Exporting Democracy: Rhetoric vs. Reality 9781588269706

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EXPORTING DEMOCRACY

Exporting Democracy RHETORIC VS. REALITY edited by

Peter J. Schraeder

b o u l d e r l o n d o n

Published in the United States of America in 2002 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 2002 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Exporting democracy : rhetoric vs. reality / edited by Peter J. Schraeder. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-58826-056-9 (alk. paper) 1. Democratization. 2. World politics—1989– 3. Political development. I. Schraeder, Peter J. JC421.E97 2002 321.8—dc21 2001058928 British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America

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The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984. 5

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To the memories of Maximilian Edward Schraeder’s namesakes:

Max Schraeder (1919–1996), who fought for the democratic ideal in World War II and

Edward McNamara (1942–1998), who reminded us that every individual counts in a democratic society

Contents

ix

Preface 1

Promoting an International Community of Democracies Peter J. Schraeder

1

PART 1 Promoting Democracy: Exploring the Rationales 2 3

In Pursuit of a Peaceful International System Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Margaret G. Hermann

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In Pursuit of a Prosperous International System Juliet Johnson

31

PART 2 The Role of State Actors 4

5 6 7

Promoting a Special Brand of Democracy: Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden Liisa Laakso

55

Germany’s Hesitant Role in Promoting Democracy Jürgen Rüland and Nikolaus Werz

73

Japan: A Passive Partner in the Promotion of Democracy Tsuneo Akaha

89

Inconsistent U.S. Efforts To Promote Democracy Abroad Steven W. Hook

109

vii

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Contents

PART 3 The Role of Multilateral and Nongovernmental Organizations 8 9 10 11

The European Union: An Ad Hoc Policy with a Low Priority Gorm Rye Olsen

131

The United Nations: Strengthening an International Norm Christopher C. Joyner

147

The World Bank: Missionary Deeds (and Misdeeds) Béatrice Hibou

173

Political Foundations and Think Tanks James M. Scott

193

PART 4 Conclusion 12

Making the World Safe for Democracy? Peter J. Schraeder

Bibliography The Contributors Index About the Book

217 237 271 277 291

Preface

he genesis of this book was the common interest of the contributors to better understand the international dimension of the democratization process still unfolding in various regions of the developing world, including Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Oceania, and the Western Hemisphere. Specifically, an international research network of scholars from North America and Europe was formed in 1996 to investigate the efforts to promote democracy by a wide variety of state and non-state actors within the international system. This book represents one of the scholarly fruits of this research network. This project was made possible by a generous grant from the Finnish International Development Agency (FINNIDA). A grant proposal originally submitted under the auspices of the editor’s home institution, Loyola University Chicago, and the Transnational Institute (TNI), a nonprofit organization based in Amsterdam, was enthusiastically embraced by FINNIDA. The funds from this grant were essentially divided between TNI and Loyola University Chicago. TNI, under its former director, Jochen Hippler, utilized its portion of the grant to fund a variety of policy-oriented democracy promotion efforts, including workshops, lectures, and support for local activists. The remaining portion of the FINNIDA grant, administered by me at Loyola University Chicago, was dedicated to funding a series of scholarly research papers that ultimately became the basis for this book. FINNIDA’s generous financial support, as well as the patience of its administrators while this project slowly wound its way to fruition, are greatly appreciated. Indeed, this grant project is indicative of the seriousness with which the Nordic countries, especially Finland, and a wide array of other international actors approach the normative goal of international democracy promotion. Several individuals and institutions were essential to the success of this project, although as project director I alone take responsibility for any

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Preface

remaining omissions and errors. Several scholars took part in the formative stages of this project: Zehra Arat, Daniel Bach, Daniel Bourmaud, Susan Mezey, Michael Mezey, Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, Olle Törnquist, Timothy Shaw, Ebrima Sall, and Anders Uhlin. Their input and advice is greatly appreciated. The research and writing of the individual chapters were greatly aided by each of our home institutions. In my own case, Loyola University Chicago supplemented the FINNIDA grant with generous in-house support, most notably by providing funding for several highly motivated and intelligent graduate research assistants—Jan Ahrens, Brian Endless, David Jesuit, Adina Sigartau, Bruce Taylor, and Patrick Van Inwegen—each of whom contributed in a special way to this project. I am particularly grateful to the Herculean efforts of Jonathan Riggs, my graduate research assistant for two years, whose good humor and attention to detail were vital to completing this book. Above all, this project would not have been possible without the loving support of my wife, Catherine Anne Scanlon, and the antics of our threeyear-old son, Maximilian Edward Schraeder, who learned the joys of typing at a computer while I was completing this book. Together Catherine Anne and I have lived, worked, and traveled in nearly seventy, usually less-thandemocratic countries that have served as living laboratories for understanding the world presented in these pages. In short, Catherine Anne completes me, and Maximilian completes the two of us together. —Peter J. Schraeder

1 Promoting an International Community of Democracies Peter J. Schraeder

n a historic meeting held June 25–27, 2000, in Warsaw, Poland, foreign ministers and other representatives from more than half of the globe’s nations gathered to discuss their common interest in advancing an international “community of democracies.” The resulting Warsaw Declaration committed its 106 signatories to a wide array of prodemocracy actions, from the preservation and strengthening of democratic practices where they already exist to the actual promotion of those practices in countries where they are absent. Although critics rightfully questioned the duplicity of some signatories (some are nondemocratic), with some denouncing the entire endeavor as a “well-meaning but largely empty exercise in legacy-hunting” coordinated by the outgoing Clinton administration, the Warsaw Declaration clearly captured two important dimensions of international relations at the beginning of the twenty-first century: democracy’s status as the predominant form of political governance within the Westphalian nation-state system, and the emergence of an international norm that considers democracy promotion to be an accepted and necessary component of international behavior.1 The international dimension of democracy promotion—the topic of this book—nonetheless remains at best understudied and poorly understood and, in the extreme, hotly debated and criticized by its contemporary detractors. The primary purpose of this chapter is to set the stage for the analysis that follows by charting the spread of democracy and reviewing how the scholarly literature has portrayed the international dimension of this process.

I

Global Spread of Democracy Dozens of countries in all regions of the world made transitions from authoritarian to democratic forms of governance during the last quarter of 1

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Exporting Democracy

the twentieth century. As aptly noted by Samuel P. Huntington, an American political scientist whose writings have frequently set the parameters of debate within the discipline,2 the world has been witnessing a “third wave” of democratization that is much stronger and more prolonged and widespread than its two predecessors that began in the 1820s and the 1940s, respectively (Huntington, 1991; see also Shin, 1994; Jaggers and Gurr, 1995; and Doorenspleet, 2000). The most recent wave of democratization began in 1974 with the downfall of dictatorships in Southern Europe, subsequently spreading throughout Latin America. Its further spread to Eastern Europe and the African continent coincided with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the subsequent collapse of the former Soviet Union and the downfall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, leading some to argue that these latter two regions actually form part of a distinct “fourth wave” of democratization within the international system (Whitehead, 1996: 4). The global spread of democracy is aptly portrayed by drawing on the democracy statistics that Freedom House, a conservative think tank, publishes annually in the Comparative Survey on Freedom.3 The survey uses a seven-point scale (with 1 being the best score and 7 the worst) to assess two dimensions of freedom: political rights, such as the ability to form political organizations free from government intrusion; and civil liberties, such as freedom of speech and assembly. The two scores are combined to create a “freedom index,” ranging from the best combined rating of 2 to the worst combined rating, 14. Countries are then grouped into three categories: (1) democratic, with a high degree of freedom (2–5 points); (2) partially democratic, with a medium degree of freedom (6–11 points); and (3) undemocratic, with a low degree of freedom (11–14 points). Although methodologists have offered critiques that may call into question rankings associated with individual countries at specific points in time (Gastil, 1991), the Freedom House figures remain extremely useful in understanding general trends within the international system (see Piano and Puddington, 2001). The last quarter of the twentieth century clearly witnessed important gains in the spread of democracy (see Table 1.1).4 In 1975, one year after the emergence of the third wave of democratization, the average democracy rating for the roughly 150 countries that comprised the international system was 9.1. Twenty-five years later, after an additional forty-one countries had achieved independence, an improved score of 7.0 represented a 23 percent gain in global democratic practices. Western Europe, the cradle of contemporary democracy, remains the most democratic region within the international system. As the starting point of the third wave of democratization, Western Europe further consolidated its democratic credentials with the downfall of dictatorships in Portugal and Spain. The fourteen Pacific island countries that comprise Oceania represent the world’s second most democratic region. Anchored by

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An International Community of Democracies

Table 1.1

Degree of Global Democratization (democracy scores, by region, 1975–2000) 1975

1985

1995

2000

Africa

11.8

11.7

9.1

8.9

Asia

10.4

10.1

10.2

9.6

Eastern Europe

12.9

12.7

6.7

5.9

Middle East

11.0

10.5

11.5

11.0

Oceania

4.4

4.4

3.6

4.1

Western Europe

3.5

2.9

2.6

2.6

Western Hemisphere

7.1

5.7

5.3

4.8

Global (all regions)

9.1

8.5

7.3

7.0

Source of data: Freedom House website: http://www.freedomhouse.org Scale: 2 (most democratic)–14 (least democratic) Free (democratic) 2–5 Partly free (partially democratic) 6–10 Not free (authoritarian) 11–14

democratic Australia and New Zealand, Oceania consistently maintained an impressive democratic standard from 1975 to 2000, a period in which seven of its fourteen countries achieved independence. Attempted coups d’état and instability in Fiji and the Solomon Islands, as well as Tonga’s consistently poor rating, nonetheless ensured a slight decline in the region’s freedom ranking in 2000 in comparison to earlier periods (Piano and Puddington, 2001: 92). Outside of Western Europe, the Western Hemisphere is the region that was most directly and immediately affected by the initial burst of the third wave of democratization. The region’s democracy rating improved from a combined score of 7.1 in 1975 to 5.7 in 1985, further improving to 4.8 in 2000. This is not surprising, not least of all because the leaders of the third wave—Spain and Portugal—were the former colonial powers of the majority of countries in Central and South America, and they continue to share important cultural links to this day. The transitions to democracy in Spanish-speaking Latin America were particularly striking, culminating in 2000 with the election of President Vicente Fox in Mexico, which further consolidated the country’s democratic status. Except for Cuba, the entire Western Hemisphere enjoys some variant of democratic rule. Impressive democratic gains have also occurred in Eastern Europe. In the aftermath of communism’s demise and the breakup of the former Soviet

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Exporting Democracy

Union, a new generation of political elites has sought to refashion outmoded and ineffective communist systems, including those in Russia—potentially one of the most important anchors for a regional democratic order. The success of these efforts to date is demonstrated by the improvement of the region’s democracy rating from an extremely dismal 12.9 in 1975 (the worst overall score for any region during the last quarter of the twentieth century) to an impressive 5.9 in 2000—a 54 percent gain in regional democratic practices. Even the Balkans, beset by political-military crises that culminated in a series of U.S.-led military interventions, witnessed the elections of President Vojislav Kostunica in Yugoslavia and President Stipe Mesic in Croatia, as well as the overthrow of Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic (Piano and Puddington, 2001: 92). The African continent was also dramatically affected by the collapse of communism in the post-1989 era. The rejection of single-party rule in its intellectual heartland ensured that African leaders, many of whom had patterned their own political systems after those of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, could no longer justify the continuation of this model on the African continent (Schraeder, 2000: 271). When combined with the increasingly vocal demands of prodemocracy movements that had emerged at the end of the 1980s, the collapse of communism ushered in a period of democratic transition, often referred to as Africa’s “second independence” or “second liberation,” previously unseen in African political history (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997). Political transitions have resulted in the gradual strengthening of democratic practices throughout the African continent, albeit not on the same scale or with the same intensity as democracy trends in Eastern Europe or Latin America. Asia, at least on the surface, appears to have been only marginally affected by the spread of democracy at the end of the twentieth century. Its democracy rating only slightly improved from 10.4 in 1975 to 9.6 in 2000. When one focuses on subregional developments, however, some noteworthy trends emerge (see Table 1.2). The countries of Central Asia, most of which were part of the former Soviet Union, have maintained the worst democracy rating. Unlike their East European counterparts, the newly independent Central Asian countries have witnessed the emergence of highly authoritarian regimes, maintaining a consistent democracy rating of 12.5 for both 1995 and 2000. In contrast, the democracy rating in East Asia has dramatically improved from 11.0 in 1975 to 7.0 in 2000. Anchored by a democratic Japan, this subregion has seen the emergence of democracy in Mongolia and the further consolidation of democratic practices in South Korea and Taiwan. The two remaining Asian subregions have maintained relatively stable averages between the two extremes of Central and East Asia. Led by a democratic India, South Asia as of 2000 maintained a democratic rating of 8.7; Southeast Asia, which includes a democratic Philippines, as of 2000 had a poorer rating of 10.1.

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An International Community of Democracies

Table 1.2

Degree of Democratization in Asia (democracy scores, by subregion, 1975–2000) 1975

1985

1995

2000

Central Asia

13.0

14.0

12.5

12.5

East Asia

11.0

10.2

7.7

7.0

8.9

8.3

9.3

8.7

Southeast Asia

10.8

10.9

11.0

10.1

Total (Asia)

10.4

10.1

10.2

9.6

South Asia

Source: Freedom House website: http://www.freedomhouse.org Scale: 2 (most democratic)–14 (least democratic) Free (democratic) 2–5 Partly free (partially democratic) 6–10 Not free (authoritarian) 11–14

The Middle East is the only region that remains largely insulated from the global spread of democracy. Although the emergence of younger, reform-minded leaders such as Morocco’s King Muhammad VI and Jordan’s King Abdallah II has generated optimism, the Middle East largely remains governed by authoritarian regimes. The region as a whole achieved a dismal democracy rating of 11.0 in both 1975 and 2000 (see also Sivan, 2000). In sharp contrast to the Western Hemisphere where only one country (Cuba) can be labeled authoritarian, in the Middle East only one country (Israel) can be labeled democratic. And even this characterization is often disputed due to continued deadlock over the creation of a Palestinian state, which in turn has fostered a recurring cycle of Palestinian uprisings and heavy-handed Israeli government responses. The global spread of democracy is most vividly portrayed by simply charting the evolution of the total number of democracies that exist within the international system (see Table 1.3). Since the beginning of the third wave of democratization, this figure has increased from 27 percent in 1975 to 44 percent in 2000. If one also includes semidemocratic countries, the totals for the democratic world increase from 58 percent to 74 percent during this same period. The regional totals as of 2000 are especially striking: 100 percent of all the countries within two regions—Western Europe and Oceania—enjoy some form of democracy, closely followed by 97 percent of all countries within the Western Hemisphere, 95 percent of all within Eastern Europe, and 63 percent within Africa. Only in Asia and the Middle East has the percentage of countries that enjoy some form of democracy declined, with Asia’s total for 2000 nonetheless remaining at a respectable 45 percent. These regional differences notwithstanding, there is no doubt

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Exporting Democracy

Table 1.3

Percentages of Democracies and Semidemocracies (by region, 1975– 2000) 1975

Africa Democracies Semidemocracies Democratic total Asia Democracies Semidemocracies Democratic total Eastern Europe Democracies Semidemocracies Democratic total Middle East Democracies Semidemocracies Democratic total Oceania Democracies Semidemocracies Democratic total Western Europe Democracies Semidemocracies Democratic total Western Hemisphere Democracies Semidemocracies Democratic total Global (all regions) Democracies Semidemocracies Democratic total

1985

1995

2000

7% 35 42

4% 17 21

19% 39 58

17% 46 63

8 40 48

8 50 58

10 38 48

24 21 45

0 0 0

0 11 11

43 43 86

52 43 95

5 32 37

5 53 58

5 16 21

5 21 26

71 29 100

73 27 100

79 21 100

79 21 100

86 14 100

90 10 100

96 4 100

96 4 100

38 41 79

66 23 89

54 43 97

63 34 97

27% 31 58

33% 27 60

40% 32 72

44% 30 74

Source: Freedom House website: http://www.freedomhouse.org

that at the beginning of the twenty-first century democracy has emerged as the dominant form of governance within the international system.

The Internal-External Debate An important outcome of the global spread of democracy during the last quarter of the twentieth century is that scholars and practitioners alike are increasingly prone to speak of democracy as a “universal value” whose “roots” can be nurtured in all regions of the world regardless of culture

An International Community of Democracies

7

(Sen, 1999; see also Danford, 2000). As a result, discussions within both the academic and the policymaking worlds have gradually shifted from a Cold-War focus on whether democracy constitutes the best form of governance, to whether and to what degree state and non-state actors should be actively involved in democracy promotion efforts abroad. A critical aspect of these discussions is our evolving understanding of the relative importance of domestic versus international factors in promoting democracy’s spread. The traditional scholarly consensus concerning this “internal-external” debate is that domestic factors are decisive in any transition to and consolidation of democracy. Such analyses at best neglect the importance of international factors and in the extreme argue that they exert little if any influence. It should therefore come as no surprise that the overwhelming majority of the scholarly literature devoted to understanding the third wave of democratization has emphasized a wide variety of domestic factors, most notably the degree of unity among ruling elites or opposition movements, the vibrancy of civil society, the receptivity of political culture, the degree of state control, and the strength of the national economy (O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, 1986; Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, 1989; Diamond, 1993; Przeworski, 1995; Linz and Stepan, 1996). With the benefit of more than a quarter century of hindsight, scholars increasingly have argued in favor of reexamining the neglected international dimension of democracy promotion. Philippe C. Schmitter, one of the most noted scholars associated with the so-called transitions literature that emphasized the overriding importance of the internal dimension of democratization, constitutes part of this new body of scholarship. “Perhaps, it is time to reconsider the impact of the international context upon regime change,” explains Schmitter (1996: 27–28). “Without seeking to elevate it to the status of prime mover, could it not be more significant than was originally thought?” Schmitter’s reassessment, as well as that of several of his colleagues within the transitions literature, is based on a retrospective analysis that often underscores an important difference between the initial transitions that took place in Southern Europe and Latin America between 1974 and 1989, and those that took place in Eastern Europe and Africa beginning in 1989. According to this viewpoint, the transitions that have taken place in the post–Cold War era on average may have been more influenced by international phenomena, most notably the fall of the Berlin Wall and the ultimate demise and disintegration of the former Soviet Union. In the end, however, external factors remain secondary in such analyses. One of the most comprehensive reexaminations of the internal-external debate is provided by Laurence Whitehead, who points to three sets of international dynamics to argue that it can be “seriously misleading” to treat the international dimension of democracy promotion as “generally

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Exporting Democracy

secondary in importance” (Whitehead, 1996: 23). The most basic dynamic is the simple process of “contagion”—the extensive and unintentional spread of an idea within a given geographical region, due to the socioeconomic, political-military, or cultural similarities and channels that link its member states (Whitehead, 1996: 5–8; see also Starr, 1991; Walt, 2000; Kopstein and Reilly, 2000). The spread of the “national conference” model of democratic transition throughout Africa provides an important case in point. Under this scenario, a broad coalition of leaders from all sectors of society, including elders and the heads of women’s organizations, ethnic and religious leaders, labor and student activists, and ruling and opposition political leaders, holds an extended national gathering that serves as the basis for debating the outlines of a new democratic political order. In its ideal form, such a conference builds upon the traditional African concept of consensus building, in which every participant has the right to voice his/her opinion, and decisions are made only when agreed upon by all members present (unlike the more widespread Western concept of majority rule). The strong appeal of this model was primarily due to the dramatic success achieved in 1990 in Benin, where a 488-member national conference that lasted ten days fashioned one of the African continent’s most celebrated democracies from the ruins of nearly eighteen years of dictatorial rule (Nzouankeu, 1993). Benin’s success not only inspired the emergence of national conferences in other francophone African countries but has become one of the hallmarks of democratic transition throughout the African continent as a whole (see Robinson, 1994; Clark and Gardinier, 1997). A second international dynamic revolves around how explicit acts of intervention by a foreign power can result in the successful imposition of some form of democracy within another country (Whitehead, 1996: 8–15). The often-cited classic cases emerged in the immediate aftermath of World War II, when the victorious Allies imposed democratic forms of governance on the defeated Axis powers of Germany (Ginsberg, 1996) and Japan (Hoffman, 1996). Together these two countries, which constitute the second and third most economically powerful democracies within the contemporary international system, offer living proof of the democratic gains that can be achieved through a wide range of interventionist practices, discussed further below. Indeed, according to Whitehead’s calculations, roughly twothirds of the sixty-one democracies that existed at the beginning of the 1990s “owed their origins, at least in part, to deliberate acts of imposition or intervention from without” (1996: 9). A final international dynamic involves the promotion of democracy through “consent” and examines the complex interaction between international and domestic actors that “generates new democratic norms and expectations from below” (Schmitter, 1996: 30). According to this perspec-

An International Community of Democracies

9

tive, foreign influences provide an international context that can either facilitate or hinder the development of democratic practices within a given country. A noteworthy example is the European Union’s requirement that aspiring countries must embody a certain level of democratic standards before being considered for membership. This requirement has provided a powerful incentive for countries, perhaps more interested in the presumed economic benefits of EU membership, to refashion their political systems in a more democratic direction (Rupnik, 2000). These three sets of literature clearly underscore the value of further exploring the circumstances under which international influences play a decisive role in the transition to and consolidation of democracy. Although witnessing important gains throughout the 1990s, the literature on international democracy promotion nonetheless still pales in comparison to the voluminous literature on the domestic origins of democracy, and in any case it suffers from two major shortcomings: an emphasis on the democracy promotion efforts of individual countries, most notably the United States as the world’s most powerful and influential democracy (Muravchik, 1992; Smith, 1994; and Carothers, 1996, 1999), and an emphasis on the democracy promotion efforts directed against individual regions, such as Eastern Europe (Dawisha, 1997; Pridham, Herring, and Sanford, 1997). Even the most comprehensive study to date (Whitehead, 1996) constitutes an edited volume of case studies largely focused on Southern Europe (3 chapters) and Latin America (7 chapters), with little attention to Eastern Europe (1 chapter) and no case studies on Africa. The limited focus of these studies hinders our ability to apply conclusions across the entire range of democracy promoters, as well as the regions that are the targets of democracy promotion efforts.

Overview This book offers an analysis of the efforts of numerous state and non-state international actors to promote democracy in all regions of the world during the post–World War II era, with a special focus on the post–Cold War era (1989–present). Individual chapters are written by members of an international research team comprised of European and North American scholars who have collaborated since the project was first launched in 1996. An important conclusion of this book is that the future success of democracy promotion efforts is potentially constrained by several realities, ranging from the often-significant gap between the rhetoric and the reality of actual policies, to the more substantial dilemma of when the normative goal of democracy clashes with other foreign policy interests. The remainder of the book is divided into three major sections. The

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Exporting Democracy

first is devoted to exploring the assumptions that drive the democracy promotion efforts of state and non-state actors within the international system. Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Margaret G. Hermann in Chapter 2 explore the widespread belief that the spread of democracy will lead to a more peaceful international system—the so-called democratic-peace hypothesis. Juliet Johnson in Chapter 3 explores the equally extensive belief that the spread of democracy will lead to a more prosperous international system, most notably in promoting economic growth and free trade. In both cases, the scholars offer a critical assessment of the existing empirical literature. Part 2 explores the democracy promotion efforts of several northern industrialized democracies: the Nordic countries (treated together as one case in Chapter 4); Germany (Chapter 5); Japan (Chapter 6); and the United States (Chapter 7). Each of these chapters is written by a scholar who is both from and a specialist of the country or region under consideration: Liisa Laakso is from Finland, Jürgen Rüland and Nikolaus Werz are from Germany, Tsuneo Akaha is from Japan, and Steven W. Hook is from the United States. As a result, each scholar is firmly grounded in the democratic cultures, scholarly traditions, and national languages of the respective case studies. Part 3 examines the democracy promotion efforts of several multilateral and nongovernmental organizations, including the European Union (Chapter 8), the United Nations (Chapter 9), the World Bank (Chapter 10), and political foundations and think tanks (Chapter 11). These chapters were prepared by four scholars (two Europeans and two Americans) who are specialists of the institutions under examination: Gorm Rye Olsen (the European Union), Christopher C. Joyner (the United Nations), Béatrice Hibou (the World Bank), and James M. Scott (political foundations and think tanks). These case studies, together with those devoted to the activities of the northern industrialized democracies, are meant to be not exhaustive but rather representative of the myriad of international influences in democracy promotion efforts. A final chapter offers some general conclusions.

Notes 1. For an overview of the aims and critics of the Warsaw Conference, see “Democracy Holds a Party” (2000). 2. Consider, for example, Huntington’s early work on the relationship between political stability and political development during the Cold War (1968) and his more recent work on the role of culture in international conflict during the post–Cold War era (1996). Both books, as well as his work on the third wave of democratization, have generated a tremendous amount of scholarly debate. 3. Another often-utilized statistical source for examining democracy’s spread

An International Community of Democracies

11

is the “Polity” data set originated by Ted Robert Gurr and updated by Keith Jaggers. The democracy trends derivative of this data source are highly correlated with the Freedom House figures. For an analysis of the correlation between the democratization scores of these and other data sets, see Jaggers and Gurr (1995: 473–476). 4. The statistics detailing regional trends in the tables of this book vary slightly from the regional trends outlined by Freedom House due to the inclusion (or noninclusion) of certain countries in specific regions and the use of a slightly different scale to distinguish between “partly free” and “not free” countries (see Tables 1.1–1.3).

PART 1

PROMOTING DEMOCRACY: EXPLORING THE RATIONALES

2 In Pursuit of a Peaceful International System Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Margaret G. Hermann

uch research has shown that wars or even military conflicts short of war are nonexistent or very rare among democracies (Gleditsch, 1992: 369–370; see also Ray, 1995a; Rummel, 1995; Russett, 1993, 1995a, 1998). This fact has been grasped by policymakers of the northern industrialized democracies in search of a principle to undergird their national security policies in the wake of the Cold War. For example, the Group of Eight (G-8) has made the promotion of democracy a key feature of its blueprint for a twenty-first-century peace. Inspired in part by the rapid diffusion of democratic governance since the 1980s (see Jaggers and Gurr, 1995; also Karatnychy and Cashdan, 1997; Starr, 1995), the northern industrialized democracies have all predicated their security policies on the belief that a world composed exclusively of democratic states would be a peaceful world. This chapter reviews and synthesizes the theory and evidence that has led these democracies to take seriously the Kantian and Wilsonian belief that the types of governments in a system can have an important impact on the incidence of war. In addition to outlining how these powers rationalize their enthusiastic embrace of peace through democratization, we evaluate the practicality of this approach for international security.

M

Democracies’ Peaceful Interactions The firm belief of northern policymakers that there are foreign policy consequences of democratization derives in large measure from academic scholarship suggesting that the international behavior of democratic states is different from that of nondemocracies. In contrast to research on dictatorships and autocracies (Schweller, 1992: 249; see also Lake, 1992, and compare Gleditsch and Ward, 1997; Weart, 1994), cross-national studies of foreign policies within the liberal democratic community have shown that 15

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Promoting Democracy

its members consistently choose cooperative exchanges with one another over confrontation and conflict. An inventory of comparative research findings as well as the claims of liberal theorists indicates that the following characterize the interactions of countries whose leaders rule by consent of the governed: • An inclination to externalize internally developed norms (Maoz and Russett, 1993; Gowa, 1995); • Incorporation of liberal beliefs into international legal norms (Burley, 1994; Joyner, 1995); • Respect for international law (Christopher, 1995: 1); • Higher levels of support for creating multilateral institutions and international organizations to address shared problems and which themselves are governed by democratic principles (Sørensen, 1992; Halperin, 1993; Dixon, 1993, 1994; Crawford, 1994; Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate, 1994; Gaubatz, 1996; Risse-Kappen, 1995a; Rochester, 1995; Oneal and Russett, 1999; Russett and Oneal, 2000); • Greater willingness to rely on third-party arbitration and mediation to settle disputes (Dixon, 1993, 1994; Raymond, 1994; Gowa, 1995); • Greater capacity to terminate rivalries (Bennett, 1997); • More rapid rates of alliance formation for collective defense (Siverson and Emmons, 1991; Maoz and Russett, 1992; Dixon, 1994; Weart, 1994); • Less inclination to disregard alliance commitments when changing circumstances decrease the benefits of existing defense pacts to the allied democracies (Kegley and Raymond, 1990, 1994); • Greater willingness to negotiate arms reduction agreements (Johansen, 1995); • A capacity for and interest in limiting the severity of violence when faced with an international crisis (Hewitt and Wilkenfeld, 1996); • Greater ability to contain conflicts over economic exchanges (Brawley, 1993; Polachek, 1994; Oneal, Oneal, Maoz, and Russett, 1996); • Higher levels of support for humanitarian foreign assistance programs (Hook, 1995; Hook, Kegley, and Hermann, 1995). The propensities of democracies to cooperate with one another is a critical component of the newly fashionable “neoliberal” creed in general (Baldwin, 1993; Kegley, 1995) and democratic-peace theory in particular. Both depart from realism by highlighting “the domestic aspects of democracies as determinants of their foreign policies” (Hallenberg, 1994: 149).

A Peaceful International System

17

The emerging consensus stems from the conviction that democratic institutions and liberal norms predispose elected governments to behave differently with one another in the international arena than they do with autocracies. The popularity of these ideas among members of the liberal democratic community and major multilateral institutions emanates primarily from the core proposition that when conflicts arise between democracies, the parties will resolve them through compromised bargaining rather than resort to force. The theory presumes that democracy is “a near-perfect sufficient condition for peace” (Gleditsch, 1995b: 318; see also Rummel, 1995b). As the evidence shows, “Over the past 50 years, pairs of democratic states have been only one-eighth as likely as other kinds of states to use force against one another, and only one-tenth as likely to carry out these threats” (Russett, 1995b: 8). This very consistent record indicating that democracies almost never fight one another has increased faith in the theory and, in turn, today’s enthusiasm for the democratic-peace paradigm. Many liberals, inspired by democracies’ humanitarian values, have long advocated democratization to enhance civil liberties and improve the human condition within countries. They have embraced democratic reforms because of ethical principles as well as the demonstrated benefits that open systems of governance bring to such countries’ peoples—including prosperity, domestic stability, and the deterrence of civil war (Enterline, 1996; Garnham, 1986; Rummel, 1985) as well as the survival of their political leaders (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995) and the governments they head (Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller, 1992). But now, even more enthusiastically, liberals have focused their attention on democratization’s impact on relations between countries. Policymakers today are again finding persuasive the proposition of Immanuel Kant and Woodrow Wilson that when a dispute arises between democracies, their shared liberal norms and values and their open political institutions predispose each party to rely on negotiation rather than the use of force (Chan, 1997; Dixon, 1994; Gowa, 1995; Maoz and Russett, 1993; Raknerud and Hegre, 1997; Ray, 1993, 1995a; Rummel, 1995a; Russett, 1993). Alternatively stated, democratic leaders embrace the assumption that mere knowledge about the political system of a country with which they experience a dispute can permit them to predict the approach the adversary will choose (Risse-Kappen, 1995b). In particular, proponents of democratic-peace theory presume that a democratically governed regime will have a natural inclination to exert its influence at the bargaining table rather than on the battlefield. In reviewing the accumulated evidence regarding the use of force that is advanced by democratic-peace theory, we observe four types of conclusions. The first is that democracies differentiate between kinds of governments in their use of force. Democracies use military force and participate in both large and small wars against nondemocracies, but they rarely, if

18

Promoting Democracy

ever, wage major wars against each other (Chan, 1997; Hermann and Kegley, 1995; Kegley and Hermann, 1995a, 1996, 1997a; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995a, 1995b, 1996; Risse-Kappen, 1995b; Small and Singer, 1976; Weede, 1984, 1992; Wright, 1942). Regime type does not predict involvement in armed conflict very well, but it does suggest that different rules apply in democracies’ interactions with others like themselves than in their interactions with nondemocracies. A second conclusion focuses on the fact that conflicts of interest, which inevitably erupt between democratic states in frequent interaction with one another, are generally resolved peacefully, without escalating into large-scale military confrontation. Still, on occasion disputes between democracies have grown so intense that one or more of the parties have sought to exercise influence through overt or covert military intervention (Forsythe, 1992; James and Mitchell, 1995; Kegley and Hermann, 1995a, 1995b) or a show of force (Farber and Gowa, 1995a). Intervention seems especially likely in such circumstances when democratic leaders face strong domestic opposition (Ostrom and Job, 1986; Russett, 1989; Alastair Smith, 1996). A third conclusion centers around the crisis-management skills of democracies; their overt military interventions against one another have all been contained short of full-scale war, denoting somewhat developed capabilities to cope with such conflicts (Gowa, 1995; Hagan, 1994; Hewitt and Wilkenfeld, 1996; Siverson and Miller, 1993). We have already noted that democracies are more likely to seek third-party mediation and arbitration to settle disputes as well as to participate in international regimes and multilateral institutions to head off problems before they become inflammatory. A fourth conclusion is based on the finding that democratic countries are infrequently attacked by either other democratic or nondemocratic countries—the rate during the last twenty-five years is far less than that targeted at nondemocracies and less than would be predicted given the proportion of democracies in the international system (Hermann and Kegley, 1996). This result instills confidence in the primary postulate of democratic-peace theory that how a state is governed will strongly influence both its foreign conduct and its national security. In a phrase, ballots act as a barrier to the use of bullets and, especially, bombs by others. The protective shield that appears to exist for established democracies is not as applicable to states that are less stable and less accountable to their populace, or to fledgling democracies. Adversaries cannot safely predict whether states that have not yet made the transition into the stable liberal democratic community and incorporated its norms, values, and institutions will use cooperative or coercive tactics. Thus, when a conflict erupts with such a transitional democracy, how the states involved are likely to react is less certain. Preemptive military intervention becomes more tempting and

A Peaceful International System

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probable against such regimes, especially if the perceived threat from them is strong (Blainey, 1988; Enterline, 1996; Kegley and Hermann, 1996, 1997a) or if their democratic foundations are fragile (Gates, Knutsen, and Moses, 1996; Spiro, 1994). But transitional democracies may also become aggressive if their governmental structures and democratic institutions are weak, as their leaders seek to consolidate authority (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995a, 1995b, 1996). The logic underlying democratic-peace theory acknowledges that liberal democracies may feel justified in militarily confronting autocratically governed countries whose rulers are believed to favor strategies that maximize their own power and repress their citizens’ freedoms. Democracies have, as Immanuel Kant (1969 [1795]) warned, a penchant for acting belligerently against autocratic governments, even to wage imperialistic wars against them, largely because democratic leaders can gain domestic political capital through military intervention against an authoritarian state. Flexing one’s muscle against a centralized polity is easily rationalized, and this rationale can become compelling to democracies if the action might convert nondemocracies to democratic rule and thus enlarge the zone of peace. Summarizing the literature, Thomas Risse-Kappen (1995b: 491; see also Hermann and Kegley, 1995, 1996) offers a useful conclusion about what is known regarding the external behavior of democracies, observing: Democracies are Janus-faced. While they do not fight each other, they are frequently involved in militarized disputes and wars with authoritarian regimes . . . To a large degree democracies create their friends and enemies—“us” and “them”—by inferring either defensive or aggressive motives from the domestic structures of their counterparts. On the one hand, they follow behavioral norms externalizing their internal compromise-oriented and non-violent decision rules in their interactions with other democracies. On the other hand, the presumption of potential enmity creates a realist world of anarchy when democratic states interact with authoritarian regimes.

Considered as a body of theory and evidence, the emerging “democratic peace” proposes the export of democratic institutions as an approach to cementing peace among democratic states throughout the world, and its advocates have begun efforts to legalize such export. The classic prohibition against external intervention into the internal affairs of sovereign states, particularly to reform governing institutions, is in decay and revision (Blechman, 1995; von Glahn, 1996; Kegley and Raymond, 2001), in no small measure as a result of changes in international law advocated by the established democracies (Blechman, 1995; Hermann, Kegley, and Raymond, 1995). Perceiving the right to live under democratic freedom as

20

Promoting Democracy

an “entitlement” or basic human right (Franck, 1994), the existing democracies have launched a global “democratist crusade” (Hendrickson, 1994– 1995) aimed at converting the entire set of more than 190 sovereign states to democratic governance. Similarly, faith in the pacifying effects of democratization has stimulated multilateral assistance and funding agencies such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to make nondemocratic states’ willingness to undertake democratic reforms a condition for aid. Such organizations as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), and the Organization of American States (OAS) have begun to define foreign interventions to promote democratization as legitimate, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has sought to enlarge its membership providing that candidates for inclusion in the East under the Partnerships for Peace plan can demonstrate that their commitment to democratization is sincere and irreversible. The sea change in thinking symbolized by the activities of the crusade for democratization rests on the validity of the research findings in the democratic-peace literature that have inspired them. And there seem to be many reasons to treat the findings as meaningful, even though they appear contingent on the definitions of armed conflict and democracy used (Chan, 1997). Yet on the whole the theory has been substantiated across many investigations, which have examined not only intervention but displays of force, threats to use force, and military acts short of war. Although the studies have found some cases in which democracies have used these tactics against other democracies (Bremer, 1992, 1993; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992; Forsythe, 1992; Mansfield and Snyder, 1996; Maoz and Russett, 1992; Weede, 1992), the data lend substantial support to the democratic-peace proposition. The theory is as robust as any in international relations. “The way states treat their own citizens has implications for the way they relate to the outside world” (Fukuyama, 1995a: 41) and how the external world acts toward them. The discovery that the political structure of countries matters exerts pressure to treat with respect the view that a country’s capacity to deter attack can be increased by liberal reforms in its governing institutions and political freedoms. As proponents of the democratic peace argue, elections and checks and balances can contribute to a nation’s defense, and international security generally can increase through the diffusion of democratic governance. The inferred lessons from the peaceful influences of democratization are particularly relevant to the developing world. As these countries seek to buffer themselves from foreign attack and internal rebellion, they can find a partial solution to their security problems in the kinds of governing structures they create. Democratization can, recent history suggests, provide

A Peaceful International System

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protection from external aggression; however, the commitment to liberal democracy must be sincere for this protective shield to operate. Fledgling democracies and those ambivalent about civil liberties are the most vulnerable to external attack, civil strife, and aggressive adventures (Enterline, 1996; Gurr, 1994; Kegley and Hermann, 1997b; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995b, 1996), in part because democracies protect the right of protest and dissent. Between 1989 and 1994 all but four of the global ninety-two wars were internal wars, not wars between countries, and most were located in the developing world where the democratization process has been delayed and partial (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 1995). The record also indicates that these fledgling democracies and, of course, the remaining autocracies will be the most probable targets of outside military intervention and the most unlikely to escape the war syndrome until democratic reforms are successfully completed and become sustained. Hence, if the developing world wants peace, leaders there have powerful incentives both to create and support democratic institutions. To understand why this prescription has potential merit, we need to examine the puzzle confronting democratic-peace theory—the reasons why democratic countries’ relations with one another are pacific. Before faith can be placed in the enlargement of democracy as a recipe for peace, the basis for the prescription must be satisfactorily understood. What factors account for democracies’ peaceful relations with each other?

In Search of Causation: The Pieces in the Puzzle Skeptics of democratic-peace theory—especially realists and neorealists— complain that before accepting its liberal prophecy, policymakers should recognize that the existing evidence and theory do not tell us why democracies behave peacefully and which aspects of democratic governance most increase a state’s invulnerability. If democracy is a panacea, then its proponents must articulate why democratization can produce more peaceful foreign relations. What properties of a democratic target most inhibit others from using military force against it? In addition, skeptics ask, what influences most deter democracies from using force against other democracies? Which attributes enhance democracies’ security while decreasing that of nondemocracies? As critics (e.g., Layne, 1994; Spiro, 1994) and skeptics (e.g., Cohen, 1994; Gates, Knutsen, and Moses, 1996; Thompson, 1996) have argued, these are unresolved questions that need to be addressed. Even advocates of democratic-peace theory (Owen, 1994: 88) have observed: “No one is sure why democracies do not fight each other . . . That we do not really know the causal mechanism behind the democratic peace means we cannot be certain the peace is genuine.”

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Promoting Democracy

In what follows we summarize the existing literature that has attempted to account for the causes of the zone of peace among democratic states and posit some propositions about the roots of democracies’ peaceful relationships that previous research has heretofore neglected. At issue is why democracies’ interactions are relatively more peaceful than those of nondemocracies, as well as why the former are also relatively more secure. The Peace Puzzle To probe the causes of the democratic peace, contemporary research often takes as its starting point the proposition that public opinion restrains leaders in democratic states from waging war. Because democratic governments establish the right of suffrage for citizens to hold elected leaders accountable for their decisions, many scholars proceed from the assumption that the power of the people best accounts for the reluctance of republican regimes to use force to settle disputes with one another. According to conventional wisdom, empowerment through the ballot gives the mass public—which would supply the soldiers and bear the human and financial costs of foreign aggression—the ability to reduce leaders’ incentives for waging war. Those doing this type of research implicitly accept Kant’s view that electoral accountability provides a natural barrier in democracies to a leader’s temptation to use force. Moreover, these researchers usually argue that the political culture of democratic states includes norms against aggression as a method of conflict resolution, which are reinforced through institutional procedures. Given these expectations, the assumption is made that in democracies public opinion operates to constrain the waging of war against other democracies. Yet many studies have failed to establish a strong correlation between mass opinion and foreign policy choice (e.g., Page, 1994; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson, 1994). In the short run, policymakers seem highly inattentive and impervious to the pressure of public opinion (Cohen, 1973) and often succeed in manipulating it in the realm of foreign policy (Margolis and Mauser, 1989). Rather than being constrained and held accountable to public preferences, somewhat counterintuitively it has been empirically shown that a leader’s likelihood of using force abroad “increases under decreasing public support, rather than under increasing popularity” (Geva, DeRouen, and Mintz, 1993: 220). Thus the alleged restraint of public opinion on foreign bellicosity, evidence shows, is not powerful. Moreover, the public is not inherently adverse to the death and hardship of war. At times mass hysteria and hypernationalism heightened by press jingoism have encouraged democratically ruled states to wage foreign wars, especially when democracies experience high levels of domestic dis-

A Peaceful International System

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content (Morgan and Bickers, 1992). As realists such as George F. Kennan (1951) and Hans J. Morgenthau (1985) have vociferously lamented, by placing our hopes in the wisdom of the democratically governed, we may see them dashed in the “unsound . . . theory of peace-loving democracies” (Mearsheimer, 1990: 49). In attempting to find a more convincing explanation, researchers have turned away from the view that participatory democracy automatically makes leaders responsive to pacific public preferences and restrains their use of force abroad. In accounting for democracies’ peaceful relations, such researchers have shifted their analysis to a larger set of explanatory factors. Potential explanations have centered around arguments nested within three general categories of variables, each of which is farther removed from the locus of decisionmaking and at a different level of analysis. These categories are: • Institutional variables: divided authority (Lake, 1992; Morgan and Schwebach, 1992); domestic opposition (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1990); routinized elections (Babst, 1964; Wright, 1942); partisan competition (Morgan and Schwebach, 1992); constitutional and institutional limits on the latitude of rulers’ decisions (Farber and Gowa, 1995b; Gowa, 1995; Manicas, 1989; Morgan and Campbell, 1991; Rummel, 1979, 1983; Siverson, 1995); and electoral accountability (Maoz and Abdolali, 1989; Ostrom and Job, 1986; Russett, 1989); • Societal attributes: consensus in public opinion (Doyle, 1994; Risse-Kappen, 1991; Russett, 1990, 1993; Schweller, 1992); normative values externalized in foreign relations (Maoz and Russett, 1993; Morgan and Schwebach, 1992; Rummel, 1979, 1983); level of mass political participation (Ember, Ember, and Russett, 1992); the duration of uninterrupted democratic rule (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995b; Maoz and Russett, 1992, 1993); and the degree of internal stability and economic prosperity (Gasiorowski, 1995; Maoz and Russett, 1992, 1993; Morgan and Schwebach, 1992; Ostrom and Job, 1986; Russett, 1989; Schweller, 1992); • International forces: trade interdependence (Dixon, 1984; Dixon and Moon, 1993); commitment to alliance ties (Dixon, 1994; Maoz and Russett, 1992); willingness to empower mediators and arbitrators (Dixon, 1994; Raymond, 1994); proportion of democracies in system (Ray, 1993, 1995a, 1995b; Small and Singer, 1976); geographical proximity (Dixon, 1994; Gleditsch, 1995; Gleditsch and Ward, 1997; Maoz and Russett, 1992); ratio of military power between disputing “joint democracy” dyads (Gleditsch, 1995; Maoz

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Promoting Democracy

and Russett, 1993; Rousseau, Gelpi, Reiter, and Huth, 1996); and history of prior cooperation (Dixon, 1994; Risse-Kappen, 1995b; Small and Singer, 1976). Yet even with this consideration of an ever-larger number of causal factors, many scholars regard the explanations and descriptions generated as less than compelling or convincing (see, e.g., Chan, 1993, 1997; Gleditsch, 1992; Morgan and Schwebach, 1992; and, of course, those writing from realist and neorealist perspectives). As Patrick James and Glenn Mitchell (1995: 87) conclude, “None of the three arguments provides a convincing argument of why democracies do not fight each other.” “Only one conclusion,” Clifton Morgan and Sally Campbell (1991: 210) summarize, “seems to be definitely supported: ‘Democracy does not appear to be a force for peace in any straightforward, uniform, or consistent fashion.’” Debate continues about the origins of the democratic peace (e.g., Chan, 1997; The Economist, 1995; Layne, 1994; Moravcsik, 1995; Owen, 1994; Russett, 1995a, 1995b; Starr, 1992). The Limitations of Existing Models The explanations proposed in previous research on the genesis of the democratic peace have one property in common: they neglect consideration of the people involved in making policy decisions. This absence of attention to the type of leader in power is of particular concern because most explanations of the democratic peace at some point acknowledge that the officials involved make the critical decisions regarding war and peace. Even though researchers stress that the “high politics” of national security is managed by leaders at the top of their countries’ foreign policy bureaucracies, students of the democratic peace rarely directly investigate the beliefs of these leaders. As Bruce Russett (1993: 31) summarizes, most scholars simply assume that “if people in a democracy perceive themselves as autonomous, self-governing people who share norms of live-and-let-live, they will respect the rights of others to self-determination if those others are also perceived as self-governing and hence not easily led into aggressive foreign policies by a self-serving elite.” In point of fact, evidence has not yet been produced that leaders actually base their decisions on a democratic “operational code” (George, 1969) or “decision regime” (Kegley, 1987). Such evidence is needed, inasmuch as “differences in regime type may have little to do with the foreign policy process because the very nature of the . . . process makes it more elitedriven and closed to social input” (Merritt and Zinnes, 1991: 230; see also Hermann and Hermann, 1989; Hermann and Kegley, 1995; Oren, 1995; Owen, 1994; Risse-Kappen, 1995b). This policy latitude is particularly

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apparent in political crises. In circumstances where time for decision is often short, elites can govern without restraint and, whether functioning in a democracy or a dictatorship, disregard constraints that might otherwise restrict their range of policy choice. How these elites perceive and define constraints and what they expect from their adversary can shape the decisions they urge on their governments. In another study (Hermann and Kegley, 1995), the authors have posited that the type of leader interacts with polity type in determining how democracies and autocracies will act in response to conflict. We have argued that it matters if a government is headed by a “crusader” or a “pragmatist” (Stoessinger, 1985). The more ideological the leader, the more willing he or she is to perceive constraints as something to overcome, to challenge; the more pragmatic the leader, the more responsive he or she is to constraints. The ideologically driven leader, whether in a democracy or autocracy, faces crises with a particular set of policy priorities; the responsive leader is sensitive to the political context. Table 2.1 shows how type of leader and polity type might interact in shaping the strategies governments use in dealing with conflicts. Thus a democratic regime with an ideologically driven leader could act more like an autocracy, engaging in covert and diversionary activities that involve the use of force. And an autocratic polity with a contextually sensitive leader could act more like a democracy, being bound by the constraints in the situation and responsive to the choices of politically relevant others. We note Ronald Reagan as an example of a more ideologically driven democratic leader who, when his policies were blocked by Congress or strong public opinion, challenged these constraints by turning to covert actions. Reagan engaged in eighteen covert operations during his tenure in office, half of which were targeted at elected governments (Kegley and Hermann, 1995a). Leonid Brezhnev has often been described as a leader who sought a consensus among the members of the Soviet Politburo before acting even though he had the power and status to do so on his own (e.g., see Snyder, 1991; Valenta, 1979); he was a more responsive leader in an autocratic regime. He used force only when the majority of those whose positions counted in maintaining him in office supported such a move. The more ideologically driven democratic leader is more likely to support and promote democratization, particularly if he or she has accepted the democratic-peace proposition that a world of democracies will be a more peaceful place. Democratization is viewed as a “good,” and thus interventions to promote or maintain democracy are means to an important end. For such leaders, maintaining the democratic community is as important as its enlargement (Kegley and Hermann, 1997b). If a country is viewed as being even somewhat democratic, it becomes a part of the community and an object for protection. The more pragmatic democratic leaders will generally

26 Table 2.1

Promoting Democracy

Effect of Type of Leader and Political System on Strategies for Dealing with Conflict Type of Political System

Type of Leader

DEMOCRACY

AUTOCRACY

RESPONSIVE Perception of constraint

Perceives behavior to be Perceives leadership is constrained constrained; checks preferences of by preferences of elites who can a range of constituencies interested affect continuation in office in current issue before acting

Strategy for dealing with conflict

Responds to positions of relevant constituencies

Engages in external conflict only when important elites support decision

IDEOLOGICALLY DRIVEN Perception of constraint

Perceives constraint as something to be overcome; frustrated by limitations on power

Strategy for dealing Approves increased use of with conflict secrecy/covert activity and diversionary actions

Perceives others share view of world and current issues as well as support what leader wants to do Engages in both highly conflictual and cooperative actions, depending on leader’s perception of the nature of the target and his/her view of the world

only choose interventionist strategies if their relevant constituencies support such a move. This review of theory and of the inferences derived from recent research suggests that the idiosyncratic characteristics of leaders need to be incorporated into subsequent thinking about the link between democracies and peace. As with the explanations at the other levels of analysis, it is important to contextualize our understandings. After all, democracies can be differentiated into those that are presidential and those that are parliamentary, as well as those that are stable and unstable, well established and not well established, internally coherent and less coherent, more and less developed, and more and less constrained. Rather than looking for one explanation, maybe we should be considering how the various factors interact to reinforce or dampen the attribution of democracy to the regime. Which of the explanatory variables enhances others’ views that a state is a democracy and which detract from such a view? Building on this brief review of the possible causes for the democratic peace, let us give direction to subsequent investigations by suggesting some ways researchers might

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strengthen our understanding of the preconditions for promoting and preserving a separate peace among democracies.

Conclusion Since antiquity, humanity has sought solutions for the curse of war. The quest has proven largely elusive, as war has been recurrent and periods of peace have been infrequent and short. Adherents of realpolitik have pessimistically concluded that the dream of ending warfare is quixotic—that only the dead will see the end of war. They counsel that the only realistic hope is for countries to contain the size and destructiveness of wars through the operation of a balance of power, and that international anarchy makes imperative adherence to the dictum that if a state wants peace, it must prepare for war. Observing the dismal regularity with which previous balances of power have culminated in death and destruction, liberal reformers have questioned the wisdom of realism’s recipe. Believing in the capacity for international change and cooperation as substitutes for competition and conflict, liberals propose to foil the war system by changing the institutions that make foreign policy decisions. Although the liberal tradition is eclectic (see Kegley, 1995), at its heart is the conviction that to obtain peace it is prudent to prepare institutions to keep the peace. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, these two attitudes have merged to create a new approach to international security. Democraticpeace theory joins realism’s obsession with national security with liberalism’s focus on institutional reform. Peace, this merged theoretical position postulates, will result from the enlargement of the community of liberal democratic states; the global diffusion of democracy will expand the zone of stable peace because, it is averred, strengthening the institutional pillars of democracy within states has historically deterred the outbreak of war between states. Realists such as Henry Kissinger (1994) and Richard Nixon (1994) have embraced the liberal idealism of Immanuel Kant, Thomas Paine, James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, and Woodrow Wilson by accepting the prophecy that the prospects for international peace will greatly improve as the number of states practicing popular self-government grows. National and international security will flourish, converts to democraticpeace theory conclude, if governments actively preserve, promote, and defend democratic governance beyond their borders and throughout the world. At the beginning of a new century, policymakers have strong reasons for following this prescription. The evidence is very strong that if democra-

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Promoting Democracy

tization continues to spread, international security will also increase. To those prescribing an international crusade to make the world safe for democracy, the world will be safe if democratization’s third wave (Huntington, 1991; Jaggers and Gurr, 1995) is followed by a fourth wave that washes away the remnants of despotism, tyranny, and dictatorship, as appears increasingly probable should the current trend toward democratic transitions continue (Karatnychy and Cashdan, 1997). In looking at the record and theoretical foundations of the democratic peace, however, the limitations of this approach also must be recognized. Inasmuch as questions remain about the causal processes that prevent democracies from waging war against each other, policymakers are well advised to consider the international and domestic circumstances that are likely to influence whether the “separate peace” among democracies will remain stable. Our inspection of the evidence generated thus far suggests that several preconditions must be present for democratic-peace theory to fulfill its boldest predictions. Moreover, because a number of intervening factors can modify the relationship between democratization and war, the linkage may prove more precarious than its most enthusiastic proponents claim. We can better see how the pieces fit together when we recall the situations where they do not mesh so neatly. As we have observed, • full-scale war between democracies is extremely rare; however, • democracies do wage wars against nondemocracies and are prone to initiate low-scale military interventions to influence the outcome of disputes, even against other democracies, if such behavior will maintain them in the democratic community; moreover, • peace among democracies seems confined to relations among established, stable, mature democracies in which respect for citizens’ civil, human, and political rights is firmly entrenched; fledgling and fragile democracies are often attacked and, at times, are inclined to use force to settle their domestic conflicts; in addition, • the perceptions, beliefs, and values of heads of state can shape the foreign policy choices of both democratically and nondemocratically ruled countries in times of crisis and can be crucial determinants of whether disputes will be settled by military means. The context of decisions is, therefore, likely to be a very important influence on the relationship between polities and peace. A stable democratic peace is likely to be contingent upon a variety of preconditions that define the parameters within which the promotion of democracy will prove to be a pragmatic approach to a just twenty-first-century world order. Given the instability and conflict that afflicts much of the developing world, it is critical to find solutions. Indifference is not an acceptable moral

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position (Kegley, 1996). As this chapter has argued, an attractive solution for peacemaking and peacekeeping worth considering is to build democratic institutions in those countries and failed states where the rudiments of a civil society are lacking. The developing world provides an opportunity to put the propositions of democratic-peace theory to a critical test.

3 In Pursuit of a Prosperous International System Juliet Johnson

ike the contention that democracies do not fight each other, a large majority of scholars have accepted the argument that states with strong, growing economies are, over time, more likely to become and remain democratic (see Remmer, 1995). But the flip side of this causal relationship remains more contentious and less studied. That is, what effect does political democracy itself have on economic development? An increasing number of policymakers in the northern industrialized democracies clearly have been operating on the assumption that promoting both democracy and liberal economic policies in the developing world are compatible and even complementary goals. In the case of the United States, for example, the Clinton administration consistently argued that policies supporting both democracy and free markets were mutually reinforcing, leading to greater overall prosperity and good trading relationships (Clinton, 1996; Davidow, 1997; Lake, 1996; Talbott, 1996; Christopher, 1996; Ruth, 1996). As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright declared in an address at Harvard University on the fiftieth anniversary of the Marshall Plan, “We must take advantage of the historic opportunity that now exists to bring the world together in an international system based on democracy, open markets, law, and a commitment to peace” (Albright, 1997). Indeed, the vast majority of foreign aid agencies in the northern industrialized democracies further note that democracy promotion policies are “based on the realistic premise that in today’s global market, open societies with democratic governance have the best chance to produce stable and equitable economic development” (Shattuck and Atwood, 1998: 168; see also USAID, 1997). The northern industrialized democracies promote democracy in the developing world in great part because northern policymakers assume that democracies are both better at promoting economic growth and development in the long run than are dictatorships, and better (or at least no worse)

L

31

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Promoting Democracy

than dictatorships in carrying out short-term economic stabilization programs. The primary purpose of this chapter is to assess the veracity of these assumptions by briefly reviewing the theoretical and empirical evidence amassed by social scientists over the past few decades and then examining the implications of this assessment for democracy promotion in the developing world. Specifically, four presumed outcomes of democracy promotion are examined: enhanced economic growth, increased free trade, reduced inequality, and the promotion of economic stability. In short, the evidence does not strongly support these presumptions and in fact remains frustratingly inconclusive on both key points.

Democracy and Economic Growth Scholars remain bitterly divided on the question of the relationship between democracy and economic growth, a division often referred to as the “conflict” perspective versus the “compatibility” perspective (Huntington, 1987; Sirowy and Inkeles, 1991). Numerous scholars have maintained that democracy and economic growth progress naturally, over the long term, and therefore go hand in hand. Friedrich Hayek (1988), for example, believes that democracies better protect individual rights to private property and thus foster economic development. Theoretically, scholars who argue that political democracy leads to economic growth in developing countries argue that democracies help foster the political and civil liberties that lead to conditions under which the economy can develop in a balanced, healthy manner (Goodell and Powelson, 1982; Kohli, 1986b; Fukuyama, 1992). These liberties ensure that a free media will root out growth-sapping corruption; elections will make politicians accountable for sub-par economic performance; the rule of law will protect markets and contracts, making economic transactions safe and predictable; technology will flow freely; resources will be allocated efficiently (that is, without state interference); individuals will have the freedom to innovate economically; and the amount and quality of available economic information will be superior. Proponents of democracy argue further that it is not true, as is sometimes claimed, that democracies encourage internal conflict and thus act as a barrier to economic growth (Hibbs, 1973; Marsh 1979). In fact, democracy’s tendency to redistribute income and bias domestic spending toward consumption helps to improve economic functioning by widening markets and fostering the development of the all-important middle class. Authoritarian states, on the other hand, tend to be more corrupt and have distorted economies that tend toward gigantism and paternalism. This leads to unbalanced growth and especially harms state agricultural sectors. In

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addition, authoritarian states are actually more vulnerable to economic crises than democracies because often their legitimacy is based solely on economic performance (Huntington, 1991; Maravall, 1994). The fact that all of the world’s advanced industrial countries are democracies does seem to support this argument. Clearly, moreover, many authoritarian states have had serious economic growth problems. Jose Maria Maravall (1994), for example, notes the cases of Argentina, Burma, Brazil, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo (Congo-Kinshasa, former Zaire), Haiti, Nicaragua, Peru, the Philippines, Uganda, and Zambia. In addition, he points out that the terrible economic performances under communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union could have persisted so long only under authoritarian rule, because voters would not have stood for it. Maravall (1994: 26) sums up his evaluation by stating that “the case for democracy as a means to economic growth . . . rests on solid grounds.” The “Advantages” of Authoritarianism The belief that democracy threatens property rights (and therefore economic development) is also long-standing (Przeworski and Limongi, 1993; Knack and Keefer, 1997). As Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi (1993: 51) state: “While everyone seems to agree that secure property rights foster growth, it is controversial whether democracies or dictatorships better secure these rights.” Indeed, fear of the democratic mob was at the root of nineteenth-century suffrage restrictions reserving the vote for male property owners. In this view, capitalism and democracy rest on fundamentally incompatible principles. Whereas democracy enshrines the notion of equality into a nation’s political culture and institutions, capitalism operates on the ideal of competition and on the legitimacy of inequality. Empirically, scholars point out that because democracies must provide some level of economic progress to remain legitimate and survive, democracies with poor economies die off. Poorly performing dictatorships, though, can persist for years. As a result, the apparent correlation between democracy and economic growth, especially in advanced industrial democracies, is a spurious one (Lipset, 1959; Przeworski, 1991). According to this point of view, democratic regimes cannot carry out growth-oriented policies because their institutions are not strong enough to resist demands from labor and other interest groups. Too much freedom of speech, exercise of civil liberties, and so forth creates a cacophony of voices that makes it difficult to forge the consensus necessary for sustained development efforts. Authoritarian regimes therefore excel at promoting economic growth because they can provide social and political stability,

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can insulate the state from domestic pressures, have a greater political capacity to implement unpopular policies, can maintain firm control over labor markets, and have the power to allocate resources efficiently. Much theoretical economic research on the problems of collective action supports the contention that democracies are less likely than authoritarian states to foster economic efficiency and growth. In the most famous statement of this school, Mancur Olson (1982) argues that because of the paradox of collective action, stable, modern democratic societies are more likely than other kinds of societies to develop networks of interest groups that will foster their own private interests over collective interests and thus bring about national economic decline. This occurs because, as the logic of collective action dictates, the larger a group is, the less benefit each individual member will gain from group action and the greater the incentive will be for that individual to act as a free rider. Because of this, small groups have greater incentives for carrying out collective action and form more readily, but they are also more likely to lower societal efficiency and equity because members act primarily in their own narrow interests. Democracies allow such groups to form and to lobby without restraint. So the more stable and long-lived a democratic country is, the more of these groups will be able to accumulate and the less efficient their government and society will become over time as interest groups gum up the bargaining process, slow down the adoption of new technology, and try to exclude newcomers from participating in their activities. While Olson (1993) later modified this view in the face of evidence demonstrating that democracies protect private property rights more reliably than do dictatorships, Philippe Schmitter (1987) and Lester Thurow (1980) note that problems with governability and economic management commonly emerge in developed democracies, due to the wide variety of interest groups competing for access to government resources. Perhaps most important, some scholars argue that because dictatorships can favor investment policies over domestic consumption, they can continue intensifying economic development even in the face of levels of inequality and suffering unsustainable in democracies. As such, authoritarian states can concentrate more resources into investment than can democratic ones, yielding higher rates of economic growth. Those who argue that democracy impedes growth point out that because democracy indulges mass preferences for immediate consumption, investment levels remain lower than they would be under authoritarianism (Galenson, 1959; De Schweinitz, 1959; Huntington, 1968). An oft-cited example is the wide disparity in the domestic savings rates of the United States and China. According to the 1997 World Development Report, while the consumptionhappy, democratic United States saves only 15 percent of its GDP, authoritarian economic powerhouse China saves a hefty 42 percent (World Bank,

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1997). As a result, much more of China’s GDP remains available in the financial system for investment purposes, helping to fuel its economic boom. Many other authoritarian states have similarly high levels of domestic savings, including Gabon (48 percent), Indonesia (36 percent), Malaysia (37 percent), and Saudi Arabia (30 percent). Such arguments rest on two assumptions: (1) that democratic governments are responsive to the widespread desire to consume; and (2) that authoritarian states prefer and can force investment policies. However, over time it has become clear that neither of these conditions necessarily hold. In particular, authoritarian states do not always promote policies that contribute to high growth rates, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Nor do all democracies have low rates of domestic savings—cases like Japan (31 percent), Norway (29 percent), and South Korea (36 percent) call the U.S.China comparison into question (World Bank, 1997). As a result, scholars have refined the simple thesis that “authoritarianism promotes economic growth” in two significant ways, arguing either that authoritarian governments promote economic growth more successfully at certain stages in the development process or that certain kinds of authoritarian states (known as “developmental states”) enjoy a particular advantage in stimulating economic growth. Advantages of Authoritarianism “with Adjectives” The evolution of these two lines of thought goes back to the failure of the Alliance for Progress in the 1960s. The social science of the 1950s and 1960s held that once developing countries reached a certain level of economic prosperity, what W. W. Rostow called “takeoff,” democratic governments and further economic growth would surely follow (Rostow, 1960). The phrase “all good things go together” characterized this brief scholarly consensus (i.e., that modernization, democratization, and economic prosperity all fueled each other). This belief undergirded massive U.S. aid projects such as the Alliance for Progress, which funneled economic aid to Latin American countries anticipating that, after the seeds of development had taken root, they would rapidly progress along the path to democracy and prosperity. Instead, what Samuel Huntington labels the “second reverse wave” of democratization occurred, as the economies of Latin American countries improved while at the same time their governments reverted to authoritarian forms (Huntington, 1991). At this point, scholars such as Huntington (1968), David Apter (1965), and Guillermo O’Donnell (1979) began to argue that once states reached a certain level of development and modernization, they needed the coercive power of an authoritarian state to push industrialization forward. According to this view, the most difficult time for a regime may be immediately after

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its economy starts to improve, when the rate of public expectations and desires for political participation begin to outstrip the rate of actual economic growth. Huntington (1968) summarized this process in his famous dictum, “Modernization breeds instability.” O’Donnell’s 1979 work on bureaucratic-authoritarian states in Latin America reached similar conclusions. His research began with the puzzle that emerged from the failure of the Alliance for Progress—why did the most economically advanced Latin American countries, especially Argentina, slip into authoritarianism precisely after their economies started to “take off”? Like Huntington, he concluded that the pressures of modernization and the need to repress labor in order to concentrate and direct investment capital led naturally to authoritarianism in this phase of development. These arguments drew much inspiration from Alexander Gershchenkron’s thesis that later-developing states must modernize more rapidly, in a more capital-intensive way, than states on the cusp of the Industrial Revolution did. This kind of intense development, to his mind, required an active, powerful, interventionist state to mobilize the necessary resources (Gershchenkron, 1962; Kuznets, 1955; Hewlett, 1979). Therefore, governments must make “cruel choices,” because at certain stages economic growth and democracy are incompatible with each other (Huntington and Nelson, 1976; Hewlett, 1979). These complementary arguments have, at the extreme, served as justifications for Joseph Stalin’s repressive political and economic policies in the Soviet Union in the 1930s, holding that only such authoritarian policies could have produced intensive, rapid industrialization in an economy formerly dominated by peasant agriculture (Huntington, 1965). After the Portuguese transition of 1974 kicked off an unprecedented “third wave” of democratization around the world, though, theories emphasizing the necessity of authoritarianism at particular stages of economic development fell out of favor. Instead, scholars began to argue that, while democratic states were not necessarily bad at promoting economic development, certain kinds of authoritarian states (which came to be known as “developmental states”) were particularly good at it. This mirrored an earlier scholarly debate on the developmental prowess of military regimes. According to one school, military regimes were better developers than other kinds of regimes because they wanted to modernize their countries, had an interest in and access to technology, were egalitarian organizations, and could effectively achieve control over society (Pye, 1966; Shils, 1964; Levy, 1966). Others riposted with the claim that militaries prized order and security too much to promote solid economic development programs (Bienen, 1971; Nordlinger, 1970). The developmental states of the 1980s supposedly encompassed the positive attributes of the military regime (autonomy, technical ability, and a

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desire to modernize) without the negative, overwhelming focus on national defense and patronage policies. The poster children of the developmental state literature were the newly industrializing countries (NICs) of Asia. These states combined active industrial policies, labor repression, and export-led growth programs to yield economic growth rates far surpassing those of other developing and developed countries alike. As Robert Wade (1990: 26–27) sums up: The governed market theory says that the superiority of East Asian economic performance is due in large measure to a combination of: (1) very high levels of productive investment, making for fast transfer of newer techniques into actual production; (2) more investment in certain key industries than would have occurred in the absence of government intervention; and (3) exposure of many industries to international competition, in foreign markets if not at home. At a second level of causation, they are themselves the result, in important degree, of a set of government economic policies . . . [that] enabled the government to guide—or govern— market processes of resource allocation . . . The corporatist and authoritarian political arrangements of East Asia have provided the basis for [this] market guidance.

Peter Evans, among others, further refined this theory by focusing attention on the “Weberian” administrative capacities of these developmental states. In contrast to “predatory” authoritarian states (most notably those in subSaharan Africa), which remained locked in a vicious cycle of patrimonialism and corruption, the developmental states of East Asia, through their administrative prowess, provided the institutional basis for truly competitive markets and thus for economic development (Evans, 1993). The concept of “state autonomy” came into vogue, denoting authoritarian states whose autonomous technocrats successfully molded the market. The growth of these NICs was so impressive and surprising that it effectively undermined the entire dependency school of political science, which held that true economic development in the “periphery” had become impossible due to an international economic system that locked these underdeveloped states into a permanently subordinate relationship to the “core” advanced industrial nations (Cardoso, 1973; Valenzuela and Valenzuela, 1978; Deyo, 1987). However, as David Kang (1995) argues, no one fully understands why the NIC economies grew so rapidly; it appears equally as likely that historical experiences, international economic and security factors, or other phenomena, rather than developmentally oriented state institutions, caused this to occur. Moreover, the 1997 economic crises in East and Southeast Asia called the entire existence of the developmental state into question, as countries that had expanded rapidly during the 1980s saw their currencies plunge in value. As a condition of their bailout, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) imposed harsh, neoorthodox macroeco-

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nomic policies on these countries, which explicitly contradicted their previous state-led development programs. Weighing the Empirical Evidence With so many contradictory theoretical and case-based arguments on each side, scholars have increasingly turned to cross-national quantitative analyses to attempt to resolve the question. However, these studies have often proved inconclusive as well, in great part because of methodological and data inconsistencies. Larry Sirowy and Alex Inkeles (1991) carefully evaluated thirteen cross-national, quantitative studies measuring the effect of democracy on economic development. Three found negative effects of democracy on development, six found no relationship, while four found conditional relationships (e.g., that democracy inhibits growth only among less-developed countries or that the result depends upon the way economic progress is measured). They find the only consistent, somewhat conclusive result to be that civilian regimes were better than military regimes at improving citizens’ overall quality of life and access to social services. In a more recent study of one hundred countries, economist Robert Barro (1994) found that democracy not only does not lead to economic growth but in fact retards it. As he observes, “One way to view the findings is that political freedom emerges as a sort of luxury good . . . Basically, rich countries can afford the reduced rate of economic progress.” Barro concludes that a policy of “exporting democracy” is therefore misguided and should focus instead on promoting the protection of property rights and free markets. Sirowy and Inkeles noted numerous problems with the methodologies of these kinds of studies, however, reflecting the difficulty of capturing and measuring causality for such broad concepts as “democracy” and “development.” Many studies did not control for initial conditions or population growth; labeled a country’s political regime based on a single point in time while looking at economic results over a much longer period; and/or used measures of democracy that “confound democracy with stability.” Sirowy and Inkeles (1991: 149) note in their conclusion that “the evidence . . . would seem to suggest that political democracy does not widely and directly facilitate more rapid economic growth . . . hence, the compatibility perspective finds little support.” Yet neither did they find that democracy has a significantly negative effect on development. Maravall (1994) counters that while the empirical evidence is indeed inconclusive, this is true only because most of these studies were carried out on time periods from the 1950s up to 1980 and so are biased toward the success of authoritarian governments in Latin America, Southern Europe, and East Asia during that time. Indeed, Adam Przeworski and Fernando

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Limongi (1993) found that quantitative studies carried out after 1986 determined that democracies proved decidedly better at economic growth than did authoritarian states and that authoritarian governments were more likely to encounter economic difficulties. These critiques highlight two fundamental problems with much of the quantitative, cross-national research on the relationship between democracy and economic growth. First, causal relationships over time cannot be adequately determined by tightly time-specific, cross-sectional analysis (Leblang, 1997; Rueschemeyer, 1991; O’Donnell, 1979). Second, “economic growth” in particular presents significant limitations as a variable, both because of the problems inherent in using data such as gross domestic product (GDP) as a proxy for “growth” and because of the likely existence of intervening variables between democracy and its potential, measurable effects on growth. In addressing these methodological inadequacies, some scholars have turned to increasingly sophisticated time-series analyses, while others have more narrowly specified the dependent variable to be investigated. The results of three recent time-series analyses, unfortunately, also reach contradictory conclusions, with one finding a positive effect of democracy on growth, one a strongly negative effect, and a third no discernable effect at all. David Leblang (1997), in a temporally sensitive analysis of seventy countries between 1960–1989, found that democracy had a consistent, significantly positive effect on growth, even when controlling for a variety of potentially confounding factors, changing variables, modifying data sources, and altering country sample and time periods. But Mark Gasiorowski (2000), using a different time-sensitive research design that investigated forty-nine underdeveloped countries from 1968–1991, found that democracy caused higher inflation in underdeveloped countries because it produced larger fiscal deficits and higher wage growth, which in turn retarded overall economic growth. Gasiorowski (2000: 345) notes that “my findings . . . provide empirical support for the pessimistic argument that democracy undermines macroeconomic performance because of the adverse effects of unrestrained political participation.” Finally, Ross Burkhart and Michael Lewis-Beck (1994: 903, 907) found in a pooled time-series analysis of 131 states that although “economic development ‘causes’ democracy, democracy does not ‘cause’ economic development . . . [but] just as clearly, we found that democracy, while not apparently a direct cause of economic development, certainly does it no harm.” In short, recent advances in methodological sophistication that take temporal dynamics into account have failed to resolve the issue. Empirical studies attempting to refine the dependent variable, however, have enjoyed marginally more success in pinning down some of democracy’s economic effects. For example, Wayne Sandholtz and William Koetzle (2000) effec-

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tively argue that, in combination with other factors, political democracy is associated with lower levels of corruption. The two specific areas in which the most research has been done touch on the connections between democracy and free trade and democracy and economic inequality.

Democracy and Free Trade Scholars have indeed enjoyed more success in evaluating the seemingly straightforward connection between democracy and free trade. As Charles Lindblom (1977) has observed, except in brief times of war every democracy extant has had a market economic system. According to economic theory, market economies work best when they trade freely with each other, operating according to the principle of comparative advantage. Thus, because of democracy’s close historical relationship to capitalism, democracies should logically be more likely to trade freely than authoritarian states. Moreover, because they protect individual rights (including property rights), democracies should be less likely to nationalize industries and more likely to allow free capital flows. As Daniel Verdier’s 1994 study of trade policies in Britain, France, and the United States from 1860–1990 concludes: Democracies are more likely to pursue free trade, stabilize currencies, and respect the environment than nondemocracies. Of course, democracies will not always do such nice things . . . Nevertheless, democracies are equipped with political institutions capable, now and then, of raising their aim above selfish, short-term targets set by small groups and, instead, taking aim at making the world a bit better and safer for its citizens. (294)

The desire of newly democratic, market-oriented countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to join international economic organizations such as the World Trade Organization, the European Union, and the G-7 appears to support such a conclusion. Philosophically, democratic countries might feel more comfortable trading with each other, establishing a “zone of trade” to parallel the democratic “zone of peace” envisaged by Kant. Or, less idealistically, perhaps the increased economic and political transparency characteristic of democracies makes it easier for democracies to sustain free trading relationships with one another (Remmer, 1998). Alternately, others argue that a country’s political regime makes no difference in the foreign economic policies it pursues. A state will act in its own national interest, which in the case of trade policy is determined by its place in the international system, its factor endowments, international economic regimes, and so forth. What makes sense for an authoritarian state will make sense for a democratic state with similar economic interests.

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Analysts often point to the U.S. trade relationship with China as an example of realist principles in action. The political regimes differ greatly, yet both states trade relatively freely with each other because it is in their mutual interest to do so. Likewise, Japan and the United States, despite their shared democratic regimes, have a much more complicated trading relationship involving mutual accusations of protectionism and other unfair practices. Protectionism among the world’s most powerful democracies deepened the Great Depression of the 1930s, while the authoritarian NICs of the 1980s expanded their economies through a purposeful regime of free trade. Even Mexico’s adoption of NAFTA came before its political opening, because of the pressures of increasing international economic interdependence. Mexico’s other major economic reforms, designed to make itself more attractive to foreign capital (particularly its 1992 constitution amendments creating an independent central bank and allowing for the renting or sale of communal land holdings), also occurred prior to Mexico’s efforts at political democratization (Purcell, 1995). Furthermore, in a 1998 study partially contradicting his earlier work, Verdier argues that even if democracies individually are more likely to be free traders than autocracies, it does not follow that a proliferation of democracy throughout the world would lead to less protectionism on the whole. In fact, he argues, because democratic regimes tend to “empower the same classes of producers,” the spread of democracy could actually lead to a worldwide increase in protectionism if countries specialize on the basis of factor endowments. The empirical evidence demonstrates that democracies may be slightly more likely to be free traders than are authoritarian states. In a “plausibility probe” examining the rates of cooperation among Mercosur countries from 1947 to 1985, Karen Remmer (1998: 45) finds that “democratic pairs of states in the Southern Cone have been several times more likely to enter into economic agreements with one another than with other pairs of states; but these differences all but disappear after controlling for other sources of variation in the propensity to cooperate, including time, joint GDP, and trade interdependence.” She does find, however, that democracy itself (as opposed to joint democracy) increases the likelihood of economic cooperation. William Dixon and Bruce Moon’s (1993: 10) study examining the relationship between similarity in political system and U.S export patterns with seventy-six nations over an eighteen-year period found that “trade is enhanced by familiarity and trust that derive in part from political and social similarity among nations.” However, the study does not directly address barriers to trade, nor does it deal with possible other factors that might be causing this relationship. Similarly, in a regression analysis of politically relevant dyads from 1950 to 1985 using data from the Correlates of War project, John Oneal et al. (1996) found that countries that trade together regularly are less likely to go to war with each other. Moreover,

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“interdependence may be particularly beneficial when combined with democratic institutions. Political and economic freedoms allow individuals to form transnational associations and to influence policy in light of the resulting interests, inhibiting their governments from acting violently toward one another” (O’Neal et al., 1996: 13). While not directly proof of the connection between democracy and free trade, the association remains suggestive of the potential benefits of increasing economic interdependence among democracies fostered by free trade practices.

Democracy and Inequality Scholars and policymakers alike have often taken for granted the assumption that democratic governments, whatever other economic effects they might engender, certainly reduce economic inequality among citizens. After all, in a democratic system elected politicians cannot freely ignore labor movements or the less-well-off sectors of society. Indeed, since contentious political issues in any state usually focus on issues of economic distribution, a democratic state that gives more citizens a voice in the process should naturally result in a more equitable economic atmosphere, especially as leftist political parties emerge (Lenski, 1966; Olson, 1982). Much anecdotal evidence supports this assumption, although it is difficult to separate out the relative effects of democratization and development in reducing inequality. For the high-income democracies, the wealthiest 20 percent of the population controls between 35 percent and 45 percent of the nation’s income, while in well-off authoritarian states (e.g., Malaysia, Jordan) the wealthiest 20 percent often controls over 50 percent of income (World Bank, 1997). Maravall (1994) also notes that, for example, income distribution became more equal after democratization in Spain and Portugal. Others argue, however, that this correlation breaks down in less-welloff democracies. In particular, in Latin America it is not at all uncommon for the top 20 percent to control over 60 percent of the nation’s income (e.g., Chile, Brazil, Panama, Guatemala), with correspondingly high Gini indexes. Moreover, some of the lowest Gini indexes in the world belong to the former communist states in Eastern Europe and Eurasia (World Bank, 1997). Why would this be the case? Charles Beitz (1982) points out that in democracies, those best able to lobby and spend are the best protected from economic hardship, so authoritarian regimes immune to such distributional pressures may be better able to help the poor. This echoes Lindblom (1977), who strongly states that democracies inevitably privilege wealthy business interests over average citizens because democratic politicians need the support and cooperation of business in order to govern effectively.

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Similarly, Kenneth Bollen and Robert Jackman (1985) argue that lowincome citizens in democracies do not necessarily demand redistribution and that often inequality is not perceived as being unjust. This is particularly the case in the United States, where the prevailing political culture insists that individuals bear sole responsibility for their economic fates, both good and bad. In countries undergoing dual transitions in the 1980s and 1990s, income inequality has, in fact, become directly associated with democracy because these states tend to embark on neoorthodox stabilization programs (Nelson, 1994). The deleterious effects of democratization combined with market reforms for income equality have been most obvious in postcommunist societies. Although income inequality remains relatively low in most of these countries compared to the rest of the world (with the exception of Russia), there is no question that it has risen precipitously since the collapse of communism. While the transition has made many wealthy, it has also hit a number of groups hard, particularly the elderly, women, and children. It has also undermined unions, which have been discredited in most postcommunist countries as stooges of the old regime. As Joan Nelson (1994) notes, “market-oriented reforms quite clearly reduce the political power of labor unions . . . union membership has dropped in most dualtransition nations, most dramatically in post-communist countries.” Therefore, democracy, especially in situations of dual transition or lessthan-high levels of economic development, seems less powerful at reducing economic inequality than one might have expected. The empirical evidence confirms these contradictory theories and anecdotes. Sirowy and Inkeles (1991) looked at twelve studies examining democracy’s effects on inequality as measured by income distribution, all completed before 1989. Seven found some support for the thesis that democracy reduces inequality, while five found either no relationship or an inverse relationship. Moreover, some studies finding a correlation noted that it was only effective for certain kinds of countries (e.g., varying by income level or by the length of time a country had been democratic). In three other studies using Morris Morris’s (1979) physical quality of life index, Sirowy and Inkeles note that the studies again have conflicting results, with one finding no correlation, another finding a correlation only for advanced democracies, and the last finding a strongly positive correlation. But in yet another study, Maravall (1994: 27) finds that, in a regression analysis of approximately ninety countries, “as the index of democracy goes up, the level of welfare effort and total expenditures on health care and education also rise.” This does not, of course, mean that income inequality would be reduced, merely that democratic countries seem to put more effort into providing a safety net for the least well-off. Unlike the reasonably well-demonstrated connection between democ-

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racy and free trade, therefore, studies on democracy and income inequality do not yield results robust enough on which to base public policy. While attempts to further specify the dependent variable will undoubtedly lead to more satisfying conclusions in the future, at present the empirical research testing causal connections between democracy and a variety of discrete economic developments remains in the early stages.

Democracy and Stabilization The question of whether democracies or dictatorships are better at carrying out short-term economic stabilization, liberalization, and privatization policies has been central to the study of political economy in the 1980s and 1990s, as more and more countries in economic crisis have swallowed the IMF’s “bitter pill” and imposed economic austerity measures on their citizens. Putting aside the larger question of whether these neoorthodox strategies are the most fair and effective means of bringing about long-term economic development, two specific questions come to mind: which kinds of regimes are more likely to decide to take this medicine, and which are more likely to succeed in implementing the measures when they do so? Most economists and a significant number of political scientists argue that authoritarian states (and in particular developmental states) have a natural advantage in this area. According to this viewpoint, democracies rarely choose to adopt such stabilization policies because they often immediately harm many influential, cohesive interest groups (such as industrialists and unions), while rewarding dispersed, powerless groups that may not even realize the benefits the policy is bestowing on them (such as a nascent middle class). Moreover, sustaining such reforms in the medium term is also difficult for democracies because growth does not immediately follow stabilization, while the kinds of continuing reform necessary for stabilization to take hold—such as financial sector reform, privatization, restructuring of social services and labor markets, and so on—also hit particular interest groups very hard (Nelson, 1994). Therefore, an authoritarian regime with a team of insulated, educated technocrats has a better chance of pushing through tough reforms in the face of negative public opinion. Other studies have shown, though, that democracies may not be at such a disadvantage. For example, Remmer (1991: 482) found that: According to a 1986 study of the implementation of IMF stabilization programs in Latin America, democratic regimes have been no less likely than authoritarian ones to introduce austerity programs, no more likely to break down in response to their political costs, and no less successful in program implementation . . . the puzzle of the 1980s has not been the fragility of liberal democracy but its surprising vitality in the face of overwhelming economic constraints.

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Barbara Geddes (1993) also notes that, contrary to popular belief, authoritarian states in Latin America have amassed extremely poor records in carrying out successful structural adjustment programs. In fact, it may be that democracies, because they enjoy greater legitimacy, are better able to ask citizens to undergo economic hardship during extreme reform processes (Maravall, 1994). Nelson (1994) agrees in part with this point, noting that democracies do tend to be better at carrying out stabilization regimes when the country faces an especially deep economic crisis, because the greater legitimacy of a democratic government gives it the power to act when a public consensus on the need for reform has emerged. The relative ability of democracies to introduce and implement stabilization programs may also have much to do with the initial conditions in the country. Maravall (1994) points out that the presence of an effective, professional bureaucracy in democratizing countries like Hungary, Spain, and Poland gave them an advantage in this realm, as opposed to democratizing countries such as Bulgaria or Romania. The most contentious aspect of the democratization-stabilization argument has been over the issue of sequencing. Specifically, is an authoritarian state with a controlled economy more likely to emerge as a free-market democracy if it begins its transformation with economic reform, political reform, or both simultaneously (i.e., a dual transition)? The economy-first view holds that democratization leads to increased pressures for public spending on social welfare needs and often results in undesirable populist policies. According to Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman (1992), most states that begin their transitions with political reform cannot carry out risky economic reforms until the third or fourth electoral cycle, and even then economic reform is difficult without a strong two-party system to support it. When beginning economic reforms, these states are at a high risk for instability, loss of legitimacy, and entrance into potentially destructive reform/retrenchment cycles. States that begin with political reform also find it harder to manage the pace of change and, because of this, have a counterproductive incentive to centralize power (Pei, 1996). Because authoritarian regimes are not accountable to the public, so the story goes, they are better able to implement difficult economic adjustment programs. Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter (1986) support this by observing that successful transitions to democracy rarely occur along with rapid economic change. Advocates of leading with economic reform typically refer to the differences in the reform paths of China and Russia to make their point. On the face of it, China’s decision to begin its reforms in the economic sphere seems to have been wise. While China has experienced rapid economic growth, Russia’s reform process, which began in the political sphere but grew to encompass political and economic factors, remains in grave danger. In fact, according to Susan Purcell (1995), Mexican President Carlos

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Salinas chose to accelerate economic reforms before opening the political system further, partly because he had been influenced by the seeming failure of the reverse strategy in the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev. This comparison, along with studies of countries such as Chile, South Korea, and Turkey, naturally led some scholars to conclude that authoritarian states had more successful political and economic outcomes in the long run if they began their reform efforts in the economic sphere. Yet strong theoretical and historical arguments exist for privileging democratization over economic reform—or at least for allowing the two processes to progress simultaneously. Both, after all, expand the scope for individual choice and entail open competition for power, be it political or economic. Nancy Bermeo (1997), for one, finds that neither moderation in the economic reform process nor deafness to labor’s economic demands are necessary for successful democratic transitions to occur. Larry Diamond (1995) makes the case even more strongly. He first debunks several fallacious assumptions in the argument that authoritarian states are more likely to successfully carry out market reforms; it assumes that authoritarian states have the legitimacy and bureaucratic coherence to do so, that authoritarian states are immune from political pressures, that authoritarian leaders will be likely to support economic liberalization policies, and that powerful popular interest groups will inevitably oppose economic liberalization. While such conditions held in many East Asian nations, these states remain the exception rather than the rule. Moreover, as Diamond points out (1995a: 124), “if one accepts that the cases of South Korea and Taiwan . . . do not qualify as instances of economic liberalization comparable in scope and urgency to the crisis-ridden economies today, then the only case of successful economic liberalization under authoritarian rule is Chile.” In general, according to Diamond, democratization and marketization have proven to be compatible processes. In India, the archetypical example of political liberalization preceding economic opening, the controlled economic environment arguably gave democracy time to become institutionalized. Only after this had occurred could ethnically and religiously divided, overpopulated India manage to introduce and sustain broader economic freedoms and the rising inequality that accompanied them. Others argue that particular kinds of democratic governments may have an advantage in implementing neoorthodox economic reforms. Nelson (1994) points to two such conditions: when the country has had previous experience with democracy and is redemocratizing, and when political actors from the old regime have been excluded and discredited. In support of this, she notes that the first elected governments in Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil were not able to carry out stabilization policies, while the second-round governments in Bolivia and Argentina carried out difficult stabilization programs followed by structural reforms; further, the break with

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old elites in Latin America was typically much less radical than in postcommunist countries, many of which thoroughly removed old elite structures from power. In addition, much may depend on the kind of stabilization strategy the state chooses to adopt. True neoorthodoxy (which also goes under the name “shock therapy”) requires rapid price and trade liberalization, monetary and fiscal stabilization, and privatization. Przeworski (1991), among others, suggests that the only way to implement such a policy in a democracy is to introduce it rapidly, without warning—in other words, undemocratically. He perceives this to be a worthwhile compromise, because in his view even if public pressure forces leaders to slow the reforms later, they will still accomplish more than will gradual reform efforts. In fact, in order to carry out such a radical program, guaranteed to cause significant and immediate negative economic effects on a large segment of the population, states almost always do find it necessary to resort to at least semiauthoritarian measures such as emergency presidential powers, rule by decree, or protected economic “change teams.” Such a strategy may continue to undermine democracy in the medium and long term as well, however, as the executive grows accustomed to its new powers and as bypassed democratic institutions lose legitimacy. Russia’s experience provides a case in point. Although the Supreme Soviet granted Boris Yeltsin emergency decree powers in late 1991 in order for him to pursue economic reforms, Yeltsin’s continued attempts to shove his radical economic programs down the throat of an increasingly recalcitrant Supreme Soviet eventually led to his bloody disbanding of that elected institution in October 1993. Yeltsin then ignored the successor legislature, the Duma, as well, and persisted in trying to run Russia by decree. In contrast, gradual (but sincere) economic reform efforts may not be so harmful to democracy. If economic changes are introduced slightly more slowly, with more public debate and participation, democratic institutions may actually have a better chance of retaining (and even increasing) their legitimacy during the reform process. Economy-first arguments also assume that once a country has made a market transition, democratic reforms will inevitably follow. While this is often the case, the cause-and-effect process may not be that straightforward. At any rate, it is certainly true that democracy does not immediately follow on the heels of economic stabilization. Again, the Russia/China dichotomy presents a good example. Although scholars who favor the Chinese-style sequencing of reforms seem to assume that China’s democratic future is foreordained (Pei, 1996; Zhang, 1993), there are no guarantees that the growth of the market will smooth the way for China’s political transition from a one-party dictatorship. Many Chinese and Western scholars alike warn of exactly the opposite: that the decline in power of the

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Chinese central government may lead to disintegration of center-regional ties and possibly an authoritarian backlash. Both Russia and China face difficult political transitions without the benefit of previous sustained experiences with democracy. It is difficult to tell at this stage which country (if either) is more likely to emerge with a free-market democracy. To a certain extent, the heated debate over sequencing economic and political reforms represents a conceit on the part of scholars and policymakers that such a decision is theirs to make. Most states have little choice in the road they take. Gorbachev, for example, attempted to begin the Soviet Union’s reforms with economic change, only to be stifled by entrenched bureaucratic and industrial interests. Without glasnost, without political reform, little economic change could have occurred. In contrast, while a significant elite constituency existed for economic reform in China, fundamental political reform remains stalled. Whether Russia’s reform sequence will prove to be more problematic than China’s in the end remains open to question, but the fact that neither country could have carried out its reforms in the opposite order seems clear. Moreover, given the myriad differences in the initial, prereform economic conditions in Russia and China, it is methodologically problematic to argue that authoritarianism represented the key causal factor allowing China to carry out economic reforms more successfully than Russia. To name just one important distinction, China could begin its transformation with the large and underdeveloped agricultural sphere, while Russia did not have this option because its agricultural sector was much smaller and more closely tied to industry. Moreover, China was able to rely on a broad network of overseas Chinese eager to invest in the country, and it began its transformation in a time of relative economic stability. Russia, in contrast, had entered a severe depression by the late 1980s and could tap no ready sources of foreign capital to ease its transformation. For these reasons and others, it makes far more sense to compare the relative success and failure of democratization and stabilization policies across postcommunist countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, where the initial conditions were more similar. In fact, when we make this comparison, a surprising empirical finding emerges—those postcommunist countries that democratized the furthest have also enjoyed the greatest success in both economic stabilization and economic growth. In the postcommunist world, it appears, all good things do go together. Why is this? Scholars have advanced a number of explanations, ranging from the influence of the international environment to initial conditions (e.g., Bunce 1999, 2000). For example, in Latin America and Southern Europe carrying out democratization and economic reforms together would have simultaneously reduced both the political and economic power of authoritarian elites and thus led to elite opposition strong

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enough to quell any attempts at change. In postcommunist states, however, the communist-era political elite substantially benefited from economic liberalization programs, inasmuch as this elite controlled the resources and connections necessary to acquire money and property under the new regime. Therefore, from the point of view of communist-era elites, economic liberalization actually made political democratization easier to swallow. Alternately, Janos Kornai has stated that if democratization and marketization do not proceed simultaneously in postcommunist countries, the bureaucratic monopolies will not be broken and a “racket” economy will develop (Kornai, 1989). Guiseppe DiPalma (1991) agreed, arguing that dual transitions can feed off each other—a state chooses to begin a democratic transition, democracy demands the creation of a market, and the growing market supports democratic individualist values. In Hungary, for example, David Bartlett (1997) finds that emerging democratic institutions aided the market transformation process by protecting the state from being overwhelmed by “special interests” and losers of the economic reform process. In other words, it prevented the old guard, unpopular in the electoral arena, from sabotaging the moves toward marketization. Furthermore, as Steven Fish (1998) demonstrates through a crossnational quantitative analysis, the causal connection in postcommunist states goes primarily from democracy (specifically, the outcome of the first elections) to stabilization and development and not the other way around. Countries able to make a strong break from the past by freely electing democratic opposition leaders in their first competitive elections enjoyed a honeymoon period in which citizens tolerated painful economic reform programs. This relationship between democratization and stabilization in postcommunist states does not appear to be strictly linear, however. As Joel Hellman (1998) shows, postcommunist states like Russia that underwent only partial democratization left the state open to capture by newly empowered economic interest groups, thus forestalling additional political and economic reforms. While the postcommunist transformations are still in their early stages, the experiences of these countries with democratization, economic liberalization, and economic growth, properly compared, promise to add significantly to our understanding of the relationship between political openness and economic progress.

Conclusion For the most part, this analysis of the posited causal connections between democracy and economic development remains, unfortunately, inconclusive. An investigation of the theoretical and empirical literature revealed no agreement on whether there is a causal relationship between democracy and

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economic growth, inequality, or stabilization. The only two relationships that stand up to scholarly scrutiny to this point are those between democracy and free trade, and those between democracy and economic reform in postcommunist states. For scholars, this review raises two important considerations for further research on democracy and development. First, these contradictory results suggest that it may be necessary to combine quantitative and qualitative approaches in individual studies in order to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between democracy and development (Rueschemeyer, 1991). Increasingly careful cross-temporal and cross-national quantitative analysis can further illuminate the potential connections between democracy and development, while case study research can allow us both to understand the deeper processes and policies that make these relationships possible and to identify and investigate those cases in which common trends fail to materialize. Second, in order to reach more reliable conclusions, we should consider narrowing our areas of inquiry. No scholarly consensus exists on what “democracy” is or how it can be broadly promoted (see, e.g., Collier and Levitsky, 1997; O’Donnell, 1996; Schmitter and Karl, 1991). According to most definitions, Brazil, Russia, and the United States are all democracies, yet their political systems function in extremely diverse ways. As Przeworski and Limongi (1993) put it, “our guess is that political institutions do matter for growth, but thinking in terms of regimes does not seem to capture the relevant differences.” Similarly, “economic development” can be defined in myriad ways and proves difficult to measure. Therefore, the variables “democracy” and “development” should be unpacked to get at the true causal mechanisms driving economic successes or failures. As theories develop and contradictory cases appear, these variables should continue to be supplemented—and perhaps replaced—by examinations of mid-range institutional variables such as democratic party systems, electoral systems, methods of state intervention in the economy, initial institutional conditions, and the autonomy and capacity of state bureaucracies. Such an approach also calls for a closer examination of “institutions of horizontal accountability” such as independent central banks, judiciaries, electoral commissions, and anticorruption agencies, which check the ability of democratically elected politicians to manipulate their countries’ economic and legal systems (O’Donnell, 1996). In addition, as the contradictory experiences of Latin America and Eastern Europe demonstrate, we should be prepared to narrow our inquiries by region when circumstances indicate that differing internal and external conditions across regions may dramatically affect our results. While achieving generalizable theoretical results across regions is desirable, it may not always be possible.

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Politically, this conclusion indicates that, at least for the time being, democracy promotion policies predicated on the assumption that democracy causes economic development will often rest on shaky theoretical and empirical grounds. At best, the evidence suggests that successful democracy promotion policies will lead to greater adherence to free trade policies, as well as successful economic reform in postcommunist states. The overarching lesson is that northern industrialized countries should not promote democracy in developing countries because democratization will lead to “something else,” but because northern policymakers and their peoples believe that democratic freedoms are good in and of themselves. Such a policy would not only be more honest but would be more likely to produce the intended results.

PART 2

THE ROLE OF STATE ACTORS

4 Promoting a Special Brand of Democracy: Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden Liisa Laakso ordic democracy, inclusive of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden,1 is traditionally conceptualized within the framework of the welfare state, without any sharp distinction between economic, social, and cultural rights on the one hand, and civil and political rights on the other. To a large extent, the Nordics have been eager to present their countries as models for internal development (Allardt et al., 1981: 1). The historical development of Nordic democracies from traditionally unequal societies has prompted Nordics to regard democracy as a good in itself. As a result, most Nordics are ready to pay for their democracies through extensive taxation systems in which tax rates are generally higher than those in other northern industrialized democracies. Even if sometimes inefficient, democracy is regarded as better than a strong but undemocratic government. The primary purpose of this chapter is to clarify the involvement of the Nordic countries in the promotion of their special brand of democracy. Democracy promotion, reflective of Nordic values, is considered to be an important national interest. It is tied to Nordic national identities and the way in which these countries define themselves. Some observers have even argued that small industrialized democracies such as the Nordic countries are more likely to associate their interests with democratic and peaceful development in the developing world (Stokke, 1989: 275). However, this chapter demonstrates that economic, ideological, and security interests of the Nordic countries sometimes run counter to, and may even override, their long-term interest in democracy promotion.

N

Goals and Normative Assumptions Nordic democracy, although not without its own innovations—such as the institution of the ombudsman, a government official appointed to receive 55

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and investigate complaints against abuses or capricious acts of public officials—is based on models and ideologies that have been imported from the outside. Following the liberal tradition of parliamentary government, the Nordic concept of democracy embraces the concepts of freedom of opinion and association, transparency of public decisionmaking, and a strongly institutionalized rechtstaat (rule of law) with an independent judiciary. From the socialist tradition, the Nordic concept of democracy embraces the necessity of shared responsibility for providing equal opportunity and overcoming socioeconomic inequality. Although strategies for safeguarding independence have varied according to specific histories and geopolitical constellations, these relatively small northern industrialized democracies consider national sovereignty and self-reliance among the core values of their democratic ethos. A common feature of all Nordic countries has been their active internationalist role and their tendency to regard peaceful international development as critical for ensuring the security of small nations throughout the world. The Nordic governments interact with countries of very different political and social systems through active involvement in international organizations and the pursuit of mutually beneficial economic relations (i.e., trade and investments) (Rudebeck, 1982: 155). Only seldom, as in the cases of United Nations–sponsored policies against the apartheid system in South Africa (1949–1994) or Iraq’s illegal invasion of Kuwait in 1990, have the Nordic governments agreed to adopt economic sanctions to force repressive governments to undertake political reforms. When trade and investment agreements are negotiated with the developing world, issues of human rights and democratization are often formally included in the agenda but are substantially marginalized. Trade and investment, according to Nordic policymakers, should be governed by economic self-interest rather than ideological values, and in any case they are not typically viewed as useful tools for exporting Nordic democracy. This is particularly striking as concerns the Nordic policy (especially in the cases of Finland and Sweden) of selling arms to the developing world, which is often rationalized in terms of the strategic necessity of maintaining the Nordic defense industry. The Nordic reluctance to tie trade to democracy promotion, nonetheless, is best explained by their liberal ideology and domestic politics, where employment promotion is so essential. The promotion of widely shared socioeconomic development through a generous foreign aid program serves as an important component of Nordic democracy promotion. This commitment is derivative of strong Nordic ideological support for the global decolonization process (Andrén, 1981: 693). A commonsensical recognition of their limited individual economic capacities has ensured that, from the beginning, the Nordic countries have sought to coordinate foreign aid policies. Finland, for example, launched its first

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bilateral development cooperation project in Tanzania in 1962 through the joint Nordic Tanganyika project. This and other joint projects, created within the framework of the Nordic Council, have always implicitly sought to export Nordic democracy to other countries and areas (Pohjoismaiden neuvosto, 1988: 126). In 1989 a joint agreement in Isafjördur, Iceland, explicitly declared for the first time that democracy promotion was one of the primary goals of Nordic development cooperation (see Toma sˇevski, 1991: 32, 33; DANIDA, 1993c: 30). With the exception of Finland, the Nordic countries lead the northern industrialized democracies in providing foreign aid, often exceeding the United Nations target of giving at least .7 percent of gross national product (GNP). Whereas the Nordic countries as a whole gave .8 percent during the 1990s, the average for the other northern industrialized democracies was less than .3 percent (Ulkoasiainministeriö, 1995: 8; Michel, l997). Several aspects of Nordic development aid stand out. At the ideological level, multilateral assistance, especially when it is channeled through United Nations organizations, is traditionally seen by the Nordics as the most democratic form of aid. As a result, the Nordic countries are among the major donors to these organizations, including providing nearly 30 percent of all contributions to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (DANIDA, 1995: 37). Nordic aid has also favored the poorest countries, especially those intent on overcoming socioeconomic inequality. In the case of Tanzania, the largest recipient of Nordic aid, President Julius Nyerere’s Ujamaa (brotherhood) ideology, with its focus on creating a more equal and just society in one of Africa’s poorest countries, clearly reflected Nordic values. Third, although each Nordic country has had partners in all three continents of the developing world, the bulk of their aid has been concentrated in Southern Africa. As demonstrated in a study on the case of Sweden, this reflects the tendency of middle powers to maximize the effectiveness of their limited resources (see Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor, 1998). Finally, as the total amount of aid increased during the 1980s and became more important for Nordic economies, the ratio of bilateral versus multilateral aid gradually has shifted in favor of bilateral aid. Although the Nordics recognized, at least implicitly, the importance of civil and political rights in the development process, their development projects typically concentrated on the practical socioeconomic concerns of economic growth, production, infrastructure, health care, and education. A significant exception was humanitarian aid to national liberation movements and victims of repression in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Southern Africa. This aid typically included support for refugees and political prisoners as well as legal and trade union education. Toward the end of the Cold War, a more comprehensive policy for civil and political rights became both necessary and possible. Political repres-

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sion as well as discontent with the existing development efforts in the developing world were receiving more attention in the media and among NGOs. The implementation of conditionality in economic policies could easily be extended to the political field as well (Stokke, 1995). Besides, one can note that during the 1960s and 1970s requirements of democracy in the developing world have appeared incoherent since democracy was not required in many countries of Southern and Eastern Europe, with which Nordics had significant economic and cultural cooperation, including development aid to Spain and Portugal through the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). The process of democratization in Europe changed this situation. Democracy as a goal of development cooperation was gradually extended to cover political reforms in the developing world (Andreassen, 1991: 76). Democracy was no longer solely approached through a focus on social and economic inequality. An increasing focus on the “political” premise of democratization instead initially included human rights and political participation concerns, followed by recognition of the importance of introducing multiparty political systems. Moreover, my interviews have demonstrated that, by paying attention to “sensitive” political questions in the recipient countries, the development agencies inside the Nordic ministries of foreign affairs attempted to raise their status vis-à-vis other sectors of foreign policy.

Emergence of the Political Dimension Norway was the first Nordic country to introduce an explicit human rights policy into its development programs. In its first governmental report clarifying Norwegian policy (1977), the protection of human rights was linked to development aid in general terms by emphasizing the economic, social, and cultural aspects of those rights. After an intense debate over aid to Sri Lanka, a change occurred in 1984 when the government stated that the promotion of human rights would be one of the principal goals of Norwegian development assistance. Human rights violations that were persistent, gross, and/or systematic, without any government attempt to end the abuses or to identify and prosecute the violators, were listed as reasons for the modification, reduction, or cessation of Norwegian aid. Modification included the rechanneling of aid from governmental to nongovernmental bodies, especially nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working for the protection of human rights (Eide, 1986: 190, 191; Kjekhus, 1989: 25–30). In Denmark, debate over development aid during the 1970s largely concentrated on the quantity of aid, as the official goal of the government was to achieve an aid level of 1 percent of GNP. Qualitative criteria entered the picture during the 1980s, initially focusing on environmental issues and

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the equality of women. After 1987 the promotion of human rights became one of the main objectives of Danish development cooperation (DANIDA, 1988: 2, 3; Rehof, 1989: 7). A strategic planning paper of the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) published in 1988 nonetheless included no proposals in the area of human rights, and its first booklet on the topic was not published until 1993 (DANIDA, 1993c; see also KrabJohansen, 1995). The Danish parliament attempted to play a more assertive role in 1989 by underscoring that the recipients of foreign aid needed to demonstrate “the prospect of achieving effective progress in furthering respect for human rights and promoting democracy” (Elklit, 1994; DANIDA, 1993c: 7). In the case of India, for example, the publication of a report dealing with human rights violations prompted an intense foreign aid debate. This, however, did not lead to the termination of Danish development cooperation with India. Sweden’s human rights policy initially followed the principle of “assist rather than abandon,” with the governing Social Democratic Party refusing to accede to domestic demands to terminate foreign assistance in cases of human rights violations (Axell, 1989; Danelius, 1988). This was particularly true when recipient countries established progressive socialist or marxist governments. In countries governed by conservative authoritarian dictatorships, however, the Swedish government financed numerous human rights projects through a special budgetary category, “Democracy and Human Rights.” In Chile, Guatemala, El Salvador, and South Africa, for example, Sweden funded numerous projects administered by democratic movements and local organizations. In many cases this took place under difficult circumstances, in secret, and without normal accounting procedures ( Toma sˇ evski, 1989). It was not until 1993, however, that the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) presented a clearly defined strategy for democracy and human rights assistance (SIDA, 1993a). Under this new policy, SIDA has not only increased its own direct involvement in human rights projects but has required at least 20 percent financing by local organizations and closer cooperation with target governments. Finland represents a somewhat deviant case among the Nordic countries. Although the possibility of withholding aid on the basis of human rights violations was mentioned in a report of the Finnish Development Cooperation Committee as early as 1978, Finland proceeded with utmost caution during the Cold War due to its official policy of neutrality (often referred to by critics as “Finlandization”). Even in the Cold War’s aftermath, however, Finland remained a hesitant actor in the promotion of human rights. “Aspects of human rights and democracy or our views thereon must not be used as a criterion for reward or punishment when we decide on our development cooperation,” explained Minister of Foreign Affairs Pertti Paasio in 1990. “We should rather approach the problem so as

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to support democratic developments and avoid the supporting of contrary trends” (FINNIDA, 1991: 90). Only very recently has such caution given way to a more activist human rights policy. This activism is primarily due to Finland’s membership in the European Union since 1995, which maintains an activist human rights policy; the Maastricht Treaty stipulates the inclusion of a human rights clause in all treaties between the EU and a third country. In a report on development cooperation presented to the government in 1996, for example, Mr. Paasio called for human rights initiatives in which Finland’s threat to withdraw or suspend development aid can be used as a tool (1996: 27). The Nordics perceive popular participation in democratic processes both as a goal in itself and as a means to achieve other goals of development. The right of individuals to participate in the planning of measures that affect their life situations is deemed important for the successful pursuit of sustainable development (NORAD, 1992: 11). Legal and democratic institutions, access to and responsibility in public administration, the existence of independent media, and the development of human resources are factors that are understood to facilitate this participation. A particularly important target group is women. A strategy of assistance for women in development (WID) was adopted by the Nordics during the 1980s. The ultimate objective has been to empower women in development and to achieve women’s political and legal equality. A good example is assistance given to a project, Women and Law in Southern Africa, which launched a regional network of researchers and lawyers working on the legal status of women. Indeed, the Nordics have sought to make all assistance accord to the WID theme. As a result, gender analysis is mandated in every development project or program at the earliest possible point. This is seen as beneficial not only in terms of gender equality but also in enhancing the political participation of women in non-Western societies. The importance of promoting multiparty politics in the developing world was broached in 1990 when the Nordic ministers for development cooperation met in Molde, Norway, and issued a formal Nordic stance on democracy promotion (the Molde Declaration). It referred to free elections and to the questioning of single-party systems, especially in Africa (DANIDA, 1993c: 30). Even more explicitly, the Danish minister for foreign affairs, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, stated that same year that a multiparty system was inherent in the concept of democracy. According to him, the idea that developing countries should be able to elaborate new variants of democracy within a single-party system could no longer be defended (DANIDA, 1990: 2). This statement was clearly referring to the earlier Nordic approach toward socialist and marxist regimes, which advocated the idea of participatory democracy via mass parties in a single-party setting rather than the Western concept of representative democracy in a multiparty

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setting. Indeed, by 1992 the Nordic ministers regarded corruption and the abuse of government power as problems that could not be prevented without adequate political reforms, most notably the replacement of singleparty with multiparty political systems (DANIDA, 1993c: 31, 32).

Strategies and Instruments The evolving focus of Nordic aid policy on the political dimensions of democracy promotion can be distinguished in terms of strategies and instruments. Indirect means, most notably extending and withdrawing foreign aid, play a major role in the area of human rights, whereas more direct means, most notably direct funding for legal assistance, legal education, and local organizations, are prevalent in the promotion of multiparty systems and popular participation. In the case of Denmark, for example, a flexible channel of delivery has been the implementation of “Human Rights Packages” involving Danish NGOs and local human rights organizations in recipient countries (DANIDA, 1991: 85). A general trend toward the use of more direct means in democracy promotion has called into question the classic Nordic norm of noninterference in the internal affairs of a recipient country. There are no cases in which Nordic aid has been withdrawn if the recipient country has only failed to introduce a multiparty political system. Nordic aid nonetheless has been used in such a way as to affect the nature of the transition process. Sweden and Norway refused to provide funds when, immediately preceding the holding of multiparty elections in 1991, the Zambian government sought to delay price increases on stable foodstuffs demanded by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The price subsidy clearly would have helped Zambia’s incumbent president, Kenneth Kaunda, to stay in power. Similarly, irregularities in the first multiparty elections in Zanzibar in 1995 were punished by the Nordic donors. New projects were not considered, while ongoing and often successful projects were allowed to end. Often the pressure to introduce political reforms has been associated with the worsening human rights performance of the recipient country. This occurred in the case of Kenya, where pressure was exerted within the framework of the “Paris Club” of the major donors from the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Uganda, to the contrary, has been able to maintain its unique “nonparty” system without the threat of losing its Nordic development aid. Uganda’s successful implementation of economic reforms instead has been rewarded by the granting of debt relief. The implementation of political conditionality has been inconsistent

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and certainly is not a prominent feature of Nordic aid. Prior to the 1990s the ideological commitment of the recipient regime to promote a more just, egalitarian society was often enough to downplay that regime’s actual performance or even any systematic attempts to monitor that performance. More recently it has not always been clear how to differentiate between technical and political reductions of aid. The fact that there are no clear guidelines for the implementation of political conditionality in the development strategies of the Nordics seems to be a conscious choice. For example, SIDA’s strategy explicitly states that political conditionality should be considered on a case-by-case basis (SIDA, 1993a: 5). Moreover, it is difficult to demonstrate that the introduction of a multiparty system in a recipient country has been rewarded by the allocation of extra funds. To the contrary, the evidence suggests that there is no such policy. When Madagascar made the transition to multiparty rule, Norway closed the local office of the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD). Indeed, the Nordic tendency has been to support the actual preparation and conduct of multiparty elections and the introduction of parliamentarianism, including providing expertise and funding to assist in drafting new constitutions. Popular participation, typically promoted through direct means, is stated by the Nordics to be a goal in all development programs. This goal is considered to be the most demanding of aid objectives. Especially demanding is the assessment, modification, or termination of aid that diminishes people’s ability to participate in making decisions that affect their lives. The question is whether projects that have been relatively successful on grounds of economic efficiency, environmental impact, or poverty reduction should be terminated on the basis of their lack of emphasis on popular participation in democratic processes. However, increased attention is being paid to identifying and implementing development projects that will reduce dependency on the donors while strengthening and building up administrative capacities in the recipient countries, particularly at the local level. If successful, this could mean that Nordic aid would be given a new orientation, in which the substance rather than the mere forms of participation in democratic processes is taken into consideration. Although the role of political conditionalities is increasingly being discussed in the evaluation reports of Nordic development projects, the longterm, macrolevel effects of Nordic development cooperation upon popular power, participation, and human rights have not been systematically analyzed. It was not until autumn 1997 that the Nordic governments agreed to promote a joint effort in this field. Five years later it is still impossible to say how the evaluation will proceed. The Nordics have yet to define the appropriate tools by which to evaluate this cooperation. Equally important, there is no agreement about how best to classify different types of democracy and human rights support, as well as the criteria used in their evaluation.

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Since Nordic attempts to promote democratization relate to other goals of their development cooperation in complex and sometimes unexpected ways, a form of quality control has also become necessary. In Norway this task has been given to a special advisory group on women, the environment, sociocultural affairs, democracy, and human rights that has the task of ensuring these sectoral issues are taken into account in development activities for which NORAD is responsible (NORAD, 1994: 11). In practice, the introduction of advisers or experts on democracy and human rights and the systemic supervision of these issues has been a more effective mechanism. Since January 1992 NORAD has had a special adviser monitoring government strategy on assistance for democracy promotion. In spite of the pressure to reduce the size of its staff, the Finnish ministry for foreign affairs in 1995 introduced a special post for democratization and human rights issues in the Department for International Development Cooperation and another for human rights in the Department for Political Affairs. Following the practice of the other Nordic countries, Finnish ambassadors were also given a special responsibility to report on the human rights situation in the countries to which they were accredited. An important element in the effective monitoring of the promotion of human rights and democracy is access to reliable and independent information of the situation in recipient countries. Since 1985 an annual report has been published on human rights situations in the recipients of Nordic development aid. The first report, produced by Norwegian researchers and supported by the Norwegian government, initially focused only on Norwegian partners. The project subsequently became known as the Nordic Yearbook on Human Rights in Developing Countries, and later as the Yearbook on Human Rights in Developing Countries and the Yearbook on Human Rights in Development. The project has included research institutes from Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. The Nordic-led yearbook on human rights differs from other similar efforts in a number of respects. Contrary to the U.S. model in which the annual State Department country reports published by Congress are required by law, the Nordic model is based on a contract between the governments and research institutes, thereby providing a measure of objectivity and distance from the actual policymaking process. Country reports are written by independent researchers that gather and analyze information. Second, the country reports focus on both human rights violations and positive developments. The human rights performance of each country is not systematically compared to that of other countries but rather evaluated on its own merits, including an analysis of economic, social, and cultural rights (as opposed to the civil and political rights focus of the U.S. State Department). Finally, the yearbook attempts to pay equal attention to viola-

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tions committed by both governmental and nongovernmental forces (Andreassen, 1991: 76, 77; Skogly, 1990). In 1995 the Nordics were among fourteen countries that founded the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) in Stockholm. The main objective of the institute—the consolidation of new democracies—is pursued by bringing together academic, governmental, and nongovernmental actors. Its purpose is not to compete with other institutes but rather to perform a complementary and coordinating role. For example, it does not send observer teams to oversee elections but has organized seminars for organizations working in this field to collect, analyze, and disseminate lessons related to democracy promotion (see International IDEA, 1997). Nordic support for research and analysis on issues related to democracy promotion has also been provided to scholars and research institutes in the developing world. An early example was Swedish support for social science research in Latin America on the topic of political repression (Kihlberg, 1987: 21). The Nordics have supported the Southern Africa Political Economy Series (SAPES) since its beginning in 1987. SAPES’s main objective is to promote and nurture social science research in Southern Africa. It publishes a monthly research journal, the Southern Africa Political and Economic Monthly (SAPEM), as well as monographs and occasional papers. SAPES has provided one of the most lively forums for critical and independent discussion on government policies in Southern Africa, especially in Zimbabwe, where SAPES’s headquarters is located (Sawyerr and Hyden, 1993).

Employing the “Carrot” and the “Stick” in Nordic Aid Being selected to receive Nordic foreign aid represents, at least potentially, a “carrot” offered by Nordic governments to developing countries that are trying to democratize their political systems. Approximately thirty countries have achieved the status of major recipients of Nordic aid.2 Yet it is difficult to evaluate exactly why these countries were chosen, as well as the impact of the “democracy factor” that may govern these choices. The decisionmaking process is usually not made public. A number of interests are involved, and the criteria for prioritization employed by the various Nordic ministries of foreign affairs are not always clear due to the simple fact that these bureaucracies do not operate in a transparent way. In fact, it is paradoxical that the Nordic ministries of foreign affairs, one of the least transparent state bureaucracies, are trying to promote democracy in other countries, especially since transparency of administration is understood as one of the preconditions of Nordic democracy.

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There have been political disputes within the Nordic countries over the selection of aid recipients. Changes of government in Nordic countries nonetheless have not led to changes in the selection of recipient countries. During the Cold War, disputes between different political parties usually resulted in balancing foreign aid priorities between socialist-oriented countries, such as Tanzania, with market-oriented countries, such as Kenya (Rosas, Krause, and Vainio, 1989: 23). In Finland, for example, left-wing and right-wing parties had different interpretations of the principles for selecting recipient countries. The first comprehensive government document from 1974 outlining the principles of bilateral development cooperation stated that “particular attention will be paid to attempts to guarantee all members of society equal political, economic, social and cultural rights” (Ulkoasiainministeriö, 1974: 17). Whereas leftist parties in parliament argued that these principles precluded the selection of Egypt, Kenya, and Sri Lanka as program countries, conservative parties argued that these principles worked against the inclusion of Cuba and Vietnam (Ulkoasiainministeriö, 1984: 81–83). Nevertheless, when compared to that of the other northern industrialized democracies, Nordic aid has been quite favorable toward progressive regimes with socialist or marxist orientations. In the post–Cold War era, parliamentary debate has been especially lively concerning the desirability of giving aid to countries where the political opposition is repressed. Interestingly enough, countries with a somewhat successful track record in democracy have found themselves at a relative disadvantage within the Nordic aid hierarchy if they otherwise were no longer regarded as qualifying for traditional aid. In a sense, this is the ideal situation with respect to the ultimate aspirations of all development aid. A change in the nature of international cooperation from foreign aid to a more commercial basis should not be seen as a punishment. For example, Norwegian cooperation with Botswana and India and, more recently, Finnish cooperation with Vietnam have witnessed such changes. Only seldom has a country lost its status as a recipient of Nordic aid because of its political problems. During the 1970s and 1980s this reflected at least partially the stated willingness of recipient regimes to promote the Nordic ideal of ensuring social and economic equality in their respective countries. For example, a review of Norwegian development aid written in 1984 acknowledged that human rights violations were taking place in virtually all of Norway’s development partners. The same could have been said, and can be said even today, about the development partners of all Nordic countries. Although the Nordic countries remain cautious in using their development aid as a “stick” in democracy promotion, their punitive approach has involved a refusal to consider new projects proposed by recipients and the rechanneling of aid through NGOs. The real picture is

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becoming increasingly nuanced as both the competence and commitment of Nordic development cooperation agencies within the realm of democracy promotion receive more attention. Several examples nonetheless underscore the willingness of Nordic countries to punish developing countries for human rights violations. In 1990 Denmark began phasing out assistance to the Sudan in response to human rights violations and ceased one of its remaining projects in 1992 for the same reason. In 1991 it suspended aid to Indonesia after a massacre of peaceful demonstrators in East Timor (Stokke, 1995: 47). At the end of the 1980s Ethiopia and Sri Lanka and, more recently, Kenya have witnessed reductions in Nordic aid due to human rights violations. The review of Norwegian aid to Sri Lanka, commissioned by the Norwegian government in 1986, successfully recommended discontinuing aid that provided direct budgetary support to the government; however, rural development programs and aid for the rehabilitation of victims of the armed conflict continued. Gross human rights violations are often associated with political instability, affecting the general environment of development cooperation. The actual impetus and reason for suspending cooperation therefore often concerns practical issues. According to the Finnish International Development Agency (FINNIDA), Finland’s decisions to suspend or decrease assistance to Burma, Ethiopia, Peru, Somalia, and the Sudan were predominantly motivated by practical problems in the delivery of assistance. Human rights and democracy considerations were said to constitute only background factors (FINNIDA, 1991: 91). The discontinuation of Nordic development cooperation with Cuba, while cooperation with Vietnam continued, was also the result of practical considerations rather than concern over human rights issues. An increasingly important but arbitrarily implemented form of placing pressure on recipient governments has been the public condemnation of undemocratic tendencies. In 1992 the Norwegian and Swedish development agencies’ decision not to release funds for drought relief to Namibia because of the purchase of an aircraft for the country’s president was widely publicized in the Namibian press. Finland, on the other hand, although also an important donor to Namibia, did not react in the same way. Sweden openly criticized Botswana’s decision to build a military airbase and said it would influence future aid; Norway, however, found no reason to criticize Botswana on this issue. Ironically, Botswana had also purchased an aircraft for its president, which did not give rise to any Nordic condemnations.

Direct Support for Democracy Since there are no internationally accepted definitions of development cooperation that directly benefit democracy, one must rely on what has

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been specifically stated by the Nordic donors themselves as to their intentions to promote democratization. It has to be noted, however, that the measure most often emphasized by the Nordics in this regard—engaging in a dialogue with recipient governments on open, democratic, and accountable political systems—is difficult to evaluate, not least because such dialogues are often held in secret (NORAD, 1992: 16; DANIDA, 1992: 5; FINNIDA, 1991: 90). Due to its character, direct support for democratization covers a fragmented area. Although special funds for democratic development have been created, all aid mentioned as promoting democratization has not necessarily been earmarked for that purpose. For example, support for procedures to resolve conflicts can be interpreted as supporting democracy, as in the case of Norwegian assistance for a campaign in Sri Lanka intended to promote understanding between ethnic groups (NORAD, 1994: 11). A large portion of Nordic democracy aid is also channeled through international organizations. In 1991 Finland provided funds to fifteen different international organizations to promote democracy and human rights (FINNIDA, 1991: 91–93). In short, it is not possible to arrive at precise estimates of the proportion of total development assistance that is allocated to democracy promotion. The Nordics have placed special emphasis on directly assisting recipient countries in the preparation and implementation of multiparty elections. Support has included promoting public information campaigns by local NGOs, funding voter registration processes, and publishing election information in local languages to enhance voter education. The Nordics have also supported election observer missions staffed by Nordic observers as well as local NGOs. The list of countries that have received this kind of assistance is extensive, including nearly all countries that have sought such aid for their first multiparty elections, especially in Africa and the exSoviet states but also in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia. Postapartheid South Africa, Palestine, and independent Namibia can be named as well. Even in China, the Nordics have participated in a UNDP project examining possibilities for supporting electoral democracy at the village level (DANIDA, 1990, 1994; SIDA, 1993b). The Nordics have also been extensively involved in constitutional and parliamentary issues. They have provided assistance on constitutional questions by offering expertise and funding for drafting new constitutions. Advice has focused on strengthening parliamentary working methods in countries with no parliamentarian traditions. Nordic aid has also funded visits to study Nordic constitutions and electoral processes. Politicians from Kenya, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe have been invited to study election campaigns and the roles of the press and political parties in Sweden. Theoretically, democracy assistance should vest the donor side with

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significant influence. In the case of the Nordic countries, however, at least two factors mitigate such influence. First, all development (including democratization) proposals must be presented by the recipient country; the donors can only express their willingness to provide this type of support. Ethiopia is an example of a recipient country with serious problems in the field of human rights and democratization but limited interest in submitting proposals on such projects despite continual encouragement of the Nordic donors. Equally important, recipient governments often have been able to maintain control over the political transition process. Nordic influence can be constrained by the simple fact that democratic transitions, after all, do not constitute the kind of rupture hoped for. Both institutionally and culturally, continuities with single-party or even colonial periods have often been remarkable. Electoral laws might reflect the systems of the former colonial powers, or practical arrangements surrounding elections may have been more dependent on the nature of the state bureaucracy than on any expertise provided by the Nordic donors. In these respects, the 1995 general elections in Tanzania were insightful. According to a common view of Nordic development cooperation since the early 1960s, Tanzania, more than any other country, has been open to Nordic influence because of its special standing as the leading recipient of Nordic development cooperation. As a result, Nordic ideas of democracy, if truly exported as part of the Nordic development experience, should have guided the political transition in Tanzania. Indeed, as underscored by Samuel Mushi, the Nordic countries played an “important role” during the transition to multiparty rule. “Most of the ‘party system’ seminars and work-shops organized during this period by both opposition groups and the ruling party itself had a contribution from one or other of the four Nordic countries aiding Tanzania” (Mushi, 1995: 242). The 1995 election process, however, contained several technical problems and irregularities. More important, all donors, including the Nordics, clearly expressed their dissatisfaction with the electoral process and the announced results in Zanzibar, without having any effect on the responsible authorities. The overall impact of this constrained donor involvement in the introduction of multiparty elections was perhaps most manifest in the behavior of opposition parties. Instead of complaining about irregularities by demonstrating outside the offices of government authorities, they did so outside the Nordic embassies. In this sense, the externally supported multiparty elections may actually obscure the legitimation of national power instead of strengthening it. Another area of Nordic activity in democracy promotion has involved strengthening the legal protection of human rights and pluralism. In Tanzania, Sweden has funded the compilation of the Tanzanian statute book since 1965. Legal education, research, and the production of information

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for the public about their rights have been increasingly emphasized. Legal aid clinics have been established at least in Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Tanzania, and Zambia through Danish support. Assistance in this field was provided by Denmark and Norway to Uganda. Human rights education has been contributed to police and prison personnel in Zambia. In Guinea-Bissau, Sweden has supported a project that stresses the importance of a division between executive and judiciary powers. In Vietnam, economic liberalization has required legal reform to change the old combination of Confucian legal norms with elements inherited from the French and centrally planned traditions. This reform has been supported by SIDA, which apparently also saw it as a means to strengthen human rights in Vietnam (DANIDA, 1990: 84, 85; 1992: 53, 54; SIDA, 1993b: 90, 91; Tomaˇsevski, 1989: 104). Support for NGOs, including trade unions and the media, is a further component of Nordic democracy promotion that has its roots in Nordic support for the various liberation struggles in Southern Africa. An interesting debate emerged after the African National Congress (ANC), heavily supported by the Nordics during the liberation struggle, was accepted as a legal party in South Africa. The Nordics began debating whether political parties could be supported by development aid. In Sweden, especially, there was an explicit interest among the political parties to find ways of channeling support for voters’ education, workshops, and equipment to political parties in developing countries. “Conventionally,” democracy assistance has been defined as being neutral in relation to the establishment of political parties (SIDA, 1993a: 20; NORAD, 1992: 16.) However, the difficulties of opposition parties in many new multiparty systems is overriding this principle. A Swedish innovation was to support political parties through special bodies associated with the Swedish parliament.

Conclusion Democracy is certainly not the first notion that comes to mind when one reflects on the political systems of the recipients of Nordic aid during the last four decades. Of course, it is important to note that initial support for democratization makes sense only in countries without democracy. It is also important to note that the Nordic countries are still minor donors for many developing countries, most of which have intensive cultural, political, or economic relations with their former colonial powers or the United States.3 But does this mean that the Nordic attempt to export democracy via development aid has either been a total failure or is not a seriously stated goal at all? In light of the above analysis, neither of these conclusions seems to be justified. During the first decades of Nordic development cooperation, democra-

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cy was considered to be merely one aspect of social and economic development. In the eyes of many Nordic policymakers, it was not obvious at all that the recipient countries could not have developed and democratized as assumed by the early modernization theorists—whether in the framework of single-party systems or not. In a way the more recent discussion of the “right to development” reflects this traditional approach of development assistance (see Thiis, 1996). Human rights, popular participation, and multiparty systems are relatively new themes in Nordic development cooperation. These themes have yet to become operationalized into an explicit, coordinated Nordic policy, both with regard to the strategies used and to the political will and commitment to realize them. In many respects Nordic aid policy has become similar to that of the other northern industrialized democracies. But if there is still something special in the Nordic policy of democracy promotion, it is the emphasis on the role of the state. In the early years of Nordic development cooperation this was evident in the recipient-oriented nature of development aid, which even today facilitates political dialogue between Nordic and developing countries. Lacking former colonial links, the superpower status of the United States, or the economic importance of critical trading partners, the Nordics have had to build their influence in the developing world on the basis of a continuous dialogue and a search for common goals. Support given to NGOs, rather than envisioned as antagonistic to the state, has been motivated by attempts to strengthen democratic forces outside repressive governments or to promote civic education and other activities to facilitate the functioning of the democratic state. Current support for institution-building activities can also be regarded as part of that strategy. The so-called ownership agenda, which attempts to reduce recipient dependency on development aid by giving them more control of the development projects is also related to the legitimation and strengthening of the state. There is no doubt that the formulation of a policy and doctrines for promoting democracy inevitably challenges the principles of sovereignty and nonintervention in the internal affairs of other countries. According to Nordic perceptions, however, democracy promotion is not necessarily antagonistic to sovereignty as such but rather can replace the concept of government sovereignty with popular sovereignty in international politics. The dismantling of repressive governments brings hardly any changes without the simultaneous introduction of democratic institutions, and democratic institutions can remain empty formalities without citizens who have the necessary capacities to effectively participate in decisionmaking. That the promotion of democracy requires work at many levels is clearly evident in the evolving Nordic policy in this field.

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Notes The author is most grateful for comments given by Michael Cowen, Jorgen Elklit, Juhani Koponen, Lauri Siitonen, and Edward Rhodes, and for the assistance of Riikka Lehto in collecting data. 1. As a special case, Iceland is not included in this study. It is a minor donor of development aid, which received regular assistance from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) until 1976 (Rudebeck, 1982: 156). Iceland has closely followed and cooperated with the development programs of the other Nordic countries. 2. In 1995, for example, fifteen countries (in order of importance) received more than $50 million in Nordic aid: Tanzania, Mozambique, former Yugoslavia, Uganda, Bangladesh, Zambia, Nicaragua, India, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Vietnam, South Africa, Palestinian Administrative Areas, Angola, and China. 3. For example, the Nordic withdrawal of aid from Chile in 1974 had little effect, because the United States simultaneously increased its aid to that country. See Toma sˇevski (1989: 69).

5 Germany’s Hesitant Role in Promoting Democracy Jürgen Rüland and Nikolaus Werz

fter the collapse of the fragile Weimar democracy (1919–1933) and twelve years of savage Nazi dictatorship (1933–1945), Germany in 1945 became the target of democracy promotion. In the western occupation zones, which became the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), the creation of a democratic polity served as an important element in U.S. and British efforts to ensure that German soil would never again become the source of a world war. Denazification, the establishment of parliamentary institutions, and a reliance on surviving Weimar democrats to staff newly created government positions were key elements of this democratization program (Paterson, 2000). In the eastern occupation zone that became the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), the former Soviet Union, which had suffered more than twenty million casualties in World War II, decided that the creation of a communist regime, part of a cordon sanitaire of Eastern, so-called people’s democracies, would best prevent yet another invasion from German soil. East and West Germany vied for international influence throughout the Cold War, stressing the ideological superiority of their respective political systems. The democratic polity ultimately prevailed, with West Germany absorbing its socialist competitor after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union and other communist regimes throughout Eastern Europe. German unification in 1990 served as a potent symbol of the success of Western-style democracy, as well as the importance of international efforts to promote that ideal during the second half of the twentieth century. Observers typically cite Germany as one of the most successful cases of democracy promotion during the post–World War II era. The newly unified Germany, however, has not been an avid proponent of the political dimensions of democracy promotion in the developing world, preferring instead to pursue an approach that underscores the overriding importance of secur-

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ing economic self-interest relative to other foreign policy goals. This emphasis on the economic dimensions of the democratization process is strengthened by a belief within the German policymaking establishment that economic growth fueled by foreign trade and investment serves as the most important precondition for the emergence of Western-style political democracies in the developing world. Although policy pronouncements throughout the 1990s, most notably after the election in 1998 of Gerhard Schröder’s Social Democratic Party (SPD)–Green Party coalition, suggest an increased focus on the political dimensions of the democratic ideal, Germany remains a hesitant and inconsistent promoter of democracy among the northern industrialized democracies.

Initial Lack of Support for Democracy Promotion Although a West German state was formed in 1949, the allied occupation statute remained in place and for the next six years severely restricted West Germany’s foreign policy making autonomy. As a result, West Germany pursued two overriding objectives in the early 1950s: the restoration of national sovereignty and, in order to alleviate the rising security concerns of its Western neighbors over the idea of a recovering Germany, the full integratation of the country into Western Europe’s fledgling supranational institutions, most notably the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the stillborn idea of a European Defense Community (EDC). Economic recovery became Germany’s third major policy priority of the early postwar years. Together these objectives naturally implied a basically Eurocentric and transatlantic outlook. Although developments behind the Iron Curtain were closely watched and castigated in harsh statements, there was no proactive democratization policy vis-à-vis Eastern Europe designed to strengthen anticommunist opposition forces. German policymakers instead believed that rapid economic recovery under the auspices of a social market economy and a parliamentary democracy would have magnetic effects on Eastern Europe, gradually undermining the control of communist regimes. All that was needed was a policy of strength, which in the end would prove the superiority of the Western system. By the mid-1950s the global power equation began to change. With decolonization new players appeared in the international arena that sought to steer clear of the two ideological blocs. In 1955 the leaders of twentynine countries from Asia and Africa met in Bandung, Indonesia, searching for a “third way” to development beyond capitalism and socialism and laying the foundations for what later became known as the Nonaligned Movement. Not surprisingly, these nations increasingly became targets of deepening superpower rivalry. U.S. policymakers responded to what they

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perceived as a communist threat to Western interests by channeling substantial amounts of economic and military aid to developing countries, as well as by exerting pressure on U.S. allies such as West Germany to play a supporting role in such efforts. For example, after a period of East-West brinkmanship between 1958 and 1962 that included the Berlin crisis, the erection of the Berlin Wall, and the Cuban missile crisis, the Kennedy administration sought West German financial and diplomatic support for the U.S. Partnership for Progress in Latin America and increasing military involvement in Southeast Asia. Official German development aid began in 1956, when the Auswärtiges Amt (Foreign Office) for the first time released approximately $21 million for technical assistance (Bodemer, 1974: 95; Nuscheler, 1995: 378). Increasingly pressured by Washington and the other Western allies to do more in the developing world, West Germany in 1961 established the Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development). A number of additional semigovernmental bodies were also created to aid in the implementation of German development policies, including the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Agency for Technical Cooperation); the Deutsche Entwicklungsdienst (German Development Service); and the Deutsche Stiftung für internationale Entwicklung (German Foundation for International Development). At the same time the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (Bank for Reconstruction) increasingly mutated from an institution financing internal postwar reconstruction to financing development in the developing world. While sympathies with liberal parliamentarian systems existed among German policymakers, democracy promotion did not become an explicit criterion for the allocation of foreign aid. The overriding objective was still to prevent forays of the socialist camp into the developing world. Competition between the two ideologically opposed German countries intensified during the early years of the Cold War. West Germany’s claim to be the only rightful representative of the German people (Alleinvertretungsanspruch) found its expression in the Hallstein Doctrine (named after the former state secretary of the West German Foreign Office), which considered diplomatic recognition of East Germany as an unfriendly act and provided for a variety of retaliatory measures ranging from a reduction in foreign aid to a full break in diplomatic relations. Although initially successful (only Cuba and Yugoslavia among the developing countries extended diplomatic recognition in 1957 and 1963), the emergence in 1969 of a new Ostpolitik (literally “Eastern politics,” or an opening to the East), under the leadership of Chancellor Willy Brandt, led during that same year to the official recognition of East Germany by eleven countries (Algeria, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chile, Guinea, Iraq, Sri Lanka,

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Sudan, Syria, South Yemen, and the United Arab Republic), with little if any retribution on the part of West Germany (Bodemer, 1974: 137). In this regard, the Hallstein Doctrine was an unsuitable instrument for democracy promotion. It encouraged an indiscriminate spread of foreign aid regardless of recipient regime type and made the West German government susceptible to political blackmail (Bodemer, 1974; Spranger and Brock, 1987). Economic motivations also relegated democratic principles to a back seat in West German foreign policy. The first economic recession in postwar Germany in the mid-1960s and the two oil crises in the 1970s underscored the dependency of German economic well-being on foreign trade, most notably the regular supply of cheap raw materials. As a result, oil producers in the Middle East and countries with potentially large markets such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Turkey became priority recipients of German foreign aid. Except for India, none of these countries exhibited a distinguished record of democratic governance. West German policymakers for the most part accepted the widely shared tenet of modernization theory that a causal relationship exists between economic and political development; first there must be economic growth, which in turn is best guaranteed by a strong, unitarian, centralizing, and usually authoritarian state. It was believed that Entwicklungsdiktaturen (developmental dictatorships; see Löwenthal, 1962) and Vormundschaftsdemokratien (“tutelary” democracies; see Shils, 1962) would gradually fade away with economic growth (Newman, 1963). Economic growth would stimulate economic diversification, which leads to organizational differentiation and the rise of new interest groups and an educated middle class that increasingly will demand political representation. In short, a belief that democratic change would naturally accompany the modernization process suggested there was no need for explicit democratization support measures in West German foreign policy and development cooperation.1

Rising Pressures for Democracy Promotion A series of developments created pressures for a more democracy-oriented foreign policy. The far from satisfactory results of the first development decade, including (but not limited to) economic stagnation, widening income disparities within and among countries, growing mass poverty, and development projects that turned out to be white elephants, were sharply criticized by German churches and an emerging community of German nongovernmental organizations. The view that centrally managed, capitalintensive megaprojects could be a panacea for development was softened

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by a more participatory approach based on the slogans of “development from below,” “self-help,” and “small is beautiful” (Schumacher, 1977). According to church and NGO leaders, development projects would succeed only if they involved the participation and know-how of target groups within the host country in the pursuit of poverty alleviation and basic human needs. Widespread public and media support created pressures for the West German government to adopt these principles in governmentsponsored projects. In a sense, a point of no return had been reached that made it virtually impossible for any development organization—governmental or nongovernmental—to ignore the issue of popular participation in development planning (Spranger and Brock, 1987). The new Ostpolitik created additional opportunities for a more democracy-oriented foreign policy. By recognizing the existence of a second German state, West Germany’s relations with East Germany were freed from previous legal rigidities in exchange for East German concessions to grant more liberties to its citizens. Democratic values and human rights were subsequently incorporated into a list of principles as agreed by the member states of the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) under the Helsinki Act of 1975. Principle no. VII of the act called for “respect of human rights and basic liberties, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion and convictions.” Basket no. 3 added further weight to these principles, as it called for improved cooperation in the areas of humanitarian relations, culture, education, and information exchange (von Bredow, 1992). Humanitarian issues and human rights subsequently played a crucial role in the agenda of CSCE successor conferences, especially after the Carter administration’s insistence on the human rights theme almost provoked a collapse of the negotiations at the CSCE successor conference in Belgrade. The German government, more interested in Central European détente, sought to tone down human rights controversies. Both the coalition of the Social Democratic Party and the Liberal Party (FDP) headed by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (1974–1982), and the conservative government of Chancellor Helmut Kohl leading a coalition of the Christian Democratic Parties (CDU/CSU) together with the FDP from 1982 through 1998, acquiesced to East Germany’s nondemocratic order in the interest of improving German-German relations. Criticism of East Germany’s authoritarian nature was muted, and multibillion dollar credits such as in 1983 helped the ailing communist regime to survive times of acute crisis. Although humanitarian and human rights issues often appeared on the agenda within the general context of East-West relations, West Germany did not use them to exert pressure on the East German leadership or that of other socialist bloc nations to open up their regimes (Hacke, 1993). Controversy was nonetheless manifest in West Germany’s foreign poli-

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cy toward the developing world. The Schmidt government, for example, sought to distance itself from the U.S. policy of assessing relations with the developing world through the lens of East-West conflict. In the case of Latin America, aid was provided to the leftist (and authoritarian) Sandinista regime of Nicaragua, whereas it was frozen for the “rightist” authoritarian regime in El Salvador. The conservative Kohl government, however, closed ranks with the Reagan administration and simply reversed these decisions (Spranger and Brock, 1987: 302). Policy toward South Africa’s apartheid regime and other African dictatorships was also controversial. South Africa was courted as an anticommunist bulwark and vital economic partner by the Bavaria-based Christian Social Union (CSU), which at the time held the development portfolio and used the ministry to endear itself to its conservative voter clientele by creating its own foreign policy. This periodically led to acrimonious debates in the cabinet with the Foreign Office that were resolved only after South Africa dismantled its apartheid system. The Cold War’s end not surprisingly changed the parameters of Germany’s approach to democracy promotion. As was the case in the other northern industrialized democracies, German policymakers believed they could now afford to criticize authoritarian regimes that only a few years earlier had been courted for their ideological (often anticommunist) stance in international affairs. That such regimes—referred to as “Dracula regimes” by one noteworthy critic (Hanf, 1980: 17)—with their flagrant human rights violations, harassment of political dissidents, and in general a tendency to “feed” on their own populations should no longer be tolerated became an article of faith far beyond the habitual champions of human rights and democracy in the NGO and church communities. A new public mood was translated into official policies in 1991 when the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development announced a policy of conditionalities that henceforth would link foreign aid to recipient progress in promoting human rights, people’s participation in political decisionmaking, rule of law, a market economy, and development orientation (Betz, 1997; Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, 1996; Nuscheler, 1999; Sandschneider, 1997; and Tetzlaff, 1992). The relative weight and hierarchy of importance of these wide-ranging goals nonetheless remained unclear and therefore susceptible to varying interpretations throughout the German government. The coalition government of the Social Democrats and the Green Party led by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, which came to power in September 1998, disappointed many who expected democracy promotion and human rights to become cornerstones of Germany’s foreign policy. Changes thus far have been largely declaratory in nature. Although the new government declared human rights and democracy to be priorities across numerous policy fields, at an operational level the record is mixed (Nuscheler, 1999: 16;

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see also Aufbruch und Erneurung, 1998). Perhaps the most forceful initiative in terms of democracy promotion is Germany’s contribution to the Stability Pact for the Balkans. Nonetheless, democracy and human rights promotion are adjuncts to the government’s security agenda, which rests on the premise that stability and peace can be secured best through a strategy of conflict prevention. Participation in the NATO intervention in Kosovo, which in the absence of a UN mandate deeply divided German society, reaffirmed these perceptions. While Foreign Minister Fischer and highranking diplomats habitually link democracy and human rights to conflict prevention, the causality remains vague. Sometimes democracy and human rights are viewed as prerequisites for, sometimes as consequences of conflict prevention.2 The rhetorical nature of democracy promotion under the Red-Green coalition is perhaps best illustrated by Fischer’s more recent initiatives to transfer the promotion of values such as democracy, human rights, openness, and critical tolerance into the realm of cultural cooperation.

Institutional Support for Democracy Promotion The formulation and implementation of German foreign policy has become increasingly complex during the 1990s due to institutional restructuring associated with reunification, the demands of globalization, the deepening process of European integration, and attempts on the part of European Union members to create a common European foreign policy (see Chapter 8). Three government agencies in particular determine the extent to which democracy promotion is integrated into German foreign policy: the Foreign Office, the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the Chancellor’s Office (Kanzleramt). Other agencies and organizations, particularly political foundations, play important supporting roles. As witnessed by the publication of a series of human rights reports during the 1990s, the Foreign Office considers democracy promotion to be part of its overall human rights policy (Auswärtiges Amt, 1996: 21). The bureaucratic focal point of this policy is the “coordinator” for human rights issues (Auswärtiges Amt, 1993: 16). In 1993 this official was dispatched to China, Indonesia, Iran, and Malaysia. In February 1995 the position was upgraded, as one of the Foreign Office’s permanent secretaries was appointed representative for humanitarian aid and human rights. The Foreign Office has also established the United Nations Human Rights and Humanitarian Aid Bureau, a subdivision of which is directed by an official with the rank of ambassador and which exclusively deals with human rights and humanitarian aid problems (Auswärtiges Amt, 1996: 14). Moreover, each of Germany’s more than 150 embassies are obliged to report yearly on

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the human rights conditions in their host country (Auswärtiges Amt, 1993: 16). The appointment of a commissioner for human rights and humanitarian aid attached to the Foreign Office is a novelty introduced by the Schröder government, though one with little influence on actual policymaking (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000). The chancellor’s first trip to China is a good example. The commissioner, a former East German human rights activist, reportedly was neither involved in the preparation of the trip nor was he part of the delegation (Hansen, 2000). The Red-Green coalition also plans to establish an independent national human rights institute with possible activities centering on “information and documentation, human rights education, research and policy advice, promotion of dialogue and cooperation in Germany, and, in the long-term, social and public administration projects abroad” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000: 104). A desire to avoid accusations of intervening in the internal affairs of other sovereign states has prompted the Foreign Office to prefer indirect means as concerns democracy promotion (Auswärtiges Amt, 1993: 41). Most of this bureaucracy’s activities thus concentrate on norm building in international fora, most notably the various organs of the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the European Union, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Importance is also attached to Germany’s participation in a number of world summits, including the World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna in 1993 and the World Conference of Women held in Beijing in 1995. The Schröder government has stepped up these activities. The actual impact of these multilateral contributions is nonetheless difficult to measure. Strengthening the international legal framework for human rights and democracy, for example, says little about the extent to which these conventions are followed in practice by German policymakers. Indeed, the human rights reports published by the Foreign Office are relatively quiet about how Germany deals with countries that ignore agreedupon international norms. In fact, human rights activists frequently deplore that in the closing years of the Kohl government there was a noticeable shift toward realpolitik in German foreign policy that continues to this day. According to this interpretation, human rights and democracy increasingly have been sacrificed on the altar of export interests. The early lifting of sanctions against China after the Tiananmen tragedy and the policy of “critical dialogue” with Burma and Iran are frequently cited as examples of such a policy. A scrutiny of foreign policy documents also reveals the regional diversity of the Foreign Office’s support for democracy promotion. While in the case of Asia, democracy is rarely explicitly mentioned as a foreign policy goal, Foreign Office documents focusing on relations with African,

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Caribbean, and Central American countries typically contain lengthy statements on democracy and human rights (Auswärtiges Amt, 1995). The government argues that, in the case of Asia, democracy promotion with the “megaphone” would be considered confrontational and close many channels through which a more effective “quiet” dialogue could be pursued. The Foreign Office also maintains a democracy promotion facility, created in 1992, which is allotted funds through the Finance and Foreign Relations Committees of the Bundestag (the German parliament). An annual appropriation of approximately $4.32 million funds the dispatch of election observer missions and, in cooperation with the Bundestag, the upgrading of parliamentary services in the new democracies of Eastern Europe and various regions of the developing world (Auswärtiges Amt, 1996: 38). The funds used for democracy promotion are taken from an ominous budgetary item administered by the Foreign Office that is known as “equipment aid” (Ausstattungshilfe). With an annual capitalization of $26-28 million, the fund supports projects designed to strengthen the German military’s developmental and civic functions in partner countries by increasing its role in infrastructural development, disaster and refugee relief operations, and the strengthening of internal security within recipient countries (Auswärtiges Amt, 1996: 38). While the Foreign Office justifies such projects with the argument that they help train police forces and other security personnel to observe human rights and the rule of law, critics contend that such an approach actually strengthens the repressive capacities of authoritarian governments by improving their public images and, in any case, by making authoritarian states more efficient (Auswärtiges Amt, 1996: 39; see also Adelmann, 1992: 10–12; and Erdmann, 1996: 133). The Schröder government reformed the facility, which henceforth will focus only on crisis prevention, peacekeeping missions, and disaster management. The Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development has emerged as the most vocal government agency in support of democracy promotion. A division of labor has been worked out with the Foreign Office, which concentrates on short-term measures such as sending election observer missions, leaving Economic Cooperation and Development to focus on long-term measures (Adelmann, 1992: 12). Indeed, officials note that their ministry played a key role in making popular participation an important aspect of foreign aid projects beginning in the 1970s, ensuring that a much greater and more systematic emphasis was placed on conditions conducive to the development of democratic structures during the 1990s. In a number of cases the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development has successfully argued for the termination or temporary suspension of foreign aid. Critics contend, however, that the majority of countries targeted are often small countries with little economic value

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(Erdmann, 1999b: 79). When larger politically, economically, and strategically important countries such as China, India, or Turkey are concerned, sharp disagreements have emerged with the Foreign Office. In the case of Burma, the Foreign Office, despite a suspension of German aid, in 1994 promoted a policy of “critical dialogue” with the Burmese military (Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 1993). In the mid-1990s, a deepening economic recession led to growing pressures on the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development to downgrade, though not give up, its democracy promotion policies. The development objective of poverty alleviation, with its implicit objective of empowering marginalized segments of the population, in particular came under fire by critics who argued that its developmental effects were spurious and that, in any case, there is less room for altruism as other northern industrialized democracies increasingly use their development aid to promote economic self-interest (Wolff, 1995). In fact, the ministry’s new sectoral priorities, most notably infrastructure, environment, and energy development, must be seen as attempts to reconcile global developmental concerns with German export interests. An attempt to balance this shift toward economic objectives nonetheless led Economic Cooperation and Development to develop a new type of project in 1994—in cooperation with its implementing arm, the German Agency for Technical Cooperation—that it hoped would have a more direct effect on democracy promotion. These projects focused on decentralization programs, most notably by strengthening local governance and organizations that represent civil society. These projects, coordinated since April 2000 in a separate organizational unit of the ministry, were controversial for two reasons. First, many German NGOs regarded decentralization support measures as an invasion of their democratization turf, leading to conflicts between the ministry and the agency on one hand and German NGOs on the other. Second, and equally important, as official development aid is basically state-to-state cooperation, most of these projects are characterized by considerable government involvement. If democratization is not on the agenda of these governments, projects essentially will be in vain. Decentralization programs, for example, which may have a decisive impact on the national power equation, more likely than not will be designed in such a way that they merely strengthen the existing state apparatus without contributing to vertical divisions of power and widening avenues for political participation. Even teaming up with NGOs does not necessarily increase the options for official development cooperation because the selection of NGO partners is dependent on which actors are acceptable to the aid recipient’s government. The era of summit diplomacy has ensured the emergence of the Chancellor’s Office as a major actor and competitor with the Foreign

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Office in the realm of democracy promotion. The Chancellor’s Office pursues the most pragmatic policy approach of its institutional counterparts, as witnessed by the evolution of Germany’s Asia policy. Although the Chancellor’s Office in the early 1990s fully supported the European Union’s human rights and democratization policies, making these a major criterion in its relations with Asian nations such as China and the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), it was Chancellor Kohl himself who initiated a major reversal of Germany’s Asia policy. Under the impact of the severe and persisting economic recession that was affecting Germany’s economy after the consumption-driven unification boom, as well as the unprecedented economic growth in many parts of East and Southeast Asia to which Germany had been a latecomer, Kohl increasingly viewed the acrimonious debates with Asian leaders over democratic values as an obstacle to German efforts to find a way out of its economic malaise. After visiting five Asian countries (India, Indonesia, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea) in 1993, Kohl instructed the Foreign Office to produce an Asia policy paper that would elevate Asia to a priority position within Germany’s foreign policy. Not unexpectedly, the paper had a clear economic bias. Except for vague references to “participation of the people in the political decision-making process,” “good governance,” and the “rule of law,” neither the Asia policy paper nor the policy guidelines drafted in January 1994 by the conference of German ambassadors in the Asia-Pacific mentioned democracy promotion as a foreign policy goal. Human rights, however, were mentioned explicity, albeit treated in a much less detailed way than economic and security issues (Auswärtiges Amt, 1995; Möller, 1996: 712). Economic issues clearly overshadowed any reference to democracy in Chancellor Kohl’s subsequent trips to China in 1995 and Indonesia in 1996. In conversations with Presidents Jiang Zemin and Suharto, issues related to democracy promotion (e.g., human rights protection) were either completely sidestepped or touched upon only briefly as a routine exercise. The most controversial act was Chancellor Kohl’s visit to a garrison of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) near Tianjin, the first such visit of a Western head of state since the Tiananmen massacre. While the German government justified the visit as a gesture to acknowledge the importance of the PLA as a political factor in China, the visit was misperceived by the symbol-conscious Chinese that Germany had entirely dropped its stress on democratic values in favor of realpolitik. Similarly, Germany’s relatively mild criticism of Russia’s war against its secessionist province of Chechenya gave rise to allegations that democracy and human rights have been relegated to a lower priority than in the early 1990s. The democracy promotion policies of Chancellor Schröder’s RedGreen coalition in reality have largely followed the guidelines of its conser-

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vative predecessors. Although Foreign Minister Fischer officially received the Dalai Lama and met with a leading Chinese dissident, the chancellor himself toned down human rights issues during his visit to Beijing in November 1999 (Hansen, 2000). Similarly, at the annual sessions of the UN Human Rights Commission (UNCHR) in Geneva, Germany only reluctantly adopted a more critical stance toward Beijing’s human rights record, while harsher criticism of Moscow over Chechenya did not transcend rhetoric (Hansen, 2000). Parliamentarians, especially, have been advocates of democracy. Delegations of parliamentarians traveling abroad have habitually admonished authoritarian rulers to respect human rights and to facilitate political openings. Moreover, under the Red-Green coalition, the Bundestag created the Committee on Human Rights Affairs which, however, has yet to produce substantial initiatives (Nuscheler, 1999). Outside of official government circles, broad sections of the NGO community remain the most persistent advocates for democracy and human rights in German foreign policy (Mair, 1997: 31). The Politische Stiftungen (political foundations), which occupy the unique status of publicly funded NGOs, are particularly influential (see Chapter 11). Political foundations were established by the political parties in the late 1950s and early 1960s as instruments to foster political education in Germany, to maintain close relations to sister parties abroad, and to promote democratic values in various regions of the developing world. Presently there are six major political foundations associated with German political parties: the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (Christian Democratic Union); the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (Social Democratic Party); the Friedrich Naumann Foundation (Liberal Party); the Hanns Seidel Foundation (Christian Social Union); the Heinrich Böll Foundation (Green Party); and the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation (Party of Democratic Socialism). Political foundations typically maintain offices in partner countries. They support the process of democratization through commissioned policy studies, consultancies, the provision of short- and long-term experts, field trips to neighboring countries and to Germany, scholarships, the production of teaching materials, and the organization and funding of seminars, symposia, workshops, and so-called track two dialogues.3 The latter allow for flexibility to react to new themes quickly or even to stimulate debate by creating a forum for topics that have been overlooked or deliberately ignored in target countries. Largely funded by the German government, political foundations nonetheless are relatively autonomous in their activities. This provides flexibility to Germany’s democracy promotion policies. In those cases where, due to strategic, economic, or diplomatic concerns, the “official” hands of the German government are tied, political foundations serve as the

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ideal vehicles for democracy promotion. Moreover, in case the political foundations go too far and their programs collide with the host government, the German government can reject responsibility for their activities and therefore avoid any rupture in official relations. Yet as a Friedrich Naumann Foundation seminar on Tibet demonstrated in 1996, this does not always work. The seminar and a subsequent Bundestag resolution on Tibet prompted a serious crisis in German-Chinese relations (Möller, 1996).

Evolving Debate over Conditionality Despite repeated assurances that development aid would not be reduced in the face of German unification and the political transformation of Eastern Europe, an increased propensity to impose sanctions has been guided by the certitude that the development budget is substantially shrinking. In this regard, the lack of democratic credentials could be—and has been—used to justify aid cuts in general and to concentrate aid on specific countries and regions (e.g., Asia and Eastern Europe) considered to be of overriding importance to German foreign policy (Waller, 1992; Betz, 1997; Hanisch, 1997; Nuscheler, 1999). Globalization and intensifying international economic competition nonetheless have made most German policymakers wary of linking trade to a country’s democratic progress. In the case of Asia, Germany’s approach stands in contrast to the European Commission’s growing tendency to target Asian countries for a wide variety of shortcomings, most notably the widespread practice of child labor, as well as to raise this and other issues at ASEAN-European Union dialogue meetings and at multilateral fora such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). Although in general supportive of the European Commission’s efforts, Germany has not been at the forefront of these moves. The primary reason for this stance is that Germany’s export-oriented economy is more dependent on foreign trade than those of the smaller European democracies, including the Scandinavian nations, the Netherlands, and Portugal (Rüland, 1996). Indeed, Germany has a relatively modest trade deficit with Asian countries as a whole and, in contrast to France or Italy, pursues a less protectionist trade policy. The use of economic sanctions in the pursuit of democracy promotion is widely criticized in German policymaking circles. Even the Red-Green coalition treats the issue with great care. Proponents of a more pragmatic foreign policy have argued that such conditionalities confine German foreign policy to a one-issue policy with reduced options. The development community in Germany and partner organizations in the developing world have further argued that economic sanctions punish the poor much more so than the targeted authoritarian regimes. Finally, democracy activists have

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criticized the selective and situational adoption of sanctions that amount to the application of double standards. In most cases sanctions have been imposed on small, economically insignificant countries that are highly dependent on development aid. Large powers with potentially lucrative markets, such as China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Turkey, typically do not find themselves the targets of German economic sanctions or—as in the case of China after the Tiananmen massacre—they witness the withdrawal of sanctions after a short period (Wissing, 1994; Herrmann-Pillath, 1996; Betz, 1997: 208). The German government has reacted to these criticisms in various ways. First, in cases where development aid was terminated or suspended, the government has been prepared to continue programs that directly benefit the target country’s population, such as poverty alleviation and disaster relief operations. Preferably, the funds should be channeled through NGOs to minimize the legitimizing effects of these projects on authoritarian regimes (Tetzlaff, 1992: 490). In response to the critique of maintaining double standards, the government has underscored that sanctions cannot be rigidly and/or automatically imposed across the board (van de Sand and Mohs, 1991: 5). The imposition of sanctions is dependent on the specific political and sociocultural conditions in a country and hence requires sensitive decisionmaking. The most important response of the German government to its critics has been to focus increasingly on providing incentives for countries to promote or strengthen their democracies (Waller, 1992; Tetzlaff, 1992; Betz, 1997; Hanisch, 1997; Eidmann, 1999a, 1999b). In particular, projects promoting “good governance,” including promoting the rule of law and honest and efficient administration, constitute a key element in Germany’s recent democratization strategies. Many of these projects are carried out under the label of administrative cooperation (Verwaltungszusammenarbeit), and they target agencies that play key roles in initiating and supporting reforms in areas such as economic planning, financial management, tax administration, environmental management, social services, and local government (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, 1997: 51). For example, support has been provided to political foundations to develop projects designed to advise partner countries in parliamentary and constitutional reforms, such as the improvement and professionalization of committee work.

Conclusion The impact and sustainability of democracy promotion measures remain a source of controversy within German policymaking circles. Attempts at

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developing a systematic checklist of statistical indicators to assess when to adopt conditionalities bore little fruit and were ultimately dropped by the German government in favor of qualitative indicators that allow for an assessment of very general political trends (Betz, 1997: 206; see also van de Sand and Mohs, 1991; and Erdmann, 1996). Although such an approach is far from satisfactory and lacks scientific objectivity, it nevertheless increases the foreign policy flexibility of the German government. Overall, German democracy promotion policies have been piecemeal and indirect in nature, lacking in financial commitment, and often reluctantly imposed without clear direction. The highly decentralized structure of the German aid and foreign policy apparatus ensures that much remains to be done to improve coordination among government organizations, as well as with German political foundations and NGOs and other northern industrialized democracies. The question remains, however, whether such policies, even if substantially funded and forcefully implemented, could ever become more than a complement to domestic political developments in recipient countries (Köβler, 1993). Indeed, many German critics of the political dimensions of democracy promotion argue that government-sponsored democratization projects are limited by the willingness of the recipient government to permit political liberalization. There is a strong sense in the German policymaking establishment that democratization projects are only successful in political environments that are already conducive to democratic change. Interestingly enough, criticism increasingly has been directed against the allegedly nontransparent activities of the political foundations and the impact and sustainability of their projects (Erdmann, 1996; Hanisch, 1997; Betz, 1997; Wolf, 1994). While admitting that the projects of the political foundations have not been evaluated with the same frequency and rigor as government-sponsored projects, supporters counter that even by taking into account occasional flaws, the foundations’ democracy promotion activities must be seen in a generally favorable light, the more so as their projects are usually carried out within the confines of very modest budgets. An important rationale for their continuation is that they provide Germany with valuable communication channels and networks of contacts that government agencies are often unable (or unwilling) to establish. Most German policymakers and academics would agree that the promotion of democratic values should continue to be a part of German foreign policy. Positive measures as outlined above should even be strengthened; more funds should be appropriated. Yet this does not mean that foreign policy should be turned into a single-issue policy, exclusively designed to gain the moral high ground. Only economically strong and independent powers can afford such a policy, and even then at considerable cost. Democracy promotion policies therefore must be formulated in accor-

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dance with other national interests, most notably the pursuit of the longterm health and strength of the German economy. The adoption of “purist” democracy promotion policies, irrespective of their consequences for the German economy, is not affordable in a country facing the major structural changes associated with unification. This is a lesson the Red-Green coalition had to learn as well. In the long run, such essentially narrow policies could undermine the very foundations on which the lofty values of democracy are actually built: economic prosperity, social peace, and security.

Notes 1. Behrendt (1965) deviated from the mainstream, making a forceful plea for a development strategy that promoted “fundamental democratization.” 2. For perhaps the most elucidating statement in this respect, see Foreign Minister Fischer’s speech opening the Forum Globale Fragen in April 1999 (Auswärtiges Amt, 1999: 11). 3. In Asia, track two dialogues were originally initiated by the Institute of Security and International Studies in ASEAN member countries to provide a framework to discuss controversial issues without damaging official relations. Depending on the issue involved, these meetings would bring together politicians, senior officials, academics, entrepreneurs, representatives of NGOs, journalists, and highranking military officers. All would attend in a personal capacity. Issues are debated until an agreeable compromise solution emerges that can then be transferred to track one (i.e., official) diplomacy.

6 Japan: A Passive Partner in the Promotion of Democracy Tsuneo Akaha

apan has been slow in recognizing democracy promotion as a fundamental premise of peaceful international relations. This economic giant has been a passive follower rather than an active promoter of global trends toward democratization (Yokota, 1995: 141–143; Mukae, 1995). This passive role has been admitted even by the Japanese government. “Japan has as a principle refrained from attaching political conditions to its aid,” explained the Japanese Foreign Ministry at the beginning of the 1990s. “This approach differs sharply from that taken by the United States and France, which use their foreign aid to promote what they regard as universal values of freedom and democracy and the French language and culture, respectively” (Watanabe and Kusano, 1991: 45–46). Although this situation has begun to change, albeit only slightly, at the beginning of the twentyfirst century Japan has not adopted a firm democracy promotion stance commensurate with its status as the second most economically powerful country among the northern industrialized democracies. The primary purpose of this chapter is to describe Japan’s approach to democracy promotion at home and abroad. An emphasis is placed on underscoring why Japan has not actively pursued its potentially influential role in democratization processes in Asia and other regions of the developing world. An analysis of domestic and international constraints is followed by a description of Tokyo’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter, the most explicit expression so far of Japan’s desire to use its economic power for security and political goals, including the promotion of democratization and human rights. A special emphasis is placed on assessing the seriousness and effectiveness of Japan’s new policy in effectuating democratic changes in the countries receiving Japanese economic aid. A final section offers some general observations about Japan’s experience with democracy and its role in democracy promotion.

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Hindrances to Japanese Support for Democracy A variety of domestic and international factors impose enormous constraints on Japan’s ability to firmly embrace democracy promotion as a core value of Japanese foreign policy. Contemporary Japanese culture does not encourage the Japanese people to “export” political values. At the risk of oversimplification, one can say that Japanese policymaking processes gravitate toward moderate consensus on policy issues and discourage a public display of conflict over fundamental values underlying policies (Haley, 1992; Richardson, 1997: 7–8). As well, Japanese preference for group harmony over conflict tends to mitigate against the development of strong, aggressive leadership skills. In fact, not seeking leadership until called upon is considered a virtue (Pempel, 1982: 3). These contemporary proclivities of the Japanese people can be observed in their economic-technological performance as well as in their international behavior. It is often observed, for example, that Japan is quick and good at importing hard and soft technologies (products and ideas) from abroad and adapting them to the Japanese situation, often improving on the original models and outcompeting the foreign sources (Borrus and Zysman, 1992: 19–21). Similarly, it is often said that Japanese diplomats spend more time listening to others and taking notes than talking and advocating ideas, even when their longheld values are under international attack (Friedheim, 1996). These tendencies do not make for assertive foreign policy behavior. Moreover, the Japanese remember that the last time they aggressively pursued Japan’s national interests in international politics, they ended up suffering more than a bloody defeat in war. The Japanese are still suffering the loss of credibility and legitimacy in international affairs, particularly in the Asian regional context (Akaha, 1997). The Japanese people’s concept of and experience with democracy prevents them from viewing individual rights as the foundation of democracy. The communal orientation of most Japanese often prevents identification of clearly demarcated rights and responsibilities, which is the fundamental premise of liberal democracy. Political and policy processes in Japan do not reflect widespread conviction or passion for democratic values and beliefs at the individual level (Reischauer, 1977: 327–328). While this tendency has prevented the proliferation of civil litigation that one sees in the United States, it certainly has not helped the cause of individual rights and freedoms in Japan. Japanese preference for public order and social harmony over individual rights and freedoms tends to ignore the welfare and rights of minorities in the country, be they racial, ethnic, or gender minorities (see Reischauer, 1977: 35–36; De Vos and Wetherall, 1974; Smith, 1995; and Lee and De Vos, 1981). There are deep-rooted prejudices against the group of Japanese

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known as burakumin, who used to engage in occupations that were regarded as unclean, such as handling carcasses and tanning leather. Discrimination against ethnic Koreans in Japan continues, as it does for foreign workers and women in the workplace. And Japan has historically discriminated against and persecuted the Ainu, the indigenous people of northern Japan. Another important reason for the lack of emphasis on democracy promotion in Japanese foreign policy is a widespread belief among the Japanese that the development of a democratic society requires some degree of political stability and that this in turn requires economic development. To a large extent, this belief is based on their own, largely successful postwar experience. In the immediate postwar years, the Japanese were preoccupied with economic recovery and material welfare while the U.S.led occupation authorities conducted sweeping democratization reforms in the country. As the Cold War began in Asia toward the end of the 1940s, however, the democratization campaign quickly gave way to a campaign of ensuring political stability and suppressing leftist dissent (Scalapino and Masumi, 1971: 22–53). Left-leaning political groups and the labor movement were intimidated and frustrated as the United States took measures to make sure Tokyo stayed in its ideological fold. The conservative political forces in Japan found it in their own interest to cooperate, and in this they were supported by growing business interests who also wanted domestic political stability, as well as cheap domestic labor and access to U.S. markets for their fledging exports (Masumi, 1995: 15–157). Staying focused on domestic political stability and economic development, the conservative coalition of political and economic forces, supported by the United States, were able to turn their country into an economic superpower. In the process of economic growth the Japanese were able to introduce and enjoy institutions of democracy. Therefore, many Japanese can appreciate the Chinese leadership’s repeated statement that political stability and economic development are more important than individual rights and freedoms in today’s China (e.g., see Eto, 1996). Japan’s postwar political system has further limited its ability to formulate and implement a coherent policy on democratization. Again at the risk of oversimplification, one can say that in postwar Japanese politics a public display of dissent has long been reserved for parties out of power, but until recently the opposition has often, if not always, been excluded from participating in a meaningful way in foreign policymaking. The foreign policy process has been dominated until 2001 by a hegemonic coalition—the so-called Iron Triangle—composed of the former conservative ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party; the elite bureaucrats in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI); and the business community (Hosoya, 1977: 5–10; Tanaka, 1994: 93–110). This strongly pro-U.S. and procapitalist coalition

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has generally been reluctant to criticize authoritarian regimes in Asia and other regions of the developing world. In the fight against communism and in search of dependable trade and investment partners, Japan has placed higher priority on promoting political stability and a better business environment than on free elections. Japan’s bitter experience as an imperialist-militarist power, culminating in defeat during World War II, has imposed enormous constraints on its international political role. A noted human rights and international law expert in Japan laments: “Looking back with remorse on their prewar and wartime history of human-rights violations in colonies and occupied territories, the Japanese concluded that they were not qualified to comment on human rights in other countries. Consequently, they tended to focus their attention on human-rights issues within Japan” (Yokota, 1995: 138). This sentiment is widely held among the Japanese people. Many Japanese feel very reluctant to advocate human rights protection in neighboring Asian countries because their country committed unspeakable atrocities against these peoples during World War II. However, this is not the only reason why the Japanese government has not loudly spoken up against human rights violations in Asia. Another important reason for Japan’s poor record in international democracy promotion is that its foreign policy has long been geared toward promoting economic and commercial interests, and its foreign aid policy has been a means of achieving this goal. This is a point on which virtually all observers of Japanese economic assistance agree (Rix, 1980; Yasutomo, 1986; Orr, 1990; Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor, 1998). The case often cited in this connection is Tokyo’s support of the Indonesian government in the 1970s in forcibly suppressing the independence movement in the former Portuguese colony, where there were many instances of human rights violations. Japan’s position has been attributed to its anticommunist policy and its eagerness to protect its economic (oil) interests in Indonesia (Kawabe, 1994: 156–159). For a long time after Japan started providing official economic assistance to the developing world, Tokyo refrained from asserting itself politically and strategically. For example, one Japanese analyst writes that Japan’s foreign aid goal until 1965 was to expand markets for Japanese exports and secure access to important raw materials. Until 1973 the goal of foreign aid was to discharge Japan’s responsibility as an advanced industrialized democracy to expand economic assistance to developing countries and to strengthen economic relationships with them. Following the first oil crisis of 1973–1974 until about 1980, Japan was preoccupied with “economic security,” with an emphasis again on access to strategic raw materials (Inada, 1990: 117–118).

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Linkage Between Economic Aid and Democratization Policies The promotion of democracy by Japanese policymakers is a more recent concern (Honma, 1990, cited in Mukae, 1995: 249). Since the 1970s Japan has shown some willingness to interject political and strategic considerations, including principles of human rights, into its foreign aid policy. This change was more a result of alliance politics than a reflection of bursting desire to promote democratization universally. Initially the effort to link Tokyo’s foreign aid policy to democratization was developed as part of burden sharing with the United States in the context of the Cold War, to demonstrate Tokyo’s willingness to support proWestern governments such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and South Korea. Within the same context, Japan also extended economic aid to a wide range of countries, including Angola, Egypt, Jamaica, Kenya, Oman, Pakistan, Sudan, Turkey, Thailand, and Zimbabwe, considered by the United States as strategically important or bordering international conflicts, in order to counter the influence of the Soviet Union and its allies, most notably Cuba and Vietnam (Tanaka, 1995: 126–144). These points are well documented by many observers of Japanese economic assistance (Yokota, 1995). Japan’s commitment to human rights protection has been less than universal and more reactive than proactive. It was only after pressure from the Carter administration that Japan decided to sign the International Covenants on Human Rights in 1978 (see Mukae, 1995: 259). In 1981 Japan joined the convention relating to the status of refugees and the 1966 Protocol to the convention relating to the status of refugees. This also was prompted by external pressure, namely the increasing numbers of Indochinese refugees reaching Japanese shores after the fall of Saigon in 1975. Initially, Japan would allow only temporary stays for Vietnamese refugees, but as the number of Vietnamese and other Indochinese refugees continued to rise and international pressure for liberalization of Japanese refugee policy mounted, the government was forced to allow permanent settlement in Japan by qualified refugees (Mukae, 1995: 259–260). Japan had ratified four of the six human rights conventions by 1994, including the covenant on economic, social, and cultural rights, the covenant on civil and political rights, the convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women, and the convention on the rights of the child. However, it was not until 1995 and 1999, respectively, that Japan ratified the convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination and the convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. Japan’s approach to foreign policy is slowly changing, as Tokyo feels

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increasingly confident in asserting itself in international political and security affairs. This is evident in Japanese support of the U.S.-led international coalition against Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War and its participation in international peacekeeping operations. Japan’s commitment of $13 billion to the U.S.-led coalition marked a major departure from its previous policy of staying out of international conflicts altogether. Even though the international community was highly critical of the slow decisionmaking process in Tokyo and its exclusively financial role during the Gulf War, Japan was able to share a substantial portion of the burden of fighting the first major regional conflict after the end of the Cold War. This experience paved the way for Japan’s participation in a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Kampuchea (Cambodia), including the dispatch of Japanese Self-Defense Force (SDF) personnel as part of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), and international support of free elections in the country in 1993. This was made possible by the passage in June 1992 of new legislation authorizing the deployment of SDF personnel to international peacekeeping missions based on United Nations Security Council resolutions. The law nonetheless placed strict limitations on Japanese participation.1 Before the dispatch of SDF personnel to UNTAC, Japanese participation in UN peacekeeping missions had been limited to the dispatch of civilian election monitors and/or political officials. These missions included UNGOMAP in Afghanistan and Pakistan (1988–1989); UNIIMOG in Iran and Iraq (1988–1989); UNTAG in Namibia (1989–1990); UNIKOM in Iraq and Kuwait (1991); and UNAMIC in Cambodia (1991–1992); In 1994–1995, Japan participated in UNPROFOR in former Yugoslavia. In the aftermath of Japan’s participation in UNTAC in 1993, the country’s role in United Nations missions has expanded to include the dispatch of SDF personnel as well as civilian law enforcement officials. These include UNAVEM II in Angola (1992); UNUMOZ in Mozambique (1993–94); ONUSAL in El Salvador (1994); and UNDOF in the Golan Heights (1996– present) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999: 408–409). Japan has also increased its participation in the international monitoring of free elections around the world. In the case of Namibia, Japan dispatched twenty-seven election monitors to the newly independent country. Japan also supported free elections by sending six monitors to Nicaragua in 1990, three to Angola in 1992, forty-one to Cambodia in 1993, fifteen to El Salvador in 1994, twenty-two to South Africa in 1994, fifteen to Mozambique in 1995, five to Haiti in 1995, and seventy-seven to Palestine in 1996 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1996: 281–282). The most explicit expression of Japan’s desire to use its enormous economic resources for security and political goals, including democracy promotion, is the adoption by the Japanese government of an ODA charter in

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June 1992 (hereinafter referred to as the charter or the foreign aid charter). The charter states that Japan’s foreign aid policy is based on four basic ideas: humanitarianism, recognition of interdependence between donor and recipient countries, the importance of environmental protection, and selfhelp efforts by aid recipients. In making foreign aid decisions, the charter states that Tokyo will pay “full attention” to a recipient country’s actions to promote democratization, to introduce a market-oriented economy, and to ensure basic human rights and freedoms. The charter also states that Tokyo will closely monitor trends in recipient countries’ military expenditures, development and production of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, and arms imports and exports. According to the 1992 guidelines, Tokyo will discourage the use of foreign aid for military purposes or for aggravation of international conflicts and pursue environmental conservation in tandem with development (Asahi Shimbun, 27 June 1992: 1; Gaimusho, 1995: 80–81; Hirabayashi, 1995). Prior to the adoption of the foreign aid charter, Tokyo’s foreign policy was often criticized for its commercially oriented, Asia-focused, and loandominant nature. That is, until recently a preponderance of Japanese foreign aid was in the form of loans rather than grants, the loans were often “tied” to Japanese providers, and most assistance was extended to Asian countries where Japan’s economic interests were concentrated, to the neglect of countries in other parts of the world. For example, in fiscal year 1990 (April 1990–March 1991), 73 percent of Japanese loans to the developing world were extended to Asian countries, as opposed to 7 percent each for the Middle East and Africa, 11 percent for Latin America, and 2 percent for Oceania and Eastern Europe. Japan’s Asia focus throughout the 1990s increased, with 90 percent of its loan pledges destined for Asia during the second half of the 1990s. The predominant Asia focus of Japanese foreign aid policy continues with the start of the new century, as does the emphasis on loans rather than grants. In Asia there is growing appreciation of Japan’s positive contributions to the region’s peace and prosperity through its pacifist and economics-centered policy (Jihua, 1993: 185–200; Chittiwatanapong, 1993). Elsewhere in the world, Japan’s economic presence has generated some expectations for expanded political roles, but those expectations have so far proven unrealistic. This is particularly the case in Latin America (Elton, 1993) and Africa (Schraeder, 1999). Tokyo also believes that loans requiring repayment are a more effective way to develop effective economic management on the part of aid recipients, and therefore it limits the grant element of its foreign aid. During the Cold War, Japan’s political and strategic interests were clearly tied to its cooperation with the United States in the political and strategic rivalry against the Soviet Union and its allies. This was particular-

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ly the case in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, where political instability was seen as a prime target for communist expansion. Japan’s interest in democracy promotion in the developing world is a more recent phenomenon. Even more recent is Japan’s participation in international support for democratization and market development in the so-called transitional economies in Central and East Asia, the former Soviet republics, and Eastern Europe. Japan’s adoption of the 1992 foreign aid charter and its increasing willingness to use economic assistance for democratization purposes in a more explicit manner than in the past has been encouraged by the growing international acceptance of the so-called political conditionality in economic assistance. In May 1990, when the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) was founded, the new organization adopted the principle of political conditionality in promoting democratization and market reform in the former socialist economies of Europe (Oshiba, 1994: 137– 138). Moreover, the United States and its Cold War allies find themselves in a better position materially and morally to pursue democratization in their former enemies (Oshiba, 1994: 139). Humanitarian missions, international environmental cooperation, the proliferation of nongovernmental human rights organizations, and deepening economic interdependence throughout the world are also strengthening—and being strengthened by— political and moral arguments in favor of political conditionality. Finally, there is growing acceptance of the proposition that democracies do not go to war against each other (Oshiba, 1994: 138–139). Although its empirical verification remains highly problematic, the democratic-peace hypothesis provides additional ammunition to the advocates of economic assistance to the newly independent states of Europe and Central Asia and to the former socialist countries of East Asia, most importantly Mongolia and Vietnam (see Chapter 2). Another question often raised about the effectiveness of foreign economic assistance in democracy promotion is how serious and committed donor countries are with the promises of rewards and threats of punishment they might offer as part of their conditionality approach. “Positive sanctions” appear more readily deliverable than “negative sanctions.” Evidence from international cases is far from conclusive (Cassen, 1986, cited in Takeda, 1995: 141–147). The political conditionality that Japan has recently incorporated into its foreign aid policy is quite ambiguous, and Tokyo appears ambivalent about its implementation (Takeda, 1995: 147). From a purely theoretical perspective, an assessment of political and social effects of the offer or withdrawal of economic assistance in the developing world might be called for. However, because such an assessment would be very controversial or unacceptable altogether for political reasons, the Japanese foreign aid system has no provision for such assess-

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ments (Okabe, 1992: 208). Tokyo is clearly quite sensitive to any criticisms of interference in the international affairs of its foreign aid recipients. Japan has traditionally adopted the position, known as yoseishugi, that it would consider economic aid on the basis of requests initiated by recipient countries. Moreover, Japan’s foreign aid administration and personnel resources are woefully inadequate to undertake a thorough assessment of the impact of its economic assistance, much less the political and social consequences of its foreign aid programs. Under these circumstances, perhaps the best the donor country could do would be to engage the recipient government in dialogue and persuade it to develop indigenous political and social institutions for an equitable sharing of the benefits of economic development. It may be helpful to involve members of the intellectual elite in the recipient country in this dialogue in view of the accentuated importance of the role of elites in developing countries in general (see Kohli, 1986, cited in Takeda, 1995: 135, 152). According to Japanese policymakers, there are also some serious questions about the long-term effect of democratization intervention. For example, international monitoring of elections in developing countries is one thing, but the postelection establishment of democratic institutions and practices is quite another. Long-term democratization obviously requires commitment of far greater human and material resources than the monitoring of elections. Witness, for example, the cases of Haiti and Angola, where a coup d’état and a civil war erupted after democratic elections in 1990 and 1992, respectively. In Myanmar, as discussed in the following section, a military junta nullified democratic elections in 1990 and deprived elected officials of their legitimate right to govern. A number of experts have proposed steps to improve Tokyo’s ability to promote democratization in developing countries through its foreign aid policy. One idea is to specifically interject human rights-focused projects in foreign aid. Such projects might include the construction of modern prisons, improvement of justice systems, and education of police and military personnel in human rights. Also suggested are projects to train members of minority groups in recipient countries who are subject to discrimination. So far this idea has proven too political for Japanese officials to consider seriously. Another proposal is to conduct a human rights assessment as part of the process of selecting foreign aid projects. Environmental assessments have become an important if not always effective part of Japanese foreign aid. By the same token, some critics argue, the Japanese government should include human rights assessments as a formal requirement. So far the Japanese government has remained publicly silent on the desirability of an explicit evaluation of progress on the human rights front in recipient countries. Similarly, the government has been cool to the idea of introducing human rights principles and conditions into foreign aid projects, for exam-

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ple, consideration that a foreign aid contract should stipulate nondiscrimination against and promotion of minorities in the workplace. In other words, what is required is an affirmative action program as part of Japanese foreign aid, an idea bound to raise criticisms in recipient countries. Even more controversial would be making the size and nature of Japanese foreign aid proportional to the quality of human rights records of recipient countries (see Yokota, 1995: 145–146). A number of cases illustrate Japan’s preferred “quiet approach” to democracy promotion. For example, after the military coup in Thailand in 1991, Japan’s policy toward that country remained essentially the same: to provide economic assistance, including support for large infrastructure projects, and to encourage Japanese commercial investments. As noted earlier, Tokyo’s response to Indonesia’s suppression of proindependence demonstrations in East Timor in 1991 differed substantially from the approach taken by many northern industrialized democracies with stronger human rights initiatives. Similarly, Tokyo was not moved by President Fujimori’s emergency rule of Peru, including the suspension of the national legislature in 1992, to review its pro-Lima policy, which included extension of economic assistance and promotion of commercial investments in the Latin American country. The logic behind these and other cases, which serves as the cornerstone of Japan’s democratization policy, was aptly captured by a Japanese analyst: “Democracy is a universal value, and the world shares in this value. However, paths to democracy vary according to each country’s situation, and it is not wise to impose democratization in a uniform and rash manner. The repeatedly observable pattern in many developing countries, particularly in Asia, is that economic stability is established first and then political stability comes, leading to political democratization” (Yokota, 1995: 170). Under domestic and international pressure, Japan belatedly added a democratization dimension to its foreign aid program in 1996—the Partnership for Democratic Development (PDD), an initiative explicitly designed to support democratization efforts in the developing world. PDD assistance is intended to help recipient countries develop legal, administrative, electoral, and police systems and institutions, as well as build the human resources capacity necessary for democratization and human rights protection. Most of the aid under this initiative is extended bilaterally, but some assistance has gone to support the activities of the Voluntary Fund for Advisory Services and Technical Assistance and the UN Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Program. Japan organizes lectures and introduces Japanese systems through the dispatch of experts, the acceptance of trainees, and the invitation of government officials to visit Japan and others from the recipient countries. Under this initiative, Japan has extended financial and technical assistance to such countries as Cambodia, China, El

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Salvador, Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, South Africa, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. Since 1994 Japan has also provided electoral support to about forty countries around the world. In 1998 alone, Japan extended financial, technical, and personnel training support to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, the Central African Republic, Equador, Guinea, Lesotho, and Nigeria (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000). Japan’s assistance to Indonesia is illuminating. Indonesia is Japan’s fifth most important trade partner in the world, with bilateral trade in 1998 valued at $10.8 billion, or 3.9 percent of Japan’s global trade. Indonesia is also the second largest recipient of Japanese foreign aid, after China. In 1998 Japan disbursed $828 million in ODA to Indonesia—a figure representing 9.6 percent of Japan’s bilateral assistance (Japan 2000, 2000: 60, 68). Japanese aid represents about 60 percent of the aid Indonesia receives annually. Obviously, political stability in Indonesia is of great concern to Japan. In June 1999 Japan extended assistance to Indonesia to support the general election under the new government of President B. J. Habibie, offering $34.5 million through the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), which coordinated international support. In addition, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), a quasi-government agency in charge of Japanese technical assistance to developing countries, sent seventeen experts to the Indonesian general election commission and three experts to the UNDP. Finally, a former ambassador to Indonesia headed a Japanese government observer mission to Indonesia from June 3 to 9, 2000 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000). During the East Timor crisis in 1999–2000, Japan came under international criticism for its less-than-vigilant approach to Indonesia. It was widely believed that Indonesian troops and East Timorese police worked with pro-Indonesian militias in the mass killings, destruction of infrastructure, and forced relocation of thousands of East Timorese to West Timor that occurred in the wake of the East Timorese referendum for independence in August 1999. The Japanese government refused to criticize directly the Indonesian government for these atrocities. Moreover, when the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was established in October 1999 to oversee the establishment of a civilian government in East Timor, Japan did not participate in peacekeeping, explaining that it could not take part in peacekeeping because no cease-fire was in place—one of the conditions under the international peace cooperation law that had been used to send peacekeepers to Cambodia. Japan limited its participation in the East Timor crisis to financial aid, humanitarian assistance, emergency rehabilitation, and postconflict economic and social development. It dispatched a contingent of the Air SelfDefense Force to airlift four hundred tons of relief goods to refugees in West Timor from November 1999 to February 2000 and sent a few police

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officers to East Timor to train local residents as police officers. In December 1999 Japan invited East Timorese rival factions to Tokyo to urge reconciliation and cooperation in postconflict development, and it also pledged $100 million in emergency, technical, and humanitarian assistance over three years. When three UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) employees were slain by East Timorese militias in September 2000, Japan participated in a UN-appointed fact-finding mission. In short, its role was strictly in the civilian sector.

Political Conditionality and Japanese Foreign Policy Practice The degree to which the Japanese government has been seriously applying political conditionality in its foreign aid policy is best demonstrated by an analysis of Japanese foreign aid to three disparate cases: China, Myanmar, and Russia. The most visible and most difficult case that has tested and continues to test Japan’s commitment to democracy promotion is China and its human rights violations. Although Japan has expressed a degree of concern over China’s human rights record, Tokyo has taken pains to ensure that the issue does not affect its relationship with Beijing. Historical, political, strategic, and economic factors affect Tokyo’s approach to China. The most significant is the historical factor. Japan’s influence over China is severely compromised by Imperial Japan’s aggression against China in the 1930s and 1940s. Beijing rarely fails to bring up this dark chapter in the history of bilateral relations between the countries. The most recent incident involving Chinese criticism of Japan’s past aggression occurred in November 1998, when Premier Jiang Zemin visited Japan for a series of high-level meetings, including ones with the Japanese prime minister and emperor. The Chinese leader, by repeatedly and pointedly reminding his hosts of the history issue, irked the Japanese and seriously affected the political climate surrounding their relations. Tokyo also underscores the enormous importance of its giant neighbor to the peace and stability of the entire Asia-Pacific region and is determined to keep Beijing engaged in bilateral and multilateral dialogue for the construction of a post–Cold War regional order. For this reason, Tokyo does not want to see the human rights issue isolate Beijing internationally. Most Japanese further believe that China’s internal stability is essential to the region’s peace and stability and that this requires sustained economic development in China. Most important, Japan has substantial economic interests in China, which is its second most important trade partner after the United States, and Japan is China’s largest trade partner, with the two-way trade in 1998 amounting to approximately $37 billion. For these reasons,

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Tokyo believes its substantial economic assistance to Beijing is both necessary and justified even if China’s human rights record is poor. Indeed, Japan is China’s largest foreign aid donor and provided $1.2 billion in economic aid in 1998, making China the largest recipient of Japanese aid (Japan 2000, 2000: 60, 68). In the aftermath of China’s brutal subjugation of the prodemocracy movement at Tiananmen Square in 1989, Tokyo was the most reluctant Group of Seven (G-7) country (now G-8 with the addition of Russia) to join the decision to impose diplomatic and economic sanctions against Beijing. On the contrary, Tokyo strongly advocated limiting sanctions and the early lifting of sanctions. Even while Western sanctions were in effect, Japan allowed China to proceed with Japanese foreign aid projects already in progress. At the same time, however, Japan repeatedly informed China it would not be able to lift its sanctions until Beijing took measures that would be acceptable to the international community and that demonstrated its resolve to continue with the reform and open policy. Japan’s ambivalent attitude was thus reflected in the seemingly contradictory elements in its action and words. At the Houston summit of G-8 leaders in 1990, Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu stressed the “special relationship” between Japan and China and obtained the other summit leaders’ tacit approval of his decision to resume new government loans to China. Tokyo’s explanation for its position was that even though democratization was an important issue, stopping economic assistance to China would not necessarily promote democratization in that country. To the contrary, Tokyo argued, continuing support for China’s reform and open policy rather than isolating the country was important not only to China but also to the stability of Asia (Inada, 1995a: 6, 9–10). Japan’s emphasis on its special relationship with China was at odds with the more critical policy of the United States and the other northern industrialized democracies. Japanese leaders publicly acknowledged the difference between their approach to China and that of the United States, their closest ally. Chinese leaders took full advantage of Japan’s position. For example, following the meeting between Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa and Chinese Premier Li Peng in Beijing in March 1994, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman reported that the Japanese leader told his Chinese counterpart, “It is not wise to impose a Western democratic value on other countries,” a reference to the visible criticism U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher had raised about China’s human rights record during his visit to Beijing, which just preceded Hosokawa’s visit (Asahi Shimbun, 21 March 1994: 3). Tokyo’s position no doubt compromised its stand on democracy and human rights around the world. At the same time, however, Japanese policymakers refused to believe that China would have changed (improved) its human rights policy to any significant

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degree if Japan had joined the position on China of the United States and the other northern industrialized democracies. This is the basic dilemma that continues to confront the international community. Long after Tiananmen, many Japanese analysts continue to believe that Japan is justified in maintaining a unique approach to China and that it should continue to support China’s economic development to ensure political stability in the country (Inada, 1995b: 162). This view reflects the continuing apprehension among Japanese analysts concerning China’s ability to maintain political order peacefully against the backdrop of rising social expectations, growing ethnic aspirations, and increasing regional and class disparities (Nakajima, 1992: 164–179). It is important to note that this view is shared by many Chinese intellectuals as well. They are quietly critical and regretful of the brutal end to the prodemocracy movement at Tiananmen Square in 1989, but they believe China’s stability must be maintained to improve the plight of average Chinese before the country is ready to accommodate the intellectuals’ aspirations for freedom and democracy. Myanmar represents a different case because the country is small enough that outside pressure can have a substantial impact on the behavior of the government. Although Myanmar was the first case in which Japan imposed economic sanctions for reasons of democratization (Inada, 1995b: 155), here too Tokyo was reluctant to use foreign aid and did not abandon a more subtle approach, choosing engagement and dialogue over isolation and overt pressure. In March 1988 a prodemocracy student demonstration in Yangon escalated into violence, and by June violence had spread to provincial cities. By the end of August the antigovernment movement had reached its height, with public officials and soldiers also participating in demonstrations. On September 18, the military launched a coup d’état and took over the government. By September 7, the U.S. government had announced it would discontinue all economic assistance except humanitarian aid. As late as mid-August, however, Tokyo was planning to proceed with its economic assistance to Burma, but the chaos in the country forced postponement of the delivery of food production aid and medical equipment worth $7.8 million. By September Tokyo had decided not to resume aid until a peaceful resolution to the situation came about. In February 1989, when violence had quieted down, Tokyo moved to recognize the military government before any of the other northern industrialized democracies and resumed economic assistance that was already under contract, although it placed a freeze on new aid projects. In 1990, when the UN General Assembly was debating the proper international response to the Burmese military’s suppression of democracy advocates, the Japanese delegation worked to postpone a vote on a

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Swedish-proposed resolution stating that all political detainees should be released immediately and confirming and fully restoring their right to participate in the political process. In 1991 Japan rejected Sweden’s request to jointly sponsor another General Assembly resolution noting that many democratically elected leaders of Myanmar, including the Nobel Peace Prize winner Aun San Su Kyi, had been deprived of their freedom and demanding that the Yangon government allow all citizens to participate in the political process. Japan’s decision not to support the Swedish initiative was motivated both by its concern not to isolate the Myanmar government internationally and by its fear of negative consequences for Japanese economic aid to the country, which incidentally was the largest from a single country (Inada, 1995b: 169–175). With the general elections in May 1990, which gave opposition candidates a major victory, democracy appeared to be returning to Myanmar. However, the military government placed opposition leader Aun San Su Kyi and other civilian leaders under house arrest and refused to turn the government over to civilian control. Tokyo decided to suspend all economic aid except humanitarian assistance. In March, as a sign of constructive engagement, Tokyo had announced it would extend approximately $9 million in grants for food production programs but continued the suspension of all loans (Asahi Shimbun, 9 March 1995: 2). This continued until July 1995, when the military government in Yangon released the Nobel Peace Prize winner from house arrest. Japan welcomed the move and announced it would gradually unfreeze loans to Myanmar, with the timing of aid restoration contingent on progress toward democratization. Tokyo believed this was the best way to prod Myanmar along toward democracy (Asahi Shimbun, 11 July 1995: 2, 3; Asahi Shimbun, 19 July 1995: 2). It is difficult to say that Tokyo’s carrot-and-stick approach was critical to the change in Myanmar, but in view of the fact that its economic assistance represented 70–80 percent of all international aid to the country, Tokyo’s influence clearly could not be underestimated. In February 1998 the Japanese government decided, against criticisms in the United States and the other northern industrialized democracies, to resume loans to Myanmar. Tokyo was prepared to extend approximately $21 million in loans for the expansion of the Yangon international airport; evidently, safety concerns overrode democracy and human rights issues. The Japanese Foreign Ministry justified the decision on the basis of the urgent need to ensure safety in air transport in view of the deteriorating condition of the runways and control tower at the airport (Asahi Shimbun, 26 February 1998: 2). In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, Japan is showing increasing commitment to international assistance for the development of democracies and market economies. Here again, however, Japanese support

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is more extensive, more direct, and more varied on the economic than the political front. Japan’s assistance for what is often referred to as “transitional economies” began in 1990, when Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu announced a series of aid programs for Poland and Hungary during his tour of Europe. In announcing these initiatives, the prime minister emphasized that Japan wanted to cooperate with the United States and Europe in building a new world order and that successful reforms in the former Soviet bloc countries were important to the stability of the Asia-Pacific region. An observer of Japanese aid policy notes, however, that these initiatives did not represent a major shift in Tokyo’s aid philosophy, suggesting that they were consistent with the policy the government had enunciated since 1980 to use foreign aid as an element of Japanese participation in the Western alliance. Moreover, the analyst adds, Tokyo wanted to establish the introduction of democratic principles and other criteria for extending assistance to former socialist countries as a means of preventing unconditional expansion of Western aid to the Soviet Union (Inada, 1995b: 159). Among the former Soviet Union and East European countries, Russia is of the greatest importance to Japan, both politically and economically. The goals and objectives of Japanese assistance programs are purported to include support for Russia’s transition to a market economy, democratization, and establishment of diplomatic relations based on “law and justice.” The last of these refers to Tokyo’s most important political interest in Russia: settlement of the Japanese-Russian dispute over the Russian-controlled islands known as the “Northern Territories” in Japan and the “Southern Kuriles” in Russia. Japan has made aid to Russia conditional to Moscow’s concessions on this issue, and since Moscow has offered no such concessions, Tokyo has been unwilling to provide extensive financial assistance, preferring humanitarian and technical assistance instead (see Akaha, 1993; 1994). In contrast, democratization receives scant attention in Japanese assistance programs. Since 1991 Japan has earmarked $1.2 billion for loans through the Export-Import Bank for various projects to develop telecommunications, energy supply, and small-to-medium enterprises, as well as to privatized corporations. Japan has also allocated $2.9 billion for trade insurance to cover major Russian industries, while making it amply clear that its economic interests are first and foremost in the Russian Far East region, which offers an important potential market for Japanese investment and an equally attractive source of natural resources. Japan has long declined to provide direct, bilateral economic assistance to Russia, limiting its aid either to multilateral channels within the G-8 framework or technical and humanitarian aid on a bilateral basis. Tokyo has justified this position by asserting that Russia is not a developing country, and therefore, according to the foreign aid criteria established by the

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Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), of which Japan is a member, it is not eligible for official economic assistance. While technically correct, the justification more accurately serves as an excuse for the Japanese government’s reluctance to extend direct assistance, particularly financial, to Russia unless and until Moscow concedes even partially to Tokyo’s demand for the return of the disputed Kurile Islands. Tokyo has also communicated to Russia that Japanese businesses would be reluctant—as they have been—to invest in Russia unless and until legal and administrative improvements are made to provide substantially more hospitable market conditions. The situation appeared to be changing, with Tokyo and Moscow agreeing in 1997 to do their best to conclude a peace treaty by the end of the century, with the prospective treaty interpreted in Japan as including a territorial settlement but in Russia as not necessarily representing a final territorial solution (Akaha, 1998a). However, Japan’s improving attitude toward Russia is a reflection not so much of its appreciation of democratization processes underway in the latter as of its eagerness to reach a territorial settlement and diversify its sources of imported natural resources. Additionally, Japan is increasingly interested in improving political and security relations with Russia to counter the growing potential of a Chinese threat (Akaha, 1998b). In summary, most of the aid Japan has extended to Russia has been focused on the introduction of market principles and the development of institutions to promote economic reforms rather than the process of democratization and promotion of human rights. Indeed, Japan’s more recent interest in improved economic relations with Russia is based more on strategic, territorial, and economic calculations than on expectations of a democratic Russia.

Conclusion A variety of factors, most notably a cultural bias against exporting political values, has limited Japan’s embrace and support of democracy promotion in the developing world. However, there are some reasons why one can expect Japan to become more assertive in its foreign policy, including a more pronounced use of foreign economic assistance to promote democratization and human rights. Japan’s most important foreign policy partner, the United States, expects—and Japan’s Asian neighbors are beginning to accept—a change in the nation’s foreign policy in this direction. Other reasons include Japan’s broadening definition of its role as a provider of not only economic values but also political and even security values to the international community.

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The Japanese government has accepted the plausible yet unsubstantiated assumption that through economic development, societies can cultivate democratic values and institutions and that the best instrument Japan has for promoting democracy and human rights around the world is economic assistance. However, it remains to be seen whether an even more assertive use of economic resources will visibly improve Japan’s ability to facilitate democratization processes in Asia and other regions of the developing world. There will be limits to the persuasiveness of Japanese efforts. Japan’s own human rights record must be substantially improved if Tokyo’s democratization effort can carry moral weight. For example, critics find reprehensible Tokyo’s stand on the issue of compensation for the socalled “comfort women”—foreign women who were forced into prostitution to service Japanese troops during World War II. The Japanese government has repeatedly stated that its postwar peace treaties with neighboring Asian countries legally settled the issue of compensation. Under mounting international pressures on this issue, however, the government decided in December 1994 to establish a nongovernmental fund to provide financial assistance to former comfort women and asked private citizens to contribute to it, but critics see this as a shirking of responsibility on the part of the government itself (Asahi Shimbun, 21 December 1994: 3). It is also reported that even this fund is far too small to provide the level of compensation being demanded by Korean, Chinese, and other citizens who had suffered under Japanese military occupation. Many Japanese and foreign critics also remain skeptical about the seriousness with which the Japanese government intends to implement the 1992 foreign aid charter. They particularly note a lack of consistency in the application of the guidelines, as shown in the case of China. Even if Tokyo is serious about implementing the policy, doubts will remain about the charter’s effectiveness if the effort is viewed as an imposition of foreign values and meddling in the internal affairs of target countries, be they developing capitalist countries or former socialist countries (Okabe, 1992: 212). Although the seriousness and effectiveness of Japan’s democracy promotion efforts have yet to be tested, one thing is clear. This economic giant has finally awoken to the realities of the post–Cold War world, realities that beckon Japan to speak more openly and clearly of its philosophy and its political aspirations. Although the complexity of contemporary global problems defies unidimensional and quick solutions, Japan is expected to participate actively and consistently in the formulation of viable solutions. The contemporary problems of freedom, prosperity, and security continue to heighten the Japanese people’s awareness of the interconnectedness of the world, and the realities of the world are forcing them to seek sensitive and sensible solutions to these problems.

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Japan’s answer thus far has been to use its enormous economic power in an increasingly strategic and political manner. While this approach is certainly not revolutionary, it is a big step for a country that still has a long way to go before it can overcome the weighty legacies of its past and establish itself as a credible and legitimate world power. In the process, the Japanese people are slowly overcoming their cultural barriers to international life. They are beginning to see peace and prosperity not as “private goods” to be won and cherished within their own island country but as “public goods” to be won and cherished in the borderless “one world.”

Notes 1. Japanese SDF personnel could participate in a UN-sanctioned peacekeeping operation if a cease-fire was in effect, if the parties to the conflict accepted the peacekeeping operation, and if the operation maintained neutrality. They would withdraw if one of these conditions ceased to exist. They would bear only minimally required arms to protect themselves.

7 Inconsistent U.S. Efforts to Promote Democracy Abroad Steven W. Hook

o country has had a greater impact on global democratization, for better and for worse, than the United States during the twentieth century. No country has possessed its vast political, cultural, economic, and military resources—and its predisposition to use them toward recreating other states in its own image. Thus it should come as no surprise that the U.S. government’s involvement in democracy promotion has received such great attention, along with a considerable degree of skepticism and suspicion. Indeed, the very foundations of U.S. democracy promotion have come into question since the terrorist attacks on the nation occurred in September 2001. The U.S. pursuit of global democratization historically has served an ambiguous combination of altruistic aspirations and concrete national selfinterests. Unfortunately, the subordination of U.S. democratic ideals to geopolitical concerns during the Cold War, combined with the tendency to impose its own democratic model on foreign countries, fueled ideological polarization within many developing countries and left a legacy of mistrust and resentment that has yet to be overcome more than a decade after the Cold War’s collapse. Democracy promotion efforts have also been hampered during the post–Cold War era by a variety of domestic obstacles, including the lack of consensus regarding the broad outlines of U.S. foreign policy and the presence of other foreign policy objectives that, in many cases, clash with the pursuit of democracy promotion. Despite mounting evidence that many of the lessons associated with the failures of previous democratization campaigns have been taken into account in more recent efforts (e.g., see Carothers, 1999), the government’s ability to achieve its stated goals remains greatly constrained by domestic factors. This chapter explores and evaluates the U.S. experience with democracy promotion. First, such efforts are placed in historical context, one that begins well before the Cold War and that, in turn, views the campaign in the 1990s as an extension of long-standing practice. Second, the U.S. gov-

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ernment’s attempt to make global democratization a central objective of foreign policy is assessed. The major obstacles confronting U.S. policymakers are then considered before the chapter concludes with a consideration of future prospects.

U.S. Democracy Promotion in Historical Perspective Contemporary initiatives in the pursuit of democracy promotion may be viewed as the continuation, by other means, of a virtually continuous “democratist crusade” that has been underway throughout the nation’s history (Hendrickson, 1994–1995). The equation of U.S. moral principles with universal ideals, the goal of transforming diverse political systems into replications of the U.S. model, and the linkage of U.S. material support to appropriate behavior by real or potential beneficiaries—all are deeply entrenched features of the U.S. “style” of foreign policy (Hook and Spanier, 2000). To some scholars, the tradition of liberal internationalism most often associated with Woodrow Wilson “has been the most important and distinctive contribution of the United States” to contemporary international relations (Smith, 1994: 12). What has dismayed critics, before and during the Cold War, was not so much the expression of democratic ideals by the U.S. government but the gaping chasm between its words and deeds. Prior to the twentieth century, the enslavement of Africans, the dislocation of Native Americans, and the denial of voting rights to women openly contradicted the country’s professed democratic principles. In foreign affairs, the Monroe Doctrine and “manifest destiny” served as normative justifications for an expansionist foreign policy that included the absorption of Latin America into a U.S. sphere of influence and the conquest of northern Mexico (Merk, 1963). As Raymond Aron, a distinguished French international relations theorist, observed, American leaders during this period “never recognized the similarity between continental expansion and the imperialism of other states” (1974: xxxv). This behavior pattern spread into the Pacific at the turn of the twentieth century, when the U.S. colonization of the Philippines was defended by William McKinley as an act of political and spiritual emancipation. Wilson epitomized the characteristic strain of U.S. moralism in depicting the country’s role in World War I as a mission “for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own government, for the rights and liberties of small nations . . . and to make the world itself free.” Wilson’s call for national self-determination appeared hypocritical, however, in the context of frequent U.S. interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean.1 In similar fashion, Franklin Roosevelt por-

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trayed the U.S. role in World War II not merely as the protection of U.S. national security but as a more general defense of democratic institutions and principles. Yet Roosevelt’s embrace of Joseph Stalin, the Soviet dictator whose atrocities against his own people rivaled those of Adolph Hitler, his accommodation of Soviet postwar hegemony in Eastern Europe, and his vision of a world order “policed” by the great powers revealed a deeper and complicating realism. As the realist approach to foreign policy became dominant within the U.S. government, academia, and the elite press in the immediate postwar period, prominent realists such as Hans Morgenthau and Walter Lippmann discouraged the assertion of global democratization as a key mission of U.S. foreign policy. Instead, they argued that a narrowly construed national interest should be the focus of foreign policy and that international stability should be the policy’s primary objective rather than the democratic conduct of foreign countries. In this regard, the strategy of communist containment outlined by George Kennan was essentially a geopolitical doctrine based upon a sociological understanding of Russo-Soviet political culture and a pessimistic economic assessment of Soviet communism.2 Yet contrary to the doctrine’s proposed narrow application to the Soviet context, containment was expanded into an ideological campaign with an open-ended global mandate (Shafer, 1988). In typical fashion, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles viewed the communist threat in apocalyptic terms by noting, “Bolshevism was the product of the Devil, but God will bear out the Bolsheviks in the long run” (Stoessinger, 1985: 98). Contrary to its principled rhetorical tone, the actual conduct of U.S. foreign policy reflected a consequentialist ethic that regarded anticommunism as a moral end in itself, one that superseded the means by which the outcome was achieved.3 U.S. support for undemocratic regimes was thus viewed as an acceptable alternative to communist expansion as U.S. leaders drew moral distinctions between repressive governments of the right and left. “We should know the difference between reversible nondemocratic regimes and those which are irreversible because their power is informed by the fanatic dogma of Communism,” Reinhold Niebuhr noted at the height of the Cold War (Niebuhr, 1968: 217).4 Through such arguments the U.S. government paid for communist containment by dismissing the aspirations of mass publics in many developing countries and thus provoking and propelling the revolutionary mass movements that were its stated concern. The U.S. government’s embrace of Iran’s Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and Cuba’s Fulgencio Batista, and its support for the 1954 coup against the democratically elected Arbenz regime of Guatemala, most clearly demonstrated the prevalence of consequentialist ethics. Ongoing U.S. military support for authoritarian governments in Latin America and the Caribbean during the early 1960s belied the avowed good intentions of

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John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress. In these cases, and compelled by the prospect of “losing” such countries to leftist insurgents, Washington allied with authoritarian governments. The logic of ideological relativism was most clearly articulated by Kennedy in response to the 1961 assassination of Rafael Trujillo, the Dominican Republic’s dictatorial leader since 1940: There are three possibilities in descending order of preference: a decent democratic regime, a continuation of the Trujillo regime (a dictatorship), or a Castro regime (a communist government). We ought to aim at the first, but we really can’t denounce the second until we are sure that we can avoid the third. (Quoted in Ambrose, 1988: 219)

U.S. support for the corrupt Diem and Thieu regimes during the extended period of its military involvement in Vietnam, coupled with the sustained and indiscriminate bombardment of Vietnamese populations, represented the culmination of a foreign policy whose preoccupations with ultimate ends sanctioned behavior that not only violated the country’s own moral principles and international sensibilities but produced the very consequences previously declared unacceptable to the U.S. government. In this manner Vietnam represented the bankruptcy of U.S. democratization policy both on the basis of absolute principles and on consequentialist grounds. The Nixon-Kissinger policy of superpower détente was, in part, designed to close this gap between U.S. principles and actions. By basing its foreign policy on concrete national interests, Henry Kissinger argued, the government could at least avoid the charge of hypocrisy. In keeping with the policy, the Nixon administration established a modus vivendi with communist leaders in the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union while it prosecuted the Vietnam War, helped overthrow the elected Chilean government, supported proapartheid forces in South Africa, and provided generous amounts of military aid to authoritarian rulers such as Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, Mohammed ul-Haq Zia of Pakistan, and Achmed Sukarno of Indonesia. While the Nixon administration may not have been considered hypocritical and while the geopolitics of détente may have been elegant, the U.S. government was openly despised throughout much of the developing world, which remained both economically disadvantaged and highly undemocratic. At the very least, the Nixon administration’s pursuit of realpolitik was clearly incompatible with the country’s moralistic approach to foreign affairs. Under Jimmy Carter, the U.S. government rejected the “amoral” aspects of détente and identified one aspect of democracy promotion— human rights—as the cornerstone of its post-Vietnam foreign policy.5 Like his predecessors, however, Carter was unable to avoid compromises or to reconcile his principled rhetoric with established U.S. economic and securi-

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ty interests. Carter overlooked continuing repression in many areas that produced anti-American revolts, most portentously in Iran. Perversely, Carter’s withdrawal of support for the repressive Somoza regime in Nicaragua contributed to an equally problematic outcome for the United States—the emergence of a pro-Soviet regime that denied many political rights at home while supporting revolutionary movements elsewhere in Central America. Ronald Reagan framed the revival of the Cold War in the context of global democratization. His proposal for a “Campaign for Democracy” led to the formation in 1983 of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), financed by the U.S. government to subsidize democratic reforms overseas. The NED was effective in mobilizing interest groups and administering elections in such diverse settings as Chile, the Philippines, South Korea, and after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, Eastern Europe. But it was continuing U.S. support for autocratic rulers and resistance to antiapartheid forces in South Africa that captured public attention and drew criticism from Congress. Most notably, the administration’s “off-the-shelf” policy to overthrow the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, leading to the Iran-Contra scandal, violated not only international sensibilities but U.S. law itself. In sum, the promotion of democracy has long served as a key vehicle for the projection of U.S. political ideals as well as for the pursuit of the country’s material self-interests. In the view of U.S. leaders, democratic governments make for stable, reliable trading partners and are less likely than repressive states to pose military threats to the United States and its allies. “The dominant logic of American foreign policy was dictated by concerns for national security,” scholar Tony Smith observes; “the dominant way Washington saw to assure this security . . . was that democratic governments be promoted worldwide” (1994: 144). U.S. democracy promotion, in this view, need not be consigned exclusively to the domain of Wilsonian idealism. Liberal governments pursuing market-oriented economic policies have always served the “national interests” of the United States, a principle considered so important to realists. Perversely, the U.S. government’s preoccupation with democratic governance merely exposed the duplicity of its own discriminatory policies toward minorities and women. And in its conduct of foreign policy, the United States routinely strayed from its declared principles toward a starker form of realism—the consequentialism of Machiavelli and its offshoot, ideological relativism. In supporting dozens of reactionary regimes, however important they were viewed in furthering containment, the U.S. government played a vital role in provoking revolution and undermining prospects of reconciliation. As a result, the primary accomplishments of the United States in promoting democracy during the Cold War—creating pluralistic and stable governments in Germany and Japan and supporting Western

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European integration—were overshadowed by the country’s frequent lapses, particularly in the developing world. For the United States, this represented the supreme and most unfortunate paradox of the Cold War.

“Building Democracy” After the Cold War The first Bush administration (1989–1993) began at a momentous turning point in U.S. foreign policy. Less than one year after George H. W. Bush took office, the Berlin Wall fell, marking the beginning of the end of the Cold War and ushering in a period of unparalleled democratic change in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. To its credit, the Bush administration identified global democratization as a key element of the “new world order” and specified democracy promotion as a central foreign policy goal. U.S. actions in that regard assumed many forms, including a show of military force in the Philippines, designed to prevent the rise of antidemocratic forces, and the 1989 invasion of Panama, justified as a mission to liberate the country from its autocratic leader, Manuel Noriega. In addition, the United States joined other members of the Organization of American States (OAS) in signing the 1991 Santiago Agreement that equated threats to democratic reforms with challenges to regional stability.6 Bush supported international sanctions in September 1991 against Haiti after a military coup; in November 1991 against the autocratic Daniel Arap Moi regime of Kenya; and in April 1992 against Peru, after President Alberto Fujimori suspended the constitution and disbanded the national legislature. All of these steps were nonetheless secondary to the Bush administration’s primary concern of “managing” the former Soviet bloc’s transformation toward democratic rule and market economies. The success of the effort, which had obvious security ramifications for the United States, was by no means certain given the entrenched domestic forces that benefited from the old systems. Under the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) program, the United States would provide an average of $360 million to the region each year between 1989 and 1994, in addition to largescale financial support for economic and political reforms in Russia (USAID, 1995). The relatively large volumes of aid devoted to these recipients reflected a geographic selectivity in U.S. post–Cold War democratization policy that would continue throughout the Clinton administration. As a presidential candidate, Bill Clinton endorsed the global environmental measures proposed at the June 1992 UN-sponsored Earth Summit. Once elected, Clinton exhibited greater passion for the political aspects of “sustainable development,” specifically those that called for democratic reforms in developing countries. In the view of Agenda 21, the Earth Summit’s concluding plan of action, only a pluralistic, politically empow-

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ered citizenry could ensure the passage of market- and environmentalfriendly economic reforms (United Nations, 1992). And at the global level, democratic states were viewed as essential for the success of multilateral efforts in such areas as global warming, nuclear proliferation, and population control. Early in his administration, President Clinton embraced the “enlargement of the democratic community” as a key element of U.S. foreign policy. His effort responded to the widely perceived need to establish a new, postcontainment orienting principle for U.S. policy in the aftermath of the Cold War. The policy of democratic enlargement, labeled the “Clinton Doctrine” by one scholar (Brinkley, 1997), was formally articulated by National Security Adviser Anthony Lake: The successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement—enlargement of the world’s free community. . . . We must counter the aggression—and support the liberalization—of states hostile to democracy. . . . The United States will seek to isolate [nondemocratic states] diplomatically, militarily, economically and technologically. (Lake, 1993: 658–664)

Democratic enlargement served four related purposes for the U.S. government. First, the policy reflected and conformed to the existing reality of world politics—specifically the adoption of democratic norms, institutions, and processes by an unprecedented number of countries. Second, democratic enlargement was consistent, in principle if not always in practice, with the government’s concurrent goal of promoting U.S. economic growth and worldwide competitiveness. Both objectives, viewed as symbiotic and mutually reinforcing, were informed by the same model of neoliberal institutionalism adopted by the U.S. government in the years immediately following World War II. A third function served by democratic enlargement was the alignment of U.S. development policy with the political and economic principles espoused by the United Nations, the World Bank, and major nongovernmental organizations, many of which had become estranged from the United States during the Cold War. More generally, the policy furthered the policy of transnational institutionalism by which the United States and other major powers would become enmeshed cooperatively in a network of “institutions and arrangements.” Finally, the policy accepted and advanced the Kantian view that a world consisting of democratic states would be inherently more peaceful (see Chapter 2).7 The Clinton administration aligned its development policies with those of the other northern industrialized democracies during this period. An important part of this effort was the conditioning of foreign aid flows upon the adoption of democratic reforms by recipients. The imposition of politi-

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cal “conditionalities” reflected “an evolving donor consensus that more attention should be placed on political reforms” (Nelson and Eglington, 1992: 1). 8 The World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) imposed similar conditions on multilateral aid flows. These added to the economic requirements already in place to encourage market-based fiscal and monetary reforms associated with structural adjustment programs. 9 Within the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the primary source of U.S. aid, new standards were established for aid qualification and new programs were designed for democratic development. The agency’s Washington-based bureaucratic structure was reorganized around the new mission, a move that resulted in a greater role for recipient governments and NGOs in implementing development projects. In some cases, most notably the Democratic Republic of Congo (Congo-Kinshasa, former Zaire), USAID missions were closed because recipient governments had proven to be “poor partners” in implementing reforms. The Clinton administration’s enlargement policy was outlined in a March 1994 USAID report entitled Strategies for Sustainable Development. The report identified five specific areas of U.S. policy, including environmental protection, population control, “broad-based” economic growth, and humanitarian assistance. Under a fifth category, entitled “Building Democracy,” USAID declared that faltering democracies and persistent oppression pose serious threats to the security of the United States. Because democratic regimes contribute to peace and security in the world and because democracy and respect for human rights coincide with fundamental American values, the Clinton administration has identified the promotion of democracy as a primary objective of U.S. foreign policy. (1994: 17)

The policy of Building Democracy was in turn subdivided into four specific areas of concern. First, through the NED and USAID, the United States supported efforts by aid recipients to establish electoral processes, particularly the conduct of competitive, multiparty elections open to external observers. Second, the United States promoted the rule of law within recipient governments, with emphasis on the drafting of constitutions, the creation of independent courts, and the training of accountable police forces. Third, the internal governance of these countries was of interest to the U.S. government, particularly the practice of open and pluralistic decisionmaking and the effective prohibition of government corruption. Finally, the United States promoted civil society by funding independent news media, labor unions, and professional associations, all designed to enhance the accountability of governments and provide for broad-based political participation.

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Other efforts by the U.S. government, not specifically linked to the Building Democracy campaign, included the occupation of BosniaHerzegovina by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces and NATO’s subsequent intervention in the Kosovo conflict of 1999. The NATO mission in Bosnia, based upon the 1994 Dayton Accords, introduced a system of power sharing among the Muslim, Croat, and Serbian factions. A tripartite governing structure was devised and elections were held, although the viability of the system in the absence of external occupation remained dubious. The NATO intention in Kosovo, which included a bombing campaign in Belgrade, finally ended Slobodan Milosovic’s campaign of ethnic cleansing and contributed to his fall from power in October 2000. Importantly, the Yugoslav president had been indicted by an international war crimes tribunal, an unprecedented move that received the blessing of the U.S. government. Finally, the proposed expansion of NATO to include the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland was part of a broader effort to extend the reach of democratic governance into Eastern Europe. As in the case of the earlier Bush administration, Clinton’s interest in the region was infused by geopolitical self-interests, but it was consistent with his declared normative principles regarding democratic enlargement. These policies carried over into the administration of President George W. Bush, who succeeded Clinton in January 2001. In less than eight months, an emerging foreign-policy agenda under the guidance of National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Secretary of State Colin Powell was profoundly affected by terrorist attacks in September 2001. Prior to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, President Bush had called for a foreign policy based more upon U.S. national interests than the transnational concerns of interest to the Clinton administration—including democracy promotion. In waging its war on terrorism, however, the Bush administration was compelled to form cooperative arrangements with other governments in resisting terrorism as a transnational threat. While this return to multilateralism was welcomed by U.S. allies, the counterterrorism effort forced the Bush administration to cooperate with authoritarian regimes, particularly in the Middle East, with little history of democratic development. Domestically, the war on terrorism raised questions about whether the U.S. government would jeopardize civil liberties in seeking to enhance the security of its citizens and government institutions. Although it is still too early to judge the long-term impact the new Bush administration will have on U.S. democracy promotion, it is clear that democracy promoters are well aware of the problems they faced in the past and have amply documented the mistakes made by the U.S. government both during and after the Cold War. Indeed, there has been an observable “learning curve” (see Carothers, 1999) as past lessons have been converted

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into concrete reforms: more collaboration with nongovernmental organizations; attempts at closer coordination with other aid donors, public and private; increased support for civil society vis-à-vis political institutions; greater sensitivity and accommodation of cultural diversity; and support for alternative, “nonlinear” models of democratic development (see also Diamond, 1999). Most important, U.S.-based democracy promoters at the beginning of the twenty-first century are more pragmatic than in the past. It is increasingly common for even the proponents of democracy promotion to argue that the “effects” of past U.S. democratization programs are potentially marginal at best and often virtually impossible to discern among the many other forces that either promote or retard democratic development. “Despite thousands of democracy projects carried out in dozens of countries, billions of dollars spent, and endless reports by aid providers,” Carothers (1999: 303) observes, “there is surprisingly little conventional wisdom on the utility of democracy aid.” This pragmatic view, however, has fallen far short of dismissing the enterprise altogether. While the United States has been unable to “bring democracy” fully to such countries as Russia and Mexico, U.S. aid to NGOs, political parties, journalists, and labor unions—combined with support for judicial reform and free elections—has made a difference in these and other countries, most notably Nicaragua, South Africa, and Indonesia, which have undergone historic, if halting, democratic transitions. Most vividly, the October 2000 removal of President Milosovic through electoral means followed a grueling U.S.-led effort in all areas—economic sanctions, aid to political opponents, and military intervention. A middle ground, therefore, has been found in between the two poles of exuberance and fatalism.

Obstacles to Successful Democracy Promotion While the U.S. government was claiming considerable success in implementing its post–Cold War democracy programs, the effort came under political assault at home. For reasons that will be explored in greater detail below, domestic unease with the overall direction of U.S. foreign policy led to a challenge not only to the Building Democracy program but to the broader policy of liberal internationalism initiated by George Bush and continued during the subsequent Clinton and Bush administrations. This domestic backlash was most clearly evident in the downward trend in U.S. spending on economic aid, described in 1994 by USAID as the “natural vehicle” for promoting democracy (1994: 17). Transfers of U.S. aid declined from $11.6 billion in 1991 to $7 billion in 1999, a reduction of 40 percent (USAID 1992; 2000: 4). As a percentage of U.S. gross

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national product (GNP), a closely watched indicator of donor commitment, the level of U.S. official development assistance dropped from .20 to .10 during this period, the lowest level among major aid donors (see OECD, 1999; 2000). Given that the massive annual transfers of U.S. aid to two recipients—Israel and Egypt—remained untouched, the cutbacks in aid were largely imposed upon developing countries in Latin America and Africa. U.S. aid to Latin America fell from $1.6 billion in 1991 to $681 million in 1996, while aid to sub-Saharan Africa fell from a 1993 peak of $1.5 billion to $1.1 billion in 1996. Overall, the amount of aid allocated by the United States to least-less-developed countries (LLDCs) fell to .03 percent of U.S. GNP by the late 1990s, also the lowest level among the northern industrialized democracies (OECD, 1997: A13–A14). Programmatically, while major and long-standing aid projects were left in place, those relating to the program of Building Democracy were scaled back during the program’s first years of implementation. As a result, lessdemocratic states received proportionately more U.S. economic aid between 1991 and 1996. The distribution of U.S. aid to recipients classified by Freedom House as “not free” increased from 18 percent of the total pool of recipients in 1991 to an average of 30 percent during the next five years. Meanwhile, the proportion of U.S. aid to recipients rated as “free” fell from 32 to 30 percent.10 This pattern continued in 2002 as a result of the Bush administration’s war on global terrorism. The limitations of the U.S. effort reflected in these aid trends are attributable to two primary factors to which the analysis now turns: public and elite ambivalence about the role of democracy in U.S. foreign policy and the presence of clashing foreign policy objectives. Public and Elite Ambivalence Although few openly criticized the principle of U.S. support for democracy overseas, as an operational foreign policy “doctrine,” democratic enlargement failed to resonate among the general public. As one scholar noted, “most measures of public support for American international engagement were at all-time lows since immediately after Vietnam” (Ruggie, 1997: 91). According to a Times-Mirror survey, regularly conducted using identical sets of questions, a record 41 percent of respondents believed in June 1995 that the United States should “mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along the best they can on their own” (Schneider, 1997: 27–28). In a similar survey conducted in 1994 by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, no foreign policy concerns appeared on the public’s list of the top ten problems facing the United States. Instead, domestic problems such as crime, unemployment, the national budget deficit, health care, education, and drug abuse were considered more pressing. Among the few

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foreign policy priorities mentioned, survey respondents cited “intermestic” issues that crossed international and domestic boundaries, such as protecting jobs, reducing the trade deficit, securing energy resources, and stopping the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. These trends were again reported in the council’s 1999 survey. When asked to identify the most important foreign policy problem facing the United States, the largest group of respondents answered “Don’t Know” (Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1995, 1999). Public support for liberal internationalism eroded further after a series of foreign crises that unfolded in the 1990s. The Gulf War demonstrated that foreign policy success could be achieved through the deployment of massive military forces to achieve clear objectives relating to concrete U.S. self-interests. The failure of the U.S. intervention in Somalia, by contrast, demonstrated the hazards of state building in areas of marginal strategic importance to the United States. The protracted civil war in the former Yugoslavia, meanwhile, revealed the limits of external intervention in the face of blatant violations of human rights, and the genocidal slaughter in Rwanda graphically illustrated the degree of chaos that is possible in “failed states” (Helman and Ratner, 1992–1993). Thus it was predictable that when Clinton sought to forcefully remove a military junta from Haiti in 1994 and restore a democratically elected regime, the initiative received little public support. Subsequent problems with “restoring” Haiti’s elected government further turned public opinion against such “nation-building” missions. Along with domestic concerns, discontent with the Clinton administration’s foreign policies contributed in November 1994 to the Republican Party’s takeover of the U.S. Congress and the subsequent confrontation between the legislative and executive branches over foreign policy. Congressional Republicans advanced a more limited role for the United States based on narrowly defined national self-interests rather than transnational concerns. While the Clinton administration was able to prevent the abolition of USAID, Congress exercised its “power of the purse” in reducing USAID’s budget and constraining the agency’s ability to pursue its stated objectives (Hook, 1997). As a result, the United States became less capable of matching its democratic rhetoric with the material assistance many developing countries required to implement reform programs that were sought, and in many cases designed, by the U.S. government. Public unease with U.S. activism coincided with a deep divide among political and economic elites regarding the appropriate “grand strategy” of the United States in the post–Cold War era (Posen and Ross, 1996–1997). The Clinton administration’s program of liberal internationalism was embedded in a broader strategy of “cooperative security,” which, in addition to support for global political reforms, implied a proactive role by the

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United States in preventing the rise of regional hegemons and promoting multilateral security agreements and arms control (Carter et al., 1992). In many respects, the approach was compatible with the first Bush administration’s post–Cold War strategy of global U.S. “primacy” that was supported among prominent scholars (Huntington, 1993; Nye, 1990a). Critics of the strategy, however, argued that such a strategy would drain U.S. resources, alienate other major powers, and lead to the “imperial overstretch” foreshadowed in 1987 by historian Paul Kennedy (1987). These critics either called for a more modest strategy of “selective engagement” or, carried a step further, neoisolationism.11 While none of these alternative strategies explicitly rejected the promotion of democracy as a national objective, their prescriptions for U.S. policy in specific cases varied widely, from active interventionism to the minimal promotion of the United States as a role model to be emulated overseas. In his second term, during which Clinton was impeached by the House of Representatives for his role in the Monica Lewinsky sex scandal, the president deferred to congressional leaders who advocated a more restrained approach. In effect, given the lack of public interest in a more proactive policy, congressional assertiveness fueled animosity between the United States and the United Nations, U.S. opposition to proposed UN peacekeeping missions, and the withdrawal of U.S. support for many facets of sustainable development. Even though the State Department’s allocations for democracy promotion reached a record level of $637 million by 1999 (Carothers, 1999: 49), the terrorist attacks of September 2001 fostered a renewed focus on national security interests at the expense of democracy promotion. Conflicting Policy Objectives The U.S. democratization effort must also be placed in the context of other foreign policy priorities pursued by the United States during this period. It is in this context that the limitations of Building Democracy fully revealed themselves. Two broad priorities, representing the other “pillars” of the Clinton administration’s foreign policy, may be identified: (1) promoting U.S. economic competitiveness in an integrating, market-based global economy; and (2) maintaining a predominant military presence at the global level and in regions of perceived strategic interest to the United States. To varying degrees, both objectives impinged on the U.S. government’s ability to pursue the general objective of sustainable development and the more specific cause of democracy promotion. The Clinton administration’s embrace of “geoeconomics” reflected a recognition of global economic integration in the 1990s and a widely held belief that foreign markets would serve as the primary locomotive for the

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country’s economic growth in the twenty-first century. Related domestic goals included reductions in the federal budget and trade deficits, restrictive monetary policies, and a more hospitable relationship between business and government. At the regional and global level, the U.S. government’s goals included ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), consolidation of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the empowerment of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The relationship of this effort to democratization, however, was not clearly elaborated beyond largely implicit assertions that economic integration would encourage political stability and, ultimately, democratic governance. When contradictions emerged, short-term economic interests prevailed and a new economic relativism emerged: close economic ties with the United States subdued U.S. criticism of domestic repression. Nowhere was this economic relativism on display more clearly than in Sino-American relations. In this case the established linkage between bilateral trade and Chinese human rights behavior was not only overlooked but abolished outright by the Clinton administration in 1994. Its “engagement” policy toward Beijing was based on the presumption that closer trade ties would elicit political reforms—specifically the Chinese government’s easing of punishments against prodemocracy activists, toleration of religious freedoms and the rights of workers, and restraint on arms transfers to “rogue states” (later referred to as “countries of concern”). None of these reforms proved forthcoming, however, and China’s ranking as one of the world’s most undemocratic states remained intact into the twenty-first century (see Freedom House, 2000). Despite this evidence that the engagement policy had failed, the Clinton administration endorsed China’s entry into the WTO and Congress approved “permanent normal trade relations” with China in September 2000. Both measures followed intense lobbying efforts by NGOs on both sides of the engagement debate. As religious and human rights groups, along with U.S.-based labor unions, campaigned vigorously against closer Sino-American trade, hundreds of trade groups and multinational corporations pushed for normalized trade relations, primarily through financial contributions to proengagement candidates for Congress. In the end, the more affluent economic interests prevailed (see Hook and Lesh, 2002). Meanwhile, intimate U.S. trade ties with autocratic but economically vital states such as Congo-Kinshasa, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Saudi Arabia figured prominently in U.S. calculations. The United States provided most of the $20 billion in emergency funding required by the Mexican government during the 1994 peso crisis, which was abetted by widespread corruption in the Mexican banking system, the national courts, and the dominant PRI political party. 12 Uprisings against the repressive rulers in Congo-

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Kinshasa and Indonesia, which led to the ouster of both, gained support from Washington only after they had gained momentum and proved unstoppable. Regional security considerations also weighed heavily in U.S. foreign policy calculations. In cases when these clashed with the policy of Building Democracy, most conspicuously in the Middle East, strategic concerns generally prevailed. As noted above, Israel and Egypt retained their status as the primary recipients of U.S. aid.13 While Israel is often referred to as a democratic country, its ongoing control of the occupied territories has been accompanied by repression of political rights and widely reported cases of human rights violations against Palestinians in these areas (U.S. State Department, 1995). In Egypt, meanwhile, the government of Hosni Mubarek “continued to commit serious abuses” throughout this period and “dominated the political scene to such an extent that citizens do not have a meaningful ability to change their government” (U.S. State Department, 1996a). Despite these problems, the massive annual infusions of U.S. aid to both governments were not threatened. To the contrary, new aid programs were established for the unelected monarchy of Jordan in an effort to advance the Arab-Israeli peace process. U.S. aid to Egypt was viewed as essential not only to prevent the Middle East peace process from unraveling but also to prevent the Mubarek regime from being overtaken by Islamic fundamentalists. The U.S. government feared that such an outcome would greatly strengthen the power of militant Islam in the Middle East and across North Africa while increasing the likelihood of terrorist attacks against the United States and its Western allies. In this respect, the U.S. government registered little alarm when Islamic revivalists in Algeria were democratically elected but denied power by domestic opponents and the French government. Similarly, the United States grew more comfortable with leaders in sub-Saharan Africa who sacrificed democratic principles in the name of maintaining internal and regional stability (Connell and Smyth, 1998). The case of Turkey further illustrates the primacy of U.S. regional security interests over its proclaimed democratization policy. The Turkish government received $401 million in U.S. military aid between 1992 and 1996 in addition to more than $2 billion in military assistance (USAID, 1997: 183). For the United States, Turkey’s pivotal role as a member of NATO, combined with the secular and pro-Western Turkish government’s fragile hold on power, warranted large-scale flows of military aid. These considerations outweighed the government’s poor record in upholding both political rights and civil liberties. According to the State Department (1994), human rights violations by the Turkish government included the “torture of persons in police or security forces custody during periods of incommunicado detention and interrogation; use of excessive force against

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noncombatants by security forces; restrictions on freedom of expression and association; [and] disappearances and ‘mystery killings’ that appear to be politically motivated.” The same problems were reported in 1998 by the State Department, which noted that “serious human rights abuses continued.” The Russian case provides the most ample evidence of cross-cutting U.S. foreign policy preferences. The survival of Boris Yeltsin’s government served a variety of interests for the United States: the preservation of internal stability within Russia, the maintenance of regional stability within Eastern Europe and across the former Soviet Union, and the consolidation of economic and democratic reforms. Between 1992 and 1996, the Russian government received the third largest volume of bilateral U.S. aid (more than $2.1 billion) in addition to large bilateral packages from other OECD members, particularly Germany, and billions more in multilateral assistance. While Yeltsin’s strategy of “shock therapy” exposed the Russian economy to market forces, democratic reforms were more difficult to sustain (Freedom House, 1997: 324). In 1996 an independent commission reported “serious and widespread human rights violations, ethnic and religious discrimination, labor exploitation, [and] attacks on the media and prisoners’ rights.” 14 In addition, the Russian government’s violent crackdown of Chechenya separatists provoked international outrage. While the U.S. government argued for patience in allowing the reforms to take hold, broader strategic factors were clearly apparent. The United States and its Western European allies gained Russian acquiescence to the eastern expansion of NATO while taking steps to implement nuclear arms reductions and to prepare for deeper cuts under the proposed START III. These priorities remained in force after Yeltsin abruptly left office late in 1999 and transferred power to his hand-picked successor, Vladimir Putin. Even within the rubric of USAID’s program for sustainable development, the cross-pressures of varying objectives were evident. Of USAID’s $11.3 billion budget for economic assistance in 1995, for example, $436 million (4 percent of the total) was directed specifically toward the program of Building Democracy. Larger volumes of aid were committed for the promotion of economic growth ($3.8 billion), population and health care programs ($1.1 billion), and environmental protection ($634 million). These efforts were complementary in many respects, but the linkage between democratic development and other priorities varied considerably among the dozens of countries receiving U.S. assistance. Tensions among the various spending programs became increasingly clear in 2002, when aid programs not clearly linked to the U.S. war on terrorism suffered the deepest cutbacks.

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Limitations of the U.S. Democratic Model In promoting democracy abroad, the U.S. government has consistently sought to transplant its own distinctive model of democratic governance onto other societies with very different social structures, historical experiences, and material needs. The lack of a feudal tradition in the United States, its abundant territory and material wealth, and its relatively homogeneous population—all were peculiar to the U.S. case and foreign to most other societies (Hartz, 1951). Thus presumptions by the U.S. government of the universal applicability of its democratic model provoked justifiable resentment within foreign countries that were viewed as prospective protégés of U.S.-style democracy. Among other issues, many of which are explored at length elsewhere in this volume, the question of democracy’s origins is fraught with ambiguity. Must democracy emerge from within, or may external intervention— economic, military, political, or social—propel a nation-state toward democratic rule? Despite some moderation in recent years, the U.S. government has consistently adopted the latter position. Its attempt to export not only its democratic principles but replicas of its political institutions has persisted for more than two centuries (Tucker and Hendrickson, 1990). Enduring democratic reform, however, ultimately depends upon hospitable internal conditions that extend far beyond the narrow confines of state building to include such factors as cultural cohesion, relations between church and state, and the distribution of wealth. The U.S. government’s preoccupation with “free and fair elections,” a necessary but hardly sufficient component of democratization, was largely explainable because electoral reforms were most susceptible to short-term external intervention. As the criteria of democratic development become more abstract, however, they become more resistant to external influence. No amount of external pressure, material assistance, and institutional tinkering can create democratic rule in the absence of a tolerant and pluralistic “civic culture” (Almond and Verba, 1963; Dahl, 1971). This lesson became clear to U.S. policymakers through an arduous process of trial and error. In the Philippines, the facade of postcolonial democracy shielded a polarized and elite-dominated civil society that denied political or economic power to the vast majority of Filipinos. The same could be said of most countries in Central America, particularly Guatemala and El Salvador, that received large volumes of U.S. democracy assistance after the Cold War. By contrast, political reforms were more successful in Eastern Europe during the 1990s given the presence of labor unions, church groups, news media, and other elements of civil society. Without an empowered and broadly based “third force” standing between entrenched elites and long-suppressed peasantries, the prospects for demo-

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cratic reform are dim no matter how much external aid is provided or pressure applied. A second question involves whether democracy is more readily established through populist, “bottom-up” mechanisms or from above, by a small but cohesive elite. Recent history has provided both examples: elite domination yielded to broader participatory government in Chile, Japan, and Mexico, while mass-based democratic movements displaced autocratic regimes across Eastern Europe and in Congo-Kinshasa, Indonesia, Nicaragua, the Philippines, South Africa, and South Korea (Sørensen, 1993a). The U.S. government has generally relied upon its ties to the political and economic elites in developing countries over which it has exercised a considerable measure of control. During the Cold War it looked warily toward populist movements as potential sources of marxist revolution, and in the 1990s mass uprisings sparked anti-American backlashes in Haiti, Somalia, and several Islamic states, leading to the continued reliance of the U.S. government on top-down democratization.15 Finally, the tension between political liberty and socioeconomic equality as components of a democratic polity has always been a central dilemma of social organization given their inherent contradictions. While Western European leaders have reduced governmental activism in many areas of social policy, they have not forsaken the state’s role as an essential agent for social and economic equity (Keohane et al., 1993). Political reforms in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have retained a central state role in economic redistribution, and in many developing countries the successful application of market-driven economic policies has been possible only after labor unions and peasant groups have been assured of some measure of social security (Issak, 1995). The U.S. democratic model, however, has traditionally emphasized political liberty while de-emphasizing socioeconomic equality. Indeed, the latter has been consistently viewed as a threat to the former. The failure of the U.S. government to accommodate a more expansive conception of democratic development in this additional area has not only produced frustration in the United States but antiAmerican sentiments in foreign countries seeking their own path.

Conclusion The late 1990s may be viewed as a testing ground for the consolidation of the democratic wave that coincided with the Cold War ’s demise. Experience has shown, often painfully, that failed efforts to maintain democratic reforms encourage reaction from ideological extremists and renewed oppression. In some cases, such as revolutionary France and Weimar Germany, aborted democratic transitions produced violent conflict and

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international crisis. For this reason, as well as for its compelling normative rationales, continued support for global democratization is essential. In the face of public indifference and elite dissensus, the U.S. government has wisely held to the preservation of democratic reforms as a foreign policy goal. Its foreign aid program, however constrained by domestic opposition, has provided urgently needed material support to transition states. In addition, the United States has taken the lead in attempting to resolve one of the most serious regional crises of the post–Cold War era— the protracted civil war in the former Yugoslavia—raising at least a reasonable prospect that some form of accommodation can be achieved among the rival factions in Bosnia and Kosovo. In stark contrast to U.S. interventions during the Cold War, the earlier U.S intervention in Haiti deposed a military junta and restored a democratically elected regime. As noted above, the U.S. government also played key roles in forcing the Suharto regime in Indonesia to step down in 1998, and in supporting the independence of East Timor in 1999. In pursuing its democratization campaign into the twenty-first century, the U.S. government must still overcome the distrust harbored within many developing countries as a result of its conduct during the Cold War. Consequentialist ethics and appeals to authoritarianism as the lesser of two evils were lost on these populations, making up most of the world’s population, who paid a high price for U.S. grand strategy, in political repression and economic privation. Democratic transitions in many regions of the developing world have, as a result, been widely perceived as occurring in spite of rather than as a result of U.S. policy. Domestic uncertainty regarding the appropriate role of the United States will likely continue to constrain democratization efforts. Most serious, the narrow conception of national interest adopted by the Bush administration in 2001 greatly impaired the country’s contribution to global environmental reforms and population programs while encouraging other industrialized countries to reduce their own contributions to these transnational efforts. As new democracies face inevitable challenges in the years to come, the ongoing commitment of the United States will be critical, not only in areas of obvious vital interest such as Eastern Europe but in other areas, where living conditions are far worse, such as Central and South Asia. The failure of democracy in these most distressed areas will pose comparable, if not greater, long-term threats to U.S. security and economic growth. While the U.S. government has acknowledged these global realities, its ability to follow through with concrete action will ultimately depend on the outcome of domestic political struggles among political parties, branches of government, and interest groups. Thus, ironically, the decisive factor in shaping the outcome of U.S. democratization efforts overseas will be the result of democratic processes at home.

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Notes 1. Paradoxically, Wilson’s attempt to codify such principles in the League of Nations was undermined by a crucial democratic principle. Under the separation of powers, the Senate rejected U.S. membership in the League. 2. This memorandum was anonymously published under the pseudonym of “X” (1947). 3. Consequentialism contrasted with an approach to foreign policy based upon absolute or deontological principles, viewed as morally acceptable or unacceptable on their inherent merits without reference to end results. See Johnson (1987). 4. Niebuhr’s view was later restated by Jeanne Kirkpatrick, whose distinction between pro-U.S. authoritarian and Marxist-Leninist totalitarian regimes was embraced by the Reagan administration. See Kirkpatrick (1982). 5. As Carter (1979: 2) declared in December 1978, “We are free of the inordinate fear of communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear.” 6. Other regional programs included the Democratic Pluralism Initiative in Central and Eastern Europe in 1990 and the Asia Democracy Program in 1991. 7. Among other prominent works, see Rummel (1995) and Russett (1993). 8. In 1989 the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee anticipated the broadening scope of aid conditionality by declaring that “there is a vital connection, now more widely appreciated, between open, democratic and accountable political systems, individual rights and the effective and equitable operation of economic systems.” 9. The joining of the two “generations” of economic and political aid conditionality may thus be viewed as the most significant step taken by the aid regime during the 1990s. See Stokke (1995). 10. For an elaboration of these findings, see Hook (1998). 11. On selective engagement, see Chase et al. (1996) and Steel (1995). On neoisolationism, see Nordlinger (1995). 12. Much larger volumes of U.S. and IMF emergency funding were required in 1997 and 1998 to prevent an economic calamity in East Asia, which resulted from many of the same domestic failures as those that pushed the Mexican economy to the brink of bankruptcy. 13. Israel received $3 billion annually from the U.S. government between 1992 and 1996, including $1.2 billion in economic aid and $1.8 billion in military aid, while Egypt received an average of $2.1 billion annually during this period (USAID, 1997: 10, 13). 14. The U.S. State Department reported “numerous killings and serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights” by both sides in the Chechen conflict, although “violations committed by Russian military forces occurred on a much greater scale than those of the Chechen separatists” (U.S. State Department, 1996b). 15. Perhaps the clearest example of this is Chile, whose autocratic government gradually gave way to democratic institutions in the 1990s. The U.S. government praised the Chilean model and offered its leaders an auxiliary role in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

PART 3

THE ROLE OF MULTILATERAL AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

8 The European Union: An Ad Hoc Policy with a Low Priority Gorm Rye Olsen

uropean leaders historically have dreamed of transforming Europe into a unified political actor that has a common political system and foreign policy. This dream was officially launched by six European countries in 1957 with the signing of the Treaty of Rome and the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC), the precursor to today’s fifteenmember European Union (EU), and it was gradually strengthened during the second half of the twentieth century. It was not until the Cold War’s end, however, that democracy promotion became an explicit goal of EU foreign policy. Only a few months after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, EU politicians began to link economic development with political freedom in declarations on development issues. As early as 1991, EU members adopted a resolution unequivocally stating that the transition to democracy would be one of the conditions for receiving EU foreign assistance. This foreign policy stance received its most comprehensive treatment in the Treaty of Maastricht, which stressed that “the development and consolidation of democracy” constituted one of the EU’s most “important aims” (Article 130 U, Section 2). The purpose of this chapter is to offer an initial assessment of the role of democracy promotion in EU foreign policy. The primary theme of the chapter is that, although adherence to democratic values serves as one of the prerequisites of EU membership, the transmission of those values abroad remains at best an ad hoc policy with a low priority relative to other, more traditional foreign policy goals, such as ensuring the military security and economic well-being of EU members. The analysis draws on EU democracy promotion efforts in two regions: Eastern Europe (inclusive of Russia), which constitutes the region of greatest strategic importance to the EU; and Africa, a region with special historical ties to many EU members and the most important non-European target of EU democracy promotion.

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The European Union as Promoter of Democracy The dream of fostering a common European foreign policy did not take a significant step forward until the launching in 1970 of regular meetings among EU foreign ministers, a process often referred to as European Political Cooperation (EPC), which did not become formally institutionalized until 1986 with the enactment of the Single European Act. This process was strengthened by the Cold War’s end, which in 1991 led to a number of initiatives with special reference to establishing a common foreign and security policy. The principles of this common policy were made part of the European Union Treaty (usually referred to as the Maastricht Treaty, ratified in 1993) and were carried forward unchanged into the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 (Cafruny and Peters, 1998a: 7; Schirm, 1998: 65). The Cold War’s end changed the security framework of Europe in fundamental ways, as “softer” security issues, such as immigration, entered the EU’s foreign policy agenda. The new security situation underscored the need for a new approach to regional security, which could take into account the nonmilitary threats and challenges that characterized the post–Cold War situation in Europe (Schirm, 1998: 76). As noted by Michael Smith, a prominent British international relations theorist, the “intertwining” of the EU’s previous civilian agenda with the new “high politics” of peace and security was especially prominent in Europe during the 1990s (M. Smith, 1996: 253). One of the most prominent themes of Europe’s transformed security situation during this period was the value attached to democracy promotion and human rights, combined with a general belief that Western values were on the rise (Tank, 1998: 179; Diamond, 1999: 24ff.). EU policymakers perceived a number of advantages associated with making democracy promotion a prominent foreign policy theme. First, democracy promotion is considered one of the most effective civilian means the EU has to promote global stability and thereby enhance European security. According to Stefan Schirm, “Europe can focus on its specific strength as a civil power in order to promote ‘stability transfer’ as a preventive security policy” (Schirm, 1998: 76). EU policymakers further believe that the positive attitudes toward democracy in their member states could create and strengthen popular support for the ambitious goal of creating a common EU foreign policy, if promotion of such values was conspicuous and integrated elements of EU discourse. In short, adopting the promotion of democracy as a prominent theme in EU foreign policy could contribute to creating a European identity and thus further the European integration process (Schirm, 1998: 70, 78). Despite the advantages of using democracy both as a goal and as an instrument of European foreign policy, the promoters of this policy are

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confronted with several realities. First, if there is a conflict between democracy promotion and security, the EU will always give higher priority to security. Only in those cases where other, more important issues are not at stake will the EU seek to promote democracy with considerable consistency and vigor. Second, the latter situation will only emerge under one crucial condition: unanimity among EU member states to give priority to democracy promotion. This conclusion is based on the simple fact that both foreign policy and development policy are not exclusive EU prerogatives; each member state has its own, possibly conflicting policy on these and other topics. Finally, the EU’s political-bureaucratic culture stresses the importance of seeking consensus in decisionmaking and therefore the necessity of seeking compromises between opposing views and opposing groups of countries. This latter point is particularly true in the case of foreign policy, which touches upon the very delicate question of state sovereignty. It is generally agreed that the EU is a significant actor in international politics (Hill, 1993; M. Smith, 1996; Risse-Kappen, 1996). There is also agreement that, in international affairs, Europe is still far from being a unitary actor. This is partly explained by the fact that the national interests of key EU actors diverge. It is precisely for this reason that the EU has had difficulties in defining common interests and precise goals for its common foreign policy (Schirm, 1998: 70). The lack of a common understanding of the appropriate role of Europe in international politics to a large extent explains why the EU is generally perceived as an inefficient and inconsistent actor in international affairs. The constitutional explanation to this is that both before and after ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, most foreign and security policy was and remains intergovernmental, which allows for separate actions on the part of individual EU members. This is most evident in security affairs, the foreign policy realm most closely tied to national sovereignty, which most European states are still very reluctant to surrender (Rhodes, 1998; Cafruny and Peters, 1998b: 299). But the same is true for a number of other external policy areas; as Alan Cafruny and Patrick Peters point out, “in political affairs, a ‘sotto voce’ Union still struggles to be heard over the din of member states” (1998a: 3). In short, despite the gradual improvements over the years in the EU’s capacity to act internationally, it is still constrained by the disparate interests of its members. The Maastricht Treaty nonetheless introduced a new phenomenon in European foreign policymaking by creating a system of “joint actions” in areas where member states share important interests. At least in the formal sense, joint actions did not exist under the pre-Maastricht system. The significant point about joint actions is that once agreed upon within the EU, members are theoretically bound by them and should work to ensure that

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their own policies are in accordance (Piening, 1997: 40–42). In the case of development policy, for example, the EU is authorized under the treaty to implement its own development programs. However, this competence is complementary to that of the EU members, all of which (except for Greece) maintain their own bilateral development aid programs. Within this framework of dual competence, the Maastricht Treaty underscores the desirability of achieving greater coordination with members’ foreign aid programs, greater coherence between different policies carried out by the EU, and complementarity between the EU’s and the member states’ bilateral programs. This complex web of competencies and diverging interests, as well as a complex institutional framework, significantly explains the incoherent or inefficient nature of EU foreign policy initiatives (Cafruny and Peters, 1998a: 2). According to the Maastricht Treaty (Title V, Article J), the pursuit of a common foreign policy is primarily a matter for the presidency of the Council of Ministers, which consists of a cabinet drawn from members. Concerning the European Parliament, it plays no real role in relation to the common foreign policy beyond the right to be consulted when “important” foreign policy and security issues are discussed in Council. Neither does the treaty describe an explicit role for the European Commission, which consists of twenty commissioners (two each from France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and Spain, and one each from the remaining member states). The Commission nonetheless has become increasingly involved in the day-to-day management of foreign policy, essentially developing an institutional role that is not sanctioned by various EU treaties. Interesting enough, the Commission enjoyed this predominant role before the signing of the Single European Act in 1986 and before ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. According to some observers, this suggests that the policy outcomes of recent attempts to create a common foreign policy are not so different from the pre-Maastricht days, for the simple fact that “political declarations are still the main vehicle” of EU foreign policy (Spence and Spence, 1998: 51). In addition to the prominent roles played by the European Council and the European Commission, one must by necessity focus on the foreign affairs bureaucracies of individual EU members. What makes things even more difficult is the existence of an often intense competition between the different commissioners (and thus between the individual general directorates). In his capacity as head of a separate general directorate, a commissioner is responsible for the day-to-day business of a specific policy area that is subject to common EU policy directives. Each commissioner therefore has a tendency to develop personal ambitions and agendas for an individual policy field, which might not always be compatible with the ambitions of other commissioners (Peters, 1992, 1997). Until the replacement of

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the European Commission in mid-1999, no less than four commissioners were involved in EU foreign policymaking (Peters, 1997: 25). It should therefore come as no surprise that numerous interpretations exist of exactly how common foreign policy is made. Thomas RisseKappen (1995b) argues that individual member states are still the dominant actors of European foreign policy; their interests and preferences significantly influence the EU’s international actions. Roy Ginsberg (1989) points out that EU foreign policy to a large extent is the result of different elites engaging in bureaucratic politics. Christopher Hill (1996) finds that foreign policy is the result of a bargaining process of the EU’s dominant states. Cafruny and Peters (1997) argue to the contrary that EU policy preferences in no way reflect solely the preferences of the dominant actors but are instead the result of a hybrid process reflecting different types of interests that diverge depending on the specific issue in question. It is the argument here that these different interpretations do not necessarily contrast with each other sharply. The foreign policy positions of the European Union are the result of lengthy and often nontransparent bargaining processes involving a considerable number of actors. Depending on the specific issue being negotiated, the participants may be national politicans, national bureaucracies, and “European” policymakers, including EU bureaucrats.

Democracy Promotion in the European Union’s Eastern Neighbors During the 1990s, the EU for obvious reasons became strongly preoccupied with the dramatic changes taking place in its eastern neighbors, most notably the former Soviet Union. Preoccupation was transformed into action at least partly because of a decision made at the Group of Seven (G7; currently G-8 with the addition of Russia) summit meeting in Paris in 1989. The summit charged the EU with the role of coordinating international aid to Poland and Hungary under the auspices of what became known as the “Phare Program,” later extended to include the former Soviet Union under the “Tacis Program.” These programs initially focused on supporting the transition to market economies in the former communist states but they were subsequently broadened to include democracy promotion. Two broad sets of policies guided the Phare and Tacis programs: the encouragement of democratic change through the classic instruments of economic and technical assistance; and a more unique “carrot” approach offering the possibility that, if democratic practices are successfully launched and consolidated, some of these countries might one day become full members of the European Union.

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Encouraging Democratic Change with Classic Instruments Despite the predominance of democratic values in EU policy discourse in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War’s end, it was not until 1992 that the European Parliament insisted on adding a special “democracy” line into the general budget for that year. The parliament’s decision forced the European Commission to create a special democracy component within the Phare and Tacis programs, signaling a shift from a previous preoccupation with ensuring market reforms in the former communist states (Kramer, 1993). The Phare and Tacis programs placed strong emphasis on reinvigorating civil society and restructuring the state apparatus in Eastern Europe. Democracy promotion encompassed several specific areas, including strengthening parliamentary practice and organization, promoting transparency in public organizations and public management, developing nongovernmental organizations and other components of civil society, and ensuring the strengthening of an independent and responsible media. Civic education and promoting and monitoring human rights were also included. Each of these components was perceived as contributing to the strengthening of democratic structures and the promotion of cross-cultural cooperation, primarily through involvement in partnerships between local and regional authorities and NGOs. The amount of aid allocated directly to democracy promotion was nonetheless far smaller than that devoted to economic restructuring and the creation of market economies. From 1990 to 1996, for example, only 1 percent of all Phare assistance was allocated to civil society (Mayhew, 1998: 141). The EU was far more engaged in encouraging market reforms and therefore took it upon itself to give extensive advice about the economic transformation of former state-owned economies. As a result, the conditions the EU attached to its foreign aid programs were largely confined to the development of market economies; indeed, EU policymakers initially believed that democracy would be a natural outgrowth of such development. This line of thinking was in accordance with the EU tradition of seeking political goals through economic means (e.g., the EU goal of seeking political unification through an initial focus on economic integration). Two trends characterize the EU’s use of foreign aid to promote democracy in the former communist countries. First, it was the EU members and not the EU as such that were the primary actors in this context. The EU’s democracy program was in fact rather small and largely limited to the Phare and Tacis programs. From 1990 to 1995, bilateral assistance from EU members in reality represented nearly 70 percent of the total aid received from Europe (Mayhew, 1998: 157). A second important trend is that the EU did not make democracy an explicit condition for economic or other kinds of support to the former Soviet bloc. EU attempts to promote democratic

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values and democratic institutions to a large extent remain limited to public declarations, leading many to argue that the EU’s democracy policy is “largely about symbolism” (Sedelmeier and Wallace, 1996: 361–365). This tendency, according to David Allen, is explained by the simple reality that EU members “have drawn the correct conclusion that they can have little impact on political developments,” at least in the former communist states of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (1997: 233). Offering the “Carrot” of Potential EU Membership A second policy instrument in EU democracy promotion is the prospect that a number of former Soviet bloc countries might one day become full members of the European Union. During the European Council meeting in Copenhagen in June 1993, it was agreed that ten countries from the former Soviet bloc might eventually become EU members if they are able to assume the obligations of membership. The so-called Copenhagen criteria for membership consist of three broad categories. The potential member country must embody institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, and respect for the protection of minorities. Each potential member must also exhibit a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with the pressures of EU market forces. Finally, all prospective members must have the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of the political, economic, and monetary union (Sedelmeier and Wallace, 1996: 372). An important purpose of the EU’s enlargement policy is to offer indirect backing to the efforts of potential members to transform their economic and political structures. Many EU policymakers consider the potentially long path to EU membership as a learning process of how best to manage a market economy and the demands of democracy. Toward this end, many argue that the EU’s most important function is serving as a democratic model for potential applicants (Petersen, 1995: 62). The enlargement policy is not without its critics or internal debate. Simmering debate reached a provisional climax in June 1997, when the fifteen EU members met in Amsterdam to discuss additions to the Maastricht Treaty. The so-called Amsterdam Summit made it clear that strong disagreement existed over the number of countries that should be invited to the first round of negotiations on membership enlargement. The majority was in favor of inviting five or six potential new members, whereas the minority wanted all ten potential countries to take part in the negotiations (Mayhew, 1998: 358ff.). The figure of five or six countries reflected the view of the European Commission and the majority of EU members that progress toward market economies and democracy in mid-1997 was only satisfactory in a limited number of former communist countries. Following the Amsterdam Summit,

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the Commission officially announced that the timetable for admitting the first new members into an enlarged EU was 2003 at the earliest, with 2005 being the most realistic date. EU policymakers clearly believe that the transition process toward market-economy-based democracies in Eastern Europe will last at least fifteen years and possibly more. This reflects the hard-headed recognition that it takes time to establish a viable democracy; it also underscores recognition that even massive European assistance does not necessarily shorten the transition period to a few years. One must be careful, however, not to overemphasize the role of democracy promotion for democracy’s sake in EU foreign policy toward Eastern Europe. Many EU policymakers firmly believe that the eventual eastern expansion of the EU will reap “significant” political benefits, leading to an “increase in the power and the prestige” of the EU in international arenas and negotiations (Mayhew, 1998: 186). The improved relationship between the EU and Russia, for example, is perceived as having contributed to a strengthened role and identity for the EU in international affairs (Herrberg, 1998: 101). In this regard, democracy promotion is only one of several EU foreign policy aims within the region, and there is general unanimity that the strategy of enlargement was and remains strongly motivated by security concerns (Leigh, 1998: 64; see also Mayhew, 1998: 187; Takako, 1997: 92).

The Democracy Promotion Record in Africa Africa constitutes the most prominent arena of EU democracy promotion efforts outside of the larger European community of nations. An important factor in Africa’s special place in the hierarchy of EU foreign policy interests is that seven EU member states—Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Portugal, and Spain—are former colonial powers. Not surprisingly, the colonial era contributed to enduring European-African ties that have now manifested in the EU’s more general pursuit of democracy promotion. As noted by Hans Smida, former head of the EU’s Directorate General with responsibility for development aid, Africa serves as a “practical illustration” of the EU’s determination to make democracy promotion “one of the linchpins of its development policy.” Three case studies—South Africa, Algeria, and Kenya—illuminate the nature of EU democracy promotion efforts. South Africa: “Test Case” for Democracy Promotion In 1985 the EU adopted the Special Program for the Victims of Apartheid. Until that time, intra-EU disagreements had delayed even moderate propos-

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als as to how best place pressure on the white minority-ruled apartheid regime in South Africa (Holland, 1997: 176). The special program represented a considerable step toward adopting a more proactive democracy promotion policy. Specifically, the program sought to encourage peaceful change by “supporting development initiatives, particularly education and training, humanitarian and social aid and legal assistance” (European Council, 1993: 8). A characteristic feature of the special program was that EU funds were exclusively channeled through a limited number of nonracial NGOs. Whereas 50 percent of the aid went to education and training, 40 percent went to humanitarian and social programs, leaving about 10 percent for legal aid (European Council, 1993: 11). Despite its small percentage, legal aid received special attention. It was believed that ongoing trials involving apartheid issues and therefore human rights questions could be used as instruments to broaden the space for democratic action in South Africa. The EU also supported opposition newspapers with the same aim in mind. The release of Nelson Mandela from prison in February 1990 served as a turning point in the EU’s approach to South Africa. The special program was revised and expanded, earning the distinction of being the EU’s “largest programmable aid programme of any kind” (Tsie et al., 1997: 3). The European Commission in particular sought to support the negotiation process, which in the end resulted in the establishment of a multiparty, multiracial democracy in 1994. An important element in the EU’s changed policy was the aggressive monitoring of growing racial violence (Anglin, 1995: 525ff.). One specific way of doing so was through the deployment of European police observers who, among other duties, monitored the actions of South African police during public meetings. In anticipation of the 1994 democratic elections, the EU supported voter registration and voter education programs, with the aim of ensuring that as many people as possible were able to participate in the democratic process. A real and significant change in EU policy occurred by the end of 1993 when South Africa was made the centerpiece of one of the EU’s first five joint foreign policy actions. South Africa constituted the first non-European area of joint action, announced at the European Council’s 1993 meeting in Brussels (Holland, 1997: 174). One outgrowth of this decision was the EU’s establishment of a Commission delegation in Pretoria, South Africa, in December 1993, as well as a decision to launch a joint scheme to back the ongoing democratization process. The EU deployed at least 450 people to South Africa in 1994 and provided approximately $12 million for the election process (Holland, 1995a: 563). This contribution was both “considerable” and “a clear success” (Holland, 1997: 177). Unlike most election observer teams that typically spend one week in the host country, the EU observers spent between one to three months each. As a result, “the

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European profile became really prominent in South Africa” (Holland, 1995b: 272). After the 1994 democratic elections, the EU launched a general development program designed to assist the transition toward “a stable, democratic, non-racial and prosperous South Africa” (Program Coordination Office, 1994: 4). Contrary to expectations, apartheid’s demise did not result in the EU’s declining interest in democracy promotion in South Africa. The EU instead underscored its continued support for the efforts of the new government, stressing the necessity of political dialogue and the consolidation of democratic institutions. However, the emergence of a majority-rule, democratically elected government prompted the EU to change its strategy of relying solely on NGOs to one of carrying out a constructive dialogue with the new state apparatus. The 1994 South African elections represented “the first significant test” of the EU’s willingness and ability to perform a function previously associated with the United Nations and the British Commonwealth of Nations (Holland, 1997: 177). There is no doubt that the increases in EU financial and technical support to South Africa throughout the early 1990s had an important impact on that country’s democratic transition. One must remember, however, that the EU’s involvement ultimately was driven by other factors beyond an interest in democracy promotion. Holland (1997: 180) argues, for example, that the EU was searching for a foreign policy “success” at the beginning of the 1990s, when the EU experienced a number of foreign policy failures in the former Yugoslavia. Once focused on South Africa, EU backing for democratic change became substantial only after this process had reached a “point of no return” with the release of Nelson Mandela from prison in 1990. As a result, it was relatively “safe” for EU policymakers to get heavily involved in the transformation of the apartheid system. In the end, support for democratization in South Africa served an important symbolic function by giving the EU a strong international profile that, in turn, had a positive effect on efforts to further develop a common EU foreign policy. Algeria: Pursuit of Security at the Expense of Democracy In January 1992, less than two months after the European Council had decided that democracy and human rights should be conditions for receiving European aid, the Algerian military carried out a coup d’état that ended Algeria’s experiment in democracy. The primary motivation for the coup, argued the generals and their supporters, was that an Islamic fundamentalist group, the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS; Islamic Salvation Front), was on the verge of assuming power in democratic elections and that its leaders were expected to dismantle democracy should they win. Despite the fact

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that it had just adopted clear guidelines on how best to tackle such situations, the EU remained silent over the military’s intervention. Evidently, a number of European countries, most notably France, considered a military government in Algeria to be the “lesser evil” (at least in the short term) when confronted with the uncertain prospects of what a democratically elected FIS government would entail for Algerian democracy (Spencer, 1996: 132). An important complication in EU decisionmaking was the historically strong French relationship with Algeria; most EU member states expected France to take the lead in guiding EU foreign policy toward Algeria. French policymakers, in turn, expected EU member states to balance their own more limited interests in Algeria with clear support for France’s foreign policy lead within the region (Spencer, 1996: 135). In the end, French priorities dominated EU foreign policy toward Algeria. This policy was clearly enunciated by French Minister of Foreign Affairs Alain Juppé, who asserted in 1994 that the EU’s only possible role was to give economic and financial support to the Algerian government (Spencer, 1996: 137). France’s lead in EU policy was also accepted by the G-7 countries (Spencer, 1996: 137), which resulted in significant credits from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, important factors in ensuring the Algerian military government’s survival. France stepped up its bilateral aid and credit facilities, resulting in a growth in French aid from $122 million in 1990 to $241 million in 1994 (OECD, 1996, 1999). France also persuaded its EU partners to accord extensive credits to the military government. As a result, the EU increased its development aid from $10 million in 1990 to $46 million in 1993 (OECD, 1996, 1999). A tendency to follow France’s lead regardless of developments in Algeria was clearly demonstrated by the EU’s response to military-led “democratic” elections in 1997 that not surprisingly resulted in the victory of military leader Liamine Zeroual. Despite rising levels of violence in the two years before the elections, the EU maintained an essentially French-led policy of offering strong support to the Zeroual regime. The EU even added legitimacy to what many considered to be a tainted election process by deploying an international corps of election observers that ultimately characterized the elections as a “milestone in Algeria’s political history” (Bouandel and Zoubir, 1998: 198). The EU clearly did not follow its democracy promotion rhetoric when confronted with hard choices in Algeria. Instead of cutting aid to a military dictatorship, the EU and several bilateral European donors stepped up their foreign assistance. When it came to implementing democratic ideals, there was no willingness to act in a case where one strong member state (France) had special interests and traditional relations at stake. In the end, the EU’s willingness to follow France’s lead essentially highlighted that democracy

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promotion is considered less important than the classic pursuit of ensuring regional stability and security. The low priority accorded to democracy promotion in Algeria and North Africa in general must also be considered against the backdrop of the EU’s dilemma of balancing interests in its eastern and southern neighbors. The June 1992 European Council meeting in Lisbon explicitly placed the Mediterranean, particularly the Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia), on the EU’s foreign policy agenda. The so-called Lisbon report asserted that the stability of the region, of “great common interest” to the EU, is threatened by demographic growth, repeated social crises, large-scale migration, and Islamic fundamentalism (Barbé, 1998: 124). In order to strike a compromise between East and South, the Cannes summit in June 1995 decided to allocate $4.7 billion to the Mediterranean region (European Council, 1995a). That same year, the Barcelona conference confirmed that the EU would give priority to the region and would provide unconditional backing for a Euro-Mediterranean partnership (European Council, 1995b). Democracy was not given any special attention in these declarations. The vague notion of “political dialogue” was stressed instead as an instrument to further EU security interests across the Mediterranean (Barbé, 1998: 117–127). Critics of the Mediterranean partnership note that it is based essentially on negative European concerns about political instability and subsequent migration from North Africa (Smith and Lahteenmaki, 1998: 166ff.; Barbé, 1998). As early as 1990, the European Commission published a report warning that population growth south of the Mediterranean threatened to “make the economic and social balance worse and make it impossible to handle.” It should therefore come as no surprise that the EU opted for stability rather than democracy when it supported the consolidation of power by a military regime in Algeria. In short, when EU security concerns clash with the principle of democracy, security concerns receive higher priority. Kenya: Lack of Policy Coherence Kenya was one of the first countries to be subjected to massive EU pressure to democratize and to show more respect for human rights after the Cold War’s end. In fall 1991 the EU decided to significantly reduce Kenya’s foreign aid until improvements had been achieved in the field of human rights and corruption had been brought under control (Barkan, 1998: 218). Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi subsequently announced that multiparty elections would be held in December 1992 both for the presidency and the parliament. The net result of these elections—deemed “free and fair” by some international observers and badly tainted by most others—was that

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Moi remained in power. The EU was nonetheless hesitant to resume foreign aid in 1992. By the middle of 1993, the EU and a number of bilateral European donors argued that progress was under way, although they would continue to maintain a watchful eye. This shift in policy appears to have been the direct result of macroeconomic reforms, economic liberalization, and the regime’s accountability to international financial institutions, rather than political reform (Ajulu, 1998: 284). In 1995 the EU Commission signed a memorandum of understanding with the Kenyan government that recognized the success of economic reforms. But both before and after the conclusion of the memorandum, the EU approved a number of new development projects that gave priority to road rehabilitation. The EU also provided significant sums to Kenyan NGOs to finance a wide range of projects outside of governmental control, most notably in the fields of health and education. The Kenya case is interesting in that considerable disagreements can be identified between the EU and a number of member states that were critical to EU aid to Kenya. While the EU continued to disburse aid that directly or indirectly buttressed the Kenyan government, critical states, most notably in Scandinavia, were reluctant to engage in any kind of activity that could be interpreted as supporting the Moi regime. As a result, the Scandinavians were very careful to channel their increasingly smaller amounts of development aid through NGOs (see Chapter 4). New international attention was focused on the Moi regime beginning in 1996 due to the fact that general elections were scheduled for the end of 1997. It was clear to the outside world that the net result of combined donor pressure five years earlier had been ineffective in improving the democratic environment within the country (Harbeson, 1998). New democracy promotion efforts were therefore launched with the intent of forcing change on the Moi regime. For example, in July 1997 the IMF was prompted to suspend its structural adjustment facility to Kenya (Barkan, 1998: 218f.). Shortly after this, Moi announced that he and his government wanted to discuss political reform, including changes in the constitution and the election laws. In the end, elections held in December 1997 were characterized as highly irregular (Ajulu, 1998: 275ff.; Harbeson, 1998: 161ff.; Holmquist and Ford, 1998: 246ff.). In retrospect, the EU’s policy toward Kenya during the 1990s was so inconsistent as to make it difficult to talk about a “European” policy on promoting democracy in Kenya, at least if the focus is on actual policy implementation and not simply official declarations and policy statements. This point is best illustrated by the EU’s statement in Nairobi following the 1997 election, which ruled out a proposal that called for suspension of EU

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aid to Kenya (Ajulu, 1998: 284). This statement was issued despite the fact that Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the EU “voiced concern about the widespread irregularities but, as in 1992, stopped short of denouncing the results [of the elections].” Indeed, despite quite harsh critiques of the Kenyan regime, EU aid to Kenya grew from $15 million in 1991 to $42 million in 1997 (OECD, 1996, 1999). The gap between rhetoric (denunciations of the lack of democratic progress) and reality (the continuation of aid) in EU foreign policy toward Kenya significantly questions the EU’s true commitment to democracy promotion. Some have argued that the lack of adherence to declared democratic goals can be explained by the existence of other, more important concerns, most notably economic self-interest and/or security. In the case of Kenya, this is a difficult argument to make. A more valid conclusion is the very severe limitations associated with implementing EU principles and ideals that go beyond the traditional policy instrument of making public declarations (Spence and Spence, 1998: 51). Without the will and interest to act, such policy declarations and resolutions are reduced to mere symbols of a well-meaning actor more interested in enhancing its international moral profile than in becoming involved in complicated policy processes in a country that is not very important to Europe (Barkan, 1998: 217; Harbeson, 1998: 174).

Conclusion Several tentative conclusions can be drawn about the EU’s role in democracy promotion. A common EU policy is obviously hampered by the oftendivergent interests of the EU and its individual member states. This is basically a consequence of the fact that EU democracy promotion remains dependent on the consensus of individual member states, each of which maintains a high degree of autonomy and maneuverability within the foreign policy realm. The EU in fact embodies a consensus-oriented bureaucratic culture that places a high premium on compromise between disparate actors. However, if one especially powerful member state demonstrates a special interest or historical involvement in a particular country, EU policy in the realm of democracy promotion more likely than not will follow the lead of that member state. Not surprisingly, security interests take priority over democracy promotion, most notably in the arena of so-called soft security, which includes the issue of immigration. One must be careful, however, not to equate the EU’s hesitancy to grant foreign policy priority to the issue of democracy promotion with its lack of interest in this realm. That democracy promotion has been at best an

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ad hoc policy with a low priority is balanced by the fact that this foreign policy has served an important symbolic function. Indeed, proponents persuasively argue that EU democracy promotion efforts not only have contributed to Europe’s rising stature in international affairs but have furthered the quest to ensuring a more coordinated EU foreign policy and therefore a deepening of the integration process in Europe.

9 The United Nations: Strengthening an International Norm Christopher C. Joyner

he United Nations has expanded beyond all expectations since its creation in the aftermath of World War II. The UN organization has evolved into a complex system of agencies, commissions, and programs that has grown and developed to meet changing national needs and new international challenges. Importantly, along with this development has come a progressive emphasis by the UN on democracy as a value, even a preeminent value, in national and international affairs. This may not appear particularly surprising, given that various democratic precepts permeate the design and procedure of UN institutions and that the UN Charter has its constitutional roots in democratic principles. The more salient observation is that the activities of the UN and its affiliated organs during the second half of the twentieth century progressively sought to codify democratic values and expand opportunities for democratic government throughout the world. Democratic notions have been influenced by the UN in at least three fundamental ways. First, as an institutional organization, the UN was conceived and constructed on fundamental democratic principles. The UN Charter is clearly grounded in democratic values and aspirations, and most UN organs, with the notable exception of the Security Council, operate mainly through democratic decisionmaking procedures and processes. Second, the UN actively promotes democracy through its norm-creating ability. UN organs have promulgated considerable international law embodying cardinal principles and values of democracy, especially through human rights treaties and the progressive codification of democratic principles into international legal norms. Third, the UN actively facilitates democratic principles and institutions internationally. It does so by promoting a democratic culture in states through electoral assistance (including monitoring and verifying national elections), holding referenda, and sponsoring plebiscites—all of which foster freer and fairer opportunities for the demo-

T

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cratic process to work more openly and efficiently in newly emerging national societies. These impacts on democracy promotion by UN institutions and activities have not, however, occurred in a systematic, premeditated manner. Many of them emerged through the process of decolonization during the 1960s, and in political response to aspirations of peoples in Africa, Asia, and Latin America to attain the status of sovereign independent states participating in the international community. In this respect, the UN has contributed to articulating various international norms that uphold democratic rights and principles. More than 120 new states have come into being since the UN’s founding, and they now participate as sovereign equals under international law. Even so, the ultimate arbiter for implementing these rights and principles in domestic societies remains the governments of those states. This chapter examines the main contours of UN contributions toward fostering democracy internationally, both in terms of establishing legal rights for individuals and in promoting democratic practices within the developing world. It explores the development of UN institutions as reflecting democratic characteristics and appraises opportunities created by UN bodies that generate greater respect for democratic values globally. Some generalizations and conclusions are suggested about the UN’s impact on contemporary trends toward global democratization. Finally, an assessment is made of the evolving place of the UN in this international democratization process to gauge the performance of the organization in promoting democratic values among its member states.

Democracy Within the United Nations System The UN Charter, largely initiated and drafted by the United States, was composed at Dumbarton Oaks between August and October 1944 by representatives of the United States, Great Britain, the former Soviet Union, and China. In its aspirations, the Preamble of the UN Charter is striking for its resemblance to a modern-day constitution. As noted in the Preamble, the organization is dedicated not only to eliminating the “scourge of war” but also to promoting such democratic values and objectives as “fundamental human rights,” “the dignity and worth of the human person,” “equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small,” “better standards of living in larger freedom,” and “tolerance.” Such solemn dedication to these democratic ideals set the UN on a premeditated course to pursue promotion of democratic rights and values through its institutions, practices, and adopted policies. Although the term democracy appears nowhere in the text of the UN

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Charter, essential components of democracy are conspicuous throughout the document. One main purpose of the UN is “to achieve international cooperation . . . in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion” (Art. 1, Para. 3 of the UN Charter). Each UN member state pledges “to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of . . . universal respect for, and observance of, human rights” (Arts. 56 and 55[c]). Other Charter references reaffirm this commitment to human rights. Whatever the full legal import of these obligations, there can be no doubt that human rights and democratic values have been preeminent concerns of the UN from its inception (Sohn and Buergenthal, 1973: 505–856). Democracy refers to a particular distribution of power within a community or institution. Democratic practice may be described as rule of the people, with the defining principle of democracy being political equality. To progress toward democracy is to maximize or move forward toward political equality. Obviously, though, the size of a political unit can become a restraint on democratization. Full democracy may well be incompatible with the modern international state system. International relations, with their varied cultural life and multiplicity of values, give pause to the pursuit of democracy (e.g., compare Russett, 1990, and Mancias, 1989). This observation is no less true for UN activities. As regards organization, a significant realization is that the UN founders applied the institutional principle of bicameralism with the creation of the General Assembly and the Security Council. Moreover, often associated with democratic governance is the concept of separation of powers, which was introduced into the UN structure with the inclusion of an International Court of Justice and a Secretariat. As an institutional body dedicated to decisionmaking by states, the UN was purposefully designed to check and balance concentrations of political power through its own organizational structure—a safeguard that ostensibly permits democratic principles to operate more freely throughout the entire system. The UN is neither a world government nor a world legislature. It does, however, personify a world commonwealth—a kind of world meeting place where governments come together and express their views and concerns through democratic processes over various issues affecting their national interests. In such a democratic forum, rule by the majority governs. The commitment to principles of individual worth and political equality is upheld by majority rule, with respect for minority rights. Equality is inseparable from the democratic method, whether in civic societies or international organizations. So, too, in the UN does the right to vote carry limited meaning unless votes are equal and voters have the same influence.1 The General Assembly thus serves as the parliamentary hub for the UN

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system; composed of all 189 UN member states, it is the organization’s largest and most representative body. As such, it exercises significant deliberative, supervisory, financial, elective, and constituent functions in the organization. As the UN’s main deliberative organ, the General Assembly personifies a global town meeting. All member states are treated as sovereign equals, with each state having one vote. Decisions on important questions, including those pertaining to peace and security, admission, suspension, and budgetary matters, require a two-thirds majority. Decisions on other questions are made by simple majority. While the General Assembly cannot compel action by any member state, its recommendations do carry considerable moral weight as expressions of world opinion. Pluralist democracy operates under well-defined conditions. Democratic states tend to be polities that are well off economically—they are generally characterized by high standards of living and reasonable distributions of popular income that tend to temper social unrest. Pervasive poverty, illiteracy, hunger, and ignorance can contribute to rendering a society less capable of sustaining democratic processes. Gross economic inequities and social disparities in a society make attainment and sustainment of a democratic civic culture more difficult. If democracy and democratic processes are to take root internationally, more extensive efforts must be made to improve economic and social conditions that are more conducive to facilitating the practice of democratic values. Several UN organs actively engage in this effort. The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), under the authority of the General Assembly, coordinates the economic and social work of the UN, specialized agencies, and other institutions. Though ECOSOC only has the power to recommend, it remains intimately concerned with issues affecting conditions for promoting democracy in the international community: health, nutrition, education, economic development, human rights, status of women, refugees, and child welfare. The sixteen specialized agencies that report to ECOSOC annually are organizations specifically designed to promote economic betterment of the human condition. According to functionalist theories of integration (Mitrany, 1966; Haas, 1964; see also Joyner, 1997), these ameliorations, if attained, should improve social conditions such that democratic practices might be able to take root more easily. These agencies are: • International Labour Organization (ILO) • Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) • United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) • World Health Organization (WHO)

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• International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank, IBRD) • International Finance Corporation (IFC) • International Development Association (IDA) • International Monetary Fund (IMF) • International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) • Universal Postal Union (UPU) • International Telecommunications Union (ITU) • World Meteorological Organization (WMO) • International Maritime Organization (IMO) • World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) • International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) • United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) The notion of democracy suggests means, ways, and ends. In dealing with a complex organization such as the UN, democracy becomes an institutional means for effecting decisions aimed at attaining the common good. Decisions are intended to be reached though majority rule, with respect for minority rights. Forms of representative democracy are also practiced within the UN organization, though in at least one instance—the Security Council—some governments are guaranteed to be more equal than others with respect to the weight of their votes. Within the UN organization, issues affecting peace and international security tend to override considerations for majority-rule among the membership. That is, democratic decisionmaking practices are endemic to voting procedures and processes, with one notable exception. The Security Council is the organ charged with the primary responsibility for maintaining peace and security. The Security Council is composed of fifteen members. Ten of these are elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms, while five—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—are permanent members. In appearance, this composition takes on the form of representative democracy, with the fifteen members making decisions on behalf of the entire UN membership. Moreover, each Security Council member has one vote, with decisions made by a qualified majority vote. The weight of a member’s vote can be skewed, however, by the type of question being addressed. Matters of procedure are decided by an affirmative vote of any nine of the fifteen members. Decisions on substantive matters also require nine votes, but there can be no negative vote from any one of the five permanent members. This point is critical, as it underscores the so-called Great Power unanimity rule, often referred to as “the veto.” It is this right-of-veto by the Permanent Five in the Security Council’s decision-

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making process that departs most starkly from democratic practice in the UN organization. The votes of members on the Security Council are not weighted equally, since a single negative vote by any one of the Permanent Five can defeat a motion on a substantive question. Nevertheless, when the Security Council adopts a resolution on a substantive question, under Article 25 of the Charter all members of the organization are legally obligated to accept and carry out that decision. The Security Council is the only UN body that can issue binding resolutions of significance. Important also is that the prestige and power of the Security Council within the UN and the world community has shifted dramatically over time, in relation to international circumstances. The lesson here becomes evident: the effectiveness of the Security Council remains inextricably linked to the utility of the UN, and that utility ultimately depends on the attitudes and political will of member governments to cooperate in implementing the Council’s decisions.

Promotion of Democratic Ideals Democratization is a process that involves cultivating principles of democracy in a political culture. For democratization to occur, members of a society must come to participate in their civic culture through the development of democratic norms, practices, and representative government. In the world arena, international society is comprised mainly of sovereign independent states. The UN formally adopts various resolutions and often subsequently sponsors binding international conventions on a wide range of issues. By doing so, the world body has contributed substantially to establishing, legitimatizing, and codifying international norms that embody democratic values. In these ways, UN activities engender greater international acceptability of democratization as a political process, governed by the rule of law. Moreover, since 1991 the UN has actively promoted the acceptance of democratic processes worldwide (e.g., see Joyner, 1999; see also Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1995, 1996a, 1996b, 1997, 1998; UN General Assembly, 1998). The notion of democracy also represents an ideal of justice as well as a form of government. Democracy assumes the belief that freedom and equality are good in themselves and that democratic participation in ruling enhances human dignity. These precepts have guided development of the democratic values implicit in UN-created human rights law, perhaps most articulately embodied in the so-called International Bill of Human Rights. At its first session in 1946, the General Assembly approved a proposal by ECOSOC for the Commission on Human Rights to formulate “an international bill of rights” (GA Res. 43 [I], Dec. 11). Two years later, the

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Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted as an aspirational, nonbinding “common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations” (GA Res. 217 [III], Dec. 10, 1948). This proclamation of fundamental human rights standards marked the beginning of a process that has culminated in the adoption of legally binding norms, many of which inculcate essential values of democracy. While not binding in international law, the Universal Declaration sets forth basic democratic principles upon which subsequent conventions are based. Some principles of democracy proclaimed in the Universal Declaration have ripened into customary international law, binding on all states. Among these are the rights to “life, liberty and security of person”; recognition as a person “equal before the law”; “freedom of movement and residence” within states; freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; “full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal”; and “effective remedy” by competent national courts for violations of these rights. Also prohibited are certain practices that patently contravene democratic values, including, inter alia, slavery or servitude, torture, “arbitrary arrest, detention or exile,” and “arbitrary interference” with a person’s privacy. Many of these democratic principles were later incorporated by the UN into two special conventions—the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 1976 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights—both of which carry legally binding authority for those states that become parties. These two covenants provide formal legal codification for the principles expressed in the Universal Declaration. Taken in tandem, the Universal Declaration and these two human rights covenants comprise what is known as the International Bill of Human Rights, which embodies for international law the essence of democratic rights and liberties. While these documents supply a critical core of democratic principles adopted by members of the UN, they have also fostered several other instruments containing more specific protections for human rights and democratic liberties. In general, these latter conventions aim to prohibit forms of discrimination that deprive individuals of the essential democratic quality of equality under the law and include the following: • The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which entered into force January 4, 1969. States are committed “to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay” policies to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms. Governments agree to guarantee equality before the law and to prohibit the dissemination of propaganda based on ideas of racial superiority or which incite racial hatred.

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• The Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, which entered into force April 30, 1957. This UN instrument reaffirms the unlawfulness of slavery and any trade in slaves on land or by sea. The UN thus reaffirms that slavery is a blatant assault on human freedom and dignity and is grossly anathema to democratic values. • The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which entered into force June 26, 1987. By this convention, the prohibition against torture as a violation of civil rights and liberties is confirmed and codified as an international legal norm. • The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which entered into force September 3, 1981. CEDAW codifies respect for and observance of human rights for women. CEDAW aims to redress specific inequities caused by cultural and religious discrimination and to change negative presumptions that perpetrate gender discrimination and denial of fundamental equal rights for women. • The Convention on the Rights of the Child, which entered into force on September 2, 1990. This instrument addresses a wide range of rights, including political and civil rights that children should enjoy (e.g., freedom of expression, freedom of conscience, freedom of association, and right to privacy), as well as others more apt for a child (e.g., the obligation to protect children without families and protection from sexual exploitation). • The Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, which entered into force July 18, 1976. This convention aims to condemn and outlaw the practice of compulsory racial segregation. • The Convention and Protocol on the Status of Refugees, which entered into force April 22, 1954. This instrument contains as its core obligation the agreement not to return a refugee to a country in which “his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” This protection against involuntary return of a refugee, known in international law as nonrefoulement, furnishes a fundamental guarantee for the democratic right to dissent against a government, without fear of persecution, as well as safeguards for a person’s freedom of thought, expression, and religion. Resolutions adopted by UN bodies, especially the General Assembly, do not normally create international law. The UN Charter does not confer

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on any UN organ special powers of legislation comparable to those vested in the municipal legislatures of states. Yet the General Assembly may draft, approve, and recommend international instruments for multilateral agreement and has often done so on the basis of resolutions it has previously adopted. Many UN resolutions on human rights thus provide the basis for international norms that eventually evolve into legally binding obligations. UN resolutions have been particularly useful for fixing certain human rights as democratic values, and four categories of these are apparent. First, there are resolutions that have been adopted by consensus, provide additional content or more specific definition to already accepted rights, and are widely seen as constituting a step leading to the adoption of a binding international convention on the topic. Examples of these are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (GA Res. 217A [III], Dec. 10, 1948); Declaration on the Rights of the Child (GA Res. 1386 [XIV], Nov. 20, 1959); Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (GA Res. 2263 [XXII], Nov. 7, 1967); Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (GA Res. 36/55, Nov. 25, 1981); and the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious, or Linguistic Minorities (GA Res. 47/135, Dec. 18, 1992). Second, there are resolutions that set out nonbinding guidelines or principles on relatively specific subjects related to democratic concerns. These resolutions are not intended to become immediately or universally binding, nor are they generally perceived to be precursors for convention instruments. Many such resolutions concern criminal justice administration and the treatment of detainees (Clark, 1994), such as the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (ESC Res. 663C [XXIV], July 31, 1957); Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (GA Res. 34/169, Dec. 17, 1979); Principles of Medical Ethics Relevant to the Protection of Prisoners and Detainees (GA Res. 37/194, Dec. 18, 1982); Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty (ESC Res. 1984/50, May 25, 1984); Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (GA Res., 40/33, Nov. 29, 1985); and the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (GA Res. 40/34, Nov. 29, 1985). A third category of UN resolutions concerns human rights activities in more controversial areas affecting democratic practice. Many such resolutions concern economic and social development, and several have been qualified by governments with dissenting or abstaining votes. Examples of these resolutions would include the Declaration on Social Progress and Development (GA Res. 2542 [XXIV], Dec. 11, 1969); the Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace (GA Res. 39/11, Nov. 12, 1984); the Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice (UNESCO Res., Nov. 27, 1978);

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and the Declaration on Fundamental Principles Concerning the Contributions of Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and International Understanding, to the Promotion of Human Rights, and to Countering Racism, Apartheid, and Incitement to War (UNESCO Res., Nov. 28, 1978). While UN resolutions proclaiming such considerations may not directly reflect democratic values, they treat topics that severely affect the free and fair practice of democracy in a society. The fourth category of UN resolutions concerns certain activities that flagrantly contravene norms associated with democratic principles. These activities are banned in democratic civic cultures on the grounds that they abrogate fundamental human rights and have been condemned in the international realm as well. Among these prohibited practices are: genocide (GA Res. 96 [I], Dec. 11, 1946); slavery or the slave trade;2 murder or causing the disappearance of individuals (Rodley, 1987: 191–218); torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment;3 prolonged arbitrary detention; and systematic racial discrimination (Sohn, 1995). UN resolutions have substantially contributed to identifying and defining international norms against such practices, as well as to codifying them into subsequent international instruments. UN resolutions pertaining to democratic values can substantially add to norm creation by expressing some certain desirable behavior—an expectation that then shapes and guides the practical and principled policy assumed by states. Resolutions give rise to demands for new legal regulations or norms, which are often translated afterwards into legally binding instruments through the treaty-making process. The UN contribution to the stipulation of certain human rights norms as democratic values has been formidable. While the UN itself may not be able to “create” law, its increasing concern with human rights has led states to recognize their legal obligation to promote and protect a growing number of fundamental human rights that inculcate values implicit in democracy.

From Trusteeship to Election Monitoring The Trusteeship Council was established to deal with nonindependent territories previously held under the League of Nations mandate system, as well as territories taken from powers defeated in World War II. Principal activities of the Trusteeship Council included receiving annual reports of states administering these trusteeships and periodically visiting the territories. In a real sense, the Trusteeship Council engaged in supervising decolonization of these territories, as well as in preparing them for independence, ostensibly under democratic forms of government. Since the Council first met in 1947, all eleven of its trust territories

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have been assimilated or transformed into independent states (see Table 9.1). Such success toward fulfilling the democratic principles of self-determination and political independence should be applauded. Yet recent disruptions have profoundly shaken the internal stability and legal integrity of states that had been trusteeship territories, namely Rwanda, Burundi, and Somalia. In these instances, the tug of ethno-separatist tendencies overwhelmed allegiance to a democratic national state. The fundamental question persists over what, if anything, the UN might have done during the trusteeship period to instill more respect for democratic principles and human rights in these societies. Belief in and practice of political equality presumably produces popular sovereignty, that is, rule by the people. Since its founding, the UN has undertaken a number of activities aimed at instituting processes designed to fulfill these democratic-oriented ambitions. 4 Three main phases have occurred in the UN effort to facilitate democratic processes. First, in the early era of UN involvement, the Trusteeship Council supervised and observed plebiscites, referenda, and elections in non-selfgoverning territories moving toward independence. Some thirty plebiscites, referenda, and elections in non-self-governing territories were conducted under UN Trusteeship Council auspices between 1956 and 1990 (see Table 9.2).5 Working in concert with the General Assembly, the trusteeship era lasted nearly five decades, but it successfully concluded with the transition of all UN trust territories to independent status. Building on its trusteeship experience, a second phase saw the UN sponsoring plebiscites for elections that were designed to permit non-selfgoverning territories to select through a democratic process their own form of government. One of the most successful examples of this UN role was the preindependence election in Namibia, in which some 97 percent of the eligible electors cast votes (UN SC Res. 628, 1989). Deployment of the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) to the region came in 1989 with the purpose of overseeing transfer of control over Namibia from South Africa. This force introduced a new phase of UN involvement in electoral matters, as elections were incorporated into the UN’s peacekeeping role. 6 The Namibian experience also foreshadowed the dramatic expansion of electoral activities into states already members of the UN. A future candidate conceivably eligible for UN-sponsored plebiscites is the Western Sahara. Political conditions and circumstances now affecting that territory, however, make it unclear whether UN elections aimed at self-determination will take place there in the near future. As a more recent third phase, the UN has engaged in providing various forms of electoral assistance for national governments (see Table 9.3). The United Nations in 1992 established an Electoral Assistance Division (EAD) to assist the Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs in coordinating

158 Table 9.1

Multilateral and Nongovernmental Organizations

UN Trust Territories That Exercised the Right to Self-Determination, 1957–1994

Togoland under British administration

United with the Gold Coast (Colony and Protectorate), a non-self-governing territory, administered by the United Kingdom, to form Ghana in 1957

Somaliland under Italian administration

United with British Somaliland Protectorate to form Somalia in 1960

Togoland under French administration

Became independent as Togo in 1960

Cameroons under French administration

Became independent as Cameroon in 1960

Cameroons under British administration

The northern part of the Trust Territory joined the Federation of Nigeria on 1 June 1961 and the southern part joined the Republic of Cameroon on 1 October 1961

Tanganyika under British administration

Became independent in 1961 (in 1964, Tanganyika and the former Protectorate of Zanzibar, which had become independent in 1963, united as a single state under the name of the United Republic of Tanzania)

Ruanda-Urundi under Belgian administration

Voted to divide into the two sovereign states of Rwanda and Burundi in 1962

Western Samoa under New Zealand administration

Became independent as Samoa in 1962

Nauru, administered by Australia on behalf of Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom

Became independent in 1968

New Guinea, administered by Australia

United with the non-self-governing territory of Papau, also administered by Australia, to become the independent state of Papau New Guinea in 1975

Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Federated States of Micronesia

Became fully self-governing in free association with the United States in 1990

Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Republic of the Marshall Islands

Became fully self-governing in free association with the United States in 1990

Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands

Became fully self-governing as a commonwealth of the United States in 1990

Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Palau

Became fully self-governing in free association with the United States in 1994

Source: Basic Facts About the United Nations, UN Department of Public Information.

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Table 9.2

Year

Plebiscites, Referenda, and Elections, 1956–1990 (Held Under UN Supervision in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories)

Territory

1956

Togoland unification and future Togoland under British supervision 1958 Togoland under French administration 1959 British Cameroon (northern part) 1961 British Cameroon (southern and northern parts) 1961 Western Samoa 1961–2 Ruanda-Urundi 1963 Malaysia

1965 1967

Cook Islands Aden

1968

Equatorial Guinea

1969 1970

West Irian Bahrain

1972 1974 1974 1975

Papau New Guinea Niue Gilbert and Ellice Islands Mariana Islands, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands French Somaliland

1977 1978 1979

1984 1986

Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands Marshall Islands, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands Palau, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands New Hebrides Turks and Caicos Islands Palau, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands Federated States of Micronesia, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands Marshall Islands, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands Cocos (Keeling) Islands Palau, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

1987

Palau, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

1989 1990

Namibia Palau, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

1979 1979 1980 1983 1983 1983

Action Plebiscite supervision Election supervision Plebiscite supervision Plebiscite supervision Plebiscite supervision Election supervision Inquiry on future of Sabah and Sarawak prior to establishment of Federation of Malaysia Election supervision Election supervision (mission was not permitted to achieve fulfillment of its mandate) Referendum/election supervision Act of self-determination Ascertain wishes of people of Bahrain Election observation Referendum observation Referendum observation Plebiscite observation Referendum/election observation Referendum Referendum Referendum Election observation Election observation Plebiscite observation Plebiscite observation Plebiscite observation Act of self- determination Plebiscite observation (February and December) Plebiscite observation (June and August) Election supervision and control Plebiscite observation

Source: UN Document A/46/609; Plebiscites, referenda, and elections held under the supervision or observation of the United Nations in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories—Annex

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and considering requests for electoral assistance. The main activities of the EAD are to evaluate requests for electoral assistance, conduct needs assessment missions, design and coordinate electoral assistance projects with other UN agencies, develop electoral facets of UN peacekeeping operations, provide logistical and advisory support for international observer groups, maintain a roster of electoral experts, organize training conferences, and administer UN electoral trust funds. The increasing demand for UN electoral assistance has necessitated greater cooperation within and between agencies in the UN system to ensure concerted effort and avoid duplication of activities. To these ends, the consolidation of electoral assistance capacities within the UN system has the EAD working most closely with the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, the United Development Programme, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the United Nations Volunteers, the group that identifies and recruits qualified staff for electoral missions around the world.7 Between 1989 and 1991, only eight requests for such assistance were submitted to the UN by member states. By August 1996 the number of requests had risen to a total of 123, and by 2000 a total of 192 requests had been registered.8 This remarkable rise in requests for UN electoral assistance can be attributed to the end of the Cold War, the attainment of various peace agreements around the world, the breakup of the former Soviet Union and elections in the new republics, and the desire of governments in various developing countries to introduce or strengthen democratic institutions. Toward this end, the UN has furnished seven basic forms of electoral assistance: • Organization and conduct of elections, which must be adjusted to the constitution and election laws of, as well as conditions in, a state. This assistance was carried out by the UNTAC in Cambodia in May 1993 and East Timor in August 1999. • Supervision of elections, in which a special representative of the Secretary-General must certify the results of the elections and all stages of their process. Election supervision has been used mainly in decolonization elections, such as the recent example of UNTAG in Namibia in November 1989. • Verification of elections, in which the government of the state organizes and conducts the election, and the UN remains responsible only for certifying the legitimacy of various phases of the electoral process. Such assistance is usually part of a peacekeeping mission and was provided for Nicaragua in 1990, Haiti in 1991, Angola in 1992, Eritrea in 1993, El Salvador in 1994, Mozambique in 1994, and South Africa in 1994.

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• Coordination and support for international observers involves the UN setting up a small secretariat in the requesting country that can coordinate and furnish logistical support for international election observers. This mission keeps the UN at a relatively low profile, while also providing support to facilitate the political process. More than thirty cases of coordination and support have occurred, including UN efforts in Lesotho in 1991 and 1999, Niger in 1993, 1995, and 1996, and Armenia in 1995 and 1999. • Support for national election observers, provided in 1994 for elections in Mexico, stresses the importance of strengthening existing national institutions by fostering participation of local nongovernmental organizations in the national observation process. • Technical assistance, the type of UN electoral assistance most frequently requested, takes many forms, among them election organization and budgeting, civic and voter education, procuring election materials, computer applications, defining boundaries, and training of local election administrators. Since 1989 more than eighty cases of technical assistance have been provided by the UN Electoral Assistance Division, including that prior to the elections held by Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique in 1994, by Sierra Leone in 1996, Guyana in 1997, and Niger in 1999. • Observation by one or more UN representatives of an election. While more than thirty cases of this form of assistance have been provided since 1989, it is mainly symbolic and involves little more than observer presence. Examples include the election in the Russian Federation in December 1993, in Senegal in May 1993, in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in October 1994, and in Yemen and Nepal in 1999. Of these seven forms of UN electoral assistance, the first three categories require major missions and approval of either the Security Council or the General Assembly. The latter four categories are more ad hoc and come at the specific invitation of sovereign states. In sum, the type of electoral assistance provided by the UN depends on the needs of a requesting state, a fact clearly borne out by recent UN election assistance experiences. The UN observer mission to verify the electoral process in Nicaragua in 1989 was the first instance where a public international organization monitored an election in an already independent state. Significantly, the General Assembly subsequently passed Resolution 44/10 in support of the mission, which set the precedent for later UN electoral verification missions. The second UN member state to request verification through election monitoring was Haiti in 1990, but that produced more mixed results. While the two rounds of elections held in December 1990 and January 1991 may

162 Table 9.3

Multilateral and Nongovernmental Organizations

Types of UN Electoral Assistance, 1989–June 2001

Type of Assistance

Number (comment) Country

Organization and Conduct Verification

3 (provided) 1 (in abeyance) 8 (provided)

Coordination and Support

36 (provided or being provided)

Technical Assistance 88 (provided or being provided)

Follow and Report/ Observation

32 (provided)

Training of National 2 (provided) Observers

Cambodia, Eastern Slavonia, and East Timor Western Sahara Angola, El Salvador, Eritrea, Haiti, Liberia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, South Africa Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Benin, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti (x2), Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau (x2), Guyana, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lesotho (x2), Malawi (x2), Mali, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger (x2), Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania Albania (x2), Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Bangladesh (x2), Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic (x2), Chad (x3), Colombia, Comoros (x2), Côte d’Ivoire (x2), Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, El Salvador (x3), Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon (x2), Gambia, Ghana, Guinea (x2), Guinea-Bissau (x3), Guyana (x4), Haiti (x3), Honduras (x2), Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Lesotho (x2), Liberia (x2), Madagascar, Malawi (x3), Mali (x3), Mauritius, Mexico, Mozambique (x2), Nicaragua (x2), Niger (x3), Nigeria, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Rwanda, Sierra Leone (x2), South Africa, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo (x2), Uganda (x3), Yemen (x2) Algeria, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Djibouti, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea (x2), Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar (x2), Mali, Netherlands (Antilles) (x2), Paraguay, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles (x2), the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Uganda, Ukraine (x2), Uzbekistan, Yemen, Zambia Mexico (x2)

Source: UN Document A/51/512; Report of the Secretary-General on Support by the United Nations System of the Efforts of Governments to Promote and Consolidate New or Restored Democracies. See also “Member States’ Requests for Assistance to the United Nations System” located at www.un.org/Depts/dpa/ea/websit10.htm.

be considered successful UN efforts, the military coup d’état that subsequently ensued overshadowed that noteworthy accomplishment.9 UN involvement as a monitor has also entailed creating conditions more conducive for free elections and for establishing democratic rule. In

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1991 Cambodia requested UN assistance to bring about an end to its civil war by monitoring elections for a newly constituted government. The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), the largest such force in UN peacekeeping history, became the largest, most comprehensive electoral assistance and verification mission to date.10 UNTAC was given extraordinary authority by the 1991 Paris Peace Accords: Not only was this UN mission responsible for overseeing the demobilization of warring factions and the return of hundreds of thousands of refugees, it was also given an extensive mandate over civil administration of the country, including monitoring human rights conditions and conducting and supervising free and fair elections throughout the country. UNTAC was able to register political parties and voters between March 1992 and April 1993. Elections were finally held in May 1993, in which more than 90 percent of the 4.5 million eligible electorate voted freely and peacefully. Though acclaim is clearly due the UNTAC mission, the lasting success of that UN effort remains to be seen.11 The UN also contributed to bringing an end to the civil war in El Salvador and facilitating opportunities for the conduct of democratic elections. During December 1991 Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar brokered a cease-fire between the government and guerrilla leaders, bringing an end to fighting that had killed more than 75,000 people since 1979. UN negotiators during the fall of 1992 additionally devised a plan for government redistribution of farmland to rebels, and UN observers also presided over the destruction of arms and demobilization of guerrilla forces later that year. National elections, monitored and supervised by UN observers, were held throughout El Salvador on March 21, 1994, leaving the impression that they represented a victory for democracy in that country. More recently, the United Nations planned and implemented its second organization and conduct mission in East Timor (the first was for Cambodia, in 1993). In response to a formal agreement in May 1999 between Portugal and Indonesia, the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) organized a referendum in East Timor held on August 30, 1999, for those people to determine whether they wanted a special autonomous relationship with Indonesia. More than nine hundred UN personnel from twenty-five countries were sent to East Timor to prepare and supervise the election process, at a cost of $53 million. The resultant majority independence vote touched off violence by pro-Indonesian militia, forcing most Timorese to flee and leaving hundreds of others dead and thousands dispossessed. In September 1999 a UN-sanctioned force led by Australian troops restored order, and by late October 1999 the Security Council authorized sending a UN peacekeeping force to East Timor to provide greater assurance that the East Timorese could rebuild their society without being attacked by pro-Indonesian forces.

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Problems and pitfalls affect UN-sponsored election monitoring, most of which relate to conditions in countries requesting assistance. In some states, the weakness of legal institutions calls into question the very existence of the rule of law and reveals the lack of political pluralism necessary for organizations to function in a civil society. To facilitate the development of democratic institutions, greater domestic security is needed through more effective crime control and fairer administration of justice. For democracy to function in these countries, governments must fully commit their efforts to institute legal reform, but only by taking into account the social, religious, and customary factors in society. Further, new laws must be applied fairly and made compatible with the transition in these states to market-based economies. The judicial system must be strengthened by improving the administration of justice. The management of courts must be made more efficient, personnel policies made more transparent, and better training provided for judicial staff. Coincidentally, stronger legislation must be adopted and enforced to deter and punish political corruption of public officials. Thus, procurement policies affecting the disbursement of international loans, financial grants, and capital investments must be made more transparent and accountable to grantees and to the population at large. The critical point is that if UN-sponsored election monitoring is to attain its objectives, the judicial infrastructure in these societies must be modernized to permit the democratization process to operate. For successful election monitoring, the government conducting the elections must be dedicated to the democratic process and the rule of law in that society. Underskilled and poorly motivated judicial staff must be transformed into a more professional civil service—one that can administer justice more fairly and promote more efficiently the transition from a traditional, inexperienced judiciary to a more participatory democratic society. As a concluding observation, the UN General Assembly in 1992 provisionally endorsed guidelines for election observation, and the UN Electoral Assistance Division functions to implement them. UN assistance in national elections would be offered “on a case-by-case basis,” bolstered with the critical understanding that “the fundamental responsibility for ensuring free and fair elections lies with Governments” (GA Res. 47/138, Dec. 18, 1992). The point here is plain: while the UN is willing to assist those governments that request help with conducting their elections, it cannot ensure that such opportunities for democracy, even through free and fair elections, will lead to democratic government. That onus ultimately belongs to the people themselves. However, UN activities can contribute to making a national political climate more tolerant of democratic processes and liberties, which might then permit such democratic processes to take root and become insti-

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tutionalized in the political culture of that state. That contribution is in no way trite or inconsequential.

From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking An important ingredient in the formula for creating a secure environment for the promulgation of elections and promotion of democratization in general has been the UN role of suppressing violent conflicts and restoring political stability in developing countries. The most innovative means to control international violence has been peacekeeping, a concept not mentioned in the UN Charter but implemented by the Security Council and the General Assembly more than fifty times in practice since 1956, the year in which the term peacekeeping was first applied to these types of operations (although effective peacekeeping actually began in 1948, with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine) (see Tables 9.4 and 9.5). Peacekeeping missions involve nonfighting field operations by UN forces that are undertaken to maintain or restore peace in an area of conflict. Peacekeeping differs sharply from collective security as set out in Chapter VII of the charter. Rather than acting to defeat or deter an aggressor, a UN peacekeeping mission is deployed against no specific enemy. Its main purpose is to act as a buffer between hostile forces by supervising truce agreements, inspecting for border violations, overseeing troop movements or withdrawals, assisting in monitoring elections, and maintaining domestic order in periods of transition. UN peacekeeping missions have been deployed only with the consent of the government on whose territory those forces will be stationed, only with the full consent of parties involved in the conflict, and only after a cease-fire has been achieved (for example, after the Suez crisis in 1956, the October War in 1973, and the Iran-Iraq War in 1988). UN peacekeeping troops may use their weapons only in self-defense. UN peacekeepers are not to use armed force to impose UN-sponsored policies on any party or to prevent a general resumption of the fighting. In sum, the traditional UN peacekeeping force was positioned between the former belligerents and monitored cease-fire conditions, thus creating political space for negotiating an end to the dispute. Most UN peacekeeping missions deployed since 1948 have had fewer than one thousand troops at peak strength, but the largest UN forces were sent to Cambodia (19,500 in 1992–1993) and the former Yugoslavia (22,000 in 1992–1995) (United Nations, 1990; Blechman and Vaccaro, 1994; Durch, 1993). Since the end of the Cold War, UN missions have become more ambitious in seeking to convert belligerent situations into sustainable peace.

166 Table 9.4 Country Middle East

Multilateral and Nongovernmental Organizations

Current UN Peacekeeping Missions (as of January 2002) Mission Name

Beginning of Operation

UNTSO—United Nations Truce Supervision Organization India/Pakistan UNMOGIP—United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan Cyprus UNFICYP—United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus Golan Heights UNDOF—United Nations Disengagement Observer Force Lebanon UNIFIL—United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon Iraq/Kuwait UNIKOM—United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission Western Sahara MINURSO—United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara Georgia UNOMIG—United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia Bosnia-Herzegovina UNMIBH—United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina Croatia and the UNMOP—United Nations Mission of Federal Republic Observers in Prevlaka (a disputed peninsula) of Yugoslavia Kosovo UNMIK—United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo Sierra Leone UNAMSIL—United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone East Timor UNTAET—United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor Democratic Republic MONUC—United Nations Organization Mission of the Congo of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Ethiopia and UNMEE—United Nations Mission in Eritrea Ethiopia and Eritrea

June 1948 January 1949 March 1964 June 1974 March 1978 April 1991 April 1991 August 1993 December 1995 February 1996

June 1999 October 1999 October 1999 December 1999 July 2000

Source: United Nations Homepage on the World Wide Web, http://www.un.org/

Some operations have been mandated not only to reduce tensions but also to implement peace accords between the belligerents (e.g., in Cambodia). Other missions have been more crisis-oriented and were undertaken to relieve massive human suffering during situations of domestic anarchy. These acts of UN humanitarian interventions are expressly intended to protect innocent civilians from the ravages of war and alleviate acute suffering. The UN operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (CongoKinshasa, former Zaire) (1960–1964) foreshadowed this UN humanitarian role, highlighted more recently by the U.S. and UN-led operations in

167

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Table 9.5 Country Lebanon

Completed UN Peacekeeping Missions (as of January 2002) Mission Name

UNOGIL—United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon West New Guinea UNSF—United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian) Congo ONUC—United Nations Operation in Congo Yemen UNYOM—United Nations Yemen Observation Mission India/Pakistan UNIPOM—United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission Dominican Republic DOMREP—Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic Middle East UNEF I—First United Nations Emergency Force Middle East UNEF II—Second United Nations Emergency Force Afghanistan/ UNGOMAP—United Nations Good Offices Pakistan Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan Namibia UNTAG—United Nations Transition Assistance Group Iran/Iraq UNIIMOG—United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group Angola UNAVEM I—United Nations Angola Verification Mission I Central America ONUCA—United Nations Observer Group in Central America Cambodia UNAMIC—United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia Cambodia UNTAC—United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia Angola UNAVEM II—United Nations Angola Verification Mission II El Salvador ONUSAL—United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador Former Yugoslavia UNPROFOR—United Nations Protection Force Somalia UNOSOM I—United Nations Operation in Somalia I Mozambique ONUMOZ—United Nations Operation in Mozambique Somalia UNOSOM II—United Nations Operation in Somalia II Rwanda/Uganda UNOMUR—United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda Haiti UNMIH—United Nations Mission in Haiti Liberia Rwanda

Dates of Operation June 1958–December 1958 October 1962–April 1963 July 1960–June 1964 July 1963–September 1964 September 1965–March 1966 May 1965–October 1966

November 1956–June 1967 October 1973–July 1979 May 1988–March 1990 April 1989–March 1990 August 1988–February 1991 December 1988–May 1991 November 1989– January 1992 October 1991–March 1992 March 1992–September 1993 May 1991–February 1995 July 1991–April 1995 February 1992–March 1995 April 1992–March 1993

December 1992– December 1994 March 1993–March 1995 June 1993–September 1994 September 1993–June 1996 UNOMIL—United Nations Observer Mission September 1993– in Liberia September 1997 UNAMIR—United Nations Assistance October 1993–March Mission for Rwanda 1996 (continues)

168 Table 9.5

Multilateral and Nongovernmental Organizations

Continued

Country

Mission Name

Dates of Operation

Chad/Libya

UNASOG—United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group UNAVEM III—United Nations Angola Verification Mission III UNCRO—United Nations Confidence Restoration Organization in Croatia UNPREDEP—United Nations Preventive Deployment Force

May 1994–June 1994

Angola Croatia Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Croatia

Haiti Guatemala Haiti Croatia Angola Sierra Leone Central African Republic Haiti Tajikistan

UNTAES—United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium UNSMIH—United Nations Support Mission in Haiti MINUGUA—United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala UNTMIH—United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti UNPSG—United Nations Civilian Police Support Group MONUA—United Nations Observer Mission in Angola UNOMSIL—United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone MINURCA—United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic MIPONUH—United Nations Mission in Haiti UNMOT—United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan

February 1995–June 1997 March 1995–January 1996 March 1995–February 1999 January 1996–January 1998 July 1996–July 1997 January 1997–May 1997 August 1997–November 1997 January 1998–October 1998 June 1997–February 1999 July 1998–October 1999 April 1998–February 2000 December 1997–March 2000 December 1994–May 2000

Source: United Nations Homepage on the World Wide Web, http://www.un.org/

Somalia during 1992–1993, and in Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1992 (Durch and Schear, 1996a, 1996b). UN-sponsored humanitarian operations starkly contrast with earlier UN peacekeeping efforts. While attaining a stable political order remains the ultimate goal for both missions, the means used for humanitarian operations have revealed serious difficulties. For one, UN intervention forces may be violently opposed by one or more of the fighting factions in their efforts to protect civilians during the conflict. A myriad of logistics and command-and-control complications also arise during a multinational interventionary force’s operations in foreign lands. Third, UN force operations may be seriously complicated by the activities of multiple international and nongovernmental relief groups whose policies, objectives, and priorities

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might be at odds with the UN mission. Finally, if the UN does not enjoy support for its operations among the local population, as well as the governing authority, a peacekeeping mission will be doomed from the outset. More recently, UN missions have evolved into a more proactive means for suppressing internal conflicts. The UN has resorted to peacemaking efforts in the attempt to coercively end fighting between belligerents, create cease-fires, and protect noncombatant civilian populations from local violence. Such peace enforcement operations include UN efforts in Somalia in late 1993, the 1994–1995 multilateral intervention in Haiti, and the NATOled Implementation Force (IFOR) for Bosnia-Herzegovina in late 1995. UN peacemaking efforts have met with only mixed success. First, it is not practical to enforce the peace when there is no peace to be enforced, nor to compel people in a country to accept a peaceful settlement when they remain willing to fight and die for their cause. That explains in part why UN forces were compelled to leave Somalia in 1995, before political stability could be attained. Second, peace comes only with the political will or exhaustion of the belligerents—conditions not present in Bosnia until after the Dayton Peace Accords were negotiated in late 1995. Finally, implementing a peacemaking mandate generally requires clear military superiority over local forces, something the UN did not secure in either Somalia or Bosnia but did obtain in the case of Haiti (Durch, 1996). The UN has done reasonably well since 1947 through its peacekeeping activities to facilitate conditions necessary for resolving violent conflicts and to produce greater political order and civil stability. To this extent, UN peacekeeping has contributed much to laying the seedbed for democratic opportunities in several developing countries, as well as in Palestine and Namibia, which were not even member states at the time UN electoral assistance was provided. With respect to peacemaking activities, however, success is harder to gauge. While the UN can alter local attitudes about the benefits of democracy and peace, it cannot impose a democratic peace. The UN cannot supply a permanent police force to maintain civil order for every country in need, nor can it make all people in developing societies abandon the use of force to obtain political objectives. That challenge ultimately lies with the people themselves. Last, but hardly least, for UN peacekeeping or peacemaking operations to succeed, greater financial, logistical, military, and political support must be provided by UN member governments. In a very real sense, UN peacekeeping efforts will only be as strong and effective as the member governments—especially the five Great Powers on the Security Council—are willing to make them be. Given that peaceful resolution of internal conflict is often necessary for promoting democratic opportunities in developing countries, securing genuine support and commitment from the Permanent

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Multilateral and Nongovernmental Organizations

Members for attaining that domestic stability may be the greatest challenge for the UN to overcome.

Conclusion The UN has done much to articulate minimum standards for democracy by promoting respect for human rights reflecting democratic values, as well as by sponsoring numerous legal agreements that more clearly articulate obligations of governments with respect to democratic rights and freedoms. Indeed, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides in Article 25 that every citizen has the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through chosen representatives. This includes the right to vote by secret ballot in circumstances that guarantee “the free expression of the will of the electors.” This language has its origins in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which adds as a qualification that “the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of the government” (Art. 21, Para. 3). This notion of “the will of the people” aptly summarizes the fundamental essence of the democratic idea. But the concept of democracy contained in UN human rights documents is not merely that of majoritarianism. These UN instruments reflect a broader span of democracy—one that embraces the notion that every person, whether part of a majority or minority, is entitled to basic rights, including the right to participate in the public life of the community. The idea of democracy suggested in UN-sponsored human rights documents presumes that the authority of a government derives from the will and participation of the people. The government should be elected by a majority, consequential to the rights of all persons to participate in the public political life of that society. No less important, that elected government bears responsibility for conducting affairs on behalf of all persons in that society, with respect for the dignity and rights of all persons, whether they be among the majority or minority. The philosophical construct of democracy enshrined in UN human rights conventions and resolutions does not always square with the reality of the political situation in many UN member states. At the international level, preservation of democratic rule with respect for the protection of human rights sometimes gets lost in abuses of power by a national government. The UN cannot exercise an international consensus on the values of tolerating pluralism, nor can it compel governments to guarantee in practice those individual liberties associated with democratic values. That responsibility ultimately lies with the national governments. The UN has contributed much to democracy promotion as an international aspiration. To a considerable degree, UN organs and agencies have

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been designed to function through democratic decisionmaking procedures, in accordance with democratic rules and principles. For more than half a century, the UN organization has actively promoted democratic rights and liberties as fundamental norms of international law. The world body has done this in a variety of ways: by sponsoring the adoption of international agreements that codify democratic principles; by adopting special declarations and resolutions indicating a consensus of world opinion on democratic values; by providing opportunities for various national societies to choose democratically through plebiscites or national elections their particular form of governance; and by attempting to bring about the peaceful settlement of violent conflicts so that democratic practices might be instituted by that society. The key to a long-range strategy for spreading and stabilizing democracy through the UN is to build institutions for international cooperation among existing democracies. Democracies are expected to be better partners in the international system. Democratic institutions add substance to a civic society and turn mutual respect into necessary political practices. Hence, the central task of democracies at the beginning of the twenty-first century is to build and strengthen democratic institutions on all levels and in all forms—regional, functional, and global. In this way, developing countries can see the merits of democratic societies in action, democracy can be promoted more effectively as an international plan for world order, and the UN and its member states can build on successes of the past by promoting democratic rights and values for the future.

Notes 1. Of course, a majority of states in the United Nations does not necessarily produce a majority of the world’s people. Of the world’s current 5.7 billion population, six countries—Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia, and the United States— taken together account for 3.7 billion people, or some three-fifths of the world’s total population. 2. Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 266, UNTS 3 (entered into force Apr. 30, 1957). See also ESC Res. 608 [XXI] (Apr. 30, 1956). 3. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, GA Res. 3452 (Dec. 9, 1975). 4. The UN General Assembly in December 1994 adopted Resolution 49/30, entitled “Support by the United Nations System of the Efforts of Governments to Promote and Consolidate New or Restored Democracies,” which requested the Secretary-General to produce a report that studied the ways in which the UN can contribute to efforts of governments that promote or consolidate democracy in states (GA Res. 49/30, Dec. 22, 1994). This Secretary-General’s report was submitted to the General Assembly on August 7, 1995, and details in a comprehensive

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fashion for the first time the ways and means that the UN has worked to promote a democratic culture in states. “Support by the United Nations System of the Efforts of Governments to Promote and Consolidate New or Restored Democracies: Report by the Secretary-General” (UN Doc. A/50/332, Aug. 7, 1995; hereinafter cited as Secretary-General’s 1995 Democracy Report). As such, the report furnishes a valuable inventory of UN activities, principally since 1989, designed to foster democratic practices and institutions around the world. 5. See “Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections,” UN GAOR, 46th Sess., Annex, UN Doc. A/46/609 Annexes (1991). 6. During the elections that occurred in November 1989, some 8,000 UN personnel were in Namibia as peacekeeping troops, civilian police, and civilian monitors. 7. See “Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections: Report of the Secretary-General,” UN GAOR, 54th Sess., UN Doc. A/54/491, Oct. 25, 1999, p. 2. 8. “Statistics Electoral Assistance” (mimeo furnished by UN Electoral Assistance Division to the author, November 15, 1999, on file with editor); “Support by the United Nations System of the Efforts of Governments to Promote and Consolidate New or Restored Democracies: Report of the Secretary-General,” UN Doc. A/51/512, Oct. 18, 1996, 31 (Annex II “Electoral Assistance Statistics”; hereinafter cited as Secretary-General’s 1996 Democracy Report). 9. See Electoral Assistance to Haiti: Note by the Secretary-General, UN GAOR, 45th Sess., Agenda Item 154, UN Doc. A/45/870 (1990); Electoral Assistance to Haiti: Note by the Secretary-General, UN GAOR, 45th Sess., Agenda Items 86 and 154, UN Doc. A/45/870/Add. 1 (1991). 10. During 1992–1993, the UNTAC mission involved more than 15,000 UN troops and cost more than $2 billion. For a useful appraisal, see Ratner (1993). 11. The coup and civil war that erupted in mid-1997 in Cambodia reveals the difficulty of maintaining order in states despite the earlier success of UN peacekeeping operations there. See Seth Mydans, “Cambodia Victors Kill Off Losers, Raising Specter of a Civil War,” New York Times, July 9, 1997, p. A1; Seth Mydans, “Hundreds Flee Cambodia; Violence Chills the Capital,” New York Times, July 10, 1997, p. A6; Barbara Crossette, “World Gets Plea to Act on Cambodia,” New York Times, July 10, 1997, p. A7.

10 The World Bank: Missionary Deeds (and Misdeeds) Béatrice Hibou

nternational financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have developed a norm-driven philosophy of imposing economic and political conditionalities to restructure developing countries in the image of the “modern Western state.” In the case of Africa, the emergence of economic conditionalities was signaled by the publication of a World Bank study at the beginning of the 1980s that proposed the linking of all flows of Western financial capital to the willingness of African leaders to implement economic liberalization reforms known as “structural adjustment programs” (World Bank, 1981). These reforms, imposed in varying degrees throughout the developing world during the 1980s, embodied the liberal consensus of the northern industrialized democracies that economic success depended on the pursuit of a free-market strategy of economic growth and reduced levels of state intervention in national economies. A second World Bank report published at the end of the 1980s heralded the emergence of “institutional” conditionalities that for all intents and purposes added a budding political component to the liberalization programs promoted by international financial institutions (World Bank, 1989). In addition to claiming that countries following IMF and World Bank economic prescriptions were performing better than those that were not, this report went beyond previous studies by underscoring that the success of economic reforms was dependent on the promotion of “good governance”—essentially the establishment of transparent, accountable, and efficient political systems similar to those in the northern industrialized democracies. Later reports would build upon this notion by recognizing the importance of political institutions, most notably the state, in the liberalization process (World Bank, 1997). The implication of the 1989 report and subsequent World Bank and IMF rhetoric was that access to Western financial capital would be contingent on the willingness of recipient leaders to

I

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promote the political liberalization of their respective political systems. In short, international financial institutions had entered the realm of democracy promotion by the beginning of the 1990s. The primary purpose of this chapter is to examine the shift toward democracy promotion in the official discourse of international financial institutions. The basic conclusion of the chapter is that despite a change in rhetoric, the philosophy and the method of international financial institutions have remained the same: the political imperative of democracy promotion is treated as simply a technical and supplementary element, only mobilized to reinforce the prevailing economic catechism of export-oriented free markets with little state intervention. This theme is highlighted by focusing on the World Bank, an international lender that has acquired a quasi monopoly on institutional knowledge in the field of economic development, and its policies toward Africa, the continent arguably subjected to the most comprehensive forms of economic and political conditionalities. The conclusions of this chapter are also valid for understanding the democratization activities of other international financial institutions and their impact on developing countries outside of the African continent that are undergoing economic and political liberalization.

The Economic Catechism of Political Liberalization It is typically assumed that the World Bank’s liberalization policies are grounded in rigorous theory. A comparison of World Bank publications with classic academic texts nonetheless demonstrates that only portions of theories mentioned are actually used, only certain conclusions are retained, and there is constant recall to selective “empirical evidence” and other practical considerations to resolve contradictory outcomes (see Hibou, 1998a, for a more complete discussion). This is such that one cannot speak of the underlying “theories” of recommended reforms; we have, in fact, a reform “discourse” in the Foucaultian (1969, 1971) sense that informs World Bank policies.1 This discourse offers and sometimes seeks to impose a certain vision of economic and political reality; it communicates an economic and political canon; it encourages the adoption of a language whose effects cannot be underestimated. By establishing manners of understanding, categories of analysis, and modes of questioning, liberalization discourse exercises influence in itself—it is performative. The World Bank’s liberalization discourse is constructed around three more or less implicit principles: • The superiority of the liberal norms of export-oriented free markets and the noninterventionist state, or what has often been referred to

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as the “Washington consensus” (e.g., see Williamson, 1990; Naim, 2000); • The quest for parsimony at all costs in terms of project formulation, implementation, and evaluation (i.e., one economic blueprint “fits all”), leading to accusations among critics of liberalization programs that the World Bank is insensitive to the unique backgrounds of individual countries; and • The underlying proclivity to “circumscribe” (i.e., restrict or deemphasize) the political dimension of liberalization programs. The first two principles are captured by the World Bank’s willingness to support structural adjustment programs that draw upon the following menu of choices with little if any sensitivity to the cultural, economic, historical, or political uniqueness of the target country. • Currency devaluation. The value of the nation’s currency is reduced relative to other major currencies. This makes imports more expensive but reduces the cost of exports to foreign buyers, thus reducing the current account deficit. • Price stability. Restrictive policies are enacted in an attempt to bring the inflation rate down. Since high or unpredictable inflation can scare off foreign investors or lenders, lower and more stable inflation rates improve the investment climate. • Fiscal austerity. The government is typically required to cut spending and subsidies, raise taxes, and “privatize” publicly owned enterprises. These policies reduce government borrowing, which is often an important cause of the nation’s capital account problems. • Tariff liberalization. Restrictive trade policies are reduced or eliminated, encouraging both imports (especially of raw materials and unfinished goods) and exports (Balaam and Veseth, 2001: 165). The third principle—the willingness to “circumscribe the political”—is particularly relevant to understanding the unique role of international financial institutions in democracy promotion. This principle appears straightforward enough, due to the simple reality that the World Bank’s founders stressed the importance of noninterference in the internal politics and social systems of member states. According to Article III, Section 4, of its founding charter: The [World] Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed impartially.

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As witnessed by an evolving focus on the importance of good governance and the quality of political institutions, however, the World Bank and other international financial institutions have clearly entered the realm of democracy promotion—often referred to in international financial circles as the promotion of “market democracies.” Economic habits, predispositions, and official mandates nonetheless die hard, essentially ensuring that the World Bank continues to conceive of democratization primarily in terms of its economic components and ends. Political actors are analyzed as economic actors only. Methodological individualism is extended to all forms of organizations or institutions and especially the state. This approach is such that international financial institutions perceive recipient countries as individuals. This can be seen in the manner in which developing countries are treated and the ways in which their respective performances are recounted. There is no place for contradictory forces or movements, conflict and compromise between internal actors, or internal political stakes (Meier, 1991). Each country, as a whole, is considered to be a “good” or “bad” student. And by following trends, developments, and contexts, specific countries are presented as “exemplary” students. In Africa these have included Côte d’Ivoire, followed by Botswana, Ghana, and Uganda. International financial institutions also perceive the discipline of political economy as a purely technical science of neutral and politically incontestable concepts. However, numerous works have concretely illustrated the meaning of terms constantly used by the World Bank and often taken up by African societies, although used in disparate ways. James Ferguson (1995) shows that for the World Bank, good is a technical term, while for Africans it has a moral connotation. L. M. Sachikonye (1995) shows that the word participation is perceived by international financial institutions as ensuring efficient reforms, whereas for Africans it justifies the “tendency for accumulation” (obtaining wealth) on the part of the economic ruling class. What we have, in effect, is the World Bank’s outright rejection of Max Weber’s thought, which posits that “the science of political economy is a political science.” The arguments favoring the creation of market democracies based on “good governance” are particularly insightful. These arguments are not, as one might presume, based on an avowed political position, specific moral standards, or a political philosophy adhered to by international financial institutions. Support for good governance is instead derivative of widely supported economic rationales. Specifically, good governance is presumed to be economically more efficient not only because it will make the market work better, but because it will make the institutions necessary to the functioning of the market work better. The tendency of international financial institutions to circumscribe the

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political is aptly demonstrated by the use and misuse of various social science concepts and theories. The World Bank’s adoption of the concept of civil society—a critical dimension of the democracy promotion literature of the 1990s—is particularly illuminating. At the onset, this was inspired by the writings of Hernando de Soto (1990) for whom the informal and “spontaneous” organizations of civil society are forms of state resistance and creative responses to state incapacities. In the case of Africa, the World Bank used, in an often simplified and truncated manner, the scholarly research of primarily U.S. political scientists and anthropologists who underscored the strength, dynamism, and independence of actors lying “outside” the state (Hyden, 1983; Chazan and Rothchild, 1987; MacGaffey, 1987; Sandbrook, 1993). What the World Bank most often retains from these writings is a simplistic understanding of developing societies based on a series of dichotomies: state versus private actors; the state versus the market; public versus private spheres; and formal versus informal sectors (World Bank, 1992; Hyden and Bratton, 1992). However, extensive field research challenges these dichotomous categories by highlighting the overlapping nature of “sectors” and the fluidity of affiliation, most notably the interpenetration between the state, informal networks, and other “spontaneous organizations” that represent civil society (e.g., Bayart, 1989; Berry, 1993; Grégoire and Labazée, 1993; Hibou, 1996). The net result of this simplistic conceptualization of civil society is that it justifies the World Bank’s allocation of funds to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other “community development” associations, which allows institutions like the World Bank to withdraw into “pure economy,” leaving the social and the political to private actors (Coussy, 1991; Lautier, de Miras, and Morice, 1991; Sindzingre, 1993a). A second example of the use and misuse of social science concepts by the World Bank revolves around the concept of the rule of law. Standard World Bank documents typically argue that adherence to the rule of law will facilitate a country’s economic development and adjustment to the global economy (e.g., World Bank, 1996). In reality, however, the World Bank’s emphasis on the rule of law is an indirect way of trying to redesign the state in accordance with a normative view of how that state should function. Specifically, the trend within the international financial community is to place more emphasis on the procedures, the rules, and the law, than on the substance of public policy and regulations. In this context, the rules and the relationships between public and private actors are strictly defined. The rules must be clear enough to minimize discretion on the part of national leaders and to protect the right of private ownership. Even though the concept of the rule of law is itself vague (e.g., see Ohnesorge, 2000), the implicit meaning of the state and the public it con-

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veys is clear. The implicit model is that of the Weberian state: a rationallegal entity in which state interventions are bureaucratized and repetitive. Moreover, this model presupposes a certain number of normative assumptions, most notably the unity of the principles of state action (legality, universality, bureaucratization, and direct control) and the duality of organization (i.e., clear distinctions between economic and political goals, state and the market, public and private, and legal and illegal). The implicit meaning of the state, however, does not fit, in any way, the reality of most states within the developing world, including in Africa. As already noted, there is a great deal of fluidity in the meanings associated with the core concepts advanced by international financial institutions, in the lines between the public and private spheres, and between the allowed, the tolerated, and the legal. To these one can add the existence of a multiplicity of referents (the law is neither the sole nor the most important referent), the ambiguity of power, and the role of violence and arbitrariness, not to mention the fact that the law is moving, multifarious, divisible, and unstable (Berry, 1993; Kopytoff, 1987; Guyer, 1993; Bayart, 1989; Mbembe, 2000). Indeed, the tendency of international financial institutions to promote value-laden norms such as market democracy and the rationallegal state, as well as their inability to take into account the diversity and historicity of specific states, serve as the source of many of the misunderstandings that have emerged between international financial institutions and recipient countries in the developing world.

Sources of Missionary Deeds and Misdeeds The resemblance of World Bank liberalization reforms to colonialism, and especially the work of religious missions, is striking, as has been noted elsewhere (Bayart, 1989; see also George and Sabelli, 1994). The World Bank’s canon is comprised of a missionary-inspired catechism, as is suggested by the catechists’ proclivity for normative adjectives such as “good” or “bad.” The will to “do good” and to “develop” are reflections of a certain naiveté associated with religious movements, reminding us of their “civilizing” ambitions. And the capacity to establish truths not by demonstration but by repetition and power plays is strangely reminiscent of the Protestant missions of the nineteenth century. This analogy is unconsciously divulged by the World Bank itself. In a recent issue of its information bulletin, an evocatively titled editorial, “Religious Leaders and Wolfensohn Find Inspiration at Lambeth’s,” noted: “Like the [World] Bank, most religious leaders consider it to be their duty to defend certain causes relating to the poor, the environment, violence, and the construction of social cohesion” (World Bank, 1998; emphasis added).

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The evangelical nature of World Bank discourse does not preclude its involvement in the production of very concrete missionary deeds (and misdeeds) in the realm of economic and political liberalization.2 However, the World Bank does not produce missionary deeds in a direct way. This process is rather the result of two convergent movements: the laxity of international financial institutions and the capacity for adaptation and interpretation on the part of local actors. While in the host country, the World Bank cannot avoid the multiple constraints that present themselves. Thus it is often forced to deviate from the path etched out in its discourse and by its principles for intervention. Doubtless, this is not particular to the World Bank or even other international financial institutions. It is the fate of all economic actors. However, given the World Bank’s ideological nature and financial weight, the consequences of this deviation are important. When we observe the World Bank’s strategy over time, we see that it continues to intervene in African countries even though agreed-upon conditionalities have not been respected. This laxist (and typically missionary) behavior is not the result of modified perceptions; it emanates from a certain number of bureaucratic constraints. All international development banks evolve, by their very nature, in a context of constraints. As a bank, the logic of action is shaped by the objective to maximize the number of ongoing projects, especially after the tenure of director Robert McNamara, who successfully expanded the number of World Bank projects.3 The raison d’être of a banker is nothing other than the logic of credit. As a development entity, the World Bank’s actions must be continuous and visible. As a missionary institution, it has difficulties admitting to the problematic conditions of its interventions, the perpetuation of poverty, and especially the inconsistency of results obtained. The idea of the cessation of its actions is practically unthinkable. This would amount to the suppression of its raison d’être. Moreover, when the World Bank is pressured to disburse credits on schedule and when it is subjected to the imperatives of reimbursement, it can only close its eyes when confronted with slippages, mistakes, or the flagrant rule bending of its principles of intervention. A second set of constraints is purely administrative. The international bureaucrat, like any salaried person, must manage and succeed in his or her career. This is such that a detailed accounting of problems encountered for any one country is fairly difficult to obtain. Mention of weak economic performances is problematic, and the decision to put a stop to a “mission” delegated by a superior is virtually inconceivable. Moreover, political pressure is often significant. The pressure of bilateral partners—which in Africa include France, the United States, and to a lesser degree, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom—or fears of the development of civil wars or for

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stability, more generally, compel the World Bank to perpetuate and even reinforce its presence. Together these bureaucratic constraints serve to perpetuate the lax treatment of African countries, ultimately leading the World Bank to promote expedient (and ultimately positive) evaluations and compromises as concerns the implementation of liberalization policies. It is precisely for this reason that the World Bank has been willing to accept fairly unorthodox budget closings; apply “revisions” to budget accounting such that certain reforms “succeed” (e.g., the devaluation of the CFA franc in francophone West and Central Africa);4 ignore money laundering operations when these fill state treasuries (the case for customs operations in several West African countries, especially Senegal); permit the acceleration of the “privatization” of state functions, such as ensuring security (Hibou, 1999a); forego sanctions of abuses and poor performance (the flagrant case of Cameroon for many years now); and accept the rapid organization and holding of elections or the creation of an anticorruption commission as proof of good governance. These bureaucratic constraints also explain why recourse to severity and rigor usually comes much too late (as in the Goldenberg affair in Kenya, which took place in mid-1993 and was “discovered” in July 1997). Local actors in turn manipulate and interpret reforms imposed by international financial institutions according to their own political and socioeconomic trajectories and traditions. The literature is quite abundant on the problem of conditionality and lack of respect thereof (Stiles, 1990; Nelson, 1989, 1990; Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye, 1991; Hyden and Bratton, 1992; Gordon, 1993; Sørensen, 1993; Haggard and Webb, 1994; Duruflé, 1994). Without going into a detailed analysis of the latter (see Hibou, 1996, 1997, for a more complete discussion), suffice it to note that the most important economic manifestations of this political and economic tradition include: • The insertion of all public interventions in the rentier economy and the economy of “plunder”; • The institutional weakness of the banking system and the importance of financial fraud; • The long experience of customs fraud and contraband; • War or violence as an economic enterprise; • The management of export resources according to the “politics of the belly” and contrary to economic expansion; • Severe dereliction in fiscal contributions and appropriations; • Extraversion of sources of state financial revenues; and • Resistance to and expropriation of international constraints.

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These historically structured elements and their relationship to the liberalization process are in no way defined solely by public action. They emanate from the organizational schema, strategies, and behavior of numerous political and economic actors. Paradoxically, the World Bank’s anti-statist and essentially apolitical discourse does not prevent it from adopting a particularly narrow concept of liberalization policy. That is, the World Bank takes into account only the “construction” of these policies (i.e., the elaboration of liberalization policy by public authorities and administrations) and neglects their “formation” (i.e., the complex and often contradictory historical processes of decisions, market structures, behaviors, strategies of public and private actors, and domestic and international actors) (Berman and Lonsdale, 1992; Bayart, 1996; Hibou, 1996). In short, the World Bank considers only the policy outputs of the state, not the internal politics that lead to a particular policy decision. In this sense, references to the “recolonization” of Africa by international financial institutions, and especially the World Bank, are surely misplaced (e.g., see Laïdi, 1989). We see, rather, the resurgence of two longterm trends in the 1980s: the practice of “double talk” (Hibou, 1997) and, above all, the strengthening of dual power structures (Bayart, 1993, 1997; Mbembe, 1990). In terms of double talk, African governments successfully resisted in varying degrees the World Bank’s liberalization discourse despite the quick adoption of its vocabulary. Indeed, it often takes statistical manipulations or minimalist interpretations of reforms to show that the majority of African countries have respected conditionalities. The arbitrary nature of reforms allows African states to present a facade that conforms to World Bank exigencies. Behind this facade, unorthodox practices abound. Often powerless, a lender like the World Bank is by no means unaware of these practices. However, caught in its own bureaucratic constraints, the World Bank becomes enmeshed in a spiral of “make believe” by both consciously and unconsciously accepting trompe l’oeil conditionalities. The strengthening of dual power structures reflects, in its extreme form, the existence of an “occult” (obscure) structure parallel or internal to the official government (as in the past in Sierra Leone and Rwanda; or today in Cameroon, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo [CongoKinshasa, former Zaire], and Kenya). This structure is the veritable space of coercive—as much as economic or political—power. In its most benign form, more or less occult networks are involved in official networks and institutions of power. But in both cases, the institutional and external visibility of power does not correspond to its reality, and international financial institutions are not necessarily negotiating with the right interlocutors. Ultimately, the practice of make believe and the strengthening of dual

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power structures considerably lessen the impact and efficacy of conditionalities.

Sociopolitical Impacts of Externally Demanded Economic Reform The meaning and consequences of World Bank-enforced economic reforms are less economic than social and political. The World Bank’s lack of knowledge, or misunderstanding, of the specificity of the state and politics in Africa explains this simple reality. This is not the place to enter into the already well-documented debate on the nature of the African state, in which it is already accepted that the state is not “imported” (Badie, 1992) and that we must consider the historicity of the African state (Bayart, 1979, 1989), even and especially if this takes specific and novel forms and if the contemporary process of state formation takes place through crises and wars (Boone, 1992; Berman and Lonsdale, 1992; Roitman and Mbembe, 1995; Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou, 1997; Mbembe, 2000). The crucial point is that misconceptions about these debates and research among the majority of policymakers within the World Bank (or the marginalization of the minority who subscribe to this research) have important consequences for liberalization reforms. For example, in the process of state formation in Africa, all economic opportunities merit consideration in the eyes of the political class. In other words, state formation and the formation of the national economy are inseparable. The quest for economic and financial, but also political and social resources is necessary in a situation where everything is up for negotiation, where conflict is permanent, and where instability pervades the environment. This is an important dimension of what has been referred to as the “politics of the belly,” which involves more than mere enrichment and corruption (Bayart, 1989). The long-term trend toward the proliferation of social and economic networks has been reinforced in Africa due to recent instability, economic crises, and in some countries, increasing violence leading to war. It is more important to reinforce one’s capacity to participate, to influence negotiations and compromises, and to mobilize allies and potential supporters than to acquire resources that are not immediately profitable and certainly not as flexible (Berry, 1993; Sindzingre, 1993b). In this context, wealth acquisition takes place less on an accumulative scale (i.e., accumulate the same thing in large quantities) than on a compositional scale (i.e., accumulate different kinds of values on different registers) that, taken together, means privileging the accumulation of human capital (humans being the only item that transcends various registers of value) (Guyer, 1993; de Boeck, 1997). Furthermore, for elites, acquisition of physical (economic and financial) wealth is less important than the control of social and political wealth

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(Kopytoff, 1987). Factional struggles are the expression of this logic. The “rhizome state’s” (Bayart 1989)5 heterogeneity and the fragmentation of power manifest themselves in conflict, negotiations, and compromises over sources of wealth (Migdal, 1988; Bayart, 1989; Berman and Lonsdale, 1992; Berry, 1993). This is the case concerning struggles over the privatization of public enterprises or marketing boards; the struggle against contraband or corruption; and even war for economic and sociopolitical ends, as in Congo-Kinshasa, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia. Liberalization reforms can only be understood in this context. Modifications in policies promoted by the World Bank have less impact upon economic mechanisms, modes of production, or the nature of state economic interventions than on the conditions under which the quest for economic and financial, as well as political and social, resources takes place. Privatizations end up being less a modification of management techniques and modalities (the move from “economic nationalism” to the exploitation of “market mechanisms”) than a modification of the techniques and modalities of the “economy of plunder” (the move from the siphoning of public resources by elites to the sharing of the national pie by purchase or participation in newly privatized enterprises by these same elites) (Hibou, 1997).6 Trade liberalization is less a modification of development strategies (the move from import substitution to export-driven development) than a modification of modalities for accessing resources of extraversion (the move from rents of protectionism, such as licenses, quotas, currency restrictions, and entry into public monopolies, to rents of liberalization, such as the control of private monopolies or oligopolies, access to informal networks, and access to credit) (Hibou, 1996). This is such that, due to the very nature of the state and politics in Africa, economic reforms have more sociopolitical significance and influence than economic impact. The paradox is that the World Bank does not take into account these social and political changes, including within its internal analyses and external policies that are intended to promote market democracies. As a matter of fact, the concepts of good governance and the rule of law as understood and implemented by the World Bank are unable to explain these features of African politics and society. That is why there are so many “unintended consequences” in the economic and, most of all, political realms.

Unintended Consequences of Externally Demanded Liberalization Following the example of its nineteenth-century missionary predecessors, the World Bank instigates reforms that ultimately escape its very control. The effects of World Bank liberalization programs are thus inadvertent and

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often contrary to what was expected. Two sets of unintended consequences are particularly relevant to our understanding of democracy promotion: the reinforcement of incumbent regimes and the delegitimation and privatization of government. The first unintended consequence of World Bank liberalization reforms—the reinforcement of incumbent regimes—is far removed from its official statutes. This observation, while debated, is often affirmed (Moore, 1993; Callaghy, 1994; Schmitz, 1995; Banégas and Quantin, 1996). By giving priority to existing structures and institutions, and through its inability to push forward true civil societies, the financial support of the World Bank often serves to maintain incumbent elites and governing coalitions in positions of power. However, observers rarely note that this involuntary support operates beside parallel and “shadow” networks and institutions, thus reinforcing the “informal” and subterranean branches of the state (Reno, 1995; Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou, 1997; Mbembe, 2000). In some ways, the primacy of politics is recognized in the African case, as demonstrated by the introduction of political economy into economic catechism, as well as international lenders’ recently articulated intention to “put an end to the African exception” by obligating African countries to return to a certain “economic rationality.” The conceptualization of political reforms and conditionalities in terms of good governance (i.e., underscoring the financial and technical as opposed to the political aspects of governing) nonetheless constitutes part of the general project of depoliticization, which seeks to circumscribe the political or to render the economy autonomous from politics (Ferguson, 1990; Coussy, 1991). Indeed, an understanding that begins with the idea of the existence of a state-versusmarket dichotomy is inoperable and inadequate because it neglects, well beyond vested interests, the very foundations of sociopolitical conflicts, social structures of different economic sectors, political influence in economic activities, and especially the sociopolitical rationales of economic policies. By disregarding the reality of the sociopolitical environment in which they act, international financial institutions cannot see the real effects of their own actions. They therefore produce, in spite of themselves, a certain political dynamic, inserting themselves into local events. Thus purely technical measures such as computerization, administrative restructurings, and the privatization of security, which are designed to eliminate customs fraud, obtain particularly poor economic results, since they do not account for social and political phenomena that are inherent to fraud. Also, these technical measures benefit those who are most able to take advantage of new modes of accumulation or to act in the political realm in order to rework fraudulent techniques. These resolutely political reforms thus contribute laterally to reinforce

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the position of dominant elites in the economy. But their position is not a legal one; rather it is informal and occult. Through new norms, repression and condemnation of practices that lie at the heart of politics incite power holders to displace their strategies of accumulation toward more hidden modalities. In this way, liberalization reforms and the privatization of state functions abet shadow networks and structures of power. In the contemporary political context, the latter constitute the only spaces (or interstices) of liberty; they are margins of maneuver between political exigencies and economic constraints. During the 1960s and 1970s, practices of accumulation involved the distribution of public employment, acquisition of rights-ofpassage, profits from benefits such as import licenses, and privileged access to currency or procurement of “non-reimbursable credits.” Today, such practices have migrated to the fringes of legality, including protection of or access to informal commerce; control of criminal activities; control of violence for economic ends; and the development of various kinds of fraud (MacGaffey 1987, 1991; Grégoire and Labazée, 1993; Mbembe, 1993, 2000; Bayart, 1993, 1997; Reno, 1995; Roitman, 1996; Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou, 1997). The World Bank’s role in this is surprisingly ambiguous. Although deploying a set of resolute and sincere reform programs, the World Bank invariably supports incumbent power elites; while the latter’s management practices are criticized, the World Bank does not tackle the political logics of various regimes, even though growing rhetoric suggests the contrary. Indeed, the World Bank’s own practices undermine the long-standing material bases of governments and hence the latter’s capacity to implement reforms. Through this, the World Bank participates in the slide toward illegality in many developing states. A second unintended consequence of liberalization programs revolves around the World Bank’s insistence on achieving specific desired results while at the same time disregarding the means by which they are obtained. The World Bank and most other international financial institutions are particularly tolerant as to the ways and means by which African countries liberalize and, above all, privatize. For the World Bank, the emergence of capitalism depends upon the concentration of wealth and the rise of an entrepreneurial economic class; the adoption of management techniques by rational enterprises and the anchoring of market mechanisms constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions for development.7 Yet the World Bank is little concerned with either the modalities for accessing wealth or, following its apolitical principles, the sociopolitical processes that accompany transformations in economic management. In the African context, however, troubling sociopolitical effects can result from a particular means of implementing reforms. By neglecting the role of public policy and economic behavior in state formation, by underes-

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timating the weaknesses and even criminal aspects of incumbent regimes, by treating deficiencies in fiscality as a mere financial matter, and by taking into account only the economic performance of privatized industries, the World Bank participates, in spite of itself, in two disconcerting trends: the loss of legitimacy of public power and the privatization of the state and its modes of governance (Hibou, 1996; Mbembe, 2000). The loss of legitimacy of public authority is, above all, an internal process. But the World Bank involuntarily contributes to this process in several ways. Through its expertise and conditionalities, the World Bank intervenes in increasingly subtle ways in the very definition of economic policy and, more generally, the modes of action available to the state. Its intrusion into the modeling of public finance, the conception of public service, and the definition of public sectors is a preeminently political act (Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye, 1991). The World Bank also contributes, along with other international financial institutions, to the breakup of the state’s centers of decisionmaking (Coussy, 1994). The dispersion of power affects administrative efficiency and hence legitimacy. By aggravating the fragmentation of the bureaucracy and society, central political power becomes more and more limited. Also, in contributing to the weakening of state (public) bureaucracies through adoption of a liberal and anti-statist norm (a technocratic disposition that disregards a great part of the administration in favor of small teams working with foreign experts, and the vicious circle of proliferating reforms that are impossible to implement), the World Bank abets the loss of political and economic credibility of public agencies. Finally, the World Bank’s implicit support for the international, as opposed to domestic, legitimacy of governments is particularly pernicious. Insofar as political leaders depend largely on external resources to balance their budgets, they tend to pay more attention to the financial exigencies of international financial institutions than the economic and political demands of their own citizens. Indeed, in situations of fiscal crisis, African governments have come to be much more concerned with international respectability—even if only superficially and with the intense use of double talk, trompe l’oeil conditionalities, and make believe—than internal legitimacy. The political consequences of this inversion of public authority are of course great. Because international legitimacy is economically and financially critical, the quest for domestic political and social legitimacy is relegated to second rank. The loss of legitimacy of public power is thus accelerated by this external priority. This reaction is not specific to Africa. In the case of Eastern Europe, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996) demonstrate how the process of constructing societies on the basis of an inverted pyramid of legitimacy has damaging consequences for democratization. The dissipation and loss of legitimacy are powerful motors for the pri-

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vatization of the state and its modes of governance. Although World Bank– inspired privatization programs typically have revolved around the transfer of state-owned entreprises to private interests, a wide variety of unintended and subterranean forms of privatization have accompanied this more formal process. A noteworthy case is the private appropriation of natural resources (wood, precious stones, oil, mining, ivory, and hunting) and goods (theft of land, art objects, and economic banditry) (Chachage, 1995; Reeve and Ellis, 1995; Schmidt and McIntosh, 1996; Misser and Vallée, 1997). This appropriation benefits major political figures and especially the members of shadow or occult structures of power, which include the key members of the parallel economy (Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou, 1997; Mbembe, 2000). Development is also privatized. The proliferation of NGOs in certain countries is such that the state is unable to follow their activities and their modes of functioning. This loss of control leads to the privatization of NGOs by local elites, often in association with state power (Bowen, 1992; Kiondo, 1995). The World Bank’s attempt to instrumentalize NGOs and decentralize initiatives in order to promote its economic catechism cannot succeed (Schmitz, 1995). It is difficult to locate a bounded “civil society,” and under such conditions, international financing is captured and put to alternative economic and political ends. That is, elites or political factions privatize these development projects to their own profit (MacDonald, 1995; Kiondo, 1995; Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou, 1997).8 Finally, privatizations increasingly involve classic state functions (Hibou, 1997, 1998b). Following a World Bank initiative, customs services are often delegated to foreign private entities (like the tenant farms of the French ancien régime), even though customs revenues represent between one-third and one-half of fiscal receipts for African countries. Not only have customs revenues not increased—or imperceptibly so—but private companies now responsible for this public service cannot escape the sociopolitical logics of the various developing countries in which they work. The delegation of public service can inspire informal or undomesticated privatizations, as in the case of Cameroon and Mozambique, where ports find themselves privatized by foreign companies with the complicity of local leaders. Fiscal revenues and the fiscal system in general—a critical element of state formation—are left to the arbitrary logics of local elites, eminent political figures, and private companies. Public service is more often held by private salaried parties than by public officials. And when citizens must pay to obtain an official form or stamp, when bureaucrats must pay to receive their monthly wage, or when ministers must pay to make use of a credit line—as in Cameroon today—we are not in the midst of corruption but rather the privatization of public services (Roitman and Mbembe, 1995). This is also the case when private enterprises take the initiative to

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construct roads in desolate regions (MacGaffey, 1991). More and more, the main monopoly on public violence is violated. The development of militias and private police corps, increasing recourse to private security services and other surveillance companies, and the emergence of a veritable “mercenary market” all speak to the point that the privatization of violence to political and economic ends is not specific to countries at war (Marchal and Messiant, 1997). These diverse processes of privatization all share three characteristics: first, private interests in different economic sectors are usually the same, typically political individuals; second, in all cases, there is slippage from economic deregulation toward political deregulation; and finally, the mode of governance is modified, with an increasing delegation to private interests closely linked to spheres of power that are often occult and implicated in the parallel or even criminal economy. In short, a sort of private, indirect government, both fragmented and refocused, is strengthened.

Conclusion It is important to reaffirm that the World Bank’s discourse on promoting democracy, like that of the other principal international financial institutions, is not based on a political philosophy. The idea of market democracy promoted by international financial institutions is conceived in terms of good governance and a presumed relationship between good governance and accelerated development in the developing world. The best political system to promote development is supposedly one that will foster the transparency of institutions and abide by the rule of law. As I have emphasized in the case of Africa, however, this reform “discourse” in favor of good governance constitutes mere rhetoric that, in any case, is not representative of any given political philosophy—democratic or not. The World Bank is a bank, that is, a financial institution and a multilateral body whose principal objective has evolved from that of economic reconstruction to economic development. As such, its raison d’être should remain an economic and financial one, in spite of all the drifting caused by the continuous expansion of its field of intervention to such diverse goals as the fight against poverty, the pursuit of gender equality, and most recently and most notably, the promotion of democracy. In a sense, the World Bank’s often-criticized lack of success in these fields can be explained to a certain extent by the facts that these additional objectives are not within its field of expertise and that the World Bank’s own statutes do not allow it to intervene in the political and social realms. In other words, by gradually extending its field of action beyond its only assigned mission of develop-

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ment, the World Bank—probably more than any other international financial institution—is no longer intellectually relevant. Historical experience and scholarly research have demonstrated that there is no correlation between economic development and democratization. By refusing to recognize the lack of such a link—a position that is both morally pleasing and politically correct—the World Bank’s reform discourse has been caught up in a spiral of perverse rhetoric that has included the resort to pseudoscientific arguments and simplistic analyses. Most important, this rhetoric rests on shaky ground in that the idea of democracy as vehicle of development may disappear as quickly as it appeared, as would be suggested by the hardships that several countries in Eastern Europe are currently confronting. In addition to not being informed by any political philosophy whatsoever, the World Bank’s reform discourse is heavily swayed by the rhetoric of the dominant northern industrialized democracies, most notably the United States. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, this rhetoric has underscored the necessity of supporting fragile, fledgling democracies. The World Bank merely followed this general trend by adapting the rhetoric of democracy promotion to the constraints of its statutes (a claimed apoliticism); its underlying economic catechism (a liberalism and an aversion to state intervention); and its mode of reasoning (a staunch economism). Indeed, the lack of adherence to any kind of political philosophy was demonstrated by the ability of the World Bank to adopt a less-than-democratic rhetoric during the 1970s and the 1980s. During this period, the World Bank implicitly approved of a certain degree of authoritarianism on the part of developing states to contain rising social pressures—both in the name of economic development. Finally, the lack of any kind of political philosophy has been coupled with the inability of the World Bank to go beyond its traditional economic function. In other words, the deadlocks and the contradictions created by the disconnection between its mission and objectives distinct from development could only be resolved by a specific rhetoric: democracy promotion is justified by the market and good governance. Specifically, the argument is that a democratic regime will assure the more efficient functioning of the market economy; favor the creation of institutions sensitive to improving national economic performance and especially the effectiveness of reforms; and promote an administrative and institutional process that will reduce political impediments to the reform process. As is the case with any normative discourse, the World Bank’s discourse on market democracy essentially promotes a self-fulfilling prophecy. By continually emphasizing the strong relationship between development and democratization (and by implicitly tying its aid to the approval of

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this relationship), the World Bank intends to influence the course of history in those developing countries within which it intervenes. Theoretically speaking, such an approach would be the least effective in precisely those circumstances in which the historicity and other unique aspects of the target country are ignored. In this regard, the political rhetoric of the World Bank is indeed pointless and doomed to fail due to the tendency of international financial institutions in general to ignore the unique cultural, economic, historical, and political characteristics of the countries where they intervene. In sharp contrast to the World Bank’s economistic logic, which suggests that one economic blueprint fits all, there is no such thing as the economic model, just as there is no such thing as the political model, let alone any such thing as a one-to-one relationship between “development” and a specific type of “political regime” (as it is customary to argue). To return to my examples from Africa, it suffices to recall that democratization processes adapt themselves to very different economic and political logics. Indeed, the “politics of the belly” have yet to disappear, regardless of whether a country has experienced a democratic transition and is in the process of consolidating democratic practices or has experienced a democratic reversal replete with the restoration of authoritarianism (Banégas, 1998; Bayart, 2000).

Notes 1. For a particularly lucid elaboration, see Ferguson (1990), who, on the basis of a detailed study of World Bank projects in Lesotho, shows how the World Bank constructs its object (Lesotho), structures knowledge about or of its object, and models it such that an “anti-politics machine” results. 2. This is an explicit reference to the journal, Le Fait Missionnaire: Histoire et Héritage. This publication aims to disseminate interdisciplinary academic work on the missionary deed and the object of the mission. 3. It is interesting to note that during the 1980s, the IMF and the World Bank “pushed” for their right to intervene in Africa. This was especially the case for Cameroon, which had set out on an independent adjustment process. Again, one can only note the analogy with religious missions. 4. See Hibou (1995) on the negotiations between France, the IMF, and the World Bank before, during, and after the CFA franc’s devaluation. This episode is a good example of purely political and strategic behavior: the devaluation had to succeed, no matter what rigging and “heresy” were used to obtain this result. 5. This image suggests that the postcolonial state in sub-Saharan Africa goes beyond the institutions: the processes of exercising a centralized power. It is rather characterized by an “infinitely variable multiplicity of networks whose underground branches join together the scattered points of society” (Bayart, 1993: 220). 6. I take the term economy of plunder from the works of Hoskins (1976) on England under Henry VIII. This term refers to the monopolization of economic resources for private ends by representatives of public power.

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7. This is particularly obvious when one reads institutional texts on privatization (Caisse Française de Développement [CFD], 1997; World Bank, 1996). The reactions of these same institutions (World Bank, CFD) to the publication of Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou (1997), and especially to a section on privatization (pp. 107–111), are even more revealing. While recognizing the accuracy of the opinions expressed, these institutions’ functionaries continued to think that criminal modes of privatization contribute to the emergence of large, productive, and viable enterprises. On the basis of a specific reading of economic history, they are persuaded that in the long term, “good” management and the market will overcome archaic and mafia-esque methods. 8. In the case of Costa Rica, MacDonald (1995: 224) notes the same process: “As the Costa Rican case shows, the ideology of the self-direction of a society, based on NGO-sponsored activities, is perfectly compatible with the actual privatization and dismantlement of Third World states.”

11 Political Foundations and Think Tanks James M. Scott

ar from being the sole province of states and international organizations, democracy promotion is increasingly a transnational phenomenon involving a growing web of non-state actors linked together in a loose democracy promotion network. This chapter examines two such actors: government-sponsored but nominally independent institutes often referred to as “political foundations,” and private institutes typically referred to as “think tanks.” These two sets of actors remain engaged in a wide variety of activities broadly consistent with the notion of liberal democracy, including election procedures, protection of the rights and freedoms of individuals and groups, pluralism and civil society, accountable institutions and parties, market economics, and the rule of law. These efforts guide and structure the democracy promotion efforts of other actors from the northern industrialized democracies, most notably their respective governments, thereby conditioning the support and assistance a democratizing country receives. The remainder of this chapter is divided into four sections. The first two sections survey a sample of the political foundations and think tanks involved in democracy promotion. Whereas the section on political foundations draws on examples from Canada, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States, the section on think tanks focuses solely on examples from the United States. The next two sections detail the broad categories of democracy promotion activities pursued by political foundations and think tanks and offer a tentative assessment of the various impacts of these nonstate actors on democracy promotion. A final section offers some concluding observations about the roles of political foundations and think tanks in the international politics of democratization and the growing “multicentric world” phenomena (Rosenau, 1990, 1997; Mathews, 1997). Overall, this chapter argues that, in their efforts to support and promote democracy, these non-state actors contribute to the globalization of a transnational civil society and the redefinition of sovereignty.

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Political Foundations Involved in Democracy Promotion Political foundations are quasi-governmental actors (Bartsch, 1997; PintoDuschinsky, 1991, 1996, 1997; Quigley, 1997; Scott, 1999; Scott and Walters, 2000). They depend on their national governments for most of their funds but remain semiautonomous, supervised in varying degrees by governments, but not staffed by bureaucrats nor part of the bureaucratic structure. While created to serve a purpose closely tied to “national interests,” they are provided space within which to operate more independently. From the perspective of the countries establishing them, this provides greater freedom of action (relief from bureaucratic procedures and civil service requirements, for example) and the ability to respond to situations quickly. It further involves fewer or reduced legal and political ramifications concerning intervention and interference. It also reduces for the aid recipient the stigma of accepting foreign assistance, because of the reduced role of the donor government and the reduction in official “political strings.” Four examples, including the oldest political foundations, in Germany, and more recently established organizations from Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, provide a representative cross-section of political foundations. In the case of Germany, the West German federal government turned to the political foundations established after World War II by the German political parties—the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (Social Democratic Party), the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (Christian Democratic Union), the Friedrich Naumann Foundation (Liberal Party), the Hanns Seidel Foundation (Christian Social Union), the Heinrich Böll Foundation (Green Party), and the Rosa Luxembourg Foundation (Party of Democratic Socialism)—to help develop international ties and political influence without generating alarm over an assertive German state (see Chapter 5; see also Scott, 1999: 149). By the 1990s, the six foundations together deployed over 300 field representatives in more than 100 countries, with the two largest foundations—Friedrich Ebert and Konrad Adenauer—each employing over 600 individuals, including field representatives around the world. Although German political foundations are legally distinct from the German political parties and government, most of their funding for international activities has come from the federal government. At the end of the 1980s, for example, most of the approximately $349 million spent by the foundations came from federal funds (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1991: 35). Moreover, each foundation project must be approved by Germany’s Ministries of Development and Foreign Affairs. Each foundation also is overseen by a governing board made up of senior members of its sponsoring party (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1991: 34). Hence, these foundations exist in the gray area between government agencies, political parties, and private

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organizations because their actions have involved elements of both official foreign policy and “unofficial” transnational relations. The U.S. system of political foundations centers on the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), established in 1983. The NED is funded by Congress (about $30–35 million annually in the 1990s) and directed by a nonpartisan board representing the political parties, business community, and labor. The State Department assigns a foreign service officer the responsibility of overseeing the NED’s activities, but it does not have veto power over NED projects. Congress has control only to the extent that it sets NED’s annual budget. The NED works primarily through four “core institutes” that represent the two major political parties, labor, and business. The International Republican Institute (IRI) is loosely affiliated with the Republican Party and relies on both professional staff (about seventy) and volunteers to work internationally with local activists and organizations on projects in over thirty countries (IRI, 1998). Its board of directors was chaired in 2001 by U.S. Senator John McCain and included such party supporters as Lawrence Eagleburger, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, and Brent Scowcroft. The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), the Democratic Party’s counterpart to IRI, was chaired in 2001 by Madeleine Albright and directed by a board that included Bernard Aronson, J. Brian Atwood, and Geraldine Ferraro. It maintains a professional staff in Washington, D.C., and in field offices on four continents. NDI projects have been implemented in over eighty countries (NDI, 1998a). Labor is represented in the NED by the American Center for International Labor Solidarity (ACILS), which consists of the international institutes of the American Federation of Labor– Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO). ACILS has supported foreign labor unions around the world through finance, training, and services. The Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) is a U.S. Chamber of Commerce institute that represents the business community. CIPE has promoted the development of market-oriented economies, free enterprise–friendly legal and institutional structures, and business participation in the democratic process (CIPE, 1998). In the case of Canada, the Canadian International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development (ICHRDD) began operations in the fall of 1990 (Seymore, 1992). The Canadian government finances the center, whose annual budget during the 1990s was about $35 million, and its board of directors submits an annual report to the Foreign Affairs Ministry and the parliament. The thirteen-member governing board consists of Canadians and at least three individuals from the developing world. (In 2001, for example, those individuals were Willy Munyoki Mutunga from Kenya, Dr. Kamal Hossain from Bangladesh, and Juan Mendez from Argentina.) The center is operated by about thirty professional staff and

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provides grants to “front-line organizations” (directly or through intermediaries) throughout the world that are actively attempting to establish or strengthen democratic institutions. It has worked with citizen groups, international organizations, and governments in its efforts to develop democratic civil societies (ICHRDD, 1998). Finally, in 1992 the British government established the Westminster Foundation for Democracy to aid and promote democratization efforts around the world. Throughout the 1990s, the foundation on average managed $1.3 million in government-provided grants each year. As with the other foundations, Westminster awards its grants either directly or through other British organizations (e.g., the British Labour Party) to nongovernmental organizations working on human rights, democratization, political participation, and conflict resolution. The Westminster board of governors is appointed by the Ministry of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and is made up of representatives of the three major British political parties, trade unions, business, academia, and other NGOs (Lord and Seymore, 1996: 49–50). Simply put, the political foundations are designed to promote democracy. This goal is written into all of their charters and mission statements and is their raison d’être. However, this shared purpose masks some important variations. The German foundations also seek to promote development, combat poverty, improve social justice, and support social reform, purposes absent from NED and Westminster Foundation goals. Both the German and Canadian foundations emphasize the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The ICHRDD mandate directs the center “to defend and promote the rights and freedoms enshrined in the International Bill of Human Rights and encourage the development of democratic societies” (ICHRDD, 1998). The NED and Westminster Foundation tend to emphasize institutions, elections, and civil society, while the NED devotes a relatively greater level of effort to promote markets than the other foundations. Within the NED, the IRI and CIPE are more focused on the promotion of free-market capitalism than the NDI and ACILS. Different elements of the German and U.S. foundations also support different political parties with different agendas. Through these variations, together the foundations succeed in promoting a reasonably balanced concept of liberal democracy and market economics. Nevertheless, the overall conception is Western, and foundations support those falling in line with this broad image.

Think Tanks Involved in Democracy Promotion Think tanks are independent, not-for-profit institutions privately financed by some combination of foundation grants, endowments, individual contri-

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butions, corporate contributions, and government grants and contracts, as well as the sale of their own publications (Smith 1993a; Ricci, 1993; Stone, 1991, 2000; Weiss, 1992; Abelson, 1996; Abelson and Carberry, 1988; Wiener, 2000). In the context of this analysis, think tanks can generally be categorized into two types: the traditional analysis and advocacy think tank committed to communication through policy research, analysis, and advice, and the more recent action-oriented institute committed to practice (as opposed to research), participation (as opposed to analysis), and implementation (as opposed to recommendation). This distinction establishes an ideal-type continuum between think tanks, whose efforts in democracy promotion are chiefly concerned with informing and influencing their own government’s policy, and action tanks, which promote democracy through direct involvement with foreign NGOs and governments and international organizations. Obviously, many examples from the United States could be used, including the well-known Brookings Institution, AEI, the Heritage Foundation, and many others. The four illustrative think tanks used here were selected because they range from traditional communication think tanks to action tanks and therefore illustrate the role of think tanks in democracy promotion. Founded by President Herbert Hoover in 1919 at Stanford University, the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace represents a traditional, communications-oriented think tank (Hoover Institution, 1998a). In the late 1990s the Hoover Institution maintained approximately one hundred resident scholars and twenty-five visiting scholars from around the world, along with a professional staff to assist them. It has been funded through an endowment, private donations, and university funds. According to the institution, it has been guided by its purpose of “analyzing social, political, and economic change and formulating a diverse range of ideas and proposals on public policy” (Hoover Institution, 1998b). The Hoover Institution has focused much of its attention on the former Soviet republics and Eastern Europe. To bring the results of its research to bear on policy, the institution has typically disseminated its research through books (the Hoover Institute Press), essays (an “Essays in Public Policy” series), articles (in the Hoover Digest and elsewhere), conferences (domestic and international), seminars, training programs, public lectures, videotapes, a newsletter, newspaper commentaries, media interviews and briefings, special briefings for national and foreign policymakers, presentations for political and industry organizations, and congressional testimony. The chief targets of its activities, as would be expected from a traditional communications think tank, have been the U.S. government and academic community. Established in 1910 by Andrew Carnegie to promote international peace, the Washington-based Carnegie Institute (Carnegie Endowment for

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International Peace, CEIP) has funded its programs through its own endowment, sales of its materials (it publishes books and monographs in addition to the influential quarterly, Foreign Policy), and grants from private foundations (Smith, 1993a; CEIP, 1998a). In the late 1990s Carnegie operated on an annual budget of approximately $10 million, which supported about thirty resident researchers and an administrative staff of about thirty. It had evolved into a hybrid institute: chiefly a communications think tank focused on policy research and recommendation, it also developed international linkages and engaged in some more action-oriented programs; for example, in 1993 it added the Moscow Center for Russian and Eurasian Programs. Founded in 1962 by David Abshire, the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) was originally affiliated with Georgetown University. It has been independent since 1982, relying on individual and corporate contributions, foundation grants, and nonclassified contract work for the U.S. government to finance its annual $15 million budget (Smith, 1993a, 1993b; CSIS, 1998a). By the late 1990s, over eighty research specialists, an eighty-member staff, and seventy interns conducted the organization’s program and research. CSIS is another hybrid institute. It has engaged in traditional communications activities, developed international linkages that enable it to provide information and analysis to foreign governments, and participated in some action-oriented activities. To accomplish this, CSIS has conducted research and analysis and convened policymakers and other key figures in workshops, conferences, symposia/seminars, and “action commissions.” It has a suite of publications for its research and analysis: center-published books, The Washington Quarterly, the Washington Papers series, the Significant Issues series, CSIS Panel Reports, CSIS Reports, Post-Soviet Prospects, Policy Papers on the Americas, CSIS Africa Notes, and a newsletter. CSIS has also sponsored lectures, briefings for policymakers and practitioners, and testimony before Congress. According to the institution, its key constituents therefore include Congress, the executive branch, foreign leaders, members of the international business community, the international academic community, the media, and the general public. Founded in 1982 by former U.S. president Jimmy Carter, the Carter Center, affiliated with Emory University of Atlanta, was created “to resolve conflict, promote democracy, preserve human rights, and improve health” (Carter Center, 1998a). It is an action tank explicitly organized to promote democracy and human rights. Its central program, “International Democratization and Development,” is a multifaceted effort in conflict resolution, democratization, human rights, and global development. A board of trustees chaired by President Carter directs the center’s efforts. Overall, 200 individuals drawn from government, academia, and business, among

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other places, work full- or part-time at the center, another 130 volunteers devote time weekly, and over 100 graduate and undergraduate students serve as interns. The center was established with private funds from individuals, foundations, and corporations that finance its $27.6 million annual operating budget. Interestingly, because of its action-oriented agenda, the center has also received support from development assistance programs such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Whereas some think tanks focus on democratization and democracy promotion (e.g., the Carter Center), others have research projects with that focus (e.g., Hoover and Carnegie), and still others incorporate that issue into broader projects (CSIS). In general, however, and in contrast to political foundations, think tanks tend to target governments and policymakers for their activities, whether they are engaging in education, advocacy, or direct forms of democracy building, which may be understood as an attempt to gain access to power. In terms of their active democracy-building efforts, think tanks provide resources (e.g., impartial monitors and mediators) that the international political arena may lack.

Democracy Promotion Efforts There are important distinctions to be made between political foundations (as quasi-governmental actors) and think tanks (as autonomous non-state actors), but their activities in democracy promotion fall into a general range of behavior consisting of four broad categories. Extending Grants to Prodemocracy Groups Political foundations (and some think tanks secondarily) extend grants in support of democratization and other reforms. The major activity of political foundations is grant making (e.g., see NED, 1998b; Scott and Walters, 2000). Although political foundations may work with governments, as the German foundations do, as a rule they provide funds to non-state actors. The NED is actually required by its charter to rely on private sector initiatives and groups. This focus is interesting. Since foundations represent, in part, the foreign policies of certain states, it gives states influence in the domestic politics of others in what appears to be an increasingly more legitimate form of “interference.” In practice the grant activities of these political foundations revolve around “political aid” designed to influence politics in a foreign country (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1991: 34). The grants provided by these political foundations generally support elections, institution building, civil society, and

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market and social reforms. The grants’ databases maintained by the NED (NED, 1998b), which canvas many of the foundations, indicate that developing, strengthening, and supporting civil society associations have become major objectives for the political foundations (Scott and Walters, 2000). A recent study of foundation activity in Central Europe shows a sequence whereby foundations first stressed human rights, followed by elections and political parties, economic (market) reform, and finally and most recently, civil society and NGOs (Quigley, 1997; see also Scott and Walters, 2000). For the German foundations, this political aid has been spread throughout the countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Oceania, although the momentous upheavals in Eastern Europe and Russia have prompted a shift in attention toward those regions. The German stiftungen have provided grants (about $360 million annually in the 1990s) to political parties, trade unions, media, human rights organizations, local think tanks, local governments, and cooperatives/self-help organizations. For example, the German foundations provided about $74 million from 1984–1988 to Chilean research institutes, trade unions, political parties, and many other private sector organizations working for human rights and democratization (PintoDuschinsky, 1991: 39–40). In South Africa, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation has aided in drafting the new constitution, building new economic and legal frameworks, establishing private research institutes, and other activities (Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 1998a, 1998c). Since 1989 all the foundations have devoted considerable resources to democracy promotion in Eastern Europe (Quigley, 1997). In addition, each German foundation has a scholarship program for higher education and training. The Friedrich Ebert Foundation provided 362 scholarships to foreign nationals in 1993 (from a total of 2,078), while the Konrad Adenauer Foundation provided more than 300 such scholarships in 1997 (from a total of about 1,800) (Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 1998b). The NED has behaved similarly. Historically, about two-thirds of NED grants have been channeled through the four core institutes, with the remainder going directly to private sector organizations. In the 1980s, the NED focused its activities in Latin America and the former Soviet bloc (roughly two-thirds of its funds). High-profile projects included support for the democracy movement in Poland, aid in Chilean democratization efforts from 1984–1989, and involvement in the Nicaraguan elections in 1989– 1990. Since the Cold War’s end, the NED network has broadened its operations to every region of the world and has deepened its activities in Eastern Europe and Russia. In the 1990s, NED grants averaged about $30–35 million per year (reduced in 1996 by the budget stalemate between the Republican-led

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Congress and the Clinton administration). The foundation has a pluralism program to develop private sector institutions such as trade unions (grants provided through ACILS) and other civic organizations (e.g., women, youth, and minorities), and to foster development of a market-oriented, private enterprise system (grants provided through the CIPE). It also has a democratic governance program to aid political parties, election processes, political participation, public administration, public policy centers, legislatures, the rule of law, and sound civil-military relations (primarily through IRI and NDI). A third NED program targets education, culture, and communications to help develop a civic culture committed to the rule of law, individual liberty, freedom of religion and expression (including the press), and majority rule/minority rights. By the late 1990s, the NED was making hundreds of grants each year to projects in over one hundred countries (NED, 1998b, 1998c). Both the Canadian ICHRDD and the British Westminster Foundation follow suit, although their grants tend to be much smaller since they have only approximately $3.5 million and $1.3 million per year, respectively. Consequently, both foundations have opted to restrict the scope of their efforts. For the ICHRDD, this has meant a fairly balanced distribution of grants to only thirteen countries (Burma, El Salvador, Eritrea, Guatemala, Haiti, Kenya, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Rwanda, Tanzania, Thailand, and Togo). Likewise, Westminster provides grants limited to approximately $1,200–$22,000 each, most of which have been directed to Eastern Europe and Russia (Scott and Walters, 2000: 246; Scott, 1999: 154–155). Like foundations, think tanks provide limited funds to support democratization. In the main, however, this funding has been concentrated on enabling individuals and groups to participate in the various conferences, workshops, and seminars in which think tanks are involved. When such support funds have been applied to democracy promotion, they have typically paid for direct think-tank participation or think-tank–run programs. For example, in the 1990s, the CSIS directed some of its funds to pay for a program of conflict resolution in Eastern Europe, and the Carter Center funded a myriad of conflict resolution, development, human rights, and democratization projects in which it was directly involved. Funding and Engaging in Research and Analysis Political foundations and think tanks both fund and engage in research and analysis of democratization and related issues. Armed with this information, think tanks especially, and political foundations to a lesser extent, direct that analysis toward governments, organizations, and the public to inform, advise, and advocate specific policy actions. With respect to

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democratization, such research and analysis may focus on the foreign policies of countries trying to promote democracy, the policies of countries engaging in democratization, and/or the efforts of democracy activists. Think tanks tend to emphasize this activity just as foundations stress grant making. Their main purpose is to tell practitioners what to do; in terms of democratization, that may entail how to promote democracy internationally or how to conduct democratization nationally. The programs of the late 1990s conducted by these think tanks illustrate a range of efforts in this regard. The Hoover Institution has had a research program, “Democracy and Free Markets,” that has studied the dynamics of transitions from socialist to capitalist societies. Through this project, think tank scholars have sought to “inform and guide the political and economic leaders of the emerging democracies as well as leaders in the U.S. foreign policy-making community” (Hoover Institution, 1998c). The primary but not exclusive focus of this research program has been Eastern Europe and Russia. The Hoover Institution has also attempted to reach an international audience, in part by involving foreign officials in its conferences, seminars, and briefings. Similarly, Carnegie has run a “Democracy Project” designed “to generate a greater understanding—among policymakers and aid providers, as well as more broadly in the policy community and U.S. public—of the scope, methods, and results of democracy-building programs and policies” (CEIP, 1998b). The project has included case studies, study groups with national and international participants, and workshops and other meetings on democracy promotion. As of 2001, the project has studied U.S. democracy promotion efforts in Eastern Europe, Latin America, Nepal, Zambia, Guatemala, Romania, and others. The primary but not exclusive targets of these efforts are the U.S. government and academic community, with the general purpose of strengthening official U.S. policy efforts in the democracy promotion arena. Although CSIS had no single comparable project in the 1990s, it engaged in a number of projects related to the issues of democratization and democracy promotion. The many examples that could be noted include a CSIS “Task Force on the Democratic Republic of Congo” (CongoKinshasa, former Zaire), which studied the prospects and progress of that country toward democracy in light of ongoing civil war. A CSIS program on preventive diplomacy devoted some of its efforts to studying the “Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism.” The CSIS also had a working group on Southern Africa that focused on democratic transitions in that region. It also maintained a project on democracy in the Western Hemisphere that analyzed elections throughout Latin American and the Caribbean (CSIS, 1998b).

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Increasingly, studies such as these have been geared toward foreign governments and organizations as well as the institute’s home government, so this practice is no longer a “national” phenomenon. While the Hoover Institution has been somewhat engaged in this through its efforts to provide its studies to a broad, often international audience, it is still the most traditional think tank in this survey, primarily targeting the U.S. government. Conversely, in its Moscow Center–based program on Russian and Eurasian affairs, Carnegie not only researched democratic transitions (e.g., the “Politics and Society in Transition” project headed by Michael McFaul and Sergei Markov) but also advised the Russian government and other Russian institutions and organizations. This project pursued traditional communication think-tank goals (policy study and recommendation for government), but vis-à-vis both the Russian and U.S. systems, making Carnegie a more “international” think tank as well as a more practice-oriented one. Similarly, the CSIS democracy projects have been designed to involve international participants and advise foreign governments and organizations. While the Carter Center is primarily designed to translate research and analysis into action-oriented programs, its analysis and advocacy efforts have fallen into this international category, since it targets both the U.S. government and international audiences such as international organizations, foreign governments, and foreign NGOs. Each political foundation has a research arm that engages in this activity. For example, some Adenauer Foundation funds have supported its own researchers, whose studies of democratization and development are disseminated through the foundation’s publications, in journals, and through conferences (Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 1998b). Some NED grants have supported the research/education efforts of institutes around the world, but the NED has been directly involved through its own International Forum for Democratic Studies. Established in April 1994, the forum has conducted research programs and organized conferences designed to analyze practical and theoretical issues relating to democracy and democratization. This forum also publishes the highly regarded quarterly, Journal of Democracy, maintains a Democracy Resource Center and a democracy grants database, and runs a Visiting Fellows Program that brings scholars, journalists, and activists from around the world to the forum (NED, 1998d). In Canada, the ICHRDD has funded and conducted research on human rights practices and issues relating to democratization. It has also published studies, reports, and a newsletter, sponsored speakers and conferences, and lobbied the Canadian government on human rights and democratization issues. Finally, the Westminster Foundation has a research/education function served chiefly by its support of a variety of publications relating to democratization.

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Facilitating Coordination Among Democracy-Oriented Groups Political foundations and think tanks both develop and facilitate interaction among democracy-oriented groups. Simply put, think tanks and political foundations seek connections and interactions with their own governments, officials from foreign governments, officials from international organizations, and individuals from other think tanks, foundations, or organizations in their efforts to promote democracy. For political foundations, many of the activities that support research help develop such contacts. Active democracy-building efforts also bring together individuals and groups from around the world. These networks pool resources, share information, and coordinate efforts. Among the German stiftungen, for example, the Adenauer Foundation has coordinated with parties, parliaments, and governments; education and research institutions; industry confederations and trade unions; women’s, environmental, and self-help organizations; and the media (Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 1998b). Elaborate field networks and training, conferencing, and other activities have helped develop these connections. The NED, ICHRDD, and Westminster Foundation also foster networking of those involved in democratization, democracy studies, and democracy promotion. In fact, promoting such networking was actually written into the NED’s charter legislation, which makes facilitating exchanges between U.S. private sector groups and democratic groups abroad and supporting the participation of the major American political parties, labor, business, and other groups in cooperative efforts with democratizers abroad major purposes of the foundation (Public Law [P.L.] 98-164: National Endowment for Democracy Act of 1983). All three foundations have done this through grants enabling individuals and groups to participate in conferences, workshops, and other activities. Equally important, these foundations have organized and supported such conferences and workshops. For example, since 1991 the NED has held an annual “World Conference on Democracy” to bring together leading democratic activists from around the world. The joint work that the foundations conduct on election monitoring and other activities—both with each other (e.g., the NED and German foundations in Latin America and South Africa) and with other non-state actors, including think tanks (e.g., NDI and the Carter Center), NGOs (domestic and international), and international organizations—have also helped develop these networks. The political foundations—especially the German and American institutes—have often involved themselves in the party internationals. For the stiftungen, Ebert has worked with Socialist International, Adenauer with the Christian Democrat International, Naumann with Liberal International,

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and Seidel with the International Democrat Union (a conservative international). In the NED system, IRI has worked with the International Democrat Union, and NDI has been loosely connected to Liberal International. These ties have allowed the foundations to build contacts with party leaders around the world, as well as influence the development of those parties. All the think tanks surveyed here have engaged in networking, chiefly through their programs of conferences, seminars and workshops, briefings, media appearances, and other meetings. Obviously, one purpose of such meetings is to bring think-tank scholars and other academic voices into contact with U.S. government officials and other practitioners in order that analysis and advice might be shared. Just as significant is the international networking encouraged by the various programs, which bring democratizers, democracy promoters, and policymakers from around the world together to share information, strategies, and resources. A few examples illustrate this networking. Among its many activities, the CSIS in the late 1990s held “conversations” programs with African heads-of-state—meetings with visiting African officials and other highlevel policymakers to discuss various issues, including development and democratic transitions. Its working group on South and Southern Africa, which had members from government, academia, and the business community, held regular roundtables on the postapartheid transition in South Africa (CSIS, 1998b). The Carter Center has worked with the World Bank to sponsor workshops on the transition from war to peace. The first, held in Atlanta in February 1997, convened leaders from Guatemala and Liberia, development aid officials, and representatives of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations International Children’s and Educational Fund (UNICEF), the Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE), and fifty participants from around the world (Carter Center, 1998b). The work of the center’s “Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government” (twenty-six current and former heads of state from the Western Hemisphere) has involved regular conferences. Its major 1997 conference in Atlanta, “The Agenda for the Americas for the 21st Century,” discussed relations in the Western Hemisphere and problems involving peace, illegal drug trafficking, democratization, and free trade. The council’s recommendations were subsequently shared with policymakers and elected officials throughout the hemisphere (Carter Center, 1998c). In sum, through networking, think tanks can become involved in policy recommendation and advising for foreign governments, political parties, and other foreign NGOs, making networking a route for active democracy promotion and international think tanking.

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Hands-On Role in Active Democracy Building Political foundations and some think tanks also take a hands-on approach to democracy building, which may involve efforts to build and train political parties and other civil organizations, as well as to establish and conduct elections. All the political foundations examined here have gone beyond financial support or conference organizing and other such meetings. The German foundations directly supported party development in Chile in the late 1980s as that country democratized (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1991: 39–40). NED activities in the 1990s include such examples as civic-education training programs designed to establish participatory local governments in Ethiopia; political party training and development in Azerbaijan and francophone Africa (through NDI); local election training programs in China (through IRI); and union training programs in Latin America (through ACILS) (NED, 1998c). The Westminster Foundation has trained Kenyan parliament members in opposition party strategies and Bulgarian Social Democratic Party members in media skills, and they have trained union leaders in different areas of Eastern Europe (e.g., the Hungarian Public Sector Trade Unions) (Scott, 1999: 159). Some foundations have participated directly in constitution and law writing as well. The Friedrich Ebert Foundation helped draft South Africa’s new constitution after the dismantling of the apartheid regime and also aided in the construction of basic economic and legal frameworks (Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 1998a, 1998c). In 1995 the Hanns Seidel Foundation began work with the Ministry of Justice, the Institute of Law, and the Institute for Administration and Management Development in Mongolia to develop constitutional and administrative law in that country (Asian Development Bank, 1997). Finally, political foundations have assisted in the design and conduct of democratic elections. The German and American foundations have collaborated in election training and monitoring in various places, including India and several countries in Latin America. According to the NED, through IRI and NDI the foundation has participated in election monitoring and other election activities in such varied places as Chile, Jordan, Nicaragua, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, South Africa, and Russia. By 1998 NDI alone had participated in over thirty observation teams and conducted various election programs in over sixty countries (NDI, 1998b). ICHRDD is also a regular contributor to election-monitoring teams. These efforts are significant for another reason: foundations network with each other on these election activities and also work with other organizations. For example, NDI and the Carter Center have collaborated on election-monitoring activities in Africa and Latin America. Among this sample of think tanks, the Carter Center in particular, the

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CSIS, and the Carnegie Endowment (in some ways) all have engaged directly in democracy-building or action-tank activities. Such think tanks have thereby become practitioners—democracy promoters rather than analysts or policy advocates. Carnegie’s direct democracy-building efforts occur chiefly through its Moscow Center and its collaborative projects linking it with other institutions abroad. Active democracy building has been even more prevalent in CSIS. For example, as part of its project on democracy in the Western Hemisphere, CSIS has not only analyzed elections throughout Latin America and the Caribbean but has also participated in election observation delegations. The CSIS project, “Democratic Pluralism in Slovakia,” has engaged directly in conflict resolution processes for the Slovak/ethnic Hungarian/Gypsy relationship in three towns in Slovakia (CSIS, 1998b). The Carter Center provides the best illustration of active democracy building, its primary purpose as a self-styled action tank (Carter Center, 1998d). In its conflict resolution program, the center has worked alone and in collaboration with NGOs and international organizations to mediate disputes and bring parties together to work out their differences, often through its twenty-five-member International Negotiation Network, which consists of Jimmy Carter, other world leaders, and conflict resolution experts from foundations, universities, and international organizations. This network has been active throughout Africa, as well as in the Balkans, the Baltics, and Korea. The center’s global development initiative (started in 1993) has helped countries design strategies for sustainable development (including democratization). The first project (1995) of this initiative involved the country of Guyana, where the center collaborated with the government, elements of the private sector, and several transnational NGOs (including the U.S.-based World Resources Institute). A human rights program has assisted victims of human rights violations and aids NGOs, intergovernmental agencies, and governments working to protect human rights. A seminal feature of this program was the establishment in 1994 of the International Human Rights Council, chaired by Carter, whose twenty-eight members include leaders from around the world (Carter Center, 1998e). This council has worked with and developed a network of activists, NGOs, international organizations, and others to intervene in situations of human rights abuse, develop better human rights policies, and strengthen international monitoring. The heart of the Carter Center’s efforts has been its Latin American and Caribbean program. In addition to research on hemispheric developments, this program has aided in conflict resolution/mediation (e.g., the center’s efforts in Haiti on behalf of Jean Bertrand Aristide and with the UNDP in Nicaragua in 1995 and after); election monitoring (e.g., in Nicaragua, 1990 and 1996; with NDI in the Dominican Republic, 1990 and

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1996; in Haiti, 1995; and in Mexico, 1997); and democratic consolidation (including electoral law, legal reform, and human rights issues). The center’s Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government led these efforts.

The Impact of Foundations and Think Tanks As this survey of the activities of political foundations and think tanks suggests, democracy promotion on the part of non-state actors takes place in a complex tapestry, which makes evaluation of their precise impact difficult. Nevertheless, the myriad activities and networks maintained by these actors strongly suggest that they impact this increasingly important arena of international politics. Even at a more general level of evaluation, at least six broad effects of foundations and think tanks on democratization bear comment. Foundations and think tanks expand the resources available to democratizing groups in the developing world. Promoters of democracy have access to greater amounts and varieties of assistance than they would if these actors did not exist. These resources include more money through the grants, but the support and advocacy that activists can turn to are also significant. This is seen in the variety of funds provided primarily by the political foundations and the services provided by these foundations and think tanks in elections, conflict resolution, and other areas. In creating, strengthening, and supporting players inside other countries, such players acquire resources that their countries need or must accommodate. These transnational resources alter state-society relations in the country in question, making national politics susceptible to international or transnational influence. Similarly, the channels established in part by foundations and think tanks provide alternatives to both domestic NGOs and national actors as they pursue democracy promotion in their own societies. These channels may provide resources, advice, and even conflict resolution options otherwise unavailable within the society or in the international arena. Political foundations and think tanks also provide aid in the form of information and advice to their home governments, democratizing governments, and non-state organizations. This contribution, which includes policy recommendations and technical advice, continues to expand our knowledge base about the techniques, procedures, and problems of democracy promotion. In effect, these actors behave much like an “epistemic community” in the issue area of democracy promotion, developing specialized knowledge, expertise, and policy preferences and disseminating them through various national and international channels (see Haas, 1989, 1992). This has important policy impacts: the advice and recommendations shape debates and actions at home (nationally) and abroad (internationally). This

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policy expertise involves these actors in policy discussion, formulation, and implementation, as in foundation and think-tank involvement in training parties, designing and monitoring elections, and writing constitutions and laws. The knowledge held by this democracy promotion community buttresses and helps to spread Western concepts of democracy. Political foundations and think tanks (especially action tanks such as the Carter Center) contribute to a variety of successful elections throughout the developing world by helping to establish procedures, provide resources, support parties, and monitor elections to ensure fairness. These efforts have brought rival factions into electoral procedures (as the Carter Center’s conflict resolution strategies illustrate), and their activities have tended to increase the legitimacy of electoral procedures as mechanisms for distributing political power and authority in democratizing states. They have also helped institutionalize these procedures. Much remains to consolidate the fledgling democracies often launched by such elections, but elections are a vital step toward representative and accountable governments. Political foundations and think tanks contribute to the development, maintenance, and strengthening of civil society in democratizing countries, an important aspect of the consolidation of democracy. Non-state civil associations are a major target for assistance (Scott and Walters, 2000). A recent review of democracy promotion in Central Europe concurs, arguing that a key contribution of democracy promotion activities by these actors is their emphasis on the construction of a civil society, an important aspect of a “democratic culture” without which democracies struggle (Quigley, 1997; Dahl, 1997). This is an important contribution to the long-term consolidation and maintenance of democratic societies. Furthermore, this strengthening of civil society and development of voluntary non-state associations contributes to the production or restoration of societal trust, which several recent analyses have identified as essential to community, democracy, and efficient and productive market economies (Putnam, 1992, 1995, 2000; Putnam et al., 1992; Fukuyama, 1995b, 2000). A further impact of political foundations and think tanks is to expand the range of actors engaged in the promotion of democracy. This pluralism is a positive element in the international politics of democracy promotion because it allows its advocates to evade some of the political strings connected to aid from national and international providers, and because a wider range of democracy promoters offers greater variety, perspectives, and targets for assistance. While it does not eliminate selectivity and bias on the part of the grantor, it does allow greater democratic pluralism overall. A corollary of this effect is the greater speed and innovation of these actors compared to state or international aid providers. This enables them to respond quickly to targets of opportunity without cumbersome bureau-

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cratic procedures, maximizing the impact of the aid. It also enables such actors to capitalize on the expertise and availability of foreign personnel to administer the programs since, unlike most national aid providers, these organizations do not need to limit themselves to their own personnel. As recent evaluations have suggested, this efficiency should not be ignored (Diamond, 1995; Quigley, 1997). Finally, even as the transnational aspects of democracy promotion reduce the ability of states to completely control the democratization process, political foundations (and think tanks secondarily) provide avenues for some northern industrialized democracies to shape the purposes, behavior, and success of state and non-state actors elsewhere. They also mask or legitimate interference in the domestic politics of another state. For example, the NED achieves this by providing grants (either through the core institutes or directly) to some groups and not others, and by supporting some alliances (e.g., between the NDI and the Carter Center) and not others. In the process, Western political foundations help empower certain groups with certain purposes, and they work to construct certain types of states and economies. Indeed, Western think tanks will almost certainly reflect Western conceptions of democracy. This, of course, is to say that foundations, in part, serve state interests and that both foundations and think tanks reinforce Western conceptions of democracy.

Conclusion Among the broad implications of the nature, activities, and impact of political foundations and think tanks on democracy promotion, the webs of interaction established by these and other actors stand out. The activities of political foundations and think tanks evade traditional conceptions of sovereignty and noninterference usually associated with the state-centric international system. The result is the construction of an international or transnational democracy issue network. This establishes a series of national linkages between governments and organizations within the same state, transnational linkages among non-state actors (those promoting democracy in their own countries) and between non-state actors from one state and the governments of another, and others that greatly complicate the issue and make the national politics of a given country much more susceptible to forces from outside that country’s borders. As part of this transnational issue network, political foundations straddle the line between state and non-state actors and blur traditional distinctions between domestic and international actors. Think tanks increasingly cross boundaries, becoming international policy advocates and independent actors carrying out their own policies. The international networks that

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political foundations and think tanks help develop clearly produce greater collaboration on democracy promotion. Their activities strengthen an international issue network: “a set of organizations bound by shared values and by dense exchanges of information and services, working internationally on an issue” (Sikkink, 1993: 415). Such networks—transnational, not statecentric—collaborate to shape the policies of states into those they prefer. In so doing, they may work through governments or beneath and around them. It is the juxtaposition and interaction of these “sovereignty-free actors,” to use one theorist’s term, with “sovereignty-bound actors” (i.e., states) that increasingly make democracy promotion a transnational activity in which states are merely one element (Rosenau, 1990). This issue network provides channels for political foundations, think tanks, other NGOs (domestic and international), and groups within other countries (sovereignty-free actors) to evade the constraints of the state system in pursuit of their preferences. For domestic actors, this offers routes and resources to contest and/or influence their own governments, since issue networks provide opportunities to jump out of domestic constraints, gain access to resources, aid, and services, and bring external pressure to bear on the state when internal channels are blocked. This issue network also provides avenues for external actors to gain entry into the domestic political environment of developing countries, strengthening certain actors; pressuring for, establishing, or supporting certain procedures; and supporting preferred outcomes. As analysts of issue networks have stressed, such alternative transnational channels are important in expanding communication, multiplying the voices that are brought to bear on an issue, applying pressure for policy or behavior change, sharing resources and information, spreading norms, conditioning perceptions of interests, and offering alternative routes to implement policy (Sikkink, 1993; Keck and Sikkink, 1998). The preceding survey of the democracy promotion activities of political foundations and think tanks suggests that these actors play a role in these and other effects of transnational issue networks. In the democracy network discussed here, at least two contributions stand out. Among the contributions of think tanks, the provision of certain services seems particularly significant. Whether it is specialized information or advice through policy analysis or more direct democracy promotion through election monitoring or mediation, think tanks help other actors in the network as they pursue democratization. For political foundations, among the major contributions to the transnational issue network is the provision of resources in support of various organizations. Foundation grants are enablers to many organizations. The transnational democracy issue network would also seem to be more than simply a group of sovereignty-free actors vying with states for international political influence. While the network reduces the control of

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state governments over democratization, some states can take advantage of the network to gain assistance for their own preferred policies. They may find other actors willing to support their democracy promotion efforts (e.g., Carnegie’s assistance to Russia). States interested in democracy promotion can take advantage of the transnational democracy network to find alternatives for implementation (e.g., non-state actors that can carry out elements of state policies). They may also gain opportunities to advance policies from which they are normally barred by principles of sovereignty and noninterference or practical political concerns. Political foundations are especially interesting in this regard. As quasi-governmental actors, political foundations may be understood, at least in part, as state efforts to tap and influence non-state, transnational actors. Through the foundations examined here, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States are able to reach into the non-state arena to strengthen certain organizations (even within other countries) with certain objectives (consistent with state interests) in pursuit of certain outcomes (especially Western-style democracy and market economics). In the end, this democracy issue network seems especially instrumental in international norm building. The direct result of the activities discussed in the preceding pages is the diffusion of Western democratic norms that impact notions of the proper form of the state and the proper relations between state and society. The transnational democratic issue network therefore plays an important role in the generation of ideas, or even “ideational power,” which structures and can transform international society (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993). Given its Western orientation, it probably also contributes to the “soft power” of the northern industrialized democracies (Nye, 1990b; Brown, 1995: 157–163). As part of this norm building, the issue network has an impact on the meaning and limits of sovereignty in the international system. The democracy issue network becomes an important modifier of sovereignty in a number of ways. It clearly plays a role in specifying and reinforcing “proper” types of states (i.e., Western-style, liberal democratic states) by promoting and supporting them. The international democratic issue network also specifies and reinforces “proper” types of state-society relations by promoting and supporting civil society, market economies, human rights, and social justice. The issue network further shapes both the structures and institutions seen to have legitimate authority and the relations between those authorities and society. At the same time, the existence and operation of the issue network also limits those authorities in significant ways, by offering ways to evade them, for example, and by practicing and legitimating certain forms of external intervention and domestic interference. Consequently, this issue network also provides a rationale for delegitimizing some “improper” authorities,

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particularly those who fail to adhere to the democracy norms promoted by the network. Because the result of all this is to condition the structures, procedures, and policies of states through transnational activities, the international democratic networks constitute “one of the most important results” of the international politics of democracy promotion (Diamond, 1995).

PART 4

CONCLUSION

12 Making the World Safe for Democracy? Peter J. Schraeder

n April 2, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson argued before an extraordinary session of the United States Congress that “making the world safe for democracy” should serve as the guiding principle for U.S. involvement in World War I (Wilson, 1917). Although many of his detractors, who also favored U.S. entry into the conflict, criticized Wilson’s tendency to focus on a normative global good as opposed to a more realist analysis of U.S. national security interests, nearly one hundred years later democracy has emerged as the predominant form of political governance within the international system. This development has been strengthened by the emergence of an international norm that considers democracy promotion to be an accepted and necessary component of international behavior. The primary purpose of this chapter is to set out some general concluding trends and future prospects associated with what Wilson referred to as making the world safe for democracy. An initial section details four key debates that continue to set the parameters of contemporary democracy promotion efforts. The analysis subsequently focuses on the variety of constraints that potentially impede the success of such efforts.

O

Evolving Debates over Democracy Promotion Several debates continue to characterize the general field of international democracy promotion. The most fundamental revolves around the normative issue of whether the international community should be actively involved in democracy promotion efforts. According to its most erstwhile proponents, democracy promotion should serve as the guiding foreign policy principle of the northern industrialized democracies (e.g., Diamond, 1995). Some even go so far as to argue that “exporting democracy” will allow the northern industrial democracies to “fulfill their destinies” within 217

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the international system (e.g., Muravchik, 1992). Yet, even more sanguine observers, who recognize that it is neither very likely nor necessarily desirable that democracy promotion will override other foreign policy goals, cautiously argue that it should serve as a foreign policy priority of the northern industrialized democracies (e.g., Carothers, 1999: 16). The opposition to democracy promotion is equally varied (for an overview, see Robinson, 1996). Arguments range from the isolationist perspective that the northern industrialized democracies should focus on their own affairs, including a recognition that other foreign priorities (e.g., economic self-interest and national security) should predominate, to the belief that the ability to influence the democratic character of other countries is in fact extremely limited. Others are more concerned with the negative consequences of democracy promotion programs, regardless of how well intentioned their proponents may be in the northern industrialized democracies. A corollary to this argument is that democracy promotion serves as a rhetorical veneer for the pursuit of economic self-interest on the part of the international system’s most economically powerful countries, which also happen to be democracies. Some add a cultural dimension to this debate in denouncing democracy promotion as the attempted Westernization of nonWestern peoples. In the extreme, these critics argue that democracy promotion essentially amounts to a form of “neo-colonialism” within the international system (Shaw, 1991). The advocates of democracy promotion clearly have the edge in the normative debate. In its broadest sense, democracy promotion is perceived by policymakers within the northern industrialized democracies as a normative good that is worth pursuing (see Chapters 4 to 7). It is precisely for this reason that the last quarter of the twentieth century witnessed the emergence of a virtual “democracy promotion industry,” the hallmark of which has been the willingness of governments from the northern industrialized democracies to channel vast amounts of democracy assistance to the various regions of the developing world. In the case of the United States, for example, it has been estimated that more than a half-billion dollars was devoted annually throughout the 1990s to some form of democracy promotion by the various agencies of the U.S. government (Carothers, 1999: 53). An equally important component of the democracy promotion industry has been the growing involvement of a wide array of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The United Nations and its affiliated organs have progressively sought to codify democratic values and expand opportunities for democratic government throughout the world (see Chapter 9). As a result, international law has undergone a gradual transformation in favor of recognizing democracy as an “entitlement” to be both defended and promoted (Franck, 1994). The

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European Union provides a powerful incentive for aspiring members to rethink their domestic political arrangements by making democracy a precondition for membership (see Chapter 8; see also Rupnik, 2000). Other regionally based IGOs, such as the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA), appear to be following suit. A wide array of quasi-governmental political foundations and think tanks within the northern industrialized democracies both set the democracy promotion agendas of their respective governments and serve as important conduits for official government aid (see Chapter 11). These politically based foundations and think tanks, of course, are but one component of a larger network of NGOs that seeks to link the civil societies of the northern industrialized democracies with those of the developing world (Ottaway and Carothers, 2000). The emergence of what constitutes essentially a global consensus in favor of democracy promotion has prompted a second debate among its proponents that revolves around the question: What forms of intervention should constitute part of the global arsenal in seeking democracy’s spread? Toward this end, one can speak of a “spectrum of violence” in which a variety of interventionist tools have been employed in democracy’s name. The most prominent of these interventionist tools, listed in order from the least to most coercive, are the following: • The pursuit of classic diplomacy, ranging from a leader’s use of the executive office as a “bully pulpit” for promoting democratic values abroad, to the dispatch of observer teams to oversee elections (Beigbeder, 1995; Kumar, 1998); • The provision of foreign aid to fund activities ranging from the holding of democratic elections to the strengthening of civil society (Moore and Robinson, 1994; Crawford, 1997; Hook, 1998; Carothers, 1999; Ottaway and Carothers, 2000); • The attachment of political conditionalities to various dimensions of the foreign policy relationship, as in the case of the EU making democracy a precondition for membership (Crawford, 1997; Rupnik, 2000); • The adoption of economic sanctions to punish the undemocratic acts of authoritarian regimes and promote transitions to democracy, especially in countries where previously democratic governments have been illegally turned out of office (Elliott, 1992; Hendrickson, 1994–1995); • The pursuit of covert intervention against authoritarian regimes, including assassination plots, coups d’état, election intervention, and propaganda and psychological warfare (Forsythe, 1992; James and Mitchell, 1995);

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• The launching of paramilitary intervention, in which the fostering of a guerrilla insurgency is designed to overthrow an authoritarian regime through the proxy use of force (Schraeder, 1992); • The use of military intervention to directly overthrow an authoritarian regime and install a democratic regime in its place (Meernik, 1996; Kegley and Hermann, 1997; Hermann and Kegley, 1998b; Peceny, 1999a, 1999b). The least coercive end of the interventionist spectrum not surprisingly includes the least controversial and most widely adopted forms of international democracy promotion: the pursuit of classic diplomacy and the provision of foreign aid. Foreign aid in particular has emerged as the “most common and often most significant tool” in the realm of international democracy promotion (Burnell, 2000: 1; Carothers, 1999: 6). As one proceeds along the interventionist spectrum, questions increasingly are raised as to whether specific interventionist tools are both proper and effective in securing democratic norms. Many who question whether democracy should or can be forced upon another country not surprisingly are critical of the middle tier of the interventionist spectrum, in which political conditionalities and economic sanctions are imposed on another country in the name of democratic values. This middle tier nonetheless enjoys widespread support, particularly within the policymaking establishments of the northern industrialized democracies, as a useful “middle road” in between the two coercive ends of the interventionist spectrum. The most coercive end of the interventionist spectrum, which includes the use of covert, paramilitary, and military force, not surprisingly generates the greatest level of concern among many supporters of democracy promotion. For these individuals, the use of force is simply antithetical to the democratic ideal. A third debate focuses on what should constitute the proper guidelines for democracy promotion. Several questions are important in this regard. Are unilateral interventions more effective, or should attempts be made to foster multilateral initiatives? Although the last quarter of the twentieth century clearly demonstrated that the vast majority of democracy promotion efforts have constituted unilateral interventions, recent scholarship has underscored the promise associated with multilateral efforts (e.g., see Carothers, 1999; Burnell, 2000). How important is the degree of support for such actions within the general population of the target country? If such support is lacking, how justified is foreign action regardless of the undemocratic nature of the regime in question? What about the regional dimension? Should democracy promotion policies be pursued in the absence of support among the regional neighbors of the target country? Finally, what should be the roles of international law and support for democracy promotion efforts within the wider international community? In short, the chal-

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lenge for the international community revolves around determining those circumstances under which intervention in favor of democracy promotion will be both legitimate and effective, an increasingly difficult task as one moves to the more coercive end of the interventionist spectrum. Some potential guidelines emerge from a brief comparison of two cases of U.S. paramilitary intervention that were launched by the Reagan administration during the 1980s: support for the mujahedin guerrillas in Afghanistan, who sought the overthrow of a Soviet-installed dictatorship and the withdrawal of occupying Soviet troops; and support for the contras in Nicaragua, a coalition of guerrilla groups that sought to overthrow a revolutionary Sandinista regime that had achieved power after an extended civil conflict. The Reagan administration’s aid to the mujahedin and the contras was couched in the rhetoric of providing support to “freedom fighters,” leading many to label these paramilitary interventions as examples of U.S. support for democracy promotion (e.g., see Muravchik, 1992: 144– 146; see also Whitehead, 1996: 8–9). Although this rhetoric in reality served as a democratic veneer for a wide variety of paramilitary efforts that were principally designed to overthrow pro-Soviet regimes in the developing world during the last decade of the Cold War (Schraeder, 1992), Washington’s experiences with the mujahedin and the contras nonetheless provide some clues as to what guidelines should be followed by policymakers as they contemplate intervention abroad, inclusive of democracy promotion: • Determining whether a policy enjoys popular support within the target country. The popular or unpopular nature of the target regime is especially crucial to successful intervention. In Afghanistan, popular feelings were almost unanimous in desiring a Soviet withdrawal from their country, and traditional Afghani nationalism ensured a steady stream of recruits to carry out a jihad (holy war) against what were perceived as “infidel” invaders (i.e., nonbelievers of Islam). In Nicaragua, however, the Sandinistas were ushered into power on the back of a popularly based revolutionary movement, whereas the contras, primarily because of the great number of sympathizers with the former ruling (Somoza) family dynasty, were rejected by the majority of the population as an artificial creation of Washington. • Building on a coalition of regional and international support. A second gauge of the legitimacy and the probability of success of an interventionist policy is its level of regional and international support. In Afghanistan, the mujahedin enjoyed overwhelming regional and international support. U.S. efforts not only were supported by traditional regional allies, such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, but also by communist China and revolutionary Iran. Moreover, a 1987

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vote in the UN General Assembly that overwhelmingly called for a Soviet withdrawal (123 voted in favor, 19 were opposed, and 11 abstained) clearly indicated the substantial level of support enjoyed by the mujahedin. U.S. efforts in Nicaragua, to the contrary, were opposed by the majority of nations within the region as well as within the international system, most notably U.S. allies in Europe. Most significant were Latin American denunciations of U.S. paramilitary efforts to overthrow the Sandinistas. Indeed, the Contadora group, led by Mexico, and several Central American countries, led by President Oscar Arias of Costa Rica, preferred diplomatic initiatives in seeking an accommodation with the Sandinista regime. • Constructing policy within the framework of international law. Although international law prohibiting intervention may be ignored with relative impunity by countries pursuing self-interested policies, there is no denying its importance as a legitimizing factor, as to what goals and actions are acceptable within the consensual framework of international law. In the case of Afghanistan, accepted precepts of international law clearly branded as illegal the Soviet invasion and occupation of that country, legitimizing aid to guerrillas seeking to force a Soviet withdrawal. In the case of Nicaragua, however, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that U.S. support of the contras violated international norms and subsequently ordered the immediate cessation of such activities—an edict the Reagan administration chose to ignore by claiming that the court had no jurisdiction to rule in the matter. “When seen retrospectively,” explains Christopher Joyner (1989: 203), “it becomes clear that by turning away from the court, the United States lost legal credibility, appeared diplomatically disingenuous, and allowed Nicaragua to gain a propaganda advantage in view of its lawful appeal to the international legal forum.” Although the combination of these three guidelines cannot, of course, guarantee a successful interventionist episode, they at least enhance the possibility for success and most certainly ensure that any democracy promotion effort will enjoy a high degree of legitimacy at the local, regional, and international levels. If we apply these three guidelines to the international community’s response to the authoritarian apartheid regime that ruled South Africa from 1948 to 1994, for example, it becomes clear why the international community’s imposition of a vast array of cultural, economic, political, and military sanctions was both successful and legitimate: (1) According to accepted precepts of international law, the apartheid regime was in violation of numerous international conventions and treaties concerning the treatment of its majority black population, the occupation of

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the territory of South West Africa (the current independent country of Namibia), and military intervention in neighboring countries; (2) the vast majority of the South African people, most notably its black majority, desired an end to the apartheid regime and its replacement with a more inclusive (albeit not necessarily democratic) regime; and (3) the imposition of comprehensive sanctions was overwhelmingly supported both regionally in Africa and throughout the international system. The key to the success of the international sanctions effort, which was one of many factors that contributed to South Africa’s transition to democracy in 1994, was the emergence of a multilateral anti-apartheid coalition that transcended the specific ideological, religious, and security interests of individual countries (Klotz, 1995). A final debate revolves around whether the third wave of democratization is and will continue to be marked by the further spread and consolidation of democratic regimes, or if setbacks in individual countries during the 1990s are indicative of democratic decay that will accelerate in the future. Africanists who are more optimistic, for example, often point to South Africa’s transition to a multiparty democracy in 1994 as proof of the growing strength of a democratic “renaissance” on the African continent (e.g., Schraeder, 2000). Africanists who are more pessimistic, however, have focused on the rise of authoritarian warlords in African countries beset by civil war, such as Sierra Leone (e.g., see Reno, 1998). Such debates are fairly typical and in fact intensifying within the area-studies literatures in general, as regional specialists attempt to make sense of democracy trends within their specific regions. As part of his elegant treatment of this question, Samuel Huntington notes that the first two waves of democratization within the international system were followed by “reverse waves” of democratic breakdown, and that democracy’s third wave more likely than not will follow this same pattern (Huntington, 1991). Larry Diamond, the coeditor of the Journal of Democracy and one of the most noted American observers of democracy’s spread, applies Huntington’s concept of reverse waves to one case study— democratic breakdown in Pakistan in 1999—to provide a sobering analysis of the third wave’s prospects. He concludes that, although it is still too early to offer either an optimistic or a pessimistic projection, Pakistan constitutes one of twenty strategic “swing” states whose evolution “will heavily determine the future of democracy in the world” (Diamond, 2000: 97).1 Still others have concentrated on undertaking statistical manipulations of democratic trends in all countries of the world. One of the most recent and thoughtful statistical analyses of this genre suggests that the metaphor of reverse waves itself needs to be reconsidered: “Many researchers simply expect a reverse wave in the near future and are waiting for it because they think that each wave is inevitably followed by a reverse wave,” explains

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Renske Doorenspleet (2000: 401). According to his statistical analysis, however, the answer to the question—“Are we on the edge of such a reverse wave?”—is no. The more likely short-term trend will be that of a “democratic equilibrium” in which the “overall number of democracies in the world neither increases or decreases” (Doorenspleet, 2000: 401). The debate over democratic consolidation versus democratic decay at the bare minimum has fostered the sharpening of the analytical tools designed to understand the process of democratization. An ironic outcome of this debate is that both positions have been seized upon by democracy promoters to urge the northern industrialized democracies to take a more proactive role in fostering democracy throughout the world. Scholarly analyses citing the consolidation of democratic practices are heralded as proof of the need to continue and even intensify already successful democracy promotion efforts. Scholarly analyses citing the decay of democratic practices are equally brandished as demonstrative of the need for greater involvement on the part of the northern industrialized democracies, so as to prevent even further slippage in democratic gains. In short, democracy promoters simultaneously use both sides of the consolidation-decay debate to favor their position.

Constraints on Effective Democracy Promotion The beginning of the twenty-first century has been marked by the strengthening of an international norm that favors intervention in the pursuit of democracy promotion on behalf of the international community. The widespread acceptance of this international norm is clearly demonstrated by its embodiment in the activities of the United Nations, the largest and most far-reaching international organization that enjoys almost universal membership of independent nation-states within the international system. As aptly demonstrated by Christopher C. Joyner in Chapter 9, the UN has served as the bellwether of an international norm that considers democracy promotion to be an accepted and necessary component of international behavior. • As an institutional organization, the UN was conceived and constructed on fundamental democratic principles. The UN Charter is clearly grounded in democratic values and aspirations, and most UN organs, with the notable exception of the Security Council, operate mainly through democratic decisionmaking procedures and processes. • The UN actively promotes democracy through its norm-creating ability. UN organs have promulgated considerable international law

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embodying cardinal principles and values of democracy, especially through human rights treaties and the progressive codification of democratic principles into international legal norms. • The UN actively facilitates democratic principles and institutions internationally. It does so by promoting a democratic culture in states through electoral assistance (including monitoring and verifying national elections), holding referenda, and sponsoring plebiscites—all of which foster freer and fairer opportunities for the democratic process to work more openly and efficiently in newly emerging national societies. The future success of global democracy is nonetheless potentially constrained by several realities of democracy promotion efforts to date. An important starting point is an examination of the assumptions that drive the democracy promotion efforts of state and non-state actors within the international system. Specifically, academics and policymakers typically link the emergence of democracy with other political-military and socioeconomic outcomes that subsequently become part of the so-called democratic environment presumably already achieved by the northern industrialized democracies and aspired to by the developing world. Among the major outcomes typically associated with the spread of democracy, which in turn have strengthened arguments in favor of democracy promotion, are the following: • The emergence of a more stable international system—the so-called democratic-peace hypothesis—in which democracies do not go to war with each other; • Greater levels of internal domestic political stability, in which potential and existing conflicts are resolved peacefully; • The emergence of a more prosperous international system, due to the greater proclivity of democracies to engage in free trade; • Rising levels of national economic growth, typically measured in terms of rising gross domestic product (GDP) or gross national product (GNP); • The promotion of social development, typically measured in terms of a decline in social inequalities based on caste, ethnicity, race, religion, or gender; • Greater protection for human rights, such that individuals and groups at the bare minimum are able to lead lives free from state coercion or persecution. The empirical evidence linking the spread of democracy with these various outcomes is far from conclusive and, in some cases, suggests out-

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comes contrary to the expectations of democracy promoters. The democratic-peace hypothesis, for example, which embodies the belief of northern policymakers that democracy promotion will lead to a more peaceful international system, is often characterized in the scholarly literature as the closest one can get to an “iron-clad” law in international relations theory (see Chapter 2). Although this hypothesis holds for the most part when one focuses on the most coercive form of intervention—the launching of direct military intervention by one democracy against another—it is empirically less sound as one descends the spectrum of interventionist tools available to democratic states. The historical record clearly demonstrates that the United States launched a wide number of covert interventions against democratically elected governments during the Cold War and in at least three cases—Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), and Chile (1973)—played a key role in the overthrow of those governments (Forsythe, 1992; Russett, 1993: 120–124). The often overly optimistic expectations associated with the other dimensions of the democratic environment must also be tempered by the historical record. As concerns the ability of democracies to quell domestic violence, extensive research has demonstrated that both consolidated democracies and extreme dictatorships exhibit low levels of domestic violence—the former due to peaceful avenues of conflict resolution and the latter due to strong state control—with the greatest level of internal conflict often found in countries making the transition from one form of governance to another (Taylor, forthcoming; see also Snyder, 2000). In the economic realm, recent research does suggest that democracies demonstrate a greater proclivity to engage in free trade, thereby potentially contributing to a more prosperous international system, but it refutes the claim that democracies do better than nondemocracies in terms of ensuring rising levels of national economic growth (see Chapter 3). Whether democracies do a better job of protecting human rights depends on how those rights are defined: the answer is yes when human rights are defined in terms of their civil and political components, including the right to free speech and the ability to vote in free and fair elections, but no when they are defined in terms of social and economic rights, including access to adequate housing, medical care, and economic security (Arat, 1991). Democracies typically have not fared well in reducing social inequalities, and in some cases—such as the transitions to democracy in Eastern Europe, in which female representation in national legislatures has actually declined—democracies have actually fared worse than their authoritarian predecessors (Saxonberg, 2000; see also Reynolds, 1999). In short, policymakers within the northern industrialized democracies would be well advised to engage in democracy promotion only if democracy is perceived to be a noble good in and of itself, rather than as a means to something else.

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Democracy promotion, however, has never served as the principal foreign policy interest of the northern industrialized democracies. In each of the four country studies examined in this book, democracy promotion has played at best a secondary role behind more self-interested foreign policy pursuits. U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War era was principally driven by strategic interests derived from an intense, ideologically based competition with the former Soviet Union. Although the pursuit of economic interests, most notably the expansion of U.S. trade and investment in all regions of the world, has gradually replaced fading ideological interests during the post–Cold War era, the Bush administration’s antiterrorism campaign in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist acts clearly demonstrates the continued salience of strategic interests in U.S. foreign policy. Japanese and German foreign policies are similar in that both have been clearly dominated by the pursuit of economic self-interest. As rising economic superpowers with the world’s second and third largest GNPs, Japan and Germany have pursued neomercantilist foreign policies in their quest for global economic supremacy. In the case of the Nordic countries, largely progressive Nordic political cultures have fostered the centrality of humanitarian-based foreign policies highly infused with ideological values. Specifically, the Nordics have demonstrated an overriding foreign policy predilection to support progressive, socialist-oriented regimes in the developing world (see Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor, 1998). The secondary status of democracy promotion in the foreign policy hierarchies of the northern industrialized democracies has ensured that whenever democracy clashes with more central foreign policy interests, democracy promotion is compromised. Whenever the ideal of democracy clashed with the U.S. national security objective of containing communism during the Cold War, for example, both Democratic and Republican administrations were willing to downplay the authoritarian shortcomings of a variety of U.S. allies, such as Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, and Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran, in favor of their strong support for U.S. anticommunist policies. This trend continued during the post–Cold War era, as witnessed by the tendency of Democratic and Republican administrations alike to emphasize U.S. strategic and especially economic interests over democracy promotion in the U.S.-Chinese foreign policy relationship (see Chapter 7). The case of China is equally illuminating as concerns Japanese and German foreign policy priorities. Germany was the first European country to make an official break with European Union-sponsored sanctions imposed in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square massacre. This break was signaled by President Helmut Kohl’s official head-of-state visit to China in 1996—including a much criticized visit to a garrison of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the Chinese town of Tianjin (see

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Chapter 5). For its part, Japan remained unwilling to publicly criticize, let alone join in any sanctions campaign against the Chinese government after Tiananmen, a reflection of the determination of Japanese leaders to scrupulously avoid any actions that could threaten Japan’s lucrative trading relationships in Asia and other parts of the developing world (see Chapter 6). Contradictions have also emerged in Nordic democracy promotion policies. Especially during the Cold War, when the normative goal of promoting democracy clashed with the Nordic ideological imperative of supporting progressive regimes, Nordic governments were willing to downplay the authoritarian shortcomings of a variety of Nordic aid recipients, such as Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia, and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, in favor of their strong support for progressive national policies. The case of Sweden is particularly illuminating. A foreign policy approach known as “assist rather than abandon” often characterized Sweden’s unwillingness to terminate foreign aid relationships even in cases of severe human rights violations. As aptly demonstrated by Liisa Laakso in Chapter 4, this was particularly true when aid recipients had established progressive socialist or marxist regimes. The interaction between the foreign policy interests of the northern industrialized democracies and how their policymakers perceive the nature of the democratic environment is critical to understanding the nature of the democracy promotion policies enacted by each of the four case studies of this book (see Table 12.1). In the case of the United States, an overriding focus on security interests and ensuring both domestic and international stability has fostered an approach that emphasizes the political liberalization of developing countries. U.S. policymakers generally agree that stability is best served by fostering a regularized political process that has as its basis the holding of free and fair elections, as well as the nurturing of effective state institutions, most notably an independent legislature and judiciary and a civilian-controlled military. One result of this approach is that U.S. policymakers are often prone to portray even significantly flawed election results, especially in countries closely allied to the United States, as nonetheless constituting “important starting points” in the transition to democracy, which can be improved in later rounds of more-democratic elections. It is precisely for this reason that critics have often criticized U.S. democracy promotion as placing too much faith in the election process, as well as favoring a “top-down” approach to democratization that is too elitecentered (Carothers, 1999: 136–140). German and especially Japanese policymakers remain hesitant to stress the political dimensions of democracy promotion (see Chapters 5 and 6). An overriding focus on economic interests and the need to ensure both national economic growth and a prosperous international system has

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Table 12.1

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Determinants of Approaches to Democracy Promotion

Principal Foreign Policy Thrust SECURITY INTERESTS (politicalmilitary stability)

Principal Assumptions Associated with the Democratic Environment

Principal Targets of Democracy Promotion Programs

STABLE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM (democratic peace hypothesis)

EMPHASIS ON POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION (opening up the political system)

INTERNAL DOMESTIC POLITICAL STABILITY (peaceful resolution of conflicts)

KEY EXAMPLE: UNITED STATES ECONOMIC INTERESTS (trade and investment)

• REGULARIZED POLITICAL PROCESS (free and fair elections) • EFFECTIVE AND INDEPENDENT STATE INSTITUTIONS (legislature, judiciary, and civilian-controlled military)

PROSPEROUS INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM (free trade)

EMPHASIS ON ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION (opening up the economic system)

NATIONAL ECONOMIC GROWTH (rising GDP and GNP)

• FREE MARKET ECONOMY (reduced barriers to free trade and privatization of parastatals)

KEY EXAMPLE: GERMANY AND JAPAN

• GOOD GOVERNANCE ON THE PART OF “DEVELOPMENTAL STATES” (transparency, accountability, and efficiency)

HUMANITARIAN INTERESTS (social welfare)

EMPHASIS ON SOCIAL LIBERALIZATION (opening up the social system)

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT (reducing levels of socioeconomic inequalities)

PROTECTION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (especially social rights) KEY EXAMPLE: NORDIC COUNTRIES

• STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY (popular participation in decisionmaking) • SOCIAL WELFARE PROGRAMS (e.g., gender equality)

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instead prompted these policymakers to approach democracy promotion from the vantage point of economic liberalization. Developing countries are encouraged to embrace a free-market economy that is based on reducing barriers to free trade and selling off failing and inefficient parastatals. Toward this end, democracy aid should be targeted toward fostering “good governance” (transparency, accountability, and efficiency) within “developmental states” (strong, unitarian, centralizing, and often authoritarian states perceived as important precursors to economic development and subsequent political liberalization). This approach has been criticized as placing too much stock in the ability of the free market to lead enlightened despots to transform their authoritarian societies. As is the case with the U.S. approach to democracy promotion, those of the Germans and the Japanese have also been criticized as being too elite-centered. In the case of the Nordic countries, an ideologically infused focus on humanitarian interests (including a more recent focus on the protection of human rights) has fostered an approach to democratization that emphasizes the social liberalization of developing countries. The Nordic vision of democracy promotion, unlike the top-down approaches of the Americans, Germans, and Japanese, is based on a bottom-up, popular approach that traditionally has favored the strengthening of civil society. In this regard, Nordic policymakers are strongly committed to making social welfare programs intent on reducing socioeconomic inequalities the centerpiece of democracy promotion. Given the prominent role of women at all levels of political power within Nordic political systems, it should come as no surprise that programs devoted to reducing gender inequalities are especially prominent in Nordic democracy promotion. Indeed, as Laakso notes in Chapter 4, “gender analysis is mandated in every development project or program at the earliest possible point.” Despite the divergent nature of national interests, a certain degree of convergence has occurred in democracy promotion efforts. The Nordic countries and especially the United States have increasingly recognized the importance of paying attention to the economic dimension of the democratization process. Japanese policymakers have committed Japan to playing an enhanced role in the security dimension, most notably through involvement in a variety of conflict resolution and peacekeeping missions under the auspices of the UN Security Council. And Germany and the United States have significantly strengthened their democracy promotion portfolios in a wide range of activities designed to strengthen civil societies in developing countries. These changes notwithstanding, the essential thrust of democracy promotion policies undertaken individually by each of our four country studies basically remains the same: a U.S. emphasis on political liberalization in the pursuit of security interests; a German and Japanese focus on economic liberalization as reflective of economic interests; and a

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Nordic emphasis on social liberalization reflective of the special social welfare dimension of Nordic democracies. The principal dilemma for policymakers revolves around the degree to which the policies of the northern industrialized democracies can be coordinated. Increasingly heralded among many within both the academic and policymaking worlds as the key to consolidating the gains associated with the third wave of democratization, policy coordination remains elusive at best (e.g., see Carothers, 1999; Burnell, 2000). Unlike their U.S. and to a lesser degree Nordic counterparts, German and Japanese policymakers are extremely reluctant to impose economic sanctions to punish recalcitrant regimes. German, Japanese, and Nordic policymakers similarly have been highly critical of the U.S. willingness to use even more coercive measures, including covert, paramilitary, and military intervention, in the name of democracy promotion. Even something seemingly as simple as systematically assessing the human rights record of a developing country as the means for coordinating policy is fraught with obstacles. In the case of the United States, for example, the State Department compiles an annual assessment of human rights practices (Country Reports on Human Rights Practices) that is submitted to and jointly published with the Committee on International Relations in the U.S. House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations in the U.S. Senate; these reports emphasize assessment of political rights and civil liberties. In sharp contrast, the Japanese government neither compiles nor publishes any such list, an indication of their rejection in principle of attaching political conditions to foreign aid. Although the Nordics jointly publish an annual assessment of human rights practices (Yearbook on Human Rights in Development), Nordic policymakers are quick to note important differences and therefore perceived problems with the U.S. approach. The most notable is that the Nordic assessment is compiled by independent research institutes to avoid the perceived inherent bias in government-prepared reports (as in the U.S. case). The German government initially disagreed with the qualitative nature of both the U.S. and Nordic approaches, attempting at first to compile a statistical checklist that would facilitate an unbiased ranking of human rights abusers. This approach was ultimately dropped in favor of a largely disregarded assessment that simply focuses on very general political trends. In short, if agreement is unlikely in terms of classifying all but perhaps the most egregious violators of human rights (e.g., clear-cut cases of government-sponsored genocide), how difficult will it be to formulate common policies? A further area of convergence within many northern industrialized democracies has been the creation of quasi-government institutes often referred to as political foundations. As James M. Scott notes in Chapter 11, such government-funded foundations, although technically independent,

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often play an important role in advancing the democracy promotion agendas of their respective governments. From the perspectives of the governments that created them, the political foundations allow for the pursuit of democracy promotion efforts that otherwise might not be possible. Specifically, governments often turn to these foundations in three sets of circumstances: when time is of the essence and a reliance on official channels would require lengthy bureaucratic debates and reviews; when a recipient country desires democracy aid but wishes to avoid the stigma and domestic political ramifications of receiving such aid from a particular donor government; and when a donor government wishes to undertake a democracy promotion initiative but for whatever reason seeks to avoid the legal and political ramifications of direct intervention in the target country (see Chapter 11). The desire to ensure political flexibility on the part of donor governments is particularly demonstrated by the German model of politische stiftungen (political foundations), which in turn inspired the creation of a similar model in the United States. “In those cases where, due to strategic, economic, or diplomatic concerns, the ‘official’ hands of the German government are tied, political foundations serve as the ideal vehicles for democracy promotion,” explain Jürgen Rüland and Nikolaus Werz in Chapter 5. “Moreover, in case the political foundations go too far and their programs collide with the host government, the German government can reject responsibility for their activities and therefore avoid any rupture in official relations.” The political foundations and a wide variety of northern-based NGOs and civil society groups nonetheless constitute part of a growing web of international interaction—what Scott refers to in Chapter 11 as a “transnational democracy issue network”—that informs, guides, and in some cases structures the democracy promotion efforts of the northern industrialized democracies. In this regard, their most important function is the generation of new ideas and approaches that otherwise would not have emerged from a solely state-centric approach to democracy promotion. “This contribution, which includes policy recommendations and technical advice, continues to expand our knowledge base about the techniques, procedures, and problems of democracy promotion,” explains Scott. “In effect, these actors behave much like an epistemic community in the issue area of democracy promotion, developing specialized knowledge, expertise, and policy preferences and disseminating them through various national and international channels.” The activities of these groups are ultimately hindered, however, by their lack of an independent financial base capable of funding largescale democratization programs. At least for the near future, democracy promotion efforts that require substantial infusions of external financial support invariably will remain dependent on the interests and generosity of governments within the northern industrialized democracies.

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The continued centrality of states in international democracy promotion is clearly demonstrated by their impact on the policies of regional organizations in this realm. The most noteworthy case in this regard is the European Union, which has made democracy a precondition of future membership. As aptly noted by Gorm Rye Olsen in Chapter 8, the democracy promotion activities of the EU and other regional organizations are significantly constrained by the interests and concerns of their individual members. The requirement of achieving consensus prior to taking action has ensured that recent policies have been representative of the lowest common denominator of the extremely varied foreign policy interests of the EU’s fifteen member states. Equally important, there is a tendency for EU democracy promotion policies to follow the foreign policy lead of one of its members, if that member “demonstrates a special interest or historical involvement in a particular country” (see Chapter 8). It is precisely for this reason that the EU response to the derailment of democracy in Algeria during the 1990s, which included strong support for rather than criticism of the military regime led by General Liamine Zeroual, essentially reflected the foreign policy interests of France, the former colonial power. Indeed, the tainted national elections of 1997, not surprisingly won by Zeroual, ultimately were characterized and legitimized by an EU election observer group as a “milestone in Algerian political history” (see Chapter 8). The continued centrality of state interests in international democracy promotion is also demonstrated by the role of international financial institutions in this realm. As demonstrated by Béatrice Hibou’s examination of the World Bank in Chapter 10, the democracy promotion policies of international financial institutions are clearly reflective of the capitalist norms promoted by the major northern industrialized democracies, which also happen to be the international system’s leading capitalist powers. These institutions, however, are predominantly focused on the economic dimensions of the democratization process, as witnessed by the imposition of a wide array of structural adjustment programs designed to promote liberal, free-market economies in which the state plays a limited role. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, there exists a clear tendency for these institutions to “circumscribe” (i.e., downplay) the political dimensions of the democratization process. In the case of the World Bank, for example, such an approach is theoretically mandated by its founding charter, which prohibits interference in the internal politics of member states. The “unintended” impacts of World Bank policies on the political systems of developing countries are nonetheless substantial, most notably in terms of the tendency of liberalization reforms often to reinforce existing power structures in favor of incumbent (and often less-than-democratic) elites and governing coalitions (see Chapter 10).

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Conclusion The political contours of the contemporary international system in many respects reflect President Wilson’s liberal democratic vision of making the world safe for democracy. The global spread of democratic forms of governance has reached levels unparalleled in global history. This development has been strengthened by the rise of a far-reaching democracy promotion industry that is equally unparalleled in global history. State and non-state actors alike have vigorously contributed to the emergence of a new international norm that considers democracy promotion to be an accepted and necessary component of international behavior. As a result, debates within both the academic and the policymaking worlds have gradually shifted from a cold-war focus on whether democracy constitutes the best form of governance, to whether and to what degree state and non-state actors should be actively involved in democracy promotion efforts. Although a wide number of debates, such as those dealing with the precise forms of intervention that should constitute part of the global democratic arsenal, continue to divide the northern industrialized democracies, the advocates of democracy promotion clearly have the edge in both the academic and policymaking worlds. A second important conclusion of this study is that the future success of global democracy is nonetheless potentially constrained by several realities of democracy promotion efforts to date. In addition to the fact that democracy promoters often maintain overly optimistic assumptions concerning the linkages between the emergence of democracy and other politico-military and socioeconomic outcomes associated with the so-called democratic environment, democracy promotion on the part of the northern industrialized countries is often compromised when the normative goal of democracy clashes with other foreign policy interests. Competing foreign policy interests among the northern industrialized democracies has also affected democracy promotion efforts, most notably in terms of hindering effective cooperation. Such differences have carried over into a wide number of non-state actors, such as the EU, where democracy promotion policies are representative of the least-common denominator of the varied interests of its fifteen member states. Indeed, despite the rise of an international democracy network among a wide variety of NGOs and IGOs presumably beyond the reach of individual state interests, democracy promotion efforts at the beginning of the twenty-first century largely remain dominated by northern industrialized states. In short, states remain the key actors in democracy promotion. One simple fact, however, provides the basis for optimism as concerns the future of democracy promotion efforts, even in the absence of enhanced cooperation either among the northern industrialized democracies or

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between state and non-state actors. Each wave of democratization—regardless of whether one counts three, four, or even more waves that have occurred in the last two hundred years—has contributed to the further strengthening of the international democratic context within which individual democracy promotion policies are pursued. Specifically, the international democratic environment at the beginning of the twenty-first century is much stronger and more nurturing and protective of existing democratic practices than was the case at the beginning of either the nineteenth or twentieth centuries. Democratic reversals and thus the decline of democracy promotion efforts are much more unlikely in today’s international system.

Note 1. The “swing” states, divided by region, are: Africa (Nigeria, South Africa); Asia (Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand); Eastern Europe (Poland, Russia); Middle East (Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey); Oceania (none); Western Europe (none); Western Hemisphere (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia).

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The Contributors

TSUNEO AKAHA is professor of International Policy Studies and director of the Center for East Asian Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in California. A specialist of Asian politics and international relations, he is the editor of The Future of North Korea (2001) and Politics and Economics in Northeast Asia: Nationalism and Regionalism in Contention (1999), and the coeditor (with Frank Langdon) of Japan in the Posthegemonic World (1993). He has been a visiting research fellow at Seikei University in Tokyo and at Hokkaido University’s Slavic Research Center in Sapporo, Japan. He is directing an international research project on the nature and impact of human flows across national borders in Northeast Asia. MARGARET G. HERMANN is Gerald B. and Daphna Cramer Professor of Global Affairs in the Department of Political Science and director of the Global Affairs Institute of the Maxwell School at Syracuse University in New York. She is coauthor (with Joe D. Hagan) of Leaders, Groups, and Coalitions: Understanding the People and Processes in Foreign Policymaking (2002), editor of Political Psychology: Contemporary Issues and Problems (1986), and coeditor (with Patrick Callahan and Linda P. Brady) of Describing Foreign Policy Behavior (1982). She has served as president of the International Society of Political Psychology and the International Studies Association, and as editor of her fields’ leading journals: Political Psychology and International Studies Review. She received the Jeanne N. Knutson Award for Contributions to Political Psychology from the International Society of Political Psychology in 1990 and the Distinguished Scholar Award from the Foreign Policy Analysis Section of the International Studies Association in 1994.

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BÉATRICE HIBOU is research fellow at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) and the Centre d’Études et de Recherches Internationales (CERI) in Paris. In addition to serving on the editorial boards of Critique Internationale and Politique Africaine, she is the coauthor (with Jean-François Bayart and Stephen Ellis) of The Criminalisation of the State in Africa (1999) (originally published in French in 1997 as La criminalisation de l’Etat en Afrique), editor of La Privatisation des Etats (1999), and author of L’Afrique est-elle protectionniste? Les chemins buissonniers de la libéralisation extérieure (1996). At present she is working on a research project on the comparative political economy of reform in the Mediterranean basin. S TEVEN W. H OOK is associate professor in the Department of Political Science at Kent State University in Ohio. He is the coauthor (with John Spanier) of American Foreign Policy Since World War II (15th ed., 2000), author of National Interest and Foreign Aid (1995), and editor of Comparative Foreign Policy: Adaptation Strategies of the Great and Emerging Powers (2002) and Foreign Aid Toward the Millennium (1996). He has served as president of the International Studies Association/ Midwest and currently chairs the Foreign Policy Section of the American Political Science Association. JULIET JOHNSON is assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at Loyola University Chicago, where she is a specialist of Russia and Eastern Europe, most notably the transformation of post-communist financial systems. Formerly assistant editor of the Journal of Democracy and foreign policy research fellow at the Brookings Institution, she is the author of A Fistful of Rubles: The Rise and Fall of the Russian Banking System (2001), as well as scholarly articles in Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Comparative Politics, Europe-Asia Studies, and Problems of PostCommunism. She is completing a book, Financial Globalization and National Sovereignty: The Creation of Independent Central Banks in PostCommunist Democracies, while in residence as a national fellow at the Hoover Institution. CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER is professor in the Department of Government at Georgetown University in Washington, DC, where he specializes in international organization and international law. His scholarly writings have appeared in a wide array of international law journals, such as the American Journal of International Law, Harvard International Law Journal, and the Virginia Journal of International Law. He is also the author of Governing the Frozen Commons: The Antarctic Regime and Environmental Protection (1998), coauthor (with Ethel R. Theis) of Eagle

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273

Over the Ice: The U.S. in the Antarctic (1997), and editor of The United Nations and International Law (1997). A former member of the executive council of the American Society of International Law, he is on the board of directors of the American Council on the United Nations. He is completing a book project, International Law in the 21st Century: Rules for Global Governance (forthcoming 2002). CHARLES W. KEGLEY, JR. is Pearce Professor of International Relations in the Department of Government and International Studies at the University of South Carolina in Columbia. Among his four dozen book publications, he most recently coauthored From War to Peace: Fateful Decisions in International Politics (2002) and Exorcising the Ghost of Westphalia: Building World Order in the New Millennium (2002) (with Gregory A. Raymond), and World Politics: Trend and Transformation (8th ed., 2001) (with Eugene R. Wittkopf). His research has appeared in International Interactions, International Studies Quarterly, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, and The Journal of Peace Research. The former president of the International Studies Association, he presently serves as a member of the board of trustees of the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs. L IISA L AAKSO is lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Helsinki (Finland). A specialist of social and political change in Africa, she is the author of Voting Without Choosing: State Making and Elections in Zimbabwe (1999) and coeditor (with Michael P. Cowen) of Multiparty Elections in Africa (2001) and (with Adebayo O. Olukoshi) of Challenges to the Nation-State in Africa (1996). She has been a visiting research associate with the Department of Political and Administrative Studies at the University of Zimbabwe in Harare and with the Fernand Braudel Center at the State University of New York at Binghamton. Her current research focuses on civilian crisis management and European foreign policy. G ORM R YE O LSEN is senior research fellow with the Centre for Development Research and Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Copenhagen in Denmark. He is the author of Political Power and Economic Change in the Arab World: A Comparison of Egypt, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia (1994) and Golfkrisen og den nye verdensorden (1991). A specialist of European Union foreign policy and the relationship between taxation, aid, and democracy in Africa, his research has been published in numerous scholarly journals, such the The Journal of Modern African Studies, Forum for Development Studies, and Global Society. He presently is the codirector (with Ulf Engel) of an international working group on the evolution of European-African relations in the post–Cold War era.

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J ÜRGEN R ÜLAND is professor in the Department of Political Science at Freiburg University (Germany), where he is a specialist of German foreign policy and Asian politics and international relations. He is the author of Politische Systeme in Südostasien. eine Einführung (1998), coauthor (with Bert Becker) of Japan und Deutschland in der internationalen Politik: neue Herausforderungen nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges (1997), and coeditor (with Eva Manska and Werner Draguhn) of The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC): The First Decade (2001). At present his research focuses on the evolving role of parliaments throughout Asia. PETER J. SCHRAEDER is associate professor in the Department of Political Science at Loyola University Chicago where he specializes in comparative foreign policy and international relations theory, especially as both relate to Africa. He is the author of African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation (2000) and United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change (1994) and editor of Intervention into the 1990s: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Third World (1994). His scholarship has appeared in African Affairs, The Journal of Modern African Studies, The Journal of Politics, Politique Africaine, and World Politics. He has lectured widely throughout Africa and Europe, including as a Fulbright scholar at Cheikh Anta Diop University in Senegal (1994–1996) and as a visiting professor at the University of the Antilles in Guadeloupe (1999). He is currently completing a book, Beyond the “Big Man”: African Foreign Policy in the Era of Democratization. J AMES M. S COTT is associate professor and chair of the Department of Political Science at the University of Nebraska at Kearney. A specialist of U.S. foreign policy, he is the author of Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy (1996), editor of After the End: Making U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era (1998), and coauthor (with Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf) of American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process (6th ed, 2002). He has served as president of the International Studies Association/Midwest and the Foreign Policy Analysis Section of the International Studies Association. He is currently collaborating with Ralph G. Carter on a research project that focuses on the evolving role of the U.S. Congress in the foreign policymaking process. NIKOLAUS WERZ is professor in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at the University of Rostock (Germany), where he is a specialist of European and Latin American politics and social change. He is the author of Das neuere politische und sozialwissenschaftliche Denken in Lateinamerika (1991) and coauthor (with Hans-Joerg Hennecke) of Parteien und Politik in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (2000) and (with

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Wolfram Schulz) of Parteiensystem und Wahlverhalten in Venezuela: Entstehung und Verfall eines Zweiparteiensystem. At present his research focuses on the promotion of regional cooperation and institutional development in the Baltic Sea region.

Index

Abdallah II (King of Jordan), 5 Abshire, David, 198 Aden: electoral assistance to, 159tab Afghanistan, 221, 222; peacekeeping missions in, 94, 167tab Africa: collapse of communism and, 4; consensus building in, 8; democratization in, 3tab, 4, 6tab, 8; electoral assistance to, 67; European Union aid to, 138–144; liberation struggles in, 69; Nordic countries aid to, 57, 67; “second independence” in, 4; semidemocracies in, 6tab; United States aid to, 119 African National Congress, 69 Akaha, Tsuneo, 10, 89–107 Albania: electoral assistance to, 162tab Albright, Madeleine, 31, 195 Algeria, 123; democratization in, 140–142; electoral assistance to, 162tab; European Union aid to, 141–142; French aid to, 141; Front Islamique du Salut in, 140; International Monetary Fund credits to, 141; military regime in, 140–142; security issues in, 140–142 Alliance for Progress, 35, 36, 112 American Center for International Labor Solidarity, 195 American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations, 195 Amsterdam Treaty (1997), 132, 137 Angola: electoral assistance to, 94, 160, 162tab; Japanese aid to, 93; Nordic countries aid to, 71n2; peacekeeping missions in, 94, 167tab, 168tab Argentina: authoritarianism in, 36; democratization in, 46; economic development in, 33; electoral assistance to, 162tab; structural adjustment programs in, 46

Arias, Oscar, 222 Armenia: electoral assistance to, 161, 162tab Aronson, Bernard, 195 ASEAN. See Association of Southeast Asian Nations Asia: democracy promotion in, 4; democratization in, 3tab, 5, 5tab, 6tab; economic crises in, 37; economic development in, 37; electoral assistance to, 67; German aid to, 85; investment in, 37; newly industrializing countries of, 37; Nordic countries aid to, 57, 67; semidemocracies in, 6tab; United States military involvement, 75 Asia Democracy Program, 128n6 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, 122 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 83 Atwood, J. Brian, 195 Aun San Su Kyi, 103 Australia: democratization in, 3 Austria: human rights research in, 63 Authoritarian regimes: accountability in, 457; “advantages” of, 33–38; bureaucratic coherence in, 46; corruption in, 32; covert intervention against, 219; distortion of economy in, 32; domestic savings in, 34; gigantism in, 32; international community response to, 222; investment in, 34, 35; in Latin America, 2; legitimacy of, 33, 46; in Middle East, 5; military intervention in, 19, 220; paramilitary intervention and, 220; paternalism in, 32; political pressures in, 46; in Portugal, 2; reform in, 44; resources in, 34; in Spain, 2; stabilization programs in, 44; transition from, 1–2; vulnerability to economic crises in, 33 Azerbaijan: electoral assistance to, 162tab

277

278

Index

Bahrain: electoral assistance to, 159tab Balkan region: democratization in, 4; political-military crisis in, 4 Bangladesh: electoral assistance to, 162tab; Nordic countries aid to, 71n2 Batista, Fulgencio, 111 Belgium: as colonial power, 138 Benin: democratization in, 8; electoral assistance to, 162tab Berlin Crisis, 75 Berlin Wall: erection of, 75; fall of, 2, 7, 114, 131 Bolivia: democratization in, 46; structural adjustment programs in, 46 Bosnia: electoral assistance to, 99; Japanese aid to, 99; North American Treaty Organization in, 117, 169; peacekeeping missions in, 166tab; United States involvement in, 117 Botswana: Nordic countries aid to, 65, 66; World Bank and, 176 Brandt, Willy, 75 Brazil: democratization in, 46; economic development in, 33; electoral assistance to, 162tab; German aid to, 76; income distribution in, 42; structural adjustment programs in, 46 Brezhnev, Leonid, 25 British Somaliland Protectorate, 158tab Brookings Institution, 197 Bulgaria: democratization in, 45 Burkina Faso: electoral assistance to, 162tab Burma. See also Myanmar; economic development in, 33; German aid to, 82; Nordic countries aid to, 66 Burundi: electoral assistance to, 162tab; as trust territory, 157 Bush, George H. W., 114 Bush, George W., 117, 127 Cambodia: civil war in, 172n11; electoral assistance to, 94, 99, 160, 162tab, 163; Japanese aid to, 98, 99; peacekeeping missions in, 94, 166, 167tab, 172n11 Cameroon: adjustment process in, 190Ielectoral assistance to, 159tab; privatization in, 187; as trust territory, 158tab; World Bank and, 180, 181 Canada: Canadian International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, 195; human rights research in, 63; political foundations in, 195–196, 201 Canadian International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, 195 Capital: flows, 173; human, 182; investment, 36; political, 19

Capitalism: competition and, 33; democracy and, 33, 40–42 Carnegie, Andrew, 197 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 197–198 Carnegie Institute, 197–198, 203; Democracy Project, 202; Moscow Center for Russian and Eurasian Programs, 198 Carter, Jimmy, 77, 93, 112, 113, 128n5, 198 Carter Center, 198–199, 201, 203, 206–208 Center for International Private Enterprise, 195 Center for Strategic and International Studies, 198 Central African Republic: economic development in, 33; electoral assistance to, 99, 162tab; Japanese aid to, 99 Chad: electoral assistance to, 162tab; peacekeeping missions in, 168tab; World Bank and, 181 Chile: democratization in, 126, 128n15; economic reform in, 46; electoral assistance to, 113; income distribution in, 42; Nordic countries aid to, 59, 71n3; United States involvement in, 71n3, 226 China, 221; democratization in, 122; domestic savings in, 34, 35; economic development in, 35, 100; economic reform in, 47, 48, 457; electoral assistance to, 67; German aid to, 80, 82, 84, 86, 227; investment in, 35; Japanese aid to, 98, 99, 100–102, 227.228; Nordic countries aid to, 67, 71n2; political reform in, 48; political transitions in, 48; Tiananmen Square incident in, 101; trade with United States, 41; United States involvement in, 112 Christopher, Warren, 101 Civil liberty, 2, 17; ambivalence about, 21; promotion of, 32 Civil society, 7, 125, 136; promotion of, 116, 118; strengthening, 230; World Bank and, 177 Civil war: in Cambodia, 172n11; deterrence of, 17; in Sierra Leone, 223 Clinton, Bill, 1, 31, 114, 115, 117, 120, 121, 122 Clinton Doctrine, 115 Cocos Islands, 159tab Colombia: electoral assistance to, 162tab Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands: as trust territory, 158tab Comoros: electoral assistance to, 162tab Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe, 77 Conflict: of interest, 18; internal, 169; military, 15; prevention, 79; resolution, 16, 17, 22, 67; suppression, 165

Index

Congo. See Democratic Republic of the Congo Consequentialism, 128n3 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (1987), 153 Convention and Protocol on the Status of Refugees (1954), 153 Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (1981), 153 Convention on the Rights of the Child (1990), 153 Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1976), 153 Cook Islands: electoral assistance to, 159tab Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE), 205 Correlates of War project, 41–42 Corruption: in democracies, 40; free media and, 32; political reform and, 61 Costa Rica, 222 Côte d’Ivoire: electoral assistance to, 162tab; legal assistance to, 69; Nordic countries aid to, 69; World Bank and, 176 Council of Europe, 80 Croatia: democratization in, 4; peacekeeping missions in, 168tab CSCE. See Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe Cuba, 5; missile crisis and, 75; Nordic countries aid to, 66 Cultural: diversity, 118; rights, 55, 93 Culture: civic, 125; democratic, 147; political, 7, 22, 33, 43 Currency: devaluation, 175, 180, 190n4; restrictions, 183; stabilization, 40 Cyprus: peacekeeping missions in, 166tab Czech Republic: North American Treaty Organization and, 117 Danish International Development Agency, 59 Dayton Accords (1994), 117, 169 Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice (1978), 155 Declaration on Social Progress and Development (1969), 155 Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (1967), 155 Declaration on the Elimination of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion (1981), 155 Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace (1984), 155

279

Declaration on the Rights of the Child (1959), 155 Democracies, northern industrialized, 98; developmental policies of, 115–116; foreign aid by, 57; promotion of democracy by, 31 Democracy; capitalism and, 33, 40–42; as condition for peace, 17; consolidation of, 131; degrees of freedom and, 2; domestic factors in, 16; economic cooperation and, 41; economic growth and, 10; economic reform and, 50; electoral, 67; foreign intervention and, 8; free-market, 457; free trade and, 40–42, 50; humanitarian values of, 17; income distribution in, 32; inequality and, 42–44; inflation and, 39; internal-external debate in, 6–9; international dimension of, 1; liberal, 19, 21, 27, 90; market, 176; “national conference” model, 8; parliamentary, 74; participatory, 23, 60; peace hypothesis and, 10, 15–29; political, 31, 40, 74; as predominant form of governance, 1, 6; property rights and, 33; protectionism and, 41; representative, 60; spread of, 1–6; stabilization and, 44–49; through “consent,” 8–9; transitional, 3, 18, 19; tutelary, 76; welfare state, 55 Democracy promotion; as accepted component of international behavior, 1; in Africa, 138–144; compatibility perspective, 32; conflict perspective, 32; constraints on, 224–233; criteria for, 75; debates over, 217–224; domestic factors in, 6–9; economic growth and, 32–40; European Union and, 10, 131–145; Germany and, 10, 73–88; “good governance” and, 173, 176, 184, 230; guidelines for, 220–223; international factors in, 6–9; Japan and, 89–107; liberal, 193; multilateral organizations and, 10; Nordic countries and, 10, 55–70; opposition to, 218; pluralist, 150; political foundations and, 193–213; secondary status in foreign policy hierarchy, 227–230; think tanks and, 193–213; trade and, 56; United Nations and, 147–171; United States and, 10, 109–127; World Bank and, 10 Democratic governments: alliance formation and, 16, 23; causes of peaceful behavior in, 21–27; conflict resolution and, 16, 17, 18; constitutional limits on authority in, 23; consumerism in, 34, 35; cooperative exchanges among, 16, 24; corruption in, 40; crisis-management skills of, 18; democratic-peace theory and, 15–29; domestic opposition in, 23; domestic stability and, 17; economic development in, 31, 33, 34;

280

Index

electoral accountability in, 22, 23; empowerment through voting in, 22; externalization of internally developed norms and, 16; free trade and, 40–42; income distribution in, 42–44; infrequency of attacks on, 18; interest groups in, 34, 44; internal stability in, 23; international law and, 16; legitimacy of, 45; military intervention in authoritarian regimes, 19; neoorthodox reform in, 46; peaceful interactions among, 15–29; property rights and, 34; public opinion in, 22; quality of life in, 38; stabilization and, 44–49; support for multilateral institutions and, 16; third-party arbitration and, 16, 18; transparency in, 40; use of force and, 17–18; welfare efforts and, 43 Democratic peace theory, 15–29; causation factors, 21–27; characteristics of, 16; defining, 15–21; limitations of models of, 24–27 Democratic Republic of the Congo, 126; economic development in, 33; electoral assistance to, 162tab; humanitarian missions in, 166; peacekeeping missions in, 167tab, 168tab; United States aid to, 122; United States involvement in, 116; World Bank and, 181 Democratization: degrees of, 3tab; fear of democratic mob and, 33; fourth wave, 2, 28; internal-external factors in, 6–9; longterm, 97; neoorthodox stabilization programs and, 43; Nordic countries support for, 66–69; pacifying effects of, 20; partial, 21, 49; process of “contagion” and, 8; protection from external aggression and, 20–21; public spending and, 457; reduction of inequality and, 42; second reverse wave, 35; spread of, 27–28; third wave, 2, 3, 7, 28, 36, 231 Denmark: aid levels of, 58–59; Danish International Development Agency in, 59; democracy promotion in, 55–70; “Human Rights Packages” and, 61; human rights research in, 63 Development: aid, 57; assistance for women in, 60; community, 177; cooperation, 58; democratic, 116, 118; economic, 31, 70, 76, 106, 131; export-driven, 183; “from below,” 77; human rights and, 58; infrastructure, 81; intense, 36; internal, 55; of middle class, 32; planning, 77; political, 76; privatization of, 187; projects, 57; right to, 70; rural, 66; social, 70, 225, 229tab; state-led, 38; sustainable, 60, 114, 121 Developmental states, 35, 36; administrative

capacities of, 37; autonomy of, 36; East Asian, 37; modernization and, 37; structural adjustment programs and, 45 Development assistance: goals of, 55–58; human rights and, 61; instruments of, 61–64; Nordic countries, 55–70; normative assumptions on, 55–58; political conditionality and, 61–62, 95–96; political dimension of, 58–61; strategies, 61–64 Djibouti: electoral assistance to, 162tab Dominican Republic: peacekeeping missions in, 167tab “Dracula regimes,” 78 Dulles, John Foster, 111 Eagleburger, Lawrence, 195 Earth Summit (1992), 114 East Timor: electoral assistance to, 160, 162tab, 163; peacekeeping missions in, 168tab Economic: aid, 35; austerity, 44; competition, 85, 121; conditionalities, 173; cooperation, 41; development, 31, 70, 76, 106, 131; distribution, 42; freedoms, 42; growth, 10, 32–40, 57, 76, 173, 225; inequality, 42–44; integration, 121, 122; interdependence, 41; liberalization, 46, 49, 69, 143, 173, 229tab, 230; nationalism, 183; networks, 182; organizations, 40; policy, 31; prosperity, 23; rationality, 184; reform, 41, 44, 46, 50, 173, 182–183, 183, 457; relativism, 122; rights, 55; sanctions, 56, 85–86, 219; selfinterest, 56; stabilization, 32, 44–49, 47; stagnation, 76 Economy: controlled, 457; global, 121; market, 40–42, 74, 78, 95, 104, 113, 135–138, 138, 229tab, 230; national, 7; “of plunder,” 183, 190n6; political, 44, 176; “racket,” 49; state-owned, 136; strength of, 7 Ecuador: electoral assistance to, 99; Japanese aid to, 99 EFTA. See European Free Trade Association Egypt: human rights in, 123; Japanese aid to, 93; United States aid to, 119, 123, 128n13 Equatorial Guinea: electoral assistance to, 159tab, 162tab Eritrea: electoral assistance to, 160, 162tab; peacekeeping missions in, 168tab Ethiopia: democratization in, 68; electoral assistance to, 162tab; human rights in, 68; Nordic countries aid to, 66, 68, 71n2, 228; peacekeeping missions in, 168tab EU. See European Union Europe, Eastern: authoritarian regimes in, 2; Democratic Pluralism Initiative in, 128n6;

Index

democratization in, 3tab, 3–4, 6tab, 126; economic development in, 33; electoral assistance to, 67; European Union aid to, 135–138; market-oriented economies in, 40, 138; non-governmental organizations in, 136; Nordic countries aid to, 67; political transformation of, 85; semidemocracies in, 6tab; state restructuring in, 136 Europe, Western: democratization in, 3tab, 5, 6tab; as most democratic region, 2; semidemocracies in, 6tab European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 96 European Coal and Steel Community, 74 European Defense Community, 74 European Economic Community. See European Union European Free Trade Association, 58 European Political Cooperation, 132 European Union, 80, 233; bilateral assistance from members in, 136; consensus requirements, 133; Council of Ministers, 134; criteria for membership, 137; democracy promotion by, 10, 131–145; as democratic model, 137; democratization as condition of aid, 132; Directorate General, 138; enlargement policy, 137; European Commission, 134, 136; European Parliament, 134, 136; foreign policy agenda, 132–135; human rights policy, 60, 132; inefficient nature of foreign policy iniatives, 134; intergovernmental policies in, 133, 135; joint actions by, 133–134, 139; low priority for democratization issues, 131; member states’ policy issues, 133, 135; national interests of members, 133; Phare Program, 135–138, 136; political stability concerns, 140–142; prospect of membership in return for democratization, 137; security issues, 133; Tacis Program, 135–138, 136 Export-Import Bank, 104 Federated States of Micronesia: as trust territory, 158tab Ferraro, Geraldine, 195 Fiji: electoral assistance to, 162tab; instability in, 3 Finland: democracy promotion in, 55–70; Department for International Development Cooperation in, 63; Department for Political Affairs in, 63; European Union membership, 60; Finnish Development Cooperation Committee in, 59; Finnish International Development Agency, 66; human rights policy, 59, 60; human rights research in, 63; neutrality

281

policy, 59; post for democratization and human rights issues in, 63 FINNIDA. See Finnish International Development Agency Finnish Development Cooperation Committee, 59 Finnish International Development Agency, 66 Foreign policy. See also individual countries; consequences of democratization, 15–21; coordination of, 56; domestic aspects of democracy and, 16; normative values externalized in, 23 Fox, Vicente, 3 France: as colonial power, 138; role in Algeria, 141 Freedom House, 2, 3, 119 Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 84, 194, 200, 204, 206 Friedrich Naumann Foundation, 84, 194, 204 Front Islamique du Salut, 140 Fujimori, Alberto, 98, 114 Gabon: domestic savings in, 35; electoral assistance to, 162tab Geoeconomics, 121 Georgia: peacekeeping missions in, 166tab German Agency for Technical Cooperation, 75, 82 German Development Service, 75 German Foundation for International Development, 75 Germany: approaches to democracy promotion, 229tab; Asia policy in, 83; Bank for Reconstruction, 75; Chancellor’s Office in, 82–83; Christian Social Union in, 78; as colonial power, 138; Committee on Human Rights Affairs in, 84; conditionality of aid by, 85–86; decentralization programs, 82; democracy promotion by, 10, 73–88; denazification in, 73; economic motivations for development aid, 76, 83; economic recovery in, 74; economic selfinterest and, 73–74, 76, 83; in European Coal and Steel Community, 74; Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 75; Foreign Office in, 79, 80, 81, 82; Friedrich Ebert Foundation in, 84, 194, 200, 204, 206; Friedrich Naumann Foundation in, 84, 194, 204; German Agency for Technical Cooperation, 75, 82; German Development Service, 75; German Foundation for International Development, 75; Hanns Seidel Foundation in, 84, 194, 205, 206; Heinrich Böll Foundation in, 84; human

282

Index

rights and, 79–80, 84; imposition of democracy on, 8; initial lack of support for democracy promotion in, 74–76; institutional support for democracy promotion in, 79–85; integration into European institutions, 74; Konrad Adenauer Foundation in, 84, 194, 200, 203, 204; Liberal Party in, 77; Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 79, 81, 82; National Human Rights Institute in, 80; non-governmental organizations in, 76, 78, 82, 84; occupation of, 73; Ostpolitik in, 77; political foundations in, 84–85, 195, 196, 200; pressure for democracy-oriented foreign policy in, 76–79; recession in, 82; reunification of, 73, 85; Rosa Luxemburg Foundation in, 84, 194; Social Democratic Party in, 74, 77; Stability Pact for the Balkans and, 79; United States involvement in, 113; use of economic sanctions by, 85–86 Ghana, 158tab; electoral assistance to, 162tab; legal assistance to, 69; Nordic countries aid to, 69; World Bank and, 176 Gilbert and Ellice Islands: electoral assistance to, 159tab Glasnost, 48 Gold Coast, 158tab Gorbachev, Mikhail, 46, 48 Great Britain: as colonial power, 138; political foundations in, 196, 201; Westminster Foundation for Democracy in, 196, 201 Great Depression, 41 Group of Eight, 15, 101, 135 Group of Seven, 40, 141 Guatemala: income distribution in, 42; Nordic countries aid to, 59; peacekeeping missions in, 168tab; United States involvement in, 125, 226 Guinea: electoral assistance to, 99; Japanese aid to, 99 Guinea-Bissau: electoral assistance to, 161, 162tab Guyana: electoral assistance to, 161, 162tab Habibie, B.J., 99 Haiti: economic development in, 33; electoral assistance to, 94, 160, 162tab; peacekeeping missions in, 167tab, 168tab, 169; sanctions against, 114; United States involvement in, 114, 120, 126 Hallstein Doctrine, 75, 76 Hanns Seidel Foundation, 84, 194, 205, 206 Heinrich Böll Foundation, 84 Helsinki Act (1975), 77 Heritage Foundation, 197 Hermann, Margaret, 10, 15–29

Hibou, Béatrice, 10, 173–190, 233 Honduras: electoral assistance to, 162tab Hook, Steven, 10, 109–127 Hoover, Herbert, 197 Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 197, 202, 203 Hosokawa, Morohiro, 101 Hossain, Kamal, 195 Hungary: democratization in, 45, 49; European Union aid to, 135; Japanese aid to, 104; market transformation in, 49; North American Treaty Organization and, 117; professional bureaucracy in, 45 Iceland: development aid from, 71n1; human rights research in, 63 India: democratization in, 4; German aid to, 76, 82, 83, 86; Nordic countries aid to, 59, 65, 71n2; peacekeeping missions in, 166tab, 167tab Indonesia: democratization in, 126; domestic savings in, 35; electoral assistance to, 162tab; German aid to, 76, 83; Japanese aid to, 92, 98, 99; Nordic countries aid to, 66; United States aid to, 122; United States involvement in, 112, 118 Institutions: democratic, 17, 19, 42, 60; financial, 143, 173–190; of horizontal accountability, 50; international, 143, 173–190; legal, 60; multilateral, 16, 18; political, 33, 118, 173; state, 229tab; transnational, 115 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 151 International Bill of Human Rights, 152, 153 International Civil Aviation Organization, 151 International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (1969), 153 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), 153 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1976), 153 International Covenants on Human Rights (1978), 93 International Finance Corporation, 151 International Fund for Agricultural Development, 151 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 63 International Labour Organization, 150 International Maritime Organization, 151 International Monetary Fund, 20, 116, 151, 173; economic austerity and, 44; economic policies of, 37–38; Latin American programs of, 44; neoorthodox strategies of, 44; stabilization programs and, 44 International Republican Institute, 195

Index

International Telecommunications Union, 151 Investment: agreements, 56; capital, 36; commercial, 98; direct, 36 Iran, 221; German aid to, 76; peacekeeping missions in, 94, 167tab; United States involvement in, 113, 226 Iran-Contra scandal, 113 Iran-Iraq War, 165 Iraq: peacekeeping missions in, 94, 166tab, 167tab Iron Triangle, 91 Islamic Salvation Front, 140 Isolationism, 218 Israel, 5; United States aid to, 119, 123, 128n13 Italy: as colonial power, 138 Jamaica: Japanese aid to, 93 Japan: approaches to democracy promotion, 229tab; belief in economic development prior to political liberalization, 91–92; communal perspective of, 90; concern with economic security, 92; conditionality on aid in, 100–105; constraints on support for democracy promotion, 90–92; cooperation with United States, 95–96; democracy promotion by, 10, 89–107; democratization policies and economic aid, 4, 93–100, 126; discrimination in, 90–91; domestic savings in, 35; economic growth in, 91; expansion for foreign markets for, 92; foreign policy of, 95; German aid to, 83; in Gulf War, 94; human rights in, 92, 106; imposition of democracy on, 8; interest in Kuriles, 104, 105; in international peacekeeping efforts, 94; international political role, 92; Iron Triangle in, 91; lack of assertive foreign policy, 90; lack of firm stande on democratization, 89–107; market economy in, 95; Official Development Assistance Charter, 89; Partnership for Democratic Development in, 98; in peacekeeping missions, 107n1; political stability in, 91–92; preference for loans rather than grants, 95; protectionism in, 41; Self-Defense Force in, 94, 99, 107n1; United States involvement in, 41, 113 Japan International Cooperation Agency, 99 Jefferson, Thomas, 27 Jiang Zemin, 83, 100 Johnson, Juliet, 10, 31–51 Jordan: democratization in, 5; income distribution in, 42; United States aid to, 123 Joyner, Christopher, 10, 147–171, 224 Juppé, Alain, 141

283

Kaifu, Toshiki, 101 Kant, Immanuel, 15, 17, 19, 27, 115 Kaunda, Kenneth, 61 Kegley, Charles W. Jr., 10, 15–29 Kennan, George, 111 Kennedy, John F., 75, 112 Kenya: economic liberalization in, 143; economic reform in, 61; electoral assistance to, 142, 143, 162tab; European Union aid to, 142–144; human rights in, 142; International Monetary Fund credits in, 143; Japanese aid to, 93, 99; non-governmental organizations in, 143; Nordic countries aid to, 61, 65, 66, 67; sanctions against, 114; structural adjustment programs in, 143; World Bank and, 181 Kirkpatrick, Jeane, 128n4, 195 Kissinger, Henry, 27, 112 Kohl, Helmut, 77, 78, 80, 83, 227 Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 84, 194, 200, 203, 204 Kosovo: North American Treaty Organization in, 117; peacekeeping missions in, 166tab Kostunica, Vojislav, 4 Kuwait: peacekeeping missions in, 94, 166tab Laakso, Liisa, 10, 55–70, 228 Labor: child, 85; exploitation, 124; markets, 34, 44; movements, 42, 91; repression, 36, 37; unions, 43, 116, 122 Lake, Anthony, 115 Latin America: aid to, 35; authoritarian regimes in, 2; democratization in, 3; economic reform in, 48; electoral assistance to, 67; income distribution in, 42; International Monetary Fund and, 44; Nordic countries aid to, 57, 67; Partnership for Progress in, 75; reversion to authoritarianism, 35; stabilization programs and, 44; United States aid to, 119 Leadership: crusader-type, 25; idealogically driven, 25, 26, 26tab; pragmatic, 25; responsive, 26, 26tab Lebanon: peacekeeping missions in, 166tab, 167tab Lesotho: electoral assistance to, 99, 161, 162tab; Japanese aid to, 99 Liberalization: economic, 46, 49, 69, 143, 173, 229tab, 230; political, 46, 174–178, 229tab; price, 47; reform, 182, 183; social, 229tab, 230; tariff, 175; trade, 47, 183 Liberia: electoral assistance to, 162tab Libya: peacekeeping missions in, 168tab Li Peng, 101 Lippmann, Walter, 111

284

Index

Maastricht Treaty, 60, 132 McCain, John, 195 McNamara, Robert, 179 Madagascar, 162tab; Nordic countries aid to, 62; political reform in, 62 Madison, James, 27 Malawi: electoral assistance to, 162tab Malaysia: domestic savings in, 35; electoral assistance to, 159tab; income distribution in, 42 Mali: electoral assistance to, 162tab Mandela, Nelson, 139, 140 Marcos, Ferdinand, 112 Market(s): access to, 91; competitive, 37; economies, 40–42, 78, 104, 135–138, 138; expanding, 32; export-oriented, 174; foreign, 121; free, 31, 174, 229tab; labor, 34, 44; mechanisms, 183; reform, 43, 46, 96, 136; transitions, 47 Marshall Islands: electoral assistance to, 159tab Mauritius: electoral assistance to, 162tab Media: attacks on, 124; corruption and, 32; free, 32; independent, 60 Mendez, Juan, 195 Mengistu, Haile Mariam, 228 Mesic, Stipe, 4 Mexico, 222; democratization in, 3, 41, 126; economic reform in, 41, 457–46; electoral assistance to, 161, 162tab; German aid to, 76; in North American Free Trade Association, 41; United States aid to, 122 Middle East: authoritarian regimes in, 5; democratization in, 3tab, 5, 6tab; peacekeeping missions in, 167tab Military regimes: in Algeria, 140–142; modernization and, 36; quality of life in, 38 Milosevic, Slobodan, 4, 117, 118 Modernization: instability and, 36; military regimes and, 36; rapid, 36; theory, 76 Moi, Daniel arap, 114, 142, 143 Molde Declaration (1990), 60 Mongolia: democratization in, 4 Morgenthau, Hans, 111 Morocco: democratization in, 5 Mozambique: electoral assistance to, 94, 160, 161, 162tab; Nordic countries aid to, 71n2; peacekeeping missions in, 94, 167tab; privatization in, 187 Mubarek, Hosni, 123 Mugabe, Robert, 228 Muhammad VI (King of Morocco), 5 Mutunga, Willy, 195 Myanmar: Japanese aid to, 100, 102–103 NAFTA. See North American Free Trade Association

Namibia, 223; electoral assistance to, 67, 94, 157, 159tab, 160, 162tab, 172n6; Nordic countries aid to, 66, 67; peacekeeping missions in, 94, 167tab, 169; United Nations Transition Assistance Group in, 157 National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 195 National Endowment for Democracy, 113, 116, 195, 200–201 Nationalism, 22; economic, 183 NATO. See North American Treaty Organization Nauru: as trust territory, 158tab Neibuhr, Reinhold, 111, 128n4 Neoisolationism, 121 Neorealism, 21, 24 Nepal: electoral assistance to, 161, 162tab Netherlands: electoral assistance to, 162tab; human rights research in, 63 New Guinea: as trust territory, 158tab Newly-industrializing countries: Asian, 37; economic development in, 37; export-led growth in, 37; industrial policies in, 37; labor repression in, 37; United States involvement in, 118 New Zealand: democratization in, 3 Nicaragua: democratization in, 126; economic development in, 33; electoral assistance to, 94, 160, 161, 162tab; German aid to, 78; Nordic countries aid to, 71n2; Sandinistas in, 113, 221; United States involvement in, 113, 222 Niger: electoral assistance to, 161, 162tab Nigeria, 158tab; electoral assistance to, 99, 162tab; German aid to, 76; Japanese aid to, 99; United States aid to, 122 Niue: electoral assistance to, 159tab Nixon, Richard, 27, 112 Nonaligned Movement, 74 Non-governmental organizations, 58, 115, 218–219; collaboration with, 118; development of, 136; in Germany, 76, 78, 82, 84; in Kenya, 143; Nordic countries support for, 69, 70; privatization of, 187; project planning by, 116; in South Africa, 139; World Bank and, 177 Nordic Council, 57 Nordic countries. See also individual countries; aid strategies, 61–64; aid through international organizations, 67; arms sales by, 56; carrot and stick approach to aid, 64–66; coordination of foreign aid policies, 56–57; democracy promotion by, 10, 55–70; direct support for democratization, 66–69; electoral support from, 67; foreign aid amounts, 57; freedom of association

Index

in, 56; goals in, 55–58; human rights policies, 66; independent judiciary in, 56; instruments of assistance, 61–64; intercountry disputes over aid, 65; internationalist role of, 56; multilateral assistance by, 57; national identities in, 55; noninterference norms in, 61; normative assumptions in, 55–58; ombudsman in, 55; reluctance to apply economic sanctions in, 56; role of state in, 70; rule of law in, 56; socialist tradition in, 56, 65; socioeconomic equality in, 56; support for liberation struggles, 69; support for non-governmental organizations, 69; suspension of aid by, 64–66; transparency in, 56; Women and Law in Southern Africa project, 60 Nordic Yearbook on Human Rights in Developing Countries, 63 Noriega, Manuel, 114 North American Free Trade Association, 122, 128n15, 219; Mexico in, 41 North Atlantic Treaty Organization: in Bosnia, 117, 169; in Kosovo, 79, 117; membership expansion, 20, 117, 124; Partnership for Peace and, 20 Norway: advisory group on sectoral issues in, 63; democracy promotion in, 55–70; domestic savings in, 35; human rights policy, 58; human rights research in, 63; Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, 62, 63 Nyerere, Julius, 57, 228 OAS. See Organization of American States Oceania: democratization in, 2–3, 3, 3tab, 5, 6tab; semidemocracies in, 6tab OECD. See Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development Olsen, Gorm Rye, 10, 131–145, 233 Oman: Japanese aid to, 93 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 20, 80 Organization of American States: intervention in democracy promotion and, 20; Santiago Agreement, 114 Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, 61, 105, 116, 128n8 OSCE. See Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Pahlavi, Mohammed Reza, 111 Paine, Thomas, 27 Pakistan, 221; German aid to, 76, 86; Japanese aid to, 93, 99; peacekeeping missions in, 94, 166tab, 167tab; United States involvement in, 112

285

Palau: electoral assistance to, 159tab; as trust territory, 158tab Palestine, 5; electoral assistance to, 67, 94; Nordic countries aid to, 67; peacekeeping missions in, 169 Palestinian Administrative Areas: Nordic countries aid to, 71n2 Panama: electoral assistance to, 162tab; income distribution in, 42; United States involvement in, 114 Papua New Guinea, 158tab; electoral assistance to, 159tab Paraguay: electoral assistance to, 162tab Paris Club, 61 Paris Peace Accords (1991), 163 Partnership for Democratic Development, 98 Partnership for Peace, 20 Partnership for Progress, 75 Paternalism, 32 Patrimonialism, 37 Perez de Cuellar, Javier, 163 Peru: economic development in, 33; electoral assistance to, 162tab; Japanese aid to, 98; Nordic countries aid to, 66; sanctions against, 114 Philippines: democratization in, 4, 126; economic development in, 33; electoral assistance to, 113; Japanese aid to, 99; United States involvement in, 112, 114, 125 Poland: democratization in, 45; European Union aid to, 135; Japanese aid to, 99, 104; North American Treaty Organization and, 117; professional bureaucracy in, 45 Policy: construction, 222; decisions, 24; economic, 31; growth-oriented, 33; industrial, 37; influencing, 42; patronage, 37; populist, 457 Political: capital, 19; conditionalities, 96, 173, 219; culture, 7, 22, 33, 43; decisionmaking, 78; democracy, 31, 40, 74; development, 76; economy, 44, 176; equality, 149, 157; freedoms, 42; governance, 1; institutions, 118, 173; liberalization, 46, 174–178, 229tab; opposition, 65; participation, 23, 36, 39, 58, 62; parties, 42; power, 149; reform, 48, 56, 58, 61, 114, 125, 143, 184, 457; repression, 57–58, 63, 65; rights, 55, 57; similarity, 41; stability, 91–92, 96, 122, 165, 225, 229tab; transparency, 40 Political foundations, 84–85, 193–213, 231–232; autonomy of, 84; civil society development by, 209; coordination activities, 204–205; democracy promotion and, 199–208; electoral assistance by, 209; expansion of resources to democratizing groups by, 208; freedom of action, 194;

286

Index

funding, 194; funding research and analysis, 201–203; grants to prodemocracy groups, 199–201; hands-on role of, 206–208; impact of, 208–210; provision of information by, 208–209; response time, 194; scholarship programs, 200; staffing, 195, 196 Politics: bureaucratic, 135; multiparty, 60; “of the belly,” 182 Portugal: authoritarian regimes in, 2; as colonial power, 3, 138; democratization in, 3, 36 Powell, Colin, 117 Power: centralized, 457; coercive, 181; competition for, 46; fragmentation, 183; political, 149 Privatization, 44, 47, 180, 183, 184, 186, 187, 191n7 Protectionism, 41, 183 Putin, Vladimir, 124 Reagan, Ronald, 25, 78, 113, 128n4, 221, 222 Realism, 21, 24, 27 Reform: democratic, 20, 47, 115–116, 125; economic, 41, 44, 46, 50, 173, 182–183, 183, 457; financial sector, 44; institutional, 27; liberalization, 182, 183; macroeconomic, 143; market, 43, 46, 96, 136; neoorthodox, 46; political, 48, 58, 114, 125, 143, 184, 457; structural, 46 Resources: allocation, 34; energy, 120; government, 34; monopolization of, 190n6; private appropriation of, 187; social, 182 Rice, Condoleezza, 117 Rights: civil, 55, 57, 93; cultural, 55, 93; development, 70; of dissent, 21; economic, 55; human, 56, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 66, 70, 77, 78, 120, 122, 139, 149, 225, 229tab, 231; individual, 32, 90; of minorities, 90, 149; political, 55, 57; property, 32, 33, 34, 38; of protest, 21; religious, 122; social, 93; of suffrage, 22; universal, 153; violations, 66; voting, 110; women’s, 110; of workers, 122 Romania: democratization in, 457 Roosevelt, Franklin, 110, 111 Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, 84, 194 Rostow, W.W., 35 Rüland, Jürgen, 10, 73–88, 232 Rumsfeld, Donald, 117 Russia: democratization in, 4, 114; economic reform in, 47, 457; electoral assistance to, 161, 162tab; emergency decrees in, 47; human rights in, 124; interest in Kuriles, 104, 105; Japanese aid to, 100, 104–105; political transitions in, 48; transition to

market economy, 104; United States aid to, 124; war against Chechenya, 83, 124 Rwanda: electoral assistance to, 162tab; genocide in, 120; peacekeeping missions in, 168tab; as trust territory, 157; World Bank and, 181 Saddam Hussein, 94 Salinas, Carlos, 457–46 El Salvador: electoral assistance to, 94, 160, 162tab, 163; German aid to, 78; Japanese aid to, 98–99; Nordic countries aid to, 59; peacekeeping missions in, 94, 167tab; United States involvement in, 125 Samoa, 158tab Santiago Agreement (1991), 114 Saudi Arabia, 221; domestic savings in, 35; United States aid to, 122 Schmidt, Helmut, 77, 78 Schraeder, Peter, 1–10, 217–235 Schröder, Gerhard, 74, 78, 80, 83 Scott, James, 10, 193–213, 231, 232 Scowcroft, Brent, 195 Security: international, 28; national, 27 Senegal: electoral assistance to, 161, 162tab; World Bank and, 180 Seychelles: electoral assistance to, 162tab SIDA. See Swedish International Development Agency Sierra Leone: civil war in, 223; electoral assistance in, 161, 162tab; peacekeeping missions in, 167tab, 168tab; World Bank and, 181 Singapore: German aid to, 83 Single European Act (1986), 132, 134 Social: development, 70, 225, 229tab; equality, 150; harmony, 90; liberalization, 229tab, 230; networks, 182; resources, 182; rights, 93; services, 44; similarity, 41; welfare, 229tab, 457 Solomon Islands: instability in, 3 Somalia: humanitarian missions in, 166; Nordic countries aid to, 66; peacekeeping missions in, 167tab, 168tab, 169; as trust territory, 157; United States involvement in, 120, 126 Somaliland: as trust territory, 158tab Somoza, Anastasio, 113 South Africa: democratization in, 126; electoral assistance to, 67, 139, 140, 160, 162tab; European Union aid to, 138–140; German aid to, 78; human rights in, 139; international community response to apartheid regime, 222–223; Japanese aid to, 99; non-governmental organizations in, 139, 140; Nordic countries aid to, 59, 67, 69, 71n2; Special Program for the

Index

Victims of Apartheid in, 138–139; United States involvement in, 113, 118 Southern Africa Political Economy Series, 63 South Korea: democratization in, 4, 126; domestic savings in, 35; economic reform in, 46; electoral assistance to, 113; German aid to, 83 Soviet Union: collapse of, 2, 3–4, 7; economic development in, 33; economic reform in, 48 Spain: authoritarian regimes in, 2; as colonial power, 3, 138; democratization in, 3, 45; income distribution in, 42; professional bureaucracy in, 45 Sri Lanka: Nordic countries aid to, 58, 66, 67 Stability Pact for the Balkans, 79 Stalin, Josef, 36, 111 State: autonomy, 37; capacity, 177; control, 7; developmental, 229tab; failed, 120; formation, 182, 185; institutions, 229tab; intervention, 32, 37, 174, 183; meaning of, 178; resistance, 177; restructuring, 136; “rhizome,” 183; rogue, 122; sovereignty, 133; welfare, 55 Structural adjustment programs, 45, 46, 116, 143 Sudan: Japanese aid to, 93; Nordic countries aid to, 66 Sukarno, Achmed, 112 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery (1957), 153 Support for East European Democracy program, 114 Sweden: democracy promotion in, 55–70; human rights policy, 59; human rights research in, 63; Social Democratic Party in, 59; Swedish International Development Agency in, 59 Swedish International Development Agency in, 59 Taiwan: democratization in, 4 Tajikistan: Japanese aid to, 99; peacekeeping missions in, 167tab Tanganyika: as trust territory, 158tab Tanzania: electoral assistance to, 68, 162tab; legal assistance to, 69; Nordic countries aid to, 57, 58–59, 65, 67, 69, 71n2, 228; transition to multiparty rule, 68 Thailand: Japanese aid to, 93, 98; military coup in, 98 Think tanks, 193–213; civil society development by, 209; coordination activities, 204–205; democracy promotion and, 199–208; electoral assistance by, 209; expansion of resources to democratizing groups by, 208; funding, 196–197; fund-

287

ing research and analysis, 201–203; hands-on role of, 206–208; impact of, 208–210; policy recommendations by, 205; provision of information by, 208–209; types, 197 Togo: electoral assistance to, 162tab Togoland: electoral assistance to, 159tab; as trust territory, 158tab Tonga: instability in, 3 Trade: agreements, 56; barriers, 230; bilateral, 99; deficits, 120, 122; democracy promotion and, 56; familiarity and, 41; foreign, 74, 85; free, 10, 32, 40–42, 50, 230; interdependence, 23; liberalization, 47, 183; relations, 31, 41, 122; “zone of,” 40 Treaty of Maastricht, 131 Treaty of Rome (1957), 131 Trujillo, Rafael, 112 Turkey: economic reform in, 46; German aid to, 76, 82, 86; human rights in, 123–124; Japanese aid to, 93; United States aid to, 123 Turks and Caicos Islands: electoral assistance to, 159tab Uganda: economic development in, 33; economic reform in, 61; electoral assistance in, 162tab; legal assistance to, 69; Nordic countries aid to, 61, 67, 69, 71n2; peacekeeping missions in, 168tab; World Bank and, 176 Ukraine: electoral assistance to, 162tab United Nations, 115; Charter, 147, 148–149, 153–154; Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, 155; Construction on democratic principles, 147; Convention Against Torture, 153; Convention and Protocol on the Status of Refugees, 153; Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 153; Convention on the Rights of the Child, 153; Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, 153; Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Program, 98; decisionmaking in, 147, 150, 151; Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice, 155; Declaration on Social Progress and Development, 155; Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 155; Declaration on the Elimination of Intolerance Based on Religion, 155; Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace, 155; Declaration on the Rights of the Child, 155; democracy promotion by, 10, 147–171, 224–225; democratic values of, 147; Development

288

Index

Program, 57, 67, 71n1, 99, 160, 199, 205; Economic and Social Council, 150; Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 150; electoral assistance by, 157, 159tab, 160; Electoral Assistance Division, 157–158, 160, 164; expansion of, 147, 148; Food and Agricultural Organization, 150; foreign aid targets, 57; General Assembly, 102, 149, 150, 152, 153, 164; High Commissioner for Refugees, 100, 205; humanitarian interventions by, 166; Human Rights Commission, 84; human rights resolutions, 155; Industrial Development Organization, 151; International Bill of Human Rights, 152, 153; International Children’s and Educational Fund, 205; International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (1969), 153; International Court of Justice, 149; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 153; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 153; membership, 171n1; norm-creating ability of, 147; Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 160; peacekeeping missions, 160, 163; peacemaking activities, 165–170; Principles of Medical Ethics Relevant to the Protection of Prisoners, 155; resolutions on banned activities, 156; Secretariat, 149; Security Council, 147, 149, 151, 152, 163; separation of powers in, 149; Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, 155; Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, 155; Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery (1957), 153; Transition Assistance Group, 157; Trusteeship Council activities, 156–165; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 153, 155 United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, 166tab United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, 166tab United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission, 166tab United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, 166tab United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, 166tab United Nations Mission in BosniaHerzegovina, 166tab United Nations Mission in East Timor, 163

United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia, 166tab United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, 166tab United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, 99 United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, 94, 163 United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine, 165 United States: aid to Chile, 71n3; American Center for International Labor Solidarity in, 195; approaches to democracy promotion, 229tab; Brookings Institution in, 197; Building Democracy program, 116, 118, 119, 121; Carnegie Institute in, 197–198; Carter Center in, 198–199, 201, 206–208; Center for International Private Enterprise in, 195; Center for Strategic and International Studies in, 198; Chinese relations with, 122; Clinton Doctrine, 115; communist containment strategy, 111; concern for domestic problems in, 119; conflicting policy objectives in, 121–124; consequentialist ethics of, 111–112; decline in aid by, 118–119; democracy promotion by, 10, 109–127; democratic enlargement policy, 115; development policy of, 115; discriminatory policies in, 113; domestic obstacles to democracy promotion, 109; domestic savings in, 34; economic growth in, 122; export patterns, 41; foreign policy of, 117; in Gulf War, 120; Heritage Foundation in, 197; historical perspective of democracy promotion, 110–114; Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace in, 197, 202, 203; imposition of own model by, 109, 125–126; income distribution in, 42; International Republican Institute in, 195; Iran-Contra scandal in, 113; Japan and, 41; limitations of own democratic model, 125–126; National Democratic Institute for International Affairs in, 195; National Endowment for Democracy in, 113, 116, 195, 200–201; national security concerns, 113; obstacles to democracy promotion by, 118–126; political foundations in, 195, 200–201; post-Cold War democratization policy, 114–118; public ambivalence to democratic enlargement efforts, 119–121; realist approach to foreign policy by, 110–114; return to mulitlateralism by, 117; role in World War II, 111; superpower détente policy of, 112; Support for East European Democracy program, 114; support of authoritarian regimes, 111–112;

Index

terrorist attack on, 117; think tanks in, 197–199; trade with China, 41; Vietnam involvement, 112 United States Agency for International Development, 199 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), 153, 155 Universal Postal Union, 151 U.S. Agency for International Development, 116, 120 Uzbekistan: Japanese aid to, 99 Vietnam: economic liberalization in, 69; Japanese aid to, 99; Nordic countries aid to, 65, 66, 69, 71n2; United States involvement in, 112 Voluntary Fund for Advisory Services and Technical Assistnce, 98 Warsaw Declaration (2000), 1 Washington consensus, 175 Weber, Max, 176 Werz, Nicolaus, 10, 73–88, 232 Western Sahara, 157; electoral assistance to, 162tab; peacekeeping missions in, 166tab Western Samoa: electoral assistance to, 159tab; as trust territory, 158tab West Irian: electoral assistance to, 159tab Westminster Foundation for Democracy, 196, 201 West New Guinea: peacekeeping missions in, 167tab Wilson, Woodrow, 15, 17, 27, 110, 128n1, 217 Women and Law in Southern Africa, 60 World Bank, 20, 115, 116, 173–190, 233; anti-statist discourse, 181; civil society and, 177; colonialism and, 178; consequences of liberalization and, 183–188; constraints on, 178, 179, 180; currency devaluation and, 175, 180; democracy promotion by, 10, 173–190; emphasis on economic ends, 176; fiscal austerity and,

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175; impact of externally demanded economic reform and, 182–183; insistence on specific results, 185; liberalization discourse of, 174–178; maintenance of incumbent elites and, 184, 185; missionary-inspired catechism of, 178–182; nongovernmental organizations and, 177; noninterference in internal affairs of members, 175; price stability and, 175; rule of law and, 177–178; state legitimacy and, 186–187; tariff liberalization and, 175; in Zambia, 61 World Conference on Human Rights (1993), 80 World Conference on Women (1995), 80 World Health Organization, 150 World Meteorological Organization, 151 World Trade Organization, 40, 85, 122 World War II: imposition of democracy after, 8 Yearbook on Human Rights in Developing Countries, 63 Yeltsin, Boris, 47, 124 Yemen: electoral assistance to, 161, 162tab; peacekeeping missions in, 167tab Yugoslavia: democratization in, 4; Nordic countries aid to, 71n2; peacekeeping missions in, 94, 166tab, 167tab; United States involvement in, 120 Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: electoral assistance to, 161; peacekeeping missions in, 168tab Zambia: economic development in, 33; electoral assistance to, 162tab; legal assistance to, 69; Nordic countries aid to, 61, 67, 69, 71n2 Zanzibar, 158tab; electoral assistance to, 68; Nordic countries aid to, 61, 68 Zeroual, Liamine, 141, 233 Zia, Mohammed ul-Haq, 112 Zimbabwe, 63; Japanese aid to, 93; Nordic countries aid to, 67, 71n2, 228

About the Book

In recent years, debates within academic and policymaking circles have gradually shifted—from a Cold War focus on whether democracy constitutes the best form of governance, to the question of whether (and to what degree) international actors should be actively involved in democracy promotion. This book offers the first comprehensive analysis of international efforts to promote democracy during the post–World War II period, with an emphasis on developments since 1989. The authors assess the efforts of major industrialized democracies, multilateral actors, and NGOs. They find that the success of these endeavors is constrained by several realities, ranging from the often significant gap between the rhetoric and the reality of actual policies, to the dilemma that occurs when the goal of democracy clashes with other foreign policy interests. Peter J. Schraeder is associate professor of political science at Loyola University Chicago. He is author of United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change and African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation. He is also the editor of Intervention in the 1990s: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Third World.

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