Exploring the Final Frontier - Issues, Plans and Funding for NASA : Issues, Plans and Funding for NASA [1 ed.] 9781613245651, 9781608760800

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Copyright © 2010. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved. Exploring the Final Frontier - Issues, Plans and Funding for NASA : Issues, Plans and Funding for NASA, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010.

Copyright © 2010. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved. Exploring the Final Frontier - Issues, Plans and Funding for NASA : Issues, Plans and Funding for NASA, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010.

SPACE SCIENCE, EXPLORATION AND POLICIES SERIES

EXPLORING THE FINAL FRONTIER

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ISSUES, PLANS AND FUNDING FOR NASA

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SPACE SCIENCE, EXPLORATION AND POLICIES SERIES Progress in Dark Matter Research J. Val Blain (Editor) 2005. ISBN 1-59454-248-1 Space Science: New Research Nick S. Maravell (Editor) 2006. ISBN 1-60021-005-8 Space Policy and Exploration William N. Callmers (Editor) 2008. ISBN 978-1-60456-448-8 Space Commercialization and the Development of Space Law from a Chinese Legal Perspective Yun Zhao 2009. ISBN 978-1-60692-244-6

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Space Commercialization and the Development of Space Law from a Chinese Legal Perspective Yun Zhao 2009. ISBN 978-1-60876-874-5 (Online Book) Space Exploration Research John H. Denis and Paul D. Aldridge (Editors) 2009. ISBN: 978-1-60692-264-4 Space Exploration Research John H. Denis and Paul D. Aldridge (Editors) 2009. ISBN: 978-1-61668-212-5 (Online Book) Next Generation of Human Space Flight Systems Alfred T. Chesley (Editor) 2009. ISBN 978-1-60692-726-7 Nutritional Biochemistry of Space Flight Scott M. Smith, Sara R. Zwart, Vickie Kloeris and Martina Heer 2009. ISBN 978-1-60741-641-8

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Environmental Satellites: Weather and Environmental Information Systems Vincent L. Webber (Editor) 2009. ISBN 978-1-60692-984-1 Smaller Satellites Operations Near Geostationary Orbit Matthew T. Erdner 2009. ISBN 978-1-60741-181-9 Black Holes and Galaxy Formation Adonis D. Wachter and Raphael J. Propst (Editors) 2010. ISBN: 978-1-60741-703-3 Dark Energy: Theories, Developments, and Implications Karl Lefebvre and Raoul Garcia (Editors) 2010. ISBN: 978-1-61668-271-2 Dark Energy: Theories, Developments, and Implications Karl Lefebvre and Raoul Garcia (Editors) 2010. ISBN: 978-1-61668-889-9 (Online Book)

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Future U.S. Space Launch Capabilities Franz Lojdahl (Editor) 2010. ISBN: 978-1-60741-384-4 The International Space Station David E. Jamison (Editor) 2010. ISBN: 978-1-60692-322-1 Global Positioning Systems Viggo Asphaug and Elias Sørensen (Editors) 2010. ISBN: 978-1-60741-012-6 Astrobiology: Physical Origin, Biological Evolution and Spatial Distribution Simon Hegedűs and Jakob Csonka (Editors) 2010. ISBN: 978-1-60741-290-8 Space Tourism Issues Elias Wikborg (Editor) 2010. ISBN: 978-1-60741-353-0 Exploring the Final Frontier : Issues, Plans and Funding for NASA Dillon S. Maguire (Editor) 2010. ISBN: 978-1-60876-080-0

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Primordial Space Bernd Schmeikal 2010. ISBN: 978-1-60876-781-6 Sustaining the Global Positioning System Earl M. Peabody (Editor) 2010. ISBN: 978-1-60741-006-5 Analytical Methods for the Formation of Dark Matter Haloes in the Universe Nicos Hiotelis 2010. ISBN: 978-1-60876-473-0 Space Material Sciences A.I. Feonychev 2010. ISBN: 978-1-61668-236-1 Space Material Sciences A.I. Feonychev 2010. ISBN: 978-1-61668-477-8 (Online Book) Commercial Space Transportation Jocelyn S. Gunther (Editor) 2010. ISBN: 978-1-61668-707-6

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Commercial Space Transportation Jocelyn S. Gunther (Editor) 2010. ISBN: 978-1-61668-795-3 (Online Book) Future of U.S. Human Spaceflight: Background and Issues Derek A. Warren and Bridget D. Conway (Editors) 2010. ISBN: 978-1-61668-774-8 Future of U.S. Human Spaceflight: Background and Issues Derek A. Warren and Bridget D. Conway (Editors) 2010. ISBN: 978-1-61668-876-9 (Online Book)

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EXPLORING THE FINAL FRONTIER ISSUES, PLANS AND FUNDING FOR NASA

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DILLON S. MAGUIRE EDITOR

Nova Science Publishers, Inc. New York

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Independent verification should be sought for any data, advice or recommendations contained in this book. In addition, no responsibility is assumed by the publisher for any injury and/or damage to persons or property arising from any methods, products, instructions, ideas or otherwise contained in this publication. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information with regard to the subject matter covered herein. It is sold with the clear understanding that the Publisher is not engaged in rendering legal or any other professional services. If legal or any other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent person should be sought. FROM A DECLARATION OF PARTICIPANTS JOINTLY ADOPTED BY A COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND A COMMITTEE OF PUBLISHERS. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA Exploring the final frontier : issues, plans, and funding for NASA / editor, Dillon S. Maguire. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN H%RRN 1. Astronautics--Government policy--United States. 2. Astronautics--United States--Costs. 3. Outer space--Exploration--United States--Planning. 4. United States. National Aeronautics and Space Administration--Finance. 5. United States. National Aeronautics and Space Administration--Planning. I. Maguire, Dillon S. TL789.8.U5E868 2009 354.79--dc22 2009038390

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CONTENTS Preface Chapter 1

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Chapter 2

ix An Analysis of NASA’s Plans for Continuing Human Spaceflight after Retiring the Space Shuttle Congressional Budget Office The Budgetary Implications of NASA's Current Plans for Space Exploration Congressional Budget Office

1

15

Chapter 3

NASA:Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects U. S. Government Accountability Office

Chapter 4

NASA Cost Management Hearing—Scolese Testimony Christopher Scolese

Chapter 5

National Aeronautics and Space Administrations: Overview, FY2009 Budget, and Issues for Congress Daniel Morgan and Carl E. Behrens

121

U.S. Civilian Space Policy Priorities: Reflections 50 Years after Sputnik Deborah D. Stine

129

Chapter 6

Index

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149

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PREFACE This book explores and assesses the future of NASA which is at a critical juncture. The agency is in the midst of phasing out the Space Shuttle program and beginning another major undertaking, the Constellation program - which will create the next generation of spacecraft for human spaceflight and is expected to cost upward of $230 billion. This massive effort, unparalleled since the transition from the Apollo program to the Shuttle program, presents the agency with myriad complex and interdependent challenges. NASA is taking on this endeavor against a backdrop of growing national government fiscal imbalance and budget deficits that continue to strain all federal agencies' resources. While NASA's budget represents less than 2 percent of the federal government's fiscal discretionary budget, the agency is increasingly being asked to expand its portfolio to support important scientific missions including the study of climate change. Therefore, it is exceedingly important that these resources be managed as effectively and efficiently as possible.This book consists of public documents which have been located, gathered, combined, reformatted, and enhanced with a subject index, selectively edited and bound to provide easy access. Chapter 1 - In 2004, President Bush announced his “Vision for U.S. Space Exploration,” which called for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to complete construction of the International Space Station and retire the space shuttle fleet by 2010. The President also directed NASA to develop new vehicles for human space-flight that would allow missions to the moon, Mars, and beyond. NASA was directed to complete that development as quickly as possible to minimize the gap in time, once the space shuttle fleet was retired, during which NASA would be unable to carry out human space missions. The development of new vehicles for such missions—including the Ares 1 crew launch vehicle and the Orion crew exploration vehicle—is funded through NASA’s Constellation Program. This Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report describes the status of the program and the prospects for accomplishing its goals over the planned timetable. NASA’s current plans call for the Ares 1 and Orion vehicles to reach the milestone of initial operating capability (IOC) in March 2015. (At that point, the Ares 1 and Orion vehicles should be capable of carrying a crew of astronauts to the International Space Station.) NASA is also developing additional vehicles and systems—including the Ares 5 cargo launch vehicle—that are required to return humans to the moon by 2020. Chapter 2 - In 2004, President Bush announced his “Vision for U.S. Space Exploration,” which called for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to develop new vehicles for spaceflight that would allow humans to return to the moon by 2020. In response,

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Dillon S. Maguire

NASA restructured its plans to achieve that objective, and in September 2004, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) published a budgetary analysis of NASA’s new plans.1 This report updates that analysis, incorporating elements of NASA’s plans that had not been established in 2004. To meet the goal set by the President, NASA reduced its planned budgets supporting science and research in aeronautics by more than 40 percent and made plans to complete construction of the International Space Station and retire the space shuttle by 2010. Using about $100 billion of potential funding through 2020 made available by those changes, NASA began developing new vehicles for human spaceflight in what the agency calls its Constellation program. Two of those vehicles—the Ares 1 crew launch vehicle and the Orion crew exploration vehicle—are to achieve “initial operating capability” by March 2015. At that point, the vehicles should be capable of carrying a crew of astronauts to the International Space Station. NASA is also developing additional vehicles and systems—including the Ares 5 cargo launch vehicle and the Altair lunar lander—that are needed to return humans to the moon.2 According to NASA, its current plans will require an average of $19.1 billion of funding annually from 2010 through 2025, with the Constellation program accounting for about half of the total by 2017. Under its current plans, the agency also intends to conduct 79 new robotic science missions through 2025, requiring funding of $4.7 billion annually, and to perform aeronautics research, at a cost of about $460 million annually. Chapter 3 - The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) plans to invest billions in the coming years in science and exploration space flight initiatives. The scientific and technical complexities inherent in NASA’s mission create great challenges in managing its projects and controlling costs. In the past, NASA has had difficulty meeting cost, schedule, and performance objectives for some of its projects. The need to effectively manage projects will gain even moreimportance as NASA seeks to manage its wide-ranging portfolio in an increasingly constrained fiscal environment. Per congressional direction, this report provides an independent assessment of selected NASA projects. In conducting this work, GAO compared projects against best practice criteria for system development including attainment of knowledge on technologies and design as well as various aspects of program management. The projects assessed are considered major acquisitions by NASA—each with a life-cycle cost of over $250 million. No recommendations are provided. Chapter 4 features testimony before the U. S. House of Representatives Chapter 5 - The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) conducts U.S. civilian space and aeronautics activities. For FY2009, the Bush Administration requested $17.6 14 billion for NASA, an increase of 1.8% from the FY2008 appropriation of $ 17.309 billion. The House Appropriations Committee recommended $ 17.769 billion. The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $17.8 14 billion. The NASA Authorization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-422) authorizes $20.2 10 billion. The Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (H.R. 1105 as passed by the House) would provide 17.782 billion. Pending enactment of an FY2009 appropriations act, NASA is operating at FY2008 funding levels under the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2009 (Division A of P.L. 110-329) as extended by H.J.Res. 38. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5) provided an additional $1 .002 billion. The Vision for Space Exploration—returning humans to the Moon by 2020 and eventually going on to Mars—has been the major focus of NASA’s activities

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since President Bush announced it in 2004. It is not yet clear whether or how the Obama Administration will seek to modify the Vision. Issues for Congress include the development of new vehicles for human spaceflight, plans for the transition to these vehicles after the space shuttle is retired in 2010, and the balance in NASA’s priorities between human space exploration and the agency’s activities in science and aeronautics. Chapter 6 - The “space age” began on October 4, 1957, when the Soviet Union (USSR) launched Sputnik, the world’s first artificial satellite. Some U.S. policymakers, concerned about the USSR’s ability to launch a satellite, thought Sputnik might be an indication that the United States was trailing behind the USSR in science and technology. The Cold War also led some U.S. policymakers to perceive the Sputnik launch as a possible precursor to nuclear attack. In response to this “Sputnik moment,” the U.S. government undertook several policy actions, including the establishment of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), enhancement of research funding, and reformation of science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) education policy. Following the “Sputnik moment,” a set of fundamental factors gave “importance, urgency, and inevitability to the advancement of space technology,” according to an Eisenhower presidential committee. These four factors include the compelling need to explore and discover; national defense; prestige and confidence in the U.S. scientific, technological, industrial, and military systems; and scientific observation and experimentation to add to our knowledge and understanding of the Earth, solar system, and universe. They are still part of current policy discussions and influence the nation’s civilian space policy priorities—both in terms of what actions NASA is authorized to undertake and the appropriations each activity within NASA receives.

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Chapter 1

AN ANALYSIS OF NASA’S PLANS FOR CONTINUING HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT AFTER RETIRING THE SPACE SHUTTLE ∗

Congressional Budget Office

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SUMMARY In 2004, President Bush announced his “Vision for U.S. Space Exploration,” which called for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to complete construction of the International Space Station and retire the space shuttle fleet by 2010. The President also directed NASA to develop new vehicles for human space-flight that would allow missions to the moon, Mars, and beyond. NASA was directed to complete that development as quickly as possible to minimize the gap in time, once the space shuttle fleet was retired, during which NASA would be unable to carry out human space missions. The development of new vehicles for such missions—including the Ares 1 crew launch vehicle and the Orion crew exploration vehicle—is funded through NASA’s Constellation Program. This Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report describes the status of the program and the prospects for accomplishing its goals over the planned timetable. NASA’s current plans call for the Ares 1 and Orion vehicles to reach the milestone of initial operating capability (IOC) in March 2015. (At that point, the Ares 1 and Orion vehicles should be capable of carrying a crew of astronauts to the International Space Station.) NASA is also developing additional vehicles and systems—including the Ares 5 cargo launch vehicle—that are required to return humans to the moon by 2020. NASA indicates that the probability of achieving the IOC milestone for the Ares 1 and Orion vehicles by March 2015 is 65 percent—that is, its level of confidence about meeting that date is 65 percent, which the agency considers to be a reasonable level for purposes of program planning. (NASA estimates the feasibility of meeting such milestones by using ∗

This is an edited, reformatted and augmented version of a Congressional Budget Office publication dated November 2008.

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Congressional Budget Office

standard probability analyses of its plans for development programs.) NASA’s 65 percent figure takes into account the reduction in its fiscal year 2007 budget (relative to the Administration’s request) of $577 million (in 2007 dollars), a change enacted in the Revised Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2007 (Public Law 110-5). The agency has accommodated the cut in its 2007 funding by eliminating some future missions of its Lunar Precursor Robotic Program. (That program is designed to launch robotic spacecraft to the moon to collect data about the moon’s surface to help plan future human lunar missions.) CBO’s analysis of NASA’s Constellation Program points to several general conclusions: • The five-year gap in U.S. human spaceflight between the retirement of the space shuttle, in September 2010, and the achievement of initial operating capability for Ares 1 and Orion, in March 2015, might increase if NASA could not avoid the risks to the successful completion of those projects that it and others (in particular, the Government Accountability Office, or GAO) have identified in the Constellation Program.1 Those risks include an increase during development in the mass of the Orion vehicle that would exceed the capability of the Ares 1 to lift it into orbit; excessive thrust oscillation in the first stage of the Ares 1 and less-than-required performance during the rocket’s launch; a longer-than-expected development period for the J-2X engine of the Ares 1’s second, or upper, stage; and NASA’s inability to develop and fabricate effective heat shields for the Orion within its current development schedule. • The potential problems that those risks represent could require additional time and money to resolve. NASA’s current plans include an allowance of almost $7 billion to ensure that the Ares 1 and Orion achieve initial operating capability according to the current schedule. (Unless otherwise noted, dollar amounts are expressed as 2009 dollars of budget authority.) NASA staff indicate that those reserves imply a 65 percent level of confidence that the IOC milestone will be met as planned. However, CBO’s 2004 analysis of the growth of costs in previous NASA programs indicates that the costs that the agency currently foresees for the Ares 1 and Orion programs could rise by 50 percent.2 Accommodating that cost growth would require as much as $7 billion more than NASA has budgeted, CBO estimates. Moreover, if NASA’s total budget grew by no more than 2 percent annually, such cost increases, in CBO’s estimation, would imply a delay of as much as 18 months beyond March 2015 for the vehicles to achieve the IOC milestone. • The five-year gap in U.S. human spaceflight could also increase if delays consistent with past space shuttle missions occurred in launching the remaining missions needed to complete construction of the International Space Station. Such delays could postpone retirement of the shuttle, thereby increasing the funding needed for its operations and, under a constrained total NASA budget, decreasing the funding available to the Constellation Program. A one-year delay in retiring the space shuttle, CBO estimates, would result in a corresponding one-year delay in achieving initial operating capability for Ares 1 and Orion. NASA officials estimate that the probability that the shuttle can complete its 10 remaining missions by September 2010 is between 40 percent and 69 percent; CBO estimates that a delay is more likely and that the probability of carrying out those missions on that timetable is between 20 percent and 60 percent.3 NASA has also stated that if delays occurred that required missions to be flown after September 2010, it might cancel those missions

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An Analysis of NASA’s Plans for Continuing Human Spaceflight…

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•

3

so as not to use funding that would otherwise have been reallocated to the Ares 1 and Orion programs. NASA’s decision to accommodate the $577 million reduction in its 2007 funding by forgoing robotic surface exploration of the moon has the potential to delay the launch of the Constellation Program’s first human lunar missions beyond 2020.

Source: National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Notes: The architecture for the vehicles is as of February 2008. Al-Li = aluminum-lithium; LOx = liquid oxygen; LH2 = liquid hydrogen; RSRB = reusable solid rocket booster. Figure 1. The Ares 1 and Ares 5 Vehicles

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The Constellation Program and NASA’s Budget NASA’s current plans for human spaceflight call for retiring the space shuttle fleet in 2010, after construction of the International Space Station is complete, and achieving an initial operating capability in March 2015 for two of the new spacecraft being developed to return humans to the moon: the Ares 1 crew launch vehicle and the Orion crew exploration vehicle. During the gap between the shuttle fleet’s retirement and the start of flights using the Ares 1 and the Orion, NASA plans to use commercial transportation services and the Russian-operated Soyuz spacecraft to transport cargo and crew members to the space station. The designs for the new vehicles were initially formulated in NASA’s 2005 Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) and have since been refined as development progressed.4 Under NASA’s plan for the Constellation Program, which is drawn from the results of the ESAS, the space agency will first develop the Ares 1 and Orion vehicles. •

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•

The two-stage Ares 1 launch vehicle is based in part on hardware used in the shuttle—specifically, for the Ares 1’s first stage, hardware derived from the shuttle’s reusable solid rocket motor/booster (see Figure 1). The second stage of the Ares 1 is a new design, and it is now under development. The Ares 1 will deliver the Orion crew exploration vehicle into low Earth orbit for human missions to the space station and later to the moon.5 The Orion is made up of a crew module to carry astronauts, a service module containing propulsion and power systems, and a launch abort system that allows the crew to escape unharmed if a launch fails. The Orion’s crew module resembles a larger version of the Apollo spacecraft used in the original U.S. lunar landing program of the 1960s and 1970s.

NASA’s plans to return humans to the moon also require development of the Ares 5 cargo launch vehicle and the Altair lunar lander. The Ares 5, which comprises a core stage and an Earth-departure stage, will also be based in part on hardware from the shuttle. The core stage of the Ares 5 is intended to deliver the Earth-departure stage and the Altair into orbit to rendezvous with the Orion. The Earth-departure stage of the vehicle is designed to propel the Altair and the Orion to the moon. NASA has altered its original plans for the Constellation Program several times since it completed the ESAS. Those changes include the following: •

•

•

The date of the United States’ return to human spaceflight following retirement of the space shuttle has been moved from 2011 to 2015 to ensure sufficient time and budgetary resources for developing the Ares 1 and Orion vehicles. NASA has decreased the diameter of the Orion crew module from 5.5 meters (about 18 feet) to 5.0 meters to reduce the module’s weight but still maintain sufficient room for up to six crew members. The first stage of the Ares 1 will use a five-segment solid rocket motor instead of the four-segment motor used on the space shuttle. That change allows the first stage to carry more propellant and provides more thrust during the launch.

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•

•

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The Ares 1 will use a new J-2X engine for its second stage rather than a modified version of the space shuttle’s main engine.6 That change, which addresses technical and cost issues associated with use of the shuttle engine, also increases the number of elements that the Ares 1 and Ares 5 have in common, thereby reducing development and procurement costs for both programs. (The Ares 5 will also use the J-2X engine in its Earth-departure stage.) NASA will use a common wall between the two tanks of the Ares 1’s upper stage instead of using two independent tanks. That change will reduce the inert weight of the second stage, thereby improving the Ares 1’s performance during launch. NASA has decided that its primary recovery approach for the Orion will be on water rather than on land, as originally planned, a change that will permit a reduction in the Orion’s weight. However, NASA will also maintain an emergency backup capability to recover the Orion on land.

Public Law 110-5, the Revised Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2007, provided funding for NASA’s Constellation Program for that year that was $577 million (in 2007 dollars) less than the Administration had requested. Initially, NASA indicated that the reduction in funding would cause the program’s total costs to increase and significant delays to occur in the first launches of the Ares 1 and the Orion.7 Subsequently, NASA chose to accommodate the reduction and avoid those delays by downsizing its Lunar Precursor Robotic Program (a series of robotic missions to the moon designed to help prepare for future human lunar missions). Cuts to the Lunar Precursor Robotic Program, however, could risk delaying those future human lunar missions, which are currently scheduled by NASA to begin no later than 2020.

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The Gap in U.S. Human Spaceflight Members of the space community have expressed concerns regarding the five-year gap in the United States’ ability to carry out human spaceflight missions between the time of the shuttle’s retirement and NASA’s achievement of initial operating capability for the Ares 1 and Orion systems. Until August 2008, NASA had assessed a 30 percent probability that the Ares 1 and the Orion would achieve initial operating capability in September 2013 if no additional problems were encountered. If, however, $1 billion was added to the agency’s proposed budget for both fiscal year 2009 and 2010, the agency assessed a higher probability—65 percent—of the vehicles’ achieving the IOC milestone in September 2013.8 Now, however, NASA states that initial operating capability for Ares 1 and Orion cannot be achieved by September 2013. However, there is a 50 percent chance that, if no additional problems are encountered, the Ares 1 and Orion vehicles will achieve the IOC milestone in September 2014 and a 65 percent chance of achieving the mile-stone in March 2015. NASA has also stated that at this point in the development process for the two vehicles, additional funding can no longer significantly change either the estimated date for or NASA’s level of confidence about its achievement of the IOC milestone.

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The Constellation Program Within NASA’s Budget NASA provided actual and planned funding for its programs for the years 2007 to 2013 in its 2009 budget request, and CBO used those data (together with information about NASA’s plans beyond 2013) to project budgets for the agency through 2020. CBO assumes, as does NASA, that in general the agency’s overall funding will experience no real growth (that is, no growth after accounting for inflation) beyond 2013—an assumption that also applies to funding for the majority of the components of NASA’s budget. However, CBO’s projection of funding for the Constellation Program beyond 2013 shows real increases—a view consistent with NASA’s plans—as development and operation of the Ares and Orion vehicles proceed. Within NASA’s planned total budget request of about $18 billion annually (in 2009 dollars) between 2007 and 2013, the Constellation Program’s budget ranges from about $3 billion in 2007 to more than $3.5 billion in 2010 and then, in a sharp increase, to roughly $6.5 billion in 2011. By 2013, according to NASA’s plans, the total annual budget for the Constellation Program will be about $7 billion. Beyond 2013, the budget for the program will reach $8 billion in 2016, CBO projects, with additional increases through 2020. The jump in funding between 2010 and 2011 is due to the retirement of the space shuttle fleet and the transfer of that funding to the Constellation Program. (Because of that linkage, a delay in retiring the space shuttle would result in a delay of additional funding to support the Constellation Program, which would affect the timing of development of the Ares 1 and the Orion.) Beyond 2016, according to NASA’s current budget plan, the agency will not support the operations of the International Space Station, and the funds previously allocated for that purpose will be redirected to the Constellation Program. However, NASA thus far has taken no action that would preclude its support of the space station’s operations beyond 2016. Through 2015, projected funding for the Constellation Program will primarily pay for the development of Ares 1 and Orion. As that development nears completion and the vehicles begin operations, funding to develop the Ares 5 cargo launch vehicle and the Altair lunar lander and to support other activities associated with future human lunar missions is projected to increase (see Figure 2).

RISKS TO THE TIMELY COMPLETION OF ARES 1 AND ORION In its budget justification materials for fiscal year 2009, NASA lists several potential problems that could increase the costs and time needed to develop the Ares 1 and the Orion spacecraft. (GAO has identified several similar risks to the successful outcome of the two development programs.)9 Those factors include the following: •

•

An increase during the development process in the mass of the Orion crew exploration vehicle that would exceed the Ares 1’s capability to lift the Orion into low Earth orbit; Excessive thrust oscillations during the burn of the first stage of the Ares 1 that result in excessive vibrations in the Orion crew module;

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(Billions of 2009 dollars)

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on the President’s budget for fiscal year 2009 and data provided by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Notes: Cx = Constellation theme; ISS = International Space Station; COTS = commercial orbital transportation services; Adv. Cap. = Advanced Capabilities. Figure 2. Budget of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2007 to 2020 (Billions of 2009 dollars)

• • •

Performance of the Ares 1 that is less than that required to lift the Orion into low Earth orbit;10 A longer time than planned to develop the J-2X engine needed for the Ares 1’s second stage, which would delay the vehicle’s completion;11 and The inability to develop and fabricate heat shields for the Orion within NASA’s current schedule.

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NASA has plans to mitigate those risks. For example, it has established a mass properties group to study the potential problem with the Orion’s mass and lessen the risk that an excessive increase in its mass poses. However, should NASA’s planned efforts fail to address the potential problems that those risks represent, additional time and funding would be required to develop vehicles that could satisfy NASA’s requirements. In that case, the timing gap between the space shuttle’s retirement and the achievement of initial operating capability for the Ares 1 and Orion would widen. CBO cannot estimate the specific costs and delays that the risks listed above would entail. However, using data on the cost growth associated with past NASA programs, CBO calculated the potential increase in the overall costs to develop the Ares 1 and Orion vehicles. Those historical data indicate that when problems such as those identified by NASA and GAO occur during the development of systems like the Ares 1 and Orion, solving such problems has required additional time and money. NASA’s plans for the two vehicles include allowances of 6 months and almost $7 billion to help ensure—with a probability of 65 percent—that the Ares 1 and the Orion can achieve the IOC milestone by March 2015. (NASA has said that if no additional problems arise, the programs could achieve initial operating capability by September 2014, but its confidence level regarding that date is a lower 50 percent.) CBO expects, on the basis of its analysis of 72 past NASA programs, that cost growth in the Ares 1 and Orion programs will be about 50 percent and that NASA will require as much as $7 billion more than it has budgeted.12 If no real growth occurred in NASA’s overall annual budget, the increase in costs that CBO has projected would also imply as much as an 18-month delay beyond March 2015 in achieving initial operating capability for Ares 1 and Orion. Moreover, under a fixed overall budget for the agency, increases in costs and delays in development schedules for the two vehicles would also hold up funds that NASA plans to use to support lunar exploration, which would in turn interfere with the agency’s goal of returning humans to the moon by 2020. Details of several of the potential problems in the Ares 1 and Orion development programs are described below.

The Margin for Increases in Orion’s Mass An excessive increase in the mass of the Orion vehicle as development proceeds could affect both the costs and the schedule for completing it and the Ares 1. If the Orion is too large, the Ares 1 launch vehicle will be unable to lift it into orbit; in that case, NASA would probably have to redesign both vehicles. Under the ground rules and assumptions laid out in its Exploration Systems Architecture Study, NASA set maximum margins for increases in mass during development: 15 percent for any launch vehicle (such as the Ares 1) and 20 percent for any in-space element (such as the Orion). Data from earlier NASA programs indicate that increases in the mass of systems in such projects during the development stage have ranged from about 8 percent to nearly 55 percent, with a mean across 70 programs of 28.5 percent—a figure greater than NASA’s assumptions about maximum margins in the ESAS.13 Statistical analysis of those data on mass growth in the agency’s programs indicates that NASA should have initially used a mass margin of 32 percent for Orion (a margin associated with a 65 percent level of confidence); it should also

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have had 21 percent of that margin left at the time of the preliminary design review (PDR)— that is, before the start of detailed design work. However, the remaining mass margin dropped to below 2 per-cent, in CBO’s estimation, during the preliminary design stage, notwithstanding the reductions in Orion’s mass that NASA had made since the completion of the ESAS. So, in August 2007, NASA began a complete overhaul of the design for the Orion vehicle to bring the spacecraft’s mass within bounds, and the agency now estimates that mass margins for Orion are greater than 20 percent. However, NASA has delayed its planned achievement of the PDR milestone, shifting it from September 2008 to November 2008. If the agency requires additional changes to reduce the Orion’s mass, they could further affect development costs as well as NASA’s current schedule for both the Ares 1 and the Orion.

Development Risks for the Ares 1

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NASA has identified several problems associated with the Ares 1 that could delay successful development of the vehicle beyond March 2015. Those problems include thrust oscillations during the firing of the first stage that could cause unacceptable structural vibration, the risk that the vehicle will not perform as required, and the possibility that the development schedule for the second-stage J-2X engine will not be met.

Thrust Oscillations The agency’s guideline for vibrational loads on the crew of astronauts in the Orion module is 0.25 g.14 NASA estimates that the effects on the crew of the structural vibration caused by thrust oscillations during the Ares 1’s first stage are, at worst, plus or minus 5 g. The agency is currently working on changes in the design of the vehicle that will add a system at its aft skirt to actively control the oscillations and reduce the vibrational loads on the crew to meet the agency’s guideline. (The aft skirt is on the very bottom of the Ares 1.) However, the modification will reduce the weight of the Ares 1’s payload (that is, the weight of the object or objects it can lift into orbit) by 1,200 to 1,400 pounds. Performance Shortfall NASA has also identified a risk that the Ares 1 vehicle will not be capable of lifting the Orion into low Earth orbit—specifically, if the Orion’s mass increases so much that it cannot be accommodated by changes in the Ares 1. The agency is currently conducting detailed design analyses of the Ares 1 to mitigate that risk. For example, to save weight in the vehicle’s second stage and increase the mass of the payload that the Ares 1 can lift into low Earth orbit, NASA has changed the design of the fuel tanks in the second stage, shifting from two tanks that are completely separate to two tanks that share a common bulkhead. However, the latter design is more difficult to produce and thus could increase the costs and time required to develop the Ares 1. Schedule for Development of the J-2X Engine As the ESAS indicates, NASA had planned to use the space shuttle’s main engine in the second stage of the Ares 1 launch vehicle. It now intends to use the J-2X engine—originally planned only for the Ares 5—on both Ares vehicles to increase the number of common

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components and reduce life-cycle costs (for development, manufacturing, and operations) for both programs. According to NASA’s current plans, development of the J-2X engine will take seven years versus the nine years it took to develop the space shuttle’s main engine. Any delay in developing the J-2X would postpone NASA’s achievement of initial operating capability for both the Ares 1 and the Orion.

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POTENTIAL DELAYS IN COMPLETING THE SPACE STATION AND RETIRING THE SPACE SHUTTLE NASA’s current plans call for retiring the space shuttle in 2010 after the assembly of the International Space Station is completed. NASA’s launch manifest for the space shuttle contains 10 remaining missions (including two “contingency” flights that would transport critical spare parts and supplies to the space station for use in emergency or other situations arising after the shuttle’s retirement).15 After 2010, NASA plans to reallocate funding that had previously been budgeted for the space shuttle’s operations and use it for development of the Ares 1 and Orion vehicles. Thus, in the context of a fixed overall budget for the agency, a delay in retiring the space shuttle would mean a delay in developing the Ares 1 and the Orion. NASA officials estimate (at confidence levels ranging from 40 percent to 69 percent) that the shuttle can complete its 10 remaining missions by September 2010. Those levels were calculated by using NASA’s Manifest Assessment Simulation Tool; CBO’s corresponding estimate shows confidence levels ranging from about 20 percent to about 60 per-cent, depending on the assumed frequency of minor delays (see Figure 3). Thus, there is a substantial probability, in CBO’s view, that the September 2010 target date will not be met. NASA has also stated that if delays occurred that required missions to be flown beyond September 2010, the agency might decide to cancel any remaining missions so as not to use funding that would otherwise have been reallocated to the Ares 1 and Orion programs. To estimate potential delays during the 10 upcoming missions, CBO used the manifest of remaining launches and data on the delays that had occurred during past shuttle missions. The analysis considered both minor delays (those attributable to known but unpredictable causes, such as bad weather) and major delays (those attributable to unforeseen problems that are identified during a mission—such as the foam that was shed from the shuttle Columbia’s external tank and caused the loss of the shuttle). In the case of problems that cause major delays, subsequent missions are postponed until the problem causing the delay is resolved. NASA schedules shuttle launches at a minimum interval of five weeks. For its analysis, CBO used data from previous launches to identify delays that resulted in post-ponements of more than five weeks. In the history of the shuttle program, the probability of a successful launch without a minor delay has been about 94 percent, and the duration of the average delay has been about seven weeks. For missions since the Columbia disaster, the probability of a shuttle launch without a minor delay has been 80 percent (8 out of 10 launches). CBO’s assessment of five major delays (including those following the loss of the Challenger and the Columbia) indicates that the launch schedule for subsequent missions was typically postponed by more than seven months. On the basis of data from the entire shuttle program to date, CBO estimates the probability of a successful launch without a major delay to be 96 percent.

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(Confidence level in percent)

Sources: Congressional Budget Office; National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Note:The figure compares estimated levels of confidence about the date for retirement of the space shuttle fleet, as calculated by CBO and NASA using various assumptions about the probability of delays in scheduled shuttle missions. The top line of the stair-step structure shows CBO’s estimated levels of confidence about the retirement date for the shuttle when the probability of launching a mission without a minor delay is 94 percent; the lower line represents estimates that assume an 80 percent probability of no minor delay. For NASA’s estimates, the top line represents confidence levels derived by using likely-case assumptions from the agency’s Manifest Assessment Simulation Tool; the lower line represents the use of conservative assumptions. Thus, in the case of the 10-mission manifest, the probability that NASA can retire the space shuttle fleet by September 2010 is shown at the dashed vertical line: The probability is between about 20 percent and 60 percent in CBO’s estimation, and between roughly 40 percent and 70 percent in NASA’s estimation. Figure 3. Confidence Estimates for Space Station Completion and Shuttle Fleet Retirement Under Various Mission Manifests (Confidence level in percent)

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To compute the delays that would be expected in completing the shuttle’s remaining missions, CBO simulated the schedule of remaining launches by using a Monte Carlo analysis. For each case in the analysis (each simulation considered a million such cases), randomly drawn numbers determined whether each launch on the manifest was postponed for one or more minor delays. Once each launch occurred in the simulation (except for the final scheduled launch), randomly drawn numbers determined whether the subsequent launch would be postponed seven months because of a major delay. The delay in the space shuttle’s retirement that CBO projected through the simulation is greater when more missions are flown—because there are more opportunities for launches to be delayed (see Figure 3). CBO simulated NASA’s planned launch manifest of 10 missions, a manifest of 8 missions (under which the final two contingency missions are not flown), and an 11-mission manifest that adds a mission to transport the Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer project to the space station. Analysts used two different probabilities for a successful launch without a minor delay: 94 percent (based on the history of the entire shuttle program) and 80 percent (based on the missions flown since the loss of the Columbia). For the 10-mission manifest, the probability that NASA can retire the space shuttle fleet by September 2010, in CBO’s estimation, is between 20 percent and 60 percent. (The lower boundary of that confidence interval results from using the assumption that the probability of launching the shuttle without a minor delay is 80 percent; the higher end of the range derives from the assumption of a 94 percent probability of a minor delay.) CBO estimates confidence intervals in the 60 percent to 70 percent range for the 8-mission manifest and between about 5 percent and 30 percent for the 11-mission manifest.

End Notes

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1

See Government Accountability Office, NASA: Ares 1 and Orion Project Risks and Key Indicators to Measure Progress, GAO-08-186T (April 3, 2008). 2 See Congressional Budget Office, A Budgetary Analysis of NASA’s New Vision for Space Exploration (September 2004). 3 Those confidence levels have been adjusted to take into account the postponement of the servicing mission to repair a malfunction on the Hubble Space Telescope. The levels incorporate the assumption that NASA’s new 10-mission manifest will require the same amount of time to achieve as the manifest in place prior to the postponement, with the first of 10 launches occurring one month later (on November 14 instead of October 14). The effect (if any) on the Ares 1 development program from postponing the Hubble servicing mission currently is not known. (Such an effect would arise from a delay in the availability of launch pad 39B at Kennedy Space Center.) 4 See National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA’s Exploration Systems Architecture Study, NASATM-2005-214062 (November 2005). 5 A low Earth orbit has an altitude of no more than 800 kilometers above the Earth’s surface. 6 Using the shuttle’s main engine for the Ares 1 would have required changes in design to allow for ignition at high altitudes instead of at sea level, which is where the engine on the space shuttle is started. Furthermore, NASA anticipated that it would have to change the engine’s design to make it more cost-effective as a disposable engine for the Ares 1 instead of the reusable version in place on the shuttle. 7 See the statement of Michael Griffin, NASA Administrator, before the House Committee on Science and Technology, March 15, 2007. 8 See F. Morring Jr., “Bipartisan Blueprint: Congress Sending a Message to Next President on Space,” Aviation Week and Space Technology (May 26, 2008). 9 See Government Accountability Office, NASA: Ares 1 and Orion Project Risks. 10 To date, the Ares 1 program has met the targets set for the vehicle’s performance. But the Ares 1 has only a limited potential for expansion and risks being unable to provide the greater lift capability that could be required as designs for it and the Orion evolve and become final.

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The design of the new J-2X engine is based on the J-2 and J-2S engines used on the Saturn V launch vehicle developed during the original U.S. lunar landing program of the 1960s and 1970s. 12 See Congressional Budget Office, A Budgetary Analysis of NASA’s New Vision for Space Exploration. 13 See A.W. Wilhite and others, “Evaluating the Impacts of Mass Uncertainty on Future Exploration Architectures,” in Space 2006 Conference Proceedings, 4 vols., AIAA 2006-7250 (Reston, Va.: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, September 2006). 14 One g equals approximately 9.8 meters per second squared acceleration—or roughly the gravitational acceleration that an object would experience at the Earth’s surface. 15 Until the loss of the shuttle Columbia, NASA had planned more missions before retiring the space shuttle fleet, but after that disaster, the number of shuttle missions was reduced. (Included among the missions that were cut was transport of the Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer—a space-borne particle physics experiment designed to search for and measure unusual types of matter—to the International Space Station.)

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In: Exploring the Final Frontier: Issues, Plans and Funding … ISBN: 978-1-60876-080-0 Editor: Dillon S. Maguire © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 2

THE BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS OF NASA'S CURRENT PLANS FOR SPACE EXPLORATION ∗

Congressional Budget Office

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SUMMARY In 2004, President Bush announced his “Vision for U.S. Space Exploration,” which called for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to develop new vehicles for spaceflight that would allow humans to return to the moon by 2020. In response, NASA restructured its plans to achieve that objective, and in September 2004, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) published a budgetary analysis of NASA’s new plans.1 This report updates that analysis, incorporating elements of NASA’s plans that had not been established in 2004. To meet the goal set by the President, NASA reduced its planned budgets supporting science and research in aeronautics by more than 40 percent and made plans to complete construction of the International Space Station and retire the space shuttle by 2010. Using about $100 billion of potential funding through 2020 made available by those changes, NASA began developing new vehicles for human spaceflight in what the agency calls its Constellation program. Two of those vehicles—the Ares 1 crew launch vehicle and the Orion crew exploration vehicle—are to achieve “initial operating capability” by March 2015. At that point, the vehicles should be capable of carrying a crew of astronauts to the International Space Station. NASA is also developing additional vehicles and systems—including the Ares 5 cargo launch vehicle and the Altair lunar lander—that are needed to return humans to the moon.2 According to NASA, its current plans will require an average of $19.1 billion of funding annually from 2010 through 2025, with the Constellation program accounting for about half of the total by 2017. Under its current plans, the agency also intends to conduct 79 new ∗

This is an edited, reformatted and augmented version of a Congressional Budget Office publication dated April 2009.

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robotic science missions through 2025, requiring funding of $4.7 billion annually, and to perform aeronautics research, at a cost of about $460 million annually.

Table 1. Budgets and Schedules for NASA’s Plans and Alternative Scenarios

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NASA's Plans

Average Annual Funding, 2010 to 2025 (Billions of 2009 dollars) 19.1

Ares 1's and Orion's IOC

Humans' Return to the Moon

No. of Science Missions Through 2025

March 2015

2020

Space Shuttle's Retirement

End of Support for ISS

79

September 2010

December 2015

Scenario 1: Keep Funding Fixed and Allow Schedules to Slip Scenario 2: Execute NASA's Current Plans and Extend Operation of the Shuttle and Space Station

19.1

Late 2016

2023

64

September 2010

December 2015

23.8

March 2015

2020

79

March 2015

December 2020

Scenario 3: Achieve the Constellation Program's Schedule and Allow the Science Schedule to Slip Scenario 4: Absorb Cost Growth to Achieve Constellation's Schedule by Reducing Funding for Science and Aeronautics

21.1

March 2015

2020

64

September 2010

December 2015

19.1

March 2015

2020

44

September 2010

December 2015

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2009 and data provided by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Notes: IOC = initial operating capability; ISS = International Space Station. All scenarios incorporate cost growth for the affected programs that averages 50 percent, which is the amount that occurred for 72 of NASA’s past programs.

CBO’s analysis considers four alternatives to NASA’s current plans, accounting for the possibility of cost growth like what has happened in the past: •

•

If NASA’s funding was maintained at $19.1 billion annually and the agency realized cost growth in its programs consistent with the average for 72 of its past programs, its planned schedules for spaceflight programs would be delayed. In particular, the initial operating capability for Ares 1 and Orion would be pushed to late 2016, the return of humans to the moon would slip to 2023, and 15 of 79 science missions would be delayed beyond 2025. The space shuttle would be retired in 2010 and support for the Internation Space Station would end after 2015. If NASA’s funding was increased to about $23.8 billion annually, the agency would be able to meet its planned schedules notwithstanding cost growth consistent with the average for its past programs. Furthermore, that increase in its budgets would allow

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•

•

17

NASA to extend the operation of the space shuttle to 2015 and to support the operation of the International Space Station to 2020. Between those two alternatives, if NASA’s funding was increased to about $21.1 billion annually, the agency would be able to meet its planned schedules for the Constellation program even if cost growth was consistent with the average for past programs. But that amount of funding would not permit NASA to fly the space shuttle beyond 2010 or to support the space station beyond 2015. Moreover, under this budgetary scenario, 15 of the planned science missions would be delayed past 2025. Finally, if NASA’s funding was maintained at $19.1 billion annually and the agency reduced funding for science and research in aeronautics to cover cost growth in the Constellation program, it could conduct 44 science missions (35 fewer than planned) by 2025, and the cut to aeronautics research would be more than one-third.

Table 1 encapsulates NASA’s plans and summarizes those scenarios.

NASA’s Current Plans

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According to NASA, its plans for conducting human and robotic spaceflight and supporting science and research in aeronautics from 2010 to 2025 will require funding averaging $19.1 billion annually.3 About 80 percent of the funding for NASA’s activities is distributed across the agency’s four mission directorates: Exploration Systems, Space Operations, Science, and Aeronautics Research. The remaining 20 percent is in accounts funding crossagency support, education, and its inspector general (see Figure 1 and Table 2).

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2009 and data provided by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Note: NASA received stimulus funding in February 2009 under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. Figure 1. Projected Funding for NASA’s Plans

NASA plans to more than double the annual budget for the Exploration Systems mission directorate between 2010 and 2025, from $3.7 billion to over $10 billion. More than 90 Exploring the Final Frontier - Issues, Plans and Funding for NASA : Issues, Plans and Funding for NASA, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated,

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percent of the directorate’s budget will be devoted to the Constellation program––to develop and then operate new human exploration vehicles, including the Ares 1 crew launch vehicle, Orion crew exploration vehicle, Ares 5 cargo launch vehicle, and Altair lunar lander.4 NASA’s current plans provide for the initial operating capability of Ares 1 and Orion by March 2015, at which point those vehicles will be able to conduct missions to the International Space Station. The agency also plans to complete development of the Ares 5 cargo launch vehicle and Altair lunar lander in time to return humans to the moon in 2020. Table 2. Projected Average Annual Funding for NASA’s Plans

(Billions of 2009 dollars)

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Directorate or Function

20102013

20142017

20182021

20222025

20102025

Exploration Systems

6.2

8.5

9.8

10.0

8.7

Space Operations

3.6

1.8

0.7

0.7

1.7

Science

4.5

4.7

4.8

4.9

4.7

Aeronautics Research

0.4

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

Cross-Agency Support, Education, and IG Total

3.5

3.6

3.7

3.8

3.6

18.2

19.1

19.5

19.8

19.1

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2009 and data provided by the National data provided by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Note: IG = inspector general.

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data provided by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Note: IOC =initial operating capability; ISS = International Space Station. Figure 2. Projected Schedules for NASA’s Plans

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In conjunction with increases in funding for the Constellation program, NASA plans substantial decreases in the annual budgets for the Space Operations mission directorate. Between 2010 and 2025, the agency plans to decrease annual funding for the directorate from $5.8 billion to $0.7 billion. Through that directorate, NASA pays for the operation of the space shuttle and the International Space Station along with associated support activities. According to the agency’s plans, the space shuttle will be retired in September 2010, once construction of the space station is complete, freeing up funds that will be shifted to the Constellation program.5 In addition, according to plans, funding for the space station’s operations will cease after December 2015, freeing up additional funds to shift to the Constellation program.6 For the Science directorate and the Aeronautics Research directorate, NASA intends essentially constant annual budgets from 2010 to 2025, at $4.7 billion and $460 million, respectively. The Science directorate develops hardware for and carries out robotic missions in four primary areas: earth science, planetary science, astrophysics, and heliophysics. Through 2025, NASA intends to conduct 79 such missions investigating the Earth, the solar system, the universe, and the sun, along with performing other science-related research activities in areas such as weather and climate change. The Aeronautics Research directorate performs its work in four categories: aviation safety, airspace systems, fundamental aeronautics, and aeronautics testing. (Figure 2 summarizes NASA’s plans.)7 NASA also intends essentially constant annual budgets from 2010 to 2025 for crossagency support activities ($3.5 billion), education ($120 million), and its inspector general ($39 million). The accounts for cross-agency support provide funding for the agency’s management and operations and its nine field research and spaceflight centers throughout the United States, as well as maintenance of NASA’s infrastructure. In February 2009, NASA received an additional $1 billion in funding under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. The legislation directed the agency to use the funding for exploration ($400 million), science ($400 million), aeronautics research ($150 million), and cross-agency support ($50 million).8

EXPECTED COST GROWTH IN NASA’S PROGRAMS AND ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS On the basis of the cost growth that has occurred in the past, CBO’s analysis indicates that the costs of NASA’s development programs could grow by 50 percent, on average. That analysis examined the performance of 72 of the agency’s past programs—65 percent of which experienced less than 50 percent cost growth and 35 percent of which experienced more (see Box 1). 9 NASA’s budgetary plans include reserves in the agency’s development programs that would allow cost growth of about 25 percent to be accommodated.10 Because of the likelihood that NASA will not meets its planned schedules if funded at its current level, CBO considered four alternative scenarios. Under those scenarios, CBO estimated what would happen to the schedules given the current funding and what amounts of additional funding would be required to accomplish all of the plans on schedule and to accomplish some of them.

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BOX 1. GROWTH IN THE COSTS OF NASA’S PAST PROGRAMS The Congressional Budget Office (CB O) based its projections of cost growth for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) development programs on an analysis of the agency’s past programs. In the 2004 study that this paper updates, CBO analyzed 72 of NASA’s programs.1 Using the earliest available estimate generated by NASA for a program’s cost and the program’s final actual cost, CBO computed the percentage cost growth (adjusted for inflation) that each program realized. The range for the 72 programs spanned a low of a 25 percent cost reduction to a high of more than 250 percent cost growth (see the figure). The average cost growth for the 72 programs all together was about 50 percent—with 65 percent of them below that amount and 35 percent above—and 20 percent of the projects experienced cost growth of 90 percent or more.

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Source: Congressional Budget Office. Cost Growth For 72 of Nasa’s Programs (Percentage of Cost Growth) 1.See Congressional Budget Office, A Budgetary Analysis of NASA’s New Vision for Space Exploration (September 2004).

Scenario 1: Keep Funding Fixed and Allow Schedules to Slip If funding remained fixed, cost growth in NASA’s spaceflight programs would cause planned schedules to be delayed. Cost growth averaging 50 percent would be about twice the planned reserves, and delays would occur if the agency did not seek and receive additional funding from the Congress. By CBO’s projections, with such cost growth and fixed annual budgets for the Constellation program, the initial operating capability for Ares 1 and Orion would be delayed from March 2015 to late 2016, and the first mission to return humans to the moon would be delayed from 2020 to 2023 (see Figure 3). CBO derived those estimates by factoring in historical cost growth and then gauging when annual budgets would provide sufficient funding. If the programs experienced greater cost growth, their milestones would be

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delayed even more. Some of NASA’s ongoing programs, such as the Mars Science Laboratory, have already experienced cost growth greater than 50 percent.11 If funding remained fixed and historical cost growth occurred for NASA’s science missions, 15 fewer such missions could occur through 2025 than what NASA has planned. CBO derived that estimate by applying 50 percent cost growth to the 72 percent of the Science mission directorate’s budget that is used to develop hardware for science missions.12 CBO did not project cost growth in the Space Operations and Aeronautics Research directorates because the development of new spacecraft and other hardware is not a major part of the activities funded through those directorates. Finally, for this scenario, CBO assumed that NASA would forgo any missions on the space shuttle’s launch manifest that did not occur by the September 30, 2010.

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data provided by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Notes: IOC = initial operating capability; ISS = International Space Station. The scenario incorporates cost growth that averages 50 percent, which is the amount that occurred for 72 of NASA’s past programs. Figure 3. Effects on NASA’s Plans Under Scenario 1: Keep Funding Fixed and Allow Schedules to Slip

Scenario 2: Execute NASA’s Current Plans and Extend Operation of the Shuttle and Space Station In analyzing NASA’s plans, CBO estimated the additional funding that would be required under a scenario that addresses cost growth in development programs conducted within the agency’s Exploration Systems and Science mission directorates and that funds changes to NASA’s plans that various industry experts have discussed. The changes that CBO considered include extending the operation of the space shuttle to 2015 to eliminate the gap between its retirement and the availability of Ares 1 and Orion; extending support for the International Space Station by five years, allowing its continued use for experimentation, to December 2020; and fully funding investments in infrastructure, allowing NASA to perform the full amount of maintenance that the agency states is needed for its facilities. To cover all

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Congressional Budget Office

of the additional activities considered, NASA would require, by CB O’s estimates, annual budgets averaging about $23.8 billion, or about 25 percent more than under its current plans (see Figure 4). In particular, cost growth for the spacecraft developed under the Constellation program within the Exploration Systems mission directorate would require additional funding of about $1.0 billion in 2010 and amounts rising to about $2.7 billion by 2020, CBO estimates. Those estimates assume that the development programs in the Constellation program would experience average cost growth of 50 percent and that it would be partially addressed by the 25 percent reserve funds that NASA says are included in planned budgets. Similarly, cost growth for spacecraft development programs conducted by the Science mission directorate would require additional funding of about $700 million annually between 2010 and 2025, CBO projects.13

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(Billions of 2009 dollars)

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2009 and data provided by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Note: NASA received stimulus funding in February 2009 under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. a. Under this scenario, NASA’s support for the International Space Station (ISS) would extend until 2020. Figure 4. Projected Funding Under Scenario 2: Execute NASA’s Current Plans and Extend Operation of the Shuttle and Space Station

CBO’s projections for this scenario also include annual funding of about $2.5 billion for activities not included in NASA’s current plans. In particular, there has been discussion (in the press and by observers of the U.S. space program) of extending the space shuttle’s operations to 2015 to eliminate the gap in the United States’ ability to conduct human spaceflight between the shuttle’s retirement and the initial operating capability of Ares 1 and

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23

Orion. CBO projects, on the basis of data provided by NASA, that the agency would require an additional $3.3 billion annually from 2011 to 2015 to fly the space shuttle to the International Space Station three times each year. (Any missions currently on the space shuttle’s launch manifest that were not conducted by September 30, 2010, probably would be the first of those missions.) Under this scenario, once the Ares 1 and Orion vehicles achieved their initial operating capability in 2015, the space shuttle would be retired without a gap in NASA’s capability to conduct human spaceflight (see Figure 5).14

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data provided by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Notes: IOC =initial operating capability; ISS = International Space Station. The scenario incorporates cost growth that averages 50 percent, which is the amount that occurred for 72 of NASA’s past programs.

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Figure 5. Effects of Scenario 2: Execute NASA’s Current Plans and Extend Operation of the Shuttle and Space Station

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data provided by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Notes: IOC =initial operating capability; ISS = International Space Station. The scenario incorporates cost growth that averages 50 percent, which is the amount that occurred for 72 of NASA’s past programs. Figure 6. Effects of Scenario 3: Achieve the Constellation Progam’s Schedule and Allow the Science Schedule to Slip

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Congressional Budget Office (Billions of 2009 dollars)

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2009 and data provided by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Note: NASA received stimulus funding in February 2009 under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.

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Figure 7. Projected Funding Under Scenario 4: Absorb Cost Growth to Achieve Constellation’s Schedule by Reducing Funding for Science and Aeronautics

Continued operation of the space shuttle could affect the schedule on which the Constellation program could be executed even if additional funding was provided to NASA. In particular, continued use of both launchpads 39A and 39B at the Kennedy Space Center, at Cape Canaveral, Florida, could delay testing of the Ares 1 and Ares 5 launch vehicles because those launchpads need to be modified for that purpose. A test flight for Ares 1 has already been delayed because NASA has had to retain the use of both launchpads for the shuttle for a mission planned for May 2009 to service the Hubble space telescope; after that mission, modifications to launchpad 39B for use with Ares 1 can be completed.15 But modifications to launchpad 39A for use with Ares 5 can be completed only after the end of the shuttle’s operations. Therefore, extending those to 2015 using launchpad 39A could delay the development of Ares 5 and, in turn, the return of humans to the moon. Some industry experts have also recommended that NASA continue to support the International Space Station until December 2020 instead of ending that support after December 2015.16 To accomplish that extension, NASA would require additional funding averaging about $1.4 billion annually from 2016 to 2020, according to CBO’s projections based on data provided by the agency. Finally, part of the $23.8 billion required each year under this scenario would be an additional $450 million that, by CBO’s projections, would be required to fully fund NASA’s estimates of required maintenance of and upgrades to its facilities.

Scenario 3: Achieve the Constellation Program’s Schedule and Allow the Science Schedule to Slip CBO also estimated the additional funding that would be required under a scenario in which NASA seeks increased budgets to accommodate cost growth (at the historical average)

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for only the spacecraft development activities conducted within the Constellation program. In this scenario, CBO did not include funding for cost growth in the Science mission directorate, nor for the additional projects included in the previous scenario. According to CBO’s projections, under this scenario NASA would require, on average, $21.1 billion annually, or an increase of about 10 percent relative to the amount needed for its current plans (with NASA’s 25 percent reserves taken into account). The additional funding needed to accommodate cost growth in the Constellation program would be about $1 billion in 2010 and would grow to about $2.7 billion in 2025. Under this scenario, because no additional funds would be included to accommodate projected cost growth for the Science mission directorate, 15 fewer of its missions could be conducted by 2025 (if they faced cost growth at the historical average) (see Figure 6). Furthermore, additional funds to extend operation of the space shuttle and support of the space station would not be available under this scenario, and CBO assumed that NASA would forgo any of the shuttle’s planned missions that did not occur by September 30, 2010.

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Scenario 4: Absorb Cost Growth to Achieve Constellation’s Schedule by Reducing Funding for Science and Aeronautics

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data provided by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Notes: IOC =initial operating capability; ISS = International Space Station. The scenario incorporates cost growth that averages 50 percent, which is the amount that occurred for 72 of NASA’s past programs. Figure 8. Effects of Scenario 4: Absorb Cost Growth to Achieve Constellation’s Schedule by Reducing Funding for Science and Aeronautics

As a final scenario, CBO considered the budgetary impact of NASA’s choosing to accommodate cost growth in the Constellation program by reducing its budgets for the Science and Aeronautics Research mission directorates. In this scenario, NASA’s total funding would remain at $19.1 billion annually, but the agency would reduce the budgets for those two directorates by about $1 billion in 2010 and by amounts growing to about $2.7 billion in 2025 (see Figure 7).17 Reductions in funding for science would be about $900 million in 2010 and would rise to about $2.4 billion by 2020. Such reductions would result in

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Congressional Budget Office

35 fewer missions through 2025 than under NASA’s current plans (see Figure 8). Reductions in funding for aeronautics research would be about $100 million in 2010 and would rise to $270 million by 2020.18 For this scenario, CBO also assumes that NASA would forgo any of the planned missions for the space shuttle that did not occur by the end of September 2010. Table 3. Projected Average Annual Funding for NASA Under Alternative Scenarios (Billions of 2009 dollars)

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20102014201820222013 2017 2021 2025 Scenario 2: Execute NASA's Current Plans and Extend Operation of the Shuttle and Space Station

20102025

NASA's Plans Cost Growth for Exploration Extension of Space Shuttle to 2015 Extension of Support for Space Station to 2020 Cost Growth for Science Fully Funded Maintenance and Upgrades to Facilities

18.2 +1.1

19.1 +1.8

19.5 +2.1

19.8 +2.7

19.1 +1.9

+2.5

+1.7

0

0

+1.0

0

+0.8

+1.2

+0.1

+0.5

+0.6

+0.7

+0.7

+0.7

+0.7

+0.4

+0.4

+0.4

+0.4

+0.4

Total

23.0 24.5 23.9 23.7 20102014201820222013 2017 2021 2025 Scenario 3: Achieve the Constellation Program's Schedule and Allow Science Schedule to Slip

23.8 20102025

NASA's Plans Cost Growth for Exploration Total

18.2 +1.1

19.8 +2.7

19.1 +1.9

20.9 21.6 22.5 Scenario 4: Absorb Cost Growth to Achieve Constellation's Schedule by Reducing Funding for Science and Aeronautics

21.1

NASA's Plans Cost Growth for Exploration Cuts in the Science Directorate Cuts in the Aeronautics Research Directorate

18.2 +1.1

19.1 +1.8

19.5 +2.1

19.8 +2.7

19.1 +1.9

-1.0

-1.7

-1.9

-2.4

-1.7

-0.1

-0.2

-0.2

-0.3

-0.2

Total

18.2

19.1

19.5

19.8

19.1

19.1 +1.8

19.5 +2.1

19.3

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2009 and data provided by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).

Table 3 summarizes the funding changes that would occur under the scenarios CBO considered.

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Comparison of the Constellation and Apollo Programs In its September 2004 study of NASA’s vision for space exploration, CBO compared NASA’s estimates of the costs of the Constellation program with the costs of the Apollo program and of other proposals for human exploration of the moon. Here, CBO updates those comparisons using NASA’s current estimates of the costs of the Constellation program. The Constellation program plans to develop capabilities greater than those developed under the Apollo program. In particular, the Constellation program will eventually develop systems capable of performing not just the relatively short-duration mission to the moon conducted under the Apollo program but operation of a lunar outpost for relatively long periods of time. Consequently, for the purpose of a like comparison of the Constellation and Apollo programs, CBO excluded funding for activities in the Constellation program not associated with a short-duration mission to the moon.

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(Billions of 2009 dollars)

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2009 and data provided by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Notes: The top portion of each bar represents CBO’s projected cost growth above NASA’s estimates. For the Apollo program, actual costs are shown. For details on the estimates for the FLO, LUNOX, and Apollo programs and the SEI, see Congressional Budget Office, A Budgetary Analysis of NASA’s New Vision for Space Exploration (September 2004). Figure 9. Comparison of the Constellation, Apollo, and Other Programs

CBO also compared funding for the Constellation program with the costs estimated by NASA to conduct other human lunar missions that the agency considered, including the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI), the Lunar Oxygen (LUNOX) program, and the First Lunar Outpost (FLO) program. NASA proposed the SEI in 1989; the initiative consisted of three components: returning humans to the moon, establishing a lunar outpost, and sending astronauts to Mars. NASA proposed the FLO program in 1992; it consisted of a mission to return humans to the moon and provide a lunar habitat module delivered by a robotic lander. NASA proposed the LUNOX program in 1993; it consisted of a mission to return humans to the moon but sought to reduce costs by producing liquid oxygen on the moon, thereby

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Congressional Budget Office

reducing the size and cost of the launch vehicle. In all cases, CBO’s comparison includes only the costs for systems needed to return humans to the moon for a short stay. According to NASA’s current plans for the Constellation program, the agency would require $92 billion in funding to return humans to the moon in 2020. If 50 percent cost growth occurred, that figure would rise to $110 billion. Those costs can be compared with the analogous estimates provided in CBO’s September 2004 analysis of the Constellation program as it was envisioned then ($40 billion to $57 billion), the Apollo program ($110 billion), the SEI ($83 billion to $120 billion), the LUNOX program ($40 billion to $57 billion), and the FLO program ($26 billion to $38 billion) (see Figure 9).19 The lower values in the ranges reflect NASA’s estimates, and the higher values reflect figures incorporating about 50 percent growth in costs. The smaller range that currently exists for the Constellation program results from the fact that NASA now explicitly incorporates in its plans reserves that would accommodate 25 percent cost growth.

APPENDIX: DETAILS OF NASA’S PLANS, BY DIRECTORATE AND FUNCTION The National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) budget is divided into seven accounts: one for each of the agency’s four mission directorates—Exploration Systems, Space Operations, Science, and Aeronautics Research—and one each for cross-agency support, education, and its inspector general.

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Exploration Systems Mission Directorate The Exploration Systems mission directorate is responsible for developing NASA’s new human spaceflight vehicles to conduct missions to the moon, Mars, and other destinations. In the near term, NASA’s Constellation program is developing the Ares 1 crew launch vehicle and the Orion crew exploration vehicle along with required ground support, infrastructure, and mission operations. Later, the agency will develop the Ares 5 cargo launch vehicle and the Altair lunar lander. For missions to the moon, Ares 1 will boost Orion into low-Earth orbit, and Ares 5 will do the same for Altair; Orion will then rendezvous with Ares 5 and Altair, and Ares 5 will make use of what is termed its earth departure stage to propel the two crew vehicles to the moon. In NASA’s plans, Ares 1 and Orion will achieve their initial operating capability by March 2015. At that time, they will be used for missions to the International Space Station. Ares 5 and Altair will reach their initial operating capability by 2020 for humans’ return to the moon. Beyond 2020, the agency’s plans call for the establishment of a lunar outpost that will be a proving ground for human exploration of Mars. Under NASA’s plans, the budgets for the Exploration Systems mission directorate increase from about $3.5 billion in 2009 to over $10 billion by 2017. The increases arise as a result of plans to retire the space shuttle after September 2010 and plans to end support for the space station after December 2015. In 2009, funding primarily supports the development of Ares 1 ($1.0 billion) and Orion ($1.1 billion), along with associated ground and mission operations systems. For Ares 1, planned funding reaches a peak of about $2.0 billion in 2011

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and levels off at about $1.0 billion by 2015, once development is complete and regular operations begin. Similarly, for Orion, planned funding peaks at around $1.7 billion in 2011 and levels off at about $0.7 billion by 2015. For Ares 5, planned funding starts at $0.4 billion in 2011, peaks at $1.9 billion in 2017, and levels off at $1.4 billion beginning in 2021. For Altair, planned funding starts at $0.1 billion in 2011, peaks at $1.1 billion in 2016, and levels off at $0.9 billion by 2019. At some point, NASA plans to shift funding for opera tion of the Constellation program vehicles back to the Space Operations mission directorate, but the agency has not yet stated when that change will occur.20

Space Operations Mission Directorate

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(Billions of 2009 dollars)

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2009 and data provided by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Note: NASA received stimulus funding in February 2009 under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. a. Funding for projects to spur private industry to provide transportation to the International Space Station. b. Funding for programs to, among other things, develop new technologies for space exploration and further understanding of the effects of space on human performance. c. Within the Constellation program. d. Funding for space communications and navigation, civil space launch services, rocket propulsion testing, and the health and safety of crews. Figure A-1. Planned Budgets for the Exploration Systems and the Space Operations Mission Directorates

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The Space Operations mission directorate conducts the operation of the space shuttle and the International Space Station, along with other activities. Over the 2010–2025 period, the planned funding for the directorate decreases substantially. In 2010, total planned funding for space operations is about $5.8 billion. The funding drops to $2.8 billion in 2011 because of the retirement of the space shuttle. NASA’s current plans call for retiring the space shuttle no later than September 30, 2010, but experience suggests that the agency may not be able to complete all of the missions on the space shuttle’s launch manifest by that date.21 NASA officials have indicated that any missions that cannot be conducted by that time could be canceled so that funding can be shifted to the Constellation program in 2011, as planned. Table A-1. Projected Average Annual Funding for the Exploration Systems and the Space Operations Mission Directorates (Billions of 2009 dollars)

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2010-2013

Advanced Capabilitiesa Orionb Ares 1b Ares 5b Reserves Program Integration, Operations, Otherb Altairb Lunar Surface Systemsb Total

0.5 1.4 1.6 0.6 1.1 0.7

Space Shuttle International Space Station Space and Flight Supportc Total

0.8 2.2 0.6 3.6

0.2 0 6.2

2014-2017

2018-2021

Exploration Systems 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.6 1.0 0.9 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.7 2.0 1.8 1.0 0.9 0.2 1.8 8.5 9.8 Space Operations 0 0 1.2 0 0.6 0.6 1.8 0.7

20222025

20102025

0.6 0.7 1.1 1.4 1.4 2.0

0.6 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.6

0.9 2.1 10.0

0.7 1.0 8.7

0 0 0.7 0.7

0.2 0.8 0.6 1.7

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on Budget of the United States, Fiscal Year 2009 and data provided by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). a. Funding for programs to, among other things, develop new technologies for space exploration and further understanding of the effects of space on human performance. b. Within the Constellation program. c. Funding for space communications and navigation, civil space launch services, rocket propulsion testing, and the health and safety of crews.

The funding for the directorate drops further in 2016 and 2017, as support for the space station ends. By 2018, the planned annual funding falls to about $0.7 billion, for activities in four categories: space communications and navigation (about $500 million), launch services (about $85 million), testing of rocket propulsion (about $45 million), and the health and safety of crews (less than $9 million). See Figure A-1 and Table A-1 for depictions of the plans for the Exploration Systems mission directorate and the Space Operations mission directorate.

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Science Mission Directorate NASA’s Science mission directorate is responsible for developing systems for conducting scientific exploration in four categories, or “themes”: Earth science, planetary science, astrophysics, and heliophysics. •

•

•

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•

In pursuing earth science, NASA conducts missions to “study Earth from space to dvance scientific understanding and meet societal needs.” Examples of missions of this type include the Ocean Surface Topography Mission, the Aquarius satellite to measure salinity at oceans’ surfaces, and the Glory satellite for climate and atmospheric research. Missions in planetary science are to “advance scientific knowledge of the origin and history of the solar system, the potential for life elsewhere, and the hazards and resources present as humans explore space.” Examples of missions include the Dawn mission to Ceres and Vesta in the asteroid belt, the Juno New Frontiers Mission to Jupiter, the Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory Discovery mission to the moon to determine the structure of the moon from its crust to its core, and the Mars Science Laboratory. Missions in astrophysics are to “discover the origin, structure, evolution, and destiny of the universe, and search for Earth-like planets.” Examples of such missions include the Fermi gamma ray observatory, the Kepler exoplanet exploration mission, and the James Webb space telescope. In heliophysics, NASA conducts missions to “understand the Sun and its effects on Earth and the solar system.” Examples include the Solar Dynamics Observatory; the Radiation Belt Storm Probes mission to study Earth’s radiation belts, ionosphere, and thermosphere to better understand the sun’s influence on Earth; and the Interstellar Boundary Explorer to detect the edge of the solar system.

The planned funding for the Science mission directorate is about $4.7 billion annually between 2010 and 2025. NASA intends to apportion the planned budgets thus annually: $1.3 billion for Earth science, $1.6 billion for planetary science, $1.1 billion for astrophysics, and $0.7 billion for heliophysics.

Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate The Aeronautics Research mission directorate performs basic research through four programs devoted to aviation safety, airspace systems, fundamental aeronautics, and aeronautics testing: • •

The aviation safety program performs research to improve the “intrinsic safety attributes of current and future air vehicles.” The airspace systems program performs research on managing air traffic, focusing on the Next Generation (NextGen) Air Transportation System.

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Congressional Budget Office •

•

The fundamental aeronautics program performs long-term research in four types of flight: subsonic for rotary-wing aircraft, subsonic for fixed-wing aircraft, supersonic, and hypersonic. The aeronautics testing program manages the agency’s ground and flight test assets, including wind tunnels, propulsion testing facilities, and test aircraft.

The planned funding for the directorate is about $460 million annually between 2010 and 2025. Of that amount, $66 million is for aviation safety, $77 million for airspace systems, $240 million for fundamental aeronautics, and $78 million for aeronautics testing. See Figure A-2 and Table A-2 for depictions of the plans for the Science mission directorate and the Aeronautics Research mission directorate.

Cross-Agency Support, Education, and Inspector General The remaining accounts of NASA’s budget are for cross-agency support, education, and the agency’s inspector general.

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(Billions of 2009 dollars)

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2009 and data provided by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Note: NASA received stimulus funding in February 2009 as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. Figure A-2. Planned Budgets for the Science and the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorates

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Table A-2. Projected Average Annual Funding for the Science and the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorates (Billions of 2009 dollars) (Billions of 2009 dollars) 20102013

20142017

Earth Science Planetary Science Astrophysics Heliophysics Total

1.3 1.5 1.1 0.7 4.5

1.3 1.6 1.1 0.7 4.7

Aviation Safety Airspace Systems Fundamental Aeronautics Aeronautics Testing Total

0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.4

0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.5

20182021

20222025

Science 1.3 1.6 1.1 0.8 4.8 Aeronautics Research 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.5

20102025

1.3 1.6 1.1 0.8 4.9

1.3 1.6 1.1 0.7 4.7

0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.5

0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.5

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2009 and data provided by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).

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Planned funding for cross-agency support averages $3.5 billion annually from 2010 to 2025. Such support falls into three categories: management and operation of field centers ($2.2 billion), management and operation of the agency otherwise ($1.0 billion), and what the agency terms institutional investments ($0.3 billion). The nine field centers are: • • • • • • • • •

Ames Research Center, near San Francisco, California; Dryden Flight Research Center, at Edwards Air Force Base, California; Glenn Research Center, in Cleveland, Ohio; Goddard Space Flight Center, in Maryland, outside Washington, D.C.; Johnson Space Center, in Houston, Texas; Kennedy Space Center, at Cape Canaveral, Florida; Langley Research Center, near Norfolk, Virginia; Marshall Space Flight Center, in Huntsville, Alabama; and Stennis Space Center, in Mississippi, near New Orleans, Louisiana.

The funding for field centers covers a range of activities, including facility operations and maintenance, security, environmental management, safety services, information technology, management, legal services, work promoting equal employment opportunity, public affairs, procurement and financial services, and human resources services. The funding does not, however, cover project-specific technical work conducted at the centers; that work is funded by the mission directorates. Funding for management and operation of the agency otherwise covers, among other things, those activities for NASA headquarters and agencywide safety activities. Under the category of institutional investments, NASA funds construction, repair, rehabilitation, and modification of the agency’s basic facilities that are not associated with specific projects by the mission directorates.

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Congressional Budget Office Table A-3. Projected Average Annual Funding for NASA’s Cross-Agency Support (Billions of 2009 dollars)

Center Management and Operations Agency Management and Operations Institutional Investmentsa Total

20102013

20142017

2.1 0.9 0.3 3.3

2.2 0.9 0.3 3.5

2018- 20222021 2025 2.2 1.0 0.3 3.5

2.3 1.0 0.3 3.6

20102025 2.2 1.0 0.3 3.5

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2009 and data provided by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Note: For the 2010–2025 period, planned funding for education averages $120 million and for NASA’s inspector general, $39 million. a. NASA’s phrase “institutional investments” refers to the maintenance of and upgrades to its facilities that are not associated with specific projects by the mission directorates.

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(Billions of 2009 dollars)

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2009 and data provided by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Notes: HQ = NASA headquarters; JPL = Jet Propulsion Laboratory. NASA received stimulus funding in February 2009 as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. a. NASA’s phrase “institutional investments” refers to the maintenance of and upgrades to its facilities that are not associated with specific projects by the mission directorates. Figure A-3. Planned Budgets for Cross-Agency Support

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For education, planned funding averages about $120 million annually from 2010 to 2025. The funding supports three major goals: strengthening the nation’s future workforce; attracting and retaining students in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics; and engaging Americans in NASA’s mission. For the inspector general’s office, planned funding is $39 million each year. See Table A-3 and Figure A-3 for depictions of NASA’s plans for cross-agency support, education, and its inspector general.

End Notes

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1

See Congressional Budget Office, A Budgetary Analysis of NASA’s New Vision for Space Exploration (September 2004). 2 See Congressional Budget Office, Alternatives for Future U.S. Space-Launch Capabilities (October 2006). 3 Information on NASA’s plans for 2009 to 2013 comes from Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2009 and for the period beyond 2013, from data provided by the agency. NASA assumes an inflation rate of 2.4 percent each year beyond 2013, compared with CBO’s assumption of 1.9 percent. At that lower rate, NASA would realize a slight increase in its budget in real (inflation-adjusted) terms. 4 At some point, NASA plans to shift funding for operation of the Constellation program’s vehicles to the Space Operations mission directorate, but the agency has not yet stated when that change will occur. 5 NASA could decide to forgo any planned missions for the space shuttle that are not completed by September 30, 2010, in order to avoid using funds intended for the Constellation program and causing delays for it. See Congressional Budget Office, “An Analysis of NASA’s Plans for Continuing Human Spaceflight After Retiring the Space Shuttle,” letter to the Honorable Dave Weldon, M.D. (November 3, 2008). 6 NASA’s current plans do not preclude operation of the space station in 2016 and beyond should additional funding be made available. 7 The current version of NASA’s plans can be found at www.nasa.gov/offices/pae/references/ index.html. 8 The appendix to this report provides more details of NASA’s plans, by directorate and function. 9 See Congressional Budget Office, A Budgetary Analysis of NASA’s New Vision for Space Exploration. 10 NASA’s current planning process requires sufficient funding so that programs can be conducted with a 65 percent level of confidence, and agency officials suggest that that approach should prevent cost growth like what has occurred in past programs. 11 Although the Mars Science Laboratory was initially classified as a “medium” mission (that is, with a range of costs from $300 million to $750 million) costing more than $650 million, NASA’s first formal baseline estimate for the project, provided in August 2006 as part of the preliminary design process, was $1.63 billion. The project is now estimated to cost more than $2 billion, and its launch has been delayed from 2009 to 2011, requiring an additional $200 million of funding annually in 2010 and 2011. Formal baseline estimates for the Constellation program’s Ares 1 and Orion have not yet been completed. 12 NASA officials indicate that an alternative to conducting fewer missions to accommodate cost growth would be to fly the same number of missions but reduce their capabilities and associated costs. Such reduced capabilities might be a smaller number of sensors or a stationary probe instead of a rover. Decisions to bring about such cost reductions would be most effective if made before a program was initiated instead of after costs had already been incurred to develop capabilities that would eventually be eliminated. 13 Although not considered in this scenario, the additional funding required from 2010 to 2025 (after reserves were exhausted) to accommodate 90 percent cost growth would be about $4.6 billion annually for the Constellation program and $1.8 billion annually for the spacecraft development programs conducted by the Science directorate, CBO projects. Among NASA’s past missions that CBO analyzed, 80 percent had less than 90 percent cost growth, and 20 percent had more. 14 According to NASA officials, under this scenario conflicts for the workforce between activities for the space shuttle and for the Constellation program would need to be resolved, and the effect that the shuttle’s continued operation could have for commercial cargo carriers would have to be mitigated. 15 The mission to service the Hubble requires launching the space shuttle into an orbit that precludes reaching the space station in the event of an emergency. Therefore, NASA will have another shuttle on standby for a rescue mission if necessary. 16 NASA currently plans to take no action that would preclude extending operations to allow continued use of the space station for experiments should additional funding be available.

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Congressional Budget Office

17

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CBO assumed that the reductions would be split between the Science and Aeronautics Research directorates in proportion to their planned budgets (and therefore allocated at roughly 90 percent and 10 percent, respectively). 18 NASA officials indicate that those funding reductions would significantly delay the agency’s contributions to the Next Generation (NextGen) Air Transportation System and would require lessening planned research into environmental improvements for aviation. 19 For details on those estimates, see Congressional Budget Office, A Budgetary Analysis of NASA’s New Vision for Space Exploration. 20 Data used for CBO’s projections come from Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2009 and additional data provided by NASA. CBO’s projections beyond 2020 also use data from NASA’s Lunar Capability Concept Review. See Geoffrey Yoder and Kent Joosten, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Exploration Systems Mission Directorate, “Lunar Architecture ––Integrated Analyses and Strategy” (presentation, September 25, 2008), available at www.nasa.gov/pdf/278841main_YoderJoostenESMDchamber-industry%20day_rev.pdf. 21 See Congressional Budget Office, “An Analysis of NASA’s Plans for Continuing Human Spaceflight After Retiring the Space Shuttle,” letter to the Honorable Dave Weldon, M.D. (November 3, 2008).

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In: Exploring the Final Frontier: Issues, Plans and Funding … ISBN: 978-1-60876-080-0 Editor: Dillon S. Maguire © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 3

NASA:ASSESSMENTS OF SELECTED LARGE-SCALE PROJECTS ∗

U. S. Government Accountability Office

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WHY GAO DID THIS STUDY The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) plans to invest billions in the coming years in science and exploration space flight initiatives. The scientific and technical complexities inherent in NASA’s mission create great challenges in managing its projects and controlling costs. In the past, NASA has had difficulty meeting cost, schedule, and performance objectives for some of its projects. The need to effectively manage projects will gain even moreimportance as NASA seeks to manage its wide-ranging portfolio in an increasingly constrained fiscal environment. Per congressional direction, this report provides an independent assessment of selected NASA projects. In conducting this work, GAO compared projects against best practice criteria for system development including attainment of knowledge on technologies and design as well as various aspects of program management. The projects assessed are considered major acquisitions by NASA—each with a life-cycle cost of over $250 million. No recommendations are provided. To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on GAO-09-306SP.

WHAT GAO FOUND GAO assessed 18 NASA projects with a combined life-cycle cost of more than $50 billion. Of those, 10 out of 13 projects that had entered the implementation phase experienced significant cost and/or schedule growth. For these 10 projects, development costs increased ∗

This is an edited, reformatted and augmented version of a U. S. Government Accountability Office publication dated March 2009.

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by an average of 13 percent from baseline cost estimates that were established just 2 or 3 years ago and they had an average launch delay of 11-months. In some cases, cost growth was considerably higher than what is reported because it had occurred prior to the most recent baseline. Many of the projects we reviewed experienced challenges in developing new technologies or retrofitting older technologies as well as in managing their contractors, and more generally, understanding the risks and challenges they were up against when they started their efforts. GAO’s previous work has consistently shown that reducing the kinds of problems this assessment identifies in acquisition programs hinges on developing a sound business case for a project. In essence, this means establishing firm requirements, maturing technologies, and assuring other vital resources, such as time and funding, are sufficient before making longterm commitments to acquisitions. NASA has acted to adopt practices that would ensure programs proceed based on a sound business case and undertaken an array of initiatives aimed at improving program management, cost estimating, and contractor oversight. Continued attention to these efforts should help maximize NASA’s acquisition investments.

Source: Kennedy Space Center, Cape Canaveral. JWST Project Office; NASA/JPL/McREL; Background: William K. Hartmann, UCLA: Mars Science Laboratory.

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ABBREVIATIONS

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AFB AFS AIA APS ASI CCD CDR CERES CEV CONAE CrIS CSA DCI DLR DPR EO-1 ESA EVE GBM GLAST GMI GPM HIFI HMI IPO JAXA JPL KDP LAT LCROSS LDCM LRO MEP MSL NAR NASA NIR NPR NPOESS NPP OCO OLI

Air Force Base Air Force Station Atmospheric Imaging Assembly aerosol polarimetry sensor Argenzia Spaciale Italiana (Italian Space Agency) charged-coupled device critical design review Clouds and Earth’s Radiant Energy System Crew Exploration Vehicle Comision Nacional de Actividades Espaciales (Space Agency of Argentina) Cross-track Infrared Sounder Canadian Space Agency data collection instrument German Aerospace Center dual-frequency precipitation radar Earth Observatory Satellite European Space Agency Extreme Ultraviolet Variability Experiment gamma-ray burst monitor Gamma-ray Large Area Space Telescope GPM microwave imager Global Precipitation Measurement (mission) Heterodyne Instrument for the Far Infrared Helioseismic and Magnetic Imager Integrated Program Office Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency Jet Propulsion Laboratory key decision point large area telescope Lunar Crater Observation and Sensing Satellite Landsat Data Continuity Mission Lunar Reconnaisance Orbiter Mars Exploration Program Mars Science Laboratory nonadvocate review National Aeronautics and Space Administration near infrared (bands) NASA Procedural Requirements National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System NPOESS Preparatory Project Orbiting Carbon Observatory Operational Land Imager

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U. S. Government Accountability Office PA&E PDR PICA SDO SDR SOFIA SSS TIM TIRS TRL TSIS USGS VIIRS

Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation (NASA) preliminary design review phenolic impregnated carbon ablator Solar Dynamics Observatory system definition review Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy sea surface salinity total irradiance monitor Thermal Infrared Sensor technology readiness level Total Solar Irradiance Sensor U.S. Geological Service Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite

March 2, 2009

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Congressional Committees In response to congressional direction, this report provides our assessment of large-scale NASA projects. NASA is at a critical juncture. The agency is in the midst of phasing out the Space Shuttle program and beginning another major undertaking, the Constellation program—which will create the next generation of spacecraft for human spaceflight and is expected to cost upward of $230 billion. This massive effort, unparalleled since the transition from the Apollo program to the Shuttle program, presents the agency with myriad complex and interdependent challenges. NASA is taking on this endeavor against a backdrop of growing national government fiscal imbalance and budget deficits that continue to strain all federal agencies’ resources. While NASA’s budget represents less than 2 percent of the federal government’s fiscal discretionary budget, the agency is increasingly being asked to expand its portfolio to support important scientific missions including the study of climate change. Therefore, it is exceedingly important that these resources be managed as effectively and efficiently as possible. In the past, this has not always been the case. NASA has had difficulty meeting cost, schedule, and performance objectives for some of its projects, and in fact, it had to cancel prior attempts to replace the Space Shuttle, after billions had already been spent, in the face of cost overruns and program management problems. However, to its credit, NASA has developed a comprehensive plan to address systemic acquisition management weaknesses and is in the initial stages of implementing the plan. Moreover, as we have urged it to do, NASA recently incorporated best practice criteria for system development in its acquisition policy, though our review shows more needs to be done to ensure the policy is followed. To maximize NASA’s ability to invest in science and space exploration, senior leaders should focus attention to adopting best practices and demonstrate a willingness to fix and/or terminate projects that are not performing well. This assessment should support such efforts.

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Gene L. Dodaro Acting Comptroller General of the United States

March 2, 2009

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Congressional Committees The National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) extensive portfolio of missions ranges from sending robotic vehicles to Mars, to scientific study of Earth from space, to assembling and supplying the International Space Station. Some of these missions, such as the Hubble Space Telescope and NASA’s earth science efforts, have literally changed the way we view our planet and the universe. The technology that NASA developed has resulted in numerous spin-off products that are used across a wide range of technical and commercial fields. However, NASA has also had its share of challenges. For example, the X-33 and X-34 programs, which were meant to demonstrate technology for future reusable launch vehicles, were cancelled due to technical difficulties and cost overruns after NASA spent more than $1 billion on them. More recently, the Mars Science Laboratory, which was already over budget, announced a two-year launch delay. Current estimates suggest the price of this delay may be $400 million—which drives the current project lifecycle cost estimate to $2.3 billion, up from its initial confirmation estimate of $1.6 billion. GAO and others have also reported on overruns on many other NASA programs over the past decade. What is common among these and other programs is that whether they succeed or fail, they cost more to build and take longer to launch than planned. As a result, NASA is able to accomplish less than it plans with the money it is allocated, and it is forced to make unplanned trade-offs among its projects— shorting one to pay for the mistakes of another. Congress has expressed concern about NASA’s performance and has identified the need to standardize the reporting of cost, schedule, and content for NASA research and development projects. In 2005, Congress required NASA to report cost and schedule baselines—benchmarks against which changes can be measured— for all NASA programs and projects with estimated life-cycle costs of at least $250 million that have been approved to proceed to implementation.1 It also required that NASA report to Congress when development cost is likely to exceed the baseline estimate by 15 percent or more, or when a milestone is likely to be delayed by six months or more.2 In response, NASA began establishing cost and schedule baselines in 2006 and has been using them as the basis for

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annual project performance reports for Congress provided in its annual budget submission each year. The explanatory statement of the House Committee on Appropriations accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 directed GAO to prepare project status reports on selected large-scale NASA programs, projects, or activities. This report responds to that mandate by assessing 18 NASA projects, each with a life-cycle cost over $250 million. The combined life-cycle cost for these 18 projects exceeds $50 billion. Each assessment is presented in a two-page summary that analyzes the project’s cost and schedule status and project challenges. We also provide general observations about the performance of NASA’s major projects and the agency’s management of those projects during development. NASA provided updated cost and schedule data as of December 2008 for 13 of the 18 projects.3 We reviewed and compared that data to previously established baselines for each of those 13 projects. We took appropriate steps to address data reliability. Our approach included an examination of the phase of a project’s development and how each project was advancing within this framework. Each project we reviewed was in either the formulation phase or the implementation phase of the project life-cycle. In the formulation phase, the project develops and defines the project requirements—what the project should be able to do—establishes a schedule, estimates costs and produces a plan for implementation. In the implementation phase, the project carries out these plans, performing final design and fabrication as well as testing components and system assembly, integrating these components and testing how they work together, and launching the project. This phase also includes the period from project launch through mission completion. We assessed each project’s cost and schedule and characterized growth in either as significant if it was greater than the thresholds established for Congressional reporting. Based on discussion with project officials and drawing on GAO’s established criteria for knowledge-based acquisitions and on other GAO work on space and weapon system acquisitions, we identified five challenges that can contribute to cost and schedule growth in these projects: technology maturity, design stability, complexity of heritage technology, contractor performance and development partner performance. To assess technology maturity, we examined the projects’ reported critical technology readiness levels—a measure that NASA devised and that is now used at other agencies as well. We looked at the technology readiness level at the time of the project’s preliminary design review, which occurs just before it enters the implementation phase, and compared that against the level of maturity that best practices call for at that stage to minimize risks. To assess design stability, we examined the percentage of engineering drawings completed or projected to be completed by the critical design review—which is usually held about mid-way through the project’s development. We asked project officials to provide this information and we compared it against GAO’s best practices’ metric of 90 percent of drawings released by the critical design review. Finally, based in part on our discussions with officials for the individual projects, we identified the extent to which project cost and schedule were negatively impacted by challenges integrating heritage—or pre-existing—technology into their projects. We also discussed the extent to which contractors’ and development partners’ challenges in developing and delivering project hardware impacted overall project cost and schedule. In this review, these challenges were largely apparent in the projects that had entered the implementation phase.

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This list of challenges is not exhaustive; we believe these challenges will evolve and change as we continue this work into the future. Our objectives are to expand on the importance of developing a knowledge-based acquisition strategy and to provide decisionmakers with an independent, knowledge-based assessment of individual systems that identifies potential risks and allows them to take actions to put projects that are early in the development cycle in a better position to succeed. This report and the challenges we discuss in it are a starting point for our future work in this area. The individual project offices were given an opportunity to comment on and provide technical clarifications on our assessments prior to their inclusion in the final product. We conducted this performance audit from February 2008 to March 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix III contains detailed information on our scope and methodology. We do not provide recommendations in this report.

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A SOUND BUSINESS CASE UNDERPINS SUCCESSFUL ACQUISITION OUTCOMES The major projects that NASA undertakes range from highly complex and sophisticated space transportation vehicles, to robotic probes, to satellites equipped with advanced sensors to study the earth. In many cases, NASA’s projects are expected to incorporate new and sophisticated technologies while operating in harsh, distant environments. Many of its projects are also one time articles, meaning there is little opportunity to apply knowledge gained to the production of a second, third, or future increments of spacecraft. Moreover, NASA often partners with other space-faring countries, including several European nations, Japan, and Argentina. These partnerships go a long way to foster international cooperation in space, but they also put NASA projects in a vulnerable position when partners do not meet their obligations or run into technical obstacles they cannot easily overcome. While space development programs are complex and difficult by nature, and most are one-time efforts, we are convinced that NASA would benefit from a more disciplined approach to its acquisitions. The nature of its work should not preclude NASA from achieving what it promises when requesting and receiving funds. The development and execution of a knowledge-based business case for these projects can provide early recognition of challenges, allow managers to take corrective action, and place needed and justifiable projects in a better position to succeed. Our studies of best practice organizations show the risks inherent in NASA’s work can be mitigated by developing a solid, executable business case before committing resources to a new product development.4 In its simplest form, this is evidence that (1) the customer’s needs are valid and can best be met with the chosen concept, and (2) the chosen concept can be developed and produced within existing resources—that is, proven technologies, design knowledge, adequate funding, and adequate time to deliver the product when needed. A program should not go forward into product development unless a sound business case can be made. If the

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business case measures up, the organization commits to the development of the product, including making the financial investment. Our best practice work has shown that developing business cases based on matching requirements to resources before program start leads to more predictable program outcomes—that is, programs are more likely to be successfully completed within cost and schedule estimates and deliver anticipated system performance.5 At the heart of a business case is a knowledge-based approach to product development that is a best practice among leading commercial firms. Those firms have created an environment and adopted practices that put their program managers in a good position to succeed in meeting these expectations. For a program to deliver a successful product within available resources, managers should demonstrate high levels of knowledge before significant commitments are made. In essence, knowledge supplants risk over time. This building of knowledge can be described over the course of a program, as follows: •

•

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•

When a project begins development, the customer’s needs should match the developer’s available resources—mature technologies, time, and funding. An indication of this match is the demonstrated maturity of the technologies needed to meet customer needs—referred to as critical technologies. If the project is relying on heritage—or pre-existing— technology, that technology must be in appropriate form, fit, and function to address the customer’s needs within available resources. Then, about midway through the product’s development, its design should be stable and demonstrate it is capable of meeting performance requirements. The critical design review takes place at that point in time because it generally signifies when the program is ready to start building production-representative prototypes. If design stability is not achieved, but a product development continues, costly re-designs to address changes to project requirements and unforeseen challenges can occur. Finally, by the time of the production decision, the product must be shown to be producible within cost, schedule, and quality targets and have demonstrated its reliability, and the design must demonstrate that it performs as needed through realistic system-level testing. Lack of testing increases the possibility that project managers will not have information that could help avoid costly system failures in late stages of development or during system operations.

Our best practice work has identified numerous other actions that can be taken to increase the likelihood that a program can be successfully executed once that business case is established. These include ensuring cost estimates are complete, accurate and updated regularly; holding suppliers accountable to deliver high-quality parts for their product through such activities as regular supplier audits and performance evaluations of quality and delivery; and holding program managers accountable for their choices. Moreover, we have recommended using metrics and controls throughout the life-cycle to gauge when the requisite level of knowledge has been attained and direct decision makers to consider criteria before advancing a program to the next level and making additional investments. The consequence of proceeding with system development without establishing and adhering to a sound business case is substantial. GAO and others have reported that NASA has experienced cost and schedule growth in several of its projects over the past decade, resulting from problems that include failing to adequately identify requirements and

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underestimating complexity and technology maturity. For example, the X-33 and X-34 programs both were terminated because of significant cost increases caused by problems developing the necessary technologies and flight demonstration vehicles. Neither program fully assessed the costs associated with developing new, unproven technologies. Additionally, in 2005, GAO reported on the lack of an established sound business case for NASA’s Prometheus I—a project that faced challenges in identifying preliminary requirements, establishing firm cost estimates and maturing critical technologies. After concurring with GAO’s recommendation that NASA establish a firm business case for the project, NASA identified more realistic requirements for Prometheus I and reduced the project’s requested funding by nearly $2.4 billion through 2010.

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NASA HAS MADE EFFORTS TO IMPROVE ITS ACQUISITIONS In 2005, we reported that NASA’s acquisition policies did not conform to best practices for product development because they lacked major decision reviews at several key points in the project life-cycle, which would allow decision makers to make informed decisions about whether a project should be authorized to proceed in the development life-cycle. Based, in part, on our recommendations, NASA issued a revised policy in March 20076 that institutes several key decision points (KDP) in the development lifecycle for space fiight ight programs and projects. At each KDP, a decision authority is responsible for authorizing the transition to the next life-cycle phase for the project.7 In addition, NASA acquisition policies also require that new technologies be sufficiently mature at the preliminary design review, the design is appropriate to support proceeding with full-scale fabrication, assembly, assembly, integrating and test at the critical design review, and the system can be fabricated within cost, schedule and performance specifications. These changes brought the policy more in line with best practices for product development. A more detailed discussion of NASA’s acquisition policy and how it relates to best practices is provided in appendix II of this report. Further, in response to GAO’s designation of NASA acquisition management as a “high risk” area,8 NASA developed a corrective action plan to improve the effectiveness of NASA program/project management.9 The approach focuses on how best to ensure the mitigation of potential issues in acquisition decisions and better monitor contractor performance. The plan identifies five areas for improvement—program/project management, cost reporting process, cost estimating and analysis, standard business processes, and management of financial management systems—each of which contain targets and goals to measure improvement. As part of this initiative, NASA has taken a positive step in improving management oversight of project cost, schedule, and technical performance with the establishment of a baseline performance review with NASA’s senior management. Through monthly reviews, NASA intends to highlight projects that are predicted to exceed internal NASA cost and/or schedule baselines, which are set lower than cost and schedule baselines submitted to Congress, so the agency can take pre-emptive actions to minimize the projects’ potential cost overruns or schedule delays. While these efforts are positive steps towards achieving successful project outcomes and ensuring that decision makers are appropriately investing the agency’s resources, they will be limited if project officials are not held accountable for demonstrating that elements of a

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knowledge-based business case are demonstrated at key junctures in development. It is critical that project officials not only have a high level of knowledge about a project at key junctures, but also that this information is used by decision makers to make decisions on whether to invest additional resources and allow a project to proceed through the development life cycle.

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PROJECT ASSESSMENTS We found several factors that occurred throughout the various projects we reviewed that can contribute to project cost and schedule growth. These factors—characterized as project challenges—were mostly present in the projects that had reached the implementation phase of the project lifecycle. They, along with a profile of each project we reviewed, are described in a two-page assessment for each project. The project profile presents a general description of the mission objectives for each of the projects; a picture of the spacecraft or aircraft; a schedule timeline identifying key dates for the project; a table identifying programmatic and launch information; and the baseline year cost and schedule estimates and December 2008 cost and schedule data. The remainder of the assessment analyzes the project challenges and the extent to which each project faces cost, schedule, or performance risk due to these challenges. They are based on past GAO work on elements of a successful acquisition business case—technology maturity, heritage technology complexity, and design stability. Additionally, through our review, we identified two more challenges—contractor performance and development partner performance—that had an impact on cost and schedule performance of the NASA projects. Contractor performance impacts NASA’s ability to deliver a project within cost and schedule baselines because the agency depends on the expertise of the contractor to deliver what it promises. Similarly, NASA sometimes relies on other domestic and international organizations to provide key instruments, the spacecraft, and/or launch services for collaborative projects; the performance of these partners can impact NASA’s performance for a project. When a development partner cannot deliver an instrument or integrate it on schedule, the impact is felt by NASA. Specifically, since often there is no exchange of money between partners, the cost of any delays to the project must be assumed by each partner. For each individual project assessment, we provide a table showing the challenges relevant to the project and a project status narrative. This is followed by a narrative of the project challenges we identified relevant to each project. NASA project offices were provided an opportunity to review drafts of the individual two-page assessments prior to their inclusion in the final product. The projects provided both technical corrections and more general comments. We integrated the technical corrections as appropriate and characterized the general comments on the second page of each two-page assessment.

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OUR OBSERVATIONS NASA provided cost and schedule data for 13 projects in the implementation phase of the project life-cycle.10 Ten of those 13 projects experienced significant cost and/or schedule growth from their project baselines.11 Based on our analysis, development costs for projects in our review increased by an average of almost 13 percent from their baseline cost estimates— all in just two or three years—including one project’s cost that increased by over 50 percent. It should be noted that a number of these projects had experienced considerably more cost growth before they were baselined in response to the statutory reporting requirement.12 Our analysis also shows that projects in our review had an average delay of 11 months to their launch dates. The lack of knowledge at key junctures during project development, as well as the complexity of using heritage hardware— systems with characteristics similar to the one being developed—and working relationships with contractors and development partners contributed to the cost and schedule growth. Table 1 depicts the 13 projects we reviewed that had entered the implementation phase, the challenges they faced or are currently facing, and the cost and schedule changes they experienced. We did not specifically correlate individual project challenges with specific cost and/or schedule changes in each project. The degree to which specific challenges contributed to cost and schedule growth varied across the projects in this review. Nonetheless, since previous GAO work has demonstrated the impact of these challenges on cost and schedule growth and our discussions with NASA project officials identified the additional challenges we discuss as contributing to cost and schedule growth, we are confident in our characterization of them for the purpose of this specific review.

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Technology Maturity Four of the thirteen projects in our assessment for which we received data and that had entered the implementation phase did so without first maturing all critical technologies.13 Further, three of those four projects had also not matured their critical technologies before continuing to assembly, integration, and testing. This means that needed knowledge about these technologies remained unknown well into development thereby adding potential cost and schedule risk to the projects. For example, five of the eight critical technologies for one instrument and three of the five critical technologies for another instrument identified by the Herschel project office were immature when the project moved into implementation. Almost two years later at the critical design reviews, four of the thirteen critical technologies for these two instruments were still immature, yet the project proceeded. When complex development programs proceed without understanding whether technologies can work as intended, they end up facing unanticipated technical problems that have costly, reverberating effects on other aspects of the program.

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U. S. Government Accountability Office Table 1. Assessment of Challenges for NASA Projects in the Implementation Phase NASA Projects

Technology Design Complexity Contractor Development Development Maturity Stability of Heritage Performance Partner Cost Change Technology Performance

Aquarius

•

Dawn Gamma-ray Large Area Space Telescope

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Glory

•

•

Herschel

•

•

•

•

10

-2%

0

5%

9

53%

6

13%

20

•

25%

9

Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter

•

0%

6a

26%

25

19%

26

18%

5

1%

17

3%

9

-1%

0

Mars Science Laboratory

•

•

•

NPOESS Preparatory Project

•

•

•

•

6%

Kepler

•

Orbiting Carbon Observatory

•

•

Solar Dynamics Observatory

•

•

Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy Wide-field Infrared Survey Explorer

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•

Launch Delay (months)

•

•

•

•

Source: GAO analysis of NASA project data. Note: Shading indicates project exceeded cost and/or schedule baseline. A blank cell indicates the challenge does not apply to that particular project or the project did not supply data or make a projection of the data. a The Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter exceeded its schedule threshold by 5 months and 25 days, but the table shows 6 months due to rounding.

Design Stability The majority of the projects in our assessment that held a critical design review did so without first achieving a stable design. GAO best practices recommend completion of at least 90 percent of engineering drawings at the critical design review to provide evidence that the design is stable. Though NASA’s acquisition policy does not specify how the project should achieve design stability by the critical design review, NASA’s system engineering handbook adheres to GAO’s metric. Of the projects we were able to assess that had reached that point in their life-cycle, none had achieved design stability by the time they proceeded into assembly, integration, and testing. All of the projects in our assessment that had reached their critical design review and that provided data on engineering drawings experienced some growth in the total number of design drawings after their critical design review. Growth ranged from 8 percent to, in the case of two projects, well over 100 percent. Some of this increase can be attributed to change in system design after the critical design review. For some projects, design changes after the

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critical design review were necessary due to problems in maturing technologies or issues found during testing. For example, the Mars Science Laboratory required several design changes to address various issues, including redesign of the plumbing for the propulsion system, which increased the drawing count by 67 percent from the critical design review to the time of our review.

Complexity of Heritage Technology More than half the projects in the implementation phase—8 of them—encountered challenges in integrating or modifying heritage technologies. Additionally, two projects in formulation—Ares I and Orion—also encountered this challenge. We found that the projects that relied on heritage technologies underestimated the effort required to modify them to the necessary form, fit, or function. According to NASA officials, heritage technologies are not the same as critical technologies because, in their opinion, critical technologies are not based on existing—or heritage—technology. Generally, the project officials said that the technology they were using was not considered “new” if it had been demonstrated in a test environment or used on a prior mission, even if there needed to be a change or customization in configuration or design. Yet, these projects all failed to uild in the necessary resources for technology modification. For example, the Kepler project office did not identify any critical technologies since all had flown on earlier missions, but viewed their modification as a design challenge for the Kepler mission. However, the project underestimated the effort required to modify the photometry array and, as a result, this challenge contributed to a 25 percent—or $78 million—cost overrun and Kepler’s launch schedule being delayed by nine months.

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Contractor Performance Six of the seven projects that cited contractor performance as a challenge also experienced significant cost and/or schedule growth. Through our discussions with the project offices, we were informed that contractors encountered technical and design problems with hardware which disrupted development progress. Additionally, contractors lacked the experience in space systems that was required for the projects, which may be the underlying reason for these development challenges. For example, the Dawn contractor had no experience in deep space missions. Officials from the company acknowledged they had difficulty developing the spacecraft wiring. They also encountered problems developing the ion propulsion system for the spacecraft. Contractors also faced workforce or corporate issues, such as closing facilities, lack of resources, and management inefficiencies. For example, the Glory project manager cited management inefficiencies with the instrument contractor. According to Glory project officials at NASA, among the drivers of these management inefficiencies were senior leadership changes, a loss of core competencies due to plant closure, and a lack of proper decision authority. The contractor agreed that the plant closure and the need to re-staff were major project challenges. In this case, as with others in our review, the contractors forfeited their contract fees or spent the fee they had received from NASA to cover project costs.

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Development Partner Performance Five of the thirteen projects we reviewed encountered challenges with a development partner. In these cases, the development partner could not meet their commitments to the project within planned timeframes. This may have been a result of issues within the specific development partner organization or as a result of issues faced by a contractor to that development partner. For example, NASA is collaborating with the European Space Agency (ESA) on the Herschel space observatory. While NASA has delivered its two instruments to ESA, ESA has encountered difficulties developing its instruments and has delayed Herschel’s launch by 14 months. Because of this delay, NASA has incurred about $39 million in cost growth due to the need to fund component developers for a longer period of time than originally planned.

ASSESSMENTS OF INDIVIDUAL PROJECTS Our assessments of all 18 individual projects follow.

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AQUARIUS Aquarius is a satellite mission developed by NASA and the Space Agency of Argentina (Comisión Nacional de Actividades Espaciales, CONAE) to investigate the links between the global water cycle, ocean circulation, and the climate. It will measure global sea surface salinity. The Aquarius science goals are to observe and model the processes that relate salinity variations to climatic changes in the global cycling of water and to understand how these variations influence the general ocean circulation. By measuring salinity globally for 3 years, Aquarius will provide an unprecedented new view of the ocean's role in climate.

Source: Aquarius Project Office (artist depiction).

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Project Status

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The launch for Aquarius has been delayed 10 months, from July 2009 to May 2010 because of delays in CONAE’s spacecraft development activities. The launch delay prompted NASA to report to the Congress that the Aquarius project exceeded its development schedule threshold and caused NASA to experience a $10.7 million cost increase. Based on the costsharing arrangements with CONAE, NASA will also bear its own costs associated with future delays. NASA has continued its development of the Aquarius instrument, which is currently scheduled for completion in March 2009 and shipment to CONAE in June 2009 for integration with the Argentine-developed spacecraft.

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Detailed Project Discussion The only critical technology the project office identified was the Aquarius instrument itself, which includes the scatterometer and the radiometer components. The project deemed the instrument mature at the preliminary design review because the instrument uses heritage technologies, even though those technologies were brought together in a different form, fit, and function for use on Aquarius. The instrument design, however, was not stable at the critical design review (CDR) as the Aquarius project had released only 16 percent of the engineering drawings. Project officials told us that some detailed parts were either not accounted for or not very mature at CDR, and they needed a follow-on review to clear up the issue. For example, details in the design of a connector arm of a reflector to the instrument were lagging. In addition, project officials said that the Aquarius instrument design was far ahead of development of CONAE’s spacecraft, so the project could not finalize and release all the instrument drawings until CONAE finished the spacecraft design. To help minimize project risk in the interim, project officials said NASA provided CONAE with an engineering model to work with as the Argentines developed the spacecraft. All engineering drawings have now been released. Aquarius’ schedule slipped 10 months, prompting NASA to report to the Congress that the Aquarius program has exceeded its development schedule threshold. According to project officials and budget documents, a delay in development of the spacecraft bus by CONAE is the primary reason for the schedule slip. Project officials said that CONAE is using some newer and unfamiliar technologies on the spacecraft, such as lithium-ion batteries for power storage. NASA’s review of CONAE’s proposed schedule indicated that CONAE had made several high-risk decisions in order to meet a planned launch date of September 2009. For example, CONAE decided to begin flight model fabrication before completing adequate testing of the engineering models. Subsequent discussions between NASA and CONAE led to a decision to set a new launch date of May 2010. The spacecraft will also house several instruments for CONAE science missions. According to project officials, those instruments all appear to be on schedule, but officials added that none of those instruments are needed for NASA’s Aquarius mission and that the mission would launch without the CONAE instruments if any were delayed. NASA expects the Aquarius instrument to be completed in March 2009 and held until June 2009 when it will ship to Argentina to be integrated with the spacecraft. Since no funds are exchanged between the U.S. and Argentina for this project, NASA bears its own costs associated with any further delays for its portion that could occur. Project officials indicated that the schedule slip increased NASA’s cost by $10.7 million. They also noted that this cost increase does not include increased launch vehicle costs because of the delay or Delta-II launch site maintenance costs at Vandenberg Air Force Base.

Project Office Comments The Aquarius project provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Project officials also commented that Aquarius had changes to its baseline due to slips by its development partner, the CONAE, and that they believe the

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NASA contribution to this mission is on schedule for completion in March 2009. They added that the benefit of the international partnership, plus the groundbreaking information about the Earth’s climate, out weigh the additional costs, which NASA has chosen to absorb within its budget. Project officials said that NASA will continue to closely monitor progress and work with its development partner to minimize impacts.

ARES I CREW LAUNCH VEHICLE (CLV) NASA’s Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle, as part of the Constellation Program, is the next generation human spacecraft that will carry the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle into low Earth orbit. The mission of the Ares I project is to deliver a safe, reliable, and affordable launch system for space exploration. Ares I will feature a 24.5-metric ton lift capability to carry crew to the Moon or deliver crew and cargo to the International Space Station.

Project Status

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Contract costs for the development the Ares I increased by $304 million since initial award and the first manned launch has slipped from fiscal year 2014 to fiscal year 2015. The Ares I had planned to begin developmental flight testing in April 2009. However, delays to the planned Hubble Space Telescope servicing mission have impacted the project’s ability to modify the launch pad needed to support planned testing, resulting in at least a 3-month delay to the first Ares I developmental flight test.

Source: Ares Project Office (artist depiction).

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Detailed Project Discussion Because of the use of heritage systems and technology in system designs, Ares I project officials said they did not identify any critical technologies. However, we found that all three major elements of the Ares I system—the first stage, upper stage, and upper stage engine— face significant development challenges. The first stage draws heavily from existing Space Shuttle systems, but requires modifications such as incorporating a fifth segment that is likely to affect flight characteristics. In addition, modeling indicates that thrust oscillation within the first stage could cause unacceptable structural vibrations throughout the Ares I and Orion vehicles which could adversely affect crew safety if left unmitigated. NASA is considering solutions including incorporating tuned vibration absorbers into the Ares I first stage or adding a composite structure between the first and second stages. Thrust oscillation was again identified as a risk during the September 2008 preliminary design review, and the project has scheduled another review in the fall of 2009 to fully incorporate design solutions. The upper stage design includes a shared bulkhead between the hydrogen and oxygen fuel tanks, even though experience from the Apollo program shows that common bulkheads are complex and difficult to manufacture. The J-2X upper stage engine represents a new engine development

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effort that is likely to encounter problems during development; NASA estimates that J-2X will require 29 rework cycles to address problems, which they state is less than the number experienced during the development of other rocket engines. NASA has not released official cost and schedule estimates to complete the Ares I program. NASA officials stated that these estimates will be made available when the project moves into implementation, or at the conclusion of the Constellation Program’s non-advocate review. However, the value of various development contracts for the Ares I have increased by $304 million since initial award, and the first manned launch has slipped from 2014 to 2015. The project has already experienced schedule delays that they attribute to funding instability in fiscal years 2007 and 2008 and launch pad availability. Constellation’s integrated risk management system also indicates there is a high risk that funding shortfalls could occur in fiscal years 2009 through 2012, resulting in planned work not being completed to support schedules and milestones. Further, the delayed Hubble Space Telescope servicing mission has caused the first planned Ares I developmental flight test—Ares I-X—to slip at least 3 months from April 2009 to July 2009. Since the Hubble mission will have a back up Shuttle for crew rescue purposes, thus utilizing both launch pads, the Ares I project cannot modify launch pad 39B for its use until the Hubble servicing mission is complete. NASA continues to develop an integrated schedule based on how the Hubble mission will impact pad modifications for the Ares I-X mission, as well as joint scheduling of a mobile launch platform and space in the Vertical Assembly Building.

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Project Office Comments The Ares I project office provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Project officials also commented that they believe the project has made progress in maturing the Ares I design and associated elements, and that all planned reviews have been executed on a schedule that supports the initial operating capability commitment. They added that the project is responding to technical and programmatic challenges, and they feel that all major element contracts are in place and are performing to plan.

DAWN The Dawn mission is on a journey to the two largest asteroids in our solar system, Vesta and Ceres. Launched from Cape Canaveral in September 2007, the Dawn spacecraft will encounter and orbit Vest 4 years later, then travel an additional three years to reach and orbit Ceres. The Dawn spacecraft will use solar-electric (ion) propulsion to reach and orbit Vesta for 7 months and Ceres for 5 months while performing scientific investigations at various altitudes and lighting conditions. Dawn will use imaging, spectroscopy, and gravity measurements to characterize the two asteroids—measuring their mass, gravity fields, principal axes, rotational axes, and moments of inertia.

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Source: NASA/JPL/McREL; Background: William K. Hartmann, UCLA (artist depiction).

Project Status Dawn launched on September 27, 2007. The spacecraft is scheduled to begin the survey of Vesta on August 18, 2011 and then survey Ceres beginning February 18, 2015.

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Detailed Project Discussion The Dawn project has been beset with funding issues. The project was approved for early formulation in January 2001, but was delayed nine months as NASA did not have the funds to proceed. Budget issues also caused a delay in the project as it moved through the formulation phase. The mission objectives were then modified to a baseline mission to Vesta with travel to Ceres as an extended mission. During the project’s second confirmation review, NASA added the travel to Ceres as a primary mission objective. The project was also told to increase reserves to 25 percent to comply with JPL design principles which, according to project officials, were not written when the Dawn project was first proposed, causing the project to be descoped and under-funded at the beginning of implementation. Project management expended $25 million in project reserves in the first year of implementation attempting to meet a June 2006 launch date, but the use of reserves was not conveyed to the mission directorate. In the subsequent year, the project experienced significant cost overruns. The project stopped development activities between October 2005 and January 2006 during a review by an Independent Assessment Team (IAT). The IAT reported technical issues with the project, recommended management changes, and stated a need for an additional $57 million and a 12 to 18 month extension to complete implementation. According to project officials, NASA’s Science Mission Directorate terminated the project in February 2006, but it was reinstated on appeal and resulted in a launch readiness date slip to June 2007. Ultimately, this one year launch delay cost the project an additional $54 million. JPL indicated that contractor performance led to several problems during Dawn’s development, generally stemming from a lack of technical and corporate experience on the part of the prime contractor with regard to complex space systems, such as the ion propulsion system which contractor officials agreed was new to them. The IAT noted that JPL did not provide enough oversight of its contractor, which had no system-level planetary project implementation experience, to assure hardware delivery schedules would be met and software development activities could be accomplished on time and within budget. Project officials told us that other sub-contractors on the project also experienced development and testing issues. For example, a sub-contractor working on development of the ion propulsion system encountered problems that led to deficient workmanship and component failures, while another subcontractor had issues with development of the xenon tank for the ion propulsion system; both the flight tank and spare failed testing. As a result of these issues and other system level implementation issues, the project experienced cost overruns and the overall launch readiness date for the system slipped 15 months. Subsequently, the prime contractor suggested forfeiting part of their contract award fees to keep the project on cost and its mission intact, and NASA agreed. The initial project proposal for Dawn assumed a high level of heritage technology for the ion propulsion system from the Deep Space One mission. According to project officials, inheritance reviews were conducted early in the life cycle for Dawn and the design was generally correct. A study performed during formulation should have derived that the cost and schedule assumptions of using heritage technology were not valid, but officials told us the study was not accurate. Problems with the heritage technology, however, were discovered in implementation, resulting in significant cost growth.

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Project Office Comments The Dawn project office provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Project officials said that NASA agrees that there were funding issues but points out that they were initially externally driven, which necessitated changes to project scope during the project life cycle and resulted in the prime contractor giving up their fee prior to confirmation. Project officials also agreed that there were technical challenges faced by both prime and by some sub-contractors, some of which were due to a higher expectation of heritage hardware than was actually the case.

GAMMA-RAY LARGE AREA SPACE TELESCOPE (GLAST) Gamma-ray Large Area Space Telescope (GLAST) The Gamma-ray Large Area Space Telescope (GLAST) seeks to improve understanding of the structure of the universe. By measuring the direction, energy, and arrival time of celestial high-energy gamma rays, GLAST will map the sky with 50 times the sensitivity of previous missions. GLAST’s scientific payload includes two instruments: the Large Area Telescope (LAT) and the Gammaray Burst Monitor (GBM). The mission has four objectives: (1) understanding the mechanisms of particle acceleration in astrophysical environments; (2) determining the highenergy behavior of gammaray bursts; (3) resolving and identifying point sources with known objects; and (4) probing dark matter and the extra galactic background light in the early universe.

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Project Status GLAST successfully launched into low Earth orbit on June 11, 2008.

Source: Kennedy Space Center, Cape Canaveral, Fl IMG RSC-08PD-1637.

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Detailed Project Discussion Prior to launch in June 2008, the GLAST project experienced several schedule delays because of conflicts over test facilities, launch pad time, and engineering issues. These delays resulted in NASA’s reporting to the Congress that the GLAST project exceeded its schedule baseline by 8 months. Project officials told us that the spacecraft vendor gave priority to Department of Defense projects for thermal vacuum testing at its test facility. This action forced GLAST to be moved to the Naval Research Labs for testing. In order to accommodate GLAST, the alternate test facility required some minor modification. According to NASA officials, this resulted in a 3-month delay. A busy launch schedule at Cape Canaveral then made it difficult for GLAST to re-schedule its launch date, contributing to the remainder of the project’s overall schedule slip. Project officials said schedule slippage can also be attributed to heritage technology engineering problems. At the project’s preliminary design review, GLAST had matured its one critical technology, while the rest were considered heritage technologies. The project considers the Large Area Telescope (LAT) a new instrument, though it is made up of several heritage technologies. According to a project official, the LAT has experienced both engineering design and electrical parts problems that resulted in schedule delays and the need for additional funding. Likewise, officials told us that a component of GLAST’s command and datahandling system also features a new combination of heritage technology. Because of software and hardware problems, project officials said that the prime contractor had to bring this work, which had been outsourced to a sub-contractor, back in-house.

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The project also identified partner issues that contributed to an increase in project cost. According to project officials, France initially was responsible for significant instrument integration work; however, the French were unable to complete that work and, as a result, the project office transferred it to the Naval Research Laboratory. This transfer increased costs by about $5 million. In addition, officials said that Italy originally was supposed to supply the GLAST ground station with X-band communications. However, in 2003, Italian officials informed the project they could not keep this commitment. The antenna on the GLAST spacecraft now uses Ku-band communications instead. Italy also used an inexperienced contractor to produce GLAST’s tracking towers, a situation that resulted in contamination problems. Project officials stated that these partner issues combined to increase the cost of the GLAST project and contributed to the $45 million increase. The GLAST project’s design was not stable at critical design review as the project had released only 76 percent of its drawings and experienced a 31 percent growth in the number of drawings after the critical design review. Project officials attributed the growth to the withdrawal of the French partners, the change to a Ku-band transmitter and ground system, and the change in facility for producing the solar arrays.

Project Office Comments

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The GLAST project office provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Project officials also commented that they believe the principal project challenge was the loss of development partners, and that the eight month launch slip was caused by contractor performance and launch vehicle development issues. They did not consider design stability or the complexity of heritage technology as issues for this project.

GLORY The Glory project is a low-Earth orbit satellite that will contribute to the U.S. Climate Change Science Program. The satellite has two principal science objectives: (1) collect data on the properties of aerosols and black carbon in the Earth’s atmosphere and climate systems and (2) collect data on solar irradiance. The satellite has two main instruments—the Aerosol Polarimetry Sensor (APS) and the Total Irradiance Monitor (TIM)—as well as two cloud cameras. The TIM will allow NASA to have uninterrupted solar irradiance data by bridging the gap between NASA’s Solar Radiation and Climate Experiment and the National Polar Orbiting Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) missions.

Project Status The Glory project reported to the Congress that it exceeded its development cost threshold by 31 percent from its baseline, requiring the Congress to reauthorize Glory. The project is waiting for delivery of the APS, which is now projected for February 2009. The

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delivery of this instrument is over one year behind schedule. The launch date for Glory, originally scheduled for June 2008, is now scheduled for June 2009. The launch delay may require the project to report to the Congress that it will also exceed its development schedule baseline.

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Source: Glory Project Office (artist depiction).

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Detailed Project Discussion The Glory project has experienced significant delays because of late delivery of the Aerosol Polarimetry Sensor (APS), which is based on heritage technology. At its preliminary design review in September 2005, the Glory project had one immature technology: the APS. At that review, the project estimated that the APS would be delivered by September 2007. According to the APS contractor, the instrument is now forecasted for delivery in February 2009—over one year behind schedule. The project identified contractor performance as the top risk facing the mission. Despite the contractor’s performance, NASA has kept work on the APS with the company because the project believes it is more cost effective than starting a new inhouse development project of this instrument. NASA estimated that an in-house development effort would cost an additional $78 million and delay launch until February 2010. Glory project officials stated that the APS development problems do not stem from technical issues, but from the contractor’s inability to plan and execute the work. The officials outlined several causes for the project’s issues with the contractor, including the company consolidating its workforce and a resulting loss of APS corporate design knowledge. Contractor officials told us that along with moving the APS development effort from one facility to another, they made the decision to finish building the instrument with the new team rather than doing a complete design analysis. They said this led directly to cost and schedule increases as they had to perform more testing concurrent with the development of the instrument. At the critical design review, the project’s design was not stable as it had released only 70 percent of its drawings. As of GAO’s review, 99 percent of total drawings have been released. However, Glory’s drawing count increased by 27 percent after the critical design review. This increase is attributed to the modification of drawings for heritage parts for Glory’s unique configuration. Since Glory was baselined in fiscal year 2008, the project’s development costs have increased by 31 percent. As a result, NASA has reported to the Congress that Glory has exceeded its development cost threshold, requiring the Congress to reauthorize the project. Uncertainty in the project prior to its mission confirmation in 2005 delayed the launch readiness date from June 2008 to December 2008. More recently, the project’s scheduled launch date has slipped from December 2008 to June 2009, which could cause the project to also have to report the slip to the Congress. According to project officials, Glory’s recent cost and schedule issues are driven solely by the late delivery of the APS. The project has taken several steps to mitigate the cost increases caused by the delayed delivery of the APS and to improve the contractor’s performance. The project has eliminated requirements, simplified the instrument design, provided NASA engineering and management resources to the contractor, and involved both NASA and contractor executives in addressing the problems. According to contractor officials, the company has used its award fee to cover the costs on this project. The company has also provided its own funding to help off-set cost overruns.

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Project Office Comments The project office provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Project officials also commented that since filing the threshold report, NASA has continued to pursue the baseline plan for the Glory implementation. They added that performance at the APS instrument supplier continues to be slow, but the instrument technical performance evaluated at each major developmental gate has been excellent. In addition, they believe the engineering design and the technical performance of the APS instrument have never been issues, and the programmatic issues have all been connected with the supplier’s manufacturing and management.

GLOBAL PRECIPITATION MEASUREMENT (GPM) MISSION The Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) mission, a joint NASA and Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) project, seeks to improve the scientific understanding of the global water cycle and the accuracy of precipitation forecasts. The GPM is composed of a core spacecraft carrying two main instruments: a Dual-frequency Precipitation Radar (DPR) and a GPM Microwave Imager (GMI). In addition, the GPM project includes a second Low- Inclination spacecraft with a second GMI instrument. The GPM builds on the work of the Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission, and will provide the first opportunity to calibrate measurements of global precipitation.

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Project Status GPM is in the formulation phase and is expected to enter implementation after its mission confirmation review in the spring of 2009. Recent project budget changes show reductions in fiscal years 2009 and 2010. These reductions caused a project re-plan and delayed the scheduled development of the second GMI instrument by 1 year and delayed the launch of the Low-Inclination observatory by 5 months. The re-plan schedules a July 2013 launch of the core spacecraft at the latest as requested by JAXA.

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Detailed Project Discussion The GPM spacecraft and its components are being designed to be demiseable—they will burn up during re-entry into the Earth’s atmosphere to limit orbital debris—which poses a challenge for the project in the integration of the propellant management device with the craft’s aluminum composite propulsion tanks. Neither the propellant management device nor the aluminum composite tanks are new technologies, but the integration of the two is the challenge. Currently, the integration of the propellant management device and the aluminum composite tank is not expected to be mature until after the preliminary design review. If the project is unable to sufficiently mature this technology, it will use a titanium propellant management device and/or tank that is less demiseable. The GPM project has not reached a design review where we could assess design stability based on our metric. The project currently has released 17 percent of its engineering drawings, but expects to have released only 70 percent of drawings at the critical design review. According to project officials, the two main instruments—the JAXA-supplied Dualfrequency Precipitation Radar (DPR) and the NASA-supplied GPM Microwave Imager (GMI)—are based on heritage technology and therefore are not considered critical technologies. However, the DPR and GMI will have to be adapted to the GPM spacecraft design for this mission. In addition, the DPR instrument includes a Ka-band radar that the project identified as a new design.

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Project officials told us that JAXA has been frustrated by NASA’s uncertainty over funding the GPM project and questioned NASA’s commitment to the project. According to a March 2008 report from NASA’s Inspector General, budget reductions to the GPM project in fiscal years 2005 through 2007 led to a 2-year delay in the contract for the development and delivery of the GMI. These reductions caused the launch of the core spacecraft to be delayed from 2007 to 2013 and the cost estimate to rise from $600 million to over $1 billion. In early 2008, NASA signed a launch vehicle agreement with JAXA. Subsequently, the preliminary design and critical design reviews were scheduled for the project. The project’s budget was recently reduced for fiscal years 2009 and 2010. Following these cuts, NASA directed the project to re-plan with two constraints: 1) maintain the core spacecraft launch date of June 2013 but let the Low-Inclination spacecraft slip as necessary and, 2) accept increased programmatic risk from low contingency funds in fiscal year 2009. The re-plan presented maintains the core spacecraft to a July 2013 launch date requested by JAXA, but the start of work on the second GMI instrument is delayed by one year and the launch of the Constellation observatory is delayed by 5 months. As a result of the reduction in funding levels, NASA considers fiscal year 2009 as a high-risk year for the project since it now has low contingency reserves of approximately 5 percent.

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Project Office Comments The project office provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Project officials said that following the numerous mission delays that drove the launch date from 2008 to the current July 2013, the sustained funding increases the GPM project has received since the fiscal year 2008 budget has enabled steady progress towards mission confirmation and implementation in fiscal year 2009. They added that JAXA has been satisfied with this progress, including the formal agreement concluded in early 2008 between NASA and JAXA on the use of the H-IIA launch vehicle to launch the Core Observatory. Project officials believe they will have a stable design since they plan to have necessary hardware manufacturing drawings released by the critical design review.

HERSCHEL The Herschel Space observatory, a collaborative project between NASA and the European Space Agency (ESA), will seek to discover how the first galaxies formed and how they evolved to give rise to present day galaxies like our own. Herschel has the largest mirror ever built for a space telescope. At 3.5 meters in diameter, the mirror will collect longwavelength radiation from some of the coldest and most distant objects in the Universe. It will be able to observe dust-obscured and cold objects that are invisible to other telescopes. Additional targets for Herschel will include clouds of gas and dust where new stars are being born, disks out of which planets may form, and cometary atmospheres packed with complex organic molecules.

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Source: ESA/AOES Medialab (artist depiction).

Project Status Since Herschel’s baseline was established in 2007, ESA slipped the Herschel launch schedule three times because of scope changes and challenges with integration of the instruments onto the spacecraft. A recent slip resulted in a project cost increase of $43 million

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and required NASA to report to the Congress that it exceeded its schedule baseline. The project is currently behind schedule by about 50 days, a delay that has caused a fourth launch date slip from its current October 2008 date to April 2009.

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Detailed Project Discussion NASA has completed the development of components for two Herschel instruments—the Heterodyne Instrument for the Far Infrared (HIFI) and the Spectral and Photometric Imaging Receiver (SPIRE) instrument—and delivered them to ESA. However, during both the preliminary and critical design reviews, some of the critical technologies for these elements were considered immature. At the preliminary design review (PDR) for HIFI, five of the eight critical technologies were immature. Later, at critical design review (CDR), two of the eight HIFicritical technologies were still assessed as immature. SPIRE had a similar record. At SPIRE’s PDR, three of the five critical technologies were assessed as being immature. Two years later at CDR, two of five SPIRE critical technologies were still assessed as immature. Regardless of this, the project proceeded. After delivery of NASA’s components, problems were found during testing of the equipment in Europe. According to the project office, the HIFI failed in thermal cycling during testing and SPIRE had problems with the wiring that connects its detectors. The technical issues with the two instruments cost $3.9 million to resolve. In addition to technology maturity issues, NASA committed to developing components for the HIFI and SPIRE instruments before achieving design stability for the instruments. At the CDR for both the HIFI and SPIRE instruments, NASA had released less than 10 percent of the engineering design drawings. According to the project office, this was primarily due to the fact that ESA’s interface drawings were in preliminary format. The office also said that the lack of timeliness in the submission of design drawings is a challenge when the project has to depend on multiple partners for input. Herschel’s $43 million growth in life cycle costs can be largely attributed to technical integration problems, which resulted in launch delays. Those delays are also the primary cause of overall schedule slippage. ESA’s contractor could not complete development of its instruments or integrate Herschel instruments in a timely manner, prompting ESA to pull the integration work in-house. While NASA faced some technical problems with development of components for the HIFI and SPIRE instruments, resulting in about $3.9 million of cost growth, project officials said the remaining increase of about $39 million is due to the three slips in Herschel’s launch date since the project’s baseline was established in February 2007 since the project must maintain a workforce to support testing and integration activities. Based on the 14-month delay in launch date, NASA reported to the Congress in February 2008 that the Herschel project has exceeded its schedule baseline. Herschel’s launch schedule has now slipped even further. The project office stated that Herschel is currently behind schedule by about 50 days, which caused the launch date to slip from its current October 2008 date to early in calendar year 2009.

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Project Office Comments The Herschel project office provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Project officials also commented that although NASA did have some technical issues with their hardware contributions which did cause an increase to the NASA cost in order to correct the problems, the majority of the cost increase to NASA has been due to technical problems on the European side which have caused the launch to slip several times in the last several years.

JAMES WEBB SPACE TELESCOPE (JWST) The James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) is a large, infrared-optimized space telescope that is designed to find the first galaxies that formed in the early universe. The focus of scientific study will include first light, assembly of galaxies, origins of stars and planetary systems, and origins of the elements necessary for life. JWST's instruments will be designed to work primarily in the infrared range of the electromagnetic spectrum, with some capability in the visible range. JWST will have a large mirror, 6.5 meters (21.3 feet) in diameter and a sunshield the size of a tennis court. Both the mirror and sunshade will not fit onto the rocket fully open, so both will fold up and open once JWST is in outer space. JWST will reside in an orbit about 1.5 million kilometers (1 million miles) from the Earth.

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Project Status The JWST project was re-planned in fiscal year 2006 after a $1 billion cost increase— $3.5 billion to $4.5 billion— and a 2-year schedule delay on the project. A major risk that continued to affect the project following this replan was the low level and late phasing of contingency funding budgeted, despite 12 percent of the $1 billion cost growth being used to increase such funding. Although JWST passed its preliminary design review, the project still has to address several issues related to testing.

Source: JWST Project Office (artist depiction).

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Detailed Project Discussion The JWST project was re-planned in fiscal year 2006 after a $1 billion cost increase and a 2-year schedule delay on the project. About half of the cost growth was because of a 1-year schedule slip, resulting from a delayed decision to use an ESA-supplied Ariane 5 launch vehicle and an additional 10-month slip caused by budget profile limitations in fiscal years 2006 and 2007. Changes in requirements and a 12 percent increase in the program’s contingency funding accounted for the remainder of the growth. Despite this increase in contingency funding (i.e., reserves), the level and phasing of contingency funding budgeted for the project continues to be a major risk. An independent review team expressed concern over the contingency funding, stating that it is too low and phased in too late. Further, it stated that a contingency fund of 25 percent to 30 percent would be appropriate for a project through implementation. Goddard Space Flight Center policies also require reserves of 25 percent through Phase D, Implementation. NASA directed its Science Mission Directorate to address the JWST reserves issue at the project’s confirmation reviews in the summer of 2008. The project budgeted for 5 years of operation for JWST, instead of 10 years of mission operations, which, according to the JWST Deputy Associate Director, saved the project approximately $300 million. Prior to the re-plan in fiscal year 2006, the JWST project was set to proceed into development with immature technologies. Because of substantial cost growth on the project and as part of the 2006 re-plan, NASA decided to invest additional time and resources in maturing JWST’s critical technologies prior to the preliminary design review. JWST held a

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technology non advocate review in January 2007 to assess the maturity of its ten critical technologies. At that time, all but one of the critical technologies was assessed as mature, the remaining critical technology—the cryocooler—has since been matured. Maturing critical technologies on the project prior to entering implementation was a significant step to reducing risk. The JWST project office also had 53 percent of its design drawings released at its preliminary design review in March 2008 and anticipates that it will have 94 percent of its design drawings released by the critical design review in June 2009. Although JWST passed its preliminary design review, the project still has to address several issues related to testing. One concern is that the project plans to do only one test at the highest level of assembly possible in the cryogenic vacuum chamber at the Johnson Space Center. The review panel advised JWST to add another test cycle to its schedule. Further, the board recommended the addition of a center of curvature test on the Optical Telescope Element and was also concerned that the project was not planning to test the sunshield at the highest level of assembly in the cryogenic vacuum chamber. The project is still working through how to address such testing issues.

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Project Office Comments The JWST project provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Project officials said they generally agree with the assessment as presented. Project officials commented that the specific concern expressed by the review team was that the project's baseline plan only included one cryogenic thermal vacuum test opportunity at the integrated level of assembly, but the officials added that the specific tests that will be conducted during that one cryogenic thermal vacuum test opportunity are numerous and comprehensive. Project officials said to address the review team’s concern in this regard, the project has accounted for the cost of the additional cryogenic testing, should it eventually be required.

KEPLER The Kepler mission has been designed to discover Earth-like planets in orbit around stars in our galaxy. The goal is to detect tens or even hundreds of Earthsize planets in the habitable zones of stars similar to our own sun. The habitable zone is the region around a star where the temperature of a terrestrialtype planet can be expected to allow water to exist in liquid form on the planet's surface, thereby increasing the probability of life. Kepler will explore the structure and diversity of planetary systems by conducting a census of extra-solar terrestrial planets using a photometer in heliocentric orbit to observe the dimming of starlight caused by planetary transits.

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Source: Ball Aerospace.

Project Status Since being baselined in fiscal year 2007, NASA has reported to the Congress that both Kepler’s development costs and schedule have exceeded the baseline. During that time, Kepler’s development costs have increased by about $78 million—or 25 percent—and its

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schedule has increased by 9 months, despite a reliance on heritage technologies. Kepler project officials attribute the cost and schedule growth to contractor performance problems, cost overruns, and the disruption caused by a $35-million budget reduction in fiscal year 2005.

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Detailed Project Discussion None of Kepler’s technologies were identified as critical by the project management office because all of Kepler’s technologies have flown on other missions and are therefore considered heritage. However, the project office acknowledged that the customization of some of Kepler’s instruments, and the reliance on heritage technology has proven to be a challenge to Kepler’s development. Project officials told us that Kepler’s large photometry array added to the complexity of the project because photometers of Kepler’s sensitivity have not flown before and proved more difficult to adapt than anticipated; an adaptation that contributed to cost growth. Officials added that the Kepler photometer requires a low noise level in its signal chain in order to detect changes in the brightness of stars. This made developing the electronics for the focal plane array a challenge. The focal plane array is the largest ever flown in space and has stringent requirements. Coupled with the high density of elements and electrical and thermal attachments, this makes the assembly and tests of this element a key challenge for the project. We were unable to determine if Kepler’s design was stable at its critical design review. According to the project office, the prime contractor, Ball Aerospace and Technologies Corporation, implemented a new drawing management system called Agile, and the project did not have any way to recover the forecast drawings count at the critical design phase in October 2006. However, the project reports that 96 percent of its engineering design drawings have been released to the manufacturer. Kepler’s total cost and overall schedule have increased significantly. Since being baselined in fiscal year 2007, Kepler’s development costs have increased by about $78 million—or 25 percent—and its schedule has increased by nine months. NASA has reported to the Congress that both Kepler’s development costs and schedule have exceeded the baseline. The project office attributes the cost and schedule growth to contractor performance problems, which occurred because the prime contractor was unable to execute the project planned activities within the cost and schedule they proposed, despite a reliance on heritage technology. Contractor officials agreed that they underestimated the complexity and the effort required to modify the existing these technologies. Both the Kepler project manager and contractor officials also believe that a $35 million funding cut in the program because of funding constraints in fiscal year 2005 was a significant contributor of the project’s delays. This funding instability, according to a NASA project official, contributed to an overall 20month delay in the project’s schedule and about $169 million in cost growth. Both the project office and the prime contractor made changes to ensure that the project remained executable with sufficient reserves. The project office shortened the operations period by 6 months and accepted additional project risk when it cancelled or de-scoped several tests. For example, the flight segment vibration test was reduced to an acoustic test, and the vibration tests of the solar panel were removed. Additionally, the prime contractor put

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new management personnel in place and according to contractor officials, agreed to commit $7 million of its projected award fee to a cost performance incentive that may allow the contractor to earn the fee later in the project’s life cycle.

Project Office Comments The Kepler project office provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Project officials also commented that Kepler instrument uses existing technology components in a new and complex instrument design, and that the contractor underestimated the complexity and effort required to develop the instrument system and subsystems. They added that after the 2006 re-baselining of the project, the contractor continued to have problems with the instrument development resulting in additional cost and schedule overruns. They said the project was able to absorb this cost increase by de-scoping elements of the program, delaying the guest observer science program and reducing the mission duration by 6 months.

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LANDSAT DATA CONTINUITY MISSION (LDCM) The Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM), a partnership between NASA and the U.S. Geological Service (USGS), seeks to extend the ability to detect and quantitatively characterize changes on the global land surface at a scale where natural and man-made causes of change can be detected and differentiated. It is the successor mission to Landsat 7. The Landsat data series, begun in 1972, is the longest continuous record of changes in the Earth’s surface as seen from space. Landsat data is a unique resource for people who work in agriculture, geology, forestry, regional planning, education, mapping, and global change research.

Source: General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems (artist depiction).

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Project Status

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The LDCM project shifted its estimated launch date from July 2011 to December 2012 after it completed its Initial Mission Confirmation Review in September 2008. The LDCM project is on an aggressive 39-month development schedule for the main instrument. The LDCM instrument payload consists of a single science instrument, the Operational Land Imager (OLI); however, NASA is considering the addition of another science instrument—a decision that could exacerbate the already aggressive schedule and add cost.

Detailed Project Discussion The LDCM instrument payload consists of a single science instrument—the Operational Land Imager (OLI). The project considered the addition of two other science instruments— the Thermal Infrared Sensor (TIRS) and the Total Solar Irradiance Sensor (TSIS). The project has decided not to add TSIS, but will continue studying whether TIRS will be included. The project hopes to receive funding for completion of the TIRS instrument in spring 2009. The spacecraft is being designed to accommodate TIRS and both the spacecraft and OLI developers are studying the impacts of adding TIRS. According to a project official, Goddard Space Flight Center would develop and build TIRS in-house, a process that would take

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approximately 48 months. If TIRS is added to the LDCM mission, however, it could delay launch by over a year and, according to a project official, cost about $5 million for the redesign of the spacecraft to accommodate the instrument. This design cost does not include the cost of integrating the instrument onto the spacecraft. Project officials have indicated that LDCM has already undertaken an aggressive 39-month OLI development schedule. According to the contractor for the OLI instrument, this aggressive schedule was necessary because of delays in the procurement process. The LDCM project delayed its estimated launch date from July 2011 to December 2012 after it completed its Initial Mission Confirmation Review in September 2008. While a launch after January 2012 could jeopardize the continuity of Landsat data, project officials said recent reliability analyses show that the Landsat 7 satellite may be operational until 2017, lessening the likelihood of a data gap. The project office has identified four critical technologies for the OLI instrument. Three of the four critical technologies—the wide field of view optics, linear arrays, and modular sensor chip assemblies—are considered fully mature as they have been fully validated by the Earth Observing Satellite (EO-1) mission through scene comparisons with Landsat 7. The sensor assembly chips for the OLI are considered mature since prototypes were included on the Advanced Land Imager that flew on EO-1. The project does not anticipate that there will be any additional critical technologies for the spacecraft because most of the technology used to build the spacecraft will be commercial off-the-shelf items that have flown on other missions. Because LDCM has not yet reached its critical design review, we were unable to assess design stability of the project at this time. The project office anticipates having over 95 percent of the flight design and manufacturing drawings complete by the critical design review currently scheduled for August 2009. The spacecraft contract was awarded in April 2008, and the project office anticipates releasing the spacecraft drawings after design maturation. Formal cost and schedule baselines will be established for the project at the Mission Confirmation Review in 2009.

Project Office Comments The project office provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. The project office also commented that NASA and the OLI instrument vendor are making steady progress on the OLI instrument on the planned schedule. The project is developing detailed schedules now to ensure sufficient schedule reserve is applied to the critical hardware developments.

LUNAR RECONNAISSANCE ORBITER (LRO) The Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) is NASA’s first mission in the implementation of the Vision for Space Exploration, the plan to return to the moon and beyond. LRO’s mission is to orbit the moon for one year measuring lunar topography, resources, and thermal and radiation environments. This data will be used to select a landing site for future manned missions to the moon and to ensure astronaut safety. The LRO has a scientific payload of six

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main instruments and one technology demonstration instrument. LRO’s launch vehicle contains a secondary payload, the Lunar Crater Observation and Sensing Satellite (LCROSS), which will investigate lunar surface volatiles such as water.

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Source: LRO Project Office.

.

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Project Status LRO’s original schedule with a launch date by the end of 2008 placed the project on a challenging and aggressive development schedule. This schedule is driven by the need to provide data for the Orion and Ares I hardware designs and mission planning efforts for a human lunar mission by 2020. The project experienced challenges modifying instruments for the moon’s thermal environment. These challenges, along with a decision by the launch authority to re-prioritize the LRO launch on its manifest, contributed to a launch slip to April 2009.

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Detailed Project Discussion The project did not identify any critical technologies. Each of the project’s major instruments is based significantly on heritage technology. However, the project manager said the project had underestimated the difficulty of the modifications needed. For example, the project manager said the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter Cameras needed some technical work to adapt their designs for the lunar thermal environment as well as some redesign when areas needing reinforcement were found during testing. The Lunar Orbiter Laser Altimeter, while similar to laser altimeters that have flown on previous Mars and Mercury missions, had issues with the electronics that time the laser pulses of the altimeter, which, according to the project manager, took more time to resolve than originally expected. The Diviner Lunar Radiometer Experiment instrument is almost a copy of an instrument on Mars now, but experienced motor failures, which the project manager said took extra time and money to recover from. Finally, the Lyman-Alpha Mapping Project instrument, a copy of the Pluto Alice instrument, was slightly delayed because of a detector failure during thermal vacuum testing. According to the project manager, most instruments required additional design and analysis of their thermal control designs to operate reliably on the mission. Redesign was necessary because the lunar environment presents a harsher thermal environment than the environment faced by earth-orbiting missions. The project did not measure design stability by percentage of drawings completed at the critical design review (CDR), and therefore was not assessed according to this metric. Project officials said NASA gave LRO more reserve funding because of the aggressive schedule on the project to compensate for schedule slippages. Most challenges faced by the project occurred prior to the confirmation review, so officials stated that the project will probably finish at about only 3 percent above the confirmation cost estimate. However, late delivery of instruments from project partners and a decision by the launch authority to slip the LRO launch date both contributed to the project’s launch date being delayed 6 months from October 2008 to April 2009.

Project Office Comments The LRO project office provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Project officials also commented that the change in launch

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date from December 2008 to April 2009 was made to accommodate other launch priorities and as well as technical problems with the launch vehicle. Project officials noted that, while LRO’s schedule was aggressive, schedule reserve had been built in to accommodate late instrument deliveries and the project was on track for a December 2008 launch. They added that the additional time afforded by the new April 2009 launch date is being used by the project to perform additional testing and mission simulations.

MARS SCIENCE LABORATORY (MSL) The Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) is part of the Mars Exploration Program (MEP). The MEP seeks to understand whether Mars was, is, or can be a habitable world. To answer this question the MSL project will investigate how geologic, climatic, and other processes have worked to shape Mars and its environment over time, as well as how they interact today. The MSL will continue this systematic exploration by placing a mobile science laboratory on the Mars surface to quantitatively assess a local site as a potential habitat for life, past or present. The MSL is considered one of NASA’s flagship projects and will be the most advanced rover ever sent to explore the surface of Mars.

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Project Status Since the project was baselined, MSL has experienced significant cost growth—over $200 million thus far, or more than a 26 percent increase in development costs—because of technological and engineering problems. While the project has overcome design and weight growth issues, it continues to face other technical challenges that contributed to MSL’s launch delay from October 2009 to October 2011. This launch delay will result in about $400 million in cost growth as the project works to resolve its remaining technical risks.

Source: Mars Science Laboratory (artist depiction).

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Detailed Project Discussion At the project’s preliminary design review, the project assessed all seven of critical technologies as immature resulting from late development challenges encountered. At the critical design review a year later, three of the seven critical technologies had been replaced by backup technologies with two of the seven still assessed as immature, including one of the replacement technologies. In addition, MSL’s design was never stabilized at the critical design review. Several design changes were required to address various issues. For example, the plumbing for the propulsion system was redesigned because it was determined that MSL needed larger, rigid lines for the system than were previously used on smaller Mars rovers. These thicker lines inadvertently became load-bearing components, which caused the project to redesign part of the structure to account for the loads and shift them to MSL’s primary structure. MSL has relied on several heritage technologies that have had to be re-designed, reengineered, or replaced for use on the lab. For example, the heatshield made of a super lightweight ablator that had flown on previous missions was considered nearly ready at the critical design review, but it suffered a significant setback in testing and could not be proved for use on MSL. The project had to select a new and less mature technology—phenolic impregnated carbon ablator (PICA). According to the MSL project office, the impact of this change was

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approximately $30 million in cost growth and a nine-month delay in delivery of the heat shield. Significant weight growth has occurred during MSL’s development brining the spacecraft to 90 percent of its mass threshold according to MSL project officials. For example, MSL’s project manager said that the project wanted to implement a dry lubrication scheme with lightweight titanium gears for the actuators, or motors that allow the lab to function autonomously. During fabrication, however, it was discovered that the lightweight titanium gears did not provide the durability needed for MSL, causing the project to revert to the heavier stainless steel gear system with wet lubricant used by prior projects. To keep the lubricant from freezing in Martian temperatures, the project also had to add heaters to the actuators, adding even more mass to the rover. The project cost has grown by over $200 million in the last year—more than a 26 percent increase in development costs—and will increase even more due to the launch delay from October 2009 to 2011. The project could not meet its original schedule due to difficulty in meeting delivery milestones for actuators, key avionics, and flight software while maintaining its full testing program. Since Mars launch windows are optimally aligned every 26 months, the project has to delay its planned launch to October 2011. As a result of the launch delay, project officials state that costs will likely grow by an estimated $400 million bringing the project’s life-cycle cost to $2.2 to $2.3 billion.

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Project Office Comments The MSL project office provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. The project also commented that while most of the system development is on track, MSL cannot meet its October 2009 launch date due to a few critical elements that are lagging. Project officials said the MSL launch is now scheduled for the fall of 2011, which is the next opportunity for an optimally aligned Earth-Mars transit.

NPOESS PREPARATORY PROJECT (NPP) The NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) is a joint mission with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the U.S. Air Force. The satellite will measure ozone, atmospheric and sea surface temperatures, land and ocean biological productivity, and cloud and aerosol properties. The NPP mission has two objectives. First, NPP will provide a continuation of global observations following the Earth Observing System missions Terra and Aqua. Second, NPP will provide the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) with risk-reduction demonstration and validation for the critical NPOESS sensors, algorithms, and ground data processing.

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Project Status Due primarily to the late delivery of a key instrument being developed by project partners, the NPP project has experienced nearly $111 million in development cost growth and a 26-month delay in its launch readiness date since being baselined in fiscal year 2007. As a result, NASA has reported to the Congress that the NPP project has exceeded both its cost and schedule thresholds. The NPP project office is monitoring the risk of further instrument delivery delays.

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Source: Ball Aerospace.

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Detailed Project Discussion The NPP project office identified six critical technologies for the project—the spacecraft and all five instruments. Five of the six critical technologies were assessed as immature at the preliminary and critical design reviews. The Clouds’ and the Earth’s Radiant Energy System (CERES) instrument was the only mature technology, and according to project officials this instrument was only added back to the mission when it was determined that development of other instruments would cause a significant launch delay. Many of the spacecraft’s components and subsystems have flown on previous missions and are therefore mature. The NPP project office now considers all critical technologies to be mature. The project’s design was unstable at the critical design review (CDR). Two instruments being developed by the Integrated Program Office (IPO), which is composed of National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and Department of Defense officials, are the Crosstrack Infrared Sounder (CrIS) and the Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS). Both had to be redesigned because of failures that were detected during testing after the CDR. The project office said a 31 percent increase in new engineering drawings was largely attributed to the redesign of the VIIRS and CrIS stemming from testing failures. According to a project official, the CrIS structure development multiple fractures during testing and needed to be stripped to its components and rebuilt. The project official also said the VIIRS could not meet its science requirement of detecting ocean color because of the poor quality of its filters. The official indicated a problem exists with the system’s requirements and not the ability of the contractor to produce the correct filters. An official for the contractor building the VIIRS instrument said the original requirement was unachievable and the filters will be improved for the second VIIRS instrument, which will be a part of the NPOESS mission. Since NPP was baselined in fiscal year 2007, the project’s development costs increased by about $111 million, or almost 19 percent, and its schedule has increased by 26 months. As a result, NASA has reported to the Congress that the NPP project has exceeded both its cost and schedule thresholds. The project office attributes almost all of the cost and schedule changes to the late delivery of the VIIRS instrument by the project partners. The instrument is now scheduled to be delivered in April 2009. An official for the VIIRS instrument contractor cites the presence of multiple government customers and ongoing requirements changes as the reasons for the delay and increase in cost. Neither the IPO nor the NPOESS prime contractor, according to NASA’s NPP project manager, provided adequate oversight of the VIIRS contractor during the development of VIIRS. While there is no contractual relationship between NASA and the VIIRS contractor, project officials told us NASA now has two engineers at the prime contractor’s facility to oversee the design and development of the instrument. Additional delay in instrument delivery could result in observatory integration delays, cost increases, schedule slips, and possible gaps in data continuity.

Project Office Comments The NPP project office provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. The project also commented that the NASA-developed instruments did not experience challenges with design stability, rather it was NASA’s

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partners’ instruments. They added that the VIIRS performance requirements have remained stable since the critical design review and the primary drivers of the schedule delay are issues found during fabrication and testing of the engineering and flight models. Project officials said the VIIRS instrument continues to incur delays during environmental testing which will likely result in a delay in NPP launch readiness beyond June 2010. NASA has provided the NPOESS IPO additional expertise to help provide more oversight to attempt to minimize additional delays and increase the likelihood of VIIRS meeting performance goals.

ORBITING CARBON OBSERVATORY (OCO) NASA’s Orbiting Carbon Observatory (OCO) seeks to enable more reliable forecasts of climate change. It will make the first global measurements of atmospheric carbon dioxide with the precision and resolution needed to characterize production and loss rates. These measurements will improve mankind’s understanding of the processes that regulate atmospheric carbon dioxide. The OCO payload consists of a single unit instrument with three high resolution grating spectrometers. Each of these spectrometers records the intensity of radiation over one of three very narrow Near Infrared bands that are sensitive to the presence of carbon dioxide and oxygen. The observatory will fly in loose formation with other satellites to enable synergy and to complement the science return.

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Project Status OCO’s launch date slipped from September 2008 to February 2009, and NASA reported to the Congress that the project’s development cost increased 18 percent from the baseline established in fiscal year 2008. On February 24, 2009, OCO launched but failed to reach orbit.

Source: Jet Propulsion Laboratory (artist depiction).

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Detailed Project Discussion The only critical technology for OCO, its three-channel grating spectrometer, was considered mature at the mission’s preliminary design review. However, technical problems arose for the instrument after its critical design review (CDR) in August 2006. Testing results showed that the detectors used in the instrument suffer from a residual image problem when they transition from a bright-to-dark image. This is an inherent characteristic of the detectors and the error in data will be corrected by ground-based software. In addition, OCO’s design was not stable at CDR as the project reported that it had only released 66 percent of its engineering drawings. Following CDR, the project also experienced a 15 percent increase in the total number of drawings expected. According to project officials, the increase was attributed to the changes made in the system design to address structural issues. The project has since released all of its engineering drawings. According to project officials, the contractor developing the three-channel spectrometer underestimated the cost to develop the instrument. In December 2005, OCO project management began providing its own personnel to augment the contractor’s workforce in order to mitigate schedule slippage. Reviews of the instrument design identified areas that would not withstand launch and/or flight forces—a finding that necessitated a redesign of the instrument structure. According to the deputy project manager, the contract was modified to bring responsibility for the instrument’s integration and testing activity in house. Project

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management stated that the contractor did not receive its award fee because of its poor performance, but will still be eligible for on-orbit award fees. OCO has experienced cost increases and schedule delays, and NASA has reported to the Congress that OCO has exceeded its development cost baseline. According to project officials, the project did not receive funding to begin its preliminary design phase in 2003, resulting in a one year schedule delay and an increase to the estimated mission cost of approximately $60 million. In addition, the movement of the instrument work in-house in October 2006 led to an increase in development costs and an inability to maintain the planned September 2008 launch date. NASA recently reported to the Congress an 18 percent increase in development cost from the baseline established in fiscal year 2008 and a schedule slip to December 2008. OCO was ready to launch in December but a delay at Vandenberg Air Force Base pushed the launch into 2009.

Project Office Comments The OCO project office provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. In addition, project officials commented that they believe the instrument and mission design were stable at the critical design review and neither have experienced significant changes to the CDRapproved design. They added that the project did experience problems during instrument development, assembly, and testing which prompted the project to be rebaselined. Since then, they stated that the project has stayed within its planned cost and schedule and was prepared to launch in December 2008, but was delayed because of unavailability of the launch range and launch vehicle certification issues.

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ORION CREW EXPLORATION VEHICLE (CEV) NASA’s Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), as part of the Constellation Program, is the nextgeneration spacecraft to carry crew and cargo to the International Space Station and to the Moon. The Constellation Program includes the CEV and a launch system that will replace the Space Shuttle, which is slated to retire in 2010. The five-meter diameter Orion capsule is to be launched by the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle. Orion will carry up to six astronauts to the International Space Station or four astronauts to the Moon after linking up with a lunar lander. The capsule will return to Earth and descend on parachutes to the surface. Orion has three main elements—the crew module (capsule), service module/spacecraft adapter, and launch abort system.

Project Status NASA is currently working toward a preliminary design review (PDR) for the Orion vehicle. As a result of several issues including unexpected weight growth, the PDR has been delayed by at least 9 months into fiscal year 2009. Additional schedule movement is under consideration to allow more time for integration of preliminary design products across the

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Orion organization to assure acceptable risk for completing the PDR with the right vehicle design.

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Source: Lockheed Martin Space Systems (artist depiction).

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Detailed Project Discussion The Orion project identified three critical technologies for the spacecraft: the phenolic impregnated carbon ablator (PICA) heat shield, which was used on Stardust, NASA’s comet sample return mission, landing airbags, and landing parachutes. The project identified a backup heat shield technology for PICA. Project officials said that both heat shield technologies have some heritage to earlier NASA missions, but both technologies have distinct risks. According to officials, PICA must be built and applied to Orion in sections creating gaps between the sections that need to be filled, similar to Space Shuttle tiles. The backup is lighter than PICA, but more difficult to manufacture. The PICA material is the chosen technology for the thermal protection system, but project officials said that they will select a single technology at PDR based on performance, how difficult it is to produce, weight, and cost. The project expects that all technologies will be mature by the preliminary design review. We found, however, that the heat shield development and manufacturing schedule is at risk and may impact Orion’s test schedule. In addition, Orion faces challenges in the development of the attitude control motor for the launch abort system. While similar attitude control motors have been demonstrated before, Orion’s motor design is complex, and any failures during developmental testing may cause unexpected delays. Although the Orion project has not reached a design review where we could assess design stability based on our metric, NASA recognizes that continued weight growth and requirements changes are contributing to instability in the Orion design. For example, according to agency officials, continuing Orion weight growth led NASA to redesign the Orion vehicle in fall 2007. As a result of engineering trade-offs that were made during this process, NASA modified the requirement for landing on land to landing in water, which would reduce vehicle mass. The Orion project is still working on these issues and has not yet finalized requirements or design. At the time of our review, NASA had not released cost and schedule estimates for completing the Orion project. NASA officials stated that these estimates will be made available at the conclusion of the Constellation Program non-advocate review, which takes places after PDR, when all NASA projects establish an integrated cost and schedule baseline. According to the Constellation program’s risk database, there is a high risk that Orion could face funding shortfalls in fiscal years 2009 through 2012, resulting in planned testing not being completed in time to support schedule and milestones. Furthermore, schedule delays have already occurred as a result of unexpected efforts to resolve mass, power, and other architecture issues and because the project needed sufficient time to attain an acceptable level of design risk.

Project Office Comments The Orion project office provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. The project office also commented that they believe steady progress has been made in all technology areas and appropriate technology readiness will be achieved prior to PDR in late summer 2009. They also believe that the Orion project has achieved stability in requirements growth and that NASA will continue to narrow design

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options as the project moves toward a confirmed baseline design. Project officials added the project is on schedule to finalize the choice of material for the heat shield by March 2009.

SOLAR DYNAMICS OBSERVATORY (SDO) NASA’s Solar Dynamics Observatory (SDO) will investigate how the Sun's magnetic field is structured and how its energy is converted and released into the heliosphere in the forms of solar wind, energetic particles, and variations in solar irradiance. The primary goal of the SDO mission is to understand the solar variations that influence life on Earth and humanity’s technological systems. It seeks to do this by determining how the Sun’s magnetic field is generated and structured, and how this stored magnetic energy is released. Analysis of data from SDO’s three instruments—Atmospheric Imaging Assembly (AIA), Extreme Ultraviolet Variability Experiment (EVE), and Helioseismic and Magnetic Imager (HMI)— will improve the science needed to enable space weather predictions.

Project Status

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SDO has experienced significant launch schedule delays. Funding cuts in fiscal year 2005 caused the project to slip SDO’s launch date from April to August 2008. Subsequent test scheduling issues and spacecraft parts problems caused a further delay until December 2008. A crowded launch manifest has now forced a 13-month delay to January 2010.

Source: SDO Project Office (artist depiction).

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Detailed Project Discussion The SDO project reported that its only critical technology—a 4K x 4K array of chargecoupled devices (CCD) to be used in both the HMI and AIA instruments—was mature at the project’s preliminary design review. The United Kingdom originally led development of the CCD camera systems, but dropped out of the project before the preliminary design review. Project officials also stated that SDO was purposefully designed to use existing technology components, but recognized that some technologies—such as the Kaband transmitter, highspeed bus, and high-gain antenna system—required modifications to be used on SDO. For example, the existing technology for the Ka-band transmitter required a new design for integration with SDO. Project officials told us that originally Northrop Grumman was to build the Ka-band transmitter, but its development was brought in house after contractor performance issues arose. SDO’s design was not stable at the critical design review (CDR). Following this review, the project experienced nearly a 1,200 percent increase in the number of releasable drawings expected. Project officials said only drawings for in-house structures such as propulsion systems, electronics, instrument ports, the high-gain antenna system, and the spacecraft were considered at CDR. Drawings for the instruments were not included and flight drawings were only in draft form at CDR. Project officials indicated that flight drawings did not need to be

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ready so far in advance of the project’s launch readiness date since there was enough time to build these components. SDO also experienced several problems during testing of flight hardware. The project suffered a technical setback in 2007 when the thermal vacuum chamber being used to test the high gain antenna overheated, resulting in the need to completely rebuild the antenna. Several other risks to the project were identified during testing. For example, testing identified a part on the spacecraft’s high-speed bus that, under certain circumstances, could cause the spacecraft to reset itself, which could mean failure to meet science data quality and completeness requirements. At the time of its critical design review in April 2005, the SDO project budget was reduced by one third for fiscal year 2005 because of other funding priorities. As a result, the project underwent a replan that delayed the project’s launch readiness date from April 2008 to August 2008. Subsequent scheduling issues for testing of the AIA instrument and other spacecraft parts problems caused further delays and cost increases: the launch date slipped to December 2008 resulting in a cost increase of $18.1 million. Because of launch manifest issues, SDO’s launch date has since slipped to January 2010.

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Project Office Comments The SDO project office provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. The project office commented that all of the problems they found during testing have been corrected, and that they believe the SDO design has been relatively stable and drawing releases occurred as planned. Project officials also said the project combined technology components in new ways in a new type of design, but the technologies themselves were not modified. They reported that SDO has been integrated and tested and is awaiting launch. Officials said the current delay and resulting cost increase is due to a crowded launch manifest.

STRATOSPHERIC OBSERVATORY FOR INFRARED ASTRONOMY (SOFIA) SOFIA is a joint project between NASA and the German Space Agency (DLR) to install a 2.5 meter telescope in a specially modified Boeing 747SP aircraft. This airborne observatory is designed to provide routine access to the visual, infrared, far-infrared, and submillimeter parts of the spectrum. Its mission objectives include studying many different kinds of astronomical objects and phenomena, including star birth and death; the formation of new solar systems; planets, comets, and asteroids in our solar system; and black holes at the center of galaxies. Interchangeable instruments for the observatory are being developed to allow a range of scientific measurement to be taken by SOFIA.

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Source: SOFIA Program Office.

Project Status SOFIA plans to have its first science flight in 2009. The SOFIA project was rebaselined in fiscal year 2007; its development costs have grown to almost four times its original estimate. The rebaseline sought to achieve science objectives earlier than previously planned, but resulted in a 9 month delay in full operational capability. Cost growth is in part because of

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challenges with the modification of the aircraft used as the platform for SOFIA. Project officials said the aircraft modification proved to be more complex job than anticipated.

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Detailed Project Discussion We could not assess the technology maturity or the design stability of the overall project as NASA did not provide information related to the aircraft modification. Data provided for development of the instruments that will fly on SOFIA generally indicates a high level of technology maturity. Many of these technologies have already been used on ground-based telescopes, and the early instruments are essentially finished and have been waiting for the observatory to be completed. Similarly, we could not assess design stability of the instruments since the drawings were still preliminary at the critical design review. NASA experienced challenges with the modification of the aircraft used as the platform for th SOFIA project, which led to significant cost overruns. Contributing to this challenge, according to project officials, was the aircraft manufacturer’s refusal to provide the blueprints for the 747SP. The plane had to be reverse engineered, making the modifications more difficult. Project officials also said that the contractor responsible for the aircraft’s modification and integration had limited experience with this type of work and did not fully understand the statement of work, further contributing to cost overruns. The SOFIA project also experienced problems related to the original prime contractor’s performance earlier in development. The SOFIA program manager said the original prime contractor was tasked to lead the project and NASA would purchase the raw data collected by SOFIA from the contractor. According to another NASA official, that contractor had neither the project management experience nor the design-build expertise necessary for the project— a situation that contributed to some of the SOFIA project’s problems. Consequently, NASA brought overall management of both development and operations of SOFIA in-house to achieve stronger technical, cost, and schedule controls. Project management was restructured and operational responsibility now resides with NASA’s Dryden Flight Research Center, while NASA’s Ames Research Center manages the project’s science. The original contractor is still under contract for some science operations and instrument development. As a result of ongoing cost growth early in development, the SOFIA project underwent a review in 2006. The project was slated for cancellation in 2006, and no funds were allocated to it in that fiscal year. However, later that year, SOFIA was reinstated. In 2007, it was redesigned and, in July of that year, rebaselined. This new plan sought to be more responsive to the science community and achieve science objectives earlier than previously planned by performing science flights while still maturing the aircraft and telescope, but resulted in a 9month delay in full operational capability. SOFIA’s current development costs are estimated to be about $950 million, almost four times the estimated development costs in 1997.

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Project Office Comments The project office provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. The project office also commented that since its rebaselining in July 2007, the SOFIA project has not experienced cost or schedule growth.

WIDE-FIELD INFRARED SURVEY EXPLORER (WISE) The WISE mission is designed to map the sky in infrared light and search for the nearest and coolest stars, the origins of stellar and planetary systems, the most luminous galaxies in the universe, and most main-belt asteroids larger than 3 kilometers. It is also intended to create a catalog of over 300 million sources that will be of interest to future infrared studies, including the upcoming James Webb Space Telescope mission. During its 6-month mission, WISE will use a four-channel imager to take overlapping snapshots of the sky. The WISE telescope optics will be cooled below 20 degrees Kelvin to keep it colder than the objects in space it will observe so that WISE can see the dim infrared emission from them rather than from the telescope itself.

Project Status

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The WISE project is currently on schedule to meet its November 2009 launch date. However, the failure of a structural model of the flight cryostat during vibration testing prompted a design change to add a soft-ride system to the launch vehicle, a solution that cost about $2.6 million. This failure has caused the project to descope some testing in order to regain lost cost and schedule margin.

Source: NASA/JPL-Caltech (artist depiction).

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Detailed Project Discussion Though the project is currently on track to meet its launch readiness date, the WISE project encountered schedule delays early in its life cycle. According to a project official, the project was not initially confirmed to proceed because of cost and technical concerns. As a result, the official said the project designed a smaller telescope and matured the technology that had concerned the review board. The preliminary design review for WISE was held in July 2005, and the project had its initial confirmation review in November 2005; however, there was a lack of funding in the NASA budget for the WISE project at that time so the formulation phase was extended. At this point in the project, the launch readiness date had slipped from 2008 to June 2009. A second confirmation review was held in October 2006, at which time the launch readiness date was set for October 2009. Although the second

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confirmation review happened one year later, the launch readiness date set at the original confirmation review only slipped 4 months since, according to a project official, the project was able to make progress during that year. WISE project officials identified two mission critical technologies—the solid hydrogen cryostat and the long wavelength infrared detector multiplexer—both of which were assessed as mature at the project’s preliminary design review. The solid hydrogen cryostat is a modification of a heritage technology. It is of similar design and construction and manufactured by the same contractor that produced cryostats for previous NASA missions. A project official said the project did not encounter any challenges with the development of the cryostat. WISE’s design, however, was not stable at the project’s critical design review. At the time of that review, the project had released only 70 percent of its engineering drawings. A project official stated that the drawing count and additional analyses, prototypes, and engineering models were used at the critical design review to evaluate the project’s design stability. The project has since released the remainder of the engineering drawings. The project did encounter some challenges during testing, which impacted the spacecraft’s design. The thermal-mass-dynamics-simulator, a structural model of the flight cryostat, failed during structural testing. According to a NASA official, analyses done by NASA and the cryostat’s contractor did not predict this problem. To mitigate this problem, the project added a soft-ride system to the launch vehicle to reduce loads on the cryostat. The failure also caused the project to accept more project risk by de-scoping two test events in order to regain reserve margin. According to the project office, the remedy cost $2.6 million, but the overall project schedule was not affected.

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Project Office Comments The WISE project office provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Project officials also commented that they believe that development of a complex cryogenic instrument from heritage technology was more challenging to the project than its design stability.

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION We provided a draft of this report to NASA for review and comment. In written comments, NASA recognizes that its goal is to improve its cost estimating and schedule and indicates that it will work hard to improve its performance. The actions NASA has taken to address our past recommendations are positive steps toward achieving successful project outcomes and ensuring that decision makers are appropriately investing the agency’s resources. However, NASA asserts that its projects are typically high risk, one-of-a-kind missions that do not readily fit into the knowledge-based framework associated with best practices in system acquisition. NASA’s own studies and those of others have shown that the challenges discussed in this report, as well as other project management challenges, have plagued the agency for decades. Given the fact that most of the projects we reviewed in this study breached congressional thresholds within a 2-

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to 3-year period, we remain convinced that NASA would benefit from a more disciplined, knowledge-based approach to its acquisitions. NASA sought to provide clarification and additional context to the information we provided in our observations. The agency indicated that the growth we reported for the 10 projects in implementation was a forward-looking estimate, rather than actual growth. For this review, NASA provided us baseline cost and schedule estimates for most projects and then provided us updated estimates for those same projects. We assume that the estimates NASA provided are projections based on costs incurred and schedule completed to date, as well as realistic assumptions about future costs and schedule plans. NASA also stated that cost and schedule growth for some projects was due to factors outside of the agency’s control. Specifically: 1. Two NASA missions—the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter and Solar Dynamics Observatory—experienced delays to their launch dates due to U.S. launch manifest prioritization. While NASA maintains that the launch slips for LRO and SDO were beyond its control, we believe that greater discipline in these and other acquisitions can still alleviate the impact of these factors. Specifically, given the launch manifest constraints that the agency is and has been experiencing, it would be prudent to adequately plan for such launch delays when determining cost and schedule reserves. 2. NASA believes that Aquarius, NPP, and Herschel projects experienced cost growth and schedule delays due to partner performance beyond its control. We believe that having the sufficient amount of insight into the partner’s activities and schedules may have allowed NASA to become aware of the issues earlier and to actively manage the issues throughout the development process. 3. NASA stated in its comments that not all cost growth is reported from the time of the NASA commitment to Congress for the performance, cost and schedule of its projects, as is the case with the James Webb Space Telescope. This project was just confirmed in the fall of 2008. Nonetheless, NASA provided GAO data for projects as late as December 2008. Since NASA develops baseline estimates for its projects at the confirmation review that are formal commitments, we would have expected NASA to report that data to us in December 2008. 4. NASA stated that it underestimates the complexity of developing first-of-a-kind missions. While we recognize the nature of NASA projects, as stated in our report, we remain convinced that a knowledge-based approach will allow the agency to better plan for and address these complexities. We are pleased that NASA recognizes our desire to assist the agency in improving its cost and schedule estimating and look forward to continuing to work with it to improve performance in these areas. NASA’s comments are reprinted in appendix I. NASA also provided technical comments, which we addressed throughout the report as appropriate and where sufficient evidence was provided to support significant changes.

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We will send copies of the report to NASA’s Administrator and interested congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. Should you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V. Sincerely yours,

Cristina Chaplain Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management List of Congressional Committees

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The Honorable Barbara A. Mikulski Chairman The Honorable Richard C. Shelby Ranking Member Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Committee on Appropriations United States Senate The Honorable Alan B. Mollohan Chairman The Honorable Frank R. Wolf Ranking Member Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives The Honorable Gabrielle Giffords Chairwoman The Honorable Pete Olson Ranking Member Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics Committee on Science and Technology House of Representatives

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APPENDIX I: COMMENTS FROM THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

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APPENDIX II: NASA LIFE CYCLE FOR FLIGHT SYSTEMS COMPARED TO A KNOWLEDGE-BASED APPROACH GAO has previously conducted work on NASA’s acquisition policy for space-flight systems, and in particular, on its alignment with a knowledge-based approach to system acquisitions. The figure below depicts this alignment. As the figure shows, NASA’s policy defines a project life cycle in two phases—the formulation14 and implementation15 phases, which are further divided into incremental pieces: phase A through phase F. Project formulation consists of phases A and B, during which time the projects develop and define the project requirements and cost/schedule basis and design for implementation, including an acquisition strategy. During the end of the formulation phase, leading up to the preliminary design review (PDR)16 and non-advocate review (NAR)17, the project team completes its preliminary design and technology development. NASA Procedural Requirements 7120.5D, NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements, specify that the project complete development of mission-critical or enabling technology, as needed, with demonstrated evidence of required technology qualification (i.e., component and/or breadboard validation in the relevant environment) documented in a technology readiness assessment report. The project must also develop, document, and maintain a project integrated baseline which includes the integrated master schedule and baseline life-cycle cost estimate. Implementing these requirements brings the project closer to ensuring that resources and needs match, but it is not fully consistent with knowledge point 1 of the knowledge-based acquisition life cycle. Our best practices show that demonstrating technology maturity at this point in the system life cycle should include a system or subsystem model or prototype demonstration in a relevant environment, not only component validation. As written, NASA’s policy does not require full technology maturity before a project enters the implementation phase. After project confirmation, the project begins implementation, consisting of phases C, D, E, and F. During phases C and D, the project performs final design and fabrication as well as testing of components and system assembly, integration, test, and launch. Phases E and F consist of operations and sustainment and project closeout. A second design review, the critical design review (CDR),18 is held during the implementation phase toward the end of phase C. The purpose of the CDR is to demonstrate that the maturity of the design is appropriate to support proceeding with full scale fabrication, assembly, integration, and test. Though this review is not a formal decision review, its requirements for a mature design and ability to meet mission performance requirements within the identifind cost and schedule constraints are similar to knowledge expected at knowledge point 2 of the knowledge-based acquisition life cycle. Furthermore, after CDR, the project must be approved at KDP D before continuing into the next phase. The NASA acquisition life cycle lacks a major decision review at knowledge point 3 to demonstrate that production processes are mature. According to NASA officials, the agency rarely enters a formal production phase due to the small quantities of space systems that they build.

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Source: NASA data and GAO analysis.

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Figure 1. NASA’s Life Cycle for Flight Systems Compared to a Knowledge-Based Approach

APPENDIX III: OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY Our objectgives were to report on the status and challenges faced by several NASA systems with life-cycle costs greater than $250 million and to discuss broader trends faced by the agency in its management of system acquisitions. In conducting our work, we evaluated performance and identifind challenges for each of 18 major projects19 included in this report. We summarized our assessments of each individual project in two components—a project profile and a detailed discussion of project challenges. We did not validate the data provided by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). However, we took appropriate steps to address data reliability. Specifically, we confirmed the accuracy of NASA-generated data with multiple sources within NASA and, in some cases, with external sources. Additionally, we corroborated data provided to us with published documentation. We determined that the data provided by NASA project offices were sufficiently reliable for our engagement purposes. We developed a standardized data collection instrument (DCI) that was completed by each project office and returned by December 2008. Through the DCI, we gathered basic information about projects as well as current and projected development activities for those

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projects. The cost, schedule and performance data estimates that NASA inputted were the most recent updates as of December 2008. At the time we collected the data, 4 of the 18 projects were in formulation and 14 were in implementation. However, NASA only provided cost and schedule data for 13 of the projects. To further understand performance issues, we talked with officials from each project office and NASA’s Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E). The results collected from each project office, Mission Directorate, and PA&E were summarized in a two-page report format providing a project overview; key cost, contract, and schedule data; and a discussion of the challenges associated with the deviation from relevant indicators from best practice standards. The aggregate measures and averages calculated were analyzed for meaningful relationships, e.g. relationship between cost growth and schedule slippage and knowledge maturity attained both at critical milestones and through the various stages of the project life cycle. We identified cost and/or schedule growth as significant where, in either case, a project’s cost and/or its schedule exceeded the thresholds for the Congressional reporting requirement. To supplement our analysis, we relied on GAO’s body of work over the past years that has examined acquisition issues across multiple agencies. These reports cover such issues as contracting, program management, acquisition policy, and cost estimating. GAO also has an extensive body of work related to challenges NASA has faced with regard to specific system acquisitions, financial management, and cost estimating. This work provided the context and basis for much of the general observations we made with regard to the projects we reviewed. Additionally, the discussions with the individual NASA projects helped us identify further challenges faced by the projects. Together, this contributed to our development of a short list of challenges discussed for each project. The challenges we identifind and discussed do not represent an exhaustive or exclusive list. They are subject to change and evolution as GAO continues this annual assessment in future years. Our work was performed primarily at NASA headquarters in Washington, D.C. In addition, we visited NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, Dryden Flight Research Center at Edwards Air Force Base in California, and Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland to discuss individual projects. We also met with representatives from NASA’s Jet Propulsion Lab in Pasadena, California and three NASA suppliers.

Data Limitations NASA only provided specific cost and schedule estimates for 13 of the 18 projects in our review. Agency officials believe that because one project, the James Webb Space Telescope, will not formally release its baseline cost and schedule estimates until the fiscal year 2010 budget submission to Congress, they are not required to provide those estimates to GAO. For three of the projects that had not yet entered implementation, NASA provided internal preliminary estimated total (life-cycle) cost ranges and associated schedules, from key decision point B (KDP-B), solely for informational purposes.20 NASA formally baselines and commits itself to cost and schedule targets for a project with a specific and aligned set of planned mission objectives at key decision point C (KDP-C), which follows a non-advocate

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review (NAR) and preliminary design review (PDR). KDP-C reflects the life-cycle point where NASA approves a project to leave the formulation phase and enter into the implementation phase. NASA explained that preliminary estimates are generated for internal planning and fiscal year budgeting purposes at KDP-B, which occurs mid-stream in the formulation phase, and hence, are not considered a formal commitment by the agency on cost and schedule for the mission deliverables. NASA officials contend that because of changes that occur to a project’s scope and technologies between KDP-B and KDP-C, estimates of project cost and schedule can change significantly heading toward KDP-C. Finally, NASA did not provide data for the Global Precipitation Measurement mission because NASA officials said it did not have a requirement for a KDP-B review, because it was authorized to be formulated prior to the requirements of NPR 7120.5D were in place.

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Project Profile Information on Each Individual Two-Page Assessment This section of the two-page assessment outlines the essentials of the project, its cost and schedule performance and its status. Project essentials reflect pertinent information about each project, including, where applicable, the major contractors and partners involved in the project. These organizations have primary responsibility over a major segment of the project, or in some cases, the entire project. Project performance is depicted according to cost and schedule changes in the various stages of the project life cycle. To assess the cost and schedule changes of each project we obtained data directly from NASA PA&E and from NASA’s Integrated Budget and Performance documents. For systems in implementation, we compared the latest available information with baseline cost and schedule estimates set for each project in the fiscal year 2007 or 2008 budget request. All cost information is presented in nominal “then year” dollars for consistency with budget data.21 Baseline costs are adjusted to reflect the cost accounting structure in NASA’s fiscal year 2009 budget estimates. For the fiscal year 2009 budget request, NASA changed its accounting practices from full-cost accounting to reporting only direct costs at the project level. The schedule assessment is based on acquisition cycle time, which is defined as the number of months between the project start, or formulation start, and projected or actual launch date.22 Formulation start generally refers to the initiation of a project; NASA refers to project start as key decision point A, or the beginning of the formulation phase. The preliminary design review typically occurs during the end of the formulation phase, followed by a confirmation review which allows the project to move into the implementation phase. The critical design review is held during the final design period of implementation and demonstrates that the maturity of the design is appropriate to support proceeding with full scale fabrication, assembly, integration, and test. Launch readiness is determined through a launch readiness review which verifins that the launch system and spacecraft/payloads are ready for launch. The implementation phase includes the operations of the mission and concludes with project disposal.

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We assessed the extent to which NASA projects exceeded their cost and schedule baselines. To do this, we compared the project baseline cost and schedule estimates with the current cost and schedule data reported by the project office in December 2008.

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Project Challenges Discussion on Each Individual Two-Page Assessment To assess the project challenges for each project, we submitted a data collection instrument to each project office. We also held interviews with each of the project offices to discuss the information on the data collection instrument. These discussions led to identification of further challenges faced by NASA projects. These challenges were largely apparent in the projects that had entered the implementation phase. We then reviewed pertinent project documentation, such as the project plan, schedule, risk assessments, and major project reviews. To assess technology maturity, we asked project officials to assess the technology readiness levels (TRL) of each of the project’s critical technologies at various stages of project development. Originally developed by NASA, TRLs are measured on a scale of one to nine, beginning with paper studies of a technology’s feasibility and culminating with a technology fully integrated into a completed product. (See appendix IV for the definitions of technology readiness levels.) In most cases, we did not validate the project offices’ selection of critical technologies or the determination of the demonstrated level of maturity. However, we sought to clarify the technology readiness levels in those cases where the information provided raised concerns, such as where a critical technology was reported as immature late in the project development cycle. Additionally, we asked project officials to explain the environments in which technologies were tested. Our best practices work has shown that a technology readiness level of 6— demonstrating a technology as a fully integrated prototype in a realistic environment—is the level of maturity needed to minimize risks for space systems entering product development. In our assessment, the technologies that have reached technology readiness level 6 are referred to as fully mature due to the difficulty of achieving technology readiness level 7, which is demonstrating maturity in an operational environment—space. Projects with critical technologies that did not achieve maturity by the preliminary design review were assessed as having a technology maturity project challenge. We did not assess technology maturity for those projects which had not yet reached the preliminary design review at the time of this assessment.23 To assess design stability, we asked project officials to provide the percentage of engineering drawings completed or projected for completion by the preliminary and critical design reviews and as of our current assessment.24 In most cases, we did not verify or validate the percentage of engineering drawings provided by the project office. However, we collected the project offices’ rationale for cases where it appeared that only a small number of drawings were completed by the time of the design reviews or where the project office reported significant growth in the number of drawings released after CDR. In accordance with GAO best practices, projects were assessed as having achieved design stability if they had released at least 90 percent of all projected drawings by the critical design review. Projects which had not met this metric were determined to have a design stability project challenge. Though

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some projects used other methods to assess design stability, such as computer and engineering models and analyses, we did not analyze the use of these other methods and therefore could not assess the design stability of those projects. We could not assess design stability for those projects which had not yet reached the critical design review at the time of this assessment. To assess the complexity of heritage technology, we interviewed project officials about the use of heritage technologies in their projects.25 We asked them what heritage technologies were being used, what effort was needed to modify the form, fit, and function of the technology for use in the new system, and whether the project encountered any problems in modifying the technology. Heritage technologies were not considered critical technologies by several of the projects we reviewed. Based on our interviews, review of cost and schedule data from the data collection instruments, and previous GAO work on space systems, we determined whether complexity of heritage technology was a challenge for a particular project. To assess whether projects encountered challenges with contractor performance, we interviewed project officials about their interaction and experience with contractors. We also interviewed contractor officials from Orbital Sciences Corporation, Ball Aerospace and Technologies Corporation, and Raytheon Space Systems about their experiences contracting with NASA. We were informed about contractor performance problems pertaining to their workforce, the supplier base, and technical and corporate experience. We also discussed contract fees and situations in which NASA and a contractor agreed that the contractor would use their award fee to cover project cost overruns. We assessed a project as having this challenge if these contractor performance problems, as confirmed by NASA and, where possible, the project contractor, caused the project to experience a cost overrun, schedule delay, or decrease in mission capability. For projects which did not have a major contractor, we considered this challenge not applicable to the project. To assess whether projects encountered challenges with development partner performance, we interviewed NASA project officials about their interaction with international or domestic partners during project development. Development partner performance was considered a challenge for the project if project officials indicated that domestic or foreign partners were experiencing problems with project development that impacted the cost, schedule, or performance of the project for NASA. These challenges were specific to the partner organization or caused by a contractor to that partner organization. For projects which did not have an international or domestic development partner, we considered this challenge not applicable to the project. The individual project offices were given an opportunity to comment on and provide technical clarifications to the two-page assessments prior to their inclusion in the final product. We conducted this performance audit from February 2008 to March 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

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APPENDIX IV: TECHNOLOGY READINESS LEVELS Technology readiness level 1. Basic principles observed and reported.

2. Technology concept and/or application formulated.

Discription

Demonstration Environment

Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific research begins to be translated into applied research an development. Examples might include paper studies of a technology’s basic properties

None (paper studies and None analysis)

Invention begins. Once basic principles are observed, practical applications can be invented. The application is speculative and there is no proof or detailed analysis to support the assumption. Examples are still limited to paper studies.

None (paper studies and None analysis)

3. Analytical and experimental critical function and/ or characteristic proof of concept.

Active research and development is initiated. This includes analytical studies and laboratory studies to physically validate analytical predictions of separate elements of the technology. Examples include components that are not yet integrated or representative. 4. Component and/or Basic technological components breadboard. are integrated to establish that the Validation in pieces will work together. This is laboratory relatively “low fidelity” compared to environment. the eventual system. Examples include integration of “ad hoc” hardware in a laboratory.

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Hardware

5. Component and/or breadboard validation in relevant environment.

Fidelity of breadboard technology increases significantly. The basic technological components are integrated with reasonably realistic supporting elements so that the technology can be tested in a simulated environment. Examples include “high fidelity” laboratory integration of components.

6. System/subsystem model or prototype demonstration in a relevant environment.

Representative model or prototype system, which is well beyond the breadboard tested for TRL 5, is tested in a relevant environment. Represents a major step up in a technology’s demonstrated readiness. Examples include testing a prototype in a high fidelity laboratory environment or in simulated realistic environment.

Analytical studies and demonstration of nonscale individual components (pieces of subsystem).

Lab

Low fidelity breadboard. Integration of nonscale components to show pieces will work together. Not fully functional or form or fit but representative of technically feasible approach suitable for flight articles. High fidelity breadboard. Functionally equivalent but not necessarily form and/or fit (size weight, materials, etc). Should be approaching appropriate scale. May include integration of several components with reasonably realistic support elements/ subsystems to demonstrate functionality. Prototype. Should be very close to form, fit and function. Probably includes the integration of many new components and realistic supporting elements/subsystems if needed to demonstrate full functionality of the subsystem.

Lab

Lab demonstrating functionality but not form and fit. May include flight demonstrating breadboard in surrogate aircraft. Technology ready for detailed design studies.

High-fidelity lab demonstration or limited/restricted flight demonstration for a relevant environment. Integration of technology is well defined.

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Technology readiness level 7. System prototype demonstration in an realistic environment.

Discription

Prototype near or at planned operational system. Represents a major step up from TRL 6, requiring the demonstration of an actual system prototype in a realistic environment, such as in an aircraft, vehicle or space. Examples include testing the prototype in a test bed aircraft. 8. Actual system Technology has been proven to completed work in its final form and under and “flight qualified” expected conditions. In almost all through cases, this TRL represents the test and end of true system development. demonstration. Examples include developmental test and evaluation of the system in its intended weapon system to determine if it meets design specifications. 9. Actual system Actual application of the technology “flight in its final form and under proven” through mission conditions, such as those successful encountered in operational test mission operations. and evaluation. In almost all cases, this is the end of the last “bug fixing” aspects of true system development. Examples include using the system under operational mission conditions.

Hardware Prototype. Should be form, fit and function integrated with other key supporting elements/subsystems to demonstrate full functionality of subsystem.

Demonstration Environment Flight demonstration in representative realistic environment such as flying test bed or demonstrator aircraft. Technology is well substantiated with test data.

Flight qualified hardware Development Test and Evaluation (DT&E) in the actual system application

Actual system in final form

Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) in operational mission conditions

Source: GAO and its analysis of National Aeronautics and Space Administration data.

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APPENDIX V: GAO CONTACT AND STAFF ACKNOWLEDGMENTS GAO Contact Cristina Chaplain (202) 512-4841 or [email protected]

Acknowledgments In additional to the contact named above, Jim Morrison, Assistant Director; Greg Campbell; Richard A. Cederholm; Brendan S. Culley; Neil D. Feldman; Leon S. Gill; Rachel L. Girshick; Kristine R. Heuwinkel; Deanna R. Laufer; Shelby S. Oakley; Kenneth E. Patton; Sylvia Schatz; and Letisha T. Watson made key contributions to this report.

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GAO’s Mission The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost is through GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday afternoon, GAO posts on its Web site newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products, go to www.gao.gov and select “E-mail Updates.”

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Order by Phone The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s Web site, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm. Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or TDD (202) 5122537. Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional information.

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Public Affairs Chuck Young, Managing Director, [email protected], (202) 512-4800 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 Washington, DC 20548

End Notes

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1

National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-161, §103; 42 U.S.C. § 16613(b)(f)(4). 2 42 U.S.C. § 16613(d). 3 NASA also provided preliminary estimates in the form of cost ranges for three projects in the formulation phase. Since the values provided were ranges, rather than specific values, we did not include these projects in our analysis. Further, the agency did not provide schedule baselines for these projects so we could not determine any schedule changes they experienced. 4 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Key Decisions to Be Made on Future Combat System, GAO-07-376 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2007); Defense Acquisitions: Improved Business Case Key for Future Combat System’s Success, GAO-06-564T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4, 2006) ; NASA: Implementing a Knowledge-Based Acquisition Framework Could Lead to Better Investment Decisions and Project Outcomes, GAO-06-218 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 21, 2005); NASA’s Space Vision: Business Case for Prometheus 1 Needed to Ensure Requirements Match Available Resources, GAO-05-242 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2005). 5 GAO-05-242. 6 National Aeronautics and Space Administration Procedural Requirements 7120.5D, NASA Spaceflight Program and Project Management Requirements (Mar. 6, 2007). (Hereinafter cited as NPR 7120.5D (Mar. 6, 2007). 7 NPR 7120.5D, paragraph 2.4.5 (Mar. 6, 2007). 8 GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2007). 9 NASA, Plan for Improvement in the GAO High-Risk Area of Contract Management (Oct. 31, 2007). 10 We also reviewed the James Webb Space Telescope, but NASA did not provide cost or schedule data for that project even though it is in implementation. 11 For purposes of our analysis, significant cost and schedule growth occurs when a project’s cost and/or its schedule growth exceeds the thresholds established for Congressional reporting. 12 42 U.S.C. § 16613(b). 13 Appendix IV provides a description of the metrics used to assess technology maturity in this review. 14 NASA defines formulation as the identification of how the program or project supports the Agency’s strategic needs, goals, and objectives; the assessment of feasibility, technology and concepts; risk assessment, team building, development of operations concepts and acquisition strategies; establishment of high-level requirements and success criteria; the preparation of plans, budgets, and schedules essential to the success of a program or project; and the establishment of control systems to ensure performance to those plans and alignment with current Agency strategies. NPR 7120.5D, paragraph 1.2.1 a. (Mar. 6, 2007). 15 The implementation phase is defined as the execution of approved plans for the development and operation of the program/project, and the use of control systems to ensure performance to approved plans and continued alignment with the Agency’s strategic needs, goals, and objectives. NPR 7120.5D, paragraph 1.2.1 c. (Mar. 6, 2007). 16 According to NPR 7120.5D, Table 2-6 (Mar. 6, 2007), the PDR demonstrates that the preliminary design meets all system requirements with acceptable risk and within the cost and schedule constraints and establishes the basis for proceeding with detailed design. It shows that the correct design option has been selected, interfaces have been identifind, and verification methods have been described. Full baseline cost and schedules, as well as risk assessments, management systems, and metrics are presented. 17 According to NPR 7120.5D, Table 2-6 (Mar. 6, 2007), the PDR demonstrates that the preliminary design meets all system requirements with acceptable risk and within the cost and schedule constraints and establishes the basis for proceeding with detailed design. It shows that the correct design option has been selected, interfaces have been identifind, and verification methods have been described. Full baseline cost and schedules, as well as risk assessments, management systems, and metrics are presented. 18 According to NPR 7120.5D, appendix A (Mar. 6, 2007), a non-advocate review (NAR) is comprised of the analysis of a proposed program or project by a (non-advocate) team composed of management, technical, and resources experts (personnel) from outside the advocacy chain of the proposed program or project. It provides agency management with an independent assessment of the readiness of the program/project to proceed into implementation.

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According to NPR 7120.5D, Table 2-6 (Mar. 6, 2007), the CDR demonstrates that the maturity of the design is appropriate to support proceeding with full scale fabrication, assembly, integration, and test, and that the technical effort is on track to complete the flight and ground system development and mission operations in order to meet mission performance requirements within the identifind cost and schedule constraints. Progress against management plans, budget, and schedule, as well as risk assessments are presented. 20 These missions include: Ares I, Landsat Data Continuity Mission and Orion. 21 Due to changes in NASA’s accounting structure, its historical cost data is relatively inconsistent. As such, we used “then-year” dollars to report data consistent with the data that NASA reported to us. 22 Some projects reported that their spacecraft would be ready for launch sooner than the date that the launch authority could provide actual launch services. In these cases, we used the actual launch date for our analysis rather than the date that the project reported readiness. 23 According to NASA officials, projects that were in formulation at the time of the agency’s 2007 revision of its project management policy are required to comply with that policy. Projects that had already entered implementation at the time of the revision were directed to implement those requirements which would not adversely affect the project’s cost and schedule baselines. 24 In our calculation for the percentage of total number of drawings projected for release, we used the number of drawings released at the critical design review as a fraction of the total number of drawings projected, including where drawing growth occurred. So, the denominator in the calculation may have been larger than what was projected at the critical design review. We felt that this more accurately reflected the design stability of the project. 25 NASA distinguishes critical technologies from heritage technologies. NASA officials do not believe that heritage technologies are the same as critical technologies because they believe critical technology does not rely on existing technology. GAO best practices describe critical technologies as those that are required for the project to successfully meet customer requirements, regardless of whether or not they are based on existing or heritage technology. For the purposes of this review, we distinguish between the two types because NASA did not report heritage technologies as critical technologies in our data collection instrument.

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Chapter 4

NASA COST MANAGEMENT HEARING—SCOLESE TESTIMONY

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Christopher Scolese Ms. Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss NASA’s progress in managing the cost and schedule of the Agency’s projects. NASA missions have allowed us to rove the surface of other planets, to send people to live and work in space, to improve our understanding of the Universe, and to better understand our Earth. NASA recognizes the importance of delivering missions on cost and on schedule, and developing clear and stable baselines for planning. We strive to continually improve our tools to identify issues so we can implement corrective action. Today, my testimony will outline NASA’s progress to date and the actions the Agency is taking to continue to improve its performance. We are pleased that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) recognizes our efforts to mitigate acquisition management risk and lay a foundation to improve project cost and schedule performance.

FEDERAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT As one of the Federal government’s research and development (R&D) organizations, NASA functions in an environment where we must accept and manage considerable risk and uncertainty. NASA develops scientific instruments, spacecraft, and new launch systems that redefine state-of-the-art. The Agency strives to standardize and reuse systems and capabilities where feasible. However, where we endeavor to achieve the next goal, develop the next technology, and make the next discovery, we venture beyond the realm of past experience and into an environment of uncertainty and higher risk. This is just one of the facts of life in an aggressive and exciting R&D environment. Let me take a moment to share some examples with you, partially because they are illuminating, and partially because they show why people really love working at NASA.

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The International Space Station (ISS), permanently crewed since November 2000, is being built by over a dozen nations. The ISS already has the American Destiny and European Columbus science laboratories on board and, with the flight of STS-127 later this year, the Japanese Kibo laboratory will be complete. Upon its completion next year, the ISS will have a mass of over 900,000 pounds and be a world-class research center for conducting experiments in life and materials sciences; it will also serve as a training ground for long-duration human space missions. The ISS has repeatedly demonstrated the ability of nations to work together on complex projects: with Station components being designed and built in different countries, many were actually assembled for the first time in orbit. Now, international crews are operating, repairing, and utilizing the ISS for the benefit of the world. This kind of cooperation is essential if we are to continue to expand our reach beyond our planet. Research results have already improved medical science here on Earth: as you probably know, experiments conducted aboard the Space Shuttle and the ISS have been useful in demonstrating techniques for the development of salmonella vaccines. The ISS Program represents unprecedented international cooperation on a peacetime task of immense technical complexity. In the past five years, NASA has landed three vehicles on the surface of Mars – each without human intervention. The planning and on-board capabilities to avoid obstacles make these landings some of the most difficult accomplishments imaginable. Think of shooting a basketball from Washington, DC, and making a perfect shot through a basketball hoop located at in Los Angeles without hitting the rim, while the rim is moving. The discoveries made by these rovers and their companion orbiters have changed our view of Mars. We now know that, at one time, Mars was indeed a wet planet, and our vehicles have found ice on its surface. More mysteries remain to be unlocked. The Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) is the next in the series of missions to Mars. MSL is significantly more complex than its predecessors, as it builds upon the lessons and discoveries they made to address the next level of scientific questions. As a result, the MSL vehicle is much larger -- about the size of a MiniCooper -- than the Mars Rovers Spirit and Opportunity -- roughly the size of a coffee table -so it requires a new type of landing system. The Nation and the world benefit from NASA's breakthrough research in Earth science and technology on a daily basis. This legacy began in April 1960 when NASA launched the world's first environmental satellite. The focus then was to improve weather forecasts. Our focus now is much more challenging. NASA conducts a comprehensive research program to advance fundamental knowledge on the most important scientific questions on the global and regional integrated Earth system. NASA presently operates 15 on-orbit Earth science missions, making measurements ranging from precision sea level through atmospheric chemistry and composition, and winds through ocean color and land vegetation, as well as ice cover and surface temperature. NASA’s robust research and analysis develops outstanding scientific advances that improve climate projections and provide societal applications. NASA has six missions in formulation and development, and is pleased to have a first-ever National Research Council Decadal Survey for Earth science and applications that establishes NASA’s priorities for satellite missions to study changes in the Earth’s climate and environment. Achieving simultaneity of NASA's outstanding measurements is a major challenge for progress in understanding the changing climate, its interaction with life, and how human activities affect the environment.

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As you can imagine, the NASA and Earth science communities are saddened at the loss of a key Earth science asset when the NASA Orbiting Carbon Observatory satellite failed to reach orbit last week following launch. NASA immediately convened a Mishap Investigation Board to determine the cause of the launch failure. In addition, we are assessing options for its replacement. Although rare, these kinds of events demonstrate the need for flexibility in NASA’s ongoing portfolio. The scientific and technical results across NASA’s portfolio are substantial, and often extraordinary. However, as we push the performance envelope on several fronts, NASA’s specific cost and schedule performance has, indeed, been less than desired in the past. It is NASA’s responsibility to maximize the value of the American taxpayer’s dollars. We already have some tools in place, but we also have plans to incorporate additional tools and make better use of existing tools and processes to improve our delivery of missions on cost and on schedule.

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POTENTIAL CAUSES OF COST GROWTH AND SCHEDULE DELAY NASA puts great effort into managing the environment of uncertainty that naturally surrounds a project. Some uncertainties are within the realm of the project’s control. Proposers can be overly optimistic in their efforts to provide the most attractive package in a competition. The cost savings assumed based on the use of “heritage technology” for spacecraft or instruments can be over estimated. New technology development can ultimately be much more challenging than anticipated. Sometimes inadequate time is planned for early engineering efforts and refinement of requirements. These are all areas within project accountability and the majority of this statement outlines the steps NASA has taken to address these issues. I would like to digress for a moment to add a bit of “ground truth” on cost or schedule variances. NASA focuses a great deal of effort on measuring variations from plans and responding to trend patterns reported in monthly Baseline Performance Reviews, and in program and project reviews. NASA’s renewed emphasis on the use of various tools such as Earned Value Management also help provide indications of problems early enough to take corrective action. Reports of apparent cost growth can be misleading. If one measures project cost or schedule from the very earliest conceptual phase, as compared to measuring cost after the preliminary design is complete, the project typically appears to have incurred significant growth. NASA commits to project cost and schedule estimates at the completion of the preliminary design phase when technology readiness is better understood, preliminary designs are complete, and partner arrangements and industrial base considerations are better understood. This information provides a much better basis for estimating cost and schedule. While useful and necessary for the initial planning phase of a mission, early estimates are, at best, educated guesses made with preliminary conceptual information. As an example, although there remains plenty of room for improvement in the case of MSL, one of these early conceptual estimates quoted in the press for MSL was not even an estimate produced by NASA.

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Other events can occur that are not within the control of the project, but are typically under the control, and within the accountability, of the overall program or the Agency. Owing to other stresses in the host program, funding flexibility to address problems may be inadequate, there may be inadequate validation of cost and schedule assumptions, or performance on one project may negatively affect others. This last point needs clarification. Not all projects that adversely impact other projects are poor performers. Sometimes they are stellar performers. For example, because on- orbit lifetime of a mission is difficult to predict from afar, projects already in operation that extend well beyond the original planned operational life may require more funding, resulting in the need to obtain resources from other sources, often projects in development. As an example, the Spirit and Opportunity Rovers on Mars were planned for approximately 3 months of operation, but are now past 5 years of operations and are still returning valuable data. NASA also tries to estimate these costs and control impacts by having a group of independent experts periodically review these extraordinary missions to assess their value and the likelihood that they will operate until the end of the projected budget horizon. However, who could have guessed that the Terra Earth Science mission -- approaching its 10th anniversary -- would operate over twice its design life, or that the Voyagers -- at over 30 years in space -- would still be operational outside of our solar system? Of course, some events occur that are not under the control of the project or the Agency, although we take measures to mitigate the attendant risk. In the case of the Solar Dynamics Observatory, national launch manifest priorities -- not project performance -- resulted in delays of about a year, with the attendant cost growth. In the case of the Glory project -- a first-of-a-kind Earth science mission -- the mission experienced unexpected problems due to a loss of contractor expertise, which is illustrative of challenges in the aerospace industrial base. Simply put, the number of capable suppliers has substantially contracted and the demand is such that the skills of the remaining suppliers are difficult to maintain. Contributions from our international partners can be late. Launch vehicle delays or price increases have also had significant impacts. External changes in budget profiles, including the unavoidable impacts of Continuing Resolutions, can also occur. Out of the ten NASA projects in the GAO QuickLook Report that exceeded the Congressionally-mandated cost and schedule thresholds, approximately half did so as a result of external factors; some with limited solution options open to NASA. In an effort to better understand the extent to which our performance has been impacted by events that are beyond the control of the project and program, we have initiated a study of NASA and Department of Defense projects with the objective of being able to quantitatively separate internal and external growth. This will enable the Agency to better compare the results of a project’s detailed cost estimate with the results of analytical cost estimates based upon historical performance. NASA currently anticipates completing this study by the end of calendar year 2009. We will keep the Congress informed of our progress in evaluating these factors.

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HISTORICAL COST AND SCHEDULE STUDIES Over time, various NASA organizations have studied cost and schedule growth after the fact. Most of the studies were focused on a specific question, or measured cost or schedule from different points in a project’s life cycle. Additionally, the individual research tasks utilized different data, methods, and approaches, and thus are not directly comparable. To provide a proactive means to control costs, NASA has implemented monthly reviews -- using common data set requirements and consistent data and analyses that are centrally coordinated -- to produce results that are comparable from project to project and from year to year. It is this data that is now reported both internally to NASA and to the Administration and externally to the Congress. The January 2009 update to the GAO High-Risk Series notes a number of these changes that have improved NASA’s standard reporting. Additionally, NASA is using the research on historical cost and schedule performance to identify areas that need to be addressed with corrections to tools or processes. A number of changes have been initiated that address common issues such as optimism in cost estimates and schedules, inadequate identification of risks, and unrealistic assumptions on technology maturity, along with external issues such as instability in funding, launch vehicle issues, and the performance of partners.

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STEPS ALREADY TAKEN The Agency has undertaken a number of actions to address cost and schedule growth through modifications to NASA’s project lifecycle. These actions are also noted in the NASA High-Risk Corrective Action Plan, which the Agency developed in recognition of the complexity and cross- functional nature of the issues identified in the GAO High-Risk Series. While NASA continues to address the issues outlined in the GAO High-Risk series, we were pleased that the January 2009 update to the series highlighted the efforts we have made to improve NASA acquisition management. Some actions that NASA has taken relate to the definition of a project life cycle that is now used by all space flight projects. Examples include: •

•

The project life cycle has six phases that each space flight project now must address. This is a change from the past, where different types of projects followed different paths, so that comparisons were more difficult to make, and most importantly, progress across NASA was difficult to assess. To ensure that we have an unbiased assessment of project performance and plans, NASA has implemented the use of Standing Review Boards to evaluate the project at each key decision point in the project’s life cycle. The Standing Review Boards are composed of discipline experts who are independent of the project being reviewed. The Boards provide the Agency with independent advice on project design implementation, manufacturing plans, cost and schedule planning, risks, and margins. This change helps address past performance issues related to optimism, inadequate evaluation of technology maturity, heritage assumptions, etc.

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U. S. Government Accountability Office •

NASA commits to the project content, cost, and schedule baseline only after successful completion of the Key Decision Point C (KDP-C). At that point in the lifecycle, following the completion of the Preliminary Design Review, project management has a more thorough understanding of the technological maturity, complexity, and risk associated with the project. As a number of risks have been retired by that point, and the implications of the project requirements are better understood, the baseline established at KDP-C provides a more meaningful basis for measuring cost and schedule performance. Several NASA research efforts confirm that the Agency’s cost and schedule performance is better when measured from the KDP-C gate than when measured from the earlier milestones.

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RECENT ACTIONS In January 2009, NASA adopted a new acquisition strategy policy, which improves its ability to manage performance risk (including the adoption of probabilistic cost and schedule estimating methods). Among its features, the new policy requires space flight and information technology projects and programs to develop joint cost and schedule probabilistic estimates. Probabilistic estimating provides NASA with an approach that fully integrates technical, cost, and schedule plans and risks to develop both an understanding of the sensitivity of parameters to each other and the most likely estimate. Using this approach allows NASA to understand and document how the mitigation of technical risks would enable an increase in the project confidence level. Conversely, the introduction of a budget reduction would have the effect of increasing technical and schedule risks and thus lower the confidence level for the project. The use of probabilistic estimates also generates baseline values that include funding to address impacts associated with contingencies and uncertainties, such as industrial base, partner performance and technology optimism. The introduction of probabilistic joint cost and schedule estimating puts NASA on the leading edge of applying these techniques in both the Federal and space sectors. Because this estimating approach requires the employment of new tools and techniques, full implementation will take some time to deploy; we are currently estimating at least two years to develop the tools, training, and understanding across the Agency. Given the deployment and the typical project development cycle of 3-5 years, it is unlikely that NASA will be able to evaluate the impact of these changes for a few more years. The recent GAO QuickLook Report underlines the fact that it takes time to realize the results from policy and process changes. Further, as we implement this joint confidence level policy, we are looking back at existing projects in development to ascertain risks and make adjustments where prudent to improve our cost and schedule posture. As noted earlier in this testimony, there have been issues with the consistency of historical data used for various cost research studies. In another recent action, NASA has taken steps to improve and bring consistency to the cost and schedule data collection that is now included in the Cost Analysis Data Requirement documents. This effort is also part of the NASA High Risk Corrective Action Plan. These documents serve to collect data in a standard format to allow us to assess performance on current projects and to provide a

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reference for future activities. At this time, NASA has completed detailed documentation on 38 historical projects and has captured data from 90 KDPs on current projects. NASA is committed to using our tools and processes to identify issues and take corrective actions to address those issues. The steps that we have taken to standardize our project lifecycle, to utilize Standing Review Boards to provide focused assessments at Key Decision Points, the renewed emphasis on tools such as Earned Value Management, the institution of strengthened acquisition planning and monthly reviews, and the use of joint cost and schedule confidence levels in our decision making, have all moved NASA along a path towards improving our delivery of projects on time and within budget.

CONCLUSION

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In closing, cost and schedule estimation and performance are extremely important, and the Agency has taken a number of steps in recent years that have been acknowledged in the January 2009 update to the GAO High-Risk Series. We understand and support transparency and accountability in NASA project cost and schedule assessment. NASA is dedicated to the continuous improvement of its acquisition management processes and performance. There are many improvement efforts already in place, and others are underway. From these, we have developed -- and will continue to develop -- significantly improved NASA processes yielding results now and in the years to come. I would be happy to respond to any questions you or the other Members of the Subcommittee may have.

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Chapter 5

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATIONS: OVERVIEW, FY2009 BUDGET, AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS ∗

Daniel Morgan1 and Carl E. Behrens2 1

Science and Technology Policy 2 Energy Policy

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SUMMARY The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) conducts U.S. civilian space and aeronautics activities. For FY2009, the Bush Administration requested $17.6 14 billion for NASA, an increase of 1.8% from the FY2008 appropriation of $ 17.309 billion. The House Appropriations Committee recommended $ 17.769 billion. The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $17.8 14 billion. The NASA Authorization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-422) authorizes $20.2 10 billion. The Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (H.R. 1105 as passed by the House) would provide 17.782 billion. Pending enactment of an FY2009 appropriations act, NASA is operating at FY2008 funding levels under the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2009 (Division A of P.L. 110-329) as extended by H.J.Res. 38. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5) provided an additional $1 .002 billion. The Vision for Space Exploration—returning humans to the Moon by 2020 and eventually going on to Mars—has been the major focus of NASA’s activities since President Bush announced it in 2004. It is not yet clear whether or how the Obama Administration will seek to modify the Vision. Issues for Congress include the development of new vehicles for human spaceflight, plans for the transition to these vehicles after the space shuttle is retired in 2010, and the balance in NASA’s priorities between human space exploration and the agency’s activities in science and aeronautics.

∗

This is an edited, reformatted and augmented version of a CRS Report for Congress publication dated March 2009.

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AGENCY OVERVIEW The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was created by the 1958 National Aeronautics and Space Act (P.L. 85-568) to conduct civilian space and aeronautics activities. Its programs include human and robotic spaceflight, technology development, and scientific research. NASA opened its doors on October 1, 1958, almost exactly a year after the Soviet Union launched the world’s first satellite, Sputnik.1 The first day of FY2009 was NASA’s 50th anniversary. NASA is headquartered in Washington, DC. It has nine major field centers: Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA; Dryden Flight Research Center, Edwards, CA; Glenn Research Center, Cleveland, OH; Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, MD; Johnson Space Center, near Houston, TX; Kennedy Space Center, near Cape Canaveral, FL; Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA; Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, AL; and Stennis Space Center, in Mississippi, near Slidell, LA. In addition, it has a federally funded research and development center, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasadena, CA, operated by the California Institute of Technology. NASA’s programs are organized into four Mission Directorates: Aeronautics Research, Exploration Systems, Science, and Space Operations. More information on the agency’s centers, directorates, and management team can be found on the NASA website at http://www.nasa.gov/about/org_index.html.

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NASA’S FY2009 BUDGET The requested FY2009 budget for NASA is $17.6 14 billion, which is 1.8% more than the FY2008 appropriation of $1 7.309 billion.2 The House committee recommended $1 7.769 billion.3 The Senate committee recommended $17.8 14 billion.4 The NASA Authorization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-422) authorizes $20.2 10 billion. FY2009 began on October 1, 2009. The Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (H.R. 1105 as passed by the House) would provide $1 7.7 82 billion. Pending the enactment of an appropriations act for FY2009, NASA is operating at FY2008 funding levels under the authority of the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2009 (Division A of P.L. 110-329) as extended by H.J.Res. 38. That authority extends through March 11, 2009. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5) provided an additional $1 .002 billion. For a breakdown of these figures by program, see Table 1. For FY2009, NASA again changed how it accounts for overhead expenses.5 In the previous system, indirect costs were included in each program’s budget. In the new system, most indirect costs are budgeted separately in the Cross-Agency Support account. This change reduces the stated budget of each program (except Cross-Agency Support) without affecting program content or NASA’s total budget. For any program, amounts expressed in the new accounting system are not directly comparable with amounts expressed in the previous system. Table 1 displays FY2008 amounts both ways: in the old system, as enacted, and in the new system, for comparability with FY2009.

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Table 1. NASA Budget, FY2008 and FY2009 ($ in millions)

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FY2008 as FY2008 Enacted Comparable to FY2009 Science 5,546.9 4,706.2 Earth Science 1,524.2 1,280.3 Planetary 1,387.4 1,247.5 Science Astrophysics 1,578.8 1,337.5 Heliophysics 1,056.6 840.9 Unallocated — — Adjustment Aeronautics 621.9 511.7 Exploration 3,821.0 3,143.1 Constellation 2,991.0 2,471.9 Systems Advanced 830.0 671.1 452.3 Capabilities Unallocated — — Adjustment Space 6,733.7 5,526.2 Operations Space Shuttle 3,981.1 3,266.7 International 2,209.5 1,813.2 Space Station Space and 543.1 446.3 Flight Suppt. Education 177.7 146.8 Cross-Agency 375.6 3,242.9 Support Inspector 32.6 32.6 General Total 17,309.4 17,309.4

FY2009 Request 4,441.5 1,367.5 1,334.2

FY2009 House Cmte. 4,518.0 1,447.6 1,410.9

FY2009 FY2009 FY2009 FY2009 Senate Authorization Omnibus Stimulus Cmte. 4,522.9 4,932.2 4,503.0 400.0 1,439.5 1,518.0 1,439.6 — 1,410.9 1,483.0 1,326.9 —

1,162.5 577.3 —

1,181.0 618.3 (139.8)

1,184.1 633.4 (145.0)

1,290.4 640.8 —

1,201.1 606.4 (70.9)

— — —

446.5 3,500.5 3,048.2

515.0 3,505.7 3,028.2

500.0 3,530.5 3,078.2

853.4 4,886.0 4,148.2

500.0 3,505.5 3,051.1 —

150.0 400.0

477.5

452.3

737.8

472.3

—

—

—

—

—

(18.0)

—

5,774.7

5,764.7

5,774.7

6,074.7

5,764.7

—

2,981.7 2,060.2

2,981.7 2,060.2

2,981.7 2,060.2

— —

2,981.7 2,060.2

— —

732.8

722.8

732.8

—

722.8

—

115.6 3,299.9

187.2 3,244.8

130.0 3,320.4

128.3 3,299.9

169.2 3,306.4

— 50.0

35.5

33.6

35.5

35.5

33.6

2.0

17,614.2

17,769.0

17,814.0

20,210.0

17,782.4

1,002.0

Sources: FY2008 as enacted from P.L. 110-161, Division B, and explanatory statement, Congressional Record, December 17, 2007, with general reductions applied proportionally. FY2008 comparable and FY2009 request from NASA FY2009 congressional budget justification, available online at http://www.nasa.gov/news/budget/. See text for explanation of “comparable.” FY2009 House from H.R. 7322 (110th Congress) as reported and H.Rept. 110-919. FY2009 Senate from S. 3182 (110th Congress) as reported and S.Rept. 110- 397. FY2009 authorization from Sec. 101 of P.L. 11 0-422. FY2009 Omnibus from the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (H.R. 1105) as passed by the House, Division B, and explanatory statement, Congressional Record, February 23, 2009. FY2009 Stimulus from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5). Rounding may cause totals not to add.

THE VISION FOR SPACE EXPLORATION On January 14, 2004, President Bush announced new goals for NASA: the Vision for Space Exploration. The President directed NASA to focus its efforts on returning humans to the Moon by 2020 and some day sending them to Mars and “worlds beyond.” (Twelve U.S. astronauts walked on the Moon between 1969 and 1972. No humans have visited Mars.) The President further directed NASA to fulfill commitments made to the 13 countries that are its

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partners in the International Space Station (ISS). In the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-155), Congress endorsed the goals of the Vision and directed NASA to establish a program to accomplish them. The NASA Authorization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-422) reaffirmed this endorsement and expressed the sense of Congress that other countries should be invited to participate in the Moon/Mars program as part of an international initiative under U.S. leadership. It is not yet clear whether or how the Obama Administration will seek to modify the Vision. NASA is developing a spacecraft called Orion (formerly the Crew Exploration Vehicle) and a launch vehicle for it called Ares I (formerly the Crew Launch Vehicle). An initial operating capability (i.e., a first flight into Earth orbit with a crew on board) is planned for March 2015, with the ability to take astronauts to and from the Moon following no later than 2020. NASA has stressed that its strategy is to “go as we can afford to pay,” with the pace of the program set, in part, by the available funding. Most funding for the Vision has been redirected from other NASA activities. The space shuttle program will be terminated in 2010, and U.S. use of the ISS will end by 2017. NASA has not provided a cost estimate for the Vision as a whole. Its 2005 implementation plan estimates that returning astronauts to the Moon will cost $104 billion, not including the cost of robotic precursor missions, and that using Orion to service the ISS will cost an additional $20 billion.6 A report by the Government Accountability Office gives a total cost for the Vision of $230 billion over two decades.7 The 2008 authorization act directed the Congressional Budget Office to update its 2004 budgetary analysis of the Vision.8 The Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) is responsible for implementing the Moon/Mars program. The FY2009 request for ESMD is $3.500 billion. The House and Senate committees recommended $3.506 billion and $3.530 billion respectively. The 2008 authorization act authorizes $3.886 billion in baseline funding plus $1 billion to accelerate the availability of Orion and Ares I. The Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, would provide $3.505 billion. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act provided an additional $400 million. The bulk of all these amounts would be for the Constellation Systems program, which is developing Orion and Ares I and related activities. The requested 23% increase for Constellation Systems is consistent with NASA’s previous projections for the program. The FY2009 request for ESMD restores full funding for the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program to help private-sector companies develop space transportation systems that could service the ISS after the shuttle is retired. The House committee recommended $20 million less than the request for COTS, “without prejudice ... based on estimated expenditures”; the Senate committee recommended the requested amount; the omnibus bill would provide $20 million less, with the same language as the House committee’s. Along with a host of implementation challenges, the Vision creates issues about the balance between human space exploration and NASA’s other activities in science and aeronautics. Former NASA Administrator Michael Griffin reportedly said, “I will do everything I can to keep Orion and Ares I on schedule. That will be right behind keeping shuttle and station on track, and then after that we’ll fill up the bucket with our other priorities.”9 The 2005 and 2008 authorization acts both emphasized that NASA should have a balanced set of programs, including science and aeronautics as well as activities related to the

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Vision. The Senate committee report for FY2009 also expressed concern about NASA’s programmatic balance.

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NASA SCIENCE PROGRAMS The FY2009 request for the Science Mission Directorate (SMD) is $4.442 billion. After adjusting for the accounting change, this is a 6% decrease from FY2008, but almost the entire decrease results from a transfer of the Deep Space and Near Earth Networks from SMD’s Heliophysics division to the Space Operations Mission Directorate. The House and Senate committees recommended $4.518 billion and $4.523 billion respectively; both totals included reallocated balances carried over from past fiscal years. The Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, would provide $4.503 billion, also offset with balances from past years. The 2008 authorization act authorizes $4.932 billion. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act provided an additional $400 million. The request would increase funding for Research and Analysis in all four SMD divisions as well as for suborbital research carried out on balloons and sounding rockets. Requested increases for Planetary Science and Earth Science would be offset by requested decreases for Astrophysics and Heliophysics. The request for Planetary Science includes $60 million to initiate a new program in lunar robotic science, including a Moon orbiter to be launched by 2011 and a pair of small landers to be launched by 2014. The increase for Earth Science would fund two new missions recommended by the National Research Council’s decadal survey10 and accelerate the schedule for several others; the House and Senate committees recommended further increases for this purpose of $50 million and $47 million respectively. Also in Earth Science, both committees supported inclusion of a thermal infrared sensor (TIRS) on the Landsat Data Continuity Mission; the House committee recommended an additional $20 million for this purpose, while the Senate committee urged “development ... within available funds.” The request for Astrophysics includes funding for the NASA/DOE Joint Dark Energy Mission (JDEM), as directed by Congress in the FY2008 explanatory statement, but not for the Space Interferometer mission (SIM). Both committees recommended the requested amount for JDEM. In FY2008, NASA reallocated part of SIM’s funding to a new exoplanet exploration initiative, which could include a smaller version of SIM as recommended by the FY2008 Senate committee report (S.Rept. 110-124); the House committee recommended $30 million more than the request for exoplanet exploration. Also in Astrophysics, the House committee deleted “without prejudice” the $41.5 million requested for the Nuclear Spectroscopic Telescope Array (NuStar); the Senate committee recommended $30 million. Both committees recommended increases to cover cost growth in several Science programs. The omnibus bill would provide a total of $150 million for Earth Science decadal survey missions, $10 million for TIRS, and $20 million to assess lower-cost versions of SIM; the explanatory statement directs NASA to report to the appropriations committees on its plans for the Mars Science Laboratory, whose expected cost has increased by $400 million. The additional funding provided by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act included funds to accelerate Earth Science mission recommended by the NRC decadal survey and to increase NASA’s supercomputing capabilities.

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NASA AERONAUTICS RESEARCH The FY2009 request for the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate is $446 million. That level is consistent with NASA’s previous projections, but it would be a 13% decrease relative to the FY2008 appropriation (after adjusting for the accounting change). Most of the proposed reduction would be in two programs: Airspace Systems (down $26 million) and Fundamental Aeronautics (down $34 million). The House and Senate committees recommended $515 million and $500 million respectively. The omnibus bill would provide $500 million. The 2008 authorization act authorizes $853 million and directs NASA to align its Fundamental Aeronautics program with a set of 51 technology challenges identified by the National Research Council.11 According to NASA, 47 of those challenges are “well represented” in NASA’s current and proposed aeronautics research portfolio, and that portfolio is also “closely aligned” with the 2007 national aeronautics R&D plan.12 The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act provided an additional $150 million for systemlevel R&D and demonstration activities related to aviation safety, environmental mitigation, and the Next Generation Air Transportation System.

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THE SPACE SHUTTLE AND THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION Construction of the ISS, suspended after the Columbia disaster in February 2003, resumed in September 2006. NASA plans six shuttle flights in 2009-2010 to complete the ISS, plus one mission in 2009 to service the Hubble Space Telescope.13 Two additional flights in 2010 to supply the ISS with spare parts were formerly considered “contingency” flights. The 2008 authorization act requires those flights to be flown before the shuttle is retired and directs NASA to add an additional flight to deliver the Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer to the ISS, if that can be done before the end of 2010. The 2008 authorization act also directs NASA to suspend any activity that would preclude the continued operation of the space shuttle after FY20 10, if the President were to decide to delay its scheduled retirement. The gap between the end of shuttle flights in 2010 and the expected availability of Orion in 2015 raises several issues. Some analysts are concerned that placing a fixed termination date on the shuttle may create schedule pressure similar to that identified as a contributing factor in the Columbia disaster. Some question whether the United States should be dependent on Russia to launch U.S. astronauts to the ISS during the gap period.14 A major concern is how NASA will retain its skilled workforce during the transition from shuttle to Orion, especially if Orion’s schedule slips and the gap lengthens. Former Administrator Griffin testified in late 2007 that Orion’s first flight could be moved forward to September 2013 at the cost of an additional $2 billion.15 The 2008 authorization act authorizes $1 billion for this purpose in FY2009, but the House and Senate committees recommended no additional funds, and the omnibus bill would provide none. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, however, provided an additional $400 million for this purpose. Considering the modest ISS research agenda that remains, some observers have questioned whether completing the ISS is worth the cost—about $2 billion per year plus about $3 billion per year for the shuttle and $1 billion per year of indirect costs in the Cross-

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Agency Support account. Alternatively, some policymakers want to restore the ISS research program: for example, the House recommendation for ESMD included $50 million, nearly double the request, for research on the ISS; the 2005 authorization act directs that 15% of ISS research spending be used for nonVision-related research; and the 2008 authorization act authorizes an additional $100 million for ISS research utilization and directs NASA to extend ISS availability through at least 2020. Some observers consider it essential to fulfill U.S. commitments to its international partners in the ISS (Russia, Japan, Canada, and 10 countries in Europe); others find this rationale insufficient to justify the expense. As the ISS completion date in late 2010 approaches, this debate is becoming less prominent. The FY2009 request includes $5.775 billion for the Space Operations Mission Directorate (SOMD), which consists of the space shuttle, the ISS, and the Space and Flight Support program. A requested decrease of $285 million for the space shuttle is largely offset by a requested increase of $247 million for the ISS. Both are consistent with NASA’s previous projections: they reflect the trend toward the shuttle program’s completion in 2010 and the planned construction schedule of the ISS. The requested increase for Space and Flight Support mostly reflects the transfer of the Deep Space and Near Earth Networks from SMD. The House and Senate committees recommended $5.765 billion and $5.775 billion respectively. The 2008 authorization act authorizes $6.075 billion, including $150 million for the additional shuttle flight to deliver the Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer. The omnibus bill would provide $5.765 billion. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act provided no additional funds for SOMD.

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AUTHOR CONTACT INFORMATION Daniel Morgan Analyst in Science and Technology Policy [email protected], 7-5849 Carl E. Behrens Specialist in Energy Policy [email protected], 7-8303

End Notes 1

See CRS Report RL34263, U.S. Civilian Space Policy Priorities: Reflections 50 Years After Sputnik, by Deborah D. Stine. 2 As well as appropriating new funds for NASA for FY2008, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110161) rescinded $192 million in unobligated NASA funds from prior years. The request for FY2009 is 2.9% more than the FY2008 appropriation less this rescission. 3 H.R. 7322 (110th Congress) as reported and H.Rept. 110-919. 4 S. 3182 (110th Congress) as reported and S.Rept. 110-397. 5 Other recent changes include “full cost accounting,” introduced in the FY2004 budget request, and “full cost simplification,” introduced during FY2007. 6 NASA, Exploration Systems Architecture Study: Final Report, NASA-TM-2005-214062, November 2005, http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/exploration/news/ESAS_report.html. 7 Government Accountability Office, High Risk Series, GAO-07-3 10, January 2007, p. 75.

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8

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Congressional Budget Office, A Budgetary Analysis of NASA’s New Vision for Space Exploration, September 2004. 9 Quoted in “NASA Will Protect CEV, Station Against Flat-Budget Squeeze,” Aerospace Daily and Defense Report, January 11, 2007. 10 See National Research Council, Earth Science and Applications from Space: National Imperatives for the Next Decade and Beyond, 2007, http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11820.html. 11 National Research Council, Decadal Survey of Civil Aeronautics: Foundation for the Future, June 2006, http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11664.html. 12 Executive Office of the President, National Science and Technology Council, National Plan for Aeronautics Research and Development and Related Infrastructure, December 2007, http://www.aeronautics.nasa.gov/releases/ aero_rd_plan_final_21_dec_2007.pdf. 13 “Consolidated Launch Manifest,” online at http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/structure/iss_manifest.html, updated February 13, 2009. 14 The Russian Soyuz is the only currently available alternative to the space shuttle for carrying humans. In order to contract for Soyuz service to the ISS, NASA needed an exemption from the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act. This exemption was extended to 2016 by P.L. 110-329. For details, see CRS Report RL34477, Extending NASA’s Exemption from the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act, by Carl E. Behrens and Mary Beth Nikitin. 15 Michael D. Griffin, testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Space, Aeronautics, and Related Sciences, November 15, 2007.

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Chapter 6

U.S. CIVILIAN SPACE POLICY PRIORITIES: REFLECTIONS 50 YEARS AFTER SPUTNIK ∗

Deborah D. Stine Science and Technology Policy

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SUMMARY The “space age” began on October 4, 1957, when the Soviet Union (USSR) launched Sputnik, the world’s first artificial satellite. Some U.S. policymakers, concerned about the USSR’s ability to launch a satellite, thought Sputnik might be an indication that the United States was trailing behind the USSR in science and technology. The Cold War also led some U.S. policymakers to perceive the Sputnik launch as a possible precursor to nuclear attack. In response to this “Sputnik moment,” the U.S. government undertook several policy actions, including the establishment of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), enhancement of research funding, and reformation of science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) education policy. Following the “Sputnik moment,” a set of fundamental factors gave “importance, urgency, and inevitability to the advancement of space technology,” according to an Eisenhower presidential committee. These four factors include the compelling need to explore and discover; national defense; prestige and confidence in the U.S. scientific, technological, industrial, and military systems; and scientific observation and experimentation to add to our knowledge and understanding of the Earth, solar system, and universe. They are still part of current policy discussions and influence the nation’s civilian space policy priorities—both in terms of what actions NASA is authorized to undertake and the appropriations each activity within NASA receives.

∗

This is an edited, reformatted and augmented version of a CRS Report for Congress publication dated February 2009.

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Further, the United States faces a far different world today. No Sputnik moment, Cold War, or space race exists to help policymakers clarify the goals of the nation’s civilian space program. The Hubble telescope, Challenger and Columbia space shuttle disasters, and Mars exploration rovers frame the experience of current generations, in contrast to the Sputnik launch and the U.S. Moon landings. As a result, some experts have called for new 21st century space policy objectives and priorities to replace those developed 50 years ago. On October 15, 2008, the NASA Authorization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-422) was signed into law. This act authorized appropriations for FY2009, and prohibited NASA from taking any steps prior to April 30, 2009, that would preclude the President and Congress from being able to continue to fly the Space Shuttle past 2010. During the 111th Congress, policymakers may discuss another authorization bill for future years, and identify priorities for civil space exploration. Little is known about the Obama Administration’s space policy priorities, and the degree to which they agree with Bush Administration policies. If policymakers identify priorities for U.S. civil space exploration, this might help Congress determine the most appropriate balance of funding for NASA’s programs during its authorization and appropriation process. For example, if Congress believes that national prestige should be the highest priority, they may choose to emphasize NASA’s human exploration activities, such as establishing a Moon base and landing a human on Mars. If they consider scientific knowledge the highest priority, Congress may emphasize unmanned missions and other science-related activities as NASA’s major goal. If international relations are a high priority, Congress might encourage other nations to become equal partners in actions related to the International Space Station. If spinoff effects, including the creation of new jobs and markets and its catalytic effect on math and science education, are Congress’ priorities, then they may focus NASA’s activities on technological development and linking to the needs of business and industry, and expanding its role in science and mathematics education. Current U.S. space policy is based on a set of fundamental factors which, according to an Eisenhower presidential committee, “give importance, urgency, and inevitability to the advancement of space technology.”1 These factors were developed fifty years ago as a direct result of the Soviet Union’s (USSR) launch of the first artificial satellite, Sputnik. This launch began the “space age” and a “space race” between the United States and USSR. The four factors are the compelling need to explore and discover; national defense; prestige and confidence in the U.S. scientific, technological, industrial, and military systems; and scientific observation and experimentation to add to our knowledge and understanding of the Earth, solar system, and universe.2 They are still part of current policy discussions and influence the nation’s civilian space policy priorities—both in terms of what actions NASA is authorized to undertake and the appropriations each activity within NASA receives. NASA has active programs that address all four factors, but many believe that it is being asked to accomplish too much for the available resources. An understanding of how policy decisions made during the Sputnik era influence U.S. space policy today may be useful as Congress considers changing that policy. The response of Congress to the fundamental question, “Why go to space?,” may influence NASA’s programs, such as its earth-observing satellites, human exploration of the Moon and Mars, and robotic investigation of the solar system and wider universe as well as its policies on related activities, including spinoff technological development,3 science and mathematics education, international relations, and commercial space transportation.

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This report describes Sputnik and its influence on today’s U.S. civilian space policy, the actions other nations and commercial organizations are taking in space exploration, and why the nation invests in space exploration and the public’s attitude toward it. The report concludes with a discussion of possible options for future U.S. civilian space policy priorities and the implication of those priorities.

SPUTNIK AND AMERICA'S "SPUTNIK MOMENT"

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On October 4, 1957, the USSR launched Sputnik, the world’s first artificial satellite. Sputnik (Russian for “traveling companion”) was the size of a basketball and weighed 183 pounds (see Figure 1). Sputnik’s launch and orbit4 still influences policy decisions 50 years later. The USSR’s ability to launch a satellite ahead of the United States led to a national concern that the United States was falling behind the USSR in its science and technology capabilities and thus might be vulnerable to a nuclear missile attack.5 The resulting competition for scientific and technological superiority came to represent a competition between capitalism and communism. Both the 85th Congress and President Eisenhower undertook an immediate set of policy actions in response to the launch of Sputnik. Congress established the Senate Special Committee on Space and Astronautics on February 6, 1958, and the House Select Committee on Science and Astronautics on March 5, 1958—the first time since 1892 that both the House and Senate took action to create standing committees on an entirely new subject. Each committee was chaired by the Majority Leader. The Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee was also active in analyzing the nation’s satellite and missile programs.6

Source: NASA, at http://history.nasa.gov/sputnik/gallerysput.html. Figure 1. Sputnik Exploring the Final Frontier - Issues, Plans and Funding for NASA : Issues, Plans and Funding for NASA, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated,

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Multiple congressional hearings were held in the three months following Sputnik, and President Eisenhower addressed the nation to assure the public that the United States was scientifically strong and able to compete in space. Within 10 months after Sputnik’s launch, the Eisenhower Administration and Congress took actions that • •

• •

established the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) through the National Aeronautics and Space Act (P.L. 85-568),7 established the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) within the Department of Defense through DOD Directive 5105.15 and National Security Military Installations and Facilities (P.L. 85-325),8 increased its appropriation for the National Science Foundation to $134 million, nearly $100 million higher than the previous year,9 and reformed elementary, secondary, and postsecondary science and mathematics education (including gifted education) and provided incentives for American students to pursue science, technology, engineering, and mathematics postsecondary degrees via fellowships and loans through the National Defense Education Act (P.L. 85864).10

Figure 2 provides a timeline of the some of the major policy events in the year following the Sputnik launch. When people today speak of a “Sputnik moment,” they often refer to a rapid national response that quickly mobilizes major policy change as opposed to a response of inaction or incremental policy change. The term is also used to question inaction—as in whether or not the nation is prepared to respond to a challenge without an initiating Sputnik moment.

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WHY WAS SPUTNIK SO INFLUENTIAL? The Sputnik launch captured the public’s attention at a time of heightened U.S. tension regarding the threat posed by the USSR and communism. Societal focus on civil defense, including “duck and cover” drills and the establishment of some personal bomb shelters, predisposed the nation towards identifying the potential threat posed by the Sputnik launch.11 In this climate, many Americans became concerned that if the USSR could launch a satellite into space, it could also launch a nuclear missile capable of reaching the United States.12 The Sputnik launch was immediately viewed as a challenge to U.S. scientific and technological prowess. The Soviet Union launched both Sputnik and Sputnik 2 before the United States was able to attempt a satellite launch.13 Additionally, the Soviet launch was of a far heavier satellite than the U.S. had planned.14 The net result of the Sputnik launch was called a “Pearl Harbor for American Science”—a sign that the United States was falling behind the USSR in science and technology.15 The ensuing competition in scientific and technological skills came to represent a competition to determine the political superiority of capitalism versus communism. The Senate Majority Leader at the time, future President Lyndon B. Johnson, illustrated the concern of many Americans in his own observations of the night sky: “Now, somehow, in some new way, the sky seemed almost alien. I also remember the profound shock of realizing

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that it might be possible for another nation to achieve technological superiority over this great country of ours.”16

WHY IS SPUTNIK IMPORTANT TO TODAY'S POLICIES?

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The Sputnik launch prompted rapid development of new federal policies and programs. In particular, federal investment in NASA is still influenced by the Sputnik-era principles as illustrated in the Space Act, both in terms of what actions NASA is authorized to undertake and the extent to which each activity is funded.

Source: Association of American Universities, at http://www.aau.edu/education/Sputnik_Timeline_2007-09-20.pdf. Notes: DARPA was also established by Congress in P.L. 85-325. Figure 2. Timeline of select policy events in the year following the sputnik launch

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In 2008, NASA was reauthorized for FY2009.17 As Congress considers future reauthorization of NASA, the status of the nation’s space policy, and the relative importance of the various objectives underlying this policy may become topics of debate. The United States faces a far different world today than 50 years ago. No Sputnik moment, Cold War, or space race exists to help policymakers clarify the goals of the nation’s civilian space program. The Hubble telescope, Challenger and Columbia space shuttle disasters, and Mars exploration rovers frame the experience of current generations, in contrast to the Sputnik launch and the U.S. Moon landings that form the experience of older generations.

WHAT ARE THE ACTIVITIES OF OTHER NATIONS AND THE COMMERCIAL SECTOR IN SPACE EXPLORATION?

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According to an analysis conducted by the Space Foundation, the global space industry in 2007 generated $251.16 billion in revenues.18 (See Figure 3.) The United States faces a possible new set of competitors or collaborators in civilian space exploration. China, India, Japan, Russia, and Europe are taking an active role in space exploration as are commercial companies.19 If China is the first to land humans on the Moon and establish a Moon base in the 21st century or the European Space Agency is the first to land humans on Mars, will policymakers and the public view these activities as a loss in United States status and leadership? If so, what are the policy implications? Would such activities become this century’s “Sputnik moment” that would spur further investment in U.S. space exploration activities? If not, how might this affect U.S. space policy priorities?

Source: Space Foundation, The Space Report: Guide to Global Space Activities, 2008, at http://www.thespacereport.org/. Figure 3. Global space Activity, 2007

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Future spacecraft are being developed. For example, the X-Prize Foundation Google Lunar X Prize ($30 million) invites private teams from around the world to build a robotic rover capable of landing on the Moon.20 Virgin Galactic, currently based in California with a spaceport under construction in New Mexico, has plans for SpaceShipTwo, a six-passenger spaceliner.21 In Europe, EADS-Astrium is developing a four-person spacecraft to make suborbital trips.22 According to press reports, a number of venture capitalists are also planning to build spaceships or develop private space programs.23 Should these efforts prove successful, what implications might this have for U.S. space policy priorities?

WHAT IS THE NATION'S CURRENT CIVILIAN SPACE POLICY?

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Little is known about the Obama Administration’s space policy. The Obama Administration has said that it “will restore American leadership on space issues,”24 but only provides details regarding its military space policy. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) indicates that a decision as to whether or not to retire the space shuttle among the top 13 issues facing President Obama. The degree to which the Obama Administration agrees with the Bush Administration space policy is unknown. During the Bush Administration, a U.S. National Space Policy defined the key objectives of defense and civilian space policy.25 This policy incorporated key elements of the Vision for Space Exploration (“Vision”), often referred to as the Moon/Mars program. In the Vision,26 the President directed NASA to focus its efforts on returning humans to the Moon by 2020 and eventually sending them to Mars and “worlds beyond.”27 The President further directed NASA to fulfill commitments made to the 13 countries that are its partners in the International Space Station (ISS). In the 2005 NASA authorization act (P.L. 109-155), Congress directed NASA to establish a program to accomplish the goals outlined in the Vision, which are that the United States • •

• •

Implement a sustained and affordable human and robotic program to explore the solar system and beyond; Extend human presence across the solar system, starting with a human return to the Moon by the year 2020, in preparation for human exploration of Mars and other destinations; Develop the innovative technologies, knowledge, and infrastructures both to explore and to support decisions about the destinations for human exploration; and Promote international and commercial participation in exploration to further U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests.28

More specifically, the Vision included plans, via a strategy based on “long-term affordability,” to • •

return the Space Shuttle safely to flight (which has been accomplished), complete the International Space Station (ISS) by 2010 but discontinue its use by 2017,

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Deborah D. Stine • • • •

phase out the Space Shuttle when the ISS is complete by 2010, send a robotic orbiter and lander to the Moon, send a human expedition to the Moon (sometime between 2015-2020), send a robotic mission to Mars in preparation for a future human expedition, and conduct robotic exploration across the solar system.29

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NASA is developing a new spacecraft called Orion (formerly the Crew Exploration Vehicle) and a new launch vehicle for it called Ares I (formerly the Crew Launch Vehicle). An Earth-orbit capability is planned by 2014 (although NASA now considers early 2015 more likely) with the ability to take astronauts to and from the Moon following no later than 2020. The Vision had broad implications for NASA, especially since almost all the funds to implement the initiative are expected to come from other NASA activities. Among the issues Congress is debating are the balance between NASA’s exploration activities and its other programs, such as science and aeronautics research; the impact of the Vision on NASA’s workforce needs; whether the space shuttle program might be ended in 2010; and if the United States might discontinue using the International Space Station.30 NASA stated that its strategy is to “go as we can afford to pay,” with the pace of the program set, in part, by the available funding.31 Affording such a program is challenging, however, with a 2006 National Research Council report finding “NASA is being asked to accomplish too much with too little.” The report recommended that “both the executive and the legislative branches of the federal government need to seriously examine the mismatch between the tasks assigned to NASA and the resources that the agency has been provided to accomplish them and should identify actions that will make the agency’s portfolio of responsibilities sustainable.”32

WHY INVEST IN SPACE EXPLORATION? The Table A-1 compares The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 as amended (“Space Act”),33 the oldest and most recent Presidential commission reports (Killian34 and Aldridge35), the U.S. National Space Policy36 (“Space Policy”), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-422). The analyses identify the following reasons why the United States might explore space: • • • • •

knowledge and understanding, discovery, economic growth—job creation and new markets, national prestige, and defense.

Some also include the following reasons: • •

international relations, and education and workforce development.

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Table 1. NASA Centers Center

Mission Area

Location

Ames Research Center

New Technology Research

Moffett Field, CA

Dryden Flight Research Center

Flight Research

Edwards, CA

Glenn Research Center

Aeropropulsion and Communications Technologies

Cleveland, OH

Goddard Space Flight Center

Earth, the Solar System, and Universe Observations

Greenbelt, MD

Jet Propulsion Laboratory (FFRDC)

Robotic Exploration of the Solar System

Pasadena, CA

Johnson Space Center

Human Space Exploration

Clear lake TX near Housion TX

Kennedy Space Center

Prepare and Launch Missions Around the Earth and Beyond

Cape Canaveral, FL

Langley Research Center

Aviation and Space Research

Hampton, VA

Marshall Space Flight Center

Space Transportation and Propulsion Technologies

Huntsville, AL

Stennis Space Center

Rocket Propulsion Testing and Remote Sensing technology

Hancock County, MS, near Slidell LA

Source: NASA, http://education.nasa.gov/about/nasacenters/index.html Note: FFRDC is a federally funded research and development center.

Although there is broad agreement on the reasons for space exploration, there is a great deal of variation in the details. Among the chief differences in these documents are the degree to which • • • •

discovery is the major reason for space exploration as opposed to meeting needs here on Earth; creation of jobs and new markets should be a major focus of NASA activities as opposed to a side effect; science and mathematics education and workforce development should be a goal of NASA in addition to other federal agencies; and relationships with other countries should be competitive or cooperative regarding space exploration.

Comparing the Aldridge Commission themes, the Space Policy goals, and the Space Act objectives on the issue of the relationship of the space program to economic growth provides

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some insights. While the Aldridge committee has a much broader view of the industries related to space exploration, focusing on the potential role of space exploration in job generation and new market development, the Space Act and Space Policy focus on only one sector, the aeronautical and space vehicle industry. The two Presidential commissions have two key differences. One is the first theme outlined in the Sputnik-era Killian Committee report: “the compelling urge of man to explore and discover.” This is quite different from the recent Aldridge Commission report, which, although indicating exploration and discovery should be among NASA goals, states that “exploration and discovery will perhaps not be sufficient drivers to sustain what will be a long, and at times risky, journey.” The implication is that, today, solely responding to the challenge of going to the Moon or Mars is not sufficient to energize public support for space exploration. The second key difference is the focus of the Aldridge Commission on economic growth as a proposed space exploration theme. The Aldridge Commission identifies the ability of investments in civilian space programs to generate new jobs within current industries and spawn new markets. The contribution that federal space investments make to the nation’s economy was not a key factor identified by the Killian Committee. As a result of its focus on economic growth as a key theme of space exploration, the Aldridge Commission recommended that “NASA’s relationship to the private sector, its organizational structure, business culture, and management processes—all largely inherited from the Apollo era—must be decisively transformed to implement the new, multi-decadal space exploration vision.” Two of its specific recommendations were that NASA recognize and implement a far larger private industry presence in space operations, with the specific goal of allowing private industry to assume the primary role of providing services to NASA, and that NASA’s centers be reconfigured as Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) to enable innovation, work effectively with the private sector, and stimulate economic development.37 FFRDCs are not-for-profit organizations which are financed on a sole-source basis, exclusively or substantially by an agency of the federal government, and not subject to Office of Personnel Management regulations. They operate as private non-profit corporations, although they are subject to certain personnel and budgetary controls imposed by Congress and/or their sponsoring agency. Each FFRDC is administered by either an industrial firm, a university, or a nonprofit institution through a contract with the sponsoring federal agency. FFRDC personnel are not considered federal employees, but rather employees of the organization that manages and operates the center.38 NASA has not fully adopted the Aldridge Commission recommendations. NASA has 10 centers (see Table 1).39 One, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), is already an FFRDC and is managed by the California Institute of Technology.

WHAT IS THE PUBLIC'S ATTITUDE TOWARD SPACE EXPLORATION? Some editorialists question whether investing in space exploration is relevant today.40 Others question if NASA has the right priorities.41 Would the public care if the country’s investment in space exploration ended? Does the public believe it would be better to invest in

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social needs here on Earth rather than space exploration? Does the public support the current prioritization of the nation’s space exploration activities? According to poll data, Americans do not rank space exploration as a high priority for federal government spending. For example, in an April 10, 2007 Harris poll, respondents were given a list of twelve federal government programs and asked to pick two which should be cut “if spending had to be cut.” Space programs led the list (51%), followed by welfare programs (28%), defense spending (28%), and farm subsidies (24%).42 Space exploration was also near the bottom of a University of Chicago National Opinion Research Center survey reported in January 2007 that asked Americans about how they would prioritize federal spending.43 On the other hand, Americans are interested in space exploration. According to a May 2008 Gallup Poll,44 sponsored by the Coalition for Space Exploration, most Americans (69%) believe that the space program benefits the nation’s economy by inspiring young people to consider STEM education, and believe that the benefits of space exploration outweigh the risks of human space flight (68%). The poll also found that most Americans (67%) indicated that they would not be concerned if the United States loses its leadership in space exploration to China, while almost half (47%) of the public surveyed expressed concern regarding the five-year gap between the end of the space shuttle program and the first scheduled launch of the Constellation program. Just over half (52%) of those surveyed in the Gallup Poll said they would support increasing NASA’s budget from 0.6% to 1.0% of the federal budget; however, when the public was asked how willing they would be to support an increase in taxes if the money was to go to NASA to help close the budget deficit, more than half (57%) reported they would not be willing. NASA’s Office of Strategic Communication funded several analyses of the public’s attitude toward space exploration based on focus groups45 and a survey,46 the results of which were presented in June 2007.47 According to an analysis conducted for NASA, the focus group participants were ambivalent about going to the Moon and Mars and wanted to know why these missions were important. Reasons such as leadership, legacy, and public inspiration were found to be less persuasive, especially for future Moon exploration, than NASA-influenced technologies. Most participants agreed that partnership with other countries would be beneficial, but doubted whether it can be achieved realistically. In addition, one of the analysis conducted for NASA found that most survey respondents rated NASA-influenced technologies48 as somewhat or extremely relevant to them. Over 52% of participants said such technologies were a “very strong” reason to go to space. In contrast, the public’s response to a mission to send humans to the Moon by the year 2020 was less strong with 15% of respondents very excited and 31% somewhat excited. Results for a mission to send humans to the Mars were similar to those for the Moon. The public opinion analysis has found that there are generational differences in regard to NASA’s proposed activities. For example, NASA’s base support came from those who encompass “The Apollo Generation” (45-64 year olds), the majority (79%) of whom support NASA’s new space exploration mission, particularly the return to the Moon. By contrast, the majority (64%) of those between 18-24 years of age are uninterested or neutral about a human Moon mission. Those between 25 and 44 years of age are approximately evenly split between those who are interested/excited and those who are either uninterested or neutral. Those over 65 were more likely to be neutral or disinterested in a Moon mission, with those over 75 years of age the least interested of all age groups.49

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WHAT ARE THE NATION'S PRIORITIES FOR CIVILIAN SPACE EXPLORATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE SPACE POLICY? Current U.S. civilian space policy is based on a set of fundamental objectives in the Space Act, based on policy discussions that occurred following the launch of Sputnik over 50 years ago. Those objectives are still part of current policy discussions and influence the nation’s civilian space policy priorities—both in terms of what actions NASA is authorized to undertake and the degree of appropriations each activity within NASA receives. NASA has active programs that address all its objectives, but many believe that it is being asked to accomplish too much for the available resources. NASA was last reauthorized in 2008 for FY2009.50 Thus, the reauthorization of NASA for FY2010 and beyond, along with a new Presidential Administration, may provide an opportunity for Congress to rethink the nation’s space policy. The goals of the nation’s investment in space exploration may be a key factor in determining the focus of NASA’s activities and the degree of funding appropriated for its programs. Congress and outside experts have concerns as to whether the United States can afford to implement President Bush’s Vision for Space Exploration without adversely influencing NASA’s other programs.51 Congress may need to make challenging decisions to determine how to reap the most benefit from the nation’s civilian space program investment. These decisions might answer questions such as •

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•

•

What are the priorities among the many reasons for U.S. space exploration? For example, what might be the priority ranking among the previously identified reasons as to why the United States might explore space—knowledge and understanding, discovery, economic growth, national prestige, defense, international relations, and education and workforce development? What implications would this prioritization have for NASA’s current and future budgets and the balance among its programs? For example, what is the proper balance between human and robotic space activities? What influence might the timing of other countries’ space exploration activities have on U.S. policy? For example, what would be the impact of the United States, China, or another country, or a commercial organization, establishing the first Moon base or landing on Mars?

New objectives and priorities might help determine NASA’s goals. This, in turn, might potentially help Congress determine the most appropriate balance of funding available among NASA’s programs during its authorization and appropriation process. For example, if Congress believes that national prestige should be the highest priority, they may choose to emphasize NASA’s human exploration activities, such as establishing a Moon base and landing a human on Mars. If they consider scientific knowledge the highest priority, Congress may emphasize unmanned missions and other science-related activities as NASA’s major goal. If international relations are a high priority, Congress might encourage other nations to become equal partners in actions related to the International Space Station. If spinoff effects, including the creation of new jobs and markets and its catalytic effect on math and science education, are Congress’ priorities, then they may focus NASA’s activities on technological

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development and linking to the needs of business and industry, and expanding its role in science and mathematics education.

CONGRESSIONAL ACTIVITIES On October 15, 2008, the NASA Authorization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-422) was signed into law.52 This act authorized appropriations for FY2009, and prohibited NASA from taking any steps prior to April 30, 2009, that would preclude the President and Congress from being able to continue to fly the Space Shuttle past 2010. When the law was passed, the Chair of the House Science and Technology Committee stated

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The [Space Shuttle] provision should not be construed as a congressional endorsement of extending the life of the Shuttle program beyond the additional flight added by this bill to deliver the AMS [Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer] to the International Space Station. Rather, it reflects our common belief that the decision of whether or not to extend the Shuttle past its planned 2010 retirement date should be left to the next President and Congress, especially since both of the Presidential candidates have asked for the flexibility to make that decision.53

During the 111th Congress, policymakers may discuss another authorization bill for future years, and identify new priorities for civil space exploration. H.Res. 67 would recognize and commend NASA, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), and Cornell University for the success of the Mars Exploration Rovers, Spirit and Opportunity, on the 5th anniversary of the Rovers' successful landing. H.R. 255, the NASA 50th Anniversary Commemorative Coin Act, would require the Secretary of the Treasury to mint coins in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the establishment of NASA. The Federal Ocean Acidification Research And Monitoring Act of 2009 (H.R. 14, S. 173) would require that the NASA Administrator ensure that space-based monitoring assets are used in as productive a manner as possible for monitoring of ocean acidification and consistent with a strategic research, and encourage coordination of the Agency's ocean acidification activities with such activities of other nations and international organizations. As passed by the Senate, the same provision is within the Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009 (S. 22).

AUTHOR CONTACT INFORMATION Deborah D. Stine Specialist in Science and Technology Policy [email protected], 7-8431

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APPENDIX. POSSIBLE U.S. CIVILIAN SPACE POLICY OBJECTIVES

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Table A-1. Possible U.S. Civilian Space Policy Objectives: Comparison of Selected Extracts from Historical and Current Space Policy Documents

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Table A-1. (Continued)

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Table A-1. (Continued)

Sources: “Space Act”: P.L. 85-568, The National Aeronautics and Space Act, July 29, 1958. The unamended act is available at http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/ spaceact.html; the amended act is available at http://www.nasa.gov/offices/ogc/ about/space_act1 . html This analysis focuses on the objectives section. “Killian Committee”: U.S. President (Dwight D. Eisenhower), President’s Science Advisory Committee, Introduction to Outer Space, March 26, 1958. p. 2. Available at http://www. hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/monograph 1 0/doc6.pdf. “Aldridge Commission”: U.S. President (George W. Bush), President’s Commission on Implementation of United States Space Exploration Policy, A Journey to Inspire, Innovate, and Discovery, June 2004, p. 11. Excerpts are from the section entitled “Why Go?”. Available at http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/ 60736main_M2M_report_small.pdf. “Space Policy”: U.S. President (G.W. Bush), U.S. National Space Policy, August 31, 2006, at http://www.ostp.gov/html/ US%20National%20Space% 20Policy.pdf. Excerpts are from section 3, “United States Space Policy Goals.” NASA Authorization Act: P.L. 110-422, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2008, October 1 5, 2008. This analysis focuses on Section 2, Findings. Notes: Excerpts are selected to reflect the general tone of text and are not necessarily the only language discussing these issues. a. The words in italics in the “Space Act” column show the changes made to the objectives since 1958.

End Notes 1

U.S. President (Dwight D. Eisenhower), President’s Science Advisory Committee, Introduction to Outer Space, March 26, 1958. p. 1, at http://www.hq.nasa.gov /office/pao/History/ monograph10/doc6.pdf. 2 Ibid., pp. 1-2. 3 A spinoff is defined by NASA as “A commercialized product incorporating NASA technology or ‘know how’ which benefits the public.” For more information, see NASA, Spinoff: 50 Years of NASA-Derived Technologies (1958-2008), at http://www.sti.nasa.gov/tto/Spinoff2008/index.html. 4 Sputnik 1 orbited the Earth every 96 minutes until it fell from orbit on January 4, 1958, three months after its launch. Roger D. Launius, “Sputnik and the Origins of the Space Age,” at http://history.nasa.gov/ sputnik/sputorig.html. 5 Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Center, “Sputnik and the Space Race,” at http://www.eisenhower. utexas.edu/dl/ Sputnik/Sputnikdocuments.html.

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U.S. Congress, House Committee on Science and Technology, Toward the Endless Frontier: History of the Committee on Science and Technology, 1959-79, prepared for the Committee by Ken Hechler, committee print, 96th Cong., 2nd sess., H.Prt. 35-120, (Washington: GPO, 1980), pp. 1-28. 7 P.L. 85-568, The National Aeronautics and Space Act (“Space Act”), July 29, 1958, at http://www.nasa.gov/offices/ ogc/about/space_act1 .html. 8 DARPA was originally called the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). It was established by DOD Directive 5105.15 on February 7, 1958, and by Congress in P.L. 85-325 on February 12, 1958. The name was changed from ARPA to DARPA by DoD Directive on March 23, 1972. DARPA was redesignated ARPA by President Bill Clinton in an Administration document on February 22, 1993. ARPA’s name was changed back to DARPA by P.L. 104-106 on February 10, 1996. For more information about DARPA and its history, see DARPA, “Defense Advanced Research Project Agency: Technology Transition,” January 1997 at http://www.darpa.mil/body/pdf/transition.pdf. 9 The appropriation for NSF continued to increase in future years. In 1968, it was almost $500 million. National Science Foundation, An Overview of the First 50 years, at http://www.nsf.gov/about/ history/overview-50.jsp. 10 P.L. 85-864, National Defense Education Act (NDEA), September 2, 1958. 11 Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Center, “Sputnik and the Space Race,” at http://www.eisenhower.utexas.edu/dl/ Sputnik/Sputnikdocuments.html. 12 Council on Foreign Relations, Chronology of National Missile Defense Programs, June 1, 2002, at http://www.cfr.org/publication/10443/. 13 The Project Vanguard booster tests on December 6, 1957 (rose 3 feet, caught fire) and February 5, 1958 (rose 4 miles, exploded) were unsuccessful. A new effort, Project Explorer led by Wernher von Braun, was initiated. Explorer 1 was successful, after two aborted launches, on January 31, 1958. Roger D. Launius, “Sputnik and the Origins of the Space Age,” at http://history.nasa.gov/sputnik/sputorig.html. 14 Sputnik 1 weighed 183 pounds. Sputnik 2 launched on November 3, 1957 weighed 1,120 pounds, carried a dog, and stayed in orbit for almost 200 days. The first satellite to be launched in the American Project Vanguard was planned to be 3.5 pounds. Roger D. Launius, “Sputnik and the Origins of the Space Age,” at http://history.nasa.gov/sputnik/sputorig.html. 15 Davis, James C., The Human Story: Our History, From the Stone Age to Today (New York: Harper Collins, 2004). According to Davis, the statement was made by a Japanese newspaper shortly after the event. Others called it a “technological Pearl Harbor.” 16 Roger D. Launius, “Sputnik and the Origins of the Space Age,” at http://history.nasa.gov/sputnik/sputorig.html. 17 NASA Authorization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-422). 18 Space Foundation, The Space Report: Guide to Global Space Activities, 2006, at http://www.thespacereport.org/. For more on the space economy, see Michael D. Griffin, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, The Space Economy, NASA 50th Anniversary Lecture Series, September 17, 2007, at http://www.nasa.gov/audience/ formedia/speeches/mg_speech_collection_archive_1.html. 19 Peter Spotts, “Many Contestants in Latest ‘Space Race’ to the Moon,” Christian Science Monitor, October 1, 2007. 20 X-prize Foundation, “Google Sponsors Lunar X PRIZE to Create a Space Race for a New Generation,” press release, September 13, 2007, at http://www.xprize.org/lunar/press-release/google-sponsors-lunar-x-prize-tocreate-a-spacerace-for-a-new-generation. 21 Virgin Galactic, Overview, at http://www.virgingalactic.com/. NASA has signed a memorandum of understanding with Virgin Galactic to explore the potential for collaborations on the development of space suits, heat shields for spaceships, hybrid rocket motors, and hypersonic vehicles capable of traveling five or more times the speed of sound. See NASA, “NASA, Virgin Galactic to Explore Future Cooperation,” press release, February 21, 2007, at http://www.nasa.gov/ home/hqnews/2007/ feb/ HQ_07049_ Virgin_ Galactic.html. 22 EADS-Astrium, “Astrium Rockets into Space Tourism,” press release, June 13, 2007, at http://www.astrium.eads.net/press-center/press-releases/astrium-rockets-into-space-tourism. 23 Jeremy Quittner (ed.), “I Need My Space,” Business Week, Winter 2007, at http://www. businessweek.com/magazine/ content/07_09/b4023413.htm. 24 White House, “The Agenda - Defense,” webpage at http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/defense/ , accessed February 2, 2009. 25 U.S. President (G.W. Bush), U.S. National Space Policy, August 31, 2006, at http://www.ostp.gov/html/ US%20National%20Space%20Policy.pdf. It replaced the previous space policy that had been in place for 10 years. 26 U.S. President (G.W. Bush), President Bush Announces New Vision for Space Exploration Program, Fact Sheet: A Renewed Spirit of Discovery, January 14, 2004, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ news/releases /2004/01/20040114- 1.html. 27 Twelve U.S. astronauts walked on the Moon between 1969 and 1972. No humans have visited Mars. 28 U.S. President (G. W. Bush), “A Renewed Spirit of Discovery,” document, January 14, 2004, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/space/renewed_spirit.html.

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29

NASA, Vision for Space Exploration, February 2004, at http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/exploration/main/ index.html. 30 CRS Report RS22625, National Aeronautics and Space Administration: Overview, FY2008 Budget in Brief, and Key Issues for Congress, by Daniel Morgan and Carl E. Behrens; CRS Report RL33568, The International Space Station and the Space Shuttle, by Carl E. Behrens; and CRS Report RS21720, Space Exploration: Issues Concerning the "Vision for Space Exploration", by Marcia S. Smith. 31 Testimony of Michael D. Griffin, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation Subcommittee on Space, Aeronautics and Related Sciences, Budget Hearing, U.S. Senate, February 28, 2007, at http://commerce.senate.gov/public/_files/Testimony_MichaelDGriffin_NASA_FY2008Posture StatementFINAL22707.pdf. 32 National Research Council, Space Studies Board, An Assessment of Balance in NASA’s Science Program, Washington, DC, 2006, p. 2 http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11644. The NRC is in the midst of a project entitled “Rationale and Goals of the U.S. Civil Space Program.” The report from this project is scheduled to be released in July 2009. For more information, see http://www7.nationalacademies.org/ ssb/rationale_goals_civil_space.html. 33 P.L. 85-568, The National Aeronautics and Space Act, July 29, 1958, at http://www.nasa.gov/offices/ogc/about/ space_act1.html. Since 1958, the objectives have only had two modifications. The clause, “of the Earth and” was added to the first objective by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act, 1985, P.L. 98-361, § I 10(b), 98 Stat. 422, 426 (July 16, 1984). Objective (9) was added by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989, P.L. 100-685, § 214, 102 Stat. 4083, 4093 (November 17, 1988). Objective (9) states the following: “The preservation of the United States’ preeminent position in aeronautics and space through research and technology development related to associated manufacturing processes.” 34 During the Sputnik era, President Eisenhower’s Science Advisory Committee, chaired by George Killian, (“Killian Commission”) responded to the fundamental question of why the United States might undertake a national space program in its report Introduction to Outer Space. (U.S. President (Dwight D. Eisenhower), President’s Science Advisory Committee, Introduction to Outer Space, March 26, 1958. p. 2, at http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/ monograph10/doc6.pdf). The President’s Science Advisory Committee is analogous to today’s President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST). 35 U.S. President (George W. Bush), President’s Commission on Implementation of United States Space Exploration Policy, A Journey to Inspire, Innovate, and Discovery, June 2004. Available at http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/ 6073 6main_M2M_report_small.pdf. The commission report is named for its chair, Edward C. “Pete” Aldridge, Jr., and called the “Aldridge Commission” report. 36 U.S. President (G.W. Bush), U.S. National Space Policy, August 31, 2006, at http://www.ostp.gov/html/ US%20National%20Space%20Policy.pdf. 37 U.S. President (George W. Bush), President’s Commission on Implementation of United States Space Exploration Policy, A Journey to Inspire, Innovate, and Discovery, June 2004, p. 7, at http://www.nasa.gov/ pdf/ 60736main_M2M_report_small.pdf. 38 See CRS Report RL34454, Science and Technology Policymaking: A Primer, by Deborah D. Stine. 39 For more information, see http://education.nasa.gov/about/nasacenters/index.html. 40 See, for example, Anne Applebaum, “Mission to Nowhere,” Washington Post, January 7, 2004, p. A21. 41 See, for example, Gregg Easterbrook, “How NASA Screwed Up (And Four Ways to Fix It),” Wired, May 22, 2007, at http://www.wired.com/science/space/magazine/15-06/ff_space_nasa; The Economist, “Spacemen Are from Mars,” September 27, 2007, at http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9867224. 42 Harris Interactive, “Closing the Budget Deficit: U.S. Adults Strongly Resist Raising Any Taxes Except “Sin Taxes”Or Cutting Major Programs,” press release, April 10, 2007, at http://www.harrisinteractive. com/harris_poll/ index.asp?PID=746. The poll was of 2,223 adults surveyed online between March 6 and 14, 2007. This online survey is not based on a probability sample and therefore no theoretical sampling error can be calculated. 43 University of Chicago, “Americans Want to Spend More on Education, Health,” press release, January 10, 2007, at http://www-news.uchicago.edu/releases/07/070110.gss.shtml. The General Social Survey, supported by the National Science Foundation, has been conducted since 1973, and is based on face-to-face interviews of randomly selected people who represent a scientifically accurate cross section of Americans. For the 2006 survey, 2,992 people were interviewed and asked a wide variety of questions in addition to those related to spending priorities. 44 Coalition for Space Exploration, 2008 Gallup Poll: American Support for Space Exploration is Strong, at http://www.spacecoalition.com/files/galluppolls/final%20report-june%2008.pdf. 45 The focus groups were professionally moderated by Dr. Stephen Everett of the Everett Group, Inc., in consultation with ViaNovo. The six focus groups were located in San Diego, Kansas City, and Philadelphia.

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The professionally conducted telephone survey was of 1,001 U.S. adults in February 2007. The margin of error was ± 3.2%. The survey was conducted by Dr. Mary Lynne Dittmar of Dittmar Associates, in consultation with ViaNovo. 47 Robert Hopkins, “Strategic Communications Framework Implementation Plan,” powerpoint presentation, NASA, Office of Strategic Communications, June 26, 2007, at http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html? pid=24646. 48 An example of a NASA-influenced technology (commonly called “spinoff”) mentioned in the survey that had significant results is a smoke alarm. According to NASA, in the 1970s NASA needed a smoke and fire detector with adjustable sensitivity for Skylab, America’s first space station. Honeywell developed the device for NASA and then made it available commercially so that consumers could avoid “nuisance” alarms while cooking. Other devices in the survey were advanced breast cancer imaging, heart defibrillators, weather satellites, remote-controlled robots, global positioning system, cordless tools, satellite radio, and DirecTV. See http://www.sti.nasa.gov/tto/ for more details on NASA’s spinoffs. See a list of NASA’s top 20 spinoffs in the last five years at http://www.ipp.nasa.gov/ spinoff_top_20a.pdf. 49 Ibid., p. 9. Robert Hopkins, “Strategic Communications Framework,” powerpoint presentation, NASA, Office of Communications Planning, February 2007, at http://images.spaceref.com/news/2007/feb07.stratcomm.pdf. M. L. Dittmar, The Market Study for Space Exploration, (Houston, TX: Dittmar Associates, Inc., 2004), pp. 26-29 (age data) and pp. 8-11 (Executive Summary). M. L. Dittmar, “Engaging the 18-25 Generation: Educational Outreach, Interactive Technologies, and Space”. Paper #2006-7303 in Proceedings of AIAA Space 2006, September 19-21, (San Jose, California. Washington, D.C.: AIAA, 2006). Paper and presentation available at http://www.dittmar-associates.com/ Paper_Downloads.htm. 50 P.L. 109-155, NASA Authorization Act of 2005, December 30, 2005. 51 See earlier discussion for Senate and House Committee on Appropriations report language; also Lennard Fisk, Chair, Space Studies Board, National Research Council and Thomas M. Donahue Collegiate Professor of Space Science, University of Michigan, The President’s Vision for Space Exploration: Perspectives from a Recent NRC Workshop on National Space Policy, Testimony before the House Committee on Science, March 10, 2004, at http://science.house.gov/Commdocs/ hearings/full04 /mar10/fisk.pdf. 52 For more information, see CRS Report RS22818, National Aeronautics and Space Administration: Overview, FY2009 Budget, and Issues for Congress, by Daniel Morgan and Carl E. Behrens. 53 House Committee on Science and Technology, “House Sends NASA Bill to President’s Desk, Reaffirms Commitment to Balanced and Robust Space and Aeronautics Program,” press release, September 27, 2008 at http://science.house.gov/press/PRArticle.aspx?NewsID=2309.

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INDEX

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A  accountability, 109, 115, 116, 119  accounting, x, 6, 15, 16, 104, 111, 122, 125, 126  accuracy, 63, 102  achievement, 2, 5, 8, 9, 10  acidification, 141  acoustic, 72  acquisitions, x, 37, 38, 42, 43, 96, 101, 102, 103  actuators, 80  adaptation, 72  ADS, 135  adults, 146, 147  advocacy, 110  aeronautical, 138  aerosol, 39, 80  aerosols, 60  aerospace, 116  afternoon, 109  age, xi, 129, 130, 139, 147  agriculture, 73  air, 31  Air Force, 33, 39, 52, 80, 85, 103  air traffic, 31  Alabama, 33, 103  alternative, 19, 35, 128  alternatives, 16, 17  aluminum, 3, 64  ambivalent, 139  American Express, 109  AMS, 141  analysts, 126  antenna, 60, 89, 90  appendix, 35, 45, 96, 97, 105, 110  application, 107, 108 

      applied research, 107  appropriate technology, 87  appropriations, x, xi, 121, 122, 125, 129, 130, 140,  141  Appropriations Committee, x, 121  Argentina, 39, 43, 50, 52  ASI, 39  assessment, x, 10, 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, 46, 47, 48,  52, 55, 58, 60, 63, 65, 68, 70, 73, 75, 77, 80, 82,  85, 87, 90, 93, 95, 101, 103, 104, 105, 110, 117,  119  assets, 32, 141  assumptions, 8, 11, 57, 96, 116, 117  astrophysics, 19, 31  atmosphere, 60, 64  auditing, 43, 106  authority, 2, 45, 49, 77, 111, 122  availability, 12, 21, 55, 124, 126, 127  averaging, 17, 20, 22, 24  aviation, 19, 31, 32, 36, 126  aviation safety, 19, 31, 32, 126 

B  basic research, 31  basketball, 114, 131  batteries, 52  behavior, 58  benchmarks, 41  benefits, 139, 144  black carbon, 60  black hole, 90  Boeing, 90 

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150

Index

bomb, 132  breakdown, 122  breast cancer, 147  budget deficit, ix, 40, 139  budgetary resources, 4  burn, 6, 64  Bush Administration, x, 121, 130, 135 

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C  Canada, 127  candidates, 141  capitalism, 131, 132  capsule, 85  carbon, 39, 40, 60, 79, 83, 87, 115  cargo, ix, x, 1, 4, 6, 15, 18, 28, 35, 53, 85  catalytic effect, 130, 140  CDR, 39, 52, 67, 77, 82, 84, 89, 101, 105, 111  cell, 48  CERES, 39, 82  certification, 85  Challenger, 10, 130, 134  China, 134, 139, 140  circulation, 50  civilian, x, xi, 121, 122, 129, 130, 131, 134, 135, 138,  140  climate change, ix, 19, 40, 83  Climate Change Science Program, 60  closure, 49  clouds, 65  coffee, 114  Cold War, xi, 129, 130, 134  Columbia, 10, 12, 13, 126, 130, 134  commerce, 146  Commerce, Justice, Science, 97  Committee on Appropriations, 42, 97, 147  communism, 131, 132  communities, 115  community, 5, 92  competition, 115, 131, 132  complexity, 42, 45, 46, 47, 60, 72, 73, 96, 106, 114,  117, 118  components, 6, 10, 27, 42, 52, 64, 67, 73, 79, 82, 89,  90, 101, 102, 107, 114  composition, 114  confidence, xi, 1, 2, 5, 8, 10, 11, 12, 35, 118, 119,  129, 130  configuration, 62  congressional budget, 123 

Congressional Budget Office, vii, ix, x, 1, 7, 11, 12,  13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27,  29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 124, 128  congressional hearings, 132  Consolidated Appropriations Act, 42, 127  constraints, 65, 72, 96, 101, 110, 111  construction, ix, x, 1, 2, 4, 15, 19, 33, 95, 127, 135  consumers, 147  contamination, 60  contingency, 10, 12, 65, 68, 69, 126  continuity, 75, 82  contractors, 38, 42, 47, 49, 57, 58, 104, 106  contracts, 55  control, 9, 77, 87, 96, 110, 115, 116, 117  cooking, 147  corporations, 138  cost accounting, 104, 127  cost saving, 115  cost‐effective, 12  costs, x, 2, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 19, 27, 28, 35, 37, 41, 42,  45, 47, 49, 51, 52, 53, 60, 62, 67, 71, 72, 78, 80,  82, 85, 91, 92, 96, 102, 104, 116, 117, 122, 126  cost‐sharing, 51  credit, 40  Crew Launch Vehicle, 53, 85, 124, 136  CRS, 121, 127, 128, 129, 146, 147  crust, 31  cryogenic, 70, 95  culture, 138  customers, 82  cycles, 55  cycling, 50, 67 

D  dark matter, 58  DARPA, 133, 145  data collection, 39, 102, 105, 106, 111, 118  data processing, 80  DCI, 39, 102  death, 90  decision makers, 44, 45, 95  decision making, 119  decisions, 45, 46, 52, 109, 130, 131, 135, 140  defense, xi, 129, 130, 132, 135, 136, 139, 140, 145  Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, xi,  129, 132  Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency  (DARPA), xi, 129, 132  deficits, ix, 40 

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Index definition, 40, 117  delivery, 44, 57, 60, 62, 65, 67, 77, 80, 81, 82, 115,  119  density, 72  Department of Defense, 59, 82, 116, 132  deviation, 103  direct costs, 104  disaster, 10, 13, 126  discipline, 96, 117  Discovery, 31, 144, 145, 146  discretionary, ix, 40  distribution, 109  diversity, 70  division, 125  doors, 122  downsizing, 5  draft, 52, 55, 58, 60, 63, 65, 68, 70, 73, 75, 77, 80,  82, 85, 87, 89, 90, 93, 95  durability, 80  duration, 10, 27, 73, 114  dust, 65 

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E  early universe, 58, 68  earth, 19, 28, 31, 41, 43, 77, 130  Earth Science, 33, 116, 123, 125, 128  economic development, 138  economic growth, 136, 137, 138, 140  education, 18, 32, 123, 132, 145, 146  Edwards Air Force Base, 33, 103  electromagnetic, 68  emission, 93  employees, 138  employment, 33, 118  energy, 58, 88  engagement, 102  engines, 13, 55  environment, x, 37, 44, 49, 77, 78, 101, 105, 107,  108, 113, 114, 115  estimating, 38, 45, 95, 96, 103, 115, 118  Europe, 67, 127, 134, 135  European Space Agency, 39, 50, 65, 134  evolution, 31, 103  execution, 43, 110  Executive Office of the President, 128  expenditures, 124  expertise, 46, 83, 92, 116  external growth, 116 

151

F  fabricate, 2, 7  fabrication, 42, 45, 52, 80, 83, 101, 104, 111  failure, 77, 90, 93, 95, 115  federal budget, 139  federal government, ix, 40, 109, 136, 138, 139  fee, 49, 58, 62, 73, 85, 106  fees, 49, 57, 85, 106  feet, 4, 68, 145  Fermi, 31  fidelity, 107  filters, 82  fire, 145, 147  firms, 44  flexibility, 115, 116, 141  flight, ix, x, 1, 24, 32, 37, 45, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57, 72,  75, 80, 83, 84, 89, 90, 91, 93, 95, 101, 107, 108,  111, 114, 117, 118, 124, 126, 127, 135, 139, 141  focus groups, 139, 146  focusing, 31, 138  forestry, 73  fractures, 82  France, 60  freezing, 80  fuel, 9, 54  funds, 6, 8, 19, 21, 22, 25, 33, 35, 43, 52, 57, 65, 92,  109, 125, 126, 127, 136 

G  galactic, 58  Gallup Poll, 139, 146  Gamma, 39, 48, 58  gamma rays, 39, 58  gas, 65  gauge, 44  generation, 138, 145  geology, 73  gifted, 132  goals, ix, 1, 35, 45, 50, 83, 110, 123, 130, 134, 135,  137, 138, 140, 146  google, 145  government, 40, 43, 82, 106, 109, 113, 129, 136,  138, 139  Government Accountability Office, vii, 2, 12, 37,  109, 110, 113, 124, 127, 135  Government Accountability Office (GAO), 113, 135  GPO, 145 

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152

Index

gravity, 55  ground‐based, 84, 92  groups, 139, 146 

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H  habitat, 27, 78  hazards, 31  health, 29, 30  heart, 44, 147  heat, 2, 7, 80, 87, 88, 145  heat shield, 2, 7, 80, 87, 88, 145  heliosphere, 88  heme, 138  high resolution, 83  high risk, 45, 55, 87, 95  high‐level, 110  high‐risk, 52, 65  high‐speed, 89, 90  horizon, 116  host, 116, 124  House, x, 12, 42, 97, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126,  127, 131, 141, 145, 147  House Appropriations Committee, x, 121  Hubble, 12, 24, 35, 41, 53, 55, 126, 130, 134  human, ix, x, xi, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 15, 17, 18, 22, 27, 28,  29, 30, 33, 40, 53, 77, 114, 121, 122, 124, 130,  135, 136, 139, 140  human resources, 33  humanity, 88  humans, ix, x, 1, 4, 8, 15, 16, 18, 20, 24, 27, 28, 31,  121, 123, 128, 134, 135, 139, 145  hybrid, 145  hydrogen, 3, 54, 95 

I  identification, 105, 110, 117  images, 40, 147  imaging, 55, 147  implementation, 37, 41, 42, 46, 47, 49, 55, 57, 63,  65, 69, 70, 75, 96, 101, 103, 104, 105, 110, 111,  117, 118, 124  incentive, 73  incentives, 132  inclusion, 43, 46, 106, 125  India, 134  indication, xi, 44, 129  indicators, 103 

industrial, xi, 115, 116, 118, 129, 130, 138  industry, 21, 24, 29, 36, 130, 134, 138, 141  inert, 5  inertia, 55  inflation, 6, 20, 35  Information System, 73  information technology, 33, 118  infrared, 39, 68, 90, 93, 95, 125  infrared light, 93  infrastructure, 19, 21, 28  inheritance, 57  inherited, 138  initiation, 104  innovation, 138  insight, 96  Inspector General, 32, 65, 123  inspiration, 139  instability, 55, 72, 87, 117  instruments, 46, 47, 50, 52, 58, 60, 63, 64, 66, 67,  68, 72, 74, 76, 77, 82, 88, 89, 90, 92, 106, 113,  115  integration, 47, 48, 51, 60, 64, 66, 67, 82, 84, 85, 89,  92, 101, 104, 107, 111  integrity, 109  interaction, 106, 114  interface, 67  international relations, 130, 136, 140  International Space Station, ix, x, 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 10, 13,  15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30,  41, 53, 85, 114, 123, 124, 126, 130, 135, 136, 140,  141, 146  interval, 10  intervention, 114  interviews, 105, 106, 146  intrinsic, 31  investment, 44, 133, 134, 138, 140  IOC, ix, 1, 2, 5, 8, 16, 18, 21, 23, 25  ionosphere, 31  IPO, 39, 82, 83  Iran, 128  ISS, 7, 16, 18, 21, 22, 23, 25, 114, 124, 126, 127, 128,  135, 136  Italy, 60 

J  Japan, 39, 43, 63, 127, 134  Japanese, 114, 145  Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 34, 39, 83, 122, 137, 138,  141 

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Index job creation, 136  jobs, 130, 137, 138, 140  justification, 6, 123 

K  Korea, 128 

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L  LA, 122, 137  laboratory studies, 107  land, 5, 73, 80, 87, 114, 134  Landsat 7, 73, 75  language, 124, 144, 147  large‐scale, 40, 42  laser, 77  law, 130, 141  leadership, 49, 124, 134, 135, 139  legislation, 19  life cycle, 46, 57, 58, 67, 73, 94, 101, 103, 104, 117  lifecycle, 41, 45, 46, 117, 118, 119  life‐cycle, x, 10, 37, 41, 42, 44, 45, 47, 48, 80, 101,  102, 103  lifetime, 116  likelihood, 19, 44, 75, 83, 116  limitations, 69  linear, 75  linkage, 6  liquid hydrogen, 3  liquid oxygen, 3, 27  lithium, 3, 52  loans, 132  Lockheed Martin, 86  long period, 27  Los Angeles, 114  Louisiana, 33  lubrication, 80  luminous galaxies, 93 

M  magnetic field, 88  maintenance, 19, 21, 24, 33, 34, 52  management, x, 19, 33, 37, 38, 40, 42, 45, 49, 55,  57, 62, 63, 64, 72, 73, 84, 92, 95, 102, 103, 110,  111, 113, 117, 118, 119, 122, 138  man‐made, 73  manufacturer, 72, 92 

153

manufacturing, 10, 63, 65, 75, 87, 117, 146  mapping, 73  margin of error, 147  market, 138  markets, 130, 136, 137, 138, 140  Mars, ix, x, 1, 21, 27, 28, 31, 35, 38, 39, 41, 48, 49,  77, 78, 79, 80, 114, 116, 121, 123, 124, 125, 130,  134, 135, 136, 138, 139, 140, 141, 145, 146  Martian, 80  Maryland, 33, 103  MasterCard, 109  materials science, 114  mathematics, xi, 35, 129, 130, 132, 137, 141  maturation, 75  measurement, 90  measures, 44, 103, 115, 116  memorandum of understanding, 145  Mercury, 77  metric, 42, 48, 53, 64, 77, 87, 105  Mexico, 135  microwave, 39  military, xi, 129, 130, 135  mirror, 65, 68  misleading, 115  missions, ix, x, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17,  18, 19, 21, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 35, 40, 41,  49, 52, 58, 60, 72, 75, 77, 79, 80, 82, 87, 95, 96,  111, 113, 114, 115, 116, 124, 125, 130, 139, 140  Mississippi, 33, 122  modeling, 54  models, 52, 83, 95, 106  molecules, 65  money, 2, 8, 41, 46, 77, 109, 139  Monte Carlo, 12  Moon, x, 16, 53, 85, 121, 123, 124, 125, 130, 134,  135, 136, 138, 139, 140, 145  motors, 80, 87, 145  movement, 85 

N  nation, xi, 35, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 138,  139, 140  National Aeronautics and Space Act, 122, 132, 136,  144, 145, 146  National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,  80, 82  National Research Council, 114, 125, 126, 128, 136,  146, 147  National Science and Technology Council, 128 

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154

Index

National Science Foundation, 132, 145, 146  natural, 73  New Frontier, 31  New Mexico, 135  New Orleans, 33  New York, 145  next generation, ix, 40, 53  NIR, 39  noise, 72  non‐profit, 138  Norfolk, 33  North Korea, 128  not‐for‐profit, 138  NPP, 39, 80, 81, 82, 96  NPR, 39, 104, 110, 111  NRC, 125, 146, 147  nuclear, xi, 129, 131, 132 

Copyright © 2010. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

O  obligations, 43  observations, 42, 80, 96, 103, 132  oceans, 31  Office of Personnel Management, 138  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs,  97  off‐the‐shelf, 75  Ohio, 33  omnibus, 124, 125, 126, 127  online, 123, 128, 146  optics, 75, 93  optimism, 117, 118  orbit, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 28, 35, 53, 55, 58, 60, 68,  70, 75, 83, 85, 114, 115, 116, 124, 136, 144, 145  orbiters, 114  organic, 65  oscillation, 2, 54  oscillations, 6, 9  oversight, 38, 45, 57, 82, 83, 109  oxygen, 3, 27, 54, 83  ozone, 80 

P  particle physics, 13  particles, 88  partnership, 53, 73, 139  partnerships, 43  passenger, 135 

performers, 116  permit, 5, 17  phenolic, 40, 79, 87  Philadelphia, 146  physics, 13  planetary, 19, 31, 57, 68, 70, 93  planets, 31, 65, 70, 90, 113  planning, 1, 35, 70, 73, 77, 104, 113, 114, 115, 117,  119, 135  policymakers, xi, 127, 129, 130, 134, 141  poor, 82, 85, 116  poor performance, 85  portfolio, ix, x, 37, 40, 41, 115, 126, 136  ports, 89  postponement, 12  posture, 118  power, 4, 52, 87  precipitation, 39, 63  pre‐existing, 42, 44  prejudice, 124, 125  President Bush, ix, xi, 1, 15, 121, 123, 140, 145  pressure, 126  prestige, xi, 129, 130, 136, 140  private, 29, 124, 135, 138  private sector, 124, 138  proactive, 117  probability, 1, 2, 5, 8, 10, 11, 12, 70, 146  probe, 35  production, 43, 44, 83, 101, 109  productivity, 80  profit, 138  program outcomes, 44  propulsion, 4, 29, 30, 32, 49, 55, 57, 64, 79, 89  protection, 40, 87  prototype, 101, 105, 107, 108  public affairs, 33  public funds, 109  public opinion, 139  public support, 138, 139  public view, 134  pulses, 77 

R  R&D, 113, 126  race, 130, 134  radar, 39, 64  radiation, 31, 60, 65, 75, 83  radio, 147  range, 12, 20, 28, 33, 35, 41, 43, 68, 85, 90 

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Copyright © 2010. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Index recognition, 43, 117  recovery, 5  regulations, 138  rehabilitation, 33  reinforcement, 77  relationship, 47, 82, 103, 137, 138  reliability, 42, 44, 75, 102, 109  repair, 12, 33  rescission, 127  research and development, 41, 107, 113, 122, 137  Research and Development, 113, 128, 138  research funding, xi, 129  reserves, 2, 19, 20, 25, 28, 35, 57, 65, 69, 72, 96  resolution, 83  resources, ix, 4, 31, 33, 38, 40, 43, 44, 45, 49, 62, 69,  75, 95, 101, 110, 116, 130, 136, 140  retirement, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 21, 22, 30, 126,  141  reusable launch vehicles, 41  risk, 5, 8, 9, 44, 45, 46, 47, 52, 54, 55, 62, 65, 68, 69,  70, 72, 80, 81, 86, 87, 95, 105, 110, 111, 113, 116,  118  risk assessment, 105, 110, 111  risk management, 55  risks, 2, 6, 8, 12, 38, 42, 43, 78, 87, 90, 105, 117,  118, 139  robotic, x, 2, 3, 5, 16, 17, 19, 27, 41, 43, 122, 124,  125, 130, 135, 136, 140  rovers, 79, 114, 130, 134  Russia, 126, 127, 134  Russian, 4, 128, 131 

S  safety, 19, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 54, 75, 126  salinity, 31, 40, 50  salmonella, 114  sample, 87, 146  sampling, 146  sampling error, 146  satellite, xi, 31, 50, 60, 75, 80, 114, 115, 122, 129,  130, 131, 132, 145, 147  scheduling, 55, 88, 90  science education, 130, 140  scientific knowledge, 31, 130, 140  scientific understanding, 31, 63  sea level, 12, 114  search, 13, 31, 93  Secretary of the Treasury, 141  security, 33, 135 

155

senate, 146  Senate, x, 97, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127,  128, 131, 132, 141, 146, 147  sensitivity, 58, 72, 118, 147  sensors, 35, 43, 80  services, vi, 4, 7, 29, 30, 33, 46, 111, 138  shock, 132  simulation, 12  simulations, 78  skills, 116, 132  smoke, 147  software, 57, 59, 80, 84  solar, xi, 19, 31, 55, 60, 70, 72, 88, 90, 116, 129, 130,  135, 136  solar system, xi, 19, 31, 55, 90, 116, 129, 130, 135,  136  solar wind, 88  Soviet Union, xi, 122, 129, 130, 132  Soyuz, 4, 128  space exploration, xi, 27, 29, 30, 41, 53, 121, 124,  130, 131, 134, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141  space shuttle, ix, x, xi, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,  13, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 28, 30, 35,  121, 124, 126, 127, 128, 130, 134, 135, 136, 139  space station, 4, 6, 10, 12, 17, 19, 25, 28, 30, 35, 147  spectroscopy, 55  spectrum, 68, 90  speed, 89, 90, 145  spin, 41  spinoff, 130, 140, 144, 147  Sputnik, vii, xi, 122, 127, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133,  134, 138, 140, 144, 145, 146  stability, 42, 44, 46, 48, 60, 64, 67, 75, 77, 82, 87, 92,  95, 105, 111  stages, 40, 44, 54, 103, 104, 105  stainless steel, 80  standards, 43, 103, 106  stars, 65, 68, 70, 72, 93  statutory, 47  steel, 80  STEM, xi, 129, 139  stimulus, 17, 22, 24, 29, 32, 34  storage, 52  strain, ix, 40  strategies, 110  students, 35, 132  subsidies, 139  subsonic, 32  summer, 69, 87  Sun, 31, 88 

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156

Index

superiority, 131, 132, 133  suppliers, 44, 103, 116  supply, 48, 60, 126  Syria, 128 

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T  tanks, 5, 9, 54, 64  targets, 12, 44, 45, 65, 103  taxes, 139  telephone, 147  temperature, 70, 114  tension, 132  test data, 108  testimony, x, 109, 113, 118, 128  Texas, 33  The Economist, 146  threat, 132  thresholds, 42, 48, 51, 52, 60, 62, 63, 80, 81, 82, 95,  103, 110, 116  timetable, ix, 1, 2  timing, 6, 8, 140  titanium, 64, 80  total costs, 5  tourism, 145  tracking, 60  trade‐off, 41, 87  traffic, 31  training, 114, 118  transfer, 6, 60, 125, 127  transition, ix, xi, 40, 45, 84, 121, 126, 145  transparency, 119  transport, 4, 10, 12, 13  transportation, 4, 7, 29, 43, 124, 130  travel, 55, 57  Treasury, 141 

United Kingdom, 89  United States, xi, 4, 5, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 24, 26, 27,  29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 40, 41, 97, 126, 129,  130, 131, 132, 134, 135, 136, 139, 140, 144, 146  universe, xi, 19, 31, 41, 58, 93, 129, 130  USSR, xi, 129, 130, 131, 132 

V  vacuum, 59, 70, 77, 90  validation, 80, 101, 107, 116  values, 28, 109, 110, 118  variation, 137  vegetation, 114  vehicles, ix, x, xi, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 15, 18, 23,  24, 28, 29, 31, 35, 41, 43, 45, 54, 114, 121, 145  venture capital, 135  vibration, 9, 54, 72, 93  visible, 68  vision, 27, 138  Vision for Space Exploration, x, 12, 13, 20, 27, 35,  36, 75, 121, 123, 128, 135, 140, 145, 146, 147 

W  water, 5, 50, 63, 70, 76, 87  weather prediction, 88  weather satellites, 147  welfare, 139  White House, 145  wind, 32, 88  wind tunnels, 32  windows, 80  withdrawal, 60  workforce, 35, 49, 62, 67, 84, 106, 126, 136, 137,  140 

U  Ultraviolet, 39, 88  uncertainty, 65, 113, 115 

X  xenon, 57 

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