n d 25 rubles, but then, chintz only cost about 2 rubles p e r arshin; more elegant fabrics cost more—prices varied greatly, with petitioners reporting that calico cost 3.50 rubles, satin and cambric 5 - 8 rubles, velvet 12 rubles, and muslin 25 rubles per arshin. Unlike peasants, m e n and w o m e n of t h e higher classes were expected in addition to wear white linen shirts priced a r o u n d 10 rubles, as well as socks and stockings; unlike outer garments, these n e e d e d to be washed regularly, which meant, aside f r o m the labor involved, that one n e e d ed to own an a d e q u a t e supply. Horse-drawn vehicles likewise varied in price b u t were generally expensive: while a peasant telega might cost only 10 rubles, a Moscow cartwright's petition lists droshkies worth 110,130,200,350,450,650,800, and 1,000 rubles, 3 3 and Moscow's climate called for a sleigh in addition. It was costly in any case to appear more genteel than the c o m m o n masses; t h e broad range of qualities and prices of luxury items made for intense competition within the "respectable" classes as well, but it also allowed individuals of limited m e a n s to make powerful social statements by acquiring a few expensive, d r a m a t ic items. As elsewhere in E u r o p e , it seems that the growing interest in fashion w a s

Precarious Existences • 77 associated with a sartorial gender gap—in one petition, the husband's wardrobe is valued at only 40 percent of his wife's, in a n o t h e r at a mere 9 percent, and the s a m e g e n d e r gap is apparent in the households of archpriestTimofei Iakovlev and t h e meshchanin Semen Kaftannikov, two petitioners whom we discussed earlier. 3 4 This may reflect, in part, the success of uniforms in redirecting men's status competition away from the pursuit of conspicuous vestimentary consumption, whereas early a t t e m p t s to do the same for w o m e n , by requiring them to wear dresses m o d e l e d on their husbands' uniforms, were soon abandoned. 3 5 Instead, the E u r o p e a n - w i d e tendency prevailed that a woman's clothing served as a showcase f o r her h u s b a n d ' s wealth. An external appearance that exuded wealth and refinement was a wise investm e n t . Sixty percent of Moscow's pre-1812 population consisted of serfs or state peasants, while at the same time the city had a tiny but conspicuous population of extravagantly rich aristocrats. Since social status and official rank regulated many aspects of social interactions—e.g., how o n e was addressed in public or was treated by the police or by the servants of powerful lords—it was desirable to place oneself symbolically on the side of the aristocrats, not the commoners. F u r t h e r m o r e , in a city where genuinely public spaces were scarce, the contexts in which "society" amused itself and where struggling officials could pursue the career, patronage, and matrimonial strategies vital to their futures—balls at the noble assembly, promenading on the boulevard, evenings at the theater, the famous " o p e n tables" of the elite—were d o m i n a t e d by aristocrats and often took place at their city mansions or suburban estates. Fortunately, upper-class Moscow was f a m o u s for its lavish hospitality. As m e n t i o n e d earlier, the governor had a " t a b l e " budget of 2,400 rubles. Tat'iana Ivanova Mansurova, whose father had been an army major (rank VIII), furnished her two houses—which, taken together, had 23 rooms and which she rented out for a handsome 3,600 rubles a year— with 18 tables, eight card tables, five couches, and 140 chairs, which suggests that she expected her tenants to entertain many guests. Nikanor Egorov Vinogradov (by far the richest of the rank VIII petitioners, with property worth almost 165,000 rubles), reported having 16 card tables and 206 chairs in his house, in addition to 168 teacups, 240 porcelain plates, and 240 crystal wine glasses, while rank IV official Sergei Mikhailov Vlasov r e p o r t e d the loss of 3,000 bottles of C h a m p a g n e , Burgundy, and other expensive wines totaling 20,000 rubles. 3 6 Such hospitality must have mitigated the poverty of many lower-ranking officials, but appropriate dress was of course a sine qua non. So was transportation. For example, Natal'ia A n d r e e v a Iakimova, daughter of a deceased rank X official, wrote that she had been left "utterly destitute" by the war. The graduate of a respected imperial boarding school, she most likely had the polish and social graces required for escaping poverty by finding patrons and p e r h a p s a husband, but such strategies must have been severely h a m p e r e d by the fact that she apparently owned no carriage. As a result, unless she paid for a cab, the young woman's round trip f r o m her h o m e at the Donskoi Monastery to the theaters or soirées in

78 • Alexander

M. Martin

d o w n t o w n M o s c o w w o u l d have b e e n a five-mile walk down dimly lit nighttime streets that w e r e d e s e r t e d by all but the most w r e t c h e d , crisscrossed by the speeding carriages of t h e rich, a n d icy and wind-swept during the nobility's winter social season. 3 7 ( W h e n G o g o l ' s A k a k i i A k a k i e v i c h r e t u r n s on foot f r o m an evening with friends, he is p r o m p t l y m u g g e d . ) T h e petitions also give us s o m e sense of their a u t h o r s ' private relationship to the world of culture, even in cases w h e r e we h a v e n o c o m p l e t e h o u s e h o l d inventories. P e t i t i o n e r s s o m e t i m e s p r o v i d e d a brief list of possessions they evidently d e e m e d especially valuable or i m p o r t a n t . T h e s e lists occur m o r e f r e q u e n t l y as b o t h the r a n k of the p e t i t i o n e r a n d the overall value of the possessions rise. Interestingly, half of the twelve such lists f r o m ober-otficers include icons, usually at the h e a d of t h e list, w h e r e a s n o n e of the d o z e n f r o m sftiafr-officers do. O n the o t h e r h a n d , t h e s/ifab-officers twice m e n t i o n b o o k s a n d musical instruments, while the ober-officers n e v e r do. This m a y not reflect a f u n d a m e n t a l d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n the t w o g r o u p s ' p o s s e s s i o n s — c o m p l e t e i n v e n t o r i e s f r o m shtab-oihceT h o u s e h o l d s d o include i c o n s — b u t for l o w e r - r a n k i n g officials w h o were less extensively socialized into elite culture, icons evidently h a d g r e a t e r symbolic i m p o r t a n c e (as they did for m e r c h a n t s a n d meshchane) relative to books. A certain d e t a c h m e n t f r o m the high c u l t u r e of Russia's " G o l d e n A g e " w o u l d not be surprising in light of the costs involved. Giving o n e ' s children a sophisticated e d u c a t i o n was expensive: a f o r e i g n t u t o r cost over 1,000 r u b l e s a year, a n d even in provincial P e n z a , a year at a pansion cost 100-150 r u b l e s tuition, plus a n o t h e r 150 f o r r o o m and b o a r d . 3 8 T h e a t e r tickets (which s t a r t e d a r o u n d o n e r u b l e ) w e r e a f f o r d a b l e , but buying b o o k s — t h o u g h p e r h a p s not b o r r o w i n g t h e m — was o f t e n a luxury: for instance, bibliophiles in 1802 could buy the w o r k s of N i k o lai Mikhailovich K a r a m z i n f o r prices r a n g i n g f r o m 60 k o p e k s to 9.10 r u b l e s ( f o r all six v o l u m e s of Pis'ma russkogo puteshestvennika ( ' L e t t e r s of a Russian travele r ' ) , a n d a y e a r ' s subscription to K a r a m z i n ' s Vestnik Evropy ( ' E u r o p e a n m e s s e n g e r ' ) cost 12 rubles. K e e p i n g a b r e a s t of the latest fashions f r o m E u r o p e t h r o u g h the Journal des dames et des modes de Paris cost 57 rubles annually. K a r a m z i n ' s j o u r n a l o f f e r e d a p e r h a p s unwitting c o m m e n t a r y on the e c o n o m i c status of its r e a d e r s w h e n , in a solicitation for d o n a t i o n s to a school w h e r e e d u c a t i n g a s t u d e n t cost 150 r u b l e s a year, it a s k e d , " W h a t o t h e r p l e a s u r e can we buy so c h e a p l y ? " 3 9 T h e e n j o y m e n t of b o o k s a n d t h e a t e r m a y also have been a f f e c t e d by p o o r eyesight. M o r e o r less p r o f e s s i o n a l eye care was a v a i l a b l e — a n 1820s M o s c o w g u i d e b o o k listed five opticians a n d o n e " e y e o p e r a t o r " 4 0 — b u t despite s o m e p e t i t i o n e r s ' i n a d e q u a t e vision ( i n v o k e d by several to explain their inability to work), 4 1 only one, the hugely wealthy N i k a n o r Vinogradov, m e n t i o n e d o w n i n g eyeglasses ( w o r t h 25 r u b l e s ) . G i v e n t h a t o t h e r p e t i t i o n e r s r e p o r t e d that they h a d lost p r o missory notes, jewelry, p a t e n t s of nobility, 4 2 and o t h e r easily p o r t a b l e items of great value d u r i n g the N a p o l e o n i c o c c u p a t i o n , it seems unlikely t h a t they h a d all r e m e m b e r e d to t a k e their r e a d i n g glasses with t h e m when they fled M o s c o w . I n s t e a d , in a society w h e r e spectacles w e r e expensive and wearing t h e m in p u b l i c

Precarious Existences • 79 was d e e m e d foppish and vaguely insolent, 4 3 it seems likely that corrective lenses lay b e y o n d the cultural horizons and financial means of many petitioners, who instead went about in a p e r m a n e n t fog. Here, both the "consumer revolution" and t h e " r e a d i n g revolution" may have reached their limits. For most of the petitioners, the effects of the N a p o l e o n i c occupation were shattering. T h e lost clothing, china, furniture, and so forth were irreplaceable tokens of m e m b e r s h i p in the privileged class, and often included the valuable linens and o t h e r items that, accumulated over many years, f o r m e d the trousseau without which o n e ' s daughters had little hope of finding a husband. 4 4 The blow was even h a r s h e r if the loss of one's house had removed a vital source of income, had added rent p a y m e n t s to the b u r d e n s on a household's already strained budget, and—in a cruelly ironic twist—destroyed the collateral required for the government loan n e e d e d to rebuild one's life. Petitioners who had invested their savings by loaning t h e m to others o f t e n found that their debtors were now b a n k r u p t or the promissory notes were gone, yet the petitioners themselves still had to repay their own o u t s t a n d i n g debts. To complete the disaster, the p r e m a t u r e death or disability of m a n y a breadwinner eliminated even the small salary he had received. Previously p r o s p e r o u s families found themselves reduced to abject poverty; thus, Nikanor Vinogradov, owner of a lavish household worth almost 165,000 rubles, lost everything and wrote bitterly that "were it not for the little assistance we receive from charitable and sympathetic people," his family would be forced to go begging. 4 5 This sense of hopelessness is echoed in the petitions' alternately stoic, pleading, or despairing appeals for cash assistance, for help in recovering lost possessions, for a pension, or for one's children to be admitted f r e e of charge to an imperial b o a r d i n g school. A m o n g those who never got back on their feet were retired captain (rank IX) Petr A n d r e e v Baskov and his wife Katerina. H e had served in the cavalry for 22 years b e f o r e retiring in 1795. W h e n they lost 8,000 rubles worth of possessions in 1812, he petitioned for relief but received none. H e tried, he later wrote, to get a j o b "in the water-transport d e p a r t m e n t , the liquor d e p a r t m e n t , and t h e postal d e p a r t m e n t , but received rejections everywhere." In 1818, his wife was g r a n t e d 200 rubles in state assistance, but that was not nearly enough to remedy the situation. The elderly couple ended up in the town of Zaraisk, 90 miles f r o m Moscow, where "I now live like a p a u p e r and have to m a k e the rounds of people's houses each day to beg for alms," as did his wife, while the local elite refused to take them u n d e r their wing "even t h o u g h I have a certificate of discharge [stating] that I always served honorably, and even now I live h o n o r a b l y despite my poverty." Finally, in h o p e f u l anticipation of the 1826 coronation of Nicholas I, "I have c o m e to Moscow like a p a u p e r " ("all my clothing is falling off my shoulders," he explained, "it is that t h r e a d b a r e " ) " t o petition the Lord E m p e r o r , but they would not allow a poor man like me petition him." C r u s h e d , he wrote to E m p r e s s M o t h e r Mariia Fedorovna, begging her for a few rubles so he could go h o m e to Zaraisk. Alternatively, he a d d e d , could she not arrange for

80 • Alexander

M.

Martin

h i m — t h e t s a r ' s l o y a l o f f i c e r a n d g e n t l e m a n — t o b e h i r e d as a s i m p l e w a t c h m a n (strazh)

a t t h e F o u n d l i n g s H o m e ? S y m p a t h e t i c , b u t p r o b a b l y o v e r w h e l m e d by

t h e c o n t i n u i n g flood of p e t i t i o n s , t h e m o t h e r of t h e d y n a s t y m e r e l y n o t e d at t h e b o t t o m of t h e p a g e t h a t t h e g o v e r n o r of M o s c o w " s h o u l d p l e a s e w h e t h e r a s s i s t a n c e is r e q u i r e d . "

investigate

46

*

*

*

T h i s e s s a y h a s s u g g e s t e d t h a t b y 1812 a s u b s t a n t i a l i n t e r m e d i a t e social s t r a t u m , h i g h l y d i v e r s e in legal s t a t u s a n d e c o n o m i c c o n d i t i o n , h a d a b s o r b e d a s p e c t s of a p a n - E u r o p e a n , m i d d l e - c l a s s w a y of life. T h e i r s h a r e d m a t e r i a l c u l t u r e t e n d e d t o b l u r t h e b o u n d a r i e s s e p a r a t i n g t h e s e g r o u p s f r o m e a c h o t h e r a n d f r o m t h e elites, and reflected the conspicuous c o n s u m p t i o n and socio-cultural emulation that we c o n v e n t i o n a l l y a s s o c i a t e w i t h a m o d e r n m i d d l e class. So f a r . t h e h i s t o r i o g r a p h y of e a r l y n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y R u s s i a h a s f o c u s e d p r i n c i p a l l y o n its elites, t h e s t a t e , a n d t h e p e a s a n t r y , b u t p e r h a p s f u t u r e r e s e a r c h will s h e d light o n t h e m i d d l e g r o u p s as well a n d t h e r e b y r e p l a c e i m p e r i a l R u s s i a i n t o t h e w i d e r A t l a n t i c c o n t e x t of t h e s h i f t f r o m a n o b l e - d o m i n a t e d s o c i e t y of o r d e r s t o w a r d a b o u r g e o i s - d o m i n a t e d s o c i e t y of classes. T h e p o l a r i t i e s t h a t d e f i n e o u r c o n v e n t i o n a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g of pre-reform Russia—"society" (obshchestvo) versus "the p e o p l e " (narod), weste r n i z a t i o n v e r s u s n a t i o n a l t r a d i t i o n , a n d s o f o r t h — m a y b e in n e e d of r e v i s i o n t o a c c o m m o d a t e t h e r o l e of i n t e r m e d i a t e g r o u p s w h o s e e x p e r i e n c e a l l o w e d e l e m e n t s of e l i t e m a t e r i a l c u l t u r e a n d e v e r y d a y b e h a v i o r s a n d m a n n e r s t o s p r e a d t o w i d e r social s t r a t a . If t h a t is i n d e e d t h e c a s e , i m p e r i a l R u s s i a m a y h a v e b e e n a m o r e " n o r m a l " E u r o p e a n society than scholars have traditionally imagined.

Notes The research for this essay was made possible in part by a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities. I thank Boris Gorshkov, Michael Melancon, and John Steinberg for their insightful comments on this essay. 1 K.K. Pavlova, "Moi vospominaniia," Russkii Arkhiv 4, no. 10 (1875): 222-40, 224. 2 Ariette Farge, Fragile Lives : Violence, Power and Solidarity in Eighteenth-Century Paris, trans. Carol Shelton (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993). 3 Jack P. Greene, Pursuits of Happiness: The Social Development of Early Modern British Colonies and the Formation of American Culture (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 108-13; Gordon Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution ( N e w York: Vintage Books, 1991), 34-36, 136-37, 347-69; Daniel Roche, La Culture des apparences. Une histoire du vêtement (XVIl'XVIII' siècle) (Paris: Fayard, 1989), 13-14, 479-82; Richard van Dülmen, Kultur und Alltag in der Frühen Neuzeit, 2d ed., 3 vols. (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1999), 2: 188, 3: 241; see also the essays in Hans Erich Bödeker, ed., Lesekulturen im 18. Jahrhundert, Interdisziplinäre Halbjahresschrift zur Erforschung des 18. Jahrhunderts und seiner Wirkungsgeschichte 6, no. 1 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1991). 4 Ruskoi vestnik (June 1811), 76-86; Emile Dupré de Saint-Maure, L'Hermite en cited in Le Voyage en Russie. Anthologie des voyageurs français aux XVIIIe " XIXe

Russie, siècles,

Notes

• 81

e d . C l a u d e d e G r è v e (Paris: R o b e r t L a f f o n t , 1990), 9 3 4 - 3 5 : E n g e l b e r t W i c h e l h a u s e n , Züge zu einem Gemähide von Moskwa ( B e r l i n : Bei J o h a n n D a n i e l S a n d e r , 1803), 3 2 7 - 2 8 : H e i n r i c h S t o r c h , Cemaehlde von St. Petersburg, 2 vols. ( R i g a : Bei J o h a n n Friedrich H a r t k n o c h . 1794), 2:389-90. do otechestvennoi voiny 1812 goda, 10 5 P e t r I. S h c h u k i n , ed., Bumagi, otnosiashchiiasia vols. ( M o s c o w : T o v a r i s h c h e s t v o tipografii A . I. M a m o n t o v a , 1897-1905), 1: 125, 2: 155, 6: 74-76,81-88. 6 R i c h a r d S. W o r t m a n , Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy, 2 vols. ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1995,2000), 1 : 2 5 0 - 5 4 . 7 T h e 376 p e t i t i o n e r s a r e identified as: h o l d e r s of r a n k s X 1 V - I (217), n o n - c o m m i s s i o n e d o f f i c e r s and clerks (14), soldiers (11), meshchane (42), m e r c h a n t s (40), white and black clergy (15), and v a r i o u s o t h e r g r o u p s (37). Russia in the Age of Enlightenment: The Memoir of a 8 D m i t r i i I. Rostislavov. Provincial Priest's Son. trans., ed., a n d with an i n t r o d u c t i o n by A l e x a n d e r M. M a r t i n ( D e K a l b : N o r t h e r n Illinois U n i v e r s i t y Press, 2002). 9 S h c h u k i n , Bumagi, 2: 142-44 ( A . Ivanov, G. Vasil'ev), 2: 159-60 (P. Ivanov), 2: 166-67 ( S a v e l ' e v ) . 3: 9 9 - 1 0 1 ( I a k o v l e v ) , 5: 2 0 0 - 0 1 ( K o b r o n o v a ) . 10 Ibid., 3: 99-101. 11 Ibid., 1: 2 5 - 3 6 , 2 : 1 6 1 ( M u s i n a - P u s h k i n a ) , 202 ( V i n o g r a d o v ) , 5: 8 8 - 9 2 ( M a n s u r o v a ) . 12 R o c h e , La Culture des apparences, 164; M a r i e - D a n i e l d e C o r b é r o n , Un diplomate français à la cour de Catherine II (1775-1780) and J e a n - B a p t i s t e May, Saint-Pétersbourg et la Russie en 1829, cited in Le Voyage en Russie, 950-54. 13 D a n i e l R o c h e , Le Peuple de Paris. Essai sur la culture populaire au XVIIIe siècle, 2d e d . (Paris: F a y a r d , 1998), 200-05. 14 R o c h e , La Culture des apparences, 110-13; S h c h u k i n , Bumagi, 6: 2 3 - 2 6 . 15 Ibid., 6: 3 0 - 3 3 . 16 B o r i s N. M i r o n o v , Sotsial'naia istoriia Rossii perioda Imperii (XVIII-nachalo XX veka.). Genezis lichnosti, demokraticheskoi sem 7, grazhdanskogo obshchestva i pravovogo gosudarstva, 2 vols. (St. P e t e r s b u r g : D m i t r i i B u l a n i n , 1999): 2: 207. 17 Rossiiskaia Imperiia razdelennaia v gubernii v 1796 i 1797 godakh. Prezhde byvshie staty gubernskie, koi nyne peremeneny. 1776 do 1796 ( U n d a t e d p r i n t e d d o c u m e n t , e v i d e n t l y f r o m the 1790s, w i t h o u t p a g i n a t i o n or publishing i n f o r m a t i o n ) . 18 H e i n r i c h S t o r c h , Rußland unter Alexander dem Ersten, 9 vols. (St. P e t e r s b u r g , Leipzig: Bei J o h a n n Friedrich H a r t k n o c h , 1804-08), 3: 92; S h c h u k i n , Bumagi, 5: 207 ( S h i k h l a r e v a ) ; H e i n r i c h v o n R e i m e r s , St. Petersburg am Ende seines ersten Jahrhunderts, 2 vols. (St. P e t e r s b u r g , Penig: Bei F. D i e n e m a n n , 1805), 2 : 1 4 1 . 19 A l e k s a n d r N i k i t e n k o , Up From Serfdom: My Childhood and Youth in Russia, 1804-1824, trans. H e l e n Saltz J a c o b s o n ( N e w H a v e n , L o n d o n : Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press, 2001), 54; G e o r g R e i n b e c k , Flüchtige Bemerkungen auf einer Reise von St. Petersburg über Moskwa, Grodno, Warschau, Breslau nach Deutschland im Jahre 1805,2 vols. (Leipzig: Bei Wilhelm R e i n , 1806), 1: 296-306; J o h a n n R i c h t e r , Russische Miszellen, 3 vols. (Leipzig: Bei J o h a n n Friedrich H a r t k n o c h , 1803-04), 2, no. 5: 2 1 1 - 1 4 . 20 R e i m e r s , St. Petersburg, 1: 296; S t o r c h , Rußland,

2 : 1 3 9 , 1 4 1 ^ 1 7 , 2 1 1 - 1 4 , 2 1 7 - 1 8 ; R e i n b e c k , Flüchtige 3: 9 2 , 9 : 12-13.

21 S h c h u k i n , Bumagi, 7: 124. 22 Mironov, Sotsial'naia istoriia

Rossii, 2: 200.

23 J e r o m e B l u m , Lord and Peasant in Russia From the Ninth ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1961), 368. 24 S h c h u k i n , Bumagi,

5: 2 1 4 , 9 : 113 ( S h t e n d e r ) .

25 Ibid., 7: 9 8 - 1 0 2 , 1 1 7 - 1 8 , 1 2 4 .

Bemerkungen,

to the Nineteenth

Century

8 2 • Alexander

M.

Martin

26 " I m p e r a t o r s k i i M o s k o v s k i i u n i v e r s i t e t v v o s p o m i n a n i i a k h M i k h a i l a P r o k h o r o v i c h a Tret ' i a k o v a . " Russkaia Starina 75 ( J u l y - S e p t e m b e r 1892): 104-131, 124; Friedrich R a u p a c h , Reise von St. Petersburg nach dem Gesundbrunnen zu Lipezk am Don. Nebst einem Beitrage zur Charakteristik der Russen ( B r e s l a u : Bei Wilhelm G o t t l i e b K o r n , 1809), 8 9 - 9 0 . 27 S h c h u k i n , Bumagi, 2: 206 ( B u r a v o v a ) , 3 : 6 3 ( A n d r e e v a ) , 5: 2 1 4 , 9 : 112 ( G a l d a n o v a ) , 5 : 2 1 5 , 7:115 (Nefed'eva). 28 Ibid., 2: 142-44 (G. Vasil'ev, A . I v a n o v ) , 159-60 (P. Ivanov), 3: 151 ( I v a n o v a ) , 5: 188-89 (I. Vasil'ev). 29 Ibid., 4: 257-59. 30 Ibid.,3:

149 ( N e f i m o n o v ) , 5: 185-86 (N. I v a n o v a ) .

31 For e x a m p l e : Ibid., 7: 118 ( K a r t e i ' ) , 9: 1 1 2 - 1 3 ( E . I v a n o v a , B e k l e m i s h e v a ) . 32 Ibid.,2: 146 ( C h u m i c h e v a ) . 33 Ibid., 6: 2 6 - 2 8 ( S u r k o v o - A r b a t s k i e ) . 34 Ibid., 2: 178-202 ( V i n o g r a d o v ) , 161-62 ( M u s i n a P u s h k i n a ) . 35 L e o n i d E . Shepelev, Chinovnyi mir Rossii. XVIlI-nachalo XX v. (St. P e t e r s b u r g : IskusstvoSPb, 1999), 203. 36 S h c h u k i n , Bumagi, 1: 156,2: 1 7 8 - 2 0 2 , 5 : 8 8 - 9 2 . 37 Ibid., 5:205, 9:99-100 ( I a k i m o v a ) ; see also S i m o n e D e l a t t r e , Les Douze heures noires. La nuit ä Paris au XIX'siede (Paris: A l b i n Michel, 2000), 7 9 - 9 1 , 1 4 5 . 38 S t o r c h , Rußland, 2: 1 6 8 - 6 9 , 4 : 130; R a u p a c h , 2 5 8 - 6 1 . 39 Vestnik Evropy 1, no. 4 ( F e b r u a r y 1802): 103-04; 6, no. 23 ( D e c e m b e r 1802): 229; 8, no. 8 ( A p r i l 1803): 325; R i c h t e r , Russische Miszellen 3, no. 7: 161-72. 40 A l e k s a n d r Kuznetsov, Almanakh na 1826 dlia priezzhaiushchikh v Moskvu i dlia samikh zhitelei sei stolitsy, Hi Noveishii ukazatel' Moskvy ( M o s c o w : V Tipografii Avgusta S e m e n a . pri I m p e r a t o r s k o i M e d i k o - K h i r u r g i c h e s k o i A k a d e m i i , 1825), 66, 7 5 - 7 6 . 41 S h c h u k i n , Bumagi, 2: 213 ( P e l e v i n a ) , 7: 113 ( S a k h a r o v a ) , 119 ( M a r ' i a n o v a ) . 42 For e x a m p l e : Ibid.,2: 151-52 (Savin), 3: 66 ( M a k a r o v , A . l a k o v l e v ) . 43 Iurii M. L o t m a n . Besedy o russkoi kul'ture. Byt i traditsii russkogo (XVIII-nachalo XIX veka) (St. P e t e r s b u r g : I s k u s s t v o - S P B , 1994), 129. 44 For e x a m p l e : S h c h u k i n , Bumagi, 5:200-01 ( K o b r o n o v a ) . 45 Ibid.,2:179. 46 Ibid., 5: 203, 6: 9 7 - 9 8 .

dvorianstva

The Rise of Male Secondary Education in Provincial Russia: D.A. Tolstoy's Ministry Revisited MARINA

LOSKOUTOVA

The social history of education has been for many years a rather neglected field of research. When professional historians did turn to the field of education, their attention has been usually directed to state policy. In this respect, Russian, Soviet and American scholarship displayed a remarkable similarity, despite their theoretical and methodological frameworks. American studies of Russian education, beginning in the 1960s and through the last decade, commonly adopted a master narrative of the struggle between Russian society and the authoritarian state where the forces were manifestly unequal and the state was always allowed to win. 1 Soviet historians, although ascribing the primary role to socio-economic processes, in their detailed archival research were still mainly interested in exploring the policy of the government, 2 which was implicitly presented, in both Soviet and American research, as coherent and possessing limitless resources and room for maneuver. Studied through the prism of legislation, the history of education has been almost invariably written as the story of drafting new statutes, reform projects, and the struggles over them in upper government circles. This familiar narrative acquired an additional dimension in the last two decades, when nineteenth-century Russian history has been often uncritically used to provide straightforward justifications and explanatory models for an understanding of current events. Perhaps one of the most pervasive of these models, which gained tremendous popularity in the time of perestroika and has retained its strength up to the present day, is the narrative of reforms versus counter-reforms. Applied to education, this narrative framework portrays the decade of liberal reforms of the late 1850s—early 1860s as the golden age of Russian education, in the nineteenth century at least. Indeed, it was in that period when Russian faculty and students achieved a considerable degree of academic freedom under the new university statute of 1863. Newly created zemstvos and city dumas, as institutions of local self-administration, were empowered to support and partially control elementary and post-elementary education, a new system of supervision over primary school was established to boost the development

84 • Marina

Loskoutova

of this long neglected field, women's education was actively p r o m o t e d and finally, secondary schooling was r e f o r m e d in order to make room in its curriculum for the natural sciences and m o d e r n technology. Progressive reforms, however, were rapidly aborted after the Polish uprising of 1863 and Karakozov's attempted assassination of the tsar in 1866. According to a well-established tradition stretching back to the nineteenth century, the Ministry of D.A. Tolstoy, who presided over educational affairs of the Russian E m p i r e from 1866 to 1880, is considered an early manifestation of a counter-reform policy of the autocratic government, a policy that engulfed all o t h e r spheres of administration in the 1880s. 3 For D.A. Tolstoy and his advisors secondary education was evidently the key sector that had to be restructured. The new secondary school statutes of 1871-1872 considerably strengthened the position of the curriculum based on Latin and Greek at the expense of the natural sciences and restored centralized control over the school administration, including the imposition of uniform study programs and textbooks. The behavior of teachers and students and their extramural activities were subjected to rigid disciplinary regulations. These statutes were enacted with a fierce struggle between D.A. Tolstoy and the champions of real—that is m o d e r n as opposed to classical—education in the State Council. Understandably, the details of this opposition were in the focus of attention for nineteenth-century publicists and latter-day historians. The tsar's e n d o r s e m e n t of the statutes was thus the end of the story: any further discussion of the curriculum was precluded at least for the time being and the Ministry was f r e e to implement the policy, whose principles had been already clear from the normative acts. As contemporary observers and latter-day historians concentrated on the classicalreal controversy, a massive expansion of the secondary school sector that occurred precisely in the 1870s passed almost unnoticed. The scale of growth, particularly in the sector of men's secondary education, was in fact unprecedented for nineteenth-century Russia. During the Ministry of D.A. Tolstoy the n u m b e r of men's secondary schools in the E u r o p e a n part of the empire (without Poland and Finland) rose f r o m 94 to 238. 4 A n average annual increase of the student body in the whole imperial territory was approximately 520-530 students in 1833-1843, 220-230 in 1843-1853, 860 in 1853-1863,1.700 in 1863-1873, 5,000 in 1873-1877, reaching more than 6000 students per a n n u m in 1878-1882. A rapid increase in the student population was halted in t h e mid1880s, when the n u m b e r of schools stabilized; respective figures for s t u d e n t s were falling at a rate of about 3,800-3,900 students per annum in the period of 1883-1888. The student population began growing again only in the very last decade of the nineteenth century, remaining, however, still less p r o n o u n c e d than in thel870s (2,800 average increase per annum). It was only in the first d e c a d e s of the twentieth century that men's secondary education underwent a new wave of rapid expansion. 5 The actual importance of this statistical data can only be properly u n d e r s t o o d if o n e turns f r o m the conventional approach concerning ideology and politics to

Male Secondary Education • 85 the much b r o a d e r issues of the role of education in the making of modern society. Unlike education in its most general sense, the spread of formal schooling that targeted a broad stratum of the population is considered to be a feature of modernity. If in the medieval and early m o d e r n periods learning was associated with specialized forms of clerical, legal and crafts training that affected only very narrow strata of the population, the national educational systems that emerged in the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth century b e c a m e an integral part of the state apparatus. These educational systems imposed national and religious uniformity, instilled moral discipline and rationality, and transformed the political and economic creeds of the dominant classes into the consensual "wisdom" of the society as a whole. 6 Applying Gramscian and Foucauldian models to the social history of education in Western E u r o p e and North America, some recent research even establishes a link between the new educational practices and a general shift in the technologies of governing the population that occurred at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries. The government, which had been previously directed at the land or territory, now focused upon the population itself; new technologies of power were aimed at making the behavior of individuals, social groups and institutions increasingly more visible to the state authorities. The emergence of the interrelated system of schools, school administration and control is seen then as a part of this more general process. 7 The latter approach in particular accentuates the spatial dimension of social change. Indeed, as the state increasingly penetrated the local level, no place could be allowed to escape from control and supervision. The regulatory authorities of various kinds m a p p e d their success developing institutional networks. The very concept of a network is based on a premise that the influence of a given institution—be it a school, a library, or a health center—was to be spread evenly across the population. The concept became so familiar and self-evident that contemporary scholars rarely view it historically, tacitly assuming that it had been ready available for the educational authorities at least from the time when the Ministry of Public Education was created in the first decade of the nineteenth century. Perhaps for that reason n u m e r o u s studies on the history of education in late imperial Russia paid little attention to its geography. However to identify and m a p numerous secondary schools, which were opened in the 1870s, would be only the first stage of such research. In order to understand emerging patterns one would need to know the entire decision-making process behind the opening of a new school. It is this task that I u n d e r t a k e in this article. The state of archival materials, unfortunately, imposed its own limitations upon the scope of research. D o c u m e n t a t i o n on the establishment of new secondary schools with classical curricula—gymnasia or pro-gymnasia (i.e., an incomplete gymnasium without several finishing forms)—is scattered across a vast n u m b e r of files in the collection of the Ministry of Public Education, demanding a substantial amount of time to locate and examine. The haphazard location of the documents is revealing in itself: the Ministry apparently did not have a coherent vision

86 • Marina

Loskoutova

as to where new school should have been created, processing each case individually. Unlike pro-gymnasia, most realschulen (i.e., secondary schools with a modern curriculum) were o p e n e d in a relatively brief period of time, from 1872 when the respective statute defining this institution was enacted, to 1878 when the Balkan War imposed severe constrains on the state budget. Perhaps for this reason the fate of the ministerial correspondence on the opening of realschulen was different and the bulk of d o c u m e n t a t i o n went to several separate files for respective educational circuits. 8 T h e r e f o r e I was able to obtain detailed information only on the latter institutions. U p to the 1860s-1870s, men's gymnasia in Russian heartland provinces were restricted almost exclusively to the main provincial centers, where they had been founded in the first few decades of the nineteenth century. The secondary school reform of 1864, which was so much lauded for the boost it gave to the modern curriculum, produced in fact little impact upon the school network, since it merely converted a n u m b e r of pre-existing secondary schools into real gymnasia (i.e., schools that taught natural sciences instead of Latin and Greek) and no new establishments were opened. 9 The situation was somewhat different in western Ukrainian, Belorussian, Lithuanian, and Baltic provinces where quite an impressive n u m b e r of secondary schools had been in operation outside of the central provincial cities. Many of these schools date back to the eighteenth or even seventeenth centuries, being initially affiliated with Catholic or Protestant churches and monastic orders. 1 0 In the late 1860s in the aftermath of the Polish uprising, the number of schools in the western provinces actually decreased, as the imperial government closed down some of them, such as the gymnasia in Keidany and Ponevezh, the pro-gymnasium in Svisloch, schools for noblemen in Vitebsk and Mogilev. Many others were converted into post-elementary district schools. A similar fate awaited so-called schools for noblemen that existed in the western Ukrainian provinces. In 1868-1869 they passed through a similar transformation: the best of them, located in Kiev, Zlatopole and Ostrog, were converted into regular gymnasia, while the other five schools were simply closed down. 1 1 The gap between the western provinces and the heartland Russian provinces became less pronounced, and in the 1870s the situation was completely reversed in favor of the center. As the Ministry of Public Education had only limited means for initiating reform, it had f r o m the start to acknowledge the right of private individuals, estates, churches, zemstvos and municipalities to participate in establishing and supporting secondary schools. Thus the statutes of 1871-1872 left considerable room for local bodies to play an active role in founding new educational institutions, while leaving the Ministry with the last word in deciding whether a given locality would be assigned a school or not. Besides, the Ministry had to decide where to open the first few realschulen financed by the State Treasury. The correspondence between the central apparatus of the Ministry in St. Petersburg and the administration of educational circuits reveals that, by the time the statute on realschulen was endorsed by Alexander II, the Ministry did not

Male Secondary Education • 87 have a clear perspective on the location of these schools. From the 1864 reform the Ministry had inherited a n u m b e r of so-called real gymnasia, most of which were situated in the western provinces. In 1872-1873, they were reorganized into realschulen.^2 In doing so the Ministry evidently thought that the d e m a n d for real e d u c a t i o n would be reasonably met in the region without opening any such new institutions supported by the State Treasury. Solving the problem for the western provinces, the Ministry still had to decide where to open the state-funded realschulen on the remaining territories of Russia. In June 1872 the Ministry asked the heads of the educational circuits to submit their opinion on the issue. A s the Ministry was most interested in procuring supp l e m e n t a r y financial support f r o m local sources, the curators of the circuits were also asked to consult with the governors of their respective provinces, marshals of nobility, city dumas and zemstvo executive boards. 1 3 Characteristically, the circuit curators in their replies to the Ministry did not come up with any general strategy concerning the issue, merely restating the opinions given by gymnasium headmasters and school inspectors on individual localities. 14 A s a result, by the late a u t u m n of 1872 the Ministry was only able to work out a list of places where it proposed to o p e n those realschulen that were supported mainly by the State Treasury, failing to formulate any general strategy concerning the issue. In the absence of a general plan of development, the fate of individual localities d e p e n d e d mainly on the initiative and material resources of city municipalities and zemstvos. If in theory the statutes of 1871-1872 envisaged a situation when educational institutions could be opened and supported by various voluntary organizations, estates, churches and private individuals, in practice it was only the zemstvos and city dumas that actively participated in establishing new schools. 15 For realschulen I was able not only to m a p the location of the establishments, but also to trace the fate of those initiatives that were turned down by the Ministry. Characteristically, among all the petitions for opening a new realschule that I was able to locate, only three came from the western provinces, where no zemstvo institutions were created under the legislation of 1864. 16 Indeed, the very geography of the petitions supports the argument that, without these structures of self-administration created in the G r e a t Reforms era, local societies had been unable to organize themselves and—even more importantly—to raise necessary funding. As the marshal of the Mogilev nobility stressed in his letter to the Ministry, local landowners were sympathetic to the establishment of a realschule but were deprived of an opportunity to help "because of the absence of both zemstvo institutions and assemblies of nobility." 17 Thus, very few secondary schools were opened in that period in the western provinces: from the middle decades of the nineteenth century the region lost its advantage over the Russian heartland provinces. In the zemstvo provinces, most realschulen were o p e n e d in the major provincial centers, while smaller district towns were m o r e likely to establish a pro-gymnasium. Such a pattern, however, was not the result of a conscious plan. Several

88 • Marina

Loskoutova

factors, in my view, contributed to this particular configuration of a secondary school network. First, if the Ministry did not have a clear policy on where to o p e n new realschulen, it did have its own sense of priorities: it strongly favored a classical curriculum. D.A. Tolstoy and his advisors evidently realized that not all students aspiring to a secondary education would be able for various reasons to complete the course of a gymnasium. A n d yet, the primary concern of the Ministry under D.A.Tolstoy was to secure the position of classical schooling. In the 1870s the leading experts on the issue in the Ministry were still not certain w h e t h e r a given gymnasium would be able to enroll sufficient number of applicants to function properly. They were also afraid of, from their point of view, unnecessary competition for students between gymnasia and realschulen. The Ministry under D.A. Tolstoy evidently found it desirable that those students who opted for a secondary education at least started in a school with a classical curriculum. Characteristically, in trying to find ways to cut down the secondary school budget, the Ministry designed two different schemes for a realschule and for a gymnasium. The gymnasium statute of 1871 allowed the opening of a pro-gymnasium—a school with the same curriculum as a full gymnasium but consisting only of four or six junior forms. A similar clause was included in the 1872 statute on realschulen, the only difference was that a realschule, if necessary, could consist only of two, three, four, or five senior forms. Such a structure meant that before admission into a realschul a student had to complete a program for the missing one, two, three or four years. If parents, local zemstvos and ultimately the Ministry itself held the view that it was possible to p r e p a r e a student for entering the second form directly at h o m e or at a district school ( u e z d n o e uchilishche), then the only place to complete the program over the next two or three years (as was necessary if the realschule consisted only of two classes) was in a gymnasium or pro-gymnasium. 1 8 This provision alone—when it was properly explained to a local society interested in establishing a secondary school—could p r o m p t it to decide in favor of a pro-gymnasium. Second, a realschule, even without its lower forms, was still m o r e expensive to o p e r a t e than a pro-gymnasium, and the Ministry often reminded local bodies of this simple fact, particularly when it expected them to supply the larger share of the school budget. For that reason, few zemstvos and city dumas of a district level could realistically hope to raise sufficient f u n d s for a realschule if the Ministry refused to cover most part of a school budget. As a result, most realschulen were o p e n e d in the m a j o r provincial centers where local bodies had considerably m o r e resources to support them. The geographical distribution of the new schools, as well as examined petitions for the opening of a realschule across G r e a t Russian, eastern Ukrainian, a n d the southern and eastern provinces was also uneven. Most active were the zemstvos and cities of the central industrial and central agricultural regions, three Ukrainian provinces on the left bank of D n e p r and the Black Sea coastal area. Evidently the

Male Secondary Education • 89 high population density and the prefisence of the zemstvo institutions were two m a j o r factors that accounted for the general configuration of the school network. However, a careful examination of the location of the schools established in that period suggests that some other factors might have also been significant. I n d e e d , most cities and towns that petitioned for the opening of a realschule were located along the railroads. It is worth r e m e m b e r i n g that the period of the late 1860s and the first half of the 1870s was a time of large-scale railroad construction that affected precisely the center of the empire. The major lines, such as Moscow-Yaroslavl-Vologda, Moscow-Tambov, Tambov-Saratov, Moscow-Brest, K i e v - B r e s t , Kursk-Kiev, Kursk-Kharkov, K h a r k o v - O d e s s a , K h a r k o v - R o s t o v , Voronezh-Rostov, R i g a - S m o l e n s k - O r e l - E l e t s - G r i a z i , and V i a z ' m a - K a l u g a - T u l a - M o r s h a n s k - P e n z a - S y z r a n , were all c o m p l e t e d in t h e period b e t w e e n 1868-1875. 1 9 Many applications for a realschule came from places that were at the same time the sites of active railroad construction. Such a correlation is particularly p r o n o u n c e d in the case of small district towns of the central agricultural region and central industrial regions. In fact, a n u m b e r of petitions specifically stressed that a given city or town had or would soon have excellent communication facilities that would enable a school to enroll students from other localities— a weighty argument for ministerial officials. Railroads hastened local initiative by creating a d e m a n d for trained personnel, but also in a more subtle way by stirring new expectations and bringing a sense of modernity into the stagnant waters of provincial life—a motif appearing in some petitions. 2 0 The concentration of the landowner nobility in the belt of provinces running f r o m Kovno and Vilno to Mogilev, Smolensk, Chernigov, to Poltava, Kharkov, Kursk. Orel and Riazan' 2 1 might also be considered as an explanatory factor for the presence or absence of local initiative. Indeed, if such provinces as Penza, Simbirsk or even Tambov were ostensibly less developed in terms of the density of a school network as c o m p a r e d to the equally heavily populated Orel and Poltava provinces, it might have b e e n because these f o r m e r provinces lacked the people who would be most interested in securing secondary school provisions for their children and who had a greater leverage in the decision-making process during the allocation of zemstvo or municipal resources. Many petitions indeed emphasized the educational needs of this particular social stratum. 2 2 Sparsely populated provinces of the n o r t h e r n part of Russia submitted rather few applications. As very few schools subordinated to the Ministry of Public Education were opened in these provinces outside of provincial centers, church schools or seminaries were the most available educational institutions of a secondary level in the districts. 23 What impact this pattern had on the local population still remains to be explored. It is quite remarkable, however, that the petitions from small, r e m o t e towns of the Russian north and northeast were a m o n g the few that displayed a trace of active involvement, not only of local zemstvo or city duma but also of ordinary townspeople, some of whom identified themselves as stna 1 merchants or meshchane. They might have organized subscriptions to

90 • Marina

Loskouiova

raise m o n e y f o r t h e s c h o o l , o r t h e y just c o l l e c t e d the s i g n a t u r e s of t h e p e o p l e i n t e r e s t e d in t h e o p e n i n g of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n . In d o i n g so they w e r e e v i d e n t l y motiv a t e d by a sense t h a t w i t h o u t t h e i r active e f f o r t s t h e g o v e r n m e n t w o u l d hardly r e m e m b e r their G o d - f o r s a k e n place. 2 4 Similar p e t i t i o n s w e r e also r e c e i v e d by t h e Ministry f r o m t h e w e s t e r n p r o vinces w h e r e t h e initiative e v i d e n t l y b e l o n g e d t o t h e Jewish c o m m u n i t i e s . 2 5 T h e p r e s e n c e of e t h n i c m i n o r i t i e s is visible in a f e w o t h e r cases, such as t h e G e r m a n L u t h e r a n p a r i s h society in S a r a t o v 2 6 o r t h e A r m e n i a n c o m m u n i t i e s in N a k h i c h e v a n 2 7 a n d A s t r a k h a n . 2 8 In t h e s e cases t h e societies t o o k care to p r o v i d e a p p r o p r i a t e religious and l a n g u a g e i n s t r u c t i o n f o r t h e children on an o p t i o n a l basis, the costs b e i n g c o v e r e d by t h e local b o d i e s i n v o l v e d . W h e t h e r a p a r t i c u l a r a p p l i c a t i o n s u c c e e d e d or failed d e p e n d e d o n a c o m b i n a tion of factors, b u t first a n d f o r e m o s t was t h e i m m e d i a t e availability of m a t e r i a l r e s o u r c e s . 2 9 Local bodies, with very f e w exceptions, w e r e n o t able t o raise sufficient a m o u n t s of m o n e y to s u p p o r t a s c h o o l entirely on their o w n w i t h o u t the h e l p of t h e S t a t e Treasury. Thus, t h e f a t e of a given e d u c a t i o n a l e s t a b l i s h m e n t was d e c i d e d in t h e p r o c e s s of e x h a u s t i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e M i n i s t r y a n d t h e local b o d i e s with r e g a r d s to their s h a r e of t h e school f u n d i n g . T h e first issue was t o find s u i t a b l e h o u s i n g f o r the school; m a n y cities simply l a c k e d any building t h a t could b e easily c o n v e r t e d f o r this p u r p o s e . I n d e e d , e d u c a t i o n a l institutions, e v e n at t h e s e c o n d a r y level, w e r e materially d e p r i v e d in midn i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y R u s s i a . E v e n in t h e i m p e r i a l capital, several g y m n a s i a f o u n d ed in t h e 1860s a n d early

1870s h a d t o b e l o c a t e d for d e c a d e s in

rented

a p a r t m e n t s , which did n o t allow sufficient s p a c e f o r t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a library, l a b o r a t o r i e s , a n d a r e c r e a t i o n hall. 3 0 T h a t is why, w h e n the M i n i s t r y b e g a n c o n s i d e r i n g t h e location f o r t h e first s t a t e - f u n d e d realschulen,

t h e circuit c u r a t o r s

w e r e specifically i n s t r u c t e d t o p a y p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n to the availability of h o u s ing in t h o s e localities t h a t t h e y r e c o m m e n d e d . In this early stage m u c h d e p e n d e d o n t h e ability of t h e local f o r c e s t o seize t h e initiative. T h o s e cities t h a t w e r e e a g e r t o p r o v i d e t h e b u i l d i n g a n d at least a m o d e s t financial c o n t r i b u t i o n — n o t e v e n o n a p e r m a n e n t b a s i s — c o u l d b e fairly s e c u r e in their h o p e s of o b t a i n i n g a

realschule.

L a t e r , w h e n t h e S t a t e C o u n c i l a p p r o v e d t h e Ministry's plan f o r w h e r e t o o p e n s t a t e - f i n a n c e d realschulen—the

p l a n t h a t w a s b a s e d o n t h e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s of

t h e c u r a t o r s of t h e e d u c a t i o n a l circuits a n d t h o s e very first p e t i t i o n s t h a t a r r i v e d at t h e Ministry d u r i n g t h e s u m m e r a n d e a r l y a u t u m n of 1872—it b e c a m e m u c h m o r e difficult f o r an a p p l i c a t i o n to s u c c e e d . N o w a provincial s o c i e t y h a d t o p r o c u r e f u n d i n g f o r t h e realschule

t h a t w o u l d c o v e r at least p a r t of t h e e x p e n s e s

r e l a t e d t o its e s t a b l i s h m e n t a n d a n n u a l b u d g e t . It was p a r t i c u l a r l y d i f f i c u l t t o o b t a i n p e r m i s s i o n t o o p e n a s c h o o l if a n o t h e r realschule

had already b e e n open-

e d , o r w a s going to b e o p e n e d , in t h e s a m e p r o v i n c e . In t h e s e c a s e s t h e M i n i s t r y w a s d e t e r m i n e d n o t to s p e n d m o r e r e s o u r c e s o n real e d u c a t i o n in t h e a r e a , r e q u e s t i n g e v e n relatively small district t o w n s t o p r o v i d e all s u p p o r t — a c o n d i t i o n t h a t m o s t of t h e m c o u l d n o t realistically h o p e to m e e t .

Male Secondary Education • 91 In 1876 when the prospect of a new war in the Balkans became evident to the g o v e r n m e n t , the Ministry of Education started to turn down applications for o p e n i n g new schools because the Ministry of Finance refused to provide extra f u n d i n g . In 1877 the Ministry a p p r o v e d only a few of the incoming applications for a realschul. In all those cases, local bodies o f f e r e d considerable financial contributions, but the fate of those petitions remained uncertain up to the last m o m e n t . 3 1 Thus, the period of energetic establishment of realschulen was practically over in 1877, and the next wave of massive secondary school openings started only in the first decades of the twentieth century. To establish a men's secondary school, the local community had to decide u p o n its curriculum, or rather to choose between two available types—classical or real. W h e n the Ministry began to set up the first few realschulen it was quite willing to respect the wishes of local communities. However, when a n u m b e r of t h e m had b e e n already opened, and the Ministry began to regard the future of real education as secured, it often started to express its doubts concerning the need to have a school with a modern curriculum. O n many occasions, it attempted to force zemstvos and city municipalities to reconsider their petition and opt for a pro-gymnasium. Facing pressure from the Ministry, many provincial societies quickly aband o n e d their initial proposals and agreed to support a pro-gymnasium, as they had indeed very little understanding of the differences between various types of postelementary and secondary schooling. Their confusion was undoubtedly aggravated when in 1872 the Ministry also p r o c e e d e d to reform district schools—educational institutions of post-elementary level created in the early years of the nineteenth century. Indeed, not only many zemstvos and city dumas but also even some high-ranking officials of the Ministry were evidently under the impression that district schools were to be closed down and replaced by realschulen,32 District schools apparently were not popular among the provincial population— many petitions for a realschule emphasize the failure of the f o r m e r institutions to provide adequate schooling. In the eyes of many representatives of zemstvos and city dumas, district schools did not p r e p a r e the students for any occupation, only fostering unrealistic aspirations. 3 3 Those petitions reveal that in many cases local societies were actually looking not for a secondary school but for a kind of a postprimary institution with vocational training in the crafts. This was particularly true for the northern and n o r t h e a s t e r n provinces, where a resident nobility that could aspire to a career in the state bureaucracy for its children was virtually non-existent. If the reform of district schools had proceeded more energetically and m o r e realschulen were opened in the districts, many young people of limited m e a n s probably would not have aspired for a gymnasium education. However, as the ministerial policy m a d e a pro-gymnasium much more accessible to t h e m , they flooded classical schools in great n u m b e r s during the 1870s. 34 *

*

*

92 • Marina

Loskoutova

What conclusions can be m a d e f r o m these observations? First, the geography of the emerging school network was very unfavorable to the region where it was most n e e d e d for the successful transformation of the empire along the lines of m o d e r n state formation, i.e., the western borderlands. It would not be entirely correct, however, to say that in the west, government policy explicitly hindered the development of m e n ' s schooling because of the fear that nationalist forces might easily use education. Indeed, the situation in these provinces differed drastically from one in the Kingdom of Poland, where the Ministry spent considerable resources building a dense network of secondary schools that was far superior even to the core provinces of the empire. 3 5 M o r e likely, closing down a substantial n u m b e r of schools in the a f t e r m a t h of the Polish uprising of 1863, the Ministry did not work out any special policy with regards to this region. The opening of new educational establishments in the following years occurred primarily through local initiatives. As the western provinces lacked the principal institution that served as the base for public initiative in that period—the zemstvo—they failed to attract the attention of the Ministry, which would not have established the schools without some local support. As the opening of new secondary schools in the 1860s-1870s proceeded in a rather haphazard way, the actual development of the educational system often occurred before the Ministry was able to identify problems and develop a coherent approach. As I would argue, the reactionary policy of the Ministry in the 1880s can only be properly understood if we appreciate this trait from the previous period. The Ministry of Education u n d e r D.A.Tolstoy explicitly favored classical education, considering it as inherently superior to any other type. The classical curriculum definitely had a touch of social exclusivity; it was not a p p r o p r i a t e for every child. To the extent that real education did in fact correspond to the needs of industrialization, the ministerial policy hindered the process of modernization and can even be considered reactionary. However, it is worth r e m e m b e r i n g that D.A.Tolstoy and his advisors sincerely believed themselves to be reshaping Russian education along E u r o p e a n lines, and indeed the establishment in such countries as G e r m a n y or France (not to speak about England) had very much the same set of ideas about secondary education. However, the educational authorities in Western E u r o p e accepted the f o r m a t i o n of a wide network of secondary and post-elementary schools with a m o d e r n curriculum as long as they did not infringe on the rights and benefits of classical schools. The m o d e r n sector of secondary education that considerably e x p a n d e d f r o m the 1870s to the turn of the century began to function as an outlet for the middle and lower-middle strata of the population that entered the educational system in increasing numbers. A social distinction that was ascribed to the classical curriculum in Western E u r o p e stemmed f r o m its traditional association with the education of elites. However in the period of the 1870s-1920s, it acquired a new dimension. As formal education b e c a m e an indispensable prerequisite for professional career, the educational system started to function as a mechanism for

Male Secondary Education • 93 r e p r o d u c i n g and legitimizing the social hierarchy: thus access to classical education was increasingly restricted. 3 6 In the Russian Empire, however, the situation was in many ways different. Classical education had no venerated tradition, particularly in the provinces. 3 7 In t h e 1830s-1840s under S.S. Uvarov, the Ministry apparently achieved a certain d e g r e e of success in improving gymnasium educational standards. 3 8 T h e data of t h e 1897 census seem to suggest that already by the mid-century more than twothirds of n o b l e m e n in the major provincial centers had some experience of formal secondary schooling, most likely of gymnasium type. As the Ministry u n d e r D.A.Tolstoy firmly supported classical education, it could have acquired with the course of time the same mark of distinction and social exclusivity that it e n j o y e d in Germany. ( A n o t h e r matter is whether it was a worthy model to emulate.) H o w e v e r , it was precisely in the 1870s when the n u m b e r of secondary schools, and classical secondary schools in particular, considerably increased. As the Ministry encouraged and often even pressed local societies to choose in favor of classical curriculum, the pro-gymnasium became in the 1870s the most widespread type of m e n ' s secondary school. Its importance was particularly manifest on the level of the district towns where it was commonly the only secondary school for men available with exception of a clerical school or seminarium—institutions attended almost exclusively by the offspring of the clergy. In fact, the n u m ber of realschulen was comparable to those for pro-gymnasia and gymnasia only on the Kazan educational circuit. Promoting classical schooling, however, the Ministry was rather late in realizing the growing willingness of a wider stratum of the population to complete a secondary education—a p h e n o m e n o n indicated by the proliferation of petitions to o p e n so-called "parallel classes" in m e n ' s secondary schools. The Ministry began to perceive the newcomers as a danger only by the mid-1880s, that is in the period when many other E u r o p e a n countries also expressed a concern over the inflation of educational certificates and the overcrowding of learned professions, and respectively tried to curb down students' enrolments. 3 9 In Russia, however, the ministerial circulars of 1887 that drastically limited the access of Jews and lower classes to secondary schooling seemed to be more repressive, as they were a clumsy attempt to restrict access to the very same schools that were so much promoted in the previous decade, sometimes almost against the wishes of local public. Seen f r o m this perspective, the Ministry of I.D. Delianov was a decisive break from the policy of D.A. Tolstoy, even if I.D. Delianov was known as a close associate of D.A. Tolstoy and exhibited the same ideological preferences.

94 • Marina

Loskoutova

Notes This essay is based on the author's unpublished Ph.D. thesis completed at the Central European University, Budapest, under the supervision of A.J. Rieber in 2000. The author also expresses her thanks to the Program "Promoting Social Studies of Education in Russia," at the E u r o p e a n University at St. Petersburg and the Spencer Foundation, Chicago, for the grant that enabled her to continue the research. 1 Patrick L. Alston, Education and the State in Tsarist Russia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969); Allen Sinei, The Classroom and the Chancellery: State Educational Reform in Russia under Count Dmitry Tolstoy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973); Daniel R. Brower, Training the Nihilists: Education and Radicalism in Tsarist Russia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1975); James C. McClelland, Autocrats and Academics: Education, Culture, and Society in Tsarist Russia (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979); Samuel D. Kasai, Students, Professors, and the State in Tsarist Russia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). 2 Sh.I.Ganelin, Ocherki po istorii srednei shkoly v Rossii (Leningrad: Gossudarstvennoe uchebno-pedagogichnoe izd., 1950); N.A.Konstantinov, Ocherki po istorii srednei shkoly (Gimnazii i real'nye uchilishcha s kontsa XIX veka do Fevral'skoi revoliutsii 1917 goda) (Moscow, 1956); L.V. Kamosko, "Izmeneniia soslovnogo sostava uchashchikhsia srednei i vysshei shkoly Rossii (30e-80e gody XIX veka)", Voprosy Istorii 10 (1970): 203-207; A.I. Piskunov, ed., Ocherki istorii shkoly i pedagogicheskoi mysli narodov SSSR. Vtoraia polovina XIX veka (Moscow: Pedagogika, 1976). 3 Ben Eklof and Edward Dneprov, eds., Democracy in the Russian School: the Reform Movement in Education since 1984 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993). The policy of D.A.Tolstoy was characterized as the policy of "counter-reforms" already in L.V. Kamosko, "Izmeneniia soslovnogo sostava uchashchikhsia," 203-207, and also in G.I. Shchetinina, Universitety v Rossii i ustav 1884 goda (Moscow: Nauka, 1976), 89. 4 The calculations are based on A.V. Dubrovskii, Universitety i srednie uchebnye zavedeniia muzhskie i zhenskie v 50-ti guberniiakh Evropeiskoi Rossii i 10-ti guberniiakh privislianskikh po perepisi 20 marta 1880 goda. Obshchie vyvody (St. Petersburg, 1888), appendix 1; Uchebnye zavedenia vedomstva Ministerstva Narodnogo Prosveshcheniia (St. Petersburg, 1895); Izvlechenie iz vsepoddanneishego otcheta Ministra Narodnogo Prosveshchenia za 1871 (St. Petersburg, 1873); Izvlechenie iz vsepoddanneishego otcheta Ministra Narodnogo Prosveshchenia za 1877 (St. Petersburg, 1879); Izvlechenie iz vsepoddanneishego otcheta Ministra Narodnogo Prosveshchenia za 1882 (St. Petersburg, 1886). 5 The calculations are based on the data published in the annual reports of the Ministry of Pufllic Education. Absolute figures are also given in L.V. Kamosko,"Izmeneniia soslovnogo sostava uchashchikhsia," 203-207. 6 A n d y Green, Education and State Formation: the Rise of Education Systems in England, France, and the USA (Hampshire: Macmillan, 1990). 7 Bruce Curtis, Building the Education State: Canada West, 1838-1871 (London, Ontario: Althouse Press, 1988); Bruce Curtis, True Government by Choice Men? Inspection, Education, and State Formation in Canada West (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992); Ian Hunter, Culture and Government:The Emergence of Literary Education (London: Macmillan, 1988); James Donald, Sentimental Education: Schooling, Popular Culture, and the Regulation of Liberty (London: Verso, 1992); James Van Horn Melton, Absolutism and the Eighteenth-Century Origins of Compulsory Schooling in Prussia and Austria (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

Notes

• 95

8 Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv [hereafter R G I A ] , f. 733, op.162, d. 666 (Kharkov educational circuit), d. 667 (Moscow educational circuit), d. 668 (Odessa educational circuit), d. 669 (St. Petersburg educational circuit), d. 670 (Kiev educational circuit), d. 671 (Vilno educational circuit), d. 672 (Kazan educational circuit). 9 Spisok uchebnykh zavedenii vedomstva Ministerstva Narodnogo Prosveshcheniia (krome nachal'nykh) po gorodam i seleniiam (St. Petersburg, 1883); Uchebnye zavedeniia vedomstva Ministerstva Narodnogo Prosveshcheniia. Spravochnaia kniga, sostavlennaia po ofitsial'nym svedeniiam k 1-mu ianvaria 1895 goda (St. Petersburg, 1895). 10 Ibid. 11 S.V.Rozhdestvenskii, Istoricheskii obzor deiatel'nosti Ministerstva Narodnogo Prosveshcheniia 1802-1902 (St. Petersburg, 1902), 461-470; R G I A , f. 733, op. 162, d. 212, d. 213. 12 In practice only nine schools were converted into real gymnasia according to the statute of 1864. They were the seventh St. Petersburg gymnasium (transformed into the first realschule after 1872), gymnasia in Arkhangel'sk, Nikolaev, Belostok, Pinsk, Dinaburg, and Belaia Tserkov'. See R G I A , f. 846, d. 83,11.11,41. Four of the latter institutions were converted in 1872 into realschulen. See R G I A , f. 733, op. 162, d. 671. 13 R G I A , f. 733, op. 162, d.668, II. 1-4, d. 666,1. 2, d. 667,1. 1 - l o b , d. 669,11. l - 2 o b . 14 R G I A , f. 733, op. 162, d. 666, 11. 20-25ob, d.667, I. 1 - l o b , d.668, 11. 1-4, d. 669, 11. l - 2 o b , 3-7ob, 8-10. 15 It can also be confirmed by the data on the secondary school budgets. See A.V.Dubrovskii, Universitety i srednie uchebnye zavedeniia, 52-53. 16 We are talking about Zhitomir, Mogilev-on-the Dnestr, and Minsk. See R G I A , f. 733, op. 162, d. 670,11.82-85, 306-308ob, 327-327ob, d. 671,11.216-219. 17 R G I A , f. 733, op. 162, d. 670,11. 317ob-318. 18 The Ministry specifically explained these complicated details in a special circular from 31 June 1872. For a contemporary comment see Mikhail Stasiulevich, "'Vidy' i 'soobrazheniia' Ministerstva Narodnogo Prosveshcheniia po delu real'nykh uchilishch," Vestnik Evropy 5, bk. 9 (1872): 383-394, esp. 19 N.A.Kislinskii, Nasha zheleznodorozhnaia politika, vols. (St. Petersburg: Gos. tip., 1902), vol. 2. 20 For example, in a petition from Livny—RGIA, f. 733, op. 162, d. 667,1. 34-34ob. 21 (Author unknown), "Dvorianstvo v Rossii. Istoricheskii i obshchestvenny ocherk," Vestnik Evropy 2, bk. 3 (1887), 253-257; A.P. Korelin, Dvorianstvo v poreformennoi Rossii. 1861-1904 gg. Sostav, chislennost', korporativnaia organizatsiia (Moscow:Nauka, 1979), 34, 40-41,43,292-303. 22 R G I A , f. 733, op. 162, d. 666,1. 15ob (petition from Orel), 1. 36ob (petition from Kozlov), d. 669,11. 3 - 7 o b (petition from Velikie Luki), 1. 394-394ob (petition from Livny). 23 Geographical distribution of church secondary schools can be established from A.V. Dubrovskii, Universitety i srednie uchebnye zavedeniia, appendix 1. 24 R G I A , f. 733, op. 162, d. 669,11.147ob-149, d. 672,11. 50, 55-59. 25 R G I A , f. 733, op. 162, d. 670,11. 82-85,11. 306-309,314-318ob, 327-327ob, 340-343ob. 26 R G I A , f. 733. op. 162, d. 672,11. 13-17,90-91ob. 27 R G I A , f. 733. op. 162, d. 668,11. 157-161ob, 241-244ob, 255-256, 287-287ob, 545,571-572. 28 R G I A , f. 733. op. 162, d. 672., 11. 61-64,112-112ob, 115-115ob. 29 Human resources apparently did not play any considerable role in determining the outcome of an application, even if the question did occasionally pop up in the correspondence between the curators and the Ministry. 30 N.A.Kusov, 25-letie Sankt-Peterburgskoi sed'moi gimnazii (byvshei vtoroi progimnazii) (1867-1892) (St. Petersburg, 1893), 2 - 3 , 1 6 - 1 7 , 2 4 - 3 3 ; A.I. Chevakinskii, Dvadtsatipiatiletie Sankt-Peterburgskoi desiatoi gimnazii 1871-1896 gg. Istoricheskaia zapiska (St. Peters-

96 • Marina

31 32 33 34 35 36

37

3 8

39

Loskoutova

burg. 1897), 1, 31-34; Otchel za pervoe dvadtsatipiatiletie sushchestvovaniia SanktPeterburgskogo vtorogo real'nogo uchilishcha (1873-1898 gg.) (St. Petersburg, 1898), 19-20. R G I A , f. 733, op. 162, d. 667,11. 582-591ob, 613, 618-619ob, 625, 697-697ob, 706, d. 666,11. 440-441, d. 668,1. 553, d. 669,1. 510-510ob, d. 670,11. 341-343ob, d. 671,11. 263-254ob. R G I A , f. 733, op. 162, d. 668,11. 9-11,13, 15ob, 16-18, 36-39ob. R G I A , f. 733, op. 162, d. 667,11. 584-591, d. 672,11. 3-7ob. Statistical data can be found in L.V. Kamosko, "Izmeneniia soslovnogo sostava uchashchikhsia," 203-207. See also Alston, Education and the State in Tsarist Russia, 127-133. A.V. Dubrovskii, Universitety i srednie uchebnye zavedeniia, appendix 1. Fritz K. Ringer, Education and Society in Modern Europe (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979); Detlef Müller, Fritz K. Ringer, and Brian Simon, eds. The Rise of Modern Educational System. Structural Change and Social Reproduction, 1870-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and Editions de La Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, 1987). The tradition of reading Latin authors in eighteenth-century Russia looks particularly weak in the light of a recent study by Max Okenfuss, even if more research on the problem is needed to support his claims. See Max J. Okenfuss, The Rise and Fall of Latin Humanism in Early Modern Russia: Pagan Authors, Ukrainians, and the Resiliency of Muscovy (Leiden, New York: E.J. Brill, 1995). Cynthia H. Whittaker, The Origins of Modern Russian Education: an Intellectual Biography of Count Sergei Uvarov, 1786-1855 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1984). See Gary B. Cohen, Education and Middle Class Society in Imperial Austria, 1848-1918 (West Lafayette, In.: Purdue University Press, 1996), 95-108; Konrad H. Jarausch, Students, Society, and Politics in Imperial Germany. The Rise of Academic IIliberalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1982), 57-61; Detlef K. Müller, "The Process of Systematisation: The Case of G e r m a n Secondary Education," in Detlef Müller, Fritz K. Ringer, and Brian Simon, eds.. The Rise of Modern Educational System: Structural Change and Social Reproduction, 1870-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and Editions de La Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, 1987), 38-41.

Ruslan, Bohdan, and Myron: Three Constructed Identities among Galician Ruthenians/Ukrainians, 1830-1914 IAROSLAV

HRYTSAK

In 1786 Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart moved from Vienna to Prague. H e wrote a letter to his friend Gottfried von Jaquin, who stayed in Vienna: Now farewell dearest friend, dearest Hikkity Horky! That is your name, so you will know it; we have all of us on our trip invented names; they follow here. I am Punkitititi.—My wife is Shabla Pumfa. Hofer is Rozka Pumpa Stadler is Notschibikitschibi. Joseph my servant is Sagadarata. Goukerl my dog is Schomanntzky—Madame Quallenberg is Runzifunzi.—Mademoiselle Crux Ps: Ramlo is Schurimuri. Freistadtler is Goulimauli. Have the kindness to communicate to the last mentioned his name. 1 Larry Wolff in his book. Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment, treats this episode as "the comical expression of alienation that attended the imaginative eighteenth-century traveler to Eastern Europe. Mozart, born in Salzburg, resident in Vienna, a German by native tongue, was not at home in Slavic Bohemia where the language he heard around him sounded like nonsense." 2 The paradox was, however, that few decades later, some Slavic intellectuals, native-speakers of Slavic languages, also stopped feeling "at home" with their own names. It was their Christian names (i.e., baptismal names of Christian saints) that sounded like nonsense and seemed to alienate them from their own people. This article explores three successive generations of Galician Ruthenian/Ukrainian nationalists and how their choice of names embodies the story of their search for a national identity.

98 • laroslav

Hrytsak RUSLAN

In an introduction to a glossary of Slavic names, published in Buda in 1828, one of its two authors, a Serbian priest Jovan Pacic wrote: I have been thinking that through several centuries we k e e p accepting alien names—e.g., C h a l d e a n , Jewish, G r e e k , Latin and G e r m a n ones— without understanding their meaning. A n d that by absorbing them [...], we k e e p alienating ourselves f r o m our beautiful and beloved Slavdom and S e r b d o m . T h e r e f o r e it is the right time to ask ourselves: why should we not r e t u r n to our own traditions? Why should we not start giving ourselves our own names? 3 In his glossary Pacic collected 800 " t r u e " Slavic first names, based on historical documents and studies of naming habits among Serbs who were believed to have best preserved ancient Slavic traditions. His co-author Jan Kollar, a famous poet and a scholar-dilettante, a d d e d another 2,300 "original Slavic" names that he found in old chronicles, in folklore and in writings of Vuk Karadzic, Nikolai Karamzin, A l e x a n d e r Grach, and other Slavic intellectuals. In composing the list, he pursued a threefold task: to record old traditions; to show the richness of Slavic languages; and to provide an impetus for parents "to revive [their own] nationality" by choosing these names for their children. 4 In 1833 and 1834, the PaCic-Kollar glossary was read in Lemberg (Polish Lwow/Ruthenian-Ukrainian Lviv), the capital of the largest Austrian province Galicia, by two young R u t h e n i a n students at the Greek-Catholic seminary, Markian Shashkevych and Ivan Vahylevych. 5 Together with their friend, Iakiv Holovats'kyi, another seminary student, they were called by their peers, half mockingly and half seriously, Rus'ka Triitsia (the Ruthenian triad). The reason was rather simple: whenever they strolled around the city, whatever they discussed in classrooms or dormitories, they were heard speaking the R u t h e n i a n ( R u s ' k a ) language. In the city, where in 1825 R u t h e n i a n s were a tiny minority of only 5 percent of the population 6 and where the Greek-Catholic priests—the only educated elite among R u t h e n i a n s — s p o k e either G e r m a n (the official language of the H a b s b u r g empire) or Polish (the language of the local nobility), the use of the " p e a s a n t " R u t h e n i a n language was unusual. By the consistent use of this language the three young men wanted to d e m o n s t r a t e their desire to revive their "long b u r i e d " Ruthenian nationality. A n o t h e r manifestation of that desire was a revival of Slavic R u t h e n i a n names. Holovats'kyi wrote later in his memoirs, We came to a c o m m o n a g r e e m e n t that a n y o n e we chose to join our circle had to take an oath that he would work all his life for the benefit of his p e o ple and for the revival of R u t h e n i a n popular literature. To m a k e this o a t h sacred, we accepted Slavic names: Shashkevych became Ruslan, Vahyle-

Rustan, Bohdan vych

became

Dalibor, and

I became

Iaroslav. T h e n

and Myron • 99

there

appeared

L o p a t y n s ' k y i as V e l y m y r . I l ' k e v y c h as M y r o s l a v , my b r o t h e r Ivan as B o h d a n , B u l v i n s ' k y i as R o s t y s l a v . . . ; t h e r e also a p p e a r e d V s e v o l o d s , Mstyslavs, V o l o d a r s a n d others. 7 F r o m t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e 1830s, t h e R u t h e n i a n t r i a d signed t h e i r w o r k s as Ruslan

S h a s h k e v y c h , Dalibor

V a h y l e v y c h a n d Iaroslav

t h e y c o m p i l e d a l i t e r a r y a l m a n a c Rus'ka

Zoria

H o l o v a t s ' k y i . In 1834,

("Ruthenian star') that included

f o l k l o r e as well as t h e i r o w n l i t e r a r y works. T h e a l m a n a c r e v e a l e d a c l e a r U k r a i n i a n o r i e n t a t i o n by s t a t i n g t h a t R u t h e n i a n s in G a l i c i a a n d Little R u s s i a n s ( U k r a i n i a n s ) in t h e R u s s i a n E m p i r e m a d e a single n a t i o n . T h e A u s t r i a n c e n s o r s f o r b a d e t h e p u b l i c a t i o n of Rus'ka because

of w h a t

Zoria

n o t so m u c h b e c a u s e of its c o n t e n t , b u t

t h e y saw as l o n g - t e r m

political i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h e

local

R u t h e n i a n s ' c h o i c e of a U k r a i n i a n o r i e n t a t i o n f o r t h e H a b s b u r g m o n a r c h y , e s p e cially in r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n V i e n n a a n d St. P e t e r s b u r g . 8 T h e c e n s o r s ' d e c i s i o n did n o t s t o p t h e R u t h e n i a n t r i a d . In 1837 t h e y p u b l i s h e d t h e a l m a n a c in a slightly c h a n g e d f o r m a n d u n d e r a n e w title, Rusalka

Dnistrova

( ' W a t e r n y m p h of t h e

D n i e s t e r " ) in B u d a , w h e r e c e n s o r s h i p r e g u l a t i o n s w e r e n o t as strict as in t h e A u s t r i a n p a r t of t h e H a b s b u r g E m p i r e . P u n i s h m e n t s o o n f o l l o w e d . All t h r e e w e r e s u b j e c t e d t o d i s c i p l i n a r y trials a n d w e r e r e p r i m a n d e d , which h a d s e r i o u s c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r t h e i r c a r e e r s a n d lives. T h e h i s t o r y of t h e R u t h e n i a n t r i a d is r a t h e r well k n o w n . S c h o l a r s , h o w e v e r , h a v e n e v e r p a i d a d e q u a t e a t t e n t i o n to t h e issue of t h e n e w n a m e s a c c e p t e d by S h a s h k e v y c h , V a h y l e v y c h a n d H o l o v a t s ' k y i . E v e n t h o u g h this issue f e a t u r e d in m a t e r i a l s of t h e official i n v e s t i g a t i o n , 9 l a t e r h i s t o r i a n s c o n s i d e r e d it of m i n o r i m p o r t a n c e . A n d y e t in a l a r g e r c u l t u r a l a n d g e o g r a p h i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e , t h e issue of c h o o s i n g n e w n a m e s h e l p s to i d e n t i f y s o u r c e s of i n t e l l e c t u a l i n s p i r a t i o n f o r t h e R u t h e n i a n T r i a d . All b u t o n e of t h e Slavic n a m e s t a k e n by t h e m a n d t h e i r f o l l o w e r s c o u l d b e f o u n d in t h e P a c i c - K o l l a r glossary. T h e o n l y e x c e p t i o n r e f e r s t o t h e c a s e of " R u s l a n , " a n a m e t h a t w a s n o t r e c o r d e d b y e i t h e r PaSic o r Kollar. T h e g l o s s a r y i n c l u d e s t h e n a m e s of " R u s , " " R u s k o , " a n d " R u s m y r , " e a c h of t h e m i m p l y i n g t h e e t h n i c n a m e of R u t h e n i a n s ( R u s y n y ) a n d t h e i r l a n d niaIRus'). Other

nineteenth-century

Slavic o n o m a s t i c g l o s s a r i e s

(Ruthe-

mentioned

r e l a t e d n a m e s like " R u s a k , " " R u s a n , " " R u s i a n , " " R u s y n k o , " " R u s l a v , " " R u s m y r , " "Rusanets'," "Rusynets'," "Rus'."

10

O n t h e m a r g i n s of E a s t Slavic o e c u m e n u m ,

t h e e t h n i c n a m e " R u s y n " as first n a m e w a s r e g i s t e r e d as l a t e as t h e s e c o n d half of t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y , 1 1 a n d H o l o v a t s ' k y i u s e d this f o r m f o r his p e n - n a m e , Havrylo Rusyn.

12

N o n e of t h e s e o p t i o n s s e e m e d to satisfy S h a s h k e v y c h , w h o c h o s e t h e n a m e " R u s l a n . " T h e r e a r e t w o h y p o t h e s e s e x p l a i n i n g his choice. A c c o r d i n g to t h e first, R u s l a n was a p o e t i c version of R u s y n . It was b o r r o w e d f r o m t h e so-called " U k r a i n i a n " s c h o o l in t h e Polish p o e t r y ( 1 8 2 0 - 1 8 3 0 s ) a n d w a s c o i n e d f r o m an ancient ethnic n a m e "Roxolanus."13 No further arguments are provided, howev-

100 • laroslav

Hrytsak

er. So it remains unclear why Shashkevych did not use the original form, "Roxolan(us)." A n o t h e r hypothesis draws a parallel between " R u s l a n " and the G e r m a n name for Russia, " R u ß l a n d . " This explanation originated f r o m a misinterpretation of a letter that was written by Mykhailo Levyts'kyi, the Greek-Catholic Metropolitan, to the Austrian G e n e r a l G o v e r n o r in Lviv (27 May 1835). In this letter he allegedly indicated that the n a m e chosen by Shashkevych was certain proof of the latter's Russian orientation. The problem is that the original of this letter was u n k n o w n at the time of its publication, so most historians referred to a preserved copy. A recently found original, however, revealed that it was misquoted, and the n a m e of Ruslan was m e n t i o n e d t h e r e in a quite d i f f e r e n t c o n t e x t , as Shashkevych's attempt to disguise his own identity, and no connection has been m a d e between Ruslan and Rußland. 1 4 T h e r e is, however, a simpler explanation. In the 1830s the n a m e of Ruslan was widely known a m o n g r e a d e r s of Slavic literature, since it had been i n t r o d u c e d by A l e x a n d e r Pushkin in his 1820 p o e m , " R u s l a n and L i u d m i l a " ( L i u d m y l a in Ukrainian). 1 5 O n e has to look closer at the Pushkin p o e m to imagine possible readings in remote Austrian Galicia. Pushkin's Ruslan, an ancient mighty hero, is d e f e n d i n g Rus' and its capital, Kyiv (Kiev), which was the Ruthenian triad's center of the imagined R u t h e n i a n / U k r a i n i a n motherland. In his "Psalms of Ruslan" Shashkevych revealed the same heroic ethos as he answered in the n a m e of Ruslan to an invisible enemy: "[A]nd you can tear apart my eyes and take away my soul, but you cannot take away my love, and you cannot take my faith, because I have a Ruthenian heart and a Ruthenian faith!" 1 6 Pushkin had written his poem in 1817-1820, a few years after the publication of Karamzin's History of Russian Statehood. Some of Pushkin's heroes—Prince Vladimir, R a k h d a i and Farlaf—are directly taken from Karamzin's History,17 but Ruslan is not m e n t i o n e d there. Most probably Pushkin's Ruslan is a modified form of the n a m e s " E r u s l a n " and "Oruslan," which one can find in Russian folk tales and which, in turn, c a m e from the Tatar word arslan (lion). 1 8 "Ruslan and Liudmila" contained many other borrowings from folk tales. 19 A m o n g them was Rusalka (water nymph), a traditional heroine of t h e Eastern E u r o p e a n folk culture. O n e detail has to be emphasized here: Pushkin's Rusalka, both in "Ruslan and Liudmila" as well as in a later unfinished p o e m " R u s a l k a , " dwells in the D n i e p e r ( D n i p r o in Ukrainian). By the beginning of t h e n i n e t e e n t h century in St. Petersburg cultural life, Rusalka was known in her U k r a i n i a n (Little Russian) form, according to the contemporary, imported R o m a n t i c fashion for Little Russian themes. O n e of the most popular St. Petersburg o p e r a s of that time has the title Dneprovskaia Rusalka ('The D n i e p e r water n y m p h ' ) , with music by C a t t e r i n o Cavos and libretto H. Krasnopol's'kyi, first p e r f o r m e d at t h e Bolshoi T h e a t r e on 5/17 May 1804. The opera was allegedly a source of inspiration for Pushkin and had been inspired by the G e r m a n opera Das Donauweibchen ("The D a n u b e Water N y m p h " ) , written by Ferdinand Kauer. 2 0

Ruslan,

Bohdan

and Myron

• 101

T h e r e is a n o b v i o u s s i m i l a r i t y b e t w e e n t h e i m a g e s of t h e D n i e p e r a n d D a n u b e w a t e r n y m p h s a n d t h e title of t h e first U k r a i n i a n a l m a n a c in A u s t r i a n G a l i c i a . I n d i r e c t l y , it p r o v e s a h y p o t h e s i s a b o u t P u s h k i n ' s i n f l u e n c e o n S h a s h k e v y c h : b o t h " R u s l a n " a n d Rusalka

Dnistrova

b e l o n g t o t h e s a m e c u l t u r a l circle, a n d t h i s is

hardly a coincidence. BOHDAN

Stories a b o u t R u s l a n and R u s a l k a s h o w explicitly that n e i t h e r Pushkin nor Shashk e v y c h w e r e t h a t o r i g i n a l in t h e i r a r t i s t i c i n v e n t i o n s . B o t h b o r r o w e d i d e a s a n d i m a g e s t h a t a c t i v e l y f u n c t i o n e d in a l a r g e c u l t u r a l s p a c e b e t w e e n V i e n n a in t h e W e s t a n d Kyiv in t h e E a s t , St. P e t e r s b u r g in t h e N o r t h a n d t h e B a l k a n s in t h e S o u t h . A l a r g e p a r t of this t e r r i t o r y w a s i n h a b i t e d by E a s t e r n Slavs. T h e y s p o k e m u t u a l l y c o m p r e h e n s i b l e d i a l e c t s , r e t a i n e d a d i f f u s e m e m o r y of t h e i r d e s c e n t f r o m K y i v a n R u s ' as well as a s h a r p e r s e n s e of t h e i r c o m m o n E a s t e r n C h r i s t i a n — e i t h e r O r t h o d o x o r G r e e k - C a t h o l i c — r i t e . In t h e 1830s this s p a c e w a s n o t y e t clearly divided b e t w e e n different national projects. Only gradually, u n d e r cent r i f u g a l i n f l u e n c e s of l a r g e

urban

centers

such

a s St. P e t e r s b u r g ,

Vienna,

B u d a p e s t , V i l n i u s , Kyiv a n d o t h e r s , d i d d i s t i n c t i v e n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t i e s e m e r g e . 2 1 G a l i c i a o c c u p i e d t h e f u r t h e s t w e s t e r n p a r t of t h i s t e r r i t o r y , a n d Lviv w a s a m a j o r c e n t e r of p o l i t i c a l p o w e r a n d c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n . L o c a l R u t h e n i a n i n t e l lectuals significantly influenced d e b a t e s on h o w to carve new national m o t h e r l a n d s f r o m t h i s E a s t e r n S l a v i c / E a s t C h r i s t i a n w o r l d . T h e y d i s c u s s e d a v a r i e t y of options: they c o u l d f o r m a unified E a s t Slavic n a t i o n , be assimilated into the n e w l y e m e r g i n g P o l i s h o r R u s s i a n n a t i o n s , a s s e r t t h e i r i d e n t i t y as U k r a i n i a n s l i n k e d w i t h t h e s o - c a l l e d L i t t l e R u s s i a n s in t h e R u s s i a n E m p i r e o r as A u s t r i a n R u t h e n i a n s s e p a r a t e l y , o r c r e a t e m i x e d (e.g., B e l o r u s s i a n - U k r a i n i a n ) i d e n t i t i e s . F r o m t h e 1830s u n t i l t h e First W o r l d W a r , t h e g e n e r a l b a l a n c e b e t w e e n d i f f e r ent national o r i e n t a t i o n s a m o n g Galician R u t h e n i a n s c h a n g e d several times.22 S u f f i c e it t o s a y t h a t , of t h e R u t h e n i a n T r i a d , V a h y l e v y c h s h i f t e d t o t h e P o l i s h identity, H o l o v a t s ' k y i later chose a p r o - R u s s i a n o r i e n t a t i o n , and o n e w o n d e r s w h a t w o u l d h a v e h a p p e n e d if S h a s h k e v y c h h a d n o t d i e d y o u n g . T h e r e w e r e m a n y r e a s o n s w h y t h e o r i g i n a l l y U k r a i n i a n o r i e n t a t i o n of t h e R u t h e n i a n T r i a d f a d e d , m o s t h a v i n g t o d o w i t h c h a n g e s in t h e p o l i t i c a l c o n j u n c t u r e . T h e r e was, h o w e v e r , an intellectual r e a s o n that s t e m m e d f r o m the way t h e R u t h e n i a n

Ukrainian

n a t i o n was i m a g i n e d b y S h a s h k e v y c h , H o l o v a t s ' k y i a n d V a h y l e v y c h . T h e R u t h e n i a n T r i a d d e f i n e d t h e i r n a t i o n as a c u l t u r a l c o m m u n i t y t h a t s p o k e t h e R u t h e n i a n l a n g u a g e , 2 3 which m a d e the nation d e p e n d e n t on f u t u r e linguistic d e v e l o p m e n t s . In a s i t u a t i o n w h e n g r a m m a r s of t h e R u t h e n i a n l a n g u a g e w e r e f e w a n d v o c a b u laries non-existent, only s o m e e d u c a t e d R u t h e n i a n s could m a n a g e to speak the l a n g u a g e a n d e v e n a s m a l l e r n u m b e r t o w r i t e it. A n d t h o s e w h o c o u l d w e r e o f t e n m o c k e d for t h e u s e of a " p e a s a n t " l a n g u a g e t h a t w a s h a r d l y s u i t a b l e f o r a " h i g h style." In r e s p o n s e , s o m e R u t h e n i a n a u t h o r s s t a r t e d u s i n g e x i s t i n g " h i g h s t y l e "

102 • laroslav

Hrytsak

Russian forms, adding some borrowings from Church Slavonic, G e r m a n and Polish. By producing such a macaronic language, they sought to create a distance from the language of " u n e d u c a t e d peasants." But this did not help to overcome the identity crisis. In the 1850s, Kornylo Ustyianovych, a young national activist, wrote to his father, the R u t h e n i a n poet Mykola Ustyianovych: "Tell me, father, who we really are? We think G e r m a n , speak Polish, and write Russian." 2 4 A solution was suggested by B o h d a n Didyts'kyi (1827-1909), a prolific Ruthenian author and publicist. In 1866 he published anonymously a brochure under the title, "It takes only one hour for a Little Russian to learn the Russian language." 2 5 According to him, all differences between the two languages stem from different pronunciations of four characters in the Church Slavonic Cyrillic—"!)," "r," "H"and " e " after consonants. Ukrainians and Russians pronounced them differently. Once "Little Russians" would learn "in an h o u r " how to pronounce these vowels in the " R u s s i a n " way, they would automatically understand the Russian language. A n d vice versa, Russians could easily teach themselves the Ukrainian language, if they would memorize these differences in pronunciation. The mutual comprehensibility of Ukrainian and Russian was for Didyts'kyi a sure proof that both could develop their own literatures without any harm to their cultural and national unity. Their philological differences did not matter as long as they kept to the Church Slavonic Cyrillic alphabet. In that sense the "philological" definition of a nation became even narrower than the one developed by the Ruthenian Triad: now the main criterion was not a language, but the characters in which it was written and the way they were p r o n o u n c e d . Didyts'kyi came to these conclusions based on his own experience. H e was born in a R u t h e n i a n priest's family, and he and his twin-brother were baptized as Theodosii and Antionii, in honor of two Kyiv O r t h o d o x saints. Despite his origins, he was brought up in Polish schools and only learned to read Cyrillic characters at the age of 21, during the 1848 Revolution. Then he made a literary d e b u t in Ruthenian literature as a poet. H e signed his poetry with a pseudonym " B o h d a n , " which was a literary Slavic translation of the G r e e k name "Theodosii." 2 6 Together with another " B o h d a n " (Iakiv Holovats'kyi's brother Ivan), Mykola Ustyianovych and Mykhailo Kossak, they edited the official Halyts'ko-Rus'kyi Vistnyk ('Galician Ruthenian H e r a l d ' ) in 1849. Editing proved to be much harder than writing poetry. The f o r m e r required constant translations of official G e r m a n documents full of abstract terms. A n d these terms were absent in both the R u t h e n i a n vernacular and Church Slavonic. To meet this challenge, Didyts'kyi started to compile a list of terms b o r r o w e d f r o m Ukrainian writings published in the Russian Empire and f r o m Russian, Czech, and Serbian-Croatian vocabularies. H e soon concluded that the Russian vocabulary fits best for such purposes; for 100 words in the Russian vocabulary there were hardly 10 that would not be perfectly understood by Galician R u t h e nians. In 1849 he also met with officers of the Russian Imperial Army, which was crossing Galicia on the way to revolutionary Hungary. In discussions with t h e m ,

Ruslan, Bohdcin and Myron • 103 he discovered "the rule of the four characters" and he gave up his plans to create a literature in a " p e a s a n t " language. 2 7 His new literary idols became Nikolai Gogol and Alexander Pushkin. H e f o u n d their works in the private library of (by then) Professor Holovats'kyi. Both Didyt'skyi and Holovats'kyi were preoccupied with a question put by Pushkin, "Will all the Slavic streams flow into the Russian sea, or will they simply dry u p ? " Didyts'kyi found an answer in the words of Gogol who understood Little Russians and Russians as twin souls that complement each o t h e r and he refused to give priority to one over the other. 2 8 Didyts'kyi was a key figure in the R u t h e n i a n national c a m p f r o m the 1860s to the early 1880s, when it was d o m i n a t e d by the Russophile orientation. In 1861-1871 he edited a leading Ruthenian newspaper Slovo ('the word'), which in 1866 proclaimed the doctrine of cultural unity of the all-Russian nation " f r o m the Carpathians to the Urals." It would be a crude oversimplification, however, to label Didyts'kyi and other Russophiles Russian nationalists. Their position was more n u a n c e d . 2 9 As in Gogol's case, 30 Didyts'kyi never wanted Ukrainians to be assimilated into the all-Russian culture. Quite to the contrary, he envisaged the strength and vitality of the latter in preserving elements of different ethnic cultures, both Ukrainian and Russian. A guarantee for such coexistence was, to his mind, the preservation of the Church Slavonic characters. For these ends he fought against the introduction of Latin characters into Ruthenian publications (1851-1859), and against a simpler Cyrillic alphabet (so-called phonetyka) that would render more explicitly the Ukrainian character of the Ruthenian language. H e succeeded in the former, but he lost in the latter, for in 1892 phonetyka was introduced into the Galician school curriculum. Until the very end of his life he considered it his personal tragedy since phonetyka sealed the victory of the Galician "Ukrainian separatists" over his beloved all-Ruthenian project.

MYRON

O n e of the first literary critics who drew attention to the Ukrainian origins of Pushkin's "Rusalka" was Ivan Franko (1856-1916), a leading Galician Ruthenian/Ukrainian intellectual. 3 1 Like Shashkevych he also used Ruslan as his pseudonym. But it did not have such a profound meaning for him as for his famous forebear; he used it very sporadically and for a very short period of time (1879-1883). 3 2 Differences in usage of this pseudonym between Shashkevych and Franko— deeply symbolic and profoundly affectionate for the f o r m e r and sporadic for the latter—reflected, to a large extent, the dynamics of the R u t h e n i a n / U k r a i n i a n nationalism in Austrian Galicia, its shifts to new narrative strategies and new symbols, as it evolved into a mass movement. While Shashkevych's production was aimed at Ruthenian literati, who like him were basically Greek-Catholic priests, Franko wrote for new mass readers, secular intellectuals and literate peasants.

104 • Iaroslav

Hrytsak

T h e c o n t e n t of w h a t w a s p r o d u c e d a n d w h a t was r e a d had c h a n g e d too. W h e n F r a n k o r e a d " R u s a l k a D n i s t r o v a " in t h e 1870s, he hardly u n d e r s t o o d it, and its idea s e e m e d to him very v a g u e a n d u n a r t i c u l a t e d . 3 3 A c c o r d i n g to F r a n k o , Shashk e v y c h ' s literary p r o d u c t i o n w a s r e v o l u t i o n a r y only to t h e e x t e n t t h a t it introd u c e d t h e " p e a s a n t " l a n g u a g e i n t o " h i g h " l i t e r a t u r e . 3 4 F r a n k o ' s activity was r e v o l u t i o n a r y in m a n y m o r e ways: h e w a s a socialist and an a t h e i s t , a h e r a l d of f e m i n i s m a n d " f r e e love." H e w a s b r o u g h t to trial a n d jailed several times. F r a n k o ' s f r e q u e n t use of p s e u d o n y m s was an efficient way to b r e a k t h r o u g h c e n s o r ship. A n d while F r a n k o w a s t h e first R u t h e n i a n intellectual w h o lived totally by t h e p e n , h i d i n g his i d e n t i t y b e h i n d p s e u d o n y m s was f o r him, to a large e x t e n t , an issue of survival. F r a n k o ' s f a v o r i t e p s e u d o n y m ( u s e d in 178 o u t of the 337 k n o w n cases) was " M y r o n . " 3 5 C o n t r a r y t o " R u s l a n " b u t like " B o h d a n , " " M y r o n " was a " n a t u r a l , " n o t i n v e n t e d n a m e . It w a s t h e n a m e of a C h r i s t i a n m a r t y r a n d w a s listed in t h e C h r i s t i a n c a l e n d a r u n d e r 7 A u g u s t (old style, respectively 20 A u g u s t , n e w style). 3 6 In a t r a d i t i o n a l C h r i s t i a n s o c i e t y — a n d F r a n k o was b o r n in a village in t h e C a r p a t h i a n region t h a t w a s very t r a d i t i o n a l — t h e C h u r c h c a l e n d a r p r e d e t e r m i n e d a choice of n a m e f o r a n e w b o r n child. If a b o y was b o r n , say, f e w d a y s b e f o r e o r a f t e r t h e Saint D y m y t r i i f e a s t d a y (8 N o v e m b e r ) , he most likely w o u l d be b a p tized as " D y m y t r i i . " It w a s b e l i e v e d t h a t a child " b r o u g h t a n a m e with himself." Since F r a n k o was b o r n o n 27 A u g u s t 1856, it might be e x p e c t e d t h a t h e w o u l d b e given t h e n a m e " M y r o n . " F r a n k o w r o t e a s e r i e s of allegedly a u t o b i o g r a p h i c a l stories a b o u t "little M y r o n , " a small village b o y w h o he claimed was called t h a t n a m e by his p a r e n t s .

37

H e r e is w h e r e t h e m y s t e r y begins. A c c o r d i n g to an entry in t h e c h u r c h register of his n a t i v e village, F r a n k o w a s b a p t i z e d as " I v a n " and was given n o s e c o n d n a m e . M o r e o v e r , the c h u r c h register d o e s n o t c o n t a i n any e x a m p l e of a child w h o w a s b a p t i z e d " M y r o n " in t h e village d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d of 1848-1864. 3 8 O n e e x p l a n a t i o n is t h a t children b o r n in w e d l o c k w e r e b a p t i z e d with t h e n a m e of t h e C h r i s t i a n saint t h a t s t o o d at t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e C h u r c h c a l e n d a r f o r any given day while illegiti m a t e c h i l d r e n w e r e given n a m e s f r o m t h e very e n d of each c a l e n d a r entry, i.e., n a m e s of little k n o w n s a i n t s . 3 9 " M y r o n " certainly b e l o n g e d to t h e l a t t e r g r o u p . W h y w o u l d F r a n k o ' s p a r e n t s call h i m by such a s t r a n g e n a m e ? A c c o r d i n g t o o n e hypothesis, it h a d to d o with a special history s u r r o u n d i n g his b i r t h . F r a n k o was a

first-born

son in t h e family. For his f a t h e r , it was his s e c o n d m a r r i a g e ; his

first wife d i e d leaving h i m n o c h i l d r e n . H e was a f r a i d to lose his first-born s o n , a n d t h e r e f o r e the family allegedly u s e d a trick t o " c h e a t d e a t h " : if p a r e n t s w e r e a f r a i d of losing t h e i r c h i l d r e n , t h e y c a l l e d t h e m an a l t e r n a t i v e n a m e at h o m e . S u c h a n a m e w a s s u p p o s e d to b e very r a r e o r e v e n a b s e n t in a given village, so d e a t h " c o u l d n o t find t h e child." 4 0 T h i s p r a c t i c e w a s w i d e s p r e a d in t r a d i t i o n a l s o c i e t i e s in E a s t e r n a n d C e n t r a l E u r o p e , but n o n e of t h e n u m e r o u s d o c u m e n t s r e l a t e d t o F r a n k o ' s b i o g r a p h y c o n t a i n a single p r o o f t h a t it was t h e case in his family. Q u i t e to t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e r e is e v i d e n c e t h a t u n d e r m i n e s its credibility. A c c o r d i n g t o

Rustan, Bohdan and Myron • 105 some memoirs, in his native village F r a n k o was called by his first name, "Iasio" (diminutive of "Ivan"). 4 1 T h e r e are good reasons to believe that Franko's choice of " M y r o n " as his p s e u d o n y m was a part and parcel of his attempt to coin "a peasant identity." The n a m e contained a hidden message: as suitable for bastards only, it signified someo n e who by definition was very different f r o m other " n o r m a l " peasant children. A n d the real story of F r a n k o ' s life was very different. Franko was born in a village, but it did not m a k e him a peasant. His family was mixed in a social sense. His f a t h e r was a wealthy village blacksmith, allegedly (as F r a n k o himself believed) of G e r m a n origin. His m o t h e r ' s family belonged to petty nobility. In terms of property size, these impoverished nobles did not differ very much from local peasants. However, they did their best to preserve their social distance f r o m the peasantry, they lived separately, dressed differently, had their own moral code and tended to marry a m o n g themselves or to s o m e o n e they considered equal in social status. 4 2 T h e latter was the case with F r a n k o ' s father. He came f r o m a free peasant family, was a wealthy and respected m e m b e r of the village community, and in this sense was considered a legitimate match for a noble woman. 4 3 Franko's early biography differed radically f r o m traditional patterns of peasant childhood. Peasant children started to work very early, at the age of five to seven and by the age of eight a boy would already be assisting his father in the field.44 Until his father's d e a t h in 1865, F r a n k o never did any physical work. The most distinctive f e a t u r e of Franko's early biography is that from the age of eight in 1864 he went to a school in the neighboring Drohobych, where in 1875 he completed the gymnasium and enrolled in Lviv University. A t that time, such cases among peasant offspring in Austrian Galicia were extremely rare. In the countryside parents were very reluctant to send a child to school for a longer period of time, fearing its undermining effects. H a r d physical work was the absolute core of peasant identity. Peasants looked with contempt at the habits of the privileged classes, including intellectual work, which was to them not work at all. In the peasant worldview, education was a dividing line between " u s " and "them," " L o r d s " were not noblemen only, but represented all educated society in general. In a sense, such peasant attitudes reflected the basic repudiation of m o d e r n culture and educated classes as its bearers. 4 5 As a rule peasants yielded only to pressure f r o m outside, usually by a local priest or teacher, who a t t e m p t e d to persuade parents to send a talented son to a gymnasium. (The idea of female education was non-existent then.) F r a n k o ' s fate was determined by his g r a n d m o t h e r on his m o t h e r ' s side, Ludwika Kulczycka, who took care of her talented grandson. She herself was early widowed, but she managed to provide an education for all of her male children. To this end she took the radical step of selling her land, a behavior alien to peasant attitudes. For peasants, their land was sacred, it was their " m o t h e r / f a t h e r l a n d " that should not and might not be sold, least of all for such purposes as educating children. As his education progressed, F r a n k o felt more and more alienated f r o m his

106 • laroslav

Hrytsak

n a t i v e village. Since he was early o r p h a n e d , he rarely visited it. T h r o u g h his uncle o n his m o t h e r ' s side, a G r e e k - C a t h o l i c priest, he b e c a m e increasingly i n t e g r a t e d into t h e clerical milieu. A t s o m e p o i n t h e fell in love with a n o t h e r priest's d a u g h t e r a n d s p e n t most of his vacations in h e r f a t h e r ' s house. Young F r a n k o was c o n s i d e r e d a very g o o d m a t c h . B e c a u s e of his early r e v e a l e d literary talents, he was e x p e c t e d t o b e c o m e a university o r at least g y m n a s i u m p r o f e s s o r and in that way t o a c q u i r e a s t a b l e position. H e did his best t o m e e t t h e s e expectations, as well as t h e stand a r d s of his new social e n v i r o n m e n t : his p i c t u r e s of that time show him d r e s s e d as a y o u n g dandy, and he c o r r e s p o n d e d with his s w e e t h e a r t in G e r m a n . 4 6 A s a y o u n g writer he e n j o y e d f a m e u n d e r a fancy p s e u d o n y m of " D z h e d z h a l y k . " In that period he was very close to t h e R u s s o p h i l e o r i e n t a t i o n . H e considered writing f o r t h e R u t h e n i a n e d u c a t e d elite only a n d had n o i n t e n t i o n — a s he c o n f e s s e d t o his f r i e n d — t o write "in t h e p e a s a n t way [language] a b o u t p e a s a n t s a n d f o r peasants." 4 7 C h a n g e c a m e d u r i n g his s e c o n d u n i v e r s i t y in 1876, u n d e r t h e influence of Kyiv p r o f e s s o r M y k h a i l o D r a h o m a n o v . In 1875 D r a h o m a n o v had b e e n e x p e l l e d f r o m Kyiv U n i v e r s i t y f o r his p r o - U k r a i n i a n a n d socialist activities. H e l e f t t h e R u s s i a n E m p i r e f o r the West, a n d o n his way to V i e n n a visited Lviv. D r a h o m a n o v was s h o c k e d by t h e p r o v i n c i a l c h a r a c t e r of t h e R u t h e n i a n intellectual life t h e r e a n d s o u g h t to " E u r o p e a n i z e " a n d " U k r a i n i z e " it. A s t h e m a i n agent f o r his plans, h e c h o s e t h e R u t h e n i a n s t u d e n t j o u r n a l Druh, his " T h r e e L e t t e r s t o Druh"

of which F r a n k o was a c o - e d i t o r . In

(1875-1876) D r a h o m a n o v encouraged students to

r e a d as m u c h R u s s i a n l i t e r a t u r e as possible. R u s s i a n realism w o u l d lead t h e m to khlopomania

( ' l o v e f o r p e a s a n t s ' ) a n d khlopomania,

u n d e r c o n t e m p o r a r y cir-

c u m s t a n c e s , was e q u a l to U k r a i n o p h i l i s m . 4 8 T h e " T h r e e L e t t e r s . . . " p r o v o k e d an i n t e l l e c t u a l r e v o l u t i o n within t h e s t u d e n t milieu. F r a n k o ' s f r i e n d , M y k h a i l o Pavlyk, w r o t e to M y k h a i l o D r a h o m a n o v in N o v e m b e r 1876: " N e w i d e a s w o r k s u r r e ptitiously, b u t very p r o f o u n d l y . . . . Y o u w o u l d not r e c o g n i z e F r a n k o . H e w a s a b o u t t o c o m m i t suicide [so a s h a m e d w a s he] of w h a t we w r o t e a n d said b e f o r e . " 4 9 A m o n g t h e R u t h e n i a n s t u d e n t s F r a n k o a n d Pavlyk w e r e t h e m o s t r e s p o n s i v e t o D r a h o m a n o v ' s m e s s a g e . U n d e r his t u t e l a g e t h e y c r e a t e d a n d led a m o v e m e n t t o t u r n y o u n g R u t h e n i a n i n t e l l e c t u a l s i n t o U k r a i n i a n socialists. T h e y led by v i r t u e of b e i n g " p e a s a n t s ' sons," t h o u g h it w a s t r u e only f o r Pavlyk. F r a n k o w a s d i f f e r e n t , b o t h in his origin a n d c u l t u r e , a n d Pavlyk o f t e n castigated h i m f o r "his n o b l e h a b i t s " a n d f o r his c o n n e c t i o n s with t h e clergy, u n w o r t h y of a t r u e socialist. B u t F r a n k o w a s quick t o l e a r n . H e quit using t h e G e r m a n l a n g u a g e in c o r r e s p o n d e n c e with his s w e e t h e a r t . A f t e r his " c o n v e r s i o n , " F r a n k o w r o t e to her: Y o u m a y ask why I w r i t e in R u t h e n i a n now, and n o t in G e r m a n . Well, this is a simple thing. T h e G e r m a n l a n g u a g e is f o r m e a f a s h i o n a b l e suit, w h i c h is o f t e n w o r n by a d a n d y with e m p t y p o c k e t s . A n d t h e R u t h e n i a n l a n g u a g e is f o r m e a b e l o v e d n a t i v e dress, in which e v e r y o n e p r e s e n t s himself t o o t h e r s t h e way he really is, a n d in which I like y o u t h e m o s t ! T h e R u t h e n i a n lang u a g e is t h e l a n g u a g e of my h e a r t !

Rustan, Bohdan and Myron • 107 A later picture of Franko in 1881 testifies that he was true to his words in another sense: his youthful Bohemian dress disappeared and was replaced by an unpret e n t i o u s embroidered shirt, a symbol of Ukrainian peasant culture. 5 0 H e also shed his fancy pseudonym " D z h e d z h a l y k " which he replaced by the peasant-like "Myron." He used this pseudonym for his most inflammatory poetry a n d revolutionary writings. In his autobiographical stories Franko was trying to p e r s u a d e readers that Galician villages were full of " M y r o n s " like him, peasant children endowed with many talents. But in most cases, they were lost because they either did not get any education or gave up their distinctiveness u n d e r the pressure of society. A n d only few—again, like him—managed to persist, and now they were bringing a word of truth " u n d e r the thatched roofs." 5 1 The implication was that once social barriers were removed, there would be a whole nation of "Myrons." In the 1880s and 1890s such an ethos p e r m e a t e d young R u t h e n i a n intellectuals, who like Franko preferred the Ukrainian orientation. Franko became a role model, not so much as a physical "Ivan," but as an imaginary "Myron," as an attractive symbol of self-sacrifice for the noble cause of national and social emancipation of peasants. 5 2 But he was not r e m e m b e r e d this way in his native village and in the neighboring village where his family lived. The local nobility still regarded him as their own, claiming that no peasant son could produce such outstanding literature. On the other hand, some local peasants treated him with scorn and ridicule and considered him insane and punished by G o d for his education and his atheism. 5 3 It took more effort and a longer time until both intellectuals and peasants started to accept F r a n k o as their own. F r a n k o was instrumental in making t h e m both feel "at h o m e " in their newly discovered Ukrainian m o t h e r l a n d . Of special importance was his contribution to the making of the m o d e r n Ukrainian language, as can be seen in interwar U k r a i n i a n vocabulary with its f r e q u e n t q u o t e s f r o m Franko. F r a n k o ' s language m a d e a d e e p impression on intellectuals born " u n d e r thatched roofs." By hearing this language full of abstract terms, they could feel that they were no longer in e m b r o i d e r e d shirts, but in fancy G e r m a n clothes. 5 4 EPILOGUE

In the 1890s Lviv witnessed an emergence of mass R u t h e n i a n / U k r a i n i a n politics. Its debut was the 1893 reburial of Ruslan Markian Shaschkevych, "the most zealous son of Rus'." O n that occasion his mortal remains were brought f r o m a remote village and buried in the Lviv central cemetery. As a correspondent of a Lviv Polish newspaper, Ivan F r a n k o described that event and noticed that never before had Lviv seen so many R u t h e n i a n s (about 10,000 including peasants). 5 5 Five years later, to counteract official celebrations of the 50 th anniversary of Franz Josef's rule, R u t h e n i a n / U k r a i n i a n institutions organized a series of alternative

108 • laroslav

Hrytsak

mass festivities in Lviv: the 25 th anniversary of Franko's literary activity, the 50 th anniversary of the abolishment of serfdom in Galicia, the hundred years of Ukrainian literature, and 250 years of the Ukrainian Cossack uprising led by Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi. 5 6 All of them were heavily attended. A distinguished result of these festivities was that from this time on the Ruthenian camp started to use consistently a new national n a m e — " R u s ' - U k r a i n a " (Ruthenia-Ukraine)—instead of the previous Rus'. 5 7 The 1916 funeral of Ivan Franko was attended by 10,000 people (considering that it occurred in the second year of the war, this was a huge n u m b e r ) . In n u m e r o u s mourning speeches and addresses—some delivered or signed by peasants and peasant communities—Franko was called "the greatest son of Ukraine." 5 8 Bohdan Didyts'kyi had passed away unnoticed and his funeral was a t t e n d e d only by a small group of people. From a perspective of the victorious Ukrainian nationalism (and, respectively, Ukrainian national historiography), he made a wrong choice by shifting f r o m the Ukrainophile to the Russophile orientation. T h e r e f o r e in contemporary Ukrainian Lviv one may find n u m e r o u s signs and symbols which c o m m e m o r a t e F r a n k o and Shashkevych, from the local university n a m e d a f t e r Ivan Franko to a private sewer firm called "Rusalka D n i s t r o v a . " T h e r e is, however, no sign in memory of Bohdan Didyts'kyi. A n d that is no wonder, given the strong anti-Russian resentments in the city that has the image of a stronghold of Ukrainian nationalism. 5 9 CONCLUSIONS

The story of pseudonyms, chosen by the most distinguished representatives of three generations of Galician R u t h e n i a n / U k r a i n i a n nationalists in 1830-1914, can be written so far only on the margins of great national narratives. Yet this marginal story calls for a reconsideration of history writ large. First of all, it u n d e r m i n e s the perspective according to which the history of the Ruthenian victory in forming Ukrainian identity is presented as a contest b e t w e e n pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian orientations. The picture is m o r e n u a n c e d . T h e r e were more options than two, and shifting f r o m one to a n o t h e r was not a "zerosum game." As all t h r e e cases suggest, for a long period of time U k r a i n i a n and Russian orientations were not mutually exclusive. They could be relatively easily reconciled within a broad and vague concept of Rus'. Second, the international context has to be taken into account. Galicia was t h e furthest western region of Rus' where Eastern nationalisms ( U k r a i n i a n , Russian, and, to a large extent, Jewish) were met by Western nationalisms (Polish a n d Austrian G e r m a n ) . In this context, the making of one nation was the u n m a k i n g of another. This point has b e e n vigorously and persuasively m a d e by R o m a n Szporluk. 6 0 What is absent in this scheme, however, is Rus'. Both the " m a k i n g of U k r a i n e " and the "making of Russia" were not only unmaking each other, but they were also " u n m a k i n g of Rus'," which was defined for a long time in pre-national

Ruslcin, Bohdan

and Myron

• 109

t e r m s as a territory of Eastern Slavs, Eastern Christianity and the Church Slavonic language. Eastern nationalisms were n u r t u r e d in this territory in response to challenges m a d e by western nationalisms, the Polish one above all. But many "weste r n i z e d " impulses reached Galicia through a medium of intensive contacts with o t h e r parts of Rus', represented either by St. Petersburg or Kyiv. Finally, " M y r o n " adds a n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t aspect to this history. The explanation for the final result of this quest for identity should not be looked for only in the field of contesting nationalisms. In this contest over group loyalties and identities of Galician Ruthenians, t h e r e was m o r e than one "ism" involved. O t h e r ideologies, and socialism above all, also contributed to the way in which U k r a i n i a n identity triumphed. A social dimension—how to integrate p e a s a n t s into these contested p r o j e c t s — w a s equally significant. T h e r e w e r e leftist U k r a i n i a n activists, like D r a h o m a n o v and Franko, who o p e n e d venues for merging intellectuals and peasants into o n e c o m m o n body. To do so, they had to start speaking "peasant," not only in philological terms, as the R u t h e n i a n Triad had suggested, but in social terms as well. Again, as in the case with nationalism, socialism was a " w e s t e r n " ideology that arrived, to a large extent f r o m the East, as a result of political and intellectual f e r m e n t in the Russian Empire. It is this " b o r d e r l a n d " character of Austrian Galicia that makes studies of this region both so complicated and so fascinating.

Notes 1 Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 107. 2 Idem. 3 Ioann Pachich [Jovan Pa£ic], Foreword to Imenoslov Hi rechnik lichny imena razny naroda slavenski. Skupio Ioann Pacic a latinskim ortografiom izrazio, i primechania dodao Ioann Kollar (Buda: Slovima Kr. Vseucil. Pestanskog, 1828), unnumbered pages. 4 Jan Kollar, Addition to foreword in Pa£ic, Imenoslov. 5 "Rusalka Dnistrova," in F.I. Steblii, O.A. Kupchyn'skyi, et al., eds., Dokumenty i materialy (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1989), 42,46. 6 Poles had 55 percent and Jews made 37 percent. Ruthenians (Ukrainian Rusyny; Polish Rusini; German Ruthenen ), however, made the largest ethnic group in the crownland (46.8 per cent out of 4,290,000 of inhabitants living in Galicia in 1849) and outnumbered Poles (45.9 percent), Jews (6.7 percent) and Germans (0.55 percent). They made an outspoken majority in the twelve eastern Galician districts (71 percent versus 20.4 percent for Poles, 7.9 percent for Jews, 0.6 percent for Germans) that made historical Galicia (i.e., the lands of the twelfth and thirteenth century Ruthenian Galician princedom). 7 "Rusalka Dnistrova," 298. 8 See a censorial decision on the Rus'ka Zoria written by Jernez Kopitar, who himself was a connoisseur of Slavic antiquities. "Rusalka Dnistrova," 52. 9 Josef Safarik believed that their pagan names were one of the main reasons for the punishment of the Ruthenian triad. See his letter to Nikolai Pogodin, 18 July 1837, in "Rusalka Dnistrova," 114.

1 1 0 • laroslav

Hrytsak

10 M. M o r o s h k i n , ed., Slavianskoi imennoslov ili sobranie slavianskikh lichnykh imen v alfavitnom poriadke (St. P e t e r s b u r g : Tip. V t o r o g o o t d e l a s o b s t v e n n o i E.l.V. k a n t s e l a r i i , 1867), 170; N . M . Tupikov, Wörterbuch der altrussischen Personennamen, a f t e r w o r d by E r n s t E i c h l e r ( C o l o g n e : B ö h l a u , 1989), 3 4 2 - 3 4 4 . I I S . Ia. C e r n y k h , Slovar' mariiskikh licnykh imen/Marii Mariiskii g o s u d a r s t v e n n y i u n i v e r s i t e t , 1995), 381.

en him-vlakh

muter

(Ioshkar-Ola:

12 " R u s a l k a D n i s t r o v a , " 247. 13 W. S h c h u r a t , Na dosvitkakh novoidoby (Lviv, 1919), 102. 14 Y e v h e n H u m e n i u k , " S l i d a m y biohrafiv M a r k i a n a S h a s h k e v y c h a , " in Shashkevychiana: Zbirnyk naukovykh prats' (Lviv, W i n n i p e g : I n s t y t u t u k r a i n o z n a v s t v a N A N Ukrai'ny,2001), 3 - 4 : 396-397. I w o u l d like t o t h a n k D r . F e o d o s i j Steblij for d r a w i n g my a t t e n t i o n to this publication. 15 M.V. Biryla, Belarus'kaia antrapanimiia, ( M i n s k : N a u k a i t e k h n i k a , 1982), 10.

vol. 3, Struktura

ulasnykh

muzchinskikh

16 M a r k i a n S h a s h k e v y c h , Tvory (Kyiv: D n i p r o , 1973), 118. 17 B. T i c h o n i u k , Nazwy osobowe w poemacie A. Puszkina 'Ruslan i Ludmila', k o w e Wyzszej Szkoly P e d a g o g i c z n e j w O p o l u . Filologia 28 (1991): 7 3 - 7 6 . antrapanimiia , 106. 18 Biryla. Belarus'kaia

imen

Zeszyty Nau-

19 " P u t e v o d i t e l ' p o P u s h k i n u , " in A l e x a n d r P u s h k i n , Polnoe sobranie sochinenii. (Moscow: V o s k r e s e n i e , 1997), 19: 1253. 20 V. R e t s e p t e r , M. S h e m i a k i n , Vozvrashchenie Pushkinskoi "Rusalki" (St. P e t e r s b u r g : G o s u d a r s t v e n n y i pushkinskii t e a t r a l ' n y i t s e n t r , 1998), 150; "Cavos, C a t t e r i n o A l ' b e r t o v i c h , " in The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians, 2d ed. ( N e w York: G r o v e , 2001), accessed 15 D e c e m b e r 2001, http://www.grovemusic.com/shared/views/article.html. 21 H e r e I a m using t h e s c h e m e t h a t was s u g g e s t e d by J o h n A. A r m s t r o n g , b a s e d on t h e linguistic t h e o r i e s of t h e F r e n c h scholar A n t o i n e M a r t e l . J o h n A r m s t r o n g , " M y t h and H i s t o r y in the E v o l u t i o n of U k r a i n i a n C o n s c i o u s n e s s . " in P e t e r J. Potichnyj, M a r c R a e f f , J a r o s l a w P e l e n s k i , G l e b N. Z e k u n i n , eds., Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter ( E d m o n t o n : C a n a d i a n I n s t i t u t e of U k r a i n i a n S t u d i e s Press, 1992), 129-130. 22 J o h n - P a u l H i m k a , " T h e C o n s t r u c t i o n of N a t i o n a l i t y in Galician R u s ' : I c a r i a n Flights in A l m o s t All D i r e c t i o n s " in R o n a l d G. Suny, M i c h a e l D. K e n n e d y , eds., Intellectuals and the Articulation of the Nation ( A n n A r b o r : U n i v e r s i t y of Michigan Press, 1999), 109-164; I v a n L. R u d n y t s k y , Essays in Modern Ukrainian History ( E d m o n t o n : C a n a d i a n Institute of U k r a i n i a n S t u d i e s Press, 1987), 333-346. 23 Jan Kozik, The Ukrainian National Movement in Galicia: 1815-1849, e d . a n d i n t r o d u c t i o n L a w r e n c e D. O r t o n ( E d m o n t o n : C a n a d i a n I n s t i t u t e of U k r a i n i a n S t u d i e s Press, 1986), 66. 24 K o r n y l o U s t y i a n o v y c h , M.E Raievskii i rosiis'kii panslavizm. Spomynky peredumanoho (Lviv: N a k l a d o m K. B e d n a r s ' k o h o , 1884), 11.

z perezhytoho

i

25 [ B o h d a n D i d y t s ' k y i ] , " V o d i n chas n a u c h y t y s i a M a l o r u s y n u p o v e l y k o r u s k y " (Lviv, 1866). 26 L v i v s ' k a N a u k o v a B i b l i o t e k a imeni Vasylia S t e f a n y k a N A N Ukrainy. Viddil rukopysiv, f. 2, od.zb. 330/2,1. 65ob. 27 See his a u t o b i o g r a p h y Svoiezhittievyie zapiski Bohdana A.Didyts'koho, vol.1, Hde-shcho do istoriisamorozvitiia iazyka i azbuky Halitskoi Rusi (Lviv, 1906), p a s s i m . 28 Svoiezhittievyie zapiski Bohdana A.Didyts'koho, halitskoi Rusi v XIX st. (Lviv, 1908), 17.

vol.2, Vzhliad

na shkolnoe

obrazovan'e

29 For an e x c e l l e n t a n d d e t a i l e d o v e r v i e w of t h e R u s s o p h i l e o r i e n t a t i o n s e e A n n a V e r o n i k a W e n d l a n d , Die Russophilen in Galizien. Ukrainische Konservative zwischen Österreich und Russland, 1848-1915 ( V i e n n a : Ö s t e r r e i c h i s c h e A k a d e m i e d e r W i s s e n s c h a f t e n , 2001). 30 G e o r g e S.N. L u c k y j , Between Gogol' and 1798-1847 ( M u n i c h : W. Fink, 1971), 123. 31 Ivan F r a n k o , Zibrannia

tvoriv,

Sevcenko.

Polarity

in the Literary

50 vols. (Kyiv: N a u k o v a d u m k a , 1978), 11: 286.

Ukraine,

Notes

-111

32 Ivan Franko, Bibliohrafiia tvoriv. 1874-1964. Sklav M.O. Moroz (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1966), 439-440. 33 Ivan Franko, Zibrannia tvoriv, 49: 243. 34 Ivan Franko, Zibrannia tvoriv, 26: 89-93. 35 Ivan Franko, Bibliohrafiia tvoriv, 439-440. The bibliography does not, however, provide the n u m b e r of the cases when Ivan Franko was using cryptonyms I F., I.Fr., Iw.Fr. 36 Mesiatseslov v pozdravlenie uhors'kykh rusynov na hod 1857 (Lviv, 1856); Mesiatseslov hospodarskii L'vovskii na hod 1857 (Lviv, 1856). 37 They were published in a separate collection. Ivan Franko, Halyts'ki obrazky, 1st ed. (Lviv, 1885), and then were republished several times. 38 Tsentralnyi Derzhavnyi Istorychnyi Arkhiv (Lviv), f. 201, op. 4-a, od.zber. 4024,1. 37. 39 Yaroslav Hrytsak, "History of Names: A Case of Constructing a National Historical Memory in Galicia, 1830-1930." Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropa 49 (2001) : 171-172. 40 R o m a n Horak, "Lehendy pro narodzhennia Ivana Franka," Literaturna Ukraina 30 (August 2001). 41 Vasyl Stefanyk, Vybrane (Uzhhorod: Karpaty, 1979), 231,237. 42 Krzysztof Slusarek, Wloscianscy i niewloscianscy mieszkancy wsi galicyjskiej w XIX wieku. Wzajemne relacje, Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagielloriskiego, Prace Historyczne 126 (1999): 118,122. 43 Ivan Nehrebets'kyj, " D o rodovodu Ivana Franka," Literaturno-naukovyj vistnyk 90, nos. 7 - 8 (1926): 233. 44 R o m a n Chmelyk, Mala ukrains'ka selians'ka simia druhoi polovyny XIX-pochatku XXst. (Lviv: Institut narodoznavstva N A N Ukrainy, 1999), 104-105. 45 Leonid Heretz, "Russian Apocalypse, 1891-1917: Popular Perceptions of Events from the Year of Famine and Cholera to the Fall of the Tsar" (Ph.D. diss. Harvard University, 1993), 184-186; Zenon Pelens'kyj, "Mizh dvoma konechnostiamy. Prychynok do sotsiolohii ukrains'koho nacional'no-vyzvol'noho revoluciinoho rukhu v Zakhidnii Ukraini mizh oboma svitovymy voinamy," in Yevhen Konovalets' ta ioho doba (Munich: Fundatsiia Yevhena Konovalets'ia, 1974), 513-516; Yu.P. Prysiazhniuk, "Mental'nist' ukrajins'koho selianstva v umovakh kapitalistychnoi transformacii suspil'stva (druha polovyna X I X - p o c h a t o k XX st.)," Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal 3 (1999): 25-27. 46 I.P. Slups'kyi, ed., Ivan Franko. Dokumentalni fotohrafii, 2d and rev. ed. (n.d., n.p. [Lviv: Kameniar, 1971]), 23,25. 47 Perepyska Mykhaila Drahomanova z Mykhailom Pavlykom (1876-1895), vol. 2,1876-1878 (Chernivtsi, 1910), 96. 48 For more details see John-Paul Himka, Socialism in Galicia. The Emergence of Polish Social Democracy and Ukrainian Radicalism, 1860-1890 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 46-56. 49 Perepyska, 2: 26. 50 I.P. Slups'kyi, Ivan Franko, 27. 51 Franko, Halyts'ki obrazky, passim. 52 Uliana Kravchenko, Pamiati druha. Virshi v prozi, statti, spohady, lysty (Lviv: Kameniar, 1996), passim; Instytut literatury imeni Tarasa Shevchenka NAN Ukrainy, f. 3, od.zb. 1603, 11. 111-113. 53 Ivan Kobylets'kyi, " D e s h c h o pro Ivana Franka," in M. Hnatiuk, ed., Spohady pro Ivana Franka (Lviv: Kameniar, 1997), 41. 54 Iurii Sherekh, lurii Shevelov: Vnesok Halychyny vu formuvannia ukrains'koi literaturnoi movy (Lviv-New York: Naukove tovarystvo imeni Shevchenka, 1996). 55 [Ivan Franko], "Pogrzeb popiolów sp. Marciana Szaszkewicza," Kurjer Lwowski 304 (2 N o v e m b e r 1893): 2; " Z pogrzebu Szaszkewicza," Kurjer Lwowski 305 (3 N o v e m b e r 1893): 3.

112- lar osla v Hrytsak 56 M y k h a i l o H r u s h e v s ' k y ¡ . " A p o s t o l o v i p r a t s i , " in M y k h a i l o H n a t i u k . ed., Spohady Franka (Lviv: K a m e n i a r , 1997), 214-215.

pro

¡vana

57 For d e t a i l s see t h e very i n f o r m a t i v e t h o u g h slightly biased b o o k I e v h e n N a k o n e c h n y i , Ukradene im'ia. Chomu rusyny staly ukraintsiamy (Lviv: Institut u k r a d ' n o z n a v s t v a i m e n i K r y p ' i a k e v y c h a N A N U k r a i n y , 2001), p a s s i m . 58 M y k h a i l o V o z n i a k , Pamiaty Ivana Franka: Soiuz vyzvolenia U k r a i n y , 1916), passim.

Opys zhyttia,

diial'nosty

i pokhoronu

59 S e e my "Lviv: A M u l t i c u l t u r a l H i s t o r y t h r o u g h the C e n t u r i e s , " Harvard 24, nos. 1/4 (2002).

Ukrainian

(Vienna: Studies

60 R o m a n S z p o r l u k , " U k r a i n e : F r o m an I m p e r i a l P e r i p h e r y to a Sovereign State," Daedalus. Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Science 126, no. 3 ( S u m m e r 1997): 8 5 - 1 1 9 .

From Elisavetgrad to Broadway: The Strange Odyssey of Iakov Gordin JOHN

KLIER

It is doubtful that the crowds that made Mirele Efros one of the most popular dramas on the Yiddish stage at the turn of the century were aware of the colorful past of its author, I.M. Gordin. They might have been surprised to learn that the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs had ordered that, should Gordin appear at any Russian border crossing, he was to be immediately arrested and dispatched to St. Petersburg. What was the dark secret of Gordin's early career? Was he a revolutionary terrorist or master criminal? Surprisingly, Gordin's road to notoriety led along the path of religious reform. This article will explore the transformation of a would-be reformer of Russian Jewry into a target of the Russian secret police. It will offer the portrait of a man who, having achieved notoriety in both Russian and Jewish circles as a would-be religious reformer, achieved his most lasting fame in America as a reformer of quite a different sort: of the modern Yiddish stage. Religious reform was an integral part of the so-called "Jewish Question" in Russia, which was itself a transplantation into Russia of the attitudes towards the Jews that evolved in European Enlightenment thought. 1 Drawing on E u r o p e a n conceptions of the Jews, Russian officials divided the Jewish Question into two components, religious and socio-economic. (There was some disagreement as to which component deserved priority and the extent to which they were innate to Jews and Judaism, or environmental, the product of centuries of persecution.) The former was characterized as "religious fanaticism," through which Jews considered themselves a "chosen people," superior to all the other nations of the earth. It was exemplified and codified by the dictates of the Talmud, which demanded that the Jews keep themselves apart from the non-Jewish goyim, to whom they owed no moral duties or respect. Out of these feelings of superiority and exclusiveness arose "economic exploitation." The Jews felt no moral restraint against cheating and despoiling the goyim, through a parasitic existence at the non-Jews' expense. Thus, the typical Jewish occupations were petty trade and huckstering, and pursuits that ^relied on human weakness, such as tavern keeping and usury. The solution to the Jewish Question was to wean the Jews away from their tal-

114 • John Klier mudic fanaticism, while turning them to "productive" economic endeavors, especially agriculture. A t least some of these assumptions were to be found in the Haskalah, the Jewish variant of the E u r o p e a n - w i d e Enlightenment movement. Many of the maskilim, as the p r o p o n e n t s of the Haskalah were called, sought to strip away the centuries-old accretions of superstition and fanaticism which persecution had encouraged, and recover the "pure core of the Mosaic belief." This had the added virtue, for its proponents, of being m o r e "rational" and closer to the Enlightenment ideals of "Natural Religion." While the maskilim attributed their co-religionists' undesirable economic pursuits to medieval persecution, they nonetheless strongly c o n d e m n e d them and argued for policies that would m a k e the Jews more productive. In Eastern E u r o p e , the maskilim were the special foes of the Hasidim, followers of the Jewish revivalist m o v e m e n t , Hasidism, associated with Israel Baal Shem Tov and his followers. 2 By the last q u a r t e r of the nineteenth century, therefore, there was already a tradition of debate, especially in the Jewish press, over the need for the religious reform of Judaism paralleling, but not identical with, non-Jewish Russian critiques of Jewish religious and socio-economic life. Indeed, given their isolation amidst the numerically superior community of Jewish traditionalists, religious r e f o r m e r s were almost totally d e p e n d e n t upon the Jewish press to disseminate their views. What was unique about the reform movements of the 1880s, including Iakov Gordin's, was that they were also widely r e p o r t e d and c o m m e n t e d upon by the Russian press. Iakov Mikhailovich Gordin (Jacob G o r d i n ) was born in Mirgorod, Poltava province, in 1853, and died in New York City in 1909. He was educated according to maskilic principles, and in the 1870s began to publish sketches drawn f r o m Jewish life in the liberal and Judeophile Russian press. Gordin developed a personal philosophy that led him to attempt a reform of Judaism following rationalistic and ethical-social principles. His prescriptions for change were very much a reflection of ideas that were in the air. H e stressed the need for physical labor by Jews, himself included, as an essential ingredient for personal self-development. G o r d i n attempted to p r o p a g a t e these ideas through the establishment, in the city of Elisavetgrad, of a fellowship which he named the "Spiritual Biblical B r o t h e r h o o d " ( D u k h o v n o - B i b l e i s k o e Bratstvo) in January of 1880. 3 "The core of pure Mosaic belief" and productive labor—in m o r e normal times Gordin might have expected a hearty welcome for his movement f r o m the side of " e n l i g h t e n e d " Jewish opinion, as r e p r e s e n t e d by the Russian-language Jewish press. 4 A n d indeed, the first reports in the Jewish press were generally favorable. But these were not normal times. On 1 March 1881, members of the revolutionary terrorist group, the People's Will (Narodnaia volia), assassinated E m p e r o r A l e x a n d e r II. In the confused weeks and months that followed, there were a n u m ber of o u t b r e a k s of popular disorder, including a wave of anti-Jewish violence, the pogroms, which began in mid-April 1881 and persisted sporadically until the fall of 1882. 5 The pogroms have rightly been seen as a major turning point in m o d e r n

From Elisavetgrad

to Broadway

• 115

J e w i s h history. W h i l e they did n o t e n t i r e l y discredit a liberal ideology that envision e d t h e g r a d u a l e m a n c i p a t i o n of R u s s i a n Jewry, as h a s o f t e n b e e n c l a i m e d in t h e s e c o n d a r y l i t e r a t u r e , they did give rise to n e w political i d e o l o g i e s a m o n g t h e J e w s of E a s t e r n E u r o p e , m o s t n o t a b l y t h e p r o t o - Z i o n i s t m o v e m e n t of H o v e v e - Z i o n ( t h e L o v e r s of Z i o n ) a n d distinctively Jewish f o r m s of socialism, c u l m i n a t i n g in t h e B u n d . 6 T h e m o v e m e n t of G o r d i n a n d his c o l l a b o r a t o r s has b e e n d i s m i s s e d by m o s t h i s t o r i a n s of R u s s i a n Jewry as u n i m p o r t a n t a n d i r r e l e v a n t , d e s p i t e t h e m o m e n t a r y s t o r m t h a t they raised. N o n e t h e l e s s , given t h e ferocity of t h e p o l e m i c t h a t s u r r o u n d e d t h e r e f o r m e r s , their m o v e m e n t s a r e w o r t h a closer e x a m i n a t i o n . T h e first p o g r o m of 1881 o c c u r r e d o n 15-17 A p r i l in E l i s a v e t g r a d , K h e r s o n p r o v i n c e , t h e b i r t h p l a c e of t h e Spiritual Biblical B r o t h e r h o o d [SBB]. G o r d i n ' s r e s p o n s e m u s t b e v i e w e d against t h e b a c k g r o u n d of t h e press d e b a t e s o v e r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r this first p o g r o m , a n d t h o s e t h a t f o l l o w e d it. J u d e o p h o b e s w e r e q u i c k t o p l a c e t h e b l a m e on t h e Jews t h e m s e l v e s . It w a s Jewish e x p l o i t a t i o n , t h e y c l a i m e d , t h a t d r o v e t h e p e a s a n t s , r u i n e d by Jewish u s u r y a n d t a v e r n k e e p i n g , t o r e s p o n d in t h e only way they knew. W h i l e o n e could n o t t o l e r a t e such p r i m i t i v e , p o p u l a r v e n g e a n c e , it was e n t i r e l y c o m p r e h e n s i b l e . Jewish publicists initially s o u g h t to c o u n t e r such claims by a t t r i b u t i n g t h e p o g r o m s t o r e v o l u t i o n a r y agitat i o n , a i m e d at w e a k e n i n g p u b l i c o r d e r , a n d s u b s e q u e n t l y by b l a m i n g t h e r e s t r i c t ed legal p o s i t i o n of t h e Jews, which p l a c e d t h e m o u t s i d e the p r o t e c t i o n of t h e law in t h e e y e s of t h e " d a r k masses." 7 In early J u n e of 1881, as p o g r o m s e r u p t e d s p o r a d i c a l l y across U k r a i n e , G o r d i n p u b l i s h e d a m a n i f e s t o in the n a m e of t h e B r o t h e r h o o d in t h e K h a r k o v n e w s p a p e r Iuzhnyi

krai, which a p p e a r e d to a c c e p t t h e J u d e o p h o b e side of t h e a r g u m e n t .

G o r d i n l a m e n t e d t h a t " w e Jews h a v e a m o r a l illness, which c a u s e s g r e a t e r s o r r o w , t o r m e n t a n d s u f f e r i n g t h a n t h e w o r s t physical m i s f o r t u n e : o u r b a d h a b i t s t h a t h a v e t a k e n r o o t d e e p l y in o u r life." H o w was it possible, he a s k e d , t h a t in t h e a f t e r m a t h of b r u t a l i t y such as t h e p o g r o m s , n o b o d y s y m p a t h i z e d with t h e J e w s o r o f f e r e d t h e m a s s i s t a n c e ? W h y w e r e all s t r a t a of R u s s i a n society u n i t e d a g a i n s t t h e J e w s ? Jewish a p o l o g i s t s p r e f e r r e d t o a t t r i b u t e such hostility t o religious p r e j u d i c e . T h e f a u l t actually lay with t h e Jews t h e m s e l v e s . " O u r g r e e d , insatiability, cove t o u s n e s s , cupidity, o u r p e r s i s t e n c e , p u s h i n e s s , o u r e x t r e m e willingness t o

flaunt,

o u r e x t r a v a g a n c e , o u r slavish a n d s t u p i d i m i t a t i o n of p r o u d a n d u n b r i d l e d R u s sian h a u g h t i n e s s , o u r usury, t a v e r n - k e e p i n g , h u c k s t e r i n g , a n d similar s h o r t c o m i n g s p r o v o k e t h e R u s s i a n p e o p l e against us, stirring u p t h e envy of t h e m e r c h a n t a n d t h e c o n t e m p t of t h e n o b l e . " G o r d i n u r g e d J e w s t o r e j e c t d i s h o n o r a b l e u n d e r t a k ings such as u s u r y a n d t a v e r n k e e p i n g , a n d to i m i t a t e t h e r e f o r m e d e c o n o m i c a n d spiritual life p i o n e e r e d by t h e B r o t h e r h o o d . " C o m e to us, b e l o v e d b r o t h e r s , c o m e ! . . . I m p a t i e n t l y a w a i t i n g you is a s p i r i t u a l f a m i l y w h o a r e g o o d , s y m p a t h e t i c a n d r e s p o n s i v e . . . . W e love you w a r m l y a n d deeply, a l t h o u g h s o m e t i m e s we tell you the bitter truth."8 T h i s b r o a d s i d e p r o v o k e d a s t o r m of c o n t r o v e r s y in the press. G o r d i n ' s " c o m ing o u t " as a s t r o n g critic of t r a d i t i o n a l J u d a i s m m a y h a v e given c o n f i d e n c e t o o t h -

116- John Klier ers to take a similar stand in public. In Odessa, a young teacher at a state Jewish school, Iakov Priluker, used the local press to announce the foundation of another reform group, "New Israel." 9 The movement claimed to base itself on the rational principles of the Mosaic Law. It sought to reform contemporary Jewry, turn Jews into "productive and useful sons of the Fatherland," and to ease their rapprochement with the Christian population. Priluker presented a list of fifteen essential dogmas. They were a naive blend of serious concerns and ludicrous trivialities, and might be contrasted with the greater simplicity of Gordin's approach. 1 0 1. Rejection of Talmudic interpretations of the Pentateuch. 2. Designation of Sunday as the Sabbath. 3. Rejection of the rite of circumcision. 4. Compilation of a r e f o r m e d prayer book written in Hebrew. 5. Renaming "shuls" as "churches." 6. Acceptance of a printed Torah which fully spelt the n a m e of G o d . 7. A b a n d o n m e n t of the dietary rules of kashrut. 8. Celebration of all (non-Talmudic) Jewish holidays. 9. Obligation to learn and use the Russian language. 10. Obligation to obey all state laws, including those on military service. 11. Members forbidden to practice usury or keep houses of prostitution. 12. Request official recognition of the sect. 13. U p o n formal recognition of the sect, all members obliged to name their first-born children either A l e x a n d e r or Alexandria. 14. Request for the grant of full civil rights and official approval of mixed marriages. 15. So that they might be fully distinguished from rabbinical Jews, all m e m b e r s to be allowed to wear a distinguishing mark. 1 1 Priluker's doctrines were essentially a point by point accommodation of the criticisms of Jews and Judaism (especially the Talmud) made by Russian J u d e o phobes. They would have reduced the core of Judaism to the P e n t a t e u c h , while eliminating virtually every aspect that differentiated Jews from Christians. R a t h e r than "reform," these doctrines suggested the repudiation of Judaism. Priluker was motivated by the open desire—which many critics saw as p r e m a t u r e and u n s e e m ly—of securing special privileges and rights for his sect. Priluker followed the succès de scandal occasioned by the a p p e a r a n c e of this article with the publication of a pamphlet, issued under the p s e u d o n y m of " E m m a n u e l Ben-Sion," entitled "Jewish R e f o r m e r s " ( E v r e i - R e f o r m a t o r y ) } 2 T h e historian of the Jewish press Yehuda Slutsky characterized "Jewish R e f o r m e r s " as a "violent attack on the Talmud and traditional Judaism, thus supplying material for antisemitic propaganda." 1 3 W h a t e v e r the uses to which the p a m p h l e t might ultimately have been put, it may fairly be characterized as an a t t e m p t to o f f e r a balanced discussion of the p o g r o m s and a more serious, albeit hostile, analysis

From Elisavetgrad to Broadway • 117 of rabbinical Judaism. Priluker adopted the curious literary device of posing as a n e u t r a l observer of the movement, thus allowing himself to conduct a discussion with '"Mr. Priluker" (i.e., himself) as a separate person. He also criticized several of t h e very dogmas that he had promulgated in Odesskii listok, specifically numbers f o u r t e e n and fifteen. The pamphlet was a convenient compendium of the beliefs of the two sects and was extensively reviewed in the Russian press, including a discussion by Iakov Gordin. 1 4 This first meeting of the two reformers, if only in a n e w s p a p e r , was significant, since Priluker's much smaller movement eventually m e r g e d with the Spiritual Biblical B r o t h e r h o o d in 1883. 1 5 Given the events that touched on the status of the Jews in Russia after 1881, including the pogroms themselves, the d e b a t e over their causes, the committees c o n v o k e d in every province to report on the Jews, and the behind-doors maneuvering which preceded the publication of the notorious May Laws, it might at first sight a p p e a r astonishing that so much attention was devoted to a few tiny reform m o v e m e n t s in the midst of a religious minority. A closer look reveals that all comm e n t a t o r s used their discussion to support their own particular vision of the best way to resolve the Jewish Question, or to score points against polemical rivals. T h e close attention paid by the Jewish press was perhaps most understandable, given the long-standing interest of acculturated Jews in the question of religious reform. Indeed, the Jewish press was generally welcoming to Gordin's m o v e m e n t in 1880 and early 1881. 16 Their editorial tone sharpened considerably after G o r din's i n t e m p e r a t e post-pogrom attack on the Jews. The Jewish press treated it as a virtual declaration of war, and the Hebrew-language Hamelits called for the B r o t h e r h o o d ' s "moral death." 1 7 A Russkii Evrei editorial described G o r d i n ' s letter as "filled with banal phrases, like those teeming in Kievlianin [a leading J u d e o p h o b e newspaper] editorials; this is simply a cloying morality, taken out on lease." T h e anti-Talmudic rhetoric of the B r o t h e r h o o d was calculated only to gain the support of "a certain kind of newspaper." These anti-Talmudists were either fools or rogues. 1 8 For Rassvet, G o r d i n ' s statements were the "prologue and epilogue" of the pogroms, which the B r o t h e r h o o d was happy to manipulate for its own purposes. G o r d i n ' s rhetoric was dismissed as "arrogant and superior." 19 The columns of both newspapers carried letters from Elisavetgrad, which blackened the activities and motives of the B r o t h e r h o o d . R u m o r s circulated that all the Brothers were kulaks, 2 0 that they had participated in the pogroms, or that G o r d i n was a m e m b e r of a committee that had been organized to assist the families of arrested pogromshchiki,21 For A. Landau, the editor of Voskhod, "these saviours of the Jews have nothing but a flashy nickname, u n d e r which is concealed flashy, high-blown phrases, disguising moral and intellectual emptiness." It was indeed a strange religious sect, he noted, that propagated its religious beliefs through the periodical press, rather than through sermons, preaching, or even the example of a good life. 22 The liberal and m o d e r a t e Russian press, such as the Russkii vedomosti, were sceptical that the sectarians could have a beneficial effect on the Jewish c o m m u -

118 John Klier nity as a whole. M.M. Filippov, writing in Vek in July of 1882, dismissed the potential of an " i m m a t u r e rationalist" like Gordin, who was too learned for the masses and too much the a m a t e u r for the intelligentsia. Golos doubted that "the type of dishes one eats f r o m is the key to the Jewish Question." 2 3 The J u d e o p h o b e press, in contrast, greeted the sectarians with glee. Novoe vremia praised the B r o t h e r h o o d as "more important than all the commissions and committees on the Jewish Question," since it offered the promise of a truly radical solution. The sectarians, with their criticisms of the Talmud, were only confirming what the J u d e o p h o b e s had been saying for years. As Odesskii vestnik headlined an article of 21 January 1882, which was a description of the SBB by one of its members, "The Jews Themselves Recognize the Necessity of Regeneration and Self-Development." Volyn, with Gordin rather than Priluker in mind, a p p l a u d e d the announced intentions of the sectarians to achieve internal r e f o r m before they d e m a n d e d full civil rights, contradicting the Judeophile position that discriminatory legislation was itself the major factor underlying the Jewish Question. A magazine affiliated with the Russian O r t h o d o x Church, TserkovnoObshchestvennyi vestnik, presented a four-part review of Ben-Sion's "Jewish Reformers," using the occasion to chronicle all the alleged faults of the Jews which r e n d e r e d reform a necessary prelude to any sort of Jewish emancipation. The ultimate problem, the author a n n o u n c e d , was that, due to the Talmud, "the basic principles of their lives make the Jews our enemies." 2 4 Literary Judeophobes discovered, in the public debate over the sectarians, a cudgel with which to beat one of their favorite targets, the Russian-Jewish intelligentsia. O n e of the distinctive shifts in Russian Judeophobia that occurred during the R e f o r m Era in Russia (1855-1881) was the relocation of the essence of the Jewish Question from the Jewish masses to the Jewish intelligentsia. Russian critics of the Jews and the Russian-Jewish intelligentsia 2 5 had once shared a consensus that the Jewish masses were backward and fanatical, engaged in occupations, such as usury and tavern keeping, which d e p e n d e d on human weakness. The Jewish Question would be resolved by acculturation and economic r e f o r m (to which agenda the Jewish intelligentsia a d d e d the abolition of the Pale of Settlement). 2 6 A parting of the ways had c o m e at the end of the 1860s, when J u d e o p h o b e s rallied to the ideas of the Jewish renegade, Iakov B r a f m a n . B r a f m a n claimed that the Jewish masses were so difficult to reform because they were held in thrall by a secret, universal Jewish g o v e r n m e n t , the kahal. The kahal was dominated by the communal oligarchy that used the precepts of the Talmud t o justify exploitation of the Christian peasantry. Only the abolition of the kahal could resolve the Jewish Question. 2 7 When the Russian-Jewish intelligentsia r e f u s e d to confirm B r a f m a n ' s fantasies, they were c o n d e m n e d as "agents of the kahal." The d e b a t e over the sectarians allowed J u d e o p h o b e s to reprise this t h e m e . T h e Jewish sectarians and their supporters led the way. The veteran Jewish critic of traditional Judaism, V. Portugalov, c o n d e m n e d the Jewish press for "closing its eyes b e f o r e the true but bitter reality, b e f o r e the imperfect moral physiognomy of

From Elisavetgrad to Broadway -119 Russian Jewry." 2 8 Priluker, writing under his Ben-Sion pseudonym in Nedelia, d e n o u n c e d his critics in the Jewish press as m o d e r n Pharisees who hurled libellous falsehoods at the sectarians. G o r d i n also writing in Nedelia, portrayed Jewish journalists as a clique that was completely unsympathetic to the interests of the Jewish masses, and intent only on pandering to their subscribers. 2 9 The J u d e o p h o b e press was quick to develop this theme. Nedelia, which had earlier in 1880 published an article by Portugalov in which he c o n d e m n e d the Jewish press as "slaves of the Jewish bourgeoisie," asked rhetorically in 1882 why the Jewish press was so hostile to the r e f o r m e r s ? A f t e r all, they were merely implementing r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s which Jewish journalists had b e e n making for years. 3 0 Istoricheskii vestnik took an early interest in the Spiritual Biblical Brot h e r h o o d and urged its readers to peruse closely the p a m p h l e t of Ben-Sion. The Jewish intelligentsia now stood in opposition to these reformers, a situation which clearly revealed the hopelessness of relying upon the f o r m e r to bring any changes to the life of the Jewish masses. 31 The J u d e o p h o b e Russkii kurer complained that the Jewish intelligentsia "sows not peace but hostility between them [the Jews] and Russians." A subsequent article observed that since the Jewish intelligentsia had b e e n brought up on Russian literature and journalism, they had to be aware of t h e importance of self-criticism. Even the haughty Poles were now willing to admit that their national decline could not be blamed solely on outsiders. Yet educated Jews continued to insist that they would never criticize their own people until they had been given full civil rights. Russkii kurer declared itself in favor of greater rights, but rejected the Jewish failure to be self-critical. "The sun has spots. T h e Jews have shortcomings. ...It follows that the more attentive and objective of the Jews should examine the more crying of their shortcomings which stand b e t w e e n them and the local population in areas where they live." Their persistent failure to do so was a serious obstacle to the ultimate resolution of the Jewish Question. 3 2 T h e subsequent fate of the diverse reform m o v e m e n t s is as fascinating as the polemics they aroused in 1881-82. The m o v e m e n t of Rabinovich 3 3 remained in the public eye most consistently since it held out the illusory promise of the mass conversion of Russian Jewry to Christianity, and was widely trailed by the conservative and religious press. As n o t e d above, the small New Israel group of O d e s s a d i s a p p e a r e d a f t e r its merger with the Spiritual Biblical B r o t h e r h o o d in 1883. D u r i n g the period of the press d e b a t e s G o r d i n had been attempting to put his beliefs into practice by establishing a small agricultural c o m m u n e in the countryside. A n u m b e r of the Brothers joined the post-pogrom emigration m o v e m e n t to A m e r i c a , with the intention of taking up farming there. In 1884, G o r d i n r e t u r n e d to Elisavetgrad to rebuild and re-energize his movement. W h a t were the motives and aspirations that influenced G o r d i n ? Much of the available i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t G o r d i n and the SBB comes f r o m a lengthy police file in t h e Russian archives which shows that the m o v e m e n t had been u n d e r police observation almost f r o m its f o u n d a t i o n . G o r d i n and the SBB clearly

120 • John

Klier

u n d e r w e n t c h a n g e s o v e r t i m e , a n d t h e historical l i t e r a t u r e t e n d s t o r e a d back l a t e r d e v e l o p m e n t s in t h e m o v e m e n t t o its origins. A c c o r d i n g to t h e s e l a t e r r e p o r t s , G o r d i n was m o t i v a t e d by t h e i d e a s of t h e social r e v o l u t i o n a r y m o v e ment, revolutionary (Narodrtiki).™ Narodnaia

a g r a r i a n socialists k n o w n

generically

as t h e

Populists

H e w a s e v e n a c c u s e d of f o r m i n g a b r a n c h of t h e t e r r o r i s t g r o u p volia

in K r e m e n c h u g . C e r t a i n l y t h e D e p a r t m e n t of Police in St

P e t e r s b u r g i n i t i a t e d s u r v e i l l a n c e o v e r G o r d i n o v e r f e a r of p o s s i b l e socialist s y m p a t h i e s . T h a t said, t h e police w e r e o b s e s s e d with r e v o l u t i o n a r y activity, a n d a l e r t t o its a p p e a r a n c e a n y w h e r e . T h e p o l i c e file o n G o r d i n a n d t h e S B B — f e d by h e l p ful i n f o r m e r s — g r e w i n t o an e v e r m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d n a r r a t i v e o v e r t h e years. By 1889, G o r d i n w a s a c c u s e d of b e i n g p a r t of a social r e v o l u t i o n a r y conspiracy, d a t ing f r o m 1881, to s p r e a d socialist i d e a s a m o n g a C h r i s t i a n s e c t a r i a n m o v e m e n t in U k r a i n e k n o w n as t h e " S t u n d i s t s . " T h a t such w e r e t h e original o b j e c t i v e s of G o r d i n a n d his m o v e m e n t , which r e s t r i c t e d its activity to Jews, a p p e a r s i m p r o b able, to say t h e least. 3 5 I n d e e d , a f t e r a t h o r o u g h i n v e s t i g a t i o n p r o m p t e d by their s u p e r i o r s in St. P e t e r s b u r g , t h e local a u t h o r i t i e s g a v e G o r d i n a n d the B r o t h e r h o o d a clean bill of political h e a l t h in 1884. A s a c o n s e q u e n c e , t h e g r o u p was able to gain t h e right f r o m t h e local police to o p e n its o w n s y n a g o g u e a n d elect its own r a b b i . 3 6 T h e m o v e m e n t also r e q u e s t e d to be given land in o r d e r t o establish a Jewish agricultural c o m m u n i t y , a n d to be a l l o w e d to k e e p its own official vital statistics. T h e r e q u e s t for land was d e n i e d . While t h e Russian state had at o n e t i m e e n c o u r a g e d Jewish agricultural c o l o n i s a t i o n , o n e of the lessons d r a w n f r o m t h e p o g r o m s of 1881-82 (which had included a t t a c k s on existing Jewish a g r i c u l t u r a l colonies) was that Jews had to b e driven o u t of the c o u n t r y s i d e lest they e x p l o i t t h e p e a s a n t p o p u l a t i o n . T h e f r u i t s of this belief were t h e n o t o r i o u s M a y L a w s of 1882, which b a n n e d " n e w " Jewish s e t t l e m e n t in the c o u n t r y s i d e . T h e m o v e m e n t ' s s e l f - i m p r o v e m e n t s c h e m e s fell victim, f o r t h e m o m e n t , to these regulations. T h e q u e s t i o n of vital statistics w a s e v e n m o r e p r o b l e m a t i c . A c c o r d i n g t o legislation of t h e first half of t h e c e n t u r y , e v e r y Jewish c o m m u n i t y h a d t o k e e p a set of r e c o r d s r e g i s t e r i n g t h e b i r t h , d e a t h , m a r r i a g e a n d d i v o r c e of its m e m b e r s . T h e y w e r e k e p t in special n o t e b o o k s , called metricheskie

knigi, in R u s s i a n a n d H e b r e w

o n f a c i n g pages. T h e task of k e e p i n g t h e s e r e c o r d s w a s a s s i g n e d t o t h e s o - c a l l e d " s t a t e " or " c r o w n " r a b b i , e l e c t e d e v e r y t h r e e years by t h e c o m m u n i t y , w i t h t h e r a t i f i c a t i o n of t h e R u s s i a n a u t h o r i t i e s . W h i l e t h e r e c o r d s w e r e u s e d t o d e m a n d s t a t e o b l i g a t i o n s , such as t a x e s o r m i l i t a r y service, t h e y w e r e also t h e b a s i s f o r issuing i d e n t i f i c a t i o n p a p e r s . T h e y also c e r t i f i e d t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l b e l o n g e d t o t h e J e w i s h c o m m u n i t y . W h i l e t h e s t a t e p e r m i t t e d d i f f e r e n t sects t o h a v e t h e i r o w n s y n a g o g u e a n d r a b b i , t h e r e c o r d s w e r e k e p t by t h e d e s i g n a t e d s t a t e c o m m u n a l r a b b i . To give t h e B r o t h e r h o o d t h e right t o k e e p its o w n r e c o r d s w o u l d n o t o n l y c o m p l i c a t e r e c o r d k e e p i n g , b u t m i g h t give t h e " B r o t h e r s " a s p e c i a l status. N o t in t h e h a b i t of g r a n t i n g n e w " p r i v i l e g e s " to t h e Jews, t h e g o v e r n m e n t declined the request.37

From Elisavetgrad to Broadway

121

This left the B r o t h e r h o o d in a difficult situation, d e p e n d e n t upon the good will of the state rabbi (who himself owned his election and salary to the Jewish community which he served). The crux of the problem was that the registration of males in the community took place upon the occasion of their circumcision, and the B r o t h e r h o o d was rejecting this rite. Thus, state rabbis were refusing to register uncircumcised children of the "Brothers," with all the legal difficulties to which this gave rise. Therefore, the Brothers submitted a n o t h e r petition in 1888, sweetening it with the request that they be allowed to k e e p their records only in Russian, without the H e b r e w text. No answer was received b e f o r e the disappearance of the sect. 3 8 This was not the best of times for the B r o t h e r h o o d to seek further assistance from the government. The local authorities were unhappy with the p e r f o r m a n c e of the person designated as the "rabbi" of the B r o t h e r h o o d , Mordukh Shmul Shapsovich, who had not been actively engaged in the duties of his post for over a year; meanwhile, the metricheskie knigi of the sect were (perhaps understandably) in disarray. This was not the limit of the Brotherhood's difficulties. If the bureaucrats were unhappy, the Russian O r t h o d o x authorities were even m o r e so. There is a common assumption in the secondary literature that the O r t h o d o x Church was eager to convert Russian Jews to Christianity. As I have argued elsewhere, there was certainly no centralized, co-ordinated policy. 39 If the institutional Church thought about the Jews at all, it was as a threat to the integrity of the faith through "Judaising." A f t e r the great schism in the O r t h o d o x Church in the seventeenth century, popular religion had given rise to numerous sects, some which had characteristics (keeping the Sabbath, circumcision) that resembled Jewish practice and could be blamed on Jewish conversionary activity. Indeed, a law dating to 1825 provided for the expulsion of the Jewish population from any district where "Judaising" sects appeared. 4 0 In May of 1888 the newspaper of the Kherson diocese carried an article which complained of the negative influence of the Brotherhood on O r t h o d o x believers. The office of the Over-Procurator of the Church, the lay administrative arm, asked the police to investigate. The police r e p o r t e d that, in the beginning, some Christians had attended meetings of the sect, but that their curiosity had waned. A n investigation was continuing into the claim that a member of the sect had married a Christian woman according to the (Jewish) rites of the sect, which would have been illegal under Russian law. 41 The governor of Kherson province submitted additional reports to the D e p a r t m e n t of Police in S e p t e m b e r of 1890. It can hardly be said that the report described the movement at its height, because it had u n d e r g o n e a schism, between those m e m b e r s who wished to continue the m o v e m e n t as it was and those who sought to move it in a different direction. T h e culprit for the split was a certain Isaac Fainerman, a Jewish convert to Christianity. Unfortunately, he was the "wrong kind of Christian"—a follower of Count Leo Tolstoy. (Reportedly, Fainerman had even waited upon the Master at his estate of Iasnaia Poliana.) 4 2

122 • John

Klier

W o r s e still, he had sufficient f u n d s to buy land on which to settle m e m b e r s of t h e sect w h o a g r e e d t o live by Tolstoian principles. H e p u r c h a s e d t h e entire, albeit m i n u s c u l e , shtetl of G l o d o s , E k a t e r i n o s l a v district, a n d leased 20 d e s i a t i n a s of l a n d f o r t h e colonists. F a i n e r m a n a n d his disciples lived simply a n d soberly, b u t h a d b e e n s e e n in discussions with Stundists. 4 3 It was against this b a c k g r o u n d t h a t t h e sect a p p r o a c h e d the a u t h o r i t i e s with a r e q u e s t t o elect a n e w r a b b i t o r e p l a c e S h a p s o v i c h . T h e y m a d e it clear t h a t his r e p l a c e m e n t would be G o r d i n . T h e D e p a r t m e n t of Police sent this a p p e a l to t h e D e p a r t m e n t of R e l i g i o u s A f f a i r s f o r F o r e i g n C r e e d s ( D D U I ) . t h e section of t h e M i n i s t r y of I n t e r n a l A f f a i r s with responsibility f o r t h e religious a f f a i r s of t h e Jews. It was a c c o m p a n i e d by t h e bulging file t h a t t h e a u t h o r i t i e s had a s s e m b l e d o n G o r d i n a n d t h e B r o t h e r h o o d . T h e i m p l i c a t i o n s w e r e clear, and t h e D D I I I o b l i g e d , on 30 S e p t e m b e r 1891, by r e s c i n d i n g p e r m i s s i o n f o r t h e B r o t h e r h o o d to h a v e a s e p a r a t e s y n a g o g u e a n d to elect a r a b b i . 4 4 In s o m e ways this was a m o o t p o i n t , since G o r d i n h a d a l r e a d y left the c o u n t r y , a l t h o u g h n o t t h e surveillance of t h e secret police, t h e O k h r a n a . A r e p o r t , d a t e d 26 J a n u a r y 1892, f r o m an a g e n t in N e w York City, i n f o r m e d t h e a u t h o r i t i e s t h a t G o r d i n was n o w an A m e r i c a n citizen w h o styled himself " J a m e s G o r d i n . " ( H e h a d allegedly r e t u r n e d to R u s s i a u n d e r this i n c o g n i t o in M a r c h of 1891.) A c t i n g o n this i n f o r m a t i o n , t h e D e p a r t m e n t of Police sent a circular to all R u s s i a n p o i n t s of e n t r y advising t h e m t h a t , s h o u l d " J a m e s G o r d i n " a p p e a r at the f r o n t i e r , he s h o u l d i m m e d i a t e l y be a r r e s t e d . 4 5 With his B r o t h e r h o o d in ruins, G o r d i n h a d n o n e e d t o r e t u r n to Russia. I n d e e d , he n o w had o t h e r c o n c e r n s . U n s u c c e s s f u l in his e f f o r t s to a c q u i r e land in A m e r i c a f o r p r o d u c t i v e labor, he h a d b e c o m e a Y i d d i s h - l a n g u a g e j o u r n a l i s t a n d playwright, soon to be hailed as " t h e r e f o r m e r of t h e Y i d d i s h stage." In t h e y e a r of his secret visit to R u s s i a , G o r d i n p r e m i e r e d his first fulllength play, ironically e n t i t l e d " S i b i r y a " ( " S i b e r i a " ) . T h e following year, e v e n as h e w a s p l a c e d on t h e O k h r a n a ' s w a n t e d list, he p r o d u c e d o n e of t h e classics of t h e m o d e r n Yiddish stage, " D e r yidisher k e n i g lir" ( " t h e Jewish King L e a r " ) , w h i c h also m a d e a star of t h e a c t o r J a c o b P. A d l e r . 4 6 W h a t c o n c l u s i o n s can be d r a w n f r o m t h e f a t e of I a k o v G o r d i n ' s r e f o r m m o v e m e n t ? It was very m u c h a p r o d u c t of its time, a n d of t h e Jewish H a s k a l a h in R u s s i a , with its e m p h a s i s o n p r o d u c t i v e l a b o r f o r t h e Jews, h e a l t h y self-criticism, and calls f o r acculturation into Russian society. G o r d i n could have a n t i c i p a t e d a w e l c o m e f r o m l i k e - m i n d e d m e m b e r s of t h e R u s s i a n - J e w i s h i n t e l l i g e n t s i a , a n d f r o m R u s s i a n officials intent o n solving t h e Jewish Q u e s t i o n . It was his m i s f o r t u n e to a r r i v e o n t h e s c e n e at t h e very m o m e n t — a n d in t h e exact p l a c e — w h e r e e v e n t s w e r e calling i n t o q u e s t i o n all t h e old n o s t r u m s t h a t h a d s u r r o u n d e d t h e J e w i s h Q u e s t i o n . Jewish liberals h a d n o w t o r e c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r o r n o t R u s s i a m i g h t i n d e e d be m o v i n g t o w a r d Jewish e m a n c i p a t i o n as it e v o l v e d into a m o d e r n s t a t e . ( T h e a n s w e r of socialists a n d p r o t o - Z i o n i s t s , of c o u r s e , was a r e s o u n d i n g " n o ! " . ) T h e R u s s i a n s t a t e itself was t u r n i n g its b a c k o n p a s t policies t o p r o m o t e t h e i n t e g r a t i o n a n d a c c u l t u r a t i o n of t h e Jews a n d m o v i n g in t h e d i r e c t i o n of s e g r e g a t i o n .

From

Elisavetgrad

to Broadway

T h e Spiritual Biblical B r o t h e r h o o d ' s agricultural colonisation policy

• 123

foundered

on t h e new, restrictive M a y Laws. T h e turbulent e n v i r o n m e n t of late

imperial

R u s s i a w a s clearly n o place for v o i c e s calling for internal r e f o r m of the Jews. T h e t r e a t m e n t o f t h e B r o t h e r h o o d b y t h e a u t h o r i t i e s is a c l a s s i c e x a m p l e o f t h e t e n d e n c y of the secret p o l i c e to inflate any private initiative into an anti-state c o n s p i r a c y . H a v i n g d o n e s o , t h e y r e v e a l e d t h e i r i n e p t i t u d e in d e a l i n g w i t h p e r c e i v e d threats: a g e n t s of the s a m e Ministry of Internal Affairs, which had identified the S B B a s a n e s t o f " R e d s , " a u t h o r i z e d its o p e r a t i o n s a s a J e w i s h r e l i g i o u s s e c t . D e s p i t e the insignificance of the B r o t h e r h o o d from the point of view of n u m b e r s o r i n f l u e n c e o n t h e m a s s o f R u s s i a n J e w r y , it g e n e r a t e d a n e n o r m o u s a m o u n t o f p u b l i c i t y in t h e R u s s i a n p r e s s . T h e J e w i s h Q u e s t i o n w a s n o w firmly e n s c o n c e d in t h e p u b l i c m i n d a s a m a j o r s o c i a l i s s u e t h a t h a d t o b e e x p l o r e d in all its d i v e r s e g u i s e s . G o r d i n ' s r e i n v e n t i o n a s a Y i d d i s h p l a y w r i g h t m i g h t s e e m i r o n i c , u n t i l it is r e c o g n i z e d that he u s e d his stage p r o d u c t i o n s to c o n v e y a distinct m o r a l m e s s a g e — i n d e e d , this overt d i d a c t i c i s m w a s the c h i e f critical c o m p l a i n t m a d e against his w o r k . In t h e e n d , h o w e v e r , the b l e n d of historical i r o n i e s a n d surprise e n d i n g s , w h i c h m a r k e d t h e s t o r y o f t h e S p i r i t u a l B i b l i c a l B r o t h e r h o o d , is a p p r o p r i a t e l y e n c a p s u l a t e d in t h e l i f e o f a d r a m a t i s t .

Notes The p r e p a r a t i o n of this article was assisted by s u p p o r t f r o m t h e D e a n ' s Travel F u n d and t h e G r a d u a t e School R e s e a r c h F u n d at University C o l l e g e L o n d o n . 1 I h a v e a r g u e d this p o i n t at length in Russia Gathers Her Jews: The Origins of the Jewish Question in Russia, 1772-1825 ( D e K a l b : N o r t h e r n Illinois U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1986). In partic u l a r I reject the l e a d i n g role t h a t m a n y s e c o n d a r y s o u r c e s h a v e a t t r i b u t e d to " t r a d i t i o n al R u s s i a n religious a n t i s e m i t i s m . " and the Jewish Enlightenment: Their Confrontation in 2 See R a p h a e l M a h l e r , Hasidism Galicia and Poland in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century ( P h i l a d e l p h i a : Jewish P u b l i c a t i o n Society of A m e r i c a , 1985). 3 Evreiskaia entsiklopediia, 16 vols. (St P e t e r s b u r g . 1908-1913), 6: 687. H i s t o r i a n s of t h e m o v e m e n t d i s a g r e e o v e r t h e origins a n d m o t i v e s of G o r d i n ' s activities. T h e brief c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n in this p a r a g r a p h is b a s e d o n t h e ideas t h a t h e p r o p a g a t e d o p e n l y in the press. Possible u l t e r i o r m o t i v e s a r e discussed below. and 4 J o n a t h a n F r a n k e l m a k e s this point in Prophecy and Politics: Socialism, Nationalism, the Russian Jews, 1862-1917 ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1981), 57. 5 See Irwin M i c h a e l A r o n s o n , Troubled Waters: The Origins of the 1881 Anti-Jewish Pogroms in Russia ( P i t t s b u r g h : U n i v e r s i t y of P i t t s b u r g h Press, 1990). U n l e s s o t h e r w i s e i n d i c a t e d , all d a t e s a r e a c c o r d i n g to t h e Julian c a l e n d a r t h e n in use in Russia, which was twelve d a y s b e h i n d the G r e g o r i a n c a l e n d a r in t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . 6 T h e classic study o n t h e rise of t h e new politics is F r a n k e l ' s Prophecy and Politics. For a n u a n c e d view of 1881 as a t u r n i n g point, see E r i c h E . H a b e r e r , Jews and Revolution in Nineteenth-Century Russia ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1995), 206-229. 7 See J.D. Klier, " T h e R u s s i a n Press and the A n t i - J e w i s h P o g r o m s of 1881," American Slavic Studies 17, n o . l (1983): 199-221. 8 R e p r i n t e d in Russkii

evrei 27 (2 July 1881).

Canadian-

1 2 4 • John

Klier

9 T h e r e was yet a t h i r d widely r e p o r t e d m o v e m e n t , " N e w T e s t a m e n t Israelites in the S a v i o u r ' s N a m e , " f o u n d e d in Kishinev in 1883 by J o s e p h R a b i n o v i c h . It was r e c o g n i s e d by t h e Russian a u t h o r i t i e s as a s e p a r a t e Jewish sect in 1884, but was soon t r a n s f o r m e d into a stalking h o r s e for f o r e i g n P r o t e s t a n t m i s s i o n a r y activity in Russia. See S t e v e n J. Z i p p e r stein, " H e r e s y , A p o s t a s y , a n d the T r a n s f o r m a t i o n of J o s e p h R a b i n o v i c h , " in Todd M. E n d e l m a n , ed., Jewish Apostasy in the Modern World ( N e w York: H o l m e s and Meier, 1987), 206-31; a n d Kai K j a e r - H a n s e n , Joseph Rabinowitz and the Messianic Movement ( E d i n b u r g h a n d G r a n d Rapids, Mich.: W m . B. E e r d m a n s , 1995). 10 S t e p h e n M. B e r k d o e s n o t a g r e e , s e e i n g t h e m as " a m o r e sophisticated and radical ' r e f o r m , ' " t h a n G o r d i n ' s in his Year of Crisis, Year of Hope: Russian Jewry and the Pogroms of 1881-1882 ( W e s t p o r t , C o n n . : G r e e n w o o d Press, 1985), 137. 11 Odesskii

listok 25 (31 J a n u a r y 1882). This article was widely r e p r i n t e d in the Russian press.

12 A c c o r d i n g to Y e h u d a Slutsky, it was p u b l i s h e d with g o v e r n m e n t a l assistance. See lopedia Judaica, 16 vols. ( J e r u s a l e m , 1972), 12: 1027.

Encyc-

13 Ibid. 14 Evreiskaia entsiklopediia, 11: 770: Nedelia 45 (4 N o v e m b e r 1884). 15 I. C h e r i k o v e r claims t h a t t h e r e m n a n t s of N e w Israel j o i n e d 1. R a b i n o v i c h ' s Christianising m o v e m e n t . See Evreiskaia entsiklopediia. 11: 770. 16 Rassvet 15 (9 A p r i l 1881). 17 A.S. P r u g a v i n , " D u k h o v n o - b i b l e i s k o e b r a t s t v o , " Istoricheskii 401. 18 Russkii Evrei 27 (2 July 1881). 19 Rassvet 25 (19 J u n e 1881).

vestnik

18 ( N o v e m b e r 1884):

20 T h e t e r m " k u l a k s " at this time had a s s o c i a t i o n s of grasping, exploitative activity in t h e m a r k e t p l a c e , not t h e Stalin-era c o n s t r u c t of a rich p e a s a n t . See Klier, Imperial Russia's Jewish Question, 1855-1881 ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e University Press, 1995), 320-8. 21 Russkii Evrei 29 (5 July 1881); Rassvet 26 (26 July 1881); 28 (10 July 1881); 29 (17 July 1881). 22 Voskhod 7 (July 1881): 35. 23 Russkii vedomosti 41 (2 F e b r u a r y 1882); Vek 7 (July 1882); Golos 289 (24 O c t o b e r 1882). 24 Novoe vremia 2991 (27 J u n e 1884): Volyn 31 (22 A p r i l 1883); Tserkovno-Obshchestvennyi vestnik 140 (21 O c t o b e r 1882); 141 (23 O c t o b e r 1882); 147 (4 N o v e m b e r 1882) a n d 148 (6 N o v e m b e r 1882). 25 For the e v o l u t i o n of this t e r m , see Klier, Imperial Russia's Jewish Question, 2 5 - 7 . 26 T h e R u s s i a n Jewish intelligentsia had n o t r o u b l e a g r e e i n g with such negative i n t e r p r e t a tions of t h e Jewish m a s s e s since it was an integral part of t h e H a s k a l a h dialogue. 27 Klier, Imperial Russia's Jewish Question, 2 6 3 - 8 3 . B r a f m a n ' s w o r k went t h r o u g h m a n y p e r m u t a t i o n s , a n d it m a y be c o n s i d e r e d a direct s o u r c e of the ideas set f o r t h in The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. 28 Odesskii listok 264 (25 N o v e m b e r 1882). 29 Nedelia 12 (20 M a r c h 1883); 45 (1 N o v e m b e r 1884). 30 Nedelia 14 (6 A p r i l 1880); 43 (24 O c t o b e r 1882). 31 Istoricheskii vestnik 12 ( D e c e m b e r 1882). 32 Russkii kurer 42 (13 F e b r u a r y 1882); 315 (15 N o v e m b e r 1882). 33 See f o o t n o t e 9. 34 For t h e classic s t u d y of the Populist m o v e m e n t , see F r a n c o V e n t u r i , Roots of Revolution: A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth-Century Russia ( N e w York: G r o s s e t a n d D u n l a p , 1966 [I960]). 35 G o s u d a r s t v e n n y i A r k h i v R o s s i i s k o i F e d e r a t s i i ( M o s c o w ) [ h e r e a f t e r G A R F ] , f. 102 ( D P 3 o e d e l o p r o i z v o d s t v o ) , 1881-89, d. 606,11. 15-30.

Notes

• 125

36 This privilege was g r a n t e d on t h e basis of l o n g - s t a n d i n g legislation in the R u s s i a n E m p i r e , originally i n t e n d e d for the H a s i d i c m o v e m e n t , which a l l o w e d Jewish sects in a c o m m u n i ty to have their o w n s y n a g o g u e and religious p e r s o n n e l . In this way, the S B B was de facto given official s t a t u s as a Jewish sect. 37 G A R F . f. 102, d. 606,11. 6 0 - 6 0 o b . 38

Ibid.

39 " S t a t e Policy a n d t h e C o n v e r s i o n of Jews in I m p e r i a l R u s s i a , " in R. G e r a c i a n d M. K h o d a r k o v s k y , eds.. Of Religion and Empire: Missions, Conversion and Tolerance in Russia ( I t h a c a : C o r n e l l University Press, 2001): 9 2 - 1 1 2 . 40 Klier, Russia Gathers Her Jews, 166. 41 G A R F , f. 102, d. 606,11. 61ob. 42 This fact is c o n f i r m e d by the u n f l a t t e r i n g p o r t r a i t of F a i n e r m a n a n d his c o m p a n i o n B u t k e vich, f o u n d in the diary of Tolstoy's wife, Sonia. H e n r i Troyat, Tolstoy ( G a r d e n City: D o u b l e d a y , 1967), 471. 43 G A R F , f. 102, d. 606, II. 57ob. S h l e t l a k h did n o t fall u n d e r the provisions of t h e M a y Laws. 44 Ibid., 1. 73. 45 Ibid., 1. 90. 46 A f u r t h e r irony, given the role of Tolstoian b e l i e f s in t h e b r e a k - u p of the SBB, was the successful staging of G o r d o n ' s Yiddish a d a p t i o n of " T h e K r e u t z e r S o n a t a " in 1902. Encyclopedia Judaica, 7: 787-89.

Colonial Frontiers in Eighteenth-Century Russia: From the North Caucasus to Central Asia MICHAEL

KHODARKOVSKY

"By the late eighteenth century Russia became a full-fledged colonial empire." This statement may be a cause for legitimate arguments and controversy. A f t e r all, the attribute "colonial" is usually reserved for Western powers' overseas expansion, while its expansion into the contiguous territories seemed to disqualify Russia from belonging to an exclusive "club of the colonial empires." In the following pages, I intend to show that Russia's imperial experience in its southern and southeastern regions was not different from other colonial empires, and that Russia should be considered a colonial empire, even though it did not conceive of itself as such. 1 But what is "colonial"? The terms "colonial" and more recently "neocolonial" and "postcolonial" had been so widely used throughout the twentieth century and so frequently deployed to fit numerous political agendas that a natural semantic inflation and corrosion were unavoidable. In the context of this essay, I will define "colonial" by a nature of an encounter between the metropolis and periphery in which periphery is being transformed either through bringing in the settlers from the metropolis or through intrusive policies aimed at transforming the local societies on the model of a metropolis. Thus, it would be incongruous to apply the term "colonial" to the Russianruled Poland or Baltic region where the population was overwhelmingly Christian and where Russia could hardly claim to bring Christianity, Enlightenment and Civilization to the local residents. Just as it would be equally inappropriate, for instance, to apply "colonial" to the Ottoman occupation of eastern Anatolia, where the Porte had little ambition beyond securing the political and military loyalty of the local Muslim tribesmen. In other words, "colonial" implies an asymmetrical relationship between the two distinctly different entities, the dominant metropolis and subjugated periphery, where the former rules the periphery, directly or indirectly, with the ultimate purpose of transforming the periphery into a civilization similar to a metropolis. Such a colonial situation existed in

128 • Michael

Khodarkovsky

Russia's southern and southeastern borderlands. Let us consider some of the policies, attitudes, and issues that emerged as a result of the colonial encounters between Russia and the indigenous peoples throughout the eighteenth century.

PHASE

I: POLITICAL S T A T U S

NON-NEGOTIABLE

The emergence of Moscow and the Muscovite state were intimately connected to the world of steppe politics. For centuries subjected to interminable raids from its belligerent nomadic neighbors in the south, Moscow was p r e p a r e d to purchase peace along the steppe frontier at any price: ornate flattery, trade privileges, military cooperation and, above all, sizable payments to the nomadic chiefs. However, with the simultaneous collapse of the steppe societies and the rise of Muscovy in the middle of the sixteenth century, the autocratic Russian sovereign and the centralized state he represented could now codify his relationship with the disparate non-Christian and non-state-organized peoples only in terms of a suzerain bestowing favors on his subjects. While in the seventeenth century Moscow continued to construct an image of the tsar as that of a benevolent sovereign ready to reward his subjects in exchange for their service and loyalty, a hundred years later it was simply unthinkable for a Russian emperor, regarded as the e m b o d i m e n t of civilized E u r o p e a n values, to be anything but a patron and protector of its barbaric neighbors.The latter attitude was most forthrightly expressed by M u h a m m e d Tevkelev, a Tatar translator of the Office of Foreign Affairs charged with negotiating and executing the Kazakhs' oath of allegiance to the Russian crown. In response to some Kazakh notables who explained that they had sent an envoy to Russia solely to m a k e peace but not to become Russia's subjects, Tevkelev declaimed that "it was not befitting for such an illustrious monarch to have a peace treaty with you, steppe beasts." 2 Yet, it seemed that the "beasts" did not appreciate the privilege of becoming Russian subjects. In 1762, succumbing to the d e m a n d s of the Russian envoys, the Kazakh khan Nuraly swore an oath of allegiance to the newly-enthroned Russian empress, Catherine II, only to explain later that he could not be responsible for his people, who were hostile to the Russian authorities because of their unaddressed grievances. Furthermore, his people disparagingly r e f e r r e d to him as "the Russian." 1 Despite a manifestly adverse reaction of the Kazakhs and an obvious fact that Moscow's rush to confer the status of subjects on the newly e n c o u n t e r e d peoples was little m o r e than wishful thinking, the Russian g o v e r n m e n t continued to insist on an oath of allegiance. During the eighteenth century several p r o m i n e n t natives of the Caucasus, w h o had long been in Russian imperial service, advised the g o v e r n m e n t to a d o p t a more realistic view of the indigenous peoples. In 1714 Prince A l e x a n d e r Bekovich-Cherkasskii wrote to Peter I and stated unambiguously that "these peoples [the Kabardinians] were independent and submitted to no one." Bekovich-

Colonial

Frontiers in Eighteenth-Century

Russia • 129

C h e r k a s s k i i e x p l a i n e d t h a t t h e n a t u r e of r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e K a b a r d i n i a n s a n d R u s s i a w a s n o d i f f e r e n t t h a n t h a t of t h e K u m y k s with P e r s i a , w h o s e r u l e r s tradit i o n a l l y p r o v i d e d large p a y m e n t s f o r t h e K u m y k s t o e n s u r e t h e i r amity. 4 A d d r e s s i n g t h e s a m e issue in his r e p o r t to t h e S e n a t e in 1762, t h e G e o r g i a n P r i n c e a n d l i e u t e n a n t - c o l o n e l in t h e R u s s i a n army, O t a r T u m a n o v h a d s t a t e d e m p h a t i c a l l y t h a t t h e p e o p l e s of t h e N o r t h C a u c a s u s w e r e R u s s i a n s u b j e c t s m o r e in n a m e t h a n in fact. 5 C o m p e t e n t advice n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , any a d j u s t m e n t t o the r e a l s i t u a t i o n on t h e g r o u n d w a s resisted in t h e R u s s i a n capital, a n d t h e a u t h o r i t i e s c o n t i n u e d to d e m a n d relentlessly the o a t h s of allegiance t o t h e R u s s i a n s u z e r a i n . O n e n o t a b l e e x c e p t i o n w a s t h e Ossetians. In t h e 1740s, c a r e f u l l y e x p l o i t i n g t h e l o o p h o l e in R u s s o - O t t o m a n and R u s s o - P e r s i a n p e a c e t r e a t i e s t h a t r e c o g n i z e d t h e O s s e t i a n s ' political i n d e p e n d e n c e , t h e R u s s i a n g o v e r n m e n t o r g a n i z e d a C h r i s t i a n mission a m o n g t h e O s s e t i a n s . B u t c o n t r a r y to t h e wishes of t h e z e a l o u s missionaries, t h e S e n a t e o r d e r e d that t h e O s s e t i a n s w e r e n o t to b e s w o r n as R u s s i a ' s subjects, so t h a t such hasty a l l e g i a n c e did n o t a l a r m t h e m a n d j e o p a r d i z e t h e i r c o n v e r s i o n . T h e p r i o r i t i e s of t h e g o v e r n m e n t w e r e clear: it w a s p r e p a r e d t o d e l a y t h e f o r m a l a l l e g i a n c e of t h e O s s e t i a n s in o r d e r to see t h e m b e c o m e O r t h o d o x C h r i s t i a n s . 6 By t h e m i d - e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y a n e w political v o c a b u l a r y a n d m o r e c o m p e t e n t t r a n s l a t i o n s into n a t i v e l a n g u a g e s left n o a m b i g u i t y in R u s s i a ' s p e r c e p t i o n of t h e political s t a t u s of its n e i g h b o r s . T h e increasingly a n t i q u a t e d political t e r m i n o l o g y w a s being r e p l a c e d by a m o d e r n imperial v o c a b u l a r y . T h e n a t i v e chiefs a n d their p e o p l e w e r e n o w d e c l a r e d to b e c o m e a p r o t e c t o r a t e of R u s s i a (v Rossiiskoi tektsii).

T h e i r allegiance to be loyal s u b j e c t s w a s r e f e r r e d to as prisiaga

poddanstvo

na

provernoe

a n d its violation w a s n o w r e g a r d e d as a c r i m e ( k l i a t v o p r e s t u p l e n i e )

a n d was to b e p u n i s h e d . Yet t h e political t e r m s a n d n o t i o n s of b o t h old a n d n e w R u s s i a c o n t i n u e d to collide with t h e t r a d i t i o n a l n o t i o n s of t h e n a t i v e societies. O n e

particular

e n c o u n t e r illustrates t h e s t a r k d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n t h e R u s s i a n n o t i o n of a political p r o t e c t o r a t e a n d t h e n a t i v e s ' n o t i o n of a k i n s h i p - b a s e d p a t r o n a g e . W h e n in 1779 t h e n o b l e s of G r e a t e r K a b a r d a r e f u s e d to s w e a r a l l e g i a n c e t o R u s s i a a n d d e c l a r e d t h a t t h e y h a d t r a d i t i o n a l l y b e e n u n d e r R u s s i a n p r o t e c t i o n as g u e s t s o r allies ( k u n a k s ) b u t n o t subjects, R u s s i a n t r o o p s m a r c h e d into K a b a r d a f o r c i n g t h e K a b a r d i n i a n s t o sue f o r p e a c e a n d to p l e d g e u n c o n d i t i o n a l a l l e g i a n c e . 7 W h e r e f o r c e could n o t be a p p l i e d , t h e lure of p r e s e n t s a n d r e w a r d s w o r k e d to t h e s a m e e f f e c t . P r e s e n t e d with t h e R u s s i a n d e m a n d to t a k e an o a t h of a l l e g i a n c e t o t h e e m p r e s s in 1786, t h e K a z a k h c o m m o n e r s a g r e e d t o d o so u n d e r i n s t r u c t i o n s of their religious l e a d e r , t h e m u f t i , w h o told t h e m t h a t it was n o t against t h e i r law t o lie to C h r i s t i a n s , a n d t h e r e f o r e they c o u l d a g r e e t o t h e R u s s i a n d e m a n d s in o r d e r to r e c e i v e p r e s e n t s . 8 W h e t h e r d e l i b e r a t e l y misled, i n d u c e d by t h e o f f e r s of p r e s e n t s a n d p a y m e n t s , o r i n t i m i d a t e d by t h e f o r c e of t h e R u s s i a n military, t h e d i s p a r a t e p e o p l e s a l o n g t h e R u s s i a n f r o n t i e r h a d t o b e r e d u c e d i n t o s u b m i s s i o n a n d m a d e loyal. T h e polit-

130 • Michael

Khodarkovsky

ical i d e n t i t y of the n a t i v e s as s u b j e c t s of the R u s s i a n c r o w n h a d to be c o n s t r u c t e d a n d r e a f f i r m e d t h r o u g h an o a t h of a l l e g i a n c e . T h i s w a s the b e g i n n i n g of a long and a r d u o u s p r o c e s s of t h e i r p o l i t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n into the R u s s i a n O r t h o d o x C h r i s t i a n Empire. P H A S E 2: U N I T E AND OR D I V I D E A N D

RULE

RULE?

W h i l e the issue of R u s s i a ' s s u z e r a i n t y o v e r its n e w l y d e c l a r e d s u b j e c t s w a s little m o r e than r h e t o r i c a l e x e r c i s e , the i s s u e of h o w to r u l e such p u r p o r t e d s u b j e c t s w a s f a r f r o m r h e t o r i c a l . A f t e r all, the n e w s u b j e c t s r e m a i n e d f u l l y i n d e p e n d e n t a n d o u t s i d e of R u s s i a ' s i m p e r i a l b o r d e r s , w h i c h w e r e d e f a c t o m a r k e d by the R u s s i a n f o r t i f i c a t i o n lines. T o e x e r t its i n f l u e n c e , the R u s s i a n g o v e r n m e n t f a c e d a t r a d i t i o n a l d i l e m m a of h o w b e s t to p r o j e c t its interests: to r e l y on a l o c a l r u l e r , a k h a n , by b o o s t i n g his p o w e r a n d c o n t r o l o v e r the d i s p a r a t e t r i b a l units, o r b y s u p p o r t i n g l o c a l n o b l e s a n d n o t a b l e s a n d thus e n c o u r a g i n g f u r t h e r d i v i s i o n s a n d f r a g m e n t a t i o n of the i n d i g e n o u s s o c i e t y . E a c h of these p o l i c y a p p r o a c h e s h a d their o w n a d v a n t a g e s a n d d o w n s i d e s . O n e of the m o s t d i s t i n c t f e a t u r e s of the s t e p p e s o c i e t i e s w a s the w e a k n e s s of c e n t r a l p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y . I n i t i a l l y , the s t r e n g t h e n i n g of the a u t h o r i t y of the k h a n s o r s i m i l a r l o c a l c h i e f s w a s a c o r n e r s t o n e of R u s s i a n p o l i c i e s in the r e g i o n . M o s c o w itself h a d b e e n s u b j e c t to s i m i l a r p o l i c i e s by the M o n g o l s s e v e r a l c e n t u r i e s e a r l i e r . T h e r i s e of the p r i n c e s of M o s c o w to the p o s i t i o n of g r a n d p r i n c e s of M u s c o v y a n d l a t e r , the t s a r s of all R u s s i a , w a s in n o s m a l l m e a s u r e a r e s u l t of p o l i c i e s p u r s u e d by the k h a n s of the G o l d e n H o r d e . W h i l e the R u s s i a n l a n d s c o n t i n u e d to b e d i v i d e d i n t o d i s p a r a t e p r i n c i p a l i t i e s u n d e r n u m e r o u s r i v a l p r i n c e s , the k h a n s f o u n d it m o r e e x p e d i e n t to r e l y on the s e r v i c e s of a s i n g l e R u s s i a n p r i n c e to m o b i l i z e a l o y a l m i l i t a r y f o r c e a n d to d e l i v e r t a x e s a n d t r i b u t e s to the khans' capital, Saray. In the r e v e r s a l of f o r t u n e s , by the e a r l y s i x t e e n t h c e n t u r y it w a s M o s c o w ' s turn to f a c e the distinctly d i f f e r e n t r e m n a n t s of the G o l d e n

Horde, a variety

of

n o m a d i c a n d s e m i - n o m a d i c s o c i e t i e s w i t h r u d i m e n t a r y c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y . In the f o l l o w i n g c e n t u r i e s , M o s c o w ' s p r i o r i t i e s w o u l d b e to s t o p the i n c e s s a n t a t t a c k s a g a i n s t its t o w n s a n d v i l l a g e s a n d to p r o v i d e p e a c e a n d s e c u r i t y a l o n g its s o u t h e r n f r o n t i e r . In d o i n g so, M o s c o w c h o s e to r e l y o n p o l i c i e s w h i c h h a d o n c e b e e n a p p l i e d to R u s s i a by its M o n g o l o v e r l o r d s , i.e., b u t t r e s s i n g the a u t h o r i t y of a sing l e r u l e r c a p a b l e of c u r b i n g his p e o p l e ' s r a i d s a n d a c t i n g as a r e l i a b l e m i l i t a r y ally. N o m i n a l l y , s u c h a r u l e r w i t h s u p r e m e a u t h o r i t y e x i s t e d in b o t h the C r i m e a n a n d K a z a n k h a n a t e s as w e l l as a m o n g the s t e p p e s o c i e t i e s : the N o g a y s , K a l m y k s a n d K a z a k h s . B u t e v e n in the C r i m e a n k h a n a t e , o n e of the m o s t s o p h i s t i c a t e d p o l i t i e s a m o n g the s u c c e s s i v e r e m n a n t s of the G o l d e n H o r d e , the a u t h o r i t y of a k h a n w a s l i m i t e d by the p o w e r f u l a n d e c o n o m i c a l l y i n d e p e n d e n t n o b l e s . T h e p o w e r of a k h a n w a s e v e n m o r e l i m i t e d a m o n g the n o m a d i c

confederations.

Colonial

Frontiers in Eighteenth-Century

Russia • 131

C o n s i d e r i n g a successor t o t h e K a l m y k k h a n Ayuki in 1722, o n e influential Kalm y k n o b l e e x p l a i n e d to a R u s s i a n official: " W h o e v e r b e c o m e s a k h a n would n o t m a t t e r . All he gains is a title a n d p r o m i n e n c e , but his i n c o m e c o m e s only f r o m his o w n ulus [an a p p a n a g e c o n s i s t i n g of p e o p l e and h e r d s ] . O t h e r taishy o w n ulusy

have their

a n d they g o v e r n t h e m i n d e p e n d e n t l y , a n d t h e k h a n is not s u p p o s e d to

i n t e r f e r e ; a n d if he does, n o o n e will obey." 9 T h e politics of t h e " k h a n ' s t i t l e " a n d its e v o l u t i o n i n t o o n e of m o s t i m p o r t a n t t o o l s of R u s s i a n i m p e r i a l policies is p a r t i c u l a r l y visible in t h e case of t h e K a z a k h s . In t h e e i g h t e e n t h

c e n t u r y successive

Russian

officials w h o

were

c h a r g e d with i m p l e m e n t i n g g o v e r n m e n t policies t o w a r d t h e K a z a k h s r e p o r t e d , in c o n t i n u o u s b e m u s e m e n t , h o w little p o w e r t h e K a z a k h k h a n s h a d o v e r t h e i r p e o p l e . T h e g o v e r n m e n t s t r a t e g i e s in t h e K a z a k h s t e p p e w e r e v i g o r o u s l y articul a t e d in t h e 1740s a n d 1750s by O r e n b u r g ' s first g o v e r n o r , Ivan N e p l i u e v , a n d by R u s s i a ' s i n d i s p e n s a b l e n e g o t i a t o r with t h e K a z a k h s , M u h a m m e d Tevkelev, w h o a f t e r his b a p t i s m in 1734 b e c a m e k n o w n as A l e k s e i Tevkelev. T h e t w o d i s a g r e e d o n t h e best policy t o p u r s u e R u s s i a n i n t e r e s t s in t h e r e g i o n . W h i l e T e v k e l e v a d v i s e d s t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e a u t h o r i t y of a k h a n as a best way to c o n t r o l t h e K a z a k h s , N e p l i u e v w a r n e d t h a t this w o u l d be d a m a g i n g t o R u s s i a n i n t e r e s t s a n d , at any r a t e , i m p o s s i b l e t o a c h i e v e . His r e c o m m e n d a t i o n w a s to k e e p t h e K a z a k h s in t h e p r e s e n t state, w e a k a n d d i v i d e d . 1 0 O t h e r r e p o r t s f r o m local g o v e r n m e n t officials s u g g e s t e d t h a t R u s s i a n i n t e r e s t s in t h e r e g i o n would be best s e r v e d by h a v i n g an o b e d i e n t a n d s u b m i s s i v e K a z a k h k h a n directly a p p o i n t e d by t h e R u s s i a n g o v e r n m e n t . T h e y w a r n e d t h a t t h e gove r n m e n t h a d t o p r o c e e d c a u t i o u s l y in this d i r e c t i o n . A t first, it o u g h t t o insist t h a t an a l r e a d y elected k h a n s h o u l d s e e k c o n f i r m a t i o n of his title by an i m p e r i a l d e c r e e , t h u s leaving n o d o u b t as t o his s t a t u s of a R u s s i a n s u b j e c t . T h e g o v e r n m e n t m i g h t also begin c u l t i v a t i n g t h e loyalty of o n e or s e v e r a l K a z a k h s u l t a n s (a title of t h e legitimate s u c c e s s o r s t o a k h a n ) in a d v a n c e . T h e s e s u l t a n s w e r e to be publicly p r a i s e d a n d given m o n e y a n d p r e s e n t s to buy s u p p o r t of o t h e r K a z a k h s . U p o n t h e k h a n ' s d e a t h , o n e of t h e s e s u l t a n s might be a p p o i n t e d a viceroy a n d later, if he p r o v e d loyal t o R u s s i a , d e c l a r e d k h a n . Such w a s t h e advice of two seas o n e d officials c h a r g e d with g o v e r n i n g t h e O r e n b u r g r e g i o n , A l e k s e i T e v k e l e v a n d P e t r R y c h k o v , in their 1759 m e m o r a n d u m to t h e Foreign O f f i c e . " T h e s e were, in e s s e n c e , t h e i d e a s e x p o u n d e d by T e v k e l e v in t h e 1740s a n d t h e n f u r t h e r e l a b o r a t e d a n d s u p p o r t e d by R y c h k o v . B o t h T e v k e l e v a n d R y c h k o v b e lieved it was p a r a m o u n t t o R u s s i a n i n t e r e s t s to d e p r i v e t h e K a z a k h s of t h e ability to elect t h e i r own k h a n s . T h e i r s t r a t e g y w a s t o e n d o w t h e p o s i t i o n of k h a n with s t r o n g e r a u t h o r i t y by e l e v a t i n g him o v e r t h e i n f l u e n c e of his o w n p e o p l e a n d f o r g i n g direct links b e t w e e n a k h a n a n d R u s s i a n a u t h o r i t i e s . A t t h e s a m e time, to p r e v e n t a k h a n f r o m b e c o m i n g t o o p o w e r f u l a n d i n d e p e n d e n t , t h e y u r g e d t h a t t h e k h a n ' s p o s i t i o n n o t b e c o m e h e r e d i t a r y . 1 2 T h e i r views p r o v e d t o be p o p u l a r in St. P e t e r s b u r g a n d b e c a m e t h e f o u n d a t i o n of R u s s i a n policies in t h e following decades.

132 • Michael

Khodarkovsky

The attempts of the Russian g o v e r n m e n t to control its unruly nomadic neighbors by endowing the position of khan with m o r e power and authority ach eved limited success. Such g o v e r n m e n t policy often backfired and instead contributed to the consolidation of opposition against the khan, who was seen as promoting Russian interests at the expense of the Kazakhs. O n other occasions, when a khan chose to use his increased power against Russia, the government was compelled to seek help a m o n g influential K a z a k h nobles and notables. Such a seesaw of first " u n i t e " and then "divide" policies changed only in the 1820s when the Kazakhs of the Lesser and Middle H o r d e s h a d become incorporated into the imperial administrative and political institutions. The position of khan then became superf uous.

P H A S E 3: EXPANSION AND SETTLEMENT With the expanding Russian f r o n t i e r s f u r t h e r encroaching on the traditional nomadic pastures, the acquisition of new lands needed for the construction of forts, settlements, and cultivation brought the Russian government into direct confrontation with the native population over the question of land. Let us consider some aspects of the Russian g o v e r n m e n t ' s land policies, which became a central issue in Russia's colonization of the region. By the mid-eighteenth century Russia's sprawling forts and Cossack settlements studded the banks of the rivers flowing south into the Caspian and Black Seas, while the newly-built fortification lines crossed the steppe in the east-west direction. The Russian g o v e r n m e n t was now in a position to control and often dictate the seasonal migratory r o u t e s to the nomads. To cross the rivers or pass through the fortification lines, the natives had to seek permission from the Russian authorities, which o f t e n used the issue to force the natives' compliance with their various demands. The gradual loss of p a s t u r e l a n d s by the Kalmyks is a typical example of Russian policies in the s o u t h e r n steppe. In 1718 the Tsaritsyn fortification line connected the Volga and D o n Rivers and effectively locked the Kalmyks into the lower Volga area. The line cut off the s u m m e r migration routes of the Kalmyks to the north, and one of the possible escape routes f r o m their traditional foes, the Kuban Nogays. Both the Kalmyks' military f o r t u n e and their economic well being were now increasingly in the h a n d s of the Russian authorities. By the late 1760s the Kalmyks indeed f o u n d themselves f u r t h e r h e m m e d in by the Tsaritsyn and Mozdok fortification lines in the north and south, and by the D o n and Yaik Cossacks in the west and east. Driven into despair by the continuous loss of their grazing g r o u n d s to the G e r m a n colonists and pushed away further into the arid steppe, the Kalmyks resolved to take a dramatic step—exodus of the entire people back to Jungaria, the last such mass migration of a nomadic people in E u r a s i a n steppe. 1 3 The e x p a n d i n g fortification lines b r o u g h t security to the Russian towns and

Colonial

Frontiers in Eighteenth-Century

Russia • 133

v i l l a g e s v u l n e r a b l e to n o m a d i c r a i d s a n d m a d e p o s s i b l e f u r t h e r c o l o n i z a t i o n of t h e s t e p p e . In 1763 t h e g o v e r n m e n t c o m p i l e d a list of " t h e lands t h a t w e r e inside t h e R u s s i a n e m p i r e as well as v a c a n t a n d s u i t a b l e f o r s e t t l e m e n t . " T h e p r o v i n c e s c h o s e n f o r s e t t l i n g w e r e t h o s e of B e l g o r o d , A s t r a k h a n , O r e n b u r g , a n d T o b o l s k ' . In o t h e r w o r d s , t h e g o v e r n m e n t r e s o l v e d t o settle a n d c u l t i v a t e a h u g e e x p a n s e of t h e n o r t h e r n f r i n g e of t h e E u r a s i a n s t e p p e f r o m t h e D o n river in t h e west t o t h e I r t y s h river in t h e e a s t , t h e l a n d s which w e r e t r a d i t i o n a l s u m m e r p a s t u r e s of v a r i o u s n o m a d i c p e o p l e s a n d w e r e n o w c o n s i d e r e d t o be t h e e m p i r e ' s s o u t h e r n borderlands.14 A t t h e c o r e of t h e l a n d d i s p u t e s b e t w e e n the R u s s i a n g o v e r n m e n t a n d t h e n o m a d i c i n h a b i t a n t s of t h e s t e p p e lay f u n d a m e n t a l l y d i f f e r e n t n o t i o n s of land o w n e r s h i p a n d its i n t e n d e d usage. A s far as the R u s s i a n g o v e r n m e n t w a s c o n c e r n e d , t h e newly a c q u i r e d lands w e r e e m p t y spaces b e l o n g i n g to n o one. A s such t h e s e l a n d s had t o b e a p p r o p r i a t e d , t r a n s f o r m e d into a p a r t of t h e i m p e r i a l d o m a i n , d i v i d e d , s e t t l e d , a n d f a r m e d . For t h e n o m a d s , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e lands w e r e i n d i s p e n s a b l e p a s t u r e l a n d s in c o m m o n p o s s e s s i o n of t h e ulus

or o t h e r

a g g r e g a t e n o m a d i c unit. T h e s e d i v e r g e n t a t t i t u d e s a n d goals w e r e first clearly a r t i c u l a t e d in t h e mids e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y d u r i n g o n e of t h e R u s s o - K a l m y k e n c o u n t e r s o v e r t h e issue. C o n f r o n t e d by t h e R u s s i a n d e m a n d s to v a c a t e t h e C a s p i a n s t e p p e , t h e K a l m y k chief, D a i c h i n , insisted t h a t " l a n d a n d w a t e r b e l o n g e d to G o d , " a n d t h e K a l m y k s m e r e l y seized the p a s t u r e s of t h e d e f e a t e d Nogays. 1 5 A c e n t u r y later, g o v e r n m e n t officials h e a r d

similar a r g u m e n t s

from the Kazakhs when

the

government

assigned t h e m p a s t u r e s by d e c r e e s , d e m a n d i n g that t h e K a z a k h s o b t a i n p e r m i s sion f r o m t h e f r o n t i e r a u t h o r i t i e s a n d pay crossing fees. T h e K a z a k h s r e s p o n d e d with a s t o n i s h m e n t : " t h e grass a n d w a t e r b e l o n g to H e a v e n , a n d why s h o u l d we pay a n y f e e s ? " 1 6 T h e i r o b j e c t i o n s n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , by t h e late e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y t h e K a z a k h s f o u n d t h e m s e l v e s in a s i t u a t i o n similar t o t h e K a l m y k s . T h e O r e n b u r g a n d S i b e r i a n f o r t i f i e d lines o u t l i n e d t h e most n o r t h e r n b o u n d a r i e s of t h e K a z a k h s ' possible m i g r a t i o n s . T h e g r o w i n g p r e s e n c e of R u s s i a n t o w n s a n d f o r t s , s e t t l e r s a n d s o l d i e r s w a s also r a p i d l y c h a n g i n g t h e t r a d i t i o n a l l a n d s c a p e of t h e N o r t h C a u c a s u s . A s e r i e s of f o r t i f i c a t i o n lines in t h e N o r t h C a u c a s u s s q u e e z e d t h e p a s t u r e l a n d s of t h e K u m y k s , K a b a r d i n i a n s , a n d o t h e r p e o p l e s of t h e r e g i o n . T h e newly a c q u i r e d lands did n o t r e m a i n v a c a n t f o r long. O r d e r s c a m e t o f o l l o w t h e e x a m p l e of N o v o r o s s i i s k p r o v i n c e a n d d i s t r i b u t e t h e lands b e h i n d t h e f o r t i f i c a t i o n line. S o m e officials r e c o m m e n d e d t h a t l a n d s a l o n g t h e T e r e k R i v e r s h o u l d be u s e d f o r f a r m i n g , p l a n t i n g v i n e y a r d s , a n d p r o d u c i n g silk. L a n d s a r o u n d M o z d o k w e r e distributed a m o n g the Cossacks, settlers from Russia, and fugitives f r o m

the

C a u c a s u s . 1 7 In time, t h e newly a c q u i r e d lands w e r e c o m p l e t e l y t r a n s f o r m e d f r o m p a s t u r e l a n d s in t h e c o m m o n p o s s e s s i o n of t h e n a t i v e s i n t o f a r m l a n d s in t h e individual p o s s e s s i o n of R u s s i a n s . W h a t h a d b e e n a p e r i l o u s f r o n t i e r h a d b e e n decisively t u r n e d into an i m p e r i a l b o r d e r l a n d .

134 • Michael

Khodarkovsky P H A S E 4: FROM INDIRECT TOWARD DIRECT

CONTROL

RULE

By the late eighteenth century, the numerous peoples of the southern borderlands—the Tatars and Nogays of the Crimea, the Kabardinians of the North Caucasus, the Kalmyks of the lower Volga River, and the Kazakhs of the Lesser Horde—all found themselves under Russia's increasing military, political, and economic dominance. The proximity of the Russian forts and settlements, the growing conflicts with the Russian population over the grazing grounds and fishing sites, and the increased d e p e n d e n c e on the Russian administration were unavoidable facts. As far as St. Petersburg was concerned, the time had come to begin integrating Russia's steppe subjects into imperial administrative and legal structures. In the absence of a political concept of autonomy, and with only a vaguely defined notion of protectorship emerging slowly in the mid-eighteenth century, how were the Russian authorities to resolve frontier disputes with their dubious subjects? In the second half of the eighteenth century, with the relative security of Russia's frontiers and its unquestionable military superiority over the neighboring states and peoples in the south, the government attempted to affect changes directly within the indigenous societies. The Kalmyks were the first to become the target of this new approach. In 1762, as the government conferred the title of viceroy on a new Kalmyk ruler, it also introduced a change in the Kalmyk institution of zargo. Traditionally, a khan's councilor body consisting of eight zayisangs (members of the lesser nobility) solely from the khan's ulus, now zargo was to represent the zayisangs elected by all Kalmyk ulusy in accordance with their population. The reconstitution of the zargo meant to undermine the authority of the Kalmyk khan and to increase the government's leverage over the Kalmyks. But such a strategy backfired. The new Russian approach disturbed the traditional balance of power b e t w e e n the khan and the established Kalmyk secular and clerical elite, who were f u r t h e r antagonized by the intrusive Russian policies. Nine years after the reconstitution of the zargo, its m e m b e r s agreed with the khan that Russia's policies t h r e a t e n e d the very existence of the Kalmyk people. Shortly after a great majority of Kalmyks had left the Volga in 1771 for their historic homeland in Jungaria, a government decree hastily abolished zargo among those Kalmyks who r e m a i n e d in the Caspian steppe. 1 8 The institution of zargo was revived again a m o n g those Kalmyks who remained on the banks of the Volga in 1788. However, now the effective control over the Kalmyks was placed in the hands of the newly established chancellery in Astrakhan. 1 9 In other regions the government undertook similar attempts to r e m o l d the indigenous societies and put them under firmer control of the Russian authorities. Throughout the 1780s in the Kazakh steppe and 1790s in the North Caucasus, the government introduced a new instrument of control, a system of native and f r o n tier courts. Detailed directives came personally from Catherine II, who took a lively interest in "pacifying the wild peoples of Her Empire."

Colonial Frontiers in Eighteenth-Century

Russia • 135

In 1786 the G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l of Orenburg, Baron Osip Igelstrom, informed the K a z a k h s of the Lesser H o r d e that the empress had decreed that their khan, Nuraly, be detained and his title abolished. The H o r d e was to be divided into three parts, each led by a chief notable elected from among other notables. To resolve frontier disputes, the Frontier Court (pogranichnyi sud, later referred to as divan) was established in O r e n b u r g . It was to be composed of six Kazakh notables and one sultan as well as six Russian officials. This Court was to judge both K a z a k h s and Russians. Each of the three parts of the newly divided Lesser H o r d e was to have its own local court (rasprava) to adjudicate Kazakh matters. A reliable Russian or Tatar informer was to be attached to the local courts in the guise of a deputy. All m e m b e r s of the courts were to be paid by the Russian treasury. 2 0 T h e attempts of the Russian government to institute structural changes a m o n g the Kazakhs brought already familiar results. Russia's reliance on notables and c o m m o n e r s in administering the Kazakhs sharply antagonized the Kazakh nobles and pitched one group against the other. Abolishing the authority of the khan proved to be an extreme step, unpopular with both the nobles and commoners. In 1788 the advice of the local military c o m m a n d e r , D. Grankin, was to impose upon the Kazakhs the Russian administrative and military system: dividing the Lesser H o r d e into four parts similar to Russian counties ( u e z d s ) , and reconstituting the Frontier Court with only six m e m b e r s — o n e notable from each part of the Horde, one Russian secretary with a knowledge of Tatar, and one m e m b e r of the Islamic clergy, a mullah. 2 1 Eight years later, Baron Igelstrom m a d e his last attempt to bring the Kazakh factions together with a modified proposal of establishing a Khan Council, consisting of six notables representing m a j o r clans. When this idea too proved to be unfeasible, Igelstrom decided to move closer to the position of the Kazakh nobility, abolishing the Khan Council and strengthening the authority of the khan appointed by the government. 2 2 Throughout the last quarter of the eighteenth century various attempts by the Russian officials to alter a traditional balance of power among the Kazakh authorities by imposing alien legal and administrative structures proved to be premature. Despite the government's willingness to change the composition of the Frontier Courts or K h a n ' s Council, these very institutions were seen by the Kazakh nobles and notables as too intrusive and undermining their traditional power base. It was not until 1824 that the Kazakhs of the Lesser Horde, no longer capable of resisting the government's plans, found themselves divided into three parts and the position of their khan abolished. Their last khan was brought to O r e n b u r g to reside there with an honorary but perfectly meaningless title of the First M e m b e r of the Frontier Commission.

136 • Michael

Khodarkovsky PHASE 5: TOWARD DISTANT G O A L S IDEALS: CONVERT AND

AND

CIVILIZE

By the e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y the Russian g o v e r n m e n t had achieved a r e m a r k a b l e r e v e r s a l of a l o n g e s t a b l i s h e d f r o n t i e r p a t t e r n . T h e p r o t r a c t e d h e m o r r h a g i n g of t h e R u s s i a n p o p u l a t i o n , w h i c h f o r c e n t u r i e s w a s c a p t u r e d a n d sold i n t o s l a v e r y outside

of R u s s i a , h a d

been

largely s t o p p e d . Increasingly, the f o r m e r

non-

Christian raiders were t r a n s f o r m e d into converts and settled within the borders of t h e R u s s i a n E m p i r e . S o m e of t h e m w e r e c a p t u r e d a n d sold i n t o R u s s i a n h o u s e h o l d s , b u t m o s t c a m e t o s e e k r e f u g e of t h e i r o w n v o l i t i o n . While some native p e o p l e s tried to escape the Russian military and administ r a t i v e a r m s by f l e e i n g i n t o t h e m o r e d i s t a n t i m p e r i a l b o r d e r l a n d s , o t h e r s p r e ferred to a b a n d o n their native society and seek opportunities across the frontier in R u s s i a . T h e R u s s i a n a u t h o r i t i e s d i r e c t l y a n d i n d i r e c t l y e n c o u r a g e d t h e e s c a p e a n d m i g r a t i o n of t h e i n d i g e n o u s p o p u l a t i o n i n t o R u s s i a in w h a t b e c a m e o n e of t h e c o r n e r s t o n e s of t h e g o v e r n m e n t c o l o n i z a t i o n p o l i c i e s in t h e f r o n t i e r r e g i o n s . A t t r a c t e d by t h e R u s s i a n g o v e r n m e n t ' s o f f e r s of g e n e r o u s r e w a r d s a n d c o m p e n s a t i o n s , s o m e of t h e n a t i v e e l i t e c h o s e t o l e a v e f o r R u s s i a . B u t e v e n t h o s e w h o s t a y e d b e h i n d f o u n d t h e b e n e f i t s of t r a d e w i t h R u s s i a i r r e s i s t i b l e . T o m a x i m i z e t h e p r o f i t s f r o m s u c h t r a d e , t h e y i n c r e a s e d t a x a t i o n of t h e i r o w n p o p u l a t i o n , i n a d v e r t e n t l y a d d i n g t o t h e n u m b e r s of r e f u g e e s t o R u s s i a . In t i m e , t h e c o m m o n e r s t o o b e g a n f l e e i n g t o R u s s i a t o a v o i d o p p r e s s i o n of t h e i r o w n n o b l e s . 2 3 S u c h a m i g r a t i o n of t h e i n d i g e n o u s p o p u l a t i o n , b o t h e l i t e a n d c o m m o n e r s , a n d its l a r g e r implic a t i o n s r e m a i n v i r t u a l l y u n n o t i c e d a n d u n e x a m i n e d in t h e h i s t o r i o g r a p h y . T h e g o v e r n m e n t c o n t i n u e d t o e x p r e s s i n t e r e s t in d e f e c t o r s , n o b l e s a n d c o m m o n e r s alike, a n d p r o v i d e d t h e m w i t h s t r o n g i n c e n t i v e s t o r e s e t t l e a n d c o n v e r t . In o n e s u c h t y p i c a l e x a m p l e , in 1762 a K a b a r d i n i a n n o b l e c o n v e r t , f o r m e r l y K o r g o k a K a n c h o k i n a n d n o w k n o w n as A n d r e i I v a n o v , p e t i t i o n e d t o b e r e s e t t l e d within Russian borders. To e n c o u r a g e him further, the Senate g r a n t e d him the rank

of l i e u t e n a n t

c o l o n e l , a n d a n e w title a n d

name, Prince

Cherkasskii-

K a n c h o k i n . T h e S e n a t e a l s o listed s e v e r a l o p t i o n s a v a i l a b l e t o h i m . H e w o u l d r e c e i v e a n a n n u i t y of 5 0 0 r u b l e s if h e r e l o c a t e d w i t h i n t h e R u s s i a n b o r d e r s w i t h his p e o p l e . If h e c o u l d n o t c o n v i n c e his p e o p l e t o c o n v e r t a n d j o i n h i m , h e c o u l d m o v e t o t h e R u s s i a n f r o n t i e r t o w n of K i z l i a r a n d r e c e i v e 3 0 0 r u b l e s . Finally, if h e c h o s e t o stay in K a b a r d a , h e w o u l d r e c e i v e 150 r u b l e s a n d h a d t o c o m e t o K i z l i a r t h r e e t i m e s a y e a r t o r e c e i v e his a n n u i t y a n d h a v e his C h r i s t i a n i t y c o n f i r m e d . T h e S e n a t e e x p r e s s e d h o p e t h a t h e a n d his p e o p l e w o u l d t h u s c o n v e r t a n d r e s e t t l e . 2 4 T h e b a p t i z e d f u g i t i v e s w e r e listed as n e w c o n v e r t s , e v e n t h o u g h t h e y h a d little i d e a of t h e i r n e w r e l i g i o n a n d c o n t i n u e d t o p r a c t i c e t h e i r o l d o n e . T o s e c u r e c o n v e r t s as C h r i s t i a n s a n d t o p r o t e c t t h e m f r o m t h e i r k i n ' s r e v e n g e , t h e g o v e r n m e n t m o v e d t h e m a w a y f r o m t h e f r o n t i e r a r e a a n d s e t t l e d t h e m in t o w n s f o u n d e d e s p e cially f o r this p u r p o s e . O n g o v e r n m e n t o r d e r s t h e f o r t of N a g a i b a k in t h e U f a p r o v i n c e w a s b u i l t f o r t h e B a s h k i r c o n v e r t s in 1736. T h r e e y e a r s l a t e r t h e t o w n of

Colonial Frontiers in Eighteenth-Century

Russia • 137

Stavropol was founded to settle Kalmyk converts near the Volga River north of t h e city of Samara. 2 5 Neither these nor o t h e r settlements proved to be at a sufficient distance to prevent the escape of many converts seeking to reunite with their co-religionists and kin. When the issue of the settlement of the Kazakh converts came up in 1763, the Senate decreed that they should be sent f u r t h e r away f r o m O r e n b u r g , Astrakhan, and Kazan provinces and settled on the state lands d e e p in the Russian interior. 2 6 T h e government's principle concern with transforming non-Christians into Russian O r t h o d o x underpinned Russian policies in the frontier area throughout this time. In 1755, responding to the undeniable reality of massive exodus, purchase and conversion of the natives, the government gave a green light to those that wished to purchase and convert the natives in the frontier regions of Astrak h a n , O r e n b u r g and Siberia. In a r e m a r k a b l e violation of the exclusive privilege of the Russian nobility to purchase and own serfs, the government permitted priests, merchants, Cossacks and others to buy, convert and teach non-Christians, w h o were to remain their serfs until the owners' death. The Senate sanctioned t h e purchase of Kalmyks, Kumyks, Chechens, Kazakhs, Karakalpaks, Turkmens, Tomuts, Tatars, Bashkirs, B a r a b a Tatars and o t h e r Muslims and idol-worshippers. Thus, the non-Christians would be acquired without force "so that they could be converted to Christianity." 2 7 The situation in the North Caucasus in the second half of the eighteenth century illustrates with particular clarity the nature of Russian frontier policies and their intended and unintended impact on the indigenous societies. As elsewhere, the numerous pleas from the Kabardinian and other local chiefs to have their fugitives returned continued to fall on deaf ears. But in the mid-eighteenth century with the construction of Mozdok, a new fort a short distance away f r o m some Kabardinian villages, the issue of the fugitives' return took on a different dimension. Despairing Kabardinian nobles complained that they could no longer exercise control over their people, who t h r e a t e n e d to flee and convert to Christianity in Mozdok, Kizliar or Astrakhan. 2 8 A temporary reprieve for the local nobles was achieved in 1771, when Catherine II personally wrote to the Kabardinian people, trying, as always, to reconcile her ideas learned from the books of Western philosophers with the incongruous realities of the Russian Empire. While she nobly declared that "there is no such law in the entire world to reject those who seek Christian faith," she then conceded to the demands that the Kabardinian peasants should be returned "because they have no way of comprehending Christianity and because you need them in the fields."29 Russian policies of providing refuge for fugitives inadvertently led to the growing division between the Kabardinian nobles and the commoners. Exploiting such a rift later became central to the administration's policies in the North Caucasus. By promoting a social conflict within the native society the Russian g o v e r n m e n t sought to weaken the nobles and thus to increase its leverage over the natives. For instance, one of the tasks of the Russian liaison officer residing among the Kabar-

138 • Michael

Khoclarkovsky

dinians was "to incite the c o m m o n e r s to be loyal to Russia," and when in 1767 more than ten thousand Kabardinian peasants rebelled against the nobles and threatened to flee, the Russian m a j o r was sent to convince the rebels to leave their nobles and settle in Russian territory. 3 0 In 1782 Prince G.A. Potemkin-Tavricheskii instructed the c o m m a n d e r of the Russian troops in the Caucasus, G e n e r a l P.S. Potemkin, to reject any requests from the Kabardinian nobles for a return of their commoners who had fled to escape oppression. Leaving no doubt as to his views on the subject, he added: "I regard the separation of the c o m m o n e r s from the nobles the surest way to secure our frontier." 3 1 The idea of converting the natives received another impetus in the late eighteenth century, when Russia's continuous triumphant expansion allowed government officials to e q u a t e a new Russian imperial expansion with propagation of Christianity. In 1784 the G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l of the Caucasus, P.S. Potemkin, concluded that it was quite possible that the Kabardinians had become duplicitous after they converted to Islam, but that their perfidious nature could be explained by their poor understanding of Islam's tenets. Before this conversion to Islam, the governor continued, they were Christians, and if suitable priests were to be sent to preach a m o n g them, "undoubtedly, they would soon shed the light of divine bliss among all the peoples scattered in the mountains." 3 2 In the last quarter of the eighteenth century, although still mostly concerned with political and military objectives, the government began to embark on a different course of action, now actively seeking to alter the way of life of the peoples of the North Caucasus. A 1778 report by the Office of Foreign Affairs, referring to the Kabardinians. stated explicitly that "until this time there was no need to pay close attention to their internal affairs, and our side had been satisfied merely by pursuit of their political or external loyalty." 33 What changed was more than just Russia's needs. Since the mid-eighteenth century, Russian interests in the region were served by a new, educated, and westernized elite of military officers and government administrators. Typical representatives of the Age of Reason, schooled in contemporary concepts of law, military tactics and administration, and confident of their innate superiority, they brought with them new ideas and new m e t h o d s of governing. From their vantage point, the natives with their "savage c u s t o m s " and "completely corrupt m o r a l s " were "perfidious and unreliable p e o p l e " ( n e p o s t o i a n n y i verolomny), who could not be trusted because of "their fickle and crude n a t u r e " (vetrennosti i grubosti) and "their p r e d a t o r y way of life (khishchnoe remeslo) to which they are predisposed by their very n a t u r e and upbringing." 3 4 These were not merely personal prejudices, but officially sanctioned views. The natives, not unlike other subjects of the empire, were seen and treated as children, a notion unmistakably confirmed by one of the official titles of the Caucasus' g o v e r n o r s in the late eighteenth century, "the guardian and patron of various non-Christians ( o p e k u n raznykh inovertsov)."35

Colonial Frontiers in Eighteenth-Century

Russia • 139

Of course, the children could grow up and achieve redemption by becoming the faithful subjects of the Russian Empire and enjoying the benefits of civilization, which the Russian officials claimed to embody. The natives were not yet romanticized as "innocent children of n a t u r e " or "noble savages" as the natives of t h e New World were or as the natives of the Russian Empire would be in the ninet e e n t h century. First, like any children, they needed to be controlled, instructed and ruled, and if they misbehaved, admonished and punished. Catherine II envisioned the Kazakhs serving as an irregular Russian military and the steppe transformed through the newly built towns, mosques, schools, and trading centers. Islam was to be put in the service of the empire, and her plans included recruiting and paying a loyal mullah from among the Kazan Tatars, who could encourage the Kazakhs' loyalty and ensure their peaceful intentions. O t h e r Muslims, such as merchants of Bukhara and Tashkent with residence in Tobolsk', were exempt from local laws, taxation, or any service, "in order to attract more of them to settle in the Russian Empire and to expand trade with the neighboring peoples." 36 O n e of the most comprehensive plans for colonial administration of the region was submitted by the A s t r a k h a n G o v e r n o r Petr Krechetnikov in 1775. Like previous proposals, this one too was based on the belief that "nothing can tame their b a r b a r i t y b e t t e r a n d m a k e t h e m m o r e docile than their conversion to Christianity," and "because many of these peoples are Muslim only in name, it will not be difficult to convert them, and through the contact with our people it would be possible to have their language and their customs eradicated completely." A school was to be founded in the city of A s t r a k h a n where the local nobles could send their children, and trade would be encouraged so that the natives would get used to Russian merchandise and particularly to using money. To convince the authorities in St. Petersburg to pursue a more active policy in the Caucasus, the governor described how the treasury would benefit from the exploration of the region's natural resources and its fertile lands. F u r t h e r m o r e , the natives could supply cheap labor, and, because the concept of profit was unfamiliar to them, they could be paid very little or be given shirts as a compensation for their labor, as was customary among them. But to achieve this, the governor argued, the Russian authorities needed to create new settlements along the entire frontier line from Kizliar to Mozdok. T h e r e the natives should be settled a m o n g the Russian troops, which should comprise at least one third of its population, be put under Russian command and allowed to intermarry; "this way their way of life, customs, and language will wither away painlessly and easily, and they will become the full subjects of H e r Imperial Majesty." 3 7 He *

*

In the end, the pattern of Russia's changing policies and objectives a p p e a r s to be consistent along the entire stretch of the southern and southeastern frontier. In the initial stage, Russia's goals were to stop the hostile activity of the newly encountered peoples against Russia and redirect it toward Russia's foes. While

140 • Michael

Khodarkovsky

M o s c o w i n v a r i a b l y insisted o n an o a t h of allegiance, its r e l a t i o n s h i p with t h e i n d i g e n o u s p e o p l e s w a s n o m o r e t h a n a m i l i t a r y alliance of c o n v e n i e n c e . D u r i n g this s t a g e M o s c o w b e l i e v e d t h a t its i n t e r e s t s w o u l d be best s e r v e d by a s t r o n g central a u t h o r i t y of a local k h a n o r chief. A s t h e R u s s i a n f r o n t i e r a d v a n c e d f u r t h e r a n d t h e t h r e a t of raids r e c e d e d , t h e g r o w i n g c o l o n i z a t i o n of t h e l a n d s s e c u r e d by t h e fortification line d e m a n d e d n e w priorities. R u s s i a w a s n o w less i n t e r e s t e d in t h e military p o t e n t i a l of its s t e p p e n e i g h b o r s a n d m o r e in t h e i r l a n d a n d r e s o u r c e s . To achieve this objective, it p r e f e r r e d to f u r t h e r d i v i d e a n d w e a k e n t h e i n d i g e n o u s societies. W i t h t h e natives i n c r e a s i n g d e p e n d e n c e o n R u s s i a , t h e g o v e r n m e n t p r o c e e d e d in i n t e g r a t i n g t h e n a t i v e s i n t o t h e i m p e r i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s y s t e m , first t h r o u g h t h e c r e a t i o n of syncretic f r o n t i e r i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d l a t e r by p l a c i n g t h e n a t i v e s u n d e r R u s s i a ' s direct administrative control. Yet a l t e r i n g t h e n a t i v e way of life, a n d m a k i n g t h e m a b a n d o n their religion, c u s t o m s a n d t r a d i t i o n s p r o v e d to b e a task f a r m o r e f o r m i d a b l e t h a n e i t h e r t h e R u s s i a n o r t h e Soviet g o v e r n m e n t s i m a g i n e d . A c o m p e t e n t , w e l l - n u a n c e d a n d ideologically d i s i n t e r e s t e d s t o r y of t h e s u c c e s s e s a n d failures of R u s s i a ' s colonial e n d e a v o r s is yet t o b e told.

Notes 1 For more expansive and substantive arguments, see my Russia's Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500-1800 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001). otnosheniia v 16-18 vekakh: Sbornik dokumentov i materialov 2 Kazakhsko-russkie Ata: A N Kazakhskoi SSR, 1961), no. 33, 53-54. 3 Ibid, no. 2 5 0 , 6 3 9 . 4 Russko-dagestanskie otnosheniia 17-pervoi chetverti 18 vv: Dokumenty i (Makhachkala: D a g e s t a n k o e izd., 1958), no. 9 6 , 2 2 4 - 2 5 .

(Alma-

materialy

5 Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv drevnikh aktov ( M o s c o w ) [hereafter R G A D A ] , f. 248, op. 113 (Opis' del Sekretnoi Ekspeditsii Senata), d. 1257,1. 14ob. 6 Russko-osetinskie otnosheniia v 18 veke, 1742-62, comp. by M.M. Bliev (Ordzhonikidze: Izd. IR, 1976), 1: no. 53, 121; nos. 5 6 , 5 7 , 1 2 3 - 2 7 . 7 Kazanskii Universitet, Rukopisnyi otdel, no. 4865; Akty sobrannye Kavkazskoi Arkheograficheskoi komissiei [hereafter A K A K ] , 12 vols. (Tiflis, 1866-83) 1:91. O n patronage, see Ernest Gellner, "Patrons and Clients" in Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury, eds.. Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies (London: Duckworth, 1977), 1 - 6 ; on a notion of kunak in the Caucasus, s e e M.O. Kosven, Etnografiia i istoriia Kavkaza (Moscow: Vostochnaia literatura, 1961), 126-9. 8 Kazakhsko-russkie otnosheniia v 18-19 Ata: Nauka, 1964), no. 7 0 , 1 2 5 .

vekakh: Sbornik

9 N.N. Pal'mov, Etiudy po istorii privolzhskikh Tip. Kalmoblitizdata, 1926-32), 3^1: 289-90. 10 Kazakhsko-russkie

otnosheniia

v 16-18 vekakh,

kalmykov

dokumentov

i materialov

(Alma-

17 i 18 veka, 5 vols. (Astrakhan:

no. 153,401.

11 Ibid., no. 152,394; no. 2 2 5 , 5 8 0 - 8 3 ; no. 269, 686-87. 12 Ibid., no. 225, 580. 13 Michael Khodarkovsky, Where Two Worlds Met: The Russian State and the Kalmyk mads, 1600-1771 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 163, 182-85, 230.

No-

Notes

-141

14 Arkhiv Voenno-Morskogo Flota (St. Petersburg), f. 212. op. 1, d. 33,1.161. 15 Khodarkovsky, Where Two Worlds Met, 249. 16 Kazakhsko-russkie otnosheniia v 16-18 vv., no. 228, 596; Istoriia Kazakhskoi SSR, 2 vols. (Alma-Ata: AN Kazakhskoi SSR, 1957), 1: 282-83. 17 Kabardino-russkie otnosheniia v 16-18 vv.: Dokumenty i materialy, 2 vols. (Moscow: AN SSSR, 1957), 2: nos. 188-89, 255-59; no. 251, 355. Don i Stepnoe Predkavkaz'e, 18-pervaia polovina 19 v. Zaselenie i khoziaistvo (Rostov-on-Don, 1977), 61. 18 Khodarkovsky, Where Two Worlds Met, 44, 45,225,230-32. 19 P.G. Butkov, Materialy dlia novoi istorii Kavkaza s 1722 po 1803 g., 3 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1869), 1:311. 20 Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii, ser. 1,45 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1830) [hereafter Kazakhsko-russkie PSZ], 22: no. 15,991, 142-44; no. 16,292, 493-95; no. 16,400, 604-6; otnosheniia v 18-19 vv., no. 66, 120; M.P. Viatkin, Batvr Srym (Moscow-Leningrad: AN SSSR, 1947). 225. 21 Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Orenburgskoi Oblasti [hereafter GAOO], f. 5, op. 1, 1788, d. 22, 11. 35-71; Kazakhsko-russkie otnosheniia v 18-19 vv., no. 70, 129-130. 22 Viatkin, Batyr Srym, 352-7. 23 R G A D A , f. 248, op. 126, d. 90 (Dela i prigovory Pravitel'stvuiushchego Senata po Astrakhanskoi gubernii), 1. 13; Khodarkovsky, Where Two Worlds Met, passim. 24 Kabardino-russkie otnosheniia, 2: no. 165, 221-2. 25 R G A D A , f. 248, op. 126, d. 135 (Dela i prigovory Pravitel'stvuiushchego Senata po Orenburgskoi gubernii), 1735-37,1. 78; V.N. Vitevskii, I.I. Nepliuev i Orenburgskii krai v p r e z h nem ego soslave do 1758g., 3 vols. (Kazan: Tip. V.M. Kliuchnikova, 1897), 2: 439. 26 PSZ, 16, no. 11,886,321. 27 Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi imperii (Moscow) [hereafter AVPRI], f. 119, op. 5 (Kalmytskie dela), 1755, d. 17,11. 17-20. 28 Kabardino-russkie otnosheniia, 2: nos. 98-99, 122-24; no. 124, 167-8; no. 212, 298. For the earliest accounts chronicling Russian expansion in the Caucasus see, S.M. Bronevskii, Istoricheskie vypiski o snosheniiakh Rossii s Persiei, Gruziei i voobshche s gorskimi narodami. v Kavkaze obitaiushchimi, so vremen Ivana Vasil'evicha donyne, ed. I.K. Pavlova (St. Petersburg: Peterburgskoe Vostokovedenie. 1996); Butkov, Materialy dlia novoi istorii Kavkaza, and Michael Khodarkovsky, "Of Christianity, Enlightenment, and Colonialism: Russia in the North Caucasus, 1500-1800," Journal of Modern History 71, no. 2 (1999): 394-430. 29 Kabardino-russkie otnosheniia, 2: no. 213,302. 30 Ibid., nos. 194-95, 269-73; no. 212, 298. 31 Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi voenno-istoricheskii arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Moscow) [hereafter VIA], f. 52, op. 1, d. 286, pt. 3,11.8-10; Kabardino-russkie otnosheniia, 2: no. 251,355. 32 Kabardino-russkie otnosheniia, 2: no. 256, 360, 362. 33 Ibid., no. 227, 329. 34 Ibid., no. 225, 324; no. 256, 359-63. In 1768 the Kabardinian nobles complained that the Kizliar commander Major-General N.A. Potapov did not come to meet with them in Mozdok and wrote to them that "it was below his dignity to speak to such people as we are." Ibid., nos. 199-200, 276-77. 35 VIA, f. 52, op. 1, d. 264,1. 32; d. 286, pt. 3,11. 2, et al. 36 PSZ, 22: no. 16,292, 493-95; no. 16,400,604-6; no. 16,593,951-2. 37 Kabardino-russkie otnosheniia, 2: no. 220,312-16. Conversion of the Native Americans in the late eighteenth-century North America was also presented in terms of "taming the wild." See Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 506.

Colonization by Contract: Russian Settlers, South Caucasian Elites, and the Dynamics of Nineteenth-Century Tsarist Imperialism NICHOLAS B.

BREYFOGLE

In M a r c h 1845 Prince David Dadiani of Mingrelia a p p r o a c h e d the tsarist administration in the Caucasus with a r e m a r k a b l e proposal that would allow Russian p e a s a n t colonists from the central provinces to settle on his privately owned lands. 1 Believing there to be a shortage of labor on his territory, Dadiani was e a g e r to put this plan into action because he saw in it an opportunity not only to a u g m e n t his wealth but also to increase his power in relations with the tsarist state. Russian officials and settlers were similarly enthusiastic about Dadiani's project. State authorities, who were concerned in the 1840s to respect the property rights of Georgian elites, believed that such colonization a r r a n g e m e n t s would f u r t h e r their imperialist agenda in the region in a variety of ways, particularly economically. For their part, Russian colonists in the South Caucasus— the majority of which were Russian religious sectarians such as D u k h o b o r s , Molokans, and Subbotniks 2 —were confident that relocation to the lands of G e o r g i a n nobles such as D a d i a n i would be economically advantageous for them as well. The settlement a r r a n g e m e n t that Dadiani proposed (and which was sanctioned in a m e n d e d form later that year) represents a stage in the development of an u n u s u a l c o m p o n e n t of Russian imperialism in n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y Transcaucasia, what I call "colonization by contract." In this imperial structure, the tsarist state chose to facilitate Russian in-migration to the region by settling their colonists as tenant farmers on lands owned by Caucasian nobles. These settlements were formalized by term-prescribed contracts that were negotiated between colonists and landowners. Russian peasants had begun living unsystematically on the domains of South Caucasian elites beginning in the late 1830s. These dealings were partially standardized in 1845 with the Dadiani case and fully codified with the passing of a landmark decree in June 1858. This law, which was developed out of the triangular interaction of Caucasian elites, tsarist officials, and Russian peasant colonists, formalized past practice and facilitated such land a r r a n g e m e n t s in the future. 3 Mirroring tsarist ethnic policy broadly in

144 • Nicholas

B.

Breyfogle

t h e r e g i o n , t h e m a j o r i t y of t h e s e cases i n v o l v e d G e o r g i a n nobles, with only a f e w i n c i d e n t s c o n c e r n i n g A r m e n i a n a n d A z e r b a i j a n i notables. 4 D u r i n g t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , t h e p r o c e s s of c o l o n i z a t i o n by c o n t r a c t inv o l v e d only a f e w t h o u s a n d i n d i v i d u a l s — m o s t R u s s i a n colonists in t h e S o u t h C a u c a s u s settled o n s t a t e - o w n e d l a n d w i t h o u t the n e e d f o r n e g o t i a t e d a g r e e m e n t s . 5 N o n e t h e l e s s , it has i m p o r t a n t i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e c h a r a c t e r of tsarist e m p i r e - b u i l d i n g . In p a r t i c u l a r , it p e r m i t s an e x p l o r a t i o n of t h e inters e c t i o n of ethnicity, c o n f e s s i o n a l affiliation, a n d social s t a t u s in t h e s t r u c t u r i n g of i m p e r i a l p o w e r relations. It also s h e d s light o n the n a t u r e of land o w n e r s h i p a n d t h e m e a n i n g s of p r o p e r t y in n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y Russia, a n d on t h e flexibility a n d rigidity of tsarist e s t a t e categories. T h e system of R u s s i a n p e a s a n t s e t t l e m e n t o n lands of C a u c a s i a n elites is p a r ticularly i n t e r e s t i n g f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of global imperialism. T h e S o u t h C a u c a sian r e g i o n was i n c o r p o r a t e d into t h e e m p i r e d u r i n g t h e late e i g h t e e n t h a n d early n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r i e s , b o t h t h r o u g h d i p l o m a t i c n e g o t i a t i o n s and military c o n q u e s t , a n d R u s s i a n officials c o n s i d e r e d it to be a colony. 6 A s p a r t of their i m p e r i a l i s t policies, t h e tsarist s t a t e b e g a n to settle R u s s i a n p e a s a n t s in t h e r e g i o n . Yet, in c o n t r a s t to t h e m a j o r i t y of cases of colonialism in m o d e r n world h i s t o r y ( a n d in o t h e r p a r t s of t h e R u s s i a n E m p i r e ) , h e r e t h e R u s s i a n s t a t e a p p r o a c h e d c o l o n i z a tion of t h e region n o t simply by d i s p o s s e s s i n g t h e C a u c a s i a n p e o p l e s of t h e i r land ( w h i c h t h e y did aggressively f r o m t h e 1810s t h r o u g h t h e 1830s) b u t also by settling their " c o l o n i s t s " on t h e l a n d s of elite m e m b e r s of t h e " c o l o n i z e d " p e o p l e s , at t i m e s in socially a n d e c o n o m i c a l l y d e p e n d e n t relationships. I n d e e d , t h e c o n t r a c t s that indigenous landowners and the sectarians entered into governing land usage a n d r e m u n e r a t i o n belie a n y s i m p l e c a t e g o r i z a t i o n of t h e p o w e r

relationships

b e t w e e n c o l o n i z e r a n d c o l o n i z e d in T r a n s c a u c a s i a . 7 M o r e o v e r , t h e p r a c t i c e of settling these p e a s a n t s on " n a t i v e " n o b l e lands was a n o m a l o u s f o r R u s s i a on a social level, c o n t r a v e n i n g l o n g s t a n d i n g tsarist law a n d practice. R u s s i a n settlers w h o r e l o c a t e d t o Transcaucasia, w h a t e v e r t h e i r original social d e s i g n a t i o n in t h e i n t e r i o r provinces, w e r e almost always classified as " s t a t e p e a s a n t s " a f t e r their arrival o n t h e f r o n t i e r . A c c o r d i n g to t h e s t a t u t e s of R u s s i a ' s " a s c r i p t i v e l e g a l - a d m i n i s t r a t i v e categories," s t a t e p e a s a n t s could be s e t t l e d only o n s t a t e - o w n e d land a n d w e r e to pay d u e s solely to the treasury. 8 Thus, t h e law of 1858, with its c o l o n i z a t i o n by c o n t r a c t , is also n o t a b l e f o r t h e e x c e p t i o n it o f f e r e d in allowing s t a t e p e a s a n t s t o live on t h e p r i v a t e lands of nobles, o n a c o n t r a c t u a l f o u n d a t i o n , while s i m u l t a n e o u s l y r e m a i n i n g in their original ascriptive c a t e g o r y (with its privileges a n d b u r d e n s ) . ACCIDENTAL

SETTLERS

R u s s i a n s t a t e p e a s a n t s b e g a n t o settle on t h e lands of S o u t h C a u c a s i a n elites in unofficial and ad h o c ways well b e f o r e e i t h e r t h e c o n c e p t i o n or p a s s i n g of t h e 1858 law. T h e r e w e r e t h r e e c a u s e s f o r t h e s e u n c o n v e n t i o n a l s e t t l e m e n t a r r a n g e m e n t s :

Colonization

by Contract • 145

ts.arist problems in demarcating the boundaries of private versus state land; confiscation and then return of lands belonging to Caucasian nobles as tsarist imperial policies changed; and the settlers' willingness to enter into such contractual relations. This irregular, often post-facto-sanctioned settlement reflects the very chaotic nature of Russian imperial expansion in which about-faces of policy were by n o means uncommon. The absence of knowledge about local conditions (in this case about land boundaries) added to an already disorderly process. State peasant sectarians found themselves on the property of indigenous l a n d o w n e r s as a result of the inability (especially lack of time and resources) and i n c o m p e t e n c e of tsarist administrators to delimit properly the territorial boundaries in Transcaucasia. Dissenters coming f r o m central Russia settled on land that tsarist officials had initially labeled state-owned but which later came under disp u t e by local landowners. 9 For example, Molokans settled in 1843 in Aleksandrop o l ' uezd (Armenian oblast') on land that, "because of a misunderstanding," administrators demarcated as treasury property. However, the Georgian Orbeliani family soon challenged the state for ownership of the land, saying they had long b e e n its proprietors, and they officially regained possession in 1853. H o w e v e r , for a variety of reasons, tsarist officials opposed relocating the state p e a s a n t s to neighboring state lands. In 1848, well before the end of the dispute, viceroy M.S. Vorontsov contacted Orbeliani to negotiate conditions under which t h e Russian settlers would remain on his domain. 1 0 Second, sectarians found themselves living on private land because of changing tsarist policy towards local elites. A n t h o n y Rhinelander ( a m o n g other scholars) describes how Russian administration of the South Caucasus in the first half of the nineteenth century vacillated b e t w e e n centralization and regionalism in its approach. 1 1 As part of one of these shifts to standardize and "Russify" the administration in the Caucasus (especially in 1837-41 under Baron RV. H a h n ) , land belonging to Transcaucasian notables was confiscated in 1841—an action that was simultaneously designed to weaken the p o w e r of the elites and provide land for the Russian colonists to live on. In 1842, tsarist policy shifted again after H a h n ' s restructuring proved unworkable, and, a m o n g other results, the property was returned to the original owners, leaving recently settled Russians inhabiting private land. Such was the case with the lands of the Karabakh-bek Begliarovs. 1 2 In 1841, Molokan settlers founded the village of Borisy (Shusha uezd, S h e m a k h a guberniia) on confiscated lands formerly belonging to this A r m e n i a n family. The following year, as imperial policy swung to the other pole, the property, with the Molokans on it, was returned to their possession. 1 3 Both before and after the tsarist legislation, the settlement of peasants on noble land would not have been possible without the sectarians' willingness to d o so. Dealings with landlords included certain obligations and difficulties that the colonists would not have encountered on state-owned lands. Nonetheless, they embraced settlement on noble land in an e f f o r t to enhance their economic opportunities or to escape an environmentally challenging place of habitation (infertile

146 • Nicholas B. Breyfogle soil, difficult climate, and lack of access to water, among other factors). 1 4 For instance, a group of D u k h o b o r s exiled to the South Caucasus (1841-45) found the conditions in the so-called "Wet M o u n t a i n s " locale where they were settled to be so adverse that soon after their arrival they requested relocation to lands of the O r b e l i a n i family (Borchalo uchastok, Tiflis guberniia) where they f o u n d e d f o u r villages. 15 Similarly, in January 1858, M o l o k a n s f r o m the town of A l e k s a n d r o p o l ' r e q u e s t e d permission to relocate to private lands in the hope of ameliorating their economic situation. O n their own initiative, the Molokans entered into an agreem e n t with Nina Ivanova Loris-Melikova (wife of Mikhail Tarielovich Loris-Melikov) to rent and live on part of her land. 1 6 In fact, the sectarians' d e m a n d for settlement on elite-owned lands at times outstripped the state's willingness to allow such settlement and they were denied authorization. In the wake of the 1858 law, Molokans f r o m various parts of the South Caucasus sent in petitions, filled with stories of communal and personal ruin, requesting relocation f r o m their current villages because of economic problems. O n e g r o u p of petitioners applied to live on land owned by the G e o r g i a n O r t h o d o x Church. While the petitioners saw this m o v e m e n t as the solution to all their problems, the Chief A d m i n i s t r a t o r of the C h a m b e r of the Ministry of State Properties b a r r e d such a migration because of the negative impact it would have on the local population already settled there. 1 7

S E T T L E M E N T BY D E S I G N : O R I G I N S OF T H E 1 8 5 8 L A W Four factors came together to generate the legislation that permitted the settlement of Russian state peasants on the lands of South Caucasian elites. First, the active lobbying efforts of Georgian nobles themselves m a d e possible this arrangem e n t , both in pressing the local administration for such settlement laws and also in recruiting settlers. Indeed, Georgian nobles originated the very idea for Russian state-peasant settlement on their lands, and it was not until their intervention t h a t tsarist administrators began to conceive the possibility of a broad-based policy. 18 Second, the development of this project was intricately linked to the b r o a d e r agenda of Russian colonization in the South Caucasus. Tsarist officials settled the incoming sectarians on the properties of local elites in an effort to resolve p r o b l e m s they faced in providing a d e q u a t e land to s u p p o r t all the religious dissenters they wanted to relocate to Transcaucasia. Third, tsarist officialdom's sense of the inviolability of social-status categories—and the rights and responsibilities a t t a c h e d to these groupings, particularly in terms of land usage and ownership—also directly shaped the development of the law. Finally, it is unlikely that the legislation would have come about at all, let alone in the form that it did, without the p e r s o n a l authority and individual initiative of two Caucasian Viceroys, Vorontsov and Prince A.I. Bariatinskii, in driving forward this legal exception.

Colonization

by Contract • 147

C h r o n o l o g i c a l l y , this u n u s u a l a n d u n p r e c e d e n t e d policy d e v e l o p e d in t h r e e s t a g e s — 1 8 4 4 ^ 1 5 , 1 8 5 0 . a n d 1 8 5 7 - 5 8 — a n d b e g a n with an initially u n r e l a t e d p e t i t i o n of t h e n Chief A d m i n i s t r a t o r of t h e Caucasus, A.I. N e i d g a r d t . In it, he r e q u e s t e d a c e s s a t i o n of sectarian s e t t l e m e n t in Transcaucasia b e c a u s e of a d e a r t h of s t a t e l a n d o n which to settle these migrants, a n d t h e n e e d to t a k e s o m e time to d e t e r m i n e e x a c t l y h o w m u c h land t h e r e was available f o r t h e settlers. 1 9 T h e a b s e n c e of land r e s u l t e d f r o m five sources. First, m u c h of t h e land that t h e Russian state claimed as its o w n , a n d o n which it initially p l a n n e d t o settle the R u s s i a n migrants, t u r n e d o u t in f a c t t o b e u n s u i t a b l e f o r h u m a n h a b i t a t i o n b e c a u s e of disease, harsh climate, or a lack of w a t e r . S e c o n d , for all of t h e tsarist a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s e f f o r t s to increase t h e size of t h e R u s s i a n p o p u l a t i o n in t h e region, tsarist officials w e r e very c o n c e r n e d in i m p l e m e n t i n g their colonization policy to e n s u r e that t h e s e t t l e m e n t of the sectarian m i g r a n t s would not cause h a r m to t h e local p o p u l a t i o n . A s Bariatinskii asserted in discussing the a b s e n c e of lands f o r R u s s i a n s to settle on, " f a i r n e s s d e m a n d s d e s i g n a t i n g f r e e lands primarily to t h e native peasants, of w h o m a large n u m b e r a r e s u f f e r i n g f r o m an e x t r e m e insufficiency of land." 2 0 T h i r d , t h e r e w e r e p r o b l e m s in d e m a r c a t i n g t h e b o u n d a r i e s of privately o w n e d and s t a t e lands. F o u r t h , tsarist officials f o u n d t h e m s e l v e s c i r c u m s c r i b e d in their choice of lands in Transcaucasia f o r t h e s e c t a r i a n settlers b e c a u s e t h e rules of s e t t l e m e n t were initially d e s i g n e d t o place t h e d i s s e n t e r s as far away as possible f r o m o t h e r Christians, a n d particularly O r t h o d o x Russians. 2 1 Finally, even t h o u g h the g o v e r n m e n t c a m e to realize that t h e r e w e r e lands o w n e d by private n o b l e l a n d o w n e r s c u r r e n t l y lying u n u s e d , t h e t r e a s u r y f o u n d it impossible to b u y t h e s e lands b e c a u s e of the expense. 2 2 In t h e f a c e of this s t a t e d i l e m m a o v e r w h e r e a n d how to settle t h e s e c t a r i a n s in t h e r e g i o n , P r i n c e C h a v c h a v a d z e , 2 3 r e p r e s e n t i n g a g r o u p of G e o r g i a n n o b l e s t h a t i n c l u d e d t h e D a d i a n i and O r b e l i a n i f a m i l i e s a m o n g o t h e r s , p r o p o s e d a s o l u t i o n . H e d e c l a r e d their " w i l l i n g n e s s " to allow t h e s e c t a r i a n c o l o n i s t s to r e l o c a t e o n t o t h e i r lands. Such s e t t l e m e n t w o u l d b e b a s e d on m u t u a l l y d e t e r m i n e d c o n t r a c t s in w h i c h t h e R u s s i a n s w o u l d r e t a i n t h e s t a t u s rights of s t a t e p e a s a n t s b u t w o u l d o w e o b l i g a t i o n s a n d r e m u n e r a t i o n to t h e l a n d o w n e r f o r t h e use of his land. O n a n u m b e r of o c c a s i o n s in t h e following years, t h e n o b l e s p r e s s e d their r e q u e s t f o r this contractual colonization.24 C h a v c h a v a d z e c o u c h e d t h e p r o p o s a l as beneficial for all i n v o l v e d . U s i n g lang u a g e t h a t was s u r e to a p p e a l to t h e tsarist l e a d e r s h i p , he r e a s o n e d t h a t t h e i r p l a n w o u l d satisfy a p l e t h o r a of tsarist policy goals in o n e fell s w o o p . 2 5 It w o u l d solve t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s insufficiency of a p p r o p r i a t e s t a t e land a n d also m a k e possible far g r e a t e r s e t t l e m e n t of R u s s i a n s i n t o t h e region. A d d i t i o n a l l y , he i n d i c a t e d t h a t e a c h of t h e n o b l e p e t i t i o n e r s p o s s e s s e d m o r e land t h a n t h e y w e r e able t o cult i v a t e with their c u r r e n t p o p u l a t i o n . F a c e d with a d e a r t h of G e o r g i a n p e a s a n t s , t h e y w e r e h a p p y to b r i n g in n e w l a b o r e r s t o m a k e t h e land p r o f i t a b l e a n d i n c r e a s e t h e r e g i o n ' s productivity. C h a v c h a v a d z e also c o n t e n d e d t h a t t h e m u t u a l t e r m s of s e t t l e m e n t w o u l d be " i n c o m p a r a b l y m o r e p r o f i t a b l e f o r t h e s e t t l e r h e r e t h a n is g e n e r a l l y t h e case in t h e i n t e r n a l p r o v i n c e s . " 2 6

148 • Nicholas B. Breyfogle M o r e notably, Chavchavadze argued that the "coming together" (sblizhenie) of Russian settlers with the native Georgian peasants would have a very positive economic and cultural influence on the latter. "The people resettled f r o m Russia, being hard-working, experienced in agriculture, and acquainted with handicraft work, industrial endeavors, and t h e carting trade could, by their example, arouse the natives to similar enterprise." That said, Chavchavadze assured the tsarist state that cultural transference would only go so far. He guaranteed that the settlement of Russian sectarians so close to O r t h o d o x Georgians would pose no threat of spreading the former's "heretical" religious views—a particular concern of the Russian administration. In his estimation, Georgian peasants were staunch believers in their faith who had d e f e n d e d it against the encroachment and conquest of their "non-Christian" (inovertsy) neighbors for centuries. There was nothing that the sectarians could do that would break the Georgian peasants f r o m Orthodoxy. 2 7 The fact that Georgian nobles were willing to foster the colonization of the region by Russian peasants is indicative of certain features of the Russian imperial system. O n one level it shows that the nobility, whatever anxieties and opposition they might have held about the tsarist presence in the region, were willing to take advantage of imperial rule even though it meant bringing Russians o n t o their lands. 2 8 Indeed, Russian incorporation of the South Caucasus o f f e r e d these elites appealing new options even as it constricted and redefined their powers. In this case, Georgian nobles saw Russian settlement as a welcome opportunity to increase their wealth and m a k e more productive use of their lands. Although they presented their proposal as a selfless proposition designed to help the Russian state, the prospect of enrichment clearly was a primary determining factor. These economic incentives a p p e a r to have overshadowed any fears that the Georgians may have had at the prospect of the Russian state achieving its goals of imperial integration through ethnic Russian settlement. 2 9 In addition, this colonial structure provided a chance to recoup, in small measure, the social power they lost when the tsarist government stripped them of their traditional rights to own clergy and minor nobles. 3 0 Moreover, and more ingeniously, certain Georgian nobles appear to have b e e n using the prospect of Russian colonization as a means to moderate the impact of direct Russian control. For instance, the colonization terms that Prince Dadiani initially proposed indicate his hope to use the settlement of Russians on his lands as a way to reduce the direct power of tsarist institutions over his territories and people. Dadiani was extremely u n h a p p y with tsarist plans to expand its administration into his region, and was concerned that tsarist agents would "lower him in the eyes of his subjects." A s part of his proposition, Dadiani requested that the G e o r g i a n - d o m i n a t e d Mingrelian administration should hold primary administrative authority over the peasant settlers, which would eliminate, he argued any need for the Ministry of State Properties to set up an office on his territory. In this way, it appears that Dadiani m a d e use of the settlement of Russians as a m e a n s to

Colonization

by Contract • 149

prevent tsarist institutionalization on his lands and the threat that it posed to his p o w e r and prestige. 3 1 Despite the nobles' atypical proposal, Russian leaders were willing to fulfill the request, in part, as an element of tsarism's larger imperialist policy of accommodation and cooptation of native elites. As A l f r e d J. Rieber has noted, Russian policy towards indigenous notables generally did not stem from "any official policy of ethnic or racial exclusionism. ...Instead of destroying the indigenous nobilities, the natural leaders of cultural groups that were incorporated into the empire, the Russian state sought to grant them equal standing in the imperial nobility, o f t e n extending special privileges that preserved their local cultural traditions." 3 2 Tsarist rule in Transcaucasia f r o m 1842 o n w a r d included this effort to enlist the support of local elites in Russia's empire-building project by granting them privileges, bringing t h e m into the administration, and putting an end to H a h n ' s heavyh a n d e d policies. As R o n a l d Suny has argued: "The aim and result of Vorontsov's policies was to reduce the opposition to Russian rule in the Caucasus and to forge an alliance between the Russian state and Georgian nobility." 33 G r a n t i n g the nobles the opportunity to increase both their wealth and the productivity of their lands, and treating the Georgian nobles as they would Russian elites in their interactions with Russian peasants, comprised aspects of this larger policy of cooptation. M o r e o v e r , Chavchavadze's proposal did not fall on deaf ears a m o n g the tsarist leaders because it dovetailed nicely with the Russian state's colonization endeavors in the region. Successive viceroys and many layers of the central government (including, at different times and in slightly different ways, the Minister of State Properties, the Caucasian Committee, and the E m p e r o r ) supported the basic outline of Chavchavadze's proposal. They began f r o m the first principles that the relocation of religious dissenters to the South Caucasus was a valuable policy goal f o r t h r e e reasons. First, the sectarians' segregation on the frontier was designed to cleanse the interior provinces of the " h e r e t i c a l " non-conformists. The state h o p e d in this m a n n e r to punish them for their faith, dissuade others f r o m joining, and prevent the spread of the sectarians to the O r t h o d o x population. 3 4 Second, it would increase the n u m b e r of Russian settlers in Transcaucasia as quickly as possible. These Russian colonists would act as the glue of imperial integration by physically linking center and periphery: "in political terms, acting to consolidate Russian dominion (vladychestvo) there and to bring about the merging (sliianie) of the region with the empire." 3 5 Third, they championed the noble option because they believed that an increase in the Russian population in the region would bear untold economic fruit. The Russian colonists would play the role of agents of cultural and economic transformation, bringing with them assumed superior traits and skills. On one level, tsarist officials considered the sectarian settlers to be "industrious people and excellent f a r m e r s " who woiiild act as "positive examples for the nomadic peoples of the region to follow." 36 On another level, the settlers would "spread different, previ-

150 • Nicholas B. Breyfogle ously unknown types of agriculture" and foster industrial development. As Vorontsov wrote to the Minister of State Domains, P.D. Kiselev: "Ever since Russian peasants began to settle here, there have appeared in the region ... types of industry which were formerly unknown. Carters have appeared, transporting fish, caviar and other loads, as have carpenters, brick workers, and other artisans." The appearance of these carters and artisans, as well as of Russian-run gristmills and the cultivation of certain imported crops, was welcome news to the tsarist government. They saw these developments as a foundation for economic growth in the area, and indispensable to the government's larger goal of developing the region as a colony. 37 Moreover, in addition to benefiting the South Caucasian territories, such a settlement relationship would be economically advantageous to both noble and sectarian-settler. "Traveling through Mingrelia, rich with forests, flowing waters, and fertile soil," Vorontsov could not help but express his regret "that this perfect region stands in disregard and does not have sufficient population of hardworking settlers." To remedy this economic under-use, Vorontsov was "gladdened" at the thought of Russian settlement on Caucasian noble land. 38 State authorities lamented that all of these benefits were being lost because of the difficulties in allotting usable state land to the migrating sectarians, and growing sectarian d e m a n d in the mid-1840s voluntarily to move to the South Caucasus was only exacerbating the problem. F u r t h e r m o r e , Russian administrators all agreed with Chavchavadze's estimation that the sectarians would pose no religious threat to the South Caucasian peasants. The non-conformists would be unable to spread their faith to the surrounding " t r i b e s " because of the cultural and linguistic separateness: "the different ways of life, customs, and u n d e r s t a n d ings that exist between the Russians and the Georgian peasants, and also because of the G e o r g i a n peasants' a t t a c h m e n t to O r t h o d o x y that has been d e m o n s t r a t e d over the centuries." 3 9 While these justifications remained more or less in place from 1844 through 1858, and despite generally positive estimations of the plan, certain reservations and legal obstacles appeared in 1845 and 1850 that prevented the project becoming law. In 1 8 4 4 ^ 5 , Kiselev s u p p o r t e d the project but nonetheless felt reluctance and discomfort with the idea of state peasants inhabiting the lands of the nobility. H e realized that Chavchavadze's scheme contravened existing social rules and, if brought to fruition, it would have to be on the foundation of new legislation. For Kiselev, any such statute would need to protect the colonists' status rights as state peasants, ensure payment to the treasury, and involve detailed contracts in o r d e r to delimit properly the privileges and obligations of landowner, settler, and local administration in this type of relationship. 4 0 T h r o u g h o u t the discussions that ensued, both the Minister of State Properties and successive Caucasian viceroys were determined to protect the rights of the state peasants involved in this sort of a r r a n g e m e n t . This resolve reflects, on one hand, the general importance of ascriptive social categories for tsarist officials and, on the other hand, the Ministry of State Properties' efforts to ameliorate the

Colonization

by Contract

151

lives of the state peasants through the reforms of the first half of the nineteenth century. 4 1 Significantly, their concerns encompassed only the possibility of socioe c o n o m i c exploitation and had nothing to do with anxiety that Georgians or A r m e n i a n s would wield power over Russians. They feared the potential that the c o n t r a c t s would devolve through noble machinations into a form of e n s e r f m e n t in which the state peasants lost their " f r e e " status. As a result, officials worked to a s s u r e that these would be relationships of mutual responsibility, in which the conditions would be carried out in complete exactness and contracts would "be c o m p o s e d with all possible detail, clarity, and definitiveness in order not to provide m e a n s in the f u t u r e for some sort of d i s a g r e e m e n t . " 4 2 Vorontsov paid particular attention to protect the rights of the state peasants. In his response to Dadiani's proposal, he laid out his general principles: "I believe it necessary ... to remove any occasion or thought that the Sovereign [Dadiani] might hold unrestricted right over the peasants, and [to assert] from the very beginning that they are free people forever." 4 3 To safeguard their rights f r o m the potentially willful actions of Georgian landowners, Vorontsov required that the G e o r g i a n - I m e r i t i a n Civilian G o v e r n o r together with the Viceroy carry out the primary surveillance of the settlers, and that the peasants be ensured their own c o m m u n a l administration. 4 4 Additionally, whereas Dadiani initially proposed that legal cases involving the sectarians be handled solely by the Mingrelian administration and police, Vorontsov believed that for "fairness" settler litigants should have the right of appeal directly to the Viceroy and the local C h a m b e r of Civil Court in cases where they were unhappy with the initial resolution. Vorontsov was concerned that "the Mingrelian administration is comprised of people more or less u n d e r the authority of the Prince [Dadiani], and its decisions will of course be biased to the side of the landowner, and not that of the settlers." 4 5 At the same time, Vorontsov was quick to include in the contract the stipulation that Dadiani (or any Georgian landowner) would not restrict their f r e e d o m of m o v e m e n t either short-term travel for carting work or p e r m a n e n t relocation—so long as they properly fulfilled their obligations to the landlord. 4 6 In the end, the discussions of 1844—45 permitted settlement of sectarians on noble land only in the case of Prince Dadiani, who proved particularly quick in compiling information about his region and proposing a series of contractual relations. 47 A t the same time, all other such settlement was put on hold while Vorontsov began the process of collecting data and formulating specific terms. This process was labor intensive and prevented any immediate implementation despite the agreement of officials at each level of government, Georgian nobles, and the settlers to do so. 48 Vorontsov a t t e m p t e d again in 1850 to implement a blanket policy for all state peasant settlers in the South Caucasus. H e r e too, the Viceroy was careful to ensure that the rules laid out in this plan "clearly and absolutely protected the status rights of the peasants" and that they detailed the mutual rights and responsibilities of both settlers and nobles. 49 However, unlike in 1845, the Ministry of

152 • Nicholas

B.

Breyfogle

S t a t e P r o p e r t i e s a n d t h e e m p e r o r n o w o p p o s e d the s t a t e - p e a s a n t - n o b l e settlem e n t plan. T h e r o o t s of this n e w f o u n d r e s i s t a n c e g r e w n o t f r o m s o c i o - e c o n o m i c o r e t h n i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , b u t f r o m t h e religious identity of t h e settlers as sectarians a n d t h e s e g r e g a t i o n c o m p o n e n t of tsarist c o l o n i z a t i o n policy in Transcaucasia. O v e r t h o s e five years, t h e M i n i s t e r of S t a t e P r o p e r t i e s h a d b e c o m e convinced t h a t t h e r e s e t t l e m e n t of religious d i s s e n t e r s to t h e S o u t h C a u c a s u s , far f r o m acting as a d e t e r r e n t to t h e g r o w t h of t h e f a i t h , w a s in fact h a v i n g t h e o p p o s i t e e f f e c t . In his o p i n i o n , t h e s e c t a r i a n s e t t l e r s in T r a n s c a u c a s i a " h a d a t t a i n e d a significant d e g r e e of w e a l t h " a n d this o u t c o m e w a s p e r s u a d i n g t h e m to r e m a i n s t e a d f a s t in their relig i o u s dissent. 5 0 M o r e o v e r , in 1850, tsarist officials w e r e n o l o n g e r facing a land s h o r t a g e f o r t h e s e s e t t l e r s b e c a u s e t h e n u m b e r of n o n - c o n f o r m i s t s w h o w a n t e d t o m o v e to t h e S o u t h C a u c a s u s h a d d e c r e a s e d o v e r t h e i n t e r v e n i n g years. V o r o n tsov's plan was shelved. 5 1 In 1857, a y e a r a f t e r he t o o k o v e r t h e position of C a u c a s i a n Viceroy, Prince B a r i a t i n s k i i o n c e again r e n e w e d V o r o n t s o v ' s e f f o r t s to a c c e l e r a t e the s e t t l e m e n t of R u s s i a n s in t h e r e g i o n by l o b b y i n g t h e c e n t r a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n to allow s t a t e p e a s a n t m i g r a n t s t o settle o n t h e lands of G e o r g i a n nobles. Bariatinskii a r g u e d against t h e logic of 1850, a s s e r t i n g t h a t s e c t a r i a n m i g r a t i o n was a sure way t o diminish their faith. H e also n o t e d t h a t in 1856 t h e new E m p e r o r A l e x a n d e r II h a d o n c e again c o n s i d e r e d it u s e f u l to s e n d s e c t a r i a n s to t h e S o u t h Caucasus. 5 2 In a d d i t i o n , l o o k i n g at t h e issue in 1857, B a r i a t i n s k i i a r g u e d that e x p e r i e n c e p r o v i d e d i r r e f u t a b l e e v i d e n c e t h a t such a r r a n g e m e n t s w o r k e d . S e c t a r i a n s had b e e n settled o n p r i v a t e land f r o m t h e early 1840s, and such s e t t l e m e n t h a d led to t h e m u t u a l profit of b o t h n o b l e s a n d migrants. I n d e e d , he w e n t so far as to claim t h a t "in t h e f u t u r e , this e x a m p l e can act as a g o o d influence f o r t h e s p r e a d of m u t u a l a g r e e m e n t s and t r a n s a c t i o n s b e t w e e n p e a s a n t s a n d l a n d o w n e r s , b o t h in this r e g i o n a n d in t h e i n t e r n a l p r o v i n c e s . " In this way, he held u p t h e case of R u s s i a n s e t t l e r s a n d T r a n s c a u c a s i a n n o b l e s as a m o d e l f o r t h e rest of t h e e m p i r e t o f o l l o w as t h e y d e b a t e d t h e f u t u r e p e a s a n t - n o b l e r e l a t i o n s a f t e r t h e l i b e r a t i o n of t h e serfs. 5 3 S w a y e d by B a r i a t i n s k i i ' s a r g u m e n t s , in J u n e of 1858, the tsar a g r e e d t o a r e g i o n - w i d e policy of s e c t a r i a n s t a t e - p e a s a n t s e t t l e m e n t o n n o b l e l a n d s in Transcaucasia.54

COLONIALISM TERMS AND

BY C O N T R A C T

(I):

ARRANGEMENTS

T h e actual a g r e e m e n t s n e g o t i a t e d b e t w e e n settlers a n d n o b l e s varied d r a m a t i c a l ly f r o m o n e case t o a n o t h e r in t e r m s of t h e settlers' d u e s and obligations, w h a t t h e y r e c e i v e d in r e t u r n , t h e t y p e a n d d u r a t i o n of the c o n t r a c t , w h e t h e r and h o w t h e c o n tract might be a m e n d e d or v o i d e d , a n d w h e t h e r t h e settlers w e r e allowed t o m o v e o r travel f r o m t h e l a n d l o r d ' s lands. D e s p i t e their h e t e r o g e n e i t y , t h e n a t u r e of t h e s e a c c o r d s p r o v i d e s an indication of w h a t each side ( a n d particularly t h e n o b l e s ) h o p e d to receive f r o m t h e relationship. T h e n o b l e s a p p e a r most c o n c e r n e d t o

Colonization

by Contract • 153

e n s u r e a constant and lucrative flow of rents without incurring any of the costs or f r u s t r a t i o n s of having to manage the settlers' communities directly. The settlers desired the best possible package of land and obligations, the f r e e d o m to move f r o m lands when they wanted, the opportunity to take advantage of other econ o m i c opportunities (especially in the carting trade and milling), and the protection of the state f r o m exploitation. For their part, state officials were required to a p p r o v e these contracts and were not shy to intervene in the process. They c h a n g e d conditions and wording in order to ensure that the deals were detailed, fair t o all involved, and particularly defended the rights of the colonists. 55 T h e Russian state-peasant settlers obtained a variety of benefits from the contracts.. Most importantly, they were allocated land on which to settle and work ( a l t h o u g h the a m o u n t of land per family could vary quite substantially), certain rights to use nearby forests for wood, occasionally the use of any industrial enterprises already on the land (such as mills, taverns, or general stores), and o f t e n the p r o t e c t i o n of the landowner should others try to seize their allotted land. Certain settlers had included in their contracts the promise of relief from payment of dues in the initial years of settlement, and direct aid should a poor harvest befall t h e m at any time. In addition, colonists might receive the option to engage in new types of e c o n o m i c endeavors, from building and operating gristmills, commercial forestry, owning taverns and stores, mining coal or minerals, and fishing (although with each n e w venture, they were required to pay some tithing to the noble). 5 6 In the specific case of the 1845 agreement with Dadiani, settlers received land that could serve a variety of purposes (from viticulture to grain growing, haymaking, and pasturage) but to a limit of ten desiatinas per revision soul. In order to help the settlers in their first years of habitation, Dadiani o f f e r e d to supply each family with a pair of bulls, two cows, two pigs, provisions for the first two years, and an exemption from rents during the first year. 5 7 T h e specific advantages sought by the landowners varied widely in terms of the a m o u n t owed, who specifically owed it, and the combination of money, kind, and service d e m a n d e d , depending on the desires of the landlord and location of settlement. Rents paid in cash diverged in amount, sometimes calculated per household (annually anywhere from one to 24 rubles), sometimes as a lump sum f r o m the community ( f r o m 200 to 330 rubles per year). 5 8 Many nobles also required payment in kind, which might include wheat, barley, wood, beeswax, and honey. For instance, K a r a b a k h - b e k Begliarov d e m a n d e d two silver rubles, two chetverty of wheat and half of barley from each household annually. 5 9 Moreover, certain nobles, like Dadiani, p r e f e r r e d a combination of rents and service: in addition to owing twenty percent of all their produce, one laborer f r o m each family was to work for the Prince for one day each week. 6 0 Similarly, Talyshbek Begliarov insisted on ten percent of the total harvest, as well as two workdays annually per settler at the landowner's discretion. 6 1 Contracts might include any n u m b e r of other service obligations in addition to working the noble's land. O n e agreement required the D u k h o b o r settlers, in addition to rent payments, to main-

154 • Nicholas

B.

Breyfogle

tain t h e local r o a d s a n d t o p r o v i d e " e x c e l l e n t h o u s i n g " for r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the O r b e l i a n i f a m i l y s h o u l d they b e t r a v e l i n g t h r o u g h t h e area. 6 2 L o r i s - M e l i k o v a r e q u e s t e d a n n u a l p a y m e n t of eight silver r u b l e s a n d two " f u l l " carts of w o o d p e r h o u s e h o l d , t h e l a t t e r to b e d e l i v e r e d d i r e c t l y t o h e r h o u s e in Tiflis, a n d i n s e r t e d t h e c o n t r a c t u a l right to build herself a s u m m e r h o u s e in t h e M o l o k a n s ' village. 6 3 C o n t r a c t s t h e m s e l v e s could also v a r y in t e r m s of t h e f o r m a n d d u r a t i o n . Most p a c t s w e r e w r i t t e n , lasting a n y w h e r e f r o m s e v e n to thirty years. A t t h e e n d of e a c h c o n t r a c t b o t h sides had t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to r e n e g o t i a t e on t h e s a m e o r d i f f e r e n t t e r m s , or a g r e e to g o t h e i r s e p a r a t e ways. H o w e v e r , p r i o r to 1858, v e r b a l a g r e e m e n t s g o v e r n e d t h e s e c t a r i a n s living o n t h e land of Princess M a r i a O r b e l i a n i a n d P r i n c e s Ivan a n d M a k a r i i O r b e l i a n i . In t h e case of Ivan a n d M a k a r i i , t h e settlers f o u n d t h a t t h e l a n d o w n e r s ' e x a c t i o n s a r b i t r a r i l y c h a n g e d f r o m year to year. A s a result of t h e s e a n d o t h e r u n i l a t e r a l n o b l e a l t e r a t i o n s , Bariatinskii r e q u i r e d all a g r e e m e n t s a f t e r 1858 ( i n c l u d i n g t h e p r e e x i s t i n g v e r b a l o n e s ) to be m a d e in written f o r m a n d be a p p r o v e d by t h e g o v e r n m e n t . 6 4 W h a t e v e r t h e specific t e r m s of t h e c o n t r a c t s b i n d i n g s e c t a r i a n s a n d Transc a u c a s i a n l a n d o w n e r s , m a n y local elites s t r o v e to o b t a i n t h e e c o n o m i c b e n e f i t s of a " s e r f " e c o n o m y w i t h o u t a s s u m i n g t h e responsibilities. G e o r g i a n a n d A r m e n i a n n o b l e s o f t e n r e q u i r e d s t a t e a g e n t s f r o m t h e Ministry of S t a t e P r o p e r t i e s to act as m i d d l e m e n f o r t h e m to avoid the p o t e n t i a l c o m p l i c a t i o n s of direct i n t e r a c t i o n with t h e settlers. T h e g o v e r n m e n t w a s h a p p y to c o m p l y with this wish since t h e y did not w a n t the s t a t e p e a s a n t s to b e t o o c o m p l e t e l y u n d e r t h e c o n t r o l of t h e nobility. For instance, t h e O r b e l i a n i f a m i l y in E r e v a n g u b e r n i i a w o u l d only a g r e e to sign a c o n t r a c t with s e t t l e r s if a local r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f r o m t h e M i n i s t r y of S t a t e P r o p e r t i e s first c o l l e c t e d t h e r e n t m o n e y , d e p o s i t e d it in t h e local uezd treasury, a n d finally t r a n s f e r r e d it to an O r b e l i a n i a g e n t . T h e y f u r t h e r r e q u i r e d t h a t "in e n f o r c i n g t h e c o l l e c t i o n of t h e s e m o n e y s , a n d in all o t h e r situations, t h e P r i n c e s O r b e l i a n i s h o u l d h a v e n o direct r e l a t i o n s with t h e p e a s a n t s . " 6 5 Similarly, w h e n B e k T e i m u r a z M e l i k - B e g l i a r o v r e v i s e d t h e t e r m s of his c o n t r a c t with M o l o k a n s o n his land, h e d e m a n d e d t h a t t h e m o n e y b e p a i d to him via t h e t r e a s u r y , n o t by t h e M o l o k a n s directly, as h a d originally b e e n t h e case. 6 6 In a d d i t i o n , a n o t insignificant n u m b e r of C a u c a s i a n n o b l e s a t t e m p t e d t h r o u g h t h e c o n t r a c t s to restrict t h e m o b i l i t y of t h e settlers, b o t h c o n c e r n i n g t e m p o r a r y leaves a n d also o u t - m i g r a t i o n f r o m t h e l a n d o w n e r s ' lands. T h e s e e f f o r t s w e r e int e n d e d to k e e p t h e p e a s a n t s w o r k i n g t h e l a n d a n d t o p r e v e n t t h e s e t t l e r s f r o m s k i p p i n g o u t w i t h o u t p a y i n g their dues. D a d i a n i , f o r e x a m p l e , was c o n c e r n e d t o c o n t r o l t h e s e t t l e r s ' c o m i n g s and g o i n g s f o r s h o r t - t e r m , w o r k - r e l a t e d t r a v e l . H e initially p r o p o s e d a r e l a t i o n s h i p in which t h e s e t t l e r s w o u l d n o t be a b l e t o l e a v e t h e i r place of r e s i d e n c e for any r e a s o n w i t h o u t receiving p e r s o n a l , w r i t t e n p e r mission f r o m t h e P r i n c e himself. H o w e v e r , V o r o n t s o v and t h e C a u c a s i a n C o m m i t t e e w e r e quick t o a m e n d this p a r t of t h e p r o p o s a l . S e c t a r i a n s p l a y e d an i m p o r t a n t role in t h e r e g i o n a l c a r t i n g t r a d e a n d t h e officials did n o t w a n t r e s t r i c t i o n s on t h e m c a r r y i n g o u t t h e s e e s s e n t i a l e c o n o m i c activities. 6 7

any

Colonization

by Contract • 155

Most contracts broached the issue of Russian settlers leaving the landowners' land before the end of the contract, either through their own volition or by o r d e r of tsarist authorities. In certain cases, nobles f o r b a d e any early termination of the contract and required the colonists to remain on site until the end of the agreem e n t (at which point they could move, but often had to leave behind much of their property, for which they might either be paid or simply have to forfeit). In the case that villagers ran away, contractual clauses held the r e m a i n d e r of the c o m m u n i t y responsible for their rents. 6 8 In contrast, the D u k h o b o r s in the village of Bashkichet in 1867 were given full rights to leave the landowner's territory at their whim, with the only condition that they settle up certain payments b e f o r e they left. In this instance, they were even permitted to take with them whatever buildings and industrial structures they had erected a f t e r settlement. 6 9

COLONIALISM

BY C O N T R A C T

OUTCOMES AND

(II):

INTERACTIONS

Both b e f o r e and especially after the legislation of 1858, the practice of Russian state-peasant settlement on Caucasian nobles' lands created exciting opportunities and painful frustrations for settlers, nobles, and state officials alike. Their triangular interactions provide insight into the lived experience of Russian colonialism in the South Caucasus. Significantly, as far as the documentary sources indicate, their relations were filled with socio-economic tensions characteristic of t e n a n t - l a n d o w n e r relations generally, and were devoid of ethnic or confessional considerations or discourse. 7 0 Moreover, these p e a s a n t - n o b l e contacts provide an example of how the tsarist state managed its multi-ethnic empire. R a t h e r than the unmitigated champion of one side or the other, tsarist officials frequently found themselves cast in the role of referee between the Russian peasants and the Caucasian nobles, charged with arbitrating the terms of the contracts when one side or the o t h e r believed that its rights had been violated. In many cases, both parties followed exactly the arrangements laid out in the contracts. Regarding Molokans settled on lands of the Orbeliani family in Aleksandropol' uezd, one official reported that " a f t e r nine years, no problems have arisen in the fulfillment of the contract and there have been no important grievances on the part of either the settlers or the landowners." 7 1 A s a result, the landowners generally embraced the occasion to have Russian settlers work their lands, and it a p p e a r s f r o m the existing records that in the majority of cases the nobles received what they desired f r o m the settlement arrangement. However, not all sectarians turned out to be the best tenants (nor, as I will discuss later, were nobles always the best landlords). While some settler communities paid their rents and fulfilled obligations meticulously, others did not, both as a result of poor economic conditions and also as a conscious ploy. Such cynical non-payment a p p e a r s to have been the case with the community of Molokans

156 • Nicholas B.

Breyfogle

who settled on lands o f L o r i s - M e l i k o v a . 7 2 In 1860, her husband complained to the local C h a m b e r of the Ministry of State Properties that the Molokans were not meeting their obligations. T h e y were a year late in paying the first year's rent, had not paid the second year's dues, and had not supplied the specified quantity of felled wood. L o r i s - M e l i k o v had attempted to force payment by hiring an independent agent, but with no success. Instead, he e n c o u n t e r e d a series o f Molokan explanations and excuses that he did not find satisfying. He requested the intervention of the local administration e i t h e r to enforce the payment terms of the contract or nullify the agreement and expel them from the land. 7 3 State agents sent to investigate concluded that the M o l o k a n s had chosen not to pay their dues, reporting that they were well off economically and suffered from few disabilities that might prevent payment. 7 4 Despite this conflict, Loris-Melikov later agreed to allow the M o l o k a n s to stay on his wife's lands, but only on the condition that they submit to a revised contract of c o m m u n a l responsibility for the dues of each m e m b e r (krugovaia

poruka).75

F r o m the settlers' perspective, their interactions with their Caucasian landowners were an equally mixed bag. Almost immediately following the passing of the law in 1858, sectarian settlers from various parts of Transcaucasia approached the administration with requests to relocate to either noble- or Church-owned lands with the goal o f bettering their material condition. 7 6 Y e t , what initially appeared a beneficial opportunity often left the sectarians dissatisfied. On one level, the Russian colonists were frustrated by arbitrary actions on the part of G e o r g i a n and A r m e n i a n landowners who unilaterally changed contractual obligations as they attempted to extract what they could from the peasants' economy. In addition to the Orbeliani Princes recurrently modifying the terms o f their verbal agreements, B e k Teimuraz M e l i k - B e g l i a r o v also altered the contract with the M o l o k a n s on his land without first negotiating with them and despite the fact that they had mutually agreed to a written document. 7 7 O n a n o t h e r level, their discontent arose from perceived and real socio-economic e x p l o i t a t i o n — t h e " b u r d e n s o m e " nature of the contracts. 7 8 M o l o k a n s in the villages of N o v o - S a r a t o v k a and V o r o n t s o v k a ( A l e k s a n d r o p o l ' uezd,Tiflis guberniia) " f e a r e d enslavement from the O r b e l i a n i s and began to look for a new place to live that would be on state-owned land." In the late 1840s and early 1850s, many M o l o k a n s from both villages did leave for Elisavetpol' uezd. 7 9 T h e M o l o kans who stayed behind in Vorontsovka remained dissatisfied with their e c o n o m ic situation. A s their contract with the Orbelianis was coming to an end in the late 1860s, they repeatedly voiced their unhappiness with the relationship to tsarist authorities. T h e M o l o k a n s found the payment of rent in cash ( o b r o k ) to be e c o nomically disadvantageous, and were particularly frustrated by the e c o n o m i c "insecurity o f their property situation" that resulted from " d e p e n d e n c e " on a landowner who held the power to change the terms o f their rental a g r e e m e n t . 8 0 Similarly, even the D u k h o b o r s who had themselves requested relocation

to

Orbeliani lands in B o r c h a l o uchastok, Tiflis guberniia, in the early 1840s quickly

Colonization

by Contract • 157

c h a n g e d t h e i r m i n d s . D i s a p p o i n t e d with t h e c o n d i t i o n s of s e t t l e m e n t o n this priv a t e land t h e y r e f u s e d to build h o m e s o r b e g i n f a r m i n g . R a t h e r , t h e y d e m a n d e d to b e m o v e d a g a i n , this t i m e t o t r e a s u r y l a n d , a n d within a few years t h e y also r e l o c a t e d t o E l i s a v e t p o l ' uezd. 8 1 L i k e t h e n o b l e s , s e c t a r i a n s w o u l d call in t h e s t a t e as m e d i a t o r w h e n t h e y felt t h a t t h e i r r i g h t s h a d b e e n c o m p r o m i s e d , t h e c o n t r a c t b r o k e n , or i n s t r u m e n t a l l y t o tip t h e p o w e r a d v a n t a g e in t h e i r d i r e c t i o n generally. T w o years a f t e r t h e initial i n c i d e n t of n o n - p a y m e n t , M o l o k a n s living o n t h e l a n d s of L o r i s - M e l i k o v a r a n i n t o s o m e u n e x p e c t e d difficulties with a n e i g h b o r i n g n o b l e , P r i n c e A r g u t i n s k i i - D o l g o r u k o v , w h o a p p r o p r i a t e d p r o p e r t y a l l o t t e d t o t h e m . A s a r e l a t i v e of L o r i s - M e l i k o v w h o o w n e d n e i g h b o r i n g lands, A r g u t i n s k i i - D o l g o r u k o v h a d a p p a r e n t l y b e l i e v e d t h e l a n d n o t t o be in use. A l t h o u g h t h e c o n t r a c t m a d e specific provision f o r LorisM e l i k o v to p r o t e c t t h e M o l o k a n s ' land r i g h t s in s u c h a case, he p r o v e d of n o s u p p o r t t o t h e colonists. T h e M o l o k a n s t u r n e d to t h e s t a t e f o r official i n t e r v e n t i o n and A r g u t i n s k i i - D o l g o r u k o v u l t i m a t e l y r e t u r n e d t h e land. 8 2 T h i s is n o t to say t h a t s o c i o - e c o n o m i c d i s c o n t e n t w a s t h e only o u t c o m e of this sort of s e t t l e m e n t . Q u i t e t h e o p p o s i t e , m a n y s e t t l e r c o m m u n i t i e s f o u n d their e c o n o m i c s t a t u s rise as a result of t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o s e t t l e o n n o b l e land. Local officials n o t e d t h a t t h e e c o n o m y of t h e M o l o k a n s s e t t l e d on t h e lands of LorisM e l i k o v a was "in a very s a t i s f a c t o r y c o n d i t i o n , as m u c h as o n e can j u d g e f r o m t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e i r h o m e s a n d their e c o n o m i c a c q u i s i t i o n s , a n d t h e m a j o r i t y live in w e a l t h a n d c o n t e n t m e n t . All of t h e m k n o w this t h e m s e l v e s , a n d n o n e of t h e m ... w a n t to m o v e e l s e w h e r e . " 8 3 S e t t l e m e n t o n l a n d l o r d land also p r o v i d e d t h e s e t t l e r s with c e r t a i n l o n g - t e r m o p p o r t u n i t i e s . In p a r t i c u l a r , t h e R u s s i a n s e t t l e r s n o t i n f r e q u e n t l y w e r e given t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to p u r c h a s e t h e l a n d they h a d b e e n r e n t i n g f r o m t h e nobles. T h e y b e c a m e p r i v a t e l a n d h o l d e r s in their o w n right a n d m a n y of t h e m a t t a i n e d enviable levels of w e a l t h . 8 4 Such was especially t h e c a s e with t h e M o l o k a n s of V o r o n t s o v k a . U n h a p p y with their c o n d i t i o n s o n n o b l e l a n d , t h e s e

colonists

d e c l a r e d t h e i r i n t e n t i o n in 1869 t o m i g r a t e t o t h e N o r t h C a u c a s u s u p o n t h e term i n a t i o n of t h e c o n t r a c t (in 1871) w h e r e t h e y b e l i e v e d t h e y could a c q u i r e t h e i r own land. T h e viceroy, G r a n d D u k e M i c h a e l , m a d e his e x t r e m e d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with this p r o s p e c t plain in a letter to t h e C a u c a s u s C o m m i t t e e a n d m a d e e f f o r t s to r e t a i n t h e M o l o k a n s in V o r o n t s o v k a . " S u c h a d i s a p p e a r a n c e of so c o n s i d e r a b l e a R u s s i a n p o p u l a t i o n f r o m an a r e a which h a s b o t h political as well as s t r a t e g i c importance would have extremely unfavorable consequences."85 He proposed that t h e s e t t l e r s b u y f r o m O r b e l i a n i t h e land t h a t t h e y h a d b e e n r e n t i n g f o r m o r e than twenty-five years. 8 6 H o w e v e r , an e n o r m o u s c h a s m existed b e t w e e n O r b e liani's a s k i n g p r i c e ( b a s e d o n t h e l a n d v a l u e ) a n d t h e a m o u n t t h a t t h e s e c t a r i a n s could a f f o r d t o pay. In t h e i r e f f o r t s t o k e e p t h e s e t t l e r s in place, tsarist officials n e g o t i a t e d t h e price d o w n f r o m t w e n t y r u b l e s p e r d e s i a t i n a t o s e v e n , b u t e v e n then t h e M o l o k a n s did n o t h a v e t h e 56,000 r u b l e s n e c e s s a r y to p u r c h a s e t h e land. A s a result, local a u t h o r i t i e s a g r e e d t o t h e s e t t l e r s ' r e q u e s t f o r a loan to b r i d g e t h e

158 • Nicholas B. Breyfogle difference. In the final result, Vorontsovka's Molokans received 32,000 rubles in a no-interest loan that they were to pay back over a fifteen-year period, and were also given 8,000 rubles as a one-time grant that they were not required to repay. 87 Thus, with the aid of these loans, they were able to purchase both land and their f r e e d o m f r o m Orbeliani, and attain relatively uncommon levels of wealth. A f t e r their initial acquisition of 7,000 desiatinas in 1870, certain Vorontsovka Molokans continued over the succeeding decades, particularly in 1882 and 1885, to increase the size of their holdings by buying land from Georgian nobles. As one statistician recorded in 1887, "the Vorontsovka Molokans were the first to give the example of obtaining private land and at the present time there are among them not an insignificant n u m b e r of household heads who own between 200 and 350 desiatinas of their own land." 8 8

EMPIRE AND ESTATE:

CONCLUSIONS

The u n p r e c e d e n t e d , hybrid form of colonization found in the 1858 legislation d e m o n s t r a t e s the subtleties and complexities of both the administration and lived experience of tsarist Russia's culturally and socially diverse empire. Russian society was both constructed upon and cleaved by a series of hierarchies of power and identity (officially ascribed and self-defined)—including ethnicity, social status, and religious affiliation, to n a m e those most relevant here. As state authorities (at various levels of government), sectarian settlers, and indigenous elites in Transcaucasia struggled together to sort out acceptable mutual relations, certain of those hierarchies intersected, clashed, and transformed each other, producing the practice of "colonization by contract." In particular, the settlement of Russian colonists as tenant farmers on Caucasian noble land underscores two aspects of Russian imperialist policy at loggerheads. On one hand, Russian officials did what they could to enlist the support of nobles (in part because they needed their backing to manage the empire and in part because the authorities respected their status rights as elites) while simultaneously demonstrating a certain a m o u n t of concern for the health and prosperity of the Caucasian peasants and nomads. O n the other hand, tsarist authorities wanted to increase the presence of ethnic Russians in the region. They did so because they considered Russians, by virtue of their ethnic characteristics, to be the most loyal subjects and wanted to reduce the need to rely on non-Russians in the future. Additionally, such Russian migration would clean up the interior provinces of religious "heretics" and help develop the region's economy. W h e n the drive to increase the n u m b e r of Russians in the region required the state to settle Russian colonists on private land, one aspect of the Russian imperialist agenda overshadowed another. Since tsarist authorities considered the native elites to be of higher social standing than the Russian colonists—and t h e r e f o r e the recipients of certain prerogatives—the settlers entered, at times, into u n e v e n

Colonization

by Contract • 159

relationships with indigenous notables. By settling the sectarians on landowner p r o p e r t y under such contracts, tsarist officials placed the very Russian colonists t h a t they considered the advance guard of "Russification" in the region in an economically subordinate position to Georgian and A r m e n i a n notables, all in the n a m e of expanding their n u m b e r s in the region. The legislative development of the 1858 law also indicates the degree to which Russian imperial policy in the South Caucasus was driven as much by social considerations as ethnic ones, at least when dealing with the region's Christian elites. O n many levels, this case study confirms the model of tsarist Russia as a traditional, p r e - m o d e r n empire that has been c h a m p i o n e d recently by A n d r e a s Kappeler, a m o n g others. In this view, Russia was an e m p i r e of estates rather than ethnicities in which social status frequently proved determinant (at least for the state) in ordering the interrelations of a diverse, multi-cultural society. 89 In this example of contractual colonization, socio-economic power structures (in which nobles d o m i n a t e d ) did overshadow the ethnic hierarchies of colonial power systems, often to the detriment of the Russian peasant colonists. In negotiating this land settlement a r r a n g e m e n t , Russian officials voiced reservations only on social and religious grounds, and described the colonists most often by their estate label as "state peasants." They were reluctant to permit such settlement, not because of the Russian-Georgian power dynamic it would engender, but because it contravened the rules of their social categories, and they were concerned to protect the Russians' rights as state peasants from socio-economic exploitation by nobles. In developing the law, tsarist officials treated Georgian (particularly) and A r m e n i a n elites more or less as they would Russian ones. In their daily routines, Russian peasant colonists and Caucasian nobles a p p e a r to have interacted most commonly on "class" terms, rather than ethnic or religious ones. Yet, notions of ethnic or confessional difference were not absent in this story. Tsarist officials might utilize social status distinctions in their efforts to order and administer the e m p i r e ' s peoples, but in their policies and actions they were consistently c o n f r o n t e d with a h u m a n diversity that defied such social-status ordering. Ethnic and religious factors repeatedly buffeted and refashioned the estate hierarchy. 9 0 Tsarist leaders p r o m o t e d Russian migration to the region based on a desire for religious homogeneity in the center and on assumptions of Russian cultural and economic superiority (even if these Russians were tainted by their religious non-conformity). Georgian nobles echoed these latter ideas in their original proposal for contractual colonization, noting that Russian settlers would act as positive role models for the Georgian peasants, while also underscoring that fundamental ethno-cultural differences would prevent any transference of religious ideas. In related fashion, the Caucasian nobles' characteristics as nonRussians m a d e possible the colonization-by-contract a r r a n g e m e n t . Russian nobles could not have received such opportunities because the state feared the dissenters' religious "infection" of O r t h o d o x Russians—a threat that did not exist for Georgians, in the worldview of officialdom, because of their cultural distinc-

160 • Nicholas

B.

Breyfogle

tions. M o r e o v e r , t h e w h o l e p r o j e c t was p u t on hold in 1850 b e c a u s e of religious c o n c e r n s : t h a t s e c t a r i a n s e t t l e m e n t in t h e S o u t h C a u c a s u s w a s actually s t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e d i s s i d e n t faith, n o t w e a k e n i n g it as t h e y had i n t e n d e d . This story also p r o v i d e s insight into h o w G e o r g i a n elites e x p e r i e n c e d t h e R u s s i a n i m p e r i a l p r e s e n c e . T h e o p p o r t u n i t y to b r i n g R u s s i a n p e a s a n t s o n t o their l a n d s o f f e r e d t h e m access to g r e a t e r w e a l t h a n d productivity. P e r h a p s m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , t h e fact t h a t G e o r g i a n n o b l e s t h e m s e l v e s o r i g i n a t e d a n d p u s h e d this i d e a f o r w a r d d e m o n s t r a t e s a c e r t a i n c o m f o r t within t h e i m p e r i a l o r d e r , and t h e r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t t h e R u s s i a n p r e s e n c e c o u l d b r i n g new possibilities even as it shut off p r e v i o u s o p p o r t u n i t i e s . In r e l a t e d f a s h i o n , this s e t t l e m e n t p r a c t i c e s h e d s light o n t h e t r e a t m e n t of n o n - R u s s i a n s in t h e m u l t i - c u l t u r a l tsarist e m p i r e . In a p p l y i n g their c o l o n i z a t i o n a g e n d a , tsarist a u t h o r i t i e s w e r e f r e q u e n t l y c o n c e r n e d f o r t h e rights a n d e c o n o m i c success of t h e p o p u l a t i o n native to t h e a r e a . H o w e v e r , t h e r e w e r e significant d i f f e r e n c e s in R u s s i a n c o n d u c t b a s e d u p o n t h e social s t a t u s of t h e C a u c a s i a n s involved. M i r r o r i n g t h e tsarist a p p r o a c h to t h e R u s s i a n p o p u l a t i o n generally, n o b l e s or o t h e r social elites r e c e i v e d m u c h b e t t e r t r e a t m e n t and far m o r e o p p o r t u n i t i e s t h a n t h e i r social " i n f e r i o r s . " T h e s e t t l e m e n t of s t a t e p e a s a n t s on t h e lands of C a u c a s i a n n o b l e s also s h e d s light o n t h e p r o c e s s of policy f o r m a t i o n in i m p e r i a l Russia. It indicates the d e g r e e to which policies in the R u s s i a n s t a t e w e r e not simply i m p l e m e n t e d f r o m a t o p d o w n autocracy, b u t d e v e l o p e d f r o m t h e g r o u n d u p and t h r o u g h the i n v o l v e m e n t of a multiplicity of local p e o p l e s a n d officials. Additionally, t h e 1858 law reflects t h e t e n d e n c y of the tsarist g o v e r n m e n t , given its diversity a n d u n d e r d e v e l o p e d g o v e r n i n g structures, to try to accomplish multiple, at t i m e s c o n t r a d i c t o r y tasks with o n e set of laws. Within t h e confines of t h e practice of settling s t a t e - p e a s a n t s on t h e lands of i n d i g e n o u s nobles, the g o v e r n m e n t a t t e m p t e d s i m u l t a n e o u s l y to rid t h e c e n t r a l p r o v i n c e s of religious diversity, a d v a n c e an a g e n d a of i m p e r i a l integration of Transcaucasia t h r o u g h R u s s i a n c o l o n i z a t i o n , a n d " f o r g e and alliance bet w e e n t h e R u s s i a n state a n d G e o r g i a n nobility," to n a m e only t h e p r i m a r y goals. 9 1 T h i s s t u d y also i n d i c a t e s t h e willingness of t h e g o v e r n m e n t t o a c c e p t e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n a n d r e g i o n a l diversity in t h e d e v e l o p m e n t a n d a p p l i c a t i o n of laws a n d r e g u l a t i o n s . T h r o u g h o u t t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y ( a n d b e y o n d ) , tsarist officials s t r u g g l e d to find a b a l a n c e b e t w e e n diversity a n d u n i f o r m i t y in t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of t h e e m p i r e . H e r e , t h e tsarist g o v e r n m e n t w a s willing t o p e r m i t c e r t a i n r e g i o n a l v a r i a t i o n s in its social laws b e c a u s e t h e y w o u l d a d v a n c e i m p e r i a l , religious, a n d e t h n i c policy goals. Yet, t h e y did so only slowly a n d with r e l u c t a n c e . W h i l e t h e y m i g h t b e willing t o allow t h e e x c e p t i o n of s t a t e - p e a s a n t s e t t l e m e n t o n n o b l e l a n d s in t h e S o u t h C a u c a s u s , t h e y did e v e r y t h i n g in t h e i r p o w e r t o e n s u r e t h a t t h e e x c e p t i o n w o u l d stray as little as possible f r o m t h e n o r m , a n d t h e p e a s a n t s ' r i g h t s would be thoroughly protected. Finally, t h e 1858 law i n d i c a t e s a c o n c e r n f o r p r o p e r t y r i g h t s o n t h e p a r t of t h e tsarist g o v e r n m e n t . Certainly, this was by n o m e a n s a u n i v e r s a l policy in t h e R u s sian E m p i r e . A s D a v i d M o o n has rightly a s s e r t e d : " T h e R u s s i a n s t a t e a s s u m e d

Colonization

by Contract

• 161

that m o s t land in n e w l y c o n q u e r e d frontier regions w a s s t a t e property, and disp o s e d of the land as it s a w fit."92 M o r e o v e r , there w e r e p e r i o d s of Russia's i m p e rial rule in the S o u t h C a u c a s u s (particularly u n d e r H a h n , a n d t o w a r d s M u s l i m s a n d n o m a d s ) in which land rights w e r e summarily i g n o r e d . N o n e t h e l e s s , the treatm e n t of G e o r g i a n and A r m e n i a n n o b l e s surrounding t h e 1858 law s u g g e s t s s o m e n u a n c e s in the q u e s t i o n of land rights. W h e n tsarist a u t h o r i t i e s r e c o g n i z e d the s o c i a l - s t a t u s privileges of c e r t a i n g r o u p s — a s was the c a s e with G e o r g i a n (and to a l e s s e r d e g r e e A r m e n i a n ) e l i t e s after 1 8 4 2 — t h e y w e r e quick a n d d o g g e d in their d e f e n s e of property. T h e y w e r e unwilling simply to s e i z e land f r o m t h e m , e v e n if it m e a n t that they w o u l d s l o w d o w n their progress in p o p u l a t i n g t h e region with R u s s i a n s and c o m p l i c a t e tsarist e m p i r e - b u i l d i n g .

Notes I wish to thank Leslie Alexander, Robin Judd, Lucy Murphy and Judy Wu for their careful reading and stimulating suggestions on an earlier version of this essay, and Victoria Clement for her research assistance. The research and writing of this article were supported by grants from the National Endowment for the Humanities, an independent federal agency, the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research ( N C E E E R ) under authority of a Title VIII grant from the US Department of State, the Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad Program, the International Research and Exchanges Board, with funds provided by the US Department of State (Title VIII program), the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, the Mershon Center, The Ohio State University College of Humanities and Department of History, and the University of Pennsylvania. None of these people and organizations is responsible for the views expressed within this text. 1 Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv (St. Petersburg) [hereafter RGIA], f. 381, op. 1, d. 23297. 1844-45,11. 60-63, 74-92ob, 132-142ob: Akly sobrannye Kavkazskoiu Arkheograficheskoiu Kommissieiu, 12 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1886-1904) [hereafter AKAK], 10: dok. 97, 119-23; and Sobranie postanovlenii po chasti raskola, sostoiavshikhsia po vedomstvu 5v. Sinoda (St. Petersburg: Tip. Ministerstva vnutrennykh del, 1860) [hereafter SPChR], 2: 417-30. 2 Beginning in 1830, tsarist legislation decreed that Christian religious sectarians [sektanty] classified as "most pernicious" (including Dukhobors, Molokans and Subbotniks, but not Old Believers) were to be relocated to Transcaucasia (either by forcible exile or voluntary resettlement) in a conscious effort to utilize the empire's periphery as a means to segregate sectarian Russians from Orthodox ones. As a result, these non-conformists comprised the majority of non-military ethnic Russians in Transcaucasia until the 1890s. Indeed, they often represented the majority of all Russians there (at times more than three-quarters of the Russian inhabitants, although only a small percent of the region's total population). For a discussion of the formation of this segregation policy and the process of resettlement, see Nicholas B. Breyfogle, "Heretics and Colonizers: Religious Dissent and Russian Colonization of Transcaucasia, 1830-1890" (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1998), 25-131. and D.I. Ismail-Zade, Russkoe krest'ianstvo v Zakavkaz'e: 30-e gody XlX-nachalo XX v. (Moscow: Nauka, 1982). 3 The relationship between Russian settlers and Caucasian nobles is only one of a number of different possible points of contact between colonists and Caucasians. Settlers also interacted with "natives" in the latter's role as state officials and with indigenous peas-

162 • Nicholas

B.

Breyfogle

ants and nomads, and each type of colonial encounter had its own unique characteristics and outcomes. For space reasons, this essay focuses only on the history of the relations between settlers and indigenous nobles. I have explored the colonists' interactions with non-elite Caucasians at length elsewhere. See Breyfogle, "Heretics and Colonizers," 208-270. 4 During the nineteenth century, tsarist policy was generally more discriminatory towards the Muslim Azerbaijani and Kurdish elites than towards their Georgian or Armenian counterparts, although prejudiced treatment of Armenians increased as the century progressed. Audrey Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity under Russian Rule (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1992), 15-49; Firouzeh Mostashari, "Tsarist Colonial Policy, Economic Change, and the Making of the Azerbaijani Nation: 1828-1905" (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1995); and Vartan Gregorian, "The Impact of Russia on the Armenians and Armenia," in Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., Russia in Asia: Essays on the Influence of Russia on the Asian Peoples (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), 178-186. 5 Unfortunately, while the archives offer up broad patterns, there are no reliable statistics from which to determine exactly how many Russian colonists settled on the lands of Caucasian nobles, or what percentage of the total settler population this constituted. 6 On the incorporation of the South Caucasus and Russian imperial policy writ large, see Ronald Grigor Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation, 2d ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 42-95; Anthony L.H. Rhinelander, "The Incorporation of the Caucasus into the Russian Empire: The Case of Georgia, 1801-1854" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1972); Mostashari, "Tsarist Colonial Policy"; Altstadt, Azerbaijani Turks, 15-73; George A. Bournoutian, ed. and trans., Russia and the Armenians of Transcaucasia, 1797-1889: A Documentary Record (Costa Mesa, Calif.: Mazda Publishers, 1998); Gregorian, "The Impact of Russia," 178-186; and Kolonial'naia poiitika Rossiiskogo tsarisma v Azerbaidzhane v 20-60-ch gg. XIXv.,2 vols. (Moscow and Leningrad: Izd. Akademii nauk SSSR, 1936-7). 7 This is not to say that tsarist authorities in Transcaucasia did not implement damaging policies of land seizure in other contexts. Quite the opposite, such discriminatory property appropriations are well documented. While the government might respect the property privileges of certain Caucasian elites, they tended to act more prejudicially towards nomadic communities, those of lower social status (especially peasants), and non-Christians. See, for instance, Stephen F. Jones, "Russian Imperial Administration and the Georgian Nobility: The Georgian Conspiracy of 1832," Slavonic and East European Review 65, no. 1 (1987): 65-66; G.A. Orudzhev, "Iz istorii obrazovaniia russkikh poselenii v Azerbaidzhane," Izvestiia Akademii Nauk AzSSR: Istoriia, Filosofiia, Pravo, no. 2 (1969), 21; O.E. Tumanian, Ekonomicheskoe razvitie Arrnenii, 2 vols. (Erevan: Armianskoe gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo, 1954), 1: 41-42; and Mostashari, "Tsarist Colonial Policy," 332-339. 8 Elise Kimerling Wirtschafter, Social Identity in Imperial Russia (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1997), 4, passim. On the state peasants, see David Moon, The Russian Peasantry, 1600-1930: The World the Peasants Made (London and New York: Longman, 1999) and N. M. Druzhinin, Gosudarstvennye krest'iane i reforma P.D. Kiseleva. 2 vols. (Moscow: Izd. Akademii nauk SSSR, 1946-58). 9 R G I A , f. 1268, op. 2, d. 533,1847-48,11. 1 - l o b ; R G I A , f. 1268, op. 4, d. 196,1850,11. 3-3ob; R G I A , f. 381, op. 1, d. 23297,1844-45,1. 2ob, 8-8ob, 58: and AKAK, 10: dok. 97, 120. 10 R G I A , f. 1268, op. 9, d. 367a, 1857-58,11. 9-10; R G I A , f. 381, op. 1, d. 23297,1844-45,1. 58; and I.E. Petrov, "Seleniia Novo-Saratovka i Novo-Ivanovka Elisavetpol'skogo uezda," Izvestiia Kavkazskogo otdela Imperatorskogo Russkogo geograficheskogo obshchestva 19 (1907-1908) (Tiflis, 1909), otd. 1, 226. Most state sources use the Russified version of the family's name, Orbelianov.

Notes

• 163

11 F o r a discussion of the shifts of tsarist policy towards local elites m o r e broadly, see L.H. R h i n e l a n d e r . "Russia's Imperial Policy: The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the Caucasus in the First Half of the N i n e t e e n t h Century," Canadian Slavonic Papers 17 (1975): 218-35: Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, 1905-1920: The Shaping of National Identity in a Muslim Community ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e University Press, 1985). 12-13; G r e g o r i a n , "The Impact of Russia," 180-3; and Mostashari, "Tsarist Colonial Policy," 332-353. 12 T h e family is also n a m e d Begliar-bek Begliarov in some documents. O n the Beglarean clan, see B o u r n o u t i a n . Russia and the Armenians, 17-18, 249-251, 512. 13 R G I A , f. 1268, op. 15, d. 86.1870,1.1. Skoptsy settled in the village of Staraia-Talysha experienced a similar fate to the M o l o k a n s of Borisy when the land they were living on was r e t u r n e d to Talysh-bek Begliarov. A K A K , 10: dok. 293,287. 14 O n the sectarian-settlers' many difficulties adapting to the South Caucasian e n v i r o n m e n t , see Breyfogle, " H e r e t i c s and Colonizers," 131-143. 15 R G I A , f. 1268, op. 9. d. 367a, 1857-58. I. B o b ; R G I A , f. 381, op. 1, d. 23297, 1844-45, 1. 5 8 - 5 8 o b ; S a k ' a r t ' v e l o s s a i s t o r i o c ' e n t r a l u r i s a x e l m c i p ' o a r k ' i v i (Tbilisi) [ h e r e a f t e r S S C ' S A ] , f. 240, op. 1, d. 1709, 1867, 11. 6 - 6 o b ; and S.A. Inikova, " V z a i m n o o t n o s h e n i i a i k h o z i a i s t v e n n o - k u l ' t u r n y e k o n t a k t y kavkazskikh d u k h o b o r t s e v s mestnym naseleniem," in V.I. Kozlov and A.P. Pavlenko, eds., Dukhobortsy i Molokane v Zakavkaz'e (Moscow: I E A R A N , 1992), 45. 16 S S C ' S A , f. 240, op. 2, d. 3 1 7 , 1 8 5 8 - 6 3 , II. 1-2. 17 S S C ' S A , f. 240, op. 2, d. 1 8 8 , 1 8 5 8 - 5 9 . T h e r e is a certain irony h e r e that the sectarians, many of w h o m had fled the central provinces because of persecution by the Russian O r t h o d o x C h u r c h , were willing to settle on land belonging to the G e o r g i a n C h u r c h . In many respects, this case reflects the m a n n e r in which socio-economic factors o f t e n outweighed in i m p o r t a n c e considerations of e i t h e r ethnic or confessional affiliation in daily life. For a discussion of the sectarians' m a l t r e a t m e n t by O r t h o d o x Russians, see Breyfogle. " H e r e t i c s and Colonizers," 93-99. 18 R G I A , f. 381, op. 1, d. 23297.1844-45; R G I A . f. 1268, op. 1. d. 8 6 6 , 1 8 4 5 - 4 6 : and A K A K , 10: d o k . 95, 118. 19 R G I A , f. 381, op. 1, d. 23297, 1844-45,11. l - 1 3 o b . 20 A K A K . 12 (1893):ch. l . d o k . 18,38; R G I A , f. 1263,op. l , d . 7 9 1 , 1 1 . 2 8 7 - 2 9 1 o b ; and S S C ' S A , f. 240, op. 2, d. 188, 1858-59. 21 R G I A , f. 381, op. 1. d. 23297, 1844-45,11. 19ob-20; A K A K , 10: dok. 95, 118; and R G I A , f. 384, op. 3, d. 1149,1846-51, II. 9 5 o b - 9 6 . 22 R G I A , f. 381. op. 1, d. 23297, 1844-45,11. 133ob-134. 23 This was likely A l e x a n d e r C h a v c h a v a d z e . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , n o n e of t h e d o c u m e n t s I have b e e n able to r e a d include his first name. 24 R G I A , f. 381.op. 1. d. 23297,1844-45,11.28-29ob, 5 2 o b - 5 3 , 6 0 - 6 3 , 7 4 o b , 134; R G I A , f. 1268, op. 1, d. 866,1845-46,11. 26-27; and A K A K , 10: dok. 95,118. 25 It would be interesting to k n o w the d e g r e e to which C h a v c h a v a d z e and his fellow petitioners believed in the language and c o n t e n t of his proposal. It is u n f o r t u n a t e l y unclear f r o m the sources I have consulted w h e t h e r the G e o r g i a n nobles were cynically engaging with tsarist officials in t e r m s they knew the latter would a p p r e c i a t e and u n d e r s t a n d , or w h e t h e r they s h a r e d (to varying d e g r e e s ) the ideas and discourse of the tsarist administration. Certainly. Austin Jersild, a m o n g others, has recently u n d e r s c o r e d the extent to which G e o r g i a n elites in the first half of the n i n e t e e n t h century s h a r e d a pan-imperial culture with Russians and others. Austin Jersild, Orientalism and Empire: North Caucasus Mountain Peoples and the Georgian Frontier, 1845-1917 ( M o n t r e a l and Kingston: McGillQ u e e n ' s University Press, 2002); idem, "'Russia,' f r o m the Vistula to the Terek to the A m u r , " Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 1 ( S u m m e r 2000): 531-46; and idem and Neli Melkadze, " T h e D i l e m m a s of E n l i g h t e n m e n t in t h e E a s t e r n B o r d e r -

164 • Nicholas

26 27 28 29 30 31 32

33

34

35 36 37

38 39 40

41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48

B.

Breyfogle

lands: The Theater and Library in Tbilisi," Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 3 (Winter 2002): 27-50. R G I A , f. 381, op. 1, d. 23297,1844-45,11. 28ob-29ob, quotation on 1. 29ob. R G I A , f. 381, op. 1, d. 23297,1844-45,11. 28ob-29, quotation on 1. 29. On Georgian opposition to Russian rule, see Jones, "Russian Imperial Administration," 53-76. R G I A , f. 381, op. 1, d. 23297,1844-45, II. 28-29ob, 60-63. Jones, "Russian Imperial Administration," 57. R G I A , f. 381, op. 1, d. 23297, 1844-45, 11. 62ob-63, 79ob-80. On the official terms of Mingrelia's relationship to Russia, see ibid., 11. 63-67,80ob-83, 85-92ob. Alfred J. Rieber, "Persistent Factors in Russian Foreign Policy: An Interpretive Essay," in Hugh Ragsdale, ed.. Imperial Russian Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 339. Ronald Grigor Suny, "Russian Rule and Caucasian Society in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century: The Georgian Nobility and the Armenian Bourgeoisie, 1801-1856," Nationalities Papers 7, no. 1 (spring 1979): 60: and Anthony L.H. Rhinelander, Prince Michael Vorontsov: Viceroy to the Tsar (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990), 146-184. For similar policies regarding Azerbaijani notables, see Mostashari, "Tsarist Colonial Policy," 332-402. For an extended discussion of the religious aspects of Russian colonization policy in Transcaucasia and the development of a policy I describe as "toleration through isolation," see Breyfogle, "Heretics and Colonizers," 25-78. See also R G I A , f. 381, op. 1, d. 23297,1844-45,11. 23, 54ob, 62,133; and R G I A , f. 384, op. 3, d. 1149,1846-51, II. 95ob-96. R G I A , f. 381, op. 1, d. 23297, 1844-45,11. 132ob-133. R G I A , f. 381, op. l , d . 23297,1844-45,11.23,52ob; and Gregorian,"The Impact of Russia," 183-84. R G I A , f. 381, op. 1, d. 23297,1844-45,11.52-53,58ob-59,132ob-133; R G I A , f. 384, op. 3, d. 1149, 1846-51, II. 96, 97ob-98; and Breyfogle, "Heretics and Colonizers," 156-58. A later viceroy, A.I. Bariatinskii, voiced almost identical ideas, see A K A K , 12 (1893): ch. 1, dok. 18, 38. So too did the journalist, N. B., who happily reported in 1861: "Now we have joiners and carpenters, blacksmiths and other skilled craftsmen, drivers of passenger coaches at stations, wagon drivers [izvozchiki] in the towns,... traders of wood and other materials. There are very decent bakers." N.B.,"Ozero Gochka (iz vospominanii o zakavkazskom krae)," Kavkaz 61 (1861): 330. R G I A , f. 1268, op. 9, d. 367a, 1857-58,1.4-4ob; and R G I A , f. 381, op. 1, d. 23297,1844-45, 1.60. R G I A , f. 384, op. 3, d. 1149,1846-51,1.96; R G I A , f. 381, op. 1, d. 23297,1844-45,11.27-27ob, 29,42-42ob, 52ob; and R G I A , f. 1268, op. 9, d. 367a, 1857-58,11. 4^1ob. R G I A , f. 381, op. 1, d. 23297,1844-45,11. 54ob-55. As he searched for a potential model or precedent, Kiselev put forward the anomalous case of a group of Molokan state-peasant families who had been granted the exceptional opportunity to settle on the privately owned land of the Transcaucasian Silkworm Breeding Society in 1842. Ibid., 11. 55-56 and R G I A , f. 1268, op. 1, d. 363,1842. Moon, Russian Peasantry, 107-108; and Druzhinin, Gosudarstvennye krest'iane. R G I A , f. 381, op. 1, d. 23297,1844^5,11. 54-55,136ob-138,140-140ob. R G I A , f. 381, op. 1, d. 23297,1844-45,1.61ob. R G I A , f. 381, op. 1, d. 23297,1844^5,11. 80-80ob, 135ob, 140ob. R G I A , f. 381, op. 1, d. 23297,1844-45, II. 60ob-61ob, 140ob-141, quotation on 61ob. R G I A , f. 381, op. 1, d. 23297,1844-45,11. 61-62. R G I A , f. 381, op. 1, d. 23297,1844-45,11. 60-63, 132-142ob; A K A K , 10: dok. 97, 119-123; and SPChR (1860), 417^430. R G I A , f. 381, op. 1, d. 23297, 1844^5,11. 134ob-135.

Notes

• 165

49 R G I A . f. 384. op. 3, d. 1149, 1846-51.11. 9 4 - 9 5 o b . 50 R G I A , f. 384, op. 3, d. 1149,1846-51,11. 9 7 - 9 7 o b ; and A K A K , 12 (1893): ch. 1. d o k . 18, 39. 51 R G I A , f. 1268, op. 9. d. 367a, 1857-58.11. 2 - 2 o b ; and R G I A , f. 384, op. 3, d. 1149, 1846-51, 11. 9 7 o b - 9 9 . Notably, while t h e e m p e r o r o p p o s e d R u s s i a n c o l o n i z a t i o n o n the lands of G e o r g i a n nobles, he was willing to p e r m i t such s e t t l e m e n t in the case of the G e r m a n colonists in the r e g i o n . T h e s e G e r m a n s had b e g u n to a p p e a r in t h e region in t h e 1810s a n d add a n o t h e r i n t e r e s t i n g piece t o t h e m u l t i c u l t u r a l m o s a i c of t h e C a u c a s u s . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , their role in this p r o c e s s is b e y o n d the scope of this p a p e r . O n t h e G e r m a n colonists, see R G I A . f. 384, op. 3, d. 1149,1846-51,11. 80-93, 9 8 o b - 9 9 ; a n d " E k o n o m i c h e s k i i byt n e m e t s kikh k o l o n i s t o v v Z a k a v k a z s k o m krae," in Materialy dlia izucheniia ekonomicheskogo byta gosudarstvennykh krestiian Zakavkazskogo kraia (Tiflis: 1885), 1: 99-160. 52 A K A K , 12 (1893): ch. 1, d o k . 18, 39. 53 R G I A , f. 1268, op. 9, d. 367a, 1857-58,1. 4 o b ; a n d A K A K , 12 (1893): ch. 1, d o k . 18, 41. 54 R G I A , f. 1268, op. 9. d. 367a, 1857-58,1. 28; and A K A K . 12 (1893): ch. 1, d o k . 2 2 , 4 9 . O n t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p of B a r i a t i n s k i i a n d T s a r A l e x a n d e r II, a n d t h e q u e s t i o n of e m a n c i p a t i o n generally, see A l f r e d J. R i e b e r , The Politics of Autocracy: Letters of Alexander II to Prince A.I. Bariatinskii, 1857-1864 ( P a r i s a n d the H a g u e : M o u t o n , 1966). 55 See, for e x a m p l e , S S C ' S A , f. 240, op. 1, d. 1709,1867, II. 7 - 7 o b ; S S C ' S A , f. 240, op. 2, d. 317, 1858-63,1. 7; R G I A , f. 381, op. 1, d. 2 3 2 9 7 , 1 8 4 4 - 4 5 , 1 1 . 6 1 - 6 2 , 1 3 5 - 1 4 2 o b ; R G I A , f. 1268, op. 15, d. 86.1870,1. l o b ; a n d R G I A , f. 384, op. 3, d. 1149,1846-51,11. 9 4 o b - 9 5 o b . 56 S S C ' S A , f. 240, op. 1, d. 1709, 1867,11. 1 - 3 ; S S C ' S A , f. 240, op. 2, d. 317, 1858-63, II. 3 - 5 o b ; and R G I A , f. 1268, op. 9, d. 367a, 1857-58,11. 9 - 1 5 o b . 57 R G I A , f. 381, op. 1, d. 23297, 1844-45,11. 60ob, 139-139ob. 58 R G I A , f. 1268, op. 9, d. 367a, 1857-58, II. 9 - 1 5 o b ; S S C ' S A , f. 240, op. 1, d. 1709, 1867, II. l o t - 2 , 7 - 9 ; S S C ' S A , f. 240, op. 2. d. 317, 1858-63, II. 3 - 4 ; and R G I A , f. 1268. op. 15, d. 86, 1870,11. l o b - 2 . 59 A K A K . 10, d o k . 293, 287; S S C ' S A , f. 240. op. 2, d. 317, 1858-63, 11. 3 - 3 o b ; a n d S S C ' S A , f. 24), op. 1, d. 1709, 1867, II. l o b - 2 . 60 A K A K , 10: d o k . 9 7 . 1 2 0 ; a n d R G I A . f. 381, op. 1, d. 23297,1844^15,11. 139ob-140. 61 A K A K , 10: d o k . 2 9 3 , 2 8 7 . 62 S S C ' S A , f. 240, op. 1, d. 1709, 1867,1. 2ob. 63 S S C ' S A , f. 240, op. 2, d. 317, 1858-63, II. 3 - 5 . It was not u n c o m m o n for n o b l e s a n d a d m i n istrative elites t o e s c a p e t h e s u m m e r h e a t of Tiflis, E r e v a n , a n d B a k u by r e n t i n g h o u s e s in t h e sectarian m o u n t a i n villages. See A.I. M a s a l k i n , "Iz istorii z a k a v k a z s k i k h s e k t a n t o v . C h . 3, Sektanty, kak k o l o n i z a t o r y Z a k a v k a z ' i a , " Kavkaz 333 (16 D e c e m b e r 1893): 3; S. Kolos o v , " R u s s k i e s e k t a n t y v E r i v a n s k o i g u b e r n i i , " Pamiatnaia Knizhka Erivanskoi gubernii na .902 g. ( E r e v a n : G u b e r n s k o g o P r a v l e n i i a , 1902), o t d . 4, 148; and S.I. P o k h i l e v i c h , "Selenie A l t y - A g a c h , " in Sbornik materialov dlia opisaniia mestnostei i piemen Kavkaza, 46 vols. (Tiflis: Tip. G l a v n o g o U p r a v l e n i i a N a m e s t n i k a K a v k a z s k o g o , 1881) 1: 90. 64 S S C S A , f. 240, op. 2, d. 317, 1858-63,11. l o b , 4ob; R G I A , f. 381, op. 1, d. 23297, 1 8 4 4 ^ 5 , 1 . 1 4 2 ; R G I A , f. 1268, op. 9, d. 367a, 1857-58,11. 9 - 1 5 o b ; S S C ' S A , f. 240, op. 1, d. 1709,1. 1 - 6 ; a n d R G I A , f. 1268, op. 15, d. 8 6 . 1 8 7 0 , 1 . l o b . 65 R G I A , f. 1268, op. 9, d. 367a, 1857-58,1. 11; and R G I A , f. 381, op. l . d . 23297, 1844^15,11. 140-140ob. 66 R G I A , f. 1268, op. 15, d. 86, 1870,1. l o b . Certainly, not all n o b l e s tried s o h a r d t o k e e p t h e sect: at a r m s ' length, a n d t h e r e w e r e cases w h e r e t h e n o b l e s w e r e willing, i n d e e d d e s i r o u s , of interacting directly with t h e s e c t a r i a n s so t h a t they might wield m o r e direct c o n t r o l . A s I noied earlier, Prince D a d i a n i tried to avoid as m u c h as possible a n y official tsarist i n t e r f e r e i c e in his a f f a i r s with R u s s i a n colonists o n his land. A K A K , 10: d o k . 97, 120; and R G I A , f. 381, op. 1, d. 23297, 1844-45,11. 6 0 - 6 3 . 67 RGIA., f. 381, op. l . d . 23297, 1844-45,11. 6 0 o b - 6 2 , 1 3 8 - 1 3 8 o b , 1 4 1 o b - 1 4 2 .

166 • Nicholas

B.

Breyfogle

68 R G I A , f. 1268, op. 9, d. 367a, 1857-58, 11. 12-12ob, 14ob; R G I A , f. 381, op. 1, d. 23297, 1844-45,1. 142; and SSC'SA, f. 240, op. 2, d. 317, 1858-63,1. 4ob. 69 SSC'SA, f. 240, op. 1, d. 1709, 1867,11. 2-2ob; and R G I A , f. 1268, op. 9, d. 367a, 1857-58,11. 12-12ob. 70 That social-status power hierarchies proved prominent in this case contrasts with the "ethnic-religious conflict" that Vartan Gregorian highlights as an important aspect of the relations between Armenian peasants settled on the lands of Azerbaijani landowners. Gregorian, "The Impact of Russia," 183. 71 R G I A , f. 1268, op. 9, d. 367a, 1857-58,11.12ob-13. 72 SSC'SA, f. 240, op. 2, d. 317,1858-63,11. 3-5ob. 73 SSC'SA, f. 240. op. 2, d. 317,1858-63,11. 16-17ob. 74 SSC'SA, f. 240, op. 2, d. 317,1858-63,11. 21-21ob.The Molokans did face the problem that they had registered in their village more people than actually lived there, since a good many male members of the community worked in cities such as Tiflis or in the carting trade. The Molokans argued that the absence of these villagers was making it m o r e difficult for them to meet the contractual payments to Loris-Melikov. See ibid., 11.16ob-17, 2 lob. 75 SSC'SA, f. 240, op. 2, d. 317,1858-63,1. 38. 76 SSC'SA, f. 240, op. 2, d. 188,1858-59. 77 R G I A , f. 1268, op. 15, d. 86, 1870, 11. l o b - 2 ; and R G I A , f. 1268, op. 9, d. 367a, 1857-58,11. 15-15ob. 78 A K A K , 10: dok. 293,287. 79 Petrov, "Seleniia Novo-Saratovka," 226; and R G I A , f. 1268, op. 9, d. 367a, 1857-58,1.12ob. 80 R G I A , f. 1268, op. 14, d. 77, 1869-70,1. l o b , passim; and I.Ia. Orekhov, "Ocherki iz zhizni zakavkazskikh sektatorov," Kavkaz 136 (1878): 1. 81 R G I A . f. 1268, op. 9, d. 367a, 1857-58,11. 13ob-14; A K A K , 10: dok. 98, 123; and lnikova, "Vzaimnootnosheniia," 45. 82 However, to the Molokans' chagrin, the state rejected their demands to be relieved of payment of dues, arguing that their economy had not suffered sufficient disruption for state aid. SSC'SA. f. 240, op. 2, d. 317,1858-63,11. 5, 61-63,67-67ob. 83 SSC'SA, f. 240, op. 2, d. 317,1858-63,11. 21-21ob; R G I A , f. 1268, op. 15, d. 86,1870,1. l o b ; and R G I A . f. 1268, op. 9, d. 367a, 1857-58,1. 4ob. 84 A.D. Eritsov, "Ekonomicheskii byt gosudarstvennykh krest'ian Borchalinskogo uezda Tiflisskoi gubernii" in Materialy dlia izucheniia ekonomicheskogo byta gosudarstvennykh krest'ian Zakavkazskogo kraia (Tiflis: 1887), 7: 473. 85 R G I A , f. 1268, op. 14, d. 77,1869-70,11. l o b - 2 . 86 This land totaled eight thousand desiatiny (seven thousand desiatiny of arable and pastureland and one thousand desiatiny of forest). 87 R G I A , f. 1268, op. 14, d. 77,1869-70,11. l - 2 1 o b ; R G I A , f. 1284, op. 221-1885, d. 22,11. l - 5 o b ; and Orekhov, "Ocherki iz zhizni," 136: 1. 88 Eritsov, "Ekonomicheskii byt," 473. Following the Molokans' lead, neighboring A r m e n i ans and G e r m a n colonists also began to purchase land from different m e m b e r s of the Orbeliani family. On Vorontsovka's conspicuous wealth, see A.I. Klibanov, History of Religious Sectarianism in Russia (1860s-1917), trans. Ethel Dunn (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), 196-199. 89 Andreas Kappeler, Rossiia-Mnogonatsional'naia imperiia: vozniknovenie, istoriia, raspad, trans. Svetlana Chervonnaia (Moscow: Progress-Traditsiia, 1997). 90 Jones, "Russian Imperial Administration," 57-61, and Suny, Making of the Georgian Nation, 113-143. 91 Suny, "Russian Rule," 60. 92 David Moon, "Peasant Migration and the Settlement of Russia's Frontiers, 1550-1897," The Historical Journal 40, no. 4 (1997): 882.

Russian Colonization of Caucasian Azerbaijan, 1 8 3 0 - 1 9 0 5 FIROUZEH

MOSTASHARI

Someone (if I am not mistaken, Shchapov) very successfully defined the history of the Russian people, as the history of colonization of unsettled territories. I.A. GURVICH,

1889'

The history of the Russian Empire was significantly intertwined with the process of pereseleniia (settlement). Within its nineteenth-century context, pereseleniia, similar to the Prussian innere ¡Colonisation, referred to the movement of a peasant population within the confines of state borders, in order to settle sparsely populated frontier areas. 2 Whether it was spontaneous (samovol'noe pereselenie) or officially sponsored, colonization nevertheless transformed the ethnic landscape of the empire, as the primary direction of movement was away from European Russia and towards the Siberian, Central Asian and Caucasian borderlands. 3 This study centers on the state-sponsored movement of the Russian peasants to Azerbaijan, which can be conceptualized as the Russian demographic conquest of Eastern Transcaucasia. 4 It also analyzes the impact of this conquest on the native Azerbaijani population. 5 In the course of the nineteenth century the Russian state took an avid interest in settling its newly acquired Transcaucasian territories with "Russians." 6 The motives varied through time and included a concern for strengthening the security of frontier regions, a desire to alleviate land shortage in the central regions of Russia, and a means to punish and exile religious and political dissidents. The first sporadic attempts to settle non-natives in Transcaucasia were made under Alexander I, and involved Christian groups and religious sectarians from outside of the empire. 7 Beginning in the 1830s, however, the government also promoted the settling of Russians into the region. The Russian religious "heretics," members of the various Old Believer sects, were exiled to the region and thereafter many petitioned to immigrate to Transcaucasia where they believed they could live freely. Only after 1881 did the central government initiate policies that would assist landless Russian Orthodox peasants to settle in Transcaucasia.

168 • Firouzeh

Mostcishari CONTIGUOUS

COLONIZATION

A N D STATE

SECURITY

T h e fact t h a t R u s s i a ' s i n t e r n a l c o l o n i e s w e r e c o n t i g u o u s with t h e m e t r o p o l i s a l t e r e d t h e n a t u r e of t h e colonial e n c o u n t e r , c l o u d i n g t h e clear e t h n i c a n d a d m i n istrative distinctions usually p r e s e n t in o v e r s e a s colonial situations. Partly as a c o n s e q u e n c e of g e o g r a p h i c contiguity, t h e imperial p e r c e p t i o n of n o n - R u s s i a n f r o n t i e r s was t h a t t h e s e a r e a s w e r e a n a t u r a l e x t e n s i o n of t h e R u s s i a n state. F u r t h e r m o r e , in t h e R u s s i a n E m p i r e , t h e r e existed g r e a t e r possibilities for t h e i n t e g r a t i o n of t h e n o n - R u s s i a n s i n t o t h e imperial system, an a v e n u e usually c l o s e d to t r a d i t i o n a l c o l o n i z e d g r o u p s . W h i l e studying t h e e x p e r i e n c e s of o t h e r c o l o n i a l p o w e r s of t h e i r time, R u s s i a n policy m a k e r s f o r m u l a t e d their o w n colon i z a t i o n policy, which t h e y c o n s i d e r e d t o be b e t t e r s u i t e d to the p e c u l i a r i t i e s of t h e i r e m p i r e . This policy was b a s e d o n t h e p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e p r e s e n c e of e t h nic R u s s i a n s w o u l d s e c u r e the i n t e r e s t s of t h e s t a t e in the f r o n t i e r regions. Since t h e a r e a s of m i g r a t i o n w e r e c o n t i g u o u s with the G r e a t R u s s i a n c o r e a r e a , t h e p a t t e r n of s e t t l e m e n t d e p a r t e d f r o m that of t h e s e a - b o u n d A t l a n t i c p o w ers, a n d m o r e closely r e s e m b l e d t h e c o l o n i z a t i o n of the A m e r i c a n West. H e r e sett l e m e n t c o n t r i b u t e d to t h e i n t e g r a t i o n of t h e newly c o n q u e r e d a r e a s into t h e c e n tral s t a t e system. A l o n g t h e f r o n t i e r s , s e t t l e m e n t was p a r t of t h e p r o c e s s of n a t i o n building. H o w e v e r in b o t h t h e R u s s i a n a n d A m e r i c a n cases, s e t t l e m e n t r e s u l t e d in t h e u p r o o t i n g of local village c o m m u n i t i e s , t h e d i s r u p t i o n of t r a d i t i o n a l local e c o n o m i e s a n d n o m a d i c way of life, a n d s t a t e s u p p o r t e d violence against n a t i v e p o p u l a t i o n s . Finally, d e m o g r a p h i c c o n q u e s t m e t with p e r s i s t e n t local r e s i s t a n c e . A s early as 1879, Kavkazskii

Kalendar,

t h e a n n u a l p u b l i c a t i o n of t h e Chief

A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of t h e V i c e r o y of t h e C a u c a s u s , f e a t u r e d an article c o m p a r i n g British i n v o l v e m e n t in India with t h e R u s s i a n p r e s e n c e in t h e C a u c a s u s . T h e article criticized the British f o r r u n n i n g t o o costly an e m p i r e a n d q u e s t i o n e d t h e "wisd o m a n d f a r s i g h t e d n e s s of t h e British a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . "

8

British p o w e r in I n d i a is f o u n d e d n o t u p o n t h e settling of t h e E n g l i s h in t h e r e g i o n , b u t on t h e w e a k n e s s a n d i n t e r n a l d i s c o r d a m o n g t h e n a t i v e p o p u l a tion; on an e x a g g e r a t e d n o t i o n of British w e a l t h a n d might. . . . N o t h i n g similar t o this is t a k i n g place in t h e C a u c a s u s . This land is being g r a d u a l l y a n d n a t u r a l l y c o l o n i z e d by t h e R u s s i a n p o p u l a t i o n , which at p r e s e n t c o m p r i s e s 24 p e r c e n t of t h e t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n of t h e C a u c a s u s ; while in I n d i a , 100,000 British or a p p r o x i m a t e l y .004 p e r c e n t of t h e total p o p u l a t i o n is ruling o v e r 240 million natives. 9 By the early t w e n t i e t h century, n a t i o n a l i s t t h e o r i s t s of R u s s i a n

colonization

a d v a n c e d t h e o r i e s d e f i n i n g their ideal of c r e a t i n g an a l l - e m p i r e R u s s i f i e d p e o p l e . Ideally, R u s s i a w o u l d n e u t r a l i z e o p p o s i t i o n by c h a n g i n g t h e very n a t u r e of t h e s u b j u g a t e d societies by t u r n i n g t h e m i n t o e t h n i c Russians. T h e i r u l t i m a t e a i m w a s

Colonization

of Caucasian Azerbaijan

• 169

to be implemented by settling Russians into the colonized regions, where they would subsequently intermarry with the local population and produce a hybrid people. In the words of one theorist, "From the merging of the Great Russian and Little Russian elements with an inevitable dash of native blood, there will a p p e a r a type of Transcaucasian Russian. . . . " 1 0 T h e p r o p o n e n t s of creating Transcaucasian Russians faulted the previous settlement policies of the government, which had initially settled peoples of " o t h e r tribes" in the region, instead of Russians. 1 1 The Russian government had f r o m the first days of its conquest of Transcaucasia shown a desire to settle Russians in the region. Yet this had not been feasible on a mass scale until Nicholas I decided to exile the Old Believers f r o m central Russia. Initially, the central government had attempted to settle m e m b e r s of the army stationed in the Caucasus, by encouraging the wives of the soldiers and officers to move to the region. However, this attempt did not suffice in securing a significant n u m b e r of Russians, as the n u m b e r s of military personnel were small and they usually returned to Russia u p o n the completion of their duties. 1 2 Nicholas had in October of 1837 passed legislation for establishing military colonies in Transcaucasia in order to increase the n u m b e r of Russians, secure the f r o n tiers and stimulate the development of agriculture, trade and industry in the region. Yet, the failure of these military colonies had been conceded by 1857. 13

EASTERN

TRANSCAUCASIA

AS " W A R M

SIBERIA"

Tiie first Russian settlers in Transcaucasia, if we discount the discharged military men of the Caucasian wars who may have opted to remain, were the exiled Russian sectarians. Initially, in the 1830s the sectarians were exiled to the region, for purely punitive reasons, in order to reduce their influence in central Russia. By the 1840s a dramatic shift took place in official views on the settlers, and their presence was seen as advantageous for promoting Russian imperial policy in the borderlands. The sectarians who were exiled to the region beginning in the 1830s included primarily the Molokans, the Dukhobors, Subbotniks, and Old Believers. 1 4 Accordingly, General Ermolov, C o m m a n d e r of the Caucasian Corps, had concocted the nickname of "warm Siberia" for Transcaucasia. 1 5 The bulk of religious sectarian exiles came from the Tambov, Voronezh, Kharkov, Samara, Penza and Riazan provinces. 16 In Eastern Transcaucasia, they were concentrated in S h e m a k h a (later Bakinskii), Lenkoran and Shusha uezds where they were primarily occupied in farming, transportation and handicrafts. 1 7 Under Nicholas I, state policy t o w a r d s religious dissidents reversed half a century of toleration u n d e r C a t h e r i n e II and A l e x a n d e r I. O n 20 O c t o b e r 1830, t h e State Council a p p r o v e d t h e criteria f o r the settling of the sectarians in Transcaucasia:

170 • Firouzeh

Mostashari

All sectarians, r e c o g n i z e d by t h e c o u r t s as guilty of s p r e a d i n g their heresy, c o r r u p t i n g o t h e r s , a n d d i s r e s p e c t f u l b e h a v i o r against the C h u r c h a n d t h e O r t h o d o x clergy, will be p l a c e d in t h e service of the C a u c a s i a n Corps, a n d in t h e e v e n t that they a r e unfit f o r service, [they] along with t h e w o m e n , will b e d i s p a t c h e d to t h e T r a n s c a u c a s i a n p r o v i n c e to be settled. . . . S e c t a r i a n s a r e t o be s e t t l e d only in t h o s e a r e a s of T r a n s c a u c a s i a w h e r e O r t h o d o x p e a s a n t s are not present.18 Exile to t h e C a u c a s u s w a s especially r u i n o u s f o r the R u s s i a n p e a s a n t s w h o w e r e u n a c c u s t o m e d to t h e n e w climatic c o n d i t i o n s . A t t r i t i o n r a t e s w e r e high as a result of t h e i n h o s p i t a b l e e n v i r o n m e n t a n d r a m p a n t epidemics. D e s c r i b i n g t h e s e condit i o n s in t h e m i d - n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , a n o u t s p o k e n critic of N i c h o l a s I, Ivan Golovin wrote: Hell is on t h e s h o r e s of t h e Black Sea, t h a n k s to the e p i d e m i c s t h a t reign t h e r e ; t h a n k s also to Nicholas, w h o h a s c h o s e n it for a place of exile. T h e u n f o r t u n a t e beings w h o h a v e b e e n b a n i s h e d t h e r e a r e c o n t i n u a l l y saying t h a t t h e y would p r e f e r Siberia to t h e e n c h a n t i n g regions of Colchis; in fact, m e n a r e n o t killed by t h e cold, as t h e y a r e by an a t m o s p h e r e filled with pestilential m i a s m a . So N i c h o l a s k n o w s well what he is a b o u t w h e n he b a n ishes his e n e m i e s to a p a r t w h e r e n o o n e dies a n a t u r a l d e a t h . 1 9 Initially, t h e settling of s e c t a r i a n p e a s a n t s in T r a n s c a u c a s i a was n o t m o t i v a t e d by i m p e r i a l aims, n o r was it e v e n m o t i v a t e d by t h e desire to c o n v e r t t h e s e c t a r i a n s t o O r t h o d o x y . A s s t a t e d by the C a u c a s i a n C o m m i t t e e : " . . . w h e n t h e s e c t a r i a n s w e r e a l l o w e d to e m i g r a t e to t h e C a u c a s u s , t h e aim was n o t t o c o n v e r t t h e m t o O r t h o doxy." 2 0 T h e settling of an u n r e l i a b l e p e o p l e in a f r o n t i e r a r e a w a s an i n t e r e s t i n g policy, b u t o n e which w a s g e n e r a l l y p r a c t i c e d in t h e e m p i r e , p a r t i c u l a r l y in t h e case of t h e C o s s a c k s a n d convicts in Siberia. 2 1 In t h e 1830s t h e C o m m i t t e e of M i n i s t e r s s e e m e d a m b i v a l e n t a b o u t t h e b e n e f i t s of exiling t h e s e c t a r i a n s to T r a n s c a u c a s i a . F e a r i n g that a large c o n c e n t r a t i o n of sectarians would

influence t h e l o w e r a r m y officials a n d c o r r u p t t h e m ,

the

C o m m i t t e e d e c i d e d t o settle t h e s e c t a r i a n s in v a r i o u s localities a n d in small n u m bers. In a d d i t i o n , t h e C o m m i t t e e of M i n i s t e r s was c o n c e r n e d t h a t t h e s e c t a r i a n s m a y d i s r u p t t h e life of t h e C a u c a s i a n n o m a d s by c o n s t r a i n i n g t h e i r s e a s o n a l m o v e m e n t s t h r o u g h p a s t u r e l a n d s . B a r o n G.V. R o s e n , t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r in chief of t h e G e o r g i a n provinces, h a d also o b j e c t e d t o t h e s e n d i n g of s e c t a r i a n s t o t h e r e g i o n . H e h a d a s k e d f o r this p r o c e s s t o b e h a l t e d , as he saw n o b e n e f i t s e i t h e r f o r t h e s t a t e o r t h e r e g i o n a n d e x p r e s s e d c o n c e r n t h a t the s e c t a r i a n s w o u l d " f r i g h t e n t h e n a t i v e p o p u l a t i o n f o r t h e i r c a t t l e a n d t h e i r p a s t u r e lands." 2 2 T h e g r e a t e s t f e a r , h o w e v e r , was t h a t t h e s e c t a r i a n s w o u l d incite t h e n a t i v e p o p u l a t i o n t o resist s t a t e a u t h o r i t y . T h u s t h e C o m m i t t e e of M i n i s t e r s c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e n a t i v e p o p u l a t i o n which " h a s j u s t b e g u n t o b e c o m e a c c u s t o m e d to o r d e r will

Colonization

of Caucasian Azerbaijan

171

n o w not be allowed to develop loyalty towards the state." 2 3 In order to diminish t h e influence of the sectarians on both the O r t h o d o x Russians and the native population, those sectarians who had emigrated of their own volition were prohibite d f r o m settling in the cities, and were allowed to settle only in areas specified by t h e Caucasian administration. 2 4 Eventually the state realized that the settling of sectarians in Transcaucasia could be used to promote the imperial agenda. In November of 1845, the Caucasian Committee expressed its satisfaction with the presence of the Old Believers in Transcaucasia, which n u m b e r e d over ten thousand, and considered their p r e s e n c e "beneficial and necessary": T h e settling of Russian peasants in the Transcaucasian region is extremely beneficial. Politically, it assists in the consolidation of the Russian dominion there and in the merger of the region with the empire. ...In addition, the settling of the sectarians with h a r m f u l heresies in Transcaucasia, in the C o m m i t t e e ' s opinion also represents a n o t h e r advantage. It deprives them of the means to propagate the schism between the O r t h o d o x population of the inner guberniias. 2 5 T h e local administration also began to perceive the presence of the sectarians as beneficial to Russian policy aims in the area. In the view of the Tiflis governor, the D u k h o b o r sectarians "made all the local population respect them and on the distant b o r d e r it seemed they raised the Russian banner high. Spreading out over three guberniias among the miserable native population, their flourishing villages were pleasing oases, and on the political side, were staging points for the Russian cause and influence in the region." 2 6 Ironically, the sectarians who were a source of concern in the inner guberniias, where they destabilized and h a r m e d state interests, were considered allies of the state in the Transcaucasian borderlands, at least until the last decade of the nineteenth century. Acknowledging the positive impact of the sectarian settlers in Transcaucasia, the government began to encourage their voluntary resettling into the region by offering them special privileges and incentives. The edict of 9 D e c e m b e r 1848, entitled " O n privileges to the Old Believers migrating to Transcaucasia," was directed towards all sects and o f f e r e d exemption from paying dues and taxes for an eight-year period for those voluntarily settling in the region. 2 7 Official reports mention that the Russian sectarians were distinguished by their stamina and n e e d e d little monetary aid from the government. 2 8 T h e exiling of the Russian sectarian peasants to Transcaucasia served multiple purposes. It not only " p u n i s h e d " these peasants, but it also contributed to establishing the Russian presence in this region after the withdrawal of troops. The authorities made use of elements that were considered subversive in core areas, and turned them into agents of Russian political aims in the borderlands. By 1869 there were nearly 60,000 sectarians living in the Caucasus, half of them in the

172 • Firouzeh

Mostashari

North Caucasus and the remainder in Transcaucasia (mostly concentrated in B a k u guberniia). 2 9 A l t h o u g h it benefited f r o m the presence of the sectarians in Transcaucasia, the Caucasian viceroyalty was not resigned to tolerating their religious preference and periodically drew plans to convert t h e m to Orthodoxy. These proselytizing activities were particularly prevalent during the viceroyalty of Prince A.I. Bariatinskii (1856—1862).30 The viceroy did not see the sectarians as a tool for Russian imperial policy and wanted to return them to the fold of the O r t h o d o x Church. Bariatinskii took a personal interest in this question and openly stated that "it would be desirable to spread O r t h o d o x y among the sectarians." 31 In March 1858 Bariatinskii informed Prince Orlov, chairman of the Caucasian Committee, that sectarians converting to O r t h o d o x y were to be awarded permission to return to Russia as well as a three-year exemption from taxes. Yet, he lamented, "these benefits cannot assist us in appealing to them." 3 2 These privileges were ineffective as the sectarians, who had long a b a n d o n e d the Russian heartland and were well established in Transcaucasia, had adapted to their new surroundings. They did not care to return to Russia, where their children would still be obliged to pay duties from which they were liberated in the Caucasus. Living on the edge of the empire, the sectarians were in a privileged p o s i t i o n . T h e r e they enjoyed greater cultural and religious f r e e d o m s and were not enticed by offers to return to Russia. Bariatinskii therefore suggested that the g o v e r n m e n t provide additional incentives to the Old Believers. According to his proposal, converts to O r t h o d o x y would be exempt from paying monetary duties for 25 years, labor duties for two years and land tax for six years. 33 Yet Bariatinskii's thinking on the conversion of the Old Believers was fundamentally flawed, as it underestimated the tenacity of their religious beliefs. The Caucasian C o m m i t t e e rejected Bariatinskii's proposal. G o v e r n m e n t policy towards the sectarians in Transcaucasia u n d e r w e n t dramatic changes through the nineteenth century. It evolved from regarding them as seditious convicts, to allies of the state and finally to individuals capable of rejoining Russia, if only they converted to Orthodoxy. A f t e r the 1880s official policy took yet another turn and u n d e r the influence of Alexander Ill's Russification policies, the government led a campaign to limit emigration to the region to the "purely Russian" and O r t h o d o x peasantry.

COLONIZATION

AS A S O C I O - E C O N O M I C

REMEDY

The government could resolve the tension between imperial and religious concerns, once there was a pool of "pure O r t h o d o x " peasants able to migrate. The emancipation of the peasantry provided this opportunity and inaugurated a new era in the history of peasant colonization. Thereafter, voluntary migration was officially possible for the Russian O r t h o d o x peasantry. A f t e r 1866, when the

Colonization

of Caucasian Azerbaijan

• 173

Ministry of State Domains was no longer in charge of state peasants, they were f r e e to submit petitions to resettle. 3 4 The government however did little to aid the p e a s a n t s who had ventured to risk the move. In one critic's opinion, "in the twenty years following the emancipation of the peasantry, the government did not d e p a r t f r o m its passive and even negative attitude to peasant colonization." 3 5 Peasant unrest forced the government to reevaluate its position. The increasing land hunger in the central provinces of Russia after emancipation and the expectations of a "Black Repartition" agitated the peasants. This was clearly one of the factors contributing to the change in the government's settlement policy. By 1881 general rules were promulgated defining and organizing the migration of peasants to Transcaucasia. Although there had been some opportunity after 19 February 1861, for landless peasants to emigrate, the regulations touched a very small percentage of the population. Whereas in the 1860s and 1870s the government only permitted the migration of landless peasants, by the 1880s it started to p r o m o t e the large-scale migration of peasants suffering from land shortage. Not only the g o v e r n m e n t , but also the zemstvos showed an increasing concern over land shortage in central Russia. Beginning in 1880, the zemstvos in Russia's central agricultural region began to petition the central government asking for the loosening of restrictions concerning the resettling of peasants from the inner Russian provinces to the state lands in Transcaucasia. The zemstvo authorities feared that the peasants' increasing land-hunger would exacerbate social tensions between landlords and peasants. 3 6 Yet in spite of these developments, state policy towards peasant settlement remained inconsistent and vacillated through the years. The new settlement laws had their limitations. On 10 July 1881, the "Temporary Regulations" on the migration of the peasantry had been confirmed by the C o m m i t t e e of Ministers. However, these regulations only concerned those peasants "owning plots which were insufficient for feeding their families." 3 7 Peasants were granted permission to migrate if both the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Domains recognized the urgency of their economic predicament and approved their petition. O n c e they had resettled, the peasants were leased lands on a short-term basis ranging f r o m 6 to 12 years and the land plots were limited to 8 desiatinas per person. In 1884 the Minister of Internal Affairs, D.A. Tolstoy, limited the regions to which the peasants could migrate, justifying this restriction by the alleged shortage of suitable state lands. 38 Contradictory state policies resulted f r o m bureaucratic clashes b e t w e e n the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of State Domains, and the Caucasian administration. While the Ministry of Interior favored colonization as a means of alleviating social and economic problems in Russia proper, most of the Caucasian administrators tended to oppose the settlement of questionable elements, which would complicate their duties. The Ministry of State D o m a i n s opposed colonization in cases which obviously e n d a n g e r e d the local economy. Bureaucratic struggle between the center and periphery heightened under Prince A.M. Dondukov-Korsakov's administration of the Caucasus (1882-1890).

174 • Firouzeh

Mostashari

Identifying with local interests, Dondukov-Korsakov was uneasy with the overlapping powers of his administration and those of the central ministries. H e lobbied to forestall the full-fledged colonization of Transcaucasia, and succeeded in holding the plans of the Ministry of Interior at bay. Defiantly, Dondukov-Korsakov refused to provide the Ministry of Internal Affairs with an account of the available lands in Transcaucasia. Reluctant to accept more colonists, he reported that "there are no free treasury lands in the Caucasus on which colonizers might be settled." 3 9 H e added that those "insignificant amounts" of treasury lands that were unoccupied were necessary for the use of the local state peasants. Thus, due to the "negative relationship of the high commissioner to the possibility of widely colonizing Transcaucasia," the Ministry of Internal Affairs temporarily abandoned plans for the extension of new colonization legislation to the region. Dondukov-Korsakov had temporarily succeeded in forestalling colonization in Transcaucasia. However, in the a f t e r m a t h of the famine of 1891-1892, those elements within the government that favored settlement were strengthened, since this was seen as the solution to the agricultural crisis in Russia. Pressed by the peasantry as well as the public's awakened interest in the plight of the settlers, the government after 1892 became more active in its support for colonization. In D e c e m b e r of 1896, the government created the Settlement Administration (Pereselencheskoe Upravlenie), under the aegis of the Ministry of Interior, in order to organize and regulate peasant colonization. Its functions were to issue permits for colonization, organize the orderly movement of the settlers, take charge of the initial needs of the settlers in their new villages, and distribute credits. 4 0 In the same year, the Minister of Interior, I.L. Goremykin, drew attention to the colonization of the Caucasus, pointing to the shortage of lands in Siberia. H e stressed that the settling of "the Russian e l e m e n t " in the Caucasus would be "indisputably desirable f r o m the point of view of the general interests of the state." 4 1 Once again elements deemed unreliable in the center of the empire (in this case dissatisfied and potentially rebellious peasants) were used to p r o m o t e state interests in the borderlands of the empire. By May of 1897 the Ministry of Interior had m a d e a c o m m i t m e n t to peasant colonization and G o r e m y k i n asked Prince G.S. Golitsyn, the high commissioner of the Caucasus (1897-1904), to prepare a list of state lands which, in spite of being under use by the native population, could be labeled as "surplus" and were suitable for settlement by Russian peasants. By 1898 Golitsyn, a staunch Russifier and a zealous supporter of colonization, set aside over 100,000 desiatinas of land for settlement in Baku guberniia. In addition, native villagers were o r d e r e d to relinquish 252,000 desiatinas of state lands, which they were using. 42 In spite of his generally favorable view of colonization, Golitsyn cautioned the Ministry of Interior against too enthusiastically pursuing its settlement policy. Golitsyn wrote: "The conditions in the Caucasus for colonization are generally less favorable than in Siberia. . . . H e r e no expanses of available lands are found ...and the local p o p ulation harbors antipathy towards the new Russian people, and this was not the

Colonization

of Caucasian Azerbaijan

• 175

case in Siberia." 4 3 Golitsyn was concerned about the possibility of a backlash from t h e local population. In addition, the g o v e r n m e n t itself had d o u b t s a b o u t the suitability of Transcaucasia for peasant settlement, as was indicated by the internal m e m o s of t h e Ministry of Agriculture and State Domains. While pointing to land shortage in t h e five Transcaucasian provinces, the Ministry noted that "the government has p r o v i d e d the native population almost no alternatives to surplus lands to e n s u r e t h e i r existence." 4 4 T h e S e t t l e m e n t A d m i n i s t r a t i o n also admitted that "the Caucasian provinces do not offer the conditions that would allow for the largescale development of Russian colonization." 4 5 The real aim, according to the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , should be the introduction of the Russian element within possible limits, rather than the opening of Transcaucasia to massive colonization. Regardless of the concerns of the local administration, the settlement authorities viewed colonization as essential. They described its rationale: "Russia is in possession of such borderlands, in which the increasing of the Russian population not only answers the needs of the agricultural economy, but also constitutes an object of state necessity." 46 Only the Russians were seen as "capable of p r o m o t ing the development of this borderland in the direction of cultural r a p p r o c h e m e n t with the other parts of the empire." 4 7 A s a result of a new settlement law promulgated in 1899, within eighteen months, 12,835 heads of families received permission for colonization. 4 8 Those choosing to migrate were exempt from paying rent for two years in E u r o p e a n Russia and up to three and a half years in n o n - E u r o p e a n Russia. Military service was also reduced by 2 and 3 years respectively. In addition, the d e p a r t u r e of the colonists from their village communities was facilitated by writing off arrears owed by prospective settlers. Finally, railroad tariffs were significantly lowered for the colonists. 4 9 These privileges were granted only to persons "of Russian origin and the O r t h o d o x faith." Golitsyn took stringent measures to m a k e sure that the new settlers were " p e o ple of exclusively Russian and O r t h o d o x origins." H e required "that peasants f r o m the inner guberniias who desired to rent lands in the Caucasus be provided by their local officials with certificates that they are people of purely Russian origin and do not belong to any sect." 5 0 Disregarding the interests of the local population, Golitsyn instructed his governors to d e t e r m i n e the availability of lands for colonization "entirely independent of considerations of the landed organization of the natives of Transcaucasia." 51 All of the available state lands were to be set aside for Russian settlement. In addition, Golitsyn took a step f u r t h e r and urged the Ministry of Interior to rescind the law of 1844, which f o r b a d e allotting pasturelands to colonists. H e argued: "True, at present these lands are being used by the native population for the grazing of herds, but this use ...not only does not have to have a p e r m a n e n t character, but on the contrary must constantly change in accordance with the demands of the times." 52 This request m e t with opposition f r o m the Ministry of

176 • Firouzeh

Mostashari

A g r i c u l t u r e and S t a t e D o m a i n s , which w a s c o n c e r n e d less with t h e p r o m o t i o n of R u s s i a n i z a t i o n a n d m o r e with an efficient use of s t a t e land. 5 3 T h e r e g u l a t i o n s of A p r i l 1899 u n a m b i g u o u s l y p l a c e d t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e settlers b e f o r e t h o s e of t h e n a t i v e p o p u l a t i o n as well as t h o s e of t h e s e c t a r i a n peasants. So-called " s u r p l u s " l a n d s w e r e t a k e n a w a y f r o m t h e n a t i v e p o p u l a t i o n , a n d t h e right t o r e n t s t a t e land w a s given exclusively t o t h e R u s s i a n p e a s a n t s of t h e O r t h o d o x faith. 5 4 This was d o n e r e g a r d l e s s of t h e land s h o r t a g e s a f f e c t i n g t h e local p o p u l a t i o n . T h e r e m o v a l of land f r o m n a t i v e h a n d s was n o t u n i q u e t o Russia a n d w a s also p r a c t i c e d by o t h e r s e d e n t a r y civilizations e n c r o a c h i n g o n n o m a d i c f r o n t i e r s , i n h a b i t e d by p e o p l e s p e r c e i v e d as b e i n g uncivilized. A s s c h o l a r s of A m e r i c a n history h a v e o b s e r v e d : " T h e ' f r e e l a n d ' of t h e f r o n t i e r was n o t h i n g of the sort."55 RUSSIAN

S E T T L E M E N T FROM T H E

OF THE S E T T L E R S A N D THE

PERSPECTIVE NATIVES

By p r o m o t i n g p e a s a n t colonization, the s t a t e was t r a n s f e r r i n g its p r o b l e m s to t h e b o r d e r l a n d s . A s the p r e s s u r e of land s h o r t a g e was alleviated in t h e central R u s s i a n provinces, the situation w o r s e n e d in t h e Muslim b o r d e r l a n d s , w h e r e an a l r e a d y l a n d - d e p r i v e d p e a s a n t r y f o u n d m o r e c l a i m a n t s to its ancestral d o m a i n s . To m a k e m a t t e r s worse, what the tsarist officials n o n c h a l a n t l y r e f e r r e d to as " s u r p l u s " or " f r e e " t r e a s u r y lands w e r e t h o s e not o w n e d by local large l a n d o w n e r s , influential p e r s o n a g e s or g o v e r n m e n t officials. L a n d s i n h a b i t e d by local Muslim villagers, f o r e x a m p l e , w e r e c o n s i d e r e d to be "surplus." We k n o w f r o m d o c u m e n t s t h a t w h o l e villages w e r e abolished, exiled a n d resettled in o r d e r to a c c o m m o d a t e R u s s i a n settlers. A description of w h a t h a p p e n e d , o n c e a village had b e e n d e s i g n a t e d as "surplus," is p r o v i d e d by t h e p e t i t i o n of R u s s i a n villagers in Kuba uezd t o t h e high c o m m i s s i o n e r of t h e C a u c a s u s : " W h e n a l r e a d y in 1899 the higher a u t h o r i t i e s in t h e region w e r e a c k n o w l e d g i n g t h e necessity of settling Russians in Tatar villages which h a d b e e n a b o l i s h e d , their i n h a b i t a n t s e i t h e r exiled or resettled a m o n g d i f f e r e n t villages of K u b a uezd, we previously living in A l g y - A g a c h expressed o u r d e s i r e as p a r t of 26 families to settle in K u b a uezd o n t h e abolished Tatar village of ' K i u s n e t . ' " 5 6 O n c e t h e y h a d s e t t l e d in A l g y - A g a c h a n d r e n a m e d it " V l a d i m i r o v s k i i " t h e R u s s i a n p e a s a n t s f o u n d t h e m s e l v e s in a m o s t u n c o m f o r t a b l e p o s i t i o n . T h e y w e r e s u r r o u n d e d by " T a t a r " villagers w h o t h e y c l a i m e d e n c r o a c h e d u p o n their l a n d s a n d s t o l e t h e i r cattle. 5 7 I g n o r i n g t h e r e a s o n s f o r " T a t a r " hostility t o w a r d s t h e m , t h e R u s s i a n villagers w r o t e to t h e a u t h o r i t i e s : " W e h a v e n e v e r t h o u g h t of o f f e n d ing o u r T a t a r n e i g h b o r s a n d d o n o t w a n t t h e m to b e o f f e n d e d f o r o u r b e n e f i t s e i t h e r , b u t t h e y t h e m s e l v e s o f f e n d us." 5 8 T h e s e p e a s a n t s f e a r i n g " T a t a r " a t t e m p t s t o r e c l a i m t h e i r l a n d s with a r m e d f o r c e a s k e d t h e a u t h o r i t i e s t o p r o v i d e t h e m with military p r o t e c t i o n . S i m i l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s p r e v a i l e d in o t h e r u e z d s of B a k u p r o v i n c e . In D j e v a d u e z d , R u s s i a n colonists of t h e N o v o - N i k o l a e v s k i i village s u b m i t t e d a p e t i t i o n t o

Colonization

of Caucasian Azerbaijan

• 177

Prince Golitsyn in 1901, requesting protection f r o m the "Tatars." A f t e r r e p e a t e d ly asking the local administrators to provide t h e m with weapons, they appealed to t h e high commissioner: "We beg your highness not to deny us weapons for the d e f e n s e of our lives and our property, which has been obtained by hard labor." 5 9 T h e governor of Baku province reported that the initial mistrust with which t h e colonists treated the native population led to the latter's hostility.This hostility was mainly expressed in acts of theft and trespassing, and culprits were rarely a p p r e h e n d e d as their communities protected them and hid them from the a u t h o r ities. The governor therefore suggested that the colonists be armed with rifles. H e concluded that "this last measure will on the o n e hand reassure the colonists, who feel intimidated in the midst of an armed native population, and on the o t h e r h a n d it will restrain the animosity of the natives." 6 0 Throughout the 1890s and in the early years of the twentieth century, both the Russian settlers and the Caucasian administration suggested the use of force to deter the native population from attempts to reclaim their lands. These requests were taken seriously and the Local Committees for the Needs of the Agricultural Economy meeting in the Caucasus in 1902 demanded the active involvement of the police in cases where the rights of ownership of the Russian peasants were "violated." 6 1 The petitions of the Russian settlers in Eastern Transcaucasia to the authorities illustrate how the settlement policies of tsarism were harmful to the native population. By "abolishing" entire villages, and replacing their inhabitants with Russians, the government was sowing ethnic enmity between the Russians and the local Azerbaijani peasants. The settling of the "pure Russian elements" entailed much violence and suffering for the native populations. A petition by the trustees of the Khodzha Bala village in Lenkoran uezd to the Baku provincial governor, dated 30 October 1897, reveals the nature of government policy in this predominantly Muslim region: " O n 30 October 1893 we were evicted from Kuba uezd to Lenkoran uezd. All of the evicted amounted to 76 families of which one-half have already died from a pernicious fever. We ask your excellency to have mercy upon us and resettle us on state lands in the Kuba uezd or divide us among the villages of that uezd, so that we can uphold our families' health and put an end to the acute mortality among us." 62 In cases where the Azerbaijani peasants were not evicted from their villages, those using state lands were forced to sign documents renouncing their rights to part of their lands, so as to make way for the Russian settlers. Furthermore, the natives were unabashedly informed that Russians were entitled to twice the a m o u n t of land that they were. This process is well described in the letter of the trustees of five villages in Dzhevad uezd of Baku guberniia to the viceroy of the Caucasus: In view of the land shortage and constant increase in the n u m b e r of h o m e owners, ...lands in our use from the time the Persian Shakhsevans held the Mughan (Steppe) were taken away by the administration. ... A while ago the director of the Colonization Administration of Baku guberniia, G. Lich-

178 • Firouzeh

Mostashari

kus, was in our society and in the presence of the village elders announced that inhabitants of these five villages were allotted only 3 desiatinas per soul and the Russian settlers 6 or more desiatinas per soul. All of the villagers were obliged to sign a document stating that they do not have the right to plow lands exceeding this a m o u n t which belonged to the treasury and were to be allotted to the Russian settlers. 6 3 The ethnic tensions that such an openly discriminating policy created are self-evident. In addition, f r o m the above d o c u m e n t s it is clear that the native Azerbaijani peasantry and their representatives had correctly recognized the agent of their misery not in the person of the settlers (although there was no great affection for them either) but in the settlement bureaucrats of the tsarist state. As the petition by the trustees of the peasants in Dzhevad uezd indicates, these peasants were well i n f o r m e d of the various laws and their consequences. The petition by the trustees of the Khodzha Bala village also shows that the native peasantry was aware that their growing mortality rate was due to the government's disastrous policies and hence it was to the authorities, which they appealed for mercy. In some cases those dissatisfied with the response of local authorities tried to appeal to the central administration in St. Petersburg. In May of 1903, the peasants of the village of Khodzhavend of Shusha uezd petitioned the Minister of Justice. The local administration had accused them of seizing the lands allotted for settlement. The petitioners justified their action: H o w could we have allowed that the land for which we have continuously paid taxes, which is our only source of food, on which our gardens have existed for over one hundred years, and without which our existence is unthinkable, should be arbitrarily and contrary to all laws ... allotted anew to the arriving settlers. We are its true masters and we have worked this land with our blood, yet we are to be driven out of it by force, ... we have remained without the smallest plot of land suitable for cultivation. 6 4 Eventually the Muslim villagers managed to involve in their case not only Golitsyn, but also the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Justice. Golitsyn claimed that the villagers had, "constantly and systematically" taken possession of over 4,000 desiatinas of land. The Ministry of Justice, mostly concerned a b o u t legality, f o u n d this position extreme and contradictory to the information it had received. D e f e n d i n g the needs of the native population, the Minister of Justice wrote: "In conclusion in my opinion, one must k e e p in mind that the natives, whose chief and almost sole possessions consist of cattle, cannot manage without their special migratory way of life, established centuries a g o . . . . " 6 5 Hence the ministry o p p o s e d closing the access of the villagers to their s u m m e r pasture lands, and d e f e n d e d the traditional economy. The tragedy of tsarist settlement policy in Eastern Transcaucasia was that

Colonization

of Caucasian Azerbaijan

• 179

w h i l e it o b v i o u s l y h a r m e d t h e n a t i v e M u s l i m p e a s a n t s , it did n o t b e n e f i t t h e R u s sian O r t h o d o x p e a s a n t s e i t h e r . In c o n t r a s t to t h e sectarians, the O r t h o d o x p e a s a n t s l a c k e d s t a m i n a a n d c o u l d n o t a d a p t t o t h e living c o n d i t i o n s of E a s t e r n T r a n s c a u c a s i a . I n s t e a d t h e R u s s i a n O r t h o d o x p e a s a n t s d e g e n e r a t e d into idleness, living off t h e p r i v i l e g e s given to t h e m at t h e e x p e n s e of t h e local p o p u l a t i o n . T h e d e g e n e r a t i o n of t h e s e p e a s a n t s is d e s c r i b e d by t h e O r t h o d o x priest of A l t y A c h a g village of S h e m a k h a g u b e r n i i a , writing to t h e g o v e r n o r : O u r c o l o n i s t s as e v i d e n t a r e s c r o u n g e r s , wishing to live easy. It has a l r e a d y b e e n a y e a r since t h e y h a v e m i g r a t e d to A l t y A c h a g a n d they h a v e n o t y e t t h o u g h t of building, a l t h o u g h t h e y a r e s u r r o u n d e d by f o r e s t . T h e y r e n t o u t all of t h e l a n d s in small p l o t s to t h e local M o l o k a n s a n d use t h e m o n e y w i t h o u t p a y i n g any taxes. T h e y also b u r n d o w n t h e f o r e s t a n d sell it. . . . M a n y s p e a k of leaving. T h e i r land is suitable, t h e c l i m a t e is g o o d , b u t they d o n ' t w a n t t o build. W h y ? It is c l e a r t h a t t h e y w a n t t o use an excuse a n d l e a v e f o r a place f u r t h e r off. ,.. 6 6 A s t h e priest of A l t y A c h a g l a m e n t e d , t h e R u s s i a n O r t h o d o x p e a s a n t s , as o p p o s e d to t h e s e c t a r i a n s , h a d little d e t e r m i n a t i o n o r d e s i r e t o a d a p t t o life in T r a n s caucasia. M a n y i n d e e d did r e t u r n to Russia. T h e local a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s r e s p o n s e t o this crisis h o w e v e r was simply t o o f f e r m o r e of t h e s a m e ; t h e S e t t l e m e n t A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s l e t t e r s to t h e C a u c a s i a n g o v e r n o r s in 1905 a r e r e p l e t e with r e q u e s t s to i n c r e a s e t h e n o r m s of t h e lands u n d e r use by t h e R u s s i a n settlers. 6 7 T h e sacrificing of local i n t e r e s t s in o r d e r to e n c o u r a g e t h e influx of t h e R u s s i a n O r t h o d o x s e t t l e r s was a m a j o r f a c t o r in instigating d i s t u r b a n c e s in

Eastern

T r a n s c a u c a s i a n c o u n t r y s i d e . By i n t r o d u c i n g e t h n i c d i s c r i m i n a t i o n to t h e r u r a l c o m m u n i t y , t s a r i s m a i d e d t h e local p e a s a n t r y ' s identity f o r m a t i o n a n d t h e i r selfdefinition as a M u s l i m p e o p l e , in a d d i t i o n t o s i m p l e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with village interests. T h u s t h e A z e r b a i j a n i p e a s a n t s ' i d e n t i t y h a d s h i f t e d f r o m a local a n d e c o n o m i c o n e t o a r e l i g i o u s a n d e t h n i c identity. R u s s i a n s e t t l e m e n t policy h a d clearly e v o l v e d b e t w e e n t h e 1820s a n d t h e 1890s. This e v o l u t i o n w a s t h e result of c h a n g i n g c o n d i t i o n s in c e n t r a l R u s s i a as well as t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h i n k i n g a b o u t m e t h o d s of i n t e g r a t i n g b o r d e r l a n d s into t h e e m p i r e . W h i l e at first R u s s i a n s e t t l e m e n t policy was an i n a d v e r t e n t r e s u l t of p e n a l policy t o w a r d s religious d e v i a n t s in c e n t r a l R u s s i a , it e v e n t u a l l y b e c a m e a d e l i b e r a t e l y p l a n n e d policy. In its m a t u r e f o r m this policy tried t o r e s o l v e b o t h e c o n o m i c a n d social t e n s i o n s within c o r e a r e a s of t h e e m p i r e , by p r o m o t i n g t h e i n t e g r a t i o n of t h e b o r d e r l a n d s . T h e p r e s e n c e of t h e R u s s i a n e t h n i c e l e m e n t in t h e b o r d e r l a n d s w a s increasingly s e e n as a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n of such i n t e g r a t i o n . T h e s e t t l e m e n t polices of tsarism t r a n s f o r m e d t h e social a n d e t h n i c l a n d s c a p e of E a s t e r n T r a n s c a u c a s i a . By t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e t w e n t i e t h century, s t a t e - s p o n s o r e d and v o l u n t a r y m i g r a t i o n h a d u s h e r e d in social a n d n a t i o n a l

tensions.

C o u p l e d with r a p i d i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , t h e s t a g e w a s set f o r a tragic h i s t o r y in 1905.

180 • Firouzeh

Mostashari

Notes This article is a s u b s t a n t i a l l y revised v e r s i o n of an article that a p p e a r e d in Journal Asian

Studies

of

Central

(1996), a n d a p p e a r s h e r e with p e r m i s s i o n .

1 I.A. G u r v i c h , Pereselenie

Krest'ian

v Sibir' ( M o s c o w . 1889), i.

Slovar', 23 vols. (St. P e t e r s b u r g , 1898). 2 F.A. B r o k h a u s and I.A. E f r o n , Entsiklopedicheskii 265. This study c o n c e n t r a t e s on m i g r a t i o n to f r o n t i e r a r e a s and not to industrial centers. For a d e t a i l e d discussion of i n t e r n a l m i g r a t i o n in the Russian E m p i r e , see B a r b a r a A n d e r s o n ' s Internal Migration During Modernization in Late Nineteenth-Century Russia ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1980). 3 For figures o n m i g r a t o r y flows a w a y f r o m c e n t r a l Russia, see B.V. T i k h o n o v ' s Pereseleniia v Rossii vo vtoroi polovinie xix v. ( M o s c o w : N a u k a , 1978). 38-39. 4 In this article A z e r b a i j a n r e f e r s to C a u c a s i a n A z e r b a i j a n , which a f t e r the R u s s i a n conq u e s t a n d e s t a b l i s h m e n t of civil a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , was k n o w n as B a k u and E l i z a v e t p o l ' provinces. T h e s e t w o p r o v i n c e s f o r m e d E a s t e r n Transcaucasia a n d the p r e s e n t - d a y R e p u b l i c of A z e r b a i j a n o c c u p i e s the r e g i o n s c o r r e s p o n d i n g with t h e two provinces. 5 T h e A z e r b a i j a n i s are s p e a k e r s of t h e A z e r i dialect of Turkish and are natives of E a s t e r n T r a n s c a u c a s i a . U n l i k e o t h e r M u s l i m s of the Russian E m p i r e , the A z e r b a i j a n i s w e r e pred o m i n a t e l y Shi'ite Muslims. T h e i m p e r i a l c e n s u s r e p o r t s classified the A z e r b a i j a n i s as "Tatars." 6 This b r o a d c a t e g o r y also i n c l u d e d U k r a i n i a n s . 7 T h e s e g r o u p s included the A r m e n i a n s of t h e Q a j a r and O t t o m a n states as well as G e r m a n religious sectarians. 8 N. Shavrov, " O b z o r p r o i z v o d i t e l ' n y k h sil' K a v k a z s k a g o n a m e s t n i c h e s t v a , " in Kavkazskii Kalendar' na 1880 god (Tiflis, 1879), 7. 9 Ibid.J. 10 N. Shavrov, " R u s s k a i a k o l o n i z a t s i i a na K a v k a z e , " in G.F. Chirkin and N.A. Gavrilov, eds.. Voprosy Kolonizatsii 8 (St. P e t e r s b u r g , 1911), 176. 11 Ibid., 133,143. 12 D.I. I s m a i l - Z a d e . Russkoe krest'ianstvo v Zakavkaz cow: I z d a t e l ' s t v o N a u k a , 1982), 3 4 - 3 5 .

e:30-e gody XIX-nachalo

35. 13 D. I. I s m a i l - Z a d e , Russkoe krest'ianstvo, 14 Akty sobrannye Kavkazskoiu Arkheograficheskoiu vols. (Tiflis, 1866-1904), 12: d o k . 483, 552. 15 D.I. I s m a i l - Z a d e , Russkoe krest'ianstvo, 50.

Kommissieiu

XXv.

(Mos-

[ h e r e a f t e r A K A K ] , 12

16 D.I. I s m a i l - Z a d e , Russkoe krest'ianstvo, 35. 17 Rossiiskii g o s u d a r s t v e n n y i istoricheskii a r k h i v [ h e r e a f t e r R G I A ] , f. 1268, op. 10, d. 127, 275. T h e t e r r i t o r i e s of S h e m a k h a , L e n k o r a n a n d S h u s h a uezds all fall within t h e p r e s e n t d a y R e p u b l i c of A z e r b a i j a n . 18 R G I A , f. 1263, op. l , d . 7 8 9 , 4 7 7 . 19 Ivan G o l o v i n , The Caucasus ( L o n d o n , 1854), 121. 20 A K A K , 12: d o k . 489,561. 21 F r a n ç o i s - X a v i e r C o q u i n , La Siberie: Peuplement (Paris: Institut d ' é t u d e s slaves, 1969), 12.

et Immigration

Paysanne

Au XIX

Siècle

22 D.I. I s m a i l - Z a d e , Russkoe krest'ianstvo, 36. 23 R G I A , f. 1263, op. 1, d. 7 8 9 , 4 7 8 B - 4 7 9 B . 24 R G I A , f. 1263, op. 1, d. 7 8 9 , 4 8 2 . 25 A K A K , 10: d o k . 97,119-120. 26 A.I. Klibanov, History Press, 1982), 122.

of Religious

Sectarianism

in Russia,

1860-1917

(Oxford: Pergamon

Notes 27 D. I. I s m a i l - Z a d e . Russkoe

krest'ianstvo,

-181

44.

28 R G I A , f. 391. op. 2. d. 1065,4. 29 Sbornik statisticheskikh svedenii o Kavkaze, vol. 1, (Tiflis: Kavkazkii O t d e l . I m p e r a t o r s k a g o R u s s k o g o G e o g r a f i c h e s k o g o O b s h c h e s t v a , 1869), A-14. 30 F o r m o r e i n f o r m a t i o n o n Bariatinskii see A.J. R i e b e r , The Politics of Autocracy: Letters of Alexander II to Prince A.I. Bariatinskii, 1857-1864 (Paris a n d the H a g u e : M o u t o n . 1966). 31 A K A K . 12: d o k . 4 8 3 , 5 5 3 . 32 Ibid.. 33 Ibid.,

553. 553-554.

34 A . A . K a u f m a n , Pereselenie 16-17. 35 Ibid.,

i kolonizatsiia

(St. P e t e r s b u r g : O b s h c h e s t v e n n o i Pol'za, 1905),

21.

36 E . M . B r u s n i k i n , " P e r e s e l e n c h e s k a i a politika T s a r i s m a v k o n t s e X I X veka," Voprosy 1 ( J a n u a r y 1965): 2 8 - 2 9 . 37 A . A . K a u f m a n , Pereselenie i kolonizatsiia, 24. 38 39 40 41

istorii

E . M . Brusnikin. "Pereselencheskaia politika," 29-31. R G I A , f. 391, op. 2, d. 195, 224ob. D.I. I s m a i l - Z a d e , Russkoe krest'ianstvo, 96, 113. R G I A , f. 391. op. 2, d. 195, 3ob.

42 R G I A . f . 391. op. 2, d. 195,225. 43 R G I A . f . 391, op. 2, d. 195, p. 192ob. 44 R G I A , f. 391, op. 2. d. 195,2. 45 46 47 48 49 50

R G I A , f. 391, op. 1, d. 3 3 8 . 6 5 - 6 5 o b . R G I A , f. 391, op. 2. d. 195,224. R G I A . f. 391. op. 1, d. 338, 65ob. R G I A . f. 391, op. 2. d. 1065,2. A . A . K a u f m a n , Pereselenie i kolonizatsiia, R G I A . f. 391, op. 2, d. 195, 157ob.

51 52 53 54

RGIA, RGIA, RGIA, RGIA,

f. 391, f. 391. f. 391, f. 391,

op. op. op. op.

2, 2, 2, 2,

d. d. d. d.

195, 195, 195. 195,

29, 37.

161ob. 164ob. 193. 157.

55 William C r o n o n , G e o r g e Miles, and Jay Gitlin, Under an Open Sky: Rethinking America's Western Past ( N e w York: W.W. N o r t o n , 1992), 4. 56 N a u c h n y i A r k h i v Institut Istorii A z e r b a i d z h a n a , inv. no. 1687, vol. 7 (Kopii m a t e r i a l o v p o t e m e 'Istoriia A z e r b a i d z h a n a X I X v,' v T s G I A [ T s e n t r a l ' n y i g o s u d a r s t v e n n y i istoricheskii a r k h i v ] G r u z i n s k o i S S R ) , 816. 57 T a t a r in this c o n t e x t r e f e r s t o A z e r b a i j a n i s . 58 Ibid., 817. 59 R G I A , f. 391, op. 2, d. 908, 147-147ob. 60 R G I A , f. 1263, op. 2, d. 5257, 648-649. 61 Kavkazskii krai, vol. 12 of Trudy mestnykh komitetov promyshlennosti (St. P e t e r s b u r g , 1903), 58.

o nuzhdakh

sel'skokhoziaistvennoi

62 T s e n t r a l ' n y i g o s u d a r s t v e n n y i istoricheskii a r k h i v A z e r b a i d z h a n a [ h e r e a f t e r T s G I A Az], f. 44, op. 2, d. 572, 2. 63 T s G I A A z , f . 14, op. l , d . 21, 12-13. 64 R G I A . f. 391, op. 2, d. 1042, 2 4 - 2 4 o b . 65 R G I A , f. 391, op. 2, d. 1042, 2 9 o b and 36ob. 66 T s G I A Az, f. 14, op. l , d . 11.11.7-8. 67 T s G I A Az, f. 14, op. 1. d. 13,1. 8. s

Diamond in the Rough: The State, Entrepreneurs and Turkestan's Hidden Resources in Late Imperial Russia MURIEL

JOFFE

In 1890, following a visit to Russia's C e n t r a l A s i a n b o r d e r l a n d , Minister of Fin a n c e V y s h n e g r a d s k i i characterized the region as " t h e precious d i a m o n d in the c r o w n of the Russian Empire." 1 His r e p e a t e d praise d u r i n g that j o u r n e y for the " p i o n e e r i n g " a n d " e n e r g e t i c " e f f o r t s of the first Russian settlers to exploit T u r k e s t a n ' s " b o u n t i f u l natural gifts" and his s u b s e q u e n t call for a b r o a d p r o g r a m of irrigation a n d colonization m a k e clear that T u r k e s t a n ' s value c o n s t i t u t e d an e c o n o m i c vision of the f u t u r e based on the application of Russian enterprise. 2 Witte, w h o a c c o m p a n i e d V y s h n e g r a d s k i i on that journey, recalled in his m e m o i r s that he t o o was equally i m p r e s s e d by the r e g i o n ' s vast " u n t a p p e d " resources. H o w e v e r , he n o t e d that in the a p p r o x i m a t e l y twenty-five years since that visit, these resources, with the exception of c o t t o n p r o d u c t i o n , were still largely u n d e v e l o p e d . " 3 In o t h e r words, the precious jewel in the R u s s i a n crown r e m a i n e d a " d i a m o n d in the r o u g h . " This essay s e e k s to explain s o m e of the r e a s o n s b e h i n d the u n e v e n d e v e l o p m e n t of T u r k e s t a n n o t e d by Witte t o w a r d the e n d of Russian imperial rule. 4 It will f o c u s primarily on the c o m p l e x r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n law, administration, and econ o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t . T h e essay begins with a brief overview of the s u p p o r t for the e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t of T u r k e s t a n f o u n d a m o n g g o v e r n m e n t officials, military a d m i n i s t r a t o r s a n d Russian e n t r e p r e n e u r s a n d p r e s e n t s a general assessment of the e c o n o m i c a c h i e v e m e n t s during the first d e c a d e s of tsarist rule. It will then a d d r e s s the f a i l u r e of the state a n d private s e c t o r s to d e v e l o p T u r k e s t a n ' s m i n e r al resources. T h e latter, t o g e t h e r with the r e g i o n ' s fertile agricultural soil, r e p r e s e n t e d the m a i n t r e a s u r e s that a t t r a c t e d the a t t e n t i o n of the state and private capital to C e n t r a l Asia. I n d e e d , legends a b o u t sandy deposits of gold h a d led P e t e r the G r e a t to o r d e r the c o n q u e s t of the C e n t r a l A s i a n city of I a r k e n d in Sinkiang (western T u r k e s t a n ) . 5 With the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of Russian rule o v e r T u r k e s t a n , oil a n d coal r e p l a c e d gold as the p r i m a r y m i n e r a l a t t r a c t i o n . This essay builds u p o n my previous r e s e a r c h on the failed e f f o r t s of g o v e r n ment officials, mainly A l e x a n d e r Krivoshein a n d the Chief A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of L a n d S e t t l e m e n t a n d A g r i c u l t u r e , to enlist the firm s u p p o r t of the private sector f o r

184 • Muriel

Joffe

t h e i r g r a n d i o s e s c h e m e to t r a n s f o r m t h e r e g i o n t h r o u g h irrigation. A s I a r g u e d , o n e of t h e m a j o r o b s t a c l e s to t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of p r i v a t e capital in irrigation lay in t h e legal a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o n t r o l t h e g o v e r n m e n t p l a c e d on c o r p o r a t i o n s wishing to d o b u s i n e s s in C e n t r a l A s i a . 6 This essay e x p l o r e s f u r t h e r t h e p r o b l e m of e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t in a m u l t i - e t h n i c s t a t e e n c o m p a s s i n g t e r r i t o r i e s with diff e r e n t s o c i o - e c o n o m i c a n d cultural p a t t e r n s . W i t h r e s p e c t to T u r k e s t a n ' s m i n i n g industry, t h e logic of d e v e l o p m e n t u l t i m a t e l y r e q u i r e d a r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of p r o p e r t y r e l a t i o n s in t h e r e g i o n , f o r b o t h T u r k e s t a n ' s s e t t l e d a n d n o m a d i c p o p u l a t i o n s , and

regulation

of access by R u s s i a n e n t r e p r e n e u r s

t o the r e g i o n ' s

natural

r e s o u r c e s , i n c l u d i n g l a n d a n d u n d e r g r o u n d minerals. F a c e d with t h e s e n e w i m p e r atives, tsarist b u r e a u c r a t s , military a d m i n i s t r a t o r s a n d R u s s i a n

entrepreneurs

w e r e n o l o n g e r u n i t e d b e h i n d t h e c o m m o n goal of e c o n o m i c

development.

I n s t e a d , t h e a r t i c u l a t i o n of policies f o r t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of T u r k e s t a n b e c a m e an integral p a r t of t h e d e b a t e s o v e r t h e c h a r a c t e r a n d q u a l i t y of R u s s i a n i m p e r i a l r u l e in t h e r e g i o n . T h i s essay c o n t r i b u t e s t o o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of two m a j o r p r o b l e m s in t h e hist o r y of late i m p e r i a l Russia. First, it p r o v i d e s f u r t h e r e v i d e n c e of t h e f u n d a m e n tal t e n s i o n b e t w e e n capitalist d e v e l o p m e n t a n d t h e a u t o c r a t i c system. 7 S e c o n d , it c o n t r i b u t e s t o o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e p r o c e s s of e m p i r e building in R u s s i a a n d t o t h e s t u d y of ruling R u s s i a ' s b o r d e r l a n d s . 8 ^

^

R u s s i a ' s pacification of the K a z a k h s t e p p e in t h e 1850s a n d initial military victories a g a i n s t the i n d e p e n d e n t k h a n a t e s of K o k a n d a n d B u k h a r a in t h e early 1860s set t h e s t a g e f o r t h e possible r e a l i z a t i o n of R u s s i a n e c o n o m i c goals in C e n t r a l A s i a : at t h e m o s t , R u s s i a n e c o n o m i c d o m i n a n c e , at t h e very least, i m p r o v e d c o m m e r c i a l relations. T h e d e v e l o p m e n t of R u s s i a n textile, especially c o t t o n , m a n u f a c t u r i n g in t h e first half of t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y s t r e n g t h e n e d e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l d r e a m s of t r a n s f o r m i n g C e n t r a l A s i a into a vast m a r k e t f o r R u s s i a n g o o d s a n d s o u r c e of r a w m a t e r i a l s f o r R u s s i a n industry. T h e s e h o p e s r e f l e c t e d n o t only a s o b e r a s s e s s m e n t of R u s s i a ' s w e a k d o m e s t i c m a r k e t a n d inability to c o m p e t e o n E u r o p e a n m a r k e t s , b u t also t h e e n t r e p r e n e u r s ' belief t h a t R u s s i a ' s e c o n o m i c relat i o n s with A s i a w e r e essential t o a n d p r o o f of R u s s i a ' s identity as a g r e a t p o w e r . T h i s c o m b i n a t i o n of e c o n o m i c i n t e r e s t , R u s s i a n n a t i o n a l i s m and i m p e r i a l d r e a m s led l e a d e r s in t h e M o s c o w m e r c h a n t c o m m u n i t y , in a s s o c i a t i o n with t h e Slavophile e n t r e p r e n e u r s , A l e x a n d e r P. S h i p o v a n d F e d o r V. Chizhov, to s u p p o r t t h e a d v o c a t e s of a f o r w a r d policy in Asia in R u s s i a n b u r e a u c r a t i c circles. 9 T h e c o t t o n f a m i n e in R u s s i a c a u s e d by t h e U S Civil W a r f u r t h e r s t r e n g t h e n e d m e r c h a n t s u p p o r t f o r military a c t i o n . T h e military a d m i n i s t r a t o r s of t h e e m p i r e ' s newly a c q u i r e d t e r r i t o r y s u p p o r t ed t h e initiatives of R u s s i a n e n t r e p r e n e u r s a n d c o n s i d e r e d t h e m as u n e q u a l p a r t n e r s in R u s s i a ' s i m p e r i a l v e n t u r e . 1 0 S t r o n g e r e c o n o m i c ties b e t w e e n R u s s i a a n d its n e w b o r d e r l a n d w o u l d n o t only b i n d t h e r e g i o n m o r e closely t o t h e r e s t of t h e

Diamond in the Rough • 185 Russian Empire, especially in light of the absence of direct and rapid communications, but were also proof of Russia's successful imperial mission. The benefits of economic d e v e l o p m e n t , as explained in the reports of Turkestan's governorgenerals, were both financial and moral. In addition to repaying the Russian state for its financial sacrifices associated with the conquest of the region and the export of capital to purchase foreign cotton, economic development would improve the material and spiritual lives of Turkestan's native populations. 1 1 In this respect, development joined peace, security and civil order (grazhdanstvennost') as a symbol and achievement of Russian imperial rule. Soon a f t e r the creation of the Turkestan governor-generalship in 1867, Turkestan's military administrators took a n u m b e r of measures to develop trade and industry there. 1 2 They p r o m o t e d the scientific investigation of Russia's newly acquired territories, developed experimental plantations to grow cotton and improve silk cultivation, and established agricultural schools for the native populations. 1 3 Turkestan's military rulers also c o o p e r a t e d with Russian scientific and e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l organizations interested in strengthening Russian economic relations in Central Asia. 1 4 The generals also lent their support to or even took the initiative in establishing Russian companies to do business in Central Asia, but most of these ended in failure. 1 5 Although the government blamed these failures on the m e r c h a n t s ' lack of enterprise, Russian e n t r e p r e n e u r s faced a n u m b e r of serious obstacles to conducting business in the region: the absence of direct means of communication, unstable political relations with the i n d e p e n d e n t khanates, and threats to personal safety. By the end of the 1880s Russia had completed its military pacification of the region. T h e i n d e p e n d e n t k h a n a t e of Kokand had been incorporated into the Turkestan governor-generalship and Khiva and B u k h a r a had been reduced to vassal states. The Central Asian railroad, built in the 1880s, b e c a m e an important artery for Russian commerce in Central Asia. Finally, in 1895, with the inclusion of B u k h a r a in the Russian customs zone, Russian merchants were granted a monopoly in Central Asian m a r k e t s and the territory was sealed off f r o m imports of foreign, especially British goods. 1 6 Railroad construction, peace and customs protection strengthened Russia's economic influence in Central Asia. By 1900 Turkestan, B u k h a r a and Khiva supplied 36 percent of the cotton consumed in Russia, most of it grown f r o m A m e r i c a n varieties of cotton. 1 7 The trade of Russian m a n u f a c t u r e s in Central Asia also increased dramatically. In a reversal of the historical p a t t e r n of trade between Russia and Central Asia that existed as late as the 1850s, Russia now supplied the latter with cotton goods. 1 8 Some of this i m p r o v e m e n t can be attributed to the Russian cotton m a n u f a c t u r e r s in the Central Industrial Region and Tsarist Poland w h o established companies in the 1880s and 1890s to deliver A m e r i c a n cotton seed to native growers, buy and process cotton, and trade Russian m a n u factures in the regipn. 1 9 In essence, by the late nineteenth century a combination of government policy

186 • Muriel

Joffe

a n d e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l initiative h a d s u c c e e d e d in t r a n s f o r m i n g T u r k e s t a n ( a n d indirectly B u k h a r a a n d K h i v a ) into w h a t R u s s i a n s t h e m s e l v e s r e f e r r e d to as their "colony," a t e r r i t o r y t h a t s u p p l i e d the m e t r o p o l e with r a w m a t e r i a l s a n d cons u m e d its m a n u f a c t u r e s . 2 0 H o w e v e r , m u c h r e m a i n e d to be d o n e b e f o r e Russia c o m p l e t e d its civilizing mission in t h e r e g i o n . I n d e e d , V y s h n e g r a d s k i i ' s visit to C e n t r a l Asia in 1890 r e p r e s e n t e d a significant c h a n g e in St. P e t e r s b u r g ' s a t t i t u d e to its d i s t a n t b o r d e r l a n d . T h e M i n i s t e r of F i n a n c e was t h e first p r o m i n e n t official in St. P e t e r s b u r g t o s u p p o r t s t r o n g e r g o v e r n m e n t policies d i r e c t e d t o t h e econ o m i c and c u l t u r a l d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e b o r d e r l a n d a n d its i n t e g r a t i o n into t h e Russian Empire. T h e d e g r e e t o which R u s s i a n e n t r e p r e n e u r s w o u l d p a r t i c i p a t e in this r e n e w e d e f f o r t at e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t u l t i m a t e l y d e p e n d e d o n t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s willingness to e r e c t t h e final pillar in t h e i n f r a s t r u c t u r e f o r e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t , n a m e l y t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a firm legal f o u n d a t i o n f o r e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l activity. M y analysis of e f f o r t s t o d e v e l o p T u r k e s t a n ' s m i n i n g i n d u s t r y will d e m o n s t r a t e h o w t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s f a i l u r e to r e s o l v e t h e legal basis f o r p r o p e r t y o w n e r s h i p in R u s s i a n T u r k e s t a n b e f o r e W o r l d W a r I s e v e r e l y i m p e d e d its ability t o t r a n s f o r m the region through economic development.

O n t h e eve of R u s s i a ' s c o n q u e s t s in C e n t r a l A s i a , t h e r e g i o n ' s m i n e r a l r e s o u r c e s h a d b e e n b a r e l y e x p l o i t e d . W i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n of T r a n s c a s p i a w h e r e T u r k m e n e x t r a c t e d oil f o r f u e l a n d o t h e r needs, T u r k e s t a n ' s native p o p u l a t i o n s used w o o d f r o m t h e saksciul b u s h as t h e i r p r i m a r y f u e l a n d relied on i m p o r t s of finished iron p r o d u c t s f r o m R u s s i a f o r t h e i r d o m e s t i c needs. Small a m o u n t s of c o p p e r a n d lead w e r e m i n e d p r i m a r i l y f o r military p u r p o s e s . 2 1 G o v e r n m e n t a n d p r i v a t e e f f o r t s to d e v e l o p t h e r e g i o n ' s m i n e r a l r e s o u r c e s follow t h e s a m e p a t t e r n t h a t c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h e g e n e r a l e c o n o m i c history of t h e r e g i o n . In t h e i m m e d i a t e a f t e r m a t h of R u s s i a ' s initial victories, a n u m b e r of e n t e r prising m e r c h a n t s , I.I. P e r v u s h i n , A . E . G r o m o v a n d N . I . Ivanov, s e a r c h e d f o r gold, iron, c o p p e r , lead, coal a n d oil. T h e s e " p i o n e e r s " w e r e involved in a n u m b e r of e c o n o m i c c o n c e r n s : v i n i c u l t u r e a n d t o b a c c o f a r m i n g , t h e p r o d u c t i o n of a l c o h o l , textiles, sugar, p a p i r o s y a n d e v e n b a n k i n g . S o m e of their e n t e r p r i s e s c o n s u m e d coal f r o m t h e i r m i n e s as a s o u r c e of fuel. 2 2 T h e b o l d n e s s with which t h e s e e n t r e p r e n e u r s c h a r t e d o u t n e w e c o n o m i c territ o r i e s also e x p l a i n s t h e i r m u l t i p l e failures. In c o n t r a s t to t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h o s e b r a n c h e s of p r o d u c t i o n , e.g. alcohol a n d t o b a c c o , t h e p r o d u c t s of which w e r e i m m e d i a t e l y c o n s u m e d by R u s s i a n s living n e a r b y , t h e e x p l o i t a t i o n of T u r k e s t a n ' s m i n e r a l r e s o u r c e s r e q u i r e d a g r e a t e r d e g r e e of t e c h n i c a l as well as g e o l o g i c k n o w l e d g e , which t h e e n t r e p r e n e u r s l a c k e d , a n d m e a n s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n t o c o n nect mines, f a c t o r i e s a n d m a r k e t s . T h e s e s a m e p r o b l e m s c o n f r o n t e d t h e g o v e r n m e n t in its e f f o r t s . E v e n b e f o r e t h e c o n q u e s t of T a s h k e n t , t h e military b e g a n its s e a r c h f o r h e a t i n g m a t e r i a l s a n d f u e l f o r t h e t r o o p s . T h e first m i n e in C e n t r a l A s i a ,

Diamond

in the Rough • 187

n a m e d a f t e r t h e m i n i n g e n g i n e e r Tatarinov. w a s f o u n d e d in 1868 in C h i m k e n t u e z d by t h e T r e a s u r y t o s u p p l y coal to t h e A r a l fleet a n d f u e l f o r T a s h k e n t a n d C h i m k e n t . D u r i n g t h e six y e a r s the m i n e o p e r a t e d , it p r o d u c e d 300,000 p u d s of c o a l b u t as a result of t h e e x h a u s t i o n of its coal d e p o s i t s a n d its d i s t a n c e f r o m m a r k e t s , t h e m i n e s h u t d o w n . D u r i n g this p e r i o d , t h e T u r k e s t a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n e n c o u r a g e d t h e geological e x p l o r a t i o n of t h e r e g i o n . T h e s u r v e y s carried o u t by t h e m i n i n g e n g i n e e r s M u s h k e t o v a n d R o m a n o v s k i i in 1874 of p a r t s of S y r - D a r ' i a a n d F e r g a n a oblasts a n d S e m i r e c h i e r e m a i n e d t h e p r i m a r y a n d limited s o u r c e of g e o l o g i c i n f o r m a t i o n as late as 1909. 2 3 T h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a m o d e r n m i n i n g i n d u s t r y in T u r k e s t a n b e g a n in t h e late 1870s a n d 1880s a n d w a s assisted by t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e C e n t r a l A s i a n railr o a d . T h e latter i n c r e a s e d d e m a n d f o r t h e r e g i o n ' s coal a n d oil, facilitated t h e s h i p m e n t of m i n e r a l s to f a c t o r i e s a n d m a r k e t , a n d itself u n d e r t o o k the e x p l o i t a t i o n of t h e s e minerals. A l t h o u g h initial f a i l u r e s s o m e t i m e s d i s c o u r a g e d n e w inv e s t m e n t , t h e a p p e a r a n c e of a g u s h e r , f o r e x a m p l e , w o u l d in c o n t r a s t lead to a n e w w a v e of s p e c u l a t i o n . I n v e s t m e n t p a r t i c u l a r l y i n c r e a s e d in t h e first d e c a d e of the

twentieth

century, stimulated

by d e m a n d

f r o m the newly

constructed

O r e n b u r g - T a s h k e n t r a i l r o a d a n d t h e e x p a n s i o n of T u r k e s t a n ' s f a c t o r y i n d u s t r y in c o m b i n a t i o n with d i m i n i s h e d s u p p l i e s of local f u e l a n d t h e high cost of f u e l imports.24 T h e p o t e n t i a l l y oil-rich t e r r i t o r y of C h e l e k e n Island in T r a n s c a s p i a a n d t h e k n o w n r e s e r v e s of oil a n d coal in F e r g a n a o b l a s t a t t r a c t e d e n t r e p r e n e u r s f r o m o u t s i d e t h e b o r d e r l a n d . T h e s e i n v e s t o r s c a m e f r o m n e i g h b o r i n g regions, such as O r e n b u r g a n d t h e C a u c a s u s , or r e g i o n s with i m m e d i a t e e c o n o m i c i n t e r e s t s in C e n t r a l A s i a , p r i m a r i l y M o s c o w . For e x a m p l e , t h e first successful oil v e n t u r e s o n C h e l e k e n Island w e r e e s t a b l i s h e d in t h e 1880s by t h e R u s s i a n e n g i n e e r S.E. P a l a s h k o v s k i i a n d t h e w e l l - k n o w n N o b e l family, w h o w e r e a l r e a d y active in t h e C a u c a s u s a n d Persia. S o o n a f t e r , a g r o u p of i n v e s t o r s f r o m Moscow, including r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of old m e r c h a n t f a m i l i e s such as t h e B o s t a n z h o g l y a n d R o z h d e s t v e n skii, e x p l o r e d this s a m e territory. In a p a t t e r n f o u n d e l s e w h e r e in t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of R u s s i a n industry, T u r k e s t a n a t t r a c t e d a small n u m b e r of f o r e i g n investors, w e a l t h y n o b l e s such as t h e P r i n c e s T r u b e t s k o i a n d L o b a n o v - R o s t o v s k i i , a n d engin e e r s . In 1900 t h e r a i l r o a d e n g i n e e r A.N. Kovalevskii, w h o later w o u l d b e c o m e involved in g r a n d i o s e irrigation p r o j e c t s in T u r k e s t a n , e s t a b l i s h e d t h e j o i n t - s t o c k c o m p a n y , C h i m i o n . B e f o r e financial m i s m a n a g e m e n t e v e n t u a l l y led to its sale to t h e N o b e l family, C h i m i o n b e c a m e t h e largest m i n i n g e n t e r p r i s e in F e r g a n a o b l a s t . In 1908 it p r o d u c e d a p p r o x i m a t e l y 99 p e r c e n t of t h e oil e x t r a c t e d in F e r g a n a oblast. 2 5 D e s p i t e p e r s i s t e n t r e p o r t s a b o u t t h e r e g i o n ' s rich m i n e r a l w e a l t h , t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of T u r k e s t a n ' s m i n e r a l r e s o u r c e s n e v e r m a t c h e d e x p e c t a t i o n s . 2 6 O n t h e e v e of World W a r I, t h e t o t a l o u t p u t of T u r k e s t a n ' s m i n i n g i n d u s t r y r e p r e s e n t e d b u t a f r a c t i o n of i m p e r i a l p r o d u c t i o n . W h e r e a s t h e q u a n t i t y of coal m i n e d in T u r k e s t a n rose f r o m 100,000 p u d s in 1870 to 8.4 million p u d s in 1914, coal p r o d u c t i o n in

188 • Muriel

Joffe

T u r k e s t a n e q u a l e d less t h a n 1 p e r c e n t of t h e total o u t p u t of coal in Russia. T h e m a x i m u m a m o u n t of oil e x t r a c t e d , 15.3 million p u d s in 1911, e q u a l e d 2.7 p e r c e n t of t o t a l i m p e r i a l p r o d u c t i o n . 2 7 T h e slow d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e r e g i o n ' s m i n e r a l r e s o u r c e s can be e x p l a i n e d by a n u m b e r of factors. P e r s i s t e n t e c o n o m i c a n d technical difficulties, m o s t n o t a b l y t h e c o n t i n u e d p r o b l e m of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , d i s c o u r a g e d R u s s i a n e n t r e p r e n e u r s f r o m investing in T u r k e s t a n ' s m i n i n g industry, as did o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r p r o f i t a b l e i n v e s t m e n t e l s e w h e r e in t h e e m p i r e . H o w e v e r , a m a j o r o b s t a c l e was t h e a m b i g u ous legal s i t u a t i o n g o v e r n i n g p r i v a t e m i n i n g activities. I n d e e d , o n t h e basis of his i n v e s t i g a t i o n of T u r k e s t a n in 1908-1909, C o u n t P a l e n identified two critical imped i m e n t s to t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of T u r k e s t a n ' s m i n e r a l wealth: t h e a b s e n c e of capital a n d t h e lack of clarity with r e s p e c t to land t e n u r e in T u r k e s t a n . 2 8 In essence, t h e s e t w o i m p e d i m e n t s w e r e r e l a t e d : u n c e r t a i n t y a b o u t t h e right of access to l a n d e d p r o p e r t y d e t e r r e d t h e flow of c a p i t a l t o t h e r e g i o n . T h e s a m e g o v e r n m e n t policies t h a t i m p e d e d the i n v e s t m e n t of p r i v a t e capital in irrigation in T u r k e s t a n also r e s t r i c t e d capital i n v e s t m e n t in mining. T h e tsarist g o v e r n m e n t ' s g e n e r a l distrust of p r i v a t e e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l initiative a n d its conc e r n , t o g e t h e r with t h a t of t h e T u r k e s t a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , to s a f e g u a r d t h e security of t h e b o r d e r l a n d s led t o s e v e r e r e s t r i c t i o n s o n e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l activity in Turk e s t a n . N o n - C h r i s t i a n R u s s i a n s u b j e c t s f r o m o u t s i d e of T u r k e s t a n a n d f o r e i g n e r s w e r e f o r b i d d e n t o a c q u i r e land in t h e r e g i o n a n d t h e s e s a m e g r o u p s w e r e b a n n e d f r o m m i n i n g activities. C o r p o r a t e access t o land w a s equally r e s t r i c t e d within t h e c o n t e x t of t h e c o n c e s s i o n a r y system t h a t r e q u i r e d each new c o m p a n y t o r e c e i v e a c h a r t e r f r o m t h e s t a t e a n d in t h e case of T u r k e s t a n t h e a p p r o v a l of t h e T u r k e s t a n g o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l in c o n s u l t a t i o n with t h e M i n i s t r i e s of War a n d Finance. 2 9 W h i l e t h e s e laws c e r t a i n l y r e s t r i c t e d t h e p o o l of p o t e n t i a l i n v e s t o r s in T u r k e s t a n , t h e total c o n f u s i o n s u r r o u n d i n g existing p r o p e r t y r e l a t i o n s in the r e g i o n s e r v e d as t h e m a i n o b s t a c l e to t h e m i n i n g i n d u s t r y ' s d e v e l o p m e n t . In t h e a b s e n c e of a g e n e r a l m i n i n g s t a t u t e f o r T u r k e s t a n , t h e i n d u s t r y was r e g u l a t e d t h r o u g h t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of c e r t a i n s e c t i o n s of t h e I m p e r i a l M i n i n g C o d e to t h e b o r d e r l a n d . T h i s c o d e r e p r e s e n t e d an e n o r m o u s collection of articles, e n a c t e d o v e r c e n t u r i e s , with specific r e g u l a t i o n s f o r v a r i o u s c a t e g o r i e s of m i n i n g activities. T h e r e w e r e d i f f e r e n t r e g u l a t i o n s f o r distinct minerals, f o r s e p a r a t e social c a t e g o r i e s of e n t r e p r e n e u r s a n d f o r i n d i v i d u a l regions. M o r e o v e r , t h e c o d e disting u i s h e d b e t w e e n m i n i n g activities c a r r i e d o u t on e m p t y s t a t e lands, on lands in t h e p o s s e s s i o n of specific g r o u p s , e.g. s t a t e p e a s a n t s , n o m a d i c g r o u p s a n d o n privately o w n e d p r o p e r t i e s . L i k e o t h e r f o r e i g n codes, R u s s i a n m i n i n g law d i s t i n g u i s h e d b e t w e e n t h e r i g h t s of l a n d o w n e r s to m i n e r a l s f o u n d o n t h e s u r f a c e of their lands a n d t h o s e f o u n d u n d e r g r o u n d . By t h e e n d of t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y t h e I m p e r i a l M i n i n g C o d e c o n t a i n e d a m u l t i - v a r i a n t b u t essentially d u a l s y s t e m of rights. U n d e r g r o u n d r i g h t s b e l o n g e d t o t h e p u b l i c r e a l m o n e m p t y s t a t e lands, o n lands in t h e p o s s e s sion of v a r i o u s n o m a d i c g r o u p s , s t a t e p e a s a n t s , a n d o n t h e n o n - a l l o t m e n t l a n d s of

Diamond

in the Rough

• 189

t h e p e a s a n t r y . T h e only g r o u p g r a n t e d u n d e r g r o u n d r i g h t s o n its land w e r e p r i v a t e l a n d o w n e r s . 3 0 H o w e v e r , a m a j o r e x c e p t i o n t o this r u l e w a s Tsarist P o l a n d . T h e r e , in an o b v i o u s a t t e m p t to restrict t h e w e a l t h a n d p o w e r of t h e politically s u s p e c t Polish nobility, t h e s t a t e r e t a i n e d c o n t r o l o v e r u n d e r g r o u n d d e p o s i t s f o u n d o n privately o w n e d lands. 3 1 T h e first s e r i o u s a t t e m p t t o r e g u l a t e m i n i n g in T u r k e s t a n o c c u r r e d in 1893 w h e n t h e g o v e r n m e n t e x t e n d e d t o t h o s e l a n d s t h a t w e r e p a r t of t h e original t e r ritory of t h e T u r k e s t a n g o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l s h i p , t h e 1887 s t a t u t e g o v e r n i n g m i n i n g o n f r e e s t a t e lands. 3 2 A c c o r d i n g to this s t a t u t e , p r i v a t e e n t r e p r e n e u r s could carry o u t e x p l o r a t i o n s a n d o p e n m i n e s o n l a n d s d e s i g n a t e d as f r e e s t a t e p r o p e r t i e s . A t first, t h e T u r k e s t a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w a s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r g r a n t i n g licenses t o c a r r y o u t e x p l o r a t i o n s ; a f t e r 1901 this r e s p o n s i b i l i t y w a s t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e M i n i s t r y of A g r i c u l t u r e a n d S t a t e D o m a i n s . Local m i n i n g a u t h o r i t i e s u n d e r t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e g o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l h a d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a p p r o v i n g t h e a l l o t m e n t of s t a t e l a n d s to p r i v a t e e n t r e p r e n e u r s f o r m i n i n g p u r p o s e s . 3 3 P r i v a t e m i n i n g w a s also p e r m i t t e d in T r a n s c a s p i a , w h e r e all land was d e c l a r e d to b e s t a t e p r o p e r t y . R e s p o n s i bility f o r g r a n t i n g p r o s p e c t i n g licenses w a s e n t r u s t e d t o t h e g o v e r n o r ' s c h a n cellery, while local m i n i n g officials r e t a i n e d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a l l o c a t i n g s t a t e lands. If m i n i n g activities i n v o l v e d lands c o n f i r m e d f o r t h e limitless use of T r a n s caspia's n o m a d i c p o p u l a t i o n s . A r t i c l e 203 of t h e I m p e r i a l M i n i n g C o d e r e q u i r e d m i n e r s to s e e k t h e n o m a d s ' p r e l i m i n a r y a g r e e m e n t if m i n e s or e x p l o r a t i o n s w e r e to be c a r r i e d o u t on lands t h e y u s e d f o r w i n t e r p a s t u r e o r o t h e r e c o n o m i c necessities. 3 4 H o w e v e r , e x c l u d e d f r o m this p r o v i s i o n w e r e t h e oil-rich lands of C h e l e k e n Island t h a t b o t h local a d m i n i s t r a t o r s a n d St. P e t e r s b u r g c o n f i r m e d , b a s e d on their i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of c u s t o m a n d Islamic law, as historically b e l o n g i n g to t h e T u r k m e n s . In t h e 1870s i n t e r e s t by t h e B a k u oil industrialists, especially N o b e l , f o r c e d t h e p r o v i n c i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t e m p o r a r i l y to allow p r i v a t e e n t r e p r e n e u r s t o lease l a n d s f r o m t h e T u r k m e n until final clarification of t h e T u r k m e n ' s p r o p e r ty rights. 3 5 T h e o n e a r e a in T u r k e s t a n e f f e c t i v e l y closed t o p r i v a t e m i n i n g was t h e l a n d settled by t h e n a t i v e a g r i c u l t u r a l p o p u l a t i o n s . T h e T u r k e s t a n S t a t u t e of 1886, t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e law f o r t h e g o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l s h i p , c o n t a i n e d n o p r o v i s i o n d e f i n i n g u n d e r g r o u n d rights in t h e b o r d e r l a n d . R e c o g n i z i n g t h e n e e d to r e s o l v e this issue, t h e State C o u n c i l i n s t r u c t e d t h e Ministry of A g r i c u l t u r e a n d S t a t e D o m a i n s in 1889 to p r e p a r e legislation o n this m a t t e r . T h e final p r o j e c t , c o m p l e t e d in 1894, d e c l a r e d all u n d e r g r o u n d d e p o s i t s o n p r i v a t e l y h e l d l a n d s in T u r k e s t a n t o b e s t a t e property. A c c o r d i n g to C o u n t P a l e n , t h e m i n i s t e r i a l p r o j e c t relied heavily o n t h e views of A d j u n c t G e n e r a l N.O. R o s e n b a c h , g o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l of T u r k e s t a n f r o m 1884-1889. B a s e d o n analysis of Islamic law a n d p r a c t i c e s d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d of k h a n rule in C e n t r a l A s i a , R o s e n b a c h a r g u e d t h a t b e f o r e R u s s i a ' s m i l i t a r y c o n quest of t h e r e g i o n , a n y individual could s e a r c h f o r m i n e r a l deposits. H o w e v e r , t h e k h a n s d e t e r m i n e d w h o could exploit t h e s e r e s o u r c e s . R o s e n b a c h t h e r e f o r e r e a s o n e d t h a t , as t h e s u c c e s s o r to t h e k h a n s , t h e R u s s i a n s t a t e p o s s e s s e d c o n t r o l

190 • Muriel

Joffe

o v e r u n d e r g r o u n d m i n e r a l w e a l t h a n d he a d v o c a t e d t h a t e x p l o r a t i o n s be allowed on p r i v a t e l y held l a n d s o n c o n d i t i o n that m i n e r s r e c o m p e n s e t h e o w n e r s of these lands. 3 6 B e c a u s e of t h e o b j e c t i o n s by t h e M i n i s t r y of Justice, h o w e v e r , t h e p r o p o s e d law was n e v e r e n a c t e d . T h e r o o t c a u s e of t h e difficulty in d e t e r m i n i n g m i n i n g rights on t h e lands of t h e s e t t l e d a g r i c u l t u r a l p o p u l a t i o n s a n d t h e s o u r c e of t h e Ministry of Justice's o b j e c t i o n s to t h e R o s e n b a c h p r o p o s a l w a s t h e i m p r e c i s e legal definition of t h e n a t i v e p o p u l a t i o n s ' rights t o t h e i r l a n d in g e n e r a l . A r t i c l e 255 of the T u r k e s t a n S t a t u t e p r e c l u d e d any d e f i n i t i o n of u n d e r g r o u n d rights. T h i s article c o n f i r m e d f o r t h e n a t i v e p o p u l a t i o n s , t h e l a n d in t h e i r c o n s t a n t , h e r e d i t a r y , use, a n d possession in a c c o r d a n c e with local c u s t o m . 3 7 A l t h o u g h originally i n t e n d e d to s a n c t i o n existing p r a c t i c e s of land t e n u r e in the r e g i o n , this article p r o v i d e d n o legal g u i d e l i n e s f o r d e t e r m i n i n g c u s t o m a r y rights. T h e T u r k e s t a n S t a t u t e of 1886 was the result of 20 years of discussions a n d p r o jects to c r e a t e a system of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n to g o v e r n t h e b o r d e r l a n d . T h e R u s s i a n c o n q u e s t s in C e n t r a l A s i a h a d c r e a t e d a u n i q u e c h a l l e n g e f o r Russia: how to gove r n a sizeable t e r r i t o r y with a large M u s l i m p o p u l a t i o n and s u r r o u n d e d by M u s l i m states. W h e r e a s Russia h a d e n a c t e d p r e v i o u s laws t o g o v e r n n o m a d i c p o p u l a t i o n s in t h e e m p i r e , a n d t h e r e f o r e h a d s o m e e x p e r i e n c e on which to a d m i n i s t e r t h e n o m a d i c p o p u l a t i o n s in t h e g o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l s h i p , it h a d little familiarity with t h e c o m p l e x system of irrigation a g r i c u l t u r e a n d land t e n u r e f o u n d in T u r k e s t a n . T h e decision by t h e S t a t e C o u n c i l to affix p r o p e r t y rights on t h e basis of cust o m r e p r e s e n t e d a r e j e c t i o n of t h e two d o m i n a n t views on t h e s y s t e m of land t e n u r e existing in T u r k e s t a n a r t i c u l a t e d d u r i n g t h e l e n g t h y d e l i b e r a t i o n s l e a d i n g to t h e 1886 s t a t u t e . T h e first i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , initially a d v a n c e d by G e n e r a l v o n K a u f m a n and b a s e d in p a r t o n a t h o r o u g h e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e f u n d a m e n t a l principles of Islamic law a n d Islamic s t a t e practices, h e l d t h a t land in t h e p o s s e s s i o n of t h e n a t i v e a g r i c u l t u r i s t s b e l o n g e d to t h e s t a t e w h i c h in t u r n g r a n t e d c o n d i t i o n al rights of u s a g e t o t h e m in e x c h a n g e f o r taxes. T h e o p p o s i n g p o i n t of view, m o s t f o r c e f u l l y a d v o c a t e d by Privy C o u n c i l o r F.A. G i e r s , w h o w a s sent t o T u r k e s t a n t o i n v e s t i g a t e a l l e g e d m i s c o n d u c t in t h e military a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of von K a u f m a n , a s s e r t e d that t h e p o p u l a t i o n h e l d their lands as p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y . 3 8 A s D a n i e l B r o w e r c o r r e c t l y n o t e d , t h e d i f f e r e n c e s in o p i n i o n b e t w e e n t h e t w o m e n r e f l e c t e d d i f f e r i n g s t r a t e g i e s of e m p i r e b u i l d i n g in T u r k e s t a n : o n e which a c k n o w l e d g e d t h e d e g r e e to which t h e u n i q u e c h a r a c t e r of t h e b o r d e r l a n d p r e c l u d e d its easy integ r a t i o n into t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a n d legal f r a m e w o r k of t h e R u s s i a n E m p i r e a n d t h e o t h e r a d v o c a t i n g t h e c o n c e p t of a unified i m p e r i a l t e r r i t o r y in which all s u b j e c t s s h o u l d s h a r e as q u i c k l y as p o s s i b l e in a p r o g r e s s i v e civil o r d e r . 3 9 D e s p i t e t h e i r d i f f e r i n g c o n c l u s i o n s , h o w e v e r , b o t h p o i n t s of view t r a n s l a t e d t h e s y s t e m of l a n d t e n u r e in t h e b o r d e r l a n d i n t o R u s s i a n legal c a t e g o r i e s . T h e S t a t e C o u n c i l , h o w e v e r , at least with r e s p e c t t o l a n d e d p r o p e r t y , d e t e r m i n e d t h a t R u s s i a n legal p r i n c i p l e s w e r e in fact i n c o m p a t i b l e with t h e r e a l i t y in t h e b o r d e r l a n d . In a c u r i o u s a r g u m e n t t h a t specifically r e j e c t e d v o n K a u f m a n ' s

Diamond

in the Rough • 191

r e l i a n c e o n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of Islam a n d a c c e p t e d in p r i n c i p l e G i e r s ' views o n t h e n e c e s s i t y of e s t a b l i s h i n g laws f o r t h e b o r d e r l a n d t h a t a g r e e d with t h e f u n d a m e n tal laws of t h e R u s s i a n E m p i r e , t h e C o u n c i l t h e n p r o c e e d e d to a c k n o w l e d g e v o n K a u f m a n ' s e m p h a s i s o n t h e special c h a r a c t e r of land t e n u r e in t h e b o r d e r l a n d . I n d e e d , in d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t p r o p e r t y rights in T u r k e s t a n r e s t e d o n c u s t o m , t h e S t a t e C o u n c i l explicitly a c k n o w l e d g e d its inability t o d e t e r m i n e fully w h a t existing l a n d p r a c t i c e s w e r e . P o i n t i n g t o t h e c o e x i s t e n c e of p r i v a t e a n d c o m m u n a l f o r m s of l a n d h o l d i n g a n d e v e n m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , t h e c o m p l e x s y s t e m of obligat i o n s p l a c e d on l a n d h o l d e r s to s u p p o r t the r e g i o n ' s irrigation s y s t e m , t h e S t a t e C o u n c i l c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e l a n d s y s t e m o p e r a t i n g in t h e b o r d e r l a n d could n o t easily be t r a n s l a t e d i n t o R u s s i a n legal terms. 4 0 W i t h r e s p e c t to t h e m i n i n g industry, t h e a b s e n c e of any precise legal d e f i n i t i o n of t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l p o p u l a t i o n ' s right to their l a n d left u n r e s o l v e d t h e q u e s t i o n of u n d e r g r o u n d rights in t h e b o r d e r l a n d . It w o u l d also i m p e d e all s u b s e q u e n t e f f o r t s by t h e R u s s i a n s t a t e to e n c o u r a g e t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of m i n i n g a n d o t h e r i n d u s t r i e s in T u r k e s t a n . I n d e e d , 24 y e a r s later in 1910, C o u n t P a l e n a s s e r t e d t h a t t h e lack of clarification on o w n e r s h i p of i m m o v a b l e p r o p e r t y in t h e b o r d e r l a n d " s t r a n g l e s e c o n o m i c e n t e r p r i s e a n d to a significant d e g r e e p r e v e n t s t h e influx of capital a n d t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of i n d u s t r y in t h e region." 4 1 I n d u s t r y ' s d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with t h e c o n f u s e d set of legal p r i n c i p l e s a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o n t r o l s g o v e r n i n g p r i v a t e m i n i n g initiatives in T u r k e s t a n r e s u l t e d in t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a c o m m i s s i o n in 1907 to p r e p a r e a f o r m a l c o m p l a i n t to t h e T u r k e s t a n g o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l a n d t h e M i n i n g D e p a r t m e n t . T h i s c o m m i s s i o n include d s o m e of t h e l e a d i n g e n t r e p r e n e u r s in t h e m i n i n g i n d u s t r y : A . N . Kovalevskii; N . M . T s u k h a n o v , f o u n d e r of t h e C e n t r a l A s i a n Oil C o m p a n y ; S.I. K r a u z e , w h o s e f a m i l y ' s activity in oil d a t e d b a c k t o t h e late 1860s; a n d P.S. N a z a r o v , son of o n e of t h e f o u n d e r s of t h e C e n t r a l A s i a n B a n k , a n d n o w r e p r e s e n t i n g a B e l g i a n firm involved in b o t h coal a n d oil p r o d u c t i o n . 4 2 T h e i n d u s t r i a l i s t s ' c o m p l a i n t s f o c u s e d o n t w o i n t e r r e l a t e d issues: t h e i r right t o carry o u t e x p l o r a t i o n s o n t h e t e r r i t o r y of T u r k e s t a n a n d t h e i r right t o m i n e u n d e r g r o u n d m i n e r a l deposits. 4 3 W i t h respect t o e x p l o r a t i o n s , t h e industrialists p r e s e n t e d a n u m b e r of e x a m p l e s , mostly on C h e l e k e n Island a n d in F e r g a n a o b l a s t , in which lands, previously d e c l a r e d as o p e n t o mining, w e r e t h e n c l o s e d . T h e agency r e s p o n s i b l e f o r this r e v e r sal was t h e l a n d - t a x c o m m i s s i o n . T h e origin a n d f u n c t i o n of this institution d a t e s back to v o n K a u f m a n ' s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . T h e s e c o m m i s s i o n s w e r e c r e a t e d in 1880 t o u n d e r t a k e " o r g a n i z a t i o n a l w o r k " in F e r g a n a o b l a s t , i.e., to investigate n a t i v e land t e n u r e a r r a n g e m e n t s in p r e p a r a t i o n f o r t h e final r e f o r m of t h e tax s t r u c t u r e on l a n d e d p r o p e r t y . A f t e r 1886 t h e c o m m i s s i o n s h a d responsibility to d e t e r m i n e which lands, according t o A r t i c l e 255, w e r e c o n f i r m e d f o r t h e n a t i v e settled p o p u l a t i o n s and to a p p o r t i o n t a x e s b a s e d on t h e profit d e r i v e d f r o m t h e s e lands. 4 4 D u r i n g t h e 14 y e a r s a f t e r m i n i n g o n f r e e s t a t e l a n d s b e c a m e legally r e c o g n i z e d in T u r k e s t a n , t h e l a n d - t a x c o m m i s s i o n s c o n t i n u e d t h e i r surveys. A similar investig a t i o n of T u r k m e n - h e l d p r o p e r t i e s also t o o k p l a c e o n C h e l e k e n Island. A s a result

192 • Muriel

Joffe

of t h e i r w o r k , t h e l a n d - t a x c o m m i s s i o n s in e f f e c t t o o k back lands p r e v i o u s l y alloc a t e d t o p r i v a t e e n t r e p r e n e u r s a n d d e s i g n a t e d t h e m as b e l o n g i n g t o t h e local p o p u l a t i o n . U n d e r s t a n d a b l y , t h e e n t r e p r e n e u r s o b j e c t e d to this p r a c t i c e which cost them time and money.45 In p a r t , this c o n f u s e d s t a t e of a f f a i r s r e s u l t e d f r o m t h e i n d e p e n d e n t a n d f r e q u e n t l y c o n t r a d i c t o r y e f f o r t s of d i f f e r e n t g r o u p s of officials, p u r s u i n g d i f f e r e n t o b j e c t i v e s a n d o p e r a t i n g o n i m p r e c i s e legal principles. Local officials in t h e agric u l t u r a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n d e c l a r e d c e r t a i n l a n d s o p e n t o m i n i n g activity; t h e i r o p i n ions w e r e t h e n r e p u d i a t e d by t h e l a n d - t a x c o m m i s s i o n s . Indirectly s u p p o r t i n g t h e i n d u s t r i a l i s t s ' claim t h a t t h e l a n d - t a x c o m m i s s i o n s h a d insufficient e v i d e n c e on which to b a s e t h e i r decisions, C o u n t P a l e n n o t e d in his investigation t h a t , in t h e a b s e n c e of any clear i n s t r u c t i o n s g o v e r n i n g t h e i r w o r k , t h e decisions r e a c h e d by t h e l a n d - t a x c o m m i s s i o n s w e r e n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n individual i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of t h e law by local officials. S t r u g g l i n g t o d e f i n e l a n d t e n u r e a r r a n g e m e n t s b a s e d on c u s t o m , t h e s e officials, acting with c a u t i o n , s o u g h t t o p r o t e c t t h e i n t e r e s t s of the local p o p u l a t i o n a n d t h e r e f o r e g e n e r a l l y a c c e p t e d n a t i v e claims of h e r e d i t a r y l a n d o w n e r s h i p r e g a r d l e s s of legal p r o o f t h e r e o f . T h e a c t u a l p r o c e s s of l a n d s e t t l e m e n t t a k i n g place in t h e b o r d e r l a n d f u r t h e r c o m p l i c a t e d t h e e f f o r t s of local officials a n d p r i v a t e e n t r e p r e n e u r s . T h e a m o u n t of land a v a i l a b l e to m i n i n g in T u r k e s t a n w a s r e d u c e d as n o m a d s a d o p t e d a g r i c u l t u r e as t h e i r p r i m a r y o c c u p a t i o n a n d t h e l a n d - t a x c o m m i s s i o n s c o n f i r m e d lands f o r t h e m on t h e basis of A r t i c l e 255. Finally, d u r i n g this s a m e p e r i o d , t h e T u r k e s t a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n g r a d u a l l y e x t e n d e d t h e t y p e s of l a n d t h a t could t h e o r e t i c a l l y be assigned t o n a t i v e agriculturists. W h e r e a s initially only l a n d s irrigated by artificial m e a n s w e r e d e s i g n a t e d f o r t h e h e r e d i t a r y use of T u r k e s t a n ' s s e t t l e d n a t i v e p o p u lations, a f t e r 1900 l a n d s i r r i g a t e d n a t u r a l l y b e l o n g e d to this category. This c o n s t a n t r e d e f i n i t i o n of which lands b e l o n g e d to t h e agriculturists f u r t h e r r e s t r i c t e d t h e a m o u n t of land o p e n to m i n i n g a n d at t h e s a m e t i m e c o n d i t i o n e d n e w revisions of p r e v i o u s land s e t t l e m e n t s . 4 6 In r e s p o n s e to this c o n f u s i n g w e b of legal d e c i s i o n s a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e practices, the i n d u s t r i a l i s t s p e t i t i o n e d t h e T u r k e s t a n g o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l t o r e q u i r e , in e f f e c t , t h a t t h e l a n d - t a x c o m m i s s i o n s c o n s u l t with a n d u l t i m a t e l y a c c e p t t h e decisions of local r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a n d local m i n i n g a u t h o r i t i e s t h a t d e s i g n a t e d c e r t a i n l a n d s as f r e e f o r mining. T h e y also a s k e d t h a t n o a d d i t i o n a l l a n d s be t r a n s f e r r e d t o f o r m e r l y n o m a d i c p o p u l a t i o n s until legislative a p p r o v a l of a s t a t u t e g o v e r n i n g m i n i n g o n l a n d s of p r i v a t e l a n d h o l d e r s in T u r k e s t a n . In e f f e c t , t h e m i n e r s w a n t e d t o limit t h e rights of T u r k e s t a n ' s p o p u l a tion t o any a d d i t i o n a l t e r r i t o r y n o t fully in its p o s s e s s i o n , t h e r e b y p r e s e r v i n g as m u c h l a n d as p o s s i b l e f o r p r i v a t e e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l initiative. T h i s s a m e o b j e c t i v e c h a r a c t e r i z e d i n d u s t r y ' s p o s i t i o n with r e s p e c t t o u n d e r g r o u n d r i g h t s in T u r k e s t a n . T h e i n d u s t r i a l i s t s a d v o c a t e d t h e p a s s a g e of a law t h a t w o u l d d e c l a r e all subsoil in T u r k e s t a n to be t h e p r o p e r t y of t h e s t a t e , in o t h e r w o r d s t h e original s o l u t i o n p r o p o s e d by t h e M i n i s t r y of A g r i c u l t u r e in 1894. 47

Diamond

in the Rough

• 193

T h e C o u n c i l of t h e T u r k e s t a n g o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l c o n s i d e r e d t h e i n d u s t r i a l i s t s ' c o m p l a i n t s in N o v e m b e r 1907. A l t h o u g h d e n y i n g t h a t t h e l a n d - t a x c o m m i s s i o n s h a d a c t e d i m p r o p e r l y and i n s t e a d b l a m i n g t h e i n d u s t r i a l i s t s f o r t h e i r f a i l u r e t o m a r k their claims accurately, t h e C o u n c i l r e c o g n i z e d t h e n e e d t o p r e v e n t t h e s e d i s p u t e s in t h e f u t u r e . T h e C o u n c i l ' s discussion f o c u s e d o n two q u e s t i o n s :

first,

s h o u l d t h e T u r k e s t a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n c o n t i n u e t h e p r e v i o u s policies of t h e g o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l s which p e r m i t t e d p r i v a t e m i n e r s to c a r r y o u t e x p l o r a t i o n s o n l a n d s t h e o w n e r s h i p of which r e m a i n e d u n k n o w n p e n d i n g t h e w o r k of t h e l a n d - t a x c o m m i s s i o n s ; a n d s e c o n d , if t h e s e l a n d s w e r e s u b s e q u e n t l y c o n f i r m e d f o r t h e n a t i v e p o p u l a t i o n s , did t h e claims of t h e m i n e r s t a k e p r e c e d e n t ? O n b o t h issues t h e C o u n c i l split. G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l G r o d e k o v a n d a m i n o r i t y of t h e C o u n c i l a r g u e d t h a t p r o s p e c t i n g licenses s h o u l d only b e given o u t o n l a n d s clearly identified as f r e e s t a t e p r o p e r t y , in o t h e r w o r d s , land o n which t h e l a n d - t a x s u r v e y s h a d b e e n c o m p l e t e d . T h e m a j o r i t y , h o w e v e r , r e j e c t e d this idea a n d i n s t e a d p r o p o s e d to c o n t i n u e t h e p r a c t i c e of a l l o w i n g m i n e r s to e n t e r into a g r e e m e n t s with p r i v a t e " o w n e r s " until g e n e r a l r u l e s c o u l d be w o r k e d o u t which r e g u l a t e d m i n i n g on p r i v a t e l y held l a n d s in T u r k e s t a n . D e s p i t e t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s , b o t h g r o u p s w e r e trying to r e c o n c i l e t h e n e e d t o e n c o u r a g e t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of m i n i n g in T u r k e s t a n with p r o t e c t i o n f o r t h e rights of t h e n a t i v e p o p u l a t i o n . H o w e v e r , r e f l e c t i n g p e r h a p s t h e r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t the s o l u t i o n p r o p o s e d by t h e m a j o r i t y w o u l d in e f f e c t c o n t i n u e t h e c h a o t i c s t a t e of a f f a i r s which existed in t h e b o r d e r l a n d , t h e M i n i n g D e p a r t m e n t r e j e c t e d this s o l u t i o n in 1909 on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t any lease a g r e e m e n t s w o u l d not be legal in t h e a b s e n c e of a law o n u n d e r g r o u n d rights. 4 8 In an e f f o r t to u n t i e t h e G o r d i a n k n o t t h a t b o u n d l a n d t e n u r e a n d m i n i n g , t h e M i n i n g D e p a r t m e n t b e g a n w o r k o n legislation t o g o v e r n m i n i n g o n p r i v a t e l y h e l d lands in T u r k e s t a n a n d T r a n s c a s p i a . In F e b r u a r y 1908 t h e D i r e c t o r of t h e M i n i n g D e p a r t m e n t , D.P. K o n o v a l o v , o r g a n i z e d a c o n f e r e n c e , a t t e n d e d by officials f r o m the a g r i c u l t u r a l

administration

in T u r k e s t a n

and

representatives

from

the

C h a n c e l l e r y of t h e T u r k e s t a n g o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l , t o b e g i n p r e l i m i n a r y c o n s i d e r a tion of t h e m a t t e r . 4 9 Discussion f o c u s e d i m m e d i a t e l y o n t h e e s s e n t i a l p r o b l e m t h a t h a d t h w a r t e d earlier e f f o r t s t o r e g u l a t e m i n i n g o n p r i v a t e l y h e l d lands: namely, t h e a m b i g u o u s n a t u r e of A r t i c l e 255. A m a j o r i t y of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s s u p p o r t e d t h e view t h a t t h e settled native p o p u l a t i o n s only h e l d c o n d i t i o n a l r i g h t s to t h e land in t h e i r p o s s e s sion. C e n t r a l t o t h e i r d e c i s i o n w a s n o t only t h e p r e v i o u s l y m e n t i o n e d t e n e t s of Islamic law b u t t h e fact t h a t in c o n t r a s t t o A r t i c l e 255, A r t i c l e s 260 a n d 269 of t h e T u r k e s t a n s t a t u t e g r a n t e d full rights of p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y t o u r b a n citizens with respect to their l a n d s a n d buildings. In o t h e r words, t h e a b s e n c e of such l a n g u a g e in Article 255 signified t h e a b s e n c e of t h e s e rights. 5 0 O p p o s i n g this p o i n t of view was the h e a d of t h e T u r k e s t a n g o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l ' s c h a n c e l l e r y , C o l o n e l M u s t a f i n , w h s s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e S t a t e C o u n c i l ' s c o n f i r m a t i o n of l a n d o w n e r s h i p b a s e d o n custom may h a v e r e f e r r e d n o t t o juridical rights of o w n e r s h i p d e r i v e d f r o m Islamic law but in fact t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of p r o p e r t y a m o n g t h e p o p u l a t i o n . M o r e o v e r , h e

194 • Muriel

Joffe

r e m i n d e d t h e c o n f e r e n c e t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e s of Islamic law w e r e n o t sufficiently " d e f i n i t e " o r " c l e a r " t o serve as t h e basis o n which to decide such a f u n d a m e n t a l ly i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n as t h e "civil p r o p e r t y r i g h t s " of t h e large p o p u l a t i o n of an "enormous borderland."51 R e s o l v i n g t h a t only t h e S e n a t e c o u l d d e t e r m i n e o n c e a n d f o r all t h e m e a n i n g of A r t i c l e 255, t h e c o n f e r e n c e r e q u e s t e d t h a t t h e Minister of T r a d e a n d I n d u s t r y b r i n g this m a t t e r to t h e S e n a t e ' s a t t e n t i o n . 5 2 A t t h e s a m e time, t h e M i n i s t r y c o m p l e t e d its d r a f t p r o j e c t o n t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t u n d e r g r o u n d rights b e l o n g e d to t h e p u b l i c r e a l m . 5 3 A l t h o u g h this decision signified an a p p a r e n t victory f o r t h e rights of p r i v a t e e n t r e p r e n e u r s in r e l a t i o n to T u r k e s t a n ' s native p o p u l a t i o n s , t h e p r o p o s e d legislation also p l a c e d c e r t a i n limits o n p r i v a t e industry. A r t i c l e 10 stipul a t e d t h a t t h e s t a t e h a d an e q u a l right to c a r r y o u t m i n i n g activities b u t w i t h o u t o b s e r v a n c e of any of t h e

financial

or temporal obligations placed on private

industry. 5 4 In o t h e r words, t h e d r a f t legislation p l a c e d p r i v a t e m i n i n g e n t e r p r i s e s at a c o m p e t i t i v e d i s a d v a n t a g e in r e l a t i o n to t h e s t a t e ' s o w n m i n i n g e f f o r t s . M o r e o v e r , t h e legislative p r o j e c t c o n t a i n e d a d e t a i l e d p r o p o s a l to r e m o v e s u p e r v i s i o n o v e r m i n i n g f r o m t h e local a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a n d s u b o r d i n a t e it to t h e

Mining

D e p a r t m e n t of t h e M i n i s t r y of T r a d e a n d Industry. 5 5 If i m p l e m e n t e d , this p r o p o s al w o u l d h a v e s t r e n g t h e n e d t h e ability of t h e g o v e r n m e n t to r e g u l a t e t h e activities of p r i v a t e industry. In essence, t h e p r o p o s e d mining bill r e p r e s e n t e d an e f f o r t by the Ministry of T r a d e and I n d u s t r y to assert its control o v e r what it perceived as a rapidly develo p i n g and e x t r e m e l y i m p o r t a n t b r a n c h of industry. By t r a n s f e r r i n g a u t h o r i t y o v e r mining to t h e St. P e t e r s b u r g b u r e a u c r a c y a n d s u b o r d i n a t i n g t h e lands o c c u p i e d by t h e settled agricultural p o p u l a t i o n to sections of the Imperial M i n i n g C o d e , t h e Ministry in e f f e c t s o u g h t to e l i m i n a t e t h e last r e m a i n i n g legal a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s a f e g u a r d s g o v e r n i n g m i n i n g activities in T u r k e s t a n c o n s t r u c t e d o n t h e basis of t h e special c h a r a c t e r of e c o n o m i c r e l a t i o n s in t h e b o r d e r l a n d . For this r e a s o n t h e Ministry's p r o p o s a l s b e c a m e p a r t of t h e larger discussions t a k i n g place d u r i n g this s a m e p e r i o d t o e n a c t a n e w s t a t u t e f o r T u r k e s t a n and p r e p a r e for t h e t r a n s f e r of t h e b o r d e r l a n d f r o m the jurisdiction of t h e Ministry of War to that of I n t e r n a l A f f a i r s . A l t h o u g h p a r t of t h e g e n e r a l r e f o r m of t h e s t a t e s t r u c t u r e t a k i n g p l a c e a f t e r 1905, t h e specific decision t o revise t h e T u r k e s t a n s t a t u t e r e f l e c t e d a h e i g h t e n e d a w a r e n e s s , b o t h in St. P e t e r s b u r g a n d T a s h k e n t , t h a t t h e task of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n in t h e b o r d e r l a n d h a d f u n d a m e n t a l l y c h a n g e d d u r i n g t h e fifty-year p e r i o d of R u s sian rule. A s e x p r e s s e d by M i n i s t e r of W a r S u k h o m l i n o v in a l e t t e r to P r i m e M i nister K o k o v t s e v in 1912, a d m i n i s t r a t i o n h a d e v o l v e d f r o m t h e s i m p l e task of p r e serving o r d e r a n d calm in a " d i s t a n t b o r d e r l a n d " or "colony," i n h a b i t e d by p e o p l e l e a d i n g " p r i m i t i v e " lives, t o t h e c o m p l e x task of g o v e r n i n g an " i n d i v i s i b l e " p a r t of t h e e m p i r e . T h e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e r e g i o n t h r o u g h r a i l r o a d c o n s t r u c t i o n , c o t t o n c u l t i v a t i o n a n d c o l o n i z a t i o n h a d t r a n s f o r m e d t h e task of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n f r o m p e a c e k e e p i n g t o m a n a g e m e n t of b r o a d a r e a s of civil a n d e c o n o m i c life. 5 6 E q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t , revision of t h e s t a t u t e w a s essential to t h e n e w d i r e c t i o n of

Diamond in the Rough • 195 R u s s i a n state policy in Turkestan after 1905: to p r o m o t e the "economic and cultural development of the borderland." 5 7 Initially advanced by Minister of War R e d i g e r in 1906, this new agenda, which in fact had been advocated by Vyshnegradskii in 1890, received its clearest elaboration in the policies of A.I. Krivoshein a n d the Chief Administration of Land Settlement and Agriculture ( G U Z Z ) . T h e s e policies called for a sweeping p r o g r a m of g o v e r n m e n t and private initiatives dedicated to the creation of a new Turkestan through cotton-growing, irrigation, and colonization. In his m e m o r a n d u m to the tsar based on his visit to T u r k e s t a n in 1912, Krivoshein asserted that the "immediate, e n o r m o u s task of Russian rule" lay in "the development of [Turkestan's] productive forces," the i m p r o v e m e n t of which would "enrich" the entire state. 5 8 In contrast to tsarist policy during the first half-century of Russian rule, which had subordinated economic objectives to the complicated tasks of peace and security, and for that same reason restricted Russian settlement in Turkestan to Semirechie oblast, Krivoshein m a d e economic progress and colonization the foundation of Russian rule and security in Turkestan. Within this context, the proposed bill on mining was part of a larger state effort a f t e r 1905 to create a new legal and administrative structure for Turkestan conditioned by the past and f u t u r e development of the region under Russian rule. 59 A l t h o u g h deliberations on this statute revisited the same arguments that were advanced in the period leading up to the 1886 statute about the degree to which conditions of life in the borderland required "special" laws, state policy, especially a f t e r 1905, gradually restricted the sphere of civil and economic life afforded special protection. As the Council of Ministers explained, it was time to bring the principles of administration in the borderland into conformity with the general laws of the Russian E m p i r e thereby strengthening the principle of Russian gosudarstvennost' (state consciousness). 6 0 In other words, the objective was to include Turkestan within the unified imperial state system. At the very least, that system required the transfer of overall authority over Turkestan to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. With respect to economic life, it signified the transfer of responsibility to the civil bureaucracies in St. Petersburg responsible for the national economy. Although the o u t b r e a k of World War I prevented completion of a new administrative statute for Turkestan, as well as passage of the mining bill, the proposals contained therein represented a mixed blessing for the private sector. In its reco m m e n d a t i o n s to the tsar in N o v e m b e r 1912 for a new Turkestan statute, the Council of Ministers, supporting the view of governor-general Samsonov, as well as the general spirit of land reform initiated by Stolypin, finally advocated granting full property rights to the native population. 6 1 Although this may be interpreted as protection for the native agriculturists, both Tashkent and St. Petersburg understood that this measure also established a legal basis to facilitate the transfer of these lands to Russian e n t r e p r e n e u r s and, perhaps even m o r e importantly, to Russian colonists. Indeed, in championing the native populations' right of pri-

196 • Muriel

Joffe

v a t e p r o p e r t y , K r i v o s h e i n a r g u e d t h a t this m e a s u r e would e n c o u r a g e the "civil t u r n o v e r " of p r o p e r t y . 6 2 Final d e m a r c a t i o n of p r o p e r t y rights w o u l d also serve to restrict t h e " l a n d - g r a b b i n g " activities of t h e agriculturists n o t e d by the T u r k e s t a n g o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l s , e.g. V r e v s k i i in 1895, P a l e n a n d K r i v o s h e i n , m u c h t h e s a m e as p r e v i o u s g o v e r n m e n t l a n d s e t t l e m e n t s f o r t h e K a z a k h s a n d T u r k m e n had p l a c e d limits on their claims t o p r o p e r t y . 6 3 T h e C o u n c i l ' s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n to apply t h e r u l e s g o v e r n i n g m i n i n g in Tsarist P o l a n d t o T u r k e s t a n also p r o t e c t e d the m i n i n g i n d u s t r y f r o m t h e t h r e a t p o s e d b y t h e small p r i v a t e l a n d o w n e r s , w h o m P a l e n , in t h e colonial d i s c o u r s e of t h e e r a , d e s c r i b e d as "a relatively u n c u l t u r e d p o p u l a t i o n " " f a n a t i c a l l y d e v o t e d to its clergy." 6 4 A t the s a m e t i m e , t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s p r o p o s a l s also placed s e r i o u s restrictions o n t h e activity of t h e p r i v a t e s e c t o r , similar t o t h o s e f o u n d in t h e legislative p r o j e c t s of t h e G U Z Z o n w a t e r r i g h t s a n d p r i v a t e irrigation c o m p a n i e s in T u r k e s t a n . S u b o r d i n a t i o n of t h e i n d u s t r y t o t h e I m p e r i a l M i n i n g C o d e , especially t h e rules g o v e r n i n g m i n i n g in T s a r i s t P o l a n d , m e a n t i n c r e a s e d i n t e r f e r e n c e by t h e m i n i n g d e p a r t m e n t in g r a n t i n g m i n i n g c o n c e s s i o n s a n d in t h e c o n t r a c t u a l

relations

between private landowners and entrepreneurs. W i t h respect to T u r k e s t a n ' s n a t i v e p o p u l a t i o n s , t h e p r o p o s e d laws implied f u r t h e r c h a n g e s in t h e i r way of life t h r o u g h i n c r e a s e d , n o w legal, access by R u s s i a n c a p i t a l a n d R u s s i a n s e t t l e r s to t h e i r n a t u r a l resources. It also implied g r e a t e r i n t e r f e r e n c e by t h e tsarist g o v e r n m e n t in a r e a s of civil a n d e c o n o m i c life previously c o n t r o l l e d by n a t i v e a u t h o r i t i e s a n d t h e e x t e n s i o n of R u s s i a n civil laws t o a r e a s o n c e d e f i n e d by " c u s t o m . " In e f f e c t , o n t h e e v e of World W a r I t h e tsarist g o v e r n m e n t p r o p o s e d a n e w set of e c o n o m i c rights in T u r k e s t a n t o s u p p o r t t h e b r o a d e c o n o m i c t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of t h e r e g i o n . T h e d e c i s i o n f o l l o w e d 50 y e a r s of d e b a t e s a m o n g tsarist officials a n d t h e m i l i t a r y - a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of T u r k e s t a n a b o u t h o w to g o v e r n t h e R u s s i a n b o r d e r l a n d . In these d e b a t e s , i m p e r i a l d r e a m s of e x p l o i t i n g T u r k e s t a n ' s rich n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e s w e r e s u b o r d i n a t e d t o t h e b r o a d e r political o b j e c t i v e s of s t r e n g t h e n i n g R u s s i a n rule in t h e b o r d e r l a n d . To this e n d , a n d c o n s i s t e n t with tsarist policy in o t h e r p a r t s of t h e e m p i r e , R u s s i a n a u t h o r i t i e s s o u g h t t o c o n t r o l t h e e c o n o m i c life in t h e b o r d e r l a n d t h r o u g h legal a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e m e a n s . This task, h o w e v e r , w a s c o m p l i c a t e d by t h e u n f a m i l i a r set of s o c i o - e c o n o m i c a n d c u l t u r a l p a t t e r n s t h a t R u s s i a n a u t h o r i t i e s e n c o u n t e r e d in T u r k e s t a n , especially t h e large M u s l i m , s e t t l e d p o p u l a t i o n a n d t h e c o m p l e x s y s t e m of irrigation agriculture. In r e s p o n s e , tsarist officials a n d m i l i t a r y - a d m i n i s t r a t o r s c o m m i s s i o n e d s e r i o u s i n v e s t i g a t i o n s i n t o t h e laws a n d c u s t o m s g o v e r n i n g e c o n o m i c life in t h e b o r d e r l a n d : e.g. Islamic law, e c o n o m i c rights u n d e r t h e k h a n s , a n d n o m a d i c c u s t o m s t o d e t e r m i n e t h e a p p r o p r i a t e policies t o s u p p o r t R u s s i a n rule. H o w e v e r , as this s t u d y h a s s h o w n , t h e i r c o n c l u sions a n d R u s s i a n policy in g e n e r a l w e r e strongly i n f l u e n c e d by R u s s i a n legal p r e c e d e n t s a n d R u s s i a n c o n c e p t s of e c o n o m i c , civil a n d political o r d e r . T h e a r t i c u l a t i o n of i m p e r i a l e c o n o m i c policies ( t h e laws a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e g u l a t i o n s c o n t r o l l i n g e c o n o m i c life) t o w a r d R u s s i a ' s b o r d e r l a n d s r e v e a l s t h e

Diamond

in the Rough

• 197

complexity of the process of empire building in Russia. As evident in the discussion of property rights and mining laws, the debates over policy choices involved multiple authorities and reflected more than just the traditional division between the central bureaucracies in St. Petersburg and the military administration in Tashkent. For the most part, Russian entrepreneurs were minor players in these debates and the native populations had no voice. However, the implementation of these policies, e.g., the role of the "land-tax commissions" and mining authorities in Turkestan, suggests an additional level in the administration of the borderlands and an area where the "colonizers" and the "colonized" interacted. The subordination of economic policy to broader political objectives contributed to the uneven development of Turkestan observed by Witte at the end of the tsarist era. With respect to economic rights, the proposed assimilation of Turkestan into the Russian Empire extended to Russia's Central Asian borderland the restrictions governing economic life elsewhere in the empire. These included a circumscribed set of property rights, discriminatory laws that apportioned economic rights on the basis of nationality and ethnicity, and government restrictions on private entrepreneurship. In other words, the assimilation of Turkestan into the Russian Empire deepened the internal contradictions between economic development and autocratic rule. The absence of private property in land continues to restrict economic development in Russia today. Notes k otchetu po revizii Turkestanskogo kraia, proizvedennoi po 1 K.K. Palen, Prilozhenie Vysochaishemu poveleniiu Senatorom Gofmeislerom Grafom K.K. Palenom. Materialy k kharakteristike narodnogo khoziaistva v Turkestane (St. Petersburg, 1911), pt. 1: 582. 2 "Prebyvanie vTashkent Ministra finansov," Turkestanskie vedemosti (18 September 1890). 3 S.Iu. Witte, Izbrannye vospominaniia 1849-1911 gg. (Moscow: Mysl', 1991), 150. 4 The use of the term Turkestan in this article refers specifically to the governor-generalship of Turkestan created in 1867. This administrative unit underwent a number of changes in the prewar period and eventually consisted of five oblasts: Transcaspia, Syr-Daria, Semirechie, Fergana and Samarkand. Today parts of this territory are found in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 5 Glavnoe upravlenie zemleustroistva i zemledeliia [hereafter G U Z Z ] , P e r e s e l e n c h e s k o e upravlenie, Aziatskaia Rossiia, 2 vols. (St. Petersburg. 1914), 1: 27. 6 Muriel Joffe, "Autocracy, Capitalism and Empire: The Politics of Irrigation." Russian Review 54, no. 3 (July 1995): 3 6 5 - 3 8 8 . 7 Autocratic system refers here to the political and legal institutions with c o n s e q u e n c e s for economic development. According to the e c o n o m i c historian Douglass C. North, institutions such as laws, constitutions, contracts, and property rights are the rules of the g a m e that determine e c o n o m i c performance. Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). For an excellent analysis of how political and legal institutions, as well as cultural values, limited Russian e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t , see Thomas C. O w e n , The Corporation under Russian Law, 1800-1917: A Study in Tsarist Economic Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) and Thomas C. O w e n , Russian Corporate Capitalism from Peter the Great to Perestroika ( N e w York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

1 9 8 • Muriel J o f f e 8 R e c e n t s t u d i e s of R u s s i a ' s b o r d e r l a n d s have s h i f t e d historical a t t e n t i o n a w a y f r o m t h e c e n t e r s of a u t o c r a t i c p o w e r t o p e o p l e s or t e r r i t o r i e s on the p e r i p h e r i e s or m a r g i n s of t h e e m p i r e . This n e w field of " b o r d e r l a n d s r e s e a r c h " increases o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the evol u t i o n of Russian imperial rule. S o m e of t h e s e studies apply n e w m e t h o d o l o g i e s in cultural a n t h r o p o l o g y a n d e t h n o g r a p h y o r t h e l i t e r a t u r e on colonialism to e x p l o r e t h e relations h i p s b e t w e e n distinct p e o p l e s , c o n c e p t s of identity, or r e a c t i o n s to colonial rule. This essay s e e k s t o i n c r e a s e o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e c h o i c e and significance of imperial policies t o w a r d t h e b o r d e r l a n d . O n e of t h e best c o l l e c t i o n s of t h e n e w r e s e a r c h is D a n i e l R . B r o w e r and E d w a r d J. Lazzerini, eds., Russia's Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700-1917 ( B l o o m i n g t o n : I n d i a n a University Press, 1997). 9 S h i p o v ' s t w o - v o l u m e w o r k o n t h e c o t t o n i n d u s t r y and his " M e m o r a n d u m o n t h e M e a n s t o D e v e l o p O u r T r a d e with C e n t r a l A s i a " (1862) explicitly link R u s s i a n i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , R u s s i a n e c o n o m i c a s c e n d a n c y in Asia, a n d R u s s i a ' s u n i q u e f u t u r e as a g r e a t p o w e r . A l e k s a n d r Shipov, Khlopchato-bumazhnaia promyshlennost' i vazhnost' eia znacheniia v Rossii, 2 vols. ( M o s c o w , 1858), 2: 20-22; m e m o r a n d u m q u o t e d in M a r i a K. R o z h k o v a , Ekonomicheskie sviazi Rossii so Srednei Aziei 40-60-e gody XIX veka ( M o s c o w : A N S S S R , 1963), 148-149. A l f r e d J. R i e b e r c h a r a c t e r i z e s this S l a v o p h i l e - m e r c h a n t association as a regional interest g r o u p , t h e M o s c o w e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l g r o u p . T h e e m e r g e n c e of this g r o u p is e x p l a i n e d in A l f r e d J. R i e b e r , Merchants and Entrepreneurs in Imperial Russia ( C h a p e l Hill: U n i v e r s i t y of N o r t h C a r o l i n a Press, 1982), chaps. 4 - 5 . 10 A few d a r i n g individuals, such as t h e textile m a n u f a c t u r e r M . A . Khludov, t o o k a d v a n t a g e of R u s s i a ' s initial military victories t o travel b e t w e e n 1863 a n d 1865, at g r e a t e c o n o m i c a n d p e r s o n a l risk, to e x p l o r e business o p p o r t u n i t i e s in B u k h a r a and K o k a n d . K h l u d o v ' s initiative, as well as a c t u a l h e r o i s m at the b a t t l e s of U r a T u b e a n d D z h i z a k , e a r n e d him t h e r e s p e c t and f r i e n d s h i p of C h e r n a i e v w h o a d m i r e d his " h o n e s t R u s s i a n c h a r a c t e r , " r e a d y f o r any "self-sacrifice." F.I. L o b y s e v i c h , Postupatel'noe dvizhenie v Srednoiu Aziiu v torgovom i diplomatichesko-voennom otnoshenii. Dopolnitel'nyi material dlia istorii pokhoda 1873g. (St. P e t e r s b u r g : Tip. O b s h c h e s t v e n n a i a p o l ' z a , 1900), Khivinskago 127-128. 11 K.P. von K a u f m a n , Proekt vsepoddaneishago otcheta gen.-adiutanta K.P. fon-Kaufmana 1 po grazhdanskomu upravleniiu i ustroistvu v oblastiakh Turkestanskago general-gubernatostva, 7 noiabria 1867-25 marta 1881g. (St. P e t e r s b u r g , 1885), 306-308; s e e also r e p o r t of G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l Vrevskii (1898) in Rossiiskii g o s u d a r s t v e n n y i istoricheskii a r k h i v [ h e r e a f t e r R G I A ] , f. 560, op. 26, ed. khr. 87,11. 5 - 5 o b , 2 0 - 2 0 o b . 12 N o t all g o v e r n m e n t e f f o r t s s u c c e e d e d . In 1868 G e n e r a l von K a u f m a n tried to m a k e T a s h k e n t the c o m m e r c i a l c e n t e r of C e n t r a l A s i a n c o m m e r c e by o p e n i n g t w o n e w fairs in t h e R u s s i a n p a r t of t h e city. H o w e v e r , this a t t e m p t to r e d u c e t h e historical a n d religious p r e s tige of B u k h a r a and s u b s t i t u t e for it a n e w c o m m e r c i a l s y m b o l of R u s s i a n rule f a i l e d . C e n t r a l A s i a n m e r c h a n t s r e f u s e d t o t r a d e at t h e s e fairs a n d t h e y closed in 1879. E d w a r d A l l w o r t h , ed., Central Asia: 130 Years of Russian Dominance, A Historical Overview, 3 r d e d . ( D u r h a m : D u k e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1994), 138; von K a u f m a n , Proekt, 361-363; A . I . D o b r o s myslov, Tashkent v proshlom i nastoiashchem ( T a s h k e n t , 1912), 365-368. 13 Local o r g a n s of t h e Ministry of A g r i c u l t u r e a n d State D o m a i n s were only c r e a t e d in Turk e s t a n in 1897. V.I. M a s a l ' s k i i , Turkestanskii krai, vol. 19 of Rossiia. Polnoe geograficheskoe opisanie nashego otechestva, e d . V.P. S e m e n o v - T i a n Shanskii (St. P e t e r s b u r g , 1913), 7 - 8 , 5 1 0 - 5 1 1 . 14 For e x a m p l e von K a u f m a n was an h o n o r a r y m e m b e r of t h e Russian Industrial S o c i e t y which d e v o t e d several m e e t i n g s to p r o m o t i n g Russian c o m m e r c e in C e n t r a l Asia. N.A. Khalfin, " O b s h c h e s t v o dlia sodeistviia russkoi p r o m y s h l e n n o s t i i torgovli i S r e d n i a i a Aziia," Voprosy istorii 8 (1975): 52-53, 55; T h o m a s C. O w e n , " T h e R u s s i a n I n d u s t r i a l Society a n d Tsarist E c o n o m i c Policy, 1867-1905," Journal of Economic History 45, no. 3 (1985): 589-594.

Notes • 199 15 T h e M o s c o w - T a s h k e n t C o m p a n y is o n e e x a m p l e of t h e s e business failures. See R i e b e r , Merchants and Entrepreneurs, 208-209. 1 6 S u p p o r t for c u s t o m s unification c a m e f r o m Witte. w h o a d v o c a t e d t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of R u s s i a n c o m m e r c e in Asia as a m e a n s of s t r e n g t h e n i n g R u s s i a n political i n f l u e n c e t h e r e a n d t h e Ministry of W a r in an a t t e m p t to r e d u c e f u r t h e r t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e of t h e B u k h a r a n e m i r , a policy which t h e M i n i s t r y of Foreign A f f a i r s s t r e n u o u s l y but u n s u c c e s s f u l l y o p p o s e d . B.V. A n a n ' i c h , Rossiiskoe samoderzhavie i vyvoz kapiialov 1895-19I4gg. (Po materialam Uchetno-ssudnogo banka Persii) ( L e n i n g r a d : N a u k a , 1975), 15-16; O n R u s s i a ' s r e l a t i o n s with B u k h a r a and K h i v a , see S e y m o u r B e c k e r , Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924 ( C a m b r i d g e : H a r v a r d University Press, 1968). 17 M i n i s t e r s t v o finansov, Materialy dlia statistiki khlopchato-bumazhnago proizvodstva Rossii (St. P e t e r s b u r g . 1901), 2; V.N. O g l o b l i n , Khlopchatobumazhnaia promyshlennost' russkikh sredneaziatskikh vladeniiakh. Putevye zametki (St. P e t e r s b u r g , 1901), 20.

v v

18 S h i f t i n g f r o n t i e r s a n d c u s t o m s z o n e s , as well as v a r i a t i o n s in t h e m e t h o d of c o l l e c t i n g statistics p r e c l u d e any exact c o m p a r i s o n of R u s s i a n - C e n t r a l A s i a n t r a d e b e f o r e a n d a f t e r R u s s i a ' s pacification of the r e g i o n . O g l o b l i n e s t i m a t e s t h a t t h e v o l u m e of R u s s i a n e x p o r t s of finished g o o d s to C e n t r a l A s i a m o r e t h a n d o u b l e d in t h e p e r i o d b e t w e e n 1887 a n d 1897. O g l o b l i n , Khlopchatobumazhnaia promyshlennost', 44. 19 For an o v e r v i e w of t h e i r activity, see V.Ia. Laverychev, Moskovskie fabrikanty i sredneaziatskii khlopok, Vestnik M o s k o v s k o g o u n i v e r s i t e t a , Istoriia, ser. 9, no. 1 (1970): 5 6 - 6 0 . 20 M.I. B r o d o v s k i i , Kolonial'noe znachenie nashikh sredneaziatskikh vladenii dlia vnutrennikh gubernii ( M o s c o w : Tip. D.I. I n o z e m t s e v a , 1891), 4. B r o d o v s k i i was t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r of t h e c h a n c e l l e r y of t h e T u r k e s t a n g o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l f r o m 1899 to 1901 a n d s e c r e t a r y of the T u r k e s t a n B r a n c h of the Society for A m a t e u r s of N a t u r a l Science. A n t h r o p o l o g y a n d Ethnography. 21 Masal'skii, Turkestanskii krai, 5 3 9 - 5 4 0 : K.K. P a l e n , Otchet po revizii Turkestanskago proizvedennoi po Vyshochaishemu poveleniiu Senatorom Gofmeisterom Grafom Palenom. Gornoe delo (St. P e t e r s b u r g : S e n a t o r s k a i a tipografiia, 1910), intro., 1 - 2 , 3 1 . i n t r o d u c t i o n t o this v o l u m e is p a g i n a t e d s e p a r a t e l y ; t h e c h a p t e r s [ h e n c e f o r t h text] a r e inated in c o n s e c u t i v e o r d e r . )

kraia, K.K. (The pag-

22 P e r v u s h i n a n d the c o t t o n m a n u f a c t u r e r K h l u d o v w e r e business associates. For a p a n e g y r i c t o t h e s e pioneers, see E . L . M a r k o v , " N a O k s u s e i I a k s a r t e ( P u t e v y e o c h e r k i T u r k e s t a n a ) , " Russkoe obozrenie ( D e c e m b e r 1893): 6 2 3 - 6 2 5 ; o n t h e i r e c o n o m i c v e n t u r e s , s e e D o b r o s m y s l o v , Tashkent, 371-372, 3 7 6 - 3 8 9 , 394-395, 514-515; E . L . M a r k o v , " F e r g a n a ( P u t e v y e o c h e r k i T u r k e s t a n a ) , " Russkii vestnik ( J u n e 1893): 102. 2 3 B r o d o v s k i i , Kolonial'noe znachenie 57-58; Masal'skii, Turkestanskii krai, Gornoe delo, intro., 1 - 2 ; text, 173, 244. 24 Masal'skii, Turkestanskii krai, 542; P a l e n , Gornoe delo, intro., 3 1 , 1 4 6 .

541-542; Palen,

25 P a l a s h k o v s k i i a t t e m p t e d to build a p i p e l i n e f r o m t h e C a s p i a n Sea to Persia in 1885. See A n a n ' i c h , Rossiiskoe samoderzhavie i vyvoz kapitalov, 34; Masal'skii, Turkestanskii krai, 540-541; P a l e n , Gornoe delo, intro. 2 - 3 , 90; text, 31, 62-65, 71, 74, 2 0 4 - 2 1 7 , 2 2 4 - 2 3 5 . O n Kovalevskii and i r r i g a t i o n , see J o f f e , "Autocracy, C a p i t a l i s m and E m p i r e , " 3 7 9 - 3 8 0 . 26 See for e x a m p l e the r e p o r t of M a j o r - G e n e r a l Vasil'ev c o m p o s e d for t h e M i n i s t e r of W a r in 1906. R G I A , f. 1276, op. 2, ed. k h r . 36,11. 3 - 3 o b . 27 G o r n y i d e p a r t a m e n t , Obshchii obzor glavnykh lennosti ( P e t r o g r a d , 1915), 2 3 1 - 2 3 2 , 279.

otraslei gornoi

i gornozavodskoi

promysh-

28 K.K. P a l e n , Prilozhenie k otchetu po revizii Turkestanskago kraia, 480. In 1908, C o u n t K.K. Palen ( s o m e t i m e s spelled P a h l e n ) was a p p o i n t e d t o h e a d a s e n a t o r i a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n into t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of T u r k e s t a n a n d in p a r t i c u l a r , c h a r g e s of c o r r u p t i o n . F r o m J u n e 1908— J u n e 1909 Palen t o u r e d t h e b o r d e r l a n d a n d c o n d u c t e d a m u l t i - f a c e t e d e x a m i n a t i o n of gove r n m e n t a l , social a n d e c o n o m i c affairs. His m u l t i - v o l u m e r e p o r t of t h e r e s u l t s of this

200 • Muriel J o f f e

29

30

31 32

33 34 35 36

37 38

39 40 41 42 43 44

45 46

47

investigation, published between 1909-1910, remains one of the best sources on Turkestan in the imperial period. Joffe, "Autocracy, Capitalism and Empire," 376-377; Owen, The Corporation under Russian Law, 128: Palen, Prilozhenie k otchetu po revizii Turkestanskago kraia, 492-495; Ustav gornyi, vol. 7 of Svod zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii (St. Petersburg: Izd. Kodifikatsionnogo otd. pri Gos. Soviete, 1893), art. 267. Susan P. McCaffray, The Politics of Industrialization in Tsarist Russia: The Association of Southern Coal and Steel Producers, 1874-1917) (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1996), 10. For the evolution of these laws, see Semen Abamalek-Lazarev, Vopros o nedrakh i razvitie gornoi promyshlennosti v xix stoletie (St. Petersburg: 1902), pt. 1. Abamalek-Lazarev, Vopros o nedrakh, 38-39. The territorial and administrative structures of Turkestan were revised several times after the initial creation of the governor-generalship in 1867. The last revision occurred in 1898 when Transcaspia and Semirechie oblasts were included in the governor-generalship. The 1887 mining law applied to those lands included in the Syr-Daria, Fergana and Samarkand oblasts in 1898. Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii, ser. 3 (1887), no. 4521; Ustav gornyi, art. 255. Ustav gornyi, art. 271; Palen, Cornoe delo, text, 31-32, 172-180. Ustav gornyi, art. 203, 271 ; Palen, Gornoe delo, text, 31, 200, 246. Palen, Gornoe delo, text, 260-263. The opinions of General Rosenbach are found in Palen, Gornoe delo, text, 12-14. A reexamination of the 1894 decision by the Mining Department in St. Petersburg in 1907-08 provides additional insight into the basis of Islamic law used in the 1894 project. See R G I A , f. 37, op. 68, ed. khr. 549,11. 7-8. Palen, Gornoe delo, text, 14. In their analysis of the system of land tenure or other legal issues, such as mining rights in Turkestan, von Kaufman and other military-administrators enlisted the support of Russian orientalists, consulted the works of foreign experts on Islamic law and stale practices and even consulted local qadi, judges who adjudicate disputes on the basis of Islamic law or the Shar'ia. Von Kaufman also dispatched the future Minister of War and Governor-General of Turkestan, A.N. Kuropatkin to Algeria to study its system of land tenure. Privy Councilor Giers and other tsarist officials in St. Petersburg working on the administrative projects for Turkestan also consulted scholarly works on Islamic law. For a history of these debates, see A.P. Savitskii, Pozemel'nyi vopros v Turkestane (v proektakh i zakone 1867-1886 gg.) (Tashkent: CamGU, 1903). For a critical analysis of von K a u f m a n ' s support for scientific study of Turkestan see Daniel R. Brower, "Islam and Ethnicity: Russian Colonial Policy in Turkestan" in Brower and Lazzerini, eds., Russia's Orient, 123-125. Daniel Brower, "The Russian Imperial Project in Turkestan: Divergent Visions, Convergent Failure" (paper presented at the A A A S S convention, Boston, 14 November 1996), 2. Pechatnaia zapiska zasedaniia Gosudarstvennago Soveta, no. 268 (1886): 11-15. R G I A , f. 1276, op. 2, ed. khr. 36,1. 128ob. R G I A , f. 1396, op. 1, ed. khr. 201,1. 2; Palen, Gornoe delo, text, 3. R G I A , f. 1396, op. 1, ed. khr. 201,1. 2ob. K.K. Palen, Otchet po revizii Turkestanskago kraia, proizvedennoi po Vyshochaishemu poveleniiu Senatorom Gofmeisterom Grafom K.K. Palenom. Pozemel'no-podatnoe delo (St. Petersburg: Tip. Glav. Upr. Udelov, 1910), 3-4. For examples, see R G I A , f. 1396, op. 1, ed. khr. 201,11. 3-5ob. Palen, Pozemel'no-podatnoe delo, 6 - 7 , 1 3 - 1 7 . The small number of personnel involved, as well as breach of administrative practices and official corruption, also contributed to oscillating decisions. Palen, Gornoe delo, chap. 3. R G I A , f. 1396, op.l, ed. khr. 201, II. 6-6ob. 1 0 o b - l l .

Notes • 201 4 8 R G I A . f. 37, op. 68, ed. khr. 695, II. 5 7 - 5 7 o b ; P a l e n , Gornoe

delo, text, 1 2 , 1 9 - 2 0 .

4 9 R G I A . f. 37, op. 68. ed. khr. 549,1. 6ob. 50 Ibid.. 11. 6 o b - l l . In a d d i t i o n , the c o n f e r e n c e p o i n t e d o u t t h a t , a c c o r d i n g t o Article 261 of t h e s t a t u t e , p u r c h a s e r s of n a t i v e land a c q u i r e d only t h o s e rights which t h e seller h a d at t h e time. This stipulation would n o t h a v e b e e n n e c e s s a r y if t h e seller had full p r o p e r t y rights t o his land. 51 R G I A , f. 37, op. 68, ed. k h r . 549, II. 1 1 - l l o b . 52 Ibid., 1. 1 l o b . 53 R G I A , f. 37, op. 68, e d . khr. 549,1.3. 54 T h e d r a f t p r o j e c t is f o u n d in R G I A , f. 37, op. 65, e d . khr. 1479,11.232-246; see also f. 37, op. 77, e d . k h r . 5 0 1 , 5 3 . 55 C o u n t P a l e n also r e c o m m e n d e d this a c t i o n , insisting t h a t the local m i n i n g a u t h o r i t i e s in T u r k e s t a n w e r e o v e r w o r k e d , u n d e r s t a f f e d , u n d e r p a i d , and t h e r e f o r e , u n a b l e to c a r r y o u t their activities. H e also r e c o m m e n d e d that t h e M i n i n g D e p a r t m e n t t a k e o v e r r e s p o n s i b i l ity for g r a n t i n g p r o s p e c t i n g licenses. P a l e n , Gornoe delo, text, 241-244. 56 R G I A . f. 1276, op. 2, ed. k h r . 36,11. 2 3 7 o b - 2 3 8 o b . 57 Q u o t e d f r o m a 4 A p r i l 1906 m e m o r a n d u m of t h e C o u n c i l of Ministers, r e f e r e n c e t o t h e s e e c o n o m i c and cultural tasks can also b e f o u n d in v a r i o u s s t a t e m e n t s m a d e by the M i n i s t r y of War a n d others. See R G I A , f. 1276, op. 2, e d . k h r . 36,1. 23; f. 821, op. 133, ed. k h r . 613,1. 89ob; f. 1276, op. 2, ed. khr. 36,11. 1 - 2 . 58 G U Z Z , Zapiska Glavnoupravliaiushchago zemleustroistvom i zemledeliem o poezdke v Turkestanskii kraia v 1912 godu. Prilozhenie k vsepoddanneishemu dokladu (St. P e t e r s burg, 1912), 77, 75. 59 Work o n the n e w s t a t u t e t o o k place i n t e r m i t t e n t l y a f t e r 1906. P r i m a r y responsibility f o r d e t e r m i n i n g its u n d e r l y i n g principles fell to t h e e x t r a - d e p a r t m e n t a l c o m m i s s i o n e s t a b lished in 1911 u n d e r the c h a i r m a n s h i p of t h e S t a t e C o n t r o l l e r , T.S. K h a r i t o n o v . B o t h t h e c o m m i s s i o n and s u b s e q u e n t l y t h e C o u n c i l of M i n i s t e r s m a d e e x t e n s i v e use of t h e m a t e r i als g a t h e r e d by C o u n t P a l e n . 60 R G I A , f. 1276, op. 2, ed. k h r . 36,1.24; f. 821, op. 133, ed. k h r . 613,11. 8 9 - 9 0 , 1 0 3 o b . U n d e r Stolypin, t h e t e r m gosudarstvennost' in c o n t r a s t to obshchestvennost' signified a n a t i o n a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s based on t h e a u t o c r a t i c state. F o r discussion of this t e r m , see F r a n c i s William Wcislo, Reforming Rural Russia ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1990), 311. 61 R G I A , f. 1276, op. 2, ed. k h r . 36,1. 92ob. 62 G U Z Z , Zapiska, 58. 63 G U Z Z , Zapiska, 48-49; P a l e n , Gornoe delo, text, 1 5 - 1 6 , 2 6 5 - 2 7 0 ; R G I A , f. 560, op. 26, e d . k h r 87,1.79. In D e c e m b e r 1910, t h e g o v e r n m e n t p a s s e d a law a m e n d i n g A r t i c l e 270 of t h e T u r k e s t a n s t a t u t e that r e s t r i c t e d t h e a m o u n t of land allotted for t h e use of T u r k e s t a n ' s nomadic populations. 64 Palen, Gornoe

delo, text, 28; R G I A , f. 821, op. 133, ed. khr. 613,11. 100ob-101.

ILL T H E REVOLUTIONARY DECADE

Worry about Workers: Concerns of the Russian Intelligentsia from the 1870s to W H A T IS TO B E D O N E ? REGINALD E .

ZELNIK

In a brilliant chapter of his monograph on Soviet ideology in the 1920s, Eric Naiman draws our attention to the deeply felt anxiety of many Communist thinkers over the political reliability of the Soviet working class.1 Naiman finds some antecedents to this anxiety in the writings of Karl Marx, who feared (to cite Marx's well-known phrase) that the "tradition of all the dead generations" continued to "weigh as a nightmare on the brain of the living." Of course for Marx that "nightmare" was not defined as the proletariat, at least not explicitly. Nevertheless, the very foundations of his theory of capitalist society were weakened by a deep contradiction in its portrayal of the proletariat, a contradiction of which Marx could not have been unaware and which comes to the surface even in as optimistic a revolutionary document as the Communist Manifesto.2 For in the very pages in which they call upon the proletariat to play the role of revolutionary class par excellence, Marx and Engels also find themselves describing workers in what would normally be considered highly unflattering terms, stressing the degree to which their humanity is diminished by the capitalist system of production, forcing them into a degraded condition, deprived of any tools of their own, reduced to selling their labor power, actually to selling themselves, "piecemeal," like a "commodity" (Ware), to survive. Thanks to modern machinery and the division of labor, the worker had lost his skills, has become a mere "appendage" ( Z u behör) to the machine. Overworked during an ever-lengthening work day, workers were "slaves" or "bondsmen" (Knechte) of their employers. And if this was not enough, even the already degraded and enserfed (male) worker was destined to disappear from the very factory that had at least provided him with strength in numbers, for he was displaced, as his work required less and less skill, by women and children. Hence while more and more people "sink into the proletariat," the proletariat itself, meaning its adult males, seem destined to disappear from the industrial economy altogether. Of course the Manifesto failed to follow these projections to their logical conclusion: that the proletariat would either be too exhausted and demoralized to carry out its historical task, or would no longer be a working class but a former working class, part of "that passively rotting mass

206 • Reginald E. Zelnik thrown off by the lowest layers of the old society." Somehow, the authors of the Manifesto expected workers to avoid this fate, but just how it could be avoided as crisis after crisis threw workers into the reserve army of the unemployed was never m a d e clear. Lacking leisure and f r e e d o m , and eventually stripped of even the vestiges of bourgeois morality, workers were nonetheless expected to lead humanity into the realm of f r e e d o m . Little wonder, given these contradictions, that Marx and Engels already recognized the workers' need for guidance from people like themselves, the small "sections of the ruling class" that chose to identify with its cause. Just why such privileged people would make this choice is never really explained, but whatever the reason, there were "bourgeois ideologists" who "raised themselves" to the level of " c o m p r e h e n d i n g theoretically the historical m o v e m e n t as a whole" (words later borrowed almost wholesale by Lenin). Clearly Marx and Engels were not prepared to make the claim that the debased and degraded proletarian masses could be the source of sophisticated historical wisdom and political insight. Despite their confidence in the ability of workers to organize for the coming struggle—and in the Manifesto they seem more confident than the Lenin of What is to be Done?—the clear implication was that workers, though their emancipation was s o m e h o w to be accomplished "by the working classes themselves," could not be relied upon to orient themselves correctly in the absence of theoretical guidance f r o m bourgeois intellectuals. In this respect the a u t h o r of What is to be Done? would have justification enough to think of his own views of the worker as "Marxist." But he also had another heritage, a Russian one, with which to combine his reading of Marx. In this p a p e r I will argue that Marxism's own perplexities about the character and reliability of the industrial working class, when combined with a three-decade tradition of ambivalence about workers among the late-nineteenth-century Russian Left, m a d e it only too understandable, p e r h a p s even inevitable, that Lenin would eventually share such anxieties. W h a t e v e r other approaches o n e might use to explain his emphasis on the need for a tightly organized, politically conscious, elite Marxist leadership, Lenin, by 1902, when he published What is to be Done? ( h e r e a f t e r WTBD), like the future Mensheviks who sat with him on the Iskra editorial board at the time, was deeply concerned about the political reliability of Russia's real, living working class. Scholars have explained Lenin's "elitist" orientation in a n u m b e r of different ways—his personal character, the context of an oppressive tsarist regime, and the conspiratorial legacy of Narodnaia volia. There is certainly some validity to all these explanations, and it is not my purpose here to r e f u t e them. Instead, what I would like to do is suggest the extent to which Lenin's own doubts about workers, as expressed in WTBD, were grounded in several decades of worried thinking on the Russian and the E u r o p e a n L e f t , and to point to one of the ways in which he e n d e a v o r e d to relieve his anxiety— by cautiously placing his hopes not in the working class as a whole, but in its intellectual elite, a small but influential group that could insert itself between the unreliable worker masses and the non-working-class intelligentsia.

Worry aboul Workers • 207 If one such stream of anxiety about workers began with Marx and Engels themselves, the other, the Russian stream, began with those m e m b e r s of the Populist intelligentsia of the 1870s who first began to interact with workers in Russia's m a j o r cities. The two streams converged, as it were, in the person of Georgii Plekhanov. who was the direct heir of both traditions, having had intense relations with Petersburg workers in the mid-1870s, and having become Russia's first i m p o r t a n t Marxist thinker in the 1880s and 1890s. In the late spring of 1901, when Lenin began to conceptualize his famous pamphlet of 1902, Plekhanov was still Lenin's most admired Russian Marxist. It should t h e r e f o r e come as no surprise that their views of Russian workers would partially converge, though Lenin added i m p o r t a n t nuances to Plekhanov's position and expressed his worries with greater clarity and intensity.

POPULISM, PLEKHANOV, AND WORKER

THE

INTELLIGENTSIA

From the earliest contacts between the revolutionary intelligentsia and industrial workers, which began in St. Petersburg midway through the reign of A l e x a n d e r II, intelligenty had e n o r m o u s difficulty deciding just who these workers were, what if any their special role should be in the revolutionary movement or in the socialist society of the future, and how they, the peasant-oriented, narod-loving, Populist intelligentsia, should relate to such workers. The intelligentsia's initial uncertainty was c o m p o u n d e d by the mixed social identities of their worker comrades. Most of these workers were peasants in some significant sense, and not simply by virtue of their statutory adherence to a soslovie. In most cases they were born in the 1840s or 1850s to enserfed village families, maintained their m e m b e r s h i p in and contacts with their c o m m u n e s of origin, and h a r b o r e d memories, either bitter or sweet, of village childhoods. Yet many were also, and very visibly so, urban industrial workers, citified and literate, skilled, and themselves passionately engaged in an internal struggle to define their own identities even as their intelligentsia acquaintances tried to do the j o b for them. Complicating the matter even f u r t h e r was the availability to the workers of a third possible identity, one that derived from neither their peasant nor their worker lives, but f r o m the model presented to them by the example of the intelligenty themselves. That was the model of a worker-intelligent, or p e r h a p s simply an intelligent unmodified, into which they could now begin to grow while attempting to leave both peasant and worker identities behind t h e m . 3 This, after all, paralleled what the intelligentsia itself had done by consciously forsaking a gentry background or backgrounds f r o m other, more diverse groups (summarized for convenience as the raznochintsy), and assuming the acquired persona of intelligent as the locus of their social singularity. When Nikolai Mikhailovskii and others began to speak of the raznochinnaia intelligentsiia, this was another way of saying that intelligenty could c o m e f r o m

208 • Reginald E. Zelnik any and every social background, with their way of thinking about the world now serving as the universal solvent through which their previous social status was absorbed and dissolved (one might even say aufgehoben). There was no inherent reason why the proletarian, semi-proletarian, or peasant background of an intelligent should have m a d e him any less raznochinnyi than, say, an intelligent who came f r o m the clerical soslovie. (The peasant-student-terrorist A n d r e i Zheliabov is a case in point.) In the case of politically educated workers, however, the adjective rabochii/rabochaia tended to persist over time, having become especially attractive with the rise of Russian Marxism. Thus by the turn of the century one would hear the expressions rabochii intelligent and rabochaia intelligentsiia very often, krest'ianskaia intelligentsiia more rarely, and, though there were certainly radical intelligenty from merchant families, the strange sounding kupecheskaia intelligentsiia almost never. In the 1870s and early 1880s these complications of definition became even more problematic when, now deeply involved with growing n u m b e r s of urban workers, radical intelligenty (or studenty, as workers liked to call them) endeavored to create definitions of those workers' identities that would conform both with their own ideological predispositions and with their personal experiences of the workers in a variety of settings. As narodniki who placed their hopes for Russia's f u t u r e in the peasant c o m m u n e and artel', intelligenty feared that the workers with whom they were now so entangled would lose their peasant qualities, would identify instead with a new urban working class, a proletarianized mass whose a p p e a r a n c e in Russia it was the Populists' sacred duty to prevent. A s A n d r z e j Walicki has stressed, the Populists were well acquainted with Marx's writings, and the Marxist image they projected of the pauperized, dehumanized proletarian led them to the "undialectical" conclusion that it was the intelligentsia's duty to prevent the degeneration of the narod into so deplorable a state. 4 But, while there were indeed some workers who strove to retain their peasant self-identifications even as they became increasingly politicized and citified— Stepan Mitrofanov is a good example—most were likely to pursue one of two other options. O n e was to think of oneself as belonging to a distinct category of workers, identifying with workers in the factories of other countries. Apposite examples are Viktor Obnorskii, who traveled abroad to meet E u r o p e a n workers, and Ignatii Bachin, who sharply rejected his peasant antecedents. 5 The other choice, exemplified by Stepan Khalturin, was to begin to think of oneself and to act as part of the radical intelligentsia, turning the exhilarating intelligentsia world of dangerous political ideas, literary activity, and social action into o n e ' s own new world. 6 To a great extent, after all, such had been the inclinations of the first generation of politicized French workers (mainly artisans, to be sure) who, under the influence of Saint-Simonian and o t h e r French socialist intellectuals, reacted paradoxically to their m e n t o r s ' desire to define them as workers by aspiring to lead the r e m a r k a b l e lives of their m e n t o r s themselves. 7 When c o n f r o n t e d with such workers in Russia, Populist intelligenty could be very favorably impressed, but

Worry about Workers • 209 their positive impressions were often accompanied by surprise, sometimes even by disappointment and dismay. 8 A leading participant in the early Populist e n c o u n t e r with workers was the " s t u d e n t " Georgii Plekhanov. Although he declared himself a Marxist in G e n e v a in the early 1880s, Plekhanov was still heir to the Populists' confusion when confronting the liminal presence of politicized workers, though his confusion as a Marxist now took different forms. On the one hand, the workers' close peasant backgrounds were now a source of apprehension rather than gratification; on the o t h e r hand, their partial intelligentsia morphologies, which at times made them barely distinguishable from people like himself, gave rise to fears that they would leave their fellow workers and their "class" behind. To these apparent contradictions, which, despite his new air of scientific certainty, continued to leave Plekhanov awash in doubt, were added the paradoxes of his Marxist theoretical vision, which, as we have seen, simultaneously attributed to the worker the qualities of human degradation and human perfectibility. Plekhanov's strangely neglected autobiographical essay, The Russian Worker in the Revolutionary Movement, is the locus classicus of his confusion, in relation to both the Populist period he portrays and his state of mind at the time of writing, circa 1890-1892. In his decade-old Marxist, anti-Populist, incarnation, Plekhanov is now no longer in doubt about his desire to valorize retrospectively the worker identities of his acquaintances of the 1870s. In his mind, peasant characteristics are now coded negative, worker characteristics positive. Thus Plekhanov now chides workers like Mitrofanov for having shown devotion to the village, and exalts the emerging proletariat of the 1870s (Mitrofanov among them!) as Russia's most powerful and real "new social force." 9 But just what were these valorized worker characteristics meant to be? Despite his growing knowledge of Marxist theory, Plekhanov was certainly not looking for degeneration, decadence, or dehumanization, the traits that capitalist exploitation were supposed to produce in the m o d e r n worker. Indeed, it is hard to find any sign of such immiserated, suffering workers in Plekhanov's opus (or in the reminiscences of his intelligentsia contemporaries). Instead, the negative pole on his worker spectrum, the antipode of the worker he now admired, was the still inadequately proletarianized peasant-worker, whom he equated with the workers of St. Petersburg's textile factories—in other words, with the same supposedly still unformed, unproletarianized workers in whom the Populist "students" of the 1870s, not excluding young Plekhanov, had placed their hopes. 1 0 By the 1890s, then, one of the main attributes of Plekhanov's p r e f e r r e d workers was to not be peasant-like, that is, boorish, provincial, and " g r e e n " (actually "gray," seryi). The positi\e side of this coin was to be sophisticated, u r b a n (urbane?), clean, neatly dressed (but not a dandy) when away from work, and highly literate, hardly the characteristics of the insulted and injured of Engels' (or Dickens') Manchester, or of Th( Communist Manifesto and Das Kapital, works in which Plekhanov, ironically, now was steeped. 1 1 U n d e r the influence of studenty, the most politicized

210 • Reginald E. Zelnik (or "conscious," to use the term of choice by the 1890s) of these workers invariably began to resemble their student mentors—to look like them, read like them, talk like them, and belong to similar "circles." even taking on their own less " d e v e l o p e d " (razvityi, a predecessor of soznatel'nyi) pupils and disciples. This is not to say that either workers or intelligenty were fully comfortable when workers assumed or were invested with this mimetic role; from the 1870s on into the twentieth century even the most cooperative relations between them were rarely free of conflict. But the important point for our purposes is the comp o u n d e d discomfiture of Marxist intelligenty like Plekhanov, who could not but welcome the specific signs of a worker's intellectual transformation into a rabochii intelligent, but at the same time were forced to face the danger that this very development augured a f u n d a m e n t a l estrangement of that worker from his presumably dehumanized proletarian brothers, "the masses." Was it possible that as capitalism was driving more and more of its immiserated proletarian victims downward into the bowels of society, it was pushing a small segment of very special workers—one of Alfred R i e b e r ' s newer "sediments"? 1 2 —upward to the exalted heights of the educated élite? A n d if so, what were the mechanisms that would prevent a gap from developing between these two segments of what was meant to be a single great "class"? How would, say, a few hundred or even a few thousand politicized, exquisitely conscious workers pull the mass of hundreds of thousands more " b a c k w a r d " workers up into their special orbit, enabling them to grasp, let alone to act upon, such complex notions as the bourgeoisie's simultaneous existence as both the workers' most bitter class enemy and their potentially closest ally against autocracy? As both their exploiter and a class they should ally with? Plekhanov and his comrades had no clear answer, other than to struggle mightily with sociological categories that p u r p o r t e d to describe a semi-mythical ladder of political ascent, from peasant to textile worker to metalworker, and thence into the conscious worker vanguard, precariously poised at the cusp of intelligentsia identity, but without being absorbed by it. 13

MARXISTS AND WORKERS INSIDE

RUSSIA

As historians have d e m o n s t r a t e d , in the mid- to late 1880s, even before the great famine of 1891-92, a Marxist or Social-Democratic disposition was developing in revolutionary circles inside Russia that paralleled but was i n d e p e n d e n t of the shift to Marxism among the exiles gathered round Plekhanov. 1 4 In contrast to the Marxists in exile, these people, mainly studenty, were generally in touch with actual workers, with whom they regularly met in discussion circles (kruzhki). The workers, mainly politicized and fairly well educated men (a small female presence b e c a m e visible only in the 1890s), the type Plekhanov cut his teeth on a d e c a d e earlier, were welcomed into these circles for further consciousness-raising. The mid-to-late eighties and early nineties provided this Marxist intelligentsia with

Worry about Workers

-211

a m p l e r e a s o n to f o r m a positive view of such w o r k e r s , w h o s e p r e s e n c e n o u r i s h e d t h e i r g r o w i n g o p t i m i s m in t h e c o n f l u e n c e of Marxist t h e o r y and R u s s i a n practice. A f t e r a brief p e r i o d of r e c e s s i o n in the early 1880s, t h e industrial e c o n o m y had b e g u n t o t a k e off, the size of t h e w o r k force to e x p a n d . M a j o r militant textile s t r i k e s t o o k p l a c e in V l a d i m i r ( t h e " M o r o z o v s t r i k e " ) a n d T v e r p r o v i n c e s in early 1885, f o l l o w e d by a succession of strikes in t h e 1890s. F u r t h e r , t h e r e was e v i d e n c e t h a t " a d v a n c e d , " politicized w o r k e r s , including v e t e r a n s of t h e 1870s such as P e t r M o i s e e n k o , w e r e s t a r t i n g t o link u p with a b r o a d e r w o r k e r s ' m o v e m e n t , e v e n p l a y e d a l e a d e r s h i p role in t h e M o r o z o v strike. A t t h e s a m e time, t h e g o v e r n m e n t a c k n o w l e d g e d t h e p o t e n c y of t h e w o r k e r s by r e l u c t a n t l y i n t r o d u c i n g labor legisl a t i o n ( m o s t i m p o r t a n t l y in 1886). All t h e s e t e n d e n c i e s , c o m b i n e d with t h e s h o c k ing (to Populists) a b s e n c e of large-scale p e a s a n t revolt in t h e w a k e of the f a m i n e , h e l p e d o p e n t h e d o o r t o intelligentsia c o n v e r s i o n s to M a r x i s m . A l t h o u g h the p r o cess of a b a n d o n i n g p o p u l i s t a s s u m p t i o n s was p a i n f u l a n d i n c o m p l e t e , all t h e s e d e v e l o p m e n t s lent i n c r e a s i n g credibility to t h o s e intelligenty leging w o r k e r s o v e r p e a s a n t s .

15

w h o o p t e d for privi-

T h e y usually called t h e m s e l v e s M a r x i s t s or social-

d e m o c r a t s , a n d t h e y r e a c h e d a c r o s s t h e c o n t i n e n t t o p r o c l a i m their affinity to P l e k h a n o v a n d his fellow exiles, while rarely s h o w i n g signs of t h e m a s t e r ' s n e r v o u s c o n f u s i o n a b o u t w o r k e r identities. By t h e mid-1890s, h o w e v e r , t h e p r o b l e m of w o r k e r identity b e g a n to r e a p p e a r . T h e c r a v i n g of m a n y M a r x i s t s f o r c o n t a c t with a b r o a d e r w o r k e r s ' milieu, f o r a b r e a k f r o m t h e r e s t r a i n t s of circle w o r k and f o r m o r e direct c o n t a c t with t h e w o r l d of m a s s l a b o r p r o t e s t , w a s fed by a r e s u r g e n c e of strike activity in the textile industry, first in c e n t r a l R u s s i a (1895), t h e n in St. P e t e r s b u r g ( 1 8 9 6 - 9 7 ) . W h e n a c t e d u p o n in t h e spirit of t h e f a m o u s p a m p h l e t Ob agitatsii,

this c r a v i n g o f t e n led

to a b i t t e r r u p t u r e b e t w e e n intelligentsia p r o p a g a n d i s t s a n d their w o r k e r p r o tégés, as t h e " d i u r n a l " lure of t h e f a c t o r y b e c a m e m o r e exciting to intelligenty t h e " n o c t u r n a l " lure of t h e kruzhok

than

(to b o r r o w f r o m J a c q u e s R a n c i è r e ' s special

imagery). This story, which h a s a l r e a d y b e e n told by W i l d m a n a n d G e y e r , n e e d n o t d e t a i n us h e r e , e x c e p t to p o i n t o u t t h a t t h e h u g e citywide s t r i k e s of M a y - J u n e 1896, to which M a r x i s t intelligenty

r e n d e r e d significant i n t e l l e c t u a l a n d tactical

s u p p o r t , 1 6 r e p r e s e n t e d t h e high p o i n t of t h e M a r x i s t intelligentsia's (including young Lenin's) optimism regarding the confluence between themselves and the b r o a d m a s s of w o r k e r s . S o o n t h e r e a f t e r , this s h o r t - l i v e d m a r r i a g e b e g a n to dissolve, and t h e intelligentsia a g a i n f o u n d itself d e e p l y t r o u b l e d by t h e p r o b l e m of w h e r e it stood in r e l a t i o n to r e a l , live w o r k e r s , b o t h t h e r a n k - a n d - f i l e of t h e factories and t h e politicized, " c o n s c i o u s " w o r k e r s of t h e kruzhki,

though the prob-

lems that b e s e t t h e two sets of r e l a t i o n s w e r e n o t identical. B e c a u s e t h e s t o r m o v e r " E c o n o m i s m " was t h e c e n t e r of c o n t r o v e r s y , b o t h at t h e time and in t h e s u b s e q u e n t h i s t o r i o g r a p h y , 1 7 it is easy t o a s s u m e , especially w h e n r e a d i n g b a c k w a r d s f r o m WTBD,

t h a t t h e revival of intelligentsia c o n c e r n

a b o u t the reliability of w o r k e r s w a s e n t i r e l y b a s e d o n t h e f e a r t h a t , if a l l o w e d t o act " s p o n t a n e o u s l y " ( s t i k h i i n o ) , t h e y w o u l d s u c c u m b t o g r a d u a l i s m , t r a d e - u n i o n -

212 • Reginald

E.

Zelnik

ism, a n d liberalism. W i t h o u t d e n y i n g t h e c e n t r a l i t y of t h a t f e a r o n t h e p a r t of L e n i n a n d o t h e r s ( i n c l u d i n g f u t u r e M e n s h e v i k s ) . it should be n o t e d t h a t Marxist intelligenty

also f e a r e d t h e ill e f f e c t s of s p o n t a n e o u s violence,

of allegedly peas-

ant-like, primitive, d r u n k e n , l u d d i t e , " b a c k w a r d , " i n c e n d i a r y b e h a v i o r , including m a c h i n e - b r e a k i n g , p e r s o n a l assaults, a n d f a c t o r y t e r r o r . In c o n t r a s t to t h e m o r e self-disciplined b e h a v i o r of s t r i k e r s in 1896, t h e strikes of 1885, t o t a k e an early e x a m p l e , h a d p r e s e n t e d a m i x e d p i c t u r e : t h o u g h m o s t of t h e s t r i k e r s w e r e o r d e r ly, t h o s e s t r i k e s w e r e a c c o m p a n i e d by t h e wild kind of v i o l e n c e that R u s s i a n Marxists, while n e v e r c o m p l e t e l y u n s y m p a t h e t i c to t h e p e r p e t r a t o r s , w e r e reluct a n t to c o n d o n e . A s t h e y e a r s w e n t by, intelligentsia f e a r of this k i n d of s p o n t a n e ity r e m a i n e d intact. In 1895, in t h e w a k e of violent textile s t r i k e s in t h e C e n t r a l I n d u s t r i a l R e g i o n , such f e a r s w e r e s t r o n g e n o u g h to m o v e t h e W o r k e r s ' U n i o n (Rabochii

soiuz),

a M o s c o w - b a s e d o r g a n i z a t i o n with n a t i o n w i d e a m b i t i o n s — i t s

l e a d e r s i n c l u d e d L e n i n ' s sister, A n n a E l i z a r o v a — t o issue a special b r o c h u r e , Stachki,

ikh znachenie

dlia rabochikh,

in which it sternly c a u t i o n e d against m a r -

ring t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of s t r i k e s by such u n p r o d u c t i v e actions. 1 8 T h e a u t h o r s w e r e h a r s h l y critical of u n d i s c i p l i n e d p r o t e s t , a s y m p t o m of w o r k e r s ' deficient u n d e r s t a n d i n g of c a p i t a l i s m ' s systemic individual

failings a n d m i s d i r e c t e d h a t r e d of m a c h i n e s a n d

e m p l o y e r s . T h e y d e s c r i b e d v i o l e n c e against individual o v e r s e e r s and

t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of " i n n o c e n t " m a c h i n e s as bunty,

a t e r m n o r m a l l y a p p l i e d t o rio-

t o u s p e a s a n t u n r e s t , at o n e p o i n t e v e n g o i n g so far as to label t h e s e a c t i o n s pogromy.™ To b e s u r e , t h e a u t h o r s w e r e o p t i m i s t i c in t h a t t h e y d e p i c t e d such u n r e s t r a i n e d b e h a v i o r as a s t a g e t h a t w o r k e r s w o u l d j e t t i s o n as t h e y b e g a n

to

u n d e r s t a n d t h e g r e a t e r e f f e c t i v e n e s s of " p e a c e f u l " ( m i r n y i ) , disciplined, o r g a nized strikes, f o l l o w i n g t h e e x a m p l e of " o t h e r c o u n t r i e s " : "[I]f t h e age of bunty

in

R u s s i a h a s n o t yet p a s s e d , at least t h e t i m e has c o m e w h e n s t r i k e s h a v e a p p e a r e d on an e q u a l f o o t i n g with bunty."20

T h e a u t h o r s w e r e less t h a n c l e a r , h o w e v e r , as

to h o w this t r a n s i t i o n was t o c o m e a b o u t . For w e find within t h e s a m e f e w p a g e s e l e m e n t s of b o t h a classical M a r x i s t i m m i s e r a t i o n t h e o r y — r e s e r v e a r m i e s of d e humanized, impoverished, unemployed men (often unemployed proletarianized peasants,

a R u s s i a n t w i s t ) — a n d p r o j e c t i o n s of w e l l - o r g a n i z e d , legalized u n i o n s

a n d t h e i r disciplined, n o n - v i o l e n t s t r i k e actions, a t t r a c t i n g w o r k e r s t h r o u g h their a c h i e v e m e n t of g e n u i n e i m p r o v e m e n t s . A s n o t e d a b o v e , t h e s t r i k e s of 1896 h a d t h e p r e d i c t a b l e e f f e c t of i n c r e a s i n g t h e o p t i m i s m a n d e n t h u s i a s m of M a r x i s t intelligenty.

Clearly t h e s e m i l i t a n t yet self-

disciplined m u l t i - f a c t o r y w o r k s t o p p a g e s , c a r r i e d out with t h e s u b s t a n t i a l assist a n c e of intelligenty

f r o m t h e r e c e n t l y f o r m e d U n i o n of S t r u g g l e f o r t h e E m a n c i -

p a t i o n of t h e W o r k i n g Class ( S o i u z bor'by

za osvobozhdenie

rabochego

klassa),

g a v e weight to t h e belief t h a t t h e " r i o t o u s " s t a g e of t h e l a b o r m o v e m e n t c o u l d b e t r a n s c e n d e d , r e d u c i n g t h e f e a r t h a t t h e s e n s e l e s s R u s s i a n bunt ( o n c e e v o k e d with e x q u i s i t e h o r r o r by P u s h k i n ) w o u l d b e t h e m o v e m e n t ' s d o m i n a n t m o d e of e x p r e s sion. T h e h o p e of f u t u r e c o o p e r a t i o n a n d u l t i m a t e alliance b e t w e e n t h e " m a s s e s " a n d t h e M a r x i s t intelligentsia w a s r e k i n d l e d . T h e intelligenty

had

apparently

Worry about Workers • 213 f o u n d a way out of the dead-end frustration of circle work; agitation had proven itself as a tactic, and, t h o u g h marred by a wave of arrests, the future of intelligentsia-worker relations must have looked brighter than ever. Learning of the P e t e r s b u r g strikes while in exile in Ekaterinoslav in 1897, the highly "conscious" w o r k e r Ivan Babushkin, worker-comrade of intelligenty and perennial favorite of Lenin's, rejoiced in the news, interpreting it as a harbinger of the end of the bunt as a defining characteristic of Russian labor unrest: "[I]t was only then that I came to believe that beginning [factory] agitation had not been in vain"; and only then was he confident that rank-and-file workers were starting to grasp the advantages of the strike over the bunt, "a giant (ogromnyi) step forward." 2 1 Nevertheless, this very success contained seeds of future conflict. A labor m o v e m e n t that could succeed in flexing its muscles while the intelligentsia played only an auxiliary role would not necessarily proceed in a "consciously" socialist direction. Marxist agitators, while effective in the dissemination of leaflets that elucidated the strikers' grievances, thereby adding to their sense of unity and solidarity, were still c o m m i t t e d to a contradictory notion: that whereas the movement's goal at this stage should be the overthrow of autocracy and its replacement with the kind of liberal-democratic political order that Marxists associated with a capitalist economy, workers should also be waging a class war against the entire capitalist system, thereby challenging the very heart of that system, private ownership. Since Marxism anticipated that capitalism would advance robustly, expanding to its maximum capacities, thereby extending the size and experience of the working class u n d e r a bourgeois-democratic political and legal order, one logical corollary of that position was for Russia's workers to restrain themselves for the m o m e n t from acting in a sweepingly anti-capitalist fashion, confining their actions, however militant, to limited economic goals while others led the struggle against autocracy. Still a n o t h e r possible logic (later adopted by Trotsky and later still by Lenin) was for w o r k e r s to discount the notion of "stages" and push their assault on the capitalist class enemy to its extreme limits, striving to overthrow capitalist relations (private ownership) as well as political autocracy. Though creative new combinations and permutations would soon evolve, these were indeed the polar extremes between which Russian Marxists would oscillate in the years ahead, with no clear consensus on these matters ever emerging a m o n g intelligenty, let alone between intelligenty and workers. But h e a r t e n e d by the successes of 1896-97, including government concessions to the strike movement on the length of the workday, in late 1897 many activist workers and some "worker-phile" intelligenty, though without a b a n d o n i n g their principled opposition to the autocracy, opted for the first of these approaches, and for worker-led strike activity in particular, a position that was soon embodied in a new and controversial workerfounded journal, Rabochaia mysl\22 For the many Marxist intelligenty (including f u t u r e Mensheviks as well as Lenin) this was an unacceptable solution. The c o m p o r t m e n t of the Petersburg workers had been admirable, but it now threatened to take new and unpredictable

214 • Reginald E. Zelnik directions. A n d the conduct of workers in the more "backward" provinces was still less reliable. What, then, was to be done? A f t e r the experience of 1896-97, a return to kruzhkovshchina, to late-night and Sunday propaganda work at secret meetings with small n u m b e r s of "conscious" workers, though never a b a n d o n e d , was no longer thinkable as a master strategy, an adequate substitute for the attractions of mass agitation. To be sure, the cultivation of new cadres of advanced workers was still i m p o r t a n t — t h e s e were the very years when Semen Kanatchikov and others like him were acquiring their "consciousness." 2 3 But some of these workers had been itching to u n d e r t a k e the field work that was normally the province of intelligentsia agitators, and, while actually endeavoring to complement the intelligenty by acting as intermediaries between them and the "masses," they sometimes came into conflict with intelligenty in the course of these activities. 24 But most disturbing of all to Lenin and many other intelligenty were the workers, like those attached to Rabochaia mysl', who, taking literally the Marxist slogan that the liberation of the working class was the task of the workers themselves, endeavored to displace the intelligentsia altogether. 2 5 As a result of these circumstances, with the issues of worker a u t o n o m y f r o m the intelligentsia now merging with many militant workers' (and worker-phile intelligenty'%) emphasis on strikes and self-organization, the years 1898-1901 could be characterized as a period of maximum tension between independence-minded workers and those intelligenty who were most concerned with retaining their leadership role in the movement. If we add to this mix the deeper issue of contradictory views of the leadership capacities of the working class in Marxism itself, the appearance of such strains was all but unavoidable, and one need not delve very deeply into Lenin's personality to understand their emergence. Until 1902 and in some cases beyond, what troubled Lenin seemed to be troubling Iulii Martov, Plekhanov and other f u t u r e Menshevik leaders, some of whom later became the staunchest critics of Lenin's "elitism."

AN

A N T I C I P A T I O N OF

What is to be Done'?

If we use as a base line 1895, when young Lenin was a leader of the g r o u p of Marxist intelligenty that later became the Union of Struggle, we can safely say that at the time he enthusiastically espoused the recent tactic of economic agitation and expressed no notable anxiety about it possibly leading to a rejection of socialist politics on the part of workers. 2 6 To be sure, there were conflicts with workers over finances, and Lenin's group was loath to admit workers into its own ranks. 2 7 But neither Lenin nor his comrades wished to articulate such problems as matters of any theoretical import. They did not seem terribly worried. The first major piece of writing in which Lenin began to a d u m b r a t e the ideas that would be more fully developed in WTBD) dates to 1900, when he published "The U r g e n t Tasks of O u r Movement," the unsigned lead editorial of t h e first

Worry about Workers • 215 issue of ¡skra.2S A f t e r defining "social-democracy" as "the unification of the worke r s ' m o v e m e n t with socialism," Lenin began to address social-democracy's prim a r y task by stating what it was not. Its task was "not [to provide] passive services to the workers' m o v e m e n t at each of its separate stages," but to act as "representative of the interests of the [workers'] movement as a whole, as the indicator (iukazanie) to this m o v e m e n t of its final goal, its political task, [as] the preserver of its political and ideological independence." In effect, this was a still imprecise anticipation of Lenin's later formulation about the danger of leaving workers to their own devices, a point he clarified somewhat in a subsequent passage: "Isolated f r o m social-democracy, the workers' movement turns into something petty (melchaet) and inevitably degenerates into bourgeois-ness [burzhuaznost']". The working class thereby "loses its political i n d e p e n d e n c e " and, he continues, planting the seeds of his polemic against tailism, "becomes the tail of other parties," betraying the principle that "the emancipation of the workers must be the task of the workers themselves." By "social-democracy," in this context, Lenin of course meant the social-democratic intelligentsia, or, more to the point, the editors of Iskra. Exactly whom he meant by the "workers" was less clear, but his choice of words here is suggestive. History has shown, he lamented, that Russia has suffered particularly f r o m "the separation of socialist thought from the advanced representatives of the working classes" (emphasis added), a situation that "condemned the Russian revolutionary movement to impotence." So the specific linkage he had in mind (or was groping for) may not have been between socialist thinkers and the mass of workers, but between the former and the workers' most "advanced" or "conscious" representatives. But this thought is not fully developed here, as Lenin quickly shifts his focus to the "proletarian masses," those workers yet to acquire "socialist ideas and political self-consciousness," those into whom the social democrats must "instill" {vnedrit') that consciousness by forming a party that was "indissolubly linked with the spontaneous labor movement." Was Lenin confident at this point about the prospects of such an e n d e a v o r ? His words might be described as cautiously optimistic. The process had just recently begun, and its was bound to be accompanied by "waverings and doubts," he warned. The key to success was organization, without which the proletariat would be unable to rise to the level of "conscious class struggle." With only mutual aid and strike funds, with only study circles ( k r u z h k i ) , the working class would never succeed in fulfilling its great historical task: "to free itself and all the Russian people from their political and economic slavery." A n d the marker of that success, he continued, briefly returning to the theme of a special, "advanced" worker leadership, would be the working class's ability to generate its own leaders: " N o class in history has ever gained dominion unless it brought forth its own political leaders, its own advanced representatives." Russia now was moving in that direction, he averred, ending this part of his editorial on an optimistic note while again underscoring the requirement that the leaders be molded into a conspiratorial "party": "We must prepare [podgotovliat']29 people who are

216 • Reginald E. Zelnik devoted to revolution not only during their free evenings but all their life." Clearly this could not have meant the great mass of production-line workers. Broadly speaking, Lenin's Iskra

editorial represented the views at the time of

Martov and the paper's other editors, as reflected, for example, in an article by Martov in the very same issue. Like Lenin, Martov too was now worried about Russian workers, and he was no less prepared to leave them to their own devices; like Lenin, he linked these concerns to a vigorous call for a tightly disciplined party organization, with a central committee that could act both quickly and decisively. 30 The full extent of Lenin's special worries, however, the points that caused him to stand out among his Iskra comrades, would not be visible until the appearance of WTBD, a work in which he spoke entirely for himself.

W H A T IS TO B E

DONE?

Let us begin with a brief look at the context in which Lenin was working and living in late 1901-early 1902, the months when he was conceptualizing and writing WTBD. His was a life in European apartments and cafés (colorfully evoked by Trotsky in "Lenin and the Old Iskra"),31 with trips between London and Stuttgart, Paris and Geneva, a life almost entirely devoid of any ongoing contact with real Russian workers, such as he had experienced in the 1890s. He was focused intensely on three related activities: collaborating with his co-editors, all intelligent'y, on the publication and dissemination of their underground paper; corresponding with secret "agents" in Russia (Lenin seemed to love the Russian word agent), most of them (like his brother Dmitrii) also intelligenty who referred to workers with the third person pronoun (on/); 3 2 and polemicizing with intelligenty from rival publications ( R a b o c h e e delo, Svoboda, etc.). In 1902 his contact with workers was largely limited to such activities as visiting working-class meetings in one of London's socialist churches, where his fear that workers could be corrupted by the allures of trade-unionism was reinforced. "Among the English proletariat there are many revolutionary and socialist elements," he once told Trotsky as they left the church, "but it is all so intertwined with conservatism, religion, and prejudices that it cannot reach the surface and become the property of all." 3 3 Lenin would remain quite remote from direct contact with the mass of Russian workers for much of his life in exile. Here we might pause to take note of such facts as the near absence of workers at the R S D R P ' s fateful Second Party Congress (1903), 3 4 and Lenin's seeming indifference to the activities of St. Petersburg's worker-dominated Rabochaia Organizatsiia in 1901-02. 3 5 Little wonder, then, that like most of the SDs who lived abroad, Lenin was caught completely by surprise by the successes of the Gapon movement in 1904 and the outbreak of Revolution in 1905. Little wonder too that in 1902 his mind had lots of room for anxious play about the Russian workers' future path. Let us turn now to the actual text of W7"BD. 3 6 The traditional view in the liter-

Worry about Workers • 217 ature, one that I largely accept, is that the pamphlet expressed Lenin's f u n d a mental lack of confidence in the labor m o v e m e n t ' s ability to evolve spontaneously into a mass movement that adhered to the political program, the "consciousness," that he wished it to have. Of course this does not mean he had no confidence in his cause's ultimate victory—on that score he could be very cocky— but rather that he doubted the victory could be achieved simply by coaxing the pre-conscious labor m o v e m e n t along its " n a t u r a l " path. Lenin did indeed believe in his own revolutionary abilities and in those of people like him, people whose knowledge and will were n e e d e d in order to alter the labor movement's natural course, which he saw as a clear and present danger. This attitude was hardly hete r o d o x among Russian Marxists, let alone unique to Lenin, though I d o read WTBD as demonstrating that he had become its most tenacious representative. Nor would I argue that this was always his view. Taking into account the editorial in Iskra, it would seem that he reached these conclusions shortly before he turned 30. 37 And he held them for reasons that by now should not strike us as terribly surprising. To be sure, in underlining Lenin's pessimism about workers, I do not m e a n to ignore the passages in WTBD that indicate his belief that some workers could become "conscious," by which he basically meant that they could develop a political world view and consequent strategy that were similar to his. Nevertheless, he feared that most of them would not, and saw as the only guarantee against that danger the creation of a vanguard party, consisting of people who already were conscious (otherwise, why let them in?) and could preserve a correct outlook whatever the volatile twists and turns of the broader, more labile, mass movement. That movement, though it could be very militant and determined, had a built-in tendency to yield to the temptation to accommodate to "trade-unionist" approaches that were ultimately compatible with liberal politics. H e n c e those social-democrats who failed to support the creation of a vanguard party were encouraging workers to wallow in the mud of trade-unionism and liberalism. Since he clearly perceived this danger as grave, it of course makes little sense to speak of Lenin's confidence in the working class. But at the same time, if those intelligenty who understood the need for a vanguard organization could teach a significant number of advanced workers to follow their lead, to adopt their consciousness, a favorable o u t c o m e was still within reach, in which case it makes equally little sense to speak of Lenin's pessimism. His pessimism applied only to the proposition that the " m a s s " of workers, the "crowd" (tolpa) as he called them, could find the right trajectory on their own. This view was not inconsistent with the inner logic of Marxism, according to which the mass of workers would be entering a downward spiral as capitalism took a greater and greater toll on their humanity, turning them into mere appendages to their machines or, worse still, into defenseless, unemployed armies of reserve labor. In a sense, when Lenin wrote about alternative paths, he was thinking less of the choices open to Russia's workers than of the choices open to intelligenty. It is

218 • Reginald

E. Zelnik

t h e r e f o r e m i s l e a d i n g (a p o i n t that is o f t e n lost) to describe him as calling f o r a vang u a r d p a r t y consisting of the intelligentsia. W h a t he was calling for was a f r a c t i o n of t h e intelligentsia, a l e a d e r s h i p g r o u p of politically e d u c a t e d p e o p l e w h o s h a r e d his views. U p to a point, their social a n d e t h n i c origins were of little c o n s e q u e n c e t o him. Since t h e 1860s, as we know, intelligenty

h a d c o m e f r o m all d i f f e r e n t social

b a c k g r o u n d s . W h e t h e r their p a r e n t s w e r e nobles, bourgeois, or even, like t h o s e of Z h e l i a b o v ( w h o m L e n i n m e n t i o n s a d m i r i n g l y [106.171]), p e a s a n t serfs, o r w h e t h e r they w e r e Russians, Jews. Poles, Finns, or G e o r g i a n s , they became

intelligent)).

c o u r s e w o r k e r s would be m o r e t h a n w e l c o m e into this special fold; intelligenty

Of had

b e e n w e l c o m i n g t h e m as u n i q u e individuals with the capacity to attain consciousness since t h e first " a d v a n c e d " w o r k e r s m e t with t h e m in the 1870s. But in e n t e r ing t h a t magic circle, t h e w o r k e r s w o u l d become

" w o r k e r intelligenty"

L e n i n uses several times), a special s u b - g r o u p , as already suggested, of nye intelligenty,

(a t e r m raznochin-

b u t with t h e " w o r k e r " part serving as a special m a r k e r of t h e i r con-

t i n u e d link, w h e t h e r real or i m a g i n e d , to t h e w o r k e r masses. It is n o t e w o r t h y t h a t in WTBD,

t h e m o s t shining e x a m p l e s of such ( e x ) w o r -

king-class leaders, P r o u d h o n , Weitling, A u g u s t B e b e l , Ignaz A u e r [39n, 133, 171], w e r e t a k e n f r o m t h e past or c u r r e n t h i s t o r y of c o u n t r i e s o t h e r t h a n R u s s i a . 3 8 All w e r e c r a f t s m e n of high intellectual f o r m a t i o n , m e n w h o had rarely if e v e r t r e a d on a f a c t o r y floor a n d w h o s e p r o d u c t i v e lives w e r e spent a m o n g political intellectuals, n o t at physical labor. To be sure, L e n i n was h o p i n g to find " R u s s i a n B e b e l s " [171]. and we k n o w t h a t he s u c c e e d e d , in the p e r s o n s of such skilled a n d l i t e r a t e w o r k e r s as B a b u s h k i n , K a n a t c h i k o v , a n d M a t v e i Fisher ( t h o u g h n o living R u s s i a n w o r k e r is m e n t i o n e d in WTBD).

In t h e a b s e n c e of a s t r o n g E u r o p e a n -

t y p e a r t i s a n a l or c o r p o r a t e e s t a t e t r a d i t i o n in Russia, 3 9 L e n i n ' s B e b e l s w e r e likely t o c o m e f r o m real factories, n o t small a r t i s a n a l w o r k s h o p s . But t h e s e m e n still e n t e r e d t h e p a r t y l e a d e r s h i p as individuals, p e r f o r m e d m a n y of t h e i r political f u n c t i o n s o u t s i d e of t h e factory, a n d e v e n t h e n almost

never rose to l e a d i n g posi-

t i o n s in t h e party, which was always a n d e v e r d o m i n a t e d by " b o u r g e o i s " genty

intelli-

with e x c e l l e n t e d u c a t i o n s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , L e n i n obviously did b e l i e v e t h a t

s o m e w o r k e r s c o u l d , albeit with difficulty, a t t a i n full political c o n s c i o u s n e s s . T h e o n e s t h a t did w e r e t r u e h e r o e s , R u s s i a n Bebels, but w i t h o u t t h e real B e b e l ' s stat u s as a high p a r t y l e a d e r a n d t h e o r e t i c i a n . Such w o r k e r s w e r e so r a r e , a c c o r d i n g t o L e n i n , t h a t it w a s i m p o r t a n t t h a t t h e i r t a l e n t s n o t be s q u a n d e r e d f o r e l e v e n h o u r s a day on t h e f a c t o r y floor! [133] H o w e v e r central to L e n i n ' s project w e r e these Russian Bebels, he was u n a b a s h ed in e x p r e s s i n g his c o n v i c t i o n t h a t in t h e i r p r e s e n t c o n d i t i o n m o s t R u s s i a n w o r k ers, t h o u g h m i l i t a n t a n d c o m b a t i v e , w e r e u n a b l e to g r a s p t h e historical signific a n c e of t h e i r o w n militancy. T h e r e w a s a s e r i o u s d a n g e r t h a t they w o u l d t a k e t h e w r o n g p a t h , m o s t likely a n o n - r e v o l u t i o n a r y one. 4 0 This o u t c o m e c o u l d b e a v e r t ed only t h r o u g h a s u c c e s s f u l struggle against t h e false p r o p h e t s a m o n g t h e (selfp r o c l a i m e d ) M a r x i s t intelligentsia, w a g e d by t h e intelligentsia's t r u e w i n g — h i m s e l f , his c o - e d i t o r s , a n d Iskra's

Marxist

f r i e n d s in Russia. If " w e " c o u l d c o m e t o

Worry about Workers -219 d o m i n a t e the movement, he postulated, the broad masses would follow. Here an examination of WTBD's m e t a p h o r s can be quite revealing. Viewed in spatial terms, most of the d e b a t e in WTBD can be exemplified by the image of the tail (khvost, khvostizm)-, it is about positioning oneself and one's comrades not at the rear but at the front. Hence Rabochee delo is wrong to follow the tail of the workers, whereas Iskra is right to be ahead of them. But if Lenin usually counterposes the rear- to the vanguard, at times his spatial metaphors are based on height [52], with conscious social democrats described as a "spirit" ( d u k h ) "hovering above [vitaiushchii nad] the spontaneous m o v e m e n t " in order to "raise" (podnimat Lenin's emphasis) that movement to a higher level. O r elsewhere [131]:" [I]t is not at all our task to lower ourselves [opuskat'sia, Lenin's emphasis] to the level of the 'working masses.'" If Rabochee delo is lagging too far behind the workers, now the m e t a p h o r gets mixed, switching from distance measured on the ground to altitude. In either case, "we" always occupy a special position vis-à-vis the workers, whether ahead of or above them. If " w e " are to succeed, however, there must be more of us! So Lenin asks those intelligent)' (at times he says studenty) w h o m he hopes to persuade, and the small if growing n u m b e r of (relatively) well educated, well read workers who will listen, to join with him as a group of full-time, fully dedicated revolutionary activists, much in the spirit of Narodnaia volia, but without the terrorism. These learned and devoted revolutionaries would clearly and almost tautologically be intelligenty, of sorts, though of course they would not comprise the intelligentsia. (That there is of course no the in the Russian language may well be a source of the confusion in some discussion of this issue). WTBD is literally studded with statements that express the author's worry that workers may easily be seduced by false p r o p h e t s and his belief in the necessity for outside (i.e., non-worker) intervention if that outcome is to be averted. The following is but three samples of his critical view of the Russian masses, workers included, though often accompanied, nonetheless, by extraordinary claims as to what these same debased people would some day, some way, accomplish. First, he alludes derisively to the Russian masses' "slave" or "serf" mentality. In Russia 99.9 percent of the population is "corrupted ... by political subservience [or "servility," kholopstvo] and completely lack the conception of party h o n o r and party ties" [21n]. Yet this same " c o r r u p t e d " population now faced a task that was "the most revolutionary of all the immediate tasks confronting the proletariat of any country," the destruction of the most powerful bulwark of E u r o p e a n and Asiatic reaction [28], This very challenge, Lenin claimed, now ignoring their corruption, m a d e Russian workers "the vanguard of the international revolutionary proletariat." So the servile workers of Russia were somehow to stand things on their head and become the international vanguard! Of course something special would have to be added to this paradoxical formula to bring it about. Second, not only were the Russian masses servile, if left unattended they were so open to the temptations of bourgeois-liberal politics that it was urgent for socialist intelligenty to "reveal" (raskryvat') to them that their interests were

220 • Reginald E. Zelnik opposed to those of the bourgeoisie. A b s e n t this "revealing," liberals and pseudoMarxist demagogues would be able to attract workers by appealing to their "base instincts." Lenin frequently uses terms like raskryvat' and oblichenie (exposure), as when he stresses the need for "oblichenie" to be carried out by "conscious" socialists [69] as part of their educational work. Since the worker masses were unable to respond to tsarism in a revolutionary way, were unable to distinguish friend f r o m foe, they will " n e v e r " conduct the necessary political struggle until we educate (vospitat') leaders both f r o m among the worker intelligentsia and from the "intelligent)!" (iz intelligentnykh rabochikh i iz intelligentov) [sect. Vb]. Note that the unmodified use here of "intelligenty" seems to refer to what would elsewhere be called bourgeois intelligentsia, now identified as distinct from workerintellectuals, though at another point Lenin does advance the idea that some time in the f u t u r e distinctions between workers and intelligenty will, be "completely e f f a c e d " [112]. Third, although Lenin was p r e p a r e d to recognize and welcome signs of growing worker militancy, he refused to greet even that development as evidence of the dawning of a proper consciousness. True [sect. Ila], he did see a "rudimentary" (zachatochnaia) consciousness in the strikes of 1896, or, as he put it somewhat confusedly, their "spontaneous e l e m e n t " actually represented consciousness, but only in a "rudimentary form," as "flashes" (probleski). But he cannot quite get himself to define that rudimentary form lest it weaken his broader case for intelligentsia mentoring. Thus, in one of WTBD's most famous passages, one that would be clear in its import even if Lenin had not taken pains to underscore the italicized words, ne moglo byt'\ "[T\here could not have been" socialist consciousness among the workers "had it not been brought to them from without" [30]. To put it differently, Lenin does not hesitate to reveal his fear that there were indeed two possible futures for the workers and their movement: "either bourgeois or socialist ideology" [39]. This was a way of saying that bourgeois ideology was a real historical alternative in Russia, one that might indeed succeed if the right people failed to do all they could to push and pull the "masses." H e says as much a few lines later [40]: "The spontaneous development of the working class movement leads to its subordination to bourgeois ideology." Elsewhere [174-5] he writes of the danger that the "crowd might ( m o z h e t ) crush and push back (smiat' i otteret') the regular, conscious a r m y " (he really means the officer corps) in the absence of strong organization. A n d finally: " [ 0 ] u r task ... is the struggle with spontaneity, in order to divert [or "lead away," sovlech'] the working-class movement from the spontaneous striving of trade-unionism to come under the wing of the bourgeoisie." Certainly these words are sufficient to convey Lenin's d e e p conviction that there was no easy, natural confluence between the spontaneity of workers and the consciousness of people like himself. Lenin's clear warning against spontaneity is accompanied by an interesting footnote [39], f r a m e d almost as an a f t e r t h o u g h t , and perhaps conceived a f t e r s o m e o n e pointed out to him that the central argument in the main text could r u b

Worry about Workers • 221 p e o p l e the wrong way. H e r e Lenin takes a step or two back from his leitmotiv by s u d d e n l y assuring the reader that "of course" his words do not mean that worke r s have no part in creating socialist ideology. But his elaboration of this t h e m e simply gets him into deeper trouble, and supports my point about his assumption, not always articulated, that conscious workers would be limited to a small circle of w o r k e r intelligenty: Workers participate in creating social-democratic ideology " n o t in the capacity of workers but in the capacity of theoreticians (teoretiki) of socialism, as P r o u d h o n s and Weitlings," that is, only as men who have been able to " m a s t e r [and advance] the knowledge (znanie) of their age." Again, in the same spirit as his call for "Russian Bebels," his examples are chosen not f r o m production-line factory workers but f r o m already well educated E u r o p e a n artisanintellectuals, men who have entered the ranks of their national intelligentsias and assumed the primary identities of political intellectuals. So once again Lenin's a b r u p t concession that workers can evolve into conscious revolutionaries turns out to have a limited scope, simply a way of affirming that the thin ranks of the socialist intelligentsia were not closed to select(ed) individuals of working-class background. Having shared his worries about the worker masses, Lenin at least had the courage to pose the question, why? Why does the spontaneous workers' movem e n t , "the movement along the line of least resistance, lead to the domination [gospodstvo] of bourgeois ideology?" [41] His answer: "For the simple reason that bourgeois ideology is far older in origin than socialist ideology, ... more fully developed," and "has at its disposal ... more means of dissemination." This is followed by a n o t h e r qualifying f o o t n o t e [41 n]. All of a sudden the same s p o n t a n e o u s m o v e m e n t that, without external intervention, has bourgeois ideology as its potential end point, now turns out to have socialism as its end point, "if only (esli tol'ko) it [i.e., socialist theory] subordinates spontaneity to itself." All I can m a k e of this is the near tautology that a s p o n t a n e o u s movement of the workers will become bourgeois unless it does not, which is only possible if conscious socialists work rigorously to guard it f r o m that outcome. Or, as Lenin puts it later in the same note: "The working class is spontaneously drawn to [or "attracted by," vlechetsia] socialism, but the much more widely disseminated ... bourgeois ideology no less spontaneously thrusts itself upon the workers even m o r e " (vsego bolee). P e r h a p s it will suffice to call this a "tension" in Lenin's thinking. *

*

*

In D e c e m b e r 1910 Lenin wrote a belated obituary for his most cherished workerintelligent, Ivan Babushkin, who had perished at the hands of a tsarist punitive expedition in the wake of the 1905 Revolution. 4 1 Acutely aware by then of r e p e a t ed "liberal" accusations that the R S D R P had been mainly an "intelligentsia party" (partiia intelligentskaia, in Lenin's words), isolated f r o m workers, Lenin was quick to r e f u t e the accuracy of that claim by invoking Babushkin's exemplary life. The biography of this fallen "Iskrovite w o r k e r " (rabochii-iskrovets), he

2 2 2 • Reginald

E.

Zelrtik

asserted, completely gave the lie to such an outrageous slur. Babushkin was an "advanced w o r k e r " (rabochit-peredovik) who devoted his life to the emancipation of his class and the creation of a workers' party. Without the tireless, heroic work of such rabochie-peredoviki among the masses, Lenin proclaimed, the R S D R P could not have survived ten months, let alone ten years. Workers like Babushkin did not waste their energy on useless acts of individual terror, but worked "doggedly, steadfastly ( u p o r n o , neuklonno) among the proletarian masses, helping to develop their consciousness, their organization, their revolutionary self-activity. ...Everything that was won f r o m the tsarist autocracy [in 1905] was won exclusively by the struggle of the masses, led by people such as B a b u s h k i n " (Lenin's emphasis). Although it is fair to say that in principle the Bolshevik wing of the R S D R P was still run on the basis of "democratic centralism" at the time, that is, as a centralized, selective, disciplined, top-down organization, Lenin was justified (and would be m o r e so in the years ahead) in suggesting that the party had become more of a mass workers' party than it had been in earlier years. 42 By this time, his fears about the spontaneous urges of Russia's workers had no doubt dissipated, at least to a degree. But the language he chose to deploy in his praise for Babushkin is an important m a r k e r of the extent to which Lenin could now recognize that in his earlier thinking, the central role of bearer and disseminator of "consciousness" among the workers themselves had belonged not to the proletariat as such, but to a much smaller group of elite workers, an elect or chosen few. In many respects, including their own tense relations with the intelligentsia's nonworker majority, these Russian Bebels, whether named Babushkin, Shapovalov, or Kanatchikov, still resembled the " d e v e l o p e d " workers of the 1870s.43 E v e n when highly motivated and activated, the workers as a whole were still not fully reliable in Lenin's eyes. And if it was no longer "intelligentsia" as such, with its connotation of burzhuaznost', who had to lead them, it was now, more explicitly than in 1902, an important contingent of worker intelligenty. "Without such people," Lenin averred, returning to his 1902 evocation of slavery, "the Russian narod would have forever remained a nation of slaves" (narod rabov, narod kholopov). But with such leaders, the Babushkins, the Russian people will win their "complete emancipation f r o m all exploitation." By placing his confidence in Russian Bebels, Lenin seemed to have squared the circle of one of Marx's greatest dilemmas—how to imagine a movement for the emancipation of humanity led by those who were the most dehumanized.

Notes 1 Eric Naiman, Sex in Public: The Incarnation

of Early Soviet Ideology

(Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1997). chap. 4. 2 In citing the Manifesto, Communist

Manifesto,

I have used both a readily available English edition,

The

with an introduction by Martin Malia ( N e w York: Signet Classics,

Notes

• 223

1998), and the German edition published as Das Kommunistische Manifest, 2d ed. (Vienna, 1921). My translations are a slight modification of the authorized Signet version. The pages cited are (English) 58-59,62-64, and (German) 20,22. 3 The Russian singular noun intelligent is italicized in my essay to avoid confusion with the English adjective with the same spelling. 4 Andrzej Walicki, The Controversy over Capitalism: Studies in the Social Philosophy of the Russian Populists (Oxford: Clarendon, 1969). An early example of Populist writing in this vein is V. Bervi-Flerovskii, Polozhenie rabochego klassa v Rossii. See also N.K. Mikhailovskii, Sochineniia, 4"> ed. (St. Petersburg, 1906), 1: 686-722. 5 V. Levitskii, Viktor Obnorskii: Osnovatel' "Severnogo Soiuza Russkikh Rabochikh" (Moscow: Izd. Vsesoiuznogo obshchestva politkatorzhan i ss.-polentsev, 1929); L. Deich, "Russkie rabochie revoliutsionery. V. Obnorskii," Rabochii mir 10-12 (1919). Bachin defied his Populist mentors by deploring the backwardness of peasants and denouncing his background ("I'll never go back to the village, not for anything. ...The peasants are sheep."); quoted in G.V. Plekhanov, Russkii rabochii v revoliutsionnom dvizhenii (po lichnym vospominaniiam) (Moscow: Politizdat, 1940), 19; see also G. Golosov, "K biografii odnogo iz osnovatelei 'Severo-Russkogo Rabochego Soiuza' (I.A. Bachin i ego drama)," Katorga i ssylka, no. 6/13 (1924). 6 See Reginald E. Zelnik, "On the Eve: An Inquiry into the Life Histories and SelfAwareness of Some Worker-Revolutionaries," in Lewis H. Siegelbaum and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds., Making Workers Soviet (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 56-61; idem, "Workers and Intelligentsia in the 1870s: The Politics of Sociability," in idem, ed., Workers and Intelligentsia in Late Imperial Russia, International and Area Studies, University of California Research, ser. no. 1 (Berkeley, 1999), esp. 42-45. 7 This theme is a leitmotiv of Jacques Rancière, La Nuit des prolétaires: Archives du rêve ouvrier (Paris: Fayard, 1981). 8 See Nikolai Morozov, Povesti moei zhizni: Memuary, 2 vols. (Moscow: Akademia nauk SSSR, 1961), 1:221-23. For more on Populist interactions with factory workers see Zelnik, "Workers and Intelligentsia"; Pamela Sears McKinsey,"The Kazan Square Demonstration and the Conflict Between Russian Workers and Intelligenty" Slavic Review 44 (1985): 83-103. For further evidence of tensions between workers and the intelligentsia leaders of Zemlia i Volia, see Stanovlenie revoliutsionnykh traditsii piterskogo proletariata. Poreformennyi period, 1861-1883 gg. (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1987), 262-63. 9 Plekhanov, Russkii rabochii, 11-12,18, 59. My page citations are from the reprint edition cited in note 5. The original appeared in the Geneva émigré journal Sotsial-Demokrat, nos. 3 and 4 (1890-92); see also Plekhanov, Sochineniia, 25 vols. (Moscow, 1923), vol. 3. 10 For a statement of the Populist preference for what they held to be the less proletarianized, purer textile workers and their suspicion of allegedly more urbanized, spoiled metalworkers, see Petr Kropotkin, Memoirs of a Revolutionist, ed. James A. Rogers (Garden City: Doubleday, 1962), 218,325. 11 In 1882 Plekhanov had overseen the translation of the Manifesto into Russian (Samuel H. Baron, Plekhanov: The Father of Russian Marxism [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963], 67); he was apparently unhappy with the 1869 translation by Mikhail Bakunin and Sergei Nechaev. 12 Alfred J. Rieber, "The Sedimentary Society," in Edith W. Clowes, et al., eds., Between Tsar and People: Educated Society and the Quest for Public Identity in Late Imperial Russia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991). 13 For a more detailed critical analysis of Plekhanov's complicated scheme, see Zelnik, " O n the Eve," 29-34. 14 Norman M. Naimark, Terrorists and Social Democrats: The Russian Revolutionary Movement Under Alexander III (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), esp. chap. 3;

2 2 4 • Reginald

E.

Zelnik

see also D e r e k O f f o r d , The Russian Revolutionary Movement in the 1880s ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1986). A n i n d i s p e n s a b l e s o u r c e is Ot gruppy Blagoeva k "Soiuzu Bor'by" (¡886-1894 gg.) ( R o s t o v - o n - D o n : G o s i z d a t , 1921). Essential for t h e period f r o m the early 1890s t o circa 1903 a r e : D i e t r i c h G e y e r , Lenin in der russischen Sozialdemokratie: Die Arbeiterbewegung im Zarenreich als Organizatsionsproblem der revolutionären Intelligentz, 1890-1903 ( C o l o g n e : B o e l a n , 1962); Allan K. W i l d m a n , The Making of a Workers' Revolution: Russian Social Democracy, 1891-1903 (Chicago: U n i versity of C h i c a g o Press, 1967); a n d . for t h e intellectual history seen f r o m a psycho-biog r a p h i c a l perspective, L e o p o l d H. H a i m s o n , The Russian Marxists and the Origins of Bolshevism ( C a m b r i d g e : H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1955). 15 O n t h e impact of t h e f a m i n e on the a s s u m p t i o n s of intelligentsia y o u t h , see W i l d m a n , Making of a Workers' Revolution, esp. 26. O n M o i s e e n k o , see Z e l n i k , " O n t h e Eve," 43-46. 16 O n t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n of intelligenty to the strikes, see W i l d m a n , Making of a Workers' Revolution, esp. 27. For a contrasting view see R i c h a r d Pipes, Social Democracy and the St. Petersburg Labor Movement, 1885-1897 ( C a m b r i d g e : H a r v a r d University Press, 1963), chap. 6. For an incisive analysis of the strikes themselves, see G e r a l d D. Surh, 1905 in St. Petersburg: Labor, Society, and Revolution ( S t a n f o r d : S t a n f o r d University Press, 1989), 53-65. 17 A n i n d i s p e n s a b l e s t u d y r e m a i n s t h e long i n t r o d u c t i o n to J o n a t h a n F r a n k e l , ed., Vladimir Akimov on the Dilemmas of Russian Marxism, 1895-1903 ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e University Press, 1969); t h e b o o k includes t r a n s l a t i o n s of i m p o r t a n t s t a t e m e n t s by A k i m o v , o n e of L e n i n ' s principal " E c o n o m i s t " a d v e r s a r i e s . 18 Stachki is r e p r i n t e d in L.M. Ivanov, ed., Rabochee dvizhenie v Rossii v XIX veke: Sbornik dokumentov i materialov, vol. 4, pt. 1: 1895-1897 ( M o s c o w : Sotsekgiz, 1961), 72-89. T h e b r o c h u r e d e s c r i b e d five r e c e n t strikes, all of t h e m d e e m e d " f a i l u r e s " (89) in part d u e t o w o r k e r s ' violence a n d lack of s e l f - r e s t r a i n t . 19 Ibid., 75, 77 (pogromy). In o n e f o o t n o t e (75n) the a u t h o r s r e f e r to G e r h a r t H a u p t m a n n ' s play Die Weber (Tkachi, which had recently b e e n translated into Russian by A n n a Elizarova) as depicting a primitive bunt carried out by w o r k e r s w h o have not yet attained a sufficient level of u n d e r s t a n d i n g of " t h e c o n d i t i o n s of life and labor"; see Zelnik, " Weber into Tkachi: O n a Russian R e a d i n g of G e r h a r t H a u p t m a n n ' s Play The Weavers," in L a u r a Engelstein and S t e p h a n i e Sadler, eds., Self and Story in Russian History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000). A t a r o u n d the s a m e time as the a p p e a r a n c e of Stachki, leaflets of t h e P e t e r s b u r g g r o u p of stariki, closely associated with Lenin, w e r e also a d v o c a t i n g disciplined strikes and w a r n i n g of the h a r m f u l n e s s of violent disorders; W i l d m a n , Making of a Workers' Revolution, 59-60. 20 Stachki, 79. O n e of t h e five i n c i d e n t s the a u t h o r s discussed was the 1895 strike at a large c o t t o n mill in Teikovo, n e a r I v a n o v o - V o z n e s e n s k (81-82). T h i s strike is e x p l o r e d in rich detail in D a v e Pretty, " N e i t h e r P e a s a n t n o r P r o l e t a r i a n : T h e W o r k e r s of t h e I v a n o v o V o z n e s e n s k R e g i o n , 1 8 8 5 - 1 9 0 5 " ( P h . D . diss.. B r o w n University, 1997), c h a p . 3. In c o n t r a s t to t h e a u t h o r s of Stachki, Pretty sees the violence of the T e i k o v o w o r k e r s as having a rational basis. See also D a n i e l R. B r o w e r , " L a b o r Violence in Russia in t h e L a t e N i n e t e e n t h C e n t u r y , " Slavic Review 41 (Fall, 1982), and C h a r t e r s W y n n . Workers, Strikes, and Pogroms: The Donbass-Dnepr Bend in Late Imperial Russia 1870-1905 ( P r i n c e t o n : Princ e t o n University Press, 1992). 21 Vospominaniia Ivana Vasil'evicha Babushkina, 74 ( w r i t t e n 1902, first p u b l i s h e d 1925).

1893-1900

( M o s c o w : G o s p o l i t i z d a t , 1955),

22 O n Rabochaia mysl' see W i l d m a n , Making of a Workers' Revolution, chap. 5.1 borrow the t e r m " w o r k e r - p h i l e , " a r o u g h e q u i v a l e n t to t h e F r e n c h ouvriériste, f r o m W i l d m a n ; w o r k e r phile intelligenty w e r e t h e t y p e s t h a t L e n i n w o u l d later accuse of "tailism."

Notes • 225 23 See Reginald E. Zelnik, ed. and trans.. A Radical Worker in Tsarist Russia: The Autobiography of Semen Ivanovich Kanatchikov (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1986). 24 Babushkin is an cxccllcnt example of a worker who began his radical career in "propaganda" circles, but. admiring his intelligentsia mentors, subsequently adopted the intelligentsia model of social-democratic agitator among the rank-and-file; after his 1896 arrest, while in exile in Ekaterinoslav in 1897-98, even Babushkin found himself in conflict with Marxist intelligenty. Wildman. Making of a Workers' Revolution, 103-07; see also Vospominaniia Babushkina. 25 On this phase and the earlier background of worker-intelligentsia tensions in the 1890s, see Wildman. Making of a Workers' Revolution, chaps. 4-5. 26 On this point, at least, the views of Wildman, Making of a Workers' Revolution, 68-70 and Pipes, Social Democracy, 91-92 are very close. 27 At one time, of the group's seventeen members, not one was a worker. For the occupations of the seventeen intelligenty see Geyer, Lenin in der russischen Sozialdemokratie, 63. 28 [Lenin], "Nasushchnyia zadachi nashego dvizheniia," Iskra 1 (1 December 1900), front page. Here and below, all citations from lskra are from the facsimile edition published by Balgarska Kniga (Sofia, 1970): see also Lenin. Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 5 lh ed., 55 vols. (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izd. Politicheskoi Literatury, 1958), 4: 371-77. 2 9 In English versions of WTBD, the verb podgotovliat'/podgotovit' is often translated as "train."This practice was cogently criticized by Lars Lih at an AAASS panel on WTBD in November 2001. To a great extent the part of this essay in which I specifically address Lenin's WTBD was provoked by stimulating ideas set forth by Lih at that panel. Our disagreements are significant, but I am all the more grateful to him for having invited me into that discussion. 30 "Novye druz'ia russkogo proletariata," lskra 1 (1 December 1900), unnumbered pages 3-4, unsigned, but by Martov. In partial contrast to Lenin, however, whose main worry was that workers would follow the siren call of the bourgeoisie. Martov focused on the latest danger, that they were being "diverted" (otvlech', a verb soon to be associated primarily with Lenin) from the path of political struggle by the false promises of Sergei Zubatov, who tempted them to accommodate to tsarist autocracy. Martov was even worried that conscious workers might opt for Zubatov (an oxymoron, since in the language of the movement such a choice would have revealed their lack of consciousness, consciousness itself being essentially performative). 31 In Leon Trotsky. Lenin (New York: Capricorn, 1962; reprint, New York: Minton Balch, 1925), 3-63. Trotsky describes a period only slightly later than the time when Lenin was composing WTBD. 32 lskra's correspondence with these agenty takes up some 1,500 pages: Perepiska V.I. Lenina i redaktsii gazety "Iskra" s sotsial-demokraticheskimi organizatsiiami v Rossii, 1900-1903 gg., M.S. Volin, et al., eds., 3 vols. (Moscow: Mysl', 1969-70). 33 Trotsky, Lenin, 31. 34 There was only one worker, Samuel Katz of the Jewish Bund, at the RSDRP's First Congress, in Minsk in 1898; apparently upset that some delegates were reluctant to include the word Rabochaia in the Party's title, Katz expressed the hope that at the next congress he would no longer be the only worker. See Henry J.Tobias, The Jewish Bund in Russia, From Its Origins to 1905 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), 77,76-77n; Geyer, Lenin in der russischen Sozialdemokratie, 107, 107n. 35 See Gerald D. Surh, "The Petersburg Workers' Organization and the Politics of 'Economism.' 1900-1903," in Zelnik, Workers and Intelligentsia. Surh calls the Workers' Organization (WO) "the most important Social Democratic association of workers and intelligenty in the capital before 1905" (116); while Lenin was abroad composing WTBD, the

226 • Reginald

36

37 38

39 40 41

42

43

E.

Zelnik

W O was helping to organize the spectacular 1901 action of metalworkers that came to be known as the "Obukhov Defense." All subsequent page and section references to WTBD. in square brackets, are from Chto delat'? Nabolevshie voprosy nashego dvizheniia. in Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 5 ,h ed., 55 vols. (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1958), vol. 6. I use the Russian original because small nuances of language are essential to this kind of analysis; but not wishing to add to the proliferation of translations, I have tried to keep my own reasonably close to an accessible English version: What is to be Done?, trans. Joe Fineberg and George Hanna, with revisions to trans. Robert Service (London: Penguin Books, 1988). He would also change these views considerably in later years, specifically in response to 1905. Anna Krylova is preparing an important investigation of this change. Lenin had used the same examples in 1899: "Every viable working-class movement has brought to the fore such working-class leaders, its own Proudhons, Vaillants, Weitlings, and Bebels. ...This 'working-class intelligentsia' already exists in Russia"; Lenin, Collected Works, 4'h ed., vol.4 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964), 280-81. See Rieber, "The Sedimentary Society," 347. But note that Lenin also foresaw the possibility that workers would take a revolutionary yet no less incorrect path [96n]. "Ivan Vasil'evich Babushkin (Nekrolog)"', in Vospominaniia Babushkina, 9-12 (first published in Rabochaia Gazeta 2 [18/31 Dec. 1910]); all quotes are from pages 11-12. Babushkin was shot in 1906 after his arrest for transporting arms. See Henry Reichman, "On Kanatchikov's Bolshevism: Workers and Intelligentsia in Lenin's What is to be done?," in Russian History/Histoire Russe 23 (1996): 27-28. For data on worker membership in the party, see David Lane, The Roots of Russian Communism: A Social and Historical Study of the Roots of Social Democracy, ¡898-1907 (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1968). See also Leopold Haimson, "The Problem of Social Stability in Urban Russia. 1905-1917," Slavic Review 23, no. 4 (1964): 619-642; 24, no. 1 (1965): 1-22. On the point that workers recruited by intelligenty in the 1870s were "elect" or "chosen" (izbrannye), see Zelnik, "Workers and Intelligentsia," esp. 19.

The Political Evolution of Moscow's Kupechestvo in Early Twentieth-Century Russia: Observations and Reflections LEOPOLD H .

HAIMSON

The political evolution of the Moscow kupechestvo in the early twentieth century played a significant role in the politics of pre-revolutionary Russia. This significance lies not only in the dramatic changes that it reflected in this group's political attitudes and behavior, culminating in the emergence of the Moscow Progressisty as a political organization and the central role that it came to play in Russia's prerevolutionary development, but also in the relationship that these dramatic changes bore to other aspects of the politics of pre-revolutionary Russia, including the political role that the landowning nobility assumed during this period. In A l f r e d Rieber's longer-term perspective on the Moscow kupechestvo's evolution f r o m the mid-nineteenth century onward, however, these dramatic changes took place within the framework of several important continuities, which found their most interesting reflection in the political attitudes displayed by those who came to be identified as its "younger generation," as most of them reached adult age at the turn of the century. The first of these continuities was the central role that the Moscow kupechestvo, through this "younger generation," continued to exercise throughout this period in the cultural, social, as well as economic life of Russia's second capital. A m o n g the many possible demonstrations of this role it is only necessary, perhaps, to mention the role played by members of the kupechestvo in the financial support of the Bolshoi Theatre and in the flowering of Moscow's Art Theatre (whose founder Stanislavsky originated from a family of kuptsy), as well as the importance of Nikolai P. Riabushinskii's sponsorship in the development of modern painting and architecture in Russia. A second continuity was the sharpness of the sense of rivalry and antagonism that members of Moscow's kupechestvo consistently displayed toward the landed nobility during these years. The character and sources of this antagonism were dramatically illustrated in a statement by the organizers of the Nizhnyi Novgorod trade fair at the opening of the century, which emphasized the dramatic contrasts between the parasitic role displayed by the nobility in its conspicuous consump-

228 • Leopold H. Haimson tion of Russia's material wealth and the kupechestvo's major contribution to the d e v e l o p m e n t of the country's material resources. It was high time, the statement argued in words that resounded well beyond the Central Industrial Region, that the kupechestvo be recognized as the first estate of the Russian land. Thus, and h e r e is an additional continuity, the antagonism that members of the kupechestvo e n t e r t a i n e d towards the landed nobility was not translated at this time into hostility toward the tsarist regime, notwithstanding the regime's strengthening of the nobility's privileged position especially during the period of counter-reforms in the 1880s and early 1890s. In part, the sense of grievance and antagonism expressed in the Nizhnyi Novgorod statement was a response to the contempt that members of the nobility continued to entertain about the kupechestvo, which they viewed as a social group animated solely by its pursuit of material gains, achieved largely through speculation, rather than the " g e n u i n e " creation of material wealth, and at the expense of other groups in Russian society. From the nobility's perspective, it was the kupechestvo that was parasitic and whose social role was in sharp contrast to the honor, devotion and duty that distinguished the nobility's own service to society a n d the state. This mutual antagonism, shaded with contempt, between Moscow's nobility and its kupechestvo was generally characteristic of the relations between these two social groups throughout the empire in this period. But in the life of Russia's second capital, it was exacerbated by a particular rivalry centering on the competition between these two social groups for control of the city's institutions of selfadministration, most notably Moscow's City D u m a . At the political center of this rivalry was the fact that Moscow's kupechestvo was successful during this period in its challenge for control of Moscow's City D u m a , as Walter H a n c h e t t d e m o n s t r a t e d many years ago in his conclusive analysis of t h e D u m a ' s elections. 1 Indeed, they were so successful that the m e m b e r s of M o s c o w ' s landed nobility effectively withdrew f r o m seeking to play any significant role in the city's institutional life, and in particular, in the functioning of the organs of self-administration. T h e Revolution of 1905, which witnessed for the first time the political emergence of Moscow's kupechestvo's "younger generation," and of its sharp differences on political platform and tactics with the older generation, did not attenuate t h e sharpness of the conflict b e t w e e n A.I. Konovalov, Pavel R Riabushinskii and the self-appointed leadership of this new, more militant generation, and of the equally militant representatives of the landed nobility. When Konovalov and Riabushinskii sought to take part in the proceedings of the zemstvo congress held in Moscow in the spring of 1905, they were r e b u f f e d by the congress leadership on the g r o u n d s that participation in its proceedings was restricted to representatives of the gentry-dominated zemstvo assemblies. In the wake of this rebuff, these spokesmen for the "younger g e n e r a t i o n " of Moscow's kupechestvo felt compelled, a f t e r the ukaz in the s u m m e r of 1905 calling for the elections to the so-

Political Evolution of Moscow's Kupechestvo • 229 called Bulygin D u m a , to form a party of their own, to formulate a new electoral p l a t f o r m and to participate in the elections This platform differed sharply f r o m the one espoused by the older kupechestvo g e n e r a t i o n . It called for the adoption of a new electoral system, resting on the principles of universal, equal and secret s u f f r a g e — t h r e e of the "four tails" called for in N o v e m b e r 1904 by the Union of Liberation. Notably, however, it did not include the fourth tail d e m a n d e d by the Union of Liberation, calling for direct suffrage. In this regard, the representatives of the younger, no less than the older, generation of the Moscow kupechestvo were intent on ensuring that their own economic interest be represented and d e f e n d e d in the country's new national representative institution. It should be noted nonetheless that the approach adopted by the molodye Muscovites presented a r e m a r k a b l e contrast to the one adopted by the m e m b e r s of the St. Petersburg Society of M a n u f a c t u r e r s and Mill Owners, who also felt compelled to create a party to participate in the elections. In comparison with the wide-ranging and militant political posture of Moscow's "younger generation," the platform adopted by the St. Petersburg manufacturers was focused exclusively on self-advocacy, which could only appeal to those members of the electorate who also completely identified their interests with those in the St. Petersburg Society. In any event, none of the newly created parties, including the party created by the representatives of the "younger g e n e r a t i o n " of Moscow's kupechestvo, survived the subsequent political developments of the Revolution of 1905, culminating in the issuance of the October Manifesto. Subsequently, in the elections to the First and Second State Dumas, Konovalov, Riabushinskii, and their followers threw their support to the leadership of the Mirnoobnovlentsy (the Party of Peaceful Renewal), and they took part under the flag of this party, after Stolypin's coup d'état of June 1907, in the Third D u m a . The fate of the Mirnoobnovlentsy, which played a leading role in the organization of the Union of 17 October and in its political leadership during the early sessions of the Third D u m a until it was eclipsed by m o r e conservative political currents, was marked by a decisive turn in the political evolution of Konovalov and Riabushinskii themselves, as well as of their followers among the Moscow kupechestvo's "younger generation."This evolution culminated after the elections to the Fourth D u m a in the organization of the Progressisty as an independent political group, and the adoption at its inaugural meeting in O c t o b e r 1912 of a platform of militant opposition to the tsarist regime. This was a decisive turn in the political sympathies of Konovalov, Riabushinskii and their youthful followers. It can be deciphered only in the b r o a d e r context of the political evolution that the Third D u m a itself had undergone under the impact of the new electoral system governing D u m a elections adopted after Stolypin's coup d'état of June 1907. In the explanations offered by the spokesmen of the Progressisty themselves for their break with the Union of 17 October, considerable emphasis was laid on the rejection by the majority of the Third D u m a ,

230 • Leopold H. Haimson including most of the Octobrist deputies, of the demand by the spokesmen for the Old Believers (or more precisely, for the officially recognized variant of their faith) for the right to proselytize their religious beliefs. A n d indeed, this proved to be the catalyst not only in the break between Konovalov, Riabushinskii, and their followers with the Octobrists but, m o r e importantly, for their subsequent adoption of a posture of militant opposition to the tsarist regime itself. W h e n this change is viewed in a b r o a d e r political perspective, however, it is important to emphasize that it occurred within the setting of a national representative institution which, as a result of the electoral system introduced by Stolypin's coup d'état of June 1907, had b e c o m e completely dominated by representatives of the landowning nobility. In essence, the new electoral system placed the State D u m a u n d e r the full control of representatives of this group, as was already the case with respect to the State Council, whose interests on a wide variety of issues ran directly counter to those of the kupechestvo of Moscow and the rest of the Central Industrial Region. A f t e r Stolypin's assassination removed the remaining restraints on their ability to d o m i n a t e Russia's political scene, these representatives of the pomeshchiki capitalized on their now unrestrained control of the State D u m a and the State Council to promote their own economic interests on a variety of issues—including taxation and tariff policy—at the expense of the linked interests of the peasantry and the commercial industrial class. Most importantly, given that the peasants were the chief customers of the textile products m a n u f a c t u r e d by Moscow's kupechestvo (the demand of Russia's urban m a r k e t s being largely satisfied by the finer textile products produced in the Kingdom of Poland), the renewed exploitation of the peasantry through various forms of taxa t i o n — a n d particularly the reduction in the peasants' purchasing power that it involved—contributed to the contraction of the chief market for the products of the manufaktury of the Moscow kupechestvo and of other textile enterprises of the Central Industrial Region. This was the basic factor that pushed the politically m o r e active m e m b e r s of the Moscow kupechestvo into a posture of o p e n political opposition, one that assumed a particularly militant character a m o n g the representatives of its "younger generation." It was in this context, at an organizational meeting on the eve of the opening of the Fourth D u m a which marked the emergence of the Progressisty as an indep e n d e n t political group, that its s p o k e s m e n approved a militant p l a t f o r m designed to compel the tsarist regime to give in to the party's demands. These d e m a n d s now included a democratic r e f o r m of the electoral system governing d u m a elections, as well as the expansion of the power vis-à-vis the state, of the new, m o r e democratic d u m a that the electoral reforms would create. Toward this end, the platform adopted by the Progressisty advocated the use of the d u m a ' s budgetary powers to reject the g o v e r n m e n t ' s requests for new appropriations as a stratagem to force the tsarist regime to give in to their demands, tactics eventually espoused by other liberal opposition groups as well before the First World

Political Evolution

of Moscow's Kupechestvo • 231

War. In pursuing these tactics, the Progressisty eventually came to threaten the o v e r t h r o w of the tsarist regime, if it did not give in to their political demands. While it is dubious to what degree the rank and file of Moscow's kupechestvo s u p p o r t e d this increasing militancy, archival d o c u m e n t s show that even the memb e r s of the Stock Exchange Society experienced a genuine process of liberalization comparable to the political evolution of the "younger generation" of M o s c o w ' s kupechestvo, most notably in the platform that they espoused on labor relations. For example, my reading of archival fond on the St. Petersburg Society of M a n u f a c t u r e r s and Mill Owners 2 indicates that on the eve of the war, as the conflict intensified between the m e m b e r firms of the St. Petersburg Society and their w o r k e r s over the recognition of May D a y as a paid holiday, the m e m b e r firms of the Moscow Stock Exchange Society issued an insistent appeal to the St. P e t e r s b u r g Society to give up its militant opposition to their workers' d e m a n d s over this issue. Their argument was that the origin of the celebration of May Day, r a t h e r than reflecting political demands, dated back to an ancient Russian ritual c o m m e m o r a t i n g the beginning of the agricultural season. There is no better example of the differences in attitudes toward labor policy, as well as in political acumen, that distinguished by this time Moscow's Stock Exchange Society and its m e m b e r firms from the St. Petersburg Society of Manufacturers and Mill Owners. Needless to say, the m e m b e r firms of the St. Petersburg Society were not converted by this argument. By the summer of 1915, moreover, in the context of Russia's increasingly perilous military situation, the m e m b e r s of Moscow's Stock Exchange Society had also begun to distance themselves from the tactics advocated by the Progressisty. Let me conclude these brief remarks by suggesting, however, that the dramatic changes that occurred in the attitudes of the Progressisty and the b r o a d e r process of liberalization, reflected in the evolution of Moscow's "younger generation" toward a militant position in opposition to the tsarist regime are f u r t h e r testimony to the inability of the regime to accommodate the pressure for constructive reform, even f r o m those who were traditionally most loyal to it, and helped create a climate which, in the absence of war, encouraged militant c o n f r o n t a t i o n well beyond that exhibited by Russian labor alone. Indeed, it is here, perhaps, that we can most clearly see the social and political foundations on which Russia's radical efforts at r e f o r m were ultimately structured in 1917.

Notes 1 Walter Sidney Hanchett, "Moscow in the Late N i n e t e e n t h Century: A Study in Municipal Self-Government," (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1964). 2 Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv (St. Petersburg), f. 150, passim.

A Testament of the All-Russian Idea: Foreign Ministry Memoranda to the Imperial, Provisional and Bolshevik Governments ALEXEI

MILLER

In researching Russian attitudes to the "Ukrainian question" in the second half of the nineteenth century, one of my key tasks was to analyze the "internal" bureaucratic discourse. O t h e r than very few private letters, diaries and memoirs, the main sources for studying how the problem was described and understood within the imperial bureaucracy were official documents that were not supposed to become public. During the research I came across a set of interesting papers from a later period. This article analyzes these papers for insight into the evolution of the perception of "Ukrainian and Belorussian questions" within the Russian bureaucracy during the dramatic years of the First World War and October Revolution. The a t t e m p t to analyze this "internal" discourse is important because both in the nineteenth century and during World War I the imperial bureaucracy was unable to agree on questions concerning the Western borderlands ( Z a p a d n y i Krai). Therefore, not only were all decisions perceived as provisional but there was also n o agreement about the very nature of the problem and its challenges. In the nineteenth century, particularly after the emergence of Ukrainian nationalism, the questions of what is "Russianness" and where are the territorial, ethnic and/or cultural borders of the Russian nation or nation-in-the-making become central both for emerging Russian nationalist public opinion and for the imperial bureaucracy. 1 There were two interpretations of Russian ethnic borders. Those who believed that Russian equaled Great Russian (velikorusskii) were a minority. The majority interpreted Russian as a common name for Great Russians (velikorussy), White Russians (belorussy) and Little Russians (malorussy), the latter being the most widespread name for those who are now called Ukrainians. The differences between these "branches of the Russian p e o p l e " were interpreted not as national, but as regional, developed as a result of the regrettable partition of the Russians after the collapse of Kievan Rus'. For this majority the Russian nation had to embrace all the Eastern Slavs, and the "national territory" had to include also the lands of contemporary Ukraine and Belorussia.

234 • Alexei

Miller

A s a m e a n s of legitimizing R u s s i a n claims t o t h e e a s t e r n t e r r i t o r i e s of t h e p a r t i t i o n e d Polish C o m m o n w e a l t h , t h e c o n c e p t of t h e A l l - R u s s i a n n a t i o n g a i n e d a d d i t i o n a l political i m p o r t a n c e at the e n d of t h e e i g h t e e n t h century. F r o m t h a t t i m e o n t h e conflict b e t w e e n A l l - R u s s i a n a n d Polish v e r s i o n s of t h e " i d e a l M o t h e r l a n d , " 2 t h e l a t t e r a l w a y s c l a i m i n g t h e " b o r d e r s of 1772," r e m a i n e d a key issue in R u s s i a n political life a n d t h o u g h t . In t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y the t e r r i t o r y of c o n t e m p o r a r y U k r a i n e b e c a m e an o b j e c t of a t e r m i n o l o g i c a l war. Poles called t h e right b a n k of D n i e p e r kresy

wschodnie

( e a s t e r n b o r d e r l a n d s ) or ziemie

zabrane

( o c c u p i e d lands). In St. P e t e r s b u r g a n d M o s c o w t h e s e t e r r i t o r i e s w e r e called zapadnyi

krai ( s o u t h w e s t e r n lands) or vozvrashchennyie

zemli

iugo-

(restored lands).

Poles called t h e O r t h o d o x a n d U n i a t e ( G r e e k - C a t h o l i c ) p o p u l a t i o n of c o n t e m p o r a r y U k r a i n e rusiny,

while G r e a t R u s s i a n s w e r e called moskali,

stressing t h e

e t h n i c d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e m , a n d s o m e t i m e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y in Galicia, insisting o n t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of rusiny as a b r a n c h of t h e Polish p e o p l e . In R u s s i a t h e t e r m russiny

w a s always used with d o u b l e " s " t o stress t h a t t h e y b e l o n g e d to t h e A l l -

R u s s i a n unity. M o r e c o m m o n was t h e t e r m malorossy

(Little Russians). From the

1840s U k r a i n i a n n a t i o n a l i s t s also j o i n e d this t e r m i n o l o g i c a l battle, i n t r o d u c i n g t h e t e r m s U k r a i n e a n d U k r a i n i a n s in their c o n t e m p o r a r y m e a n i n g . In t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y t h e m e a n i n g of t h e w o r d Russkii

(Russian) differed

f r o m c o n t e m p o r a r y usage. It e m b r a c e d all t h e E a s t e r n Slavs a n d d e s i g n a t e d t h e n a t i o n , which was s u p p o s e d to include Little R u s s i a n s , G r e a t Russians, a n d W h i t e R u s s i a n s , just as t h e G e r m a n n a t i o n w a s s u p p o s e d t o i n c l u d e all G e r m a n s in s o m e c o n c e p t s of G e r m a n unification. S o m e p r o p o n e n t s of t h e A l l - R u s s i a n p r o j e c t insisted on t h e a n a l o g y b e t w e e n " t h e L i t t l e - R u s s i a n v e r n a c u l a r " a n d P r o v e n ç a l , C e l t i c a n d o t h e r v e r n a c u l a r s s u p p r e s s e d by t h e F r e n c h , S p a n i s h a n d E n g l i s h . R u s s i a n n e s s was an e t h n i c c o n c e p t , stressing t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e E a s t e r n Slavic p o p u l a t i o n a n d t h e rest, b u t Little a n d W h i t e R u s s i a n s w e r e i n c l u d e d within this unity. E v e n at t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y in t h e m o s t x e n o p h o b i c v e r s i o n s of R u s s i a n n a t i o n a l i s m , only Little R u s s i a n s a n d W h i t e R u s s i a n s w e r e n e v e r d e s i g n a t e d as inorodtsy

(ethnically alien). 3 O n a p e r s o n a l level t h e y

w e r e n e v e r d i s c r i m i n a t e d against o n e t h n i c g r o u n d s . 4 B u t at t h e s a m e t i m e all claims f o r a collective i d e n t i t y s e p a r a t e f r o m t h e R u s s i a n w e r e r e j e c t e d a n d s u p p r e s s e d as a t t e m p t s t o split t h e R u s s i a n n a t i o n . T h e s i t u a t i o n of o t h e r e t h n i c g r o u p s was exactly t h e o p p o s i t e ; Poles, Jews, etc. w e r e a l w a y s easily r e c o g n i z e d in t h e i r s e p a r a t e n e s s as e t h n i c g r o u p s a n d w e r e d i s c r i m i n a t e d against o n t h e p e r s o n al level. T h u s t h e U k r a i n i a n a n d B e l o r u s s i a n n a t i o n a l m o v e m e n t s w e r e p e r c e i v e d d i f f e r e n t l y f r o m o t h e r n a t i o n a l m o v e m e n t s in t h e R u s s i a n E m p i r e . T h e l a t t e r w e r e c h a l l e n g i n g ( o p e n l y o r p o t e n t i a l l y ) t h e unity of t h e e m p i r e , while t h e f o r m e r t h e unity of t h e n a t i o n as well. In a d d i t i o n , t h e politics of R u s s i f i c a t i o n t o w a r d s o t h e r e t h n i c g r o u p s , p a r t i c u l a r l y Poles, w e r e o f t e n p e r c e i v e d in St. P e t e r s b u r g a n d M o s c o w as a kind of p u n i s h m e n t f o r disloyalty a n d a s u b j e c t f o r b a r g a i n i n g , w h i l e t h e R u s s i f i c a t i o n of L i t t l e a n d W h i t e R u s s i a n s w a s n o t . T h e f r o n t l i n e in this d e b a t e did n o t r u n a l o n g e t h n i c lines. S o m e of t h e G r e a t

A Testament of the All-Russian

Idea • 235

Russians were ready to recognize claims for Ukrainian separateness. But the majority, together with numerous Little-Russian intellectuals, strongly opposed the Ukrainian project, insisting on a combination of All-Russian and LittleRussian identities. There were significant differences in visions of the ideal proportions in this combination, as well as in views of how All-Russian unity should be achieved. Some in both the public and bureaucracy envisaged a "French" scenario, with a potentially radical elimination of any traces of local cultural and linguistic particularities of Little and White Russians. O t h e r s considered the "British" solution of preserving regional identities and cultural particularities under the common roof of an All-Russian identity to be more realistic. These differences resulted also in different approaches to the means of achieving the desired goal. Some laid their hopes exclusively on repressive measures against Ukrainian nationalists and "cleansing the Russian soul of the Western borderlands from alien Polish influences," thinking that it would be enough to uncover the pure Russian nature of these population. Others insisted on some "positive" pressure for assimilation in the " F r e n c h " style, while yet another group believed that some concession and compromise with m o d e r a t e Ukrainian claims was inevitable. The discourse, which considered Little and White Russians to be branches of the Russian nation, and local tongues to be just the dialects (narechie) of the Russian language, remained official and also dominant in public discourse throughout the nineteenth century. A f t e r the Revolution of 1905 and some liberalization of censorship these views were challenged in the press both by Ukrainian activists and by Russian centrist and leftist journalists and politicians. However, among the bureaucracy these views were changing much more slowly. The dramatic shift comes during World War I and the October Revolution, which brings us to the collection of documents mentioned at the beginning of the article. The d o c u m e n t s are part of the Special Political D e p a r t m e n t (SPD) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 5 The Special Political D e p a r t m e n t ( O s o b y i Politicheskii Otdel) was f o r m e d in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1916. The f o r m e r General Consul in Budapest M.G. Priklonskii was appointed Director and accepted his a p p o i n t m e n t by a telegram dated 9 March 1916. 6 However, the process of organizing the D e p a r t m e n t lasted until August, when Nicholas II approved the Minister's report about the D e p a r t m e n t and its tasks. 7 The personnel consisted mainly of experienced diplomats, who had to return to Russia after the outbreak of World War I, including V.G. Zukovskii, f o r m e r consul in Prague; B.V. Miller, former vice-consul in Colombo; N.N. Kratirov, official for special tasks of the minister; specialist in Polish affairs Shishkovskii. 8 The initial n a m e of the d e p a r t m e n t was "Vatican-Slavic" (Vatikansko-slavianskii) and its task was to analyze the political m o v e m e n t s of the Slavs of the H a b s b u r g E m p i r e and the relations with Vatican. By the time the D e p a r t m e n t started full-scale operation its tasks had significantly b r o a d e n e d to include three areas: Vatican, Polish and CarpathoRussian affairs, Czechoslovak affairs (including political influence on Czech and Slovak prisoners of war in Russia), and South Slav and H u n g a r i a n affairs.

236 • Alexei Miller But by t h e end of 1916 t h e d e p a r t m e n t a l activities focused m o r e and more on the problems concerning Ukrainians and to some extent Belorussians. In 1915-1916 the main attention was paid to the problem of East Slavic populations of Austria-Hungary. T h e S P D commissioned several experts to write on the issue and collected many materials that were prepared on personal initiative. Most of the papers—by B.A. Budilovich, son of a well-known Slavist and enemy of Ukrainofiles, A n t o n Budilovich; by D.N. Vergun, publicist, f o r m e r representative of St. Petersburg Telegraph Agency (and, most probably of Russian intelligence) in the Austro-Hungarian Empire; and by A. Sobolevskii, President of Slavic Benevolent Society in St. Petersburg—were devoted exclusively to defining the ethnic border of Russians in Galicia, Bukovina and Ugorskaia Rus' (Transcarpathia in contemporary Ukraine). 9 The common belief of the authors was that one of the main goals of the war was the unification of Russian people where, according to the All-Russian concept, the Eastern Slavic population of these Habsburg provinces belonged. Thus, all were preoccupied with the question of post-war border regulations and possible annexations after the success of the Entente, and the main criteria for f u t u r e a r r a n g e m e n t s in these m e m o r a n d u m s were ethnic and nationalist. The SPD M e m o r a n d u m entitled "Survey of sources and materials for the demarcation of the border of Russian nationality (narodnost') 1 0 in Galicia, Ugorskaia Rus' and B u k o v i n a " clearly formulates the political directive: "The task is to draw the b o r d e r primarily to separate the Russian population and the western neighbors of the Russian tribe ( R u s s k o e plemia) in Austria." 1 1 Needless to say, the authors argued for including all territories where Eastern Slavs were mixed with other ethnic groups into the Russian Empire. Budilovich, for example, insisted that the southwestern border of Ugorskaia Rus' should run along the river Seret, not the Pruth and of course not the Dniestr. 1 2 For the majority of the commissioned experts the Russianness of the Eastern Slavic population of these territories was non-problematic. But some authors did see problems with the identity of these Eastern Slavic populations and addressed the issue of what politics Russia should pursue toward the inhabitants of the eastern borderlands of the Habsburg Empire already during the course of war. The urgency of the matter in late 1915 and early 1916 was determined by the plans for new offensive operations to restore Russian control over Galicia. The Russian experience of the first occupation of Galicia in 1914-1915 had been annoying. In dealing with the local Eastern Slavic population, military and civil authorities, as well as representatives of the O r t h o d o x hierarchy, demonstrated not only lack of any coordination, but even the willingness to undermine the policies of other branches of administration. To a large extent that behavior was caused by the lack of any clear political instructions from the center. In general, authorities tended to treat the local population as Russian, perceiving the Uniate church and Ukrainian identity as something superficial, imposed by Vienna, Vatican, Poles, lacking support among masses of local inhabitants, and easy to eradicate when Eastern Galicia would come under Russian rule. These beliefs led to an

A Testament of the All-Russian

Idea • 237

openly repressive attitude to the Ukrainian language and the Uniate church and provoked the rise of anti-Russian sentiments a m o n g local Ukrainians. The most developed concept for the politics of any new occupation of Galicia by the Russian a r m y was p r e s e n t e d in A.J. Gierowskii's m e m o r a n d u m . 1 3 " U k r a i n i a n separatism leads to weakening and f r a g m e n t a t i o n of Russia and is one of the most serious questions of Russian internal politics. O n e of the main results of the present war should be the termination of Ukrainian irredentism. The successful liquidation of Ukrainian question in Galicia will partly also neutralize the U k r a i n i a n s within Russia, who see Galicia as a sort of Piedmont," wrote Gierowskii in July 1916. 14 Later Gierowskii used the same argument in a special m e m o r a n d u m on the f u t u r e R u s s i a n - R o m a n i a n border, warning against leaving the right bank of the Pruth River in the hands of Romanians, because "Bukovina beyond the Pruth will play the same role in the Mazepist movement 1 5 as the Republic of K r a k o w played after the partitions of Poland." 1 6 Gierowskii's interpretation of the Ukrainian p r o b l e m follows the tradition of the All-Russian discourse, putting the very n a m e " U k r a i n i a n s " into quotation marks. H e also speaks a b o u t the local "Russian vernacular." A t the same time he suggested tactics aimed at avoiding "creating new martyrs to the Ukrainian idea." H e r e Gierowskii again was following the tradition of those officials of the previous century, which advocated the combination of some limited restrictions and what they used to call "positive" measures. These positive measures did not mean any concessions to U k r a i n i a n demands, but r a t h e r the development of Russian schooling and o t h e r institutions that were to "process" Eastern Slavic peasants into Russians. Gierowskii also advised against prohibiting the U k r a i n i a n press, as had been done in 1915. Instead he suggested cutting off its external sources of financial support because he was sure that without Austrian and G e r m a n money U k r a i n i a n newspapers would die a "natural death." H e even suggested allowing publication of U k r a i n i a n papers if the publisher were able to prove that the finances were his own. 1 7 Gierowskii was correct to notice that U k r a i n i a n p r o p a g a n d a had been very much connected to the social, namely agrarian, issue. T h e main point of his memo r a n d u m was that the government should introduce radical agrarian reform in Galicia as soon as possible in order to block the possibility that Ukrainian activists might use social discontent for nationalist aims. In his opinion that was easier to do in Galicia because there was no possible way of gaining the loyalty of the Polish landlords, and t h e r e was also no need of protecting the Jews, whom Gierowskii particularly and deeply hated. 1 8 H e r e again he was tackling a very sensitive issue of the conflict, on the one hand, b e t w e e n the social identity of the imperial bureaucracy as a protector of rights of the nobility and the legality of dealing with property rights as such, and, on the o t h e r hand, the nationalist idea of sacrificing these principles in the Western b o r d e r l a n d s and now Galicia in o r d e r to destroy /the Polish influence and p r o m o t e Russification. A f t e r the Polish uprising of 1863 the Milutin brothers and M.N. Muraviev were a m o n g those on

238 • Alexei

Miller

the very top of the bureaucratic pyramid who opted for at least partial implementation of the second approach. O n the religious question Gierowskii's recipe was "to support the belief of the Uniates that Unia and Orthodoxy is practically the same." In o t h e r words he advocated not to d e m a n d the formal transition from the U n i a t e church to O r t h o d o x , to avoid asking people to which denomination they belong when they come to church, and to supply Galicia with educated O r t h o d o x priests who could match their U n i a t e counterparts, all with higher education. 1 9 Probably the most sensitive and intellectually responsive to changing realities was V.P. Svatkovskii, officially a journalist, unofficially a resident of Russian intelligence in Berne. Svatkovskii closely followed the tactics of Vienna and Berlin on the Ukrainian question, maintained contacts with many Ukrainian emigrants of different political orientations and tried to use them for political purposes. H e was involved in practical politics and at the same time was supplying St. Petersburg with information and m e m o r a n d a with recommendations that must have looked radical to those who read them in the Russian capital. Svatkovskii obviously understood that his ideas were crossing some conventional lines. So he begins his first m e m o r a n d u m , "Ukrainian question on the eve of the spring campaign" dated 30 N o v e m b e r 1915 (old style), with a declaration to protect him f r o m possible suspicions about his political reliability: "The author of this overview has a totally negative attitude toward the political and national-separatist ideals of Ukrainianism, considering them a great sin against Russia. He also believes that the Ukrainian programs' d e m a n d s for a national culture are exaggerated and harmful." 2 0 But he continues with a "totally negative evaluation of the sad fact of total lack of any tactic or even simple tact, which are necessary for arranging the Ukrainian question for our profit." His extensive analysis of the p e r f o r m a n c e of military and particularly civil administrations during the Russian occupation of Galicia is devastating. 2 1 Svatkovskii's main point is that the Ukrainian question b e c o m e s a subject of competition among many international actors, including Hungarians, Austrians, and Germans. Russia, in his view, was in a position to give U k r a i n i a n s what Hungary 2 2 could never give, and G e r m a n y was able to give only in case Russia was totally d e f e a t e d , which seemed improbable at that time. Svatkovskii m e a n t "immediate unification of all the Ukraine, of all 35 million of the Little Russian or Ukrainian population." 2 3 Svatkovskii was probably among the first in Russia who u n d e r s t o o d that with the beginning of war the nature of all the ethnic problems was changing dramatically. Now Russia had to compete with o t h e r powerful actors for the sympathy and loyalty of the Ukrainians. H e also recognized that this situation, combined with the considerable potential of the Ukrainian national movement, 2 4 m a d e it necessary for Russia " t o give something," in other words to accept some of the d e m a n d s of the Ukrainian movement. Svatkovskii believed that these concessions could be rather limited, most of them even symbolic, because Ukrainian leaders would perceive that t h e unification of all the Ukrainians in o n e state was so

A Testament of the All-Russian

Idea • 239

i m p o r t a n t that many of t h e m would be ready for far-reaching compromises with t h e Russian government. 2 5 It would not be correct to say that such an approach was completely new. A l r e a d y in the 1870s the G e n e r a l G o v e r n o r in Kiev, Dondukov-Korsakov, had tried to establish some kind of modus vivendi with the leaders of the Ukrainian m o v e m e n t , offering them some modest opportunities for legal activities. But his g a m e was soon interrupted by the Ems decree of 1876, which imposed restrictions o n t h e use of Ukrainian language. The important difference is that D o n d u k o v Korsakov had been playing his game at his own risk, without any attempt to conceptualize his tactics in official documents and without any hope of getting the tsar's approval, while Svatkovskii was the first to suggest a concept of such tactics in a m e m o r a n d u m with the aim to convince the decision-makers. By the time Svatkovski was writing his first m e m o r a n d u m on the Ukrainian issue he however had some signs that people on the very top of imperial hierarchy were to some extent p r e p a r e d to listen to his arguments. In the summer of 1915 a landowner from Kiev guberniia, Count M. Tyszkiewicz, who positioned himself as a Ukrainian, conservative in his social views and loyal to the empire a n d e m p e r o r , sent the tsar a telegram expressing loyalty in the n a m e of Ukrainians. The tsar, most probably under the influence of those who thought similarly to Svatkovskii, answered on August 24,1915 with t h e following telegram, signed by his Minister of Court, Count Frederiks: "Sa Majesté m ' a donné l'ordre de vous remercier ainsi que le g r o u p e d'Ukrainiens réunis en Suisse pour les sentiments exprimés dans votre télégramme." 2 6 The revolutionary significance of this telegram for Russian official discourse on Ukraine was the presence of the word " U k r a i n i a n s " instead of "Little Russians" in a public d o c u m e n t that at least could be interpreted as a quotation of the words of the tsar himself. Most probably following this exchange of telegrams Svatkovskii was instructed to contact Tyszkiewicz, who was then in Switzerland. By N o v e m b e r he was ready to inform St. Petersburg about Tyszkiewicz's suggestions. The point of d e p a r t u r e for a big landowner like Tsyzkiewicz was quite opposite to that of Gierowskii. Tyszkiewicz suggested that the main danger f r o m the Ukrainian movement was its social program, and he advised concessions in the national sphere to neutralize the influence of the socialists, who, according to Tyszkiewicz, were using national sentiment in order to p r o m o t e their revolutionary social ideas. 27 Tyszkiewicz suggested several possible steps of a symbolic nature, which to some extent copied the moves already taken by the Habsburgs, but some going farther. Tyszkiewicz advised that the heir to the Russian t h r o n e be proclaimed the H e t m a n of Little Russia and portraits be published of Tsarevich Alexei in Ukrainian dress. H e also suggested publishing in Kiev an official newspaper in Ukrainian. 2 8 Later Tyszkiewicz also suggested that Alexei should visit Lvov and address the local population in Ukrainian, of which—Tyszkiewicz h o p e d — h e might have known several words t h a n k s to his favorite Ukrainian servant, Derevenko. 2 9 It is not clear whether it was Tyszkiewicz or Svatkovskii (most probably the latter)

240 • Alexei Miller who also advised that contacts be established with the political leadership of the Ukrainian movement both in Russia and in Austria (with the exception of a few holding deeply anti-Russian views) in order to discuss a possible compromise. Svatkovskii's two m o r e m e m o r a n d a are dated 17 August and 7 November 1916, but he begins the first one by mentioning several of his papers, which had been sent to St. Petersburg after his first m e m o r a n d u m of November 1915. Svatkovskii continued to inform the government about politics of Vienna and Berlin on the Ukrainian question, stressing that both were making serious efforts to win the Ukrainians to their side, including the creation of special privileged camps for Russian prisoners of war of Ukrainian origin. 3 0 He strongly argued for establishing contacts with Ukrainian politicians, even of socialist orientation, in Russia and abroad. 3 1 Svatkovskii and Gierowskii were united in criticizing the harsh repressive behavior of the authorities during the first occupation of Galicia. But the crucial difference was that Gierowskii believed more efficient politics could lead to the elimination of the U k r a i n i a n movement altogether while Svatkovskii was more realistically recommending some compromise with the Ukrainian movement and some, however limited, concessions to Ukrainians. Gierowskii followed the "French" pattern, while Svatkovskii was obviously thinking in terms of the "English-Scottish" solution. The February Revolution of 1917 influenced the rhetoric and argumentation of the documents that the SPD was sending to the government. On 18 May 1917, the SPD reported to the Minister-President of the Provisional Government, Prince G.J. Lvov, about "the meeting of Russian refugees from Galicia, Bukovina and Ugorskaia R u s ' " in Petrograd on 14 May. Most probably the meeting was organized or at least influenced by the SPD, and its resolution was to be used for diplomatic purposes and propaganda. This resolution, which expressed "the will for selfidentification in the form of unification of Galicia, Bukovina and Ugorskaia R u s ' with the G r e a t Russian democratic republic," particularly stressed that such unification should be treated not as annexation, but as a result of self-identification: "The meeting is deeply convinced that unification of these regions with Russia will be an act of reinstitution of justice by the Russian revolutionary nation and fulfillment of its obligation to the Little Russian nationality ( n a r o d n o s t ' ) , which contributed over several centuries to the creation and strengthening of AllRussian culture and, similarly to the Polish people, which remained divided as a result of the absurd will of autocratic tsars and kaisers." 32 Concepts of self-identification and democracy were replacing the concept of religious unity and loyalty to the tsar, now united with G e r m a n and Austrian kaisers in a category of those responsible for the evils of the past. The All-Russian motive survives, but is combined with the will for unification not of All-Russian, but of Little Russian people. It is not quite clear how SPD's situation changed after Bolsheviks came to power. Its activities certainly declined, and very few documents f r o m the later period survived in the archive. But one is of particular interest, the lengthy text of m o r e

A Testament of the All-Russian

Idea • 241

than 40 pages entitled " M e m o r a n d u m of SPD on the Historical Paths of Belorussia and Ukraine." It is anonymous and undated. But it is likely that the unknown author was a specialist in dialectology, and he completed this text not earlier than 1919, because he mentions Freitag's map of Ukraine, which was published that year. Later the text was edited by somebody in the SPD. Initially the author wrote two reports—one dealing with the border between Great Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians, the other with the Russian-Polish border giving detailed description of ethnic and linguistic composition of all the borderlands. The reference to the second report as a separate paper survived in the first part of the Memorandum, 3 3 but the text preserved in the archive includes both. Most probably, it was the editor who added the political conclusion, because the first author limited himself to scientific linguistic data. The first author openly stated that he was not in a position to judge where people who spoke transitional dialects belonged, because "this problem has to be solved on the basis of some other considerations." 3 4 So, it would be more accurate to speak of authors, in so far as we are not able to trace all the insertions and additions to the initial text. In any case the m e m o r a n d u m definitely reflects the position of those officials who for some strange reasons continued to work in the SPD almost two years after the Bolsheviks came to power. The authors a d h e r e to the concept of the All-Russian nation. They speak about "all three representatives of Russians—Great, White and Little Russians," living in G r o d n o guberniia, 3 5 about areas where the "Belorussian tongue (narechie) comes in contact with other Russian tongues." 3 6 On the o t h e r hand, they acknowledge that both in Belorussia and Ukraine "Russian rule did not change the ethnographic characteristics of the mass of population." 3 7 Their interpretation of this fact reflects the changes in the political situation and their sometimes awkward attempts to adjust to these changes. At the beginning of the text the Belorussian tongue is classified among " o t h e r vestiges of the Belorussian past" in full accordance with the traditional AllRussian discourse. 3 8 However, in the Conclusion of the M e m o r a n d u m the picture becomes more complicated. The authors praise the abolition of serfdom, the development of education and the Russian revolutionary m o v e m e n t for their role "in the revival of Belorussian f r e e d o m and the development of a national consciousness among Belorussians." They acknowledge as a positive fact that "local intelligentsia, instead of becoming part of the Polish or G r e a t Russian intelligentsia, started to perceive itself as an inseparable part of its own people and to strive for the a u t o n o m y of their land ( k r a i ) within the federal Russian republic." 3 9 The authors were quick to declare, however, that "many Belorussians do not separate themselves f r o m the rest of Russia and do not want to isolate themselves as a separate nation (narodnost'), preferring to remain simply Russians." 4 0 This statement brought the authors to the main message of the m e m o r a n d u m , which they addressed to the Bolshevik leadership:

242 • Alexei Miller The overwhelming majority of Belorussians perceive themselves as a branch of the Russian nation and would be very upset by an artificial partition of their Motherland and annexation of parts of it by Poland and Lithuania. Such a partition is also against the principle of self-determination of nations, which was declared and is being implemented by Soviet Russia. Having agreed on secession from Russia of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, inhabited by non-Russians, Soviet Russia cannot agree to give these new republics those parts of Russian people who are against belonging to the alien (inorodcheskie) republics. Soviet Russia also cannot agree to give up parts of the Belorussian territory under Polish rule, with the exception of those areas that are populated by an overwhelming majority of Polish laboring masses. 41 The delimitation of borders with these countries was on the agenda. The reputation of the Bolsheviks as an anti-Russian force, or at least a force that does not care about the ethnic factor, was fairly strong. Praising the revolutionary movement, speaking about rights of national self-determination and the rights of workers and peasants, those still remaining in the SPD were trying to motivate their new and deeply alien masters to accept at least something from the concept of the All-Russian nation and to provide t h e m with necessary information if they wished to accept some of this logic. ( O n e can imagine the psychological state of these f o r m e r imperial officials while writing this text.) Ukraine is not mentioned in the conclusion exactly because the situation there, with its strong nationalist movement and with an obvious lack of military potential to claim all the Ukrainian territories, does not fit the message of the M e m o r a n d u m . The papers of the Special Political D e p a r t m e n t were produced either by officials or by "reliable experts" commissioned by them. These materials show how this group was responding to the dramatic events of World War I and the Revolution. The circumstances forced the D e p a r t m e n t to change the focus of its activities: instead of cutting pieces f r o m Austria-Hungary they became preoccupied with preventing f u r t h e r partition of their own empire. While accommodating arguments and social rhetoric to the changing regimes, some of them were ready to modify significantly their views on possible concessions to Ukrainian and Belorussian national movements. However, the concept of All-Russian unity, which had to include all Eastern Slavs, proved to be such a core element that it was able to survive all these rhetorical, tactical and even ideological changes. A n d the M e m o r a n d u m of 1919 a p p e a r s as a testament of the All-Russian concept that the people f r o m the imperial S P D were trying to pass to the new rulers of Russia.

Notes 1 Here I summarize the argument of my b o o k Ukrainskii obschestvennom

mnenii.

Vtoraia polovina

vopros

v politike

vlastei i

russkom

19 v. (Moscow: Aleteia, 2000).

2 By "Motherland" is meant the concept of what a national territory should be and w h o

Notes

• 243

s h o u l d i n h a b i t it "by rights." Such "ideal M o t h e r l a n d s " usually o v e r l a p e i t h e r partially, as did t h e Polish a n d R u s s i a n , or totally as the R u s s i a n version of " i d e a l M o t h e r l a n d " includ e d all of the U k r a i n i a n one. T h e E v o l u t i o n of the C a t e g o r y 3 S e e J o h n W. S l o c u m , " W h o a n d W h e n . W e r e the Inorodtsyl of ' A l i e n s ' in I m p e r i a l R u s s i a , " The Russian Review 57 (1998): 173-190. 4 A n d r e a s K a p p e l e r , " M a z e p i n t s y , malorossy, k h o k h l y : u k r a i n t s y v e t n i c h e s k o i ierarkhii R o ssiiskoi imperii," in A l e x e i Miller, ed.. Rossiia-Ukraina: istoriia vzaimootnoshenii (Moscow: Iazyki russkoi kultury, 1997): 134-135. 5 A r k h i v V n e s h n e i Politiki Rossiiskoi Imperii [ h e r e a f t e r A V P R I ] , f. 135, op. 474. 6 A V P R I . f. 135, op. 474, d. 1,1.1. 7 A V P R I , f. 135. op. 474, d. 1,1.7. 8 A V P R I , f. 135, op. 474, d. 1.1. 30. 30ob. 9 A V P R I , f. 135, op. 474, d. 201; F. 35, op. 474. d. 418; F. 135, op. 474, d. 29/101,11. 55-59. 10 In cases w h e n the exact R u s s i a n w o r d is i m p o r t a n t ( f o r e x a m p l e , o n e can n e v e r guess w h a t s t o o d in t h e R u s s i a n original text for " n a t i o n " or " n a t i o n a l i t y " in English t r a n s l a t i o n — n a rodnost', plemia, narod, natsiia) I will give the original R u s s i a n t e r m in p a r e n t h e s e s . 11 A V P R I , f. 135, op. 474, d. 200,1. 1. 12 A V P R I , f. 135, op. 474, d. 201,1. l o b . 13 T h e m e m o r a n d u m was r e g i s t e r e d in the S P D on August 4, 1916. 14 A V P R I , f. 135, op. 474, d. 403,1. 2. 15 T h e d e r i v a t i v e n a m e for t h e U k r a i n i a n n a t i o n a l m o v e m e n t in Russia, which c o n n e c t e d it to "the traitor," H e t m a n Mazepa. 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

A V P R I , f. 135, op. 474, d. 419.1. 28ob. A V P R I , f. 135, op. 474, d. 403.1. 2ob. A V P R I , f. 135, op. 474, d. 403, II. 4 - 5 . A V P R I , f. 135. op. 474, d. 403, II. 6, 6ob. A V P R I , f. 135, op. 474, d. 27,1. 4. A V P R I , f. 135, op. 474, d. 27.11. 4 - 6 . S v a t k o v s k i i a r g u e d that the H u n g a r i a n a p p r o a c h to the p r o b l e m d i f f e r e d f r o m t h e Austria n . H e b e l i e v e d H u n g a r y was r e a d y t o collect all U k r a i n i a n t e r r i t o r i e s of the dual M o n a r c h y u n d e r their rule, giving t h e m rights similar t o t h e C r o a t i a n t e r r i t o r i e s in o r d e r to c r e a t e a s t r o n g a n t i - R u s s i a n b u l w a r k on its e a s t e r n b o r d e r . A V P R I , f. 135, op. 474, d. 27,1.8.

23 24 25 26 27

AVPRI, AVPRI, AVPRI, AVPRI, AVPRI,

f. f. f. f. f.

135, 135, 135, 135, 135,

op. op. op. op. op.

474, 474, 474, 474, 474,

d. d. d. d. d.

27,1. 27.1. 32,1. 27,1. 27,1.

8. 8. 3. 12. 15.

28 A V P R I , f. 135, op. 474, d. 27,1. 16. 29 A V P R I , f. 135, op. 474, d. 27,1. 28. 30 A V P R I , f. 135, op. 474, d. 27,11. 4 4 - 4 7 , II. 48-61. 31 A V P R I , f. 135, op. 474. d. 2 7 , 1 . 4 6 , 5 6 , 6 1 . 32 A V P R I , f. 135, op. 474. d. 42,1. 2. 33 A V P R I , f. 135, op. 474, d. 42.1. 9. 34 A V P R I , f. 135. op. 474, d. 42,1. 10. 35 A V P R I , f. 135, op. 474, d. 42,1 33. 36 A V P R I , f. 135, op. 474, d. 42,1. 11. 37 A V P R I , f. 135. op. 474, d. 42,1. 5 , 8 . 38 A V P R I . f. 135, op. 474, d. 42,1. 5. 39 A V P R I , f. 135, op. 474, d. 42,1. 40. 40 A V P R I , f. 135, op. 474, d. 42,1. 40. 41 A V P R I , f. 135, op. 474, d. 42,1. 4 1 , 4 1 o b .

The Day before the Downfall of the Old Regime: 26 February igiy in Petrograd RAFAIL SH.

GANELIN

In Soviet times, Nevskii Prospekt was renamed the Prospekt of 25 O c t o b e r (and regained its original name in 1943). Z n a m e n s k a i a Square was r e n a m e d Ploshchad Vosstaniia (the Uprising Square). Most likely the names were determined by a p r e f e r e n c e for revolutionary events occurring in October. Nonetheless, both the Prospekt and the Square were sites of revolutionary events in February, not O c t o b e r of 1917. What happened there? This question is of crucial importance because on the following day, 27 February, soldiers of the Volynskii Regiment's training unit who had participated in the 26 February skirmish refused to obey their commanders and refused to fire on the crowd. This day is also known as the downfall of the old regime. However, already on 26 February, a company of the Pavlovskii Regiment had also refused to advance against the crowd. This article recounts the crucial events of that day. *

*

*

From 23 February crowds of people began flooding the Nevskii Prospekt daily. A m o n g them were workers coming to the center from the Vyborg quarter. They were coming despite attempts of the police to close the Alexander II (now Liteinyi) Bridge and the paths across the ice-covered river. Events on 25 February made it clear that the authorities were unable to suppress the popular movement. When Chief of the Vyborg Police D e p a r t m e n t , Colonel M.P. Shalfeev, who was in charge of cavalry and infantry on the Vyborg side of the Alexander II Bridge, ordered the crowd that was heading downtown to disperse, he was severely beaten and wounded. The Staronevskii district police officer, Colonel A.E. Krylov, was killed during a mass gathering at the Alexander II m o n u m e n t on Znamenskaia Square. Police were losing control of the labor districts. In the Vyborg quarter, some police stations were destroyed and the central command of government forces, located in the building of the City Council (gradonachal'stvo) at G o r o k h o vaia Street no. 2, lost its telephone connection with the Vyborg police. Around 9 p.m., the chief of the Petrograd military district, S.S. Khabalov, received a cable from Nicholas II who was at the General H e a d q u a r t e r s in Mogilev. The cable stated: "I order you to suppress the disorders in the capital at once, tomorrow, since they are absolutely impermissible in the times of our war

246 • Rafail Sh. Ganelin with G e r m a n y and Austria." 1 "This cable... how shall I put it, honestly speaking, took me aback," Khabalov testified later to the Extraordinary Investigation Committee of the Provisional G o v e r n m e n t . How could we suppress it immediately? But the Tsar said immediately. The Tsar ordered it to be suppressed at any cost. When we were o r d e r e d to give bread, we gave bread and that was the end of it. But no bread can help when the banners read: " D o w n with the monarchy!" What could we do? The Tsar had issued an order: we had to shoot. I was stunned, really stunned. I did not believe that this action would achieve the desired result. Every evening all the g e n d a r m e chiefs would convene and report on the events of the day. Then they would m a k e plans for the next day. Later, by 10 p.m. district commanders and c o m m a n d e r s of reserve battalions would be summoned for the next day's instructions. On that day they were to gather right after I had received the cable. W h e n they arrived I read the text to m a k e it public and showed it to o t h e r members of the meeting. Then I announced: " G e n t l e m e n , the Tsar gave an o r d e r to stop the disorders at once, tomorrow. It is our last resort; we must use it. ...Therefore, if the crowd is small, not aggressive and without flags, disperse it with cavalry. If the crowd is aggressive and carrying banners, act according to the Field Manual, I mean, warn them three times and then shoot." 2 During the early morning hours of 26 February, more than 100 people were arrested. A m o n g them were many leaders of the labor m o v e m e n t , as well as participants in the Congress of the War Industries Committee. A t 4 a.m. the Minister of Internal Affairs A.D. P r o t o p o p o v wrote to Tsarina A l e x a n d r a Fodorovna at Tsarskoe Selo that several rightist m e m b e r s of the State D u m a had been seeking his advice on "the application of strict measures, and all of them hoped it would bring calm for the following day." The hope for calm was based on the fact that 26 February was a Sunday and the factories were closed. However, many people went into the streets. Khabalov arrived at the city council in the morning and took control of military actions. He ordered the troops to k e e p the crowds away f r o m the Nevskii Prospekt on both the southern and n o r t h e r n ends. Since the Vyborg q u a r t e r was considered to be already in the hands of the "revolting masses," the central c o m m a n d o r d e r e d troops to use w e a p o n s if the rebels tried to break through to the A l e x a n d e r II Bridge. According to N.F. Akaemov, a journalist the demonstrations nonetheless continued Nevskii. Attacks against the gendarmes and being pushed f u r t h e r westward. 3 A r o u n d 10

who knew the G o v e r n o r personally, and caused a clash to the n o r t h of cavalry usually resulted in the rebels a.m., the City G o v e r n o r of P e t r o g r a d

The Day before the Downfall of the Old Regime • 247 (gradonachal'nik), General A.P. Balk, received reports f r o m the outskirts that s h o o t i n g had begun. At noon he was informed that the training unit of the Volynskii G u a r d s Regiment " o p e n e d fire along New Nevskii, Goncharnaia and Ligovskaia." 4 Balk wrote about this incident in his diary. In addition to General Balk's diary, the following description of the 26 February events on the Square and adjacent parts of Nevskii, Old Nevskii, and Ligovskii Prospekts and Goncharnaia Street relies on several sources. These include two versions of memoirs by T.I. Kirpichnikov, a noncommissioned officer w h o h e a d e d the uprising of the Volynskii Regiment on 27 February. 5 A wellk n o w n publicist of that time, I.S. Lukash also refers to Kirpichnikov. Despite the subtitle, "A Story of Timofei Kirpichnikov, the First H e r o of the Insurrection," that Lukash gave his pamphlet on "The Uprising by the Volynskii Regiment," he says that M.G. Markov, Ivan Drenchuk (in real life Drenichev), Kozlov, Y.K. Orlov and I.V. Il'in also took part in the discussions. 6 In 1924, an Estonian journalist, Y. Selyamaa, published Kirpichnikov's memoirs and those of other members of the Volynskii Regiment. 7 There is also a testimony of a well-known publicist and political journalist, V.L. Burtsev, who observed events from the H o t e l Balabinskaia. 8 According to Kirpichnikov's memoirs in Byloe and Lukash's notes, shortly b e f o r e the February events a training unit of 400 soldiers was divided into two companies, 32 rows each. (Some of the soldiers who m a d e up the first platoon were later sent to guard the prison and the treasury.) The First Company was u n d e r the c o m m a n d of Captain I.S. Lashkevich. 9 Lukash's interlocutors characterized him as "a cruel, acid and coarse person who could reduce to tears even experienced soldiers." In charge of the soldiers in the first squadron were: Sergeant Major Lukin; platoon commanders, Senior non-commissioned officers Vasiliy Kozlov, Fyodor Konnikov; Junior officer Mikhail Markov and Mikhail Brodnikov; Brigade C o m m a n d e r s Karasev, Orlov, Gubarev, Il'in, Borisov, Valuk, Kirin, Kireev, and Kochergin alias "the kid." The Second C o m p a n y was under the c o m m a n d of Second Captain Mashkin II. In charge of the soldiers were Sergeant M a j o r T.I. Kirpichnikov and Platoon C o m m a n d e r Junior non-commissioned officer Miron Kirpichnikov (Timofei's brother) and Senior non-commissioned officers Ivan Zaitsev, T.I. Plis, and E.T. Seroglazov. Already on 24 February the First Platoon and on 25 February the Second Company of the training unit of the Volkonskii Regiment had been brought to Z n a m enskaia Square. Officers were shouting at the crowd, threatening to open fire, but withholding the order. Somebody f r o m the crowd cried out: "Soldiers, don't shoot!" On 25 February, the Second C o m p a n y was brought to the Square. Captain Mashkin II was the c o m m a n d e r and T. Kirpichnikov, who had played a similar role for Second Captain Tsurikov on 24 February, was his second in command. Ensign Vorontsov-Veliaminov and Kochura were also there (in Byloe and Leningrad Kochura was mistakenly referred to as Tkachura). Mashkin, following the practice of the previous days, ordered the soldiers to deploy at Ligovka no. 37

2 4 8 • Rafnil

Sh.

Ganelin

(a house where a priest from Z n a m e n s k a i a Church lived) in the caretaker's premises and in the basement occupied by a group of Chinese craftsmen. At 11 a.m. the Second C o m p a n y lined up opposite the right corner of Bol'shaia Severnaia Hotel. A crowd with a red banner was heading from Nevskii to the m o n u m e n t of Alexander III. Speeches began. Vorontsov-Veliaminov decided to tear down the banner, but slipped and fell. They pelted his back with pieces of wood (according to Penchkovskii's notes a worker struck him on the back), but he managed to pull down the banner. His and Kochura's threats to open fire had no effect. The crowd could feel the unwillingness of soldiers to shoot and began to taunt them. Officers went to the hotel and got drunk. Soldiers spent the evening from 6 p.m. to 11 p.m. in the basement. During the night Kirpichnikov and Sergeant Major Lukin of the First Company debated whether to shoot or not to shoot the next day. Earlier that evening, Lashkevich had d e m a n d e d that they shoot. In this detail Lukash's notes coincide with Penchkovskii's account of this part of Kirpichnikov's story: Lashkevich s u m m o n e d the soldiers of the First Company, cursed us out and concluded with the words: "I hope that tomorrow you will wipe out this disgrace and prove that you are not cowards but soldiers." The soldiers were silent. "Aha, it means I was mistaken about you," said Lashkevich, who abruptly turned round and left. When the soldiers went back to the barracks Lashkevich sent for the Platoon C o m m a n d e r s and was questioning t h e m about the mood of the people. The Platoon C o m m a n d e r s could not guarantee anything. Kirpichnikov suggested that they refrain from shooting. Lukin, who was o r d e r e d to bring up the machine guns the next morning, said his wound hurt badly and went to the hospital instead. Then Lashkevich appointed Kirpichnikov Sergeant M a j o r of the First C o m p a n y and Ivan Zaitsev the Sergeant M a j o r of the Second. Vorontsov-Veliaminov and Kochura were now in the First Company. Such is the prehistory of the 26 February events on Z n a m e n s k a i a Square and the adjacent area. Lukash's and Pechkovkii's accounts of Kirpichnikov's story are identical in describing Lashkevich's behavior before the advance. He would "stroll along the line-up rapidly saying that ... soldiers are the d e f e n d e r s of the Tsar. He instructed t h e m to shoot mercilessly, and if necessary, to club and bayonet." There is disagreement on the important point about the machine guns. Lukash spoke of two machine guns that were placed in front of the soldiers. The two machine guns assigned to the soldiers of the Volynskii R e g i m e n t were also mentioned by Selyamaa and by a soldier, S.T. Lebedev, in his m e m o i r s written in 1967. 10 "The machine guns were set up on the first floor of Z n a m e n s k a i a Hotel," Lebedev wrote. "We set the safety catches on the machine guns so that they could fire only once. The c o m m a n d e r of the machine-gun d e t a c h m e n t C o r p o r a l Liakh

The Day before the Downfall of the Old Regime • 249 could not immediately detect the trick. But a f t e r long efforts and some help the m a c h i n e guns were repaired and we began to shoot at the workers." On the other h a n d . Kirpichnikov's version recorded in Penchkovskii's notes states: " O u r m a c h i n e guns were set up on Nevskii. C o m m a n d e r of the machine-gun detachm e n t C o r p o r a l Liakh was shouting all the time: 'Cut them down, shoot without mercy!' O u r machine-gunners put wooden blocks under the machine guns so that the bullets flew up even though the gun sight was accurate." When Seliamaa wrote a b o u t the guns rattling "over people's heads," he meant the notorious police machine guns that allegedly had been set on the roofs, not those of the Volynskii R e g i m e n t that were firing in the air. At this time the First Company was in the basement of Znamenskaia Square. T h e Second Company took up positions on Nikolaevskaia Street. The patrol on Z n a m e n s k a i a Square was ordered to block the street to Nevskii and to chase away those who were beginning to gather on the Square. In Byloe Kirpichnikov maintains that it h a p p e n e d at 2 p.m., but Lukash claims that already at midday " f a r away on G o n c h a r n a y a Street a crowd of demonstrators came into sight." F u r t h e r , he states that "this crowd was more menacing than yesterday's. The d r o n e of voices, dissonant singing of 'La Marseillaise,' and passionate cries m e r g e d into a continous roar. The crowd poured forth and roared, like a dark boiling s t r e a m . " As m e n t i o n e d earlier, G e n e r a l Balk r e p o r t e d that he was inf o r m e d about the shooting in the Square shortly after 12 a.m. This fact makes the discrepancies between Kirpichnikov's account in Byloe and Lukash's notes about the outset of the bloody events quite significant. V.L. Burtsev does not specify the time when the crowd appeared. Unlike Lukash, he maintains that "those who came specifically for the political demonstration were few and dispersed soon." It is clear from the first lines of his article that Burtsev assumed the shooting broke out in the morning: " O n the morning of 26 February on all the walls of Petrograd we read Khabalov's order threatening to suppress the popular movement 'at any cost.' We [Burtsev and N.N. Rozhkov, a D u m a deputy], lodgers of Balabinskaya Hotel on Znamenskaia Square, f r o m early morning ... could witness how G e n e r a l Khlebnikov's order was taking shape." Burtsev, like Kirpichnikov, did not see the crowd as a threatening mob, but as harmless passers-by, each of whom was "going about his business." The central c o m m a n d in all probability feared that they were demonstrators. In the morning, armed soldiers were lined up in two rows where Old Nevskii and G o n c h a r n a i a adjoin the Square. Next to them another unit was positioned in a horseshoe shape. Inside the horseshoe were the local inspector (pristav) and police, both mounted and on foot. Beside them were Lieutenant Colonels Lebedev and Tolubeev, Colonel Pletnev and G e n e r a l Fursa, whom Burtsev considered a general of the gendarmes. Sources describing the atmosphere in the Volynskii Regiment agree that even b e f o r e the shooting began, a m e m b e r of the Second Platoon, Corporal Ivan Il'in was suspended from his post for refusing to disperse the crowd in the Square. In

250 • Rafail Sh. Ganelin both his versions Kirpichnikov and Lukash link this episode to the time when the crowds began to fill the Square. Lukash writes that in the morning Il'in declared that "he would not disperse anyone and it was not a soldier's business at all." Lukash then called him a mutineer, put him under arrest and was about to tear off his stripes when Il'in did it himself, relieved that he would not have to "go into the streets, face the anxious crowd and look into thousands of pleading wide-open eyes again." Kirpichnikov, who was ordered to take Il'in to the caretaker's premises, shook his hand and said: "You were great, my friend. D o n ' t be afraid, everything is alright." Kirpichnikov mentioned that Lashkevich called Il'in a coward. (In Byloe, according to the account in Leningrad magazine, Lashkevich cursed Il'in "terribly": " W h o are you—a d e f e n d e r of the e m p e r o r and the motherland, or a son of a bitch?" "I am a d e f e n d e r of my motherland!" replied Il'in.) Lashkevich ordered his replacement and put Kirpichnikov in charge of the patrol. When Kirpichnikov asked the people in the Square to disperse, he said the workers replied: "We are not disturbing you, so don't ask us to leave." The shooting was preceded by the officers' attempts to drive out the people. "They came back and h e a d e d to Nevskii," says Kirpichnikov in Byloe. He goes on: "I slowed down, lingered behind the crowd, came up to the patrol and said: 'A storm is approaching, big trouble. What shall we do?' The soldiers said: 'It's real trouble, no way we can survive.' I instructed them, ' R e m e m b e r , if they m a k e you fire—shoot in the air. A failure to carry out the order may result in our death. G o d willing, if we return to our barracks, we shall decide on our fate there.'" Having asked the bugler to give the signal, Lashkevich ordered the soldiers to club, bayonet and shoot. Vorontsov-Veliaminov and 12 soldiers moved to G o n c h a r n a i a . flooded with people ( r e m e m b e r that Lukash mentioned a crowd of d e m o n s t r a t e r s moving down Goncharnaia Street). The bugler repeated the signal three times but was not understood, people did not move. Vorontsov-Veliaminov shouted: "Aim at the crowd, open fire by ranks. Ranks 1,2,3,4,5...fire!" But it was not t h e crowd that the soldiers fired at. As a result of the volley, plaster fell from the u p p e r floor of a building in Poltavskaia Street (Kirpichnikov says it was clay). The lieutenant ordered: "Fire at their legs, fire into the running crowd." Still, a second volley yielded neither dead nor wounded. The shooting scared away most but not all of the marchers. Vorontsov Veliaminov, shouting "run," started hunting down people who pressed closer to the front gates. He o r d e r e d Corporal Sleskaukhov (Il'in in Penchkovskii's records) to shoot an old man who approached from the right side of G o n c h a r n a i a . Sleskaukhov discharged three times. T h e third shot hit a lantern. T h e old m a n meanwhile disappeared into a courtyard. Then Vorontsov-Veliaminov tore the rifle out of corporal's hands and began shooting at the people clinging to the doors. H e wounded a woman in the knee. A general unfamiliar to Kirpichnikov (possibly Fursa) ordered two soldiers to drive her to the hospital. According to Kirpichnikov, Vorontsov sat down on a pedestal a n d started

The Day before the Downfall

of the Old Regime • 251

" s h o o t i n g to kill." H e was accurate. " H e killed t h r e e , w o u n d e d a w o m a n a n d a m a n , w h o w r i t h e d in pain on the sidewalk. A n a m b u l a n c e was sent for a n d t h e s e p e o p l e w e r e r e m o v e d f r o m the Square. A soldier r e t u r n i n g f r o m leave was s h o t d e a d too." T h e n V o r o n t s o v - V e l i a m i n o v s t a r t e d s h o o t i n g at the p e o p l e in the passageway for the s t e a m tram. H e walked Ligovka, m o v e d to a n o t h e r p e d e s t a l a n d c o n t i n u e d shooting, killing a n o t h e r f o u r p e o p l e . T h e t r u t h f u l n e s s of K i r p i c h n i k o v ' s story can be c o m p a r e d to B u r t s e v ' s statem e n t . T h e only d i s c r e p a n c y is that B u r t s e v did not c o n s i d e r the soldiers' s h o o t i n g totally ineffective. M o s t likely, " t h e y o u n g l i e u t e n a n t " in Burtsev's n o t e s is Vorontsov-Veliaminov

from Kirpichnikov's memoirs. Lukash characterized

the

b e h a v i o r of the c o m m a n d e r of the First C o m p a n y , C a p t a i n Lashkevich, the s a m e way. His a c c o u n t is w o r t h q u o t i n g in full: A n officer a n d then soldiers called several times on the crowd to disperse. A f t e r the first ear-piercing s o u n d of the bugle we k n e w that t h e r e would be n o s h o o t i n g immediately, that e v e r y t h i n g would be d o n e according to regulations. We k n e w that only a f t e r the third signal soldiers would e x e c u t e the officers' o r d e r . I n d e e d , in a few s e c o n d s t h e r e was a n o t h e r signal, t h e n a third. T h e officer o r d e r e d calmly: "Fire." I h e a r d the cocks click, the rifles r e s p o n d , a n d t h e n the volley. A few m o m e n t s later I could h e a r cries. . . . A wall was s e p a r a t i n g m e f r o m the t a r g e t s but I could h e a r the c r o w d fleeing and the w o u n d e d groaning. S o o n two soldiers passed me carrying off a badly w o u n d e d old w o m a n . . . . T h e n o t h e r soldiers passed carrying a dying m a n . ... T h e officer gave a n o t h e r o r d e r . . . . A n o t h e r volley, m o r e moans, s o m e w h e r e a h e a d . A y o u n g l i e u t e n a n t stood in f r o n t of me. H e was p e a c e f u l l y smoking a cigarette, cracking j o k e s with his soldiers and superiors. His posture d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t this was r o u t i n e for him. A p p a r e n t l y , f r o m the beginning the officer was displeased with his soldiers. Their " p r e c i s i o n " was not as great as he wished. S o m e t i m e s the soldiers would shoot in the air, s o m e t i m e s to the side, but they w e r e very reluctant to shoot at live targets as o r d e r e d . T h e n the officer w a n t e d t h e m to shoot not a l t o g e t h e r but o n e at a time. N o w he could be sure to trace e v e r y single bullet. " T h a t o n e , n e a r the l a m p post. ...No, n o t that one. Try again! A g a i n ! " "You fool! You missed." "There, across t h e street. You see, t h o s e two, crossing." Every word was u t t e r e d in a very calm flat tone. Obviously the soldier missed several times in a row. T h e officer was d i s a p p o i n t e d . H e t o o k the soldier's rifle a n d fired. T h e expression of s e l f - c o n t e n t o n his face said the shot h a d b e e n successful. ... T h e r e were q u i t e a few such successful shots o n O l d Nevskii P r o s p e k t

252 • Rafail Sh. Ganelin and in Goncharnaia Street. From the window my neighbor saw ... a little girl appear from Nevskii no. 132. She tried to cross the street when a bullet f r o m o n e of our brave men cut her down. ... A guest from the provinces had come for a visit to one of our neighbors. Standing in the gateway, five m e t e r s f r o m the soldiers, he peeped out curiously to see what General Khabalov's minions were doing. The next m o m e n t , a bullet smashed the skull of this curious fellow. There were many successful shots. O n e of the officers said he had to carry off 28 wounded on that day in his own automobile. First, the gendarme general, then colonels and lieutenant colonels, whose names I have given in the beginning, came up to the officer and firmly shook his hand for good service "to the Tsar and motherland." In Kirpichnikov's and Lukash's descriptions the shooting initiated by th soldiers of the Volynskii Regiment was not intensive and did not cause significant casualties. However, according to data received by the City Council, the day resulted in 50 dead and about 100 wounded. E n t e r i n g these numbers in his journal, A.P. Balk then added in parenthesis "in most cases, unfortunately, the fatalities were accid e n t a l " and then crossed out these words. 11 "For three million people it is a negligible percentage," he thought. Also in his opinion, all the casualties were a result of the shooting on Z n a m e n s k a i a Square. H e wrote that "the troops were shooting in other quarters too. but moderately. There was no need, after the first volleys the crowd scattered." What if the following episode a p p e a r e d in the stories of Volynskii officers to justify the origin of the casualties? As recorded by Lukash and Selyamaa, machine-gun fire originated from a truck or an automobile driven by d r u n k e n soldiers of a training unit of an u n k n o w n regiment. They were shooting at workers who came from Kolpino for bread. "Only now," insisted Lukash, "brotherly blood was shed by the soldiers, m a d e heavily drunk by their officers. But fellow soldiers quickly disarmed the d r u n k e n horde that dared shoot at the people. N o n e of these bandits returned to the barracks alive." According to Lukash, this incident happ e n e d at around 5 p.m. while the Volynskii Regiment was ordered to cease fire at 3 p.m. Seliamaa also asserts that shooting on the square was stopped at 3 p.m. sharp. In Byloe Kirpichnikov mentions the last shots by Vorontsov-Veliaminov at around 4 p.m. A t approximately this time, G e n e r a l Khabalov decided the troops should take up the defensive in the eastern part of Nevskii along the Catherine Canal. But soon it became known at the City Council that a battalion of the Pavlovskii Regiment—always considered the most reliable regiment—refused to fight against the public and stopped at the canal. Khabalov together with Chief of the Military O k h r a n a , Colonel V.I. Pavlenkov, managed to return the company to the barracks, disarm it and send the initiators to the Peter-Paul Fortress. Did the Pavlovskii Regiment's protest (not described here) have an impact on

The Day before the Downfall of the Old Regime • 253 h o w the situation was perceived at the City Council where the h e a d q u a r t e r s of t h e g o v e r n m e n t forces was located? N.F. Akaemov, who interviewed the witnesses, wrote that people split into two groups: o n e group that believed in the exist e n c e of a nerve center, something like "a council of councils," and a n o t h e r group that insisted that "the protest was nothing else but a disorganized strike and would be easily suppressed by reliable forces as soon as they arrived f r o m the vicinity." "And the G u a r d will fight for themselves. There is a black sheep in every flock. ...The Pavlovskii battalion does not count. . . . A f t e r all, it was suppressed," he q u o t e d the optimists. 1 2 City G o v e r n o r Balk did not mention the encounter with the Pavlovskii R e g i m e n t in his notes. On that day his reception r o o m s were packed with visitors. " S o m e were scared, but the majority was satisfied: finally the troops switched from observing the disorders to taking action," he wrote. 1 3 Prince von Oldenburg, form e r Premier A. F. Trepov, other ministers and Countess M.I. Vitte were concerned a b o u t the events and were trying to reach Balk from Tsarskoe Selo, where the Tsarina was staying with her children. Balk was also visited by two experts from the D e p a r t m e n t of Police—General A . A . R e i n b o t (Rezvoit), later G o v e r n o r of Moscow in 1906-1907, and General P.P. Meier, G o v e r n o r of Rostov-on-Don, who had b e e n Warsaw chief of police in 1905-1906. T h e r e was no mention of a coup during their discussions with Balk. "Disorders—yes," wrote Balk. "But Russia witnessed a n u m b e r of them in the last few years. A n d we officials of the Ministry of H o m e Affairs were far from hysterical. We got used to them and understood that losses on both sides were unavoidable. Yet, we could not imagine that in the long run troops would fail to suppress them. ...Long before twilight stillness and a p p a r e n t order fell upon the capital. The military c o m m a n d was extremely content with the actions of the soldiers of the Volynskii Regiment on the Square; the shooting did disperse the crowd," emphasized the Governor. 1 4 This observation coincides with N.F. A k a e m o v ' s report that, by the evening "the pressure of the rebellious crowd" had begun to subside, as in many previous conflicts. Cavalry units sent to "clear" the Nevskii Prospekt handled the task easily. T h e part of Nevskii Prospekt adjacent to Z n a m e n s k a i a Square was dark, since earlier that day the crowd had damaged the transformer. A searchlight was m o u n t e d on the top of the Admiralty that was supposed to illuminate Nevskii all the way through to Z n a m e n s k a i a Square. A patrol at the crossroads was instructed to let through neither pedestrians nor horse traffic. At 11 p.m. the Minister of H o m e Affairs A.D. P r o t o p o p o v joined the military session at the City Council. According to Balk, he was "calm and even cheerful." The reports of district heads were of a comforting nature. Chief of the O k h r a n a , General K.I. Globachev phoned, asked to excuse his absence and r e p o r t e d that "the actions of the troops had so oppressed the marchers that a decline in the intensity of disorders could be expected tomorrow." Even some years later, Balk thought that "he was right," referring to the stories of the Preobrazhenskii soldiers who conveyed those arrested under guard to the ministerial section of the

254 • Rafail Sh. Ganelin D u m a . The soldiers maintained that on the evening of 26 February, workers said to them: " D a m n you! We toil for you, and you shoot at us! Tomorrow we will sleep till lunch and only then go to work." In Balk's words: Even the m o d e r a t e shooting had such a repressive effect that the next morning one could be confident things would settle down in the capital. In the last two days mostly mobs were wandering about the city. By now they must be quite exhausted and, most importantly, must have realized that they cannot rely on military forces. I worked until 2 in the morning and for the first time during these days I went to bed with a feeling of relief. Crossing the reception area, I was fascinated by the divine winter beauty of the Admiralty Park and the poetic Admiralty spire. The city was asleep as if recovering from the ugliness of the past few days. Only a few cab drivers hunched over bonfires and next to them stood still an unchangeable guardian of order, the old chief of the Petrograd police. Some episodes in Balk's description of that day, as well as one of his orders, reveal doubts regarding the future behavior of the troops. H e recorded the general opinion of district chiefs that the troops "were tired" and remained hungry. This was particularly true about the Volynskii Regiment on Z n a m e n s k a i a Square. T h e reader r e m e m b e r s a close friend of Balk, Captain Mashkin, who replaced Colonel Viskovskii in leading the reserve battalion of the Volynskii Regiment. When Balk r e m a r k s to him that "everybody admired the soldiers of the Volynskii Regiment that day" he replied "with a bitter smile: 'Yes, it is true, their actions were perfect. But they are terribly exhausted, and at 4 in the morning we have to wake them up again. It is not easy.' I did not like his tone," wrote Balk. " H e was at the end of his rope." W h e n police inspectors (politseiskie pristavi) of the southern districts of Petrograd, according to H.F. Akaemov, asked Balk what to d o in case of assaults on police stations he answered: "If they are hooligans, beat them back. If, G o d forbid, they are soldiers, do not offer any resistance. You will end up losing police chiefs." The governor's fears came true the next morning when overnight the soldiers of the Volynskii Regiment went over to the side of the Revolution.

Notes 1 A . A . Blok, "Poslednie dni imperatorskoi vlasti," in A . A . Blok ed., Sobranie vols. (Leningrad, 1982) 5: 319.

sochinenii,

6

2 Padenie tsarskogo rezhima: Stenograficheskie otchety doprosov i pokazanii, dannykh v 1917 g. Chrezvychainoi sledstvennoi komissii Vremennogo pravitel'stva,7 vols. (Leningrad, 1 9 2 4 - 1 9 2 7 ) , 1: 1 9 0 - 1 9 1 .

The Day before the Downfall

of the Old Regime

• 255

3 N.F. Akaemov. "Agoniia starogo rezhima (Po pristavskim doneseniiam i pokazaniiam svidetelei)," lstoricheskii vestnik (April 1917): xxii. 4 A.P. Balk, "Poslednie piat' dnei tsarskogo Petrograda (23-28 fevralia 1917 g.), Dnevnik poslednego petrogradskogo gradonachal'nika," Sumerki 13, nos. 9 -12 (1991): 145. 5 Timofei Ivanovich Kirpichnikov was bom in 1892. In February 1917 he was a junior officer in the training unit of the reserve battalion of the Volynskii Regiment. On 1 April 1917 for leading the insurrection he was awarded the George Cross of the IV degree and promoted to junior ensign (podpraporschik) and on 7 May to ensign (praporschik). According to some sources, he was shot during the Civil War on the order of General A.P. Kutepov. His memoirs were published in Byloe (1917) bks. 5-6, nos. 27-28, reprinted in a collection of memoirs of the participants of the revolutionary movement in Petrograd. R.Sh. Ganelin, V.A. Ulanov, eds., Krushenie tsarizma: vospominaniia uchastnikov revoliutsionnogo dvizheniia v Petrograde, 1907 g.-fevral' 1917 g. (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1986), 300-314. An abridged version was published in Ogonek 11 (1927): 4-5. An article on the origin of Kirpichnikov's recollections was published in Byloe (1918) bk. 1, no. 29,239. It stated that minutes of his talk were recorded in March 1917 by F. F. Linde, one of the initiators of the April uprising of the soldiers of the Petrograd garrison in 1917, and by Ia.M. Fishman, who later became member of the Petrograd Military and Revolution Committee. The Committee of the Volynskii Regiment advised them to interview Kirpichnikov. A less detailed record of Kirpichnikov's memoirs was made by journalist N. Penchkovskii on 28 February and published in the magazine Leningrad 2 (1931): 73-76. For comparison of these two records refer to R.Sh. Ganelin, Z.P. Solovjeva, Vospominaniia T. Kirpichnikova kak istochnik po istorii fevral'skih revolutsionnykh dnei 1917g. v Petrograde: Rabochij klass Rossii, ego soiuzniki i politicheskie protivniki v 1917g. (Leningrad: Nauka, 1989), 178-195. 6 Byloe bks. 5-6, nos. 27-28, 5-6, 25-26. The same record with insignificant discrepancies can be found in P.P. (Colonel G.G. Perets), V tsitadeli russkoi revoliutsii. Zapiski komendanla Tavricheskogo dvortsa 27 fevralia-23 marta 1917g. 2d ed. (Petrograd, 1917), 14-18. In this edition it was called "rasskaz odnogo iz doblestnykh volyntsev." 7 See Ganelin and Solovieva, Vospominaniia T. Kirpichnikova, 178. 8 Birzhevye vedomosti, 5 March 1917. reprinted E. Semenov, "Fevral'skie i martovskie dni 1917 g." lstoricheskii vestnik (March 1917): 11-14. 9 Read about him in Ganelin and Solovieva, Vospominaniia T. Kirpichnikova, 193. 10 Ganelin and Solovieva, Vospominaniia T. Kirpichnikova, 188,194. 11 Balk, "Poslednie piat' dnei tsarskogo Petrograda," 146. 12 Akaemov, "Agoniia starogo rezhima," xxii-xxiii. 13 Balk, "Poslednie piat' dnei tsarskogo Petrograda," 145-146, emphasis added. 14 Ibid.

Unusual Comrades: Red Planning for the August igig Counter Offensive in the Russian Civil War CURTIS

S.

KING

...in the South, absolutely everything must be put on a war footing, and all work, all efforts, all thoughts subordinated to the war and only the war. Otherwise it will be im possible to repulse Denikin's attack. That is clear. And this must be clearly understood and fully put into practice. V . I . L E N I N , JULY

19191

A r e v o l u t i o n can m a k e s t r a n g e bedfellows. Such was the case of the Russian R e v o l u t i o n a n d the Civil War that e n s u e d . This conflict f o r c e d the c o o p e r a t i o n of d e v o t e d Bolshevik r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s V l a d i m i r Lenin and L e o n Trotsky with f o r m e r I m p e r i a l Russian A r m y officers such as Sergei S. K a m e n e v and Vladimir N. E g o r y e v — o f f i c e r s w h o m the Bolsheviks previously despised as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of a r e p r e s s i v e tsarist regime. T h e Bolshevik l e a d e r s soon f o u n d that their own s k e t c h y c o n c e p t s of a new, "socialist" style of w a r f a r e o f t e n failed against their p o w e r f u l W h i t e o p p o n e n t s . Facing d e f e a t , the r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s t u r n e d to f o r m e r tsarist officers to p r o v i d e m u c h n e e d e d military e x p e r t i s e to d e f e a t the Whites. D u r i n g the c o u r s e of the Civil War, the Bolshevik political l e a d e r s h i p achieved a m e a s u r e of c o o p e r a t i o n with their military c o m m a n d e r s that, h o w e v e r uneasy, w a s substantial e n o u g h to c o n t r i b u t e to the R e d victory. T h e multiple facets of c o o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n the Bolshevik political chiefs a n d their military leaders in the August 1919 c o u n t e r offensive on the S o u t h e r n F r o n t provide an interesting view at the complexity and ultimate success of R e d political-military relations in the R u s s i a n Civil War. T h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n politics a n d w a r is hardly news; the great Prussian war t h e o r i s t , Carl von Clausewitz, e x a m i n e d this c o n n e c t i o n in the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u ry, a n d his o f t - q u o t e d conclusion was that "war is not a m e r e act of policy, but a t r u e political i n s t r u m e n t , a c o n t i n u a t i o n of political activity by o t h e r means. W h a t r e m a i n s peculiar to war is simply the peculiar n a t u r e of its means. T h e political objective is the goal, war is the m e a n s of r e a c h i n g it, a n d m e a n s can n e v e r be c o n s i d e r e d in isolation f r o m their p u r p o s e . " 2 T h e most o b v i o u s aspect of Clause-

258 • Curtis S. King witz's c o n c e p t is t h a t t h e military " m e a n s " of any war should always c o n t r i b u t e to t h e a c c o m p l i s h m e n t of t h e political " g o a l " of t h a t war. Most s c h o l a r s a g r e e t h a t t h e B o l s h e v i k s a d h e r e d to this i d e a by k e e p i n g firm c o n t r o l o v e r their military l e a d e r s . H o w e v e r , m a n y h i s t o r i a n s h a v e o v e r s i m p l i f i e d t h e R e d political-military r e l a t i o n s h i p . S p a c e d o e s n o t p e r m i t a full discussion of t h e h i s t o r i o g r a p h y of t h e R u s s i a n Civil W a r a n d t h e R e d l e a d e r s h i p ; n o n e t h e l e s s , scholars h a v e g e n e r a l l y p o r t r a y e d t h e B o l s h e v i k c h i e f s a n d t h e i r military c o m m a n d e r s with very basic, if s o m e t i m e s c o n t r a d i c t o r y , views. O n o n e h a n d , L e n i n , Trotsky a n d t h e o t h e r p a r t y l e a d e r s a r e s e e n as brilliant political l e a d e r s w h o k e p t firm c o n t r o l o v e r t h e i r politically naive a n d u n r e l i a b l e military " e x p e r t s . " T h e o p p o s i t e view p a i n t s t h e B o l s h e v i k s as u t t e r l y i g n o r a n t of military realities who, if n o t f o r t h e skill of t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l officers, would h a v e f a i l e d t o win t h e war. Still o t h e r a c c o u n t s dismiss b o t h t h e B o l s h e v i k s a n d t h e military c o m m a n d e r s as i n c o m p e t e n t s w h o m a n a g e d t o win t h e w a r only t h r o u g h o v e r w h e l m i n g n u m b e r s , resources, a n d luck. 3 In f a c t , t h e r e is c o n s i d e r a b l e e v i d e n c e t h a t R e d political a n d military l e a d e r s m a n a g e d t o m a i n t a i n a r e a s o n a b l e b a l a n c e b e t w e e n their political goals and military m e a n s d u r i n g the war. This is n o t m e a n t t o imply t h a t R e d civil-military r e l a t i o n s w e r e p e r f e c t . T h e R e d s ' m u l t i p l e c o m m i t t e e s a n d system of political c o m m i s s a r s w e r e a w k w a r d , p e r s o n a l i t i e s s o m e t i m e s i n t e r v e n e d in t h e p l a n n i n g , a n d political infighting occasionally h i n d e r e d o p e r a t i o n s . Still, t h e R e d s g r a s p e d t h e e s s e n t i a l s of C l a u s e w i t z ' s political-military c o n n e c t i o n . T h i s essay will e x a m i n e o n e c a m p a i g n of t h e w a r — t h e Soviet c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e in s o u t h R u s s i a in A u g u s t 1919—as a c a s e s t u d y of R e d p l a n n i n g in a m a j o r o p e r a t i o n . T h e f o r m u l a t i o n of t h e R e d p l a n s h o w s i n t e r p l a y b e t w e e n t h e technical skills of t h e military specialists ( t h e t e r m " m i l i t a r y specialists" r e f e r r e d t o the extsarist officers serving with t h e R e d s ) a n d t h e insight of t h e B o l s h e v i k leaders. W h a t e m e r g e s m o s t clearly is t h a t t h e R e d p l a n evolved o v e r time. It was influe n c e d by a r g u m e n t s t h a t w e r e o c c a s i o n a l l y h e a t e d , b u t g e n e r a l l y r a t i o n a l a n d p r o f e s s i o n a l . In fact, t h e h a r s h e s t e x c h a n g e s w e r e o f t e n a m o n g t h e military s p e cialists ( e x - o f f i c e r s ) t h e m s e l v e s while t h e B o l s h e v i k s a n d t h e military c o m m a n ders o f t e n displayed respect for each other's judgment.

BACKGROUND T h e B o l s h e v i k seizure of p o w e r in P e t r o g r a d in O c t o b e r 1917 ( N o v e m b e r by t h e n e w c a l e n d a r ) did n o t i m m e d i a t e l y p r e c i p i t a t e a civil war. O p p o s i t i o n t o t h e R e d s was d i s o r g a n i z e d , a n d t h e t r e a t y of B r e s t - L i t o v s k gave t h e n e w l e a d e r s in R u s s i a a v a l u a b l e " b r e a t h i n g s p a c e " to c o n s o l i d a t e their p o w e r . This c o n s o l i d a t i o n t o o k p l a c e in c e n t r a l R u s s i a with P e t r o g r a d a n d M o s c o w as t h e c o r n e r s t o n e s . Slowly, t h e o p p o s i t i o n m o v e m e n t s ( s o o n t o b e k n o w n as t h e W h i t e s ) f o r m e d o n t h e p e r i p h e r y of t h e f o r m e r R u s s i a n E m p i r e . E v e n t u a l l y , t h e W h i t e s m o u n t e d military threats to the R e d s from several different directions: the south (primarily the D o n

Unusual Comrades • 259 a n d Caucasus regions), the east (a vast area including Siberia and land adjacent to both sides of the Ural mountains), the northwest (the Baltic states and Petrograd), and the north (Archangel and Murmansk). All of these efforts posed significant threats to the Bolshevik regime. In the spring of 1919, the Reds focused their main effort in the east and by the s u m m e r they had achieved considerable success. Later that summer, the Reds began to t r a n s f e r their main effort to the south. In the course of this fighting, the R e d s had built a stable and largely conventional organization to run their military war e f f o r t . The Red c o m m a n d e r in chief of Glavkom was Sergei S. Kamenev and his chief of staff was Pavel P. Lebedev. (Red military leaders did not have formal r a n k s during the Civil War and were simply referred to as "comrade c o m m a n der.") Glavkom was the Russian abbreviation for the military "high c o m m a n d , " which included the c o m m a n d e r in chief and his supporting staff and bureaus. G l a v k o m controlled the various Red Fronts ( " f r o n t " is the Russian term for an A r m y G r o u p ) fighting the Whites. T h e Reds had established several other mechanisms for control of the war e f f o r t . Of course, the Bolshevik Party retained ultimate power with the Central Committee. Lenin headed this Committee as well as the State Defense Council, which consisted of m e m b e r s of the government representing the key commissariats prosecuting the war (military, economic, diplomatic and others). The War Commissar was the indefatigable Leon Trotsky, but he did not have unfettered power. H e belonged to another collective body as the Republic Revvoensoviet, which consisted of Trotsky, several other party members, and the Red A r m y C o m m a n d e r in Chief, Kamenev. The revvoensoviet concept was mirrored at Front and A r m y levels. At these levels, the revvoensoviety usually consisted of the commander, his chief of staff, and one or two political commissars. These structures were in place as the Reds prepared their forces in the south for the 1919 s u m m e r campaign. By July 1919 the fighting in south Russia had already lasted over a year. The f r o n t lines had swayed back and forth over a vast territory with each side enjoying intermittent success. Red forces in 1918 and early 1919 were often disorganized, and even though they fielded larger n u m b e r s than their White opponents, the R e d s lacked trained and battle-worthy soldiers. A f t e r a long and bitter struggle, the Whites seized Tsaritsyn (later r e n a m e d Stalingrad), a key city on the Volga river, but their offensive stalled in August 1919. The Red Southern Front h o p e d to exploit the White pause under its new commander, Vladimir N. Egoryev. T h e Front consisted of five armies (from west to east): the F o u r t e e n t h , T h i r t e e n t h , Eighth. Ninth, and Tenth Armies. By mid-1919, the Whites had still not achieved a high level of strategic coordination in Russia, but the forces in the south were significantly stronger in the summer of 1919 than at any previous time. The overall White c o m m a n d e r in the south, General Anton Denikin, commanded three forces: the Volunteer A r m y (a highly skilled collection of ex-tsarist officers and non-commissioned officers with a rec-

260 • Curtis S. King ent leavening of peasant recruits), the D o n Cossack Army, and the Caucasian A r m y (mostly Kuban Cossacks). Denikin had to placate differing political views between his subordinate forces, but his "Armed Forces of South Russia" ( A F S R ) were at the peak of their strength in July and August 1919. A f t e r taking Tsaritsyn, Denikin issued an order, his famous "Moscow Directive," that called for an advance by all three of his subordinate forces converging on Moscow. However, with Red and White forces evenly balanced in August, Denikin's forces had to parry a thrust from the Reds before resuming their own offensive.

T H E F O R M A T I O N OF A P L A N : JULY-AUGUST

1919

The formation of the Red plan for the August counter offensive was not simply a case of politicians versus military experts. In fact, the final version of the R e d concept evolved through a multifaceted process. The c o m m a n d e r in chief, Kamenev, desired a major blow on the eastern flank towards Tsaritsyn. Both Trotsky and Egoryev objected to aspects of this plan, but their objections had distinctly different approaches and reflected legitimate operational concerns. Egoryev agreed with a major offensive on Tsaritsyn, but he had reservations concerning K a m e n e v ' s secondary thrust with the Eighth and Thirteenth Armies. Trotsky's objections were based on broader political considerations; he believed that the main attack would be better directed on the western flank against the Volunteers near Kharkov (instead of Tsaritsyn) in order to take advantage of R e d support a m o n g the industrial sectors of the Donbas. It should be noted that Trotsky's "political" analysis was based on the effect of politics on the conduct of operations—not on any personal political motives. Whatever their opposition, neither Egoryev nor Trotsky undermined the August counter offensive. Their a r g u m e n t s against the plan were genuine and open, but once the Red leadership had finalized their plan both Trotsky and Egoryev did their best to carry out the offensive. The planning for a Southern Front attack intensified almost immediately a f t e r K a m e n e v ' s assumption of command in July, coinciding with Lenin and the Party leadership's increasing belief that the main Red effort n e e d e d to be in south Russia. At this time, the Bolshevik leader noted that in addition to earlier transfers of 70,000 soldiers, the Southern Front had received a n o t h e r 22,000 t r o o p s in the first week of July. Shortly after Lenin's message, the Party Central C o m m i t t e e , at Lenin's urging, issued the well-known decree, "All Out for the Fight against Denikin." 4 This document was, for the most part, a strategic, economic, and politically oriented series of instructions. Lenin t e r m e d the Soviet Republic "a single a r m e d military camp," and he called for the mobilization of m o r e workers, m o r e intensive propaganda, the need to bring deserters back to the army, increased economic efforts, and firm support of the military specialists. Lenin was clearly supporting the R e d c o m m a n d e r s and not meddling in operational matters.

Unusual Comrades • 261 Translating the desires of Bolshevik leaders into workable operational plans was a d e m a n d i n g task that required time. The new Front c o m m a n d e r , Egoryev, a f o r m e r tsarist officer with G e n e r a l Staff A c a d e m y training, struggled to halt the R e d r e t r e a t and restore order to his worn out forces. O n 16 July, the new comm a n d e r issued an o r d e r to the Southern Front A r m i e s that identified the greatest danger to the R e d s on the eastern flank of the front. 5 Two days later Egoryev slightly altered his instructions by giving a m o r e offensive role to the Eighth A r m y (a limited attack by the Eighth's right flank to ease the pressure on the Thirteenth A r m y ) , and by directing the Tenth A r m y to focus more on fortifying its current positions r a t h e r than on offensive actions. 6 Stopping a retreating army is one of the most difficult tasks faced by military commanders. The Southern Front withdrawal in June and July 1919 was no exception. The retreating peasant soldiers were often dispirited (and indifferent to almost any political appeal after several years of devastating war and terror executed by both sides), the supply system was a shambles, and reinforcements were o f t e n compelled to plug gaps in the line in a piecemeal fashion. Egoryev took reasonable steps to stop the Southern Front's retreat, but simple exhaustion a m o n g the attackers was probably the key factor that brought the White advance to a halt in the s u m m e r of 1919. Denikin's attacking forces had supply problems of their own as they advanced and the Whites had to dissipate their forces to cover ever-increasing pieces of occupied terrain. The main achievement of the R e d comm a n d e r s during the withdrawal was to k e e p their forces intact, thus allowing the White offensive to run its course. K a m e n e v recognized the delicate balance of forces, as well as the fleeting offensive opportunities on the Southern Front, and the Glavkom c o m m a n d e r wanted the R e d s to seize the initiative. O n 23 July he issued O r d e r 1116. This was the key d o c u m e n t outlining the plan for an offensive against Denikin, and thus it f o r m e d the basis for the August counter offensive. K a m e n e v began the o r d e r by coming to grips with the direction and timing of the main thrust: T h e S o u t h e r n Front is assigned the task of routing Denikin. For this purpose: 1. the Front will m a k e preparations for launching the main blow on its left flank by mid August. For this purpose, within the specified time: a) the Southern Front will p r e p a r e the Ninth and Tenth A r m i e s for the offensive by bringing them up to strength and providing for their a p p r o p r i a t e regrouping. b) the overall c o m m a n d of the strike g r o u p is assigned to the Second A r m y c o m m a n d e r Shorin. The Second A r m y h e a d q u a r t e r s is appointed as headq u a r t e r s of the Strike Group. [Shorin and his staff were transferred f r o m the E a s t e r n Front to the Southern Front for the offensive.] 7

262 • Curtis S. King K a m e n e v ' s directive went on to specify measures for reinforcing the strike group. This included bringing t h e 28 lh and 25 lh Rifle Divisions ( R D s ) from the E a s t e r n Front as well as transferring units f r o m the Kazan and Samara regions to replenish the depleted divisions of the Ninth and Tenth Armies. The Glavkom comm a n d e r instructed the Southern Front to use its reserve (the 56 lh R D and a separate brigade) to reinforce Shorin's group. Also, Kamenev asked Egoryev to send Glavkom the Southern Front's operational plan as soon as possible. A n o t h e r crucial aspect of K a m e n e v ' s plan appeared in the second paragraph of O r d e r 1116: P r e p a r e to inflict a more limited blow in the first days of August in the Voronezh direction with the forces of the Eighth Army, reinforced by the 31 st R D and also the 7 t h R D if the latter division has not been committed to the Kursk direction prior to the start of the offensive. The Southern Front comm a n d e r must bear in mind that the 7 l h R D is to be committed to the d e f e n s e of Kursk only in the most exceptional circumstances. 8 Finally, Kamenev directed the Eastern Front to transfer the First Siberian Rifle Brigade to the Southern Front for incorporation into the 13 th R D in o r d e r to strengthen the Eighth Army's secondary thrust. The Glavkom c o m m a n d e r wanted the Eighth A r m y to begin its offensive as planned, hoping for the timely arrival of the 13 lh RD. But even if r e i n f o r c e m e n t s were late, they could always join the diversionary attack after its start. K a m e n e v ' s order was clear and succinct, but still comprehensive. The main effort of the Southern Front was to be on the left (eastern) flank. The Ninth and Tenth Armies, with substantial reinforcements, were to form a strike group u n d e r the c o m m a n d of Vasilii N. Shorin, attack the enemy's flank, and seize Tsaritsyn with an eye to advancing into the Kuban. The main attack was to begin in "mid August," and the key secondary attack by the Eighth Army (later to include part of the Thirteenth A r m y ) was scheduled to start two weeks earlier, in the "first days of August." The logic of the timing was unmistakable. The purpose of any secondary, or diversionary, attack is to draw the e n e m y ' s attention away f r o m the direction of the main offensive. Clearly, a diversionary attack must begin prior to the main thrust if it has any hope of drawing the enemy's units away f r o m the primary objective. The two-week pause b e t w e e n the Eighth Army's thrust and Shorin's main attack would provide an a p p r o p r i a t e delay that would entice the Whites to commit to the feint, entraining and marching units away f r o m the Tsaritsyn area. Anything less than a 10- to 14-day separation would probably not give the Whites enough time to send their forces in the " w r o n g " direction. Kamenev's plan recognized this basic tenet f o r the timing of main and secondary offensives, and he clearly communicated his desires t o the Southern Front commander. Although Trotsky recognized the operational merits of K a m e n e v ' s plan, he

Unusual Comrades • 263 opposed the c o m m a n d e r in chief's choice of direction for the main effort. This objection was based on Trotsky's knowledge of the political peculiarities of the Civil War and their effect on operational planning. In two reports submitted to the Central Committee, Trotsky outlined his arguments. 9 The first of these reports, sent soon after a meeting at the Southern Front headq u a r t e r s in Kozlov, focused chiefly on operational considerations. Trotsky believed that K a m e n e v ' s plan d e m a n d e d a major regrouping of forces that would disrupt the current flow of operations. H e also believed that Denikin had already moved considerable forces to the eastern flank and thus was well disposed to repel a Red assault on Tsaritsyn. The War Commissar dismissed, on both political and military grounds, the possibility of Denikin and Kolchak uniting their forces on the eastern flank. H e was more concerned with the prospect of the Poles supporting D e n i k i n in the west. Finally, Trotsky reminded the Committee that Denikin's Volunteers were the key enemy (not the m o r e politically fickle Cossacks) and that the Reds n e e d e d to gain and maintain the initiative—without a pause for regrouping their units. In a later report Trotsky emphasized the political conditions in south Russia and their influence on Kamenev's plan. H e noted that Denikin's Volunteer A r m y was constantly feuding with its ostensible allies, the D o n and Kuban Cossacks, and he believed that K a m e n e v ' s plan of attack would only serve to drive the Cossacks into closer ties with Denikin's Volunteer Army. Trotsky also recognized that a f t e r the repeated fighting over the Kuban and North Caucasus regions, this region was devastated and would have difficulty supporting an offensive with a d e q u a t e transport and supplies. The War Commissar reiterated his earlier belief that the Reds should attack farther to the west near K h a r k o v where the Soviets could take advantage of their stronger base of political and logistic support among peasants and workers in the industrial areas of the Donbas. Finally, although Trotsky agreed with the c o m m a n d e r in chief's argument that reinforcements from the east would have a shorter distance to travel for an attack near the Volga, the War Commissar dismissed as specious the claim that K a m e n e v ' s plan would prevent a link up between Denikin and White Forces in the Urals; the Whites facing the Eastern Front had already been soundly d e f e a t e d and no longer represented a threat to join Denikin on the Volga. Both K a m e n e v ' s concept and Trotsky's counter arguments had considerable merit. The c o m m a n d e r in chief, a f o r m e r tsarist officer whose focus was on the operational conditions of the front, devised a plan that neatly skirted the enemy's main strength and o f f e r e d an opportunity to cut in behind the Volunteer Army. Trotsky, the astute revolutionary, saw advantages to an attack in a region where the Reds had considerable political support (the D o n b a s ) . The War Commissar minimized the operational and tactical difficulties of facing the Volunteers in a frontal assault while emphasizing the need to avoid an offensive that would only encourage the Cossacks to solidify their alliance with the Volunteers. Both concepts were well reasoned and cogent. K a m e n e v ' s plan ultimately failed, but to say

264 • Curtis S. King that Trotsky's c o u r s e would h a v e s u c c e e d e d is p u r e conjecture. W h a t is m o r e certain is that T r o t s k y — d e s p i t e his misgivings—gave his full e f f o r t in o r d e r to help K a m e n e v carry out the plan successfully. U n l i k e Trotsky, E g o r y e v a g r e e d with K a m e n e v ' s plan for the main attack on the left flank, but he o b j e c t e d to G l a v k o m ' s i n t e n d e d missions for the r e m a i n d e r of the S o u t h e r n Front. In a r e p o r t sent to G l a v k o m on 24 July, the Front comm a n d e r o f f e r e d an alternative plan. 1 0 This r e p o r t a p p e a r s to have been d e v e l o p e d b e f o r e E g o r y e v received a copy of O r d e r 1116, but the S o u t h e r n Front comm a n d e r was clearly aware of G l a v k o m ' s intent, probably f r o m previous discussions with K a m e n e v and Lebedev. E g o r y e v c o n f i r m e d the n e e d to c o n c e n t r a t e reinf o r c e m e n t s for the strike g r o u p in the N o v o k h o p e r s k - K a m y s h i n region, a n d he a g r e e d that the c a p t u r e of Tsaritsyn s h o u l d be the key objective of Shorin's group. H o w e v e r , E g o r y e v desired "an e n e r g e t i c d e m o n s t r a t i o n " by the F o u r t e e n t h A r m y — a n o p e r a t i o n smaller in scope a n d f u r t h e r west than K a m e n e v ' s p r o p o s e d s e c o n d a r y assault by the E i g h t h a n d T h i r t e e n t h Armies. In fact, Egoryev felt that the latter two a r m i e s n e e d e d to m a i n t a i n a static d e f e n s e until such time as the strike g r o u p ' s attack p r e s e n t e d an o p p o r t u n i t y for the Eighth A r m y to join in a general offensive. H e r e g a r d e d the V o l u n t e e r push on K h a r k o v as the most serio u s t h r e a t to the F r o n t ' s position, but he urged that the R e d s use only "local f o r c e s " to contain the e n e m y a d v a n c e . Recognizing the risks, Egoryev believed that only by c o m m i t t i n g all fresh r e i n f o r c e m e n t s to the strike g r o u p ' s blow would the R e d s be able to cut the W h i t e s f r o m their Kuban base b e f o r e a V o l u n t e e r attack in the K h a r k o v - K u r s k - O r e l d i r e c t i o n could achieve decisive results. E g o r y e v ' s plan had b o t h insights a n d flaws. T h e concept of minimizing t h e forces d e f e n d i n g K h a r k o v for the s a k e of providing all possible r e i n f o r c e m e n t s to the strike g r o u p s h o w e d that E g o r y e v was willing to take risks in o r d e r to achieve a decisive victory. T h e Front c o m m a n d e r saw the i m p o r t a n c e of focusing on the main e f f o r t w i t h o u t dissipating his limited forces piecemeal along the e n t i r e F r o n t . Egoryev, however, failed to s e e h o w a diversionary offensive might assist the main thrust by drawing White f o r c e s away f r o m the Tsaritsyn region. T h e S o u t h e r n Front c o m m a n d e r w a n t e d the E i g h t h a n d T h i r t e e n t h A r m i e s to c o n d u c t a " s t u b b o r n d e f e n s e " on their fronts, a n d he envisioned that the F o u r t e e n t h A r m y ' s d e m o n s t r a t i o n would begin " o n o r d e r . " While it might be a r g u e d t h a t a diversion on the F o u r t e e n t h A r m y ' s f r o n t could be just as effective as a seco n d a r y attack f r o m the Eighth and T h i r t e e n t h Armies, E g o r y e v ' s key m i s t a k e was his failure to set a definitive d a t e t h a t w o u l d e n a b l e a diversion to d r a w W h i t e forces away f r o m the Tsaritsyn direction. His r e p o r t stated that t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n of forces for S h o r i n ' s strike g r o u p w o u l d be c o m p l e t e by 10 A u g u s t — t h u s implying that he could m a k e the " m i d A u g u s t " d e a d l i n e for t h e m a i n o f f e n s i v e . H o w e v e r , E g o r y e v p r o v i d e d n o d a t e s for the start of the s e c o n d a r y offensive. T h e next day E g o r y e v a c k n o w l e d g e d receipt of O r d e r 1116 a n d c o n f i r m e d t h e basic intent of his r e p o r t f r o m the day b e f o r e while adding details. 1 1 T h e F r o n t c o m m a n d e r b e g a n with a thinly veiled d i s p a r a g e m e n t of G l a v k o m ' s plan w h e n h e

Unusual Comrades • 265 claimed that the directive called for three simultaneous advances. His c o m m e n t was unjustified; K a m e n e v ' s plan called for one secondary effort followed by one main e f f o r t — n o t simultaneous, triple offensives. Egoryev reiterated his desire to conduct a " d e m o n s t r a t i o n " on the Fourteenth A r m y ' s front, while the Eighth and Thirteenth A r m i e s essentially p e r f o r m e d defensive roles. The latter two armies were to join in the attack towards Ekaterinoslav or Kursk-Valuiki at some later time, " d e p e n d i n g on the conditions." Finally, he asked—in fact pleaded—for G l a v k o m to give the Front more time to p r e p a r e for its attack^, stating that he was unsure of the condition of many of his units due to "vague and f r a g m e n t a r y " reports coming f r o m his subordinates, especially the Fourteenth Army. Unquestionably, Egoryev raised several legitimate points, not the least of which was the poor condition of most of the divisions e a r m a r k e d by Glavkom for the secondary thrust. O n e might also argue that an attack by the Fourteenth A r m y on the far right of the Front could create just as useful a diversion as an attack by the Eighth Army. Nonetheless, Egoryev failed to appreciate two key points—wherever the diversionary attack was directed, it had to begin before the main assault and be executed with sufficient vigor (not a half-hearted demonstration) in o r d e r to draw away significant White forces f r o m the Tsaritsyn region. Egoryev clamored for time to p r e p a r e his attacks, but his request was vague. Did he want to delay the main thrust, the diversion or both? In the end, Egoryev's request lacked the sense of timing between the diversion and the main attack needed to m a k e the counter offensive successful. D o c u m e n t s f r o m 26 and 27 July reinforced the intent of G l a v k o m while revealing that the disagreements between the high c o m m a n d and the Southern Front were substantial. First, a Glavkom directive subordinated the Red Twelfth Army to the Southern Front (from the Western Front). 1 2 A month later, the Twelfth A r m y was returned to the Western Front's control, but for the immediate future, the directive implied that the Fourteenth and Twelfth A r m y operations might be coordinated to k e e p the Whites off balance. However, Kamenev did not state that the Twelfth A r m y could be used to substitute for the diversionary attack of the Eighth and Thirteenth Armies. This Glavkom directive was followed with a n o t h e r high command set of instructions that explained the need for "active o p e r a t i o n s " at both Ekaterinoslav and Kharkov. 1 3 On the surface, Kamenev could be accused of ordering secondary offensives in two directions and conceding to Egoryev's desire to use the Fourteenth A r m y for the key diversionary attack. However, the latter portion of Kamenev's instructions clarified his intention that timing, not a specific direction, was pivotal to the R e d attack. H e emphasized that t h e intent of the secondary operation was to "rivet the enemy's attention on your right flank, this is necessary for the success of f u r t h e r operations." The c o m m a n d e r in chief emphasized that "even if not successful, we will buy time" to concentrate Shorin's strike group. More than anything else, Kamenev wanted a quicker start to the attack on the Voronezh direction—no later than early August—in o r d e r to pave the way for

266 • Curtis S. King Shorin's offensive. W h e t h e r or not the Fourteenth Army could contribute to the Eighth Army's diversion was not nearly as important as starting the secondary thrust on time. In support of his ideas, Kamenev reminded Egoryev of the meeting at the Front h e a d q u a r t e r s in Kozlov in which the c o m m a n d e r in chief had m a d e it clear that the diversionary thrust had to begin in early August in order to have the desired effect on enemy dispositions. Trotsky had also a t t e n d e d this meeting and two messages concerning the conference to the Central Committee and Lenin's State Defense Council shed light on the War Commissar's role and attitude towards the Southern Front's August counter offensive. 1 4 The first message, discussed above, presented Trotsky's objections to Glavkom's plan. In the second report, the War Commissar finally accepted, albeit reluctantly, Kamenev's concept, and Trotsky seemed to be most concerned with uniting Red efforts behind the upcoming offensive. H e reported that Egoryev, as well as his commissars and operational staff, shared significant disagreements with K a m e n e v ' s plan.Trotsky stated that he was not overly concerned with the substance of the disagreement, but he was very much worried that the Front c o m m a n d e r would not be able to execute the high c o m m a n d ' s plan with full vigor because of Egoryev's misgivings. The War Commissar even suggested that Egoryev might be relieved (in favor of Vladimir I. Selivachev) in o r d e r to ensure that the Southern Front leadership fully supported Kamenev's plan. Trotsky's latter report destroys the notion that he undermined Kamenev's plan. The War Commissar may have questioned the direction of Glavkom's main thrust, but he was clearly willing to subsume his own concerns to the greater good of preserving unity of c o m m a n d and backing the expertise of the military specialists. Trotsky believed that it was more important to put all effort behind Kamenev's plan rather than to continue endless debate, which might render any plan ineffective. Trotsky was even willing to remove the Front c o m m a n d e r in o r d e r to guarantee the full support of the entire chain of c o m m a n d . O n 28 July, Egoryev spoke by direct wire with Glavkom. His conversation focused on reporting the recent White efforts to "divert our a t t e n t i o n " away f r o m the main Volunteer thrust in the center of the front. 1 5 Although concerned about the situation near Poltava, Egoryev felt somewhat confident that he could occupy the initial starting positions for the offensive to the east of Kamyshin. Yet, he even hedged this assertion with the comment that the Tenth Army had committed its units to current missions and thus was having difficulty in "scraping together a reserve." Egoryev clearly felt that he was being pressed to conduct an offensive without enough time to gather his reinforcements for the strike group a n d a chance to put his retreating units into order; however, his c o m m e n t s do not reveal a deliberate desire to undermine the c o m m a n d e r in chief's plan. Egoryev's complaints reflect a c o m m o n desire of most military professionals to ensure that they have sufficient resources and time for the success of their mission. In the c o m f o r t of retrospective analysis, we can conclude that Egoryev failed to appreciate the need to begin an early diversion against the Volunteers. Regardless, the Southern

Unusual Comrades • 267

A.K. Stepin

L.L. Klyuev

Figure 17.1 Southern

Front Organization

A.I. Rataiskii

A.I. Gekker

for the August 1919 Counter

A.I. Egorov

Offensive

Front commander presented considered arguments for an alternative concept. The Red commanders were engaged in a professional disagreement with oversight, but not undo interference, from their political bosses. The Southern Front commander and his staff must have been working day and night at the end of July. Not only did the Front command engage in extensive communications with Glavkom and host the Kozlov meeting between the debating parties, it also issued five extensive orders to the Front's armies that outlined their tasks in the upcoming offensive. (See Figure 17.1 for the organization of the Southern Front's armies.) All of these instructions were dated 28 July, and although they supported the bulk of Kamenev's original plan, these directives reflected the still smoldering disagreements between Egoryev and the commander in chief over the nature and timing of the secondary blow. It is worth examining these orders in some detail. The Front's directive to the Fourteenth Army gave it a more active role than originally envisioned in Kamenev's Order 1116 but remained close to Glavkom's intent. 16 The Fourteenth Army was to capture Ekaterinoslav as soon as possible and then continue further to the southeast. Egoryev also tasked the Army to begin a movement on its left near Kharkov. The Front commander wanted the demonstration to draw the maximum amount of enemy forces towards the Fourteenth Army, which certainly reflected a crucial purpose of Glavkom's secondary blow. Finally, the Front advised the new Army commander, Alexander I. Egorov (not to be confused with his Front commander, Egoryev) to conserve his reserve in order to counter a possible White attack on Kharkov and be ready to exploit any Red success with a pursuit to Novocherkassk. Egoryev ordered the Thirteenth Army commander, Anatolii I. Gekker, to keep

268 • Curtis S. King his forces in a defensive role. 17 T h e Front c o m m a n d e r ordered the Thirteenth A r m y to "maintain the link" between the armies on its left and right. The directive placed particular emphasis on supporting the Eighth Army's right flank, telling G e k k e r to move his adjoining flank forward with the Eighth in o r d e r to prevent any gaps f r o m forming. In the final part of the order, Egoryev informed G e k k e r that the Front would retain the 7th R D in reserve in case of a d e e p penetration by the enemy, but if conditions permitted, Egoryev would give the division to the Thirteenth Army. In his directive to the Eighth Army, Egoryev began with an outline of the Front's overall design for the offensive. 1 8 H e explained that the main effort was to be with the Ninth and Tenth Armies, beginning in "mid August" with a demonstration by the Fourteenth Army. The Front c o m m a n d e r ordered the Eighth A r m y "between 2 and 5 August [to] deliver the first blow to draw in enemy reserves and tie down the enemy to your front." Egoryev informed A n d r e i I. Rataiskii, the Eighth A r m y c o m m a n d e r , that his A r m y would have to begin the offensive without the 31st RD. The A r m y was to advance to the line of Biryuch-Pavlovsk-Averinskii, and then join in with the general offensive of the Ninth and Tenth Armies in mid August. Egoryev told Rataiskii to create reserves and maintain links on his left flank with the Ninth Army. The final directive to the Front's forces went to the c o m m a n d e r of the strike group, Vasilii I. Shorin. 1 9 As he had m a d e clear in his other directives, Egoryev designated Shorin's force as the Front's main effort. In order to reinforce the strike group, the Front c o m m a n d e r promised to give Shorin the 56th R D from the Front reserve, the Kazan and Saratov Brigades, and the 25th and 28th R D s f r o m the Eastern Front. The group's "general tasks" were to smash the enemy and capture Novocherkassk-Manych. The more "immediate task" was to occupy the line Khop e r - D o n - T s a r i t s y n . Finally, Egoryev advised Shorin that the more energetically he began the offensive, the more easily his group could advance later, thus paving the way for the Eighth and Fourteenth Armies to join in the general offensive. Taken as a whole (see Figure 17.2), Egoryev's directives a d h e r e d to the spirit of K a m e n e v ' s plan with some variations. The principle area of a g r e e m e n t was that Shorin's group would launch the main effort with the goal of seizing Tsaritsyn. Egoryev also gave in to K a m e n e v ' s d e m a n d that the Eighth A r m y begin its diversionary attack in early August. However, Egoryev instructed the Eighth A r m y to time its blow s o m e w h e r e between 2 and 5 August, which showed that the Front c o m m a n d e r was still unable to pinpoint an exact d a t e for the attack. In fact, this lack of precision would haunt the offensive over the next two weeks when the diversionary attack was postponed several times. Finally, Egoryev's planned diversion by the Fourteenth was not in G l a v k o m ' s original plan, although K a m e nev gave his tacit approval as long as the Eighth A r m y began its assault soon enough to draw the White reserves away f r o m Shorin's group. Egoryev's alternative plan may have contained some flaws in its design, but the quality of his orders was outstanding. Each directive was crisply written with clear

270 • Curtis S. King tasks and lines of advance. The Front c o m m a n d e r began each army's order with an explanation of the Front's entire plan that placed that army's mission clearly within the context of the Front's scheme. In addition, Egoryev clearly delineated the distribution of reserves and reinforcements while urging his subordinates to build their own reserves that could be used to prevent enemy penetrations of the front or to exploit successful attacks. In some ways, these orders contrast with Egoryev's reports and wire conversations with the high command, which were sometimes obscure. This contrast may have been due to the difference, relatively common among military leaders, between giving orders to subordinates and debating plans with higher headquarters. Credit should also go to Nicolai V. Pnevskii, the Front chief of staff, who played a role in crafting and staffing operational orders. O n the same busy day of 28 July, the Central Committee replied to Trotsky's report on the divergence of views between the Front and the c o m m a n d e r in chief (differences that were now much less pronounced than at the earlier meeting at Front headquarters). 2 0 The Bolshevik leadership chose to ignore Trotsky's request to replace Egoryev with Selivachev. However, they reaffirmed the authority of the c o m m a n d e r in chief. Also, the Central Committee sent Ivan Smilga and Mikhail M. Lashevich to the Southern Front Revvoensoviet to oversee the Front's operations. In short, the political leadership was little concerned with the substance of operational disagreements between the military specialists, but they were particularly concerned that the effort was unified. Trotsky recognized the need to support Kamenev's plan and respected the technical skills of the military specialists. On 29 July, the War Commissar complained about the Central Committee's unwillingness to address the disagreements b e t w e e n Egoryev and Kamenev over the Southern Front's scheme of maneuver. 2 1 H e also did not like the posting of Lashevich and Smilga to the Southern Front. Despite these complaints, Trotsky still offered his support to Kamenev. Trotsky r e p o r t e d that the Front operations officer, A. M. Peremytov, had been replaced by K.Io. B e r e n d s for opposition to Glavkom's plan, but both Egoryev and his commissar, Gregorii la. Sokol'nikov, had eventually agreed to execute K a m e n e v ' s plan. Against this backdrop, Trotsky offered some insurance: Selivachev would b e c o m e the deputy Front commander-ready to replace the Front c o m m a n d e r in case Egoryev's "hesitations" negatively effected G l a v k o m ' s plan. The War Commissar felt that this was "the least painful solution." O n the same day,Trotsky directed the Ninth A r m y to prepare for its upcoming offensive. 2 2 His message mentioned nothing of the operational disagreements at the higher levels of c o m m a n d . The War Commissar was prudent not to let the strategic d e b a t e filter down to the subordinate commands. He directed the A r m y to conduct extensive political work to reverse the low morale resulting f r o m recent setbacks. This o r d e r confirms that Trotsky was not attempting to subvert K a m e n e v ' s efforts. The War Commissar had his objections towards the plan, but his instructions to subordinate units always reflected full support of the c o m m a n der in chief.

Unusual

Comrades

• 271

CONCLUSION In s u m , the A u g u s t c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e r e v e a l s s e v e r a l a s p e c t s of civil-military relat i o n s a n d the level of military skill e x h i b i t e d o n the R e d side. T h e B o l s h e v i k political l e a d e r s and their ex-tsarist military l e a d e r s a r g u e d o v e r o p e r a t i o n a l plans, but t h e y u l t i m a t e l y c o o p e r a t e d and e v e n f o u n d a g r u d g i n g respect for e a c h o t h e r s ' v i e w s . T h e military specialists t e n d e d to s e e t h e c a m p a i g n in largely o p e r a t i o n a l t e r m s with a f o c u s o n the military a s p e c t s of m a n e u v e r i n g units, timing of o f f e n sives, the n e e d to bring o r d e r to R e d forces, and t h e m o r e technical d e t a i l s of moving

and positioning

reinforcements. The

Bolshevik

leaders,

particularly

Trotsky, b e t t e r p e r c e i v e d t h e political factors in s o u t h Russia, e v e n if t h e y o n l y partially g r a s p e d the t e c h n i c a l and tactical d e t a i l s of military o p e r a t i o n s . M o s t i m p o r t a n t l y , b o t h the political leaders and military specialists r e c o g n i z e d the diff e r e n c e s , p r e s e n t e d their a r g u m e n t s , and ultimately w o r k e d t o g e t h e r o n c e the d e c i s i o n had b e e n m a d e . In the e n d the R e d s w e r e d e f e a t e d in A u g u s t but l e a r n e d f r o m their d e f e a t . T h i s e n a b l e d t h e m to r e s h a p e their plan in O c t o b e r 1919. C o n t i n u i n g to c o m b i n e c o n v e n t i o n a l military e x p e r t i s e and the B o l s h e v i k p e r s p e c t i v e o n the political and social a s p e c t s of r e v o l u t i o n a r y war, t h e R e d s c o r r e c t e d their earlier errors. T h e f o r m a t i o n of the R e d plan for the A u g u s t 1919 c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e , e v e n w i t h its s h o r t c o m i n g s , g a v e e v i d e n c e of this future, s u c c e s s f u l c o o p e r a t i o n .

Notes 1 V.I. Lenin, Selected Works, rev. ed., 3 vols. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), 3: 193. 2 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 87. 3 The literature on the Russian Civil War is extensive, but frequently biased or often lacking details on military issues. Among western scholars, one of the most conservative works is by Richard Pipes, Russia under the Bolshevik Regime (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993). A more moderate view is taken by William Henry Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution 1918-1921, 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1935). A strongly leftist view is represented by Edward Hallett Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923, 3 vols. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1953). A work with more military detail than Chamberlin and Carr, but critical of Red military leaders is Evan Mawdsley, The Russian Civil War (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987). John Erickson, The Soviet High Command: A MilitaryPolitical History, 1918-1941 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1962) looks at the Red military leaders more favorably, but does not analyze their operational skills in much detail. D. Fedotoff White, The Growth of the Red Army (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944) is typical of the view that the Bolshevik Party, not the military leadership, was the key to the Red victory. Russian views of the war include Leon Trotsky, How the Revolution Armed, 5 vols., trans. Brian Pearce (London: New Park Publications, 1979). Trotsky recognized the need for military specialists, but his analysis of the war is still traditionally Marxist, crediting economic and social factors for the Red victory. A.S. Bubnov, et at., eds., Grazhdanskaia Voina, 1918-1921, 3 vols. (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izd., 1930) is the first (of three)

272 • Curtis S. King

4

5

6 7

8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

Soviet official histories of the Civil War. The second volume of N.E. Kakurin, Kak srazhalas' revoliutsiia (Moscow: Gosudartsvennoe Izd., 1926) is even handed, but still relies heavily on an overall Marxist framework that minimizes the role of military leaders. One work that focuses on the origins of the military specialists, but not their operational skill, is A.G. Kavtaradze, Voennye Spetsialisly na sluzhbe Respubliki Sovetov 1917-1920gg. (Moscow: Nauka, 1988). Leon Trotsky, My Life (New York: Pathfinder, 1970), 451-455; Direktivy Glavnova Komandovaniia Krasnoi Armii (1917-1920). Sbornik Dokumentov [hereafter referred to as Glavkom] (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Oborony SSSR, 1969), 438-439, #407; and Lenin's Collected Works, 51: 8. Also see V.I. Lenin, Selected Works, 3 vols., rev. ed. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975) 3: 184-199. This is a good English translation of the document. Russian language versions are available in Glavkom Directives, 344-345, and S. N. Shiskin et al., Direktivy Komandovaniia Frontov Armii (1917-1922) [hereafter referred to as Front], 4 vols. (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Oborony SSSR, 1972) 2: 280-281, #256. Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voennyi arkhiv [hereafter RGVA], f. 100, op. 3, d. 100, 1. 466 (Front, 2: 275-277, #252): RGVA, f. 100, op. 3, d 100,1. 470 (Front, 2: 278-279, #253); and RGVA, f. 100, op. 3, d. 100,1. 502 (Front, 2: 279-280, #254). RGVA, f. 100, op. 3, d. 100,1. 523 (Front, 2: 281-282, #257); and RGVA, f. 100, op. 3, d. 100, I. 534 (Front, 2: 283-284, #258). RGVA, f. 6, op. 10, d. 103, 1. 36-38 (Glavkom, 438-439, #408). An English translation is available in Jan M. Meijer, ed., The Trotsky Papers, 1917-1922 , 2 vols. (The Hague: Mouton, 1964-1971), 1: 606-609 as an appendix (note) to document #338. Ibid., emphasis added. RGVA, f. 6, op. 4, d. 49,1. 29-30 and Trotsky, How the Revolution Armed, 2:429-433. RGVA, f. 6, op. 4, d. 49,1. 31-36 (Front, 2: 284-289, #259). RGVA, f. 100, op. 3, d. 97,1. 176-178 (Glavkom, 439-440, #409). RGVA, f. 6, op. 10, d. 103,1. 32 (Glavkom, 440^41, #410). RGVA, f. 6, op. 4, d. 102,1. 241-243 (Glavkom, 441^42, #411). RGVA, f. 6, op. 4, d. 49,1. 29-30 and Meijer, The Trotsky Papers, 1: 604-605 (#338). RGVA, f. 6, op. 12, d. 63,1. 83. RGVA, f. 100, op. 3, d. 68,1. 91 (Front, 2: 290-291, #260). RGVA, f. 100, op. 3, d. 68,1. 92 (Front, 2: 291, #262). RGVA, f. 100, op. 3, d. 68,1. 93 (Front, 2: 292, #263). RGVA, f. 107, op. 1, d. 21,1. 126 (Front, 2: 290-291, #261). Meijer, The Trotsky Papers, 1: 610-613 (#340). Ibid., 1:612-615 (#342). Trotsky, How the Revolution Armed, 2: 356-358.

Wartime Entrepreneur: Mikhail Riabushinskii's Banking Business, 1914-1919 BORIS V.

ANAN'ICH

In his elaborate research on Merchants and Entrepreneurs in Imperial Russia, A l f r e d Rieber paid special attention to the role of the Old Believers in the develo p m e n t of Russian trade and industry. From the large family of Riabushinskiis he singled out the brothers Pavel, Vladimir, and Mikhail as "most active entrepreneurs," who devoted their creative energies, will, and talent to the economic revival of Moscow. 1 This article is devoted to the activities of one of them, Mikhail Pavlovich Riabushinskii, during the Revolution and Civil War and is based on his memoirs and letters collected in the manuscript d e p a r t m e n t of the New York Public Library. 2 The Riabushinskiis' entrepreneurial ethics and strategy during the first World War are already fairly well known. The history of the Riabushinskiis' trade company goes back to the early nineteenth century. They started with retail trade and already by the middle of the century, the family had amassed substantial capital. In 1867 the trade company named P. and V. Riabushinskii Brothers was opened in Moscow. In 1887 it was restructured to become the Manufactures Partnership of P.M. Riabushinskii and Sons. When P.M. Riabushinskii died in December 1899, he left the multimillion-ruble inheritance to his eight sons—Pavel, Sergei, Vladimir, Stepan, Nikolai, Mikhail, Dmitrii, and Fedor. In 1901 the Riabushinskiis acquired the bankrupt Kharkov Land Bank. Vladimir, Pavel and Mikhail became members of the board of directors. In 1902 they established the Banking House of the Riabushinskii Brothers. In 1912 the Manufactures Partnership was reorganized to become the Trade-Industrial Partnership of P.M. Riabushinskii and Sons, while the banking company was turned into the Moscow Bank with an endowment of 10 million rubles, a sum which was later increased to 25 million rubles. By 1917 the Riabushinskiis were the owners of numerous sizeable textile mills, with high-quality flax processing and first-rate fabric, along with timber and woodworking industries. 3 Like other families of Old Believers, the Riabushinskiis were in opposition to the monarchy and welcomed the February Revolution. However, they quickly became disappointed in the politics of the Provisional Government. Delivering a speech at the State Council in August 1917, Pavel P. Riabushinskii declared that

274 • Boris V.

Anan'ich

"Russia is ruled by some impossible dream, ignorance, and demagogy." 4 Nonetheless, the fall of the Provisional G o v e r n m e n t turned out to have a fatal impact not only on the entrepreneurial activities of the Riabushinskiis, but on their personal destinies as well. They had to leave Moscow and attempted to reestablish their banking empire in the territories occupied by the White Army. In these extraordinary circumstances they strove to create new banks without necessary means, often relying solely on their experience and reputation. In D e c e m b e r 1917 Mikhail Riabushinskii fled to the south of Russia, carrying a false passport issued in the n a m e of A n d r e i Mikhailovich Markelov. A f t e r n u m e r o u s difficulties, he finally arrived in Kharkov. There this ex-owner of the Kharkov Land Bank found himself in the position of "a poor relative." He was allowed to put his desk in the office of the directors' board, but was refused any loans, under the pretext of the b a n k ' s regulations. Such " f o r c e d " unemployment b o t h e r e d Mikhail Riabushinskii and, after "a series of failures," he "discarded all the great plans and decided to start small." As a result of his lengthy negotiations, the Riabushinskii Trade-Industrial Partnership agreed to grant Mikhail 25,000 rubles. 5 Since this sum was insufficient to launch a large bank, it was necessary "to limit himself to starting a banking house." He chose to present it as a "local organization" and o p e n his venture under the n a m e of the Kharkov Banking House. A m o n g the f o u n d e r s were V.G. Korenev, A.G. Karpov, and P.N. Kotov, all of whom had already participated in Riabushinskiis' other enterprises. Korenev was Mikhail Riabushinskii's most important partner in founding the banking house. H e enjoyed great influence in the city as a native of Kharkov and played a major role in the board of the Kharkov Land Bank. P.N. Kotov was also associated with the bank. A.G. Karpov, ex-husband of Elizaveta Pavlovna Riabushinskaia, was the president of the board of directors of the Riabushinskiis' factories in Okulovka. R a t h e r quickly the basic capital of the banking house was increased f r o m 25,000 to 45,000 rubles. 6 Mikhail Riabushinskii maintained the office in the K h a r k o v Land Bank as his headquarters, and usually spent the first half of his working day there. O n e day he was unexpectedly visited by his "old acquaintance f r o m Moscow," A n d r e i Ivanovich Shul'ts, who belonged to a traditional Moscow stockbrokers' firm and who often used to p e r f o r m accounting transactions for t h e Riabushinskiis' Moscow Bank. Shul'ts o f f e r e d to renew their cooperation. Later, in his memoirs, Riabushinskii wrote: My first emotion was to burst out laughing, but before the laugh could reach my face, "the idea" came as a bold of lightning. It was exactly the o n e I was so desperately seeking during my long weeks in Kharkov. I went on staring at a surprised Shul'ts, while thoughts were racing in my head and "the idea" took form in this chaos. Everything was singing in me, I did not see or feel anything. I gave my thoughts some time to shape and systematize and to circulate the plan throughout my brain, filling up all its cells. In a minute every detail of the plan was ready. Why did it not occur to me earlier? It was so

Wartime Entrepreneur

• 275

simple. I once again felt that thought is a free bird and cannot live in a cage. Shul'ts, with his thoughtless offer, gave an impulse and upon it I built a plan of how to create a big bank. 7 Mikhail Riabushinskii refused to take the accounting material from Shul'ts, but o f f e r e d to provide him with promissory notes for a whole range of companies, such as the Partnership of the Lokalovo Manufactures, the Riabushinskiis' Partnership, Partnership for Russian Linen ( R A L O ) , and others "for registration on the local stock exchange." The prestige of the Moscow Bank and the Riabushinskiis' Partnership was so high that Shul'ts accepted these conditions without reservation. Mikhail Riabushinskii o f f e r e d to discount the promissory notes for five million rubles. From this sum he intended to take 25 percent in cash, that is 1,250,000 rubles. H e decided to k e e p the remaining sum on his current accounts for these partnerships under the condition that he "would reserve the right to dispose of the current accounts, but only with checks, so that a person or a company could not cash such a check immediately, but would have to put it on a current account in the same bank." 8 Riabushinskii proposed that these firms would accept shares of the newly f o u n d e d bank and, upon receiving the payment, he would put it u n d e r his n a m e on his current bank account. 9 Riabushinskii's plan was not put into practice immediately. Shul'ts' offer was declined by Derzhavnyi Bank (the new name of the f o r m e r Kharkov d e p a r t m e n t of the State B a n k ) because the Derzhavnyi Bank refused to accept the bills of the enterprises that were "located outside of Ukraine." "Thus for 'Ukraine,' Russia is considered a foreign state, and this was told [to me] by people who spoke no other language but Russian," Riabushinskii complained. Shul'ts was also turned down by the Kharkov D e p a r t m e n t of the Moscow Merchant Bank, and only the Kharkov Accounting Bank, after some hesitation, accepted Riabushinskii's offer. 1 0 The success of the operation inspired Mikhail Riabushinskii. From a "poor relative" he "again became an authority who was trusted and whose orders were fulfilled and not questioned." As he wrote in his memoirs, when he was already in emigration, Success begot success. As if by magic everything started to work out. People trusted me blindly and followed me without hesitation. It was as if I was suffocating f r o m too much air. I wanted to spread my hands into eternity and bring everyone along. ...From this m o m e n t on, I lived as if in a state of oblivion. I devoted myself fully to work. ...I knew no fatigue, I knew no selfdoubts. ...I was going onward, onward f r o m one engagement to another. I did not accept failures. 1 1 As a result of the operation, Riabushinskii acquired five million rubles on his accounts, out of which a million and a quarter rubles was free of obligation. H e began to accumulate capital for the bank. A m o n g the first subscribers were the

276 • Boris V.

Anan'ich

Riabushinskiis' firms, as well as many Muscovites who had come to Kharkov, including a rich diaspora of Moscow Armenians, together with the shareholders f r o m Kiev and southern provincial towns. The bank's starting capital was announced to be 15,000,000 rubles. Despite the fact that the director of the Ukrainian credit office was Z a m e n , a f o r m e r director of the Credit office in Petrograd and Mikhail Riabushinskii's good friend, Kiev for a long time did not want to approve the charters of the new bank. "They were reluctant to let the Muscovites into Ukrainian affairs, especially banks." 1 2 A f t e r tiresome red tape, the Minister of Finance finally approved the charters of the bank on 30 October/12 November 1918, at the same time agreeing with Kiev authorities on its n a m e — t h e SouthCentral Bank (Iugo-Tsentral'nyi bank). Vladimir Pavlovich Riabushinskii was elected the president of the b o a r d of directors, the vice-president was Mikhail Pavlovich Riabushinskii, m e m b e r s of the board were A.F. Deriuzhinskii, V.G. Korenev, S.S. Smirnov, while candidates were N.V. Teslenko and A.A. Rittikh.The bank was to cover the territory of Ukraine and the south of Russia. Almost immediately, the Riabushinskiis o p e n e d local branches in Kiev, Odessa, and Ekaterinoslavl. Thus, the Riabushinskiis' new bank began operations. All the bills issued by the Kharkov Accounting Bank were bought back ahead of time, partly because the Riabushinskiis succeeded in having their money, which they had buried in glass jars, brought from Moscow.To transport the money to Kharkov a special travelingbag with a false bottom was ordered and two of Riabushinskii's proxies, I.P. Anismov and Shinkarenko, risked their lives to bring them over a million rubles. The founding meeting of the South-Central Bank opened on 18 November/1 D e c e m b e r 1918. Of the 94 original shareholders 32 attended the meeting, representing personally and as proxies 51,884 shares for the sum of 12,971,000 rubles. In total, there were 60,000 shares issued for the sum of over 15,000,000 rubles. 1 3 Having f o u n d e d the South-Central Bank, the Riabushinskiis extended their p r o g r a m of financial expansion to the south of Russia, which was not then occupied by the Red Army. Thus they reached into three territories u n d e r independent governments: the Ukrainian Directory with the capital in Kiev, the D o n Cossack republic with the capital in Novocherkassk, and the Crimean regional government with the capital in Simferopol'. The Riabushinskiis intended to create their own "financial organizations" in all three areas and "to m a k e their structure flexible for reconfiguration in case of danger." In Rostov-on-Don, which was a financial center of the D o n Army, they decided to open the Black Sea Bank (Chernomorskii Bank), with a starting capital of 10,000,000 rubles and local branches in Novorossiisk, E k a t e r i n o d a r , and Batumi. In the Crimea and in Yalta, they intended to open the Tavrida Commercial Bank with a local branch in Sevastopol'. 1 4 As a result the South-Central Bank with h e a d q u a r t e r s in K h a r k o v and with branches in Kiev and Odessa, was supposed to cover U k r a i n e and the south of Russia. Meanwhile, the Black Sea Bank with headquarters in Rostov-onD o n and branches in Batumi, Novorossiisk, and Ekaterinodar was to cover the area along the D o n River, as well as the Caucasus, Kuban' and lower Volga

Wartime Entrepreneur

• 277

regions. The Tavrida Bank with its h e a d q u a r t e r in Yalta and a branch in Sevast o p o l ' would offer its services for the Crimean peninsula. In addition, a trade comp a n y called the South-Russian Shareholding Society ( I u R A ) was created, with t h e e n d o w m e n t of one million rubles and the board of directors in Novorossiisk. T h e general meeting of the shareholders took place on 2/15 D e c e m b e r 1918, in R o s t o v - o n - D o n at the office of the Black Sea Bank on Bolshaia Sadovaia no. 47. T h e 44 shareholders represented personally and by proxy 17,807 shares for the sum of 4,451,750 rubles out of the total 20,000 shares for five million rubles. The b o a r d of directors and the council of the Black Sea Bank were elected. Mikhail Riabushinskii headed the board, which included Stepan Pavlovich Riabushinskii, A.G. Karpov, V.V. Nosov, M.I. Shaposhnikov. 1 5 Mikhail Riabushinskii did not succeed in forming the desired board of directors and the m e m b e r s h i p policy of the Tavrida Bank immediately. The regional C r i m e a n government approved its charters already on 4 / 1 7 0 c t o b e r 1918. However, Pavel P. Riabushinskii junior tried to turn this bank into an a u t o n o m o u s enterprise, independent f r o m the rest of the group. The "rebellion" was suppressed only in the beginning of January 1919 when Mikhail Riabushinskii went to Yalta to hold a general meeting of the shareholders on 12/25 January. The 20,000 shares of the Tavrida Bank with a total sum of 5.000,000 rubles were distributed among 178 shareholders, 24 of whom were present at the general meeting, representing personally and as proxies 19,034 shares for the sum of 4,758,5000 rubles. The board of the bank was headed by Vladimir Pavlovich Riabushinskii. Mikhail Riabushinskii became deputy director, and along with A.F. Deriuzhinskii and Sergei Pavlovich Riabushinskii entered the directors' board. 1 6 A cursory glance at the m e m b e r s of all the three bank boards and councils shows clearly the presence of the same people connected with the Riabushinskii family, either as relatives or by business ties. This ensured the Riabushinskiis' total control over the financial system created in the Russian south. Control was guaranteed by creating a central governing body for all the banks, named the S u p r e m e Financial Council, chaired by Mikhail Riabushinskii. It was also he who defined the mission of this organization: "In the chaos that was still ruling, and with all possible divisions that separated us from each other, we had to create a central organization that would be so flexible as to adjust to the changing circumstances and quickly handle new situations, not letting anarchy break through, guiding and directing our organizations continuously. It should also play a role in developing and directing economic policy, if possible uniform for everyone." 1 7 The members of the S u p r e m e Financial Council were Vladimir Pavlovich Riabushinskii, A.F. Deriuzhinskii, V.G. Korenev, V.V. Nosov, P.P. Riabushinskii senior, Stepan Pavlovich Riabushinskii, A . A . Rittikh, S.S. Smirnov, N.V. Teslenko, A.G. Karpov, and M.I. Shaposhnikov. 1 8 Thus the m a n a g e m e n t of virtually all the banks was concentrated in the hands of Mikhail Riabushinskii. Mikhail Riabushinskii saw the next step as strengthening the b a n k ' s international network. For this p u r p o s e he decided to use the Odessa branch of the

278 • Boris V. Ancin'ich South-Central Bank; Odessa was to become a "window to Europe." The SouthCentral Bank o p e n e d a branch in Constantinople, which was already in the hands of the allies. Mikhail Riabushinskii intended to use Constantinople for establishing a connection with Paris and L o n d o n , where he wanted to "found a headquarters until the chaos in Russia settles down." 1 9 In early February 1919 Mikhail Riabushinskii m a d e a trip to Odessa especially to establish the institution of couriers in the branch of the South-Central Bank and to organize the purchase of foreign currency through the Odessa banks (including a d e p a r t m e n t of Credit Lyonnaise), as well as through the consulates of foreign countries. While the development of the Riabushinskiis' financial system in the south of Russia was progressing, the White movement was experiencing o n e defeat after another. Kiev fell. With great difficulties, through the Kiev branch of the Petrograd International Bank, the Riabushinskiis managed to transfer part of their money to the Odessa branch of the International Bank. However, it refused to pay those transfers, which arrived from the fallen Kiev. Mikhail Riabushinskii succeeded in completing the transfers only because one of the members of the board of the Petrograd International Bank and a f o r m e r employee in one of the Riabushinskiis' banks, P.I. Zhaba, was in Odessa. Even so, he was only able to make it as an accounting transaction with a high interest rate. 2 0 While in Odessa, Mikhail Riabushinskii made arrangements for a visa application to travel abroad. Already in D e c e m b e r 1918, he received a passport, signed by the head of Foreign Affairs D e p a r t m e n t of the government of the Don Army, General-Lieutenant A. Bogaevskii. Now he was concerned with obtaining entrance visas to England, France, Tlirkey, Greece, and Romania. The feeling of an approaching catastrophe started to seriously worry him. His working days became less intense compared to just a year ago in Kharkov. He dined at the famous London Hotel in Odessa, where " o n e could see the elite of a crumbling city," to learn the latest news. H e r e he "met closely and often had b r e a k f a s t " with the American General Consul, V. Jenkins. Riabushinskii recalled later that "he was a medium height, slim, probably tubercular American, with sad and very intelligent eyes. I got to like him a lot. ...We spent hours together, passing time with a bottle of red wine, smoking cigars in the hotel restaurant, discussing all possibilities and conversing about general issues." 21 Mikhail Riabushinskii was troubled by the policy of the French authorities, who, in his opinion, were "flirting with the Ukrainians, transferred power in the city into their hands, d r e a m e d about the 'independent Ukraine' as their protectorate, and committed one blunder after another." He was even more concerned with the signs of c o m m o n people's hostile attitude to the authorities. The day the Russian troops left the city for the front, I went to the s q u a r e where they were assembling for the farewell parade. It felt very sad. The army behaved perfectly. They were truly ready for sacrifice. E v e n though they had a wild life in Odessa, they were now going to die, betrayed by the allies. The crowd a r o u n d them looked terrifying. None showed a sign of

Wartime Entrepreneur

• 279

compassion to the troops that were saving their city from the Bolsheviks. T h e army was leaving the p a r a d e silently. I r e m e m b e r that only I and somebody else shouted " h u r r a h " , but the crowd kept silent, and the weight of such a hostile silence was heavier than the sharpest anger. 2 2 D e s p i t e a deteriorating political situation, Mikhail Riabushinskii continued exercising control over his banks, traveling between Rostov-on-Don, E k a t e r i n o d a r , a n d Novorossiisk. On 27 April/10 May 1919 he left Russia o n b o a r d an English naval vessel, accompanied by his secretary, R.A. Virkau. His wife Tatiana Fominishna and his small children, Tatiana and Pavlik, remained in Crimea. His journey was envisioned as a business trip to establish connections with international partners. However, Mikhail Riabushinskii was destined never to return again to Russia. The following incident, which cast a shadow on his departure, was a minor e p i s o d e that nevertheless hurt his national pride. When he was already boarding t h e boat, out of the blue there a p p e a r e d a small man, who grabbed Virkau's coat and asked what he was carrying. Virkau, not realizing what was going on, answered calmly: "a Russian typewriter." The man burst out screaming with indignation: "Why a Russian typewriter and why are you taking it out of Russia? ... Where is your permission?" Two soldiers arrived to the call of the white "commissar"; this little man was more and more arrogantly d e m a n d i n g the confiscation of the typewriter. ...Attracted by the noise, the English commandant of the port, Captain Douglas, came down. H e was a man of enormous build. Having learned from Virkau what was the matter, he pushed away the "commissar" with his huge " p a w " and quite sternly told him that this is English territory. ...The man somehow shrunk and immediately disappeared. This whole story evoked "mixed feelings" in Mikhail Riabushinskii. He felt that "his national pride was humiliated as some English captain allows himself to say on the Russian land that it is 'English territory,' but at the same time he was satisfied that this development e n d e d the 'stupid, annoying argument.'" 2 3 H e went abroad on commission f r o m the Voluntary Army. H e was assigned to establish trade exchange b e t w e e n the south of Russia and western exporters. In addition, M. Riabushinskii was worried about his accounts in the E u r o p e a n banks. A s it turned out, his anxiety had serious grounds. A s he wrote on 19 July/1 August f r o m London in a letter to his b r o t h e r Vladimir, "after all the talks with the bankers, their concern is whether they can cash the checks f r o m our enterprises, partly because of our nationality, as well as because of a general cynical unwillingness to pay, because we are outlawed." 2 4 H e m a d e the first attempt to cash five checks issued by the Odessa branch of the Credit Lyonnaise in Paris. H e had to visit the office of the Credit Lyonnaise four times, had to go twice to the Ministry

280 • Boris V.

Anan'ich

of Trade and once to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to spend ten whole days on the matter, and only after such f r e q u e n t efforts could he finally obtain his money. H e also had problems getting the money in Paris from the current Partnership for Russian Linen ( R A L O ) account in the G u a r a n t e e Trust in the USA. To L o n d o n he brought checks for the total a m o u n t of 18,500 pounds. He had submitted them to the City Midland Bank, but the bank covered only the sum of 3,500 pounds. 2 5 Nevertheless, he was not fully disheartened, and not only did he obtain the money on the basis of the financial d o c u m e n t s in the banks of Paris and London, but he also started opening his own banks there. By early August, using the help of the stockbroker K. Kharchevskii (who had helped M. Riabushinskii in 1910 purchase the bust of Victor H u g o by Rodin), or one of his relatives, 26 he opened in Paris the Banque des Pays du Sud with a starting capital of 1,000,000 francs. The office was rented on the third floor in a house on the corner of Boulevard des Italiens and Rue des Italiens for 50,000 francs for a period of 12 years. On 23 July/5 August there was a general meeting of the shareholders, chaired by I.P. Anisimov. The meeting was purely formal.The shareholders chose three proxies, I.P. Anisimov, Kharchevskii, and V.N. Onoprienko. The board of directors included Mikhail Riabushinskii, N.V. Grudistov, and Kharchevskii. T h e whole staff of the bank included a Russian secretary and a French accountant. 2 7 The starting capital of the bank was later increased to 4,000,000 francs. The main shareholders were Mikhail Riabushinskii himself, and the enterprises belonging to the Riabushinskiis, such as the Moscow Bank, Partnership for Russian Linen ( R A L O ) . and the Rusanov's Partnership of the Belomor Timber Enterprises. Substantial amounts of capital stock were purchased by N.I. Kharchevskii, N.V. Grudistov, and G.A. Izvol'skii, the only son of the Russian ambassador in Paris, who was married to a rich owner of extensive sugar plantations in Cuba. 2 8 Following this, Mikhail Riabushinskii opened the Western Bank in London, initially with a starting capital of 10,000 pounds, later increased to 200,000 pounds. At this point, his Banque des Pays du Sud became one of the foreign shareholders of the Western Bank. A n o t h e r stockholder was the American Interseas Corporation, an enterprise created by Mikhail Riabushinskii in New York. 2 9 This time he decided to look for a serious p a r t n e r for Russian trade relations in the USA. O n the evening of 13/26 N o v e m b e r 1919 Mikhail Riabushinskii arrived in New York, accompanied by R . A . Virkau and N.V. Grudistov. At the outset, he settled his money relations with the G u a r a n t e e Trust but the bank refused to start a joint enterprise with him. T h e negotiations with the Singer Company and the Mercantile Bank of the A m e r i c a were equally unsuccessful as the conditions o f f e r e d by the latter were unacceptable to Riabushinskii. The negotiations with the G r a c e American International C o r p o r a t i o n went more fruitfully. T h e company was a joint venture of the export-import company of W. Grace and Co. (total assets of 50 million dollars) and the American International C o r p o r a t i o n , owned by the National City Bank of New York (with total assets reaching 100 million dollars). These large American companies decided to unite their assets in working with

Wartime Entrepreneur • 281 Russia and allotted one million dollars, of which one-third belonged to the W. G r a c e and Co., one-third came f r o m the American International Corporation, and one-sixth from Fredrick Holbrook, a construction engineer and vice-director of the C o r p o r a t i o n . The final sixth came f r o m A l e k s a n d e r Romanovich St. Galli, a Petrograd e n t r e p r e n e u r and f o r m e r representative of the Grace Company there, who now b e c a m e a vice-president of t h e G r a c e International Corporation. 3 0 Charles A. Stone, the president of the A m e r i c a n I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o r p o r a t i o n , organized a welcoming reception for Mikhail Riabushinskii in the Metropolitan Club where, along with the famous American entrepreneurs, he invited St. Galli, Petr Morozov, N.V. Grudistov, A.V. Ber, and a Russian trade agent in New York, S.A. Uget. H a v i n g consulted with the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e G r a c e I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o r p o r a t i o n , Mikhail Riabushinskii decided it was necessary establish his own industrial enterprise in New York. T h u s the A m e r i c a n Interseas C o r p o r a t i o n with a starting capital of 1,000,000 dollars was established. The capital stock holders were again other Riabushinskii enterprises. A l m o s t half of the expenses were taken by the Partnership for Russian Linen ( R A L O ) and a substantial part was contributed by the Banque des Pays du Sud. Since G.A. Izvolskii lived permanently in New York, he was m a d e a m e m b e r of the board, being assigned also the duties of secretary and treasurer. In addition, t h e r e was another company started specifically for purchasing, leasing, and renting steamboats, named the American Interseas Shipping Corporation with a starting capital of 100,000 dollars. Its capital stock holders were the Partnership for Russian Linen ( R A L O ) and the American Interseas Corporation. 3 1 Thus, Mikhail Riabushinskii created his own network of companies in England, France and t h e US, which aimed at ensuring the development of trade relations with the south of Russia. Naturally, during the Civil War the Riabushinskiis could not hope for success in all their trade operations. Nevertheless, they succeeded in several. They brought a shipment of deer skins f r o m Arkhangel'sk to France and a shipment of timber f r o m Kovda to England, and they purchased English goods for the sum of 47,000 pounds, French goods for 500,000 francs, and A m e r i c a n goods f o r 18,000 dollars. They also leased an oil tanker and shipped 1,300 tons of petrol f r o m the Crimea, and then arranged for a second shipment with 2,900 tons of petrol. Remarkably, in his letters Mikhail Riabushinskkii refrained f r o m evaluating the political and military situation in Russia. H e was rather concerned with what was happening in E u r o p e and built his e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l strategy according to the local situation. A s he wrote in a letter to his b r o t h e r Vladimir on 12/25 N o v e m b e r 1919, "political and economic life a b r o a d is very tense and it is not clear how it would evolve in the near future. Thus, I decided to establish related enterprises in three countries—England, France, and A m e r i c a — s o that if there was a crisis in one or another of the states, we could move our h e a d q u a r t e r s to the third. Russia is now so weak economically that for a long time she won't be able to i m p l e m e n t an active financial policy. But keeping in mind that offense is the best defense, we transferred our work abroad. It is better to meet t h e m there than to wait for t h e m

282 • Boris

V.

Anan'ich

at h o m e . " 3 2 W h e n M i k h a i l R i a b u s h i n s k i i w a s writing this letter o n b o a r d

the

s t e a m e r , t r a v e l i n g f r o m N e w Y o r k to E u r o p e , his ideas a b o u t t h e d e v e l o p m e n t s in R u s s i a w e r e q u i t e f a r f r o m reality. Of c o u r s e , he could n o t i m a g i n e t h a t by a s t r a n g e irony of f a t e h e w a s d e s t i n e d t o s p e n d t h e rest of his life in t h e c a p i t a l of o n e of t h e t h r e e c o u n t r i e s h e m e n t i o n e d , namely, in L o n d o n . T h e f a i l u r e of t h e W h i t e m o v e m e n t led t o t h e collapse of the w h o l e b a n k i n g s y s t e m c r e a t e d by M i k h a i l R i a b u s h i n s k i i in t h e s o u t h of R u s s i a a n d in t h e C r i m e a . In t h e s i t u a t i o n of w o r l d e c o n o m i c crisis, all his a t t e m p t s to play a p r o m i n e n t role in w o r l d t r a d e w e r e also d o o m e d . His textile t r a d e o p e r a t i o n s in t h e 1920s n o t only h a r m e d him, b u t also i m p a i r e d t h e f a m i l y business of t h e Riabushinskiis. H i s b r o t h e r s h a r s h l y criticized him a n d a c c u s e d him of m a k i n g u n f e a s i b l e d e c i s i o n s " t o o p e n m o r e a n d m o r e b r a n c h e s all o v e r t h e w o r l d a n d t o m o n o p o l i z e t h e w o r l d textile t r a d e . " U p o n t h e d e m a n d of t h e b r o t h e r s , Mikhail h a d to close d o w n his A m e r i c a n e n t e r p r i s e s a n d t o t u r n t h e B a n q u e d e s Pays d u Sud i n t o an e x c h a n g e office. 3 3 M i k h a i l R i a b u s h i n s k i i e x p l a i n e d his f a i l u r e s of t h o s e t i m e s by t h e loss of his p r e v i o u s will a n d energy, by his d e t a c h m e n t f r o m R u s s i a . "I w a s tired a n d I w a n t e d to h a v e a rest," h e w r o t e in his m e m o i r s in 1931. " A n d w h e n fate, in t h e s h a p e of t h e w o r l d crisis, a g a i n s h o o k e v e r y t h i n g d o w n t o t h e very basics, I felt t h a t my f e e t w e r e n o l o n g e r o n t h e n a t i v e soil which so m a n y t i m e s r e n e w e d m y strength. I no longer had the stamina to maintain our business abroad. Everything f a i l e d a n d t u r n e d t o d u s t . H a d I b e e n in my n a t i v e land, this w o u l d n o t h a v e h a p p e n e d . . . . W h e n t h e last t h r e a d c o n n e c t i n g us to t h e m o t h e r l a n d w a s cut, o u r souls w e r e s e v e r e d as well. We t u r n e d b a r r e n . T h e m i n d s t o p p e d giving birth." 3 4 T h e actual r e a s o n f o r M i k h a i l R i a b u s h i n s k i i ' s failure is p r o b a b l y c a u s e d by t h e fact t h a t , w o r k i n g in t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of the d e e p e s t crisis a n d n o t k n o w i n g e n o u g h t h e s i t u a t i o n on t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l m a r k e t , he was r e a d y to get involved in q u i t e d u b i o u s a n d risky e n t e r p r i s e s , t h u s b r e a k i n g the e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l t r a d i t i o n s of t h e O l d Believers. H o w e v e r , it is h a r d n o w t o j u d g e h o w justified R i a b u s h i n s k i i ' s activities w e r e . A f t e r all, t h e success of his financial and t r a d e e n t e r p r i s e s f r o m t h e very b e g i n n i n g d e p e n d e d o n t h e military a n d political s i t u a t i o n in Russia. M i k h a i l R i a b u s h i n s k i i ' s activities in Russia a n d a b r o a d d u r i n g 1918 a n d 1919 a r e a b o v e all i n t e r e s t i n g as an e x a m p l e of the e x c e p t i o n a l business activity u n d e r e x t r e m e circ u m s t a n c e s of o n e of t h e l e a d e r s of t h e R u s s i a n b o u r g e o i s i e w h o n o t w i t h o u t r e a son c o n s i d e r e d himself a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e n a t i o n a l capital. M i k h a i l R i a b u s h i n s k i i k e p t a h e i g h t e n e d n a t i o n a l sensitivity until his very last days. T h e s e f e e l i n g s largely g u i d e d his b e h a v i o r a n d a t t i t u d e s a n d w e r e s t r o n g e r t h a n his h a t r e d t o w a r d s t h e Soviet r e g i m e . A s h e w r o t e in a l e t t e r t o his son P a v e l in M a y 1945, I h a v e s t r a n g e f e e l i n g s t o w a r d s t h e Bolsheviks. A s a result of t h e i r activities all m y relatives, f r i e n d s , I personally, a n d my class, all of us s u f f e r e d . . . . W e t u r n e d t o dust, t o n o t h i n g ... a n d n o t only w e r e we r u i n e d p e r s o n a l l y a n d

Wartime financially,

Entrepreneur

• 283

b u t w h a t is m o r e s e r i o u s , o u r i d e a l s , f a i t h , a n d p e r s o n a l b e l i e f s

w e r e not able to win o v e r their collectivist ideals. ...The B o l s h e v i k s c o u l d inspire p e o p l e to the greatest sacrifices and sufferings. ...They created order a n d s y s t e m , t h e y inspired e n t h u s i a s m . . . . A s a result of this R u s s i a

became

e v e n g r e a t e r t h a n s h e e v e r w a s b e f o r e . T h i s is a m y s t e r y t o m e . I h a v e l o n g f o r g o t t e n all m y p e r s o n a l t r o u b l e s , a n d i n s t e a d I h a v e g r e a t p r i d e a n d j o y for m y p e o p l e and gratitude to " t h e m " for their a c h i e v e m e n t s . 3 5

T h e s e w o r d s did not imply Mikhail Riabushinskii's readiness to be

reconciled

w i t h t h e still a l i e n p o w e r . H o w e v e r " g r e a t " R u s s i a h a d b e c o m e , it p a i n e d

him

d e e p l y to learn about the diplomatic r e c e p t i o n s — i n the 1930s they w e r e organ i z e d by the P e o p l e ' s C o m m i s s a r o f F o r e i g n A f f a i r s M a k s i m M. Litivinov, a n d in 1955 C h a n c e l l o r Konrad A d e n a u e r w a s r e c e i v e d by N i k o l a i A . B u l g a n i n and Nik i t a S. K h r u s h c h e v — h e l d at h i s c o n f i s c a t e d p r i v a t e r e s i d e n c e o n S p i r o d o n o v k a .

Notes 1 A l f r e d J. R i e b e r , Merchants and Entrepreneurs in Imperial Russia ( C h a p e l Hill: U n i v e r s i t y of N o r t h C a r o l i n a Press, 1982), 294. 2 T h e N e w York Public Library. R a r e B o o k s a n d M a n u s c r i p t s Division. M i k h a i l P. R i a b u shinskii P a p e r s [ h e r e a f t e r R i a b u s h i n s k i i P a p e r s ] , 3 See details in B o r i s V. A n a n ' i c h , Bankirskie doma v Rossii 1860-1914 gg.: ocherki istorii chastnogo predprinimatel'stva ( L e n i n g r a d : N a u k a , 1991), 111-130. A m o n g c o n t e m p o r a r y w o r k s on the R i a b u s h i n s k i i s p u b l i s h e d in R u s s i a , I w o u l d m e n t i o n a m o n o g r a p h by I u . A . Petrov, Dinastiia Riabushinskikh ( M o s c o w : R u s s k a i a kniga, 1997). 4 P e t r o v , Dinastiia, 114-115. 5 R i a b u s h i n s k i i Papers, Mikhail P. R i a b u s h i n s k i i , ' ' S m u t n y e gody: K h r o n i k a . M o s k v a - l u g Rossii. D e k a b r ' 1 9 1 7 - M a i 1919g.," 191-192. 6 M.P. R i a b u s h i n s k i i , " S m u t n y e gody," 193-194. 7 M.P. R i a b u s h i n s k i i , " S m u t n y e gody," 195. 8 M.P. R i a b u s h i n s k i i , " S m u t n y e gody," 196-197. 9 M.P. R i a b u s h i n s k i i , " S m u t n y e gody," 197. 10 M.P. R i a b u s h i n s k i i , " S m u t n y e gody," 198-202. 11 M.P. R i a b u s h i n s k i i , " S m u t n y e gody," 206. 12 M.P. R i a b u s h i n s k i i , " S m u t n y e gody," 211. 13 T h e council of t h e S o u t h - C e n t r a l B a n k i n c l u d e d t h e following p e o p l e : C o u n t A . A . B o b rinskii, F.S. G e n c h - O g l u e v , I.P. G l a d k o v , N.F. von D i e t m a r , S.N. Z h e v e r z h e e v , A . I a . Z h m u d s k i i , S.D. Izhboldin, A . G . K a r p o v , A . A . Kiriakov, P.N. Kotov, C o u n t V.S. K o c h u b e i , S . M . Kuznetsov, I.K. M a r a k u s h e v , C o u n t e s s E.V. M u s i n a - P u s h k i n a , V.V. N o s o v , P.P. R y z h kov, P.P. R i a b u s h i n s k i i senior, Sergei Pavlovich R i a b u s h i n s k i i , S t e p a n P a v l o v i c h R i a b u shinskii, D.V. S i r o t k i n , P.K. S k o r d e l l i , I . E . T r e s k i n , S . N . T r e t i a k o v , A.I. F e n i n , I.N. K h a r m a dzhev, S.D. Shishlov, M.I. S h a p o s h n i k o v . M.P. R i a b u s h i n s k i i , " S m u t n y e gody," 2 2 7 - 2 2 8 . 14 M.P. R i a b u s h i n s k i i , " S m u t n y e gody," 216-217. 15 T h e m e m b e r s of t h e Black See B a n k C o u n c i l w e r e F.S. G e n c h - O g l u e v , Kh.S. G e n c h Ogluev, A.F. D e r i u z h i n s k i i , K.D. D i a m a n t i d i , A.V. K a s h e n k o , V.G. K o r e n e v , P.V. M a k s i m o v , I.G. M e l ' k o n o v - E z e k o v , P.E. P a r a m o n o v , A . M . Popov, M . M . Popov, V.P. R i a b u s h i n s k i i , P.P.

284 • Boris V.

Anan'ich

R i a b u s h i n s k i i s e n i o r , S e r g e i P a v l o v i c h R i a b u s h i n s k i i , D.V. S i r o t k i n , S.S. S m i r n o v , V.N. T e s l e n k o , I.N. K h a r m a d z h e v , P.V. K h a k h l a d z h e v , I.A. K h u t a r e v . M.P. R i a b u s h i n s k i i , "Smutnye gody", 231-232. 16 T h e m e m b e r s elected t o t h e council w e r e S.N. Vasiliev, A.V. Volzhaninov, P.A. A . G . K a r p o v , V.V. K e l l e r , V.V. Nosov, G . E . O v c h i n n i k o v , A . A . R i t t i k h , A . A . P.P. R i a b u s h i n s k i i s e n i o r , S t e p a n Pavlovich R i a b u s h i n s k i i , D.V. S i r o t k i n , S.S. A.V. Teslenko, N.V. T e s l e n k o , A.I. S h a m s h i n , V.G. K o r e n e v , and G . A . K h u t a r e v . bushinskii, " S m u t n y e gody," 248.

Demidov, Rosinskii, Smironov, M.P. R i a -

17 M.P. R i a b u s h i n s k i i , " S m u t n y e gody," 220. 18 M.P. R i a b u s h i n s k i i , " S m u t n y e gody," 19 M.P. R i a b u s h i n s k i i , " S m u t n y e gody," 257. 20 M.P. R i a b u s h i n s k i i , " S m u t n y e gody," 259-260. 21 22 23 24

M.P. R i a b u s h i n s k i i , " S m u t n y e gody," 268. M.P. R i a b u s h i n s k i i , " S m u t n y e gody," 266. M.P. R i a b u s h i n s k i i , " S m u t n y e gody," 300. R i a b u s h i n s k i i Papers. C o r r e s p o n d e n c e with V l a d i m i r Pavlovich R i a b u s h i n s k i i , 1. 136.

25 Ibid., 1. 37. 26 Petrov, Dinastiia, 142. 27 R i a b u s h i n s k i i Papers, L e t t e r f r o m M. P. R i a b u s h i n s k i i to V. P. R i a b u s h i n s k i i , 21 July/3 A u gust 1919, 44. 28 R i a b u s h i n s k i i Papers, L e t t e r f r o m M. P. R i a b u s h i n s k i i to V. P. R i a b u s h i n s k i i , 12/25 N o v e m b e r 1919,95. 29 Ibid., 1. 97. 30 31 32 33 34 35

Ibid., 1. 115. Ibid.119. Ibid., 1. 133. See details in Petrov, Dinastiia, 180-183. M.P. R i a b u s h i n s k i i , " S m u t n y e gody," 207. R i a b u s h i n s k i i Papers, C o r r e s p o n d e n c e with V l a d i m i r Pavlovich R i a b u s h i n s k i i , 104.

Russia's First World War: Remembering, Forgetting, Remembering PETER

GATRELL

In m a n y societies the aftermath of war has been inscribed in collective remembrance, embodied in public ceremonial, and encoded in personal memory, in complex and contested ways. This article indicates how an uneven process of remembrance has operated with respect to Russia's First World War. It begins by making the point that Russia's war has only recently begun to attract the attention it deserves. By contrast with the historiography of other belligerents, a lengthy historiographical caesura frustrated any serious examination of the multiple dimensions of Russia's wartime experience. A p a r t from a handful of Soviet studies on specialist topics, little scholarly work of note saw the light of day in Russia. 1 In Britain, Germany, France, Italy or Australia, the First World War was commemorated and depicted in a variety of forms, but nothing comparable occurred in the Soviet Union. I do not want to labor this point, partly because it is so obvious, even if it exaggerates the degree of serious historical work that actually appeared anywhere before the 1970s. The final section of this article considers the ways in which, during the war itself, attempts were being made to historicize wartime experience. Thus the prolonged historical amnesia referred to above does not indicate a lack of interest amongst contemporaries in the prospective recollection and representation of the war, as they struggled to reflect upon its devastating consequences at the time and to imagine what future historians would make of it. Contemporaries devoted considerable energy to providing a documentary record, conscious of the need to record for posterity the unprecedented impact of the war.

REMEMBERING

(NOW)

For reasons that will become clear, the collective memory of Russia's First World War did not become entrenched after 1918. Instead, the remembrance of war was entrusted to the historical profession. The results were modest. To be sure, the military history of the war was the focus of a book on the eastern front, while other studies dealt with duma politics and with the political aspects of economic mobilization. 2 But the explosion of work from the 1960s onwards on the social history of late imperial Russia and on the interwar period did not find its counter-

286 • Peter Gatrell part in studies of the G r e a t War. This seems set to change. Recent works have e m b r a c e d propaganda and popular culture in wartime Russia, the impact of G e r m a n occupation of the Baltic lands, refugees and population displacement, peasant women's protest, and the fate of prisoners-of-war. 3 To be sure, we lack studies of important topics, including religious activity in wartime, military ceremonial, children, war widows, the R e d Cross, disability, and the impact of war on popular opinion. Many topics in the economic history of the war remain obscure. But we have come a long way in the last few years. 4 Setting historiography to one side, what of public or collective r e m e m b r a n c e of the G r e a t War? As we shall see, a d e e p silence rapidly settled over the war after the Bolshevik Revolution. But in post-Soviet Russia, official attention has at last begun to be devoted to the war. In 1995, the State D u m a , the Council of the F e d e r a t i o n and the President issued a proclamation on the dates to be designated as "victory days." A new date was added to the calendar (23 February), marking the " D a y of D e f e n d e r s of the Fatherland," although it somewhat confusingly identified this as the occasion when the R e d A r m y scored a victory over the forces of imperial Germany, overlooking the fact that the R e d Army had hardly begun to form. 5 Dan Orlovsky points out that some Russian observers now regard the war as the starting point of Russia's m o d e r n troubles. Clearly they belong to a tradition in which the G r e a t War is blamed for helping to bring about the Revolution of 1917, a familiar but rather sterile argument that does not encourage serious scholarly work on the war. Also important in modern-day Russia, according to Orlovsky, is the lack of any "spiritual" coming to terms with the millions of dead, w o u n d e d and bereaved, whose suffering needs to be reclaimed on behalf of "new Russia." 6 In this reading, the G r e a t War may yet acquire fresh significance as e m b l e m a t i c of current political concerns. Yet such a blanket preoccupation with war, loss and reckoning tends to portray an entire nation as the "victim" of war, leaving little room for individual accounts, whether they focus u p o n personal tragedy or upon self-realization.

FORGETTING:

1917-1990

H o w and why did silence, rather than collective remembrance, c o m e to be the defining characteristic of Russia's place in the history of the G r e a t War? What have been the consequences of that silence? Is it as absolute as a p p e a r s at first sight? A few brief remarks are in order about the various ways in which the war impinged upon the lives of the tsar's subjects. A r o u n d 15 million men d o n n e d a uniform between 1914 and 1917. A r o u n d 626,000 were killed in battle, 2.6 million were wounded and m o r e than 3.6 million were captured or listed as missing in action. 7 The experience of having been drafted, having fought, having b e e n w o u n d e d or imprisoned, or having b e c o m e sick brought home to t h e individuals

Russia's First World War • 287 c o n c e r n e d , and their families and friends, the scale and scope of the war. Others, m e n a n d women, were drafted into the organized war economy or volunteered as n u r s e s or welfare workers. They experienced the war as a productive effort, as b a c k b r e a k i n g work and as an encounter with danger. Everyone experienced the war as a strain on consumption, through the inflation in the prices of basic goods. ( T h e r e were, of course, advantages to be had if o n e c o m m a n d e d control over g o o d s in short supply.) For o t h e r civilians, the war a m o u n t e d also to a brutal form of involuntary population displacement. So far as Russia's troops were conc e r n e d , the war figured as a bloated b e h e m o t h that absorbed ever more manp o w e r . The old army, having a t t e m p t e d to fashion a more modern system of induction and training before 1914, was quickly overwhelmed by the scale of the w a r t i m e mobilization. The war disrupted lives, and it also wreaked havoc with military convention. W h e n the s u m m e r offensive of 1917 collapsed, front-line troops b e g a n to return to their homes and units in the r e a r refused to go to the front. T h e o f t e n - q u o t e d figure of two million deserters strains credibility, but there is no d o u b t that desertion decimated the ranks of the Russian army during 1917. 8 T h e comparison with G e r m a n y is illuminating. By N o v e m b e r 1918 G e r m a n y was obliged to accept defeat, and a new g o v e r n m e n t came into being. Some political leaders on the left in Weimar G e r m a n y welcomed the war as the driving force b e h i n d political reconstruction. But many ordinary G e r m a n s experienced the G r e a t War as a traumatic event, which had scarred the population. Veterans and war widows b e c a m e very visible and pressed their claim for recognition and reco m p e n s e . They d e m a n d e d that their fallen c o m r a d e s be given proper burial sites a b r o a d , and the state acted upon those injunctions. The war might have b e e n painful and embarrassing, both for individual soldiers and for the G e r m a n state, but its very capacity to shock and destroy also ensured that the war r e m a i n e d firmly in public and private consciousness. D u r i n g the 1930s, when the " f r o n t gene r a t i o n " still n u m b e r e d ten million, the Nazi regime paid particular attention to the needs of war veterans. Thus the war constituted a m a j o r point of reference; indeed, neither Weimar nor Nazi G e r m a n y could ever be said to have come to terms with it. Veterans talked endlessly about " t h e i r " war; some spoke of having "the war in their bones." The same was true of the troubled G e r m a n state. 9 T h e experiences of G e r m a n soldiers in t h e Ost Land were of particular significance, personally, professionally and collectively. O n e outcome of t h e Dolchstoß or "stab in the b a c k " was that military f r e e b o o t e r s took up arms t o attack the " R e d s " and to seek revenge for the " b e t r a y a l " of the homeland, envisaging battle as a continuation of the struggle to d e f e n d the "real" G e r m a n y against its enemies within and without. In the Baltic, the Freikorps would reward themselves with land and other trophies. H e r e was an episode in which the past m a t t e r e d hugely to the foot soldier. G e r m a n y could be " r e b o r n " in the East, where everything was imaginable. Yet the possibilities of realizing a vision of a victorious new G e r m a n y were also combined with a sense that the colonizing mission had inextricable links to the G e r m a n past: " W h e n we explore t h e ele-

288 • Peter Gatrell m e n t s which gave the G e r m a n Freikorps fighter spiritual bearing ... we can find traces of all the elements that have worked in G e r m a n history." This iconography drew upon a rich storehouse of images from the distant past. Thus, the Freikorps traced their lineage back by several hundred years, to the Thirty Years' War and even to the era of the Teutonic knights. 1 0 In contrast, the troops of the f o r m e r Russian Imperial A r m y manifested a desp e r a t e desire to return to their villages, in order to e m b a r k on the revolutionary transformation of property rights in land. In other words, whereas in 1919 G e r m a n y ' s troops displaced their radicalization on to the suffering population of the Baltic, Russian troops went h o m e to realize a vision of agrarian radicalism. In the Russian heartland, the old war was over; the memories evoked in the land transfer were not those of long-ago "national" campaigns but the peasants' war against the landlords. This conclusion is reinforced by the behavior of armed peasant bands during the Russian Civil War. The prize was not a revived national epic, but a chernyi peredel and a settling of accounts with the propertied strata. 1 1 Some veterans from the World War did of course enter the Red Army, whose size swelled to around 2.3 million in July 1919 and a r o u n d 4.4 million a year later. But, although it recruited f o r m e r tsarist non-commissioned officers and "specialists" (as well as Red Guards, factory workers and peasant conscripts), and although it relied upon conventional military hierarchies of c o m m a n d and subordination, it was nevertheless a new institution. It did not rest upon tradition—new regiments were formed, with new rituals and symbols, with Communist leadership and Soviet military commissars, and with an emphasis upon revolutionary or comradely discipline. Described as the "Workers' and Peasants' R e d Army," it drew a clear distinction between the new krasnoarmeets and the c o m m o n soldier who served the tsar. There was little here to suggest the cultivation of continuities with the old army, still less any reverence for military tradition. 1 2 O n e did not celebrate regimental participation in the G r e a t War. The kind of camaraderie evident for example in the French, British and G e r m a n armies was absent f r o m Russia's generation of 1914. What m a t t e r e d was commitment to the cause of the Revolution. This temporal discontinuity deprived the soldier of any sense that the experience of fighting in 1914 or 1915 a m o u n t e d to something of historical significance. The Civil War became instead the "formative experience." 1 3 T h e example of the Latvian Riflemen is also instructive. Formed in 1915, and allowed to bear Latvian flags and insignia, they went into battle to d e f e n d Latvia against G e r m a n invasion, in which cause they s u f f e r e d grievous losses in the winter of 1916. Even as, famously, they fought in d e f e n s e of Lenin's Revolution, they symbolized the claims of Latvia for recognition. Nationalists subsequently claimed the Riflemen as martyrs of Latvia who deserved to find a place of h o n o r in Riga's national cemetery, whereas in Soviet historiography they belonged to the pantheon of revolutionary heroes. H e r e was a complex mixture of military comradeship, radical political zeal and invented national tradition. From one standpoint, the defense of revolutionary Petrograd validated the conduct of these

Russia's First World War • 289 men. From a n o t h e r , the G r e a t War could indeed b e c o m e their " f o r m a t i v e " experience. In o t h e r words, once nationalism b e c a m e part of the equation, the war might assume a quite different significance. 14 Against this b a c k g r o u n d , no formal space was found in the Soviet Union for personal recollection of the G r e a t War. True, the well-known writer Konstantin Paustovskii alluded to his war service. E m p l o y e d as a medical orderly (fel'dsher) by the Union of Towns, Paustovskii e n c o u n t e r e d civilians displaced by enemy action or by the decisions of the Russian High C o m m a n d . His memoirs vividly describe the degradation of refugees, as well as the cultural transformation of Russia's provincial towns. Paustovskii himself was excited by the war, which helped give meaning to a life hitherto purposeless. 1 5 But this is a rare exception in the m e m o i r literature. Soviet officialdom sanctioned certain kinds of experience, but the lives of millions of Russian citizens during the G r e a t War did not belong to the realm of valid testimony. T h e literary efforts of A l e k s a n d r Solzhenitsyn are the exception that proves the rule: in placing personalized accounts of wartime episodes at the center of his narrative of Red Wheel, Solzhenitsyn deliberately flouted the official Soviet line. 16 M e m o r i e s of war were recorded differently and for different reasons by some of the non-Russian national minorities. Armenians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Jews, Kazakhs and G e r m a n s interpreted the war in terms of national hurt and disaster; at least, this was the interpretation advanced by a patriotic intelligentsia. The collective m e m o r y of these minorities emphasized the ways in which the civilian population of the b o r d e r l a n d s had b e e n brutalized, whether by the O t t o m a n state (in the case of A r m e n i a n s ) or the tsarist state (in the case of the other minorities). The displacement of population not only r e n d e r e d these minorities vulnerable to hunger, cold, and epidemic disease; it also t h r e a t e n e d to "de-nationalize" entire ethnic groups, whose m e m b e r s were spread across E u r o p e a n Russia, the Urals, Central Asia and Siberia. Patriotic elites began in the midst of war to collect reminiscences that would testify to national hurt. The suffering of Russian Jews was set in a familiar context of collective national suffering, with allusions ranging f r o m Biblical t o r m e n t to m o r e recent p o g r o m s in E a s t e r n E u r o p e . Latvian, Lithuanian and Polish leaders, by contrast, expressed the fear that they faced the lot of the Jews, " t o be scattered across the globe." 1 7 T h e r e are fascinating questions here a b o u t the process whereby new successor states sought a f t e r 1918 to realize a vision of the nation-state, whether by drawing u p o n wartime struggles or by e m b a r k i n g upon state-building programs such as the construction of new national museums. H o w were these managed, staffed, and filled with collections worthy of the nation? H o w did they seek to attract visitors, and what responses did they evoke? T h e m u s e u m was doubtless a site dedicated in part to the triumph of the national ideal in wartime; it would include refe r e n c e to the tribulations of war and to the survival of the " n a t i o n " u n d e r extreme conditions such /as occupation, dissolution, and war. Within its walls the state could present a narrative of "national time" as well as national travail—a site where

290 • Peter Gatrell the nation could assert its continuity and survival in the face of catastrophe. A Latvian open-air ethnographic m u s e u m was established outside Riga in 1924, as was a new national art museum. O n e of its advocates, Janis Silins wrote that: " O u r growing confidence d e m a n d s that we spend our money on this outstanding purpose; we should remind ourselves of our living houses and cottages in Latvia, of those rooms where our spirit dwells." 18 The theme of national r e m e m b r a n c e appears also to have been developed by Latvian educationists. Children were invited to work on their memories and to question their parents as well. A 1927 text instructed them to ponder the following: " D o you r e m e m b e r what your mother and f a t h e r told you about their childhood and youth? What nation did they live in? ...What holidays and other celebrations were there? What wars? What unrest?" 1 9 This kind of " m e m o r y w o r k " doubtless took place in Poland, Lithuania, and Estonia as well. Strenuous efforts went into the collection of Lithuanian folksongs. 20 Museums, schools, universities, clinics, musical associations and other institutions were turned into laboratories for the cultivation of national memory. To be sure, there is a Soviet academic literature on the First World War. But it occupies a different intellectual universe. Some of it was sponsored by the emerging military establishment during the 1920s, whose planners wished to draw lessons f r o m the wartime experience. Specialist journals such as Snabzhenie Krasnoi armii, Voennaia mysl' i revoliutsii, and Voina i revoliutsiia devoted space to aspects of economic mobilization, the preserve of military technocrats. Much of the mainstream historiography belonged to the genre of economic and labor history, with a heavy emphasis upon statistics, as if there were literally safety in n u m bers. However, no one took up the challenge posed by Prokopovich, Grinevetskii, and others who studied the macroeconomic impact of the war. 21 O t h e r scholars seemed to be more comfortable with detailed studies of policy-making, with some descriptive data thrown in for good measure. Arkadii Sidorov was probably the doyen of this tradition. Sidorov had launched his career as a specialist on industrial mobilization and financial-economic policy as early as 1927, with a preliminary study that a p p e a r e d under the auspices of the Institute of Red Professors. 2 2 Notwithstanding an official Stalinist line f r o m the mid-1930s to the mid-1950s that contradicted his research findings, by emphasizing Russia's "semi-colonial" status, Sidorov and his students drew attention to the close links between t h e tsarist state and big business, and thus to the existence of highly developed elements of capitalism in pre-Revolutionary Russia. By the early 1960s Sidorov had himself established a new orthodoxy. H e occupied a position of considerable influence, and his students were responsible for the most serious work on the political e c o n o m y of the war, couched in terms that sought to establish the "preconditions" (predposyliki) for the O c t o b e r Revolution. 2 3 In similar vein, relatively few émigré memoirs dealt with the experience of war. There is a valuable unpublished account by Evgenii Nikol'skii, who a t t e n d e d to the needs of Russia's refugee population in 1915-16, but not much else. 24 É m i g r é economists and lawyers supplied an academic need in several impressive volumes

Russia's First World War • 291 f o r t h e C a r n e g i e E n d o w m e n t . Sir Paul V i n o g r a d o f f , chief editor of the R u s s i a n series, p l a n n e d to write a g e n e r a l history of the war, which would show the "revo l u t i o n a r y crisis ... in its historical setting; political b r e a k d o w n , theories a n d practice; t h e gospel of h a t r e d ; fictions and realities; club d e s p o t i s m ; the coming recko n i n g . " A f t e r his s u d d e n d e a t h , his project was r e p l a c e d by Michael Florinsky's s o m e w h a t m o r e s o b e r account. O t h e r p l a n n e d v o l u m e s included studies of G e r m a n capital, the psychology of z e m s t v o workers, l a n d h o l d i n g and land settlem e n t , t h e l a b o r m a r k e t , t r a d e and c o m m e r c e , a n d "social conditions and m o v e m e n t s in U k r a i n e d u r i n g t h e war." H o w e v e r , they w e r e never published. 2 5 Why, t h e n , was the w a r largely f o r g o t t e n ? Partly, to m a k e an obvious p o i n t , it was f o r g o t t e n b e c a u s e o t h e r wars quickly a s s u m e d g r e a t e r p r o m i n e n c e in the lives of R u s s i a n citizens a n d their rulers. Within the n e w Soviet historical n a r r a tive, o t h e r conflicts r e p r e s e n t e d e i t h e r the t r i u m p h of the Bolsheviks over their e n e m i e s , as in the Civil War, or of the Soviet U n i o n o v e r its external foes, as in 1941-1945. Vast a m o u n t s of s t a t e - s p o n s o r e d p r o p a g a n d a w e r e d e v o t e d to t h e creation a n d c o n s o l i d a t i o n of myths a b o u t the centrality of these conflicts. R u s s i a ' s new rulers h a d n o cause to find m e a n i n g in a war l a u n c h e d by the old regime. T h e G r e a t War h a d already b e c o m e s o m e t h i n g of an e m b a r r a s s m e n t . Forgetting t h e war was partly " a c c i d e n t a l " ( o t h e r f o r m s of settling a c c o u n t s b e c a m e m o r e i m p o r t a n t t o officialdom, a n d to the individuals w h o grieved a b o u t t h e m ) and partly d e l i b e r a t e (class struggle b r o u g h t tsarism d o w n , n o t the strains induced by w a r ) . Individuals t o o may h a v e d i s o w n e d the war, e i t h e r b e c a u s e they were e n c o u r a g e d to find a d i f f e r e n t kind of m e a n i n g in the Civil War, a n d / o r because they e m b a r k e d on t h e challenging tasks of social, e c o n o m i c a n d political r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , w i t h o u t wishing to look back. P e r h a p s soldiers a n d civilians alike a b a n d o n e d quickly any s e n t i m e n t a l a t t a c h m e n t to the war, having r e c o u r s e instead to a t t a c k s u p o n internal foes (speculators, profiteers, fifth columnists, and shirkers, as well as m o r e familiar e n e m i e s such as landlords, traders, factory o w n e r s a n d f a c t o r y f o r e m e n ) . This p o p u l a r p r e o c c u p a t i o n with the class e n e m y d o v e t a i l e d neatly with Bolshevik doctrines of social conflict. If this is true, t h e n the Russian p o p u l a t i o n f o u n d significant m e a n ing in social a n t a g o n i s m , r a t h e r t h a n in the w a r e f f o r t as such. Put a n o t h e r way, the s u b s e q u e n t Soviet a m n e s i a c o r r e s p o n d e d to t h e p o p u l a r m o o d of a n t i p a t h y t o w a r d s capital as o p p o s e d to any mass e n g a g e m e n t with the war as s u c h — e v e n if it d e p r i v e d Soviet citizens of any sense that their p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the G r e a t War d e s e r v e d s o m e kind of recognition. W h a t e v e r its mainsprings, Soviet f o r g e t t i n g f o u n d e x p r e s s i o n in t h e a b s e n c e of public m o n u m e n t s a k i n to the C e n o t a p h a n d t h e M e n i n G a t e . T h e r e w e r e n o g a r d e n s of r e m e m b r a n c e , n o village w a r m e m o r i a l s , a n d t h u s n o o p p o r t u n i t y f o r t h o s e w h o w i s h e d to t r a n s c e n d grief. 2 6 Military units w e r e d i s m a n t l e d a n d r e o r d e r e d as the R e d A r m y e m e r g e d , so t h e r e was n o r e g i m e n t a l c o n t i n u i t y a n d an a b s e n c e of i n s t i t u t i o n a l devices f o r r e m e m b e r i n g o n e ' s fallen c o m r a d e s . N o graves m a r k e d t h e spot w h e r e soldiers fell in b a t t l e o r civilians p e r i s h e d en r o u t e

292 • Peter

Gatrell

t o a p l a c e of safety. O b l i v i o n w a s officially s a n c t i o n e d . T h e M o s c o w city c e m e t e r y w h e r e " f a l l e n s o l d i e r s " w e r e b u r i e d in 1 9 1 5 - 1 7 b e c a m e t h e site of m a s s b u r i a l of t h e C h e k a ' s victims, u n t i l it w a s b u l l d o z e d to m a k e w a y f o r t h e " L e n i n g r a d " cinema.27 REMEMBERING

(THEN)

A s in o t h e r b e l l i g e r e n t societies, t h e R u s s i a n p u b l i c w a s d e s p e r a t e f o r n e w s f r o m t h e f r o n t . N e w s r e e l s a n d d o c u m e n t a r y films w e n t s o m e way t o w a r d s satisfying t h a t d e m a n d , c o n v e y i n g an i m p r e s s i o n of t h e war w i t h o u t risking t o o " r e a l i s t i c " a v e r s i o n . S o m e t i m e s b a t t l e s c e n e s w e r e s t a g e d f o r t h e benefit of c a m e r a s ; o n occasions, old f o o t a g e ( f o r e x a m p l e , of t h e B a l k a n w a r s in 1912-13) was p r e s e n t e d as f r e s h m a t e r i a l . T h e o n e significant e x c e p t i o n w a s t h e c a p t u r e of E r z e r u m , w h e r e a u t h e n t i c f o o t a g e t e n d e d t o d o m i n a t e , a n d w h e r e t h e d o c u m e n t a r y style conv e y e d t h e b r a v e r y of R u s s i a n t r o o p s a n d t h e d e s o l a t e s t a t e of t h e city. T h e S k o b e l e v c o m m i t t e e , which issued a s u b s t a n t i a l n u m b e r of p a t r i o t i c films a n d o t h e r p r o p a g a n d a m a t e r i a l , e x c e l l e d itself h e r e . M u c h of its w a r t i m e o u t p u t e m p h a s i z e d t h e use of n e w m i l i t a r y t e c h n o l o g y , t h e t h r e a t p o s e d by G e r m a n y to R u s sian f e m a l e virtue, a n d t h e n e e d f o r g o o d n e s s a n d c o u r a g e to t r i u m p h o v e r evil a n d c o w a r d i c e . 2 8 By 1916, h o w e v e r , t h e p a t r i o t i c e m p h a s i s u p o n a d v e n t u r e a n d b r a v e r y h a d given way t o a m o r e t r o u b l i n g p r e o c c u p a t i o n with loss, s u f f e r i n g a n d t h e d e p r e s s i n g e n d l e s s n e s s of w a r . 2 9 I m a g e s of war did n o t d e r i v e exclusively f r o m official p r o p a g a n d a . Tales of b r a v e r y , albeit p r o d u c e d in s o m e w h a t stylized f o r m , w e r e s c a t t e r e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e p o p u l a r press. N e w s p a p e r s c a r r i e d r e p o r t s of h e r o i c a c t i o n , e v e n by r e f u g e e s w h o w e r e o t h e r w i s e i m a g i n e d i n c a p a b l e of i n d e p e n d e n t agency. T h e tale w a s told of a n a n o n y m o u s r e f u g e e w h o h a d t r i c k e d a p a r t y of G e r m a n s o l d i e r s into t h i n k ing t h a t s h e could d i r e c t t h e m b a c k t o t h e i r b a s e c a m p n e a r T a r n o p o l . I n s t e a d of h e l p i n g t h e m she t o o k o u t a b o m b c o n c e a l e d in h e r bag, t h r e w it in their midst a n d w o u n d e d all e i g h t of t h e m . S h e w a s r e w a r d e d with h e r p h o t o g r a p h in t h e local n e w s p a p e r . T h e s e i m a g e s a r e i m p o r t a n t , b e c a u s e t h e y c o u n t e r e d t h e p r e v a l e n t d e p i c t i o n of r e f u g e e s as feckless, u n d i s c i p l i n e d , i m m o r a l , a n d d i s e a s e d . 3 0 O t h e r k i n d s of r e c o r d w e r e g e n e r a t e d by t e a c h e r s , psychologists, a n d social w o r k e r s , as well as by c o l l e c t o r s of f o l k s o n g . A g r o u p of p e d a g o g u e s a t t a c h e d t o t h e K i e v F r o e b e l Society c o l l e c t e d s o m e of t h e d r a w i n g s d o n e by c h i l d r e n , o n e of w h o m p r o d u c e d a c a r t o o n - l i k e m i n i - h i s t o r y of t h e o u t b r e a k of t h e war. T h e collection, e n t i t l e d " C h i l d r e n a n d t h e W a r , " also i n c l u d e d l e t t e r s w r i t t e n by c h i l d r e n t o s o l d i e r s at t h e f r o n t , o f f e r i n g t h e m e n c o u r a g e m e n t a b o u t t h e c o n d u c t of t h e w a r , a n d r e a s s u r a n c e a b o u t t h e c a r e b e i n g lavished o n their f a m i l i e s a n d w o u n d e d c o m r a d e s . 3 1 T h i s m a t e r i a l w a s n o t c o l l e c t e d explicitly in o r d e r t o p r o v i d e t h e b a s i s f o r f u t u r e h i s t o r i a n s . P r e s u m a b l y it w a s a s s e m b l e d to e n a b l e child p s y c h o l ogists t o e n g a g e with t h e m e n t a l w o r l d of t h e n e x t g e n e r a t i o n of citizens. S e r i o u s e f f o r t s w e r e also m a d e t o collect f o l k s o n g s f r o m R u s s i a n , U k r a i n i a n , L i t h u a n i a n

Russia's First World War • 293 and G e o r g i a n soldiers serving at the front and in the rear. The most active collector was the peasant turned fel'dsher V.I. Simakov (1879-1955) who traced the e m e r g e n c e of a diversified popular culture, in which traditional soldiers' songs were mixed with urban ballads, outlaws' songs, chastushki, and other genres. 3 2 This activity demonstrates the rich variety of source material on which a fuller social and cultural history of the war might be based. It is understandable that the tsarist government and the military should have devoted resources to the dissemination of particular images of the enemy and of the efforts required on the h o m e front. What is more impressive and unusual is the way in which contemporaries sought to historicize the war, by deliberately generating material that would contribute to a future account of the war. The f a m o u s historian Sergei Platonov (1860-1933) was emphatic about the need for testimony to be sought from displaced persons, in order to supply raw material for the " f u t u r e historian." He had in mind collections of letters, stories, p o e m s etc., extracts of which a p p e a r e d in the periodical press and in specialist publications dedicated to the refugee " p r o b l e m " : "I emphatically urge that those who concern themselves with the collection of information about refugees should hold onto everything that comes into their possession, rejecting nothing, retaining every little scrap of information, every personal opinion, without reservation and without stricture, storing everything away for the future scholar." 3 3 The need to r e m e m b e r was particularly acute for the patriotic intelligentsia for whom death and displacement spelled national disaster—the erasure of the nation through occupation and enforced migration (loss of national solidarity and cultural meaning in Siberia etc.). The leading Jewish historian, Simon Dubnow, wrote in 1918 that "[t]he historic events of the last four years are so p r o f o u n d that many years will be n e e d e d for the preparatory work to be u n d e r t a k e n , in order to allow the future historian to m a k e sense of them." 3 4 Russia's educated elite acted upon these injunctions. In this regard, t h e T a t i a n a c o m m i t t e e — f o r m e d in 1914 to look after the interests of war widows, but by 1915 heavily involved in refugee relief—was all important. Toward the end of 1916 a distinctive approach towards refugees can be detected in the offices of the Tatiana committee. Two m o m e n t s stand out as being particularly significant. First, the committee launched an ambitious program to publicize the history of refugeedom, by means of a special exhibition that was scheduled to take place in the spring of 1917. Underlying this initiative was a belief that the Russian public needed to be better informed about the living conditions and activities of refugees, who were not all "beggars, idlers and spongers."The exhibition would be f u n d e d by private contributions and sponsored by 82 refugee organizations. 3 5 In its preliminary proposal the Tatiana committee spoke of four main themes that needed to be highlighted: conditions in Russia's borderlands b e f o r e and during the war (including "the destruction of settlements, property and artistic monuments"); the "sorrowful j o u r n e y " of refugees, including the background to their displacement, the course of their movement and the assistance given by government and public

294 • Peter Gatrell organizations; the living conditions in their new homes (including "the work u n d e r t a k e n by refugees and their impact on the local population"); and lastly the restoration of normal life in the regions cleared of enemy occupation. 3 6 Leading figures in the national committees certainly saw the proposal for an exhibition on "Russia and her devastated b o r d e r l a n d s " (Rossiia i razorennye okrainy) in a positive light. 37 Not only would it help to challenge prevailing misconceptions about the "idle refugee"; it would also afford an opportunity to display the talents and cultural attributes of national minorities in the Russian Empire, most of whom impinged only tangentially on the consciousness of the "Russian foreigner." The Latvian Central Welfare C o m m i t t e e called upon its local affiliates to submit handicrafts and agricultural produce, as well as testimonies of defense work and photographs of living conditions. Several governors expressed their misgivings, arguing that handicrafts and other items should be submitted without any national attribution, but rather as products of provincial life. Arguably, however, the source of particular exhibits was less important to the national committees than the decision of the organizers to include a record of enemy occupation and despoliation of the imperial borderlands. In this manner they would help to constitute a new sense of national purpose, that is to remind refugees that they had a duty to participate in the reconstruction of their homeland. Although nothing came of these elaborate plans (the timing was judged inappropriate in April 1917), it appears that many items of refugee provenance were actually submitted from as far afield as Krasnoiarsk, Baku and Odessa. Typical items submitted by Latvian refugees included jewelry, dolls (in national costume), embroidery, leather goods, and furniture. 3 8 In a related initiative t h e T a t i a n a committee sponsored an even m o r e r e m a r k able project designed to gather material f r o m refugees at first hand a b o u t their experiences before, during and after displacement. "An extremely important indicator [of the refugee movement] are the stories of refugees themselves." 3 9 R e f u g e e s were encouraged to describe their experiences in their own words. If they needed help in formulating a coherent narrative the Tatiana c o m m i t t e e obligingly published a schedule of 24 questions that might be put. 4 0 The aim was very much to secure stories from "simple p e o p l e " and not just f r o m the r e f u g e e intelligentsia. O t h e r kinds of testimony were also sought: photographs, drawings, reports, memoirs, stories and belles lettres: "The material that is collected ... will be collated and organized systematically and will form part of a projected v o l u m e o f ' C o l l e c t e d materials on the history of the refugee movement during the world war'." 4 1 This doctrine represents a significant shift away from the earlier e m p h a sis on supervision and discipline, which inevitably tended to deny a voice to refugees. Unusually, the project deliberately places the human agent at the c e n t e r of attention. The project straddled the final months of the tsarist regime and the short life of the Provisional G o v e r n m e n t , and eventually yielded several published accounts of episodes in the lives of refugees and relief workers. O n e s y m p a t h e t i c

Russia's First World War • 295 o b s e r v e r recorded that the exhausted and frightened refugee had "the eyes of a w o u n d e d animal." A n o t h e r wrote of his encounter with a distraught father who h a d just buried his young daughter, concluding that "I comforted him." But not all accounts depicted the active and benevolent relief worker. The elderly Iakov Vol'rat, originally f r o m Kurland, spoke not only of the pain and torment of displacement, but also of the fact that his experience was "interesting for an observant individual," who had access to "unexpected and different places, peoples and customs." 4 2 T h r o u g h o u t 1917 a sub-committee of dignitaries, officials and historians continued to encourage the collection of material for the projected history of r e f u g e e d o m : "recognizing that facts and observations, even if they seem at first to be insignificant and trivial, may prove to be of great interest. ...The most important thing is for the description to be sincere and truthful."43 The only other similar project which has come to light was conducted by the Jewish ethnographer, Solomon R a p o p o r t (pen n a m e S. Anskii, 1863-1920). R a p o port carried out relief work amongst Jewish refugees in Russian Poland, Galicia and Bukovina during the war, and in his diaries he makes much of his wish to record as much as possible of the Jewish experience, whether recounted in stories, p o e m s or song. In so doing, he appears to have sought to convey the integrity of popular religious sentiment from which the Jewish population derived some comfort in troubled times. In other words, according to Rapoport, Jewish civilians made sense of their experiences through recourse to traditional systems of belief. 44

CONCLUSION

Historians of Russia have been accused of a readiness to "skip" World War Two. 45 The same accusation can be leveled even more legitimately at historians in respect of the First World War. Why this unwillingness on the part of Russianists to give war its d u e ? The explanation is simple, at least so far as Soviet scholarship on the First World War is concerned: Russia's Revolution was validated not by reference to the immediate circumstances of social upheaval but by reference to socio-economic "preconditions" over the longer term. In this f r a m e w o r k there was no room for accounts of war that hinged upon human agency. As a consequence, no significant attempt was made to solicit the memories of millions of ordinary people, or to recover and record their history. B e f o r e long, other projects for dramatic social and economic transformation occupied center stage. Major efforts were m a d e to invest in the heroization or demonization of individuals or social collectivities associated with the Revolution. In Soviet Russia remembrance of the Civil War implied the c o m m e m o r a t i o n of the victor over the vanquished; to have c o m m e m o r a t e d the G r e a t War would have been to invite the recollection of a something more akin to a shared endeavor, amongst people who shortly t h e r e a f t e r became bitter foes. It was important to wipe the slate clean, in order to record the struggle to m a k e society and state anew.

2 9 6 • Peter

Gcitrell

A t t e m p t s w e r e m a d e t o h i s t o r i c i z e t h e w a r e v e n a s it w a s t a k i n g p l a c e . T h e r e w e r e ( t o u s e H e n r y R o u s s o ' s t e r m ) d i f f e r e n t " v e c t o r s " o f m e m o r y at t h e t i m e . T h e m o s t significant w e r e s e m i - p u b l i c o r g a n i z a t i o n s such as the Tatiana

committee

a n d its t a l e n t e d a n d e n e r g e t i c p r o f e s s i o n a l staff. T h e s e e f f o r t s w e r e a l s o s h a r e d by the national committees, w h o s e

transformation into political authorities

after

1918 e n a b l e d the n o n - R u s s i a n participants of war to begin to recollect their e x p e r i e n c e s , a l b e i t in a n e w n a t i o n a l r e g i s t e r . W h e t h e r t h i s w a s t h e r a p e u t i c a l l y p r e f e r a b l e t o S o v i e t a m n e s i a is a n i s s u e t h a t is i m p o s s i b l e t o r e s o l v e .

Notes A n earlier version of this p a p e r was r e a d to t h e Russian H i s t o r y s e m i n a r at St. A n t o n y ' s College, O x f o r d ( M a y 2001). I am g r a t e f u l to t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s for h e l p f u l c o m m e n t s . 1 T h e t w o m a i n b i b l i o g r a p h i e s a r e G. K h m e l e v s k i i , Mirovaia imperialisticheskaia voina, 1914-1918: sistematicheskii ukazalel' knizhnoi i stateinoi voenno-istoricheskoi literatury za 19l4-I935g. (Moscow, 1935; r e p r i n t e d C a m b r i d g e , E n g l a n d : O r i e n t a l R e s e a r c h P a r t n e r s , 1973), a n d R . E . R u t m a n , Rossiia v period pervoi mirovoi voiny i fevral'skoi burzhuaznodemokralicheskoi revoliutsii ( L e n i n g r a d : A N S S S R , 1975). 2 N o r m a n S t o n e , The Eastern Front ( L o n d o n : H o d d e r & S t o u g h t o n , 1975); Lewis Siegelb a u m . The Politics of Industrial Mobilization in Russia, 1914-1917: A Study of the WarIndustry Committees ( L o n d o n : M a c m i l l a n , 1983); R a y m o n d P e a r s o n , The Russian Moderates and the Crisis of Tsarism, 1914-1917 ( L o n d o n : M a c m i l l a n , 1977). See also W. B r u c e Lincoln, Passage Through Armageddon: The Russians in War and Revolution (New York: S i m o n & S c h u s t e r , 1986). 3 H u b e r t u s Jahn, Patriotic Culture in Russia during World War 1 ( I t h a c a : C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1995): Vejas Liulevicius, War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity and German Occupation in World War I ( C a m b r i d g e , E n g l a n d : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 2000); P e t e r G a t r e l l , A Whole Empire Walking: Refugees in Russia during World War I ( B l o o m i n g t o n : I n d i a n a U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1999); B a r b a r a E n g e l , " N o t by B r e a d A l o n e : S u b s i s t e n c e R i o t s in R u s s i a d u r i n g World War I," Journal of Modern History 69 (1997): 696-721; R e i n h a r d N a c h t i g a l , " S e u c h e n u n t e r militärischer A u f s i c h t in R u s s l a n d : d a s L a g e r T o c k o e als Beispiel f ü r die B e h a n d l u n g d e r K r i e g s g e f a n g e n e n 1915-1916?," Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 48 (2000): 363-87. See also N. Smirnov, ed., Rossiia i pervaia mirovaia voina (St. P e t e r s b u r g : D m i t r i i B u l a n i n , 1999). 4 N e w w o r k includes A.I. U t k i n , Zabytaia tragediia: Rossiia v pervoi mirovoi voine ( S m o lensk: R u s i c h , 2000); O.S. P o r s h n e v a , Mentalitet i sotsial'noe povedenie rabochikh, krest'ian i soldat v period pervoi mirovoi voiny ( E k a t e r i n b u r g : U r O R A N , 2000); A . I u . B a k h t u r i n a , Politika rossiiskoi imperii v Vostochnoi Galitsii v gody pervoi mirovoi voiny ( M o s c o w : A I R O - X X , 2000). 5 Otechestvennaia

istoriia

1 (2001), 188, citing Krasnaia

zvezda,

16 M a r c h 1995.

6 D a n Orlovsky, " T h e G r e a t War and R u s s i a n M e m o r y , " in N. Smirnov, ed., Rossiia ia mirovaia voina (St. P e t e r s b u r g : D m i t r i i B u l a n i n , 1999), 4 9 - 5 7 . 7 Rossiia

v mirovoi

voine 1914-1918

v tsifrakh

perva-

( M o s c o w : T S U , 1925), 30.

8 A l l a n W i l d m a n , The End of the Russian Press, 1980), 3 6 3 - 4 .

Imperial

Army

9 R o b e r t W h a l e n , Bitter Wounds: versity Press, 1984), 57.

Victims

of the Great

German

i

(Princeton: Princeton University War ( I t h a c a : C o r n e l l U n i -

Notes • 297 10 Quoted in Liulevicius, Warland. 236-7. 11 It might nevertheless be interesting to compare the behavior of Cossack troops with those of the Freikorps. The problem of identifying a crystallized Russian "nation" is a theme of Jahn, Patriotic Culture, 173-4, and Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking, 162-5. 12 Evan Mawdsley, The Russian Civil War, 2d ed. (Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2000), 59-63. 13 Diane Koenker et al., eds., Party, State and Society in the Russian Civil War: Explorations in Social History (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989). Josh Sanborn is preparing important work on this topic for publication. 14 Alfred Bilmanis, A History of Latvia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), 281. The Latvian rock band Skyforger recently issued an album called "Latvian Riflemen," with accompanying words and pictures telling the story of Latvia during World War I. See http://www.toroddfuglesteg.com/skyforger.html. 15 See Konstantin Paustovskii, Slow Approach of Thunder (London: Harvill, 1965), 175-6, for an indication of "the utter helplessness of the world to which I belonged, the utter lonely rootlessness of my unsettled life." 16 For the latest rendition, A. Solzhenitsyn, November 1916 (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1999). 17 Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking, 159, quoting Janis Goldmanis. 18 Information kindly supplied by Dr. Aija Priedite. 19 Vieda Skultans, The Testimony of Lives: Narrative and Memory in Post-Soviet Latvia (London: Routledge, 1998), 153. 20 Donald Rayfield,"The Soldiers' Lament: World War I Folk Poetry in the Russian Empire," Slavonic and East European Review 66 (1988): 66-90. 21 S.N. Prokopovich, Voina i narodnoe khoziaistvo (Sovet vserossiiskikh kooperativnykh s'ezdov, 1918); V.l. Grinevetskii, Poslevoennye perspektivy russkoi promyshlennosti (Kharkov: Vserossiiskii tsentral'nyi soiuz potrebitel'nykh obshchestv, 1919). 22 A.A. Sidorov, "Vliianie imperialisticheskoi voiny na ekonomiku Rossii," Ocherkipo istorii Oktiabr'skoi revoliutsii,2 vols. (Moscow-Leningrad: Gossudarstvennoe Izd., 1927): 1. 23 K.N. Tarnovskii, Sovetskaia istoriografiia russkogo imperializma (Moscow: Nauka, 1964). 24 E.A. Nikol'skii, "Bezhentsy v velikuiu voinu 1914—1918gg." (ms., Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, 1934). 25 James Shotwell, Economic and Social History of the World War: Outline of Plan (Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 1924), for brief autobiographies of the contributors. 26 Catherine Merridale, Night of Stone: Death and Memory in Russia (London: Granta, 2000), 123-25. 27 Orlovsky, "The Great War and Russian Memory." 28 Jahn, Patriotic Culture, 155. 29 Ibid., 167, describing the film The Poor Chap Died in an Army Hospital, 1916. 30 Zhizn' bezhentsev (3 September 1916);"Geroistvo bezhenki," Vestnik iuga (6 September 1915); Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking, 128-40. 31 Deli i voina: sbornik statei (Kiev, 1915). 32 Rayfield, "The Soldiers' Lament." 33 Izvestiia Vserossiiskogo komiteta dlia okazaniia pomoshchi postradavshim ot voennykh bedstvii 20 (15 May 1917): 8. 34 S. Dubnow, "Iz 'chernoi knigi' rossiiskogo evreistva," Evreiskaia starina 10 (1918): 195. 35 Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv [hereafter RGIA], f.1276, op.12, d.1382, 11.387-90. 36 Izvestiia KTN 17 (1 February 1917): 10; Trudovaia pomoshch' 10 (1916): 512, where this initiative was seen as a contribution to "the history of war in general." 37 Armianskii vestnik 8 (19 February 1917): 19-21.

2 9 8 • Peter

Gatrell

38 Zinojums 51 (22 D e c e m b e r 1916); V. Olavs, Latviesu beglu apgadasanas ( R i g a , 1931), 144-46; R G I A , f. 1322, op. 1, d.13,1. 142ob. 39 " S o b r a n i e m a t e r i a l o v o b e z h e n s k o m dvizhenii," Izvestiia 40 G a t r e l l , A Whole Empire Walking, A p p e n d i x 2. 41 Izvestiia KTN 9 (1 O c t o b e r 1916): 5-6; Trudovaia

KTN

pomoshch'

centralkomiteja

15 (1 J a n u a r y 1917): 10-11. 9 (1916): 394.

42 E . G l u k h o v t s o v a . " S k a z k a zhizni," Izvestiia KTN 18 (15 F e b r u a r y 1917): 2 1 - 2 8 ; I a k o v V o l ' r a t , " B e g s t v o ot g e r m a n t s e v i skitaniia," ibid., 19 (15 A p r i l 1917): 17-22. See also Vera S l a v e n s o n , " B e z h e n s k o e : p o p o v o d u pisem b e z h e n t s e v , " Vestnik Evropy 51, no.7 (1916): 292-301. 43 Izvestiia KTN 23 (15 J u n e 1917), 24. e m p h a s i s a d d e d . 44 David Roskies, Against the Apocalypse: Responses to Catastrophe ( C a m b r i d g e , Mass.: H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1984), 135.

in Modern

45 A m i r W e i n e r , " S a v i n g P r i v a t e Ivan: F r o m W h a t , Why, and H o w ? " Kritika

Jewish

Culture

1 (2000): 305-36.

IV T H E SOVIET EXPERIENCE

The Political Police and the Study of History in the USSR VIKTOR M .

PANEIAKH

The political police in the USSR were always a secret service. Throughout their existence, they did not change their punitive style, but were institutionalized differently. From 1918-1922 they were the Extraordinary Committee (Chrezvychainaia komissiia or ChK). In 1922, they were r e f o r m e d and the name changed to the State Political D e p a r t m e n t (Gosudarstvennoe politicheskoe upravlenie, G P U ) and from 1923 until 1934 they were called the Joint Chief Political Department (Obiedinnoe glavnoe politicheskoe upravlenie, O G P U ) . Later in 1934, the O G P U became part of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (Narodnyi k o m m i s s a r i a t v n u t r e n n i k h del, or the N K V D ) . F r o m F e b r u a r y to July 1941, the same institution was named the People's Commissariat of State Security (Narodnyi kommissariat gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti, N K G B ) , but from August 1941 to April 1943 the previous name, N K V D , was brought back, only to reinstate N K G B again for the period from May 1943 until May 1946. From May 1946 until March 1953, the political police were known as the Ministry of State Security (Ministerstvo gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti, M G B ) when the name was changed to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del, MVD). From March 1954, the political police were finally institutionalized as the notorious KGB, Committee of State Security (Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti) within the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Whatever the name and acronym, however, the goals never changed, as the political police were always envisioned as the punitive sword of the Bolshevik Party. Their activities were numerous, and with time the structure became more sophisticated. The Bolshevik party assigned them ever more tasks. They had offices in every region, which were gradually r e f o r m e d to become local departments. They had a wide network of secret agents (sekretnye sotrudniki), sometimes recruited voluntarily, sometimes by coercion. They had their own investigation prisons, c o n c e n t r a t i o n camps, e x e c u t i o n e r s (who carried out d e a t h sentences), construction companies (using convicts as slave labor), research institutes, foreign intelligence services, and so forth. The activities of the Bolshevik Party apparatus and the political police became tightly intertwined. The Party sent its functionaries to work in the political police, and vice versa; top officers of the political police received positions in the Party

302 • Viktor M.

Paneiakh

bureaucracy, remaining within t h e supposed "active reserve" of the political police. U n d e r the pretext of fighting the so-called counterrevolution, its focus was eliminating the political adversaries of the Party, envisioning any opposition as contesting Party control and thus as its enemy. Furthermore, along with the growth of the Terror against its own people, the political police were fabricating and falsifying political prosecutions against millions of innocent citizens. These cases were c o m m a n d e d and commissioned by the political leadership. Sometimes the political police were the initiator, but each case had to be sanctioned by Party authorities. The major fabrications of political processes were instigated by Stalin himself. From the very m o m e n t of seizing political power, the Bolsheviks sought to educate the population in the spirit of socialism. Thus history, like o t h e r fields in the humanities, was considered first to be an instrument of state politics. The Party's total saturation of history was additionally secured by the political police. For this purpose the police recruited secret agents among historians, who provided information about the attitudes and talks regarding various issues, relevant for c o n t e m p o r a r y politics. The agents were particularly vigilant after the publication of particularly significant decrees and regulations, when they were assigned to gather historians' reactions. T h e information was often used subsequently to prosecute the latter. A well-known party historian G. Zaidel', who was one of these agent-historians in the 1920s and early 1930s, was registered in the secret documents of the political police u n d e r the conspiratorial nickname "Stormy P e t r e l " (burevestnik).' Moreover, within the informal circles of historians in the 1920s, including the "salon" of Tarle and the "Circle of the Young Historians," 2 there were agents as well. In 1930 Nikolai Druzhinin, already a creditable historian and a future academic, was arrested. While u n d e r investigation, he agreed to collaborate with the political police, 3 and was freed two months later. Certainly, the story could be presumed to be a falsification. However, his widow E.I. Druzhinina, also an outstanding historian, published an extract f r o m his memoirs that he did not intend to publish. There, Nikolai Druzhinin affirmed that such a step was m a d e consciously and even praised his investigator, who is renowned, as it is now known, for his exemplary cruelty. 4 A t the same time Lev Cherepnin, another f u t u r e academic, also agreed under strong pressure to become an agent of the political police, but the next day signed a declaration renouncing his decision. Predictably, he was immediately sent to a concentration camp. 5 The n u m b e r of recruited i n f o r m a n t s multiplied in the 1930s. A m o n g them was, for example, a doctoral history student f r o m the Leningrad Institute of History, Philosophy and Literature, whose reports played a role in preparing the groundwork for the accusation of many of his colleagues who were subsequently arrested. Later he became a celebrated historian, head of the D e p a r t m e n t of M o d e r n and C o n t e m p o r a r y History of Leningrad University. Here is his testimony, m a d e

The Political Police and the Study of History • 303 in 1956 to A.L. Voitolovskaya, o n e of his victims, who survived more than fifteen years of imprisonment in concentration camps and exile, and was later rehabilitated. Vladimir R-ov, as she transparently disguised his name, was arrested in 1935 a n d f r e e d three days later. This is how it began: T h e y pointed you out to me. So I started with you... I was giving information a b o u t you, about our Komsomol cell... about the doctoral students. In the course of time, the assignments became more demanding. At first I was providing the information orally, but later such communication was not satisfactory, and I was ordered to submit written and signed reports, and even diary entries regarding the people I met at work. Every week ... at a particular day I gave new information about students ... teachers,professors, my supervisor ... and others, even about those who were already imprisoned. Sometimes I felt trapped, I did not want to go on ... and then I escaped Leningrad, but later returned and was still writing, writing. O n c e I fled for a year, being on the edge of mental breakdown. Not because of some doubts or repentance, what is the point in lying? That was over long time ago. Rather it was d u e to the desperate hopelessness of my situation. I was found and returned to the city, all the conditions for writing a dissertation were created for me. I defe n d e d it and was called u p o n more rarely, but I still had to go there. ...Now they are coming to "consult" with me. I have served enough... I told myself: "Everything should be paid for, and I have paid my share." 6 At the time I was a student at Leningrad University in 1948-1953, there were mass arrests among both students and professors. In these same circles there were also secret agents of the political police, which we p r e s u m e d at the time. Later some of our guesses were confirmed, but some were not. But even though all these cases reveal the mechanisms of mass terror as well as exemplify the process of agent recruitment a m o n g different parts of society, they still d o not reflect the specific details of the repression carried out by the political police against a whole generation of professional historians. Obviously, such persecution was sanctioned by the top Bolshevik leadership personified in Stalin. The authorities in such cases set rather pragmatic and clear goals. A f t e r seizing power in O c t o b e r 1917, the Bolsheviks realized that they did not have their own somewhat p r o m i n e n t Marxist historians, with the possible exception of Mikhail Pokrovskii, a party functionary, holding important positions in the state apparatus. Unwillingly, they had to draft historians who had received their education in pre-Revolutionary universities. A m o n g them were young historians, established scholars of the middle generation, as well as a range of f a m o u s academics of the old cohort. With their efforts, t h e system of regional and central Soviet archives was created. For the time being they also taught in universities and o t h e r educational institutions; f u r t h e r m o r e , they worked in the Russian and later the All-Union A c a d e m y of Sciences.

304 • Viktor M.

Paneiakh

The authorities quickly turned to establishing alternative educational institutions, where Marxist cadres would be trained, as well as research organizations, where doctoral students and young specialists were to receive intensive historical training. These organizations included the Sverdlov University, the Institute of the Red Professors (Institut Krasnoi Professury), the Communist Academy, the Society of Marxist Historians, and others. By the end of the 1920s, the Bolshevik authorities decided to replace the old, so-called bourgeois scholars with a generation of new historians who had u n d e r g o n e intensive schooling in these institutions. This generation was not trained to work with historical sources, but rather was introduced to the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and other revolutionary leaders. Further, they had a superficial knowledge of Marxist historical methodology, but could skillfully juggle the quotations from these authors, creating speculative theories disconnected from real life. Obviously, they were not able to honestly compete with specialists from the pre-Revolutionary institutions. It was then that Stalin decided to use the political police (at that time, O G P U ) to eliminate an entire generation of professional historians, who were allegedly loyal but did not fully accept the regime, although they had no real opportunity to criticize it. The threshold turned out to be late 1929 and 1930, when the political police created a grandiose political "case," commissioned by Stalin. It started with "purges" within different institutions of the Academy of Sciences, using this specific public form of public prosecution for massive firing.7 Very soon the purges developed into arrests. Starting on 23 October 1929 through to the end of the year, about fifteen people involved in managing the manuscript collection of the A c a d e m y of Sciences and some of the administrative personnel of the geological expeditions were arrested in Leningrad. The political police began punitive measures as a reaction to the discovery, during the process of purges and mass firing, of n u m e r o u s so-called "political" documents that had been archived by these humanities institutions. A particularly large scandal came to be known as "the Archival case." 8 It grew out of the discovery of a n u m b e r of documents, including the original abdication papers by Nicholas II and his b r o t h e r Michael, the documents of the Socialist Revolutionary Party (SR) and the Party of Constitutional Democracy (Kadets), papers related to A.F. Kerenskii and P.B. Struve, the private archive of the ex-chief of gendarmes V.F. Dzhunkovskii, and a m e m b e r ship list of the chernosotennyi (anti-Semitic) Union of the Russian People. These discoveries, as it turned out, were merely the pretext for mass arrests mainly of historians as well as specialists from o t h e r fields of the humanities, literary historians, and m u s e u m workers. In the beginning of the 1930s, the "Archival C a s e " was turned into a fullfledged fabricated and falsified investigation. By putting forward the accusations of counterrevolutionary activities and cooperation with interventionist circles in the West, first against Leningrad scholars (at the time the A c a d e m y was based in Leningrad rather than in the capital Moscow), and later Moscow and regional ones, the authorities sought to "Bolshevize" the A c a d e m y of Sciences. The goal

The Political Police and the Study of History • 305 was to put the Academy in the service of the regime and to replace the representatives of the old school with the new cadres, educated at the Communist A c a d e m y and the Institute of the R e d Professors. Clearly, such an e n d e a v o r was n o t isolated f r o m the general tendencies in politics. The attack on the preR e v o l u t i o n a r y intelligentsia intensified at the same time as N E P politics were c u r b e d at the end of the 1920s. Thus Stalin commissioned the fabrication of o t h e r cases, the so-called "Industrial Party," " L a b o r Peasant Party," and " U n i o n Bureau of t h e Mensheviks" 9 all had virtually identical scenarios, but the case against hist o r i a n s chronologically came first. T h e turning point of the "Archival Case," later referred to as the "Academic Case," the "Case of Historians," and the "Case of Four Academics," was m a r k e d by a decision of the Special Investigating Commission. This Commission was created in November 1929 and included the head of the c o m m i t t e e supervising purges, chief prosecutor of the Russian Federation (RSFSR), and senior executives of the political police ( O G P U ) . The Commission immediately decided to p r o c e e d with an in-depth investigation to " u n c o v e r " a connection between leading m e m b e r s of the Academy of Sciences and the White émigrés, foreign official representatives and missions, as well as possible spying activities (military intelligence) for the interests of foreign states. 1 0 The result was a report of the O G P U leadership (G. Iagoda) to Stalin, m a d e on 9 January 1930 about an allegedly existing counterrevolutionary organization, which in reality did not exist, and the request for the arrest warrant of mainly p r o m i n e n t academics. 1 1 T h e warrant was issued immediately, and already on 12 January 1930 a famous Russian historian and academic, Sergei Platonov, 1 2 was arrested in Leningrad, just b e f o r e his 70 th birthday. He was assigned the role of the head of a mythical u n d e r g r o u n d organization. The O G P U report details what was to become a standard and general scenario of the f u t u r e allegations of the "Academic Case": the creation of an illegal counterrevolutionary organization, conspiracies to overthrow Soviet power, the restoration of the monarchy, relations with the émigré circles and E u r o p e a n intelligence services. 1 3 1 stress once again that all these were false accusations toward political ends. Such a scenario was sufficient for the first round of interrogations. H o w e v e r , new arrests were supposed to give the interrogators a chance to use their imagination to further elaborate this scenario in order to m a k e it credible and also to give it a sense of individuality and an " a p p r o p r i a t e " f r a m e w o r k . It needs to be r e m e m b e r e d that this was a typical inquisition-type investigation, conducted without advocates, without judicial supervision, with the people u n d e r investigation fully d e p e n d e n t on the investigators. T h e confession to non-existent crimes was the only evidence and at the same time was the basis for the elaboration of the basic scenario. The personal avowal of guilt was considered to be the " Q u e e n of Evidence." Following S. Platonov's d e t a i n m e n t , mass arrests began in Leningrad. From October 1929 up to S e p t e m b e r 1930, about 150 people were arrested, a m o n g them

306 • Viktor M.

Paneiakh

such prominent historians as E. Tarle, N. Likhachev and M. Liubavskii. Some, such as M. Liubavskii, S. Bakhrushin, A. Iakovlev, V. Picheta, Iu. Got'e, and S. Bogoiavlenskii, were brought f r o m Moscow to Leningrad. The investigators accused these historians of belonging to the leading core of the supposed counterrevolutionary organization. M o r e than ten people (assimilated G e r m a n s ) were accused of espionage for Germany. The arrested people found themselves under heavy psychological pressure. For instance, V. Picheta later wrote about the investigation: When I was interrogated, I was given back my own testimony to change some words for o t h e r s — n o t to my benefit. I was read the testimony of Liubavskii, was given some h a p h a z a r d facts and was forced to change my statements. I was forced to admit to being a m e m b e r of an organization I had never h e a r d of, and I signed everything that was written by t h e investigator. I could not protest in f r o n t of them, otherwise I would have been convicted. 1 4 M. Liubavskii, in his 1934 letter to the persecutor, detailed how he was forced to slander himself, as well as to give false testimonies. During the first interrogation, the investigator warned him that the political police ( O G P U ) "already knew everything" about his crimes. So he should not "deny anything," if he did not want to "worsen his fate," and also "should not hope for any open trial," for he would be tried by the O G P U itself on the basis of the interrogator's report. The questioning was over at t h r e e in the morning. A f t e r that the investigator p r e p a r e d a short report with his testimony, which stated that M. Liubavskii " o p e n - h e a r t e d ly confessed to being a constitutional monarchist, for which he is deeply remorseful." Liubavskii's a t t e m p t s to contradict this report had no resonance. The interrogator said that he and his colleagues wanted to finish this "trivial case" quickly and not to protract it with a variety of testimonies. Although aware that the case was truly ridiculous, under the interrogator's pressure Liubavskii signed the record. U p o n his return to his cell, Liubavskii, in his own words, realized that he fell into a horrible trap, out of which there was no escape. Already the next day there was a new copy m a d e f r o m the d r a f t of his testimony, and the interrogator harshly said that M. Liubavskii had no right to change his testimony. 1 5 The illegal m e t h o d s of psychological pressure and even physical torture were applied to many, if not all people u n d e r investigation. The elderly professor S.V. Rozhdestvenskii was kept in a solitary cell and not allowed to receive parcels, to have walks or change clothes. 1 6 According to M. Beliaev, he was k e p t for nine days in a dark lock-up, was t h r e a t e n e d with a death sentence as well as with the exile of his aged m o t h e r , if he did not "recall" anything. 1 7 A. Mervart later told that the testimony of her husband was fabricated from beginning to end, u n d e r the pressure of the investigator. Fearing for the fate of his family, he wrote everything that was dictated to him. She herself "confessed" to being a spy and testified

The Political Police and the Study of History • 307 against her husband u n d e r the threat of "elimination" (unichtozhenie) not only of herself but also her relatives and small children. 1 8 In his application for rehabilitation, B. R o m a n o v wrote in 1956: " U n d e r a clearly posed threat to mutilate me, I had no other choice but to sign, with great disgust, everything that the interrogator himself wrote or forced me to write. I did it, fully realizing the hopelessness and vulnerability of my situation." 1 9 O n e method of psychological pressure was the investigator's declaration that the other detainees had already confessed something (often about the fabricated facts) and that another testimony would alleviate everyone's situation. Moreover, the reports were often written as short summaries or as prisoners' monologues, without any record of the questions asked and answers given. The reports themselves were often written after and not during the interrogations. Such an approach to record keeping allowed the investigators to falsify the content of what was said, as well as to distort the answers. At the same time, the interrogators forced the detainees to sign testimonies consisting of imaginary vulgar anti-Soviet slogans. O n 15 S e p t e m b e r 1930, more than half a year after the beginning of the investigation, Stalin received the next O G P U report about the intermediate results of the investigation. 2 0 The report, accompanied by fragments of the testimony reports, was typeset and bound into a book that was distributed to a small circle of the political police functionaries and the party leadership. 2 1 This report is full of evidence that was falsified from top to bottom. For instance, the report mentions that the investigation proved the existence of an anti-Soviet counterrevolutionary organization called the "Popular Union for the Rebirth of Free Russia," whose goal was to restore the monarchy following an armed resurrection and foreign intervention. Allegedly, there was a plan to carry out a G e r m a n landing in Leningrad from the Baltic Sea with the help of 15,000 armed and trained soldiers. Communication with the conspirators was supposedly maintained through the G e r m a n consul in Leningrad, who was to provide money for the plotters. The weapons were claimed to be kept in Leningrad in the institutes and museums of the Academy of Sciences. If so, it is remarkable that the investigating organs of the political police did not even bother to confiscate these arms. Clearly, no arms could be found in the archives of the Academy of Sciences. The plotters and spies were allegedly providing information about the condition of the R e d Army. How on earth could they have known anything about it? Supposedly the Pope was to send money through some mediators to support the Orthodox Church. The "organization" was said to have branches in different cities and towns, with the so-called "Moscow center." E. Tarle was forced to testify that he established a connection with French governmental circles and had met President Poincaré and Prime-Minister Briand. Clear falsifications seemed to be endless. In February 1931 the first sentences were announced by the O G P U "groups of t h r e e " (troiki OGPU), created outside of the legal f r a m e w o r k . Six people were sentenced to be shot. The majority was sent to a concentration camp. Only the

308 • Viktor M.

Paneiakh

m a j o r and most renowned historians were sentenced to exile in r e m o t e towns in the country. The destinies of the sentenced historians were different. Some perished in the camps or exile. Thus, S. Platonov died in Samara in 1933, D. Egorov died in 1931, A. Mervart passed away in 1932 in a concentration camp, the same year S. Rozhdestvenskii died in exile in Tomsk, and in 1936 M. Liubavskii died in Ufa. In 1932 some of the survivors began to come back. If there were a favorable concurrence of coincidences, some, but by no means all, could resume their research and teaching, for example, E. Tarle, Iu. G o t ' e , S. Bakhrushin, and V. Picheta. Some of the most psychologically detrimental factors for those who returned f r o m Soviet prisons and concentration camps were the fear of a new arrest, the fear of being mutilated in prison, and the fear of violent death. The fears did not let anyone forget for a minute, and overcoming these fears took all their available energy. A n d yet, the fear could not be fully conquered. Those scholars who returned f r o m imprisonment and exile were subjected to various forms of persecution and restrictions. For instance, for a long time they were forbidden to settle in large cities but, even if allowed, they were sometimes again exiled to Siberia without permission to live near urban centers. Only after the end of World War II were their rights officially restored. However, only a small n u m b e r of people were rehabilitated in their lifetime (only after the Twentieth Party Congress, mainly in 1956-57). Full rehabilitation took place only under Gorbachev, when, on 16 January 1989, after a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, " O n Additional Measures of Restoring Justice Towards the Victims of Political Repressions of the 1 9 3 0 s ^ 0 s and Early 1950s." The moral trauma as a result of the arrest, investigation, sentence without a trial, period of imprisonment and f u r t h e r limitations could never be healed. The scholars who experienced detainment cells and concentration camps clearly realized that at any point in time the persecution could be resumed. They also feared being blackmailed by the political police, with reason, as such cases were not exceptional. The fear was even present for those who had been acquitted and released. In general, the political police kept everyone who was ever detained under control, no matter whether they were later freed or convicted. For instance, the political police requested N. Druzhinin's records f r o m the archives n u m e r o u s times, even though he had already agreed to collaborate with them. I know of some cases: 7 May 1941 ("because of the investigation"), 22 O c t o b e r 1946 (not specifying the cause); 4 April 1950 (on account of relations with Budovnits, a historian and a major editor, at that time working in the A c a d e m y of Sciences); 7 June 1956 (in the investigation of Vilenskaia, an assistant of Druzhinin, at that time free). Similar uses were m a d e of I. Polosin's personal file: 7 June 1941 (targeted investigation), 7 October 1944, August 1944, 22 S e p t e m b e r 1947,25 February 1947,25 February 1948 (without indication of reason), January 1949 (ordered by the Ministry of State Security of o n e of the regions, neighboring the Moscow oblast), July 1956 ("review of the contacts"). L. Cherepnin's file contains similar

The Political Police and the Study of History • 309 r e c o r d s : 16 D e c e m b e r 1944 ( b e c a u s e of t h e f r o n t c o u n t e r - i n t e l l i g e n c e o r g a n i z a t i o n " D e a t h to Spies," S M E R S h ) , 29 M a r c h 1948. 6 M a y 1950 ( n o t s p e c i f y i n g t h e c a u s e ) , D e c e m b e r 1951 ( t a r g e t e d i n v e s t i g a t i o n ) , 27 A p r i l 1956 ( " o n a c c o u n t of t r a v e l i n g a b r o a d " ) , A p r i l 1972 ( " f o r o p e r a t i v e n e e d s " ) . 2 2 A l l t h e s e e x a m p l e s d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t , until t h e e n d of t h e i r lives, t h e h i s t o r i a n s felt t o a c e r t a i n e x t e n t h o u n d e d . H o w is it possible f o r s c h o l a r s to fully d e v e l o p t h e i r t a l e n t u n d e r such c i r c u m s t a n c e s ? T h e political e n g a g e m e n t of m a n y of t h e m s h o u l d n o t c o m e as a surprise. O n l y a very f e w could avoid it. T h e m o s t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c e x a m p l e w o u l d be t h e d e s t i n y of E. Tarle. H e was t h e first t o b e r e l e a s e d f r o m exile. Stalin p e r s o n a l l y p a t r o n i z e d him a n d he u s e d his e x t r a o r d i n a r y t a l e n t to s a t i s f y Stalin. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , Tarle t h e h i s t o r i a n d e t e r i o r a t e d p r o f e s s i o n a l l y . 2 3 A r e t u r n t o t h e historical p r o f e s s i o n a f t e r r e p r e s s i o n w a s n o t a c c i d e n t a l . D u e to t h e c h a n g i n g political s i t u a t i o n in t h e c o u n t r y a n d o n t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l scene, a n e w p a r t y d o c t r i n e was b e i n g c r e a t e d to r e p l a c e L e n i n ' s views of t h e 1920s. T h e s e c h a n g e s w e r e b e c o m i n g increasingly n o t i c e a b l e . U n d e r Stalin t h e Soviet s t a t e w a s s t e a d i l y inching t o w a r d s a tightly c e n t r a l i z e d a n d t o t a l i t a r i a n s t r u c t u r e , h e a d e d by t h e p a r t y a p p a r a t u s , p r e s i d e d o v e r by Stalin a n d s u p p o r t e d by t h e political police. T h e i d e a s of world r e v o l u t i o n a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m w e r e a b a n d o n e d , r e p l a c e d by b u i l d i n g socialism in o n e c o u n t r y . T h e shift f r o m the m e s s i a n i s m of w o r l d r e v o l u tion t o an imperial style a n d r e f e r e n c e s to a s t r o n g s t a t e with an e x t e n d e d g e n e a l ogy of t h e i r " g r e a t f o r e f a t h e r s " w i t n e s s e d an a b a n d o n m e n t of t h e classical M a r x ist c o s m o p o l i t i s m in f a v o r of t h e i d e a of p a t r i o t i s m . 2 4 T h u s , it is n o t by c h a n c e t h a t p r e - R e v o l u t i o n a r y historical w o r k s , such as t h e writings by Kliuchevskii, P l a t o n o v , P r e s n i a k o v , and L i u b o m i r o v , o n c e b e c a m e a g a i n a c c l a i m e d a n d p r o m o t e d . M o r e a t t e n t i o n was also given t o t h e h i s t o r i a n s w h o s u r v i v e d t h e p u r g e s a n d w h o w e r e g r a d u a l l y r e t u r n i n g f r o m exile a n d c o n c e n t r a t i o n camps. T h e " q u i c k l y - m a d e " P a r t y historians, e d u c a t e d in p o s t - R e v o l u t i o n a r y institutions such as t h e I n s t i t u t e of R e d P r o f e s s o r s a n d t h e C o m m u n i s t A c a d e m y , w e r e n o w useless. Stalin p a s s e d t h e m on t o t h e political police, w h o d e c i d e d their f a t e s q u i t e radically: s t a r t i n g f r o m 1935 t h e r e w e r e m a s s e x e c u t i o n s a n d 10- t o 25-year s e n t e n c e s . O n behalf of the C o m m u n i s t Party, t h e political p o l i c e f o r c e f u l l y i m p o s e d Stalin's c o n c e p t i o n of the historical process. M a n y P a r t y h i s t o r i a n s w e r e r e p r e s s e d , a n d t h e accusations, as a rule, w e r e f a b r i c a t e d by t h e political police. T h e c o n f e s s i o n s w e r e r e c e i v e d a f t e r long a n d b r u t a l t o r t u r e . Thus, an e s t a b l i s h e d P a r t y h i s t o r i a n N. Vanag, d u r i n g t h e i n t e r r o g a t i o n in 1937, w a s f o r c e d t o c o n f e s s t o " c r i m i n a l views" that he allegedly " w i d e l y p r o p a g a t e d . " A c c o r d i n g t o V a n a g ' s i n t e r r o g a t i o n r e c o r d , t h e i n t e r r o g a t o r s t a t e d : " W e c a m e t o k n o w t h a t you a n d other historians—Trotskyites—were smuggling Trotskyist p r o p a g a n d a into your works. I believe you w o u l d n o t try t o d e n y this h e r e , d u r i n g t h e i n t e r r o g a t i o n ? " U n d e r t o r t u r e t h e h i s t o r i a n a d m i t t e d t h a t he w a s " s m u g g l i n g in t h e n a t u r e of t h e s e historical a n d t h e o r e t i c a l claims Trotskyist ideas, t h r e a t e n i n g t h e socialist r e g i m e . " H e also d e t a i l e d :

310 • Viktor M.

Paneiakh

I pointed out the backwardness of capitalism in Russia, denied the progressive impact of such factors as the 1861 reforms. ... I disagreed with Lenin's theory of the transformation of democratic bourgeois revolution into proletarian revolution. ... I did not consciously c o m p a r e the conceptual differences of the O c t o b e r proletarian Revolution and the bourgeois one, did not point out principal differences between the two, did not consider the October revolution as a beginning of a new era in the history of humanity. ... I deliberately ignored the transient character of bourgeois parliamentary democracy, did not point out its crisis and did not put it in contrast with the Soviet proletarian democracy as its more evolved form. ... I purposefully drew attention to some of the organized, coordinated, and powerful peasant movements as well as singled out peasant uprisings. ... I have consciously idealized the narodniks' fight with tsarism in the textbook on the history of the USSR. ... I have purposefully ignored the histories of different peoples of the U S S R , who were previously a part of the Russian Empire. As a result, the interrogators and executioners prepared Vanag's final self-accusation, according to which he "consciously ignored the gigantic success of the building of socialism in the USSR." 2 5 Political concerns with the state of historical science led not only to the execution of N. Vanag, but caused a whole range of leading Party historians to be sentenced and shot in 1936-1938, among whom S. Bykovskii, A. Prigozhin, S. Piontkovskii, S. Tomsinskii, F. Kiparisov, and M. Tsvibak. G. Zaidel' was persecuted as well, even though, as was pointed out above, he was a secret agent of the political police. Despite his high official positions (Director of the Historical Institute of the Leningrad branch of the Communist Academy, Vice-President of the Presidium of the Leningrad branch of the Communist Academy), in 1935 he was exiled to Saratov. In Saratov he was for some time a professor at the Pedagogical Institute, but was arrested in 1936 and shot in 1937 in Leningrad. His last position b e f o r e execution was as the D e a n of the History D e p a r t m e n t of the University. 2 6 H e was replaced by A. Drezen, a m e m b e r of the Latvian riflemen regiment and an active participant in the O c t o b e r Revolution. Some time later he was also arrested and executed. The next D e a n was S. Dubrovskii, who was arrested a few m o n t h s later. 2 7 H e came back 17 years later after imprisonment as an old and ailing man. A n d so it continued until finally the position of the D e a n was assigned to M. Priselkov, who featured in the "Academic C a s e " and had been recently permitted to reside in Leningrad. Clearly, the political police did not stop controlling the activities of the historians even later. It often h a p p e n e d that those already returned f r o m prison were persecuted anew. For example, B. Romanov, my professor, also f e a t u r e d in the

The Political Police and the Study of History • 311 "Academic Case." H e spent 13 months in a detainment cell and later tration camp. He returned to Leningrad in the middle of 1933, but police prevented him f r o m obtaining a position as a historian M o r e o v e r , in 1939, during the Soviet-Finnish "winter" war, he was L e n i n g r a d to Siberia. 2 8

in a concenthe political until 1941. exiled from

A new wave of arrests emerged after World War II, as the struggle begun u n d e r the Bolsheviks against "bourgeois objectivism," "liberalism," "adoration of everything foreign," and "cosmopolitanism" was unfolding. During my years in the Leningrad University, 1948-1953, our professors were disappearing without a trace. (There were also arrests a m o n g students.) A m o n g those who were persecuted was a major art historian, Professor Nikolai Punin, who was shot to death. Professor Matvei Gukovskii spent a few years in a concentration c a m p and a f t e r Stalin's death returned to teach in the d e p a r t m e n t . Assistant Professor Mikhail Rabinovich was also arrested. H e also returned. Some time b e f o r e his death, he published his memoirs, detailing the circumstances of his arrest, interrogation and imprisonment. 2 9 Evidently, even after Stalin's death, the political police remained a punitive organ of the C o m m u n i s t Party. H o w e v e r , at that point massive repression stopped. As a rule, the authorities persecuted those who read and distributed literature that was published abroad and considered illegal, typed manually (samizdat) and critized the regime and Solzhenitsyn's works. If a copy of Solzhenitsyn's The Gulag Archipelago was found during a search, it guaranteed prosecution. Naturally, the political police punished those who publicly criticized the authorities. Usually publicly displayed opposition was somehow related to foreign interventions: the Soviet army's suppression of the Hungarian uprising in 1956, the annihilation of "Prague spring" in 1968, or military intervention in Afghanistan. There also was political prosecution of those who protested against the internal politics of the USSR. Many historians took part in different "protest actions" and were persecuted afterwards. For instance, a group of young people, among them a few historians, students, docents, and professors of the History D e p a r t m e n t of the Moscow State University, were arrested and persecuted during 1956-57 for discussing various issues related to the history of the Communist Party and revolutionary movements in Russia. They sought to fight "Stalinist socialism." In July 1956 they had been distributing pamphlets, lobbying for the abrogation of Article 58 of the Criminal Code which concerned criminal prosecution for counterrevolutionary agitation, the creation of anti-Soviet organizations, sabotage, and so on. A m o n g those prosecuted was Nikolai Pokrovskii, who was sentenced to six years in a concentration camp. A f t e r coming back, he was forbidden to live in Moscow and worked in Suzdal' in a museum. Only in the mid-1960s, when a branch of the Academy of Sciences was created in Novosibirsk, Pokrovskii was moved there to work in the Historical Institute and the University. Now he is a renowned historian, awarded the status of an Academician, a specialist in the Middle Ages in Russia. H e surely was rehabilitated.

312 • Viktor

M.

Paneiakh

D u r i n g t h e s e y e a r s t h e political p o l i c e ( K G B ) also t o o k steps against t h e diss i d e n t s w h o w e r e fighting f o r d e m o c r a t i c a n d h u m a n values. Thus, a n o t o r i o u s hist o r i a n N i k o l a i I a k o v l e v ( n o t to be c o n f u s e d with A l e x a n d e r Iakovlev, an associate of M. G o r b a c h e v ) r e c e i v e d f r o m Iu. A n d r o p o v , t h e K G B h e a d at t h e time, t h e falsified 1939 t e s t i m o n y of Nikolai N e k r a s o v , an e x - K a d e t and a Minister in t h e 1917 P r o v i s i o n a l G o v e r n m e n t . This t e s t i m o n y s t a t e d that d u r i n g t h e F e b r u a r y R e v o l u t i o n (which led to t h e o v e r t h r o w of t h e m o n a r c h y ) he was u n d e r t h e i n f l u e n c e of F r e e m a s o n s , w h o l a t e r t o o k l e a d i n g positions in t h e Provisional Government.30 A n d r o p o v a n n o u n c e d t o I a k o v l e v t h a t t h e political police d e c i d e d to use this t e s t i m o n y t o a t t a c k t h e i d e a s p u t f o r w a r d by Solzhenitsyn in his novels 1914 ( a l r e a d y p u b l i s h e d a b r o a d ) a n d The Gulag Archipelago

August

(still a m a n u s c r i p t ) .

A n d r o p o v also i n f o r m e d I a k o v l e v t h a t t h e d i s s i d e n t s w e r e u n d e r m i n i n g t h e stability of t h e c o u n t r y , a n d t h e i n t e r n a l p r o b l e m s of t h e c o u n t r y could c r e a t e a p r e c e d e n t f o r W e s t e r n i n t e r v e n t i o n . A n d r o p o v insisted t h a t , in o r d e r to p r e v e n t slipping i n t o m o n a r c h y , b o o k s s h o u l d b e w r i t t e n that would h e l p in t h e struggle against c u r r e n t nihilists, d e m o c r a t s a n d R u s s o p h o b e s . 3 1 A s a result, in 1974 N. I a k o v l e v p u b l i s h e d a b o o k e n t i t l e d August overthrow

of t h e m o n a r c h y

as a r e s u l t

1, 1914.i2

Iakovlev p r e s e n t e d t h e

of t h e activities of t h e

Masons-

R u s s o p h o b e s , w h o s e goal was to d e s t r o y t h e mighty Russian state. It w a s t h e Bolsheviks, w h o w e r e t h e real R u s s i a n p a t r i o t s , w h o h a d e x t r a c t e d p o w e r f r o m t h e h a n d s of t h e M a s o n i c Provisional G o v e r n m e n t a n d p u t an e n d t o t h e i r intrigues. A t t h e s a m e t i m e , Iakovlev c o n c e a l e d f r o m the r e a d e r s t h a t he was relying o n N. N e k r a s o v ' s t e s t i m o n y o b t a i n e d u n d e r t o r t u r e and p r e s e n t e d t h e i n f o r m a t i o n as N e k r a s o v ' s m e m o i r s . T h e activities of t h e political police w e r e n o t c o n f i n e d only to t h e s p h e r e of ideology. T h e so-called " p r o p h y l a c t i c s " w e r e a p p l i e d against m a n y d i s s i d e n t s w h o w e r e called to t h e political police a n d w a r n e d that they should s t o p t h e i r c r i t i q u e of t h e politics of t h e S o v i e t U n i o n o r f a c e a r r e s t . T e r m i n a t i o n of e m p l o y m e n t usually f o l l o w e d such a w a r n i n g . A n e x a m p l e of a p p l y i n g such a " s t r a t e g y " is t h e case of t h e f a m o u s h i s t o r i a n a n d w r i t e r , N a t a n E i d e l ' m a n . T h e r e w e r e also m a s s i v e f o r c e d e m i g r a t i o n s , like t h e case of A l e x a n d e r N e k r i c h . A f t e r n u m e r o u s s e a r c h e s , t h e h i s t o r i a n V l a d i m i r T o l ' t s was f o r c e d t o e m i g r a t e as well. C u r r e n t l y he is a l e a d ing c o m m e n t a t o r o n R a d i o F r e e E u r o p e , in P r a g u e . T h e s e w e r e t h e ways t o s u p press internal opposition, a noticeable number

of w h o m w e r e

historians.

H o p e f u l l y , h i s t o r y d o e s n o t r e p e a t itself. But if it does, t h e n only as a f a r c e , f o r R u s s i a m u s t n o t e x p e r i e n c e again s u c h p e r s e c u t i o n and injustice, e s p e c i a l l y against h i s t o r i a n s .

Notes - 3 1 3

Notes 1 B.V. Anan'ich, V.M. Paneiakh, and A.N. Tsamutali, "Foreword" in Akademicheskoe delo 1929-1931 gg. Dokumenty i materialy sledstvennogo dela, sfabrikovannogo OGPU, 2 vols. (St. Petersburg: Izd. Biblioteki Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk. 1993, 1998), 1: li-lii; idem, "Foreword," 2: xlviii. 2 N.S. Shtakel'berg, "Kruzhok molodyh istorikov" and "Akademicheskoe delo." Preface, afterword, and ed. B.V. Anan'ich, notes E.A. Pravilova, in In memoriam: Istoricheskii sbornik pamiati F.F. Perchenka (Moscow-St. Petersburg: Atheneum-Feniks, 1995), 19-77; B.V. Anan'ich, "O vospominaniakh N.S. Shtakel'berg," ibid., 77-86. 3 Tsentral'nyi arkhiv Federal'noi sluzhby bezopasnosti [hereafter TsA FSB], d. P-14677 (N.M. Druzhinin). On the paper cover there was a stamp "Delo tsentra." 4 N.M. Druzhinin, "Moi aresty v 1918-1930 gg.," in N.M. Druzhinin, Izbrannye trudy: Vospominania, mysli, opyt istorika (Moscow: Nauka, 1990), 97,101-102. 5 TsA FSB, d. P-35124 (L.V. Cherepnin). On the paper cover there was a stamp "Delo tsentra." 6 A.L. Voitolovskaia, "Sud nad sledovatelem (from the book 'Po sledam sud'by moego pokolenia')," Zvenia: Istoricheskii al'manakh 1 (Moscow: Progress-Feniks-Atheneum, 1991), 415,426-429. 7 F.F. Perchenok, "Akademiia nauk na 'velikom perelome'," Priroda 4 (1991); Akademicheskoe delo 1929-1931 gg., 1: xxiv-xxvi. 8 Akademicheskoe delo ¡929-1931 gg., 1: xxvi-xxxx. 9 I.V. Stalin-V.M. Molotov, 2 August 1930; not earlier than 6 August 1930; not earlier than 23 August/2 September 1930; not later than 15 September 1930; 22 September 1930, in Pisma I. V. Stahna V.M. Molotovu. Sbornik dokumentov (Moscow: Rossia Molodaia, 1995), 192-224: Kommunist 11 (1990): 99-100. 10 "Zapiska N.V. Krylenko v politbiuro TsK VKP(b), 11 dekabria 1929 g.," in Akademiia nauk v resheniiah politbiuro TsK RKP(b)-TsK VKP(b), 1922-1952 (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2000), 86-88.

11 "Dokladnaia zapiska zam. Predsedatelia OGPU G. Iagody i nachal'nika Sekretno-operativnogo upravlenia OGPU G. Evdokimova I.V. Stalinu,9 ianvaria 1930 g.," in Akademiia nauk v resheniiah politbiuro TsK RKP(b)-TsK VKP(b). 1922-1952 (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2000), 88-90. 12 Akademicheskoe delo 1929-1931 gg., 1: 10-17. 13 "Dokladnaia zapiska," 88-90. 14 '"Mne oni sovershenno ne nuzhny' (Sem' pisem iz lichnogo archiva akademika M.N. Pokrovskogo)," Vestnik Rossiiskoi Akademii nauk 19 (1992): 110; Arkhiv Upravlenia Federal'noi sluzhby bezopasnosti po St. Petersburgu i oblasti [hereafter AU FSB], d. P- 65245, t. 19.11.173-174. 15 AU FSB, "Pis'mo M. Liubavskogo Prokuroru SSSR I. Akulovu," d. P-65245, t. 19, 11. 222-224. 16 Alexei Rostov [Sigrist S.V.], "Delo chetyrekh akademikov," in Pamiat': Istoricheskii Sbornik (Paris: Atheneum, 1981), 479. 17 Ibid., 475. 8 AU FSB, d. P-65245, t. 19,11. 205-206. 19 V.M. Paneiakh, Tvorchestvo i sud'ba istorika: Boris Aleksandrovich Romanov (St. Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 2000), 128-129. 20 "Dokladnaia zapiska predsedatelia OGPU V. Menzhinskogo i pomoshnika nachal'nika Sekretno-opertivnogo upravleniia OGPU la. Agranova general'nomu sekretariu TsK VKP(b) I.V. Stalinu i sekretariu TsK VKP(b) V. Molotovu o predvaritel'nyh rezul'tatah

3 1 4 • Viktor

M.

Paneiakh

sledstviia p o ' A k a d e m i c h e s k o m u d e l u ' . 15 s e n t i a b r i a 1930g.," in Akademicheskoe ¡929-1931 gg., 2: " A p p e n d i x 1," 599-603. 21 Akademicheskoe

delo 1929-1931

delo

gg.. 2: xxvi-xxxxi.

22 Ts A FSB, d. P-14677; d. P-34016; d. P-35124. 23 B.S. K a g a n o v i c h , Evgenii Viktorovich b u r g : D m i t r i i B u l a n i n , 1995), 108. 24 P a n e i a k h , Tvorchestvo

i sud'ba

istorika,

Tarle i peterburgskaia

shkola

istorikov

(St. P e t e r s -

160-163.

25 Iu.N. A f a n a s i e v , " F e n o m e n s o v e t s k o i istoriografii," in Sovetskaia ¡storiografia Rossiiskii g o s u d a r s t v e n n y i g u m a n i t a r n y i u n i v e r s i t e t , 1996). 2 9 - 3 0 .

(Moscow:

26 Leningradskii martirolog, 1937-1938, 4 vols. (St. P e t e r s b u r g : zd. St. P e t e r s b u r g s k o i nats i o n a l ' n o i biblioteki, 1999), 4: 162-163. 27 K o p r z h i v a - L u r ' e [Ia.S. L u r ' e ] , Istoriia odnoi zhizni (Paris: A t h e n e u m , 1987), 157. 28 P a n e i a k h , Tvorchestvo i sud'ba istorika, 176-178. 29 M.B. R a b i n o v i c h , Vospominaniia dolgoi zhizni (St. P e t e r s b u r g : E v r o p e i s k i i dorn, 1996), 244-341. 30 " P r o t o k o l d o p r o s a o b v i n i a e m o g o N.V. N e k r a s o v a 2 2 - 2 3 i 28 iuil'ia 1939 g.," c o m p . V.V. P o l i k a r p o v a i V.V. S h e l o k h a e v a , Voprosy istorii 11-12 (1998): 39^18. 31 N. Iakovlev, 1 avgusta 1914 g., ser. 2 ( M o s c o w : M o l o d a i a G v a r d i i a , 1974). 32 N. Iakovlev, 1 avgusta 1914 g., ser. 3, rev. ed., " A p p e n d i x : O '1 avgusta 1914g.', istoricheskoi n a u k e , Iu.V. A n d r o p o v e i d r . . . " ( M o s c o w : M o l o d a i a G v a r d i i a , 1993), 288, 290-295, 301, 312; V.V. Polikarpov, " I z s l e d s t v e n n y k h del N.V. N e k r a s o v a , " Voprosy istorii 11-12 (1998): 10-15.

The Internal Soviet Passport: Workers and Free Movement WENDY ZEVA

GOLDMAN

As a whole "the free and itinerant" were viewed as an alien body in the social organism that posed a social menace. E V G E N I I A N I S I M O V , H I S T O R I A N OF P E T E R T H E G R E A T 1

To eliminate the parasitical element from the Soviet apparatus, to purge them from the ranks of the workers, we must extract this social garbage from the swelling towns, clean our industrial centers of people who are not involved in socially useful labor. E D I T O R I A L IN Trud,

19322

In 1932 the Soviet state revived the internal passport, a document that was first established by Peter the Great in 1724 and proudly abolished by the Bolsheviks in 1918 immediately after the October Revolution. Passports became mandatory for all inhabitants of towns, workers' settlements, and construction sites, along with waged workers and people living near the USSR's western border. As the years passed, the passport system affected many sectors of the population, including peasants, national minorities resettled during World War II, prisoners amnestied after the war, and dissidents. 3 Although the state eventually found many purposes for the passport system, the primary impetus for its revival originated in the state's relationship to the new working class formed during the social upheaval of the First Five Year Plan (1929-1932). The 1932 law on passports, like its Petrine predecessor, was one in a series of decrees aimed at ensuring stable production and maximum revenue for the state. If Peter's 1724 decree aimed to fix Russia's population in place and criminalize the "itinerant," Stalin's 1932 law took the same dim view of the mobile, the dispossessed and the unwaged. The 1932 internal passport promised to slow labor turnover, control sources of new labor, purge the "unemployed" and promote strict new forms of labor discipline.

316 • Wendy Zeva

Goldman ITINERANCY A N D STATE A C C U M U L A T I O N

Although P e t e r the G r e a t was the first to m a n d a t e an internal passport, the idea of fixing every person in place originated earlier, in the fugitive laws that shaped the system of serfdom. Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, peasants and lords waged a continuing struggle over labor and freedom. As peasants tried to escape their onerous labor obligations through flight, lords pressured the state to bind the peasants legally to their estates. The annual "window" of time in which a peasant could legally move narrowed as the period in which a runaway could be r e t u r n e d lengthened. The Ulozhenie of 1649 fully bound the peasants to the land. Peasants lost the window of movement and a runaway would be returned, no matter how long he had lived in f r e e d o m . Moreover, his wife, his children, his grandchildren and all his descendents were also bound to the lord and his land, even if born in f r e e d o m . B o n d e d status now cast its net beyond the lord's territory into an infinite future. The category of "serf" became hereditary, a labor obligation carried in one's very loins, a "genetic" legacy for generations yet u n b o r n . In order to police the roads and towns and to capture fugitives, the state compelled peasants who wished to travel to carry a "subsistence t o k e n " f r o m their lord. In 1724 the state decreed that any peasant who wished to travel more than twenty miles from h o m e or to enter another district to work needed a pass from his lord. The pass noted both the traveler's destination and the length of absence from his h o m e district. The passport system was linked to a nation-wide census that Peter established to e n u m e r a t e and assess the population for a new soul tax. The laws on fugitives, the census and passport system were all part of the state's effort to stamp out "unsanctioned m o v e m e n t " of "a free and itinerant population." 4 Peasants and townspeople alike were to be fixed in their place of residence so that the state could collect the soul tax to finance industrial production, expansion, and war. A n y o n e who escaped enumeration was considered a fugitive or a criminal. Passports ensured that no one left their fixed category of labor without the permission of the landlord or the state. No one escaped the taxes, which provided revenue for the state's great building projects. T h e Petrine laws on passports remained in force for 170 years. Beginning in 1894 the state eased some restrictions, but not until 1918 did the new revolutionary government abolish the despised tsarist restrictions on f r e e m o v e m e n t . The Bolsheviks proudly considered abolition of the internal passport as one of their most important, democratic reforms. During the Civil War the state introduced registration cards and labor books, but rescinded these wartime measures in 1923. Identification cards subsequently became voluntary. In fact, administrative organs were expressly " f o r b i d d e n to demand f r o m citizens the obligatory presentation of passports or other d o c u m e n t s registering residence." The state required new arrivals in town to register with local housing authorities in 1925 and o f f e r e d voluntary identification cards for all Russian citizens in 1927. 5

The Internal Soviet Passport • 317 It was not until the end of the First Five Year Plan that the state broke decisively with its 1918 legislation on f r e e m o v e m e n t . On 27 D e c e m b e r 1932 the state issued a decree reviving the internal personal passport. Its purpose was to purge t h e towns, w o r k e r s ' settlements, and construction sites of people "not involved in p r o d u c t i v e work or socially useful labor." 6 The parallels with Petrine Russia w e r e striking. T h e country was in the midst of a giant, state-sponsored industrialization drive. Collectivization p r o m p t e d h u n d r e d s of thousands of peasants to leave the countryside to work in lumber camps, factories, mines and on vast new construction sites. Labor turnover reached massive proportions as laborers, " f r e e a n d itinerant," crowded the towns, roads and railroad stations in search of work a n d housing. L A B O R T U R N O V E R A N D S C H E M I N G TO

EAT

For managers and Party leaders, one of the greatest obstacles to production and social stability was the high rate of labor turnover throughout the period of the First Five Year Plan. Between 1928 and 1932, approximately 12 million people m o v e d f r o m village to town. Yet this journey did not follow a straight line between the point of departure and of arrival. A study of 22 large Russian towns showed that at least half as many people left as arrived in 1932. In Stalingrad, for example, approximately 104,500 people arrived as 53,000 left. In many towns— Tomsk, O r e n b u r g , Astrakhan, Saratov, Yaroslavl, Ivanovo—the numbers of those leaving reached 70 to 80 percent of those arriving. 7 These waves of people, crashing and receding, overwhelmed the towns' existing housing, social and municipal services, and food distribution networks. The great building projects and seasonal industries experienced an even greater influx and outflow of people. In fall of 1931 Magnitostroi, the rising iron and steel giant, lost 129 percent of its new arrivals; Cheliabtraktorstroi, a huge new tractor plant, 123 percent; and Uralmashstroi, a machine building plant, 142 percent. 8 The lack of housing, food and services led to disruptions everywhere. Timber, a seasonal industry essential to construction, had the highest levels of turnover. In the first half of 1932 alone, 962,200 workers took jobs and 1,395,200 left. In the heavily forested region a r o u n d Leningrad, timber workers had no housing and rarely ate meat, fish or sugar. The funds allocated to housing were never spent, because there was no available lumber.9 In the summer of 1932, t h o u s a n d s of workers in the Moscow region fled the textile factories to work on collective farms because there was no food in the towns. Many were older kadrovye workers who had been working in the mills for years. Many textile workers lived in wooden huts, heated by wood burning stoves. The steel industry, however, was not producing axe heads for consumer use. Workers froze because there were no axes available to chop wood. 1 0 Studies conducted in 1930 in twelve large factories showed that labor turnover was so high that even older factories with established procedures like Krasnyi

318 • Wendy Zeva

Goldman

Putilovets in Leningrad were unable to maintain accurate attendance records. 1 1 In many factories up to one-third of the workers never returned f r o m vacation. A b s e n t e e rates, like turnover, also soared during the First Five Year Plan. The Party claimed that peasant migrants with their "petty bourgeois psychology and self-seeking tendencies" were largely responsible. Yet absenteeism had many causes. Chaotic, interrupted distribution of food, clothing, and basic services like baths often forced workers to stand in line for hours and miss work. The lack of simple but necessary consumer items like tools, silverware, shoes, mugs, and thread sent workers scrounging through factory grounds and urban m a r k e t s on work time. The hunt for housing consumed days. The factories themselves were chaotic and f o r e m e n had no fixed system for recording attendance. The e n o r m o u s influx and outflow of new labor rendered almost any system of accounting useless. The discipline of the clock, the bell and the time card had yet to encompass the masses of new workers, and the difficult conditions of daily life regularly undercut what little work discipline existed. T h e state instituted rationing in 1929 to control f o o d distribution under conditions of severe shortage. Rations entitled workers to basic foodstuffs, including bread, sugar, fats and meat, while wages purchased additional foods and goods in state stores and higher-priced peasant markets. Workers survived on a combination of ration cards and wages, but the ration ensured the basic measure of survival. Like wages, rations too were subject to hierarchy of distribution. 1 2 A f t e r the introduction of rationing, Party leaders tried to use the ration system as well as the wage to tie workers to the factories and ensure greater productivity. In most towns and cities workers received their ration cards after showing a spravka or certificate attesting to their residence or workplace. The ration card was good for three months. Many workers, moving f r o m place to place, would collect and use several cards at the same time. The opportunity to amass cards by changing jobs not only " s q u a n d e r e d the larger rationing f u n d " but encouraged turnover. Ration cards, aimed at eliminating exorbitant prices amid shortage, fueled their own lively private trade as workers began to use them as a new currency. Two enterprising stone masons, for example, showed up in one factory long e n o u g h to receive ration cards. Soon after, they disappeared from the factory and sold the cards in the private market to desperate people for outrageous prices. Living on the proceeds, they moved on to the next "job." Workers also did a brisk trade in "shock w o r k e r " awards and banners, trading them for extra ration cards p r o c u r e d by various scams and swindles. People who had never once set a production record waved " t h e i r " new shock worker b a n n e r s and boldly exercised their right to move to the head of every line. Some factories distributed c o u p o n s (zabornye knizhki), t o k e n s or monthly passes for meals in the factory dining halls. Yet all sorts of people showed up to eat. A surprise visit to one state f a r m f o u n d 160 people registered to work and 280 people eating dinner. Workers also sold their meal passes outside the factory, creating an active m a r k e t in " c o u p o n currency." Relatives and friends concocted elaborate swindling schemes using falsi-

The Internal Soviet Passport • 319 fied claims of kinship and certificates of residence, entitling large n u m b e r s of people to unauthorized rations. Cooperative store employees resold or recycled the r a t i o n coupons they received from customers. They diverted food for resale on t h e private m a r k e t and hid the losses by manipulating the coupons that served as receipts. They sold goods to customers without coupons and pocketed the money. U n d e r conditions of deprivation and shortage, everyone became a "speculator." Short rations and hunger spawned an infinite variety of inventive, ingenious s c h e m e s to drain the ration fund. 1 3

CONTROLLING MOVEMENT THROUGH

RATIONS

T h e passport system was one of a series of state measures in 1932 aimed at tightening control over workers and the rationing system. In the summer the administration of a large Kharkov factory initiated an experiment directly tying ration cards to good attendance. Timekeepers in the shops were given responsibility for the distribution of bread cards. In order to receive bread cards, workers had to hand over their personal documents to the t i m e k e e p e r as collateral. Workers who quit could not get their personal documents until they returned the bread card. M o r e o v e r , timekeepers had to validate the bread cards every five days. Even if a w o r k e r absconded with a card, it soon expired. Timekeepers were given the considerable power to reduce a worker's ration for violation of labor discipline or unexplained absence. The experiment was aimed at reducing absenteeism and eliminating the various scams that had developed a r o u n d "bread card currency." By transferring the distribution of cards to the workshops, thousands of "dead souls" who collected rations without working were removed from the ration lists. Bread cards were strictly limited to those actually working in the factory and their families. A f t e r timekeepers assumed responsibility for bread cards, they discovered 6,000 f r a u d u l e n t cards, belonging either to " d o u b l e dippers" or people who were n o longer employed at the factory. A troika of workers was set up to ensure honesty in the shops. The Party presented both the troika and the new system as a form of "workers' control" over the distribution of food. From the state's perspective, the experiment was a success, "leading to a significant increase in labor discipline." 1 4 In N o v e m b e r workers in Moscow, Leningrad and the machine building industry voted to adopt the new system. Individual factories began experimenting with even harsher f o r m s of labor discipline in the same spirit of control. In Moscow's Malenkov factory workers voted to endorse strict new controls over bread cards and the coupons that entitled them to e n t e r the factory dining halls each day. C o u p o n s too were now to be distributed by the timekeepers in the shops on a daily, rather than a monthly basis. Any worker who was 15 or more minutes late to work would not receive a coupon. Barred f r o m the dining hall for the day, late workers would go hungry. 15

320 • Wendy Zeva

Goldman

The local experiments tying rations and meals to attendance and timeliness were quickly followed by harsh, new nationwide legislation. On 15 N o v e m b e r 1932 the Central Executive C o m m i t t e e decreed that any worker who missed even a single day of work without "an important reason" was subject to dismissal and the loss of all privileges associated with their job: housing, ration card and other social services. 16 The labor press strained to convince workers of the importance of good attendance. "Absenteeism is a sore on the body of socialist industry, gnawing away a huge part of production necessary to the country every year," the papers luridly proclaimed. " H u n d r e d s of thousands of tons of lost coal, metal, machines, millions of meters of lost cloth, these are the results of absenteeism for unimportant reasons." 1 7 The Party was straightforward and unapologetic about the connection between capital accumulation and labor discipline: "If the plan for labor productivity is not met and there are excess expenditures of the wage fund, prices will rise, and this will lead to a decrease in internal industrial socialist accumulation." 18 Yet ideological appeals had their limits when workers did not expect to benefit in the foreseeable future. Capital investment, according to plan, was directed toward heavy industry not consumer goods. Two weeks later the state transformed the ration card into a new national weapon for labor discipline. On 4 D e c e m b e r the Central Executive C o m m i t t e e and the Council of Peoples Commissars passed a decree that elevated the Kharkov experiment to the law of the land by transforming the entire food distribution system into a lever for raising labor discipline. It transferred all the stores, inventories, monies, goods, gardens, rabbit hutches, pigsties, milk and poultry farms, and fisheries u n d e r the control of the closed workers' cooperatives ( Z R K ) to departments of workers' rationing within the factories. Z R K was to be eliminated. Timekeepers in the shops took control of the coupons that permitted workers to enter the factory dining halls. A n y worker fired f r o m a factory was deprived of the right to use its facilities, including housing, dining halls, ration cards or day care centers. A worker found using a ration card after dismissal was liable to criminal prosecution. A new system to exert more control over the printing and distribution of cards was instituted. Workers who changed jobs could not receive a new ration card until they obtained a certificate proving they had r e t u r n e d their old one. Every worker was to be attached to a particular store, with a ration card for that store only. 19 T h e newspapers a n n o u n c e d that "Workers of Moscow and Leningrad Warmly G r e e t the Decree." 2 0 The implementation of the new system did not run as smoothly as its " w a r m " reception might have implied. Foremen, timekeepers and factory administrators, forced to regularize attendance records, quickly discovered that they did not know who was working in their shops. A s Peter the Great u n d e r s t o o d , control could not be exercised without e n u m e r a t i o n . Factories hastily began counting workers, trying to create order out of the prevailing chaos. 21 Managers on construction sites had a particularly difficult task because of their massive rates of turnover. 2 2 The law set 28 D e c e m b e r 1932 as the last day to distribute the new

The Internal Soviel Passport • 321 ration cards, but few of the large factories complied. Housing authorities, slow to issue the necessary residence certificates for workers, delayed plant managers f r o m distributing the new cards. T i m e k e e p e r s in the shops were unsure how to draw up a basic a t t e n d a n c e roster. Moscow's huge machine factory, Serp i Molot, had all these problems and more. New cards were printed and ready for distribution, but there was no d e p a r t m e n t of rationing created to distribute them. The administration did not know which workers were supposed to receive cards. Certificates f r o m the housing authorities, attesting to the size of every worker's family, were late, and no one in the factory knew how many rations to provide. H u n d r e d s of hungry, angry workers crowded the corridors outside the offices of the director and the factory committee, d e s p e r a t e for their ration cards. N o one seemed to know who was responsible. In o t h e r places chaos ensued when officials p r e p a r e d to transfer the property of the w o r k e r s ' cooperatives to plant managers. The space b e t w e e n the hands of o n e official and the next turned into a " B e r m u d a Triangle" where much of the inventory simply vanished. In many areas officials swiftly eliminated the workers' cooperatives, but did not create d e p a r t m e n t s of rationing to replace them. In the transition f r o m the old to the new system, many workers were left without any food at all. There were riots, wildcat strikes and work stoppages in many places. A n d b e f o r e the new system was even in place, fresh scams for trading and stealing ration cards and coupons were being hatched. Timekeepers, the new enforcers of labor discipline and rationing, had already been caught stealing coupons! 2 3

ENUMERATION, ATTENDANCE, AND

CONTROL

In 1933 A. Tsikhon, the Commissar of Labor, wrote a long letter to Stalin, Molotov, and Kaganovich, summarizing the effect of the new law. Beginning with its "successes," he n o t e d that absenteeism had d r o p p e d significantly in many factories. M a n a g e r s were developing new systems of accounting and control. Yet Tsikhon argued that the law was being sabotaged at m a n y levels. Plant managers were afraid to punish workers too harshly. Anxious above all to retain their labor force, they p r e f e r r e d to overlook absence, especially of the highly skilled. 2 4 Workers u n d e r s t o o d that the new law was not only a w e a p o n against individual absence, but could easily be used to punish w o r k e r s who protested wages, rations, or conditions through work stoppages or strikes. O n e machinist declared, "This noose a r o u n d our necks gives the administration the chance to chase out whoever they want." 2 5 In Tsikhon's opinion, the weakest link in the new law was poor record keeping in the factories. Directors could only account for their workers on a monthly basis; they had no idea how many were working f r o m day to day. "Statistical work in the factories is k chaotic mess," he wrote. The t i m e k e e p e r s were barely literate, and time sheets were filled with " d e a d souls." P e o p l e w h o did not work in t h e

322 • Wendy Zeva

Goldman

shops were regularly marked present; attendance. Tsikhon noted with exasperation, was often marked in advance. Tsikhon suggested that the Central C o m m i t t e e o r d e r the Central Statistical Branch to develop new procedures for taking daily attendance. "The factory should know how many people are working or absent every day," he explained. "The factory director should closely monitor his timekeepers, using Party m e m b e r s to oversee their work." 2 6 Tsikhon recognized that without a standardized system of attendance within the factories, the new law could not be applied. The Commissariat of Labor moved quickly to petition the Central C o m m i t t e e for stronger, clearer procedures. In late January 1933 the Central C o m m i t t e e gathered a set of suggestions aimed at improving record keeping. Timekeepers were required to be literate and c o m p e t e n t , and their wages were upgraded. The provisions on absence, moreover, were to extend to lateness as well. Any worker who was more than 15 minutes late o n e time per month or less than 15 minutes late twice a month without an "important r e a s o n " could be fired. Only the shop heads could deem an absence "import a n t " enough to excuse. New accounting systems for attendance were established. Control booths were set up at the gates to the factory to stamp workers' time cards u p o n entering and leaving. Timekeepers within each shop were to check a t t e n d a n c e daily and keep accurate records of absence. Timekeepers were responsible for correlating their records with those of the gatekeepers. Thus two parallel systems of control—within the factory and within the shops—were established. Each w o r k e r was recorded a total of four times every day: entering and leaving the factory and the shop. 27 In effect, the regularization of standards for attendance originated in a punitive campaign for labor discipline. The entire system of timekeeping, clocking and record keeping was inextricably linked to the n e e d to control the movement of workers in o r d e r to increase capital accumulation. By tying rations and meals to attendance, the state not only bound the w o r k e r to the factory; it also undercut the lively trade in bread cards and coupons. Steady waged work became a necessity for new arrivals to the towns. As in P e t e r ' s time, the state a t t e m p t e d to close off the possibilities for subsistence outside fixed categories of labor. The press pursued a relentless campaign against the "itinerant," explaining that food was scarce because "absentees, idlers, rolling stones, alien, p s e u d o workers and loafers" ate at the expense of those who worked. It b l a m e d food shortages on those who were undeservedly dipping into the ration f u n d . By eliminating " d o u b l e dippers, swindlers and o t h e r schemers," m o r e food would be available to " h o n e s t " workers. The d e c r e e on rations was thus p r e s e n t e d to w o r k e r s as a means for increasing the food supply. While cheating was partially responsible for shortage, it was shortage itself that spurred hungry, chronically undernourished workers, migrants and their families to cheat. Literally t h o u s a n d s of workers were involved in cheating schemes. In Leningrad, after the new distribution system for ration cards went into effect, 50,000 fewer cards were given out in the large factories. In Rostov another 50,000 f r a u d u l e n t cards were withdrawn, in B a k u , 20,000, and in Moscow's Paris C o m m u n e factory alone, 5,000. 28 T h e n u m -

The Internal Soviet Passport • 323 bers suggested that abuse of the ration system was ubiquitous, providing a critical (if unfairly distributed) supplement to thousands of workers, dispossessed peasants and their families. T h e rhetoric surrounding the new rationing system echoed the unions' denunciations of peasant migrants in the 1920s, invoking again a two-tiered system of settled " p r o t e c t e d " workers versus mobile and disruptive migrants. The Party encouraged workers to write in support of the new laws and to denounce "idlers" for stealing food f r o m the "hardworking." O n e editorial starkly posed "yesterday's peasants," "undigested by the proletarian cauldron," against "the heroic strength of kadrovye workers." It demonized the new migrants for their purported view of the factory "as a temporary stage, merely an occasionally 'profitable place' in which they could snatch a little more f r o m the state." These "professional deserters and rolling stones, constantly absent from the factories, wander from one factory to a n o t h e r , earning money e v e r y w h e r e but actually working nowhere." 2 9 By tarring migrants as chronic cheats and "rolling stones," the rhetoric refused to acknowledge the deeper social reasons for labor turnover: no housing, poor living conditions, short rations. By 1932 the consequences of collectivization and dispossession were everywhere: chronic food shortages, peasant flight, crowded towns. In its virulent condemnations of labor mobility and its increasingly frantic efforts to stamp out the petty private trading schemes and swindles of a hungry population, the state subordinated the ration to production. Ration card and worker were both tied to the clock.

NATIONAL

"ATTENDANCE"

The decrees on lateness and absence were quickly followed by even broader measures. On 27 D e c e m b e r 1932 the state introduced a new internal passport for waged workers. A means for tracking and controlling the population, the internal passport replicated the new attendance procedures in the factories on a larger, national level.The decree introduced a compulsory passport for every citizen, sixteen years and older, living permanently in towns, new construction sites and workers' settlements, or employed in transport and on state farms. The passport would be the only valid proof of identity. Children would be listed on the passports of their parents, o r p h a n s with their institution, and soldiers with the military. The internal passport listed the citizen's full name, date and place of birth, nationality, social position, p e r m a n e n t residence, dates of compulsory military service, dependents and the original documents on which the passport was based. Citizens were required to carry their passports at all times. A n y o n e found without a passport was liable to a large fine or criminal prosecution. In o r d e r to take a job, receive urban housing or move from one area to another, a citizen had to register with the militia and present a passport. A peasant wishing to leave the countryside had to request a passport from the rural militia. Everyone engaged in waged

324 • Wendy Zeva

Goldman

labor or d e p e n d e n t on the state had to register for a passport. Peasants did not need to register for passports unless they intended to move to an urban area. The passport system was instituted gradually throughout 1933. It was first applied to Moscow, Leningrad, Kharkov, Kiev, Odessa, Minsk, Rostov-on-Don and Vladivostok. Within two m o n t h s Kuznetsk, Stalingrad, Baku, Gorky-Sormovo, and Magnitogorsk were added. Wide areas around Moscow and Leningrad, and all population centers within 100 kilometers of the western border were also incorp o r a t e d , as well as additional towns, regions, workers' settlements, and construction sites. 30 The decree on passports, like the preceding decrees tying rations and meals to attendance, fixed the waged population and narrowed opportunities for the unwaged and itinerant. If food was to be used as a weapon of labor discipline, the state n e e d e d to gain greater control over the food supply by plugging the leaks that sustained the private market. Officials used the passport system to isolate dispossessed kulaks, private traders, f o r m e r N E P m e n , lishentsy (people deprived of voting rights) and byvshie liudi. These people, frequently deprived of jobs because of their social backgrounds, joined with freewheeling criminals and homeless street children to support a shadowy private market that traded in shortage at the expense of the state. In the words of the labor press, the new law would flush out the "social garbage," the "thieves, swindlers, speculators, lovers of easy profit," who "hid in the labyrinths of the towns." It sought to expel those who found themselves, either by choice or by necessity, trading, stealing, and siphoning goods at the margins of the state economy. Using precisely the same language and categories that marked the earlier decrees on attendance, rationing, and absenteeism, authorities divided the " h o n e s t " waged worker from the private trader by fixing the f o r m e r in place and expelling the latter. As one editorial noted, "Passports will reveal the underlying social face of their owners." 3 1 T h e decree was also used to purge the factories of workers who came f r o m "suspect" backgrounds. In February 1933 the Commissariat of Labor instructed the unions, labor d e p a r t m e n t s and local soviets that all workers who did not receive passports were to be fired within ten days. Moreover, the reason for dismissal was to be noted in their official documents. Factory directors were encouraged to c o m b their personnel records to ensure that former kulaks, traders, small business owners or lishentsy were not masquerading as workers. O n e director n o t e d that a search in his factory uncovered 200 "foreign elements" who had not received passports. H e queried the Commissariat of Labor about how to fire them, noting that unless the reason for dismissal was marked in their documents, they would "work in other places." Local organizations, including the labor d e p a r t m e n t , had counseled the director not to record the "real reason," suggesting that many officials considered the purge too harsh. Defying the directive f r o m the center, they tried to leave other e m p l o y m e n t options to those who were fired. But in a secret memo, the deputy commissar of labor dispelled any ambiguity a b o u t the decree: those without passports were to be marked so that f u t u r e

The Internal Soviet Passport • 325 e m p l o y m e n t would be impossible. 3 2 In Moscow the union soviet explained that it was actively purging the factories of traders and kulaks who "crawled into them." All p u r g e d workers received a certificate stating the reason for their dismissal, such as "concealing social origins as a dekulakized person." Throughout the spring many factories were purged. A b o u t 500 people were expelled from Izhorsk, a d e f e n s e factory with more than 11,000 workers, and 350 from Elektrosila, an electrical plant of similar size. People were fired without warning and without pay. For those who successfully concealed their pasts, the passport became a ticket to a new life. Yet a passport not only concealed the bearer's past, it also ensured their silence. For any worker who participated in a work stoppage or protest immediately ran the risk of a background check. 3 3

PASSPORTS A N D F E M A L E

LABOR

Passportization also gave the state a way to gain some control over the composition and size of the new working class and the labor market. Its success d e p e n d ed on the use of urban female labor. The Second Five Year Plan, unlike the First, was not based on extensive construction of new plants but on the acquisition of new skills and increase in labor productivity. Planners expected the rate of growth to decrease: the labor force was expected to expand more slowly and workers were expected to produce goods of better quality. According to the Second Five Year Plan, only 390,000 new jobs would be created in 1933, including 127,000 in industry. Thus according to plan, 390,000 jobs would be created and 1,100,000 eliminated, leaving 710,000 waged workers unemployed. 3 4 If the Second Five Year Plan was implemented successfully, the labor shortage of the previous four years would turn into a labor glut. The plan actually understated the magnitude of the contraction in 1933: in reality, only 77,000 new jobs were created in the national economy. No new jobs were created in industry; on the contrary, 10,000 jobs were lost. 35 New migrants from the countryside would only increase competition for a reduced n u m b e r of jobs. The state aimed to stop the flood of new migrants, yet it still needed a flexible reserve of labor to fill whatever gaps remained. This flexible reserve was found in the wives and d a u g h t e r s of w o r k e r s who were already based in the towns. Passportization reflected a concerted shift from peasant to female labor. Although women had composed a significant percentage of new workers during the First Five Year Plan, they became essential to the Second. In 1932 and 1933, they provided the sole source of incoming workers: 100 percent of the new workers were female. Moreover, they not only provided the sole source of incoming workers, but they also actively began to replace men. The substitution of male by female labor began in 1932 even before passportization took effect. For men 1932 was a year of layoffs despite the overall expansion of jobs: 175,000 men left waged labor, and 901,000 w o m e n entered. In 1933 the trend of male layoffs and female

326 • Wendy Zeva

Goldman

hiring continued as the rapid t e m p o of growth slowed. Only 77,000 new jobs were created in 1933, in comparison with 726,000 jobs the previous year. An even larger n u m b e r of men lost their jobs (219,000), while 296,000 women were hired. Women were not only providing 100 percent of the new labor in 1932 and 1933, but they were replacing men as well. In 1932 and 1933, almost 400,000 men lost their jobs, and were replaced by 1,197,000 women. Hiring improved in 1934 and 1935 for both men and women, but women retained their predominance: in these two years 1,288,000 women were hired in comparison to 962,000 men. 3 6 The trends in the national economy—slowdown of growth, large layoffs of men, unprecedented use of w o m e n — w e r e even more a p p a r e n t in industry. Between 1932 and 1936 the n u m b e r of women increased by 865,000 and the number of men by only 285,000. In these years women also expanded their share of jobs within large-scale industry from 33 to 40 percent. Their share of every branch grew. 37 Women constituted the overwhelming majority (75 percent) of the 1,150,000 workers who entered industry in this period and 100 percent of new workers in 1932 and 1933. In these two years 189,000 men lost their jobs and 231,000 w o m e n were hired. 3 8 This contraction of the male labor force was partly a result of passportization which purged the factories of "undesirables," tightened controls on movement into the cities, and shifted labor recruiting from the villages to the wives and daughters of urban workers. The contraction of the labor force was most severe in the construction industry. The construction work force shrank steadily between 1932 and 1936: 864,000 workers lost their jobs. The overall loss, however, concealed the fact that while the n u m b e r of men plummeted, the n u m b e r of women increased. Men bore the brunt of the layoffs: 886,000 men lost their jobs. The combination of male layoff and female hiring, however, marked only the beginning of the Second Five Year Plan: in 1932 and 1933, 541,000 men lost their jobs and 74,000 women were hired. By 1934 and 1935 women, too, were leaving construction: 52,000 women left in these two years. 39 Workers were keenly attuned to the slow down in the economy, mass layoffs, and the new laws tying them to the workplace. They linked the draconian legislation on ration cards, absence and lateness to the fact that the state was no longer short of labor. O n e worker noted, "At the beginning, they said they would only fire absentees, but now they are letting good workers go. The decree of the gove r n m e n t [on absenteeism] comes out of the fact that they no longer need a work force." 4 0 Workers intuitively understood that the state's need for labor during the First Five Year Plan had protected them from harsher forms of labor discipline. The state chose to enact new laws at precisely the moment that workers were no longer n e e d e d . Labor discipline and layoffs were inextricably linked. The state could not have enacted the passport system and harsher laws against labor mobility, absenteeism and turnover without the female reserve of labor within the urban working class. The campaign to involve women reflected a choice about which labor reserves the Party could tap most profitably and reliably:

The Internal Soviet Passport • 327 w o m e n within working class families or rural peasants. The Party openly admitted that u r b a n women were preferable to peasants because they required no additional outlay on housing, water, sewage, electricity, social services, schools and o t h e r urban infrastructures. U r b a n women provided an ideal reserve of labor during the slower growth of the Second Five Year Plan. They allowed the state to halt m o v e m e n t into and between cities and to begin to stabilize the work force. Passportization continued the struggle over the relative privileges of urban life, including access to better housing, schools, medical care and food distribution within the urban areas. The peasantry could never have become the second-class citizens of the passport system without the labor reserves provided by women already settled in the cities.

T H E E F F E C T OF

PASSPORTIZATION

The state never obtained the degree of control over the new working class promised by passportization. According to law, the local militia was responsible for issuing passports. The militia launched a broad explanatory campaign informing peasants that they would not be able to get housing in towns without passports, but peasant migrants continued to arrive without them. Instructions to town militias noted firmly that "these citizens must be removed." Yet the militia was not pleased at the prospect of rounding up thousands of peasants and shipping them back to their villages. It urged the local rural soviets to educate peasants about the consequences of arriving in town without a passport. In 1934 Usov, the deputy director of the militia, wrote to the Central Executive Committee, noting that "there are still mass arrivals of citizens without passports from the agricultural areas to the towns. People are also arriving at work sites samotek.'" U n d e t e r r e d by the new law, peasants continued to arrive without d o c u m e n t s or with invalid certificates f r o m their rural soviets. Seeking " t o avoid pointless detention and removal of citizens," Usov once again urged the local soviets to stop giving out worthless papers and to direct peasants to their rural militia. Correspondence between Usov and the soviets indicated that passportization did little to dam the stream of migrants. 4 1 T h r o u g h o u t 1934 and 1935 the state a t t e m p t e d to tighten the restrictions on migration from the countryside through passports and organized labor recruiting. Collective farm workers who were not officially recruited to work for wages u n d e r a collective labor contract were not permitted to leave without permission f r o m their collective farm manager and a valid certificate of residence f r o m their local militia. Peasants with p r o p e r documents would receive temporary passports, which had to be renewed by their factory every three months. Peasants who left without permission f r o m their collective farm would be deprived of the right to live in their chosen locality. 42 Statistics suggest that passportization was only briefly effective in controlling peasant migration to the towns. In 1932,10,505,000 people arrived in the towns,

328 • Wendy Zeva

Goldman

7,886,000 l e f t , a n d 2,719,000 s e t t l e d . In 1933, h o w e v e r , t h e s e n u m b e r s w e r e s u b s t a n t i a l l y r e d u c e d : 7,416,000 a r r i v e d , 6,644,000 left a n d only 772,000 s e t t l e d . In 1934 a n d 1935 t h e n u m b e r s b e g a n t o c l i m b a g a i n . In 1935, 14,374,100 p e o p l e a r r i v e d , 11,909,700 l e f t a n d 2,464,400 s e t t l e d . T h u s by 1935 t h e n u m b e r of p e o p l e s e t t l i n g in t h e t o w n s o n c e a g a i n a p p r o a c h e d t h e 1932 ( p r e - p a s s p o r t ) level. T h i s s u g g e s t s t h a t a l t h o u g h p a s s p o r t i z a t i o n c o n s i d e r a b l y r e d u c e d s e t t l e m e n t in t h e t o w n s in 1933, it f a i l e d t o s t o p o r e v e n slow t h e high m o b i l i t y of t h e p o p u l a t i o n f o r v e r y long. 4 3 CONCLUSION T h e u p h e a v a l s of c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n a n d i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n c r e a t e d a h u g e , f l o a t i n g p o p u l a t i o n in s e a r c h of w o r k , h o u s i n g a n d , u n d e r g r o w i n g s t a t e p r e s s u r e , a s e c u r e i d e n t i t y . F o r m e r s o c i a l c a t e g o r i e s lost t h e i r m e a n i n g . In t h e P e t r o v s k i i m e t a l l u r gical f a c t o r y in D n e p r o p e t r o v s k , h o m e l e s s p e o p l e b r o k e i n t o t h e h o t s h o p s a n d t h e d i n i n g h a l l s t o s l e e p . A d o c t o r in t h e f a c t o r y ' s h o s p i t a l e x p l a i n e d , " T h e y h i d e f r o m t h e m i l i t i a , g r a d u a l l y b e c o m e e x h a u s t e d , a n d fall i n t o t h e h o s p i t a l . T h e y stay w i t h us f o r a d a y o r t w o a n d t h e n t h e y die. W e b u r i e d s e v e r a l , b u t n o o n e e v e r a s k e d a b o u t t h e m . T h e y b r i n g t h e m in a m b u l a n c e s . T h e y a r e r a g g e d , dirty, a n d lousy." 4 4 W h o w a s t h e p e a s a n t m i g r a n t w h o fled c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n , s e a r c h e d f o r w o r k a n d d i e d in t h e P e t r o v s k i i h o s p i t a l ? T h e f o r m e r t r a d e r w h o w o r k e d in a factory, t h e besprizornik

w h o s c a m m e d in t h e m a r k e t t o s u r v i v e ? T h e y w e r e t h e itin-

e r a n t , a n d b y 1933 t h e t a r g e t of t h e p a s s p o r t s y s t e m . T h e y i n c l u d e d w o r k e r s , disp o s s e s s e d p e a s a n t s , t r a d e r s , byvshie

liudi, c r i m i n a l s a n d t h o u s a n d s of o t h e r s .

U s i n g a h i g h l y i d e o l o g i c a l a n d i n f l a m m a t o r y l a n g u a g e , t h e s t a t e s o u g h t t o fix l a b o r in p l a c e a n d t o s e p a r a t e t h e s t a b l e , fixed w o r k e r f r o m t h e i t i n e r a n t b y p r i v i l e g i n g t h e f o r m e r a n d c r i m i n a l i z i n g t h e l a t t e r . By i n t r o d u c i n g a s y s t e m of c h e c k s a n d r e g i s t r a t i o n , t h e s t a t e a i m e d n o t o n l y t o h a l t t h e c o n t i n u i n g m i g r a t i o n of p e a s a n t s , b u t a l s o t h e c o n s t a n t m o v e m e n t of w o r k e r s . T h e s t a t e ' s s t r u g g l e t o c o n t r o l t h e f o o d s u p p l y a n d d e p l o y it as a t o o l of l a b o r d i s c i p l i n e f u e l e d t h e c a m p a i g n t o c u r t a i l t h e p r i v a t e m a r k e t a n d t o e l i m i n a t e t h e u n w a g e d f r o m t h e cities. T h e p a s s p o r t w a s a l s o u s e d t o p u r g e t h e f a c t o r i e s of d e k u l a k i z e d t r a d e r s a n d byvshie

liudi

peasants,

w h o h a d t a k e n " h o n e s t " e m p l o y m e n t as w o r k e r s .

H o u n d e d f r o m the cities and the factories, these g r o u p s b e c a m e a " h u n t e d " p e o ple, d r i v e n f r o m p l a c e t o p l a c e , u n a b l e t o s e t t l e o r find w o r k w i t h o u t c o n c e a l i n g t h e i r p a s t s . T h e s y s t e m r e s t e d o n t h e u s e of u r b a n f e m a l e l a b o r , a r e s e r v e t h a t a l l o w e d t h e s t a t e t o c l o s e t h e g a t e s t o t h e cities a n d t h e t o w n s . A s in P e t r i n e t i m e s , t h e i n t e r n a l p a s s p o r t b e c a m e a P r o c r u s t e a n b e d , fitting a d i s p o s s e s s e d a n d m o t l e y p o p u l a t i o n i n t o fixed c a t e g o r i e s of s e r v i c e .

Notes • 329

Notes 1 Evgenii V. Anisimov, The Reforms of Peter the Great: Progress through Coercion in Russia (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 229. 2 "Ochistit' Goroda ot Sotsial'nogo Musora," Trud (29 December 1932): 2. 3 Mervyn Matthews, The Passport Society: Controlling Movement in Russia and the USSR (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993) provides the best overall survey of passportization and the various purposes to which it was put. Historians have interpreted the system in various ways, stressing its effect on peasants. Roy Medvedev argues that the internal passport system was a response to the 1932 famine and mass peasant flight from the countryside. By denying peasants passports and thus the right to move to the cities, the Stalin government aimed "to stop the spontaneous migration of millions of people," "binding poor and middle peasants to their collective farms." See Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 245-8. Sheila Fitzpatrick also emphasizes the state's need to control peasant flight and to protect the urban rationing system. In her view, passportization provided a means to purge former kulaks, homeless peasants, byvshie liudi (former nobles, priests, gendarmes, etc.), criminals and other "marginals" from the cities. See Everyday Stalinism. Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 120-7. 4 Anisimov, The Reforms, 229-35. 5 Medvedev, Let History Judge, 245; Matthews, The Passport Society, 1-33. 6 "Ob Ustanovlenii Edinoi Pasportnoi Sistemy po Soiuzu SSR i Obiazatel'noi Propiski Pasportov," Sobranie Zakonov i Rasporiazhenii (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1934), 821-23. 7 Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv ekonomiki [hereafter RGAE], f. 1562, op. 20. d. 25,5,6, 17. Trud v SSSR. Statisticheskii Spravochnik (Moscow, TsUNKhU Gosplana, 1936), 8 on ratio of female to male migrants for 1932-1934. 8 Z. Mordukhovich/'Uzlovye Voprosy Privlecheniia Rabochei Sily v 1932g.," Na Trudovom Fronte 34 (1931): 5; Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism, 120-2. 9 Aristov, "Likvidirovat' Tekuchest' na Lesozagotovkakh," Na Trudovom Fronte 31-32 (1932): 8. 10 A. Anserov, "Bol'she Vnimaniia Bytovym 'Melocham'!" Na Trudovom Fronte 33 (1932): 10-11.

11 Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii [hereafter GARF], f. 6983, op. 1, d. 165 (Zhenskii Trud v Promyshlennosti), 141-142. 12 For an excellent treatment of the rationing system, see E.A. Osokina, Ierarkhiia Potrebleniia. O Zhizni Liudei v Usloviiakh Stalinskogo Snabzheniia, 1928-1935 (Moscow: MGOU, 1993). 13 "Prodkartochki Nuzhno Vydat' v Tsekhakh," Trud (17 November 1932): 1; "Razvernem Besposhchadnuiu Bor'bu s Tekuchest'iu i Progulami," Trud (18 November 1932): 1; "V Stolovuiu Zavodu im. Malenkova Vkhod dlia Progulshchikov Zakryt," Trud (5 December 1932): 3; "Na Bor'bu za Real'naia Zarplata," Trud (8 January 1930): 2; "Povyshenie Real'noi Zarplaty," Trud (7 February 1930): 4. 14 "V Nastuplenie na Proguly," Trud (17 November 1932): 1. 15 "V Stolovuiu Zavodu im. Malenkova Vkhod Dlia Progulshchikov Zakryt," Trud (5 December 1932): 3. 16 "Ob Uvol'nenii za Progul bez Uvazhitel'nykh Prichin," Sobranie Zakonov i Rasporiazhenii, 765-66. The new law replaced another, which stipulated that workers could be dismissed for unexplained absence of three days in a single month. This law had been widely flouted by workers and managers. In 1933, even stiffer penalties for absence were applied to workers in defense, chemicals, military transport, electronics and water supply.

3 3 0 • Wendy

Zeva

Goldman

W o r k e r s c o u l d be d e m o t e d , fired, a n d even a r r e s t e d f o r lateness, r e f u s a l to w o r k , leaving w o r k early, d r i n k i n g on t h e j o b , c a r e l e s s n e s s with tools or machinery, work s t o p p a g e , t o o m u c h waste in p r o d u c t i o n , or a b s e n c e w i t h o u t an i m p o r t a n t r e a s o n . G A R F , f. 5515, op. 33, d. 54, " P o s t a n o v l e n i e T s K S S S R o b Instruktsii N K T S S S R , " " V SNK SSSR," " I n s t r u k t s i i a N K T SSSR." 1 5 , 1 7 , 1 8 - 2 2 . 17 " V N a s t u p l e n i e na Proguly," Trud (17 N o v e m b e r 1932): 1. 18 "Protiv I z v r a s h c h e n i i Politiki Z a r p l a t y , " Trud (4 D e c e m b e r 1932): 2. 19 " O Rasshirenii P r a v Z a v o d u p r a v e l n i i v D e l e S n a b z h c n i i a R a b o c h i k h i U l u c h s h e n i i K a r t o c h n o i Sistemy," Trud (5 D e c e m b e r 1932): 1 ; " 0 P r a k t i c h e s k i k h M e r o p r i i a t i i a k h p o P r o v e d e n i i u v Z h i z n ' P o s t a n o v l e n i i a SNK Soiuza S S R i TsK V K P (b) ot 4 D e k a b r i a 0 Rasshirenii Prav Z a v o d u p r a v l e n i i v D e l e S n a b z h e n i i a R a b o c h i k h i U l u c h s h e n i i Kartochnoi Sistemy," Sobranie Zakonov i Rasporiazhenii, 802-804. 20 " Z a Luchshuiu P o s t a n o v k u R a b o c h e g o S n a b z h e n i i a na Predpriiatiiakh," Trud e m b e r 1932): 1.

(6 Dec-

21 " R a z v e r n e m B e s p o s h c h a d n u i u B o r ' b u s T e k u c h e s t ' i u i P r o g u l a m i , " Trud (18 N o v e m b e r 1932): 1. 22 " B o r ' b a s P r o g u l a m i O t l o z h e n a ... d o Z a s e d a n i i a , " Trud (27 N o v e m b e r 1932): 2. 23 " O t v e t s t v e n n o s t ' P r o f s o i u z o v za S n a b z h e n i e , " Trud (16 D e c e m b e r 1932): 1; " P r o f s o i u z y O b i a z a n y V z i a t ' V y d a c h u P r o d k a r t o c h e k Pod Samyi Z h e s t k i i Kontrol'," Trud (14 D e c e m b e r 1932): 1: G A R F , f. 5515, op. 33, d. 50, " S e k t o r Informatsii O t d e l a O r g r a b o t y 1 P r o v e r k u I s p o l ' n e n i i a V T s S P S . S v o d k a no. 4," 116. 24 " R a z v e r n e m B e s p o s h c h a d n u i u B o r ' b u s T e k u c h e s t ' i u i P r o g u l a m i , " Trud (18 N o v e m b e r 1932): 1; " P r o g u l s h c h i k i Pod Z a s h c h i t o i N a c h . T s e k h a , " Trud (27 N o v e m b e r 1932): 2; " V Stolovuiu Z a v o d u im. M a l e n k o v a V k h o d Dlia P r o g u l s h c h i k o v Z a k r y t , " Trud (5 D e c e m b e r 1932): 3. 25 G A R F . f. 5515, op. 13, d. 50 ( S e k t o r I n f o r m a t s i i O t d e l a O r g r a b o t y i P r o v e r k i I s p o l n e n i i a VTsSPS. S v o d k a no. 5), 1 1 4 - 1 1 4 o b , ( S e k t o r I n f o r m a t s i i O t d e l a O r g r a b o t y i P r o v e r k i Ispolneniia V T s S P S . S v o d k a no. 4). 117ob. 26 G A R F , f. 5515, op. 33, d. 50 ( V T s K V K P [b] - T o v . Slainu i Tov. K a g a n o v i c h u . S N K SSSR - T o v . M o l o t o v u ) , 5 7 - 6 4 : (V T s K V K P [b], D o p o l n i t e l ' n y e P u n k t y P r e d l o z h e n i i N K T SSSR o B o r be s P r o g u l a m i ) , 70. 27 G A R F , f. 5515, op. 33, d. 50 ( P o s t a n o v l e n i e T s e n t r a l ' n o g o K o m i t e t a V K P [b] o b O r g a nizatsii U c h e t i Iavki n a R a b o t u i M e r o p r i i a t i i a k h p o R e a l ' n o m u U k r e p l e n i i u T r u d o v o i Distsiplinii), 133-5: ( I n s t r u k t s i i a N K T a SSSR o b U c h e t e Iavki R a b o c h i k h i S l u z h a s h c h i k h na R a b o t u ) , 136-7. 28 " P r a v o na P r o d k a r t o c h k u T o l ' k o R a b o t a i u s h c h i m , " Trud (6 J a n u a r y 1933): 2. 29 " V k l i u c h i t ' T s e k h i P i t a n i i a v B o r ' b u za V y s o k u i u T r u d o v u i u Distsiplinu," Trud (6 J a n u a r y 1933): 3 : " Z a U k r e p l e n i e E d i n o n a c h a l i i a , " Trud (20 N o v e m b e r 1932): 1. 30 " O b U s t a n o v l e n i i E d i n o i P a s p o r t n o i Sistemy p o S o i u z u S S R i O b i a z a t e l ' n o i Pasportov," Sobranie Zakonov i Rasporiazhenii, 821-23.

Propiski

31 " O c h i s t i t ' G o r o d a O t S o t s i a l ' n o g o M u s o r a , " Trud (29 D e c e m b e r 1932): 2. 32 G A R F , f. 5515, op. 33, d. 54 ( D i r e k t o r u Z a v o d a no. 37), ( N K T S S S R ) , ( T s i r k u l a r N K T SSSR o b U v o l ' n e n i i Lits, n e Poluchivshikh P a s p o r t o v ) , 3 - 1 0 . 33 G A R F , f. 5515, op. 33, d. 55 (V V T s S P S Tov. S h v e r n i k u i N K T SSSR Tov. T s i k h o n ) , ( N a r komtrudam Soiuznykh Respublikov: o Poriadok Uvolneniia Klassovo-Chuzhdykh E l e m e n t o v ) , 78, 2 1 9 - 2 0 ; ( S e k t o r I n f o r m a t s i i - O t d e l O r g r a b o t y i P r o v e r k i I s p o l n e n i i a VTsSPS), 128,125. 34 " O N a r o d n o m - K h o z i a i s t v e n n o m Plane S S R na 1933 - Pervyi G o d V t o r o i Piatiletki," Sobranie Zakonov i Rasporiazhenii, 50-58. 35 " C h i s l e n n o s t ' Z h e n s h c h i n - R a b o t n i t s i S l u z h a s h c h i k h - p o O t r a s l i a m T r u d a , " in Zhenshchina v SSSR. Statisticheskii sbornik (Moscow, 1937): 51. See W e n d y G o l d m a n , Women

Notes

• 331

at the Gates. Gender and Industry in Stalin's Russia ( N e w York: C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 2002), chap. 8 o n role of f e m a l e l a b o r in t h e S e c o n d Five Year P l a n . S o m e s e c t o r s w e r e p l a n n e d to c o n t r a c t : 400,000 w a g e d w o r k e r s in a g r i c u l t u r e and 700,000 c o n s t r u c t i o n w o r k e r s were e x p e c t e d to lose their jobs. O n l y in c o n s t r u c t i o n did the plan o v e r e s t i m a t e the c o n t r a c t i o n : 303,000 j o b s w e r e e l i m i n a t e d in place of t h e 700,000 p l a n n e d . 36 Ibid. 37 " V P r o t s e n t a k h k Chislu R a b o c h i k h i U c h e n i k o v O b o e g o Pola K a z h d o i O t r a s l i , " in shchina v SSSR, 58.

Zhen-

38 " C h i s l e n n o s t ' Z h e n s h c h i n - R a b o t n i t s i S l u z h a s h c h i k h - p o O t r i a s l i a m T r u d a , " 51. E v e n the influx of w o m e n could n o t m a k e u p for t h e large layoffs of m e n : i n d u s t r y lost a total of 10,000 w o r k e r s in 1933. 39

Ibid.

40 G A R F , f. 5515, op. 33, d. 50 ( S e k t o r I n f o r m a t s i i O t d e l a O r g r a b o t y i P r o v e r k i I s p o l n e n i i a VTsSPS. Svodka no. 5), 114. 41 G A R F , f. 3316, op. 25, d. 193 ( P o s t a n o v l e n i e S N K a S S S R ) , 27; ( P r o t o k o l y S N K S S S R ) , 29, ( P r o t o k o l Z a s e d a n i i a S e k r e t a r i a t a T s I K a S S S R ) , 61; ( S p r a v k a ) , 63-4; (V S e k r e t a r i a t P r e z i d i u m a T s I K a S S S R ) , 65; ( V P r e z i d i u m T s I K S S S R ) , 73; ( S e k r e t a r i a t P r e z i d i u m a T s I K Soiuza SSR), 77; ( T s i r k u l i a r n o T s I K S S S R ) , 79. 42 G A R F , f. 5446, op. 1, d. 91 ( O P r o p i s k e P a s p o r t o v K o l k h o z n i k o v - O t k h o d n i k o v , Postup a i u s h c h i k h na R a b o t u v G o r o d na P r e d p r i i a t i i a b e z D o g o v o r o v s K h o z o r g a n a m i ) , 149. 43 " Z h e n s h c h i n y Sredi P r i b y v s h i k h v G o r o d a i V y b y v s h i k h iz G o r o d o v S S S R , " Zhenshchina v SSSR, 69. 44 G A R F , f. 5451, op. 43, d. 50 ( B o l ' n i t s a Z a v o d a im. P e t r o v s k o g o ) , 107.

Class and Nation at the Borderlands: Pleas for Soviet Citizenship during the Great Terror LESLEY A .

RIMMEL

During the past decade, much scholarly attention has focused on the deportation of Soviet minority nationalities that occurred during the Stalin era. Until very recently, most of the writing has centered on the deportations of the 1940s and 1950s, because these operations, many of them related to the Second World War or its immediate antecedents, affected millions of people, with whole national groups being uprooted and forced to settle in Soviet lands thousands of kilometers away, and with large numbers of people not surviving either the journey or the resettlement. 1 Those who did survive, or their descendants, have sought, with varying degrees of success, to publicize or seek redress for their sufferings. The two wars in Chechnia during the past decade have also brought 1940s deportations, and their consequences, to the world's attention. 2 On the other hand, few works on the 1930s have focused specifically on nationalities policy. Only recently have the less well-known deportations of the 1930s been the subject of study. A number of these works touch upon 1930s ethnic deportations of specific groups, such as the Koreans and Finns. 3 Rarely mentioned, however, is the 1937-38 operation in which persons living in the USSR, sometimes for many decades, without official citizenship were targeted for deportation not just to another part of the USSR, but to their alleged country of origin. 4 These deportations are the subject of a group of letters to Mikhail I. Kalinin, nominal president of the USSR 5 and popularly known as the \sesoiuznyi starosta. In these letters, written during the height of the G r e a t Terror, the writers implored Kalinin to allow them to stay in the Soviet Union, from which they were imminently due to be deported. During this period, new attitudes and, ultimately, a new law redefining citizenship in the USSR 6 resulted in a number of foreignborn as well as native-born residents receiving notice from the D e p a r t m e n t of Visas and Registrations ( O V I R ) , part of the Main Administration of the Workers'-Peasants' Militia ( G U R K M ) of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs ( N K V D ) , that they were being deported from the USSR in fairly short order. Formally, the question of citizenship became a pressing one with the introduction of the 1936 Constitution; the Central Election Commission had the task

334 • Lesley A. Rimmel of determining the n u m b e r of eligible voters in the country. But, of course, as official correspondence demonstrates, this was more than just a bookkeeping question. For the NKVD, the presence of people with any ties to foreign countries, whether real or potential, was a security issue, and closely connected to the campaign against "enemies of the people," and to the securing of the country's border zones, across which many of these letter-writers originally came. For the supplicants themselves, it was not just a matter of voting (to many, the elections meant little), but rather o n e of j o b security, access to rations, housing and other necessities, family security and, for some, even a matter of life and death. 7 There are a n u m b e r of larger questions raised by these deportation orders, including the usual problem of institutional rivalries among different government agencies and the role of Kalinin in enforcing or preventing deportations. ( H e did occasionally try to intervene in individual cases, although he was usually overruled by the NKVD.) This m a d e the resolving of these problems of citizenship more complicated; the All-Union Central Executive C o m m i t t e e (TsIK) and its successor, the Supreme Soviet's Presidium, as well as the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs ( N K I D ) , the Procuracy, the Commissariat of Justice (NKIu), and the N K V D , all often disagreed with o n e a n o t h e r on specific cases and on the application of the laws. The N K V D , not surprisingly, usually took the harder line, and almost always had the decisive voice. 8 Yet one of the most intriguing aspects of the letters to Kalinin is the way in which petitioners a t t e m p t e d to ascertain their right to Soviet citizenship, and how confused and interconnected were their—and the government's—notions of nationality, class, family, territory, and revolutionary politics. These letters, written to Kalinin in 1937 and 1938 (with a few from 1939), demonstrate, once again, how "class" and " i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m " were being s u p p l a n t e d by the category of "nation," 9 while "Soviet" was becoming increasingly synonymous with "Russian," 1 0 this being the fruit of earlier attempts at "class war" using ethnic, gender, and other "surrogates" for class. The regime was surely not intentionally trying to "reify nationality," 11 but rather secure its border zones, around which these supplicants lived. 12 Yet, as several letter-writers pointed out, the new policy did in fact appear to make national origin—sometimes along with sex—the sole basis for considering one to be "Soviet." Thus, while some writers saw the d e p o r t a t i o n notices as inconsistent with Soviet ideals and a t t e m p t e d to defend themselves against a seeming indictment of their "nationality," others were confused by the conflicting messages they were getting about citizenship, and t h e r e f o r e used both "national" and "class" or "revolutionary" arguments to assert their claims to remain in the Soviet Union. A clear example of this confusion over nationality and citizenship a p p e a r s in the letter of Klavdiia Vladimirovna Gonios, a 63-year-old life-long resident of Leningrad. On 20 July 1938, she wrote to Kalinin that six days earlier O V I R had handed her an exit visa for G r e e c e ; she was to leave Leningrad on 31 July. She surmised that she had received the visa because her late husband, Mikhail Gonios,

Class and Nation at the Borderlands • 335 w h o had died in D e c e m b e r 1937, had been born in G r e e c e and had come to Russia in 1883 as a 13-year-old, where he worked first as a cook and then as a street hawker (lotoshnik). They married in 1895 and lived in St. Petersburg, P e t r o g r a d , and Leningrad during the entire time of their marriage. 1 3 In her letter, G o n i o s first appealed strictly to nationality. "We considered ourselves Russian [russkimi] people, and my husband never gave a thought to the question of citizenship. We knew only that we were Russians." She went on to say that she lived with her daughter, a shock worker, and that she had no relatives or acquaintances in G r e e c e — s o "why on earth send me, a Russian person [russkogo cheloveka], to a country completely alien to me? Please, m a k e me officially a R U S S I A N [russkogo] person, a Russian citizen." B u t then Gonios changed her tactic, and her language. "I want to die on my native Soviet soil, where I've lived all my life," she added. Her arguments now took on a political, non-national coloring; she described how joyous it was to live in the Soviet Union, where the Party of Lenin and Stalin had come to power and had led the country out of poverty and hunger. Why would an old person like her want to go live in Greece? She had already suffered enough in capitalist captivity, before the party of Lenin and Stalin came to power. "I want to die on my own [rodnoi] Soviet land," she repeated. It would appear that Gonios saw nationality and citizenship as being separate, whereas the government viewed them as being interconnected. And neither side could agree on what exactly was her nationality. (Kalinin's office sent the letter on to the O V I R office the next day, requesting a decision on the matter of the "Greek subject"; it is not clear what O V I R finally decided.) 1 4 A slightly more complicated picture is presented by the case of Igor' Orestovich Koletskii, a 47-year-old Leningrad resident who, having applied for Soviet citizenship on 20 July 1937, received notice from O V I R on 28 May 1938 that instead his permission as a foreigner to reside in the USSR would not be renewed beyond its current expiration date of 26 June 1938. H e would thus have to leave the country for Germany, a citizen of which he "had the unhappiness to be," according to his documents; this was because his parents had been foreigners, although he himself " f r o m the m o m e n t of birth" had lived and worked in the Soviet Union and considered it to be his " t r u e and only motherland." 1 5 Actually, his autobiography was not so straightforward. In his 30 May 1938 letter to Kalinin, he noted how his university studies had been interrupted by the world war, during which time he was taken prisoner. In 1917 he r e t u r n e d to Leningrad but did not continue his studies, working instead as a chemist. But because of his "weak knowledge and the weak level of chemistry in the Soviet Union at the time," he had wanted to go to G e r m a n y for half a year or so to study areas not covered in the USSR, and then return h o m e to contribute the fruits of his knowledge to his country. This had proved impossible, as in 1922 he had married a woman with three children f r o m a previous marriage, so he stayed in the USSR, helped raise three Soviet citizens, and meanwhile, despite deficiencies in his educational background, solved three important problems in chemistry in 1935 and

336 • Lesley A.

Rimmel

1936. "I never considered my citizenship to be important," he wrote to Kalinin, "because I was giving all the knowledge from my honest work to the Soviet U n i o n ... and on the other hand, relationships with G e r m a n y weren't bad, and I felt that in the near f u t u r e Soviet power would be established by the G e r m a n proletariat." Hitler and the Nazis seemed to be only a small episode, soon to be overturned by a G e r m a n Soviet republic. Thus, he continued, "due to my naivete and political illiteracy," "the Supreme Soviet's rejection of my appeal will bring down upon me the death penalty" in Germany. 1 6 Koletskii's argumentation was strictly political. Perhaps he was trying to base his case for citizenship on the Polozhenie o grazhdanstve of 22 April 1931, which stated that conditions for hastening citizenship included being a " r e f u g e e for revolutionary activity." 17 He wasted no time in declaring that being sent to fascist Germany, which he labeled a "monstrosity" to all laboring humanity, would be the greatest tragedy for him, a "non-party Bolshevik." In both his letter to Kalinin and in an unpublished letter sent to Leningradskaia Pravda on 26 March 1938, Koletskii emphasized his full a g r e e m e n t with the ideals of the Soviet Union, and his total enmity towards Nazi Germany, to which he tied the recently tried "RightTrotskyite bloc," those traitors, spies, and hirelings of "beastly, bloody fascism," f r o m which they were inspired. 1 8 More interesting, however, is his argument about racism. "Besides my nationality, which has significance only in the light of the racist theory of the raving [bezumstvuiushchikh] fascists, I have nothing and can have nothing in common with the G e r m a n fascist state," and he added that because he considered fascist G e r m a n y to be both his personal enemy and the enemy of all laboring people, he had decided to openly repudiate his G e r m a n citizenship in the letter to Leningradskaia Pravda. Thus Koletskii was directly comparing the Soviet government's position on citizenship—which he believed was tied to nationality—with National Socialist racial policies. But in any case, Koletskii's arguments may have had little effect on his fate. O V I R had no problem with allowing the " G e r m a n subject" to stay in the USSR until his case was examined, and on 8 July sent the materials back to Kalinin's office, which responded on 17 July that Koletskii's exile was halted for a month until all necessary documents had been collected. 1 9 But it may have been his scientific discoveries that elicited the authorities' interest. Less f o r t u n a t e were those whose work was not of use to the country—or who had no real work at all. O n e such person was Tat'iana Nikolaevna Feroni, a Leningrad resident described by O V I R as an "Italian subject." O V I R wrote to Kalinin's priemnaia on 25 O c t o b e r 1938 that for now they would agree to the latter's suggestion that Feroni's case be examined and her exit halted until her petition for Soviet citizenship had been decided. But in view of the fact that she did not engage in any useful public work (polezno-obshchestvennym trudom ne zanimaetsia), but rather was suspected of maintaining a "den of depravity" (priton ravrata) in the univermag ( d e p a r t m e n t store) and wasting g o v e r n m e n t money, State Security officer Zak and police officer Bitkin urged Kalinin's office to

Class and Nation at the Borderlands

• 337

r e c o n s i d e r their decision on the "anti-Soviet disposed" Feroni. 2 0 Similarly, Iolanta G e k t o r o v n a Mariani, a woman of Italian background born in Russia in 1915 to p a r e n t s also born in Russia, and married to a Soviet citizen, lost out on her bid to stay partially due to work-related issues. She wrote to Kalinin that moving to Italy duTing this time would be a zhutkaia katastrofa, and on 28 D e c e m b e r 1937, Kalinin's office postponed the d e p a r t u r e until the question could be resolved. Five m o n t h s passed before G U R K M wrote to Kalinin's priemnaia to confirm the d e p o r t a t i o n ' s suspension. But, officers Zak and Perlin noted, "For your information," the said citizen maintained "ties with foreigners through correspondence, d o e s not work anywhere, and displays an anti-Soviet disposition." In view of these facts, the men added, "we request that you repeal your decision on suspending the d e p o r t a t i o n . " O n 25 May 1938, the suspension was indeed repealed. 2 1 T h u s political arguments against nationality as race did not necessarily go over t o o well with the political police—and could sometimes backfire—so occasionally petitioners mixed in with their professions of loyalty pleas of ignorance on the i m p o r t a n c e of nationality and citizenship. For example, Avetis Khristoforovich Siurmen'ian, having received on 25 March 1938 an Iranian passport with an exit visa for Iran, complained on 28 March to Kalinin, "How could I be an Iranian? A f t e r all, by nationality I am an A r m e n i a n , and I remember nothing about Iran and d o not know a single person there." His parents had fled Turkey for Iran during the slaughter of 1905, he was born the following year, and in 1912 the family left Iran and settled in Iuzovka, in the Russian Empire. "Until the m o m e n t of passportization in the USSR in 1934 [s/c]," he continued, "I did not know and attributed absolutely no significance to the fact that juridically speaking I was an Iranian subject." 2 2 But then the following year he applied for Soviet citizenship, "and f r o m the moment of my application for citizenship until 25 March 1938, I impatiently awaited the joyous day when I would have a USSR passport in my hands. ...I consider the USSR to be my motherland. ...In my soul and in my convictions I am a Bolshevik. ...I will die for the cause of Lenin and Stalin." 2 3 On 2 April Kalinin's office reported to G U R K M that Siurmen'ian had b e e n granted a m o n t h ' s reprieve, but on 20 May, G U R K M informed Kalinin's priemnaia that Siumen'ian had been arrested, after which the priemnaia responded that the suspension had been rescinded. 2 4 A similar fate ultimately awaited Isak Veniaminovich Lashko who, according to his letter of 11 October 1937, had arrived in Russia in 1915 as a five-year-old with his parents, refugees from Iran. Now living in Kaluga and married to a Soviet citizen, with three children and another on the way, Lashko wrote that he could not go to live in a country that was alien to him in terms of both " b l o o d " and "class." H e had worked since childhood shining shoes, then briefly in a milk plant, until illness forced him to shine shoes again (there was no artel', so he worked as an individual—but always paid his taxes akuratno). Because of his malokul'turnost' and malogramotnosthe claimed, he was being exiled f r o m the USSR. O n 20 October 1937, Kalinin's office informed G U R K M that Lashko's exile was halted. Not until

338 • Lesley A.

Rimmel

10 months later, on 26 August 1938, did the N K V D tell the priemnaia that Lashko had been arrested; two days later, the suspension order was rescinded. 2 5 Of course, many of the political sentiments expressed by the petitioners, and their fears of being sent to countries where socialists were actively persecuted, were quite genuine (in addition to the fear of being sent to a place where they did not know the language). Nikolai Frantsevich Koz'mai wrote convincingly of the fate that awaited him if he were sent to Fascist Italy. His parents had emigrated f r o m Italy in 1871 and settled in the Crimea, where Koz'mai was born in 1896, and away from which he had never ventured. He had actively aided the Bolsheviks during the Civil War, especially during 1919, and he feared that this past would m a k e him a certain target for the Fascists. His three sisters had successfully appealed to Kalinin for Soviet citizenship during the previous year. Koz'mai apologized for his carelessness in not having acquired citizenship earlier. On 26 May 1938, he received a stay of one month to gather his documents. 2 6 But it is quite possible that it was not just "carelessness" or "illiteracy" or "hard work" that had prevented some from applying for citizenship on time. Rather, some people may have wanted the benefits of residency in the Soviet Union, where they had been established for years, without the burdens—especially the military and fiscal ones—and were content to live quiet lives with their families. That this might have been the case is evident from an evaluation letter about Fedor Antonovich Kochiani written jointly by the director and party committee secretary at the Moscow Institute of Engineers of Hydraulic Equipment. Responding to an 8 October 1937 request f r o m Kalinin's office for information on Kochiani, who was a student at the Institute, Director Novin and Secretary Vinokurov wrote that Kochiani had stubbornly ( u p o r n o ) resisted applying for Soviet citizenship "despite our numerous suggestions that he do so." Only when the organs of the militia told him to obtain permission for long-term residency in the USSR did he turn to them for a kharakteristika. How this case was resolved is not apparent from the materials collected here, but considering Kochiani's specialty—hydrotechnical construction—it might have been more useful for the authorities to hold onto him. 2 7 Along with petitioners' political arguments based on Russianness, class, antiracism, or revolutionary services were those based on the issue of sex discrimination. As is evident f r o m the previous examples, to which country one was being deported usually d e p e n d e d on one's country of origin, or on one's parents' or husband's country of origin. In o t h e r words, women born in the Russian E m p i r e married to m e n born elsewhere were not automatically considered citizens (and their husbands definitely were not), while Russian men married to non-Russian women usually were, as were their wives. For example, a Bulgarian-born man, l u r d a n Radev Nikolov, had come to Russia in 1915 (under which circumstances is unclear; he wrote on 24 January 1938 that it was by "personal wish," so p e r h a p s he had volunteered to fight in the Russian Army). He had married a " R u s s i a n " [s/'c] citizen and had a son who was now a m e m b e r of the " R e d A r m y ' s b o r d e r detachment of the N K V D in the Far East." Nikolov stressed his own political reli-

Class and Nation at the Borderlands

• 339

ability, having played an active role in the Civil War, saving a train full of R e d partisans f r o m crashing because of wrecked tracks, and also engaging in "socialist construction," most especially during dekulakization in Ukraine. Nowhere, however, did he bring up the issue of his wife's citizenship not being applicable to him, although it would seem to have been a helpful argument. 2 8 Neither did Azata Keropovich Karakhaniants, yet a n o t h e r person of A r m e n i a n background being sent to Iran. His parents had brought him to Russia in 1914, when he was 13; he b e c a m e a Red G u a r d in 1918, married a Soviet citizen in 1924, and had a child. Because of his "illiteracy" and failure to realize the significance of citizenship questions, and because his "productive w o r k " was overburdening him, he had not b o t h e r e d to obtain " R u s s i a n " [s/c] citizenship. H e did not want to live in Iran, where he knew no one and did not r e m e m b e r the language. A n d his family certainly did not want to go there. Kalinin's office suspended the deportation order on 9 February 1938. But on 1 S e p t e m b e r O V I R informed the priemnaia that K a r a k h a n i a n t s had been arrested in Stalingrad and four days later the Presidium of the S u p r e m e Soviet rescinded its order. 2 9 U n l i k e these two men, however, many letter-writers, especially w o m e n , protesting deportation did not fail to note that this traditional form of sex discrimination—citizenship based on the males of the family—contradicted the rights promised in the 1936 Constitution. 3 0 In fact, arguments based on the sex issue were actually more persuasive to the authorities, especially if they came from the so-called "women of the East." O n e striking case concerned a w o m a n born in Omsk in 1903, Minovar Nabievna Osad-Ogly, whose mother and sister were Soviet citizens. In 1919, at the age of 15, she was given in marriage to an Iranian citizen living in A s t r a k h a n . There was no official registration of the marriage at Z A G S ; rather, a mullah inscribed Minovar's name into the passport of her husband, Sadyk Osad-Ogly. The latter already had another wife, and they all lived together, along with (eventually) six children. Minovar wrote (on 28 May 1937) that Sadyk had constantly taunted and beaten her, so in 1925 she separated (razoshlas') from him (psychologically, at least), and initiated a suit for alimony, which the Narsud had ordered. In 1933 she severed all family ties with Sadyk, although they continued to live in the same apartment. Then on 27 May 1937, Minovar was told to leave the country. Protesting this, she wrote on the following day that since she had never declared that she was giving up her Soviet citizenship, "counting me as an Iranian subject is incorrect; I've broken all ties with my husband the Iranian subject Osad-Ogly since 1933. Therefore, I beg you to ensure that I remain a Soviet citizen and repeal my expulsion from the USSR." She then concluded, "I haven't yet initiated a corresponding application for Soviet citizenship, because Osad-Ogly has t h r e a t e n e d to murder me." Kalinin's office sent the case to the Interdepartmental Commission on National Minority Affairs of the Moscow Soviet, which had ordered an investigation, this occurring on 31 May (the family had moved to Moscow in 1923). The investigator, A.D. Platonova, reported that Minovar's husband considered her to

340 • Lesley A. Rimmel be property, and never gave her or her children enough to eat, forcing Minovar to take u p lace-making to support her children. A f t e r the birth of her sixth child, she refused to continue living with Sadyk, who then increased his violence toward her. She subsequently turned to the Natskomissiia, which got her a j o b (selling fish at the Krasnosei'skaia metro station, thus giving her an independent life). Platonova wrote that "all her life Citizen Osad-Ogly, living under the threat of her husband, could not even hiccup [zaiknut'sia] about Soviet citizenship; her husband would say, 'it's not your affair.'" There were constant scandals; neighbors had to grab the axes and knives away from Sadyk, who threatened Minovar with them. T h e neighbors, with whom Platonova consulted, also testified that Minovar was on the whole sovetski nastroena, and was a good mother to her children. They noted that they found "nothing reprehensible" in her life. Platonova concluded her r e p o r t in saying that "Osad-Ogly was truly a Soviet woman, a native of Siberia who had never been to Persia, did not know that country and only through her husband [who was currently doing time in prison] had she become a foreign subject." Also a p p e n d e d to the report was a plea from the six children, stating that they were "Soviet children; our Diadia Stalin loves us." Platonova noted that the children had sobbed all through the investigation. 3 1 Kalinin must have taken a d e e p personal interest in this case; he wrote "let her stay in the Union," literally "Ostavit' v Soiuze, M. Kalinin. 2/VI-37g.", at the top of the first page of the file —much stronger than his usual " s u s p e n d " (priostanovit'). Kalinin likewise intervened in the case of Ol'ga Alekseevna Lopovok, who was married to an "abusive Persian national" who had left her. She was now living with her daughter and had found some security, but then she received the order to leave the country. Kalinin disagreed with the order and wrote (also on 2 June 1937): "Udovletvorit'pros'bu". (Satisfy the request.) 3 2 But men who came to Russia or the Soviet Union from Iran and who had wives who were Soviet citizens did not get such consideration. The Azerbaijani O V I R reported on 13 June 1937 that Semen A g a d z h a n i a n t s was a c o n t r a b a n d i s t , and that A r s h a k Grigor'evich Khachatur'ian was an expelled f o r m e r Communist. 3 3 Both of these men were nominally Iranian nationals; Khachatur'ian had a " R u s s i a n " wife. Neither man was allowed to stay. Thus the attitude of the Soviet Union toward citizenship was in practice as traditional as in most places in the world at that time. A woman's citizenship was established through her husband, but a man could not get it through his wife. Only special goals, such as the on-going campaign for the emancipation of the women of the East, could overrule this contradiction of the Soviet U n i o n ' s claim to be a bastion of equality (which also revealed some hypocrisy in the Soviet government's often condescending attitude toward the Muslim areas). However, in the case of Soviet wives with non-Soviet husbands, any taint of classalien activity (e.g., economic crimes) d o o m e d their quests to stay in the country. 3 4 So the question of determining citizenship remained a baffling one, and the need for stronger guidelines became more urgent. On 26 D e c e m b e r 1937, the director of the Secretariat of the Central Election Commission, P. Tumanov, sent

Class and Nation at the Borderlands

• 341

t o T s I K Presidium m e m b e r S.E. Chutskaev two letters describing the confusion a n d c o n t r a d i c t i o n s in c i t i z e n s h i p a n d n a t i o n a l i t y policy; t h e l e t t e r s highlighted b o t h t h e " s e x " c o n t r a d i c t i o n a n d t h e " c l a s s / r e v o l u t i o n a r y s e r v i c e s " one. T h e first l e t t e r h a d originally b e e n sent t o Pravda

by a law s t u d e n t , P.P. K o z y r ' , in A s h k h -

a b a d , a n d s u m m e d u p t h e p r o b l e m s f a c e d by b o r d e r z o n e d e s c e n d a n t s of immig r a n t s w h e n origins c o u n t e d m o r e s t r o n g l y t h a n political convictions. " R e s p e c t e d C o m r a d e Editor!" Kozyr' began: .In t h e b o r d e r z o n e of A s h k h a b a d raion ( T u r k m e n i i a ) , a c c o r d i n g to t h e d i r e c t i v e of t h e O k r u g E l e c t i o n C o m m i s s i o n a n d R a i i s p o l k o m . m a n y k o l k h o z n i k i a n d k o l k h o z n i t s y h a v e b e e n d r o p p e d f r o m t h e v o t i n g lists m e r e l y b e c a u s e they have I r a n i a n origins [proiskhozhdenie],

[and a r e ] of K u r d i s h

n a t i o n a l i t y . A m o n g t h o s e e x c l u d e d f r o m the lists a r e p e o p l e w h o s e r v e d in t h e R e d A r m y , t o o k p a r t in t h e s t r u g g l e against basmachestvo,

and are now

activists and shock w o r k e r s . T h e y w e r e b o r n a n d r a i s e d h e r e , b u t their misf o r t u n e lies in t h e fact t h a t long b e f o r e t h e R e v o l u t i o n their g r a n d p a r e n t s a n d g r e a t - g r a n d p a r e n t s c a m e t o t h e R u s s i a n E m p i r e f r o m I r a n . In t h e auls t h e r e a r e b o t h K u r d s a n d T u r k m e n s w i t h o u t p a s s p o r t s , b u t only T u r k m e n s g e t r e g i s t e r e d in t h e v o t i n g lists. 35 In A s h k h a b a d I've f r e q u e n t l y p u t f o r t h t h e q u e s t i o n : " W h a t w o u l d h a p p e n if a T u r k m e n k a m a r r i e d a K u r d i s h m a n ; w o u l d their c h i l d r e n , on r e a c h i n g t h e age of 18, b e i n c l u d e d in t h e list of vote r s ? " " N o , " t h e y tell m e . " b u t on t h e o t h e r h a n d , if a K u r d i s h w o m a n m a r ries a T u r k m e n e t s , t h e n their c h i l d r e n will be r e g i s t e r e d as v o t e r s o n r e a c h ing a d u l t h o o d . " Kozyr' then asked: It's s t r a n g e ; is t h e f a t h e r - r i g h t [pravo otsovstva]

being established here? This

is o u t r a g e o u s ! We m a d e a R e v o l u t i o n , a n d yet this is h o w we d e t e r m i n e citi z e n s h i p ? Gde zhe nasha

rodinal

W h y is it t h a t f o r t w e n t y y e a r s we h a v e

e n j o y e d voting rights, a n d t h e n in t h e twenty-first y e a r of t h e R e v o l u t i o n , w e a r e d e p r i v e d of t h e m ? Is it fair t o d e m a n d [ a p p l i c a t i o n f o r ] c i t i z e n s h i p f r o m those who came to the USSR, but

not f r o m those who before

the

R e v o l u t i o n w e r e b o r n h e r e a n d lived h e r e , yet w h o in b a t t l e s with t h e e n e m y f o u g h t against Soviet p o w e r — a n d this gets t h e m c i t i z e n s h i p ? I d o n ' t u n d e r s t a n d it at all. P l e a s e a n s w e r this q u e s t i o n . A t t h e e n d of t h e letter he a d d e d : I a m w o r k i n g at t h e b e h e s t of t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e of t h e C o m m u n i s t P a r t y of T u r k m e n i i a as an a g i t a t o r t o h e l p p r e p a r e o n e of t h e b o r d e r z o n e auls f o r e l e c t i o n s to t h e S u p r e m e Soviet; I a m in e x t r e m e n e e d of y o u r explanations.36

342 • Lesley A.

Rimmel

W h e t h e r Kozyr' got any explanation is not known, but both his letter and the following o n e were forwarded to the N K V D for appraisal. The s e c o n d letter, originally a d d r e s s e d to P r o c u r a t o r - G e n e r a l A n d r e i Vyshinskii with a copy going to the Central Election Commission, came from Mamet Izmailovich Sabary, a.k.a. Dervishev, of Yalta. Writing on 9 D e c e m b e r 1937, Sabry complained that his raikom and gorsovet had agreed to deprive him of his voting rights because he did not have the proper documentation from TsIK. A f o r m e r Turkish subject who had been taken prisoner during the imperialist war in 1916, he then fought as a volunteer for the Reds in the Russian Civil War from 1918 to 1921, during which time he had served as a politruk and battle commander. From 1921 to 1927 he did underground work abroad (for the Executive C o m m i t t e e of the Communist International), then he returned to the USSR, studying in Moscow. When pasportizatsiia began, he applied to the Gubispolkom for Soviet citizenship, as he no longer wanted to be a Turkish subject, and filled out a special application from M O P R (International Aid Organization for Fighters of the Revolution). The Moscow militia then gave him a passport, and he considered himself legally to be a Soviet citizen. However, there was no certificate from TsIK. Sabry—who was not being deported—nevertheless concluded that for him, being deprived of voting rights "would be a moral death. ...I consider myself to be a genuine Soviet citizen, not just in words but in deeds, since I fought for Soviet power not to the life, but to the death." 3 7 Chutskaev of TsIK on 31 D e c e m b e r 1937 then forwarded the letters to Foreign Affairs Commissar Maksim Litvinov, commenting that "currently the question of citizenship has become very pressing for a considerable n u m b e r of people. Taking into consideration the way local organs of power have been handling this issue, the need for the speediest preparation and publication of a new law [polozhenie] on Soviet citizenship has become totally obvious. Inasmuch as work on preparing such a law goes through NKID, I ask you to do what you can to hasten the preparation of a draft law, and get the approval of the NKVD." 3 8 F u r t h e r correspondence between representatives of these (and other) institutions ensued. Finally, on 19 August 1938, the Supreme Soviet officially ratified a new law, "O grazhdanstve SSSR." The law seemed directly to answer many of the questions raised by letter-writers (and by the authorities to which they wrote). For example. Paragraph 2 defined citizens as all those who prior to 7 N o v e m b e r 1917 were subjects of the Russian Empire, and all those who had obtained Soviet citizenship through "established legal procedures." Thus those who had been P O W ' s during the world war, whatever their subsequent services to the Revolution, still had to apply for citizenship. Paragraph 3 took pains to emphasize that foreigners, "no m a t t e r what their nationality or race," were accepted for Soviet citizenship by petitioning the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Perhaps most important for many petitioners were Paragraphs 5 and 6, which concerned family matters. Paragraph 5 put an end to the marital double standard; the marriage of either male or female Soviet citizens to non-citizens did not affect the citizenship status of any

Class and Nation at the Borderlands • 343 of the parties involved. On the o t h e r hand, Paragraph 6 stated that any changes to p a r e n t s ' citizenship status affected the status of their children under age 14, while changes in the citizenship status of children f r o m age 14 until age 18 required those children's agreement. 3 9 The following year, in the ukaz of 2 June 1939, O postanovleniiakh TsIK i SNK SSSR, utrativshikh silu zakona v sviazi s priniatym Verkhovnogo Sovetom SSSR zakonom "O grazhdanstve SSSR" earlier Soviet laws were nullified, including the polozhenie (TsIK) of 22 April 1931, which had taken into account one's revolutionary past. But while the new laws helped resolve legal questions of defining citizenship, larger issues of nationality r e m a i n e d . While some people during this period of t e r r o r and insecurity were being d e p o r t e d or arrested for " n a t i o n a l " reasons, others were for the same reasons being removed f r o m their jobs and reassigned to o n e s less tied to defense. O n e woman, for example, protested to Kalinin that she had lost her j o b simply because she did not have a Russian surname. Mariia Gustavnovna Sepp of Leningrad wrote on 12 August 1938 (just a week b e f o r e the new citizenship law was passed) that a f t e r the 1 May celebrations, she and a number of people, even those who had worked there for 20, 30, and 40 years, had b e e n removed f r o m Plant no. 232, purely on account of their non-Russian names. " W h a t brought this about I don't know, but what concerns me is that my guilt seems merely in my having had the misfortune to have been born in Leningrad [s/c] to a non-Russian family, that is, my father and m o t h e r were Estonians. But a f t e r all," she continued, " o u r country is multinational [mnogonational'na] and you can't blame s o m e o n e for having a non-Russian background." She went on to describe how her parents had left Estliandskaia guberniia at the age of 22 and settled in Leningrad, which they then never left. Her father had worked as a lathe o p e r a t o r at Russkii dizel' for 20 years, and her m o t h e r as a housekeeper. During the Civil War her f a t h e r had been a volunteer in the Red Army, after which he w o r k e d at the Lenin plant until his retirement. As for Sepp herself, upon finishing school she started work at Plant no. 232, where she had worked for 20 years, with only a three- to three-and-one-half-year break for family reasons, until she was forced to quit on 7 May. "I received no r e p r i m a n d s or penalties," she noted. She had begun as an office worker, and worked her way up to being an economist in the construction d e p a r t m e n t , where she had a security clearance. Sepp noted especially her work during the difficult days of the Civil War, when typhus and o t h e r diseases raged. While others forsook the plant, engaging in sabotage or just looking for bread, she stood firm and never deserted her post, fearing neither hunger nor cold, and not even sparing her health; souvenirs of those times remained in her continued suffering from a tubercular lung and rheumatic joints. She successfully survived many purges, the occurrence of which she had welcomed, of people who had contacts or correspondents in hostile countries. But nevertheless, she continued, "those responsible for the apparat of the plant should verify whom they are letting go and whom they are keeping during a purge, and

344 • Lesley A.

Rimmel

not just g r o u n d l e s s l y fire p e o p l e on t h e basis of their n o n - R u s s i a n n a m e s . " She justified h e r r e a s o n i n g on the basis of Point 127 of the C o n s t i t u t i o n , which forb a d e the c a r r y i n g o u t of u n j u s t m e a s u r e s t o w a r d w o r k e r s of w h a t e v e r nationality. " W e live in a m u l t i n a t i o n a l c o u n t r y , " s h e r e p e a t e d , " a n d t h e r e s h o u l d be n o divisions of p e o p l e . For us it's all t h e s a m e — R u s s i a n s , Jews, Poles, or Latvians; if t h e y a r e h o n e s t l a b o r e r s , t h e n t h e y h a v e t h e right to labor." True, she h a d not b e e n d e p r i v e d of t h e right t o w o r k ; s h e c o u l d w o r k at an e n t e r p r i s e t h a t was not conn e c t e d t o t h e military. B u t she loved h e r w o r k ; s h e h a d b e e n " r a i s e d " in t h a t p l a n t , a n d besides, she h a d sacrificed so m u c h , h e r y o u t h and her h e a l t h , w o r k i n g t h e r e d u r i n g t h e Civil War, h e l p i n g to r e s t o r e it f r o m c o m p l e t e ruin. She d e s c r i b e d h e r e f f o r t s to get r e i n s t a t e d , f r o m going t o t h e C o m m i s s i o n on Soviet C o n t r o l to writing to Moskovskaia financial

Pravda,

f o r e x a m p l e . N o w t h r e e m o n t h s h a d passed a n d h e r

s i t u a t i o n w a s very difficult, especially as she was t h e b r e a d w i n n e r f o r

a m o t h e r in h e r sixties a n d a s e v e n t e e n - y e a r - o l d son. Kalinin initialed t h e letter, b u t it is not c l e a r w h a t , if any, a c t i o n he t o o k in t h e m a t t e r . 4 0 A n o t h e r s t e a d f a s t , c o m m i t t e d w o m a n of n o n - R u s s i a n b a c k g r o u n d p r o t e s t e d h e r e x p u l s i o n f r o m a j o b in military p r o d u c t i o n at this time; h e r a r g u m e n t s w e n t e v e n f u r t h e r t h a n S e p p ' s in c r i t i q u i n g t h e latest conflation of " n a t i o n a l " e n e m i e s with "class" ones. E k a t e r i n a K a z i m i r o v n a A l e k s e e v a a s k e d K a l i n i n on 31 J u n e 1939 to e x p l a i n a q u e s t i o n that was h a v i n g a p r o f o u n d e f f e c t on h e r m o r a l e . She h a d b e e n b o r n in 1908 into a w o r k e r s ' family in " L e n i n g r a d . " H e r f a t h e r , w h o h a d c o m e to L e n i n g r a d in 1908. was by n a t i o n a l i t y a L i t h u a n i a n , while h e r m o t h e r was B e l o r u s s i a n . B u t E k a t e r i n a , t h r o u g h h e r "political illiteracy," had r e g i s t e r e d h e r self in 1933 as a Pole. 4 1 " W h a t d o e s n a t i o n a l i t y m e a n , " she w o n d e r e d , " w h e n t h e class e n e m y 'rechristened'

m e into a Pole, a n d I was p r o u d of my ' n a t i o n a l i t y . ' " B u t

n o w she w a s u p s e t . U n t i l 22 N o v e m b e r 1937 she h a d w o r k e d in p r o d u c t i o n , w h e r e s h e was a S t a k h a n o v i t e ; she had b e e n a m e m b e r of t h e K o m s o m o l since 1924, a n d e v e n t h o u g h she h a d a distant r e l a t i v e in L a t v i a w h o m she h a d n e v e r k n o w n , a n d w h o s e e x i s t e n c e s h e h a d n e v e r hid, s h e h a d b e e n m a d e a c a n d i d a t e m e m b e r of t h e p a r t y in 1931. S h e h a d w o r k e d with g r e a t zeal at p r o d u c t i o n , in o r d e r to justify t h e p a r t y ' s t r u s t , b u t o n 5 J a n u a r y 1939 s h e was let g o d u r i n g lay-offs a n d t r e a t e d as t h o u g h she h a d t h e p l a g u e . " W h y ? " s h e a s k e d , b u t C o m m u n i s t s h a d told h e r that "it's only in this field of t h e Soviet e c o n o m y t h a t you c a n ' t w o r k , " to which she r e p l i e d , " B u t

I'm

a C o m m u n i s t ; you c a n ' t cut m e o u t of this w o r k b e c a u s e of my n a t i o n a l i t y ! " S h e w e n t o n t o c o m p l a i n t h a t a l t h o u g h she h a d b e e n a leading activist a n d h e l d u p as a m o d e l to o l d e r m e m b e r s , full m e m b e r s h i p in t h e party w a s b e i n g d e l a y e d b e c a u s e she w a s a Pole. ( H e r raikom

biuro h a d c o n f i r m e d h e r a d v a n c e m e n t s e v e n

m o n t h s ago, b u t s h e still did not h a v e a c a r d . ) 4 2 A l e k s e e v a ' s p l e a t h e n t o o k on a m o r e p e r s o n a l t o n e . " M i k h a i l I v a n o v i c h , " s h e w r o t e , "I k n o w t h a t y o u will s e n d my l e t t e r o n to t h e L e n s o v e t o r t o s o m e o t h e r place, r e q u e s t i n g t h a t I be given w o r k , j u s t as you h a v e sent t h e l e t t e r s of o t h e r s . B u t you w o n ' t s o o t h e m e by this; a f t e r all, I could find w o r k as a c l e a n i n g w o m a n

Class and Nation at the Borderlands • 345 or some such. I want to know why this is happening. A f t e r all, the class enemy could exploit this situation; people who are being forced out of work in military plants and Soviet work are becoming very angry. But I won't hold this against the Party and our country." She went on to reveal why: she had previously been a street beggar, a shepherdess (who still carried the m a r k s f r o m her master from when the wolf ate a lamb), and a prostitute, whom the Komsomol pulled up and put onto the right path. In consequence she became a znatnyi chelovek in the field of production. She was now the mother of two children, yet at the same time, "when only in our country could I be allowed to live, I can no longer grow, but instead I am being dragged back because I am a Pole. No, I won't go back to the swamp!" Alekseeva again emphasized that she did not want Kalinin to forward her letter, because she did not want anyone other than her family to know about her past sufferings. All she desired was an explanation of why people f r o m nationalities that did not have even their own a u t o n o m o u s oblasts were not allowed to work in "responsible sectors" of industry, while among Russians (ruskikh [if'c]) a lot of "real vermin" that had tried to break the might of the Soviet Union were allowed to stay in these sectors. Meanwhile she, as a Pole, was hurled out even though she would be the first to answer the call to defend her country. 4 3 A similar r e s e n t m e n t t o w a r d e t h n i c Russians 4 4 was felt by A l e k s a n d r Iakovlevich Grauzit, an ethnic Latvian, who on 16 September 1938 wrote to Litvinov, his Supreme Soviet deputy, "as a citizen of the USSR, not as a party m e m b e r , " which he had been since 1904. 45 H e had participated in the 1905 Revolution in Riga and in both 1917 Revolutions in Leningrad. H e had been a Red Partisan during the Civil War and had fought Denikin in the south, and then was transferred to the 15 th A r m y on the western front, where he had served until the conclusion of peace. H e then labored with distinction on the economic front, working in Leningrad plants f r o m 1921, until Plant no. 209, where he had most recently worked, was converted to d e f e n s e production. Now, because of some secret order, 4 6 national minorities no longer had the right to work at such plants. But this violated the Stalin Constitution, especially Article 123, which guaranteed the equal rights of all citizens of the USSR. All the f o r m e r lishentsy, all the kulaks, the sons of priests, the White Guards, and such, who with all their might had tried to overturn Soviet power, now got equal rights—since they had pure Russian blood—while he, a Latvian, was denied his rights because he was from a national minority group. A f t e r all he had given to the Revolution, to the party, to production, he was fired, but now the idlers, the progul'shchiki—they were Russian, so they were not fired. O n e of them, he claimed, probably with a touch of exaggeration, had even had the nerve to look Grauzit in the eye and say, "There you are, m e m b e r of the u n d e r g r o u n d , a R e d Partisan, brought u p by the plant, and now you just go to your Latvia, while we, kulaks and loafers, we are going to work." Since 17 May Grauzit had b e e n out of work; all he was asking was if he had the right to d e m a n d equality with all the priest-lovers, kulaks,

346 • Lesley A.

Rimmel

W h i t e G u a r d s , a n d o t h e r s , R u s s i a n s , w h o n o w w o r k e d at P l a n t no. 209. If he did n o t h a v e t h a t right, t h e n did n o t t h e y ( m e m b e r s of t h e S u p r e m e S o v i e t ) h a v e t h e right t o t a k e a p p r o p r i a t e m e a s u r e s a n d h e l p him to establish t h a t e q u a l i t y ? 4 7 ^ ^ ^

In a m u c h - c i t e d p a s s a g e , R o g e r s B r u b a k e r w r o t e t h a t " t h e Soviet s t a t e n o t only passively t o l e r a t e d b u t actively i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d t h e existence of m u l t i p l e n a t i o n s a n d n a t i o n a l i t i e s as f u n d a m e n t a l c o n s t i t u e n t s of t h e s t a t e a n d its citizenry. It e s t a b l i s h e d n a t i o n h o o d a n d n a t i o n a l i t y as f u n d a m e n t a l social c a t e g o r i e s of stateh o o d a n d citizenship." 4 8 If i n d e e d t h e Soviet U n i o n did e n d u p r e i f y i n g or essentializing n a t i o n a l i t y t h r o u g h its policies of t h e 1920s a n d 1930s, policies which b o r e violent f r u i t d u r i n g t h e Stalin e r a , t h e r e w e r e n o n e t h e l e s s p e o p l e in t h e U S S R w h o p r o t e s t e d this privileging of " n a t i o n " o v e r o t h e r classifications, especially if t h o s e p e o p l e t u r n e d o u t t o be m e m b e r s of t h e " w r o n g " nations. But t h o s e d u e t o be d e p o r t e d f r o m t h e c o u n t r y w e r e also, in a sense, p r o t e s t i n g t h e p r o m o tion of " s t a t e h o o d " a n d " c i t i z e n s h i p , " 4 9 since the latter goal r e q u i r e d t h e definition of exactly w h o was a citizen, a q u e s t i o n t h a t was e i t h e r n o t of i n t e r e s t o r was actively to be a v o i d e d . Thus, w h i l e s o m e letter-writers may n o t h a v e b e e n e n t i r e ly sincere in all t h e issues t h e y r a i s e d , t h e y n e v e r t h e l e s s point to t h e r e m a r k a b l e fact t h a t t h e r e w e r e i n d e e d p e o p l e w h o w e r e begging to stay in t h e Soviet U n i o n d u r i n g t h e h e i g h t of t h e G r e a t T e r r o r . Yet t h e Soviet U n i o n t h a t t h e y t h o u g h t they k n e w was going o u t of e x i s t e n c e . " C l a s s " was n o longer t h e only r e l e v a n t c a t e g o ry; " n a t i o n a l " c a t e g o r i e s h a d s u p p l a n t e d s u p r a n a t i o n a l ones. B u t n o o n e w a s q u i t e s u r e w h a t exactly t h e s e n e w c a t e g o r i e s w e r e or how to d e f i n e t h e m . T h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n " c i t i z e n s h i p " a n d " n a t i o n a l i t y " c o n t i n u e d to be a p e r p l e x i n g a n d i n c o n s i s t e n t o n e , especially a f t e r t h e a n n e x a t i o n of Polish t e r r i t o r y in 1939 a n d , of c o u r s e , a f t e r 1941. 5 0 T h e c o u n t r y was s u p p o s e d to be " S o v i e t " , b u t to s o m e , it a p p e a r e d to h a v e g o t t e n a lot m o r e " R u s s i a n . " 5 1

Notes Initial research for this article was made possible by grants from the U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of Education (Fulbright-Hays grant), the International Research and Exchanges Board, and the American Council of Teachers of Russian. Additional research was supported by grants from the Department of History and the College of Arts and Sciences of Oklahoma State University and from the O k l a h o m a Humanities Council. This research was originally presented at the 6th I C C E E S World Congress in Tampere, Finland, in July 2000 and at the Southwest Slavic Association meeting in Dallas, in February 2001.1 am grateful to Sven Gunnar Simonsen and G e o r g e O. Liber for c o m m e n t s and suggestions. Thanks also to S.V. S o m o n o v a of the State Archive of the Russian Federation. 1 See. for example, the many works and compilations of N.F. Bugai, e.g. Iosif Stalin-Lavrentiiu Berii: "Ikh n a d o d e p o r t i r o v a t ' . . . " D o k u m e n t y , fakty, kommentarii ( M o s c o w . Druzhba narodov, 1992) and L. Beriia-I. Stalinu: "Soglasno Vashemu ukazaniiu..." ( M o s -

Notes • 347 cow: A I R O - X X , 1995); S v e t l a n a A l i e v a , comp., Tak eto bylo: Natsional'nye repressii v SSSR, 1919-1952 gody ( M o s c o w : I n s a n , 1993), vol. 1; M.B. B e d z h a n o v , N.F. Bugai, a n d D . K h . Mekulov. eds., Narody Rossii: Problemy deportatsii i reabilitatsii ( M a i k o p : M e o t y , 1997). Earlier works include Nikolai K. D e k k e r a n d A n d r e i L e b e d , eds., Genocide in the USSR: Studies in Group Destruction ( N e w York: Institute for t h e Study of t h e U S S R , 1958): R o b e r t C o n q u e s t , The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities (London: Macmillan, 1960); A l e k s a n d r M. N e k r i c h , The Punished Peoples: The Deportation and Fate of Soviet Minorities at the End of the Second World War, trans. G e o r g e S a u n d e r s ( N e w York: W.W. N o r t o n . 1978). 2 See N o r m a n M. N a i m a r k , Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century ( C a m b r i d g e : H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y Press. 2001), 8 5 - 9 9 , 1 0 4 - 1 0 7 .

Europe

3 A few n o t a b l e e x a m p l e s include Ian Matley, " T h e D i s p e r s a l of the Ingrian Finns," Slavic Review 38 (1979): 1 - 1 6 ; M i c h a e l G e l b . " A n E a r l y Soviet E t h n i c D e p o r t a t i o n : T h e FarE a s t e r n Koreans," Russian Review 54 (1995): 389-412; i d e m , " T h e W e s t e r n Finnic M i n o r ities and t h e Origins of t h e Stalinist N a t i o n a l i t i e s D e p o r t a t i o n s , " Nationalities Papers 24 (1996): 237-268; J. O t t o Pohl, Ethnic Cleansing in the USSR, 1937-1949 ( W e s t p o r t : G r e e n w o o d Press, 1999). 4 T h e most c o m p r e h e n s i v e w o r k o n the e t h n i c d e p o r t a t i o n s of t h e 1930s, Terry M a r t i n ' s " T h e Origins of Soviet E t h n i c C l e a n s i n g , " Journal of Modern History 70 (1998): 8 1 3 - 8 6 1 , specifically e x c l u d e d noncitizens, 822, 44n. His m o n o g r a p h . The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 ( I t h a c a , NY: C o r n e l l University Press, 2001) d o e s n o t c o n t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n o n t h e citizenship d e p o r t a t i o n s a n a lyzed here. 5 First as p r e s i d e n t of t h e A l l - R u s s i a n C e n t r a l E x e c u t i v e C o m m i t t e e ( V T s I K ) a n d AllU n i o n C e n t r a l E x e c u t i v e C o m m i t t e e ( T s I K ) . and t h e n as p r e s i d e n t of the P r e s i d i u m of t h e S u p r e m e Soviet of t h e U S S R . 6 This was the law of 19 A u g u s t 1938, O grazhdanstve SSSR. 1 T h e exact n u m b e r of p e o p l e t a r g e t e d in this o p e r a t i o n is t h u s f a r difficult t o d e t e r m i n e . O n 23 M a r c h 1937, t h e N K V D o r d e r e d local a u t h o r i t i e s to p r e s e n t an a c c u r a t e a c c o u n t of the n u m b e r of f o r e i g n e r s living in t h e U S S R . T h e n , b e g i n n i n g with N K V D d e c r e e no. 00485 in August 1937, a n d with t w o a d d i t i o n a l d e c r e e s in 1937 a n d t w o m o r e in 1938, t h e N K V D called for t h e a r r e s t a n d c o n v i c t i o n of p e o p l e of " f o r e i g n " n a t i o n a l i t y in t h e U S S R s u s p e c t e d of spying f o r f o r e i g n intelligence. O l e g V. K h l e v n i u k , " U p r a v l e n i e g o s u d a r s t v e n n y m t e r r o r o m , " Svobodnaia mysl' 7 - 8 (1984), 126; A . I a . R a z u m o v , ed., Leningradskii martirolog, 1937-1938, 4 vols. (St. P e t e r s b u r g : Izd. Rossiiskoi n a t s i o n a l ' n o i biblioteki, 1996), 2: 454-56; V.A. Ivanov, Missiia ordena: Mekhanizm massovykh repressii v Sovetskoi Rossii v kontse 20-kh-40-kh gg. (na materialakh Severo-Zapada RSFSR) ( S t . P e t e r s b u r g : LISS, 1997), 171-72. In a d d i t i o n , in August 1937 t h e N K V D s e n t o u t t o local a u t h o r i t i e s C i r c u l a r no. 68, " O n F o r e i g n e r s , " which i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e " o v e r w h e l m ing m a j o r i t y " of f o r e i g n e r s living in t h e Soviet U n i o n w e r e e n g a g e d in spying. T h u s e a c h local State Security A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ( U G B ) of t h e N K V D was h e n c e f o r t h t o r e f u s e t o e x t e n d t h e t e r m of r e s i d e n c y p e r m i t s of f o r e i g n n a t i o n a l s , a n d t o issue exit visas t o t h o s e subjects of f o r e i g n s t a t e s w h o s e p e r m i t s had e x p i r e d . Ivanov, Missiia ordena, 174, 377, 14n. T h e 3 r d D e p a r t m e n t of t h e local N K V D was to s u p e r v i s e t h e w o r k of O V I R . This circular was to b e e f f e c t i v e i m m e d i a t e l y f o r n a t i o n a l s of t w e n t y - o n e c o u n t r i e s ; " c o m p r o mising d a t a " w o u l d first b e n e c e s s a r y b e f o r e a p p l y i n g t h e c i r c u l a r ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s t o n a t i o n a l s of ten o t h e r c o u n t r i e s . E v e n t u a l l y the q u e s t i o n of h o w t o d e t e r m i n e " n a t i o n a l i t y " b e c a m e pressing. A c c o r d i n g t o N K V D Circular no. 65 of 2 A p r i l 1938, n a t i o n a l i t y was n o longer t o b e d e f i n e d by w h a t was already on a p e r s o n ' s i n t e r n a l p a s s p o r t , especially if t h a t p e r s o n ' s family n a m e did n o t seem to m a t c h t h e i n d i c a t e d nationality. I n s t e a d , in issuing or e x c h a n g i n g p a s s p o r t s ,

348 • Lesley A.

Rimmel

n a t i o n a l i t y was t o be d e t e r m i n e d f r o m the nationality of o n e ' s p a r e n t s , which h a d to be e s t a b l i s h e d t h r o u g h t h e i r p a s s p o r t s o r t h r o u g h o t h e r d o c u m e n t s . N e i t h e r o n e ' s place of residency, o n e ' s b i r t h p l a c e , n o r the l e n g t h of time one had lived in the U S S R , n o r c h a n g e s in t h e i r citizenship, c o u n t e d . N.V. P e t r o v and A.V. Roginskii, ' " P o l ' s k a i a o p e r a t s i i a ' N K V D 1937-1938 gg." in A . E . G u r ' i a n o v , c o m p . , Repressii protiv poliakov i pol'skikh grazhdan ( M o s c o w : Z v e n i ' i a , 1997). 36. In L e n i n g r a d o b l a s t ' , f r o m which m a n y of t h e f o l l o w i n g e x a m p l e s a r e t a k e n , o v e r 29,500 f o r e i g n e r s w e r e a r r e s t e d a n d c o n v i c t e d d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d f r o m A u g u s t 1937 t o N o v e m b e r 1938. S e v e n t y - f o u r p e r c e n t of t h e s e p e o p l e , or a p p r o x i m a t e l y 21,500, r e c e i v e d t h e d e a t h penalty. This was the s a m e p e r c e n t a g e as in t h e allU n i o n total. Ivanov, Missiia ordena, 174; P e t r o v and Roginskii, ' " P o l ' s k a i a o p e r a t s i i a , ' " 33. T h a t left a p p r o x i m a t e l y 8,000 " f o r e i g n n a t i o n a l s " w h o r e c e i v e d the " s e c o n d c a t e g o r y " of p u n i s h m e n t , five to ten y e a r s of i m p r i s o n m e n t . Of t h e s e 8,000, it is u n c l e a r h o w m a n y r e c e i v e d the " o p t i o n " of leaving the U S S R . 8 See, for e x a m p l e , G o s u d a r s t v e n n y i A r k h i v Rossiiskoi F e d e r a t s i i [ h e r e a f t e r G A R F ] , f. 3316, op. 2, d. 1 9 6 0 , 1 1 . 4 - 7 , 1 0 , 13-19, f o r c o r r e s p o n d e n c e a m o n g d e p a r t m e n t s of T s I K a n d the P r e s i d i u m of the S u p r e m e Soviet, t h e Procuracy, and t h e N K I D o v e r t h e c i t i z e n s h i p issue in 1937. 9 For w o r k s o n the flexibility of t h e s e categories, see G r e g o r y J. Massell, The Surrogate Proletariat: Moslem Women and Revolutionary Strategies in Soviet Central Asia: 1919-1929 ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1974); Sheila Fitzpatrick, " A s c r i b i n g Class: T h e C o n s t r u c t i o n of Social I d e n t i t y in Soviet Russia," Journal of Modern History 65 (1993): 745-770; R o n a l d G r i g o r Suny, The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union ( S t a n f o r d : S t a n f o r d University Press, 1993), esp. 110-112, 120-126; Yuri Slezkine, " T h e U S S R as a C o m m u n a l A p a r t m e n t , o r H o w a Socialist S t a t e P r o m o t e d E t h n i c P a r t i c u l a r i s m , " Slavic Review 53 (1994): 4 1 4 - 4 5 2 , r e p r i n t e d in Sheila F i t z p a t r i c k , Stalinism: New Directions ( N e w York: R o u t l e d g e , 2000), esp. 316, 325, 329; M a r t i n , "Origins," 8 2 6 - 2 9 , 837-38; A d r i e n n e L. E d g a r , " G e n e a l o g y , Class, a n d "Tribal Policy' in Soviet T u r k m e n i s t a n , 1924-1934," Slavic Review 60 (2001): 2 6 6 - 2 8 8 . 10 N i c h o l a s S. T i m a s h e f f was o n e of the first t o analyze this p h e n o m e n o n . T i m a s h e f f , The Great Retreat: The Growth and Decline of Communism in Russia ( N e w Y o r k : A r n o Press, Revolution 1972). M o r e r e c e n t t r e a t m e n t s include R o b e r t C. Tucker, Stalin in Power: The from Above, 1929-1941 ( N e w York: W.W. N o r t o n , 1990), esp. 568, 572; S l e z k i n e , " T h e U S S R as a C o m m u n a l A p a r t m e n t , " 332; D.L. B r a n d e n b e r g e r a n d A . M . D u b r o v s k y , ' " T h e P e o p l e N e e d a T s a r ' : T h e E m e r g e n c e of N a t i o n a l Bolshevism as Stalinist Ideology, 1931-1941," Europe-Asia Studies 50 (1998): 873-92. A t t a c k s o n t h e " n a t i v i z a t i o n " o r korenizatsiia policies had a l r e a d y b e g u n b e f o r e Stalin's " r e v o l u t i o n f r o m a b o v e " ; Avel E n u k i d z e , for e x a m p l e , was a l r e a d y extolling t h e Russian l a n g u a g e as n o t only n o l o n g e r " o p p r e s s i v e " since t h e O c t o b e r R e v o l u t i o n , but not even a l a n g u a g e of " w o r l d i m p o r t a n c e " that n o n - R u s s i a n s o u g h t to know. G e o r g e Liber, " K o r e n i z a t s i i a : R e s t r u c t u r i n g Soviet N a t i o n a l i t y Policy in t h e 1920s," Ethnic and Racial Studies 14 ( J a n u a r y 1991): 21. 11 R o g e r s B r u b a k e r , Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1996), 7 , 1 6 ; Terry M a r t i n , " M o d e r n i z a t i o n or N e o - t r a d i t i o n a l i s m ? A s c r i b e d N a t i o n a l i t y and Soviet P r i m o r d i a l i s m , " in Fitzp a t r i c k , Stalinism, 356; E d g a r , " G e n e a l o g y , Class, and 'Tribal Policy,"' 283. 12 O n t h e b o r d e r issue in t h e 1930s, see G e l b , " T h e W e s t e r n Finnic M i n o r i t i e s , " 2 4 7 - 2 5 0 ; M a r t i n , "Origins," 8 3 0 , 8 3 8 , 8 6 0 . But not all of t h e s e d e p o r t a t i o n s of n o n - c i t i z e n s w e r e b o r d e r - r e l a t e d , as t h e cases of G r e e k n a t i o n a l s show. 13 G A R F , f. 7523, op. 23, d. 173,11. 202. N e a r l y all of the letter-writers called t h e city " L e n i n g r a d , " e v e n w h e n r e f e r r i n g t o the pre-1924 e r a . 14 Ibid., 1.198. See also ibid., d. 175,11. 33-47, w h e r e a m o t h e r a n d a wife, b o t h Soviet citizens, s e n t pleas o n behalf of L e o n i d D m i t r i e v i c h D a r a , w h o had G r e e k c i t i z e n s h i p t h r o u g h his

Notes • 349 late f a t h e r a life-long r e s i d e n t of Russia (he had died in 1909, a p p a r e n t l y insisting t h a t his G r e e k citizenship be passed o n to his son). D a r a had b e e n d e p o r t e d to G r e e c e o n 2 A u g u s t 1938, his application for Soviet citizenship h a v i n g b e e n u n s u c c e s s f u l . B o t h his m o t h e r a n d wife r e p e a t e d l y stated t h a t D a r a , an a c t o r , had not a t t r i b u t e d a n y significance t o q u e s t i o n s of c i t i z e n s h i p and nationality, and did not u n d e r s t a n d t h a t t h e r e was a n y d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n the t w o until h e d i s c o v e r e d t h a t he c o u l d n o t v o t e in t h e 1937 elections, b e f o r e which he h a d e n j o y e d full rights. T h e final n o t a t i o n o n t h e case was " 1 4 - X I - 3 8 — t o be filed; we w o n ' t r e s p o n d " (I. 33). Yuri M i r o n e n k o w r o t e that t h e r e w e r e " n u m e r o u s c a s e s " of non-citizen e t h n i c G r e e k s a n d A r m e n i a n s being d e p o r t e d f r o m L e n i n g r a d in 1938. M i r o n e n k o , in D e k k e r a n d L e b e d , Genocide in the USSR, 55. H e a d d e d t h a t " t h e lot of t h o s e that w e r e d e p o r t e d , h a r d as it was, was far b e t t e r t h a n t h a t of t h o s e w h o r e m a i n e d . " It is difficult to j u d g e the accuracy of this s t a t e m e n t (cf. 16n, 29n b e l o w ) . See also M i c h a e l G e l b , " E t h n i c i t y d u r i n g t h e E z h o v s h c h i n a : A H i s t o r i o g r a p h y , " in J o h n M o r i s o n , ed., Ethnic and National Issues in Russian and East European History: Selected Papers from the Fifth World Congress of Central and East European Studies, Warsaw, 1995 ( N e w York: St. Martin's, 2000), 194-95. 15 G A R F , f. 7523, op. 23, d. 149,1.139. 16 Ibid., 11. 139ob, 140. This was n o t e m p t y rhetoric. S o m e of t h e s e foreign n a t i o n a l s did f a c e e x e c u t i o n in their ( i m m e d i a t e ) c o u n t r i e s of origin. T u c k e r , Stalin in Power, 5 0 4 - 5 . 17 Ibid., f. 3316, op. 2, d. 1960,11. 4 ^ l o b . 18 Ibid., f. 7523, op. 23, d. 149,1. 142 ( f r o m the Leningradskaia Pravda letter, the l a n g u a g e of which was especially fiery). 19 Ibid., 11. 137-38. O n e m o n t h was the usual t e r m of r e p r i e v e , while ten days was t h e usual a m o u n t of time given to d e s i g n a t e d d e p o r t e e s to get o u t of the country. 20 Ibid., op. 65, d. 556,1. 2. 21 Ibid., op. 23. d. 150, II. 21-23, 25. 22 A s an Iranian n a t i o n a l ( a n d e t h n i c P e r s i a n ) living in t h e Soviet U n i o n l a t e r testified, b e f o r e 1938 it had b e e n easy for citizens of I r a n to cross t h e b o r d e r into R u s s i a a n d t h e U S S R , all the while k e e p i n g their original citizenship. F a r i d u n Iusupov, " I r a n t s y — o c h e r k , " in Alieva, Tak eto bylo, 8 2 - 8 4 . 23 G A R F , f. 7523, op. 23. d. 151,11.80-81. 24 Ibid., 11. 7 7 - 7 9 . It is clear h e r e which g o v e r n m e n t a l b o d y had t h e decisive voice. 25 Ibid., d. 150,11.9-10. Similar s i t u a t i o n s c o v e r i n g t h e s a m e t i m e p e r i o d w e r e f a c e d by a n o t h er n o m i n a l l y Iranian citizen, G r i g o r i i O s i p o v i c h Z a g a r ' i a n , w h o b e c a u s e of t u b e r c u l o s i s was n o t w o r k i n g and w h o b e c a u s e of his temnota and malogramotnost' had not a p p l i e d f o r citizenship, but instead was living as a d e p e n d e n t of his b r o t h e r a n d sister, b o t h of w h o m h a d m a n a g e d to get citizenship in t i m e (ibid., d. 149, 11. 5 4 - 5 8 ) , a n d G a n s I v a n o v i c h M a n g a r t , b o r n in Austria and a v e t e r a n of the R u s s i a n Civil W a r (ibid., d. 150,11. 15-20). B o t h w e r e a r r e s t e d in fall 1938. Z a g a r ' i a n was a m o n g o v e r 300 e t h n i c A r m e n i a n s a r r e s t ed in K h a r k i v at this time. T u c k e r , Stalin in Power, 505. A l s o facing expulsion and p l e a d i n g " i l l i t e r a c y " and " b a c k w a r d n e s s " was K h r i s t i n a S t e p a n o v i c h U s k i , a w o m a n w h o h a d b e e n living in L e n i n g r a d for 37 years, but who, u n l i k e her h u s b a n d , had not a p p l i e d for citizenship w h e n t h e y a r r i v e d in Russia f r o m F i n l a n d in 1900. Kalinin had called for t e m p o r a r i l y h a l t i n g her d e p o r t a t i o n , but t h e n h a d to rescind his r e c o m m e n d a t i o n w h e n U s k i ' s h u b a n d and son, b o t h citizens, w e r e f o u n d t o h a v e b e e n convicted of "especially i m p o r t a n t crimes." G A R F , f. 7523, op. 23, d. 142,11. 4 5 - 4 7 . 26 Ibid., d. 149,11. 115-17. His u l t i m a t e f a t e is not d o c u m e n t e d here. 27 Ibid., 1. 180. 28 Ibid., d. 140,11. 17-19ob. 29 Ibid., d. 149, 11. 95-100. T h a t t h e s e " f o r e i g n n a t i o n a l s " w e r e a r r e s t e d did n o t n e c e s s a r i l y imply prison, t h e G u l a g , o r e x e c u t i o n . A c c o r d i n g to P e t r o v a n d R o g i n s k i i , Poles w h o w e r e

350 • Lesley A.

Rimmel

arrested had a 79.44 percent chance of being executed, while the rate for Greeks, Finns, and Estonians was even higher. The majority of Iranians and Afghanistanis. however, were exiled abroad. Petrov and Roginskii, "'Pol'skaia operatsiia,'" 33. 30 On the historical background of this discrimination, Anne McClintock notes, "The Code Napoléon was the first statute to decree that the wife's nationality should follow her husband's, an example other European countries briskly followed. A woman's political relation to the nation was thus submerged as a social relation to a man through marriage. For women, citizenship in the nation was mediated by the marriage relation within the family." McClintock, '"No Longer in a Future Heaven': Nationalism, Gender, and Race," in Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds., Becoming National: A Reader (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 262-63. 31 32 33 34

35

36 37 38 39

40

GARF, f. 3316, op. 2, d. 1962, II. 1-8. Ibid., 11. 11-17. Ibid., 1. 18. See also ibid., d. 1828,11. 102-105, where Margarita Frantsovna [s/c] Khan-Pira of Tbilisi was ordered by a Special Board of the NKVD to leave for Iran in ten days (from 10 August 1936) on account of the arrest of her husband, Fridrik Melkhisidekovich KhanPira, for counterrevolutionary crimes. Margarita insisted that she should not have to pay for the crimes of a man who was her husband in name only; he was regularly seeing another woman and only came to the apartment briefly and at night, and they did not discuss his personal business. Intriguingly, the file also contains a letter from Fridrik's girlfriend, Mariia Isakovna Karashvili, who testified that Fridrik indeed had nothing to do with his wife. Six neighbors, who included their passport numbers, also signed the letter. The Main Administration of State Security ( G U G B NKVD) did not buy Margarita's story, and on 9 July 1936 confirmed the decision of the Special Board to expel both husband and wife from the USSR on the basis of their years-long involvement in valiutnye operatsii and other contraband activity. This was not, strictly speaking, a citizenship case, nor does it fall within the time period for this article, but it does illustrate the varying issues and tactics used by all sides in these cases. The two women's economic interests clearly trumped any sexual rivalries they might have had; the economic aspect was also paramount for the authorities. This undoubtedly reflected traditional Turkmen discrimination against Kurds, who were lowest on the socio-economic scale in Turkmen-dominated areas and viewed as "foreigners." See Edgar, "Genealogy, Class, and 'Tribal Policy,'" esp. 271.282. GARF, f. 3316, op. 2, d. 1960,11. 10,13-16. Ibid., 1. 17. Ibid., 1.18. Sbornik zakonov SSSR i ukazov Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR. 1938 g.-iiun' I944g. (Moscow: Izd. Vedomostei Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 1944), 37. Old habits of the father-right died hard, however. In NKVD decree no. 001158 of 27 August 1941, which called for the "resettlement" of Volga Germans, the deportation of those families in which the male head of household was not of German nationality was not obligatory. Bugai, Iosif Stalin-Lavrentiiu Berii: "Ikh nado deportiorvat'." 45. GARF, f. 7523. op. 23, d. 147, 11. 144-45. See also ibid., d. 177, 11. 45-45ob, where on 30 November 1938 Nikolai Georgievich Zhokhov of Kingisepp, Leningrad oblast', an area with a large Finnish community, protested his being assigned the nationality of Finn, now highly stigmatized. "For eight years I studied in a Russian school, and attended no other," he noted. "My cultural and religious upbringing were Russian [j/c]—internationalist and anti-religious. My basic language is Russian; I don't know any Finnish." Nor did his parents, who grew up among Russians. They did, however, know "Talopan," a local dialect of Russian and Izhor. "Because of this Talopan language. I was categorized as a Finn, but this

Notes

• 351

is wrong," he insisted. "I have nothing in c o m m o n with Finns, and any relatives who were Finns were Russified. Why is it necessary that I be a Finn? This m a t t e r affects my job. I ' m a p a r t y m e m b e r and an honest Soviet patriot. I gave my best years—10 years—to the struggle with e n e m i e s of the people, for which I've b e e n h o n o r e d 17 times." H e r e q u e s t e d t h a t responses be sent to the raion police and party c o m m i t t e e , but the letter b o r e the h a n d w r i t t e n n o t a t i o n " t o the files." Of course, for the regime, nationalities w e r e not "all the same." Those t a r g e t e d for arrest or d e p o r t a t i o n in the 1930s, and especially d u r i n g this time, were mostly " d i a s p o r a " nationalities, people whose ethnic b r e t h r e n were located in i n d e p e n d e n t states along the Soviet b o r d e r . See Ivanov, Missiia ordena , 377-78, 14n, for the list of nationalities. See also M a r t i n , "Origins," 853, 247n, and 854-55. 41 A p p a r e n t l y this was not u n c o m m o n a m o n g r e f u g e e s of Belorussian Catholic b a c k g r o u n d , according to Martin. See idem, "Origins," 847, 204n and 856-57, 266n. 42 A l e k s e e v a was actually f o r t u n a t e that, at least u p to this point, she, as a Pole, had escaped a f a t e worse than j o b loss or lack of a d v a n c e m e n t in partiinost'. Poles had the highest n u m b e r of executions a m o n g " e n e m y n a t i o n s " in L e n i n g r a d oblast', just as they had the highest n u m b e r s in the U S S R generally. V.A. Ivanov, Missiia ordena, 174-75. 43 Ibid., 11.6-10. Having a Polish b a c k g r o u n d r a t h e r than a Lithuanian one was also a "mistak e " for the h u s b a n d of Mariia N i k o l a e v n a Shalkovskaia. She wrote to Kalinin in August 1938 that her h u s b a n d , Iosif Vladimirovich, had been a r r e s t e d , and that she did not k n o w why, but that p e r h a p s it had to d o with t h e fact that s o m e p e o p l e considered him to be "po proiskhozhdeniiu poliakom," while in fact his nationality was Lithuanian, as was that of his parents. He had b r o k e n all ties with Lithuania in 1904. If by chance h e r h u s b a n d was guilty, then she asked that he be a m n e s t i e d , on account of his tuberculosis (which he got a f t e r 34 years of working at two L e n i n g r a d plants) and because of his b a c k g r o u n d — a s c o m i n g from a p o o r batrak family.Thus, unlike the previous two letter-writers, she was not q u e s t i o n i n g the concept of b a c k g r o u n d , just putting forth a case of mistaken identity. Ibid., 1. 189. 44 T h e feeling was m u t u a l a m o n g ethnic Russians. See below, 46n. 45 This letter was included in Kalinin's lichnyi fond at the f o r m e r C e n t r a l Party A r c h i v e (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial'no-politicheskoi istorii [ h e r e a f t e r R G A S P I ] ) , a p p a r e n t l y because Grauzit had already written to Kalinin and the letter had been forw a r d e d to Z h d a n o v , with n o f u r t h e r m o v e m e n t or action indicated. 46 T h e 31 January 1938 o r d e r f r o m N K V D chief Nikolai Ezhov, e x t e n d i n g to 15 April the various o p e r a t i o n s to "smash the spying-diversionary contingents of Poles, Latvians, G e r m a n s , Estonians, Finns, G r e e k s , Iranians, Kharbintsy, Chinese, and Romanians," was labeled strogo sekretno. But a p p a r e n t l y o r d i n a r y L e n i n g r a d e r s were a w a r e of its existence. For t h e text of the decree, see Alieva, Tak eto bylo, 253. A L e n i n g r a d oblast' secret police r e p o r t d e m o n s t r a t e s how c o n t e n t i o u s it was for L e n i n g r a d party and police to carry out the o p e r a t i o n . In a 16 F e b r u a r y 1938 r e p o r t to o b k o m secretary A . A . Kuznetsov, D e p u t y C o m m a n d e r of the L O N K V D M a j o r of State Security (Senior G r a d e ) V. G a r i n and chief of Section IV of the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of State Security Captain K a r p o v described a p l e n u m of the Soshikhinskii r a i k o m on 29 J a n u a r y 1938. R a i k o m secretary Grishichev, s p e a k i n g of the party organizer (partorg) of the raion section of the N K V D , Parts, stated: "We w o n ' t confirm [Parts] because he's a Latvian, and recently large c o u n t e r r e v o l u t i o n a r y organizations h a v e been u n c o v e r e d a m o n g Latvians, Poles, Estonians, and o t h e r nationalities, and Parts t h e r e f o r e should resign. T h e r e ' s a decision by the o b k o m on this q u e s t i o n , and at the m e e t i n g of r a i k o m secretaries t h e o b k o m gave instructions to r e m o v e all ' n a t i o n a l s ' (natsionalov) f r o m the party leadership." Grishichev himself was then q u e s t i o n e d by o n e I a k o b s o n : "It a p p e a r s that this c o n c e r n s you, too; a f t e r all, y o u ' r e a Veps." Grishichev then tried to d i f f e r e n t i a t e his national g r o u p :

352 • Lesley

A.

Rimmel

"I'm a representative of a nationality that is a constituent part of the USSR. That nationrepublic, ality which is a constituent part of the USSR, and which has its own autonomous is equal in rights (with all others], Latvians, Poles, Estonians, and representatives of other nationalities—those are a completely different matter" [emphasis added]. To the "representatives of other nationalities" he should have added "and those that are part of a diaspora of independent border states." Following this discussion, party m e m b e r s Gordeichuk and Kochetov stated, "All national minorities (natsionalov) should be sent away from the border raions."This motivated the authors of the report to conclude, "In connection with this, there is an unhealthy mood among communist-nationalities." Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv istoriko-politicheskikh dokumentov goroda Peterburga [hereafter T s G A I P D ] , f. 24, op. 2v, d. 428.11. 21-23. 47 R G A S P I , f. 18, op. 1, d. 737,11. 199-120ob. 48 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed. 23. 49 Brandenberger and Dubrovsky,'"The People Need a Tsar','" and Astrid S.Tuminez, Russian Nationalism since 1856: Ideology and the Making of Foreign Policy (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 42-45, make the claim that state-building was a primary goal of the Soviet regime in its 1930s policies toward nationalism and nationality. See also Alfred J. Rieber, "Stalin, Man of the Borderlands," The American Historical Review 106, no. 5 (December 2001). 50 See, e.g., G A R F , f. 7523, op. 65, d. 543,11. 40-42, where the N K V D determined in 1940 that a man who had voluntarily (but illegally) crossed into the USSR from Poland in 1923 could not, according to the 1928 law, be a citizen, but that if he had stayed in Polish territory until it was annexed by the USSR, then he would have automatically gained citizenship. 51 Not only more "Russian" in the case of "russkaia", but also "rossiiskaia." Deportations of non-Russians and non-Slavs, involving hundreds of thousands, from the Russian Empire were a part of the "historical tradition of conquest and exile that accompanied the expansion of the state into the southern borderlands," especially from the time of Catherine II until the period of the Great Reforms. "Exile meant exclusion, expulsion from the body politic, and a recognition that some belonged in the empire while others did not." Austin Lee Jersild, "From Savagery to Citizenship: Caucasian Mountaineers and Muslims in the Russian Empire," in Daniel R. Brower and Edward J. Lazzerini, eds., Russia's Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700-1917 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), esp. 102-105. Or, as another student of imperial Russian questions of citizenship has noted, "the appearance of grazhdanstvennost' (the idea of citizenship or civil society) coincided with the end of eastward territorial expansion of imperial Russia. It became part of the search for new foundations of social control in the eastern parts of the Empire." Dov Iaroshevski, " E m p i r e and Citizenship," in ibid., 61. Ironically, a similar attempt to instill certain definitions of citizenship came with the beginning of the westward territorial expansion of the Soviet empire.

The Soviet Position at Munich Reappraised: The Romanian Enigma HUGH

RAGSDALE

Would the Soviet Union have intervened according to its treaty obligations if general war had b r o k e n out over the crisis in Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1938? Western skepticism about Soviet intentions prior to the Munich crisis has been based almost exclusively on English, French, and G e r m a n documents. 1 Yet more recent work by Czech émigrés who used East E u r o p e a n documents agrees with the Western skeptical assessment of Soviet intentions. 2 Soviet documents, however, provide suggestive evidence contrary to the conventional consensus. O n 19 S e p t e m b e r 1938 President Benes asked Moscow if it would fight if France did, and on 20 S e p t e m b e r Moscow answered yes. 3 O n 21 September, according to the memoir-history of Marshall M.V. Zakharov, Moscow ordered a remarkably extensive partial mobilization of Soviet military forces in the Kiev, Belorussian and other military districts, a total of more than 75 divisions. 4 The official Soviet history of World War II gives an account nearly identical to Z a k h a r o v ' s supported by specific archival references, 5 and the Soviet o r d e r to mobilize the Kiev military district fully supports Z a k h a r o v ' s account. 6 If the Soviet mobilization and frontier deployment actually occurred on the scale alleged—there is no evidence that the British, French, or G e r m a n s picked up any such intelligence 7 —then where might such evidence be? This article suggests how the sources from Soviet and R o m a nian archives shed some light on the Soviet position b e f o r e Munich. My discovery of the Romanian dimension of the problem began altogether indirectly. A f t e r teasing success in Moscow and the finding that all documents on Soviet-Czech military cooperation had been destroyed when the Wehrmacht entered Prague in March 1939, a colleague, Milan H a u n e r , sent me the published dispatches of Polish consuls f r o m the eastern, or Bessarabian, districts of R o m a nia during the critical last ten days of S e p t e m b e r 1938. O n e of these dispatches reports the transport of substantial quantities of Soviet military matériel through Bessarabia on its way to Czechoslovakia: Transports of military matériel continue to go both through Cainari-Bessarabiasca as well as [through] Kishinev. Thus far the contents of these shipments have consisted of, among other things, tanks, machine guns, gas masks, and covered freight cars of u n k n o w n cargo (marked "explosives,"

354 • Hugh

Ragsdale

thus probably ammunition). From well informed sources (railway employees), I have intelligence that until the 25 th of this month around 600 freight cars passed through Kishinev with Soviet military matériel for Czechoslovakia. The Soviet trains move through Kishinev exclusively during the night, maintain extensive [security] precautions, for example prohibiting in several places nighttime access to tracks and stations. The railroad worker is o r d e r e d to maintain the greatest discretion and under threat of termination of employment is forbidden to mention the passing Soviet transports. The above exceptional measures of security are prompting, on one hand, the spread of n u m e r o u s alarming rumors. ...This is particularly true of the r u m o r of alleged sightings of Soviet soldiers. In spite of the n u m b e r of such rumors, I judge, however, that thus far there have been no [Soviet] troop trains (besides those engaged in the maintenance of military vehicles)... O n 21 st and 22 nd S e p t e m b e r two shipments of tanks passed through Kishinev on several [kilkunasta, i.e., from 13-19] flatcars... —Approximately 6 tanks at present, according to an eyewitness, are sighted on a flatcar at Vesternicei station [location ??]. Here there is no d o u b t that we are dealing with Soviet tanks (reliable intelligence). —Recently numerous freight trains consisting of covered cars containing some kind of Czech cargoes have passed Kishinev during the night hours. —Shipments of Soviet tanks seen among other [places] at the Causani station [ca. 10 miles due south of Bender on way to Cainari], Shipments of machine guns seen at Zloti station [location ??] (reliable intelligence). 8 If m o v e m e n t s of Soviet military equipment on the scale here r e p o r t e d had actually taken place, they would have been observed and reported far more fully and more frequently by the R o m a n i a n army, by the border guards and the General Staff intelligence operation in particular. Thus Romanian archives b e c a m e key to verifying this intelligence. For the sake of context, we must consider briefly the nature of S o v i e t - R o m a nian relations at the time. Although R o m a n i a had a dreadful combat experience in World War I, all its enemies were eventually defeated and R o m a n i a emerged in possession of Transylvania, Bessarabia, Bukovina, and Dobrogea. In o r d e r to protect against revanchist impulses, Romania signed an alliance with Poland against the Soviet Union (1921) and joined the Little Entente (1921) against Hungary and the Balkan E n t e n t e (1934) against Bulgaria. When the Nazi triumph in G e r m a n y worked its revolution in Soviet foreign policy and brought Moscow into the camp of the League of Nations and collective security, the R o m a n i a n attitude to its Soviet neighbor altered accordingly. O n e of the critical elements in the development of S o v i e t - R o m a n i a n relations was the regard in which Maksim Litvinov was held in Bucharest. T h e r e is a detailed account in the memoirs of the Romanian Foreign Minister at the time,

The Soviet Position at Munich Reappraised • 355 Nicolae Petrescu-Comnen. 9 Upon Litvinov's first appearance at Geneva, his d e b u t in the international arena, he had made a generally shabby impression. H e h e a d e d a delegation regarded as little better than savages from the steppes, relieved only by the elegant and beautiful Mme. Lunacharsky with her s u m p t u o u s furs and jewels. Unprepossessing in appearance, Litvinov scarcely improved matters when speaking of pipe dreams of total disarmament with his "uncertain English" in a "nervous throaty voice." First impressions, however, soon yielded to better ones. Litvinov tempered his tone, and before long, Aristide Briand predicted that he would become "a great E u r o p e a n . " E d u a r d Benes declared him "the most Western of the Easterns." The distinguished Romanian foreign minister of the early 1930s, Nicolae Titulescu, reacted as Margaret Thatcher did to Gorbachev: we can do business with him. These flattering opinions gave way to superlative ones. In the opinion of C o m n e n himself, "Thanks to [Litvinov] his country ... regained its place [in diplomacy] as a great power. ...In less than three years he had succeeded in becoming a star of the first magnitude in the international firmament. .. .His influence at times seemed almost to overshadow that of Briand, then at the summit of his career. ... Benes [took] him completely on trust. [Titulescu] said, 'As long as Litvinov is Minister, I shall not be afraid of Moscow."' Litvinov and Titulescu established an unusually trusting relationship that promised to materialize in tangible benefits for collective security. These personal factors soon began to bear fruit. When Litvinov pledged the Soviets to the League and arranged the security pacts with France and Czechoslovakia in 1935, Bucharest registered the Soviet change of front surprisingly quickly and tangibly. A Romanian Foreign Office policy paper raised the question in S e p t e m b e r 1936 whether the League Pact obliged Romania as a m e m b e r state to permit the passage of Soviet troops in the event of aggression and concluded clearly, in the spirit of Titulescu, that it did. " M e m b e r states of the League of Nations are obliged to authorize passage of States [si'c] applying military sanctions u n d e r Article 16 of the Pact. They may not invoke their [own] non-participation in a military action in order to f r e e themselves from this obligation. Neither may they for this purpose take advantage of the absence of Council recommendations demanding such right of passage. The States' liberty of j u d g m e n t [i.e., policy] exists only in reference to their pronouncing upon the determination [identification] of an aggressor." 1 0 The Romanian Army registered a change of attitude toward Moscow even more quickly and more tangibly. According to a Romanian General Staff document of July 1935, the Soviet pacts with France and Czechoslovakia "changed the whole situation in the sense that a relaxation with Russia took place so that we could direct all our attention to the threatening western frontier." Consequently the plan of operations drawn up for 1936, in response to the "removal of the Russian threat," entailed a dramatic redeployment of forces. Of a total of about 29 Romanian divisions, three to four divisions of infantry and a brigade of caval-

356 • Hugh

Ragsdale

ry were deployed on the southern (Bulgarian) front, sixteen divisions of infantry and two of cavalry on the western (Hungarian) front, and a maximum of nine divisions of infantry on the eastern (Russian) front, and "that only in the gravest case." 11 In 1937 about 90 percent of all military expenditures were devoted to the western front, and in 1938 the n u m b e r of divisions posted on the eastern frontier was reduced to five.12 More dramatically yet, the campaign plan called clearly for granting the Red A r m y transit rights across Romania: "If Russia remains allied with France and intends to support Czechoslovakia we will need to permit the Russian forces to cross Romania in order to assist the Czech army." 1 3 Precisely this outlook continued to characterize R o m a n i a n military planning through 1938. T h e Romanian General Staff campaign plan for 1938 addressed the "degree of probability of war on the different fronts," east, west, and south, or Russian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian. The most threatening front was clearly the western or Hungarian. The G e n e r a l Staff judged that in view of the Soviet treaty with France, Soviet policy as enunciated at the League of Nations, and the attitude of the other powers, especially Hungary, "war on the eastern [front in 1938] appears little likely." 14 King Carol II himself had long since assured French Chief of Staff General Maurice Gamelin that in the event of war, "he would allow the Russians to cross the northern part of his territory in order to reach Czechoslovakia. But he d e m a n d e d that I keep it a secret, not wishing the question to be discussed in R o m a n i a . He would act at the desired moment." 1 5 Problems developed, however, in this surprisingly rosy scenario. Titulescu had been notoriously committed to the view that the diplomacy of the 1930s would eventuate in one of two utterly different results, either a genuine and workable Franco-Soviet pact in support of collective security or a Nazi-Soviet pact to partition Poland. He was entirely committed to the French and the Soviets. He and Litvinov had struck informally in 1934 a so-called "gentleman's a g r e e m e n t " to avoid all reference to the contested possession of Bessarabia, an indispensable prerequisite of any cooperation between them. Proceeding on this basis in July 1936, he and Litvinov signed a mutual security pact. Titulescu's policy was, however, deeply offensive to the conservative and nationalist parties of R o m a n i a on the grounds of Bessarabia and communist ideology alike, and it m a d e enemies of Germany, Italy, Poland and, increasingly, the Yugoslavia of Milan Stojadinovic. This combination of enemies told heavily against him, and parties both domestic and foreign persuaded King Carol II to repudiate the pact, the policy, and Titulescu himself. In S e p t e m b e r 1936 he was fired, a major blow to the cause of collective security. O t h e r disturbances in Soviet-Romanian relations followed. This resurgence of nationalist parties in R o m a n i a climaxed in the winter of 1937-1938 in the installation of a blatantly racist and antisemitic government under Octavian G o g a and Alexandru Cuza (National Christian Party), a turn of events very offensive to Moscow. Pravda described this government as a mere arm of G o e b b e l s and the

The Soviet Position at Munich Reappraised

• 357

N a z i Party. 1 6 It was against this u n h a p p y b a c k g r o u n d t h a t t h e most o m i n o u s d e v e l o p m e n t of S o v i e t - R o m a n i a n r e l a t i o n s of the p e r i o d o c c u r r e d , a d i p l o m a t i c i n c i d e n t at o n c e b o t h f r i v o l o u s a n d s e r i o u s k n o w n as t h e B u t e n k o affair. 1 7 It i n v o l v e d t h e m y s t e r i o u s d i s a p p e a r a n c e of Soviet c h a r g é d ' a f f a i r e s and acting chief of t h e l e g a t i o n , F e d o r B u t e n k o , in F e b r u a r y of 1938 a f t e r he was visited by s e v e r a l a g e n t s of t h e G P U . A t first t h e R o m a n i a n a n d Soviet d i p l o m a t s a g r e e d t o k e e p t h e m a t t e r c o n f i d e n t i a l . B u t a f t e r B u t e n k o t u r n e d u p in R o m e a n d g a v e an i n t e r v i e w t o a Milan n e w s p a p e r c o n t a i n i n g a full a c c o u n t b o t h of his p e r s o n a l p r e d i c a m e n t a n d a lurid e x p o s é of t h e Stalinist " h e l l " (his t e r m ) of collectivization a n d t h e purges, Litvinov, e m b a r r a s s e d , a c c u s e d t h e R o m a n i a n s of complicity in B u t e n k o ' s d i s a p p e a r a n c e . This t e m p e s t in a t e a p o t was actually a lively a n d serio u s crisis in b i l a t e r a l relations, which lasted t h r o u g h o u t t h e s p r i n g of 1938. It c o m p l e t e l y eclipses t h e A n s c h l u s s in t h e d i p l o m a t i c c o r r e s p o n d e n c e a n d , in t h e t e s t i m o n y of Foreign M i n i s t e r C o m n e n , it p r e c i p i t a t e d t h e fall of t h e R o m a n i a n g o v e r n m e n t , t h e s c r a p p i n g of the c o n s t i t u t i o n , a n d t h e i n a u g u r a t i o n o n 23 F e b r u ary 1938 of the R o y a l D i c t a t o r s h i p of C a r o l II. A s this series of p r o b l e m s p r o c e e d e d t o d i s t u r b t h e f o r m e r l y

promising

p r o s p e c t s of S o v i e t - R o m a n i a n c o o p e r a t i o n , t h e policies of B u c h a r e s t vis-à-vis M o s c o w s o o n r e f l e c t e d a n e w d i s p o s i t i o n . W h e n t h e q u e s t i o n of R e d A r m y t r a n sit t o C z e c h o s l o v a k i a u n d e r L e a g u e a u s p i c e s was raised a f t e r T i t u l e s c u ' s dismissal, t h e c o n c l u s i o n s d r a w n w e r e distinctly d i f f e r e n t . In May 1937 a R o m a n i a n F o r e i g n O f f i c e policy p a p e r a d d r e s s e d " T h e P r e s e n t I n t e n t i o n s of the Soviet G o v e r n m e n t with R e s p e c t to t h e C o n c l u s i o n of an A l l i a n c e with R o m a n i a . " T h e p a p e r o b s e r v e d that S o v i e t - R o m a n i a n r e l a t i o n s w e r e d o m i n a t e d at t h e t i m e by t w o f a c t o r s : R o m a n i a n i n t e r e s t in o b t a i n i n g a f o r m a l r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e p o s s e s sion of B e s s a r a b i a a n d Soviet i n t e r e s t in o b t a i n i n g t h e right of p a s s a g e f o r R e d A r m y t r o o p s in case of a G e r m a n a t t a c k o n C z e c h o s l o v a k i a . R e f e r r i n g to t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n s of Soviet M i n i s t e r M.S. O s t r o v s k i i a n d F r e n c h Foreign M i n i s t e r J o s e p h P a u l - B o n c o u r of 15 M a y 1937, t h e p a p e r r e l a t e s t h a t O s t r o v s k i i p r o p o s e d a m o d e of c o m p o s i n g t h e s e two interests. R e l y i n g o n t h e old L i t v i n o v - T i t u l e s c u a g r e e m e n t t o avoid t h e judicial i m p l i c a t i o n s of B e s s a r a b i a , he t h o u g h t t h a t a p r o p e r formula to reconcile S o v i e t - R o m a n i a n

i n t e r e s t s w a s t o b e f o u n d in

League

C o v e n a n t A r t i c l e s 10 ( t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y ) a n d 16 ( a p p l i c a t i o n of military s a n c t i o n s a c r o s s s t a t e f r o n t i e r s ) . A r t i c l e 10 w o u l d s e c u r e t h e p r e s e n t R o m a n i a n f r o n tier, a n d t h e t w o c o u n t r i e s could t h e n r e a c h an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o n h o w t o i m p l e m e n t A r t i c l e 16 against an a g g r e s s o r . If R o m a n i a s h o u l d p r o c e e d a c c o r d i n g t o O s t r o v s k i i ' s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s , h o w e v e r , t h e n it w o u l d lose t h e right to c h o o s e w h e t h e r o r not to p a r t i c i p a t e in military s a n c t i o n s against an a g g r e s s o r , i.e., t h e right to r e f u s e Soviet transit. Such a pact w o u l d e n t a i l two g r e a t risks: t h e o c c u p a t i o n of t h e c o u n t r y by a f o r e i g n a r m y i m b u e d with a d a n g e r o u s i d e o l o g y a n d t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of t h e c o u n t r y i n t o a t h e a t r e of o p e r a t i o n s . " W e a r e e n t i t l e d t o ask o u r s e l v e s w h e t h e r t h e a c q u i s i t i o n of indirect (lâturalnicâ) r e c o g n i t i o n of B e s s a r a b i a w o u l d c o m p e n s a t e f o r such risks in t h e eyes of p u b l i c o p i n i o n . " 1 8 F o r

358 • Hugh Ragsdale the time being the answer to such a question was suspended in limbo or in studied ambiguity. The torment continued, as just two months later the Foreign Office drafted another such effort: "Can We Really Admit in One Form or A n o t h e r the Right of Passage for Russian Troops?" 1 9 This paper raised several related problems. O n e was the clear stipulation of Article 123 of the Romanian Constitution: " N o foreign armed force may be admitted into the service of the state nor enter or cross the territory of Romania except by virtue of a specific law." Moreover, the paper noted that during the I t a l o - E t h i o p i a n crisis of 1935-1936, Hungary, Austria, and Albania refused to comply with League sanctions against Italy; and the Belgian delegate to the League had in April 1937 repudiated the obligation of his country to subscribe to League sanctions. In conclusion, the Romanian paper argued, "we remain free to decide when and if we will permit the passage of foreign troops through our territory. It would, of course, be contrary to our interests to surrender, in the framework of an agreement with the Russian state, the liberty that we enjoy at present." 2 0 The commitment of R o m a n i a to collective security was hardly in doubt, nor is there any logical reason why it should have been, given the territorial gains that it had realized in 1918 and the tacit conspiracy of its victims against it ever since. During the Anschluss crisis (12 March), the French ambassador Adrien Thierry was summoned to the Romanian Foreign Office and told that anything that affected the independence of Austria must be considered a casus belli but that it was up to the great powers to take the initiative. 21 A few weeks later (5 April), Thierry reported to Paris his opinion that in case of war, R o m a n i a would be "with us" but that it would m a k e no formal commitments in advance. 2 2 When French Foreign Minister Bonnet queried the new Romanian Foreign Minister Nicolae Petrescu-Comnen in May 1938 ( G e n e v a ) about the Romanian position in the event of a Czechoslovak crisis, Comnen gave his private opinion, repeated to the French many times. H e cited R o m a n i a n obligations to its Polish ally and to the Little E n t e n t e and the Balkan Entente. It was impossible for R o m a n i a to m a k e a move without prior reference to its allies. Furthermore, he said, it served n o one's interests, including those of France and Czechoslovakia, to jeopardize those alliances. If the English and the French were to fight in the event of a G e r m a n challenge to Czechoslovakia, R o m a n i a and its allies would in all likelihood join them, but it could for the reasons given take no position in advance. 2 3 Bonnet then asked about the likelihood of permission for Soviet t r o o p passage. C o m n e n said that no immediate response was possible. H e observed that the public was hostile to the idea and that without prior agreement with Poland, which was unlikely, the granting of such permission would result in the abrogation of the Polish alliance. 24 The Romanian attitude was deeply ambiguous and uncertain. As the crisis loomed, the French government queried the R o m a n i a n s persistently, and in July the French A m b a s s a d o r reported, "They have always given here the most categorical refusal to all suggestions in this matter." 2 5

The Soviet Position at Munich Reappraised • 359 Meanwhile, Munich approached. At the beginning of September, the French raised with Litvinov in Moscow the question of "forms of cooperation" in the event of a G e r m a n attack on Czechoslovakia. 2 6 Litvinov was obviously not fully prepared for the question, and he turned to Stalin for an answer. As he wrote, "I absolutely do not k n o w what line to take, as there has been no exchange of opinions on the question recently." 2 7 There is no record of Stalin's response—he usually did such business by phone—but on the following day, 2 September, Litvinov was prepared to give the French embassy a relatively elaborate and definite answer. 2 8 The p e o p l e ' s commissar ... confirmed his previous declarations of principle, according to which the USSR has decided to fulfill by all possible means [emphasis added] the engagements stemming f r o m the pact with Czechoslovakia on condition that France itself observes its own [obligations]... M. Litvinov further indicated to me that given the negative attitude adopted by Warsaw and Bucharest, he sees only one practical way to proceed, that of appealing to the League of Nations. H e mentioned, but only to exclude it a priori, t h e possibility of a forced passage of Soviet troops across Poland and R o m a n i a in the absence of a decision of Geneva. In his opinion, all measures should be taken in order to alert the Council of the League immediately, such that the procedure of Geneva might be ready to be activated f r o m the m o m e n t aggression occurs. If he excludes absolutely from his considerations the good will of Poland, he imagines on the contrary that a favorable [League] recommendation in regard to Czechoslovakia, even if it receives only a majority vote of the m e m b e r s of the Council [instead of the Charter's stipulated unanimity], might exercise a positive psychological influence on the ultimate attitude of Romania, alarmed by the development of Hitler's dynamism. O n the s a m e day (2 S e p t e m b e r ) Ivan Maiskii described the same strategy at length to Winston Churchill, who reported it at once to Lord Halifax. 2 9 Moscow asked Paris t o bring the S u d e t e n issue before the League Council but the French, fearing that the Soviets were searching for shelter from their obligations, refused. 3 0 A l t h o u g h in the spring of 1936 Litvinov had assured the Czechoslovaks that the R e d A r m y would c o m e to their assistance in case of need with or without the consent of the Romanians, 3 1 the Soviet position had shifted by 1938. Georges B o n n e t records that Litvinov "always d e m a n d e d a formal authorization" from R o m a n i a for transit either by land or air! 32 At this point, I must dispose of one of the important pieces of apocrypha in this story. In 1984 J i n H o c h m a n published a d o c u m e n t supplied by Ivan Pfaff and purporting to be an official note from C o m n e n to Litvinov granting permission for the Red A r m y to cross R o m a n i a . T h e r e are a host of reasons why it must be considered apocryphal. In 7 pages of printed text, 50 or more errors of French grammar and spelling make the d o c u m e n t implausible, given that the R o m a n i a n

360 • Hugh

Ragsdale

Foreign O f f i c e a n d C o m n e n himself w e r e b o t h F r a n c o p h i l e and F r a n c o p h o n e . T h e d o c u m e n t invites t h e Soviets t o s e n d i n t o C z e c h o s l o v a k i a 100,000 t r o o p s o v e r l a n d a n d t o airlift a n o t h e r 250,000, all within six days. T h e d o c u m e n t s t a t e s t h a t a copy was f u r n i s h e d to t h e p r e s i d e n t of C z e c h o s l o v a k i a , but B e n e s ' s m e m o i r s d o n o t m e n t i o n it. 3 3 N e i t h e r d o C o m n e n ' s m e m o i r s 3 4 n o r d o the m o s t a u t h o r i t a t i v e hist o r i a n s of t h e s u b j e c t — L u n g u , M o i s u c , Talpe$. 3 5 T h e R o m a n i a n archivists h a v e b e e n u n a b l e to find t h e d o c u m e n t in B u c h a r e s t and r e g a r d it as a b a d j o k e , since t h e y believe t h a t Pfaff h a s n e v e r b e e n in R o m a n i a . 3 6 A s C o m n e n tells t h e story, while t h e F r e n c h w e r e u n s u c c e s s f u l l y raising t h e q u e s t i o n of Soviet t r o o p t r a n s i t in B u c h a r e s t , M o s c o w n e v e r did. C o m n e n r e p o r t ed f r o m G e n e v a in t h e m i d d l e of S e p t e m b e r 1938 that he had a c o n v e r s a t i o n of an h o u r a n d a half with Litvinov d u r i n g which Litvinov m a d e n o r e f e r e n c e to t h e q u e s t i o n . 3 7 A c c o r d i n g to his m e m o i r s , W h i l e F r a n c e c o n t i n u e d t o m a k e e f f o r t s to o b t a i n r e a s s u r i n g d e c l a r a t i o n s o n this m a t t e r f r o m P o l a n d a n d R o m a n i a ; and at G e n e v a t h e F r e n c h d e l e gates, G e o r g e s B o n n e t , Paul B o n c o u r

[sic. J o s e p h P a u l - B o n c o u r ] ,

and

[ E d o u a r d ] H e r r i o t assailed us with r e q u e s t s , Litvinov, w h o m I saw a l m o s t daily, e i t h e r at m e e t i n g s of t h e C o u n c i l , o r the A s s e m b l y or d u r i n g official lunches and dinners, maintained

an a t t i t u d e of reserve. . . . D u r i n g

[the

S e p t e m b e r 1938] session of t h e L e a g u e of N a t i o n s ... a l t h o u g h my m e e t i n g s with Litvinov w e r e of a l m o s t daily o c c u r r e n c e , he s p o k e to m e of m a n y o t h e r m a t t e r s but n e v e r of that p r i m a r y c o n d i t i o n o n which he insisted f o r t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n of his country. H e p r e f e r r e d to leave it f o r o u r F r e n c h f r i e n d s to e n l i g h t e n us on this m a t t e r . 3 8 T h e F r e n c h p e r s i s t e d in their f a s h i o n , t h e R o m a n i a n s in theirs. 3 9 The

Poles

were

naturally

concerned

and

made

inquiries

of

their

own

(13 S e p t e m b e r ) . W h a t t h e y d i s c o v e r e d is r e c o r d e d in the diary of U n d e r - S e c r e t a r y f o r Foreign A f f a i r s Jan S z e m b e k : " T h e R o m a n i a n s assured us categorically t h a t t h e y would not a u t h o r i z e t h e p a s s a g e of Soviet troops. I j u d g e t h a t they will n o t f o r this r e a s o n , that in t h e c o n t r a r y case, t h e y would be obliged to d e m a n d w h e t h e r it w o u l d be c o n s o n a n t with o u r alliance." 4 0 Similarly, " t h e a m b a s s a d o r of R o m a n i a d e c l a r e d t o m e ... again categorically, t h a t t h e r e was n o q u e s t i o n of allowing t h e Soviet t r o o p s to pass o v e r t h e t e r r i t o r y of his c o u n t r y to assist C z e c h o s l o v a k i a . " 4 1 F u r t h e r m o r e , Soviet Foreign M i n i s t e r Litvinov said on m o r e t h a n o n e o c c a s i o n t h a t Soviet t r o o p s would not e n t e r R o m a n i a w i t h o u t R o m a n i a n c o n s e n t . 4 2 T o m a k e m a t t e r s worse, t h e rail a n d r o a d systems across s o m e five h u n d r e d m i l e s of R o m a n i a b e t w e e n t h e S o v i e t U n i o n and C z e c h o s l o v a k i a w e r e i n a d e q u a t e to t r a n s p o r t a m o d e r n army. C o m n e n himself m a d e this p o i n t " m a p in h a n d " o n several o c c a s i o n s t o t h e F r e n c h , t h e British, a n d t h e G e r m a n s . 4 3 T h e m o s t a u t h o r i t a t i v e a c c o u n t of this p r o b l e m c a m e f r o m F r e n c h T h i e r r y in B u c h a r e s t .

Ambassador

The Soviet Position at Munich Reappraised • 361 In regard to the technical aspect of the problem ... there is not yet any direct communication by rail between Russia and Czechoslovakia over R o m a n i a n territory. The lines under construction will not be complete b e f o r e next year at the earliest, and they will in any case permit only a limited traffic, around a dozen small trains a day.... As for the road network, it is far from being a d e q u a t e to transport significant forces, especially motorized [forces]. If the situation is more favorable in Bessarabia, where, during the summer dry season, one could easily drive off the roads, which are few and poor, it is not so in the Carpathians, where the progress of convoys is necessarily confined to the roads. There were only three useful roads, and they would accommodate only three divisions at a time, in Thierry's opinion. 4 4 The French G e n e r a l Staff concurred. When the question was raised (by Premier Léon Blum) in the Permanent Committee of National Defense, General Gamelin "respondjed] that he does not see what effective aid Russia might initially provide. The transport of the Russian army by the sole poor railroad is not to be envisaged."The only real possibility was the dispatch of motorized troops, but even so the roads were far f r o m promising. 4 5 The Soviets were obviously aware of the problems of military transport across Romania as Litvinov, just two weeks before the Munich conference, explained the matter to Louis Fischer: "The Rumanian railroads are poor and our heavy tanks would have difficulty on their poor bridges and highways. But we could help in the air." 46 This generally pessimistic assessment of the poor prospect of rail transport is confirmed by contemporary maps. All m a j o r R o m a n i a n rail lines connected with Poland and Hungary. No major lines crossed the f r o n t i e r of Slovakia. No rail line of any kind provided a direct connection between the Soviet Ukraine and Czechoslovakia, and all lines in the area were single-track. The few double-track lines scarcely extended north of Bucharest and Ploieçti in the far southern tip of the country. At the end of 1942 the United States Office of Strategic Services did a survey of railroads and rail stations in Eastern E u r o p e to identify a p p r o p r i a t e targets for bombing. No R o m a n i a n sites were d e e m e d worthy of attention. 4 7 This unsatisfactory state of military transport facilities was clearly recognized by the Czechs and Romanians. In April 1936 they had come to an agreement to build a rail line, financed by the Czechs, specifically to facilitate the transfer of the R e d A r m y to Slovakia, but at the time of the Munich crisis the construction was still incomplete. 4 8 We have a report of the experience of a small delegation of Soviet military traveling from Ukraine to Prague at the end of August 1938. They found that the route was long and inconvenient and required four days and four changes of train. 4 9 George Kennan, a US diplomat in Prague after the crisis, has written me that he had asked the G e r m a n military attaché in Prague in the days following the Munich agreement why the G e r m a n s seemed so little concerned about Soviet intervention. This official, G e n e r a l Rudolf Toussaint, replied that it was his special assignment to assess the risk of Soviet intervention and that he

362 • Hugh

Ragsdale

submitted an estimate that it would require the Red A r m y three months to put a single division into Czechoslovakia. These facts recall the provocative September 1938 report of the Polish Consul in Kishinev who wrote of massive quantities of Soviet military equipment entering R o m a n i a on the way to Slovakia. Moreover, one of the commonest rumors of the period alleges the presence of various large numbers of Soviet military planes in Czechoslovakia. It is time to assess such reports. I can verify that in June Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Kamil Krofta admitted to the Poles that his country had concluded an agreement with R o m a n i a to permit the overflights of Soviet planes into Slovakia. 5 0 The Romanian embassy in Prague subsequently informed the Poles that Czechoslovakia was purchasing the Soviet planes, that Romania consented to the overflights on the condition that the planes were unarmed, were not provided with photographic equipment, and were piloted by Czech personnel. 5 1 So far as I know, no one has discovered a document embodying such an agreement, but f r e q u e n t references to it in the diplomatic records leave little doubt of its reality. Although the topic of Soviet planes in Czechoslovakia was the subject of conjecture and rumors, there are no accessible and reliable figures on their numbers. R u m o r s range from several h u n d r e d to 2,000. I have seen reliable figures confirming 40 planes (SB bombers), though Soviet Commissar of Defense Kliment Voroshilov reported to the Politburo that by 30 S e p t e m b e r he would have 548 planes ready to go to the assistance of the Czechs. 52 If we consider ground forces, the pre-planned schedule of military supply trains for the Romanian Army in S e p t e m b e r 1938 shows no sign of interruptions, changes of schedule, or the intrusion of any dramatic events. 5 3 Everything was in this respect perfectly conventional. At the same time, the observations of the R o m a n i a n border guards and reports of the intelligence section of the General Staff are almost comical. Amidst reports of drowning, poaching, and a few exchanges of gunfire during the s u m m e r months, two episodes give the flavor of the b o r d e r reports: O n 19 August 1938, a patrol in the region of Rezina observed an individual bathing in the river, while directly opposite this individual on the other side of the river was a Soviet citizen fishing from a small boat. As the boat approached the R o m a n i a n who was bathing, he was taken into the boat and rowed to the Soviet bank of the river. The Romanian patrol fired repeatedly at the boat but without result. The report concludes that the b o r d e r patrols need m o r e riflery training. On the night of 30-31 August, a R o m a n i a n patrol in the region of Paraul Iagorlic discovered three persons in a boat proceeding f r o m the Soviet to the R o m a n i a n bank of the Dnestr. Unfortunately, as the boat approached within thirty-forty meters of shore, and as the patrol prepared to fire if the three persons resisted capture, their guard dog began to bark and could not be stopped. The persons in the boat, warned thus, r e t u r n e d to the Soviet bank of the river. T h e R o m a n i a n patrol fired on the boat, apparently in vain. In conclusion, the r e p o r t r e c o m m e n d e d better training of guard dogs. 54

The Soviet Position at Munich Reappraised • 363 S o m e reports record observations of more moment. O n 22 September, the day a f t e r the mobilization of the Kiev military district, there was a report on the establishment on the Soviet frontier of systematic observation and reconnoitering posts of a kind obviously not previously in place there. Each observation post was to be provided with binoculars, a map of the local vicinity, a drawing board and an optical device known to civil engineers as a declination compass (declinator). S o m e such posts were reported completed, some under construction, and some not yet begun. The report relates that R o m a n i a n efforts to pass reconnoitering patrols across the frontier into the Soviet Union had been few and difficult in view of strong and effective Soviet border controls. It was possible only at night. Soviet measures included the removal of ethnic R o m a n i a n s f r o m the frontier area. T h e r e was also a deficiency of persons who could swim well enough to m a k e up such patrols. 5 5 A l m o s t ludicrously, on 28 September, the day before the gathering at Munich, instructions were issued on the distribution of new uniforms, including white gloves and yellow cartridge belts, to the border guards. They were to be given first to the m o r e important border posts, which were to be staffed by men tall and good-looking (oameni inalfi chipe^i).56 M o r e serious was a report of 5 October 1938. During the week prior to the f a t e f u l meeting at Munich, the Soviet Telephone and Telegraph office in Odessa requested the establishment of a telephone link f r o m Odessa to Bucharest through Tighina. The request initiated a spate of correspondence between R o m a nian Telephone and Telegraph and the G e n e r a l Staff. The request was p r o m p t e d by the consideration how to maintain telephone and telegraph contact with Prague in the event that such communication was interrupted across Poland. R o m a n i a n Telephone and Telegraph approved the request on grounds that it would put R o m a n i a more au courant and give it better control of information and communications. As it observed, in present conditions a Moscow-to-Prague line was considered indispensable. Of course, there were some political obstacles to overcome, as acceding to the request was apparently regarded as having legal implications for the question of territorial claims in Bessarabia, the same considerations that had previously spoiled the negotiations on establishing regular airline service between Moscow and Prague. Eventually, during the first week of O c t o b e r , the intelligence section of the General Staff advised against it, and the operations section advised the Directorate of Telephone and Telegraph that it was a question for the Foreign Ministry to decide, because there were no relations or communications between the two armies at all.57 The curious aspect of the reports of the Romanian border guards and intelligence service, of course, is the frivolous attitude toward observations of the eastern frontier, an attitude almost unbelievably cavalier. The observations of the R o m a n i a n border guards and the intelligence section of the G e n e r a l Staff on the Czechoslovak and Hungarian frontiers were far more serious. They r e p o r t e d on 8 September the Hungarian call-up and concentration of the two reserve classes

364 • Hugh

Ragsdale

of 1934 and 1935; maneuvers in the area of Budapest-Szeged scheduled until 25 September; and Hungarian forces moving for several days toward the Czech frontier. 5 8 On 24 September Czechoslovak mobilization was reported in considerable detail, including the requisition of private vehicles capable of assisting transport to the frontiers, the evacuation of industry along the G e r m a n - H u n g a rian frontiers, and the fact that the local population was taking refuge in the Tatra Mountains. Train traffic through the R o m a n i a n border town of Valea Vi$eului was interrupted, radios were confiscated, and frontier guards were transferred to the Polish frontier. 5 9 A n d from 24-26 September, the Czechs were scheduled to begin closing the frontier posts of Valea Vi§eului and Lunca la Tisa. They would evacuate part of the population f r o m the Hungarian and G e r m a n frontiers, interrupt train traffic along these frontiers as well as along the Polish frontier, and confiscate radios in the border districts. 60 In other words the Romanian A r m y was doing its conventional duty on the Hungarian and Czechoslovak frontiers, while on the Soviet frontier it was simply on vacation. Thus, there is no news here of Soviet military equipment in Romania. Therefore, I am forced to conclude that the evidence of the Romanian Army archives leaves no doubt about the likelihood of the intervention of the R e d A r m y across Romania: it was not p r e p a r e d to move effectively across R o m a n i a to the defense of Czechoslovakia and had no plans to do so. If it had wished to do so, the condition of Romanian railroads made it impossible. But three intriguing tidbits of evidence contain suggestions of a contrary kind. First, on 20 June 1938 Romanian minister at the legation in Moscow, Nicolae Dianu, was listening to a customary litany of Litvinov's complaints against Romania, including the negotiations of the commercial airline and the visit of Romanian Chief of Staff General Ionescu to Warsaw, whereupon Dianu r e s p o n d e d in a surprising fashion: "I said that I appreciated the open m a n n e r in which he spoke his mind; however instead of these secondary questions, it surprises me that he doesn't sufficiently appreciate (pre(ui) our attitude, by which we have allowed the transit of Russian and Czechoslovak planes and materials in the air and on the ground (in aerfipe uscat), which might have caused us great difficulties." Litvinov responded, "Yes, it seems that Poland has protested to you." 6 1 Second, on 22 August the R o m a n i a n s a p p r e h e n d e d what was rather obviously a Soviet reconnaissance patrol. Two persons crossed the Dniestr from the Soviet U k r a i n e into R o m a n i a at Nord Naslavcea. S u m m o n e d by a Romanian patrol, they s u r r e n d e r e d without resistance. Interrogated by personnel of the intelligence section of the General Staff, they admitted having been sent by the G P U f r o m Moghilev in a boat rowed by a fisherman. They were found to be carrying R o m a n i a n currency and a revolver with six cartridges. Their mission was threefold: — t o travel f r o m Nord Naslavcea-Climauti-Sta{ia-Dondo$ami-Satul Scaieni, then through Dangeni and return by Volo$cova [Nord Naslavcea and Volo?cova were border points on the Ukrainian-Bessarabian frontier; Dangeni, the farthest destination in this mission, was west of the Pruth in northeastern Moldavia];

The Soviet Position at Munich Reappraised • 365 — t o study the width of the roads along this route, the strength of the bridges for artillery and tanks, to gather information on the state of public opinion; — t o gather information on military construction, military units, and to recruit informers. 6 2 Third, on 9 S e p t e m b e r R o m a n i a n Minister D i a n u recorded Soviet planes overflying Romanian territory on reconnaissance missions. H e observed that the Soviets were firing on R o m a n i a n planes inside Soviet frontiers, that the R o m a n i a n s had not been o r d e r e d to fire on Soviet planes. 6 3 Obviously, each of the two sides was mounting reconnaissance flights over the territory of the other, but what the Romanian flights discovered on the Soviet side is not known. *

*

*

In N o v e m b e r 1947 there was an exchange of opinion between f o r m e r French Foreign Minister G e o r g e s Bonnet and f o r m e r French A m b a s s a d o r in Bucharest A d r i e n Thierry in La Revue de Paris and Le Monde concerning Romanian responsibility for the Munich debacle. C o m n e n e n t e r e d t h e discussion. He wrote that t h e r e were two reasons for refusing Soviet t r o o p passage: it would have sacrificed R o m a n i a ' s alliances with Poland and Yugoslavia (Little E n t e n t e ) , and the lack of a d e q u a t e rail facilities r e n d e r e d the whole question moot. There was no point, he said, in sacrificing the alliances in a cause that the railroads r e n d e r e d entirely vain. R o m a n i a did what it could to assist Czechoslovakia by facilitating the transfer of Soviet aircraft. Meantime, he raised the forceful question: did London and Paris want a R o m a n i a n yes, or did they not in fact seek to use the R o m a n i a n no as their own alibi? To blame R o m a n i a in 1947 for the problem in 1938 was simply impious; the heart of the p r o b l e m , he said, stemmed f r o m a lack of resolution on the part of the great powers. 6 4 Precisely this attitude was reflected in a R o m a n i a n G e n e r a l Staff document of July 1938. "Until such time as the great powers, and especially England, engage themselves in a categorical fashion to sustain Czechoslovakia, G e r m a n y will continue to agitate the Sudeten problem. At some time when the international situation is favorable, G e r m a n y will certainly use [the Sudeten problem] as a pretext to put the Czechoslovak state to the test, the second stage of territorial expansion inscribed in Hitler's gospel to the G e r m a n people, Mein Kampf."65 The heart of the matter, again, was the resolve of the Western powers. The distinguished Romanian historian Viorica Moisuc makes the same point: the question of permitting Soviet troop passage was absolutely less important in the outcome of the crisis than the question of the Anglo-French attitude to G e r m a n expansion and the question of the Czechoslovak will to fight.66 In any event, the generosity of the Romanians to their u n f o r t u n a t e Czech allies exceeded their obligations. As Moisuc observes, the threat that irresistible G e r m a n expansion posed to R o m a n i a forced the g o v e r n m e n t to assume more obligations to Czechoslovakia than it was formally obliged to do, including "consent for tran-

366 • Hugh

Ragsdale

sit of Soviet a s s i s t a n c e " (asentimentul pentru

tranzitul

ajutorului

sovietic)67—

p l a n e s e v i d e n t l y — a n d C z e c h o s l o v a k e x p r e s s i o n s of g r a t i t u d e w e r e p r o f u s e . 6 8 T h e R o m a n i a n h i s t o r i a n Al. G h . Savu h a s a r g u e d , in a f a s h i o n entirely conson a n t with t h e d o c u m e n t a t i o n of t h e time, t h a t t h e g o v e r n m e n t of R o m a n i a could h a v e o v e r c o m e its n a t u r a l f e a r of c o m m u n i s m and c o n c l u d e d an alliance with M o s c o w if such an a g r e e m e n t could h a v e t a k e n place in a larger system of alliances, t h a t is in a collective-security a r r a n g e m e n t including Britain a n d France. 6 9 O f c o u r s e , Soviet policy a n d i n t e n t i o n s r e m a i n m y s t e r i o u s , a n d two c o m m e n t s c o m e as close t o t h e t r u t h of t h e m a t t e r as is c u r r e n t l y possible. First is t h a t of t h e G e r m a n C o u n s e l o r of E m b a s s y K u r t v o n T i p p e l s k i r c h . A s he w r o t e to B e r l i n in July 1938, " T h e a t t i t u d e of t h e Soviet U n i o n to t h e pacts with F r a n c e a n d C z e c h o s l o v a k i a h a s recently, especially in he c o u r s e of the C z e c h o s l o v a k crisis, u n d e r g o n e a c h a n g e . W h e n t h e Soviet U n i o n c o n c l u d e d t h e pact with F r a n c e a n d C z e c h o s l o v a k i a , she t h o u g h t t h a t by so d o i n g she could p r o t e c t herself f r o m p o s sible G e r m a n attacks. F o r this r e a s o n t h e Soviet U n i o n tried t o s u p p l e m e n t t h e political t r e a t y with F r a n c e by military a g r e e m e n t s , a n d also t o e x t e n d it i n t o a m i l i t a r y i n s t r u m e n t . In t h e c o u r s e of t h e r e c e n t crisis, t h e Soviet g o v e r n m e n t h a s b e e n f o r c e d t o realize t h a t t h e t r e a t i e s n o l o n g e r o p e r a t e in h e r f a v o r , as s h e originally i n t e n d e d , b u t o n t h e c o n t r a r y i m p o s e o n h e r e m b a r r a s s i n g o b l i g a t i o n s . " 7 0 I w o u l d a d d t h a t t h e v a l u e of t h e F r e n c h a r m y to Moscow, given t h e r e l a t i v e r e s o l v e of t h e F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t , as m a n i f e s t in t h e R h i n e l a n d crisis, t h e M u n i c h crisis, a n d t h e p h o n y w a r of 1939, w a s insignificant. S e c o n d , I cite t h e o p i n i o n of G e o r g e F. K e n n a n :

It h a d long b e e n e v i d e n t t h a t Stalin w a s d e t e r m i n e d n o t to allow R u s s i a t o b e c o m e involved in a w a r against t h e G e r m a n s unless a n d until t h e m a j o r b u r d e n of military r e s i s t a n c e to t h e G e r m a n f o r c e s h a d b e e n n o t only f o r mally a s s u m e d b u t w a s b e i n g s u c c e s s f u l l y c o n d u c t e d by t h e F r e n c h a n d B r i t i s h . If, as of late s u m m e r 1938, a s h o w of t h e p r o s p e c t s f o r R u s s i a n military support for the Czechs would serve to encourage the western powers t o a s s u m e t h a t b u r d e n a n d to t h r o w t h e m s e l v e s w h o l e - h e a r t e d l y i n t o t h e s t r u g g l e — w e l l , in S t a l i n ' s view, so m u c h t h e b e t t e r . A n d I h a v e n o d o u b t t h a t if it h a d c o m e to a s h o o t i n g w a r at t h a t time, a n d t h e w e s t e r n p o w e r s h a d s h o w n e v i d e n c e of w a g i n g t h a t w a r seriously, Stalin w o u l d n o d o u b t h a v e e x t e n d e d t o t h e C z e c h s as m u c h s u p p o r t , within t h e limits of his a v a i l a b l e r e s o u r c e s , as h e t h o u g h t n e c e s s a r y t o k e e p t h e F r e n c h a n d British actively e n g a g e d a n d t o lift t h e i r m o r a l e . 7 1 O f c o u r s e , t h e integrity of any c o n c l u s i o n s a b o u t t h e s e m a t t e r s d e p e n d s u p o n t h e i n t e g r i t y of t h e e v i d e n c e in t h e archives. T h e e v i d e n c e f r o m t h e R o m a n i a n A r m y a r c h i v e of o b s e r v a t i o n s o n t h e Soviet f r o n t i e r is strikingly, e v e n suspiciously, s p a r e a n d trivial. H e n c e I r a i s e d t h e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r t h e a r c h i v e was still in p o s s e s s i o n of all original R o m a n i a n d o c u m e n t s . T h e b e s t a u t h o r i t y t h e r e , L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l

The Soviet Position at Munich Reappraised • 367 Eftimie A r d e l e a n u , said that there were only two exclusions. Moscow requisitioned and continues to hold the entire A n t o n e s c u archive, and the Securitate had sometimes requisitioned and kept particular materials but none of interest to me. The G e r m a n s never went over the head of A n t o n e s c u about anything and hence did not requisition any documents from the army archive. In sum, everything of interest to me remained. In the R o m a n i a n Foreign Affairs archive, the director, Dr. D u m i t r u Preda, showed me great gaps in the personnel files of R o m a n i a n diplomats formerly stationed in Moscow. The archivists are convinced that significant items were removed at some time early after World War II by visiting Soviet authorities. The leading specialist there on Russian affairs, Vitalie Vâratec, worked extensively in former Soviet archives and found substantial a m o u n t s of R o m a n i a n documentation, especially in the former Osobyi arkhiv, although my inquiries at the latter elicited the response that the archive contained no Romanian materials. In sum, for Russian reasons the search for historical validity remains, as always, dicey and uncertain. Finally, although we all know that hindsight is o f t e n superior to foresight, there are times when foresight should be sufficient. This is one such time when an unblinkered observer, unlike Chamberlain, might have seen forward as clearly as we can see backward. I cite here the interview of Romanian Chief of Staff General Ionescu with French military attaché Colonel Delmas, 28 September 1938:72

you consider that G e r m a n y will limit itself, after Anchluss, to the annexation of the Sudeten region or that it has e m b a r k e d on the conquest of Central E u r o p e and that it threatens R o m a n i a sooner or later?" G E N E R A L I O N E S C U : " I think that the annexation of Czechoslovakia [sic] by the G e r m a n s is merely a stepping-stone (étape) and that G e r m a n y has in fact resolved to conquer Central E u r o p e and part of Eastern E u r o p e ; that it will seek to lay its hands on all the countries whose possession is necessary for its maximum aggrandizement, to sustain itself and to dominate the continent, that it aims at R o m a n i a in particular because of its agricultural and petroleum resources." COLONEL DELMAS: " D O

you not think that it is time and possible to arrest the expansion of G e r m a n y ? " G E N E R A L I O N E S C U : "In my opinion, it is the last chance. If it is allowed to pass, G e r m a n y cannot be restrained, [or], in any event, it will require enormous sacrifices, whereas today the victory a p p e a r s certain." COLONEL DELMAS: " D O

3 6 8 • Hugh

Ragsdale

Notes 1 J o h n L u k a c s , The Great Powers and Eastern Europe ( N e w York: A m e r i c a n B o o k Co., 1953); K e i t h E u b a n k , Munich ( N o r m a n : O k l a h o m a University Press, 1963); Telford Taylor, Munich: The Price of Peace ( N e w Y o r k : V i n t a g e Books, 1979); and G e r h a r d W e i n b e r g , The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany, vol. 2 of Starting World War II ( C h i c a g o : University of C h i c a g o Press, 1980). 2 Jiri H o c h m a n , The Soviet Union and the Failure of Collective Security, 1934-1938 ( I t h a c a . NY: C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1984); Igor L u k e s , Czechoslovakia between Stalin and Hitler: of Edvard Benes in the 1930s ( N e w York: O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1996); The Diplomacy Ivan P f a f f , Die Sowjetunion und die Verteidigung der Tschechoslowakei, 1934-1938: Versuch der Revision einer Legende ( C o l o g n e : B ö h l a u , 1996). 3 A l e k s a n d r o v s k i i to C o m m i s s a r i a t of Foreign Affairs, 19 S e p t e m b e r 1938 and V.P. P o t e m kin to A l e k s a n d r o v s k i i , 20 S e p t e m b e r 1938, in Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, 21 vols. ( M o s c o w : G o s p o l i t i z d a t , 1957-1977), 21: 4 9 8 - 5 0 0 (nos. 354, 356). 4 M . K . Z a k h a r o v , General'nyi 113-15.

shtab

v predvoennye

gody

( M o s c o w : V o e n i z d a t , 1989),

5 A . A . G r e c h k o et al., eds., Istoriia vtoroi mirovoi voiny, 1939-1945, 12 vols. ( M o s c o w : V o e n i z d a t , 1973-1982). T h e official Czech military history r e p e a t e d t h e Soviet a c c o u n t w i t h o u t significant d i f f e r e n c e s a n d w i t h o u t d o c u m e n t a t i o n . T h e Polish s c h o l a r s h i p was m o r e critical but s u p p o r t e d in all essentials the Soviet version. Z d e n ë k P r o c h â z k a , et al., eds., Vojenské dëjiny Ùeskoslovenska, 5 vols. ( P r a g u e : Naäe vojsko, 1985-1989). M a r i a n Z g ö r n i a k , Europa w przededniu wojny: sytuacja militarna w latach 1938-1939 (Krakow: K s i ç g a r n i a A k a d e m i c k a , 1993). 6 C o m m i s s a r i a t of D e f e n s e D i r e c t i v e No. 75212, 22 S e p t e m b e r 1938, Rossiiskii gosud a r s t v e n n y i v o e n n y i a r k h i v [ h e r e a f t e r R G V A ] , f. 37977, op. 5c. d. 479. 11. 11-17. 7 Wesley K. W a r k , The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939 ( L o n d o n : I . B . T a u r i s , 1985), especially 102-10. F.H. Hinsley, et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, 4 vols. ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m bridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1979-1988). J a c q u e s B e n o i s t - M é c h i n , Histoire de l'armée allemande, 1918-1939, 2 vols. (Paris: R o b e r t L a f f o n t , 1984). R u d o l f A b s o l o n . Die Wehrmacht im Dritten Reich, 6 vols. ( B o p p a r d am R h e i n : H a r a l d Boldt, 1969-1995). W o l f g a n g S c h u m a n n a n d G e r h a r t Hass, eds., Deutschland im Zweiten Weltkrieg, 6 vols. ( C o l o g n e : P a h l - R u g e n s t e i n , 1974-1985). In fact, the G e r m a n e m b a s s y in M o s c o w r e p o r t e d a positive lack of signs of m o b i l i z a t i o n . " W h e r e a s o t h e r g o v e r n m e n t s a d o p t e d p r e l i m i n a r y m e a s u r e s of m o b i l i z a t i o n , t h e Soviet G o v e r n m e n t d o e s n o t s e e m to have d o n e a n y t h i n g of t h e s o r t . " " T h e Soviet U n i o n . . . n e g l e c t e d to t a k e such p r e l i m i n a r y m e a s u r e s of m o b i l i z a t i o n as w a s c o n s i d e r e d necessary, f o r instance, in H o l l a n d , B e l g i u m , a n d S w i t z e r l a n d . " C o u n s e l o r v o n T i p p e l s k i r c h to C o u n s e l o r of L e g a t i o n Schliep, 3 a n d 10 O c t o b e r 1938, in Documents on German Foreign Policy, series D, 13 vols. ( W a s h i n g t o n , D C : U S G o v e r n m e n t P r i n t i n g Office, 1949-1964), 4: nos. 476, 477. 8 A l e k s a n d r P o n c e t d e S a n d o n t o Polish E m b a s s y in B u c h a r e s t , 27 S e p t e m b e r 1938, in J e r z y T o m a s z e w s k i , ed., " P o l s k a k o r e s p o n d e n c j a d y p l o m a t y c z n a na t e m a t w o j s k o w e j p o m o c y Z S R R dla C z e c h o s t o w a c j i w 1938r. p r z e z t e r y t o r i u m R u m u n i i , " Z dziejöw rozwoju panstw socjalistycznych 1 (1983): 182-83. 9 N i c o l a e P e t r e s c u - C o m n e n , " M a x i m Litvinov," in " D u s t a n d S h a d o w s : U n k n o w n P a g e s of History," H o o v e r I n s t i t u t i o n A r c h i v e , C o m n e n P a p e r s , box 14, f o l d e r 5 5 , 9 0 - 9 2 . A l s o p u b lished in Italy a f t e r t h e war u n d e r a s o m e w h a t d i f f e r e n t title. Luci e ombre sull'Europa, 1914-1950 ( M i l a n : B o m p i a n i , 1957). 10 R e f e r a t : C h e s t i u n e a t r e c e r e i p e s t e t e r i t o r i u l s t a t e l o r m e m b r e ale societä(ei n a f i u n i l o r a f o r j e l o r a r m a t e în a p l i c a r e a s a n c ( i u n i l o r m i l i t a r e p r e v ä z u t e d e articolul 16 al p a c t u l u i ,

Notes • 369 9 September 1936, Arkhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe al României [hereafter A M A E R ] , f. 71 U R S S (1920-1944), vol. 52 (Relatii eu Cehoslovacia). 417-33. 11 loan Talpeç, "Màsuri $i acjiuni diplomatice militare în vederea întâririi capacitafii de apârare a tarii în fa(a creçterii pericolelor hitlerist çi revizionist," File din isloria militarâ a poporutui roman 8 (1980): 119-22. 12 loan Talpes, Diplomatie fi apârare: coordonate aie politicii externe românesti, 1933-1939 (Bucharest: Editura §tiin(ificâ çi enciclopedicà, 1988), 195. Idem,"Date noi privind pozijia României în contextul contradicjiilor internationale din vara anului 1938," Revista de istorie 28 (1975): 1656. 13 "Dacâ Rusia râmâne aliatâ eu Franta $i în(elege a ajuta Cehoslovacia noi vom trebui sa permitem forjelor ruse sà treacâ prin România pentru a ajuta armata cehâ." Referate pentru întoemirea planului de campanie 1936; Arhivele Militare aie României [hereafter A M R ] , f. Marele stat major, Secjia I-a, Organizare çi mobilizare, dosar 434 (Planurile de campanie 1936), 65-92, quote on 69. 14 Memoriu pentru revederea punerea la curent a ipotezelor de râsboi 1938: A M R , f. Marele stat major, Sec(ia 3 operafii, dosar 1577 (Studii în legâturâ eu planul de campanie 1938), microfilm reel no. II. 1.974,93-94 and passim. 15 Gamelin, Servir, 2:279. Viorica Moisuc and Gheorghe Matei,"Politica externa a României în perioada Munchenului (martie 1938-martie 1939)" in Viorica Moisuc, éd., Problème de politico externa a României (Bucharest: Editura militarâ, 1971), 317. Both sources state that King Carol had previously made the same promise to former French Foreign Minister Joseph Paul-Boncour and cite Paul-Boncour's memoirs. Entre deux guerres: souvenirs sur Miinchener la Troisième république, 3 vols. (Paris: Plon 1945-1946). Boris Celovsky, Das Abkommen 1938 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1958), 204, repeats the statement, referring to Gamelin. I do not find the statement in Paul-Boncour's memoirs. According to Talpeç, Diplomatie fi apârare: 181, it was on 15 October 1937 that King Carol made the commitment to Gamelin. 16 For example, Pravda (11 February 1938): 5. 17 See my article, "The Butenko Affair: Documents from Soviet-Romanian Relations in the Time of the Purges, Anschluss, and Munich," Slavonic and East European Review 79 (2001): 698-720: sources are chiefly from the Hoover Institution Archive and the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive. 18 Intenfiunile actuale ale Guvernului Sovietic eu privire la încheierea unui Pact cu România, May 1937, A M A E R , f . 71 URSS, vol. 84 (Relatii eu România,anul 1937),222-24. 19 Extras din Referatul D-lui Ministru Al. Cretzianu din 8 Iulie 1937: Putem oare admite într'o formà sau alta dreptul de trecere a trupelor ruseçti? A M A E R , f. 71 URSS, vol. 52, 475-81. 20 Ibid. 21 Thierry to Ministère des Affaires étrangères, 12 March 1938, in Documents diplomatiques français, 1932-1939, 2d ser., 1936-1939, 19 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1963-1986), 8: 749. 22 Note du Département, 5 April 1938, ibid., 9: 215-16. 23 Comnen (Geneva) to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 May 1938, A M A E R , f. 71 URSS, vol. 85,217-20. The policy of postponing the making of such a decision until necessity required it became a settled and fixed element of Romanian policy. At the beginning of July, as a new Romanian minister took up his post in Prague, King Carol reiterated it. Lacroix to Bonnet, 12 July 1938, in Documents diplomatiques français, 2 nd series., 10: 357. 24 Ibid. 25 Adrien Thierry to Georges Bonnet, 9 July 1938, in Documents diplomatiques series., 10: 337. 26 Bonnet to Payart (chargé d'affaires), 31 August 1938, in Documents français, 2" d series, 10: 899-900.

français,

2 nd

diplomatiques

370 • Hugh

Ragsdale

27 Litvinov to Stalin (copy), 1 September 1938, RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 1146, in Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Volkogonov Collection, box 16. reel 10, folder 2. 28 Payart to Bonnet, 2 September 1938, in Documents diplomatiques français, 2 nd series, 10: 934-35. Georges Bonnet, Défense de la paix, 2 vols. (Geneva: Editions du cheval ailé, 1946-1948), 2: 408. Talpe?, Diplomatie fi apärare: 229-30. 29 Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, 6 vols. (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1948-1953), 1:294-95. 30 Talpeç, Diplomatie fi apärare: 232. 31 M. de Lacroix, French minister in Prague, to Pierre-Etienne Flandin, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 16 April 1936, in Documents diplomatiques français, 2"d series., 2: 140. 32 Bonnet, Défense de la paix, 2: 407-08. 33 See, for example, Edvard Beneä, Mnichovské dny: paméti (Prague: Svoboda, 1968), 310-24. 34 Nicolae Petrescu-Comnen, Preludi del grande dramma: ricordi i documenti di un diplomatico (Rome: Edizioni Leonardo, 1947). 35 Dov B. Lungu, Romania and the Great Powers, 1933-1940 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989); Viorica Moisuc, Diplomalia României fi problema apärärii suveranitälii fi independenfei nafionale in perioda martie 1938-mai 1940 (Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1971); idem, Probleme de politicä externa a României; Talpe?, Diplomatie fi apärare. 36 H o c h m a n has been challenged to produce the document, and he never has. My published indictment of the document has raised no objections. Hugh Ragsdale, "The Munich Crisis and the Issue of Red Army Transit across Romania," Russian Review 57 (1998): 614-17. 37 Comnen, Geneva, to Ministry of Foreign Affairs "for H . M . the King," 12. September 1938, A M A E R , f. 71 URSS, vol. 135,298-301. 38 Comnen, "Dust and Shadows," 92-93,96, Hoover Institution Archive, Comnen Collection, box 14, folder 55. 39 Moisuc, Diplomazia României fi problema apärärii suveranitäfii, 58. Comnen, Preludi del grande dramma, 39. Moisuc and Matei, "Politica externä a României în perioada Miinchenului," 311. The Polish-Romanian treaty of 1921 stipulated common defense against eastern neighbors and common diplomatic policy in reference to eastern neighbors. Text of treaty in Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1920-1923 (London: Oxford University Press, 1927), 504-05. Bonnet, Défense de la paix, 1: 201. Note du ministre (Bonnet), conversation with M. Comnène, Geneva, 11 September 1938, in Documents diplomatiques français, 2 n d series, 11: 161. 40 Diary entry, 13 September 1938; Jan Szembek, Journal, 1933-1939, trans. J. Rzewuska and T. Zaleski, preface by Leon Noel (French ambassador) (Paris: Plön, 1952), 335. This translation is an abridgement of the longer manuscript later published as Diariusz i teki Jana Szembeka, 1935 -1945, ed. Tytus Komarnicki, 4 vols. (London: Orbis, 1964-1972). 41 Diary entry, 20 September 1938, ibid., 337. 42 Bonnet, Défense de la paix, 2:199,200; Comnen, Preludi del grande dramma, 81. 43 Chargé d'affaires Stelzer (Bucharest) to Auswärtiges Amt, 6 September 1938, in Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik, 1918-1945, Series D (1937-1945), 7 vols. (Baden-Baden: Imprimerie nationale, 1950-1986), 2: Deutschland und die Tschechoslowakei (1937-1938), 558. Lord de la Warr to Viscount Halifax, 15 September 1938. in Documents on British Foreign Policy, ser.: 1938-1939,9 vols. (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1949-1961), 2: 355. Comnen, Preludi del grande dramma, 84. Bonnet, Défense de la paix, 1: 202. Note du ministre, 11 Septembre 1938, in Documents diplomatiques français, 2 nd series., 11:161. 44 Thierry to Bonnet, 9 July 1938, ibid., 10: 338. 45 Procès-verbal de la séance de la Comité permanente de la défense nationale, 15 March 1938; Maurice Gustave Gamelin, in Servir, vol. 2 of Le prologue du drame (1930-août 1939) (Paris: Pion, 1946), 324. This same meeting concluded that the Germans could attack

Notes • 371

46 47

48

49

50 51 52

53 54

55

56

57

58

Czechoslovakia and cover Poland while still leaving fifty divisions facing the French frontier. In fact, they left five divisions. Williamson Murray, The Change in the European Balance of Power, 1938-1939: The Path to Ruin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 218-19, 221. It was not France's finest hour. The frightened French were searching frantically for excuses to surrender. Louis Fischer, Men and Politics: An Autobiography (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1941), 561. Enciclopedia Romàniei, 4 vols. (Bucharest: Imprimeria najionalà, 1936-1943), 1: 50. Ion Ardeleanu, et al., Atlas pentru istoria Romàniei (Bucharest: Editura didacticà pedagogica, 1983), map no. 66, "Economia Romàniei ìntre 1919-1938." Europe: Selected Railroad Objectives, map no. 51, 9 January 1943, Branch of Research and Analysis, Office of Strategic Services. Romania and Bulgaria: Major Railroads, lithograph no. 3840, OSS, 31 August 1944. These last two items are found in the Map Division of the New York Public Library, where the US Office of Strategic Services worked during the Second World War. Celovsky, Das MUnchener Abkommen 1938,204-05. Larry L. Watts, Jr., "Romania and the Czechoslovak Crisis: The Military Perspective," (paper presented at the meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Seattle, 22 November 1997). Report of Otdel vneshnikh snoshenii, Razvedyvatel'noe upravlenie, RKKA, undated, in Library of Congress, Volkogonov Papers, reel 10, box 16, folder 2 (Czech Situation Reports, RGVA). Ambassador Kazimierz Papée (Prague) to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 June 1938; "Polska korespondencja dyplomatyczna," 170; Talpe?, Diplomatic aparare, 221. Kazimierz Papée to Józef Beck, 28 June 1938, in "Polska korespondencja," 174-75. Voroshilov to Politbiuro and Council of Commissars, 28 September 1938, in Dokumenty i materialy po istorii sovetsko-pol'skikh otnoshenii, 12 vols. (Moscow: AN SSSR, 1963-1986), 6:312-13. AMR, Marele stat major, Sec(ia 3 opera(ii, dosar 1578 (Cereri de transport pe frontul de est a diferitelor unitati militare). Comandantul I al Brigadei grànicerilor Gen. li. Mitrànescu (and accompanying documents; near village of Pàràul Iagorlic), 17 September 1938, AMR, f. Corpul grànicerilor, dosar 2348/4/a (Ordine, rapoarte, procese verbale, declarajii $i schise cu privire la anchete cercetàri intreprinse de corp asupra cazurilor de trecere frauduloasà a frontierei precum $i a unor incidente de frontiera [03.09.1938-10.11.1938]), 205-12. Memoriu asupra recunoa$terilor de pe frontiera de est, 22 September 1938, AMR, f. Marele stat major, Sec(ia 2-a informata, dosar 812/318/A (Memoriu asupra recunoa$terilor de pe frontiera de est, 22 September 1938 [among other materials]), microfilm reel no. II.1.533,122-32. Instructiuni Comandantului Corpului Grànicerilor General Gr. Cornicioiu, 28 September 1938, AMR, f. Corpului Grànicerilor, dosar 2361/13/a (Ordine, rapoarte, schife, referate, procese verbale, instrucjiuni $i declarafii cu privire la cercetarea cazurilor de trecere frauduloasà a frontierei, precum $i la cazurile de pescuire clandestina in apele de pe frontiera [Nistru], efectuarea sondajelor de càtre vasele navigante, precum $i la dotarea pichetelor cu material de clasare [18.04.1938-09.03,1939]), 945-46. Marele stat major càtre Ministrul apàràrii nazionale, 5 October 1938, AMR, f. Marele stat major, Seccia 3 operaci, dosar 1602 (Documente privind legàturile de ordin militar ìntre Romania $i URSS [1938-1939]), microfilm reel no. II.l.116,655-66. Prefectura judefului Satu-Mare càtre Corpul VI. Armata, Bir. 2, Cluj, 8 September 1938, AMR, f. Corpul 6 Armata, Statuì Major, Biroul 2, dosar Special nr. 6b (Informafiuni asupra partidelor politice, manifeste $i diferite informa(iuni externe primite de la Chestura Pol. $i Reg. de Polire Cluj, Insp. Reg. Jand. Cluj $i Prefecturile de judeje 11 martie 1938-31 martie 1939), 289.

3 7 2 • Hugh

Ragsdale

59 N o t ä I n s p e c t o r u l u i de P o l i c e , C l u j , 2 7 S e p t e m b e r 1938, ibid., 3 1 4 - 1 5 . 60 C o m a n d a n t u l J a n d a r m i l o r , M a r a m u r e ç , N o t ä i n f o r m a t i v a nr. 4 7 . 2 1 S e p t e m b e r 1938, ibid., 313-14. 61 D i a n u t o Ministry of Foreign A f f a i r s . 20 J u n e 1938, A M A E R , f. 71 U R S S . vol. 1 3 5 , 2 4 6 - 4 7 . D u p l i c a t e in A M A E R , f. 71 R o m a n i a , vol. 102, 170-71. T h e R o m a n i a n original of this i m p o r t a n t text is: "totufi tn local aceslor chestiuni secondare mä mirä cä ne preluefti destul atitudinea noastrii care am läsat sä treacä avioane fi materiale rusefti fi cehoslovace tn aer fi pe uscat, ceeace ne-ar putea produce mari dificultäfi." 62 C o m a n d a n t u l C o r p u l u i g r ä n i c e r i l o r G e n e r a l G r . C o r n i c i o i u c ä t r e M a r e l e stat m a j o r , S e c j i a 11,9 S e p t e m b e r 1938, A M R , f. C o r p u l gränicerilor, d o s a r 2348/4/a ( O r d i n e , r a p o a r t e , p r o c e s e v e r b a l e , d e c l a r a j i i $i schife cu privire la a n c h e t e $i c e r c e t ä r i î n t r e p r i n s e d e c o r p a s u p r a cazurilor d e t r e c e r e f r a u d u l o a s ä a f r o n t i e r e i p r e c u m çi a u n o r i n c i d e n t e d e f r o n tiera [03.09.1938-10.11.1938]), 192 a n d 192ob. 63 D i a n u t o Ministry of F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , 9 S e p t e m b e r 1938, A M A E R , f. 71 U R S S , vol. 1,192. 64 C o m n e n , e v i d e n t l y to Le Monde, 22 N o v e m b e r 1947; ibid., box 15, f o l d e r 58. 65 Talpe?, Diplomatie fi apärare, 228. 66 M o i s u c , Diplomala României fi problema apärärii 67 Ibid., w h a t kind of assistance is n o t specified.

suveranitätii,

62.

68 ibid., 7 7 - 7 8 . 69 Al. G h . S a v u , Dictatura regala (1938-1940) ( B u c h a r e s t : E d i t u r a politica, 1970), 205. 70 C o u n s e l o r of E m b a s s y von T i p p e l s k i r c h to Foreign Ministry, 5 July 1938, in Documents German Foreign Policy, D, 2: 469 (no. 280). 71 P e r s o n a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n . 72 Documents

diplomatiques

français,

2 n d series., 11: 684-88.

in

Allies on Film: US-USSR Filmmakers and T H E BATTLE OF R U S S I A MARSHA

SIEFERT

"This is a film a b o u t . . . s c a l e a n d g r a n d e u r . T h i s is a film a b o u t the greatest military a c h i e v e m e n t in all history. This is a film a b o u t a p e o p l e who, for all time, s h a t t e r e d the l e g e n d of Nazi invincibility. ...This is the Battle for Russia." 1 Such words, following screen testimonials by g o v e r n m e n t and military leaders, are strong praise, especially as the o p e n i n g of a U S A r m y training film. But this was 1943. T h e battle for Russia was being f o u g h t on film as well as on land and the c h a n g e d A m e r i c a n a t t i t u d e t o w a r d the U S S R r e q u i r e d d r a m a t i c measures. A n d w h e r e better for the US A r m y to p r o d u c e the h y p e r b o l e than A m e r i c a ' s own P o t e m k i n vill a g e — H o l l y w o o d . This essay uses the film The Battle of Russia as a c e n t e r p i e c e for exploring a longer-term r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n U S a n d U S S R filmmakers. The Battle of Russia was viewed by all U S military recruits and was only o n e of two f r o m the s e v e n - p a r t Why We Fight series that was distributed commercially, being shown to over 54 million civilians. 2 The film was m a r k e t e d as the " U S G o v e r n m e n t presents," o f f e r i n g not only an i m p r i m a t u r but also an iconic link with H o l l y w o o d movies, a d r a m a t i c crossover for an " o r i e n t a t i o n film." The w a r allowed A m e r i c a n films to have a " m e s s a g e " and an Office of War I n f o r m a t i o n assisted in its c o o r d i n a t i o n . W h a t e v e r the e u p h e m i s m , this m o m e n t a r y alignment of the idea of p r o p a g a n d a with H o l l y w o o d ' s p r o f e s s e d c o n c e n t r a t i o n on e n t e r t a i n m e n t c a m e to have c o n s e q u e n c e s for filmmakers w h e n the subject was the Soviet U n i o n a f t e r their g o v e r n m e n t s ' aims h a d c h a n g e d . For r e a s o n s of e c o n o m y a n d verisimilitude, the film was c o m p i l e d almost entirely f r o m Soviet f e a t u r e films and d o c u m e n t a r i e s , with a n i m a t i o n by Walt Disney Studios. This g e n r e of compilation d o c u m e n t a r y r e q u i r e s a p o w e r f u l script and a u t h o r i t a t i v e n a r r a t o r for c o h e r e n c e , a n d with skilful editing o f t e n blurs the line b e t w e e n fact and fiction, "actuality film" and shots f r o m the H o l l y w o o d lot. T h e re-editing of Soviet films, a l r e a d y edited with a p o i n t of view for e m o t i o n a l impact, shows h o w the A m e r i c a n s a t t e m p t e d to literally r e f r a m e Russia to c r e a t e visual, sonic and e m o t i o n a l a p p e a l to c o m m o n t h e m e s a n d f r a m e s of r e f e r e n c e for the most positive view of their new ally. The Battle of Russia was also distributed with Stalin's blessing in the Soviet U n i o n with a R u s s i a n - l a n g u a g e voice-over in early 1944. It was o n e of several A m e r i c a n films i m p o r t e d during the war a f t e r a long hiatus in the 1930s, but was

374 • Marsha Siefert one of the few that was not song-and-dance entertainment and whose subject was the Soviet Union. Too, the Soviet public had already seen the f e a t u r e and documentary films from which it was m a d e and yet it was still popular. Several prominent Soviet filmmakers asked why in a 1944 discussion and ranged widely in appraising its technique and intentions. Their comments were translated and shared with the film's American producer and for a brief m o m e n t the r a p p r o c h e m e n t led to a belief in the f u t u r e of "global film." While the war is its natural context, the film and its producer have a place in the longer interplay of influence between American and Soviet filmmakers. On first impression Frank Capra would seem the last filmmaker related to Russia. This Sicilian immigrant, having begun as a gag man in silent films, consolidated his 1930s reputation as the most successful Hollywood director among critics, colleagues and public with the all-American Depression trilogy, Mr. Deeds Goes to Town (1936), Mr. Smith Goes to Washington (1939), and Meet John Doe (1941).3 Yet in 1937 he visited the Soviet Union and met the most accomplished in the Soviet film industry, he met with Maxim Litvinoff in Washington in the course of making The Battle of Russia and his films surfaced in early Cold War scandals in both countries. His 1971 autobiography offers, to paraphrase Soviet director Lev Kuleshov, a public version of "the extraordinary adventures of Mr. Capra in the land of the Bolsheviks." 4 The more private version, suggested by a 1992 critical biography published after his death, suggests that he did not escape these extraordinary adventures unscathed. 5 This essay, then, will look at a longitudinal slice of fictional and factual intersections of Hollywood and the Soviet filmmakers that provide a context for The Battle of Russia.

HOLLYWOOD'S

RUSSIA AND

S O V I E T F I L M I N D U S T R Y IN T H E

THE

1930s

American films were immensely popular on Soviet screens in the 1920s, accounting for 42 percent of new films and even a larger percentage of box office hits. 6 The decline and eventual cessation of Hollywood imports after 1931 were due to many factors, and ideology certainly played a role. 7 But also critical were a shortage of foreign currency, the need to invest in domestic production of film stock and equipment, and the cost of rapidly expanding the film distribution network to rural areas. The coming of sound film in 1927. to which Hollywood had completely converted by 1931, complicated the picture. At first Soviet filmmakers d e b a t e d the role of sound in cinema "art." But by 1931, ostensibly with Stalin's approval of three of the first Soviet sound films, financial investment in sound technologies—film, cameras, projectors—became a priority and brought with it increased political attention to the substance of that sound—the text. 8 Thus, as b u r e a u c r a t ic procedures increased and local film production declined, the Soviet public and filmmakers could still well r e m e m b e r Hollywood films9 and by mid-decade Soviet

Allies on Film • 375 film authorities again would speak and act positively toward entertainment and the Hollywood studio production model. Meanwhile, Soviet films arrived in the US only in 1926, when A m k i n o was f o u n d e d in New York City to aid distribution of Eisenstein's film Potemkin.10 Between 1926 and 1936 the US imported an estimated 91 silent and 93 sound films f r o m the 900 total produced in the Soviet Union between 1918 and 1935 and in 1935 four of them a p p e a r e d in the Film Daily's "Ten Best" poll. 11 A m k i n o increased its US efforts after losing the G e r m a n m a r k e t to Hitler's ascent and in 1937-1938 approximately 450 American theaters were showing Soviet films; even as late as N o v e m b e r 1938, 24 Soviet films were seen by an estimated audience of 200,000. From 1936 Soviet films were also available in 16mm format for private bookings from clubs, schools, study groups, with about 1000 bookings in 1938, 12 and throughout the 1930s New York City had two cinemas specializing in Russianlanguage film.13 Still, in the context of the large American movie audience these numbers are relatively small. However, Soviet films had a disproportional impact on Hollywood for a n u m b e r of reasons. Their release coincided with the rise of the " a r t " cinema, 1 4 catering to small but influential audiences, especially in New York. The New Y o r k - H o l l y w o o d connection represented by the head financial offices for the major film studios 1 5 was amplified by other links. Broadway was an important source of directors, stories, stars and most importantly writers for the Hollywood community. T h e coming of the "talkies" in 1927 increased the d e m a n d for wordsmiths, so East Coast journalists, playwrights and novelists were lured by Hollywood's lucrative deals. "Distinguished writers were hired for the distinction they brought to the men w h o hired them," but they also brought a social conscience and often New York leftist politics. The observation that "most of the writers regularly a t t e n d e d foreign films at cramped art houses and pined afterward over what they believed they could accomplish if only they had the license" is only slightly overdrawn. 1 6 New York also housed the publishers for magazines that were beginning to favorably review foreign films. Trade papers like Variety and film magazines took n o t e but it was the intellectuals and reviewers in American "quality" periodicals w h o raved. E u r o p e a n films were more sophisticated, were "art." Hollywood had put its faith in entertainment (and profits) and Samuel Goldwyn's maxim, "If I wanted to send a message, I would use Western U n i o n " was gospel. By the late 1920s, however, for commercial reasons and cultural ambition Hollywood studio heads competed to hire "artistic" directors from E u r o p e to enhance the prestige of their films.17 For Soviet films all these influences come together in a famous 1926 m e m o by a rising M e t r o Goldwyn Mayer executive. U p o n seeing Potemkin he wrote that it "possesses a technique entirely new to the screen" and advised M G M to view it as artists might study a R u b e n s or a Raphael, parenthetically suggesting that the organization hire the young Russian director responsible for it. Eventually competition a m o n g Hollywood studios did entice Eisenstein to Hollywood in 1930. 18

376 • Marsha

Siefert

A l t h o u g h his b i o g r a p h e r called t h e visit " a n A m e r i c a n t r a g e d y " a f t e r o n e of the t w o u n u s e d scripts he w r o t e f o r P a r a m o u n t , it also s p a r k e d s e v e r a l a t t e m p t s at c o o p e r a t i v e film p r o j e c t s . 1 9 Too, E i s e n s t e i n r e t u r n e d h o m e with a d m i r a t i o n f o r t h e films of C h a r l i e C h a p l i n a n d Walt Disney, 2 0 even as his f o r c e d recall in which Stalin p a r t i c i p a t e d was e m b l e m a t i c of i n c r e a s e d political a t t e n t i o n t o films a n d filmmakers. A n o t h e r c o n f l u e n c e w a s H o l l y w o o d s c r i p t w r i t e r s ' interest in t h e m e l o d r a m a t ic p o t e n t i a l of t h e Soviet e x p e r i e n c e . T h e b o y genius a n d a c k n o w l e d g e d " a r t i s t i c " p r o d u c t i o n chief at M G M , Irving T h a l b e r g , h a d b e e n trying to get a film p r o d u c e d a b o u t an A m e r i c a n e n g i n e e r a n d a Soviet c o m m i s s a r "joining h a n d s " to build a d a m , topical in t h e early 1930s. 21 In O c t o b e r 1932 F r a n k C a p r a w a s l o a n e d t o M G M a n d , a c c o r d i n g t o his a c c o u n t , he c h o s e " S o v i e t " f r o m o v e r t e n p r o j e c t s T h a l b e r g o f f e r e d him. A t t h a t t i m e he t o o was e a g e r t o m a k e an " a r t i s t i c " film, t h e way to an A c a d e m y A w a r d a n d i n d u s t r y r e s p e c t . In " S o v i e t " C l a r k G a b l e was t o play t h e A m e r i c a n e n g i n e e r w h o e v e n t u a l l y p e r s u a d e d the "very, v e r y politically m i n d e d " assistant c o m m i s s a r , J o a n C r a w f o r d , of t h e s u p e r i o r i t y of A m e r i c a n k n o w - h o w t h r o u g h r u n n i n g v e r b a l b a t t l e s a n d of c o u r s e r o m a n c e . W a l l a c e B e e r y w o u l d play t h e o n e - h a n d e d , c o m m i t t e d B o l s h e v i k c o m m i s s a r w h o w o r e a h a n d cuff o n his o t h e r h a n d t o s y m b o l i z e tsarist slavery. A t the film's e n d , while t h e y c e l e b r a t e d t h e d a m ' s c o m p l e t i o n , t h e c a m e r a w o u l d p a n d o w n t h e f a c e of t h e d a m a n d m o v e in f o r a c l o s e - u p , s h o w i n g a h a n d c u f f sticking out of t h e c e m e n t . 2 2 E a r l y on t h e t r a d e press h i n t e d of story t r o u b l e s a n d t h e n e e d to c l e a n s e t h e " p r o p a g a n d a " e l e m e n t s . T h e m o m e n t T h a l b e r g b e c a m e ill, M G M d r o p p e d t h e film. N o n e t h e l e s s C a p r a ' s d e s c r i p t i o n of " S o v i e t " p r e s a g e s the cliches of t h e 19 H o l l y w o o d films on R u s s i a n s u b j e c t s t h a t w e r e m a d e b e t w e e n 1933 a n d 1940. H o l l y w o o d ' s R u s s i a d r a m a t i z e d a n t i p a t h y t o w a r d c o m m u n i s m with a clearly ideological villain. But s y m p a t h y w a s s h o w n f o r individual R u s s i a n s a n d t h e love of an A m e rican m a l e w a s able t o r e d e e m — a n d c o n v e r t — m a n y Soviet h e r o i n e s . 2 3 H o l l y w o o d e n c o u n t e r e d t h e Soviet film i n d u s t r y in p e r s o n w h e n its h e a d , B o r i s Z. S h u m i a t s k i i , visited t h e s t u d i o s f o r six w e e k s in J u n e and July 1935. S h u m i a t s kii, an O l d B o l s h e v i k active in t h e S i b e r i a n P a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n , h a d o v e r s e e n t h e v a r i o u s r e o r g a n i z a t i o n s a n d i n c r e a s e d c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of the film i n d u s t r y since D e c e m b e r 1930. D u r i n g this t i m e t h e film i n d u s t r y t o o k s h a p e f o r t h e c o m i n g d e c a d e s , with t h e f o u n d i n g of film schools, r e g i o n a l film s t u d i o s a n d t h e c i n e m a u n i o n , all u n d e r his c o m m a n d ; he also i n t e g r a t e d t h e C o m m u n i s t P a r t y i n t o t h e b u r e a u c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e f o r s c e n a r i o a n d film a p p r o v a l . 2 4 H e also p r e s i d e d o v e r t h e J a n u a r y 1935 C o n f e r e n c e of F i l m m a k e r s , w h e n t h e f o r m a l i s m of t h e " a r t i s t i c " d i r e c t o r s was d e n o u n c e d a n d t h e ideals of socialist realism a r t i c u l a t e d u n d e r t h e s l o g a n of " c i n e m a f o r t h e millions." " E n t e r t a i n m e n t " was i n t e g r a t e d i n t o t h e film f o r m u l a a n d Soviet a c t o r s w o u l d p r e s e n t " p o s i t i v e socialist h e r o e s " as real "living m e n . " His r e a s o n f o r c o m i n g to H o l l y w o o d was, as in o t h e r S o v i e t s p h e r e s in t h e early 1930s, to " c a t c h u p a n d o v e r t a k e " t h e West by s t u d y i n g film p r o d u c t i o n m e t h o d s in m a j o r studios. 2 5 In H o l l y w o o d S h u m i a t s k i i a n d his d e l e g a t i o n , w h i c h

Allies on Film • 377 included director Fridrikh M. Ermler 2 6 and c a m e r a m a n Vladimir Nil'sen, met a m o n g others Cecil B. DeMille, who had toured the Soviet Union in the a u t u m n of 1931 at the invitation of Soviet film officials. 27 Charlie Chaplin showed Shumiatskii a rough-cut of Modern Times, which Shumiatskii subsequently praised as a " d o c u m e n t that takes sides in the social struggle." 2 8 A n d Frank Capra welcomed the delegation on behalf of the A c a d e m y of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences. 29 Shumiatskii used his visit to reiterate that the " U S S R ' s film policy [would] stress e n t e r t a i n m e n t rather than propaganda." 3 0 U p o n his d e p a r t u r e he was again asked to c o m m e n t on whether p r o p a g a n d a would be subordinated to art. "What is p r o p a g a n d a , " he asked. "If you m e a n a message, then there is no question of o n e being subordinated to the other. They help each other. ...A film must have a message, be entertaining and at the same time be artistically produced." H e criticized Hollywood for their "subjects of an e p h e m e r a l and seasonal n a t u r e " and their failure to take advantage of film's "artistic" potential, but did admire the technological sophistication of Hollywood studios and singled out Disney cartoons. Shumiatskii also praised a n u m b e r of film actors and directors, leading off with Frank Capra. 3 1 Back in Moscow, u n d e r pressure to increase the production of films m a d e more difficult by increasing political demands, Shumiatskii proposed to establish a Soviet Hollywood (sovetskii Gollivud) in the Crimea, a plan approved by Stalin, so it is said, after his thirty-eighth viewing of Chapaev but which came to nothing. 3 2 But Capra took Shumiatskii's invitation to visit the Soviet Union seriously. A f t e r the L o n d o n premiere of Lost Horizon, he and his co-writer R o b e r t Riskin spent three weeks there during April and May of 1937. 33 Fridrikh Ermler showed them Leningrad and director Leonid Z.Trauberg, who was finishing part two of the Maxim trilogy, hosted them in Moscow. 34 Thus, Capra says, he and Riskin "were not just two American capitalists venturing into the forbidding bastion of communism. We were two American filmmakers being embraced by brother Russian filmmakers. From the moment we arrived we were their guests; more, we were instant friends." In Moscow, they visited Mosfilm Studios and the Moscow Film School, where Riskin was shown his film scripts in the library. 35 They "talked films" in "vodka-klatches" with directors, actors, writers, cameramen, who knew every film and admired those m a d e in America. Leningrad filmmakers feted them among the artistic elite, told them about Soviet films and plied them with questions about the United States. Back in Moscow they were taken to the May Day parade, celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the Revolution, to climax their trip. Izvestiia carried a summary of their conversation with two other Soviet filmmakers, Grigorii V. Aleksandrov, who had visited Hollywood as Eisenstein's assistant in 1930, and Nil'sen, who had just finished filming Aleksandrov's popular second musical. 36 Alluding to meeting Frank Capra in Hollywood, they characterize him as a "representative of the creative intelligentsia," "the uncrowned king" who has created an "American cinematic art." H e is complimented on his mastery of technique and for his attempts to overcome being "squeezed by the jaws of Will

378 • Marsha Siefert Hays' censorship." 3 7 In the question-and-answer interview format, Capra is first asked about cinematic technique, which he feels sometimes is a h e a d of creative ideas in Hollywood whereas in the Soviet Union the original ideas are realized only in part because of "backwardness" in technique. W h e n asked, he states his " i n d e p e n d e n c e " as a filmmaker to be relative—to choice of theme, subject and actors—as long as his films m a k e money. R o b e r t Riskin, in response to a question on scriptwriting in Hollywood, provides a substantial explanation of his style and the more collective reworking characteristic of general Hollywood practice. A f t e r discussions of technical issues, each gives a closing response on their opinion of Soviet cinematography. Capra compliments the enthusiasm and talent in the country and Riskin feels that they are lacking only a high level of film technology, but are "millionaires of drama." 3 8 Whatever may have been gained or lost in translation, the interview emphasizes the sympathy and shared concerns of filmmakers from both countries. Capra scripted his account of their meeting with Sergei Eisenstein in unlikely English at a broken-down Georgian cafe. His recollection is imbued with more symbolism than would have been evident at the time although Eisenstein was indeed at that moment "in the d o g h o u s e " over his Bezhin Meadow. Capra then asked about Shumiatskii, ironically the cause of Eisenstein's troubles. Eisenstein supposedly replied that he was also "in the doghouse." The creative dialogue suggests that Capra in 1971 still alluded delicately to the o u t c o m e this story. 39 Indeed by March 1938 Shumiatskii had been dismissed, ostensibly for failing to improve film production, and was later arrested and executed. So was their interviewer Nil'sen. 4 0 Neither C a p r a ' s nor Hollywood's comedic touches—as when G r e t a G a r b o ' s Ninotchka quipped, "the last mass trials were a great success; there will be fewer but better Russians"—was able to grasp the reality of the Soviet "doghouse." The film industry purges, coming on top of the other well-publicized trials and executions, did close down both visits and sympathy f r o m the US. Soviet films in the US shared a similar fate, signaled in New York by the influential three-part critique in Partisan Review by Dwight McDonald in late 1938-1939 that linked a decline in Soviet film quality to Stalin's policies. 41 Communist villains t o o were sought off camera. The House U n - A m e r i c a n Activities C o m m i t t e e ( H U A C ) , created in 1938 under Congressman Martin Dies, targeted Hollywood as a h o t b e d of communist associations and the 24 August 1939 signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact doused any lingering e m b e r s of goodwill remaining a m o n g most liberals in New York and Hollywood. 4 2 There it would have remained, but for the winds of war that rekindled the need for shared images and messages on film.

Allies on Film • 379 T H E B A T T L E OF R U S S I A U S A N D SOVIET FILM

BEGINS:

COOPERATION

By t h e time the US and USSR became allies at the end of 1941, the Soviet film industry had become fully mobilized. Film crews were producing valuable newsreel f o o t a g e from the front and Soviet documentaries, produced in Moscow, b e g a n to appear in theaters. 4 3 The Leningrad and Moscow film studios had b e e n e v a c u a t e d to Central Asia in O c t o b e r and the feeble production of f e a t u r e films was invigorated by a focus on the war effort and looser supervision. Even during the "strange interlude" of the Nazi-Soviet pact, some strains of dialogue had r e s u m e d between filmmakers and overseers. Politburo m e m b e r A n d r e i Z h d a n o v called a May 1941 closed conference where Aleksandrov and his remaining colleagues complained about bureaucratic interference and the difficulty of making a "realistic" film hero without flaws.44 The Soviet Union also quietly purchased seven American entertainment films between 1939 and 1941, mostly musicals. 4 5 Since the US was still officially neutral and American films were not permitted to circulate in Axis-controlled areas, the purchase was presumably m a d e through a g e n t s of the US Motion Picture Producers and Distributors Association (MPPDA).46 In spring 1942 the Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (Vsesoiuznoe Obshchestvo Kul'turnykh Sviazei s Zagranitsei or VOKS) began planning a conference on American and British Film, held 20 and 21 August. As its n a m e implies, V O K S had been formed in 1925 with a n u m b e r of bureaus to assist foreign visitors and provide books, photos, and other information to foreign countries. Cinema was included in its arts sector and an English-language volume on Soviet Cinema was published in 1935. The purges had undermined the effectiveness of V O K S and eliminated its head, so V O K S had to initiate the effort to forge new cultural ties with events such as this conference. A Central Committee special decree had confirmed its statues, structure and personnel in October 1941. 47 T h e V O K S conference organizers exchanged n u m e r o u s telegrams with Hollywood figures, including the U S Office of War Information (OWI). This office, created in June 1942, was in charge of "coordinating" the message of American films and m a d e recommendations directly to the Hollywood studios, both on scripts and on films for export. 4 8 In telegrams Hollywood writers went on record to support the overtures of Soviet filmmakers. Best wishes were forwarded f r o m the Chair of the Writers Mobilization Board, and Sidney Buchman, President of the Screen Writers Guild (SWG). A cable forwarded by the Canadian G o v e r n m e n t Film Commissioner f r o m documentary filmmaker John Grierson asks whether it is now possible to send greetings from the producers and writers of the National Film Board of Canada who admire the "great contribution of the artists" in sustaining the necessary heroism of the Russian people. 4 9 O t h e r telegrams are signed by Soviet directors, writers and cinematographers trying to directly contact American filmmakers.

380 • Marsha

Siefen

The conference planned screening three American films at the "Evenings of Friendship of American and Soviet Cinematographies"—Cecil B. DeMille's Union Pacific (1939), the musical In Old Chicago (1939),™ and Chaplin's The Great Dictator (1940). The accompanying p h o t o exhibit was to be arranged historically, with three sections. O n e was on silent film, a second of 25 p h o t o g r a p h s of Hollywood, old and new, and the third on the best directors (with scriptwriters) and actors. The exhibit selections d e m o n s t r a t e d a detailed knowledge of American films and included complimentary r e m a r k s on Soviet film by four directors— Chaplin, William Dieterle (who had also visited in 1937), Joris Ivens (who had m a d e a film there on a steel center at Magnitogorsk entitled Song of Heroes in 1932)— and of course Capra. 5 1 In his opening address C h a i r m a n of the Cinema Affairs C o m m i t t e e Ivan G. Bol'shakov expressed his desire to "strengthen the friendship and active cooperation of the filmmakers of the three countries" and names anti-fascist films that d e m o n s t r a t e their "psychological affinity." H e explicitly states that "personal contacts" and "regular film exchange" have mutually enriched their films, encouraging their continuation. T h e last evening featured several speeches the major Soviet directors that addressed an ongoing subject—the qualities of the positive film hero—as found in American films. Vsevelod Pudovkin, who with Eisenstein had been brought back f r o m Central Asia, found American films comprehensible because the American hero is realized through the natural qualities of the A m e rican actor, especially in adventure films. Eisenstein elaborates the heroic theme. He begins by recalling his visit to Hollywood as a place where "personal contacts are established quickly and easily." Although accounts of his time in Hollywood conflict with his declarations, he celebrates his conviction that the natural "fast friendships" between the two peoples has after twelve years been realized. Eloquently he catalogues A m e r i c a n films, citing Disney fantasies and Marx brothers humor, and focuses on the trait that most appeals to the Russian p e o p l e — t h e American hero and heroines' fierce energy and valor in the human struggle. Eisenstein closes with a trio of films alliterative in their titles as well as similar in their heroes—John Ford's The Young Mr. Lincoln and Frank Capra's Mr. Deeds Goes to Town (1936) and Mr. Smith Goes to Washington (1939). Eisenstein describes the decency of Mr. Deeds, suddenly a millionaire, and the freak of fate that makes Mr. Smith a S e n a t o r as providing occasions like the Senate floor for a symbolic and solitary triumph of justice in the highest circles of business and g o v e r n m e n t . In his closing speech Vladimir S. Kemenov, head of V O K S since 1940, reprises the theme, again calling upon these three films to illustrate the new " h u m a n e and democratic" hero. Capra heroes are young men who safeguard human integrity, are one with the folk. Their personality quirks protect them f r o m being absorbed by the frenzy of the urban world or submitting to the mechanized ways of business. Mr. Deeds is explicitly praised for his witty defense in the climactic trial scene, overthrowing the trumped up charges with a single w e a p o n — c o m m o n sense. 5 2

Allies on Film • 381 Of course, given V O K S sponsorship and the expectation of publicizing the speeches to American and British allies, the c o m m e n t s are predictably commendatory. But the filmmakers' exposition of what American critics had christ e n e d " C a p r a - c o r n " must have provided a rare opportunity to comment on their own recent history of struggle in legal and political contexts. The recounting of the honest individual's triumph against unequal odds takes on additional ironies in light of the films' histories. Although t h e r e is no record of their being shared with or purchased by the Soviet Union for public exhibition, Eisenstein's and K e m e n o v ' s praise for the actors suggests that the films were seen and p e r h a p s screened at the conference. Certainly Mr. Smith had already drawn the ire of the US A m b a s s a d o r to Britain Joseph P. K e n n e d y in 1939 for its negative portrayal of the US Senate, so its international distribution was raised to the level of government attention. Mr. Smith also showed up on French screens to signal defiance of the ban on American movies in the early days of the Vichy government. 5 3 Possibly the two films were simply " a n n e x e d " along with territory during the Red A r m y occupation of Eastern Poland, Bessarabia, and the annexation of the Baltic states. 5 4 A n o t h e r Capra film, It Happened One Night (1934), was adapted for the stage as New York-Miami Bus and became the most popular play during the Leningrad siege, 55 but it was never screened. And Meet John Doe (1941), Capra's last film before the war, was judged "unsuitable for screens" in 1943; the order was received by its co-writer, R o b e r t Riskin w h o at that time worked for the O W I overseas branch. 5 6 Thus C a p r a ' s world of small-town values and pastoral dreams, attacked by American critics for its sentimentality, demagoguery and anti-intellectualism, provided a social myth that resonated, as feared, "in the land of the Bolsheviks." 5 7 The Soviet efforts did fit with the ideas of U S A m b a s s a d o r to the Soviet Union, Admiral William H. Standley, who had already begun working to bring US newsreels and films to the USSR through the State D e p a r t m e n t . American newsreel footage was being incorporated into Soviet newsreels by the fall of 1942. H e used the occasion of the US Embassy sponsorship of the April 1943 Soviet premiere of the Hollywood's Mission to Moscow to initiate a formal a r r a n g e m e n t to import American f e a t u r e films.58 A m o n g the films reviewed and purchased was The Battle for Russia. T H E B A T T L E OF R U S S I A : T H E

MOVIE

Frank Capra h e a d e d the production team that developed The Battle of Russia and the rest of the Why We Fight series. 59 A l r e a d y on 28 February of 1941 Capra, now vice-president of the Motion Picture Academy, had telegraphed Roosevelt that the industry would cooperate with his request, broadcast live to the A c a d e m y Awards dinner that the motion picture industry should " p r o m o t e solidarity among all peoples of the Americas." 6 0 C a p r a enlisted after Pearl H a r b o r and was selected by G e n e r a l G e o r g e Marshall to be in charge of orientation films for the

382 • Marsha

Siefen

U S A r m y Signal Corps. Marshall thought film was the way to explain both moral and political reasons "why we fight" and was specifically interested in s o m e o n e who had experience with e n t e r t a i n m e n t films. A f t e r a complicated series of political m a n e u v e r s in Washington, in June 1942 Capra received his own motion picture unit—the 834 th Signal Service Photographic Detachment, Special Services Division, Film Production Section—that was relatively independent f r o m the Signal Corps career officers. In July he moved the unit to Hollywood, for production and political reasons. C a p r a c o m m a n d e d 8 officers and 35 enlisted men, a staff that would grow to about 150 by late 1943. The shape of the series was decided between April and August of 1942, as key t e a m m e m b e r s were assembled. All had direct or indirect experience with Soviet film.61 By April the Russian émigré director Anatole Litvak had joined the team; he was responsible for the final editing of The Battle of Russia. Born in Kiev, he came to Hollywood after film work in Leningrad in the 1920s, G e r m a n y and France in the mid-1930s. His Confessions of a Nazi Spy (1939) m e n t i o n e d positively at the V O K S conference, was re-released in 1942 minus the Communist villains and used long periods of semi-documentary techniques and narration in ways useful to the team. 6 2 He knew Hollywood's Russia well also f r o m directing Tsarevich (1937), based on a Broadway play in which Russian émigrés in Paris must cope with their distaste for communism but their love of the Russian people. Eric Knight, British-born U S A r m y captain and novelist, is credited with a m a j o r influence on the series concept, especially because he had worked with d o c u m e n t a r y filmmaker John Grierson, whose "creative treatment of actuality" acknowledged a debt to Soviet montage. 6 3 Knight's book on the war's undermining of the British class system had just been made into a feature film, This Above All (1942) directed by Litvak. 6 4 Richard Griffith joined the staff f r o m the film d e p a r t m e n t of the Museum of M o d e r n Art, where Capra saw Leni Riefenstahl's films, a major influence on the Why We Fight series. 65 Griffith was in charge of film research and would have known the considerable collection of Soviet films collected by Russian-trained film scholar Jay Leyda. 6 6 Dmitri Tiomkin, St. Petersburg Conservatory-trained composer for Capra films since 1937, p r e p a r e d the musical score. Like the series as a whole, the script for The Battle of Russia was based on the A r m y Orientation lectures begun in 1940. First drafts were written by a g r o u p of writers selected f r o m a list of volunteers compiled by the Hollywood Writers' Mobilization group of the Screen Writers Guild, with other writers joining the team later. Usually at least two writers worked on the script at a time, with one writing the narration. The rough outline was prepared without knowing what film would be available; gaps would be covered with animation and titles. Capra gave c o m m e n t s at the script stage and then again on the rough cut of the film. A s Griffith explained, C a p r a gave the films "their distinctive shape, based on the editing principle as the defining factor in the conception and execution of every film. Many times, when a film had b e e n virtually completed by others of his staff, he

Allies on Film • 383 would take it away to the cutting rooms for a few days. Screened again, it would s e e m on the surface much the same, yet invariably it had acquired a magical c o h e r e n c e and cogency which testified eloquently to C a p r a ' s editing capacity." 67 Pressure was exerted early and often on Capra with regard to whom he hired a n d what they wrote. The Army, Congress and the Office of War Information were all interested in "Hollywood's war." The first writer for The Battle of Russia, John S a n f o r d , had been specifically r e c o m m e n d e d by Sidney Buchman, president of the S W G and scriptwriter for Mr. Smith Goes to Washington, but Sanford was let go early in the process for "political reasons." 6 8 A f t e r Capra pleaded for guidance, the A r m y prepared a "bible" for the series in N o v e m b e r of 1942 and, f r o m that point on, the work of his unit was "scrutinized by A r m y officers at every stage, and changes were frequently imposed." Each film in the series had to be approved by G e n e r a l Marshall, Secretary of War Stimson and o t h e r A r m y officials, even on s o m e occasions by President Roosevelt; on those occasions Capra personally took the cans of film to the White H o u s e after the film was shown at the Pentagon. Thus, in both senses the screening process ensured that the films reflected gove r n m e n t policy. T h e substance of the script sounds like OWI's prescribed "messages" 6 9 and reso n a t e s with Hollywood's Russia. Originally titled with the O W I t h e m e "The P e o p l e ' s War," The Battle for Russia script forgives Soviet sins of commission through omission. The reconstruction of Russian history conveniently leaves out the Russian Revolution in recounting World War I as well as the purge trials and the Soviet invasion of the north in 1939. The Nazi-Soviet pact is explained as a shrewd move to buy time for R e d A r m y mobilization. As the title confirms, the subject is Russia throughout; only once "to be correct" is the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics p r o n o u n c e d with the aid of a graphic. Communism is never mentioned. These themes also harmonize with Soviet war documentaries. C o m m u n i s m was intentionally de-emphasized and Russian patriotism highlighted. O t h e r t h e m e s shared by the film and Soviet p r o p a g a n d a include the history of past Russian victories over invaders f r o m the west, the heroic feats of the R e d A r m y and t h e hom e f r o n t production achievements of workers and peasants. 7 0 The partisans a r e highlighted to personalize the fighting.71 A major difference is that while Soviet war propaganda emphasized Stalin as the symbol of the patriotic cause, 7 2 in t h e film Stalin only appears momentarily, as an image with the subtitle "J. Stalin, June 22, 1941." The villain Hitler is a more visible co-star. Stalin is also upstaged in screen time by documentary footage of then Soviet A m b a s s a d o r Maksim Litvinov urging collective security at the U n i t e d Nations and by the O r t h o d o x Church, whose head Metropolitan Sergei had been received by Stalin in S e p t e m b e r 1943. A n actor read a translated excerpt of Stalin's live broadcast of 3 July 1941, accompanied by film clips of rapt listeners; Stalin's n a m e is never spoken. In fact, narration is key. Most U S war documentaries at this time relied on the volume, resonance and authority of the male voice, sometimes called "the voice

384 • Marsha Sieferl of G o d , " to read the p r o n o u n c e m e n t s with conviction. 73 Repetition of key phrases and chanted names of cities and towns, reinforced by title frames, preached sermons of information. This description sounds very similar to the "the solemn" voice of the Soviet documentary narrator, "bordering on the bombastic." "History" was speaking. "No sentence was considered too flowery in praising Soviet heroism, and no word was considered t o o harsh in denouncing Nazi beastliness." 7 4 Narration allowed The Battle of Russia to be easily duplicated with a voice-over soundtrack in different languages for international distribution. T h e script was written first, then film footage chosen to fit the script and finally the whole was timed to the narration, sometimes matching word for shot. The selection and the assembly of film clips, or montage, defines this genre of compilation documentary. The implied "reality" of location shot adds verisimilitude and credibility but can also lead to inaccuracies when a shot is chosen for its aesthetic appeal or technical quality, which accounts for the credit given to the film editor and film researcher. Feature films and "re-enactments" also appear, a c o m m o n practice among filmmakers from Riefenstahl and March of Time newsreels to Soviet documentaries. 7 5 For example, The Battle of Russia staged the long panning shot of the faces of Russian partisans reciting an oath obviously lit for dramatic effect. 7 6 Capra's decision to m a k e the series using " f o u n d film" is also in part due to budget restraints; the whole series had to be m a d e for $400,000. 77 Capra made a personal effort to obtain film footage for The Battle of Russia. While still in Washington he visited the Soviet Embassy on 11 March 1942, according to Army Intelligence, and later twice went directly to Maksim Litvinov seeking combat footage and Soviet films over lunch. He was almost immediately accused of a major breach of the Articles of War and even according to his own account narrowly avoided a court martial. 7 8 Official channels were then established for obtaining film f r o m Artkino, the successor to A m k i n o in New York. Of the total of 7,363 feet of film in The Battle of Russia, over 60 percent or 4, 542 feet comes from various Soviet features, documentaries and newsreels. Film seized f r o m "the e n e m y " provided 496 feet, 77 feet from allied d o c u m e n t a r y films and only 500 feet from American newsreel and studio-made material. Walt Disney Studio animated maps, including 62 segments overall, and 75 title frames, m a k e up the final 24 percent. 7 9 Fifty Soviet films a p p e a r in the source list, some of which a p p e a r only briefly. A m o n t a g e of Eisenstein's Alexander Nevsky (1939), Petrov's Peter the Great (1937 and 1939), and documentary footage of World War I makes the opening argument of Russia's history fighting western invaders. Next the film explains "who is Russia" by showing close-ups of members of ethnic groups taken f r o m a variety of pre-war documentaries and The Russian People while the narrator speaks their names. Clips f r o m A Day of the War and o t h e r films reinforce the war contribution of each m e m b e r of the population. Subsequent battle scenes rely heavily on re-editing 1942 Soviet documentaries, The Defeat of the German Armies Outside Moscow, The Siege of Leningrad and Stalingrad, to pick up the t e m p o and to match images to the n a r r a t o r ' s rhythm. 8 0 The emphasis on suffering

Allies on Film • 385 t h a t characterizes Russian documentaries 8 1 is interspersed with the battle footage to vary the t e m p o and shots of defeated G e r m a n soldiers accompany the march of r e t r e a t . All go to emphasize the spoken and titled motif—"generals may win battles, but people win wars." T h e coherence of the images is underscored by the soundtrack. The sounds of war—church bells and cannons—were synchronized carefully, often sound to shot. Tiomkin's musical score was compiled as much as composed, suitable for the genre. The "classical Hollywood score" had always drawn upon non-copyrighted n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y music and the familiarity of Tchaikovsky on radio and record m a d e the choice of soundbites from the " N u t c r a c k e r " and "Sleeping B e a u t y " into sonic cues of Russian commonality. The conductor's piano score also suggests a n o t h e r way of "defining Russia musically"—the use of folk tunes in classically c o m p o s e d works. For the t h e m e music in The Battle of Russia,Tiomk'm uses various p e r m u t a t i o n s of a few key melodies. He opens with a combination of "Song of t h e Steppes," and the theme f r o m Tchaikovsky's Fifth Symphony and then varies the combinations with a few other symphonic or folk tunes. O t h e r Russian music cliches, especially folk songs and vocal choirs, are used at effective m o m e n t s to underscore the theme of the Russian people. Two o t h e r interesting musical choices show up in the musical cue sheet. First, there is a substantial use of Shostakovich's "Leningrad Symphony," not surprising given its triumphal premiere in Los Angeles in 1942 and subsequent heavy radio play. Music rights were t h e r e f o r e available and the melodies would be "in the air" for listeners. Too, the recent success of Walt Disney's Fantasia, with conductor Leopold Stokowski appearing on camera, would have also highlighted the relations of classical music and film, including animation. Interestingly, prerecorded versions of several excerpts were used, from Stravinsky's conducting his "Rite of Spring," a Cleveland Symphony recording of the 1812 Overture, Stokowski's recordings of the "Firebird" and Tchaikovky's Symphony no. 4, and E u g e n e O r m a n d y ' s recordings of Tchaikovsky's Symphonies nos. 5 and 6. The pressure of time obviously accounted for some of the short cuts in using commercial recordings for the score, but "borrowing" f r o m classical composers was a well-honed practice and the selections would resonate with Hollywood's Russia. 8 2 Overall The Battle of Russia, in portraying A r m y and OWI war aims, also comes closest to allying Soviet and American film, not least through incorporating the "kino-eye" and Russian melodies. The commonalities of the film genre aid the 1943 shared desires to enlist each other in defeating the c o m m o n enemy. Hollywood was able to edit both word and image to combine in one film the art, message and entertainment so ardently espoused by their current ally—as long as they had a new and shared villain.

386 • Marsha Siefert W I N N I N G T H E B A T T L E OF

RUSSIA

In the fall of 1943 the film became part 5 of the Why We Fight series and was shown to all US military personnel in all branches of the armed forces. Measured by social science techniques of the time on a test group of soldiers, viewing the films did not produce an immediate change in attitude. 8 3 To expect a measurable effect was naive, given the similarity and ubiquity of war coverage across all media even before the first film of the series was finished. The news media's "Russian story" contained similar themes to the film and the phrase "the battle of Russia" was the title of a lead article in Time, July 1942. Time also gave Soviet films appearing in the U S preferential treatment and generous commentary. Even Stalin received favorable cover stories in Time, Newsweek, and Life between July 1942 and March 1943. By February 1942 close to 85 percent in R o p e r opinion poll favored working along with Russia or treating Russia as a full partner. 8 4 So reinf o r c e m e n t rather than "change" in attitude would have been a more reasonable expectation. The commercial release of The Battle of Russia is exceptional because of the scuffle a m o n g the War Activities C o m m i t t e e of the Motion Picture Industry, the Office of War Information and the War D e p a r t m e n t over the commercial release of Prelude to War, first installment of the Why We Fight series. Given its box-office failure, the willingness of all three organizations to exhibit The Battle of Russia and be listed in the advertising is noteworthy. 8 5 The distributor Twentieth-CenturyFox gave it full Hollywood treatment. As Figure 24.1 suggests, "The United States G o v e r n m e n t presents" was "the n a m e above the title," featured on all versions of the ad supplied to local theaters. The most prominent icon was the image of mother and child as victims. The press kit also included a full page of " E x p l o i t a t i o n " suggestions, like sponsoring a "Know-your-ally-day," advertising tie-ins with Russian-inspired jewelry and gifts, and featuring music tie-ins of Tchaikovsky and Shostakovich on local radio or in school music classes. Publicity articles, ready to print for local newspapers, highlighted many aspects: the casualties of the Russian c a m e r a m e n at the front, "Film Depicts People's War" and "Mickey m a p s " complete with illustration. Lt. Col. Litvak, always correctly listed as the p r o d u c e r u n d e r the supervision of Lt. Col. Capra, says that the word " d o c u m e n t a r y " falls short of describing the film. All press copy used the film's Army " o r i e n t a t i o n " as a selling point. 8 6 T h e preview on 28 September 1943 sponsored by the A c a d e m y of M o t i o n Picture A r t s and Sciences was reviewed positively by Variety. New York critics also were enthusiastic. Noting the ongoing debate about releasing the film, James A g e e in t h e Nation urges viewers to write their congressmen in support, arguing it is the "best and most important war film ever assembled" in the US since Birth of a Nation. Commonweal supports the release of the series to the public, w h o has "a right to k n o w " what the War D e p a r t m e n t says. Not unexpectedly, Time recognizes the elements of Hollywood's Russia and compliments Litvak for combining

Allies on Film • 387

Figure 24.1: A d v e r t i s e m e n t f r o m T w e n t i e t h - C e n t u r y - F o x press b o o k . The Battle of Russia. Source: Press B o o k C o l l e c t i o n , C i n e m a - T e l e v i s i o n Library. University of S o u t h e r n C a l i f o r n i a .

his k n o w l e d g e of U S

filmgoers

with a " n o s t a l g i c love f o r Russia a n d its p e o p l e

[that] is u n c o m p l i c a t e d by political

finepoint."

This view is u n d e r l i n e d by

first-

g e n e r a t i o n i m m i g r a n t A l f r e d Kazin d e c a d e s later, w h e n viewing the film in an a r m y c a m p in s o u t h e r n Illinois a l l o w e d h i m to e m b r a c e " R u s s i a as his p a r e n t s h a d n o t b e e n a l l o w e d t o e m b r a c e it." 8 7 T h e S o v i e t decision t o p u r c h a s e The Battle r e c o u n t e d e x u b e r a n t l y by a New York

of Russia

for public release was

Post r e p o r t e r : " T h e Soviet E m b a s s y s e n t

w o r d to Col. F r a n k C a p r a ' s Signal C o r p s unit t h a t Stalin w a n t e d to see t h e film o n R u s s i a . . . . A b o m b e r was a b o u t t o t a k e off f o r R u s s i a a n d so t h e r e was n o t i m e t o h a v e a R u s s i a n t r a n s l a t i o n s u b s t i t u t e d f o r t h e E n g l i s h c o m m e n t a r y by M a j . A n t h o n y Veiller. ...Stalin saw it in a p r o j e c t i o n r o o m . A Soviet t r a n s l a t o r s t o o d b e h i n d t h e M a r s h a l a n d t r a n s l a t e d e a c h s e n t e n c e . . . S t a l i n o r d e r e d 500 p r i n t s m a d e at once, R u s s i a n c a p t i o n s w e r e s u p e r i m p o s e d , a n d . . . t h e film w a s s h o w n in e v e r y R u s s i a n m o v i e - h o u s e . " 8 8 A m b a s s a d o r W. A v e r e l l H a r r i m a n , w h o r e p l a c e d S t a n d l e y in O c t o b e r 1943, m a y h a v e e v e n t a k e n a copy p e r s o n a l l y : " S t a l i n p e r s o n a l l y e x p r e s s e d himself f a v o r a b l y o n t h e film. T h i s w h o l e t h i n g w a s r a t h e r r a r e f o r Stalin." 8 '' T h e film w a s available in t h e a t r e s with a R u s s i a n v o i c e - o v e r ( n o t c a p t i o n s ) by

388 • Marsha

Siefen

early 1944. 90 "Every Russian movie-house" is an exaggeration but certainly The Battle of Russia benefited f r o m the 1943 arrangement between Bol'shakov's Film Committee and the US State D e p a r t m e n t , which had convinced the Hollywood studios to cooperate. The studios sent films to the US Embassy, which organized screenings and loaned copies to the Soviet Film Committee for about three months. They in turn showed the film in closed screenings to the Soviet Information Bureau, Soviet Foreign Office, VOKS, Red Army Club, Red Navy Club, Bolshoi Theater Club, the Artists Club, the Film Club, and other trustworthy groups. This arrangement guaranteed an influential audience of close to 12,000, not to mention other unacknowledged trades of films for favors. Between 1943 and 1945 the Soviet Union agreed to purchase for commercial release only 16 films while viewing well over twice as many. The fee for each was between 25,000 and 50,000 dollars, considered by the film industry as a "foot in the d o o r " for the already envisioned post-war market. Again musical films were the most abundant. 9 1 In fact, except for Mission to Moscow, the only Hollywood "fictional" portrayals of Hollywood's Russia that were purchased were North Star and Song of Russia, both featuring several staged songs by prominent American composers, A a r o n Copland and J e r o m e Kern. 9 2 O n e influential audience did take The Battle of Russia seriously—Soviet filmmakers. The V O K S Cinema Section sponsored a discussion of the film on 25 March 1944. An 18-page English translation of the stenographic record was sent to Frank Capra at the War D e p a r t m e n t with a cover letter f r o m Ryessa D. Liberson, Chief of the V O K S American D e p a r t m e n t . 9 3 The participants' list reads like a roll call of prominent wartime directors. Vsevelod Pudovkin ( I n the Name of the Fatherland) presides over the conversation, which includes Mark Donskoi (Rainbow), A m o Bek-Nazarov ( D a v i d - B e k ) , Georgii Vasiliev ( D e f e n s e of Tsaritsin), Sergei Iutkevich (New Adventures of Schweik) and of course Aleksandrov (soon to head Mosfilm). Agapov, a film journalist, leads off with the relevant question: if "all the material used in the film is very well known to the Soviet cinema-goer," why is it "extremely popular." H e gives two reasons: because the film is well and interestingly made and because it d e m o n s t r a t e s an American interest in, knowledge of and love for the Russian people. O t h e r s take up the themes of technique and sympathy. Donskoi, commenting on the clever cutting of a particular m o n tage, compliments Capra on having a "great talent" to know "just when to stop." Iutkevich feels that the Soviet film clips are edited carefully, avoiding clutter or mere o r n a m e n t . He approves of the directors' boldness in combining f e a t u r e films with documentary and for following a clear, lucid idea f r o m beginning to end. C o m p a r e d to earlier American a t t e m p t s to portray Russia, not one shot was incorrect, according to A n d r e i Andrievskii, the head of Soiuzintogkino in charge of foreign film trade. The film allows the Russian audiences and the A m e r i c a n s to "touch elbows," said Vasiliev. The actor L. Sverdlin says the audience responds to the animated Disney maps as a good piece of acting. Pudovkin compares his documentary style to what was great a b o u t silent film.

Allies on Film • 389 A l e k s a n d r o v opens by referring to C a p r a ' s Moscow visit in 1937. H e had just seen Lost Horizon, in which "the heroes were seeking h u m a n happiness" and arrived in Tibet "where people were unspoiled by so-called civilization." Echoing Iutkevitch's earlier c o m m e n t s on the film as C a p r a ' s attempt "to go beyond his perfection in the entertaining g e n r e " to portray a Utopian new world, Aleksandrov "glimpsed the author's secret thoughts—his desire to interest the audience in stirring questions of great social m o m e n t " and anticipated meeting Capra in person. 9 4 But when the encounter occurred at the 1937 May Day parade, he was surprised that Capra wanted to leave immediately, not wanting to "imagine what would h a p p e n when all the tanks, guns and rifles begin to shoot." 9 5 The film shows a new Frank Capra, who "selects for his p u r p o s e shots of the very same parade, and of the same guns, tanks and rifles" and shows them "in the hands of the R e d A r m y men, the guerrilla fighters... It is these p e o p l e that Capra glorifies by his art as true patriots and heroes." For his fellow directors The Battle of Russia combined all three ingredients—entertainment, a message and art. The "positive h e r o " at last without flaw is Russia. Of course, V O K S was eager to use the wartime alliance as part of the "Soviet cultural offensive" and film emerged as an excellent vehicle. 96 By 1944 organizations affiliated with V O K S had established cinema sections and had begun distributing a publication titled in English Film Chronicle, which carried articles by p r o m i n e n t directors on Soviet and international films. Articles on the Why We Fight series by D o v z h e n k o ( T h e Fight for Our Soviet Ukraine) and Pudovkin appeared in its first two years, with Pudovkin writing in January 1946 about this genre of documentary as "fully international," capable of "being understood anywhere." U t o p i a n hopes also inspired Hollywood m e m b e r s of the film industry, most involved in the war effort. The opening lines of their O c t o b e r 1945 editorial of their first issue of Hollywood Quarterly were explicit: "The war, with its complex d e m a n d s f o r indoctrination, p r o p a g a n d a , and specialized training, emphasized the social function of film. . . . O n e of the first casualties of the conflict was the ' p u r e e n t e r t a i n m e n t myth,' which had served to camouflage the social irresponsibility and creative impotence of much of the material presented on the screen. ..." 9 7 A section entitled "Scenes f r o m A b r o a d " regularly included articles on Russian film by o n e of the founding editors, Jay Leyda, who had studied with Eisenstein at V G I K in Moscow 1933-1936 and had advised on the choice of d o c u m e n t a r y film for Mission to Moscow,98 E v e n as the filmmakers enhanced their c o m m e n d a t i o n of each other in print, the film a r r a n g e m e n t began to falter. Newsreel footage, which had regularly b e e n exchanged a m o n g the allies and integrated in each other's productions, diminished a f t e r newsreel films of the N o r m a n d y landing were excluded f r o m Soviet newsreels. In S e p t e m b e r 1944 the Soviet U n i o n pulled back on its purchase of all f u r t h e r f e a t u r e films but Song of Russia. Two 1946 m e m o r a n d a f r o m the U S State D e p a r t m e n t r e s p o n d e d to this change. G e o r g e K e n n a n ' s "long telegram" was supp l e m e n t e d by a lengthy "cinematic t e l e g r a m " in which he encouraged Washington

390 • Marsha Siefert to continue sending Hollywood movies to project an ideal "exposition of American life" while John Paton Davies in the State D e p a r t m e n t emphasized that the U S should send only those films that projected that portrait. Thus a modest trade resumed again in 1946 u n d e r stricter c o n d i t i o n s . " These careful State D e p a r t m e n t m e m o s coincided with the still optimistic 1947 Hollywood Quarterly, which included Leyda's translation of Pudovkin's article on " T h e Global Film." The documentary form of the Why We Fight series, he felt, would gain "ever increasing significance" in the post-war period because "it can be understood by all the peoples of the world... and can be widely used for fully and profoundly acquainting peoples with one another." 1 0 0

C A S U A L T I E S IN T H E B A T T L E OF R U S S I A : S O V I E T S HOLLYWOOD AND COSMOPOLITANS

IN

IN

MOSCOW

Pudovkin's hope for global film was already undermined by the time it was translated into English in July 1947. So was he. The Central Committee's resolution of 4 S e p t e m b e r 1946 announced a cultural cleansing of "unsuccessful and faulty films" and singled out Pudovkin's historical treatment of Admiral Nakhimov for having too many dances and too few Russian victories. 101 Other directors who had only recently praised American filmmakers were also publicly chastised. Eisenstein was attacked for Ivan the Terrible, Part II, Ivan being not sufficiently a "positive hero"; Eisenstein died in February 1938. Trauberg's Simple People was c o n d e m n e d without fanfare, fracturing his 20-year partnership with G. Kozintsev. The anti-cosmopolitan campaign of 1948-1949 upped the political costs and, a m o n g o t h e r things, targeted the very idea of a "world cinema" and i n d e p e n d e n t artistic standards. The positive references to American filmmakers solicited only 4 years b e f o r e became " p r o o f " of cosmopolitanism and a cover for anti-Semitism. Some survived, others prospered. Bol'shakov gained power in his new position as Minister of Cinema, created in March 1946, but also had to serve as Stalin's personal steward, carefully selecting homegrown or imported films for the variable taste of Politburo screenings. K e m e n o v remained V O K S President through 1948 after which he succeeded to a n u m b e r of government posts including D e p u t y Minister of Culture. 1 0 2 A n d Aleksandrov turned from The Radiant Path of musical fairytale to the anti-American Meeting on the Elbe in 1949, music by Shostakovich. Americans were now not just naive but some were nasty and Aleksandrov' wife was transformed from American circus star to American spy. In Hollywood Frank Capra, now Colonel and awarded the Army's Distinguished Service Medal on the day of his discharge, must have felt It's a Wonderful Life in 1946. However, the dormant anticommunist H U A C investigation r e s u m e d in 1947 and Hollywood personalities r e t u r n e d to their pre-war politics. Jack Warner was called to account for Mission to Moscow and Louis B. Mayer for Song of Russia; both distanced themselves. 1 0 3 Walt Disney testified and complained a b o u t

Allies on Film • 391 Hollywood unions. Frank Capra, as a vice-president of the Screen Directors Guild, was caught in the 1947 controversy over blacklisting. At a critical S D G meeting, while Cecil B. DeMille shouted down "foreigners in Hollywood," Capra tried to navigate treacherous waters between the blacklist and the loyalty oath. Capra c o n t i n u e d to experience the State of the Union (1948) as the press covered the offscreen battles of his politicized actors. A n d during the height of the H U A C hearings, John Sanford who submitted the original script for The Battle of Russia and Sidney B u c h m a n , scriptwriter for Mr. Smith, were n a m e d as members of the C o m munist Party. 1 0 4 C a p r a ' s own vulnerability became a p p a r e n t in 1951 when he applied for security clearance on a government project. A f t e r several stalled inquiries he was given a copy of a 14 D e c e m b e r letter f r o m the Army-Navy-Air Force Personnel Security B o a r d denying him clearance for a government project and accusing him of disloyalty to his country. Of the six charges against him, one was his sponsorship of Russian War Relief and a second was for receiving "propaganda literat u r e " direct f r o m the Soviet Union in 1942 and 1944—the V O K S correspondence. Included in his file was a photo of his d e p a r t u r e from his visit to the Soviet Embassy, supplied for his FBI file.105 A 1950 d o c u m e n t from the partially declassified 226-page US Army Intelligence file, which contained primarily vague allegations of associations with "left-wing groups," offers as a tangible piece of evidence: " H o l l y w o o d Reporter [dated] 4 April 44 ...stated that Russia had a plan for a series of programs to be given at The House of Cinema Workers in Moscow which p r o g r a m s were to include productions by Frank Capra." Conclusion: "Subjject] considered possibly subversive." 1 0 6 N o t coincidentally, in this same year Capra's Mr. Deeds and Mr. Smith became the subject of a US State D e p a r t m e n t complaint to the Soviet government. The complaint was m a d e on behalf of the Motion Picture Association of America ( M P A A ) , the successor to the M P P D A , which had resumed film export activities a f t e r the war. The complaint was both economic and political: the films had never b e e n sold for distribution and both films were shorn of their Hollywood endings that righted wrongs "democratically." In Soviet theaters Mr. Deeds, introduced by an ideological lecture, was marketed as The Dollar Rules,107 with Mr. D e e d s ending his days in an insane asylum and Mr. Smith was defeated by the Senate filibuster in Senator. The Soviet government claimed they were "trophy films," captured f r o m the Germans, which the Americans denied, citing the cessation of export to all Axis countries. 1 0 8 The U S Senate Internal Security Subcommittee investigated World War II films in 1954. A t that time the A r m y asked C a p r a to " n a m e names" of those responsible for the Why We Fight series and he distanced himself from the film,109 p e r h a p s not surprising given his 1951 despair over security clearance. Although H U A C never called on Capra to testify, there is evidence that he did compromise with the F B I in 1951 by agreeing to c o o p e r a t e and name three names already known to be on the blacklist. His biographer plausibly argues that this betrayal

392 • Marsha

Siefen

h a u n t e d h i m . It also m a y b e t h a t , in a d d i t i o n t o f e e l i n g f o r c e d to criticize o t h e r s , t h e n e e d t o d e n o u n c e his o w n films a n d activities in o r d e r to p r o v e his p a t r i o t i s m o v e r a n d o v e r a g a i n also c r i p p l e d his artistic b i o g r a p h y . 1 1 0 C a p r a , a f e r v e n t A m e rican a m b a s s a d o r , s u b s e q u e n t l y t r a v e l e d w h e n a s k e d to s p e a k a b o u t films f o r t h e U S I A , b u t r e t r e a t e d to e d u c a t i o n a l science d o c u m e n t a r i e s f o r c h i l d r e n , n e v e r again to m a k e a f e a t u r e film. N o n e t h e l e s s , as with his films w h e n M r . D e e d s o r Mr. S m i t h or e s p e c i a l l y J o h n D o e was p l o t t e d into a c o r n e r , with n o logically p o s i t i v e d é n o u e m e n t in sight, C a p r a w a n t e d to give his life story a h a p p y e n d i n g . It w a s w h a t his a u d i e n c e e x p e c t e d a n d t h e r e f o r e w h a t h e wished to p r e s e n t . Thus, t w e n ty y e a r s a f t e r t h e crisis h e casts himself as t h e A m e r i c a n h e r o of his o w n a u t o b i o g r a p h y , a "little g u y " w h o m a k e s g o o d . In so d o i n g he r e s u r r e c t e d his r e p u t a t i o n in t h e A m e r i c a n film c o m m u n i t y a n d r e m a i n e d t r u e t o H o l l y w o o d .

ON

THE N E V E R - E N D I N G

B A T T L E OF

RUSSIA

Films live long b e y o n d t h e i r i m m e d i a t e e x h i b i t i o n . C h a n g i n g politics can c r e a t e retrospective interpretation, both domestically and internationally. A new context o r c l e v e r c u t t i n g can also r e f a s h i o n a film f o r r e - e x h i b i t i o n in n e w c i r c u m stances. 1 1 1 T h e Soviet U n i o n m a y h a v e e v e n c o n t i n u e d to s c r e e n The Battle Russia

of

in t h e i m m e d i a t e p o s t - w a r p e r i o d w h e n victories in t h e G r e a t P a t r i o t i c

W a r w e r e still c e l e b r a t e d . T h e r e is at least o n e r e p o r t of a v e r s i o n with a p r e a m ble by Stalin, a p r a c t i c e of t h e t i m e with m a n y i m p o r t e d a n d t r o p h y

films.112

Technological i n n o v a t i o n s t o o can, in the d e m a n d for n e w c o n t e n t , allow f o r n e w d i s t r i b u t i o n a n d n e w a t t r i b u t i o n s . The Battle

of Russia

is still b e i n g f o u g h t — o n

television, c a b l e , v i d e o a n d n o w D V D . T h e film r e a p p e a r e d o n A m e r i c a n p u b l i c television in 1982, f o l l o w i n g a Bill M o y e r s ' d o c u m e n t a r y " W a l k T h r o u g h t h e 20 l h C e n t u r y : T h e P r o p a g a n d a B a t t l e " o n which F r a n k C a p r a w a s i n t e r v i e w e d a b o u t his w a r t i m e role. A t t h a t t i m e he w a s able t o say m o r e f r e e l y t h a t of c o u r s e it w a s p r o p a g a n d a , w e w e r e at war. In 1995 t h e Military C h a n n e l c a r r i e d t h e series, i n t r o d u c e d by a film h i s t o r i a n a n d it has b e e n a v a i l a b l e since o n video. 1 1 3 T h i s t i m e F r a n k C a p r a is t h e a d v e r t i s e d " n a m e a b o v e t h e t i t l e " a n d t h e V H S p a c k a g ing f e a t u r e s a p h o t o m o n t a g e with S t a l i n ' s i m a g e r a t h e r t h a n t h e m o t h e r a n d child. O n its r e v e r s e t h e f o u r t e s t i m o n i a l s by U S military p e r s o n n e l a r e u s e d as " b l u r b s . " 1 1 4 A n d t h e R u s s i a n v o i c e - o v e r v e r s i o n a p p e a r e d o n Soviet or R u s s i a n t e l e v i s i o n at least o n c e since p e r e s t r o i k a . C o n t e m p o r a r y s c r e e n i n g s f o r m o r e m e d i a savvy v i e w e r s in b o t h c o u n t r i e s suggest that the e m o t i o n a l impact has not been completely historicized. E a c h rea p p e a r a n c e , w h e t h e r o n s c r e e n or as p a r t of h i s t o r i e s of t h e war, h i s t o r i e s of film o r C a p r a ' s life stories, a d d s new layers, n e w c o n t e x t s . Thus, by w a y of e n d i n g it m a y b e a p p r o p r i a t e t o r e t u r n t o t h e h o p e of t h e

filmmaker

at t h e m o m e n t of

i m m e d i a t e e x p e r i e n c e . S u m m i n g u p his 1937 visit t o t h e U S S R in 1971, h e w r o t e : " [ B ] e c a u s e film is o n e of t h r e e u n i v e r s a l l a n g u a g e s ( t h e o t h e r t w o : m a t h e m a t i c s

Allies

on Film

• 393

a n d m u s i c ) — o n t h a t s t a t i o n p l a t f o r m in M o s c o w I first b e c a m e a w a r e o f a m o s t s i g n i f i c a n t h u m a n i s m i n h e r e n t in

filmmaking.

R e g a r d l e s s of frontiers, regardless

o f n a t i o n a l , p o l i t i c a l , o r e t h n i c a l [5/c] d i f f e r e n c e s , are u n i t e d

by a c o m m o n

bond: apprenticeship

filmmakers

all o v e r t h e w o r l d

in t h e g r e a t e s t

o f all t h e

art

forms—FILM." C a p r a here describes what might be called a "symbolic frontier society," w h e r e filmmakers

at t i m e s i n v o k e o r are f o r c e d t o s u p p o r t t h e a u t h o r i t y o f t h e p o l i t i c a l

c e n t e r against the "other" and yet o f t e n c o m m u n i c a t e with each other, s o m e t i m e s d i r e c t l y , in

friendly

rivalry, c o m m e r c e

and camaraderie

through

their

art.115

C a p r a ' s s u b s e q u e n t c o m m e n t a m p l i f i e s t h i s t h e m e . " W e all h a v e t h e s a m e a r t i s t i c a n d t e c h n i c a l p r o b l e m s ; all c r e a t e e n t e r t a i n m e n t r e s p o n s i v e t o h u m a n e m o t i o n s , a n d all r e s p e c t o u r p e e r s a n d a d o r e o u r betters. In a s e n s e , w e are an i n t e r n a t i o n al b a n d o f g y p s i e s b e a r i n g a n u n d e f i n e d b u t r e a l a l l e g i a n c e t o o u r p r o f e s s i o n t h a t e q u a l s — a n d at t i m e s s u r p a s s e s — o u r a l l e g i a n c e t o n a t i o n a l p o w e r s . " 1 1 6 It w a s t h i s s u p r a - n a t i o n a l a l l e g i a n c e t h a t e a c h s i d e in t h e C o l d W a r f e a r e d — a n d h o p e d

to

e x p l o i t w h e n t h e y d r e w u p o n t h a t " c o m m o n b o n d " t o r e - e s t a b l i s h r e l a t i o n s in t h e first C o l d W a r c u l t u r a l e x c h a n g e o f 1 9 5 8 .

Notes This article w o u l d not have b e e n possible w i t h o u t S u z a n n W e e k l y ' s h e l p with i n t e r l i b r a r y loan r e q u e s t s . A l s o cordially responsive w e r e E m i l i a B e r e n y i , C e n t r a l E u r o p e a n U n i v e r s i t y Library; C h a r l e s D e A r m a n , M e d i a Services Division ( N W C S ) , N a t i o n a l A r c h i v e s and R e c o r d s A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ; J o a n Miller, F r a n k C a p r a Archives, W e s l e y a n U n i v e r s i t y ; N e d C o m s t o c k , C i n e m a - T V L i b r a r y Archives, University of S o u t h e r n C a l i f o r n i a ; a n d B a d r i Kutelia w h o s e w o r k in t h e R u s s i a n archives was s u p p o r t e d by a C E U Faculty G r a n t to t h e a u t h o r . 1 W a r D e p a r t m e n t , P h o t o g r a p h i c Scenario, " T h e B a t t l e of R u s s i a " (rev. 13 A p r i l 1943), N a t i o n a l A r c h i v e s and R e c o r d s A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , W a s h i n g t o n D C . 2 D a v i d C u l b e r t , " W h y We Fight: Social E n g i n e e r i n g f o r a D e m o c r a t i c Society at W a r , " in K . R . M . S h o r t , ed., Film and Radio Propaganda in World War II ( L o n d o n : C r o o m H e l m , 1983), 189, n l 4 . 3 R o b e r t Sklar, Movie- Made America: A Cultural History of American Movies ( N e w York: R a n d o m H o u s e , 1975), 197. 4 K u l e s h o v ' s f a m o u s film of t h e 1924 satirizes w h a t h a p p e n s to Mr. West, an i n n o c e n t a b r o a d in t h e Soviet U n i o n . 5 F r a n k C a p r a , The Name Above The Title: An Autobiography ( N e w York: V i n t a g e , 1985 [1971]) a n d J o s e p h M c B r i d e , Frank Capra: The Catastrophe of Success ( L o n d o n : F a b e r a n d F a b e r , 1992). M c B r i d e is a relentless critic w h o s e i m p o r t a n t empirical e v i d e n c e c a t c h e s C a p r a ' s e a c h a n d every evasion or omission. O m i s s i o n s , r e o r d e r e d chronology, c o m p r e s sion of time, claims of i g n o r a n c e a r e all r e c o g n i z e d a t t r i b u t e s of life histories; C a p r a ' s r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of c o n v e r s a t i o n s c o m p l e t e with d i a l o g u e suggests t h a t oral c o r r e l a t i o n . Yet C a p r a ' s o w n w o r d s r e m a i n u s e f u l in assessing t h e way in which h e c o n s t r u c t s his o w n i d e n tity in H o l l y w o o d fashion, especially in an a r e a as sensitive as his r e l a t i o n s with t h e R u s s i a n s t u r n s out t o be. A s a literate c h r o n i c l e r of H o l l y w o o d r e m a r k s , " H o l l y w o o d p e o ple lived a n d still live in a world of fantasy, a n d t h e y a r e a c c u s t o m e d t o m a k i n g t h i n g s up,

3 9 4 • Marsha

Sieferl

t o fibbing a n d e x a g g e r a t i n g , and t o believing all their own fibs and e x a g g e r a t i o n s " as did t h e press a g e n t s , f a n - m a g a z i n e writers, ghostwriters. O t t o Friedrich, City of Nets: A Portrait of Hollywood in the 1940s ( N e w York: H a r p e r and Row, 1986), xiii. O n oral and life history see A l e s s a n d r o Porteiii. ' ' W h a t M a k e s O r a l H i s t o r y D i f f e r e n t , " in The Death of Luigi Trastulli and Other Stories: Form and Meaning in Oral History ( M a d i s o n : U n i v e r s i t y of Wisconsin Press, 1995), 4 5 - 5 8 . 6 D e n i s e J. Y o u n g b l o o d , " A m e r i c a n i t i s : A m e r i c a n Film Influences in Russia," Journal Popular Film and Television 19, no. 4 (1992): 149-50. 7 D e n i s e J. Y o u n g b l o o d , Movies for the Masses: Popular Cinema and Soviet 1920s ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e University Press, 1992), 20 t a b l , 50, 6 1 - 6 7 .

Society

of

in the

8 I a n Christie, " M a k i n g S e n s e of E a r l y Soviet S o u n d , " in R i c h a r d Taylor and I a n Christie, eds.. Inside the Film Factory: New Approaches to Russian and Soviet Cinema ( L o n d o n : R o u t l e d g e , 1991), 180-187; Stalin's role was claimed by Boris S h u m i a t s k i i , Kinematografiya millionov (Moscow, 1935) cited at 186; P e t e r Kenez, Cinema and Soviet Society, 1907-1953, n e w e d . ( L o n d o n : I.B. Tauris, 2001), chaps. 4, 5. 9 Y o u n g b l o o d , Movies for the Masses, 6 6 - 6 7 . 10 Kristin T h o m p s o n , " E i s e n s t e i n ' s E a r l y Films A b r o a d , " in lan Christie and R i c h a r d Taylor, eds., Eisenstein Rediscovered ( L o n d o n : R o u t l e d g e . 1993), 59-63; Paul B a b i t s k y and J o h n R i m b e r g , The Soviet Film Industry ( N e w York: Frederick A . P r a e g e r , 1955), 68-69. 11 Ian Christie, " I n t r o d u c t i o n , " to R i c h a r d Taylor and Ian Christie, eds.. The Film Factory: Russian and Soviet Cinema in Documents ( C a m b r i d g e : H a r v a r d University Press, 1988), 7. 12 Figures t a k e n f r o m B a b i t s k y and R i m b e r g , Soviet Film Industry, 251-253. 13 D o u g l a s G o m e r y , Shared Pleasures: A History of Movie Presentation in the United States ( L o n d o n : B F I , 1992), 178. 14 T h o m p s o n , " E i s e n s t e i n ' s Early Films A b r o a d , " 60. 15 M o s t H o l l y w o o d s t u d i o h e a d s w e r e m a j o r s t o c k h o l d e r s in their c o m p a n i e s and w e r e usually d e f e r r e d to in c r e a t i v e m a t t e r s but w e r e ultimately a c c o u n t a b l e to and s e r v e d at t h e s u f f e r a n c e of a b o a r d of d i r e c t o r s in N e w York. Neil G a b l e r , Empire of their Own: How the Jews Invented Hollywood ( L o n d o n : W.H. Allen, 1989), 181. 16 G a b l e r . Empire, 322-328; h e r e 325, 326; R o n a l d B r o w n s t e i n , The Power and the Glitter: The Hollywood-Washington Connection ( N e w York: P a n t h e o n , 1990), 5 0 - 5 1 . 17 C h a r l e s J. M a l a n d , Chaplin and American Culture.The Evolution of a Star Image ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1989), 91, 386 73n; R o b e r t C. A l l e n a n d D o u g l a s G o mery, Film History: Theory and Practice ( N e w York: K n o p f , 1985), 9 1 - 1 0 5 . 18 D i s c u s s i o n s of the M G M O c t o b e r 1926 m e m o by f u t u r e p r o d u c e r D a r y l F. Z a n u c k o n t h e i n n o v a t i o n of Potemkin a r e r e c o u n t e d in Ian Christie, " I n t r o d u c t i o n , " t o R i c h a r d Taylor a n d Ian C h r i s t i e , eds.. The Film Factory: Russian and Soviet Cinema in Documents, 1896-1939 ( C a m b r i d g e : H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1988), 5 - 6 ; F r i e d r i c h , City of Nets, 250-251; G a b l e r , Empire, 320. 19 For d e t a i l s of E i s e n s t e i n ' s visit, see M a r i e S e t o n , Sergei M. Eisenstein ( N e w Y o r k : A . A . Wyn, 1960), 156-192. N o t a b l e a t t e m p t s at c o o p e r a t i o n include the 1932 C o m i n t e r n - s p o n s o r e d film p r o j e c t in English entitled " B l a c k and White," involving L a n g s t o n H u g h e s a n d E i s e n s t e i n ' s 1934 d e s i r e t o star Paul R o b e s o n in Black Majesty, a film o n T o u s s s a i n t L ' O u v e r t u r e , t h e l i b e r a t o r of Haiti. A l l i s o n Blakely, Russia and the Negro: Blacks in Russian History and Thought ( W a s h i n g t o n , D C : H o w a r d University Press, 1986), 9 1 - 9 8 . 20 M a l a n d , Chaplin, 189; Ian Christie, " I n t r o d u c t i o n , " in Ian Christie a n d R i c h a r d Taylor, eds., Eisenstein Rediscovered ( L o n d o n : R o u t l e d g e , 1993), 3. 21 See for e x a m p l e J . D . P a r k s , Culture, Conflict and Coexistence: American-Soviet Cultural Relations, 1917-1958 ( J e f f e r s o n : M c F a r l a n d . 1983), 40 and F r e d e r i c k G. B a r g h o o r n , The Soviet Cultural Offensive: The Role of Cultural Diplomacy in Soviet Foreign Policy ( W e s t p o r t , C o n n . : G r e e n w o o d , 1976 [I960]), 5 3 - 5 6 .

Notes-

395

22 C a p r a , Name. 161; M c B r i d e . Catastrophe, 284-286; C a p r a r e c o u n t s t h e plot in R i c h a r d G l a t z e r and J o h n R a e b u r n , eds., Frank Capra: The Man and His Films ( A n n A r b o r : U n i v e r s i t y of Michigan Press. 1975). 27-28. A t this p o i n t in his c a r e e r , t h e " d r e a m c a s t " in an " a r t i s t i c " film at a m a j o r s t u d i o with A c a d e m y A w a r d p o t e n t i a l s e e m s m o r e likely t h a n politics as a r e a s o n for c h o o s i n g "Soviet." Prior to " S o v i e t , " C a p r a m a d e The Bitter Tea of General Yen (1931) p o r t r a y i n g t h e lust of a C h i n e s e g e n e r a l for a white missionary w o m a n as his O s c a r h o p e . C a p r a , Name, 140. 23 M i c h a e l J. S t r a d a a n d H a r o l d R. T r o p e r , Friend or Foe? Russans in American Foreign Policy, ¡939-1991 ( L a n h a m : S c a r e c r o w Press, 1997), c h a p . 1.

Film

and

24 Julian G r a f f y , " C i n e m a , " in C a t r i o n a Kelly and D a v i d S h e p h e r d , eds., Russian Culture: An ( O x f o r d : O x f o r d University Press, 1988), 174. O n the successive r e o r g a n i z a Introduction t i o n s of the Soviet film industry, see K e n e z , Cinema, c h a p . 6 a n d B a b i t s k y a n d R i m b e r g , Soviet Film Industry, chap. 1. 25 R i c h a r d Taylor, " I d e o l o g y as M a s s E n t e r t a i n m e n t : B o r i s S c h u m y a t s k y a n d Soviet C i n e m a in t h e 1930s," in R i c h a r d Taylor and Ian Christie, eds.. Inside the Film Factory: New Approaches to Russian and Soviet Cinema ( L o n d o n : R o u t l e d g e , 1991), 203-209. 26 E r m l e r ' s film Peasants (1934) was a w a r d e d t h e O r d e r of L e n i n in 1935, p r e s u m a b l y a r e a son he was c h o s e n for the d e l e g a t i o n . 27 B a b i t s k y and R i m b e r g , Soviet Film Industry, 258. 28 M a l a n d , Chaplin, 146. This Pravda article c a u s e d C h a p l i n m u c h t r o u b l e w h e n it was t r a n s lated a n d p u b l i s h e d in New Masses, a "social r a d i c a l " j o u r n a l , a n d later publicized by the New York Times. M a l a n d , Chaplin, 137, 145-147, 3 9 2 - 3 9 3 , n 4 1 - 4 2 . 29 C a p r a says t h a t he played host as P r e s i d e n t , a l t h o u g h he was not elected such until O c t o b e r 9 of t h a t year. Name, 205. •'« New York Times (5 J u n e 1935). " " M r . S h u m i a t s k y on A m e r i c a n Films," New York Times (4 A u g u s t 1935), sec. 9, 3. 32 G r a f f y , " C i n e m a " , 179; Taylor, "Ideology," 213-214. A relatively c o n t e m p o r a r y e m p i r i c a l s t u d y of the relative d i s t r i b u t i o n of art, e n t e r t a i n m e n t a n d p r o p a g a n d a in 750 Soviet films f r o m 1921-1953 c o n c l u d e d t h a t i n d e e d the t h r e e e l e m e n t s w e r e p r e s e n t in films t h r o u g h out t h e p e r i o d . H o w e v e r e a c h P a r t y a t t e m p t to i n c r e a s e t h e p r o p a g a n d a c o m p o n e n t r e s u l t e d in a decline in p r o d u c t i o n , which t h e a u t h o r c r e d i t s t o b o t h artist a n d a u d i e n c e resistance. J o h n D a v i d R i m b e r g , The Motion Picture in the Soviet Union: 1918-1952: A Sociological Analysis ( N e w York: A m o , 1973 [1959]), 105-110. 33 B e c a u s e of t h e t w e n t i e t h a n n i v e r s a r y of t h e R e v o l u t i o n , 1937 was e x p e c t e d t o be a b a n n e r y e a r for t o u r i s m ; by July the a t t i t u d e h a d b e g u n t o cool. Parks, Culture, 60. 34 M a d e with G r i g o r i i M. Kozintsev, The Youth of Maxim (1934), The Return of Maxim (1937) and The Vyborg Side (1938) p o r t r a y t h e political e d u c a t i o n of a R u s s i a n p r o l e t a r i an f r o m the 1905 R e v o l u t i o n t o b e c o m i n g a p e o p l e ' s c o m m i s s a r . 35 C a p r a , Name, 205-213. T h e All U n i o n S t a t e C i n e m a Institute (Vsesoyuznii g o s u d a r s t vennyi institut k i n e m a t o g r a f i or V G I K ) , f o u n d e d in 1934, a t t r a c t e d f o r e i g n a d m i r a t i o n , not least b e c a u s e it signaled t h a t film was t a k e n seriously as an " a r t , " as e v i d e n c e d by K u r t L o n d o n ' s positive r e p o r t o n its c u r r i c u l u m a f t e r a 1936 visit. The Seven Soviet Arts, trans. E r i c S. B e n s i n g e r , r e p r i n t of 1937 ed. ( W e s t p o r t , C o n n . ; G r e e n w o o d Press, 1970), 281-285. C a p r a also m e n t i o n s positively S h u m i a t s k i i ' s a s s u r a n c e t h a t his films w e r e s e e n and s t u d ied in t h e M o s c o w film school. Jay L e y d a , f u t u r e film h i s t o r i a n w h o s t u d i e d t h e r e with E i s e n s t e i n d u r i n g 1933-36 was a link t o N e w York i n t e l l e c t u a l s w h o w e r e i n t e r e s t e d in a p o t e n t i a l N e w York film school and o t h e r Soviet cultural activities. D a v i d Stirk a n d E l e n a Pinot S i m o n , "Jay L e y d a and Bezhin M e a d o w , " in Ian C h r i s t i e a n d R i c h a r d Taylor, eds., Eisenstein Rediscovered ( L o n d o n : R o u t l e d g e , 1993), in 4 3 - 4 5 . 36 A l e k s a n d r o v ' s first musical The Happy Guys (1934) was p r a i s e d by S h u m i a t s k i i a n d in Circus (1936) an A m e r i c a n f e m a l e circus p e r f o r m e r w h o had given birth to a black b a b y

3 9 6 • Marsha

Siefert

is b e f r i e n d e d by a Soviet h e r o . A l e k s a n d r o v ' s style e v i d e n c e s his six m o n t h s in H o l l y w o o d . G r a f f y , " C i n e m a , " 175; R i c h a r d Stites, Russian Popular Culture ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1992), 8 8 - 9 2 . 37 Will H. H a y s was t h e h e a d ( i n f o r m a l l y t h e "film t s a r " ) of t h e M o t i o n P i c t u r e P r o d u c e r s a n d D i s t r i b u t o r s of A m e r i c a ( M P P D A ) , colloquially k n o w n as the H a y s Office, t h e organ i z a t i o n r e s p o n s i b l e f o r e x p o r t i n g A m e r i c a n films, b e t w e e n 1922 a n d 1945. H e r e t h e refe r e n c e is t o the role of his office in e n f o r c i n g the Film P r o d u c t i o n C o d e , which p r o v i d e d r e s t r i c t i o n s for w h a t c o u l d be said or p o r t r a y e d on screen, particularly with r e f e r e n c e t o sex, drugs, m i s c e g e n a t i o n a n d nudity. T h e c o d e has b e e n linked to t h e c o m i n g of s o u n d , a n d t h e d o u b l e e n t e n d r e s of M a e West a n d the M a r x brothers. H o w e v e r , it had an i m p o r t a n t e c o n o m i c i m p e r a t i v e : n o t o f f e n d i n g p o t e n t i a l a u d i e n c e s for A m e r i c a n films, especially a b r o a d . With r e g a r d to C a p r a ' s films, it is said t h a t sales of u n d e r s h i r t s d r o p p e d w h e n C l a r k G a b l e r e v e a l e d he was n o t w e a r i n g o n e in It Happened One Night (1934) a n d C a p r a e x p l a i n e d that he m a d e b u s i n e s s m e n villains b e c a u s e they were the only c o n s t i t u e n c y left w i t h o u t a s t r o n g lobby t o p r o t e s t t h e i r p o r t r a y a l . Ian Jarvie, Hollywood's Overseas Campaign: The North Atlantic Movie Trade, 1920-1950 ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1992), chaps. 9 - 1 1 , esp. 336; Christie, " M a k i n g Sense of Sound," 186; Clayton R . K o p p e s a n d G r e g o r y D. B l a c k , Hollywood Goes to War: How Politics, Profits, and Propaganda Shaped World War II Movies ( N e w York: F r e e Press, 1987), chap. 1. 38 G. A l e k s a n d r o v a n d V. Nil'sen, " K a k delaiutsia a m e r i k a n s k i e fil'my," Izvestiia (16 M a y 1937). M c B r i d e chastises C a p r a ' s q u o t e d praise but neglects Riskin's similar q u o t e d accolades. 39 C a p r a , Name, 209. A n o t h e r version h a s C a p r a m e e t i n g E i s e n s t e i n at a p u b l i c g a t h e r i n g , i s o l a t e d f r o m his c o l l e a g u e s . S e t o n , Eisenstein, 371. M c B r i d e d e v o t e s a large p o r t i o n of his a c c o u n t of C a p r a ' s R u s s i a n trip to C a p r a ' s m i s t a k e n i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the E i s e n s t e i n film a n d a p s y c h o l o g i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of his identification with E i s e n s t e i n as a g r e a t filmmaker. 40 Taylor, " S h u m y a t s k y , " 206-207; P e t e r Kenez, "Soviet C i n e m a in the A g e of Stalin," in R i c h a r d Taylor and D e r e k Spring, eds., Stalinism and Cinema ( L o n d o n : R o u t l e d g e , 1993), 2 3 8 , 2 1 n . Nil'sen was listed as " s c e n a r i s t " in the casualty list of Sovetskii ekran 1 (1989), 23. His b o o k The Cinema as a Graphic Art was published in English in 1936. Jay L e y d a , " A d Quarterly 1, no. 3 ( A p r i l 1946), 282. v a n c e d Training for Film W o r k e r s : Russia," Hollywood 41 D i s c u s s e d in Christie, " I n t r o d u c t i o n , " Film Factory, 42 See, e.g., B r o w n s t e i n , Power and Glitter, 6 6 - 7 0 .

8-10.

43 F o r m o r e o n Soviet d o c u m e n t a r i e s see S.V. D r o b a s h e n k o , "Film P r o p a g a n d a in t h e Soviet U n i o n , 1941-1945," in K . R . M . S h o r t , Film and Radio Propaganda in World War II ( L o n d o n : C r o o m H e l m , 1983); D.W. Spring, "Soviet N e w s r e e l and t h e G r e a t P a t r i o t i c W a r , " in N. P r o n a y a n d D.W. Spring, eds., Propaganda, Politics and Film, 1918-1945 (Lond o n : M a c m i l l a n , 1982). 44 K e n e z , Cinema,

165-170.

45 T h e films w e r e 100 Men and a Girl, The Great Waltz. Champagne Night, Three Musketeers, In Old Chicago, Under Your Spell.

Waltz,

Give

Us

This

46 Jarvie, Hollywood's Overseas Campaign, 354. 47 G o s u d a r s t v e n n y i a r k h i v Rossiiskoi F e d e r a t s i i [ h e r e a f t e r G A R F ] , f. 5283, op. 1, d.3,11.1-6; A.V. G o l u b e v and V.A. N e v e z h i n , " V O K S v 1930-1940-e gody," Minuvshee. Istorischesky Al'manach 14 ( M o s c o w : A t h e n e u m - F e n i k s , 1993): 3 1 3 - 3 6 4 and V.I. F o k i n , Mezhdunarodnyi kul'turnyi obmen i SSSR v 20-30 gody (St. P e t e r s b u r g : I z d a t e l ' s t v o S a n k t - P e t e r s b u r g s k o g o U n i v e r s i t e t , 1999), c h a p . 3. 48 T h e c o m p l i c a t e d r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n the military, o t h e r g o v e r n m e n t agencies, o v e r s e a s a g e n c i e s a n d the H o l l y w o o d s t u d i o s are t r e a t e d by K o p p e s and B l a c k , Hollywood, chaps. 3 - 5 ; Jarvie, Hollywood's Overseas Campaign, 194-95, 357-58, 375.

Notes

• 397

49 G A R F , f. 5283. op. 14, d. 122,11. 2, 5 - 8 . 50 This film on t h e C h i c a g o fire was t h e first A m e r i c a n film t o b e publicly e x h i b i t e d d u r i n g t h e war. L e y d a , Kino, 379. A p o c k e t b o o k of t h e script was also circulated as " a u d i e n c e e d u c a t i o n . " L e y d a , " A d v a n c e d Training," 284. 51 G A R F . f. 5283, op. 14, d. 122, II. 4 8 - 5 3 . 52 G A R F , f. 5283, op. 14, d. 122, II. 124-131 ( B o l ' s h a k o v ) , II. 177-188 ( E i s e n s t e i n ) , 11. 8 6 - 9 1 ( K e m e n o v ) , II. 162-64 ( P u d o v k i n ) . D o r z h e n k o a n d n e w s r e e l c a m e r a m a n R o m a n K a r m e n also s p o k e . 53 C a p r a , Name, 289; Sklar, Movie-Made America, 215. 54 Todd B e n n e t t , " C u l t u r e , P o w e r , and Mission to Moscow. Film a n d S o v i e t - A m e r i c a n R e l a t i o n s d u r i n g World W a r II," Journal of American History ( S e p t e m b e r 2001), 513. C o n f i r m a t i o n of this r o u t e for Stalin's f a v o r i t e film, The Great Waltz, is o f f e r e d in A n d r e i H o n c h a l o v s k y a n d A l e x a n d e r Lipkov, The Inner Circle: An Inside View of Soviet Life Under Stalin ( N e w York: N e w m a r k e t , 1991), 34 55 Jay L e y d a , Kino: A History of the Russian and Soviet Film, 3 r d ed. ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n University Press. 1983), 380. 56 T h o m a s D o h e r t y , Projections of War: Hollywood, American Culture and World War II ( N e w York: C o l u m b i a U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1993), 51. 57 C a p r a films h a v e a large critical l i t e r a t u r e , with a lineage in A m e r i c a n studies as well as film studies. See, e.g., Sklar, Movie-Made America, 2 0 5 - 2 1 1 ; L a w r e n c e W. Levine, "Film I m a g e s D u r i n g t h e G r e a t D e p r e s s i o n , " in The Unpredictable Past: Explorations in American Cultural History ( N e w York: O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1993), 249-254. 58 B e n n e t t , " M i s s i o n , " 511-513: see also D a v i d C u l b e r t , ed., Mission to Moscow ( M a d i s o n : University of Wisconsin Press, 1980), 11-41. 59 U n l e s s o t h e r w i s e s t a t e d , t h e f a c t u a l details on t h e film's p r o d u c t i o n c o m e f r o m M c B r i d e , Catastrophe, c h a p . 16 a n d C u l b e r t , " W h y We Fight." 60 Jarvie, Hollywood's Overseas Campaign, 356. 61 This r e l a t i o n reflects a 1930s H o l l y w o o d p r a c t i c e w h e r e b y E u r o p e a n d i r e c t o r s w e r e c h o sen to direct E u r o p e a n stars o r s u b j e c t s only s o m e t i m e s m a t c h e d by nationality. E r n s t L u b i t s c h , for e x a m p l e , was a s k e d t o work o n Know Your Enemy: Germany. J o h n Russell Taylor, Strangers in Paradise: The Hollywood Émigrés, 1933-1950 ( N e w York: H o l t , R i n e h a r t and W i n s t o n . 1983), 208. 62 K o p p e s and B l a c k , Hollywood,

27-30.

63 G r i e r s o n ' s initial a p p r o v a l a n d s p o n s o r s h i p of Soviet film, again s p u r r e d by Potemkin, d i m i n i s h e d by 1935 i n t o a " t h e o r y of decline," not dissimilar to M a c d o n a l d ' s j u d g m e n t . See. e.g., Christie, " M a k i n g Sense," 176. N o n e t h e l e s s , t h e i m p a c t was a c k n o w l e d g e d , as his cable t o the 1942 V O K S c o n f e r e n c e suggests. 64 65 66 67

K o p p e s and B l a c k , Hollywood, 233. C u l b e r t , " W h y We Fight," 175. Stirk a n d S i m o n , " L e y d a , " 52. Q u o t e d in M c B r i d e , Catastrophe, 471-472.

68 S a n f o r d says t h a t C a p r a ' s r e j e c t i o n was plain: " W e w e r e notified that you w e r e t o o ' r e d ' . " John S a n f o r d , A Very Good Land to Fall With: Scenes from the Life of an American Jew, vol. 3 ( S a n t a R o s a , Cal.: Black S p a r r o w Press, 1987), 229. A n t h o n y Veiller, w h o also r e a d the n a r r a t i o n , p r e p a r e d the final script. 69 " G o v e r n m e n t I n f o r m a t i o n M a n u a l for t h e M o t i o n P i c t u r e Industry," (8 J u n e 1942) O W I R e c o r d s , R G 208, N a t i o n a l Archives. 70 John B a r b e r a n d M a r k H a r r i s o n , The Soviet Home Front, 1941-1945: A Social and Economic History of the USSR in World War II (Essex: L o n g m a n , 1991), 69, 69 n34, 70. They also cite B i d l a c k ' s 1987 analysis of L e n i n g r a d n e w s p a p e r c o v e r a g e of 14 m o n t h s flanking 1942 in which g r e a t figures of t h e past, e x p l o i t s of t h e R e d A r m y , G e r m a n atroci-

398 • Marsha

Siefen

ties, and the heroic traditions of Leningrad account for a majority of the topics: the Party constituted only 13 of the 328 topics. Kenez suggests that the "turning from Marxist internationalism to old-fashioned [Russian] patriotism" began in the late 1930s, before the war. Kenez, "Black and White," 170. 71 Wartime Soviet feature films also heroize partisans for dramatic possibilities. She Defends Her Country, Donskoi's Rainbow and Zoia, the first two distributed in the US, feature solo heroines. Kenez, "Black and White," 167-169. Hollywood's Russia requires romance, however, so all her heroines are accompanied by a love interest and the women are disproportionately musical and "on their toes." 72 Barber and Harrison, Soviet Home Front, 70-73. 73 See Sarah Kozloff, Invisible Storytellers: Voice-Over Narration in American Fiction Film (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 31. 74 Kenez, "Black and White," 163. These cadanced catalogues of places had been used in documentary as early as 1929 in the Soviet film, Turksib. Eric Barnouw, Documentary: A History of Non-Fiction Film (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), 120. 75 Kenez, "Black and White," 162-63. 76 Bohn, A Historical and Descriptive Analysis, 209; Capra later denied he used reenactments or even in some cases feature films. Peter C. Rollins, "Birth of a Film Genre," World & I (June 1995), 96. 77 McBride, Catastrophe, 456-57. According to McBride, this sum was less than one percent of the War Department expenditure of $50 million on films; most was spent on combat photography and training films. Capra's unit made at least 15 films. See, for example, William J. Blakefield, "A War Within: The Making of Know Your Enemy-Japan," Sight_and Sound 52 (1983): 128-133; Thomas Cripps and David Culbert, "The Negro Soldier_{\944)\ Film Propaganda in Black and White," American Quarterly 31. (1978): 616-646 and Tony Aldgate, "Mr. Capra Goes to War: Frank Capra, the British Army Film Unit, and AngloAmerican Travails in the Production of 'Tunisian Victory'," Historical Journal of Film, Radio & Television 11, no.l (1991): 2 1 ^ 0 . 78 McBride, Catastrophe, 487-488; Capra, Name, 347. The description of his visits to the Embassy is much more extensive in the uncut version of his autobiography, describing his attempts to obtain footage from the Soviets as a game in which he never scored. Uncut manuscript, Frank Capra Archives, Wesleyan University. 79 Bohn, A Historical and Descriptive Analysis, 106, 208. The rest of the series relied heavily on the Fox-Movietone News Library and Pathe Newsreels. O n e estimate is that 15 to 20 million feet were culled to produce the film. 80 Some Soviet documentaries were released in the US, most probably to specialized newsreel theaters. Gomery, Shared Pleasures. 152. The Defeat of the German Armies Near Moscow was narrated in English by Edward G. Robinson as Moscow Strikes Back, winning a special Oscar in 1942. Richard Stites, Russian Popular Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 112. Other documentaries distributed in the US included The Russian People and The Siege of Leningrad. Peter Kenez, "Black and White: The War on Film," in R. Stites, ed.. Culture and Entertainment in Wartime Russia (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994); 161,12n. 81 Kenez, "Black and White," 162-163. 82 Conductor's score and Music Cue Sheet, The Battle of Russia, Dmitri Tiomkin Collection, Cinema-TV Library Archive of Cinema and Television Music, University of Southern California; Richard Taruskin, Defining Russia Musically (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). For the significance of music in cueing the narrative and emotional mood see Claudia G o r b m a n , Unheard Melodies: Narrative Film Music (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 73,82-91. On the use of classical music and folk songs as cues, see Royal S. Brown, Overtones and Undertones: Reading Film Music (Berkeley:

Notes

• 399

U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1994), chap. 2 a n d 54. For a p r o v o c a t i v e analysis of h o w S t r a v i n s k y ' s '"Rite of S p r i n g " is also p a i r e d with the J a p a n e s e in a n o t h e r C a p r a unit film, Know Your Enemy-Japan, see A n t h o n y S h e p p a r d , " A n E x o t i c E n e m y : A n t i - J a p a n c c Musical P r o p a g a n d a in World W a r II H o l l y w o o d , " Journal of the American_Musicological Society 54, no. 2 (2001): 3 0 4 - 3 5 7 , h e r e 312-321. W h e n D m i t r i T i o m k i n , A c a d e m y A w a r d w i n n i n g c o m p o s e r f o r such A m e r i c a n classics as High Noon a n d Duel in the Sun, was a s k e d h o w as a R u s s i a n he could write such A m e r i c a n W e s t e r n tunes, he r e p l i e d "A s h t e p p e is a s h t e p p e . " 83 E x p e r i m e n t s described in Carl I. H o v l a n d , A r t h u r A. L u m s d a i n e and Fred Sheffield, Experiments on Mass Communication, vol. 3 ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n University Press, 1949). 84 R a l p h B. Levering, American Opinion and the Russian Alliance, 1939-1945 U n i v e r s i t y of N o r t h C a r o l i n a Press, 1976), 6 0 - 6 2 , 82, u n n u m b e r e d p h o t o s .

( C h a p e l Hill:

85 K o p p e s and Black, Hollywood, 122-125. It m a y also testify t o their t e m p o r a r i l y resolved w o r k i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p a n d t h e film's " f u l l - l e n g t h f e a t u r e , " as a d v e r t i s e d . 86 The Battle of Russia, T w e n t i e t h - C e n t u r v - F o x press b o o k , Press B o o k C o l l e c t i o n , C i n e m a T V Library. A r c h i v e of C i n e m a a n d Television Music, U n i v e r s i t y of S o u t h e r n C a l i f o r n i a . 87 Nation (30 Oct. 1943); Commonweal (5 Nov. 1943), 72; Time (29 Nov. 1943), 92; A l f r e d Kazin. New York Jew ( N e w York: R a n d o m H o u s e , 1979) q u o t e d in C u l b e r t , " W h y We Fight," 185. 88 L e o n a r d Lyon's (22 A p r i l 1944) c o l u m n q u o t e d in C a p r a , Name, 350. This a c c o u n t is p l a u sible, as Stalin did p r e v i e w n e w films in his o w n p r o j e c t i o n r o o m . R o b e r t C . T u c k e r , Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928-1941 ( N e w York: N o r t o n . 1990), 556. 89 The Battle of Russia p r e s s b o o k ; M c B r i d e , Catastrophe, 489. R o o s e v e l t told M a r s h a l l he was " v e r y pleased to l e a r n of Mr. Stalin's decision." W i n s t o n Churchill also o r d e r e d t h e film to be d i s t r i b u t e d in B r i t a i n . 90 T h e R u s s i a n voice-over was sufficiently loud to d r o w n t h e musical score. H o w e v e r , f r o m o n e v i e w i n g t h e script a p p e a r e d t o be a d i r e c t t r a n s l a t i o n f r o m t h e E n g l i s h with t h e s u b s t i t u t i o n of U k r a i n i a n for "little R u s s i a n . " T h a n k s to O k s a n a S a r k i s o v a for o b t a i n i n g a copy of the R u s s i a n v e r s i o n . 91 A n a c c o u n t of t h e film p r o j e c t e m p h a s i z i n g A m b a s s a d o r S t a n d l e y ' s recollections is given in P a r k s , Culture, 8 4 - 8 7 , 9 5 - 9 9 . A n a c c o u n t a r g u i n g t h e i m p o r t a n c e of Mission to Moscow in p e r s u a d i n g the Soviet film l e a d e r s h i p to d i s t r i b u t e s o m e U S f e a t u r e films to the p u b l i c is given in B e n n e t t , " M i s s i o n , " 510-517. T h e list of films a n d e s t i m a t e d a u d i e n c e n u m b e r s for p r e l i m i n a r y s c r e e n i n g s a p p e a r s in J o h n P a t o n Davies, " M o t i o n P i c t u r e P r o g r a m for S S R , " M e m o r a n d u m t o S e c r e t a r y of State, 18 F e b r u a r y 1946 no. 2449, 861.4061, R e c o r d G r o u p 9, U S D e p t . of State, N a t i o n a l A r c h i v e s , W a s h i n g t o n D C . r e p r i n t e d in C u l b e r t , Mission to Moscow, 2 6 2 - 2 6 4 . T h e f o r e i g n film t o m a k e t h e m o s t s e r i o u s impression was B r i t i s h — N o e l C o w a r d ' s In Which We Serve. L e y d a , Kino, 380. 92 E a c h of the m a j o r H o l l y w o o d studios h a d a " R u s s i a n film" d u r i n g t h e war. K o p p e s a n d Black, Hollywood, c h a p . 7. 93 The Battle of Russia file, F r a n k C a p r a Archives, W e s l e y a n University. 94 A r e c e n t c o m m e n t a t o r h a s insightfully c o m p a r e d C a p r a ' s 1930s T i b e t a n Utopia to C h a y a nov's. See T o m Brass. " P o p u l a r C u l t u r e , Populist Fiction(s): T h e A g r a r i a n U t o p i a s of A . V. C h a y a n o v , I g n a t i u s D o n n e l l y a n d F r a n k C a p r a , " Journal of Peasant Studies 24, nos. 1 - 2 (1996-97): 153-190. 95 In his a u t o b i o g r a p h y C a p r a a t t r i b u t e s these s e n t i m e n t s t o his c o - w r i t e r Riskin. 96 O t h e r of the n u m e r o u s V O K S w a r t i m e activities a r e d e s c r i b e d in Parks, Culture, 9 0 - 9 4 ; B a r g h o o r n , Soviet Cultural Offensive. 162-164; F o k i n , Mezhdunarodnyi kul'turnyi, c h a p . 3. 97 R e p r i n t e d in E r i c S m o o d i n a n d A n n M a r t i n , eds., Hollywood Quarterly: Film Culture in Postwar America, 1945-1957 ( B e r k e l e y : U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 2002), l . T h e editors specifically cite t h e Why We Fight films as e x e m p l i f y i n g t h e s e goals.

4 0 0 • Marsha

Siefert

98 C u l b e r t , Mission to Moscow, 27. L e y d a must have felt the n e w e n v i r o n m e n t keenly, as he had b e e n f o r c e d to resign f r o m t h e M u s e u m of M o d e r n A r t in the spring of 1940 for his d e f e n s e of Soviet film. Stirk a n d S i m o n , "Jay L e y d a , " 52. 99 B e n n e t t , " M i s s i o n , " 5 1 6 - 5 1 7 ; J.P. Davies, " M e m o , " Parks, Culture, 9 6 - 9 9 , b a s e d on U S S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t m e m o s . P a r k s suggests that a n o t h e r reason f o r t h e d i s r u p t i o n of t h e feat u r e film e x c h a n g e was t h e p r i v a t e c o n t r a c t b e t w e e n the U S film s t u d i o R K O and t h e Soviet U n i o n . R K O w o u l d s u p p l y A m e r i c a n f e a t u r e films to the Soviet U n i o n a n d provided direct Soviet access at t h e i r discretion t o A m e r i c a n m a r k e t s . T h e d e a l fell t h r o u g h u n d e r US g o v e r n m e n t p r e s s u r e b u t is a r e m i n d e r that the U S film s t u d i o s o f t e n acted as i n d e p e n d e n t players. M G M h a d a t t e m p t e d s o m e t h i n g similar with t h e Soviet U n i o n in t h e early 1930s. T h e n e w d e a l was a r r a n g e d t h r o u g h the M P A A and its new P r e s i d e n t , Eric Johnston. 100 V s e v o l o d P u d o v k i n , " T h e G l o b a l Film," Hollywood

Quarterly

101 D e t a i l s f r o m L e y d a , Kino, 3 8 8 - 3 9 7 , and Kenez, Cinema, 102 G o l u b e i and N e v e z h i n , " V O K S , " 318.

2, no. 4 (July 1947): 330.

194-204,213-215.

103 W a r n e r ' s t e s t i m o n y t o R o b e r t S t r i p l i n g , chief i n v e s t i g a t o r , U S C o n g r e s s , H o u s e , C o m m i t t e e on U n - A m e r i c a n Activities, Hearings Regarding the Communist Infiltration_of the Motion Picture Industry, 80'h Cong., 1« Sess., 20 Oct. 1947, 9 - 1 1 . 3 2 - 3 9 , r e p r i n t e d in C u l b e r t , Mission to Moscow, 2 6 5 - 2 7 6 . Louis B. M a y e r also p l e a d e d i g n o r a n c e of Russia, in spite of having b e e n b o r n t h e r e . Friedrich, City of Nets, 316-317. 1 0 4 S a n f o r d a d m i t t e d he lied to C a p r a a b o u t m e m b e r s h i p w h e n a s k e d b u t also c l a i m e d his script followed t h e U.S. A r m y o r i e n t a t i o n lecture guidelines. 105 M c B r i d e , Catastrophe, 594-604; C a p r a ' s a c c o u n t of the p h o t o g r a p h says h e was "whistling a n d s t a n d i n g in f r o n t of a d o o r w a y with his h a n d s in his pockets," t h e d o o r w a y b e i n g t h e Soviet Embassy. Name, 3 4 6 - 4 8 . T h e p h o t o was r e p r o d u c e d in t h e first edition of C a p r a ' s b o o k but not in t h e 1985 e d i t i o n . 106 D o c u m e n t r e p r o d u c e d in M c B r i d e , Catastrophe, u n n u m b e r e d p h o t o s . 107 Stites, Russian Popular Culture, 125. 108 Babitsky a n d R i m b e r g , Soviet Film Industry, 257. T h e films d o not a p p e a r o n t h e list of 24 A m e r i c a n films f r o m t h e t r o p h y f u n d a p p r o v e d for "closed s c r e e n i n g s " by t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e o n 31 A u g u s t 1938. M e m o r a n d u m r e p r i n t e d in R i c h a r d Taylor, Film Propaganda: Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany, 2 n d rev. e d . ( L o n d o n : I.B. Taurus, 1998), 212. 109 M c B r i d e , Catastrophe, 566-567. 110 Cf. H e r b e r t M a r s h a l l , Masters of Soviet Cinema: Crippled Creative Biographies (London: R o u t l e d g e , 1983). 111 M u s i c was also " r e i n t e r p r e t e d " in the early days of the Cold War. See, e.g., E l i z a b e t h B e r g m a n Crist, " C r i t i c a l Politics: T h e R e c e p t i o n History of A a r o n C o p l a n d ' s T h i r d Symphony," Musical Quarterly 85, no. 2 ( S u m m e r 2001): 232-263. 112 M c B r i d e , Catastrophe,

489; Stites, Russian

Popular

Culture,

125.

113 Rollins, " B i r t h , " 6 4 - 7 4 . 1 1 4 V H S BBS-3-7125 (St. L a u r e n t , Q u e b e c : M a d a c y E n t e r t a i n m e n t , 1997). 115 A l f r e d J. R i e b e r , " T h e F r o n t i e r in History," in Neil J. S m e l s e r a n d Paul B. Bates, eds., International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, 26 vols. ( N e w York: E l s e v i e r Science, 2001), 9:5812-5818. 116 C a p r a , Name,

205.

Khrushchev and the End of the ig62 Cuban Missile Crisis ALEKSANDR

A.

FURSENKO

What was Khrushchev's idea of the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis? Whatever it was, his vision did not correspond to the actual outcome. In 1962 the unprecedented operation "Anadyr"—the delivery of Soviet missiles to Cuba—was completed. 1 Did they know in Moscow that the Americans suspected the presence of offensive missiles in the Soviet military cargoes? Judging by the reports from the American press, the statements of the Republican leaders in the Congress and the reconnaissance data, Moscow was certainly aware of this potential suspicion. It is rather questionable, however, whether Khrushchev really expected such a sharp reaction from the American administration. On the contrary, he must have considered it infeasible for several reasons. First, the US, openly confirming their target, also managed to install their missiles close to Soviet territory in Italy and Turkey. The delivery of weapons to Italy, for instance, was performed in the strictest secrecy in order to avoid any confrontation with the USSR. Thus, Moscow discovered the offensive missiles only after they had been safely shipped. The Soviets did suppose, therefore, that "Anadyr" might go off equally successfully. Second, Khrushchev was sure that Kennedy would not escalate the confrontation to warfare because the Americans had also placed their missiles at the closest Soviet periphery. Moreover, according to Aleksandr I. Alekseev, then the Soviet ambassador to Cuba, Khrushchev regarded Kennedy to be "one of the intelligentsia," incapable of sharp reactions. 2 O.A. Troyanovsky, Khrushchev's advisor on foreign affairs, recalled, on the contrary, that during private conversations Khrushchev did not conceal his worry about the outcome of the operation. His concern grew obvious by the end of summer 1962. 3 After Kennedy's speech on 22 October Khrushchev looked fairly calm, at least for the first three days. Later, however, as the head of the K G B Vladimir E. Semichastny later testified, Khrushchev suddenly saw the speech as a tragedy and said that the "Lenin cause had collapsed." 4 Khrushchev perceived the resolution of the crisis with relief. Not everyone in his administration shared the same opinion. In 1964, when Khrushchev was removed from all his posts, a Special plenum of the Central Committee incriminated him the retreat in the Cuban crisis. Khrushchev's decision to withdraw the

402 • Aleksandr A.

Fursenko

missiles engendered obvious discontent within the military circles, especially a m o n g those who had been involved in "Anadyr." Those in the Presidium of the Central Committee, who had earlier participated in the discussion on the resolution of the crisis and had supported Khrushchev's propositions, similarly criticized his actions. When Khrushchev was being removed, everyone from his entourage with the exception of Mikoyan, tried to find and throw the heaviest stone at their f o r m e r leader. Many blamed him for the Cuban crisis. Unfortunately, no minutes were taken during the discussion on 13 October. Some sketchy notes on the most important meetings taken by V.N. Malin, the head of the General Section of the Central Committee, are the only evidence available in the archives. 5 It is practically impossible to restore the discussion. As far as Semichastny r e m e m b e r e d , his predecessor Shelepin launched the most scathing criticism of Khrushchev's behavior. The latter blamed Khrushchev for the reckless handling of foreign policy during the Suez, Berlin and Cuban crises. 6 Dmitri S. Polyanski, the fourth in the Kremlin hierarchy after Brezhnev, Suslov and Mikoyan, also turned to be unexpectedly zealous in criticizing Khrushchev. While Khrushchev was in power, Polyanski seemed to be one of the heartiest sycophants and used every occasion to emphasize his own importance by standing close to Khrushchev at various meetings and celebrations. In 1964, however, he mercilessly abused his leader. The Central C o m m i t t e e Archives preserved his verbose seventy-page note asking Suslov to use it as one of the sources of the Central C o m m i t t e e Plenum. In this wordy d o c u m e n t Polyanski claimed that Khrushchev, who had previously exposed Stalin's personality cult, attempted in fact to create his own. Thus, Polyanski wrote that C o m r a d e Khrushchev stated complacently that unlike C o m r a d e Stalin he managed to force a way into Latin America. In this light, Khrushchev's callous policy towards Cuba is particularly evident. In one of his speeches Khrushchev said that we would attack the Americans in case they acted aggressively toward Cuba. H e also insisted on the shipment of our missiles. This policy led to the deepest crisis ever and the immediate threat of nuclear warfare; the organizer of this dangerous trick was himself no less frightened. With no way out, we had to accept all of the American demands, including the shameful inspection of our ships. This story, in Polyanski's words, ...not only damaged the Soviet image abroad and d e f a m e d our state, our Party and armed forces but also helped to heighten American prestige. O u r relations with C u b a considerably worsened, since Castro and the C u b a n population viewed the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles as a highly arbi-

End of the Cuban Missile Crisis • 403 trary and cruel act. But you know, of course, that C o m r a d e Khrushchev calls this retreat a victory. Moreover, he is going to further use the same indiscriminate policy. Recently, he told the Central Committee m e m b e r s the following: "It is essential to conclude a mutual aid treaty with Cuba. They would cry hell again but I do not care." Suslov did not use Polyanski's deliberations in his speech at the Plenum in October. Contrary to Polyanski's aspirations, they did not file the note in the Plenum materials either. The note was returned to the author and Polyanski's zeal went unnoticed. Despite the optimistic speech delivered by Khrushchev at the Central Committee Plenum on 23 November, the Cuban crisis provoked an extremely powerful and lasting shock within the Soviet administration. According to Semichastny, the high ranking army officers went home only "three days later," after having received the telegrams from Kennedy and "the Soviet intelligence data." "We returned to our homes, but it did not mean that the crisis was over. I think that the crisis continued at least for several months afterwards. As to Khrushchev, he was an old hand. He used to escape the most difficult situations; he always kept his face and never admitted losses. This time again, he pretended that nothing extraordinary had happened. On the contrary, he said that we all had won." 7 Khrushchev kept his usual outward composure. However, being an experienced politician, he could not but realize that the Cuban gambit was for the most part lost. The worsened relation with Cuba and the moral humiliation inflicted on him by "Kennedythe-intellectual" was a painful blow to Khrushchev's imperial ambitions. The Cuban operation was initiated exclusively by Khrushchev. Its implementation, however, meant the involvement of the military that definitely liked the idea. The Soviet military pursued their own interests in this case. They, together with the American generals, were sorry that the "trial war" had been postponed. As a result, the Soviets had to retreat and reconsider their attitude to the United States and NATO allies. The tension of the Cold War, having reached its peak during the Cuban crisis, made further peace negotiations possible. Nevertheless, this perspective hardly matched the belligerent intentions of the Party and military cliques. Khrushchev's speech in N o v e m b e r fully demonstrated this irreconcilable position. The speech itself was a combination of bluff, on the one hand, and a t t e m p t s to justify the forced agreements on the other. However, this problem was never discussed, no decision was m a d e and the text of the speech was never published. As Khrushchev put it, "We were planning to prepare the report, but then left the idea unrealized, since the events acquired a drawn-out character. When everything became clear, it was too late. Thus, I am going to speak impromptu." Khrushchev began his speech with the warning that he was not speaking " f o r the press" and asked editors to give their word that they would not publish this speech. What m a d e Khrushchev pronounce this warning? H e maintained, that due to the Cuban crisis, "we have passed a very important milestone in the devel-

404 • Aleksandr A. Fursenko o p m e n t of the Soviet state. ...We passed it with honor, peace and fairly good results. Still, some unwise and shortsighted people, who call themselves MarxistLeninists, are criticizing us, claiming that we have capitulated before imperialists." It followed from the speech that Khrushchev was much hurt by the Chinese reaction to the crisis: "The Chinese way of demonstrating solidarity with Cuba proved to be the easiest one. What were the Chinese doing at the m o m e n t of the highest tension? The staff of the Chinese Embassy in Cuba came to an aid post, ready to donate their blood. This was, however, a cheap and hackneyed method of support." Khrushchev clarified that " C u b a hardly needed the blood of a few people" but rather "tangible military and political aid." Instead, "for three days the Chinese have been marching about Peking, demonstrating their solidarity with Cuba. Imperialists do not care a thing about this kind of struggle. It reminds me of some anti-bedbug powders that I happened to buy while studying in the Promakademia. A f t e r using this powder, I noticed that bedbugs started running even faster. What is the point of selling the powders that help bedbugs get fatter? The analogy can be extended to those Chinese demonstrations. It does not take much wisdom to curse imperialists. We have to invent something more effective." Khrushchev explained that the only way to save Cuba was by providing the country with weapons and missiles: "These missiles are like the prickles of a hedgehog, they sting." H e said that the "missile question" had been debated "for a long time and the final decision had been postponed twice." "We knew that sooner or later the Americans would find out about the missiles and would be shocked by this discovery." The Soviet administration, according to Khrushchev, "purposefully designed this shrewd maneuver in order to prevent the American attack on Cuba." Khrushchev claimed at the same time that the USSR had been primarily pursuing "political but not military interests." "We had never intended to violate the frontiers of another state, least of all the American ones," he said. "We have to admit that we would not have been able to accomplish the attack on the US, even if we had planned it. Thus, the only goal of this operation was to preserve revolutionary Cuba." However, when the US detected the missiles, "the situation became very dangerous." The crisis was resolved due to negotiations: "We extorted the promise f r o m the American president that neither the US nor their allies in the Western H e m i s p h e r e would attack Cuba. We, accordingly, found it possible to authorize the removal of our missiles and fighters IL 28. Have we conceded something? Yes, we have. Have the Americans conceded? They equally have. So, who conceded m o r e and who conceded less? We finally reached compromise through mutual concessions." Encouraged by somebody's positive "that-is-right" comment from the audience, Khrushchev continued his improvisation: "People, who judge the danger after it passes, always seem to be much smarter than those who had to directly cope with this danger. I know it from my war experience. At war, when the battle was over, we used to have many more know-it-all strategists than we did during the battle,

End of the Cuban Missile Crisis • 405 when there was a pressing need for clever advisors. Today, we also have some "smart alecks" who are blaming us for the compromise and the withdrawal of the missiles. Unfortunately, such people are not infrequent a m o n g our Communists." W h o particularly did Khrushchev allude to in this passage? Undoubtedly, he hinted at the Chinese and the Cuban administration that regarded the resolution of the crisis as a defeat. It was this unfavorable opinion that Bias Roca, a veteran of the Socialist Party, directly expressed to the Soviet representative in Prague. 8 Khrushchev also referred to those public figures who, however reluctant to protest openly, were obviously discontented with the decision: "Now, when the mutual concessions are made, some 'wise guys' are trying to estimate the probable total of the American concessions in case of the Soviet uncompromising attitude. True, the US might have conceded more that they did. However, this approach to the problem reminds me of a fairy tale about two stubborn sheep on a narrow bridge over the precipice. As you r e m e m b e r , they were infinitely clever, butted each other, and both fell off the bridge." Khrushchev concluded by claiming that "I think, that in this situation we behaved adequately. There is no sense in acting like one of the tsarist officers f r o m an anecdote, who made a clumsy turn at the ball and passed gas. This officer had to shoot himself. The anecdote illustrates sad prospects for a person who dared to lose his self-control. Thus, if the state administration loses theirs, it will lead to a catastrophe for the whole nation. I beg your pardon for this blunt comparison, but I tried to make my point intelligible." 9 Khrushchev was forced to recall his bravado in 1964. Unlike the tsarist officer from the anecdote, Khrushchev did not need to shoot himself. Still, he had to resign. During Stalinist times, Khrushchev would have been severely punished; in 1964 he was simply dismissed. It was the result of his policy aimed at the liquidation of repressive Stalinist measures.

Notes 1 Aleksandr A . Fursenko and T. Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble. Kennedy, 1958-1964 ( N e w York: W.W. Norton, 1997). 2 Interview with Aleksandr I. Alekseev, 16 February 1994.

Khrushchev,

Castro,

3 O. Troyanovsky, "The Cuban Crisis, The V i e w from the Kremlin" in International (1992): 172. 4 Interview with Vladimir E. Semichastny, 18 September 1993.

and

Life 3 - 4

5 Malin's notes at the meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee, 13-14 October 1964. Vestnik Arkhiva Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii [hereafter A P R F ] 198, no. 2: 125-135. 6 See Polyanski's note on 14 October 1964 in Vestnik A P R F 198, no. 2: 101-125. 7 Interview with Semichastny, 18 September 1993. 8 On the conversation with Bias Roca in N o v e m b e r 1962 see Rossiiskii Gosudarstvenyi Arkhiv Noveishei Istorii. 9 See Khrushchev's concluding remarks at the Plenum of the Central Committee, 23 N o vember 1962 in A P R F , f. 2, op. 2, d. 231,11. 134-138.

Belief and Disbelief in the Soviet Union NICHOLAS V.

RIASANOVSKY

The issues of belief and ideology had some very striking characteristics in the Soviet Union. No other state in history was so explicitly and thoroughly based on spreading ideology to almost every detail of human existence. Even the ideology of Nazi Germany, often compared to the USSR, was much more mushy, confusing and incomplete, while its practical realization—most dreadful and tragic, to be sure—lasted twelve rather than seventy-four years. Very much has been written about communist ideology, including ideology in the Soviet Union. Authors have ranged from such splendid specialists as Leszek Kolakowsky, Andrzej Walicki to scholars, journalists, diplomats, and others who had some contact with Soviet reality. And yet that ideology needs more rather than less emphasis. Failures to appreciate it fully range from suspicions of intellectual history as basic causation to the omnipresence of official dogma to the point that ideology appears something obvious and natural rather than imposed. A very large number of misconceptions stems from substituting leaders' struggle for power, vanity, suspiciousness, pride, vengeance, conspiracies, etc. for MarxismLeninism. Usually the error is simply mixing the levels of discourse. It is not that Soviet protagonists were free from the vices and rivalries in all their forms. It is rather that their vices and rivalries took place within the basic framework of their ideology while by no means eliminating that ideology. A comprehensive ideology is of a fundamental importance because that is how those who believe in it, whether they are aggressive or passive, honest or dishonest, see the world. And that is how the world was seen from the Kremlin from 1917 to 1991. In fact, the Soviet leadership, from Lenin, to Stalin, to Khruschev, to Brezhnev, to Andropov, to Chernenko, to Gorbachev, as well as their numerous associates and assistants, demonstrated a remarkable ideological consistency. Lenin, whose contributions extended Marxism to Marxism-Leninism, has often been accused of fanaticism, but not of disbelief. Stalin, whose almost entire intellectual, particularly theoretical, baggage was limited to Marxism, considered that after Lenin he became its true seer and leader, with some of the results that form the subject of this article. On a more naive and less murderous plane Khrushchev put his heart into the competition of his socialist fatherland with the capitalist world, especially the United States of America, and was still counting Soviet gains in the production of milk, meat, and eggs as he was dismissed from office. Brezhnev's long

408 • Nicholas V. Riasanovsky rule came to be known as a period of stagnation precisely because no f u n d a m e n tal changes took place, and the USSR continued on its established dogmatic course. Many observers noted a decline in enthusiasm for old beliefs and goals, but there was nothing to replace them. Nor did the leadership of A n d r o p o v and after him C h e r n e n k o transform the scene; besides, both died very shortly after attaining the highest position. Even the last occupier of that position, the reformer Gorbachev, was in his own way as much a Marxist-Leninist as Khrushchev. In addition to impeccable communist service prior to his elevation, he praised the Soviet system—for example for having successfully solved the problem of nationalities just b e f o r e that problem exploded—and some of the Party's potentials. Even after being rescued from the putsch of the hard-liners, G o r b a c h e v ' s authentic vision was that of a repaired, restored to its full glory, and dynamic Leninism. Fate willed it otherwise. A f t e r the collapse of the USSR and the new availability of primary sources, scholars find f u r t h e r confirmation of the role of ideology in Soviet Russia. In particular, at the highest Party and government level there seems to be no instance, no matter how private or secret, of a cynical use of Marxism to trick the unwary or misled masses. It is a community of believers, although it is fair to speculate that with the passage of time the community contained fewer fanatics and more timeservers. Intellectual history is not the only important aspect of history, which is a record of a complex many-sided development of a society over centuries. Even the dominant and official Soviet Marxism had its major limitations. First, Marxism did not cover some important, even very important, areas of state activity. Thus classical Marxism o f f e r e d no manual on foreign policy after the Russian Revolution for the good reason that there was to be no such policy but instead of division, diplomacy and war, a united proletarian world. Lenin and his associates looked for that world in the Russian Revolution itself and especially in revolutionary o u t b r e a k s in Central and Eastern E u r o p e as well as the invasion of Poland by the Red Army. But when the O c t o b e r Revolution failed to spread, they had to improvise and improvise they did f r o m the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk signed on 3 March 1918, to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Bereft of comprehensive guidance, the Soviet leaders used their Marxism in specific instances, including the creation and activity of the C o m i n t e r n and later the Cominform. It is also only with reference to Marxism that o n e can understand the Soviet expectation of a war between the United States and G r e a t Britain (the new capitalism challenging the old capitalism) or the light t r e a t m e n t of the rise of Nazi power in Germany, which represented to them the last gasp of dying imperialism to be followed by a major struggle against the Social D e m o c r a t s for allegiance of the G e r m a n people. Second, theory had to be translated into practice, and that almost inevitably means adaptation and change. A textbook example was provided by the First Five Year Plan with its r e m a r k a b l e ups and downs, but essentially with its relentless drive to produce (or collectivize) as much as possible. The drive would not stop

Belief and Disbelief in the Soviet Union • 409 even at the edge of the precipice, as millions of peasants who perished during collectivization would testify if they could. But there were other and more subtle forms of adaptation. The end product, whether in economics, social policy, or culture, would be, of course, connected to the plan but also greatly changed by Soviet reality. Third, the dominant position of Soviet Marxism did not exclude some role for certain subordinate, even contradictory beliefs, such as nationalism and antisemitism in the 1930s but especially in connection with the Second World War and its a f t e r m a t h in the Soviet Union and abroad. In the fourth place, but p e r h a p s most important, was the spread and p e r m e ation of Marxism and Leninism to b e c o m e the guiding light of the masses. The results of effort by the Party and the government to create a new socialist, eventually communist, state, inhabited by the new Soviet men and women, proved to be extremely complex and controversial, leading to no consensus among scholars, even with the passage of time. In any case, the beliefs and aspirations of the masses should not be simply assimilated into official Soviet history or the often lengthy p r o n o u n c e m e n t s of the leaders. They deserve a separate consideration to be given at the end of this essay. Lenin believed ardently in the teaching of Marx and Engels and even m a d e some valuable contributions to it. While not at the same level as the basic framework, Lenin a d d e n d a helped point Marxists in the direction of the colonial countries and even to an extent toward peasants. Originally strictly industrial, urban and E u r o p e a n , Marxism and Marxists, Lenin argued, once capitalism reached the stage of imperialism, found their natural allies in exploited colonial peoples. Peasants—of great significance to Russia—even could be of help to revolution: while rich peasants were its natural enemies, the p o o r peasants and the agricultural laborers were its logical supporters, and even better off peasants could be an asset if properly managed. Lenin was also the main figure in the creation and the evolution of the Bolshevik, later Communist, Party in Russia with its emphasis on exclusiveness, intolerance of o t h e r opinions, and discipline. W h e t h e r or not these qualities were naturally ingrained in Marxism and the Marxist vision of the world, they were certainly part of Lenin's character. T h e much-disputed larger question of whether Leninism was true creative Marxism or a heresy with legitimate succession, p e r h a p s to be found in a more peaceful and evolutionary social democracy, defies a simple answer. Marx and Engels wrote and argued very much, over a long period of time, and not always consistently. It may be best to consider Leninism as one appropriate teaching to come out of Marxism without denying the authenticity of some other. Lenin's crucial decision and role in the O c t o b e r Revolution was based on his Marxist beliefs, but also on his own extreme interpretation of the situational advantage for revolution in Russia at that m o m e n t . This j u d g e m e n t was initially not shared even by other Bolsheviks, let alone the socialists, who considered the country entirely too backward for immediate socialism. It was thus both a "scien-

410 • Nicholas V. Riasanovsky tific" Marxist evaluation and a gamble, with Lenin feeling repeatedly in 1917 that everything was lost. Even more eagerly than his associates he was looking for any sign of the spread of the revolution in Europe, which was to validate and support the Russian overturn. But that Marxist expectation failed. The following years brought instead the Civil War at home, an u n b e a r a b l e strain and even collapse of the nation's economy, and hostility and isolation in foreign affairs. The fighting itself with its attendant executions and massacres, and even more starvation, typhus and other diseases took uncounted millions of lives, exceeding by far in n u m b e r s or in the percentage of population the causalities of other revolutions in m o d e r n E u r o p e a n history. The country also lost a million or two people by emigration, quite in line with the Soviet social policies, although those who departed were by no means all "exploiters." The period f r o m 1918 to 1921 came to be known as that of "War C o m m u n i s m " and many of its horrors were indeed linked directly to the Civil War. However, as a n u m b e r of scholars have correctly emphasized, War C o m m u n i s m also marked the height of revolutionary optimism, of the effort by Lenin and his lieutenants to achieve socialism immediately or within a few months. To cite Walicki's summary of the d r a f t of the Party program written in March 1918: At this early stage Lenin's program envisioned not only a countrywide socialist organization of production, coupled with the forced allocation of labor, but also a complete and final replacement of trade by " p l a n n e d , organized distribution" to be followed by the gradual abolition of all f o r m s of monetary exchange; it d e m a n d e d strict collective control over individual consumption of all well-to-do people and postulated that individual households should be replaced by c o m m u n a l catering for large groups. In o t h e r words, it was a program for a drastic collectivization of all spheres of life, including private consumption. It did not, as yet, d e m a n d the expropriation of the bourgeoisie but made up for this by abolishing the m a r k e t , introducing universal control, and compulsorily organizing the whole population into consumer and producer communes. ...From the very beginning, therefore, the Bolshevik party e m b a r k e d on the brutal suppression of the m a r k e t in the n a m e of the communist ideal of a consciously regulated marketless economy; this was its ideological option, its conscious and deliberate attempt to realize Marx's Utopia." 1 A number of studies traced the Utopian aspects of War C o m m u n i s m in considerable detail, 2 while o t h e r s slighted it usually by concentrating almost entirely on mobilization for war. The Red A r m y won, but War C o m m u n i s m lost to the utter d e v a s t a t i o n of the land and ruin of the economy by 1921. The New Economic Policy, o r NEP, 1921-1927, was thus a forced t e m p o r a r y retreat f r o m the original c o m m u n i s t vision to a mixed economy, and it was so argued by Lenin. The Party, of course,

Belief and Disbelief in the Soviet Union • 411 r e t a i n e d full political control. In economics, the state kept its exclusive hold on t h e " c o m m a n d i n g heights," that is, on finance, on large and medium industry, on m o d e r n transportation, on foreign trade, and all wholesale commerce. Private enterprise, however, was allowed in small industry and in retail trade. Perhaps, still m o r e importantly, requisitioning produce f r o m the peasants, characteristic of War C o m m u n i s m , was replaced by a tax in kind, regularly in grain, and later by m o n e y tax. The peasants could k e e p and sell on the free m a r k e t what r e m a i n e d a f t e r the payment to the state, and thus they were given an obvious incentive to p r o d u c e more. By most counts N E P was a great success. Economy revived and according to many economic indicators Russia was even slightly better off than in the last years of tsarist rule. But problems were numerous, and the frequently expressed opinion that the Soviet authorities should have left N E P run its natural course probably lacked realism. The state and the private sectors of the economy did not work well together. While it proved possible in general to restore prewar industry, its f u r t h e r development required capital investment and determined leadership, which were sadly lacking. Peasants, for their part, were not eager to exert themselves on the land, when they could get so little in exchange for their produce. Moreover, whatever their potential in economic theory, the embodiment and beneficiaries of the new course, the N E P m e n , that is, small traders and manufacturers, as well as rich peasants, became increasingly irritating, and indeed threatening, to the MarxistLeninist rulers of the country and their communist supporters. A f t e r all, what had the Revolution and the Civil War been fought for, and to whom did the Soviet Union belong? Again ideology was playing a major role. There was thus, so to speak, ideological logic as well as economic, social and other reasons that turned the Soviet leadership against NEP, which had in any case been accepted as a t e m p o r a r y expedient in dire circumstances. Socialism and after that communism were to be achieved through industrialization, collectivization of land, and the spread of communism throughout society and to each detail of private life. Totalitarianism is not a bad word for it, although economists may prefer to speak of a c o m m a n d economy. Writ large it became the story of the Five Year Plans, of kolkhozes and sovkhozes, of the police control of society, of forced labor, purges and concentration camps. To be sure, there is nothing in classical Marxism about the Five Year Plans. It may well be considered ironic that instead of happening in the most advanced industrial society the socialist revolution occurred in a huge backward borderland, which had m a d e a desperate, even partly successful effort to industrialize. The doctrine of the weakest link of capitalism and much else has been adduced to explain the O c t o b e r Revolution in Marxist terms. (I even heard a Soviet speaker argue that in 1917 Russia was more economically advanced than G r e a t Britain, because both must be considered in their totality, and G r e a t Britain with all of its empire would be more backward on the average.) And every student of the Soviet Union knows how prominent t h e concepts of "proletarians," " p r o l e t a r i a t " and

412 • Nicholas V. Riasanovsky " p r o l e t a r i a n " as an adjective were in Soviet history, especially in its first decades, when they were virtually omnipresent. They represented, of course, a clear legacy of Marxism-Leninism. Again, Marx and Engels did not write about kolkhozes and sovkhozes. But the collectivization of agriculture was the greatest Soviet step toward Socialism, announcing the destruction of the old world and the creation of the new. A n d because it affected most Russians in a fundamental way, the year 1929 m a r k e d the most important turning in all Russian history with the probable exception of year 988. Those who liken the kolkhoz to the peasant commune, well known to Russian peasants, are wrong. M e m b e r s of a c o m m u n e possessed their land in common, but they farmed their assigned lots separately, undisturbed, and in their own traditional way. Organization and regimentation of labor became the very essence of the kolkhoz. It is remarkable to what extent the Soviet leaders resented the r e m n a n t s of private farming within the collectives, namely the small private plots allotted to kolkhoz peasants. These plots were diminished in size and even f o r b i d d e n , only to be reinstated because peasants wanted them and certainly m a d e a very much better use of them than of socialized fields. Over the years the kolkhozes were increasing in size but declining in number. A n o t h e r continuous trend in Soviet agriculture was the growth of the sovkhozes, in effect state agricultural factories, at the expense of the kolkhozes, and thus a further socialization of production. A s usual in the USSR, the direction came from the highest level. O n e of Stalin's greatest ambitions was the socialization of Soviet agriculture. It was a p p a r e n t l y especially in that connection that he came to consider himself the architect of the second communist revolution in Russia that would surpass in its results even that of Lenin. Khrushchev in turn concentrated on agriculture as his specific d o m a i n . His unrealized projects included even that of agrogoroda, entire agricultural towns, which would replace scattered collective farms and thus eliminate the very concept of peasants and countryside. The abandoned buildings, fields, matériel, etc., hostile critics calculated, would surpass all the destruction in the Soviet Union during the Second World War. Soviet leaders were still socializing a n d improving agriculture when the USSR collapsed. Of the major Soviet policies, it is the purges, especially the great purges of t h e 1930s, that are the most difficult to explain. A setting for extreme, arbitrary violence, it is true, had already been provided by Lenin and by Marxist ideology. In the words of Walicki: Lenin's conception of dictatorship as authority "absolutely unrestricted by any rules whatever" was an extreme case of "teleocratic" thinking, of a resolute and contemptuous opposition to all sorts of "nomocracy." It is therefore not enough to treat Lenin as "probably the most extreme utilitarian" in history: utilitarianism as such does not necessarily involve c o n t e m p t f o r all rules. The existence of some rules, on the contrary, may be justified on pure-

Belief and Disbelief in the Soviet Union • 413 ly utilitarian grounds. Neither does it suffice to define Lenin as a "legal nihilist"; typical legal nihilists, especially in the Russian tradition, cond e m n e d law in the n a m e of morality, whereas in Lenin's case contempt for all rules e x t e n d e d to morality as well. In his view proletarian morality had to be strictly teleocratic, that is, consistently subordinated to the struggle for c o m m u n i s m , as defined by the vanguard party. In "The Tasks of Youth Leagues," he explained this with his usual precision and clarity: "We reject any morality based on extra-human and extra-class concepts. We say that this is deception, dupery, and stultification of the workers and peasants in t h e interests of the landowners and capitalists. We say that our morality is entirely s u b o r d i n a t e d to the interests of the proletariat's class struggle. O u r morality stems f r o m the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat." 3 Practice illustrated theory. The political police, or the Cheka, had been established already on 20 D e c e m b e r 1917. The frightful cruelty of the Civil War, displayed on the R e d as well as on the White side and also in numerous peasant rebellions, seemed impossible to trump. Lenin's personal cruelty has been richly confirmed by new archival evidence, and the same was true of other Soviet leaders, such as Trotsky, or for that matter Tukhachevsky. A f t e r the relatively quiet years of N E P came unbelievably brutal collectivization with its victims, men, women and children, counted in the millions. Solzhenitsyn had good reason to rage that it was not necessary to wait for the execution of Zinoviev and Bukharin to find cruelty in the Soviet Union. My teacher, Sir Isaiah Berlin, would draw the line between senior Marxists led by Plekhanov who still belonged to the h u m a n e Russian intelligentsia and the young fanatics, such as Lenin and his lieutenants. But even if such a line could ever be drawn, the Soviet regime left it far behind once it went into operation. What, then, could the great purges in the 1930s add to the Soviet experience, and why should they not be considered simply a n o t h e r characteristic manifestation of the Soviet system? Several factors m a d e the purges unique. For one thing, these purges meant the annihilation of the ruling elite in Soviet Russia, in the Party, in the government, in the armed forces. It was almost as if the Whites had won the Civil War and proceeded to exterminate the communists. The need for public display, except in the case of the military, and the confessions to most unlikely and even impossible crimes turned the builders of Soviet Russia into its deadliest enemies. Confessions can now be firmly explained by the mass use of torture as well as by threats and action against family m e m b e r s and false promises of pardon. However, the need to obtain most extravagant confessions in each case and the entire surrealistic performance m a k e little or no sense. Many explanations, of course, have been proposed, from advancing new cadres to strengthening the army for the forthcoming war (by virtually destroying its command). Some scholars have emphasized the significance of local conditions, rivalries and struggles and their impact on the cleansing. Yet all these interpretations of what h a p p e n e d seem to be either irrele-

414 • Nicholas V. Riasanovsky vant or at best accounting only for a small part of an enormous centrally directed enterprise. A n d the director, most scholars concluded, could only be Stalin. As a clear example of the Stalin approach, Robert C. Tucker describes the great purge as organized in general, and often in particular, by Stalin to destroy his enemies and suspected enemies in order to establish himself as the only and absolute successor to Lenin. Stalin's ego and self-doubt could never rest; the reader readily shares the author's hatred of the supreme criminal 4 . Clear and powerful, nonetheless Tucker's explanation of the purges has its weaknesses. By its very n a t u r e it minimizes factors other than Stalin, such as the n a t u r e of Marxism and the characteristics of the Soviet system m e n t i o n e d above. A n d its psychological argument can be challenged. Stalin is presented as a coldblooded and calculating mass murderer. Yet he needs confessions f r o m the victims. Tucker's explanation for the confessions is that Stalin must convince himself that it was they not he who committed crimes. A f t e r arranging the assassination of Kirov (Tucker is absolutely certain that Stalin arranged it, although some other specialists are not), does he need Zinoviev's confession to convince himself that Zinoviev was really the guilty party? A n d if the "double e n t e n d r e " was exceptional, what were the other exceptions? Was Stalin insane? 5 The systemic and situational reasons combine poorly with abnormal psychology, and it is best to k e e p both approaches firmly in mind when dealing with Stalin and the purges. Whatever the reasons, ideology was never absent f r o m the purges, although it often looked like Marxism-Leninism edited by Alice and her acquaintances in Wonderland, as the devil Trotsky waged his war against the Party and Stalin, while most associates of Lenin turned out to be traitors plotting for years the destruction of their own work. On a slightly different level it is worth noting that in 1937 Stalin declared that as the country progresses towards socialism, social antagonisms and struggle become sharper. That view was condemned in 1956. The issue of Russian nationalism as part of Soviet ideology has p r o d u c e d much d i s a g r e e m e n t a m o n g specialists. A t one e x t r e m e scholars followed Timasheff's argument of the "great r e t r e a t " 6 and other conservative interpretations of Soviet reality to claim that the communist Revolution had spent itself and that Stalinization m e a n t the restoration, or at least partial restoration, of traditional values connected with family, school, history and p e r h a p s indirectly nationalism. Russian nationalism b e c a m e more direct in the frightful years of t h e Second World War when the g o v e r n m e n t mobilized its appeal to save the country. A very important ingredient of the new orientation was a g r e a t e r permissiveness toward religion, especially Orthodoxy. The O r t h o d o x Church o b t a i n e d a patriarch, strengthened its organization, and m a d e a certain recovery a f t e r its devastating persecutions. H e r o e s f r o m the Russian past, even some clerical heroes, competed with communist stalwarts for public attention. I n d e e d s o m e observers believed that during the war Stalin became a Russian nationalist m o d eling himself on Ivan the Terrible or P e t e r the G r e a t rather than on Marxist theoreticians or his Georgian ancestors.

Belief and Disbelief in the Soviet Union • 415 Yet it is the opposite view that has a better argument. For the Marxist elite ruling t h e Soviet Union—and it is the ideology of that elite that we have been so far discussing—any serious resort to nationalism, tradition, non-Marxist history or religion had a manipulative, but not a substantive value. Dire circumstances forced retreats and allowances but the basic direction and goal never changed. T h u s religious persecution resumed its course and the Church experienced its nadir at the time of Khrushchev. While history in schools became patriotic, its fund a m e n t a l framework remained Marxist-Leninist with no exceptions and no other a p p r o a c h allowed at any level of schooling. A s to the transformation of Stalin into a Russian nationalist, one should rem e m b e r that the supreme leader never considered himself a Russian and referred to the Russians as "they," not "we." To the end of his days he was more comfortable speaking Georgian than Russian. (His first published pieces were poems, in G e o r g i a n . ) Much as he admired other powerful and decisive rulers, they were not allowed to transgress his basic Marxist intellectual f r a m e w o r k . Once a foreign visitor asked Stalin how Peter the G r e a t compared to Lenin; Stalin answered, like a d r o p of water to an ocean. 7 Stalin's death on 5 March 1953 registered as a shock in the Soviet Union, but it did not change the country. If anything there was a certain reassertion of a m o r e dogmatic Marxism-Leninism, emphasizing the Party and not only its Secretary, resuming regular meetings of the Politburo, and paying a new attention to the formal functioning of the Soviet political and Party institutions. Much stress was put on collective leadership and proper communist procedure. Khrushchev's secret speech about the crimes of Stalin's regime delivered on 25 February 1956 following the Twentieth Ail-Union Communist Party Congress and certain later efforts at de-Stalinization, notably at the Twenty-Second Congress in O c t o b e r 1961, bore some fruit. The process of a rehabilitation of the victim's of Stalin's purges began and gained m o m e n t u m . Part of draconian anti-labor legislation was repealed, notably the law of 1940 tying workers to their jobs and holding them criminally responsible for absenteeism and simply for being late. Perhaps most importantly, the concentration c a m p empire, the notorious gulag, was largely disbanded releasing millions of prisoners. Not surprisingly, however, de-Stalinization proved to be in a sense sporadic, fragmentary, and overall very difficult. Stalinism could not be separated f r o m its crimes—after all, it was the history of the Soviet U n i o n — a n d the guilt involved the entire governing elite, as well as many others, except f o r the very young. O n e could c o n d e m n particular repressions and "rehabilitate" specific victims, usually dead, but one could n o t — o r was it that one did not dare?—go deeper and try to explain why criminal transgressions on such an e n o r m o u s scale could occur in a Marxist country, in the land of socialism. As that was the question asked not only by critics of all sorts, but also by such allies and associates as the head of t h e Italian Communist Party, Palmiro Togliatti. There was no answer given beyond r e f e r e n c e to the apparently magic evil powers of "the cult of personality." Possibly even more significant than the extremely sensitive and explo-

416 • Nicholas

V.

Riasanovsky

sive p e r s o n a l aspect of d e - S t a l i n i z a t i o n was t h e fact that t h e c o m m u n i s t g o v e r n m e n t a n d elite saw n o a l t e r n a t i v e t o w h a t t h e y r e c e i v e d in b e q u e s t f r o m L e n i n a n d Stalin. So t h e y c a r r i e d o u t m o r e Five Year Plans, s p r e a d M a r x i s t e d u c a t i o n t o a p o i n t w h e r e they could claim t o h a v e t h e best e d u c a t e d w o r k i n g f o r c e in t h e w o r l d , p r o c l a i m e d their c o u n t r y t o h a v e r e a c h e d t h e stage of d e v e l o p e d socialism a n d a d d e d B r e z h n e v ' s v a c u o u s v o l u m e s t o t h e r e a d i n g list. In a discussion of Soviet ideology a n d politics, t h e p r o b l e m of n a t i o n a l i t i e s in t h e U S S R has to be m e n t i o n e d , a l t h o u g h it is a l m o s t impossibly m a n y - s i d e d a n d c o m p l e x . A g a i n we are f a c e d with Marxist t h e o r y a n d its specific i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , n e e d s and o p p o r t u n i t i e s of the m o m e n t , c h a n g e s of t h e Party line, suspicion, s w e e p i n g purges, etc. " N a t i o n " or " n a t i o n a l i t y " is n o t a basic Marxist category, a n d t h e p r o b l e m f o r Marxists is, t h e r e f o r e , t o fit n a t i o n s or " n a t i o n a l i t i e s " into t h e i r o w n f r a m e w o r k in t h e o r y a n d s o m e t i m e s also, as in the r e m a r k a b l e Soviet case, in practice. Simplifying, t h e Soviet s o l u t i o n was b a s e d on a specific a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e dialectic, in itself a clear indication of its a b s t r a c t intellectual origin. C o m m u n i s t s b e l i e v e d in a t r a n s f o r m e d u n i t a r y society as their goal. H o w e v e r , t h e y c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h a t aim could be r e a c h e d best n o t by mixing d i f f e r e n t p e o p l e s in d i f f e r e n t stages of d e v e l o p m e n t , b u t by h a v i n g e a c h nationality evolve to its own h i g h e s t level f r o m which each could consciously a n d freely join o t h e r s in a n e w h i g h e r synthesis. T h e dialectic t h u s p o s t u l a t e d t h e g r e a t e s t e v o l u t i o n a n d d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n t o a c h i e v e the most e f f e c t i v e unity. N o r w o u l d socialism be at all j e o p a r d i z e d b e c a u s e , according to t h e f a m o u s f o r m u l a , each evolution will b e n a t i o n a l in f o r m a n d socialist in c o n t e n t . In practice t h e Soviet U n i o n c a m e to be d i v i d e d into e v e n tually fifteen union r e p u b l i c s a n d , within t h e m , o v e r a h u n d r e d s m a l l e r subdivisions, based again on the e t h n i c principle. Soviet a u t h o r i t i e s m a d e a great e f f o r t t o build u p the culture of all e t h n i c units t o t h e point of e s t a b l i s h i n g full-fledged A c a d e m i e s of Sciences in the u n i o n republics.

But the b u i l d u p w a s across t h e

b o a r d . It has b e e n a r g u e d that the g r e a t e s t g a i n e r s w e r e t h e smallest nationalities, which h a d little cultural b a g g a g e t o begin with a n d o b t a i n e d m u c h including, w h e n n e e d e d , alphabets. 8 W h o l e native intelligentsias w e r e thus c r e a t e d in t h e 1920s a n d 1930s, even t h o u g h Stalinization a n d its a f t e r m a t h s o m e t i m e s w i p e d o u t t h e intelligentsia that h a d just b e e n c r e a t e d . H o w e v e r , a f t e r a c o n t r o l l e d m e a s u r e of G r e a t R u s s i a n p a t r i o t i s m and n a t i o n a l i s m b e c a m e r e s p e c t a b l e in t h e Soviet U n i o n , Stalin a n d t h e Politburo b e g a n t o stress t h e R u s s i a n l a n g u a g e a n d t h e historical role of t h e G r e a t R u s s i a n p e o p l e as b i n d i n g c e m e n t of their m u l t i n a t i o n a l state. This t r e n d c o n t i n u e d d u r i n g t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r a n d in t h e p o s t w a r years. E a s t e r n p e o p l e s of t h e U S S R w e r e m a d e t o use t h e Cyrillic in p l a c e of t h e L a t i n a l p h a b e t for their n a t i v e t o n g u e s , w h i l e t h e R u s s i a n l a n g u a g e r e c e i v e d e m p h a s i s in all Soviet schools. H i s t o r i e s h a d to b e r e w r i t t e n again t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t t h e i n c o r p o r a t i o n of m i n o r i t y n a t i o n a l i t i e s i n t o t h e R u s s i a n s t a t e w a s a positive g o o d r a t h e r t h a n m e r e l y t h e lesser evil as c o m p a r e d t o o t h e r a l t e r n a t i v e s . T h e n e w i n t e r p r e t a t i o n was fitted i n t o M a r x i s t d r e s s by such m e a n s as s t r e s s o n t h e p r o gressive n a t u r e of t h e R u s s i a n p r o l e t a r i a t a n d t h e a d v a n c e d c h a r a c t e r of t h e

Belief and Disbelief in the Soviet Union • 417 Russian revolutionary m o v e m e n t , which benefited all the peoples f o r t u n a t e e n o u g h to be associated with Russians. But Stalin and some other Soviet leaders as well, went f u r t h e r , giving violent expression to some of the worst kind of prejudices, notably the quite un-Marxist vice of antisemitism. Yiddish intellectuals were a m o n g the groups virtually wiped out by the purges of 1948-1952, and Stalin's and Z h d a n o v ' s notorious pursuit of "cosmopolitans" had Jews as a main focus. A s to Russians proper, some might have enjoyed their assigned role of "elder b r o t h e r " and the privileged position of their language and culture. But, to r e p e a t , they generally shared the pain and tribulations of the citizens of the Soviet U n i o n and even were deprived of a separate A c a d e m y of Sciences or a distinct section of the Party. The Russian standard of living was lower than those in several o t h e r republics of the USSR. Soviet authorities were very p r o u d of their "solution" to the p r o b l e m of nationalities, and their optimism was shared by many outside observers, including specialists. G r a n t e d some remnants of religious prejudices and certain o t h e r archaic traits in older generations, younger people guara n t e e d a truly progressive and united multicultural Soviet socialist state. It was difficult to be more wrong. But what did the Soviet people, in particular the Russian people, really believe during some seventy-five years of communist rule? So far we have discussed only the governing layers, and it is time to turn to the masses. 9 The official answer is simple: they all believed in Marxism-Leninism (and for a long time also Stalinism), to a different d e p t h and degree of comprehension, ranging f r o m the gloriously enlightened leadership in Moscow to remarkably o b d u r a t e remaining class e n e m i e s and clods in backwaters. Education was the answer. A n d the Soviet U n i o n may be considered a m o n u m e n t a l experiment in education, with some very impressive results. Education brought individuals and peoples into the m o d e r n world and, in addition, so they would be correctly oriented, there were courses in Marxism-Leninism to be taken in almost every school and at almost every level of learning. By contrast, all dissenting or competing views were excluded to the greatest degree possible. Only specialists were allowed to read crucial foreign works in their field, mainly to d e n o u n c e them in print. Indeed, as some critics emphasize, it was only in the last part of the twentieth century, when technological and economic d e v e l o p m e n t s m a d e this extraordinary intellectual isolation impossible or at least extremely difficult, that the Soviet Union collapsed. As a recent study d e m o n s t r a t e d , education, careers, appointments, and almost everything else in the Soviet Union came to be presented in the form of a generous gift f r o m t h e leader and the Party which the recipient could never fully repay, although he or she was expected to try to do so t h r o u g h o u t life. 10 The disparity b e t w e e n the two sides to the deal could hardly be m a d e more striking. Every effort was tried to convert and inspire the masses. The typical Soviet novel b e c a m e the story of the communist illumination of the hero or heroine. 1 1 All was to be in black and white, clear and simple for the mass reader to understand. Optimism was prescribed. T h e great poetess A n n a A k h m a t o v a was de-

418 • Nicholas V. Riasanovsky nounced for her eroticism and her loneliness, while the composer Dmitrii Shostakovich was told to simplify his music. Socialist realism became the dominant creative mode. Claiming association with the superb realistic tradition of pre-revolutionary Russian literature, it became in fact simplistic Soviet propaganda. Indeed it was explained that writers must depict human beings and society as they should and will be under socialism and communism rather than look for blemishes a r o u n d them. As one émigré critic put it, socialist realism was "a method o f ' r e a l i s t i c ' depiction of unrealistic p h e n o m e n a , absent in reality." 12 The colossal effort of Soviet education and p r o p a g a n d a to m a k e the population enthusiastically support Marxism, their leader, and the Party line had some f o u n d a t i o n in facts. The October Revolution and its immediate aftermath represented a social revolution as well as a conspiratorial coup leading to the annihilation of whole classes of society. In the process there were gainers as well as losers. In spite of some remarkable proletarian detachments on the White side, workers in general fought for the Reds, and they were for many years afterwards considered by the communists as the most reliable social element, in particular if they already had been workers in tsarist times. Ironically, it was this dedicated, often fanatical element, composed of professional revolutionaries, workers, soldiers, sailors and other sundry radicals, that was largely wiped out in the great purges of the 1930s. Peasants and peasants as soldiers battled on all sides, including in their own peasant wars, but they did obtain the landlord's land and kept their coveted prize until collectivization. Collectivization meant death to millions of people and in fact the destruction of traditional Russian peasantry. Some o t h e r Stalinist and generally Soviet measures proved, however, more promising for the population. Notably the drive in education eventually transformed the more than half-illiterate land into one of the best-educated countries in the world. Education went together with industrialization and urbanization, all these processes affecting, in the framework of the Soviet Union, tens of millions people. In its own way the U S S R was a land of opportunity for the government never had enough qualified personnel for its endless undertakings. Whatever the reasons for the purges, one of their results was a contribution to social mobility as millions of jobs became open, sometimes more than once in rapid succession. In addition to the opportunities of a dynamic society, Soviet citizens enjoyed such special advantages as free medical help, very low rent, and rather effective general access to education. Authorities spent generously on arts of almost every kind, although, of course, without forgetting the requirements of MarxismLeninism and socialist realism. Soviet citizens could be justly proud of many scientists, musicians or chess players. A new culture was developing perhaps more striking in little things than in big. What are we to make of the following exchange: When, for example, Professor Kalmanson, who held a chair in zoology a n d an assistant director of the Moscow Zoo, e n t e r e d the Butyrka cell occupied by Ivanov R a z u m n i k and others, they classified him as a "spy" when he told

Belief and Disbelief in the Soviet Union • 419 t h e m that he was born of émigré parents in Bulgaria, a t t e n d e d G e r m a n universities, came to Moscow in 1930 with a G e r m a n wife and corresponded with relatives a b r o a d . They were d u m b f o u n d e d when Kalmanson r e t u r n e d f r o m his first interrogation and a n n o u n c e d that he was a "wrecke r " on the charge that 16 percent of the zoo's monkeys, for whose feeding rations he was responsible, had died in the past year—a charge apparently arising f r o m the fact that the professor had criticized the zoo's director, w h o was on good terms with the N K V D , in a recent article. When he a n s w e r e d that the deaths were caused by the w e a t h e r and that the L o n d o n Z o o ' s statistics showed that 22 percent of its m o n k e y s died of tuberculosis in the same period, his interrogator impulsively replied: "Well that m e a n s that England has its wreckers too," then checked himself and said: "We can't take England as an example." 1 3 O n the whole it is not surprising that in addition to outspoken admirers of the Soviet Union, many of its critics also credited it with important achievements. The issue o f t e n became whether it had d e m o n s t r a t e d enough success and stability to be a generally accepted and quasi-permanent m e m b e r nation of the world. S o m e writers found that success and stability in modernization, in particular in industrialization and the development of education, or later, in the Soviet achievements in space. Others saw the conclusive proof of the success and value of the Soviet system in its victory over G e r m a n y in the Second World War. Certain comm e n t a t o r s emphasized the rise of the middle class with its interests and orientation quite different from those of the old communists. More often the stress was on the present and future generations, not crippled by Stalin and the purges, that would revitalize the system and take it to new achievements. Now that c o m m u nism has collapsed in Russia, the inevitable additional question is what went wrong. O r to put it in the terms of the Russian people, did the Marxist government have the mass support of the people, and if so, when and why did it lose it? A b o v e all, what did the dogmatic ideological government offer to the people and what was the popular response? Although any answer is bound to be mere speculation, I would suggest—and I have no claim to originality—that the Communist Party and the Soviet government never had popular majority support. What went wrong? To begin with, the e n o r m o u s and impressive ideological indoctrination and education of the p e o p l e had serious weaknesses. In retrospect, it seems that it was in general t o o crude and pitched at too low a level, especially as the population came to know its masters better and also as it acquired some awareness of life abroad. A surfeit of propaganda could even backfire. I r e m e m b e r a chauffeur of the Academy of Sciences telling me that he knew that there was no race problem in the United States; when, taken somewhat aback, I asked him how he knew it, he answered that because the Soviet media talk about the alleged problem and its devastating impact day and night. But, to evaluate the matter in more general terms:

420 • Nicholas V. Riasanovsky With the privilege of hindsight, we can say that Soviet public culture, like the Soviet economy failed. It failed not because it lacked complexity or richness, but because, in the end, it left little r o o m for a critical commentary a d e q u a t e to recognize its own defects and to provide a nuanced understanding of its accomplishments. Despite changes following Stalin's death, the official culture retained its power, and the Soviet policy could not modify its self-image sufficiently to prolong its existence. As the revolution in information, the third industrial revolution, took hold in America, Europe, and Japan, the Soviet government clung to a system of public expression and self-referential view of the world that effectively precluded participation in the global integration of information. The government monopoly of information had little room for the informal and international exchanges of knowledge that might have sustained the country's economic competitiveness in the second half of the century. Nor was t h e r e foresight to see the approaching end. In communism's twilight, Brezhnev and his colleges did not publicly discuss the destruction of the physical environment in which they lived, the t r e m e n d o u s waste and loss throughout the economy, or the growing corruption of their society. Yet within the public culture their gove r n m e n t a p p e a r e d to be the only possible one. A t the end of the communist rule there was no organized opposition. There were no alternative programs, nor even publicly expressed and commonly shared judgements about what had gone wrong. 1 4 Surely this evaluation emphasizes the power of Marxism-Leninism as well as its persistence and rigidity in the Soviet Union. Still, the main p r o b l e m for the communists was not that they delivered their message to t h e p e o p l e in an ineffective m a n n e r , but the message itself. U t o p i a in power was disjoined from reality and in many ways increasingly so with the passage of time, as its promises failed to be realized. M o r e o v e r , the drastic Utopian d e m a n d s were not superficial, but went to the heart of Marxism-Leninism. Most far-reaching was the need to abolish religion and, indeed, G o d . Frequently u n d e r p l a y e d at p r e s e n t , it p r o c e e d e d straight f r o m the classics of Marxism to Lenin and the entire anti-religious policy of the Soviet Union. To q u o t e the 15 May 1932 entry f r o m a Soviet chronology: " T h e r e is declared 'an anti-religious Five Year Plan,' the aim of which is the liquidation by the first of May 1937 of all the houses of prayer in the U S S R and the 'the expulsion' (izgnanie) of t h e very concept of God." 1 5 But the Russian people r e m a i n e d to a r e m a r k a b l e extent religious. The official census of 1937, f o r example, f o u n d t h e m m o r e religious percentagewise than the French. It was that finding that probably contributed to the suppression of t h e census, although t h e main reason might well have been its catastrophic figure f o r the total population of the country. Because religion would not go away in spite of all the persecutions, a certain compromise b e c a m e necessary, especially during

Belief and Disbelief in the Soviet Union • 421 the S e c o n d World War a n d also a f t e r . Nevertheless, K h r u s h c h e v m o u n t e d a n o t h er m i g h t y liquidation of " t h e h o u s e s of w o r s h i p " a n d s o m e o t h e r aspects of religion l o o k i n g f o r w a r d to its total elimination. In the e n d , however, religion survived a n d c o m m u n i s m did not. A l t h o u g h t h e r e w e r e m a n y r e a s o n s for its collapse, the b r u t a l and s u s t a i n e d anti-religious policy r e p r e s e n t e d p r o b a b l y t h e g r e a t e s t c l e a v a g e b e t w e e n the rulers and the ruled. W h e r e a s religion m e a n t o v e r w h e l m ingly O r t h o d o x y f o r the Russians, U k r a i n i a n s , Belorussians, G e o r g i a n s a n d s o m e s m a l l e r e t h n i c groups, the Soviet state also p e r s e c u t e d Islam in the Muslim republics, J u d a i s m , B u d d h i s m , a n d o t h e r n o n - C h r i s t i a n a n d Christian creeds. T h e u l t i m a t e aim was always the same, a l t h o u g h the p a r t i c u l a r circumstances varied greatly, including the pitting of the O r t h o d o x C h u r c h against the U n i a t e s a n d the R o m a n Catholics in w e s t e r n U k r a i n e a n d Belorussia. Class struggle a n d e x t e r m i n a t i o n also c r e a t e d cleavages that u n d e r m i n e d the p o t e n t i a l mass s u p p o r t for c o m m u n i s m . Martin Malia 1 6 and others stressed that m u c h m o r e t h o r o u g h social d i s p l a c e m e n t followed the O c t o b e r R e v o l u t i o n in Russia than h a d been b r o u g h t a b o u t by the g r e a t revolutions in E n g l a n d , France, or t h e U n i t e d States. In Soviet Russia entire classes d i s a p p e a r e d either immediately as in the case of landlords, or at the end of the New E c o n o m i c Policy as was the f a t e of c o m m e r c i a l and industrial small bourgeoisie. I n d e e d , the e n t i r e f o r m e r u p p e r and middle classes, broadly speaking, had n o place in the new society. They consisted of " f o r m e r p e o p l e " d e f e a t e d in the R e v o l u t i o n and the Civil War. A s individuals, to be sure, m a n y m e m b e r s of these classes could and did serve the new state as technical specialists and in m a n y o t h e r capacities. O r they could m i g r a t e as up to two million of t h e m did (although the e m i g r a n t s included many C o s s a c k s or o t h e r p e o p l e not usually classified as u p p e r or m i d d l e class). Those who r e m a i n e d in the Soviet U n i o n s u f f e r e d f r o m legal and social discrimination and they f o r m e d particularly attractive material for f o r t h c o m i n g p u r g e s and punishments. Still most of t h e m survived a n d b e c a m e part of the Soviet technical and general intelligentsia, which was being rapidly mass p r o d u c e d in schools and universities. T h e case of the p e a s a n t s was m u c h m o r e tragic and r e p r e s e n t s a m u c h m o r e serious u n d e r m i n i n g of any p o p u l a r s u p p o r t f o r c o m m u n i s m . P e a s a n t s c o n s t i t u t ed p e r h a p s eighty-five p e r c e n t of the p o p u l a t i o n of the Russian E m p i r e at t h e t i m e of the R e v o l u t i o n a n d thus could by n o m e a n s be marginalized as f a d i n g r e m n a n t s of t h e old o r d e r . T h e p r o b l e m was to b r i n g t h e m into the new system. T h e m e t h o d selected by Stalin to d o so, n a m e l y rapid collectivization, w a s in a sense successful, b e c a u s e it d e s t r o y e d f o r e v e r t h e old Russian p e a s a n t world. But in h u m a n t e r m s five million h u m a n beings o r m o r e p e r i s h e d . E v e n if miscalculations, droughts, a n d disorganization are given as causes r a t h e r t h a n a d e l i b e r ate decision t o punish recalcitrant p e a s a n t s or, s o m e argue, U k r a i n i a n s , it s e e m s hardly possible to t h i n k of any w i d e s p r e a d a p p r o v a l of c o m m u n i s t plans or c o m m u n i s m in t h e c o u n t r y s i d e . A n d , e v e n for a n u m b e r of years a f t e r the S e c o n d World War, m o r e t h a n half of the Soviet citizens lived in t h e countryside. F r o m the p o i n t of view of the Soviet p e o p l e , t h e p u r g e s that f o l l o w e d collec-

422 • Nicholas V.

Riasanovsky

tivization could n o t have p r o v i d e d a convincing m e s s a g e f o r c o m m u n i s m . A g a i n millions of p e o p l e died and o t h e r millions w e r e s e n t t o l a t V c a m p s f r o m which m a n y of t h e m n e v e r r e t u r n e d . T h e p u r g e s r e m a i n e d a mystery. Best k n o w n f o r its e x e c u t i o n of c o m m u n i s t l e a d e r s a n d a large p a r t of t h e c o m m u n i s t elite, p u r g i n g quickly a c q u i r e d a m a s s c h a r a c t e r . P e o p l e w e r e a r r e s t e d b e c a u s e of their social origin, b e c a u s e of their n a t i o n ality, b e c a u s e of their religion, b e c a u s e of their c o n t a c t with t h o s e w h o h a d a l r e a d y b e e n c o n d e m n e d , b e c a u s e of their political past, b e c a u s e of their p r o f e s s i o n . T h e a r r e s t e d w e r e accused of t h e m o s t f a n t a s t i c crimes and \ w r e f o r c e d by m e a n s of t o r t u r e to d e n o u n c e their relatives, friends, a n d colleagues. T h o s e m e n t i o n e d d u r i n g the i n t e r r o g a t i o n b e c a m e new victims. 1 7 T h e c a t e g o r i e s m e n t i o n e d a b o v e by n o m e a n s e x h a u s t e d t h e victims of t h e p u r g e s or the a c c u s a t i o n s against t h e m . Also, while t h e costs of collectivization w e r e k e p t secret as m u c h as possible a n d w e r e g e n e r a l l y little k n o w n , the g r e a t p u r g e s b e c a m e public a n d i m m e d i a t e l y p r e s e n t e d a c o n u n d r u m t o the i n h a b i t a n t s of t h e Soviet U n i o n . W h a t was p o p u l a r r e a c t i o n ? To b e s u r e p e o p l e w e r e s t u n n e d , a n d m o s t of t h e m p r o b a b l y r e m a i n e d s t u n n e d t h r o u g h o u t . S o m e m u s t h a v e believed t h e official e x p l a n a t i o n or r a t h e r explanations, difficult t h o u g h it is for us to i m a g i n e t h a t . A l t h o u g h s u d d e n l y t h r e a t e n e d by the d e a d l y e n e m y in their midst, they could at least find s u p p o r t in the vigilance of t h e s t a t e a n d feel relatively s e c u r e t h e m selves, b e c a u s e they k n e w that t h e y w e r e not a n d h a d n o association with J a p a n e s e spies or British s a b o t e u r s . T h e less naive, a p p a r e n t l y , o f t e n a t t r i b u t e d t h e explosive n e w d e v e l o p m e n t s to s o m e kind of P a r t y struggle a n d tried to find their security in lying low a n d avoiding any intrigues. P u r g e s also c o n t r i b u t e d to s o m e local scores b e i n g settled, a n d they even h a v e b e e n p r e s e n t e d as a m a j o r Soviet way to a d v a n c e in office by d e n o u n c i n g y o u r s u p e r i o r or superiors. A n d i n d e e d m a n y j o b s b e c a m e o p e n . Still, it s h o u l d be r e m e m b e r e d t h a t as the p u r g e s g a t h e r e d m o m e n t u m d e n u n c i a t i o n s w e r e d e m a n d e d a l m o s t f r o m all a n d a l m o s t all t h e time. T h e r e f o r e p r o d u c i n g o n e could h a v e m o r e t o d o with a t t e m p t i n g t o save o n e ' s own skin t h a n with aiming f o r a h i g h e r p o s i t i o n or b e t t e r housing. Finally, w h e t h e r Stalin h a d a c o m p r e h e n s i v e overall p l a n o r not w h e n he instituted t h e purges, locally t h e y generally b e c a m e s e p a r a t e a n d even d i s j o i n t e d e v e n t s also s u b j e c t to local conditions. T h e r e was n o c e n t e r , not e v e n a central p e r s o n a l i t y to rally the d i s c o n t e n t . If, as is my o p i n i o n , m o s t R u s s i a n s did n o t simply a c c e p t t h e P a r t y a n d c o m m u n i s m as t h e i r h a l l o w e d g u i d e s in e v e r y t h i n g , w h a t did they b e l i e v e in? My first a n s w e r w o u l d b e survival. I was t i m e a n d again s u r p r i s e d t o w h a t e x t e n t t h e p o s sibility of o b t a i n i n g a r o o m or t h e q u a l i t y of p o t a t o e s m a t t e r e d . E n d u r a n c e r a t h e r t h a n any k i n d of e n t h u s i a s m w e r e t h e n o r m . E n d u r a n c e m a y n o t b e a n A r i s t o t e l i a n political category, but it h a s its uses in politics a n d in life. It h e l d t h e

Belief and Disbelief in the Soviel Union • 423 G e r m a n s at Stalingrad, as beautifully described by Vasilii Grossman in Life and Fate, and it also m a d e it possible for the people to survive the other, mostly h o m e m a d e , trials and tribulations of the Soviet period. Russians readily accepted t h e advantages of the Soviet system, such as general education, but few, and it seems with the passage of time always fewer, were inspired by the Marxist vision of universal proletarian blessedness. In that sense too communism and the Soviet Union failed. W e r e these recalcitrant Russians inspired by anything else? O r at least by s o m e t h i n g beyond mere survival? A full answer would require much knowledge we do not possess, all the more so because there was no f r e e d o m of speech in the Soviet U n i o n , no alternative systems to communism ever offered, and in a sense even no opposition. Still the a r g u m e n t s were not only about the quality of the p o t a t o harvest. The most important rival was, of course, religion, which meant in Russia primarily the O r t h o d o x Church. Lenin saw that well in his own time. While not a secular ideology like Marxism-Leninism, let alone a political party, O r t h o d o x Christianity o f f e r e d a totally different system of values and understanding of the world. O t h e r non-Marxist views—ideologies would be in most cases too strong and formal a term—widespread in the Soviet Union included many kinds of nationalism or patriotism. Russian nationalism was on the rise and, to repeat, in spite of very serious and n u m e r o u s obstacles Russia was in many ways in the process of becoming a modern nation state, when the October Revolution turned it in a different direction. Lenin hated especially Russian nationalism, and in the great Civil War the nationalist cause was associated, quite logically, with the Whites, not the Reds. Yet the R e d victory did not settle the matter for good. Geller and Nekrich are probably correct in emphasizing the importance of smenovekhovstvo, an ideology created by Nicholas Ustrialov and several o t h e r émigré intellectuals and publicists, but prominent also in the 1920s in the USSR. 1 8 Even the Soviet authorities welcomed to an extent that heretical teaching both because it split the emigration and because it provided a rationale for people of different convictions to serve the Soviet government. As the n a m e implies, the doctrine meant "a change of orientation," f r o m hostility to the communist state to cooperation with it. T h e argument was that the Soviet Union had proved itself to be the true and only representative of Russia and Russian interests at the given time in history, and thus deserved the support of every Russian. Bolshevism was a passing phase, whereas Russia will remain. Ustrialov returned to Russia and was shot in the purges; but many Russians must have continued serving their country with some degree of patriotism as well as hope for a better future—even if they never heard of Ustrialov. The Second World War brought nationalism and patriotism to the fore. The authorities themselves engaged in direct appeals to these sentiments, and m a d e important gestures in their direction. While their new attitude was, in my opinion, manipulative rather than indication of a change in belief, it was nevertheless wel-

424 • Nicholas

V.

Riasanovsky

c o m e t o m a n y people. T h e long "cold w a r " provided f u r t h e r occasion for thinking a n d feeling in d i c h o t o m o u s q u a s i - n a t i o n a l , as well as in Marxist terms. Patriotic n a t i o n a l i s m certainly h e l p e d the Soviet g o v e r n m e n t in war, a n d even in peace, but it always h a d t o be c o n t r o l l e d and was ultimately irreconcilable with MarxismLeninism. In a d d i t i o n , the Soviet a u t h o r i t i e s had to be c o n c e r n e d not only with the Russians, but also with all their o t h e r nationalities. T h e Soviet system did not allow for an opposition, and in that respect, in a sense, s u c c e e d e d . A f t e r , first, o t h e r political parties a n d following that factions within the Party were proscribed, t h e r e r e m a i n e d no o n e to object legally to the Party line. T h e situation changed radically only with G o r b a c h e v ' s glasnost. Individual dissenters a n d small g r o u p s of dissenters eventually e m e r g e d , a n d certain of their publications, samizdat when published clandestinely in the country a n d tamizdat w h e n published a b r o a d , o b t a i n e d some circulation. But all this was little, a n d the police specialized in restricting and punishing the culprits. M o r e successfully during the later B r e z h n e v years a n u m b e r of critics could utilize international treaties signed by the Soviet U n i o n and thus acquire a legal standing for their protests. In any case, f u t u r e s t u d e n t s of Soviet history will have to k n o w the n a m e s of Solzhenitsyn and S a k h a r o v as well as those of Dzerzhinsky and Beria. Violence against a u t h o r i t i e s was a g r e a t crime a n d it was a p p a r e n t l y not very m u c h in use, certainly not to be c o m p a r e d to the violence of the a u t h o r i t i e s against the p e o p l e . This d i s p r o p o r t i o n has b e e n ascribed to m a n y causes ranging f r o m the efficiency of a totalitarian system to the passivity of the Russian character. Still, even earlier a n d m o r e so a f t e r the o p e n i n g of the archives, t h e r e is conclusive e v i d e n c e of strikes, protests, a t t e n d a n t massacres, rebellions in f o r c e d l a b o r c a m p s — s o m e t i m e s leading to a m e l i o r a t i o n in the labor c a m p r e g i m e — a n d o t h e r f o r m s of violence. P e a s a n t s killed c o m m u n i s t a g i t a t o r s for years a f t e r the e n d of the Civil War, a n d their graves w e r e o f t e n d e s e c r a t e d . E v e n all that may be c o n s i d e r e d little, t a k i n g into account the m a g n i t u d e of the subject. B u t o n e s h o u l d not m i s t a k e the p e o p l e ' s passivity or a c q u i e s c e n c e for a p p r o val. C o n c e n t r a t i o n c a m p m e m o i r s f o r m a d e v a s t a t i n g g e n r e of twentieth c e n t u r y literature. It is a multilingual, i n t e r n a t i o n a l species of writing f r e q u e n t l y set in Russia or G e r m a n y . T h e r e are even outsiders, Poles and others, w h o went t h r o u g h l a b o r c a m p s in b o t h systems and r e t u r n e d to tell the story. Typically they identify the G e r m a n c a m p s with the G e r m a n p e o p l e , but not the Russian c a m p s with the R u s s i a n p e o p l e . R a t h e r they are p r o n e to regard Russians, b o t h convicts a n d t h o s e o u t s i d e the camps, as living in i n v a d e d territory, a l t h o u g h the i n v a d e r s are also Russians. C o r r e s p o n d i n g l y , it was very difficult to e s c a p e f r o m a G e r m a n camp, but easy f r o m a Russian one, mainly b e c a u s e the R u s s i a n s in c o n t r a s t to t h e G e r m a n s a l m o s t invariably h e l p e d fugitives, s o m e t i m e s for m o n t h s on e n d . Of course, most G e r m a n s were not Nazis. T h e y e n j o y e d , h o w e v e r , an easy identification with t h e i r s t a t e a n d their authorities, which most of the Russians, o r at least very m a n y Russians, l a c k e d — a n d t h a t is precisely the point.

Notes • 425

Notes This article will serve also as the ninth chapter of my forthcoming book on Russian A Historical Survey to be published by Oxford University Press.

Identities:

1 A n d r z e j Walicki, Marxism and the Leap to the Kingdom of Freedom: the Rise and Fall of the Communist Utopia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 361-362. 2 For a more detailed presentation see, for instance, M. Geller and A. Nekrich, Istorii Rossii, 1917-1995, 4 vols. (Moscow: Izd. Mik, 1996), 1: 119-128, where the authors underline Lenin's own admissions of over-optimism and mistakes. 3 Walicki, Marxism, 303. 4 Robert C. Tucker, Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928-1941 (New York: Norton, 1990), 271; for purges, see 271-337 and passim. 5 The volume under discussion is Tucker's second sequential volume on Stalin. Much psychological analysis is to be found in the first, which I judged as impressive, but not always convincing. Robert C. Tucker, Stalin as Revolutionary, 1879-1929: A Study in History and Personality (New York: Norton, 1973). See my review of it (together with A d a m B. Ulam's Stalin: The Man and his Era (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989) in Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, "And Then There Was One," Reviews in European History 1, no. 2 (September 1974): 247-251. 6 Nicholas S. Timasheff, The Great Retreat: The Growth and Decline of Communism in Russia (New York: A r n o Press, 1972 [1946]). 7 Stalin on Lenin (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1946), 68. 8 On small peoples see especially: Yuri Slezkine, Arctic Mirrors: Russia and the Small Peoples of the North (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994). 9 For the most comprehensive and detailed account of the opinions of the Soviet citizens concerning the Soviet system, including many points of rapport between the two, see Alex Inkeles and Raymond A. Bauer, The Soviet Citizen. Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959). And for the more recent period, James R. Millar, ed.. Politics, Work and Daily Life in the USSR: A Survey of Former Soviet Citizens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 10 Jeffrey Brooks, Thank You, Comrade Stalin: Soviet Culture from Revolution to Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). 11 See especially Katerina Clark, The Soviet Novel: History as Ritual, 2d ed., (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985). 12 L. Rzhevsky cited in: Vera S. D u n h a m , In Stalin's Time: Middleclass Values in Soviet Fiction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 257. 13 Tucker, Stalin in Power, 470. 14 Brooks, Thank you, Comrade Stalin, 246. 15 Geller and Nekrich, Istoriia Rosii 2: 396. 16 The unprecedented liquidation of entire classes as a result of the O c t o b e r Revolution is a leitmotiv of Martin Malia, Comprendre la Revolution Russe (Paris, 1980). See also Malia's The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia 1917-1991 (New York: Free Press, 1994). 17 "Nam ostaetsia tolko imia...," Pamiatniki zhertvam politicheskikh opressii PetrogradaLeningrada (St. Petersburg, 1999), 3. 18 Geller and Nekrich, Istoriia Rosii 1:150-159.

V PERSISTENT FACTORS IN R U S S I A N H I S T O R Y

The Contemporary Russian Transformation in Historical Context VLADIMIR

SOGRIN

T h e m a j o r i t y of Russian citizens f e e l d i s c o n t e n t e d with c o n t e m p o r a r y reforms. T h e y d e b a t e the reasons for the failures and a d v a n c e v a r i o u s politicized assessments. T w o antagonistic opinions, h o w e v e r , stand out in this discord. O n e b e l o n g s to the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the C o m m u n i s t and national-patriotic camp. N e g a t i n g the R u s s i a n t r a n s f o r m a t i o n in its essence, they ascribe it to the intrigues of the West, the plotting of the A m e r i c a n intelligence services and a w o r l d w i d e Z i o n i s t or imperialist conspiracy s u p p o r t e d by local " p o w e r agents." T h e o t h e r point of v i e w is m a i n t a i n e d by those d e m o c r a t s and liberals w h o h a v e cherished this transf o r m a t i o n but w e r e clearly t a k e n a b a c k by its u n f o r e s e e n p r o b l e m s and consequences. T h e y place the responsibility for the failure on those r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of their c a m p w h o , having c o m e to p o w e r , did not m a n a g e to o v e r c o m e its c h a l l e n g e s and d e g e n e r a t e d into a n e w nomenklatura,

m e r g i n g with the nouveaux

riches and

oligarchs. In the present article Russian r e f o r m s and c h a n g e s are e x a m i n e d through the prism of the historical p r o c e s s e s of radical societal t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s in g e n e r a l and the R u s s i a n t r a n s f o r m a t i o n in particular. O n the basis of these processes, I a r g u e that both the e m e r g e n c e of c o n t e m p o r a r y R u s s i a n r e f o r m s and their u n e x p e c t e d d r a m a t i c and e v e n tragic results w e r e g r o u n d e d in l o n g - t e r m d e v e l o p m e n t s . For my analysis, three historical theories are of decisive i m p o r t a n c e : m o d e r n i z a t i o n theory, civilization t h e o r y and the t h e o r y of social r e v o l u t i o n .

THE WESTERN

IMPERATIVE

M o d e r n i z a t i o n t h e o r y e x p l a i n s the f u n d a m e n t a l cause of radical R u s s i a n transf o r m a t i o n s " f r o m a b o v e " b e g i n n i n g with P e t e r I to the present. It s h o u l d be rem e m b e r e d that this t h e o r y was f o r m u l a t e d a f t e r the S e c o n d W o r l d W a r in the c o n t e x t of W e s t e r n , and especially A m e r i c a n , social sciences. 1 T h e most influential a d h e r e n t s of this t h e o r y p r o c e e d e d f r o m the division of all societies into traditional and m o d e r n . T h e process of t r a n s f o r m a t i o n f r o m traditional (initially all societies w e r e traditional) to m o d e r n (and h e n c e the term m o d e r n i z a t i o n for the process) has f o r m e d , a c c o r d i n g to this a r g u m e n t , the f o u n d a t i o n of socio-histori-

430 • Vladimir

Sogrin

cal progress. T h e m a i n a t t r i b u t e s of m o d e r n society were the right of an individual to possess and m a n a g e p r o p e r t y , f r e e f o r m a t i o n a n d legalization of various economic, social a n d political interests, legal provision and u n a l i e n a t e d civil a n d political rights, r e p r e s e n t a t i v e g o v e r n m e n t a n d the division of p o w e r , e c o n o m i c a n d political pluralism, vertical a n d h o r i z o n t a l social mobility a n d a rational bureaucracy. Clearly, the f u n d a m e n t a l f e a t u r e s of m o d e r n society reflected the essential characteristics of W e s t e r n civilization. T h e m o d e r n i z a t i o n of w e s t e r n societies, with t h e Industrial R e v o l u t i o n a n d the liberal d e m o c r a t i c revolutions of the eight e e n t h a n d n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r i e s as its m a i n levers was considered t h e first or classical m o d e r n i z a t i o n . Scholars t h e n e x a m i n e d the e x p e r i e n c e of

non-Western

c o u n t r i e s with m o d e r n technology a n d institutions, defining it as "catching u p m o d e r n i z a t i o n . " Socio-historical d e v e l o p m e n t of Third World c o u n t r i e s was an e x a m p l e of this type of m o d e r n i z a t i o n . T h e history of such c o u n t r i e s as J a p a n a n d Russia p r o v i d e f u r t h e r illustrations. 2 T h e application of m o d e r n i z a t i o n t h e o r y to Russian history and especially the practice of b o r r o w i n g W e s t e r n social s t a n d a r d s of evaluation t u r n e d out to be insulting a n d u n a c c e p t a b l e to nationalistically o r i e n t e d Russian politicians a n d ideologues. F r o m an intellectual p o i n t of view, the question is not w h e t h e r it is h u m i l i a t i n g for Russia to use W e s t e r n s t a n d a r d s but w h e t h e r this long-lived practice of using W e s t e r n s t a n d a r d s has itself influenced the progressive t r a n s f o r m a tion of Russian society. A dispassionate analysis of Russian history allows this q u e s t i o n to be a n s w e r e d in the affirmative. T h e first e x a m p l e of Russian m o d e r n i z a t i o n on the basis of W e s t e r n s t a n d a r d s is c o n s i d e r e d the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of the P e t r i n e r e f o r m s . It is possible to a g r e e to the d e g r e e that the P e t r i n e r e f o r m s w e r e a kind of p r o t o - m o d e r n i z a t i o n since t h e West ( f r o m which P e t e r b o r r o w e d technological a n d organizational m o d e l s ) was still at the inception stage of m o d e r n i z i n g t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . It is fairly clear that at the basis of P e t e r ' s logic a n d rational choice lay the admission that w i t h o u t copying W e s t e r n e x p e r i e n c e , Russia was d o o m e d to r e m a i n a s e c o n d - r a t e , e c o n o m i cally u n d e r d e v e l o p e d country. T h e second p h a s e of Russia's m o d e r n i z a t i o n was the r e f o r m s or r a t h e r the r e f o r m i s t i n t e n t i o n s of C a t h e r i n e II. F u r t h e r r e f o r m s , t h o s e of A l e x a n d e r II, p r o v i d e an impressive e x a m p l e of Russian m o d e r n i z a t i o n . U n l i k e the P e t r i n e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s , they c o v e r e d not only e c o n o m i c , but also social, political and legal c h a n g e s that h a d b e e n a l r e a d y tested in the West. T h e activities of S. Witte a n d P. Stolypin at t h e e n d of the n i n e t e e n t h a n d b e g i n n i n g of the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s p r o v i d e d still f u r t h e r d e v e l o p m e n t of R u s s i a n m o d e r n i z a tion. 3 N e i t h e r W e s t e r n e r s n o r traditionalists ( p o c h v e n n i k i ) , C o m m u n i s t s or antiC o m m u n i s t s deny the progressive c h a r a c t e r of t h o s e r e f o r m s Thus, the process of m o d e r n i z a t i o n a p p e a r s as o n e of the most r e l e v a n t t h e m e s in m o d e r n R u s s i a n history a n d it can be a r g u e d that it has the c h a r a c t e r of " c a t c h ing u p " with the West. I n d e e d , it is difficult to imagine t h e a b o v e - m e n t i o n e d r e f o r m i s t e p o c h s in the a b s e n c e of the incentive to successfully c o o p e r a t e a n d

The Contemporary

Russian Transformation

• 431

c o m p e t e with the West. It was natural for Russian r e f o r m e r s to turn to the principles, technologies and institutions that seemed to g u a r a n t e e the steady advance of t h e West. Applying modernization theory to Russian history of the Soviet period proves m o r e difficult although many historians tend to interpret Stalinist reforms as modernization. In terms of the modernization theory this view is rather debatable. Stalinist "super-industrialization," which aimed at "catching u p " and "surpassing" the West economically, developed on an anti-western socio-political basis. It is worth mentioning that modernization theorists did not e q u a t e modernization with industrialization but regarded the latter as only one of its constituents. To "catch up with and surpass" the West through the development of socialism was also the goal of liberal Soviet r e f o r m e r s f r o m Nikita Khrushchev to Mikhail Gorbachev. Since standard Western modernization could not serve as a m o d e l for Soviet transformations, the West b e c a m e their alter ego as Soviet leaders urged the country to compete with t h e m exclusively. Yet, reluctantly admitting the progressive pace of the West, at least in the economic sphere, the U S S R a t t e m p t e d to copy, one way or another, Western technological and organizational patterns. Thus a striking paradox conditioned the Soviet perception of the West: on the o n e hand, Communist ideology professed the inevitable collapse of Western capitalism and, on the other, it launched the slogan "Catch up with and Surpass America!" that became a specific version of the G r e a t Soviet D r e a m . This acute ambivalence in the attitude of the U S S R to the West suggested a historical alternative: either the USSR would completely isolate itself f r o m the West, proceeding f r o m the thesis of socialist "self-sufficiency," or it would cooperate and compete with the West, borrowing certain technological and organizational patterns. The culmination and o u t c o m e of this ambivalence to the West were most visible in the 1980s when, during G o r b a c h e v ' s reforms, it became obvious that the possibilities to reform and guarantee gradual development on a socialist basis were exhausted and the U S S R should b o r r o w liberal democratic models. From that period on, modernization of the Soviet U n i o n and later Russia developed increasingly according to the classical, i.e., Western model. From an historical perspective, Russian modernization may be understood as a result of a natural competition between different social systems of the twentieth century. Soviet ideology presented this competition as an uncompromising struggle between the socialist and the capitalist systems with the ultimate and unconditional victory of the former. At present, c o m m e n t s on this conception a p p e a r unnecessary. In light of modernization theory, the c o n t e m p o r a r y radical transformations of Russian society may be divided into three stages. During the first stage (1985-1986) Mikhail G o r b a c h e v and his e n t o u r a g e used mostly command-administrative measures not dissimilar f r o m those that had already b e e n a t t e m p t e d by Nikita Khrushchev and Iurii Andropov. The main achievements of this period, such as the law on State Quality Inspection, reorganization of ministries, school reform, the anti-

432 • Vladimir

Sogrin

alcoholic campaign and accelerated development to yield positive results but additionally worsened lems of the country. The first stage d e m o n s t r a t e d Soviet society through a command-administrative

of engineering, not only failed the economic and social proba total inability to modernize approach.

During the second stage (1987-1991), G o r b a c h e v attempted to replace command-administrative socialism with a Soviet version of democratic socialism designed to free the economic and social potential of society. This new strategy produced results unexpected by its creators. The economic reforms failed but the political democratization acquired stability and its own inertia uncontrolled by Gorbachev. D u e to this development, modernization began accumulating liberal democratic patterns: within two or three years political pluralism advanced, the multi-party system and civic society acquired their initial shape. This democratic wave was sufficiently destructive to obliterate the command-administrative system, socialism and the USSR itself. Gorbachev, the architect of perestroika, was the last victim of the peaceful political revolution that sprang from his reforms. The third stage of modernization began after the demise of the Soviet Union and the Communist regime. It was implemented by Boris Yeltsin and the radicals to c o n f o r m to " p u r e " liberal patterns. These patterns, as well as the ample factual data that cannot be provided for the lack of space here, show that Russian modernization ripened naturally. Both liberal modernization and Westernisation were voluntarily welcomed by Russian society a f t e r the failure of gradual development on a socialist basis. However, it is a different matter whether a version of modernization that would minimize economic and social costs was workable. The experience of other countries shows that such a version is possible. In my view, the reformist elite that managed to gain public backing and came to power turned out to be incapable of realizing and accepting this possibility from either an intellectual or ethical perspective. Its utopism and populism expressed in the promise to create a capitalist paradise within a year, its self-interest and egoism manifested in the cynical acquisition of communist privileges and property, and its abuse of power in o r d e r to accumulate private capital have set a high social price for liberal democratic modernization. However, this is only one of the reasons and it is highly subjective. In the next section I turn to a n o t h e r key historical cause for the dramatic consequences of modernization for Russian society, civilization theory.

THE CIVILIZATION

BARRIER

Most scholars define civilization as a combination of societies of the same type or as o n e society that throughout its history maintains stable economic, sociocultural and political characteristics. Russia meets these criteria and most social scientists consider Russia an a u t o n o m o u s civilization. A m o n g the conceptions of Russian civilization, the most productive is that of a civilization "split" or the absence of a "normative core" 4 that provokes antagonism between " E a s t e r n " and

The Contemporary

Russian Transformation

• 433

" W e s t e r n " origins. This concept is not new. It was earlier supported, for instance, by Vasilii Kiiuchevskii who interpreted Russian history as a conflict between tradition (pochva) and "civilization." A t present, this concept is p r o m o t e d by the majority of social scientists who a d h e r e to the civilization a p p r o a c h . 5 T h e split of Russian civilization and the presence of contradictory legacies have persisted throughout its history beginning in Kievan Rus' when " E a s t e r n " and " W e s t e r n " trends balanced each other. The " E a s t e r n " heritage later prevailed and dominated during the Tatar-Mongol invasion in the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries. The consequences of the Mongol invasion have b e e n evaluated differently. Many social and political theorists proceeded f r o m the assumption that Mongol domination suspended Russia's development through the destruction of its Western roots and connections. O t h e r s thought that the Mongols did not profoundly affect Russian history. Still others, the Eurasianists a m o n g them, claimed that the invasion was beneficial because Muscovy b o r r o w e d centralized state forms f r o m the Tatars that later served as a mainstay for Russia's transformation into a strong E u r o p e a n country. 6 Without a doubt, the Muscovite rulers, such as Ivan III, Vasilii III and Ivan the Terrible, borrowing f r o m Mongol and Byzantine political traditions, created a centralized state. However, the consequences of this centralization for Russia are still contentious and the answer to this question has always d e p e n d e d on the particular ethical values of the analyst. (Such questions show that objective historical truth is hardly attainable.) Those who cherish the Russia that harnesses its own people and terrorizes others assess the activity of Ivan the Terrible positively. Those, however, who value civic society and individuals above the state, come to the conclusion that the Muscovite tsars brought the country closer to the Eastern type of despotism. They t r a n s f o r m e d the society, classes and individuals into servants of the state, a policy that had tragic results for Russian society. In the time of the tsars, especially u n d e r Ivan the Terrible, the state usurped the right to eliminate one elite (the boyarstvo) and create a n o t h e r (the dvorianstvo), to enslave millions of f r e e peasants, usurp property and impose total subservience. Thus, the central role of autocracy, unconditional supremacy of the state power in social and political affairs and the subordination of both individuals and classes have been determining factors in Russian history. In such conditions, civic society and individual rights, the b a c k b o n e of any liberal civilization, had minimal chances for development. The state played a key role in the f o r m a t i o n of social relations and structures as well as in the determination of property relations and economic development. In the twentieth century, the Bolsheviks did not change this practice but on the contrary completed the process in its most extreme form. The peculiarities of Russian civilization were dictated to a considerable degree by the specific character of O r t h o d o x Christianity, which, unlike Protestantism, prohibited any promotion of bourgeois individualistic values. A m o n g different socio-cultural features of Russian civilization, an important place belongs to corporatism and sobornosf that preached the dissolving of an individual into the col-

434 • Vladimir

Sogrin

lective and a painful feeling of antagonism toward or alienation f r o m the larger society. T h e Russian peasant c o m m u n e (obshchina) and the egalitarian consciousness of the Russian peasantry were not the invention of conservative ideologues but a p h e n o m e n o n of Russian civilization. Communal peasants disliked their p r o s p e r o u s and individualistic brethren even more than their masters. During Stolypin's r e f o r m s they would set their fellows' households on fire three times m o r e frequently than the masters' estates. The E u r o p e a n origins of Russian civilization were restored in the Petersburg period. This process, however, was again initiated by the state, which for the most part r e m a i n e d despotic. Rulers encouraged or suspended modernization at their own will. Moreover, only the top strata benefited while the lower strata (nizy) invariably remained poor. The extremely uneven distribution of benefits and the greed of the upper classes naturally m a d e the lower classes perceive modernization and liberalism as alien to their interests. This attitude enhanced their attachment to pochva. Not infrequently, pochva revolted and modernization was cut prematurely. Russian history, however r e f o r m e d , was thrust back again. Some social scientists suggest that the conflict between tradition and modernization is essentially insurmountable, and it p r e d e t e r m i n e s the evolution of Russian history along tragic lines. 7 The traditional c o m p o n e n t in Russian civilization, which undeniably includes Bolshevism, has raised serious impediments for contemporary Russian m o d e r n ization. The efforts of modernizers to overcome or ignore the obstacles and to act according to m a r k e t laws account for the failures and the dramatic economic and social outcomes. At a certain point in the beginning of the 1990s, the political behavior of the population fostered a belief that it might be possible to "jump over" civilization barriers and promptly proceed with "classical" modernization. A t that time, the majority of Russians, disillusioned with the socialist model of t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , favored radical liberals. People were overwhelmed with faith in the possibility of " p u r e " Western reforms. The democratic intelligentsia and the mass media equally supported and shared these hopes. Thus, the national peculiarities of Russia and the socialist doctrine were reduced to an ideological myth. The statement of one of the most influential radical leaders, Nicholai Travkin, was typical for that time: "As soon as we are done with the ideological hypocrisy, it b e c o m e s clear that t h e r e is no considerable discrepancy between socio-political systems of the West and the one that we are intending to build in our country." 8 The practical implementation of the radical-liberal model quickly revealed that in reality "the ideological hypocrisy" was a complex system of economic, political and socio-cultural structures, which, when violently attacked by r e f o r m ers, was able to trigger a national drama. The latter included a sharp decline of industry and agriculture, mass impoverishment, a deepening gulf b e t w e e n the nouveaux riches and the new elite on the one hand, and the rest of the population on the other, and a financial crisis in science, education and culture. The reaction

The Contemporary

Russian Transformation

• 435

of the liberal r e f o r m e r s was contradictory. Some without much hesitation moved on to the traditionalists' camp. Most liberals, however, having come to power, began aiming all their efforts at a redistribution of property and maintenance of power. This behavior, understood by many as corruption and treachery, corresponds to what some Russian social scientists have discussed in terms of the theory of social revolution and Thermidor.

R E V O L U T I O N A N D T H E R M I D O R AT T H E E N D OF T H E T W E N T I E T H

CENTURY

The ideas of "revolution" and T h e r m i d o r were used by Russian politicians and social scientists to denote the period of the 1990s and were imbued with contradictory content. Liberals define the contemporary Russian revolution, which is above all connected with the events of August 1991, as bourgeois-democratic and assessed it as entirely positive. The representatives of the other camp are of a different opinion. The events following the change of regime in August 1991 that I define as T h e r m i d o r are the subject of acute debate; thus the meaning of these controversial terms should be clarified. The term "revolution" is less vague. Usually it means a radical change of a socio-political regime or power. Historians prefer to define revolutions socially, for instance, as bourgeois or socialist. Political analysts and sociologists use broader terms of " l e f t " and "right" revolutions. These differences in definition may be easily leveled since "left" revolutions aim at a change or weakening of bourgeois social structures while "right" ones at a strengthening of the capitalist order. The disagreements about the meaning of " T h e r m i d o r " are much more significant. In Marxist thought, T h e r m i d o r stands for counterrevolution. The anti-Jacobin coup in France in 1794 was a classic example. Most Marxists and other "leftist" authors used the term to qualify bourgeois interference in popular revolutions. Thus, some Marxists and more generally "leftists" like Leon Trotsky and his followers understood Thermidor as a " d e g e n e r a t i o n " of Bolshevism in the 1920s into the anti-democratic actions of Joseph Stalin that finally led to his usurpation of power in the U S S R . T h e r m i d o r m e a n t in this case a sharp break f r o m O c t o b e r 1917, i.e., a counterrevolution. The non-Marxist literature interprets T h e r m i d o r differently. The term denotes the appropriation of the results of a revolution as well as the concentration and consolidation of economic and political power in the hands of new elites. T h e r m i d o r displays both rupture and continuity with a revolution and its results favor elite interests. The second meaning of the term d e p e n d s upon historical interpretation. Take, for instance, the French Thermidor, viewed as a classic case in both Russian and world historiography. 9 The Thermidorians who suppressed the Jacobins eliminated limits on capital accumulation and a t t e m p t e d to restore f r e e competition and market policy. In the political sphere they cut short not only any egalitarian aspi-

436 • Vladimir

Sogrin

rations of the lower o r d e r s but also the monarchists' attempts at restoration. In general, their position focused on the destruction of the Jacobin egalitarian heritage and the establishment of " p u r e " liberal-bourgeois standards. In contrast to the Jacobin program, this position more adequately corresponded to the principles of 1789. The Thermidorian politics helped concentrate power within the bourgeois elites who felt themselves f r e e f r o m any obligations to the people. This policy may be described as the normalization of the bourgeois order, which constituted the initial objective of the revolution. The fact that in order to reach this goal it was necessary to sacrifice political democracy and social egalitarianism was, f r o m the viewpoint of the bourgeoisie, secondary. The American Revolution of the eighteenth century demonstrated a n o t h e r " s o f t e r " non-violent variant. In 1787, eleven years after the revolution, the American elite successfully managed to consolidate power to work out the Federal Constitution that, approved by the majority of the states, considerably curtailed the "exaggerations" of political democracy and social egalitarianism. Equally, the American T h e r m i d o r did not imply a counterrevolution but rather a balance between the revolutionary demands and interests of the elites that participated in the revolution to secure their economic position. The American elite found it possible and even indispensable to compromise with non-elites, thus creating a stable social support for bourgeois causes. The Constitution defending economic and property rights p r o p a g a t e d concomitantly the division of power, a system of checks-and-balances, democratic state and political freedom. The elite designed the Constitution as a "social contract," imposing mutual obligations on both the rulers and the ruled. Thus, in contrast to the French case, the American T h e r m i d o r did not so much limit democracy as reaffirm the position of the elite. In Russian history an example of Thermidor is found in the period following O c t o b e r 1917. T h e Revolution of 1917 was not a bourgeois but a leftist egalitarian revolution. At the m o m e n t of its culmination, the revolution proclaimed the slogans: "Land to the Peasants!" "Factories to the Workers!" and "Power to the Soviets!" securing the link between the Bolsheviks and the people. However, already in the 1920s the Revolution renounced the burden it had assumed. The T h e r m i d o r substituted the Revolution and marked the consolidation of power within the political elite f o r m e d out of the " d e g e n e r a t e d " revolutionary leaders and a new party nomenklatura. Even this example of a Thermidor cannot be called a counterrevolution since it m a d e use of both rupture and continuity with egalitarian socio-economic Bolshevik norms. The fact that these norms were controlled by a party elite that tended to "normalize" the people is a n o t h e r question. These illustrations of Thermidor may be easily supplemented by others. They allow T h e r m i d o r to be defined as a conservative phase of a revolution that places power at the service of new elites. This is the crucial difference that distinguishes T h e r m i d o r f r o m restoration. Thermidor has been a norm for all revolutions; at the very least, it is difficult to find a single example of a "leftist" or "rightist" revolution that realized the ideals it professed. This analysis endorses G a e t a n o Mosca,

The Contemporary

Russian Transformation

• 437

R o b e r t Michels, Vilfredo Pareto, C. Wright Mills and others' division of society into the classes of the rulers and the ruled, however skillfully the f o r m e r may mask this division under the guise of ideology. 10 T h e relationship between T h e r m i d o r and democracy is controversial: "violent" T h e r m i d o r s suppress democracy while " s o f t " ones preserve democracy, constructing various compromises between elites and people, thus keeping the "social contract" o p e n for amendments. Liberal democratic regimes create models of " d e m o cratic elitism" and "open elites," expanding democratic forms and imposing new obligations on the elites. The expansion of democracy is rarely p r o m o t e d by the good will of the elites. More frequently, it requires the efforts of civic society, d e m a n d i n g a p e r m a n e n t political activism and maturity. T h e contemporary socio-political process in Russia may be divided into two periods: the period of the liberal democratic revolution (1989-1991) and the period of the Thermidorian elite (from 1992 onward). The failure of Gorbachev's perestroika was one of the chief motives for the liberal revolution. This failure created a belief that modernization on a socialist basis was impossible since the m a r k e t economy and democracy could not be " g r a f t e d " on to socialism and their acceleration required a change of the socio-political order. These ideological directives, equivalent to an ideological revolution, were discovered by the society in 1989-1991. The peaceful political revolution of 1991, striking a crippling blow to the USSR and socialism, became the culmination of this process. The revolution was led by a radical democratic movement based on three main components. The first was a relatively small group of dissidents led by A n d r e i Sakharov, the second was the majority of intelligentsia with the shestidesiatniki at its core, and the final was a portion of the Soviet party establishment such as Boris Yeltsin, Iurii Afanasiev, Ruslan Khasbulatov and Gennadii Burbulis who f o r m e d a radical opposition to Gorbachev. The mixed composition of the radical movement influenced the variety of its motives, which ranged from the sincere d e m o cratic aspirations of former dissidents to the disguised career-oriented ambitions of the ideological establishment. Despite all internal disagreements, the radical movement was characterized by a marked liberal democratic tendency that turned out to be the most effective means of gaining people's trust. The radicals won their first political success in the spring elections of people's deputies in 1989. Two years later they solidified this success with the triumphal victory in the presidential elections as well as during the three-day battle with the conservative putchists. Many radically oriented politicians, publicists and journalists defined the events of 1991 as a bourgeois-democratic revolution. They are not essentially wrong. However, the considerable differences between the revolution in Russia in 1991 and typical bourgeois revolutions cannot be ignored. Factors in E u r o p e a n and North American revolutions, such as a m a t u r e bourgeoisie, private property and business, were completely absent f r o m the Russian scene in 1991. Lacking similar social prerequisites, the Russian democratic movement molded a socio-political

438 • Vladimir Sogrin o r d e r along Western lines. The similarity shows first of all in the devotion to eral democratic values. Moreover, the Russian variant was characterized a more pronounced utopianism. Russia was supposed to be "rebuilt" within or even 400 days and the triumph of Western living standards was planned for year 2000.

libby 500 the

Having acquired power in 1989-1991, the radicals under the leadership of Yeltsin commenced the realization of the liberal modernization. Three main reforms were launched in 1992: the introduction of free market prices, the liberalization of trade and mass privatization. A f t e r the first "trial" year, it became clear that the capitalist market model that was being developed in Russia turned out to be a complete " a n t i p o d e " to the projects that had been envisioned by radicals at the time of the anti-Communist struggle. Later this inconsistency was confirmed by multiple examples, one of which was the practice of mass privatization. The latter was planned as populist and was designed to transform the Russians into a middle class of proprietors and shareholders. The idea of mass capitalism failed. Three years a f t e r the introduction of privatization the majority of the population (above 60 percent) found themselves without vouchers and shares. Those who kept their shares did not know how to handle them and did not derive any p r o f i t . " Eventually, only a small n u m b e r of the population, who constituted the core of the new elite, possessed the majority of the stock capital, property and economic power. The practice of this bewildering privatization still requires investigation. The publicly available scattered facts about the acquisition of property by the minority reveal only the tip of the iceberg. However, it becomes clear how criminal structures, Russian and foreign financial corporations and "red directors" misappropriated state property. The top state bureaucracy played the first fiddle in this process and was generously rewarded. Not without reason, the new elite was called a financial-bureaucratic oligarchy. A p a r t from privatization, the economic elite may exploit other well-known mechanisms. A n d e r s Aslund, a Swedish economist, argued that it was not privatization that ultimately helped create a class of "new Russians," but rather secret export-import subsidies and soft credits. 12 Those "special exporters" and recipients of "special credits" were illegally and not disinterestedly s u p p o r t e d by the top bureaucracy. Was the distribution of the state property and social structuralization possible on a fair basis as the radicals thought in 1992? Ideally, the model presupposes a n u m b e r of conditions: the availability of a rational, ethically unified b u r e a u c r a cy; a strong and impartial state able to legally service and counterbalance its citizens; a developed civic society to control the activity of the state and b u r e a u c r a cy; and the p r e s e n c e of relatively e q u a l e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l a p t i t u d e s within individuals. Since such a model does not exist, mass capitalism is not possible. The " m a r k e t spirit" released in 1992 began operating in the Social Darwinist regime, rewarding "the fittest." What was the reaction of those radical democrats who together with Yeltsin

The Contemporary

Russian Transformation

• 439

c a m e to power? The available data suggests that radicals behaved as typical Thermidorians, actively abusing power in o r d e r to obtain elitist status and wealth. Immediately after August 1991, those who had zealously fought the old regime u n d e r the slogans of "equal opportunities and elimination of privileges," with a striking cynicism began to view state property as their own. They appropriated expensive flats and dachas, along with the best clinics and sanatoriums and r e s t o r e d the system of "special distribution" and other privileges. T h e Thermidorian tendencies in the economy were reinforced by the changes in t h e political system. Here, they primarily concern an effort to alter the division of p o w e r in favor of the executive, particularly presidential authority and to form a " p o w e r party" of a "closed elite" in o r d e r to control the mass media. T h e conflict between the legislative and executive branches in 1992-1993 was the most famous and controversial among the post-revolutionary changes. The a r m e d confrontation led to a presidential victory and the liquidation of the Soviets. The President's side shifted all responsibility for the spilt blood on to the S u p r e m e Soviet and legislative power. The latter accused Yeltsin of power usurpation and treated the actions of the legislators as an epic of heroism meant to save the division of power, constitutional order and legality. In the light of my conception of Thermidor, o n e more interpretation arises. The actions of the executive power in 1993 may be viewed as a crucial phase in the process of power consolidation by the new elites. It was not a counterrevolution, less so a restoration. The intentions toward restoration and an attempt to foster a counterrevolution were present in the actions of the legislators. The analysis of the legislators' programs, ideology and social composition shows that their goal was the restoration of the USSR and the old order. Their ambition was not essentially different f r o m that of the putchists in August 1991. By placing the legislative power under their control, the legislators blocked the maneuverability of the executives and put the Russian state system into a deadlock. The conflict on which the f u t u r e of Russia d e p e n d e d was a conflict between T h e r m i d o r and restoration. The president's victory struck a serious blow against the restoration attempts from the " l e f t " and consolidated those socio-political tendencies that took root in 1992-1993. The adoption of the Constitution in D e c e m b e r 1993 accelerated the process of p o w e r consolidation. Russian political scientists talk about the formation of political financial groups whose m e m b e r s are connected through the practices of p a t r o n a g e and clientele. 1 3 The power elite is becoming more and more closed, mobilizing immense resources in o r d e r to k e e p the appropriations it received in 1991. T h e society is well aware of how the elite's spheres of interest enlarge and how real possibilities to confront t h e m diminish. The new elites' effective and vigorous strategy of buying-up shares a n d controlling mass media was one of the important ways in which they pursued their goals, establishing monopolies over their new information publishing empires. The discrepancy between the content of the socio-political process in 1989-1991 on the o n e hand and the period of 1992-1999 on the o t h e r is obvious. It is impos-

440 • Vladimir

Sogrin

sible t o deny, h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e s e t w o p e r i o d s display d i f f e r e n t i n s t a n c e s of continuity. T h e R u s s i a n T h e r m i d o r t h a t c r u s h e d t h e i d e o l o g e m e s , r h e t o r i c a n d illusions of 1991 suggests t h a t a u n i v e r s a l p r o s p e r i t y in t h e new regime is t h e s a m e Utopia as in t h e old one. T h e T h e r m i d o r , n e v e r t h e l e s s , h a s p r e s e r v e d a r a n g e of p r i n c i p l e s of 1991. F r o m 1992 o n w a r d p r i v a t e o w n e r s h i p of p r o p e r t y s t r e n g t h e n e d . E c o n o mic liberalism, t h e holy of holiest of t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y ideology in 1991, h a s also b e e n a d a p t e d to R u s s i a n society. R u s s i a c o n t i n u e s t o have a m u l t i - p a r t y s y s t e m , political p l u r a l i s m a n d division of p o w e r , a l t h o u g h c o m p a r e d to t h e i d e o l o g e m e s of 1991, t h e y a r e m u c h w e a k e n e d . Political p a r t i e s a n d their l e a d e r s c o m p e t e in f r e e elections. T h e R u s s i a n political s p e c t r u m is r e m a r k a b l y wide, i n c l u d i n g t h e e x t r e m e " r i g h t " a n d t h e e x t r e m e " l e f t . " T h e R u s s i a n T h e r m i d o r did n o t e l i m i n a t e t h e liberal d e m o c r a t i c r e v o l u t i o n b u t i n s t e a d of a naive image of u n i v e r s a l h a p p i ness t r a n s f o r m e d it into a reality t h a t c o r r e s p o n d s to the p r o c e s s e s of social interr e l a t i o n s h i p s in a b o u r g e o i s society. R u s s i a n society, as b e f o r e , is d i v i d e d i n t o a " p o w e r e l i t e " a n d t h e rest of t h e p o p u l a t i o n a l i e n a t e d f r o m b o t h e c o n o m i c a n d political influence. T h i s o u t c o m e h a s b r o u g h t m a s s d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t , c o n f u s i o n and a p a t h y . It was p a r t i c u l a r l y e v i d e n t a m o n g t h e intelligentsia, which was a driving f o r c e of t h e revo l u t i o n a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y filled in t h e r a n k s of t h e " n e w p o o r . " This r e a c t i o n is similarly c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of o t h e r social s t r a t a t h a t s u p p o r t e d t h e liberal d e m o c r a t ic r e v o l u t i o n . T h e i r political p o s i t i o n w a s episodically visible d u r i n g elections. T h e e l e c t i o n results s h o w t h a t t h e m a j o r i t y of t h e p o p u l a t i o n feels nostalgia f o r s t a t e p a t r o n a g e , t h e m a i n social a t t r i b u t e of t h e old o r d e r . A t the s a m e time, w h e n conf r o n t e d with the choice b e t w e e n t h e " t w o evils," p e o p l e t e n d to c h o o s e a "lesser e v i l " — t h e n e w s y s t e m . T h e e x p l a n a t i o n , to my mind, lies in the belief t h a t t h e Soviet r e g i m e has e x h a u s t e d itself while t h e n e w o n e still holds t h e possibility of change.

Notes 1 For main adherents of modernization theory, see C.E. Black, ed., The Dynamics of Modernization ( N e w York: Harper and Row, 1966):Talcott Parsons. The System of Modern Societies ( E n g l e w o o d Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1971); Reinhard Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship: Studies of Our Changing Social Order (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977). 2 See, for instance, C.E. Black, The Modernization Study ( N e w York: Free Press, 1975).

of Japan and Russia: A

Comparative

3 O n interpretations of the Great R e f o r m s see L.G. Zakharova, B. Eklof, J. Bushnell, eds., Velikiie reformy v Rossii, 1856-1874 ( M o s c o w : Izd. M o s k o v s k o g o universiteta, 1992); B.V. Anan'ich, R.Sh. Ganelin, V.M. Paneiakh, eds., Vlast' i reformy. Ot samoderzhavnoi k sovetskoi Rossii (Moscow: Dmitrii Bulanin, 1996); B.N. Mironov, Sotsial'naia istoriia Rossii perioda imperii XVHI-nachalo XXv. Genezis lichnosti, demokraticheskoi sem'i, grazhdanskogo obshchestva i pravogo gosudarstva, 2 vols. (St. Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 1999); E.G. Pantin, I.K. Plimak, Drama rossiiskikh reform i revoliutsii. Sravnitel'no-politicheskii analiz (Moscow: Ves'mir, 2000).

Notes • 441 4 B. Erasov, "Russia in Eurasian Space," Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost' 2 (1994): 59. 5 On the civilization approach see the works of A.S. Akhidze, B.S. Erasov, I.V. Kondakov, I.N. Ionov. A.S. Panarin, L.I. Semenikova, I.G. Yakovenko and others. 6 For views on the impact of the Mongol invasion see G. Simon, "Mertvyi khvataet zhivogo. Osnovy politicheskoi kul'tury Rossii," Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost' 6 (1996); E. Kulpin, "Istoki gosudarstva rossiiskogo," Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost' 1-2 (1997); Donald Ostrowski, Muscovy and the Mongols: Cross-Cultural Influences on the Steppe Frontier, 1304-1589 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Michael DavidFox, ed., Amerikanskaia rusistika. Vekhi istoriografii poslednikh let, imperatorskii period. Antologiia (Samara: Samarskii universitet, 2000). 7 See A.S. Akhiezer, Rossia. Kritika istoricheskogo opyta, 3 vols. (Moskva: Filosofskoe obshchestvo SSSR, 1991) for the insurmountability of the conflict between tradition and modernity. 8 Quoted in Literaturnaya gazeta 26 (1990): 10. 9 On the French Theridor in Russian historiography see A.Z. Manfred,et al.. Istorila Frantsii, 3 vols. (Moscow: Nauka, 1972-73), 2: 65-80. 10 Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class, trans. Hannah D. Kahn , ed., revised, with an introduction by Arthur Livingston (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939); Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy, 2 nd ed., trans. Eden and Cedar Paul; introd. by Seymour Martin Lipset (New York: Free Press, 1962 [1911]); Vilfredo Pareto, The Rise and Fall of Elites: An Application of Theoretical Sociology (New Brunswick, N.J.:Transaction, 1991 [1901]); c.Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959). 11 Finansovye Izvestiia (16 February 1996); Izvestiia (20 March 1996). 12 Anders AsIund,"Novyh Russkih ObogatiliTri Osnovnyh Istochnika," Finansovye Izvestiia (20 June 1996). 13 L. Afanasiev, "Klientela v Rossii vchera i segodnia," Politicheskii Issledovaniyal (1994); I. Kukolev, "Regionalinye elity: Bor'ba za vedushie pozitsii prodolzhaetsia," Vlast' 1 (1996); V. Gelman, "Shahmatnye partii rosiiskoi elity," Pro et Contra (Fall 1996).

Intelligentsia, Intellectuals and Elites in Transition: A Critical Discourse at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century BORIS

FIRSOV

In o n e of his works Ivan Szelenyi, a H u n g a r i a n sociologist, showed that the anarchists' dispute with Marx was the first a t t e m p t to pose the question of the role of intellectuals in the working class m o v e m e n t and in the struggle for socialism. 1 Mikhail Bakunin, for example, c o n t e n d e d that the complexity of governing a state and an economy would inevitably bring scientists and intellectuals to power. 2 A l r e a d y at that time it could be seen that intellectuals were not eternally d o o m e d to being the m o u t h p i e c e of proletarian views. On the contrary, they could and would pursue their own interests. Technocratic class theories f r o m the first half of the twentieth century located power in technocratic bureaucracy. According to those theories, the U S S R was labeled a state of bureaucratic collectivism, in which power surely belonged to the bureaucracy, the holder of national property (socialism based on state-and-party m o n o p o l y ) , and not to the working class. Some time later John K e n n e t h Gailbraith, an American economist, declared that engineers had a specific role in a new industrial state. In the 1970s, Daniel Bell a n n o u n c e d the coming of postindustrial society in which power would belong to scientists. 3 H e emphasized the c o m p l e t e d e p e n d e n c e u p o n scientific and technological knowledge for economic growth. Alvin G o u l d n e r saw highly e d u c a t e d people as a "new class" in the postindustrial era. 4 In his view, left-wing revolutionary and radical intelligentsia, t o g e t h e r with technocrats, could become u n d e r certain conditions an i n d e p e n d e n t historical force. They would provide a culture of critical discourse, i.e., highly educated people possessed knowledge and a capacity for asserting principles by critically analyzing reality. In o t h e r words, their cultural capital would m a k e it possible to assume power f r o m the p o w e r f u l , be they ossified Party b u r e a u c r a t s in socialist countries or p r o p r i e t o r s and owners of financial capital in capitalist countries. 5 H e n c e the mission of G o u l d n e r ' s new class was to replace the power of m o n e y with the power of society's confidence in technology, science, culture and education and to use the new class as the f o u n d a t i o n for renovating existing f o r m s of intellectual elites.

444 • Boris Firsov Writing five years before G o u l d n e r ' s heralding of the "new class" but publishing much later due to censorship, Ivan Szelenyi and Gyorgy Konrad took a more sensible view on intellectuals' chances of obtaining power in socialist countries. 6 They considered intellectuals as a social force that held a monopoly on the production of "teleological knowledge" (teleology—a doctrine of final causes), which allowed them to claim an active interest in the fortunes of state and society. T h e Party bureaucracy was unable to resist their claim and reacted by voluntary assimilation with a part of the intelligentsia. Although far from including the entire intelligentsia, their merging with top-class technocrats was proceeding rapidly and Party membership became remarkably less important. For example, in Hungary non-Party and even oppositely minded people came to occupy decision-making positions. The intellectualization of bureaucracy that started in the 1970s was gradually dissolving the official nomenklatura and crushing Party hegemony. Simultaneously, Party cadres were streaming into the intellectual strata. A reason for those historically inevitable concessions and changes has very much to do with the "undermining" character of teleological knowledge. Szelenyi and Konrad considered it synonymous to adversary culture, which is close in meaning to G o u l d n e r ' s culture of critical discourse. Actual events in the socialist countries in the late 1980s showed that the " u n d e r m i n i n g " potential of this culture was sufficient only to lay claims to power, i.e., to considerably limit the omnipotence of bureaucracy and to compel it to adopt new rules of the game, once the idea of "socialism with a h u m a n face" had e n d e d in an almost total fiasco. But claiming power did not at all m e a n coming to power. Indeed, even today and not only in the late twentieth century, when the old bureaucracy is still declining and the newly born proprietors are gaining strength, representatives of the educated classes have better chances of becoming candidates in a new ruling elite. However, they have not yet succeeded in changing for the better the general social and political conditions in order to occupy key positions in the system of actual power. 7 Still, we know better what we are leaving behind than what awaits us in the foreseeable future, wrote Szelenyi. E c o n o m i e s of the former socialist countries of Central and Eastern E u r o p e represent a mixture of different social and economic structures. Instead of parties, t h e r e are proto-parties and movements. Political and economic structures have not yet crystallized. The era of merciful capitalism, which should have replaced socialism with a h u m a n face, has not emerged. The power of the state has w e a k e n e d . T h e lingering transitional period still contains prerequisites for development in several directions. 8 O n e of these is to pave the way to capitalism; the second is neobureaucracy's accession to power; the third is the growing supremacy of international capital, if all the chances granted by the overthrow of old communist regimes are lost. Today, when the ruling bureaucracies are sharing p o w e r functions and commissions with the new proprietors, the social role of the most advanced representatives of the educated classes is limited to an i m p o r t a n t but still secondary mediating function in the tense dramatic dialogue b e t w e e n the

Intelligentsia,

Intellectuals

and Elites • 445

p r i n c i p a l c o m p e t i n g forces. 9 A s is testified by t h e R u s s i a n r a t h e r t h a n t h e H u n g a r i a n e x p e r i e n c e , the b e h a v i o r of all t y p e s of elites d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e of t h e t r a n sition is largely d e t e r m i n e d by t h e s p e e d a n d s c o p e of t h e c o n v e r s i o n of intellig e n t s i a i n t o intellectuals. N o v i c e s a r e r e c r u i t e d f r o m t h e e d u c a t e d classes t o r e i n f o r c e the elite social groups. T h a t is why t h e k n o t of r e l a t i o n s a m o n g t h e intelligentsia, intellectuals and elites c a n n o t be u n d e r s t o o d w i t h o u t e x p l a i n i n g e x a c t l y w h a t h a s h a p p e n e d to t h e R u s s i a n intelligentsia a n d R u s s i a n intellectuals. In o n e of his w o r k s Z y g m u n t B a u m a n d e s c r i b e s an original m e t h o d of e m p i r ically m e a s u r i n g t h e t r a n s i t i o n f r o m c o n s e r v a t i s m t o liberalism. T w e n t y p i c t u r e s w o u l d b e d r a w n . T h e first p i c t u r e s h o w e d a d o g a n d t h e t w e n t i e t h a cat. O n e a c h of t h e i n t e r v e n i n g p i c t u r e s t h e d o g ' s g e n e t i c f e a t u r e s g r a d u a l l y c h a n g e d i n t o a cat. T h e p i c t u r e s w e r e s h o w n o n e at a t i m e , the precise m o m e n t was n o t e d w h e n t h e p e r s o n r e a l i z e d t h a t t h e d o g was t u r n i n g into a cat. 1 0 A n a l o g o u s to this e x a m p l e is t h e f o l l o w i n g thesis: t h e c o n v e r s i o n of intelligentsia i n t o i n t e l l e c t u a l s d e p e n d s o n a n u m b e r of e x t e r n a l c o n t e x t u a l c o n d i t i o n s , first of all, o n high g u a r a n t e e s of t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l s ' i n d e p e n d e n c e f r o m t h e state. T h e m o r e p o w e r f u l t h e i n t e l l e c t u al c a p i t a l , t h e firmer such g u a r a n t e e s . T h e n e x t c o n d i t i o n r e s i d e s in p r o f e s s i o n a l ism a n d t h e r e j e c t i o n of i n t e l l e c t u a l r o l e s as solely to e n l i g h t e n a n d e d u c a t e " i m m a t u r e " people. 1 1 Finally of i m p o r t a n c e is t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to b e g a i n f u l l y e m p l o y e d and m a k e a living as an intellectual. H e r e h o p e s a r e p i n n e d o n t h e e m e r g e n c e of a c e r t a i n cultural a u d i e n c e to w h o m intellectuals could a p p e a l a n d a m o n g w h o m they could find n e c e s s a r y m o r a l a n d m a t e r i a l s u p p o r t . T h e s e h o p e s a r e also p l a c e d o n t h e availability of d e v e l o p e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n s y s t e m s t h a t e n a b l e t h e circulation of the r e s u l t s of i n t e l l e c t u a l productivity, as well as c r e a t i v e e x c h a n g e of o p i n i o n s , t a k i n g in all e l e m e n t s of society, if neccesary. 1 2 A s is k n o w n , t h e t e r m " i n t e l l i g e n t s i a " e m e r g e d in Russia in t h e 1860s. 1 3 Initially, t h e n o t i o n of t h e intelligentsia w a s a p e c u l i a r s y n o n y m f o r collective c o n science a n d e n l i g h t e n m e n t . L a t e r this c o n c e p t c a m e t o b e a s s o c i a t e d w i t h criticism. T h e intelligentsia was t h o u g h t of as a relatively solid g r o u p of i n t e l l e c t u a l l y a d v a n c e d p e o p l e u n i t e d by s h a r e d o p p o s i t i o n to t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t a n d t o p o w e r in g e n e r a l . T h e intelligent

is a p e r s o n of " h i g h i d e a s " w h o d e v o t e s h i m / h e r s e l f t o

public issues, a n d service to t r u t h a n d justice. T h e r e is a l o n g - s t a n d i n g t r a d i t i o n of c o n s i d e r i n g t h e intelligentsia an e x c e p t i o n a l l y R u s s i a n p h e n o m e n o n . A t t h e d a w n of the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y M a x W e b e r w r o t e t h a t this c o n c e p t was n o t a c c e p t a b l e f o r W e s t e r n c o u n t r i e s , b e c a u s e it w a s " t h e s i t u a t i o n in R u s s i a herself." 1 4 N e v e r theless, t i m e h a s s h o w n t h a t intelligentsia s h o u l d exist in all societies u n d e r m o d e r n i z a t i o n , if it is v i e w e d as a d e f i n i t e r e s o u r c e of m o d e r n i z a t i o n (a t u t o r , a g u i d e , o r t e a c h e r of t h e u n e d u c a t e d ) . T h e w o r d " i n t e l l e c t u a l s " e n t e r e d t h e F r e n c h l a n g u a g e in t h e 1890s.The c o n c e p t " i n t e l l e c t u a l s " is d e t e r m i n e d by its s t r u c t u r e of t h e p r o f e s s i o n s , a n d t h e t w o a r e practically i n s e p a r a b l e . T h e r e f o r e , solidarity will n o t b e c o m e a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r their e m e r g e n c e . T h e r e is n o d o u b t t h a t i n t e l l e c t u a l s d e t e r m i n e t h e p r o c e s s of r e p r o d u c i n g ideas. T h e y can b e in d i f f e r e n t p h a s e s of r e l a t i o n s with s o c i e t y ( a l i e n -

446 • Boris Firsov ation, externalization, concerned or constructive criticism, when criticism becomes a behavioral norm). It is permissible that an intellectual's behavior can bear traces of political and social engagement. The principal issue concerns the concepts which were erected on the f o u n d a t i o n s of these attributes.

THE INTELLIGENTSIA

MYTH

T h e myth of the intelligentsia lies at the heart of the Soviet (and Russian to a large extent) concept of the dynamics of the d e v e l o p m e n t of the educated classes. The myth originates f r o m the Stalinist epoch when the intelligentsia committed the u n p a r d o n e d sin of openly identifying with pre-Revolutionary intelligentsia, the first and last wave of culturally advanced Russians who personified spirituality and e m b o d i e d literally the opposition to tsarist power. But this "inconsistency" did not impede the myth that the intelligentsia always fought power. True, the intelligentsia went t o o far in its interest in revolutionary ideas and created the avantgarde art of the 1920s, but the intelligentsia r e s p o n d e d to b r u t e Stalinist oppression with a c o n t i n u o u s outpouring of immortal spiritual values. The Khrushchev thaw o f f e r e d them an unexpected gift in return. First came the renaissance of spirituality, which was followed by a t t e m p t s to revitalize Stalin's personality cult. But the intelligentsia stood up for the gains of deStalinization and gave birth to a dissident movement. It waited for perestroika to begin and, finally, e n t e r e d into a direct dialogue with the people. Together they ostensibly broke down the communist regime, but the fruits of that victory were grasped by other power-thirsty strata. Once again, society lost spirituality and the intelligentsia's ideas remained unclaimed. Thus, the intelligentsia once again f o u n d itself on the verge of extinction. 1 5 In reality the e d u c a t e d and semi-educated strata in pre-Revolutionary society was only a " f o r e m o t h e r " of the intelligentsia. But she never gave birth because she was deprived of her ability to procreate. 1 6 The intelligentsia of the Soviet U n i o n emerged at the turn of the 1920s-1930s as an artificially created stratum ( v y d v i z h e n t s y , Party apparatus, etc.), which was officially regarded as an alternative to the old and entirely bourgeois Russian intelligentsia. The journal Neprikosnovenny zapas reprinted an interesting entry f r o m the Russian etymological dictionary edited by Ushakov and published in 1935. According to the dictionary, intelligent at that time r e f e r r e d to a p e r s o n whose social behavior was characterized by weak will, hesitation and doubts. It was even hinted that the word intelligent could be used in everyday speech as a scornful nickname. A n d to convince the r e a d e r of the possibility of such an interpretation, the editor (an intelligent himself, by the way!) refers to a q u o t a t i o n f r o m Lenin: "That is the psychology of a Russian intelligent: he is a brave radical in words, while in deeds he is a petty m e a n clerk." 1 7 Hence, a natural j o b f o r t h e Party was to curb the intelligentsia's old habits, so it was kept on a short leash.

Intelligentsia, Intellectuals and Elites • 447 A f t e r Stalin the leash loosened but its length remained the same. Opposition was excluded, and obedience was prized above all. As a result, at least three generations were busy wasting precious time and strength in futile endeavors doing what should not be done, lost millions of lives and eventually overstrained themselves. T h e building that later on crashed b e f o r e our eyes could have never b e e n constructed without the participation of Soviet intelligentsia. 1 8 A t the beginning of the twentieth century Russia had a chance to b e c o m e a viable civilized society. Instead, it was forcedly taken down a road leading to c o m m u n i s t paradise. In the mid-1940s Russian émigré sociologist Nicholas Timasheff estimated that the balance of achievements and successes in different spheres, including education, literacy, health care, social insurance and so on shows that the Revolution was absolutely unnecessary. 1 9 Without the heavy losses and n u m e r o u s victims that accompanied Russia's development after O c t o b e r 1917 the country in many respects would have surpassed the figures for e c o n o m ic a n d social development that were ascribed exclusively to the practice of socialist construction. Successes in building socialism, even if they did take place, were in m a n y respects a result of the progress achieved in the pre-Revolutionary period. It can be said that a revolution is the most expensive technology of social change. 2 0 Moreover, the costs of the Russian Revolution have no precedent. Possibly, this high price might have a historical justification, if the aim of the Revolution was to recognize the country's backwardness and propose m e t h o d s to overcome it. But in the f o u n d a t i o n of the October upheaval there was a "social p l a n " to create an absolutely new society. O r t h o d o x Marxist theory did not rest u p o n a scheme for building a socialist society. That is why the concrete steps and actions had to be taken on the basis of constant borrowings (for example, emulating the G e r m a n economy of the time of World War I; using the idea of planning, despite the bourgeois origin of its authors, etc.). Evidently there were also some inventions—a one-party system, a rudimentary representation of workers in the soviets, the dual economy of the New Economic Policy ( N E P ) , a culture administered f r o m above, strangling of religion, socialist competition. In t h e years of perestroika and in the period of r e f o r m s that followed, the intelligentsia should be paid tribute for being a m o n g those who energetically working at the dismantling of the dying system. But also here the intelligentsia has failed to get what it expected.

THE

ELITE

T h e question of the elite has not been addressed for a long while, so strong has b e e n the myth of the intelligentsia in mass consciousness. Well until the 1970s it looked as if there were no elite, and t h e r e f o r e it was impossible to talk a b o u t it as of a natural part of the Soviet intelligentsia. A four-volume Russian language dictionary published in 1961 authoritatively r e c o m m e n d e d Soviet readers to associate the elite with the best species of whatever plants, pedigree cattle or cultivated

448 • Boris Firsov plant seeds produced by scientists. " N o word, no thing," wrote Professor V. Zhivov about its origin. 21 All the same, the word managed to "slip into" the language, although imperceptibly. In 1972 a dictionary edited by Ozhegov (and it was the ninth edition!) revealed that f r o m now on not only elite plants or elite livestock but also "the best representatives of whatever part of society" were to be referred to by this term. A n expression was suggested to help illustrate the new, officially permitted sense of the w o r d — " a n elite of the working class." It is no secret that by that time in the social structure there were well-defined state-and-party elite, on the one h a n d , and an elite recruited from different strata of cultural, artistic, scientific and technical intelligentsia. The state and party were soliciting and luring the latter through a system of privilege-based redistribution of material and cultural wealth. 2 2 The state-and-party elite longed for equality, however, not with the people but rather with the intellectual elite who lived independently, cloaked in a singular aura. This was the more attractive, the less accessible it was not only to an ordinary man but also to those in the stateand-party nomenklatura.23 That is why, despite the known official privileges, the nomenklatura strove to ensure this equality by making up for their cultural deficit through the prestigious consumption of cultural products no longer d e p e n d e n t on power. The nomenklatura elite n e e d e d to experience the life force that distinguished many stars of national culture, art and science. Books by Solzhenitsyn were circulating not only in the hands of the intelligentsia. A special editorial board, affiliated with the Progress Publishers, was set up to re-publish u n d e r "Classified" and "For Authorized Use O n l y " headings the books of dissident authors at the expense of the State Treasury and mailed them to a list of highranking bureaucrats, thus broadening their cultural outlook as well as that of their families. S. Lapin, chairperson of the Ail-Union Radio Committee in the late 1940s, was one of the vigorous fighters against groveling before the West and cosmopolitanism. With his consent, the f a t h e r of N. Eidel'man, a well-known historian, was expelled from the Party only because during the broadcast of A. Safronov's play. "The Moscow Character," he unplugged the radio saying "That's n o Chekhov." In the 1960s the almighty Lapin (by now he occupied the post of Chairman of the USSR R a d i o and T V C o m m i t t e e ) became famous for his library that contained books by both disgraced poets and dissident writers. 24 From the early 1990s onward the expression, "the nomenklatura has traded power for property," was almost commonplace. Russian sociologist O. S h k a r a t a n 2 5 has shown that this statement is not true in principle. Rather the nomenklatura seemed to be moving secretly toward radical changes, primarily in the sphere of property distribution. Although having e n o r m o u s power and relevant privileges, the nomenklatura did not possess private property. It would be a p p r o p r i a t e to r e m e m b e r Trotsky's forgotten words: "Privileges have only half of their price, if they cannot be b e q u e a t h e d to children. But the right of bequest is inseparable f r o m the right to property. It does not suffice to be a trust's director, o n e should be a shareholder. The victory of bureaucracy in this decisive area would m e a n its

Intelligentsia, Intellectuals and Elites • 449 t r a n s f o r m a t i o n into a new propertied class." 26 Thus many decades ago private p r o p e r t y was connected to an instinct as unconditional and strong as parental instinct. Karl Mannheim also stressed the inheritance of property. The nomenklatura for a long time was striving to r e m o v e limitations in this field. This was prophetically pointed out by M. Voslenskii in his remarkable book, The Nomenklatura. Although the emergence of "quasi-private" property in the 1950s to 1980s will not be described here, in reforms of the 1990s the nomenklatura saw a nearly historic chance to solve the problems of property privatization. But naturally it p r e f e r r e d acting to speaking, while hiding away and waiting for the hour when both p o w e r and property would c o m e into its hands. This is the reason that the nomenklatura supported reforms and, moreover, for obvious reasons ascribed those r e f o r m s to society (people and intelligentsia). The creators of the myth of the intelligentsia could celebrate a victory once again. The myth was victorious— the intelligentsia and the people won, and democracy started sprouting. But the communist elite could celebrate an even greater victory. Then managed to create an a t m o s p h e r e of change in historical course (Zhivov calls this "a discourse of historical turning-point"). 2 7 In fact, the communist elite retained the mechanism of social continuity of power and carried out a repartition of state property in its favor. Now it was time to leave the shade a n d make people understand that, as in previous years, those who had power n e e d e d neither equality nor b r o t h e r h o o d . Moreover, the communist elite did not need to seek a cultural or intellectual equality with intelligentsia. History r e p e a t e d itself. A certain portion of the intelligentsia was welcome to be "nursed," while the rest were left in the winds of change. Could that be the reason why the intelligentsia's discourse is waning?

THE INTELLIGENTSIA AND

SOCIETY

In reality, there is a gradual and very painful change in models of relations between the intelligentsia and society. These models were fully realized only in the history of China, 2 8 but nothing can prevent us from using them as m e t a p h o r s explaining the essence of the problem u n d e r consideration—the conversion of intelligentsia into intellectuals. Within the " C o n f u c i a n " model the intellectual is replete, lured, supported by society and even participates, to a certain extent, in decision making. In exchange he serves society as part of the administrative bureaucracy. This model was realized in medieval China where the bureaucracy, as a rule, coincided with the educated class. With certain reservations the " C o n f u c i a n " model could be used to i n t e r p r e t the role of intellectuals in the U S and other developed countries. The Soviet U n i o n came close to this model. Within the "Taoist" model a representative of the educated class is not directly supported by society. His connections with society are accidental and, in any case, have nothing to do with the status of "intellectual" chosen by the person. Consequently, he is forced to turn to s u p p l e m e n t a r y salaries or to the help of pri-

450 • Boris Firsov vate p e r s o n s (sponsors). In order to survive, such (absent) intellectuals can resort to social self-organization by uniting themselves on the basis of closed communities or c o m m u n e s (e.g., Taoist or Buddhist monasteries). In such cases the intellectual lives exclusively at his own risk, since he is outside social good and evil. So it seems that the " C o n f u c i a n " model that previously d o m i n a t e d in Russia is being substituted with elements of the "Taoist" model. In any case, the socioeconomic, as well as the socio-political context in which science, education a n d culture—the most important social institutions of society—function has radically changed. A s a result, they were suspended in a social vacuum, left to the mercy of fate. So powerful is the intellectual potential unclaimed by the reformed society and state that the situation is close to a social catastrophe. Some ten to twelve years ago we did not even guess that it worked. But there is a different point of view, one which does not ignore real difficulties but instead alerts us to the chance for redemption. Russia, our long-suffering country, is not only a social space that faces a n o t h e r inevitable cataclysm. It also is a construction site of m o d e r n history, a residence and workplace of people who seem able to e n d u r e and overcome all circumstances. Most likely, there is a phen o m e n o n in n a t u r e that could be called "the self-protective instinct of large communities" (the expression of St. Petersburg publicist and historian J. G o r d i n ) which enables them to resist any unnatural or inorganic path the society may take. The "Taoist" model is serious because here a person doing intellectual labor has to accept the axiom that society neglects him, but in exchange he receives spiritual f r e e d o m . It is the spiritual f r e e d o m and not the fate of a Buddhist m o n k , that I single out in the "Taoist" model as an alternative way which comes to light through the chaos of total permissiveness and criminal skirmishes. "For a while the intellectual has h a p p e n e d to be without the obtrusive custody of society. H e received a slight but quite real opportunity to find such forms of existence that are m o r e consistent with his nature and that will b e c o m e his support in the future, when society once again will call on him for cooperation." 2 9 That will surely happen. B u t then it will not be the intellectual who will dictate the terms of revived partnership. By a prophetic expression of an English historian Arnold Toynbee, the model of " d e p a r t u r e and r e t u r n " operates here. "A creative personality, when leaving and falling out f r o m the social environment, transforms; he returns again to the same e n v i r o n m e n t endowed with new abilities and creative powers. His d e p a r t u r e allows him to realize the potential that could not find an expression, being depressed by the inevitable load of societal obligations." 3 0 Spiritual f r e e d o m and sovereignty b e c o m e principal m o m e n t s in intellectual life. I specifically stress that I do not identify this spiritual f r e e d o m with escapism and self-isolation. T h e case in point is a moral dilemma. A n intellectual can be an outsider or a person d e t a c h e d f r o m reality, but at the same time he/she will be telling the truth to the powerful. E v e n filled with skepticism, an intellectual will remain unremittingly and consistently linked with rational research and moral judgements. 3 1 Boris

Intelligentsia, Intellectuals and Elites • 451 Pasternak was a writer and language was his political arena. His scrupulousness toward the language was paradoxical but it placed him in the middle of events despite his will. Doctor Zhivago m a d e him the dissident of dissidents! Certainly, he was balancing and sometimes even found it hard to bear the title of a Soviet artist. But for him there was no dilemma of whether " t o speak or not to speak." R a t h e r , the question was which language to s p e a k — t h e language of honesty or a pseudo-language of sanctioned cliché and banality. 3 2 H e boldly spoke a true and unique language. In 1935 Pasternak was ordered to travel to Paris to a congress in d e f e n s e of culture. H e said something absolutely contradictory to what was expected of him: "I understand that there is a congress of writers who have come together to organize resistance to fascism. In this regard I can tell you only one thing. D o n ' t get organized! Organization is the death of art. What is solely important is personal independence." 3 3

T H E L I N G U I S T I C V I C T O R Y OF T H E

INTELLIGENTSIA

The term "linguistic victory" comes from Szelenyi and Konrad. 3 4 When in the second half of the 1980s the time came for the Soviet Union to set sail for other coasts, first the course had to be mapped. Such a task was beyond the powers of the Party leadership. Then came the finest hour for the Soviet intelligentsia, of which A. Utkin wrote vividly in Nezavisimaya gazeta.35 He reminded us of important issues worthy of more attention. Khrushchev was not unwilling to read the texts written by a wise Hungarian, the Soviet academician Varga. Brezhnev tirelessly enlarged the institutes of consultants and advisors. A n d r o p o v readily discussed a p r o b l e m with an advisor who conveniently h a p p e n e d to be at hand. A n d only Gorbachev, and let us pay him his due, brought the "thick layer" (prosloyka) to the bridge of the Soviet ship, unfolded the map, p o k e d his finger at it and asked: " W h e r e d o we sail?" Historians have suggested a convincing reconstruction of all that followed. According to Unkin, three imperatives d e t e r m i n e d the answer to "Captain G o r b a c h e v ' s " question. The first imperative was to sail as fast as possible to the point of " n o return." T h e case in point was to pay whatever price for a m o r e human social order. A maximum program was hardly imaginable at that time, but a minimum p r o g r a m envisaged the achievement of irreversibility of humanistic evolution of the ruling clique. The second imperative can be summed up in the formula "we must b e c o m e a normal country." But a substitution occurred here. Striving for " n o r m a l i t y " was torn from the country's historical experience and from critical analysis. Even more importantly—and we have only started discussing this issue now that the passions connected with reform have settled—no attention was paid to the wreckage of the nation's mental stereotypes. The third imperative was a d e s p e r a t e faith in the existence of something greater than common sense. The situation went f u r t h e r than the public renunciation of Marxist

452 • Boris Firsov doctrine, which until the mid-1980s represented the essence of blind communist faith. Having pronounced an a n a t h e m a against Marxist doctrine and Marxism in general, the intelligentsia turned to the almighty god of " f r e e market": "Well, the market will arrange everything, will reward for labor and skills and will punish the lazy. It will smash the age-old urge of the center to control all and everything, will challenge the sleepy province and will shake up the people." Utkin described 1988-1991 as "a surrealistic three-year period." It was a time when everything that used to seem impossible began to look possible, if not tomorrow than in a m o n t h or two, or in 500 days, or in the coming fall. Crisis is natural, as is the a t o n e m e n t for long decades of tragic mistakes—blood, violence, terror, and the power of the aggressive ideology that strove to m a k e the world "happy." 3 6 All this is true. Equally true is that many serious plans for reforming society lacked a human quality. When carrying out reform in Russia, the question of "kindness" has never been posed, as was repeatedly pointed out by the Russian sociologist Pitirim Sorokin. A n d it is only "kindness" to h u m a n beings that can put an end to all types of aggression and can pacify conflicts. Starting f r o m Sorokin's altruism, f r o m his "high ideas" of non-egoist creative love, one can find a severe deficiency of this altruism in the implementation of Russian reforms. Otherwise, one cannot explain the fact that reformers and their advisors have never had necessary political flexibility and skills of m a n e u v e r , or simply, the elementary human decency in relation with the people of the country being r e f o r m e d . Indeed, love for the people has always b e e n the banner of Soviet and Russian intelligentsia. 3 7 The other side of the coin was the victory of the culture of critical discourse, to refer once again to G o u l d n e r ' s terminology. As a result of this victory, the f r e e m a r k e t , pluralism of thought and even dissidence were rehabilitated, and the picture of society as changing became habitual. The Party nomenklatura has lost its voice and become mute. 3 8 Michel Foucault pointed to another, probably more important consequence of this victory. Crisis can never be something external, unrelated to and fully independent of a critical discourse. T h e latter not only reflects the underlying crisis but also creates it. The stress on disempowering the old elite has not strengthened the positions of the new political forces. Mass consciousness, left without means for interpreting the past, first found itself disoriented and then turned to the familiar " g o o d " past. D u e to this development m a n y Russian sociologists regard the linguistic victory as a Pyrrhic victory. This is true. But it is also true that the victims and losses could have b e e n significantly less h a d the virus of self-destruction not been brought by Russian intelligentsia into the social organism at the beginning of this century. Thus, Soviet and post-Soviet intelligentsia have not become intellectuals. I have two goals in suggesting this conclusion. The first goal is to unbundle a complex of social hopes that, in this world of a b u n d a n t knowledge, is linked more and m o r e frequently with contemporary notions of intellectualism, as a leading f e a t u r e of present-day civilization, and of intellectuals who ideally are its bearers. T h e sec-

Intelligentsia, Intellectuals and Elites • 453 ond goal is to understand why, when transplanted in Russian society, the Western m o d e l of intellectuals is subjected to a "transcultural translation." As a result, the intelligentsia looks different from the Western intellectual elite. 39 Several observations highlight distortions of this transcultural translation. The first observation relates to the early twentieth century and was m a d e by the leader of Russian liberalism, Peter Struve: "The Russian intelligentsia as a specific cultural category is an o u t c o m e of the interaction between Western socialism and peculiar conditions of our cultural, economic and political development. Prior to the reception of socialism in Russia, the Russian intelligentsia did not exist; there was only an 'educated class,' with different t r e n d s within it." 40 A n internal aspiration to be, above all, a socialist prevailed over the organic need of an educated person to come, by trial and error, to an understanding of social reality. In doing so, the possible influence of class p r e f e r e n c e s and sympathies had to be overcome. The h y p e r t r o p h y of oppositionalism and revolutionarism shaped the intelligentsia's side focus. It should have r e m a i n e d a cultural elite and never turned into a social elite. It would be a p p r o p r i a t e here to recall that in the first years of Soviet power M a n d e l s t a m did not take pride in the intelligentsia's oppositionalism but felt it as a burden. 4 1 H e thought that, with a patronizing power, the role of curator and m a n a g e r of culture would be more natural for the intelligentsia. He hoped that the intelligentsia's oppositional responsibilities had vanished in the past t o g e t h e r with the tsarist regime. Better educated and more dynamic, the intelligentsia could play a special restraining role at critical moments. In other words, not the struggle of some people against o t h e r s on barricades but reconnoitering, a search for solutions along different ways; h u m a n e experiments should have become the p r o g r a m for the activities of the intelligentsia. Such a behavioral strategy would have helped the conversion of intelligentsia into intellectuals. In this case it might have proved possible to reject revolution as the only way of solving society's problems. It is useful to recall the sentence: "The greatest event of the n i n e t e e n t h century was a proletarian revolution in England that did not happen." 4 2 The second observation comes f r o m our time. When watching Russia f r o m outside and looking into t h e peculiar features of the Russian intelligentsia and its role for the destiny of Soviet (contemporary Russian) society, U m b e r t o E c o noted in 1998 in the Russian weekly, Literaturnaya gazeta: "The Russian word "intelligentsia" has taken root in E u r o p e a n languages. But it is used to d e n o t e a category of people called maîtres à penser in French. O r masters of public opinion. ...This word is used ironically, with regard to those who continuously come up with moral pronouncements. That is why the Russian notion of "intelligentsia" does not c o m e under the E u r o p e a n term intellighenzia. A n d , in general, there is a long distance between our intelligentsia and your intelligentsia." The distance has not been measured but I can say that stubborn moralizing and intolerance of different opinions point out the deficit of one's own thoughts. Such a consciousness r e p r o d u c e s a cliché or, at best, a m o r p h o u s mass notions, instead

4 5 4 • Boris

Firsov

of working out new objectives and values. Let me support this statement by referring to the reflections of an intellectual, the late academician Nikita Moiseev: "The young government of Gaidar was filled with people better educated than before, but nevertheless they were half-educated and insufficiently competent. ...They did not receive f u n d a m e n t a l university e d u c a t i o n . T h e y received disgusting economic and social education." 4 3 The crash of the Soviet system was predestined by the degradation of the upper echelon of power, although those who think that the collapse came because of the devastation of cultural, ideological and human resources are also right. 4 4 The goals of the Soviet intelligentsia consisted in legitimizing Soviet power and providing support to the regime. The latter was achieved through education, which trained primarily functionaries. Unified models of education left no room for the possibilities of individual diversity, variability, choice, competition and personal achievement. The cultural resources of the social system became exhausted quite quickly. These were enough for the initial industrialization, military modernization and, with e n o r m o u s efforts, for the replacement of losses and destruction of World War II. Everything went smoothly as long as there was a "catching-up" industrialization. But as soon as the period of post-industrialism began, intended for the dominance of science and reproduction of knowledge, the country came to a halt. There began a sclerosis of internal d e v e l o p m e n t of an educated society. H e r e it was difficult to call the leadership of the state and society an elite. These upper strata, who administered economy, industry, politics, culture and education, represent a reproductive bureaucracy with a servile philosophy. Their worldviews differ from the values and attitudes of the middle class, which "in o t h e r societies sees itself as the center of the universe, as a natural basis of the society, and whose systems of coordinates become a norm for others." 4 5

Notes 1 I. Szelenyi and B. Martin, "The Three Waves of N e w Class Theories and a Postscript," in Charles C. Lemert, ed.. Intellectuals and Politics: Social Theory in a Changing World ( N e w b u r y Park: Sage, 1991), 19-30. 2 Szelenyi and Martin, "The Three Waves," 20. 3 Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial York: Basic Books, 1973). 4 Alvin Gouldner, The Dialectic of Ideology

Society. A Venture in Social Forecasting and Technology

5 Alvin Gouldner, The Future of the Intellectuals Seabury, 1979), 19.

(New

( N e w York: Seabury, 1976).

and the Rise of the New Class ( N e w York:

6 Gyorgy Konrad and Ivan Szelenyi, The Intellectuals York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979).

on the Road

to Class Power

(New

7 Gyorgy Konrad and Ivan Szelenyi, "Intellectuals and D o m i n a t i o n in Post-Communist Societies," in Pierre Bourdieu and John Coleman, eds., Social Theory for a Changing Society (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 337-61. 8 Szelenyi and Martin, "The Three Waves," 30.

Notes • 455 9 Konrad and Szelenyi, "Intellectuals and Domination in Post-Communist Societies," 353-55. 10 Zygmunt Bauman, "Spor o postmodernizme," Sotsiologicheskii Zhurnal 4 (1994): 69-80. 11 Iu. A. Levada, "Problema intelligentsii v sovremennoi Rossii," in T.I. Zaslavskaia and L. A. Arutiunian, general eds., Kuda idet Rossiia? Al'ternativy obshchestvennogo razvitiia (Moscow: Interpraks, 1994), 208-14. 12 I.S. Kon, Sotsiologicheskaia psikhologiia (Moscow: Moskovskii Psikhologo-Sotsial'nyi Institut, 1999), 361. 13 B.M. Firsov, "Intellektualy, vlast' i kommunikatsiia," Sotsiologicheskii zhurnal 4 (1995): 21-30. 14 Iu.N. Davydov, "Utochnenie poniatia 'intelligentsia'," in T.I. Zaslavskaia and L.A. Arutiunian, Kuda idet Rossiia?, 244. 15 V. Zhivov, " O b ogliadyvanii nazad i chastichno po povodu sbornyka 'Semidesiatye kak predmet istorii russkoi kul'tury'," Neprikosnovennyi Zapas 2, no. 4 (1999): 50-2. 16 V. Zhivov, " O b ogliadyvanii nazad," 51. 17 V. Zhivov, " O b ogliadyvanii nazad," 51. 18 N.P. Shmelev, "Intelligentsiia i reformy," Kongress Rossiiskoi Intelligentsii: Moskva 10-11 dekakria 1997 g. (St. Petersburg: Sankt-Peterburgskii Gumanitarnyi Universitet Profsoiuzov, 1998), 39-55. 19 Nicholas Timasheff, The Great Retreat. The Growth and Decline of Communism in Russia (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1946), 373-402. 20 Timasheff, The Great Retreat, 396. 21 V. Zhivov, " O b ogliadyvanii nazad," 50. 22 B.M. Firsov, "Intellektualy, vlast' i kommunikatsiia," 26. 23 V. Zhivov, " O b ogliadyvanii nazad," 55. 24 M. Podgorodnikov, "Slabyi pozvonochnik," Znamia 9 (1999): 157-172. 25 O.I. Shkaratan, "Sotsial'naia stratifikatsiia v postsovetskoi Rossii: ot soslovno-sloevykh k klassovym otnosheniiam," Tsotsial'naia stratifikatsiia: Uchebnoe posobie (Moscow: Aspekt Press, 1996), 287-312. 26 E. Gaidar, Gosudarstvo i evolutsiia (Moscow: Evraziia, 1995), 114. 27 V. Zhivov, " O b ogliadyvanii nazad," 49. 28 S. Kornev, "Vyzhivanie intellektuala v epokhu massovoi kul'tury," Neprikosnovennyi Zapas 1 (1998): 18-21. 29 S. Kornev, "Vyzhivanie intellektuala v epokhu massovoi kul'tury," 20. 30 A.Toynbee, Postizhenie istorii (Moscow: Progress, 1991), 267. 31 F. Bjorling, "Whether 'tis nobler in the mind... Pasternak i nravstvennaia dilemma poslerevoliutsionnoi intelligentsii," Rossiia/Russia 2, no. 10 (1999); N. Okhotin, ed., Russkaia intelligentsiia i zapadnyi intellektualizm: Istoriia i tipologiia, new series, (Moscow: O.G.I., 1999), 95-103. 32 F. Bjorling, "Whether 'tis nobler in the mind," 100. 33 Boris Pasternak, Sobranie sochinenii, 5 vols. (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1989-1992) 4: 883. 34 Konrad and Szelenyi, "Intellectuals and Domination in Post-Communist Societies," 337-61. 35 A. Utkin, "Nasha i 'eta' strana," NG Stsenarii, supplement to Nezavisimaia Gazeta, no. 22 (12 December 1997), 3. 36 N.P. Shmelev, "Intelligentsiia i reformy," 40-41. 37 Pitirim Sorokin i sotsial'no-kul'turnye tendentsii nashego vremeni. Materialy k Mezhdunarodnomu simpoziumu, posviashchennomu 110-letiiu so dnia rozhdeniia P.A. Sorokina. Moskva-Sankt-Peterburg, 4-6 fevralia 1999 g. (Moscow and St. Petersburg: Sankt-Peterburgskii Gumanitarnyi Universitet Profsoiuzov, 1999), 324-31.

456 • Boris

Firsov

38 Konràd and Szelényi, "Intellectuals and Domination in Post-Communist Societies," 352. 39 M.Iu. Lotman, "Intelligentsiia i svoboda (k analizu intelligentskogo diskursa)," Rossiia/Russia 2, no. 10 (1999), 127-128. 40 Vekhi. Sbornik statei o russkoi intelligentsii (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnaia Assotsiatsiia Deiatelei Kul'tury, 1990), 173. 41 M.L. Gasparov, "Russkaia intelligentsiia kak otvodok evropeiskoi kul'tury," Rossiia/Russia 2, no. 10 (1999): 25. 42 M.L. Gasparov, "Russkaia intelligentsiia kak otvodok evropeiskoi kul'tury," 27. 43 G. Lisichkin, "Lovushka dlia reformatorov," Oktiabr'1 (1999): 155. 44 L. Gudkov, "Obrazovannye soobshchestva v Rossii: sotsiologicheskie podstupy k teme," Neprikosnovennyi Zapas 1, no. 3 (1999): 23-31. 45 L. Gudkov, "Obrazovannye soobshchestva v Rossii," 29-30.

Public-Private Partnerships in Russian Education: Historical Models and Lessons HARLEY D .

BALZER

The education system encapsulates the multiple challenges facing Russia since 1991. While the Soviet Union achieved impressive improvements in the education system inherited from tsarist Russia, it never adjusted its extensive model to the needs of late industrialization. The flawed attempt to introduce neoliberal economic reforms after the breakup of the USSR exposed the highly uneven and resource-starved system to the ravages of simultaneous inflation and drastic reductions in government spending. The Russian state has lost its capacity to mobilize resources at a time when the education system desperately needs funding not only to upgrade the decaying infrastructure inherited from Soviet days but to radically revise the curriculum and acquire new technology to participate in the global knowledge economy. Russia's situation is an extreme case of a problem affecting all education systems: the rising cost of information technology at a time of shrinking governments creates chronic economic difficulties for school systems. Increasingly, politicians invoke a mantra of private and commercial support for educational institutions as the solution to the resource problem. This raises an enormous public policy challenge: how to attract private funds without creating a separate private education system serving the affluent, while the public system deteriorates. 1 Combining public and private support for education can be accomplished in myriad ways. Russian educators seeking models might find a "usable past" in the hitherto neglected story of government-society collaboration to expand Russia's education system during the last decades of the imperial era. 2 The education needs of tsarist Russia at the end of the nineteenth century and the Russian Federation at the beginning of the twenty-first century are of course quite different, but some lessons can be derived from Russia's pre-Revolutionary experience in attracting public financial support that have resonance today. This article examines tapping non-government tion. It describes Witte's grams, and the growth of The conclusion points to

Sergei Witte's efforts to expand Russian education by sources of funding, thereby encouraging civic participaapproach, the team he assembled to carry out his proschools at both the primary/secondary and higher levels. some lessons for current conditions.

458 • Harley D. Balzer W I T T E A N D P U B L I C - P R I V A T E P A R T N E R S H I P S IN

EDUCATION

We k n o w a fair a m o u n t a b o u t t h e small n u m b e r of p r i v a t e s e c o n d a r y a n d h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n a l e s t a b l i s h m e n t s in R u s s i a b e f o r e 1917. Far less a t t e n t i o n has b e e n p a i d t o t h e significant a m o u n t of p u b l i c f u n d i n g c o n t r i b u t e d t o s t a t e institutions. 3 Success in b l e n d i n g s t a t e a n d p r i v a t e e f f o r t s was d u e largely t o t h e vision, e n e r g y a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n a l t a l e n t of F i n a n c e M i n i s t e r Sergei W i t t e . W i t t e r e c o g n i z e d a n d utilized o p p o r t u n i t i e s t h a t m o s t R u s s i a n officials s t u d i o u s l y i g n o r e d . T h e r e was significant p o t e n t i a l f o r f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t f o r e d u c a t i o n f r o m local z e m s t v o s , d u m a s , stock e x c h a n g e c o m m i t t e e s , city g o v e r n m e n t s a n d individual m e r c h a n t s a n d industrialists, b u t t h e tsarist M i n i s t r y of E d u c a t i o n w a s n o t willing to g r a n t such g r o u p s a m e a n i n g f u l role in t h e e d u c a t i o n s y s t e m . W h e n E d u c a t i o n M i n i s t e r Dmitrii A.Tolstoy permitted " h o n o r a r y trustees" to help support general education schools, he s o u g h t to k e e p t h e i r i n v o l v e m e n t superficial. 4 H i s s u c c e s s o r Ivan D e l i a n o v e x t e n d e d t h e t r u s t e e s h i p s to technical s c h o o l s while c o n t i n u i n g t o i n s u r e they w e r e p r o f o r m a . T h e R u s s i a n public w a n t e d a d d i t i o n a l s c h o o l s o f f e r ing g e n e r a l e d u c a t i o n a n d access t o h i g h e r institutions. A g r o w i n g n u m b e r of R u s s i a n s b e l i e v e d t h e i r financial c o n t r i b u t i o n s e n t i t l e d t h e m to a g r e a t e r voice in d e t e r m i n i n g w h a t k i n d s of s c h o o l s to build a n d h o w t h e y s h o u l d be a d m i n i s t e r e d . Yet t h e s e a s p i r a t i o n s w e r e resisted by t h e E d u c a t i o n M i n i s t r y a n d t h e I n t e r i o r Ministry, which f r e q u e n t l y c o n s i d e r e d c o n t r i b u t i o n s f r o m p u b l i c g r o u p s s u s p e c t o n religious o r e t h n i c g r o u n d s . T h e p u b l i c p r o v i d e d s o m e financial s u p p o r t f o r s c h o o l s d e s p i t e t h e E d u c a t i o n M i n i s t r y ' s e m p h a s i s o n l o w e r level e d u c a t i o n a n d its m a z e of

bureaucratic

r e s t r i c t i o n s . 5 S u b s e q u e n t F i n a n c e M i n i s t r y success in soliciting p u b l i c c o n t r i b u tions, h o w e v e r , s u g g e s t s t h a t D e l i a n o v ' s inflexibility p r e v e n t e d s c h o o l s f r o m t a p p i n g significant r e s o u r c e s . T h e E d u c a t i o n M i n i s t r y ' s i n s i s t e n c e o n b u r e a u c r a t i c c o n t r o l w a s n o t solely a p r o d u c t of D e l i a n o v ' s c o n s e r v a t i v e (classicist) views. T h e r e w e r e valid r e a s o n s t o m o n i t o r p r i v a t e s c h o o l s w h e n p a t r o n a g e c o u l d h a v e an e n o r m o u s i m p a c t o n an i n s t i t u t i o n ' s c i r c u m s t a n c e s . F o r m a n y , t h e c h a r i t a b l e i m p u l s e w a s as i m p o r t a n t as p e d a g o g i c goals. N o t all p r i v a t e s c h o o l s w e r e e s t a b lished with h i g h - m i n d e d m o t i v e s . S o m e w e r e a v o w e d l y c o m m e r c i a l e n t e r p r i s e s , with t h e w o r s t of t h e s e o f f e r i n g t h e i r s t u d e n t s little b e y o n d m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e e x e m p t i o n s . D u r i n g t h e R u s s o - J a p a n e s e W a r , such a b u s e s b e c a m e p a r t i c u l a r l y notorious.6 I n a d e q u a t e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e s c h o o l s y s t e m u n d e r t h e E d u c a t i o n M i n i s t r y led o t h e r d e p a r t m e n t s to c o m p e n s a t e by e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e i r o w n e d u c a t i o n p r o g r a m s . T h e M i n i s t r y of F i n a n c e , with its close ties t o industry, was p a r t i c u l a r l y active. In t h e p e r i o d 1896-1902, W i t t e ' s t e a m p r o p o s e d an e n t i r e s y s t e m of n e w s p e c i a l i z e d schools. 7 E a c h of t h e p r o p o s a l s p e r m i t t e d significant local involvem e n t in d e s i g n i n g a n d a d m i n i s t e r i n g t h e s c h o o l s in r e t u r n f o r financial assistance. Two t h e m e s r e a p p e a r c o n s i s t e n t l y in F i n a n c e M i n i s t r y e d u c a t i o n p r o p o s a l s : t h a t e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n m u s t b e p e r m i t t e d a n d t h a t local s o u r c e s of f u n d i n g s h o u l d b e

Public-Private

Partnerships in Russian Education • 459

t a p p e d — p r e f e r a b l y to do things the government w a n t e d to do, but with concessions to local concerns in return for the financial contributions. All of the proposals sought to meet the n e e d s of an industrializing society by relying on the assistance—particularly the material assistance—of local groups.

WITTE'S EDUCATION

TEAM

To expand the Finance Ministry's school network Witte assembled a staff that included many of Russia's leading experts on industrial education. Some were actively recruited while others recognized the opportunities being created and sought to participate. T h e most famous m e m b e r of Witte's education team was the chemist D.I. Mendeleev, who has been widely credited for generating many of the ideas Witte sought to implement. 8 Mendeleev's role, however, was more in the realm of public relations and ideology than in implementing school programs. In higher technical e d u c a t i o n the most important individuals were the surviving m e m b e r s of Ivan Vyshnegradskii's Pentagonal Society circle, particularly N.P. Petrov and V.L. Kirpichev. 9 A m o n g the key individuals who worked with Witte on primary and secondary education were V.I. Kovalevskii, E.P. Kovalevskii and I.A. Anopov. Their careers suggest the range of people Witte was able to recruit and the diverse p r o g r a m s they sought to develop. 1 0 Vladimir Ivanovich Kovalevskii (1848-192?) overcame a serious brush with revolution to b e c o m e Witte's chief spokesman on education in the State Council. From the gentry in K h a r k o v province, Kovalevskii received a military education, but resigned his commission the same year he received it (1868)." H e then enrolled at the P e t e r s b u r g Agricultural Institute, completing the course in 1874. Implication in the Nechaev affair resulted in his incarceration in the Peter and Paul fortress during 1875-1877, but in 1879 he was able to obtain a position in the Ministry of State Domains. In 1884 he b e c a m e Vice-Director of the D e p a r t m e n t of Direct Taxation in the Ministry of Finance, and in 1892 became Director of the important D e p a r t m e n t of C o m m e r c e and M a n u f a c t u r e . It was in this post and as Assistant Minister of Finance that Kovalevskii s h e p h e r d e d the Ministry's education legislation t h r o u g h the State Council. His statistical training m a d e him invaluable in compiling r e p o r t s on industry for various International Exhibitions. 1 2 We know less a b o u t Evgraf Petrovich Kovalevskii (no known relation to V.I.), another Technical Society activist who assisted Witte on several education projects. H e was dispatched by the Technical Society as its representative to the International C o n f e r e n c e on Technical E d u c a t i o n at B o r d e a u x in 1895, and his report on the C o n f e r e n c e was of help in arranging subsequent meetings in Russia. Witte seems to have used him as a t r o u b l e s h o o t e r on several occasions. For example, when groups in Kiev were unable to agree on a site for the new Polytechnical Institute in that city, E.P. Kovalevskii was sent to resolve the issue. 13 Perhaps the most interesting a p p o i n t m e n t Witte m a d e was Ivan Alekseevich

460 • Harley D. Balzer A n o p o v as Director of the Finance Ministry Education C o m m i t t e e in 1900. For over a decade A n o p o v had h e a d e d the Education Ministry's Section for Technical Education. U n d e r Witte, he oversaw development of the network of craft schools, commercial schools, polytechnical institutes and programs of design and commercial education. 1 4 A n o p o v g r a d u a t e d f r o m P e t e r s b u r g Technical Institute in 1866 and began service in the Artillery D e p a r t m e n t . 1 5 In 1876 he b e c a m e D i r e c t o r of the Lodz Higher Craft School and in 1880 was brought to Petersburg as Director of the prestigious Craft School of Tsarevich Nicholas, a post that he retained for twelve years. He became particularly concerned with the trouble his g r a d u a t e s encountered finding jobs, a situation he attributed to domination of Petersburg industry by G e r m a n s and Finns, and he established a society to aid graduates of the School. 1 6 Anopov was active in the Russian Technical Society, most notably as a m e m b e r and eventually Vice-Chairman of its P e r m a n e n t Commission on Technical Education. A f t e r playing a prominent role in the Il'in Commission, he became Director of the Section for Technical Education. A n o p o v was active in charitable activities related to education, serving on the Council of the Dom prezreniia i remeslennogo obrazovaniia bednykh detei. Witte also served on the Council, which means that they had connections in their philanthropic activity as well as f r e q u e n t contact on official education business. 1 7 A n o p o v was also one of the f o u n d e r s of the journal Tekhnicheskoe obrazovanie.l& A n o p o v ' s particular interest was craft education, and many of his students became teachers in craft schools. He supervised Education Ministry projects for lower craft schools in 1893 and 1895 and later guided a Finance Ministry project for craft shops through the State Council. A n o p o v was a strong advocate of "feedb a c k " between the central government and local groups, o f t e n travelling to observe local conditions, and he approved of local participation in expanding and financing the education system. 1 9 Anopov headed the Finance Ministry D e p a r t m e n t of C o m m e r c e and Industry Education C o m m i t t e e and Education D e p a r t m e n t and served as a m e m b e r of the Finance Ministry Council until forced to retire by illness in 1906. H e played an important role in the e f f o r t to foster a separate Finance Ministry education system based on public participation and financing. In obtaining his services Witte acquired the most experienced individual in the bureaucracy in the field of technical education. 2 0 Witte was d e t e r m i n e d to acquire the services of the most capable individuals in his effort to develop Russian industry and education. If many, or even most, of the ideas for education p r o g r a m s originated with Vyshnegradskii—attention to commercial and navigation education, polytechnical institutes and others—it was Witte who, by his drive, determination and ability to advance c o m p e t e n t assistants, achieved the results. Witte spent Treasury f u n d s for projects Vyshnegradskii favored but could not finance, solving the economic difficulties in part by encouraging public funding in return for a voice in administering the schools.

Public-Private PARTNERSHIPS

Partnerships in Russian Education • 461

IN E L E M E N T A R Y

SECONDARY

AND

EDUCATION

Witte was already an advocate of universal elementary education and became a patron of commercial and technical education in the 1890s. Solicitude for education struck a responsive chord in the young tsar, and Witte was able to achieve a great deal. " N o t h i n g s e e m e d to touch him [Nicholas II] more deeply that the need of his people for schools." 2 1 The period 1896-1900 was the apogee of Witte's power. In these years he was able to institute the liquor monopoly, put Russia on the gold standard and gain approval for a n u m b e r of education projects. A f t e r 1900 his victories were fewer and less easily won. The first and most successful Finance Ministry initiative in education involved commercial schools. T h e Statute on Commercial Education (1896) authorized opening four types of schools suited to the needs of different social classes and commercial activities, including elementary-level schools for the children of peasants, craftsmen and the meshchanstvo and secondary schools for children of the merchantry. A n important f e a t u r e of the project was emphasis on public participation in designing and o p e r a t i n g individual schools established with their funds. 2 2 In his Memoirs, Witte took full credit for the project and emphasized his efforts to elicit public participation: "With this Statute I awakened the initiative among industrialists and commercial people, giving them significant initiative both in the establishment of commercial schools and in their administration. As a result they willingly began to contribute f u n d s for the construction and support of their commercial schools." 2 3 Despite liberalized a r r a n g e m e n t s for f u n d i n g and generally favorable public reaction to establishing schools u n d e r the Finance Ministry, it was not always possible to finance commercial schools in the locations most in need of them. In 1900, Witte proposed allowing cities lacking merchant societies to collect funds for commercial schools by taxing commercial licenses. T h e State Council approved the proposal despite q u a l m s a b o u t establishing this sort of precedent. 2 4 Less than a year a f t e r approval of the commercial education statute Witte presented a proposal for "Village C r a f t E d u c a t i o n Shops." W h e r e Education Ministry schools for w o r k e r s were mostly urban or, in the case of the primary-level craft schools were i n t e n d e d for centers of kustar industry, the new Finance Ministry craft schools were designed to help peasants build and maintain agricultural machinery. T h e schools were inexpensive—construction costs of 12,000 to 15,000 rubles and an annual b u d g e t of 2800 rubles. S o m e m e m b e r s of the State Council raised questions a b o u t this sort of proposal coming f r o m the Finance Ministry, but Witte's s p o k e s m e n swayed the d o u b t e r s by invoking the need for experiments to find solutions to difficult problems. 2 5 In 1901 the Finance Ministry submitted two more projects, each involving an overhaul of a long-neglected area of education. The first dealt with design training for industry; the second provided education for nautical specialties, including

462 • Harley D. Balzer sailing, piloting, navigation a n d m a i n t a i n i n g steamships. In the S t a t e Council, V.I. Kovalevskii a r g u e d that it w o u l d be " u n f a i r " to delay a n e e d e d e d u c a t i o n p r o j e c t when g r o u p s were ready to m a k e financial contributions, a n d convinced the C o u n cil to sanction a n o t h e r " e x p e r i m e n t . " Witte and Kovalevskii w e r e not successful, however, e x t e n d i n g t h e n e w financing a r r a n g e m e n t established f o r c o m m e r c i a l schools. T h e S t a t e Council d e t e r m i n e d that p e r m i t t i n g cities to tax citizens involved in t r a d e a n d i n d u s t r y violated basic Russian legal t e n e t s a n d r e f u s e d to a p p r o v e this m e t h o d of financing design schools. Instead, the Council p r o v i d e d for s t a t e subsidies for a d v a n c e d design schools. 2 6 In this instance the S t a t e Council r e j e c t e d W i t t e ' s e f f o r t to e s t a b lish w h a t was essentially a new tax. T h e p r o g r a m of navigation training was a logical corollary to the new n e t w o r k of c o m m e r c i a l schools. B o t h systems w e r e i n t e n d e d to r e d u c e R u s s i a ' s r e l i a n c e o n foreign m e r c h a n t s , shippers a n d i m p o r t - e x p o r t dealers. Legislation e s t a b l i s h e d new a d v a n c e d navigation schools for coastal and long-distance shipping, t w o varieties of lower-level navigation schools with two-year a n d t h r e e - y e a r courses, a p r e p a r a t o r y school, a n d a series of special courses. 2 7 T h e State Council raised a revealing o b j e c t i o n to p r e p a r a t o r y classes for the secondary-level navigation schools. T h e curriculum n e a r l y d u p l i c a t e d the u r b a n school, a n d the F i n a n c e Ministry was accused of d a b b l i n g in g e n e r a l e d u c a t i o n . 2 8 T h e final p r o j e c t for lower-level e d u c a t i o n s u b m i t t e d by the F i n a n c e Ministry d u r i n g W i t t e ' s t e r m c o n c e r n e d "Technical and C r a f t E d u c a t i o n S h o p s a n d C o u r ses." W i t t e ' s staff f r a m e d this p r o p o s a l within a discussion of R u s s i a n e c o n o m i c b a c k w a r d n e s s and the difficulty of i n t r o d u c i n g c o m p u l s o r y universal e d u c a t i o n . A l t h o u g h universal primary e d u c a t i o n was o u t s i d e the province of the F i n a n c e Ministry, a clear n e e d existed f o r a d d i t i o n a l practical training r e q u i r i n g basic literacy a n d n u m e r i c skills. T h e state could not finance a n o t h e r n e t w o r k of schools, but it could "show society the way," by providing e n c o u r a g e m e n t a n d , in special cases, sharing the costs. A s evidence of a successful p r e c e d e n t , A n o p o v cited t h e significant s u p p o r t given to c o m m e r c i a l e d u c a t i o n : in just five years public contributions of over two and a half million rubles had established more t h a n 100 schools a n d classes. 2 9 W i t t e ' s staff a r g u e d that the new n e t w o r k of schools would not d u p l i c a t e existing institutions: E d u c a t i o n Ministry schools included g e n e r a l e d u c a t i o n , while t h e new s h o p s would have a " p u r e l y practical c h a r a c t e r . " This was disingenuous. T h e p r o p o s a l s t a t e d that while the goal of t h e new e s t a b l i s h m e n t s was p u r e l y practical training, it would be u n f a i r to d e p r i v e w o r k e r s in localities with n o e l e m e n t a r y schools of the benefits of e d u c a t i o n . In such cases e l e m e n t a r y p r e p a r a t o r y classes would b e p e r m i t t e d . 3 0 By suggesting, a l m o s t as an a f t e r t h o u g h t , t h a t it s h o u l d be e m p o w e r e d to o v e r s e e what was essentially an e n t i r e n e w n e t w o r k of schools c o m b i n i n g basic literacy a n d technical training, Witte's staff r e v e a l e d their t r u e g o a l - t o e n c o u r a g e as m a n y f o r m s of e d u c a t i o n as possible u n d e r F i n a n c e Ministry auspices, a n d t o e n c o u r a g e public p a r t i c i p a t i o n in financing and organizing t h e s e

Public-Private

TABLE 29.1 (AFTER

SPECIALIZED

1905

Partnerships

SCHOOLS

IN T H E M I N I S T R Y

IN T H E

in Russian

MINISTRY

OF C O M M E R C E

AND

OF

Education

• 463

FINANCE

INDUSTRY)

1902

1905

1910

(students)

1914

(students)

Commercial Schools

43

—

178

42,105

204

54,791

Trading Schools

39

—

2

14,215

130

20,086

Trading Classes

8

—

21

4,451

25

6,085

Commercial Classes

16

—

Total

107

184

344

62,429

457

10

20

35

2,780

81

6,021

9

15

28

3,730

89

7,653

20

34

38

1,560

58

—

6

420

8

—

46

T Y P E OF S C H O O L

commercial

D e s i g n Schools Technical & Craft Village Craft S h o p Mining Schools

6(MGI)

Navigation Schools

2

Navigation Classes

36

53

3,528

—

98

—

8,809 89,741

2,411 682

—

Source: Compiled from R G I A , f. 25, op. 5, d. 484,1.2; N.F. R u d o l f , Kratkie svedeniia o nasazhdenii v Rossii tekhnicheskogo i professional'nogo obrazovaniia za vremia s 1888 po 1901 g. (St. Petersburg, 1901), 13; and Russia. MTP. U c h e b n y i otdel. Staticheskiia svedeniia o sostoianii uchebnykh zavedenii podvedomstvenny'ia uchebnomu otdelu MP za god (St. Petersburg, annually, beginning 1906-1907).

institutions. Table 29.1 illustrates the expansion of the Finance Ministry's school network. At many of the new schools the general education f u n c t i o n was p a r a m o u n t . The commercial schools frequently provided basic education to children who were unable to a t t e n d E d u c a t i o n Ministry schools due to their location or for other reasons. Children f r o m minority groups, especially Jews and o t h e r nonO r t h o d o x groups, w h o e n c o u n t e r e d discrimination at regular secondary schools, were a m a j o r constituency. 3 1 Critics complained that public organizations established commercial schools only because t h e Finance Ministry imposed fewer bureaucratic restrictions and permitted m o r e local control than the E d u c a t i o n Ministry. That these schools o f t e n served to provide general secondary educa-

464 • Harley D. Balzer tion, with many students dropping out b e f o r e beginning the specialized commercial courses, does not a p p e a r to have c o n c e r n e d W i t t e o v e r m u c h . 3 2 Many economists argue that basic literacy is the most important skill for e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t , 3 3 and the c o n s t a n t need for p r e p a r a t o r y courses at specialized schools suggests that R u s s i a ' s general education system c o n t i n u e d to b e woefully inadequate. Witte recognized the value of education and, equally important, he understood that society would help pay the bills if the c o n t r i b u t o r s were t r e a t e d as p a r t n e r s — e v e n if less than equal partners.

EXPANDING

ENGINEERING

EDUCATION

It was less easy for tsarist administrators to relinquish control at higher education institutions which were larger and m o r e visible, but here, too, W i t t e forged the basis for creative partnerships, fomenting an extraordinary expansion of engineering education with m o m e n t o u s results for Russian society. T h e n u m b e r o f engineers was increased while simultaneously changing institutes' programmatic c o n t e n t , geographical orientation and

financing.

T h e curriculum at the new

schools was polytechnical, with a two-year general course followed by two years o f specialized study emphasizing practical industrial and e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l skills. This represented a striking departure from the heavily specialized and encyclopedic programs at existing institutes. Most of the new schools were located in peripheral areas of the empire where local groups provided significant financial contributions. As in the case o f commercial education, Witte did not initiate the suggestion that Russia n e e d e d new institutes. His contribution was to bring together people who recognized the need, c o o r d i n a t e their efforts with those o f local groups willing to provide desperately needed funds, and guide the entire initiative through Russia's legislative labyrinth. T h e need for engineers to work in industry was a main motivation for expanding engineering education. For parents, the c h a n c e for their sons to receive a higher education with c o r r e s p o n d i n g opportunities for rank and social prestige was a paramount c o n c e r n . This was particularly true for Poles, Jews and m e m b e r s of other minority groups subject to discrimination in university admissions. A s with the c o m m e r c i a l schools, Witte sought to m a k e education available to people who would put it to e c o n o m i c a l l y productive use. Industrial and c o m mercial

leaders in many cities believed

higher

technical

education

would

improve local e c o n o m i c p e r f o r m a n c e and e n h a n c e the prestige and cultural life o f their regions. The

flywheel

o f W i t t e ' s drive to expand engineering education was the

Polytechnical Institute at Kiev. It was the model school e m b o d y i n g his goals. A polytechnical institute with a four-year course oriented to generating cadres for industry represented the quickest way to train new industrial engineers in a new region. Faculty were recruited with an eye to their practical industrial

Public-Private

Partnerships in Russian Education • 465

experience. The institute was in the southwestern part of the empire, the most rapidly developing economic region and the place where Witte began his railroad a n d business career, and Kiev served as a model for mobilizing and channeling local political and financial support. T h e Kiev Polytechnicum inaugurated a period of general expansion of engin e e r i n g education. The Warsaw Polytechnicum was almost a duplicate of Kiev, a n d was m a n e u v e r e d through the legislative process one step behind Kiev in o r d e r to disarm Russian nationalists. The Petersburg Polytechnical Institute had a s o m e w h a t different character, being m o r e research-oriented, but closely followed Kiev's structure, statutes and organization. The design for the Education Ministry's new Tomsk Technical Institute also took its cue from Kiev, adopting a polytechnical curriculum. T h e Ekaterinoslav Mining School received Witte's personal attention and reflected his goal of training more engineers with practical skills. The new Moscow Transport Institute also reflected concern with practical cadres and was designed by the same people who worked with Witte in establishing the Kiev Polytechnical Institute. The Education Ministry and other departm e n t s doubled admissions at Russia's existing technical institutes in direct response to Witte's proposal for the Kiev institute. B e f o r e Witte left the Finance Ministry in 1903, plans for a fourth polytechnical institute in the Don region were d r a f t e d . It was established at Novocherkassk in 1907. The only engineering school that did not flourish during Witte's term was the Riga Polytechnicum, a victim the Russification policies of a r d e n t nationalists in the Education Ministry. The Kiev Polytechnicum d e m o n s t r a t e s Witte's ability to orchestrate a complex interplay of local interests and different levels of Russia's political system to achieve the results he desired. U n d e r his careful guidance, a decades-old local initiative to establish a secondary technical school was transformed into a petition for a new type of engineering institute. As in the case of the Finance Ministry's commercial and craft schools, available funding and the need for experiment were used as arguments to sway the State Council, even though Witte had been careful to obtain the tsar's support for his project in advance. Plans to build a secondary technical school in Kiev had languished for two decades despite promises of local financial support. By 1895 the Kiev stock exchange committee had raised more than 70,000 rubles. In February 1896, at the twentyfifth anniversary meeting of the Kiev Branch of the Russian Technical Society, sugar magnate Lazar I. Brodskii and engineer A.A. A b r a g a m s o n proposed establishing an engineering school. Abragamson published a series of articles in Kievlianin noting that there was much discussion of a new type of engineering institute "in the higher spheres of g o v e r n m e n t " and suggesting Kiev would be the logical place to o p e n such an institution. A b r a g a m s o n ' s article coincided with a visit to Kiev by Witte, who conveyed a similar message in person. 3 4 Brodskii was an active m e m b e r of the stock exchange committee. Abragamson was a close associate of Pentagonal Society m e m b e r Borodin, both on the Southwestern Railway and on the editorial board of Inzhener. H e became editor of that journal in 1898 and

466 • Harley D. Balzer remained in the post until the Revolution. Abragamson also worked closely with Witte on the Southwestern Railway. 35 The Kiev city d u m a and stock exchange committee continued discussing a secondary school, while Witte's associates emphasized the willingness of sugar industrialists to contribute substantial sums for a polytechnicum.The decisive shift to local advocacy of a higher institute came at a "private c o n f e r e n c e " convened at Lazar Brodskii's home on 25 N o v e m b e r 1896. Organized by Brodskii and Kiev's mayor, S.M. Sol'skii, the conference brought together engineers, industrialists, and Kiev University faculty members. This group, more heavily weighted to engineers and industrialists than either the d u m a or the stock exchange committee, produced a protocol calling for a polytechnical institute u n d e r the Ministry of Finance. O n e week later the city d u m a voted overwhelmingly to raise 300,000 rubles for a higher technical school. 3 6 E f f o r t s to solicit f u n d s produced a significant demonstration of local interest and support, particularly f r o m sugar industrialists like Brodskii and N.A. Tereshchenko. By N o v e m b e r 1897 contributions totaled nearly a million rubles. 37 Witte astutely mobilized this local interest and guided it in the direction he wished, while preserving key decisions for his Ministry. The Kiev committee was empowered to decide w h e r e to locate the school and how to collect local funds and provided important suggestions regarding the educational program, while the Finance Ministry controlled final decisions a b o u t structure, curriculum and budget. 3 8 The program for the new institute was developed in a series of conferences examining proposals f r o m the Kiev Branch of the Technical Society. A special commission chaired by Petrov did most of the work. Witte then convened a Finance Ministry c o n f e r e n c e to generate interest, elicit support and provide an aura of scientific prestige for the project. Petrov influenced both groups and steered the Technical Society commission to quick approval of a polytechnical program. The commission proceedings leave no doubt that both expansion and reorientation of technical training had already been decided upon in the "higher spheres of government." Instruction began in S e p t e m b e r 1898 with 360 students in the four divisions. 39 The Warsaw Polytechnical Institute was essentially a copy of Kiev. Local sources provided over o n e million rubles to construct the Institute, and this was a powerful inducement for Nicholas II to approve the project. The Ministry of Finance also emphasized the economic situation of the region, where dense population, a difficult raw m a t e r i a l s situation and intense G e r m a n c o m p e t i t i o n m a d e advanced technology essential. 4 0 Witte's efforts to create new institutes provoked a significant response f r o m other government departments. Education Minister Delianov, who for years had insisted that no expansion of higher technical education was necessary, now sought approval to enlarge the existing Education Ministry technical institutes in Petersburg, Moscow and Kharkov. Witte endorsed Delianov's proposals as a supplemental measure; his team played an important role in the expansion. Witte encouraged the Education Ministry expansion proposals in part to diminish Delianov's

Public-Private

Partnerships

in Russian

Education

• 467

o p p o s i t i o n t o his n e w institutes, b u t it also m e s h e d with W i t t e ' s a g e n d a of e x p a n d ing e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s . T h e E d u c a t i o n M i n i s t r y ' s p r o p o s a l f o r its new T o m s k Technical I n s t i t u t e r e p e a l e d v e r b a t i m m u c h of t h e F i n a n c e Ministry's disc u s s i o n of polytechnical e d u c a t i o n . A l t h o u g h the T o m s k p r o p o s a l m e t s o m e o p p o sition in t h e State C o u n c i l , it was a p p r o v e d d u e to W i t t e ' s i n t e r v e n t i o n . 4 1 T h e Ministry of Ways of C o m m u n i c a t i o n o p e n e d a n e w institute

meeting

W i t t e ' s d e m a n d s f o r practical t e c h n i c a l c a d r e s e v e n b e f o r e t h e Kiev Polytechn i c u m . T h e T r a n s p o r t I n s t i t u t e in M o s c o w was a r e s p o n s e to g r o w i n g n e e d f o r auxiliary t e c h n i c a l p e r s o n n e l t o service R u s s i a ' s e x p a n d i n g r a i l r o a d n e t w o r k . 4 2 L o c a t ing t h e institute in M o s c o w was a s u b j e c t of i n t e n s e d e b a t e , with p r o p o n e n t s e m p h a s i z i n g the a v a i l a b l e p e d a g o g i c a l resources, t h e city's c e n t r a l location at t h e h u b of R u s s i a ' s rail n e t w o r k , a n d its p u r e l y Russian c h a r a c t e r . 4 3 T h e C o m m u n i c a t i o n s Ministry w a x e d e l o q u e n t o n t h e e t h n i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n , suggesting t h a t cons t r u c t i o n of r a i l r o a d s o n t h e f r o n t i e r s of t h e e m p i r e m e a n t e n g i n e e r s n o w h a d a civilizing a n d colonizing mission: " [ O J u r e n g i n e e r s a r e called u p o n to be n o t only c o n s t r u c t o r s of ways of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , b u t also c o l o n i z e r s a n d c r e a t o r s of R u s sian c u l t u r e in d i s t a n t r e g i o n s , a m o n g f o r e i g n a n d s o m e t i m e s e v e n u n f r i e n d l y p o p u l a t i o n s . Such p i o n e e r s of R u s s i a n ways can be p r e p a r e d only in an e d u c a t i o n al e s t a b l i s h m e n t l o c a t e d in a place with a purely R u s s i a n , O r t h o d o x p o p u l a t i o n , t h e f a i t h f u l historical basis of t h e R u s s i a n s t a t e s y s t e m , d e v o t e d to R u s s i a n interests." 4 4 R h e t o r i c a b o u t e n g i n e e r s as colonizers 4 5 a n d b e a r e r s of civilization gave voice to a s e n t i m e n t s h a r e d by m a n y C o m m u n i c a t i o n s Ministry officials a n d was reflected in the foreign m o d e l f o r t h e n e w school, the C o o p e r ' s Hill E n g i n e e r i n g C o l l e g e in L o n d o n , established in t h e 1860s to train e n g i n e e r s f o r service in India. 4 6 A n e w m i n i n g s c h o o l in E k a t e r i n o s l a v r e s u l t e d f r o m a p r o c e s s similar t o t h a t s e e n in Kiev. W i t t e c a p i t a l i z e d o n s t r o n g local i n t e r e s t a n d

financial

support,

c h a n n e l i n g it in t h e d i r e c t i o n he d e e m e d a p p r o p r i a t e a n d using s u b s t a n t i a l local financing

to elicit S t a t e C o u n c i l a p p r o v a l . Like t h e M o s c o w T r a n s p o r t I n s t i t u t e , it

w a s initially a t h r e e - y e a r i n s t i t u t e t r a i n i n g technicians. 4 7 T h e E k a t e r i n o s l a v city d u m a , s u p p o r t e d by t h e C o n f e r e n c e of M i n i n g Industrialists of S o u t h R u s s i a , was willing to p r o v i d e 200,000 r u b l e s f o r a n e w mining institute. T h e E d u c a t i o n M i n istry a n d local g r o u p s in K h a r k o v a r g u e d t h a t a m o r e e c o n o m i c a l s o l u t i o n w o u l d be a m i n i n g division at t h e existing K h a r k o v Technical I n s t i t u t e . A t h i r d f a c t i o n , consisting of t h e M i n i s t r y of A g r i c u l t u r e a n d S t a t e D o m a i n s a n d t h e C o n f e r e n c e of I r o n Industrialists, f a v o r e d a s e c o n d a r y t e c h n i c a l s c h o o l in

Ekaterinoslav.

W i t t e ' s i n t e r v e n t i o n was decisive. H e visited E k a t e r i n o s l a v in t h e a u t u m n of 1896 a n d e n c o u r a g e d local g r o u p s t o s u p p o r t a school similar to t h e M o s c o w T r a n s p o r t I n s t i t u t e . Local industrialist N.S. A v d a k o v p u b l i s h e d a letter in Iuzhnyi

krai o u t -

lining W i t t e ' s views j u s t b e f o r e t h e twenty-first C o n f e r e n c e of M i n i n g I n d u s trialists of S o u t h R u s s i a c o n v e n e d . A v d a k o v c h a i r e d a special c o m m i s s i o n o n t h e school question and steered the entire C o n f e r e n c e to support Witte's proposal. W i t t e a n d P e t r o v e n c o u r a g e d t h e local initiative a n d p r o v i d e d crucial s u p p o r t in t h e b u r e a u c r a c y a n d S t a t e C o u n c i l . W i t t e e x t o r t e d c o m p l i a n c e f r o m t h e local

468 • Harley D. Balzer d u m a by warning that no school would be built, while threatening the State Council with loss of local f u n d i n g if it was not a "higher" school. 4 8 In 1902 Witte presided over the opening of his "technical university," the Petersburg Polytechnical Institute. T h e Petersburg Polytechnicum was the culmination of Witte's efforts in higher technical education. It combined theoretical and practical training in technical specialties and economics with advanced scientific research. T h e goal was to produce engineers, scientists and professors. W h e r e the other new schools (except Tomsk) were built with private or special funds, Witte p o u r e d e n o r m o u s a m o u n t s of Treasury money into the Petersburg Polytechnicum. 4 9 W h e n a wave of disturbances swept Russia's higher schools in 1899, Witte sought to turn this to his advantage, claiming more schools were necessary so that the n u m b e r of students at each could be reduced to permit more a d e q u a t e supervision. W h e n State Council m e m b e r s questioned how money could be spent and buildings constructed b e f o r e education plans were available, Witte threatened, cajoled, pleaded and got his way. Funds were appropriated and plans m a d e in the o r d e r he desired. 5 0 By all accounts the Petersburg Polytechnicum fulfilled the hopes of its creators, becoming an important center of advanced teaching and research. The faculty attracted many of the leading specialists in Russia, including some professors banned f r o m o t h e r schools for political reasons. V.L. Kirpichev was offered a post almost immediately after his dismissal as Rector at Kiev, and the economics faculty reads like a who's who of "progressive" economists. The school had an unprecedented degree of autonomy. Even when disturbances led to the dismissal and trial of Rector Gagarin, the Finance Ministry (and a f t e r 1905 Ministry of Commerce and Industry) never interfered as the Education Ministry routinely did at its institutions. Descriptions of the academic f r e e d o m , c o r p o r a t e organization and inter-disciplinary investigative spirit at the Polytechnicum makes it sound like a golden age. By 1914 the school enrolled as many students as the total attending all Russian engineering schools in 1895. 51 A telling exception to the general expansion of higher technical education in the 1890s was the Riga Polytechnicum. A victim of Russification policies, Riga provides an instructive c o u n t e r p o i n t to Witte's efforts to encourage alternative sources of financing by encouraging local initiatives. The Riga Institute sought to be financially self-supporting, but tuition and local contributions did not fully cover the cost of its diverse engineering curriculum. Beginning in 1875 the state provided an annual subsidy of 10,000 rubles. In the early 1890s the E d u c a t i o n Ministry indicated its willingness to assume greater financial responsibility if the language of instruction was changed f r o m G e r m a n to Russian. This caused many students to seek education in G e r m a n technical schools where instruction was in their native language. M a n y G e r m a n faculty were replaced by Russian professors who received higher salaries, f u r t h e r straining the budget. The Education Ministry m a d e financial assistance contingent on limiting the school's c o r p o r a t e organizations and autonomy, whittling away the faculty's privileges. The result was to turn

Public-Private

Partnerships

in Russian

Education

• 469

o n e of the e m p i r e ' s best i n s t i t u t e s i n t o a s e c o n d - r a t e i n s t i t u t i o n with d e c l i n i n g enrollments.52 I n s u m , W i t t e ' s e f f o r t s to e x p a n d e n g i n e e r i n g e d u c a t i o n h a d significant a n d l o n g lasting c o n s e q u e n c e s . B e t w e e n

1895 a n d 1904 t h e n u m b e r of

students

i n c r e a s e d f r o m 4,000 to 13,000 a n d t h e n u m b e r of g r a d u a t e s p e r y e a r r o s e f r o m 4 0 0 t o 1,000. T h e 1905 R e v o l u t i o n d i s r u p t e d R u s s i a ' s e n t i r e e d u c a t i o n s y s t e m , b u t a f t e r 1907 e x p a n s i o n r e s u m e d . In 1914 t h e n u m b e r of s t u d e n t s at R u s s i a n engin e e r i n g i n s t i t u t e s e x c e e d e d 20,000, a n d t h e g r a d u a t e s b e g a n t o r e p l a c e f o r e i g n p e r s o n n e l in industry. 5 3 W i t t e was highly i n n o v a t i v e in his e f f o r t s to solicit public f i n a n c i a l c o n t r i b u tions. T h e image of t h e a u t h o r of Samoderzhevie

i zemstvo

e n c o u r a g i n g public ini-

t i a t i v e a n d t r a d i n g c o n t r o l o v e r s c h o o l s f o r financial s u p p o r t p r e s e n t s s o m e t h i n g of a c o n t r a d i c t i o n . 5 4 T h r e e c o m p l e m e n t a r y e x p l a n a t i o n s m a y b e o f f e r e d . O n e , s u g g e s t e d by G u r k o , is t h a t W i t t e d i s t r u s t e d t h e zemstvos, b u t felt d i f f e r e n t l y a b o u t o r g a n i z a t i o n s r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e c o m m e r c i a l a n d i n d u s t r i a l ( u r b a n ) classes. 5 5 H e w a s q u i t e c o m f o r t a b l e w o r k i n g with stock e x c h a n g e c o m m i t t e e s o r o r g a n i z a t i o n s of m e r c h a n t s a n d i n d u s t r i a l i s t s — g r o u p s h a v i n g a special r e l a t i o n s h i p with t h e F i n a n c e Ministry. S e c o n d , w h a t e v e r W i t t e ' s feelings a b o u t t h e z e m s t v o s , h e w a s willing to accept t h e i r m o n e y . T h i s is closely r e l a t e d to a t h i r d f a c t o r : W i t t e e n c o u r a g e d public p a r t i c i p a t i o n b u t r e t a i n e d u l t i m a t e c o n t r o l , e s p e c i a l l y in highe r e d u c a t i o n . P l a n s f o r t h e K i e v P o l y t e c h n i c u m clearly illustrate this process, as d o e s t h e story of t h e E k a t e r i n o s l a v M i n i n g School. W h e n W i t t e d e c i d e d t o c o n s t r u c t t h e P e t e r s b u r g P o l y t e c h n i c u m with s t a t e f u n d s , he saw less n e e d f o r p u b l i c i n v o l v e m e n t , t h o u g h he did c o n t i n u e t o rely on c o m m e r c i a l a n d t e c h n i c a l " e x p erts." All of his e d u c a t i o n initiatives r e f l e c t e d t h e spirit of e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l i n n o v a tion a n d receptivity t o n e w b u s i n e s s a n d t e c h n i c a l p r a c t i c e s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of t h e southwestern "frontier."56 Was W i t t e o f f e r i n g superficial c o n c e s s i o n s t o local i n v o l v e m e n t in r e t u r n f o r significant m a t e r i a l s u p p o r t ? R u s s i a n society certainly did not p e r c e i v e it in this way, a n d t h r e e p o i n t s s t a n d o u t a b o u t W i t t e ' s a p p r o a c h . First, h e s o u g h t t o m o b i lize p r o m i n e n t local i n d i v i d u a l s a n d g r o u p s in s u p p o r t of F i n a n c e M i n i s t r y p r o p o s a l s f o r new h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n institutions, a n d t h e design of t h e n e w i n s t i t u t e s i n c o r p o r a t e d p r o p o s a l s f r o m t h e s e s u p p o r t e r s . S e c o n d , he d i f f e r e n t i a t e d b e t w e e n h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n a n d t h e c o m m e r c i a l a n d industrial schools, w h e r e local g r o u p s w e r e actively e n c o u r a g e d a n d w e r e g r a n t e d far m o r e responsibility. T h i r d , a n d p e r h a p s m o s t i m p o r t a n t , W i t t e insisted o n a n d consistently d e f e n d e d t h e a u t o n o m y of t h e faculty at t h e n e w institutes, a n d this c o n t i n u e d to be Ministry of T r a d e a n d I n d u s t r y policy a f t e r 1905, w h e n

the universities were u n d e r assault

from

E d u c a t i o n Ministers S c h w a r t z a n d Kasso. M a n y of the faculty, in t u r n , h a d close links with local e c o n o m i c a n d i n d u s t r i a l interests. W i t t e r e c o g n i z e d t h e i m p o r t a n c e of e n c o u r a g i n g the initiative of e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l a n d technical g r o u p s , a n d t h e n e e d t o g r a n t t h e m a b r o a d d e g r e e of a u t o n o m y if t h a t initiative was t o

flourish.57

T h e n e w e n g i n e e r i n g s c h o o l s h a d a d e c i d e d l y practical profile a n d w e r e ori-

470 • Harley D. Baker ented toward the economic development of the periphery. T h r e e were in southwestern Russia, the empire's most rapidly growing industrial region. O n e was in Siberia, where rich natural resources promised future economic gain. The Moscow Transport Institute was designed to train engineers for work in the borderlands. W h e r e a s overconcentration of educational institutions in the capitals created "administrative" and other problems, Witte recognized local aspirations and tapped local sources of financing. T h e shift to the periphery facilitated the introduction of new e d u c a t i o n programs. A significant pattern in the history of Russian science and education is that innovations can be introduced m o r e easily and rapidly in " f r i n g e " areas and institutions. Established centers e v e r y w h e r e tend to resist new developments. By creating the first polytechnical institutes away from the capitals, Witte insured that implementation of new m e t h o d s would not be h a m p e r e d by established conventions. 5 8 Finance Ministry schools permitted a significant degree of real independence, offering a striking contrast to the stifling bureaucratic supervision at E d u c a t i o n Ministry institutions. Witte allowed m o r e faculty involvement in personnel selection and greater scope for student c o r p o r a t e organizations. While he retained the power to intervene on a massive scale, he did not use it. Neither did the men he appointed as directors of the new polytechnics. Kirpichev at Kiev and Gagarin in St. Petersburg both finally were dismissed at the insistence of the Interior Ministry, charged with permitting (if not encouraging) student activism. 5 9

CONCLUSIONS AND

IMPLICATIONS

The story of Witte's efforts to expand Russian education is not merely an important and relatively unexplored aspect of imperial Russian history. It has something to teach us about post-Soviet Russia. President Putin and his cadre of derzhavniki might be tempted to draw the lesson that state-fostered d e v e l o p m e n t and mobilization of society by the bureaucracy are "traditional" and even essential Russian patterns. Yet at least four o t h e r vitally important lessons apply. O n e is that there is a Russian tradition of societal involvement in social policy and in support for education in particular. Russians need not import or reinvent models of civic involvement; they can recover vital elements of their own society's history. Second, even the author of Samoderzhavie i zemstvn was successful in large part because he was able to learn on the j o b and to alter his views, permitting a greater degree of public involvement both to elicit financial contributions and in some instances (faculty a u t o n o m y ) as an end in itself. Witte came to u n d e r s t a n d that attempting to control details f r o m Moscow was not merely futile, but also stifled local initiative and the d e v e l o p m e n t of Russia's economic and intellectual potential. Witte presents an example of a talented, ambitious g o v e r n m e n t minister selectively collaborating with public/societal initiatives to expand the educa

Public-Private

Partnerships

in Russian

Education

T A B L E 2 9 . 2 D Y N A M I C S O F C H A N G E IN P A Y M E N T F O R H I G H E R IN T H E R U S S I A N

INDICATOR

FEDERATION

( I N T H O U S A N D S OF

• 471

EDUCATION

STUDENTS)

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2418

2414

2476

2572

2581

2663

1629

1694

1711

2213

474

729

1021

18.4%

28.2%

38.3%

207

302

12.2%

17.6%

Number of students studying in State Higher Education Institutions Of these, number studying

1557

1580

116

228

4 8 %

9.5%

full-time Number of students paying full cost of their

326

higher education Percentage paying full cost of their higher

13.2%

education Number paying full cost in full-time

71

112

148

413

programs Percentage in full-time programs paying full

4.6%

, 7 . 1 %

9.1%

18.6%

cost of their education Source: Ministerstvo obrazovaniia Rossiiskoi Federatsii. Nil vysshego obrazovaniia. Tsentr obrazovatel'noi statistiki. Vysshee i srednee professional'noe obrazovanie Rossiiskoi Federatsii. Statisticheskii Spravochnik (Moscow: 2000), 15.

tion system. H e did not do this to create civil society in Russia, but o n e effect of his policies was to stimulate its development. A third important lesson f r o m Witte's e f f o r t s is that competition matters in multiple ways. Competition among ministries for federal, local and private f u n d ing fostered unprecedented expansion of the school system and innovation in programs. The Finance Ministry's willingness to grant the public even a limited role in designing and operating the schools elicited far more public f u n d i n g than the E d u c a t i o n Ministry's more restrictive approach. Once Witte began to build a rival network of educational institutions, the Education Ministry changed its policy and increased enrollments at its existing institutions. It is unlikely that Delianov would have acted without Witte's challenge. 6 0

472 • Harley D. Balzer Finally, W i t t e ' s e m p h a s i s o n d i v e r s i t y i n c l u d e d p r o v i d i n g e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u nities to m i n o r i t y g r o u p s t h a t s u f f e r e d d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in e d u c a t i o n Ministry institutions. In this W i t t e ' s policies p r o v i d e a s t a r k c o n t r a s t with t h e f a t e of the R i g a P o l y t e c h n i c u m u n d e r E d u c a t i o n M i n i s t r y auspices. W i t t e u n d e r s t o o d t h a t a nation with a d i v e r s i t y of r e l i g i o n s a n d e t h n i c g r o u p s c a n n o t a f f o r d t o limit access t o e d u c a t i o n o n t h e basis of t h e s e c r i t e r i a . All f o u r of t h e s e l e s s o n s p o i n t t o a l a r g e r i m p l i c a t i o n — t h a t in e d u c a t i o n , as in so m a n y r e a l m s , m o n o p o l i e s s h o u l d b e a v o i d e d . R u s s i a has b e e n closer t o t h e F r e n c h s y s t e m , with a c e n t r a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s e t t i n g policies f o r t h e e n t i r e n a t i o n , as c o m p a r e d to t h e A m e r i c a n a p p r o a c h of d e l e g a t i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to t h e states. T h e r e m a y b e valid a r g u m e n t s f o r a c e n t r a l i z e d s y s t e m , b u t p e r m i t t i n g a single m i n i s t r y to d o m i n a t e a r e a l m as c o m p l e x as e d u c a t i o n e n t a i l s significant costs. Since 1991 t h e n u m b e r of p r i v a t e e d u c a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s in R u s s i a h a s g r o w n e n o r m o u s l y , as h a v e e f f o r t s t o a t t r a c t p u b l i c f u n d i n g f o r s t a t e s c h o o l s (see T a b l e 29.2). Yet t h e R u s s i a n E d u c a t i o n M i n i s t r y r e m a i n s s k e p t i c a l of p r i v a t e institutions, p a r t i c u l a r l y in h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n , a n d c o n t i n u e s to insist o n r e s t r i c t i o n s t h a t m a k e t h e p r o c e s s of a c c r e d i t a t i o n e n o r m o u s l y difficult. T h e r e is little i n d i c a t i o n of t h e sort of c r e a t i v e p u b l i c - p r i v a t e initiatives t h a t c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h e last d e c a d e s of t h e i m p e r i a l era. G i v e n t h e d i s m a l d e m o g r a p h i c o u t l o o k , 6 1 R u s s i a d o e s n o t n e e d m o r e schools, b u t it d e s p e r a t e l y n e e d s m o r e financial s u p p o r t f o r t h o s e t h a t exist. A n d it n e e d s p r e c i s e l y t h e s o r t of r e o r i e n t a t i o n in p r o g r a m s a n d s p e c i a l t i e s t h a t W i t t e s o u g h t to i n t r o d u c e . T h e small a m o u n t of " c r e a t i v e d e s t r u c t i o n " s e e n in c h o i c e s of s p e c i a l t i e s a f t e r 1983 h a s b e e n o v e r t a k e n by an influx of s t u d e n t s in trad i t i o n a l e n g i n e e r i n g disciplines since 1993 (see T a b l e s 29.3 a n d 29.4). R e s o u r c e s t h e R u s s i a n g o v e r n m e n t is using t o m a i n t a i n o u t d a t e d e n g i n e e r i n g

programs

m i g h t be far b e t t e r s p e n t o n c o o p e r a t i o n with n e w business, e c o n o m i c s a n d social s c i e n c e institutions. 6 2 Yet t h e M i n i s t r y of E d u c a t i o n r e m a i n s f o c u s e d o n r e c a p t u r i n g public f u n d s e x p e n d e d o n g a i n i n g a d m i s s i o n to t h e e x i s t i n g h i g h e r e d u c a tion i n s t i t u t i o n s r a t h e r t h a n e x p l o r i n g c r e a t i v e c o o p e r a t i o n with n e w institutions. R u s s i a n s a r e s p e n d i n g a large a m o u n t of their p r i v a t e f u n d s f o r e d u c a t i o n . 6 3 M o n e y h a s p o u r e d i n t o n e w p r i v a t e e d u c a t i o n a l institutions, c r e a t i n g a t w o - t i e r s y s t e m w h e r e c h i l d r e n of t h e a f f l u e n t can get access to a h i g h - q u a l i t y e d u c a t i o n at p r i v a t e schools, while t h o s e w h o c a n n o t a f f o r d t h e tuition r e m a i n in t h e s t a t e syst e m . S o m e of t h e p r i v a t e s c h o o l s t a k e m o n e y f r o m t h e gullible a n d p e r p e t r a t e f r a u d . 6 4 I n t r o d u c i n g v o u c h e r s , as p r o p o s e d by E d u c a t i o n M i n i s t e r Filippov, w o u l d likely result in t h e p r i v a t e i n s t i t u t i o n s i n c r e a s i n g t h e i r f e e s t o m a i n t a i n t h e social boundaries.65 A massive p o o l of p r i v a t e m o n e y f u n d s t h e i n f o r m a l s y s t e m t h a t p r e p a r e s stud e n t s f o r a d m i s s i o n s e x a m s at s t a t e h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n i n s t i t u t i o n s . T h e p r e v a i l i n g p r i v a t e t u t o r i n g a n d o u t r i g h t b r i b e r y h a v e b e e n widely criticized, a n d discussion of t h e n e e d t o r e c a p t u r e t h e r e s o u r c e s p a r e n t s a r e e x p e n d i n g o n this p r o c e s s ( v a r iously e s t i m a t e d at b e t w e e n 1 billion U S d o l l a r s a n d 6 billion U S d o l l a r s ) h a s r e a c h e d as high as P r e s i d e n t P u t i n himself. A c t i v e l y m o v i n g to a c c r e d i t m o r e pri-

Source: Narodnoe

ious y e a r s ) : Statisticheskii

TABLE 29.3

khoziaistvo

650

Industry &

on given government data; Rossiiskii

izdatel'skii tsentr, 1992), 2 5 6 ; Narodnoe

Rossiiskoi

khoziaistvo

Federatsii

Press-Biuletert'

Statisticheskii

143

Agriculture

428

368

RSFSR

Ezhegodnik

12 ( M o s c o w : Respublikanskii

(1997), 202. 230 8.83%

8.54% 216 9.56%

Educ., Sports

Education

52 2.00%

40 1.77%

21

1.67%

—' 0 0

Cinematograph

Arts &

254 9.75%

193

103

8.17%

0 0 — , 1 r-

Health, Physical

2.34%

63

9.10%

245

9.28%

250

266 9.88%

252 9.67%

227 10.05%

120

9.52%

15.89%

Law

14.12%

295 13.06%

9.62%

9.17%

8.85%

259

239

200

43.89%

46.47%

Ecomomics &

11.35%

113

8.97%

1211

1088 48.16%

2.42%

64

9.21 %

241

9.42%

249

10.26%

271

16.24%

429

9.35%

247

43.19%

1141

2642

1980

771

864

1016

11.62%

288

10.57%

195

55 2.86%

50

269

2.38%

55

11.43%

264

252 10.91%

11.95%

276

11.61%

268

8.45%

214

14.01%

2.20%

2309

2000

11.11%

10.14%

195

13.20%

15.02%

341

13.61%

309

9.52% 262

216

394 15.90% 243

302 13.30%

8.88%

9.81%

254

188 8.28%

220

166 8.61%

38.06%

41.00

40.08%

1923

2770

2478

1995

1990

1985

£

Communication

2693

2606

2259 1182

1975

1970

1965

^ M TF

Transportation &

51.59%

1260

TOTAL

1960

ON ON

Construction

ENROLLMENTS I N SPECIALIZED SECONDARY INSTITUTIONS IN THE

R U S S I A N F E D E R A T I O N BY F I E L D ( I N T H O U S A N D S , AT T H E B E G I N N I N G O F A C A D E M I C Y E A R )

O

U-L < N