European Multiplicity [1 ed.] 9781443863193, 9781443853668

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European Multiplicity

European Multiplicity

Edited by

Chris Rumford and Didem Buhari-Gulmez

European Multiplicity, Edited by Chris Rumford and Didem Buhari-Gulmez This book first published 2014 Cambridge Scholars Publishing 12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2014 by Chris Rumford, Didem Buhari-Gulmez and contributors All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-5366-6, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-5366-8

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter One ................................................................................................. 1 Introduction: European Multiplicity Chris Rumford and Didem Buhari-Gulmez Part I: “Fixing” Europe Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 13 EUrope and Other Europes S. Anne G. Bostanci Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 31 EU Multiplicity and the European Commission: The Case of Free Movement of People for Work Purposes Valentina Kostadinova Chapter Four .............................................................................................. 51 Many Multiculturalisms: Models, Management and Meaning Joanna Cagney Chapter Five .............................................................................................. 69 Unity in Diversity? The Standardized Diversification of EU Regions Sebastian M. Büttner Part II: Constituting Europe Chapter Six ................................................................................................ 91 Another Brick in the Tower of Babel: Turkey’s Challenges and Contributions to the EU’s Language Policy C. Akca Atac Chapter Seven.......................................................................................... 111 Fostering the EU’s Democratic Identity through the European Public Sphere Cristian Nitoiu

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Chapter Eight ........................................................................................... 129 Multi-Level Citizenship: Labour Migration and the Transformation of Identity in the EU Nora Siklodi Chapter Nine............................................................................................ 147 A “Civil” Euro-Mediterranean: The Anna Lindh Foundation and the Civil Societalization of Politics Alistair Brisbourne Part III: Multiple Europes beyond the EU Chapter Ten ............................................................................................. 167 Opposing Europe or Opposing the EU? Re-Evaluating Party Positions on EU Accession in Candidate Countries Seckin Baris Gulmez Chapter Eleven ........................................................................................ 187 Europeanization of the Roma Identity and the Search for Transnational Advocacy Ramneek Grewal Chapter Twelve ....................................................................................... 205 Europeanization Meets Homo Economicus, Homo Sociologicus and Homo Intellectus: The Turkish Case and Beyond Didem Buhari-Gulmez Notes........................................................................................................ 225 Contributors ............................................................................................. 231 Index ........................................................................................................ 235

CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION: EUROPEAN MULTIPLICITY CHRIS RUMFORD AND DIDEM BUHARI-GULMEZ

The study of European integration, and the promise of a single European economic, political and cultural space, has for too long obscured the possibility of “European multiplicity,” the study of which has been consigned to the margins of European Union (EU) integration studies. Agnew’s (2001) still provocative question of “How many Europes?” cannot be answered satisfactorily through discussions of identity alone. “How many Europes?” remains a very pertinent question as it confronts the tendency to see Europe in terms of binaries: East/West, old/new, North/South, core/periphery, Christian/Muslim, EU members/nonmembers. To these more established binary divisions has recently been added “top-down”/“bottom-up,” highlighting a hitherto neglected division between Europe’s elites and “the people” (Taras 2009). The core task of this book is to establish the viability of an approach to studying Europe which does not rely on the binaries upon which thinking about identity is all-too-often based. Understanding European multiplicity—Europe conceived beyond a plurality of identities—is far from a narrow academic pursuit. Institutional Europe is also addressing this issue, as can be seen from the following quote from the European Parliament. [R]eflection about contemporary Europe should rise above the level of issues such as identity, ethnic conflicts, the nation-state, religious tolerance and essentialist cultural values. The complexity of today’s society calls for a new input in academic, political and public thought, in order to deal with the countless less or more unpredictable events and interactions which take place in today's local and global social world. The current reality asks for a focus on interactions in multiple contexts and networks.1

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This is a particularly interesting statement, combining as it does a rejection of essentialism, a call for new thinking on society, a recognition of the need for a global context when studying Europe, and an acknowledgement of the importance of multiplicity. Contained here is the outline of an important research agenda, and a context within which to appreciate the centrality of “European multiplicity,” themes very much at the heart of this volume.

A European Studies frame The papers collected here do not conform to the expectations driven by a narrow EU integration agenda wherein the development of the EU, its enlargement, and future trajectory are conveyed in developmental and/or quasi-teleological terms and EU integration is seen as the destiny for the continent, each country (including non-members) being compelled to seek a place in the unfolding order. On such a model the European Union replaces Europe as the object of study and the investigation of European transformations is reduced to a question of EU belonging, institution building, and the process of “Europeanization.” The argument here is that an EU integration studies agenda will only tell part of the story of Europe’s multiplicity (or of “many Europes”). What is required in order to provide a fuller and richer account, it is argued, is a more rounded view of developments placed within a broader context of global transformations as they relate to Europe. European Studies takes the question “How should we study Europe?” seriously, and is animated by a constant questioning of what Europe we are studying and how best we might go about it. We need a healthy and robust European Studies to sit alongside the more established integration studies (with the aim of enriching both). What, then, distinguishes this European Studies approach, apart from the name and a reluctance to be subsumed to the agenda of a larger, more entrenched, and in many ways dominant field of study? The first point to note is that European Studies offers generous portions of multidisciplinarity. Whereas EU integration studies tends to be dominated by political scientists and international relations scholars, European studies embraces a host of disciplinary perspectives. This multidisciplinarity is reflected in the papers comprising this volume, including contributions from geography, sociology and cultural studies in addition to political science and international relations. The result is a greater range of perspectives than is usually the case with volumes focussing on integration studies. It is not only the lack of breadth that is the issue. Too often, EU integration studies insists that if other

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disciplines wish to make a contribution they must do so by following an agenda framed by political scientists, and in fact it is often the case that scholars in other disciplines are happy to participate on these terms (Favell & Guiraudon 2011). European Studies poses an impressive range of questions about Europe, dealing primarily with the transformation of Europe, of which EU integration is one part. European Studies is centrally concerned with questions of cultural identities, of Europe’s relation to the rest of the world, of transnational communities, of cross-border mobilities and networks, of colonial legacies, and of the heritage of a multiplicity of European peoples. European Studies aims to study Europe in the broadest and most inclusive sense possible, and it should never presume to be able to answer the question “What is Europe?” in definitive, once-and-for-all terms (Biebuyck & Rumford 2012). Understanding Europe’s changing role in world politics needs to be prioritized. Caricaturing EU integration studies, we can say that it has been rather inward-looking and tends to see Europe as separate from the rest of the world. European Studies encourages approaches to studying Europe that place it within a global framework, and is concerned with exploring the transformations which have shaped and continue to shape Europe, both internally and in the wider world.

“Many Europes” We have seen how the book embraces a European Studies approach to the exploration of contemporary Europe. To this end it seeks to develop what is arguably the newest trend in European Studies—European multiplicity or “many Europes” (Biebuyck & Rumford 2012). The theme of “European multiplicity” is certainly one which, as yet, is far less developed than other “hot” contemporary themes such as European mobilities or Europe-in-the world, and yet is related to both. Both of these themes have yielded an impressive literature in the past few years. In the field of mobility studies, Favell’s (2008) Eurostars and Eurocities, Recchi & Favell’s (2009) Pioneers of European Integration, and Verstrasete’s (2010) Tracking Europe are particularly noteworthy, as is Jensen & Richardson’s (2003) Making European Space, albeit from a more critical perspective. There is of course a large and diverse literature on migration as a specific form of mobility which poses a problem for Europe (and EU integration), e.g. Squire (2012), Geddes (2008) and Huysmans (2006). The title of Huysman’s book, The Politics of Insecurity, is indicative of the

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unsettling nature of immigration, as perceived by EU authorities, and to which “fortress Europe” is the preferred response for some. Europe’s role in emerging forms of global governance is becoming a key theme in the literature (Telo 2009; Laidi, 2007, 2010), as is the idea of Europe’s changing place in the world (Böröcz 2010; Bialasiewicz 2011). In addition, in recent years the idea of a cosmopolitan Europe has become a key theme in the literature, e.g. Rumford, (2007), Calhoun (2010), Beck & Grande (2007) and Parker (2012). The EU, as a promoter of global governance and as a cosmopolitan entity, while advancing our understanding of Europe-in-the-world, arguably also represents attempts to reduce the complex relationship between Europe and globalization. The argument here is that rather than projecting Europe as being at the helm of an emerging global order, it is more important, following Outhwaite (2008, 133), to “put Europe in its place.” This requires not only placing Europe in a global context but also developing global perspectives on it. What is called for is a non-Eurocentric global perspective on Europe, and this is why Böröcz’s The European Union and Global Social Change is especially significant. European multiplicity advances an agenda for studying contemporary Europe, which aims at avoiding answering the question of “how many Europes?” (Agnew 2001) along the familiar lines of identities, i.e. Europe is “united in diversity.” The argument here is that it is more profitable to explore Europe’s numerous political imaginaries, geopolitical configurations and ways of being in the world by highlighting how Europe is an active site of multiple—and often times contradictory—productions and transformations. Nevertheless, the “identity agenda” has much purchase on the study of contemporary Europe. It is worth noting that conventional divisions (and sources of diversity) such as East/West, old/new, North/South, Christian/Muslim, EU members/non-members have been supplemented of late with a new cleavage—“top-down Europe” versus “bottom-up Europe,” highlighting a division between Europe’s elites and “the people” (Taras 2009). Indeed, Checkel & Katzenstein (2009, 11–12) point to an elitist “cosmopolitan European identity” engendered by the constitutional treaty, versus a “national-populist European identity” fuelled by the threats represented by “Polish plumbers and Islamic headscarves.” For Taras (2009, 60–61), the elite versus popular division takes the form of an elite “metacultural perspective” on a common European culture versus a “polyvocal European public,” aware of (and threatened by) particularities and difference. Checkel & Katzenstein’s idea of a “cosmopolitan European identity” is problematic for a number of reasons, not least because it may well prove to be oxymoronic. There is a tendency

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in much contemporary IR and political science literature on the EU to label the EU as cosmopolitan without questioning what this might mean. For example, Risse (2010, 51) holds that the EU is a “modern, democratic, secular, and cosmopolitan value community” yet never interrogates whether “European cosmopolitanism” is meaningful, in the sense that it may not be embedded in the consciousness of Europeans (or even in the discourses of the European Union). Further, Risse (2010, 38–39) holds that rather than a single European identity we have many Europes “expressed in various national colours.” This is the result of the Europeanization of national identities. Risse’s main contribution is the idea that the various constructions of Europe involve particular visions of Europe’s others. The idea of the EU as a Europe of modernization, human rights and democracy leads to the construction of Europe’s Other in terms of its own past: “militarism, nationalism and economic backwardness” (Risse 2010, 53). In other words, “Europe’s own past is the out-group of the EU’s modern political identity.” Taras (2009, 63) makes a similar point. Upon accession, Eastern European countries had to “accept that they had not really been European until then”—this leads to a division between Old and New Europe. Risse makes the point that “modern” Europe also generates another “out group”; via racism and xenophobia, Haider, for example, was portrayed as the “enemy within.” More populist constructions of Europe tend to use religion as a marker of us/them. This results in the mobilization of opposition to Turkey’s candidature, on the one hand, and on the other the identification of non-European immigrants (from North Africa) as internal others. Moreover, the developing literature on the EU’s “normative actorness” in promoting democratization, multilateralism and individual freedoms in Europe and beyond has discovered that the EU’s normative discourse does not stem from a parochial vision of the world that belongs in the EU, but it rather shares the basic notions, concepts and methods advocated by many other international organizations that include the United Nations and a host of international governmental and nongovernmental organizations (Manners 2002). In this regard, EU Studies increasingly faces the challenge of developing an approach that takes into account the degree of integration between the EU and its global environment without reducing the global context to a narrow set of values, norms, interests, institutions or trends, like economic interconnectedness.

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The Design of the Volume The book aims to demonstrate the benefits of a small agenda shift, away from an overriding concern with EU integration and Europeanization and all the assumptions that underpin these processes, towards a consideration of the possibility that Europe in the singular may not exist and that the multiplicity of Europe is all around us. As the papers in this volume demonstrate, multiplicity reveals itself across the range of EU studies as a key dimension in Europe’s transformation. Multiplicity is evident both in cases where official EU policy exists (labour migration, citizenship, regional policy) and in areas which are central to European life (multiculturalism, multilingualism, the public sphere, Euroscepticism). Indeed, taken together the papers point strongly to the conclusion that Europe is best defined in terms of its inherent multiplicity. The volume is divided into three sections. The first of these, “Fixing Europe,” explores the ways in which attempts to “fix” or establish Europe based on a presumed singularity can come unstuck and allow multiplicity to emerge from within. On this basis, multiplicity is that which emerges from within Europe when cracks in the edifice of singularity become visible to all. Moreover, attempts at rendering Europe in terms of singularity generate new ways of seeing and understanding “many Europes.” This section comprises four papers. The first of these, “EUrope and other Europes” (chapter two) is by Anne Bostanci and sets in motion discussion of the book’s central challenge to integration studies—that the EU is but one version of contemporary Europe. Bostanci explores public relations and marketing brochures produced by the European Commission in order to understand how the EU promotes a vision of Europe created very much in its own image. In doing so it works to silence alternative imaginaries, including Eurosceptic alternatives. Bostanci argues that such attempts to “fix” Europeanness fail to engage with the experience of EUropeans and ultimately lack credibility. Moreover, “European multiplicity” is by no means the threat that the Commission assumes it to be. The second paper in Section 1 is by Valentina Kostadinova (chapter three) and concerns Commission policy on the free movement of workers. According to Kostadinova this is an example of an attempt by the EU to create singularity which has resulted in multiplicity—in other words, a very good example of the way in which multiplicity escapes from the cracks of failed singularity. In this domain, the Commission has not been able to “fix” a singular EU because regimes governing the free movement of people for work purposes are characterised by different rights for different groups. In other words, policy on free movement has been an

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engine for creating multiplicity in a Europe where treating groups differently has become the norm. Chapter four is by Joanna Cagney who offers a provocative reading of multiculturalism in Germany and the UK. In some ways multiculturalism can be seen as a metaphor for the European project—promising commonality on the one hand, and openness and opportunity on the other, in reality multiculturalism is structured around national models which are very different from one another and don’t go together easily to create a European version. Of late, many countries have retreated from earlier commitments to (different visions of) multiculturalism. Nevertheless, a complete rejection of multiculturalism is unlikely and the current phase of re-balancing may serve only to increase the wide range of multiculturalisms currently on offer. Finally in this section, Sebastian Büttner examines EU regions not from the perspective of their diversity per se but in terms of their standardization (chapter five). In doing so, he not only challenges integration scholars’ ideas of regional diversity in Europe but also offers a critique of the “European multiplicity” discourse. He observes a high degree of “standardized multiplicity” among Europe’s regions and sees regional diversification as a global trend. In a powerful piece, Büttner criticizes existing approaches to Europe’s regions for their adherence to static notions of “the region” and naïve assumptions about the agency possessed by regions. Büttner’s World Polity Theory-inspired critique reveals the multiplicity of Europe’s regions to be illusory, merely the result of “standardized diversity” derived from global models of development. Section two of the book comprises another four chapters and takes as its theme “Constituting Europes.” The focus here is on European projects and developments which, on the face of it, contain within them elements of, or the potential for, multiplicity. Chapter six leads off the section with a piece by Akca Atac on the EU’s language policy. She finds an odd relationship between multilingualism and the EU, being that it is part of European self-identity and yet is not at the forefront of EU initiatives to unite the continent. One interesting feature of this chapter, aside from its focus on an under-studied aspect of European transformation, is the advocacy of multiplicity. The case is made for the inclusion of Turkish in the EU family of languages, perhaps the most compelling reason being that multilingualism strengthens Europe’s sense of self; in this sense, multiplicity is inherently positive. In chapter seven Cristian Nitoiu explores the European public sphere and its role in strengthening democratic identity. He finds that attempts to democratize Europe have unwittingly generated multiplicity. It is very difficult to ensure that legitimacy, accountability and transparency are applied consistently across

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Europe. The result is a multiplicity of forms of democracy. The public sphere can be seen as a way of increasing democracy “from below.” The people are placed closer to decision-making if the public sphere is allowed to mediate political debate. In this sense the European public sphere can become a driver of democracy but at the same time the absence of a coherent European space—the public sphere still being segmented into national tranches—means that multiplicity is always present. Following on from this, Nora Siklodi’s chapter deals with multi-level citizenship in the context of labour migration. She makes the case that EU citizenship is characterized by multiplicity and as such does not provide the foundation for a single European identity. This is particularly true for migrants for whom multiplicity is a product of several factors: type of migrant, country of residence, and social factors such as age and gender. The second section is rounded out by an interesting contribution from Alistair Brisbourne who explores the role of the Anna Lindh Foundation in regional development and civil society promotion in the Mediterranean. In particular, his work examines the ways in which processes of “civil societalization” are associated with the spread of common global principles of normative culture, e.g. human rights, justice, development and growth. The Anna Lindh Foundation is responsible for the development of intercultural dialogue across the Mediterranean region and the use of civil society development as a way of framing political legitimacy. Section three of the book comprises a further three chapters and focuses on “Multiple Europes beyond the EU.” In doing so it reinforces one of the core European Studies themes of the volume—that Europe should not be reduced to EU membership—and opens up the horizons of the debate still further. In Chapter ten Baris Gulmez is critical of conventional approaches to Euroscepticism, seeing these as applying to EU member states only. To compensate for the omission, Gulmez advances the idea of EU-scepticism as a term which can also include the experience of non-members. There is a real need, he argues, to assess antiEU sentiment during the process of becoming an EU member. This opens up a new window on multiplicity, to be found in multiple EU institutions, national interests and contradictory responses to common problems. The new framework developed here is applied to the case of Turkey, among other countries, where it is found that EU-scepticism is embraced by both government and opposition. Chapter eleven is by Ramneek Grewal and concerns Roma identity and the search for transnational advocacy. Grewal explores the ways in which the Roma have long been encouraged to project a unified identity, a necessity conditioned by the long shadow cast by the nationalist imagination. This same “methodological nationalism”

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accords the Roma the status of “excluded minority” and “marginalized community.” But beyond methodological nationalism a multiplicity of Roma can emerge and their unity is less the result of national minority status and more to do with the abilities of minorities to mobilize transnationally. In the contemporary context the issues of Roma identity and rights are being recast by transnational advocacy networks. The final chapter in the section, and also the book, is by Didem Buhari-Gulmez and addresses the vexed question of Turkey-EU relations, not from a Europeanization perspective but from a novel global perspective. BuhariGulmez argues that the EU is a heuristic device with which to understand the complex world order. She criticises a scholarly reliance on the idea of Europeanization for being unreflexive and for not being aware of the ritualized nature of much Europeanization, which results in EU membership on autopilot. On this platform of critique she advances an innovative understanding of Turkey-EU relations wherein the EU acts as a gateway to the fulfilment of global standards. In this sense the EU is but the bearer of global scripts.

References Agnew, John. “How many Europes? The European Union, eastward enlargement and uneven development.” European Urban and Regional Studies 8 (1) (2001): 29–38. Bialasiewicz, Luiza. Europe in the World: EU Geopolitics and the Making of European Space. Farnham: Ashgate, 2011. Böröcz, József. The European Union and Global Social Change: A Critical Geopolitical Economic Analysis. London and New York: Routledge, 2010. Geddes, Andrew. Immigration and European Integration: Towards Fortress Europe. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008. Huysmans, Jef. The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU. Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2006. Laidi, Zaki. “Europe and World Governance: Norms Over Power.” Working Papers Series—Governance and Globalization Sciences Po in China, 2007. http://sciencespo-globalgovernance.net/node/53. Laidi, Zaki. (Ed). EU Foreign Policy in a Globalized World: Normative power and social preferences. Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2010. Outhwaite, William. European Society. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008. Parker, Owen. Cosmopolitan Government in Europe: Citizens and Entrepreneurs in Postnational Politics. Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2012.

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Recchi, Ettore & Adrian Favell (Eds). Pioneers of European Integration: Citizenship and Mobility in the EU. Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2009. Rumford, Chris. Cosmopolitanism and Europe. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2007. Squire, Vicki. (Ed). The Contested Politics of Mobility: Borderzones and Irregularity. London: Routledge, 2012. Taras, Ray. Europe Old and New: Transnationalism, Belonging, Xenophobia. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009. Verstraete, Ginette. Tracking Europe: Mobility, Diaspora, and the Politics of Location. Durham: Duke University Press, 2010.

PART I: “FIXING” EUROPE

CHAPTER TWO EUROPE AND OTHER EUROPES S. ANNE G. BOSTANCI

What is Europe? There are two main answers that are usually given in response to this question. One is: Europe is a continent stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals, from Scandinavia to the Mediterranean Sea. This is the conventional—though tectonically hardly accurate—geographical conceptualisation. The other conventional conceptualisation is this: Europe is a union of states; a region in which one can travel without visas, border controls and—to a considerable extent—without having to exchange currency; a group of countries that are unified by a history of violent conflict and, on the basis of this memory, the project of establishing and maintaining peaceful coexistence and cooperation. But are these two accounts the only things the term “Europe” refers to? And how is it possible that the same term refers to two such different things? The answer given here is that, in and of itself, the term “Europe” is devoid of meaning. This is not intended to say that it does not refer to anything or, indeed, many things, but that it is an “empty signifier” (Laclau & Mouffe 1985). Instead of holding a specific, intrinsic meaning, it is an umbrella term, which draws together a multitude of meanings from a variety of fields, contexts and ways of making sense of the world— history, geography, economics, politics, culture and society, to name but a few—and anchors them in a temporally and spatially context-specific, durable yet malleable morphology of combined meaning. Moreover, this morphology of combined meaning does not refer to one single meaning-complex or narrative account of what “Europe” is about. Instead, various stories and accounts circulate, each drawing on various discourses. A variety of actors participate in the construction of this morphology: the political classes of various countries, institutions, and international organizations; scholars; media commentators; and ordinary people in a vast variety of places. Yet, it cannot be assumed that they all have the same understanding of the meaning of the term “Europe.” This

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means that there is not one way to make sense of or imagine Europe, but many—not one Europe, but many Europes. The Europes spoken of or imagined in this way arise from social interaction, and it can be observed that some of them are widely held in a sufficiently unified form to be considered shared understandings or “social imaginaries” (Calhoun 2002). As mentioned above, one of the most firmly established social imaginaries of Europe is the one that portrays Europe in the image of the EU. But others exist, too. For instance, Biebuyck & Rumford (2012) instructively identify different imaginaries of Europe in social science, popular science and populist discourses, drawing attention to the extent to which they are linked with narratives about the EU. Further study could address imaginaries of Europe proposed by voices marginalized due to, for instance, lifestyle choices or nationality status (i.e. lack of member state citizenship) in societies in the EU. Beyond the European Union, too, different European imaginaries could be identified, such as those from recent member states and candidate countries that are unfettered by the exercise of EU-isation that is part of the accession process, which often involves suppression of some historical memories and their resulting contemporary identities. Yet other imaginaries of Europe may be found in countries that have rejected the idea of joining the EU or those that are uncertain whether there may be a place for them in it. In addition, the ways in which Europe is imagined in the overseas territories of long-standing EU member states might be interesting. But, because of its salience, it is the EUropean imaginary—that is, the imaginary of Europe promoted by the EU in its own image—that is brought into focus here. The present chapter asks: what traits, what practices, what beliefs, attitudes and “repertoires of evaluation” (Delanty & Rumford 2005) does the Union construct, in its discourses, as European? Or, put differently: what are the contents of the EUropean imaginary that the EU offers Europeans for identification? A variety of inter- and intra-institutional “coordinative” and citizendirected “communicative” discursive forms (Schmidt 2006) may lend themselves to studying these questions. However, many of these discourses and texts contribute more implicitly than explicitly, more incidentally than intentionally, to the construction of the EUropean imaginary. Only one type is specifically intended by the Union’s institutions to communicate what they see themselves as standing for and how they encourage citizens of the Union to imagine EUrope. These are the public relations brochures; the text-based political marketing materials. Hence, these brochures form the empirical basis of the present discussion.

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The following structure is proposed for the present chapter. After some theoretical engagement with the function of imaginaries of this kind and their political significance, in which some important concepts and processes in the phenomenon of social construction in general and the particular role of political discourses and story-telling are addressed, both the sample and its content will be discussed. Then, based on the findings presented, the content and form of presentation will be assessed through the prism of theoretical engagement with political marketing and branding. The conclusion drawn from this discussion will be that mechanisms of fixing the meaning of the term “Europe” can be observed in the effort to promote the EUropean imaginary as the European imaginary, but that, at the same time, some of the identity-endowing functions aimed for in the EU’s political marketing are hindered by the very content and form of the discourses conveying this imaginary of EUrope.

The EUropean Imaginary and the Construction of EUropean Identity As the above understanding of imaginaries, including their social character, implicitly suggests, an approach is adopted here that adheres to the principle of social construction. Although by now a well-established theoretical approach in the social sciences, including the field of European studies, it is worth making explicit—as is rarely done—that the process of social construction consists of two complementary and mutually constitutive parts. Social constructivism refers to the psychological conceptualisation that forms the first part. Epistemological in nature, it explains that people make sense of the world by constructing cognitive models of it. These accounts are socially constructed in the sense that they arise from social exchanges, such as political or cultural practices or discourses, and are commonly held. Social constructionism is the second part of the process of social construction; it complements the cognitive focus of this conceptualisation by accounting for the level of practice more directly. Offering a sociological conceptualisation and located on the ontological plane, it explains that the world is constructed through social interaction, such as discursive exchanges and symbolic activity that spring from and contribute to a particular understanding of the world. This means that they are enabled through as well as giving rise to the afore-mentioned cognitive models. Making the distinctness of constructivism and constructionism explicit draws attention to the fact that social construction entails two analytically separate processes. Thus, the social construction of a political entity such

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as the European Union can be differentiated into two levels: that of the social and political practices that constitute it, and that of its constituent imaginaries. This enables analysis of either of these processes without losing sight of the other. The social and political practices that constitute the Union are studied extensively in the field of European studies. However, the same does not apply to the cognitive models or imaginaries of Europe and the processes of “social learning and normative diffusion” (Checkel 1999, 546) by which they are disseminated. Hence, the focus of the present discussion is on the narratives about Europe as EUrope. It is argued that the EUropean imaginary is not limited to offering individuals a way of making sense of their socio-cultural and sociopolitical context. Inextricably linked to this, and by means of the aforementioned processes of social learning and normative diffusion, it also offers an account of individuals themselves as EUropeans. Thus, not only the meaning or identity assigned to political entities but also those assigned to individuals and groups can be sought to be understood through the study of imaginaries.

Content—the EUropean Imaginary and Ideology Regarding the content of political identities in general, and the identity-endowing EUropean imaginary in particular, the concept of ideology is a useful analytical device. Ideology here is not understood in simple terms of political “-isms,” and is also not understood in Marxist or similarly critically inspired terms as domination through the manipulation of ideas held by the socially disadvantaged to conform to those of the powerful. Instead, it is seen to be an omnipresent social phenomenon, which can be made sense of in a non-judgemental way and which, through its structural focus, can offer insights into political identification. Freeden (1996) describes it as shared “patterns of thought-behaviour” that offer accounts for people to make sense of the world and motivations that facilitate political action. By doing so, ideology enables collective identification. The similarity to the concept of the “imaginary” adopted here is obvious. However, the notion of the imaginary is rather unspecific as to its structure and functions. Regarding ideologies, in contrast, Freeden identifies them as clusters of core and peripheral concepts whose weight and meaning are defined in relation to each other in a morphology characteristic of each respective ideology. As they also draw on characteristic clusters of concepts and on descriptive and prescriptive patterns of thought-behaviour, it is argued here that this understanding of ideology can be applied to collective political projects and institutions

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beyond classical ideologically identified ones, such as political parties, including the European Union. As mentioned above, the point when doing so is not to identify attempts at the manipulation of cognitions or condemn the perceived politics of the project, but to enable the study of the “patterns of thought-behaviour” that can be found in widely disseminated discourses that represent the EUropean imaginary.

Form—the EUropean Imaginary and Communication The EUropean imaginary cannot be studied per se; it is only possible to approach it through representations in social practice, of which the discourses in EU public relations brochures form an example. An early understanding of the identity-endowing function of shared communication in political communities was offered by the transactionalist school of thought (Deutsch 1953), which identified it as a key type of transaction that establishes a “we-feeling” in the community. This is taken up by Eder (2007) in his conceptualisation of the “European communication space” (author’s translation)—a socio-cultural setting in which the sharing of discourses, especially in narrative form, gives rise to collective identification. The content of such narratives can be equated with contributions to broadly shared imaginaries of Europe. Eder’s concept contains two constitutive aspects: the communicative activity and the social group engaging in it. However, it understands the relationship between these constitutive parts and their function in the production and expression of identification slightly differently to the oft-mobilised public sphere (Habermas 1991). The Habermasian understanding assigns the identityendowing function mainly to the organizational level of the demos, while the public sphere is understood as an arena in which to express, more than form, collective identification. The contribution of the concept of the “communication space” is that the identity-endowing function is recognised in the level of activity, namely the communication processes themselves, while the society in which they take place, i.e. the organizational level, is understood as its expression or product. Eder identifies two types of shared identity-endowing stories in the context of the EU and the EUropean “communication space”: those that refer to the perceived experience of fairness that result from the fact that rules of membership of the EU are based on a legal contract and are therefore the same for all members,1 and those that refer to historical events of existential struggle that are perceived to be shared (even if only in the rather wide sense of the term, as commonly attributing significance to them). But, while he is right that the latter type of narrative plays a

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significant role in the EUropean imaginary, the idea that a shared narrative of equality and fairness circulates within the Union is more questionable. Moreover, the exclusive commitment to these narratives seems unnecessarily limiting, for the identity-endowing narratives making up European imaginaries, including the EUropean imaginary, revolve around a much greater variety of “constant reference points” (Lenschow & Sprungk 2010). A theoretical tool that aims to conceptualize identity-endowing political narratives in more general terms is that of “political myth” (e.g. Bottici 2007; Flood 2002). A useful conceptualisation is offered by Flood—firstly, they are narratives that carry messages that are ideological in the sense outlined above; secondly, they present themselves as, and are held to be, true and, often, sacrosanct (that is, insulated from critique); thirdly, they may appear in diachronic variations and synchronic analogies. Of further importance, as other writers suggest, is their ordinariness as an everyday phenomenon (MacIver 1947; Bottici 2007) and the fact that myths are linked to political practice through the ability to mobilise collective action by offering generally accepted descriptive and normative statements (MacNeill 1986). More importantly for the present purposes, however, myths, in their affective narrative form, cannot be challenged by rational argument. Thus, they remove the ideology they promote, or the imaginary they construct, from contestation.

Function—Decontestation, Political Capital and the Colonisation of Europe From the public relations brochures that form the basis of the study, it can be observed that the EU draws on political myths as a strategy to remove the EUropean imaginary from contestation. This means that, in its communications, processes can be observed that serve to fix the meaning of the European imaginary by equating it with the EUropean imaginary and eliminating alternative discursive constructions. To this effect, the Union draws on an important resource and an important strategy. The resource that the EU draws on for this purpose can be described as its social—and more specifically, its political—capital. Bourdieu (1991) defines this as the ability of a person to exercise power over others facilitated by the others’ belief in that person’s entitlement and ability to do so, rather than by material structures or coercive means. While the Foucauldian notion of power as constituted in a dialectical relationship that always entails the possibility of resistance is acknowledged here, Bourdieu’s concept of political capital aptly illustrates how this possibility

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is often passed up. With a five-decades-long process of public socialisation and employment of discursive strategies, such as the one discussed in the next section, the EU carries more such capital than other actors involved in the construction of the European imaginary. Thus, the EU has established itself as an authoritative speaker on all matters European. Moreover, it also very often successfully claims to be speaking on behalf of Europe. And, while the blurring of the distinction between “speaking on” and “speaking for” something or someone has been considered problematic in other fields, such as anthropology (Cliffford 1983) or feminist critique (Spivak 1988), it goes largely unquestioned in European studies. Hence, the most common strategy of decontestation drawn on by the Union is a matter of simple rhetorical conflation of the terms Europe and European Union. This extends beyond the appropriation of the adjective “European” to describe the Union and its institutions (for, why is it the “European Commission” and not the “European Union Commission”?) to frequent synonymous usage reproduced in common parlance, media representation, academic study and political rhetoric. However, the European Union and Europe are distinct terms with distinct referents. Conflation of them is at best naïve. At worst, however, obscuring this distinction can be identified as a means for glossing over internal fragmentation of the EU and for the “colonisation” of the broader and more imprecise term “Europe” (Boedeltje & van Houtum 2008).

Sample and Methods These pretentions to authorship of a EUropean imaginary, as well as the rhetorical colonisation that works to establish it as the European imaginary, find clear expression in the EU’s public relations brochures.2 Beyond a multitude of materials dedicated to individual policies (of which over fifty recent publications have been drawn on for the purpose of triangulation), some are identified by officials as the “basic publications.” One of these, Europe in 12 Lessons (European Communities 2006) details the key political and policy discourses of the Union. The English language version of this publication forms the basis of this discussion.3 In line with the ontological and epistemological commitments presented above, the brochures in question were subjected to critical discourse analytical methods to elicit both the meaning-making processes at work and the “cultural models” (Gee 2002) and “meanings-in-use” (Weldes 1998) communicated. The aim was to do justice to the critical objective of identifying the function of power through discourse, while simultaneously avoiding both the Foucauldian tradition’s sweeping claims

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about the (manipulative) social function of discourse and the rather technical detail of many types of linguistic analysis, for instance a functional grammar approach à la Halliday (2004). For this reason, this included broad as well as detailed methods of analysis, contextualisation and juxtaposition with alternative discourses, and in-depth analysis of rhetorical devices including mode of address, nominalisation, predication, the use of metaphors, euphemisms, omissions, assumptions, framing, affective and aspirational narrativity, and semiotic analysis of images. While it is true that this kind of deconstructive analysis is not necessarily much different from the kinds of questions any citizen of a polity might ask under ideal conditions in response to the myths he or she is presented with (Chilton & Schäffner 1997), critical discourse analysis is not simply a “replication of everyday critique” because discourse analysts “can draw upon social theories and theories of language, and methodologies for language analysis, which are not generally available, and [have] resources for systematic and in-depth investigations which go beyond ordinary experience” (Fairclough & Wodak 1997, 281). Furthermore, the possibility of discourse analysis and critique (potentially) forming an ordinary practice does not detract from its effectiveness at exposing both the contingent nature of established discourses and the structures and functions of power that sustain them. Thus, the following paragraphs will look at the content of the EUropean imaginary, and are followed by a discussion that makes explicit some of the power relations between it and (potential) alternative accounts. And while it is not the objective here to be overly critical of the European Union, its professed aims or its practices, a critical evaluation of some of its communication strategies, their underlying ideologies, and their political effects cannot be avoided. This is in line with the demand—made, for instance, by Delanty (1995, 158)— that Europe must not be judged “by its lofty ideals” only. This, of course, also applies to the EU.

Findings—Content and Form of the EUropean Imaginary Based on Biebuyck & Rumford’s (2012, 4) outline of different European imaginaries, it is possible to categorise the one discussed here as belonging to the “governmental field,” as it originates from the European institutions. However, it is not of the mundane and rationalistic kind that refers to a territory or population to be managed by means of policies, but an explicitly ideological and affective identity-endowing narrative construct.

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As such, the EUropean imaginary aids decontestation—it naturalizes the current shape and functions of the Union and its institutions. It does so not only by stating them as simple fact rather than engaging in a discussion (even as a rhetorical device) about alternatives and reasoning in favour of the present forms and by mobilising emotions such as aspiration, pride and gratitude. It also often couches them in narratives that refer to historical origins and developments (which has the effect of suggesting inevitability) and anchors EUropean convictions and conventional EUropean practices (these are mostly presented in contemporary incarnations as timeless facts of life, and are usually represented in imagery or accounts that suggest their everyday existence in the EUropean society). This historical-narrative anchoring means that it cannot be questioned by rational argument, and such difficult questions regarding differing cultures within the Union can be avoided. It also means that room for manoeuver is included in the sense that the reader of the brochures is able to identify with those ideas and practices expressing EUropeanness that speak to him or her and disregard others. Despite a lot of factual statements, most of the discourses presented in the EU brochures can be identified as drawing on narratives. This is possible because of the use of “story lines” (Hajer 2005)—gaps in the discourse that are filled by the recipient (in this case, the reader) by means of prior contextual knowledge, which is assumed by both recipient and sender of the communication to be the same as that intended by the sender. For this reason, many accounts of EUropeanness in the brochures discussed do not need to spell out their narrative. Nevertheless, a number of widely mobilised mythopoeic narratives can be identified in them. One that is widely used is that of the EU as the bringer of peace and prosperity in Europe after a long history of conflict and bloodshed. While there may be some truth in this account, it can also be deconstructed in various ways. Firstly, by drawing attention to the convenient omission of the debacle of the Balkan War, and secondly with reference to other organizations—such as NATO—who could conceivably make the same claim. Also, the pairing of peace and prosperity is a peculiar one, even if it may have become engrained by the drip-feed effect of repetition over the years. For instance, the hippie movement of the 1960s and 1970s would have paired the concept of peace not with prosperity but with love. The second set of common mythopoeic narratives can be summarised as messianic tales of progressivism. These refer to both human(itarian) and technological terms—to global responsibility and EU-internal solidarity on the one hand, and the implicit belief in the power of technological advances and the ideal of human progress on the other. However, the

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progressivism promoted could be critically approached on a number of counts. Firstly, it contains tenets that could be questioned or criticised as euphemisms—one may question the progressive nature of some of the neoliberal ideas promoted, for example, or the salutary potential of environmentalism. Secondly, some tenets are contradictory, such as the conservationist tendencies of environmentalism versus the emphasis on individual gratification inherent in the consumerism proposed. And thirdly, the progressivism promoted often carries an implied sense of cultural superiority that seems to be the only remnant of an otherwise omitted long-standing European discourse of assumed universalism of EUropean ideas and values and exceptionalism attached to many ostensibly EUropean practices. Thirdly, and related to the points about cultural exceptionalism, the portrayal of outside “others” as either a threat to EUrope or EUropeanness or a victim of their “non-EUropeanness” figures largely in the EUropean imaginary. Despite simultaneous use of similar markers to emphasise diversity and inclusiveness, which are evaluated in positive terms, these negatively evaluated “others” are often presented in crude, racialized terms (and because of the familiarity of these discourses from national contexts they are prime examples of the way story lines work in the construction of narratives). The simplistic, racialized terms they draw on give the impression that the supranational aspirations of the Union are merely a matter of political organization and not one of transcending outdated conceptualisations in terms of ethno-cultural exclusivity that were originally drawn on in nationalist contexts. Fourthly, the metaphorical European family is a common reference point of narratives contributing to the EUropean imaginary. This functions to discursively counteract the phenomena summarised under the “Postwesternisation thesis,” namely the internal fragmentation and disunity of EUrope and the fact that outside influences may impact on its nature and self-understanding (Biebuyck & Rumford 2012). Although an empirical fact—which proves the Postwesternisation thesis conceptually useful—the EU claims a Europe unaffected by such processes. External influences are silenced in the official version of the EUropean imaginary and discourses that would imply fragmentation or disunity are confronted with an expectation of assimilation and conformity. As a result of this homogenisation, the rhetorical mobilisation of self-professed diversity— which is, of course, one of the narratives the EU draws on in the construction of Europe—is somewhat discredited. A fifth, rather domineering narrative can be found in the portrayal of what might be phrased “EUropean world consumer citizenship.” In it, the

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cosmopolitan and inclusionary aspirations of the Union are combined with a strong focus on consumerist practices as identity-endowing (which can be found in a variety of narratives contributing to the EUropean imaginary). Taking the identification with consumption to the extreme, exotic otherness becomes a consumable quality along the lines of Hooks’ (2006) concept of “eating the other.” More generally, too, citizenship and EUropean identity are presented in terms uncannily similar to the vacuous, aspirational yet ultimately unsatisfactory—for perpetually deferred— identification offered by commercial advertising. This applies both to their contents and to the form in which the narratives are presented, such as the format and design strategies of the EU’s public relations brochures. Thus, the brochures seem to promote an ideology pivoting on individualism and material gratification rather than solidarity and anti- or post-materialist ideals. The ideological cluster, that can be identified as underlying the imaginary that these common narratives contain elements of, consists of: liberalism, progressivism, environmentalism, neoliberalism (which appears to be a euphemism for advanced capitalism), securitism, conservatism, democracy, the rule of law, solidarity, social welfare, educational elitism, technology fetishism, a degree of protectionism, cosmopolitanism, and a strong focus on consumerism with its associated tenet of individualism. Some of these concepts have become so engrained that they almost go without saying, for instance liberalism, and the rule of law and democracy—often referred to as the “European values”—are often assumed to be the core principles. However, considering, for instance, the questionable democratic nature of the Union or the amount of attention dedicated in the public relations discourses to other tenets in the form of representations of EUropean practices rather than the self-professed EUropean values, it could be argued in the present context that the core lies with neoliberalism and consumerism.

Discussion—Problems of the EUropean Imaginary One of the fundamental problems with the EUropean imaginary lies in the fact that while it propagates ideals such as solidarity and civic engagement, it also exhibits a strong focus on consumption that betrays a commitment to individualism. But the contradiction inherent in this ideology is not the only problem. As mentioned above, the consumerist focus is not only expressed in the content of the EU’s public relations brochures, but at least as much in their form. Assessing this form with the

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help of theoretical engagement with political communication reveals other problems. Their format and visual designs along with the self-promotional contents clearly place the EU brochures in the realm not only of political communication in general, but political marketing in particular. Political marketing as a field of study “emanat[es] from the two disciplines of marketing and political science” (Lees-Marshment 2008, 1). It aims to provide insight into a political practice inspired by academic theories and the practical business strategies of marketing (Ibid., 30). The development of this field of study is, of course, owed to the fact that “[i]n these last few decades, ‘consumer culture’ (Featherstone 1991) has spread from the private to the public sphere, resulting in political institutions’ growing use of practices that are typical of the commercial sector” (Magistro 2010, 155). Further, it is owed to the fact that, as a result, hybrid forms of communication have emerged that combine market-oriented promotional and traditional institutional traits (Ibid.). One of the main debates within the field, according to Henneberg et al. (2009), centres around the question of whether high-minded political institutions should or should not condescend to adopting the ostensibly trivial methods of quasi-corporate attention-seeking behaviour to cajole citizens who have lost interest in information and politics unless they are presented in the easily consumable form of infotainment, soundbites or similarly commercially inspired communication techniques. This is not the main concern here, however, even though the potentially depoliticising effect of triggering aspirational and other affective responses through the glorification of consumption practices is considered problematic. More importantly, however, the adoption of methods akin to commercial advertising seems indicative of the institutions’ understanding of the political process and entities within it as trivial or meaningless beyond capitalist/consumerist ideas of competition, choice, gratification, service and individualism. The methods adopted—similar to corporate self-promotion—often include established (Ibid.) strategies, such as the identification of a unique selling point regarding the political “product” (this may include narratives of superior ideological commitments in comparison to alternative organizations and levels) and the alignment of institutional identity with the (factual or aspirational) identity perceived to be already held by the message’s intended recipients (that is, presenting institutional and individuals’ interests as the same and establishing a direct relationship). Both these processes can be observed in the EU’s public relations brochures and—just as in commercial contexts—they coincide with the

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marketing method of branding, i.e. the association of a recognisable symbol or emblem with the organization. Based on Simon’s (1957) theory that humans are “cognitive misers,” the established understanding is that brands help reduce political complexity and, thus, enable individuals to form opinions and preferences. However, as Smith & French (2009) explain, a political brand is not only a straightforward short-hand technique for an institution to communicate with citizens, but also works to attach recognition value and favourable perceptions by doing two things: gratifying the recipient’s variety-seeking behaviour and reinforcing their self-concept. The former, “variety seeking,” refers to the fact that people confronted with (political or other) brands may have positive perceptions and enhanced recall of them if they carry the promise of novelty. The latter, “self-concept reinforcement,” refers to the phenomenon that brands are perceived in a favourable light if they are seen to stand for practices and values that their public already identify with. Especially when the product or organization is entirely detached from the individual faced with the brand, gratification of variety-seeking behaviour and self-concept reinforcement can occur alongside each other, because a multitude of attributes can be interpreted as multifacetedness rather than (potential) self-contradiction. But this is not the case with the EU’s public relations brochures, in which the brand is simultaneously applied to the socio-cultural and political context of EUrope and to EUropean individuals. Thus, the brochures mystify the institutions and rather specific representations of what it means to be a EUropean. This means that readers of the EU’s public relations brochures are called on to form a cognitive model, an imaginary or, in the terms of a scholar of political branding, a “set of associative networks” (Collins & Loftus 1975; Wyer & Srull 1989, quoted in Smith & French 2009) of EUrope. The associative network they form is also expected to lead to approval and adoption of the specific EUropean identity that is also proposed by the discourse. However, even where such acceptance takes place on the basis of selfconcept reinforcement, the lack of a novelty factor leads to serious questions (both in the abstract and those potentially posed by readers), such as: “What is specifically EUropean about this identity?”, “What is the added value of the EUropeanness the brochures proclaim, if it does not have anything new to offer?” or “Why should anyone become politically active, if the identity offered is no different from the depoliticised, consumption-focussed one already held?” As these questions illustrate, the “lowest common denominator” strategy of reflecting a commonplace— mainly capitalist/consumerist—identity back at EUropeans raises questions

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about the specificity and inherent value of the EUropeanness offered in the brochures, as well as its political nature. Additionally, these are likely to have an impact on the legitimacy-endowing function of the imaginary. Vice versa, if the EUropean institutional and individual identity offered is perceived to be novel by the readers of the brochures (that is, it may have the potential to gratify variety-seeking behaviour) there is, due to the mystification taking place in the present context, per definitionem a danger of it clashing with their self-concept. Hence, the linking of institutions and individuals’ identities leaves only one possible response to divergence of the institutional discourse from the self-concept of the individual—the rejection of both identities promoted. As such, the Union’s public relations brochures’ practice of linking the two distinct types of identity seems to make alternative interpretations of Europe impossible. This can be argued to constitute an attempt to sacralize and remove the EUropean imaginary from contestation. The point can be illustrated by the following example—the rejection of the European Union, expressed in a No-vote majority in referenda on accession application in Norway in 1972 and 1994, was widely (and simplistically) classed as a case of majority EUroscepticism. However, according to Sundliskaeter Skinner (2012), EUroscepticism is not a unified ideological tenet and was, in this case, not based in the bigotry conventionally associated with it in political and academic discourse, but to a considerable extent founded in perceptions of the Union as a threat to many Norwegians’ (rather affectively held) post-materialist ideological commitments and everyday practices. This means that they seem to have rejected a particular aspect of the EU’s portrayal of EUropean identity based on their adherence to an alternative aspirational imaginary of Europe, which was then equated with rejection of the Union in terms of all its institutional make-up and policy objectives and endeavours.

Conclusion It can be assumed that it is because of this undifferentiated and allencompassing understanding that EUroscepticism is stigmatised in large parts of academic and political discourse. Further, it becomes very clear from this example that, by attaching such a label to alternative European imaginaries, the EU effectively silences them in the endeavour to fix its own interpretation as the European imaginary. Of course it is impossible, on the basis of the evidence presented here, to say whether this is and will be the fate of all alternative European imaginaries. However, it is suggestive that the Union seems to (consciously and intentionally or not)

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employ methods of silencing alternative European imaginaries, such as the stigmatisation discussed here, the glossing over of outside influences that could give rise to alternative European imaginaries, and the expectation of assimilation discussed regarding the European imaginaries that the former Communist countries could currently contribute. As has been argued in the introduction, because what is at stake is nothing less than the Union’s claims to legitimacy, it is hardly surprising that it should establish a competitive rather than inclusive process regarding the establishment of the European imaginary. However, this bid for a hegemonic discursive position is rather worrying as it is fundamentally irreconcilable with the Union’s selfprofessed principle of “unity in diversity.” As a matter of fact, this inherent contradiction may further undermine the already questionable meaning- or identity-endowing utility of this motto. With regard to the Union’s public relations endeavours, this problem could easily be remedied if it shifted the focus of its brochures away from quasi-corporate and consumerist representations of an imaginary of rather questionable Europeanness towards authentic accounts of EUropeans’ identification both in terms of cognitive models and unreflective practices. This would also involve a transition from ill-founded claims to a representativeness that serves a political function towards a more modest approach, respectful of EU citizens’ diversity and intellectual capabilities of offering exemplary EUropean experiences and thoughts for identification. This would certainly be more expressive of the principle of “unity in diversity” and, at the same time, allow for the dynamism that results from the multiplicity of European imaginaries (Biebuyck & Rumford 2012, 14). The present chapter, however, looks at the contents and discursive processes employed by the EU that function to establish a single, stagnant and dominant EUropean imaginary. It first outlined the importance of imaginaries of Europe as cognitive models that contribute to processes of identification in a larger context of social construction. It then introduced the concept of ideology to make sense of the structure and function of such imaginaries in general, before moving on to the concept of political myth to draw attention to the fact that they are often represented in affective political narratives. It argued that the EU is in a privileged position to determine the hegemonic discursive content of representations of the European imaginary (which, thus, becomes equated with the EUropean imaginary) due to its political capital and the fact that its discursive colonisation of Europe is largely accepted. After outlining some of the contents, the chapter highlighted the inherent contradictions of content and form of the EUropean imaginary, the depoliticising potential of both, and

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the political effect of silencing that they have vis-à-vis alternative imaginaries of Europe. It concludes that ways could easily be found to allow for a multiplicity of Europes within the EU and its public relations brochures, and that these would contribute to a much more authentic and credible (and, thus, more successfully identity-endowing) European, as well as European, imaginary.

References Biebuyck, William & Chris Rumford, “Many Europes: Rethinking Multiplicity.” European Journal of Social Theory 15 (1) (2012): 3–20. Boedeltje, Freerk & Henk van Houtum. “The Abduction of Europe: a Plea for Less ‘Unionism’ and More Europe.” Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie 99 (3) (2008): 361–365 Bottici, Chiara. A Philosophy of Political Myth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Bourdieu, Pierre. Language and Symbolic Power. Cambridge and Oxford: Polity Press, 1991. Calhoun, Craig. “Imagining Solidarity: Cosmopolitanism, Constitutional Patriotism, and the Public Sphere.” Public Culture 14 (1) (2002): 147– 171. Checkel, Jeffrey T. “Social Construction and Integration.” Journal of European Public Policy 6 (4) (1999): 545–560. Chilton, Paul & Christina Schäffner. “Discourse and Politics.” In Discourse as Social Interaction, edited by Teun van Dijk, 206–230. London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1997. Clifford, James. “On Ethnographic Authority.” Representations 2 (1983): 118–146. Collins, Allan & Elizabeth Loftus. “A Spreading Activation Theory of Semantic Processing.” Psychological Review 82 (6) (1975): 407–428. Delanty, Gerard. Inventing Europe—Idea, Identity, Reality. Basingstoke and London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1995. Delanty, Gerard & Chris Rumford. Rethinking Europe. Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2005. Deutsch, Karl W. Nationalism and Social Communication. An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1953. Eder, Klaus. “Europa als besonderer Kommunikationsraum. Zur Frage der sozialen Integration einer kulturell heterogenen Gesellschaft.” Berliner Journal für Soziologie 17 (1) (2007): 33–50. European Communities. Europe in 12 Lessons. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2006.

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—. How the European Union Works—Your Guide to the EU Institutions. Luxembourg: Office for the Official Publications of the European Communities, 2007. Fairclough, Norman & Ruth Wodak. “Critical Discourse Analysis.” In Discourse as Social Interaction, edited by Teun van Dijk, 258–285. London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1997. Featherstone, Mike. Consumer Culture and Postmodernism. London: Sage Publications, 1991. Flick, Uwe. An Introduction to Qualitative Research. London, Thousand Oaks, and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2009. Flood, Chris G. Political Myth: a theoretical introduction. London and New York: Routledge, 2002. Freeden, Michael. Ideologies and Political Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. Gee, James P. An Introduction to Discourse Analysis: Theory and Method. London and New York: Routledge, 2002. Habermas, Jürgen. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991. —. “Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe,” Praxis International 12, no.1 (1992): 1-19. Hajer, Maarten. “Coalitions, Practices, and Meaning in Environmental Politics: from Acid Rain to BSE.” In Discourse Theory in European Politics, edited by David R. Howarth and Jacob Torfing. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. Halliday, Michael A. K. Construing Experience Through Meaning: A Language-Based Approach to Cognition. Revised by Christian M. I. M. Matthiessen. London, New York: Cassell, 1999, London: Arnold, 2004. Henneberg, Stephan, Margaret Scammell & Nicholas J. O'Shaughnessy. “Political Marketing Management and Theories of Democracy.” Marketing Theory 9 (2) (2009): 165–188. Hooks, Bell. “Eating the Other: Desire and Resistance.” In Media and Cultural Studies: Key Works, edited by Meenakshi G. Durham and Douglas M. Kellner, 366–381. Malden MA, Oxford and Charlton: Blackwell Publishing, 2006. Laclau, Ernesto & Chantal Mouffe. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. London: Verso, 1985. Lees-Marshment, Jennifer. Political Marketing. London and New York: Routledge, 2008. Lenschow, Andrea & Carina Sprungk. “The Myth of a Green Europe.” Journal of Common Market Studies 48 (1) (2010): 133–154.

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CHAPTER THREE EU MULTIPLICITY AND THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION: THE CASE OF FREE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE FOR WORK PURPOSES VALENTINA KOSTADINOVA

Determination to establish an ever closer union between the peoples of Europe inspired the European integration process, requiring the elimination of the barriers dividing the continent (Treaty establishing the EEC 1957, Preamble), which promotes the emergence of a singular space and identity in the European Community (EC)/European Union (EU). More than sixty years later, the result is a profound transformation of the continent. Importantly, however, it falls short of the existence of a singular EU. As scholars such as Diez (2006), Rumford (2006), Delanty & Rumford (2005) or Balibar (1998) have convincingly argued, a crucial outcome of the process of European integration has been the multiplication of spaces, identities, borders or individual perceptions of the EU. This trend is summed up well by Biebuyck & Rumford who talk about “Many Europes” (2012). This poses the question of how this multiplication came about. In this chapter I engage with this issue, arguing that EU multiplicity is an outcome of the limitations to the efforts to fix a singular Union, which are a result of the complex EU decision-making structure. More often than not, it makes it impossible to agree on the measures that would establish a single EU space or identity. Such limitations contribute to the emergence of various EU spaces, demarcated by diverse borders, and inhabited by different categories of people. I focus on the EU because the European integration process has been a major contributing factor to European multiplication. To investigate EU multiplicity, I examine European Commission articulations in an increasingly prominent area—the free

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movement of people for work purposes (FMoPfWP). My focus on the Commission is due to its structural position within the EU decisionmaking system and the powers and prerogatives it is vested with under the Treaties. These ensure that due to its drive for unification, the European Commission will advocate greater integration (Kostadinova 2012, 29–31), thus promoting singularity. Hence, the shortfalls of Commission efforts will illustrate well the ways in which EU multiplicity emerges. For its part, FMoPfWP has not only attracted a lot of scholarly interest (Lahav 2004; Sinn 2004; Geddes 2000; DĦvell 2009; Carrera 2005; Guild 2005), but is also a policy field characterized by important differences in the rights conferred upon various types of people. This makes it fertile for investigating EU multiplicity. I proceed as follows. First, I elaborate on the study’s theoretical and methodological underpinnings by presenting an account of how EU multiplicity is established and how it can be investigated. Then I examine the Commission articulations that epitomize the efforts towards the establishment of a singular EU with regards to FMoPfWP. Next I look at the two major categories of workers that currently have their freedom of movement in the EU curtailed (third country nationals [TCNs] and citizens of the so-called new member states [that joined in 2004–071]), and analyse how this has been articulated in the European Commission discourse. I conclude with a summary of the findings.

EU Multiplicity—Theorisation of Its Emergence and the Commission’s Contribution Investigation into the Commission’s contribution to EU multiplicity in the field of FMoPfWP builds upon two major EU Studies strands: migration and EU policymaking. It contributes by providing detailed empirical analysis of the specific ways in which the desire for EU singularity and its limitations are articulated in Commission discourse on FMoPfWP. Such an examination requires elaboration of the types of EU multiplicity and the Commission’s contribution to the process, which pinpoints its limitations in promoting singularity and an explanation of how the documents that inform the analysis were collected and interpreted. My analysis of EU multiplicity is focused on two aspects: multiplicity of space and identities, which are inextricably related to the question of borders. It is through the re/configuration of EU borders that EU multiplication or singularity comes about. Following social constructivist understandings, borders are delimiters of sovereignty that are constructed and reconstructed in a search for control, linked to the nature of political

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power (Williams 2003, 28), and are differentiators of socially constructed mindscapes and meaning (van Houtum 2005, 673). Geddes (2005) and Cuttitta (2006) define the major types of borders of interest here. Geddes distinguishes between territorial, organizational (functional) and conceptual borders—territorial borders are the sites (sea/land/air) of entry at which the sovereign powers of the state to exclude are exercised, being an instance of a more general type of border that Cuttitta terms material borders. They: “… can be marked and physically reproduced on the earth’s surface” (2006, 29), which makes them easy to visualize space-wise. Organizational (functional) borders are the sites where conditions for the membership into the labour market, the welfare state and the national citizenship are specified. Conceptual borders encompass a set of concerns centred on notions of belonging and identity to various communities (trans-national, national or sub-national) (Geddes 2005, 789–790). Cuttitta refers to this last type of border as non-material that manifests differences between various kinds of non-material entities, such as dividing lines between ethnic and linguistic groups, cultures or classes (2006, 29). EU space multiplicity is directly related to the proliferation of territorial and functional borders as a result of the process of European integration, articulated through references to “member states” or the various administrative, legal and technical provisions in the EU that regulate people’s access to the EU labour market/s. These regimes invest the notion of multiple EU spaces with meaning. Under the acquis, various countries (sometimes even non-EU member states) apply different aspects of the legislation. For example, the UK, Ireland and Denmark are entitled to decide whether they want to join measures such as a single application procedure for a single permit for TCNs. The multiplication of identities is a result of the construction of novel categories of people in the context of European integration. A classic example is the increasingly meaningful distinction between EU citizens and TCNs (Kostadinova 2013). However, as this chapter shows, there is a proliferation of TCN identities as a result of the enunciation of different statuses and rights (i.e. for long-term TCN residents in an EU member state or for highly-skilled workers). In a similar way, EU nationals are articulated as belonging to old or new Union member states. The Commission’s contribution to EU multiplicity is as a balancing act between the desire to promote greater unification (a result of its position within the EU decision-making structure) and the obstacles it faces in achieving this aim. EU scholars disagree about how to characterize its contribution to EU decision-making. Intergovernmentalists deny any substantial role of the Commission (Moravcsik 1991; 1993; 1998), while

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Neo-functionalists maintain it has the ability to independently influence the EU decision-making process (Haas 1996; Lindberg 1963; Schmitter 1969). The latter theorise this through the concept of spillover and over time have developed more nuanced definitions of the term that capture different reasons and actors behind the process (for more details see Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991, 5; Niemann & Schmitter 2009, 49–50; Jensen 2000, 74). My take on this debate is that the Commission does have important tools at its disposal, which allow it, under certain circumstances, to influence EU decision-making independently. Nugent summarises these by saying that the Commission has a: “very significant impact on what policy issues are considered by the formal decision-takers, in what terms they are considered, when they are considered, by whom they are considered, and with what receptivity they are considered” (1997, 23). Importantly, however, in the complex EU decision-making structure, the Commission’s ability to successfully sway the decision-making process in its preferred direction varies. Multiple studies have outlined the particular tools the Commission uses in its various roles in the EU decision-making system (Pollack 1997; Nugent 1995, 1997 and 2001; Hix 2005; Coombes 1970). Firstly, as Pollack argues, the Commission is prone to anticipating the Council’s reaction to its proposals and to tailoring them accordingly (1997, 110; see also Hix 2005, 53–57). Thus, the Commission acts tactically. It would not act on issues it thinks it does not have the necessary support for at present, or when it lacks legal basis. Discursively, this is most likely to be expressed through silences or absences in Commission articulations. In practice, these obstruct the successful achievement of the discourse’s declared aims. Carabine defines silences/absences as issues not present in a discourse although one may reasonably expect them to be covered by it (2001, 285). Thus, a silence or absence in a discourse ruptures it by making its enunciations logically inconsistent, which leads to important contradictions. Secondly, as Lindberg & Scheingold argue, despite the Commission’s formal powers of legislative initiative, in practice other institutions (i.e. the Council of Ministers [CoM]) inevitably have important input in the formulation of the official proposals. Among other things this involves bargaining between institutions on the inclusion of their preferred policies in the official legislative proposals (1970, 87–98). This has two important consequences. Firstly, Commission discourse is bound to contain articulations that are not supported by the Commission per se. As such it expresses multiple voices. Due to this multiplicity of voices, secondly, one can anticipate that Commission discourses will display contradictions, which are a result of the clashing desires of the main EU decision-making

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institutions. Lequesne succinctly summarizes the overall outcome of this debate about the independent influence of the Commission: “… the EU Commission agents can mobilise specific resources in order to behave as ‘policy entrepreneurs’ in the EU polity with a certain degree of autonomy from the national governments … this policy entrepreneurship is also constrained by endogeneous and exogeneous factors which make the Commission dependent on the national governments in the EU polity” (2000, 37). So, EU multiplicity is a result of the often contradictory preferences of its various institutions. The tendencies of the supranational organs (the Commission) to push towards unification are counterbalanced by the intergovernmental bodies (the CoM). This imposes limitations to what each institution can achieve in practice. This chapter demonstrates this by looking at the case of FMoPfWP, an area with ever-growing prominence encompassing a wide range of inter-related policies. To avoid overstretching the study, I focus on the stipulations about who is entitled to move within the Union for work purposes and the regimes regulating such movements. Thus, I do not analyse other related issues, such as family reunification or migrant integration. My understanding of EU multiplicity is inspired by social constructivism. The processes that lead to multiplication of EU spaces and identities are a result of social interactions that bring about and invest with specific meanings concepts such as EU citizens, TCNs, or the European labour market. I study in detail Commission articulations after the Single European Act (SEA) and present an account of how EU singularity/multiplicity is enunciated. I chose the SEA as the starting point of the analysis because it explicitly states as its goal the aim of establishing an “area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of … persons … is ensured …” (SEA 1986, article 13). This clearly presents the aim of creating a singular EU. Furthermore, this goal had the potential to spill over to other areas, which at the time were not included in European Community cooperation (i.e. social, environmental policies or border controls) (Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1993; George 1991). Moreover, the SEA introduced qualified majority voting (QMV) for single market measures, which as Tranholm-Mikkelsen puts it gave the Commission: “some leverage in its dealing with the Council” (1993, 12). Therefore, overall, after the SEA the Commission was better positioned to promote a singular EU in an increased number of areas. This provides a good starting point for analysing the limitations of this development, if an outcome of multiplication of EU space and identities is observed instead.

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The analysis presented below is based on the interrogation of major types of Commission documents, Green and White Papers, Communications (COM and SEC documents), and officials’ speeches. These have allowed for the collection of comprehensive data on Commission articulations addressed to both other EU institutions and the general public. The data’s interpretation is based on the double reading technique, which allows a critical engagement with a discourse (Ashley 1988; Brown 1994). The next section represents the first reading of the Commission discourse where the articulations are taken at face value. The following section, examining the limitations of Commission articulations, represents the second reading, in which I put the Commission discourse in context and engage with it critically.

Attempts at “Fixing” a Singular EU— Commission Articulations As expected, in Commission FMoPfWP discourse there is a strong trend towards establishing a singular EU. The articulations can be broadly divided into two main categories. Firstly, general enunciations advancing the goal of establishing an area of FMoPfWP. Secondly, measures undertaken by the Commission aimed at creating a regime for FMoPfWP for both EU nationals from the new member states and for TCNs. In this section I present in detail these types of Commission articulations and specify the kind of singularity they promote. The general Commission articulations that promote the establishment of a singular EU for FMoPfWP are best exemplified by terms such as “mobility,” “European labour market,” “a single European employment/ labour market,” “European-wide labour markets” or the goal of “the creation of an employment and work area on a Community-wide scale.”2 For example, the Commission has supported: “a variety of programmes for transnational mobility of persons who are keen to undergo training … or contribute to training activities in another Member State of the Community” (European Commission 1996, 1, emphasis added; see also European Commission 2006d, 14). In the same vein, the Mobility Action Plan states: “Worker mobility is a key instrument for an efficiently functioning single market …” (European Commission 2007a, 2, emphasis added). For two main reasons these articulations promote the decreased salience of previously-existing borders between the member states. Firstly, in Commission discourse terms such as mobility are linked with phrases such as “united Europe” and “development of solidarity between all Europeans” (European Commission 1996, summary and 1 respectively).

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Thus, the overall goal is to reduce the existing territorial and functional divisions between the member states which also contribute to the emergence of a singular EU. Furthermore, the emergence of a singular identity is promoted by references to “Europe” and “Europeans” instead of any of the Union’s constituent parts. Secondly, the anticipated emergence of a singular EU as a result of the increased mobility is regarded as contributing towards the achievement of a single market (European Commission 2007a, 2), which is premised on the idea of creating a frontier free area in the EC/EU (SEA, Article 13). The second main category consists of Commission articulations demonstrating an effort to establish a singular EU, and which are the enunciations concerning freer movement of TCNs for work purposes. As discussed above, the general Commission FMoPfWP articulations, such as “European labour market” or “mobility,” promote the idea of the existence of a singular EU in which previously-existing borders are less salient. Crucially, usually when the Commission employs these terms, no qualifications are added, which suggests not only the unification of the area in question, but also that this covers both EU citizens and TCNs.3 Nevertheless, some articulations remind us that this is not yet the case. For example, a Commission Action Plan reads: “Third country nationals do not currently enjoy the right to free movement under Community law, and this proposal does not imply the granting of such a right” (European Commission 1997, 12); “The right to free movement of workers … gives every European citizen the right to enter the territory of any Member State in order to work or to look for work” (European Commission 1997, 5). Such articulations maintain the continued existence of different categories of people within the EU with regards to their freedom of movement for work purposes. Directly contradicting the aim of “fixing” a singular EU, this multiplies individual perceptions due to the multiplication of identities. Furthermore, due to the continued application of differing regimes at the Union’s territorial and functional borders, these articulations also contribute to space multiplication. Nevertheless, Commission discourse shows obvious efforts towards overcoming some of these divisions. A number of proposals aim to facilitate the free movement for work purposes of some TCNs. For example, according to a Commission Action Plan: “It is no longer justifiable that a worker who is covered by national security arrangements should be completely excluded from the protection offered by the Community co-ordination system simply because he or she is not an EU national” (European Commission 1997, 12). This principle is put into practice through signing agreements with third countries coordinating the

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social security systems between the EU and the respective third country. This allows the TCNs of these countries to aggregate insurance periods acquired by working in different EU member states (European Commission 2007c). Thus, these provisions follow the logic applied a few decades earlier when the free movement of Community workers had to be implemented (Bartolini 2005; Ferrera 2005). However, the aim is now to extend current provisions on coordination of social security benefits to also cover TCNs who have worked in different member states (European Commission 2004c provides a general overview of the current system of social security coordination). This removes previously existing internal EU legal and administrative barriers and facilitates TCNs’ movement by establishing an EU-level regime. Furthermore, in the longer term it can also lead to the emergence of a singular EU identity by eliminating the conditions contributing to the enunciation of different categories of people. Another way in which Commission discourse on the free movement of TCNs promotes the establishment of a singular EU is via the provisions regulating access to the member states’ labour markets for certain categories of TCNs. The two most prominent examples are the status of long-term TCN residents (European Commission 2001a) in a member state and highly qualified TCN employees (European Commission 2007b). With regards to long-term residents, the Commission’s position is that: there should be a common status for long-term residents, so that all thirdcountry nationals residing legally can acquire and enjoy it on much the same terms in all the Member States … For the sake of certainty as to the law governing third-country nationals, it is essential that acquisition of the status should not be left to Member State’s discretion where the conditions are actually met (European Commission 2001a, 7).

So, the Commission has proposed harmonising the conditions for conferring and withdrawing long-term resident status of a member state and the rights on which long-term residents enjoy equal treatment with EU nationals. Furthermore, according to this proposal, long-term TCN residents will enjoy the right to reside in a member state different from the one that conferred them the status (European Commission 2001a, 29 and 34). The Council formally adopted this proposal in November 2003 (EU Official Journal 2004). Similarly, the proposal for the conditions of entry of TCNs for the purposes of highly skilled employment in a member state (European Commission 2007b) argues that the EU’s attractiveness for this category of people can be enhanced only through Community action and can be implemented only if there is a common system for allowing such workers

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in. The aim is to ensure common rules for admitting this type of worker and that they enjoy the same rights throughout the Union. Furthermore, directly contradicting the existing system in other fields of employment, this proposal envisages allowing highly-skilled TCNs to move between EU member states (European Commission 2007b, 7). If implemented, in the long-term this provision can render the distinction between EU citizens and TCNs much less meaningful, thus contributing to the emergence of a singular EU identity. Furthermore, both proposals work to remove existing legal and administrative barriers for the movement of certain types of TCNs within the EU, thus contributing to the creation of a singular EU space for the movement of people for work purposes. The specific tools articulated by the Commission are the establishment of harmonised EUlevel rules regulating the movement of the categories of TCNs concerned. Other examples of efforts to harmonise EU rules and procedures are the laying down of a uniform format for TCNs’ residence permits (European Commission 2003) and the application procedure for a single work and residence permit for TCNs in the territory of a member state (European Commission 2007e). All these articulations demonstrate the Commission’s contribution to the efforts in fixing a singular EU space and identity. This effort can also be found in the Commission discourse on free movement for work purposes of the new EU member states’ nationals. Under the provisions of the Accession Treaties, unless an old member state decides to wave it, there is a seven-year transition period after accession before workers of the new member state/s are allowed to seek employment in countries that have been Union members before them. During the 2004 Enlargement three old member states (the UK, Ireland and Sweden) did not impose restrictions on movement of workers from the CEE acceding countries, and in May 2006 several others lifted the restrictions (European Commission 2004b provides an overview of the regime for free movement of workers from the new member states). The Commission has consistently supported free movement within the entire Union and the lifting of restrictions for East European workers. Its position is articulated in three main ways, as set out below. Firstly, the Commission has reiterated its commitment to free movement of labour throughout the EU. According to the Commissioner responsible for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, Vladimir Špidla: “Free movement of workers is one of the four freedoms of the EU and should be enjoyed by all. I urge all Member States to seriously examine whether transitional periods cannot be dropped” (quoted in European Commission 2005c; see also European Commission 2006a, 2). Secondly, the Commission has pointed out on different occasions that

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free movement of East European workers has had an overall positive impact on the member states that have lifted the restrictions (Barroso 2006, 2). More specifically: Workers from EU10 helped to relieve labour market shortages and contributed to better economic performance in Europe. Countries that have not applied restrictions after May 2004 … have experienced high economic growth, a drop of unemployment and a rise of employment (European Commission 2006b).

Furthermore, “There was no evidence of a surge in either numbers of workers or welfare expenditure following enlargement in comparison to the previous two years” (European Commission 2006b; see also Špidla 2006, 3 and McCreevy 2007, 3). Moreover, a line in the discourse points out that there have not been spectacular flows of migrants to the member states that opened up their labour markets and no serious disturbances to labour markets (Frattini 2005, 2; European Commission 2005a, 6). Thirdly, the Commission has expressed its satisfaction that more old member states are dropping the restrictions before the end of the transition period. For example, President Barroso welcomed: “the … announcement that Finland, Portugal and Spain will join Ireland, United Kingdom and Sweden in lifting … restrictions on the free movement of workers. I look forward to more countries joining the club!” (2006, 2). Commissioner Špidla has also made similar statements (quoted in European Commission 2006c, 1). These articulations indicate the anticipated significant Commission effort to fix a singular EU, where everyone can move freely for work purposes. These efforts, however, have been only partially successful and have resulted in the creation of multiple EU regimes regulating the movement of people for work purposes. The reason for this outcome is in the limitations the Commission faces in the EU decision-making system. It cannot always secure acceptance of its preferred arrangements and more often than not loses some ground in the inter-institutional bargaining process. This development is easily traceable if the context and finalized outcomes of Commission articulations in the fields discussed above are examined. The account below highlights the major ways in which Commission discourse articulates EU multiplicity.

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Limitations of Commission Articulations— the Emergence of EU Multiplicity on FMoPfWP As I have highlighted, current Commission articulations on mobility, the European labour market and so on, implying the establishment of a singular EU, coexist with enunciations that create a regime for the free movement of nationals of the (old) EU member states for work purposes only. Therefore, in the Commission discourse there is a fundamental contradiction between the goal of creating a singular EU and the actual practices that have enabled its multiplication. The source of this contradiction is the struggle between the major EU institutions, especially the CoM and the Commission, over the formulation of the legislative provisions regulating FMoPfWP. The outcomes of these struggles in each case lead to EU multiplicity. However, as the examples below demonstrate, there are significant differences in the ways these outcomes are articulated. Firstly, sometimes the provisions of Commission proposals are likely to be watered down while being processed through the EU decision-making machinery. Secondly, occasionally the Commission will manage to salvage aspects of its proposals at the expense of compromise. Thirdly, when the Commission considers current chances for success as nonexistent it will likely abstain from articulations unacceptable to the CoM. All of these promote multiplication instead of straightforward unification. However, various articulations contribute to different kinds of multiplication. Multiplication of space is a result of the reconfiguration of internal EU territorial and functional borders, while the establishment of different categories of people can lead to proliferation of identities. Commission proposals on long-term TCN residents in a member state (European Commission 2001a), on the conditions for employment for highly-qualified TCNs (European Commission 2007b) (also called the “Blue Card Initiative”) and a single residence and work permit procedure for TCNs (European Commission 2007e) exemplify proposals that have been watered down while being processed through the EU decisionmaking machinery. Despite Commission efforts to secure a singular Union practice, discussed above, the final versions of these documents preserve member states’ independence in decision-making on a number of issues. This is achieved by including amendments deferring many decisions back to the member states’ national legislation (EU Official Journal 2004; Council of the EU 2009; and EU Official Journal 2011 respectively). For example, the Blue Card Initiative requires TCNs wishing to move to another member state to comply with all relevant entry requirements of that member state, including the possibility of setting quotas (Council of

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the European Union 2009). Furthermore, member states continue to operate their own highly-skilled admission schemes, under some of which admission is easier and gives access to more rights than under the Blue Card regime itself (Kostadinova 2013). As a result, EU movement of highly-skilled TCNs is in no way guaranteed and cannot be compared to the rights granted to EU nationals. Thus, watering-down the provisions proposed by the Commission multiplies EU space and maintains the member states’ application of divergent legal and administrative regimes for FMoPfWP, which reinforce the Union’s existing territorial divisions, albeit through methods different from those traditionally used by national states. References to “member states” and their “national legislation” open the door for the preservation of different criteria about who qualifies for certain statuses (i.e. long-term residents) and for the conferring of divergent rights packages in the different EU member states to the same categories of people. The Blue Card Initiative and some of its relevant background exemplify the second type of Commission articulations that lead to EU multiplicity. This proposal was not the first Commission articulation challenging the principle that FMoPfWP in the EU was applicable only to EU nationals. For example, in the Green Paper on Managing Economic Migration the Commission explores whether the Community Preference principle4 should be granted to TCNs already present in a member state (European Commission 2004a, 6). This, however, was likely to encounter resistance in the other EU decision-making institutions. The experience with the proposal on common conditions and common procedural standards on the entry and residence of TCNs for the purposes of paid employment or self-employed economic activities (European Commission 2001b) showed that the CoM was not supportively inclined (European Commission 2007b, 3). This led to the official withdrawal of the proposal in 2006. Importantly, as Guild (2007, 1) points out, in this proposal the Commission adopted a comprehensive approach that did not distinguish between the type of economic activity exercised by the TCN. In other words, it was of no consequence whether the TCN was highly-skilled or had lower qualifications. In distinction, the Commission Blue Card Initiative proposal reads: After two years of legal residence in the first Member State as holder of an EU Blue Card, the person concerned … shall be allowed to move to a Member State other than the first Member State for the purpose of highly

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qualified employment’ (European Commission 2007b, article 19, point 1, emphasis added).

This articulation juxtaposes highly qualified employees with other types of (i.e. low-skilled) TCNs. This constructs different types of TCNs, which leads to the proliferation of EU identities. As Guild summarises, in this second attempt to promote greater freedom of movement in the EU for TCNs, the Commission has adopted a more piecemeal approach (2007, 1). Its proposal covers one particular type of TCNs, which can be read as tactical behaviour necessitated by the anticipated Council reactions to the proposal. The last route into EU multiplicity is the silence on some matters in the Commission FMoPfWP discourse. Absences from the articulations on free movement of workers in the EU from the new member states demonstrate this best. Despite all the rhetoric of the old member states encouraging and welcoming the opening of the labour markets presented above, the Commission discourse has failed to actively promote a more inclusive arrangement for the movement of workers from the new member states. During the Enlargement it was established that: [N]ationals of the new Member States who are legally working with a contract of 12 months or over in a current Member State at the time of accession of their country to the EU will benefit from the right to free access to the labour market of that Member State (European Commission 2002, 5, emphasis added).

None of the above-analysed Commission documents articulates a more inclusive regime for the movement of workers from the new member states. For example, the rights for at least those nationals of the new member states that are already working in an old member state can be extended. If the Commission is keen on encouraging freer movement for new member states’ workers, one could expect articulations promoting the idea of allowing free movement to the entire EU for these workers. In other words, the Commission should have promoted giving alreadyexisting migrants from acceding states access to not only the labour market of their current member states of residence, but also the entire EU. Such a position is much more in unison with the other Commission articulations and better fits the goal of creating a single area for movement for work purposes. The absence of such articulations in Commission discourse contributes to prolonging existing obstacles to the movement of some EU citizens within the Union, multiplying both EU spaces and identities and reiterating the continued differentiation between the member

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states while also leading to the construction of different categories of people (old/new member states’ workers). Arguably, the Commission had a reduced scope for manoeuvre with regards to the provisions for free movement of workers from the new member states. Certain precedents for regulating movement of workers have already been set during previous Enlargement rounds.5 When the UK joined in 1973 it accepted potential limitations on the freedom of movement of its workers to Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and France. During the Southern Enlargement, the acceding states accepted up to seven-year transition periods until their citizens could benefit fully from workers’ freedom of movement (PlĦmper & Schneider 2007, 574). However, Bohle & Husz point out two crucial differences between the latest Enlargement and previous EU expansion. Firstly, in distinction to the Eastern Enlargement, in the 1980s the concept of Union citizenship was not codified in the Treaties. Secondly, during the Southern Enlargement, the internal market project was, at best, in its early stages. Therefore, as the authors conclude, the political importance of not extending the right to free movement of workers was greater in the case of the Eastern Enlargement (2005, 98). Furthermore, as previous enlargement experiences show, fears of waves of immigration have failed to materialize (HĘnekopp & Werner 2000). All these provide some ground for the Commission to advance a more inclusive arrangement for movement of East European workers. Although initially the Commission was trying to subdue fears of an influx of workers to EU15, by 2001 it had altered its stance and moved much closer to the German position that prioritised flexible transitional arrangements (Bohle & Husz 2005, 100–101). Thus, the silence in Commission discourse on freedom of movement of the new member states’ workers can be summarised as a tactical move related to the balance of power between the main EU decision-making institutions. The Commission anticipated the negative Council reactions, especially of key old member states, and refrained from losing political capital by advocating measures, unlikely to be accepted, thus contributing to EU multiplication.

Summary This chapter investigates how EU multiplicity comes about. I argued that it is a result of the limitations to achieving a singular Union with fixed meanings of space and identity. To substantiate my claim I focused on examining articulations of the European Commission on FMoPfWP. As an institution, the Commission has a vested interest in promoting a singular

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EU, not least because this will mean greater EU-level harmonization, potentially increasing the Commission’s powers. The EU’s complex decision-making structure, however, ensures that the final decisions are compromises, an outcome of the balancing of the preferences of the various Union institutions. This allows for a thorough examination of the limitations to fixing a singular EU. FMoPfWP is not only an area of grave political and economic importance but also one that has recently experienced significant developments due to the European integration process. As the chapter demonstrates, these have led to the proliferation of EU spaces and identities. Importantly, as I have shown, these are often a result of ambiguous Commission articulations. The Blue Card Initiative demonstrates that, sometimes, even efforts at overcoming established principles can obstruct EU singularity, and instead lead to Union multiplicity. This comes about either through the enunciation of categories of people not prominent before (i.e. highly-skilled workers vis-à-vis nonskilled ones) or by reiterating national decision-making independence on certain issues, which lead to the multiplication of EU space. Nevertheless, the examination of Commission discourse also showed attempts at fixing a singular EU, a strong trend aimed at overcoming current Union divides. As I have argued elsewhere (Kostadinova 2013), in the long-term the Commission may be (partially) successful in such an endeavour. Although I remain sceptical that this can ever lead to the emergence of a singular EU space or identity, it remains to be seen what specific Union multiplication/s these articulations will result in.

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Employment and Self-Employed Economic Activities. COM (2001) 386 final, July 11, 2001b. —. Free Movement of Workers—Achieving the Full Benefits and Potential. COM (2002) 694 final, December 11, 2002. —. Proposal for a Council Regulation Amending Regulation (EC) 1030/2002 Laying Down a Uniform Format for Residence Permits for Third-Country Nationals. COM (2003) 558-2 final, September 24, 2003. —. Green Paper on an EU Approach to Managing Economic Migration. COM (2004) 811 final, January 11, 2004a. —. Enlargement Achieves, 2004b. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/enlargement_process/future_ prospects/negotiations/eu10_bulgaria_romania/chapters/chap_2_en.ht m (accessed July 20, 2012). —. The Community Provisions on Social Security. Your Rights when Moving within the European Union. Luxembourg: Office for the Official Publications of the European Communities, 2004c. —. 2006—European Year of Workers’ Mobility, the Importance of the Mobility of Workers to the Implementation of the Lisbon Strategy. MEMO/05/229, June 30, 2005a. —. Commissioner Špidla Kicks off Run-in to Free Labour Movement Decisions for Next Three Years. IP/05/1153, September 16, 2005b. —. High Level Group on Free Movement of Workers. MEMO/05/2005, September 16, 2005c. —. FAQ on the Commission’s Free Movement of Workers Report. MEMO/06/64, February 08, 2006a. —. Free Movement of Workers since the 2004 Enlargement had a Positive Impact—Commission Report Finds. IP/06/130, February 8, 2006b. —. Meeting Offers Last Chance to Review Restrictions on Free Movement of Workers in EU, IP/06/390, March 28, 2006c. —. Recommendation on the Establishment of the European Qualifications Framework for Lifelong Learning. COM (2006) 479 final, September 5, 2006d. —. Mobility, an Instrument for More and Better Jobs: The European Mobility Action Plan (2007–2010). COM (2007) 773 final, December 6, 2007a. —. Proposal for a Council Directive on the Conditions of Entry and Residence of Third-Country Nationals for the Purposes of Highly Qualified Employment. COM (2007) 637 final, October 23, 2007b. —. Proposal for Council Decision on the Position to be Taken by the Community within the Association Council Created by the Euro-

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Mediterranean Agreement Establishing an Association between the European Communities and their Member States, of One Part, and the Republic of Tunisia, of the Other Part, with Regard to the Adoption of Provisions on the Co-ordination of the Social Security Systems. COM (2007) 788 final, December 11, 2007c. —. Towards a Single European Labour Market. COM (2007) 116 final, March 16, 2007d. —. Proposal for a Council Directive on a Single Application Procedure for a Single Permit for Third-Country Nationals to Reside and Work in the Territory of a Member State and on a Common Set of Rights for Third Country Nationals Legally Residing in a Member State. COM (2007) 638 final, October 23, 2007e. Ferrera, Maurizio. The Boundaries of Welfare—European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Frattini, Franco. The Green Paper on an EU Approach to Managing Economic Migration. SPEECH/05/364, June 20, 2005. Geddes, Andrew. “Europe’s Border Relationships and International Migration Relations.” Journal of Common Market Studies 43 (4) (2005): 787–806. —. Immigration and European Integration—Towards a Fortress Europe?. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000. George, Stephen. Politics and Policy in the European Community, 2nd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991. Guild, Elspeth. “The Legal Framework: Who is Entitled to Move?” In Controlling Frontiers: Free Movement into and within Europe, edited by Didier Bigo & Elspeth Guild, 14–48. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005. —. “EU Policy on Labour Migration—a first Look at the Commission’s Blue Card Initiative.” CEPS Policy Brief no. 145, November 2007. Haas, Earnst. Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950–1957. Michigan: Ann Arbor, 1996. Hix, Simon. The Political System of the European Union, 2nd edn. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. HĘnekopp, Elmar & Heinz Werner. “Is the EU’s Labour Market Threatened by a Wave of Immigration?” Intereconomics 35 (1) (2000): 3–8. Jensen, Carsten. “Neofunctionalist Theories and the Development of European Social and Labour Market Policy.” Journal of Common Market Studies 38 (1) (2000): 71–92. Kostadinova, Valentina. “Neo-functionalism, the Commission and the Construction of the EU’s External Borders.” In The EU’s Shifting

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Borders—Theoretical Approaches and Policy Implications in the New Neighbourhood, edited by Klaus Bachmann & ElĪbieta StadtmĦller, 28–42. London: Routledge, 2012. —. “The European Commission and the Configuration of Internal EU Borders: Direct and Indirect Contribution.” Journal of Common Market Studies 51 (2) (2013): 264–280. Lahav, Gallya. Immigration and Politics in the New Europe—Reinventing Borders. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Lequesne, Christian. “The European Commission: a Balancing Act between Autonomy and Dependence.” In European Integration after Amsterdam—Institutional Dynamics and Prospects for Democracy, edited by Karlheinz Neureither and Antje Wiener, 36–51. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Lindberg, Leon. The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963. Lindberg, Leon and Stuart Scheingold. Europe’s Would-be Polity. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970. McCreevy, Charlie. Review of the Single Market. SPEECH/07/532, July 14, 2007. Moravcsik, Andrew. “Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community.” International Organization 45 (1) (1991): 19–56. —. “Preferences and Power in the European Community: a Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach.” Journal of Common Market Studies 31 (4) (1993): 473–524. —. The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998. Niemann, Arne & Philippe Schmitter. “Neofunctionalism.” In European Integration Theory, 2nd edn, edited by Thomas Diez & Antje Wiener, 45–66. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Nugent, Neill. “The Leadership Capacity of the European Commission.” Journal of European Public Policy 2 (4) (1995): 603–623. —. “At the Heart of the Union.” In At the Heart of the Union—Studies of the European Commission, edited by Neill Nugent, 1–26. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997. —. The European Commission. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001. PlĦmper, Thomas & Christina Schneider. “Discriminatory European Union Membership and the Redistribution of Enlargement Gains.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51 (4) (2007): 568–587. Pollack, Mark. “Delegation, Agency and Agenda Setting in the European Community.” International Organization 51 (1) (1997): 99–134.

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Rumford, Chris. “Theorizing Borders.” European Journal of Social Theory 9 (2) (2006): 155–69. Schmitter, Philippe. “Three Neo-Functional Hypotheses about International Integration.” International Organization 23 (1) (1969): 161–66. “Single European Act”. 1986. http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/library/historic%20documents/SEA /Single%20European%20Act.pdf (accessed July 13, 2013). Sinn, Hans-Werner. “EU Enlargement, Migration and New Constitution.” Economic Studies 50 (4) (2004): 685–707. Špidla, Vladimir. The European Year of Workers’ Mobility. SPEECH/06/248, April, 24, 2006. Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe. “Neo-Functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC.” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 20 (1) (1991): 1–22. “Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community.” 1957. http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/library/historic%20documents/ Rome/TRAITES_1957_CEE.pdf. (accessed July 15, 2013). Van Houtum, Henk. “The Geopolitics of Borders and Boundaries.” Geopolitics 10 (4) (2005): 672–679. Williams, John. “Territorial Borders, International Ethics and Geography: Do Good Fences Still Make Good Neighbours?” Geopolitics 8 (2) (2003): 25–46.

CHAPTER FOUR MANY MULTICULTURALISMS: MODELS, MANAGEMENT AND MEANING JOANNA CAGNEY

Multiculturalism whatever it was has failed. Multiculturalism wherever it was has imploded. Multiculturalism whenever it was has gifted us the pathologies that gird our new certainties. —Lentin & Titley (2011, 11)

Multiculturalism as a political programme promoting cultural diversity, recognition and participation is being directly challenged on the European stage (Vertovec & Wessendorf 2010; Aggestam & Hill 2008). Admissions on the state of multiculturalism as “in crisis,” “in retreat” or “failed” (Cameron 2011; Merkel quoted in Weaver 2010), and wider debate suggesting that multiculturalism may be “dead” or reaching “the end” (McGhee 2008), accentuate the ongoing challenges and opportunities for theoretical and political engagement with the ensuing issues of migrant integration in Europe today. In light and spite of increased political, contextual and linguistic developments, increased engagement with the subject of recognition and the integration of migrants in academic and mainstream discussion and media, the future of multiculturalism remains unclear. The question of what multiculturalism is, where it emerges, and how and when it plays out remain ambiguous aspects of the overarching debates. Multiculturalism in this chapter is not taken as a unified and universally accepted policy or method of integration, but as a reflexive tool through which to assess its status and function as a policy at present, and to project its possible future. It is acknowledged that multiculturalism is neither a stable nor coherent object, yet it is equally accepted that a static, all-encompassing alternative model will not provide a resolution to the ongoing debates (Lentin & Titley 2011; 2012; Pitcher 2009). This chapter’s point of enquiry arises amidst the divergent discussions and

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policies in evidence today, where multiculturalism is being taken as a point of reference not only at the international and national levels, but equally at the local and regional levels. It is widely accepted that many types of multiculturalism exist and that distinct versions emerge and take different meanings in different countries (McGhee 2008). Nevertheless, such questions and uncertainty sustain the interdisciplinary conversations within this milieu. In signifying the uncertainty of what multiculturalism has been and is supposed to be, but indicating that it has failed, raises questions as to what it means for Europe today. The sheer complexity of dealing with diversity, and a lack of clarity surrounding multiculturalism as a political model of integration, lead to the challenging and interrogation of the multicultural experiment from a wide range of disciplinary angles. As multiculturalism is being explored on a Europe-wide scale, the critical question which arises is: “how and why such seemingly similar public debates unfolded across such varied social and political situations” (Vertovec & Wessendorf 2010, 1). Following this fundamental question, this chapter takes as its point of reference the two countries which have been most vocal in their rejection of multiculturalism: the UK, following Prime Minister David Cameron’s speech at the Munich Security Conference (Cameron 2011), and Chancellor Angela Merkel’s public admission of multiculturalism in Germany as having failed (Weaver 2010). Naturally, these examples do not exist in isolation from other nations and governments who have also publically discussed their thoughts and positions on multiculturalism as a policy for integration. What the selection of these particular examples provides is an opportunity to gauge an understanding of some of the implications of integration policy through a comparison of two different cases, whereby their political leaders have been actively engaged in recent discussions on multiculturalism as policy and have pointed to its potential inadequacies in spite of their traditional positions. To contextualize the issue at hand this article will firstly address the continued importance of national models in defining how positions on multiculturalism are articulated in the UK and Germany, including how these may be considered divergent according to different political programmes of integration. Secondly, the EU dimension and the role and influence of the EU in this particular set of debates will be outlined. Thirdly, the article will address the (in)adequacy of the language and terminology used to describe policies aimed at migrant integration, and how these are perhaps understood and expressed differently outside of the predominant political arenas where they are being discussed, by those

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people “on the ground” who are actively working and experiencing the backlash on a local level. This shift in focus from the national to the local aims to critically address and challenge the denunciation of multicultural policy by showing the possible inconsistencies between mainstream political viewpoints and the day-to-day realities of integration schemes and programmes in both countries. By taking multiculturalism as the point of departure, a specific set of literature and debates which already exist will be introduced and criticized. Moreover, it provides a specific outlook, using the same vocabulary and operating within the same frame of reference as we see being portrayed in the public domain at present.

Dealing with Difference—National Models In an attempt to understand the present status of multiculturalism, national models remain an important tool. In the European context there are three distinct models which can be distinguished and these are usually discussed in relation to particular states, for example a model of assimilation usually associated with France, of multiculturalism associated with Britain and the Netherlands, and of a third exclusionary model mainly associated with Germany and Austria (Aggestam & Hill 2008; Castles 1995; Joppke 2007). There is undoubtedly a chance that a member state may draw on the elements of more than one, but traditionally states have been viewed as supporting a particular model. The questions of how and why such debates have unfolded underline the importance of examining specific or nationally contextualized debates and local developments surrounding the seemingly widespread turn against multiculturalism (Vertovec & Wessendorf 2010). In the selected examples, the UK has traditionally been oriented towards multicultural citizenship whereas Germany has exercised a political orientation closer to ideas of national cohesion (Meer & Modood 2012a). In other words, where the UK has embarked upon a system of recognition of individual or minority cultures, Germany has taken a more singular, monist stance to the integration of migrants. If it is to be accepted that these two countries have adopted such different outlooks on integration in the past, it seems necessary to question and explore how the political leaders of each country can reach the same conclusion on the success of multicultural policy today. To investigate the possible reasons for this outcome, the generally accepted national models of the UK and Germany will be addressed together with their positions on multiculturalism. While the history of each case will not be discussed at length, some of the fundamental changes and

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key features of their integration policies, particularly in the last decade or so, will be examined.

Britain To begin with the British example, one which has previously exercised a visibly multicultural policy of integration, there is evidence of a change from a traditional outlook on migrant integration. In the last decade (at least) British debates have developed in line with an EU-wide backlash against multiculturalism, and this is particularly evident post 9/11 (McGhee 2008). The 2001 race riots and the resulting Home Office Report on Community Cohesion (hereafter the Cantle Report 2001) highlighted a number of community issues concerning racial segregation and concluded that a greater sense of citizenship and nationhood was required in the UK. Although successive British governments since the 1970s have recapitulated the multicultural ideal, local government and other departments have been responsible for its conceptualization and implementation (Brighton 2007). Previously, as Joppke (2004, 249) suggests, Britain’s brand of multiculturalism “had always been more laissez-faire and de-centred, firmly instituted in some branches of the state (especially at local level) but repudiated or ignored by others (such as the central government under Thatcher).” Following this assertion he signals that Britain’s post-2001 focus has essentially moved “beyond multiculturalism” with a new emphasis upon integration at the civic level, and further maintains the need for a greater sense of citizenship and nationhood as expressed in the Cantle report (Joppke 2004). This is further evidenced by the increased prominence of a conception of national unity in UK policy today (Meer & Modood 2012a). Though we see this shift in evidence, there are a number of smaller shifts which may not be so obvious. As Grillo (2010) suggests there has been a paradoxical shift in the UK post-2001 as Britain moves away from talks of race relations towards a new focus on more discrete categories of ethnicity, culture and faith. What this highlights is a number of discursive shifts in the integration narrative, what Meer & Modood (2009, 473) have noticed as a “discursive re-orientation of British multiculturalism to focus upon an anti-essentialist ‘multiculture’ that can transcend the alleged hitherto reification of British multiculturalism.” This can be seen particularly in the wake and rise of discourses around “community cohesion” (Cantle report 2001; Meer & Modood 2009) and greater emphasis on integration as a way of rebalancing the recognition of diversity found in past dialogue and policy. These aforementioned shifts

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are precisely those characterized as the retreat of nation states from multiculturalism. Today’s policy tends to focus on features such as citizenship, shared values, respect for human rights and language competence. In this regard, the focus is not specifically placed on “being British” and denying recognition of minority cultures. Instead, there is a move towards the general tenets of liberal society (Kymlicka 1995). Whilst this change may not be seen as particularly dramatic, it highlights a shift in the UK’s priorities for the integration of migrants. It is important to remember that this shift has not taken place on its own. Whenever multiculturalism has become an issue for central government, it has largely been because of some crisis (Brighton 2007; McGhee 2008). Crises or events are often pivotal in re-igniting discussion on failed policies of integration, which we see propelled into the public sphere at times of disaster by politicians and the media looking for someone or something on which to place blame. Following the 2001 race riots, the events of 9/11 and the London bombings of 7/7, commentators have often utilized the opportunity to implicate multiculturalism as a “culprit” or at least facilitator of such cataclysmic occurrences. As a result, the turn away from multiculturalism becomes increasingly publicised and calls for the review of and need for change within certain policies are vocalized more strongly. These changes, together with instances of insecurity resulting from catastrophic events in the UK and beyond, have been characterized as part of the UK’s move away from multiculturalism in mainstream political, academic and media discussion. Therefore, it seems that, inflamed by specific moments and challenges of an ever more diverse society, policy shifts and ways of talking about integration are determining factors leading to the predominant view of multiculturalism as a failure at the national level. Nevertheless, as Meer & Modood (2009, 476) argue: “… rather than having been defeated, the fate of this peculiarly British multiculturalism currently remains undecided and might equally be characterised as subject to a ‘re-balancing’ rather than a wholesale ‘retreat’.” It is this ongoing uncertainty as to the future of multiculturalism which remains unresolved. What is clear is that this is not just a British problem. It is difficult to address specificities of the British situation and position in isolation from that of other nations or wider European objectives, and it is not as simple as adopting a different model. This will be explored in the following overview of the German case with its alternative approach and position on multiculturalism.

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Germany There has been much discussion on how to precisely explain Germany’s position on (or brand of) multiculturalism, since Germany has not traditionally taken a pro-multicultural stance. In spite of previous policies which related specifically to the control and return of migrants in relation to their guest worker programme, it has been considered that there has been great progress made towards integration, after the correction in 2001 of its previous denial of being an immigration country (Meer & Modood 2012a). Nevertheless, multiculturalism emerged extremely late in Germany, existing only at the level of discourse without being endorsed or administered as a policy by any German government (Kraus & Schönwälder 2006). Though it may be unusual to study Germany, a country which is not considered multicultural or as characterized by a historically established diversity, there are a number of notable features of German integration policy which demonstrate a commitment to integration, but under a set of prescribed ideas. As attacks on multiculturalism in Germany are largely rhetorical there should be significant room for manoeuvre on this particular set of issues (Schönwälder 2010). An interesting feature of German integration policy, tentatively discussed over the past decade, has been a particularly strong prioritisation of a central or dominant culture referred to as “Leitkultur” (Meer & Modood 2012a; Joppke 2004). This challenging term is carefully used as it raises accusations that “Leitkultur” has been used as part of an assimilation programme. In the German context, this raises a number of historically pertinent considerations which it tries to distance itself from. Conversely, to lean towards the idea of a “Leitkultur” as a context for integration may be viewed in a more neutral light. If one connects those universal tenets of liberal society, including language competence and citizenship, it is possible that these can be built around an idea of a core culture, thereby defining what it means to be a citizen of a certain country, or at least the liberal and democratic values it seeks to uphold. What seems clear is that the “Leitkultur debate” is rooted in, as well as symptomatic of, a view of German citizenship within an idea of a unified German culture and identity (Winter 2010). Moreover, it may be argued that what is currently being presented as “multiculturalism” is essentially a new kind of assimilation which, following Brubaker (2001), can be seen to have shed its old persona and disreputable qualities and is now coming to the fore as a defensible concept in the shift away from broader ideas of recognition and multiculturalism. It is important to emphasize that this is not a clear-cut response to debates, but it demonstrates a different way of

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thinking and assessment about how such policies as assimilation and multiculturalism transform over time. The main challenge remains to decide what kind of immigrant future Germany envisages for itself and what space will be allowed for the development of immigrant cultures, languages and religions in Germany (Schönwälder 2010). Schönwälder also highlights that the federal structure of the German state allows considerable room for different strategies at both the regional and the local levels which may encourage the implementation of explicitly “multicultural” programmes (like in Frankfurt-am-Main). Nonetheless, it is crucial to note that multiculturalism was never exercised as a governmental policy in Germany. Furthermore, the terms “multiculturalism” and “ethnic diversity” have been noticeably absent from the country’s official political discourse (Eckardt 2007). Additionally, multiculturalism tends to be seen as a derogatory term, relating to “backward” ideas of integration and fostering so-called “parallel lives,” encouraging politicians to omit such terms (Schönwälder 2010). Therefore, Merkel’s (and Cameron’s) 2010 remark that multiculturalism had been a failure raises more questions than answers about the context, purpose and timing of the remark, which has thrust this particular model of integration back into public view, though this had previously been debated and discredited behind the scenes of the European stage.

Managing Multiculturalism—the EU dimension A critical issue is the level of disparity between political discourse and practical realities in a context which considers the implementation of integration policy as not dominated by central government but instead by local actors, NGOs and private individuals (Parkes 2008). Thus, part of the problem of integration lies in the fact that it becomes somewhat depoliticized as it gets broken down into functional questions within the parameters formed by established models (Ibid. 2008). Whilst it is important to highlight that differences in approach exist, it is also essential that these do not become over-emphasized (Joppke & Morawska 2003). Following state-level rejection of multiculturalism, which has been characterized to some extent as an advance of assimilation, we see precisely how differences in approach or at least structural policy changes may become over-accentuated. Instead, if we consider Brubaker’s (2001) idea of a new kind of reputable assimilation which is advancing, instead of the negatively viewed version, we can underline that what is happening here is a clearly renewed interest and emphasis on citizenship, a line of

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thought followed by Kymlicka (2011), who stresses the promotion of citizenship as a legitimate task of all liberal democratic states. The apparently widespread verdict on multiculturalism as a failed model has come to light as a direct consequence of Merkel et al. announcing their concerns and conclusions in late 2010 and early 2011, but Kymlicka (2012a) highlighted how the 2008 “White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue,” constructed by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, had already begun to take steps away from multiculturalism. As part of this, the Council of Europe cites the promotion of intercultural dialogue as a core objective based on calls for a new way of dealing with difference. Developed in response to a project involving the distribution of questionnaires within member states, in which results showed that multiculturalism had been found to be inadequate, this new focus on intercultural dialogue was addressed to a number of key actors including policy makers, administrators, youth organizations and NGOs as well as individuals, whilst highlighting that “every level of governance from local to regional to national to international … [was] drawn into the democratic management of cultural diversity” (Council of Europe 2008, 10). This was promoted as a direct response to the overwhelming denunciation of multiculturalism by member states. Though the responses to these questionnaires did not show any desire to return to policies of assimilation, all member states endorsed the fact that multiculturalism had failed, regardless of their traditional positions on this particular policy. Yet despite the publication of this document in 2008, it was not until these influential political figures spoke out on multiculturalism as being an inadequate model for integration that the question of multiculturalism came to be considered newsworthy once again (Kymlicka 2012a). Highlighting multiculturalism as a “European” problem further rationalizes the potential for research within different states and what their actions and policies on integration are. What Kymlicka’s observation of newsworthiness seems to show is that the EU influence is not necessarily felt at the national level where debates are unfolding. In the EU, nationallevel debates tend to be characterized by references to the pros and cons of the three most pronounced models of integration (Parkes 2008). It is precisely this that seems to be problematic because, following Aggestam & Hill (2008, 98) it seems that: “... the EU is handicapped in addressing these issues [multiculturalism and European foreign policy] coherently because member states themselves have different approaches and traditions ….” By acknowledging this fact of difference as a reason for the lack, or difficulty, of pursuing a “European-wide” approach to integration,

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a tension appears which it seems will only be solved by a more unified approach. However, given the national specificities, migration histories and levels of diversity, a singular European approach does not seem viable. In that vein, it seems that the only possibilities at present are the pursuit and encouragement of participation in programmes like intercultural dialogue, which do not impose specific guidelines and remain largely based on universal principles, underlining the potential for a wider citizenship agenda. If it is to be suggested that the EU takes a role in the formation and promotion of a more unified policy of integration, it seems that this must come together around a set of shared and mutually beneficial values. It is crucial to note that the democratic values underpinning the Council of Europe are not distinctively European but universal. It is thus possible to approach integration through a number of universal aspects which may facilitate a more coherent and suitably flexible policy approach. For instance, in 2004 the EU Council agreed on eleven basic principles for immigrant integration policy in the European Union, referring to a dynamic, long-term and continuous two-way process, and the outlining of the responsibility of member states in actively assuring the protection of all residents (EU Council 2004). In addition, they outline the responsibilities of migrants to ensure that they have a basic knowledge of the host society’s language, history and institutions, and suggest that such knowledge is indispensable to integration. What is clear is that interaction between immigrants and member state citizens is a fundamental mechanism for integration (Miera 2012). European debates have tended to coalesce around a set of issues that are country-specific (Fekete 2004), though, as Parkes (2008, 9) states, “the highly political role attributed to the European Commission suggests that that Institution may systematically reject suitable national and policy tools in favour of European solutions.” This calls for further debate on the EU’s role in social and cultural matters, which on occasion has been considered to be better left to national and local resolutions (Amin 2004). The EU has been seen to enter the debate at a somewhat practical level, with institutions proposing that the EU can play a role in supporting integration practices. Yet, the EU’s role can be seen as symbolic and of limited significance rather than a successful driver of a new and coherent agenda.

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Discussing Difference—Making Meaning, Concretizing Concepts Multiculturalism is rejected, feted, celebrated or condemned from such a wide range of positions that it is often hard to pin down precisely what it might refer to in any particular instance, frustrating any attempts that might be made to derive a more general meaning from it (Pitcher 2009, 1).

The notion of liberal democracy indicates that there are different frameworks which rest upon different philosophies and different understandings of core concepts (Favell 2001). A primary complication encountered in both cases and the wider European dimension of multiculturalism seems to be the inadequacy of politically and ideologically loaded terminology, such as assimilation and multiculturalism, which do not necessarily articulate the present realities of integration in Europe, in conjunction with a lack of a suitably applicable alternatives. When writing about a so-called “problem of integration,” Favell (2001) stresses the limitations of public philosophy based on abstract ideas and reductionist linguistic terms which cause problems for a political system striving for stability and legitimacy across multiple domains. In this context there is a need to discover and discuss the use of language and terminology as tools for understanding how integration policies become presented and viewed in both the European and national contexts (and specifically how they influence those living and working on the ground). A primary issue is the existence of a wide variety of types and definitions of multiculturalism (Vertovec 1998; Delanty 2003; Vertovec & Wessendorf 2010). Multiculturalism and its derivatives have long been contested and discussed in an array of disciplinary arenas and the problem of defining and delimiting such concepts remains a challenging task in the field. There seems to be a great and almost unavoidable tendency for analysts to use the taken-for-granted concepts that have become adopted and homogenized under umbrella terms like “multiculturalism” and “integration,” but do not necessarily articulate everyday expectations and understandings of the social and political actors engaging with the issues. This is demonstrated particularly well by the Merkel example in which she speaks in terms of multiculturalism, though it is unclear what she means by this within the German context, which does not officially recognize it. This section seeks to address some of the problems associated with the interpretation of multiculturalism. I hope to show how the term has become increasingly vague and complex and to highlight the need for a better conceptualization of multiculturalism as a selection of policies

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affecting daily life at not only state-level but also at local and regional levels. It is notable that there is no single accepted definition of multiculturalism. Barry (2001) suggests distinguishing between multiculturalism as an ideology and multiculturality as the fact of diversity. Werbner argues that as well as a political theory, multiculturalism is a discourse “in which scholars participate along with cultural actors, politicians and the media” (2012, 197). Parekh (2006) defines multiculturalism as a way of viewing human life, based on the assumption that people are deeply shaped by culture. Within the wider academic literature there are a number of focal points which become established when talking about multiculturalism, but what is notable is that there is no consensus on a common definition . Acknowledging this, every scholar writing within this field expresses his/her own definition of what s/he purports multiculturalism to be. Meer & Modood (2012b) point to the multitude of ways in which the notion of multiculturalism is interpreted, which makes the latter ambiguous and difficult to study. This may also be an inhibiting factor in the search for a solution to the “multicultural crisis.” What is problematic about the term is that it is now widely considered to be overused and unclear. This was the view of the UK’s Commission on Integration and Cohesion (CIC) (which was set up in 2007), which suggested avoiding the term multiculturalism due to its “catch all” and confusing nature (Vertovec & Wessendorf 2010). Furthermore, similar calls for an update in the language of multiculturalism have elsewhere become widespread (Karakayali 2009). Previously adopted by the UK as a general yet satisfactory method of describing the government’s policy approach to migrant integration, the now all-encompassing term multiculturalism no longer seems to be adequate. As articulated by Aggestam & Hill (2008, 98), “Multiculturalism will not suffice on its own although it is almost universally employed in public discussions. It has become, like its root term ‘culture’ so contested and abused as to approach redundancy.” This becomes problematic where there is no apparent alternative which accurately reflects the complex dynamics underlying approaches to migrant integration. In the absence of an appropriate alternative to multiculturalism, it becomes ever more useful to use the word “integration.” The term “integration” becomes popular as a generic, broad and unspecific term which is far less politically charged than “assimilation” or “multiculturalism” (Miera 2012). The necessity for a general and applicable term is most apparent in the German situation where, as previously stated, multicultural policies have never been systematically

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implemented. Whilst there is a resounding difficulty in using vague and ambiguous terminology, “… integration appears as a concept somewhere between multiculturalism and assimilation, which therefore would ask of immigrants a certain degree of adaptation to existing social norms and conventions without demanding that they give up their cultural specificities” (Ibid., 208). Integration is increasingly used in empirical research, theory and political practice as the range of meanings is so diverse, and “likewise, there is a broad variety of local- national- and European-level policies under the label of integration policies” (Ibid., 193). Integration then appears to have achieved an inherently positive connotation although this view is not accepted by all, with some scholars considering it to be a vague, slippery term which can essentially mean whatever people want it to, as well as having less political weight than other available or previously accepted terms (Castles et al. 2002). In theory, using a term which is more ambiguous and thus potentially more inclusive solves the problem of talking about multiculturalism by using a broader conception of the processes taking place in policy under the umbrella of integration. It also points to the general expectations of many states leaning towards a citizenship agenda. The main problem is that more discrete aspects and nuances have the potential to become overemphasized or diminished by grouping too many complex aspects under one large heading. Ultimately, as the political figures who are discussing such policies at the highest level are talking in terms of multiculturalism at present, it seems necessary to further highlight its inadequacy and demand a suitable alternative. What that alternative may be remains to be seen, though the debate on interculturalism seems to be gathering momentum. The idea of interculturalism as a positive alternative to multiculturalism is not a fully evolved concept (Meer & Modood 2012b). As an approach which promotes communication and recognises the dynamism of identity, it does not currently offer a distinct perspective on the kinds of concerns arising in relation to difference and diversity. Nevertheless, a kind of political interculturalist discourse comes to the fore in light of the socalled retreat and crisis of multiculturalism, when there is little else to replace it. The main problem is the difficulty of generating a stable or clear distinction between interculturalism and multiculturalism (Levey 2012). Similar to multiculturalism, interculturalism is criticized for conceptual ambiguity (Wieviorka 2012) and a lack of intellectual substance (Kymlicka 2012a). This means that despite an emphasis on intercultural dialogue in the European sphere, interculturalism is still developing as a framework to meet the needs of political and social actors in Europe today.

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Following the observation that “the most favoured alternative term to ‘multiculturalism’ is ‘integration’ and its synonyms in various languages” (Meer & Modood 2012c, 234), it appears that there is no solution at present. The inadequacy of the terminology must then restrict our abilities to fully engage with the issues that arise through an inability to sufficiently express the situation as it stands. This leads to further misunderstanding of the situation where information is filtered inconsistently or imprecisely from the national level, through the media and to the general population on the ground. These discussions and views on what multiculturalism is (or may be) can be construed as part of the wider master narrative of multiculturalism (Kymlicka 2010; Amin 2012). A key element of this master narrative has been the rise and fall of multiculturalism as part of an emerging debate suggesting that we are now in a post-multicultural era (Kymlicka 2012b). The problem, as Kymlicka points out, is that the prevailing narrative has a tendency to mis-characterize the multicultural experiments which have taken place, together with the exaggeration of the extent to which they have been abandoned. The problem is that the retreat or abandonment is branded as a failure and only insufficient attention has been paid to more discrete difficulties or even positive connotations of multicultural programmes. Though it is possible to trace this master narrative there are many secondary delineations which do not get transmitted into the public sphere at times of heightened debate. This makes the situation seem much clearer than it is in reality and sends mixed messages to groups and individuals engaged in such questions.

Concluding Comments Different countries and even cities within them have not taken the same approach, introduced the same measures or set up the same institutions for migrant integration. That it is difficult to formulate a specific corpus or set of definitive tenets of multiculturalism is not surprising, as it is rare to find a singular set of well-integrated policies and institutions (Vertovec & Wessendorf 2010). However as Kymlicka (2010, 47) concludes, “the fact that there are grave obstacles to multiculturalism does not mean there are viable alternatives to it.” At present this is precisely what needs to be conveyed to a wider public, highlighting that there are existing uncertainties but reassuring people that these have been recognized and are being dealt with as a priority as part of a wider policy agenda. Public debates on multiculturalism cannot be fully comprehended without taking into account the broader context within which they are

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embedded. To understand that there is a cross-national and crossdisciplinary interweaving of political, popular and academic discourses is to acknowledge a multi-level intertextuality (Grillo 2010). Traditionally, multiculturalism has been discussed from a top-down perspective (Kivisto 2002; Wise & Velayutham 2009). This has led to identity crises as multiculturalism no longer expresses the same positive message as it previously did. To address the difficulties of multiculturalism, it is possible to look at the scope of engagement from the local and regional to wider national and international policy aims and positions. The retreat of multicultural policy has been most evident at the state level; however, the everyday and lived realities of cultural difference in cities and urban spaces, and how cultural diversity can be experienced and negotiated in these everyday situations, have only been explored by a handful of scholars and empirical studies remain limited (Wise & Velayutham 2009). While there may have been progress or success in localized and even some national initiatives, these are not widely publicized or addressed in the public domain. Focused and detailed research on local policies remains scarce and where it does exist there is often a lack of a clear agenda or policy statement (Schönwälder 2010). The potential then may be that key actors, including politicians and scholars, begin to address the issue of managing difference from a more bottom-up perspective, though not exclusively confined to this approach, following the recognition of the existence of multiple levels of engagement. By investigating and confronting this issue through the use of situated empirical studies within European member states, it may be possible to understand how these may be transferable and lead to a more mutually beneficial relationship between the state and those communities which are faced with the day-to-day realities of living with difference. A one-size-fits-all model will not solve the multiculturalism crisis, but timely answers are needed and the role of the EU in the future of migrant integration needs to be addressed and clarified if progress is to be made at the European level. In this vein, empirical research with a strong focus on the local would aim to elucidate the multi-level processes with the ability to disrupt the master narrative taking place, which have been shown to have largely negative connotations. This would thus aim towards the development of multiple specific and coherent policies, which account for and reflect the diversity that exists in contemporary Europe through clearly defined, measurable and reciprocal objectives and outcomes.

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References Aggestam, Lisbeth & Christopher Hill. “The challenge of multiculturalism in European foreign policy.” International Affairs 84 (1) (2008): 94– 114. Amin, Ash. “Multi-ethnicity and the idea of Europe.” Theory, Culture, Society 21 (2) (2004): 1–24. —. Land of Strangers. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012. Barry, Bryan. Culture and Equality: an egalitarian critique of equality. London: Polity Press, 2001. Brighton, Shane. “British Muslims, multiculturalism and UK foreign policy: ‘integration’ and ‘cohesion’ in and beyond the state.” International Affairs 83 (1) (2007): 1–17. Brubaker, Rogers. “The return of assimilation? Changing perspectives on immigration and its sequels in France, Germany, and the United States.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 24 (4) (2001): 531–548. Cameron, David. PM's speech at Munich Security Conference. The official site of the British Prime Minister's Office [database online], 2011. http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/pms-speech-at-munich-securityconference/ (accessed July 14, 2013). Castles, Stephen, Maja Korac, Ellie Vasta & Steven Vertovec ,with Katrin Hansing, Fiona Moore, Emma Newcombe, Lucy Rix & Soojin Yu. Integration: Mapping the Field. Home Office Online Report 28/03 2002. http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/rdsolr2803.doc/ (accessed July 14, 2013). Castles, Stephen. “How nation-states respond to Immigration and Ethnic Diversity.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 21 (3) (1995): 293–308. Council of Europe. White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue: Living together as equals in dignity, 2008. http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/intercultural/source/white%20paper_final_rev ised_en.pdf (accessed July 15, 2013). Delanty, Gerard. Community. London: Routledge, 2003. Eckardt, Frank. “Multiculturalism in Germany: From ideology to pragmatism - and back?” National Identities 9 (3) (2007): 235–245. EU Council. “Common basic principles for immigrant integration policy in the European Union.” Press Release 2818th Council Meeting, Justice and Home Affairs 19–24, 2004. Favell, Adrian. Philosophies of integration: Immigration and the idea of citizenship in France and Britain. 2nd edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001.

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Fekete, Liz. “Anti-Muslim Racism and the European security state.” Race and Class 46 (1) (2004): 3–29. Grillo, Ralph. “British and Others: From ‘race’ to ‘faith’.” In The Multiculturalism Backlash: European discourses, policies and practices, edited by Stephen Vertovec and Susanne Wessendorf, 50– 72. London: Routledge, 2010. Home Office. Community Cohesion—A Report of the Independent Review Team (the Cantle Report). London: Home Office, 2001. Joppke, Christian. “Beyond National Models: Civic Integration Policies for Immigrants in Western Europe.” Western European Politics 30 (1) (2007): 1–22. —. “The retreat of multiculturalism in the liberal state: Theory and policy.” The British Journal of Sociology 55 (2) (2004): 237–257. Joppke, Christian & Ewa Morawska. “Integrating immigrants in liberal nation-states: policies and practices.” In Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-State, edited by Christian Joppke & Ewa Morawska, 1–37. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. Karakayali, Serhat. “Paranoic integrationism: die Integrationsformel als unmöglicher (Klassen-)Kompromiss.” In No integration?!: kulturwissenschaftliche Beiträge zur Integrationsdebatte in Europa, edited by Sabine Hess, Jana Binder & Johannes Moser, 95– 103.Bielefeld:Transcript Verlag, 2009. Kivisto, Peter. Multiculturalism in a Global Society. Cambridge: Blackwell, 2002. Kraus, Peter & Karen Schönwälder. “Multiculturalism in Germany: rhetoric, scattered experiments and future chances.” In Multiculturalism and the Welfare State: Recogntion and Redistribution in Contemporary Democracies, edited by Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka, 202–221. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. Kymlicka, Will. “Comment on Meer and Modood.” Journal of Intercultural Studies 33 (2) (2012a): 211–216. —. Multiculturalism: Success, failure and the future. Migration Policy Institute, 2012b. —. “Multicultural citizenship within multination states.” Ethnicities 11 (3) (2011): 281–302. —. “The Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism?” In The Multiculturalism Backlash: European discourses, policies and practices, edited by Stephen Vertovec & Susanne Wessendorf, 32–50. London: Routledge., 2010.

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—. Multicultural Citizenship. A liberal theory of minority rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. Lentin, Alana & Gavan Titley. “The crisis of 'multiculturalism' in Europe: Mediated minarets, intolerable subjects.” European Journal of Cultural Studies 15 (2) (2012): 123–138. —. The Crises of Multiculturalism: Racism in a neoliberal age. London: Zed Books, 2011. Levey, Geoffrey Brahm. “Interculturalism vs. Multiculturalism: A Distinction without a Difference?” Journal of Intercultural Studies 33 (2) (2012): 217–224. McGhee, Derek. The End of Multiculturalism? Terrorism, Integration and Human Rights. Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2008. Meer, Nasar & Tariq Modood. “Framing Contemporary Citizenship and Diversity in Europe.” In European multiculturalisms, cultural religious and ethnic challenges, edited by Anna Triandafyllidou, Tariq Modood, and Nasar Meer, 33–60. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012a. —. “How does interculturalism Contrast with Multiculturalism?” Journal of Intercultural Studies 33 (2) (2012b): 175–196. —. “Rejoinder: Assessing the Divergences on our Readings of Interculturalism and Multiculturalism.” Journal of Intercultural Studies 33 (2) (2012c): 223–244. —. “The Multicultural State We’re in: Muslims, ‘Multiculture’ and the ‘Civic Re-balancing’ of British Multiculturalism.” Political Studies 57 (3) (2009): 473–497. Miera, Frauke. “Not a One-way Road? Integration as a Concept and as a Policy.” In European multiculturalisms, cultural religious and ethnic challenges, edited by Anna Triandafyllidou, Tariq Modood, and Nasar Meer, 192–212. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012. Modood, Tariq. Post-immigration ‘difference; and integration: The Case of Muslims in Western Europe. Report prepared for the British Academy. London: British Academy, 2012. Parekh, Bhiku. Rethinking Multiculturalism, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. Parkes, Roderick. “Immigrant Integration meets European Integration.” Working Paper FG1 SWP: Berlin, 2008. Pitcher, Ben. The Politics of Multiculturalism: Race and Racism in Contemporary Britain. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. Schönwälder, Karen. “Germany: Integration and pluralism in a selfconscious country of integration.” In The multiculturalism backlash:

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European discourses, policies and practices, edited by Steve Vertovec and Susanne Wessendorf, 152–170. London: Routledge, 2010. Vertovec, Steve. “Multi-multiculturalisms.” In Multicultural Policies and the State, edited by Marco Martiniello, 25–38. Utrecht: ERCOMER, 1998. —. “Multiculturalism, culturalism and public incorporation.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 19 (1) (1996): 49–69. Vertovec, Steve & Susanne Wessendorf (eds). The Multiculturalism Backlash: European discourses, policies and practices. London: Routledge, 2010. Weaver, Matthew. “Angela Merkel: German multiculturalism has 'utterly failed'.” The Guardian [database online], October 17, 2010. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/oct/17/angela-merkel-germanmulticulturalism-failed (accessed July 15, 2013). Werbner, Pnina. “Multiculturalism from Above and Below: Analysing a Political Discourse.” Journal of Intercultural Studies 33 (2) (2012): 197–209. Winter, Elke. “Trajectories of Multiculturalism in Germany, the Netherlands and Canada: In Search of Common Patterns.” Government and Opposition 45 (2) (2010): 166–186. Wieviorka, Michel. “Multiculturalism: A Concept not to be Redefined and Certainly Not Replaced by the Extremely Vague Term of Interculturalism.” Journal of Intercultural Studies 33 (2) (2012) 225– 231. Wise, Amanda & Selvaraj Velayutham.eds. Everyday Multiculturalism. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

CHAPTER FIVE UNITY IN DIVERSITY? THE STANDARDIZED DIVERSIFICATION OF EU REGIONS SEBASTIAN M. BÜTTNER1

Introduction European multiplicity is often described in terms of “unity in diversity,” not least in official political narratives and imageries. This notion contains the image of an extremely diverse, multi-ethnic and multilingual Europe of regions and nation states that holds together on the basis of common experiences, a set of common values, and common aspirations. However, while national and regional diversity in terms of political, economic and cultural differences are ubiquitous both within and beyond the current territory of the European Union, the “unity” of Europe is highly disputed (e.g. Biebuyck & Rumford 2012). In this chapter I argue that regional diversification reflects a global trend of contemporary logics and conceptions of spatial development that has also strongly affected practices and patterns of regional mobilization in contemporary EUrope. In fact, the mobilization of subnational territories has gained special attention all around Europe and in particular within the framework of the EU regional development policies and EU activities aimed at fostering “territorial cohesion.” Consequently, despite the expression of regional uniqueness and difference, regional development strategies are becoming ever more similar and standardized. This remarkable “standardized multiplicity” of sub-national regions in contemporary Europe constitutes the central concern of this chapter. Thus, departing from classical assumptions of the so-called worldpolity approach put forward by John Meyer and colleagues from Stanford University, I propose to conceive of regional mobilization in contemporary Europe as the expression of a larger cultural transformation of established

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modes of social government and social mobilization. Based on this assumption, I argue that sub-national territories in contemporary Europe are fundamentally shaped by relatively universal models of social development and by globally standardized practices of expertise and professionalism. This contributes to a huge structural homology of regional development strategies all around EUrope, and at the same time to the promotion of a new regionalism that fosters sub-national sources and resources of social change and “development.” The chapter starts with a short portrayal of the role of regions in European history and the rise of a new wave of regionalism in the past few decades. Subsequently, limitations of conventional interpretations of this “new regionalism” are discussed, after which the major features of the macro-phenomenological world-polity approach are briefly introduced. This sub-chapter also contains a depiction of the major cultural-cognitive foundations of the “new regionalism” and a short outline of the institutionalization of worldcultural models in the so-called “Cohesion Policy” of the European Union. The final remarks underline the analytical surplus of culturalist interpretations of regional mobilization, highlighting the normative and performative implications of scientific models and scientized practices.

The standardized diversification of regions in contemporary EUrope Europe has always been a continent of extraordinary cultural diversity and multi-faceted local traditions. During medieval times the continent was mainly shaped by smaller territories, small independent cities and a multitude of smaller counties and duchies inhabited by a huge variety of different tribes and ethnicities (Braudel 1996). However, with the expansion of central state administrations and the rise of nation states during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, many counties and independent regional territories lost their autonomy and distinctiveness and were incorporated into the larger territory of nation states or degraded to the status of provinces of larger empires. During the era of nationbuilding, “national identity” was vigorously promoted and strongly fostered in opposition to persisting regional identities and political movements (Anderson 1983; Therborn 1995; Bartolini 2005). Although overcoming internal territorial barriers and taming particularistic regional assertiveness was one of the primary aims of emerging European nation states, the transformative and all-encompassing force of nation-building has not led to an entire abolishment of regional structures or loss of regional identities anywhere in Europe. Many regions

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and provinces managed to preserve some degree of political autonomy and assertiveness, though in varying degrees from one European country to another, mainly depending on particular cultural traditions and the ethnic routes of the regional population. Thus, there are many different histories of regionalization in Europe. The reasons for the persistence of regional traditions, regional cultures, and regional political institutions are manifold. In some cases regionalization constitutes an expression of regional assertiveness and strong regional identification, and in other cases regional structures were introduced in order to make state administration more efficient and to strengthen the authority of central governments (Keating 1998 and 2004). Since the beginning of the 1990s, however, a new wave of regionalization has flourished on the European continent (Le Galès & Lequesne 1998; Keating 2001; Paasi 2009). Old territorial and cultural identities have been revived, and in some countries without extensive regional traditions new regional identities have even been created. Moreover, it has been observed by analysts of the more recent upswing of regionalization in contemporary Europe that a new “model” of regional development policy has started to take shape (e.g. Keating 2001; Paasi 2009). Thus, there is a strong drive towards “institution- and capacitybuilding” at sub-national levels of government, with a new emphasis on “multi-annual” and “strategic” development planning. In many places and areas all around Europe “science and technology parks,” “sciencebusiness-transfer centres” and “business incubators” have been set up in order to foster “innovation” and “cross-fertilization” amongst various business sectors as well as between business and sciences. Beyond that, municipalities and regional authorities also actively develop their particular “cultural heritage” in numerous dimensions, such as both the material and the less tangible forms of “regional culture” and “regional traditions,” aiming to foster the “tourist attractiveness” of particular areas as well as the “social cohesion” of regional populations and the overall “standard of living.” In short, sub-national regions have become more visible and more pronounced during recent decades. At the same time, nonetheless, it can be noticed that sub-national areas have become more a focal point of development activities and that the strategies regional authorities choose are based on relatively similar principles and models of regional mobilization. In fact, the huge approximation of regional development strategies occurs despite a great deal of regional divergence. This can be considered as the paradox of an increasing “standardized diversification” of sub-national territories in contemporary Europe.

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From governance to diffusion—limitations of existing views on regional mobilization The resurgence of sub-national territories, and especially the rise of regions as responsible agents and motors of development, have mainly been studied from two analytical angles: (international) political economy and multilevel governance approaches. The first strand of literature addresses the globalization of market competition, and especially the “new geographies” (Krugman 1991) and new forms of economic value-creation brought about by intensifying global integration of markets in the past few decades (Cox 1997; Keating 1998; Hudson 2001; Brenner et al. 2003). It has been observed, in this context, that increasing globalization of economic activities and chains of production has by no means led to the disappearance of “place.” On the contrary, places and regions are affected differently and local institutions and social structures can be decisive factors for the success or failure of economic development (Saxenian 1994; Ohmae 1995; Storper & Salais 1997; Asheim 1997; Amin 1999; Cooke et al. 2004). The latter strand of research, the multi-level governance approaches, aims to account for the transformation of government in times of increasing transnationalization of political decision-making and the emergence of new political actors, new political arenas and new fields of interest formation at various levels of society and their complex interplay (e.g. Marks et al. 1996; Scharpf 1999; Kohler-Koch & Eising 1999; Hooghe & Marks 2001). In this context, an increasing “Europeanization” of regional policy in the area of EU Cohesion Policy has been observed (Hooghe 1996; Gualini 2004; Leonardi 2005). It has been explored how and to what extent new European institutional rules and regulations contributed to the empowerment of sub-national actors alongside national institutions (Börzel 2002). It was also shown that EU Cohesion Policy fostered the emergence of decentralized structures of regional government, even in countries and contexts without stronger regionalist or even federalist traditions, such as Ireland or Great Britain and especially in the post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Bache 2008; Büttner 2012). Both strands of research have contributed to a deeper understanding of the economic and the political conditions of regional mobilization in the past decade and of the dispersion of state authority and governance capacity across various spatial levels. From a sociological point of view, however, the prevailing multi-level perspective, or rather the clear-cut distinction of discrete actors and institutional arrangements at various

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spatial layers of society, is not sufficient. For if we take the more recent insights of research on globalization and transnationalization really seriously, and in particular the idea of the spatial transcendence of ideas, artifacts, exchanges and interactions (Appadurai 1997; Urry 2007; Mau 2010; Mau & Büttner 2010), we cannot adhere to the idea of static spatial distinctions and territorial arrangements: “Ideas associated with discrete ‘levels’ need to be replaced by a notion of spaces interpenetrated by the global, local and national, in the context of which the conventional idea of inside and outside, domestic and international, no longer holds.” This was vigorously pointed out by Gerard Delanty and Chris Rumford (2005, 136) in Rethinking Europe, their ground-breaking plea for a new sociology of Europeanization. Thus, instead of reifying clear-cut distinctions between “inside” and “outside,” or “above” and “below,” Delanty & Rumford claim that we need an account of the extent to which “global” processes interact with more static territorial arrangements. Furthermore, it is acknowledged in existing research that practices, institutional principles and models of regional development “… have been diffused through EU Structural Funds programmes, academic publication, consultancy and interregional cooperation” (Keating 2001, 219). However, there is no account in existing regional research that captures these various forms and channels of diffusion. Most of the existing accounts of diffusion are predominantly governance-centred and presuppose the agential character of regions, or rather regional governance structures, as well as clear-cut regional “interests.” Thus, they mainly conceive of diffusion as a process which is confined to procedural rules and expert networks within state bureaucracies. However, no existing account systematically considers the fundamental cultural-cognitive foundations and the multi-faceted trans-regional institutional context of diffusion, which accounts for the astonishing structural homology of regional development strategies despite regional multiplicity and divergence. Hence, we need an approach that transcends the prevailing actor-based governance-centred perspectives and accounts for the trans-regional context of diffusion which structures regional interests and actorhood. This is the major concern of macro-phenomenological research perspectives in the tradition of the so-called world-polity approach. They shed light on the broader cultural conditions and the epistemic foundations of the increasing structural homology of social entities regarded as, and that regard themselves as, “actors.”

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Regional mobilization from a macro-phenomenological perspective The macro-phenomenological research perspective has been put forward in the past thirty years by John Meyer and colleagues under the label of “world-polity studies.” This perspective is “macro-phenomenological” in that it builds on both the classical phenomenological assumption of an all-encompassing social construction of reality (Berger & Luckmann 1966) and on Max Weber’s famous macro-sociological assumption of an increasing cultural significance and legitimacy of formal-rational models of social organization with the breakthrough of modernity (Meyer & Rowan 1977; Thomas et al. 1987; Meyer 2010; Krücken & Drori 2010). At the centre of this perspective is the assumption of a massive worldwide diffusion of “world culture,” and the overarching cultural umbrella of contemporary and ever more globalizing modernity. Accordingly, all modern actors are seen as being constitutively shaped by this particular cultural account which significantly determines what modern, purposeful social actors think, aspire and believe in (Meyer & Jepperson 2000). On the basis of this particular analytical perspective the current phase of regional mobilization in Europe can be conceived as a broader cultural phenomenon and not “just” as an outcome of economic powers or politics. And instead of assuming fixed actor-identities and interest-formation on various spatial levels, even in opposition to one another, we are able to focus on cultural and institutional conditions that are shared by agents and carriers of “world culture” across space, and which strongly contribute to the formation of interests, expectations, perceptions and self-images of regions as “modern” social actors (Büttner 2012). In order to comprehend how the diffusion of world culture is conceptualized from this particular research perspective, one has to acknowledge the huge cultural significance of sciences in modern times and, more particularly, the practical repercussions of scientifically grounded standards and models on the conduct of everyday lives. Hence, although “world culture” is conceptualized as a cultural system that largely transcends particular local contexts, it is not conceived as detached from social practice. On the contrary, it entirely develops and expands within society, namely within the expanding institutions and practices of scientific reflection, and in particular in connection with all types of “professional” practice. The sciences constantly analyse social reality and produce interpretations and images on the nature and coherence of social life, and some of these scientific interpretations gain broader political and cultural significance (Drori et al. 2003; Drori & Meyer 2006).

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Thus, from a macro-phenomenological perspective, “scientization” is regarded as the main force behind the extraordinary global expansion of rationalized organizational structures and purposeful actorhood. For Meyer and colleagues it creates both the demand for and the supply of ever more “rationalization” and “rule-making” in everyday life (Drori & Meyer 2006, 31). Accordingly, they see the sciences and “modern” scientifically grounded “professions” as the major generators of world-cultural diffusion. Beyond that, however, the world-polity perspective is also sensitive to political dimensions of diffusion, and it also takes processes of institutionalization and the establishment of institutional imperatives seriously: “In some way, models must make the transition from theoretical formulation to social movement to institutional imperative” (Strang & Meyer 1993, 495). Hence, apart from the exploration of expert knowledge and scientific discourse, a macro-phenomenological analysis is particularly sensitive to processes of “authoritative institutionalization,” meaning the inscription of certain world-cultural categories and models into more explicit regulative institutional rules and policy programmes. Consequently, the following discussion of the cultural foundations of the rise of a “new regionalism” deals with both an exploration of the emergence of new notions and narrations of regional development and of the way in which these narrations have become institutionalized in the European context.

World-cultural models of contemporary regional development practice When we look at the intellectual foundations of the current wave of regional mobilization, one fundamental shift in the discourse of development stands at the outset of this endeavour—the observation of a fundamental “spatial turn” in social sciences against the backdrop of a fundamental transformation of established modes of economic valuecreation since the 1970s. In fact, social-scientific analysts widely agree that the shift from Fordism to post-Fordism in advanced industrial societies at the end of the 1970s marks a new age of economic valuecreation, bringing about a new international division of labour, new rules of the economic game and, above all, a new level of economic competition on a global scale (Piore & Sabel 1989; Porter 1990; Amin 1994). While the previous Fordist mode of production was mainly based on integrated mass production and Keynesian interventionist economic policy within nation-state structures, economic activities are now increasingly uncoupled from national markets and former territorial restrictions. It could be

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observed that the new modes of value-creation depend less on “real” production in “concrete” places than the former Fordist types; and economic profits are increasingly achieved on the basis of largely “intangible” and “placeless” assets such as trade in financial products on capital markets, revenues from franchises, patent protection, or brandselling in global (often virtual) “spaces of flows” (Lash & Urry 1994; Knorr-Cetina & Preda 2004). In this context, it also transpired that individual territories were affected differently by economic crisis and by the new rules of economic production. In fact, it turned out that some areas were hit intensely by a huge economic downturn and a dramatic decline of industries and other areas were less affected by recession, while some areas, such as the famous Silicon Valley in Northern California, or some smaller traditional industrial districts in Southern Germany and Northern Italy, were able to adapt easily to new conditions of economic competition and even profited markedly from increasing globalization. These differences in local capacities of coping with economic changes and new rules of economic competition created a new awareness for geographic space in economics and related social sciences, inspiring a huge number of researchers from various disciplines to explore the conditions of success and failure and to study local and regional conditions of development (for an overview see Storper [1995]). The vast body of research which has emerged since the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s clearly reflects the transformation of common understandings of spatial development and prevailing images of regional development. These days, regions are in fact no longer considered as passive contexts of economic production and business activities. On the contrary, they are considered as vital spaces of economic value-creation, as “key sources” (Storper 1995) and “motors” (Scott 1996) of development in the new economic era. In this context, some scientific vocabularies and scientifically sanctified “best practice” models of regional development have become prominent both in sciences and in practices of regional mobilization. Some have even attained the status of quasi-universal models of contemporary regional development practice and, consequently, have also found their way into mainstream political programmes (Büttner 2012, 78ff.). One notion which has become a quasi-universalistic dictum of good regional development practice is that of flexible specialisation (Piore & Sabel 1989), which suggests that in times of intensified global competition, all municipalities and regions must define their unique “core competences” and find their niche in the global economy. Another notion which has become particularly popular in the past three decades is the

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model of innovative cluster economies. Without doubt, the assumption that businesses should be concentrated in “clusters” and that innovativeness evolves out of intensified, multi-faceted and fruitful inter-linkages between science and businesses is currently widely accepted. Initially deriving from economic geography but vigorously proposed and promoted in a stylized and easy-applicable way by the figureheads of business studies at Harvard Business School (Porter 1998 and 2003), it definitely constitutes one of the most prominent world-cultural models of regional economic mobilization of contemporary times.2 Likewise, the few successful and exceptionally vibrant business clusters, such as, above all, Silicon Valley in the USA, have even become iconic reference models and prototypes of successful regional mobilization. Once the features of models of “good practice” were specified, they were subject to massive emulation on a global scale.3 The new academic interest in regions, regional social practices, and regional institutions has also widely transcended the narrow disciplinary focus on business studies and enterprise development. Over the past three decades the interdisciplinary scientific engagements with sub-national regions and questions of regional development have produced numerous models and accounts of “good” development practice (Lawson & Lorenz 1999; Morgan 2004; Salais & Villeneuve 2005). Consequently, it is now widely believed in regional research and far beyond that (regional) innovation and overall socio-economic well-being is decisively determined by certain endogenous relational, institutional, or cultural factors. Accordingly, the prevalence of open-minded, active and co-operative attitudes based on generalized forms of trust and interactions rather than bonding types of “social capital” are seen as decisive elements of favourable regional development (Putnam 1993; Trigilia 2001). Furthermore, researchers have also observed and evoked the emergence of new political actors, new corporatist arrangements and new forms of policy experimentation at local and regional levels. Consequently, scientific assumptions and interpretations of “good” regional governance have become widely shared world-cultural models and institutional imperatives over the past decade (Benz & Fürst 2002; Cooke et al. 2004; Crouch et al. 2004). Moreover, a variety of alternative concepts and models of regional development, such as models of sustainable development or cohesion, were also put forward by numerous scientists from different disciplinary backgrounds and made the subject of multifaceted “regional experimentation” (Morgan 2004; Salais & Villeneuve 2005; Hadjimichalis & Hudson 2007; Barton & Dlouhá 2011). Thus, we can observe a peculiar simultaneous increase and intermingling of two contradictory, or even

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opposing, aspirations of development in contemporary regional development practice. Along with the rise of sub-national regions both as objects and subjects of development interventions, the aspirations of regional development have extended tremendously, and have been refocused more forcefully both in economic and in non-economic terms: Building upon the pioneering experimentalism of the 1980s and stimulated by growing concerns about the character, quality and sustainability of local and regional “development,” the often dominant economic focus has broadened in recent years in an attempt to address social, ecological, political and cultural concerns … Unequal experiences of living standards and wellbeing between places even at equal or comparable income levels has fuelled dissatisfaction with conventional economic indicators of “development” … Reducing social inequality, promoting environmental sustainability, encouraging inclusive government and governance and recognizing cultural diversity have been emphasized to varying degrees within broadened definitions of local and regional development … Often uncertain moves toward notions of quality of life, social cohesion and wellbeing are being integrated or balanced, sometimes uneasily, with continued concerns about economic competitiveness and growth (Pike et al. 2007, 1254f.).

This multiple extension of aspirations of regional development in contemporary Europe reflects a larger and more general shift of governmental rationalities in advanced modern societies, widely interpreted as a reinforcement of the liberal practices of state government (Rose & Miller 2008). However, from a macro-phenomenological research perspective this shift is not just interpreted as the outcome of “raw” material interests or shifts in contemporary regimes of capitalist accumulation, as is usually suggested by materialist accounts of regional mobilization (Rumford 2000; Brenner et al. 2003; Lagendijk 2007; Paasi 2009). Rather, it is regarded here as the expression of the expansion of the scientific discourse of regional development and of the extent to which diverse scientific models become manifest in concrete political practice. In fact, the discovery of the region as the “appropriate” spatial unit for development intervention has contributed to a massive diffusion of modernist aspirations and highly rationalized organizational structures to local and regional grounds. This expansion of “world culture” has taken place both within and independent of official governmental structures. However, it must be noted that especially influential international agents of development, such as the EU and the OECD, have played vital roles in the promotion and diffusion of “world-cultural” models and principles of regional mobilization.

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Indeed, these international agents of development disseminate a whole range of information on regional development and regional reform. Through outlining common standards for regional reform, institutionalizing transnational channels of exchange or publishing reports, rankings and huge amounts of statistical material on regional development, they create transnational linkages and new discursive fields in which states, and—ever more frequently—regions and other sub-state units can locate themselves and compare their own situations in relation to other similar political units.4 Thus, they contribute vigorously to the establishment of transnational “social fields” (Bourdieu 1998) within which knowledge, experts, practices and even financial resources on regional mobilization diffuse rapidly and massively on a transnational scale. This facilitates the mutual perception of similarities and differences amongst similar social entities from formerly rather un-connected social environments, which is one of the most important conditions for the rapid and massive transnational diffusion of world-cultural models (e.g. Meyer & Strang 1993). And with the establishment of a common “Cohesion Policy” at the European level in the late 1980s a whole range of standards, principles, procedures and practices of regional mobilization have been institutionalized as “institutional imperatives” and absolute conditions sine qua non in European regional development practice.

EU Cohesion policy as a catalyst of pan-European regional mobilization Introduction of the EU’s Cohesion Policy in 1989 has established a new pan-European multi-level system of regional mobilization based on a number of unitary organizing principles and standard procedures, such as subsidiarity, multi-annual planning, participation, partnership, or good governance (e.g. Hooghe 1996; Rumford 2000; Leonardi 2005; Molle 2007; EC 2008a). Initially introduced as a complementary side-project of the establishment of the European Single Market in order to counterbalance potential market-failures, the Cohesion Policy has become one of the largest EU policy areas in terms of annual spending next to agricultural policy. In fact, since its introduction in 1989 more than EUR 700 billion has been spent on projects of spatial and regional development all over Europe. This accounts for more than one third of the whole EU budget (EC 2008a). Furthermore, in the past decade the Cohesion Policy has gained even more importance in political terms as a means to support the integration of new member states into the existing institutional structure of the European Union, and to spread the strategic goals of the

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renewed Lisbon agenda to cities and regions all over the EU territory (EC 2005a, 2005b, 2007 and 2008b). The strategic guidelines and funding priorities of Cohesion policy mirror, in an ideal-typical way, the major standards and models of contemporary development thought that were outlined in the previous section. Thus, the Cohesion Policy is aimed at strengthening the “innovativeness” and “competitiveness” of European regions by cofinancing countless initiatives of regional specialisation, cluster-building and human resource development and by stimulating regional learning and experimentation (EC 2006a and 2006b). It supports the increase of entrepreneurship and knowledge-based industries in areas all around Europe, but also the refurbishment of roads, basic local infrastructures and the expansion of broadband internet connections. At the same time, moreover, it also co-finances numerous projects of environmental protection, social and cultural activation, inter- and trans-regional social exchange and co-operation (EC 2008c and 2008d), and promotes the improvement of the “administrative capacity” of the national, regional and local authorities involved in planning and implementation in order to ensure effectiveness and efficiency of funding. Hence, in short, the EU Cohesion policy strongly contributes to the evocation and dissemination of many scripts and aspirations of contemporary regional development practice which are most prevalent in the development discourse, and it also contributes to this discourse by promoting its own research and respective notions and concepts.5 Moreover, in line with the most important credo of the new regionalism, “supporting regions to foster self-support” of local and “regional agency” is stimulated by mobilizing regional actors to get active and work together for the good of their common regional environment (Büttner 2012, 96–101). The most important element of the Cohesion Policy in terms of EUwide standardization of regional development practices, however, is the so-called conditionality which is built into the funding and implementation system of the Cohesion Policy based on a multi-annual strategic vision. The strategic goals of the Cohesion Policy are officially determined and adopted by the European Council, but they mainly derive from policy proposals of the DG-Regio and expert debate on its strategic objectives at the forefront and aftermath of decision-making. Once the strategic objectives are determined in legal terms, they have to be adopted and transposed into national, regional and local development practices by the political authorities in order to be eligible for receiving the financial support of one of the EU’s structural and cohesion funds (EC 2005b and 2008b). In this way, the institutional framework of EU Cohesion Policy is

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central to the rapid diffusion of world-cultural models and practices to regional development agendas all around EUrope and beyond. Thus, many regions all over Europe have started to draft and implement distinct mid- and long-term development strategies in accordance with European visions of spatial development and, more concretely, with major strategy aims and objectives of EU Cohesion Policy (Adams et al. 2006; Dimitriou & Thompson 2007; Büttner 2012, 159–191). Moreover, regional authorities have also become more active in advertising their region to the outside world. Consequently, regional symbols and idioms are currently ubiquitous in TV commercials, life-style magazines and even on billboards at train stations, airports, or bus stops in order to promote tourism and attract new investments. In all these commercials and public self-presentations, which are frequently funded with financial support of EU structural funds, the particularities and uniqueness of sub-national spaces are strongly emphasized. Likewise, Europeans invest in the promotion and refurbishment of the so-called “cultural heritage” of their regions and the modernization of technical infrastructures. In fact, a huge amount of EU funds that are allocated for so-called “least development” areas are assigned for infrastructure development and cultural regeneration in many different dimensions. All these activities strongly contribute to the promotion of sub-national regional cultures and of the image of a “Europe of many different cultures and regions.”

Final remarks It was argued in this contribution that sub-national territories in contemporary Europe are fundamentally shaped by relatively similar models of social development and by globally standardized practices of expertise and professionalism. It was also shown that there is indeed a high level of “rationalization” of regional development and a strong drive for regional mobilization in the Europe of today. Along with the transition from Fordism to Post-Fordism, and thus along with the transformation from “organized” to “disorganized modernity” (Wagner 1994), subnational territories have become the subject of multi-faceted scientific reflections on the nature of development. Consequently, sub-national regions have become more active in development planning. In addition, they have become focal points of numerous and diverse development aspirations ranging from strategies of economic mobilization to more holistic, distinctly non-economic agendas of sustainable, socially balanced and ecologically sensitive development.

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Based on a macro-phenomenological research perspective this has been interpreted and discussed here primarily as a cultural phenomenon, rather than the result of deliberate political action or purely economic results. This is the major analytical thrust of the macro-phenomenological research perspective and, in my opinion, its analytical surplus in relation to other perspectives. It helps to shed light on the broader cultural-cognitive foundations of political or economic interests and other forms of “reasoned” agency, and it conveys a culturalist understanding of social change, meaning a perspective that emphasizes agentless factors of change such as scientization, knowledge transfer, institutional diffusion and emulation over agential narrations. However, this does not mean that the macro-phenomenological research perspective is agnostic towards political or economic factors; it simply does not presuppose their predominance and does not take interests for granted (see also Buhari-Gulmez 2010 and 2012). Moreover, the analytical presumption of the normative and performative character of theoretical accounts and best-practice models, and in particular the assumption of the cultural significance of scientific authority, adds an important dimension to the analysis of social transformations in contemporary Europe and the world. Based on this perspective we are able to see to what extent both development planning and practice are formalized, standardized and subject to extensive professional treatment. Against this backdrop, we are also able to see the distinctive “worldcultural” character of international agents of development, such as the OECD or the European Commission, as platforms of multi-faceted worldcultural diffusion that serve, in this way, as catalysts of diffusion, reinforcing, accelerating and specifying the diffusion of certain “global” standards and models of development across countries. This encourages local actors to get active and mobilize themselves in the name of progress and future development, and fosters the expansion of “multiplicity” in highly standardized terms. However, this distinctive world-cultural character and the tremendously high level of standardization are often overlooked in emphatic images of regional diversity.

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PART II: CONSTITUTING EUROPE

CHAPTER SIX ANOTHER BRICK IN THE TOWER OF BABEL: TURKEY’S CHALLENGES AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE EU’S LANGUAGE POLICY C. AKCA ATAC

Despite its crucial role in sustaining integration, multilingualism is not discussed as widely as other aspects of multiculturalism within the context of European Union (EU) enlargement. Various opinion groups have appealed to EU institutions and member-states to dwell more on creating coherent, stable and harmonious language policies to “overcome the separation between nations.” Lacking a uniform message, those appeals appear to be limited to the adaption of Latin as the “language of learning” or to the promotion of multilingual dictionaries in Europe instead of bilingual ones (Merolle 2007, 1–2). During the first Barroso Commission, the EU demonstrated an unprecedented interest in multilingualism and set an agenda following which the first overview of the new linguistic initiatives would have taken place in 2012. Nevertheless, such an overview is now much overdue and the results of Eurobarometer’s multilingualism survey have not yet been announced. Given the necessity of better language policies in the European integration process, delays in introducing the EU’s multilingual scheme are likely to also delay further integration. In addition, within the context of Turkish candidature, the accession process requires Turkey to take notice of the opportunities and shortcomings as well as the challenges of European multilingualism and to communicate the relevance of the Turkish language to the debate on European multiculturalism. The present chapter aims to assess the EU language policy in light of the future necessity of incorporating Turkish into Europe’s linguistic family by referring to the EU’s laws, norms and values as well as NGO reports and opinion papers. Because the EU’s official, “authentic” language policy does not include regional and

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minority languages, this research is concerned only with official languages. Several aspects of enlargement and multiculturalism, such as immigration, ethnicity and religion, have overshadowed the possible contributions and challenges that the Turkish language is likely to offer to the EU’s multilingualism. Multilingualism across the EU requires the mutual commitment of both member and candidate states to the ecumenical value of all the present and future official languages. Within this context, EU-funded projects, trade chambers and NGOs, state officials and chief negotiators for accession should also encourage further discussions on the comparative benefits of linguistic variety. Turkey, to achieve full integration, needs to be acquainted with the ongoing discussions on multilingualism within the EU, and the EU needs to fulfil its obligations towards the ideal of a multilingual Europe by pursuing an inclusive policy towards the Turkish language. Multilingualism was added to the European Commission’s agenda following the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 during discussions for new ministerial portfolios for the newcomers. Before finalizing the new portfolios, President Jose Manuel Barroso had to overcome opposition from Socialist MEPs who asserted that multilingualism “is not worthy of a commissioner” (Kubosova 2006). Having been surprised by the title of the portfolio offered to them, the Romanians had apprehensions about being the keepers of multilingualism in Europe. Romanian journalists tried to find out whether the “multilingualism portfolio” was an EU sanction “against Bucharest for delays in combating corruption” (Ibid.). Nevertheless, as the EU now has 500 million citizens, 27 member states, three candidate-states, three alphabets and 23 official languages, multilingualism is a real task requiring good management and is certainly worthy of a commissioner. The Romanian Commissioner of Multilingualism, Leonard Orban, did a pioneering job in terms of planting multilingualism on the EU’s integration agenda and proving that multilingualism is not “an ideological hobby horse” (High Level Group on Multilingualism 2008, 22) of the EU. Multilingualism presupposes respect for linguistic diversity in particular and cultural diversity in general. It stands where national identity, education policy, social cohesion, complex communication, good immigration policies and competitiveness intersect. According to the Commission’s definition, multilingualism should be “understood as the ability of societies, institutions, groups, and individuals to engage, on a regular basis, with more than one language in their day-to-day lives” (High Level Group on Multilingualism 2008, 6). Within this context, the EU

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should encourage language learning, promote linguistic diversity, sustain a healthy and competitive economy and facilitate citizens’ access to EU legislation. In doing so, multilingualism should govern and manage crucial policy areas such as education, media, research and development, competitiveness and social inclusion. In the words of Abram de Swaan (2011, 144) of the University of Amsterdam, multilingualism has remained “the great non-dit of European integration” for fifty years and is now a pressing issue embedded in attempts to manage multiculturalism.

The EU’s Test with Multilingualism On the European Commission’s webpage, the EU’s language policy is described as one that “promotes multilingualism and aims for a situation in which every EU citizen can speak at least two foreign languages in addition to their mother tongue” (European Commission 2013). The multilingualism of the EU appears to be a unique characteristic among the organizations of the international community in terms of scope, quality, quantity and functionality. Its legal incarnation is to be found in Articles 21, 314 and 290 of the Treaty and Regulation No 1/58, in which the legal texts published in the official languages of the member states are given the “equally authentic” status (Athanassiou 2006). As the acquis communautaire expands, the documents have continued to forcefully confirm the authenticity of the legislation issued in the member states’ official languages, despite the increasing number of languages and the percentage of the translation load. This principle will continue to apply at each accession unless the EU Council takes a unanimous negative vote (High Level Group on Multilingualism 2008, 6). The concept of “equal authenticity” has proven crucial in granting the translated documents an unchallenged legal status equal to that of the originals. The foremost priority of the EU in its devotion to multilingualism lies in its obligation to create “legal certainty” and guarantee “democratic accountability” (Ibid.). Before thinking in terms of cultural significance, the equal treatment of languages bears importance in the processes of law-making, courthearings and, of course, decision-making. The European debate over institutional, educational and individual multilingualism has been fuelled by the launch of the Lisbon Strategy. In order to be able to catch up with the global competition, the EU adopted the Lisbon Strategy in 2000. Foreign language acquisition is deemed crucial to sustainable development, innovative technologies and research and development. As a preparation for the relaunch of multilingualism within this context, the Commission put an online consultation into action

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at the end of 2007, and the relevant organizations and individuals were invited to share their opinions on creating an ideal language policy. On May 22, 2008, at a Ministerial Conference those debates were further elaborated upon and published as the Council Conclusions. In these conclusions, multilingualism was defined as a policy that “encompasses the economic, social and cultural aspects of languages in lifelong learning” (Council of the European Union 2008). The Conclusions were followed that September by the Commission Communication entitled “Multilingualism: An Asset for Europe and a Shared Commitment.” The Communication encouraged the Member States and the European institutions to “join efforts to encourage and assist citizens in acquiring language skills and removing communication barriers” (European Commission 2008). More importantly, Orban, following his appointment as the multilingualism commissioner, saw fit to convene a group of experts who could provide useful insights into multilingualism and provide unofficial, recommendatory reports from a High Level Expert Group. Wolfgang Mackiewicz, Honorary Professor of English Philology at the Freie Universitat Berlin, was designated as the rapporteur of the Group. The first report was published by “the Group of Intellectuals” chaired by the renowned Franco-Lebanese author Amin Maalouf in January 2008. The second report, emphasizing the competitiveness and labour mobility aspects of multilingualism, was published by the “Business Forum” presided over by Viscount Etienne Davignon in July 2008. Among the data to be taken into consideration were two Eurobarometer surveys carried out in 2001 and 2006 on the language skills in member and candidate states. Despite the discursive respect for multilingualism and equal treatment of official languages, managing the necessarily expanding linguistic diversity within the EU remains problematic. Only recently, the interest in multilingualism shown by José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, resulted in the creation of a portfolio at the Commission specifically designed to manage “multilingualism in education, culture, interpretation, translation, and publications” as well as to monitor “the revival of the regions, the advent of the knowledge society, migration to the EU, and globalisation” (High Level Group on Multilingualism 2008, 5–6). Even though, with the appointment of the second Barroso Commission, the multilingualism portfolio has been incorporated into a larger portfolio of “Education, Culture, Multilingualism and Youth” under the supervision of the Greek Cypriot Commissioner Androulla Vassiliou, the linguistic challenge of the increasing number of official languages is unlikely to become a non-issue for the EU ever again.

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EU multilingualism is, in the first place, defined as the “democratic right” of the member states and citizens to “their own language” (Doczekalska 2009, 341). This definition is useful in understanding institutional multilingualism. The recognition of one state’s official language as an authentic EU language provides that state’s citizens with an unalienable right to be involved in the EU’s decision-making process, conduct bureaucratic communication in their own language, sit in the European Parliament as MEPs and deliver a speech in any of the EU’s official languages (Ibid.). The sustainability of this democratic right, however, depends on extremely costly, swift, accurate translations and excellent language skills. In other words, multilingualism as democratic right requires high maintenance and a very generous budget. Of all the concerns regarding the future of multilingualism, the financial burden stands out as the most overwhelming. The institutional cost of governing a fair language regime accounts for approximately €1.1 billion per year “representing one percent of the EU budget or €2.5 per citizen” (Euractiv 2008a). In 2008, around 2,500 people translated some two million pages and this figure tends to rise by five percent each year (Ibid.). If each of the twenty-three authentic languages were to be translated into the twenty-two other languages, it would result in “506 possible linguistic combinations” (Sberro 2009, 37). Equally significant, despite the impressive amount earmarked for the multilingualism budget, the outcomes of the linguistic-diversity policy do not necessarily suggest a non-hierarchical use of EU languages. The hegemony of the English language is evident and an in-house battle of languages is taking place—72.5% of Commission documents are originally issued in English, 11.8% in French, 2.7% in German and 13% in the other EU official languages (Sberro 2009, 36). To the annoyance of French officials, the widespread popularity of the English language within the EU is impressive. By virtue of being “the internet’s lingua franca” (Julios 2002, 185), or being the language on which many member states spent their “language learning provision in primary and secondary education between 1999 and 2005” (European Commission 2008, 10), or on account of other obvious reasons, English has gained the upper hand over other EU languages. Furthermore, mostly for reasons of convenience and practicality there has emerged a strong tendency “to tolerate a de facto situation in which a single language, English, would be dominant in the work of the European Institutions” (Proposals from the Group of Intellectuals 2008, 4). Ironically, the lingua franca quality of English does not only challenge Europe’s linguistic diversity, but also enables countries

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such as the United Kingdom and Ireland to adopt inexpensive monolingual policies at the expense of other European languages, particularly French. Lorenzo Consoli, President of the International Press Association (IPA/API), raises the serious issue that “after the enlargement of 2004” their selection of spokespersons and commissioners have tended “to privilege English mother tongue officials in the press room” and to prefer the “language criteria” over “competence or communication skills” (Euractiv 2010a). What is striking, Consoli adds, as if no concerns were expressed regarding in-house language diversity, is that Catherine Ashton, the new High Representative for Foreign Affairs, issues press releases “almost exclusively in English” (Ibid.). The hegemony of English has thus resulted in monolingual practices in European institutions to the extent that it has worsened the current democratic deficit troubling the EU today on so many levels, and inevitably constrains the use of other languages in the European linguistic environment. Consoli urges the EU executives to attend to the “cultural pluralism at risk” (Ibid.) as a matter of urgency. To some linguists, the risk has reached such a threatening point that the time has come to take the discussions of constructing an artificial language—a European Babel—seriously. Since the undemocratic predominance of English is to challenge the European linguistic diversity continuously, the option of a neutral lingua franca may need to be considered more persistently. It is true that with every new acquisition of the EU’s linguistic family, the budget and translation load will increase. It is also true that the EU language policy is complicated enough as it is. Nevertheless, an irreversible commitment to multilingualism should be understood as central to successful and democratic integration. Multilingualism proudly partakes of the essential elements that create “a Community based on diversity” (Doczekalska 2009, 366). Therefore, it is too valuable a cause to be conceded over budget and translation loads. Besides, as will be discussed below, the value of future business to be gained as a result of well-governed multilingualism is likely to pay off the annual translation budget of the EU many times over. Also, the increase in the number of “authentic” languages does not necessarily increase the translation work at hand. The Commission officials believe that the linguistic diversity will lead to “less but better” translation, since the Commission now produces documents of fifteen pages, while prior to the 2004 enlargement they were thirty-seven pages (Euractiv 2008a). Inadequate multilingualism evidently intensifies the democratic deficit of the EU (Wright 2000, 120). Nevertheless, the linguists also admit that perfect equality among languages is not a realistic ideal to pursue.

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Languages “in contact” eventually fall into hierarchical order. What comes to the fore as imperative, therefore, is not to aim at perfect multilingualism but to manage the dominance of powerful languages over the others (Julios 2002, 190). The more plausible way appears both to accept and control the “perceived usefulness and pertinence of one language in relation to others.” To preserve this diverse linguistic environment, the citizens of the EU must excel in language skills and knowledge. This requisite, however, should not exclude the necessity of mastering English, French or even German. In the long run, however, the global competition, new demands of the global markets and the pressing need to better mediate immigration disputes will prove that monolingualism or the knowledge of the English language alone does not suffice. The multilingualist camp assures us that the EU, “[i]nherently pluralist and multicultural in its outlook,” will always stand as “a heterogeneous entity comprised of a myriad of multilingual societies” (Julios 2002, 184, 186 and 191). Multilingualism is not a natural process that can be left to take its course; it can only thrive on a high-maintenance strategy of “a modern and effective teaching system” (Orban 2009). As proposed in the Commission Framework Strategy for Multilingualism of 2005, “the learning of a mother tongue plus two languages,” “national plans to give coherence and direction to actions to promote multilingualism,” “better teacher training” and “early language training” (European Commission 2005) would together support the backbone of European multilingualism. The LINGUA scheme of teaching and learning European languages has, in fact, been designed to serve this purpose. It aims to create multilingualism awareness through encouragement for life-long learning, to adopt innovative techniques in language teaching and to render all sorts of learning tools accessible to every single language learner (Julios 2002, 187). Nevertheless, LINGUA, in force since the 1990s, has not so far lived up to expectations and projections. Neither has the 2004–2006 Plan of Promoting Language Learning and Linguistic Diversity. Surveys demonstrate that “[i]n nearly half of the Member States, students still do not have the opportunity to study two languages during compulsory schooling” 1 (European Commission 2005, 10). The Maalouf Report, for that reason, suggests a new measure that will boost the previous efforts for linguistic diversity—the “personal adoptive language.” Grounded in the idea that Europeans should be advised “to freely choose a distinctive language, different from his or her language of identity, and also different from his or her language of international communication,” this language of personal choice, which is expected to be “learned intensively, spoken and written fluently,” is called the “personal

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adoptive language.” It will be added to the school and university curriculum and the knowledge of that language will be accompanied by the knowledge of the country in which the language is spoken. For the success of the “personal adoptive language,” the language learners should be willing to take “two separate decisions”: one “dictated by the needs of the broadest possible communication,” the other “guided by a whole host of personal reasons,” be they emotional, professional or cultural. Also, pairs of member and candidate states should establish a “bilateral and bilingual organization” to substantiate this linguistic cooperation and integration. A conscious and meticulous implementation of the “personal adoptive language” promises to bring about desirable results in terms of youth empowerment, social justice and individuals’ employability (Group of Intellectuals for Intercultural Dialogue 2008, 8, 11, 22 and 23). Multilingualism is equally essential in achieving the full employability and mobility of individuals to promote “economic growth and social cohesion” throughout the EU. The “production, transfer, and application of knowledge,” the goals of Lisbon Strategy, necessitate a linguistically diverse environment (European Commission 2005). Orban asserts that people who dismiss the multilingual target of “1+2” as “unrealistic” make a fatal error, because, in his own words, “anyone who does not speak several languages will increasingly find themselves in difficulty in the labor market” (Orban 2009). In addition to the cognitive, intellectual, educational and cultural advantages of multilingualism, its positive impact on employment and business has increasingly become more visible. If not for other reasons, therefore, the Europeans have come to believe in the virtue of developing multilingualism strategies to survive and thrive in the global markets as well as to manage successful companies and competitive business. A Commission survey estimates that “eleven percent of exporting EU SMEs may be losing business because of language barriers” (CILT 2006). Multicultural workforces in possession of linguistic and intercultural skills create business and increase the global competitiveness of the local companies that they work for, and a multilingual environment removes labour rigidities and market fragmentation. Nevertheless, the Business Forum Report “Languages Mean Business,” also known as the Davignon Report and prepared upon the request of Orban, reveals that despite the business loss, 40% of the SMEs assessed do not have plurilingual websites and only 48% of the SMEs assessed have developed “formal languages strategies.” Multilingualism still remains a goal to be achieved and it depends not only on the individual strategies of the companies but also on a concerted efforts of national trade promotion organizations, Chambers of

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Commerce, and trade organizations. Through this effort, awareness should be created to communicate the fact that “the optimal level of investments for overcoming language barriers raises the export sale ratio by 44.5 percent for European SMEs” (Business Forum for Multilingualism 2011, 5 and 14). In the eyes of many, however, the EU represents an area of free movement worker mobility that has yet to reach the intended level. The Davignon Report states that “[o]nly two percent of working age citizens live and work in another Member State” (Business Forum for Multilingualism 2011, 7). Among the factors hindering the workers’ free movement and decreasing the value of European human capital, the lack of linguistic skills is one of the most decisive. In this regard, as the Report concludes, it is imperative to have “a diversified workforce that considers all of Europe their homebase.” For companies and workers willing to invest and work in multilingual environments, the European Commission encourages their participation in the Lifelong Learning Program and Leonardo da Vinci vocational training programme. In addition, agreeing that the current schemes are not enough to boost mobility to its full capacity, the Commission seeks to enhance the European Job Mobility Action programme within the framework of the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs (Business Forum for Multilingualism 2011, 7 and 11). The Lisbon Strategy also highlights the need to attract new highly skilled immigrant workers as a means to underpin Brussels’ new initiatives in research and development, informatics technology, and other technological innovations. The Davignon Report argues that highly skilled immigrant workers will not only bring their skills but also the languages that Europe needs “to trade with the markets where growth will still be measured in double digits in the years to come” (Ibid.). Therefore, multilingualism is essential in regulating, reconciling and solving immigration problems as well as attracting high quality immigration, which will add value to European human capital. An EU project called “Language Rich Europe” has been launched to monitor the progress that the member states have made since 2008 in terms of incorporating EU languages in business (Euractiv 2011).

The Impact of Turkish Language The hurdles of budget, management and monolingual tendencies stall EU multilingualism. Yet, the accession of every new member-state complicates the European language regime even further. Nevertheless, multilingualism is an ideal irreversibly embedded in the normativeness of

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the EU and Europe’s linguistic family, and is required to make room for the official languages of the EU’s newcomers. This principle applies to Turkey and the Turkish language as well, and it will certainly increase the translation costs earmarked for the language budget. Given the picture depicted above, it may seem that one more language in the linguistic family of Europe will seriously jeopardize the EU’s ideal of arriving at an optimal language policy (Julios 2002, 195). Alternatively, most simply, because Turkish is not a European language, the European Commission should give in to the politicians such as the former French President Nicolas Sarkozy, whose perception of multilingualism has been proven on numerous occasions to not be very expansive. Sarkozy’s words, “at school I have learned that Turkey is an Asiatic country, therefore, it is not European”, reflect his unflattering and value-charged notion of multiculturalism (al Awsat 2005), as does his comment on the Turkish language not being European. If such a vision is to represent the official and institutional view of the EU then Turkey has no place within European multiculturalism and the Turkish language can contribute nothing to European multilingualism. If, in Umberto Eco’s words, translation is really the language of the EU and if the translation cost is the price to be paid for democracy, full integration and peace, then Turkish cannot simply be disregarded as a nonEuropean language. As the Hungarian MEP Zita Gurmai elegantly puts it, “all languages encode values and perspectives that one will absorb in speaking them and that will be lost without them” (Euractiv 2010b). A serious reconsideration should, in effect, prove that the successful inclusion of Turkish into the EU languages will result in a good number of desirable outcomes for some longstanding problems within the EU and, thus, will eventually make the financial cost look insignificant. Turkish, once an “authentic” language of the EU, will guarantee much closer integration, peaceful harmonization, and perfect twinning, as it will take part in an atmosphere of cultural diversity and plurality, which will prevent the present tactlessness of certain European leaders insisting that “Turkey, which is not a European country, has no place inside the European Union” (Sarkozy 2007). Europeans are entitled to discuss Turkey’s accession process long and hard, and by all means criticize its performance during the negotiations of the accession chapters (always according to the Copenhagen criteria). Nevertheless, any attack at the level of multiculturalism and multilingualism appears discriminative, arbitrary and prejudiced, and hence offensive to the cultural values and norms that the EU itself desires to promote. Particularly, judging a candidate state’s qualifications for

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membership in relation to the historical and geographical origins of its language not only hampers that state’s fair chance of accession but also harms the external perceptions of the EU as a normative global actor. The way that the EU treats the candidate states conveys a global message. When the EU fails to honour its own commitment, since “[c]ultural diversity and linguistics involve the respect of cultural identity, traditions, and religion,” it does not go unnoticed (ALDE 2009). The EU’s language policy cannot be assessed in terms of European and non-European languages. The adhesion of Finland in 1995 contributed the first non-European language to the EU’s linguistic family, and subsequent to the 2004 enlargement the European/non-European distinction must have faded away completely. The possible challenge and contribution of Turkish to the EU’s language regime, therefore, should not be assessed with reference to its Europeanness/non-Europeanness. The impact of the Turkish language should be understood within the contexts of the democratic deficit, personal adoptive languages, the multilingual workforce and SMEs, social peace and good immigration policy. Before elaborating on these aspects, however, a few remarks on the role that Turkish could play in developing the EU’s political harmony should be made. The context in which we will first tackle this issue is, of course, the Cyprus question. In an interview with Euractiv Romania in 2008, Orban, then Commissioner of Multilingualism, declared that whenever the Greek Cypriot government completed the required paperwork, Turkish would become the next official EU language (Euractiv 2008b). Article 3 of the Cypriot Constitution, which is currently in force, stipulates that both Greek and Turkish have official language status “with no distinction made between them” (Yves 2004, 6). Evidently, had the Annan Plan been accepted by Greek Cypriots, Turkish would have become one of EU’s “authentic” languages.2 Nevertheless, due to the now pending political settlement on the island, the Greek Cypriot government does not fulfil its obligation of registering the Turkish language with the European Commission as an official language. According to Article 8 of Regulation 1/1958, member-state languages do not automatically obtain official status. The member state itself is expected to apply for the registration of its official languages as official and working languages of the EU (Doczekalska 2009, 342). Because Greek had already been an “authentic” EU language and the Greek Cypriot government did not register Turkish with the Commission, when it became a member state in 2004 Cyprus did not contribute a language to the EU.

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It is true that, as the Commission’s communication underlines, “Member States are the key decision-makers on language policy” (ALDE 2009, 4). From this perspective, it seems to be up to the Greek Cypriot government to make the necessary arrangements for the Turkish language and they are entitled not to do so. Nevertheless, their preference for not registering Turkish as an EU official language contradicts their official stance promising that “[a]s an EU member, Cyprus’s democratic institutions can guarantee the political rights and freedoms of all its citizens” (Evrivades 2005, 7). Turkish is the democratic means that would provide better communication between the EU institutions and Turkish Cypriots, and the Greek Cypriot government should not be in the position to prevent such communication. In the words of a scholar of law, “the Turkish Cypriots” should not be “deprived of the possibility of using their own official language in their relations with the European institutions” (Arda 2006). The Greek Cypriot government’s treatment of the issue as a non-issue disturbs even its Greek Cypriot citizens. Olga Demetriou, for example, highlights that the absence of Turkish in communications with the EU also hampers “the access of young Turkish-Cypriots to the EUrelated job market” (Demetriou 2008, 8). The Maalouf Report underlines that “[t]o neglect a language is to run the risk of seeing its speakers becoming disenchanted with the European project” (Group of Intellectuals for Intercultural Dialogue 2008, 12). Turkish could have helped facilitate closer reconciliation on the island. The EU language policy, as the Maalouf Report once again stresses, should be able to provide answers to such pressing questions: .

…how do we get so many different populations to live together in harmony, how do we give them a sense of shared destiny and of belonging together? Should we be seeking to define a European identity? If so, can this identity take on board all our differences? Can it accommodate elements of non-European origin? Is respect for cultural differences compatible with the respect for fundamental values? (Group of Intellectuals for Intercultural Dialogue 2008, 3)

For those who have said “Yes” to the majority of the above questions, Turkish must seem a “rewarding challenge” within the context of both the Cyprus issue and the future adhesion of Turkey to the EU. Another contribution to the already crowded linguistic family of Europe will result in new complexity, but it will also reaffirm “the need for a broader policy to promote multilingualism” (ALDE 2009, 3). A broader policy of multilingualism will enhance the ideal of unity in diversity and manage the tendency towards monolingualism better. In his campaign for multilingual

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awareness, Orban very aptly pointed out that Europe should resist the tendency towards linguistic “standardization” and seek to “respect and promote differences” as well as secure democratic rights (Orban 2009). By this token, restraining the number of EU languages will only encourage linguistic homogeneity which, in Wright’s words, could not be the “basis for European integration” (Wright 2000, 120). A multilingual democratic Europe should encompass the languages of the candidate states. Multilingualism also supports good immigration policies, and a European linguistic environment embracing Turkish may provide a partial solution to the integration problems of Turkish immigrants all around Europe. The Maalouf Report concludes that: [J]ust as an immigrant would be encouraged to fully adopt the language of the host country and the culture it carries, it would be fair and useful for the immigrants’ languages of identity to also be part of the languages which Europeans themselves would be encouraged to adopt (Group of Intellectuals for Intercultural Dialogue 2008, 20).

Safe in the conviction that their culture and language are respected, immigrants would likely reciprocate and enhance their language abilities with a particular focus on their home country’s language. In that sense, it should be expected that Turkish, once an EU language, will have a positive impact on the management of EU immigration. Once given the official “authentic” status, Turkish, which is the foremost “non-indigenous language” in Germany, would encourage Turkish immigrants to integrate better within German society. The negative implications of the unfortunate words of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, that “the multicultural concept of living ‘happily side by side [with Turkish immigrants] … has failed and failed utterly’” (Connolly 2010) need to be undone. Germany also needs to take note that the German and Turkish societies, eventually, do not have to be so different or incompatible. The Eurobarometer survey of 2006 has shown that within five years, from 2001–2006, “[t]he only substantial drop in support for English, equivalent to 11 points is observed in Turkey.” In return, “the share of Turks who perceive German as a useful language for children to learn increases by 12 points” (Special Eurobarometer 2006). A good language policy could actually be very practical in healing the cultural tension between two societies and contribute to European integration. Bilateral encouragement of language education could bring social peace to the relations between states troubled by the discourse of discrimination, xenophobia, and the cultural rigidity of immigrants. According to the Commission, commitment to multilingualism “necessitates understanding other people

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and their way of thinking to oppose intolerance, xenophobia and racism” (Euractiv 2008c). The Turkish language may exert equally positive influences on business development all around Europe. The Davignon Report (motto: “Languages Mean Business”) highlights the loss of business due to a lack of language skills in European SMEs. The Commission has acknowledged on numerous occasions that the EU’s capacity for global competition depends on its capacity to “promote a healthy multilingual economy” (Euractiv 2008c). The role of multilingual communication in global marketing and sales strategies is undeniable and, within this context, Turkish comes to the fore as a useful tool to promote business in Europe. Recent surveys show that “not all languages have a market value,” but “every language encapsulates an economic subjective value” because “the use of each language delivers to its speakers a utility” (Portuese 2012, 286). From this standpoint, emphasizing the utility of Turkish seems only fair. An EU Council conclusion of May 22, 2008 on multilingualism stipulates that “[w]ith a view to promoting economic growth and competitiveness, it is important for Europe also to maintain a sufficient knowledge base in non-European languages with a global reach” (Council of the European Union 2008). As Turkey prepares itself for the multilingual business environment of the EU, TUSIAD, the leading Turkish business association, is publishing an Intellectual Property Rights Dictionary “containing 1000 terms to be used in EU accession talks.” The dictionary has been introduced by Euractiv as “Turkey No Longer Lost in Translation” (Euractiv 2010c). According to the renowned philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein’s language game theory, an individual will agree to learn a new language “if the expected returns of their current linguistic competence are smaller than the additional net communicative benefits expected from a new language” (Euractiv 2010c, 7). For the businessmen and SMEs that wish to invest in Turkey and its immediate and expanded neighbourhood, the knowledge of Turkish will most certainly promote business. As the language game theory suggests, “[t]he home-based bias emphasizes that a lack of familiarity, due to cultures and languages, impedes investments” (Business Forum for Multilingualism 2011, 17). In order to prevent the mismanagement of business and immigration as well as enhance Europe’s positive and unbiased perceptions of the Turkish culture, Turkish could be promoted throughout the EU as a “personal adoptive language.” The concept of “personal adoptive language,” which has been referred to as the “language of the heart,” (Orban 2009) depends on the external perceptions of the mother country of that language.

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Whereas Croatia, another candidate country, provokes little opposition, Turkey encounters considerable resistance. The famous British independent policy advisor Simon Anholt, in a striking comment, says that: “[i]n many ways, Turkey’s brand image today in the West is in the same shape as if Atatürk had never lived.” On this account, Turkey needs a “comprehensive and consistent strategy for gradually improving its international image,” emphasizing “the real Turkey in its modern manifestation” (Euractiv 2009b). This strategy surely requires substantial planning. Of course, subsequent to Orhan Pamuk’s receipt of the Nobel Prize for Literature in 2006, awareness of Turkish language and literature has increased. Nevertheless, the promotion of Turkish requires a continuous and coherent strategy. The business lobby of Turkey, in this context, could assume a crucial role in conveying the business value of Turkish to their European counterparts, chambers of commerce, SMEs and trade unions, while languages could offer various advantages for business. Research demonstrates that, other than its commercial value, Turkish is a valuable asset for computational linguistics, since it is an essential spam-filtering tool, protecting electronic communications (Özgür, Güngör & Gürgen 2004). As for improving Turkey’s image in Europe, the Turkish students’ increasing mobility within the framework of the Erasmus program has transformed, and will continue to transform, Europe’s perceptions of Turkey. Studying and working abroad is one of the most efficient ways of engaging in multicultural and multilingual contact. In this way, the Turkish youth seizes the opportunity to excel in their linguistic skills, represent Turkey in its modern manifestations, and create an affinity for the Turkish language. In order to have a more complete multilingual experience, however, mobility should not be limited to students. Young workers, apprentices and investors should also acquire freedom of movement within the EU. The Davignon report testifies that most of the EU fund supporting mobility stems from the European Social Fund, the Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund (Business Forum for Multilingualism 2011, 11). Therefore, we argue that Turkey’s success at multilingualism depends on its access to those funds.

Conclusion Following the accession of Finland in 1995, Finnish became the first nonEuropean language in the linguistic family of the EU. When it was Finland’s turn to take over the rotating presidency for the first time on July 1, 1999, a surprisingly strong opposition emerged, complaining about the

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inappropriateness of an EU presidency webpage in a non-European language. In order to ease the tension, Finnish officials came up with the solution of broadcasting and publishing the news-in-brief in Latin. Having enjoyed a strong tradition of Latin language and literature in Finland under the auspices of famous scholars Tuomo Pekkanen and Reijo Pitkaranta, Finland brought forward an easy compromise.3 Thankfully, with the 2004 enlargement and afterwards, the strict distinction of European/nonEuropean language no longer applies, at least institutionally. Otherwise, the funds for multilingualism would have been allocated to Latin courses first. Today, in the discussions of Europe’s future, multilingualism comes to the fore as a necessary ideal. Despite the Commission’s emphasis on the “mother tongue plus two foreign languages” goal, Europe fails to exhibit a multilingual map. Although Luxembourgers (99%) and Latvians and the Maltese (93%) have high scores in respect to multilingualism, Hungarians (71%), British (70%), Spanish, Italians, and Portuguese (64% each) do not impress the world with their tendency to master their mother tongues only (Euractiv 2008c). The Commission, through the efforts of Commissioner Vassiliou, is planning the relaunch of multilingualism policies. By 2012, new goals were set and new methods for measuring the language competence introduced. This relaunch is an opportunity for Turkey to be involved in Europe’s multilingualism in order to complete a crucial phase of its historical commitment to European integration. Turkey needs to follow every discussion on multilingualism. In the present research I have attempted to draw attention to multilingualism, the rather neglected component of multiculturalism, and its role in Turkey’s further integration into Europe. The public opinion scholars Antonia M. Ruiz-Jiménez and Jose I. Torreblanca very rightly underline that “[t]he key to Turkish EU membership may well lie in the way accession is argued and justified,” and “not wholly in the way it is negotiated” (Euractiv 2009). Turkey’s commitment to multilingualism and the promotion of Turkish as one of the “personal adoptive languages” will increase its chances of arguing and justifying its membership bid. In return, the EU, its institutions and peoples, need to be more receptive to the democratic legitimacy and business and culture value of the Turkish language. Celebrating “Multilingualism Day,” Philippe Cayla, the President of Euronews, underlined that multilingualism is central to all political cultures (Cayla 2010). The scope of these words, spoken in defence of the French language, could certainly be extended to the use of Turkish throughout Europe.

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—. EU Languages and Language Policy, 2013. http://ec.europa.eu/languages/languages-of-europe/ (accessed July 15, 2013). —. A New Framework Strategy for Multilingualism, November 2005. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005: 0596:FIN:EN:PDF (accessed July 15, 2013). Evrivades, Euripides. “Cyprus in the European Union: Prospects for Reunification, Peace with Turkey, and Regional Stability.” Mediterranean Quarterly 1 (3) (2005): 1–16. Group of Intellectuals for Intercultural Dialogue. “A Rewarding Challenge. How the Multiplicity of Languages Could Strengthen Europe.” Proposals from the Group of Intellectuals for Intercultural Dialogue set up at the initiative of the European Commission, Brussels, 2008. http://ec.europa.eu/languages/documents/report_en.pdf (accessed July 15, 2013). High Level Group on Multilingualism. Commission of the European Communities: Final Report, 2008. http://ec.europa.eu/languages/documents/multishort_en.pdf (accessed July 15, 2013). Julios, Christina. “Towards a European Language Policy.” In European Integration in the 21st Century: Unity in Diversity?, edited by Mary Farrell, Stefano Fella & Michael Newman, 184–202. London: Sage publications, 2002. Kubosova, Lucia. “Barroso Defends Romania’s New Multilingualism Job.” EUObserver.com, November 15, 2006. http://euobserver.com/9/22866/?rk=1 (accessed July 15, 2013). Merolle, Vincenzo. “A Case for ‘European’ Dictionaries.” The European Journal 8 (2007): 1. Orban, Leonard [European Commissioner for Multilingualism]. “The Benefits and Challenges of Linguistic Diversity in Europe.” The launch of the civil society platform, Brussels, 23 October, 2009. http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/09/ 495&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (accessed July 15, 2013). Ozgur, Levent, Tunga Gungor & Fikret Gurgen. “Adaptive Anti-spam Filtering for Agglutinative Languages: a Special Case for Turkish.” Pattern Recognition Letters 25 (16) (2004): 1819–1831. Portuese, Aurélien. “Law and Economics of the European Multilingualism.” European Journal of Law and Economics 34 (2) (2012): 279–325. Sarkozy, Nicolas. “Un Traité Simplifié Proposé au Parlement: ‘Je Veux que l’Europe Change’.” Le Taurillon, February 24, 2007.

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http://www.taurillon.org/Nicolas-Sarkozy-un-traite-simplifie-proposeau-Parlement (accessed July 15, 2013). Sberro, Stephan. “Could-and Should-English Win the ‘Language War’ in Regional Integration? NAFTA and EU Experience.” Jean Monnet Working Paper 13 (9) (2009): 1–50. http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/papers/09/091301.html (accessed July 15, 2013). Special EuroBarometer. “Europeans and Their Languages,” February 2006. http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_243_en.pdf (accessed July 15, 2013). de Swaan, Abram. Words of the World: The Global Language System. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001. Wright, Sue. Community and Communication: The Role of Language in Nation-State Building and European Integration. Clevendon: Multilingual Ltd, 2000. Yves, Peter. “Managing or Celebrating Linguistic Diversity in the EU?” Note de recherche 3/4, 2004. http://www.iee.umontreal.ca/pubicationsfr_fichiers/COLLOQUE2004/IvesIESfinal.pdf (accessed July 15, 2013).

CHAPTER SEVEN FOSTERING THE EU’S DEMOCRATIC IDENTITY THROUGH THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE CRISTIAN NITOIU

The evolution of the European Union since its creation has been intrinsically linked to ideas and principles of democracy, inscribed in its founding treaties. Internally, the European project is considered to have contributed to the enhancement and spread of democracy throughout the continent. During the last ten years, both scholars and practitioners have advanced the idea that the EU’s deep democratic commitment has also shaped or constrained its behaviour on the world arena. Sharing its experience and promoting democracy, human rights or multilateralism is seen as an inherent duty for the EU. However, a more detailed look at the way democracy is constructed and enacted in the EU points to the fact that European democracy departs from its internal and external goals. Not one but many diverse interpretations and narratives of what democracy is reside throughout the member states. On the one hand, diversity in terms of the images and visions of democracy constructed in the EU provides thrust to the creation of a multicultural Europe. On the other hand, the multiplicity of interpretations of democracy has given birth to many practices which at times fall short of the acceptable universal norms and benchmarks present in the Copenhagen criteria, and member states legitimize their undemocratic behaviour and policies by cherry picking from the menu of standards articulated in the official criteria and standards of the EU. The democratic malaise, underpinned to a large degree by the effects of the current financial crisis in countries such as Italy, Greece, Spain, Hungary or Romania, points to the idea that democracy across the EU is more self-assumed in formal terms than residing in social and political practices. This chapter explores whether a coherent narrative and practice of European democracy can be created through a European discursive space. Such a discursive space, conceptualized as the European

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public sphere (EPS), could foster the promotion and spread of a series of ideas and practices that could enhance the main aspects of democracy: legitimacy, accountability and transparency (Habermas 1992; Held 2003; Archibugi 2004; Follesdal & Hix 2006; Lord 2006). In what follows, the chapter will outline the principles and practices that should lie at the base of the set of coherent European narratives and practice of democracy. The next section will highlight the processes and mechanisms within the public sphere that have the potential to foster European democracy, while the last part of the chapter presents the links between democracy and the European public sphere.

European Democracy While many definitions of what a democratic system entails have been developed in literature, they all seem to converge on the minimal idea that democracy is a government of the people for the people. All democracies in this respect have to be based on a sense of collective identity which is rather constructed than being an existing ontological characteristic of the state (Habermas 1992; Held 1995, 2003; Archibugi 2004). Democracy thus stems from the recognition within an already formed state—and a political national setting—of the collective identity on which it was built. Only after this occurs can more formal principles of democracy be institutionalized within a state, ranging from rule of law, to free elections or respect for human rights. In developed democracies, like those of the European Union, such formal principles seem to be taken for granted and rather fixed into a universalistic position. What is disputed is the capacity of individuals to have their voices heard and shape politics. Contestation through public debate compels political authorities to explain and justify their actions and policies. Within the transnational space of the EU, national democratic systems tend to have various specificities and different degrees of openness to input from the public. In the absence of a coherent European demos (Cerutti 2010), this points to the fact that the EU’s democracy is stated and self-assumed, but very rarely disputed and negotiated. The crucial question here is whether widespread equal and open access to public debate fostered by the European Union can enhance its transnational democracy and further its collective identity formation processes. The widespread and predictable application of a set of formal, universal principles (such as the ones mentioned above) is a minimum requirement for the development of a coherent European “government” of and for the people.

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Three features lie at the centre of the European Union’s democratic identity: legitimacy, accountability and transparency. Legitimacy, based on widespread ontological public support shared within a political community, tends to remain constant throughout time. Secondly, various utilitarian calculations on the part of individuals, coupled with their assessment of the effectiveness of policy outcomes, can also grant legitimacy to a political system. Politicization and mediatisation of policy debates are commonly considered to have an upward effect on legitimacy in democracies. The current financial crisis has put the democratic legitimacy of governments in all but a few select member states under a considerable amount of stress. Austerity measures were seen by the general public and the media as being imposed both by illegitimate domestic political elites and distant bureaucrats in Brussels without any prior debates or openness to ideas developed in the public sphere. For example, in both Spain1 and Greece,2 the member states which were hit the hardest by the crisis, governments have had little legitimacy as the general public perceived that democracy and their livelihood was under threat. Hence, an argument prevailed that the EU is trying to overcome the crisis by creating multiple hierarchical Europes, whereby citizens in some member states affected would not have the chance to have their voice heard, and more importantly influence decision-making processes.3 By imposing austerity measures and framing them as the only way to solve an ontological threat in these member states, the EU also transferred part of its democratic deficit and crisis of legitimacy. Paradoxically, the EU framed such measures as necessary evils that would build-up legitimacy and faith in democracy in the long run: “Look, if they do not carry out these austerity packages, these countries could virtually disappear in the way that we know them as democracies. They've got no choice, this is it,”4 was an idea stressed by European Commission President, Jose Manuel Barroso, on many occasions. Making public actions justifiable on the grounds of common and universal democratic values captures the notion of accountability. The relations between citizens and their democratically elected representatives are usually highly dependent on the quality of “interpreters”—actors who can translate highly technical and functional policies (Kantner & Liberatore 2006, 377). This space is often occupied by the media, which acts both as the actor and the background through which individuals can judge the accountability of political decisions. Besides governments, national parliaments have also come under intense scrutiny during the last decade (and especially recently with the financial crisis). The increase in power of unelected Constitutional Courts that can overrule laws adopted

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by national parliaments has been endemic through the European Union. On the other hand, in some cases populist and extremist parties have been co-opted in governing coalitions backed up by “super majorities” in national parliaments which safeguard the activity of the government.5 Emergency laws have also been a preferred method for bypassing public accountability and leaving parliaments in the dark.6 These developments, which underpin a continuously decreasing concern for accountability, should not be thought to describe the whole of the EU, but more as part of the different practices of democracy that underscore an image of multiple Europes. For example, the UK has traditionally been overtly critical of the standards of democratic accountability proffered in other European states, the leaders of the UK Independence Party (UKIP) being the most vocal regarding this issue. Finally, transparency refers to the “composition of the space in question where (political issues) can be seen and understood” (Curtin 2007, 246). Both the political and the public sphere in the case of democracies are synonymous with high levels of transparency. To this end, individuals should share free access to information, debates and communicative processes, allowing them to evaluate the basis on which laws, policies or procedures are developed and enacted. At the supranational level, democracy has been considered to be “chronically diseased,”7 its problems often spilling over into the national settings of the member states. Traditionally, it was thought that a permissive consensus influenced by the lack of citizen interest in EU affairs allowed for the development of the European project (Hooghe & Marks 2008). Transparency has been dealt with as a secondary aspect of the EU’s democratic identity, as decision-making processes have not been made fully public. The need to urgently address the consequences of the financial crisis has made the transparency problems of the EU spill over into the democratic systems of the member states. The countries most affected by the crisis have been given a carte blanche by the Commission to adopt crucial economic policies behind closed doors in a timely manner. In turn, this has deepened the divide between the way in which the EU’s democratic values are enacted throughout the member states. EU officials have reacted to breaches in transparency only in extreme cases, when the principle of rule of law was under question (e.g. recently, when the Romanian Government unilaterally stripped the Constitutional Court of its power8). Besides the more formal principles of democracy, the media is considered to play “a central role in the staging of democracy” (Trenz 2009, 59). Either as educators regarding the standards of democracy,

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watchdogs and conveyors of public legitimacy, or merely suppliers of news regarding politics to the general public, the media has an important role in the continuous bargaining processes between society and politics within a democratic system. It contributes to a sort of “playful democracy” where it provides the grounds for and mediates the debates within the public sphere. Democracy relies here on the mediatisation capacities of the media through which individuals can ultimately come into contact with politics and through their feedback make their mark on political decisions. Even more, Levrat (2010) has identified that in developed democracies politicians tend to discuss decisions within the media rather than in institutionalized public policy debate forums, making the media the locus for political debate. The loss of legitimacy and the decrease in accountability have also been accompanied by the curtailing of press freedom in most of the member states severely affected by the crisis. As measures had to be adopted swiftly without taking into account opposing views or the debates developed in the public sphere, the media has been accused on several occasions of “subversion and interference in domestic affairs.”9 During the last years, countries such as Italy, Romania10 and Hungary11 have dropped about 30–40 places in the annual indexes released by Reporters Without Borders (2012) and Freedom House (2012). A more detailed look at the indexes clearly highlights the existence of many Europes, where the Nordic countries score the highest, followed by the UK and Germany and Slovakia, and Romania or Hungary at the other end of the spectrum alongside Ukraine. Consequently, as The Economist’s 2011 “Democracy Index” finds, the existence of the multiple practices and interpretations of the press go against the values of the European Union, which puts freedom of speech at its core.

The European Public Sphere The classical liberal definition of the public sphere frames it as “the space between government and society, in which private individuals exercise formal (election of governments) and informal (pressure of the public opinion) control over the state” (Curran 1993, 36). However, the notion of the public sphere has been widely contested and debated, a process which is also mirrored by Habermas’ (1989, 1998, 2000) work on the concept. While he traditionally views the public sphere as a common space that both emanates from and shapes society in an inclusive manner, in the revised versions of his theory he adds the idea that it is built on different categories and layers, be they social, geographical, historical or political. For example, on a societal level, class, race, age or gender seem to make a

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difference when informing the way in which individuals engage in the public sphere. Through their interactions such divisions tend to coagulate—gaining democratic strength and legitimacy—and “wash” into political decisions. Fraser offers a more stylized version of the argument, positing that the internal divisions within the public sphere manage the tension between “normative legitimacy and political efficacy” of social action (Fraser 2007, 7). Consequently, only decisions that are bottom up (in that they derive from public communicative discourse) and yield practical democratic results are considered to be legitimate within the public sphere, and thus binding for society. Four main conceptualizations of the European public sphere have been developed in the literature. Firstly, drawing on Habermas’ work, scholars have focused on the importance of the constant interactions and negotiations between society and individuals, seen as part of a historically developed Europe (Fossum & Schlesinger 2007). The historical development of European states is considered to be marked by the communication processes which have linked various communities to their polities. However, the European Commission (2006), through its strategy on communication, has shown considerable willingness to go farther than just trying to connect individuals with European institutions, proposing an overarching partnership which would include all relevant societal actors, from civil society, the media or epistemic communities. Secondly, the EPS has been framed as a space where public opinion can be formed and individuals can have informed, equal and free access to public debate (Statham 2010). Institutionalized structures and procedures that facilitate individuals’ participation are crucial to the development of such a space. Through this inclusive space, citizens could be informed and form coherent opinions about politics which can have an influence on decision making processes. However, studies that assume this view of the public sphere conclude that the EPS departs in a large degree from the ideal of having institutional structures and democratic processes which nurture public debate and common will formation at the European level (Nieminen 2009, 78). Instead, more ad-hoc and fragmented public spheres are created by different transnational networks in Europe, which often focus their discourse around a limited number of issue areas. Thus, the EPS lays at the intersection of the communication processes spawned by transnational networks which possess different institutionalized forms of open public debate in various forms. Thirdly, the appearance of European issues and discussions that concern Europe in various public debates within the EU has been presented as indicative for the formation of a European public sphere

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(Fossum & Schlesinger 2007; Schlesinger 2007; Trenz 2010). Theoretically, this approach sustains the idea that the EPS is the result of the overlapping between various national public spheres with different degrees of Europeanization. Insofar as Europeanization is present, we should identify the existence of the same themes or similar frames in European national public spheres at any point in time. Stronger forms of Europeanization would imply that patterns of interpretation and meaning structures are employed across national public debates, while ideas expressed here should address and be tailored for many audiences from other public spheres. Fourthly, the majority of scholarship has tried to empirically evaluate the European public sphere by analyzing the references to Europe that are produced by the media. The Europeanization of national public spheres has been empirically studied by looking at the following aspects: making claims,12 the analysis of frames and standpoints employed by the media or interviews with journalists and representatives of European media institutions. The concept of Europeanization captures the extent to which European discourse has extended from the supranational arena to the national public spheres in the member states and beyond them. To be clearer, it traces and assesses the way in which European issues are discussed within national public spheres, and through transnational communication flows come to travel from one domestic public debate to another. Furthermore, Koopmans & Statham (2010, 43) maintain that national public spheres become Europeanized if the discourses within these spaces evade the boundaries of certain national debates and assume transnational, European points of view. The minimal requirement for the presence of Europeanization is that the public already is or becomes aware of the European dimension of the discourses created and circulated within national public spheres. On the other hand, the rule of thumb (Bee & Bozzini 2010) for a Europeanized public debate involves participating in a shared debate on European issues which are discussed using roughly the same criteria as in other national public spheres. Before further exploring the European public sphere it is worth briefly juxtaposing it with the concept of the global public sphere. The advent of mass communication and the development of internet technologies have had a positive effect on the development of communication at the global level by facilitating contact between individuals and their access to information. However, this has not influenced the development of a global public sphere, but more of a series of “proto-cosmopolitan public spheres” built around issues that have global resonance, such as climate change, terrorism or human rights (Nash 2007, 55). International media

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conglomerates are considered to be the driving force behind politicizing and mediatising these issues, most times promoting only certain (neoliberal) interpretations, which rule out points of view derived from various national and global settings. On the other hand, European themes are presented in a much more contentious way by media in the EU, in this way promoting open and free access to information and public debates to a larger extent. Unlike the EPS, the global public sphere is not predicated upon a set of transitional institutions which have at their base a series of norms and values or a broad cultural heritage shared by all of its members. Among the principles within the founding treaties of the EU, solidarity between member states is impossible to achieve in the global arena, as even issues that have global reach are seen by most states as zero-sum games (Linklater 2007, 34–35). For example, a progressive global agreement that could effectively tackle the effects of climate change has been continuously hampered by states (such as China or the US) which, unlike the EU, value more short-term economic interests over safeguarding the future of peoples around the world. Hence, a comparison between the EPS and the global public sphere finds the latter entrenched in seemingly irresolvable conflict, and far from possessing the ability to foster free and open global public debate (Ugarteche 2007, 69).

Enhanced democracy through the European public sphere? All four conceptualizations of the EPS recognise that by seeking public legitimacy for political decisions the public sphere alters power relations significantly. Political elites become more constrained to enter the public arena and open their judgments to the scrutiny of individuals. This puts more and more emphasis on the need to foster open public debate which has norm-giving power bestowed on it by a certain moral community of the willing. To be more precise, the emphasis on public debate is built on the idea that everyone is entitled to take part in it, with the rationale of “the more the better” applying to this case. Democracy seems to be intrinsically linked to the imperative of open debate within the public sphere (Eriksen 2007, 30). The more a political regime shifts towards authoritarianism, the less political decisions reflect the debates within the public, culminating in situations where such debates are silenced. However, the public sphere should not be understood as an intentional political actor which shapes the political agenda—it is both the context in which society meets politics and part of the process through which public debate shapes political decisions. In a stronger conceptualization, Risse posits that the role of the public

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sphere is to inform citizens, and to monitor and critically evaluate the government (Risse 2010, 108). Among others, Fuchs (2011, 27) has located the source of the democratic deficit of the EU in the fact that the transfer of sovereignty was not accompanied by more transparency, accountability or public legitimacy. However, on many occasion politicians have been forced to adapt or change their decisions due to popular pressure and public debate created within the media. In the last twenty years there has been an increase in national referenda on European issues, all of which have received considerable coverage by the media. This has happened because individuals seem to be more interested in political outcomes rather than the mechanisms and processes through which decisions are being adopted; citizens primarily form opinions about what should be done and how policies should be adopted or put into practice. In this context, Schmidt has argued that the EU has the duty and potential, more than the national state, to foster both wide input and output legitimacy. At least in theory, the European Union’s political system is close to this goal because it is: [M]ainly characterized by governance for the people through effective rule-making reinforced by transparency and accountability—or “output democracy”—and by governance with the people through efficient, accountability and transparent decision making plus an elaborate interest consultation process known as throughout legitimacy (Schmidt 2010, 29).

The advent of the European public sphere, based on having transnational communication flows at its core, provides the avenue for the development of “media democracy” within the EU. In this model, the media works side by side with decision makers in order to provide a type of communication that political institutions have had difficulties in devising. More legitimacy would be granted to the European Union, and its democratic deficit would be corrected at the expense of the political system of the Union, which would have to adapt and accept the multiple discourses—many times divergent from official political views—that the media presents. Conversely, “media democracy” within Europe’s transnational political space can be seen as a much needed medicine designed to cure the lack of trust that individuals share towards the EU’s institutions. It also provides legitimacy to a European-wide discourse of democracy that could act as a cure for the sub-par multiple practices of democracy found within the EU. Such a discourse possesses the power to reinforce the need to safeguard the main aspects of democracy (i.e. legitimacy, accountability and transparency) even in the face of the need to tackle the present financial crisis effectively.

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According to Habermas (1989, 1992, 2000) a transnational public sphere could contribute to the functioning of multi-level governance that could foster democracy and thus make the decision-making process more accountable and transparent for the general public. Though in reality the European public sphere is imperfect and far from the ideal announced by Habermas, it is still desirable due to the fact that it links individuals to multi-level governance by providing access to information about decisionmaking processes and facilitating their participation in public debates. It also facilitates the spread of discursively formed normative notions of democracy throughout European societies. The European Union has the potential to offer and promote different institutional forums and fluxes of communications, where groups that are usually marginalized within the nation state can voice their interests and concerns. For example, the wellpublicized European Citizens’ Initiative13 could promote the advent of transnational networks and discourses formed by actors which wouldn’t otherwise have a European reach. In this way, individuals and civil society groups that normally operate on the fringes of the political sphere and have little or no understanding of its mechanisms could have the opportunity to influence the political agenda. Although the set of issues on which the ECI’s could be initiated is quite limited, it provides a way of overcoming the “multiple” democratic malaise identified throughout member states and empowers citizens to promote legislation, in this way by-passing domestic politics (together with democratic problems). The European public sphere could also spur the creation of processes and mechanisms that can endow the EU with democratic legitimacy. Firstly, the EPS acts as a space where individuals have the opportunity to engage in public debates regarding the EU’s affairs, thus allowing them to have direct contact through discourse with policy-making at the European transnational level. However, the interactions within this space are limited by the language barriers which also add more diversity to European debates. At the moment, scholars have equated the formation of a European public sphere to that of a space which is intrinsically Anglophone due to the widespread presence of the English language in discourses regarding the EU (Schlesinger 2007, 70). Secondly, the EPS increases peoples’ familiarity with the EU and their “sense that the political institutions of the community, along with the decisions emanating from it, conform to acceptable standards” (Schmidt 2010, 17). It is the role of the media to bring individuals closer to the Union, as politicians have made the public alien to the European Union by only speaking about it infrequently and in technocratic terms. Simultaneously, this could lead to a transfer of legitimacy through the construction of narratives from the

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supranational level to the national level and back. Lastly, it could contribute to the degree of appreciation that individuals share towards the EU. Since legitimacy is dependent on the accessibility to and effectiveness of public debates and decision-making processes, more discourse regarding the Union in national public spheres might prompt individuals to increase their trust in the European Union. Furthermore, as has been highlighted, EU governance presented to, debated and understood by European citizens might provide a voice to individuals that are normally marginalized at the national level. Hence, a transnational European debate built around the multiple practices of democracy found throughout the EU (and deepened by the current financial crisis) would contribute to publicising the problems associated with democracy in each member state. This would prompt the articulation of solutions for tackling the EU’s democratic malaise which would otherwise not have had transnational resonance. Communicative processes within the European public sphere entail not only the transfer of discourses but also the creation of meaning structures, be they social, political or cultural. Transnational communication, on the other hand, gives way to the production of discourses and meanings which evade the constraints imposed by centres of power located within nation states. Through this it promotes several mechanisms which drive democratization forward. The European public sphere has often been described as “fragmented, polymorphous, polyphonic and even anarchistic” (Eriksen 2007, 26–27). Forms of transnational communication within Europe provide avenues where different national or regional public spheres can meet and become entangled in democratic processes of contestation or consensus formation. Secondly in Habermas’ (1989) classic theory, communication needs to be institutionalized in order to foster a democratic public sphere where citizens could freely and equally interact with politics. Two main forms of such institutionalized communication are thought to coexist in reality: mediated communication (Gripsrud 2009, 210) and regulative communication (Koçan 2008, 24). Mediated communication within a transnational public like the European one requires the construction of various patterns of circulation through which discourses can overcome traditional national borders. While within the state the public sphere can play a significant role through its agenda-setting powers, the EPS tends to lie at the periphery of each member state. At least in theory, this positioning of the EPS facilitates more processes of public legitimation because transnational discourses created here are to a larger degree protected from the interference of political interests. In weak and young

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democracies, such as those of the new Central and European states, the majority of the media systems have been used as tools for political propaganda by the parties in power, decreasing the public legitimacygranting role of the public sphere (Balabanova 2011). Secondly, regulative communications are related to creating a culture open to consensus achieved through free and equal access to public debates. In this sense, Trenz (2010, 26) has argued that the EPS is a space “in which particular information is distributed, issues and policies made transparent, positions and claims are staked and old and new divisions are demarcated.” It is an environment that through its own nature calls on actors and encourages them to accept transformations that are suitable to all. The inner workings of the European Parliament seem to reflect the regulative potential of European communication, where consensus rather than political compromise and conflict form the modus vivendi. Hence, the EPS could foster consensus around a unified set of democratic values and practices which could mitigate the democratic malaise found within a large number of the member states. The media could have an upward effect on the standards of democracy within the EPS. Through mediatisation, European issues come to be present in various national debates, fostering and creating new platforms of negotiations for ideas and different standpoints which are key to a democratic system. Coverage by the media also provides citizens with the necessary information for them to construct reflexive opinions and evaluations regarding the European views of politicians. As individuals in the EU have few chances to get in contact with decision makers at the supranational level, news reports and articles supplied by the media fill this knowledge gap, mediating the interactions between society and politics. EU politicians may benefit from media coverage by monitoring and evaluating the impact of their policies in the settings of the member states. Moreover, mediatisation encourages EU decision makers and administrators to initiate policies and open them to public debate, although the media can at times assume a more active role in setting the agenda or legitimizing different patterns of behaviour and rules within the political sphere (Trenz 2009, 53). Conversely, the EU’s institutions could assume a more active role in gatekeeping the EU’s deep commitment to democracy, and, by fostering a unified and legitimate discourse within the EPS, act against the multiplicity of unacceptable practices of democracy found in some member states.

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Conclusion The well-known democratic deficit of the EU coupled with the recent crises of legitimacy in many member states highlight the discrepancy between the multitude of narratives or images of democracy and the way they unfold into political practice. Democracy in the EU seems to be rather self-assumed, where national leaderships, especially in the context of the current financial crisis, legitimize themselves and their political decisions by cherry picking from the formal benchmarks and standards set out in the Copenhagen criteria. In this context, this chapter explored whether a European discursive space can have the potential to foster the convergence of narratives, images or discourses, and practices of democracy. It was suggested that a coherent European public sphere could mitigate the EU’s democratic deficit. However, the European public sphere should not be seen as a coherent and unified space but more as a result of the overlapping of national public spheres. Europeanization has been used in the literature in order to empirically assess the EPS, with a focus on the media, considered to play a central role. More coverage of EU issues in national media will lead to an increase in debates regarding Europe and in the democratic legitimacy of the political elites that engage with such debates in the European public sphere. Secondly, the EPS could grant a voice to groups that are normally marginalized within nation states by providing a space in which individuals can enjoy free and open access to information and debates. People’s participation in political processes would become closely linked to their familiarity with, faith in, and appreciation of the EU and European democracy. Through this process, overarching shared undertakings of European democracy can be fostered, granting a higher degree of legitimacy to the EU’s polity and decisions. Thirdly, the EPS could also contribute to the stability of the political system of the member states by providing a social base for state authority or regulating the rules and the interactions between different political actors (de Beus 2010, 28). Finally, through open public debate the EPS could foster the development of a coherent and unified discourse about the EU’s democratic identity, which would have a positive effect on and provide a cure for the democratic malaise which plagues an increasing number of member states.

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Follesdal, Andreas & Simon Hix. “Why there is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik.” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 44 (3) (2006): 533–562. Fossum, John Erik & Philip Schlesinger. The European Union and the public sphere: a communicative space in the making? Abingdon: Routledge, 2007. Fraser, Nancy. “Transnationalizing the Public Sphere: On the Legitimacy and Efficacy of Public Opinion in a Post-Westphalian World.” Theory, Culture & Society 24 (4) (2007): 7–30. Fuchs, Dieter. “Explaining Support for European Integration: An Attitudinal Model.” In Cultural Diversity, European Identity and the Legitimacy of the EU, edited by Dieter Fuchs & Hans-Dieter Klingemann, 220–246. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011. Gavin, Neil. “Addressing climate change: a media perspective.” Environmental Politics 18 (5) (2009): 765–780. Goode, Luke. Jurgen Habermas: Democracy and the public sphere. London: Pluto Press, 2005. Gripsrud, Jostein. “The Cultural Dimension of Democracy”. In Media, Democracy and European Culture, edited by Ib Bondebjerg & Peter Madsen, 197–214. Bristol: Intellect, 2009. Habermas, Jurgen. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1989. —. “The democratic deficit in the European Union—Much ado about nothing?” Praxis International 12 (1) (1992): 1–19. —. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1998. —. The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2000. Held, David. Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance. 1st ed. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1995. —. “Cosmopolitanism: globalisation tamed?” Review of International Studies 29 (4) (2003): 465–480. Heller, Maria & Agnes Renyi. “EU enlargement, identity and the public sphere.” In The European Union and the public sphere: a communicative space in the making? John Erik Fossum & Philip Schlesinger, 169–186. Abingdon: Routledge, 2007. Hooghe, Liesbet & Gary Marks. “A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus.” British Journal of Political Science 39 (1) (2008): 1–23.

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Kantner, Cathleen & Angela Liberatore. “Security and Democracy in the European Union: An Introductory Framework.” European Security 15 (4) (2006): 363–383. Koçan, Gurcan. “Models of Public Sphere in Political Philosophy.” Eurosphere Working Papers Series 2, 2008. Koopmans, Ruud, Jessica Erbe & Martin F. Meyer. “The Europeanization of Public Spheres: Comparisons across Issues, Time, and Countries.” In The Making of a European Public Sphere: Media Discourse and Political Contention, edited by Ruud Koopmans & Paul Statham, 63– 96. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Koopmans, Ruud & Paul Statham. “Theoretical Framework, Research Design, and Methods.” In The Making of a European Public Sphere: Media Discourse and Political Contention, edited by Ruud Koopmans & Paul Statham, 34–60. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Kriesi, Hanspeter, Anke Tresch & Margit Jochum. “Going Public in the European Union: Action Repertoires of Collective Political Actors.” In The Making of a European Public Sphere: Media Discourse and Political Contention, edited by Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham, 223–244. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Levrat, Nicolas. “Does the Power Exerted by the EU need a Legitimacy Based on the Citizens’ European Identity.” In Debating Political Identity and Legitimacy in the European Union, edited by Sonia Lucarelli, Furio Cerutti & Vivien A. Schmidt, 76–89. Abingdon: Routledge, 2010. Linklater, Andrew. “Public Spheres and Civilizing Processes.” Theory, Culture & Society 24 (4) (2007): 31–37. Lord, Christopher. “Democracy and the European Union: Matching means to standards.” Democratization 13 (4) (2006): 668–684. Nash, Kate. “Transnationalizing the Public Sphere.” Theory, Culture & Society 24 (4) (2007): 53–57. Reporters Without Borders, Press Freedom Index, 2012. Risse-Kappen, Thomas. A Community of Europeans?: Transnational Identities and Public Spheres. New York: Cornell University Press, 2010. Schlesinger, Philip. “Changing Spaces of Political Communication: The Case of the European Union.” Political Communication 16 (3) (1999): 263–279. —. “A fragile cosmopolitanism: On the unresolved ambiguities of the European public sphere.” In The European Union and the public

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sphere: a communicative space in the making?, John Erik Fossum & Philip Schlesinger, 65–82. Abingdon: Routledge, 2007. Schmidt, Vivien. “The Problems of Identity and Legitimacy in the European Union: Is More Politics the Answer?” In Debating Political Identity and Legitimacy in the European Union, edited by Sonia Lucarelli, Furio Cerutti & Vivien A. Schmidt, 16–37. Abingdon: Routledge, 2010. Sifft, Stefanie, Michael Brüggemann, Katharina Kleinen-V. Königslöw, Bernhard Peters & Andreas Wimmel. “Segmented Europeanization: Exploring the Legitimacy of the European Union from a Public Discourse Perspective.” Journal of Common Market Studies 45 (1) (2007): 127–155. Statham, Paul. “Media Performance and Europe’s ‘Communication Deficit’: A Study of Journalists’ Perceptions.” In Mapping the European Public Sphere: Institutions, Media and Civil Society, edited by Christiano Bee & Emanuela Bozzini, 117–140. Surrey: Ashgate, 2010. Van de Steeg, M. “Theoretical Reflections on the Public Sphere in the European Union: A Network of Communication or a Political Community?” In Mapping the European Public Sphere: Institutions, Media and Civil Society, edited by Christiano Bee & Emanuela Bozzini, 31–46. Surrey: Ashgate, 2010. The Economist. Democracy Index: Democracy under stress, 2011. http://www.sida.se/Global/About%20Sida/S%C3%A5%20arbetar%20 vi/EIU_Democracy_Index_Dec2011.pdf (accessed July 16, 2013). Trenz, Hans-Jorg. “Media: the Unknown Player in European Integration.” In Media, Democracy and European Culture, edited by Ib Bondebjerg & Peter Madsen, 49–64. Bristol: Intellect, 2009. —. “The Europeanisation of Political Communication: Conceptual Clarifications and Empirical Measurements.” In Mapping the European Public Sphere: Institutions, Media and Civil Society, edited by Christiano Bee & Emanuela Bozzini, 15–30. Surrey: Ashgate, 2010. Ugarteche, Oscar. “Transnationalizing the Public Sphere: A Critique of Fraser.” Theory, Culture & Society 24 (4) (2007): 65–69.

CHAPTER EIGHT MULTI-LEVEL CITIZENSHIP: LABOUR MIGRATION AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF IDENTITY IN THE EU NORA SIKLODI

European Union (EU) citizenship is at the core of debates about European multiplicity. According to EU institutions, it serves as the source of collective European identity and legitimises further EU integration (European Commission 2001). In reality, however, it is characterised by contrasting definitions of who the EU citizens and non-citizens are, even though a collective European identity should be able to define these distinctions more clearly (Eder 2005). Seemingly, EU citizenship challenges national citizenships and national identities, but in practice it does not replace member state citizenships, it only adds a regional status to citizens’ existing member state statuses. It unites 27 national statuses, but at the same time preserves their distinctiveness, based on national history, languages, cultures and diverse rules to acquiring national and consequently EU citizenships. Therefore, EU citizenship can be framed and analysed from at least 28 different angles; 27 national and one regional legal framework. Empirical research has demonstrated that the practices and participation of EU citizens in the economic and political life of the EU influences the depth and strength of their European identity. Some EU citizens—those who make use of their economic and political rights—have a stronger sense of European identity than others who do not participate and remain disconnected from the EU (Rother & Nebe 2009; Fligstein et al. 2012). Recent surveys reveal that the first group of EU citizens tend to have a single European identity or European and national identities together, while the latter group simply assert and strengthen their national identities

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(TNS Opinion and Social 2011). Accordingly, there are at least 29 different ways in which EU citizens’ identities are constructed, leading either to a single European or national identity, or a European identity coupled with one of the 27 national identities. Furthermore, EU citizens’ regional and national identities are also defined and shaped by intersecting social factors, like gender and ethnicity (Yuval-Davis 2007). These factors have been proven to further multiply the existing national differences between EU citizens’ identity (Karolewski & Suszycki 2010). Therefore, the multifaceted dynamics between the statuses, rights, practices and identities of EU citizens make the effect of EU citizenship on the individual and EU integration debatable. This chapter examines these dynamics in an exploratory fashion. It is part of a larger research project that focuses on whether, how and to what extent the introduction of EU citizenship affects citizens’ identities. More specifically, the chapter explores how exercising the core right of EU citizenship—freedom of movement within the EU—affects the identity of labour migrants based on an EU-wide quantitative survey and exploratory evidence from migrant EU citizens in the United Kingdom (UK). It assesses EU citizenship within a multilevel framework and citizens’ identity transformation as a dynamic process. It argues that the latter is rooted in exercising EU citizenship’s economic rights and shaped by personal experiences as well as citizens’ encounters with EU-wide projects. The chapter proposes that more research on the link between intra-EU migration and European identity is necessary in order to flesh out the reasons for the differences between migrant and non-migrant identities. The chapter is structured as follows. The first part contextualizes member state and EU citizenship by making clear how recent developments at the EU level are related to broader processes at the global level. The second part explains the link between identity construction and citizenship, focusing in particular on the role of mobility in the transformation of existing identities and the development of new ones. The third part discusses the research methods. The fourth part goes on to combine the findings of EU-wide empirical surveys and original empirical evidence. The chapter demonstrates that due to citizens’ multilayered identities and intra-EU labour migration, EU citizenship is characterised by multiplicity and does not serve as the basis of a single, collective European identity.

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EU Citizenship in the Context of Transnational Processes Citizenship is the link between a political entity—traditionally the nation state, and the individual (Isin & Turner 2002)—and it is the source of citizens’ identity, rights and participation (Bellamy 2008). Although scholars continue to disagree about the origins, nature and consequences of globalization (Held & McGrew 2007; Agné 2011), there is a general consensus that the relationship between the state and its citizens is changing as a result of these processes (Talani 2012). Today’s most apparent example of the potentials and limits of globalization can be observed in the EU, where some of the more recently-adopted policies designed to further EU integration are, at least in part, direct political responses to broader global trends and changes. One such initiative is the creation of a new link between regional entity, the EU, and its citizens through the introduction of EU citizenship. It is an excellent example of the potential of globalization; it is the first, transnational link between the individual and the EU, and the source of European identity, EU rights and EU-level participation (European Commission 2001). Although EU citizenship transcends the borders of its member states and directly links individuals to the EU, it does not replace member state citizenships (Art 20/1 TFEU). As such, it is an addition to the existing state citizenships and rests on being a citizen in one of the member states. The European Court of Justice ruled that the loss of member state citizenship automatically leads to the loss of EU citizenship (Janko Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern 2008). Therefore, EU citizenship is multilevel because it has two distinctive levels of citizenship: the national and the EU. The multilevel structure of EU citizenship is also reflective of the limits of globalization and the ongoing relevance of the EU’s member states as they have the right to decide who can become an EU citizen, restrict access to their territory and labour market, and influence who resides in the EU. The relationship between EU citizenship and European identity is assumed to be causal in that EU citizenship eventually leads to the development of European identity in the course of citizens’ active participation at the EU level (European Commission, 2001). EU citizens’ identities are thus likely to change as a result of their participation at the EU level. Their EU participation is guaranteed by freedom of movement entitlements (Art. 20/2a, TFEU) and the right to vote in European Parliament elections (Art. 20/2b, TFEU). However, economic migration rather than political engagement is at the heart of EU citizenship because it facilitates individual claims of EU citizenship rights, including, for example, equal treatment with other EU nationals (Guild 2004; Maas

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2007), and citizens’ cross-border transactions have the real potential to establish a collective European identity (Kuhn 2011). Furthermore, the structural framework of EU citizenship also places the economic migration of citizens prior to their political engagement. Even in the most recent official treaty of the EU, the Lisbon Treaty, EU citizens’ rights are listed in the same order as in 1992—first the economic rights are spelt out and then the political rights are specified. The ordering also highlights that EU citizens’ economic rights—economic mobility and the right to migrate, obtain employment and education in other EU member states—remain at the core of EU citizenship. It is important to distinguish between EU citizens based on their participation in the Single Market of the EU. Migrant EU citizens are by far in the minority if we consider the EU’s population as a whole. Until 2010 only one in eight EU citizens worked abroad, one in twelve studied abroad, one in ten stayed abroad and one in five was expected to move to another member state within the next ten years (TNS Opinion & Social 2010a). The benefits that can be gained from intra-EU migration and the declining costs thanks to the increasing efforts undertaken at the EU level to offer all EU citizens equal opportunities in the labour market have, in recent years, made many more EU citizens ready to migrate than before (Recchi & Triandafyllidou 2010). For example, the EU grants its citizens access to higher education across the whole of the EU, allowing them to enhance their skills and competences and thus their prospects in the labour market. The Education and Training programme of 2020 regulates EU member states’ educational facilities and identifies common strategic objectives in order to make “lifelong learning” available to all EU citizens (Council of Ministers 2009). It recognises that education transforms people into active EU citizens by improving their employability. The so-called Bologna Process standardised higher education degrees to enhance EU citizens’ employability and made education more accessible by building on freedom of movement rights by guaranteeing young EU citizens the opportunity to “shop around” for higher education degrees within the EU labour market (Times Higher Education 2012). Nevertheless, in 2010, 23% of all migrants were EU citizens and 77% were third country nationals, i.e. citizens of non-EU member states (Eurostat 2012). This shows us that although EU citizens have a right to move freely and migrate from their country of origin to other EU member states to seek employment and education, only a small proportion actually takes advantage of this possibility. Having discussed the framework of EU citizenship, the next section considers the different ways in which

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collective identity among citizens emerges and how this can be enhanced by intra-EU migration.

Identity Construction through Citizenship—Economic Migration and Collective European Identity in the EU Citizens’ collective identity is based on their knowledge of belonging to a specific social group (Tajfel 1974, 72). Citizens are mutually aware of their social belonging, which affords them with specific entitlements and rights that are denied to non-members, the “others” (Warleigh 1998). Collective identity also has an emotional value and significance. The emotional attachment among citizens leads to a sense of loyalty and obligation to the state and is a source of social mobilisation, forming the basis for collective action (Risse 2010). However, the extent to which citizens must identify with each other for these effects to materialize is debateable (Bellamy 2008). Citizens’ acceptance of the legitimacy of prevailing rules, their ability to debate politics with one another, their trust in each other and solidarity to the state are necessary prerequisites for democratic citizenships in practice. Other components of this collective identity include a common culture, history and territory. Although a muchcontested notion, a common EU cultural heritage is believed to draw EU citizens together against the backdrop of 27 national cultures and many more local traditions. But whereas internally citizens’ collective identity inspires reciprocity and mutual awareness leading to solidarity toward the state and fellow citizens, externally citizens’ collective identity poses limitations on the acceptance of newcomers. Residency conditions, language tests and cultural tests can act as obstacles to the forging of a (new) citizenship identity by the would-be citizen who has to meet them, as these requirements draw a clear line between “us” and “them.” There is much debate in the EU about the identity, rights and political engagement of long-term, third-country residents compared to member state nationals (Soysal 2012). These groups are not legally recognised as EU citizens and are perceived to be part of the “other,” non-EU citizen. In practice, however, they could develop a European identity due to, for example, their limited EU-level political rights1 and encounters with various top-down projects targeted at enhancing European identity, like the EU flag. They might develop a European identity that is confined to and defined by member state boundaries and cultures. In comparison, EU citizens are directly linked to the EU through exercising EU citizenship’s core economic rights which reach beyond national borders. Thus, there is a clear distinction between the European identities of EU citizens and third-

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country residents. Therefore, the ways in which different social groups in the EU develop their European identities challenge accounts which perceive collective identity as embedded, hierarchical or nested (Hooghe & Marks 2005) rather than what they really are, namely cross-cutting and multilayered. Therefore, collective identity is clearly not exclusive to but dependent on and shaped by the different social groups that citizens belong to, i.e. local, national and regional entities, and a number of intersecting social factors including gender, age and ethnicity (Yuval-Davis 2007). That is why this study analyzes citizens’ identity in a multilayered framework. It is understood that citizens do not simply have a national or European identity but a number of identities blended together, including identity layers which are not linked to their citizenship status per se. EU citizens have national identities but they are also likely to have identity layers which correspond to their local, ethnic and regional communities, as well as the EU and the broader European region. EU citizens create their European identity layer based on their individual and collective relationships with and perceived importance of these different identity “layers” and citizens’ roles within them (Ibid.). The collective identity of citizens is constructed, enhanced and transformed both in top-down and bottom-up ways. From the top-down, states have introduced nationalist rhetoric and symbols including flags, hymns and currencies to create a national identity within their territories. In the EU, the Euro, a European hymn and flag were introduced to boost European identity (although the main reason for introducing the Euro was of course not the promotion of European identity). However, in the EU, top-down attempts have had paradoxical consequences. The Euro is a symbol of an exclusive and, some would say, “privileged” group of EU citizens, but even within this privileged group there are differences in EU citizens’ identities (Risse 2003). The current economic crisis has exacerbated these perceived (and real) divisions in the minds of EU citizens between “privileged insiders” and “neglected outsiders,” as the rhetoric of Greek, Irish and Spanish protesters facing the consequences of the “Eurocrisis” has highlighted. It is more likely that EU citizens developing their own sense of a collective European identity in a bottomup process will have a more lasting effect than these top-down measures. From the bottom-up, EU citizens’ European identities are constructed and transformed through their intra-EU labour migration. It is important to remember that there are no clear measures of the extent to which EU citizens have to actively practice their economic rights in order to develop a sense of belonging and, ultimately, a collective European identity. Still,

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EU labour migrants can influence politics more than their non-migrant counterparts by voting or standing as candidates at the municipal elections of their host member state (Art. 20/2b, TFEU). In fact, their participation in the local politics of their host country can be quite significant. For example, the turn out in the 2010 municipal elections was between 50– 60%, much higher than the European Parliamentary elections in 2009, with France and Sweden electing the highest number of migrant EU citizens at 32.8% and 17.1% respectively (TNS Opinion & Social 2010b). However, only about half of the EU’s migrant citizens are involved in municipal elections, and therefore their political participation in the host state is not generalizable to the whole of the EU’s migrant population. Another, arguably more inclusive way to explore the effects of labour migration on EU citizen identity is to recognise economic mobility as a form of social exchange relations (Aradau et al. 2010). In this fashion, intra-EU labour migration is more than just a simple personal experience. Intra-EU migration brings a variety of EU citizens together in an EU society that is composed of host country nationals and EU migrants, challenges the existing national identities and boundaries, and promotes the development of a collective European identity through social exchanges. Just like the “Stranger” in Georg Simmel’s (1950) article, EU migrants are free to come and go and reside in different EU member states or even return to their home countries. For example, a large number of Polish labour migrants returned to Poland in the aftermath of the economic crisis. Even so, in their temporary residence in the UK Polish migrants had the opportunity to bond with other migrant EU citizens and British nationals. Thus, migrant EU citizens act as the “contemporary strangers” of the EU labour market and can make some (or no) personal contacts in the host country. EU citizens’ intra-EU migration is also characterised by limitations and isolation. Their freedom of movement is restricted and dependent on sufficient economic resources and EU texts differentiate between EU migrants on this basis (Citizenship Directive 94/80/EC). In addition, migrants from the 2004 and 2007 Central and Eastern European (CEE) member states have faced a range of labour market restrictions in most EU-15 states, whereas migrants from EU-15 member states have, as a rule, not faced restrictions.2 Only in Sweden have CEE migrants had to comply with the standard EU regulations that apply to citizens of all 27 member states. Other member states have applied periodical transitional measures. The UK welcomed CEE migrants from the 2004 accession states, applying minor constraints like the Worker Registration Scheme, but migrants from the 2007 member states have to comply with more restrictive rules,

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including applying for accession worker cards and work permits (UKBA 2012). In addition, empirical research has shown that EU migrants take the “lonely path” (Favell 2008, 230) of EU citizenship by leaving their personal ties in their country of origin and stay (personally) disconnected from the host society. In this sense the migration of EU citizens is purely for professional and economic purposes. The contradictory nature of intra-EU migration is likely to transform migrants’ identities and shape their affiliation with the home and receiving member states, as well as the EU. A number of scholars have already found that economic migration can change the identity of migrants because migration unites migrants and non-migrants and is likely to enhance their European identity (Recchi et al. 2006). However, whereas some EU citizens interact with EU labour migrants, others—the larger segment of the EU’s population—do not join in these processes at all. Therefore, there is a difference not only between the European identity of migrant and non-migrant EU citizens but also within these groups. Furthermore, existing research demonstrates that EU citizens with weaker local identities are more likely to migrate than those with stronger local identities (Fligstein et al. 2012), and those EU citizens who have migrated before are more likely than non-migrants to do so again. Only 2% of nonmigrants are likely to move abroad sometime in the future, compared to 17% of migrants (TNS Opinion & Social 2011). Hence, the gap between the identity of migrants and non-migrants is likely to widen. However, the identity of migrants also varies owing to the type of activity they engage in and the length of time they spend abroad. In this sense, EU citizens who do their weekly shopping in different member states have a different identity than those who take on permanent jobs, “shop around” for education or focus on temporary work or education opportunities and plan to return home after a certain period. Finally, the experiences of migrating EU citizens differ depending on where they (choose to) reside. Reasons for choosing to access the labour market of one member state rather than another include language issues and labour market conditions (Doyle et al. 2006). An additional factor influencing and even restricting the choices of EU migrants is the fact that different member states have different policies on intra-EU labour migration.

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Research Methods In order to examine the different sources of European identity, effects of intra-EU migration and the traces of multilayered identities in the EU, the empirical section includes a descriptive analysis of Eurobarometer surveys (TNS Opinion and Social 2011).3 In addition, the original empirical evidence seeks to really explore the significance of factors that impact on how intra-EU migrants’ European identities develop. Rather than making generalisations, the empirical evidence seeks to illustrate how the respondents’ identities were affected by their intra-EU migration to the UK, intersecting with social factors—namely gender, age and ethnicity— their socialising trends, the length of time they spent in the UK, the UK labour market, and their country of origin. The empirical evidence comprising twenty pilot, semi-structured interviews with EU labour migrants was collected by the author between February 2009 and August 2010.4 The respondents, ten men and ten women, were recruited with a snowball technique and were required to have had migrated to the UK as a result of their EU citizenship rights. They came from a variety of CEE and EU-15 member states, specifically France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, Hungary and Poland. At the time of their interviews respondents were aged between 18 to 50 and had previously stayed in the UK for periods between 6 months and 12 years. The UK was chosen as the case study for this illustrative research because of its conflicting approaches towards EU membership and inflow of EU labour migrants. On the one hand, debates about whether or not the UK should have a referendum on EU membership are at the forefront of governmental debates, and the current Prime Minister David Cameron has suggested that a referendum would be held if its party won the next general election. On the other hand, the UK was one of the first EU countries to open its borders to CEE migrants, and in 2010 it registered almost two million (1,919, 900) EU migrants aged 18 or over (Eurostat 2012). This was the highest number of migrant EU residents across all EU member states, making up 3.1% of the UK’s total population (Eurostat 2012), of which the largest segment was from Poland (Kahanec et al. 2010). Nevertheless, EU migrant integration into the UK labour market has not been an easy process, as highlighted by the “Polish plumber” debate (Watts 2006), for example. Therefore, the effects of the UK labour market might impede the development of migrants’ European identities.

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Observations from Migrant EU Citizens Secondary analysis of the EU-wide survey Based on the findings of the EU survey (TNS Opinion and Social 2011),5 migrants and second generation Europeans’ European identities are stronger than those of non-migrants, but the report does not explore these differences and their reasons in much detail. Nonetheless, it demonstrates the multiplicity in respondents’ European identities, revealing that there are considerable differences between EU member states, socio-demographic groups and migrant, non-migrant and second generation EU citizens in terms of what they consider as significant for their European identities. The survey suggests that various EU symbols and values enhance the development of European identity. Based on the quantitative data, the most influential source of European identity is the Euro, followed by the EU’s democratic values. However, there is a difference between respondents’ preferences over the Euro depending on whether their country is in the Eurozone or not. Only about a fifth of the respondents from non-Eurozone states felt that the Euro was constructive for their European identity, compared to almost half of the respondents from Eurozone countries. There is also considerable difference between EU15 and CEE states’ preferences for the Euro and democratic values—37% and 24% respectively—which can also be explained by their membership of the Eurozone. There are considerably more EU15 member states within the Eurozone than CEE countries. Thus, the survey data proposes that everyday use of the Euro is more constructive towards EU citizens’ European identities than simple awareness of the single currency’s existence. The differences between social groups based on age and gender and migration status suggest that a variety of intersecting social factors can influence how respondents’ European identities emerge. Symbols such as the European flag and hymn are the most important for under 24 year olds, while older generations find these symbols less significant, and more male respondents consider the EU’s geographic boundaries a significant part of their European identity than females. Although the survey does not specifically analyse whether EU citizens have multilayered identities, it reveals that 53% of all respondents have developed their European identity in addition to their national identity. What is also interesting is that for migrants the EU’s democratic values are the most important element of their European identity, followed by second generation and non-migrant EU citizens. Therefore, the EU-wide survey suggests that there are

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considerable differences in the sources of EU citizens’ European identities based on their migration status, country of residence and intersecting social factors.

Original Empirical Evidence The idea that intra-EU migration affects the identities of EU citizens in a constructive manner is also supported by the original empirical evidence which suggests that there are considerable differences between the identities of migrants and non-migrants. Respondents had the tendency to use the phrase “more European” throughout the interviews, referring to a stronger sense of European identity compared to non-migrants, and sometimes compared to their own European identity prior to their experiences in the EU labour market. [I am] more European [now], [because] if I would have only lived in just one country, then I would only know about that country. I would not know about other countries or what rights they [citizens] have or freedom of movement. I would not know about it. But once you move to another country you can see the transition and the differences and then you would know about that (Swedish, Female). It [intra-EU migration] made me more European, more open minded and also more kind of realising actually that I can belong to other countries, not just to one (Hungarian, Female).

Some respondents recognised that their European identity was the result of living in a number of different EU member states: “I am European … but I have the experience of living in more European countries. My identity is all mixed” (German, Male). Others linked their European identity and EU citizenship and felt that as an EU citizen it is “easier to belong and to travel in the EU” (French, Female), “you can do anything, you can open up shops, work, etc. anywhere” (Dutch, Female). Based on their experiences in different EU member states respondents felt that “it [i]s much better and easier to be a European than just a national” (Swedish, Male). Again, others compared their exercise of EU citizenship’s economic rights to non-migrants’ experiences and (likely) European identity. I am more European than those British who have never left the UK. Coming here made me more aware of my national history, but also of my national history in light of a European history and culture. I think European citizenship relies on the awareness that coming from Europe you have your

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Therefore, the exploratory evidence supports the idea that respondents have developed stronger European identities in the course of their exercise of EU citizenship rights and EU-level participation, especially considering their intra-EU economic migration. Once again, the multiplicity in the source of respondents’ European identity was highlighted by different aspects of how migration and EU citizenship affect respondents’ daily lives and identities. While some respondents indicated that they had stronger European identities due to the professional advantages they enjoy as EU citizens in the UK, others cited personal benefits in terms of being aware of how distinct and similar different EU member states are. Participants did not connect their European identity with political participation at the EU level because most of them have never even voted in the European Parliamentary or UK local elections. Therefore, their intra-EU migration was more likely to affect their emerging European identity than political participation. The different ways in which country of origin and host country can influence European identities were also mentioned in the interviews. Respondents from CEE member states felt that an East-West divide along the line of the Iron Curtain still exists. They sensed that this divide separates them from Western Europeans and defines their experiences in the UK. I do feel like they [British people] never treat us as British, you know people who come from Eastern Europe, because of registration processes and from Western Europe your degree is more influential (Hungarian, Female).

Interestingly, some respondents stated that certain EU member states are “more European,” forming a stronger, integral part of the EU, than others. They referred mainly to France, Germany and Italy, and they claimed that they would feel a stronger sense of European identity if they resided in one of these countries rather than the UK: “I feel culturally closer [in France or Germany] than going to England which is on another island in many respects” (Hungarian, Male). The UK’s registration policies were also mentioned as a hindering effect because “to pay £50 to register yourself, it feels like it is against the basic EU idea” (Polish, Female). However, none of the respondents mentioned that they had weaker European identities due to their experiences in the EU labour market and, in particular, the UK.

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Finally, the original evidence with EU migrants in the UK suggested that respondents’ individual and collective identities were multi-layered, i.e. local, national, regional and international levels were important, and that intersecting social factors, i.e. ethnic background, gender and age, were influential in the development of their European identities. Therefore, respondents’ European identities were tied not just to them exercising their EU-level rights and migration statuses, but also a range of other factors relating to multi-layered identities. “I feel European, but because I was born in Hungary I am Hungarian [and], as my ethnic background I am Roma” (Hungarian, Male). [It is] difficult to tell about my identity, because I have other roots as well. I am a woman … and when people ask me where are you from I answer to them I was born in Yemen, lived in Somalia, [and] then I went to France and came to the UK as a European (French, Female).

The evidence also indicates that respondents’ multi-layered identities were intensified by their socialising experiences in the UK.6 For example, their ability to socialize with British citizens seems to have a different outcome depending on gender and is affected by their English language proficiencies. It appears that male respondents with lower levels of language skills were more likely to socialize with other migrants from the same country of origin and as a consequence have a stronger national identity rather than a British or European identity. Male migrants with better language skills did not stop at simply having a European identity, but also had a more international outlook. In comparison, female respondents had better communication skills and socialized mainly with British citizens and migrants from different EU member states. Owing to their socialising experiences they seem to have national, British and European identities simultaneously. Hence, it seems that the type of people respondents socialized with influenced their European identity construction. The evidence suggests that a stronger European identity emerges through the interaction with host country nationals and other EU and international migrants. However, respondents with sufficient language skills were also more integrated in British society and tended to have a British identity in addition to their national and European identities, but, interestingly, this also depends on their gender.

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Conclusion—The Effects of Labour Migration on the Identity of EU Citizens This chapter has shown that EU citizenship is not just “pie in the sky” (Oliveria 1995), but that the active participation of EU citizens in the EU labour market can transform their identity, resulting in the formation of a European identity. However, it has also demonstrated that European identity and EU citizenship are not characterised by unity and singularity. Rather, these concepts are best understood as part of the “European multiplicity” idea, because the dynamics of EU citizenship’s legal framework and citizens’ practicing of their EU-level rights as well as various EU-led projects can all account for the emergence of European identities. In particular, the empirical cases help us both understand how multifaceted the EU identity construction process is and also identify additional factors that the European identity and citizenship literature do not sufficiently focus on, including multi-layered identities and intra-EU migration as forms of social exchange relations. The examples of survey data and original empirical evidence of labour migrants in the UK indicate that there are considerable differences between the European identity of migrant and non-migrant EU citizens as well as what EU citizens perceive as important elements of their European identity. They demonstrate multiplicity in the sources of European identity, the way in which it emerges, and how it is experienced by EU citizens. The empirical section has shown that the factors likely to promote the development of European identity are the use of the single currency, the EU’s democratic values, citizens’ intra-EU labour migration and the analysis of freedom of movement as a form of social exchange relations. The factors likely to impede the transformation of EU citizens’ existing identities and prevent them from developing new identities are nonmigration as well as cultural differences and language issues. We have also seen here that EU citizens’ identities are affected not just by intra-EU labour migration per se, but also by intersecting social factors, including gender, age and ethnicity, country of origin, residence and length of time spent in the host country. The tentative conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis in this chapter are that EU citizenship, through its multilevel structure and freedom of movement rights, does not actually unite EU citizens in a single, shared European identity. It multiplies the different identities of EU citizens in a particular fashion that is directly linked to citizens’ personal characteristics, migration patterns, length of time spent abroad, country of origin (CEE or EU-15 member states), as well as their social exchanges in

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the host community. Most importantly, migrant EU citizens are aware of the significance of EU citizenship entitlements and their sense of identity seems to emerge from their exercise of EU rights and socialisation with other EU and non-EU citizens. Therefore, the transformative effects of migration on migrant EU citizens’ identities are tangible. Non-migrants do not tend to have European identities and are not likely to develop them because they are less likely to migrate within the EU in the near future. The overall number of EU labour migrants is likely to decline owing to the recent economic crisis, but there may also be an upsurge in the level of labour migration because the limitations imposed on citizens from CEE member states are gradually being lifted, opening up the possibility for migration to a greater number of host countries (Brückner et al. 2009). We can expect that a proportion of EU citizens will continue to actively use their citizenship rights and that their choice of target country will continue to be influenced by a set of criteria, such as labour market flexibility, language issues, job and educational opportunities. Their selection, in turn, will have either a positive or a negative impact on their identities as citizens, of their country of origin, the country they migrate to, and the EU. Therefore, more research on how identity is constructed among labour migrant and non-migrant EU citizens is required, in particular research that explores what kind of effect citizens’ core EU citizenship rights, i.e. freedom of movement, as a form of exchange relations, has on the development of European identity.

References Agné, Hans. “The Autonomy of Globalizing States: Bridging the Gap between Democratic Theory and International Political Economy.” International Political Science Review 32 (1) (2011): 43–60. Aradau, Clausia, Jef Huysmans & Vicki Squire. “Acts of European citizenship: a political sociology of mobility.” Journal of Common Market Studies 48 (4) (2010): 947–967. Bellamy, Richard. “Evaluating Union citizenship: belonging, rights and participation with the EU.” Citizenship Studies 12 (6) (2008): 597–611. Brückner, Herbert, Timo Baas, Iskra Beleva, Simone Bertoli, Tito Boeri, Andreas Damelang, Laetitia Duval, Andreas Hauptmann, Agnieszka Fihel, Peter Huber, Anna Iara, Artjoms Ivlevs, Elke J. Jahn, Pawel Kaczmarczyk, Michael E. Landesmann, Joanna Mackiewicz-Lyziak, Mattia Makovec, Paola Monti, Klaus Nowotny, Marek Okólski, Sándor Richter, Richard Upward, Hermine Vidovic, Katja Wolf, Nina Wolfeil, Peter Wright, Krisjane Zaiga & Anna Zylicz. Final Report:

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Hooghe, Liesbet & Gary Marks. “Calculation, Community and Cues: Public Opinion on European Integration.” European Union Politics 6 (4) (2005): 419–443. Isin, Engin & Brian S. Turner (eds.). Handbook of Citizenship Studies. London: Sage, 2002. Kahanec, Martin, Anzelika Zaiceva & Klaus F. Zimmerman. “Lessons from migration after EU enlargement.” In EU Labour Markets after Post-Enlargement, edited by Martin Kahanec & Klaus F. Zimmerman, 3–45. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2010. Karolewski, Ireneusz Pawel & Andrzej Marcin Suszycki (eds.). Multiplicity of Nationalism in Contemporary Europe. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield/ Lexington Books, 2010. Kuhn, Theresa. “Individual Transnationalism, Globalisation and Euroscepticism: An Empirical Test of Deutsch's Transactionalist Theory.” European Journal of Political Research 50 (6) (2011): 811– 837. Maas, Willem. Creating European Citizens. Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007. D’Oliveira, Jesserun. “Union Citizenship: a Pie in the Sky?” In A Citizens’ Europe: in the Search of a New Order, edited by Allan Rosas and Esko Antola, 58–84. London: Sage, 1995. Recchi, Ettore & Anna Triandafyllidou. “Crossing Over, Heading West and South: Mobility, Citizenship and Employment in the Enlarged Europe.” In The Changing Face of Labour Migration in Europe, edited by Georg Menz & Alexander Caviedes, 125–148. London: Palgrave, 2010. Risse, Thomas. “The Euro between National and European Identity.” Journal of European Public Policy 10 (4) (2003): 487–505. Risse-Kappen, Thomas. A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010. Roeder, Antje. “Does Mobility Matter for Attitudes to Europe? A Multilevel Analysis of Immigrants' Attitudes to European Unification.” Political Studies 59 (2) (2011): 458–471. Rother, N. & T. M. Nebe. “More Mobile, More European? Free Movement and EU Identity.” In Pioneers of European Integration, edited by Ettore Recchi & Adrian Favell, 120–155. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009. Simmel, Georg. “The Stranger.” In The Sociology of Georg Simmel, edited by Kurt Heinrich Wolf, 402–408. New York: Free Press, 1950.

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CHAPTER NINE A “CIVIL” EURO-MEDITERRANEAN: THE ANNA LINDH FOUNDATION AND THE CIVIL SOCIETALIZATION OF POLITICS ALISTAIR BRISBOURNE

The “Many Europes” theme opens up investigation of the multitude of ways in which Europe and the European Union (EU) are represented. Whether that be through official policies and actors, the development of a European public sphere, or in the recognition of alternative models within Europe, this approach is valuable in its rejection of monolithic understandings. The multiplicity of Europe and the EU is seen starkly in its relations with the rest of the world and the Mediterranean is an intriguing case as it bridges internal and external visions of the EU and Europe as a cultural entity. The historical trajectory of the region and the fluctuating relationship between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean sea add to the complexity. In terms of EU enlargement, the Middle East and North African sub-regions are also genuinely foreign relations in that they (apart from Turkey) do not represent real aspirations to EU membership (the Moroccan aspiration was quickly deterred). On the other hand, colonial histories and ongoing policy developments continue to link EU member states and countries across the region. This chapter attempts to build on this by reconsidering Europe’s role in the Mediterranean and the development of a “Euro-Mediterranean” space. Specifically, it is part of an initial attempt to reconsider the significance of the Anna Lindh Foundation (ALF) as a key promoter of the EuroMediterranean and an important actor for promoting intercultural dialogue and networking among civil society actors. The ALF brings a crucial social and cultural focus to a region dominated by political and economic interests but it also espouses a particular view of the Euro-Mediterranean which may alternatively reflect the discursive dominance of EU policymakers and a distinct attempt to foster some sort of cohesive EuroMediterranean vision that goes beyond the geographical region.

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The purpose of looking at—and rethinking the significance of—the ALF is to reveal the emerging globalism that is inherent in the construction of a Euro-Mediterranean space. This chapter will provide an overview of the ALF in terms of its political and institutional context and argue that the ALF’s political role should be recognized as an important transformation of politics in the region. Criticism of political censorship and control over many of the ALF activities should not be overlooked but this does not adequately engage with the political significance of the ALF both in terms of regional development and in terms of civil society promotion. The “civil societalization of politics” suggests that the ALF should be seen not only in terms of civil society development but also in terms of a related transformation of politics. The chapter will begin with an introduction of the ALF and then proceed through an exploration of civil society as it relates to developments in the Euro-Mediterranean. This section will effectively introduce the concept of “civil societalization” which will lay the basis for an attempt to situate the Euro-Mediterranean within a global normative politics and subsequently provide a discussion of the political content of “intercultural dialogue.” As such, the chapter will chart a political course for the ALF in the context of the EuroMediterranean and reveal the inherent limitations in its approach to civil society development and intercultural dialogue. At the same time, the analysis will suggest that the ALF has the potential for promoting alternative forms of regional interaction.

The Anna Lindh Foundation The Anna Lindh Foundation represents a significant achievement in cooperation and partnership arising out of the social and cultural basket of the Euro-Mediterranean Process (EMP). Despite great expectations following the 2003 High Level Advisory Group meeting (“Groupe des Sages”), optimism towards the Foundation remained low among many observers given the difficulty surrounding budgetary negotiations and remaining political constraints (Pace 2006, 86). However, despite immense difficulty, as well as having to withstand an uncertain institutional context and political wrangling over the creation of the Union for the Mediterranean, the ALF evolved in its early years into an intriguing institution and a potential source of development on socio-cultural issues and intercultural dialogue in the region. Originating out of the considerations and prescriptions of the Report of the High Level Advisory Group in 2003, the structure and goals of the ALF contain both a normative and functional basis. The ALF functions as a central node in a

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network of national networks for civil society organizations that exist across European and Mediterranean members of the UfM. Its primary objective is to promote intercultural dialogue, which in practice consists of supporting four fields of action: “Education and Youth,” “Culture and Arts,” “Cities and Migration” and “Peace and Coexistence.” According to the 2003 report, in contrast to markets and capital in the EU, youth represent one of the most significant assets of Southern Mediterranean countries. Youth also represent a potential threat to the EU in terms of migration flows and through the perpetuation of cultural conflict. Thus, the strategic is not far from socio-cultural considerations. The work of the ALF encompasses a range of events, awards, reports and calls for proposals. Events often include roundtables and forums where civil society actors and officials from either side of the Mediterranean can meet and discuss new priorities and concerns. Awards vary by theme depending on yearly priorities and target those groups that promote these priorities most effectively. The ALF also produces an Intercultural Trends Report, which takes a comprehensive analysis of cultural values and trends on either side of the Mediterranean through examining opinion polls, undertaking expert analysis and media analysis and then engaging with proposals for action. As such, the ALF does a significant amount of work in encouraging youth development and in promoting the conditions for understanding divisions across the region. While the ALF contributes to and offers new opportunities to civil society actors across the region, a look at the 2010 member survey reveals a desire among a significant portion of members for more cross-border contacts as well as increased and easier access to funding (Results of the Network Survey 2010). Furthermore, the survey reveals a significant level of dissatisfaction with national networks and the roles and selection of Heads of Network, currently approved by national governments. In terms of funding, the survey also reveals discontent with both the level and format of funding. Though the Network survey only represents a small number of all ALF members (with 533 respondents, or approximately 20% of the total) the breakdown of these organizations along fields of action reveals the influence of funding priorities towards “Education and Youth,” with 290 respondents working in this field. The High Level Advisory Group meeting in 2003 declared the necessary independence of the ALF in order to achieve legitimacy and neutrality in a highly politicized region. However, the scope of independence attainable by the Foundation seems to remain limited due to its reliance on the EU Commission for funding (Feliu 2005) and the institutional context of the ALF within the UfM framework. Furthermore, the ALF does not have freedom of action within

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UfM member states. It acts as an organizational hub for national networks, setting strategies for development and implementation as well as deciding on funding priorities. However, funding is often still funnelled through official channels and member states remain responsible for selecting Heads of Network and maintaining oversight over national networks, potentially limiting network penetration and membership opportunities.

Civil society promotion and Regional Civil Society The concept of civil society is one that is highly contested and fraught with difficulties and yet its use is also widespread in both academic and policy circles. Approaches to development espousing the centrality of civil society for political transformation became dominant in the period immediately preceding and following the collapse of the Soviet Union aided by the influence of global development institutions (Robinson 1995). For example, the United Nations Human Development Programme’s 1993 Human Development Report promoted the strengthening of civil society institutions as a way of increasing social stability in developing states, a call that was repeated in the World Bank’s World Development Report (McIlwaine 1998). In accordance with the spread of neo-liberal policies through the Washington Consensus, civil society promotion also took on a specific form in official policies depicting civil society as a third sector, inclusive of social activity and market relations, standing in direct opposition to state control and promoting economic development and efficient (and limited) government. Such policies highlight the existence of multiple understandings of civil society. Foley & Edwards (1996) have distinguished two groups: Civil Society I (associated with liberalism) and Civil Society II (associated with resistance movements such as Solidarity in Poland and scholars such as Adam Michnik). The first version of civil society largely reflects a concern for the governance impact of civil society organizations (CSOs) by focusing on organised citizen groups that help to smooth out local political antagonisms. The second notion of civil society is usually attributed to radical agendas and limited to resistance within authoritarian regimes; however, the importance of such a conception for democratic politics should not be overlooked. These two “models” of civil society reflect the normative and contested nature of the concept as it has come to be used in both liberal and leftist discourses to promote alternative routes to political transformation. The increasing salience of transnational relations as a result of deepening neoliberal reforms, speedier mobility and greater access to global communications

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has given rise to the idea of global civil society, another highly elusive but widespread term. The use of global civil society in academic and policy circles similarly reflects a division between different conceptions and the understanding of roles. Mary Kaldor has advocated global civil society through the rise of new social movements as a bulwark against the centralisation of power and as a “global process” of negotiation with global governance institutions (Kaldor 2003). As such, global civil society is central to the construction of global norms and is offered an innate legitimacy on behalf of new social movements and non-governmental actors. More sceptical voices point toward the difficulties associated with the promotion of global civil society within frameworks of governance and decision-making. John Keane offers several different types of relationship between non-governmental and governmental groups, such as hostility, catalyst, contractors, partnership, co-optation and various groupings thereof. Such a spectrum highlights the necessary interconnectedness of political institutions and civil society (Keane 2003, 108–109). By extension, it also means that the role and significance of civil society depends largely upon political context. Such considerations have led those more sceptical of the inherent legitimacy of global civil society to query the deceptive nature of partnership where: “lack of representational accountability leaves control in the hands of the powerful, while offering the appearance of ‘openness,’ ‘transparency’ and ‘accountability’” (Chandler 2004, 44). Such concerns are highly relevant in the politicized context of the Euro-Mediterranean and potentially within the work of organizations like the ALF. The idea of global civil society is one that is difficult to reconcile with the reality of the Euro-Mediterranean. As Laura Feliu points out, the networks that do exist are of low density and can hardly be referred to as “global” in scale (Feliu 2005, 380). Perhaps unsurprisingly, southern Mediterranean civil societies are noticeably under-represented in global institutions. For example, within the United Nations Economic and Social Council, out of 3,194 registered NGOs only 162 (or 6%) are from the MENA region, placing it second worst in this category. UNESCO, which formally ascribes a greater role to national authorities, also maintains official relations with NGOs; however, out of the 369 listed on their searchable database only 10 are listed within the MENA countries of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey. Out of 65 countries listed, only 7 are within the MENA region and average just over one organization per country. Such observations have previously allowed such notions as “Arab exceptionalism,” referring to the perceived democratic deficit among states with majority Arab populations. Such

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simplistic accounts have effectively been countered through various discussions, including allusion to the significant Arab populations living within democracies outside the MENA region. Rather, it seems that this region is subject to a unique geopolitical environment. Furthermore, lack of democratic development and the resilience of autocratic regimes are very much linked to the “narrow conception of civil society that some international donors make concrete through their activities … and that funding mechanisms potentially increase” (Challand 2006, 20). In this context, the highly normative basis of global civil society is significant. As Robert Falk (2003) argues, the global discourse owes less to reality and is rather looked upon in the creation of new dynamics and new realities. The ALF employs a broad conception of civil society in its activities, engaging with universities, NGOs, associations, public institutions, nonprofit organizations, private companies and local authorities. The promotion of civil society is a central tenet of intercultural dialogue in the work of the ALF, and the new Strategy and Programme Guidelines reinforce this position by contextualizing the promotion of civil society within a broader “intercultural strategy” that relates dialogue, diversity and democracy within the Euro-Mediterranean (ALF Strategy 2011, 11–12). Building upon the idea of intercultural dialogue as a promoter of “good neighbourliness,” this strategy suggests a more ideological framework for the continuation of ALF operations. Furthermore, according to this new strategy, the ALF commits itself to playing a much more significant role in developing the Euro-Mediterranean region in concert with EU policy (ALF Strategy 2011, 12). The regional dimension of the Foundation offers a unique opportunity to overcome some of the problems faced by CSOs in the Euro-Mediterranean. Currently, the transnational links that have been fostered in the region exist primarily through vertical relations (that is between North and South) rather than horizontally (between southern Mediterranean states) (Feliu 2005). These issues raise concerns over the conception of civil society being favoured as a Western and secular model (Schumacher 2005). As such, links between CSOs may be promoted according to the interests and comforts of European groups and at the expense of local actors. In this light, one of the most important contributions of the ALF is in the development of independent spaces of interaction and dialogue through regional activities, forums and meetings. These spaces evoke a regional “public sphere” by providing the institutional setting for civil society actors to engage in dialogue on a more equal footing, though this too is subject to political interference, not least by potentially controlling the mobility and communication of actors across borders.

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Politicization of civil society actors can be witnessed in the wake of the Arab uprisings across the region, whereby states have actively reintroduced social divisions against budding transverse relations (Harling 2012). On the EU side, the purpose of the ALF also clearly includes a functional element in promoting the development of a core group within the southern non-member states—the youth—which has been identified as a source of potential labour power and migration to the EU. Whether the new strategy encourages a greater centralization of control within the Foundation itself or extends a level of autonomy for national networks might also be significant for the development of regional initiatives. In terms of political handling, centralization may reduce the significance of officially controlled Heads of Network and increase access to funding for some actors. On the other hand, the opposite may also be true depending on the priorities for action determined by the Board of Governors and the level of access for civil society actors. Political and governmental actors will continue to play an important role in the ALF and this is something which is inherently tied to the debates over civil society and the political nature of regional development. This should neither be overlooked nor dismissed but instead should itself be understood as a process of development.

The Civil Societalization of Politics Critiques of the ALF may easily arise from normative prescriptions but such an approach would risk missing its inherent (and important) political basis. A reconsideration of the ALF first requires an approach that can maintain the fundamental link between culture and politics rather than dividing them into separate categories. This section will take a step towards this goal by contextualizing the ALF and the Euro-Mediterranean within a global politics which opens new roles for local, regional, national and transnational actors. Before discussing the “civil societalization of politics” it would be beneficial to very briefly consider the concept of “civil societalization” (CS) as a social phenomenon. CS appears as a social process through which the development of a distinct public sphere can occur. David McCrone (2007), for example, argues that CS is a process of social change that occurs in a particular time and space and produces effects of national identity construction through the restructuring of social relations. As a result, the process of constituting a “civil society” leads to a parallel process of identity construction, in this case nationalism and national citizenship. For this reason, organizational and liberal approaches towards analyzing civil society do not wholly capture its significance. As

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McCrone argues: “civil society is more than market relations; it is, if anything, the ‘cause’ of national feeling, not its outcome” (McCrone 2007). This sociological understanding evokes a constructive role for civil society in generating common values and feelings similar to Cohen & Arato’s (1992) “politics of identity,” whereby civil society effectively acts upon itself. However, rather than focusing on issues of autonomy (from political society) or internal democratization, national identification is central and may be more of a by-product of existing social relations. Civil societalization has impacted upon politics by opening up new avenues for political contestation. The CS of politics can be seen as an element of political transformation associated with the globalization of a normative discourse based on human rights, the increasing significance attributed to the activities of transnational actors, and the corresponding scale shifts in governance practices in order to incorporate them. Gerard Delanty and Chris Rumford (2007), in their original discussion of civil societalization, point to not only the increasing impact of transnational relations and social actors on governance but also to their influence on the construction of a global (normative) culture. The concept of civil societalization highlights the extent to which this culture is subsequently capable of impacting upon politics at various scales of governance. As such; “… the ‘civil societalisation’ of politics signifies a commonality of political forms which link the local and the global, the national and the transnational, and mobilizes a range of actors around common political codes: competitiveness, sustainability, personhood rights and social justice” (Delanty & Rumford 2007, 421). Significantly, the extension of CS into the fields of international relations and foreign policy shows that one of the outcomes of the various debates surrounding civil society and democratic governance is the focus on organizational strategies. As a result, governments may mobilize transnational civil society actors, or actors representative of a global civil society (Ibid.). The inherent legitimacy attributed to these actors can then be linked directly to official policies. An important question that remains, however, is in following this change in organizational and mobilization strategy to what extent does the CS of politics also produce or support the construction of particular imaginations and identities? As a strategy, CS develops around external forms of legitimacy that conform to universalized values and international agreements—a normative global culture. The CS of politics infers a process of transformation in state-society relations in response to which political actors are faced with new strategic considerations regarding the adoption of new organizational forms and particular discourses of legitimacy. However, this is not the

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same as instrumental use. Instrumental uses of human rights and/or democratization in the pursuit of economic gain (as one example) evoke the legitimacy of these discourses without applying the criteria. On the other hand, the CS of politics leads political actors to organize around particular discourses or issues and to mobilize networked actors. The extension of governance programmes across the Euro-Mediterranean plays an important role in changing how regional governments relate not only to other actors in the region and the EU but also potentially to their own constituents and societies. But even governance programmes work on the back of a transnational and globalizing organization of power. The growing significance of transnational actors, including migrants and civil society actors, necessitates a transformation in the way that governments relate to civil societies and social actors. Promoting opportunities and opening new spaces for cooperation across the region is an underdeveloped but key aspect of EU programmes. At an extreme end the extension of the “civil” beyond the nation-state and across borders could produce a sense of citizenship on a limited scale. As the previous section attested, transnational civil society actors are relatively scarce in the EuroMediterranean, however, as Pertti Joenniemi argued in relation to the Nordic region, increasing plurality and the promotion of non-state actors indirectly, or implicitly, favour the “civil” (Joenniemi 2003, 236). With this in mind it would be useful to consider developments in the “EuroMediterranean” through the Anna Lindh Foundation and the Union for the Mediterranean.

The ALF and the “Euro”-Mediterranean Now we want to have much closer relationships with civil society organizations, shifting the focus from relationships with the authorities to relationships with civil society. The time has come to be more ambitious in offering a more solid basis for our relationship (Fule 2011).

The ALF has evolved through a changing regional and institutional context within the Mediterranean from the Euro-Mediterranean Process (EMP) to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and now the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). EU policy towards the Mediterranean region took on a novel form with the Barcelona declaration in 1995. At that point, the EU began to negotiate a path influenced by a concern for development and democratization. The various shortcomings of the Barcelona Process and Euro-Mediterranean Process have been well-discussed and documented. However, the multilateralism of the EMP and its comprehensive approach towards regional integration as a response to the

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constraints of economic globalization and neoliberalism had the benefit of emphasizing long-term transformation based on social and political cohesion. In the context of ongoing frustration with the EMP, the ALF was recognized as being able to contribute “decisively to a sense of joint ownership” in virtue of its being truly multilateral and yet independent of the EMP partners (Pardo & Zemer 2005, 67). But on this basis it could also not maintain independence from political influences. The criticism levelled at the ALF by Helle Malmvig (2005), and echoed by Richard Youngs (2006), points towards the influence that governmental actors have in selecting who participates in national networks, potentially either co-opting Heads of Network or handing the work to ministries and thus placing political actors at the centre of the cultural forum (Youngs 2006; Malmvig 2005, 360). This scenario places limits on the ability of the ALF to engage independently with civil society actors and promote greater horizontal linkages across the region. In addition, the movement towards the UfM means a new context in the form of a more functional and project-oriented framework. The transition from the EMP to the UfM is an important one in that they mark two different modes of cooperation. The EMP is based upon a more comprehensive and “communitarian” approach, whereas the UfM is primarily intergovernmental and project-based. In the context of the UfM, the perceived shortcomings of the ALF may become more explicit. Roberto Aliboni reveals the substantial impact of this transition on the ALF as it reflects a broader compromise between the development of socio-cultural issues and European interests: What is currently happening to the Anna Lindh Foundation—the network for intercultural relations—is an example of such compromise. The Foundation’s Board of Governors, which is composed of Member States, has invited the executive boards to cut a number of initiatives which are considered too "political." Before publication of an inquiry conducted in 2009 on perceptions of “the other" in the Euro-Mediterranean area, a series of substantial changes were requested—to put it bluntly, a degree of censorship was used (Aliboni 2009, 5).

Censorship entails a broad consideration of the framing and context of issues in order to reduce the potential impact of any statement and bring it back in line with what has been deemed “acceptable.” What this also entails is a considered eye for what is recognized as legitimate and a highly selective appropriation of normative language, such as “good governance,” “participation” and so on (Scholte 2001, 21). In terms of regional development, Aliboni’s analysis reveals a change of focus from the overtly

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normative concerns of the EMP. This is reflected in the EU’s joint communication on the ENP wherein the UfM is endorsed as a complement to the bilateral approach of the ENP by allowing Action Plans to focus on fewer priorities (COM 2011, 303, 18). The development of new and existing cultural initiatives is notably absent, even within discussion of the promotion of “partnership between people.” What is more, the UfM, while offering substantial room for intergovernmental cooperation, places the relationship between EU member states and southern Mediterranean states on a path which reinforces an inherent power imbalance by re-establishing the EU as a regional power broker. Following Aliboni’s insight, then, it is possible that the ALF could take on the role of a legitimating actor, giving credence to member states and the UfM by illustrating a material role for civil society. However, while normative criteria may have been “watered down,” a liberal model of economic and political development remains implicit in the functional framework integration. This new functional— project-oriented—direction posits a uniquely “‘EU’ropean brand of regionbuilding in the Mediterranean which removes the question of reform from cooperation—‘realistically or cynically’” (Aliboni 2008, 12), but it also incorporates a strategic targeting of actors (including civil society actors) for the development of programmes and the promotion of common values and interests. The ALF reflects the political salience of social and cultural issues and the transnationalization of civil society actors (whether through mobility or communication technology) that create new problems and opportunities for governments. There is no doubt that national governments play an important role in the ALF, from participating in the Board of Governors to working with national networks. In both of these locations they can exert influence and mobilize support for their own interests. During negotiations over the most recent Programme and Guidelines, the Egyptian government rejected the first draft on the basis that it was too political, purportedly pointing towards the language of reform and democratization (a topic of some controversy given the events unfolding within the country). Politicization is a tricky issue. When it comes to political issues, the ALF headquarters (ALF HQ) is careful to tread on neutral ground in order to avoid controversy or antagonism amongst networks or member states. This was evident during the events of the “Arab Spring,” during which the ALF HQ expressly avoided taking part in events or taking sides in the media, despite the urging to do so by some member organizations. In contrast, however, overtly political programmes do exist and are an important part of the work that the ALF undertakes. So whereas the Egyptian government found the language of the negotiations too political, it fervently supports

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inherently political programmes such as Arab Voices. Arab Voices, a programme initiated through the UK national network, has quickly become a success in bringing together young people from across the region to debate political, cultural and social issues. Interestingly, with regard to this same programme, we can also highlight the other area of government involvement. Arab Voices was initiated as a project under the UK national network. However, growing interest from the UK government led to the British Council taking over coordination of the programme and taking control of funding from the ALF.1 These observations help to reveal the extent to which governmental actors have taken on social and cultural issues based—at least in part—on their transnational impact, but they also raise the question of the direction of development for national networks and the extent of involvement of established cultural institutions with close links to national governments. The ALF’s “realignment strategy” supposes a more crucial role for the ALF within the UfM and—taken next to the EU’s Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity—the developing Euro-Mediterranean region. Despite the relatively meagre budget of the organization, the confluence of opinion within the EU commission and the ALF would suggest recognition of the significance of the ALF for preserving and continuing to build a “Euro-Mediterranean” space. It is especially significant in considering the content of the UfM, which prioritizes economic development and political cooperation at the expense of social issues (Dimitrovova 2010). When it was first proposed, the autonomy of the ALF offered it a unique standing, and led to suggestions that a new— post-colonial—agenda might be possible within the Mediterranean (Nicolaïdis & Nicolaïdis 2004, 349). This would place cultural alongside political and economic interests when determining regional strategies. However, the ALF’s new Strategy and Programme Guidelines 2012–2014 explicitly reflect recent EU joint communications in furthering variable geometry as the functional logic behind regional development. The ALF document declares as one of its priorities: Applying a strategy of “variable geometry” to act complementarily at the regional, sub-regional, or national level, according [sic] the variety of scenarios coming into view, and the priorities of the ALF donors, which cannot be handled with a one fits all policy (ALF Strategy 2011, 11).

In this sense, the ALF might be seen within an extension of EU patterns of governance over the region allowing for a highly differentiated set of relations to develop. Moreover, the strategic realignment of the ALF requires a reconsideration of the autonomy of the Foundation in relation to

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the EU Commission, given not only the replication of language but also the explicit statement of intent to prioritize the interests of donors, the EU commission being the largest thereof. The ALF supports the development of a dialogue on EuroMediterranean issues and identities that includes civil society groups across the region. Through various regional programmes the ALF offers a platform to groups and individuals who might otherwise be excluded from regional developments. This approach complements that of the UfM which targets private actors and economic interests in building regional projects. While EU policy towards southern Mediterranean countries broadly consists of a strategy towards region-building, it is also infiltrated by a multitude of interests and discourses from EU member states, EU officials, and institutions and officials from non-member states who are variously influenced by global politics and discourses. Strengthening the civil sphere through official discourses and actions is a key aspect of engaging in complex international networks and building relations across states. To the extent that private actors and informal networks become more important in regional policies, there is also a corresponding “globalization” of the region as transnational actors more or less rooted in local settings take on greater significance. As a consequence; “the ‘civil’ appears to unfold in space being opened with states that enable such a trend, either explicitly supporting it or simply allowing it to happen by taking an increasingly international approach in order to cope with the various challenges of globalization” (Joenniemi 2003, 236). Civil society development in the Euro-Mediterranean has occurred under the supervision or ambivalence of state actors where the role of the government is to approve and facilitate the development of such cooperation. In addition, the ALF maintains a core element of region-building by linking identity and culture to a process of political transformation. As such, it also represents an attempt to question the identities and relations within the region through intercultural dialogue.

Promoting intercultural dialogue The civil societalization of politics infers a limited form of intercultural dialogue as a result of politicization and strategic interaction. However it has become an important concept for debate within many international organizations—such as UNESCO, the Council of Europe, the EU—and a novel approach in place of multiculturalism. In many ways it has become a concept around which the politics of cultural diversity is being organized. At the same time, it is in no way immune from political influence. The

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basis of intercultural dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean is briefly summed up by the EU Commission as a process through which peaceful coexistence is made possible, as opposed to the transformation of either category of Self or Other (European Commission 2003, Annex 1). This “cosy antagonism” (Bauman 1991, 53) fails to account for the power inequalities between the different regions and cultures in question. The primary location for cultural representation among southern Mediterranean states remains within the state apparatus and not amongst the populations (Del Sarto 2005). This practice thus territorializes the notion of culture within a frame to which it is not naturally limited (Hannerz 1991, 113). Relations between southern Mediterranean states continue to focus on boundarysetting and competition. Political anxiety over border controls is something with which civil societies across the region continue to battle, as evidenced by the inability of Palestinian bloggers to obtain visas to attend the Arab Bloggers conference held in Tunisia in August 2011 (Abrougui 2011). In opposition to the position expressed by the EU Commission, a formative cultural dialogue would have to be based on the re-drawing of boundaries and rigid cultural categories (Del Sarto 2005, 321). However, one of the fundamental problems linked to the intercultural strategy of the ALF in practice is conferring upon government officials the ability to speak in the name of specific cultures: “Thus, while serving as just another tool to strengthen state authority and to promote government policies, the intercultural dialogue becomes politicised, thus failing to address the objectives it was meant to address in the first place” (Ibid.). This limiting influence can be seen in the ability of national ministries to effectively regulate national networks from the determination of membership to the naming of Heads of Network. The ALF’s “intercultural strategy” goes beyond promoting dialogue by imposing a set of normative goals and values. Rather than engaging with the “other,” the practice of intercultural dialogue manages the relationship between “self” and “other,” preserving the dominance and unilateralism of EU policy (Dimitrovova 2010). In this regard, the ALF’s mission has been viewed as hiding strategic interests within a process of socialization towards common values (Bouris 2011, 98), but it also builds upon the original recommendations of the High Level Advisory group in 2003 which suggest that intercultural dialogue “must be within a context of respect for fundamental rights, and may then also become a powerful vehicle of democratization” (Report by the High Level Advisory Group 2003, 11). This approach would posit the institutionalization of intercultural dialogue as an instrument for democratization. This is potentially problematic in the work of the ALF. As an intergovernmental

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and multilateral institution, the ALF involves actors both within—UfM member states and regional organizations such as the Arab League—and beyond the region—UNESCO, Council of Europe, UN Alliance of Civilizations—through partnerships and engagement in projects. The agreement from the Tunis Exchange Forum on the triadic relationship between intercultural dialogue, citizenship and human rights reflects a conception of the region more amenable to the realization of a multilevelled dialogue that would engage social and political actors at various scales. In this formation, the concept of citizenship functions as the crucial connection that implies an increased responsibility on the part of both governments and civil societies. However, in contrast, the pursuance of an agenda in accordance with democratization strategies introduces greater politicization, which alongside continual budget concerns may mean a greater role for the ALF in regional development but only a reduced independent capacity to support civil society actors. In this sense, intercultural dialogue comes with its own set of political baggage—it is focused on the promotion and contestation of particular political values rather than the development of a true dialogue, which would require a more natural space for different cultures to encounter each other.

Conclusion As a regional actor the ALF highlights the interplay of different approaches to the region supported by EU policy makers and regional governments. Through an increased role for (and significance of) transnational actors in the region this study argues that there is a corresponding “civil societalization of politics” through which common political codes, such as human rights and intercultural dialogue, have become grounds for contesting political issues. This marks a process of political transformation but also a strategic shift in policy-making towards the mobilization and support of civil society actors who beget legitimacy not normally bestowed upon governmental actors. In the context of variable geometry it can be said that the ALF is undergoing a role enhancement as it establishes closer links to EU policies. However, it also reflects ambivalence within the EU towards the role of culture and between the logic of functionality versus norm promotion. It is possible to differentiate the position of the ALF between the variable geometry of the region, whereby it effectively institutionalizes an intercultural dialogue in accordance with the political objectives of the EU Commission and national governments, and as the central hub of a network of political, cultural and civil society actors across the region. This alternative understanding of the ALF points toward the

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importance of political strategy in relation to the underlying influence of normative models. It also posits a more complex identity for the ALF. The approach taken in this study opens the door to a more subtle understanding of influence and questions the political significance of transnational links and interactions among elements of regional civil societies when subject to strategic positioning.

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Delanty, Gerard & Chris Rumford. “Political Globalisation.” In Blackwell Companion to Globalization, edited by Gerard Delanty and George Ritzer, 414–428. Oxford: Blackwell, 2007. Del Sarto, Rafaella. “Setting the (Cultural) Agenda: Concepts, Communities, and Representation in Euro-Mediterranean Relations.” Mediterranean Politics 10 (3) (2005): 313–330. Dimitrovova, Bohdana. “Cultural Bordering and Re-Bordering in the EU’s Neighbourhood: Members, Strangers or Neighbours?” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18 (4) (2010): 463–481. European Commission. A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean. COM (2011), March 8, 2011. http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/fule/docs/news/joint _communication-a_partnership_for_democracy_and_shared_prosperity _with_south_med_en.pdf (accessed July 16, 2013). Feliu, Laura. “Global Civil Society Across the Euro-Mediterranean: The Case of Human Rights.” Mediterranean Politics 10 (3) (2005): 365– 383. Foley, Michael & Bob Edwards. “The Paradox of Civil Society.” Journal of Democracy 7 (3) (1996): 38–52. Hannerz, Ulf. “Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture.” In Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity, edited by Mike Featherstone, 237–252. London: Sage publishing, 1990. Harling, Peter. “Le monde arabe est-il vraiment en ‘hiver’?” Le Monde, Februrary 1, 2012. http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2012/02/01/lemonde-arabe-est-il-vraiment-en-hiver_1637004_3232.html (accessed July 16, 2013). Hibou, Beatrice. The Force of Obedience. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011. Joenniemi, Pertti. “Talking ‘Civil’: Learning from Region-building.” In Civil Society in the Baltic Sea Region, edited by Jorg Häckman and Norbert Götz, 217–235. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003. Johansson-Nogues, Elisabeth. “The UfM's Institutional Structure: Making Inroads towards ‘Co-Ownership’?” Mediterranean Politics 16 (1) (2011): 21–38. Jünemann, Annnette. “The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in Perspective: The Political and Institutional Context.” In A New Euro-Mediterranean Cultural Identity, edited by Stefania Panebianco, 82–106. London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003. Kaldor, Mary. Global Civil Society: An Answer to War. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003. Keane, John. Global Civil Society? Cambridge: The University Press, 2003.

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Malmvig, Helle. “Security through Intercultural Dialogue? Implications of the Securitization of Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue between Cultures.” Mediterranean Politics 10 (3) (2005): 349–364. McIlwaine, Cathy. “Civil Society and Development Geography.” Progress in Human Geography 22 (3) (1998): 415–424. McCrone, David. “Recovering civil society: does sociology need it?” Paper presented to the European Sociological Association conference, Glasgow, September 2007. http://www.institute-of-governance.org/ publications/working_papers/recovering_civil_society (accessed July 16, 2013). Nicolaïdis, Kalypso & Dimitri Nicolaïdis. “The EuroMed Beyond Civilisational Paradigms.” In The Convergence of Civilisations? Constructing a Mediterranean Region, edited by Emanuel Adler, Beverley Crawford, Federica Bicchi & Rafaella Del Sarto, 337–378. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004. Pace, Michelle. The Politics of Regional Identity: Meddling with the Mediterranean. Oxon: Routledge, 2006. Palencia-Roth, Michael. “Universalism and transversalism: dialogue and dialogics in a global perspective.” In Cultural Diversity and Transversal Values: East-West Dialogue on Spiritual and Secular Dynamics, edited by Samantha Wauchope, 38–52. Paris: UNESCO, 2006. Pardo, Sharon & Lior Zemer. “Towards a New Euro-Mediterranean Neighbourhood Space.” European Foreign Affairs Review 10 (1) (2005): 39–77. Report by the High Level Advisory Group. “Dialogue Between Peoples and Cultures in the Euro-Mediterranean Area.” Brussels, October 2003. Robinson, Mark. “Strengthening Civil Society in Africa: the role of foreign political aid.” IDS Bulletin 26 (2) (1995): 70–80. Schumacher, Tobias. “Introduction: The Study of Euro-Mediterranean Cultural and Social Co-operation in Perspective.” Mediterranean Politics 10 (3) (2005): 281–290. Scholte, Jan Aarte. “Civil Society and Democracy in Global Governance.” CSGR Working Paper No. 65/01, January, 2001. Shotton, Richard (ALF UK Head of Network, Manchester), interview by Alistair Brisbourne, July 5, 2012. Youngs, Richard. “How Europe’s Mediterranean policy went so badly wrong.” Europe’s World 4 (2006): 26–33.

PART III: MULTIPLE EUROPES BEYOND THE EU

CHAPTER TEN OPPOSING EUROPE OR OPPOSING THE EU? RE-EVALUATING PARTY POSITIONS ON EU ACCESSION IN CANDIDATE COUNTRIES SECKIN BARIS GULMEZ

This chapter proposes a new analytical framework for the study of political party positions towards European Union (EU) membership in candidate countries. It advocates that the explanatory power of models based on Euroscepticism—defined as opposing Europe—diminishes when the focus of the study shifts from member countries to the accession process in candidate countries. Thus, it is necessary to introduce the concept of “EU-scepticism” to emphasize that a critical stance embraced in candidate countries does not necessarily qualify for an opposition to Europe, but it rather tends to specifically target the EU and its membership conditionality. Drawing upon the argument advanced by Biebuyck & Rumford (2012), depicting Europe as a site of multiple and diverse actors, interests and identities, the chapter assumes that the EU as a multiplicity is prone to contradictory actions and creates controversy abroad. Therefore, it treats EU-scepticism as a set of reactions to the EU’s conflicted enlargement policy behaviour deriving from the internal contradictions within the EU. Introducing different forms of EU-scepticism (as issuespecific and country-specific), the study intends to cover the major aspects of the interaction between candidate countries and the EU during the accession negotiations. Based on the cases derived from former and current candidate countries, this study finds that EU-scepticism differs from Euroscepticism in that it is not entirely an opposition party phenomenon. Ideological party positioning has no explanatory power over EU-scepticism, and it is more easily reversible since the mitigation or elimination of EU-scepticism is contingent upon the realization of membership.

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Euroscepticism and its Critics The prevailing literature mainly defines Euroscepticism as “the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration” (Taggart 1998, 366). Taggart & Szczerbiak (2004) argue that Euroscepticism involves two different forms of opposition to European integration: “hard” and “soft” Euroscepticism. “Hard Euroscepticism” implies an “outright” and “unqualified” rejection of the European integration both in economic and political terms right from the beginning. Therefore, “hard Eurosceptics” reject the idea of EU membership, since they have no desire to be a part of such a Union. On the other hand, “soft Euroscepticism” suggests a “contingent and qualified opposition to European integration” (Ibid.). Kopecky & Mudde (2002) suggest an alternative classification for Eurosceptic tendencies in Europe. In this context, Euroscepticism refers to a combination of “Europhiles” and “EU-pessimists.” Eurosceptics are Europhiles who are pessimistic about the future of European integration (Kopecky & Mudde 2002, 304). However, extant typologies suffer from crucial limitations. First of all, as the analytical boundaries between “principled opposition” and “qualified objection” are fuzzy (Mudde 2011, 6), it is difficult to determine a party’s political stance along the axis of soft and hard Euroscepticism. In particular, when political parties involve both soft and hard Eurosceptic elements simultaneously— take for instance the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM) in the Czech Republic—(Hanley 2008, 254), the soft/hard distinction is insufficient to grasp such overlapping Eurosceptic tendencies. Furthermore, Euroscepticism-based categories have been mainly designed for EU member states. Scholars interested in Euroscepticism in candidate countries have failed to develop new models and frameworks, and thus have often attempted to replicate the same categories in candidate countries (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2004, 2). However, this suggests serious limitations. For instance, while defining “hard Eurosceptics,” Szczerbiak & Taggart (2008a, 2) more specifically refer to “parties who think that their countries should withdraw from membership.” Since candidate countries are not yet EU members, rather than demanding withdrawal from membership, hard Eurosceptics would be inclined to ask to withdraw their candidacy for EU membership. Application of the Kopecky & Mudde typology to candidate countries is even more problematic. For instance, Eurosceptics defined as both Europhile and EU-pessimist do not make sense for a candidate country (Batory 2008, 267). If you are pessimistic about the EU’s current or future projection, why would you

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wish to join the EU in the first place? In response to critics, Szczerbiak & Taggart (2008b) refined their typology, which in the end better emphasized its focus on member states at the expense of candidate states. Accordingly, the priority is to grasp the “underlying support for or opposition to the European integration project as embodied in the EU” and “attitudes towards further actual or planned extensions of EU competencies,” rather than “a party’s support for or opposition to their country’s membership at any given time” (Szczerbiak & Taggart 2008b, 242). In other words, Euroscepticism can only be used to categorise parties which oppose the European integration project as a whole, not the ones which oppose their own accession to that project. Hence, numerous academic pieces, which used the same typology for analysing party reactions during the accession negotiation process, have proven problematic. An important reason is that, rather than the idea of integration or certain policy fields, it is the membership prospects which gather much attention in candidate states (Szczerbiak 2008). Overall, this study aims to go beyond the mainstream by studying party attitudes towards EU membership in candidate countries, thus focusing on the accession process rather than the post-accession phase. In so doing, the chapter will offer the concept of EU-scepticism to specifically scrutinise party attitudes towards EU membership in candidate countries. The next sections explain the constitutive elements and varieties of EU-scepticism that distinguish it from the notion of Euroscepticism.

EU-scepticism versus Euroscepticism Existing frameworks based on Euroscepticism investigate domestic attitudes towards overall European integration and its trajectory in member states, while ruling out the fact that the main concerns of political parties in candidate countries concentrate upon the prospects for their country’s membership. In this respect, there is a need to differentiate between opposition to Europe and opposition to EU membership as they imply two distinct phenomena. Therefore, in order to better evaluate party positions in accession countries, this study introduces EU-scepticism, which involves criticisms of and reluctance for EU membership in candidate countries reflected as a reaction to EU membership conditions. EUscepticism differs from Euroscepticism because its focus is limited to the temporal phase that follows the officialization of a country’s EU candidacy and ends with its accession to the EU. Hence, it scrutinizes the process through which a candidate country makes active efforts to comply with EU membership conditionality. For its part, Euroscepticism involves

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opposition to the idea of European integration—for instance, seeing it as moving towards a federal Europe (Euroscepticism in a broader sense)— and/or particular EU policies like the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) (Euroscepticism in a narrow sense). Euroscepticism is therefore the reflection of a negative preconception about what “Europe” and/or the idea of a “Union” stand for due to historical memories or ideological standpoints. Such a preconception fuels nationalist sentiments and thus triggers strong reservations against joining the EU in the first place. Therefore, opposition stems from the previous experiences of a country with Europe, Europeans, and/or membership to a Union before the EU accession process. For instance, due to a historically based collective memory towards the Soviet Union, the Baltic States in general and Estonia in particular were hesitant towards the idea of joining another union, i.e. the European “Union” (Mikkel & Kasekamp 2008). Vetik et al. (2006, 1086) claim that the fear of re-Germanization led the Estonian public to forge a “reactive identity” against assimilation under the EU umbrella and to embrace Eurosceptic discourses. EU-scepticism, on the other hand, is a reaction against the EU negotiation process. It stands for the reluctance of candidates to become a member because of certain unfavourable accession criteria and/or a reaction against the EU’s inconsistent behaviour towards the candidate country’s membership. This opposition is strategic and reversible because the main motivation underpinning EU-scepticism is to gain membership with full benefits. It therefore materializes after the initiation of EU membership conditionality and reaches its peak during the accession negotiations. The study argues that in most cases political parties in the accession countries reflect EU-scepticism rather than Euroscepticism. They thus react to the complications associated with membership conditionality which arise during negotiations with the EU. Besides, when the EU fails to provide concrete and credible membership prospects, political parties become even more reluctant to adopt EU-led reforms (Rulikova 2004, 36–37). The EU can respond in at least two ways to dissipate EU-scepticism: either it can convince EU-sceptics to embrace the reforms by guaranteeing membership or it can present a more consistent and non-discriminatory attitude towards its enlargement by withdrawing any additional non-standard criteria from its membership negotiations.

Varieties of EU-scepticism EU enlargement is essentially depicted in the literature as an asymmetrical top-down process, in which a candidate country carries out reforms and

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adopts norms that the EU dictates for the sake of membership. During this process, according to Schimmelfennig (2008, 921) the success of political conditionality is contingent on three factors: (a) credible membership conditionality in which the EU promises eventual membership provided that a candidate complies with accession criteria; (b) normative consistency which dictates that the EU should be “guided only by the democratic and human rights performance of the target countries,” without any discrimination based on nationality or culture; and finally (c) low political costs of domestic compliance with EU requirements. He argues that, most of the time, conditions (a) and (b) are met but the fulfilment of (c) has proven problematic; in other words, when candidate states perceive compliance with the EU as too costly. As against the prevailing tendency in the literature which treats Europe “as a singular, vital or reductionist” force (Biebuyck & Rumford 2012, 4), it is necessary to avoid depicting the EU as a unitary actor whose actions remain consistent. Alternatively, Biebuyck & Rumford (2012, 5) define Europe as a multiplicity without an essence or centre. Europe is more than what the EU officials and treaties define in a functionalist (and thus reductionist) sense. It is rather “an active site of multiple—and often times contradictory—productions and transformations” (Ibid.). Accordingly, the EU could also be considered as a multiplicity composed of (clashing) multiple actors, societies and cultures; it is thus prone to contradictions in its course of action. The existence of multiple EU institutions with different agendas and capabilities, and numerous member states with differing cultures, and social and political structures and interests, confirm the thesis of multiplicity. The unanimity rule behind the EU enlargement policy contradicts the depiction of enlargement as a solely technical process and emphasizes its political nature. The differing agendas of both member states and institutions complicate the decision making over the accession of new members hampering a standardized EU approach to each candidate’s accession process. Therefore, noncompliance in candidate countries develops as a reaction to the EU’s failure to meet conditions (a) and (b) outlined by Schimmelfennig (2008). Overall, EU-scepticism stems from two main factors. First, it develops as a reaction against the EU’s conditional pressures deriving from endogenous considerations, including domestic cost-benefit calculations and/or cultural reservations (the criterion “c” in Schimmelfennig’s account). Second, it materializes against non-standard exogenous pressures from the EU and its member states (the criteria “a” and “b” according to Schimmelfennig). In this context, there are two major types of EU-scepticism deriving from the negotiation process. The first is an issue-specific reaction against

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the EU-led reforms associated with the Copenhagen criteria. It develops during the negotiation process whereby domestic political actors oppose particular EU reforms, either due to high costs of compliance or to the perceived threats that those reforms pose to national sovereignty and identity (Schimmelfennig 2008; Hooghe & Marks 2008). This reaction may also partly stem from the notion of estrangement in the sense that the accession country is dealing with an organization established without its contributions; therefore, until becoming a member, it perceives its relations with the EU as an external affair (Rulikova 2004, 34). As the accession process dictates a candidate to “tacitly adapt most, if not all, external outputs to its legal domestic order,” political actors tend to react to such top-down reforms (Ibid.). This issue-specific reaction is frequently witnessed in most candidates having to fulfil the Copenhagen Criteria. For instance, certain EU-sponsored reforms may be perceived as threatening a country’s sovereignty and/or national interests since they often challenge domestic social and political norms and practices, and thus have the potential to make significant changes in people’s daily lives. In the case of issue-specific EU-scepticism, high costs of compliance draw a domestic reaction and render the fulfilment of EU conditionality problematic. The second type of EU-scepticism derives from resentment of additional EU conditionality that targets a particular country. It generally happens when the EU applies additional conditions due to a bilateral issue between a candidate country and a member state. The EU thus inherits the extant bilateral problem and fails to act as an impartial problem-solver. It either remains indifferent to the constraints inflicted upon a candidate by an EU member state or puts extra-conditions on a candidate country to solve its bilateral problem with a member country before joining the Union. In such cases, a member state holds the veto power to block the initiation of accession negotiations with the candidate country in question or even freeze an ongoing negotiation process by blocking the negotiation chapters. This triggers resentment in the political parties of the accession country towards the additional conditions of the EU. In such cases, EUscepticism emerges as a particular reaction to the instrumentalization of the EU’s accession negotiations by an individual member state which seeks to get concessions from a candidate country on a bilateral issue that is not directly related to the EU’s official membership criteria. The mitigation of such EU-scepticism is directly contingent upon the solution of the bilateral issue either through unilateral or reciprocal concessions in return for a membership guarantee. In addition, country-specific EU-scepticism also emerges when domestic political actors perceive strong reluctance or indecisiveness

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within the EU towards their country’s membership. There are two main determinants for the spread of domestic perception about the EU’s lack of political will. First, the EU creates additional preconditions either specifically targeting the membership of a particular candidate country or slowing down the overall EU enlargement process. For instance, the introduction of additional preconditions such as “absorption capacity,” “open-ended negotiations” and “permanent derogations” to the official documents on Turkey’s membership has sparked strong domestic reactions in the country as it has generally been perceived as an indication of the EU’s reluctance of Turkey’s membership. Second, political statements of leading European figures against the accession of a particular country or propositions such as “privileged partnership” in lieu of full membership are likely to be interpreted in a negative light. Country-specific EUscepticism challenges the assumption that the EU is normatively consistent and non-discriminatory in its enlargement strategy. Political actors in candidate countries often show reluctance for membership because of the perception that the EU’s strategy towards them is “unfair” and discriminatory.

Empirical Discussion—EU-scepticism in Accession Countries In this part, the study aims to apply the different forms of EU-scepticism (issue-specific and country-specific) to selected EU candidate countries. The case selection is based on the application of the “Copenhagen criteria,”1 which were introduced in 1993 and have significantly changed the traditional (and economistic) ways through which the EU enlargement had been approached. Compliance with such norms as minority rights has become part of the official preconditions for membership (Wiener & Wobbe 2002). Non-compliance with the Copenhagen criteria is punished by rejection of membership (Schimmelfennig 2008). In this context, this study looks at EU-scepticism in countries whose EU candidacy has been assessed under the Copenhagen criteria.

Issue-specific EU-scepticism Issue-specific EU-scepticism is a reaction observed in many (if not all) candidate countries against the EU-led reforms deriving from the Copenhagen criteria. Political parties tend to resort not only to endogenous factors—such as national sovereignty and pride, national and sectoral interests or identity—but also such exogenous factors as the inconsistent

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and unfair treatment of the EU in a particular policy area in order to justify their issue-specific opposition. During their accession negotiations with the EU, many candidate countries have witnessed the rise of political party protests against particular reforms associated with the Copenhagen criteria even among the pro-EU parties. One of the reforms drawing EU-scepticism is ensuring the free movement of capital through lifting restrictions against foreigners’ rights to purchase land. There are numerous reasons for opposing foreign land ownership, ranging from purely economic fears that foreign ownership may increase land prices enormously at the expense of local buyers, to patriotic concerns over the loss of national sovereignty and fear of “reGermanisation” (Tesser 2004, 214). For instance, in the Polish case, most of the opposition parties, all from different ideological backgrounds, stood against this reform. The Polish Peasant Party (PSL), an agrarian party with 9% popularity in the 2001 elections, supported Polish membership of the EU but it strongly opposed the foreign acquisition of land, forests or areas containing water sources (Ibid., 220). Party officials even demanded an eighteen-year prohibition on foreigners purchasing agricultural land in Poland (Zuba 2009, 332). The centre-right Solidarity coalition (AWS) also opposed land liberalization because of the fear of the “German return” to Poland (Tesser 2004, 220). Similarly, the centre right parties Law and Justice (PiS) and Civic Platform (PO) have shown scepticism against foreign land ownership during the accession negotiations. The PiS proposed a “land turnover law” in order to protect Polish farmers from foreign land speculators (Szczerbiak 2008, 232) and party officials threatened to vote “no” in the referendum unless the membership package offered to Poland was substantially improved (Ibid.). Hungary is another example of a state with EU-sceptic political parties opposing land liberalisation during accession negotiations. The FideszHungarian Civic Party, a mainstream right-wing party with 41% popularity in the 2002 elections, was one of the most Euro-enthusiast political actors in Hungary, endorsing the “return to Europe” motto. However, its eagerness shifted to EU-scepticism as the country started EU membership negotiations. Defending “hard bargaining with Brussels,” the party declared itself the protector of Hungarian land and proposed a referendum to prevent the EU-led reforms that would enable foreign land ownership in Hungary (Batory 2008, 270–271). The Hungarian Justice and Life Party, a fringe right-wing party with 4.4% popularity in 2002, also reflected an EU-sceptic stance, conditioning its support for EU membership on the full guarantee of national survival, culture and independence (Ibid., 272). In particular, it demanded a full guarantee

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regarding the issue of foreign land ownership until wage parity with existing members was established; otherwise, they proposed the postponement of Hungary’s membership (Ibid.). EU-scepticism in the form of opposition to land liberalisation is also applicable to Slovenia, a strong pro-EU country, which already determined its “return to Europe” as a strategic goal, even before the dissolution of Yugoslavia (Krasovec & Lipicer 2008, 316). The Slovenian National Party and the New Party, far-right fringe parties with 4.4% and 0.6% popularities in the 2000 election, opposed the foreign land ownership stipulation, claiming that the latter made them realize the hegemonic nature of the EU (Krasovec & Lipicer 2008, 318). Another issue that raises tension in candidate countries is the question of agricultural subsidies. The EU offered its recent candidates only 25% of what farmers in older member countries received. In particular, the countries that rely heavily upon the agricultural sector, such as Poland, Estonia and the Czech Republic, protested against this. In Poland, the PSL, the main party defending the rights of local farmers, strongly opposed the EU’s offer to Polish farmers and demanded full subsidies for them (Szczerbiak 2008, 237; Riishoj 2007, 517; Zuba 2009, 332). Self-Defence (Samoobrona), a nationalist right-wing party with 10% popularity in 2001, also prioritised agricultural subsidies in its EU policy. Denoting the negotiations as a threat to Polish farmers, party leaders claimed that with the deal offered by the EU, Poland would be permanently relegated to the role of a second-class member (Zuba 2009, 333; Szczerbiak 2008, 228– 229). Instead, the party explicitly demanded that Polish membership be based on equal rights (Szczerbiak 2008, 230). Although there are already significant eurosceptic tendencies in Czech politics associated with historical memory and identity, it is plausible to talk about EU-scepticism especially concerning the issue of agricultural subsidies. The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM), which is generally accepted as hard Eurosceptic for its opposition to EU membership (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2004), actually stressed the importance of Czech membership under equitable conditions and denounced the EU’s unbalanced agricultural subsidies for new comers (Hanley 2008, 252). Similarly, although the Estonian public is known as being highly Eurosceptic, all political parties regarded EU membership as a necessity for Estonia’s development and supported the Estonian accession to the EU (Mikkel & Kasekamp 2008, 300). Estonian parties, however, stressed the importance of conducting fair negotiations with the EU upholding national interests (Ibid.). Therefore, many political parties in the country, including the mainstream Centre Party with 25.4% popularity in the 2003 elections,

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reacted to particular EU-led reforms, especially the level of agricultural subsidies for Estonian farmers, and blamed the government for being too submissive to such EU demands (Mikkel & Kasekamp 2008, 309). Other issues that trigger EU-scepticism include identity, human rights and minority rights whose reform has proven problematic in candidate countries. In Slovakia, even pro-EU parties, such as the Christian Democratic Movement (KHD) (8.3%) and the Social Democrat SMER (13.5%), have criticized the EU’s negotiation process intensively. While the KDH attacked particular EU-led reforms, such as same-sex partnerships and abortion (Henderson 2008a, 287), the SMER defended the preservation of the Bohunice nuclear reactor in its election campaign, standing firm against the EU pressures to close it down and depicting it as “a pillar of Slovak economy” and national pride (Ivanov 2008, 161). The SMER also demanded the re-opening of various negotiation chapters that had already been closed in order to not accept EU membership at all costs (Henderson 2008a, 288). In Estonia, the Centre Party opposed the EU-led reforms on the citizenship rights of minorities and the removal of the Estonian language requirement for minority candidates in national elections. Claiming that such reforms would constitute a serious threat to Estonian identity, party officials condemned the government for “giving in” to Western institutions on such sensitive issues (Feldman 2001, 16). The reform of minority rights has been a source of intense opposition in Romania as well. The far-right nationalist Greater Romania Party, although giving strategic support to EU membership, stood against the reforms on the rights of Hungarian and Roma minorities. Its leader, Vadim Tudor, even demanded that all Gypsies be put in jail, for there was no other solution (Goldston 2002, 155). Opposition to minority rights also engulfed Latvian politics. The far-right nationalist For Fatherland and Freedom/Latvian National Independence Party opposed the EU-led reforms which demanded the naturalisation of non-Latvians residing in the country. The reason for such opposition originated from the fear that “if all the noncitizens were suddenly given voting rights they would vote to destabilise Latvia's shaky political scene and even re-annex Latvia to Russia” (Morris 2004, 554). The party even demanded a referendum in order to prevent the reforms. However, after becoming a member of the coalition government in 1998, the party revised its hard-line stance on the citizenship issue since party officials announced that it was in Latvia’s strategic interest to become an EU member to offset future threats from Russia (Ibid.). During the accession process, political party views towards EU integration in candidate countries were mainly formed through the prism

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of membership negotiations and there was no tangible reference to the European project as a whole and its trajectory (Szczerbiak 2008, 237). Because of this, the criticisms discussed above qualify for EU-scepticism rather than Euroscepticism. Their actions can be categorized as issuespecific EU-scepticism, because the opposition against EU conditionality was limited to particular policy issues and has proven reversible once EU membership prospects became clear.

Country-specific EU-scepticism Unlike the first type of EU-scepticism, country-specific EU-scepticism indicates a more problematic accession process for a particular candidate country due to an ongoing bilateral conflict with an EU member state and/or the domestic perceptions that the EU remains reluctant to accept its membership. As regards the EU-sceptic reactions stemming from bilateral relations, since the member state, which is party to the ongoing bilateral issue, can block the initiation of the accession negotiations and use its veto power as a blackmailing device due to the unanimity rule in the EU enlargement policy, country-specific EU-scepticism is frequently observed in current accession countries. For instance, the Republic of Macedonia, a candidate since 2005, has been under pressure from Greece, an EU member since 1981, which has a historical claim on the name “Macedonia.” Greece has been blocking Macedonia’s EU accession talks since 2009 despite the European Commission’s recommendation to initiate the negotiations with the country. Political actors in Macedonia, including the government, have reacted strongly to Greece and condemned Brussels’ one-sidedness for precluding Macedonia’s EU bid (Marusic 2011). Accusing the EU of inflicting double-standards, the officials of the ruling party VMRO-DPMNE even likened the EU’s Macedonian policy to “the Holocaust” (Balkan Insight 2011). A member state in conflict with a candidate country can even curtail an ongoing negotiation process by blocking the negotiation chapters. For instance, the Exclusive Economic Zone issue between Croatia and Slovenia caused the curtailment of Croatia’s EU membership negotiations for up to ten months due to the Slovenian veto. Correspondingly, reluctance towards membership rose among all Croatian political actors who felt threatened by the Slovenian-led EU pressure to choose either the fisheries zone or membership (Zoriü 2008). The Croatian Prime Minister Ivo Sanader even accused Slovenia of blackmailing them, and asserted that they did not intend to “buy the EU membership with the [Slovenian] territory” (EUobserver 2008). The negotiations resumed only after Croatia

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and Slovenia agreed to the EU plan of bringing the issue to an ad hoc international arbitration court. Croatia consented to the plan since the fisheries zone stood as the final obstacle to Croatia’s realization of EU membership. In the Turkish case, the EU put pressure on Turkey (along with other new member states) to open its harbours and airspace to the Republic of Cyprus as a part of its obligations arising out of the additional protocol. Turkey defied EU pressure since it does not officially recognise the Republic of Cyprus as the governing authority of the entire island. Upon Turkey’s refusal to comply with this precondition, the EU partially froze the Turkish accession negotiations. Currently, eighteen chapters remain frozen and this has practically halted the entire accession process. These developments have sparked a significant amount of negative reactions within both the government and the opposition in Turkey (Gulmez & Buhari-Gulmez 2008). The main opposition party in Turkey, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), argued that the Cyprus problem took Turkey-EU relations “hostage,” prohibiting Turkey’s eventual EU membership. Deniz Baykal, the party leader, claimed: “If Turkey fails or is prevented from becoming a member, this is not the end of the world” (Hürriyet 2005). The governing party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), accused the EU of “sacrificing” Turkey for the Greek Cypriots and froze its relations with the EU for six months after the Republic of Cyprus was granted the EU Presidency (Vatan 2011). Turkey’s EU-scepticism signals that there is almost no membership incentive for the candidate country and future relations with the EU are in danger. Turkey stands out as the only candidate country whose political actors reflect such extreme EU-scepticism due to the increasing Turkish perception that the EU remains negative towards Turkish accession. As previously discussed, the EU introduced additional provisions such as “absorption capacity,” “open-ended negotiations” and “permanent derogations” to the official documents regarding Turkey’s accession. Those expressions constitute a novelty for the EU’s enlargement policy because they were first introduced in the Turkish case. Another novelty is that a number of top EU politicians2 overtly stood against Turkey’s accession and offered instead the possibility of “privileged partnership,” i.e. cooperation short of full membership. In the meantime, due to Turkey’s persistent refusal to open its harbours and airspace to Cyprus, its accession negotiations remain frozen. The EU cannot credibly promise eventual membership to Turkey even if Turkish borders are opened to Cyprus. Additional preconditions and the lack of clear membership impetus decrease the EU’s political leverage on Turkey (Yilmaz 2009).

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Therefore, especially after the postponement of the accession negotiations, the Turkish government has become even less motivated to continue with the EU-led reform process. Government officials accused the EU of being indecisive vis-à-vis Turkey’s membership. The Prime Minister (and the AKP leader), Tayyip Erdo÷an, argued that the EU has been dragging its feet over Turkey for more than fifty years and he urged EU officials to announce whether they really want Turkey in or not (Hürriyet 2011). Erdo÷an claimed that no other candidate country had faced such unfair treatment as Turkey (Vatan 2011) and accused the EU of becoming a unified bloc against Turkey’s accession (Erdo÷an 2011). Baykal, the CHP leader, criticized the open-ended nature of the negotiations, the absorption capacity of the EU, and permanent safeguard clauses against Turkey. The CHP leader claimed that such expressions were proof that the EU had never considered Turkey’s membership seriously (Hürriyet 2004). This type of EU-scepticism in Turkey transcended the notion of strategic reaction to certain reform areas and changed the overall rhetoric of the major political actors towards the EU. Condemning the EU’s reluctance towards Turkey’s accession has become the daily practice of domestic political actors voicing their stance on Turkey’s EU accession. The Turkish case confirms that EU-scepticism is embraced by both opposition and government, and also indicates that party ideology does not directly affect their behaviour towards the EU since both a centre-right party (AKP) and a social democrat party (CHP) adopted a similar stance towards the EU.

Conclusion This study offers a new framework from which to analyse the oppositional stances of political parties towards EU membership in recent (postCopenhagen criteria) candidate countries in general, and in Turkey in particular. With this in mind, it has highlighted the limitations of approaches based on Euroscepticism in explaining political party positions towards EU membership during the accession negotiations. Accordingly, it advocated EU-scepticism as a more useful concept in terms of emphasizing that the critical attitudes of political parties during the negotiation process do not reflect a wholesale opposition to the idea of Europe. Following the thesis of “many Europes” (Biebuyck & Rumford 2012), the chapter suggests that the EU is composed of multiple bodies and actors with diverging and converging agendas which often render its enlargement policy problematic. Accordingly, the study argues that EUscepticism in accession countries stems not only from the EU’s standard

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conditionality but also its non-standard exogenous pressures related to the competing agendas of member states and EU institutions which may interfere with the process. Overall, three observations are made. First of all, EU-scepticism is not limited to opposition parties. Empirical findings discussed above confirm that while issue-specific EU-scepticism is mainly observed in opposition parties, country-specific EU-scepticism has been a broader political phenomenon and involved both government and opposition. Not only fringe parties, such as the Hungarian Justice and Life Party, the Slovak National Party and the New Party in Slovenia, but also mainstream parties, such as the KSCM in the Czech Republic, the PO and the PiS in Poland and the Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Party in Hungary, have resorted to issue-specific EU-scepticism during the accession process, especially when in opposition. On the other hand, as the cases of Turkey, Macedonia and Croatia indicate, three factors have triggered countryspecific EU-scepticism, which has spread to the government and even to some previously Europhile segments of the political elite. These are: (1) additional conditionality by the EU; (2) interruption or changes in accession negotiations due to bilateral issues with an EU member state, and; (3) the EU’s perceived reluctance to proceed with the negotiations (as well as widespread political statements of leading European figures against a particular candidate country’s membership). The second finding suggests that ideological positioning (left/right or GAL/TAN) fails to explain EU-scepticism observed in political parties of candidate countries.3 Since EU-scepticism implies reaction to membership conditionality rather than deep-seated resentment against Europe, political parties from different ideological perspectives may stand against particular reforms that are perceived as violating national and sectoral interests or culture and identity. In such cases, not only left-wing or right-wing parties but also GAL as well as TAN parties demonstrate EU-sceptic reflexes. Examples derived from candidate countries readily confirm this. For instance, the Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Party, a mainstream Right/GAL party, as well as the Justice and Life Party, a fringe Right/TAN party, showed similar reactions to the EU-led reform of foreign land ownership in Hungary. Major right-wing GAL parties in Poland—the PO and the PiS as well as the left/TAN Self-Defence (Samoobrona)—criticized similar EU reforms during the Polish candidacy. Moreover, the SMER, a major left/GAL party and radical right-wing TAN Slovak National Party, also adopted EU-sceptic rhetoric during the negotiation process of Slovakia. This is also true for the current EU candidate, Turkey. For example, not only the conservative governing AKP (right/GAL), but also the main opposition, the social democrat CHP (left/TAN before 2010 during Baykal

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leadership and left/GAL afterwards) and the ultra-nationalist National Action Party (MHP) (right/TAN) commonly reflected EU-scepticism as regards the EU’s Cyprus conditionality. Thirdly, empirical evidence demonstrates that EU-scepticism in most candidate countries is mitigated or likely to disappear when the EU guarantees membership via the signature of the accession treaty. EUscepticism therefore mostly changes into Euro-supportiveness after membership. Even in the case of the KSCM in the Czech Republic, whose officials had shown a hard-line stance towards the EU, the party said “yes” to the referendum and revised its critical stance towards the EU because the party officials admitted that membership was imminent and that the majority of the Czech public was in favour of membership (Riishoj 2007, 527). In some other cases Euroscepticism has been seen to replace EUscepticism. For instance, it is plausible to argue that the PO and the PiS in Poland have become Eurosceptic after the Polish referendum, since they started to raise substantial criticisms against the European Constitution. “Nice or Die” became a popular motto spearheaded by the PO after the referendum (Zuba 2009, 332). After Polish EU membership, the PiS particularly reflected a “soft Eurosceptic” image as the party officials focused their criticisms on the EU’s energy policy (Riishoj 2007, 522). Finally, Turkey stands out as the only case in which all forms of EUscepticism have been observed. At the beginning of accession negotiations, the opposition parties showed issue-specific EU-scepticism by criticizing certain EU-led reforms, while the government was mostly pro-EU. However, after the curtailment of the accession negotiations due to the bilateral issue with Cyprus, the Turkish government joined the opposition in questioning the fairness of the EU in terms of its additional conditionality towards Turkey’s Cyprus policy. The Cyprus problem has not only precluded Turkey’s advancement in the negotiations but also contributed to the erosion of Turkish trust in the EU’s political will for accession. Moreover, the introduction of new provisions for Turkey’s membership, along with overt oppositional stances of certain European statesmen against Turkey, has increased the perception among the Turkish political elite that Turkey is not wanted by the EU. Therefore, while Turkey-EU relations have both reached a zenith and hit the bottom during the last decade, Turkish political actors have reflected all forms of EUscepticism in their EU policies.

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Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, March 24–27, 2002. Yilmaz, Hakan. “The International Context.” In Democratization, edited by Christian W. Haerpfer, Patrick Bernhagen, Ronald F. Inglehart & Christian Welzel, 92–106. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Zoriü, Katarina. “ZERP ili EU—recept za širenje ‘euroskepticizma’” [ZERP or the EU—a recipe for the spread of ‘euro-skepticism’].” Nacional.hr, March 2, 2008. http://www.nacional.hr/clanak/43248/zerp-ili-eu-recept-za-sirenjeeuroskepticizma (accessed July 17, 2013). Zuba, Krzysztof. “Through the Looking Glass: The Attitudes of Polish Political Parties towards the EU before and after Accession.” Perspectives on European Politics and Society 10 (3) (2009): 326–349.

CHAPTER ELEVEN EUROPEANIZATION OF THE ROMA IDENTITY AND THE SEARCH FOR TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY RAMNEEK GREWAL

In discussing how “European multiplicity” (Biebuyck & Rumford 2012) may be conceptualized, it is important to take into consideration the role of ethnic minorities, particularly the Roma community. In imagining “Europe,” the Roma community is often viewed as a peripheral, subservient underclass to be ignored or deported. Populist parties in Europe often use the Roma community as an example of social, moral and ethical deviance. For example, comments by former French President Nicolas Sarkozy (2010) concerning settlement evictions and violent racial incidents were presented as “related to the behaviour of certain Roma and travellers in France” (Amnesty International 2010). The Roma community throughout history has adopted multiple roles in the European imaginary. Both historically and in the present, Roma identity has been characterized in multiple ways, such as being romanticized in fiction and television, or “admired” for their fortune telling and musical abilities (Van De Port 1999). As stated by well-known activist Andrzej Mirga, “you may not know who we are, but we do” (Stewart 2010, 1). This statement conveys the sentiment that anyone who thinks of themselves as Roma can be defined as such, without the specific demarcations that generally indicate “belonging” to an ethnic group or nation-state. Thus, Roma perceived as an evasive, foreign presence have often contested the European imaginary of an integrated homogenous entity. The following argument will articulate how defining a Roma identity has often been an external imposition by state authorities and international institutions seeking to control the population. The chapter will also illuminate how transnational advocacy networks have supported the community’s interest in developing a sense of identity.

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Ethnic Categorization and Boundary Making The term “Roma,” signifying the inclusion of communities with varying cultural and linguistic attributes, is a response to state imposition and insistence that the “Roma” community has a singular voice and vision (Memedova et al. 2005). The “Roma” risk political alienation unless a unified identity is displayed, despite the fact that no ethnic community has a monolithic identity. Attempts to define a “Roma identity” are a response to the nation-state system that seeks to control its population through the categorization of individuals and construction of salient boundaries (Wimmer 2008, 975). The literature on nationalism does not include a discussion of how the creation of ethnic identity categories presents a specific construction of reality—state mechanisms such as the census allow for the expansion and maintenance of this illusion. Thus, “categories are central to the state’s exercise of racial governmentality; censuses have constituted a formative governmental technology in the service of the state to fashion racialized knowledge …” (Brubaker et al. 2004, 34). Assigning individuals to a singular category creates the myth of a shared identity and emphasizes the differences among categories. Instead of perceiving social groups as circumstantial the census promotes categorization and boundary making (Kertzer & Arel 2002, 5–6). A further critique of the nationalism literature is the limited interrogation of key assumptions that only perpetuate Western modes of political organization and power structures. For example, the literature does not include a conceptual analysis of how divisions are created and maintained among “ethnic communities.” The “natural” phenomenon of national and ethnic identity, and everyday primordialist assumptions as proposed by Kaplan’s analysis, can be critiqued by reviewing the work of constructivists such as Barth (1969), Fearon & Laitin (2000) and Wimmer (2008) that acknowledge the social construction of identity and its impact on inter-ethnic relations. The authors refute the idea of “eternal hostility” —the idea that conflict ensues because of enduring characteristics and enmities between ethnic groups. As noted by Barth in a seminal essay, ethnic boundaries are defined by differences and not the cultural characteristics of the social group (Kertzer & Arel 2002, 5–6). Expanding on Barth’s ideas, Wimmer introduces a multilevel model of ethnic boundary making by presenting different strategies of ethnic boundary construction used by actors in various social contexts. As defined by Wimmer, a boundary: displays both a categorical and a social or behavioral dimension. The former refers to acts of social classification and collective representation;

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the latter to everyday networks of relationships that result from individual acts of connecting and distancing. On the individual level, the categorical and the behavioral aspects appear as two cognitive schemes. One divides the social world into social groups—into “us” and “them”—and the other offers scripts of action—how to relate to individuals classified as “us” and “them” under given circumstances. Only when the two schemes coincide, when ways of seeing the world correspond to ways of acting in the world, shall I speak of a social boundary (Wimmer 2008, 975).

It is important to note that the concept of boundary does not intend to restrict definitions and belonging to an ethnic group; boundaries are variable dependent on the societal and institutional context. As Silverman notes “there has been … a tendency to study Gypsies context-free, that is, as an isolated, bounded group. This tendency reflects the conventional concept of an ethnic group which implies that members have more frequent … contact with each other than … with outsiders” (Silverman 1988, 266). However Gypsies, although maintaining a strict boundary between members and non-members, conduct informal and formal relations with non-Gypsies. Thus, any account of Gypsy ethnicity must focus on the interaction between Gypsy and non-Gypsy culture. This is especially interesting concerning the Gypsy identity which, depending on the context, may reflect mainstream stereotypes of the group. For example, Gypsy fortune tellers encourage the stereotype of the exotic, foreign healer that meets the expectations of non-Gypsies, as it is more profitable to advertise this image. Furthermore, by presenting a superficial image of the Gypsy culture, the group is able to hide the in-group culture (Silverman 1988, 266). An analysis of Gypsy culture and identity demonstrates how “race” is an ideological construct and a historical process. “Gypsiness,” as a racial/ethnic category, has been defined differently depending on the social structure, dominant ideology, historical context, and geographical location. As a mechanism to overcome this challenge, Gypsies have negotiated their identity depending on the oppressive structure in place at a specific time. For instance, Gypsies may “assimilate” cultural traits such as clothing, music, language and occupation without identifying with non-Gypsy culture. The characteristics have no meaning beyond their significance for the particular role that is “expected” and period of time. To an outsider, this may be perceived as an adaptation to the local culture or to categorize the Gypsy as a “foreigner,” but with specific social traits to be ranked within a hierarchy. However, the identity that is presented to the “outside world” is fictive (Silverman 1988, 267).

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Ethnic boundary-making strategies, as compared to the literature on nationalism, account for how the state’s promotion of ethnic categorization at times creates the justification for minority discrimination, as members of the majority are “representative” of a particular state. Minorities are confronted with a new hierarchy of exclusion as ethnic boundaries become established in everyday understanding and action. In contextualizing Romani exclusion in the overall debate regarding European racism and nationalism, it is useful to refer to Balibar’s (2002) argument that each nation “through its institutions, constructs a fictive ethnicity” that is different from the “other” on the basis of visible, behavioural or audible characteristics. As fictive ethnicity and patriotism are augmented, it serves only to perpetuate racism. Balibar understands racism as “internal to the current history of nationalisms” (Balibar 2002, 71). As states are progressing toward “anti-citizenship,” security measures, constitutional changes and legislation coordinated among nations are similar in the aspects of immigration and asylum rights. National identity is increasingly displaced by fictive ethnicities and racism. Additional security measures and constitutional changes coordinated among European nations create “a new mode of discrimination between the national and the alien” (Balibar 2002, 78). The nation’s exclusion of “others” and individual internalization of the “foreigner” creates internal and external borders. The previous discussion focused on how the literature on nationalism is inadequate to explain Roma exclusion. The concept of “ethnic community” is problematized in the case of Roma as the social group does not conform to European ideals of national belonging. While the nationalist literature provides an account of how national ideology based on culture and ethnic affiliation contribute to societal divisions and internal conflict, it does not analyze state ethnic categorization and boundary making. The nationalism literature is focused on Western conceptions of collective identity and does not include a discussion of identity construction, and this is especially limiting in the case of Roma identity formation and political participation in Europe.

Identity politics—The Externalization of Roma Identity The literature on nationalism and ethnic boundaries provides a framework for understanding how European societies are characterized by a high degree of social closure and politicization. Generally, individuals are identified as belonging to a specific ethnic community with little ambiguity and with strong emotional attachment to an ethnic category. Social groups will attempt to preserve cultural authenticity at any cost,

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even in periods of great social change. Identity preservation reduces the options for boundary making strategies and interpretation of ethnic categories (Wimmer 2008, 1003). However, this structure of ethnic boundary making in relation to Roma is not deterministic. At certain historical junctures, a strategy may be reformed and change is possible. An “exogenous shift” (Wimmer 2008, 1005) may occur as new actors become involved, changing the availability of resources and political alliances. For instance, international organizations such as the European Union, the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have been active in Eastern European candidate countries on issues regarding inter-ethnic relations. Wimmer accounts for political alliance networks as an integral factor in boundary adaptation (2008, 1005). However, a critical evaluation of international organization discourse demonstrates an external imposition of identity on the Roma community. The EU, for instance, has been an important actor in authenticating “Gypsy” and “Roma” as political terms within international organization discourse and documents such as “action plans.” Challenges arising from seemingly “objective” categories remain submersed, as EU institutions and governments search for numerical evidence to validate the construction of the “Gypsy/Roma” category and its political objects. Early EU discussions acknowledged that information regarding “Gypsies” was to be collected, but the community was not included as active participants. Instead, dialogue occurred only among EU institutional actors, an interaction that has only recently included the Roma community (Simhandl 2010, 73–75). As the Roma community does not have significant political power and legitimacy, advocating a new ethnic boundary and establishing alliances is challenging. Political actors with different interests have to be persuaded of their self perception that entails a delicate negotiation process (Wimmer 2008, 997). Although the state and international institutions determine the contours of individual ethnic boundary making, those in a disadvantaged position may construct counter discourses and categories to those promoted by the dominant actors. For instance, Valery Novoselsky, Roma activist and organizer of the web-based Romano Liloro Groups—a forum and information service on Roma issues—has argued that the internet encourages “cultural communities” and “transnational ethnic identification among the Roma” (Atanasoski 2009, 210). Novoselsky has argued that the internet can change how Roma communicate, disseminate information, build civil society, and develop social partnerships and political activism. These mechanisms can foster a “virtual nation,” utilizing the internet as a platform. In critically evaluating the role of the internet as an

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“emancipatory tool” for Romani political mobilization, Atanasoski suggests that the marginalized status of Roma communities in Eastern Europe limits the capacity of technology to advance Roma rights. For instance, for many Roma families in non-Western nations the internet is relatively expensive. Furthermore, as Roma rights discourse on the internet is generally influenced by Western international agencies and NGOs, there is a misrepresentation of the Roma issue as an Eastern European problem. For instance, the European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) is often the target of criticism for not publishing sufficient information on the Roma rights violations in Western Europe. It is also recognized that the ERRC monitors and conducts research predominately on EU accession states, rather than current member states (Atanasoski 2009, 212).

Roma as a “Victim-Subject” within Development Discourse Development discourse is especially useful in negating Western European constructions of Roma identity and perceptions of the community. International organizations such as the EU have authenticated the category “Roma,” creating a vast network of experts, statistics and documents that validate the community’s existence. Prior to the early 1990s Roma were predominately excluded from the development discourse. Developmental policies and programs under the guise of “political activism” target a once peripheral people, and symbolize “reform” and “progression” in Eastern European countries to eventually join the European community. As noted by Havel, the Gypsies offered “a litmus test of liberal tolerance within ‘new Europe’ constituting Gypsiness as a marker of racial difference that measured the progress of Eastern Europe democracies by their multicultural inclusiveness” (Atanasoski 2006, 220). Thus, any measures to support Roma political activism are connected with the idea of “Balkan development and minority inclusion” and the adoption of international human rights norms, as well as the particular transformation of Serbia as a “Balkan monster.” Macedonia is comparatively romanticized as a haven for minorities, and thus more amenable to international intervention. The role of the “victim subject” in particular is a dominant concept in the context of Western intervention regarding marginal groups in “developing nations.” International institutions and Western European states have reinforced the image of Roma as a victim subject (Kapur 2002), promoting cultural essentialism in discussions of minority issues

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that has further transferred into a Western European/Balkan divide. As stated by Hansen: The Western discursive constructions of the “Balkans” have taken a spatial identity, the Balkans, and constructed it within three different discourses: a Byronian Romanticism that constituted “the Balkans” as different from the West, as an object of admiration that should be transformed, but supported by the West in its struggles for independence; a civilizational Enlightenment discourse that constituted “the Balkans” as different from the West but with the capacity for liberal political and economic transformation, a transformation for which the West had a moral responsibility as well as financial and geopolitical interest; and, finally, a Balkanization discourse that constructed “the Balkans” as radically different and threatening in its capacity to bring chaos and war to the West, as incapable of transformation, and to be isolated and deterred rather than supported (Hansen 2006, 42).

In particular, academic, media and government discourses refer to Serbian national identity as “violent,” “irrational,” “underdeveloped,” “barbaric,” “backward,” “tribal,” “primitive” and “savage,” as compared to the “developed,” “civilized,” “rational” and “controlled” European identity (Hansen 2006, 42). The connection between Balkan culture and violence is used as an explanation of the kind of marginalization and impoverishment that Roma individuals are confronted with in Eastern European contexts. By successfully adopting Western “multicultural” standards, Eastern European states may also “progress” in attaining racial equality and eradicate inter-ethnic divisions (Atanasoski 2006, 220). Within this emancipatory framework, the important marker of “colour” loses its significance. Recognizing “difference” through the process of “integration” thus renders “race” an insignificant signifier, as Eastern European states adopt neoliberal values sustained by economic reforms. The “multicultural” society as an “ideal” state does not always make visible the cultural and physical characteristics that define and empower a community. “Race consciousness,” ethnic identity, heterogeneity and fragmentation within the Roma community do not devalue its representation and participation in an inclusive society. These ideas are an essential foundation for Western development discourse that seeks, through the extensive network of international organizations and development agencies, to propose strategies and programs that will “develop” Eastern European states to discontinue the victimization of Roma communities. The emphasis on the victim subject reinforces the impression of Roma in Eastern Europe as perpetually ostracized and impoverished, reasserting stereotypes and racist portrayals

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of Balkan culture that privileges the position of Western European nations. International attention has had important and beneficial consequences, focusing interest on the lack of domestic governmental action on Roma claims for equality in education, employment, health care and housing. The victim subject has also allowed for the discussion of issues of importance that otherwise would have remained invisible in human rights discourse. However, if a more progressive and representational movement is to develop on Roma concerns it is necessary to renegotiate international intervention on Roma affairs. As stated by Kapur: “it is important to recognize and centre the peripheral subject and her multiple historically, culturally, and socially determined subjectivities instead of falling back on universalized assumptions about the individual’s realities and their subject position” (Kapur 2002, 19). In order to empower marginalized people, it is important to recognize “moments of resistance” so as not to produce a narrative that simply describes how the individual is subjugated. Providing multiple narratives of an individual’s or movement’s history helps to undermine hegemonic interpretations of culture and race that are reiterated in the international and domestic arenas. Representations of Roma as thoroughly disempowered and incapable of self-determination do not help to liberate the community from repressive domestic power structures.

Limitations of the Nationalism, Ethnic Boundaries and Development Literature To sum up, the nationalism, ethnic boundary and development literature focuses on how identity construction impacts processes of internal conflict and exclusion. The nationalism literature based on Western European ideas of collective identity and national belonging pays little attention to ethnicity and how this determines insider-outsider status in a society. The literature reflects on the nation-building process but is limited by not interrogating state categorization and how this may create the justification for minority discrimination. Comparatively, the ethnic boundary model provides a multi-level analysis of how “differences” between social groups are constructed, thereby critiquing everyday primordialist assumptions of “eternal hostility.” In the specific case of the Roma community it is important to reflect on the externalization of identity using the concept of political alliance networks. Strategies of boundary adaptation are important to challenge nationalism and exclusion in Macedonian and Serbian societies. External actors such as the EU have supported alternative constructions of the

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“Gypsy” identity, but have only recently included the Roma community in political discussions. The further contextualization of Roma as a “victim subject” within the Western European/Balkan divide illustrates how the literatures on development and nationalism are integrated. The promotion of cultural essentialism and characterization of the Balkan identity as “violent” and “barbaric” privileges the Western position and intervention on minority issues in the Balkans. International attention on the Roma community is essential for criticizing limited domestic implementation of Roma-related policies and programs, but an emancipatory framework would challenge universalized assumptions of Balkan culture and the victimization of the Roma community. It is thus important to introduce the social movement literature that provides a framework for understanding how a marginalized community such as the Roma can challenge political institutions. Kapur (2002) addresses the importance of recognizing “moments of resistance” and focuses on community emancipation without providing a basic narrative of subjugation. The literature on nationalism, ethnic boundaries, and development provided a useful analysis to illustrate minority exclusion, but in order to address the topic of minority mobilization it is important to focus on transnational advocacy networks that facilitate or constrain claims making.

Trans-national Advocacy Networks—International-NGO Interventions on Roma Inclusion In addressing the question of how social movement actors and international institutions seek to influence and change Roma inclusion policy in Eastern Europe, it is helpful to refer to the literature on transnational advocacy. As argued by Keck & Sikkink (1998), domestic protest groups may seek recourse at the international level when their government refuses to recognize their concerns. Transnational advocacy networks are most likely to appear concerning issues where: (i) the linkages between domestic groups and governments are restricted or when communication paths are ineffective for conflict resolution; (ii) activists believe that networking will strengthen social movement campaigns and further promote the issue; (iii) international conferences and contacts create opportunities for network building (Keck & Sikkink 1998, 12). Thus, “transnational advocacy networks” are defined by the international actors that share common values, discourse, information and services on a specific issue. Furthermore, alliances between civil society actors, states and international organizations allow for increased linkages to

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international resources that activists can utilize in domestic protest activity (Keck & Sikkink 1998, 2). The literature on transnational advocacy networks has demonstrated a strong link between the influence of international organizations and legitimacy of civil society organizations, thus facilitating NGO and activist access to national political arenas (Risse & Sikkink 1999). As the situation of Roma increasingly became an important issue on the European agenda and defined within the context of “minority and human rights,” proRomani activists and NGOs gained legitimacy and support from international institutions. Although EU conditionality criteria has not led to significant improvements concerning Roma inclusion, it has led to significant links between international and civil society organizations, as well as highlighting the situation of Roma on domestic agendas. Without the support of international organizations and, vice versa, the participation of civil society, the issue of Roma would not have entered the debate on EU membership (Ram 2009). During the accession period, the EU supported NGOs in various ways to promote and impact policy making on Roma inclusion. EU funding to Roma NGOs increased substantially in the 1990s and EU bodies continue to support programs for Roma communities in the SEE region. Funding was predominately provided through the EU PHARE program, with an estimated €100 million supporting the creation of Roma positions and offices within national government bodies and NGO projects (Guy 2010, 30–33). International pro-Romani organizations such as the ERRC, ERIO and ERTF have also been the recipients of EU funding. Overall, EU funding enhanced the visibility of Roma political activism in international and national arenas, supporting a strong partnership with the European Commission and encouraging a prominent role for pro-Romani NGOs in EU institutions. Various educational and training opportunities were offered to Roma activists to facilitate future contribution in policy discussions and effectively represent the community’s interests (Ram 2009, 10–13). NGOs have also supported the EU by providing essential information about Roma communities in various states. The EU, especially in the mid to late 1990s, had minimal knowledge concerning the situation and concerns of the community. Without the input of NGOs the EU could not establish conditionality requirements for candidate states regarding minority inclusion, and the situation of Roma may not have been considered during the accession process. Pro-Romani NGOs have undertaken the important task of monitoring during the accession period. Organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and

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the ERRC have contributed frequent evaluations and press releases enabling the EU to assess progress on conditionality criteria effectively. NGOs have also acted as lobbyists, emphasizing certain issues for the EU to address with national governments. The EU has sometimes used Roma and international NGOs to reinforce EU policies or highlight politically sensitive issues the institution cannot discuss. EU officials, in turn, have often visited local communities legitimating Roma concerns. Conferences and seminars, in addition to highlighting the situation of Roma on the international level, have also provided European Commission officers and other international organization representatives with an arena to network with Roma activists and leaders (Ram 2009, 20–25). It is important to now consider how transnational advocacy networks can support protest group activities regarding both issue creation and agenda setting, and influence the discursive positions of states (Keck & Sikkink 1998, 25).

Issue Creation and Agenda Setting— “Framing” the Roma Issue The previous discussion highlighted the EU/NGO cooperation that was essential in influencing domestic agendas concerning Roma inclusion. An important step in “issue creation and agenda setting” is also the construction of a “cognitive frame” that can enhance the appeal of the movement to the wider public, supporting a better understanding of protest group goals and interests. Framing is defined as the simplification of our “lifeworld” (Habermas 1987, 355, quoted in Buechler 2000, 83–85) by emphasizing and encoding objects, experiences, situations and actions that are part of past or present environments. Collective action frames can be used as a tool to support or amplify the injustice of a social condition or re-conceptualize as an unjust condition what was perhaps viewed as a tolerable situation. However, “framing” an issue as immoral is not sufficient to justify a social movement cause; rather, one has to specify blame or convey responsibility for the rectification of a social condition (Snow & Benford 1992, 137). Roma politicians and activists have been effective in framing socio-economic inequalities and impoverishment within Roma communities as a humanitarian issue, deserving the attention of domestic governments and international organizations. Roma leaders have contested their identity as a subservient ethnic and social class, reconceptualising their “tolerated” status within European societies. Roma have been successful in constructing a “cognitive frame” that has appeal at the domestic and international level. One way the movement has been able to raise consciousness and change how Roma are perceived

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by mainstream society, the state and international bodies is the reformation of their “political identity.” Across Europe, the Roma have had multiple identities in various states—such as “Gypsy” and “Tsigani”—that have derogatory connotations. Various anti-racism campaigns and programs have utilized the term “Roma” to contest negative images of this social group. Although the term “Roma” does not have resonance with the general “Roma” populace in Eastern Europe, the emergence of “Roma” as a collective identity at the international level has enabled the emergence of specific organizational policies and programs that target discrimination and alleviate social inequality regarding this social group (Barany 2002, 77). Roma have also adopted nationalistic cultural symbols such as a flag and an anthem to assert their collective identity. Roma have renegotiated their political identity as well as reconstructed historical and present discrimination. It is only recently that the persecution of the Roma during the Holocaust has been memorialized in texts, museums and concentration camps (Acton & Klimova 2001, 163). However, Roma leaders and activists have not been successful in creating an innovative, resonant “master frame,” essential to the success of a social movement, and without which mass mobilization is highly unlikely. It is important to consider that movement tactics are not only constrained by structural considerations, but also the initial “master frame” constructed by the protest group. If the “master frame” does not resonate with social movement constituents it will lack appeal, and be dismissed (Snow & Benford 1992, 147–148). Presently, the “master frame” is an elite driven process that only resonates with a small number of Roma activists and intellectuals participating in international arenas through transnational advocacy networks. The majority of Roma in Eastern Europe are not aware of their “human rights” and lack knowledge of the various domestic and international instruments utilized to contest Roma rights violations. It was also noted by a Roma activist that as the younger generation of educated Roma occupy positions within government and international institutions, there is a widening gap between leaders of the movement and the general Roma populace (Enisa Eminovska, personal communication with author.). Secondly, it is important that the “master frame” be consistent in the values it advocates. Roma politicians often present a disunited public image, lacking a common platform to advocate effectively for Roma inclusion. Roma politicians, once elected, do not always represent the community’s needs, with personal ambition and conflict within political parties often taking precedence. The monopolization of information and resources, and the undemocratic politics practiced by many Romani

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leaders, do not serve to establish a participatory framework that enables a mass movement. Thus, the “master frame,” lacking “potency” among target constituents, does not enable movement longevity (Snow & Benford 1992, 148–149). As the “master frame” does not have resonance with the general Roma community, “competing frames” are more able to demonstrate the irrelevance or limitations of the “master frame” (Ibid., 150). For example, mainstream nationalist political parties in Serbia can more easily practice voter intimidation and co-opt Roma political parties, knowing that there is a lack of consensus among Roma politicians. As suggested by many Roma politicians and activists, fracturing the Romani vote among various political parties has debilitated efforts to push the Roma agenda in national assemblies (interview with Member of Parliament, February 2009). A further example of a “competing frame” was recently constructed by the Romanian government attempting to oppose and renegotiate the Roma political identity. Stipulating concerns of possible confusion between the words “Roma” and “Romania,” the parliament attempted to change the official name of the Roma to “Tigan,” a derogatory name widely used in the SEE region, associated with the enslavement of Roma in Romania from 1385–1856 as well as forced deportations in WWII. Many activists believe the name change could promote further discrimination (Murray 2010).

Does International Influence Matter? Although many international initiatives exist, to what extent can international organizations influence Roma-related policy and programs within a state if there is reluctance on the part of domestic actors and institutions? The “Decade of Roma Inclusion,” like many international initiatives, appears as a conduit to strengthen the Roma movement, but as other Roma-related policies have demonstrated, what appears on paper is lacking in implementation. As a former government advisor in the province of Vojvodina noted: “the Roma issue is not high on the priority list of the Serbian government, even if it is on the agenda” (interview with Anonymous, June 2009). The creation of institutional positions, National Strategies and Action Plans are limited achievements in the absence of political will and interest to create sustainable long-term policies and programs that effectively address Roma issues. It has been argued that the EU, with the support of Roma NGOs, played an important role in influencing domestic agendas on Roma inclusion. Although the EU may have used conditionality as a tool to

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improve the situation of Roma communities, target states may only establish a “rhetorical commitment” to international norms. As the literature on the socialization of international human rights norms has discussed, it is through international declarations and statements that states are effectively “entrapped” by their discourse. Many Eastern European countries provided symbolic tokens of Roma inclusion, such as signing and participating in international initiatives such as the Decade of Roma Inclusion, and with the guidance of the OSCE created national and local action plans on improving the situation of the Roma. The respective states have “instrumentally adapted,” engaging in “rhetorical communication” to demonstrate a concession to international norms (Schimmelfenning 2001). Initially, instrumental adaptations are viewed as minimal concessions to a larger goal, such as EU membership, but eventually may lead to the internalization of international human rights norms. The second phase of norm socialization is the process of argumentation and persuasion. There has been the creation of government positions and bodies in Eastern European states regarding Roma inclusion to demonstrate progress on international commitments. The combination of fulfilling instrumental interests, in addition to engaging in international discussions on Roma issues in various high-level meetings and conferences, has led to a long-term commitment to satisfy international political obligations. Numerous pro-Romani organizations, activists and Roma leaders seek to provide constant criticism while states justify their instrumental priorities, leading to further arguments and persuasion. Moreover, although the EU does not have a coherent minority rights policy, Roma activists can still refer to EU human rights declarations to encourage beneficial policy direction on Roma issues. States, however, may exercise “rhetorical action” (Risse & Sikkink 1999, 16) that compromises international values, reframes ideas in accordance with individual priorities, and utilizes alternative international norms to support their perspective. For instance, some states have used the idea of Roma integration as a collaborative, “pan-European initiative” to absolve national responsibility for the situation. Greater institutional involvement on the part of European organizations is not the problem, it is the re-framing of EU interest in Roma by some political actors as a way to further categorize and exclude the community. By viewing Roma as a “European minority” they are no longer citizens of the state, deserving of socio-economic equality. Additionally, as the Roma community is viewed as the recipient of generous EU funding it may exacerbate the divide between Roma and domestic populations (Vermeersch 2010). Well-known Romanian Roma activist Nicolae Gheorghe has noted:

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The mass Roma migration since EU accession has served the purpose of getting the Roma people out of the local communities. This approach tolerates the idea of the Roma “becoming European” on the assumption that the Roma will leave, the westerners will take on the burden and will then start to “understand our bitterness.” The Roma as an EU citizen is a subtle argument but the solution has to be found here, in Romania. The Romanian government recently announced the intention to adopt a new strategy for the Roma. I think this is a bad idea because it will enable the Romanian authorities to shirk their responsibilities towards their fellow Romanian citizens by “Europeanising” the problem, in other words passing the problem onto the EU institutions and other member states (Gheorghe 2010).

Rhetorical action, such as reframing the Roma issue within the context of Europeanization, allows for member states to maintain a consistent image without damaging their international reputation. This signals potential candidate countries to follow similar processes of norm socialization, as the outcome will not necessarily lead to the institutionalization of Roma inclusion policies.

Conclusion Transnational advocacy networks have facilitated the ability of Roma activists in Eastern Europe to highlight the precarious situation of Roma communities on domestic and international agendas. Although international institutions and NGOs have been essential in conducting research and compiling reports on discrimination and socio-economic inequalities regarding the Roma community, it is questionable if the international community has made a concerted effort to comprehensively address Roma inclusion in Eastern Europe. International organizations have expended considerable monetary resources on Roma inclusion. In the 1990s, an estimated €100 million supported the development of NGO projects and Roma inclusion offices in national government institutions. These activities have, however, not been effective, as domestic rhetoric, short-term projects and an incoherent EU minority protection policy have often led to minimal progress on Roma issues. While Roma have been effective in establishing organizations and networks, recruiting participants and coordinating public meetings and demonstrations, the actions of Roma activists and politicians have not presented a sustained challenge to power holders in Eastern Europe. Roma organizations are not yet a “social movement.” As the Roma continue to mobilize and seek to re-negotiate their identity in a changing Europe, it is important that international and domestic policies promote an emancipatory potential,

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contrary to exercising a “racial governmentality” that controls and manipulates the diverse voices within the community. The Roma community is a collection of the diverse narratives and “moments of resistance” that will modify and expand the ambivalent boundaries of nations and nationalisms and further seek to enrich and complicate the idea of Europe, thus reaffirming the idea of a European multiplicity.

References Acton, Thomas & Ilona Klimova. “The International Romani Union: An East European answer to West European questions?” In Between past and future: the Roma of Central and Eastern Europe, edited by Will Guy, 157–227. Hertfordshire: University of Hertfordshire Press, 2001. Amnesty International. “France President Urged Not to Stigmatize Roma and Travellers,” July 23, 2010. http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-andupdates/france-president-urged-not-stigmatize-roma-and-travellers2010-07-23 (accessed July 17, 2013). Atanasoski, Neda. “Race Toward Freedom: Post-Cold War US Multiculturalism and the Reconstruction of Eastern Europe.” The Journal of American Culture 29 (2) (2006): 213–226. —. “Roma Rights on the World Wide Web: The role of internet technologies in shaping minority and human rights discourses in postsocialist Central and Eastern Europe.” European Journal of Cultural Studies 12 (2) (2009): 205–218. Balibar, Etienne. Politics and the Other Scene. London and New York: Verso, 2002. Barany, Zoltan D. The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality and Ethnopolitics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Barth, Fredrik. “Introduction.” In Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: the Social Organization of Culture Difference, edited by Fredrik Barth, 9– 38. Bergen: Univertsitetsforlaget, 1969. Biebuyck, William & Chris Rumford. “Many Europes: Rethinking Multiplicity.” European Journal of Social Theory 15 (1) (2012): 3–20. Brubaker, Rogers, Mara Loveman & Peter Stamatov. “Ethnicity as Cognition.” Theory and Society 33 (1) (2004): 31–64. Buechler, Steven. Social Movements in Advanced Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Gheorghe, Nicolae [Romanian Roma Activist and former OSCE-ODIHRCPRSI Senior Advisor]. “Romania is shirking its Roma responsibilities.” Guardian.co.uk, November 3, 2010.

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http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/nov/03/romaniashirking-roma-responsibilities (accessed July 17, 2013). Guy, Will. “EU Initiatives on Roma: Limitations and Ways Forward.” In Romani Politics in Contemporary Europe: Poverty, Ethnic Mobilization, and the Neo-liberal Order, edited by Nidhi Trehan & Nando Sigona, 22–50. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. Habermas, Jurgen. The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 2. Translated by Thomas McCarthy. Boston:Beacon Press, 1987. Hansen, Lene. Security as practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War. London and New York: Routledge, 2006. Kapur, Ratna. “The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the ‘Native’ Subject in International/Post-Colonial Feminist Legal Politics.” Harvard Human Rights Journal 15 (1) (2002): 1–37. Keck, Margaret & Kathryn Sikkink. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998. Kertzer, David & Dominique Arel. Census and Identity: The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Khagram, Sanjeev, James V. Riker & Kathryn Sikkink. “From Santiago to Seattle: Transnational Advocacy Groups Restructuring World Politics.” In Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms, edited by Sanjeev Khagram, James V. Riker & Kathryn Sikkink, 3–23. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2002. Memedova, Azbija, Shayna Plaut, Andrea Boscoboinik & Christian Giordano. “Roma Identities in Southeast Europe: Macedonia.” The Ethnobarometer Working Paper Series, Rome: Utta Wickert-Sili, 2005. Murray, Rupert. “Romania’s Government Moves to Rename the Roma.” TIME, November 30, 2010. http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2035862,00.html (accessed July 17, 2013). Ram, Melanie. “Roma Advocacy and EU Conditionality: Not One without the Other?” Paper presented at the Association for the Study of Nationalities (ASN) World Convention, Columbia University, New York, April 2009. Risse, Thomas & Kathryn Sikkink. “The socialization of international human rights norms into domestic practices: introduction.” In The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change. eds. Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink, 1–39. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

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Schimmelfennig, Frank. “The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union.” International Organization 55 (1) (2001): 47–80. Silverman, Carol. “Negotiating Gypsiness: Strategy in Context.” The Journal of American Folklore 101 (401) (1988): 261–275. Simhandl, Katrin. “Beyond Boundaries? Comparing the Construction of the Political Categories ‘Gypsies’ and ‘Roma’ Before and After EU Enlargement.” In Romani Politics in Contemporary Europe: Poverty, Ethnic Mobilization, and the Neo-Liberal Order, edited by Nando Trehan & Nidhi Sigona, 72–94. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. Snow, David & Robert Benford. “Master Frames and Cycles of Protest.” In Frontiers of Social Movement Theory, edited by Carol Mueller & Aldon Morris, 133–155. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992. Stewart, Michael. “Introduction.” In Multi-Disciplinary Approaches to Romany Studies, edited by Michael Stewart & Marton Rovid, 1–13. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2010. Van de Port, Mattijs. “The Articulation of Soul: Gypsy Musicians and the Serbian Other.” Popular Music 18 (3) (1999): 291–307. Vermeersch, Peter. “Between Europeanisation and Discrimination: the Roma as a Special Focus of EU Policy.” Paper presented at Refugee Studies Centre conference “Romani Mobilities in Europe: Multidisciplinary Perspectives.” Oxford University, Oxford, January 2010. Wimmer, Andreas. “The Making and Unmaking of Ethnic Boundaries: A Multilevel Process Theory.” American Journal of Sociology 113 (4) (2008): 970–1022.

CHAPTER TWELVE EUROPEANIZATION MEETS HOMO ECONOMICUS, HOMO SOCIOLOGICUS AND HOMO INTELLECTUS: THE TURKISH CASE AND BEYOND DIDEM BUHARI-GULMEZ

This chapter is inspired by the “Many Europes” research agenda put forward by Biebuyck & Rumford (2012), and previously by Yasemin Soysal (2002), which emphasizes the EU’s lack of a political or cultural centre, and thus the difficulty of understanding it as a singular project. The EU is a rather “polycentric” and “multiperspectival” polity. Accordingly, this chapter intends to study Turkey’s socio-political transformations under the EU’s conditional pressures from the perspective of “multiplicity,” which implies a critique of studies that take the EU as a unified front speaking with a single voice. The emphasis is on the multiplicity of actors and processes that influence Turkish-EU interactions and the resulting transformations in Turkey. The chapter’s innovations are twofold. First, it goes beyond the dichotomous thinking on Turkey-EU interactions by studying three types of processes: strategic, normative and cognitive. Second, in light of this three-dimensional approach to TurkeyEU relations, it discovers that the EU-led reform process is more than a redistribution of strategic opportunities and is less than a normative identification with a fictitious European identity and culture. Instead, the EU is a heuristic device to grasp global complexities and adjust to them to reach a legitimate status in a globalizing world. In order to emphasize that the EU is a normative construction, Ian Manners said that “the EU is not what it does [its outcomes and impact] or what it says [its policies and actions], but what it is” (Manners 2002, 252). In other words, the EU is a socially constructed project that attempts to spatio-temporally fix “Many Europes” (Biebuyck & Rumford 2012) and

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reinforce the illusion that Europe has a centre that pacifies and spreads post-material values to the world. Benefiting from political research on heuristics (Mintz 1997; Johns 2009), this chapter also implies that the EU is not what it models. Refining the assumption that post-War civilization was largely determined by European “hegemons,” this chapter alternatively suggests that the relationship between Europe and the modern world order is more complex than it seems. For instance, the EU has been used by national elites as a “heuristic device” to understand the highly complex, dynamic and changing global structure. “A heuristic is a strategy that ignores part of the information, with the goal of making decisions more quickly, frugally, and/or accurately than more complex methods” (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier 2011, 454). Particularly when social and political actors face uncertainty, they tend to rely on social information, institutional rules or other social heuristics such as “imitate-thesuccessful” (Ibid.). In this context, the EU is both a successful model to imitate and an institutional authority that provides blueprints and roadmaps to deal with growing complexities in an increasingly interdependent world. As a heuristic device, the EU decontextualizes and objectifies the idea of Europe and thus wipes out the collective memory of past nationalistic and religious conflicts on the European continent (Eder & Spohn 2005). By introducing heuristics into the analysis, it is possible to move beyond the prevailing accounts that describe the EU as either “unipolar,” “bipolar” or multilevel. Instead, the EU is “polycentric” (Rumford 2006) and the mainstream accounts usually ignore the fact that different types of European forces operate in (at least) three different realms: interests, norms and values, and intellect and ideas. Although European-led processes and actors overlap in those realms, their analytical separation is possible since they attribute different meanings to actor, system and the relationship between actor and system. The first part of the chapter will introduce the multiple types of actors and processes respectively in the realms of interests, norms and ideas as an attempt to move beyond the prevailing dichotomies in the current EU studies (for the analytical separation of strategic, normative and cognitive realms, see Scott 1995; DiMaggio & Powell 1991; Zucker 1977). The second part will discuss the multidimensional character of Turkey’s socio-political transformations during the EU accession negotiations. The final part will emphasize the cognitive dimension of Turko-European interactions and conclude that Turkey follows the EU in order to reach a globally legitimate status rather than acquire economic and strategic gains or a parochial European culture.

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Turkey constitutes a “hard case” for the EU because its membership is contested in not only strategic and normative terms but also because it lacks a cognitive frame such as the idea of “return to Europe” that facilitated the accession of the ex-communist countries. Turkey signed an Association agreement with the European Economic Community in 1963, made an official application for membership in 1987, was granted official candidate status in 1999, and eventually started accession negotiations in 2005. Turkey adopted substantial reforms in line with the EU membership criteria but its failure to comply with the EU’s Cyprus policy led to partial suspension of its accession negotiations in 2006. It would be misleading to think that Turkey’s compliance with the EU’s Cyprus policy would put a decisive end to the current impasse in Turkey’s EU membership process. Not only the incessant failures of Turkey to adopt and implement several other EU-led reforms, but also a bourgeoning European cultural opposition against the membership of an Islamic country have reinforced the uncertainty around Turkey’s EU membership prospects. The current stalemate in the EU-Turkey relations is likely to endure even after Turkey’s compliance with the EU’s conditionality on its Cyprus policy. In this context, the prevailing scholarship on Turkey–EU relations tends to treat the Turkish case as sui generis, due to the remarkable contestations and delays in its EU membership process (Börzel 2012). Rather than treating Turkey as a sui generis case, this study suggests benefiting from the Turkish case in order to expand the theory of Europeanization and domestic reform.

Multiple realms, actors and processes In the realm of interests, the main actor is homo economicus who inherently resorts to cost-benefit calculus in their search for utilitymaximization and optimal solution (Hirsch et al. 1990). Accordingly, the actor seeks to maximize their predetermined interests and to this end follows the “logic of expected consequences,” which means that they make a decision after determining all the alternative options and predicting the consequences of taking each alternative (March & Olsen 1998). For its part, the system is narrowly defined as strategic opportunities and challenges that regulate and constrain (not constitute) the actor’s choices. An actor is thought to be aware of and largely insulated from systemic constraints. In the world of interests, an actor’s interaction with the system is through instrumentalization. Rather than internalizing systemic properties, an actor seeks to benefit from systemic lacuna and opportunities.

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Alternatively, in the realm of norms and values, an actor is defined as homo sociologicus whose rationality is largely bounded due to the scarcity of information, complexity of situation, time pressure, societal constraints as well as cognitive limitations such as the inherent inability to process and compute the expected utility of every alternative action. The realm of norms is populated by “satisficers” rather than utility-maximizers (March & Olsen 1998). In other words, homo sociologicus follows the “logic of normative appropriateness” and tends to avoid inappropriate decisions even though such decisions would have been “beneficial” from the perspective of homo economicus (Hirsch et al. 1990). In the normative realm, system-actor boundaries are less impermeable and the normative system has a broader effect on the actor. This emerges from the fact that the actor does not only instrumentalize systemic forces but also internalizes certain systemic attributes on a selective basis and adjusts their behaviour accordingly. This implies that the system has both constraining and constitutive effects on actors. Hence, the awareness of the actor regarding systemic effects is much lower. Accordingly, an actor finds it difficult to reverse an action every time they desire to do so as they fall prey to path-dependency, institutional lock-ins, and normative pressures (Aspinwall & Schneider 2000; Pierson 1996). In a modern organization, if the world of interests is compared to the Finance Department, and the world of norms is the Ethics Department, the world of the intellect and ideas represents the Research and Development section. Rather than the binary logic of expected consequences and normative appropriateness, actors in the cognitive realm follow the “logic of heuristic decision-making.” This implies that they frequently resort to mental shortcuts or heuristic devices to make judgments in a complex environment. An actor’s rationality is ritualized or ceremonial (Meyer & Rowan 1977). In other words, the realm of the intellect assumes that actors are not inherently rational but take for granted that they are supposed to act rationally to be counted as legitimate actors in the modern world. Therefore, they attempt to live up to this expectation by constant “post-hoc rationalization.” Hence, actors in the world of ideas are constituted by the system and need the system to make sense of the world and operate in it. The boundaries between actor and system are porous and the effects of the system on the actor are the broadest. Yet, the actor’s awareness of this is the lowest amongst all three realms because they tend to take systemic (constitutive) effects for granted. In sum, it is the wider system that enacts, “tames” and legitimates the actor (Meyer & Jepperson 2000). The analytical separation of the three realms as strategic, normative and cognitive helps to grasp the multiplicity of actors and processes

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underlying the EU’s influence—here called “Europeanization” to emphasize the transformative processes led by the EU—abroad. In general, scholars use Europeanization to indicate at least five different processes associated with European integration: territorial expansion (widening), institutional expansion (deepening), institutional adaptation of national or sub-national polities to the EU rules and norms, diffusion of the EU rules and norms to non-EU areas of the globe, and finally the political unification of the EU as a global actor (Olsen 2002). Rather than coercion, the EU resorts to conditionality, including economic and strategic incentives (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005). Furthermore, the EU influences states by altering existing domestic opportunity structures and the power distribution among domestic actors (Börzel & Risse 2003). Finally, the European discourse has a potential transformative and persuasive power on the domestic sphere through its (normative and cognitive) influence on identities and ideas (Checkel 1999). Hence, Europeanization is used to explain policy change, administrative innovation, cultural change and new identity formation, which render the term ambiguous, if not meaningless (Howell 2004). European forces that operate in three realms involve different primary actors, strategies and outcomes (see Fig. 12.1 below). The European world of interests is primarily led by intergovernmental bargains that take place at the Council of Ministers where coercion and persuasion are the main strategies towards candidate states (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005). In this context, Turkey and other candidate states tend to see the EU primarily as an instrument to maximize their own economic and strategic interests. Hence, their compliance with the EU conditionality is largely selective and strictly relies upon official membership criteria. EU scholars call such selective and limited compliance with the EU “thin Europeanization” (Vink 2003) or “EU-ization” (Flockhart 2010). The European normative realm is primarily driven by norm diffusion and norm entrepreneurship (Checkel 2001). For instance, the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, the European Court of Human Rights and civil society organizations disseminate “European” values, which are interchangeable with “post-material values” (Inglehart 1971). In the normative realm, candidate states tend to define the EU as a peaceful Kantian system of values (Kiriúçi 2006). Compliance with the EU is often voluntary because becoming European means becoming modernized, democratized and advanced in terms of embracing post-material values like human rights and individual freedoms. Some scholars describe such processes of norm-driven transformation in candidate countries as “thick Europeanization” (Vink 2003). While some scholars view the strategic and

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the normative processes of Europeanization as complementary in terms of explaining different phases of domestic change (Checkel 2001, 196), others think they are mutually exclusive (Vink 2003). Fig. 12.1. Three Types of Europeanization processes

Strategic

Europeanization processes Normative Cognitive

EU as a cost-effective instrument for economic and strategic gains

EU as a Kantian system of values

EU as providing status/category/c lass, vision, legitimate actorness

Selective compliance with EU official criteria

Voluntary compliance with post-material values

Automatic compliance and post-hoc rationalization

Thin Europeanization

Thick Europeanization

Ritualized Europeanization

Finally, in the European world of ideas the primary actors are epistemic communities, the European Commission and the European Court of Justice, which constantly theorize, redefine and reorganize; in other words, they problematize the taken-for-granted phenomena and offer new methods and solutions. In this context, candidate states perceive the EU as a “gateway” to prevailing global templates. The EU does not only provide strategic-economic gains or democratization, but it also—and most importantly—grants international recognition, a legitimate world status, and a world category that is accepted as the standard of contemporary civilization. Being categorized as “European” matters not only in terms of attracting foreign investment or international prestige, but in that it also permits access to all types of global networks as a legitimate actor. Seeking external legitimation, social and political actors comply automatically with what they assume to be global standards. EU-led reforms are embraced not because they solve certain problems but because they often back their recommendations with scientific, UN- and INGO-promoted “evidence.”

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Europeanization in that sense is “ritualized” because it is not a thought-out process. It is rather automatic and reflex-like, and, like a ritual, reforms are passed by national Parliaments in candidate countries but no parliamentarian has any idea of how to put them into practice in that specific context. In this sense, rather than the efficiency of the reforms carried by the EU, candidate countries consider whether such reforms would legitimate one’s actorhood in the world. The search for EU membership is thus understood as a request to be re-categorized in the global forums and lists. For a candidate country like Turkey, which tries to find its place in the post-Cold War world order, EU membership means more than certain economic and strategic benefits. Contrary to “modernization” arguments, candidate countries are “too proud” of their national independence and their particular culture to look for moral or cultural substitutes. Hence, their major objective is to acquire the status of “EU member,” which is treated as a “gateway” to global standards. This revolutionizes research on the relationship between Europe and globalization—rather than a “gatekeeper” against global flows, the EU is a “gateway” to global networks and standards (see Rumford & Buhari-Gulmez 2011; for a review of EU-globalization relations see Rumford & Buhari-Gulmez 2012). In other words, independent of its economic and strategic incentives, EU membership is meaningful and appealing as long as it is situated at the hub of the production and dissemination of global scripts. If this three-dimensional approach, that locates the EU within the global cognitive realm, is applied to Turkey’s relations with the EU, it can be seen that the study of normative and cognitive processes led by the EU has been neglected. The following section aims to introduce processes of Europeanization that go beyond the strategic realm in Turkey.

Turkey’s Europeanization beyond the strategic realm Turkey’s formal relations with the European Union (previously the European Economic Community, then the European Community) date back to 1963, but Turkey-EU relations remained atypical until the end of the Cold War. This was due to two mutually-reinforcing assumptions. First, until the dissolution of the Soviet Union the “West” was perceived as a unitary bloc incorporating America and Europe as well as Japan, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. In other words, the European was not thought to be distinguished from the American in terms of ideology and political preferences. Second, given its self-proclaimed pro-Westernism, Turkey was assumed to be an effective barrier against the spread of the Communist bloc in the Middle East and Caucasus (a “green belt” in Ergil

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2000, a “pivotal state” in Larrabee & Lesser 2002). In particular, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the Islamist coup in Iran increased the strategic value of Turkey in the eyes of the West (Öniú 1995; Larrabee & Lesser 2002). Therefore, the literature dealing with Turkish politics in the Cold War era tends to overemphasize Turkey’s strategic location and avoids an analysis of differences between Turkey and the West in social, economic and cultural terms. However, in the post-Cold War era, both assumptions have been deeply challenged, problematizing Turkey’s relations with the West in general, and with Europe in particular. First of all, with the dissolution of the common enemy, the “West” split into two; in other words, two different “Wests” emerged (Habermas 2006; Kagan 2003; Ateso÷lu Güney 2007). Assuming full responsibility for their security and political choices, Europeans transformed their economic Community into a political Union by concluding the Maastricht Treaty. Accordingly, the EU set itself as an alternative political entity with distinctive choices on a wide range of policies from socio-economic preferences to normative concerns (Manners 2002; Lucarelli 2006, 39). This has had serious implications on Turkey-EU relations, since many issues that were not on the agenda of Turkish-Western/European relations in the previous era (such as Turkey’s approach to minority and human rights) have become potential sources of conflict in Turkey’s relations with the EU (Hale 2000, 180). Furthermore, as the EU started to distinguish itself from the United States of America (USA), Turkey’s close alliance with the USA turned out to be an obstacle to its rapprochement with Europe. The American support for Turkey’s EU membership has often been perceived as a strategy to introduce a “Trojan horse” (Turkey) to the EU in order to influence the political decision-making (Fuller 2004). Turkey’s refusal to open its bases to the use of the USA military during the second Iraq war has been interpreted as evidence for Turkey’s affinity with the EU (Sever 2007). In this respect, Turkey is assumed to be “caught between two Wests” and will eventually be forced to make a decision between them in the future (Mowle 2007, 30). Studies on Turkey’s Europeanization abounded following the officialization of Turkey’s EU candidacy in 1999 (BölükbaúÕ et al. 2010, 465). Since then, Turkey has enacted significant reforms in a wide range of policy domains. According to Öniú (2003, 13) “a change of this magnitude would have been impossible in the absence of a powerful and highly institutionalized EU anchor in the direction of full membership.” Similarly, SarÕgil (2007) concludes that the EU has been the “main trigger” in the democratization of Turkey. However, there is no consensus on the meaning of Europeanization in Turkey. A prevailing tendency is to

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define Europeanization in functional terms as an instrument to maximize domestic economic and strategic interests. In this context, if the expected benefits of Europeanization outweigh the costs associated with adaptation, domestic actors are likely to allow for compliance with the EU (Schimmelfennig 2005). Yet, there are several cases of Europeanization which cannot be explained in terms of economic-strategic benefits. For instance, Turkey has been the only country that acceded to the Customs Union before the formal acceptance of its EU candidacy, and whether Turkey benefits from this in economic and strategic terms is still dubious (Aral 2005). Accordingly, rather than short-term interests, there are longterm interests at play. Alternatively, Europeanization is increasingly seen as part of an overall project of modernization, which is broadly defined as an identity-building process in Turkey. Hence, secularism, liberalism, democratic principles, minority and human rights come into play. However, there is an apparent confusion about Turkey’s own identity. The rising religious conservatism in Turkey may be perceived as a counterprocess to Europeanization (becoming Middle Eastern), but Turkey’s Islamists are self-proclaimed Europhiles. Besides, there is no consensus on the EU’s identity. For instance, Marcussen et al. (1999) explains that there are at least five interpretations of the EU’s identity by European elites, namely: (1) liberal nationalist Europe, (2) wider Europe as a community of values, (3) Europe as a democratic and socialist alternative between capitalism and communism, (4) modern Europe as part of the Western community based on liberal democracy and social market economy, and (5) Christian Europe. To complicate things further, there are “postWestern” processes at work both in Europe and in Turkey (Rumford & Turunc 2010). Turkish elites and experts increasingly embrace a normative discourse presenting the EU as a “catalyst” for peace, democratization, as well as the advance of human rights and the rule of law in candidate countries (for example, see Kiriúçi 2006). Taha Aksoy states that “previously EU membership was sought for mainly economic reasons: economic aid and employment opportunities in Europe [but failed to receive substantial aid due to the Greek veto]. Yet, things seem to have significantly changed. Turkey has become a successful economy and the EU is now suffering from economic crises and high levels of unemployment” (interview with the author, 2010). Algan Hacalo÷lu, from the main opposition party (CHP), similarly argues that the EU is no longer able to offer substantial economic aid to its member countries like Greece, let alone the candidate countries. Thus, normative Europeanization has come to be highly valued, at least at the rhetorical level amongst Turkish elites. Accordingly, EU

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membership is currently sought for its promise to spread post-material values, especially democracy, human rights and the rule of law in Turkey. “Anchoring” Turkey to EU structures is a discourse that is embraced by a large segment of pro-EU groups in Turkey. Even the leading Turkish political elites state that the reform process through which Turkey gets closer to EU-led standards are more important than the final outcome, i.e. Turkey’s EU membership. Otherwise, in their opinion, Turkey might succumb to crisis and backwardness. Abdullah ÇalÕúkan, a leading member of the Parliamentary committee on EU Harmonization, states that the Turkish government values the post-Helsinki (negotiation) process much more than the outcome, i.e. full membership, because it already anchors Turkey to the “standard of contemporary civilization” (interview with the author). Similarly, Zeynep Da÷Õ, a strong government supporter of Turkey’s EU membership, explains: I reject an outcome-focused approach to EU-Turkey relations. Both the EU and the international system are dynamic, and transformations they undertake are only partially predictable. It is thus misleading to see Turkey-EU relations in terms of some love-hate relationship. The process is much more important. It catalyzes democratization and the advance of human rights and the rule of law in Turkey. It institutionalizes mutual interests and interdependencies in economic, political and legal domains (Zeynep Da÷Õ, interview with the author).

Yaúar YakÕú, another leading member of the government and a former Minister of the Foreign Affairs, provides a similar account: There is uncertainty around both Turkey’s EU membership and the EU’s own future. There are too many unknown variables to solve the equation. So, let’s focus on the process. If we succeed in enacting well-functioning democratic institutions, transparent market economy, greater freedoms, less corruption, then membership becomes less important (Yaúar YakÕú, interview with the author).

Nevertheless, the Turkish government’s election manifesto in 2002 made sure that EU membership was not seen as a precondition for Turkey’s modernization. “EU membership is a natural result (not cause) of Turkey’s modernization process. Implementing the EU’s socioeconomic criteria is an important step towards further modernization of state and society. These criteria are inevitable even when they are thought of independently of EU membership” (AKP election manifesto 2002). The previous chair of the External Relations committee in the Turkish Parliament and an influential member of the government, Murat Mercan,

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“strongly disagree[d] with the claim that Turkey couldn’t achieve modernization without EU membership. Turkey is already experiencing a modernization process that derives from its cultural peculiarities and traditions. Nothing can stop this process” (Murat Mercan, interview with the author). Not only the Turkish government but also the opposition deemphasize the EU membership as a precondition for Turkey’s progress and modernization. A renowned professor of international law in Turkey and a member of the Parliamentary Committee on External Relations from the opposition party (CHP), Hüseyin PazarcÕ, argues that “The EU membership process accelerates the advance of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in candidate states. Yet, it is still possible to democratize and modernize without the EU process. For example, Norway’s experience shows that EU membership is not a precondition for modernity” (Hüseyin PazarcÕ, interview with the author 2010). Furthermore, the opposition claims that “The EU and its acquis is only a part of universal human rights, democracy and the rule of law. It does not represent the whole set of universal values” (Faruk Bal, opposition MP 2010). Finally, normative Europeanization not only involves democratization and the advance of human rights. It also encourages the popularization of certain historical figures who have for a long time been “bête noires” of the Kemalist regime such as the Ottoman sultan Abdulhamid II, and the Kurdish tribe leader Sheikh Said. This goes hand in hand with the rise of criticisms against the Kemalist regime, which is frequently described as an oppressive regime against individuals, groups and foreigner’s rights. The trial of military and political figures involved in the 1980 coup d’état was only possible during the EU accession process. In brief, if one seeks to understand Turkish transformations within the EU process, one needs to understand that Europeanization is more than the redistribution of strategic opportunities within domestic society. Europeanization has also a normative face which is highly influential on Turkish society and politics when it comes to receiving and adopting EU-led reforms and norms.

A cognitive perspective—the EU reflecting global scripts “Cognitive Europeanization” implies that the EU “has penetrated the fabric of law and the toolbox used by domestic policy makers” (Harcourt 2003, 180). For instance, the EU has triggered cognitive transformations where it has a structural impact, for example on how business interests are formed and represented in Europe (Coen & Dannreuther 2003, 267), and when it “has brought the introduction of yet unknown technical structures

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inside the … public administration” (Giuliani 2001, 57). Rather than official membership conditionality or culture, the EU influences candidate countries “through ranking [them], benchmarking in particular policy areas, and providing examples of best practice that the applicants seek to emulate” (Grabbe 2003, 315). Finally, the EU’s advice and twinning mechanisms that are available to candidate states are crucial in terms of triggering cognitive changes on how to define and organize political issues (Ibid.). Although it is less visible than the EU-led processes in strategic and normative realms, it is crucial in tracing the cognitive influence of the EU on its candidates. Turkey, which is a candidate infamous for failing to comply with EU conditionality, is undergoing important cognitive transformations during its accession negotiations with the EU. For instance, it has started to treat the Kurdish question under the category of “minority problems.” This means that Turkey has redefined the concept of minority, which was exclusively defined in religious terms according to the 1923 founding Treaty of Lausanne. The “Kurdish question” was either openly denied or antagonistically framed as separatist terrorism. In a 2006 survey conducted with members of the main opposition party (the Republican People’s Party [CHP]), 60% of the respondents denied the existence of such a problem by saying that every Turkish citizen was a Turk (Gulmez 2010). Some of them (20%) even argued that acknowledging that Turkey had a Kurdish problem would legitimize the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), internationally recognized as a terrorist organization (Gulmez 2010). Six years later the party did not only acknowledge the Kurdish question but its leader stated that he was ready to sacrifice his political career to solve the Kurdish problem (Vatan 2012). Throughout the EU process Turkey has acquiesced and reframed the Kurdish question as one of minority rights rather than terrorism (Sofos 2001). In addition, the EU process led to the problematization of taken-forgranted concepts such as secularism and nationalism in Turkey. The Turkish state’s financial support of Sunni Islam, the latter’s affiliation with the state through the state institute of religious affairs (Diyanet) and the compulsory education of Sunni Islam in Turkish schools have become problematic during the EU process. The Turkish government has been encouraged to rethink its understanding of secularism and to consider redefining the concept in order to treat other religious communities, such as Alevis, on equal terms with Sunni Muslims (de Castro 2010). Another interesting debate relied upon the questioning of the concept of national security. A leading Turkish think tank—the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV)—published a report suggesting that the

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traditional understanding of national security in Turkey had become obsolete and should be redefined in line with the emerging notion of human security in a post-national world. According to TESEV, both threat perceptions and the methods to deal with them have changed in the sense that the notions of “martyrdom” and “national heroism” are no longer useful in understanding citizenship and national identity. In terms of new methods and approaches, the EU process has given birth to “EU experts” in the public and private sectors as well as the EU Ministry, which is responsible for following EU developments and adjusting Turkish responses accordingly. So far, the EU has promoted a myriad of concepts and methods to deal with the growing complexities in domestic and global socio-political spheres. For instance, “multi-level governance” and decentralization were integrated into the Turkish mindset through the EU reform process. Overall, Europeanization is very much a mental process. Ufuk Uras, an opposition MP from BDP, states that: “I think EU-led reforms transform Turkish mentality: our way of seeing, interpreting, understanding things” (interview with the author, 2010). Therefore, Europeanization is about understanding (and is neither goaloriented nor norm-driven behaviour). Furthermore, major benefits of EU membership are neither economic-strategic interests nor the diffusion of post-material values. They are the reaching of universally accepted standards and becoming part of a class that makes one recognized as a legitimate actor in the modern world. In this sense, EU membership is valuable as long as the EU is perceived as reflecting universal scripts. Abdullah ÇalÕúkan and Yaúar YakÕú provide confirmatory statements: EU membership means recognition and a legitimate status in the world … EU membership is a [legitimate] recognized category in the eyes of the world (Yaúar YakÕú, interview with the author 2010). We aim to promote Turkey to a higher class in the world. We are doing it by using the EU as both an anchor and a justification … Even the status of “official EU candidate” has improved Turkey’s influence and prestige in the Middle East, Africa, and the Far East (Abdullah ÇalÕúkan, interview with the author 2010).

Here, Europe is defined as a contributor to and carrier of global standards. In other words, Turks see EU membership conditionality as a “roadmap” with which to reach the standards of contemporary civilization. In this sense, global standards are largely shaped by Europe but are not interchangeable with European standards. The President of the Turkish Republic announced that the overall aim of Turkey is to reach universal

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standards, not necessarily European standards (Gül 2009), while the Turkish ambassador to the EU stated that Turkey adopts EU-led reforms, such as the death penalty, only because the reform is universally endorsed (Rettman 2011). Similarly, Abdullah ÇalÕúkan describes the EU as a “blueprint”: It provides us with standards [of contemporary civilization]. Those standards are largely enacted and refined by the EU but these are universal, not European. Standards are not exclusively European. They rather belong to all modern and advanced societies. There is not necessarily any geographical rule: we can find them in China, in Russia, or in the USA. Yet, the EU has tested those standards, refined them over time, and codified them into an acquis. It categorized topics under 35 chapters for Turkey; and it made them visible, comparable, measurable, and testable … We can certainly reach similar outcomes without the EU with our own internal dynamics but we do not need much effort or spend time to understand all these. Because these are readily assessed and implemented in the European context. Without the EU pressures, Turkey would still continue its efforts to catch up with those [universal] standards yet the EU process has surely accelerated the pace of necessary reforms. If the EU membership gets permanently stalled, we’ll call the Copenhagen criteria “Ankara or Istanbul criteria” and continue reforms (Abdullah ÇalÕúkan, interview with the author 2010).

The opposition parties offer similar accounts in terms of defining the EU as a carrier of global standards: CHP supports EU-led reforms because in addition to spreading EU standards, they further integrate Turkey with the world, and help Turkey to adjust its economic, social, legal structures to world standards (Faik Öztrak 2010). The principal reason for my support to Turkey’s EU membership is the EU’s provision of standards. Democracy, the rule of law, and human rights are universal values but the EU has succeeded in institutionalizing them. The EU thus provides us with a roadmap (Ufuk Uras, interview with the author 2010).

The main challenge for the EU in this realm is to demonstrate that the standards (definitions, tools, solutions) it provides are “part of the intersubjective common-sense world” (Zucker 1991, 87) and are compatible with the established models and standards at the global level. In other words, the EU’s cognitive legitimacy relies upon global endorsement. To some, the EU needs the “stamp of approval” of the

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United Nations (Claude 1966), or the support of international nongovernmental organizations that provide technical and cognitive standards (Boli & Thomas 1999). Without resonance with prevailing cognitive models, the EU’s conditional pressures are prone to trigger opposition in the candidate country.

Concluding Remarks This chapter offered an analytical framework through which the sociopolitical transformations led by the EU in a difficult candidate country, Turkey, could be studied in three realms: strategic, normative and cognitive. While rationalist studies that prioritize the strategic realm—the realm of interests—abound (for instance, the Veto Players model of George Tsebelis [2002]), and there are increasing attempts to incorporate the normative realm—the realm of culture, norms, and values—in EU studies (see for instance, Checkel 2001 and 2003); the cognitive realm— the realm of intellect and ideas—often goes unnoticed. This becomes highly problematic in EU studies when one is quick to jump to the conclusion that the failure to alter or “Europeanize” domestic norms and identities means that the Europeanization process is limited to the strategic realm. This chapter suggests that Europeanization is more than the redistribution of opportunity structures in the domestic arena. Lacking a cultural centre, it also goes beyond the spread of certain post-material norms and values. At a less visible but more influential level, Europeanization as a cognitive process transforms taken-for-granted visions of existing problems and available solutions in the domestic sphere. The chapter suggests that further studies should seek an answer to the complexity and multiplicity behind European transformations in the global arena.

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NOTES

Chapter One 1

“Re-thinking Realities,” Meeting at the European Parliament in Brussels, November 29, 2011. http://gallery.mailchimp.com/50215b8b5aeba5202e37dff9b/files/Presentation_of_t he_whole_European_Trail_project.4.pdf

Chapter Two 1

A similar notion of legally based collective identification is expressed by Habermas’ (1992) concept of “constitutional patriotism.” 2 These are mainly published and distributed by the European Commission—either centrally (including through the online “EU bookshop”) or by the Commission representations in various countries. Other institutions produce formally similar material with a focus on their own structures, processes and remits. The majority of the Commission brochures and leaflets, in contrast, focus on policy discourses. 3 It should be noted that the aims here are not comprehensiveness and objectivity, or representativeness and generalizability, which are traditionally perceived to be the characteristics on which the validity of research depends (Flick 2009). Instead, in line with post-positivist and discourse analytical acknowledgement that such aims are illusory in qualitiative research, a mere illustration of some of the recurring narrative structures and ideological contents that collectively constitute the EUropean imaginary is aimed for. However, the findings presented here can be observed not only in the basic publication Europe in 12 Lessons but are also substantiated by common observation in many of the publications used in the triangulation process.

Chapter Three 1

Although the transitional periods for the free movement of citizens of even the newest member states are due to expire at the beginning of 2014, with a reasonably long queue of membership candidates and with Croatia joining in mid-2013 this category of people is set to persist for some time to come. 2 For the first three formulations, see European Commission (1997, 8–17). The last formulation is from European Commission (1996, 1). For other references to “the European Labour Market” see European Commission (2007d) and Diamantopoulou (2001).

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3

As Guild (2005, 22) points out, there has been much academic debate about the possibility of including TCNs into the concept of workers under the Community law. 4 According to this principle, “Member States will consider requests for admission to their territories for the purpose of employment only where vacancies in a Member State cannot be filled by national and Community manpower or by nonCommunity manpower lawfully resident on a permanent basis in that Member State and already forming part of the Member State’s regular labour market” (Council of the EU, cited in European Commission 2004a, 6, original emphasis). 5 Providing a detailed account of Commission articulations on the question of FMoPfWP in the 1970s and early 1980s Enlargements is beyond the scope of this study because of its time frame. Such an inquiry, however, will undoubtedly be of great interest.

Chapter Five 1

This chapter largely draws on my research monograph that was published in 2012 under the title “Mobilizing Regions, Mobilizing Europe: Expert Knowledge and Scientific Planning in European Regional Development” (Büttner 2012). 2 Remarkably, most analytical models of “good” regional practice derive from research on best practice models of economic government at the national level (Porter 1990; Lundvall 1992; Edquist 1997). The major assumptions and rationales of these models have been directly transposed to sub-national settings without any major changes or adaptations. 3 In fact, in reference to the famous iconic role model, many economic activities are situated or promoted in one or the other way in some kind of “valley,” at least in semantic terms. See, for example, the “Tees Valley” in the North-East of England, the “Aviation Valley” in South-Eastern Poland, the “Medicine Valley” in Erlangen (Southern Germany) and many other examples from many European countries. 4 See http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/index_en.cfm for a look at the activities of the European Commission in the field of regional policy, and http://www.oecd.org/regional/ for an overview of OECD activities. 5 One of the newest “innovations” in the field of concept-promotion seems to be the notion of “smart specialization” that is supposed to link “smart growth” with “sustainable growth” (see EC 2012).

Chapter Six 1

It should also be noted that the LINGUA programme was supposed to eventually evolve into a scheme of “protecting the less widely used and less widely taught languages.” Its influence has unfortunately remained limited to learning English (Sberro 2009). 2 Prior to Cypriot adhesion to the EU, the Annan Plan was taken to referenda concurrently on both sides of the island. Whereas 75% of the Greek Cypriot voters

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said “No,” 65% of the Turkish Cypriot voters said “Yes.” The fact that their “Yes” vote for an EU-supported UN plan has not substantially eased up the sanctions on them has caused significant resentment among Turkish Cypriots. A 2007 survey showed that 65% of Turkish Cypriots now opted for two separate states and not a united Cyprus. See Mehmet Hasgüler & Murat Tüzünkan “Cyprus at a Crossroads,” Middle East Quarterly 16 (4) (2009): 63–71. 3 For Latin fever in Finland, see Finnish Government, “The Website and Visual Image for Finland’s EU Presidency Unveiled,” May 31, 2006 http://www.vn.fi/ajankohtaista/tiedotteet/tiedote/fi.jsp?oid=156528, and Nicholas Watt, “Finns Turn Jargon of Unio Europaea into Poetry with Weekly Latin Readings,” July 3, 2006. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/jul/03/eu.politics.

Chapter Seven 1

Tim King. “Spain told to speed up bank reforms,” European Voice, May 15, 2012. http://www.euuropeanvoice.com/article/2012/may/spain-told-to-speed-upbank-reforms/74336.aspx 2 Joshua Chaffin and Quentin Peel. “Talks begin to build coalition in Greece,” Financial Times, June 18, 2012. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/533b80a2-b92f-11e19bfd-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1zwBUw201SFJ 3 Honor Mahony. “Greece urged to uphold austerity as coalition talks begin,” EUObserver.com, May 7, 2012. http://euobserver.com/843/116165 4 Leigh Phillips. “Union chief, Barroso fear Europe ‘returning to 1930s’,” EUObserver.com, June 14, 2010. http://euobserver.com/19/30271 5 Since 2010, the Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s party Fidesz has had more than a two thirds supermajority in the Hungarian Parliament. 6 For example, the 2012 Freedom House report for Romania states that successive governments throughout the last few years have tended to use fast-track procedures that could by-pass the parliament http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nationstransit/2012/romania 7 Othon Anastasakis. “Greek democracy ‘at gunpoint’.” European Voice, November 10, 2011. http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/greekdemocracy-at-gunpoint-/72573.aspx 8 This was, according to EU commission spokesman Olivier Bailly, a development that could “put at risk all the progress made over the past five years in having more respect for the rule of law and democratic checks and balances and independence of the judiciary in this country.” Quoted in Valentina Pop, “EU warns Romania on rule of law,” EUObserver.com, July 6, 2012. http://euobserver.com/843/116896 9 Leigh Philips, “MEPs call for anti-Italian sanctions in press freedom row.” EUObserver.com, October 7, 2009. http://euobserver.com/843/28796 10 In Romania, the 2011 National Security Strategy framed media discourse which criticized the policies adopted by the government as a threat to national security. See Dan Alexe, “Is free press a threat to Romania's stability?” EUObserver.com, June 30, 2010. http://euobserver.com/9/30387 11 The 2010–2011 revisions of the Hungarian constitution have limited the right to speech by making journalists more liable in justice for their ideas. See Christopher

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Walker & Sylvana Habdank-Koáaczkowska, Europe's Viktors and democracy's downturn, European Voice, June 7, 2012. http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2012/june/europe-s-viktors-and-democracys-downturn/74553.aspx 12 According to Koopmans & Statham (2010, 54) claim-making analysis is the most suitable method for examining the way politics interacts with the media in the boundaries of the public sphere. Claim making acts are examples of intentional communicative actions within the public sphere: they “consist of public speech acts (including protest events) that articulate political demands, calls to action, proposals, or criticisms, which, actually or potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the claimants or other collective actors” (Koopmans & Statham 2010, 55). 13 A European Citizens’ Initiative requires one million votes from at least seven member states in order to prompt the European Commission to discuss legislation within policy areas where it has competences conferred by the EU’s treaties.

Chapter Eight 1

Art. 24,TFEU: the right to petition to the EP and apply to the Ombudsman in any of the 23 official languages of the EU and receive an answer in the same language. It can be invoked by any EU resident regardless of their nationality. 2 CEE member states have been EU members since 2004 and 2007. New member states since 1st May 2004: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland. New member states since 1st January 2007: Bulgaria and Romania. EU 15 member states are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. 3 Data collected in all 27 member states with 27,500 respondents by TNS Opinion & Social (2011) between March and April 2010. The full dataset is not yet available to the public, so here I refer to the data summary presented in a report. 4 All interviews were conducted in English. Respondents’ language skills thus greatly influenced the discussions. 5 The report distinguishes three groups of EU citizens: (1) “new Europeans by openness alone”: EU citizens who have worked or studied in another country, have a partner from another country or own property abroad; (2) “new Europeans by ancestry alone” are second generation migrants; and (3) “old Europeans” are those with no connection to more than one country. For the purpose of this chapter I consider group (1) as the migrant EU citizens, group (2) as second generation EU citizens and group (3) as the non-migrant EU citizens. 6 Respondents’ socialising trends were established via questionnaires prior to their interviews.

Chapter Nine 1

Interview with UK Head of Network, July 5, 2012.

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Chapter Ten 1

Membership requires that candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union (EU Council 1993). 2 Such as the French President Nicholas Sarkozy, German Prime Minister Angela Merkel, Austrian Chancellor Wolfang Schussel and the EU President Herman Van Rompuy. 3 GAL (green/alternative/libertarian) and TAN (traditionalism/authority/nationalism) are alternative non-economic, cultural and identity-based categorizations of parties in Europe developed by Marks et al. (2006). According to their analysis, GAL parties tend to support European integration while TAN parties remain more conservative and eurosceptic.

CONTRIBUTORS

Co-Editors CHRIS RUMFORD is Professor of Political Sociology and Global Politics at Royal Holloway, University of London, where he is also the coDirector of the Centre for Global and Transnational Politics. His books include “The Globalization of Strangeness” (Palgrave, 2013), “Cosmopolitan Spaces: Europe, Globalization, Theory” (Routledge, 2005), “The Sage Handbook of European Studies” (ed.) (Sage, 2009), and “Rethinking Europe: Social Theory and the Implications of Europeanization” (with Gerard Delanty) (Routledge, 2005). DIDEM BUHARI-GULMEZ (PhD in Politics and International Relations, University of London) is an Early Career Research Fellow at Oxford Brookes University. She has published in International Political Sociology, New Global Studies, Journal of Contemporary European Studies and Southeast European and Black Sea Studies on European enlargement, World Society School, and Turkish politics. She is founding co-editor of ChangingTurkey.com.

Contributors (in alphabetical order) C. AKCA ATAC (PhD in Political History, Bilkent University) is Lecturer at Cankaya University. She teaches Diplomatic History, European Integration History and EU Social policy. Second Place Winner of the 5th International SabancÕ Research Awards 2010 on Multiculturalism and Europe. Her research interests include Theories, History and Rhetoric of Empire, Historical Cosmopolitanism, Normativism and Normative Theories in International Relations. Her articles appeared at Turkish Studies, Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs, and History of Political Thought, amongst others. S. ANNE G. BOSTANCI (PhD in Politics, University of Surrey) is External Relations expert at British Council in London and previously worked for the German think tank Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. She has published a number of policy papers on German and British politics,

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particularly in the field of migration, integration and diversity. Her academic interests span European studies, cultural studies and communication. Academic publications include “Making the Mythical European: Elucidating the EU's Powerful Integration Instrument of Discursive Identity Construction” in Perspectives on European Politics and Society volume 14, Issue 2, 2013. ALISTAIR BRISBOURNE is a PhD candidate in Politics and International Relations at Royal Holloway, University of London and Research assistant for the Global Studies Association (UK). His PhD research titled “Between a global Mediterranean and Europe’s ‘Neighbourhood’: transnationalism, organizations and civil society in the construction of Euro-Mediterranean space” looks at the role of civil society in constructing both a Euro-Mediterranean space and alternative representations through the development of transnational practices and identifications. SEBASTIAN M. BÜTTNER (PhD, Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sciences—BIGSSS) is Lecturer at the Institute of Sociology of the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg (FAU), Germany. He teaches Social Theory and Cultural Sociology. In his research he focuses on various aspects of Europeanization, where he is particularly interested in the role of expert knowledge and the emergence of particular professional culture. Since May 2012 Sebastian has also been a member of the research group “Horizontal Europeanization” funded by the German Science Foundation. His most recent publication in English was Mobilizing Regions, Mobilizing Europe: Expert Knowledge and Scientific Planning in European Regional Development (Routledge 2012). JOANNA CAGNEY is a PhD candidate in Geography at Royal Holloway, University of London. Her doctoral thesis explores different dimensions of the urban politics of living together in areas of diversity through a case study of Frankfurt am Main, Germany and focuses on themes of symbolic politics, hospitality and encounter. RAMNEEK GREWAL graduated with a doctorate in Politics and International Relations (University of Edinburgh, 2012). Her thesis focused on the mobilization of the Roma community in Macedonia and Serbia. Her research interests include: minority rights, social movements, citizenship and exclusion. She previously worked as a consultant in the Contact Point for Roma and Sinti Issues, Organization for Security and

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Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and is currently a policy adviser with the Aboriginal Education Office, Government of Ontario. SECKIN BARIS GULMEZ is a PhD candidate in Politics and International Relations at Royal Holloway, University of London. He previously worked as a political advisor in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (2003–2006) and was an FCO fellow at the European Research Institute, Birmingham University. His PhD dissertation, “Understanding the EU-Scepticism in Turkish Politics,” aims to develop a new framework for analyzing party attitudes toward EU accession in candidates, and Turkey in particular. His publications appeared in Turkish Studies and Acta Politica on EU enlargement, euroskepticism, EU candidate countries, Turkish political parties and Cyprus. He is the founding co-editor of the scholarly website ChangingTurkey.com. VALENTINA KOSTADINOVA (PhD in Politics and International Relations, University of Birmingham) completed her undergraduate degree in International Relations in Sofia, Bulgaria (2001) and attained her Master’s in European Studies at the University of Exeter (2003). She was an Honorary Research Associate at POLSIS, working on a successful ESRC-funded project, “Paradoxes and contradictions in EU democracy promotion efforts in the Middle East”. Her research interests include (re)construction of EU borders, the European Commission, EU’s external relations with the Middle Eastern countries (especially Saudi Arabia), EU promotion of regionalism (with a focus on the Arab Gulf). She has published in leading academic journals, like Journal of Common Market Studies and Geopolitics, edited volumes, as well as contributed to the output of a leading think-tank on the Middle East - the Gulf Research Centre. CRISTIAN NITOIU is a PhD candidate in Politics and International Relations at the University of Loughborough. He has published on the role of the EU as an international actor and on EU-Russia relations in articles and book reviews in various journals including the Journal of Contemporary European Studies, the Journal of Common Market Studies, the Journal of Contemporary European Research, Perspectives on European Politics and Society and Political Studies Review. NORA SIKLODI is a PhD candidate in Politics, History and International Relations at Royal Holloway, University of London, and member of the Hungarian Parliamentary Lobby. Her doctoral research explores the

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Contributors

experiences of young European migrants in their capacity as EU citizens in Sweden and the United Kingdom, and whether they fulfil the ideal of EU citizenship as present in the European Commission discourse.

INDEX A accession negotiations, 167, 170, 172, 174, 177-181, 206, 207, 216 Agenda Setting, 121, 122, 197 Anna Lindh Foundation, 8, 147, 148, 155, 156 B Balkan, 21, 192, 193, 194, 195 border, 3, 13, 31-37, 41, 121, 131133, 137, 149, 152, 155, 160, 178, 190

culture, 4, 8, 9, 10, 13, 21, 24, 33, 53, 55-57, 61, 71, 74, 78, 81, 94, 103, 104, 106, 122, 129, 133, 139, 149, 153, 154, 159-161, 171, 174, 180, 189190, 193-195, 205-206, 211, 216, 219 culture multiculturalism, 6, 7, 51, 58, 60, 64, 91, 93, 100, 106, 159 Cyprus Cypriot, 94, 101, 102 D

C citizenship, 6, 8, 14, 22, 23, 33, 44, 53-59, 62, 129-143, 153, 155, 161, 176, 190, 217 civil society, 8, 109, 116, 120, 147161, 191, 195, 196, 209, 232 communication, 17, 18, 20, 21, 24, 62, 92, 94-98, 102-117, 119-122, 141, 150, 152, 157, 159, 195 community, 5, 9, 17, 36, 54, 93, 96, 113, 118, 120, 143, 187, 188, 190-202, 213 conditionality, 80, 167, 169-172, 177, 180-181, 197, 199, 207, 107, 112, 113, 117, 118 conflict, 1, 13, 21, 118, 122, 137, 149, 167, 177, 188, 190, 194198, 206, 212 cosmopolitan, 4, 5, 23, 117 cultural

democracy, 5, 8, 23, 60, 100, 111115, 118-123, 152, 158, 213-215, 218 development, 2, 7, 8, 21, 24, 35, 36, 40, 45, 51, 53, 57, 64, 69-73, 7582, 93, 99, 104, 105, 112, 114, 116, 117, 119, 123, 130, 131, 137, 138, 141-143m 147-150, 152-159, 161, 175, 178, 192, 201, 208, 217 diffusion, 16, 72-75, 78-82, 209, 217 discourse, 5, 7, 13-15, 17, 19-23, 25, 26, 32, 34, 36-41, 43-45, 54, 56, 57, 61, 62, 64, 75, 78, 80, 103, 116-123, 150-155, 159, 170, 191-195, 200, 209, 213, 214 discrimination, 103, 171, 190, 194, 198, 199, 201

Index

236 diversity, 4, 7, 22, 27, 51-57, 61, 62, 64, 69, 70, 78, 82, 92, 93-97, 100-102, 111, 120, 152, 159

frame, 2, 3, 53, 62, 69,82, 97, 99, 117, 160, 197-199, 207 free movement, 6, 31, 32, 35, 37, 41, 43, 44, 99, 174

E elite, 1, 4, 113, 118, 123, 181, 198, 206, 213, 214 employment, 19, 36, 38-43, 98, 132, 194, 213 enlargement, 2, 39, 40, 43, 44, 91, 92, 96, 101, 106, 147, 167, 170, 171, 173, 177, 178, 180 ethnicity, 54, 92, 130, 134, 137, 142, 189, 190, 194 EU, 1, 2, 4, 5, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20, 26, 31, 42, 59, 69, 70, 79, 91, 94, 100, 104, 137, 138, 147, 169, 170, 173-180, 191, 209, 211, 213, 215-219 European imaginary, 14, 23, 26, 27, 187 European Union integration, 1, 3, 31, 33, 45, 46, 91, 93, 100, 103, 106, 111-115, 119-121, 128, 168-170, 209 Europeanization, 2, 5, 6, 9, 72, 73, 117, 123, 187, 201, 205, 207, 209-213, 215, 217, 219 Eurosceptic, Euroscepticism, 6, 8, 26, 167170, 177, 179, 181 exclusion, 53, 190, 194, 195

F foreigner, 174, 189, 190, 215

G global globalization, 4, 72, 73, 76, 94, 131, 154, 156, 159, 211 governance, 4, 58, 72, 73, 77, 78, 79, 119-121, 150-158, 217 Gypsy listing Roma, 187, 188, 190-202 H Habermas, 17, 112, 115, 116, 120, 121, 197, 212 heuristic, 9, 205, 206, 208 human rights, 5, 8, 55, 111, 112, 117, 154, 155, 161, 171, 176, 192, 194, 196, 198,200, 209, 212-215, 218 I identity, 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 23-28, 301 33, 37, 38, 39, 44, 45, 56, 62, 64, 70, 92, 97, 101, 102, 103, 111-114, 123, 129-143, 153, 154, 159, 162, 170, 172, 173, 175, 176, 180, 187-195, 197-199, 201, 205, 209, 212, 217 immigrant, 5, 57, 59, 62, 99., 103, 142 institution, 1, 2, 5, 8, 13, 14, 16, 19, 20-26, 34-36, 40-44, 59, 63, 7075, 77, 79, 80, 82, 91-96, 100, 102, 106, 112, 115-117, 119,

European Multiplicity 120-122, 129, 148-152, 155, 159-161, 173, 176, 180, 187, 189, 191, 192, 195-201, 206,208, 209, 212, 214, 218 internet, 80, 95, 117, 191, 192 Islam, 4, 207, 212, 213, 216 L labour, 6, 8, 33, 35-41, 43, 75, 94, 98, 129-132, 134-137, 139, 140, 142-143, 153 land, 174, 175, 180 language, 7, 19, 20, 52, 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, 61, 63, 91-106, 120, 129, 133, 136, 141, 142, 143, 156, 157, 159, 176, 189 learning, 16, 80, 91, 94, 95, 97, 99, 132 legitimacy, 7, 8, 26, 27, 60, 74, 106, 112, 113, 115, 116, 118-123, 133, 149, 151, 154, 155, 161, 191, 196, 218 local, 1, 52, 53, 54, 57, 58, 59, 61, 62, 64, 70, 72, 73, 74, 76, 78, 80, 82, 98, 133-136, 140, 141, 150, 152, 154, 159, 174, 175, 189, 197, 200, 201 M marketing, 6, 14, 15, 24, 25, 104 media, 8, 13, 19, 51, 55, 61, 63, 93, 97, 104, 113-123, 149, 150, 157, 193 Mediterranean, 8, 13, 147-149, 151153, 155-160 member states, 8, 14, 32, 33, 36-44, 58-59, 64, 79, 92-95, 97, 99, 102, 111, 113-115, 117, 118, 120, 122, 123, 131, 132, 135-143,

237

147, 150, 153, 156-159, 161, 168, 169, 171, 178, 180, 192, 201 minority, 9, 53, 55, 92, 132, 173, 176, 190, 192, 194-196, 200, 201, 212, 213, 216 mobility, 3, 36, 37, 41, 94, 98, 99, 105, 130, 132, 135, 150, 152, 157 modernization, 5, 81, 211, 213-215 N narrative, 13, 14, 16-18, 20-24, 27, 54, 63-64, 69, 111, 112, 120, 123, 194, 195, 202 nationalism, 5, 8, 9, 153, 188, 190, 194, 195, 202, 216 neoliberal, 22, 23, 150, 156, 193 normative, 5, 8, 16, 18, 70, 82, 99, 101, 116, 120, 148, 160, 152154, 156, 157, 160, 162, 171, 173, 205-213, 215, 216, 219 North Africa, 5, 147 P Parliament, 1, 95, 113, 114, 122, 131, 135, 140, 199, 209, 211, 214, 215 political party, 167, 174, 177, 179 postWestern, 23, 213 power, 7, 16, 18-21, 32-34, 44, 45, 72, 74, 113, 114, 118, 119, 121, 122, 151, 153, 155, 157, 160, 172, 177, 188, 191, 194, 201, 209 public relations, 6, 14, 17, 18, 19, 23-28 public sphere, 6-8, 17, 24, 55, 63, 111-123, 143, 152, 153

Index

238 R racism, 5, 104, 190, 198 rationalization, 75, 81, 208 reform, 79, 150, 157, 170, 172-174, 176, 179-181, 192, 193, 205, 207, 210, 215, 217, 218 region, 6, 8,13, 52, 57, 58, 61, 64, 69-82, 91, 94, 105, 121, 129-131, 134, 141, 147-153, 155-162, 196, 199 Roma, 189, 191, 195, 198 S social, 1, 4, 8, 14-20, 23, 27, 32, 33, 35, 38, 39, 52, 59, 60, 62, 70, 7282, 92-94, 98, 101, 103, 105, 111, 115, 116, 121, 123, 130, 133-135, 137, 138, 139, 141, 142, 147, 148, 150, 151, 153156, 161, 171, 172, 176, 177, 181, 187-191, 194, 195, 197, 199, 200, 205, 206, 210, 212, 213 social movement, 75, 151, 195, 197, 198, 201 society, 1, 2, 8, 13, 17, 21, 55, 56, 59, 72, 73, 74, 94, 103, 115, 116, 118, `120, 122, 135, 136, 141, 147-157, 193, 194, 198, 214, 215

sovereignty, 32, 119, 172, 173, 174 strategic, 71, 79, 80, 132, 149, 154, 157-162, 170, 175, 176, 179, 205-213, 214-216, 218 system, 32, 34, 37-40, 53, 59, 60, 74, 80, 97, 112-115, 119, 122, 123, 188, 206-209, 214 T Territorial, 33, 37, 41, 42, 50, 69, 70, 71, 73, 75, 209 transnational advocacy networks, 9, 187, 195-197, 199, 201 transparency, 7, 112, 113, 114, 119, 151 Turkey, 5, 8, 9, 91, 92, 100, 102106, 147, 151, 173, 178-181, 205-207, 209, 211-219 U United Nations, 5, 150, 151, 219 universal, 22, 51, 56, 59, 61, 70, 76, 111-113, 154, 194, 195, 215, 217, 218 W West, 1, 3, 4, 152, 176, 188, 190, 192-195, 201, 211-213 World Polity Theory, 7, 74, 75